On February 27, 1976, a routine summary of the Soviet press from the U.S. embassy in Moscow contained the following information item:

*Pravda* reports from Vienna that “well-known West German publicist” Emil Hoffmann has sent to [the] embassies of CSCE1 signatories in that city a letter on “the illegal activities of radio stations Free Europe and Freedom [sic, Liberty].” Hoffmann says that the “subversive activity” of these stations “contradicts a basic principle of international law which is obligatory for all states — non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.”

What *Pravda* failed to mention was that Emil Hoffmann was, in fact, a former member of the Nazis’ Sturmabteilung (SA) and one-time employee of Joseph Goebbels’s propaganda ministry. It also failed to report that Hoffmann had distributed the study on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) at the behest of the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS, Stasi) — specifically, its foreign intelligence division, Hauptverwaltung A (HV A). What the U.S. embassy did not know and failed to report was that Hoffmann’s action constituted, to some extent, an act of personal revenge against the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose “terror” Hoffmann blamed for his loss of lucrative business deals in East-West trade and — from his perspective — his forced retirement as a journalist. Having worked for decades in East-West trade — the “jungle of the secret services,” Hoffmann called it3 — the former Nazi propagandist decided to moonlight in his retirement for the HV A.

Hoffmann’s decision to work for the HV A by no means reflected an ideological affinity with East German communism. In the 1950s and 1960s, he had feared potential arrest and “disappearance” at the hands of the Stasi,4 and in his post-unification memoirs, which make no mention of his work for the HV A, he wrote derisively about the East German regime and its representatives (although much less so about Soviet officials).5 As the HV A explained, Hoffmann

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1 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
4 Emil Hoffmann, *Mandat für Deutschland: Staatsfeind aus Verantwortung* (Koblenz, 1992), 137.
was driven by a “strong anti-Americanism,” 6 which ran like a thread through his life from his ideological groundings in the SA and the Strasserite wing of the Nazi Party, through his postwar neutralism and confrontations with the CIA, and into his post-retirement career as a propagandist for the HV A against RFE/RL. Opposition to American policies and anti-American sentiment provided common ground not only for Hoffmann’s work on behalf of the HV A after his retirement but also for its potential appeal to the West German left, a major target of the HV A’s propaganda and a milieu from which it drew both knowing and unknowing collaborators. Not surprisingly, after the collapse of communism and the unification of Germany, Hoffmann found a new, old home in Germany’s “new right,” as reflected by the publication of his memoirs — a font of praise for Gregor Strasser and his ideas 7 and a philippic against the U.S. for its alleged oppression and alleged responsibility for the 41-year division of Germany 8 — by the right-wing Siegfried Bublies Verlag. 9

While Hoffmann’s career demonstrates the continuity of certain anti-American sentiments from the Nazi era into postwar and post-unification Germany, it also exemplifies how intelligence agencies, East and West, competed in their efforts to recruit former Nazi functionaries before and during the Cold War and how, when it came to recruiting foreign agents in general, their methods differed very little. It also shows how individuals with connections in East and West could fall into the “jungle of intelligence agencies,” in which the interest of one side could stoke the other’s, both in terms of countermeasures and potential recruitment. Hoffmann’s post-retirement career also serves as a case study of how Division X of the Stasi’s HV A (HV A/X), responsible for active measures, 10 went about its work.

“National Revolutionary” Propagandist between Intelligence Services (1939-1948)

After working for several newspapers as a law student, Hoffmann began his career as an official “publicist” in 1939, when he joined Joseph Goebbels’s propaganda ministry as an adviser on “nationality questions in the Southeast.” 11 During his time there, he published a Blut und Boden propaganda tract about the resettlement of ethnic Germans to Poznania and coauthored a second book on the return of Bessarabian Germans to their homeland for the Nibelungen Press,
a front organization for Goebbels’s ministry. The first publication, a picture book in an initial run of 117,000 copies, praised the Führer’s reclamation of Poznania from the “robber state (Raubstaat) Poland,” the “elimination” of the “filth of the Poles” from the region, and the return of German “order and cleanliness.” Hoffmann’s publications for the Nibelungen Press arguably represented his first engagement in “active measures” — at this point, for Goebbels’s ministry.

In 1941, Hoffmann transferred to the German Foreign Office, and from 1941 to 1942, he worked as an adviser on propaganda matters to the German legation in Bucharest and as an official adviser to Romania’s Deputy Prime Minister Mihai Antonescu. By 1942, if not before, Hoffmann had come to have doubts about the war, and a friend, Carl Marcus, had put him into contact with Kurt Jahnke, a former German intelligence official who sought a negotiated peace with the Allies. Jahnke was affiliated with Walter Schellenberg’s Amt VI for foreign intelligence of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), which subsequently sought to recruit Hoffmann. This confronted Hoffmann with a dilemma; joining the SD would mean joining the SS. For Hoffmann, a former Truppenführer in the Sturmabteilung (SA) and member of the the “Schwarze Front,” the national-revolutionary wing of the Nazi Party, joining the SS would have meant betrayal of his Strasserite comrades and ideas. In the end, Hoffmann decided against the SD. Nevertheless, Hoffmann undertook at least two missions in the Balkans on behalf of Jahnke after 1942. Ironically, Hoffmann still ended up in the SS; to avoid compulsory transfer to a SS combat unit, he joined a SS war-reporting unit.

Upon his capture by U.S. forces in Austria in 1945, Hoffmann claimed a longer association with Jahnke — since 1936 — to burnish his credentials as a dissident within the Nazi regime. On November 17, 1945, he was released by the Americans. The Army’s Strategic Services Unit, the successor intelligence agency to the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and predecessor to the CIA, apparently had second thoughts; it sought to organize Hoffmann’s recapture, but to no avail. He had made his way to Rheydt in the British zone of occupation in Germany, where he moved in with his old friend Marcus, whom the British had appointed the town’s mayor.

From this point until the end of 1948, Hoffmann’s biography becomes rather murky. He apparently joined a Strasserite, national-revolutionary organization, the “German Revolution,” which sought to reestablish German autonomy along “German socialist” lines within a pan-European framework in collaboration with the Western powers.
and especially with Great Britain. The U.S. suspected that if the network did not find support from the Western powers, it would turn to the Soviet Union. Based on conflicting accounts, Hoffmann worked either knowingly or unknowingly as an agent for MI6 through Marcus and may have sought to help the British to capture or, alternatively, to recruit Klaus Barbie, the infamous Gestapo chief in Lyon. Hoffmann has claimed in his memoirs that he fled Rheydt upon learning of Marcus’s recruitment by MI6. He sought to avoid arrest — implicitly, for harboring former Nazi officials and Waffen-SS officers sought by the Anglo-Americans. The latter subsequently arrested Hoffmann, along with other SS and Nazi officials from the “German Revolution” underground, in “Operation Selection Board.” According to a Stasi report, the British had justified Hoffmann’s arrest by citing his “alleged contact to subversive Nazi and Russian espionage circles.” The Stasi, relatively certain that Hoffmann had worked for the British, received information from their Soviet “friends” that Hoffmann had also worked for Moscow as a secret informant (Geheimer Informator, GI) at the end of the war. Both the British and the Soviets allegedly broke off contact with Hoffmann due to his real or perceived relationship with the other side.

After his release by the British, Hoffmann had little or no problem with denazification in 1948. His work for Jahnke, membership in the Schwarze Front, and conflicts within the former party and state bureaucracy spoke in his favor. Hoffmann also claimed to have assisted individuals threatened by the Nazi regime, including “a Romanian Jew, a half-Jewish ethnic German [Volksdeutscher] from Czechoslovakia, [and] a freemason friend.”

**Between the CIA and the Stasi: The “Jungle of the Intelligence Agencies” (1949-1956)**

Hoffmann sparked renewed interest on the part of intelligence services, East and West, as he began a new career in East-West trade as...
a broker and journalist in 1949. From this point forward, Hoffmann posed a problem for intelligence services on both sides: Should they try to recruit him, arrest him, or simply keep him under “operational control”?: They all agreed on the need to spy on him. The more attractive he became to one side as a potential target or agent, the more interesting he became to the other side. While Hoffmann, for his part, sought to avoid entrapment by the various intelligence agencies, he also sought to play upon their thirst for information for economic and journalistic benefits. If Hoffmann fell into the “jungle of intelligence agencies,” as he later wrote, it was a jungle with which he was quite familiar. Between 1949 and 1956, Hoffmann’s greatest fears in his erstwhile “jungle” were the CIA, which actively spied upon him, and the Stasi, which — he feared — might arrest him.

In 1949, Hoffmann’s entry into the field of East-West trade as a representative for the West German firm, Atlas Trading, along with his decision to join the neutralist Nauheimer Kreis of Professor Ulrich Noack, raised the interest of both Soviet intelligence and the CIA. In September 1949, Hoffmann accompanied Noack to the Leipzig trade fair, where they met with the Soviet High Commissar for Germany, Vladimir Semenov, to discuss not only interzonal trade but also the neutralization and unification of Germany.24 The suspicions of the U.S. authorities about the “German Revolution” network, it seemed, were thus fulfilled,25 at least in the case of Hoffmann.

Between 1949 and 1951, Soviet intelligence continually sought — unsuccessfully — to recruit Hoffmann,26 and the CIA, suspecting him of already working for the Soviets, began to spy on him. The CIA’s initial concern focused on Hoffmann’s work for Atlas, an alleged “source of funds for communist activity in West Germany.”27 The CIA, as well as the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG), suspected Hoffmann of engaging in triangular trade via Scandinavia or Austria in violation of the West’s embargo on strategic commodities to the Soviet bloc.28 With regard to Hoffmann’s political activities, HICOG reported: “As might be expected of an adherent of the Nauheimer Kreis, Hoffmann displays a marked animosity to the U.S.A.”29 The CIA subsequently provided its own assessment: Hoffmann “makes no secret of his intense German nationalism; he belongs in the extreme right-wing lunatic fringe of politics.”30 In January 1951, the CIA ordered U.S. Army telephone taps and mail intercepts on Hoffmann.31 Hoffmann, aware of both measures, complained to West German authorities and to the post office. He knew it was the Americans at

24 Ibid., 92–100, 120–21.
27 Memorandum, Chief of Base, Berlin, to Chief, Eastern Europe (EE), 20 December 1957, NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 1 of 2.
28 Agent Report: Trade in War Material, 18 January 1951, NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 1 of 2.
29 Charles W. Thayer, Chief, Reports Division, Office of Political Affairs, US HICOG, Bonn, to Department of State, 17 April 1952, with attachment, “Case Study: EMIL FRIDOLIN HOFFMANN, Interzonal Trader,” NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 1 of 2, pp. 1, 4.
30 Memorandum, Chief of Base, Berlin, to Chief, EE, 20 December 1957, p. 2.
31 Acting Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, to Chief, BOB, 22 January 1951, NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 1 of 2.
work; his wife once picked up the receiver and heard American voices discussing the telephone tap.32

A turning point in Hoffmann’s unwanted relationship with the CIA came in 1953. He blamed “CIA terror” for ruining his business deals with the East through West Berlin, and he abruptly moved from Berlin to West Germany.33 The CIA was unsettled by Hoffmann’s decision to leave Berlin. Its Chief of Base there later reported that Hoffmann felt that U.S. officials had forced him to leave out of jealousy of his trade position and for personal, ulterior motives. This “erroneous belief” had induced “Hoffmann’s anti-Americanism.”34 In fact, Hoffmann based his decision to leave Berlin on the phone taps, mail intercepts, and — most importantly — the revocation of his interzonal passport, which had made his travel for business to West Germany impossible. Hoffmann suspected that the Americans would use the information from the telephone taps and mail intercepts to ruin his business.35 He blamed the Americans for the fact that one of his trade deals through Sweden had netted only 7 million West German Marks (DM) rather than the ca. 180 million that he had anticipated.36 Although HICOG was indeed responsible for the revocation of Hoffmann’s interzonal passport, the CIA wanted to keep Hoffmann in Berlin. The CIA’s Chief of Base in Bonn, startled that Hoffmann suddenly popped up on his grid in 1953, recommended CIA intervention with the West German Ministry of the Interior to compel Hoffmann’s return to Berlin, “where he may be more closely watched and, possibly, neutralized.”37

However, things did not work out as the CIA intended. As Hoffmann himself had predicted and planned, the West German authorities were less willing than the authorities in West Berlin, where the occupying powers had greater influence, to maintain pressure on him. In 1953, the BfV informed the CIA that its investigations of Hoffmann had “not resulted in any concrete indication” that he was “engaged in espionage activity.” Unless “American offices” could provide additional material suggesting the contrary, the BfV planned not only to discontinue its investigations of Hoffmann but also to “notify the LfV [Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, State Office for Constitutional Protection] in Berlin that objections to the furnishing of travel passes to Dr. HOFFMANN no longer exist.”38 Over the CIA’s objections, Hoffmann subsequently received a West German passport.39 Then, at the end of 1956, the CIA had to discontinue its telephone taps and

32 Hoffmann, Mandat, 101.
33 Ibid., 131–32.
34 Memorandum, Chief of Base, Berlin, to Chief, EE, 20 December 1957, p. 2.
35 Hoffmann, Mandat, 131–32.
36 Translation, Memorandum for Mr. Hughes, 14 July 1953, attachment to cable, Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, to Chief of Base, Bonn, 26 August 1953, NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 1 of 2. The translation was of a memorandum from the BfV.
37 Chief of Base, Bonn, to Chief, BOB, 20 April 1953, NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 1 of 2.
38 Chief of Mission, Frankfurt, to Chief of Base, Bonn, 26 August 1953, NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 1 of 2.
39 Memorandum, Gerken, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), o.D., attached to memorandum, Chief of Base (COB) Berlin to COB Bonn, 10 March 1958, in NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 2 of 2.
mail intercepts of Hoffmann through the U.S. Army in Germany (CIA codename: “CALLIKAK”) because of complaints from Hoffmann’s “influential friends in the West German government.”

These earlier interventions notwithstanding, the West German authorities initiated their own investigation of Hoffmann for “treasonable relations” in 1959 and briefly arrested him in 1962 — if only in order to interrogate him. Ironically, by this point, the CIA had considered the possibility of recruiting Hoffmann (see below) and seemed to have lost interest in his trading activities. Hoffmann was also a cause for CIA introspection. The CIA worried that it — or more likely, the U.S. Army’s Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) in cooperation with the LfV — had gone too far in their efforts against Hoffmann in the early 1950s. The CIC/LfV investigation, Hoffmann’s CIA case officer reported in 1957, had most likely involved “the usual telephone and mail censorship, surveillance, possibly even hostile interrogation.” The CIC, he wrote, “mugs and fingerprints most suspects and generally treats its clients in a dragnet fashion.” Hoffmann, he wrote, probably “underwent some such handling and as an upper class European reacted violently.” Despite the CIA’s erstwhile regrets, it still received a copy of Hoffmann’s interrogation from the Federal Criminal Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA).

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The CIA was not the only agency to receive a report regarding Hoffmann’s arrest; the Stasi obtained similar information from its own purloined cables from the BKA. For Hoffmann, the Stasi was as much a cause for concern as the CIA; indeed, he feared that the CIA might even feed the Stasi with information that could lead to his arrest and “disappearance” in the East. His main cause of concern was his contact to Helmut-Sonja Casemir, an old fraternity brother in East Berlin. Hoffmann had been astonished to learn in 1950 that Casemir had joined the East German state police (Volkspolizei). He asked Casemir upon their reunion in 1950 how he, “as a nationally-minded German and fraternity brother,” could accept a rank in such an organization. To Hoffmann’s chagrin, Casemir replied that he was secretly working for the CIA “as a staunch supporter of the USA,” because he believed that only the U.S. would bring about German reunification — i.e., the opposite of Hoffmann’s stance. Around the same time, Hoffmann had also

41 Federal Criminal Office, Security Group, 6 November 1959 (translation), attachment to Chief of Base Bonn, to BEDOX/DISTAG/HHAV/[sanitized]/CALL, 4 December 1959; and dispatch, Chief of Base, Bonn, to Chief, EE, and Chief of Station Germany, 22 April 1963, with attachment, BKA, “Verantwortliche Vernehmung, 15.11.1962,” both in NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 2 of 2.
42 Memorandum, Chief of Base, Berlin, to Chief, EE, 20 December 1957, p. 3.
43 BKA, “Verantwortliche Vernehmung, 15.11.1962” (see n45).
44 Telegramm, BKA, Sicherungsgruppe (SG) Bad Godesberg to General-bundesanwalt Karlsruhe, 23 October 1962, BStU, MIS, AP 8993/42, Bd. 17, pp. 32–33.
established contact with a West Berlin communist, Alfred Nehm, and the three began to meet socially.45 Nehm, who — as the U.S. suspected — was working for the MfS in “intelligence collection,”46 tipped Hoffmann off in the same year that the East Germans were planning to arrest Casemir. According to Hoffmann, he helped Casemir to escape across the border to West Berlin.47 Casemir eventually became the chief of security for the Untersuchungsausschuss freieheitlicher Juristen (Independent Jurists’ Investigative Committee, UfJ), an organization to which the CIA was providing covert funding and advice.48 Despite Hoffmann’s fears, the MfS apparently did not know about his earlier contact with Casemir; they first noted such a connection — in fact, a connection between Hoffmann and the UfJ — in 1954.49

The CIA sought to use Casemir — CIA codename CARBOHYDRATE — to spy on Hoffmann, but in 1957, it noted with some concern: “There is a hint in CALLIKAK reports that Hoffmann is aware of CARBOHYDRATE’s connection to an American agency. We intend to debrief CARBOHYDRATE on this score for obvious security reasons and to follow up with a detailed summary of his relationship to Hoffmann.”50 In 1959, if not before, the GDR outed “HELMUT CASEMIR alias DOHRMANN,” then head of the UfJ’s security office, for his connections to U.S. intelligence.51 The incident from 1950 suggested, however, that for Hoffmann, Nehm, and Casemir, personal friendships were more important than erstwhile political alignments or intelligence-service loyalties.

Recruiting Dr. Hoffmann? The CIA and Stasi, 1956–1964

Around the same time, 1956–1957, both the Stasi and the CIA began to reconsider Hoffmann. Perhaps it would be better to recruit him than to continue intensive surveillance against him? Both agencies agreed that Hoffmann, given his contacts in East-West trade, could provide valuable political, economic, and personal information about the other side. In 1956, Main Division III (HA III) of the Stasi, responsible for economic questions, including trade with the West, first broached the possibility of recruiting Hoffmann; he could provide valuable information, they thought, not only about East-West trade but also about the BfV and the UfJ.52 The Berlin Operations Base of the CIA hoped to win general economic, political, and “personality” information from Hoffmann about the East.53 The CIA subsequently learned from the BfV that Hoffmann had already declared his willingness...
to work for an unnamed Western intelligence service in 1954 and to report on “East-West trade in its larger context”; his "ongoing contacts to important Russian functionaries and offices,” including Semenov; and his “contacts to high-level economic functionaries” in East Germany.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, the agency wondered whether he could provide similar information to the U.S.

Both HA III and the CIA agreed that special care would be necessary in any potential recruitment of Hoffmann. HA III wrote that low-level contacts would not suffice for a recruiting pitch; Hoffmann should first be approached by the “press chief of the Central Committee” and other “authoritative functionaries in politics and economics.” Just as importantly, "Fridolin" (Hoffmann’s fraternity name) "will never agree to a written commitment, since he would necessarily see it as a violation of his principles, if not necessarily his person ....\textsuperscript{55} Hoffmann’s CIA case officer agreed that Hoffmann could be won over only through informal contacts that appealed to his ego. “[A]fter additional vetting by CARBOHYDRATE,” he wrote, “it may be possible to induce Hoffmann to meet with an American posing as an economic researcher surveying east/west problems.” The case officer continued:

If this cooperation with the American, possibly using an ODACID [Department of State] office for meetings, showed signs of developing over a period of months into a personal friendship, it might be possible gradually to elicit from Hoffmann some of the economic, political and personality information that we want. Played carefully and by throwing an occasional benefice his way — offering for example, to look into his record with US security, which he is bound to mention anyway — Hoffmann might be wooed a little at least over to our side.\textsuperscript{56}

Hoffmann’s CIA case officer suggested that financial inducements would be important; Hoffmann should be paid for his assistance to the “American researcher.” At any rate the CIA knew that Hoffmann could not be recruited in the “usual” way, especially given his past experiences with U.S. agencies. His CIA case officer wrote:

The more or less negative forms of recruitment — for example, picking him up on a security charge and then

\textsuperscript{54} Memo, Gerken, BfV, o.D.
\textsuperscript{55} HA III/4/k, Bericht, 11 February 1956, in BStU, MIS, HA XVII/2940, pp. 57–60, here, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{56} Memorandum, Chief of Base, Berlin, to Chief, EE, 20 December 1957, p. 11.
offering to let him off the hook if he works for us — we have rejected out of hand. He has too many influential friends in the West German press and Government to whom he would complain, as he did when he suspected CALLIKAK surveillance. Moreover, let’s face it, these recruitments are rarely successful.57

An attempt to recruit Hoffmann was finally made in 1961, not by the CIA or Stasi, but by the GDR’s foreign military intelligence service, the 12th Administration of the Ministry for National Defense. The erstwhile recruiter apparently did not follow the refined methods recommended by HA III and the CIA’s Berlin base. After Hoffmann offered to provide an officer from the 12th Administration general information about the FRG’s trade and economic policy, he failed to show up for a second meeting. The 12th Administration reported to the Stasi’s counterintelligence division, Main Division II (HA II), that Hoffmann’s “grounds for keeping away are questionable.”58

By this time, the CIA and the Stasi had decided that there were a number of good reasons not to recruit Hoffmann. The CIA worried about Hoffmann’s potential reaction, including negative publicity for the agency. The CIA’s Berlin base wrote in 1958:

We have decided to postpone indefinitely our plans for approaching Subject [Hoffmann] under any guise in view of the possibility that he would cry to his friends in the Bundestag. This is a legitimate risk in dealing with Subject and cannot be overlooked. The flap potential is too great to warrant further consideration of an operation at this time...59

The Stasi, for its part, worried about Hoffmann’s true loyalties. HA II implicitly discouraged efforts to recruit him, given the experiences of the Soviet “friends” in 1949-1951, East German military intelligence’s failed recruitment in 1961, and the HV A’s assessment of his informational activities.60

The latter point was perhaps decisive. The HV A, just like HA III, had been tapping Hoffman — officially unbeknownst to him — for

57 Ibid.
59 Dispatch, Chief of Base, Berlin, to Chief, EE, 14 July 1958.
60 Proft, Auskunftsbericht, pp. 14-16.
information through its unofficial collaborators (*Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, IM). The HV A reported with regard to Hoffmann:

> His information consists mainly of vague reports about certain developments and events about which we already partly know from the West German press; conclusions and predictions that later are almost never confirmed; and several proven cases of disinformation. Only in exceptional cases has the information that he has provided proved to be correct.

Characteristic for all of Hoffmann’s information is the tendency to report mainly on such issues in which the security organs of the GDR are naturally interested (activity of the Lemmer Ministry, the work on the GDR by the Bonn Foreign Office, warnings about alleged American agents etc.). Hoffmann never forgets in such cases to declare himself a citizen consistently friendly to the GDR.

In other words, although Hoffmann played upon the desires of intelligence agencies, East and West, for secret information, he was offering mainly public information, private information that was not necessarily secret, and some details about erstwhile agents or unfriendly elements from the other side of the Cold War — primarily, individuals with whom Hoffmann had had run-ins of his own. Much of the information that Hoffmann collected and offered to the various intelligence agencies was most likely public and intended for publication in his own articles and books. By flirting with the intelligence agencies, Hoffmann apparently sought to obtain funding and other privileges — for example, publication in East-bloc journals with corresponding honoraria or inside economic information that he could use in his publications or for his on-again, off-again work as a trade consultant. In general, Hoffman sought to exploit the intelligence agencies, East and West, as much as they sought to exploit him. He thus sought to avoid formal commitments; an agreement with one side could lead to lost opportunities for information and trade with the other. In his memoirs, Hoffmann justified his rejection of the GDR’s attempted recruitment — he assumed it had been

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61 Ernst Lemmer was West German Minister for All-German Affairs from 1957 to 1962.
62 Proft, Auskunftsbericht, p. 15.
63 Ibid., pp. 12, 14; Memo, Gerken, BfV, o.d.
the Stasi — on the grounds that the GDR would attempt to censor his publications, the center of his standing and his career, and he would thus lose the “freedom of maneuver” that he enjoyed in the West despite the CIA.64

The interest of the Stasi and the CIA in Hoffmann continued to wane in the second half of the 1960s. Even the Stasi’s HA II, which had been collecting material on Hoffmann since 1961 for potential espionage charges, decided that he was no longer worth the effort. He was no better or no worse than the other Western journalists who visited the GDR to collect information. Indeed, the effort necessary to convict him would “surpass” HA II’s “current capabilities.”65 The CIA’s declassified files on Hoffmann suggest that their concerns about Hoffmann waned after 1964, although they continued to keep an eye on his activities in East-West trade and especially his contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).66

Likely contributing to the declining interest in Hoffmann was his decision in 1964 to move to Vienna and to curtail his visits to East Germany. Whereas CIA “terror” had been the main problem for Hoffmann in the 1950s, he now perceived Stasi “terror” at work against him in his journalistic and trading activities in the form of delays on the borders to West Berlin, lack of access to East German officials and journalists, and the sudden cancellation of contracts that he had brokered for West German firms in inner-German trade.67 He failed in an attempt to establish his own journal on East-West trade. Hoffmann’s East German contacts had refused to finance it,68 and, according to Hoffmann, he was stymied by the intervention of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) and its alleged U.S. backers, including the CIA. Instead, Hoffmann maintained his post as director of the Bavarian-based *Welthandels-Informationen: Zeitschrift für freien Welthandel* from 1963 until his retirement in 1976.69

**Active Measure “Spider”: Life after Retirement**

Given the thought that various intelligence agencies had put into Hoffmann’s recruitment in the 1950s and 1960s, it would be interesting to learn the details of how he came to work for HV A/X in 1976 and how the HV A subsequently coordinated his work. Unfortunately, the almost complete destruction70 or removal of the archives of the

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64 Hoffmann, Mandat, 181–82.
67 Proft, Auskunftsbericht, pp. 182-83.
68 Proft, Auskunftsbericht, p. 15.
70 In February 1990, the Working Group for Security of the Central Round Table, consisting of members of the East German opposition as well as former East German officials, agreed that the HV A could dissolve itself, and in contrast to the efforts of the opposition with regard to the other Stasi divisions, the HV A was permitted to destroy its own archives. Hubertus Knabe, *West-Arbeit des MfS: Das Zusammenspiel von “Aufklärung” und “Abwehr (“Berlin, 1999), 133.
former HV A\textsuperscript{71} has made a detailed reconstruction impossible. Still, there are some telling traces in his memoirs, the former card catalog of the HV A (“Rosenholz”),\textsuperscript{72} the remnants of the HV A’s former databank for incoming and outgoing information (SIRA),\textsuperscript{73} other former MfS card catalogs, and records at the Security Services Archive (Archiv bezpečnostních složek, ABS) in Prague on cooperation between HV A/X and the active measures division of Czechoslovak foreign intelligence, Department 36 of Main Division I of the ČSSR’s Ministry of the Interior.\textsuperscript{74}

In terms of Hoffmann’s motivation to work for the Stasi in his retirement, the officers of HV A/X later asserted in talks with their colleagues in Prague that the driving force behind Hoffmann’s activities was his “strong anti-Americanism.”\textsuperscript{75} As suggested above and based on Hoffmann’s memoirs, his disdain for the U.S. resulted not only from his run-ins with the CIA but also his rejection of U.S. policy, which he blamed for Germany’s division and arguably, at least in part, for the scuttling of his youthful, “national revolutionary” dreams. He also blamed the CSU and indirectly, its alleged U.S. supporters for his forced retirement in 1976; someone close to the CSU had allegedly bought the publisher of Welthandels-Informationen, closed the publication, and dismissed Hoffmann.\textsuperscript{76}

Another motivation was money. Both the CIA and the MfS had assumed that the best way to obtain information from Hoffmann in an ongoing fashion would be to pay him for information reports or articles. For HV A/X’s active measure “Spider,” Hoffmann prepared articles and a book attacking RFE/RL for HV A/X. For the publications, he ostensibly collected not only honoraria from the journals and presses that published his work but also payments from HV A/X. In November 1979, HV A/X requested assistance from the ČSSR’s Department 36 in laundering one payment in the amount of 24,000 DM to Hoffmann through the International Organization for Journalists (IOJ), a communist front organization with headquarters in Prague.\textsuperscript{77} Hoffmann remained, even in retirement, a paid publicist.

\textsuperscript{71} Polish scholars have recently asserted — based on documents at the Polish Institute for National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN) — that files from the HV A archives were transported via rail “containers” to the Soviet Union in 1990. The documentation appears accurate, but the “containers” likely refer — in Stasi jargon — to the relatively small “containers” used to smuggle photographs and copies of covertly-obtained documents. Of course, if the “containers” in question contained microfilm, then the quantity of documents would be larger, although likely not as large as the content of an untold number of railway “containers.” See, for example, Sławomir Cenckiewicz, “W kontenerach do Moskwy...” in idem, Ślady Bezpieczeństwa i Partii Studia — Źródła — Publicystyka (Koźmianki, 2009), 589–600.


\textsuperscript{73} On the System der Informations-Recherche der HV A (SIRA), see Stephan Kopolatsky, “Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der SIRA-Datenbanken,” in Das Gesicht dem Westen zu..., DDR-Spionage gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2nd corrected ed., ed. Georg Herbstrit and Helmut Müller-Enbergs (Bremen, 2003), 112–32.

\textsuperscript{74} For an overview of the Soviet bloc’s joint operations in the realm of active measures during the 1980s, see Martin Slávik, “Spolupráce rozvědky StB a KGB v oblasti aktivních opatření,” in Aktivity NKVD/KGB a její spolupráce s tajnými službami střední a východní Evropy 1945–1989. II. (Prague, 2009), 175–84.

\textsuperscript{75} “Centers of ideological diversion — RFE/RL,” p. 81 (see note 6).

\textsuperscript{76} Hoffmann, Mandat, 225–26.

As the Stasi had predicted in 1956 — and as witnessed by the experiences of East German military intelligence — Hoffmann apparently sought to avoid any written or binding commitment to the HV A. Although Hoffmann began to prepare and place materials for HV A/X under the codename “Fridolin” in 1976, he was first officially registered by the HV A as an influence agent (IMA)\(^\text{78}\) in its card catalog under that cryptonym on September 28, 1981. The registering officer was Rudolf Mnich of HV A/XVI,\(^\text{79}\) responsible for the HV A’s various “legal covers,” including the East Berlin Institute for International Politics and Economics (Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, IPW). The IPW served not only as a contact point for journalists, East and West, but also as a cover for HV A officers to meet unofficial collaborators (IMs) and Western contacts that they sought to influence.\(^\text{80}\)

It is likely that Herbert Bertsch — Division Director at IPW, Director of its Working Group for the GDR Council of Ministers, and an Officer with Special Tasks (Offizier im besonderen Einsatz, OibE) for the HV A\(^\text{81}\) — played a major role in Hoffmann’s work. In a section of his memoirs devoted to Bertsch, Hoffmann writes that they had been personal friends since their first meeting in East Berlin in 1955.\(^\text{82}\) Bertsch, codename “Korff,” had the same control officer as Hoffmann — i.e., Mnich.\(^\text{83}\) Although Mnich may have met with Hoffmann, it is possible that most or all of Hoffmann’s contact with the HV A ran through Bertsch. When Hoffmann presented a paper at a conference in Tampere, Finland, in 1977 on the alleged illegality of RFE/RL in international law, Bertsch chaired the panel.\(^\text{84}\) Shortly after Hoffmann visited Bertsch in East Berlin in 1985, IM “Fridolin” sent his first and only incoming report logged in the HV A’s database: a report on the opinions of an “Albanian diplomat in Austria regarding the ‘Kosovo problem’ and the work of the embassy.”\(^\text{85}\)

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\(^{78}\) “IMA” stands for “unoffizieller Mitarbeiter mit besonderen Aufgaben” or “unofficial collaborator with special tasks.” This referred in Stasi jargon to an IM assigned with special, offensive tasks for the HV A in the West — mainly active measures, including the placement of articles in the West German mass media. See the entry on IMAs by Helmut Müller Enbergs in Roger Engelmann et al., Das MfS-Lexikon: Begriffe, Personen und Strukturen der Staatssicherheit der DDR (Berlin, 2011), 161.

\(^{79}\) BStU, Rosenholz (RoHo), F16 and F22, Reg. Nr. XV/5877/81; BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8225612. In previous conversations with Department 36, the leaders of HV A/X had referred to its “collaborator Fridolin”; at meetings in October and November 1981, HV A/X referred to its “unofficial collaborator” Fridolin. See “Operation INFECTION,” attachment to memorandum, Col. Václav Stárek, Director, Department 36, to Director, I. Directorate, National Security Corps (Sbor národní bezpečnosti, SNB), Major General Karel Sochor, 19 October 1981, in ABS, A.č. 81282/111, p. 120, and “Operation INFECTION,” in ABS, A.č. 81282/111, p. 22.

\(^{80}\) Günter Bohnsack, Die Legende stirbt (Berlin, 1997), 111-12.


\(^{82}\) Hoffmann, Mandat, 200-202. On Hoffmann’s visit to Bertsch in 1985, see BStU, AR 2, Karteikarte HA XIX/Abt. 1-VSH, Dr. jur. Emil Hoffmann.

\(^{83}\) RoHo F16, Reg. Nr. MIS/3665/60; RoHo F22, MIS/3665/60, PNA “Korff”: BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8261620. The three cited sources suggest that Bertsch had been an employee of the HV A since February 13, 1957. The finance card for Bertsch in the Stasi’s former catalog states that he had entered the MfS in 1970, but the MfS calculated his “loyalty payments (Treuegeld)” based on an entry month of May 1955. BStU, AR 2, Abt. Fin./Abt. 6-GKK-HIM/OibE, Reg. Nr. 3665/60/1.

\(^{84}\) See Bertsch’s introduction to the panel in Wissenschaft und Frieden 1/78: 33-40. At the time, Bertsch had worked as an OibE for HV A/X. BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/6, SIRA-TDB 21, ZV8261620.

\(^{85}\) BStU, MfS, HV A/MD/3, SIRA-TDB 12, SE8503084.
When Hoffmann began his work for HV A/X in 1976, the Soviet bloc had launched a new offensive against the Munich-based RFE/RL. Having failed to achieve its closure in its bilateral negotiations with Bonn in the era of Willy Brandt’s new Ostpolitik and then at the negotiations of the CSCE in Geneva, the Soviet bloc now proclaimed that the activities of RFE/RL violated the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE and international law in general. Both broadcasters, alleged relics of the Cold War, needed to be closed. Boris Ponomarev, the CPSU’s International Secretary, launched the new offensive in January 1976 at a meeting of the Soviet bloc’s International and Ideological Secretaries. At the meeting, Ponomarev reconfi rmed the Soviet bloc’s line of “completing” the “political détente” embodied in the Helsinki Final Act with “military détente” — i.e., arms control and disarmament, especially in the West — in order to make détente “ir-reversible.” To this end, he called for more assertive countermeasures in the East’s propaganda against the growing Western accusations of Eastern violations of the human-rights (Principle VII) and human-contacts (Basket III) provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Ponomarev singled out RFE/RL as a target: “Whereas we could limit ourselves before — in military terms — to propagandistic ‘covering fi re,’ now a well-directed target shooting is necessary. Among the most important targets in this regard are the broadcasting stations ‘Liberty’ and ‘Free Europe.’ These malicious CIA tools are poisoning the atmosphere in Europe and are executing the vilest work against socialism. And it is necessary to do everything possible to achieve their closure…. “

In the new offensive against RFE/RL, the divisions for active measures of the Soviet bloc’s intelligence services were assigned a key role. Within three weeks of Ponomarev’s address, representatives of the bloc’s intelligence services gathered for a “working meeting” in Prague. Colonel-General Oleg Kalugin, head of the counterintelligence (KR) line of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, opened the meeting. He and his Prague hosts announced that the goal of the new offensive, Operation “Infection,” was to “remove” RFE/RL from Europe and to “fi nally liquidate” it.

Apparently, HV A/X had already engaged in preparatory work for the new campaign. In 1975, the West German Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag had published in its journal, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (BdIP), an article attacking Bonn’s lack of “courage” in permitting RFE/RL to continue its operations in alleged violation of the CSCE Final Act. Although the article and its author might not
have had any direct connection to the HV A, HV A/X covertly subsidized Pahl-Rugenstein, and the editorial policy of its publications, including BdiP, tended to reflect and echo the foreign-policy line and interests of the Soviet bloc. BdiP followed up with a second article in 1976 by the same author. The article began: “The ink was not yet dry under the CSCE document before the President of the U.S. Bureau for International Broadcasting, David Manker Abshire, proclaimed that ‘Radio Free Europe’ and ‘Radio Liberty’ would expand their antisocialist program.”

However, the central contribution of HV A/X to the new campaign, discussed at the multilateral meeting in February 1976, was active measure “Spider” (Spinne) in Austria, which would “bring home to the states that participated in the CSCE in Helsinki and world public opinion in general the legal grounds for [declaring] the ongoing existence of Radio ‘Liberty’ and ‘Free Europe’ to be illegal.” While the record of the multilateral meeting of the Soviet bloc’s intelligence services provided no details about “Spider,” the record of a subsequent meeting between HV A/X and the ČSSR’s Department 36 presented more details. The comments of the Deputy Director of HV A/X, Lieutenant-Colonel Hans Knaust, made clear that Hoffmann stood at the center of “Spider” and HV A/X’s planned efforts against RFE/RL:

Comrade Knaust acquainted us with the content of their active measure [Aktion] “Spider,” directed against RFE/RL. The study regarding the international-law aspects of RFE/RL’s existence has been distributed at the UN and distributed at UNESCO, the World Peace Council, and 34 embassies in Vienna, and they are trying to publish it at a press in the FRG in a somewhat different form. The best hope for its publication is still with the journal “Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik” in Cologne. The author of the study, Hoffmann, a recognized expert on international law, has a strongly anti-American focus. He has already received a few responses from international organizations that have promised him support in the fight for the abolition of both ideologically subversive radios.

Hoffmann’s study had already garnered international publicity, as reflected in the Pravda article cited by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on February 27, 1976. Although it was not published in BdiP, as

91 Bohnsack, Legende, 111–12.


95 See footnote 2.
HV A/X had considered, it did appear in June 1976 in the IOJ’s international journal, The Democratic Journalist.96

Hoffmann’s study on the illegality of RFE/RL in international law, which he submitted to the embassies of the CSCE states in Vienna in 1976 and subsequently published in various forms, was originally prepared, in fact, by Herbert Kröger, Rector of the German Academy for Government and Law in Potsdam-Babelsberg, in January 1975.97 Hoffmann’s abbreviated study copied directly from Kröger’s the key argument regarding the illegality of RFE/RL based on the CSCE — namely, that it constituted “intervention in the internal affairs” of the communist states. Both Kröger’s study and Hoffmann’s abbreviated version declared: “All these conclusions [regarding the illegality of RFE/RL] must apply all the more today in Europe since the 35 states participating in the CSCE posed the task in the Final Document from Helsinki [1975]: ‘[to] respect the right of every participating state to freely determine and develop its own political, social, economic and cultural system, as well as its right to determine its laws and statutes on its own.’”98 Hoffmann’s study was already outdated at the time of its preparation in January 1976; for example, he had cited the CSCE foreign ministers’ declaration from 1973 instead of the CSCE Final Act of August 1975. In September 1976, Kröger corrected this and other omissions in a new study for the MfS, “Supplementations to the Affidavit by Dr. E. Hoffmann regarding the Illegality in International Law of the Operation of RFE and RL.” The title and text of the paper suggested that Kröger was informed about Hoffmann’s use of his work.99 Not surprisingly, an abbreviated version of Kröger’s “Supplementations” with Hoffmann as author, dated May 1977, found its way into the Stasi files,100 and in May 1977, Hoffmann’s “Supplementations” appeared in a West German journal, Interfact, published by the neutralist Verlagsgemeinschaft Studien von Zeitfragen (SvZ).101


101 A subsequent paper prepared for HV A/X by another author, codename “Bober,” cited Hoffmann’s article in Interfact, but the bibliographical data appear to be incorrect, and the journal could not be located. The citation: “Dr. jur. Emil Hoffmann, Wien in ‘Interfact,’ Nr. XXXII/77, ‘Supplementations to the Report of the Operation of the Broadcasting Stations RFE and RL in Contravention of International Law’” BSU, MIS, HV A 1015, p. 169. The page with the bibliographical citations was separated in the archival file from “Bober’s” article, ibid., pp. 1–32.
In the fall of 1977, Hoffmann spoke at a conference organized in Tampere by the Finnish Institute for Peace Research, the Institute for Journalism of the University of Tampere, and the International Institute for Peace (IIP) in Vienna: “The Role of the Mass Media in Maintaining and Strengthening Peace.” Knaust reported to Department 36 shortly thereafter: “The Hoffmann materials from the conference in Tampere will be published in book form by the peace committee for the purposes of UNESCO, which has effectively legalized them internationally as well.”

Indeed, the IIP published Hoffmann’s presentation, “A Principled Assessment of the Operations of the Stations Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as Violations of International Law,” which was based on his (and Kröger’s) previous research, in its journal, *Science and Peace*, in early 1978. It was subsequently republished in March 1978 in East Berlin in the IPW’s monthly review of international politics and economics, along with Hoffmann’s original study from 1976 (under the rubric “Documentation”). In June 1978, Knaust told his Czechoslovak colleagues: “Hoffmann, driven by a strong anti-Americanism, wants to continue working.” A few months later, HV A/X reported that with Hoffmann’s assistance, “they are further attacking the activities of RFE/RL from the standpoint of international law, and they are expanding this activity to Spain and Portugal.”

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**Although Hoffmann and others were apparently working hard for the closure of RFE/RL, the question naturally arises: How effective were the Soviet bloc’s active measures, including “Spider”? Despite the overt and covert activities of the Soviet bloc, including Hoffmann’s work for HV A/X, the East failed to attain sufficient support from the Western or the neutral and nonaligned delegations at the Belgrade Follow-Up Meeting (1977–1978) of the CSCE for the closure of RFE/RL, let alone for a Czechoslovak proposal for a “code of conduct” for journalists and the mass media in their reporting — i.e., that their reporting serve the cause of peace, friendship, and détente as the Soviet bloc understood them. Nevertheless, as Ladislav Bittman, a Czechoslovak foreign intelligence officer who had defected, pointed out to his U.S. audience in**

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106 Department 36, I. Directorate, FMV, Course of cooperation with GDR intelligence in 1978 in the area of AM (active measures), 6 October 1978, ABS, A.č. 81282/107, p. 132.

107 Paul Roth, “Die neue Weltnachrichtenordnung. Argumentation, Zielvorstellung und Vorgehen der UdSSR (I),” *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien (BBOIS)* 44 (1982): 41. On the activities of the Soviet bloc with regard to RFE/RL before the Belgrade meeting especially with regard to the radio stations’ alleged illegality under the CSCE Final Act, see ibid., 37-41.
1985, Moscow believed “that mass production of active measures will have a significant cumulative effect over a period of several decades.”

Indeed, Hoffmann’s publication from the IIP conference in Tampere had already helped the Soviet bloc to open a second front against RFE/RL at UNESCO, where Moscow was asserting the illegality of RFE/RL on the basis of international law and the CSCE Final Act. At the CSCE’s follow-up meeting in Madrid (1980-83), the Soviet bloc openly proposed the closure of RFE and RL, citing their alleged illegality in international law. To bolster the argument, the USSR stressed the efforts of the UN through UNESCO to establish a New World Information Order (NWIO), which, at least from the Soviet perspective, was supposed to ban any broadcasting that was directed against the internal order of other states or that could potentially threaten peace. Hoffmann made a further contribution on the UNESCO/NWIO front against RFE/RL with a subsequent book entitled Medienfreiheit? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit (Free Media? Claims and Reality). The book was published in the FRG in 1981 in an initial run of 2000 copies — again, by the SvZ press. For the publication, Hoffmann secured an introduction by Sean MacBride, former Irish foreign minister, recipient of both the Nobel and Lenin Peace Prizes, and chairman of UNESCO’s International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, responsible for NWIO.

The book, which did not focus exclusively on Soviet-bloc desiderata, had apparently sparked tensions between HV A/X and Hoffmann. Knaust commented in November 1981: “With considerable delay, the book — Emil Hoffmann’s Medienfreiheit — has come out abroad. However, it did not meet the GDR’s expectations. The basic error of the book is that it mechanically juxtaposes imperialist propaganda with the propaganda of the socialist commonwealth. Only with regard to Chapter III (RFE/RL) can there be no reservations.” HV A/X had originally wanted a book with three chapters, focused exclusively on RFE/RL. In contrast, Medienfreiheit consisted of five chapters, and only Chapter III, “U.S. ‘Freedom Radios’ in the Light of International Law,” focused on RFE/RL. The other chapters contained general information relating to UNESCO’s efforts to create a NWIO.

108 Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider’s View (Washington, 1985), 45. Ironically, Hoffmann played a disputed role in Bittman’s defection to the West in 1968. See Hoffmann, Mandat, 215–16; Dispatch from Chief, European Division, to [sanitized], 9 April 1971, and Telegram, Munich to Director, 27 September 1968. both in NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 2 of 2.


112 Knaust and the Director of HV A/X, Klaus Wagenbreth, had outlined the proposed book to their colleagues in Prague in November 1979: a first chapter on Western plans and intentions with regard to RFE/RL; a second chapter on the illegality of RFE/RL in international law, ostensibly to include its alleged violation of the CSCE Final Act; and a third chapter on RFE/RL’s interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries. “Operation INFECTION,” attachment #9 to Ostrovský, Record of negotiations with GDR intelligence, 28 November 1979, ABS, A.č. 81282/107, pp. 215–16.

113 Hoffmann, Medienfreiheit?, passim.
Arguably, the ostensibly neutral character of the publication brought it — including HV A/X’s favored chapter — to the attention of a broader public than a propaganda screed focused only on RFE/RL. However, based on Knaust’s comments, this subtlety seems to have been lost on HV A/X. Department 36 reported in November 1981: “IM FRIDOLIN, who worked on the brochure, is already too old in the opinion of the German comrades and they will cease to use him.” 114

Others were more positive about Hoffmann’s book. Two Soviet authors cited favorably the “well-known Western journalist Emil Hoffmann” in their 1985 brochure, *Aggressive Broadcasting*. They quoted one passage from *Medienfreiheit* — particularly ironic given Hoffmann’s own patronage — about the CIA’s alleged “direct management of journalists…working on its behalf.” 115 At another point, they asserted the illegality of RFE/RL in international law based on “studies...prepared for the GDR’s foreign press service ‘Panorama’ by Dr. Emil Hoffmann (legal expert).” 116 The People’s Republic of Bulgaria published a translation of *Medienfreiheit* in 1985, 117 and although HV A/X apparently discontinued its cooperation with Hoffmann in 1981, it reported in 1984 that it was preparing an “updated” study on the illegality of RFE/RL based on the Kröger/Hoffmann materials from 1977. 118

Indeed, Hoffmann’s work and the anti-Americanism that had fueled it proved more enduring than the HV A or even Hoffmann himself. Since 2009, *Studien von Zeitfragen* (*SvZ*) has maintained on its website an excerpt from Hoffmann’s *Medienfreiheit* that decries the alleged U.S. “disinformation war against Iran since 1978.” 119 To attest to Hoffmann’s *bona fides*, *SvZ* has posted alongside its excerpt from *Medienfreiheit* both MacBride’s introduction to the book and a short biography of the Nobel and Lenin Peace Prize laureate. 120

**Conclusion**

Emil Hoffmann’s long path from Goebbels’s propaganda ministry to the HV A elucidates various aspects of the intelligence agencies’ Cold War in Germany and in Europe as a whole. As has long been known, former membership in the Nazi Party and work on behalf of the “Third Reich” was by no means a barrier to recruitment by the intelligence agencies of its former enemies during the Cold War. At the end of World War II, both British and Soviet intelligence, as well as the Americans, were interested in Hoffmann and his potential information regarding other, more important, Nazis — more

important not only in terms of their rank and potential war crimes but also in terms of their potential knowledge about the other side in the future Cold War. Hoffmann’s entry (or re-entry) into the “jungle of the secret services” as a broker and publicist in East-West trade and the subsequent interest of intelligence agencies, East and West, in his activities demonstrate how one side’s interest in an individual could spark the other side’s interest. Hoffmann’s relationship with CARBOHYDRATE served as an interesting example; the CIA’s efforts to use Casemir to spy on Hoffmann increased the Stasi’s interest in the latter, due to its struggle against the CIA front organization, UfJ. The CIA also wanted Casemir to help smooth the path to Hoffmann’s potential recruitment; ironically, Hoffmann’s contact with Casemir only heightened his fears that the CIA could tip-off the Stasi and potentially cause his “disappearance” in the East.

The methods of the CIA and Stasi in their respective efforts to “neutralize” or recruit Hoffmann or others in West Germany, it turned out, were not that different: use of secret informants, telephone taps, opening of mail, and the general collection of secret and private information. In terms of recruitment, although various sticks could be used — e.g., arrest for alleged security violations — carrots were considered more effective for the potential recruitment of Hoffmann: high-level meetings and official contacts, offers of information for his activities as a publicist and consultant, and payment for professional services rendered.

One major difference between the activities of the CIA in Germany in contrast to the Soviet secret services and the Stasi was that restrictions on CIA activities grew in the early 1950s due to the increasing independence of the Federal Republic. First, the General Treaty (Deutschlandvertrag) of 1952 gave it some independence, and in 1955, it attained relative sovereignty. This independence had already marked a shift in the CIA’s efforts to “neutralize” Hoffmann in 1953. At that point, the BfV informed the CIA that an interzonal pass could no longer be denied to Hoffmann without any concrete proof of criminal activity on his part. In general, the CIA was no longer able to use some methods that it had used before because they were unconstitutional in the Federal Republic. It curtailed some of its earlier surveillance and control practices in West Germany. However, based on Hoffmann’s CIA file, West Berlin remained an exception, at least in the 1950s, and the Federal Republic’s newly established BfV, BKA, and BND proved willing to cooperate, at least on an ad hoc
basis, in providing the CIA and U.S. officials in general with private information obtained from its own investigations of West German citizens. Of course, the Stasi and its “fraternal organ,” the KGB, faced far fewer restrictions in East Germany.

Hoffmann’s post-retirement career in active measures demonstrated the close coordination and blurring of boundaries between the Soviet bloc’s overt (e.g., through communist-front organizations) and covert propaganda (i.e., through the security services). Covertly funded publications, such as those by Hoffmann for HV A/X, found their way not only into secretly subsidized Western press organs and into journals published by communist-front organizations but also into unsuspecting private publications and officially funded publications by such organizations as UNESCO. Covertly funded publications by one Soviet-bloc intelligence agency received further publicity and attention through the overt and covert propaganda efforts of the other Soviet bloc states in their respective press outlets at home and in the West.121

As for Hoffmann, he had remained true throughout his adult life to his national-revolutionary, Strasserite principles, whether during the Third Reich years; as a member of the “German Revolution” network until his arrest and its dissolution; in his support for a neutral, unified Germany in opposition to the U.S. and the Adenauer government in West Germany; in his support for East-West trade, especially inner-German trade, to maintain all-German, national bonds; in his attacks on the commercial media of the West, especially the U.S., or against Washington’s propaganda organs, RFE and RL; or in his support for ostensibly nationally minded, state-controlled media. In all periods of his life, he successfully maintained his career as a publicist, in tandem with occasional contracting work for Western firms and at least one intelligence agency (i.e., the HV A). Hoffmann asserted this ideological and professional consistency — despite omitting his publications under Goebbels or his work on behalf of any foreign intelligence agencies — in his 1992 memoir, A Mandate for Germany: Enemy of the State from a Sense of Responsibility.122 His choice of press for his memoir reflected his ideological consistency: the Siegfried Bublies Verlag (SBV), named after its director, the one-time chairman of the Republikaner Partei in Koblenz.123 One expert on the right-wing in Germany characterized the SBV’s journal, wir selbst, as standing in the “left-nationalist, anti-capitalist,” “national-revolutionary tradition” of Otto Strasser in its support of

\[121\] For a general overview of such cooperation in the placement of disinformation in the West, see U.S. Dept. of State, ed., Active Measures, 1–14, 17–22; and Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesminister des Innern, ed. Moskau getarnte Helfer: Die Aktivitäten sowjetisch gesteuerter internationaler Einwirkungsorganisationen und ihrer Partner in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn, 1987), passim.

\[122\] Hoffmann, Mandat, passim.

“ethnopluralism” and “liberation nationalism” against “universalist political philosophies” and the “chains of imperialism.” The revival of Strasserite ideas as part of a “new Right” in West Germany had ensued in the 1980s in the wake of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party’s (NPD) decline as an electoral force. One of the New Right’s slogans was “learning from the left” — that is, from the anti-American new Left of the 1960s, which had attacked the alleged “daily fascism” in the U.S. and had adopted the rallying cry, “USA-SA-SS.” Against this backdrop, Hoffmann’s path from propagandist for Goebbels to propagandist for HV A/X against RFE/RL and back to the new Right after German unification was perhaps not such a long path after all; he was associated from the beginning of his career to its very end with the “left-wing people on the right.” However, in contrast to the West German new Left, he would never have equated the SA with the SS, let alone the SA of his youth with the USA. His path through the “jungle of the intelligence agencies” had been quite different — from membership in the SA through surveillance by the CIA to eventual work for the HV A: SA-CIA-HV A.

Colonel Henryk Sokolak, head of Polish foreign intelligence and a former inmate of Buchenwald concentration camp, allegedly offered a blunter, less-nuanced assessment of Hoffmann and his career. In 1961, a Polish defector to the U.S. reported to the CIA that Sokolak had declared Hoffmann, whom he suspected of working for the BND, to be “an unreconstructed Nazi.”

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126 For the term, see Jaschke, “Nationalismus,” 9.

127 Memorandum, “Subject: Dr. Emil HOFFMANN, 18 December 1961; Date of Debriefing: 14 October 1961,” NARA, RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 56, Hoffmann, Emil, 2 of 2.