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FROM MANHATTAN TO MAINHATTAN: RECONSIDERING THE TRANSATLANTIC ARCHITECTURAL DIALOGUE

Cordula Grewe and Dietrich Neumann

The title of this collection of essays, “From Manhattan to Mainhattan,” suggests both a program and a metaphor. It evokes two cities—New York and Frankfurt am Main—and the movement from one to the other. On the one hand, it refers to a literal passage of people and goods and a transfer of assets and careers, which requires trade, travel, and transport. At the same time, it is a metaphor for the voyage of ideas, for an immaterial exchange of concepts, customs, and particular ways of looking at life, which are attached to the bodies in transit. The route from Manhattan to Mainhattan also includes, as the essays here elucidate, the journey back, for the story told here is not of a one-way street.¹

The title reveals a desire for emulation. The lonely letter “i” that distinguishes Mainhattan from Manhattan suggests a factual proximity. Manhattan, icon of the modern city, emblem of modern capitalism, big business, and world trade, functioned as a template for the city of Frankfurt when it strove to rebuild itself after the destruction of World War II and emerged as Germany’s leading financial capital. The analogy of names simultaneously alludes to the significance of perception and to the particularities of the cultural imagination. Presumably, everybody knows what and where Manhattan is, though not everyone might be familiar with the name’s origin: the local Indian tribe from whom Peter Minuit purportedly purchased the island in 1626. On the other hand, Mainhattan, named for the Main River on whose banks Frankfurt stands, is a much more obscure term, known only to Germans and those who know Germany intimately.

While other German cities tried to reclaim their prewar appearance, Frankfurt decided soon after the war to allow the concentrated building of skyscrapers in its center, thereby creating a skyline that would remain unique within Germany. The Hochhausplan 1953 stimulated a first wave of high-rise building. Twenty years later, the effort to contain future sprawl led to another plan, which in 1972 designated three locations west of the old city—along the Ludwig-Ehrhard-Anlage, the Mainzer Landstrasse and the existing banking district—as centers for future high-rise building activity. Supported by the economic boom of the 1970s, this second wave of high-rise buildings substantially altered the city’s skyline, and by 1980 the nickname “Mainhattan” had become common usage.² A third high-rise boom in the early 1990s gave renewed justification to the term and
secured its frequent use until today. However, while Frankfurt’s steel and glass buildings are indeed a metaphor for the city’s aspirations, its internationalism and, with almost 400 national and international banks and credit institutions, its success as one of the world’s most important financial centers, the merely regional signification of the term “Mainhattan” reflects obvious differences from New York.

What had been transferred to the city of Frankfurt, was, of course, the old longing for a German Weltstadt, a world-class city on a level with Paris, London, and, especially, New York. Historically, this dream stood at the heart of German Amerikanismus in the 1920s, when it was hoped that Berlin could finally join the ranks of other capitals. To that end, an administrative reorganization of the city in 1920 included so many neighboring communities that, at least in terms of square mileage and the number of inhabitants, this goal seemed to have been reached. But the visual symbolism of skyscrapers was needed if the city’s new status was to be convincing; countless articles written during the Hochhausteibatte of the 1920s allude to their symbolic role. For a brief moment in 1949, it seemed as if Frankfurt would become the new capital of West Germany, adopting the role that Berlin could no longer fulfill. Before Bonn was finally chosen, due to Adenauer’s insistence, the dream had become real enough for Frankfurt to actually build a new parliament building. Although this building, by the Bauhaus architect Gerhard Weber, had to be converted to another use (it housed Hesse’s State Broadcasting Corporation, Hessischer Rundfunk), Frankfurt’s subsequent rise as a European center of business with a major airport and a powerful skyline nonetheless reflected ambitions that Berlin had long held.

Like Berlin, however, the city of Frankfurt never came close to New York in size and importance. With roughly 650,000 inhabitants, Frankfurt ranks only fifth among German cities. Its population is less than one tenth of New York City’s 8,000,000. Frankfurt’s skyscrapers bear little resemblance to those in Manhattan. They are smaller, newer, and also thinner, due to German building code requirements for daylight in the workspace. The city’s skyline is much closer to that of a midsize American city such as Raleigh, North Carolina, or Wilmington, Delaware, than New York. The buzzing activity inside the banking towers—which are often the nodal points of vast international financial networks—has not influenced the city’s life and rhythm. Instead, as Bruno Flierl has pointed out, “Mainhattan never became Manhattan, but remained Frankfurt—a city half metropolitan, half provincial.”

While the city of Frankfurt itself is not a main focus of this collection of essays, our title “From Manhattan to Mainhattan” refers to two central tropes of Germany’s Amerikanismus before and after World War II: the important role of the skyscraper and the complex exchange of images,
metaphors, references, misunderstandings, hopes, and frustrations that accompanied them. The core of this essay collection is an examination of the cultural transfer between Germany and the United States. For practical reasons, we limit our investigation to the years between 1920 and 1970. Focusing on this period, the essays examine the cultural implications of “style” in relation to socio-economic conditions, industrial production, and consumption. In so doing, they analyze the triangular relationship between the production of style and aesthetic ideologies, the habits and mentalities of their consumers, and the socio-economic as well as political conditions that frame the production and consumption of style.

The driving concept behind this volume was a desire to bring different historical disciplines into dialogue, to enable historians of art, architecture, economics, politics, and diplomacy to speak to each other. Though these disciplines share many roots, they rarely enter into an extended exchange of ideas, as Volker Berghahn observes in his concluding essay. In fact, the histories of architecture and urban planning have existed somewhat isolated from other disciplines, with the effect that their main narrative—the story of the rise of the past century’s dominant architecture—has remained largely unchallenged for an astonishingly long time. It is hard to find a survey of modern architecture that does not reflect this narrative: a compelling story of cultural transfer, progress, and the ultimate victory of a better, more livable, and more appropriate architecture. Inevitably, this victory is also associated with the victory of democracy (and implicitly, capitalism) over totalitarian political systems, whether fascist or Marxist. Yet, as the essays in this collection poignantly demonstrate, styles do not possess any inherent meaning. Rather, such meaning is discursively constructed. This insight into the malleability of meaning might seem rather obvious yet, as the analyses of historical debates presented in this volume warn us, essentializing discourses on national identity repeatedly obscure the constructed nature of style. Styles often become naturalized as indigenous markers of tradition and national character. The deconstruction of such myth-making is part of this project.

In brief and simplified terms, this story begins in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with the emerging utilitarian architecture in the United States. The “Chicago School” developed a new formal and structural language which avoided historicism and conformed to nineteenth-century ideals of truthfulness and structural honesty. But European architects took the lead when America temporarily reverted to widespread historicism after the great popular success of the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893. In France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Russia, the new architectural vocabulary was expanded and endowed with a theoretical and
institutional framework, as well as with social and political importance. When the National Socialists, Stalinists, and fascists came to power in the 1920s and 1930s, they enforced a return to classicism and banned the new architectural language. It flowered anew in the United States, however, thanks to the epoch-making “International Style” exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in 1932, and thanks as well to the immigration of key modernists to the United States in the following years. After the war, the new architecture returned from America to the free countries of Europe, and spread all over the world as a symbol of democracy and resistance against totalitarianism. The key figures in this narrative are Walter Gropius and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe in Germany and the U.S., Le Corbusier in France, and Frank Lloyd Wright in the U.S. The skyscraper was one exemplary form for this development, notable examples being Louis Sullivan’s Guarantee Building in Buffalo (1891), the glass skyscrapers by Mies, Le Corbusier, and Wright in the early 1920s, Gropius’s project for the 1922 Chicago Tribune competition, Mies’s Lake Shore Drive Apartments in Chicago (1950), and his Seagram Building (1956) in New York.

This compelling narrative of architectural development, which had been outlined as early as the 1930s and 1940s by historians and polemists such as Nicholaus Pevsner, Henry-Russell Hitchcock, and Sigfried Giedion, spawned an astonishing number of publications in subsequent decades. In fact, the twentieth century is by far the most widely-researched period in the history of architecture. In terms of the number of articles in architecture journals, modern architecture is covered about twice as much as the Renaissance; among individual architects, Frank Lloyd Wright clearly leads the way, followed by Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, and, after a considerable gap, Michelangelo and Brunelleschi. But the many publications which uphold the general structure of this narrative and the importance of its protagonists have more recently been accompanied by a growing number of voices that undermine this seemingly solid edifice with a method that one might call “the application of the magnifying glass,” where a closer examination contradicts and distorts the large picture.

Many of those corrections are on their way to becoming common knowledge in the scholarly world, but have still not reached mainstream surveys and publications for the general public. Mies and Gropius, for example, both tried to ingratiate themselves with the National Socialist regime, and would have probably stayed in Germany if they had received a commission. From this perspective it seems ironic that it was Mies, as Kathleen James-Chakraborty shows, who ultimately benefited from the American perception of German modernist architecture as resistance to fascism, rather than Erich Mendelsohn, a Jewish architect. The
expressionistic qualities of Mendelsohn’s dynamic, theatrical, and idiosyncratic buildings of the Weimar years did not prove a viable model for a commercially appealing, mass-producible architecture suited to the rise of corporate capitalism after World War II. Whereas Mies built the Seagram building, Mendelsohn, whose architectural ideas had permanently been transformed by his experience in Palestine, helped to reform ecclesiastical architecture with a number of remarkable synagogues in America. While these were a major achievement in their own right, James-Chakraborty claims in her essay that these buildings did “not fit easily into the myth that supported the style.” Mies’s success, by contrast, hinged to a certain degree on the notion that the style he represented was not only one of great clarity, transparency, and inescapable inner logic, but was also untainted by links to National Socialism, an ideology one-sidedly identified with “neoclassical” architecture. The myth of two distinct, monolithic architectural cultures served the ideological need for a discursive redefinition of modernism as an expression of American-style capitalism. Of course, it also served the economic interests of Europe’s and America’s postwar building industries, who fully embraced the style because it coincided with the rise of mass production, unionization, and the concurrent loss of a specialized, skilled workforce.

Certainly, the heavy classicism favored by the Nazis represented another “international style.” In fact, it was the widely accepted mainstream vocabulary for representative buildings the world over. A more multifaceted image of National Socialist architecture than that which prevailed in the postwar period had to await acknowledgment of the existence of Nazi modernist building strategies, and their successful use of the sober, restrained architectural vocabulary of the 1920s and early 1930s in many industrial plants. This is the formal language that Mies van der Rohe would use and develop further in his first American buildings at Chicago’s Illinois Institute of Technology. At the same time, it is equally important to notice that in Germany the so-called “Bauhaus Style” (actually a misnomer: the Bauhaus had no architecture department until 1928) contributed relatively little to the architectural debate and was employed by only a small minority. Debates about modern architecture were not the predominant topic in Germany’s numerous architectural and building magazines. The buildings conforming to that style were relatively few in number. The famous flat-roofed housing blocks by modern German architects such as Bruno Taut in Berlin, Ernst May in Frankfurt, and Otto Ernst Haesler in Celle, for example, which have long symbolized the success of Germany’s modern architecture and its political and social agenda, were exceptional cases among the large number of social housing projects across Germany. The majority of these were executed in more moderate styles. They fulfilled their task—to house the families of
returning soldiers and the urban working and middle classes—just as adequately (if not often more successfully), albeit less spectacularly.10

Not all critics of modern architecture were politically reactionary, or even National Socialists. Among writers and philosophers on the left, there were many thoughtful, justified, and (in welcome contrast to the sternness of modernism’s main apologists) humorous comments about modern architecture’s shortcomings. The brilliant journalist Joseph Roth, for instance, mocked Neue Sachlichkeit (New Sobriety) interiors in a 1929 feuilleton for a Munich newspaper: “For a bedroom there is a glass-walled studio. They dine in gyms. Rooms you would have sworn were tennis courts serve as libraries and music rooms . . . They relax after meals on white operating tables.”11 Walter Benjamin’s enigmatic and nuanced 1933 text about glass architecture, entitled “Experience and Poverty,” is another case in point, as are Ernst Bloch’s wonderful remarks about modern houses that “look as if they are ready to leave.”12

On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, similar omissions and misinterpretations could be observed. The 1932 International Style exhibition in New York, usually credited with bringing modern architecture to the United States, was by no means the unqualified success that its protagonists immediately claimed it to be. In fact, countless American architects and writers noted their discontent with the arrival of yet another foreign, international style and argued strongly for an American version of modernism. Richard Neutra, for example, although himself a recent immigrant, firmly rejected the exhibition’s claims of Internationalism and its presumed leadership of the European avant-garde, and instead emphasized the strength of the American contributions, especially his own, such as the Lovell House in Los Angeles: “California ideas of dwelling, so to speak, are practically being accepted in Amsterdam, Paris, and Vienna, and an abundance of natural aeration and light influx is cherished under climatic conditions which are much more severe than those in California.”13 In a string of subsequent exhibitions, the Museum of Modern Art itself tried rather hard to rectify the impression made by the 1932 exhibition. As late as 1944, the museum had to assure the visitors of its “Built in USA 1932–1944” exhibition that only “hostile and ill-informed critics” were suggesting the museum’s 1932 show had intended to impose a “foreign style on the United States.” Instead, the museum had “been first to show the growth of an authentic modern American style.”14 The rich architectural culture of 1930s America, its ideological and stylistic nuances, and its relationship with Europe have only begun to be adequately explored.15

The essays collected here all profit from and contribute to the current reevaluation of modern architecture’s astonishingly resilient master narrative. As one of the key building types in this master narrative, the
skyscraper (and its smaller variant, the high-rise building) has served us well as an overarching framing device and a subject for a more interdisciplinary exchange. Its example demonstrates how architecture not only reflects a community’s social, cultural, and political parameters, but also how it decisively shapes its values and practices: “style” implies “lifestyle.” Architects and urban planners were highly sensitive to this connection, and reflected upon how their appropriation of a foreign culture would also transport and import elements of that culture’s value system. This could lead to a highly complicated, even ambivalent relationship, as the work of Max Berg exemplifies.

It was Berg’s reaction to the fast growth of American cities such as Chicago that inspired his ideas about zoning in the context of the 1910 “Greater Berlin” urban design competition (Gross Berlin Wettbewerb). Berg suggested three discrete monofunctional urban zones: one for living, one for work, and a central monumental zone for culture, administration, and representation. After World War I, Berg was one of the first to suggest high-rise office buildings for German cities in order to relieve pressing housing shortages, because many apartments were occupied by businesses. He implemented his ideas about town planning and the sensitive integration of high-rise buildings in his 1919 plan for a reorganization of Breslau, which is the main focus of the article by Beate Störtkuhl and Jerzy Ilkosz in this volume.

Berg urged a careful adaptation of the transatlantic model to the needs of the local context. Like most of the countless architects who pondered the introduction of skyscrapers into German cities in the 1920s and spoke of a “Germanization of the skyscraper,” he decisively rejected the perceived social implications of American-style skyscraper politics: a ruthless, unchecked, land-speculating capitalism to which the greater needs of society were sacrificed. A convinced Social Democrat, Berg described the American skyscraper as “a petrified accusation against the brutal rule of capital” and had little sympathy for New York’s skyline, which he denounced as “a pile of giant building blocks placed willy-nilly next to each other.” Instead, he felt that Breslau’s vertical growth should reflect a historical sensibility and follow a strictly controlled high-rise policy. The vertical striations and reductive tectonic structures in Berg’s high-rise designs are typical of a search for formal solutions that would reach far into the past.

By hailing tectonic expression as an alternative to the modernist emphasis on surface value, German architects harked back to ideas first articulated by those whom Adrian von Buttlar calls “Romantic classicists.” Exploring the way in which their concepts were adopted for the construction of “Germanness” through high-rise architecture, Buttlar sketches a framework for a political iconography of German high-rise buildings. He
thereby traces the persistence of such ideas, from their use during the Third Reich to their renewed adaptation to the needs of both postwar Germanies. The onset of the Cold War paradoxically facilitated this persistence, in so far as it simultaneously supported the introduction of American-style Internationalism and provoked ongoing concerns about preserving elements of German style.

Peter Müller’s essay offers a compelling case study of this phenomenon. In East Berlin, Knobelsdorff and Schinkel were invoked once again in the GDR’s search for a “counter-architecture” that could outshine the building initiatives in West Berlin, where the “Interbau” and “Hansa- viertel” projects had received international press and praise. At the same time, the GDR wanted to retain a historicist reference that would resist the “cosmopolitan dogma” of American capitalism. The idea that this neoclassicist tradition was tainted by its National Socialist articulation, however, was buried under the myth that Anglo-American bombers were solely responsible for the destruction of German cities. According to East German ideology, this destruction was completed in the West by the reimportation of classic modernism. Müller paints a vivid picture of how anti-Americanism, Cold War politics, and the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States played itself out on the small territory of the divided city of Berlin. Following Stalinist dogma, urban planning in East Berlin envisioned a skyscraper skyline exclusively as a means of political representation; high-rise buildings, as symbols of power, would serve propagandistic goals, leaving aside any notion of a profitable use of prime inner-city space. Yet when economic realities shattered the far-fetched dreams of a grand vertical urban space, in the end only the television tower would rise into the sky. Designed as a rocket taking off, with a Sputnik satellite as its sparkling crown, the television tower successfully tapped into fascination with outer space and the heroism of the cosmonauts, which even today can unleash a rich nostalgia, as the 2003 movie Goodbye, Lenin demonstrates. At the same time, its space flight aesthetic fits squarely into the current revival of 1960s cool and hip. It is one of the ironies of history that the capitalist city of the third millennium can so slickly absorb East Germany’s attempt to surpass the West.

Yet, again, we would gain only a one-sided, simplified image of the complex social, artistic, and ideological history of GDR architecture if we exclusively associate it with the conservative rhetoric of a national building tradition which fed on the doctrine of Socialist Realism. Instead, Wolfgang Thöner uses the example of the GDR Bauhaus reception to show the complexity of this story. He demonstrates that even during the years when the Bauhaus notion of functionalism was negatively stigmatized in the East as “pure formalism,” architects searched for a mode of building that followed neither avant-garde modernism nor the so-called
national style. Franz Ehrlich’s Berlin Rundfunkgebäude (1951–56) is an example of this sort of particularized functionalism. The fact that the state fully controlled the country’s architectural activities allows Thöner to use its shifting evaluation of the Bauhaus—which evolved from demonization as “a movement hostile to the people” (volksfeindliche Bewegung) to a reevaluation as a “poetry of the future”—as a seismograph to record larger shifts in the GDR’s vision of a new socialist society.

Wolfgang Thöner reminds us that construction was more often than not shaped by economic reality rather than aesthetic or political goals. This was not only true for the Eastern bloc but for the West as well, as Jeffrey Diefendorf demonstrates in his analysis of the postwar activities of Walter Gropius and Martin Wagner. Both of these émigré architects, who co-authored several articles between 1941 and 1943, embody a movement back and forth between the United States and Europe, which in their case resulted in a complex transfer and transformation of reformist ideas of how to construct a healthy modern city. While both understood small neighborhoods as the kernel from which healthy cities grow (thereby producing, in their view, genuine communities and securing democracy), their actual building activity was ultimately defined by their acceptance or rejection of market realities. Whereas Gropius sacrificed his reformist spirit to his desire for commissions and building actual buildings, Wagner remained true to his revolutionary vision. Consequently, Gropius successfully planted mega-settlements and skyscrapers in Berlin, Boston, and New York, while Wagner’s dream to rebuild Germany after 1945 proved a chimera. His unrealistic expectations and acerbic voice prevented him from obtaining a planning position in his home country and finally eclipsed his fame in the face of Gropius’s success. In the end, the desire to shape society through the built environment was crushed by the prosaic demands of the marketplace, on both sides of the Atlantic and on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

After World War II, the onset of the Cold War made it possible to realize American-style structures in Germany, at least in its western half. Built almost immediately after the Berlin Wall, the Europa-Center (1963–65) in the heart of now-isolated West Berlin, exemplifies the marriage of politics and economics, architecture and urban lifestyle. Marketed as a “city within a city,” the building’s height and curtain-wall façade unmistakably identified it with “Western values” and the American “lifestyle.” Eager to emulate New York’s Rockefeller Center, the building’s style boldly proclaimed economic growth and technological progress. An emblem of the heyday of American impact, the Europa-Center served an accelerated consumer culture that, literally enclosed by the Iron Curtain, searched for new spaces of consumption. The gigantic Mercedes star, prominently revolving on top of the structure, thus quickly became, as
Alexander Sedlmaier remarks in his essay, “not only the pivotal marker for the site but a symbol of West Germany’s ‘economic miracle.’” Inevitably, German critics recalled Manhattan, whose air, the newspaper Die Welt claimed, now breezed through Berlin. A critical glimpse at a photograph of the true situation (p. 96, Fig. 7) reveals the phantasmagoric nature of such claims.

The last two contributions to the collection show how mass media also played a significant role in the interpretation of architecture. Advertising, as Christian Maryška argues, not only helped to promote a city’s modernity through the compressed depiction of high-rises, it could even compensate for the lack of such buildings by replacing the representation of existing structures with orchestrated lightshows, magnified lettering, or even skyscraper-size objects. This ability to serve as a surrogate image explains the frequency with which Austrian and German posters depicted skyscrapers precisely at a time when their construction was stagnant in these countries. Advertising posters creatively played with aesthetic trends and avant-garde modes, while their spectacular staging simultaneously articulated a language of modern visuality that extended to the reading of the buildings themselves.

Peter Krieger, on the other hand, reminds us that movies could provide an important simulacrum for real experience while training their audiences to read architecture according to mainstream ideology. In this sense, the visual ambience of glass curtain walls was sufficient to create a virtual Manhattan as the stage for secret agent “Jerry Cotton,” a pulp fiction hero in the mold of James Bond who appeared in a series of movies between 1965 and 1969. Because the low budget made filming in New York impossible, the hero, played by George Nader, instead saved the world against the backdrop of Hamburg. Stock footage of Manhattan’s dramatic skyline was intercut with close-ups of high-rise façades in Hamburg, such as the 1964 Unilever House, the headquarters of a Dutch-British conglomerate. This strategy, as Krieger argues, testifies as much to the artistic possibilities of film as to an actual interchangeability of buildings and locations within the now truly international style. Repeated in endless reproductions, which signified rather than realized modernist principles, modernism’s programmatic dissolution of local references ultimately became all too often translated into soulless, uninspired projects. Using Krieger’s argument to look back at the series itself, the example of Jerry Cotton also lays bare the loss of the provocative critical potential once inherent in montage technique. Reduced to creating the effect of “modern life,” montage itself occurred from a logic of commerce and conspicuous consumption and, in this sense, its specific use mirrors the transformation of Mies’s avant-gardism into bland corporate architecture. Not the shock of the new but the shock of the ugly (or trivial) is the result.
Krieger’s article also lends itself to a look back at the discussion of modernism in East Germany as presented by Wolfgang Thöner and Peter Müller. If the ease of Jerry Cotton’s moves through a phantasmagoric “Ham-hattan” points to a modernity of stylistic convergence, we, like architects in 1970s East and West Germany, begin to question the degree to which the architecture of capitalism was distinct from that of state socialism. With Erich Honecker’s rise to power in 1971 and his subsequent cultural-political policy of Abgrenzung vis-à-vis the Federal Republic, the East German architectural community reacted to this challenge with numerous attempts to redefine the distinguishing features of socialist architecture. They conceded the similarity of Eastern and Western building systems, but turned the question of architectural identity into a question of ideology.\textsuperscript{17} In the end, the eye of the beholder rather than the existing form determined the reading of structures and their political signification.

The continuous reevaluation of the history of modern architecture and urbanism, to which this volume hopes to contribute, is not intended to lead to another linear, progressive, and historically deterministic master narrative, but rather towards an increasingly complex, rich tapestry of observations, achievements, and characters. While notions of a single, pioneering “avant-garde,” of masterpieces and heroic creators as key agents of historical change are naturally less prominent in such a view of history—where the typical will have as much impact as the exceptional—our imaginary tapestry is by no means without discernable structures and patterns. The above-mentioned grand narrative that had such an impact on the historiography of architecture and urbanism in the twentieth century will be one of those recognizable patterns. Recognizable, too, will be the recurring inclination to tie style to national, political, and economic characteristics as well as the astonishing resilience, recurrence, and ambiguity of Germany’s Amerikanismus.

Notes

4 The fascination with the phenomenon of the \textit{Weltstadt} in the 1920s, and its desirability for Germany, outweighed contemporary criticism, such as Oswald Spengler’s emphatic warnings that it stood for the final and most destructive episode in the decline of the West: “Der Steinkoloß ‘Weltstadt’ steht am Ende des Lebenslaufes einer jeden großen Kultur. Der

5 Berlin’s inferiority complex is much older, of course. A famous episode recalls the Prussian King Friedrich II, after having surrounded Berlin by a wall that included vast areas for future growth, asking the French Ambassador Marquis de Valori if Berlin was not comparable to Paris. The diplomat’s answer: “But, of course. Perhaps with the only difference that we neither sow nor harvest in Paris.” Michael Winteroll, *Die Geschichte Berlins* (Berlin, 2002), 51.


8 The Avery Index to Architectural Periodicals allows (admittedly somewhat crude) statistical surveys of the topics covered in architectural publications for about the past 100 years. Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, is the subject of 3,554 articles (more than any other individual architect), followed by Corbusier with 1,999 and Mies van der Rohe with 1,070, Michelangelo with 317 and Brunelleschi with 171. Modern Architecture was twice as often the subject matter than the buildings of the Renaissance or the Middle Ages. The interest in the twentieth century leads all other periods by a wide margin. While these numbers are probably neither complete nor accurate (since overlaps and double counts occur), they provide a general picture.


15 See for example the recent symposium at Yale University Architecture School, “When Modern was Modern,” October 1–2, 2004.


17 Richard Anderson, “Konvergenz and Abgrenzung: Architecture as System in the GDR” (paper presented at Columbia University, New York, 2003). Cordula Grewe would like to thank Richard Anderson for his assistance in preparing this volume. His help in the projects organizational phase was greatly appreciated, and his careful reading of the articles and insightful suggestions contributed much to the success of the volume.
A Cathedral of Work and New Social Life: The Contribution of Max Berg to the German Skyscraper Debate

Jerzy Ilkosz and Beate Störtkuhl

Convinced of Centenary Hall’s importance for the city of Breslau (today Wrocław), its creator, Max Berg, wrote thirty years after its construction: “The hall’s characteristic form already appears on stamps and so forth as a symbol of Breslau, just as the city’s old Gothic town hall once did.” Kathleen James-Chakraborty has compared the influence of the hall on architecture to the impact of Kandinsky’s works on modern painting, emphasizing that Berg managed to combine abstract forms with unparalleled engineering achievement. She notes that the reinforced concrete ribs of the vault, big arches, and details create an effect similar to the abstract forms of Kandinsky’s paintings, and that the interior expression achieved by the concrete construction heralded the dynamism of Erich Mendelsohn’s work.

During his pre-World War I period, Max Berg elaborated concepts of modern architecture and town planning which remained crucial for his further work. In 1909, Berg was elected chief architect of the city of Breslau and worked in that capacity until 1925. He considered problems of urban agglomeration in terms of the organization of social life, with the credo that “a well-designed town makes its inhabitants better.” Like many German architects, Berg was fascinated with the Chicago School and Frank Lloyd Wright. Around 1910, inspired by the American metropolis, an increasing interest in the architecture of skyscrapers can be noted in Germany, a fascination which to a certain extent emerged from a desire for monumentalism in Wilhelminian architecture. German architects and town planners accepted the high-rise building as a characteristic component of the cityscape in a rapidly expanding metropolis, something that would transform its center into an important core for business.

In 1910, the Gross Berlin competition was announced to solicit proposals for a new master plan for the German capital. Skyscraper projects designed in this context by Paul Wittig and Bruno Schmitz occasioned a long-lasting debate. Max Berg’s submission to the Gross Berlin competition presented his first urban plans. They contain his main ideas about the shape of a big city, which were expanded in the following years. He suggested new building regulations for Berlin, which would take account of economic and hygienic conditions and offer the ability to develop and expand the city in accordance with an agreed plan. Using the
example of Berlin, Berg proposed that a town should be divided into three functionally different zones: Wohnstadt (a residential zone), Arbeitstadt (a zone for work, subdivided into a business center called Geschäftstadt or City and an industrial park called Industriestadt), and Monumentalstadt (an area for culture and state administration). Around that time, Berg wrote of his business district, the City:

For functional reasons, the City should not be too spacious, as it would lose its density; its layout should be determined by the saying “time is money” . . . Therefore the City should grow high . . . Everybody familiar with American cities knows that business matters are simpler there and require much less time. By building adequately wide streets and big yards, high-rise development can be shaped as successfully as low-rise areas.

A heated discussion about skyscrapers broke out after World War I and became so widespread that it came to be called Hochhausfieber (skyscraper fever). Not only professional periodicals, but also daily newspapers devoted much attention to the subject. Despite the lack of an appropriate architectural form for this type of structure, German architects were united in regard to its function in city planning. The skyscraper was to enrich and compositionally unite the city panorama. However, German architects maintained an ambivalent attitude toward the American pattern. Neither the historicizing manner of the École des Beaux-Arts style nor the concept of a city densely built up with skyscrapers found favor in Germany. The latter stood in contrast to the proposals put forward by early twentieth-century reformers, such as the garden-city movement, who demanded light and green areas for the towns. It is worth noting that even in the biggest German towns there was no need to build a dense network of skyscrapers, as they did not lack space to the extent that American cities did.

The acceptance of the skyscraper concept was not brought about by the fantastic ideas of Taut and the Gläserne Kette (Glass Chain). Instead, it resulted from the popularization of projects for specific sites, even if from the very beginning there was little chance of realizing them. Berg’s articles in several periodicals in 1920–21 were important in this process. One was entitled “The Construction of High-rise Office Buildings in Order to Alleviate Housing Shortages, With Examples for Breslau,” in which he stated the need to concentrate offices in high-rise buildings. Thanks to this solution, many flats hitherto used as offices could regain their original function. Berg was the first German architect to connect the issue of skyscrapers with the housing shortage haunting Germany after the war. Due to the influx of refugees, this especially effected Breslau. Berg thus advanced a powerful argument for this type of building.
Max Berg executed his first skyscraper studies in late 1919. During the next two years, together with his assistants Ludwig Moshamer and Richard Konwiarz, he prepared a redevelopment project for Breslau’s city center, based on his concept for the Gross Berlin competition (Figure 1). He proposed to change Breslau’s transportation system by remodeling and widening streets and creating new commercial centers with buildings of various heights, from eight to twelve stories high. The city’s skyscrapers were to be located on large squares or on the banks of the Odra River and the city moat, functioning as hubs for future administrative, trade, and cultural centers (Figure 2). The dominant feature of Breslau’s old town was to be a high-rise building situated next to the Gothic town hall. The tall building on Lessingplatz (today, Powstańców Warszawskich) was to be the focal point of the future Monumentalstadt, consisting of a new arts and crafts museum, a university campus, and more (Figure 3). On the other side of the river, the head of the former Imperial Bridge was to be preceded by two high structures which would form a gate to the Lessingplatz. This cultural district was to supplant the market square and, at the same time, to become a symbol of new times and new architecture. A high-rise building near the Freiburger Bahnhof (Dworzec Świebodzki) was to be a destination for travelers, as that station was envisioned as Breslau’s main railway stop (Figure 4). The skyscraper near the

Figure 1. Max Berg (with Ludwig Moshamer and Richard Konwiarz), Project for the reorganization of the Breslau (Wrocław) city center, with locations for high-rise buildings, 1919. Source: Siedlung und Stadtpla-nung in Schlesien, vol. 1. (Breslau, 1926).
Figure 2. Max Berg, Model groundplans for high-rise buildings, 1922. Source: Institut für Regionalentwicklung und Strukturplanung, Erkner bei Berlin, Teilnachlass Max Berg.
Figure 3. Max Berg, Project for a high-rise building on the Lessingplatz, Breslau (Wrocław), view from the Odra river, 1920. Source: Muzeum Architektury we Wrocławiu—Wrocław Museum of Architecture.

Figure 4. Max Berg, Project for a shopping mall near Freiburger railway station, Brelsau (Wrocław), 1920. Source: Muzeum Architektury we Wrocławiu—Wrocław Museum of Architecture.
city moat (Schweidnitzer Stadtgraben/Podwale) was intended as an auxiliary center for the old town (Figure 5). Two other high-rise towers were planned by Berg near Centenary Hall, within Breslau’s exposition grounds, the principal site for trade and cultural exchange for the entire province.¹³

An important aspect of Max Berg’s work was the rational preparation of the structural layout, composition, and construction. Apart from aesthetic considerations, he was very concerned with the technical issues of a given project. Berg aimed for optimum use of the advantages of a high-rise building, through economy in planning and construction according to the following three requirements: 1) good lighting for the interior; 2) good lighting for nearby buildings; 3) an optimum usable to

Figure 5. Max Berg, Project for a high-rise at the Schweidnitzer Stadtgraben, Breslau (Wrocław), 1920. Source: Muzeum Architektury we Wrocławiu—Wrocław Museum of Architecture.
non-usable area ratio. In order to fulfill these requirements, Berg created auxiliary models: geometric projections of high-rise buildings, which he divided into two categories, taking account of differences in the transportation system. He explained how to use these models:

The basic form of a high-rise building (through a reduction in size below the standard and, to balance this, a partial increase beyond it, and a sequencing of the building parts) grows organically, almost mathematically like a crystal, when it fulfills these three requirements. In this way, the shaping hand of the artistically sensitive architect creates artistic cultural value through the sensitive placement of the building within the network of urban spaces and streets.

Berg had already applied this organic “from inside to outside” approach in the design of Centenary Hall. Starting work on a skyscraper from a plan, and not from the three-dimensional modeling of the mass according to its intended function, is also reminiscent of the concepts of Frank Lloyd Wright and Louis Sullivan, as well as Hugo Härings “organic architecture.”

Max Berg placed great emphasis on “noble” proportions. In the 1930s, he dealt with the issue in a treatise entitled “Proportions and Artistic Creativity,” which shows the influence of the esoteric teachings of Pythagoras and the Neo-Pythagoreans:

At the basis of all creation, from the macrocosm to the micro-cosm, are the cosmic-mathematical proportions that we can also identify in art works of all eras . . . The magic world of symbols found in medieval cathedrals is alive and vibrant and was only completely and willingly taken up by Christianity because it refers, beyond the mystical-esoteric Greek and Egyptian tradition, to a common heathen world of symbols of a monotheistic Ur-religion, more or less related to all Urvölker (ancient peoples).

For the construction of high-rise buildings, Berg planned to use reinforced concrete. He had applied this material before, in Centenary Hall and other edifices in Breslau. Walter Gropius also considered using reinforced concrete in a skyscraper, when he was preparing his design for the competition held by the Chicago Tribune. In Berg’s considerations, the town planning aspect, i.e. the function of skyscrapers in the city structure, played an important role. Max Berg suggested the introduction of adequate building regulations in order to protect towns from a chaotic increase of skyscrapers (as had happened in America) because this would distort the historically evolved cityscape and drastically worsen living conditions.
Pointing out the difference between Europe and America ("in America the town center is perceived as vertical; in Europe, horizontal"), Berg thought that modern European towns should blend verticalism and horizontalism by decentralizing their traffic systems. He recommended that prior to making a decision to erect a high-rise, the city's general redevelopment plan had to be drawn up. He also advocated considering spatial planning from the perspective of regional planning and economic, transportation, and energy conditions, just as Martin Mächler (a Swiss town planner and Berg's friend) had done. Both architects regarded spatial planning as an activity that should be undertaken in tandem with the introduction of a new economic policy that would make social reforms and radically improve living conditions. In a sense, Berg's town planning proposals anticipated the designs of the Tennessee Valley Authority during President Roosevelt's New Deal.

Like Taut and Gropius, Berg compared skyscrapers to Gothic cathedrals and large parish churches. Just as the latter had dominated the medieval townscape, skyscrapers would dominate the business center (Geschäftsstadt) of the modern city, as temples of human labor. However, from among the formal reminiscences of the Gothic, perceived as the triumph of verticalism, Berg left only pilaster strips crowned with wave-like, pointed forms and pointed crowns on top of roof edges (e.g. the high-rise building on the Lessingplatz). Instead, Berg's designs anticipated the principles of the Neues Bauen movement from the later 1920s: the rhythmization of the structure’s gigantic mass was in agreement with its harmonious proportions, taking account of the height of the neighboring buildings. Berg dematerialized the walls by means of window strips and, in so doing, uncovered the building's skeleton. His main achievement with this concept was the 1920 design of a shopping mall near the Freiburger railway station in Breslau (Figure 4). Along a broad street, Berg planned eight- and twelve-story buildings in which the accentuation of verticals would be entirely replaced with a horizontal structure, composed of alternating strips of windows and walls. These characteristic forms with rounded house corners heralded the famous department stores of Erich Mendelsohn. For Berg, the point of reference was Hans Polezig's office building in Breslau (Junkernstrasse/ul. Ofiar Oświęcimskich), erected in 1911–12.

Near the city moat, Berg planned a twenty-five-story building, consisting of a circular core with a round inner yard surrounded by four-story houses (Figure 5). The design shows a much more advanced reduction of architectural form, cut down to a compact geometric solid. Its readable and simple architectural form anticipated structures such as the model of the Haus Berlin, designed for the Potsdamerplatz by Hans and Wassili Luckhard and Alfons Anker in 1929–31.
Together with Richard Konwiarz, Max Berg created three versions of the office building at Siebenhufener Strasse (ul.Tęczowa), which are among the most interesting and mature of all his work (Figure 6). They differ stylistically, showing expressionist or constructivist tendencies. The ground floor had one large room intended for ticket counters, which was modeled on the Larkin Building in Buffalo, designed by Frank Lloyd Wright in 1904. In the second version, the building has twenty-five stories, growing narrower at the top. This was the most dynamic model, reminiscent of Bruno Taut’s expressionist projects. The third version (Figures 7 and 8) is the opposite of the second: it is calm, even static, based on an intermingling of cubic solids. The concept reflected Berg’s inclination toward functionalist architecture. He was close to the Chicago School and Louis Sullivan, as well as to the work of Ludwig Hilberseimer, from

Figure 6. Max Berg, Project (first version) for a high-rise on Siebenhufener Strasse, Breslau (Wroclaw), 1920. Source: Muzeum Architektury we Wroclawiu—Wroclaw Museum of Architecture.
Hilberseimer’s 1922 skyscraper design for the *Chicago Tribune* competition to his city architecture concept of later years.

Berg’s design, submitted in several versions, for a twenty-to-thirty-story skyscraper on Breslau’s market square on a site immediately adjac-
cent to the Gothic town hall evoked vigorous protest from municipal authorities. Berg’s vision, striking even today, derives from his convictions about the essence of architecture:

It is not the historical form (never mind whether Romanesque, Gothic, baroque, or modern) that determines the harmony of works of art from various historical periods and styles. What matters is the artist’s sensitivity for the right form. Well-comprehended architecture fits together well, irrespective of the period in which it was created.23

Despite the fact that his third version of the market square skyscraper was clearly influenced by American examples (above all, the Equitable Life Insurance building in New York, designed by Ernest E. Graham in 1915), and despite frequent technical “borrowings” from the United States, Berg rejected the American skyscraper, as did most German architects: “It is generally agreed that American solutions cannot be models for Germany in terms of town planning, architecture, or society.”24 His theoretical works are very concerned with a critical assessment of the
American skyscraper, as well as with the criteria for a better, “German” type of high-rise:

Although many skyscrapers have been built in the United States, no well-worked-out architectural form has been developed for them . . . The building is most often eclectic and combines components of various origin . . . America’s most frequent solution is a ground floor modeled on palace or temple architecture; above it, telescopically formed stories with windows in classical or Renaissance frames, with a pillar order motif . . . The whole edifice is crowned with a superstructure, again resembling church or palace architecture, usually topped with a pointed roof, cupola, or pyramid.25

According to Berg, American architects were much more interested in a building’s economy than its aesthetic or town-planning components:

Knowing that a skyscraper’s outline must be as clear and simple as possible because of the density of rooms and intensive traffic within, [the architect] chooses a compact projection, fills in the building plot as fully as possible and raises the edifice high, in the simplest cubic form, disregarding the environment . . . Like a mess of enormous building blocks one atop the other, by its dimensions alone the city of New York astonishes those who enter its harbor.26

Comparing American skyscrapers to the designs of German architects, Max Berg noticed that Germans emphasized a structure’s external form, adapting it to the city’s appearance. Berg did not overlook this issue in his own work, and took account of the city’s panorama. A new building’s height should correspond to that of nearby existing structures and should not exceed a certain limit established for the city; in the case of Breslau, this was to be the tower of St. Elizabeth’s church (Figure 9). The importance Berg attached to this is clear when his design for Breslau is compared with other high-rise structures, such as skyscrapers in New York.

Berg’s ideas differed from American concepts, not only in purely architectural and city planning terms, but also in the social and political sphere. The American skyscraper was to Berg a symbol of wild, land-speculating capitalism, which he described as “a concrete indictment of the oppressive rule of capital.”27 In opposition, Berg, who like Taut and other architects of the younger generation regarded himself as a Social Democrat, wanted the German skyscraper to symbolize a new social vision. To deter speculation in real estate, skyscrapers were only to be permitted on public land. The construction and, later, the administration
of the edifices would be in the hands of publicly owned building companies.

The critical position toward American models was to no small degree a result of Germany’s defeat in World War I: the “German” skyscraper was to manifest the independence and superiority of German culture. Thus, it was no coincidence that the first German skyscraper competition was announced in May 1920 in Danzig (Gdańsk), a city which had been separated from the “Reich” by the Versailles Treaty. Many works prepared for the competition contained intentional references to the architecture of Prussia at the time of the Teutonic Knights, thus stressing the “Germanness” of the land. The significance of the “skyscraper debate” for the self-determination of the Germans as a steadfast and unbroken nation was also noticed outside their country. Le Corbusier noted in 1921: “The systematic use of the vertical line is mystical in Germany . . . Germans wish to turn their architecture into one of the most effective weapons of Pan-Germanism.”

Max Berg’s skyscraper designs and his proposals for the redevelopment of Breslau’s center did not find favor with the city authorities, and not only because of their cost. However, they inspired many German architects in the interwar period. This is best evidenced by the competition for a skyscraper near Berlin’s Friedrichstrasse railway station, announced in 1921, which marked the peak of German “skyscraper fever.” The organizer received 144 designs for the development of a triangular plot in downtown Berlin, which prior to World War I had already been considered as a potential site for a skyscraper. The terms or the competition set the maximum building height at eighty meters. Financial considerations and bureaucratic problems prohibited the competition designs from ever being implemented.

Because the competition was restricted to free-lance architects, as a civil servant, Max Berg could not take part, but he joined the discussion and was one of the competition’s most discerning observers. Berg criti-
cized the winning designs for misunderstanding the concept of a sky-
scraper in a European city. He also condemned the various historicizing
projects which treated the skyscraper as a palace or sacred building. On
the other hand, he emphasized the interesting proposals by Hans
Scharoun, Hugo Häring, and Ludwig Moshammer. Furthermore, Berg was
the only critic to draw attention to Mies van der Rohe’s “Honeycomb.”
In the periodical Die Bauwelt, Max Berg presented five versions of his own
proposal for a skyscraper in Berlin, which were reminiscent of his Breslau
projects.

During the 1920s, Berg took part in several skyscraper competitions,
including ones in Cologne, Breslau, and Hindenburg/Zabrze (Upper Sile-
sia). None were realized. Generally, visions for German skyscraper were
seldom executed, due to building laws. A building counting more than
six stories was considered a “high-rise building” and the tallest edifices in
German towns reached only ten to thirteen stories.

In the end, Max Berg’s idea of erecting skyscrapers to fight the hous-
ing shortage did not convince the authorities. During the financial crises
of the first Weimar years, they rightly chose to concentrate public spend-
ing on building residential quarters. In Breslau, Berg’s position weakened
after the dispute over the market square skyscraper. To end his quarrels
with the municipal authorities, Berg left his position as chief architect
before the end of his term. Nevertheless, Berg was one of the most emi-
nent architects and town planners in early twentieth-century Germany.
As pointed out by Adolf Rading, an architect and a professor at Breslau’s
Art Academy, Berg’s importance for Breslau was not recognized until the
creator of Centenary Hall had left the city. In 1925 Paul Heim, a local
architect, wrote about him:

Berg rejects compromises . . . Such people make many enemies . . .
However, there are two things undisputed even by his most ar-
dent opponents: his intentions were perfectly clear and his skills
impeccable. His buildings are of lasting value. They show how to
move away from fossilization towards function and purity of
form, shaping frames for a new life.

Notes

1 This paper is based on the authors’ theses in Jerzy Ilkosz and Beate Störtkuhl, eds.,
vor dem Hintergrund des ‘Hochhausfiebers’ in Deutschland um 1920,” 17–30; Ilkosz, “Das
Hochhaus in der Stadtstruktur am Beispiel Breslaus in den Jahren 1919–1928. Die städte-
bauliche Konzeption Max Bergs,” 31–60.

2 Max Berg, letter to Friedrich Sesselberg, February 18, 1941, Nachlass Max Berg, Deutsches
Museum München, box 050/001.

4 Wolfgang Pehnt, Die Architektur des Expressionismus (Stuttgart, 1973), 35.

5 Ilkosz, “Das Hochhaus in der Stadtstruktur.”


7 Zimmermann, Der Schrei, 238–9.


9 Ibid.


13 Ilkosz, “Das Hochhaus in der Stadtstruktur.”


15 Ibid., 58.

16 See Jerzy Ilkosz, Hala Stulecia i Tereny Wystawowe we Wroclawir (The Centenary Hall and the Exposition Grounds at Wroclaw-Szczyniki), (Wrocław, 2005), 148–212.


21 See Jerzy Ilkosz, “Koncepcje urbanistyczne Maxa Berga na przykładzie projektów przebudowy Berlina w 1910 i Wrocławia w latach 1919–1920” (Max Berg’s urbanistic concepts—


26 Ibid.


29 Zimmermann, Der Schrei.


FROM GERMANY TO AMERICA: WALTER GROPIUS AND MARTIN WAGNER ON SKYSCRAPERS AND THE PLANNING OF HEALTHY CITIES

Jeffry M. Diefendorf

In order to explore the complex conjuncture of the themes of transatlantic exchanges between Germany and America, urban planning, and the design of skyscrapers, I have chosen to look at two émigré architects and planners, Walter Gropius and Martin Wagner, both part of the generation that created the modernist movement. They were designers, but also authors of prescriptive essays. Once in the United States, both sought to integrate European and American ideas about modern architecture, housing, and urban design.¹ Both were actively and self-consciously engaged in a dialogue between America and Germany, and a key feature of that dialogue was the place of skyscrapers in healthy cities of the future, although today neither Gropius nor Wagner is best known for skyscraper design.² Because they left Germany for America, it is tempting to see their careers as part of an American import of European modernism. But, in fact, they embody the interconnected movement of ideas about buildings and cities back and forth across the Atlantic. A primary aim of this essay is to see how those ideas were formed and then changed by relocation and new circumstances.

German émigré architects were fascinated by the possibilities of using industrial technology in designing both skyscrapers and houses. David Nye has argued that skyscrapers embody the American “technological sublime.” The technological sublime is experienced when “an object, natural or man-made, disrupts ordinary perception and astonishes the senses, forcing the observer to grapple mentally with its immensity and power.”³ Skyscrapers stimulate this experience from several perspectives. During construction, observers thrill at the creation of the rising steel frame. When the completed building is viewed up close from the street, mass and height cause dizziness and awe. When viewed from a distance, skyscrapers form “an artificial horizon” and conjure up the sensation of a Romantic landscape. Since many skyscrapers have observation platforms or windows at the top, viewers can also be dazzled by the powerful sensation of a commanding panorama of a miniaturized city, complete with tiny vehicles and pedestrians.

At the same time, industrial technology was considered as an almost magical solution to the housing crises faced by Germany in the 1920s, and by America during the 1930s and 1940s. Overcrowded, congested slums
made cities unhealthy both biologically and politically. New forms of housing, embedded in new concepts of urban design, promised a remedy. Architects and planners believed that elegant, simple design, the mass production of building elements or entire houses using modern materials, the absence of unnecessary and expensive decorative façades, and the standardization and prefabrication of bathrooms, kitchens, and laundries would result in the large-scale production of high-quality, low-cost houses for the working class, unmarried adults (including war widows), and retirees. Erected on the right sites, with easy access to plenty of light, air, and greenery, the new housing would make for healthy, happy, and productive citizens—and healthy cities meant a healthy nation. By updating, modernizing, and vastly expanding the garden city ideal, architects could fulfill their deep-felt obligation to society as a whole and not just serve clients with deep pockets. But a common thread in both skyscraper and housing design was the fascination with industrial production and technology that characterized the modern age and promised revolutionary change.

While critics saw skyscrapers as a negative symbol of threatening materialism and American economic and imperial power, there was also a positive German and American image of America as a country characterized equally by skyscrapers and shining mobile homes. Both were featured in a 1949 exhibition in Frankfurt entitled “Wo wohnt Amerika?” (“Where does America Live?”). The reviewer for Die Neue Stadt saw both skyscrapers and mobile homes as expressions of modern industrial design and technology aimed at meeting consumers’ needs and wishes. He argued that because they shared this aim, German-born architects were well received in America. Furthermore, something modern skyscrapers and mobile homes had in common was steel. In a 1930 book entitled Stahlland Amerika (America: Land of Steel), Otto van Halem celebrated “the symbolic power of steel in society,” as characterized by the Ford motor works. In Germany, “Fordism” meant the mass production of modern consumer goods. Perhaps the best example of such a product was the automobile, which was transforming modern life.

The career of Walter Gropius is well known. After working in Peter Behrens’s Berlin office, Gropius gained some fame before World War I for his modernist Fagus factory. When the war ended, he was one of many architects sharing a radical vision of solving society’s problems through design. He directed the Bauhaus, first in Weimar and then in Dessau, from 1919 to 1928, when he left to resume a full-time practice in Berlin. In 1934, recognizing that the combination of Nazi hostility to modernism and the depressed building market meant few opportunities to work, he left for England. In 1937, Gropius moved on to America, becoming head of the architecture department at Harvard.
The connection between modern architecture and a radical social vision was already present in 1911 when, in a speech in Hagen, Gropius praised Behrens, who created ingenious monumental industrial buildings using iron and glass. Such buildings were “palaces which provide factory workers, the slaves of modern industrial labor, not only light, air, and cleanliness but also allow them to feel something of the value of the common great idea that drives the whole.”

The creation of such “works of art,” Gropius said, required the “personality and power of genius. . . . Only a genius possesses the power to combine the natural and supernatural” and bring together the great ideas of the age in forms that were beautiful, practical, and economical. By 1919, Gropius saw the architect as the “Führer of the arts,” whose “high office must play a public role in a democracy,” creating great works by being in harmony with the spirit of the people and solving the great problems of the times.

The most immediate way to do this was to mass-produce housing. Thus, in 1925, the Bauhaus developed a model house with the goal of encouraging the factory production of components which could be assembled on-site. Describing this project, Gropius anticipated the post-1945 image of America as a land of skyscrapers and mobile homes when he speculated: “Perhaps mobile houses, which would help us to enjoy the convenience of truly comfortable housing that we could take with us when we move, are no longer a distant utopia.”

Because of his advocacy of economical, factory-produced housing, Gropius became known as the “WohnFord,” the innovator who would use American forms of industrial production to solve the housing problem. As we will see, however, this moniker was inaccurate.

As a leading advocate of the “new architecture”—buildings constructed from modern materials and devoid of historicist decoration—Gropius was also interested in skyscrapers, but opportunities to build them in impoverished, tumultuous post-1919 Germany were negligible. Hence Gropius submitted an entry for the Chicago Tribune’s 1922 international skyscraper competition. His design, a clean thirty-two-floor tower of asymmetrical cubic masses broken by cantilevered balconies, is a far cry from mass-produced housing, but it shows that Gropius was fascinated with American high-rise, steel-frame construction (Figure 1). That he did not win the competition left a sour taste in his mouth. Writing in 1926, he called skyscrapers “another creation of American technology,” one made possible by economic demand and low land prices. In Germany they would be an “unused luxury.” While skyscrapers could lay “claim to beauty” as long as they remain “objective” (sachlich), all too often Americans display “a latent Romanticism” and clad their skyscrapers with Gothic or Renaissance features. This, Gropius wrote, “made them as ridiculous as a Negro who wears [fancy shirt] cuffs with a loin-cloth.”
Figure 1. Walter Gropius, Competition Entry for the Chicago Tribune Tower, 1922. Source: Walter Gropius Archive, Busch-Reisinger Museum, Harvard University. Reproduced with permission.
Gropius expresses reluctant admiration for the economic efficiency of American skyscrapers, built rapidly by teams of architects, draftsmen, engineers, and technicians.\(^\text{15}\)

Gropius sought to combine his interests in housing construction and tall buildings in designs for new residential settlements between 1929 and 1931, including one for Berlin-Spandau-Haselhorst whose the prize committee included Martin Wagner, then chief planner for Berlin. This project would have housed nearly 18,000 people (Figure 2).\(^\text{16}\) Gropius discussed his design in several articles entitled “Flach-, Mittel- oder Hochbau” (low-, medium-, or high-rise). Wagner wrote an introduction to a version published in 1929, and this was also the title of Gropius’s talk to the 3\(^{rd}\) CIAM (Congrès Internationaux de l’Architecture Moderne) conference in Brussels in 1930. The 1930 CIAM meeting focused on land planning and housing, contrasting high density, high-rise projects with the sprawl resulting from the garden city approach. Gropius was a prominent speaker at this conference, and Martin Wagner also attended.\(^\text{17}\) Gropius’s talk is worth our attention because therein he puts forth his ideas for healthy city living.\(^\text{18}\)

Gropius admits that the current desire for healthy, hygienic housing stresses light and air, which is best achieved through single-family housing with gardens. The desire to go back to nature as an antidote to the overcrowded metropolis is entirely understandable, but this, he argues, is “an economic utopia.”\(^\text{19}\) Allowing cities to spread out into distant suburbs made up of single-family homes necessitates long commutes to work, which is a huge waste of time and an economic burden in terms of lost work time. In fact, new studies of several big cities show that cities do not necessarily lead to lower birth rates or bad health. It is not urban living per se but rather bad housing that is the problem. Gropius notes that even Martin Wagner, “a passionate advocate of Flachbau,” admits that small dwellings are not the solution to urban problems.\(^\text{20}\)

Instead, a properly designed high-rise, set in greenery with views of nature, can be “a biologically correct housing model for our times.”\(^\text{21}\) One can simply calculate the ideal height, based on cost of production (building and land costs) and how placement combined with size can maximize sunlight, even for apartments on the lower floors. Gropius concludes that high-rise buildings of ten to twelve floors are the ideal. In principle, though, the calculations can be made for any size, and he cites the study by the Hamburg Oberbaudirektor Gustav Leo who considered buildings up to sixty stories. Gropius’s housing projects, therefore, feature some low-rise buildings but are characterized by a series of carefully situated ten-to twelve-story slabs. They feature communal facilities, such as shops, on the ground floors, and he would build roof gardens for small children. Building only single-family houses would be “the dissolution and renun-
A" instead, one should pursue the "opening up (Auflockerung) of the city." Building high-rise apartments of the right kind allows for the introduction of greenery on the ground and roofs, thereby connecting (not separating) nature and the city. Since existing German...
cities were already densely built up, new settlements of the sort Gropius suggested would have to be built on the edges, but he believed this design could stop what is today called sprawl.

Admittedly, the ten-to-twelve-story slabs proposed by Gropius might not be considered skyscrapers in New York, but they were the sort of Hochhäuser he thought best for Germany. Gropius displayed a model of a steel-skeleton apartment tower, an eleven-story slab, at the Paris exhibition of 1930. According to his friend and biographer Reg Isaacs, the idea of the steel frame was something he brought back from the United States. He undoubtedly observed the technique in New York and Chicago during his first trip to the United States in 1928, where he also met the Austrian-born architect Richard Neutra in Los Angeles. Neutra, who had come to the United States in 1923, had already praised steel-frame high-rise construction in his 1927 book Wie baut Amerika? At the time they met, Neutra was heavily involved in designing his pioneering steel-framed Lovell House. Surely the two modernists discussed it.

Once he moved to the United States, Gropius’s time was mostly taken up with teaching and establishing an architectural practice, initially with Marcel Breuer. Together they designed the 1941 housing settlement in New Kensington, Pennsylvania, a one-to-two-story, 250-unit project for employees of a nearby ALCOA aluminum plant. This small project is emblematic of the challenge confronting all architects in America as the country rearmed and then joined World War II. Huge amounts of housing needed to be built quickly to accommodate the migration of workers to key industrial sites, and the German-born architects were all involved in this effort.

Martin Wagner studied in Berlin and Dresden, then moved back to Berlin in 1914. In 1918 he was chosen as chief planner in the suburb of Schöneberg. During the heady days of the revolution of 1918–19, he cautioned against the rapid socialization of the building industry, preferring instead that the trade unions form their own building companies on a capitalist basis and then sponsor mass housing programs. When Schöneberg was incorporated into Greater Berlin in 1920, he went to work for one of the largest social housing corporations, which sent him in 1924 on a study trip to the United States. In 1925–26, he joined Bruno Taut (certainly one of the utopians in 1919) in designing the famous “Horseshoe” settlement in Berlin Britz, with 1,000 dwellings constructed using the rationalized building practices of the “new building.” And in late 1926, Wagner was appointed head of the Berlin planning department, where he became a firm proponent of the industrialization of housing production and initiated several large housing construction projects. In other words, where Gropius was a theoretician of industrialized mass
housing, Wagner sought to put this combination of social vision and architectural design into practice.

As Berlin’s chief planner, he had other tasks as well. He prepared proposals to redesign both Potsdamer Platz and Alexanderplatz in 1928–29, and photos of the models show massed cubic buildings of varying heights, including modest towers of perhaps sixteen stories on Alexanderplatz and a considerably taller tower on Potsdamer Platz. In 1929 he traveled again to New York, this time with Ernst Reuter, the head of the traffic planning department, and came away with strong impressions of the negative impact of skyscrapers on the land prices of neighboring properties in inner-city areas and of the growing problem of automobile traffic. In an essay written in 1929, he drew on his American trip to argue that “modern city planning desires the freedom to design,” and that new urban forms include skyscrapers. However, since such buildings create problems relating to land speculation, traffic flow, light, and air, planning for skyscrapers requires comprehensive planning for the “entire city,” not just a few blocks. The onset of the Great Depression, of course, meant that such projects could not be realized.

Identified both with the Social Democrats and with Berlin’s huge social housing corporation, Wagner quickly came under fire from the Nazis in 1933. When the Werkbund was “coordinated” and it moved to expel Käthe Kollwitz and Heinrich Mann, Wagner resigned from the board in protest and Gropius joined him. Ousted from the city government in March 1933, Wagner first went in 1935 to become chief planner in Ankara, Turkey, but in 1938 Gropius was able to find a position for him at Harvard, teaching town planning. Between 1941 and 1943, Gropius and Wagner co-authored a half-dozen essays and reports on city planning and housing in wartime America.

The themes of these papers reveal a greater shift for Gropius than for Wagner. For example, “Cities’ Renaissance” begins boldly: “Our cities are sick, deathly sick, machine sick.” American cities built in the railroad age were now decaying and run by corrupt politicians. With words that show their embrace of American democracy, the German exiles endorse town meetings that could only be found in small communities, where living would be on a human scale. The creation of such towns would not mean that people would be forced to live there. Although people have freedom of choice, however, these townships would offer a qualitatively better life that would reduce nomadism and build community values. What is needed is large-scale comprehensive planning, national building laws, and “compulsory amortization and depreciation of all building structures” so that planning authorities can demolish and renew big cities. Moreover, Wagner and Gropius denounce skyscrapers in no uncertain terms, calling them “light robbers, traffic compressors, and space
squeezers . . . stone masses and crematoriums of real life and happiness.” Consequently, they argued that in the new central cities there should be no “‘business cathedrals’ in the form of huge skyscrapers” because people want to be able to drive and park, which requires space for traffic. The “people’s” cultural buildings should not be “overtopped by profane business buildings . . . A people that tolerates business cathedrals has lost its soul to them and should not be surprised at being sold to usurers and usurpers.”

In other essays, Wagner and Gropius argue that people flee cities for the suburbs so they can live closer to nature. Planners thus need to devise a transportation system to ease traffic flow between (the) old cities, which should be rejuvenated, and (the) new neighborhoods on the edges. Hence “the goal of the modern town-planner is to bring town and country into a closer relationship,” ending the distinction between the two.28 The old cities’ excess population should be siphoned off to populate the new small towns, freeing up urban space for renovation.29 City land should be acquired on a large scale by the public and consolidated to facilitate new planning and building. In this way, “all those employed in the central areas will live in dwelling quarters which, more widely spaced and surrounded by parks, will [fit to build] that constructive community interest and neighborhood spirit long lost in the old cities.”30 Communities, neighborhoods, town meetings, the union of town and country - these were the ingredients for healthy cities and a healthy democracy.

At the same time as they put forth this planning vision, Wagner and Gropius also advocated prefabrication as a way to meet wartime demand for new housing. Gilbert Herbert has argued that “Gropius and Wagner, in the American context, were ideologues of prefabrication, and not practitioners.”31 Yet Gropius certainly sought to be a practitioner of a certain sort. In 1941, Konrad Wachsmann, yet another refugee from Berlin, arrived at the Gropius home with a design for a steel-frame for prefabricated wall panels. Before fleeing Germany, Wachsmann had been the chief engineer for its biggest producer of prefab wooden houses. Wachsmann and Gropius collaborated on designing and patenting a panel system for on-site housing construction, known as the “Packaged House” system, and Gropius and Wagner proposed building settlements using this system.32 After the war, Wachsmann went on to found the General Panel Corporation, with the goal of producing 10,000 houses each year. In fact, the corporation was a failure and went into bankruptcy in 1951. Far too many firms were competing to produce prefabricated housing.33

What is of interest here is that this effort was entirely directed toward single family homes and embraced the American ideal of indi-
individual home ownership. This was a kind of Fordism, to be sure, but the Gropius-Wachsmann panels did not sell. Gropius was not the WohnFord after all. Herbert suggests that Wachsmann (and, I think, Gropius too) was most interested in

the elegant exploitation of advanced technology. He was drawn, philosophically, aesthetically (in the sense of a mathematician seeking the beauty of an elegant, minimalist equation) to the materials of tomorrow . . . rather than to the cumbersome and crude mass materials of yesterday; he was fascinated by the fineness of machine production, not by the quantitative bulk output of the concrete mixer. [Gropius] saw in the repetition of large units, or of total dwellings, a perversion of technology, exploiting its mechanical potential through soulless multiplication of identical units, without the saving grace of variability and individual choice. 34

Production of these panels, in other words, was perhaps an exercise in the technological sublime and not a realistic attempt to solve the problem of mass housing. Elements were prefabricated, not whole houses, thus avoiding the threat of monotony and uniformity. Moreover, Gropius’s ideal of high-rise slabs of apartments disappeared in favor of individualized homes: Flachbau won out over Hochbau.

By the end of the war, Gropius may have absorbed American values like individualism and small-town democracy, but he had lost most of the radical social vision that had animated his earlier thinking and led him to advocate the complete transformation of cities. For example, in a speech to the Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts in November 1943, he stressed the role of the architect as a humble coordinator of building activity, no longer the “Führer of the arts,” as he had proclaimed in 1915. Indeed, he condemned any architect who “suffers from the antiquated dream of genius, forgetting that ‘genius is 5% inspiration and 95% perspiration,’ as Edison once aptly put it.” 35 Here, Gropius is a long way from that praise he lavished on the genius of Behrens before World War I. Furthermore, he admits that prefabrication “was a slow, evolutionary movement” and not “a sudden revolutionary break” that would provide good housing for all. “For the time being, people will unavoidably connect prefabrication in their mind with jerry-building.” 36

In mid-1944, the remnants of CIAM held several meetings in New York. Attended by a few American architects and exiles like Gropius, Neutra, Siegfried Giedion, and José Luis Sert (now head of the organization), the goal was not so much to revitalize CIAM as to define a role for themselves in postwar reconstruction. To this end they created a “Chapter for Relief and Postwar Planning,” and Neutra was elected its presi-
dent. War damage, combined with a global enthusiasm for planning, seemed to present a golden opportunity not just to further their ideas but to win actual commissions. They hoped both to renovate unbombed but run-down cities and to rebuild bombed cities. To promote this goal, Neutra subsequently attended the spring 1945 meeting in San Francisco at which the United Nations was created, but CIAM’s dream of leading postwar reconstruction was realized neither in war-torn Europe nor in America.37

If the dialogue between Germany and America was broken off by Nazism and the war, there was an opportunity to revive it after 1945. Gropius was invited by General Lucius Clay to come to Germany in 1947 and advise the military governor on rebuilding bombed cities. His visit generated great excitement among “progressive” architects who had stayed in Germany, hunkered down, and survived the war. They were looking for support from Gropius to bolster their ideals, but they were to be disappointed. Gropius was horrified by the damage and he did not feel up to the challenge of really engaging with reconstruction. To Clay and to the Germans who heard him speak, he recommended creating broad agencies, strong laws, and research institutes for planning. He called for constructing small neighborhood units of five to eight thousand people as vehicles for building community and promoting democracy. He encouraged prefabrication of housing elements but urged Germans to avoid “the prevalent mechanistic approach to standardization,” noting that “a mechanistic and technocratic attitude derived from the Nazi mentality, instead of a creative one, is still prevalent.” And he offered general support for the Deutscher Werkbund, the Bauhaus, and CIAM, all of which represented modern ideas.38 Karl Bonatz, then head of planning in West Berlin, found Gropius’s Berlin lecture “disillusioning,” offering little more than utopian platitudes with little relation to reality.39

When Gropius went to Frankfurt am Main, where the Americans had their headquarters, he was invited by his German hosts to prepare plans for the city’s reconstruction. He declined, though again he argued for a new kind of city, a healthier city made up of small communities surrounding a core. In the core there could be tall buildings to allow for an opening up of the city and the introduction of greenery, but he warned against over-mechanization and over-standardization.40 These themes echoed his speech to the CIAM Congress in Bridgewater, where he had argued that a community that was healthy in a spiritual and physical sense had to be made of small neighborhoods connected by a good transportation network.41 When it came to specifics, however, Walter Gropius simply was not willing to assume any responsibility for rebuilding Germany, nor did he contribute much to any dialogue about reconstruction. This was something best left to Germans; Gropius was now an American.
While some German planners, like Bonatz, rejected Gropius’s “advice,” others welcomed it. Notable is Rudolf Hillebrecht, who had worked with Gropius on his proposal for the Reichsbank and for a Haus der Arbeit in 1933, and then worked in the office of Konstanty Gutschow in Hamburg until 1945, before becoming the chief planner for Hannover. As such, he gained the reputation as postwar Germany’s most important and successful reconstruction planner. Hillebrecht met Gropius in Stuttgart in 1947 and reported in detail on their conversation. He observed that Gropius now “distances himself” from high-rise apartments, though most people remember him as “a one-sided and apodictic defender” of such buildings. Gropius would now allow for high-rises for the elderly or retired people, but generally favored low housing to encourage community formation and democracy. Hillebrecht expressed amazement and pleasure at how close Gropius’s ideas of neighborhood-based small towns were to those of the English and also the Germans during the war. Nazi-era planners used the term “Ortsgruppen als Siedlungszellen,” which is still essentially a neighborhood “in spite of all the unmistakable Nazi diction.” All of them conceive of towns of five to eight thousand people, or two to three thousand families. “We are talking about a necessary decentralization of the metropolis,” Hillebrecht said. Gropius also saw the bomb damage as “an opportunity” for a “mighty renewal” of cities. Furthermore, Gropius rejected the whole idea of an “international style” of architecture. Gropius found the term misleading, since in reality practitioners of “functional building” tailor style to suit local conditions, including “climate, geographical position, landscape, orientation to sky and wind, [and the] customs and practices of residents.” Style was thus individual and local, not international at all.

In other words, Gropius made it clear that he could offer only general advice to his former countrymen. Rebuilding postwar cities was an opportunity to renew and rebuild healthy cities, but those should consist of small clustered neighborhoods of low structures. Only a few tall buildings should still rise in city cores, but probably no higher than ten to twelve floors. The style of construction should be functional, not “international,” based on local physical conditions and human needs. The prefabrication of building components was fine, but not excessive standardization or entire prefabricated houses. There was no grand social vision, no endorsement of skyscrapers, no strong praise for the plain, cubic, steel and glass boxes based on the Bauhaus. With that, Gropius returned to Harvard to teach and build his architectural practice, The Architects’ Collaborative (TAC), a new firm that embodied Gropius’s model of shared project design.

By this time, Gropius had broken with Martin Wagner, precisely because Wagner openly criticized him for having lost his reforming spirit.
Unlike Gropius, who was invited by General Clay to Germany in 1947, who built in Berlin in the 1950s and 1960s, and who was feted world-wide as a pioneer genius of modern architecture, Wagner sank into relative obscurity—a fall partly of his own making. For unlike Gropius, who had either abandoned his earlier radical social vision or had given work for individual clients much higher priority, Wagner clung to his revolutionary vision of healthy cities and healthy, prefabricated housing for the masses. More importantly, he desperately wanted to return to Germany to play a leading role in rebuilding. He bombarded the reemerging German architectural and planning periodicals with articles demanding that Germans engage in comprehensive planning to completely restructure their bombed cities. He firmly believed that this was a one-time opportunity to remake nearly all of Germany’s outmoded cities and thereby remake German society, and he declared himself ready to help. His earlier experience in Berlin and his knowledge of American planning and prefabrication gave him unique qualifications.

As an example, he offered the radical redesign of all of downtown Boston proposed by Wagner and his Harvard students. The proposal featured a huge artery ringing the central city, at the heart of which would be a green park. It would be surrounded by cultural buildings, shops, hotels, a number of eighteen-story office buildings, and lots of parking. Some of these elements harken back to Wagner’s ideas for Berlin in the late 1920s. Very few of Boston’s historic buildings on Beacon Hill were to be spared the mighty hand of redevelopment (Figures 3–4). This dramatic proposal grew out of a project at Harvard’s Graduate School of Design in fall 1942. The draft of the project suggests that it was another collaborative effort with Gropius, but the tone of the work and the line drawings were by Wagner, and Gropius’s name does not appear on the post-war versions. The Boston drawings were published in Bau- und-Bau in 1948 and exhibited at the 1951 Constructa building exhibition in Hannover. There, plans for Braunschweig bore the caption “the evolutionary path” and Wagner’s proposal for Boston “the revolutionary path.” His Boston proposal was certainly more radical than even the dramatic urban renewal of Boston’s West End and construction of an urban freeway in the 1950s.

When Wagner’s offer of his services to help rebuild Germany was not accepted and his revolutionary advice ignored, he condemned German reconstruction planning as “bankrupt.” German editors printed his intemperate polemical missives, but they sometimes noted that readers might be left “speechless” by Wagner’s “Philippics.” Far more than Gropius, Wagner strove to engage in a dialogue with Germany after 1945, but in spite of his many publications, it was a dialogue that remained fruitless.
By contrast, Gropius had further opportunities to build in Germany. Working through TAC, between 1955 and 1957 he contributed a rather unremarkable nine-floor apartment building to the redevelopment of the Hansaviertel in Berlin, though he was not pleased with the overall planning and coordination of that enterprise. He was asked by a big Berlin social housing corporation to design apartments for the area around Mehringplatz, but this was later built by Hans Scharoun, not Gropius. Beginning in 1960, Gropius and TAC began design work on a gigantic housing project in Berlin’s Britz-Buckow-Rudow area. This development, which subsequently became known as Gropiusstadt, included 16,400 dwellings for 44,000 inhabitants who resided in apartment blocks of various sizes, including sixteen-story slabs and a thirty-one-story tower. The tower was dedicated at a festive ceremony in 1968 by the mayor with Gropius at his side (Figure 5). 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War II. Moreover, in spite of the presence of greenery, shops, access to public transportation, and community facilities, the project quickly earned a reputation as cold and alienating, just the sort of thing that Gropius had earlier warned against.

There is perhaps an irony to be found in Gropius’s contributions to skyscraper design. His most famous skyscraper is the fifty-nine-story Pan-Am building in New York. Built between 1958 and 1963, it was the largest office tower in the world in terms of its capacity. It was criticized by Philip Johnson, who suggested that it would have been better to create a green space on that location. Gropius responded angrily that this criticism was an example of “prevailing urbanistic sentimentality, a blindness in regard to new trends and changing standards of size and orientation of building mass in cities”—a statement which clearly shows how far Gropius had moved from his earlier ideas about healthy cities. Between 1961 and 1966 Gropius and TAC also built the twenty-six-story towers of the John F. Kennedy Federal Building in Boston, Gropius’s adopted home city (Figure 6). This steel-skeleton structure, with its prefabricated concrete-panel cladding, has not enjoyed much favor with critics or histori-
It is interesting, however, that the two offset towers may be a deliberate quotation of the most famous skyscrapers built in Germany in the 1950s, the Thyssen building in Düsseldorf. This is a twenty-eight-floor, 100-meter, asymmetrical ensemble of three staggered towers, built
with the greatest technical exactitude and time-saving precision as a steel-frame building. In fact, for the first post-1945 decade it was not Frankfurt am Main which merited the term “Mainhattan” but Düsseldorf.

The irony is that the sponsors of modern architecture in that city were Konstanty Gutschow, Friedrich Tamms, and Helmut Hentrich, all of whom had enjoyed successful careers during the Third Reich. Perhaps because these men were wedded neither to the social housing agenda of Weimar nor to the programs of the Third Reich, nor were they politically committed to the psychological sense of modesty and humility that characterized so much post-1945 German architecture, they were able to open the way for modern corporate architecture in the form of glass towers. Before building the Thyssen tower, Hentrich and Tamms (the latter was Düsseldorf’s chief planner) went to America to study skyscrapers. They consulted with the architects at Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, studied New York’s central business district, and admired the vertical city as well as the new traffic arteries. In other words, it may be that the model of the New York corporate skyscraper was transported to Düsseldorf and perhaps then back to Boston in the form of Gropius’s Federal Building.

I have argued that Gropius and Wagner started with a vision in which technology and rationalized, Fordist industrial production would allow architecture to solve great social problems, transform urban living, and produce a better world. This revolutionary vision involved sublime steel-skeleton skyscrapers and mass-produced, prefabricated housing within a context of comprehensive urban planning, and it was a vision that had evolved out of an exchange of ideas between Europe and America. However, in their American setting, from the late 1930s through 1945, Wagner and Gropius came to see rather small neighborhoods as the kernel from which healthy societies grow, people become less nomadic, and genuine community and democracy form. Gropius’s reforming spirit, however, waned by the time the war ended. He wanted to build, not pursue dreams. His firm built mega-settlements and skyscrapers in Berlin, central Boston, and New York, but not the kind of neighborhood settlements he had earlier advocated. Martin Wagner, in contrast, held fast to his revolutionary vision of new cities, but his unrealistic expectations and acerbic voice precluded a planning position in Germany. He learned the bitter lesson that the opportunity for radical urban change was a chimera. Wagner misunderstood the realities of post-1945 Germany and postwar America. Time had passed him by, and he was unable to realize his visions. Gropius became an icon of architectural modernism while Wagner’s name faded in comparison.
Notes

1 Gropius (1883–1969) and Wagner (1885–1957) left Germany in the mid-1930s and are thus of the same generation. Mies van der Rohe (1892–1970) would also fit here. More than any other architect, Mies is identified with the modern steel and glass skyscraper, yet he was far less interested in urban design. See Christian Otto, “American Skyscrapers and Weimar Modern: Transactions between Fact and Idea,” in Jarrell C. Jackman and Carla M. Borden, eds., The Muses Flee Hitler: Cultural Transfer and Adaptation, 1930–1945, (Washington, D.C., 1983), and Philip C. Johnson, Mies van der Rohe, rev. 3rd ed. (New York, 1978). Johnson was pivotal in making skyscrapers and the new architecture the basis of a dialogue between Germany and America; he was the prime organizer of the 1932 Museum of Modern Art exhibition that trumpeted architectural modernism and elevated the international reputations of Gropius, Mies, and Richard Neutra.

2 For a general introduction to the subject of skyscrapers and the relations between German and American architecture I have used William H. Jordy, American Buildings and Their Architects, vol. 5, The Impact of European Modernism in the Mid-Twentieth Century (New York, 1972) and John Jacobus, Twentieth-Century Architecture: The Middle Years 1940–1965 (New York, 1966). The word “skyscraper” is somewhat ambiguous. Germans more often use Hochhaus than Wolkenkratzer. How “high” must a building be to count as a skyscraper? For a German in 1920, a twelve-story Hochhaus might have been perceived as a skyscraper, but perhaps not in 1970.


9 Ibid., 29.


15 Gropius, “Tatsachen und Zahlen über Wolkenkratzer.” This four page typescript (dated 7 August 1928) with handwritten corrections was published, according to Gropius’s nota-


18 Ibid.


20 Ibid., 125.

21 Ibid., 126.

22 Ibid., 129.


27 Walter Gropius and Martin Wagner, “Cities’ Renaissance,” typescript in Houghton Library, Gropius papers, BMS Ger 208 (56) [from the tone, probably written by Wagner]. 1. For the following quotations see pp. 5, 9, 11, and 14.


29 Gropius and Wagner directed a studio project at Harvard, where students designed suburban housing developments to help reduce Boston’s population. See Walter Gropius and Martin Wagner, “A Program for City Reconstruction,” Architectural Forum 79 (July 1943): 83–5. Initial drafts of this essay are in the Houghton Library, Harvard University, Gropius papers, 81m-84, bMS Ger 208 (62). The initial draft, in folder 1, begins with Daniel Burnham’s call to “Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men’s blood,” but this was not included in the print version.


33 Herbert, Dream, 276, 306–7. For examples of prefabricated houses, see Architectural Forum 86 (1947), which featured stories on General Panel (February, 115–120) and other firms, such as Kaiser Community Homes, which also aimed to produce 10,000 units annually (March, 105–13).

34 Herbert, Dream, 317–18. Herbert also observes (321) that “it is interesting that neither Gropius nor Wachsmann ever seriously related to the mobile home industry, for it was to prove to be, according to informed judgment, ‘by far the most efficient building industry in
the United States and probably in the world.” For Wachsmann, mobiles were technologically primitive. For Gropius, they were complete and monotonous units.


36 Ibid., 37. According to a recent report using census data, about six percent of new homes built in the U.S. in 2001 were prefabricated or modular, compared to 3.4 percent in 1992, suggesting that resistance to them has remained strong. Thomas Grillo, “Signed, sealed and delivered,” Boston Globe (February 2, 2003): J1.


43 Ibid., 72.

44 Ibid., 73–74.


46 Martin Wagner, “Der Neubau der City,” Baurundschau 38 (1948): 129–60 and 413–421. I have a photocopy (provided by Niels Gutschow) from the private archive of Konstanty Gutschow, now in the Hamburg Architecture Archive, showing the Constructa posters.


49 Isaacs, Walter Gropius, 1061ff, 1079, 1082–85.

50 Ibid., 1055. Isaacs discusses the project on 1050–56. See also Probst and Schädlich, vol. 1, 238–43.

51 Isaacs, Walter Gropius, 1134–45 and Probst and Schädlich, vol. 1, 244–46.


53 Isaacs, Walter Gropius, 1134–35.

Werner Durth, Deutsche Architekten: Biographische Verflechtungen, 1900–1970 (Braunschweig, 1986), 370–71. Sponsored by the U.S. aluminum industry, a Düsseldorf group headed by Tamms returned in 1959; they again met with Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, but also Mies, Saarinen, and others. (See p.431, note 236.) See also Helmut Hentrich, Bauzeit: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Leben eines Architekten (Düsseldorf, 1995), 102-03 and 222.


A good indication of Wagner’s declining status in relation to Gropius is his absence from a 1947 conference in celebration of Princeton’s bicentennial. Gropius joined fifty-six other luminaries of architecture, including Frank Lloyd Wright, Alvar Aalto, Sigfried Giedion, George Howe, Philip Johnson, Robert Moses, and Mies van der Rohe. Wagner’s boss, Dean Joseph Hudnut, was there, as was Konrad Wachsmann, Gropius’s partner in the prefabricated panel firm. See The Princeton University Bicentennial Conference on Planning Man’s Physical Environment (Princeton, 1947), 28–30.
For generations, architectural historians understood the adoption of Gothic, Renaissance, and modern architecture by cultures outside those in which they were created as evidence of good taste. Slowness in adopting the new paradigm was deemed “provincialism.” Postwar advocates of modern architecture, for instance, depicted its export from Europe to the United States as a seamless transition in which the logic of its forms swept aside all alternatives. This is history as told by the victor. In fact, there was often considerable and principled resistance to new styles when they did not fit the needs of individual patrons or entire societies. They succeeded only when they offered those who adopted them something they needed.

So what did European modernism offer Americans? Those who defended American modernism against the postmodernist onslaught admitted that its critical core had unfortunately fallen off somewhere over the Atlantic, so to speak, when the modernist skyscraper became emblematic of American corporate capitalism. Modern architecture never existed at a pristine remove from the marketplace, however. As recent studies of the interplay of capitalist display and modernist aesthetics in the Weimar-era German cityscape make clear, it is precisely these displays that did not cross the Atlantic. Moreover, in its deliberate resistance to overt advertising, American postwar corporate architecture retained more than a whiff of European idealism.

Two architects dominate the story of the reception of the American skyscraper in Weimar Germany and the export back to America of lessons learned from it. Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, the third and final director of the Bauhaus, and Eric Mendelsohn, the author of *Amerika: Bilderbuch eines Architekten*, competed with one another, first to define how this quintessentially American building type could be assimilated into Berlin and, then, for success as immigrant architects in the United States. Comparing these two figures illuminates the degree to which personal circumstances and consumer taste influenced their careers. In Germany, Mies’s designs for high-rises remained too abstract for the merchants and developers who flocked to Mendelsohn for dynamically functional expressions of modern metropolitan glamour. In America, Mendelsohn directly engaged the preference for a specifically indigenous modernism that greeted both architects upon their arrival. Mies’s original
distance from Mendelsohn’s dramatic curves, intended to invoke the speed of newly motorized traffic, eventually proved more useful to Americans anxious to dignify structural changes in their construction industry and to display the cultural sophistication appropriate for a global superpower.

In 1921, Mies van der Rohe sat down at his drawing board to design an entry in a competition for a skyscraper for Berlin’s Friedrichstrasse (Figure 1). Although his previous work had been consistently neoclassical, he now proposed a stunning break with historicism. The frank modernity of this building type, as well as his recent exposure to Expressionism, undoubtedly helped prompt this radical reconsideration of his architecture, which would remain a matter of theory rather than practice for several more years. All that was obviously American, however, about this and Mies’s subsequent skyscraper project was their means of construction and their height. Mies’s commitment to formal purity remained uninflected by the commercial function of such structures. The design (erroneously dated for many years as 1919) became an icon of twentieth-century architecture, but was apparently never seriously considered by the competition jurors.

In 1924, another Berlin architect, Eric Mendelsohn, Mies’s junior by one year, set sail for the United States. The result, published in 1926, was a popular book. Its illustrations depict the excitement of urban modernity, while the text expresses reservations about the incompleteness with which that modernity was represented architecturally. Like Mies, Mendelsohn believed that modern construction should not be dressed in historical forms. Unlike Mies, however, Mendelsohn fully appreciated the theatrical quality of what he had seen in New York. Like the German popular press, Mendelsohn was fascinated by Times Square’s night lighting and also realized the inevitability of advertising’s increasing presence in the modern cityscape.

During the brief period of economic recovery between 1924 and 1929, Mies and Mendelsohn competed to design shops and office buildings. These were, along with cinemas, two of the building types most closely identified by Germans in the 1920s with urban modernity. Their respective designs for stores in the center of Stuttgart illustrate why Mendelsohn was more successful at this point in getting his designs constructed. In his second department store for the Schocken chain, Mendelsohn enlivened an American daylight factory (a favorite German image of modernity that here emphasized the industrial origins of the goods on sale within) with technological spectacle. The boldly glazed corner stair tower and expansive display windows, which functioned even more effectively at night with illuminated letters spelling out “Schocken,” drew the atten-
tion of potential shoppers without offering a fantasy based on images of wealth or social status. He defended his choice of style as appropriate for popular mass culture and contemporary technological and economic development, defining the spirit of the times in terms of “bare knees and
short haircuts, radio and film, car and airplane, banana wholesalers and combines that run department stores.” In the popular imagination, the startling appearance of Mendelsohn’s architecture was linked with his Jewish heritage, as was much of Weimar-era modernism. This was something Mendelsohn, whose initial fame stemmed from the Einstein Tower, shared with many of his clients, including Salman Schocken.

Mies remained aloof from such spectacle; his rigorous attention to proportions and construction offered a potent antidote to it. But partly as a result of this, none of his Weimar-era designs for commercial buildings were ever realized, despite the high regard the profession and the industry had for his collaborations with Lilly Reich. Instead, he was occupied during the final years of the Weimar Republic with a series of positions and commissions that would eventually ensure his enduring fame. He organized the Weissenhof Siedlung, an exhibition sponsored by the German Werkbund in 1927 in Stuttgart, for which he assembled two generations of architects from across western Europe to display the potential impact of prefabrication upon housing. Two years later, he designed the German Pavilion for the Barcelona World’s Fair. Its gleaming materials, including polished onyx as well as chrome, imbued its open plan with a stately elegance entirely at odds with Mendelsohn’s celebration of mass consumerism. The Tugendhat House in Brno, Czechoslovakia, proved that such abstract spaces were indeed habitable. Finally, in 1930, as this luxury villa was being completed, he assumed the directorship of the Bauhaus, which became largely an architecture school under his leadership.

These accomplishments attracted the attention of those younger architects who continued to privilege form over the strict functionalism espoused by architects such as Hannes Meyer, Mies’s predecessor at the Bauhaus, whose purposes were as much political as aesthetic. The dismantling of the Barcelona Pavilion in 1930, coupled with criticism of the lavish Tugendhat House (completed at the onset of the Depression) curtailed their immediate impact, however. But Mendelsohn’s position as Europe’s most influential modernist designer of commercial architecture remained unchallenged.

His primacy in this arena led to his becoming the first modernist awarded the opportunity to build a high-rise office building. Originally conceived as a department store for the French chain Galleries Lafayette, Columbushaus was instead realized by developers who christened it in a spirit of optimism (Figure 2). Located on Berlin’s Potsdamerplatz, it was heralded upon its completion in 1932 as Europe’s most technologically advanced office building. In place of the uniform blankness of Mies’s glass walls, Mendelsohn adjusted his design to accommodate a range of uses likely to yield the highest possible rental income: two floors of shops
and restaurants, followed by offices, and capped by a restaurant with a roof terrace.¹⁴

However, the very factors which accounted for Mendelsohn’s original German success hindered him from repeating it in the United States, where he moved in 1941 after eight years in London and Jerusalem. Largely for economic reasons, Americans were open to modernism’s sim-

plified forms and standardized construction using new materials, which were in any case far more fully developed on that side of the Atlantic. But they initially spurned the industrial aesthetic prized by their European counterparts.

The flirtation of a handful of American architects with the white stucco boxes exhibited by Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson at the Museum of Modern Art in 1932 soon gave way to designs that more specifically addressed American conditions. By the early 1940s, American advocates of modern architecture were proud of the degree to which their country’s architects had moved away from European precedent. Frank Lloyd Wright and William Wurster, in particular, emphasized natural materials in their design of relatively modest single family houses, which were models of sensitive integration into their sites. Although much of this work was understood as regional, it was widely dispersed throughout the country and shared affinities with the recent work of the two leading modernists who had remained in Europe, Le Corbusier and Alvar Aalto.

Mendelsohn was more than happy to adjust to the tastes of his new home, which he deeply appreciated as a sanctuary from the Nazi destruction of European Judaism. He quickly renewed the ties with Wright and Lewis Mumford he had established in 1924, and befriended Wurster. Their influence reinforced the interest in premodern vernacular architecture that he had developed while in Palestine. Mendelsohn’s American clippings file contained photographs of frontier mansions and Hindu temples rather than the factories and skyscrapers that had filled his earlier Bilderbuch. Mies, by contrast, made little effort to master the local language or to adjust his architecture to his new surroundings following his emigration to Chicago in 1938. In his first decade in the United States he attracted relatively little attention, quietly enjoying the opportunities his position at the Illinois Institute of Technology offered him to continue his own highly disciplined investigation into the relationship between form, material, and function. Despite aggressive lobbying by his friend Philip Johnson, it was almost a decade before he got any work other than the design of inexpensive two- and three-story buildings for the new IIT campus. Although these would eventually become icons of American architecture, they initially had little impact at home or abroad.

Mendelsohn’s attempts to integrate himself into the architecture scene he found upon his arrival in the United States left him unprepared as the ground shifted under his feet, away from his friends Wright, Mumford, and Wurster, and towards his fellow émigrés Mies, Walter Gropius, and Marcel Breuer. Mies, by contrast, without expending much effort on his own behalf, was lauded as the heir to what had become a prized American example of proto-modernism and as someone whose sophis-
ticated European art required enlightened American technology and patronage in order to be realized.

The end of World War II brought the social consensus and economic prosperity that Americans had been promised. It did not, however, restore the ability of architects or their clients to build as they had during the first three decades of the century. During the Depression, when few clients could afford to build magnificently, architects had competed with builders, even for modest commissions. They trimmed costs by emphasizing functional plans and they proposed buildings which were generally smaller and more simply finished than before. World War II exacerbated this process, bringing a profession whose practitioners had thought of themselves as artists into closer contact with industry. Architects became more involved in designing factories and in making efficient use of their products to further lower construction costs. Finally, postwar inflation, which dramatically raised the cost of labor and materials, made a return to earlier standards impossible.

Meanwhile, by the late 1940s the Cold War demanded that American economic and military prowess be buttressed by cultural achievement. This imperative shaped the perception of changes that had already touched the lives of the vast majority of Americans, affecting the appearance of the places where they lived, worked, shopped, and were educated. The discussion of contemporary American architecture began to be reframed in terms of continuity with the Bauhaus. This dignified cost cutting and the adoption of new construction technologies by placing them within a modernist cultural tradition with a sophisticated European provenance.

Amid increasing homogeneity, modern architecture also usefully conveyed status based more on taste than wealth. Although many middle-class Americans continued to suspect modernism as Communist, the image of America promoted in elite circles (at home as well as abroad) was of a tolerant and progressive sponsor of advanced, even experimental art. Cold War rhetoric emphasized this contrast with Nazi Germany and the Soviet bloc. Popular acceptance of modernism remained limited, but the image of glass-walled office buildings became crucial to America’s sense that it had inherited the mantle of European culture—a myth which America propagated internationally.

The Museum of Modern Art led the way. In 1947, Johnson organized an exhibit devoted to Mies. His catalogue was the first monograph on Mies to be published in any language (books on Mendelsohn had appeared in German in 1930 and in English in 1940). This fact demonstrates the extent to which Mies had been neglected in the years after his victory in the Reichsbank competition, which had briefly inspired the hope that his architecture would serve as the template for the Third
The exhibit prepared the way for the enthusiastic reception of his design for a pair of apartment towers on Chicago’s Lake Shore Drive (Figure 3).

Here, Mies finally realized buildings on the scale of his high-rise designs for Berlin. Faced with an opportunity to detail the glass skins
which he had long dreamed of, he chose a system of ornamentation so representative of their skeletal steel construction that untutored observers often assumed it was structural. Steel I-beams longitudinally framed the carefully proportioned windows, marching across the façade in a rhythm that remained constant across both towers.  

Although these were not the first curtain-walled towers built in the United States following the war, they garnered the most attention. This was in part because they seemed to make earlier American architecture a crucial predecessor for the International Style. Mies became the heir to the Chicago School of the late nineteenth century and, at the same time, an emblem of his adopted country’s new architectural maturity. The skyscraper projects which he had worked on in Berlin became the crucial midpoint between a uniquely American tradition and its reinvention as a model of international pre-eminence. The homegrown appreciation of these buildings was triggered by the attention Mendelsohn had paid to them in 1926. This triumph was confirmed by the fact that Mies’s towers were less expensive to construct than traditional masonry-clad buildings and that their condominium units quickly established themselves as extremely good investments, despite minor problems with heating and cooling. The stage was set for a generation of Miesian designs that, despite their German origins, would come to be seen as evidence of encroaching Americanization whenever they were erected outside the United States.

Mies was determined to design buildings whose ideal forms, conceived in detachment from all but the most abstract considerations of function or context, bestowed an almost spiritual dignity upon the mundane activities they housed. They also coincided conveniently with the relatively egalitarian anonymity of mid-century American corporate capitalism. Abstraction ostensibly untainted by crass commercialism imparted artistry (and, thus, dignity) to what was, in fact, a highly efficient deployment of people as well as materials. Mies himself appeared largely oblivious to the issues of representation that might have distinguished his commercial from his civic and other institutional commissions. His focus on proportion and construction as ways to resist architecture as fashion or fad discouraged inquiries into the way in which he actually blurred the boundary between the two. His example encouraged the American architectural profession to focus on issues of style, to the exclusion of any critique of the social and economic forces embedded in the corporate patronage they enjoyed.

One of the few people not impressed was Mendelsohn. Real architectural differences underlay the two men’s mutual disdain. Mendelsohn’s talent lay in his ability to reconceptualize the organization of a building type and then imbue each iteration of that type with its own
distinctly memorable form. Writing in Berlin soon after the publication of Mendelsohn’s Einstein tower, Mies retorted,

Ferro-concrete buildings are essentially skeleton structures. Neither pastry nor tank turrets. Supporting girder construction with a non-supporting wall. That means skin and bone structures.\textsuperscript{34}

Mies, by contrast, worked with ideal forms, into which he slotted whatever function was required. The differences between his postwar apartments and office towers, for instance, are minimal. In 1950, Mendelsohn lectured at IIT and toured its new buildings. He remarked afterwards of Mies, “He [has] found his formula and intends apparently to stand on it until the end, square and academic . . . a rigid synthesis of principles which will kill (quickly and painlessly) the new hope of a free humanity.”\textsuperscript{35}

Note that Mendelsohn did not complain that Mies had eliminated the spectacular from commercial architecture. Although his own work had provided a useful precedent for the movie theaters and department stores that lined American neighborhoods, he was no longer interested in commerce or spectacle. By the end of his life, Mendelsohn longed to connect with a particular place and with the enduring values of religion. If this did not provide him with enduring fame, he at least had the satisfaction of serving with distinction the people who mattered to him the most, his fellow Jews, whose religious and civic needs he now addressed.

In the United States, Mendelsohn’s primary architectural accomplishment was the suburban synagogue.\textsuperscript{36} Characteristically, he stressed the relationship between modern architectural form and the larger society, but his emphasis was now upon the relationship between faith and politics, rather than between material goods and technology. He declared in 1947, “Our temples should reject the anachronistic representation of God as a feudal lord, should apply contemporary building styles and architectural conceptions to make God’s house a part of the democratic community in which He dwells.”\textsuperscript{37}

The reform of sacred architecture, although one of modernism’s greatest successes in the postwar years, did not fit easily into the myths that supported the style. Modernism was supposed to be a response to the new, not a way of reinvigorating the old. The skyscraper was the emblem of modernity, not the Torah ark. In his single American high-rise commission, for Maimonides Hospital in San Francisco, Mendelsohn divided his focus between attention to the site and to the patients (Figure 4). The form of Maimonides, completed in 1950, was too closely tied to its particular function to be widely applicable to other high-rises. The graceful balconies were too generous for public housing and unnecessary for office buildings. Furthermore, the increasing split in Mendelsohn’s work
between abstract form and industrial imagery made it difficult to view his American buildings as the culmination of his earlier German efforts.

Paradoxes abound. Mies, while no Nazi, did compete for government work during the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{38} He nonetheless benefited far more from interpretations of modernism as anti-authoritarian than Mendelsohn,
whose architecture was permanently transformed by his experiences in Palestine. Mendelsohn consciously sought assimilation, but Mies reaped the rewards when a relatively small coterie of North Americans adopted European modernism as a badge of their own sophistication—and as a useful weapon on the cultural battleground of the Cold War. In Samuel Bronfman and his daughter Phyllis Lambert, Mies found economically successful and intellectually curious Jewish clients, not unlike Schocken.

Clients, fellow professionals, critics, and even historians reward architects who bestow upon them the ratification they crave. Weimar-era German merchants believed, with reason, that their customers wanted to be as modern as their American counterparts. Mendelsohn created this image inexpensively and artistically. Postwar American taste-makers believed, also with reason, that the country’s cultural and business elite needed affirmation of their own sophistication. Mies created this image inexpensively and artistically. Both architects balanced ambition and principle with personal taste and experience to create their own iterations of modern German and, later, modern American architecture. Although proximate in time and space as well as style, these proved distinctive enough to convince different publics.

Notes


6 For the details of his trip and the influence of the resulting publication see James, *Mendelsohn and the Architecture of German Modernism*, 57–70.
8 On Reich, see Sonja Günther, Lilly Reich 1885–1947, Innenarchitekin, Designerin, Ausstellungsge
talterin (Stuttgart, 1988) and Matilda McQuaid, Lilly Reich, Designer and Architect (New York, 1996).
13 See James, Erich Mendelsohn and the Architecture of German Modernism, especially 219–25, for an account of Mendelsohn’s influence, which also extended to streamlined industrial design.
14 See Dietrich Neumann, “Die Wolkenkratzer kommen!” Deutsche Hochhäuser der zwanziger Jahre, Debatten, Projekte, Bauten (Wiesbaden, 1995), for an account which places the building in the context of other German high-rises of the day.
16 See especially Elizabeth Mock, Built in the USA 1932–44 (New York, 1944), but also James and Katherine Morrow Ford, The Modern House in America (New York, 1940).
18 Arnold Whittick, Eric Mendelsohn (London, 1956), 177, for Wurster’s eulogy of Mendelsohn. Correspondence between Mumford and Mendelsohn can be found in the Mendelsohn archive, housed in the Kunstbibliothek, Staatliche Museum Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin. For an account of Mendelsohn’s trips to Taliesin West to visit Wright, see Louise Mendelsohn, “My Life in a Changing World,” Copies, Ita Heine-Greenberg Collection, Ruhrdorff; Department of Architecture and Design, Museum of Modern Art, New York; and Mendelsohn Archive, 165, 211.
20 I consulted this material when it was part of the Documents Collection (now the Environmental Design Archives) of the College of Environmental Design, University of California, Berkeley. It has since been donated to the Mendelsohn Archive.
21 Although this argument runs counter to Cammie McAtee, “Alien #5044325,” in Lambert, Mies in America, I am deeply indebted to her excellent research.
In addition to the Mies exhibition discussed below, a crucial turning point was the Museum of Modern Art’s critique of an essay by Lewis Mumford upholding Bay Area architecture as a template for future development. See Gail Fenske, “Lewis Mumford, Henry Russell Hitchcock and Bay Regional Style,” in Martha Pollak, ed., The Education of the Architect: Historiography, Urbanism, and the Growth of Architectural Knowledge (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 37–85.


As quoted in Neumeyer, Artless Word, 241.

Eric to Louise Mendelsohn, letter of 31 January 1950, Mendelsohn Archive.

For a study of the first of these see Kathleen James-Chakraborty, “In the Spirit of Our Age”: Eric Mendelsohn’s B’nai Amono Synagogue (St. Louis, 2000).


A few weeks after the unification of the two Germanies, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published a supplement which presented architectural visions for Germany’s future capital sketched by international star-architects. Most imagined a new scale, a skyline represented by skyscrapers. But, in reality, the “master plan” for Berlin developed over the last decade aims instead at the reconstruction of the city’s historic (seventeenth- to nineteenth-century) ground plan and restricts the height of new buildings to the traditional measure of twenty-two meters. Since reunification, only a few modest-scale high-rise buildings have been built, on the Potsdamer Platz. A few more are to be added here and there, to keep up a little bit with international standards.¹ This lessening of ambitions is not only the result of vanishing hopes for glorious economic growth in Berlin; it also results from an enduring struggle for historical and national identity which always distrusted the Babylonian symbols of “Metropolis,” as Fritz Lang had depicted them in his famous 1926 film.²

My argument is less about the well-known general objection to the importation of American skyscrapers, which, up to the 1960s, was more or less characteristic of all nations in “old Europe.” Rather, I am concerned here with architectural language and style, especially in regard to structure, texture, and their ideological implications. By “structure” I mean the parading of the tectonic forces of construction, by “texture” the surface modeling of the façades, which is more or less dependent on the structure. Sometimes, tectonics are exhibited by unveiling construction and material, but (as we will see) much more often by dressing up modern steel or concrete skeletons with ashlar, thus representing historic or abstract monumental orders. Texture, in a dialectic response, might support this fiction of “firmitas” by pattern, rhythm, color, or material—or counteract construction in favor of the effects of plastic volume and pure surface.

An attempt to establish a political iconography for German high-rise buildings, based on an attitude towards tectonics, might seem outdated to postmodern eyes. But by sketching, however briefly, the changing contexts and discourses up to nineteenth-century Romantic classicism, I hope to provide a better historical understanding of the rivalry between “conservative” and “progressive” formal languages in German postwar

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architecture. Because of its representational and ideological (rather than realistic) aspects, being more concerned with collective memory than with architecture as constructive art, this subject is not touched upon in Kenneth Frampton’s thorough study of the “poetics of construction” (1995).

If we compare two famous competitions of 1921–22, the Chicago Tribune Tower Competition and the Skyscraper Competition for Berlin’s Friedrichstrasse, we might be surprised at the extent to which, in the Chicago case, modern steel and concrete skeletons were interpreted as Gothic or classic, not only in structure but also by the application of stylistic detail and historic texture. The Berlin competition, by contrast, drew almost exclusively modernist proposals. The discussion about the necessity to abandon historic style after World War I in Germany was so advanced that nobody dared to present a skyscraper in historic costume. But it was not so easy to abandon history and meaning: verticalism in construction was transformed into a Gothic-Expressionist idiom, investing the new challenge of height with a neo-Romantic, even mystic spirit.

Because of the nationalist connotations of Gothic style, those high-rises actually built, such as Fritz Höger’s Generalanzeiger in Hannover (1927), have convincingly been interpreted as a “Germanization of the skyscraper,” something postulated by the nationalist newspaper Vossische Zeitung as early as 1922. We also find hardly any examples of neoclassical style, as in Chicago. More typical for Germany are the different attempts to avoid or at least to modernize classical form and structure, for example in Otto Kohtz’s pyramidal-cubic tower compositions.

The most radical denial of tectonic structure is of course the curtain wall, which forms a homogeneous skin, producing effects of reflected light, shade, and color on monumental abstract spaces, while the vertical tectonic skeleton is pushed back into the interior. It was in the United States that the curtain wall was first invented for industrial buildings as a façade aesthetically independent of tectonic construction. In Germany, it had been applied to civil construction by the end of the nineteenth century and introduced by Walter Gropius as a basic feature of modern style as early as 1911, although still in an industrial context. As an all-over system for the texture of high-rise buildings, it was first proposed by Mies van der Rohe in his famous glass tower project for the Friedrichstrasse competition 1921–22 (Figure 1). Except for a few experiments, for instance the new Bauhaus building in Dessau, the curtain wall system did not really succeed. Among seventy German high-rise buildings built before 1945 there is not one single curtain-wall construction. Aside from the serious air conditioning problems demonstrated by Le Corbusier’s applications in Paris and Moscow in the early 1930s, the failure of the new texture was certainly due to the neutralizing abstract message of its
aesthetics: it lacked representational ties to earth, region, tradition, and nation.

When tensions between modernist and conservative building ideologies became more brutal in Germany and, after 1933, were decided by
Nazi building regulations, the American skyscraper was at first completely rejected as commercial, materialistic, and un-German.\(^{13}\) Alfred Rosenberg, a chief Nazi propagandist, had condemned American models, but as early as 1930 he acknowledged the challenge for National Socialist architecture, especially in relation to his demand for enhanced monumentality through the solemn isolation of the building.\(^{14}\) Accepted after 1937 in order to add landmarks of power to the new Nazi building plans, high-rise buildings were supposed to emulate neo-classical patterns deeply rooted in German building tradition rather than the Gothic-Expressionist idiom or the abstract modernism of the hated Weimar Republic.

Nazi architecture produced no homogeneous style but rather different “modes,” according to a revived hierarchy of building functions. Industrial construction deliberately continued many international modernist achievements. In the country, for youth organizations as well as private housing, buildings looked back to regional traditions and the materials propagated by the Heimatschutzbewegung since 1900. For stately architecture and memorials, the classical tradition provided models.\(^{15}\) Moreover, this mode was also inspired by prehistoric Celtic and Germanic monuments (Hünengräber), which had previously been glorified by the Romantics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.\(^{16}\) In fact, although the heroic vocabulary of Nazi architecture was already in place by the end of the Weimar Republic, it was pushed to an extremity of articulation, which has to be read in the context of the racist ideology of National Socialism.\(^{17}\) Generally, the “heroic style” of Nazi architecture was inspired by the Greeks and Romans, by French “revolutionary architecture” and, of course, by the “Prussian Style,” which had already been canonized by Arthur Moeller van den Bruck during World War I and included the tradition from Friedrich Gilly, Friedrich Weinbrenner, Karl-Friedrich Schinkel, and Leo von Klenze up to neo-classicists like Peter Behrens and the young Wilhelm Kreis.\(^{18}\) It was Gilly in particular who was celebrated as a hero and forefather of contemporary architecture; his famous Academy project—a Monument for Frederick the Great (1797)—influenced several plans for war memorials and celebration halls by Wilhelm Kreis and Hanns Dustmann.\(^{19}\) Albert Speer, at least in his memoirs, saw himself as a successor to Gilly and Karl Friedrich Schinkel, from whom he borrowed several motifs and details—abstracted, of course, from their structural context and human scale. He also pitied himself because Hitler, an admirer of Vienna’s Ringstrasse, had no sense for Prussian virtues in architecture. For Speer, Hitler’s demands led him down a false path towards gargantuan splendor and historicist eclecticism.\(^{20}\) Klenze also became an important model for Nazi architecture, notably on account of his national monuments Walhalla (1830–42) and
Befreiungshalle (1847–63), but even more so for his view that monuments needed not just memories but rites, and, even more importantly, for his cultural and racist interpretation of tectonics.

Surprisingly, the imitation of classicist models was explicitly rejected during the Nazi period. “Those who speak of neo-classicism have not understood the spirit of our buildings,” wrote Rudolf Wolters in 1943. In 1936, orders were given to architectural journalists—perhaps by Hitler himself in his role as the patron of German building (Figure 2), but more likely by Alfred Rosenberg, who was responsible for the ideological education of the NSDAP—to avoid any terminological allusions to the classical tradition, which had long been identified with humanist and even democratic values. Instead, they were to emphasize the Germanic and martial roots of Nazi architecture. The propaganda term coined to serve this goal was based not on style but on structure: Germanische Tektonik (Germanic tectonics). The man who promoted this concept, a reference to Karl Bötticher’s book Tektonik der Hellenen (1842–44), was the art historian Hans Kiener in Munich, a disciple of Heinrich Wölfflin and a specialist in German Romantic classicism, which prefigures Nazi architectural ideology in important ways. So before we finally return to the subject of high-rise buildings, we have to step back once more.

The key to understanding early nineteenth-century German classicism is the struggle of Gilly, Schinkel, Klenze, and their colleagues to escape sentimental imitations of the classical past and to invent a new architecture. This architecture was to serve contemporary functions and modern ideas based on classical principles, but principles beyond the rules of Vitruvius (which had been proved wrong by the critics of the Enlightenment). They found their answer by analyzing the Greek temple as the most perfect manifestation of “Greek tectonics,” a term introduced by the archaeologist Karl Otfried Müller in 1830. Greek tectonics had already been discussed around 1820, by philosophers like Schelling and Schopenhauer and by many architects. They saw Greek tectonics as a harmonized equilibrium between contradictory physical and mental potentialities: the upright column as force, resistance, or a metaphor for the human will; the horizontal entablature as the counterpoint to gravity; and the visible balance itself, represented in particular by the entasis and the capital, as the expression of the freedom of man, who, as Schinkel and Klenze argued, is able to reconcile spirit and matter.

But how could a general discussion about structure be transformed into a national argument, urgently needed in the process of nation-building after the German wars of liberation against Napoleon? It was Leo von Klenze who, based on contemporary ethnology, tried to prove in 1821 that, rather than Gothic Romanticism, Greek tectonics should serve as the genuine principle for a national German style. His argument:
Figure 2. Fritz Erler, Portrait of Hitler as the Patron of Architecture and Sculpture (1938). Source: Die Kunst im Dritten Reich, TU Berlin.
Greeks and Germans were believed to derive from the same prehistoric Indo-Germanic tribes who had originated in India or the Caucasus and migrated to Greece and northern Europe. Thus, the Greek temple not only appeared related to Alpine houses, but also to megalithic monuments like Stonehenge, which was based on the same tectonic principle (certainly the recent archaeological revelation, which identified the skeleton of the “builder” of Stonehenge as a foreigner from the South would have given satisfaction to Klenze). In the early 1860’s, Klenze tried to support his idea of Greco-Germanic tectonics with racist arguments. Having read the cultural theories of Comte de Gobineau and Ernest Renan, he attributed the architecture of Asia Minor (which he classified as “artless”) to the Semitic race, whereas buildings based on the principles of Greek tectonics were credited to the Aryan race, which he considered superior.

Nazi propagandists inverted this Romantic theory, claiming that the classical culture of Greece originated in the prehistoric North (Rosenberg). By considering those “extraordinary ice-age heroes” from the North Pole as their ancestors, the Germans should cut any ties to the Latin humanist tradition. It was not only Walther von Fritschen’s book Von deutscher Baukunst (1939)—which illustrates how the Greek temple derived from the Germanic Vorlaubenhaus (Figure 3)—that profited from Klenze’s Indo-Germanic theories. Klenze’s first biographer, the same Hans Kiener who propagated the term “Germanic tectonics,” also found support for his anti-Semitic architectural propaganda in Klenze’s documents, thus legitimizing Paul Ludwig Troost’s completion of Klenze’s Königsplatz in Munich as a National Socialist “Acropolis Germaniae” (Figure 4).

If there was a common principle to the “modes” of Nazi architecture, it was the deliberate parading of tectonics wherever possible. Texture, material, and form could vary in relation to the purpose and message, however fictional. The supporting skeleton or applied portico could be exhibited by simplified classical columns without entasis, as in Paul Ludwig Troost’s Haus der Kunst in Munich (1934–37), which often is unfairly compared to the ionic subtlety of Schinkel’s Altes Museum in Berlin (1826–30). More frequently we find sharp cut square pillars, either with capital and fluting, as in Troost’s Ehrentempeln in Munich (1934), or covered with archaic granite, as in Albert Speer’s Reichskanzlei in Berlin (1938). Sometimes they were even more sublime, stripped of any ornament, as in the Wehrkreiskommando Kassel (1937). Other times, they were more practical, covered by brick, their authoritarian character translated into the modern functional language of industrial architecture, as in Herbert Rimpl’s Heinkelwerke Oranienburg (1936). Characteristic of National Socialist ideology, tectonic motifs ranged from refined classical...
tradition to archaic brutalism. Rosenberg even justified the deliberate omission of the classical capital, which expressed the humanism of Greek tectonics. For Rosenberg, the subtle classical transition between pressing weight and supporting pillar, a softened harmony, should be replaced by an open confrontation of forces, hard like fists, piling up stone by stone.36

As Hermann Giesler (Speer’s rival) stated in his memoirs, Hitler explicitly postulated such visible tectonics for his high-rise buildings as well, which were to be constructed in steel and concrete but dressed in stone as symbols of power and eternity.37 Some unrealized projects from the late 1930s—Giesler’s National Socialist Party school in Seebruck (Bavaria), his entrance towers for Munich’s new axis, Wilhelm Kreis’s Army Headquarters (which would have measured 17 floors and 156 meters), or other high-rises for Berlin’s transformation into the new capital “Germania”38—all followed the same model: a monumentality in material and tectonic structure that overemphasizes the strength of the corner pylons by squeezing the receding central window-grid, while (in contrast to the typical Art Deco structure of American skyscrapers) the vertical forces are heavily balanced by horizontal entablatures, cornices, and attics. They are then adorned with monumental eagles by Arno

Figure 3. Walther von Fritschen, Deduction of the Nordic House (1939). Source: von Fritschen, Von deutscher Baukunst.
Breker or with a statue of a giant warrior (Figure 5). Again it was an art historian, Hans Gerhard Evers, who theorized in his famous book *Tod, Macht und Raum* (1939) that tectonics in columns, piers, and pillars illustrate the laws of authority, power, order, respect, and obedience to the community, rather than the laws of physical gravity and human freedom.\(^{39}\)
Although the propagandistic discourse of National Socialist architecture collapsed in 1945, its architectural language and “what it betrays” (to quote Panofsky) obviously died much more slowly. After liberation by the allies, the skyscraper became a symbol of (West) Germany’s accep-

Figure 5. Wilhelm Kreis and Arno Breker: Model of Army Headquarters “Oberkommando des Heeres” (OKH) Berlin, 1939. Source: Die Kunst im Dritten Reich, TU Berlin.
tance of Western economic and democratic values, yet all of Germany’s important modernists had emigrated. Rebuilding, as Werner Durth has demonstrated, was largely administered by experts who had been prominent representatives of the Nazi regime, or at least collaborators. Hence the question of continuity versus radical change after 1945 has been widely debated. Both were evident in the forthcoming “battle” between modernists and conservatives.

The surviving patterns of “Germanic tectonics” were adapted to new political contexts after 1945, but the conviction that, in addition to “power” and “sublimity,” they also best expressed the German national character still seemed valid. The office building for the Gerling-Konzern in Cologne (1950–53) is closely related to Giesler’s and Kreis’s high-rise projects by its strong corner pylons and sharp cut square piers in the colonnades, as well as by its sublime cover of dark and light limestone. Although shaped as an upright cube and rather abstract in its vocabulary, the Gerling-Konzern building still aims at an emotional representation of tectonics, especially when illuminated in the manner of Albert Speer’s lighting effects (Figures 6 and 7). The official architect was the relatively unknown Erich Hennes, but it was the owner Hans Gerling himself and Arno Breker, Hitler’s favorite monumental sculptor and former partner of Kreis, who surveyed the “Endlösung” [sic] of the whole project. As a close friend of Hans Gerling, Breker remained in charge of the Gerling buildings up to the 1970s. It is interesting to observe how he assimilated his stylistic language to a more modernist appearance as Gerling developed into a more international company. For the Gerling office in Düsseldorf (1957–58), Breker used a round twin pier to form an upright grid, which had become the most conventional façade pattern during the 1950s. In pre-postmodern times, it certainly was read as an unbroken belief that tectonic values transcend constructive needs, something which Breker still seemed to share with Giesler in 1977.

It was not only Wilhelm Kreis himself who returned to pylon structure in his proposals for high-rise buildings at the Rochusmarkt in Düsseldorf (1949–51). Hermann Henselmann, an industrial architect during the Nazi period and later a leading exponent of socialist planning in the German Democratic Republic, also employed it in his apartment tower on Weberwiese near East Berlin’s Stalinallee (later, Karl-Marx-Allee, 1951). Originally conceived in an international modernist idiom, by 1950 the style of the socialist “Magistrale” had to be modified according to Stalin’s policy of Socialist Realism, which meant “democratic” and “socialist” in regard to program, but “national” in regard to form. That same year, Lothar Bolz, East Germany’s construction minister, published a demand to take up national traditions in his book Von deutschem Bauen. But Henselmann’s apartment building only unites the memory of tectonic
monumentalism with a light postmodernist flair: plastered walls, bright color, elegant “Schinkel windows” penetrating the corner piers, and two polished Doric columns inserted into the entrance portico. It thus reacts against the abstract “Formalism” of Western architecture. In the later

Figure 6. Wilhelm Kreis and Arno Breker: Model of Army Headquarters (OKH) Berlin, 1939. Source: *Die Kunst im Dritten Reich*, TU Berlin.
development of the Stalinallee, this playful mode had to give way to a more heroic neo-classical historicism.\textsuperscript{47}

The assimilation of Germanic tectonics to the needs of Western post-war society can be observed in the high-rise buildings of Breker’s friend Hanns Dustmann, as Eva Maria Krausse-Jünemann has recently shown in her thesis on this architect’s varied career.\textsuperscript{48} Dustmann, a chief collabo-
rator in Gropius’s office, became the official architect of the Hitler-Jugend soon after 1933. While on Albert Speer’s staff, he also planned Nazi monuments. Although Speer was imprisoned after the war because of his role as minister of armaments, another prominent member of his staff, Friedrich Tamms, was appointed as a building surveyor in Düsseldorf in 1948. There, he started a network for his Nazi friends, including Kreis, Breker, and Dustmann, who became one of the Rhineland’s most successful architects for banks and insurance buildings. He contributed to that special solemn and conservative modernist style (dozens of examples survive in many German towns) which, in my opinion, distinguishes the 1950s in Germany: functionalist concrete-skeleton cubes dressed with stone, and vertical grid façades filled in with golden elongated metal windows, emphasizing a clear hierarchy. Moreover Dustmann and his “conservative” colleagues could not do without features of monumental tectonic structure and allusions to classical frieze and entablature, even if they were only ornamental (as in his Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken AG in Wuppertal, 1952–57) or nearly abstract (as in his later administration tower for the energy trust RWE in Essen, 1959–62).

One way to rescue the representation of tectonics in more liberal times was to expel strict urbanistic symmetry from monumental structures, or to give a flying roof some extravagant, more or less “organic” form. This was exemplified by the Allianz tower in Berlin (1953–55) by Alfred Gunzenhauser and Paul Schwebes, who also had worked under Speer, and by Ernst Nolte’s bank building for the Stadtsparkasse in Cologne (1955–57). It took several years before Dustmann and the others finally adopted the “American” texture of the curtain wall, which for their clients now became a testimony to their orientation towards the “American way of life.”

The curtain wall system, used by Mies in the United States from the late 1940s onward and popularized by Gordon Bunshaft for SOM in the Lever Building (1952), re-entered Germany in the mid-1950s as an American import. Already in 1948, an exhibition arranged by the Museum of Modern Art—“In USA erbaut 1932–1944”—tried to fill the gap in information about new American architecture and to set up new models of International Style. SOM, which also built the American consulates in Bremen and Düsseldorf, especially helped to identify dominating glass façades as typically “American,” interpreting their transparency as “democratic”—a metaphor that remained valid up to the 1980s, as Heinrich Wefing has recently shown.

As early as 1952, strong resistance from modern architects emerged against the Nazi conspiracy in Düsseldorf and produced remarkable results. Among the first fully glazed German skyscrapers was the Mannesmann-Hochhaus by Paul Schneider-Esleben (1955–56), which, in
opposition to Tamms’s demand for monumentality, was innovative in its use of thin tubes (i.e. symbols of corporate identity) for the skeleton.\textsuperscript{56} The elegant curtain wall construction of the Thyssen-building in Düsseldorf by Helmut Hentrich and Hubert Petschnigg (1957–60)—the future world-famous partnership HPP—became even more important for developments in Germany.\textsuperscript{57} Both architects were admirers of SOM’s Lever building and Mies’s Seagram building, which they each visited separately in 1955.\textsuperscript{58} Schneider-Esleben, who also contacted Mies and studied his Lake Shore Drive apartments, had started building shortly after the war. Hentrich, who had studied under Poelzig before the war, admired Mies and then contributed to Speer’s giant plans for Berlin. In his Trinkaus bank building in Düsseldorf (1951), he still clung to the tectonic system. Speer himself commented from prison in 1955 that its double-pier structure reminded him of Kreis’s army headquarters project OKH (Figure 5).\textsuperscript{59} Nevertheless, Hentrich succeeded already in his early projects to turn the demonstrative representation of tectonics into a poetics of construction. Mies himself, a true German idealist, had long pondered the artistic problem of how to unite texture with structure, skin with skeleton, as an expression of clarity and truth.\textsuperscript{60}

Figure 8. Willy Kreuer, Technische Universität Berlin, Mining and Metallurgy Building 1955–59. Photograph by the author.
In postwar Germany, and especially in Berlin, the reception of the new “American” achievement still meant something more than an expression of modernity, attacked by conservatives as “monotony” and “uniformity.” Willy Kreuer, whose early projects in the 1930s also re-

Figure 10. Postcard (1970s). West Berlin with Europa-Center. Personal archive of the author.
flected the tectonic style, combined both principles in his Mining and Metallurgy Building for the Technical University of Berlin (1955–59). He framed the long sides with thin steel piers carrying the flying roof, but exhibited the first curtain in Berlin towards the square (Figure 8). In contemporary discourse, this building’s modern aesthetic was understood to symbolize West Berlin’s superiority as a frontier of the Free World, surrounded by communism (at the time, represented by the neoclassicism of the Stalinallee). There were a few attempts to escape American influence by looking to alternatives from Italy or France. But by the early 1960s, we can see the triumph of the curtain wall in every German town. Nowhere was it as programatically “American” as in West Berlin’s Europa-Center, designed by HPP (1963–65). The center (Figure 9) was an American commercial enterprise and served as the keystone for the Western postwar business city, dominated thus far by the formal influence of Le Corbusier. A naïve Cold War-era postcard proudly shows the new skyscraper, crowned by the Mercedes star, as a Western landmark in the divided city, while the historic (at that time communist) town center behind the Brandenburg Gate does not even exist (Figure 10).

When the Europa Center was outdone by a communist curtain wall hotel tower on the Alexanderplatz in 1967, it marked the end of the transatlantic dialogue through architectonic language. Curtain walls now could no longer be read as strictly “American.” Rather, as in the 1920s, they again signified modernity, technical progress, and the search for political equality within the new context of international competition between “systems.” It thus opened the door for postmodern criticism of its artistic deficiencies.

Notes


2 Helmut Weihsmann, Gebaute Illusionen—Architektur im Film (Vienna, 1988), 170–75; Wolfgang Jacobsen and Werner Sudendorf, Metropolis—in filmsches Laboratorium der modernen Architektur (Stuttgart, 2000).


9 See, for example, the Tietz department store in Berlin by Bernhard Sehring and L. Lachmann (1899–1900), in Julius Posener, *Berlin auf dem Wege zu einer neuen Architektur, Das Zeitalter Wilhelms II* (Munich, 1979), 479.

10 Although Annemarie Jaeggi, *Fagus—Industriekultur zwischen Werkbund und Bauhaus* (Berlin, 1998), 29, denies that the window system of Gropius’s Fagus Factory (1911) constitutes a curtain wall in the strict sense of the term, its appearance comes very near to it.


12 Cf. Le Corbusier’s early curtain wall facades for his Cité de Refuge in Paris (1929–33) and his Centrosoyuz building in Moscow (1929–34).


16 Frank-Berthold Raith, *Der heroische Stil—Studien zur Architektur am Ende der Weimarer Republik* (Berlin, 1997).

17 In regard to the continuity of the national Romantic symbolism of prehistoric monuments, see Gert Gröning and Uwe Schneider, eds., *Gartenkultur und nationale Identität—Strategien nationaler und regionaler Identitätsstiftung in der deutschen Gartenkultur* (Worms, 2001).


21 See Hubert Schrade, *Das deutsche Nationaldenkmal* (Munich, 1934).


23 Winckelmann’s view that Attic democracy was a basic condition for the emergence of classical art in Greece was denied by Hitler, who dismissed any connection between the Parthenon and democracy. See Giesler, *Ein anderer Hitler*, 203. This ideological deviation is not reflected in Alex Scobie, *Hitler’s State Architecture: The Impact of Classical Antiquity* (London, 1990).


27 Frampton, Studies in Tectonic Culture, 4.


30 Dirk Klose, Klassizismus als idealistische Weltanschauung: Leo von Klenze als Kunstphilosoph (Munich, 1999), 162–73; Buttlar, Leo von Klenze, 313–15.


33 Walther von Fritschen, Von deutscher Baukunst (Leipzig, 1939), Ill. 15. I thank Martin Elbeshausen for this reference.


37 Christoph Hackelsberger, Die aufgeschobene Moderne, ein Versuch zur Einordnung der Architektur der Fünfziger Jahre (Munich, 1985).
The first project planned by Helmut Hentrich, Hans Heuser, and Hubert Petschnigg showed a freestanding abstract steel grid, forming tower-galleries in front of the offices, but was greatly altered for Brekers and Gerlings "Endlösung" [sic]. Cf. Das Gerling-Hochhaus in Köln, ed. Gerling Konzern (Cologne, 1953); Hiltrud Kier, Architektur der 50er Jahre: Bauten des Gerling-Konzerns in Köln (Frankfurt/Main, 1994), 47–67.

This might be extrapolated from his letter to Giesler, when Giesler’s memoirs were published. Cf. Giesler, Ein anderer Hitler, 523.


Lothar Bolz, Von deutschem Bauen—Aufsätze und Reden (Berlin, 1951).


Krausse-Jünemann, Hanns Dustmann, W-No. 073, 305–6, ill. 168 and W-No. 114, 332, ill. 190.


Hildrud Kier and Werner Schäfke, Die Kölner Ringe: Geschichte und Glanz einer Straße (Cologne, 1994), 20.


Werner Durth and Niels Gutschow, Architektur und Städtebau der Fünfziger Jahre (Bonn, 1987), 38, 90; Heinrich Wefing, Parlamentsarchitektur: zur Selbstdarstellung der Demokratie in ihren Bauten; eine Untersuchung am Beispiel des Bonner Bundeshauses (Berlin, 1995).

Durth, Deutsche Architekten, 297–312.


While Hentrich in his memoirs, Bauzeit: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Leben eines Architekten (Düsseldorf, 1995), 222, dates his first postwar journey to New York in summer 1954, Beckers, Schneider-Esleben, 87, states that, according to Heinrich Klotz, Schneider-Esleben visited Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and New York for his Mannesmann building and met Helmut Hentrich and Friedrich Tamms.

Durth, Deutsche Architekten, 308.


Cf. for instance Alfons Leitl’s review of the UN-building in New York, Baukunst und Werkform, No. 3: 1950, 8–11, and the rejection of the glass house in East Germany; Werner Durth, Jörn Düwel, Niels Gutschow, Architektur und Städtebau der DDR, Vol. 2 (Frankfurt, 1998), 308. Thanks for this reference to Roman Hillmann, who is preparing a PhD thesis at
the TU Berlin on the contemporary and present evaluation criteria of postwar architecture in Germany.


66 Hotel Stadt Berlin (today Forum Hotel) 1967–70 by Kollektiv Scharlipp, Bogatzky, Kaiser, etc. The curtain wall in East Berlin had already been used in Hermann Henselmann’s “Haus des Lehrers” 1961–64, but its western flair was neutralized by Walter Womacka’s socialist wall-painting in the style of Rivera.

Alexander Sedlmaier

Many of those who saw the newly-built Europa-Center in 1965 associated it with America (Figure 1). The newspaper Die Welt wrote: “An air of Manhattan blows through the ... heart of Berlin...; the future has begun ... The Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church ducks under the glass and aluminum giant of the new Europa-Center a bit like St. Patrick’s Cathedral does in front of Fifth Avenue’s Rockefeller giants.”¹ A commentator from an architecture journal likened the 20,000 square meters—which accommodated shops, a business center, theaters, cinemas, sports facilities, and restaurants—to Rockefeller Center or Piccadilly.² Another observed “American speed” in the raising of the tower.³ Critical opinions were rare. One person from a small town in West Germany lamented the half-English, half-German name, “one constantly had to put up with such English-American namings [sic]: when is the Deutschlandhalle going to be re-christened ‘Germany Hall’?”⁴

The builders of the twenty-two story high-rise office block—the investor Karl Heinz Pepper, the architects Helmut Hentrich and Hubert Petschnigg, and the advisors Werner Düttmann and Egon Eiermann—clearly adopted the International Style, which had come to signify faith in economic growth and technological progress.⁵ Following the ideal of integrating multiple functions into one project, they aimed to reproduce the splendor of Raymond Hood’s Rockefeller Center and the new civic spaces around its base.⁶ The Europa-Center’s office tower with an adjacent shopping center was one of the first of its kind in Germany. It accommodated 1.8 kilometers of display windows and was situated at the intersection of several important roads. Its developers frequently used the slogan “a city within the city.” They remained faithful to their model, down to an ice skating rink. The tower’s steel frame construction with curtain walls was obviously inspired by such examples as Mies and Johnson’s Seagram Building or Lever House by Gordon Bunshaft of Skidmore, Owings & Merill. With its revolving Mercedes roundel, the Europa-Center—then the tallest building in Berlin—quickly became a symbol of West Germany’s “economic miracle” and its successful integration into Western consumer culture. The production and consumption of style and lifestyle in this urban complex were inherently connected with the Cold War antagonism between two systems, each seeking ways to express its superiority.
The Europa-Center is therefore an ideal starting point for an inquiry into the transatlantic transfer of architectural style and urban lifestyle. In the postwar era, American influences were manifold in culture, politics, and economics. In the following, I will attempt to identify the push and pull factors—that is, American input and German needs—which constituted this transfer. Crucial to the process were the developers’ and architects’ actual “Atlantic crossings” that went into the shaping of the complex. The project’s protagonists played interesting parts in Germany’s reception of American models, which included modes of familiarizing, interpretation, acquisition, cultural translation, and alienation.  

The architect Werner Düttmann, who occupied the second highest post in West Berlin’s building authority, functioned as urban planning advisor for the Europa-Center. Düttmann had a long record of good connections with the Americans; his career had blossomed on the basis of million dollar grants to Berlin from West Germany and the United States. He was involved with the European Recovery Program in the construction of the George C. Marshall Haus, the United States’ pavilion at Berlin’s central exhibition site. He then served as contact architect for Hugh Stubbins, who built West Berlin’s famous convention hall, the American
contribution to the International Building Exhibition of 1957. There he met the husband of a former fellow student and collaborator, the German-American chemical magnate Henry H. Reichhold. This acquaintance led to Düttmann’s professional breakthrough between 1958 and 1960, when he was commissioned to build a new home for West Berlin’s Academy of the Arts, financed with a million dollar donation. As Eleanor Lansing Dulles wrote, on State Department stationary, “Dear Werner: I was delighted to learn of the definite announcement of Mr. Reichhold’s contribution to the cultural life of Berlin...I am sure that you have played a part in this decision.” The academy was originally planned as a high-rise, but protests from the district government limited it to a roof-shaped low building.

Düttmann created the overall arrangement of Breitscheidplatz, which was then filled in with the Europa-Center by Hentrich and Petschnigg, who had won a competition. His model from 1961 was very close to what was actually built, except for one important detail: he proposed a hori-

Figure 2. Source: Ein Mann in unserer Stadt: Karl H. Pepper. Konsul Karl H. Pepper von Mitarbeitern und Freunden zum fünfzigjährigen Jubiläum seines Hauses (private edition, Berlin, no year), 61. Courtesy of EUROPAAUER Grundstücksgesellschaft mbH & Co KG.
izontal slab for the office building.11 Years later, in a public lecture in New York, he spoke of “a new goddess in the Friedrichstrasse competition: the skyscraper, . . . symbol of freedom and movement.”12

Hentrich and Petschnigg (HPP), from Düsseldorf, had been successful in designing International Style skyscrapers. In Germany as well as abroad, their glass and steel skyscrapers symbolized the republic of the economic miracle shaped by Adenauer and Erhard. Their 1957 “three-slab-building” for the Thyssen group marked a radical departure from Germany’s past. Among architects, Hentrich was one of the few in Germany to adopt “American methods” such as marketing or teamwork.13

Hentrich became familiar with American working methods in 1930–31 when he worked in the office of Norman Bel Geddes in New York. He got to know another young German architect, Alfred Kastner, who had immigrated in the 1920s and worked for Raymond Hood. At the time, the latter was commissioned with the blueprint for Rockefeller Center. It was at the Rockefeller Center construction office that Hentrich met Frank Lloyd Wright. Simultaneously, the Empire State Building’s shell was nearing completion. Through the help of the German consul general, Hentrich obtained a permanent permit to visit the building site. From New York he went to Chicago, where skyscrapers were again among his top concerns. And in Los Angeles it was Richard Neutra—another famous player in the transatlantic architectural dialogue—who made the buildings of Frank Lloyd Wright accessible to him.14 From the late 1930s onwards, Hentrich worked under Generalbauinspektor Albert Speer and was involved in planning his neo-classicist German Weltmachtstädte (cities befitting a world power). One of his tasks was to study and adapt American models of organization.

Between 1952 and 1957, Hentrich and Petschnigg built the first post-war skyscraper in Germany, for BASF, which was among the tallest in Europe. Because there were few high-rise buildings in Germany at the time, BASF was happy to pay for a field trip to New York. In his memoirs, Hentrich writes that he was particularly fascinated by the Unilever House and the Seagram Building: “Just like during my first visit, I had the feeling that the fortunes of the world were governed from here.” During the building of the Thyssen-house, Hentrich and Petschnigg crossed the Atlantic again. This time they visited the leading skyscraper architects Skidmore, Owings & Merill.15 In the Hentrich papers at Berlin’s Academy of the Arts there is a letter from 1930, signed by Louis Skidmore, rejecting Hentrich’s application to join the planning staff of the 1933 Chicago World’s Fair.16 The transatlantic route of exchange was firmly established by 1960, when Hentrich informed Egon Eiermann that the preceding year’s trip had convinced him that interior staircases with airshafts were much safer in a case of emergency than those located on the outer wall.17
Hentrich was friends with those who had coined the very term “International Style.” Henry-Russell Hitchcock was his guest in Düsseldorf in 1957 and later published an illustrated book on HPP. In 1960, Hitchcock wrote to Hentrich: “It is interesting that a theater by Neutra is to go up next to your skyscraper.” Hentrich also exchanged visits and letters with Philip Johnson.

International Style (or Bauhaus) was transatlantic at heart. Paul Betts has shown that the popular image of Bauhaus as a hotbed of a left-wing architecture had fundamentally changed, leading to a revision of the history of Bauhaus during the Cold War. In Germany, the Bauhaus of the 1920s functioned as a starting point for the construction of an alternative and liberal past, while the American side was prone to see itself as the original headquarters of a genuinely American “International Style.” With different premises, both countries strove to build a postwar cultural identity based on liberalism and International Style.

The Europa-Center’s artistic advisor, the renowned architect Egon Eiermann, originally did not mean to be associated with Bauhaus, but the public nevertheless perceived his buildings within that framework. In 1954, when he worked on a tall office building in Düsseldorf, he wrote to his patron: “You worry that the new building could look like the American high-rises. . . .” Denouncing Hentrich’s tower, he criticized “this covering with a steel, aluminum or glass wall that . . . negates the structural elements of a building, namely the supportive structure and the horizontal divisions . . . Once I start to make the forces at work invisible . . ., I succumb to a fashionable foolishness that won’t last.” With these words, he describes the avoidance of the curtain wall which was common in Germany at the time (Figure 3).

Nevertheless, Eiermann also became a key figure in the transatlantic exchange. He had visited the United States in 1936, 1950, and 1957. He again made frequent visits in 1962, when he built the German embassy in Washington. In 1936 he had participated in a study trip sponsored by the National Socialist Reichskammer der bildenden Künste. He went to Rockefeller Center and visited William Lescaze to express his admiration for the skyscraper of the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, one of the first to adopt the International Style. In 1946 he reviewed the catalogue of the Zurich exhibition on American architecture, which he could not see because Germans were not allowed to travel. In this review, he stresses the German component of modern architecture: “[Le Corbusier’s] works were read and understood in the USA just as in Germany, where Peter Behrens and Poelzig, and later Gropius and Mies, became the pioneers of modern German architecture.” Eiermann remembered Lescaze telling him that only two percent of American modern architecture was good according to European standards. He repeatedly stressed the role of the
emigrants: “It is a proof of the intensity of the intercontinental relationship that . . . German architects have found . . . chairs at excellent [American] universities, where their work has united with that of their American colleagues . . . modern American architecture strikes me as very strongly European.” But he added, “only someone who has felt the still chaotic strength of New York’s skyscrapers foresees the possibilities.”

In the 1960s, Eiermann did not present himself as an enthusiast for America. He wrote, “[there is] a rubbish of new things in New York . . . it is over with American modernism since the big people have gotten old.” Back home he confessed, “one could never work with Americans; they have neither fantasy nor sensitivity and think exclusively of dollars . . . the official style there differs from that applied in Soviet Russia only by very small degrees.”

Eiermann’s aim in the discussions about the Europa-Center was to reduce the height of the high-rise and to divide the building into several parts because he feared too much dominance adjacent to his Gedächtniskirche.

Next we should turn our attention to the investor. Karl Heinz Pepper also traveled to America, but “Atlantic crossings” are not so crucial to his biography. On the contrary, he embodies West Berliners’ famed stubbornness and energetic staying power. His whole career—from the parental piano factory to a wholesale radio business to building contractor and operator of a shopping center—took place in Berlin, despite or perhaps because of, the fact that division, Khrushchev’s ultimatum, and the Berlin Wall caused many entrepreneurs to leave the city.
The Western Allies obliged the Federal Republic of Germany to introduce emergency economic measures to support Berlin. In addition to the European Recovery Program, the Berlin-Hilfegesetz provided generous tax relief and subsidies. In 1959, in response to Khrushchev’s threat to terminate the four-power status, a write-off allowance topped this package. Depreciating invested capital could be written off after three years, at seventy-five percent. As a result, the isolation resulting from the building of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, hardly impeded the development of trade in West Berlin. After a short period of recession, the increased spending power of Berlin’s consumers (induced by the Berlin aid) became apparent. The retail turnover in West Berlin climbed from DM 4.4 billion in 1959 to 5.5 billion in 1963.

Pepper cleverly made the most of these opportunities by encouraging people not to transfer their money to the revenue office but instead to Berlin, in the hope of recovering it in a few years. The investment sum total came up to DM 84 million at the time of the opening in 1965. Treasury Minister Dollinger had provided a substantial part through an ERP-credit of DM 23 million. Twenty million had been raised by the Europa-Haus Grundstücksgesellschaft mbH und Co. KG (Pepper’s private limited company in partnership with a group of partners). The remaining DM 41 million were mortgage loans, making it the largest private building investment in Berlin at the time. Pepper achieved a great success with this risky financial arrangement, which was just within the limits of the law. However, by the end of 1965 both Minister Dollinger and Chancellor Erhard voiced some irritation with this organized tax loophole. There was talk of “Las Vegas on the Spree,” prompted by an advertising brochure in which Pepper had reckoned that a partnership would be worthwhile even if the finished product did not generate a profit. But indignation subsided, the general public celebrated the Europa-Center, and the Berlin aid remained unchanged. Hence the Europa-Center’s success became the starting point and a model for a high-rise and shopping center building boom in Berlin, which increasingly involved local party politics in dubious lending practices (Figure 4).

Ultimately this led to the scandal-ridden resignation of the Berlin state government under Mayor Dietrich Stobbe in January 1981. In fact, according to Thomas Hanchett’s analysis of “U.S. Tax Policy and the Shopping Center Boom of the 1950s and 1960s,” we have here a telling transatlantic analogy.

American involvement in the Europa-Center’s ongoing business is easy to discern from the press coverage of the new attraction. The commander-in-chief of the United States Armed Forces in Europe, General O’Meara, attended the opening ceremony, conveying greetings from Lucius D. Clay. The entrepreneurs lamented the failure of a planned
“American drugstore” due to “our provincial law regulating the closing time of shops.” The Schwab department store, an anchor store, belonged to the Singer Company. The Europa-Center’s Irish Pub became an important meeting point for American and British soldiers. Changes during the 1970s and 1980s reproduced well-tried strategies in mall development from the United States: the windy courtyards were covered, the ice skating rink was abandoned because it attracted an undesired clientele, and the whole complex was air-conditioned. A New York architect by the name of Henry Walshe carried out these measures (Figure 5).

The ubiquity of American modernist models obviously provided an attractive alternative to totalitarian concepts in Germany’s past and present. The very name of the Europa-Center points to a reinvention of a tradition, as does the fact that it was built on the site of the Romanisches Café, a celebrated gathering-place for artists in the 1920s. A prerequisite for the Europa-Center was, of course, the building site that used to accommodate the Romanisches Haus, which had been pulled down right after the war. This circumstance is not trivial, for the prevailing ideology of demolition in this case did away with a building that could have offered ample opportunity for reconstruction (Figure 6).

Thus, for over a decade the site was an urban wasteland, housing circus tents, snack stalls, and rats. The semiotic connotations of this site were clearly those of the experience of air war, misery, and temporary use (Figure 7). The splendid Europa-Center carried on this lost tradition by...
accommodating a rather modest Romanisches Café in its basement. Meanwhile, on the twenty-second floor there was a bar with a view of the whole city which reminded observers of a similar one in San Francisco. The Aluminium-Zentrale, a trade group representing German aluminum
producers that used to have its name displayed on a huge advertisement at the Romanisches Haus, now financed the transatlantic study trips bringing Hentrich and his colleagues to America.  

The name of the complex was originally meant to be “Europa-Haus.” This name was already used by an older high-rise, one of the first office-towers with a steel frame construction in Berlin. Here we have a telling analogy. With its eleven stories, it exceeded the maximum height permitted by law. Dietrich Neumann educates us about the curious building freeze imposed by the government for that reason, which halted the ongoing construction for two full years before the complex and its huge sky signs could be finished in 1931. In the 1960s, this building had fallen out of favor because it had housed a National Socialist ministry and was located near the commercially unattractive Berlin Wall. The Europa-Center, by contrast, never encountered any serious problems during the planning procedures because it was constructed as an icon of the modern metropolis that postwar West Berlin wished to be. The new scope in height, together with the curtain wall and the shopping center, advertised an identification with “Western” values and American “lifestyle.”

Volker Berghahn and others have noted a “triumph of the American model” in the realm of industrial culture in postwar West Germany. Americanization was equally manifest in the sphere of consumption, if not more so. Here we need to employ Americanization as an historical concept. The United States functioned as a pioneer of consumer moder-
nity. Between 1890 and 1940, new consumer habits were defined in North America: mass production, marketing, the consumer household, the spread of consumer culture to broad segments of society, and the interpretation of the right to participate in the marketplace as democracy realized. The subsequent influence on other societies followed between 1920 and 1970. The bourgeois-Malthusian economic model appeared to be in crisis after World War II. National Socialism and Soviet communism had discredited the counter-model of autarkic command economies. Hence postwar experiments strongly stressed mass consumption.\(^42\)

Within that chronological framework, I interpret the Europa-Center as a symbol for the heyday of American impact on Germany. This is paralleled by developments in architecture. Düttmann states that it was only in the 1960s that Germany’s insurance palaces and bank buildings ceased being built in the style of Third Reich architecture. At that time, sandstone, travertine, and marble were overcome and skyscrapers from Frankfurt to the Ruhr were modern again.\(^43\)

Although shopping malls and high-rises continued to spread, a new phase in the German conception of consumption and American influences began with occurrences such as the first demonstration at the Europa-Center in 1967.\(^44\) The protest against extended store hours marks a departure from the almost unanimous approval that the public had extended to this rather successful attempt at international style and lifestyle.

Notes


9 Eleanor Lansing Dulles to Werner Düttmann, 14 March 1958, Düttmann papers, Academy of the Arts Berlin, Archive, WV 12.


11 Werner Düttmann, verliebt ins Bauen: 282; Düttmann papers, WV 82.


14 Ibid., 95–112.

15 Ibid., 221–24.

16 Skidmore to Hentrich, 24 July 1930, Hentrich papers, Academy of the Arts Berlin, Archive, not yet registered.

17 Hentrich to Eiermann, 19 August 1960, ibid.


22 See Adrian von Buttlar’s contribution to this volume.

23 Eiermann to Ministerialdirektor Rossig, 6 November 1958, in Briefe des Architekten, 148–149.

24 Sonja Hildebrand, Egon Eiermann. Die Berliner Zeit (Braunschweig, 1999).


26 Egon Eiermann to Brigitte Eiermann, December 2 1962, in Briefe des Architekten, 153.


30 Kurt L. Shell, Bedrohung und Bewährung. Führung und Bevölkerung in der Berlin-Krise (Cologne, 1965), 422.


37 Illustration 7: Ein Mann in unserer Stadt, 48.
40 Dietrich Neumann, Die Wolkenkratzer kommen! Deutsche Hochhäuser der zwanziger Jahre (Braunschweig, 1995).
After the Second World War, the transatlantic architectural dialogue between the United States and Europe fractured into a many-voiced discourse. In divided Germany, it was henceforth a propagandistic dispute rooted in an ideological stand-off. While the young Federal Republic leaned towards the United States in all areas of life, East Germany remained in thrall to Moscow. Even after the aesthetic fetters were loosened at the end of the 1950s, East German architecture continued a policy of separatism. East Berlin, in particular, remained preoccupied with the political adversary and thus also participated in the transatlantic dialogue, albeit from an unusual point of departure. While the West looked to the “New World” as the Promised Land, the East rediscovered “Old Europe.” It pursued an ideal defined by a negation of its enemy’s ideals.

Socialist architectural policy accorded a special importance to city centers which derived from their propagandistic function. In the 1930s, Soviet architectural ideologues equated the city center with the center of power. It was the destination for ritualized processions, apex of the mass political cult. The now “empowered working class” could assemble here and symbolically take possession of what was once the city’s most valuable land. The conventional urban planning principle of exploiting the city’s most expensive land to realize high profits was turned on its head. There were wide open spaces instead of skyscrapers, aesthetic hegemony rather than stylistic plurality, a grim and determined show of power instead of free competition. While the competition to put up the highest, the most beautiful and, not least of all, the most profitable high-rise building was in full swing in New York in the 1930s, Stalin was planning the tallest building in the world next to the world’s largest parade square in Moscow. Only the war prevented the construction of this building, which was also intended as the biggest work of art (in the world) and a most imposing propaganda instrument. And whereas efforts in postwar West Germany focused on casting all forms of state representation in a modest vein, informing every axis, every symmetry, every skyward tendency with an essential understatement, East Germany’s Communist Party (SED) earmarked Berlin’s historical center for the largest building in Germany. The second-highest building in Europe was eventually erected here, though in an unexpected guise. But the process of reconstruction began with a destructive spree. It was the Spreeinsel district which
formed the nucleus of East Berlin’s reconstruction. The war-damaged stately home of the Hohenzollern family was demolished in 1950, sacrificed to a wide open space reserved for mass parades, whereby the scale of this void was a demonstration in its own right. Imposing axes led to this square in the form of thoroughfares, all aligned towards the same destination, the “central building.” It was a vision of a building which could symbolize power and august superiority in monumental form, although its actual function remained subordinate to this symbolism for many years. And although the dream of a “new monumentalism” was also revived in the Western modernist approach, its “lyrical content” (as Siegfried Giedion had called it in the 1940s) had nothing in common with the historicizing, politicized socialist style. Even CIAM’s reappraisal of the value of city centers differed fundamentally from the Stalinist veneration of the city. When the 8th CIAM Congress debated the “core of the city” in 1951, what the delegates had in mind was neither axes, squares, nor a central building, but traffic-free, multifunctional communal centers which were to be realized on a human scale by architects, painters, and sculptors. Their vision of the “heart of the city” was not a space for demonstrations and prestigious edifices, but a civic landscape in which a community of individuals would prevail. The blueprint appeared to be provided by Le Corbusier’s plans for Chandigarh or St. Dié, rather than Moscow, Warsaw, or East Berlin.

In 1950, GDR leaders drew up a legally binding “Sixteen Principles of Urban Development” to promote the specifically Stalinist aestheticization, politicization and, not least, exploitation of urban planning. One of the driving forces here was Kurt Liebknecht, who had formerly worked under Hans Poelzig and Mies van der Rohe. Following Soviet exile and arbitrary arrest, Liebknecht rose to the position of president of the East German Building Academy and became an arch enemy of functionalism. Alongside the structural reorientation of the city, style became a second instrument of agitation in this architectural power posturing. By inventing a new national style, the SED contributed something to the transatlantic dialogue which directly opposed the “cosmopolitan dogma” of International Style. By upholding a national building tradition in the spirit of Knobelsdorff and Schinkel, the GDR picked up on “sound popular taste” and the facile criticism of modern trends which had many supporters before, during, and after the Nazi era. Apart from its role as an instrument of political self-affirmation, a historicizing canon of style also served as an anti-American argument; the destruction of German cities was generally blamed solely on Anglo-American bombers, and the postwar reimportation of classic modernism in West Germany was seen as a continuation of the West’s depredatory work. The East German reaction to this transatlantic patronage found expression in propaganda
and new planning measures, the most impressive of which was Berlin’s Stalinallee.\textsuperscript{10} As a striking symbol of cultural superiority, a towering high-rise building was to be erected in every major East German city, but above all in East Berlin, in the form of a majestic hallmark whose functions revealed undeniably baroque traits.\textsuperscript{11}

East Berlin, of course, played the leading role in this stage-managed debate on the role of the high-rise building; numerous plans for the reshaping of the political center were drawn up between 1951 and 1963. Initially, these plans remained restricted to the building and the central square at its feet (Figure 1). The planning reached an initial milestone in 1953–54, however, with the idea of transforming the entire city—both East and West Berlin—into an all-embracing work of art. Not only streets and squares, but also factory entrances and the courses of rivers were to be artistically restyled as part of an urban scenario in an undeniably Romantic vein. A central building streamlined into a tower would form the centerpiece of a wreath of high-rise buildings, giving the low-lying city a striking silhouette.

There were never any real prospects for realizing such a mammoth project, however, which was to include the surrounding area within a 100-kilometer radius. The GDR was far too weak economically, and after
the workers’ uprising of June 17, 1953, the domestic situation was far too unstable for such a prestige-oriented undertaking. Following the Soviet Union’s recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state in 1955, the architectural mission soon lost its relevance as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the GDR continued to agitate for the unification of Germany until well into the 1960s (that is, even after the building of the Berlin Wall) and reserved a central building in East Berlin as the seat of a future all-German parliament (at least on paper), by the end of the 1950s the SED was forced to recognize the de facto division of Germany into two states.\textsuperscript{12} And this also affected urban planning for East Berlin. Planning measures for East Berlin’s center were suspended between 1955 and 1958. Housing construction activities geared towards modernization and industrialization gave rise to design blueprints which were continually rehashed until the demise of the GDR. The result was the monotonous and arbitrary character of the prefabricated slab constructions, which remain a blight upon East German towns and cities to this day.\textsuperscript{13}

It belongs to the irony of the two Germanies’ architectural history that West Berlin was repeatedly a source of fresh inspiration to (re)intensify planning efforts in East Berlin. After the above-mentioned pause in planning activities, it was above all the well-publicized success of Interbau (1957), the Hansaviertel (1957–59) and the international competition Hauptstadt Berlin (1958) which spurred the GDR leadership into action.\textsuperscript{14} The Hauptstadt competition had particularly far-reaching consequences because the most innovative city planners in the Western world were invited to reshape the historical center of both East and West Berlin. There were no limits on their proposals because the political situation ruled out the possibility of any plan ever being realized. Thus, Le Corbusier, Alison and Peter Smithson, and Hans Scharoun all submitted impressive plans which, compared with East Berlin’s rigid planning models, reveal just how great a divide between East and West had emerged in only ten years. The onus was now on the East to address modern architecture once again. This began somewhat haltingly until the early 1960s.

In order to attain international recognition, the GDR’s first move was to counter the provocation of West Berlin’s Hauptstadt competition with its own competition. Its scope was restricted to East Berlin and only architects from the Eastern Bloc states were allowed to participate.\textsuperscript{15} In an attempt to ensure the competition’s success, the undersecretary charged with its planning, Gerhard Kosel, secretly tried to push through one plan, which has been misconstrued to this day as a project imposed by the party and the government. In fact, Kosel, who had lived in the Soviet Union for more than twenty years without falling victim to Stalin’s purges, was seeking a way to marginalize Herman Henselmann, who had been tasked by the municipal authorities with planning East Berlin’s
center. This gave rise to a semi-private planning competition which had an extremely invigorating effect.

It is again ironic that the phase which eventually determined the face of East Berlin’s center began with the reactivation of Gerhard Klosel’s draft design, a model example of the Stalinist era (Figure 2). This design showed a monumental high-rise building, organized along central symmetrical lines which combined the two desired functions (a high-rise administrative building and the seat of parliament), embodying the executive power of the legislature. It marked the center of a strongly hierarchized city, which was to sacrifice two of its oldest districts to make way for the baroque pools intended to reflect the central building, creating two mirror images. Whereas the building itself remained isolated from the city, from the perspective of the political demonstrator on the parade square it merged together with the central stand, which was not reserved solely for party and government leaders during large-scale demonstrations. The plan was to install a commemorative hall inside the stand where the treasures of the workers’ movement could be displayed. There were even plans to move Karl Marx’s remains here. Kosel dreamed of surpassing the Lenin mausoleum in Moscow, the model for his vision. Whereas the Lenin mausoleum evoked ancient structures in a very gen-

Figure 2. Stalinist monumentalism after Stalin’s death by Gerhard Klosel, 1955. Image courtesy of Bundesarchiv Berlin.
eral way, Kosel chose the Pergamum Altar as the model for his memorial stand, with the aim of establishing a symbolic connection between GDR socialism and Germany’s most important ancient treasure, linking the mythological world of the past with the classless world of the future. Because communism was seen as the telos of history, it did not matter to Kosel that he used models which had also been employed by Wilhelm Kreis during the Third Reich.

Although Kosel’s plan was published only in a rigorously amended form, it lost nothing of its staid, backward-looking impetus (Figure 3). Because the plan was the unofficial winner before the competition was even launched, it stood on the conservative end of the form spectrum, which had taken on a new, modernist slant in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Here, up and coming architects had been inspired above all by Brasilia, and many planners had also taken note of West Berlin’s Hauptstadt competition. Many entries for the East Berlin competition undermined the rigid ideal behind the competition, by proposing central buildings within two high-rise blocks or without any skyscraper at all. The high-rise building was no longer seen as an ideal, and many architects proposed marking East Berlin’s political center with obelisks,

steel-needles (each 150 meters high), or with something like the Gateway Arch in St. Louis. But these non-conformist plans were rejected by GDR leaders and the competition’s top prize went to a static high-rise project by Gerhard Kröber and colleagues.

Only Hermann Henselmann’s one-off design for a Forum of the Nation, which went as far as to satirize the name of Kosel’s Marx-Engels Forum, retained its visionary force in spite of official criticism (Figure 4). Instead of a gigantic high-rise building, Henselmann planned an ensemble of separate functional buildings, the most impressive of which were a suspended assembly hall and the so-called Turm der Signal (Signal Tower). It was this tower—half television tower, half Marx-Engels memorial—which later became the landmark of East Berlin’s new city center, projecting the most important symbol of the time—Sputnik, the world’s first satellite—into the Berlin sky as a bright red sphere.17

During the competition, however, the disregard for the GDR’s conventional forms of representation was an affront. As the jury sifted through the submissions, the GDR was riding high on a short-lived wave of economic success, which was seen as an affirmation of its politics.18 The GDR thus had little incentive to change its traditional forms of state representation. The change in economic policy in 1959 towards comparative competition with the West merely called for a change in the style of traditional representations. In line with the declared aim of Überholen ohne Einzuholen (surpassing the West on our own terms), architecture was required to abandon its separatist policy. The style-based Gegenbau (counter-architecture) was to give way to quantitative Überbau (outbuilding).19 Kosel’s central building was simply given a cosmetic make-over by Hanns Hopp, one of the most productive architects in the GDR (Figure 5).20

Planning measures for East Berlin’s center continued gradually under these same premises up to the building of the Berlin Wall. The wish for prestige-enhancing symmetries continually gained ground, as did the establishment of regional planning in a graphically oriented guise which legitimized large open spaces. While the design of the central building faltered, however, Hermann Henselmann erected GDR’s first high-rise building with a curtain wall, the Haus der Lehrer on the Alexanderplatz (Figure 6). This building sought to keep pace with contemporary developments in the field of high-rise construction, such as the Seagram Building in New York or the Mannesmann Building in Düsseldorf.

The success of this high-rise earned Henselmann the privilege of submitting the last high-rise designs for East Berlin’s center. Directly after the building of the Berlin Wall, the GDR was intent on finally putting its old plan into action, to counter the horizontal gesture of impotence implied by the closure of the border with a vertical gesture of power. While
Figure 4. Hermann Henselmann’s Forum of the Nation with a Sputnik-Marx-Engels monument, 1959. Image courtesy of Sammlung Baukunst/Akademie der Künste Berlin.
Henselmann’s first draft design in 1962 endeavoured to lend East Berlin’s central building a certain South American flair with the motif of a hovering state emblem and sweeping lines, the project (intended for implementation in 1963) restricted its ambitions to the mediocrity of a typical German administrative building of that time.

The end of the GDR’s period of economic success signalled the end of high-rise planning ventures. In 1963, all prestige-building projects were shelved and the GDR parliament convened henceforth in the Haus der Lehrer. In 1964, plans for East Berlin’s center made no headway in the run-up to the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the GDR, until a unique solution emerged by chance. Just as the plans for a central building were being abandoned, plans for an East Berlin television tower sped towards a conclusion. The repeated deferral of this project since 1952 now had dire political consequences, as the West had strongly stepped up the capacity of its transmitters after the building of the Berlin Wall, with the result that there were regions in the GDR where one could receive enemy broadcasts, but not GDR programs.21
Now there was a proposal to locate the East Berlin television tower in the center of the city, where it inherited the central building’s symbolic function. Directly linked visually with the assembly hall, which still featured in the city plans (and was eventually realized as the Palast der

Figure 6. Haus der Lehrer, Alexanderplatz, by Hermann Henselmann, 1956/59. Photograph by Peter Müller.
Republik), the tower solved the core aesthetic problem facing the city planners at no extra cost, because of its height (which was a technical necessity). At the same time, it was hailed as a brilliant feat of civil engineering and broadcasting technology. Furthermore the tower had a kind of Cold War bonus, because West Berlin had no financial power to

Figure 7. East Berlin TV Tower, 1964/69. Photograph by Peter Müller.
erect its own Stuttgart-like TV tower near the Olympiastadium, as had been planned since 1959. The construction of the East Berlin TV tower began in 1965, and the project was available for propagandistic exploitation in 1969, to tie in with the GDR’s twentieth anniversary.

Because the original tower designed in 1962 was unable to make its mark on the face of the GDR’s capital in its original guise—a mixture of

Figure 8. Space Needle with flying saucer in Seattle, 1961/62. Photograph by Picture Perfect, from Charles Sheppard, Skyscrapers (New York, 1996).
Moscow’s and Hamburg’s TV Tower—Henselmann’s Signal Tower project was revived as a result of machinations which remain a subject of debate to this day. The spherical dome adopted the well known futuristic forms designed by R. Buckminster Fuller. They were striking and impressive, evocative of a rocket taking off together with the hovering Sputnik satellite (Figure 7). This unique “space architecture” heralded the redevelopment of the Alexanderplatz, fitting into a rigid prestige-oriented space which redefined the “old city” with a new, radical modernism in a renewed attempt to surpass the West. What was doomed to remain only a distant vision in West Berlin’s Hauptstadt competition proved realizable in the East, where there was no need to take any divergent interests into consideration. Just as socialism had won the race into space, the race for the future of mankind now also appeared to have been won. This gave socialism good cause to flaunt its own symbols in its architecture, exemplified here by Sputnik, and to go to provocative lengths to invent a whole new city. In the heart of Berlin’s historic center, the GDR created an image which it continued to promote with vigor, until it was overtaken by events when Apollo 11 landed on the moon. By focusing on the realistic representation of Sputnik, however, the East was able to maintain its fundamental difference from Western space architecture—decrying, for example, the lesser-known Space Needle (1961–62) in Seattle as nothing more than a flying saucer (Figure 8). Regrettably, socialist prestige-architecture had no time for such individualistic flights of fancy. The transatlantic dialogue remained permanently interrupted.

Notes

1 Werner Durth, Jörn Düwel, and Niels Gutschow, Ostkreuz/Aufbau: Architektur und Städtebau der DDR, vol. 2 (Frankfurt/Main, 1998), 17–199.
4 Peter Müller, Symbolsuche: Die Ost-Berliner Zentrumsplanung zwischen Repräsentation und Agitation (Berlin, 2005).
8 Simone Hain, Warum zum Beispiel die Stalinallee? Beiträge zu einer Transformationsgeschichte des modernen Planens und Bauens (Erkner, 1999).


10 Herbert Nicolaus and Alexander Obeth, Die Stalinallee: Geschichte einer deutschen Strasse (Berlin, 1997).


17 Peter Müller, Symbol mit Aussicht: Der Berliner Fernsehturm (Berlin, 1999), 54–63.

18 André Steiner, Die DDR-Wirtschaftsreform der sechziger Jahre: Konflikt zwischen Effizienz- und Machtkalkül (Berlin, 1999).


21 Müller, Symbol, 39–42, 68–74.

FROM AN “ALIEN, HOSTILE PHENOMENON” TO THE “POETRY OF THE FUTURE”: ON THE BAUHAUS RECEPTION IN EAST GERMANY, 1945–70

Wolfgang Thöner

The “Indestructible Idea” of the Bauhaus and its East German Reception

The Bauhaus, the most influential modern design movement of the twentieth century, made its presence felt in East Germany (meaning the Soviet Zone of Occupation from 1945 to 1949 and, later, the German Democratic Republic) not only through its intellectual and material legacy, but also through the activities of former teachers and students from the school. The reaction to this legacy was always a politically charged affair in East Germany, linked with fundamental questions of culture, lifestyle, or, as it was called in the GDR, the socialist way of life.

When one considers the legacy of the Bauhaus, particularly its adaptation in different cultural contexts, it is important to distinguish the Bauhaus reception from the general reception of modern art. Throughout its existence, from 1919 through 1933, the Bauhaus considered itself part of an international avant-garde. Decades after the school was closed, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe spoke of the “indestructible idea” of the Bauhaus, without specifying whether this idea was more a question of style in the art-historical sense or, rather, one of lifestyle. The Bauhaus strove to shape the human environment comprehensively; in this regard, it was much more effective and complex than other institutions and movements concerned with design. It was a school which developed and applied new pedagogical methods; it was active in the fields of architecture, urban planning, landscape design, industrial design, and graphic design, as well as in the fine arts. At the same time, it was a forum for theoretical debates. Common to all of these efforts was the search for the spatial and material prerequisites for a new way of life. It was above all in the era of Walter Gropius (1919–28) and Hannes Meyer (1928–30) that the Bauhaus was interested in “good design” more in the sense of a standard of living than as a formal differentiation of various lifestyles.

Any examination of the Bauhaus reception must recognize that architecture and urban planning were almost exclusively a state affair in East Germany. Government guidelines, plans, and orders determined which architectural models were favored and which projects were realized. One can distinguish four phases in the development of these state-
determined models, each of which had a different attitude towards modernism and thus towards the Bauhaus. The early phase (1945–50) was shaped by the concept of the “urban landscape,” associated with the landscape architect Reinhold Lingner and the architect Hans Scharoun. The years 1951–55 were dominated by the Deutsche Bauakademie and its director, Kurt Liebknecht (who in his youth was active as a modernist architect). Their concept of “national traditions” stigmatized the Bauhaus just as it rejected all modernist tendencies. The years 1955–70 were heavily influenced by Gerhard Kosel. A former student of Bruno Taut, Kosel was oriented towards scientific and industrial planning methods. This phase extended until a 1970 conference signaled its end. The last phase in the history of construction in the GDR after 1970, under Gerhard Gisske, was marked by a one-sided orientation towards the organization of the building process and led to a loss of a sense of architecture’s intrinsic aesthetic value. Despite an opening-up of debate, it led to a real decline in building culture.5

The unique reception of the Bauhaus in the GDR—at first continued, then demonized, then later appreciated in some quarters—differs greatly from the way it was considered by philosophers, architects, designers, and politicians in the FRG. In West Germany as in East Germany, former Bauhaus teachers and students worked as architects or designers, and schools of architecture and design either saw themselves as following in the tradition of the Bauhaus or rejected it. At various historical junctures, the reception of the Bauhaus was an important part of the discourse of national and international tradition and identity, of style and aesthetic ideology, and of lifestyle, political, and socio-economic conditions. In this essay, I will focus on those moments in East German history when an assessment of the Bauhaus was bound up with a wider discussion of goals, of the development of a new “socialist” and “German” society and its corresponding architecture. Of special interest is the question of how architecture itself can be invested with ideological meaning, either as a national style or in the sense of a functionalism derived from an understanding of the Bauhaus.

In the first two decades of the GDR’s existence, the tone was set by architects and politicians whose formative years were the 1920s; their lives and works will thus be a main focus of the first half of this essay. In the theoretical discussions of architecture and lifestyle which were dominant at the time, the Bauhaus was often portrayed as the enemy. The more nuanced theoretical and historical understanding of the Bauhaus and the positive official reaction to it which emerged later, in the 1960s, appeared more or less without grand ideological gestures. The socialist variants of “construction industry Functionalism”6 which were actually built were increasingly at odds with the GDR’s theoretical plans, which
had sought to revive Functionalism as a building form as well as a lifestyle. I will illustrate this in the second part of my essay with the example of Lothar Kühne, who approached the question in a quite differentiated way and connected it to fundamental questions of lifestyle.

**The Bauhaus-Reception in the Soviet Zone of Occupation and in the Early Years of the GDR (1945–50)**

When actual construction and the teaching of design slowly began again, a wide spectrum of design principles were possible, even in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in the first years after the end of the war, in the midst of rubble and unspeakable misery. As in the Western Zones of Occupation, the Bauhaus was often viewed as something unsullied by fascist ideology, as a victim of the National Socialist dictatorship, as something positive to which a new society could and should attach itself. The same is true of many individuals and works associated with the Bauhaus, but not all. The Nazi stigmatization of avant-garde culture, especially art and architecture, as “degenerate” contributed greatly to this image. Art and architecture in Nazi Germany was and still is often presented as free of avant-garde influence. But despite all of the Blut-und-Boden ideology, the reality of construction in modern, industrialized Nazi Germany was much more complex than a first glance at the buildings of an Albert Speer might indicate. There was a “Bauhaus modernism within National Socialism,”7 in which former members of the Bauhaus played an important role, even after 1945, in West and East Germany, with “biographical interconnections”8 across the numerous historical and political divides.

In East Germany, many architecture and design schools which consciously looked to the Bauhaus as a model were founded or reopened. Former members of the Bauhaus were active almost everywhere. In Weimar, the rededication of the Hochschule für Baukunst und bildende Künste (today the Bauhaus University) was connected with names such as Hermann Henselmann (who himself had not been part of the Bauhaus, but was a modernist architect and who emphasized its importance), Peter Keler, and Gustav Hassenpflug.9 In Dessau, Hubert Hoffmann took steps to reopen the Bauhaus through a planning group that he started. Mart Stam, Marianne Brandt, and Selman Selmanagic began efforts in Dresden and Berlin-Weißensee, and Walter Funkat was active at Halle’s Burg Giebichenstein (later the Hochschule für industrielle Formgestaltung).10 Often these developments met a premature end, even before the founding of the GDR in 1949. They clashed with the Stalinist conception of Socialist Realism and soon a general anti-modernist politics was introduced (for literature and the visual arts, already in 1947). Supported and
to some extent initiated by Soviet cultural officials, “Socialist Realism” succeeded politically as the only model in culture and design.

I would like to examine three cases in greater detail. In Dessau, Hubert Hoffmann was entrusted with city planning after 1945. He knew Dessau’s unique situation very well because, together with other Bauhaus students, from 1929 through 1931 he put together an analysis of the city which was presented by Walter Gropius at the celebrated CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne) conference.11 Hubert Hoffmann was active during the Third Reich as a “regional planer” (Landesplaner) and in the early 1940s was a proponent of the modernist concept of a “segmented and loosened city.”12 Now he made plans for the reconstruction of Dessau, which was over 80 percent destroyed. At the same time, he made efforts to reopen the Bauhaus. He developed the idea for a curriculum which sought to combine elements of the Bauhaus theories of Walter Gropius and Hannes Meyer, and tried to recruit teachers for this new Bauhaus, including Gropius, now a professor at Harvard University. Hubert Hoffmann and his allies organized exhibits and competitions for city development ideas. The clear relation to the Bauhaus is also evident from the daily newspapers and academic and industry journals of the era. But there was not only positive support. Conservative architects and city planners opposed modernist plans. Changing political conditions signaled an early end to these efforts. Hoffmann’s undertaking at first found support from the liberal mayor Hesse, the man who in the same job had brought the Bauhaus to Dessau in 1925 and for that reason was chased from office by the Nazis after 1932. As a politically untainted person, Hesse was installed by the Soviet occupiers as the first postwar mayor. As a result of the 1947 elections, the SED installed itself in power, and their candidate stopped the Bauhaus plans. Hoffmann left Dessau when, on top of that, he was reproached for his past as a Landesplaner in the Third Reich. For decades thereafter, Dessau was no longer a center of the Bauhaus reception.

In Dresden, Franz Ehrlich was in a position similar to Hoffmann’s in Dessau. In 1945, Ehrlich commenced with urban development plans which aimed to reconstruct Dresden, not in its old compactness, but rather in the spirit of an urban landscape. Outlying areas of the city would introduce a new form of residential development with organically interconnected cells, which together would form Greater Dresden. An autonomous garden city was not the goal, even if there are echoes of this contained in the proposal. Instead, Ehrlich’s plans related more to ideas such as those that the second Bauhaus director, Hannes Meyer, articulated at the 1933 CIAM Congress, and Ehrlich connected these ideas to Hubert Hoffmann’s above-mentioned concept of the “segmented and opened-up city.”13 Here, following the ideas of Hannes Meyer, modernity
is not understood in a formal or stylistic sense but rather as a process of urban development to optimize social, technical, and economic relations. Even Dresden’s city center would be integrated into this larger space (Figure 1). For that reason, Ehrlich envisioned a wide-reaching removal of the old city structure; only a few prominent older buildings such as the Hofkirche and the Zwinger were to be restored. Remnants of a city structure which had emerged over centuries thus came together as a contrast to the asymmetrically meandering modern buildings in a rapidly changing urban space. An abstract pre-stressed concrete monument in the form of a parable (a memorial for Karl Marx) marked the center of the urban landscape. It spanned an open space designed for demonstrations and parades and thus already fulfilled some of the “sixteen fundamentals of urban construction,” established in 1950. With the planned expansion of the Zwinger, Ehrlich combined modern concepts with plans dating back

Figure 1. Franz Ehrlich, Plan for a new cultural center in the historic center of Dresden in the area between Pirna and Meißen, 1945–46. Note the baroque buildings on the right (the Hofkirche and the Zwinger). Stiftung Bauhaus Dessau.
to the 1700s. Under the direction of Hans Scharoun, the “Planning Collective” in Berlin worked on a similar concept of a city comprised of residential cells. Even Berlin was seen as a city to be organically integrated into a regional landscape formed ages ago by a melting glacier. One member of the Planning Collective was the former Bauhaus member Selman Selmanagic, who a few years later, as rector of the Kunsthochschule Berlin-Weißensee, tried to realize the Bauhaus ideal of the integration of all fields of art, design, and construction.

The Bauhaus as an “Alien, Hostile Phenomenon” (1951–55)

Modernist concepts in architecture and art conflicted increasingly with the principle of “Socialist Realism” advanced by the one-party rule of the SED. “Socialist Realism” was a theory of art as “reflection,” first developed in relation to literature and then transferred to other arts, including architecture. Architecture was considered an especially effective ideological art form, a privileged tool to educate “the new man.” For architects and city planners, the “sixteen fundamentals of urban construction,” published in 1950 after leading East German architects visited the Soviet Union, became the guidelines for all of their work. The rejection of the Bauhaus (whose concepts were seen as incommensurable with such guidelines, despite plans such as Ehrlich’s above-mentioned one) reached its peak with the so-called “Formalism debate.” In the “struggle against Formalism in art and architecture,” modernist techniques of planning and design and “modernist style” were seen by leading SED politicians as an affront to “national traditions.” Naturally, the unique circumstances of the Cold War played a decisive role. In West Germany, it was “International Style,” intimately connected with the Bauhaus, which was promoted as a truly democratic architecture for the free world. In state-socialist counties, by contrast, “international” was understood to mean the creation of similar social and political relations through an emphasis on “national traditions.” The concept of International Style was developed in 1932 by Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Philip Johnson, and Alfred Barr and announced to the world with a book which grew out of a remarkable exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art. It is thus American in origin, but at the same time deeply marked by central elements of European architectural modernism, especially the Bauhaus. After the Second World War, a book was published in the American Zone of Occupation entitled *In USA erbaut, 1932–1944*. It took the 1932 MoMA exhibit as its starting point in order to demonstrate how an architectural style in which America was dominant had developed out of International Style. The book, published in 1948, declares that “to be sure, the museum was
the first to champion the new European architecture, but it also demonstrated the genesis and growth of a genuinely American modernist style, its kinship with the American landscape and its debt to ‘International Style.’”¹⁹ Modernist architecture was seen, as it had been in 1932, first and foremost as a problem for style in its rejection of the Neue Sachlichkleit, which was equated with Functionalism: “The great value placed upon aesthetics was very therapeutic at the time because it stood in direct opposition to the exaggerated materialist theory of ‘Pure Objectivity.’”²⁰ It proclaimed that, in America, “the struggle is over and ended in victory.”²¹ Now it fell to Western Europe, and to West Germany in particular, to return to an aesthetic modernism now considered genuinely American.

Another reason for a return to traditional architectural styles was added to this “culture war” within the Cold War in the newly founded GDR. It was rooted in an earlier conflict, with many of the same protagonists, which predated the Nazi rise to power. In 1930, a split within European modernism had escalated. Absolute constructions were now called into question. In the United States, by contrast, intellectuals who were “frightened” by historicism saw hope for the future modern American architecture in International Style, which was developed in these buildings and liberated from Functionalism.²² The European modernist movement splintered when faced with the mounting world economic crisis. For many, the purist aesthetic of this architecture represented a striking lack of recognizable signs and symbols; it was clearly in no position to solve the crucial problems of civilization and culture in the way they hoped. Whereas the Functionalists promoted “subsistence-level dwelling,”²³ other modernist architects searched for a new language with which they could engage society. Within a few years, European architecture experienced a turn towards regional and national symbols. In the early 1930s in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union, classical orders were re-appropriated; in other countries “historical spoils, traditional materials, handicraft techniques, or rural motifs were integrated in a collage-like fashion.”²⁴ In the early 1950s, the issue of the search for a unique architectural language, a new German architecture, emerged again for the GDR leadership. The return to classicism and to traditional local details and models was supposed to provide a familiar context for considerable social and political changes. Even limited use of modernist formal elements no longer seemed possible during the Cold War. By 1951 at the latest, modernist concepts from Constructivism to International Style, and especially Bauhaus, had no chance in East Germany. Because of their “artlessness” and “lack of beauty,” they were considered “Formalist” or even “cosmopolitan-imperialist.” Hermann Henselmann, who only a few years earlier had praised the Bauhaus as a great inspiration, described it.
in 1951 as “especially characteristic of the conservative tendency which, in the guise of a pseudo-revolutionary theory, rose against the alleged academicism of earlier epochs” in its attempt to “allegedly create a new society and a new human being.” “The theory of Constructivism (also called Functionalism),” said Henselmann, “necessarily leads to cosmopolitanism through its dissolution of all value categories which elevate the construction to the level of a work of art.” In his contribution to the fight against Bauhaus, Kurt Liebknecht attacked architectural details such as window shapes. Instead, he saw the model for the “new type of residence which would be an expression of our democratic order and a symbol of ‘Stalin’s care for humanity’” more in Gothic-style windows than in “the over-extension of window surfaces through the replacement of the entire external wall with glass.” But the sharpest criticism was reserved for a building by the second director of the Bauhaus, the Communist Hannes Meyer. His Bundesschule des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, a commission from the Organization of Trade Unions completed in 1930 in Bernau, was now a school belonging to the GDR umbrella union FDGB (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) and underwent a sensitive expansion in 1951. The SED politician Walter Ulbricht mentioned the school in a 1951 speech to the Volkskammer as “another bad example” and an “expression of cosmopolitan construction.” It is the sort of building “which could just as well stand in Africa or America,” typical of the “Bauhaus style which exercised a great influence even after 1945.” “This building,” said Ulbricht, “is . . . a mockery of the workers who are there to be educated into servants of our democratic order and whose resources were used to build the building.” Ulbricht concluded that Bauhaus style “must be recognized as an alien hostile phenomenon (Nolksfeindliche Erscheinung)” because it denied “the necessity of the creative use of progressive elements of the national architectural legacy because it claims that ideas cannot be given architectural form and that, in architecture, form, function, and construction take precedence; it went so far that Hannes Meyer, one of the last directors of the Bauhaus, claimed that we can no longer speak of building as an art, but only in general as construction.”

In the centers of large cities in the GDR, streets began to take on characteristics of the favored “national traditions.” Most prominent was the Stalinallee, constructed from 1951 to 1959 (Figure 2). In addition to Hermann Henselmann and Hans Hopp, the former Bauhaus members Richard Paulick and Ernst Collein took part in its design. The first plans for the Stalinallee were conceived in the spirit of Bauhaus modernism and caused a political scandal among the SED leadership, even though there were no political symbols or features which suggested architectural stages labeled as “progressive.” Immediately preceding this episode,
Richard Paulick had experienced the change of course from the Bauhaus towards “national traditions” when he received a commission for the sports center on Berlin’s Stalinallee in 1951 and proposed a plan which drew upon modernist theater designs from the early 1930s, in which one could see all the characteristics of Philip Johnson and Henry-Russell Hitchcock’s definition of International Style. In the middle of the project’s construction, the “Formalism debate” was launched and Paulick had to adapt the sports center as best he could to the new demands, which mostly had to do with the entrance way, which was then outfitted with a frieze and columns. Even Richard Paulick now distanced himself from Bauhaus and proved himself a master in adapting classical models of space and form. His reconstruction (in truth, a total reinvention) of the Staatsoper Unter den Linden in the spirit of Knobelsdorff is seen even today as a model, and was followed up with many similar projects. Having studied Erdmannsdorff in Dessau, he adapted such forms to the post-1945 experiments with industrialized methods of construction.

Despite the “struggle over national traditions,” there was also something of a “subliminal” fight to gain recognition for the Bauhaus. This was clear even with building projects realized in this period, in their subtle references to corresponding concepts. An example is the Rundfunkge-

Figure 2. Stalinallee (today, Karl-Marx-Allee) in Berlin, 1951–59. Photograph by Kurt Thöner, 1964.
bäude in Berlin (1951–56) by Franz Ehrlich (Figure 3), to which Hoffmann-Axthelm ascribed a “specific Functionalism that was neither part of the main trajectory of modernism nor the by-road of national style.” “One recognizes,” writes Hoffmann-Axthelm, “that the architect is not crusading against modernism nor is he intentionally designing in a modern style, but was muzzled by adherence to the party line—he wanted to build in a purposeful . . . and socially visible manner; in this way, an
architecture was born that was between Bauhaus modernism and Gestalt-conservatism, more interested in details and connections to the environment, above all in an unmistakable Functionalism.” According to Hoffmann-Axthelm, Franz Ehrlich “is one of the few twentieth-century architects who did not confuse Functionalism with style.”

The Bauhaus-Reception in the Era of the “New Economic System for Planning and Direction” (1955–70)

The change of direction in the politics of construction at the end of the 1950s was above all the result of economic pressures. It was introduced by Nikita Khrushchev in a December 1954 speech, in which he called for the loosening of Stalinist doctrines in architecture and for the industrialization of construction. The orientation towards typology, normalization, and modern technologies of construction was at first still associated with the “struggle against Constructivism,” which was now to be carried on with means other than “architectonic decoration and aesthetic ornament.”

A further reason for the new distancing from “national traditions” in architecture was specific to the GDR: the SED regime had given up the goal of reunifying Germany in the near future. Thus, “the demand for the development of a socialist architectural aesthetic with pan-German pretensions lost its political immediacy.”

The directors of the Deutsche Bauakademie were now concerned that “the theory of Socialist Realism, as a basis for overcoming Formalism and especially the one-sidedness of Functionalism and Constructivism” could be called into question. A “false interpretation of Khrushchev’s speech” might “open the door to Functionalism and Constructivism.”

The new openness towards industrial methods of construction thus signified merely the appearance of freedom in terms of form. “It was the pressure to increase productivity which pushed aside the officially decreed decorative style; despite, or rather because of the unreflective turn from a narrow-minded historicism to an equally narrow-minded technology of construction from large pre-fabricated forms, the steady diet of forced over-ideologization remained unchanged.”

It was only after 1961, during the short phase of the “new economic system for planning and direction of the national economy,” when science and technology achieved greater prominence, that the process of rehabilitation began for Functionalism and Bauhaus. That was especially true in the construction field, which had not been considered very productive. In this context, the experiences and ideas of the “New Construction” of the 1920s became of interest once again, and with them, the Bauhaus. In 1963, a German translation of the Soviet writer Leonid Pazitnov’s The Creative Legacy of the Bauhaus was published. The book was published by the Institute for Applied Arts, later called the Office for Industrial Design.
In the confrontation between the East and West German political systems, it was less a conflict between two cultures than of two essentially different standards of consumption. For that reason, after 1963 design was less influenced by ideology-laden debates about art. That cleared the way for the responsibility of artists from all disciplines for the human
environment as a whole to become a theme. The example of the Bauhaus played an important role in this.\textsuperscript{39} In the middle of the 1960s, the first monographs about the Bauhaus by GDR authors appeared and the first exhibits were mounted.\textsuperscript{40} A 1965 textbook also makes clear the transformation (Figure 4). Here, even cautious criticism of the Stalinalle (completed just five years previously) was possible, criticism that used the arguments of the once-demonized Bauhaus Functionalism: “The attempts to form links to traditional national forms of architecture (Classicism) led to an over-emphasis on decorative elements in individual buildings and therefore to a neglect of functional, economic, and technical questions.”\textsuperscript{41} By contrast, a contemporary building by the third director of the Bauhaus, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Chicago’s Crown Hall, was praised as “one of last decade’s most impressive buildings in its extreme architectonic discipline and its unity of space and body.”\textsuperscript{42}

Naturally, the theoretical confrontation with the Bauhaus was not without contradictions and ideological obstacles. Karl-Heinz Hüter’s groundbreaking study of the Bauhaus in Weimar, for example, appeared only ten years after it was written in 1966.\textsuperscript{43} At the same time, the Bauhaus legacy was discussed, and it was now considered a cultural monument worthy of preservation.\textsuperscript{44} At the Hochschule für Architektur- und Bauwesen in Weimar, research on the history of the Bauhaus became part of the institution’s program and especially after 1976, historical research was increasingly connected with the consideration of current planning, design, and cultural concepts (Figure 5). Leading theorists such as Karin and Heinz Hirdina or Lothar Kühne and practicing designers such as Claus Dietel interpreted the Bauhaus as exemplary and developed a concept of Functionalism which was not formal, but holistic and ecologically oriented.\textsuperscript{45} The outstanding project of these years, in which modernist principles informed both urban construction and the formal language of architectonics, was the construction of Halle-Neustadt from 1961 through the early 1970s (Figure 6). Richard Paulick was the chief architect in the decisive second phase of the planning and construction of this new socialist city, from 1962 through 1969. An entire city was to be

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Figure 4. Cover of a 1965 textbook, Bauwerke und Baustile von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart: Lehrbuch für die Kunstbetrachtung in der zehnten Klasse der erweiterten Oberschule. The black-and-white photograph next to the illustration of the Bauhaus building shows the Haus des Lehrers (Hermann Henselmann, 1964) in Berlin, which signaled the return of the formal language of modernism to official GDR architecture, here enriched by a Mexican-inspired mural.
erected from pre-fabricated forms. Through his work on Halle-Neustadt, the former Bauhaus architect Paulick found his way back to a modernism which was no longer the height of fashion. A new generation of architects in the West criticized architectural and urban planning concepts like those of the CIAM, which were also the basis for Halle-Neustadt. The city’s first so-called residential complex “was built from 1964 to 1968 and is characterized by a continuous, open arrangement of relatively low block-houses, so that its basic plan is almost exclusively dictated by the path of the crane; the residence units to the west of the center of the residential complex are put together in a wasteland of monotonous rows while the attempt was made in the southwestern sector, without a convincing result it might be added, to suggest courtyard-like spaces by building the blocks in a three-sided open way.” Only in the later phases was it possible “to create a self-contained structure from open spaces connected to one another and to place buildings such that their intrinsic value determines the open space.” Halle-Neustadt, hardly viewed in connection with the Bauhaus even in East Germany, was presented in 1973 at the 15th Triennial in Milan and understood by the critic Joseph Rykwert as part of the Bauhaus tradition of Ludwig Hilberseimer, a
remark that was not meant as a compliment. Rykwert wrote, “The cata-
lóg, if not the exhibit itself, wants to awaken our admiration for a seem-
ingly repulsive Hilberseimer-like building, the East German residential
complex of the Halle-Neustadt collective; to be sure, this is presented as
a splendid example of a work method and not as an architectural achieve-
ment, but God save us from work methods, even if they are collective,
that lead to such results.”49 The criticism referred to something which
intensified after 1971, when the state declared its goal of eliminating the
housing problem: construction with a small number of prefabricated
forms. The increasing crisis in the GDR economy (1970 was the height of
the crisis) did not allow for other options. The profession of “architect”
was reduced to that of “complex project designer.” In a state-industry
system oriented towards short-term efficiency, young architects hardly
had an opportunity to achieve a certain level of proficiency. In the GDR,
the era of “master architects” and great names in architecture was over.50

It seems paradoxical that it was precisely in this moment that the
Bauhaus once again became an official subject for discussion in the GDR.
The encounter with the Bauhaus remained essentially theoretical and
could not give any real inspiration to the reality of building in the GDR,
which was defined by a very different set of premises. In this phase, the
Bauhaus (and, with it, Functionalism, which had been demonized since

Figure 6. Richard Paulick and others, Halle-Neustadt, 1961–73. Photograph by the author, 1999.
Lothar Kühne
Gegenstand und Raum

Funktionalismus
Kommunismus

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the 1950s) became the great hope. Indeed, the philosopher Lothar Kühne called it the “poetry of the future” of a society which had in fact long divested itself of Communist ideals, without ever admitting it.

The Bauhaus as “The Poetry of the Future”

Like no one else in the GDR, Lothar Kühne thought about a unified model of socially equitable and future-oriented architecture. The central category of his theory was space. For Kühne, architecture served “to organize human life in space,” it was “neither art nor industrial technology, nor was it a synthesis of these.” Kühne was concerned with an aesthetics of use. Only an object which is satisfactory in its use is not exclusive, does not mask the human relations objectified in it, and could be considered satisfactory in an aesthetic sense. As with objects, for Kühne relations of ownership were also fundamental for buildings. He strove to find “the idea for a new type of building which would combine for human beings the values of urban life with those of nature.” Against this standard, he measures the reality of buildings in the GDR, which he saw as no more than vague efforts to achieve this. Kühne’s focus shifted from the individual building to the landscape, without considering the city, however. For Kühne, landscape was “the fundamental spatial form of life in Communism,” as it brought together and mediated “the unity of societal, micro-communal, and individual spatial areas” and “the realm of nature with the realm of production.” That was not the reality of construction in the GDR. These ideas were close to Hannes Meyer’s program of 1929 and 1930, and the concepts from the years 1945 to 1950. In this sense, landscape only existed for Kühne where it could be seen with the naked eye and immediately be experienced “without special means of transportation.” For Kühne, space was thus freely available for all. These basic social relations, which in Kühne’s definition of Communism were to be aimed for, contained a greater freedom of choice for individuals and communities, and also for the natural conditions for human growth. Especially significant within this ecological orientation was the concept of “caution,” by which Kühne meant a social quality in which objects were mediated through a free association of equals purged of the curse of private property which destroys the conditions for existence. It was through this mediating function that Kühne saw an object’s new aesthetic quality. Two elements were united in his concept of Func-

Figure 7. Cover of Lothar Kühne, Gegenstand und Raum (1981). Note how the ideal merging of Communism and Functionalism is visualized.
tionalism as a “concept of form oriented towards the future”: absolute state access to all of life’s preconditions and the use of this influence to promote caution and care for the environment (Figure 7). Thus for Kühne, under socialist conditions of property relations and power, modernity was not a negative concept, no utopia doomed to failure.

Kühne’s understanding of Functionalism was only possible because of his new thinking on social and aesthetic questions. He distinguished this from Constructivism. For Kühne, functional design was never the construction of artistic worlds and also no Gesamtkunstwerk which related to reality on many differentiated levels. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Bauhaus took on a positive role for Lothar Kühne. He saw the movement’s inspiration in “a feeling of responsibility for a new, socially just world” and saw Bauhaus as a prerequisite to overcome “ties to modernist handicrafts.”

Lothar Kühne saw this process at work in the Bauhaus building in Dessau: “The relations of the community are not turned inwards, but are open; there is no suggestion of completion, instead the
Figure 9. Members of the Bauhaus in front of the building in Dessau, December 4, 1976. Including Richard Paulick (fourth from left), Franz Ehrlich (seventh from left), Hubert Hoffmann (tenth from left), Max Bill (eleventh from left). Photograph by Ernst Steinkopf, Stiftung Bauhaus Dessau.
spatial conditions of the process are exposed—these are not a whole, but point towards a whole.”

Kühne did not find that comparable relations existed in the GDR, but he saw possibilities for them to develop. From this perspective, Kühne developed his critique of the reality of construction. His concepts became models of thought for which he found few precedents. He found one such precedent in Hannes Meyer’s Bundesschule des ADGB (Figure 8), which was denigrated by Walter Ulbright: “Light tones, no gesture, the school building is set back from the street, empathetically rooted in the ground and integrated into the forest.”

Thus, for Lother Kühne, a Bauhaus building served as a model in the last phase of the GDR, a style which was reviled during the first years of the state and which was rooted in a Functionalism that never attained exemplary status up though 1989. In 1976, in the presence of many former members of the movement, the restored Bauhaus building was reopened as a “Center for Culture and Scholarship” (Figure 9). This attempt by the GDR elite to ideologically appropriate the Bauhaus failed, just as the attempts to reform the GDR from within also failed. In 1987, only two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Bauhaus was reestablished in Dessau, out of which arose the present-day Stiftung Bauhaus Dessau.

Notes


12 Hubert Hoffmann worked in the Deutsche Akademie für Städtebau, Reichs- und Landesplanung in Berlin beginning in 1944. There, together with Reinhold Niemeyer and Roland Reiner, he wrote the book Die gegliederte und aufgelockerte Stadt (Tübingen, 1957) which is greatly influenced by the Charter of Athens.


18 Elizabeth Mock, ed., In USA erbaut, 1932–1944 (Wiesbaden, 1948).

19 Ibid., Foreword by Philip L. Goodwin, 5.

20 Ibid., 12.

21 Ibid., 8.


Ibid., 144.


32 Ibid., 1539. At the same time, there was a debate about the Bauhaus in West Germany which remained very different and was restricted to certain expert circles. The architect Rudolf Schwarz began this debate when he accused the Bauhaus and especially Walter Gropius of “materialism.” Many colleagues and supporters of Gropius responded. By the end of the 1950s, the sort of modernism identified with the Bauhaus became the dominant model in West Germany. Intended as a contrast to the Stalinallee in the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, the Interationale Bauausstellung (INTERBAU) was opened in 1957 in West Berlin’s Hansa district and many former members of the Bauhaus participated, including Gropius, Hubert Hoffmann, and Wils Ebert.


36 Ibid., 162.

37 Karl-Heinz Hüter, “Bauhaus-Rezeption in der DDR.”


39 It was Siegfried H. Begenau in particular who made reference to the Bauhaus as the place “where for the first time it was considered a duty to humanize as a totality the environment of an industrial society based on modern technology.” Siegfried H. Begenau, *Funktion—Form—Qualität: Zur Problematik einer Theorie der Gestaltung* (Berlin, 1967), 69. Even at the 5th German Art Exhibit in Dresden in October 1962 designs which suggested Minimalism were attacked, and the old charge of “Formalism” was resurrected.


42 Ibid., 188.


44 In November 1965, the GDR Minister of Culture, Hans Bentzien, attempted to reopen the Bauhaus and the first preliminary plans for a restoration of the building were made.


48 Ibid., 43.

Holger Barth, Thomas Topfstedt, et al., Vom Baukünstler zum Komplexprojektanten: Architekten in der DDR (Erkner, 2000).


Ibid.


Ibid.

Lothar Kühne, Haus und Landschaft, 185.

Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm summarized the situation as follows: “Afterwards came the prefabricated slabs, a functionalism of growing simplification, which no longer has goals, but only costs, quantities of material, and a mission to fulfill a plan.” Hoffmann-Axthelm, “Eine Entdeckungsreise: drei Bauen von Franz Ehrlich,” Bauwelt, July 12, 1996:1539.

NEW YORK SKYSCRAPERS, MADE IN HAMBURG: JERRY COTTON AS VISUAL EDUCATOR

Peter Krieger

All external aspects of life are becoming more and more uniform, everything is reduced to a single cultural schema. . . . More and more, we see the evaporation of the delicate aroma of what is unique in each culture, its colors are fading more quickly and beneath the cracked layer of varnish, the steel-colored pistons of the modern world-machine are visible.

Stefan Zweig, Die Monotonisierung der Welt (1925)

In the 1920s, Western Europeans had the idea that radical industrialization in the United States would erase the characteristics of traditional cultures.¹ This seemed to be confirmed by the boom in International Style architecture in the late 1950s and 1960s. The reimportation of a commercialized Bauhaus aesthetic to West Germany and other countries which focused on high-rise buildings with glass and aluminum curtain walls made one cross-cultural feature of the modernization process obvious.² There was an almost unlimited topographic interchangeability of International Style skyscraper façades, which were reduced to a formula with globalized iconic and symbolic effects.

A certain conceptual contradiction is noticeable ever since the early radical visions of modern skyscrapers, such as those by Mies van der Rohe in the 1920s. On the one hand, this modern architectural typology refused any contextual compromise with local cultural and historical patterns. On the other hand, many utopian avant-garde skyscrapers stressed their “modernist” effects, in contrast to the material substance of the old city. The transparent glass and aluminum curtain wall façade, which covers the skeleton of the high-rise, reflects its urban context. As we can see in the famous photomontage of Mies’s 1921 proposals for the Friedrichstrasse high-rise in Berlin, and also in the graphic composition of the G magazine cover (1924, also by Mies), it was the contour of the surrounding traditional buildings which defined the enormous scale of the skyscraper and its innovative aesthetic.³

Since then, this image (Figure 1) has become a visual cliché for modernized cities across the world. In modern urban ideology, this contrast was coded as a clear expression of progress. Old buildings, small in scale and constructed with traditional materials represent an anachronistic,
decadent culture of poor inhabitants, while bright, International Style skyscrapers symbolize advanced industrial society.

We can find this motif in the case of the Unilever House in Hamburg, an International Style high-rise building constructed in the early 1960s. An entire traditional urban neighborhood with eighteenth-century half-timber houses was torn down in order to erect this huge administrative building for an international firm. Most urban planners and administrators in Hamburg welcomed this radical change as an act of modernization and Americanization. Near the Unilever House, only a few fragments remained of the traditional labyrinthine urban structures of brick houses and narrow courtyards (Figure 2). Contemporary criticism mainly applauded this modern urban damnatio memoriae which allowed West German architects like Hentrich, Petschnigg, and Partners (HPP) to offer American architectural modernism as the appropriate expression of the so-called German economic miracle.

In addition to modern architectural aesthetics, the terms of cultural criticism were also imported from New York. At the same time as Hamburg’s Unilever House was completed, the Greenwich Village activist Jane Jacobs published her influential manifesto The Death and Life of Great American Cities (their death allegedly caused by an urban renewal which emphasized high-rise blocks). The “American Dream” of modernism was deconstructed by American critics themselves. Many West German planners, especially those who were invited on postwar study trips to
Figure 2. Hamburg, Backyard at the Valentinskamp, photograph by Peter Krieger.
New York and Chicago, also began to articulate their doubts about unlimited, high-density urban development with clusters of skyscrapers. The Hamburg Unilever House, for example, reveals the contradictions of how American modernist architecture was introduced in West Germany. Europeans oscillated between a fascination with shiny curtain walls and a recognition of the horror of high-density capitalist urban development, which erased open spaces used for a multitude of social activities.6

I briefly mention this background in order to explain the role of the New York-based “G-man” Jerry Cotton—a hero of popular crime fiction—in the twin processes of modernization and Americanization in postwar West Germany. Cotton was introduced in 1954 by a West German publisher as the protagonist of a widely circulated pulp novel.7 His fictional adventures take place in Manhattan, between modern skyscrapers and traditional low-rise tenements. As Cotton races through the streets of New York, he becomes a kind of tourist guide for the West German reader, most of whom still could not afford to visit the city. More than a decade later, in 1965, the Cotton adventures were presented in a series of films, and the collective literary imagination was transposed into cinematographic images.8

In these films, transparent glass curtain walls frame Cotton’s image. They not only attest to the postwar influence of American modernism and international capitalism, but they also embody the visual disorientation of an architectural style which had been invented by the European avant-garde in the early twentieth century, but later commercialized in the United States. As the camera focused on the transparent glass façades, movie-goers imagined themselves in the modern utopia of Manhattan. Only a few architectural experts would have recognized that Jerry Cotton was actually filmed in Hamburg, in front of the Unilever House. The visual effect of the glass façades in film stills was even stronger, when the building’s wings reflected each other. The glass panels looked similar and interchangeable. They were standardized products of modern industrial architecture, which film set designers used to visualize a territorial transposition.

Any detailed look at the façades of the skyscrapers assembled on Manhattan’s Avenue of the Americas (Figure 3) confirms modern architecture’s programmatic dissolution of local references, especially in the 1960s, when the sublime aesthetic prototypes of the 1950s (the United Nations Building, Lever House, the Seagram Building, and Chase Manhattan Bank)9 were endlessly reproduced in urban settings all over the world, even in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union. Yet, what critics of International Style architecture have described as the aesthetic neutralization of urban culture10 had some positive connotations in the 1960s, and therefore film producers used these visual formulae.
Figure 3. New York City, Manhattan, Avenue of the Americas, photograph by Peter Krieger.
Extreme photographic angles, looking up from street level, or from the top of a skyscraper straight to the bottom, gave drama to these interchangeable, monotonous architectural forms. These views were not overviews, but decontextualized visual constructions. Therefore, the Jerry Cotton filmmakers could switch from the original New York stills to the Hamburg stills, filmed in front of the brand new German skyscrapers of the 1950s and 1960s.

In aesthetic terms, these shots were not new; a worldwide public of comic strip readers already knew the dramatic perspectives of Superman, Batman, Spiderman, and other fictional heroes of New York. Exploding the central, head-on perspective, a destruction that Walter Benjamin had described in the 1930s as a principle of the avant-garde, became an established visual construct in postwar popular action films. The decision to film “New York” skyscrapers by using images of Hamburg in extreme perspectives was motivated by economic rather than aesthetic concerns. The West German film producer Arthur Brauner, responsible for the series of seven Cotton films, decided to film only a few aerial views of New York, some skyscraper façades, and streets scenes without actors. With this rough material, he later composed the Hamburg (and also Berlin) settings, which he combined into a convincing simulation of New York.

This blended imagery had an important narrative function. As in almost every action movie, a breathtaking architectural setting compensated for the simplicity of the story. The New York skyscrapers “made in Hamburg” were leading players in the cast; the actor George Nader (Jerry Cotton) served merely as a visual educator of the masses. He taught his West German fans how to live and work in modern, international, and metropolitan architecture. In this way, I suggest, West German high-rise buildings became more widely accepted. The same public which wrote letters to local newspapers criticizing the imposition of huge office blocks in traditional urban settings now learned how to appreciate transparent and brilliant curtain walls. They ended up sharing the elitist fascination of Mies van der Rohe’s avant-garde shocks from the 1920s. Thus, European avant-garde architecture returned from America to its geographical origin as an established aesthetic of economic progress.

The narrative space in the Cotton films, constructed from a range of existing high-rise buildings in West Germany, is in some respects a continuation of Fritz Lang’s mythic vision of New York, filmed in the 1920s with different techniques of cinematographic illusion. Both Lang’s Metropolis and the Jerry Cotton films demand visual training from the spectator: the ability to complete fragmentary images of modern façades to form a comprehensive vision of the modern American city, an ability that oscillates between critical and affirmative modes of perception. The
movie aesthetics of modern, International Style architecture thus respond to what the German architect Peter Behrens had described as a new possibility for the image of the city: a dynamic view of the cityscape, from the window of a car or train, leading to a simplification and increased interchangeability of architectural forms. The single building was no longer as important as a montage of similar façades in the mind of the spectator.

This principle characterizes the production of the Cotton movies in the 1960s. Visual decontextualization and remontage of modern architectural details, like the glass-aluminum panels of a transparent curtain wall, configured the image of booming postwar West German cities. Thus, the cinematographic representation of the International Style aesthetic had an impact on the collective memory and architectural self-image of a whole generation in West Germany. Modernism, reimported from New York and Chicago, found its most striking expression in the high-rise. Jerry Cotton became an influential aesthetic reeducator of the masses. Using characteristic elements of postwar Hamburg architecture, the film makers made American modernism appear near and understandable (Figure 4).

To avoid collective visual disorientation caused by the accumulation of anonymous modern forms, the Cotton film makers decided to include traditional, mainly classicist, architecture into the visual narrative. As in

Figure 4. Hamburg, Esplanade, BAT, and Finnland House, neoclassical building, photograph by Peter Krieger.
the G image by Mies, the transparent curtain walls on the screen were contrasted with relics of traditional architecture. In the Cotton movies, New York bankers lived in neo-classical villas (note the building on the left side of Figure 4), built in early nineteenth-century Hamburg; “FBI headquarters” was the rotunda of the Hamburg Art Museum (in the film *Die Rechnung eiskalt serviert*, 1966). It is important to note that these historical references do not allow a specific local identification, because classicism was an international style too, from Neo-Palladianism up through Walt Disney’s New Urbanism in Celebration, Florida (thus easily interpreted as another architectural cliché from the United States).

Some examples serve to illustrate the forms, context, and content of the visual montages in the Cotton films. In one of the scenes in *Der Tod im roten Jaguar* (1968), Jerry protects a nice “Fräulein” from a group of gangsters. She lives alone in her modern “Manhattan” apartment. The scene was actually shot in West Berlin’s Hansa Viertel, a paradigmatic urban renewal of the late 1950s, designed by a selection of internationally oriented architects such as Walter Gropius, Alvar Aalto, and Oscar Niemeyer. As the camera recorded the urban street setting of the Hansa Viertel, and then entered the upper floor apartment, the cliché of Manhattan modernism seemed to be perfectly captured, although experts know that it is hard to find a similar urban scheme in the New York grid system. But what counted for the film directors was an atmosphere of “Manhattan” lifestyle, where people lived and worked in contemporary, chic high-rise buildings (Figure 5).

Most of the Cotton scenes were filmed in Hamburg. In another dramatic scene from the film *Die Rechnung eiskalt serviert*, Jerry climbs like Tarzan down the modern façade of the Deutscher Ring building. The recently constructed curtain wall serves as a shining background for the action, and the architecture thus elicits a ready response from the spectator. This filmic image served as a quasi-advertisement for the international building materials and construction industries.

Another scene, from the film *Der Mörderclub von Brooklyn* (1967), takes place in between two Hamburg high-rise buildings, the BAT and the Finnland House, designed in the late 1950s by Hentrich, Petschnigg and Partners, the West German version of the American architectural firm Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (Figure 4). The BAT Building serves as Jerry’s appartment, and the Finnland House as an office space where criminal activity is planned. For architectural historians, there is a certain irony in the decision to define this specific Hamburg setting as Manhattan scenery simply because the erection of these two high-rise buildings was a result of a strong legal controversy between Hamburg’s urban planning administration, which wanted to create open spaces with limited building heights, and the building owner, who tried to push through Manhattan-
Figure 5. Hamburg, Deutscher Ring, photograph by Peter Krieger.
like construction density in order to generate more space and income. While the city administration warned the developer not to copy Manhattan’s problematic urban density, the Cotton movies unintentionally promoted his position through their fascination with the Manhattan skyscraper.

Here, too, Jerry Cotton acts like Tarzan, and the curtain wall structure is again imprinted in the collective visual memory of the West German movie public. Together with the cases discussed above, this modern Hamburg office building not only appeared in the Cotton movies, but also in many other contemporary West European action movies. Obviously Arthur Brauner’s technique of blending Hamburg and New York seemed to be a successful mode of cinematographic production, efficient in economic terms (for the producers) and in mental terms (for the public).

International Style skyscrapers, like the Inland Steel Building in Chicago, designed by SOM in the late 1950s, served as a tool for the cultural transfer of modern, industrial, and technological aesthetics from the United States to West Germany (Figure 6). The striking visual similarities between this transparent façade and its Hamburg reproduction indicate how the modern architectural forms of American corporate culture served as a blueprint to promote the political and economic values of the United States worldwide, especially in Western Europe. In the Cotton films, these curtain wall façades functioned as an aesthetic medium in which modernism was not only encoded as a necessary condition for a contemporary urban lifestyle, but also defined as the “politically correct” urban aesthetic for the Cold War. With this visual strategy, the West German culture industry tried to harmonize the spatial and cultural conflict caused by the introduction of International Style buildings in the traditional urban settings of West German cities.

Yet by the time Jerry Cotton disappeared from the screen around 1969, modern International Style architecture from the United States was increasingly rejected in West Germany. Psychological and sociological critiques of Functionalism attacked the endless repetition of standardized architectural patterns as an expression of capitalist inhumanity, or even interpreted them as a totalitarian, anti-democratic form. Moreover, the political encoding of modern glass façades as “American” was in doubt when, under the Krushchev administration, all satellite cities of the Soviet Union began to renew their capitals with modern high-rise buildings equipped with transparent curtain walls. The “Teachers’ House” (Figure 7) built in East Berlin under the Communist government illustrates the dilemma of modernist architectural ideology. When this high-rise structure was completed in the late 1960s, only the third floor mural indicated its political message, with its socialist iconogra-
Figure 6. Chicago, Inland Steel Building, photograph by Peter Krieger.
Figure 7. East-Berlin, Teacher’s House, photograph by Peter Krieger.
If West German movie producers had covered up the mural, they could have filmed another New York Jerry Cotton story there.

The problem of the almost unlimited interchangeability of architectural forms among different cultures and political systems is not new; earlier generations also dealt with the difficult question of describing and defining local urban identities (Figure 8). Petrus Appiamus, author of a famous sixteenth-century survey of the world, confronted the same problem. He structured his approach to urban images using Ptolemaic modes of describing the world in three categories: cosmography, geography and chorography, the last term derived from the Greek word "chorus", which means place. Chorography records the specific elements of a topographical situation, the characteristic elements of a city's construction. Like a portrait painter who takes pains with all the details of a face, the chorographer tries to catch the detailed architectural characteristics of a city or town. Yet in 1533, a chorographer had to face a tradition of standardized urban visual representation, as we know from Hartmann Schedel's world chronicle, published only four decades earlier, where different cities were presented in identical woodcuts. Reviewing the Cotton case, we find similar principles at work. The image of the city is composed of interchangeable and standardized visual clichés, reduced to abbreviations, the visual equivalents of "sound bites," which serve as symbols for the idea of the city, in this case the international and modern metropolis of New York. In this modern metropolitan chorography, the architectural detail of the transparent curtain wall façade serves as an elemental stereotype with which to construct a global urban identity, transferable to Hamburg or even to Russian cities.

Ernst Gombrich, in his influential book *Art and Illusion*, based on lectures given in 1959, introduced the topic of exchangeable urban representations in the fifteenth century. And although I doubt that Gombrich ever watched a Cotton movie, or that film producer Arthur Brauner had ever read one of Gombrich's books, it is striking to see how visual analysis and the production of city images at the same time refer to a common principle with a tradition over 500 years old. Woodcuts with stereotyped views of castles, town halls, and churches once constituted the image of "the city"; in the 1960s, International Style high-rise buildings performed this function. In both cases, topographic exactitude is replaced by a collage of virtual architectural details to satisfy the exotic phantasies of those who can not travel. What is more, these visual constructions helped to export the self-perception and power pretensions of both fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe and late twentieth-century North America.

Other aspects, however, must be taken into account. How is the visual communication of fragmented metropolitan images accomplished?
Que cosa es Chorographia.

Horographia (según dize Vernero) es la misma cosa que Topographia, la qual se puede dezir traça de lugar, delcrito y considera particulars lugares por si aparte, sin comparacion ni cóparacion de si mesmos, ni dellos con otros. Empero con gran diligencia considera todas las particularidades y propiedades, por minimas que sean, que en los tales lugares se hallan dignas de notar. Como son puertos, lugares, pueblos, vertientes de rios, y todas las cosas femejantes: como son los edificios, casas, torres, murallas, y cosas tales. El fin de la Chorographia es pintar un lugar particular, como si vn pintor pintasse una oreja, o vn ojo, y otras partes de la cabeza de vn hombre.
Why do isolated film stills of a modern transparent skyscraper automatically evoke a metropolitan atmosphere in the viewer’s mind? To answer these questions, we need to supplement the established linguistic analysis of urban images (as text) with architectural psychology and research in neurology. I believe that these auxiliary disciplines allow for a deeper understanding of how a focused architectural image can represent the essence of a city. Sociologists may explain how the mass media, in this case film, that show urban images can function as effective filters in evaluating the politics of those cities that allowed large-scale urban renewal with International Style skyscrapers. Anthropology may help us understand how an architectural consciousness produced in the cinema can lead to political intervention by a city’s inhabitants. A complete analysis of the urban imaginary would include all these aspects and more. Thanks to Dietrich Neumann’s book on film architecture, this sort of cultural history already has a solid precedent. Urban images contain a specific epistemological potential beyond written documents, and therefore historians need to revise their methods when they analyze them. Techniques of visual manipulation, their perception, and their effects allow one to draw conclusions about the contradictory cultural values within transatlantic transfers.

The Cotton case reveals how mass-produced cinematographic images of the modern American metropolis determine collective consciousness and memory, and not only in West Germany. Film directors choose a set of efficient visual stereotypes and organize them in coherent schemes which direct the viewer’s attention. For film producers, if the effect is strong enough to convince the masses, it is less important where these images are created, whether in Hamburg, Berlin’s UFA studios, Hollywood or, more recently, in the virtual nirvana of digital design firms. Selected images of modern corporate architecture in the American metropolis constitute an “imagineering” with metonymic representations: an International Style skyscraper gives concrete form to American metropolitan modernity.

Although it is difficult retrospectively to measure the mass reception of film images, art history offers a complex understanding of propagandistic mechanisms in the movies. In our case, it reveals how the export of architectural fashion was subsumed into the postwar propagandistic mechanisms of “Americanization” and “Westernization.” Thus, Jerry Cotton was more than a simple hero of low-budget action movies. In the 1960s, he became a visual educator, promoting urban aesthetic standards for West German cities.

Figure 8. Petrus Appiamus, *Corografía y Geografía*, 1533.
Yet the “topographic transfusion”\(^2\) between New York and Germany flowed both ways. The December 2000 edition of *The New Yorker* thematized the fact that the cultural give-and-take in a globalized world now even questions the hegemonic image of Manhattan’s skyscrapers. A cartoon entitled “Renovation of Daimler Chrysler Building Almost Complete” shows the architectural icon of American car production crowned by a traditional southern German house, replacing the emblematic art deco top of the Chrysler Building in midtown Manhattan. Chorography has to be revised permanently, and not only in New York.

Notes

1 Heiko Christians, “Gesicht, Gestalt, Ornament. Überlegungen zum epistemologischen Ort der Physiognomik zwischen Hermeneutik und Mediengeschichte,” *Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* (Heft 1, 2000).


15 For example, *Operation Taifun* (1967), a German-Spanish-French-Italian co-production filmed partly in Hamburg’s modern high-rises of the 1950s and 1960s.


The Bauhaus, Transatlantic Relations, and the Historians

Volker R. Berghahn

The Bauhaus has commanded the attention of scholars and architects since the movement’s beginnings in the period immediately after World War I, with its roots even going back to the years before 1914.¹ The contributions to this volume were written in part in an effort to provide fresh insights into this movement and the development of modern architecture more generally. Indeed, this article, too, uses the term Bauhaus as an abbreviation for the rise of modernism in design and architecture, as it began to grapple with the emergence of mass production, advanced technology, and the ever more pressing “social question” in the wake of rapid industrialization, population growth, and urbanization since the late nineteenth century.

But the previous authors have also raised other questions of broader interest. As indicated by the title “From Manhattan to Mainhattan,” this anthology is ultimately concerned with the migration of people and ideas back and forth across the Atlantic in the twentieth century. Furthermore, it hopes to encourage more dialogue between a variety of historiographical genres and sub-disciplines. This concluding chapter is designed to return to these two larger concerns in an attempt to provide some further support to the considerations that animated the contributors to write their essays on more specific topics in the first place.

As for the first concern, the title “From Manhattan to Mainhattan” gives an incomplete picture of the migratory patterns. The crucial point here is that the Atlantic never was a one-way street, but rather a two-lane highway along which people and ideas constantly traveled in both directions between Europe and North America. By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States and Canada had received millions of European emigrants. They came mostly with few belongings, but often with considerable cultural baggage. They imported and upheld their religious faiths, ethnic traditions, dietary habits, and countless other practices, attitudes, and mentalities that over time blended with those of other immigrant groups to produce hyphenated “American” identities.

However, it was not just family traditions, structures, and local cultures that came with them across the Atlantic. There were also movements, organizations, and institutions that they transplanted and adapted to the new conditions they found. Among many examples, education—and higher education in particular—offers a good case in point. If the
British college system was the main model for American undergraduate education, graduate training came to be inspired by the German tradition of scholarly inquiry and *wissenschaftliche Ausbildung*.

Still, the migration of ideas and people was not merely from East to West. Remigrants—those who did not “make it” in the New World—constituted an important group that shaped European perceptions of North America, as did novelists and travelers. For a long time these perceptions were dominated by images of trappers and “Red Indians,” of traders and gold-diggers, of cowboys and outlaws. In the eyes of many Europeans, America was a huge and wild continent with unruly and fiercely independent people; a land of “unlimited possibilities” and “rugged individualism.”

However, by the late nineteenth century, the United States had undergone dramatic changes. While farming remained important, the U.S. had also begun to emerge as a major industrial power. Mining, iron, steel, and textile manufacturing blossomed in the rapidly growing conurbations, first along the East Coast and later in Pennsylvania, Ohio, upstate New York, and Michigan. Earlier on, the flow of technology and ideas on how to organize a modern industrial economy had been mainly from East to West. Thus, Samuel Slater developed his textile mill in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, by copying machinery whose design he had memorized while living in the industrial centers of northern England.

By the 1880s, this kind of flow had slowly gone into reverse. Even before the turn of the century, European businessmen and engineers traveled across the Atlantic to learn about new steel-cutting machinery and the rationalization projects of the Scientific Management movement. They came to determine the extent to which Frederick Taylor’s ideas on industrial production or Henry Ford’s assembly lines for the mass production of automobiles could be transferred to the industrial milieu of Germany, France, or Britain. Subsequently, the electrical engineering firm of Robert Bosch in Stuttgart and Renault Cars in Paris began to experiment with Taylorism. Significantly, they did so with mixed results. But this is precisely why the exchange of people and ideas across the Atlantic is so intriguing to the historian. It enables us to study how American ideas of modernity were transformed, but also frequently rejected as alien and unsuitable, when they arrived in Europe. America became a symbol of economic, societal, and cultural modernity in the eyes of its European enthusiasts and its European critics alike.

It must be added that this was also the age when scientists and engineers claimed a leading position in the shaping of society and economy and saw themselves as the class of the future. They sought not only to design and craft industrial goods, but also to take the lead in social engineering. The rise of Social Darwinism and the eugenics move-
ment must also be seen in this context, as many looked to the future with hope and optimism that technology and the new industrial system would solve all societal problems. Those who were skeptical of this vision and of the ideas that were now coming to Europe from America in ever larger numbers pointed to the fact that Taylorist efficiency and productivity had been purchased at the price of cheap, poorly designed, and poorly manufactured goods, produced by exploited and unskilled immigrant labor. By contrast, European products were said to be of the highest quality, even if this made them more expensive.\(^6\)

Furthermore, the skeptics realized that mass production challenged traditional notions of consumption in European societies stratified by class, in which the more expensive and “better things in life” were reserved for elites. This is why they also tended to be critical of the idea that the kind of mass consumption heralded by Ford should be the goal of mass production. Indeed, Ford began to pass on the productivity gains in his rationalized factories by lowering his prices. As a result, his “tin-lizzies” came within the range of the budgets of a growing number of consumers who were eager to acquire cars as a modern means of individualized transportation.\(^7\)

Other developments also promoted the emergence of mass consumption. For example, the Sherman Act was introduced in the U.S. in 1890 with the avowed aim of protecting the consumer from the power of large corporations that were trying to gain a monopoly position in the market or that prevented a lowering of prices through the formation of cartels, i.e., horizontal price-fixing or production-limiting agreements between a group of independent companies in a particular branch of industry. In this way, certain producer behaviors that worked to the detriment of the consumer were banned and made subject to criminal prosecution. In the meantime, many European countries, much to the chagrin of ordinary consumers and their advocates, permitted the formation of overwhelmingly powerful market positions and cartels. In the case of Germany, the courts even legalized the latter in 1897.\(^8\)

Related to the rise of mass production and mass consumption in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century was the proliferation of mass culture, i.e., a culture that was not merely enjoyed as “high culture” by the elite but that was available to, and affordable for, all.

This new and “democratic” culture came to be embodied (alongside the “cheap” novel) by the movies, even before 1914. The story of the silver screen began in France and America. But like mass production and mass consumption, cinemas and “film palaces” soon mushroomed everywhere, competing with the older, architecturally splendid opera houses, theaters, and concert halls in the towns and cities of Europe.
Meanwhile, most of the films that were shown were imports from the United States. Millions of Europeans went to see them, while assorted intellectuals and elite groups worried about the dangers of a medium that was inexpensive, did not require evening gowns and dark suits, and was open “to all.” To be sure, the practices of enjoying American cultural imports, just as those of industrial mass production, were invariably adapted to indigenous conditions. Local popular cultures were not obliterated by what came from across the Atlantic. They were partly transformed and in many cases even reinforced, as industrialization and urbanization changed the composition and outlook of divergent social groups.9

Nor was it lost on both enthusiasts and critics of America that the modernization of the country’s industry and patterns of consumption occurred within the constitutional framework of democratic participation in an age of unfolding mass politics. These political shifts also raised hopes in Europe among many, especially on the Left, while the conservative and anti-democratic Right was haunted by fears of the rule of the masses. Alexis de Tocqueville had first drawn attention to this in the 1830s in Democracy in America, but was not widely noted at the time.10 Some seventy years later, however, people began to refer to his book as a warning against the rise of the “masses.” These fears were now powerfully articulated by Gustave Le Bon in his bestselling book The Crowd.”11

All this is to say that, by 1900, with information and goods flowing from West to East, the debate about the character and future of American society and its meaning for other parts of the world was in full swing in Western Europe. In particular, there was the question of the extent to which the United States anticipated the future development of European societies. World War I and the chaos and devastation it left behind temporarily halted the influx of economic and political ideas from across the Atlantic. However, by the mid-1920s, the former links had been restored. Once again, European businessmen, engineers, intellectuals, and trade unionists journeyed to the United States to look at how a country that had meanwhile emerged as the strongest industrial power in the world had developed during a war that had enormously boosted its productive capacity. Conversely, American bankers and industrialists, investors and Hollywood film distributors, entertainers and jazz musicians appeared in Europe in full force. There are a number of very good studies that examine the traffic along the trans-Atlantic highway in the postwar period, and we shall come back to this theme in a moment, inasmuch as it related to the arts and architecture.12

While there was, as before 1914, criticism and sharp rejection of America, overall the relationship intensified. At the level of industry,
American firms made direct investments in Europe on an impressive scale. Ford established production facilities in Germany and Britain. General Motors bought a stake in the British Vauxhall Company and in Opel Cars, which produced the first inexpensive German volume automobile, the *Laubfrosch*. The big chemical corporations forged joint ventures with their European counterparts, such as the German conglomerate I.G. Farben and Imperial Chemical Industries in the United Kingdom.\(^\text{13}\)

By the late 1920s, millions of Europeans went to the movies at least once a week, and in 70–80 per cent of the cases they would see a Hollywood production. Coca-Cola built a bottling plant in Essen, in the heart of the industrial Ruhr area, to compete with the local beer brewers and soft-drink makers. If we define culture not merely as “high culture,” but broadly as comprising popular culture, education, religious practices, and scientific research, then American influences in the fields of European popular culture, entertainment, technology, consumer durables, and business organization can be found in many walks of life. And yet it would be misleading to say that the flow of ideas, people, and daily practices was an entirely one-sided affair, from the United States to Europe.\(^\text{14}\)

While European companies and financial institutions also invested in the United States, the cultural interactions are particularly interesting. Partly because America was a society of immigrants who had come primarily from Europe throughout the nineteenth century, and partly because this was a country that was still in the process of self-formation and self-definition and in which many people tried to achieve, and did achieve, rapid upward mobility, the desire to be cultured and more refined caused the growing American bourgeoisie to promote “high culture.” Not surprisingly perhaps, Americans who had become successful abhorred the stereotypes of unshaven cowboys and greedy gold-diggers no less than Europe’s educated elites did. For these families, having learned to play the piano or violin and making “house music” or establishing a school of music and the performing arts was an important sign of cultural “arrival.” While there was an indigenous popular music, often imported and blended with other traditions, including African-American jazz, the pieces played in local concert halls were mostly from Europe’s classical composers.\(^\text{15}\)

In the field of music, Germany exerted an enormous influence, both in terms of the repertoire and also the conductors and soloists invited to perform in Boston, New York, Washington, or Chicago. As Jessica Gienow-Hecht has shown, not even the Germanophobia generated by World War I was able to destroy the “elective affinities” that had developed since the nineteenth century.\(^\text{16}\) The rest of Europe also remained a point of orientation for American “high culture.” However, in the field of lit-
erature and the visual arts, the exchange became increasingly mutual after 1918, as the United States began to develop its own literary tradition and schools of painting. Here, the “Americanization” movement in the United States and the strength of postwar isolationist nationalism also left its mark. Conversely, Europe fell under the spell of jazz. In what came to be called Zeitoper in Weimar Germany, trans-Atlantic influences were also striking.\(^{17}\)

When we consider such influences in the field of architecture, the picture is similarly complex. When architects and those who commissioned buildings in the U.S. looked to Europe before 1914, most of them adhered to classical styles. Until the 1870s, Britain was the main influence. Subsequently, the French Beaux Arts school dominated the field, although Georgian and colonial styles were also popular.\(^{18}\) Overall and notwithstanding the modernity of America’s industrial technologies and methods of mass production, private and public construction remained quite conservative and individualistic. The flow of ideas from Europe remained strong. There were two important exceptions where the Americans took the lead: high-rise structures and the avant-garde design of Frank Lloyd Wright’s buildings and furniture.\(^{19}\)

The emergence of the skyscraper must be related to the growth of the large and powerful corporations. It was the tycoons who felt impelled to give concrete form to their technological and economic optimism and exuberant self-confidence in office headquarters that would impress and overwhelm those who stood in front of them or visited them on the top floor. These were the “cathedrals of capitalism” (or “cathedrals of commerce,” as the Woolworth Building was called), designed to embody power and success. It is true that the façades tended to follow conventional styles, but technically and in terms of statics they posed enormous challenges for the architect and builder. In this sense they were revolutionary and went well beyond what, except for the great cathedrals or the Eiffel Tower, the Europeans had dared to contemplate.

When businessmen from Britain or Germany visited the U.S. before 1914, they studied Taylorist rationalization and Ford’s assembly lines, and also admired the high-rise office buildings that were going up in New York and Chicago. The influence of the Beaux Arts movement found expression in innumerable private dwellings, in commercial buildings and railroad stations, or in New York’s large apartment blocks—“rental palaces,” as they were called in Central Europe—for those middle-class families who were keen to have large spaces for their needs of representation but were not wealthy enough to build or buy their own single, detached residence.\(^{20}\) Parallel to the political Americanization movements inside the United States and in Europe, the “Americanization”
of architecture set in on both sides of the Atlantic. After 1918, the debate on skyscrapers was also in full swing in Europe.21

Beyond the shifts that took place in “high-cultural” architecture, especially in the field of office buildings, there was yet another level of European-American interaction that is even more difficult to disentangle: the avant-garde that began to depart quite radically from the stylistic conservatism of the mainstream. As far as the visual arts, music, literature, and theater are concerned, influences moved primarily from east to west. Architecture appears to have been more of an exception, and here it was, of course, Frank Lloyd Wright who proved to be a major inspiration, particularly in Holland, but also in Central Europe. When his work was published by Ernst Wasmuth in Germany, it created a sensation, and his visit to Berlin in 1910 generated plenty of curiosity among the small group of architects and artists, especially those who had come together in the German Werkbund.22

Indebted originally to the Arts and Crafts movement and the ideas of William Morris and others, the Werkbund members began to distance themselves from the orthodoxies of cultural production in the Wilhelmine empire. Against the background of radical experimentation in the visual arts in Paris, Munich, and Vienna, the architects among the organization’s founders had for some time been wrestling with the development of a style that would reflect a spirit of innovation and rationalism in industry and modern city living. They wanted to move away from attention to decorative detail and towards bolder and clearer lines. While the Taylorists tried to reorganize work and habits inside the factory with the help of time-and-motion studies, architects began to design modern production halls, such as Peter Behrens’s Turbinenhalle built for the German electrical engineering trust A.E.G. in Berlin in 1909, and the Fagus factory in Alfeld (south of Hanover) in 1911. They also took a more comprehensive view of their discipline and included new approaches to town planning and the shaping of the larger physical environment of ever more densely populated areas. Modern architecture was to be open to all experiments and adopted a firmly interdisciplinary outlook.23

In the limited space at my disposal, I can only allude to the evolution of European-American relations in the field of avant-garde architecture. The striking thing is that there was a certain parallelism. To some extent, they developed independently before 1914, which explains why Wright created such a sensation when he and his work reached Europe. But once again it is also intriguing to see how his ideas on the external structure and interior design of his buildings were adapted by his European colleagues. No less important, this translation process cannot be understood apart from the socio-cultural premises from which the leading lights of the Werkbund started, and which they cast into a foundational program
when they established the *Bauhaus* after World War I.\(^{24}\) Bearing in mind the notion of the Atlantic as a two-lane highway, the peculiarities of this process explain in turn why the new ideas were not always received with open arms when a few of its protagonists came to the United States in the 1920s, not merely to study—as European businessmen, engineers, and trade unionists were doing—the evolution of the American industrial system with its rationalized production and “cathedrals of capitalism,” but also to offer their ideas on architecture and modernity that had been transformed during the intervening years.

When Walter Gropius published his “Art and Technology—A New Unity” in 1923, his title summarized an essential element of the *Bauhaus* project. However, we would miss another essential element if we left out the “social” and the related search for a more humane and genuinely democratic future. This search is already present as a motivating factor before 1914; but it was the catastrophe of World War I, its trauma, and its socio-economic consequences that brought the social into sharper relief in German life more generally and in *Bauhaus* thinking in particular. During the past two decades, social and economic historians have explored in detail the expansion, complexities, and inconsistencies of the Weimar welfare state.\(^{25}\) The debates that it generated were manifestations of Germany’s “classical modernity” and its growing crisis, as it impacted material life and pervaded the thinking of contemporaries. Accordingly, social concerns came to constitute the heart of the educational work of the *Bauhaus* in Weimar, and later in Dessau, as long as Gropius was the school’s director. It may be said to have been an even stronger force during Hannes Meyer’s relatively short leadership, when the *Bauhaus* turned further left in its ideology. These were also the early years when the movement was not merely interested in developments across the Atlantic, but, significantly, also in the cultural experimentation in pre-Stalinist Russia.\(^{26}\)

There was something inescapable about this focus on the social during the early phase. The misery of the postwar years, with hyperinflation and a virtual state of permanent civil war, challenged intellectuals and in particular those who viewed themselves as the avant-garde to think radically about the relationship between their cultural production and their political aspirations. When, during the mid-1920s, a measure of economic and political stability returned to Weimar Germany, and Americans appeared on the European stage as investors and industrial modernizers who promised prosperity, mass production, and mass consumption, the concern for the social took on some American features. But it did not become “Americanized” in the sense of a pervasive ethos of individualism. Solidarity and the welfare of the larger community, including support for those in poverty continued to undergird the *Bauhaus* project, even
more so after national elections in 1928 produced a leftist Reich government led by the victorious Social Democrats.\textsuperscript{27} It is hardly a coincidence that it is in this period that, next to individual buildings, public and private, there emerged those large housing projects which were developed as model new living environments for the working “masses,” including the \textit{Hufeisen-Siedlung} in Berlin and the flat-roofed settlements in Celle, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Karlsruhe-Dammerstock, and Red Vienna.\textsuperscript{28}

It was when Ludwig Mies van der Rohe succeeded Meyer that social concerns began to fade, and the \textit{Bauhaus} became depoliticized. The new director had always preferred to design individual private houses and futuristic high-rise office buildings. Now, the stress was more on careful architectural training and less on urban planning and the humanization and democratization of the city environment. If his predecessors had thought in terms of a broad education and in this sense had been anti-academic, Mies redefined the school’s mission more narrowly, perhaps also in the hope of taking the \textit{Bauhaus} out of the political firing-line when, in the political hot-house atmosphere of the early 1930s, it was attacked by the extreme Right. When the Nazis seized power in January 1933 and Hitler established a one-party dictatorship with astonishing speed and cunning, Mies’s strategy had reached the end of the road. He closed the \textit{Bauhaus} in the summer of 1933, pre-empting a ban by the new regime.

Gropius had been guided by larger visions. If we now turn back to the question of trans-Atlantic relations, it is not surprising that even the American avant-garde had difficulties connecting with his societal utopia. True, they were fascinated by the boldness of Mies’s sky-scaper sketches. They also felt inspired by his coolly functional interior designs and Marcel Breuer’s tubular chairs. The popularity of the Swiss Charles-Edouard Jeanneret (Le Corbusier) or the Dutchman J.J.P. Oud must also be seen in this context. The avant-garde on both sides of the Atlantic was agreed that this was an age of modern technology. The machine that enthused Henry Ford was also much in evidence at the International Style Show at New York’s Museum of Modern Art in 1932. But when it came to the social that was frequently perceived as socialist, American enthusiasm began to evaporate. Indeed, it completely waned among those Americans who, like many European intellectuals and educated people, upheld elitist notions of culture within their own society against the “trashy vulgarity” of mass culture and entertainment. When it came to jazz, a racist element was added to their rejection.\textsuperscript{29}

In these circumstances, the \textit{Bauhaus} found it difficult in the 1920s to gain wider recognition in the United States. It was not just that anti-German feeling persisted after 1918. Nor was it the nationalism of the indigenous Americanization movement. Before the Great Depression of
1929, it was also reservations about the social message that was at variance with American self-images of their country as a modern industrial and urban society. Too many educated people had bought into the American Dream at a time when a liberal-capitalist economy delivered the goods. They saw themselves as one large middle-class society in which they were free to work and assert themselves as individuals. Accordingly, participation was also individual, be it as consumers of increasingly affordable mass-produced goods or as voters in a liberal-democratic system that in theory, though not necessarily in practice, gave the vote to all adult citizens.

It is against this background that the resistance of a large number of architects to *Bauhaus* modernism becomes plausible. They were the ones who, especially during the building boom of the prosperous mid-1920s, catered to the often idiosyncratic decorative tastes of their wealthy clients. In this climate of liberal individualism and aesthetic conservatism, the American architectural avant-garde faced enough of a struggle. At the time, it would have been even more difficult to absorb and transmit the social democratic messages of the *Bauhaus* on top of their advocacy of modern structures and materials. This is why the public’s imagination was more easily captured by a daring vision of sky-scrapers or a sketch of a futuristic metropolis, especially after Fritz Lang’s film with its fantastic expressionist backdrops. Modernity was also acceptable when it came to factories, like the huge halls of Ford’s River Rouge glass plants in Dearborn, Michigan. However, there was also plenty of criticism on both sides of the Atlantic from those who viewed Lang’s *Metropolis* and similar utopias of future living with horror, fearing the destruction of the individual by the Moloch of the collective and by icy-cold machines which devour the humans who worship them.

During the 1930s, the forces which supported the kind of all-embracing architectural modernity conceived in Central Europe after World War I gained strength. It is a shift that has been examined many times before and related to what Europeans had first experienced in the early 1920s and went through again after the Wall Street crash of October 1929: economic collapse, mass unemployment, political radicalization, loss of confidence in the capitalist system. If the boom years had seen a strengthening of the credo of individualism and self-reliance, with only a few lonely voices, such as Lewis Mumford’s, advocating community solidarity and action, then the depression pushed millions of Americans into abject poverty. There was virtually no safety net to halt their fall into destitution and despair. This experience was bound to have a profound effect. Its reflections can be found in the above-mentioned 1932 exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art, which featured work by Gropius, Mies, Oud, and Le Corbusier. It contained an extensive presentation of Euro-
pean housing, curated by Mumford, featuring Otto Haessler’s Celle project and Oud’s work in Rotterdam.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal reflected a shift towards a political climate in which the first corner-stones of the modern American welfare state could be established. The strategy was to pump public funds into the depressed economy to support programs that would give people work and renewed spending power. Jobs were created through public works programs in the hope of stimulating production in the private sector and thereby getting the economy as a whole back onto a path of growth and expansion. Proto-Keynesian deficit-spending was the recipe for achieving the turnaround.

As the American political system confronted the “social questions” of mass unemployment and poverty, the slums in the big cities attracted serious attention and debate for the first time. If the poor had hitherto received little or no public help and had to rely on private charity, now those most deeply affected by the crisis began to make their voices heard. They formed organizations and unions to demand improvement, if not even radical change. It was in this atmosphere of social criticism that the question of cost-efficient and publicly financed low-cost housing appeared on the agenda. Exhibitions and books reinforced the trend. Greenbelt, Maryland, was put on the drawing-board, and with all this came a greater appreciation of the larger ideas of the Bauhaus movement that had fallen on deaf ears in America in the 1920s. There was one contributing factor that dated back to those years and that now assumed additional importance: the expansion of mass production techniques during the booming 1920s had also led a few enterprising minds in the construction industry to take up Fordist ideas of rationalization and to begin to produce standardized building materials and other pre-fabricated elements.

Against the background of these developments, American architects and planners became interested in the German Siedlung experiments as well as in the broader considerations of modern industrial and urban living that were underlying these and other Weimar public building projects. Gropius and his colleagues later reinforced this interest when they came to the United States as refugees from Nazism. In the 1920s, contact had been sporadic at a time when a trip across the Atlantic was expensive and cumbersome, further exacerbated by language barriers and unfamiliarity with another society and its professional culture. After 1933, many members of the Bauhaus movement, having been forced to flee from Hitler’s dictatorship, found shelter in the U.S. Even if not all of them immediately obtained positions inside and outside the academy, at least they now lived in the country and were able to explain in detail their ideas on “art and technology,” architecture, and modern living.
Meanwhile Hitler and his favorite architect Albert Speer pursued their own grandiose plans for metropolitan reconstruction, monumental public buildings designed to overawe, suburban settlement, and ultimately mass “resettlement” through ethnic cleansing in the conquered territories in the east. What is significant about these plans is that American buildings and engineering feats served as models time and again, just as the American system of Fordist mass production and mass consumption became blueprints for Hitler’s future Thousand-Year Reich. Except, of course, that it was built not on the principle of a diverse and multicultural society, but on that of a racist one from which all “non-Aryans” were to be excluded by deportation and mass murder. Traffic across the Atlantic highway stopped only after the beginning of World War II. This also applies to the earlier eugenics movement that in Germany merged with biological racism, leading to the attempted elimination of entire social groups that were declared “inferior” and “superfluous.” As designers of the granite embodiments of brutal power, men like Speer played an important role in this utopia.

If we now move again from Europe across the Atlantic, the life and work of Gropius at Harvard, Mies at Illinois, or Josef Albers at Black Mountain College in North Carolina has been covered in a variety of studies of the migration of the Bauhaus to America. There, they transformed the training of architects, but were also transformed by their experience of American education, society, and culture. Beyond this chapter in the history of European and American cultural interaction, this volume contains a number of contributions on how the trans-Atlantic “highway” was rebuilt, physically and intellectually, after World War II. People and ideas about industrial production and consumption, social and political organization, culture, and modern living had traveled in both directions along this route prior to World War II. After the war, the human and conceptual traffic resumed in equal measure. At first, the movement was primarily from west to east, and later in both directions. And as one of the above essays demonstrates there was, as before, also cultural resistance.

We have now reached the point where we can turn to the second theme of this concluding article and examine the implications of our analysis for the discipline of History, its institutions and structures of research and teaching. Considering the evolution of the discipline since the mid-nineteenth century, there have been several attempts to reintegrate its various strands and to restore what might be called its “inner interdisciplinarity” with the aim of overcoming the fragmentation that occurred in the late nineteenth century.

There arose, it is true, the threat of further fragmentation after World War II with the rise of new genres, such as social and labor history,
gender history, the histories of memory and identity, and other more recent approaches to the field. In retrospect, it may be chalked up as an achievement that this diversification by and large did not result in the setting up of new academic departments. Nor did existing departments disintegrate along the lines of the major geographic regions. Accordingly, most history departments around the world, despite their numerical expansion during the 1970s and the attendant lure of secession, unite under one roof different genres of historical writing and major regions. To make this arrangement work productively may not always be easy and there have been repeated threats of secession. On the whole, they can be said to have failed.38

At the same time, it is well to remember that History has not always been as successful at preserving its unity as it was after World War II. This is why to this day there continue to be three sub-disciplines that lead a separate departmental existence and that have, inevitably, created institutional walls: economic history, the history of science, and the history of art and architecture. These walls have generally made it difficult to engage in conversations across them. The reasons for these divisions are found in the late nineteenth century and are most clearly identifiable in the case of economic history. When this sub-discipline developed in the wake of the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent urge of scholars to study the rapid changes it had brought, the established political, constitutional, and intellectual historians, already firmly ensconced in what the Germans called historische Seminare, refused to accept their economic history colleagues. Conservative in outlook and methodology, the opponents of integration denigrated them, declaring their work to be unimportant to the actual tasks of the discipline, namely to study politics, power, diplomacy, and great men. Consequently, economic historians moved more closely toward economics, which was then in the process of establishing itself as an independent academic discipline with its own departments. And this is where, with some exceptions, economic historians have remained to this day.39

The experience of the history of science as a sub-discipline has been similar, leading to the creation of separate departments at institutions large enough to be able to afford a group of historians of science or anxious to have them because of their broader interest in science and technology, for example, at technical universities and institutes. But the story of why art and architectural history did not become part of expanding and multiplying history departments seems to be more complicated. Here it was more a peculiar interactive process in which it was not just the influential representatives of the history of politics, diplomacy, statesmen, and great political ideas who considered their scholarship superior to that of their colleagues interested in art and architectural history;
rather, it was also the latter group’s desire to establish themselves as practitioners of a rigorous sub-discipline that asked different, but equally important questions about culture. This quest for autonomy was reinforced by the progressive professionalization and specialization that affected all spheres of life in the nineteenth century. There was also the expansion of teaching positions that followed the demographic explosion of the eighteenth century and the rising demand for higher education.

If the first scholar to be appointed as professor of art history was Johann Dominic Fiorillo who, born in Hamburg, assumed his position at Göttingen University in 1813, other positions were quickly established thereafter, including one in Bonn in 1818.\(^40\) However, it was not just that the early art historians labored hard to develop and refine their methods of investigation, often in close cooperation with archaeologists and architectural historians; there was also the perennial problem of scarce resources and conflicts among faculty over their distribution. Working and teaching in the field of art and architectural history could not be done without large collections of drawings and expensive books. Thus, Hermann Grimm complained that he had great problems in Berlin in obtaining the necessary materials for his lectures in recent art history.\(^41\)

It is in this context that the sub-discipline found the newly-created polytechnic schools and later technical Hochschulen and institutes more open than the venerable universities, which were often paralyzed by vicious infighting and bureaucratic inertia. And so art history began to establish itself at first in the polytechnic schools of southern Germany. In 1854, the Zürich Polytechnic created a special chair in the subject. The Technische Hochschulen of Stuttgart and Karlsruhe followed suit in 1865 and 1868 respectively. There were, of course, also affinities with the technical disciplines whose rise had led to the founding of these institutes in the first place, especially with engineering and architecture. It was only in the 1890s and after the turn of the century that the universities, among them Heidelberg, Tübingen, and Freiburg, finally gave up their hostility. Berlin and Leipzig also fell into line. Reeling under the condescension of their colleagues in the traditional fields of historiography, architectural historians sought salvation in the creation of institutional enclaves. The art history institute at Bonn University, evidently not fully appreciated among colleagues, even went so far as to collaborate with the Dresden Technische Hochschule in the study of medieval monuments.

With the growth of scholarship came the training of small groups of graduate students who were initiated into the methods and analytical techniques of what had by then become a serious Wissenschaft. Meanwhile, the British universities continued their education of gentlemen in the liberal arts more broadly, ending with a non-professional first degree, the bachelor of arts. A professional education came only thereafter, em-
phasizing engineering and mathematical skills that did not pay much attention to the history of buildings and monuments. It was only in the 1930s that art history became a sub-discipline in its own right when refugees from Nazi Germany arrived in the United Kingdom, bringing with them their knowledge and understanding of art history as a *Wissenschaft*. The United States had a similar experience. After having adopted and adapted the British college system for its undergraduates and educating the young in a liberal arts tradition, art history as a separate sub-discipline with autonomous departments came with the introduction to the U.S. in the second half of the nineteenth century of the Central European model of graduate education and advanced scholarly training.

The first American professional school was established in 1865, at the more innovative Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It was charged with complementing the training that future architects had traditionally been given as apprentices in architectural firms. Institutes similar to that in Boston were soon founded at Illinois, Cornell, Columbia, and Syracuse. More universities followed in the 1890s. Finally, in 1893 and largely under the leadership of Columbia’s William A. Boring, the Society of Beaux Arts Architects and the American Academy launched a campaign for uniform standards in all American architectural schools, based on the model of the Parisian school as it was interpreted by these select groups of New York-based architects. The Beaux-Arts course was *de rigueur* in all existing schools; it also provided the pedagogical context for new professional schools founded at this time, including the University of California at Berkeley, Michigan, Georgia Tech, Carnegie Tech, Texas, Rice, Virginia, and Princeton. In these schools, as in the older institutions, students turned to Julien Guadet’s *Eléments et Théorie de l’Architecture* (1902) as their new Bible. Even those who could not read French studied the drawings, “with their emphasis on universal laws of composition and their elegant style of rendering.” Beyond the formalism, “there were continuing efforts to think about other histories, especially in the evolution of building technologies,” creating a greater awareness of historical specificities and an opening for architectural historians.

Increasingly, students could also rely on influential historical textbooks, pointing them to different epochs and cultures that had produced the artifacts pictured. Texts, but above all images, were used to describe continuity and change in the field of art and architectural history. From this emerged in turn a claim that could also be heard from other new fields of scholarship in the humanities and social sciences. Now it was supposed to be the approaches and tools of analysis of these new fields that offered deeper insights into the deeper structures and the spirit of the age. Similar arguments circulated among the natural sciences that were
revolutionizing contemporary understanding of the micro- and macro-cosmos with correspondingly large assertions about the implications of their discoveries for modern society.\textsuperscript{43}

In the course of the often sharp competition over which discipline would retain or gain a hegemonic position in the world of scholarship and the interpretation of the universe, it eventually became clear that the time was over when one academic discipline would permanently occupy the central place, as theology or philosophy had done in the West in previous centuries. Modern societies had become just too complex and diverse for one perspective to be able to dominate. It was this realization that now produced a peculiar back-and-forth between two positions in art and architectural history, as it did in other disciplines. On the one hand, there was the trend toward an ever more meticulous examination of cultural objects. Practitioners developed into highly specialized experts of more and more sub-sub-fields. Very close technical inspection became the sine qua non, and this is also what the training of the next generation of scholars was assumed to involve.\textsuperscript{44}

Others, while acquiring this expertise as earnestly as everybody else, raised larger questions that led them not to make fresh claims of disciplinary superiority, but instead to throw themselves into other disciplines. Their aim was to take the scholar out of his/her “selbstgewählte Isolierung” [self-imposed isolation].\textsuperscript{45} Accordingly, they began to look for connections between art and architectural history and psychology, philosophy, semiotics, or political economy. Already before the twentieth century, historians of philosophy such as Wilhelm Dilthey searched for links between the disciplines. Whereas Jakob Burckhardt (and, even more so, Anton Springer) had tried to integrate the “study of art and of social life” in a particular period, Dilthey believed even more strongly that knowledge that was purely descriptive and classificatory was too limiting to investigate more fundamental issues of the human predicament.\textsuperscript{46} Accordingly, he embarked upon a search for humankind’s inner structures and the movements of entire cultural systems, including their rational as well as irrational wellsprings. As Dilthey put it, “the task of our generation is clearly before us: following Kant’s critical path, but in cooperation with researchers in other areas, we must found an empirical science of the human mind. It is necessary to know the laws which rule social, intellectual, and moral phenomena. This knowledge of laws is the source of all the power of man, even where mental phenomena are concerned.”\textsuperscript{47}

Meanwhile, Aby Warburg, in his own quest to advance art history as a \textit{Kulturwissenschaft}, labored to define it with the help of a “theory of symbols” and a “psychological theory of expression by imitation and by the use of tools.”\textsuperscript{48} The “underlying theme of his work” was “the fight” which he saw “the artist as waging against superstition and repressive
social convention.” Heinrich Wölfflin, who had studied under Burckhardt, moved along a similar path, arguing that art and architectural history must be more than fact-finding and “rhapsodizing” about cultural artifacts.49 He wanted to find out how objects reflected the spirit of an age. And “because the awareness of each age differs from preceding and succeeding ages, artists,” he asserted, “are beholden to their periods and cannot freely choose how to paint.”

Finally, there was the impact of Marxism upon the discipline after 1918, which postulated that “the ideological superstructure of society, with all its manipulations, disruptions, and pathologies, is to be found in the social practices, such as etiquette, and in laws, institutions, education, and art.”50 The task was “to unmask and display the system of ideas (ideologies) hidden by the social practices of the culture at large.” Or, to quote Arnold Hauser, a protagonist of this approach, “all factors material and intellectual, economic and ideological, are bound up together in a state of indissoluble interdependence.”51 Gropius, as we have seen, was similarly motivated by large concerns and proposed to link the Bauhaus project with the social sciences.

Since then, art and architectural history have continued to sway back and forth between the particularist and the positivist in a technical sense, on the one hand (for example, Nikolaus Pevner’s faithful recordings of all of Britain’s architectural monuments), and the universalist and trans-disciplinary, on the other (controversial theorizing, whether in a Marxist or, more recently, in a postmodernist mode). There is the teaching of “pure” architecture that does not wish to see urban planning included in the curriculum next to inter-disciplinary conceptualizing on a grand scale, just as there are advocates of the broad sweep.

However, this essay is not advocating the pursuit of those latter, very large ambitions. All it proposes is to make the boundaries within a single discipline, History, more permeable again. This is not to suggest that art and architectural history departments at institutions of higher learning be absorbed into the generally larger history departments. Such a merger would be unrealistic and counter-productive. But considering that history departments now contain a wide range of genres and that political historians work side-by-side with practitioners of social, gender, or cultural history, there is plenty of scope for dialogue and mutual sharing of specialized knowledge across departmental boundaries. This cooperation is made all the easier because all historians share similar ways of viewing the past and looking at evidence. There is no need to begin from zero and immerse oneself in the time-consuming and daunting task of mastering the quite different traditions of thought and methodologies of the non-historical disciplines.
The Bauhaus, broadly defined as it has been in this contribution, provides a most promising field of inquiry for this kind of integration of scholarship within a single discipline. To be sure, there exists an extensive literature on this subject, but in order to understand fully this highly influential movement it is not enough to study Gropius’s program or Mies’s curricula at Dessau, Berlin or, later, Illinois. Today’s syllabus of a course on the Bauhaus should also include as required reading, for example, Mary Nolan’s Visions of Modernity, William McNeil’s American Money and the Weimar Republic, and Kaspar Maase’s Grenzenloses Vergnügen; and for the 1930s, it should list the most important works on the New Deal.52 The transatlantic two-lane highway and the study of the encounter between two continents with their societies and cultures will also have to be an inseparable part of it.

Notes

1 I would like to thank Barry Bergdoll, Cordula Grewe, and Dietrich Neumann for their most helpful advice and comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

2 See, for example, Daniel Fallon, “Deutsche Einflüsse auf das amerikanische Erziehungswesen,” in Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore, eds., Deutsch-amerikanische Begegnungen (Stuttgart, 2001), 91–102.


6 See the telling statement by Daimler-Benz, quoted in A. Kugler (note 5), 315ff.: “Over here we are still a long way from the American situation where every Mr. Jones owns a car. With us the automobile is for the most part a vehicle for the better-off classes.” And: “Here [we do things] meticulously and thoroughly; over there [in America it is] skimping and rushing.”


9 See Kaspar Maase, Grenzenloses Vergnügen (Frankfurt/Main, 1997); Charles Musser, The Emergence of the Cinema (Berkeley, 1994).


12 See Werner Link, Die amerikanische Stabilisierungspolitik in Deutschland, 1921–1932 (Düsseldorf, 1970); Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity (Oxford, 1994); Frank Costigliola, Awkward

13 See, for example, Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology (Cambridge, 1987).


16 Ibid., chap. 7.

17 See, for example, Walter Laqueur, Weimar. Die Kultur der Republik (Frankfurt, 1974), 139ff. See also Peter Gay, Weimar Culture (London, 1974).


19 See Brendan Gill, Many Masks. A Life of Frank Lloyd Wright (New York, 1987).


23 See, Matthew Jefferies, Imperial Culture in Germany, 1871–1918 (New York, 2003), 216ff.

24 See, for example, Marcel Franciscono, Walter Gropius and the Creation of the Bauhaus in Weimar (Chicago 1971).


28 The Weissenhof-Siedlung in Stuttgart is also occasionally referred to in this context. But it was more a project for the middle-classes than a settlement for workers. It is significant that Mies did not escape this influence either. His municipal building project at Afrikanische Strasse in Berlin (1925–27) was small in scale, but constituted one of the earliest. At the same time he “began to explore—first in his personal notebooks and soon after in his design work—the challenge of retaining human and spiritual values in the face of technological change.” As he warned in 1924: “We agree with the direction [Henry] Ford has taken, but we reject the plane on which he moves. Mechanization can never be the goal; it must remain the means. A means toward a spiritual purpose.” Quoted in Barry Bergdoll and Terence Riley, “Mies in Berlin,” Guide for the Exhibition at the New York Museum of Modern Art, June 21—September 11, 2001 (New York, 2001), 9. See also Werner Blaser, Mies van der Rohe. Teaching and Principles (New York, 1977); Ulfert Herlin et al., eds., Neubausiedlungen der 20er und 60er Jahre (Frankfurt, 1987); Janet Ward, Weimar Surfaces: Urban Visual Culture in 1920s Germany (Berkeley, 2001).

29 Peter Blake, Marcel Breuer (New York 1949); M. Nolan, Visions of Modernity, 109ff.; F. Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, 172ff.


33 M. Kentgens-Craig, The Bauhaus and America, 228.
34 Ibid., 204ff.
35 See Jochen Thies, Architekt der Weltherrschaft (Düsseldorf, 1976); Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (London, 1979).
36 See Philipp Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart, 1997).
37 See the contribution by Alexander Sedlmaier in this volume.
38 See Peter Novick, That Noble Dream (Chicago, 1988). The more pessimistic view prevailed during the 1980s.
40 Heinrich Dilly, Kunstgeschichte als Institution (Frankfurt, 1979), 14.
43 See, for example, John L. Heilbron, The Dilemmas of an Upright Man (Berkeley, 1986).
45 Thus Ernst Gombrich, as quoted in Dilly, Kunstgeschichte als Institution, 40.
49 Minor, Art History’s History, 125.
50 Ibid., 148.
51 Ibid., 145. See also Donald Preziosi, Rethinking Art History (New Haven, 1989), 160ff.
52 See notes 9 and 12 above. See also Katie Withersby-Lench’s “Investigating the Bigger Picture: A Case Study of the Jacobean Great Barn at Vaynol Park,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, XIII (Cambridge, 2003), 281–91, which Clyde Binfield, the editor of the papers of a joint symposium of the Royal Historical Society and the Society of Architectural Historians of Great Britain, held at Taptton Hall, University of Sheffield, on 5–7 April 2002, introduced with the words (194ff.): “Here too is an essay on how a building-centred study, deploying the interaction of architectural, economic, socio-cultural, and political history (with a strong woman yet again powerful in the not-so-distant background), can answer the historian’s questions as no single type of history could.”
Between 1924 and 1929, Aby Warburg assembled a vast compendium of visual material, fusing philosophical investigation with an historical approach to images. Diverse materials were attached to wooden boards covered with black cloth—photographs, reproductions from books, newspapers clips, and scenes from daily life—arranged in such a way that they would illustrate multiple thematic areas, showing lines of continuity from antiquity. In Warburg’s Mnemosyne-Atlas, as he called it, one can even find examples from graphic designers. Yet Warburg’s massive work does not contain an image of the original form of the high-rise building, the Tower of Babel, an iconic topos from ancient times which evolved into the skyscrapers of the early twentieth century. This essay is intended as a small extension of Warburg’s project, as well as a tribute to it. The article is comprised of a short introduction followed by a catalogue. The twenty catalogue entries feature thirty-two posters, most of which come from the Austrian National Library in Vienna. The catalogue also includes posters from other collections, as well as illustrations from important graphic design journals of the 1920s and 1930s. The posters are vivid examples of the dialogue between different media and the pervasiveness of aesthetic ideas, for they demonstrate how applied artists appropriated and commented upon vital avant-garde architectural forms, namely the high-rise and the skyscraper.

The links between the American “skyscraper” and Austrian and German graphic design are obvious. The “tower-like monsters that owe their existence to the rampant quest for power of predatory entrepreneurs,”¹ as Siegfried Kracauer put it, also rose from the desks of graphic designers who were swept away by the general skyscraper euphoria. Kracauer, trained as an architect with a doctorate in engineering, was well-equipped to engage with the modern world of building and economic power when he began work as the Frankfurter Zeitung’s leading film and literature editor in 1922. Indeed, Kracauer dedicated one of his first articles for the Frankfurter Zeitung to the clothes manufacturer Fritz Vogel’s high-rise in Frankfurt, a project not well-known today. Kracauer proved himself to be one of the most avid observers of metropolitan surface phenomena. He took note of graphic works in public space and reflected
upon them in his articles. “The body strikes roots in concrete,” was Kra-cauer’s response to a particularly well-executed advertisement that claimed the attention of the passer-by.

Another important figure who was attuned to links between skyscrapers and advertisements was Richard Huelsenbeck, one of the central figures in DADA, whose poem “The Song of the Posters” conjured up their marriage:

When, tired from the night’s uneasy slumber,
We hurry through gray tunnels of the street,
And hear the city’s noises without number,
Great, startling pictures stay our rushing feet.

The cry of posters from the concrete walls
Proclaims a fairyland that we have lost,
Wild forests rise before us tempest-tossed,
And from Skyscrapers tumble waterfalls.²

Huelsenbeck’s vivid evocation of the power of posters alerts us to the role of graphic design in the 1920s and its desire to promote a lifestyle, thus both appropriating and shaping the visual trends of the time.

It is important to remind ourselves that, in the 1920s, the production process in the advertising sector was not marked by the division of labor to the degree it is today. In those days, a graphic artist was often solely responsible for the end result, including the proportioning of picture and text. Advertising was only just on the verge of becoming a scholarly discipline—a process that eventually led the Viennese Hochschule für Welthandel to call the subject “Werbewissenschaften”—and only very large companies had their own advertising departments.

As an introduction to the following catalogue entries, I would like to propose five theses to characterize the representation of high-rise buildings in functional graphics:

1. Parallel to the discussions about high-rise buildings which ensued around 1920, skyscrapers appeared as motifs on posters, newspaper and magazine advertisements, magazine covers, book blurbs, etc., all of which belong to the category of functional graphics. The main medium for these “low-culture” products was the poster, which found its way into public space and thus to made an important contribution to every-day aesthetics.

2. On posters, the skyscraper functioned as an icon that signified prestige, modernity, and urbanity. In the European context, it conferred upon the advertised products and services a touch of “America.” The posters promised the purchasers the opportunity to become one with a metropolis, even if they lived in a medium-
sized town with a maximum construction height of twenty-five meters rather than in Vienna or Berlin.

3. The representations of high-rise buildings in applied graphics are mostly positive. In times of economic crisis, they served as symbols of modernity, technological progress, and prosperity. It was only on film posters such as Fritz Lang’s *Metropolis* that skyscrapers carried the negative connotation of a “Tower of Babel” threatening humanity’s future.

4. Pictures of high-rise buildings were also very popular for illustrating the antagonism between old and new, between a future vision and the status quo.

5. The more rarely high-rise buildings were erected in certain areas, the more they were depicted in graphics—at least in Austria, where in comparison to Germany, few high-rises were actually erected. Many examples of high-rise illustrations are found in Austrian graphics.

It was thus not only architects, but also graphic designers on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean who heeded Louis Sullivan’s dictum, “The building must be tall, it must posses the strength and power imparted by height, the glory and pride of elevation. It must be rugged and sublime in its every detail, rising up in the pure exultation of presenting from base to summit a unity free of discordant lines.”

Notes


2 Richard Huelsenbeck, “Das Lied der Plakate,” *Gebrauchsgraphik: International Advertising Art* 1 (1927): 4. The original German version is as follows:

   Wenn wir noch müde von dem kurzen Schlaf der Nacht
   In den Tunnels grauer Straßen eilen
   Und der Lärm beginnt, der eine Stadt entfacht,
   Zwingt der großen Bilder bunte Wildheit zum Verweilen
   Der Plakate Schrei aus den Zementverließen
   Kündet uns ein Märchenland, das uns entschwand,
   Wasserfälle rollen aus der Wolkenkratzerwand,
   Nebelwälder wallen auf vor unsren Füßen.

Catalogue: Paper Skyscraper

By Christian Maryška
Conception and Layout: Cordula Grewe

Cat. 1

Urban Janke: Mein Haus am Michaelerplatz.
Vortrag Adolf Loos
Poster, Vienna 1911
84 x 62 cm
Austrian National Library, Department of Broadsheets, Posters and Ex Libris, Vienna

The Austrian reception of high-rise buildings starts with an 1892 magazine article by Fritz von Emperger, the leading Austrian specialist in reinforced concrete buildings, entitled “Chicago’s Tall Buildings.”¹ The following year (1893), after having completed his studies in Dresden, Adolf Loos (1870–1933) traveled to the United States to visit the Chicago World’s Fair. The week he spent there as a twenty-three-year-old student proved crucial for his future development as an architect, and he remained in the country until 1896.

In 1909–11, Loos erected his main opus, the six-story building on Michaelerplatz—formerly the tailoring firm Goldmann & Salatsch—directly opposite the Hofburg (Figure 1). Although Loos hid the reinforced concrete skeleton beneath an unadorned plaster façade, many protested against a building on such an important historic site. The poster depicted here testifies to the controversy, quoting a Vienna newspaper’s view that it was “a horror of a building.”

Note

Figure 1
The First World War left a vast void in the Michaelerplatz. Following American examples, firewalls were built and covered with gigantic ads. One company that believed in good advertising was Tabu, a producer of cigarette paper. After the war, they commissioned a renowned Viennese graphic designer for their advertising campaign, Julius Klinger (1876–1942). A student of the Secessionist Kolo Moser and co-founder of the “Deutschen Sachplakat,” Klinger had been a designer for the women’s magazine Wiener Mode since 1895 and, later, an illustrator for the Meggen dorfer Blätter. He moved to Munich in 1896, and then to Berlin in 1897. In Berlin, Klinger remained active in the field of applied graphics until 1915. Together with the printing firm Hollerbaum und Schmidt, he developed a new kind of functional poster production which brought him international recognition. After the First World War he opened a studio for applied graphics, where he also gave courses. Like Adolf Loos, Klinger rejected the idea of ornament for its own sake. He regarded the Loos-Haus house on Michaelerplatz as modern Vienna’s best. In 1919, the two met for the first time. Tabu also commissioned him to design an ad spanning the entire side of the Loos-Haus where it adjoined the Liechtenstein Palais, which was demolished in 1913. Acting as a sort of imaginary architect, Klinger solved the problem in an unconventional way. He designed a steel skeleton like that of an American skyscraper and attached the letters T-A-B-U to it, in irregular order (Figure 2a).

In a way, the tall building of Klinger’s firewall advertisement was completed on a poster (Figure 2b), also from 1919, which shows a skyscraper rising from medieval Vienna. As the architecture critic Ada Louis Huxtable put it, its style is functional rather than an eclectic, anticipating by decades the revolutionary poverty of International Style high-rises.
such as the Seagram Building by Mies van der Rohe. The contrast in urban design could not be more marked. In a period of postwar economic crisis, the elegant simplicity of the future-oriented skyscraper and airplane is a sharp counterpoint to the great variety of detail found in the narrow town and the images of nature, represented by the trees and birds.

Julius Klinger, who later fell victim to the Nazis, greatly admired American culture. His designs were highly praised by art critics. With a bit of understatement, Klinger wrote of his role as a commercial artist, “Advertising calls for experienced experts and craftsmen, the ‘artists’ with their ideals have no say in this matter.”¹ He thus contradicted the view of art held by groups like the Wiener Werkstätte or the German Werkbund, who sought to erase the barriers between free and applied art.

However, Hans Ankwicz-Kleehoven, then curator of the Vienna Museum of Art and Industry, claimed that Klinger thereby linked the opposing principles of art and commerce: “Julius Klinger could be called the Peter Behrens of poster art. Preferring to cater to the demands of industry, he possesses an imagination with a strong technical leaning, mixed with a healthy portion of Americanism that avoids all sentimentalism and pettiness and instead aims for simplicity and greatness, and always with a sound sense of effect.”²

Notes

In 1923, Klinger expressed his great love for America with a book meant for the American market and therefore written in painstaking English. It claimed Chicago as its fictitious place of publication, but it was unmistakably printed in Vienna. *Poster Art in Vienna*, as it was titled, was an assortment of examples of Klinger’s modern, sober, and cool posters, as well as works by his students. The introductory text describes Klinger in the following way:

America is the land of his heart’s desire. But for him America is but a theoretical conception for he has never had the good luck to see it for himself and experience its life. It may be that just for this reason his longings are the more intense. America as he conceives it means spacious style, World Power and an eye for the future. . . . his Americanized ideas in weary, stale Europe are finding more and more supporters.¹

Numerous designs in *Poster Art in Vienna* depict skyscrapers. An example is the poster designed by one of Klinger’s students, Violette Engelberg (dates unknown), for an exhibition of architectural models (Figure 3). Set in a dynamic diagonal, it shows a small detached house opposite a high-rise building which is far too large, and thus extends beyond the narrow confines of the poster.

Note

¹ Julius Klinger, *Poster Art in Vienna* (Vienna, 1923).
Cat. 4

4a Wilhelm Willrab: Teppichhaus Repper
Poster draft, Vienna 1923
30 x 24 cm
From Julius Klinger, *Poster Art in Vienna* (Vienna, 1923)

4b Wilhelm Willrab: Amerikanische Büromöbel Cyklop
Poster draft, Vienna 1923
30 x 24 cm
From Julius Klinger, *Poster Art in Vienna* (Vienna, 1923)
Austrian National Library, Department of Broadsheets, Posters and Ex Libris, Vienna

Another important student of Klinger’s, Wilhelm Willrab (1897–1973), who went to Berlin in the late 1920s, provides two more examples. The first is a poster for the Viennese carpet store Repper. It is in the best Klinger tradition: economy, simplicity, a white background (Figure 4a). It shows a high-rise resting on a solid base, covered with a carpet to depict the letter “R.” Only the saddleback roof makes some concessions to Viennese views. The second poster represents office furniture made by the American company Cyklop that resembles skyscrapers (Figure 4b). Perhaps Mies van der Rohe knew this illustration when, in 1923, he noted cryptically in the manuscript of an article, “cabinets that look like models of skyscrapers.”

Note

Figure 4a
Real skyscraper models could be built with the aid of the Ingenius construction kit (Figure 5), produced in Vienna in 1924 from designs by Wilhelm Kreis (1873–1955), who had built the Marx high-rise in Cologne, and Karl August Jüngst, one of his co-workers. This kit, “The New City,” was based on the tongue-and-groove assembly system. Its container cover was designed by Wilhelm Willrab, depicting a high-rise model that could actually be built with the largest kit, which contained 3,000 parts. The instructions promised skyscrapers of up to three meters and even recommended emulating some of Wilhelm Kreis’s real projects, such as the Marx skyscraper in Cologne. The instructions for the Ingenius construction kit proclaim,

“The splendid sight there before me seemed like something from the new world, from one of the most modern parts of the New York skyscraper district. One nearly hears New York’s hectic life incorporated here and sees palpably what until now could only be conveyed by pictures. It is like the realization of a dream and makes you almost think you live in that country of unlimited possibilities. NEW CITY may, in fact, be called the toy for the modern child.”
Cat. 6

6a Wilhelm Willrab: Cover for *Die Reklame* 2  
Magazine cover, Berlin 1933  
30 x 23 cm

6b Anonymous: Cover for *Die Reklame* 5  
Magazine cover, Berlin 1933  
30 x 23 cm  
Austrian National Library, Department of Broadsheets, Posters and Ex Libris, Vienna

It was Willrab, now living in Berlin, who created a cover for the January 1933 edition of the magazine *Reklame* (Figure 6a) that looked like an updated version of the TABU poster designed by his teacher, Julius Klinger (see Cat. 2). It also depicted the juxtaposition of old and new, with the old town in the foreground and the new, modern, technical city rising in the background. In the center, an unadorned skyscraper is circled by airplanes. The speed with which the Nazis did away with modernity can be observed in the March 1933 edition of Reklame (Figure 6b). They replaced the modern architecture-inspired Futura font with antiquated Gothic letters.
Figure 6b
Cat. 7

7a Hermann Kosel, Erwin Gibson: Wien und die Wiener
Poster, Vienna 1927
62 x 92 cm

7b Hermann Kosel: Wien einst und jetzt
Poster draft, Vienna 1929 (original 1924)
From Österreichische Reklame 8 (1929): 16
30 x 22 cm
Austrian National Library, Department of Broadsheets, Posters
and Ex Libris, Vienna

Another of Klinger’s pupils, Hermann Kosel (1896–1983), found a similar
solution in 1924, when he designed a poster to promote the book Wien—
einst und jetzt (Vienna, Then and Now) (Figure 7b). He also utilized the
dichotomy “old” versus “new.” In the center of Vienna, a number of
skyscrapers loom over the 140-meter-high Gothic spire of St. Stephen’s
Cathedral and houses that look as if they were built from a model con-
struction kit. A variation of this poster was created in 1927 for the exhi-
bition “Vienna and the Viennese” in cooperation with Erwin Gibson

Figure 7a
(1891–1972), who was also Kosel’s studio partner (Figure 7a). As the exhibit’s sub-title “Old and New Vienna” suggests, Biedermeier Vienna with its still-intact city wall is confronted with a modern Vienna of smoking chimneys and high-rises.

Figure 7b
In December 1928, Julius Klinger was invited by General Motors and thus finally got his chance to travel to America. However, the Promised Land disillusioned him. America’s rationalized advertising industry, where power shifted away from free-lance commercial artists to PR managers and promotion departments did not fit with Klinger’s ideal of how an autonomous graphic designer should work. After returning to Vienna, he gave a talk about his experience, entitled “Pseudo-Americanism,” a warning against the introduction of the American system in Europe. At the same time, Klinger took part in the international poster competition connected with the 1933 Chicago World’s Fair. This time, for the city of skyscrapers, he did without the skyscraper motif. Instead, he used an American flag—which he had previously referred to as the best poster ever—filling the profile of a Hermes head that reminds one of Oskar Schlemmer (Figure 8). Klinger did not receive a prize.

Note

1 Anita Kühnel, Julius Klinger. Plakatkünstler und Zeichner (Berlin, 1997), 17.
Another Austrian participated in the poster competition for the 1933 World’s Fair, Joseph Binder (1898–1972). The leading Austrian poster artist of the interwar period, Binder studied lithography from 1912 to 1916, and then worked for a short time for Julius Klinger. From 1922–26, he worked for Bertold Löffler and studied at the Vienna Kunstgewerbeschule. Binder wanted to retain the skyscraper motif, but only in a stylized version and on a secondary iconographic level (Figure 9a). In 1928, he created a constructivist composition for the Social Democratic Party, an abstract image of a skyscraper in red, blue, and black (Figure 9b). Binder, a master of stylization, rejected the inclusion of photo montage in poster art: “Stylized representation possesses formal and suggestive qualities that can never be achieved by a camera.”¹ True to this credo, Binder’s designs transformed products into gigantic high-rise buildings which fill the foreground, grow into the sky, and rise above everything else. One of many such examples is Binder’s poster for the detergent Persil, which uses this design technique to symbolize Persil’s superior quality (Figure 9c). The professional journals praised Binder’s posters:

. . . all his work is keenly thought out, both artistically and graphically speaking, it is reduced to the most concentrated form, and incomparable in its effect. He is a born poster artist. He always succeeds in reducing every task to such a short formula that the foremost law of all poster art, optical simplicity and quick comprehensibility, is achieved.²
Notes


Figure 9a
Figure 9b
Figure 9c
10a Joseph Binder: Fortune
Magazine cover, New York 1937
36 x 28 cm
MAK, Österreichisches Museum für angewandte Kunst, Vienna

10b Joseph Binder: New York World’s Fair
Poster, New York 1938
From Gebräuchsgraphik 2 (1939): 16
30 x 23 cm
Austrian National Library, Department of Broadsheets, Posters and Ex Libris, Vienna

In the 1930s, Binder—the most important of all Viennese poster artists—left Europe for America, where he was greatly celebrated. Among his great triumphs in the United States was his victory in the poster competition for the 1939 World’s Fair in Flushing Meadows (Figure 10b). The nighttime silhouette of the New York skyline was naturally part of this illustration, but only as a background, like that of a Broadway musical. The center is taken up by the exhibition theme: Trylon and Perisphere, surrounded by lights, airplanes, rail lines, and an ocean cruiser. In his book Delirious New York, Rem Koolhaas regards these forms—globe and needle—as symbols of the end of “Manhattanism.”¹

 Shortly before the creation of this award-winning poster, Binder designed a cover for the December 1937 edition of Fortune magazine that showed a skyscraper shaped like a crystal Christmas tree (Figure 10a). The composition, a bright star against a dark night sky, has an almost sacral and recalls Bruno Taut’s vision of the Stadtkrone (city crown).

Note

Figure 10b

NEW YORK WORLD’S FAIR
THE WORLD OF TOMORROW 1939
In 1923, the Viennese architects Viktor Weixler (b.1883) and Fritz Judtmann (1899–1968) designed an Expressionist poster for the Vienna International Fair (Figure 11). Like Binder’s magazine cover for Fortune (see Cat. 10), it was probably inspired by Bruno Taut’s thoughts about the Stadtikrone (city crown). As the Labor party’s architect, Judtmann surely sympathized with Taut’s views on social reform. The central building on the poster consists of the three letters W-I-M; it takes up the entire area of Vienna’s First District, the historical center of the city within the confines of the former city wall. Beyond the gigantic building, Vienna’s concentric structure is visible. The middle part of the edifice consists of an enormous prism glass wall that resembles that of the staircase in Bruno Taut’s own home in Dahleowitz (Brandenburg). Inscribed upon the façade of the advertising pavilion for the glass industry which Taut had designed for the German Werkbund exhibit in Cologne in 1914 was a quote from Paul Scheerbart: “Glass has been brought to us by modern times, brick culture only makes us feel sorry.”

Note

Figure 11
Cat. 12

Attributed to Ernst A. Plischke: Zeho
Poster draft, Vienna 1926
Academy of Fine Arts Vienna

The Zeho advertisement was designed shortly after Weixler’s and Judtmann’s Wiener Internationale Messe (see Cat. 11) by another Viennese architect, Ernst A. Plischke (1903–1992). While its purpose is not entirely clear, we do know that this company produced bricks, and the poster includes bricks in profile. In the skyscraper, they serve as balcony balustrades jutting over the edge of the façade. One can easily recognize elements taken from a competition entry designed by Walter Gropius and Adolf Meyer for the Chicago Tribune: the top three floors of the building are also furnished with oriels and drawn from the same perspective. An architect as open to vanguard trends as Ernst A. Plischke—who had been under the tutelage of Oskar Strnad (1879–1935) and Peter Behrens (1868–1940) in Vienna—was naturally familiar with these competition entries from the professional journals. Only the piece of angle steel attached to the roof sets his design apart from that of Gropius and Meyer.
Figure 12
In contrast to the Austrian examples above, and the lack of actually realized skyscrapers in that country, Germany provides us with a more realistic selection of high-rise posters. The deutsche Städtewerbung (German town promotion) often used images of skyscrapers, but not, surprisingly, for Berlin. The German metropolis preferred to advertise its qualities by showing off its well-known sights from the era of Kaiser Wilhelm. Instead, medium-sized towns were the ones seeking to elevate themselves to the level of cosmopolitan cities with the help of posters of high-rises. Towns such as Stuttgart, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, and Dresden thus tried to compete with the capital of the Weimar Republic.

In the context of town promotion, one medium in particular deserves mention.

The Chicago Tribune competition marked a moment in time when German daily papers also wanted to assume a new, modern image. They also began to commission architects to design high-rise buildings. The two best-known examples date from 1927–28: the brick high-rise for the Hannoverscher Anzeiger designed by Emil Lorenz (dates unknown) and Fritz Höger (1877–1949) and the tower for the Stuttgart Tagblatt, the largest liberal-democratic daily in Württemberg, by Otto Oßwald (1880–1960). In the very year of its completion, the Tagblatt tower took pride of place in a poster by August Gumbart (1884–before 1955) for the Stuttgarter Lichtschau in 1928, alongside the Schocken department store by Erich Mendelsohn (1887–1953) and the railway station tower by Paul Bonatz (1877–1956). The poster’s dramatic lighting reflects the rise of floodlight during this period; the poster congenially translates the dramatic effect of artificial light into a striking design.
In 1929, a poster competition took place to promote Stuttgart as the up-and-coming metropolis of the German southwest. Naturally, it used the new Tagblatt tower as an eyecatcher (see Cat. 13). The competition was open to German and Austrian artists and advertised by the publisher of the Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt: “Stuttgart, as the most noteworthy town of modern economic development and eternal natural beauty, should become ever better known both at home and abroad.” The poster was supposed to link the modern town with the surrounding countryside and to include the motto “Stuttgart, the blossoming city.” From the seven hundred entries, the best 100 designs were exhibited on the fourteenth floor of the Tagblatt tower at the beginning of 1930. Many entries represented the rising town with a realistic or stylized illustration of the Tagblatt tower and Paul Bonatz’s monumental railway station tower. The jury awarded two second prizes, one for a design by Helmut Schwarz (1891–1961) “for the combination of Stuttgart’s position in the landscape and its towering world-city architecture” (Figure 14a), which remotely resembles the high-rise concept for Stuttgart created by Richard Döcker (1894–1968) and Hugo Keuerleber (1883–1973) in 1921, and the other for a design by Fritz Peter (dates unknown) who “indicated the architectural features of the town in white contours on a black background” (Figure 14b).
In the last year of the Weimar Republic, the traffic society of Stuttgart printed a poster by Fritz Uhlich (1893–1993) which was supposed to present the town to travellers as a city of new buildings and thus to consolidate its reputation as southern Germany’s most modern metropolis (Figure 14c). Historical Stuttgart is set against the shadows of the past, with the new trend-setting sights looming above: the Schocken department store, the Tagblatt tower, and the railway station tower.

Notes

2 Ibid., 19.
3 Ibid., 20.
Figure 14a
Figure 14c
Cat. 15

15a Ernst Aufseeser: Düsseldorf
Poster draft 1926
From Gebrauchsgraphik 7 (1926): 56
30 x 23 cm
Austrian National Library, Department of Broadsheets, Posters and Ex Libris, Vienna

15b Hanns Herkendell: Düsseldorf, die schönste moderne
Großstadt am Rhein
Poster, Düsseldorf 1926
From Gebrauchsgraphik 7 (1926): 56
30 x 23 cm
Austrian National Library, Department of Broadsheets, Posters and Ex Libris, Vienna

Like Stuttgart (see Cat. 14a–c), the Rhenish city of Düsseldorf also embraced the new architectural trends. Posters such as this 1926 draft by Ernst Aufseeser (1880–1940) turned to the new buildings as good publicity for the city, an excellent expression of its cultural and political openness (Figure 15a). Another striking example of this approach is Hanns Herkendell’s advertisement “Düsseldorf, the loveliest modern city on the Rhine,” printed in 1926 (Figure 15b). On the banks of the Rhine, oversized grotesque buildings rise to the sky, their tops forming huge chimneys, with modern buildings in the background: the Stumm high-rise by Paul Bonatz, with its Expressionist brick façade, completed in 1925; the Rheinhalle for the Gesolei exhibition in 1926 by Wilhelm Kreis (1873–1955); and the Wilhelm-Marx-house from 1924, also by Kreis. No more than one church spire is attributed to old Düsseldorf. In contrast to Aufseeser, Herkendell (dates unknown) sketched out his design in full.
Figure 15a
Willy Dzubas: Germany
Poster, Hamburg about 1925
73 × 50 cm.
Kunstbibliothek Berlin

In 1925, the Reichszentrale für deutsche Verkehrswerbung decided to commission an advertisement that would use modern architecture. This was unusual, for the office tended to use medieval architecture for its advertising campaigns. The decision can, however, be explained with the campaign’s particular audience, namely United States. Indeed, the poster itself included the address of the German Tourist Information Office on Fifth Avenue. Aiming to symbolize Germany’s modernity by including a high-rise building, the designer, poster-artist Willy Dzubas (1877–1947), chose Hamburg’s Chile House to attract American tourists (Figure 16). Built between 1922 and 1924, the ten-story building by Fritz Höger (1877–1949) represented a striking example of brick expressionism with its south-end resembling a ship bow. In contrast to Höger’s building itself, which was only of a modest height, Dzubas increased its vertical impression by choosing a slightly lower perspective. Despite this turn to modern German architecture, Dzubas ultimately did not wish to exclude Hamburg’s past altogether, and thus added two churches, St. Jakobi and St. Michaelis, to his design. In so doing, he dramatically juxtaposed images of Germany’s tradition with its modernity, uniting them.
Cat. 17

Willy Petzold: Die Technische Stadt. Jahresschau Dresden
Poster, Niedersedlitz 1928
120 x 85 cm
Kunstbibliothek Berlin

In the 1920s, Dresden hosted a series of educational exhibitions on work and everyday life. In 1928, the theme was “The Technical City.” The convincing design by Willy Petzold (1885–1978) won the poster competition (Figure 17). Its motif was current urban development: a double-T steel beam with a coat of red anti-corrosive paint protruding diagonally into the picture, reflecting a promising view of a future city with all the signs of technical progress, including skyscrapers.
Figure 17
Cat. 18

Paul Kirnig: Gerwerbeschau München
Poster draft, Vienna 1927
From Gebrauchsgraphik 11 (1927):24
30 × 23 cm
Austrian National Library, Department of Broadsheets, Posters and Ex Libris, Vienna

It is interesting to compare Willy Petzold’s design for Dresden (Cat. 17) with the solution for a Munich advertisement (Figure 18) delivered by the Viennese painter and graphic artist Paul Kirnig (1891–1955). Like Petzold, Kirnig, who would in 1935 succeed his teacher Bertold Löffler (1874–1960) as professor at the Viennese School of Applied Arts, designed a fictitious skyscraper for the Munich Industrial Exhibition of 1927. Kirnig’s paper skyscraper resembles the American town visions that Hugh Ferriss (1889–1962) layed out in his famous and epoch-making Metropolis of Tomorrow.1

Note

1 Hugh Ferriss, Metropolis of Tomorrow (New York, 1929)
Figure 18

19a Anonymous: Advertisement for Odol Tram stop column. Vienna about 1928
From Österreichische Reklame 7 (1928): 11
30 x 22 cm
Austrian National Library, Department of Broadsheets, Posters and Ex Libris, Vienna

19b Mihály Biró: Humanic Schuhfabrik Poster, Vienna 1924
125 x 95 cm
Wiener Stadt- und Landesbibliothek, Vienna

While towns such as Stuttgart, Düsseldorf, or Hamburg were able to advertise their own, existing skyscrapers, Vienna had to be content to compete with these visions of modernity only on a symbolic level. In this sense, the Odol poster, designed around 1930 (Figure 19a), represents high-rise buildings through light columns, replacing the materiality of steel-and-glass or brick with an immaterial vision. Covered with a transparent picture of a skyscraper, the poster advertised the mouthwash at tram stops.

Faced with the challenge to create alternative signifiers of “modernity” for companies that could not claim a high-rise building, tower, or skyscraper as their headquarters, designers maximized the visual possibilities of poster design. In 1924, for example, the Hungarian designer Mihály Biró (1886–1948) manipulated typography to suggest a real building (Figure 19b). Biró takes the name of a brand of shoes, colors its letters bright red and enlarges them to the size of skyscrapers. By replacing the image of the skyscraper with the brand name, the poster symbolizes the superior quality of the advertised product.
Figure 19b
Finally, I found like to return to the Loos-Haus, in the heart of Vienna. In 1931–32, the architects Theiss and Jaksch erected their first high-rise next to this building, in exactly the same place where Julius Klinger put up his TABU advertisement in 1919, using a fictitious steel framework. The project was initiated by the conservative government, after several projects sponsored by the social-democratic had failed. The so-called Herrengasse high-rise is a steel structure building about fifty-two meters high, with sixteen floors and 225 apartments. The stepped upper floors are visible only from a distance. The building is crowned with a rooftop café made of glass (Figure 20). Thus, after countless utopian visions by graphic designers, Vienna finally managed to get its own high-rise building, even if it was only a “wannabe” skyscraper.