FROM MANHATTAN TO MAINHATTAN: RECONSIDERING THE TRANSATLANTIC ARCHITECTURAL DIALOGUE

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The title of this collection of essays, “From Manhattan to Mainhattan,” suggests both a program and a metaphor. It evokes two cities—New York and Frankfurt am Main—and the movement from one to the other. On the one hand, it refers to a literal passage of people and goods and a transfer of assets and careers, which requires trade, travel, and transport. At the same time, it is a metaphor for the voyage of ideas, for an immaterial exchange of concepts, customs, and particular ways of looking at life, which are attached to the bodies in transit. The route from Manhattan to Mainhattan also includes, as the essays here elucidate, the journey back, for the story told here is not of a one-way street.¹

The title reveals a desire for emulation. The lonely letter “i” that distinguishes Mainhattan from Manhattan suggests a factual proximity. Manhattan, icon of the modern city, emblem of modern capitalism, big business, and world trade, functioned as a template for the city of Frankfurt when it strove to rebuild itself after the destruction of World War II and emerged as Germany’s leading financial capital. The analogy of names simultaneously alludes to the significance of perception and to the particularities of the cultural imagination. Presumably, everybody knows what and where Manhattan is, though not everyone might be familiar with the name’s origin: the local Indian tribe from whom Peter Minuit purportedly purchased the island in 1626. On the other hand, Mainhattan, named for the Main River on whose banks Frankfurt stands, is a much more obscure term, known only to Germans and those who know Germany intimately.

While other German cities tried to reclaim their prewar appearance, Frankfurt decided soon after the war to allow the concentrated building of skyscrapers in its center, thereby creating a skyline that would remain unique within Germany. The Hochhausplan 1953 stimulated a first wave of high-rise building. Twenty years later, the effort to contain future sprawl led to another plan, which in 1972 designated three locations west of the old city—along the Ludwig-Ehrhard-Anlage, the Mainzer Landstrasse and the existing banking district—as centers for future high-rise building activity. Supported by the economic boom of the 1970s, this second wave of high-rise buildings substantially altered the city’s skyline, and by 1980 the nickname “Mainhattan” had become common usage.² A third high-rise boom in the early 1990s gave renewed justification to the term and...
secured its frequent use until today. However, while Frankfurt’s steel and glass buildings are indeed a metaphor for the city’s aspirations, its internationalism and, with almost 400 national and international banks and credit institutions, its success as one of the world’s most important financial centers, the merely regional signification of the term “Mainhattan” reflects obvious differences from New York.

What had been transferred to the city of Frankfurt, was, of course, the old longing for a German Weltstadt, a world-class city on a level with Paris, London, and, especially, New York. Historically, this dream stood at the heart of German Amerikanismus in the 1920s, when it was hoped that Berlin could finally join the ranks of other capitals. To that end, an administrative reorganization of the city in 1920 included so many neighboring communities that, at least in terms of square mileage and the number of inhabitants, this goal seemed to have been reached. But the visual symbolism of skyscrapers was needed if the city’s new status was to be convincing; countless articles written during the Hochhausedebatte of the 1920s allude to their symbolic role. For a brief moment in 1949, it seemed as if Frankfurt would become the new capital of West Germany, adopting the role that Berlin could no longer fulfill. Before Bonn was finally chosen, due to Adenauer’s insistence, the dream had become real enough for Frankfurt to actually build a new parliament building. Although this building, by the Bauhaus architect Gerhard Weber, had to be converted to another use (it housed Hesse’s State Broadcasting Corporation, Hessischer Rundfunk), Frankfurt’s subsequent rise as a European center of business with a major airport and a powerful skyline nonetheless reflected ambitions that Berlin had long held.

Like Berlin, however, the city of Frankfurt never came close to New York in size and importance. With roughly 650,000 inhabitants, Frankfurt ranks only fifth among German cities. Its population is less than one tenth of New York City’s 8,000,000. Frankfurt’s skyscrapers bear little resemblance to those in Manhattan. They are smaller, newer, and also thinner, due to German building code requirements for daylight in the workspace. The city’s skyline is much closer to that of a midsize American city such as Raleigh, North Carolina, or Wilmington, Delaware, than New York. The buzzing activity inside the banking towers—which are often the nodal points of vast international financial networks—has not influenced the city’s life and rhythm. Instead, as Bruno Flierl has pointed out, “Mainhattan never became Manhattan, but remained Frankfurt—a city half metropolitan, half provincial.”

While the city of Frankfurt itself is not a main focus of this collection of essays, our title “From Manhattan to Mainhattan” refers to two central tropes of Germany’s Amerikanismus before and after World War II: the important role of the skyscraper and the complex exchange of images,
metaphors, references, misunderstandings, hopes, and frustrations that accompanied them. The core of this essay collection is an examination of the cultural transfer between Germany and the United States. For practical reasons, we limit our investigation to the years between 1920 and 1970. Focusing on this period, the essays examine the cultural implications of “style” in relation to socio-economic conditions, industrial production, and consumption. In so doing, they analyze the triangular relationship between the production of style and aesthetic ideologies, the habits and mentalities of their consumers, and the socio-economic as well as political conditions that frame the production and consumption of style.

The driving concept behind this volume was a desire to bring different historical disciplines into dialogue, to enable historians of art, architecture, economics, politics, and diplomacy to speak to each other. Though these disciplines share many roots, they rarely enter into an extended exchange of ideas, as Volker Berghahn observes in his concluding essay. In fact, the histories of architecture and urban planning have existed somewhat isolated from other disciplines, with the effect that their main narrative—the story of the rise of the past century’s dominant architecture—has remained largely unchallenged for an astonishingly long time. It is hard to find a survey of modern architecture that does not reflect this narrative: a compelling story of cultural transfer, progress, and the ultimate victory of a better, more livable, and more appropriate architecture. Inevitably, this victory is also associated with the victory of democracy (and implicitly, capitalism) over totalitarian political systems, whether fascist or Marxist. Yet, as the essays in this collection poignantly demonstrate, styles do not possess any inherent meaning. Rather, such meaning is discursively constructed. This insight into the malleability of meaning might seem rather obvious yet, as the analyses of historical debates presented in this volume warn us, essentializing discourses on national identity repeatedly obscure the constructed nature of style. Styles often become naturalized as indigenous markers of tradition and national character. The deconstruction of such myth-making is part of this project.

In brief and simplified terms, this story begins in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with the emerging utilitarian architecture in the United States. The “Chicago School” developed a new formal and structural language which avoided historicism and conformed to nineteenth-century ideals of truthfulness and structural honesty. But European architects took the lead when America temporarily reverted to widespread historicism after the great popular success of the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893. In France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Russia, the new architectural vocabulary was expanded and endowed with a theoretical and
institutional framework, as well as with social and political importance. When the National Socialists, Stalinists, and fascists came to power in the 1920s and 1930s, they enforced a return to classicism and banned the new architectural language. It flowered anew in the United States, however, thanks to the epoch-making “International Style” exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in 1932, and thanks as well to the immigration of key modernists to the United States in the following years. After the war, the new architecture returned from America to the free countries of Europe, and spread all over the world as a symbol of democracy and resistance against totalitarianism. The key figures in this narrative are Walter Gropius and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe in Germany and the U.S., Le Corbusier in France, and Frank Lloyd Wright in the U.S. The skyscraper was one exemplary form for this development, notable examples being Louis Sullivan’s Guarantee Building in Buffalo (1891), the glass skyscrapers by Mies, Le Corbusier, and Wright in the early 1920s, Gropius’s project for the 1922 Chicago Tribune competition, Mies’s Lake Shore Drive Apartments in Chicago (1950), and his Seagram Building (1956) in New York.

This compelling narrative of architectural development, which had been outlined as early as the 1930s and 1940s by historians and polemists such as Nicholaus Pevsner, Henry-Russel Hitchcock, and Sigfried Giedion, spawned an astonishing number of publications in subsequent decades. In fact, the twentieth century is by far the most widely-researched period in the history of architecture. In terms of the number of articles in architecture journals, modern architecture is covered about twice as much as the Renaissance; among individual architects, Frank Lloyd Wright clearly leads the way, followed by Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, and, after a considerable gap, Michelangelo and Brunelleschi. But the many publications which uphold the general structure of this narrative and the importance of its protagonists have more recently been accompanied by a growing number of voices that undermine this seemingly solid edifice with a method that one might call “the application of the magnifying glass,” where a closer examination contradicts and distorts the large picture.

Many of those corrections are on their way to becoming common knowledge in the scholarly world, but have still not reached mainstream surveys and publications for the general public. Mies and Gropius, for example, both tried to ingratiate themselves with the National Socialist regime, and would have probably stayed in Germany if they had received a commission. From this perspective it seems ironic that it was Mies, as Kathleen James-Chakraborty shows, who ultimately benefited from the American perception of German modernist architecture as resistance to fascism, rather than Erich Mendelsohn, a Jewish architect. The
expressionistic qualities of Mendelsohn’s dynamic, theatrical, and idiosyncratic buildings of the Weimar years did not prove a viable model for a commercially appealing, mass-producible architecture suited to the rise of corporate capitalism after World War II. Whereas Mies built the Seagram building, Mendelsohn, whose architectural ideas had permanently been transformed by his experience in Palestine, helped to reform ecclesiastical architecture with a number of remarkable synagogues in America. While these were a major achievement in their own right, James-Chakraborty claims in her essay that these buildings did “not fit easily into the myth that supported the style.” Mies’s success, by contrast, hinged to a certain degree on the notion that the style he represented was not only one of great clarity, transparency, and inescapable inner logic, but was also untainted by links to National Socialism, an ideology one-sidedly identified with “neoclassical” architecture. The myth of two distinct, monolithic architectural cultures served the ideological need for a discursive redefinition of modernism as an expression of American-style capitalism. Of course, it also served the economic interests of Europe’s and America’s postwar building industries, who fully embraced the style because it coincided with the rise of mass production, unionization, and the concurrent loss of a specialized, skilled workforce.

Certainly, the heavy classicism favored by the Nazis represented another “international style.” In fact, it was the widely accepted mainstream vocabulary for representative buildings the world over. A more multifaceted image of National Socialist architecture than that which prevailed in the postwar period had to await acknowledgment of the existence of Nazi modernist building strategies, and their successful use of the sober, restrained architectural vocabulary of the 1920s and early 1930s in many industrial plants. This is the formal language that Mies van der Rohe would use and develop further in his first American buildings at Chicago’s Illinois Institute of Technology. At the same time, it is equally important to notice that in Germany the so-called “Bauhaus Style” (actually a misnomer: the Bauhaus had no architecture department until 1928) contributed relatively little to the architectural debate and was employed by only a small minority. Debates about modern architecture were not the predominant topic in Germany’s numerous architectural and building magazines. The buildings conforming to that style were relatively few in number. The famous flat-roofed housing blocks by modern German architects such as Bruno Taut in Berlin, Ernst May in Frankfurt, and Otto Ernst Haesler in Celle, for example, which have long symbolized the success of Germany’s modern architecture and its political and social agenda, were exceptional cases among the large number of social housing projects across Germany. The majority of these were executed in more moderate styles. They fulfilled their task—to house the families of
returning soldiers and the urban working and middle classes—just as adequately (if not often more successfully), albeit less spectacularly.10

Not all critics of modern architecture were politically reactionary, or even National Socialists. Among writers and philosophers on the left, there were many thoughtful, justified, and (in welcome contrast to the sternness of modernism’s main apologists) humorous comments about modern architecture’s shortcomings. The brilliant journalist Joseph Roth, for instance, mocked *Neue Sachlichkeit* (New Sobriety) interiors in a 1929 feuilleton for a Munich newspaper: “For a bedroom there is a glass-walled studio. They dine in gyms. Rooms you would have sworn were tennis courts serve as libraries and music rooms... They relax after meals on white operating tables.”11 Walter Benjamin’s enigmatic and nuanced 1933 text about glass architecture, entitled “Experience and Poverty,” is another case in point, as are Ernst Bloch’s wonderful remarks about modern houses that “look as if they are ready to leave.”12

On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, similar omissions and misinterpretations could be observed. The 1932 International Style exhibition in New York, usually credited with bringing modern architecture to the United States, was by no means the unqualified success that its proponents immediately claimed it to be. In fact, countless American architects and writers noted their discontent with the arrival of yet another foreign, international style and argued strongly for an American version of modernism. Richard Neutra, for example, although himself a recent immigrant, firmly rejected the exhibition’s claims of Internationalism and its presumed leadership of the European avant-garde, and instead emphasized the strength of the American contributions, especially his own, such as the Lovell House in Los Angeles: “California ideas of dwelling, so to speak, are practically being accepted in Amsterdam, Paris, and Vienna, and an abundance of natural aeration and light influx is cherished under climatic conditions which are much more severe than those in California.”13 In a string of subsequent exhibitions, the Museum of Modern Art itself tried rather hard to rectify the impression made by the 1932 exhibition. As late as 1944, the museum had to assure the visitors of its “Built in USA 1932–1944” exhibition that only “hostile and ill-informed critics” were suggesting the museum’s 1932 show had intended to impose a “foreign style on the United States.” Instead, the museum had “been first to show the growth of an authentic modern American style.”14 The rich architectural culture of 1930s America, its ideological and stylistic nuances, and its relationship with Europe have only begun to be adequately explored.15

The essays collected here all profit from and contribute to the current reevaluation of modern architecture’s astonishingly resilient master narrative. As one of the key building types in this master narrative, the
skyscraper (and its smaller variant, the high-rise building) has served us well as an overarching framing device and a subject for a more interdisciplinary exchange. Its example demonstrates how architecture not only reflects a community’s social, cultural, and political parameters, but also how it decisively shapes its values and practices: “style” implies “lifestyle.” Architects and urban planners were highly sensitive to this connection, and reflected upon how their appropriation of a foreign culture would also transport and import elements of that culture’s value system. This could lead to a highly complicated, even ambivalent relationship, as the work of Max Berg exemplifies.

It was Berg’s reaction to the fast growth of American cities such as Chicago that inspired his ideas about zoning in the context of the 1910 “Greater Berlin” urban design competition (Gross Berlin Wettbewerb). Berg suggested three discrete monofunctional urban zones: one for living, one for work, and a central monumental zone for culture, administration, and representation. After World War I, Berg was one of the first to suggest high-rise office buildings for German cities in order to relieve pressing housing shortages, because many apartments were occupied by businesses. He implemented his ideas about town planning and the sensitive integration of high-rise buildings in his 1919 plan for a reorganization of Breslau, which is the main focus of the article by Beate Störtkuhl and Jerzy Ilkosz in this volume.

Berg urged a careful adaptation of the transatlantic model to the needs of the local context. Like most of the countless architects who pondered the introduction of skyscrapers into German cities in the 1920s and spoke of a “Germanization of the skyscraper,” he decisively rejected the perceived social implications of American-style skyscraper politics: a ruthless, unchecked, land-speculating capitalism to which the greater needs of society were sacrificed. A convinced Social Democrat, Berg described the American skyscraper as “a petrified accusation against the brutal rule of capital” and had little sympathy for New York’s skyline, which he denounced as “a pile of giant building blocks placed willy-nilly next to each other.” Instead, he felt that Breslau’s vertical growth should reflect a historical sensibility and follow a strictly controlled high-rise policy. The vertical striations and reductive tectonic structures in Berg’s high-rise designs are typical of a search for formal solutions that would reach far into the past.

By hailing tectonic expression as an alternative to the modernist emphasis on surface value, German architects harkened back to ideas first articulated by those whom Adrian von Buttlar calls “Romantic classicists.” Exploring the way in which their concepts were adopted for the construction of “Germanness” through high-rise architecture, Buttlar sketches a framework for a political iconography of German high-rise buildings. He
thereby traces the persistence of such ideas, from their use during the Third Reich to their renewed adaptation to the needs of both postwar Germanies. The onset of the Cold War paradoxically facilitated this persistence, in so far as it simultaneously supported the introduction of American-style Internationalism and provoked ongoing concerns about preserving elements of German style.

Peter Müller’s essay offers a compelling case study of this phenomenon. In East Berlin, Knobelsdorff and Schinkel were invoked once again in the GDR’s search for a “counter-architecture” that could outshine the building initiatives in West Berlin, where the “Interbau” and “Hansa-viertel” projects had received international press and praise. At the same time, the GDR wanted to retain a historicist reference that would resist the “cosmopolitan dogma” of American capitalism. The idea that this neoclassicist tradition was tainted by its National Socialist articulation, however, was buried under the myth that Anglo-American bombers were solely responsible for the destruction of German cities. According to East German ideology, this destruction was completed in the West by the reimportation of classic modernism. Müller paints a vivid picture of how anti-Americanism, Cold War politics, and the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States played itself out on the small territory of the divided city of Berlin. Following Stalinist dogma, urban planning in East Berlin envisioned a skyscraper skyline exclusively as a means of political representation; high-rise buildings, as symbols of power, would serve propagandistic goals, leaving aside any notion of a profitable use of prime inner-city space. Yet when economic realities shattered the far-fetched dreams of a grand vertical urban space, in the end only the television tower would rise into the sky. Designed as a rocket taking off, with a Sputnik satellite as its sparkling crown, the television tower successfully tapped into fascination with outer space and the heroism of the cosmonauts, which even today can unleash a rich nostalgia, as the 2003 movie Goodbye, Lenin demonstrates. At the same time, its space flight aesthetic fits squarely into the current revival of 1960s cool and hip. It is one of the ironies of history that the capitalist city of the third millennium can so slickly absorb East Germany’s attempt to surpass the West.

Yet, again, we would gain only a one-sided, simplified image of the complex social, artistic, and ideological history of GDR architecture if we exclusively associate it with the conservative rhetoric of a national building tradition which fed on the doctrine of Socialist Realism. Instead, Wolfgang Thöner uses the example of the GDR Bauhaus reception to show the complexity of this story. He demonstrates that even during the years when the Bauhaus notion of functionalism was negatively stigmatized in the East as “pure formalism,” architects searched for a mode of building that followed neither avant-garde modernism nor the so-called
national style. Franz Ehrlich’s Berlin Rundfunkgebäude (1951–56) is an example of this sort of particularized functionalism. The fact that the state fully controlled the country’s architectural activities allows Thöner to use its shifting evaluation of the Bauhaus—which evolved from demonization as “a movement hostile to the people” (volksfeindliche Bewegung) to a reevaluation as a “poetry of the future”—as a seismograph to record larger shifts in the GDR’s vision of a new socialist society.

Wolfgang Thöner reminds us that construction was more often than not shaped by economic reality rather than aesthetic or political goals. This was not only true for the Eastern bloc but for the West as well, as Jeffrey Diefendorf demonstrates in his analysis of the postwar activities of Walter Gropius and Martin Wagner. Both of these émigré architects, who co-authored several articles between 1941 and 1943, embody a movement back and forth between the United States and Europe, which in their case resulted in a complex transfer and transformation of reformist ideas of how to construct a healthy modern city. While both understood small neighborhoods as the kernel from which healthy cities grow (thereby producing, in their view, genuine communities and securing democracy), their actual building activity was ultimately defined by their acceptance or rejection of market realities. Whereas Gropius sacrificed his reformist spirit to his desire for commissions and building actual buildings, Wagner remained true to his revolutionary vision. Consequently, Gropius successfully planted mega-settlements and skyscrapers in Berlin, Boston, and New York, while Wagner’s dream to rebuild Germany after 1945 proved a chimera. His unrealistic expectations and acerbic voice prevented him from obtaining a planning position in his home country and finally eclipsed his fame in the face of Gropius’s success. In the end, the desire to shape society through the built environment was crushed by the prosaic demands of the marketplace, on both sides of the Atlantic and on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

After World War II, the onset of the Cold War made it possible to realize American-style structures in Germany, at least in its western half. Built almost immediately after the Berlin Wall, the Europa-Center (1963–65) in the heart of now-isolated West Berlin, exemplifies the marriage of politics and economics, architecture and urban lifestyle. Marketed as a “city within a city,” the building’s height and curtain-wall façade unmistakably identified it with “Western values” and the American “lifestyle.” Eager to emulate New York’s Rockefeller Center, the building’s style boldly proclaimed economic growth and technological progress. An emblem of the heyday of American impact, the Europa-Center served an accelerated consumer culture that, literally enclosed by the Iron Curtain, searched for new spaces of consumption. The gigantic Mercedes star, prominently revolving on top of the structure, thus quickly became, as
Alexander Sedlmaier remarks in his essay, “not only the pivotal marker for the site but a symbol of West Germany’s ‘economic miracle.’” Inevitably, German critics recalled Manhattan, whose air, the newspaper Die Welt claimed, now breezed through Berlin. A critical glimpse at a photograph of the true situation (p. 96, Fig. 7) reveals the phantasmagoric nature of such claims.

The last two contributions to the collection show how mass media also played a significant role in the interpretation of architecture. Advertising, as Christian Maryška argues, not only helped to promote a city’s modernity through the compressed depiction of high-rises, it could even compensate for the lack of such buildings by replacing the representation of existing structures with orchestrated lightshows, magnified lettering, or even skyscraper-size objects. This ability to serve as a surrogate image explains the frequency with which Austrian and German posters depicted skyscrapers precisely at a time when their construction was stagnant in these countries. Advertising posters creatively played with aesthetic trends and avant-garde modes, while their spectacular staging simultaneously articulated a language of modern visuality that extended to the reading of the buildings themselves.

Peter Krieger, on the other hand, reminds us that movies could provide an important simulacrum for real experience while training their audiences to read architecture according to mainstream ideology. In this sense, the visual ambience of glass curtain walls was sufficient to create a virtual Manhattan as the stage for secret agent “Jerry Cotton,” a pulp fiction hero in the mold of James Bond who appeared in a series of movies between 1965 and 1969. Because the low budget made filming in New York impossible, the hero, played by George Nader, instead saved the world against the backdrop of Hamburg. Stock footage of Manhattan’s dramatic skyline was intercut with close-ups of high-rise façades in Hamburg, such as the 1964 Unilever House, the headquarters of a Dutch-British conglomerate. This strategy, as Krieger argues, testifies as much to the artistic possibilities of film as to an actual interchangeability of buildings and locations within the now truly international style. Repeated in endless reproductions, which signified rather than realized modernist principles, modernism’s programmatic dissolution of local references ultimately became all too often translated into soulless, uninspired projects. Using Krieger’s argument to look back at the series itself, the example of Jerry Cotton also lays bare the loss of the provocative critical potential once inherent in montage technique. Reduced to creating the effect of “modern life,” montage itself occurred from a logic of commerce and conspicuous consumption and, in this sense, its specific use mirrors the transformation of Mies’s avant-gardism into bland corporate architecture. Not the shock of the new but the shock of the ugly (or trivial) is the result.
Krieger’s article also lends itself to a look back at the discussion of modernism in East Germany as presented by Wolfgang Thöner and Peter Müller. If the ease of Jerry Cotton’s moves through a phantasmagoric “Ham-hattan” points to a modernity of stylistic convergence, we, like architects in 1970s East and West Germany, begin to question the degree to which the architecture of capitalism was distinct from that of state socialism. With Erich Honecker’s rise to power in 1971 and his subsequent cultural-political policy of Abgrenzung vis-à-vis the Federal Republic, the East German architectural community reacted to this challenge with numerous attempts to redefine the distinguishing features of socialist architecture. They conceded the similarity of Eastern and Western building systems, but turned the question of architectural identity into a question of ideology. In the end, the eye of the beholder rather than the existing form determined the reading of structures and their political signification.

The continuous reevaluation of the history of modern architecture and urbanism, to which this volume hopes to contribute, is not intended to lead to another linear, progressive, and historically deterministic master narrative, but rather towards an increasingly complex, rich tapestry of observations, achievements, and characters. While notions of a single, pioneering “avant-garde,” of masterpieces and heroic creators as key agents of historical change are naturally less prominent in such a view of history—where the typical will have as much impact as the exceptional—our imaginary tapestry is by no means without discernable structures and patterns. The above-mentioned grand narrative that had such an impact on the historiography of architecture and urbanism in the twentieth century will be one of those recognizable patterns. Recognizable, too, will be the recurring inclination to tie style to national, political, and economic characteristics as well as the astonishing resilience, recurrence, and ambiguity of Germany’s Amerikanismus.

Notes

1 See, for example, Jean-Louis Cohen, Scenes of the World to Come: European Architecture and the American Challenge, 1893–1960 (Montreal, 1995).


4 The fascination with the phenomenon of the Weltstadt in the 1920s, and its desirability for Germany, outweighed contemporary criticism, such as Oswald Spengler’s emphatic warnings that it stood for the final and most destructive episode in the decline of the West: “Der Steinkoloß ‘Weltstadt’ steht am Ende des Lebenslaufes einer jeden großen Kultur. Der
vom Lande seelisch gestaltete Kulturmensch wird von seiner eigenen Schöpfung, der Stadt, in Besitz genommen, besessen, zu ihrem Geschöpf, ihrem ausführenden Organ, endlich zu ihrem Opfer gemacht.” Oswald Spengler, _Untergang des Abendlandes_ (Munich, 1969), 673.

5 Berlin’s inferiority complex is much older, of course. A famous episode recalls the Prussian King Friedrich II, after having surrounded Berlin by a wall that included vast areas for future growth, asking the French Ambassador Marquis de Valori if Berlin was not comparable to Paris. The diplomat’s answer: “But, of course. Perhaps with the only difference that we neither sow nor harvest in Paris.” Michael Winteroll, _Die Geschichte Berlins_ (Berlin, 2002), 51.

6 Flierl, _Hundert Jahre Hochhäusler_, 136.


8 The Avery Index to Architectural Periodicals allows (admittedly somewhat crude) statistical surveys of the topics covered in architectural publications for about the past 100 years. Frank Lloyd Wright, for example, is the subject of 3,554 articles (more than any other individual architect), followed by Corbusier with 1,999 and Mies van der Rohe with 1,070, Michelangelo with 317 and Brunelleschi with 171. Modern Architecture was twice as often the subject matter than the buildings of the Renaissance or the Middle Ages. The interest in the twentieth century leads all other periods by a wide margin. While these numbers are probably neither complete nor accurate (since overlaps and double counts occur), they provide a general picture.


14 Museum of Modern Art, _Built in USA 1932–1944_ (New York, 1944), 5.

15 See for example the recent symposium at Yale University Architecture School, “When Modern was Modern,” October 1–2, 2004.


17 Richard Anderson, “Konvergenz and Abgrenzung: Architecture as System in the GDR” (paper presented at Columbia University, New York, 2003). Cordula Grewe would like to thank Richard Anderson for his assistance in preparing this volume. His help in the projects organizational phase was greatly appreciated, and his careful reading of the articles and insightful suggestions contributed much to the success of the volume.