WEIMAR SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COLD WAR AMERICA: THE CASE OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY GAME

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In September 1964, a number of high-ranking civilian and military officials, including McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Curtis LeMay, John McCon, John McNaughton, Cyrus Vance, and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), gathered at the Pentagon to play a “political-military game” that simulated the rapidly intensifying Vietnam War. The game, organized by the Joint War Games Agency (JWGA) of the JCS and dubbed SIGMA II-64, was designed to test whether Walt Whitman Rostow’s thesis that escalating the conflict by bombing the North and committing troops in the South was the path to U.S. victory. Players assumed a role on either the Red (Communist) or Blue (American/South Vietnamese) team and enacted Rostow’s recommendations. Unlike a traditional war game, this political-military game simulated not only battles but also the domestic negotiations and diplomatic exchanges that preceded and continued during a military engagement. After nine days of play, which Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and George Ball intermittently observed, the game’s participants concluded that escalating pressure against the North Vietnamese Army was not a sure path to victory.

In the 1960s, the political game was a widely used tool with which high-ranking civilian and military officials attempted to “test” policy proposals and, in the process, improve their diplomatic skills. The game had come to the JWGA through Henry Rowen, a deputy in the Department of Defense and former economist at the RAND Corporation (RAND), and Lincoln Bloomfield, a former State Department official and professor of political science at MIT. Rowen and Bloomfield had themselves learned of the game through their connections to RAND’s Social Science Division, where two sociologists, Hans Speier and Herbert Goldhamer, and their colleagues developed it in the mid-1950s.

Speier (1905-1990) was one of several European émigrés who left their mark on the theory and practice of U.S. Cold War foreign policy. He had been one of the first doctoral students of Karl Mannheim, the creator of the sociology of knowledge, at the University of Heidelberg.

1 The author would like to thank Dirk Bönker, Eric Brandom, Vanessa Freije, Malachi Hazohen, Hunter Heyck, Jan Logemann, John Mathew, Mary Nolan, and Alex Roland, as well as the participants in the June 2012 German Historical Institute conference on “More Atlantic Crossings?” for their comments and critiques. For stylistic purposes, throughout the article the political-military game will be referred to as the political game.

2 In full, the Rostow thesis claimed: “By applying limited, graduated military actions, reinforced by political and economic pressures, against a nation providing external support for an insurgency, we [the United States] could cause that nation to decide to reduce greatly, or eliminate altogether, its support for the insurgency. The objective of the attacks and pressures is not to destroy the nation’s ability to provide support but rather to affect its calculation of interests.” Quoted in H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (New York, 1997), 156. For a detailed examination of SIGMA II-64, see Thomas B. Allen, War Games: The Secret World of the Creators, Players, and Policy Makers Rehearsing World War III Today (New York, 1987), chapter 10; and Thomas B. Allen, “The Evolution of Wargaming: From Chessboard to Marine Doom,” in War and Games, ed. Thomas B. Allen and Tim J. Cornell (Rochester, NY, 2002), 235-42.


in the 1920s. In 1928, he received his Ph.D. in sociology and national economics and spent the late Weimar period working for a variety of political and educational organizations, including the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Berlin-based Hochschule für Politik. In 1933, he fled Germany to become the youngest founding member of the New School for Social Research’s University in Exile in New York City. That same decade, he emerged as one of the United States’ foremost experts on psychological warfare, and with the nation’s entry into World War II joined the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) as head of the analysis section that examined Nazi propaganda. In 1944, Speier left the FBIS to join the Office of War Information as director of the subdivision that produced the directives that guided U.S. propaganda aimed at Germany. At war’s end, Speier became Associate, and later Acting, Chief of the State Department’s Division for Occupied Areas, where he was in charge of the State Department’s education and information programs in the German occupation zone. In 1947, Speier briefly returned to the New School before accepting an offer to serve as the founding chief of RAND’s Social Science Division (SSD). Goldhamer (1907-1977) was a Canadian immigrant and an important member of the SSD who, like Speier, had a connection to Mannheim. He had earned his B.A. at the University of Toronto before matriculating at the University of Chicago to pursue a Ph.D. in sociology, which he received in 1942. In the early 1930s, Goldhamer studied with Mannheim at the London School of Economics before returning to the United States to teach at Chicago and complete his degree. He remained there until World War II, when he joined the U.S. Army as a medical psychologist. In the army he served as the Chief of the Research Division, European Theater, in a hospital unit that served in North Africa, France, and Germany. Once the war ended, Goldhamer returned to Chicago, although like Speier he left academia in 1948 to join the SSD. His most important RAND work centered upon advising the U.S. delegates to the Korean War armistice negotiations. From the early-1940s onward, Speier and Goldhamer were self-conscious “defense intellectuals” concerned with bringing their academic expertise to bear on America’s foreign and military policies.

In the early Cold War, Speier and Goldhamer developed the political game as a pedagogical tool they hoped would enable policymakers and researchers to sharpen their political and analytical skills. Although historians have examined the meaning of the political
An analysis of contemporary documents, oral history interviews, and intellectual networks reveals two primary inspirations for the political game. The first consisted of game theory, systems analysis, and war games that assigned numerical values to political and social phenomena. Specifically, the political game was a reaction against quantified social science’s dominance of RAND. Speier in particular was frustrated with the ways in which RAND’s economists and physicists used game theory and other quantified methods to abstract decision-making from the historical contexts in which it occurred. He and Goldhamer created the political game to demonstrate to these “ignorant mathematicians” that to understand war, one needed to appreciate context. The second source for the political game was more obscure than the first. Namely, the pedagogy created by Karl Mannheim in interwar Germany inspired the formulation of Speier and Goldhamer’s simulation model. For both, Mannheim was an intellectual inspiration and resource.

When confronted with the problem of how to teach RAND’s analysts to appreciate the importance of a newly nuclear geopolitical context, Speier and Goldhamer drew upon the pedagogy of Mannheim, who faced an analogous problem of teaching students how to navigate the political environment of a newly democratic Germany. Mannheim addressed this problem by creating a pedagogy of simulation that reproduced the “atmosphere” — i.e., the structures of interaction — of democratic politics. This simulacrum, he believed, imbued students with political empathy and the skills to act as effective political agents. Speier and Goldhamer’s political game correspondingly sought to model the atmosphere of international relations and improve analysts’ abilities, decision-makers’ talents, and the capacity for both groups to understand their enemies. In its methods and goals, Speier and Goldhamer’s game mirrored Mannheim’s pedagogy.

The spread of the political-military game underlines the influence émigré defense intellectuals exerted on the practice of foreign policymaking in the Cold War United States. Central European exiles permeated the institutions of the “military-intellectual complex,” the collection of governmental and nongovernmental organizations that helped create the language, frameworks, and ideologies of postwar foreign and military policymaking.9 In addition to Speier, Paul Kecskemeti, Otto Kirchheimer, Olaf Helmer, Leo Löwenthal, Herbert Marcuse, Hans Morgenthau, John von Neumann, and dozens of other

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9 Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi’s analyses of the political game are particularly insightful. See her “Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s,” Social Studies of Science 30, no. 2 (April 2000): 173–79; and The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War (Cambridge, MA, 2005), chapter 6, which updates the earlier article.

Central European émigrés worked or consulted for RAND, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other institutions. Their positions allowed them to influence a number of U.S. policies, from psychological warfare strategy to West German occupation policy. The émigrés’ impact highlights how Europeans, working through American institutions and decision-making structures, informed the direction of the Cold War.

Analyzing the development of the political game suggests the utility of pursuing a transnational history of the social sciences and provides a counterpoint to historical accounts that emphasize the triumph of a “science of politics,” or positivistic political science, in the postwar United States. Scholars have traditionally, and rightly, considered RAND a major center from which such a science of politics emerged. However, RAND was a heterogeneous institution, the divisions of which promoted different epistemologies and methodologies. For example, Speier, Goldhamer, and other members of the Social Science Division advocated a historically focused social science in line with the work of international relations theorists such as E.H. Carr, William T. R. Fox, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr. The Economics and Physics Divisions, in contrast, promoted more positivist methodologies, often under the influence of other émigrés,
most famously John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, the developers of game theory. The presence of both the political game and game theory at RAND illustrates that there were competing strands of European intellectual traditions influencing Cold War-era social science. While some, like Speier, endorsed qualitative methodologies, others, like von Neumann and Morgenstern, favored more quantitative approaches. RAND reflected both intellectual threads, and focusing on the work of the SSD, as opposed to the better known Economics Division, indicates that even during the apex of the “behavioral revolution” in political science, a significant space existed for historical and qualitative methods in premier research organizations. Moreover, Mannheim’s influence on the political game highlights the importance of linking Cold War-era social science to interwar and transnational developments.

The Political Game as a Transatlantic Phenomenon

The modern war game is a nineteenth-century transfer from Germany to the United States. Developed in Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the war game first came to America in 1879, when, inspired by the recent Prussian military victories in the Second Schleswig, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian Wars, Army Captain William Roscoe Livermore published his textbook *The American Kriegsspiel*. In 1887, McCarthy Little, a professor at the newly established Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, developed a lecture series on war gaming that proved popular, and war gaming became and remained part of the NWC’s


17 A useful summary of the behavioral revolution in political science, with a focus on Herbert Simon as an exemplar of this approach, is found in Hunter Crowther-Heyck, *Herbert A. Simon: The Boundaries of Reason in Modern America* (Baltimore, 2005), 170-79. For an account that argues that the development of international relations theory was a project, endorsed by many German exiles, to resist the behavioral revolution, see Guilhot, “The Realist Gambit.”

18 Nils Gilman, in Mandarins of the Future, and David Haney, in *The Americanization of Social Science*, demonstrate the »

Over the course of the following decades, army officers also began to publish on war gaming, and after World War I instructors began to teach war games at both the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. Additionally, beginning in 1934 the U.S. Army’s War Plans Division organized annual games to simulate U.S. mobilization efforts. These games all replicated strategic and tactical military decision-making but offered no space for players to participate in the political processes that occurred before, during, and after a nation deployed its armed forces.

In 1944, Central European émigrés John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published their *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, which formalized game theory, the “mathematical discipline which studies situations of competition and cooperation between several involved parties.” At the exact moment that von Neumann and Morgenstern developed game theory, academics were demonstrating how social science could improve the U.S. military’s strategic and tactical capabilities. Soon after the United States entered World War II in December 1941, hundreds of social scientists left university positions to join the Office of Strategic Services, Office of War Information, and other new organizations of the wartime government. These academics became a regularly used resource for both civilian and military officials, and they participated in a number of projects, the most famous of which was the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, which used social science to improve war capabilities. Once the United States defeated the Axis Powers, government and military officials, fearful of losing the brainpower that had migrated to Washington, united with this first generation of defense intellectuals to create corporate and state institutions that reproduced the wartime experience on a permanent basis. One of these organizations, the RAND Corporation, became the premier foreign policy and military think tank in the 1950s and 1960s.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s game theory enthralled defense intellectuals who were searching for ways to quantify war and thus
assert themselves over and against military officers, whose authority was based on professional and not disciplinary — or interdisciplinary — knowledge. Inspired by the two European exiles, a number of authors applied game theory to military decision-making in works released in the 1950s.²⁵ RAND, where von Neumann and Morgenstern served as consultants and which was populated by hundreds of quantitatively-assured physicists, economists, and mathematicians, quickly became a major center for the development of game theory specifically and quantitative social science generally.²⁶ As Herbert A. Simon, the Nobel Prize winning social scientist, declared in his autobiography, “for centrality to the postwar quantitative social sciences . . . the RAND Corporation [was] definitely the place[s] to see and be seen.”²⁷

In the mid-1950s, Speier and Goldhamer developed the political game as a reaction to game theory and quantitative’s dominance of RAND.²⁸ Speier found that game theory and quantitative social science could be useful means to understand foreign policy and military decision-making, but also believed that the “ignorant mathematicians” who used such methods in their own studies and war games did not appreciate the historical contexts, the “psychological difficulties and contingent circumstances,” which affected policymakers’ decisions.²⁹ Along with Goldhamer, he sought to remedy


²⁷ Simon also mentioned the University of Chicago’s Cowles Commission as the other major center that promoted quantitative social science during this period. Herbert A. Simon, Models of My Life: The Remarkable Autobiography of the Nobel Prize Winning Social Scientist and the Father of Artificial Intelligence (New York, 1991), 116. David Hounshell’s “Generation of Knowledge,” 255, pointed me toward this quote.

²⁸ The creation of a qualitative political game was first considered in early 1954, when SSD members Speier, Goldhamer, Joseph M. Goldsen, and Victor Hunt met to discuss it at RAND’s Washington, DC office. That summer, Goldhamer began developing the idea. In October, he wrote a proposal to Frank Collbohm, RAND’s president, regarding the game. Collbohm accepted the proposal, which led to the playing of the first game, which addressed U.S. activities in Western Europe. » The game was played in February 1955 by Speier (representing Germany, the State Department desk on Germany, and nature), Goldhamer (U.S.), Hunt (U.S.), Andrew Marshall (U.S.), Paul Kecksmet (the rest of the world and nature), Nathan Leites (Soviet Union, France), and the State Department desks on the Soviet Union and France), and H.A. Deweed (U.S.). Great Britain, and the State Department desk on Great Britain). For background on the game, see Herbert Goldhamer, Summary of Cold-War Game Activities in the Social Science Division (Santa Monica, CA, D-2850, April 12, 1955), 1-3. 15. For Goldhamer’s initial work on the game, see Herbert Goldhamer, Toward a Cold War Game (Santa Monica, CA, DUL-2603, October 22, 1954).

²⁹ Hans Speier, “Gesprächsweise Mitteilungen zu einer intellektuellen Autobiographie,” Box 2, Folder 32, Hans Speier Papers, German and Jewish Intellectual Elémigé Collection, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, University Libraries, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, New York (hereafter referred to as the Speier Papers), 265. The quantified political-military game to which Speier was responding was Alexander Mood’s Cold War Game (termed COW). For more on Mood’s game, see Alexander Mood, War Gaming as a Technique of Analysis (Santa Monica, CA, P-899, September 3, 1954); and U.S. Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group, Directory of Organizations and Activities Engaged or Interested in War Gaming, n.d., 1964/1965, 86.
this situation by creating a heuristic that would teach analysts the importance of understanding context in its geopolitical and institutional forms. Both Speier and Goldhamer had personal knowledge of the political-bureaucratic process. Speier gained his during World War II and its aftermath at the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Office of War Information, and Division for Occupied Areas, while Goldhamer had participated in the Korean War peace talks. Both intellectuals knew first-hand how rational calculations based on analyses of power and capabilities were not the only factors, nor necessarily the most important factors, that determined policymakers’ decisions. Culture, events, institutions, and politics all mattered, yet, they felt, the majority of RAND’s analysts elided these issues. Speier maintained that this led the insights of game theory, systems analysis, and quantified political and war games, when taken alone, to be “nonsense.” Speier and Goldhamer were not anti-quantification per se — although they generally used qualitative methodologies — but were rather concerned about what they considered to be quantification’s overreach. If RAND wanted to provide useful knowledge to decision-makers, they argued, its analysts needed to appreciate the contexts that restricted and shaped policymakers’ actions.

Speier and Goldhamer further worried that RAND’s analysts focused solely on the moment when a nation decided whether or not to participate in a war or on the hostilities themselves. As Speier declared, “in the nuclear age . . . no imaginary international conflict can be adequately simulated, unless attention is paid to threats of armed intervention, warnings of general war, nuclear blackmail, and the like”; that is to say, politics. For this reason, Speier and Goldhamer designed a political game that moved beyond traditional simulations of military strategy and tactics to model political decision-making processes. They maintained that participating in an explicitly political simulation forced analysts to immerse themselves in, and learn about, the experience and contexts of policymaking. In turn, this experience of simulation taught analysts the “political thought process” (politischen Denkprozess) and improved their research and advising skills. Speier and Goldhamer further hoped the game would “be used by government agencies, at least on a staff level, for purposes of contingency planning in foreign affairs” and for sharpening decision-makers’ abilities. The game, Speier and Goldhamer asserted, was a tool for both analysts and policymakers.
From the Science of Politics to Cold War Simulation

Educators have regularly used simulations to instruct participants to think like professionals. In addition to war games, since at least the early twentieth century U.S. professors, particularly those in business, medical, and law schools, employed case studies to replicate real world experiences. Moreover, in the 1930s and 1940s, the German and Japanese militaries played political games that foreshadowed the one created at RAND. Yet Speier and Goldhamer were unaware of these antecedents, and historians must therefore look to other sources to find the intellectual origins of the Cold War political game. If one examines the intellectual environment in which Speier and Goldhamer matured, it becomes clear that in many ways the goals and methods of their political game mirrored those of the pedagogy developed in the 1920s by Karl Mannheim, a scholar connected both personally and intellectually to the two RAND social scientists.

One of Mannheim’s intellectual projects was to develop what he termed a “science of politics,” an effort closely linked to what he conceived of as the chaotic nature of Weimar democracy and which he pursued in his landmark book, Ideology and Utopia. To Mannheim, empirical investigation demonstrated that the major problem of democratic society “consists essentially of the inescapable necessity of understanding both oneself and one’s adversary in the matrix of the social process.” Without mutual understanding and empathy, Mannheim maintained, a stable democratic politics was impossible. Intellectuals, he believed, had the duty to contribute to political stability by becoming “instructors of the democratic mass.” They needed to create a “science of politics” that would enable political analyses to be based on reasoned examination and not ideology, which overheated the political atmosphere and undermined the entire Weimar system. The way to do so was to teach students the sociology of knowledge, which would allow them to recognize the interconnection between political thought and social position. Mannheim hoped that this would engender sociopolitical integration by fostering “a synoptic perspective that will give [political] competitors an awareness of a common direction and some shared conception of

37 Speier even claimed that he was not familiar with the case study method. See “Gesprächsweise,” 269.
38 The version of Ideology and Utopia used in this essay is the 1954 printing of the 1936 translation, completed by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, which Mannheim revised and which made changes to the original 1929 Ideologie und Utopie. By the 1950s, Speier and Goldhamer were more familiar with the translation than the German original. Speier, for example, reviewed the translation for the American Journal of Sociology. See Hans Speier, “Book Review: Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia,” American Journal of Sociology 43, no. 1 (July 1937): 155-66. For an account of Mannheim’s early reception in the United States, which discusses Speier’s review, see David Kettler and Volker Meja, Karl Mannheim and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Secret of These New Times (New Brunswick, NJ, 1995), chapter 7.
meaning.”41 This would in turn combat “the extreme wings of the political movement” and create a “dynamic equilibrium” that would stabilize democracy.42

But Mannheim identified significant obstacles that augured against the creation of a stability-promoting science of politics. Most importantly, politics was intrinsically “irrational” in the sense that it was dynamic, and one could not understand it with reference to “laws, regulations, and established customs.” The rationalist, systematizing, “bourgeois” methods of social science, Mannheim declared, could not take account of politics’ irrational dynamism. Furthermore, all individuals were themselves participants in the political process, which made it difficult for a person to gain the necessary intellectual distance through which she or he could recognize that no political position represented absolute truth. Mannheim thus concerned himself with teaching “men, in action, to understand even their opponents in the light of their actual motives and their position in the historical-social situation.” He developed a pedagogy, or what he termed “a new framework,” “in which this kind of knowledge can find adequate expression.” Politics, Mannheim declared, was practice, and students could only learn how to operate within the political realm as he hoped they would through “actual conduct,” or simulation.43

Mannheim created a teacher-guided classroom that he believed allowed students to experience the realities of democratic politics while learning how to incorporate the sociology of knowledge into their analyses of the political process:

It seems certain that the interrelations in the specifically political sphere can be understood only in the course of discussion, the parties to which represent real forces in social life. There is no doubt, for example, that in order to develop the capacity for active orientation [of using the sociology of knowledge to understand one’s political opponents], the teaching procedure must concentrate on events that are immediate and actual, and in which the student has an opportunity to participate. There is no more favorable opportunity for gaining insight into the peculiar structure of the realm of politics than by grappling with one’s opponents about the most vital and immediate issues because on such occasions contradictory forces and points of view existing in a given period find expression.44

41 Kettler and Meja, Crisis of Liberalism, 69.
42 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 163.
44 Ibid., 164.
Juxtaposing different ideological positions and exposing these ideas’ connections to one’s social location, Mannheim avowed, contributed to political understanding by “toning down the exaggeration” inherent in partisan advocacy. Furthermore, experiencing the irrationality of the political sphere enabled students “to reorient [themselves] anew to an ever newly forming constellation of factors” and transform into effective political actors.\(^{45}\) That is to say, through simulations guided by educators, students learned political empathy and how to think and act like citizens living in a democracy, which contributed to Weimar’s stability. Mannheim presented his pedagogy as having two main benefits: first, it inculcated in students a respect for their fellow citizens and democratic politics itself; second, it taught them how to be political operators.

As the critiques of “bourgeois intellectualism” present elsewhere in *Ideology and Utopia* implied, Mannheim’s non-positivist science of politics made methodological claims. He framed it as a defense against the spread of quantitative methodologies and declared in no uncertain terms that he rejected the notion “that nothing is . . . ‘true’ or ‘knowable’ except what could be presented as universally valid and necessary,” “The repudiation of qualitative knowledge,” Mannheim lamented, “grew out of this” incorrect assertion. He further affirmed that the assumptions of quantification foolishly excluded “all knowledge which depended . . . upon certain historical-social characteristics of men in the concrete.” Mannheim considered quantification an “attempt to eliminate the interests and values which constitute the human element in man,” and it was against this eradication of the human that he posed his rationalizing but non-positivist science of politics.\(^{46}\)

Mannheim deeply influenced Speier. Speier was Mannheim’s first unofficial doctoral student — as a non-tenured lecturer (*Privatdozent*), Mannheim could not officially advise graduate students — at the University of Heidelberg.\(^{47}\) Although Speier had intended to earn a Ph.D. in economics when he matriculated at the university, after hearing Mannheim’s inaugural lecture on “The Contemporary State of Sociology in Germany,” he pursued a dual-degree in sociology and national economics.\(^{48}\) Speier became a founding member of the Mannheim Kreis, which eventually included Norbert Elias, Werner Falk, Hans Gerth, Gerhard Münzer, and Svend Riemer. He also made his intellectual reputation as a critic of Mannheim. First in Germany and then in the United States, Speier harshly criticized Mannheim’s epistemology and approach to intellectual life.\(^{49}\) Specifically, he

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\(^{45}\) Ibid., 154, 157.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 108, 149-50.

\(^{47}\) Speier’s Ph.D. was likely officially overseen by the economist Samuel Paul “Sally” Altmann, who changed his name to Salomon in 1927.


lambasted Mannheim for arguing in *Ideology and Utopia* that “the criterion of truth” was “historical realization,” which Speier considered a manifestation of “the professional self-hatred of the intellectuals” who “subordinate thought to action.”⁵⁰ Although Speier did not elucidate this specific point, if Mannheim were correct, then National Socialism—which had certainly been historically realized—represented a more perfect, or at least truer, political form than liberal democracy.⁵¹ Despite this split, Speier never stopped thinking of himself as a “dissenting Mannheim student.”⁵³ He continued to practice the sociology of knowledge and until the end of his life appreciated how his mentor served as an important intellectual interlocutor.

Goldhamer was also connected to Mannheim. The two met in the early 1930s, when Goldhamer took at least one course with Mannheim at the London School of Economics, where the latter had accepted a position after his dismissal from the University of Frankfurt in April 1933.⁵⁴ As a doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago, Goldhamer retained a keen interest in German sociology and was a member of an intellectual circle that included European sociologists such as Alexander von Schelting, himself a prominent critic of Mannheim. It is highly likely that Goldhamer and his colleagues discussed Mannheim’s *Ideologie und Utopie*, which had engendered significant debate amongst Central European intellectuals and those interested in European sociology.⁵⁵ Moreover, Goldhamer was the “protégé” of Louis Wirth (himself a German-Jewish immigrant), who in the mid-1930s arranged to have *Ideologie und Utopie* translated into English.⁵⁶ This is all to say that Mannheim was a significant part of Speier and Goldhamer’s intellectual worlds. Although the latter two intellectuals did not cite Mannheim in the course of their work on the political game, the similarities between their goals and methods and Mannheim’s pedagogy suggest that the ties between the three sociologists remained strong across oceans and decades, and that these parallels must be attributed to more than mere intellectual convergence.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Shils, Fragment, 45.
⁵⁷ Christian Dayé has compellingly suggested that Speier and Goldhamer’s unwillingness to cite Mannheim may be connected to Americans’ reception of Mannheim’s later writings on social planning. Namely, Dayé argues that Speier and Goldhamer may have been afraid to cite Mannheim for fear of being designated as communist sympathizers. See Christian Dayé, “Methods of Cold War Social Science: The Development of Political Gaming and Delphi as Means of Investigating » Futures” (paper submitted to the 2012 Young Scholar Prize of the ISA Research Committee on the History of Sociology, awarded on the occasion of the Interim Conference Changing Universities: Changing Sociology, University College Dublin, Ireland, June 27-30, 2012), 3n1.
Similar to Mannheim, Speier and Goldhamer presented their game as a qualitative response to the over-formalization of the social sciences. The two sociologists belonged to the tradition of European historical sociology, a significant part of which rejected the “neopositivist epistemology” endorsed by many postwar social scientists. Speier was himself an important member of the group of German exiles who brought historical sociology to the United States, where it was rarely pursued before 1933. As he and Goldhamer said in their first public essay on the political game, experiments “in which a few political and economic factors were assigned numerical values so that the relative worth of alternative strategies could be assessed quantitatively” had demonstrated “that the simplification imposed in order to permit quantification made [formalized] game[s] of doubtful value for the assessment of political strategies and tactics in the real world.” Unlike game theory, systems analysis, and quantified political and war games, they asserted that the qualitative political game revealed “possible contingencies that in analytical work [alone] might have seemed less important and less likely.” By stressing that their game “simulat[ed] as faithfully as possible much of its [the real world’s] complexity,” Speier and Goldhamer echoed Mannheim’s critique of quantification and emphasized that their game demonstrated how qualitative methods were crucial for policy research.

Speier and Goldhamer’s game, however, was far more developed than Mannheim’s pedagogy, the details of which were sketchy and framed in generalities. The most mature statement on the RAND political game appeared in the two authors’ 1959 essay “Some Observations on Political Gaming.” According to this piece, the game ran as follows: Each player or group of players represented the government of an individual country — or, as Mannheim had it, the “real forces” in political life. For example, team one played as the Soviet Union, while team two played as France. The nations portrayed were each granted their own specific characteristics, such as military capabilities, that were unknown to other teams. Before a game commenced, players received a scenario describing a particular geopolitical problem or event to which they were required to respond. Players submitted their moves in writing to a referee or group of referees, who acted as Mannheim’s teacher did, guiding and directing the simulation. The referee was the game’s ultimate arbiter, and he or she could reject a move if it was deemed impossible given “the constitutional or physical power of the government” involved. To ensure that a game’s moves mirrored the potential

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58 I borrow the term neo-positivist epistemology from Steinmetz, “Ideas in Exile.”
59 Ibid.
61 For more on scenarios and their development, see Speier, “Political Games and Scenarios,” 11-17.
62 In the largest RAND game, the fourth game from 1956, Speier assumed the role of referee. Raymond L. Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington, DC, 2001), 19.
actions in which real world political actors would engage, players were required to be “area specialists who could [justify moves by drawing] on their knowledge and accumulated area experience.”64 Thus, where Mannheim assumed that students would naturally represent different political perspectives, Speier and Goldhamer explicitly declared that the game was only effective if different area experts played it. Such a statement aligned the game with the rising tide of “area studies” in American intellectual life.65 The referee further played the role of “nature,” which “provide[d] for events of the type that happen in the real world but are not under the control of any government,” such as famines, uprisings, the death of leaders, etc.66 To simulate the real world process of intelligence gathering, the referee also “leaked” information about other teams, which would be more or less accurate depending on her or his whims. In these ways, Speier and Goldhamer hoped to reproduce the geopolitical environment and “permit tests of a wide range of United States strategies.”67

But testing strategies was not the major goal of Speier and Goldhamer’s game, even if this was the purpose to which decision-makers later put it.68 For the social scientists (as for Mannheim), the game was most useful as an “educational device.”69 They noted that no analyst or decision-maker, no matter how familiar with the wars of the first half of the twentieth century, had any experience interacting in a nuclear context.70 With the game, Speier and Goldhamer argued, players could discover how new nuclear pressures influenced “the structure of the contemporary political world and . . . the reasons behind political decisions.” Similar to Mannheim, who framed his pedagogy as inspiring “insights,” the authors declared that the game gave “players a new insight into the pressures, the uncertainties, and the moral and intellectual difficulties under which foreign policy decisions are made.”71 Just as Mannheim hoped to prevent the collapse of democracy by instilling a respect for and understanding of its process, Speier and Goldhamer

64 A footnote discussing RAND’s fourth game specified that “all players had spent some time in the country whose government they represented and were familiar with its political system but also with many members of its ruling groups.” Ibid., 73n5.
65 For more on area studies, see David A. Hollinger, ed. The Humanities and the Dynamics of Inclusion since World War II (Baltimore, 2006), part 4.
67 Ibid. For detailed descriptions of games as well as move reports, see Goldhamer, Summary of Cold-War Game Activities, 15-22; Paul Kecskemeti, Summary of Cold War Game Activities in the Social Science Division — May Experiment (Santa Monica, CA, D-2975-RC, June 20, 1955); Herbert Goldhamer, The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division’s Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise: July-August 1955 (Santa Monica, CA, D-3164-RC, September 1, 1955); Ewald W. Schnitzer, Third Political Exercise: Summary and Documents (Santa Monica, CA, D-3164-RC, September 1, 1955); and Joseph M. Goldsen, The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round (Santa Monica, CA, D-3640-RC, May 30, 1956).
68 Initially, testing was the major purpose of the game but became less so as the members of the Social Science Division gained more gaming experience. For the emphasis on testing, see Goldhamer, Political Exercise, 10. For the abandonment of testing, see Goldsen, Political Exercise, 31-33; and Goldhamer and Speier, “Some Observations,” 78.
69 From the beginning, the Social Science Division argued that “one of the principal values of a cold-war game should be its stimulating and educational function.” Goldhamer, Summary of Cold-War Game Activities, 1. According to Phil Davison, at the end of the fourth game it “was unanimously recognized by all participants and observers with a high degree of enthusiasm” that the game was very useful for “education and training.” W. P. Davison, A Summary of Experimental Research on ‘Political Gaming,’ (Santa Monica, CA, D-5695-RC, October 1, 1958), 7.
70 This was a common refrain amongst intellectuals attempting to assert their authority over the military in the early Cold War.
71 Speier and Goldhamer, “Some Observations,” 79; and “Gesprächsweise,” 264. For more on insight and gaming, see Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn, 162-65.
desired to avoid nuclear war by increasing knowledge of how atomic weaponry informed the strategic calculus of decision-makers. Empathy was central to both simulations.

In addition to inspiring respect for the pressures faced by decision-makers living in a nuclear world, Speier and Goldhamer — like Mannheim — believed the game improved the skills of participants. The authors maintained that the experience of simulation encouraged players to “acquire an overview of a political situation” that allowed them to recognize the interconnectedness of the different spheres of international relations. Speier and Goldhamer declared that by viewing the realm of geopolitics in its totality — a framework that echoed Mannheim’s vision of society — players could operate more effectively within it. Moreover, the game enabled players to engage in “extensive and explicit statements of the political and military assumptions from which they argued,” which encouraged them to reassess beliefs in light of their peers’ and referees’ critiques. In sum, the game increased analysts’ and decision-makers’ “ability to cope better with pressing tasks in their work.”

In its goals and methods, Speier and Goldhamer’s political game echoed Mannheim’s pedagogy. Both were simulations, premised upon the assumption that experiencing a simulacrum of an environment that had no historical precedent — German democratic politics, on the one hand, a nuclear world, on the other — was the most effective means to teach participants how to interact within it. Another major purpose of both simulations was to tame a dynamic political atmosphere that, if allowed to descend into disorder, could have disastrous consequences for humanity. Mannheim, Speier, and Goldhamer also each subscribed to the notion that their simulations would enable participants to gain a total view of the political process. Similarly, both simulations were designed to expose the assumptions that undergirded participants’ decisions, in the hopes that doing so would increase their political effectiveness. Furthermore, the simulations were both responses to the rise of social science quantification and, as such, were minimally formalized. The striking similarities between Mannheim’s pedagogy and Speier and Goldhamer’s game, coupled with the personal and professional connections that united the three intellectuals, suggest that Speier and Goldhamer drew on Mannheim’s work when they confronted problems that mirrored, in some ways, the ones he faced in the 1920s.

73 Speier, “Political Games and Scenarios,” 27.
74 For use of the term “dynamic” in reference to the “political process” replicated by the game, see Goldsen, Political Exercise, 37.
Migrating from RAND to the Government

RAND analysts played four political games in 1955 and 1956. The games wound up being very expensive and time-consuming, leading RAND’s analysts to conclude that, in terms of testing strategies, they had “grave doubts about the wisdom of attempting a program of the requisite scale [for the successful testing of alternative strategies] involving a relatively prohibitive commitment of manpower and expenditure of other resources.” Nevertheless, Speier, Goldhamer, and others believed in the game’s utility, arguing that it was “a uniquely valuable instrument for training and educational purposes,” and promoted the game throughout the foreign policy establishment. The means by which the game moved from RAND to universities and then to the government demonstrate the close links that had developed by the end of the 1950s between the institutions of the military-intellectual complex. In 1956, Speier presented on the game at a Social Science Research Council summer institute; in 1957, he did so at Stanford University’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (which he had helped found earlier in the decade); and in 1959, he discussed it at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Goldhamer, meanwhile, gave lectures on the game at the Army War College and presented on it at the Political Science Association, and Joseph Goldsen, also of the SSD, discussed the game at Yale and Princeton. Additionally, members of the SSD held “informal discussions about political gaming . . . with personnel of the Department of State, the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, the Brookings Institution, Northwestern University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.”

This last university proved crucial to the dissemination of the political game. In 1957 and 1958, W. Phillips Davison, Speier’s colleague from World War II whom he recruited to the SSD, took a leave of absence from RAND to become a visiting professor of political science at MIT. In Cambridge, Davison directed a political game in one of his graduate seminars, which came to the attention of Lincoln Bloomfield, a professor of political science and former State Department official then associated with MIT’s Center for International Studies (itself an organization with which Speier was involved). In the 1958-1959 academic year, Bloomfield discussed the simulation with several RAND analysts, and, with the aid of Paul Kecskemeti — another of Speier’s SSD recruits and also a European exile — directed a simulation christened the “Endicott House Game.” This game “revolved around a hypothetical international
crisis stemming from the demise of the head of the Polish government” and was played by senior faculty from MIT, Harvard, Yale, and Columbia. Bloomfield found the game to be a very useful pedagogical tool. As he and a colleague reported,

Reality can of course only be simulated in a game. A single scholar or analyst can seek to evoke reality; but group operation brings to analysis of foreign policy problems two prime values: the simple benefit of interaction between several minds, and the more complex benefits flowing from the dynamics of such interaction. . . . Inherent in this process is the potent challenge of unpredictability and the equally potent value of exposure to the antagonistic will of another who proceeds from entirely different assumptions. Neither of these factors can be derived from solitary meditation or cooperative discussion. In this sense an affirmative answer is possible to the general question “Is political gaming useful?”81

Similar to Speier and Goldhamer, Bloomfield believed the game exposed players to the realities of international politics and taught them to think like decision-makers.

Bloomfield continued to direct games played not only by academics and students but also by government officials. The most important of these, named POLEX (short for “political exercise”) II, occurred in 1960. This simulation centered upon a crisis in the Middle East and quickly became well known throughout the foreign policy establishment.82 Soon after POLEX II concluded, John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon in the 1960 presidential election, academic expertise became a high-value commodity in Washington, and many RAND analysts entered Robert McNamara’s Department of Defense.83 In 1961, Henry Rowen, a former RAND economist then serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, recommended that the newly established Joint War Games Control Group (JWGCG) play political games. The members of the JWGCG agreed, and in September, Thomas Schelling, a pioneer of game theory, former RAND consultant, and professor of economics at Harvard, directed a game at the Pentagon based on the Second Berlin Crisis.84 Numerous high-level officials and academics, including DeWitt Armstrong, McGeorge Bundy, Alain Enthoven, Carl Kaysen, Henry Kissinger, Robert Komer, John McNaughton, Walt Whitman

82 Allen, War Games, 150-53; and Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable,” 178.
83 Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, chapter 16.
84 The Second Berlin Crisis began in 1958 when First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev declared that the four Allied powers must leave Berlin.
Rostow, Rowen, Seymour Weiss, and others, played the game. Although Kennedy and cabinet secretaries did not participate in the simulation, Kaysen informed the president of its outcome.

After officials deemed Schelling’s simulation a useful means to predict and practice international politics, the JWGCG (which became the Joint War Games Agency in 1963) regularly organized political games, and throughout the 1960s at least four were played annually. Officials framed the games’ benefits in the same ways as Speier, Goldhamer, and Bloomfield. According to Lt. Colonel Thomas J. McDonald, a JWGA member, games “provide [a] ‘feel’ for Cold War ‘bargaining,’ negotiation, and escalation processes.” That is to say, officials believed games taught players to think like decision-makers while improving their political abilities. However, despite the social scientists’ protestations, decision-makers also believed the game could predict international relations, which is what exercises like SIGMA II-64 were designed to do. This underlines the intellectual distance that sometimes separated analysts from their patrons as well as defense intellectuals’ lack of power. Although the intellectuals may have wanted the game to be played in a certain way, they ultimately could not influence its use. In the journey from RAND to the JWGA, the game assumed purposes that moved beyond those intended by its creators.

The Lessons of Weimar

The political game is an example of how the “lessons of Weimar” — in this case the desire to control a chaotic political atmosphere — informed how Americans approached the foreign policymaking process. Mannheim, Speier, and Goldhamer were each responding to peculiarly late modern problems: Mannheim, to the advent of German democracy; Speier and Goldhamer, to the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States’ rise to globalism, and the Cold War. Each saw in modernity potential chaos, and they reacted to this possible disorder by promoting elitist projects intended to train a select cadre to prevent and, if necessary, manage it. Paradoxically, to defend the structures of liberal democracy, Mannheim, Speier, and Goldhamer encouraged programs that ignored the public’s traditional — and central — role in
The shift from Weimar Germany to Cold War America, however, brought changes to the contours and emphasis of the political simulation. Its goal transformed from training future elite citizens to training current experts and high-level policymakers, while its focus shifted from domestic politics to international relations. Speier and Goldhamer’s game also expanded the purview of Mannheim’s pedagogy, which was exclusively focused on Germany. The two social scientists adopted an explicitly transnational perspective, maintaining that “it would be desirable to have a few foreign political analysts play the roles of their own governments so that close cooperation of each nation’s interest would be increased.” Although Speier and Goldhamer never explicitly deployed the concept of an Atlantic Community in their scholarship on the game, their desire to incorporate foreign participants was a means to increase communication between the United States and its European partners. Speier and Goldhamer endorsed a vision of geopolitics that characterized the Cold War as a moment when “peace and Western civilization” — represented by the United States and Western Europe — “are in jeopardy.” The different national interests Western countries might have had, they assumed, were less important than what they characterized as the existential struggle between democracy and Soviet totalitarianism.

Thus, Speier, the German, and Goldhamer, the Canadian, argued that to win the Cold War, the United States, their adopted homeland, needed to rely heavily upon — and trust — both those born elsewhere and its European allies. The political game was their means to train a transatlantic elite able and willing to promote U.S. interests, which they affirmed were, ultimately, the interests of the world.

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88 Similar trends may be observed amongst other intellectuals writing from the 1920s to the 1950s. See, for example, Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York, 1922); Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New Brunswick, NJ, 1993 [1925]); and Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York, 1955).

89 Goldhamer and Speier, “Some Observations,” 83. See also Speier, “Political Games and Scenarios,” 38.
