OSTPOLITIK: PHASES, SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES, AND GRAND DESIGN

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I

International history in the late 1960s and early 1970s was shaped by an enormous amount of worldwide conflict and change. It was a period of transition in many respects. Although the superpowers were still unrivalled in military power, China, Japan, and Europe emerged as new centers of power, heralding a new multipolar structure. There was also the crisis and end of the Bretton Woods system, as well as the protest movements of the 68ers in many countries. As for East-West relations, both the United States of America and the Soviet Union were interested in relaxing tensions. Neither side could achieve superiority. Furthermore, the events in Vietnam (the Tet offensive in January 1968), Eastern Europe (the questioning of Moscow’s control by Romania and Czechoslovakia), East Asia (the Soviet-Chinese clash over the Ussuri border), and the Middle East (the Israeli-Arab conflict) marked the limits of American and Soviet power and the dangers of imperial overstretch. “Is the United States going to continue to be a great nation, number one?” was President Richard Nixon’s nervous question in August 1971. How could American power be stabilized? Nixon himself had already given the answer in 1969 when he announced his policy of negotiations, which indeed opened up a new kind of relationship with the Soviet Union and China.

Ostpolitik has to be seen in this context. The Federal Republic of Germany, being a regional European power, was only partially involved in world politics. The West German foreign policy-making elite had begun to be interested in East Asian and Middle East affairs, but the Federal Republic did not yet play an active role there or in any part of the Third World. However, the impact of world politics and European affairs was felt in Germany—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. From the West German point of view, the traditional approach to the German question had to be substituted by a more flexible attitude toward the post-war order in Europe, which featured two German states and the Soviet Union as the hegemon in Eastern Europe.

In a long and often painful process that started during the Berlin crisis (1958–1962), the Federal Republic came to the realization that the solution of the German question was not a precondition for the improvement in East-West relations. Ostpolitik, by accepting the post-war realities in Europe, was an attempt to avoid isolation within the Western alliance and
to create a modus vivendi with the East. From its founding in 1949, the Federal Republic had always depended on its ability to adapt to international trends.4

At the same time, Ostpolitik was not only a reactive policy. It was also a response to the challenge of change and transition. Its protagonists maintained that there was a good chance of influencing the dynamics of change to their own advantage. When in 1963 Egon Bahr, in his capacity as Willy Brandt’s press officer in West Berlin, used the then controversial and later famous formula “change through rapprochement” (Wandel durch Annäherung), he had exactly this in mind. A period of rapprochement between West and East was to be followed by a period of change in the East. According to Brandt and Bahr, the German lesson that had to be learned as a consequence of the Berlin Wall was a paradox that had originally been formulated by the Kennedy administration: The recognition of the status quo was the initial step to overcoming it.5 The acceptance of the territorial status quo was easier for the three Western powers than for the government in Bonn. However, any active Eastern policy had to start from the premise that negotiations with the East would have to include some form of recognition of the existing borders and of the regime in East Berlin.

When Brandt became mayor of West Berlin in 1957, he was convinced that the government in Bonn should broaden the range of its foreign policy. After its creation as a product of the Cold War, the Federal Republic had to achieve one main goal, namely the establishment of friendly relations with the United States and its neighbors in Western Europe. Stopping here, however, would mean standing “on one leg” only. In Brandt’s view, Bonn, in agreement with the three powers and firmly adhering to the West, had to put down the other foot too, “and that is called Ostpolitik.” It seemed to Brandt that the necessity of developing an Ostpolitik was felt more strongly in Berlin “than on the left bank of the Rhine.”6 In March 1958, Brandt regarded “a speedy solution of the German problem unlikely” and pleaded for “active coexistence.” He deplored the Western attitude of anxiously staring at the East. “The West has been far too much on the defensive in its dealings with the peoples of Eastern Europe. Even in Western Germany there was for years a fear that we should be affected or even poisoned by our contacts with the other side. This fear and lack of self-confidence has caused us to assume a defensive attitude and to dig ourselves in.” The West should advocate an “open door policy” with respect to “human and cultural contacts.” It should “strive for a degree of normalization in relations.” A more “flexible policy” had nothing to do with “wishful thinking” or with the “idea of capitulation.” On the contrary, it meant competition. It would provide a chance to enter the East and to work for peaceful change. Having ruled
out force, “only one course now remains: an unflinching, stubborn struggle for a peaceful solution by political action.”

The concept of Ostpolitik, as distinct from practical steps and operational policy, was outlined before the Berlin Crisis that began in November 1958. The building of the Wall in 1961 forced the West Berlin Senate to implement some elements of a new policy towards the East. The pass agreement of December 1963 was the first result of Brandt’s early Ostpolitik. Three years later, he left his post in Berlin to become foreign minister in the “grand coalition” government in Bonn formed by the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD). The new government under Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) took up a number of its predecessor’s initiatives, notably those of Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, and paved the way for what would become known internationally as Ostpolitik.

This paper cannot do justice to the grand coalition, which had a considerable impact on West German politics and foreign policy in particular. Rather, it will concentrate on the phase of Ostpolitik that began after the election of September 28, 1969, brought a new Social Democratic-Free Democratic government, with Brandt as chancellor and Walter Scheel (FDP) as foreign minister, to office. Within a few weeks of the election, German-Soviet negotiations began.

Both sides had been waiting for this moment. Gromyko pointed out to his East German colleague as early as September 1, 1969, that the time when both sides exchanged documents only was over. Now the Soviet government wanted to start negotiations with the Federal Republic. The West German side received the same signals. A member of the Soviet embassy in Bonn went to the SPD headquarters on September 15, 1969, and told a party official that the Soviet government wanted to negotiate on all aspects of the issue of the renunciation of force. On September 22, 1969, Brandt met his Soviet counterpart in New York, where Gromyko was attending the General Assembly of the UN. Their exchange of views also pointed in this direction. Moscow was prepared to talk to any West German government, but it was obviously pleased that Brandt became head of government following the September 1969 election.

The German—as well as the international—public was impressed by the speed and the intensity of the German-Soviet talks. Furthermore, Brandt’s recognition of the GDR as a state and the meeting with his East German colleague Willi Stoph in Erfurt on March 19, 1970, indicated that Bonn’s approach to the German question had changed considerably. In the Federal Republic, it provoked a fierce debate. It is interesting how the West German opponents of Ostpolitik differed from observers in the capitals of the Western powers. The CDU/CSU opposition complained that Ostpolitik was a capitulation to Moscow and the final acceptance of
the division of Germany. In London, Paris, and Washington, Ostpolitik was seen from a different perspective. It seemed to be a revolutionary turn that could possibly lead to the dissolution of the postwar settlement, which had provided special rights for the Allied powers in Berlin and in Germany as a whole. This at least was the fear expressed by Claude Arnaud, Director of European Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry, in a long conversation with Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Under Secretary for European Affairs in the U.S. Department of State. Their conversation on April 6, 1970, is only one example of frequent bilateral and multilateral consultations on Ostpolitik among Western diplomats and foreign office officials: West German participants were often included. This example is cited here because it demonstrates both uneasiness about the ultimate goal of Ostpolitik and an impressive insight into its meaning.

For Arnaud, Ostpolitik represented possibly “the biggest event in European politics since the war.” Most things no longer seemed “quite the same as they did six months before.” It goes without saying that Arnaud agreed with the “positive elements,” namely the status quo-oriented elements of Ostpolitik. What made him anxious were its dynamic elements. “Assuming that policies are continued to their logical conclusion, not much will be left of the postwar legal structure in Germany, either from Potsdam (1945) or Paris (1954).” Basically, Arnaud’s uneasiness stemmed from the question, “what would be the consequence for Allied rights concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole?” The French were haunted by the possibility of “a German reunification on Eastern terms,” however distant (“fifteen to twenty years”) this might appear. Hillenbrand agreed that the Four Power rights had to be maintained, and he did not rule out “that the Germans could unwittingly take steps which would tend to undermine the Four Power status.” But he quoted Brandt’s assurance that the rights of the Allies would be respected and he stressed that he did not see any danger of a “new Rapallo course.” “Left-wing elements of the SPD might be thinking in neutralist terms, but the government is not.”

Hillenbrand suggested examining “the German rationale concerning the new Eastern policy.” He succinctly differentiated between short-term objectives and what he called Brandt’s “grand design.” An agreement on a modus vivendi with the GDR was timely unless the FRG wanted to lose any control of the obvious trend that was going to end up in the international recognition of the GDR. As to the “grand design,” the West Germans “assume that the gradual creation of a more favorable climate in Eastern Europe would permit German reunification as the mellowing process continued.” Hillenbrand was absolutely correct in stating that “Brandt cannot articulate his grand design clearly because this might negatively affect its realization. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that this
German design is illogical. John Foster Dulles used to encourage Chancellor Adenauer to radiate more interest in the East. Adenauer felt that this was naive, and that the East would subvert the West. The Germans now are more confident."

II

Hillenbrand’s perceptive analysis did not cover all aspects of Ostpolitik, but it can serve as a useful basis for closer consideration. Consequently, I shall deal first with the immediate concerns of the decision-makers in Bonn and the short-term objectives of Ostpolitik, and secondly with the underlying assumptions and ultimate goals of Ostpolitik. The change of government in 1969 was significant in many respects. Probably most important was the vigorous effort of the SPD-FDP coalition to come to terms with the realities of post-war Europe. Certain facts, however unpleasant, could neither be ignored any longer and nor altered within a foreseeable future. Two German states existed on a territory that was much smaller than the territory of the German Reich in 1937. Any hope of “rolling back” the Soviet Union had proven illusionary. The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the ensuing proclamation of the “Brezhnev doctrine” demonstrated beyond any doubt that the Soviet Union was not willing to give up the European part of its empire.

The government in Bonn, by acknowledging a Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe without legitimizing it, was in accord with the American view. A few days after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow called the mutual acknowledgement of spheres of interest the ground rule in East-West relations. Without fulfilling “the promises made at Yalta and Potsdam,” the Soviets had subdued Eastern Europe. The United States had failed to intervene.16 In Brandt’s opinion, however, the Germans had to take into consideration an additional aspect. The Soviet empire was rooted not only in the expansionist habit of the Soviet world power, but it was also caused by German aggression in the Second World War and the attempt to reduce the Soviet Union to a non-entity in international affairs. Hence Ostpolitik had to be seen in an international as well as in a specific German context. On the one hand, it was an integral part of the policy of détente, which was shaped by the main actors in East and West. The Federal Republic concurred with this pragmatic definition of détente. On the other hand, Ostpolitik had strong moral implications. It aimed not only at stabilizing East-West relations, but also at reconciliation with the Soviet Union and the other East European countries that had suffered under German occupation and the war of annihilation. Ostpolitik was more than détente. It had to cope with both the legacies of the Cold War
and the Second World War. As to the Cold War, Ostpolitik was a contribution to its de-escalation and its transformation to a less dangerous form of conflict. As to the Second World War, Ostpolitik was the complementary step in Eastern Europe after Adenauer had achieved the reintegration of West Germany into the Western European and Atlantic world. This is why Ostpolitik had to be a policy of peace on two levels and in different places, on the level of inter-state negotiations with the governments in Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, and Bonn as actors, but additionally on the level of transnational relations between the societies in the respective countries, in places like the Kremlin, where the German-Soviet treaty was signed in August 1970, and the Warsaw Ghetto, where Brandt fell to his knees in December 1970.

Many Germans did not endorse Ostpolitik and in particular did not like Brandt’s gesture in Warsaw, which reminded them of a painful past. Henry Kissinger, too, criticized Brandt’s “enthusiasm and single-mindedness” in showing compassion for the victims of Nazi aggression and in pursuing the aim of conciliation. Kissinger suspected that it weakened Brandt’s “bargaining position.” In fact, the government in Bonn was not single-minded at all and protected German interests very well. But it was the first West German government to put the anniversary of the capitulation of May 8, 1945, on the agenda of the Bundestag. The message was crystal clear. The occupation of Germany, the subsequent division of the country, the territorial losses in the East, the whole national catastrophe—all had to do with Germany’s ruthless policy before and during the war. In December 1970, when the German-Polish treaty was signed, Brandt reminded Germans that the time had come when the “results of history” had to be accepted. The wording of the FDP leadership was similar. It was expressed by Wolfgang Mischnick, floor leader of the Free Democrats in the Bundestag: “We know what the results of the war are like.”

Coming to terms with postwar realities meant not only a growing degree of self-recognition of the Federal Republic as a separate German state but also a new self-confidence with regard to the role of West Germany in international affairs. In the late 1960s, the Federal Republic regarded itself and was perceived from outside as being in a key position in Western Europe, not least because of the steady decline of France’s traditional dominance. The assumption of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London in May 1969 that “German influence in Western Europe will increase” was shared by most international observers. The British ambassador in Bonn spoke of a “new trend” in West German policy: “Among its features are a greater self-reliance, a feeling that the period of atonement for the war is over, impatience with restraints on German liberty of action.” There was a change of policy if not in sub-
stance but in style that amounted to “a new consciousness of national interest and power.” The Federal Republic was “moving slowly out of the era of tutelage and beginning to wonder whether and how she can use in world affairs the strength which her economic development has given her.”

This process became even more explicit when Brandt became head of government. He maintained that he was the chancellor not of the defeated but of the liberated Germany. Ostpolitik signaled the awareness that the Federal Republic, even if it could not—and did not want to—play an independent role in East-West relations and must not overrate its weight, should not underestimate itself “as a partner of the Soviet Union” either. Brandt wanted the Federal Republic to be “more equal,” and Scheel spoke of “maturity.” Kenneth Rush, U.S. ambassador in Bonn, was favorably impressed: “The change of government, with the new Ostpolitik of the Brandt government, along with Germany’s new approach to the West, and her also very important new steps in domestic policies, have created an atmosphere of change and excitement even greater than that of the New Deal thirties in our country.”

The Federal Republic wished to be treated as an equal partner that could look after its interests independently. Ostpolitik was an area where this ability could be demonstrated, always in accordance with the general Western course of détente but, as Brandt underscored in his memoirs, as more than just a echo of American initiatives. This was exactly the message that Bahr had for Kissinger when he informed the White House beforehand about the foreign policy of the incoming SPD-FDP government. He stressed the importance of close U.S.-German relations. The “German-American relationship and the Alliance” were “absolutely central.” At the same time, Bahr added, Bonn did not intend to inquire every two months whether the Americans “still love us.” “Thank God,” was Kissinger’s response. Bahr “was asking not for advice.” Bonn wanted to pursue Ostpolitik “in cooperation and friendship with the U.S.” But the White House was informed rather than consulted. The policy itself was not subject to discussion.

In response to Bahr’s persuasive performance, Kissinger suggested establishing a “back channel” between the White House and the Chancellery in Bonn. When Bahr left, Kissinger concluded, “Your success will be our success.” Given the structural interdependence of American détente and German Ostpolitik, Kissinger’s statement proved absolutely correct in 1972 when the ratification of the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, the coming into effect of the Berlin agreement, and the American-Soviet summit diplomacy were linked in a new architecture of East-West relations. At the same time, the global interests of the American superpower and the regional interests of the Federal Republic, although com-
patible, were not always identical, in particular with respect to tactics and timing. In December 1970, Kissinger pointed out to the German ambassador that the German resolution to improve relations with Moscow might lead to a certain dependence of the Federal Republic on the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, an American diplomat in Bonn warned that Washington was not happy with the speed of Ostpolitik. In order to clarify the matter, Horst Ehmke, head of the Chancellery in Bonn, hurried off to see Kissinger. Ehmke was reassured that the U.S. had no principal objections to Ostpolitik. But Kissinger also stressed that the American-Soviet relationship was much more strenuous than the German-Soviet relationship seemed to be. The U.S. wanted to decrease tensions with the Soviets and the Europeans should go on with their policy of détente. But the Western allies must not be played off against each other. Not only on this occasion did Kissinger express his obsession that the Soviet Union might be successful in aiming at a “selective détente,” improving its relations with European countries while remaining tough towards the United States. Furthermore, Kissinger claimed the leadership in détente policy. “If a course of détente is to be pursued, we do it.” In the event of a race of Western states to Moscow, Kissinger left no doubt who would win.

The Brandt government was familiar with these anxieties, which could also be heard in Paris and London. Therefore, the Western allies were informed scrupulously about every move in Ostpolitik. At the same time, Bonn insisted that negotiations on Berlin should start immediately and should have absolute priority. From the German point of view, time was running out to reach a reasonable modus vivendi on the German question. The Brandt government emphasized right from the beginning that a “main point” should “be kept in mind.” The negotiations with the Soviet Union and Poland, the German-German contacts, and the Berlin talks were “all linked together.” “If the FRG should succeed in negotiating an agreement with the Soviet Union but the Berlin talks do not succeed, the whole process would be stopped.” Bonn’s policy of linkages ran parallel but not always in complete harmony with Kissinger’s efforts to construct linkages. With respect to the Federal Republic’s paramount short-term objective, the improvement of relations with the GDR and of the situation in and around Berlin, the West German government tried time and again to put pressure on its allies, which was not always welcome in Washington, London, and Paris. Bonn wanted the Western Powers to speed up the Berlin negotiations.

In addition to specific issues of the German question, there was a further argument for going ahead with Ostpolitik and striving for a broad agreement with Moscow on East-West relations in Europe. It had to do with the possible implications of the over-commitment of the United
States in world politics. What would be the impact of the Nixon doctrine on Europe? The West Germans were haunted by the possibility that Senator Mike Mansfield’s pressure on the Nixon administration to reduce the number of American troops in Europe could have serious consequences for the security of Western Europe, particularly the Federal Republic. According to Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt, it was “not Holy Writ that the U.S. forces will have to remain in Europe at present strength forever and ever.” Chancellor Brandt suspected the U.S. would stay but would reduce the size of its military commitment. To avoid unilateral American steps, early negotiations on “mutually balanced force reduction” (MBFR) were vital for the Federal Republic. Faced with Soviet military superiority, an easing of tensions had to be achieved while the United States was still willing to commit to Europe. Because the United States was perceived as an indispensable but somewhat uncertain ally, a feeling which increased in 1971 when the dollar was taken off the gold standard, and because the Federal Republic was confronted with an even less predictable adversary in the East, there was no reasonable alternative to a course of negotiation and hopefully also cooperation with the Soviet Union.

III

Ostpolitik was pursued not only under a certain pressure of time but also under the assumption that time was favorable. The Soviet Union too seemed to be interested in improving its relations with the West. At least this was the strong belief of the Brandt government. This perception was grounded in the numerous contacts between West German and Soviet politicians, diplomats, businessmen, and journalists which had started early in 1969. Preparations for the breakthrough of Brandt’s Ostpolitik were well under way while the grand coalition government was still in office. Highlights were the visits to Moscow of two leading politicians who later became members of Brandt’s government. In July and August 1969 respectively, Walter Scheel and Helmut Schmidt met with senior Soviet officials in Moscow. Scheel returned with the impression that the Soviet Union was prepared to give up certain maximum demands and to stop its aggressive stance vis-à-vis the Federal Republic. Scheel was confirmed in his view, which he had already given to the U.S. president. Nixon had warned of the implications of a possible West German “understanding with the Soviet Union.” “This was a ‘spongy road’ and great care would have to be taken in going down this road. . . . It was important to keep open the doors to the future, but one must not forget the lessons of the past. The Soviet Union had not yet changed.” Scheel’s answer was, “But they could change.”
Schmidt’s assessment was similar. The Soviet leadership seemed to be developing a “pragmatic” attitude and apparently was seriously interested in closer and more cooperative relations with the Federal Republic, especially in the field of trade relations. Soviet interests coincided with the interest of some West German industries. The Federal Republic quickly became the USSR’s largest Western trading partner. Although trade with the East formed only a small percentage of total West German trade, the Eastern bloc had potential that could not be ignored. West Germany’s perception of itself as being predominantly a trading state corresponded with the possibility of a gradual change toward a more consumer-orientated economy in the Soviet Union.

The rationale of Ostpolitik can to a large extent be explained by taking into consideration the way the Soviet Union was perceived. Methodologically speaking, the level of perception should be linked with the level of political action. Summarizing the main features of the Soviet Union’s image in which the decision makers in Bonn believed, two points are of prime importance.

(1) Moscow controlled its empire by the rule of force. Soviet armaments were designed according to the global interests of a superpower. This could lead to an acceleration of the already dangerous arms race. At the same time, it seemed perfectly clear that the Soviet Union respected the status quo in Europe and was willing to conclude an agreement on the renunciation of force. West Germany was directly confronted by the troops of the Warsaw Pact, but there seemed to be no danger that the Soviet Union wanted to use them in an offensive way. Moscow wanted and needed stability in Europe.

(2) The main reason for the Soviet attitude could be found in the difficult relations the Soviet Union had with China, but above all in the structural weakness of the Soviet superpower. It was strong militarily, but weak politically and economically. Its empire was in a state of crisis. In his analysis of Soviet policy after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Bahr concluded that the Soviet decision stemmed from fear rather than self-confidence. Brandt concurred with this view and envisaged further conflicts within the Soviet power structure due to the growing feeling of national identity and to the impact of modern technology and economy on the Soviet political system. To be certain, not all members of the SPD leadership agreed with Brandt’s view that the communist countries could not avoid political reforms and a transformation leading to some sort of Westernization. But there is no doubt that the Brandt-Bahr school of thought, which formed the basis of the
The perception of the Soviet Union as a power that posed no immediate threat to Western Europe and that was even dependent on cooperation with the West was the starting point for Brandt’s grand design. He knew very well that one could not expect any linear progress in East-West relations, to say nothing of a Soviet retreat from power in Central Europe. But in a long-range perspective, Ostpolitik could contribute to the change of power structures in the East and launch a process of peaceful change to the advantage of the West and of Germany in particular. Before change could be achieved, rapprochement had to be practiced. Rather than staring at the enemy in the East, the West should try to establish new ways and means of communication. Talking to each other instead of meeting like duelists and confidence building by communication were key elements in Brandt’s philosophy. Before he met Brezhnev on the occasion of the signing of the Moscow Treaty in August 1970, Brandt stressed the importance of getting to know each other better. A more liberal flow of information and a communicative dialogue could help to deconstruct the Cold War paradigm and to overcome the Soviet suspicion towards the West and its general ignorance of the Western world. Hopefully, the enemy image of the Federal Republic could be removed and the allegedly hostile Federal Republic would no longer be used as an excuse to discipline the member states of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet interest in improving the lines of communication became obvious when Moscow proposed to establish a “back channel” in December 1969. In September 1971, Brezhnev invited Brandt to have an exchange of views on bilateral and international issues without any formal agenda. After the meeting, Brandt was convinced that the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic had entered a phase of normal relations between two independent states that naturally included both conflict and cooperation: “Both sides know where they agree, where a rapprochement is conceivable, and where they have differences.”

Differences remained unchanged on the ideological level. Détente in international affairs ran parallel to anticommunism in domestic affairs. A strictly anticommunist stance was also helpful in quieting American critics of Ostpolitik such as John McCloy or Dean Acheson, both “distinguished American dinosaurs from the occupation age” who had shaped post-war policy towards and in Germany. In a long letter to McCloy, Brandt emphasized that Ostpolitik was embedded in the Western policy of détente and did not ignore the conflict “between communism and democracy.”

128 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 1 (2003)
Change through rapprochement did not mean change in the West. Although he could not say so publicly, Brandt believed that a “normalization” in East-West relations, based on the renunciation of force and the de facto recognition of the territorial status quo, would ultimately “change the Warsaw Pact.” By undercutting German-Soviet enmity, Ostpolitik might influence Soviet politics for the better. Even a reduction of Soviet armaments seemed conceivable. As a matter of fact, Ostpolitik did not have such an immediate response. Contrary to Brandt’s somewhat optimistic hopes, the buildup of Soviet arms continued. The “European alliance for peace” remained on the agenda, but only in a rather vague long-term perspective. As to the impact of the German-Soviet rapprochement on defense and security concepts, Defense Minister Schmidt warned against any illusions. He did not deny that a “new era” in East-West relations might have begun. Nevertheless, any “euphoric propaganda” should be avoided. Schmidt was in favor of détente but he did not believe in Bahr’s formula “change through rapprochement.” He did not hesitate to show his skepticism in conversations with American officials. In his view, Ostpolitik had to be a continuation of the balance of power policy by different means. The Treaty of Moscow had not eased the overall security problem in Europe.

Schmidt’s perception was shaped by his thinking in terms of security whereas Brandt and Bahr tended to look at the Soviet Union as a power that was going to enter a policy of cooperation. By consenting to increasing contacts with the West, Moscow would not be able to avoid reforms and peaceful change. The “transformation of the other side” was a central goal that Brandt had already announced in the early 1960s. The Soviet leadership did not overlook the dynamic and even offensive elements of Ostpolitik, but it did underestimate them. Moscow felt reassured by the de facto recognition of the existing borders. At the same time borders were going to lose their significance. Making them more permeable and opening up the East via the media, modern technologies, and economic cooperation would have severe consequences for Eastern societies. Furthermore, the Brandt government disputed the Soviet view that frontiers in Europe were forever unalterable. There was a “real conflict of interests,” as Bahr put it. “The Soviet goal is to legalize the status quo. Our goal is to overcome it.”

Ostpolitik aimed at far-reaching goals. The Federal Republic had something to offer but at a certain price. It was prepared to respect the postwar realities in Europe but expected something similar from the Soviet Union. Bonn asked Moscow to pay up. It had to accept an agreement on Berlin which stabilized West Berlin and its ties with the Federal Republic. The German question was kept open, contrary to the original Soviet and East German wishes. Bahr was right when he qualified the
agreements that his government was striving for as a step to change the status quo rather than cementing it. What Bahr had in mind was the eventual revision of the postwar order. Ostpolitik was to induce gradual change in Eastern Europe. Economic and technological cooperation as well as cultural contacts were expected to lead to a gradual change in the East. Trade relations could be interpreted as a contribution to peaceful relations with the East, but also as a lever to transform it. As Bahr wrote to Kissinger in 1973, the expansion of trade with the East would produce frictions within the communist countries and necessarily contribute to their evolution.

With respect to the German Democratic Republic, Ostpolitik went beyond a strategy of just penetrating its society and political system. Realists in the GDR knew that it was an “aggression in felt slippers.” As the GDR leadership could not avoid “dealing with the devil,” it further fortified the German-German border, built up the Stasi apparatus, and started a campaign for a separate socialist identity for the GDR. Confronted with the East German fortress mentality, the Brandt government could only pursue its short-term objective, namely the enlargement of contacts between the two German states. At the same time, it never accepted the East German position and only respected, but did not recognize the German-German border. Time and again, it stressed that unification by peaceful means must remain a possibility. On the one hand, Ostpolitik, as mentioned above, enhanced the self-recognition of the Federal Republic as a separate West German state with interests of its own. On the other hand, Ostpolitik pursued an all-German policy. Earlier than the Christian Democrats, the SPD and FDP decided to accept the existing situation and adapt their language to the political realities by differentiating between the interests of the nation, which was divided into two states, and the interests of those two separate states. Ostpolitik should serve both the interests of the Federal Republic and the interests of the German nation.

Observers in the West understood this very well and often made too much of it. There was a fear that the Brandt government could be seduced by the Soviet leadership into loosening its ties with the West if the Soviets offered concessions with regard to the question of German unity. The way Bonn conducted its policy did not support this uneasiness. Rather it was founded on the underlying perception of the Germans. Was “Rapallo” really dead? How sustainable was the westernization of the Germans? The German self-perception as a country firmly committed to the West and the perception of Ostpolitik in the White House, the Elysée, or 10 Downing Street differed at times. Ostpolitik was never blocked. According to the official wording, the United States supported “the general policy of the FRG.” But Ostpolitik was regarded as a policy full of risks.
Kissinger’s view was influenced by the legacy of German nationalism.72 Prime Minister Edward Heath put it bluntly, “Close relationships between Germany and the Soviet Union had seldom been to our advantage in the past.”73 Nixon, who despised the “socialists” in Bonn, disclosed his thoughts to Heath when he called Ostpolitik “a dangerous affair.”74 Kissinger, who was asked by Nixon for his opinion, advised that it was important “to distinguish between the things that had already happened in Ostpolitik and the long-term dangers. What had happened up to now was not dangerous. What the long-term change might be was another matter.”75

Only a few days later Kissinger, in his talk with Ehmke mentioned above, did not voice these reservations. The explanation seems to be quite simple and was given by Ehmke himself when he pointed out to Kissinger that the success of Ostpolitik, including an agreement on Berlin, would also be in the interest of the U.S. Indeed, a year later, when he met Brandt in Key Biscayne, Nixon acknowledged the achievements of Ostpolitik that had smoothed the way to better East-West relations. Consequently, he was most interested in having the Moscow Treaty ratified by the Bundestag prior to his own summit with Brezhnev.76 The cooperation between the White House in Washington and the Chancellery in Bonn turned out to be more significant than the subcutaneous images of the Germans and the doubts concerning their reliability. In March 1972, Kissinger proposed meetings with Bahr every three months. “For the first time,” Bahr noted, “the conversation with Kissinger could be described as cordial.”77 Bahr would have been extremely pleased if he had had a chance to read what Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger’s aide in the National Security Council, wrote in November 1972, just before the Basic Treaty was initialed on November 8 and Brandt won the early elections on November 19: “The treaty in effect fully Germanizes the German question, with the Allied role even in West Berlin being relegated to minor importance. It is astonishing in how many areas the East Germans have agreed to open themselves up to dealings with the FRG. Brandt has gone a long way toward achieving the Annäherung which Bahr set out as a policy objective a decade ago. The East German regime, to ensure his success at the polls, has decided to take the risk that this will cause some Wandel in its internal structure too and in its relations with West Germany.”78

Notes

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reassure the Germans and our other Allies that we remain committed to the Alliance, whose
mission has always been to defend Western Europe, not to liberate Eastern Europe. And of course we should improve our consultative procedures in NATO with regard to events in Europe, in the Mediterranean, and elsewhere as well.

But the fundamental question, and it is fundamental, lies between us and the Soviets.

At least since the first Czech crisis of 1948–1949, we have not intervened in areas of Europe liberated by Soviet troops. Perhaps we should have insisted in the late forties on Soviet fulfillment of the promises made at Yalta and Potsdam—promises of free elections in Eastern Europe, and in Germany. But we didn’t. We didn’t press for the elections. We allowed the GDR to be established, and frozen in place. We did nothing about Czechoslovakia in 1949, East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, or the Berlin Wall in 1961. […]

Our policy has been to induce the Soviets to show a similar respect for our interests, on our side of the line—in Greece, Berlin, Iran, Korea, the Middle East and Viet-Nam. To persuade and indeed to require them to accept this rule must continue to be a major goal of policy.

On the basis of that rule—but only on that basis—we can pursue the quest for detente. Our policy of bridge-building is not a matter of sentiment, but of our vital interest—and of world interest—in avoiding nuclear or any other kind of war with the Soviets. It never rested on the premise that the Russians have become gentlemen, but on a bleak recognition of the fact that they are powerful and dangerous, and that their eventual acceptance of the idea of peaceful co-existence is indispensable to the possibility of peace. 

17 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 411.
19 Brandt, Erinnerungen, 213.
23 Minute by Morgan, Head of the Western European Department in the FCO, May 9, 1969. PRO, FCO 33/566.
26 Brandt, Erinnerungen, 189; Scheel at a meeting of a committee of the FDP, September 5, 1970. ADL, A12/92.
28 Brandt, Erinnerungen, 190.
29 Memorandum of the conversation between Bahr and Kissinger, October 13, 1969. AAPD 1969 II 1114–1118. There is also a memorandum by the Department of State for those parts of the talks in which Hillenbrand participated, October 13, 1969, and an assessment by Kissinger in a memorandum to Nixon, October 20, 1969. NA, Nixon Presidential Materials (Nixon), Files of the National Security Council (NSC), Country Files Europe (CF), Box 682. See also Bahr, Zeit, 271–272; Kissinger, White House Years, 410–412.


34 Kissinger, *White House Years*, 410, 528–529.


37 Bahr during American-German conversations on the occasion of Brandt’s visit to Washington, April 10, 1970. NA, RG 59, Central Files, Box 2304.

38 There is a long series of letters and verbal communications, starting with Brandt to Nixon, March 22, 1970. AAPD 1970 I 507–508.


43 Report by Schmidt to a party committee of the SPD, August 25, 1969, AdsD, Parteivorstandsprotokolle.


45 Notes on various consultations with foreign policy experts who were invited to discuss the matter in the Foreign Office in Bonn in September 1968. AdsD, DB 399/2 and 399/3.

46 Brandt during a meeting of the party executive of the SPD, November 1–2, 1968. AdsD, Parteivorstandsprotokolle.


49 After having talked to Kossygin Bahr discovered a certain unfamiliarity with the West (”eine gewisse West-Fremdheit”). Bahr to Brandt, March 7, 1970, AAPD 1970 I 403. See also report by Brandt to the party executive of the SPD, September 14, 1970. Brandt used Bahr’s expression and pointed out that Brezhnev had never met any Western statesmen before. “The most Western politician whom Brezhnev had met before was Ulbricht.” AdsD, Parteivorstand der SPD, Sitzungsprotokolle 32.

51 Notes taken by Brandt, September 18, 1971, WBA, Bundeskanzler 92.
54 “Normalisierung verändert WP.” Notes by Brandt when he prepared carefully for a cabinet meeting on June 7, 1970. WBA, Bundeskanzler 91.
55 Brandt, Begegnungen, 397.
57 Schmidt to Brandt August 13, 1970. WBA, Bundeskanzler 18.
58 Privately, he told E.L. Richardson, Under Secretary of State, on April 9, 1970 that, with respect to MBFR, there should be a NATO initiative. “If worthwhile results were not obtained, the effort would at least produce, for the benefit particularly of the new generation, current evidence of hard realities. Indeed, he said, this applies to Brandt’s Ostpolitik generally.” NA, RG 59, Central Files, Box 2304.
64 Ibid.
69 See, e.g., Brandt to Olof Palme, June 15, 1970; Brandt to Brezhnev, April 24, 1973. WBA, Bundeskanzler 58.
70 For this differentiation, see a memorandum from Bahr to Brandt, November 10, 1970 and a press release by the SPD, December 14, 1970. AdsD, DB 398B/1 and Pressemitteilung Nr. 477.
71 Memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers, July 7, 1970. NA, RG 59 Central Files, Box 2304.
72 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982), 146–147.

74 Memorandum of conversation, December 17, 1970. PRO, FCO 7/1842. For “grave reservations” about Ostpolitik, see also Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), 735.

75 Memorandum of conversation, December 17, 1970. NA, RG 59 Central Files, Box 2657.

76 For Brandt’s account of the meeting on December 28 and 29, 1971 see Brandt, Begegnungen, 395–409.


78 Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, November 7, 1972. NA, Nixon, NSC, CF, Box 687.