THE MISSING LINK: HENRY KISSINGER AND THE BACK-CHANNEL NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN

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Few diplomats have been more identified with the means of their diplomacy than Henry Kissinger with the practice of linkage. As Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and later as Secretary of State, Kissinger linked “separate objectives” as a source of leverage, especially in relations with the Soviet Union. The primary object of Kissinger’s strategy was Vietnam; the principal subject was Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. In February 1969, Kissinger and Dobrynin established a “confidential channel” in Washington to exchange views on “delicate and important matters.” Throughout his first two years in office, Kissinger repeatedly used this channel to tie a settlement in Vietnam to agreements elsewhere, including the Middle East and arms control. Repetition apparently served to enhance his reputation. When Kissinger promised trade liberalization in exchange for an “understanding attitude” on Vietnam in September 1969, Dobrynin noted his “unusual ability to link things together.”1 The following month, President Nixon used the channel to reiterate the connection in his foreign policy between Moscow and Hanoi. “[I]f the Soviet Union found it possible to do something in Vietnam, and the Vietnam war ended,” Nixon told Dobrynin, “the U.S. might do something dramatic to improve Soviet-U.S. relations, indeed something more dramatic than they could now imagine.”2 The Soviets, however, were not ready to play their part. As Nixon later recalled: “I was disappointed but not surprised by the apparent ineffectiveness of our attempts in 1969 to get the Soviets to apply pressure on North Vietnam.”3

Kissinger was not the only diplomat to practice linkage. Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt’s foreign policy advisor, used similar tactics in his negotiations with the Soviets on a renunciation of force agreement. The primary object of Bahr’s strategy was Berlin; the principal subject was Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. During three rounds of talks from January to May 1970, Bahr repeatedly warned Gromyko that a bilateral treaty in Moscow would be tied to a quadripartite agreement on Berlin. During their first meeting, Bahr declared: “Déjàtente and normalization in Europe must include Berlin.”4 Before signing the Moscow Treaty in August, Brandt reiterated the importance of a Berlin agreement in a meeting with Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev. “I said we would ratify the Moscow Treaty,” Brandt later explained, “only when the Four Powers had concluded their negotiations satisfactorily.”5 The language may have been
different but the idea was the same: Bonn would not proceed in Moscow without progress on Berlin. Although annoyed by the requirement, the Soviets understood the realities behind this junktim or “package deal.” During a meeting with Foreign Minister Walter Scheel near Frankfurt in October, Gromyko conceded that ratification of the Moscow Treaty would require a “satisfactory” settlement on Berlin.6

After two years, the results of linkage, therefore, were mixed: Bahr had succeeded in Berlin but Kissinger had failed in Vietnam. In diplomacy, failure, like success, may be fleeting. As Bahr reached a crossroads between Moscow and Berlin, Kissinger reached a turning point between Moscow and Beijing. In spite of the confidential channel, the Soviets had not delivered the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table. Kissinger, however, was not ready to abandon his strategy. In December 1970, several developments turned in his direction. On December 9, President Nixon received a message from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai inviting a “special envoy” to Beijing for a discussion of Taiwan. On December 14, one week after Brandt signed a renunciation of force agreement with Poland, workers in Gdansk sparked a popular movement to protest an increase in food prices, leading six days later to a change of government in Warsaw. And on December 21, Horst Ehmke, head of the chancellery in Bonn, met Kissinger at the White House to seek American support for an “intensification” of the four-power talks in Berlin. These developments—all of which exposed Soviet vulnerabilities—allowed Kissinger to practice what he preached. In an impressive display of geopolitical geometry, Kissinger began to use triangular diplomacy with Beijing and the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin to force an improvement of bilateral relations with Moscow. This time, the primary object was not a settlement in Vietnam but a summit in the Soviet Union.

On December 22, Kissinger met Dobrynin at the White House to review the “general state” of Soviet-American relations. In spite of recent Soviet provocation, including harassment of Allied corridors to West Berlin, Kissinger emphasized Nixon’s desire to improve the atmosphere between the superpowers. “We are at a crossroads in our bilateral relationship,” he declared. “We have the choice between letting this chain of events continue and making a fundamental attempt to set a new course.” Dobrynin also listed a number of incidents that the Soviets found irritating. The French and West Germans, for instance, claimed that the Americans were “holding up progress” in the quadripartite talks on Berlin. Dobrynin, however, welcomed Kissinger’s suggestion that “frank exchanges between us can help to remove imagined differences based on misunderstanding as well as to make progress on real issues.”7 Within one month, Kissinger and Dobrynin began a series of “frank exchanges” that would change the course of East-West relations. Previous accounts

GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 1 (2003) 81
have emphasized the impact of such “real issues” as China and SALT in the diplomacy that followed. Using recently declassified materials on Kissinger’s role—memoranda of his meetings with Dobrynin, tapes of his conversations with Nixon, and his messages with Ambassador Kenneth Rush in Bonn—this paper will re-examine a “missing link” in his strategy: the “back-channel” negotiations on Berlin.

After their meeting in December, Kissinger and Dobrynin spent several weeks discussing how to arrange a “strictly confidential exchange of views.” On January 23, 1971, Dobrynin, who had just returned from an “extensive review” in Moscow, reported that the Kremlin was eager to conduct secret talks with the White House on Berlin. Dobrynin also mentioned that Brandt believed Kissinger was “the only person who understood German conditions enough to break through the logjams created by [the] bureaucracy” in Washington. Kissinger, who needed little encouragement to exclude the Department of State, replied that he needed time to include Bahr and Rush in his plans. He emphasized, however, the “extreme delicacy of the bureaucratic situation in which these matters were being handled. Total discretion was essential; if this failed we would simply have to interrupt this channel and he [Dobrynin] would have to take his chances through ordinary procedures.” The Soviet Ambassador did not need the reminder. “So the future of Soviet-US relations is in our hands,” Dobrynin remarked, “and I want you to know we are going to make a big effort to improve them.”

By the end of January, Kissinger had already circumvented the bureaucracy on Berlin. On January 27, Jim Fazio of his personal staff arrived in Bonn to arrange for Bahr and Rush to visit Washington as soon as possible. Four days later, Bahr met Kissinger not in Washington but aboard an airplane bound for New York from Cape Kennedy. Such measures were necessary, Kissinger claimed, due to “Foreign Office jealousies in Bonn and State Department problems here.” After a brief exchange on the issues, Kissinger and Bahr discussed the procedures necessary to expedite a Berlin agreement. Bahr told Kissinger that Brandt would “welcome with enthusiasm any bilateral Soviet-American conversations.” The two men then agreed to supplement the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel by installing a “secure communications link” between Washington and Bonn. Kissinger described the procedures to Dobrynin on February 2: “Bahr would tell me what the German Government might be willing to consider; I would discuss this with Rush. If they both agreed, I would discuss it with Dobrynin; if the three of us agreed, we would introduce it first in the Four Power Western group and subsequently in the Four Power talks on Berlin.” On February 4, Kissinger not only reviewed these arrangements with Rush in Washington but also established the “secure communications link” via a U.S. naval intelligence officer in
Frankfurt. The “back channel,” which would eventually lead to an agreement on Berlin, had become operational. After establishing the procedures, Kissinger and Dobrynin met on February 10 to discuss the substance of a settlement. Dobrynin stated that the Western draft agreement, which the Allies had tabled five days earlier, was “unacceptable as it stood.” Rather than defend the draft, Kissinger began to debate the details, including the constitutional status of parliamentary party group meetings in West Berlin. Dobrynin complained that the Germans were too legalistic on federal presence and the Americans too principled on access. Kissinger replied that a “constructive solution” required not only a balance between the two but also concessions on both sides. Changing the subject to format, Dobrynin noted that the Soviets had already agreed to a three-power Allied declaration on federal presence. Would the Allies, he asked, accept a unilateral Soviet declaration on access? Kissinger, who considered the proposal a “distinct possibility,” promised to solicit comments from Rush and Bahr. During their meeting six days later, however, Kissinger refused to discuss Berlin until Dobrynin explained recent Soviet naval deployments in Cuban waters. The two men exchanged charges of arrogance and aggravation but not respective messages from Bonn and Hanoi. This “chilly atmosphere” did not last long. Although he apparently received no explanation on Cuba, Kissinger indicated on February 22 that the United States was willing to accept a unilateral Soviet declaration on access, which Dobrynin called a “considerable step forward.” When Kissinger offered to prepare talking points on federal presence, Dobrynin even expressed “extreme eagerness to come to an understanding on the question of Berlin.”

The Americans were also eager for an agreement. On February 12, Kissinger urged Rush to send proposals to the White House rather than the Department of State. “[T]he President for other reasons,” he noted, “seeks to be forthcoming but sensible.” Kissinger neglected to specify the “other reasons.” The Soviet ambassador understood even if the American ambassador did not. On February 4, Dobrynin assured Kissinger that a Berlin settlement would make “a very positive contribution to the Summit that we were planning.” The Soviets, in other words, were practicing linkage, tying progress on the summit to progress on Berlin. Kissinger, meanwhile, told Nixon on February 23 that his talks with Dobrynin on Berlin might lead to an agreement by the end of April, “depending on how quickly we can move the Germans.” “The only pity is,” he remarked, “you won’t get the credit.” Nixon, however, needed credit on Berlin to get a summit in Moscow. He, therefore, demanded that Rush inform Brandt of the president’s “personal role in these negotiations.” Three weeks later little had changed: the White House offered
formulations on Berlin but the Kremlin deferred a summit announcement. Even Kissinger’s messages remained the same. “For a variety of reasons,” he reminded Rush, “the President is anxious to keep this channel open.”

The talks in the channel were not insulated from developments elsewhere. On February 24, Rush reported that politics in Bonn precluded too much diplomacy in Berlin, particularly on federal presence. The Allies, therefore, adopted a strategy to force the Soviets to focus on access first. “Until we have a good tentative access agreement,” Rush explained, “Brandt cannot move on federal presence, nor can we.” Two days later, Kissinger followed this advice with predictable results. Although Kissinger delivered a proposal on access, Dobrynin refused to reciprocate on federal presence. For three weeks, Kissinger waited for Dobrynin to respond, while Dobrynin waited for Kissinger to offer something else. As Kissinger informed Rush: “We seem to have reached the same deadlock you have in Berlin.”

Dobrynin finally relented on March 15 by raising another issue. Moscow might approve access procedures, he suggested, if Washington supported an increase of Soviet presence in West Berlin. After the meeting, Kissinger and Rush agreed that the suggestion merited further consideration.

On March 18, Dobrynin gave Kissinger something no one else in the West had: a Soviet draft agreement on Berlin. The gift brought responsibility as well as opportunity. When Kissinger requested permission to consult Rush, Dobrynin agreed but insisted on secrecy since Abrasimov, who planned to table the draft on March 25, had not yet seen the text. Although he later claimed that it “withdrew most of the concessions made during the previous month,” Kissinger informed the president at the time that the draft “on first reading, is acceptable.” “I think we should use Berlin,” he told Nixon, “just to keep [Dobrynin] talking.” Rush saw the Soviet move in a more positive light, particularly the decision to use the channel before tabling the draft at the talks. “This action strengthens my own feeling,” he explained in a message to Kissinger on March 21, “that the Soviets desire to reach a Berlin agreement in order to obtain ratification of the German-Soviet treaty.”

During a meeting the next day, Kissinger told Dobrynin that the Soviet draft reflected progress on some points but presented problems on others. Rather than discuss matters in detail, Kissinger promised to give Dobrynin a list of general and specific comments, which Rush had enumerated in his latest message. Kissinger also brought Rush’s formulations on several issues to a meeting on March 25. Upon examination, Dobrynin complained that the channel had evidently not encouraged flexibility. Kissinger retorted that Washington had already been more forthcoming than Moscow. “[A]ll the channel guaranteed,” he explained,
“was greater speed, not greater concessions.” Dobrynin did not contest the point but tested the waters instead, asking repeatedly whether, except for Rush’s reservations, the draft was acceptable. Although he disclaimed interest in negotiation, Kissinger promised to check on several issues, including Soviet and West German presence in West Berlin.32

As Dobrynin returned to Moscow, the Four-Power ambassadors met in Berlin for formal talks on the Soviet draft. The French and British did not know about the informal talks in Washington; but the Soviet ambassador nearly revealed the secret. Kissinger and Dobrynin had agreed that Abrasimov and Rush should meet privately in Berlin to discuss the draft in detail.33 During a conversation with an American official on March 23, the Soviet representative requested a private meeting by alluding to recent contact between their respective governments. Rush feared that Abrasimov, who was suddenly recalled to Moscow instead, was trying to torpedo the talks in Washington.34 Although each side blamed the other, both agreed that Abrasimov and Rush should try again. The result, however, was the same. In spite of the arrangements, Abrasimov failed to meet Rush on April 16, leading to another round of recrimination. Rush again suspected Abrasimov of sabotage but speculated that the Soviets had decided that “private talks are useless until the Western reaction to their draft agreement is received.”35

The Soviets were preoccupied with other decisions. The 24th Party Congress, which met in Moscow from March 30 to April 9, was an important turning point for the Soviet Union. During the congress, Brezhnev finally established his authority in foreign policy as well as domestic politics.36 In his report to the delegates, Brezhnev outlined a program to implement the “principle of peaceful coexistence”—and to complement the Moscow Treaty by negotiating a Berlin agreement.37 Policy-makers in Washington closely followed the proceedings in Moscow. On March 31, Kissinger told Nixon that Brezhnev not only indicated his commitment to détente but also acknowledged that the Moscow Treaty and a Berlin agreement were linked. “There could be a nuance here,” he suggested, “reflecting recent talks in our channel.”38 Not known for such subtlety, the Soviets reached a different conclusion. After the party congress, Brezhnev convened the Politburo to review the tactics of Soviet diplomacy. According to Dobrynin, Gromyko convinced his colleagues that a four-power agreement was more important than a superpower meeting.39 Without the nuance of diplomatic parlance, the Soviet message was clear: a Berlin settlement must come before a Moscow summit.

On April 23, Kissinger and Dobrynin met at the White House to resume their secret talks. Dobrynin delivered a “draft letter” on SALT, which Kissinger accepted as the basis for further discussion. The two men also agreed to solve the Abrasimov problem by having Rush meet pri-
vately instead with Valentin Falin, who would soon present his credentials as Soviet ambassador in Bonn. The atmosphere changed, however, when Dobrynin stated that “he did not think a visit [to Moscow] was likely until after the Berlin question was settled.” Kissinger, who recognized the tactic, rejected the message out of hand: Nixon would accept no conditions on the summit. Dobrynin tried in vain to explain the difference between reality and requirement in his statement. “[I am] familiar with that formulation since I [have] used it very often to justify the theory of linkage,” Kissinger replied, “and I simply [want] to stress that it [is] an unacceptable formulation to use towards the President.” Later that afternoon, Kissinger briefed Nixon, who approved his handling of Dobrynin. In spite of the approval, Kissinger was not optimistic. “The Germans have screwed it up to such a fare-thee-well,” he told Nixon, “that they may not be prepared to yield anything.”

The Germans were busy with preparations of their own. On April 24, Bahr met Kissinger in Vermont to deliver a draft agreement on Berlin. Where the Allies and Soviets had asserted principles, the Germans emphasized practicalities. According to Kissinger, Bahr suggested that “both sides drop the legal justifications for their positions and work instead on describing their practical responsibilities and obligations.” After giving Bahr support for his “ingenious suggestion,” Kissinger secured Nixon’s approval by pointing out the political benefits. “[T]his has the great advantage,” he explained, “that if [the Soviets] don’t play ball, we just tell Rush not to come to any meetings.” The Soviets did not want to be left on the sidelines. When Kissinger reported on April 26 that Bahr proposed to limit the agreement to “juridically neutral formulations,” Dobrynin accepted in principle, pending approval from his superiors. The two men agreed that Falin, Rush and Bahr could meet secretly in Bonn to work out the details. The next day, Kissinger also gave Dobrynin a copy of the German draft. Kissinger, however, noted a dichotomy in Soviet decision-making between “the rapidity of their responses on Berlin and the slowness of their responses on SALT.” Dobrynin conceded that the Soviets were more interested in the quadripartite than the strategic arms limitation talks. The Soviets were also concerned about Ping-Pong diplomacy. If the United States was using China to blackmail the Soviet Union, he warned, the reaction in Moscow would be “very violent.” Kissinger assured Dobrynin that nothing could be further from the truth. Three hours later, Kissinger received the message inviting him for a “direct discussion” of Sino-American relations in Beijing.

Unaware of the Chinese invitation, the Soviets approved the German initiative on May 3. The stage was now set for informal talks in Bonn; but Kissinger first arranged a more formal meeting in Washington. On May 4, Alexander Haig, Kissinger’s deputy, demanded that Dobrynin
explain why the Soviet SALT delegation recently floated a proposal that Kissinger had rejected six weeks earlier. The American delegation thought the Soviet move was a possible breakthrough; Kissinger thought it might lead to a breakdown of the channel. Rather than introduce the Soviet proposal, Haig began the meeting by handing Dobrynin a recent message from Rush, which, he believed reflected a constructive approach. “[B]oth the President and Dr. Kissinger were now, however, beginning to question the value of this special channel,” he reported, “because of various actions taken on the Soviet side.” Dobrynin may have thought Haig was bluffing. Kissinger, therefore, called him on May 11 to demand that the Kremlin negotiate only in the channel; otherwise, the White House would allow both SALT and Berlin to languish in official negotiations. To strengthen his hand, Kissinger then instructed Rush not only to cancel private meetings with Falin but also to “cool matters” with Bahr. The next day, Dobrynin gave Kissinger a new draft letter on SALT, clearing the way for the “breakthrough” one week later.

Although the obstacles in Washington had been “substantially removed,” Kissinger notified Rush on May 12 that any postponement of the secret talks in Bonn would still be “very helpful.” His instructions resulted in a one-week delay of the second meeting. By all accounts, the first meeting, which took place as scheduled on May 10, was successful. Falin, Rush and Bahr all agreed to emphasize neutrality over legality in revising the German draft. According to Rush, Falin was much more flexible than Abrasimov and clearly wanted to expedite a satisfactory settlement on Berlin. “A continuation of this type [of] approach,” he informed Kissinger, “could lead to substantial progress and possibly a final agreement in the near future.” During the next several weeks, the trio focused on a pair of issues: federal presence and access. Bahr, for instance, accepted that ties between West Berlin and West Germany need not be “special” and that transit could proceed on the basis of “international practice,” thereby addressing political concerns in East Berlin. Falin, meanwhile, conceded that the agreement could refer to the “western sectors of Berlin” rather than “Berlin (West),” thereby addressing political concerns in Bonn. Without the usual obstructionism, Rush remained unusually optimistic. “[T]here is a fair probability,” he reported to Kissinger on May 28, “that the Berlin talks [will] move ahead quite rapidly by virtue of the Russians taking an easy position on all the remaining issues.”

Kissinger watched these developments with a mixture of approval and apprehension. The White House hoped to exploit the linkage the Kremlin had established between a Berlin settlement and a summit agreement. According to Kissinger, this strategy required a two-pronged approach on Berlin: to delay the talks as insurance for SALT and to expedite...
the talks as incentive for the summit. Although these maneuvers appeared contradictory, Kissinger could only advise Rush “to avoid being stampeded into too rapid a pace.”58 The news from Bonn, therefore, was both good and bad. Kissinger told Nixon on May 29 that the secret talks were going so well that an agreement was possible by the middle of July. The president, however, did not want success in one European capital to upset his plans to visit another. “Can we keep Berlin from breaking,” he asked, “if they don’t agree with the summit?” Kissinger not only reassured Nixon but also resolved to give Dobrynin an ultimatum at their next meeting: If Moscow did not agree on the summit, Washington would not agree on Berlin.59 The denouement was not so dramatic. When they met on June 8, Dobrynin raised the issue by commenting that “it would be better to have the Summit after the Berlin negotiations were concluded.” Kissinger, who was already preparing for Beijing, did not threaten to torpedo the Berlin talks; he merely stated that if the Soviets did not agree to the summit by the end of the month, the Americans would defer the decision until the end of the year.60

After the session on June 6, Rush and Bahr went to Washington to accompany Brandt during a visit to the White House. Nixon and Kissinger first met Rush on June 14 to review the role of Berlin in their strategy. Without revealing his plans to visit Moscow and Beijing, the President confided that Berlin was part of “a game at the very highest level with the Russians.” The name of the game was politics not diplomacy. “Berlin is something they need from us a hell of a lot more than we need it from them,” Nixon declared. “We’re going to make them pay.”61 Before his meeting the next morning, Nixon was more circumspect, asking Kissinger to give Brandt “the line that he needs to hear.” “I don’t know what the hell I’m talking about,” he remarked, but “I don’t want to say that we’re enthusiastic about Ostpolitik.”62 Nixon not only tempered his views for Brandt, however, but also tendered his support, promising to take a strong stance in order to achieve a satisfactory settlement on Berlin. “What is at stake,” he stated, “is the whole Federal Republic, and its future and its position, your position as a leader, your whole Ostpolitik, etc. I mean, Berlin is the key.”63 At a meeting with Rush and Dobrynin on June 21, Kissinger approved procedures for the final round: Falin, Rush and Bahr would finish the agreement in Bonn; then Rush and Abrasimov would introduce the text in Berlin. “[I]f nothing new happened,” he told Dobrynin, “the three would agree by the end of July on a Berlin solution and the Four Powers by the end of August.”64

Before the talks resumed in Bonn, however, Rush reported that the channel had been compromised at a working-level meeting in Berlin on June 9. During the meeting, Jonathan Dean, the American adviser, had opposed an attempt by Yuli Kvitsinsky, the Soviet adviser, to introduce
draft language from the secret talks in Bonn. Kvitsinsky then revealed what he assumed Dean already knew: that there was “a direct, very high-level link between Moscow and Washington on the subject of the Berlin talks.” Although he suspected sabotage at first, Rush surmised that the incident might have been accidental. He, therefore, suggested that Kissinger do nothing to harm either of the advisers, who had established a close relationship. When they met to discuss this “impossible situation” on June 28, Dobrynin assured Kissinger that the indiscretion was not deliberate but agreed that some rectification was necessary. On the same day, Falin told Rush that, in his view, Abrasimov was trying to torpedo the talks. After summoning the Soviet principals to Moscow, Gromyko concluded instead that Kissinger was brewing a tempest in a teapot. The foreign minister reprimanded his adviser for the record but, as a practical matter, told him to forget the channel and forgo its formulations.

On June 28, Falin, Rush, and Bahr returned to Bonn for another month of secret talks on Berlin. The three men made up for lost time by first tackling the sections on access and federal presence; both were substantially resolved by July 6, including the controversial provision precluding “constitutional and official acts” in West Berlin. The talks also produced considerable progress on the travel and communications of West Berliners, formulations complicated by the legal status of the East German capital. According to Rush, Falin was largely responsible for concessions on these issues, lobbying the leadership not only in Moscow but also in East Berlin. The Soviets, if not the East Germans, were clearly determined to settle with the Allies. Falin reported that even Gromyko was eager for an agreement, making an appeal to Brezhnev unnecessary. The West Germans, well aware of Soviet willingness to cooperate, were also anxious to finish as soon as possible. Rush noted this anxiety with alarm: Bonn might blame Washington if something went wrong on Berlin. As Rush reported on July 14: Brandt and Bahr already had “a deep fear that the Russians may change their minds and attitude for some reason, such as suspicion that the United States does not want an agreement.”

Kissinger wanted an agreement on Berlin—but not before the announcement of his secret trip to Beijing. For three weeks, the White House sent messages to the Ambassador in Bonn, urging him to delay the talks but providing little in the way of explanation or suggestion. Before the final round even began, Kissinger informed Rush that he was “a little bit disturbed by the pace of your negotiations.” “It is imperative,” he insisted, “that you do not come to a final agreement until after July 15 for reasons that will become apparent to you.” Rush followed these instructions carefully, managing, in particular, to defer consideration of two major issues—West German representation and Soviet presence—until
the end of July. The White House, however, was not satisfied. Four days before Kissinger arrived in China, Dobrynin delivered the latest Soviet response on the summit. Haig notified the president and Kissinger that the response appeared to be “a holding action seeking both delay and further progress in areas of interest to the Soviets.”72 Haig then directed Rush, not once but twice, to employ delaying tactics on Berlin.73 After the announcement of his trip, Kissinger modified his instructions. “You can proceed with deliberate speed,” he told Rush on July 19, “but leave a little margin as long as you can. We still do not have Moscow’s reaction to the Peking caper.”74 Dobrynin gave Kissinger his personal reaction that afternoon. Although uncertain about the impact of China, Dobrynin expressed confidence in Soviet-American relations, including the prospects for agreement on the summit and Berlin. In an effort to avoid further misunderstanding, the Soviet ambassador also announced his intention to remain in Washington for most of the summer to “work on our relationship.”75

For the next ten days, Rush worked to finish the Berlin agreement with little or no interference from Kissinger. By mid-July, the only outstanding issues were West German representation and Soviet presence. Moving beyond legal questions to more practical matters, the final round involved the trade of West German passports for a Soviet consulate general. Bonn and Moscow were both eager for an agreement but not for the abandonment of their respective positions. The Soviets, however, were more inflexible. Rush reported on July 23 that Falin and Abrasimov were taking a “strong and unyielding” stance for the consulate general.76 He, therefore, requested authorization, in both official and back channels, to exploit the proposal as “a source of leverage in the Berlin negotiations.”77 The White House never responded but the Department of State did, denying the request.78 Rush, meanwhile, did not hesitate. Before receiving either Kissinger’s approval or Rogers’ denial, Rush conceded the issue to Falin on July 27. “Without the consulate general,” he explained to Kissinger, “it is questionable whether any agreement could be secured, certainly not one having the strength that has been tentatively agreed upon.”79 The next day, after reviewing the entire text—including draft provisions on West German representation and Soviet presence—Falin, Rush, and Bahr reached the “final tentative agreement.”80 The “Bonn triangle” had concluded the political settlement; the quadripartite talks in Berlin would attend the diplomatic details.

“The White House—Bonn—Kremlin backchannel,” Kissinger declared in his memoirs, “made possible the conclusion of the four-power negotiation on access to Berlin.”81 This statement, like others in his published recollections, contains elements of both fact and fiction. In spite of vague references to the “relevant area,” the quadripartite agreement was
about Berlin; but it covered much more than access. The final settlement
rested on a two-part trade: improved access procedures for reduced fed-
eral presence; and West German passports for a Soviet consulate general.
The "treaty complex" fully earned its designation. Even Martin Hillen-
brand, who, as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, directed
the formal negotiations, was impressed with its complexities. "[O]ne can-
not help but be struck," Hillenbrand remarked, "by the peculiar juxta-
position of umbrella agreements with a congeries of subordinate agree-
ments not negotiated or signed by the same parties who signed the basic
Agreement." Whether Kissinger himself understood its "intricacy and
esoteric jargon" is questionable. Rush, at any rate, thought that Kис-
singer "really didn’t understand the Berlin agreement very much, be-
cause he was spread so thin." 

Kissinger’s claim that his diplomacy “made possible” the Berlin
agreement remains controversial. That the agreement was negotiated by
back channel is a matter of historical record. Less historical is the asser-
tion that it could not have been otherwise. Jonathan Dean, who played a
key role on both levels, recently argued that the distinction between
formal and informal negotiations was artificial. “As far as Ambassador
Rush was concerned,” Dean noted, “I believe that he used in the back
channel and in the front channel the material that we prepared for him on
all of the aspects of the Berlin agreement.” 

Not every critic of Kissinger has been as diplomatic. David Klein, the U.S.
Minister in Berlin, spoke for many of his colleagues when he countered:
“We didn’t need the back channel. The deal would have come out not a
great deal differently.”

Whether or not the Department of State could have negotiated a
settlement on Berlin by itself is a matter of speculation. Whether or not
the White House made it possible, on the other hand, is a subject for
scrutiny. Nowhere is such scrutiny more necessary than of the apparent
connection between the quadripartite agreement and triangular diplo-
macy. Rush, after all, reached his secret agreement on Berlin two weeks
after Kissinger returned from his secret trip to Beijing. According to
Nixon and Kissinger, this was not a coincidence; this was the result of
their calculations. The “China announcement,” Nixon declared in his
memoirs, led to “progress on a Berlin settlement.” Kissinger likewise
claimed that Berlin and other issues in Soviet-American relations “began
magically to unfreeze” after his return from Beijing. Kissinger’s subor-
dinates were also impressed with the importance of this connection.
“Playing the China card was clearly a success,” William Hyland argued.
“Within a few weeks, there was a breakthrough in the Berlin talks.” The evidence supports a different conclusion. From May to July, Bahr and Falin constantly pressed Rush to expedite their talks in Bonn. Kissinger, however, deliberately delayed an agreement on Berlin until after his trip to Beijing. When the talks then resumed in Bonn, the Soviets were inflexible, conceding nothing that had not already been conceded before. Kissinger, in other words, could have had a “satisfactory” settlement in June—before the announcement of his secret trip. Playing the China card may have been a success; but it did not lead to a breakthrough on Berlin.

Kissinger did not use China as leverage to get a better deal on Berlin; he used Berlin as leverage to get a better deal elsewhere. Berlin was always a means and never the ends in Soviet-American relations. Whatever his diplomacy may have “made possible,” the junktim between ratification of the Moscow Treaty and a “satisfactory” settlement on Berlin allowed Kissinger to practice linkage with the Soviets. Kissinger recalled one example of how he used this tactic in his memoirs: “Whereas I held out on Berlin to speed progress on SALT, Gromyko slowed up SALT to accelerate the discussions on Berlin.” Although they often discussed both SALT and Berlin, neither Kissinger nor Dobrynin made progress in one dependent on progress in the other. SALT was too important, and too impervious, for such treatment. For Kissinger, the price of an agreement on Berlin was instead a summit in Moscow. While both sides began to link the two issues in February, the Soviets formally decided in April that the White House must settle on Berlin before the Kremlin would agree to a summit. Dobrynin, who initially doubted the wisdom of this decision, later judged that “progress in the Berlin talks was also the result of the implicit linkage with the summit.” The announcement of agreements on Berlin in September and on the summit in October, however, looked like the consequence of the announcement in July of Nixon’s trip to China. This was hardly conducive to the image of Soviet foreign policy. Kissinger, meanwhile, had discovered a source of diplomatic weakness in Moscow—a source that he would continue to exploit for another year. After two years of stalemate, Berlin had replaced Vietnam to become the “missing link” in Kissinger’s strategy to improve relations between the superpowers.

Notes

1 Memorandum of Conversation, September 29, 1969. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), NSC Files, Box 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969 [Part 1].
2 Memorandum of Conversation, October 20, 1969. NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 489, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1969 [Part 1].


6 Arnulf Baring, Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel, (Stuttgart, 1982), 349. See also Brandt, My Life in Politics, 190.

7 Memorandum of Conversation, December 22, 1970. NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 3. See also, Henry Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston, 1979), 801.


9 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents, (New York, 1995), 209–211.

10 Memorandum of Conversation, January 23, 1971. NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [Part 2]. See also Kissinger, White House Years, 804–805, 833; and Dobrynin, In Confidence, 211.

11 Memorandum from Fazio to Kissinger, no date; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush—Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. See also Kissinger, White House Years, 807.


13 Memorandum of Conversation, February 2; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [Part 2].


16 Memorandum of Conversation, February 10; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [Part 2]. See also Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 814, 826.

17 Memorandum of Conversation, February 16; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [Part 2]. See also Kissinger, White House Years, 651.

18 Memorandum of Conversation, February 22; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 4 [Part 2]. See also Kissinger, White House Years, 814, 826.

20 Memorandum of Conversation, February 4; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 490, President’s Trip Files, Kissinger/Dobrynin, 1971, Vol. 4 [Part 2].


24 Message from Kissinger to Rush, March 3; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. See also Kissinger, White House Years, 826.

25 Memorandum of Conversation, March 15; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 2]. See also Kissinger, White House Years, 826.


29 Message from Rush to Kissinger, March 21; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. Rush added that the move also reflected the Soviet desire to “move towards a conference on European security.”

30 Memorandum of Conversation, March 22; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 1]. See also Kissinger, White House Years, 826–827.

31 Oral Note from Kissinger to Dobrynin, March 23; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2].

32 Memorandum of Conversation, March 25; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 1]. See also Dobrynin, In Confidence, 216–217.

33 Memorandum of Conversation, March 22; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 1]; and Message from Kissinger to Rush, March 22, 1971, ibid., HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2]. See also Kissinger, White House Years, 827.

34 Messages from Rush to Kissinger, March 24 and 28; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2].

35 Message from Rush to Kissinger, April 19; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [2 of 2].


38 Diary Entry, March 31; H.R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, the Complete Multimedia Edition, (Santa Monica, CA, 1994); and Memorandum from
Kissinger to Nixon, March 31; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 714, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XII.


40 Memorandum of Conversation, April 23; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 1]. See also Kissinger, *White House Years*, 817, 827–828, 834; and Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 220–221.


43 Memorandum of Conversation, April 23; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 5 [Part 1]. See also Kissinger, *White House Years*, 828.

44 Memorandum of Conversation, April 27; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 2]). See also Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 221.

45 See Kissinger, *White House Years*, 713–714.

46 Message from Kissinger to Rush, May 3; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2].


48 Memorandum of Conversation, May 4; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2].


51 Memorandum of Conversation, May 12; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 1].


56 Messages from Rush to Kissinger, May 14, June 4 and June 6; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2].


59 Memorial of Conversation, June 8; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 2]. See also Kissinger, *White House Years*, 834.


64 Memorandum of Conversation, June 21; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 491, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 6 [Part 1].

65 Message from Rush to Kissinger, June 26; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2].

66 Memorandum of Conversation, June 28; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 57, Country Files, Europe, Berlin and European Security, Vol. II [1 of 2].

67 Message from Rush to Kissinger, June 29; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2].


70 Message from Rush to Kissinger, July 14; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2.

71 Message from Kissinger to Rush, June 28; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1 [1 of 2].

72 Memorandum from Haig to Nixon, July 6, and Message from Haig to Kissinger, July 5; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Part 2]. See also Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 225.


75 Memorandum of Conversation, July 19; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [Part 2]. See also Kissinger, *White House Years*, 835–836; and Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 226–228.

76 Message from Rush to Kissinger, July 23; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2.

77 Messages from Rush to Kissinger, July 23 and July 28; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2; and Telegram 9190 from Bonn, July 28; NARA, RG 59, Central Files, POL 38–6.

78 Telegram 138285 to Bonn, July 29; NARA, RG 59, POL 17 USSR-GER B.

79 Message from Rush to Kissinger, July 28; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2.

80 Message from Rush to Kissinger, July 29; NARA, NPMP, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2.

81 Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, (New York, 1999), 604.

83 Kissinger, White House Years, 823.


85 Transcript from Conference on American Détente and German Ostpolitik, German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, May 10, 2002. See the “Statements and Discussion” section of this volume.

86 Transcript from Conference on American Détente and German Ostpolitik, German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, May 10, 2002. See the “Statements and Discussion” section of this volume.


88 Nixon, Memoirs, 523.

89 Kissinger, White House Years, 766–767.


91 Kissinger, White House Years, 814.

92 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 223.