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Echoing a well-known quotation from Bismarck, Willy Brandt said in 1964 that politics is “the art of making something that seems impossible possible.”¹ By politics, he meant above all West German foreign policy and intra-German policy. “Something that seems impossible” was, from the viewpoint of Western officials in the 1960s, the restoration of the unity of the German state. According to the preamble of the Federal Republic of Germany’s constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), unification ought to take place in freedom. Because Germany’s division was tied to the particular security needs of its neighbors and the confrontation between the military blocs, a European peace order was necessary to make the “impossible” happen. That order would have to guarantee two things: security from Germany, including a united Germany, and security for Germany by means of détente, confidence-building measures, and disarmament on the part of the two antagonistic alliance systems. It was necessary to “think the unthinkable” twenty years after the establishment of the two German states—Egon Bahr appealed to the members of the Foreign Ministry’s planning staff in 1968–9—in order to develop goals based on national interests; an operational, offensive plan of action to achieve these goals would be necessary.²

The motto coined for West Germany’s Ostpolitik and its inner-German policy at the beginning of the Social Democratic-Free Democratic (SPD-FDP) coalition in the fall of 1969 was to “think the unthinkable” to “make the impossible possible.” This applied especially to relations with the Kremlin, where, in Brandt and Bahr’s opinion, the key to solving Europe’s security problems and thus to German unity lay. Although the efforts at a re-orientation of West German foreign policy had been labeled “new” in the three years of the “grand coalition” between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats (CDU/CSU-SPD), it was the Ostpolitik and inner-German policy of the Brandt era that deserved this distinction. Something came about that Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger did not fully achieve: a profound change in German politics and a departure from previous political patterns.³

What was really new in the policy of the Brandt-Scheel government? To answer this question, I will first give a brief overview of the initial conditions in foreign and domestic policies when the SPD-FDP coalition
came to power in October 1969. Then I will discuss how the SPD-led government perceived the Kremlin’s policy, a perception that was not unimportant for the subsequent negotiations with Moscow. My main focus, however, will be the German-Soviet talks in 1970 that resulted in the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. I will not deal with all the topics that were at issue during the West German-Soviet talks, but rather concentrate on what was, in my opinion, essential in regard to the German question.

The fierce domestic policy dispute in the early 1970s between the SPD-FDP government and the CDU/CSU opposition over treaties with certain Central and Eastern European states obscured the fact that it was the Grand Coalition that had laid the foundations of this policy. Even if the coalition partners no longer agreed on foreign policy at the end of their “temporary marriage,” it was the Kiesinger-Brandt government that initiated the change of policy on the German question and in dealing with the Eastern bloc. The new approach of seeking to restore the unity of the German state by pursuing a policy of détente within a European peace order was based on a consensus between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. And there was also a consensus among the three parties about the strategy of maintaining the option of peaceful change of the status quo in Europe by means of agreements with the states of the Eastern bloc, including the German Democratic Republic, on the renunciation of the use of force. In the end, though, the political will of the coalition partners did not suffice to keep the policy change on track. The relapse of the CDU/CSU to the non-recognition policy of the Adenauer era must be blamed on the lack of success with its Ostpolitik efforts and intra-German policy. In this context, however, one should not forget that the lack of success in Ostpolitik and intra-German policy in this period was due in large measure not only to Moscow and East Berlin but also to Prague and Warsaw because of their hesitant response to Bonn’s efforts at achieving an understanding.

That a new Ostpolitik and intra-German policy followed the change of government in Bonn was also tied to the simple fact that the beginning of the Brandt era coincided with the Kremlin’s departure from its uncooperative stance toward the West. In a talk with his East German counterpart in early September 1969, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko reported, “Thus far, we have only exchanged documents, but now we want to proceed with negotiations with the West German side.” In addition, the Social Democrats and Free Democrats held almost identical views on foreign and intra-German policy views, which made it easier to translate “the unthinkable” into policy. Since the construction of the Berlin Wall, both parties had tried to correct the previous political positions toward Eastern Europe and the GDR. In many aspects, the two
parties’ positions were similar, as had become clear through an ongoing exchange of ideas they had begun in 1967. The coalition partners were agreed in their willingness to extend international communication, i.e. to integrate the Soviet Union fully into a foreign policy dialogue and to develop new ideas on a security partnership. They were also ready to revise the picture of the Soviet Union as negotiating partner by giving up the old-fashioned enemy images from the height of the Cold War. Another indication of the SPD and FDP’s realism was their willingness to look upon the territorial status quo in Europe as being unchangeable for the time being. The combination of these two developments—a greater willingness for dialogue with the East bloc and the openly expressed will to recognize existing borders and spheres of influence in Europe—is the fundamental difference separating Ostpolitik and intra-German policy of the Brandt-Scheel government from the policies of its predecessors.

But the SPD-FDP coalition’s openness to dialogue with the Kremlin did not mean, as was time and again insinuated by the opposition, unilaterally giving up its own position and giving in to Soviet maximum demands. For East-West communication to function, the Soviets also had to show the ability to enter into dialogue. In the opinion of the Social Democratic chancellor and his aides, negotiations aimed at putting relations on a sound basis made sense only if, Brandt said, the Soviet leadership stopped stirring up a “primitive and excessively hostile attitude toward the Federal Republic of Germany” in its sphere of influence, reduced its “unfamiliarity with the West” (“Westfremdheit”), and expressed a willingness to enter into a de-ideologized dialogue on facts. Perception of the Kremlin’s policy and its position toward the Federal Republic of Germany was, in other words, an important factor as the SPD and FDP drafted their new Ostpolitik and future negotiating strategy during the change of government in Bonn in 1969.

Perceptions were all the more important because the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia to crush the “Prague Spring” of 1968 and the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine reinforced notions of threat dating from the height of the Cold War. During the Brandt-Gromyko meeting on the occasion of the UN General Assembly in October 1968, the West German foreign minister did not get answers to “new and pressing questions” that he saw arising from the Soviet actions. In an address to the SPD leadership, Brandt, who based his views on a decision by the NATO foreign ministers, said the uncertainty, as far as geography was concerned, surrounding Moscow’s hegemonic claims and “our limited ability to foresee Soviet decisions” could be addressed only by a continuous “exchange of opinion with the Soviet Union about open political ques-
The West did not show much concern for the ideological content of Soviet policy, but rather took a more pragmatic view. This was in part a result of the undisputed view that one should not expect the “Soviet Union to try to use its influence in Western Europe in a dangerous way.” But, as Brandt wrote to a party colleague, a foreign policy free of “ideological and other prejudices” was a precondition for foreign policy to “concentrate on the interests of our state.”

Between December 1968 and the 1969 Bundestag election, Brandt and Moscow’s ambassador held a series of talks, which were not publicized. These talks were supplemented by an exchange of opinion and information on the party level. For the West Germans, the main concern was to get as accurate a picture of Soviet intentions as possible and to present themselves as a partner with a serious interest in treaty negotiations. The Soviet Union plainly conveyed to the SPD that it was also willing “to make a new beginning” in its relations with the Federal Republic, especially if the future government was led by a Social Democrat. The SPD should consider this willingness for talks and, as Gromyko underlined in his conversation with Brandt in New York during the UN General Assembly in September 1969, for “all forms of contact” a “very important signal by the Soviet government.” This view also corresponded with the impression that an FDP delegation and Helmut Schmidt received during their trips to Moscow in the summer of 1969 at the invitation of the Soviet Union. In talks with Scheel, Genscher, and Mischnick, Kossygin had confirmed the Soviets’ great interest in better relations and increased economic exchange between the two states. Helmut Schmidt not only attested to “a certain degree of pragmatism” on the part of his interlocutors, but he also vouched for their “very strong . . . and . . . very credible . . . wish for mutual touch and mutual contact” After the change of government in Bonn, Kossygin let Brandt know that the chancellor could turn to him at any time “with all kinds of questions.” This was an offer that the Soviet leader clarified a little bit later with his proposal to set up a “confidential channel” between Brezhnev and the chancellor. But, as the foreign policy experts of the new SPD-FDP government were aware, this strong Soviet willingness to enter into negotiations did not say anything about what the Soviets might be willing to agree to or what concessions and compromises they were willing to make, particularly on the German question. Even at the beginning of 1970, the German foreign minister considered the signals from the Kremlin to be “strangely diverse” and “strangely sparkling.” That is why it was an important task during the Allardt-Gromyko talks and later during the Bahr-Gromyko talks to find out to what extent German interests could be asserted.

The interests that the Federal Republic of Germany pursued with its Ostpolitik and its intra-German policy under the Brandt government...
and that it wanted to assert in the negotiations with the Soviet Union were much more clearly defined. The new Ostpolitik and intra-German policy consisted in large part of an active adaptation to the Western course initiated by the Grand Coalition. This course was characterized by a serious interest in easing the rigid front between the blocs and improving relations by the dual strategy of security and détente laid down in the Harmel report. It was the prime task of the West German policy to reduce the “gap of détente” that existed between the American and the German policies towards the Eastern bloc and to end the West German “special conflict” with the U.S.S.R. and its allies.

According to the plan that was developed by Egon Bahr in 1968-69, the new Ostpolitik and intra-German policy should take into account four framework conditions:

- the U.S. interest in easing tensions in relations with the USSR and its allies;
- the Soviet policy dilemma of trying, on the one hand, to safeguard its sphere of influence and, on the other hand, to allow an opening to the outside and to loosen the reins at home to make possible an absolutely necessary increase in economic efficiency;
- the continuation and possible deepening of the division of Germany;
- the impending international recognition of the GDR, which could hardly be stopped.

Proceeding on the assumption that the FRG was firmly embedded in the Western alliance, the SPD-FDP government focused its Ostpolitik and intra-German policy on the idea of a European peace order. Basically, this policy tried, on the one hand, to achieve an overdue understanding with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe: through agreements on the renunciation of force and the recognition of existing borders, the Federal Republic sought to achieve a “normalization” of relations with its eastern neighbors. On the other hand, by including the GDR in the policy of treaties, the relationship between the two German states would be formally clarified. The FRG thus hoped that with such an approach “the material elements of the treaty [with the GDR] and the starting points for a discussion on relations contained therein will gain political weight and will have a positive effect on overcoming division.” The FRG sought a modus vivendi on the basis of recognition of the “existing real situation” in Europe, including Soviet hegemony over the East bloc. But this modus vivendi should also leave open the option of overcoming the status quo. The Soviet Union, in contrast, was interested in legalizing the European status quo.

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The policy of the West German government was not aimed at balancing this “genuine difference of interest” between Bonn and Moscow, but at asserting its own interests. The Brandt-Scheel government took advantage of the Soviets’ pressing desire for increased economic and technical cooperation and their hopes for convening a European security conference (ESC). Bonn declared its willingness to contribute to meeting these requests. In a confidential note to the chancellor, Egon Bahr wrote, “There will be no ESC without the Federal Republic. This is our leverage.” He continued, “This leverage serves the bilateral renunciation of the use of force,” but it will become “all the weaker, the closer the ESC theoretically comes without us having achieved this bilateral renunciation of force.” He added that a loss of time would mean a “loss of time for the government to take action” on the international and domestic stage. This is why Bahr advocated a “continuation of the initiated policy, and this without haste but swiftly and unwaveringly” as well as negotiations with the Soviet Union. He also wrote that the treaty should be completed by the summer of 1970 at the latest.

The chances for quick negotiations were not bad because, in the preparatory stages of the talks, the West German government met Soviet requests for intensified economic cooperation and made two unilateral moves: it signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and recognized the existence of the GDR as a state. These moves were aimed at emphasizing German goodwill but were also intended to relieve the pressure on two points that were very important to the Soviets. The Soviets were particularly grateful to West Germany for signing the NPT; nonetheless, Gromyko, on Kosygin’s order, subsequently tried, to no avail, to establish a link-up between the negotiations on the treaty and the West German ratification of the NPT.

The immediate intervention of Egon Bahr, who replaced Ambassador Allardt as negotiating leader in January 1970, was important for the momentum of the discussion process because it resulted in an extension of the basis of negotiations. The point was no longer to reach “a concrete agreement on limited aspects of the renunciation of force,” as Allardt had been instructed, but rather to work out the guidelines with the leading Eastern power. This discussion aimed at paving the way for a treaty with the Soviet Union, but also for follow-up treaties with other members of the Warsaw Pact, including the GDR. With this approach, the Brandt-Scheel government took into account the Kremlin’s willingness to accept the grand coalition’s proposal for an agreement on the renunciation of force as a basis for negotiations. It also realized that the desired treaties with the Soviet Union’s allies could hardly be concluded without a previous agreement with Moscow. By the same token, there was reason to assume that an agreement with the Soviet Union would exert pressure.
on the GDR to follow suit and give up its maximum demands if it wanted to avoid continued isolation in foreign policy. At the beginning of February 1970, Bahr persuaded his Soviet interlocutors to attempt to take stock of all previous talks in order to maintain pressure on the GDR and to not restrict German-Soviet negotiations to bilateral questions. He presented a so-called non-paper, the basic version of the “Bahr paper” that became public later. It contained a list of questions that needed to be discussed and settled. They were put in the context of a treaty with Moscow and follow-up treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR. The fact that these envisioned treaties were an “overall entity” was also accepted in the final version of the paper that was agreed upon with the Soviet Union. It summarized the German-Soviet exchange of opinion in ten guiding principles and was actually the basis for the text of the treaty and the closely linked joint declaration of intent by both sides.

Before the treaty was completed, however, both sides had to find a solution to their previously mentioned “genuine conflicting interests.” The “dominant dual question” in the negotiations was “how and to what extent—with respect to content and form—the status quo and a new modus vivendi could be put forward in a new treaty.” This referred primarily to the question of European borders, a very controversial question in the Bahr-Gromyko talks, and, closely linked to it, the question of future relations between the two German states. In order to dampen Soviet expectations concerning this question from the onset, Bahr told the Soviets at Christmas in 1969 that a “recognition of the GDR according to the principles of international law was [. . .] out of the question.” Instead, he was striving to “[lay] down the rules that regularize relations” between the two German states, and these rules “had the same binding character as the ones with all other [nations] but with a prospect for German self-determination that depended on the development of history.” The fact that the new SPD-led German government considered the German question to be open ran counter to the Kremlin’s wish for a definite recognition of existing European borders (and thus of its sphere of control extending to the Elbe). For Gromyko, however, Bonn’s willingness to make binding its position that it would not use force to bring about a change in borders did not go far enough. Bahr conceded that in principle it was acceptable not to change borders at all, but he also said Germany would not give up its interest in pursuing reunification. He said, “This is impossible and would not have any effectiveness. The border that we want to change is the border with the GDR.” As much as the Soviets insisted on the affirmation of the unchangeability of the intra-German border in the German-Soviet treaty, Egon Bahr wanted to raise the prospect of the restoration of German unity in the treaty. At this point, a failure of the negotiations could not be ruled out. Gromyko told Bahr,
“If we are unable to agree on borders and relations between the FRG and the GDR, we will be unable to reach an agreement with you.” However threatening this may have sounded, his remark “we have patience” nevertheless signaled a willingness for a continuation of the dialogue.\(^{30}\) A few days later in East Berlin, the Soviet foreign minister indicated that there was still a certain latitude for negotiations on the Soviet side. Instead of Ulbricht’s demand that the inner-German border must be mentioned in the treaty, the Soviet comrade expressed the wish that it should be mentioned.\(^{31}\) This was perhaps only a tactical ruse to change the mind of the stubborn East German leader. But the West Germans did not learn about this exchange, and Gromyko remained intransigent in his talks with Bahr.

The problem was solved by excluding it from the treaty. Bahr suggested that the incompatibility of positions on the German question could be noted by both sides and that both sides could give assurances to the other that the treaty would not affect their incompatible goals. Bahr added, “This does not mean a violation of the renunciation of force, and both sides are fully aware of this.” He said that instead of putting forward this view in the treaty, the West German side could also “imagine an exchange of letters.”\(^{32}\) But the path to “the letter of German unity” was still very long.\(^{33}\) From the Soviet point of view, an exchange of letters was out of the question. Bahr’s proposal that only the Federal Republic would write such a letter was rejected at the outset even though Bahr said that “not even a confirmation of receipt” was necessary.\(^{34}\) Only when the Soviet side made acceptance of such a letter dependent on explicit mention of the recognition of borders in the text of the treaty did things get moving again.\(^{35}\) In the end, after tough negotiations, the Soviet text referred to recognition, while the German version used the term acknowledgement instead.\(^{36}\) The German side could accept this link-up and mention of the inviolability of the intra-German border because the Soviet Union had conceded that adherence to the goal of unification of West and East Germany would not be questioned by the Moscow Treaty.

Gromyko was not willing, however, to make any concessions on the problem of Poland’s western border along the Oder-Neisse line.\(^{37}\) He categorically rejected the West German demand that the explicit mention of the final border stood under the Four Powers’ reservation of rights and of a peace treaty. He was not impressed by the view that such a position would jeopardize the constitutionality of the treaty in the Federal Republic. The West German government tried to resolve this problem by stressing that it wanted to put greater emphasis on the article on the European borders by “concretizing the article on the renunciation of force [. . .] with a phrase linking both articles.”\(^{38}\) Walter Scheel told his counterpart that this “border article” should mean “the concrete application of the renun-
ciation of force to the sector of territorial integrity and to borders.” He
gave assurances that it was not the FRG’s intention to open the gate to
revisionist tendencies, as Gromyko feared. “We respect the territorial
integrity and borders in Europe. We do not have any territorial demands
and will not raise such demands in the future,” Scheel told him.39 But
only after relying on the “back channel” between Bonn and Moscow, a
personal intervention by Bahr, and a decision of the Politburo of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union did the Soviet side approve this
“bridge” between both articles.40

At the same time, the German negotiating delegation was interested
in pointing in its interpretation of the treaty to the rights of the Four
Powers and in expressing its reservations concerning the peace treaty
without provoking immediate Soviet protests. In his talks with his Soviet
negotiating partner, Scheel said on August 1, 1970, that “without men-
tioning that a peace treaty is still pending, the treaty will be impossible.”
Finally, the two foreign ministers coordinated the West German note to
the governments of the three Western powers. Gromyko said, “If you
address the peace treaty in your letter to the Western powers, I will
remain silent.” He added, “I will only say what is my position concerning
these rights and that this has nothing to do with the treaty.”41 This, then,
was the text, couched in diplomatic language, that was sent by the gov-
ernment in Bonn as a “verbal note” to the governments in Washington,
London, and Paris.42 At the beginning of August 1970, the treaty was
finally ready to be signed. In a letter to Brandt, Bahr wrote from Moscow
on August 1, 1970, that the “scope of action in the negotiations [. . .] has
now been exhausted.”43 The first of the treaties with the Eastern Euro-
pean nations, the Moscow Treaty, was signed ten days later. Kosygin and
Gromyko signed it for the Soviet Union, and Brandt and Scheel for the
Federal Republic of Germany.

Brandt believed the Moscow treaty provided the opportunity not
only for more political and economic exchange between the Federal Re-
public and the Soviet Union and the West and the Soviet Union, but also
“though this proved wrong, for a reduction in Soviet armaments.”44 The
German chancellor made efforts to convince the Western allies, especially
the Americans, that the treaty, as an important part of his Ostpolitik, and
the Western policy of détente were mutually supportive and motivated
by the same interest in relaxing the rigid front between the blocs. As
Gottfried Niedhart wrote, “If approached in a proper way, Ostpolitik—as
an integral part of the Western policy of détente—might influence Soviet
politics for the better.”45 At the same time, Brandt warned against illu-
sions. “Setbacks,” he underlined in a letter to Nixon, “are common prac-
tice in Soviet tactics.”46 Furthermore, the West must remain on guard,
since it would never know for how long the Soviet Union was prepared
to respect Western interests. Thus Brandt, according to the memoranda and notes from his talks with the Soviet leaders in 1970 and 1971, took note with pleasure of Brezhnev’s pledge that Soviet policy did not intend to undermine the Western alliance. As Brandt commented, both sides demonstrated “strict and full loyalty to [their respective] allies” and understood where their “agreements, rapprochements, [and] differences” lay. At the same time this meant, as Brandt wrote to John J. McCloy, that the conflict between communism and democracy, between the two systems, would go on and remain to be resolved, but without resorting to military force. By starting a process of confidence-building, the enmity between the West and the East should be transformed in a “conflict under control,” as Helmut Schmidt explained in a speech before the Bundestag.

Schmidt, who is not known as a very emotional person given to euphoria, described the Moscow Treaty in a letter to Brandt on August 13, 1970, as a “great step forward,” and he hailed the beginning of a “new era” in East-West-relations. He based his conclusion on the following observations about the agreement and its consequences:

- the treaty did not remove the fundamental differences between communism and democracy;
- the treaty did not result in any need for changes in the relations between Bonn and its Western allies;
- the treaty in no way questioned the dual strategy of security and détente, it did not alter German dependence on Western support and the solid safeguard of NATO, but it also made evident that Ostpolitik was an independent German initiative and that the Brandt-Scheel government was a driving force of détente;
- and not to forget: “the treaty left room to manoeuvre with respect to peaceful change of the European status quo.”

The concept of the inviolability of borders laid down in the Moscow Treaty—in contrast to the unchangeability of borders that the Soviet side had long demanded—was accepted in all subsequent treaties with the Eastern European nations as well as the in so-called Letter on German Unity that was added to the Moscow Treaty. This marks the most important success of the new Ostpolitik and intra-German policy. The government had succeeded in putting forward in a treaty the prospect for the restoration of German unity. In addition, by recognizing the status quo and thus Soviet dominance in the East bloc, the SPD-FDP government had, as paradoxical as it may sound, opened up the possibility of influencing the GDR and of improving the situation in West Berlin through the hegemonic power in the Eastern alliance. The government in Bonn subsequently made wide use of this new ability.
The new Ostpolitik was basically an intra-German policy, or, in the words of Gottfried Niedhart, a new, peaceful form of revisionism. As Timothy Garton Ash has written, “To diminish the consequences of the division of Germany and Berlin was not the only but the most important goal of the new beginning which the Bonn government sought with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.” In this respect, relations with the USSR and the Moscow Treaty were of decisive significance.

Notes


5 See, for example, Ash, Im Namen Europas, 87, 90; Potthoff, Im Schatten der Mauer, 59–61, 75; Günter Schmid, Politik des Ausverkaufs? Die Deutschlandpolitik der Regierung Brandt/Scheel (Munich, 1975), 22; see also Henry A. Kissinger, Memoiren 1968–1973 (Munich, 1979), 109–11, 441–442.


8 Niedhart/Alpert, Neue Ostpolitik und das Bild der Sowjetunion, 28.

9 Speech given by Willy Brandt at a common meeting of the SPD executive, party council and control commission, August 25, 1969, and summary of the talks in Moscow given by Willy Brandt at a meeting of the SPD executive, September 14, 1970, in AdsD, SPD-Parteivorstand, PV-Protokolle.
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see also, for example, the memorandum of conversation between Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Semen Zarapkin, September 2, 1968, the memorandum of conversation between Willy Brandt and Michel Debré, September 7, 1968, the memorandum of conversation between Willy Brandt and Andrej Gromyko, October 8, 1968, and notes taken by Dr. H. O. K. Oncken at a special meeting of NATO ambassadors, October 17, 1968, in Akten zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD [Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany]) 1968, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz and others, Munich 1999, 1069–76, 1103–8, 1290–3 and 1351–3; Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960–1975 (Hamburg 1976), 253–6, 285–6; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 210.

Interview with Willy Brandt, in Fuldaer Zeitung, October 20, 1970; Willy Brandt to Wolfgang Kiehne, March 15, 1972, in AdsD, WBA, A 8/28.

Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 256–61.


Summary on the talks of a SPD delegation (Schmidt, Möller, Franke, Selbmann) in Moscow given by Helmut Schmidt at a common meeting of the SPD executive, party council and control commission, August 25, 1969, in AdsD, SPD-Parteivorstand, PV-Protokolle; see also notes by Hans Rueter on the visit of the SPD delegation in Moscow, September 15, 1969, in AAPD 1969, 1001–8; Helmut Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte (Berlin, 1987), 25–6; Alex Moeller, Genosse Generaldirektor (Munich/Zurich, 1978), 384–401; Falin, Politische Erinnerungen, 56–7; Allardt, Moskauer Tagebuch, 208–9.


Speech given by Walter Scheel in the German Bundestag, January 15, 1970.

Loewenthal, Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik, 2.


Notes by Egon Bahr on a framework treaty with the GDR, September 18, 1969, in AAPD 1969, 1041.

Ibid., 1040. Already one year earlier Bahr’s analysis of the political situation after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and his concept for a new Ostpolitik focused on this “genuine difference of interests” between the USSR and the FRG (notes by Egon Bahr on Ostpolitik after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, October 1, 1968, in AAPD 1968, 1279); see also Link, Die Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrages, 304.

23 For more details, see Link, Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Brandt, 166–9; Link, Die Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrags, 307–9.


26 The text of the so called Bahr paper, the Moscow treaty and the closely linked joint declaration of intent by both sides were published in Zehn Jahre Deutschlandpolitik. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1969–1979 (Bonn, 1980), 156–8; AAPD 1970, 822–4; see also: Egon Bahr, Sicherheit für und vor Deutschland. Vom Wandel durch Annäherung zur Europäischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft (Munich/Vienna, 1991), 36.

27 Link, Die Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrags, 314; see also Ash, Im Namen Europas, 108.


30 Ibid., 117.


33 For details, see Link, Die Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrags, 317–8; Vogtmeier, Egon Bahr, 133–40.


40 Egon Bahr to Willy Brandt, August 1, 1970, in AdsD, WBA, A 8/2 (also in AAPD 1970, 1335–37, in particular 1336); notes by Walter Scheel on his talks with Andrey Gromyko, August 2, 1970, ibid., 1337–41, in particular 1341; see also Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 328–9; Zehn Jahre Deutschlandpolitik, 156.


43 Egon Bahr to Willy Brandt, August 1, 1970, in AdsD, WBA, A 8/2 (also in AAPD 1970, 1336); for the answer by Brandt, August 3, 1970, and its drafts see AdsD, WBA, A 8/2.


47 Summary of the talks in Moscow given by Willy Brandt at a meeting of the SPD executive, September 14, 1970, in AdsD, SPD-Parteivorstand, PV-Protokolle; handwritten notes by Willy Brandt on his talks with Leonid Brezhnev in Oreanda, September 18, 1971, in ibid., WBA, A 8/92.

48 Willy Brandt to John J. McCloy, March 24, 1971, in Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections, Re: John J. McCloy (AC 1916) Papers, Series 14 (Germany), Box GY 1, folder 27.

49 Speech given by Helmut Schmidt in the German Bundestag, February 14, 1972.


52 See, for example, Willy Brandt to Olof Palme, June 15, 1970, in AAB, Olof Palme Archiv, 3.2/051 B; see also Link, Die Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrags, 318, 323–4, 330–1; Ash, Im Namen Europas, 113–4.

53 Ibid., 116–7, 125.

54 Niedhart, The Federal Republic’s Ostpolitik, 290.

55 Ash, Im Namen Europas, 189.