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This issue of the *Bulletin* begins with the German Historical Institute’s 32nd annual lecture, delivered last November by the distinguished historian Paul Nolte (Freie Universität Berlin). In his lecture, titled “A Different Sort of Neoliberalism? Making Sense of German History Since the 1970s,” Nolte grapples with the question of how to characterize the current era — the decades since the 1970s — in German history. Seeking to move beyond characterizations of the era as “post”-something, Nolte argues that German history since the late 1970s has been characterized by a German variant of neoliberalism. This German variant, he argues, differed from the better-known British and American versions associated with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in three crucial ways. First, German neoliberalism is “soft”: its modifications of the German welfare state and economy have been made incrementally. Second, it is “governmental”: far from pushing for complete deregulation, German neoliberalism has drawn on state regulation to implement its agenda. Finally, German neoliberalism is “ecological,” that is, committed to environmental protection and sustainability. Nolte closes by pondering the thought-provoking question of whether recent advances in individual rights — especially for women and minorities — have been connected to the advance of neoliberalism or taken place in spite of it.

Our second feature article, “Berlin’s Grand Hotels and the Crisis of German Democracy,” presents the research of the winner of the 2018 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, which is awarded annually by the Friends of the German Historical Institute for the best dissertation in German history completed at a North American university. In this article, Adam Bisno, who wrote his prize-winning dissertation at Johns Hopkins University, takes an innovative approach to the history of Berlin’s luxury hotels during the Weimar Republic. Instead of writing a cultural history of Berlin’s grand hotels as glamorous places where high-society guests gathered, Bisno examines the business history of these establishments — and uses business history as a method for addressing questions of political history. Drawing on board meeting minutes, annual reports, and other business records, Bisno demonstrates that even though Berlin’s luxury hotels were controlled by men who thought of themselves as liberals, the luxury hospitality industry quickly got in the habit
of blaming its economic problems on the Weimar Republic, turning against the Republic long before the Great Depression.

A different aspect of the Weimar Republic forms the subject of our third article, “Images of the Collective: Shapes, Types, and Bodies in Interwar Germany.” In this article, GHI postdoctoral visiting fellow Simon Unger seeks to understand the appeal of Nazi propaganda calling for a new German *Volksgemeinschaft* by demonstrating that interwar intellectuals from the right and the left shared a focus on collective typologies as a means of defining the individual via the collective. Moving from Weimar photography to psychological and psychiatric debates, Unger shows how both democrats and anti-Republicans, including the Nazis, shared an obsession with biological and psychological human “types.” Nazism, he argues, should be understood as “one possible pathway resulting from Weimar’s images of the collective.”

The last two feature articles present GHI research in the fields of global and transatlantic history. GHI research fellow Sören Urbansky’s article “A Chinese Plague” examines anti-Chinese discourses in a comparative and transnational study of Vladivostok, San Francisco, and Singapore in order to compare discriminatory strategies in these three locations of the Chinese diaspora. Arguing that the late nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of the “yellow peril” as a global discourse, Urbansky shows how in each of these cities debates over health, hygiene, and housing revealed widespread suspicions that the local Chinese communities were riddled with undetected infectious diseases. Instead of addressing the social factors that caused overcrowding and a lack of hygiene, the host societies attributed filth and squalor to Chinese national character.

Claudia Roesch’s article “Love without Fear” analyzes the role that different knowledge networks played in family planning initiatives targeting immigrant families in the postwar era. Drawing on the history of knowledge as a heuristic device, Roesch’s comparative study of the West German and American cases analyzes the roles of four different knowledge networks in providing immigrant women’s access to reproductive knowledge. Because paternalistic attitudes, language barriers, and structural racism made it difficult for immigrant women to access formal medical knowledge networks in their host countries, most immigrant women relied primarily on semi-formal networks comprised of family planners and women’s
rights groups as well as informal networks consisting of family and friends. With the rise of satellite television and more affordable international travel, immigrant women also increasingly drew on formal knowledge networks in their home countries.

The conference reports in this issue reflect the Institute’s current focus on the history of migration, Jewish history, and digital history. Recent conferences on the history of migration included the 2018 Bucerius Young Scholars Forum, which was devoted to “Histories of Migration — Transatlantic and Global Perspectives,” the GHI’s 2018 GSA panel series on “The Nexus of Migration, Youth, and Knowledge,” as well as conferences on “Exile and Emigration in an Age of War and Revolutions, 1750-1830” and on “Knowledge and Society in Times of Upheaval.” In addition, we report on the concluding conference of a major collaborative research project, “Agents of Cultural Change: Jewish and Other Responses to Modernity, 1750-1900,” and on the GHI’s most recent digital history conference, on the topic “Reconstructing Historical Networks Digitally: New Approaches, Opportunities and Epistemological Implications of Social Network Analysis.” Please turn to our news section for recent GHI news. For up-to-date information on upcoming events, publications, fellowships, and calls for papers, please also consult our website — http://www.ghi-dc.org — as well as our Facebook page.

Simone Lässig (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)
Features
I. German Zeitgeschichte, the 1970s Strukturbruch, and the neoliberal conundrum

Oh, the times we’re living in! In our current situation of deep crisis, who might not, from time to time, wish to join in the laments that we are hearing on both sides of the Atlantic. Historians, however, have been trained to be wary of such generalized jeremiads. Indeed, they recognize the pattern behind such diagnoses. Since classical antiquity, it has been a constant trope in the self-fashioning of societies that the times are out of joint. Indeed, there is hardly a period in the past, certainly since the late eighteenth century, that was not experienced as a time of transformation and crisis by those living through it, or that has been interpreted as a time of crisis and structural change by later historians.

So, what times are we living in? The question becomes more complicated as well as more precise when it is turned from a rhetorical into an analytical one, and if it is applied not simply to the present moment but to the last three or four decades. We know many things that have “happened” since the 1970s or 1980s, and that we can be rather certain will appear in the history books of the later twenty-first century: the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet communist empire; the decline of the industrial economies that had emerged in the nineteenth century; the digital revolution and even, to be sure, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2016. But what does it all add up to? What label will be attached to the history of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century: the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet communist empire; the decline of the industrial economies that had emerged in the nineteenth century; the digital revolution and even, to be sure, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2016. But what does it all add up to? What label will be attached to the history of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries? As of now, it seems, there are many things in the box, but the box does not yet carry a name. Or, to refer to the Greek fable of the hedgehog and the fox, which was translated into modern intellectual history by Isaiah Berlin: Is the field of contemporary history still in the “fox mode,” knowing “many different things,” and unable to switch into the hedgehog’s capacity of knowing and defining the one big thing?1

1 Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953). — The author wishes to thank the German Historical Institute Washington for the invitation to deliver the 32nd Annual Lecture, especially its director, Simone Lässig. References have mostly been limited to the most relevant or exemplary literature, with an emphasis on the most recently published work.
This problem may be deemed irrelevant in two different ways. On the one hand, some might say: Here comes yet another one of those historians from Germany who, true to the hedgehog character, is more interested in grand synthesis than in original research. However, regardless of national patterns in the culture of scholarship, which unquestionably still exist, the search is on for a grand narrative and overarching theme of the recent era, and moreover, it has a bearing upon American history as well. Another response might be to say this effort is premature. To recognize the shape of a historical era, would it not have to be over, so that it can be described from a truly historical vantage point as a concluded past? Again, this is a valid objection. And yet, historians know very well that many “era labels” that have proved to be persistent categories originated with contemporaries — the age of enlightenment being perhaps the best-known example. For that reason alone, it is worthwhile to survey the terminology applied to the history of the past decades because, as the record shows: It may stay with us, and in the history books, for a long time.

Then again, our era does not quite appear to be a new age of enlightenment. It may even be its opposite. The last four decades are often framed as an age of decline and deformation. They do not even carry their own distinct name. Despite the fact that we are talking about a period of almost half a century, this time-span does not exist in its own right; it is a period of “post-something,” with its Archimedean point lying outside of itself, in the supposedly better times that are long behind us. In the vibrant German discourse on Zeitgeschichte, on making sense of the recent past, the assumption of a fundamental caesura in the 1970s has almost advanced to the status of a new orthodoxy. The end of the three-decade-long period of postwar boom, expansion, and cultural optimism is symbolically marked by the first oil crisis of 1973. But more than that came to an end: in political economy (and economic and fiscal policies) the era of Keynesianism that had originated in the interwar period, not least in the American New Deal, gave way to the new doctrines and policies of Chicago-style monetarism and neoliberalism. German historians such as Ulrich Herbert have argued that the 1970s even marked the end of an age of “high” or “classical” modernity that had spanned almost a century, beginning with the emergence of industrialized, highly urbanized, and increasingly technology-bound societies in the Western world in the late nineteenth century, such as in the Wilhelmine Kaiserreich. Or, it could be said that the glorious times of the “Modell Deutschland,” established from the ruins of the Nazi Empire, were over.
How, then, can we make sense of this recent past of “post-classicism” or “post-modernity,” to use the grand concept from cultural theory that has exerted a deep impact on historical writing about the recent past? Beyond those relational categories of “post-something,” other concepts that may suggest a synthetic understanding of the times since the 1970s are in wide usage, with “globalization” and “neoliberalism” arguably being the two most important; and of course, they are in many ways interconnected, both empirically and conceptually.5 Neoliberalism, however, may be the concept that is better suited to provide a key to a variety of problems in the inner mechanics of Western societies. This includes not only their economics and politics, but also their cultural modes of operation in a wider sense. In particular, I will argue that the neoliberal transformation of Western societies emerged in different varieties across North America and Europe, despite shared origins and common denominators.

To make this argument, this essay will sketch the particular German brand of neoliberalism that emerged in the 1980s, in marked difference to those Anglo-Saxon varieties most often identified with American President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. In contrast to widespread understandings of the term both in academia and among the wider public, the German version of neoliberalism may be described by three attributes: as “soft,” “governmental,” and “ecological” (or, “sustainable”). It is a “softer” version that is historically more path-dependent, and is different from the radicalism of other varieties — a radicalism that originally both proponents and critics saw as one of neoliberalism’s central characteristics. Secondly, German neoliberalism cannot be understood as an attempt at strengthening liberalized and deregulated markets at the expense of state power and public regulation. Instead, it has taken the shape of state regulation in widely different policy fields, and it may even be characterized as establishing a primacy of political governance. German history as well as the history of the European Union in the neoliberal era did not follow a trajectory of “Entmündigung des Staates” (placing the state under guardianship), as Anselm Doering-Manteuffel has suggested6 — quite the contrary. Finally, German neoliberalism has developed since the 1980s together with the rise of the ecological movement and the Green party, and while their co-occurrence might be accidental, the two have most certainly co-evolved in many ways, with the ecological groups feeding ideas of sustainability into the German idea of neoliberalism. This is a fundamental aspect of German Zeitgeschichte that still needs to be

5 For a recent synthesis of European history in which globalization takes center stage, see Andreas Wirsching, Der Preis der Freiheit: Geschichte Europas in unserer Zeit (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2012); Wirsching, Demokratie und Globalisierung: Europa seit 1989 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2015).

better understood in the United States, especially in the context of the persistent critique of fiscal austerity in Germany that is propounded by American Leftists and Conservatives alike.

Viewing the history of the past four decades through the lens of neoliberalism may therefore be helpful in order to make sense of that still strangely “unmarked space” in contemporary history. In addition, it might also lead toward a better understanding of the complicated, and seemingly paradoxical, trajectories on which the United States on the one hand, and Germany — and in many ways, the European Union — on the other hand have embarked since around 1980. A brief look at American historiography and historical Zeitdiagnose (perspectives on the present) offers striking parallels to the German literature. Some attempts at synthesis are written primarily in the “fox mode,” such as Sean Wilentz’s Age of Reagan, 1974-2008, which eschews large analytical concepts.7 The arguably most influential, and most sophisticated, history of the recent decades, Daniel T. Rodgers’s Age of Fracture, promotes a similar narrative. Although focusing on trends in intellectual history, it conveys the same overall image of disintegration as much of the German scholarship does: the image of a previous whole that has been gradually shattering into pieces since the 1970s.8 Writing in the same vein, George Packer’s The Unwinding relates that story of disintegration and decline in a gripping journalistic manner, but he also shifts attention from the spheres of high culture and scholarship to the very fabric of society and to everyday experiences of crisis. In the paperback edition, Packer’s book carries a new subtitle that makes the historical narrative to which his study subscribes unmistakably clear: Thirty Years of American Decline.9

And yet, the differences often make transatlantic historians wonder, less perhaps differences in historiography than in the very obvious divergences in the course of history itself.10 Since the 1980s, America has remained a society profoundly shaped by the military, while Europe, and Germany in particular, has demilitarized and has become culturally pacifist. During the same time, America’s religious culture has grown stronger, especially with the rise of evangelical Christianity, while Europe has become the most secular region on Earth. American political culture, and the programs and milieus of the two major parties, have lost their middle ground and become polarized to an extreme. In Germany, meanwhile, the polarization of the 1970s has given way to a new centrism in political culture, with the major political parties, including the CDU, the SPD, and the Greens, having all moved to the middle. One can easily continue this enumeration:

Despite its massive loss in traditional industries such as textiles or consumer electronics, Germany has, to a large extent, remained an industrial and production society, especially when compared to the triumph of the American service economy. It remains to be seen whether the current American president will be able to reverse that shift. Finally, the unleashing of markets in the United States finds its parallels in certain German and European attempts at privatization, such as in the airline industry or in telecommunications. It contrasts, however, with a strong German state that has never lost its grip on society and has, on the contrary, in many respects become more, not less, of a regulatory state, especially since the 1990s. Again, therefore, the search is on for the neoliberal syndrome and its varieties on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

II. Beyond the political economy: deregulation and order — a Foucauldian view

What, then, is neoliberalism? Before specific empirical varieties can be addressed, the different layers of the term must be distinguished. In its most basic sense, the term refers to the anti-Keynesian type of market economics that is particularly connected with Friedrich August Hayek and Milton Friedman, and which rose to prominence during the 1970s, first in academic circles, and shortly thereafter in politics. Its characteristics are supply-side economics instead of an economics of (consumer) demand; a focus on individuals and their behavior in economy and society, rather than on groups and collectives; and above all: the prioritization of free markets over state intervention and governmental regulation, as the best means of achieving wealth and freedom. In that sense, neoliberalism as a new economic doctrine has heavily influenced conservative politics in the United States and the United Kingdom under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. But it has also shaped wider views of society and the “philosophy” of politics in these countries — just think of Thatcher’s famous statement that “there is no such thing as society.”

In the historical literature, it is common to refer to neoliberalism in this particular context and with those conceptions in mind. With regard to Germany, then, the standard scholarly judgment is that Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Christian-Liberal coalition formed in 1982 flirted with neoliberal ideas for several years in the 1980s and implemented parts of its agenda — through attempts at fiscal consolidation or the now-notorious beginnings of commercial television. Yet the Kohl administration eventually avoided a more...
radical pursuit of the neoliberal agenda in favor of continuity: there was no German “dismantling” of the welfare state, and likewise, fiscal consolidation quickly faded away in the rush to public spending after reunification in 1990.

In a wider, or rather, in a historically deeper sense, research in recent years has increasingly explored the intellectual origins of neoliberal economics and has drawn attention to the concerns of economists, sociologists, and philosophers long before the 1970s. From this perspective, the neoliberal impulse emerged as a response to the rise of the Keynesian paradigm in the 1930s and 1940s and acquired a much clearer profile in the grand political struggles of those times, confronting the American New Deal, Nazi Germany and the totalitarian challenge, and the economics of World War II. The founding of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947 is now often cited as a milestone, not least because it also contributed to the formation of international networks of neoliberal thinkers and propagandists. In his most recent book, historian Quinn Slobodian traces the roots of neoliberalism even further back, to the 1920s, that is, to the demise of empires after World War I and the search for order in a seemingly disorderly, and increasingly mass democratic, world.15 In this pursuit, according to Slobodian, early neoliberals were anything but free-market radicals who despised regulation. Rather, they sought to impose order on nations by means of international organizations and global institutions and thus bequeathed a legacy of “order through governance” to later generations of neoliberals — a concept that toward the end of the twentieth century, one might argue, was taken up in continental Europe much more than in the Anglo-Saxon world.

At the same time, the notion of neoliberalism has been expanded far beyond the realm of political economy by leftist critics of the conservative and anti-Keynesian turn of the 1980s. In the discourse of the social sciences, in political and cultural theory — but less so in history — it increasingly became a labelling of the era, beyond its original restriction to the governments of Reagan and Thatcher. From the neo-Marxist perspective in particular, neoliberalism became the one systemic concept that described the current phase of capitalism. With regard to historical actors rather than the logic of systems, critics on the left associated it politically with the “neoliberal project,” a deliberate, even strategic effort to roll back the progressive achievements of the postwar decades. According to this view, the goal of the neoliberals was to break up the postwar consensus of strong welfare

states and regulatory politics and, eventually, to control and even disempower the democratic people and re-establish elite control. This narrative has turned “neoliberalism” from a self-description or an analytical concept into a normative category with rather negative connotations. German historian Andreas Rödder has described this as the “pejorative infection” of the term in his *Short History of the Present*. Rejecting such associations, he insists on the narrower definition of neoliberalism as “market-oriented political economy.”

Indeed, the question why the emerging grand narratives about the last four decades are cast as narratives of decline warrants a lecture of its own. Let us assume it is too simple to say: “Because, unfortunately, it was so!” It is too simple in terms of methodology because historians know too much about narratives of crisis and decline, their persistence against all indicators as well as the conjunctures with which they come and go. A story of decline is also too simple and one-dimensional empirically since evidence to the contrary, indicating progress and rise, abounds — especially from a leftist or liberal viewpoint that emphasizes the position of women in the family, workplace, and politics, or the rights of minorities. More than in the United States, the economic boom and expansion of the welfare state of the postwar decades in Western Europe — and especially in the Federal Republic — went along with the continuation of patterns of patriarchy, with the persistence of authoritarian mentalities and practices, and with the precarious legacy of “classic” forms of inequality and poverty that we should be careful not to overlook or, even less, to romanticize. In politics, the decades of presumable economic and social decline since 1973-74 are framed as decades of a retreat of democracy in the “post-democracy” narrative influentially suggested by Colin Crouch. And yet, this period also witnessed the emergence of new styles of participatory and “movement” democracy in established democracies, while the “third wave” of twentieth-century democratization liberated parts of Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, then East Central Europe in the revolutions of 1989.

The point is not to replace the story of decline with one of progress, but to hint at the complexities of the era and at the striking fact that it is often Leftists who overlook the huge advances on their own territory. Then again, the leftist switch from optimism to pessimism, from narratives of progress to narratives of decline, is itself a major cultural and intellectual hallmark of the era. Those complexities and apparent paradoxes are woven into the fabric of neoliberalism.

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Indeed, it would be unwise to jettison this concept. Rather, it is worthwhile trying to cure it of “the pejorative infection” and to realize its broad explanatory power as an analytical category. In a very general sense, then, neoliberalism refers to a massive push of individualization that struck Western societies beginning in the 1970s and to a fundamental reworking of ideas and institutions of order that emphasized competition in the market. This trend was associated, moreover, with political regimes that sought to establish and control cultures of the market and of the autonomous individual. In practice, there was much flexibility and national variation — after all, it is neoliberalism we are talking about — that allowed for the continuation of historical path-dependencies. The German case of non-radical and state-regulated neoliberalism is a prime example.

This understanding of neoliberalism is inspired by the history and theory of “governmentality” that the French philosopher and historian of ideas Michel Foucault put forward, at the dawn of the neoliberal era, in his lectures on the “Birth of Biopolitics.”19 Incidentally, Foucault gave his last lecture in his Collège de France course on this topic on April 4, 1979, exactly a month before Margaret Thatcher moved into 10 Downing Street, and his prime reference point for the emergence of neoliberalism was not Milton Friedman, but the German tradition of *Ordoliberalismus* between the 1930s and the 1950s.

In this way Foucault, the grand theorist of the prison and modern discipline, opened the door to a historical interpretation of neoliberalism that goes beyond the simplistic notion of market radicalism. Such an interpretation would encompass the ambivalent progress in individualization as well as patterns of governance, regulation, and control (of individuals as well as societies at large) that do not contradict but often dovetail with the paradigm of the market. Neoliberalism, thus understood, is not solely a project in disintegration and fracture, volatility, and social “unwinding.” It is also an attempt at control and integration and a pattern of social engineering,20 even an attempt to shape historical time. Neoliberalism seeks to plan the future along the idea of an optimization of societies in history, as well as of individuals in their life-course.

III. The welfare state, academic regimes, and green austerity: German neoliberalism as soft, governmental, and ecological

How, then, did Germany turn “neoliberal”? The broader understanding of neoliberal societies and cultures suggested in this paper

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20 The notion of “social engineering” has played a major role in recent attempts at understanding continuities in German (and European) history throughout the 20th century, especially across regime changes and as an underlying pattern of both dictatorial and liberal-democratic regimes. See, e.g., Thomas Etzemüller (ed.), *Die Ordnung der Moderne: Social Engineering im 20. Jahrhundert* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2009); more recently, following Foucault: Hannah Ahlheim (ed.), *Gewalt. Zurichtung. Befreiung? Individuelle “Ausschmelzstände” im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2017).
certainly goes beyond political efforts directed at privatization and deregulation, strengthening market mechanisms and principles of competitive individualism. Yet politics did play a central role in implementing a new pattern of political economy and the welfare state and recalibrating the institutional order of state and society in Germany. A brief look at three policy fields that can be considered typical of the German variety of transformation since the early 1980s may be helpful. They may be seen as typical not only in the themes addressed, but also in the ways in which they have been pursued, in their policy approaches, and in the types of solutions they presented.

As in most other Western countries, limiting the welfare state was a key impulse in the emergence of neoliberal politics in Germany. With the economic recession that had started after the first oil crisis of 1973-74 and deepened in the wake of the second oil crisis of 1979, not least with a massive surge in unemployment, it became clear to many, even on the center-left, especially the pragmatic wing of the German SPD associated with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, that the era of massive expansion in social security measures and welfare expenditures was over. Welfare and budget issues had already loomed large in the fall of Schmidt’s predecessor Willy Brandt in 1974, and they took center stage in the crisis and eventual breakup of the SPD-FDP coalition in the fall of 1982. In September 1982 FDP politician Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Federal Minister of Economics since 1977 and dubbed the “market count” for his emphatically liberal convictions, presented a paper to Chancellor Schmidt that became the notorious “letter of divorce” for the center-left government. Under the conservative-liberal coalition led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (which included Lambsdorff in the same office for two more years), West Germany seemed to follow the sea change of its major Western allies, the United States and the United Kingdom (not, however, Mitterrand’s socialist France).

And judging by the general direction not only of government policy, but also of culture and Zeitgeist, it certainly did. The first years of the Kohl government in particular saw a broad spectrum of deregulation measures and the privatization of state-owned enterprises, as well as efforts at fiscal consolidation, especially by curbing social welfare expenditures. The attack on the postwar Keynesian order soon proved to be rather limited, however. Despite some significant quarrels between the Kohl government and the trade unions, the Federal Republic’s brand of Sozialpartnerschaft (social partnership) remained intact. The same was true of the Sozialstaat, the German variant of the

welfare state, both in its major principles (many of which dated back to the social insurance programs of the Bismarck era) and in volume and extent. Many of the important CDU and CSU policy makers in the realm of social policy in the 1980s and 1990s, notably long-time minister for social affairs Norbert Blüm, emerged as fierce opponents of more radical cutbacks and of neoliberal measures in the spirit of Thatcher and Reagan.22

The more significant reorganization of the German welfare state came only in the 2000s, and it came under the leftist auspices of Gerhard Schröder’s Red-Green coalition. The so-called Hartz legislation (after Peter Hartz, a VW manager and influential advisor to the chancellor) brought about a major reorganization of unemployment benefits and welfare subsidies for the poor, essentially merging the two in a new system of welfare benefits colloquially called Hartz IV. While the material losses for the long-term unemployed were substantial, changes in the patterns of discourse on welfare, state, and society proved to be at least as important. The argumentative core of neoliberalism in social policies moved from the fiscal to the cultural arena, that is, from the need to balance budgets to the mobilization of individuals who were supposed to take more responsibility for their own lives, materially and beyond.23

What can be learned from this first example of neoliberal policies in the Federal Republic, both before and after reunification? Neoliberal discourse and politics did not remain limited to the “high noon” of Western neoliberal conservatism in the 1980s, but pervaded an era of several decades, well into the twenty-first century. Varieties of the neoliberal agenda were pushed not only by right-leaning, but also by left-leaning governments, especially since the 1990s, when Bill Clinton and Tony Blair turned out to be role models and allies for Schröder, much more so, in fact, than Reagan and Thatcher had been for Kohl. Over time, the regulation of society and the “responsibilization” (Responsibilisierung) of individuals replaced the primacy of economics in the welfare agenda. Overall, however, continuity remained a hallmark of the German trajectory, and small, gentle steps were more common than radical measures.

Education and universities are a second policy field that deserves particular attention when trying to understand the German variety of neoliberalism. Since the nineteenth century, Germany had proudly described itself as the Land der Dichter und Denker (land of poets and thinkers) and without a doubt, by the eve of the First World War, it


23 In historiography, this is mostly uncharted territory. For an impressive attempt at synthesis and explanation, see Edgar Wolfrum, Rot-Grün an der Macht: Deutschland 1998-2005 (Munch: C.H. Beck, 2013).
had established one of the most successful systems of primary and secondary education as well as some of the world’s leading universities and research institutions. Nazi rule left the German academia severely weakened, and by the 1990s the crisis of the German universities had become so notorious that the sharp-tongued SPD theorist Peter Glotz called them “rotten at their core” (im Kern verrottet).\(^{24}\) In line with market discourse, Germany’s problems in education and research were diagnosed as a problem of international competitiveness, which contributed to the competitive disadvantages of Standort Deutschland (Germany as a location for doing business) — as if the country as a whole was to be judged by its attractiveness as a place to do business. The publication of the OECD’s first comparative student assessment study in 2001 caused the Federal Republic’s now famous “PISA shock.”

Significantly, the political reaction to problems in schools and universities was not designed to unleash market forces in order to generate more competition and private initiative in educational institutions. While non-public secondary schools became increasingly attractive in the 1990s, especially in East Germany, and, starting in the late 1990s, smaller private universities were being founded at an astonishing rate,\(^{25}\) the state never lost control or quickly regained the initiative. In the case of the universities, in the 2000s the state established a new system of competition sponsored and funded by the government. In keeping with the tradition established under the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic’s constitution of 1949, the Grundgesetz, made culture and education the prerogative of the states (Länder). Half a century later, the neoliberal response to crisis was not to increase competition between the states (or possibly, additional private actors), but rather, to strengthen the powers of the national government and to enforce additional regimes of regulation in education and academia. Since 2005, the “Excellence Initiative” (Exzellenzinitiative) has significantly transformed German universities by distributing billions of tax euros in additional funding through a competitive system largely master-minded by the federal government. One little-noted effect of this measure has been that private universities, which were too small to effectively compete in this game, were pushed to the margins before they could even begin to pose a serious challenge to the established public institutions.

Even though the Excellence Initiative, as has often been noted, inaugurated a new political economy, a system of “academic capitalism” in German universities, it did not open them up, as a traditional


\(^{25}\) The years around 2000 did indeed see a blossoming of private (or semi-private) institutions of higher learning in Germany, with the founding of such schools as the International University in Bremen, the Zeppelin University in Friedrichshafen, the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, and many others. The history of those initiatives in the context of the Federal Republic’s “neoliberal moment” still has to be written, and in many ways, it is a transnational and transatlantic history. In exemplary fashion, see Raymond O. Wells, ed., *The Founding of International University Bremen: Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century*, Bremen, 2006.
understanding of neoliberalism would lead one to expect, to the private sector and the mechanisms of a market economy proper. Instead, this variety of neoliberalism emphasized the creation of hierarchies in what had been a highly egalitarian system (hierarchies both within and among universities), the formation of new elites, and the exertion of government control, including through para-governmental institutions such as the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, the German equivalent of the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities). Again, as in the field of social welfare policy, this entailed a new regulation of individual behavior, in this case, the regulation of the preferences of professors and researchers according to monetarized standards of scholarly success and reputation. German neoliberalism may come in a “soft” variety, but it has nonetheless been shaped by a new determination on the part of the centralized state to exert control by new modes of governance and “governmentality.”

Finally, there is a third example to consider that touches less on a specific policy field than on an approach or attitude that has been manifest in German political, social, and cultural life during the past four decades. One of the most striking peculiarities of Germany since the early 1980s is the political strength of the environmental movement and the singular success of the Green Party. Why this German Sonderweg (special path) in the recent history of political parties? This question would have to be explored in greater depth elsewhere; suffice it to say that the country’s Nazi past is very likely among the reasons for it. Not enough thought has been given to the parallel ascendency of neoliberalism, the memory boom and the Germans’ new confrontation with the Nazi past, and the ecological crisis, including the paradigm of sustainability since the 1980s.

In the so-called Realo, or pragmatic, wing of the Green Party, the notions of sustainability and responsibility vis-à-vis “the future” and the coming generations increasingly began to include political economy and fiscal policies. Running counter to the persistent Keynesian attitude on the traditional German Left (as in the party Die Linke), Green politicians since the 1990s have emerged as staunch advocates of fiscal austerity. They argued that deficit spending means burdening future generations with our debts, while depriving them of the opportunity of living off unearned public money as we have. In line with European Union budget guidelines and debt limits, in 2009 Germany amended article 103 of the Grundgesetz to mandate balanced government budgets. This measure enjoyed wide support.


27 This, in turn, is linked to a wider pattern of neoliberal quantification, or obsession with numbers. See Oliver Schlaudt, Die politischen Zahlen. Über Quantifizierung im Neoliberalismus (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2018).


across the political spectrum: aside from more radical or traditional leftists, everyone from conservatives and liberals to Greens and moderate Social Democrats embraced the goal of balanced budgets. The controversy over the pros and cons of public debt and spending continues to divide American and European (and in particular, German) economists, politicians, and publics. It is still not fully understood in the United States that German strict fiscal restraint and Angst over debt is not purely an economic matter but is part of a larger cultural pattern shaped by the notion of sustainability.

Hence, it would be wrong to associate neoliberalism, at least in its German and other continental European varieties, with short-termism. To be sure, market behavior may put a premium on short-term decisions, on the contingency of results, and the responsibility of actors in the present to make the best of their lives and circumstances. But insofar as neoliberalism includes patterns of governmental control and regulation with the objective of making responsible lives possible, it has developed a firm horizon that takes the future into account, and not in terms of years but of decades. Leading a free and responsible life in this scenario demands a consideration of the costs of our lifestyles measured in terms of their impact on both the environment and future generations. The regulatory approach of neoliberalism, in conjunction with the reigning environmental paradigm, has revived the idea of long-term planning for the future, which had been all but abandoned with the collapse of modernist and progressive optimism in the 1970s. Moreover, the consideration of environmental impacts has pushed neoliberal monetarization to new levels in the minute calculations of each and every aspect of one’s life, including bodily and metabolic processes, as in the idea of the individual’s “ecological footprint.”

IV. The moment of 1989, neoliberal Europe, and German path-dependency

Far beyond economic theory and market-oriented policies, neoliberalism in its social and psychological facets has deeply penetrated the web of modern societies and has developed into a “moral economy”\(^\text{30}\) in the everyday regulation, and self-regulation, of individual behavior. In this broader sense, the cultural pattern of neoliberalism extends beyond its national varieties. At the same time, the different forms that neoliberal regimes have taken in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are closely linked to the historical trajectories of individual nations, states, or other systems of governance such as, in particular,

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the European Union. In recent German history, the breakdown of the state-socialist GDR and the political economy of reunification reinforced the dynamics of neoliberalization exactly at the moment when it seemed to have lost its original early-1980s momentum.

The challenge of economic and social reconstruction in East Germany gave neoliberalism a second life: economically, with the clear primacy of the logic of the market and the privatization of industries as well as socially, by summoning East Germans to conduct their lives in accordance with a new post-collective self-responsibility. Indeed, it may be argued that the transformation of East Germany and East Central Europe after communism elevated the neoliberal agenda to a new level, beyond its classical economic and fiscal concerns. The West applied its new order to the East, and from there it came back with a vengeance in the late 1990s, when West Germans started to discover that they, too, needed to go one step further. Federal President Roman Herzog captured this moment in April 1997 in his Berlin speech now famous as the “Ruck-Rede”: With the immediate job of economic reconstruction completed in the former GDR, Herzog declared, it was time the country as a whole and each individual understood that German economic institutions and German ways of thinking had to become more flexible if Germany were to remain competitive in a global future.

On a wider European level, the establishment of a new order of democracy and market liberalism in post-communist nations such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic coincided with a new phase and type of neoliberal governance in the European Union. To be sure, European integration since the 1950s had always centrally been about abolishing tariffs, national protective legislation, and other limits to free markets. At the turn of the century, however, EU governance increasingly merged the free market agenda with regulatory efforts that, in the name of fostering equal access to markets and ensuring fair competition, established a neoliberal market technocracy: a type of governmental neoliberalism that closely corresponded to the measures engaged in Germany under Gerhard Schröder. It seemed no longer sufficient to give private actors leeway on the market and certainly not by way of reining in the state and bureaucracy.

Rather, political governance entered the arena with the intention of mobilizing actors for markets, even — again, much as in the German case — for pseudo-markets as in the competition for the European Commission’s research grants. The Lisbon strategy in 2000 likewise


abandoned the classical liberal idea that the preferences of individual market actors, be they entrepreneurs or consumers, would decide Europe’s position in the globalized world of the twenty-first century. Instead, the European Union would have to emerge as “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” by 2010. In a transatlantic perspective, the European turn to governmental neoliberalism contributed to the divergence of European and U.S. models of politics and society. Given American skepticism toward this kind of regulation, it added up to a rift that was already widening with the growing homogenization of European societies and economies.

What, then, do we make of the neoliberal era that began in the 1970s? What do we make of the four decades that have seen neoliberalism repeatedly change shape like an amoeba and continuously adapt to new circumstances and new spaces? From the historian’s point of view, it is a huge advantage that the notion of neoliberalism provides a broad roof under which politics and economy, society and culture of the past forty years may be understood, for the Western world as a whole, including North America and Europe, as well as for the European Union or the recent history of individual nations such as Germany, with their own and sometimes quite distinct neoliberal varieties. For Germany in particular, the understanding of neoliberalism suggested here emphasizes continuity and path-dependency across the “structural break” (Strukturbreich) of the 1970s that has emerged so prominently in recent historiography of the era.

The German variety of “soft“ and “governmental” neoliberalism may then be seen as a re-interpretation, under changed circumstances, of the German ideas of Ordoliberalismus and Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy) that were developed in the 1930s and 1940s, and institutionalized in the early years of the Federal Republic. Since recent research may have exaggerated the caesura of the 1970s, the framework of neoliberalism not only provides an understanding of the recent era beyond the widespread usage of “post-words,” but also points to an understanding of historical origins and continuities. Neoliberalism, then, is not some alien project that represented a betrayal of original and trustworthy traditions and institutions, be it in Germany or elsewhere. The central motifs of governance and control, planning and sustainability even make it worth considering the possibility that the age of high modernity did not end with the disruptions of the 1970s and might indeed not be over yet.
V. Between liberal rights and populism: The ambivalent legacy of neoliberalism

This brief sketch has probably raised more questions than it has answered. Among those questions are issues that are not only, or not even primarily, of interest to professional historians but to all citizens of the neoliberal age. One of them concerns the relationship between a neoliberal political economy and the advances of liberal rights in Western societies. Have the rights of women and minorities been achieved despite the neoliberal agenda and against its conservative mindset? Or have the two been friends rather than foes? In other words, is there a nexus between neoliberalism and the progressive liberalization of society? And if so, perhaps more so in the Euro-German varieties of neoliberalism than in the United States? After all, individuals have been set free from restraints, for better or worse, and neoliberal political economy has eroded traditional and patriarchal notions of inequality by mobilizing women for the workforce. Have citizens of the Western world been set free, or have they instead been incarcerated in the invisible coercion to self-optimize? These are some of the issues raised in the Leftist critique of “progressive neoliberalism” by American political theorist Nancy Fraser and others.33

Another question of obvious importance concerns the political consequences of the neoliberal era.34 The rise of populism and the current crisis of democracy are often linked to neoliberal regimes. In the classical understanding of that term, the shift from public to private, from state to market has produced democracies that seek to conform to markets rather than to the will of the people. Have citizens of the Western world been set free, or have they instead been incarcerated in the invisible coercion to self-optimize? These are some of the issues raised in the Leftist critique of “progressive neoliberalism” by American political theorist Nancy Fraser and others.33


34 This is often framed in a narrative of a secret neoliberal strategy, sometimes bordering conspiracy theories, especially in the perspective of the American academic Left. See Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2015); German trans.: Die schleichende Revolution: Wie der Neoliberalismus die Demokratie zerstört (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2018); Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America (London: Scribe, 2017). On the other hand, as a network of translations demonstrates, this has very much become a transatlantic discourse itself.

1970s? We should also note that the “will of the people,” allegedly subdued by neoliberal regimes, often appears as a populist *déjà-vu* of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “volonté générale,” and hence, as Jan-Werner Müller, among others, has forcefully argued, as anti-pluralist and, ultimately, anti-democratic itself.  

Finally, there is the perennial question of transatlantic bonds and divisions. Are we under the same rule of neoliberalism and enjoying its chances for liberation together? Or has neoliberalism in its highly specific trajectories and varieties contributed to the great transatlantic divergence that very clearly is not simply a result of the last presidential elections in America? While Daniel Rodgers’s *Age of Fracture* has set a tone for the debate in the United States, in Germany just recently a brief essay by Thomas Bauer has received widespread attention: *Die Vereindeutigung der Welt: Über den Verlust an Mehrdeutigkeit und Vielfalt* (roughly translated: Making the World Unambiguous: On the Loss of Ambiguity and Plurality).  What do we make of this? Maybe the contradictory diagnoses correlate with a significant divergence between America and Germany: neoliberalism as fracture versus neoliberalism as hyper-integration. And yet, this would still amount to different accents in a broader, overarching pattern of recent transatlantic history. Neoliberalism is about ambiguity and unambiguity, about freedom and control, about release and capture at the same time. We should not accept a diagnosis of our times, or a historical narrative of the past four decades, that is simpler than that.

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On September 15, 1932, the manager of Berlin’s Kaiserhof Hotel informed its owners of what they doubtless already knew: “that Hitler has been in residence in the Kaiserhof for some time, that the Stahlhelm have commandeered the house for use as a headquarters, that too much of the clientele has been lost ... that the whole Jewish clientele has stayed away” (see Figure 1). Profits, and the Kaiserhof itself, had to be “won back” and soon.

Before taking the Chancellery, Hitler had no formal headquarters in the capital. When he came to town to campaign, he first opted for the Hotel Sanssouci, a middling concession near Potsdamer Platz. But in February 1931, his electoral successes mounting, Hitler transferred to the Kaiserhof, the windows of his chosen corner suite within view of the Chancellery, the goal.¹ By the fall of 1932, the board of the Kaiserhof’s parent company would need to decide whom to favor: Hitler and his henchmen or the establishment’s Jewish clientele.

At the September 15 meeting, the board postponed discussion to the meeting’s end, when, finally, William Meinhardt, one of Germany’s foremost industrialists and chairman of the board of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft, the Kaiserhof’s parent company, offered his solution:

> As a hotel company, we must remain neutral on matters of religion and politics [Konfession und Politik ausschalten]. Our houses must remain open to all. Surely the situation, as it has developed, is no fun for any of the interested parties, but we, the directors, cannot do anything about it.²

Next spoke Wilhelm Kleemann, a managing director of Dresdner Bank, member of the board of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft, and head of the Jewish Community of Berlin.³ “I know for certain,” he said, “that Jewish guests no longer stay at the Kaiserhof and no longer visit the restaurant, either.” Meinhardt then conceded: “I know how hard it is for the house’s restaurant director to exercise the requisite tact in face of these difficult questions.”⁴

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The minutes end there. The decision, in the end, was not to decide, and that meant the de facto expulsion of Jews from the Kaiserhof, the abdication of all civil and fiduciary responsibility, and preemptive capitulation to the radical right. Most remarkable about this discussion, as the minutes reflect it: Meinhardt was Jewish, and so were most of the board members in attendance. This was an argument among Jews about what to do with Hitler.

These men were also industrialists, financiers, and liberals — National Liberals before World War I and then members of the Weimar coalition parties afterward. Meinhardt (see Figure 2), a member of the German Democratic Party, had been born to Jewish parents in Schwedt, a small city on the Oder River, in 1872. In 1914, he became managing director of one of the world’s great manufacturers of metal filaments for incandescent bulbs, a concern he transformed, in 1919, into the new conglomerate OSRAM, which dominated the German market in light bulbs. As chairman of OSRAM’s board and architect of the legal maneuvers that allowed this monopoly to form and flourish, Meinhardt became a “recognized authority on the subject of the electrical industry,” according to a study published in Britain in 1935. Yet it was in his capacity as chairman of the board of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft and not as leader of OSRAM, a much larger concern, that Meinhardt first came face-to-face with the Nazi menace. Meinhardt’s interlocutor at the September 15 meeting, Kleemann, was himself one of Germany’s most...
prominent financiers. Other board members present included Eugen Landau, a diplomat and member of the boards of the Schultheiß-Patzenhof brewing concern and two banks, and Walter Sobernheim, Landau’s stepson, also a diplomat, and director of Schultheiß-Patzenhof. Sobernheim, Landau, Kleemann, and Meinhardt were industrial and financial elites first, hoteliers second, with liberal-democratic affiliations and tendencies.

The term “liberal” here connotes three political orientations at once. The first is party-political and places these hoteliers as businessmen in the National Liberal tradition; still intent on lowering taxes, freeing trade, and defanging labor unions, they had also come around to a more democratic liberalism by the 1920s. The second sees the hoteliers as proponents of a liberal urbanism characteristic of European bourgeoisies and the German bourgeoisie in particular, recognizable in manifold forays into civic altruism. The third groups these actors with their British counterparts, who used regulation, infrastructure, and technologies of surveillance to maintain

7 Non-Jews present were Hans Lohnert, an official of the corporation, and Fritz Aschinger, owner of one of Germany’s largest gastronomy concerns. Also in attendance were three managing directors, one of them Jewish, and two employee representatives. Meeting minutes of the board of directors of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft for September 15, 1932, in LAB, A Rep. 225-01, Nr. 39.

8 See Arndt Kremer, Deutsche Juden-Deutsche Sprache: Jüdische und jüdisenfremde Sprachkonzepte und -konflikte (Berlin, 2007), 164.


a balance between freedom and order in the modern metropolis. In my dissertation, I suggest that none of these three liberalism surv-
vived the Weimar period, because the economic chaos of 1918–1923 generated an incorrigible pessimism among industrialists, which, in turn, created the conditions whereby a number of conservative elites could, at the advent of the next crisis (1929), sabotage the economy and dismantle liberal republican institutions from within—and with little fear of the protestations of commercial interests.

In trying to understand the abdication of German liberalism from the vantage of Berlin’s grand hotels, I align myself with historians of Germany who argue that the institutions — both formal and informal — of Weimar culture, society, and politics evaporated before the wind had even yet changed direction, round about 1930–31, when, as one of Peter Jelavich’s sources has it, a kind of “fear psychosis” seized the very people one would expect to resist the forces arrayed against the Republic. Under these conditions, the board members of Berlin’s hotel corporations chose, to the detriment of their business, to let Hitler stay. The final job of this article is to connect the experience and understanding of interwar dislocations to this process of decision-making. What was the logic that made giving up on the Republic seem like the best or only option?

The writings and reports of the board and the managerial cadre are rich with explicitly political content. On the basis of these sources, I offer a qualification to the consensus among historians of Weimar Germany that the Republic, if not doomed from the start, was done in by the Great Depression. Instead, I suggest, the economic chaos of 1918–1923 discredited the Republic to the extent that a representative sample of industrial and financial elites — in this case, the hoteliers of Berlin — made arguments in the public sphere that moved them ever closer to the language and perspectives of the anti-republican right. These hoteliers’ pessimism regarding the Republic reached a fever pitch in late 1923 — a pitch that was sustained down to Hitler’s transfer from the Kaiserhof to the Chancellery on January 30, 1933.

With a high degree of precision and clear sense of causality, this his-
tory connects concrete, quotidian difficulties to the rightward drift in German politics before 1933.

These difficulties are usually hard to pin down. Struggles issue and recede in the text below, just as they do in my dissertation and in the sources, just as they did for the hoteliers. In the prewar period, hote-
liers were most concerned with maintaining hierarchy and managing

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10 See Chris Otter, “Making Liberalism Durable: Vision and Civility in the Late Victorian City,” Social History 27 (2002): 1. Governmentality, by Foucault’s formulation, did not always have to be liberal in modality, as Reuben Rose-Redwood, Anton Tantner, and others have shown in a special section of Urban History 39 (2012): “Introduction: Governmentality, House Numbering, and the Spa-
tial History of the Modern City.” See also Patrick Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City (London, 2003), 3ff and 121.

11 Peter Jelavich, Berlin Alexanderplatz: Radio, Film, and the Death of Weimar Culture (Berkeley, 2006), xii and 116. For the Reichs-
tag, Thomas Mergel ob-
serves a similar effect of Nazi intimidation tactics when after the electoral victories of the NSDAP in 1930, that party’s del-
egates adopted a language of moral absolutes and a strategy of outright dis-
ruption that undid parlia-
mentary democracy even before the advent of the presidential dictatorship, in Parlamentarische Kultur in der Weimarer Republik: Politische Kommunikati-
on, symbolische Politik und Öffentlichkeit im Reichstag (Düsseldorf, 2002).
guests’ experiences. At other intervals, such as 1918–1922, labor relations took pride of place. For 1924–1928, it would be taxes. Each of these areas of grievance helped shape hoteliers’ conception of the political between 1918 and 1933 — of what the state should do to stabilize the social and economic order. And as Eric Weitz has noted about the nature of political discourse in Weimar Germany, these conceptions quickly turned into indictments of the Republic itself. Over the course of the 1920s, it became uncommon for hoteliers to criticize the policies of the state without also heaping scorn on the Republic.

My research joins a growing body of scholarship in business history that uses the traditional sources of the field to answer questions in political and cultural history. What do ways of running a business tell us about shifting relationships of power? Where do we see signs of political and cultural discontinuity and change? Most helpful in this respect has been Jeffrey Fear’s book on the Thyssen concern, which assesses the processes, patterns, and conflicts that shaped a corporate leadership’s strategies of growth, organization, and control. Fear reads meeting minutes and public statements against the grain for clues about the extent of authoritarian leanings among the managers of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, much in the same way that I use similar sources for Berlin’s hotel corporations in roughly the same period. Fear’s actors evinced the same tendency toward blaming, against all evidence, most of their difficulties after 1918 on workers and taxes. This move excused managers from their key responsibility: to helm a large, complex enterprise through the choppy waters of an increasingly competitive and global economy. It also served to obfuscate these men’s avoidable mistakes, especially with respect to disadvantageous borrowing, misguided plans for long-term growth, and sometimes poor accounting. It is perhaps unsurprising that Berlin’s hoteliers spoke Thyssen’s language. Many were industrialists first and hoteliers second. Yet my
study not only confirms Fear’s findings but shows the great extent to which the anti-government ire of Germany’s industrialists infected the service industries as well. It was endemic.

Although September 15, 1932, is this history’s vanishing point, the advent of the Third Reich is only a small part of the picture. In recovering and assessing the twists and turns that produced such a decision as whether to let Hitler stay at the Kaiserhof, my dissertation reaches as far back as 1875, the year that the Kaiserhof opened as Berlin’s first grand hotel. I reconstruct the hierarchies and practices that shaped the business until the outbreak of World War I, the end of an age of relative equipoise among groups of people — owners, managers, workers, and guests, many from outside Germany — who would soon come into spectacular conflict. The war and its aftermath exposed class and cultural cleavages that managers had had more success concealing during the old regime. Now, the grand hotel was a crucible of social, economic, and political dislocation, the subject of the last two chapters of my dissertation and the context in which Meinhardt and the board had to come to a decision on what to do about Hitler and his henchmen. I argue that long-term weaknesses in the business model, which depended on the exploitation of thousands of workers both downstairs and upstairs, on the peaceful accommodation of foreigners who could easily turn into belligerents, as well as on the perception of social, economic, and political crisis after 1918, created the conditions for a particularly harrowing postwar experience. With class animosities and political violence out in the open, hoteliers saw no way to reestablish the relative equipoise of prewar hotel society.

This article will focus on Berlin’s luxury hospitality industry after World War I, which had worked to whittle away the niceties of grand hotel life and with them the cultural practices of the prewar social scene. The peace — followed by revolutionary violence, class animosities, and, especially, hyperinflation — led hoteliers to compromise their liberal commitments in time for the era of relative stability, 1924–1928. Even in those years, the changing language of hoteliers’ annual reports, trade publications, internal memos, correspondence with the authorities,

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16 Adam Bisno, “Hotel Berlin: The Politics of Commercial Hospitality in the German Metropolis, 1875–1945,” PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2018. For his patience and assistance with this work, I want to thank Peter Jelavich. I could not have asked for a better Doktorvater. I would also like to thank the organizations and institutions that helped me undertake my research: the Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies, the German Historical Institute Washington, DC, the Johns Hopkins University Department of History, and the Center for Metropolitan Studies at the Technische Universität Berlin. Finally, I thank Carsten Fries for his corrections to the military-historical topics I cover here and in the dissertation.
and communications with the public bore a semantic affinity to the anti-republicanism of the right. Hoteliers’ incorrigible pessimism with respect to the economy and the polity, in turn, produced a willingness to countenance the destruction of the Republic. Then, as prominent hoteliers had to contend with the Great Depression, pessimism turned to fatalism, and liberal solutions to the industry’s and the nation’s problems appeared to be unavailable, even to committed liberals such as Meinhardt, who chose not to complicate Hitler’s rise to power, instead allowing him to remain at the Kaiserhof, a stone’s throw from the Chancellery.

I.

In early 1919, the Kaiserhof descended into a nightmare of vandalism and atrocity. Having summarily and suddenly commandeered the building, Freikorps commanders gave as many as 1200 soldiers the run of the house, now a central node in the war against the Spartakists. The men flooded parts of the building and damaged virtually all of the flooring, most of the walls, and many of the ceilings. They broke windows, wrecked textiles and furniture, clogged toilets, bidets, and baths, and swung from chandeliers in the public rooms. They smashed china and glasses, pocketed all the silverware, broke up tables, ate everything in the kitchens, and quaffed or absconded with thousands of bottles of wine. They hauled in prisoners, whom they mistreated, tortured, and in some cases murdered. When the Freikorps pulled out a month later, they took with them much of the rest of the Kaiserhof’s property. The ground floor needed months


Meanwhile in western Berlin, the Eden Hotel fell under the control of the Army High Command for use as the Berlin headquarters for the government’s forces. From there, army leaders coordinated battles throughout the city. When Rosa Luxemburg was beaten nearly to death in its lobby, the Eden became not only the site of political violence but also the site of the first antifeminist, anti-Semitic attack in a grand hotel in Berlin.20 The building itself both housed and facilitated this development: the existence of back hallways, great rooms, and multiple entrances of varying publicity helped the murders of Luxemburg and Liebknecht unfold in different ways — Liebknecht’s murder having been discreet and less violent — while guest rooms served as perfect holding cells for the evening’s victims (see Figure 4). A decade later, the Eden’s advertising materials claimed that the hotel first opened in 1922, a full three years after the murders.21 Grisly scenes of revolutionary violence were public relations liabilities, of course: they laid bare the vulnerability of hotels to the vicissitudes of German history—a vulnerability all too familiar to hotel guests during World War I and after. That period had to be forgotten if hoteliers meant to turn profits in the 1920s.

However, visions of the future were grim. At a January 30, 1919, meeting of the directors of the Kaiserhof’s parent company, one of the city’s three principal hotel corporations, a board member stated the obvious: in addition to the dangers of going out and traveling amid incipient civil war and widespread street fighting, Germans’ declining incomes made it “impossible” to keep up the “luxury services of former times.” Wilhelm Rüthnik, the Kaiserhof’s general manager, offered a solution: to initiate an “alteration of the business,” a capacious idea that included the dissolution of the accommodation

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19 Ibid., and meeting minutes of the board of directors of the Berliner Hotel-Gesellschaft of October 8, 1919; October 18, 1919; March 3, 1920; March 30, 1920; September 16, 1920; and April 1, 1921, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1046.


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Figure 4. The murderers of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg celebrate their crime in the Eden Hotel on 15 January 1919. In the middle, at the table: Otto Emil Runge. Photo by Franz Gerlach. Source: Bundesarchiv (SAPMO), Bild Y 1-330-1485-76. Reproduced by permission.
Features

II.

In the midst of the 1918/19 revolution, leaders of the Verband der Gastwirtsgehilfen (Union of Hospitality and Gastronomy Workers) called for all of the city’s waiters to walk out. Union leaders demanded the abolition of the practice of tipping as well as the institution of a weekly wage of 90 to 130 Reichsmark (RM), the immediate implementation of an eight-hour workday, and a prohibition on firing a waiter without the express approval of the Verband. Reports of unruly crowds at restaurants across the city filled the papers. (The fashionable Café Keck fell to a mob that destroyed all of its furniture and porcelain.) The Adlon’s restaurant was one of the few to remain open during the strike. That fact brought 1500 waiters and their sympathizers to a demonstration at the hotel. As the dining room filled with protesters, patrons fled. Das Hotel, the weekly trade publication for hoteliers in the German-speaking world, in its reports showed little sympathy for the waiters, who were supposed to have “thrashed” a delegate to the Entente Commission and to have “violently attacked” a member of the Adlon family. For their part, the Adlon’s own waiters refused to take part in the strike. Of course, what the paper missed was the sense that these waiters, in agreeing to help keep the Adlon restaurant open, were also acting as strikebreakers.

In increasing numbers, hoteliers responded to “this terror” by trying to move together against the strikers. The chairman of the Verein Berliner Hotelbesitzer (Association of Berlin Hotel Owners) told a reporter for Das Hotel that he believed it was the “duty” of all hoteliers to come together “in solidarity.” Negotiators working on behalf of the hoteliers urged owners to close for the duration of the strike in order to put pressure on all workers, not just the ones on strike. The strategy failed. Hoteliers’ balance sheets could not sustain the closures. On January 10 and 11, the Verein Berliner Hotelbesitzer moved to notify hotel employees, by means of large placards, of the Verein’s decision to abolish tipping for waiters and kitchen staff,

concession entirely. After some discussion, the directors opted for smaller steps toward other sources of revenue, in this case a five o’clock tea dance. “With amusements like these,” they reasoned, “we might again find at least a modicum of profitability.” Nothing could be done yet, however, until the waitstaff returned. The city’s waiters were on strike.
raise wages to make up the difference, and shift almost everyone to an eight-hour day. To cover the expense, restaurant prices would go up 20 percent. The rise in wages ushered in what Das Hotel called “a new era for the German hotel industry.”

It was also a new era for labor relations, not one defined by consensus and compromise but by spectacular conflict. Trouble came again, in May 1919, when, in response to demands from the Verband der Gastwirtsgehilfen, the Verein Berliner Hotelbesitzer offered a 20 percent raise for servants and maids. The Verband declined the offer and prepared to call a strike in the event that the hoteliers refused to increase wages an additional 15 to 20 percent. Conflict between employers and workers also ensnared white-collar employees. The Hotelangestelltenverbände (Combined Associations of Hotel Employees), the umbrella organization for various associations of clerks, accountants, salesmen, procurers, and management staff, made its position clear on the pages of the Deutsche Gastwirtezeitung, a trade publication aimed at the Mittelständler (owners of small and mid-sized businesses) in the gastronomy industries: the Hotelangestelltenverbände wanted nothing to do with what they and their employers called the “terror” tactics of hotel workers. The best thing to do was to have all white-collar employees join their own unions, which would use “Christian” principles to counter the godless bolshevism of the workers.

And now, by the middle of 1919, in the hotels and elsewhere, the preconditions for the collapse of Weimar society had formed already. There was a propertied class — the hoteliers — who established close associations among each other in order to control the price of labor. These associations would turn into cartels and other illiberal formations as one corporation, Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft, came to own almost all of Berlin’s grand hotels by the late 1920s. There was also a working class, the leaders of which continued their assault on cartel capitalism. And finally, there was the petty bourgeoisie, the white-collar workers, who adopted radical language and a radical tone that took issue not with the machinations of their betters but with the efforts of their inferiors. Fearful of downward social mobility and unsure of how to respond to the political culture of the new republic, these white-collar workers of the lower middle class turned increasingly to the splinter parties of the right.

For hoteliers, the reins began to unravel in their hands. Their annual reports after 1918 became increasingly dismal for three possible reasons:

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28 “Beschlüsse des Vereins Berliner Hotelbesitzers,” Das Hotel, January 24, 1919. The eight-hour working day became the law of the land for industrial workers on November 23, 1918, and then for most other workers, including white-collar employees, on March 18, 1919. See Ben Fowkes, ed. and trans., The German Left and the Weimar Republic: A Selection of Documents (Leiden, 2014), 21–22. See also Gerard Braunthal, Socialist Labor and Politics in Weimar Germany (Hamden, Conn., 1978), 255–256.

29 “Der erste Reichstag im deutschen Hotengewerbe,” Das Hotel, April 4, 1919.

30 Noah Strote, Lions and Lambs: Conflict in Weimar and the Creation of Post-Nazi Germany (New Haven, 2017), 46ff.


33 Patsch, Christian Trade Unions, 199–201.
first, business really was as difficult as the reports contended; second, board members wanted shareholders to know that it was on account of such a difficult business environment that dividends would not come in, not on account of mismanagement; and third, the board had every reason to present to the state an account of conditions that might inspire officials to lighten the tax burdens of hotels and related businesses.

On July 12, 1920, Heinrich Kreuzer, chairman of the Hoteltreuhandgenossenschaft (Hotel Trust Cooperative) of Düsseldorf, in his address to the first annual meeting of the Verband der Hotelbesitzervereine Deutschlands (Association of Hoteliers’ Societies of Germany), pulled together the strands of hoteliers’ nascent anti-republicanism. Kreuzer called to his audience’s attention a litany of disasters and blunders that had compromised the hotel industry from before the war to the present.

The people, who have no understanding [of the problem], as well as the government and the communes, who sit by in silence as one fine hotel after the other is stripped of its identity — are all guilty. It is they who will be held responsible if in the foreseeable future the German hospitality and travel industries collapse and thus forfeit every competitive advantage to foreign countries, which never could have happened in the old days.34

Hoteliers’ belief in the indispensability of the hotel industry to German culture, society, and politics was rooted in recent experience. After all, the hotels had accommodated and continued to accommodate delegates to the Entente Commission meetings, where the details of reparations were hammered out. National and international business likewise depended on the capacity of Berlin’s grand hotels to house investors, salesmen, and money carriers. But there was little to support the belief that responsibility for the hotel industry’s woes lay primarily with the Weimar state and left-leaning municipal governments. These accusations took cues from the legend of the “stab in the back” (Dolchstosslegende), then making rounds among right-radicals, conservatives, and other Germans — namely, that proponents of the illegitimate Republic had undermined the army and lost Germany the war. Thereafter, Jewish, socialist, and effeminate republicans had besmirched the German name by signing the “war guilt clause,” disgraced Germany’s traditions by dismantling the

34 Transcript of a speech given on December 7, 1920, by Heinrich Kreuzer, Vorstand der Hoteltreuhandgenossenschaft, Düsseldorf, at the I. Hauptversammlung des Verbandes der Hotelbesitzervereine Deutschlands, in Berlin, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 893.
military, dismembered the nation by ceding territory, and crippled the national economy by agreeing to pay reparations in cash, gold, and kind. And now, Kreuzer charged, the republicans had trained their sights on the grand hotels of Berlin. In 1920, Kreuzer’s was an extreme position for a hotelier to take. But by the end of the hyper-inflationary period in 1923, it was commonplace.

Between 1918 and 1923, bitter recriminations became a common occurrence in hoteliers’ comments, annual reports, and contributions to *Das Hotel*. In his opinion piece for that publication, Harry Nitsch, an expert in advertising in the hotel industry, singled out the French for special opprobrium.35 To him, the advice to rely on “our people’s inner strength and efficiency [Tüchtigkeit],” to find “Germany’s star,” to submit to the “healing power of Reason,” was not only useless but also un-German—indeed, prototypically French. This deluded worship of reason and the belief in the nation’s capacity to overcome all challenges captured the spirit of the French Revolution in the days “of Robespierre and Danton.”36 Neither romantic nationalism nor the Enlightenment state could get the Germans, and their hotel industry, out of the hole.37 Deliverance instead depended on a change of heart among the authors of Germany’s misfortune in Paris and London, according to Nitsch. Such assignments of guilt tended to extend to the Weimar coalition parties, too, especially the SPD, which allegedly had sabotaged the German economy by abetting the Entente’s program of extortion.38

In their political statements, hoteliers began to lean to the right, however much they tried to cling to economic liberalism. Their

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35 Nitsch also published a book in 1927 titled *Das Hotel- und Gastgewerbe: Moderne Propaganda-Methoden* (Düsseldorf, 1927). By 1933, Nitsch’s publisher, the Friedrich Flodder Verlag, was distinguishing itself with such titles as *Das Ehrenbuch des Führers: Der Weg zur Volksgemeinschaft (The Führer’s Book of Honor: The Path to Volksgemeinschaft)* by Heinz Haake (1933). See David Biale, “Blood and the Discourses of Nazi Antisemitism,” in *Varieties of Antisemitism: History, Ideology, Discourse*, eds. Murray Baumgarten, Peter Kenez, and Bruce Thompson (Newark, Del., 2009), 71.


37 Railing against the machine state of the French while praising the German genius for freedom became current as early as the 1790s, shortly after the Reign of Terror, when the early German Romantics, horrified by the recent violence in France, formed an idea of Germany and German- ness as fundamentally different from France and Frenchness. See Frederick Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 1790–1800* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 1–78. On the legacy of early German Romanticism, see George Williamson, *The Longing for Myth in Germany: Religion and Aesthetic Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche* (Chicago, 2004).

38 Transcript of a speech given on December 7, 1920, by Heinrich Kreuzer, Vorstand der Hotelreihendogenossenschaft, Düsseldorf, at the I. Hauptversammlung des Verbandes der Hotelbesitzervereine Deutschlands, in Berlin, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 893. The very act of paying reparations on behalf of the German people quite enraged many voters, especially of the DVP (Deutsche Volkspartei, formerly the National Liberal Party), men and women alike. See Raffael Scheck, *Mothers of the Nation: Right-wing Women in Weimar Germany* (Oxford, 2004). 34. So intense was the anger that a group of radical nationalists murdered Walther Rathenau on June 24, 1922, largely because he had come out in favor of fulfilling the terms of the Treaty and because he was Jewish. See Gall, *Walther Rathenau*, 223.
politics between 1919 and 1923 developed into a synthesis of anti-republicanism and prewar National Liberalism — liberal in terms of a general antipathy to Social Democracy and organized labor. The sense of emergency never quite dissipated after the days “of grave danger,” when communist revolution and the first waiters’ strike prompted hoteliers to “stick together” and defeat “these radicals” and their “terroristic principles.”39 “The world war may have ended,” read an opinion piece of August 1919, “but the war of Germany with itself has yet to find its end.”40 And many men of the hotel industry made it clear whose side they were on. A lawyer writing for Das Hotel in January 1921 referred to the economy under state control as the “sword of Damocles … hanging over the head of every hotelier and restaurateur” in Germany.41 Or, if not a sword to the head, then the managed economy was the shackle around the ankle, heavy and “unbearably” tight.42 Neither abstract economic forces nor the concrete mistakes of the old regime were to blame. Rather, the Republic and its illiberal economic policies bore the sole responsibility. This logic extended to foreign relations: the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, and subsequent ancillary agreements, became an increasingly popular position among hoteliers. And these were disadvantageous agreements for which hoteliers blamed the Republic alone. Here, liberalism entered the conversation, for revision would usher in an era of free trade, and only through free trade — that is, the self-correcting capacity of the free market — could inflation be halted.43 Yet, theirs was a compromised liberalism that expressed itself in the revisionist terms of the anti-republican right.

III.

Inflation became unmanageable in March 1922, when hotel bookkeepers started to register it by the day. “Extraordinary increases in operation costs” first occurred as a result of the fast rising expenditures on labor, laundry, and coal in the winter of 1921/22.44 By September 30, runaway gas prices were causing bills for cooked meals to mount.45 As machinery and furniture wore out after almost a decade of underinvestment, the money was not there to repair them.46 When, later that year, the Entente Commission declared Germany to be in default on its reparations payments, the French occupied the Ruhr, and the government printed money in order to counter the effects of its policy of passive resistance, a concatenation of events that caused the Reichsmark to collapse, bringing down with it Berlin’s hospitality industry.47

40 “Mit- und nicht gegeneinander,” Das Hotel, August 1, 1919.
41 “Das schief Gleis unserer Zwangswirtschaft,” Das Hotel, January 21, 1921.
42 Ibid.
44 Meeting minutes of the board of directors of the Berliner Hotel-Gesellschaft of March 2, 1922, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1046.
46 Meeting minutes of the board of directors of the Berliner Hotel-Gesellschaft of April 27, 1922, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1046.
Prices now achieved new heights of esotericism. Official price lists could not be reprinted fast enough. From February 1, 1923, on, the corporate directors of Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft added to the frenzy by changing the menus without any advance warning.⁴⁸ Overnight, prices for coal would rise 160 percent; soap, 200 percent; and laundry, 350 percent.⁴⁹ In mid-March, taxes followed suit, now climbing “not only from month to month but from week to week—no, day to day, even.” Profits withered and then disappeared.⁵⁰

In April, upward pressure on wages and salaries exploded. Managers threw money at staff and workers with abandon.⁵¹ On April 14, 1923, the chairman of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft, on behalf of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce, sent waiter Franz Haas the customary notice of congratulations on 25 years of service to the Central-Hotel. The “certificate of honor” came with no less than 50,000 RM in cash, which would lose most of their value a few hours later.⁵² In fact, in four days, 50,000 RM would not have bought 5 napkins, now costing 12,000 RM apiece.⁵³ Yet employers needed some way to compensate white-collar workers like the chief buyer for the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft, for example, whose job it was to source and pay for everything the hotel needed. The board agreed to give him a bonus equaling 60 percent of his April wages. But how much money would that be, exactly? By the board’s own estimate: 23 million RM.⁵⁴ Other employees had to be let go; there was not enough cash on hand to pay them. The cost of leasing telegraphs, for example, had consumed the wages of the Fürstenhof telegraph girl, so the corporate office ordered that her post be eliminated.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, their compensation dwindling by the hour, the Fürstenhof’s musicians had been going from table to table asking guests for money. Disciplined just short of being fired, the musicians had their hours reduced and were told that they would be dismissed without compensation should they ever go “begging” again.⁵⁶

The board of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft took drastic measures to keep the situation under control, yet their cost-cutting schemes never kept pace with the crisis. In May, out of desperation, came the unanimous decision to sell all foreign currency and apply the entirety of the proceeds to the purchase of textiles, as well as goods and wine.⁵⁷ To loot its own treasury was, for the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft and the Berliner Hotel-Gesellschaft, already a foregone conclusion. Since the onset of hyperinflation, the strategy had been to “settle up every day,” including with guests, and then put every bit of the proceeds toward “constantly filling up our stores.”

⁴⁸ Beverages price list of February 1, 1923, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1174.
⁴⁹ Price list sent from the Verband Groß-Berliner Wäsche-Verleihgesellschaft to Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft on February 27, 1923, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1174.
⁵¹ Ibid.
⁵³ Lohnert to Kessels, letter of April 18, 1923, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1174.
⁵⁵ Corporate office of Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft to Kessels, unsigned letter of March 1, 1923, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1174.
⁵⁶ Corporate office of Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft to Kessel, unsigned letter of August 21, 1923, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1147.
Hoarding was now so commonplace that one hotel corporation referred to the practice without euphemisms in its annual report. It became impossible to keep account of inventories as the stores filled and emptied many times over the course of a month. In fact, when Price Waterhouse came to audit Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft a few years later, they found that the “schedules relating to the Inventories of Merchandise on Hand at January 1, 1924 have been mislaid.”

For calculating dividends, the board invented several modes of translation among the values of a prewar mark, a present-day mark, a 1918 mark, the value of gold, and the exchange rate of RM to American dollars. On November 15, 1923, when the government finally made this kind of accounting official by introducing the gold-backed Rentenmark, hotel bookkeepers now had a currency they could match to the notional sums with which they had been working since summer, and the period of hyperinflation came to a close. Yet the period of relative stability, 1924–1928, did not mollify members of the board. To the contrary, after the experience of hyperinflation, they intensified their invective against the Republic, which they appear never to have forgiven, even as business recovered and profitability returned. Theirs was an incorrigible pessimism seeded by the experiences of 1918–1923 but given new urgency by hyperinflation and lent an anti-republican edge that persisted until Weimar’s last moments.

With stabilization and the transition to a more conciliatory approach to labor, hoteliers focused even more of their energies on taxes. As of 1924, their businesses were taxed in various ways. Sales tax entailed an accommodation tax, a ten-percent state tax (Reichssteuer), a tax on wine, a surtax on sparkling wine, and a tax on profits. The state also collected on bonds, mortgages, ground rent, and land use. And finally, there was the tax on commerce in the state of Prussia. In the midst of hyperinflation, tax rates had indeed reached astronomical proportions. The accommodation tax for foreigners in early 1923 reached 80 percent (40 percent for Germans). These liabilities pushed hoteliers’ and restaurateurs’ tax contributions up to about 50 percent of all revenue. These taxes on commercial hospitality, the board argued, would surely sink “the whole of our national economy.” At the people’s expense, then, the hotel industry suffered—and worse than any other industry, “not one” of which was “saddled with so many and such heavy taxes,” as the hoteliers saw it. Such complaints spilled easily into demonization of the Republic, the “Tax-Hydra” that reached farther and wider by the day.

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60  Meeting minutes of the board of directors of the Berliner Hotel-Gesellschaft of June 20, 1923, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1046.
61  Meeting minutes of the board of directors of the Berliner Hotel-Gesellschaft and the Betriebsrat for June 12, 1924, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1046. After 1923, labor relations improved, even if the confrontational politics of the far left and the far right never quite disappeared. Increased cooperation among owners, managers, and employees helped defuse tensions. On stabilization and new taxes, see Holtfrerich, The German Inflation, 301–303.
63  Ibid.
64  Georg Persisch, “Gegen die Steuerhydra,” Das Hotel, December 12, 1921.
A second set of complaints, also contending that the Republic was singling out the hotel industry for extra punishment, revolved around the institution of the Preisprüfungsstelle beim Magistrat Berlin (Price Auditing Authority of the Magistrate of Berlin). In July 1924, the Verein der Berliner Hotels und verwandter Betriebe (Association of Berlin Hotels and Related Businesses) wrote to the Magistrate to protest the Preisprüfungsstelle’s recent decision to fix room prices at their pre-war levels.65 This move, according to the hoteliers, failed to account for the tax rate and cost of living having gone up 40 to 60 percent since July 1914.66 Moreover, the “incessant pestering of our members by your officials’ pointless inquiries” was taking up valuable time and energy.67 On the very same day, the Verein Berliner Hotels also wrote to the Statistisches Amt der Stadt Berlin (Office of Statistics for the City of Berlin) in order to tattle on the Preisprüfungsstelle. The latter’s questionnaires exhibited flaws in procedure of which the city’s statisticians should be aware. As if to goad the statisticians, the hoteliers suggested that the Preisprüfungsstelle had “neither the competency nor the prerogative” to conduct its own surveys, since surveys should be the exclusive purview of the Statistisches Amt.68 These exchanges among the Verein der Berliner Hotels, the Preisprüfungsstelle, and Statistisches Amt point to hoteliers’ two-pronged strategy when dealing with state and municipal regulations. First, complain to the relevant authority about the unfairness and deleterious effects of the policy in question; second, contact a rival authority that might intercede on one’s behalf. Increasingly, hoteliers, hotel corporations, and hotel industry combinations tried where possible to complicate, confuse, and frustrate the state’s efforts to extract revenue from the hospitality trades. As instances of evasion and protest mounted in 1924–1928, they converged with illiberal, increasingly anti-republican currents in hoteliers’ assessments and actions.

IV.

The annual reports of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft, approved if not co-authored by Meinhardt, reflected a pattern of pessimism and a lack of confidence in the governments of Germany, Prussia, and Berlin, even as economic and political conditions improved after 1923.69 Meinhardt’s reports were, in fact, more consistently pessimistic than those of Berlin’s other two large hotel corporations, the Berliner Hotel-Gesellschaft and Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft. Finally, and surprisingly, the annual reports of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft managed to conceal the fact of the corporation’s

relatively good health in the period between 1924 and 1928. By the end of the decade, the reports no longer served the purpose of informing shareholders and the public of the financial state of the corporation; rather, these documents’ principal function became to convey complaints and demands to the authorities—to lobby, not to testify. (This was a curious move considering the fact that the audience for these annual reports was primarily corporate shareholders and investors.) The politicization of the annual reports, which were overwhelmingly pessimistic, left little space for the acknowledgement of what was actually going well in these years of relative stability and prosperity.

The dismal tone of the annual reports for 1924–1928, in fact good times for Berlin’s hotels, changed little from the reports of 1918–1923, a period of almost unmitigated disaster for the hotel industry. Points of information that could have generated optimism about the near future of a German economy now blessed with a stable currency were nonetheless tempered by dark prognoses based on what hoteliers saw as the “poor general condition of the German economy.” German guests could no longer afford to patronize luxury hotels in the midst of “Germany’s impoverishment,” they lamented. Moreover, foreigners were staying away, the argument went, largely on account of advertisements abroad that cast a visit to Germany in a negative light. Board members were quick to blame Germany’s local governments for the bad press: foreign visitors to Germany knew not to expect “some of the entertainments” to which they might be accustomed “on account of officials’ wrongheaded decrees—for example, the ban on dancing in hotels,” which proved to be short-lived. That municipalities in other European countries were more permissive meant that foreigners were more likely to choose one of those places over Berlin as a vacation destination. But the official stance against fun was not the only force to blunt Germany’s competitive edge. There was also the “tremendous [ungeheuer] pressure applied by taxes,” which made it “all but impossible for the German hospitality industry to compete with destinations abroad.” The policies of the state and the municipal governments, more than any other geopolitical or economic forces, were sinking the industry, the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft’s 1925 report suggested, and without some reversal and soon, the industry would succumb.

Yet the German economy, as well as the profits and the prospects of Berlin’s hotel industry, were actually improving. The board simply downplayed improvements by tempering any suggestion of optimism

71 Ibid.
with dark aspersions on the local and national governments: “The results of this most recent fiscal year (1926/1927) more or less met those of the previous fiscal year (1925/1926), despite ... the higher expenditure on taxes.”72 The phrasing was slippery. A higher expenditure on taxes actually reflected, in this context, greater revenue, not a higher rate of taxation, but Meinhardt and his directors were comfortable leaving this fact buried in the summary of accounts that followed the report’s introductory essay. They were using the annual report as an opportunity to campaign against the present tax regime.

Instead of acknowledging their good fortunes, the reports attacked national, state, and local governments anew, this time for the failure to spur tourism. The city of Berlin had, the report conceded, made great efforts to increase traffic to the capital. “Large-scale events and the creation of new attractions” were supposed to have “revived tourism in Berlin.” The hotel industry, too, had done its bit, Meinhardt and the others contended, but all such efforts foundered on the rocks of local, state, and national tax policies. Success could only have been possible with a “reprieve” from taxes, which were still too high to allow any business, but particularly a hotel, to turn a profit and thus contribute to the national economy.73 Again, the annual report became a place for railing against tax policy and, by extension, making claims that were political in the sense of suggesting how the state should and should not collect and distribute resources for the purpose of improving national and local economic conditions. The suggestions were classically liberal: this and the other business reports of the later 1920s never missed an opportunity to make the case that lowering or even eliminating corporate taxes, however crucial the proceeds were to the social and economic goals of the government, would ultimately revive the German economy and, in turn, stabilize German social relations and politics. And yet, again, these were liberals who found themselves using falsehoods in order to downplay the successes, however limited, of Germany’s first republic.

Meinhardt’s and the managing directors’ pessimism in the annual reports came close to misrepresenting the state of affairs for the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft between 1924 and 1929. An independent study of the corporation, published in Der deutsche Volkswirt in November 1929, did indeed confirm some of the annual reports’ negative points — the decrease in German hotel guests and the failure of government programs to boost tourism, for example. But the study also established grounds for optimism, especially with respect
to the gastronomy concessions. Moreover, overall revenues from 1925 to 1928 had increased dramatically: 4.5 percent from 1925/1926 to 1926/1927, 55.6 percent from that fiscal year to 1927/1928, and then a further 29.8 percent up to the summer of 1929. These figures had been present in the directors’ respective annual reports but buried under introductions that did all they could to divert attention from the good news below.

In fact, the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft as a whole, in light of the performance of all its branches, was doing quite well by 1928. Its principal source of revenue being rents from retailers and not room fees or restaurant bills, the corporation reaped a whirlwind of cash as soon as the German economy stabilized in 1924. In 1928/1929, the corporation pulled in 1.1 million RM in rents. Yet this particularly profitable side of the hotel business — the renting of shop space on ground floors — like other positive points, escaped mention in the annual reports. The only announcement about the new profitability, and an oblique announcement at best, was the rise in dividends for the fiscal year 1928/1929, the first such increase since the war, from seven to nine percent. If this development inspired optimism, however, it did so tacitly. Meinhardt and the board spent the rest of the 1920s downplaying the various ways in which business had improved since the tumults of 1918–1923.

A look at the business reports of other hotel corporations reveals an industry-wide tendency to downplay the positive. The tone of the Berliner Hotel-Gesellschaft’s annual reports, for example, tended to be mixed, to give several examples of improvement only to dash readers’ hopes with dramatic pronouncements of decline. The business reports of Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft were likewise mixed, if more extreme in the swings between optimism and pessimism. There were the same complaints about “suffering” under the burden of taxes both from the state (Staat) and the municipality (Kommune) and the same complaints about the failure of the authorities to do enough to increase tourism. The first half of 1926, the managing directors reported, had indeed been bad, but then conditions improved to the extent that an “encouraging picture” had emerged by the end of the year. The optimism persisted well into 1927, when the managing directors drafted a particularly rosy report for the year 1926. Yet 1928 dispelled this confidence. In that year, the government’s foreign policy came into Aschinger’s crosshairs. “The monstrous burden of the Dawes Plan and the duty to pay ‘reparations,’ which
rests on all levels of society, is impeding ... the recovery of the German economy.”

This statement made a series of political and economic claims. First, it used scare quotes to express a rejection of the terms of the peace settlement. Then it presented its protest under a veil of altruism—the need to raise awareness of the plight of every class of German. But Aschinger’s was not heaping scorn on the Entente alone, although that appears to be the case. The Entente, after all, had not forced the hotel industry to pay up. In fact, the terms of the Dawes Plan exempted hotels and related businesses. But the Reich government, as a means of spreading the burden of reparations more evenly across the economy—all in an effort to blunt the effects of reparations—chose to extract from the hotel industry a portion of the payments. This line, then, worked similarly and in parallel to conservative and ultra-conservative revisionist claims that the Entente was not the only or even the principal author of German suffering; it was the Republic that must bear the guilt of having accepted and agreed to administer the unjust punishment.

The same report made further forays into political speech with the anti-worker, anti-socialist language it used to protest rising wages and the eight-hour workday: “The labor laws around the catering trades have become a special burden.” Yet for all these complaints, tinged with the ire of the anti-republican right, neither the gastronomy nor the hotel business was going badly, Aschinger’s admitted. “With respect to our hotels,” the 1927 report read, there had been “an improvement” — “despite,” of course, missing the mark of the “prewar period.” Nostalgia for the old regime was a particular feature of the Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft reports.

If we find ourselves able to report a substantial expansion of the business, of openings and re-openings and also of the acquisition of two properties, then these facts are not to be taken as a sign that operations have returned to that prewar trajectory so favorable to the development of our enterprise. No, the necessary conditions for that, embedded in the way things used to be, no longer exist.

This report was a model of anti-republicanism and had a good deal in common with prior reports from the period of hyperinflation, inflation, unrest, and revolution. But the 1927 report also did
something different. It told readers, presumably shareholders but also any interested parties in industry and government, exactly how to interpret the data — to interpret it against reason. The data pointed to good news, not bad: a hotel industry at its healthiest state in 15 years. The problem from the perspective of the board was not that the state was killing the business. It was not. The problem was that the state was taking too large a cut of the proceeds. And for that, Aschinger’s board peppered the annual reports with fiercely anti-republican pronouncements.

Aschinger’s took a harder line against the Republic than did the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft. Nonetheless, the chairmen and managing directors of both corporations used their annual reports to protest government policy and at several points to malign the Republic, its labor and fiscal policies in particular. In these cases, the tendency to see the darkest side of any development in the business — that is, a chronic pessimism even in face of improving conditions — easily spilled over into anti-republicanism after 1929, even when, as in the case of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft, the business was headed by a Jewish member of the German Democratic Party, William Meinhardt.

V.

In the aftermath of “Black Friday,” October 25, 1929, the profits of the hotel corporations began to dwindle. Margins shrunk almost to 1924 levels, and this after revenue from the first nine months of the year had appeared to guarantee an increase. Indeed, “there is very little good to say about our hotel business,” communicated the board in its annual report for 1929. It cited the *Jahresbericht der Berliner Handelskammer (Annual Report of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce)* in its declaration that “since 1923,” under hyperinflationary conditions, there has been “no year as inauspicious as this.”

Two more years of the downturn had spelled disaster, managing director Adolf Schick informed the board of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft at a meeting on July 19, 1932. In the first half of 1929, the total number of foreigners at Berlin hotels had been 790,000. For the same period in 1932, it was 473,000. Under these circumstances, revenues plunged. Between 1931 and 1932, the hotels of Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft—the Fürstenhof, Palast, and Grand Hotel am Knie—brought in a full 20 percent less than in the previous year. For 1932, the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft, the majority stake of which now belonged to Aschinger’s, operated at a staggering loss. These shortfalls...

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82 Annual report of Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft for 1929, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 637.
83 Ibid.
84 Annual report of Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft for 1932, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 407. Primarily a provider of inexpensive meals prepared simply and often in advance, Aschinger’s depended on the fortunes of the lower middle and working classes, or the “in Frage kommenden Bevölkerungskreise,” as the corporation’s annual report for 1931 put it, in LAB, A Rep. 637.
were happening throughout the German economy; between 1929 and 1933 the depression managed to erase the gains of the period from 1924 to the end of October 1929. It was in the course of this swift decline that hoteliers’ longstanding pessimism turned to fatalism.

As prices fell and hoteliers looked for new sources of revenue among groups heretofore peripheral to its publicity efforts, such as middling businessmen and budget travelers, the class profile of the guests began to change. “Perhaps it was a mistake,” wrote Paul Arpé, manager of the Fürstenhof, in his report on the New Year’s celebrations for 1930/31, “to price the menu so cheaply [billig], since around 50 percent of the attendees were first-timers.” Not all of the guests behaved. At 9:30, hotel staff wheeled out a large radio so that everyone would be able to hear President Hindenburg’s New Year’s address. The speech, which admonished Germans to “walk hand in hand toward the future,” could not be heard in its entirety on account of what Arpé described as “political troublemaking.” There is no more information about what happened, but that there was a political disturbance at all portended the baleful effects of political polarization.

Indeed, as in 1919–1923, the hotel firms blamed the state for their misfortune and seized on taxes as the means by which the fiscus sought to destroy free, profitable enterprise. They were, in part, correct: high taxes as a response to the Depression were having terrible effects in Germany as elsewhere. “We have made every effort” to right the business and only failed to turn a profit on account of “our tax burden,” the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft claimed in its annual report for 1931/1932. It was because of taxes and taxes alone that business was suffering, they argued.

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86 Penkert, The Weimar Republic, 12.
88 Ibid. These revelers, 105 in all, consumed 94 bottles of champagne that night, almost the same number drunk the previous year when the guest list had been twice as long, according to the report for 1930, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 1156.
The hoteliers advanced a sound liberal argument when it came to taxes: high rates of taxation were indeed damaging the economy by reducing the spending power of consumers. Still, hoteliers might have found a more pointed argument for why the state was to blame if that argument focused on Brüning’s deflationary measures and the conservatives’ efforts to dismantle the Republic by further ruining the economy. On that count, however, the annual reports and all other communications remained silent. Instead, hoteliers used increasingly hysterical language to describe the effects of taxation.

The emphasis remained on taxes as the principal cause of the emergency — an emphasis that tended to cast the government as selfish, anti-business, and even anti-German. But high taxes were only one way that the government managed to damage the economy. For the annual reports to have focused on deflation as well as taxes would have been to cast the leadership as saboteurs, intent on pursuing a policy that would victimize Germans to the extent that they would turn against the Republic. Instead of calling on the state to end this practice, the hoteliers chose almost never to acknowledge it. When they did speak up, it was only to ask for a “temporary” reprieve from the austerity, not for an end to deflation. This move tended to cast the present difficulties as part of a longer history of over-taxation under coalitions of the center-left and not as a result of the newer policies of the conservatives, aimed at restricting the money supply and credit.

This tacit acquiescence to the policies of the Right mirrored and, as a general phenomenon, aided in the ascent of the anti-republican, ultraconservative milieu that eventually invited Hitler to power. While hoteliers were trying to make sense of what they saw as a deepening crisis, both political and economic, they would have observed the continued rightward drift of the German electorate. In April 1932, Paul von Hindenburg won reelection to the presidency, ensuring the continued presence of arch-conservatives in the Chancellery. Two weeks later, the NSDAP prevailed in the state parliament elections of Anhalt, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Prussia. Then, in July, Chancellor von Papen, under the president’s powers to legislate by emergency decree, took over the government of Prussia and effectively abrogated parliamentary rule there. In the national elections eleven days later, the Nazi party won 37.3 percent of the vote and became the strongest faction in the Reichstag, which, by the end of August, had a new president: Hermann Göring. These were the political conditions under which the boards of the hotel corporations labored.
Throughout the minutes of board meetings and in correspondence among hoteliers in 1931 and 1932 there is a high frequency of fatalist pronouncements. The reports’ authors used language to suggest that they were in the process of washing their hands of the industry and of any effort to salvage it. “Stagnation,” “crisis,” and “catastrophe” became the words used most frequently to describe the situation.\footnote{Annual report of Aschinger’s Aktien-Gesellschaft for 1930, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 636.} Although the reports paid scant attention to the international dimensions of the Depression, the board members of the Hotelbetriebs-Aktiengesellschaft must also have been aware of the conditions of hotel industries abroad. In the United States, for example, some 70 percent of hotels were out of business, bankrupt, or in receivership by the start of 1932.\footnote{Lisa Davidson, “‘A Service Machine’: Hotel Guests and the Development of an Early-Twentieth-Century Building Type,” Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture 10 (2005): 124–125.} The Depression discredited the American example, which Berlin’s hoteliers had until very recently held up as the model of rational, responsible enterprise. Now there were no models, only the sense that a business as big and costly to operate as a grand hotel had finally and conclusively proved itself to be less viable than almost any other kind of business.\footnote{“Ein Hilfsprogramm für die deutsche Hotelwirtschaft: Entschließung des Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Hotels E.V.,” flyer of October 6, 1932, in LAB, A Rep. 225, Nr. 798.}

VI.

How do we begin to make sense of Meinhardt’s reasoning and the board’s decision to allow the Nazis to use the Kaiserhof as their Berlin headquarters? Several factors would have played into Meinhardt’s decision to allow them to stay. There were, first, the negative consequences of ejecting the Nazis: the risk of reprisals from a party that was growing rapidly in size, power, and popularity, as well as the alienation of pro-Nazi customers. Second, there was the problem of Meinhardt’s responsibility to shareholders and his duty to remain impartial: as chairman of the board, he was not supposed to let his own politics or Jewishness guide his decisions. Third, there was the problem of Meinhardt’s liberalism: to refuse service to someone on the basis of his or her political beliefs, however odious, would be an illiberal thing to do, and Meinhardt was a committed liberal. Fourth, and finally, there was his particular position as a member of Germany’s industrial elite, the anti-republican stance of which might have made the democratic solutions to Germany’s problems less attractive to Meinhardt. These four facets of Meinhardt’s profile — his appreciation for the overwhelming appeal of Nazism and his awareness of Nazi strategies of intimidation, his fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, his liberalism, and his status as a member of the German industrial elite — any or all of these might have encouraged Meinhardt to allow the Nazis to remain at the Kaiserhof.
The amorality of other industrialists’ approach to the rise of Nazism indicates that this kind of thinking would have been possible on Meinhardt’s part. Overwhelming pessimism among Germany’s industrialists eliminated any opportunity to see a way toward prosperity that did not involve a fundamental transformation of the German economy, German society, and even in some cases the German polity. As Hitler consolidated his mass base in the years 1928 to 1933, he appeared to be the most likely instrument of change. By way of a pessimism that had been intensifying and the emergence of a leader whose meteoric rise indicated at least the possibility of the transformation industrialists sought, a fatalism emerged among the industrial elite and therefore infiltrated the board room at the Hotel Bristol where Meinhardt convened the meeting of September 15, 1932. The tendency toward fatalism and toward blaming the state for all misfortunes, together with an atmosphere of uncertainty, emergency, and fear, made Meinhardt’s decision a choiceless one.

The consequence was that Meinhardt and the others invited into their own house the man who would ruin them. Quite swiftly after January 30, 1933, the situation for Meinhardt became particularly dangerous. Bad press about violence against Germany’s Jews had incensed the top brass in Berlin, especially Göring, who summoned the leaders of the city’s more assimilationist Jewish organizations in order to demand that elite Jews put a stop to the negative reports in foreign newspapers: “Unless you put a stop to these libelous accusations immediately, I shall no longer be able to vouch for the safety of German Jews.” Meinhardt lost little time. He fled to London within a few months. Eventually, he would help coordinate relief efforts under the auspices of the Association for Jewish Refugees.

The calamities of 1918–1923, and especially the hyperinflation at the end of that period, caused Meinhardt and a sample of Berlin’s most influential businessmen, who also sat on the boards of the city’s hotel corporations, to believe that their interests and the interests of the Republic might never align. The period of relative stability (1924–1928) did little to quell their pessimism. Instead, stabilization indicated the likely endurance of the Republic, its social programs, and, especially, the taxes that paid for those programs. Dismayed, the hoteliers rallied against the government, and particularly its tax regime, with such zeal that when the Republic needed them, these liberal democrats had neither the words nor the nerve to come to democracy’s defense.


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IMAGES OF THE COLLECTIVE: SHAPES, TYPES, AND BODIES IN INTERWAR GERMANY

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I. Introduction

In 1938, the writer Eugen Gürster stopped at a Southern German train station and looked at a group of young people in uniforms on the platform. “It seemed to me,” he wrote under a pseudonym in the Swiss exile journal Mass und Wert, “that the average of these clear faces resulted in an ideal worker’s face, the face of a type that wants to be active and useful in a great and manifest work.” In Nazi Germany, he thought he could recognize “the physiognomy of a human race that expects a mission and is prepared to execute a rational order with a maximum of rationality.” The liberal regime critic Gürster “felt” that “a race is growing … that has no use for freedom.”

The following article analyzes in what terms German intellectuals discussed the relation between the individual and the collective in the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany. One ubiquitous catchword, in this context, was the “type,” a notion that conveyed a multitude of political and cultural meanings. In Weimar and the Kaiserreich, intellectuals had already advanced arguments similar to Gürster’s about “typical” facial expressions and physiognomies, which allegedly corresponded to the wider historical development of German society. Numerous psychologists, journalists, biologists and even photographers debated whether there was anything like a “typical face” shaped by the experience of modernity and what could be read from such a physiognomy.

Intellectuals of all political backgrounds began to discuss whether facial features were formed by the evolution of modern society. Human faces, many authors were convinced, revealed the character and the “destiny” of an entire societal collective. As this article will argue, the normative conclusions about these developments in physiognomy were not necessarily aligned with political fault lines. Just as Gürster looked with disdain on the Nazified masses in the 1930s, conservatives and anti-democrats had earlier criticized the Weimar Republic as a standardized and soulless “mass society.” For many authors, democratic faces seemed to have degenerated into hollow masks. In the 1920s and 30s, nationalists such as Ernst Jünger triumphantly

announced alongside Nazi propagandists a new “type” of man with chiseled, clear and steely facial features, which they thought they recognized in the frontline soldier of the First World War.3

As the obsession with “human types” and ever-repeating images of collective unity would become key characteristics of Nazi propaganda and racial ideology, historians have traditionally focused on the anti-liberal and totalitarian ideas inherent in these concepts. By contrast, this article does not focus on the function of “the collective” in Nazi ideology, but rather seeks to retrace how democrats and opponents of the Nazi movement employed the very same images. Specifically, this article seeks to reveal hidden contact points and intellectual similarities between the Nazi movement and other political groups, including the left and the democratic center. This shared complex of ideas on “types,” “collectives,” and “masses” allowed for a certain degree of political communication between different ideological groups, including the Nazis and some of their opponents. In this context, I argue that intellectual parallels between different political currents strongly facilitated the spread of Nazism by blurring its exterminatory radicalism.

This article interprets National Socialism as a symptom of much larger cultural trends and patterns in the Weimar Republic. Thereby, it engages with the works of historians who have revealed the connections between Nazi ideology and (pseudo-)scientific concepts of the early twentieth century, including eugenics and Social Darwinism.4 In the last decade, however, historians such as Regina Wecker and Michael Burleigh have also begun to research the ways in which eugenic doctrines and ideas on “racial hygiene” were anchored in other political groups or in German society at large, including academia and the civil service.5 Similarly, Richard Wetzell’s book on German criminology revealed the connections between Nazism and modern scientific trends but also highlighted the political ambiguities of German science, which could lead in very diverse political directions. By problematizing the ideological openness of scientific fields, these historians have thereby made a conscious “effort not to let the Nazi experience overshadow” the intellectual history of science.6 Accordingly,

3 See, for example, Ernst Jünger, Der Arbeiter. Herrschaft und Gestalt (Stuttgart, 1932); Jünger argued that modernity transformed all of mankind into “workers”, who formed a psychologically homogeneous and collective class and shared a number of military-industrial qualities.


6 Richard Wetzell, Inventing the Criminal: A History of German Criminology (Chapel Hill, 2003), 8.
historians of racism and euthanasia in Germany have now begun to move “beyond the racial state.”

This effort was necessary in order to show that Nazism was no “external force” that usurped German science but rather a political pathway that had organically grown out of modernity’s cultural traditions. This article seeks to deepen and further complicate this discourse by placing radical National Socialist ideology and exterminatory theories of racial biology in the context of a wider Weimar-era discourse on “the collective.” In doing so, this study moves from Weimar photography to psychological and psychiatric debates. Finally, it will lead to discussions on eugenics, racial hygiene and anti-Semitism after Hitler’s “seizure of power” in 1933. Rather than analyzing the events of the Holocaust or the institutional history of racist violence in Nazi Germany, this article aims to expose the intellectual predispositions of a society that was capable of committing genocidal crimes.

This article reveals largely consensual ideas and widely shared images of human types, shapes, and forms in German society. These ideas, I argue, were never monopolized by the Nazi movement. Instead, they point to the embeddedness of Nazism in Weimar culture. In particular, I seek to show how democrats and liberals developed their own images of the collective and how they tried to fill these images with democratic meanings. Finally, I show in what ways the National Socialist movement could draw on a society-wide discourse on collectivity and individuality, but also that the Nazis were never able to lead these discussions in any coherent ideological direction. In cases such as Gürster’s, I demonstrate that similar patterns of thought and ideas on human typologies could be employed both in support of and in opposition to the Nazi regime.

In Weimar, different political groups revolved around common images, but more importantly, they shared common fears of losing their individual identity or their Gestalt in a shapeless, standardized, and amorphous “mass society.” At the same time, by contrast, intellectuals were longing for “community” and collective identity in order to overcome what they perceived as an atomized, sick, and over-individualized modernity.

In order to examine these contradictory images of “the collective” across the political spectrum and in a variety of cultural and scientific fields, this study relies on widely read periodicals. These include the liberal Neue Rundschau, the conservative Süddeutsche Monatshefte,
and the left-wing *Sozialistische Monatshefte* that was closely associated with the Social-Democratic Party. Articles from these journals will be compared to publications and statements from Nazi ideologues and writers. Taken together, these sources include the “big names” of interwar psychology, but also lesser-known intellectuals, such as Eugen Gürster, and completely unknown amateur journalists including small town doctors and civil servants. Thus, the article not only creates a representative picture of the educated middle-classes but also retraces how political opinions were formed and how ordinary citizens engaged with the writings of their intellectual and political idols. By examining the connections between Nazis and “non-Nazis” in Weimar media, this analysis contributes to our understanding of how democrats perceived the caesura of 1933 and why so many of them would eventually tolerate or even support the exterminatory policies of the Nazi regime.

II. The era of typologies

In 1932, the National Socialist Erna Lendvai-Dircksen published a photo book featuring portraits of ordinary German citizens. In her collection, *The Face of the German People*, Lendvai-Dircksen glorified the natural and authentic character of the “national comrade” (see Figures 1 and 2).8 While her photographs idolized the hardened faces of German peasants, Lendvai-Dircksen indulged in widespread clichés about the alienated and denaturized inhabitants of large German cities, who presumably did not vote for the Nazi party. The peasants, she argued, had “true form” which “unconsciously and innocently grows from life itself.”9 By contrast, Lendvai-Dircksen described the cities as the “doom of modern mankind.” The city dweller had no true physiognomy, but rather a standardized and uniform body: his face was only a “mask.” “The urban man,” the book explained, “had abandoned the nurturing soil of natural lifestyle.” Accordingly, the urban type did not gain a “soul,” but was himself shaped by the “ephemeral and superficial.”10
While Lendvai-Dircksen’s photography collection had an openly ideological message, historians have noted that the underlying idea of “typical faces” was equally endorsed by left-wing intellectuals such as the Swiss photographer Helmar Lerski, who published photo-books about “everyday heads” in the same period. Similarly, the photographer August Sander had published *Face of Our Time (Antlitz der Zeit)*, a collection of portraits of various citizens such as workers or lawyers, by which he sought to represent the “typical” physiognomy of the Weimar era (see Figures 3 and 4).

The historian of photography Wolfgang Brückle has noted that both the committed Nazi Lendvai-Dircksen and the left-liberal photographer August Sander described modernity as a process that transformed individuals into types. In their books, both engaged in a similar endeavor of decoding the relation between the individual and the collective via photography. Although they differed in their political intentions, their methodologies were strangely congruent. Significantly, Lendvai-Dircksen and Sander both came to the conclusion that modernity de-individualized society by transforming modern citizens into coherent and clearly recognizable “types.”

Other intellectuals, however, interpreted individual physiognomies in opposite terms. The Marxist journalist Siegfried Kracauer, for example, lamented the loss of purpose and *Gestalt* in a shallow capitalist mass culture. For Kracauer, modernity did not transform individuals into types but rather destroyed the typical features that premodern citizens had allegedly shared. “The soul,” he argued, “has lost its orientation and is therefore dissolving.” Life in modern society, Kracauer was convinced, was “life without any community [das Gemeinschaftslose].” Thus, modernity was not criticized for de-individualizing or standardizing

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12 See Brückle, “Face-Off in Weimar Culture.”


society, but rather for atomizing and destroying coherent collective groups. Here, individual shapes, physiognomies, and faces were reduced to a formless mass.

A perspective like Kracauer’s could, however, also be shared by anti-Marxist conservatives. Perhaps most notably, the Austrian philosopher Rudolf Kassner bemoaned the loss of “types” in the face of modernization. Before the First World War, argued Kassner, it was still possible to discern character in the faces of German individuals and to see “that the doctor, the scholar, the teacher, the tailor, the painter, the artist, the count, the baron, the bookkeeper each had a face conforming to his status in society: a scholar’s face, a teacher’s, a public servant’s, a tailor’s, a painter’s or a count’s face and so on.” After the downfall of this world and the democratic revolution of 1918, these criteria of orientation seemed to be lost. Thus, the conservative Kassner looked into the “new and horrible face” of the Weimar Republic which allegedly lacked typical features.15

While the democrat Sander and the Nazi Lendvai-Dricksen regarded “typical” and standardized contemporary faces as signs of modernity, the conservative Kassner and the left-wing Kracauer promoted the opposite view. Here, modernity was held accountable not for creating but rather for destroying the societal “types.” The most profound symptom of modern cultural decline, Kassner argued, was society’s incapacity to reproduce the old types: “to rob a people of the possibility to form types means transforming the people into a mass; it means castration.”16 Here modern republicanism was held accountable for the disintegration of German society. “Democracy is lacking in outer form, visible symbols, particular values, and measure,” Kassner believed.17

15 Rudolf Kassner, Physiognomik (Munich, 1932), 29; quoted from Wolfgang Martynkewicz, Salon Deutschland: Geist und Macht 1900-1945 (Berlin, 2009), 367.
16 Rudolf Kassner, Die Grundlagen der Physiognomik (Leipzig, 1922), 54; quoted from Martynkewicz, Salon, 370.
17 Rudolf Kassner, Der Dilettantismus (Berlin, 1910), 15; quoted from Martynkewicz, Salon, 164.
The same phenomena that Kassner attributed to modern individualism, democracy, and liberalism, the Marxist Kracauer attributed to capitalism. Yet, both authors were convinced that the twentieth century had not brought progress but decline. Mankind seemed to have lost its distinguishing features. Ultimately, however, thinkers such as Kassner or Kracauer were unsure whether to criticize modern societies for their pluralism or their uniformity. In their view, individualism and standardization became part of one and the same social development, which threatened German Kultur. Collectivist standardization and individualist atomization ultimately appeared as two sides of the same dialectical process, which undermined German culture and resulted in “amorphousness.”

Wolfgang Brückle has argued that photographic trends and the interwar discourse on physiognomic types represent “a longing for fixed patterns at a time of unrest.” According to Brückle, the various trends to (re-)establish collective identities against social erosion must be understood as “products of the cultural uncertainty that haunted Germany during the fatal economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s and the social problems it precipitated.” I would argue, however, that Weimar discourses were also characterized by a more contradictory dimension: although intellectuals longed for collective community, they feared standardization — and the notion of the “type” could represent either of the two.

Weimar visions of individuality and collectivity were so multi-faceted that the positions in this debate did not necessarily correspond to political ideologies. Many photographers and social theorists of this period did not regard their own role as political but as scientific. And in this regard, a left-wing photographer like Sander was in agreement


19 On supposedly scientific photographic methods see Manfred Heiting and Roland Jaeger, eds., Autopsie: Deutschsprachige Fotobücher 1918–1945 (Göttingen 2012).
with a right-wing theorist like Kassner. Although they differed in their assessments of interwar democracy, they were both convinced that their observations were based on scientific methods, which revealed different morphologies in human society.

The psychiatrist and expressionist novelist Alfred Döblin legitimized the scientific rigor of such projects. In his foreword to Sander’s photo-book he wrote: “one sees a kind of art history or rather a sociology of the last thirty years.”20 The book, according to Döblin, showed that German citizens were not only defined by their individual heritage and the “shaped form of their race” but also by modern society.21 Society, for Döblin, was a “collective force” and promoted a “leveling anonymity.”22 Still, Döblin acknowledged that the book depicted individuals. “As we are human, we are dealing with individuals — among other people!” “With negroes however,” Döblin dared to remark, “this issue is far more complicated.”23 Overall, he was convinced that Sander’s work was “wonderful teaching material” about society. This remark encapsulated what Döblin and other writers called the “New Objectivity” (Neue Sachlichkeit). Sachlichkeit, for Döblin and Sander, was a matter of distance and psychological diagnosis from the bird’s eye view. “From the distance,” he explained, “the individual ceases to exist and only the universal is real.”24

Sachlichkeit, however, also remained a buzzword that provided legitimacy to the most diverse political agendas.25 In his essay Little History of Photography, Walter Benjamin acknowledged that establishing human typologies was neither right- nor left-wing. According to Benjamin, “the ability to read facial types” was “a matter of vital importance” for anyone who sought to understand how modernity transformed human relations. “Whether one is of the Left or the Right,” Benjamin argued, “one will have to get used to being looked at in terms of one’s provenance. And one will have to look at others the same way.” Explicitly, he described Sander’s work as an “Übungsatlas,” a training manual.26 Grouping and being grouped into “types,” in other words, was not understood as an ideological endeavor. Instead, Benjamin believed that intellectuals of all political backgrounds had to accept this development as a necessary outcome of modernity. “The great physiognomists,” Benjamin explained in another essay, “turn into interpreters of fate.”27

But if notions of “types” and interpretations of human physiognomies could convey different political meanings, what are we left with from an interpretive perspective? One intuitive approach would be to define

21 Ibid., 9.
22 Ibid., 10.
23 Ibid., 11-12.
24 Ibid., 11.
25 On Sachlichkeit, see also Ulrich Herbert, “‘Genera-
der Sachlichkeit’. Die völkische Studentenbewe-
gung der frühen 20er Jahre in Deutschland,” in Zivilisation und Barbarei. Die widersprüch-
lichen Potentiale der Moderne, ed. Frank Bajohr, et al. (Hamburg, 1991), 115-144.
27 Walter Benjamin, “Unpack-
ing my Library: A Talk about Collecting,” in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, 1931-
1934, Part 2 (Cambridge, MA, 2005), 487.
the society-wide obsession with “types” as a purely semantic trend, which was devoid of actual normative content. However, the collective obsession of grouping individuals into “types,” I would argue, does in itself represent a pattern of how intellectuals conceived of their own individuality. Character, individuality and uniqueness were either defined in or against a type but always in relation to a vague notion of collectivity. Although the interpretations of contemporary social developments varied hugely, interwar debates kept returning to the question of the “type”: while some warned against individualist degeneration, others feared collectivist standardization. And yet, they all denounced the horrific vision of “amorphousness.”

III. The science of the soul

Debates on photography and social theory in Weimar were inextricably linked to parallel academic discourses in psychology, anthropology, and medicine. Journalists, photographers and interwar academics all engaged in similar discussions on collectivity and individuality. In academia, however, social and cultural debates were increasingly intertwined with biological questions and radical ideas of “racial hygiene.”

“It can be said without any exaggeration,” wrote the racial theorist Hans Günther (infamously nicknamed Rassengünther) in the Süddeutsche Monatshefte in 1934, “that the science of the human soul is the real battleground of cultural and ideological antagonisms today and that many fundamental ontological questions boil down to questions of psychology.”28 In contrast to the worldviews of Western positivism and “materialism,” Günther referred to the notions of humanist and idealist German philosophy. He saw himself in the tradition of Goethe, Hegel, and the romantic philosophers of the nineteenth century. What made his racist theories acceptable in the Bildungsbürgertum was not their right-wing political content but the vague revolt against the “paternalism of the natural sciences,” which allegedly reduced the individual to a purely mechanical entity.29

“Humanistic psychology,” Günther argued, “must be placed in a much closer connection to biological physiognomic research. The theory of the human “physique” must be thoroughly mixed with that of “character” and “spiritual character” in particular. Only then will humanistic psychology correspond to the tendency of unity between body, soul and Geist ...”30 From this perspective, racism appeared as the logical consequence of a long tradition of German idealism
opposed to Western materialism. The self-proclaimed “humanist” Günther could thus present his all-encompassing, universal cosmology of racial theory as a legitimate reaction against the de-individuation of the human soul in Western science. The irony that a conception of the human mind in terms of its “racial biology” was actually the apex of materialist thought was presumably lost on most contemporary readers.

The widespread use of the term “soul” (Seele), I would argue, does in itself pose a historical problem. While some used this word out of habit or rather carelessly as a synonym for “psyche,” others used it in a religious sense or in reminiscence of German Romanticism. At the same time, “soul” could also be seen as a perfectly respectable scientific term used by Günther just as much as by psychologists in the tradition of Sigmund Freud. In the same edition of the Süddeutsche Monatshefte in which Günther presented his racist vision of “humanistic psychology” other journalists referred to the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung and his theory of psychological archetypes. Just like Günther, Jung used the term “soul” as a scientific category. In Jung’s psychology, “thinking, feeling, intuiting [erschauen], and sensing” were described as “elementary functional capacities of the human soul.”

What Peter Gay has famously described as a “hunger for wholeness” in German psychology was reflected in semantic trends that increasingly made scientific use of concepts and words such as “form” (Gestalt), “immediate experience” (Erlebnis), “organic thought” or “meaning” (Sinn). It has recently been argued that the German revolt against Western scientific rationality rested on broader themes related to a “reassertion of German cultural traditions in the face of defeat in the First World War.” Although the scientific psychological terminology of the Weimar era may recall nationalist language, I would argue by contrast that examples such as Jung’s show that scientific and political developments cannot necessarily be explained by reference to each other. Instead, German-speaking intellectuals of very different political backgrounds shared a commitment to cultural ideas that transcended the borders between science and politics in multiple ways.

Thus racial theories could draw their legitimacy precisely from their embeddedness in a wider trend of interwar psychology, which largely defined itself as a reaction against a Western tradition of positivism that lacked in “soul.” The fact that Hans Günther made reference to
Wilhelm Dilthey, the doyen of German Geisteswissenschaft, was more than a shallow technique of self-legitimization. It should also be noted that Günther’s colleague Ludwig Ferdinand Clauß, the inventor of a “science of racial soul” (Rassenseelenlehre), had been a student of the philosopher Edmund Husserl, who in turn had not only been of Jewish origin but also one of Dilthey’s greatest admirers. The “humanist tradition,” in this sense, was open to a range of applications and interpretations. It could be invoked for racist and nationalist purposes but was equally in vogue among critical, left-wing, and democratic psychologists like Jung or philosophers like Husserl.

In evaluating the discursive connections between different doctrines that asserted a superiority of the “soul” and its intuitive capacities over abstract rationality, Mitchell Ash has pointed out that there is a danger of dismissing German Geisteswissenschaft as a form of ideology that teleologically evolved into right-wing radicalism. In many cases, however, it only became clear in hindsight, which strands of this tradition came to serve a political function and which remained academically useful. What appears today as a “reversion to German Romanticism” was often seen as legitimate science.

Another example illustrating this problem is the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology, which included names such as Max Wertheimer (see Figure 5), Kurt Lewin, or Kurt Koffka. These psychologists used the concept of Gestalt (meaning form or shape) to counter the Western trend of “analysis” (which derives from the Greek word for “dissolution”). Despite this anti-rational language, the Berlin School was innovative and extraordinarily productive in its experimental research, which yielded laboratory results that gained international recognition. For instance, Wertheimer and his colleagues pioneered numerous experiments on visual recognition and the perception of symmetries, forms, and colors. At the same time, however, the Berlin School also had the ambition to rethink the psychological and perceptive essence (Wesen) of man in a holistic way that did not distinguish between “emotive” and “rational” qualities.
This leads to the question of how scientific paradigms of the Weimar era were perceived by the general public and how they were translated and incorporated into the political ideologies of the wider Bildungsbürgertum. In the left-wing Sozialistische Monatshefte, the socialist school reformer Georg Chaym published enthusiastic comments on the works of Max Wertheimer and the Berlin School. Just as socialism fought for a more united society, Chaym argued in 1923, Gestalt theories “dealt with the problem summarizing particular contents and individual objects into one single and somehow structured unity.” From this perspective, Gestalt psychology appeared as a scientific expression of socialist political thought.

However, the political affiliations and interpretations of Weimar science were not always clear. In the same year, Chaym also wrote about racial hygiene: “socialism certainly does not take a negative position towards racial hygiene, insofar as it contains theoretical and practical measures for the improvement of the race and avoiding its debasement.” Chaym went on to conclude that “racial hygiene belongs unconditionally to the goals of socialism.” Such quotes not only illustrate how widespread eugenic ideas were among left-wing intellectuals, they also show how easily such middlebrow thinkers could draw connections between academic disciplines such as Gestalt psychology and racial hygiene.

While the left-wing Chaym had a Jewish background, it would not take long for other Gestalt psychologists to imbue their theories with right-wing anti-Semitism. Most notably, several colleagues of Wertheimer founded the Leipzig School of Gestalt psychology, which sought to complement its psychological findings with racial theories in order explain the “essence of the soul.” For example, the psychologist Friedrich Sander (who was unrelated to the photographer August Sander) distinguished between the “good Gestalt” of the “German Aryans” and the “foreign Gestalt” of Jews, homosexuals, and communists. Sander classified his own scientific methodology as genetische Ganzheitspsychologie (genetic holistic psychology). “Whoever seeks to purify our racial soul,” Sander explained in 1937, has to exterminate everything that is foreign to its Gestalt. In particular, [we] have to neutralize all the corrupting and foreign racial elements. This will to achieve a pure and German Gestalt justifies the extermination of the Jews, who grow like parasites, and the sterilization of those members of our own people, who carry an inferior genetic heritage.


Friedrich Sander drew a direct line from the *Gestalt* psychology of the 1920s to eugenics and racial biology. However, the methodological pathways of Weimar psychology could lead into very different, even antagonistic political directions. While racial theorists such as Friedrich Sander or Hans Günther eventually turned towards National Socialism, the political conclusions that could be derived from interwar psychology were far more ambivalent.

In parallel to Friedrich Sander’s “genetic psychology,” his contemporary colleague Carl Gustav Jung, who still enjoys a high scientific reputation today, also thought in terms of collective national “souls” and used categories such as “Germanic spirit” or “Jewish psychology.” In contrast to Sander, however, Jung wanted these categories to be understood in a politically neutral, objective, and scientific sense.40 Here, ethnic types of human psychology were understood as expressions of difference that did not necessarily correspond to any sense of racial hierarchy.

Nevertheless the trend towards collective and racial psychology shaped the relation between science and National Socialism. From Jung’s psychoanalytical perspective, Hitler himself appeared as a representation of the unconscious of the German nation. In May 1939, the British psychologist Howard Philips published an interview with Jung in the London-based journal *Psychologist* about his “diagnosis” of modern dictators. Here, it was argued that Hitler was, like an ancient shaman, “possessed” by voices, which originated from the collective subconscious of the German nation.41 In similar interviews with Western media, Jung also argued that Hitler “is the people.”42 The dictator was presented as a “seer” or a “medicine man,” who was in an intimate psychological relation with his tribe: Hitler was “anima-possessed.”43

This psychoanalytical interpretation of German history, however, was just as much a critique as a reflection of the themes that National Socialists had employed themselves. In 1934, the racial psychologist Friedrich Sander had described Hitler as “chosen” to fulfill the “longing of a divided racial body [Volkskörper] to achieve unity [Ganzheit].” Hitler allegedly represented the “holy will to purify the essence of the German nation.”44 While Sander had used such ideas to glorify Hitler as his national leader, the critic Jung employed similar psychological concepts to establish a clinical diagnosis of Hitler’s deranged mindset. Despite their political differences, however, both psychologists were convinced that Hitler was a “medium” of the collective German nation.

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43 Dowe, *Wandering Archetype*, 199.

These similarities meant that publications such as Jung’s could be simultaneously interpreted as a critique and justification of National Socialism. Hitler, according to Jung, had gained his power, like an ancient shaman, through the belief of his followers in his magic abilities. For Jung, this magic was real insofar as it was just a primitive label for the subconscious. Hitler mediated between the Germans and their subconscious; he was “the loudspeaker that enhances the silent whisper of the German soul until it can be heard by the unconscious ear of the Germans.” The only problem, from this perspective, was that the medium Hitler was no psychoanalyst, who could interpret this whisper and guide it into a healthier direction and towards psychological healing. However, the essence of the German subconscious was “not in itself destructive, but ambivalent.” “Whether this subconscious becomes a curse or a blessing,” wrote Jung as late as 1946, “depends on the character of the mind that captures it.”

IV. Psychotechnics, eugenics, and the problem of ideology

The evolution of Weimar psychology confronts historians with the problem that academic theories were open to different political directions. Scientific paradigms and methodologies revolving around identical concepts of collectivity could be used to justify very different political outcomes. One way to approach this problem is to conceive of interwar science not in terms of its political consequences but as a shared field of ideas. The similarities between “democratic” and “National Socialist” science, in other words, did not arise from political affinities but from a common framework that operated on a much deeper level than politics. In order to understand these similarities, we have to analyze common cultural questions, concerns, and fears.

Intellectuals of the Weimar period followed two contradictory but deeply connected intellectual trajectories. While they largely agreed about the need to save the individual from the “iron cage” of modern society and to revive holistic thought against “atomistic” and “elementistic” approaches, the same scholars also played an active role in the rationalization of social institutions. While they endorsed romantic terms such as “soul” or “Gestalt,” interwar psychologists were simultaneously concerned with problems of economic organization and rationalization.

In particular, new developments of “psychotechnics” sought to improve the “human factor” in modern industries, the military, and the police force by means of IQ-tests and “leader selection” programs.

46 See Balmer, Archetypentheorie, 138.
Kurt Lewin, for example, one of Max Wertheimer’s closest colleagues in the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology, published extensively on methods of economic and industrial optimization as well as on professional selection and training methods. Although Lewin rejected the “positivistic” methodology of the hard sciences and used terms such as “soul” and “Gestalt,” he nonetheless took part in the very rational endeavor of rationalizing German society.

Lewin later described his own field as “action research.” Thereby, psychotechnics also gained a political dimension. While Lewin himself worked on problems of rationalization, he also criticized the latest developments in his field from a social perspective. In particular, the term “Taylorism” had distinctly negative connotations. Such industrial principles, the Marxist Lewin argued, reduced the individual worker to a cog in a collective machinery. Against these capitalist developments, Lewin published *The Socialization of the Taylor System*. “The fact that workers’ councils and psychologists ought to work together,” argued Lewin, “guarantees that the interests of the workers … are protected.” His analysis of Western capitalist Taylorism was published in communist journals and Lewin also was in close contact with the early members of the Frankfurt School of Social Research.

In the 1920s, other psychologists such as Walther Moede worked on similar problems of mass, communication, and work psychology. After developing aptitude tests for the German army in the First World War, Moede taught at the Technische Hochschule in Berlin-Charlottenburg and founded the first institute for economic psychology. From the early Weimar Republic until the end of the Second World War, Moede was the editor of the journal *Industrielle Psychotechnik*, one of Germany’s dominant platforms for social psychologists. While a number of contributors to this field, such as

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52 See Kurt Lewin, *Resolving social conflicts: selected papers on group dynamics* (New York, 1948). This edition includes a preface from Max Horkheimer.


Kurt Lewin, had flirted with Marxism, the journal *Industrielle Psychotechnik* took a different political direction in the 1930s. The edition of 1933, for example, featured titles such as “The Science of Types and Genetic Inheritance” or “National Socialism and Psychotechnics.” While Lewin was forced into emigration, Moede kept his chair in Berlin until 1945.

Sociologists such as Silke van Dyk have interpreted the behavior of scientists like Moede in terms of a “strategy of self-*Gleichschaltung*” among German psychologists. Yet the precise relationship between ideology and “scientific” methodology remains to be analyzed. The fact that academics who abstained from joining the Nazi movement closely cooperated with National Socialists in their field also tells us something about the scientific standards at the time, which conventionally included the use of categories that would be qualified as ideological today.

The examples of the “psychotechnicians” Lewin and Moede highlight the problem that similar methodologies led in different political directions. It has often been assumed that National Socialism either suppressed independent research or politicized academic disciplines, which were supposed to provide superficial intellectual justifications for political and racial hierarchies. Accordingly, the picture has emerged that some academic fields were either artificially created or completely removed from the universities after 1933. So far, research has largely focused on processes of ideological “adjustment” or “accommodation” without probing the extent to which Weimar methodologies could be continued in the framework of the Nazi regime. However, what historians have called “self-*Gleichschaltung*” or the “normality of accommodation” only describes part of the story, which also allowed for genuine continuation of scientific work without necessarily imposing an overt process of ideological adjustment. Ultimately, we are confronted with the pattern that academics who stayed in Germany were able to use the same methodological concepts and techniques after 1933 as some of their colleagues who were forced into exile.

In recent years, historians have repeatedly highlighted the fact that eugenic initiatives and publications did not always have a right-wing background but often originated from professional associations or individual initiatives. This may also help to explain why famous eugenic publications of the 1920s were reviewed positively across Weimar’s media landscape. In 1927, for example, the high school

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58 See Michael Burleigh, *Death and Deliverance: ‘Euthanasia’ in Germany, c. 1900 to 1945* (Cambridge, 1994).
doctor Georg Wolff, who worked in Prenzlau at the time, reviewed Alfred Grotjahn’s book *Hygiene of Human Reproduction* in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. 59 “Every intelligent person immediately sees,” wrote the Social-Democrat Wolff, “that the health of a nation requires welfare and care not only for the living ... but also for future generations. Therefore, eugenic science must complement the demands of social hygiene in the interest of the individual and society.” 60

The physician Grotjahn held a chair for social hygiene at Berlin University and a parliamentary seat for the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) in the Reichstag. He called for the sterilization of alcoholics, epileptics, and disabled persons and for the “planned annihilation” of those carrying genetic illnesses. 61 His reader Wolff sought to combine these “scientific” conclusions with left-wing demands for social welfare, public housing, and family support. In the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, Wolff proposed to establish new laws to protect parents from financial risks (*Elternschaftsversicherungsgesetz*) in order to “enhance the appetite for reproduction of normal ‘valuable’ couples by means of an appreciable material support.” 62

Wolff saw socialist eugenics as the technical precondition for an equal society that improved human existence. 63 The eradication of “inferior persons” appeared as the flipside of an egalitarian socialist worldview, which sought to raise the economic conditions of society as a whole. 64 “This is not only about preserving the quantitative basis of the population,” explained Wolff: “preserving or, if possible, improving genetic dispositions is equally important to guarantee the quality of the offspring.” 65 Socialist policies should include “the right selection of those racial elements which are fit for reproduction.” 66

Again, it should be noted that the socialist Wolff never converted to Nazism. In fact, he lost his position as a doctor in 1933 on racial grounds and was forced into emigration to the United States, where he found employment at Johns Hopkins University. While his sister and his brother were murdered in Auschwitz in 1944, he did genetic and statistical research for the United States Children’s Bureau in Washington, DC. Before his death in 1952, he left a book titled, *Eugenics at the Crossroads* [*Eugenik am Scheidewege*]. 67

In order to understand biographies such as Georg Wolff’s, we have to acknowledge that he had not come to eugenics via politics and never had any “affinities” with Nazism. If anything, what is most striking in Wolff’s reviews of contemporary publications on “social hygiene”...
is his complete lack of awareness of the links between eugenics and right-wing radicalism. It is indicative of his worldview that during the 1920s he quoted left-wing as well as National Socialist authors together in the _Sozialistische Monatshefte_ as long as their theories were roughly in line with his own opinions on “social hygiene.” In 1927, for instance, Wolff had praised measures of forced sterilization, which were taken at the time in the United States, or the private initiative of the _Medizinalrat_ and Nazi-sympathizer Gustav Boeters, who had been illegally sterilizing patients in Zwickau since 1921 — without ever being convicted for his actions.68

In order to understand how National Socialist ideology gained acceptance in German society, we need to contextualize it within a web of interconnected discourses on eugenics, racial hygiene, mass psychology, and collective identities. This goes beyond saying that Germany had already been a structurally racist society before the advent of Nazism. While this may be true, the methodological challenge is to decipher in what ways contemporary Germans thought about collectivity and individuality in a more general and less openly political sense.

I interpret Nazism and its particular version of racial biology as one possible political outcome of a specifically German but not per se right-wing obsession with collective typologies. To be sure, Nazi policies were facilitated by the fact that German intellectuals were already used to defining the individual and its worth via the collective. The fact that democrats such as Georg Wolff had been discussing eugenic and racist concepts in Weimar media throughout the 1920s means that the exterminatory ideas of the Nazi party could penetrate the mainstream of the German _Bildungsbürgertum_. This observation is not meant to relativize Nazi ideology within the German political spectrum; on the contrary, it is meant to explain why Nazi ideas could spread with comparative ease in German society. While Wolff was forced into exile, it is safe to assume that the great majority of his colleagues who had advocated eugenic ideas in the 1920s eventually turned towards the Nazi party. Wolff’s colleague Gustav Boeters, for instance, joined the NSDAP in 1930 and his ideas on sterilization continued to influence Nazi policies throughout the 1930s and 40s.69

Conclusion

This article has moved, in broad strokes, from Weimar photography and psychology to discussions on eugenics and racial hygiene. While acknowledging the fundamental differences between these fields — in


both methodological and moral terms — it has sought to reveal common intellectual patterns that characterized various areas of Weimar culture and science. In particular, I analyzed society-wide obsessions with human “types,” both biological and psychological. More importantly, however, I have aimed to show to what extent very different political groups relied on similar ideas of collectivity and individuality.

This analysis builds on recent developments in interwar historiography. Historians such as Peter E. Gordon and John McCormick have recently begun to interpret the Weimar Republic, which has traditionally been described as “pluralistic” and “diverse,” in terms of a more unified, coherent, and consensual “Weimar culture.”70 In this context, scholars such as Colin Loader, Mitchell Ash, and Dana Villa have written about trends in Weimar sociology, psychology, and social theory that transcended political divisions. This article extends and complicates these newer approaches by pointing towards deeper cultural ideas underlying all of these academic disciplines.

As Germans sought to redefine the relation between the individual and the collective in the face of modernity, defeat, economic crisis, and democracy, they developed new patterns of social thought. Some of these patterns became academically fruitful methodologies of mass psychology or innovative techniques of photography. Others, by contrast, evolved into obsessions about human “types,” racial hygiene, and biological selection. Yet, these patterns all shared common intellectual roots: they all went back to a new consensus that the modern individual ought to be defined — for better or worse — via the collective.

This article offers an innovative approach to interpreting the relation between National Socialism and Weimar science. Instead of further exploring the long-understood connections between interwar “racial hygiene” and Nazi ideology, it has placed radical right-wing ideas within a wider context of Weimar debates on collectivity. Regardless of their political background, interwar intellectuals had learned to define the individual via the collective. It is this society-wide focus on collective typologies that connected scientific, artistic, and political debates in a shared corpus of ideas. Nazism, in this sense, should be understood as one possible pathway resulting from Weimar’s “images of the collective.” It was embedded in an open field of concepts, which no political group could ever monopolize.

The intention of this article is not to relativize Nazi ideas on euthanasia, racial selection, and extermination but to understand the

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structural cultural conditions that enabled Nazi ideas to gain widespread acceptance and credibility in German society. The ways in which citizens of the Weimar Republic discussed their individuality and their collectivity influenced their reactions to Nazism. This was a society that longed for coherent forms and collective identities but also feared losing its Gestalt, becoming “atomized” and “amorphous.” At the same time, intellectuals were obsessed with tropes of “mass culture,” which allegedly “standardized” mankind and destroyed all forms of individuality. In this environment, National Socialist propaganda calling for the establishment of a new German “community” in order to overcome both “Western” individualism and “Eastern” collectivism had a strong appeal, which is hard to comprehend for historians in retrospect.

In contrast to classical narratives of German historiography, which focus on the violent political conflicts leading up to World War II and the Holocaust, this article has sought to reveal a hidden intellectual convergence underlying Germany’s ideological divisions. It thereby complicates recent efforts among historians to re-interpret the “contingency of the Weimar Republic,” which was never neatly divided into democrats and Nazis in waiting. As historians are now thinking beyond the dichotomy of “glitter and doom” in Weimar culture, the point of this article has been to show how multidirectional and open intellectual patterns could be in their political applications and appropriations. It is difficult to establish a clear causal nexus between Weimar intellectual life and the rise of Nazi ideology. Conceptions and images of the collective did not necessarily precipitate a National Socialist turn in German society. On the contrary, they impeded a clear ideological, conceptual, and aesthetic localization of Nazism in the intellectual landscape. It is this process of intellectual embedding and integration, rather than obvious and violent propaganda, that would allow Nazi ideas to subliminally take over German intellectual life.

Eugen Gürster, the exiled regime critic with whom this article began, defined this problem retrospectively. In 1948, ten years after having published his first observations on Nazi mass culture, he reflected on the Holocaust and the Second World War. “First, the concept of man as a ‘replaceable being’ had to be intellectually developed,” he argued in the liberal journal Die Neue Rundschau, “before modern mass wars with their millionfold annihilation and their technologies of destruction could be led or even be planned.” From this perspective, racism, genocide, and mass warfare were not only an outcome

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of Nazi ideology but also a symptom of a much larger and more continuous “intellectual crisis of the present.”72

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They take good care of their own persons, but their houses, children, cats and dogs are filthy in the extreme. The stench about their dwellings is almost unendurable to a European, and the cesspools and slimy ditches in their backyards would breed the cholera in the most salubrious climate in the world. While the Chinaman is cleansing the house of his employer and removing every particle of dirt with scrupulous care, his family at home are living in the most slovenly quarters, where vermin of a hundred species revel in luxurious nastiness. How they can go from neat stores or fine drawing-rooms where they are employed, to eat and sleep in these foul quarters is a mystery which I have yet to hear explained.1

The alleged dichotomy of cleanliness and filth of the Chinese in Singapore fascinated not only the American Baptist minister and writer Russell H. Conwell, who published this observation in his 1871 book on the question *Why the Chinese Emigrate*. Despite his damning verdict on their hygiene, he did not deem all Chinese characteristics negative. In comparison to the native Malayans, Conwell considered the Chinese valuable and indispensable parts of the colonial population in the Straits Settlements. Conwell, the first president of Temple University in Philadelphia, had made his observations of the Chinese during a tour to Asia and the American West Coast in the late 1860s.

Conwell’s words were echoed in other publications. Fifteen years later, in 1885, Willard B. Farwell quoted this very passage in a polemical report arguing that Conwell’s comment on the Chinese in Singapore “might with equal force and equal truth apply to the habits of the Chinese in San Francisco.”2 Farwell, himself a Massachusetts transplant who came to San Francisco during the Gold Rush at the age of twenty, was Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco and was running for mayor. In his *The Chinese at Home and Abroad*, he described the filth, crowding and disease of the Chinese quarter in exaggerated terms. The report was published at a time when, fueled by political and economic motivations, attacks on the Chinese were at a

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2 Willard B. Farwell, *The Chinese at Home and Abroad: Together with the Report of the Special Committee of the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco on the Condition of the Chinese Quarter of that City* (San Francisco, 1885), 53-54.
height in California. Xenophobic pamphlets, essays, and other ostensibly factual but most often fictional accounts portrayed Chinese as inferior, diseased, morally degenerate and a peril to the purity of the white race.

The fear of Chinese people living within what many white inhabitants of San Francisco considered a “European” city was a phenomenon not unique to San Francisco and Singapore. St. Petersburg writer and publicist Mikhail G. Grebenshchikov, who served as secretary of the resettlement administration in Vladivostok in the mid-1880s, described the character of the Chinese residents in the Russian city on the Pacific in similar terms:

What is true is that the Chinese are not terribly clean. In the attic where the search was conducted, I found such dirt, compared to which even the slums of the Sennaia Square [in St. Petersburg] are samples of neatness. Bed linen is unfamiliar to the Chinese worker, he sleeps on the bare floor, on one or several animal skins or mats. Whole clouds of dust rose when the police ransacked their unpretentious lodge — quite obvious that the beds are never shaken out. ... It is quite surprising that until now the Chinese dwellings have not become yet a source of contagion in Vladivostok. In the summer they infect with their foul smell the whole of Chinatown, which in hot weather you can only walk through by holding your nose.3

During the decades that followed, the negative perception of the Chinese did not change. For Vladimir V. Grave, Commissioner of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of the Amur expedition, the Chinese habits and lifestyle made coexistence of Europeans and Chinese in the Russian Far East impossible:

From early childhood, the habit of living in the mud, in terribly unsanitary conditions, in small, often extremely overcrowded dwellings, makes the Chinese indifferent to his environment. He neither understands the need to observe elementary sanitary rules, nor does he develop a feeling of disgust at all, like the fear of getting sick. The premises of the Chinese, especially at night, when they all return to their lodgings, consist of large boxes with shelves on which the yellow people sleep shoulder to shoulder. The dirt and smell in these rooms is unbearable.4

3 Mikhail G. Grebenshchikov, Putevoe zapiski i vospominania po Dal’nomu Vostoku (St. Petersburg, 1887), 113-114.
4 V. V. Grave, Kitaiscy, koreitsy i iaponscy v Priamur’e: Trudy Amurskoj ekspeditsii, vol. 11 (St. Petersburg, 1912), 117.
In many cities on the Pacific Ocean, Chinese residents were perceived to be more culturally and socially threatening than other immigrant groups from Asia and beyond. When contemporary observers described the habits and living conditions of Chinese in the three Pacific port cities of Singapore, San Francisco and Vladivostok, they regularly relied on stereotypes of dirty and disease-breeding slums. Time and again Sinophobic demagogues depicted Chinese residents as inherently corrupted by their race and further soiled by an environment of filth. In the eyes of these authors, the Chinese clearly represented a threat to the moral and physical safety and security of the European inhabitants.

This article examines anti-Chinese attitudes in these three Pacific port cities from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. My translocal approach aims to identify similarities and differences in discrimination strategies against the Chinese diaspora. Focusing on housing conditions, hygiene and diseases, which were some of the most prevalent issues stirring Sinophobic sentiments in urban contexts, I will analyze anti-Chinese debates across the different localities on the Pacific coast. I shall argue that, despite striking similarities, forms of stigmatization were also heterogeneous.

I. A xenophobic discourse and its impact

Anti-Asian discourses and the concept of “yellow peril” are the subjects of numerous monographs. The vast majority of scholarship, however, remains narrowly grounded in one specific period and location — overwhelmingly in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. Whereas the concept of the “yellow peril” is usually understood as having emerged at a particular historical and social juncture, my study of the localities under review here demonstrates that this concept is best understood not as a product of a specific locality but as part of an eminently elusive and fluid discourse that shaped understandings of identity and difference. A comparison of different localities allows for a more comprehensive insight into the processes underlying this discourse and its consequences for the coexistence of Chinese and European subjects.

5 This was, of course, not a purely Chinese phenomenon. Other immigrant groups were also perceived negatively by the mainstream societies. For negative perceptions of Italians and Mexicans in urban immigration centers of the United States, see Thomas A. Guglielmo, White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890–1945 (New York, 2003); Natalia Molina, Fit to be citizens? Public health and race in Los Angeles, 1879–1939 (Berkeley, 2006).

Obviously, the “yellow peril” is a concept tied to race and embedded in racial classifications originating in the West. The attribution of the color yellow to Asian populations emerged from the taxonomical attempts of eighteenth-century physicians, later reinforced by anthropologists. Though recent, this discourse did not emerge in a cultural vacuum but built on pre-existing imaginings of Asia as a mysterious, dangerous, and inherently alien continent. Associated with violent invaders or deadly diseases, Asia has long served as Europe’s cultural Other. At times, this sense of unbridgeable otherness also made Asia an object of fetishistic fascination for Westerners: a world of sophistication and exoticism, reflected in certain objects and architectural styles inspired by Chinese forms, such as the “chinoiserie” that became fashionable during the Enlightenment.

The “yellow peril” emerged as a global discourse in the late nineteenth century. In the United States the concept was initially deployed to express hostility to Chinese immigration; then, particularly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the concept shifted and was primarily used to target Japanese immigrants and their American-born children. The softening of (some) negative stereotypes can be seen in the way Chinese residents of San Francisco were perceived during World War II, along with a change in attitude towards Asian Americans in the United States in recent decades. Throughout the Cold War, American anti-Asian sentiments nevertheless surfaced in the form of political fears of China, North Korea and Vietnam. Later on, in the 1980s, “yellow peril” discourses referred to a prosperous Japan. In the days of China’s rapidly growing economy and increasing military power, the “yellow peril” has re-emerged as the “China threat.”

This history of the concept of the “yellow peril” followed a different pattern in Russia. There the “yellow peril” first took shape as fear of a tide of Chinese immigrants inundating Siberia and the Russian Far East at the end of the nineteenth century. Russian fears over military confrontations further fueled such anxieties during the war with Japan in 1904/05. When Japan occupied China’s Northeast...
in 1931, alarm about the possibility of military invasion prevailed, as it did when China, previously a communist ally, was reborn as an enemy of the Soviet Union in the 1960s. With the USSR’s collapse in 1991, the meaning of the “yellow peril” in Russia changed once again. As it had a century earlier, the concept reflected demographic and economic fears of Chinese flooding into Russia’s eastern periphery.¹⁵

In Southeast Asia the anti-Chinese discourse followed yet another course. The region has a long history of Sinophobic sentiments closely related to colonialism and a long history of Chinese immigration. Beginning in the eighteenth century, Spanish, Dutch and other colonial powers introduced anti-Chinese laws and subjected some Chinese to massacres and expulsions. In subsequent periods, cohabitation was complicated by increased inequalities in distribution of wealth, majority-minority conflicts and the birth of national identities during the process of decolonization.¹⁶

Previous studies have interpreted anti-Asian sentiments mainly through the contents of debates on the “yellow peril” in newspapers, journals, and novels.¹⁷ With few exceptions,¹⁸ this scholarship has closely analyzed the production of such propaganda. Yet little has been done so far to investigate its actual impact on the everyday lives of Asian migrants overseas. In my research, therefore, the development of anti-Asian stereotypes serves as point of departure for investigating how xenophobic fears shaped areas of conflict between Asian immigrants and white majorities, and how such fears determined how the Asian diaspora fought back against racial stigmatization.

Hitherto neglected dynamics between anti-Asian discourses, actual conflicts in the public sphere and responses to xenophobic sentiments by members of the diaspora are best explored through a comparative analysis of cities with a high concentration of Asian immigrants. Though the “yellow peril” became established as a worldwide concept that was not necessarily tied to urban ethnic ghettos, Chinatowns were regarded as potential incubators of epidemics and breeding places of opium smoking, gambling and interracial romance, all of which had become synonymous with the presence of the Chinese immigrants. Therefore my focus is on examining Sinophobic stereotypes in major metropolitan hubs of the Chinese diaspora from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, the time when “yellow peril” agitation reached a peak of intensity and the Chinese faced constant discrimination.


¹⁶ Gungwu Wang, China and the Chinese overseas (Singapore, 1991); Sunil S. Amrith, Migration and diaspora in modern Asia (Cambridge, 2011), 38-46.


¹⁸ Mary Ting Yi Lui, Chinatown trunk mystery: Murder, miscegenation, and other dangerous encounters in turn- of-the-century New York City (Princeton, 2005).
Historically, hygiene, miscegenation and crime have been among the most salient issues raised by Sinophobic discourses. A comparative historical study can identify common causes and advocates of the “yellow peril” syndrome across the different localities on the Pacific coast. It can distinguish the variations of Sinophobic sentiments in Singapore, Vladivostok and San Francisco as well as trajectories of decline in perceptions of Chinese as a “yellow peril.” Such translocal comparisons can illustrate how multilayered and palimpsestic the negative narratives have been.

Chinese began to migrate in great numbers to Southeast Asia in the early nineteenth century, to the American West Coast in the mid-nineteenth century and to the Russian Far East in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Unlike in the capital cities of Russia, the United States and the British Empire, in these Pacific regions the “yellow peril” did not represent an abstract phenomenon of the media but a discourse that affected people’s everyday lives. The Chinese emigrations to Southeast Asia, the American West and the Russian Far East bear striking similarities, particularly regarding the timing and patterns of migration, the role that the Chinese played in certain labor-intensive areas of employment and the organization of ethnic community life and family structures. Vladivostok, San Francisco and Singapore are particularly suitable cases for a comparative study of the “yellow peril” because all three Chinatowns were densely populated urban areas, highly influential in the history and culture of ethnic Chinese immigrants, and predominantly inhabited by males who worked as shopkeepers, restaurant owners, small traders, and hired workers.

These common qualities had consequences for the perceptions of their inhabitants. The racial branding of Chinatowns as locations of the “yellow peril” was closely related to the spatial concentration and segregation of the Chinese population. Within the Chinatowns, Chinese residents maintained aspects of their native culture that were crucial for the construction of racial difference. Formal and informal efforts to marginalize the residents of these quarters produced Chinatowns that quickly came to be seen as physical evidence of immutable racial characteristics: contagion, disease, pollution and, due to the high male population, moral vice.

Yet despite such striking similarities, anxieties were also heterogeneous. Thus, the emergence of the “yellow peril” discourse across various regional and national contexts cannot be assumed to be

consistent with regard to the fears expressed or the stereotypes conveyed. The discourse was inherently diverse, multi-layered and contradictory. Owing to these circumstances, Chinese immigrants addressed and challenged stigmatization and stereotyping in different ways.

II. Ethnic ghettos

Singapore, San Francisco, and Vladivostok, all of which quickly became centers of the Chinese diaspora, shared certain settlement patterns. The British colony of Singapore is an example of an organized variant of an ethnic Chinese ghetto. Modern Singapore, an island at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, was founded in 1819 as a trading post of the British East India Company. Colonial administrators assigned certain areas in town to different ethnic groups. Chinese were evenly divided according to different provinces of origin, nourishing parallel societies within the city already in the original settlement pattern dictated by the statesman and founder of Singapore and British Malaya, Thomas Stamford Raffles, in 1822.20 In 1826 Singapore became part of the Straits Settlements and quickly developed into an important transit hub between China and Europe with a population of about 225,000 people in 1900. Travelers often noted the stark differences between Singapore’s English, Chinese, Malay, and Indian quarters: “The English district is laid out in squares, decorated with trees: the Chinese town is a busy part; the streets are wide, and the houses all uniform, covered with a yellow wash, giving them the appearance of stucco: arcades supported by pillars are in front, which offer good protection from the rain and sun. The internal appearance of each house is not so flattering as the outside might lead one to expect. I caught frequent glimpses, en passant, of the crowded, filthy rooms, peculiar to the natives.”21 Until well into the twentieth century, Chinese would settle in these central quarters adjacent to both banks of the Singapore River.

In 1846 the United States annexed California from Mexico. Yerba Buena, a small settlement near the northeastern end of the peninsula, was renamed San Francisco a year later. The city’s population mushroomed during the Gold Rush, and San Francisco continued to grow even after the boom had ended, particularly once the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869. By the end of the nineteenth century more than 300,000 people lived in the city. In San Francisco, as in other cities across the United States, a Chinatown had sprung up since the 1850s in what was by and large

a spontaneous process. The first Chinese took up residence, rented or built houses for accommodation and opened shops and restaurants. As time progressed, newly arriving migrants from the Middle Kingdom gradually occupied nearby streets. In the late 1870s, municipal administrators succeeded in assigning the Chinese a specific area, in which they had previously congregated. The blocks adjacent to Grant Avenue and Stockton Street became the one geographical region in the city, deeded by the city government and private property owners, that allowed Chinese people to inherit and inhabit dwellings. This area would remain the key place of settlement for Chinese residents until the first decades of the twentieth century.\(^\text{22}\)

In Vladivostok and other cities in the Russian Far East, by contrast, attempts by municipal officials to regulate Chinese settlement were doomed from the beginning.\(^\text{23}\) Vladivostok, the youngest of the three cities, was founded in 1860, after China ceded its Amur and Maritime provinces to Russia. Unlike San Francisco and Singapore, the Russian city remained economically relatively insignificant. Only after the completion of the Trans-Siberian railroad at the turn of the century did the development of the city of about 50,000 inhabitants gain momentum. In the early years, Chinese people lived scattered across the city, but soon they began to congregate in certain areas. The first Chinese market, called Manzovskii Bazaar, was already established by the late 1860s. Conveniently located at the Golden Horn Bay, it had a berth for Chinese boats and barges. Within several years’ time, the area became a place of dense Chinese population. Municipal authorities were concerned from very early on, since houses and stalls did not abide by the rules of security and hygiene, and became potential breeding ground for epidemics.\(^\text{24}\) The bazaar was finally shut down in the first years of the 1900s. By the time of its closing, a new market, known as Semenovskii Bazaar, had already been opened at the Amur Bay. At the turn of the century, Chinese began to occupy the area to the east where — inspired by its high demographic density — they built what would soon become the unofficial Chinatown.\(^\text{25}\) Thus, most of the Chinese dwelled in a neighborhood called in the vernacular “Millionka,” after the main bazaar (see Figure 1) had been relocated from the Golden Horn to the Amur Bay. Construction of residential buildings had begun east of the bazaar at the turn of the century. Soon the Chinese occupied a neighborhood bordering the shores of the Amur Bay in the West, the American (Svetlanskaia) Street in the South, the Aleutskaia Street in the East, and the city’s slaughterhouse in the North.


Between the late 1890s and early 1920s, between one third and one half of Vladivostok’s residents were of Asian origin. The Chinese were the largest Asian group in the city. Unlike the relatively gender-balanced Russians, the Chinese (and, to a much lesser degree, the Korean and Japanese) had an uneven gender ratio with males outnumbering females up to 40:1. There are striking similarities to the Chinese population of San Francisco and Singapore: the Chinese were the largest Asian immigrant group in the Russian, American, and British colonial settings, and also the one with the highest gender disparity.

Despite varying local circumstances, in all three cities the Chinese quarters were centrally located and the most densely populated areas of the towns. In all three cases there was a tendency towards territorial concentration by race, which was facilitated by the original settlement plans (Singapore), a later designation of ethnic ghettos (San Francisco) or uncontrolled movement (Vladivostok). This ethnic homogenization and segregation was reinforced by the migrants’ inclination to settle in districts where institutional support structures or particular economic niches had already been established.

All three Chinatowns were crucial places in the history and culture of ethnic Chinese immigrants. In these densely populated urban areas, predominantly male Chinese lived and worked as shopkeepers, restaurant owners, small traders, and hired workers. The racial branding of Chinatowns as locations of the “yellow peril” was closely related to the spatial concentration and segregation of the Chinese population. Within these quarters, Chinese residents maintained and practiced aspects of their native culture, from which outsiders constructed notions of racial difference. To a significant extent, the claim that the Chinese were unassimilable and therefore dangerous was based on the fact that they lived in overcrowded and segregated Chinatowns, which were the result of urban planning rather than Chinese preferences. White city dwellers’ antagonism toward the Chinese also resulted from their perception that the Chinese conceived of themselves as temporary, largely male visitors rather than permanent residents.
III. Overcrowded housing

One key problem in the negative perception of the Chinese was the miserable housing conditions in which many Chinese lived. In Singapore, Chinese preferred to build horizontally rather than vertically: instead of adding another story to a building, residents added structures separated by a courtyard. Over the years, houses would merge through horizontal fusion and through vertical additions to tenement buildings, which ran through an entire block. A four-storied tenement house which ran through from Sago Street to Sago Lane in Singapore’s main Chinese quarter south of Singapore River may illustrate this densification:

Originally it consisted of two separate houses placed back to back .... One of the houses faced Sago Street and was known as 20-3 Sago Street, and the other faced Sago Lane and was known as 18 Sago Lane. Now there is an entrance to the lower [level] from Sago Lane, but the second, third and fourth stories can only be entered from Sago Street.

Such a construction style impeded the supply of sunlight and fresh air and the efficient ventilation and drainage of the houses, and was therefore condemned as a health hazard.27

The houses in which the Chinese lived in San Francisco and Vladivostok were designed by European architects and thus differed from those in Singapore. Yet a three-or four-story fireproof building was no guarantee of decent living conditions. In San Francisco, a contemporary observer lamented that, although “many of the buildings in Chinatown are of brick and all are of American architecture,” they

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Table 1: Population Estimates for Vladivostok26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russian/European</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Other Asians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,909</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,000 (Koreans included)</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>89,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(23,000 female)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td></td>
<td>31,787 (1,080 female)</td>
<td></td>
<td>99,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td></td>
<td>24,770 (728 female)</td>
<td></td>
<td>97,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>50,476 (26,172 female)</td>
<td>7,848 (3,153 female)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(30,320 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,100 (1,600 female)</td>
<td></td>
<td>114,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>160,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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still would be impossible to live in. “Wherever the Chinese get into a building, they commence to remodel it and change the appearance of the front .... In a few months after they attack it, so to speak, it looks though it were a hundred years old. The walls become blackened up, filthy, dirty and discolored.”

In From Sea to Sea, a collection of articles about his 1889 travels to Asia and the United States, the English journalist, poet, and novelist Rudyard Kipling complained that each building in San Francisco’s Chinatown was packed “with hundreds of souls, all living in filth and squalor not to be appreciated save by you in India.”

In San Francisco there was yet another feature of concern to contemporary observers, as Kipling noted:

I struck a house about four stories high full of celestial abominations, and began to burrow down; having heard that these tenements were constructed on the lines of icebergs two-thirds below sight level. ... On the second underground floor a man asked for cumshaw and took me downstairs to yet another cellar, where the air was as thick as butter, and the lamps burned little holes in it not more than an inch square. ... It was good to see the shop-fronts and electric lights again.

No matter in which direction Chinese buildings expanded, be it vertically under the surface in San Francisco or horizontally in Singapore, the defective design of the houses was further aggravated by subdivisions of each floor into a large number of windowless cubicle rooms that received neither natural light nor air directly from the outside (see Figure 2).

Journalist and author Thomas W. Knox recalled how a police officer showed him one of several Chinese lodging houses on San Francisco’s Jackson Street in the early 1870s:

We went with him to a large four-story building, which appeared to be divided into apartments of the smallest dimensions, in which the Chinese swarmed like bees in a hive. He said that there were over six hundred persons, all of the poorer class, sleeping in this single building every night. In front of the building was a narrow opening in the sidewalk, with a stairway just sufficiently wide to allow one person at a time to descend into the subterranee regions


Figure 2. The Globe Hotel, a Chinese lodging house on Jackson Street in San Francisco's Chinatown. The cartoon, published in the illustrated San Francisco weekly Thistleton's Illustrated Jolly Giant, depicts bunk rooms, a “small pox hospital,” an “underground Chinese cemetery,” and other elements often associated with Chinese houses in the city. Source: Thistleton's Illustrated Jolly Giant 1/3 (8 June 1873): 5.
below. Down this he dived like a rat into his hole, calling out to us to follow and look sharp for our heads. The caution was not unnecessary, as I soon found to my cost. At the bottom of the stairs he lighted his candle again, and passing through a low opening in the wall, showed us the way under the street.

Here, congregated in total darkness, were some twenty of the poorest class of Chinese stowed away for the night. ... The atmosphere was that of a charnel house, thick with noisome exhalations from the foul and rotting rags, and the fouler persons, of the denizens of this worse than Black Hole of Calcutta. Water dripped from the roof constantly, and the walls were covered with mould and great patches of thick, oozy slime. What a place for a human being to sleep in and die in! In the five minutes we were there our clothes became clammy from the foul moisture.30

Many observers, such as English novelist and travel writer Mary Anne Hardy (Lady Duffus Hardy), were struck by the economy of space of the Chinese lodging houses, with chambers just long enough to lie down in and broad enough for a narrow door to open between two bunk beds. Worse than the claustrophobic confinement of those quarters were only the horrible odor and accumulation of filth: “There is no ventilation, and not a breath of air enters, except from the cellar through which we entered, and even that comes filtered through the barber’s and pawnbroker’s shops before alluded to.”31

San Francisco officials responded to unsafe tenement conditions by introducing a series of ordinances. One of them was the cubic air ordinance, passed in 1870. It required all lodging houses to have 500 cubic feet of air for each resident and made tenants and landlords equally culpable for violations. Yet the very nature of this regulation was discriminatory as police enforced the ordinance only in Chinatown and Chinese residents called it “the most inexcusable of all Acts of the Legislature of California.”32

In Singapore and Vladivostok overcrowding, poor ventilation and low levels of hygiene were of similar concern to the municipal authorities. Vladivostok’s health officer repeatedly condemned the appalling situation in the city center. After examining premises in 1910 he concluded that all of the overcrowded buildings in downtown

30 Thomas W. Knox, Underground or Life Below the Surface (Hartford, 1874), 259-260.
32 How the U. S. Treaty with China is Observed in California: For the Consideration of the American People and Government, by the Friends of International Right and Justice (San Francisco, 1877), 4-7, quotation on 4.
Vladivostok were occupied exclusively by Chinese subjects. Along with police and sanitary inspectors, the health officer found houses to be overpopulated on Koreiskaia Street 46, Fontannaia Street 12 and 16, and on Pekinskaia Street 11. But the majority were located on Semenovskaia Street. House no. 5, for instance, had 59 apartments with 300 to 350 tenants. Many Chinese tenants lived in small windowless cubicles in the attic with a ceiling height of barely one and a half meters. Further down the street, in house no. 12, the situation was even worse. The house register of these “dirty and cramped premises” listed about 500 names for the 94 apartments. The number of actual occupants was at least twice as high. Apartment no. 2, with a size of less than ten cubic meters, slept eight people. The outdoor latrines were leaking and the backyard was occupied by all kinds of small shops, bakeries, taverns, workshops, hairdressers, brothels and opium dens, the majority operating without a license.33

In Singapore, San Francisco, and Vladivostok municipal sanitary reformers called for the elimination of overcrowding, darkness, stale air, filth, and clutter from Chinese tenements. In the European explanatory scheme, all these traits were attributed to the fundamental nature of the Chinese and their intrinsic racial peculiarities rather than to the inequalities and contradictions inherent in society itself. Even though one might argue that the municipal and government officials were responsible for the unsanitary conditions of the Chinese quarters in the three Pacific port cities, they laid blame primarily on the Chinese residents, who in public discourse were portrayed as filthy in their habits. Dirt and diseases were thus presented as natural consequences of racial characteristics and separated from the social and political context of immigration. By focusing attention on Chinese cultural traits as the cause for diseases and high mortality rates, municipal health authorities eschewed arguments that related mortality and disease to poverty and economic deprivation or that questioned the socio-economic structure of the urban immigrant settings. While complaints about filth and pestilence among the Chinese remained the horror of the press and the thunder of the politicians for many years, few observers scrutinized the key reasons.

Compared to other districts of the three cities, the Chinese quarters were neglected by the authorities despite their central locations. Nevertheless the streets were not less clean due to proactive sweeping of the streets and removal of garbage by the Chinese residents. When questioned by a Joint Special Committee of Congress in 1876,
Dr. Arthur B. Stout, a physician and member of San Francisco’s Board of Health, spoke on behalf of the Chinese, saying that the authorities neglected to take care of sanitary precautions in the Chinese quarter:

The squalor of the Chinese quarter is not much greater than that which exists in other parts of the city from other people. Of course their quarter is disagreeable, because it is perhaps more densely populated, but there is less care taken of it. If ample care were taken by the city authorities toward the drainage and the cleaning, I do not think they would be much inferior to the squalor, for instance, such as I saw nearly at the summit of Telegraph Hill a day or two ago. ... There has been a great exaggeration in all those charges against the Chinese. At the same time I do not pretend to say that that quarter might not be cleaner. They would be clean if they were forced to be so, and if the city authorities did their duty.34

Another key reason for the unsanitary living conditions of the Chinese was a matter of profit for the white landlord. In San Francisco, for instance,

Chinatown property ... was let with the stipulation that the tenant must make all repairs. The primary tenants were transient men; the lessees were Chinese lodging-house keepers who like other landlords wished to make their stake and go home; the white agents charged all the lessee would bear; and the white owner discreetly avoided the premises. ... With every change of Health Officers the new appointees made the motions of cleaning up Chinatown, which consisted in a squad of men arriving in the quarter to whitewash and fumigate. But the Chinese soon learned that ‘only those were cleaned up who didn’t pay up,’ in other words they paid the police to be let alone. In all the years during which these spasms occurred the white landlords were never compelled to put them in order, as landlords were obliged to do in other parts of the city.

Up until the outbreak of the bubonic plague in San Francisco in 1900, the municipal authorities never efficiently compelled the landlords to take care of their property. Only then were buildings not only cleaned but sewered for the first time.35

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35 Mary Roberts Coolidge, Chinese Immigration (New York, 1909), 413-414, quotation on 413; John Philip Young, San Francisco: A History of the Pacific Coast Metropolis, vol. 2 (Chicago, 1912), 783.
IV. “Chinese” diseases

As port cities, Singapore, Vladivostok, and San Francisco were particularly vulnerable to infectious diseases. In the summer of 1911, Mayor Vasilii P. Margaritov emphasized Vladivostok’s exceptional position among the other Russian cities: “The city of Vladivostok, as a fortress, a military port and a commercial port, has contact with numerous countries of the East and the West. From sea and land it is surrounded by uncivilized people, who suffer annually some form of epidemic, or plague, or cholera, typhoid, scarlet fever, diphtheria and the like.”

The average death rates varied dramatically among different races in all three cities. Infectious diseases like cholera were associated with the Asian population, particularly the Chinese. This impression was further strengthened by spatial statistics, as districts which tended to be most consistently and severely affected by cholera and other filth diseases were traditionally Chinese-dominated areas.

During the third plague pandemic between 1900 and 1904, 118 people died in San Francisco. The vast majority of victims were Chinese. Many of San Francisco’s white residents saw the Chinese as a threat to the economic, social and cultural well-being of the larger community. Influenced by the prevailing mood that stigmatized the Chinese as unwanted foreigners in the United States, physicians and health officials in the second half of the nineteenth century backed these beliefs with the aura of academic truth. In studies, they identified ethnicity as a key factor in the detection, treatment and control of pandemics and disease.

In the course of the year 1900, Chinatown was repeatedly quarantined. In addition to undisguised racism, the quarantine measures also brought economic disadvantages for the Chinese people. Long after the quarantine was lifted, the Chinese residents of San Francisco remained stigmatized as medical scapegoats. Sinophobic reports discrediting the residents of Chinatown regularly appeared in the press. In December 1902, the San Francisco Chronicle wrote that their habits and traditions nullified all attempts at plague control: “They live together like pigs, and the result is that their quarters as a rule resemble sties rather than human habitations.” Stigmatizing the Chinese and framing them as disease transmitters in public debate, doctors, politicians, and other members of the urban elite demanded the elimination of Chinatown or its transfer from downtown areas to the outskirts of the city.
In Vladivostok Russian authorities had discussed the eviction of the Chinese since the mid-1880s. After the cholera outbreak in 1890, a special commission inspected the Chinese dwellings, once again “confirming the extreme overcrowding and the impossible sanitary situation in the urban apartments of Chinese.” At this point, no measures were taken to evict them from the city. In the summer of 1913, “taking into account the unsanitary conditions in which the Chinese live and the danger of their medical conditions that threaten the entire city population in the event of an outbreak of infectious disease,” the Military Governor of the Maritime Region demanded that the city administration should be guided by the interests of the entire city and not by those of individual homeowners. Grave, the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Amur expedition, called for a speedy solution of the situation since “the Chinese live in the very center ... in the streets parallel to Svetlanskaja — the main artery of the city and near the main bazaars .... By personally inspecting these streets and going inside the backyards into shops, bathhouses and even into attics and cellars ... I was surprised by what I saw. The dirt, horrible smell, crowds of people, reminded me of the worst quarters of Beijing ...”

Although such extreme voices in the press subsided after the disease had disappeared, the cultural peculiarities of the Chinese continued to be a popular subject in public discourse in all three cities. In the eyes of many of their residents of European cultural background, the Chinese quarters of San Francisco, Vladivostok and Singapore remained a foreign body. From the perspective of the majority society, the plague pandemic and other diseases further consolidated their negative symbolic ethnicity.

In Vladivostok the local press repeatedly warned Russians of the presence of Chinese and their danger to public health: “[T]housands of exhausted, dirty, poorly-dressed sons of China have flooded Vladivostok ... and seized all the trade and occupations ... The cleanliness of your premises and luxury of your clothes will not save you from cholera. You will be infected by this terrible guest through back passages, through kitchen lice, through the cheap cooks, nannies, and lackeys.”

**Conclusion**

In Pacific port cities, where European residents lived in constant interaction with their Chinese neighbors, politically charged debates...
on health, hygiene and housing conditions erupted over suspicions that the Chinese communities harbored large numbers of people suffering from undetected infectious diseases. Politicians manipulated widespread fears of vulnerability for their own ends. White European inhabitants often equated improving public health with banishing the Chinese from the central locations in San Francisco, Vladivostok and Singapore. Until well into the twentieth century, politicians, journalists and demagogues along the Asian and American Pacific shores published pamphlets, essays, and newspaper articles that repeated old arguments painting the Chinese as the most vicious residents. Overcrowding or careless and filthy habits, such as universal spitting or scant use of water and soap, were seen as inherent traits of the Chinese. Many Europeans completely overlooked a number of factors that were major causes for the misery. The impression that the Chinese quarters in San Francisco, Vladivostok and Singapore gave a picture of filth and squalor, something akin to a slum, had mainly structural reasons: Chinese residents were forced to live in certain districts that, compared with other parts of the cities, were often neglected by the municipal authorities and the European landlords, who owned the houses the Chinese had to live in.

Sören Urbansky is a research fellow at the German Historical Institute in Washington. His publications include Kolonialer Wettstreit: Russland, China, Japan und die Ostchinesische Eisenbahn (Campus, 2008), and Beyond the Steppe Frontier: A History of the Sino-Russian Border (Princeton UP, 2020), as well as numerous articles on subjects including imperial and racial entanglements, emigration, and the history of borders.
LOVE WITHOUT FEAR:  
KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS AND FAMILY PLANNING INITIATIVES FOR IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Claudia Roesch  
GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE

In 1950, scriptwriter Julia Singer and her husband Simon produced an educational film for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America set in Tucson, Arizona. They wanted to help local Mexican-American and Native-American families by making a film about family planning for them. Soon, Planned Parenthood distributed it across the United States.

Casting local schoolteacher John Samano and his wife Rosa as leading actors, the producers claimed to show the real story of a couple of Mexican-origin and their struggle to have a healthy child. An advertisement brochure (see Figure 1) described the film (which has, unfortunately, not been preserved in the Planned Parenthood archives) as follows:

A Planned Parenthood Story opens, on the pathetic funeral of a second infant boy, dead at birth, and on scenes of its crib being dismantled, its clothing put away. Rosa and John turn to their church, are led to the clinic. Here they learn how to build up Rosa’s health and space the arrival of another baby — which in the finale, they are looking forward to, with confidence that this one will have an even chance of survival.

The film brochure thus describes the family as helpless after the loss of their child and blames the mother’s weakness for it. The couple were most likely Hispanos, which means they were part of the Spanish-speaking minority that lived in New Mexico and Arizona since before the Contract of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848). Nevertheless, employers, social experts and civil society activists often mistook such people for Mexican immigrants. In the 1940s and 1950s birth rates as well as infant mortality rates were still high among families of Mexican origin in the Southwest, while they had declined for Anglo Americans. In the film, the family’s first resource for help was a Presbyterian church, which then referred the couple to a local Planned Parenthood Center.
Parenthood clinic. There, they received information about birth control methods, which the mother could use to restore her health before becoming pregnant again and then give birth to a healthy child.

The film promoted family planning as a simple solution to infant and maternal mortality. Since mainline protestant churches were among the primary supporters of Planned Parenthood in the postwar era, the organization relied on churches to direct families in need to their clinics. At the same time, the film presented a simple narrative of Mexican-American families living in a premodern void and only learning about modern principles of family planning through outsiders. It ignored traditional knowledge networks that operated through extended families or midwives, dismissing them as ineffective and anti-modern. Meanwhile, it offered a linear path to the ideal nuclear family with two or three planned and spaced children through birth control.

This article will investigate family-planning programs for immigrant families in the United States and West Germany in the second half of the twentieth century. After some conceptual considerations regarding the history of knowledge, which underlies the analysis, it will briefly discuss the overpopulation scares of the postwar years as a background to family planning campaigns. The article’s first main section will discuss the Planned Parenthood campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s and initiatives by Chicana feminists to educate Mexican Americans. The second main section will move to West Germany and study an initiative by the German family-planning organization Pro Familia to reach Turkish immigrant women. The conclusions will discuss networks for reproductive knowledge dissemination accessible to migrant families.

I. The history of knowledge as an approach to migration research

In debates about migration and family size in the second half of the twentieth century, overpopulation scares intersected with racism. Anthropologist Leo Chávez has shown that press coverage in the 1970s frequently used war metaphors and depicted Mexican women’s
reproductive functions as a threat to the United States.\textsuperscript{3} Sociologist Elena Gutiérrez has investigated discourses of race and Latina women’s fertility and traced how representations of “hyperfertile” Mexican women were directly linked to coercive sterilization practices from the 1920s up until the 1970s.\textsuperscript{4}

At the same time, sociological research since the 1970s has also demonstrated that the second generation of immigrant families did begin to desire smaller families but was not able to reduce the number of children; and that only third-generation immigrants succeeded in attaining the hegemonic small family norm.\textsuperscript{5} These findings suggest that first-generation immigrants stuck to concepts of reproduction that they had brought along from their home countries. Second-generation immigrants seemed to have adopted principles of family planning of the host country but failed to put those into practice. Mexican American civil rights activists in the 1970s argued that the reasons for this lay in structural discrimination in family planning clinics as well as antiquated attitudes towards sexuality.\textsuperscript{6} To put these findings into perspective, one must critically analyze which type of information about contraceptives was available to immigrant women.

In order to investigate this, I approach immigrant access to family planning from a history of knowledge perspective. Migrant knowledge here refers to information that migrants were able to acquire about their host society. This includes knowledge about migration routes and visa processes but also about customs and everyday essentials in the host society, such as where to obtain medical care or contraceptives.

Knowledge is human-made and thus subject to historical change.\textsuperscript{7} As historian Philip Sarasin points out, knowledge is anchored in certain locations but one of its most important features is that it circulates.\textsuperscript{8} To overcome Sarasin’s distinction between scientific or rational knowledge and traditional forms of belief,\textsuperscript{9} this paper focuses on tracing the production and circulation of reproductive knowledge in a non-judgmental fashion that takes into account both scientifically validated methods and well-meaning advice from family and friends (for instance, about the withdrawal method of contraception).

Focusing on migrant women’s agency to determine the number of children they had, this article investigates how immigrant families could access reproductive knowledge. This encompasses all knowledge necessary to determine the size of one’s family, including knowledge about the basics of human procreation, contraceptive means, legal

\textsuperscript{3} See Leo R. Chavez, \textit{Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation} (Berkeley, 2001), 233.


\textsuperscript{9} Ibid. 163.
access to contraceptives, abortion or assisted reproduction, as well as moral and ethical debates surrounding reproduction in the host country. It also includes practical knowledge about how and where to obtain an (illegal) abortion, traditional knowledge pertaining to natural family-planning methods and hegemonic ideals of family size in both the home and the host country. Civil society actors, such as physicians and other experts, family-planning organizations, churches, women’s rights groups and extended family networks were important circulators of reproductive knowledge.

Migrant families found themselves in the specific situation of having to position themselves vis-à-vis different hegemonic norms of family size, since they lived their everyday lives in transcultural spaces marked by everyday practices of fusing, mixing, negotiating, adapting or rejecting cultural practices of both the host and the home society. According to migration historians Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder, within a transcultural setting, the agency of migrant families depended on the cultural and social capital they were able to acquire in the host country. In that sense, immigrant women needed social capital to determine their reproductive agency and adjust their families to hegemonic concepts of family in both the host and home country. Immigrants could gain or lose social capital through professional aid and networks of extended families and neighbors. These networks were especially important, as immigrants might often find themselves cut off from public debates in both the home and the host country and thus missed out on social change in both societies.

II. The beginning of birth-control campaigns targeting Latinos in the United States

Since the early 1940s, local Planned Parenthood chapters in Texas and Arizona targeted Mexican American women by printing Spanish-language leaflets. In the first Spanish-speaking brochures, the

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Figure 2. Advertisement for a Birth Control Clinic in El Paso, Texas, in Spanish (1941); Planned Parenthood Federation of America Records (PPFA II), Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College (Northampton, Massachusetts). Reproduced by permission.


Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder, What is Migration History (Cambridge, Malden, 2009), 85.

12 Ibid. 79.
simplicity and inaccuracy of the language is striking. A 1941 leaflet for a Planned Parenthood clinic in El Paso (see Figure 2) simply uses the slogan “Muchos Niños [many children]” and translates “birth control” literally as “control de partos [control of births].”\(^{13}\) The leaflet is extremely simple and evasive, it assumed the clients were semiliterate and Catholic — the authors presumably thought that a leaflet with language that was too complex or offered specific information could scare them away. The goal was to get women to come into the clinic, where they would receive all information deemed necessary and a counsellor would pick the contraceptive he/she considered best — in Planned Parenthood clinics, this was the diaphragm.\(^{14}\) However, counsellors were also willing to inform Catholic women about the rhythm method as they considered an unreliable contraceptive means better than no birth control at all.

Planned Parenthood began to coordinate work with Mexican and Puerto Rican families in 1953 as contract labor programs caused a new wave of Spanish-speaking migrants to come to the United States. The federation itself had come into being when the American Birth Control League and the Birth Control Research Center merged in 1938 and changed its name to Planned Parenthood Federation of America in 1942.\(^{15}\) The association maintained a network of somewhat independent birth control clinics, affiliates in each state, and a national headquarters in New York. While the federation had sought alliances with the eugenics movement in the 1930s, it avoided any such association after the outbreak of World War II. Nevertheless, population control activists were still dominant.\(^{16}\) Leading members, such as the birth control pioneer Margaret Sanger, ornithologist William Vogt (Planned Parenthood President in 1942) and gynecologist Alan Guttmacher (president from 1962 to 1970), saw overpopulation as the greatest threat to world peace and prosperity.\(^{17}\) In the pamphlet “The Population Bomb” (1959), businessman Hugh Moore claimed that population growth would lead to hunger, totalitarian regimes, and in the end another global war.\(^{18}\)

In their campaigns, postwar family planners subscribed to an interpretation of family structure that followed sociologist Talcott Parsons’ version of modernization theory. In 1941, Parsons had observed that the isolated nuclear family with a breadwinning father, homemaking mother, and two or three children was the best fit for the industrial social order of the modern United States.\(^{19}\) While in a premodern, agricultural society the extended family composed of many children and extended kinship networks served as an institution of social

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13  “Muchos Niños” (April 16, 1941), PPFA Records II, Box 91, Folder 25, all translations by the author of this paper.
14  Cathy Moran Hajo, Birth Control on Main Street: Organizing Clinics in the United States 1916-1939 (Urbana, 2010), 50.
15  See Moran Hajo, Main Street, 17.
17  See Rickie Solinger, Pregnancy and Power: A Short History of Reproductive Politics in America (New York, 2005), 141.
18  Moore, Hugh, “The Population Bomb” (1959), PPFA Records II, Box 97, Folder 94.
security, in a modern, industrial society the nuclear family, which had severed all ties to their extended kin, could invest their income into a family home, educate the children and rise into the middle classes. While fathers brought home the family income, mothers invested their reproductive labor into socializing the children to be good democratic citizens. Even though historians have dismissed modernization theory as a Western-centric teleological model that failed to take into account (post-)colonial dependencies and multiple modernities, social actors in the 1950s believed in it as a normative concept for explaining contemporary society and for modeling individual families accordingly. Under a modernization paradigm, civic organizations adjusted social work programs for immigrants and pathologized minority families that did not fit the norm as premodern and undemocratic. Latino families were stereotyped as being too large, too patriarchal and within the prevailing discourse of anti-Catholicism, too Catholic. Their countries of origin were marked as premodern, and immigrants were told to modernize their attitudes towards family planning in order to gain access to middle-class lifestyles. That it was accelerated industrialization rather than premodern family structures that had left families poor and dislocated, especially in the case of Puerto Rico, did not fit into population planners’ campaigns.

Parallel to the overpopulation debates, contract labor programs started with the Bracero Program in 1942, in which male Mexican contract laborers received a visa to the United States for five years to overcome the labor shortage in agriculture. Many immigrant workers overstayed their visas and brought along their families. In contrast to the Bracero Program, Operation Bootstrap (1947) was a contract labor program for Puerto Rican workers aimed at men and women that placed them in both industrial and agricultural labor. The distinction between Mexican immigrants and Puerto Rican migrants was due to their U.S. citizen status. Since Puerto Ricans had been granted American citizenship in 1917, they could move frequently between Puerto Rico and the mainland United States, even though they were still racialized colonial subjects.


25 For more information on the Bracero program, see Deborah Cohen, Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United States and Mexico (Chapel Hill, 2013).

Puerto Rico, which was an American protectorate since 1898, became the testing ground for population control measures. On the island, commentators considered overpopulation and poor education the main causes of poverty rather than the accelerated industrialization and colonization policies that historians have identified as the causes of economic hardship. Measures ranged from sterilization campaigns in the 1930s to the first medical trials of oral contraceptives in 1953, as many doctors on the island were U.S.-trained. American foundations poured money into campaigns and Puerto Rico became the first Spanish-speaking territory with an active family-planning organization and a network of birth control clinics since 1937. With *Operation Bootstrap*, the U.S. government intended to both fix labor shortages on the mainland and solve the perceived overpopulation problem on the island.

In the wake of the *Bracero Program* and *Operation Bootstrap*, Planned Parenthood started to perceive Latino migrants in the United States as potential clients. In 1953, the topic came up during a national board meeting. Federation president William Vogt then described Spanish-speaking families seeking family planning advice as a problem of uncontrolled immigration, stating that there was a proliferation of “illegal entry” of people that were “50% illiterate, their health poor, badly in need of contraceptive service.” On the one hand, he advocated for immigration control, while on the other hand, he associated a lack of education with poor health and large families. Since Planned Parenthood could not change immigration restrictions, the association aimed at educating immigrants. First, they translated into Spanish a speech by the Indian Planned Parenthood activist Lady Rama Rau that insinuated that all population problems of the Global South were alike. Then, they brought the Puerto Rican physician and family planner Ofelia Mendoza to the mainland to study how to reach Spanish-speaking clients in the United States. Mendoza conducted her study among Spanish-speaking (that is, Puerto Rican) migrants in New York and concluded that a high percentage of those attending local family planning clinics in Harlem and the Bronx were Protestants who could be easily attracted by the medium of film.

In 1958, Mendoza herself produced the brochure *Hacia un Hogar Feliz* (Towards a Happy Home), which was aimed at Spanish-speaking patients in the United States. It referred to current themes in family planning campaigns such as the emphasis on making every child a wanted child and warned against the dangers of unwanted children
for society. Readers learned that if parents were unprepared and their child was unwanted, it would turn into “un enfermo físico o mentalmente, un niño rebelde o hasta un criminal [a physically or mentally ill child, a rebellious child or even a criminal],” since all criminals came from “hogares desorganizados [broken homes].” Mendoza based her argument on current psychological research that associated an unhappy home with neurosis and maladjustment, criminal or despotic tendencies in adult life, and warned against the social cost of unplanned parenthood for both the individual child and society as a whole. Mendoza presented “control de natalidad” and “planificación de familia”, which were the contemporary Latin American terms, as the only solution. In the brochure she warned that home remedies to induce abortions, which friends, neighbors or pharmacists recommended, would only destroy a woman’s health. Clandestine abortion would be a crime and sin as well as a danger to a woman’s physical and mental health. Only when the health of the mother was in danger, would a legal abortion “performed by a competent doctor” be available, in all other cases birth control must serve as “medicina preventiva [preventive medicine].” However, it was not enough to ask a pharmacist for advice. A specially trained doctor should examine a woman and fill out a prescription since the device (which, although not explicitly mentioned probably alluded to a diaphragm) had to be fitted individually. Mendoza’s brochure favored a formal information network and expert advice as the only reliable sources of information on contraceptives. It acknowledged the existence of informal knowledge networks of friends, relatives or over-the-counter drugstores, but dismissed them as insufficient or even dangerous. Instead, Mendoza sought to replace knowledge disseminated through these networks with formal professional networks. Still, she used complex language and correct terminology and mentioned different methods to control fertility like birth control, partial abstinence, sterilization and abortion.

While Mendoza’s brochure was rather sophisticated both in the use of graphics and language, the 1966 brochure “Ser Padre, Ser Madre [Being father, being mother]” switched back to extremely easy language to present the absolute basics about human procreation and birth control. For instance, it explained about oral contraceptives: “Hay unas pastillas especiales que si se toman según las instrucciones, impiden que el ovario produzca ovulos. Sin ovulo no puede haber embarazo. Su doctor puede explicarle,
o en la clínica le explicarán todo sobre estas pastillas. [There are some special pills that if you take them according to the instructions, stop the ovary from producing egg cells. Without egg, there can be no pregnancy. Your doctor can explain to you, or at the clinic, they will explain everything about these pills.]]36 That was all the information about the complex contraceptive in the brochure. Information about other contraceptive methods including the IUD, condoms, or the rhythm method were no more detailed, and women were told on each page to consult a doctor or a clinic. Doctors, however, also tended to use simplified and less accurate language when speaking with non-native speakers as patients.37 Through this, vital information about the correct use of contraceptives could get lost. It also meant that doctors would choose a contraceptive for a woman rather than letting the patient choose the contraceptive herself. The brochure framed contraception as a medical issue and doctors had the right to choose a treatment for their patients. In this way, they often dismissed a woman’s complains about minor side effects or did not inform her about more serious ones.

Rather than passing on current information about the pill’s side-effects, Planned Parenthood recycled outdated themes for their Spanish-speaking brochures such as contrasting a nice-looking, planned middle-class family to an untidy, unplanned, poor family.38 Picking up the narrative from a 1948 English-language brochure, the 1968 brochure “Ustedes Pueden Planear Su Familia [You can plan your families]”39 (see Figure 3) contrasted a middle-class family owning consumer goods such as a car or tricycle to the unplanned, poor family. In contrast to the original, this brochure showed graphically that if a family had fewer children, each one would have more food on the table. This alluded to instances of hunger among Mexican migrant worker families that became visible to the American public during the 1966 United Farm Workers strike, when Mexican-origin migrant farm workers organized nationwide boycotts of grapes to point out that their extremely low wages could not feed fruit pickers’ families.40 Rather than blaming low wages for hunger, however, this brochure blamed family size. The message was that through rational family planning, one could avoid starvation, child labor and labor unrest.

The brochure also referred to contemporary debates about machismo, when addressing the man in the family: “Es una virtud del hombre de verdad cuidar de su mujer e hijos. El Jefe de la familia
decide with their spouse how many children they can raise and educate. [It’s a real man’s virtue to be able to take care of his wife and children. The boss of the family decides with his wife how many children they can raise and educate.] This shows how birth control activists perceived Spanish-speaking families as clinging to patriarchal family structures. The common narrative that was perpetuated in some Planned Parenthood brochures was that if families had a more egalitarian relation between husband and wife and only few children, they could move to a better apartment and send their children to college. Here, however, the brochure relied on patriarchal structures to appeal to the father’s masculine duties to provide for a family. This shows that campaigns were rather pragmatic in trying to get their message to what they perceived as an uneducated and premodern immigrant population.

41 “Ustedes Pueden Planear Su Familia” (1968), PPFA Records II, Box 100, Folder 50.
43 See “La Sortija de Compromiso” (1964), PPFA Records II, Box 93, Folder 59.
III. Narratives on knowledge circulation in Planned Parenthood brochures

Since the mid-1960s, narratives of planned families not only promised affluence, they also promoted family planning as a safeguard against social decline for working-class families. Planned Parenthood commissioned the bilingual brochure *Escape from Fear/Amor Sin Temor* [Love without fear] (see Figure 4) from Marvel comics, which told the story of a factory worker Ken/Joaquín, who had a fight with his wife Joan/Marta because she would not have sex with him for fear of another pregnancy.\(^{44}\) Marta had experienced two unplanned pregnancies after using over-the-counter contraceptives like douches and sponges and feared that with another child, she would not be able to keep up the nice appearance of the household. Joaquín became distracted at work due to his conflicts at home and had an accident operating a machine. The factory doctor, who treated his injuries, told him about a Planned Parenthood clinic. There, his wife met Doctora Sánchez, who presented her with contraceptives approved by the American Medical Association such as the pill, the IUD or the diaphragm. While the comic did not say which contraceptive the wife chose, she happily recommended the clinic to her sister.

Here again, expert advice was privileged over freely available contraceptive information. But rather than dismissing informal networks, the comic presented knowledge dissemination as a drama in three acts. First, the father of the family receives information from his doctor, which he passes on to his wife. She then decides to seek out a formal knowledge network in the family planning clinic and the Spanish-speaking doctor. After that, she passes on her new knowledge to her relatives. This shows that in addition to Protestant churches, Planned Parenthood began to rely on informal family networks among immigrants to transmit information about where expertise was available. Also, it used immigrant doctors as counsellors, since they could more easily gain trust among women.

\(^{44}\) “Escape from Fear” (1962), and “Amor Sin Temor” (1965), PPFA Records II, Box 93, Folder 61-62.
However, not all Puerto Rican migrant women were happy with comics conveying the message about family planning. In 1970, Mrs. M., a Puerto Rican woman, who described herself as middle-class, wrote a protest letter to Planned Parenthood president Alan Guttmacher after seeing him in a TV talk show dismissing fears about fatal side effects of the pill. She complained that information about the pill available to her came in the form of comics and when she tried to ask her doctor about her concerns “[h]e pooh-poohed my fears like I was making them up.”45 Furthermore, she was surprised to learn that the pill was originally intended as a short-term contraceptive between two pregnancies, since she had been taking it as a long-term solution. Guttmacher replied that he also thought that it was unfortunate to use comics as means to convey reproductive knowledge but that, in his experience, immigrant women would not read brochures that were more sophisticated.46 Yet, Mrs. M.’s letter of complaint showed that these women were concerned with the pill’s side effects, that they were not getting sufficient information from experts and that they were receiving most information from public media in their host country. Such information was, of course, only available to those immigrants who spoke sufficient English and who lived in areas where they could access a television — not, for instance, in migrant labor camps or isolated rural colonias.

Mrs. M. wrote her protest letter in the context of a controversy about side effects of the pill, which arose after journalist Barbara Seaman published her monograph The Doctors’ Case against the Pill (1969).47 When it became available in 1960, the oral contraceptive pill became the birth control means of choice, even though it was Federation policy until 1968 not to inform women about serious side effects such as blood clotting.48 The book connected oral contraceptives to a long list of side effects ranging from fatal blood clots to cancer, and Seaman argued that women and doctors lacked information to make an “informed decision” about their contraception. Feminists picked up Seaman’s argument and demanded access to knowledge on reproductive medicine in order to counter the paternalistic and judgmental attitudes of most doctors. According to historian Kristina Schulz, feminist initiatives became experts in reproductive medicine against their will, since they believed that granting women access to information about their bodies would liberate them from a population control complex consisting of doctors, pharmaceutical companies and the state.49 Sociologist Kathy Davies conceptualizes second-wave feminism as an epistemological project because initiatives like the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective,
which issued the famous handbook *Our Bodies, Ourselves* (1971), juxtaposed medical knowledge with women’s experience and local knowledge to enable women to make their own reproductive decisions when to have healthy children.50 Their writings served to deconstruct myths about women’s reproductive functions, and female lay authors used their own experiences to create new knowledge about women’s bodies.51

Yet the young, academically trained members of the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective were privileged, as they were able to go to medical libraries, research and edit information on birth control. Migrant women, who did not speak the host country’s language and had little formal education, were much more vulnerable to exploitative attitudes by medical experts. Therefore, in 1977 the Chicana feminist group Amigas Latinas en Acción por Salud (ALAS) published a first Spanish translation of *Our Bodies, Ourselves* aimed at Spanish-speaking women living in the United States.52 However, the translation was controversial, as it assumed living conditions and concepts of individualism to be the same for white women as for Latinas.

Chicana feminism emerged in the late 1960s out of the Chicano movement, a movement that emerged in the late 1960s and fought for civil rights of Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants as farm workers, city dwellers, landowners and students. While activists used the term Chicano to denote every person of Mexican-origin, here it serves as a self-referent for activists. Within this movement, second-generation immigrant women experienced sexism in student organizations like African American and Anglo American women did.53 While on an external level they displayed unity with their male peers and dismantled allegations of machismo by Anglo American social sciences as a harmful stereotype, internally, they fought for more active roles within marriage and the movement.54 They combined the agendas of the second-wave feminist movement and the civil rights movement by setting up community health centers that distributed contraceptives and offered other women’s health services.

Even before the translation of *Our Bodies, Ourselves*, Chicana feminists were disseminating reproductive knowledge as both activists and researchers. Marta Cotera, who was a University of Texas archivist, set up a free clinic in Crystal City, Texas, in 1968. She argued that antiquated and ambivalent attitudes towards sexuality were the causes of the high numbers of teen pregnancies among Mexican Americans. Rather than distributing information about contraceptives randomly, as Planned Parenthood had done, she suggested conducting a thorough study of


51 See Kline, *Bodies*, 3.

52 See Davis, *Making*, 175.

53 See Benita Roth, *Separate Roads to Feminism: Black, Chicana and White Feminist Movements in America’s Second Wave* (Cambridge, 2004), 137.

the “types of programs communities would accept, and types of institutions or individuals which should provide these types of services.”55

The social work student Sally Andrade, who conducted such research for her Ph.D. thesis at a free clinic in Austin, found out that while religion was not a decisive factor, Mexican American women often did not approach family-planning clinics because they considered them to be white middle-class institutions.56

Birth preparation classes seemed to be the vehicle through which activists could reach Hispanic couples. In 1976, the Chicana feminist journal Caracol presented a successful campaign for birth preparation classes in San Antonio that mixed knowledge transmitted through experience with scientific evidence.57 A Mexican-origin couple, who already had children, taught the class, which both men and women attended together. In these classes, they showed Planned Parenthood films and invited Planned Parenthood nurses as guest speakers. In this way, they mixed traditional networks with modern ideas about reproduction.58

Since the class was led by a Spanish-speaking couple, power relations shifted, and reproductive knowledge no longer appeared as a collection of white middle-class notions of family imposed on Chicanas, thus enabling them to pass on vital scientific knowledge.

The emergence of the New Social Movements in the late 1960s thus shifted the ways in which clinics transferred reproductive knowledge to immigrant women. Formal networks and Anglo-American medical doctors lost their privileged position as the feminist movement began to criticize their paternalistic attitudes and their insufficient information on the side effects of the pill. At the same time, civil rights organizations discredited family-planning clinics as middle-class institutions that often had population-control goals in mind. Therefore, family planners started to make use of informal immigrant networks and second-generation immigrant professionals became the most relied upon bearers of reproductive knowledge in their communities.

IV. Family planning and guest workers in 1970s West Germany

In the late 1940s, American family planners were as concerned about population growth in the recent enemy countries of Germany and Japan, as they were about Latino minorities in the American Southwest. Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger had taken Hitler’s claim to seek Lebensraum in the East literally, and assumed that, if the German (and Japanese) population continued to grow, another world war would follow.59 For Sanger, the overpopulation

55 Marta Cotera, “Research Projects: IX Marriage Patterns and Sex Attitudes” (1971), José Angel Gutiérrez Collection, Benson Latin American Collection, General Libraries, University of Texas, Austin, Box 79.


59 See Margaret Sanger, Letter to Mrs. E. F. Carey (May 9, 1945), MSP LOC Microfilmed, Reel 119.
scare was an argument to send contraceptives to postwar Germany, financially support the founding of a West German family-planning association, and have Germany and Japan become founding members of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) in 1952.

Pro Familia — The (West) German Association for Marriage and Family — was founded through the initiative of Berlin gynecologist Anne-Marie Durand-Wever and Kassel social worker Ilse Lederer, who had met Sanger at a conference of the British Family Planning association in 1948. Together with the controversial social hygiene professor Hans Harmsen, who had actively promoted eugenic sterilization during the Nazi era, they founded Pro Familia with IPPF funding in 1952.60 However, already during the 1957 IPPF regional conference hosted by Pro Familia in Berlin, differences between the West German and U.S. activists became apparent. While Sanger and the Planned Parenthood activists were promoting global population control, Harmsen argued that the most pressing problem for family planners in Western Europe was the proliferation of illegal abortions.61 Thus, Pro Familia wanted to promote contraceptives as a means to fight illegal abortion rather than overpopulation. Pro Familia continued to exchange information with Planned Parenthood, especially about oral contraceptives, but they did not follow a thorough population-control approach.

Pro Familia did not target immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s and did not perceive them as threat within the context of overpopulation scares. On the contrary, since 1964 German birth rates declined, and Pro Familia officials assumed that only immigration helped keep reproduction rates above the zero-population-growth level.62

Guest worker programs in West Germany started in 1955 with agreements with Italy. Spain and Greece followed in 1960, Turkey in 1961, then came Morocco, Korea (both 1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965),

60 Anne-Marie Durand-Wever and Hans Harmsen, Letter to Margaret Sanger (July 20, 1952), The Margaret Sanger Papers (unfilmed), Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. (hereafter cited as MSP unfilmed) Box 63, Folder 2; for Harmsen’s involvement with the Nazi sterilization program, see Sabine Schleiermacher, Sozialethik im Spannungsfeld von Sozial- und Rassenhygiene: Der Mediziner Hans Harmsen im Centralausschuss für die Innere Mission (Husum, 1998).


and Yugoslavia (1968). Contract labor programs originally hired both male and female workers, who arrived independently and not as family units. Some met and married in Germany, others had spouses abroad. The so-called Anwerbestop (stop in recruitment) in 1973 made circular migration impossible, so migrant workers had to choose between permanently returning to their home countries, living in permanent long-distance relationships or bringing their families along. 1.6 out of the 2.6 million foreign workers chose to stay and bring along their families.

Like the contract labor programs in the U.S., guest worker programs in the 1960s West Germany were not part of a large-scale migration policy, but were intended to solve a short-term labor shortage. Nevertheless, by 1973 it became apparent that many Turkish-origin families were staying for good. As programs in West Germany started some twenty years later than in the United States, it was in a different discursive setting that Germany family planners started to consider labor migration a movement of families. While debates in the in the 1960s United States had focused on curbing overpopulation, in the 1970s questions of women’s choice and reproductive rights had moved into the center of campaigns.

In the beginning, Pro Familia had only run four birth control clinics, and focused on training doctors in prescribing contraceptives and advocating for legal changes. From 1972 to 1976, the organization underwent tremendous changes because it took part in a model project of pregnancy crisis counseling initiated by the German Federal Agency of Health Education. When West Germany decriminalized first term abortion under certain conditions in 1976, this included the requirement that the pregnant woman undergo mandatory counseling and Pro Familia was on the forefront of offering such counseling. This transformed the organization, as it opened 102 new clinics within nine years and hired new staff that were involved with the student and feminist movement. They brought along feminist convictions about universal women’s rights to control their fertility. In Frankfurt and Berlin, Pro Familia worked closely together with feminist initiatives. The Berlin Kreuzberg affiliate collaborated with a feminist health center run by Brot und Rosen, which had published the self-help guide Frauenhandbuch No. 1 in 1973 and was very critical of paternalistic attitudes among doctors and pharmaceutical companies. Brot and Rosen members joined Pro Familia, and once they had the majority in the Berlin
affiliate, they voted its president—a physician opposed to legal abortion—out of office.72

Clinic staff noticed a need for contraceptive information among immigrant women, when these women started to attend pregnancy crisis counseling in disproportionately high numbers.73 Therefore, in 1978, Pro Familia published glossy brochures in five foreign languages—Turkish (see Figure 5), Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Croatian—to inform women about contraceptives and abortion.74 Compared to the Spanish-language brochures in the United States, the brochure for Spanish guest workers in Germany used accurate technical terms for contraceptives in Iberian Spanish or direct translations from German, and presented a wide range of contraceptives to choose from.75 All brochures showed families in modern clothes and more modern contexts than the American brochures did. Rather than transmitting the negative narrative that unplanned families caused hunger and poverty, the well-dressed smiling children conveyed the positive message that family planning produces happy modern families.

Clinics in Berlin and Hamburg also hired Turkish interpreters and nurses.76 In 1978, the Berlin Kreuzberg clinic became the first to set up special counseling for immigrant women.77 With financial support from the Federal Agency for Health Education, it conducted an experiment to counsel Turkish-origin women in their homes in 1981.78 Two female Pro Familia counsellors (who were either trained social workers or physicians), a sociologist as a participant observer

73 See PRO FAMILIA, “Konzeption für ein Program zielgruppenorientierter Familienplanungsberatung” (May 1981), BArch N 1336/605.
75 “Planificació familiar (Por qué y Cómo)?” BArch N1336/605.
and a Turkish interpreter would arrange a visit to the home of a Turkish-origin client. That woman would invite her mother-in-law and other female relatives to the meeting and they would have an informal chat about reproduction. The interpreter guided the conversation, while the German-origin counselors took a passive role. If a woman reported a specific problem (such as infertility or fear of being pregnant), they would arrange an appointment at the Pro Familia clinic later on.

Pro Familia based this practice on the feminist concept of consciousness-raising, where women gathered to relate their own experiences in order to raise awareness about their oppression as women. Here, the informal gatherings served not to raise political awareness, but to circulate information about contraception and available counseling. At the same time, by asking women to invite members of their extended families, it drew on traditional knowledge transmission through family networks.

Through the trial, Pro Familia met with 78 Turkish-origin women and learned that most of them had—and wanted—two children. Many requested help with problems not directly related to reproduction, such as conflicts at work or with landlords. 60 out of 78 women used some kind of birth control; the rest were either pregnant, wanted to be pregnant, were not in a relationship or in menopause; only three women did not practice family planning at all. Among the women, the pill was by far the most popular method, followed by the withdrawal method, often used when women experienced side effects of the pill. Women and their partners were concerned about side effects, but did not seem to be aware of the feminist debates on this topic. A surprisingly large number had had abortions, most of them illegally in Turkey before the legal reform in Germany in 1976. One woman also reported that she regularly went to Turkey to get Depo Proveda — a long-term hormonal contraceptive that Germany had not approved yet. This shows that women — even those who were linguistically and religiously isolated — had some form of knowledge about family planning and desired to keep their families small. They knew about some modern contraceptives as well as outdated practices, and they were able to access methods in their home country that were unavailable in the host country either through formal or informal networks. Some of these methods were unreliable and unsafe from the counselors’ standpoint, but they still showed that immigrant women actively planned their families, had knowledge of procreation and chose the methods that seemed most practical to them.
Pro Familia Berlin concluded that in order to reach Turkish immigrants, they had to assist with housing and economic difficulties as well as reproductive questions. It seemed impossible for them to make contact with Turkish women’s groups unless they found a client that was willing to invite them. Therefore, Pro Familia suggested reaching out in teams of two, one German and one Turkish counselor. The Turkish counselor did not need to have a professional degree, but should be more than just an interpreter. She should take the initiative and guide the conversation. The German counselor should be a trained social worker or physician and offer expertise when needed. In this way, Pro Familia’s approach was similar to the San Antonio birth preparation classes, as immigrants took the lead and native-born professionals provided expertise when required. The major difference was that the German-Turkish model focused on women only, while US-Mexican model explicitly included men.

V. Conclusion

Immigrant families moved into the focus of American family planners in the 1950s, at a time when curbing global population growth was the underlying motive. In West Germany, as immigrants were perceived as single and transient, immigrant families slipped under the radar of family planning clinics until they appeared in abortion counseling in the late 1970s.

Brochures that addressed Spanish-speaking immigrants in the United States picked up current trends in family-planning campaigns such as the promise of affluence through planned families and the dangers of an unwanted child. They approached immigrant families from a top-down perspective, used simplified and inaccurate language, and referred potential clients to doctors in family planning clinics for more precise information. In this way, they disseminated only the most basic knowledge about the concept of family-planning and failed to pass on essential information on contraceptives and their side effects. Activists in the civil rights and feminist movements of the late 1960s began to question these practices and demanded full disclosure about the side effects of oral contraceptives. Chicana feminists tested new approaches that combined traditional forms of knowledge dissemination through experienced couples and expert presentations to reach Latino families more effectively.

In West Germany, under the influence of second-wave feminism, family planning clinics started to reach out to immigrant families.
and thus chose similar approaches of using native speakers and informal networks to enter immigrant women’s living rooms. Despite their feminist agenda, they still promised modern and happy families through family planning. They were surprised to learn about Turkish women’s agency in determining their reproductive choices, even when modern family-planning clinics did not reach out to them. This shows that immigrant families, and especially women, were not as ignorant of concepts of family planning as experts often assumed.

As Pro Familia’s findings demonstrate, immigrant women could actively access four types of networks to receive reliable reproductive knowledge in addition to public media reports. These networks can be defined according to their degree of formality, but this distinction does not aim to rank the validity of the knowledge transmitted in these networks. Instead, it highlights differences in the degree of familiarity between various agents of knowledge circulation.

Formal networks consisted of doctors, social workers or lawyers in the host country who had a professional, distant relation to the individual woman. The problem here was, as the Puerto Rican letter writer pointed out, that doctors often had paternalistic attitudes toward immigrant women and dismissed their complaints. In addition, there was the language problem; specifically, doctors tended to use simple language and therefore did not convey all necessary information. A doctor’s offices could be a place to obtain contraceptives but not necessarily knowledge.

Semi-formal networks comprise voluntary associations like family planners and women’s rights groups, such as Pro Familia or Planned Parenthood, as well as feminist campaigns and Protestant churches that directed immigrants to family planning clinics. Their actors followed a political agenda and often had sympathy with the individual woman. They were the ones active in translating scientific information into the women’s native languages. But, depending on the organization, counsellors could also be biased, as the example of Planned Parenthood’s fight against overpopulation shows. Feminists were more privileged than immigrant women in gaining access to scientific information, but soon they started initiatives that mixed traditional and modern ways of knowledge dissemination.

Informal networks consist of family and friends that have little professional interest but a lot of sympathy for the individual woman. Through such networks Turkish women accessed illegal abortion in
Turkey, and Mexican women learned of over-the-counter contraceptives. This information was not always accurate; it could be ineffective or even dangerous at times. While in the 1950s Planned Parenthood warned against relying on those networks, since the late 1960s they productively started to work with them as a means of spreading information about where to obtain expert knowledge or to legitimize experts who came into immigrant communities.

Formal networks in the home country, finally, allowed Turkish women, for instance, to obtain contraceptives from doctors in Turkey; likewise, Puerto Rican family planners published brochures for emigres. With technological progress, the networks in the home countries became more easily accessible; women could travel home more frequently and consume media from their home countries thanks to the rise of satellite television in the 1980s. Today, migrants can more easily find information about birth control in their native languages online or even import contraceptives.

Yet, historically, immigrant women especially had problems accessing formal knowledge networks in their host countries due to stereotypes, linguistic problems and structural racism. Civil society networks were often well meaning but contributed to stereotypical attitudes and biases about overpopulation. As a result, informal networks in the host country and formal networks in the home country were extremely important actors in disseminating reproductive knowledge. They helped immigrant women gain agency to determine their reproduction and to have the number of children they wanted. As women became more fluent in the host countries’ language, they began to access formal networks more easily and to adjust the number of their children to the host countries’ ideal. Thus, knowledge and language became important factors that helped immigrant families approach the family ideal of the host country.

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Conference Reports
EXILE AND EMIGRATION IN AN AGE OF WAR AND REVOLUTIONS, CA. 1750–1830

Workshop at Re:work International Research Center, Berlin, June 22–23, 2018. Sponsored by the German Historical Institute Washington, in collaboration with Princeton University and the re:work International Research Center, Berlin. Conveners: Linda Colley (Princeton University) and Jan C. Jansen (GHI). Participants: David A. Bell (Princeton University), Rafe Blaufarb (Florida State University), Edward Blumenthal (Université de Sorbonne Nouvelle-Paris 3), Linda Colley (Princeton University), Nathalie Dessens (Université de Toulouse-Jean Jaurès), Franziska Exeler (University of Cambridge/FU Berlin), Peter Gatrell (University of Manchester), Debora Gerstenberger (FU Berlin), Felicitas Hentschke (Re:work), Mischa Honeck (HU Berlin), Maurizio Isabella (Queen Mary, University of London), Jan C. Jansen (GHI), Kirsten McKenzie (University of Sydney), Matthias Middell (Universität Leipzig), Friedemann Pestel (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg), Karen Racine (University of Guelph), Liam Riordan (University of Maine), Padraic X. Scanlan (LSE), Frederik Schulze (Universität Münster), Michael Zeuske (Universität zu Köln/Re:work).

Exiles were long at the margins of the extensive historiographies of the American, French, and Latin American revolutions in the half-century between 1776 and 1826. Only recently, American Loyalists, French émigrés, and the refugees of the Haitian revolution have become subjects through whom historians are studying the wider impact these revolutions had on Europe, the Atlantic world, and beyond. Yet even as the upheavals in the Atlantic basin have come to be seen as part of an “Age of Revolutions” — or, indeed, as part of a broader “world crisis” — the forced migrations they provoked have remained the subject of separate historiographies. The workshop “Exile and Emigration in an Age of War and Revolutions (ca. 1750–1830)” set out to place the history of exiles and refugees back into the larger picture of the transformative period around 1800. To that end, it adopted a geographically broad perspective. As Linda Colley made clear in her opening remarks, the workshop sought to determine the place of exiles within the history of Atlantic and global migration during these years. She referred to the implications of the categories used, pointed to the importance of class, race and gender as determining factors, the prominent role of certain centers of exile, and the agency of exiled persons.
The first panel, “Categorizing ‘Exile’,” addressed the place of political exile within broader migration patterns. In his paper “Choice and Mobility: Loyalist Refugees from the American Revolution and the Deep History of Migration,” Liam Riordan placed the experience of American loyalist migrants in the larger context of the deep history of forced migration within the Atlantic basin, in particular the demographic impact of European immigration on Native Americans and the transatlantic slave trade. He argued that the resettlement of the loyalists has to be seen largely as an extension of early modern migration within the British Atlantic world. Kirsten McKenzie’s paper “Political Removal: Strategies of Exile in the Australian and Cape Colonies” emphasized the question of how people got exiled in the British empire between the 1790s and the 1820s. Comparing the cases of the “Scottish martyrs,” five political leaders forcibly transported to New South Wales, and the banishment of political opponents from South Africa in the mid-1820s, McKenzie demonstrated how blurred the categories of exile, transportation, and banishment were in practice. In his comment, Peter Gatrell noted the important connections between (forced) migration and state-building, in particular in the case of the loyalists, and stressed the self-fashioning and agency of these migrants.

The second panel, on “Control,” examined increasing attempts by state authorities to control migration movements during this period. Padraic Scanlan’s paper “Peasants and Slaves, 1780–1838” made a case for including people who stay in place in the broader comparative picture. His paper focused on the significance of the idea of a stable peasantry as a leitmotif in both pro-slavery and abolitionist discourse. In her paper “No Exiles and Emigrants within Sight: French, Hispano-Americans and Spaniards as Revolutionaries and Messengers of a ‘Wrong System’ in the Luso-Brazilian Empire (1808–1820),” Debora Gerstenberger examined the ways in which the Portuguese exile court in Brazil perceived movements of foreigners. She stressed the fact that the court neither referred to itself as being in exile, nor used the categories of “exiles” or “refugees” for migrants in its territory, instead casting them as political spies or revolutionary agents. In his comment, Mischa Honeck raised the question of how anti-revolutionary xenophobia travelled between countries and continents and how British the discourse examined by Scanlan was.

The third panel, “Connecting seas,” looked at the geographies of involuntary movements during the period. In her paper “New Orleans between Atlantic and Caribbean: Reinterpreting the Saint-Domingue
Migration,” Nathalie Dessens argued that the migration of more than ten thousand refugees to New Orleans in the wake of the Haitian revolution recentered Louisiana within the Atlantic world. The refugees’ cross-border networks, movements, and trading activities connected New Orleans more intimately to an emerging Caribbean space. Maurizio Isabella’s paper “Crossing the Mediterranean in the Age of Revolution: The Multiple Mobilities of the 1820s” examined the marginal revolution in Sicili in 1820–21 and the mobilities of people that it entailed. He showed how categories such as political exile, volunteer, mercenary, economic migrant or professional career become blurred when looking at the migration patterns of the people involved. In his comment, David Bell emphasized the importance not only of mobility but of spaces and the complex itineraries of the migrants and the aspect of violence in the Mediterranean context.

The forth panel examined two instances of “Monarchs and Monarchs in Exile.” In his paper “Global Imaginaries of Political Exile: Settlement Projects of French Émigrés in an ‘Age of Emigrations’,” Friedemann Pestel traced the wide-ranging projects of colonial settlement put forth within the diaspora of French émigrés in the 1790s, stretching from North America and the Caribbean to southern Russia and Australia. Such settlement projects, he argued, were informed by a world view centered on France and helped them enhance their internal cohesion and bolster their position in the international arena. Karen Racine’s paper “The Ex-Emperor in Exile: Mexico’s Agustín de Iturbide in London, 1824” focused on the short exile of Mexico’s dethroned emperor Agustín de Iturbide in London in the first half of 1824. In London, he joined a large number of exiled monarchs from around the world and got involved in geopolitical struggles for influence in Spanish America. In his comment, Matthias Middell pointed to the need to include the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in a larger chronological time frame of forced migration, and to place the Atlantic in a broader global context.

The fifth and final panel, “Geopolitics of Exile,” examined how exiles became actors in larger geopolitical conflicts of the period. Jan Jansen’s paper “American Indians for Saint-Domingue? Exiles and Geopolitics after the Haitian Revolution” examined plans for a military reconquest of Haiti immediately after its independence in 1804 among Saint-Domingue refugees and French diplomats. Discussing a plan that would have involved a large auxiliary army of Native Americans, he emphasized how the refugees’ exile politics meshed with
other geopolitical struggles in the Americas during this period. In his paper “Caudillos, Native Americans and Exile: Border Formation in Chile and the River Plate, 1810–1833,” Edward Blumenthal discussed the connection between border-crossing and border-formation in the Chilean and Argentinian borderlands. Based on two case studies of Chilean exile families, he teased out the crucial interactions between creole and indigenous networks among both republican and royalist emigrants. In his comment, Rafe Blaufarb pointed to the multiplicity of agents and the unconventional chronologies that were common to both cases, but also emphasized the different broader geopolitical settings, with British hegemony being more at stake in the case of Latin American independence.

The concluding session was introduced by David Bell and Peter Gatrell. Summing up major findings of the case studies, David Bell pointed to the porosity of borders and the complexity of migration processes during the period, the persistence of earlier patterns of migration, connections cutting across state borders, and the collision of legal systems. Topics of further inquiry included the migration across land (e.g. within Europe), the particular role of men with military training or demobilized soldiers, and the changing concepts of exile. Peter Gatrell commented on the extension of the time frame of refugee history, which tends to focus on more recent periods, as well as the agency and choices of the migrants. He pointed to the resources migrants drew on, both locally and internationally, and the historical references they used and the traces they left as topics worthy of further examination.

Jan C. Jansen (GHI)
THE NEXUS OF MIGRATION, YOUTH, AND KNOWLEDGE

Panel series sponsored by the GHI at the Annual Conference of the German Studies Association in Pittsburgh, September 27-30, 2018. Conveners: Andrea Westermann (GHI Washington) and Onur Erdur (Humboldt University of Berlin). Participants: Sheer Ganor (University of California, Berkeley), Hans Leaman (Sattler College, Boston), Andrzej Michalczyk (Ruhr-University Bochum), Jacqueline Vansant (University of Michigan, Dearborn), Akasemi Newsome (University of California, Berkeley), Matthew Specter (University of California, Berkeley), Barbara Laubenthal (University of Texas at Austin), Katharina Seehuber (University of Munich), Lilly Maier (University of Munich); Hannes Kaeckmeister (University of Strasbourg), Deniz Göktürk (University of California, Berkeley), Anne-Christine Hamel (Leipzig University), Martin Kalb (Bridgewater College), Stefan Zeppenfeld (Centre for Contemporary History, Potsdam). The GHI Washington sponsored a panel series on the nexus of migration, youth, and knowledge at the 2018 Annual Conference of the German Studies Association in Pittsburgh. The panels inquired into the knowledge that young people on the move — be it forced or deliberate displacement — had about past and present state politics; the panels also examined their economic rationalities and assessments and explored the uses of letter writing, bureaucratic interviews, and other performative acts to voice concerns, articulate oneself or make sense of the world.

The first panel, “Migrants’ Knowledge and the Economy,” chaired by Andrea Westermann, explored how young migrants gauged their own economic and educational futures and scopes of action abroad. It discussed how notions of generation, youth, uncertainty, and time came to bear on these migrants’ (everyday) conceptualizations of political economy. Last but not least, the panelists looked into the work-related making of both subjectivity and a sense of collective. The latter was particularly well demonstrated in Sheer Ganor’s paper “Farming a Future: The Youth of the Gross-Breesen and their Paths of Migration.” Ganor looked at the surprisingly quick formation of a Ludwik Fleck-like collective, an esoteric agricultural youth community massively influenced by their teacher. Established in 1936 to prepare Jewish youth for emigration from Nazi Germany, the 130 boys and girls between the ages of 15 and 17 acquired diverse agricultural skills. The school was closed down at the end of 1938. The paper
traced the ways in which the dispersed exiles used their emerging transnational network of letters as a vehicle for knowledge-sharing, addressing a variety of themes and questions — from day-to-day agricultural tasks to localized experiences of the Second World War. In their transnational conversation, the former farm trainees chronicled the story of their community, establishing their belonging to it as a life-long identity marker.

In the panel’s second paper, “German-American Printing Networks in the Immigration Accounts of Rep. Richard Bartholdt and Dr. Heinrich Fick,” Hans Leaman explored the creation of “Germanness” as a business model. Both protagonists found ways to capitalize on their German-related knowledge via their work for German-language newspapers. They created new “consumer groups” or constituencies addressing political and cultural issues that were salient to the German-American population and, in Bartholdt’s case, to America’s immigrant population at large: Barthold was elected to serve in Congress from 1893 to 1915 and became a leader in immigration policy debates.

The panel’s third paper, “Peasants’ Mobility from Polish-German Borderlands and National Identities in the Making, 1890s-1930s,” presented by Andrzej Michalczyk, adopted a biographical approach in order to investigate migration networks and cultural transfer between Germany and Poland since the 1850s among young peasants and craftsmen. Michalczyk demonstrated how the temporary absence from home and the opportunity for professional and social advancement fostered a sense of national belonging fluctuating between Polish and/or German identities among young migrants from the eastern provinces of Prussia that came to Western Europe or the German Western provinces before WWI.

The panel’s final paper, “70c ist zwar ein Haufen Geld”: The Meaning of Money as Reflected in the Correspondence of Young Jewish-Austrian Exiles (1938–1944),” by Jacqueline Vansant, followed the changing functions of work and money expressed in this correspondence. In her approach, the materiality of transactions characteristic of commodity money (stamps or “Antwortscheine” in this case) served as her entry point for studying the making of ordinary people’s economic knowledge. The young men had to deal with different economic conditions depending on where they were and whether their parents were with them or if they were unaccompanied. As they adapted to their new surroundings, which ranged from Switzerland, England,
the U.S.A., Palestine, and France, these discussions assumed an ideological dimension, which reflected the economic system of their host country. Commentator Akasemi Newsome had a range of questions for each paper. Newsome urged the panelists to create even more fine-grained pictures of the economic geographies or contexts of their case studies. She also suggested attending even more to the multifactorial details implied in (commodified) processes of subjectivation and collective identity building.

The second panel, chaired by Matthew Specter, compared the experiences of Jewish minors escaping Nazi Germany — individually or in an institutional context — with the experiences of unaccompanied minors in the ongoing “refugee crisis” in Europe. This panel brought to attention the strategies of information passing and of dealing with daily challenges. How did unaccompanied minors assess, explore, and expand their individual scopes of action within the given structures? Katharina Seehuber’s paper ““Meine Vergangenheit liegt in München, die Zukunft vor mir”: Unaccompanied Jewish Minors on Their Way from Munich to the World” followed the paths of four unaccompanied minors: While 16-year-old Erwin Schwager participated in the Youth Alijah, 20-year-old Lilo Cahnmann ended up in the waters of Haifa bay after the explosion of the ship Patria, which illegally carried her to Palestine. The persecuted sisters Elfriede and Annemarie Goldschmidt (19 and 20) found themselves on the deportation train to Auschwitz after an unsuccessful attempt to find shelter in a monastery in the Netherlands. All of them moved alone, obliged to make their own decisions based on the knowledge they had throughout each step of their migration process, and forced to deal with the consequences individually.

Based not only on archival material, but on interviews with her protagonist, Lilly Maier’s paper “Saving Arthur Kern: A Biographical Study about the French “Kindertransports’” explored Kern’s experiences as a child refugee, paying special attention to how much he knew about his own situation at any given point. In 1939, Kern was one of 200 unaccompanied minors brought to Paris from Vienna on a Kindertransport organized by the Rothschild family. In France, the refugee children lived together in orphanages operated by the Jewish relief organization Oeuvre de Secours aux Enfants (OSE). In 1941, the OSE — working together with other organizations — managed to rescue Arthur Kern and 250 other children on a second Kindertransport to the United States.
The panel’s third paper, by Hannes Kaeckmeister, adopted an ethnographic approach to observe current selection procedures in Germany and France that determine whether or not young migrants are “eligible” for youth care. State officials need to know whether young refugees are less than 18 years old and whether or not they live separated from their parents. Kaeckmeister sought to distinguish layers of experiential knowledge: young migrants experience life as foreigners, as children, and as unaccompanied minors. He also studied their coping strategies: how did they know where to go, whom to meet and, most importantly, how did they learn to fit the bureaucratic category of “unaccompanied minor”? A series of interviews with different actors in the field of child protection services and research within the local administrations in charge of child protection revealed that information is an important asset. In her concluding remarks, Barbara Laubenthal commented on the methods and narrative strategies with which the panelists managed to problematize the highly emotional grounds of their research while remaining sympathetic to the protagonists of their stories.

The final panel of the series, chaired by Onur Erdur, focused on migrant youth cultures in postwar West Germany. The first paper, titled “The German Youth of the East: the German Displaced Youth as Go-Betweens, Conveyors, and Preservers of Knowledge in the Migration Process of German Expellees,” was presented by Anne-Christine Hamel. Focusing on Die Deutsche Jugend des Ostens, the second largest youth organization in the Federal Republic, Hamel gave insight into the vast group of displaced young German individuals from Eastern Europe and their political engagement in postwar West Germany. She argued that the expulsion of this generation of children and adolescents involved a biographical break that decisively shaped their socialization within the host society. Not only did these young individuals perceive the experiences of war and migration differently from the older generation, but their strategies of coping with those experiences reached far beyond attempts to assimilate rapidly into the host society. Hamel showed that, over the course of its history, the organization’s internal decisions, negotiations, and directives vividly reflected the ties and tensions between the parent generation’s values, on the one hand, and the search for autonomous identity and societal change among the displaced youth, on the other.

Germany.” Sharing his recent research on juvenile delinquency and images of youth, Kalb spoke about the societal hysteria around so-called Gammler: These were young vagabonding drop-outs roaming the streets of numerous German cityscapes in the 1960s, feared by many bystanders and contemporaries. Borrowing from sociologist Stanley Cohen’s concept of a “moral panic,” Kalb convincingly argued that media coverage and conflicts surrounding Gammler can tell us much about contemporary anxieties as well as shifting practices among the young generation. On the one hand, he described the efforts by some individuals and authorities to expand mechanisms of social control. Those concerned about traditional values and the state of society conveniently pointed to the supposed widespread appearance of Gammler on city streets to defend their own values and roles in society. On the other hand, Kalb pointed out that young people found themselves repeatedly harassed and stereotyped, yet also increasingly able to carve out agency for a now much more international youth. He emphasized that Gammler encapsulated the global youth of the 1960s well before student revolts and organized backpackers.

The panel’s last paper, “Moving to West Berlin in the 1960s: The Experiences of Young West Germans and Guest Workers in the Siemens Factories,” by Stefan Zeppenfeld, examined these two groups within the West Berlin labor force by focusing not only on these workers’ experiences at the Siemens factory but also on the gap between their expectations and the inhospitable living conditions of West-Berlin. With this approach to West-Berlin’s migration history Zeppenfeld explored knowledge and imagination of young workforce in different contexts: First, both groups were understood as possessing professional work-related knowledge that qualified them for different jobs in West-German companies. Second, both group’s limited knowledge of Berlin’s living conditions often lead to unsatisfied expectations and subsequent relocation to their places of origin. In a third perspective, Zeppenfeld showed how the Berlin staff of Siemens, due to a lack in tolerance, reacted with hostility to what they perceived as the ‘other,’ both towards West Germans and “guestworkers”. Deniz Göktürk closed the panel with her comments on all three presentations and with general remarks on the difficulty of writing the history of migration in postwar West Germany.

Andrea Westermann (GHI Washington) and Onur Erdur (Humboldt University of Berlin)
AGENTS OF CULTURAL CHANGE: JEWISH AND OTHER RESPONSES TO MODERNITY, 1750-1900

Conference held at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), October 8–10, 2018. Organized in collaboration with Tel Aviv University as part of the collaborative research project "Innovation through Tradition? Jewish Educational Media and Cultural Transformation in the Face of Modernity," funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Conveners: Simone Lässig (GHI), Zohar Shavit (Tel Aviv University), and Kerstin von der Krone (GHI). Participants: Christian Bailey (Purchase College, SUNY), Christiane Bauer (GHI), Michael Brenner (LMU Munich/ American University), Bernard D. Cooperman (University of Maryland), Alexander Dubrau (University of Tübingen), Mary-Helen Dupree (Georgetown University), Shmuel Feiner (Bar Ilan University), Andreas Fuchs (Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research/ Göttingen University), Geraldine Gudefin (Brandeis University), Peter Jelavich (Johns Hopkins University), David Käbisch (Goethe University Frankfurt am Main), Tal Kogman (Tel Aviv University), Natalie Naimark-Goldberg (Bar Ilan University), Nisrine Rahal (University of Toronto), Claudia Roesch (GHI), Marsha L. Rozenblit (University of Maryland), Dirk Sadowski (Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research), Asher Salah (Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design/ Hebrew University in Jerusalem), Dorothea Salzer (University of Potsdam), Anne C. Schenderlein (GHI), Jonathan Sheehan (University of California, Berkeley), Barry Stiefel (College of Charleston), Stefano Villani (University of Maryland), Jeff Zalar (University of Cincinnati), Alexandra Zirkle (Boston University), Irene Zwiep (University of Amsterdam).

This conference sought to examine the role of religion and knowledge as well as education and emotion in times of social and cultural transformation and to trace the influence of and the interaction between different agents of cultural change. It did so not exclusively, but predominantly, from the vantage point of Jewish history.

The first panel discussed the challenges to authority arising within and beyond the Jewish community in the eighteenth century, prompted by the emergence of secular thought and the reciprocal influences of religion and secularism. Shmuel Feiner challenged recent interpretations of the Haskalah movement, the Jewish Enlightenment, in the context of a “religious turn.” According to Feiner, the Haskalah was the driving force behind a Jewish project of secularization, and therefore an interpretation through the lens
of a “religious turn” underestimates the multiple conflicts maskilim were confronted with: between traditional elites and a new generation of Jewish intellectuals, and between Jewish religious and secular knowledge.

Dirk Sadowski demonstrated how maskilim challenged traditional authority through print culture. He argued that books published during the first half of the eighteenth century differ significantly from the established corpus of printed knowledge in Ashkenazi Judaism. Printers like Israel bar Avraham in Jessnitz created a new corpus of knowledge through philosophical and pedagogical books that served didactic purposes and a new pedagogical agenda, scrutinizing traditional Jewish education and its focus on Talmud study.

While the first two speakers concentrated on the Haskalah as a distinctly Jewish movement embedded in Enlightenment thought, the third speaker, Jonathan Sheehan, spoke about one of the most quintessential projects of the European Enlightenment, Diderot and D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie. By analyzing its entry on God, Sheehan showed how the efforts to integrate theological concepts into a “reasoned dictionary” with ambitions for systematic order and philosophical coherence made core Christian ideas vulnerable to “unexpected triangulations, relationships, and histories.” The Encyclopédie’s article on God disaggregated the Christian God by situating him within new hierarchies of knowledge.

Drawing on the broader impact of the European and the Jewish Enlightenment, the second panel focused on the politics of knowing and knowledge formation since the late eighteenth century. Bernard D. Cooperman discussed the Italian reception of Naftali Herz Wessely’s Divrei Shalom ve-Emet (Words of Peace and Truth), published between 1782 and 1785. In this foundational text of maskilic educational reform Wessely famously advocated for revising the curriculum of traditional Jewish education by re-defining the core body of Jewish knowledge while at the same time integrating non-Jewish, secular knowledge. Cooperman highlighted that Italian responses to Wessely’s ideas were significantly more positive than among the Eastern European rabbinic elite. However, the Italian context also proved to be far more complicated, with Ashkenazi and Sephardic traditions mutually shaping one another and the presence of an economic elite that since the early modern period laid the foundation for a greater openness towards non-Jewish knowledge, local languages and literary traditions.
Kerstin von der Krone discussed the interplay of Jewish education, knowledge, and print culture in nineteenth-century Central Europe. While nineteenth-century Jewish educators and religious leaders eventually built upon the maskilic educational project they also had to respond to changing conditions of Jewish education in the context of Emancipation. New approaches to and practices of Jewish education gave rise to a new kind of literature meant to serve the dissemination of knowledge about Judaism and Jewish religious practices, about Jewish history and culture in school and at home. Von der Krone explored the reach and usage of these texts by analyzing school reports and inventory lists, curricula, and recommendations for teachers and situated Jewish educational writings within the history of nineteenth-century Jewish book culture.

Jeff Zalar discussed faith, reason, and practices of cultural negotiation in nineteenth-century Catholic Germany, pointing out that scholars often seem almost perplexed that Catholics navigated the modern world and negotiated the impact of secular knowledge in a similar fashion as other religious groups did. However, by doing so, Zalar argued, Catholics always seemed to be in an “in between-state,” state defined by the “bipolar epistemic foundations of faith and reason” through which knowledge gained authority in Catholicism.

The third panel dealt with objects of translation. Zohar Shavit explored how maskilic translations and adaptations of non-Jewish texts for children and adolescents functioned as agents of social and cultural change and thus as modes of “cultural translation.” These translations introduced new cultural and social ideas and norms into Judaism while drawing on the rich Jewish literary tradition to legitimize their reform project. According to Shavit, the maskilic translational project answered the need of a community in transition, but more importantly it showed the appreciation maskilim had for the enlightened culture and the new ideas of Bildung and Bürgerlichkeit that emerged from it.

Barry Stiefel offered another example of cultural translation, although a far more exceptional one: bilingual Hebrew-German inscriptions on a half-timbered barn in the small village of Rauschenberg in rural Hesse. The inscription told the story of the Katz family who owned the barn, located on the edge of the village in the late eighteenth century. Given that Jews rarely owned residential property in eighteenth-century rural Hesse, the inscription is not only a remarkable object, but according to Stiefel, indicates a fundamental change in rural Jewish life.
Alexander Dubrau discussed late nineteenth-century translations of rabbinic literature, situating them within a long history of translation as well as within nineteenth-century Jewish education and scholarship. A first category of translations served academically-oriented circles, and according to Dubrau stood for a secular endeavor that embraced the methods of modern philology and historical critical thought. A second category of translations were “apologetic” in nature aiming to refute prejudices about Judaism and the rabbinic tradition, especially the Talmud. These translations mostly aimed to reach a broader Jewish and non-Jewish readership while a third category — translations originated from Orthodox circles — mainly addressed a Jewish readership, although not necessarily an Orthodox one.

The fourth panel highlighted the increasing role of higher education in the training of religious leaders and educators. Irene Zwiep shed light on rabbinic education in the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the efforts of Joseph Dünner, a graduate of the Breslau Jewish Theological seminary, the first modern rabbinical seminary in Germany. Dünner developed an ambitious curriculum for the Dutch rabbinical seminary that included Greek and Latin classics. However, Dünner’s plan was at odds with the expectations and needs of the Dutch-Jewish community, leading to a much reduced amount of classical knowledge rabbinical candidates would encounter during their training.

David Käbisch examined the training of Protestant religious teachers based on a case study of the Catechetical Institute at the University of Jena. He put particular emphasis on a growing body of texts meant to teach Christian religion as well as instruct the respective teachers that was characterized by a significant degree of differentiation and pluralization. According to Käbisch, this new religious educational media should be understood as responses to and products of modernity rather that efforts of resistance.

The fifth panel shifted the focus from professional training and higher education to the education of children. Tal Kogman discussed the teaching of Hebrew by analyzing eighteenth and nineteenth-century textbooks for Jewish children published in Central Europe. She showed the impact of the Haskalah and subsequent movements like Hochmat Yisrael (Wisdom of Israel) in Galicia and their efforts to preserve the Hebrew language while the usage of German became increasingly popular. Kogman highlighted that Jewish pedagogues
not only developed new teaching materials that spoke to the children’s abilities but that they fundamentally broke with the teaching methods that had shaped the Heder, the traditional framework of Jewish elementary education. To a significant degree Jewish teachers drew on pedagogical methods for language instruction that were applied in contemporary philanthropist and humanistic schooling.

Dorothea Salzer explored the role of Jewish “Children’s Bibles” as means to teach children about emotions. Drawing on the first Jewish Children’s Bible, Peter Beer’s *Sefer Toledot Israel* published in 1796, Salzer highlighted its rational approach towards the social, cultural and emotional education of children. Beer and other authors highlighted the ethical values and societal norms present in the Hebrew bible and enlisted the biblical text — rather than the rabbinic tradition — to build a new Jewish identity in the face of modernity, based on teaching a “bourgeois habitus” that emphasized reason and respectability.

The sixth panel took a closer look at the role of emotions as well as the politics of gender. Asher Salah spoke about the “desire not to be perceived as culturally different” and the category of “shame” in the context of Italian Jewish history around 1800 while challenging the German-centric history of Haskalah, emancipation and religious reform. Salah drew on two Italian intellectuals, Elia Morpurgo and Aron Fernandez, and their respective reform projects. Both embraced civic amelioration, emancipation and acculturation as necessary steps while characterizing the cultural and social conditions of the Jews in terms of a “dialectic of shame and guilt,” drawing to a significant degree on negative stereotypes about Jews prevalent in contemporary debates.

Alexandra Zirkle explored how new concepts of romantic love and marriage influenced interpretations of the Song of Songs, drawing on Heinrich Graetz’s translation and commentary. Graetz, a leading German-Jewish historian and scholar, presented the Song of Songs as an ideal of true and chaste love that stood in contrast to Hellenistic perceptions of love, which he equated with German-Christian romanticism.

Nisrine Rahal also examined the “ideal of love” but focused on its appropriation for political or revolutionary ideas in Germany in the 1840s. Rahal concluded that activists “utilized” the concept of love to challenge the power of church and state especially in the context
Activists questioned the attitudes and actions of Protestant and Catholic authorities with respect to the violence children endured in public education while highlighting the indifference of the state and state officials towards poverty.

Picking up on the previous discussions, the seventh panel dealt with concepts of marriage and love in the age of modernity. Natalie Naimark-Goldberg discussed perceptions of marriage in maskilic texts in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. She showed how the traditional notion of arranged marriage as a means of social cohesion and economic stability became subject to change in at least two ways. First, correspondences, nuptials and poetic writings began to emphasize the idea of romantic love and erotic satisfaction, adding an individual and emotional layer to Jewish perceptions of marriage. Second, maskilic texts display a critical reflection about Jewish marriage practices as such, including early marriage and in rare cases even the very concept of matrimony.

Christian Bailey explored late nineteenth-century perceptions of one notion of love that has been equally central to both Judaism and Christianity, namely that of neighborly love. First mentioned in Leviticus 19:18, the concept of neighborly love became a crucial paradigm of Jewish and Christian perceptions of oneself and the other and is related to other biblical concepts of love, those of God, the stranger and humanity. Against the background of Kulturkampf and antisemitism, Bailey explored the conceptual history of neighborly love in the Kaiserreich, highlighting how it became a concept much debated among Jewish and Christian intellectuals, philosophers and theologians, who were shaped by the idea of Protestant “inwardness” and Jewish “universalism.”

The eighth panel introduced religion, “Bildung” and entertainment as means of respectability and sociability. Simone Lässig sketched the image of an epoch in transition from which a new Jewish middle class emerged, using the example of Louis Lesser. A young Jew from Dresden, he was eager for a new kind of knowledge, a “Bildung” beyond Judaism that became available through new opportunities of social and cultural encounters between Jews and non-Jews.

Andreas L. Fuchs explored the entanglement of aesthetic education, music and religiosit in nineteenth-century Reform Judaism through the introduction of a new kind of synagogue music. Fuchs highlighted the influence of Western models of music on the one hand and the
efforts of composers like Salomon Sulzer on the other hand to situate their work within and legitimize it by Jewish tradition.

Peter Jelavich focused on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and on popular culture as a “major agent of cultural change” in modern Jewish history. Through mass entertainment such as vaudeville theater and film, German Jews established a cultural space that was equally distant from religion and morality (“Sittlichkeit”) as it was from bourgeois culture (“Bildung”) while at the same time promoting cultural and social plurality as well as acceptance for difference and diversity.

Overall, the eight panels reflected the wide range of topics the conference was able to address. They delivered an insightful discussion about the scope of cultural and social transformation since the late eighteenth century and the various strategies employed to navigate and negotiate change. While the first two panels focused on the religious and the secular, on authority and the politics of knowing in relation to old and new practices of knowledge production and dissemination, the following panels primarily explored concrete products and producers, institutions and distributors of cultural change. Most significantly, several papers addressed the role of gender and/or introduced emotion as a valuable category. Finally, the last panel focused on practices and modes of respectability and sociability and how they played out in a spatial and performative dimension.

Anna Kokenge (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin) and Kerstin von der Krone (GHI)
HISTORIES OF MIGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Second Bucerius Young Scholars Forum at the Pacific Regional Office of the GHI Washington in Berkeley, October 17-19, 2018. Sponsored by the Zeit-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius. Convener: Andrea Westermann (GHI Washington). Participants: Jutta Allmendiger (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin), Lily Balloffet (UC Santa Cruz), Sarah Beringer (GHI Washington), Irene Bloemraad (UC Berkeley), Almuth Ebke (University of Mannheim), Onur Erdur (Humboldt University of Berlin), Stacy Fahrenthold (UC Davis), Donna Gabaccia (University of Toronto), Michael Göring (Zeit-Stiftung), Axel Jansen (GHI Washington), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Risto Lenz (University of Cologne), Barbara Luethi (University of Cologne), Joseph Malherek (University of Vienna), David Miliband (International Rescue Committee), Benjamin Nobbs-Thiessen (Arizona State University), Marcia C. Schenck (Free University of Berlin), Avi Sharma (Technical University of Berlin), Jordan Buchanan Smith (Widener University), Florian Wagner (GHI Washington).

Ten junior scholars from both sides of the Atlantic presented their research in the field of migration history. They were joined by GHI West research fellows and three senior experts in the field of migration history. The presentations and discussions tackled questions and methodological issues in migration history from a history of knowledge perspective. What could an emerging “history of migrant knowledges” look like? Also, the notion of “migrant knowledges” raised some questions: What exactly counts as knowledge? Who, in the context and processes of migrations, knows what? And who or what is actually on the move?

The two day-meeting opened with a well-attended public keynote lecture by David Miliband, President of the International Rescue Committee, entitled: “What Is in a Category: Telling Political Refugees and Economic Migrants Apart.” The speaker was introduced by Michael Göring, CEO and President of the Zeit-Stiftung. Jutta Allmendiger, Director of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and, at the time, Fellow at the Thomas Mann Haus in Los Angeles, served as discussant in a short conversation with Miliband and as moderator of a subsequent Q&A session. Miliband stressed the growing gap between the needs of and the provisions for refugees. Climate change and other modern developments create new categories of refugees.
that still need to be accepted as such by the international community. Interviewed by Jutta Allmendinger, he also noted that most refugees are school-age children but very little is done for their education. In this regard and beyond, both Miliband and Allmendinger pointed out, industrialized nations could learn from the countries of the so-called Global South, who in fact deal with the highest influx of refugees.

The workshop was organized in five panels, featuring two papers each, which opened with two comments by fellow participants, followed by discussion of the precirculated papers. Following different groups of migrants on their way through societies and across borders, the selected papers observed and analyzed these actors’ efforts to generate knowledge at various sites and in different realms. Faced with bureaucratic and/or academic routines of categorization, racialization, and legalization of their status, of themselves as persons, or of their cultural production, migrants developed different tactics for addressing them. Arguably, in these histories of (forced) transit and re-accommodation, migrants themselves became experts of migration, producing, contesting, accumulating, and deploying political, legal, or economic knowledge. The forum also paid special attention to migrants as creators of historical knowledge and memory, who both suffered from and contributed to instances of intentional highlighting, forgetting, or silencing past encounters, stories, and experiences.

Panel A was dedicated to “Migrant Knowledges of Nature: Perspectives from Body and Labor History.” Benjamin Nobbs-Thiessen shared his work about “Settlers, Braceros, Narcos: ‘Horse and Buggy’ Mennonites in Mexico, Canada, and the U.S., 1921-Present.” In the early 1990s, reports that “traditional” Old Colony horse-and-buggy Mennonites were involved in an elaborate transnational smuggling ring that connected their well-established colonies in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua and their new settlements in Ontario elicited shock in the Canadian media. Moving beyond sensationalism, Nobbs-Thiessen explored the multi-generational practices of transnational mobility that these low-German-speaking, pacifist Anabaptists forged and sustained over the twentieth century as they took on changing roles as settlers, migrant laborers (braceros), and smugglers. The panel’s second paper, “The Invention of this Noble Liquor: Free and Coerced Migrants and the Creation of Rum,” by Jordan Buchanan Smith, drew on rare books, legal records, plantation papers, deeds, and secondary literature to detail the invention of
rum on the Caribbean island of Barbados between 1627 and 1650. Instead of attributing the creation of this new alcoholic beverage (which quickly became an economically important commodity) to a single group of inventors, Smith argued that rum was the product of the convergence of at least four distinct knowledge cultures on the small island. In essence, the invention of rum was a result of Atlantic migration within the Americas and from Europe and Africa.

Panel B, “(Im)Mobility Regimes: Geopolitical Calculations and Migrants’ Tactics,” started off with Stacy Fahrenthold’s paper “Banning Muslims by Executive Order: Immobilizing Ottoman Migrants through the Passport Regime in the United States, 1918-1924.” During World War I, the United States imposed travel restrictions on immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, prompting legal questions about whether the empire’s non-Muslim migrants should be exempted. This paper examined U.S. laws exempting Syrian Arabs from wartime travel restrictions. It revealed a passport program that created a post-Ottoman “Syrian” nationality, influencing how nationality was granted in the Middle East after 1918. The second paper, by Lily Balloffet, reported on her research project “Negotiating Exclusion: Arab Migration, Ethnicity, and Borders in Central America, 1890-1970.” Balloffet examined Middle Eastern migrants who circulated through the Caribbean Basin in the twentieth century. Numerous state policies aimed to regulate or stem migrant mobility. Balloffet’s study aimed to contribute to a larger history of ethnic exclusion on a hemispheric scale and bring focus to a traditionally overlooked geography of Arabic-speaking migrants in the Americas.

Panel C was devoted to the topic “Displacement, Refuge: The Epistemological Stakes of Internal Migration.” Risto Lenz’s paper discussed the topic “‘Where do we go from here?’ Government-sponsored Folk Song Collecting and the Migrant Experience during the Great Depression.” Defining folklore as a knowledge category, Lenz argued that government-sponsored folk song collecting under the auspices of the New Deal’s Works Progress Administration (WPA) had an impact on the preservation and dissemination of migrant voices. Focusing on two WPA projects in California, Lenz discussed the shift in folklore scholarship from an interest in pioneer culture towards an interest in contemporary folk cultures. In the panel’s second paper, “Migrant Epistemologies in Unstable Times: Identity and Allocated Scarcity in Germany and India, 1945-1952.” Avi Sharma compared the cases of postwar Berlin from 1945-48 and post-Partition Calcutta between
1947–1952 to better understand the ways that both “identity” and “vulnerability” constitute systemic exclusions. By focusing on strategies for securing livelihoods and the logics of solidarity and difference in the context of mass displacement, Sharma also highlighted the unstable boundaries between different categories of migrants.

Panel D dealt with “Migration and the Making of Disciplines: The Study of Mass Culture.” In her paper “Debating race: The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, the experience of migration and the production of knowledge in 1970s and 1980s Britain,” Almuth Ebke focused on the role that the terms “race” and “race relations” have played in British sociological research since the 1950s, even though the exact way they were understood has changed over time. Using the discussions about race at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham and the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) as case studies, she argued that the researchers connected to the CCCS challenged essentialist understandings of “race,” while militant researchers at the IRR championed a neo-Marxist analysis of race relations. These debates thus reveal a scholarly discipline that challenged epistemological premises. They also represent one step in the internal decolonization of the United Kingdom. Joseph Malherek offered his views on “Critical Theory as Displaced Knowledge: Émigré Intellectuals from Central Europe and Their American Sponsors, 1933–45.” He examined the humanistic values and personal motivations that led officers of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars to assist exiles from National Socialism. Officers’ values, he argued, determined the scholarship of beneficiaries, among whom were Max Horkheimer and his Institute of Social Research as well as Paul Lazarsfeld and his Bureau of Applied Social Research.

The final panel, “Migrant Knowledges: The Making of More than German Histories,” showcased Onur Erdur’s paper “Political and Historical Knowledge of Migrants: The Case of the German Reunification 1989/90.” Erdur explored the issue of migrants’ political and historical knowledge in the context of the German culture of remembrance and politics of memory. He examined migrant memories and representations of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German reunification in 1990, with a focus on Turkish migrants in West Berlin. Erdur argued that this approach not only constitutes a contribution to Germany’s migration history but also offers an opportunity to practice contemporary history through the lens of
migration. Marcia C. Schenck’s paper “Remembering from Below, Forgetting from Above: Legacies of Mozambican and Angolan Labor Migration to the German Democratic Republic 1979-1990” analyzed the history of labor migration from Angola and Mozambique to the German Democratic Republic and back as remembered by the former migrants a quarter century after their return. Schenck showed that their nostalgic memories serve to criticize the present governments for their failure to deliver on their promises of industrialization, work, and a stable future.

During the forum, the issue of how to conceptualize agency from a history of knowledge perspective remained a contested terrain. It is definitely a question worthy of further exploration. This became evident, for instance, in our discussions of the issues of migrants’ empowerment through knowledge or migrants’ informal economic strategies, which some observers interpret as creativity capable of dynamizing the more institutionalized societal order they encounter.

Andrea Westermann (GHI)
RECONSTRUCTING HISTORICAL NETWORKS DIGITALLY: NEW APPROACHES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), October 25-27, 2018. Organized by the GHI in cooperation with Stanford University. Made possible by support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and the Friends of the GHI. Conveners: Matthew Hiebert (GHI), Simone Lässig (GHI), and Katherine McDonough (Stanford). Participants: Mollie Ables (Wabash College), James Boyd (University of Bristol), Arno Bosse (Oxford University), Prim van Bree (LAB1100), Daniel Burckhardt (GHI), Hendrikje Carius, (University of Erfurt), Alessandra Celati (University of Verona), Fabian Cremer (Max Weber Foundation), Seth Denbo (American Historical Association), Tom Ewing (Virginia Tech), Lisa Gerlach (Ruhr University Bochum), Mark J. Hill (University of Helsinki), Oliver Kiechle (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf), Geert Kessels (LAB1100), Rachel Midura (Stanford University), Jens Pohlmann (GHI), Jessica Otis (George Mason University), Atiba Pertilla (GHI), Andrew Ruis (University of Wisconsin), Martin Stark (University of Trier), Justin Dolan Stover (Idaho State University), Suzanne Sutherland (Middle Tennessee State University), Ville Vaara (University of Helsinki), Scott B. Weingart (Carnegie Mellon University), Jennifer Serventi (National Endowment for the Humanities), Thorsten Wübbena (DFK Paris), Duygu Yildirim (Stanford University).

The first panel, *Capacities and Limitations of SNA Models for History*, was chaired by Katherine McDonough. Mollie Ables, in her presentation “Musicians’ Networks and the Tourism Industry in Early Modern Venice,” discussed her work reconstructing a bimodal network of musicians and their institutional and guild associations using Gephi on the basis of archival sources that include employment records, guild rosters, and tourist guides. The network, made available at www.musiciansinvenice.com, reveals the cultural power dynamics at work in early modern Venice. In “Mapping the Post: Networks of Published Postal Itineraries, 1545-1684,” Rachel Midura presented visualizations of postal networks in the early modern period that were generated on the basis of a 1700 route database she derived from postal itineraries. Tracing the extension and international expansion of these networks, Midura showed the central hubs in this “communication revolution,” making apparent also how political events affected it over the period. In the final talk of the panel, “Modeling the
Dynamics of a Rural Credit Market in the 19th Century,” Martin Stark presented interdisciplinary research employing longitudinal stochastic actor-oriented modeling (SAOM) for overcoming limitations of traditional historical SNA in modeling change over time. Focusing on a small German village between 1830 and 1850, a time when mortgage laws underwent reformation, a social network constructed from mortgage records revealed significant expansion and decentralization of the credit market. This is in line with established research that has determined new legislation initiated a transformation of the market, suggesting the effectiveness of the SOAM methodology for simulating trustworthy historical research processes.

The second panel, Collaborative Approaches, chaired by Seth Denbo, began with Suzanne Sutherland’s paper “Discovering Microhistories in Big Data: Network Mapping and Humanities Projects.” Sutherland discussed her sub-project within “Mapping the Republic of Letters,” using Palladio to study the Italian intellectual networks of seventeenth-century polymath Athanasius Kircher, visualized through the correspondence data from 2000 letters. For Sutherland, social network visualizations provide a structural guide in her research, adding depth to readings and preserving context and nuance within her inquiry. James Boyd, in “Sourcing Historical Networks: Contemporary Networks and Controlled Crowdsourcing,” presented his research into collaborative networks behind the nineteenth-century technological development of the steam ship. His network-analysis-based approach and the development of a public-facing site to collect further data reveals forgotten actors in a historiographical shift from the biographical to social and personal history. Jessica Otis’s “Six Degrees of Francis Bacon: Gender, Social Network Analysis, and Early Modern Britain,” the final paper of the session, discussed the challenges of examining gender and the lives of women in Bacon network data. Named Entity Recognition was reinforcing biases on how women were identified, transforming women into edges rather than nodes, prompting intervention into the ontological construction and scope of the data, particularly through targeted crowdsourcing.

The final panel of the day, Technical and Methodological Innovation, was chaired by Jens Pohlmann. Mark Hill, in his presentation “Intellectual and Material Networks in Eighteenth Century Britain: The ESTC as Historic Relic,” discussed the distillation through metadata extraction of the over 480,000 English Short Title Catalogue documents into a social network of 87,000 agents, representing also their
features in relation to specific texts. In this transformation of the ESTC from a record of historical data to a representation of actual historical networks, changes within knowledge production and publications over the eighteenth century can be traced in ways inaccessible to traditional biography and secondary sources. In their presentation “Concepts and Potentials of Graph-based Data Structures for Analyses of Historical Networks,” Thorsten Wübbena and Fabian Cremer discussed their development of a graph-based model for locating relationships between entities in the Sandrart.net electronic edition. Creating a plugin to import artwork data from Wikidata into the model for visualizing connections further demonstrated the utility of graphs for finding flaws and gaps in data. Scott Wiengart, in the final panel presentation, “An Ideal Historical Network Analysis Toolkit,” assessed existing network analysis tools as not fully meeting the disciplinary needs of historians. An ideal historical network analysis toolkit would provide: affordances for accounting for biases and data uncertainty, multiple forms of connections, temporality with varying granularity, representation of perspectival differences, an interface to evidence, unstructured source extraction, and a workflow process that includes data entry and cleaning.

The fourth panel, Subversive Connections, was chaired by Atiba Pertilla, opening the second day of the conference portion of the event. Alessandra Celati, in her presentation “A network of dissident physicians in the confessional age: Research perspectives and methodological challenges,” discussed the creation of her database of sixteenth-century Italian physicians who were members of dissident movements from the 1520s (https://celati-netdis.github.io/). Drawing on various sources including inquisition trials, private correspondence, published books, and notaries, Celati maps the circulation of ideas within Venetian dissident movements, showing physicians as a bridge between aristocratic and working-class networks. Oliver Kiechle, in his paper “The emergence of a digital social network: Communication and cooperation in early Usenet,” explained the use of social network analysis within his study of early Usenet from 1979. Approaching 2 million Usenet messages as a knowledge network, Kiechle uses social network analysis in investigating the nature of the system’s cooperative structures and in informing the questions he creates for oral history interviews. In the panel’s final presentation, “Guerrilla Networks, Mobility, & Environmental Damage during the Irish Revolution,” Justin Stover discussed his use of various network analysis tools in tracing over time the diverse built and natural
environmental damage of the Irish Revolution. Historical network research facilitates for Stover the extension of his analysis from the geography and intensity of revolutionary violence to the operational dynamics of guerilla networks.

The fifth and final panel of the conference, *Implications for Historical Inquiry*, was chaired by Jennifer Serventi. Tom Ewing, in his paper “Using Digital Humanities Tools and Network Analysis to Understand a Global Influenza Epidemic, 1889-1890,” examined the global construction and circulation of knowledge arising from the Russian flu epidemic. Ewing documented the relationship between the actual number of recorded deaths and the rhetoric of the epidemic, explored through a network of terms derived from a corpus that includes newspapers and medical journals. Duygu Yildirim, in “Scholarly Engagements and the Nature of Knowledge Construction in Seventeenth-Century Constantinople,” presented her study of cross-cultural scholarly engagement between Ottoman scholars in seventeenth-century Istanbul and Europeans. Applying social network analysis to the problem presents data collection challenges, insofar as correspondence networks in the Western sense do not here pertain; Yildirim focuses analysis on how certain text were recommended, exchanged, and interpreted. In the final paper of the conference, “Academic Networks at Hebrew University (Jerusalem), 1925-1945,” Lisa Gerlach discussed a component of her doctoral project involving social network analysis in nodegoat of 150 letters of recommendation. Gerlach’s visualizations show central actors within a transnational recommendation system and how these networks changed over time with respect to purpose, topics, and persons.

Each panel was followed by rich discussion that carried over into breaks, meals, and the closing session of the conference. One recurrent observation was the capacity of network research to help develop new arguments through the use of historical sources that cannot simply be read and to approach existing sources at greater scale. Discussion also pointed to the usefulness of digital methods in helping locate biases and gaps in sources, while also posing new dangers such as algorithmic bias and the challenges of conveying critique, of power imbalances or imperialism for example, within a visualization. Also highlighted was the importance of collaboration within historical network research for heightened efficiency and depth of inquiry. Here, it was underscored, historians must treat archivists, librarians, and tool developers as intellectual equals.
The advancement of tools specific to historical network analysis was showcased by the day of workshops preceding the conference, with participants also cognizant that further developments to more fully model the specific disciplinary needs of historians would be advantageous. Discussion also addressed the often “revolutionary” expectations of digital history by historians on the outside looking in, where confirmation of a hypothesis using new techniques, for example, is often perceived not to justify the resource intensiveness of computation-based approaches. In this context the challenges of sustainably funding historical network research also arose, for while traditional research costs are “hard-funded” through libraries, salaried positions, conferences, travel funding, and publishing models for physical books, DH researchers typically require grants to do their work, which also serves to support the administrative and infrastructural development of their institutions. In establishing sustainability and advancement for the field, participants also pointed to the value of holding an international event focused on digital humanities methodologies, appreciating the unique opportunities for exchange that a forum on the digital reconstruction of historical networks was able to provide.

Matthew Hiebert (GHI)
KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY IN TIMES OF UPHEAVAL

Conference organized by the Forum Transregional Studies and the Max Weber Foundation — German Humanities Institutes Abroad, in Berlin, November 20–21, 2018. Conveners: Andreas Eckert (Humboldt University Berlin), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Franz Waldenberger (German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo). Participants: Xóchitl Bada (University of Illinois at Chicago), Frank Bösch (Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam), Omar Al-Ghazzi (London School of Economics), Nataliya Gumenyuk (hromadske.ua, Kiev), Amr Hamzawy (Stanford University/Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin), Jeannette Hofmann (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung), Jan C. Jansen (GHI), Johann Kranz (Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität, Munich), Leo Lucassen (International Institute of Social History / University of Leiden), Paweł Machcewicz (Polnische Akademie der Wissenschaften Warschau / Imre-Kertész-Kolleg, Jena), Nicole Mayer-Ahuja (University of Göttingen), Alia Mossallam (Cairo/Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung), Ernst Dieter Rossmann (Ausschuss für Bildung, Forschung und Technikfolgenabschätzung, Deutscher Bundestag), Anja Senz (University of Heidelberg), James Sidaway (National University of Singapore).

Under the title “Knowledge and Society in Times of Upheaval,” scholars from various disciplines discussed the manifold and complex connections between knowledge, society, and mobility from a global perspective at the annual conference of the Forum Transregionale Studien and the Max Weber Foundation in 2018. The conference addressed four constituent relationships that were debated in separate thematic panels: New infrastructures as drivers of change; discourses and the public sphere; migration and mobility; and the relationship between work and technological transformation. Knowledge and its dissemination defines, controls and maintains power relations. But what happens when knowledge becomes data? How do technological innovations change the relationship between the individual, the state and society? How do societies cope with the unprecedented growth of knowledge and the extent of its dissemination and control?

The first panel, titled “New Infrastructures as Drivers of Change,” highlighted the diversity of the concept of infrastructure as an analytical concept. The contributions focused on infrastructures and their function as drivers of structural, socio-political, and economic change. Based on different regional dynamics, the speakers asked
about the influence of infrastructural conditions and circumstances. Sinologist Anja Senz opened the conference with a presentation on the impact of Chinese development narratives and infrastructure investments on local communities in Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar. According to Senz, the geostrategic consequences of China’s belt-and-road initiative bring with them a high degree of uncertainty and are both an opportunity and a danger. The presentation provided a motif that was present throughout the conference.

In his lecture, Johann Kranz illustrated the negative side effects of dominant platforms such as Google and Facebook on innovation, competition and society. Network effects and an enormous concentration of data in these companies lead to competitive advantages and disproportionate market power. According to Kranz, regulation by blockchain-controlled decentralized apps would offer the possibility of correcting this and thus curbing the emergence of monopolistic structures in the Internet economy.

The geographer James Sidaway spoke about the political and socio-economic implications of modern security infrastructures in Yangon (Myanmar). The lecture examined the “securitization” of urban change against the backdrop of changing power structures and the complex relationship between government, military and capital in Myanmar. The focus was on the question of the relevance of security infrastructures and actors for the transformation of states and societies.

The second panel, “Discourses and Publics,” dealt with the role of different forms of communication and discourses in situations of social upheaval. The speakers discussed how innovations in communication and technology in Eastern Europe or the Middle East transform, transcend or fragment social and political boundaries. Omar Al-Ghazi explained how children are covered in media reports about the Syrian conflict and what role they play in these reports. Often, he argued, they are constructed as figures who report truthfully and authentically, without being influenced by ideological and geopolitical discourses. As such, they fulfill two functions in particular: suggesting “direct experience,” on the one hand, and the politicization of competing narratives, on the other.

Nataliya Gumenyuk spoke about disinformation, targeted false reports and populist media strategies in the conflict in Ukraine. Although these are not new phenomena, the worldwide triumph of
authoritarian political movements has given them additional impetus. Gumenyuk made it clear that Western societies are confronted with similar challenges: the return of nationalism, mistrust of political institutions and a high degree of polarization and fragmentation. According to Gumenyuk, the greatest danger for our democracies is not “fake news”, but “filter bubbles” and “confirmation biases.”

The political scientist Alia Mossallam investigated the question of how stories are written and told in times of political upheaval and how knowledge can be generated, reproduced and made available. A particular difficulty is how to make knowledge about subaltern actors accessible to those who originally produced this knowledge. Mossallam reported on her experiences in conducting history workshops with local communities in Egypt. The main challenges are the multivalence of histories and the inclusion of local communities in knowledge production, lengthy research processes, a lack of financial and institutional support, and state mistrust.

The second day of the conference opened with the panel “Migration and Mobility,” which dealt with the interaction of mobility and knowledge in situations of upheaval. Historian Jan C. Jansen devoted his lecture to the political refugee movements during the “Atlantic Revolutions” of 1770-1820, investigating the emergence of knowledge in the form of documents and its significance for the control, representation and spatial location of migrants. Jansen referred to the massive increase in administrative documentation on flight and migration, driven by two seemingly contradictory factors: the attempts of authorities and recipient societies to contain and control migration movements and the need to facilitate these in a world in turmoil.

The Latin American studies scholar Xóchitl Bada formulated the goal of ensuring the workers’ rights of migrants universally, regardless of territorial areas. With a focus on Mexico and the USA, she illustrated the problem of the enforcement of workers’ rights at home and cross-border worker representation for low-wage migrants. The emergence of transnational networks and global public spheres calling for the transfer of basic workers’ rights and protection measures for migrants even after their return to their country of origin has led to new efforts to prevent abuse and exploitation.

The historian Leo Lucassen then explained the role that migration experts play in political and decision-making processes. He referred to personal experiences as an intellectual in the public and political
debate on migration, integration and refugees in the Netherlands. The media are of particular relevance here because they can cause knowledge to be ignored or questioned by counter-narratives, but can also disseminate and strengthen expert knowledge and scientific findings.

The last panel of the conference was devoted to the topic “Labour and Technological Transformation.” The debate focused on the so-called fourth industrial revolution, the transformation of labor since the Second World War, and the connections between knowledge, technology, and the transformation of labor in a historical perspective. The sociologist Nicole Mayer-Ahuja examined the influence of digitization on the world of work in the light of conflicts between capital, labor and the state. According to Mayer-Ahuja, the widespread view that new technologies have led to the disappearance of entire professions is too one-sided. Current trends in digitization are always an opportunity and produce different results depending on the respective balance of power. One problem, however, is the lack of regulation of technological development, which reinforces processes of precarization and competence polarization as well as flexibilization.

Frank Bösch analysed how German civil servants, scientists and companies gained and constructed knowledge through visits to China in the course of the fundamental economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping, which was only accessible through personal observations. Bösch described how Western observers and companies tried to obtain detailed information about the Chinese market. This knowledge led to a special perception of China, which was highly dependent on the specific impressions of the visitors.

Finally, Jeanette Hofmann, Paweł Machcewicz, Ernst Dieter Rossmann and Amr Hamzawy discussed the results of the conference at a roundtable titled “Science and Society at the Borders of Europe.” The ambivalent role of science in times of political upheaval became clear. On the one hand, according to Rossmann, it functions as an explanatory and mediating medium and thus plays a key role in shaping the public debate, for instance, by pointing out future scenarios. On the other hand, as Hamzawy noted, in countries like Egypt, where scientific discourses and categories are deformed in the context of undemocratic public structures, science itself is also affected. Machcewicz added that the stability of the political and social order was not a matter of course even in the older EU member states. In
Poland he currently sees a process of rejection of rationality, which leads to science being questioned as a legitimate basis for political decisions. In this context, Rossmann stressed the urgency of finding ways to promote the freedom and exchange of science in borderline situations. Borders would not necessarily have to be of a geographical nature, but could also be ideally understood, for example in relation to European ideals of education and freedom. Finally, Hofmann pleaded for a more differentiated view of new technologies in times of political upheaval and argued that social responsibility must not be outsourced to them. Digital technologies should not be understood as an extra-societal phenomenon that only obeyed efficiency requirements and either emancipated or directed societies in authoritarian ways.

Jule Könneke (University of Potsdam)
OBITUARY: MARION DESHMUKH (1945-2019)

The German Historical Institute mourns the death of Marion Deshmukh, who passed away on April 13, 2019. Marion Deshmukh, who taught in the Department of History and Art History at George Mason University for forty-five years, was a great friend of the GHI, serving as vice president of the Friends of the GHI since the mid-1990s. In this capacity, she lent invaluable support to the many GHI activities funded by the Friends, including the annual award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, at which she often presented the award. Beyond this, Deshmukh was a valued friend, colleague, and advisor with whom the Institute often cooperated. Among her most notable cooperations with the GHI was an international conference on the impressionist painter Max Liebermann, which resulted in the edited volume *Max Liebermann and International Modernism: An Artist’s Career from Empire to Third Reich*, co-edited by Deshmukh and published in the GHI’s series with Berghahn Books in 2011. Most recently she had capped her scholarly work on Liebermann by publishing the highly acclaimed biography *Max Liebermann: Modern Art and Modern Germany* (Routledge, 2015). A warm and generous person, who was always ready to lend support, Marion Deshmukh will be deeply missed.

2018 FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE

The 2018 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, which is awarded annually by the Friends of the German Historical Institute for the best dissertation in German history completed at a North American university, was awarded to Adam Bisno (Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University). The award ceremony took place at the 27th Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute on November 9, 2018. The selection committee was composed of: Annemarie Sammartino (Chair, Oberlin College), Brendan Karch (Louisiana State University), and Beth Plummer (University of Arizona). The prize winner has contributed an article presenting his dissertation research to this issue of the *Bulletin* (see “Features”).


Adam Bisno’s dissertation “Hotel Berlin: The Politics of Commercial Hospitality in the German Metropolis, 1875–1945” is a deeply researched and elegantly written exploration of the institution of the grand hotel in Berlin during seventy tumultuous
years of German history. This is a compelling study, noteworthy both for its broad temporal scope and its tight focus on a largely forgotten story. Bisno examines all aspects of the grand hotels, from their architecture to their army of employees. In writing this dissertation, Bisno crosses the lines between urban history, social history, and political history in a unique and exemplary way. In particular, studying the grand hotel provides Bisno insight into the political evolution of the German elite, who made up both the group of hoteliers that he profiles and the majority of their clientele. He argues convincingly for the grand hotels as a main site where the aspirations, tensions, and failures of classical liberalism crystallized.

At once national and cosmopolitan institutions, grand hotels offer Bisno a unique perspective on the story of German nationalism. Bisno compellingly demonstrates how both cosmopolitan and national attitudes interacted in the advertisements and architecture of the hotels. This dissertation also offers a masterful exploration of how German class relations played out in a site where employees, managers, and guests lived side-by-side. Finally, Bisno charts how the liberalism of a group of self-made men in the Imperial period gave way to a more aggressive nationalism in the Weimar era. Bisno integrates all of these diverse themes to offer fresh perspectives to reinvigorate several longstanding debates in German history. Finally, beyond his historiographical contributions, the selection committee was impressed with Bisno’s creative and careful use of a wide body of sources, which he uses to masterful effect, drawing the reader into his rich tale. The committee looks forward to reading the excellent book that this dissertation will no doubt become. It is with great pleasure that we award “Hotel Berlin,” the 2018 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize.
NEW STAFF PUBLICATIONS

Monographs


Edited Volumes and Special Issues


**Articles and Chapters**


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**STAFF CHANGES**

**Anna-Carolin Augustin** joined the GHI as a Research Fellow in April 2019. Her main fields of interest are modern German-Jewish History and Culture with emphasis on Women’s and Gender History as well as Jewish Material Culture. From 2011-2014 she was a fellow at the Walther Rathenau Graduiertenkolleg at the Moses Mendelssohn Center for European Jewish Studies (MMZ). She received her Ph.D. in modern history from the Universität Potsdam in 2016. At the same time, she completed a two-year academic trainee (“Wissenschaftliches Volontariat”) at the Jewish Museum Berlin and worked on several exhibitions. Since 2017 she has devoted herself to provenance research in the field of Judaica. Her first monograph, *Berliner Kunstpatronage: Sammlerinnen und Förderinnen bildender Kunst um 1900* was published in 2018 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag). In her current research project, she examines the entangled object biographies and migration paths of Jewish ceremonial objects (Judaica) as well as their changing attributions of meaning and functions after 1945 in a transnational, cultural-historical study.

**Matthew Hiebert**, GHI Research Fellow since 2015, left the GHI at the end of March 2019, returning to Canada.

**Anne Schenderlein**, GHI Research Fellow since 2015, left the GHI at the end of January 2019, returning to Berlin, Germany, where she is now the Managing Director of the Dahlem Humanities Center at the Free University.
GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to European and North American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars to pursue research projects that draw upon primary sources located in the United States. We are particularly interested in research projects that fit into the following fields: German and European history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the USA in international relations, and American history (European doctoral and postdoctoral scholars only).

The proposed research projects should make use of historical methods and engage with the relevant historiography. We especially invite applications from doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars who currently have no funding from their home institutions. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to five months.

The GHI also offers a number of other long-term doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles to strengthen key research interests at institute, including: the history of knowledge, the history of race and ethnicity, the history of religion and religiosity, the history of family and kinship, the history of migration, and North American history. In addition to these opportunities, several new fellowships programs have been introduced: the Binational Tandem Research Program for “The History of Knowledge” and “Global and Trans-regional History,” and the Gerda Henkel Postdoctoral Fellowship for Digital History.

For further information about these programs and current application deadlines, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.
GHI FELLOWSHIP RECIPIENTS FOR 2018/19

**Long-term Visiting Fellows**

**Ian Beacock**, University of British Columbia
*Searching for Queer Ancestors: Historical Knowledge and Gay Activism in Europe and the United States, 1860–1940*

**Levke Harders**, Universität Bielefeld
*Narratives of Foreignness and Belonging: Migration as a Discursive Process in Western European Border Regions (1815–1871)*

**Chelsea Shields**, University of California, Irvine
*Atlantic Passages: Social Science, Decolonization and the Routes of Racial Knowledge*

**Amir Theilhaber**, Technische Universität Berlin
*Oriental Studies Integrated and Fragmented. German-American Intellectual Cross-fertilizations, 1875–1933*

**Gerda Henkel Fellow in Digital History**

**Julius Wilm**, University of Copenhagen
*Measuring the Homestead Act: Settlement Expansion and Private Land Acquisition in the American West, 1863–1934*

**Short-term Doctoral Fellowships**

**Luise Fast**, Universität Bielefeld
*Decentering Cultural Encounter. Indigenous Intermediaries as Transcultural Brokers in the 19th Century*

**Esther Heyer**, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

**Julie Keresztes**, Boston University
*Cameras for the Volk: Photography, Community and Society in Nazi Germany, 1933–1945*

**Maximilian Klose**, Freie Universität Berlin
*Why They Gave: CARE, the American Public, and U.S.-German Relations in the Postwar Era*

**Johannes Nagel**, Universität Bielefeld
*The U.S. Military Transformation and the Observation of World Politics, 1865–1910*
Franziska Walter, Institut für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin/
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
*Staatliche Sicherheitskulturen in Bayern 1945–1970. Personal, Praktiken und Prägungen im Bayerischen Innenministerium, Landeskriminalamt und Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz*

**Short-term Postdoctoral Fellowships**

Kerstin Bischl, Universität Göttingen
*Letztes Jahr in Birobidžan? Sowjetisch-jüdische Entfremdungen 1953–1991*

Mariusz Kalczewiak, Universität Potsdam
*Peretz Hirschbein, Global Yiddish Culture and Extending the Borders of Eastern Europe*

Sielke Beata Kelner, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
*Bringing the Gospel to the East: U.S. Evangelical Missionary Activism in Communist and post-Communist Romania*

Oliver Krause, Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde
*Die Verwandlung der Raumsemantik: Das Heartland-Konzept von Halford J. Mackinder und seine internationale und interdisziplinäre Rezeption, 1900–1950*

Katalin Teller, Eötvös-Loránd-Universität Budapest
*Geschichtsschreibung im Zirkus*

Timothy Wright, Max Planck Institute for Human Development
*Rituals of the Reborn: Ascetic Protestantism and Alternative Christianities in the Atlantic World, 1680–1780*
GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR AND COLLOQUIUM, FALL 2018

September 26  Prakash Kumar (Penn State University/GHI Washington)
The Contested Legacy of Modernity and Modernization in Developing India

October 4  Adam Knowles (Drexel University)
Categories of Complicity: Philosophy under National Socialism

Georg Wolff (Heidelberg Universität)
American Conservatism and the Struggle against Federal Authority: Grassroots Organizing, Activism, Discourse

Razak Khan (Universität Göttingen)
Entangled Translation: Psychology, Pedagogy, and Youth Reform in Germany and India

October 18  Yves Schmitz (Universität Marburg)
Arms Smuggling and State-Building in Imperial Borderlands: Southern Africa and Northern America in the Second Half of the 19th Century

Kerstin Schulte (Universität Bielefeld)
“Volksgemeinschaft” behind Barbed Wire: The Internment Camps of the British and American Occupation Zone and their Significance for German Postwar Society, 1945-1950

Daniel Eggstein (Universität Konstanz)
“Eine soziale Bewegung in der Wissenschaft”: Ökologisch orientierte Forschung in Deutschland und den USA in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren

October 24  Jenna Gibbs (Florida International University/GHI Washington)
The Global Latrobe Family: Evangelicalism, Slavery, and Empire

November 14  Sünné Juterczenka (Universität Göttingen /GHI Washington)
Encounters in Eden? Missions, Philanthropy, and Protestant Dissent in Eighteenth Century North America

November 15  Kristoff Kerl (Universität zu Köln)
Politiken des Rausches. Eine transnationale Körpergeschichte westlicher Gegenkulturen von den 1960er bis in die 1980er Jahre
Emanuel Steinbacher (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
The “Crime of the Century”: High Society, Medien und Familie in den USA in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts

December 6

Stephan Schmitt (Universität Erfurt)
Reporting Home: Repercussions of Colonial Rule upon American Race Relations

Ryan Heyden (McMaster University)
The German Red Cross and Humanitarianism in Divided Germany, 1945-1989

November 28

Stefan Tetzlaff (GHI Washington)
Selling Industry: Indian Public Opinion and German Industrial Public Relations Overseas, c. 1960-1972

December 12

Andrea Wiegeshoff (Universität Marburg/GHI Washington)
Of Pathogens and Humans. A Cultural History of the Policies for Epidemics in the Nineteenth Century
SPRING 2019 LECTURE SERIES

The Weimar Republic Reconsidered
Organized by David Lazar and Richard F. Wetzell

German voters went to the polls in January 1919 to elect a National Assembly to draft a new constitution to replace the imperial order that had collapsed two months earlier. The National Assembly’s meeting place soon became synonymous with the new constitution and a new era in German history: Weimar. The hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Weimar Republic affords an opportunity to take stock of new directions in research on this pivotal period of German history and to reflect on its bearing on the present.

February 21  Remembering and Forgetting Germany’s First Democracy: Reflections on Weimar Germany
Kathleen Canning (Rice University)

March 21  Founding Weimar: Violence and the Revolution of 1918/1919
Mark Jones (University College Dublin/FU Berlin)

March 28  Did Sex Bring Down the Weimar Republic?
Laurie Marhoefer (University of Washington)

April 11  City Streets and Civil Unrest: The Costs of Public Violence in the Weimar and Nazi Eras
Molly Loberg (Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo)

April 25  The Chances and Challenges of Democracy: Weimar and Beyond
Tim B. Müller (German Sinti and Roma Union)
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2019

January 22  Of Pathogens and Humans. A Cultural History of the Policies on Epidemics in the Nineteenth Century
Lecture at GHI West
Speaker: Andrea Wiegeshoff (GHI Washington / Marburg University)

February 21  The Longue Durée of 1989: Regime Change and Everyday Life in East Germany
Lecture at GHI West
Speaker: Kerstin Brückweh (Centre for Contemporary History, Potsdam)

February 21  Remembering and Forgetting Germany’s First Democracy: Reflections on Weimar Germany
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Kathleen Canning (Rice University)

February 25  Project Europe: A New History of the European Union
Gerda Henkel Lecture at the University of Colorado, Boulder
Speaker: Kiran Klaus Patel (Maastricht University)

February 27  The New Deal: A Global History
Gerda Henkel Lecture at the University of California, Santa Barbara
Speaker: Kiran Klaus Patel, Maastricht University

February 28  Project Europe: A New History of the European Union
Gerda Henkel Lecture at the University of California, Berkeley
Speaker: Kiran Klaus Patel (Maastricht University)

March 04  The Securitization of Migration and Racial Sorting in Fortress Europe
Lecture at GHI West
Speaker: Maartje van der Woude, Leiden Law School (Netherlands)

March 08-09  The Transmission of Financial Knowledge in Historical Perspective, 1840–1940
Conference at GHI Washington
Conveners: Nicholas Osborne (New-York Historical Society) and Atiba Pertilla (GHI Washington)
March 21  Founding Weimar: Violence and the Revolution of 1918/1919  
Lecture at GHI Washington  
Speaker: Mark Jones (University College Dublin/FU Berlin)

March 22  Lies about Migrants: Comparing U.S. and German Migration Politics in a Post-Truth Environment  
Lecture at GHI West  
Speaker: Beverly Crawford Ames (Center for German and European Studies, UC Berkeley)

March 22-23  The Politics of Sovereignty and Globalism in Modern Germany  
Conference at GHI Washington  
Conveners: Rüdiger Graf, Quinn Slobodian, Heidi Tworek, Anne Schenderlein (GHI Washington)

March 25-27  Entangling Pacific and Atlantic Worlds: Past and Present  
Symposium at GHI West  
Conveners: Sarah Beringer (GHI Washington), Wencke Meteling (Marburg University), Sören Urbansky (GHI Washington). Co-organized with the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius

March 28  Did Sex Bring Down the Weimar Republic?  
Lecture at GHI Washington  
Speaker: Laurie Marhoefer (University of Washington)

April 02  Indian Economic Policy 1945: The Bombay Plan, Multinationals and Indian Big Business  
Seminar at GHI Washington  
Speakers: Gurcharan Das (public intellectual), Medha Kudaisya (National University of Singapore), Promodh Malhotra (former Citibank and IFC official), Mircea Raianu (University of Maryland), Stefan Tetzlaff (GHI Washington)

April 02  Fascism’s Global Moments: New Perspectives on Entanglements and Tensions between Fascist Regimes in the 1930s and 1940s  
Lecture at GHI West  
Speaker: Sven Reichardt (Universität Konstanz)

April 05  Angst essen Seele auf (Fear Eats the Soul)  
Film Screening at Goethe-Institut San Francisco
April 06-07  German History in a Fractious World
Second Annual West Coast Germanists’ Workshop at University of Southern California
Organizing Committee: Elizabeth Drummond (LMU), Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (UC Berkeley), Paul Lerner (USC), Andrea Westermann (GHI West), Heike Friedman (GHI West)

April 11  Over Sixty in the Sixties: The Older Generation and Youth Protest in West Germany
Lecture at GHI West
Speaker: Christina von Hodenberg (German Historical Institute, London)

April 11  City Streets and Civil Unrest: The Costs of Public Violence in the Weimar and Nazi Eras
Lecture at the GHI Washington
Speaker: Molly Loberg (Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo)

April 12  Hippie Masala (Forever in India)
Film Screening at Goethe-Institut San Francisco

April 17  Competing Narratives of Failed Regimes: An International Comparison of National Memory Cultures
Panel Discussion at GHI Washington
Speakers: Soeren Brinkmann (Universidad del Norte, Barranquilla), Karen Cox (University of North Carolina at Charlotte), Donna Harsch (Carnegie Mellon University), Xolela Mangcu (George Washington University)

April 25  The Chances and Challenges of Democracy: Weimar and Beyond
Lecture at GHI Washington
Speaker: Tim B. Müller (German Sinti and Roma Union)

May 07  Bébé Tigre [Young Tiger]
Film Screening at Alliance Française, San Francisco

May 09  Getting the American Model Right: State Constitutional Revision and the Achievement of General Laws in the Mid-Nineteenth Century U.S.
10th Gerald Feldman Memorial Lecture, at GHI Washington
Speaker: Naomi R. Lamoreaux (Yale University and National Bureau of Economic Research)
May 17  
**Raving Iran**  
Film Screening at the Goethe-Institut San Francisco

May 19-22  
**In Global Transit: Forced Migration of Jews and other Refugees (1940s-1960s)**  
Conference at GHI West and The MAGNES Collection of Jewish Art and Life at the University of California, Berkeley  
Conveners: Wolf Gruner (USC Shoah Foundation Center for Advanced Genocide Research, Los Angeles), Simone Lässig (German Historical Institute Washington/GHI West, UC Berkeley), Francesco Spagnolo (The Magnes, UC Berkeley), Swen Steinberg (University of Dresden)

May 24-25  
**Maritime Missions: Religion, Ethnography and Empires in the Long Eighteenth Century**  
Workshop at GHI Washington  
Conveners: Jenna M. Gibbs (GHI Washington/Florida International University) and Sünne Juterczenka (GHI Washington/Göttingen University)

May 28 - June 04  
**Histories of Migrant Knowledges in and across the Transpacific: Agencies, Scales, Translations**  
Conference at GHI West  
Organized by The Forum Transregionale Studien, the Max Weber Stiftung, GHI West, The Maria Sibylla Merian Center for Advanced Latin American Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences (CALAS), and the Institute of European Studies, UC Berkeley

May 29 - June 01  
**25th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries**  
Seminar at GHI Washington  
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington)

May 31  
**Bezness as Usual**  
Film Screening at Goethe-Institut San Francisco

June 06-08  
**Political Culture and the History of Knowledge: Actors, Institutions, Practices**  
Conference at GHI Washington  
Conveners: Shadi Bartsch-Zimmer (Institute of the Formation of Knowledge at the University of Chicago), Kijan Espahangizi (Center “History of Knowledge” at the University Zurich and the ETH Zurich), Nils Güttler (Center “History of Knowledge” at the University Zurich and the ETH Zurich), Kerstin von der Krone (GHI Washington), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Monika Wulz (Center “History of Knowledge” at the University Zurich and the ETH Zurich)
June 06  Knowledge / Power / Political Culture - A Transatlantic Conversation
Panel Discussion at GHI Washington
Speakers: Suzanne Marchand (Louisiana State University), Jakob Tanner (Zurich University), and moderated by Anna von der Golz (Georgetown University)

September 06-07 Global Knowledge, Global Legitimacy? Transatlantic Biomedicine since 1970
Conference at GHI Washington
Conveners: Axel Jansen (GHI Washington) and Claudia Roesch (GHI Washington)

September 24-25 Sixth Junior Scholars Conference in Jewish History: Radicalism and Resistance in Modern Jewish History
Conference in Hamburg
Conveners: Miriam Rürup (Institute for the History of the German Jews, Hamburg), Anne Schenderlein (German Historical Institute Washington DC), and Mirjam Zadoff (NS-Dokumentationszentrum München), with additional support from the Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft des Leo Baeck Instituts

October 03-06 Work, Migration, Environment: The German and Central European Experience
Panel at the 43rd Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, Portland, Oregon
Conveners: Andrea Westermann (GHI West, Berkeley) and Eagle Glassheim (University of British Columbia, Vancouver)

October 03-06 GSA Seminar: Beyond the Racial State: New Perspectives on Race in Nazi Germany
Seminar at 43rd Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, Portland, Oregon
Conveners: Mark Roseman (Indiana University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington)

October 10-12 Medieval History Seminar
Seminar at GHI London
Organized by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with the German Historical Institute Washington and the German History Society
October 10–12  Digital Hermeneutics: From Research to Dissemination
Conference and Workshop at GHI Washington
Conveners: Andreas Fickers (C²DH), Gerben Zaagsma (C²DH), Sean Takats (RRCHNM), Simone Lässig (GHI), Jens Pohlmann (GHI), Daniel Burckhardt (GHI)

October 21–23  Histories of Migration: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives
Bucerius Young Scholars Forum at GHI West
Convener: Andrea Westermann (GHI West)
GHI Library

The GHI library concentrates on German history and transatlantic relations, with emphasis on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In addition to providing essential literature for scholarly research, the library fulfills an important cultural mission: no other library in the United States offers a similarly condensed inventory of modern German history. The library offers access to about 50,000 books, DVDs, CD-ROMs, microfiches, and 220 print journals. In addition, we offer access to about 500 e-books and 100 online journals.

The collection includes books on American history written by German authors as well as historical literature of the institute’s past research foci: global history, religious studies, exile and migration studies, environmental history, and economic history. The collection includes only print materials, mostly secondary literature; there are no archival holdings.

The GHI library offers free access to scholars as well as the general public; appointments or reader cards are not necessary. The library does not lend materials but visitors may consult material from the entire collection in our beautiful reading room, which also offers access to a variety of databases for journal articles, historical newspapers, genealogical research, and bibliographical research.

For the library catalog or a list of our databases, please visit www.ghi-dc.org/library. Or send an email to library@ghi-dc.org for any further questions.

The library hours are Monday to Thursday from 9 am to 5 pm, Fridays from 9 am to 4 pm, and by appointment.
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Volume 23

**GUSTAV STRESEMANN**
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Karl Heinrich Pohl
Translated from the German by Christine Brocks, with the assistance of Patricia C. Sutcliffe

Praise for the German edition:
"[A] substantial contribution … Pohl succeeds admirably in locating the statesman Stresemann within his personal experiences and his reactions to a tumultuous, sometimes fortuitous web of events."

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Volume 22

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Germans in Pacific Worlds from the Early Modern Period to World War I
Hartmut Berghoff, Frank Biess, and Ulrike Strasser [Eds.]

The studies gathered here offer fascinating research into German missionary, commercial, scientific, and imperial activity against the backdrop of the Pacific’s overlapping cultural circuits and complex oceanic transits.

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Volume 21

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Volume 20 - New in Paperback

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Volume 19

**FELLOW TRIBESMEN**
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Frank Usbeck

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Operation Crossroads Africa (OCA) was in the 1960s the largest private voluntary organization operating in Africa. It was founded in 1957, and initiated many aid projects in different regions of Africa.

Katharina Scheffler examines the early years of the organization. She explores its founding as well as the institutional and social hurdles that it had to overcome initially. A special focus is given to the experiences of the volunteers themselves and their role as informal American ambassadors on one side and as forerunners for intercultural understanding on the other.

In *Encountering Empire*, Elisabeth Engel traces how black American missionaries – men and women grappling with their African heritage – established connections in Africa during the heyday of European colonialism. Reconstructing the black American ‘colonial encounter’, Engel analyzes the images, transatlantic relationships, and possibilities of representation African American missionaries developed for themselves while negotiating colonial regimes. Illuminating a neglected chapter of Atlantic history, Engel demonstrates that African Americans used imperial structures for their own self-determination. *Encountering Empire* thus challenges the notion that pan-Africanism was the only viable strategy for black emancipation.

In early America, the notion that settlers ought to receive undeveloped land for free was enormously popular among the rural poor and social reformers. Well into the Jacksonian era, however, Congress considered the demand fiscally and economically irresponsible. Increasingly, this led proponents to cast the idea as a military matter: land grantees would supplant troops in the efforts to take over the continent from Indian nations and rival colonial powers. Julius Wilm’s book examines the free land debates from the 1790s to the 1850s and reconstructs the settlement experiences under the donation laws for Florida (1842) and the Oregon Territory (1850).


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