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3 Preface

FEATURES

9 Calculation and the Division of Labor, 1750-1950
Lorraine Daston

31 The Overburdened Peace: Competing Visions of World Order in 1918/19
Jörn Leonhard

51 The German Moment in 1918
Jennifer L. Jenkins

69 The Re-Germanization Procedure: A Domestic Model for Nazi Empire-Building
Bradley J. Nichols

93 Legitimizing New Knowledge: American Debates about Adult and Embryonic Stem Cells, 1998-2004
Axel Jansen

CONFERENCE REPORTS

113 Learning at the Margins: The Creation and Dissemination of Knowledge among African Americans and Jews since the 1880s
Lisa Gerlach

119 Inheritance Practices: Family, Property and Wealth Transfers in the Twentieth Century
Jürgen Dinkel

123 Empires of Knowledge: Expertise and Imperial Power across the Long Twentieth Century
Amanda Domingues
131 Kinship, Knowledge, and Migration
Lisa Gerlach

137 Creating Historical Knowledge Socially: New Approaches, Opportunities and Epistemological Implications of Undertaking Research with Citizen Scholars
Matthew Hiebert

145 Bucerius Young Scholars Forum Histories of Migration: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives
Atiba Pertilla

153 Knowledge in Flight: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Scholar Rescue in North America
Anne Schenderlein and Judith Beneker

159 GHI NEWS

Obituary: Jeanne Mallett (1944-2017)
GHI Washington Celebrated Thirtieth Anniversary
GHI awarded two-year grant by the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius for German History in Documents and Images
Innovation through Migration: New Senior Fellowships and Practitioners in Residence Program at GHI West, UC Berkeley
2017 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
New Staff Publications
Staff Changes
GHI Fellowships and Internships
GHI Fellowship Recipients
GHI Research Seminar and Colloquium, Fall 2017
GHI Spring Lecture Series 2018
GHI Calendar of Events 2018/19
GHI Library
This issue of the *Bulletin* reflects two main themes: the history of knowledge, which is one of the Institute’s current areas of research concentration, and the centenary of the end of the First World War in 1918. The issue opens with an article by distinguished historian of science Lorraine Daston (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin) on the history of “Calculation and the Division of Labor” from 1750 to 1950, which is based on the presentation she delivered as GHI’s 31st Annual Lecture last November. Daston begins with the observation that while there is now a rich historical literature on the history of reading and writing, we still know very little about the history of calculation. Daston’s penetrating analysis of how the introduction of calculating machines changed the organization of labor in the “Big Calculation” projects of astronomy, railways or government statistics reveals that the capacity of machines to calculate did not lead contemporaries to the conclusion that machines were intelligent (as the current fascination with Artificial Intelligence might suggest) but that most calculation was mechanical and mindless. The effect of making calculation mechanical was “to disqualify it as an intelligent activity,” which helps to explain why the history of calculation has attracted much less scholarly attention than that of reading and writing.

Our second article is the keynote lecture delivered by Jörn Leonhard (University of Freiburg) at this year’s Annual Conference of the GHI’s parent foundation, the Max Weber Foundation, which was organized by the GHI Washington on the topic “Settlement and Unsettlement: The Ends of World War I and their Legacies.” In his lecture, “The Overburdened Peace: Competing Visions of World Order in 1918/19,” Leonhard, the author of the acclaimed *Pandora’s Box: A History of the First World War*, offers a comprehensive analysis of the post-war peace settlement. Alive to the contradictory mixture of ruptures and continuities that characterized the postwar situation, he argues that the war’s long years of violence and sacrifice provoked enormous expectations that overtaxed the peace from the outset. Not only did the practical implementation of the concept of national self-determination prove contentious as it came up against the realities of multiethnic populations and competing identities, but the triumph of the nation state became increasingly dissociated from democracy.
Jennifer Jenkins’s (University of Toronto) article on the “German moment” in 1918 shifts the focus from the postwar peace settlement back to the first eight months of the year 1918. Originating in a conference panel organized by the GHI’s “German History Intersections” Project at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Jenkins’s article recovers the “radically different picture of Germany’s future” that characterized the months following the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty in March 1918. While German wartime plans for Mitteleuropa are well-known, Jenkins examines German plans for the creation of a German economic sphere much further East, across the territories of the former Russian Empire, in what the planners called the “New Orient.” Focusing on the Caucasus and Iran, she investigates the complex interaction of German diplomats, the German military, and Georgian and Persian local elites in order to argue that the “Wilsonian moment” of 1919 was preceded by a “German imperial moment” in 1918, which, despite Germany’s defeat, created connections that were revitalized in the 1920s and 1930s.

The next article presents the research of the 2017 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize winner, Bradley Nichols (Virginia Tech). The Friends of the German Historical Institute award the prize annually for the best dissertation in German history completed at a North American university. In his article, Nichols examines Nazi Germany’s “Re-Germanization Procedure” (Wiedereindeutschungsverfahren), a program that was designed to assimilate “racially kindred” foreigners by sending them to live with German families within the Reich, which eventually drew in about 100,000 people. By focusing on the responses of re-Germanization candidates as well as ordinary Germans to this program, Nichols enriches the history of Nazi racial policy with an important perspective from below. The Nazi regime’s perception that the program had popular backing, he argues, allowed the re-Germanization procedure to become a “pilot project for the assimilation of millions,” designed to help consolidate the Nazi “New Order” in Europe.

This issue’s last feature article, in which GHI Deputy Director Axel Jansen shares one of his research projects, returns to the history of knowledge. In this piece, Jansen examines the American debate on human embryonic stem cells between 1998 and 2004 as a key episode in the history of the public legitimacy of science in the United States. Paying close attention to how the development of scientific knowledge affected the public and political debates over human embryonic
stem cells, Jansen reveals the dual role that scientists played: on the one hand, serving in the role of experts who explain their research to journalists and to the public, while, on the other hand, acting in the role of advocates fighting to secure funding for their research; two roles that could, as he shows, on occasion be at cross-purposes.

The conference reports in this issue reflect the Institute’s current focus on the history of knowledge and the history of migration. Recent conferences addressing the history of knowledge have been devoted to the history of the creation and dissemination of knowledge among African Americans and Jews and the twentieth-century history of expertise and imperial power. The GHI’s most recent digital history conference examined the topic “Creating Historical Knowledge Socially: New Approaches, Opportunities and Epistemological Implications of Undertaking Research with Citizen Scholars.” Recent conferences on the history of migration have included the 2017 Bucerius Young Scholars Forum, which was devoted to “Histories of Migration: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives,” as well as two conferences on the intersection of the histories of migration and knowledge: “Knowledge in Flight: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Scholar Rescue in North America,” and the GHI’s 2017 GSA panel series on “Kinship, Knowledge, and Migration.”

Please turn to our news section for recent GHI news. For up-to-date information on upcoming events, publications, fellowships, and calls for papers, please also consult our website — http://www.ghi-dc.org — as well as our Facebook page.

Simone Lässig (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)
Features
I. The Strange Death of Calculation

The scene is a school room, in almost any epoch and any locale: it might be the house of an ancient Babylonian scribe, in which father taught son in learned lineages that stretched over centuries; or in Song Dynasty China, as students prepared for the imperial civil service examinations; or in fourteenth-century France, where an allegorized Geometria instructed cathedral school pupils; or nineteenth-century Prussia, whose schoolmasters had allegedly delivered a military victory over the French in 1870. In all of these classrooms, dispersed over centuries and continents, students would have been taught some version of the three fundamental cultural techniques that underlie all other cognitive practices in literate societies: reading, writing, and calculation. We have rich and vast histories of reading and writing; yet we barely have the rudiments of a history of calculation. Why not? This lecture is an attempt to answer that question.

The puzzle of why we lack a history of calculation is deepened by the fact that our oldest evidence for writing systems, for example from ancient Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean, suggests that alphabets are parasitic upon numerals. Somewhat disappointingly, many of the earliest surviving texts in Sumerian (c. 3500 BCE) and other ancient languages record not great epics like the Gilgamesh and the Iliad but rather what sound like merchants’ receipts: five barrels of wine, twenty-two sheepskins, and so on. The earliest use of reading and writing appears to have been to keep track of calculations, mostly for commercial and administrative purposes. Yet today, in the age of hand-held electronic calculators and calculating apps, mental calculation has almost disappeared as a widespread cognitive practice, even from the classroom. Our online lives are dominated by reading and writing to an extent probably unprecedented in world history: these culture techniques have weathered and indeed flourished under successive media revolutions, from printing to digitalization. But calculation, the third pillar of the scribal triumvirate, has almost ceased to count as an intellectual activity. How did this happen?
II. Twinned at Birth: Artificial Intelligence and the Division of Labor

Calculation did not die a sudden death. This image (Figure 1) of how pins were made in France in the mid-eighteenth century represents the moment two concepts that made the modern world were born: the division of labor and the computer. Here is the well-known story in a nutshell, in three short acts.

Act I: This image and the accompanying article on pins in the great *Encyclopédie* of Jean d’Alembert and Denis Diderot were taken from studies made by the French engineer Jean-Rodolphe Perronet, first director of the École des Ponts et Chaussées. Adam Smith, then professor at the University of Glasgow, adapted material from the *Encyclopédie* article and its sources in the famous first chapter on the pin factory and the division of labor in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776).

Act II: Another French engineer, Gaspard Riche de Prony, Perronet’s protégé and eventually successor at the École des Ponts et Chaussées, read Smith’s account of pin-making and the division of labor, and applied those methods to the calculation of some two-hundred-thousand logarithms to at least fourteen decimal places, a project launched in 1791 during the French Revolution as a monument to the new decimal metric system. Inspired by his reading of *The Wealth of Nations*, Prony decided to “manufacture my logarithms as one manufactures pins.” He created a pyramid of laborers (Figure 2) divided into three classes: at the pinnacle, a few “mathematicians of distinction” who developed the general formulas for calculating the logarithms by the method of differences; at the second level, seven or eight “algebraicists” trained in analysis who could translate the formulas into numerical forms that could be computed; and at the

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1 Jean-Rodolphe Perronet, *Description de la façon dont on fait les épingles à Laigle en Normandie* (1740), Bibliothèque de l’École des Ponts et Chaussées, MS 2385; cited in Antoine Picon, “Gestes ouvriers, opérations et processus techniques: La vision du travail des encyclopédistes,” *Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie* (13 October 1992): 131-147, on 134-135. Although the plates come from Perronet, the author of the article in the *Encyclopédie* was Alexandre Deleyre, who drew on work by Perronet and others.


broad base, seventy or eighty “workers” knowing only elementary arithmetic who actually performed the millions of additions and subtractions and entered them by hand into seventeen folio volumes.4

Act III: Prony’s project greatly impressed the British mathematician and political economist Charles Babbage, who suggested that the workers at the base of the pyramid could be replaced by “machinery, and it would only be necessary to employ people to copy down as fast as they were able the figures presented to them by the engine.”5 In his treatise On the Economy of Machinery and Manufacture (1832), Babbage returned to the Prony logarithm project as his primary proof that the principles of the division of labor could be applied “both in mechanical and mental operations.” Indeed, Babbage argued, the calculations of Prony’s third class of workers “may almost be termed mechanical,” even if they hadn’t been done by actual machines.6 Human intelligence sunk to the mechanical level, kindling the idea of machine intelligence. Thus was hatched the idea of Babbage’s Difference Engine (Figure 3), hailed by Babbage’s contemporaries for substituting “mechanical performance for an intellectual process” and by historians as the ancestor of the modern computer.7

So far, so familiar. But the intertwined histories of the division of labor and mechanical intelligence neither began nor ended with this famous three-act story from pins to computers via logarithms. Long before Prony thought of applying Adam Smith’s political economy to monumental calculation projects, astronomical observatories and nautical almanacs were confronted with mountains of computations that they accomplished by the ingenious


organization of work and workers. Long after Prony and Babbage and even after the spread of reliable calculating machines in the late nineteenth century, humans still played a crucial role in heavy-duty calculation (which I’ll call Big Calculation, on the analogy with Big Data), and the challenge of optimizing the arrangements of humans and machines became if anything even more daunting. More reliable calculating machines like the Thomas Arithmometer (not widely marketed until the 1870s) did not get rid of human calculators; in fact, machines may have actually increased the number of humans involved. What mechanization did change was the organization of Big Calculation: integrating humans and machines dictated different algorithms, different skills, different personnel, and above all different divisions of labor. These changes in turn shaped new forms of intelligence at the interface between humans and machines.

In light of our current fascination with — and fear of — Artificial Intelligence, it is Babbage’s inference from the mechanical nature of Prony’s third tier of “mechanical” human calculators to a real machine programmed to calculate that seems to presage a future ruled by algorithms. But in fact it is the middle tier, those seven or eight “algebraicists” who translated high-flown mathematics into thousands and thousands of additions and subtractions, who should be the object of our attention. They were the ones who dissected a highly complex formula into simple, step-by-step procedures. In other words, they created the algorithms that meshed mathematics with mechanical labor by humans and ultimately with machines. From the mid-nineteenth to at least the mid-twentieth centuries, it is this kind of managerial intelligence that came to dominate factories of Big Calculation — insurance companies, astronomical observatories, railways, government statistical bureaus, naval ephemerides, accounting offices, and later military weapons research. Arguably, it is the same intelligence that still dovetails humans and machines in our own online world, in which humans interact constantly with algorithms, whether as Uber drivers, Amazon customers, or college students registering for courses. I will call the
algorithmic intelligence used to organize vast calculation projects “analytical intelligence.”

My exploration of analytical intelligence will focus on how the introduction of machines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries changed both narrow and broad algorithms: those used to calculate and those used to organize calculation. Machines also altered the meaning of calculation and the identity of calculators. But machines did not fundamentally transform the mental burden of calculation that they had been designed to relieve. Instead, they shifted it to other shoulders — or rather, to other minds. The labor of massive calculation, a cause for complaint among astronomers, surveyors, administrators, and navigators since the sixteenth century, remained as monotonous and tedious as ever — so much so that it inspired whole new psychophysical inquiries into mental fatigue and flagging attention. At least in its first century of widespread application, roughly 1870-1970, mechanical calculation never entirely succeeded in exorcising the ghost in the machine — and a very weary ghost it was, too.

III. Calculation as Hard Labor

On an August morning in 1838, the seventeen-year-old Edwin Dunkin and his brother began work as computers at the Royal Observatory in Greenwich, under the directorship of Astronomer Royal George Biddell Airy:

We were at our posts at 8 a.m. to the moment. I had not been many minutes seated on a high chair before a roomy desk placed on a table in the centre of the Octagon Room, when a huge book was placed before me, very different indeed to what I had anticipated. This large folio book of printed forms, was specially arranged for the calculation of the tabular right ascension and north polar distance of the planet Mercury from Lindenau’s Tables. ... After very little instruction from Mr. Thomas, the principal computer in charge, I began to make my first entries with a slow and tremulous hand, doubting whether what I was doing was correct or not. But after a little quiet study of the examples given in the Tables, all this nervousness soon vanished, and before 8 pm came, when my day’s work was over, some of the older computers complimented me on the successful progress I had made.8

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8 Edwin Dunkin, A Far-Off Vision: A Cornishman at Greenwich Observatory, ed. P.D. Hingley and T.C. Daniel (Truro, 1999), 72-73
Two boys sent out to support their widowed mother, the high chair and the huge ledger, the twelve hours of eye-straining, hand-cramping calculation (alleviated only by an hour’s dinner break), the standardized printed forms that divided computation into steps like the manufacture of pins — it could be a vignette from Dickens, and both Airy and his predecessor in the office, John Pond, have been cast by contemporaries and historians alike in the roles of Bounderby or Scrooge.9

But the reality of massive calculation of the sort that went on in astronomical observatories since at least the medieval period in parts of Asia and in Europe since the sixteenth century (and since the nineteenth century in insurance offices and government statistical offices) was considerably more varied — as varied as the nature of work itself in different historical and cultural contexts. The only constant was that calculations on the large scale needed to reduce astronomical observations, compute life expectancies, and tally statistics on everything from crime to trade was indeed work: the first Astronomer Royal John Flamsteed, appointed in 1670, called it “labour harder than thrashing.”10 Before and even after the invention and diffusion of reliable calculating machines, the challenge to astronomers and other heavy-duty number crunchers was how to organize the work of deploying many algorithms, over and over again. These combined experiments in labor organization and algorithmic manipulation ultimately transformed both human labor and algorithms.

Let us return to young Edwin Dunkin perched on his high chair in the Octagon Room of the Royal Observatory at Greenwich. Edwin’s father William Dunkin had also been a “computer” — a word that until the mid-twentieth century referred primarily to human beings, not machines — and had worked for Airy’s predecessors, Astronomers Royal Nevil Maskelyne and John Pond, to calculate tables for the *Nautical Almanac*, a navigational tool for the globalized British navy that had been produced under the direction of the Astronomer Royal since 1767.11 Unable to supply the labor necessary to compute the *Almanac*’s numerous tables from the Greenwich Observatory’s own resources, Maskelyne organized a network of paid computers throughout Britain to perform the thousands of calculations according to a set of “precepts” or algorithms, to be entered on pre-printed forms that divided up calculations (and indicated which values had to be looked up when from which one of fourteen different books of


What is noteworthy about Maskelyne’s operation (which involved a computer, anti-computer, and comparer to check each month’s set of calculations) was its integration into an established system of piecework labor done in the home and often involving other family members. Each computer completed a whole month’s worth of lunar position or tide prediction calculations according to algorithms bundled like the patterns sent to cottage weavers to produce finished textile wares.

Just as the mid-eighteenth-century manufacturing system, in which many workers were gathered together under one roof and subjected to close managerial supervision, began to replace the family textile workshop long before the introduction of steam-driven looms, so the development of Big Calculation traced a parallel arc a good half-century before algorithms were calculated by machines. The careers of William and Edwin Dunkin, father and son computers in the service of the British Astronomers Royal, span the transition between piecework and manufacturing — but not yet mechanized — systems of labor organization. William, a former miner from Cornwall, spent most of his career as a computer in Maskelyne’s network, working from his home in Truro. When the computational work of the Nautical Almanac was centralized in London under the direction of its own superintendent in 1831, William was the only member of the old computation network to be carried over into the new system, a move he regretted to the end of his life because it deprived him of home and independence.

Edwin Dunkin’s experience as a computer began in a clerical setting like that his father had recoiled from: all the computers gathered together in a single room; fixed hours (which were significantly shortened soon after he began work at Greenwich Observatory); more supervision and hierarchy with differential pay for the various grades of computers and assistants; young personnel at the lowest ranks with a high turnover. But Airy’s “system,” as it was called, cannot be described as a factory of computation. Quite aside from the absence of any machines, the division of labor was loose and the possibilities for advancement significant: young computers like Edwin were also expected to shoulder their share of nighttime observing duties, and although William Dunkin was so unhappy with his prospects of social advancement as a computer that he discouraged his sons from following in his footsteps, Edwin eventually

13 See Georges Friedmann, “L’Encyclopédie et le travail humain,” Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 8 (1953): 53–61 on the degree to which such “grandes manufactures” were dissociated from both machines and the division of labor in the views of mid-eighteenth-century French thinkers.
became a Fellow of the Royal Society and president of the Royal Astronomical Society. A survey of Airy’s Greenwich computers and assistants reveals a spectrum of livelihoods, from teenagers hired as computers at the lowest wages, many of whom did not last long, to assistants hired straight out of university (often with strong mathematical credentials) and salaries substantial enough to support a family in solid middle-class style. Maskelyne’s printed forms and Airy’s “precepts” structured the algorithms (and consultation of multiple tables) in a clear and rigid sequence adapted to contexts of domestic piecework and supervised office work, respectively. But neither much resembled Adam Smith’s pin factory in the minute division of labor or endless repetition of the same task. Computation had not yet become “mechanical,” in either the literal or figurative sense of the word.

Airy’s “system” was in fact positioned between two extremes of organizing the labor of human computers in the nineteenth century. At one extreme was the American imitator of the *Nautical Almanac*, directed by Harvard mathematics professor Benjamin Peirce in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Simon Newcomb, who later became a prominent astronomer but who was largely self-educated in mathematics when he began work as a computer at age twenty-two, found working conditions decidedly casual: “The discipline of the public service was less rigid in the office [of the *Nautical Almanac*] than any government institution I ever heard of. In theory there was an understanding that each assistant was ‘expected’ to be in the office five hours a day. ... As a matter of fact, however, the work was done pretty much where and when the assistant chose, all that was really necessary being to have it done on time.” One of his fellow computers, the philosopher Chauncey Wright, concentrated a year’s worth of computation into two or three months, staying up into the wee hours and “stimulating his strength with cigars.”

At the opposite extreme from the laissez-faire office of the American *Nautical Almanac* was the Prony project for calculating logarithms in the decimal system initiated during the French Revolution to vaunt the advantages of the metric system. This was the moment when computation met modern manufacturing methods (though not yet machines) and could be reimagined as mechanical rather than as mental labor. By methods that Prony described as “purely mechanical,” the workers performed about 1000 additions or subtractions a day in duplicate, in order to control for errors.

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17 Simon Newcomb, *The Reminiscences of an Astronomer* (Boston/New York, 1903), 71, 74. Like Edwin Dunkin, Newcomb in retrospect regarded his job as a computer as the first rung on the ladder of a distinguished scientific career, “my birth into the world of sweetness and light” (1).
No machine more complicated than a quill pen was used in this herculean calculation project. What made it “mechanical” in the eyes of Prony and his contemporaries was the nature of the labor at the bottom of the pyramid — or rather the nature of the laborers. In a passage that Babbage was to repeat like a refrain, Prony marveled that the stupidest laborers made the fewest errors in their endless rows of additions and subtractions: “I noted that the sheets with the fewest errors came particularly from those who had the most limited intelligence, [who had] an automatic existence, so to speak.” To Babbage, steeped in the political economy of newly industrialized England, Prony’s manufacture of logarithms proved that even the most sophisticated calculations could be literally mechanized. He likened Prony’s achievement to that “of a skillful person about to construct a cotton or silk-mill.” If mindless laborers could perform so reliably, why not replace them with mindless machines?

But the Prony tables were never published in full and rarely used, Babbage’s Difference Engine remained a party entertainment and his Analytical Engine a dream, and it was a very long time before calculators like Edwin Dunkin were even reinforced, much less replaced by machines.

IV. “First Organize, Then Mechanize”: Calculating Machines and the Division of Labor

If calculation was essentially mechanical, as Prony and Babbage claimed, why did it take so long for machines to actually perform these operations — especially since there was desperate demand among calculation-intensive enterprises like the *Nautical Almanac*? Any number of ingenious calculating machines had been invented and fabricated at least in prototype version since the French mathematician Blaise Pascal tried to sell his arithmetic machine (Figure 4) in 1640s, without notable success. Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries inventors experimented with diverse designs and materials, but their machines remained difficult to construct, expensive to purchase, and unreliable to use, items to adorn a princely cabinet of curiosities rather than workaday tools.

The first calculating machine robust and reliable enough to be successfully manufactured and marketed was the Arithmometer (Figure 5), invented by the French businessman Thomas de Colmar in 1820, but not in widespread usage until the 1870s. Even then the insurance firms...

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that were its primary purchasers complained that the Arithmometer broke down often and required considerable dexterity to operate.23 By the second decade of the twentieth century, however, calculating machines manufactured in France, Britain, Germany, and the United States were fixtures in insurance offices, government census bureaus, and railway administrations. But a comprehensive 1933 survey of calculating machines then available admitted that for scientific purposes “mental calculation aided by writing and numerical tables” still predominated.24

This was more or less exactly the moment when the British Nautical Almanac began to introduce mechanical calculating machines into its operations.25 The transition from the silence of the Octagon Room, broken only by the scratching of pens and the turning of pages as schoolboy Junior Computers and more senior Assistants calculated and looked up tables, to the deafening clatter of adding machines in a crowded office at the Naval College in Greenwich must have been jarring. In an urgent plea to the Admiralty for larger quarters in 1930, Superintendent L. Comrie described the scene: “We have a large Burroughs [Adding] Machine in continual use which is so noisy

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Between 1821 and 1865, only 500 Arithmometers were sold, but by 1910, circa 18,000 Arithmometers were in use worldwide. Delphine Gardey, *Écrire, calculer, classer. Comment une révolution de papier a transformé les sociétés contemporaines* (1800-1840) (Paris, 2008), 206-212.


that no degree of concentration is possible in the room where it is working. It is essential, for the sake of the other workers, that the machine should have a room to itself.” And why was the office so crowded? Because use of the machines dictated that work previously parceled out to “outside workers” — retired staff members, their relatives, clergymen and teachers seeking to pad their modest incomes — should now be assigned to “ordinary junior market labour with calculating machines” instead of to “the old-time highly-paid computers who knew nothing but logarithms and who often worked in their own houses.” Such lower-paid workers needed “closer supervision,” and the expensive machines could not leave the office.26 And who were these cheap workers who operated the new machines under the gimlet eye of their supervisor? No longer boys fresh from school as in Edwin Dunkin’s day but rather a half-dozen unmarried women (British Civil Service regulations prohibited hiring married women) who had passed a competitive examination in “English, Arithmetic, General Knowledge and Mathematics.”27

Ironically, the machines introduced with the intention of cutting costs, saving labor, speeding up production, and, above all, alleviating mental effort had at least the initial effect of hiring more workers, spending more money, disrupting production, and increasing mental effort — especially for the supervisors charged with reorganizing how calculations were done in order to integrate human and mechanical calculators into a smooth, efficient, and error-free sequence. Take the case of the Hollerith machine that Superintendent Comrie was keen to lease for at least six months to make an ephemeris of the Moon. In addition to the circa £264 for the rental itself, there would be the additional expense of £100 for 10,000 punch cards, plus the extra “wages of four girls for six months, and two girls for an additional six months” to punch in the numbers and operate the machine, amounting to another £234 — and did I mention the extra £9 added to the electricity bill? That’s a grand total of £607, compared to £500

26 Superintendent of the Nautical Almanac to the Secretary of the Navy, 28 October 1930. RGO 16/Box 17, Manuscript Room, Cambridge University Library.

27 Secretary of the Admiralty to the Superintendent of the Nautical Almanac, 23 November 1933. In a letter from the Superintendent to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 14 April 1931, the Superintendent sees no reason why women could not also be employed at the higher-level post of assistant but recommended that the positions of Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent “be reserved for men, especially in view of the fact that the greater part of the calculation is now performed by mechanical means.” RGO 16/Box 17, Manuscript Room, Cambridge University Library.
per year for the same calculations using the old methods. Instead of calculating 10,000 sums of figures taken from seven different tables, it would now be necessary to punch twelve million figures onto three hundred thousand cards in order to run them through the Hollerith machine. The superintendent must have anticipated some raised eyebrows at the penny-pinching Admiralty when he sent in these figures, for he hastened to acknowledge that “a heavy initial cost” would be justified by subsequent increases in “speed and accuracy and saving of mental fatigue obtained by using the tabulating machines.”

“A true calculating machine,” ran one definition circa 1930, is one that “suppresses in its operation all that could genuinely demand a mental effort.” But like Freud’s return of the repressed, mental effort and fatigue tended to return through the back door. Quite apart from the fatigue endured by the women who punched the cards, a point to which I’ll return, there was the effort of rethinking the division of labor in the millions of calculations necessary to produce the Nautical Almanac. As we have seen, observatory directors and almanac superintendents had been analyzing the work of calculation into multiple steps and matching steps to degrees of mathematical skill, from schoolboys to Cambridge Wranglers, since the eighteenth century.

But with the influx of new workers to operate the calculating machines in the 1930s, the superintendent and deputy superintendent found themselves confronted with a supervisory crisis: how could the new staff and new machines be meshed with the old staff and their tried-and-true methods? There were the difficult but invaluable Daniels brothers, who were the only staff members trusted to proofread tables but deemed “temperamentally unfitted to supervise subordinate staff” and “too stereotyped in their habits to adapt themselves to the use of machines.” Miss Stocks and Miss Burroughs, who were charged to transform heliocentric into geocentric coordinates using Brunsviga calculating machines, required three months each of private tuition in computing from the Superintendent.

Trying to justify why, despite the sizeable investments in new machines and personnel, the Nautical Almanac was still twelve months behind schedule, Superintendent Comrie explained to his bosses at the Admiralty that the supervisor’s preparation of the work for the machines and their operators now constituted “20 or 30 per cent of the whole [calculation].” Whereas previously computing the ephemeris of the Moon at transit consisted of simply telling one W.F.
Doaken, M.A. “‘Do the Moon Transit,’ and four or five months later the printer’s copy would be handed over,” now the work had been divided up among “six or seven people, to whom perhaps 100 to 120 different sets of instructions are given.”

But the bottom line was the bottom line: the new methods were at least 20% cheaper than the old. If the Nautical Almanac was not going to revert back to the luxurious staffing scheme of their German counterparts, who employed eleven Ph.D.s, then cheaper staff (i.e. women), machines, and, most important, constant and creative supervision would be necessary. New algorithms disrupted old methods of calculation on at least two levels. First, the machines rarely calculated in the way that humans had been taught to or even in the way indicated by theoretical mathematical solutions. For example, the Seguin machine multiplied not by iterating additions but rather by treating numbers as polynomials of powers of ten.31 The best rules for mental calculation were not those for mechanical calculation — and different machines used different algorithms. Second, meshing the mental, mechanical, and manual aspects of calculation required supervisors to invent new procedural algorithms that divided a problem like the lunar transit into small, explicit steps. When Comrie complained, as no doubt all superintendents before and after him did, about how much of his time was nibbled away by administrative duties, it was not scientific work to which he longed to return: “My mind should be free from administrative worries, so that I can exploit methods, devise improved arrangements of computations, and collate and supervise the work of individual members of the Staff.”32 Here was analytical intelligence concentrated to its doubly algorithmic essence: calculation and the division of labor simultaneously rethought to accommodate machines and the allegedly mechanical workers who operated them — all in the name of cost-cutting.

Pressure to trim costs in order to justify the purchase of expensive machines and hiring of more staff to operate them was even more intense in calculation-heavy industries, like the railroads. At the same time the Nautical Almanac in Greenwich was experimenting with Hollerith and other calculating machines to streamline astronomical calculations, the French Chemins de Fer Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée (C.F.P.L.M.) was introducing them to keep track of freight shipments and moving stock. In a 1929 article, Georges Bolle, head of accounting at the C.F.P.L.M. and graduate of the École Polytechnique, France’s elite engineering school,

32 Superintendentent of the Nautical Almanac (L. Comrie) to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 14 October 1931, 25 January 1933, 30 September 1933. RGO 16/Box 17, Manuscript Room, Cambridge University Library.
explained that the economic advantages of the new machines were “really incalculable” — but only if every single detail of the workflow had been meticulously thought out in advance, from how to maximize the use of all of the forty-five columns of a Hollerith punch card to devising icons (Figure 6) for the kind of freight most frequently transported to speed up coding of the information by the machine operators. No detail of the process was too small to escape the supervisor’s scrutiny, not even the numbering of freight categories: “Every detail must be meticulously examined, discussed, weighed in work of this kind.” As in the case of the Nautical Almanac, the use of machines entailed centralizing the workplace (in Paris, of course) and hiring the cheapest labor consistent with the qualifications of “much orderliness, care, concentration, and good will” (women, of course). The economic advantages of a cheap work force were apparently so great that Bolle thought that all the difficulties involved in abandoning old methods — not least the cost of the machines themselves — paled by comparison. But these gains could only be achieved by a vast effort of organization: “The study of every problem to be solved by machines requires very laborious mental effort [un travail cérébral très laborieux], a considerable amount of reflection, observations, and discussions to mount the projected organization and make sure that all works well ... ”33 Or, in his lapidary motto: “First organize, then mechanize.”34

V. Mechanical Mindfulness

However different in their design, materials, power, and reliability, all calculating machines, from the seventeenth to the mid-twentieth century, promised to assuage human intelligence, not replace it.35 The inference drawn from the capacity of machines to calculate was not that machines were intelligent but rather that at least some calculation was mechanical, in the sense of being mindless. But it was a peculiar sort of mindlessness, one that required the utmost efforts.
of attention and memory. This was most dramatically displayed by
a wave of psychological studies devoted to calculating prodigies on
the one hand and to the operators of calculating machines on the
other. These two groups might once have been viewed as opposite
ends of a spectrum: number geniuses versus number dunces. But
the spread of calculating machines had simultaneously devalued
the mental activity of calculation without eliminating the monotonous
effort of concentration traditionally associated with it. As a result,
the psychological profiles of the virtuosi of mental arithmetic and
the operators of calculating machines converged in strange ways.

The history of eighteenth and early nineteenth-century mathemat-
ics boasts several calculating prodigies who later became cel-
ebrated mathematicians, including Leonhard Euler, Carl Friedrich
Gauss, and André-Marie Ampère.36 Anecdotes circulated about
their precocious feats of mental arithmetic as early signs of math-
ematical genius. But by the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, psychologists and mathematicians insisted that such
cases were anomalous: great mathematicians were rarely calculat-
ing virtuosi, and calculating virtuosi were even more rarely great
mathematicians. It is significant that these arguments featured
prominently in treatises on calculating machines: if calculating
was a mechanical activity, then minds that excelled at it were
perforce mechanical. Lightning calculation, whether performed
mentally or mechanically, was now more akin to dexterity than
to creativity.

Alfred Binet, professor of psychology at the Sorbonne and pioneer of
experimental investigations of intelligence, subjected two calculating
prodigies to a long series of tests in his laboratory in the 1890s and
concluded on the basis of his results and a review of the historical litera-
ture on such virtuosi of mental arithmetic that despite much individual
diversity they constituted a “natural family”: they were sports of nature,
born into families with no previous history of such prodigies; grew up
in impoverished circumstances; exhibited their talents at an early age
but were otherwise unremarkable, even backward in their intellectual
development; and even as adults resembled “children who did not
age.” In contrast, mathematicians like Gauss, who had dazzled parents
and teachers with feats of mental arithmetic at a young age, allegedly
lost these abilities as their mathematical genius matured. Binet went
so far as to query whether the accomplishments of the calculating
prodigies were so remarkable even as mere “number specialists.” In

36 Edward Wheeler Scrip-
ture, “Arithmetical Prodi-
gies,” American Journal of
Psychology 4 (1891): 1-59,
ofers a historical overview
of the phenomenon.
a competition with four cashiers from the department store Bon Marché, who were used to toting up prices in their heads, one of Binet’s calculating prodigies lost to the best of the Bon Marché clerks when it came to multiplication by small numbers, although he surpassed them all in solving problems involving more digits. Binet concluded that what was truly prodigious about calculating prodigies were their powers of memory and “force of attention,” at least as applied to numbers.37

It was exactly this focused attention, at once monotonous and monothematic, that the operators of calculating machines were expected to sustain for hours on end. The unbearable strain of attention required of human calculators had long been a bone of contention between them and their employers. Despite his zeal to increase calculating productivity, Airy had in 1838 reduced the working day of the computers from eleven hours to eight. Attempts to add an hour of overtime in 1837 in order to complete calculations for Halley’s Comet provoked a rebellion on the part of the computers, who protested that even the regular nine-to-five hours were “more than sufficient for the oppressive and tedious application of the mind to continued calculation.”38

In 1930, outgoing Nautical Almanac superintendent Philip Cowell wrote his successor Leslie Comrie that “anyone who worked really hard for five hours could not possibly do more,” adding parenthetically: “it may be different with your machines.”39

It was indeed different with machines, but even the efficiency-obsessed Bolle at the French railways thought that a working day of six-and-a-half hours of punching 300 cards, each with forty-five columns, was the maximum that could be expected from Hollerith machine operators, and then for only fourteen consecutive days per month (see Figure 7).40 As a 1931 psychological study devoted to the performance of French railway operators on Elliot-Fischer calculating machines observed, bodily gestures could become automatic with

Figure 7. Synchronized machines. From: Louis Couffignal, Les Machines à calculer (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1933), 63.

37 Alfred Binet, Psychologie des grands calculateurs et joueurs d’échecs (Paris, 1894), 91–109. The two calculating prodigies studied by Binet, Jacques Inaudi and Pericles Diamandi, were both the subjects of a commission of the Académie des Sciences that included Gaston Darboux, Henri Poincaré, and François-Félix Tisserand, who recruited the help of Binet’s teacher Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salpêtrière, who in turn recruited Binet.

38 Wesley Woodhouse to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 10 April 1837. RGO 16/ Box 1, Manuscript Room, Cambridge University Library.

39 P.H. Cowell to L. Comrie, 13 September 1930. RGO 16/ Box 1, Manuscript Room, Cambridge University Library.

practice, but “attention to the work must be continuous and concentrated. The operator is obliged to check her machine incessantly, to verify the names on the pieces of paper, to make sure that the elements of the calculation are correct.” Each calculation involved sixteen separate steps, from inserting the paper into the machine to clearing all the numbers before the next calculation. In the view of the psychologists who tested the operators, it was impossible to sustain such intense levels of attention for a long period “without rest” (see Figure 8).  

Commenting in 1823 on the advantages of Babbage’s Difference Engine for computing mathematical and astronomical tables, English astronomer Francis Baily had envisioned how the “unvarying action of machinery” would solve the problem of “confining the attention of the computers to the dull and tedious repetition of many thousand consecutive additions and subtractions,” and over a century later, calculating machines were still being defined in terms of the suppression of mental effort. Yet the calculating machines that had held out the promise of relieving the mental effort of attention had in the end exacerbated it.

Paradoxically, mechanical calculation had become intensely mindful, at least by the standards of the day. Turn-of-the-twentieth-century psychologists were unanimous that the ability to muster voluntary attention for tedious but necessary tasks was the essence of the conscious act of will — and the highest expression of consciousness. Théodule Ribot, professor at the Collège de France, speculated that it was the ability to sustain attention for boring work that distinguished civilized from savage peoples and “vagabonds, professional thieves, prostitutes.” Like the psychologists who had tested the calculating machine operators, Ribot emphasized that the exercise of voluntary attention was always accompanied by a sense of effort, an abnormal state that “produced rapid exhaustion of the mental effort.”

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44 William James, Principles of Psychology (1890) (New York, 1950), 2 vols., vol. 1, Ch. 11; Wilhelm Wundt, Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie (Leipzig, 1874), ch. 18. For an overview of early twentieth-century psychological research on attention, see Hans Hennig, Die Aufmerksamkeit (Berlin, 1925), especially 190-201.
organism.” Calculation was a routine task given to experimental subjects by psychologists in order to test the strength of voluntary attention and resistance to mental fatigue. Results suggested wild fluctuations in attention as subjects became fatigued, their minds wandered, and errors literally added up. In the context of the classroom or the laboratory, the dread of the tedious task was observed to grow with fatigue, allegedly sometimes to the point of “milder forms of insanity.” In the context of mechanical calculation, the operators’ fatigue also caused fluctuations in attention and an alarming propensity to error. But there was no getting rid of the operator, as a 1933 treatise on the latest calculating machines emphasized: “In the comparative study of modern machines, it is impossible not to take into account the manner in which the operator intervenes [in the calculation].” All that could be done was to organize the work of calculation so as to minimize the discretion of the operator — but at the same time to maximize her unflagging attention to her monotonous task: mechanical calculation made mindful.

VI. Conclusion: Algorithms and Intelligence

I began with a simple question: why don’t we have a full-dress history of calculation, the oldest of all cultural techniques in literate societies? We now have at least the beginnings of an answer: over a period of about 170 years, roughly from 1800-1970, calculation was demoted from intellectual to mechanical activity — even if people were still crucially involved in its execution. The well-known story with which I began traced an arc from Adam Smith’s pin factory to Babbage’s Difference Engine via Prony’s logarithm tables: from the division of labor to Artificial Intelligence. Much of the credibility of this story depends on the connection Babbage himself drew between the mechanical labor of Prony’s bottom tier of calculators and a machine — one that remained largely imaginary for over a century after Babbage conceived it. For reasons at once material, conceptual, and commercial, the first era of widespread mechanical calculation,

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roughly from 1870 to at least the early 1960s, was one that meshed the intelligence of humans and machines. Increasingly, the human computers who operated the machines were women, actively recruited by observatories in Greenwich, Paris, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, already in the 1890s, and ubiquitous for decades thereafter wherever Big Calculation took place, from insurance offices to government censuses to weapons projects (see figure 9). Although some of these institutions, such as the Harvard College Observatory, took advantage of the women’s advanced training in astronomy and mathematics, the chief attraction of female labor was that it was cheap: even women with college degrees were paid significantly less than their male counterparts. Indeed, the principal motivation for introducing calculating machines in the first place was usually to cut costs for Big Calculation, as we have seen in the scientific context of the British Nautical Almanac office and the industrial context of the French railway. Babbage the political economist would surely have approved.

But would Babbage the prophet of automated intelligence have been equally impressed? Certainly, the boundary between “mechanical” and “mental” work had been blurred, but this had already occurred in Prony’s logarithm project, before any actual machines had been used


52 “[W]e avoid employing any part of the time of a man who can get eight or ten shillings a day by his skill in tempering needles, in turning a wheel, which can be done for sixpence a day; and we equally avoid the loss arising from the employment of an accomplished mathematician in performing the lowest processes of arithmetic.” Charles Babbage, *On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures* (1832), 4th ed. (London, 1835), 201.

Figure 9. Women computers of NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Photograph by NASA, JPL-Caltech. Used by permission.
in massive calculation projects. The impact of calculating machines into the daily work of observatories and insurance offices seems not to have made the machines seem more intelligent — Artificial Intelligence in our sense — but rather to make the human calculators appear more mechanical. Emblematic of this shift was the plunging prestige of calculating prodigies: by the late nineteenth century, such talents were no longer early signs of mathematical genius but the stuff of vaudeville acts. Calculating prowess was no longer correlated with human intelligence nor did it endow calculating machines with anything like Artificial Intelligence.

Calculating machines did not eliminate human intelligence in Big Calculation, but they did shape it in new ways. First, at the level of the calculating algorithms built into the gears and levers of the machines, the operations of arithmetic had to be reconceived in ways that corresponded neither to mental arithmetic nor mathematical theory. What was optimal for human minds was not optimal for machines, and as the machines became more complex in terms of moving parts, the divergences became more pronounced. Second, at the level of the procedures required to mesh human and machines in long sequences of calculation, whether in the offices of the Nautical Almanac or the French Railways, tasks previously conceived holistically and executed by one calculator had to be analyzed into their smallest component parts, rigidly sequenced, and apportioned to the human or mechanical calculator able to execute that step most efficiently — where efficiently meant not better or even faster but cheaper.

In a sense, the analytical intelligence demanded by human-machine production lines for calculations was no different than the adaptations required by any mechanized manufacture: mechanical weaving looms did not operate the way human weavers did; the sequencing of human and mechanical labor in a textile factory also required breaking down tasks in new and counter-intuitive ways. In another sense, however, the analytical intelligence applied to making human-machine cooperation in calculation work was a rehearsal for an activity that would become known first as Operations Research and later computer programming.53

The interaction of human and mechanical calculators also modified intelligence, both the concept and the thing, in more subtle ways. In whichever way calculation had been understood, as intellectual accomplishment or drudgework, and by whoever performed, whether Astronomer Royal or schoolboy computer, it had been intensely, even

tediously mindful. Calculators from Kepler to Babbage complained of the mental strain imposed by the calculation of astronomical tables; inventors of calculating devices and machines since Napier and Pascal had promised a respite from labor that was at once monotonous but unremittingly attentive. Practice speeded up the rate of calculation, but it could not be allowed to become automatic and almost unconscious (as repetitive bodily gestures on the factory assembly line could) without increasing the risk of error. However, the spread of more reliable calculating machines not only downgraded the intellectual status of calculation; it also severed the connection between mindfulness and accuracy: by the early twentieth century, automation had become the guarantee of, no longer the obstacle to error-free calculation. Reversing a centuries-long history of erratic calculating machines, the results of which often had to be checked by hand, improvements in design and precision machining had by the 1920s made automatic calculation and accurate calculation synonymous.54

Yet a ghost lingered in the machine: the human operator. As even enthusiasts for the new generation of calculating machines admitted, the efficiency and accuracy of the results depended crucially on the dexterity and attentiveness of the humans who entered the numbers, pulled the levers, punched the cards, and cleared the tally, all in precisely the correct, rhythmic order. The operators may no longer have performed the actual calculations, but the vigilant attention demanded by their task was every bit as wearisome as the mental labor that had motivated the invention of calculating machines in the first place. Mental fatigue among operators was evidently so great that their working hours were shortened, in defiance of the iron rule of economy that had justified the introduction of calculating machines in the first place. In contrast to other forms of repetitive factory or clerical work that subjected human operators to the tempo of machines, the gestures involved in the use of calculating machines could not be mastered to the point of becoming unconscious, fingers playing automatically over the typewriter keyboard as the mind wandered. It was just this anomalous combination of routine and unwavering concentration that made calculation, with or without machines, so exhausting. Calculating machines, even reliable ones, did not banish mindfulness and monotonous attention from Big Calculation; they simply displaced these mental exertions to other tasks and people.

Calculating machines placed new demands on human intelligence, but did they pave the way for Artificial Intelligence? They did arguably

54 Matthew L. Jones, Reckoning with Matter: Calculating Machines, Innovation, and Thinking about Thinking from Pascal to Babbage (Chicago, 2016), 244-245; Louis Couffignal, Les Machines à calculer (Paris, 1933), 47.
expand the domain of algorithms, by forcing a rethinking of how to optimize Big Calculation at every level, from the innards of the machines to the organization of workflow to the attentive interaction with the machines. But making calculation even more algorithmic, in the sense of following standardized, step-by-step procedures, is a long way from making intelligence algorithmic. For that to happen, the reduction of intelligence to a form of calculation had to seem both possible and desirable. Although there are historical precedents for such visions, which made calculation and combinatorics the template for all intellectual activity, calculating machines did not advance their cause. On the contrary, the effect of making calculation mechanical was to disqualify it as an intelligent activity. It would require a complete reconceptualization of both calculation and intelligence in order to make Artificial or Machine Intelligence something other than an oxymoron. It is only with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight that calculating machines and Artificial Intelligence belong to the same story. If sometime in the first half of the twentieth century calculation ceased to be a form of intelligence, sometime in the latter half of the twentieth century intelligence ceased to be intellectual, no longer a matter of mental processes accessible to the thinking subject — the twinned birth of the cognitive sciences and Machine Intelligence.

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THE OVERBURDENED PEACE:
COMPETING VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER IN 1918/19

KEYNOTE LECTURE AT THE 2018 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE MAX WEBER FOUNDATION,
“SETTLEMENT AND UNSETTLEMENT: THE ENDS OF WORLD WAR I AND THEIR LEGACIES,”
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I. Introduction: Two Impressions from the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles

The painter William Orpen was Great Britain’s “official artist,” commissioned by Prime Minister David Lloyd George to record the Paris Peace Conference. Orpen had access to all conference rooms, produced portraits of all the major politicians, and above all put the signing of the treaty on canvas (Figure 1). Orpen presented the signing of the Versailles peace treaty in the Hall of Mirrors on June 28, 1919, as a historical moment dominated mostly by white men, suggesting the sovereignty of peace makers who represented the architecture of a new global order of peace that would prevent a repetition of the inferno that had started in August 1914. But quite in contrast to the official painting of solemn diplomacy and secured stability Orpen remarked of that scene in the Hall of Mirrors that it “had not as much dignity as a sale at Christie’s.”

Another impression of that same day highlighted a very different dimension of the peace. Another scene that took place in the same Hall of Mirrors illustrated the emotional charge of the treaty proceedings and the burdening of the postwar order with moral implications of guilt, crime and punishment. Before the German delegation was led into the hall, five severely wounded French soldiers were placed near the table where the German politicians would be required to sign the documents without any discussion. The French Prime Minister Clemenceau added to the drama by silently shaking the hands of the cinq gueules cassées before the act of signature. Afterwards, thousands of picture postcards (Figure 2) would raise the five soldiers to a symbol of the French war casualties — indeed, their disfigured features gave a face to the war itself, underlining the perception of German war guilt.

In general, the symbolic overloading of the peace talks and the Versailles treaty with allusions to the German Empire was impossible to


overlook. Thomas Mann, for example, noted the rumor that Clemenceau planned to erect a statue of the Greek goddess Pallas Athena, the personification of wisdom, art, and science, in the hotel lobby where the German delegation would be handed the document. He saw this as a provocative attempt to exclude Germany from the community of Western civilization after the experience of the war. Yet to him it was the German people who were “opposing Bolshevism with the last of its strength and a Landsknecht’s rectitude.” “It is remarkable,” he went on, “that the aged Frenchman whose twilight years are brightened by this peace has slit eyes. Perhaps he has some right of blood to kill off Western civilization and to bring in Asia and its chaos.”

The aim of my lecture is to contribute to an understanding of war and peace in 1918/19 by identifying the factors that help us better understand the ambivalence of the postwar situation, in which settlement and unsettlement, reconstructions and constructions, continuities and discontinuities often overlapped. I will not provide a detailed analysis of the many competing visions of world order but rather try to identify the frameworks for these visions.

I will advance in two steps, first by looking at the contradictions of the postwar order in more concrete and focused terms, and second by concentrating on the particular legacies of the war from a bird’s eye perspective. Both analytical operations may help us better understand the threshold of 1918/19. The mode of my analysis is more symptomatic than systematic. If I occasionally use numbers for my arguments, consider it typical of the way German academics try to hide the fact that they are close to surrendering to the complexity of a historical situation. But my surrender is not unconditional, I promise.

II. The Contradictions of the Postwar Order: Settlement and Unsettlement, Continuity and Discontinuity

The experience of totalized warfare and the enormous number of victims after 1914 made any peace settlement based on compromise almost impossible. If the sacrifices made during the war were not
to have been in vain, only a peace based on a maximum of political and territorial gains seemed acceptable — this logic fueled and radicalized the discussion on war aims during the war and explains why the war could only end once one side was simply too exhausted in its military, economic and social resources to continue fighting. Rising expectations thus characterized all states and societies in 1918 combining the internal and external dimensions of politics. Furthermore, and in contrast to earlier end-of-war-constellations, politicians found themselves not only under enormous pressure from the prospect of democratic elections on the basis of reformed franchises, but also from a public remembering the manifold expectations which the war had brought about.

The period from 1919 to 1923 differed quite fundamentally from that of the Vienna Congress of 1814/15 in that there could not be a re-definition of the international order with regard to previous premises such as the balance of power. The expectations provoked and fueled by the war prevented a return to another confirmation of the pentarchy of five European powers under different circumstances. What contemporaries expected was no less than a new order transcending the earlier practices of territorial reshuffling designed to guarantee state sovereignty and internal stability and to keep the international system free from ideological polarizations. Both the Bolshevik’s and Wilson’s promises to combine a new world order with, respectively, the idea of world revolution or democratic values and national self-determination reflected Europe’s exhaustion by 1917 as well as the global longing for a model of politics that would combine external security and internal stability in the name of a progressive ideal that would prevent any future war. From this perspective, the postwar era was less one of reconstruction, or restauration, or a return to the pre-1914 ancien régime of politics, but a complex and contradictory combination of construction and reconstruction that led to new
entanglements between the spheres of society and public on the one hand and the international system on the other.\(^4\)

The American president, Woodrow Wilson, based his vision on a very suggestive analysis of the factors that in his view had caused the world war: 1914 could not have been an accident. Instead, Wilson interpreted it as the consequence of a misguided European system of militarization, the uncontrolled development of state power, of secret diplomacy and autocratic empires, which had suppressed the rights and interests of national minorities. The counter model that he proposed seemed all the more promising since it stood in contrast to the exhausted models of European liberalism and offered an alternative not just in terms of content but of political style. The traditional focus on the balance of power and the sovereignty of states was shifted to international law, the idea of collective security, the League of Nations as an international forum, and the premise of national self-determination as the basis for redrawing borders. Wilson called for a quasi-universal democratization of both national societies and the international order, thereby bridging the gap between domestic politics and the international system. In this way Wilson’s and Lenin’s ideas were not just to be applied to national minorities within continental European empires, but from 1917 onwards also took on a global meaning in China and Korea as well as in India or in South America. Yet the result was not a simplistic “Wilsonian Moment,” as if one could translate Wilson and American war propaganda into liberation movements seeking emancipation from colonial or quasi-colonial oppression. Instead, the war produced its own version of the tension between universalism and particularism, between universalistic concepts and a rhetoric that allowed particular constellations, conflicts, and interests to be integrated into global entanglements.

At least eight factors seem to characterize the situation after 1918:

1. The implementation of the new postwar order depended on a complicated cooperation between Wilson, European politicians, and diplomatic elites, all of whom came to Paris with their own views on key concepts such as security, sovereignty, or national interest and with their own particular experience of the war as well as the lessons they derived from it. As a result many visions of world order became compromised and often overshadowed by premises such as the French obsession with security against possible attack by Germany, or the strong anti-Bolshevist position held by Wilson himself and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George.\(^5\) Therefore

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the five treaties — Versailles with Germany, in June 1919; Saint-Germain with Austria, in September 1919; Neuilly with Bulgaria, in November 1919; Trianon with Hungary, in June 1920; and Sèvres with the Ottoman Empire, in August 1920 — never fully represented the complexity of a new reality.

The postwar settlement was based on competing ideas of a new order and a new narrative of international stability being decided upon in Paris. In fact, fundamental developments during and immediately after the war had already generated their own new realities in a number of conflict zones. Thus the tri-national Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was already in existence and only sought international recognition at the Paris Peace Conference while in the Near East effective boundaries between zones of interest had already been defined by Britain and France during the war on the basis of the 1916 Sykes-Picot-Agreement — and were contradicted by other promises such as that of an Arab state in return for an Arab uprising against Ottoman rule or, according to the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, a homeland for Jews in Palestine.

Contrary to the idea of a break from the past and the promise of national self-determination, the colonial empires of France and Britain were not reduced but actually expanded when former German colonies and mandate zones in the former Ottoman Empire became integrated into the existing colonial empires. The end of the war marked a peak moment in the history of European imperialism and a new relation between apparent centers and peripheries. However, as responses from colonial societies in Asia and Africa proved and as William DuBois would realize at the Pan-African Congress, which started in Paris in February 1919, the response to 1918 was not simply a move toward liberation and decolonization, but rather a broad spectrum: hope for colonial reform, a renewed focus on assimilation, or the fight for a better status within colonial hierarchies — the alternatives were not limited to colonial regime or independence. Very often, as the events in Amritsar in April 1919 as well as conflicts in Egypt proved, local factors played a decisive role in escalating conflicts.

(2) If there was a break with the past after 1918, it was the end of monarchical empires on the European continent, but not the end of imperialism or the concept of empire as such — these continued in new forms even after the end of formal empires. In sharp contrast to the settlement of 1814/15, which brought about a reconfiguration and reformulation of the monarchical principle — ranging

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from parliamentary to constitutional to autocratic variations of monarchy — the watershed of 1919/23 separated the idea of empire from that of monarchy. After 1923 there was no major monarchy left on the European continent east of the Rhine and in the whole Eurasian sphere, since monarchy had already been abolished in China in 1911, and in Turkey the sultanate was no more than a symbolic bridge between the imperial past and the Turkish Republic founded in 1923 following the successful revision of the treaty of Sèvres.7

If in 1814/15 monarchy had been regarded as a prime instrument to achieve and guarantee internal stability and external security, this belief was delegitimized and destroyed during and by the First World War.

(3) The creation of new states with particular historical legitimacies could take the form of an apparent reconstruction as in the case of Poland. But in fact this had less to do with the peace settlement in Paris than with the 1920 war of liberation started by the Poles under Pilsudski in the shadow of the Great War. This war corresponded to earlier models of nation-building through wars of liberation, amalgamating elements of civil war and inter-state war against a foreign power that was perceived as an imperial oppressor. Here, as in the case of Ireland in 1916, the legacy of nineteenth-century premises of nation-building through war was decisive.

What the Paris settlement established was a new mixture and fragile balance between rump states formed by the former centers of empires — Austria and Hungary as well as the Turkish Republic after the successful revision of the treaty of Sèvres by the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 — and new states in the former peripheries of empires, be it nation states, as in the case of Finland or the Baltic states, or the new creations of bi- and tri-national states as in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. For many of these new states and their societies, “Paris” did not necessarily serve as a positive national narrative: neither Polish nor Irish narratives of their respective nation-state building referred to the Paris treaties in order to gain legitimacy. Many politicians from new states in Eastern Europe felt betrayed by the Little Versailles Treaty they had to sign on June 28, 1919, thereby accepting rules for protecting ethnic minorities in their countries. In their eyes this treaty damaged their newly acquired sovereignty.

In contrast, “Paris” generated suggestive narratives in a negative sense, for Germans, Austrians and Hungarians in particular; for these actors the negative reference fueled aggressive revisionisms

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or led, as in the case of China and India, to a complicated search for alternative ideologies.

(4) The postwar reconstruction included a number of contradictions that weakened the peacemakers’ credibility. Defining and applying the concept of national self-determination depended on political and ideological premises — from the French obsession with national security to the anti-Bolshevik reflex of many European politicians. National self-determination was accepted and welcomed in order to confirm secessionist nation-building in the periphery of former continental empires. But the German Austrians were prevented from joining the German nation state despite their obvious determination.8

A number of contradictions emerged when universalistic concepts were discussed with a view to practical politics: traditional connotations of state sovereignty and national interest stood in contrast with the new idea of collective security; bilateralism continued despite the ideal of multilateralism.

The most fundamental contradiction developed around the concept of national self-determination, because it was coupled with the historically or racially defined “maturity” of peoples — and was not applied to colonial contexts. When introduced by Lenin and Wilson, the principle of national self-determination seemed to denote an ideal of simple and clear solutions, following J. S. Mill’s premise that free institutions were impossible to imagine in a state with multiple nationalities.9 But efforts to apply the principle in practice revealed the complex realities of often overlapping or competing identities, especially in borderlands — and large parts of Eastern and Southeastern Europe after 1919 became characterized by features of borderlands. Hence a few plebiscites were held in Upper Silesia and Schleswig, but not, for instance, in Teschen where the situation was so complicated that even experts did not know how to realize a plebiscite. Often the plebiscite presupposed a particular knowledge of national belonging that did not exist in practice. As a result, final decisions were in most cases made by commissions and in consultation with representatives who often had no democratic legitimacy at all. This further weakened the postwar settlement’s reputation.10

(5) The triumphant ideal of the nation state, which corresponded to the negative narrative of autocratic empires doomed to failure, generated its own problems and cost. Adhering to the model of ethnically homogeneous nation states led to the practice of segregating

8 Jörn Leonhard, Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs (Munich, 2014), 953.
multi-ethnic territories. The dimensions of ethnic violence in the name of this principle had become obvious already well before 1914, in particular during the Balkan Wars. But the experience of the world war added to this the dimension of the war state, its infrastructures and its means of violence, the vocabulary of “necessity,” “mobilization,” and “loyalty.” The consequences became clear in the Armenian genocide, which continued well after 1918/19, but also in the mass expulsions and ethnic violence between Greeks and Turks after 1919. Regarding the space for violent social and demographic engineering in the name of the ethnically homogeneous nation state, there was a clear continuity from the prewar period to wartime and into the postwar period. In fact, one could argue that from this perspective the war lasted from 1908 to 1923, at least in the southeastern part of Europe. Here the dividing lines between inter-state war, civil war, and ethnic warfare became blurred.

(6) The postwar settlement’s legitimacy was further weakened by the fact that various actors either withdrew from the political forum of the international system, as in the case of the United States despite their economic and monetary presence in Europe, or were excluded from the new system already in 1919, as in the case of Germany and the Soviet Union. Both were forced to find other means of overcoming their international isolation; in that respect the treaty of Rapallo illustrated the continuity of bilateral diplomacy and its importance over collective security, as did the treaty of Locarno. The case of the Soviet Union was particular from another perspective as well: Despite Lenin’s rhetoric of national self-determination, the political practice of the interwar period revealed a very imperial practice of a multi-ethnic state in which autonomy was the exception, not the rule.

(7) The hitherto unknown number of war victims that had to be legitimized through the results of the peace, thus radicalizing war aims, the ideal of a new international order that would make future wars impossible, as well as the new mass markets of public deliberation and the new relation between “international” and “domestic” politics in an age of mass media and democratic franchise: all these factors contributed to massive disillusion and disappointment when the results of the peace settlement became apparent. Turning away from the new international order, which seemed to have lost its legitimacy very quickly, paved the way for multiple revisionisms. These, in turn, could be easily used in domestic conflicts. Foreign

political revisionism provided the ammunition for political conflicts and ideological polarization within postwar societies. That was the case not only in Germany or Hungary, but also in Italy. Hence the “vittoria mutilata” corresponded well to the various stab-in-the-back-myths and narratives of conspiracy or treason which would further weaken the reputation of postwar liberal political regimes. For the defeated Germans, the economic and monetary legacy of the peace settlement — the reparations — linked any domestic political conflict easily to the trauma of Versailles. This development poisoned German political culture and prevented the evolution of a positive republican narrative after 1918.

In a global perspective a similar disappointment was obvious in China, where protests against Western and Japanese imperialism led to the Fourth-of-May Movement and to a national revolution, as well as in India or the Arab world, where promised independence turned into the reality of mandates in which French and British colonial rule continued. Only Turkey succeeded in overcoming the constraints imposed by the treaty of Sévres by violence. After 1923 and the establishment of the Turkish Republic it was the only example of a “saturated” power that did not pursue any further revisionist aims.

(8) A last contradiction contained in the settlement can be seen in the tension between the politics and the economics of the treaty system. This was clear to many critical observers of the Paris Peace Conference, as John Maynard Keynes’ contemporary interpretation indicated. In his book on “The Economic Consequences of the Peace,” Keynes argued that the reparations would not only burden the international economic recovery but also contribute to the social instability of Germany.

In sum, 1918/19 witnessed an amalgam of constructions and deconstructions after the First World War in which the spheres of domestic and international politics became ever more entangled.

The idea of an internationalization of political deliberation in the League of Nations proved to be partially successful: now there was a public forum, albeit without executive power to implement collective security, as Japan’s aggression against Manchuria was to demonstrate in 1931/32. But as the examples of the administration of the free city of Danzig, of the Saarland and of the League of Nations mandates proved, the role of the League could be constructive, and in contrast to the prewar period, there now existed a range of institutions


16 Leonhard, Die Büchse der Pandora, 963.

17 Sharp, The Versailles Settlement, 205-206.
(International Court of Justice in Den Haag, International Labor Office in Geneva) that allowed a public and international focus on minorities as well as on problems of labor and international law.

The postwar period was characterized by elements of continuity and discontinuity: There had been no simple antagonism between empires and nation states before 1914, but rather a complex combination between nationalizing empires and imperializing nation states, and after the formal end of the war there was no simple antagonism between the end of “bad” empires and the triumph of “good” nation states. The end of autocratic and monarchical systems and the breaking up of multi-ethnic continental empires were followed by the creation of new nation states, which were often neither democratic nor stable and which sought classic alliances instead of relying on promises of collective security in order to survive in a world of aggressive revisionisms.18

If there was a triumph of the homogeneous nation state model, it became more and more dissociated from the democratic principle in practice, and it came at the enormous cost of mass expulsions and ethnic violence, demonstrating the potential of destructive utopias. This triumph of the nation state did not replace the idea of empire; instead, it co-existed with continuities of old empires in new formats — as in the Soviet Union and, to a certain degree, in Turkey as well — with the maximum expansion of the colonial empires of France and Britain and with new imperial aspirations, as in the case of Japan and the United States. The tradition of imperializing nation states certainly resurfaced again during the interwar years, but now in a radicalized form, with revisionism turning into new and radical aspirations for empire — building in Germany and Italy.

III. Legacies of the War: 1918/19 and the Threshold of Experiences and Expectations

(1) The End of State War and the Continuity of Violence

At the time people were immediately aware that the result of the war was not just a question of the scale of its casualties; the upshot of it all could not be measured by the millions of dead soldiers and civilians. There was something more fundamentally new in the character of the violence. Unlike in the Second World War, the victims were still mostly soldiers, yet there was a new dimension of violence against the civilian population especially in Belgium and northern France,

18 Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora*, 967-970.
in Serbia, Armenia, and many parts of Eastern Europe. The bleeding of areas affected by the war, the ruined cities, factories, streets, and railroads, gave some idea of what future wars might hold in store. Many of the dead were from hitherto dependent peoples within empires in regions as different as Poland, India, Africa, and East Asia. The lingering effects of the war included the army of wounded and the need for long-term public provision for war invalids. It was they who gave a face to the war in peacetime.

The war had revealed what was possible in the name of the nation and nation state, and what was possible had become evident in the widespread breaking of taboos and loss of inhibitions. A specific kind of “European socialization,” which had developed since the late seventeenth century against a background of religious civil wars, was entering into crisis. That order had been based on the idea of a set of rules to regulate wars, to prevent conflicts between sovereign states from escalating, to channel violence and make it calculable. After the experiences of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, this order had again been successful in the period between 1815 and 1914 — and for a long time the international order had proved flexible in adjusting to new nation states and imperial expansion. But that epoch came to an end with the First World War. Between August 1914 and November 1918, European countries lost the ability to achieve external and internal peace on their own or to trust that it would continue in the long term. This marked a watershed in the global perception of Europe and the credibility of the international model represented by its states.

The victor of the world war was not a nation, a state, or an empire, and its outcome was not a world without war. The true victor was war itself — the principle of war and the possibility of total violence. In the long run, this weighed all the more heavily because it contradicted a leitmotif that had developed during the war and for many had been a decisive reason to continue it with all possible means. The belief that a last ferocious war had to be waged against the principle of war itself, the confidence that the world war was “the war that will end war,” would end in bitter disappointment. For as the world war came to an end, and despite all the rhetoric about a new international order, the principle of war — of violent change through the mobilization of all available resources — actually received a boost that would last long after 1918, not only in the areas of the collapsed Russian, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires, but also outside Europe.


The period immediately after November 11, 1918 already showed that military violence was still a method of choice: to establish or round off new nation states, as in Ireland and Poland; to help an ideology to victory in a bloody civil war, as in Russia; or to revise the terms of a peace treaty, as in Turkey. What had begun in the summer of 1914 as essentially an inter-state war branched out in 1917 into new forms of violence, often overlapping with one another, that lasted far beyond the formal end of the war in the West: wars of independence, nation-building wars, ethnic conflicts, and civil wars. These experiences challenge the rigid chronology of the 1914-1918 war. Instead, for Eastern and Southeastern Europe, it was the period stretching from the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908 through the Balkan wars of 1912/13 to the Peace of Lausanne in 1923 that constituted a relative unity.

Whether used against enemy troops or against civilians in occupied zones, the violence of the world war varied in time and space according to particular constellations. For all the planning euphoria and technological or infrastructural developments, it remained an instrument of domination whose logic and dynamic repeatedly took it beyond the original political or strategic intentions.

It was not the instruments of violence as such but their ideologization that contained elements of total war. After the excesses of the wars of religion, the early modern age had witnessed attempts to decriminalize the enemy, to recognize him as a iustus hostis, but now these were giving way to a moralization of politics and a focus on war guilt. As the war went on, the tendency to absolutize and instrumentalize the antagonism between friend and enemy, loyalty and betrayal, gave rise to more radical expectations and utopian visions of victorious peace and territorial control. Attempts were often made to legitimate ethnic violence — the Armenian genocide, for example, or the mass expulsions of Greeks and Turks — by reference to the right to self-defense. Since the distinction between external and internal foes was less and less clear and anyone could suddenly see themselves surrounded by enemies, violence appeared to be an indispensable last resort to ensure survival in hostile surroundings. And the theme of self-defense lived on: in the defeated societies, for example, reference to the continuation of the war in the guise of the peace treaties was often used to justify defensive action even against the state itself on account of its acceptance of the treaty terms. This was a decisive argument for both the radical right and the radical left, for Freikorps, vigilante groups, and other paramilitary organizations.


(2) From Languages of Loyalty to the Ethnicization of Politics

In all wartime societies, the criteria of national affiliation and political loyalty became more exacting. Struggle against the external enemy was compounded by widespread suspicion of supposedly hostile aliens — businessmen in Moscow, for example, or artisans in London or Boston whose ancestors came from Germany or Austria-Hungary. The Irish in Britain, Jews in Germany, or left-wingers in a number of countries were also looked upon as disloyal elements who tended to weaken or sabotage the national war effort. The result was a practice of inclusion and exclusion, and a sharpening of external and internal enemy images. Putative threats provoked overreactions, nowhere more so than in Anglo-Saxon countries that had previously been spared the direct effects of war. Social conflicts and economic problems, including the demand for fair burden-sharing, showed a striking tendency to become ethnicized: that is, to be viewed in terms of ethnic or racial lines of divide. The war brought a new intensity to social communication, spawning special slangs and vocabularies related to service, duty, and sacrifice, or centered on the exigencies of endurance and perseverance. But many of these linguistic expressions of loyalty fell apart as the gap between expectations and experiences widened. For many people, the ever tighter criteria for national affiliation eventually meant a basic uprooting, a sense of no longer being at home. In this sense, the war may be said to have produced a “utopia,” a no-place.

(3) Close Victories and Myths of Betrayal

Why did the war not end earlier, despite the evident cost-benefit discrepancy and the many peace feelers put out in and after 1916? It ended only when the exhaustion on one side deactivated the mechanism that had ensured its continuation until then. Part of this mechanism was the openness of the military situation right until the final weeks, which made victory appear possible for either side and therefore made any concession seem a potentially serious weakening of one’s own position. Furthermore, the colossal death toll, the army of invalids, and the host of impious widows and orphans made peace without victory seem a bleak and compromising prospect, which would devalue the sacrifices and rob any postwar social-political order of legitimacy. Paradoxical though it may sound, the growing number of casualties barred any way back on all sides. But since the outcome was so unpredictable until late in 1918, the eventual defeat of Germany and its allies came as such a surprise,
such an inexplicable turnaround, that many attributed it to treachery behind the lines. This was a critical difference between 1918 and 1945. In May 1945, the unconditional surrender left no room for such constructs; the very principle of the German nation state was set aside. In 1918, there was a lingering sense of an unexplained defeat, or even a victory that Germany had been cheated out of at the last minute. This poisoned the postwar political climate. References to a barely missed victory and guilty parties meant withholding acceptance of the defeat, and obligating the nation state to seek a revision of the treaty because only that could give it legitimacy after November 1918 and June 1919. But this prolonged the war in peacetime — internally within German society and externally in the context of the international order.

(4) Reversing Spaces of Experience and Horizons of Expectation

The rupture that became so obvious since 1917, and not only in the competing visions of a future order formulated in Washington and Petrograd, points to the particular relation between expectations and experiences that changed radically in the course of the war. Walter Benjamin wrote in 1933:

No, this much is clear: experience has fallen in value, amid a generation which from 1914 to 1918 had to experience some of the most monstrous events in the history of the world. ... For never has experience been contradicted so thoroughly: strategic experience has been contravened by positional warfare; economic experience, by the inflation; physical experience, by hunger; moral experiences by the ruling powers. A generation that had gone to school in horse-drawn streetcars now stood in the open air, amid a landscape in which nothing was the same except the clouds and, at its center, in a force field of destructive torrents and explosions, the tiny, fragile human body.

What was the consequence of this dynamic devaluation of expectations by an explosion of new war experiences since the summer of 1917? German historian Reinhart Koselleck has argued that in the early modern period horizons of expectation (Erwartungshorizonte) and spaces of experience (Erfahrungsräume) were connected to each other by a cyclical regime of temporality. According to Koselleck’s premise of a particular Sattelzeit (transition period) of modern ideological vocabularies, this relation changed between 1770 and 1850,
because expectations went far beyond experiences and thus became the motor for modern ideological “isms,” from liberalism and socialism to nationalism. The global war that had started in the summer of 1914 resulted in a process that reversed this basic relation between experiences and expectations. From strategic scenarios to political plans and national anticipations: they were all consumed, devaluated, and questioned by the war in ever shorter time cycles. By 1917 the result was both a vacuum and a growing demand for new visions of world order against a backdrop of increasing numbers of war victims and war burdens all around the world. This explains the rise of new, often much more radical expectations, the almost messianic perception of both Lenin and Wilson, and the highly problematic management of rising expectations on all levels once the war was over. It explains, in other words, the overburdening of peace, which at the same time marked the possible disappointment, the disillusionment, and its translation into revolutionary energies, and into new regimes of violence that transcended 1917, 1918, and 1919.

(5) Competing Visions and a Revolution of Rising Expectations
The war unleashed a succession of ever rising expectations. This was apparent in the aggressive early debates on war aims and in self-images and enemy-images that became ever more radical as the casualties mounted. Actors on all sides promised to mobilize new forces and to win new allies, whether among national movements in the multinational empires or among relatively new nation states, which in the case of Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, or Romania sought to expand their territory and thereby complete the process of nation-building. Hopes that participation in the war might change their place in the imperial configuration were part of this same context — which in the Habsburg monarchy came down to federalization with a greater degree of autonomy and in the British Empire to Home Rule, dominion status, or outright independence. In the end, the appearance of President Wilson on the scene decisively boosted and globalized this dynamic of diverse and often contradictory expectations — among Poles and Italians, Arabs and Indians, as well as in many Asian societies. The war again seemed an opportunity for worldwide restructuring in the name of universal principles, a chance to overcome imperial domination. The concept of national self-determination fueled manifold expectations of a comprehensive recasting of the European and global order. At a point when the military, social, economic, and monetary exhaustion of the European
belligerents had become all too obvious, the entry of the United States into the war decisively contributed to the elevation of Wilson to a kind of messianic savior figure. Clearly, though, his policies led to a final surge of contradictory and ultimately incompatible expectations.

This was the basic problem of the Paris peace treaties and the related attempts to create a new international order. The hopes pinned on the new universalistic promises since 1917 in South America, Asia, Egypt, India, and elsewhere ended in bitter disappointment. The war constantly gave rise to excessive expectations, but since the postwar order blocked them (in China, Egypt, or India) or only partially fulfilled them (in Italy, for example), an unpredictable chain of disenchantment stretched far beyond the immediate victors and losers. This, too, sharpened debate after 1918 over the future viability of political and social models — liberalism and parliamentarism as much as capitalism and colonialism.

(6) From the *Translatio imperii* to the New Tension between Nationalisms and Internationalism

The war marked the end of the classical European pentarchy as new global players appeared on the scene in the shape of the United States and Japan. This occurred not as a simple dissolution, a kind of *translatio imperii* in the shadow of war, but as a complex and contradictory overlapping process. The end of the continental European empires and the maximization of the British and French colonial empires, the transition from zones of imperial rule to “imperial overstretching” was part of the legacy of the world war. Above all, the war left behind long-term zones of violence in East, East Central, and Southeast Europe, where the accelerated collapse of state structures resulted in cycles of violence, expulsion, and civil war. Here, mistrust of the staying power of political systems and the stability of personal life worlds, together with fears that violence might break out at any time became the signature mark of the twentieth century. Long-term zones of conflict arose out of the collapsing land empires: they still exist today in Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and Kurdish areas. The rise of political Islam after the end of the Ottoman Empire and the demise of the caliphate is another legacy of the war.

Part of the legacy of the war was a new tension between nationalism and internationalism. All European protagonists in the conflict embraced the principle of the nation and the nation state to win new allies, and in each case territorial ambitions drove the decision to join
the war. It also gave rise to contradictory expectations that people could not shake off after the end of the war. Thus not only hopes of political participation but also fully fledged nationalist horizons took shape, especially in the societies of the multinational empires. This explains Tomáš Masaryk’s work in exile in London and the United States, the German support for Ukrainian and Finnish nationalists, the competition between Germans and Russians for Polish support in return for a promise of extensive national autonomy, the support of London and Paris for Palestinian and Arab independence movements against the Ottoman Empire, but also the British fears of Ottoman plans to stir Indians into revolt against British rule.

After the war an ethnic-national model caught on in the new states, even though in most of the affected territories it was not possible to draw clear ethnic boundaries. The consequences were complex minority problems. From the 1920s, German-speaking minorities in East Central Europe became a key factor in Germany’s foreign policy and its efforts to revise the Versailles treaty. The new states in the region appealed to Wilson’s principle of national self-determination, but they also contained large ethnic groups that did not see themselves as part of the nation in question, or were not seen as part of it by the state. This ethnicization of the idea of statehood entailed inadequate safeguards for minorities, since the new nation states regarded the guarantees in the Paris treaties as unacceptable interference in their newly won sovereignty.

Wilson’s hoped-for peace settlement under the aegis of democracy and national self-determination proved to be fragile: the nation state did not become the active core of collective security; the “International of Peace” remained a chimera. The League of Nations failed as the forum of a new security culture, because at no point could it offer a significant counterweight to the aggression and revanchist ambitions of nation states. Indeed, by excluding the defeated countries at the outset, it actually encouraged forms of revisionist politics that deviated from its statutes. But the other international utopia also remained in play. The Communist International did not become an institution stabilizing international class solidarity, but rather an instrument of ideological polarization within European societies and the world as a whole.

Nevertheless, the war gave a definite impetus to the internationalization of such problems as the integration and repatriation of refugees and prisoners of war. In Eastern Europe, more than a million prisoners of war were confronted with the fact that their home states had

simply ceased to exist, and that successor states were neither able nor willing to concern themselves with their release and repatriation. These issues stretched across national boundaries, and the activities of the League of Nations and other organizations such as the Red Cross unfolded in this context.

More important than this legacy and the international cooperation to overcome it was the utopian dimension of internationalism and its promise of an end to war between states. The abstract line from individual through family and nation to a single humanity was already a major theme for many people during the war. In 1916 Ernst Joël referred “to the paradoxical fact today ... that the community of the truly patriotic is an international, supranational” community.26 Henri Barbusse, the author of the savagely critical war novel Le Feu, emphasized in 1918: ‘Humanity instead of nation. The revolutionaries of 1789 said: ‘All Frenchmen are equal.’ We should say: ‘All men.’ Equality demands common laws for everyone who lives on earth.”27 This hope, that the war and its gigantic sacrifices should not have been in vain and must lead to the creation of a new global order, has still not lost its normative claim today. But no one will claim that humanity, however much closer it has become, is a real subject of action. The disappointment of global hopes — “a war that will end war” — became a basic experience for people living in the twentieth century.

The transformation of the discourse on foreign policy into a domestic policy of the world indicates that conflicts have not been resolved but re-emerge in a different form: we are no longer confronted with state wars but with asymmetric civil wars and eroding boundaries between war and terrorism, between armies and militias, between combatants and non-combatants.28

The global conflict zones in Eastern Europe, in the former Yugoslavia, and in the Near and Middle East remind us of the “shatterzones” of multi-ethnic empires and the long shadow of empires after their collapse.29 If Pandora’s Box was opened in August 1914, some of the violent legacies of this war are still with us today. This past is and will remain very present.

IV. Outlook: The Tenses of History

Anyone who wishes to understand the First World War would do well not to treat it as a chronological unit with a simple “before and after”; consideration of the range of diversity and the thresholds of difference is enough to cast doubt on the idea of a simple continuum.
This war, seen from within the time of those who experienced it, is a particularly striking piece of evidence for the openness of the “future past” tense of history. At best, therefore, even in retrospect a degree of uncertainty remains about the outcome of things that had hitherto seemed familiar.\textsuperscript{30}

From this perspective, it is too simplistic to see the First World War as the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth — for it always had elements of both continuity and discontinuity. The generation of frontline combatants might have become the ideal targets for political-ideological mobilization, yet despite all the hardships the war did not lead to an ongoing brutalization of all societies in the interwar period. There was no straightforward continuum from the trenches to the regimes of ideological violence in the 1920s and 1930s. The war did not simply continue in calls for a revision of the peace settlement; numerous veterans, as in France after 1918, rejected war in principle on the basis of their own experiences.

What did change was how the potential for violence was seen in light of a new kind of perplexity, an age of fractures that made it necessary to come up with new categories. No new stable order, whether social, political, or international, was discernible after 1918. But the new models of the Bolsheviks or the Italian Fascists turned unmistakably against the liberal legacy of the nineteenth century, not least in their propensity to violence and terror. This had to do with the diverse experiences of the world war, the passages from inter-state war to revolution and civil war, as well as with the disappointed expectations common in many societies. At any event, by 1930 the model of the liberal-constitutional state and parliamentary government seemed to have its future behind it.

After 1945, the history of unfettered violence amid the catastrophes and disintegration of the first half of the century gave way, at least in Europe, to a peaceful age marked by cold war stability and the advent of democratic mass society, first in the West and after 1989/91 also in the East. It seemed as if the second half of the century was being used to heal the wounds inflicted since August 1914. When the last surviving soldiers of the Great War died a few years ago, when the transition from communicative recollections to cultural memories was nearing its completion, the public attention given to this temporal marker reflected a deeper layer of experience. The fact that this was much more intense in Britain and France than in Germany had historical reasons: it pointed to a continuing tendency in Germany

\textsuperscript{30} Henning Ritter, \textit{Notizhefte}, 4th ed. (Berlin, 2010), 266.
for the Second World War and the Holocaust to be superimposed on the memory of the First World War; here the First World War is not the past but the pre-past. For a moment, the death of the last poilu and Tommy made visible those strata of time in which the earlier shines through in the later: that is, in our necessary knowledge of the essentially cruel and destructive history of violence, of what human beings can do to one another in modern warfare. That was and is not simply a deposited history, precisely not a pre-past, but an understanding of how we have arrived in the present.

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THE GERMAN MOMENT IN 1918

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I. Introduction
At the end of the First World War, Germany’s diplomats mobilized plans for creating a vast economic sphere of influence in eastern Europe, the Caucasus and southern Russia. Looking at this “German moment” in 1918, this article addresses the global economic maps generated by the German Foreign Office and raises the question of how these connections played forward into the postwar period. “Germanness” in this context refers to forms of economic thinking, organization and expansion rather than primarily to ideas of culture, language or ethnicity. In its expansive parameters and with its economic emphases, this “German moment” provides a perspective on the end of the war that has been largely forgotten in the field at large. Here 1918 was a beginning rather than an end.

The year 1918 is indelibly marked by Germany’s defeat in the First World War. It is remembered in terms of imperial collapse and revolutionary change, as the autocratic Prusso-German state made way for a democratic, republican successor. Given the magnitude of events on the western front toward the end of the year, it is often forgotten that the first two-thirds of 1918 presented a radically different picture of Germany’s future. The winter and spring of 1918 were characterized by diplomatic activity and dramatic territorial expansion, through which Germany sought to end the war on her own terms. With the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and Lenin’s Bolsheviks in March 1918 — and secured via the Supplementary Treaties to Brest signed over the spring and summer — Germany achieved her eastern war aims and ruled over an imperial zone stretching from the Baltic to Persian Armenia and the shores of the Caspian Sea. This state of affairs lasted until the fall. It was Germany’s “moment” in 1918.²

How can we now think of the German moment one hundred years later? What can it tell us about German expansionism and empire, power and identity (themes of the German Historical Institute’s “Intersections” project) at the end of the First World War? How did it relate to its better-known Wilsonian counterpart? And why, in

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¹ A much shortened version of the following article was presented on the panel “Inside/Outside: Defining, Ascribing, and Communicating ‘Germanness’ in Different Contexts, Spaces, and Times,” organized by Kelly McCullough on behalf of the German Historical Institute’s “German History Intersections” Project at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association in January 2018.

comparison to the former, has it been so thoroughly forgotten? Germany’s defeat in the war is the obvious answer, but it is not the only one. For clear and plausible reasons our histories of the First World War are dominated by their attention to military matters, including the military reordering of German society. The German moment, by contrast, highlighted three topics that, until recently, were largely overlooked in histories of the war: the actions of German diplomats, the power of economic plans and the interaction of non-European actors with both of the above. In 1918 all three combined in projects which laid down markers for the future. In 1918 diplomats, together with planners from the Reich Economic Office, sought to create a German economic sphere across the territories of the former Russian Empire. In this attempt they struggled against the Supreme Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, hereafter OHL), specifically with Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorff and their opposing conceptions of power and security. The Foreign Office was not powerless in this struggle, as has long been thought. Rather than being steadily outmaneuvered by the military, they engaged in futuristic thinking, putting forward a number of out-of-the-box strategies. The ensuing contest between the Foreign Office and the OHL gave the German moment some of its most striking characteristics.

The German moment went far beyond Mitteleuropa. Geographically the diplomats’ plans stretched much further east and south than often remembered. The economic arrangements at their heart were to be run through alliances — “partnerships” in the lingo of the Foreign Office — with local nationalist elites. While this topic has been researched for the territories of Eastern and Central Europe — most particularly for Ukraine — it has been kept inside a broadly European frame. This shields its full scope from view, the grandiosity of the imperial map that it unfurled. It also masks the actions and aims of nationalists — Georgians, Persians and others — and their desires in 1918 to pursue postwar futures under a German security umbrella.

What follows is an overview of the German moment: its embedding in the wartime strategies of the Foreign Office, specifically the program for Aufwiegelung (insurrection); the diplomats’ use in 1918 of a language of self-determination, which connected the German moment to its Wilsonian cousin, and the economic treaties through which they aimed to control the infrastructure and resources of their new “client state” partners. Included is an up-close look at two particular arenas. How the German moment took shape on the ground in

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3 The latter third of Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht addressed this issue at length. However, given that the debate on Fischer’s book looked primarily at the war’s origins rather than its end, many of his points were neglected at the time. They will be drawn on in the analysis that follows.

4 Peter Borowsky, Deutsche Ukrainepolitik 1918: unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Wirtschaftsfragen (Lübeck, 1970).
the Caucasus and Iran is a largely unknown story. Its contours, particularly the economic arrangements made with Georgian nationalists, mirrored Germany’s draconian plan for rule in Ukraine. Those for Iran remained more project than reality, given Britain’s rapid advance toward Baku and its assertion of military supremacy across the Middle East. Yet these two examples reveal how in 1918 Germany’s diplomats conceptualized a global east, which they called a “new orient.”

II.

As both vision and plan, the German moment built on the Foreign Office’s wartime programs to instigate popular uprising across the British and Russian empires. Diplomats at all levels were mobilized for this “program for revolution.” This was Fritz Fischer’s name for the strategy. Diplomats called it Aufwiegelung, or insurrection. The program was largely run by two people: the consular official Count Max von Oppenheim, who headed the Information Service for the East (Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient), the program’s propaganda arm, and the East Prussian Rudolf Nadolny (Figure 1), a middle-class diplomat from the trade section of the Foreign Office. By 1915 Oppenheim had been sent to Istanbul and Nadolny ran operations from Berlin. With his formal title as head of the Political Section of the Reserve General Staff, a liaison office


6 Despite Nadolny’s importance to German foreign policy, including his actions as ambassador to Turkey and the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s, there is to date no comprehensive biography. The fullest treatment is Günter Wollstein, “Rudolf Nadolny: Außenminister ohne Verwendung,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Sonderdruck Heft 1 (1980): 47-93.
As such he directed the nationalist committees at the center of the revolution program. These were staffed with anti-colonial intellectuals and politicians from across the British, French and Russian Empires. Together with the Indian and Irish committees, founded at the start of the war, Nadolny and his Foreign Office colleagues oversaw Persian (Figure 2), Georgian, Egyptian, Algerian, Tunisian and Tatar committees (and many others besides). Committee members conducted propaganda operations — particularly amongst Muslim prisoners in Germany’s prisoner of war camps — and ran military missions. In the process they assembled global networks of weapons, information and money (the actions of the Indian Independence Committee were particularly striking in this regard). As an organizer of the Afghanistan Expedition, itself part of the Aufwiegelung strategy, Nadolny was active across several theatres of war. In 1918 he sat on the negotiating team at Brest-Litovsk with Foreign Secretary Richard von Kühlmann and representatives from the Foreign Office and the military. He was a force in the shaping of the German moment.

The making of a “new Orient” was his specialty. In the spring of 1917 from Kirkuk, where he was stationed with German and Ottoman troops, Nadolny sent Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg a policy assessment. The military situation was weak, he admitted to Bethmann. The second Persian campaign, which he had helped to lead, had failed; the Turkish Sixth Army had been forced to withdraw and British troops, the South Persia Rifles commanded by Percy Sykes, were on the march. Yet all was not lost, Nadolny wrote. Despite the military setback, Germany’s political interests were fully in play. “When we recognize, as we must in these circumstances,” he wrote, “that the military goal of our actions has not yet been realized and cannot be...
easily realized, we also see . . . that we have . . . achieved certain other results, which could be vital to our overall political security.”9

Nadolny referred to “our future work in Central Asian countries,” pointing to the strategic opportunities provided by Russia’s inner turmoil. With his colleagues in the revolution program, Nadolny saw Russian distress as offering long-term possibilities to Germany’s search for position. The spread of anti-British sentiment across Persia and Central Asia, he claimed, had similar effects. The moment was approaching, Nadolny wrote to Bethmann, to capitalize on these factors and extend Germany’s eastern reach. He outlined aspects of the strategy, the goal of which was the creation of a sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Following the end of the war Nadolny believed that Persia and Afghanistan could potentially be attached to Germany. “The question of the efficacy of our broader influence on Afghanistan and Persia after the war,” he told Bethmann, “comes to whether it is advisable for us to protect these two states against Russian and English invasion or if we should give them up.”10 Up to this point Germany had “observed the existing collision of English and Russian interests and decided that it was in our interest to let this collision go forward, to let these natural enemies go at each other.” This had worked in the past; a different strategy was needed now. “The notion that one has to leave Central Asia to Russia and Britain, and to turn these two Central Asia states over to them, is mistaken,” he wrote. “If I may infringe on our general political goals,” he said to Bethmann, “when the Near East is seen as a glacis of our Middle European fortress, the eastern border of this glacis is not to be found on the Persian border but in the Himalayas.”11 As the most viable weapon for pushing the German glacis into Central Asia, Nadolny chose nationalist mobilization, supported but not dominated by military power. This use of national groups as agents of German expansion was central to the strategies set out by diplomats at the negotiating table at Brest Litovsk, Nadolny chief among them.

There were complicating factors, first and foremost with the Turkish ally. The Young Turks’ war aims clashed with Germany’s, particularly regarding the postwar status of Persia and Afghanistan. Nadolny reminded Bethmann that “up to this point the Turks have regarded our work in Persia and Afghanistan with profound suspicion, mainly due to the fact that we are speaking of Muslim territories in which she herself wishes to win influence via the idea of a pan-Islamic Caliphate.”12 The Young Turk demand at the 1915 Constantinople Congress “for the recognition of Turkish supremacy over all Islamic

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
states” and the demand “to conduct negotiations with such states only through the Turkish government” made for a considerable divide with its German ally. A different strategy was needed, and Nadolny was pragmatic. He believed that pan-Islamic aspirations were malleable and that they mixed with nationalist desires in complicated ways. He knew from working with the Persian committee, and their hostile response to Ottoman pan-Islamism, that national aspirations could be stronger. Moreover, all of these impulses could be turned in pro-German directions. As a goal, he stressed to Bethmann, Germany could create:

a pan-Islamic bloc of states reaching from Constantinople to Kabul, which the British and Russians will discover at war’s end. They will find this most unpleasant. With this strategy the ability of these three states—Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan—to resist Russian and British attacks will be increased, and our position (Glacis) will thereby be reinforced.

The path toward this goal was political, and it lay in the hands of the Foreign Office. It involved continued collaboration with the national committees in the revolution program, namely support for their liberation struggles. It meant calibrating their activities in the service of German war aims. The committees would be the instruments through which German influence would be extended across Central Asia. The program was suited for this task; it had already produced certain facts on the ground. “Our work has created the following situation,” Nadolny wrote:

1. In India the desire for independence, and the idea of tearing loose from England, has grown substantially.
2. Afghanistan … in its quest to rescue its independence from England and Russia … is seeking a connection to us and our allies.
3. In Persia, the idea is now widespread that the last possible moment of rescue from the Russian-English division of the country has arrived, and that this is possible only with the help of Germany and its allies. The country desires from us protection for its independence and offers in return everything that it can possibly give.

Nadolny closed his report by citing Lord Curzon’s Persia and the Persian Question, on “the importance of the Central Asian (mittelasiatischen) countries”: “Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia — to many these names breathe only a sense of utter remoteness of a memory of strange vicissitude and or moribund romance. To me, I
confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world.” He then followed Curzon’s words with his own recommendation. “Should we sit idly by,” he asked the Chancellor, “until the war ends and one of the two [England or Russia] snatches global dominance for itself? I think that it is our duty to influence this fight, even when only with the smallest resources, for global dominance will then go to neither of them. Or, if it has to fall to someone, why not us?”

Why not us? It was a sharp question.

III.
Leaving Kirkuk in the spring of 1917, Nadolny returned to Berlin and the Foreign Office. The revolution program was in the midst of its most significant achievement: the covert action run by Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, Germany’s envoy in Denmark, to transport Vladimir Lenin from Zurich to St. Petersburg. Undersecretary Zimmermann assigned Nadolny to the Russia file, which secured his influence on the forward development of policy. In addition, he wrote to his attache, he was “overseeing the division that dealt with Persian matters” (Iran belonged to the Russia file). In December 1917 Nadolny traveled with the team to the Russian fortress of Brest-Litowsk to negotiate an armistice with the Bolshevik government. Openings were to be seized in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Brest negotiations were highly opportunistic. Operating largely behind the scenes, Nadolny was one of the most active members of this group.

Since the beginning of the war Germany’s aims had concentrated on the disintegration of the Russian empire and the transformation of its western territories into a band of buffer states. How this was to be achieved was a matter of contention, but that Germany would extend its sphere of influence deep into Russian territory was not. The Brest team in 1918, however, had to address a particular problem. Gains achieved via annexation were held to be illegitimate. “The Central Powers in general were in a difficult position,” Nadolny wrote. “They had conquered a huge amount of territory and wanted to … annex it … however, they had agreed, as a basis of the peace, to refrain from annexation.” Moreover the Russians, Nadolny stated, “continually tried to present the Central Powers as annexationists,” a charge which needed to be defended against. However, simultaneously rejecting the label of annexationist while also desiring the taking and holding of territory — annexation — was, Nadolny wrote, “not easy.”
relationship to the independence committees informed the negotiating strategy going forward. Annexation was replaced with the more supple concepts of “association” and “agreement” (*Vertrag*). As in the revolution program, expansion was conceptualized via “partnerships” with national groups. Its economic focus was also vital. While the agreements spoke of political liberation, they did so in the abstract. Practically speaking they highlighted economic arrangements, the turning over of vast amounts of resources and infrastructure to Germany, also considered to be a supple means of expansion. In 1918 Germany sought to secure ports, railroads and supply chains as “war economic necessities.” Karl Helfferich, a leading negotiator in this process, argued that Germany could achieve her economic security goals without engaging in direct annexation (that the latter would be unnecessary).21 Was there one concept that could square this circle for the negotiating table? The term that worked in this flexible fashion, signifying possibilities both abstract and concrete, was the political word of the year: self-determination.

In a speech to the Reichstag on New Year’s Day 1918, Foreign Secretary Richard von Kühlmann set out the approach to the Brest negotiations. Self-determination, he stated, was the foundation. The language of self-determination claimed to be principled and altruistic. Its use by Germany’s diplomats constituted a sharp strategic move, tailor made to the needs of the moment. “Open annexation appeared to be a road that one could not go down,” wrote Fischer, particularly as the Brest negotiations had to be sold to the parliament and the public.22 Building on self-determination, Nadolny located a suitable tactical mechanism. Germany would sign agreements with groups that had declared their independence — Finns, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Georgians, perhaps Persians as well. The signed agreements would legitimate Germany’s presence. “A Ukrainian delegation had been announced,” Nadolny wrote, “which had declared its independence from Russia. They negotiated independently, and a peace treaty was signed with this group. In this way I decided to withdraw the ability of the Russians to label us as annexationists and to arrange for the Lithuanians to declare themselves independent.”23 Receiving approval for this plan from the Foreign Office, Nadolny traveled to Vilnius with General Hoffmann to negotiate with the Lithuanian representatives (*Tarbya*). Although the German military worked with the Tarbya, Nadolny wrote that his action led to an open conflict with the OHL. “As I returned to Brest,” he wrote, “I found there a complaint about me — eight telegram pages long — that General Ludendorff had given
to the Reich Chancellor. He accused me of creating discord between the Reich government and the military command.” Nadolny refused to stand down, stating that he had received approval through the proper channels. Given that the diplomats were now running with a policy on steroids, Nadolny was not reprimanded. His own demand that Ludendorff apologize to him was, however, not fulfilled.

The strategy moved forward. We should strive, Kühlmann stressed, “to get for ourselves through the right of national self-determination whatever territorial concessions we absolutely needed.” Yet how the claims to independence made by the nationalist committees would square with German power aspirations was an open question. The decision to focus on economic control, rather than political power or territorial colonization, provided some wiggle room. Starting in 1916, officials in the Foreign Ministry had sketched out their vision of a “new Orient” in which economic issues played a central role. Their journal of the same name, *The New Orient*, which had started life as the propaganda organ for Oppenheim’s Information Service for the East, by 1918 published articles from Indian, Azeri, Persian, Tatar, Georgian and Ukrainian nationalists. They detailed projects of economic development in the Caucasus, Ukraine, Georgia and Russian Central Asia, Siberia, Japan and India. Their authors came from North Africa, Egypt, the Punjab, and Iran. They wrote on cotton, oil, wheat and railroads, on industrialization and the attainment of national sovereignty via partnership with Germany. In the aftermath of Brest, *The New Orient* reflected a world which did not materially exist but which both sides wanted to create. It was aspirational rather than actual, and it laid down markers for the future.

Through the revolution program the Foreign Office had positioned itself as the “protector” of oppressed national groups in the Russian Empire and the Middle East, and the strategy of detaching, and “liberating,” Russia’s many nationalities was popular, as Fischer reminds us. It won supporters from all sides of Germany’s political spectrum, from the Pan Germans to the SPD. Diplomats claimed that they stood on the right side of history as protectors of oppressed oriental nationalities. Nadolny’s attaché Wipert von Blücher, who joined his mentor in the Foreign Office on the Russia desk, was effusive on this point. As he wrote, the situation in Iran revealed Germany’s place in a grand historical drama. It was:

one piece of a great historical process developing across all of Asia and seizing one people after another, whether they be


25 Fischer, *Germany’s Aims*, 479, citing to Kühlmann’s *Erinnerungen*, 523 ff. As Fischer wrote on this “tactical” language: Germany’s diplomats massaged older claims of “annexation” into “more elastic methods of ‘association’ through which Germany tried to turn the new principle of self-determination into a channel for the indirect exercise of her domination.” *Germany’s Aims*, 444.

26 Fischer, *Germany’s Aims*, 133-34. Germany’s claim to stand for the national liberation of peoples was a central theme in her wartime propaganda. It was a way to sell the war to the public.
Persians, Afghans, or Indians. And while it is possible that this process might, here and there momentarily be stalled . . . it will also roll forward with the kind of elementary force possessed in nature by an avalanche and in history by the idea of progress. Germany’s place in this process is on the side of the Asian people who seek progress. For even if the present decides against us, we stand in solidarity with the future.27

Following the signing of the Brest Treaty in March 1918, the project expanded further, into the Caucasus and Mittelasien. This was “Germany’s great Eastern Idea,” Fischer wrote, “which went far beyond Brest-Litovsk.”28 Germany’s diplomats trained their sights on the Black and Caspian seas, and the economic planners set to work. Mitteleuropa died and Mittelasien was born.

IV.
The German moment in the Caucasus was notably complex with sharp conflict between all parties: the diplomats and the military, the Germans and the Turks. At Brest the Bolsheviks rescinded Russia’s territorial claims to the area and began removing troops. As the Russian military withdrew, the path was open for a German advance. This was also true for the other powers. Between the winter and fall of 1918, the Caucasus became the object of competing war aims. Its geostrategic position, mineral wealth, ports and railroads made the terrain militarily and commercially valuable; its acquisition belonged to the war’s endgame for Germany, Turkey and Great Britain. Lord Curzon wished to carve out a set of buffer states, starting in Transcaucasia and reaching toward India to give Britain an iron grip on the Persian Gulf and Iranian oil.29 Germany targeted the region’s “war economic necessities” — its high quality iron ores, manganese, oil, wheat and cotton — as well as the strategically vital Baku-Batum railroad and the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batum, the latter the terminus of the Baku oil pipeline. The Caucasus was also a geostrategic bridge: to Baku, Iran and Central Asia, as well as to southern Russia and the industrial areas of the Donetz basin. Germany’s military and commercial penetration of southern Russia and Central Asia would not only assert her dominance over rump Russia but would make her impermeable to a British blockade. As Brockdorff Rantzau wrote, “one has conquered Russia only when one possesses southern Russia.”30

27 Wipert von Blücher, Zeitwende in Iran (Biberach an der Riss, 1949), 112f, cited in Michael Jonas’s biography, which focused primarily on Blücher’s career in the Third Reich, NS-Diplomatie und Bündnispolitik, 1935-1944: Wipert von Blücher, das Dritte Reich und Finnland (Paderborn, 2011), 43.
28 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 510. The “completion of Mitteleuropa,” he wrote, “in the last phase was dropped by Germany in favour of the absolute domination of the Ostrau.” This Ostrau included areas the diplomats called “Mittelasien.”
30 PA AA Brockdorff Rantzau Papers, Az 8, 4/3: Rantzau Stenogram, April 1, 1917.
For all of the parties, local forces now came to the fore. A significant factor in the coming Transcaucasian free-for-all were the positions taken by nationalist groups vis-à-vis the powers. The three most prominent political associations—the Georgian Menscheviks, the Armenian Dashnaks and the Azeri Mussavat—mobilized quickly in the political space opened by the Brest armistice. Initially they banded together into the Transcaucasian Federation, a short-lived entity which sought protection against Turkish expansion. However, as the Federation worked toward signing a peace agreement with the Ottoman Empire in the spring of 1918, the political realities of this end phase of the war tore the fragile entity apart. Each of the powers mobilized their own group, and these same groups—reading the realities of the changing military map—appealed to the powers as “protectors”: the Azeris and Caucasian Muslims with the Turks, the Georgians with the Germans and the Armenians with the British, and later with the Americans. The cynical mobilization of local nationalists as proxy fighters for the powers contributed in no small part to the region’s violence.

The Foreign Office claimed to support the Federation in toto, but in reality had eyes only for the Georgians. They were the leaders of the Federation’s parliament (Sejm) and Germany’s chosen collaborators for their client state. A Georgian legion and nationalist committee had been founded early in the war; they were directed by the German Consul in Tiflis, Graf von der Schulenburg, Nadolny’s close collaborator. Diplomats, including Undersecretary von der Bussche, asserted that controlling Georgia was imperative to securing Germany’s future position. As Bussche wrote in an April 1918 memo to the Kaiser: “From the beginning of the war . . . and using all resources Germany has striven to establish a state that will be oriented toward Germany, [will be] located between Russia, Turkey and Persia and will provide access to Central Asia.” That state was Georgia. Bussche

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33 Fischer, Griff, 737. Fischer claimed that with this note, Bussche “ordnete . . . die Kaukasuspolitik in die Letzlinien der deutschen Politik ein, die wieder einmal die ganze Kontinuität der deutschen Kriegszielpolitik seit 1914 unterstreichen.” (Griff, 737).
and Helfferich envisioned securing the new Georgian state via a two-pronged strategy of diplomatic influence and economic control, which had consequences for policies toward Iran.34

Yet the question of how to navigate Turkey’s claims on the Caucasus deepened the ongoing conflict in Berlin between the military, the diplomats and the economic planners. The possible emergence of a Turkish sphere of interest in the Caucasus was anathema to the Foreign Office, and they vehemently guarded against it.35 They stated repeatedly the imperative “not to allow access to Central Asia and Persia to lie exclusively in Turkish hands.”36 The Brest Treaty stipulated a Turkish advance to the 1878 line but not higher. Turkey could claim Kars and Ardahan — lost to Russia in the 1877 Russo-Turkish War — as well as the southern part of Batum, which had a majority Muslim population. Through such provisions the Foreign Office attempted to respond to the Young Turks’ demands while also containing them. Batum’s all-important harbor, for example, was not included.37 This did not satisfy the Young Turk leadership, despite their signature on the Brest Treaty. Declaring an intent to protect fellow Muslims from possible massacre, the Turkish military advanced into Transcaucasia.38 Arrangements reaching beyond the parameters of Brest now dominated discussion.

Three days following the fall of Batum on April 15, Helfferich requested clarity on the situation from Kühlmann. He wanted a “definitive statement of Germany’s attitude in the Caucasus.” He took issue with the military strategists, “sharply criticizing the desire of the OHL to join forces with the Turks.”39 Helfferich made the economic points forcefully. He “drew attention,” as Fischer put it:

to Germany’s great interests in the manganese deposits of Chiaturi and to the possibility of further finds of copper and oil, and polemicized on strategic grounds against the policy of the OHL and its representative on the Turkish General Staff, [Hans von] Seeckt, of leaving Caucasia to Turkey. This policy, he said, would deprive Germany of any possibility of influencing the economic development of Caucasia. The possession of the Batum-Baku line, which Seeckt seemed prepared to cede to the Turks, was decisive for the fate of Transcaucasia. Its ores, oil, cotton, wool — all raw materials needed by German factories, would simply fall into Turkey’s lap.40

34 Discussions on the creation of such economic “satellite states” had begun with the war, and in pursuit of this goal the “Helfferich Office” was created on December 4, 1917. Helfferich “was in many ways ideally qualified for his new post,” wrote his biographer. “He had participated in most of the important war-aims discussions since the beginning of the war and his practical knowledge of continental economic and financial matters was enormous.” Williamson, Karl Helfferich, 256.


36 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 551.

37 This was pressed out of Germany during the Treaty of Bucharest negotiations. Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 552.

38 Kazemzadeh, Struggle for Transcaucasia, 86.

39 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 553.

40 Ibid.
The military saw the matter differently. In Fischer’s words — and his work is an excellent, albeit largely forgotten, guide to these events — “the OHL supported Turkey’s ambitions with the intention of building up a front in Persia, while the Foreign Ministry was strongly opposed to any Turkish expansion, both on account of the complications with Russia and in view of Germany’s interest in the Caucasus.”41 In the Caucasus Germany’s two central institutions — Foreign Office and OHL — were fighting different endgames for different futures. Yet, for the moment the alliances held: between the military and the diplomats and between the Turks and the Germans. Germany sent a high-level delegation to a new conference in Batum, which was to negotiate a peace between the Transcaucasian Federation and the Young Turks. The delegation’s head was Otto von Lossow, military plenipotentiary at Istanbul, who was “empowered to conclude the preliminaries of a peace between the German Reich and the government of Transcaucasia.”42 He was joined by two of Nadolny’s associates, Schulenburg and the diplomat Otto von Wesendonk, an expert on Russia and Persia.43 Lossow was instructed to hold the Turks to the ground of the Brest treaty in order to “protect Germany’s economic interests in the Caucasus.”44 But relations between the two alliance partners were sharp and bitter. According to one diplomat, Turkish anger at “German meddling” in Batum was expressed by jamming the telegraph communications.45

The Batum conference was not a success. It was hard to see how it could have been. The Transcaucasian Federation splintered under the pressure of the Turkish military advance. Yet, instead of a joyous birth of new national states — as many later histories declared the moment to be — the breaking up of the Federation “forced” its constituent parts to declare independence at the end of May.46 Each now had to go it alone. The Republic of Georgia gravitated immediately toward its German protector, and Lossow signed the Treaty of Poti on May 28, 1918 with representatives of the new state. This treaty conceded Georgia’s considerable mineral wealth, control of her ports and railroads and the lion’s share of her economic resources to Germany. In return Georgia would receive military support and protection.47 The German military immediately seized Georgia’s ports and railroads, and the economic planners swung into action. The deal, however, did not come cheap. As diplomats noted, “we went to great pains to clear ourselves a path to Persia across Transcaucasia” and have “spent millions on creating a pro-German Caucasian state to give us a bridge to Central Asia.”48

41 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 551. On why the last two-thirds of Germany’s Aims have been forgotten, see Jenkins, “Fritz Fischer’s Programme for Revolution.”
42 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 555.
43 Sommer, Botschafter Graf Schulenburg, 34.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Reynolds, Shattering Empires, emphasizes the gravity of this process and that the declarations of national independence were not a matter for celebration.
47 Kazemzadeh, Struggle for Transcaucasia.
48 Fischer, Germany’s Aims, 551-552.
The way seemed open toward Iran. The political situation looked favorable. Nadolny had stressed to Bethmann the importance of continuing support for the Persian nationalists in their struggle with Britain and Russia. Recent elections to Iran’s parliament in the fall of 1917 had returned German-friendly politicians. Political opinion runs toward the “the central Powers, which view this independence positively,” wrote Mohammad Jamalzadeh, a member of Berlin’s Persian Committee. News from the Brest negotiations strengthened local optimism that Persian sovereignty would be internationally recognized at the meeting and the country offered relief and support. Nadolny’s role at Brest in crafting its Persia-specific articles was known and appreciated. Article 10 of the armistice, and Article 7 of the Treaty were seen as a German promise for the renewal of Iranian sovereignty. Article 10 stipulated, as committee member Wahid al Mulk wrote in The New Orient, that Iran could “once again place itself in possession of its full sovereign rights.” An article in Kaveh (see Figure 3) in February extended the argument. “Kühlmann assured the Persian Committee that the Central Powers will protect Persian independence,” it stated, “this is in contrast to the British, who continue to injure national sovereignty through military actions in the south.” Committee member Hussein Quli Khan spoke with the BZ am Mittag on the “world historical possibilities” of the Brest armistice. “Persia is a small nation,” he told the newspaper. “It fights for its freedom and desires nothing other than justice.” Iranians, he said, “will be filled with a passionate gratitude toward the powerful German Reich, which at this fateful time has brought the fulfillment of Persian hopes and yearnings a step closer.”

Blücher recommended immediate action. “At this moment we cannot allow the Persian question to be carelessly neglected,” he wrote. A British advance must be guarded against. “A legation must immediately be sent to Tehran under military escort,” he recommended. It
should be outfitted with a military attaché, a doctor, radio equipment and “experts on economic — specifically financial — matters.” Consuls and/or consular agents should be placed “in the most important Persian cities not occupied by the British. A legation for Afghanistan should be organized.” Undersecretary Bussche concurred. “In this situation we must be vigilant,” he wrote, “to immediately safeguard our interests in Tehran, which now are threatened only by the British.”

But it wasn’t just the British. It was also the Turks. Here the Foreign Office received a hard reminder of the greater power of the military in wartime strategy. As Lossow and the leader of the Georgian nationalists, Tschenkeli, signed the Poti treaty in Batum, the military situation further east had intensified. In the spring of 1918 Enver put his brother in law, Nuri Pascha, in charge of raising a new “Army of Islam” with the goal of taking Baku from the Bolsheviks. During the month of May the Turks were driving toward Baku. The advance encompassed Iran: namely the western province of Persian Azerbeijan and the northern provinces. It enacted what the German chargé d’affaires in Tehran, Rudolf Sommer, called “the old plan, to tear the province of Azerbeijan away from Persia.” As Georgia went to Germany and the Turks were given a free hand in the eastern Caucasus and northern Iran, the murky outlines of separate German and Turkish spheres of interest in the Caucasus began to emerge.

As a signatory to Brest, Turkey had pledged not to build a sphere of interest in Persia. She was bound by treaty not to infringe on Persian territory, but the recent nature of this promise, or the heat of the fighting, robbed it of its weight. A Turkish force took Tabriz on May 6th and advanced toward Baku. Nadolny’s political strategy for Persia was thus ground between the wheels of Turkish and British military power. Iranian historians concur that Germany’s actions became utterly subsumed in those of its alliance partner, so “intermingled that it would be impossible to distinguish them from one another.” Blücher wrote despairingly on the decision to give the OHL the upper hand. “The results of the Spa discussions,” he wrote to his former mentor:

mean the wholesale abandonment of Persia. The Persian-friendly policy that we could have pursued in Berlin has been sharply rejected by the military and the diplomats have not opposed them. Persia is to once again become a

54 PA A, Rudolf und Änny Nadolny Papers, Bd. 100: Blücher to Nadolny, January 19, 1918.
theater of war ... one has given the Turks a politically free hand. I don’t believe that this decision can be changed.59

As Blücher feared, Ottoman troops and agents moved into the country. Yusuf Zia, a member of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Enver Pasha’s “Special Organization”), was named “political adviser to the Ottoman contingent in Iran” in April and a pan-Turk party set up shop in Tabriz. The Ottoman paper Azarbayjan propagated Young Turk views throughout northern Iran.60 The call to support Turkish military action was a hard pill for the Foreign Office’s Persian Committee to swallow. Discussions of a “Turkish Persia” were anathema to committee members.61 The Germans had been the safer partner. As the historian Pezhmann Dailami wrote, “some Iranians preferred relations with the Germans rather than the Turks, as they believed that in this way Iranian sovereignty would be less threatened.”62 It was not to be.

V.

The German moment in 1918 was a complicated mixture of economic, political and military plans. Across Mittelasien, which after the Brest treaty replaced Mitteleuropa as a goal of the war, the Foreign Office put its strategy of partnering with nationalist groups — from the Ukrainians to the Georgians and the Persians — into action. Looking at the reach of these plans in the spring and summer of 1918, one sees that the Wilsonian moment was preceded and challenged by a German imperial moment. Although short-lived, it set down markers — and created connections — for the future. While its arrangements were overshadowed by the defeat in 1918, and nullified by the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the economic connections forged between the Foreign Office and the area’s nationalist elites were revitalized in the 1920s and 1930s. Stephen Gross’s excellent monograph Export Empire gives an in-depth look at this process for the Balkans.63 It also stretched further. As ambassador to Ankara after 1924, Nadolny was instrumental in bringing German industry and business into Atatürk’s Turkey. Stationed in Tehran in 1923, Schulenburg did the same for Reza Shah’s Iran. Germany’s support for Iran’s nationalists in 1918 was remembered. It smoothed the making of economic agreements between the two countries, and starting in 1928 Germany became a significant partner in Iran’s industrialization. The memory of these connections still resonates in Persian culture. In this sense the year 1918 reveals a very different set of meanings, highlighting economic beginnings rather than military endings.
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THE RE-GERMANIZATION PROCEDURE: A DOMESTIC MODEL FOR NAZI EMPIRE-BUILDING

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I.

Georg Rödel would not abandon his post, not even as the world he knew crumbled around him amid the heavy snows of January 1945. The American Third Army loomed just across the Rhine from Rödel’s office in Wiesbaden, and constant shelling had seriously complicated his commission as the regional head of the SS Race and Settlement Main Office (Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt, RuSHA) — not to mention endangered his life (see Figure 1).

Yet none of this could stop Rödel and his assistant from venturing into the countryside each day to carry on with their work: performing racial examinations on foreign forced laborers, most of them from the Soviet Union, to determine whether any of them possessed “lost German blood” — a supposed biological heritage of Germanic colonists from centuries past. This was a calling near and dear to the man’s heart, and one in which he had considerable expertise. Back in 1940, he had conducted similar appraisals on inhabitants slated for deportation from German-annexed western Poland; in 1941 and 1942, he did the same thing in northwestern Yugoslavia before moving on to yet another assignment in Paris. Now, in the twilight phase of the Second World War, he plied his trade as a “race inspector” conscientiously as ever in Germany itself, where Hessian households and businesses supplied a steady stream of employees for him to peruse, even with Allied troops right on their doorstep. As Rödel scurried from town to town, evaluating subjects in underground cellars and bomb shelters, he found it equally encouraging that many of those judged favorably agreed to what he had in mind for them: Germanization, or re-Germanization. Eager to fulfill his “duty,” not even the certainty of military defeat could dampen his spirits. “Soon it will all be over,” he wrote to a friend, “and then there will be a lot of work to catch up on. I hope and expect that it will not take too long. Here we are thoroughly optimistic.”

These surreal scenes beg the question of how this SS officer could have possibly believed that such pursuits would continue after the fall

1 Berlin Document Center (hereafter BDC) SSO/38B: Personnel File on Georg Albert Rödel. His correspondence from early 1945 can be found in Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden (hereafter HStW) Abt. 483, Nr. 7359.
of the Third Reich, and why he thought they were so worthwhile to begin with. Was he just another Nazi fanatic with his head buried in the sand, detached from the reality of imminent collapse? Or did he have good reason to be sanguine in the apparent support his efforts received from the local population? If Rödel was delusional, his actions were not unique, no more of an anomaly than the seeming amenability of the people he encountered outside Wiesbaden in those chaotic final days. The circumstances were distinct, but the interactions themselves closely resembled something that took place across the continent of Europe under National Socialist rule.

In recent years, scholars have substantially broadened our knowledge of the Nazis’ multifaceted enterprise to transform the demographic make-up of conquered foreign lands. With a frame of investigation widened beyond the Holocaust itself, we now know a great deal more than we used to about programs of colonial resettlement, racial classification, and mass expulsion that affected millions of Europeans who never set foot in a death camp, faced a killing squad, or perished in the ghettos. Strangely, however, despite its centrality to the Nazi agenda, far less attention has been paid to the policy field of assimilation, even though its immense grasp encompassed numerical proportions that actually exceeded the grim toll of the “Final Solution to the Jewish Question.” This disparity is all the more puzzling given that Germanization as a social process affords fresh insights into another topic that has garnered intense interest lately among historians: the many ways in which ordinary Germans contributed to the imperial project of the National Socialist regime.

At the same time, it also reveals a side of civilian life under wartime occupation that is harder to reconcile with orthodox interpretations of the period. Although a number of studies have skillfully reconstructed how non-Germans reacted to Nazi hegemony — with
a spectrum of behaviors ranging from collaboration to resistance — previous research has yet to address sufficiently how practices of accommodation on their part influenced the trajectory of state decision-making. Germanization policy offers us a textbook example of this interplay, but its salience has been obscured by a literature that remains geographically fractured and overly top-down. For all their heavy-handedness, Nazi officials throughout occupied Europe were keenly sensitive to popular opinion and often responsive to stimuli from below (especially in Germany itself). They also circulated ideas and methods that traversed political boundaries and linked center with periphery in a huge web of reciprocal exchanges.

I argue in my dissertation that these dynamics are essential to understanding the scope and impact of Nazi Germanization policy. In turn, they help us comprehend how it came to be that over six million people obtained German citizenship in the midst of the most destructive conflict in history. Rather than concentrating on a single country or region in isolation, my analysis weaves together a more integrated, comprehensive account by tying the implementation of “ethnic reordering” in the occupied territories to the experiences of civilians on the home front, German and non-German alike. At the core of this network stood the Re-Germanization Procedure (Wiedereindeutschungsverfahren, WED), a special initiative designed to assimilate “racially kindred” foreigners by sending them to live with German families throughout the Third Reich. Eventually drawing in nearly 100,000 people (most of them from Poland), the WED was a relatively small component of the so-called hunt for good blood, but one with significance that extended far beyond its numbers. Although a brainchild and hobbyhorse of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, it opened up a forum in which civilians could articulate their own definitions of Germanness as well. Situated at the ground level of the imperial metropole, it served as a crucial mechanism for canvassing grassroots attitudes toward the “consolidation of Germandom” abroad. Because “re-Germanizables” were kept under close surveillance and instructed to write letters to the SS officers who had selected them — men like Rödel — Himmler’s agents were able to monitor their everyday relations with native-born Germans in minute detail. At issue in this arena was nothing less than the question on which the Nazis’ irredentist ambitions fundamentally hinged: whether Europeans generally, and Germans specifically, would embrace the idea of a supranational polity organized on the basis of race — a vision of the future built just as much on inclusion as exclusion.


3 This figure includes roughly one million ethnic German “resettlers”; see the statistical charts in Library of Congress, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal: Green Series, vol. IV (hereafter LOC), p. 940-941: Doc. NO-3568: “Brief Facts about Resettlement” (English transcript), January 1944.
As the editors of one fascinating recent volume have pointed out, while the extent to which the National Socialist regime can be labeled a “racial state” is highly debatable, it is abundantly clear that the Third Reich never became any sort of out-and-out “racial society.” The WED provides an edifying glimpse into some of the factors that prevented such a transformation from occurring. But it also indicates that the involvement of non-state actors who did contribute to racializing endeavors bore dramatic ramifications for how the Nazis governed their far-flung empire. Driven by a desire to unite all “persons of German blood” into a tight-knit “ethnic community” (Volksgemeinschaft), they ultimately relied on these very same people to make that chimera a reality. And while many individuals balked at the undertaking and declined to voice their assent, it also achieved a far greater measure of success than one might typically expect.

II.

“From my experience, the prospects for Germanization are not very good.” That was what Wilhelm Wagner told the Landrat of Limburg on December 14, 1944, though his words could have easily been written by many other proprietors who agreed to participate in the re-Germanization procedure. The owner of a mill outside the small town of Dauborn, Wilhelm had originally taken in the Kowalski family with high enthusiasm back in 1942, having heard that their “healthy, clean, and decent appearance” denoted the presence of “German blood in their veins.” What he did not realize at the time was that the SS had based this verdict solely on the Kowalskis’ physical features, or “racial phenotype,” after evicting them from their farm in western Poland (see Figure 2). Dispossessed though they were, Herr Wagner was nonetheless hopeful that his new charges would settle in quickly. He even treated them to steak dinners at his home. As several years went by, however, his optimism had gradually waned, and now he wanted the Kowalskis removed from his custody. As the father of two sons killed in action, he found it unconscionable that these immigrants refused to earn their keep and do their part to sustain the war effort. He also could not fathom why they continued to speak their mother tongue and engage in “forbidden relations” with Polish laborers despite repeated admonishments from the Gestapo. “In my opinion,” Wilhelm wrote in frustration to the Landrat, “we must soon decide whether these people are actually German or not.”

That tensions existed between WED candidates and their German hosts would have come as no surprise to the mid-level Nazi functionaries

4 See the introduction in Devin O. Pendas, Mark Roseman, and Richard F. Wetzell, eds., Beyond the Racial State: Rethinking Nazi Germany (New York, 2017), 17.


6 HStW Abt. 411, Nr. 1008, Bd. 1138: Wagner to Landrat Limburg-Lahn, December 14, 1944.
who managed the operation. As early as 1940, one agent of the SS Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) had warned that distinctions between “good” and “bad” foreigners would likely “induce a sense of confusion among the German population.”\(^7\) A civil servant in Frankfurt am Main picked up on just that a year later: “To the general public, who are unfamiliar with the motives behind Germanization policy, the extensive concessions granted to such families are totally incomprehensible.”\(^8\) The Nazis created this dilemma, of course, by forcibly importing millions of “ethnic aliens” to toil in the fatherland, but “re-Germanizables” were supposed to be regarded as “ethnic comrades.” What exactly occasioned the bewilderment these men spoke of, and what were its consequences? For the Kowalskis, the answer to the latter question was brutally direct: denunciation, arrest, and imprisonment.\(^9\) And most supervisors did not display nearly the same amount of patience or depth of commitment as Herr Wagner.

Indeed, many of these Betriebsführer, as they were called, completely ignored regulations on the treatment of WED candidates, particularly when it came to furnishing them with a “German standard of living.” Far too many “re-Germanizables” languished in filthy, dilapidated hovels with no plumbing or heating, some of them literally falling apart or infested with vermin.\(^10\) Such squalid circumstances made a mockery of any attempt to authenticate their “racial worth” by exhibiting “German order and cleanliness.” It certainly did not help that they also lacked basic household items such as beds, blankets, kitchen utensils, and soap. Beyond their obvious practical uses, these objects functioned as markers of social status and racial

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\(^7\) Ulrich Herbert, *Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich* (New York, 1997), 69. 
\(^8\) Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (hereafter BArch) R 36/1052: Preiss to Oberbürgermeister Frankfurt am Main, February 1941. 
\(^9\) HStW Abt. 411, Nr. 1008, Bd. 1136: Gestapo Frankfurt-Main to Landrat Limburg-Lahn, June 29, 1944. 
\(^10\) United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives (hereafter USHMMA) 15.021M/2/20/94: Pluskota to RuSHA Aussensstelle, December 8, 1940. Because these letters stem from the same record group and were addressed to the same office, I will cite them in an abbreviated form; for example, 5/31/30: Dudaczyk, 8.11.40. 
\(^11\) BArch R 49/73/11-12: Greifelt to HSSPFs, December 5, 1940.
privilege, with the want of one signifying the absence of the other. The real and symbolic meaning of segregated mealtimes underscored this connection. Upon arriving at a nursery in Waldsee, Stanislaw Stanczak quickly noticed that “The Poles eat at one table and the Germans eat at another, and they get better food.” Relegated to the ranks of the underclass, he immediately blamed the race inspectors: “You told us that we would have the same rights as German workers, but here it is not so.”12 The poor quality of the clothing distributed to WED candidates became a further index of stratification. As Feliks Majerczyk explained in one letter, “We stand out from the local Germans not just because we don’t speak German, but on account of our ragged attire.”13 The appearance of many “re-Germanizables” grew more disheveled over time given that employers confiscated their ration cards, paid them meager wages (if anything), and forced them to work in the fields in all weather for up to eighteen hours a day. Even those who were not consigned to agricultural labor often got saddled with “the worst kinds of jobs.” Wladisława Palczewska described how she and her fourteen-year-old son slogged daily through the sewers of Lützenhardt “amid water, mud, feces, and refuse,” clad only “in torn-up shirts and boots.” When she objected to these conditions, her boss replied, “If I can stand it, then you can too.”14 Needless to say, this did nothing to “advance their acclimation” or “form a strong bond with the workplace.”15

What is truly striking, however, is that exploitation and neglect led WED candidates to affirm their Germanness all the more vociferously. Angered by the favoritism shown to native-born farmhands in Bielefeld, Stefan Kulawczyk declared, “We belong to the German nation just as much as them,” and asked rhetorically, “Why should they earn more and work less than we do?”16 Jan Masurek’s unhappiness stemmed not so much from the rigors of being a chimney-sweep as it did from his belief that this profession was “unbefitting for a well-educated German.” In a similar vein, Zygmunt Seweryn attributed the contempt his German co-workers reserved for him to his employer’s insistence that he unload stone-carts alongside Ukrainians and French prisoners of war.17 Zygmunt and others grumbled that non-German workers were actually “better off” than them, that it was “re-Germanizables” who ranked lowest in local hierarchies of foreign labor. “I too am a German,” wrote Jan Karlikowski in May 1943, “yet here I am treated as an inferior. There are Poles and Russians who work on the same farm as me, but our boss hates me far more than them.”18 Like many WED candidates,

12 5/31/25-26: Stanczak, 8.7.40.
14 5/32/37: Palczewska, 3.6.41.
18 5/35/155: Karlikowski, 5.16.43.
Jan appropriated Nazi ideology for his own ends, appealing to notions of racial solidarity to gain redress for personal grievances. But there was something else going on here as well. Apart from the shock of abject subordination, these individuals seem to have been genuinely dismayed that Germans would not recognize their claim to membership in the “ethnic community,” even though they tried to ingratiate themselves by adopting Nazified social conventions. Nikolai Fornalczyk was one of many who discovered that striving to “act German” did not result in public acceptance: “It pains me very much that when I go to work on the farm nobody replies with the ‘Heil Hitler’ greeting when I give it, as if they don’t hear me.”

Be that as it may, ostracism did not necessarily instill “re-Germanizables” with empathy for sanctioned targets of discrimination; on the contrary, they invoked the dismal plight of “undesirable” foreign laborers to highlight the injustice of “German-blooded families” enduring the same hardships. “If I were a Polish girl, then I would have to suffer,” young Jadwiga Ciupinska stated baldly, “but I am a German.” Even if these people merely simulated the Nazis’ virulent racism, they nevertheless ended up reifying it, above all in their conflation of non-Germans (especially Slavs) with “serfs” or “slaves.” In seeking to avoid oppression, they legitimized the oppression of others.

And all the while, the Nazis were listening, fully cognizant of the dysfunction creeping over the re-Germanization procedure at the ground level. In reference to a group of supervisors in Brandenburg, RuSHA chief Otto Hofmann informed Himmler in August 1940, “It is evident from available reports and the incoming letters of these Polish families that no effort is being made to bring them closer to Germandom, neither with respect to accommodations nor with respect to treatment in general. The farmers are obviously not aware of their obligations.” Hofmann and his underlings had no intention of sitting idly by and letting such malpractice stand. For starters, they personally responded to letters of complaint and sought to reassure supplicants that all would be well, as SS-Sturmbannführer Ermin Künzel did when he sent the following message to Władysław Skrzypeck in October 1940: “I have received your letter and can see that you have concerns. I have written today to the authorities in Germany about your request for them to assist you. Write to me again so that I know how things are going.” RuSHA functionaries did indeed contact local administrators to ensure that “we are doing everything we can to recover these racially valuable persons and refraining from anything that might hinder this goal.”

19 5/35/51: Fornalczyk, 6.28.42.
20 5/33/57: Ciupinska, 10.9.41.
21 5/32/30: Pawlak, 2.16.41.
22 USHMMA 15.007M/10/125/8-9: Hofmann to Himmler, August 28, 1940.
23 USHMMA 15.021M/2/20/157: Künzel to Skrzypeck, October 29, 1940.
got in touch with individual hosts too. Hofmann wrote to Else Schmidt in Treskow to clarify that the Polish-speaking housemaid allocated to her was “German in terms of appearance and blood” and “must be reared in every respect to become a full-fledged German.” He similarly urged Maria Meyer in Hamburg to exhibit “extreme patience and understanding” in her dealings with “re-Germanizable” workers. The Nazi Party assisted this public relations campaign by disseminating special bulletins and brochures designed to “enlighten” the populace on the purpose of the WED.

Getting errant overseers to heed their wishes, however, turned out to be easier said than done. At first, Nazi officials presumed that “difficulties of any kind can be remedied through on-the-spot consultations with the employer.” This type of conflict resolution usually fell on deaf ears. Stanisława Magdzinska for one discerned the limits of state monitoring: “Whenever someone comes here from the SS, the boss naturally invites them in and tells them that everything is peachy, but when they leave he acts worse than before... He does nothing to sow the seeds in our hearts that would make us want to become German citizens.” Soon enough, Nazi mediators began to lose faith and concede that the situation was hopeless. After investigating quarrels between one “re-Germanizable” family and their hosts, the farm bureau chief in Hersfeld opined, “Blame lies on both sides, to be sure. For the most part though, it is the fault of the employer and his family members, who do not possess the necessary tact and do not understand how to deal with these people.”

One Nazi Party deputy in Eckernförde criticized nearly all the Betriebsführer in his district for failing to demonstrate adequate sensitivity to the needs of their “re-Germanizable” wards. These accusations only irritated them further. In February 1941, an estate-owner by the name of Bernstorff fired off an angry missive to the local SS command in Celle in which he took umbrage at charges of dereliction and voiced strong displeasure with what he deemed unwarranted meddling. This incident perfectly encapsulates the fraught dialogue the re-Germanization procedure initiated between the National Socialist regime and its citizenry.

No matter how hard they tried, the Nazis could not get most Germans to embrace WED candidates as fellow compatriots, and it is worth taking a moment to step back and consider why. The temptation here is to conclude that allergic reactions to these newcomers were simply a symptom of the deeply rooted anti-Polish prejudices that pervaded every level of German society. While such a reading would

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27 ibid.

28 5/35/146-147: Magdzinska, 4.5.43.

29 Hessisches Staatsarchiv Marburg (hereafter HSM) 180 Fulda, Nr. 6133, Bd. 53: Kreisbauernführer Hersfeld to Landrat Fulda, December 2, 1942.


31 Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv — Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover (hereafter NLH) Hann. 310 I, Nr. 358, Bd. 147: Bernstorff to Dörhofer, February 2, 1941.
no doubt be accurate to an extent, the evidence suggests a more complex reality. It is important to bear in mind that fraternization between Germans and East European laborers was commonplace despite the Gestapo’s ceaseless efforts to curb it, which proves that some people remained just as unreceptive to state-sponsored images of the Slavic “subhuman” as others were to propaganda trumpeting equality for all “persons of German blood.”32 There is another, more useful framework for grasping the cruel behavior of the Betriebsführer: the ambiguous, liminal condition postcolonial theorists refer to as hybridity.33 Because WED candidates inhabited an intermediate position between two distinct cultures, they muddled perceived contrasts meant to differentiate German from non-German and thereby undermined assumptions of in-group homogeneity and superiority. This phenomenon elucidates why residents in the town of Mönchberg, for instance, took to denigrating them as “shitty Polish-Germans” — an insult which conveys with vulgar precision the psychological unease their hyphenated identities provoked and the public disavowal that came with it.34 Ironically, their struggle to fit in and “act German” often isolated the “re-Germanizables.” They incurred popular contempt not so much because they were foreigners, but because they professed and aspired to be Germans, because they came off as uppity and inauthentic, neither fish nor fowl.

Given the hybrid aura that surrounded them, it is little wonder that Germans judged WED candidates according to how closely they measured up to traditional benchmarks of ethnic belonging, implicitly rejecting the racial criteria of the SS in favor of cultural and socio-economic definitions of nationality. By and large, ordinary civilians found these signifiers of Germanness much easier to latch on to than vague suppositions of “biological fitness.” That is why the language barrier constituted the most frequent obstacle to integration, not just because it hampered interpersonal communication, but because it audibly distinguished the “re-Germanizables” as outsiders. “Life in Germany is very bad for those who don’t speak German,” Aniela Okrzesik observed, “I can’t understand anything the people say, and they can’t understand me, so they constantly ridicule me.”35 When German employers castigated WED candidates for loafing on the job and maligning them as “lazy bastards,” they were often drawing inferences about ethnic difference, insinuating that these people inherently lacked what one overseer dubbed “the German conception of work.”36 The same negative connotations applied to their seeming inability to conform to bourgeois norms of dress, consumption,

34 5/33/34: Rynkowski, 9.9.41.
36 5/33/72: Marchlewski, 10.21.41; HStM 180 Fulda, Nr. 7133, Bd. 89: Kersten to Landrat Fulda, January 23, 1942.
domesticity, and hygiene. Needless to say, all of this indicates that most Germans did not buy into egalitarian ideals of “racial kinship” that transcended ethnic and national boundaries. As one RuSHA functionary lamented in the summer of 1943, “arbitrary abuses of power” by those charged with looking after “re-Germanizables” had done nothing but “subvert the consolidation of our pan-European vision.”

Relations with German hosts grew so toxic in some areas that the police had to intervene to stop things from spiraling out of control. All throughout Germany, accounts of physical violence were far too widespread and consistent to write off as falsehoods or hyperbole. Zygmunt Malkowski and Mieczyslaw Janiak alleged that their foreman issued routine beatings on the job; for Josef Lesinski, they occurred once a week, on Sunday. Jan Karlikowski told the even more bizarre tale of how his boss reveled in chasing him around the farm with a whip. Brutality was not merely an occupational hazard either; “re-Germanizables” courted danger in public as well. In the fall of 1941, two teenagers from Mönchberg viciously assaulted Grzegorz Rynkowski, apparently just for kicks, and capped off the attack by threatening to kill him. To make matters worse, candidates did not take the abuse of their overseers lying down, and one episode recounted by Magdalena Kaczorowska illustrates the harsh consequences that retaliation could bring down upon their heads:

Our boss, Herr Übermayer, came over to our house at lunchtime. He insulted my husband and punched him in the face twice, and because my husband fought back, there was a brawl between the two of them. When I placed myself between them to calm things down, the farmer hit me as well. Afterwards, my husband went directly to the gendarme in Pferdling to ask for help. Herr Übermayer phoned the same gendarme, who thereupon arrested my husband as a foreigner and handed him over to the Gestapo in Linz. He has still not returned.

Scenes like this, combined with mounting pressure from below, finally convinced Himmler in the spring of 1942 to authorize something he had previously been loath even to contemplate: “punitive educational measures,” or rather, the internment of WED candidates in the concentration camp system “for reasons of insubordination or a politically resistant attitude.” Gestapo officers had in fact
already started arresting “re-Germanizables,” almost always at the
instigation of civilians in their districts. In a letter to the Landrat in
Fulda dated January 23, 1942, Leo Grzegorz’s host condemned him
as a fat, drunken slob, belittled his protestations of illness as “sheer
fantasy,” and added that “His entire ethos is un-German!” That same
day, local policemen detained Leo for “refusal to work, disobedience,
agitation, and the like.” Conflicts with a supervisor also triggered
the apprehension of Jadwiga Ciupinska. Because she was “not cut out
to be a domestic servant” and continued to speak Polish, Jadwiga’s
mistress demanded her removal in July 1941; the following year,
the Gestapo transferred her to the women’s concentration camp at
Ravensbrück. Zdzislaw Lorek had voluntarily changed his name to
“Franz” and done his utmost to learn the German language; that did
not save him from being denounced and shipped off to Mauthausen,
where he was beaten to death by camp guards just days after his ar-
rival. Rather than precipitating the “rapid assimilation” of “racially
valuable foreigners,” the Nazis’ bid to “recover lost German blood”
had produced the exact opposite of its intended objective, trans-
forming locales all over the Third Reich into hotbeds of inter-ethnic
antagonism. The re-Germanization procedure, it seems, had turned
out to be a total fiasco.

III.

Or was it? Ksawera Zoltobrocka certainly did not think so. In the
summer of 1941, far away from her home in western Poland, young
Ksawera lived a charmed life in the northern German province of
Holstein. The SS had enrolled her in the WED in May of that year as
a domestic servant, though her daily routine at the villa of the Georg
family was hardly onerous. She arose from bed late in the morning,
and after a few hours of chores and a quick lunch, she whiled away
the hours sunbathing and swimming in a nearby lake. Most of her
evenings were spent taking in various diversions in the port city of
Kiel. On one occasion, the Georgs even took Ksawera along on a
vacation to Berlin, where the bright lights of the “flashy city” left
a captivating impression. In a letter written to SS-Sturmbannführer Fritz
Schwalm, she thanked God for the opportunity to be “re-Germanized”
and announced with great pride that her “transition” would soon be
complete.

Police surveillance reports confirm that Ksawera’s gratitude was
not at all unusual. As one SD functionary noted in September 1942,
“Although a substantial number of Germanization attempts have miscarried, there are many others that have been brought to full fruition.” 47 While acknowledging the “disobedience” of a few “bad apples,” his colleague in Berlin concurred: “The character flaws of re-Germanizable Poles are well-known here on the basis of lengthy observation. I must explicitly emphasize, however, that there have also been many positive experiences.” 48 The SD commander in Stuttgart went much further in his praise, insisting that 85 to 90 percent of the WED candidates in Württemberg were “worthy of the honor of Germanization,” not to mention “hardworking, compliant, upstanding, thrifty, domesticated, and surprisingly clean.” 49 This was exactly what superiors wanted to hear, of course, but their subordinates did not try to conceal evidence of failure or malfeasance either. Surely the abominable plight of most “re-Germanizables” should have dampened expectations and eclipsed any glimmers of “progress.” What were the “positive experiences” that led these men to arrive at such optimistic conclusions, and what implications did they draw from them? The warm reception Ksawera Zoltobrocka enjoyed in Holstein definitely sheds light on the answer to the first question, and some German citizens adopted a much more proactive approach to “racial consolidation” than the Georgs did.

There is plenty of evidence to the effect that WED candidates did form amicable relationships with their assigned custodians — villagers, townsfolk, and city-dwellers alike. For instance, Stanisława Kowalska’s loneliness in the days following her resettlement in Ulm soon dissipated because “the woman to whom I was entrusted is very kind to me, and we get along famously.” 50 It was also not uncommon for participating households to serve as a surrogate family to their “re-Germanizable” guests and make a point of introducing them to the local community. Zofia Pieskarska recalled her time in the home of a rural doctor and his wife as one in which “I was treated as a social equal. I ate with them, traveled with them, and went with them to the movies and the theater.” 51 In the town of Mehrow, to take another example, a certain Ulrich Senf procured extra votive candles for the municipal Christmas Eve festivities in 1941 so that the WED candidates staying with him “could celebrate with us under the tree in the German style.” 52 Access to the rituals of daily life opened the door to personal connections outside the workplace too. Jan Ratajaki asserted that he and his family were “quite well-regarded” in the Dortmund neighborhood where they resided, while Stefan Wajman derived great satisfaction from the camaraderie he shared with his

49 Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg — Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg (hereafter StL) K 110, Bü 48, Bd. 28-29: SD Stuttgart to SD Aussenstellen in Württemberg, September 1, 1941.
50 2/20/10: Kowalska, 10.19.40.
51 United States National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA) RG 238/M894/15/5269: Testimony of Zofia Pieskarska, undated.
52 Heinemann, Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut, 296-297.
neighbors in the tiny hamlet of Rosengarten. Roman Sobkowiak’s circle of friends and acquaintances in Ulm encompassed a broad range of personalities, some of them die-hard Nazis, others former Socialists, each of them perfectly willing to overlook Roman’s foreign background and offer him companionship.

These expressions of conviviality coincided with a type of ethnogenesis: the fostering of what anthropologists refer to as fictive kinship. Put another way, interactions with individual Germans encouraged WED candidates to associate themselves with the German nation as a whole. “Our employers are angels,” Maria Smulska wrote in November 1940, “and we had no idea that Germans could be so nice... I had heard so many bad things about them, but now I have totally changed my mind.”

For Marianna Wawrzyniak, having “gotten to know some good people” was essential to becoming “a good patriot for our German fatherland.” Wladyslaw Adamczyk described a similar conversion: “The people here are polite and forthcoming, and I am now convinced that brotherly love prevails among the German Volk.” Such emphatic declarations of newfound loyalty undoubtedly reflected a sense of appreciation for the material benefits of German-ness. Johanna Palikowska freely admitted that she was “very content” with her placement in St. Georgen because she and her husband had decent housing and dined on “the best food available.” Yet beyond the solace of creature comforts, she also credited their happiness to the respect accorded to them by local Bavarians.

The hospitality of Irena Jasinska’s caretakers likewise laid the foundation for bonds of mutual affection. But it was their emotional support which prompted her to proclaim, “I now see that German blood flows inside of me.”

It would be foolish to take these statements entirely at face value. The authors could have embellished the truth, and we cannot verify their sincerity with certitude. It is just as plausible to argue that they were merely paying lip service to the ideals of their SS benefactors as it is to contend that they actually internalized their classification as members of a “master race.” If authentic, the pro-German sentiments voiced by WED candidates expose the degree to which Nazi racial categories could generate a self-perpetuating dynamic of identity formation. Yet even if feigned, the likelihood is that, as with any habitual pretense, the longer one played the role, the more real the façade became. Regardless of their inner motives, what mattered most in the grand scheme of things was that Himmler and his acolytes interpreted pledges of fidelity to “Germandom” as

54 Roman Sobkowiak, Ein-deutschungsfähig?! Eine polnisch-deutsche Biogra- fie im NS-Staat und in der jungen Bundesrepublik (Ulm, 2009), 48-49, 52, 63-64.
55 2/20/36: Smulska, 11.4.40.
56 5/33/62b: Wawrzyniak, 10.13.41.
58 5/32/84: Palikowska, undated.
59 2/20a/102: Jasinska, 6.24.41.
an unequivocal sign that the program had begun to bear fruit. And even though the welcoming demeanor of some Betriebsführer did not necessarily denote grassroots backing for racialized concepts of nationality, SS leaders chose to construe it as an endorsement of their principles all the same.

The fact that local policemen corroborated the accounts of WED candidates lent their letters an enormous amount of credibility as valid intelligence. After visiting with the Lamcha family in September 1941, a gendarme in Grossenlüder predicted that they would soon be “fully educated in the ways of the German peasant” thanks to the attentiveness of their employer.60 That same month, an SS advisor in Lower Saxony likewise commended the supervision of the Orzechowskis, whose overseer had made “great strides in his efforts to incorporate [them] into Germandom.”61 A prefect in the small town of Weyher was equally impressed with his constituents’ devotion, and no less confident that the “re-Germanizables” living there were “properly immersing themselves in the ethnic community.”62 Auspicious reports like this left RuSHA chief Hofmann satisfied enough to boast to a friend in the summer of 1941 that “The results of the initiative have been very good thus far.”63

A comprehensive overview on the re-Germanization procedure from December 1942 presented a somewhat more nuanced analysis of events. The SD officer who composed this document, SS-Standartenführer Hans Ehlich, did not mince words in his estimation that nearly all candidates encountered some kind of difficulty adjusting to their new surroundings. Nor did he shy away from disclosing the reality that many hosts “based their treatment of these ethnic aliens on their own false opinions” and “paid no mind to the fulfillment of their appointed ethnic-political duties.” Quick to blame complications on the “ignorance” of the Betriebsführer, he advised a stricter protocol for vetting them so as to preclude any misunderstandings in the future. Aside from “a small amount of hopeless cases,” however, Ehlich maintained that most candidates had “rapidly adapted to the German environment.” According to a sample survey of 216 families, 62 percent fit this profile, as opposed to 28 percent who were still “hesitant to commit” and 10 percent who remained “unwilling to be Germanized.” Ehlich cited a multitude of factors to substantiate his findings: that these people endeavored to “perfect their grasp of the German language,” decorated their homes with swastikas and icons of Hitler, submitted “numerous appeals to retrieve their relatives for

60 HStM 180 Fulda, Nr. 6133, Bd. 40: Gendarmerie Grossenlüder to Landrat Fulda, September 25, 1941.
61 NLH Hann. 310 I, Nr. 358, Bd. 57: Dörhöfer to Pancke, September 10, 1941.
62 HStM 180 Fulda, Nr. 6133, Bd. 282: Gendarmerie Weyher to Landrat Fulda, June 15, 1942.
63 BArch NS 2/45/160-161: Hofmann to Körbel, June 9, 1941.
Germanization,” and “affirm in their letters that they belong to the German Volk.” As further proof that the majority had undergone a “thorough acclimation,” he also referenced individual “success stories,” such as Stanislaw Wrobel’s “close rapport with his comrades,” Bronislawa Kosmala’s “interest in German culture,” and Kasimierz Procyszyn’s “stellar reputation” among the villagers of Oberhausen.64 It goes without saying that Ehlich painted an overly sunny portrait of the status quo, and a few of his more clear-eyed colleagues did not hesitate to dispute his conclusions.65 But none of them could deny that the re-Germanization procedure had yielded at least some tangible headway.

By that point, moreover, a novel development had given advocates as well as detractors a potent incentive to stay the course: citizens were no longer just participating in the WED as volunteer hosts; they were actively supplying fresh prospects too. With millions of foreign laborers quartered in locales throughout Germany and Austria, the most accessible and potentially abundant source of “lost German blood” now lay within the borders of the Reich itself. Himmler had granted the RuSHA permission to screen Polish migrant workers back in July 1941, though only in mid-1942 did the number of these examinations start to skyrocket — right around the time when the impressment of laborers from all over Europe assumed truly colossal proportions.66 From the outset, the vast majority of recommendations came from private enterprises, and the decision to accept someone into the WED depended in large part on whether he or she was “eligible for re-Germanization according to the judgment of the employer.”67 Vested with the power to augment the “ethnic community,” many Germans took advantage of this prerogative with remarkable alacrity; all they had to do was file an application with local authorities (see Figure 3). Fritz Harnasch did just that; the owner of an estate in Päwesin, he sponsored four Polish farmhands for re-Germanization in March 1941.68 Hans Graeff, the manager of a truck factory outside Hannover, saw no need to restrict himself to Poles; in September 1942, he wrote to the Landrat in Alfeld to vouch for a handful of recent hires from Hungary and Yugoslavia as well.69 Gustav Freilinghausen was an even more prolific patron; between April and August 1943, he brought in subjects for the RuSHA to evaluate on no fewer than five separate occasions.70 Much to the annoyance of the race inspectors, some proprietors declared people “capable of Germanization” without formal approval.71 In such circumstances, the “hunt for good blood” took on a life of its own.

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67 USHMMA 15.021M/1/3/30-31: Schwalm to Waldeck, January 7, 1941.

68 USHMMA 15.021M/5/36/18: Klinger to Harnasch, May 24, 1941.

69 NLH Hann. 174 Alfeld, Nr. 16/1: Graeff to Landrat Alfeld, September 25, 1942.

70 Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv — Staatsarchiv Oldenburg (hereafter StO) Best. 136, Nr. 19592.

71 USHMMA 15.021M/5/36/45-46: Klinger to Andrae, August 7, 1941.
In seeking to ascertain what compelled these seemingly ideological deeds, several factors must be considered. In the first place, German businesses were reluctant to surrender trained personnel whom the police would otherwise ship back home once their seasonal term of employment ended. In January 1942, for instance, the directors of the Thüringische Zollwell A.G. in Schwarza wanted to keep on two skilled workers indefinitely and therefore inquired as to “whether these men can be included in the Germanization program.”

The logic here hardly speaks to altruism, though it is worth noting that admission would have entailed concessions: “re-Germanizable” employees were entitled to a higher standard of living and could not be exploited with impunity. Although these requirements proved too burdensome for many firms to abide, most assented without complaint, and some even offered to accommodate the families of newly-minted WED candidates. One case in particular demonstrates the curious mix of benevolence and self-interest that characterized these proceedings, not to mention the eagerness of non-Germans to appeal for recognition. In a letter dated October 24, 1942, a farmer named Alfred Thies wrote to the SS command in Celle to endorse the petition of Stanisława Banaszak on the following grounds: “The girl has distinguished herself through her diligence in the fields. She would feel much more at home here if she were Germanized, which would also prevent her from having to return to poverty in Poland. Naturally her relatives in Poland are currently trying to effect their Germanization too. Although Stanisława does not really have a Germanic look to her, she is extremely reliable and upstanding.” Thies almost certainly had ulterior motives. But he also seems to have genuinely cared for this young woman and believed that she truly possessed “German roots” regardless of her “racial phenotype.”

Whatever their specific reasoning, individuals who contributed to the WED in this fashion facilitated the demographic aims of the National Socialist regime whether they realized it or not. Most of them probably had little to no knowledge of contemporary racial theory, though their words and actions sometimes overlapped with its precepts quite explicitly, even with military defeat lurking on the horizon. Thus
we have the story of the Hessian veterinarian Dr. Eigendorf and his nineteen-year-old Ukrainian housemaid, Valentina Vigowskaja. On December 2, 1944, Eigendorf contacted none other than Georg Rödel to propose Valentina as a candidate for re-Germanization. Beyond commenting on her blond hair and blue eyes, Eigendorf marveled at the way Valentina embodied his (sexist) conception of a “proper” German woman: “She has quickly grown accustomed to our large household and handles the tasks we assign her to complete satisfaction. She is hard-working, honest, obedient, and always cheerful. She is also eager to learn, speaks German very well, and has the will and aptitude to become an efficient housewife in the German sense with further guidance and good role models.” Even more promising was “how utterly and honestly” she renounced her native upbringing and averred that “Her greatest wish and aspiration is to be officially Germanized soon.”

Valentina’s “wish” came true a few weeks later, when Rödel diagnosed her as “physically and mentally sound” and free of “alien racial elements.” “In my opinion,” he announced, “there is no obstacle to Germanization.”

Although surviving statistics on RuSHA activity inside the Reich are woefully incomplete, it appears that approximately 20,000 foreign laborers entered the WED in roughly the same manner as Valentina Vigowskaja. Rödel and his colleagues had effectively converted the Third Reich into a vast laboratory of racial selection. Germany, however, was not where the main impact of the re-Germanization procedure ultimately landed. Long before Dr. Eigendorf made his request in late 1944, the Nazis had extended the scope of the “hunt for good blood” across the length and breadth of Europe, from the Atlantic coast all the way to the Black Sea. And as the architects of Germanization policy undertook to “recover” every last trace of “valuable stock” extant in the empire abroad, they very much drew their inspiration from what was happening simultaneously back home.

IV.

Sometime in late June 1942, Heinrich Himmler sat down to read a special document prepared for him by the brightest minds of the SS resettlement and security apparatus. Entitled the “General Plan for the East” (Generalplan Ost), it envisioned nothing less than the wholesale destruction of entire Slavic nations through the enslavement, expulsion, and mass murder of their “non-Germanizable elements.” The plan’s authors, Konrad Meyer and Hans Ehlich (whom we met...
before), condemned some thirty-one million people to death in the frozen wastelands of Siberia while awarding their homelands to a projected eight to ten million ethnic German pioneers. Beyond all that, the General Plan for the East also anticipated an unprecedented scheme of cultural genocide. As Ehlich elaborated that December, the history of German colonization in Eastern Europe had deposited huge quantities of “Nordic blood” over the course of past millennia; it was therefore necessary to “sift” the region’s non-Jewish population in order to “harvest” every person “of good race” through a process of “ethnomorphosis” (Umvolkung). The estimates for how many individuals would qualify for this “honor” directly corresponded to the obverse percentages of those targeted for elimination: 15 to 20 percent of the Poles, 15 percent of the Lithuanians, 25 percent of the Belarusians, 25 to 30 percent of the Russians, and 50 percent of the Latvians, Estonians, and Czechs respectively.

The Generalplan Ost, of course, was only implemented on a limited scale (in eastern Poland, where the RuSHA screened 113,451 inhabitants in 1942-1943 and classified around half of them as “persons of German descent”). But it does illustrate the inordinate influence the WED exerted over National Socialist rule in the occupied territories, the way in which events on the home front reverberated outward and upward through the channels of state power at center and periphery, conferring legitimacy upon biopolitical initiatives not just in Germany, but all along the fringes of the Nazi imperial frontier. As the SD’s point man on Germanization policy, Ehlich was intimately familiar with the WED, and he fed Meyer’s office reams of pertinent data to boot. Another key contributor to the plan, Erhard Wetzel, openly acknowledged that incoming reports on the program shaped his thinking as well. What these personal and institutional connections reveal is that the cooperation of Germans who did help integrate “racially kindred” foreigners, not to mention the acquiescence of many candidates themselves, served to validate the content of Himmler’s ambitions. The perception of popular backing, however modest, set the “hunt for good blood” on a far more radical trajectory, all the while pushing it in a number of different geographical directions. Hence, by the summer of 1942, with the experience of no more than thirty thousand subjects to go by, the re-Germanization procedure had morphed into a pilot project for the assimilation of millions, a template for the consolidation of the Nazi “New Order” in Europe.

The first inkling that such an agenda was in the offing came in the former Yugoslav provinces of Upper Carniola and Lower Styria.

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(modern Slovenia) in the spring of 1941, when the General Plan for the East was still being drafted. Arriving on the heels of the Wehrmacht, RuSHA functionaries began conducting racial examinations at a feverish pace, scrutinizing the bodies of native Slovenes to establish their “suitability for Germanization.” By August 1943, a team of twenty-five inspectors had evaluated just shy of 550,000 people, 96 percent of whom gained a positive verdict.81 Those deemed “racially worthy but politically unreliable” (15,532 to be exact) were earmarked for the WED and transferred to Germany “because their presence in this ethnically endangered environment was unacceptable” (see Figure 4).82 The overwhelming majority, those who ostensibly did not require the corrective atmosphere of “pure German surroundings,” stayed behind and obtained “conditional state subjeethood,” a form of provisional citizenship. The Nazi Party took over from there, enacting a compulsory platform of linguistic schooling and ideological indoctrination designed to “return the people of these areas to the ethnic community on account of their Germanic blood quotient.”83 The framework of Germanization in northwestern Yugoslavia, in other words, looked a lot like what WED candidates were expected to undergo in the Reich.

Much the same can be said about the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (the present-day Czech Republic), especially after the appointment of SS-Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich as its de facto...
governor in the autumn of 1941. Even more so than with Poles or Slovenes, the Nazis assumed that most Czechs harbored basically the same biological make-up as that of the Germans, a “racial equivalence” molded by centuries of intermingling between the two groups. Heydrich had all sorts of ideas on how to pick out “bearers of Nordic blood” and “lay the scientific foundations for [their] future Germanization”: one involved performing “aptitude tests” on Czech schoolchildren; another focused on applicants for marriage licenses; a third linked the issuance of state ID cards to assessments of “racial-biological fitness.” Here too, deportation to Germany “for the purpose of a more thorough education” became the preferred option “in borderline cases of endangered ethnic consciousness.”

Most importantly, the RuSHA exercised a large measure of authority over matters of naturalization, and by the time the war drew to a close, around 300,000 residents of the Protectorate had become German citizens.

Western Europe also became a major theater of operations in the “hunt for good blood.” In the annexed provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, wrested back from France in the spring of 1940, the award of “conditional state subjecthood” was initially contingent upon enrollment in the Nazi Party or one of its affiliated organizations. To cast the net wider, Hitler dropped this prerequisite in July 1942, and a decree from the Interior Ministry released the following month stipulated the approval of the RuSHA in all proceedings where the person in question could not verify German descent (the same guidelines applied in Luxembourg as well). “In the interest of a smooth Germanization,” one Nazi official proclaimed, it was imperative to treat all Alsatians and Lorrainers “as valuable members of the German ethnic community.” When it came to “politically unreliable” inhabitants who “had to be removed… in order to win them back for Germandom,” the WED once again became the favored vehicle of “rehabilitation.” Beginning in late 1942, the Nazis resettled approximately 15,000 people from Alsace, Lorraine, and Luxembourg to locations spread across Germany, though they represented only a tiny fraction of the 1.6 million people in these three areas who acquired German citizenship between 1940 and 1944.

It was in western Poland, however, that Nazi Germanization policy reached its apogee and grew beyond the ability of the SS to control. Although usually permitted to recruit WED candidates at will, Himmler’s race inspectors had little say in the deliberations of a
much larger system known as the Deutsche Volksliste, or DVL. Throughout the three “incorporated eastern territories” (Wartheland, Danzig-West Prussia, and Upper Silesia), the watchword of the DVL remained the same — “not a single drop of German blood may be left behind” — but the Nazi Party bureaucrats entrusted to classify the population of these regions often had highly divergent views of what that meant in practice. 91 A restrictive taxonomy based on ethno-cultural criteria prevailed in the Wartheland, where claimants also had to certify descent from a minimum of two German grandparents. In Danzig-West Prussia and Upper Silesia, on the other hand, provincial governors disregarded these qualifications almost altogether, opting instead for a more generous approach organized around standards of race so nebulous that even the RuSHA thought they went too far. Nevertheless, with the exception of the Wartheland, where the numbers were always comparatively low, registration for the Volksliste did not truly spike until after the emergence of the General Plan for the East, coinciding with the dramatic subsequent expansion of the WED. Although officially introduced in March 1941, by December of that year only around 31,000 inhabitants of Danzig-West Prussia had joined the DVL; ten months later, that figure had risen to nearly 800,000. 92 Likewise, the number of inductees in Upper Silesia stood at 238,921 in January 1942, but by the onset of 1943, its ranks had swollen to over one million. 93 As of January 1944, the Nazis had naturalized a total of 2.68 million people in the annexed provinces of western Poland, most of whom received “conditional state subjecthood.” 94 A further 250,000 can be added to this sum if we count the individuals who signed up once the Nazis transplanted the DVL to occupied Ukraine in the fall of 1942. 95

Equally as telling, in Poland as well as Ukraine, the prescribed methodology of assimilation bore a strong resemblance to the paradigm initially devised for the WED. Careful observation was one crucial aspect of this, which is why Nazi activists regularly checked in on “persons of German descent” and asked their neighbors, co-workers, and teachers “whether [they] conduct themselves like Germans.” Above all though, the real emphasis lay on forging the bonds of a “family- and community-oriented culture,” a utopian “melting pot” where ethnic distinctions faded away and sustained social interactions inspired subjects from a variety of backgrounds to live together in harmony. To attain this lofty goal, almost every conceivable Party agency presided over a range of activities such as festivals, athletic

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92 On the DVL in general, see Gerhard Wolf, Ideologie und Herrschaftsrationalität: Nationalsozialistische Germanisierungspolitik in Polen (Hamburg, 2012).
95 BArch NS 19/543: Himmler to Koch, September 8, 1942. The figures for Ukraine come from Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Das Dritte Reich und die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion (Berlin, 1986), 205-208.
events, folk dances, and group singing, each of which aimed to “root
the people more and more into the collective ethos of Germandom”
and “surround them in a National Socialist milieu.”96 As one pro-
paganda leaflet distributed in the Wartheland put it, the essence of
Germanization had nothing to do with material rewards or individu-
alistic advancement; the principal measure of success was learning
to have faith in a vision of racial unity, to recognize that “We are all
one tribe; we are all Germans.”97

That many Europeans continued to buy into this message long after
the war turned against Germany goes a long way toward explaining
why Georg Rödel and his associates kept searching for “lost German
blood” until the bitter end. They believed, in short, that German-
ization worked, and this never would have happened without the
credible displays of “progress” on the home front that animated
the “consolidation of Germandom” there as well as abroad. Under
the wartime Third Reich, racial and ethnic formats of identity often
existed in opposition to one another. The irony is that, within the
context of the WED, ordinary Germans who behaved like decent
human beings and treated immigrants with compassion wound up
fostering the construction of a racialized imperial society (wittingly
or not), whereas the more chauvinistic or malevolent among them
who clung to ethnic nativism were the ones who actually subverted
it. We should also not be too quick to judge the “re-Germanizables”
or any other would-be “Germans” for the compliant role they played
in this dubious venture, even if some readily hitched their fate to
the Nazi cause while others did so more reluctantly. The specter of
coercion (“punitive educational measures”) was never far from the
surface, and it is always easier to wax self-righteous in the abstract
when unfettered by the kind of exigencies that drain relevance from
normal codes of morality. Most of these people were not outright
 collaborators, but nor were they utterly passive victims devoid of
agency or responsibility. It would be far more accurate to say that
they succumbed to hegemony as the Marxist philosopher Antonio
Gramsci defined it: a state of affairs in which the oppressed internal-
ize and perpetuate the conceptual categories of the oppressor, a form
of subaltern adaptation, calculated or subliminal, that traps them
within the political structures of the dominant power, yet also leaves
ample room for maneuver.98 The National Socialists created exactly
this kind of situation all across the continent of Europe, bringing mil-
ions of non-Germans into the fold, though not without first testing a
prototype inside the homeland. In that sense, the re-Germanization

96 USHMMA 15.007M/9/113/221-226: Bracht,
 “Anordnung A 71,” April 17, 1942; ITS
1.2.2.0.13/82157258-265: Wohler to Schlegelberger,
March 10, 1942; BArch R
49/3533/30-34: Globocnik,
 “Richtlinien zur kulturellen
Betreuung der Siedler.” May
12, 1943. Also see Eric C.
Steinhart, The Holocaust and
the Germanization of Ukraine
(New York, 2015).

97 USHMMA 15.021M/6/38/65: “Merkblatt für
Deutschstämmige im Gau
Wartheland,” undated.

98 Antonio Gramsci, The Pri-
son Notebooks, trans. Quintin
Hoare and Geoffrey Smith
procedure was a model for Nazi empire-building, and remains a model for those who seek to understand it.

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I. The Public Role of Science

The outcome of the 2016 presidential election in the United States raised the issue of the role of science in American society. With an eye on the administration’s dismissal of research that could affect its policy agenda, researchers, librarians, and activist groups such as Data Refuge sought to find ways to secure data related to issues such as climate change stored on government servers at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or NASA. In July 2017, the Center for Science and Democracy reported that while “political interference in science is not new,” under President Donald J. Trump “these threats to the federal scientific enterprise have escalated markedly.” Meantime, research workers and their supporters took to the streets on April 22, 2017 in “Science Marches” in Washington DC and elsewhere, drawing hundreds of thousands of protesters. Some researchers were ambivalent about such well-intentioned protest lest it “turn scientists into another group caught up in the culture wars and further drive the wedge between scientists and a certain segment of the American electorate.” The administration’s policy and public responses in protest against it are part of a perhaps unprecedented politicization of science in the United States.

These recent developments prompt the historical question of how public legitimacy for science has evolved in the United States over time. Science has long played a cultural role well beyond challenging conceptions of nature or facilitating technological applications. In the United States during the cold war, science was invoked as a model of rationality akin to democracy. When sociologist of science Joseph Ben-David arrived in the United States after World War II, he believed the country to have replaced Britain as a model society. Such a society he expected to be “a scientific society.” This rhymed with the new role science had helped bestow on the federal state during World War II, when nuclear technology boosted American global influence and power. After private foundations had provided the support to implement research-based science in a top tier of

private American universities before 1940, the cold war provided the political and cultural framework for an unprecedented expansion of federal support for research. In the 1950s and 60s, physics became the poster child of science in the context of a growing federal defense establishment and the evolving space program.

In the wake of the politics of détente, in the 1970s momentum began to shift from physics to biology as the state’s most relevant research field. This shift in attention to the field of biology occurred in the context of public controversies about the risks of using new technologies to alter the DNA of living organisms (recombinant DNA or rDNA). This mid-seventies debate about genetic engineering broadened the scope of public attention to developments in science to include risks for individuals and for the environment. After Congress, in 1980, allowed universities to patent results of research that the federal government had funded, genetic engineering kicked off what came to be called the “biotech boom.” Patents derived from biological research became an important source of revenue and reshaped academia’s relations with industry as universities turned themselves into hubs for technology development and investment.

In this brief overview, I will focus on aspects of the debate on human embryonic stem cells between 1998 and 2004 as a key development for the public legitimacy of science in the United States. During this controversy, developmental biology came to represent the legitimacy of a modernist vision associated with science at large. The political history and the outcome of the debate, I would like to suggest, provide important insights into the peculiar role that science has come to play in the United States.

Many countries discussed the use of human embryonic stem cells (hES cells) after 1998 but the political and regulatory response differed widely. Hence it serves as a good example for a discussion of the challenges that follow from the scientific profession’s ongoing work of questioning the cognitive basis of worldviews. The debate involved several related topics, all of which came together to challenge the public’s notions about the role of science. The successful isolation of hES cells was an important success for the field of developmental biology, which seeks to understand the processes that generate an organism along a trajectory from embryo to adult. The cells also were hailed by patient advocacy groups for their promise of medical advances but the opposition to this research placed them into the context of debates about abortion and the status of the embryo. The
first successful cloning of a mammal two years earlier (Dolly, a female domestic sheep) had also raised important questions for biologists and the public. It prompted an international debate about the feasibility and the ethics of cloning that carried over into the discussion about stem cells. The range of practical political options that were available to the American public were restricted by the country’s specific regulatory tradition, of which at least some discussants were not fully aware. Overall, the debate about human embryonic stem cells stands out because it provided the occasion for a striking politicization of science. In 2001, stem cells were front-page news and expected to define the legacy of incoming President George W. Bush.

I will provide some context about the political history of this debate. In keeping with our current focus on the history of knowledge at the GHI Washington, however, I will concentrate on the new knowledge and on what was at stake for its proponents. The political debate had an impact on the field of developmental biology. Researchers wore two hats: They were the ones explaining to journalists and to the public at large what they had learned while they continued to test this knowledge. At the same time, their presentation of the nature and potential of hES cells was tied to the political aim of securing public funding for their work. Scientists scored an ambivalent success: While they were able to find supporters for their ongoing work on understanding early human development, the debate about hES cells played a part in fracturing the political public along party lines.

II. From Conceptualizing to Isolating Human Embryonic Stem Cells

Stem cells entered the public arena when James Thomson at the University of Wisconsin and John Gearhart at Johns Hopkins University reported that their teams had isolated embryonic stem cells (hES cells) and that they had been able to preserve in vitro the ability of these cells to grow into different types of human tissue. The concept of the stem cell had evolved since World War II. In 1949, biologist Leon Jacobson, who had been health officer at the Manhattan Project, sought to understand the relative significance of bone marrow and of the spleen in the blood-forming system, which is particularly sensitive to radiation. He found that protecting the spleen of a mouse from lethal radiation allowed the animal to live, and that something in the spleen caused the blood system to reconstitute itself after radiation had wiped it out. When it had become clear that cells were responsible for rebuilding blood, Ernest McCulloch and
James Till in 1963 inferred that certain cells could both self-renew and give rise to most if not all other blood cells. Stem cells came to be defined by their ability to choose, in the case of blood-forming stem cells, “between self-renewal (remain a stem cell after cell division) or differentiation (start the path towards becoming a mature hematopoietic cell).”

On the basis of such work, in 1969 E. Donnall Thomas performed the first bone marrow transplant on a leukemia patient, who had previously been exposed to radiation to kill cancer cells. The question remained whether transplanting bone marrow could be avoided if blood-forming cells could be located and put to use instead. But conceptualizing such cells and finding them were two different matters.

By 1981 Martin Evans at the University of Cambridge and Gail Martin at the University of California, San Francisco, were able to isolate from mice and preserve in vitro what Martin called “embryonic stem cells.” “Embryonic” stem cells were considered “pluripotent” because they could transmogrify into cells of all different cell lineages in the body. This separated them from lineage-specific stem cells that could create more specific cells only, such as blood cells (instead of, say, nerve cells). By 1991, blood-forming stem cells in mice and in humans had been identified in Irving Weissman’s lab at Stanford.11

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By the early nineties, biologists had established a hierarchical model of cells, with embryonic stem cells at the top and more differentiated stem cells below. They had been able to identify such cells in different model organisms and they had isolated human blood-forming stem cells. But they had not isolated human embryonic stem cells, which became a perhaps obvious challenge in order to verify the overall model and to make such cells available for potential therapies.

Well before national publics would discuss such matters, therefore, researchers who considered taking on such work had to take positions on the ethical questions involved. Isolating hES cells involved human fetal tissue and this touched on the contentious status of the embryo. When he set out to isolate hES cells, James Thomson worked with fertilized human eggs discarded by parents who had given consent for their use in research.12 After he retrieved the desired hES cells from the eggs, the eggs expired. Thomson had decided that he considered the knowledge and therapies to be gleaned from these discarded eggs to be more important than preserving them. But Thomson and Gearhart knew that their work would spark strong opposition. During the 1990s, so-called “Christian patriots” targeted and even assassinated abortion clinic staff.13 With reference to his research at Johns Hopkins University, Gearhart pointed out to the Washington Post in 1996 that there was “going to have to be a real educational process on how to represent this material to the public.” His work was considered “so sensitive that security officials have been apprised of the routes he takes between home and work, lest antiabortion activists or others try to harm him.”14

In the United States, a peculiar regulatory tradition set the stage for the public debate about stem cells. While other countries such as the United Kingdom had long implemented a regulatory regime for research on human embryos (including fetal tissue and fertilized eggs) that could respond to research developments and regulate by force of law, the United States had no such regulation in place. Here, the status of embryos remained unresolved. Regulation was facilitated, not through law, but through Congress allowing or preventing the tax-funded National Institutes of Health (NIH) from funding certain types of research. This kept the matter in the public arena. In 1995, Congress passed an appropriation bill rider, the so-called Dickey-Wicker Amendment, which prohibited the NIH from funding any “research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death.”15

15 Gottweis, “Endless hESC Controversy,” 557.
Because of such restrictions, Thomson and Gearhart had relied on private funds for their work. Since the 1980s, private capital had begun to play a significant role in biological research. When the idea of isolating hES cells first came up in the early 1990s, Roger Pederson at the University of California, San Francisco was approached by the biotech company Geron about doing such work. But Pederson declined because he hoped that, given the recent election of William J. Clinton, the regulatory context would change and that the president would work with Congress to change restrictions imposed on NIH funding. “I think this area of investigation is something that is so at the headwaters that it’s not appropriate for private investors to control the headwaters of the river,” he told Geron. Isolating human ES cells, he argued, would be “something that could benefit all the people and therefore it should be developed by the people, by the federal government.” 16 After Congress passed the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, however, Pederson decided to put Geron in touch with Thomson and Gearhart, who considered doing such work.

When Thomson and Gearhart were ready to announce the successful isolation of human embryonic stem cells to the public in 1998, the NIH was keen on using the momentum to convince Congress that it should be allowed to support such research. The agency put itself on track to open that route by going through the procedure to establish official guidelines for their use by NIH grant recipients, which threw the controversial issue of fetal tissue research back into the court of public debate. This time, however, the agency could counter its critics with the prospect of medical therapies and saving lives. Publication of draft guidelines in August 2000 prompted thousands of responses from the public as stem cells (along with cloning) came to dominate national news. “I think we cannot walk away from the potential to save lives and improve lives, to help people literally get up and walk, to do all kinds of things we could never have imagined,” President Clinton argued in support of the NIH proposal to fund stem cell research, “as long as we meet rigorous, ethical standards” such as the ones the NIH promised to provide. 17 But when the 2000 presidential election put Republican George W. Bush in the White House, the matter remained unresolved as both sides struggled to convince the incoming president to accept or reject NIH support for research using hES cells. By the time George W. Bush made up his mind in 2001, the NIH had put opponents of such work on the defensive. In response, these opponents sought to turn to science to keep their footing. Conservative Christians, led by the Catholic Church,

16 Stephen S. Hall, Merchants of Immortality: Chasing the Dream of Human Life Extension (Boston, 2003), 98, 122.
decided to attack hES research by pointing to what it considered viable scientific alternatives.

Such alternatives were highlighted by opponents of hES research such as Republican Senator Sam Brownback who called the use of such cells “illegal, immoral and unnecessary.” Work done on “adult” stem cells, some researchers claimed, were as useful as hES cells. Adult stem cells are more differentiated cells that function as stem cells of a particular cell lineage and can be derived from grown human bodies instead of embryos. This made them attractive to anyone looking for alternatives to hES cells. In 1999, Richard Doerflinger of the Conference of Catholic Bishops explained that scientists had no need for hES cells because “new research showed that a different kind of stem cell isolated from a patient’s own body would provide the therapeutic benefits imputed to embryonic stem cells.” Such views were echoed by journalist Nicholas Wade in the New York Times who explained that “recent experiments have shown that the blood-making stem cells can also be coaxed to make muscle cells and even nerve cells.” In the ensuing controversy, one strand of research within developmental biology was pitted against another. By hitching their wagon to one particular position in the evolving scientific debate, opponents of embryonic stem cell research had accepted the authority of science. They were thus exposed to developments within the research field that would undermine their claim. And for the field of developmental biology, the political significance of competing theoretical claims also had an important effect because researchers had to balance their interest in advancing their particular claim against their colleagues with their joint interest in preserving the integrity of their field against outside interference.

III. Adult Stem Cells as Political Ammunition

Before Thomson and Gearhart published their work on embryonic stem cells, few researchers paid attention to papers claiming that adult cells were more flexible than had been thought. Blood-forming stem cells, for example, were supposed to act as stem cells for the blood system and give rise to cells within their lineage, not to cells of another type, such as nerve or fat cells. The idea that adult stem cells were more versatile than expected derived from the other major event in the public history of biomedicine of that period, the cloning of Dolly the sheep in 1996. Cloning had been achieved by taking the...
nucleus out of an adult cell, implanting it in an egg from which the original nucleus had been removed, and by implanting this egg (with the new nucleus) in a uterus. Hence, the nucleus of an adult instead of an embryonic cell had given rise to a female domestic sheep. For developmental biologists, the transfer raised the question of how the egg had done the trick of “reprogramming” the nucleus that had come from an adult cell. They figured that cells generally received from their environment important clues about how to develop.

In 1998 and 1999 researchers began to publish papers in which they claimed that adult cells were much more flexible than previously thought. While established theory held that cell development was irreversible, two Italian teams suggested that the commitment of cells to a particular developmental fate could be changed. A Milan-based team suggested in *Science* that blood stem cells in mice could recreate muscle tissue, i.e. that they could create not just blood cells but also cells of another cell type.21 A few months later, another group reported that in mice, neural stem cells engrafted (joined) into the blood-forming system, if that system previously had been erased through radiation.22 Taken together, these papers indicated that stem cells in the adult body could potentially be harnessed for therapy. To the editors of *Science*, this was the next big thing. Representing the “promise of youth,” both papers in 1999 together were identified as “Breakthrough of the Year.”23 As developments within the field were picked up by the media while Americans (and incoming President George W. Bush) tried to make up their minds about the relevance of research using hES cells, more and more researchers joined the adult-stem-cell camp.

In January 2000, Elain Fuchs and Julia Segre pointed out that in the preceding year, “some spectacular fireworks have exploded many long-standing dogmas in the stem cell world.”24 They explained that even though adult stem cells formerly were thought to be dedicated to one cell lineage, recent work had shown that they were more flexible. But Fuchs and Segre offered few insights into how the transdifferentiation potential of such adult stem cells could be explained, let alone controlled. They conceded that while an understanding of growth factors perhaps responsible for such transformations was evolving, the system was “hopelessly complex.” But they felt certain that perceptions of what stem cells “look like and where to find them ... [had been] revolutionized.” Even though

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21 The group had transplanted genetically marked cells taken from the bone marrow into mice where these cells repaired degenerated muscles. This seemed to prove that bone-marrow-derived cells could evolve into muscle cells, indicating that these cells were more flexible than assumed in the conventional model. Giuliana Ferrari et al., “Muscle Regeneration by Bone Marrow-Derived Myogenic Progenitors,” *Science* 279, no. 5356 (March 6, 1998): 1528–30.


they could not explain what came to be called “transdifferentiation,”
they went on to promote adult stem cells as an alternative to human
embryonic stem cells. The latter had “come under serious ethical
scrutiny, with no clear resolution in sight. Adult stem cells offered
an alternative. If “the plasticity [i.e. ability to transform into cells of
another lineage] of [adult, somatic] stem cells is truly greater than
previously imagined,” they wrote,

then it may be feasible in the future to reroute easily pro-
curable [adult] stem cells to stem cells such as neuronal or
pancreatic that are more difficult to obtain. .... While such
notions may still border on the unlikely and perhaps even
preposterous, the newly discovered versatility of at least
some somatic stem cell types is provocative and may have
enormous ramifications for stem cell therapeutics in the
future.25

The momentum would eventually peak in 2002 when Minnesota-
based researcher Catherine Verfaillie made a splash by claiming to
have discovered the “ultimate stem cell.” Suggesting that this cell
had all the capabilities of human embryonic stem cells to “turn into
every single tissue in the body,” the New Scientist pointed out that
this “might turn out to be the most important cell ever discovered.”26
In response, Senator Sam Brownback and Leon Kass of the Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics praised the work as genuine and impor-
tant because it showed the promise of adult stem cells.27 The news
seemed too good to be true: A super-adult-stem-cell resolving the
ethical dilemmas posed by hES cells. But Verfaillie’s paper had not
been published in a peer-reviewed journal28 and it was immediately
attacked from many sides. One senior biologist later remembered
that he wondered about how likely it was that these results would
stand up to scrutiny, given that seventeen researchers were listed as
authors.29

Even though (or because) such papers were celebrated by editors of
prestigious academic journals, developmental biology had a problem.
At a time when the NIH was trying to convince the public and the
federal government that it should be allowed to pay for research on
human embryonic stem cells, such papers provided welcome am-
munition for those opposing it. “Opponents of using embryonic stem
cells are quite likely to cite Dr. Verfaillie’s findings,” the New York
Times observed, “to support their argument that cell therapy can be

25 Ibid., 153.
26 Sylvia Pagán Westphal
Boston, “Ultimate Stem
Cell Discovered,” New Sci-
entist, January 23, 2002,
https://www.newscientist.
com/article/dn1826-
ultimate-stem-cell-
discovered/.
27 Hall, Merchants of Immor-
tality, 242.
28 Ibid., 397 n. 242.
29 Author’s interview with
based on adult stem cells alone.” In an important strategic reorientation, American anti-abortion groups began to lean on adult stem cells as the perfect argument against human embryonic stem cells. If indeed stem cells were about the regeneration of tissue, anti-abortion advocates argued, why not use adult cells that could be taken from the patient’s body? In the spring of 1999, Sam Brownback began to argue that research using human embryonic stem cells was unnecessary. “Destructive embryo research,” he declared, was less promising than research on adult stem cells. “We should focus our attention on legitimate research,” he wrote in a letter to the Washington Post, criticizing that paper’s more liberal stance. Brownback’s reasoning rhymed with advice emerging from the Vatican: “The progress and results obtained in the field of adult stem cells (ASC),” the Pontifical Academy for Life suggested in August 2000, “show not only their great plasticity but also their many possible uses, in all likelihood no different from those of embryonic stem cells.”

By endorsing this position, however, the Catholic Church and spokesmen of the religious right came to share its fate. The endorsement reflected an urge not to stand in the way of promising medical therapy, and to endorse biomedical research where it aligned with religious values. As it turned out, religious endorsement and active support for one side in the emerging scientific debate challenged the research field to retain its balance in two ways: First, by preserving its research standards at a time when editorial choices by publications such as Science and Nature seemed to respond to public debate; and second, by preserving all promising research options, including research on embryonic stem cells, at a time when that option was questioned from within science itself.

In the ensuing debate, the NIH and prominent researchers in the field of developmental biology took the stance that while adult stem cell plasticity was not proven, all options should be investigated, including research on human embryonic stem cells. Stanford-based biologist Irving Weissman emerged as a vocal critic of adult stem cells. He had been instrumental in developing the stem-cell concept during the previous decades. He had identified the first blood-forming stem cell in mice in 1988 and then in humans four years later. In response to claims about the plasticity of adult stem cells, he co-authored an editorial with Nobel laureate David Baltimore in April 2001. Determined to stem the tide against hES research, they insisted that groups involved in the policy-making process had to make a
decision on the basis of available facts, among them the reality that “published accounts suggesting adult stem cell pluripotency [i.e. the ability to give rise to cells of various lineages] have not successfully established that one type can produce a cell of another tissue type.” While adult stem cells might indeed prove to be valuable in the future, such value had not been shown. Accordingly they called adult cell plasticity “simply a hope, and it would be foolish to abandon the surer path for the unproven one.”

As the debate on NIH guidelines intensified during the summer and the New York Times reported on the topic every single day during the month of July, researchers had begun to fight back. In June 2001 Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy G. Thompson circulated a report by the NIH concluding that stem cells derived from embryos, despite immune-reaction issues, were “more promising for developing cures for a range of debilitating diseases than stem cells from the bones and organs of adults.” Based on a review of literature and on interviews with researchers, the study “affirms the scientific consensus” that all “avenues of research should be exhaustively investigated, including both adult and embryonic sources of tissue.”

At an event held by the National Academy of Sciences in the summer of 2001 Irving Weissman strongly rejected adult-cell alternatives as “a delaying tactic when the need [for therapies] is urgent.” But efforts to unshackle NIH funding for this type of fetal tissue research and the implicit claim for a new legitimacy for embryo research were bound to run into problems as long as the relative advantage of hES cells over adult stem cells could not be spelled out on the basis of evidence-based clarifications. Weissman attacked claims about the malleability of adult stem cells on two levels, in papers he published in peer-reviewed journals and by taking a stance in the wider public, pointing out that adult stem cell plasticity was all but certain. Weissman could not yet show that adult stem cells were less powerful, as claimed by some of his colleagues. But he and other proponents of such work were nevertheless able to convince enough conservatives to force a compromise on the incoming president.

By 2001 there was considerable public buzz about adult stem cells. The Wall Street Journal in April quoted a spokesman for the American Life League who pointed out that due to their coverage in the national media, adult stem cells had become “the keystone in our public relations battle” against embryonic stem cells. A paper by a UCLA plastic surgeon who claimed to have turned readily available fat

cells into bone and muscle cells was reported by all three TV nightly network newscasts.\textsuperscript{37} As journalists struggled to make sense of the details, many science writers touted the virtues of the adult-stem-cell alternative.\textsuperscript{38} Developmental biologist Austin Smith complained that transdifferentiation by adult cells was “picked up by politicians and lobbying groups” and that it turned out to be “quite difficult to argue against [them] because they will just list all these published [scientific] papers.”\textsuperscript{39}

In the meantime, President Bush and his advisors were moving towards a decision. Conservatives insisted that the president deliver on campaign promises to the pro-life camp. The president of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, Richard Land, argued that not following through on the stem cell issue would be “the cultural equivalent of going back on the [President H. W. Bush’s] no-new-taxes pledge” (which had helped Bush win the 1988 presidential election before it came to haunt him after a budget compromise two years later).\textsuperscript{40} But proponents of embryonic-stem-cell research were able to muster new support in Congress. During the summer some members of Congress defected the anti-abortion camp and came out in support of research on hES cells, among them Republican Senators Orrin G. Hatch and Bill Frist.\textsuperscript{41} In July, Nancy Reagan joined the supporters.\textsuperscript{42} That month, a bipartisan group of 61 senators signed a letter written by Senator John Kerry to President Bush, asking him to permit use of federal funds for human embryonic stem cell research.\textsuperscript{43}

A compromise emerged when scientists signaled that they would be content with a limited number of hES cell lines instead of all-out NIH support. Weissman in late June told the \textit{New York Times} that a “finite number [of hES cell lines] would be sufficient.” He added that if “we had 10 to 15 cell lines, no one would complain.”\textsuperscript{44} A decision seemed imminent when Bush went to visit Pope John Paul II on July 23. The administration wanted the stem cell issue off the table prior to that trip so as not to appear to align with the Vatican on the issue. Bush announced a compromise solution in his first television address as president of the United States on August 9, 2001: The NIH would fund research on human embryonic stem cell lines that had


already been isolated, but not on new embryonic stem cell lines derived from fertilized eggs after the day of his announcement. While some liberals considered Bush’s decision a scandal, it was in fact a lenient solution, allowing the NIH to fund research, albeit only on some embryonic stem cell lines. A senior scientist familiar with the 1990 German Embryonenschutzgesetz pointed out that in addition to not prohibiting such work by law (which was in line with the American regulatory tradition), the decision provided research with options by allowing some NIH funding. Such funding provided public endorsement and legitimacy for work with hES cells. For opponents of hES research, however, the Bush decision was not yet a total defeat. Some conservatives had bolted over the issue of stem cells, which suggested that the biomedical community had provided effective public leadership on behalf of science. But religious conservatives would continue to exert pressure through the viable alternative of adult stem cell research until 2002, when developmental biologists disproved their claims.

That year, Weissman published a paper in Science in which his team refuted the key claim that adult stem cells of one lineage were sufficiently flexible to give rise to cells of another type. Weissman had questioned such plasticity in earlier publications. In 2000, he had asserted that in cases where adult cell plasticity seemed to have been observed “I propose that neither dedifferentiation nor transdifferentiation occurred ..., but rather that stem cells ... in unexpected places are responsible.” At that time, Weissman had challenged his opponents to show that when they reported that blood-forming stem cells made muscle cells, it was indeed blood-forming stem cells that did the job, not muscle-forming stem cells. Fuchs and Segre had emphasized potential medical

45 Author’s interview with Rudolf Jaenisch, 2012.
applications for adult stem cells while Weissman had discussed the broader significance of the stem cell concept for the “evolution of development” and the field of biology. Two years later, Weissman had directed experiments on adult cells himself. He made sure that he knew what he was looking at by inserting into the host organism only one single adult blood-forming stem cell. When his team looked at what this adult cell did, they found “little evidence” that it contributed to anything other than what it was supposed to do: make blood cells.46 For the time being, Weissman’s paper had the effect of discrediting the idea of adult stem cell plasticity. One of his opponents later complained that the “prestige of the journal in which it appeared, let alone the prestige of the laboratory from which it emerged,” guaranteed that Weissman’s paper would have “a central and enduring role in all discussions of the entire field.”47 In December 2002, *Science* reported that adult stem cell studies, “particularly those by newcomers to the field” had come under increased attack.48

### IV. Rallying California behind Embryonic Stem Cell Science

Within the field of developmental biology, one may surmise that adult stem cells may not have received as much attention after 1998 had they not been an important instrument in political debate. But the promise of adult stem cells threatened to limit NIH funding for hES research and so researchers such as Irving Weissman began to address adult-stem-cell claims head-on. In doing so, they demanded that their field retain all research options instead of limiting them. But their involvement had effects that transcended future opportunities for their research field. Because these researchers had provided effective arguments in a political fight about policy, their perspective acquired a political value for Democrats in their political efforts to confront President George W. Bush. The leverage provided by this topic became all the more relevant in the wake of 9/11 and the difficulties involved in criticizing a president when America was “under attack.” In the context of an increasingly unpopular war in Afghanistan and in Iraq, stem cell research offered a progressive alternative for (and to) national policy. In 2004, presidential candidate John Kerry waved the banner of scientific progress in the face of George W. Bush, whose 2001 compromise on hES cells Democrats declared too restrictive. Democrats used the promise of stem cell research as a symbol to claim scientific modernism for their party, and to deny it to their political opponents. At their national

46 Amy J. Wagers et al., “Little Evidence for Developmental Plasticity of Adult Hematopoietic Stem Cells,” *Science* 297, no. 5590 (September 27, 2002): 2256–59. The paper had been submitted in June 2002. Another article had tested and questioned transdifferentiation: Raymond F. Castro et al., “Failure of Bone Marrow Cells to Transdifferentiate into Neural Cells in Vivo,” *Science* 297, no. 5585 (August 23, 2002): 1299. Neil D. Theise, “Stem Cell Research: Elephants in the Room,” *Mayo Clinic Proceedings* 78, no. 8 (August 1, 2003): 1008. When challenged by transdifferentiation proponents (in a letter to the editors of *Science*) to provide an “adequate description of the methodologies used” so as to make sure that the same markers were used to identify the cells, Weissman’s group pointed out that their experiments had not been “designed to replicate precisely the work of other investigators, but to clarify and extent their observations by reestablishing, through the transplantation of single... isolated... HSC” whether the production of cell types other than blood-cells was part of their common function. Some transdifferentiation proponents remained unconvinced, arguing that Weissman’s group should have reproduced their experiment, not improve on it.


convention, they were able to present Ronald Reagan’s son Ron Reagan who explained in his televised speech that Americans had to choose between “reason and ignorance, between true compassion and mere ideology” and that they should cast a vote for the Democratic Party and embryonic stem cell research.49 Such claims had important effects at a time when the American political landscape was shifting. No federal law existed to ban research using human embryonic stem cells. Bush was reelected to the White House in 2004 and continued to prevent the NIH from funding such work. But others remained free to do so. While some American states restricted work on stem cells by law, others endorsed an opportunity to outflank Washington.50

In 2004, the State of California passed Proposition 71, a ballot measure dedicated to human embryonic stem cell research. “It’s the first time I know of that a state has said that the federal government has neglected its opportunity to lead in this area of research,” Irving Weissman argued, “so it is the right of the states to take over where the federal government left off.”51 Real estate developer Robert Klein, father to a son with type 1 diabetes, initiated and helped fund a multimillion dollar campaign for Proposition 71. This state referendum created the California Institute of Regenerative Medicine (CIRM) which was funded by a three billion dollar bond issue over ten years and shielded from state lawmakers through elaborate constitutional anchors. CIRM outflanked the NIH to become the largest funder of stem cell research in the world. It allowed researchers to work with human embryonic stem cell lines other than the ones the NIH allowed for after the 2001 Bush decision. At the time of the California referendum in 2004, the U.S. was bogged down in costly and unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Klein and his supporters — the medical profession, patient-advocacy groups, and journalists — in a well-organized public campaign used biomedicine as a means to reinvigorate ambitions for preserving the state’s leadership in science and technology, and as a popular progressive movement against George W. Bush in Washington and against state’s political establishment in Sacramento (even if Democrats controlled the State Legislature while Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger was Governor). The pro-stem-cell line-up included well-known actors Michael J. Fox, who suffers from Parkinson’s, and Christopher Reeves, who had suffered a severe spinal cord injury. While key advisers such as Weissman helped design CIRM as an agency that would oversee the development of findings from research to therapy and clinical testing


(for companies a costly “valley of death”), campaign managers overplayed the promise of therapies for major diseases.52

Not surprisingly, therapies would be slow in the making. In 2012, one researcher explained that there was “quite a bit of pressure” on the stem cell research community in California, given that development of a drug, if successful at all, usually costs a billion dollars and takes fifteen years. But CIRM’s funding system was geared towards therapies. “They want you to develop a drug and get it into trials,” which required adjustment by academics focused on basic research.53 In 2018, CIRM funds 48 clinical trials, including one on the use of stem cells to treat blindness from age-related macular degeneration, which appeared promising, but no marketable therapy has emerged thus far.54 CIRM is “always looking for a blockbuster success that may never come,” the Los Angeles Times observed in 2015.55 If such a blockbuster drug were to materialize from CIRM grants, however, Proposition 71 would secure for the State of California income from patents, royalties, and licenses.56 While the federal government had retained the option for research on human embryonic stem cell research, therefore, a California stem cell coalition in 2004 successfully emphasized federal hesitations and created a new symbol for scientific progress around which to rally their state. Other states, such as Missouri, New York, and Massachusetts, have also responded to the stem cell hype. By 2007, all American states together spent over 500 million dollars a year on stem cell research.57 These developments attest to major shifts in the relationship between the states and the federal government since 1980, and in the shifting and increasingly polarized role of science in America.

Adult stem cells would stage a comeback after 2006 when Shinya Yamanaka showed how adult cells could be reprogrammed into

53 Author’s interview with stem cell researcher, October 2012.
54 See CIRM website, https://www.cirm.ca.gov/clinical-trials.
pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells), which could then give rise to cells of a different lineage. This confirmed critics’ earlier hesitations to endorse the idea of “transdifferentiation” while it showed that cells indeed could be nudged to create cells of a different cell lineage if they were first pushed back to an earlier (pluripotent) state. Supporters of former President George W. Bush claimed that such work had become possible because of their insistence on finding alternatives to hES cells. By that time, however, the prospect of translating such work into therapy seemed remote as the public had learned to be wary of inflated promises. Even though Yamanaka suggested that his work had initially been prompted by concerns about using human embryonic stem cells, it provided little relief to the Catholic Church, one of the key opponents of research using hES. In a 2007 publication by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, Cardinal Lehmann in his essay on “Bioethik und Menschenrechte” (bioethics and human rights) did not refer to adult stem cells. And in her introductory essay to the same volume, biologist Nicole le Douarin left no doubt that results of studies on adult stem cells, which had been “reported in the flurry of scientific literature … during the past few years[,] failed to be confirmed by other research groups.”

V. Conclusion

The stem cell debates in the United States between 1998 and 2004 were remarkable for many reasons. While other countries, such as the United Kingdom or Germany, relied on a regulatory framework in dealing with new knowledge and with the options it opened up for research and for medicine, the United States had no such legal system in place. When the NIH wanted the federal government to endorse the research and to fund it, a decision had to be made by Congress and the president, which put the matter into the public arena. In this article, I have focused on the debate’s impact on the field of developmental biology and on how the field struggled to preserve its coherence at a time when some of its ideas were used in an attempt to limit research options. During this debate, proponents of adult stem cell plasticity unwittingly provided ammunition for political opponents of research on human embryonic stem cells. While no one at the time knew whether adult stem cells really did what some claimed they could do, prominent researchers in the field advocated that all stem cell research, including research on hES cells, should retain public funding through the NIH. In this way, they pursued (national) public endorsement and support for the knowledge they had established

58 Unlike earlier ideas associated with adult stem cell plasticity, instead of a “transdifferentiation” of adult cells from one cell lineage straight to another, what could be achieved was a “dedifferentiation” of adult cells to an earlier stage, which then opened up to them a different lineage pathway. For his overall assessment of research developments in view of his own contribution, see Shinya Yamanaka, “Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells: Past, Present, and Future,” Cell Stem Cell 10, no. 6 (June 14, 2012): 678–84.


and for the knowledge they hoped to gain. Other influential groups, such as patient advocacy groups, strongly supported such demands. Even though the medical promise of stem cell research was frequently exaggerated, it allowed its advocates to recruit conservatives such as Nancy Reagan to their campaign. For the Democratic Party, this provided political leverage to attack conservative world views centered on the abortion issue. But in 2004, Democrats were unable to unseat George W. Bush, who returned to the White House. The campaign for science that human embryonic stem cells had come to represent was endorsed in particular states instead of at the national level, a pattern that continues to play out today.

LEARNING AT THE MARGINS: THE CREATION AND DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS AND JEWS SINCE THE 1880S

Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI) and Howard University, September 7-9, 2017. Conveners: Elisabeth Engel (GHI), Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (University of Augsburg), Kierra Crago-Schneider (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, USHMM), Yvonne Poser (Howard University). Participants: Aaron Bryant (National Museum of African American History and Culture, NMAAHC), Charles L. Chavis, Jr. (Morgan State University), Danielle Christmas (University of North Carolina), Marlen Eckl (University of São Paulo), Cedric Essi (University of Bremen), Robert M. Ehrenreich (USHMM), Lonneke Geerlings (Free University, Amsterdam), Lisa Gerlach (GHI), Douglas Irvin-Erickson (George Mason University), Jürgen Kocka (Professor Emeritus, Humboldt University Berlin), Kerstin von der Krone (GHI), Joyce Ladner (Professor Emerita, Howard University), Simone Lässig (GHI), Jim Loewen (Professor Emeritus, University of Vermont), Bernard Mair (Howard University), Beverly Mitchell (Wesley Theological Seminary), Jan Neubauer (University of Munich), Thomas Pegelow Kaplan (Appalachian State University), Atiba Pertilla (GHI), Kevi Phillips (Harvard University), Dan J. Puckett (Troy University), Richard Rubenstein (George Mason University), Keith Singleton (George Mason University), Jonathan Skolnik (University of Massachusetts), Frederick Ware (Howard University School of Divinity), David Weinfeld (Virginia Commonwealth University).

This conference focused on different aspects of two marginalized communities, African Americans and Jews, who collaborated in the area of education and knowledge exchange, learning together and from each other in the long twentieth century. The conference opening took place at Howard University and began with a public, well attended screening of the film “Rosenwald,” which was followed by a lively discussion with the film’s director, Aviva Kempner. On Friday, Bernard Mair, Simone Lässig, Robert M. Ehrenreich, and the conveners made additional opening remarks.

Frederick Ware chaired the conference’s first panel. Charles L. Chavis, Jr. presented the case of the lynching of Matthew Williams on December 4, 1931 in Salisbury, Maryland. The focus of his paper, “‘A Strange and Bitter Crop’: Black and Jewish Responses to Race Lynching on
Maryland’s Eastern Shore,” was on the roles of Dr. A.D. Brown, a black physician, and Rabbi Edward L. Israel. In the aftermath of this particularly brutal murder both Brown and Israel, who was an advocate for social justice, challenged political and religious leaders to break their silence and continued to speak about the injustice of lynching. Israel did so especially in his sermons, stressing that it was the duty of Christians and Jews to fight for social justice.

In his talk on “Mass Violence and Political Culture: Epistemic Interventions of Jewish Survivors and Activists of the African-American Freedom Struggle during the 1960s and 1970s,” Thomas Pegelow Kaplan linked the comparisons between the U.S. government in the 1960s to the NSDAP as well as the usage of the term genocide regarding the treatment of African Americans to the individual memories and experiences of Holocaust survivors. He explained that the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as well as the Black Panthers appropriated certain images and language that were connected to the Holocaust with the intention to raise emotions and draw people’s attention to the similarity of the suffering of African Americans and the Jews in the Third Reich.

Next, Dan J. Puckett spoke about “Jews, Jim Crow, and the Holocaust.” He showed convincingly how Southern Jews were deeply involved in an international network of North American and European Jews and that they were aware of the threat of National Socialism and the Holocaust. Southern Jews engaged in helping persecuted Jews and spoke out against the Nazi regime. They did not make the connection between the Nuremberg Laws and the Jim Crow Laws as African Americans did, however. They emphasized the similarities they saw between the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazis, for example as part of the Double V Campaign, promoting the fight for democracy abroad and within the U.S. for African Americans.

In the second panel, “Subaltern Histories on the Silver Screen,” chaired by Aaron Bryant, Danielle Christmas shared her recent research on the presentation of racism and anti-Semitism in a talk entitled “Camping up Atrocity: Jew Hunters, Circus Plantations, & American Horror Stories.” Discussing the popular TV series American Horror Story (2011–) and analyzing the Tarantino films Inglorious Basterds (2009) and Django Unchained (2012), Christmas convincingly argued that by presenting slave-plantations in an absurd, “candy-land” fashion where the evil slaveholders are obviously insane and by depicting anti-Semitism as a form of madness of a few German Nazis,
these types of movies ultimately trivialize slavery and the Holocaust. Talking about movies from the 1930s and 1960s, Jonathan Skolnik’s contribution, “‘Two Must have Got Hanged Together’: German Exiles, Hollywood, and Race in America,” focused on an examination of Fritz Lang’s *Fury* (1936) and Sidney Lumet’s *The Pawnbroker* (1964). The presentation dealt with the question of parallels and differences between the African American and the European Jewish experience. By choosing these two examples, Skolnik was also able to illustrate two very different ways to handle these topics. While *The Pawnbroker* hinted at parallels in the discrimination against African Americans and Jews through a particular setting and mood in the movie, namely the slums of New York, which allowed comparisons with Jewish ghettos, *The Fury* thematized lynching even though it had a white protagonist (in contrast to the novel on which the movie is based) and made the connection between the black and the Jewish experience, as expressed in one significant line in the movie: “Two must have got hanged together.”

Atiba Pertilla chaired the last panel of the day, whose topic was “Race and Gender in the Struggle for Freedom and Emancipation.” The first paper, “Race Was the Crucial Issue in America,” by Marlen Eckl focused on Gerda Lerner and the promotion of African American women’s history. Giving insight into the fascinating biography and work of Gerda Lerner, Eckl not only emphasized her importance for the field of women’s history, but for African American women’s history in particular. She pointed out that Lerner’s experience of being a persecuted Jew during National Socialism prevented her from assimilating to “the evil of racism” in the United States. Eckl not only showed how Lerner promoted African American female scholars later on in her career, but also that she insisted that research be pursued regardless of race, religion and gender. Lerner firmly believed that new knowledge emerges only in debates among scholars with different backgrounds and points of view.

“Cross-Racial Mothering as a ‘Conversion’ Experience in the Interracial Family Memoir” was the title of Cedric Essi’s paper. Focusing on the experience of white Jewish mothers of black children, Essi thematized the topic of claiming kinship across color lines. Showing both sides of the spectrum through the examples of Jane Lazarre, who described her transformation to a black mother as empowering and as a rebirth, and Rachel Deborah Schilsky, who experienced being excluded from her white social circles as a form of death. The talk
also touched on topics such as the mothers not only experiencing metaphorical blackness, but noticing bodily transformations, and the different stages of the “conversion” of the mothers. Most importantly, the paper emphasized specific violence against the black community in terms of knowledge production and memory, since many sources in American history tend to exclude the black experience.

Jan Neubauer presented the last paper of the day, titled “Bayard Rustin, Human Rights, and the Holocaust.” He showed how Rustin’s experience of being a pacifist during the Second World War and his knowledge about the Holocaust influenced many of his subsequent activities. It was one of his core beliefs that practicing non-violence was the only way to prevent another holocaust. He also saw similarities between the antidemocratic character of the Jim Crow laws and the National Socialist regime, though he clearly acknowledged that they are not the same. In 1975, Rustin became director of BASIC (Black Americans to Support Israel). In his overall work, he stood for an integrated society in which neither race nor religion, neither class nor sexuality should be cause for discrimination.

The conference’s last day began with the fourth panel, which focused on “Reflections on the Policies of Racial Oppression and Genocide in African American and Jewish Discourses,” chaired by Beverly Mitchell. Douglas Irvin-Erickson gave a talk titled “We Charge Genocide: R. Lemkin, W. L. Patterson, P. Robeson, W. E. B. Du Bois and the Politics of Race and Genocide in the United States (1949-1959).” Divining into the history of the famous paper by the Civil Rights Congress and the philosophical theories accompanying it, Erickson pointed out that one must not only take into consideration the physical violence of genocide but also the destruction it wrought on the processes of group formations. Referring to historian Simon Dubnow, the 1951 CRC paper stated that a nation is tied together by consciousness and that the true horror of genocide is the destruction of this shared awareness, knowledge and tradition.

In his talk on “The Black Experience: A Historical Analysis of Genocide & Ethnic Control in the U.S.,” Keith Singleton argued that the unresolved issue of African American human rights not being acknowledged by all members of society although civil rights were implemented is rooted in the history of the treatment of African American communities. He stated that every period of African American history had its own kind of disruption of the community. Starting with slavery, where people were being dehumanized and seen
as economic commodities, he showed that those disruptions were not only a process of mass violence, but a way to disconnect people from their own history and culture in order to keep them down and capitalize on them.

The next panel on “Moving beyond Academia: Teachers as Activists for Social Change” was chaired by Kerstin von der Krone. David Weinfeld gave a talk on “Black-Jewish Relations in Academia: Alain Locke, Horace Kallen and the Howard University “Minority Groups” Conference of 1935,” in which he characterized the relations between Locke and Kallen as a very specific kind of friendship. Going into biographical detail about this relationship, Weinfeld not only made the point that universities provide an ideal setting to form these kinds of sometimes productive, sometimes quarreling friendships between thinkers. He also introduced friendship as a fitting metaphor for the term cultural pluralism, since it did not imply sameness — as opposed to brotherhood — or suggest an identical starting point, but a common bond.

The second paper, titled “Time and Money: African Americans, Jews and the Colored YMCA Campaign,” was given by Kenvi Phillips. Referring back to the film screening that opened the conference, Phillips gave insight into Julius Rosenwald’s dedicated work to combat race hatred. This even included funding a Christian institution, as long as it was also accessible to black people. Phillips characterized Jesse Moorland as another hard worker for the colored-YMCA-campaign, showing that it took the efforts of many influential people to establish this institution. Her most important point was the fact that the colored-YMCA — after existing in the form of a conscious group that would meet at different places — reached its full potential by getting a physical space, a house, built out of and standing for the ideals of the colored-YMCA and providing space for a community that matters.

Lonneke Geerlings gave the last talk of the panel, discussing Rosey E. Pool’s lecture tour to HBCUs in the Deep South, 1959-1960. Her paper, titled “That Piece of Yellow Cotton Became My Black Skin,” discussed the Dutch Jewish translator, educator, and anthologist of African American poetry Rosey Pool, who visited Black Colleges in the South on one of her many postwar trips to the USA. Pool understood these colleges as spaces in which blacks and whites could talk equally, and she reported on her own experience of the National Socialists’ racial persecution of Jews. Geerlings also showed how Pool
used her humor and satirical notions when confronting white people in the south with their racism.

The last part of the conference consisted of a Contemporary Witness Panel (Panel Six), which dealt with the experience of German Jewish refugee scholars in the Southern United States following the Second World War. The panel’s chair, Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, first showed a brief film clip of interviews that she had prepared with two Jewish refugee scholars, Wilma and Georg Iggers. In the film, the two shared insights on their decision to teach at Black Colleges in the South and become actively involved in the civil rights movement despite harassment from white segregationists. Finally, historians Jim Loewen and Jürgen Kocka and sociologist, civil rights activist, and former SNCC member Joyce Ladner talked about their specific experiences regarding Black and Jewish relations in the postwar South. All of them were connected by being friends with and/or mentees of the Jewish refugee scholar Ernst Borinski, who taught at Tougaloo College in Mississippi from the 1940s to the 1980s, defied segregationist norms and became a major agent of bringing white and black scholars together.

Altogether, the different parts of the conference helped to illuminate the history of unique frameworks and collaborations that emerged within the educational spheres of African Americans and Jews throughout the twentieth century. The conference was thus able to show new concepts of knowledge exchange within academic and nonacademic communities as well as draw attention to lesser-known aspects of the history of African-American/Jewish relations in the long twentieth century.

Lisa Gerlach (University of Bochum)
INHERITANCE PRACTICES: FAMILY, PROPERTY AND WEALTH TRANSFERS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Workshop held at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), September 15, 2017. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Hoerner Bank AG, Heilbronn. Conveners: Jürgen Dinkel (University of Leipzig), Simone Lässig (GHI), Vanessa Ogle (University of California Berkeley). Participants: Simone Derix (University of Munich/University of Duisburg-Essen), Elisabeth Engel (GHI), Shennette M. Garrett-Scott (University of Mississippi), David Green (King's College London), Hendrik Hartog (Princeton University), Alastair Owens (Queen Mary University of London), Ute Schneider (University of Duisburg-Essen), Elke E. Stockreiter (American University).

The examination of inheritance patterns in the twentieth century is an emerging research topic among historians. It is spurred by public and political debates in Western countries about a growing gap between the rich and the poor and the causes for social inequality. In particular, the question of inherited wealth and its relation to rising inequality over the course of the past century prompted heightened interest. However, in contrast to the public debates about unearned wealth, only little empirical research has been done on inheritance patterns in Western societies. Therefore it was one major goal of this workshop — as Simone Lässig and Jürgen Dinkel outlined in their introductory remarks — to bring together scholars who have already conducted research on inheritance patterns in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and to discuss their arguments, methodological approaches and archival sources.

Alastair Owens and David Green presented the results of a collaborative research project analyzing the interdependencies between inheritance patterns, the state and middle-class families in England and Wales from 1850 until 1930. Both argued that for members of the middle class in England and Wales, the political and legal reforms during this period made it easier and more secure to keep property within the family. Together with social traditions and individual bequest patterns the wider legal frameworks provided incentives to keep wealth in the family. In his comment Hendrik Hartog highlighted the usefulness of the “wealthfare” concept introduced by Owens and Green. It brings policies to the foreground that support decedents to keep their wealth in the family, thus stabilizing the status quo.
Jürgen Dinkel and Ute Schneider both focused on inheritance transfers within transnational families and on property transfers across political borders. They both emphasized that migration between countries happened frequently in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus, the spatially absent decedent or heir was a common figure in inheritance transfers. In this context Dinkel analyzed inheritance transfers from the U.S. to the Soviet Union from the late 1940s until the 1970s, and Schneider examined inheritance transfers between the two Germanys. The Cold War, they found, greatly influenced transnational inheritance transfers beyond the iron curtain. Under these circumstances, international organizations and international legal experts as well as family networks became increasingly important for successful estate transfers, and some family members often overlooked in studies on families, including siblings and illegitimate children as well as nieces and nephews, became influential intermediaries, informants, and recipients of estate funds.

Simone Derix’s paper also dealt with a transnational family. Based on her research on the Thyssen family, a transnational ultra-affluent family, she also argued that the analysis of inheritance transfers must not be limited to studying last wills and testaments and the actions of decedents and heirs. Derix pointed to a vast range of rules, instruments, and institutions as well as actors involved (legal and financial advisors, notaries, etc.), that we have to bring into the picture. Furthermore, Derix provided a detailed picture of the variety of strategies related to legal matters and conflict management the Thyssen family members used to deal with inter-family property transfers. In her comment Vanessa Ogle emphasized the broader political and economic contexts in the Western capitalist world in which these transnational property transfers occurred.

Studies of inheritance tend to be rather narrowly concerned with documenting the distribution of wealth at death in understanding “who got what” in contrast to the broader range of factors all participants discussed and highlighted. In the final discussion participants pointed out three major findings of the workshop that serve to broaden this common approach: First, all of the papers stressed the equal importance of the broader political, economic and legal frameworks within which inheritance transfers occurred, as well as a broader set of actors who influenced the distribution of estates — like lawyers and attorneys, family members, friends, and transnational agencies. Second, the history of family and kinship in the twentieth century is
often described as a process stretching from the extended family to the nuclear family as the norm, and as a process through which family members were bound together less by economic calculations than by emotions. However, as became evident in all papers, family and kinship relations in the twentieth century were much broader than suggested and based on both emotions and economic calculations. Third, drawing on this observation all participants highlighted the persistence of non-market exchange into modern times. Goods and services continue to be transferred without the benefit of markets or prices, to be exchanged as gifts within (transnational) personal networks. Inheritance transfers are one type of these transactions, and thus have to be analyzed within a broader setting of property transfers.

Jürgen Dinkel (University of Leipzig)
EMPIRES OF KNOWLEDGE: EXPERTISE AND IMPERIAL POWER ACROSS THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY

GHI West inaugural workshop at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver (UBC), September 15-16, 2017. Co-organized by GHI West (Pacific Regional Office of the German Historical Institute Washington), the Department of History at UBC, and the Department of History at Georgia Institute of Technology. Made possible by the B&B Stern Foundation in Atlanta, GA, the Liu Institute for Global Issues at UBC, the Faculty of Arts and the Department of History at UBC, and Green College on the UBC campus. Conveners: Axel Jansen (GHI Washington), John Krige (Georgia Tech), Jessica Wang (UBC). Participants: Robert Brain (UBC), Jeffrey Byrne (UBC), Julia Cummiskey (University of Tennessee at Chattanooga), Amanda Domingues (Georgia Institute of Technology), Sarah Ehlers (Technical University of Munich), Mark Hendrickson (University of California, San Diego), Prakash Kumar (Pennsylvania State University), David Lazar (GHI Washington), Steven Lee (UBC), David Morton (UBC), Ruth Rogaski (Vanderbilt University), Frederik Schulze (University of Münster / GHI Washington), Suman Seth (Cornell University), Helen Tilley (Northwestern University), Heidi Tworek (UBC), Theresa Ventura (Concordia University), Mari Webel (University of Pittsburgh), Aaron Windel (Simon Fraser University), Andrew Zimmerman (George Washington University).

From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the mobilization of knowledge as an adjunct to modern state power became essential to imperial projects worldwide. As traditional empires consolidated colonial rule by backing administrative legal structures with coercive policing and military force, they found that legitimacy also called for legibility. Forms of knowledge such as the gathering and creation of facts about local customs and habit or indigenous power structures facilitated governance, whether by engaging local elites in the colonial project, displacing and supplanting existing structures of political authority, extending systems of surveillance and control, or otherwise expanding the reach of imperial rule. Empires combined hard with soft power, producing a cohort of trained imperial agents in metropolitan institutions — universities, foundations, and, in the post-World War II period, think tanks — whose fieldwork aided the projection of power abroad. This included opportunities for expanding research agendas developed at such institutions to include fields of investigation in the colonies.
The inaugural workshop of GHI West, the new Pacific regional office of the GHI Washington, focused on “Empires of Knowledge” and brought together scholars who study different regions of the globe to consider the knowledge/power nexus and explore the roles of experts in developing knowledge about colonial and putatively postcolonial societies as part of the global cultural, economic, and political agendas of metropolitan centers of power from the late nineteenth century to the present. As Jessica Wang pointed out in her welcome remarks, the workshop aptly took place at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver on the traditional, ancestral, and unceded territory of the Musqueam people on which the campus is located. The conference got underway with an introduction by John Krige, who suggested several concepts relevant to the investigation of its theme. While empires provided opportunities for investigation by elites in metropolitan centers, Krige suggested, the center-periphery model once favored by historians has been replaced by an emphasis on the plurality of centers and peripheries, allowing for charting multipolar historical relationships. Krige observed that the investigation of intermediaries and of silences in sources required special attention in studying empires of knowledge in order to move from a unidirectional perspective to a fuller picture of colonial relationships.

The workshop format called for discussion of precirculated papers — discussions kicked off by assigned commentators, many of whom joined the group from UBC’s department of history. The papers addressed a broad range of themes in the histories of agriculture, medicine, geology, and engineering in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. They traced continuities from the colonial to the postcolonial periods. While reinforcing the notion of empire as an opportunity for research and for building social capital back “home,” workshop participants also raised the issue of how colonized cultures dealt with colonizers’ knowledge and its associated practices in their own right, a question that proved much harder to assess.

Botanical exchanges, plant inspection and quarantine, and biological control methods for managing insect populations in Hawai‘i were the topics of the opening paper by Jessica Wang. In her presentation, she showed how nature and empire are coproduced, emphasizing the important relationship between internationalism and imperialism. She pointed to the collaborative aspects of imperial power and the imperial origins of international science. In Hawai‘i, the different efforts to manage the ecosystems reflected the national, intra-imperial,
inter-imperial, and international aspects of the islands’ relationships in the agricultural sciences. In order to pursue their objectives in Hawai’i, agricultural officials depended not only on scientific expertise, but also on bureaucratic, diplomatic, and political relationships, revealing the importance of personal and institutional relationships for the project of empire that made “possible the introduction of plants and seeds and the search for living controls of insect pests in Hawaii in the beginning of the twentieth century.”

Personal and institutional relationships were also crucial for the work of George Becker, a veteran of the United States Geological Survey (USGS), who worked in the Philippines and South Africa in the beginning of the twentieth century. Mark Hendrickson situated Becker in a longer tradition of experts who made a “new” part of the world legible to American and British policymakers and the public: providing information about the land, resources, peoples, and customs to those governments, he helped shape how these “empires” came to understand foreign places. As Hendrickson pointed out, Becker had the role of an intelligence agent: he held official and unofficial roles, crossing the boundaries between being a geologist and a “colonial” official.

Sleeping sickness does not respect boundaries either. In the first decade of the twentieth century, German expeditions arrived in the islands of Ssese in Uganda to start campaigns to control the disease. Mari Webel’s presentation showed how the engagement between Ssese islanders and the Germans’ diagnostic techniques and therapeutic regimens influenced theories of disease control that would be exported throughout German East Africa, serving as a model for widespread colonial intervention around the region. The camp created by the expedition was conceived as a way to isolate people with sleeping sickness from the fly vector and consequently hinder the disease’s spread. One of the images of the camp brought by Webel generated an interesting discussion. The fence, an obvious part of the background in one of the photos Webel presented, made us question locals’ “voluntarism,” especially after we learned that the people who policed the fence did not belong to the same ethnic group as the ones participating in the study. What is very interesting about the photograph, Webel argued, is the actual presence of a fence, in contrast to several images of medical experiments, in which the photographer purposely hid the fences. With that in mind, the group questioned if the bigger question raised by this case is really about colonizing the cure, or if it is about colonizing bodies.
Cure was one of the topics of a second presentation about sleeping sickness. Sarah Ehlers’ paper brought the role of pharmaceutical companies into the picture, explaining that drug use in colonial Africa was not simply the result of a top-down transfer of European products to the tropics under the influence of colonialism. Her main objective was to show the co-constitution of tropical medicine and colonialism, demonstrating that in the same way that sleeping sickness control served the interests of the empire, colonial structures conditioned the production of knowledge. She also made two important points: First, in the history of sleeping sickness in Africa, scientific techniques associated with colonial management strategies morphed into postcolonial development plans. Second, colonized people challenged scientific epistemologies and questioned the authority of colonial medicine in many ways. Africans were said to be passive and active at the same time: passive individuals without any agency to their bodies, but active in terms of embodying the disease, taking the role of vectors.

Efforts of modernization through science were also implemented in Latin America. Frederik Schulze told the story of the construction of Ciudad Guayana, in Venezuela, the main industrial center in the region and a testing ground for an experimentation with American knowledge on urban planning. Schulze showed the conflict-ridden and ambivalent facets of expert knowledge: while Americans viewed Guayana as an experimental site and a business opportunity, Venezuelan planners saw the region as a “repository of resources that could accelerate national development, and generate genuinely national planning knowledge.” Ciudad Guayana is an important case that reveals how Venezuela instrumentalized and appropriated American knowledge for its own political goals, changing unequal power relations between the countries. The case also contributes to the understanding of modernization and knowledge not simply as pillars of an empire of knowledge, but as mechanisms that provoked conflicts and failure and finally destabilized epistemological power relations. In his critical assessment of the project, Schulze in his paper drew on a contemporary American anthropologist writing in the 1960s. This prompted Axel Jansen to remark that along with the different variations of colonialism the twentieth century also witnessed the rise of fields that provided new venues for critiques. Ironically, imperial powers exported not just expertise, but also critics of imperial knowledge formations.

In his keynote address, Andrew Zimmerman picked up on and developed a theme raised in many papers presented at the conference,
namely the role of the subaltern in creating knowledge as a basis for political power. Turning the received Western canon on its head, Zimmerman connected dots in the nineteenth century to suggest a tradition of colonial knowledge that inspired rural insurgency, from the Haitian revolution to African American efforts to abolish slavery in the United States that reflected processes of self-emancipation central to struggles against involuntary servitude. Such knowledge, Zimmerman suggested, even informed political and social theories of the best-known European intellectuals, including Hegel, Marx, and Weber, in their efforts to conceptualize theories that would capture such developments.

The second day of discussions began with the debate about diseases and race in the British Empire. Suman Seth’s paper explored theories of disease to reveal how the British understood empire and how the history of these empires can illuminate the idea of the locatedness of medical discourse about specific places. Seth understands discourse and arguments as part of scientific practices, as evidence for theories of why people get sick. This idea is key to understanding that the rational medicine emerging at the end of the eighteenth century was as much a product of the colonies as it was a product of hospitals and schools in Europe. Theories of disease and their relationships to places offer illuminating sources for understanding how the British conceived of their empire and how they interpreted the distinction between the diseases of temperate and tropical climes. The analysis of that distinction would not be complete without considering race and its relationship with science. In discourses of race and disease of warm climates, the colonizers minimized smaller intra-regional differences and emphasized inter-regional differences. Seth argues that the “emergence of modern conceptions of race, and the emergence of a category of tropical diseases were inter-twined phenomena, to be explained by a history of medicine, race, slavery, and empire.”

Race is also the topic of Ruth Rogaski’s work on Manchuria. The paper she presented in our workshop is part of a bigger project to explain how the idea of Manchuria was built. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Japanese government (mainly, but the Chinese, too) conducted extensive research and experiments in Manchuria in pursuit of a better understanding of bubonic plague. One of the Japanese empire’s objectives was to create “Chinese” as a racial category. The Japanese Unit 731 — an organization of the Japanese Imperial Army that developed and deployed bacteriological weapons
in Manchuria and in the Pacific region during the 1930s and 1940s —
created knowledge about the disease by means of an interdisciplinary,
biomedical, holistic approach, which gave tropical medicine a “cross-
field character” unique among the medical sciences. “This approach
emphasized seeing all organisms from man to microbe existing in a
complex “web of life,” enabling the implementation of “progressive”
colonial policies focused on ameliorating environmental conditions
and implementation of “progressive” colonial policies focused on
ameliorating environmental conditions rather than on “castigating
native populations for unique ‘racialized’ shortcomings.” However
innovative this approach may have been, it did not prevent the mem-
bers of Unit 731 from committing atrocities in Manchuria.

Another interesting experimental medical approach was the one
adopted by the British scientist Alexander Haddow in Uganda in
the 1940s. The approach considered “non-human components of
experimental systems in virus research and how those systems
linked humans, non-human primates, and mosquitos in an ecological
understanding” of Uganda. Haddow emphasized the manipulation
of living parts in order to test hypotheses about the transmission of
yellow fever and other viruses. Moreover, he highlighted the necessity
of remaking the environment at his site of investigation in Uganda,
so yellow fever could be made visible. He and his research team thus
transformed a natural place into an experimental space by “importing
non-native species, manufacturing artificial dwellings, and manipulat-
ing the behavior of human residents.” This place, in turn, shaped his
research findings. Julia Cummiskey showed that Haddow’s research
was fundamentally a colonial project, “in which the organizing,
disciplining and reconfiguration of people, their dwelling places,
mosquitos, and monkeys” were designed to transform them into
experimental spaces and to colonize Uganda.

The inter-imperial context of disease was also discussed in Theresa
Ventura’s paper on rice enrichment in the Philippines. Beriberi, a
severe Vitamin B1 (thiamine) deficiency, was the target of a group
of American researchers in the Philippines in the mid-1940s. This
living laboratory, whose main objective was to investigate the cause
and etiology of beriberi, was composed of individuals in prisons,
insane asylums, leper colonies, plantations, and military barracks. In
her paper, Ventura described racism as embedded in the technology
of dietary practices and supplements as Americans disregarded an
indigenous understanding of infant mortality and malnourishment.
Using the example of the Philippines, Ventura showed how beriberi was understood as a modern disease produced by colonial trade and by the replication of colonial institutions. She also pointed out how “citizen-consumers, millers, and Philippine government leaders, along with the United Nations, remained deeply skeptical of the presence of pharmaceutical corporations in the daily dietary.” The independence of those companies as well as food sovereignty were crucial in this case, even if it meant slower progress on beriberi research in areas where the disease was still endemic.

The workshop’s last paper, by Prakash Kumar, traced the rise of development in India as revealed in the realms of colonial discourses. Kumar suggested that post-independence development should be viewed in its own right so as to correct the prevalent interpretation of Indian development as a successful cold war project inspired from the outside. One of the main contributions of Kumar’s research consists in establishing a clear genealogy of development in colonial India and in the period of transition to India’s sovereignty. Conceiving of nation-building as a fundamentally exclusionary project, Kumar suggested that the Indian case touches on different kinds of governmentality in addition to issues of empire. In the early decades of the twentieth century, colonial administrations sought to optimize the “governmentalization of the state.” The nineteenth century’s “civilizing mission” became insufficient for legitimizing the state’s claims, and the “colonial state claimed for itself the right to representing ‘Indian’ interests, implying that serving ‘Indian’ interests was inseparable from the functions of a ‘colonial’ state.” For Kumar, the Indian case reveals how nations were trying to discipline identities, and how identities, in turn, were politicized.

The “Empires of Knowledge” workshop emphasized how new ideas came to the fore because of colonization and decolonization processes throughout the world. What is special about science and empire in the twentieth century is that actors moved from the idea that places make us sick to the idea that people make us sick. The conclusion to this logic is obvious: people have to be controlled and disciplined, a fundamental strategy behind many projects discussed in the conference papers. Despite advances in recent scholarship about science, technology, and empire, researchers continue to face challenges such as acknowledging the role of the colonial state. Local administrations not only conspired with imperial powers to advance the development of research, but they also mediated the relationship between
localities and researchers through intermediaries or “gate-keepers.” We also must recognize the importance of the colonial environment for the development of research. Actors were engaging in multiple contact zones characterized by polycentric asymmetries of power that need to be critically analyzed and emphasized. In addition, we should investigate how empires used demonstration techniques to convince local populations of the power and effectiveness of scientific practices. Resistance to development projects from the bottom was frequently tackled by making equipment and technologies available to groups of locals, who, “by example,” would convince their neighbors of the miracles of modern, Western science and technologies. Lastly, we continue to underestimate the relevance of silences. All too often, indigenous populations as the targets of developmental and experimental activities have no voice as they have left few or no traces which we could investigate today. What do we know about indigenous health practices and of their systems of knowledge and its vertical and horizontal transfer and circulation?

The workshop’s debates and discussions provided a starting point for an original research agenda that aims to stimulate new ideas, insights and innovative work on the relationship between imperialism and internationalism.

Amanda Domingues (Georgia Institute of Technology)
KINSHIP, KNOWLEDGE, AND MIGRATION

Panel Series at the 41st Annual Conference of the German Studies Association in Atlanta, GA, October 5–8, 2017, sponsored by the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI). Conveners: Simone Lässig (GHI) and Swen Steinberg (University of Dresden). Participants: Aileen Friesen (University of Winnipeg), Katharine Gerbner (University of Minnesota), Lisa Gerlach (GHI) Jenna Gibbs (Florida International University), Scott M. Kenworthy (Miami University, Ohio), Simone Laqua-O’Donnell (University of Birmingham), Brittany Lehman (College of Charleston), Paul Peucker (Moravian Church Archives, Bethlehem, PA), David Sabean (University of California, Los Angeles), Tatjana Schell (North Dakota State University), Matthias Springborn (Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research), Sarah Thomsen Vierra (Willamette University), Machteld Venken (University of Vienna), Stephanie Zloch (Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research), Margarete Zimmermann (University of Jena).

In October 2017, Simone Lässig and Swen Steinberg convened a panel series at the German Studies Association’s annual conference that focused on the roles of family and kinship, including children, in knowledge and migration processes. In her opening remarks, Lässig emphasized that knowledge travels with migrants and is transformed by their experiences in the new homeland. Further, family is a forum for teaching and learning, for sharing, evaluating, and preserving knowledge. Kinship itself entails knowledge—of who is who and how they are connected to other family members. Kinship networks can serve as networks for communicating and processing other kinds of knowledge. They often take on particular importance when individuals and families migrate. Migrants carry knowledge with them; they produce and acquire new knowledge with the experience of migration; and they usually need new knowledge to establish themselves in their new cities, towns, and countries. Family, both immediate and extended, often constitutes a crucial knowledge resource for migrants. The aim of the panel series, Lässig concluded, was to explore the interplay of kinship, knowledge, and migration more closely by examining the experiences of German speakers who left German-speaking Europe and non-German speakers who migrated there.

The first panel focused on the production of knowledge in missionary families in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Simone Laqua-O’Donnell focused on the letters of the Pfleiderer family, especially
those by Debora Hoch-Pfleiderer (1860–1945), a prominent figure among the five generations of missionary women in the family who served in China and India. Laqua-O’Donnell proposes a conceptualization of knowledge that accounts for the gendered nature of its sources. In the context of missionary education, she advocates seeing knowledge not only in what was taught and learned in a classroom but also in the ordinary activities outside formal educational settings. Not only was letter writing in itself a gendered activity but the knowledge conveyed in letters was gendered. In this case, they afford us valuable insights into the relationship between women and children, the importance of epistolary culture for the missionary enterprise, and the role of letters in the process of family making. Three different types of knowledge stand out for Laqua-O’Donnell: news and other information about family members; conversations with or about children regarding newly acquired skills and other educational matters; and the intentional institutional memory building that the preservation of these letters as a family archive represented.

Jenna M. Gibbs also presented research on family letters, in this case from the “global” Latrobe family, Moravians, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. She found that Moravian missionary communities played a special role in both the production and transmission of knowledge as their missions constituted a transregional and transnational spiritual kinship network. Within this network, extended biological families also played a critical role, as multiple generations of Moravian families migrated in great numbers, engaging intensively in missionary work and colonization across the globe. Gibbs focuses on reports written by and distributed among family members that mostly addressed the spiritual and practical state of the missions. They detailed the numbers of conversions and baptisms, reported on efforts to expand the missions, and presented interviews with converts or potential converts. Yet the missionaries also embedded knowledge in their letters about the cultural and spiritual practices of others—the enslaved, the indigenous, and Catholics. Informed by the proverbial “imperial eye,” their correspondence nonetheless provides invaluable observations on indigenous hunting, marriage, and child-rearing practices as well as on their cosmological beliefs and associated rituals. Thus, Latrobe family members participated in the circulation, production, interpretation, and transfer of knowledge across transnational networks, not only shaping Moravian spiritual and kinship networks but also contributing to global and secular knowledge.
Katharine Gerbner examined sources from Moravian missionaries, shedding light on the transformation of Christian knowledge by enslaved slave drivers in the Caribbean who had converted. Conversion, she argues, cannot be divorced from demographic and social analysis and is best understood in the context of a dynamic conceptualization of knowledge. Thus, she seeks to address the complexity of conversion as a knowledge transfer within both a Protestant and an Afro-Caribbean context. Two slave drivers, Coffee and Matthew, exemplify how men doing such work felt uneasy about it and sought both reassurance and support from the missionaries. While Coffee convinced his whole family to be baptized, Matthew engaged in theological discussions with the Moravians. The traces both men left in history show how knowledge about Christianity was spread, adapted, contested, and reformed within a particular missionary context.

At the conclusion of the panel, David Sabean commented on how the missionary letter writing examples under consideration also served to build and maintain certain milieus as well as reproduce social class. Kinship in these contexts was not determined by “bonds of reciprocity” but instead manifested itself in spiritual communities whose members understood themselves collectively as part of an elite.

The second panel turned to child migrants in twentieth-century Central Europe, seeking to understand them “as learners, producers, and translators of knowledge.” Machteld Venken analyzed language learning in two territories that had once belonged to the German Empire but were now in Poland and Belgium, namely Upper Silesia and Eupen-Malmedy, as a result of the Versailles Treaty. In both territories, language regimes in primary schools lay at the heart of government policy measures, and they provoked intense discussions about power, social relations, family traditions, and the future of the regions. Focusing on the period of new educational laws and pedagogical reforms in both Belgium and Poland between 1932 and 1940, Venken shows how policymakers believed that every child should enjoy an equitable educational experience regardless of social background. The question was how each state went about realizing this ambition and to what extent they succeeded specifically for borderland children.

Next, Matthias Springborn discussed education and knowledge practices among Jews in Displaced Persons (DP) camps and in the newly constituted Jewish communities in Germany from 1945 to 1957. During this period, the camps saw an ultimately ephemeral, yet highly diverse renaissance of Eastern European Jewish culture—in
Germany of all places. Springborn considers not only formal aspects of education but also informal and marginalized forms of knowledge transfer and acquisition. Content defined as “knowledge” was delivered to children by international organizations through text (mostly textbooks) and personnel. Since a lot of the materials and some of the teachers came from Palestine, the ideology of Zionism and the principle of preparing for life in Palestine shaped, in varying degrees, almost all educational activities involving Jewish DPs. After the DP camps closed, remaining Jewish educational efforts in Germany were long only able to develop to a modest degree due to the low populations of Germany’s renascent Jewish communities.

Brittany Lehman discussed the history of teaching citizenship in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the social and cultural capital that comes with such knowledge to children of other nationalities over the course of thirty years. Focusing mostly on Greek and Turkish children, Lehman shows how state school books reflected and reified the perceptions of migrant children in the FRG held by the country’s constituent federal states (Länder, which set education policy) and by the foreign nation-states from which the families originated. The increasing number of children with foreign citizenship made the philosophical question of possible futures and best practices for their education a pressing practical concern, sparking public discourse about multiculturalism in the 1980s. At the same time, Lehman makes clear, the federal states refused to acknowledge that Germany was a country of immigration. They did not consider integration or how the othering performed in schools through textbooks and divisions in access to classes and curriculums further separated children.

Stephanie Zloch turned the panel’s focus to the migrant children themselves in the FRG, exploring their role in the production of knowledge in migration and integration processes. Reminding us that knowledge is not just about expert or academic output, Zloch underlines how migration processes provide a way to analyze knowledge strategies and practices in contexts shaped by different kinds of social and cultural capital, rendering non-hegemonic, non-conformist, or subversive knowledge visible and offering a way for us to better understand contemporary societies shaped by immigration. This includes the knowledge specific to children, who have long received little attention in German historiography. Going beyond studying the knowledge that might have been accessible to children in educational media, Zloch examines sources featuring children’s own agency, in
particular, essays submitted by young people for the nation-wide German Federal President’s History Competition. She shows how in the triangular relationship between family knowledge, school knowledge, and the essay writers’ personal production of knowledge, clearly identifiable narratives emerged among the essays informed by family migration experience. At the same time, the narratives often lacked broader historical context. Zloch finds further that the encounter between family knowledge and textbook knowledge occurs indirectly and without critical discussion of the resulting cognitive dissonances. Zloch’s work with products of this encounter points to the multiple and ambivalent ways in which children can act as translators and producers of knowledge in migration and integration processes—not only in society at large but also in their own families.

In her comments at the end of the second panel, Sarah Thomsen Vierra underscored how rare sources that give a voice to the children themselves are. Most of the time we must rely on sources that document what happened to children, not what children did. Yet the panel showed that children had a voice in history, including in the production of knowledge, even if the traces they left are rarer or harder to find.

The final panel of the series centered on ethnic Germans migrating from the Soviet Union before World War II. Aileen Friesen opened with the case of Mennonite refugees to Harbin, China. Between 1928 and 1931, approximately 600 Mennonites crossed the Amur River into China, following a route that proved to have the best track record out of the Soviet Union. In the course of their migration, refugees relied heavily on information obtained and verified through their kinship and ethno-confessional networks. Friesen explores the limits of these family ties regarding trust and accessibility. Before leaving Russia, many families used misinformation to conceal their escape plans, even from each other. Families misled their neighbors, pretending that they were migrating elsewhere inside the Soviet Union. Once in China, many Mennonites found it necessary to temporarily broaden their information base in order to respond to the challenges they encountered in the new country. Although they preferred European sources, the desperateness of their situation encouraged Mennonites to reach across religious, linguistic, and cultural boundaries. Once the situation grew less dire in the USSR, the Mennonites continued to access the resources of local (non-Mennonite) Russian and German communities, but they attributed more value to information provided by members of their own community regarding employment, accommodations, and exit routes out of the country.
Next, Tatjana Schell discussed letters received by German-Russian migrant families in the United States from their relatives in the Lower Volga region of Russia in the first half of the twentieth century. Beginning on the eve of World War I, the family conversation resumed afterward and continued even through the famine. A considerable shift in themes occurred between 1913–14 and the early 1920s, when the letters suddenly contained descriptions of the economic crisis that the letters’ authors, their family, and their community in Russia were going through. Admittedly written from a specific viewpoint, the letters nonetheless provide an exciting and intimate view into one family’s life, albeit without any mention of the political circumstances.

Margarete Zimmermann closed the panel by considering a different kind of knowledge, rumors, a kind of “uncertain knowledge” that traveled by word of mouth and worried authorities. Zimmerman argues that rumors, usually understood in contrast to knowledge, should instead be seen as a specific type of knowledge, not based on facts per se, but influential and suitable for analysis. In the study at hand, Zimmermann explores the origins, protagonists, modus operandi, and distribution channels of rumors about the supposed exodus of Soviet Germans, especially Volga Germans, to Germany. These rumors became widespread and popular enough to convince families to leave their homes and to alarm the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). Zimmermann’s research is informed by Marc Bloch’s theory of the rumor and also tries to tie rumors to Talcott Parsons’ “latent pattern maintenance.” The power of the exodus rumor is best explained within the context of informality and decentralization, limiting communication channels to informal personal and kinship networks.

In his comment on this panel, Scott M. Kenworthy made clear how understudied the history of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union still is. He also observed that the panelists’ findings demonstrated what a powerful tool letter writing had been in community building and to the maintenance of family ties over long distances and across generations.

The exploration of migration and knowledge will continue next year at the GSA conference with a panel series on “The Nexus of Migration, Youth, and Knowledge.”

Lisa Gerlach (University of Bochum)

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CREATING HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIALLY:
NEW APPROACHES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND
EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNDERTAKING
RESEARCH WITH CITIZEN SCHOLARS

Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), October 26-28, 2017. Organized by the GHI, the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media (RRCHNM), and Maryland Institute for Technology in the Humanities (MITH). Made possible by support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). Conveners: Matthew Hiebert (GHI), Simone Lässig (GHI), and Trevor Muñoz (MITH). Participants: Samantha Blickhan (Adler Planetarium), Denise Burgher (University of Delaware), Jim Casey (Princeton University), Constance Crompton (University of Ottawa), Laura Coyle (National Museum of African American History and Culture), Fabian Cremer (Max Weber Foundation), Meghan Ferriter (Smithsonian Institute), Aleisa Fishman (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum), Carl-Henry Geschwind (Independent Scholar/Historian), Silke Glitsch (Göttingen State and University Library), Katharina Hering (Georgetown University), Franklin Hildy (University of Maryland), Elizabeth Hopwoop, (Loyola University Chicago), Rebecca Kahn (Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society), Joseph Koivisto (University of Maryland), Ursula Lehmkuhl (University of Trier), Patrick Manning (University of Pittsburgh), Atiba Pertilla (GHI), Mia Ridge (British Library), Andrew Taylor (University of Ottawa), Jennifer Serventi (National Endowment for the Humanities), Raymond Siemens (University of Victoria), Heather Wolfe (Folger Shakespeare Library), Vladimir I. Zadorozhny (University of Pittsburgh).

This conference brought together historians, digital humanists, archivists, and librarians to discuss the growing trend of knowledge co-creation involving citizen scholars, and the implications for our conceptions of history, methodology, and how the discipline produces knowledge. The event sought to bring into critical international dialog research involving methods, systems, and standards designed and implemented to ensure quality of results and inclusivity of perspective; best approaches and consideration in bringing scholars and the public into collaboration; research into how historical knowledge is formed within groups; and the effects of citizen scholarship on societies, communities, contributors, and historical research fields.

The first panel, “Developing Communities of Practice” chaired by Carl-Henry Geschwind, explored different models for bringing
together scholars and members of the public into research communities and their effects. Mia Ridge in her paper, “How Can Crowdsourcing and Citizen History help teach Historical Thinking?”, showed ways in which research involving the public can develop core historical competencies amongst participants. Fostering skills such as source familiarity, paleography, and name disambiguation extends to the development of analytic skills and individual research interests through web forums and other community tools allowing exchange with experts. Ridge perceives communities of practice within crowdsourcing projects as social, situated learning systems. In her paper “Pelagios Commons: Decentralizing Knowledge Creation in the Web of Historical Data,” Rebecca Kahn presented Pelagios Commons as infrastructure for linked open geodata in the humanities and a decentralized community connected through shared sources and tools. The project aggregates data of external resources into an environment with search, social annotation, exploratory, and community affordances, enabling new modes of collaboration and registers for critical thinking. Ray Siemens in his paper titled “Thoughts towards an Engaged and Open Social Scholarship” outlined the trend towards “methodological commons,” advancing problem-based research through the representation, analysis, and scholarly communication of data. Collaborative networks and shared infrastructures that organize data for such purposes are fostering mutual engagement and shared skills generative of communities of practice. Together, these trends have led to greater public participation in academic data creation and analysis, and underpin a concept of open social scholarship motivating the nascent partnership-based Canadian Social Knowledge Institute (C-SKI), with its active initiatives in research, tool development, and DH education.

Chaired by Jennifer Serventi, the second panel, “Knowledge Production through Partnership and Engagement” approached ways to undertake collaborative knowledge production through partnerships and engagement with organizations outside of academia. Denise Burgher, Jim Casey, and Elizabeth Hopwood in their paper “Collective Histories and Communities of Knowledge: Transcribe Minutes and the Colored Conventions,” discussed an imperative ethics of radical inclusion, care, and partnership in approaching the collaborative transcription of minutes and other archival materials for the over 200 national, regional, and local Colored Conventions of free and once captive Black people held between 1830 and 1900. The presenters conveyed that addressing their challenges of gathering and archiving
new knowledge depends upon teamwork, a culture of consensus and acknowledgement that deemphasizes traditional academic hierarchies, and learning and respecting how stakeholder communities themselves are organized. Franklin Hildy in his presentation, “The Theatre-Finder Project: Sustainability, Efficiency, and the Challenge of Crowd Sourcing with Citizen Scholars,” discussed the challenges of collaboratively building and sustaining a comprehensive online guide to all theaters, from the classical period up until the twentieth century. Hildy stressed the importance of peer review, technical sustainability, and data interoperability. To prevent content becoming “siloed” and avoid duplication of labor, Hildy proposes that the resources of his site and other indexes in the field partner in a Wikipedia-based solution.

In his keynote address that evening, entitled “Frontiers of Digital History: Citizen Scholars, New Knowledge, and Public Debate,” Patrick Manning foregrounded his ongoing project involving citizen scholars, Collaborative for Historical Information and Analysis (CHIA), by recounting his work in digital history over the past two decades as “achievements in failure.” His “Migration in World History” (2000), provided curated historical documents, but was caught between technological obsolescence of the CD-ROM format and the infeasibility of putting an extensive resource on the web. The “World History Network” (2004) had difficulties assembling a comprehensive source base, while committed institutional support for digital projects was lacking. CHIA, which aims to collect global data at scale for research on environmental degradation, human inequality, and human-natural interaction, must cope with the reluctance of historians to contribute their data for public editing and analysis. Turning to citizen science, the project has enlisted undergraduate students and others to submit and edit historical documents. Beyond significant contributions to large-scale research projects in this way, Manning perceives citizen scholarship as helping produce an informed citizenry able to speak knowledgeably on crucial issues of policy, helping bridge gaps between specialists and the public.

The third panel, focusing on “Social Research Methods and Publics,” was chaired by Ursula Lehmkuhl, and looked to explore societal-level and societal-inclusive research initiatives. Samantha Blickhan, in her paper “Crowdsourcing Public History: Text Transcription, Historical Documents, and the Zooniverse,” discussed the history of Zooniverse, a platform with well over a million registered volunteers, and the
challenges in adapting for humanities research a system established to crowdsourc e natural and physical science data. Challenges include aggregating varying genres of text, and forthcoming affordances for transcribing audio archives. Blickhan highlighted the effectiveness of the site’s “talk” discussion feature in stressing that a great user interface should allow volunteers not only to participate, but to learn and acquire new skills. In his paper, “Crowdsourcing Data in the Mass Observation Project (1937-1965),” Matthew Hiebert presented archival research on the methodology of the early Mass Observation project (1937-1965). Founded as a study of British society in response to the perceived false news of mass media, the project innovated early participatory social research methods derived from ornithology, enlisting 1300 volunteers to contribute diaries, questionnaires, observational reports, and other materials in conducting “anthropology at home.” Hiebert discussed methodological challenges of the project, its adoption of computation, and impacts on British society and policy. Vladimir I. Zadorozhny in his presentation “Towards Computational Social Sustainability,” discussed the challenges of integrating different sorts of historical data—which may be distributed, heterogeneous, sparse, aggregated differently, inconsistent, or unreliable—and the necessity of doing so for analyzing and predicting societal change. The Collaborative Data Fusion (Col*Fusion) infrastructure project, being undertaken in cooperation with CHIA, provides a crowdsourcing-based model for large-scale data integration, curation, and reliability assessment.

The fourth panel, “Standards, Authority, and Participation,” chaired by Fabian Cremer, explored approaches to quality control and knowledge authority in citizen science projects. Laura Coyle in her paper “No Time Like the Present: Launching the National Museum of African American History and Culture’s Crowdsourced Research Projects,” discussed the crowdsourcing initiatives of the National Museum of African American History (NMAAH) using the online Smithsonian Transcription Center. Coyle attests that volunteers do high-quality work, also contributing alongside staff in error checking processes. Volunteer transcribers of the Freedman Bureau Records and other important indexed archival projects help fulfill the missions of the NMAAH and the Smithsonian, “literally helping us rewrite history.” Meghan Ferriter in “Ready — Set — Know: What You Learn When You Invite the Public to Pilot an Open Source Framework,” presented the crowdsourcing workflow based on Scribe and iterative development of the Library of Congress pilot project “Beyond Words,”
which invites the public to identify cartoons and photographs in historic newspaper collections. The effectiveness of its consensus model for assuring quality was discussed, and its tradeoffs in prioritizing accuracy over negotiation and potentially richer participation. Important considerations regarding the role of volunteers as “laborers or learners” were raised by Ferriter, questioning how knowledge, interpretation, and design decisions may also be granted to citizen scholars. Joseph Koivisto in his presentation, “Crowdsourcing as a Means of Authority Assessment and Enhancement for Cultural Heritage Description,” examined the effects of crowdsourcing on cultural heritage authority records. In the context of developing a linked open data iconographic thesaurus within the Project Andvari initiative, and using the open-source PYBOSSA application, limitations of inherited classification schemas were discovered in the inability of citizen scholars to attribute suitable terms from extant vocabularies when describing iconographic content, suggest additional terms. Koivisto observed that crowdsourcing can be an effective approach towards authority creation and refinement if clear instruction and expert review are provided.

The fifth panel, “Social Formations of Knowledge,” chaired by Atiba Pertilla (GHI), presented projects using crowdsourcing and other digital methods to ascertain how knowledge is formed within groups. The presentation given by Constance Crompton, “People’s Patterns: Social Prosopography and the Gay Liberation Movement,” discussed the Lesbian and Gay Liberation in Canada project which explores the potential of digital research environments to recover Canadian contributions to the gay liberation movement. Using Text Encoding Initiative (TEI) standards, the team has encoded Donald W. McLeod’s annotated chronology, “Lesbian and Gay Liberation in Canada” (1964–1975), creating graph network visualizations of people, prosopographical data, places, and other information in researching the structure of the movement. Crompton advocated looking to communities who have successfully used social knowledge creation within community-led activism as a research paradigm. In her paper, “History Unfolded: U.S. Newspapers and the Holocaust,” Aleisa Fishman discussed the activities of citizen historians in the History Unfolded project of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. More than 2000 participants from across the U.S. have submitted more than 14,000 articles from local newspapers of the 1930s and 1940s with news or opinion about 34 different Holocaust-era events in an effort to determine what Americans could have known about
the Nazi threat during the period. In the process, Fishman observed these volunteers have come to see history as a process of discovery, in learning about Holocaust history, using primary sources in historical research, and in challenging assumptions about American knowledge of and responses to the Holocaust. Silke Glitsch in her paper titled “Exploring the Visual History of Göttingen University: A Citizen Science Approach” first recounted recent citizen science developments in Germany, which include the Citizens Create Knowledge (GEWISS) program and platform (2014); the Citizen Science Strategy 2020 for Germany Green Paper (2016); the Directive on the Promotion of Citizen Science in Germany (2016); and the commitment of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research to “continue strengthening Citizen Science in the future” (2017). Her project, facilitated at the Göttingen State and University Library, explores the role of visual aspects in the self-representation and public perception of Göttingen University by providing a citizen science framework and 4600 photos of university events from the 1930s to the 1950s for shared analysis. Bringing together multiple institutions and players with complementary knowledge domains for the project, Glitsch underscored the effectiveness of libraries as facilitators and co-creators in citizen science research projects, possessing source material, expertise, technical infrastructure, and their function as an interface between institutions, academic departments, and the public.

The final panel, “Implications of Knowledge Co-creation,” chaired by Trevor Muñoz, sought out implications of participatory research for both volunteers and disciplinary fields. Katharina Hering in her presentation, “Punch Cards for Social Change: Participatory Research in History,” discussed two participatory research projects of the 1970s and early 1980s that fostered community organizing and social change. Activist Barry Greeter used punch card databanks in working with the Highlander Center on the Appalachian Land Ownership Study, where teams of local people were trained in how to search land records to investigate local property ownership and power structures. The Baltimore Neighborhood Heritage Project, co-coordinated by oral historian Linda Shopes, conducted more than 200 interviews with longtime residents of four Baltimore City neighborhoods, designing the project to promote community involvement. Hering stressed that such research projects aiming towards progressive social change by design benefitted rather than exploited participants. Heather Wolfe in her presentation “Shakespeare’s England: What the Folger Has Learned from Developing our Crowd,” discussed the large-scale Early
Modern Manuscript Online (EMMO) project at the Folger which provides, with the Text Creation Partnership, web access to XML/SGML encoded transcriptions, images, and metadata for English manuscripts from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their project Shakespeare’s World uses Dromio, EMMO’s transcription, mark-up, collation, and vetting tool, to allow members of the public to transcribe a variety of manuscripts from Shakespeare’s time written in secretary hand, with results then entered into the EMMO database. Measurable impact on early modern scholarship and expansion of interpretative range is already discernible. Through numerous public “Transcribathons” held on campuses around the U.S., a community of thousands of readers of early modern English handwriting has been created, able to teach, transcribe, and conduct research with manuscript sources.

The concluding discussion took up salient threads that had emerged in the productive panel discussions that followed each set of presentations. Discussion often coalesced around issues of power in knowledge production, with an emergent theme that de-colonizing the archive is not a matter extracting new stories, but about furthering communities’ self-determination through ensuring public access to and engagement with their own histories. Questions of how crowdsourcing may or may not empower participants in advancing research is related to how knowledge co-creation processes are talked about, and the conference throughout attempted to interrogate the nuances of our own critical terminology. Discussion also gravitated towards how to better facilitate the involvement of citizens scholars in the very design of co-created research projects. Issues of access were also of concern, for while Open Access policies are key to knowledge co-creation, research generated from citizen science may ironically end up behind academic journal paywalls. Citizen science research may require new forms of rigor in respect to peer review, with increased general interest in open review as a deserved corollary of open access.

The importance of project sustainability was a recurrent theme. Funding was discussed openly, with a number of projects presented supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the event itself by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Continued and expanded funding internationally was perceived crucial for new and sustained co-creation initiatives. Differences between the developments of citizen science in North America and Europe also became...
more apparent through the event, with Germany now having clear and strong national-level research policy in support, yet relatively fewer projects in current development. North American projects were also more likely to involve students or incorporate a pedagogical dimension. Participants were in agreement that the conference had shown the benefit of assembling a multi-country, multidisciplinary group, to engage in a rich discussion that focused not only on outcomes, data, and technical systems, but on the processes of co-created knowledge production, including honest treatment of failure and new challenges.

Matthew Hiebert (GHI)
BUCERIUS YOUNG SCHOLARS FORUM
HISTORIES OF MIGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC AND
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Bucerius Young Scholars Forum at GHI West (Berkeley, California), Oct.
Pertilla (GHI Washington), and Andrea Westermann (GHI West). Partici-
pants: Fatima El-Tayeb (University of California, San Diego), Paula Fass
(University of California, Berkeley), Davide Gnes (University of Amsterdam),
Michael Goebel (Freie Universität Berlin), Deniz Göktürk (University of
California, Berkeley), Mairena Hirschberg (European University Institute),
Michelle Lynn Kahn (Stanford University), Stephanie Lämmert (Max
Planck Institute for Human Development), Ursula Lehmkuhl (University of
Trier), Barry McCarron (New York University), Nicholas B. Miller (Uni-
versity of Lisbon), Kristina Poznan (College of William & Mary), Allison
Schmidt (SUNY Oswego), Kilian Spiethoff (University of Bamberg), Bryan
Van Wyck (Michigan State University).

The inaugural Bucerius Young Scholars Forum, held in fall 2017, provided an opportunity for an interdisciplinary group of scholars to examine how migrants have created, exchanged, made use of knowledge, and been the objects of knowledge collection projects in a variety of contexts throughout the world from the nineteenth century to the present. The forum helped mark the official opening of the German Historical Institute’s new Pacific regional office, GHI West, on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley. With generous funding provided by the ZEIT Stiftung/Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius, the forum brought together ten early-career scholars—five based in the United States and five based in Europe—for a scholarly interchange on their research. The forum benefited as well from the active participation of five faculty mentors from both American and German institutions who chaired the forum’s panels and offered thoughtful perspective on how the new research being presented fits into earlier developments in the field.

The format of the Bucerius Forum borrowed from the long-standing Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar. The ten pre-circulated papers presented were grouped into five themed panel sessions, each chaired by a different faculty mentor. Each scholar who presented a paper also prepared a comment on the two papers presented in one of the other sessions. These comments, offered at the start of each session,
provided a useful springboard for the group discussion of the papers’ content, but for space reasons will not be covered in detail here.

The first panel, “Migrants’ Knowledge and Politics,” examined how governments use knowledge about migrants to shape immigration policies and how migrants use international networks of knowledge to shape local politics. Historian Nicholas Miller’s paper traced the formation of contract labor proposals in the mid-nineteenth century kingdom of Hawaii. In contrast to studies focused on the labor regimes established in Hawaii after the overthrow of the monarchy and its annexation by the United States, Miller traced the monarchy’s articulation of a future dependent on the labor of migrants from Portugal, a plan that depended in part on establishing an educational system for migrant workers’ children. In his paper on immigrant rights groups in late-twentieth-century Los Angeles, political scientist Davide Gnes examined how workers’ organizations established by migrants from Korea, the Philippines, and Latin America adapted mobilization strategies that had been successful in their home countries to organize immigrant communities to win political power. The success of these strategies largely depended on a continuous interchange of knowledge and activists rather than information flows that moved only in one direction. Both papers illustrated the value of avoiding the privileging of Western political frameworks in seeking to understand how migrants have shaped and been shaped by labor policies.

The second panel, “Migrants’ Knowledge and Childhood,” traced ideas about children’s roles as carriers of knowledge as migrants across and within national borders. Mairena Hirschberg’s paper examined New York’s Children’s Aid Society and Britain’s Child Emigration Society in the early 1900s. Both organizations subsidized the moves of thousands of children from poor, urban families to rural, agricultural communities. The Children’s Aid Society sent its charges on “orphan trains” to the U.S. Midwest and West. The families with whom the children were placed were expected to parent them and raise them to become solid, upstanding citizens. The Child Emigration Society program, by contrast, sent children from Britain to schools it established in Australia and other colonies, where the children were expected to learn up-to-date farming techniques that would prepare them to eventually become independent smallholders. Both schemes assumed that the knowledge children from the “dangerous” urban classes acquired in their home surroundings was
detrimental to social progress but that a shift to a rural environment would be sufficient to change children’s attitudes towards family, work, and respect for authority.

Michelle Kahn’s paper examined how migration reshapes children’s worldviews. Its focus was on the children of Turkish migrant workers whose families lived in West Germany for many years (particularly in the 1960s and 1970s) and then returned to Turkey. These children became marked with the identity of “Almancı” (“Germaners”). Adjusting to Turkish society often meant encountering pushback from peers who resented their aesthetic habits—such as “punk” haircuts—and dissatisfaction with the explicitly nationalist curricula they encountered in their schools. Reports of the use of corporal punishment in Turkish schools, coupled with persistent tropes in West Germany of Turkish culture as virulently misogynist and patriarchal, eventually led to a recentering of West German policy around the education of migrant workers and changes in migration law that made it easier for families to remain there. The idea that the knowledge children gained in the course of migration could not be “un-learned,” Kahn’s paper showed, had the power to reshape migration policy more broadly, dovetailing neatly with Hirshberg’s discussion of the prevalent idea that child migration from urban to rural homes was inherently certain to produce healthier and more productive citizens.

In the third panel, “Migrants’ Knowledge and the Media,” the first paper by Barry McCarron described how migrant diasporas in the nineteenth century deployed concepts of racial “knowledge” to define their own and other groups. Irish migrants to English-speaking settler societies, including Australia, South Africa, and the United States, created demeaning stereotypes of Chinese migrants in order to win political benefits for themselves that would make them economically secure. A wide variety of cultural materials, including plays and cartoons, were used to diffuse bigoted imagery not only within the Irish community but among all English speakers. In California, for example, McCarron traced the culmination of these efforts in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. He noted that Chinese migrants in the same countries simultaneously sought to thwart Irish influence, using their ability to secure diplomatic intervention on their behalf. McCarron’s paper illustrated how viewing stereotypes and racial pseudo-science as forms of knowledge provides a way to bring them into the same frame of analysis as policy debates.
Kristina Poznan’s paper described the role of Hungarian-language newspapers in both the Habsburg empire and in late-nineteenth-/early-twentieth-century North America in shaping emigrants’ and would-be emigrants’ views of the new cultures they could potentially encounter in the United States and Canada. The newspapers, she noted, were rich with information contributed by migrants themselves and thus likely served as a key vector for migrants to share knowledge with those outside their immediate circles of acquaintance. Advice for travelers and warnings about dangerous working conditions could all be found in Hungarian newspapers published in the United States. Moreover, these newspapers were often collected by diplomatic officials in order to inform imperial policymakers about how the Hungarian diaspora was adjusting to life overseas. Her paper noted the Austro-Hungarian empire’s evident interest in using newspapers as tools for publicizing its own views on desirable migration strategies and in collecting overseas journalism in hopes of anticipating potential political dissent. Thus, knowledge migrants circulated amongst themselves in newspaper columns was simultaneously being used by imperial authorities to develop strategies for managing migration policy. Together, the two papers illustrated the important role of media in creating knowledge of migrants both with respect to other migrant communities and with respect to how sending countries perceive their desires and demands.

The fourth panel’s theme was “Migrants’ Knowledge and Gender.” Stephanie Lämmert’s paper examined the experiences of workers in the Copperbelt of Zambia in the mid-twentieth century who had typically migrated to the region from countries (then colonies) further east, south, and west. Male and female migrants arrived in the Copperbelt with diverging agendas—most men to work in the area’s copper mines, while women traveled there to earn money by meeting miners’ demands for food and other personal services. Lämmert focused on the religious practices and (largely Christian) spiritual communities that developed among these migrants as they became long-term residents of the region. Lämmert argued that previous research on Central African history has often framed religious belief as an “obstacle to modernity” and implicitly assumed that investigating the workings of modernity necessarily means looking away from the worldviews and practices of the devout. For most migrants, religious devotion was one component of developing a framework of knowledge that also included determining which healing practices and medical treatment would best enable them to sustain their health
in the face of arduous working conditions. Closer scrutiny, she argued, shows that migrants were discerning critics, moving from one community to another (or participating in several at once) to find a theology they found appealing, and sometimes melding ideas from disparate traditions to create entirely new churches—in other words, they took a “modern,” consumerist approach to spirituality.

Allison Schmidt’s paper examined how gender shaped travelers’ experiences of the regimes of migration control, focusing on the journeys of women traveling from Eastern Europe to the United States in the early twentieth century. She noted the importance of being aware that what has been defined in the American immigration historiography as the “typical” journey has tended to be the journey as experienced by male travelers. Female migrants were evidently aware that their gender and class identities—or more importantly their presentation of these identities—would affect how officials treated them at each stage of their voyage. Schmidt notes that these travelers typically drew on knowledge garnered from smaller-scale movement from village to village or from countryside to city in order to determine how best to make the transatlantic migration. Women travelers leaving Austria-Hungary obtained government documentation of their labor history and moral reputation to ensure they could make their way past internal border controls. Often, their experiences varied depending on whether or not they traveled with male adult relatives, which might determine how much scrutiny they faced from migration authorities and the degree of harassment or predation they might experience from ship or train personnel and other passengers. Schmidt’s analysis of several case studies of sexual assault, labor abuse, and sex trafficking indicated that notwithstanding female migrants’ diligent gathering of knowledge, they nonetheless often found their plans thwarted or undermined by arbitrary decisions they could not control, illustrating the limits of studying the history of knowledge for understanding the “typical” migration story.

In the final panel of papers, “Migrants’ Knowledge and the Professions,” Kilian Spiethoff and Brian Van Wyck presented research on the experiences of scientists and teachers in two very different contexts. Spiethoff examined the networks for exchanging natural specimens and academic publications created by naturalists and medical professionals from the German states who made their way to the U.S. Midwest—and particular Saint Louis, Missouri—in the years before the Civil War. Spiethoff argued that the emigrants were able
to make a name for themselves in German academic circles primarily through their ability to control access to rare and exotic scientific material and their use of publications to circulate news of their activities on the periphery of German-speaking scientific networks. Their contributions, moreover, provided a way for scholars in Germany to enhance their own prestige by enabling them to claim intellectual control over American as well as European research findings. In broad perspective, Spiethoff suggested, the case study suggests access to resources that are scarce or unavailable in the sending country has important bearing on whether migrant researchers can successfully participate in their home countries’ intellectual networks or face difficulty maintaining such ties.

Van Wyck’s paper, set more than a century later in West Germany and Turkey, studied the implementation from the late 1960s onward of a program that sent government-certified teachers from Turkey to German public schools to teach language, culture and history to Turkish-speaking children enrolled there. The teachers sent to West Germany labored under the “dual task” (doppelte Aufgabe) of both facilitating the adjustment of young Turkish students to the German educational system and ensuring that they would be able to integrate smoothly into the Turkish system if and when their families returned to Turkey. These teachers, Van Wyck explained, were placed in the unusual position of serving as “conveyors” of both “migrating knowledge” and “migrant knowledge.” They were expected to teach not only pedagogical subject content but also to imbue their students with “Turkishness.” Teachers rapidly learned that the children of Turkish migrants were not the same as children born and raised in Turkey and that their job would not be as simple as simply transplanting practices that worked well in Turkey’s classrooms to Germany. At the same time, assumptions that Turkish-born teachers would be experts in fulfilling their “dual task” meant that they received minimal scrutiny from German public authorities, even when Turkish families themselves raised questions about the quality of education their children received. Taken together, the two papers offered important insights into how migrants’ knowledge is incorporated with or is a barrier to intellectual and political nation-building projects.

In a concluding discussion session, the conference participants discussed several important themes that emerged over the course of the paper panels. There was broad agreement that using the heuristic
of knowledge provides a way for finding agency in migrants’ lives that moves away from the traditional framing of “high” and “low” skill levels. Focusing on migrant knowledge provides a way to think outside the nation-state “container,” but at the same time, it is noteworthy that migrant knowledge has both contributed to and helped to resolve cultural battles within both sending and receiving societies.

In addition to the panel sessions, the Bucerius Forum participants benefited from a visit to U.C. Berkeley’s renowned Oral History Center, where historian Paul Burnett gave a presentation on the use of oral history as a methodology for researching the history of migration and shared the rich variety of primary sources available there for studying the history of migration not only in California but also in other regions. The final day of the forum included a tour of the Magnes Collection of Jewish Art and Life that shed light on the usefulness of material culture for studying the experiences of migrant and diaspora communities. We thank these institutions for their hospitality and the Center for German and European Studies at U.C. Berkeley for its logistical support.

Atiba Pertilla (GHI)
KNOWLEDGE IN FLIGHT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOLAR RESCUE IN NORTH AMERICA

Conference organized by the German Historical Institute (GHI) in cooperation with the New School of Social Research and the Leo Baeck Institute, held at the New School for Social Research, New York City, December 4-5, 2017; with support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) and Dr. Henry Kaufman. Conveners: Simone Lässig (GHI), William Milberg (New School for Social Research), William Weitzer (Leo Baeck Institute, New York). Participants: Jeremy Adelman (Princeton University), Matthias Duller (University of Graz), Jane Edwards (Yale University), Judith Friedlander (Hunter College), David Gill (German Consulate New York), Daniela Gleizer (UNAM, Institute de Investigaciones Historicas), Asli Igsiz (New York University), Elisa Klüger (University of Sao Paulo), Scott Krause (ZZF Potsdam/UNC Chapel Hill), Isabella Löhö (University of Leipzig), Ludger Pries (El Colegio de Mexico/Ruhr University Bochum), Stefan Rinke (Free University Berlin), Marion Röwekamp (Free University Berlin), Anne Schenderlein (GHI), Sarah Willcox (Institute of International Education), David Van Zandt (The New School for Social Research), David Zimmerman (University of Victoria, BC).

The conference "Knowledge in Flight" continued the GHI’s interest in the history of German-speaking refugees from the Nazis in particular and migration more generally. In light of the recent refugee crisis, especially the large numbers of people fleeing the Syrian war, the GHI Washington had initiated a symposium on the challenges of integrating refugee academics from Nazi Europe already in December 2015. The positive response to this symposium, which the GHI co-organized with Germany’s Association of Historians (Historikerverband) and the American Academy in Berlin, inspired the partners to broaden the perspective and investigate the movement of scholars from different perilous and intellectually oppressive political environments and to focus on the impact of institutional forces on scholar rescue in particular.

The conference opened with a keynote lecture by Jeremy Adelman held at the Leo Baeck Institute. In his talk, Adelman reported on his experience of using MOOCs (massive open online courses) in connecting with refugee populations across the world. In a particular course that connected his Princeton undergraduate students with Syrian students still in Syria or in refugee camps, the Syrian
students sensitized their American colleagues for particular historical moments, such as the Sykes–Picot Agreement, that had not been included in their course work. Adelman emphasized that this experience did not only enhance the learning experience of the American and Syrian students in the course but also prompted him to make additions to a textbook he was editing. While humanitarian concerns were guiding principles for his efforts, Adelman pointed to the benefits gained by tapping into the special insights and knowledge of refugee populations.

The first panel, entitled “Obstacles and Opportunities: The Context of Refugee Scholarship,” was chaired by Stefan Rinke and opened with Judith Friedlander’s paper about the establishment of the University in Exile at the New School of Social Research in New York City. As a direct response to the Nazis’ Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, which dismissed professors out of racial or political grounds, Alvin Johnson launched a rescue campaign that by the end of the war had offered about 200 refugee scholars employment opportunities at the New School. Johnson’s vision for a University in Exile in New York was to not only rescue individual scholars but also European institutions and their scholarly traditions, which he considered superior to American ones. Citing the examples of Gerhard Colm and Leo Strauss, among others, Friedlander emphasized that the scholars who came to the New School have contributed more widely to the academic and policy communities in the United States than previous scholarship has acknowledged.

In his paper sociologist Ludger Pries also took up the example of scholar rescue at the New School and compared it to the Colegio de Mexico (Colmex) in Mexico City, which likewise became a haven for European intellectuals in the 1930s and 40s. While administrators at the Colegio looked to the New School as an example of how to build a similar university in exile as in New York, the general climates and contexts of forced emigration were quite different in the two cases, as were the institutional settings and goals. In both places, the presence of cosmopolitan leaders, Alvin Johnson at the New School and Daniel Cosio Villegas at Colmex, was crucial for the initiation and success of the projects though. Pries concluded that while the experience of forced migration was a bane for the European Jews, political exiles (New School), and Spanish Republicans fleeing Franco Spain (Colmex), their arrival and integration into the two institutions was a boon to those, strengthening their teaching and research. He
characterized these historical projects as a mix between charity and instrumental utilitarianism.

In the third paper of the panel Daniela Gleizer focused exclusively on Mexico’s role in the rescue of anti-fascist refugees during the Second World War. Jewish refugees had almost no chance of getting into Mexico because Mexican officials viewed them as “unassimilable” and hence prohibited Jewish immigration from 1934. In contrast to other countries that preferred taking in exiles based on their professional capacity and out of economic considerations, Mexico was primarily offering asylum to political refugees, especially active communists, most of them Spanish Republican exiles, in order to reaffirm the country’s anti-imperialist and anti-fascist principles to the outside. Such foreign political concerns were given more importance than attracting scientists and academics who could have contributed to the country’s desired modernization. Objections to attracting talent from abroad came from local groups of intellectuals, who feared competition. Thus, Gleizer emphasized the importance of taking into consideration local infrastructures rather than solely focusing on a national perspective of analysis.

In the second panel, titled “Imperial Colleagues and Unwanted Competitors,” and chaired by Anne Schenderlein, Isabella Löhr placed the persecution and flight of refugee scholars during the 1930s and 40s into larger debates of twentieth-century historiography, which showed that the refugees’ experience was not as unique as exile scholarship has generally described it. Löhr argued that historically, scholar rescue coincided with the professionalization of the modern university, the development of an academic labor market since the late nineteenth century, and with increasing global educational mobility. Taking a closer look at academic aid organizations such as the American Emergency Committee Aid of Displaced Persons and other non-state actors such as the Carnegie Foundation, she demonstrated that in their decision-making on how to distribute aid, humanitarian concerns were second to labor and professional issues, such as academic excellence. Löhr not only emphasized the importance of approaching this particular history of scholar flight and rescue in the framework of global migration and internationalist practices but argued that it serves as a good case to study border-crossing infrastructures.

In the second paper, Elisa Klüger focused on opportunities and obstacles faced by Brazilian exiles in Chile between 1964 and 1973.
Klüger demonstrated why Santiago de Chile became a center for exiled Brazilian intellectuals. The rise of the Chilean left and general upheavals in the Chilean intellectual space as well as the existence of international institutions, universities and research centers and the financial support of North American foundations provided a wide range of job opportunities in the political and academic field to the exiles. Nevertheless, there were significant differences between two waves of exiles on a structural level. Klüger observed that exiles belonging to the first wave leaving Brazil between 1964 and 1968 often came from elite families, benefited from greater social and economic resources and were older than exiles belonging to the second wave in 1968. Financial capital, social networks, political relations or professional reputation made it easier to find jobs for first wave immigrants. Second wave exiles, usually less privileged and younger, often had to deal with an interruption of their academic education but received support by the first generation exiles.

Marion Röwekamp delineated the specific situation of Spanish Republican scholars in Mexico and outlined the case in comparison to the case of German Jewish refugees in Mexico and the U.S. After the rise of Franco, around 50,000 Spanish Republican refugees came to Mexico. For several reasons such as sharing the same language and the educational system as Mexicans, the Spanish refugees experienced a relatively easy exile situation. Republican funds made them independent from financial aid by the Mexican government, and they easily received Mexican citizenship. By contrast, German refugees in the United States had a more difficult time. Their legal status as immigrants was often unclear, they faced anti-Semitism, and their professional degrees were frequently not officially recognized. In comparison to the Spaniards in Mexico, German refugees also faced a language barrier, which posed serious challenges for those intellectuals whose professions were tied to verbal communication of their ideas.

In the first paper of the third panel, “From Refugee Scholars to Returnees: the Ford Foundation behind the Iron Curtain, 1948–1970,” Matthias Duller outlined the efforts and activities of the Ford Foundation to establish scientific exchange with communist states in Eastern Europe. Despite internal debates, the Ford Foundation developed a conception of itself not only as a powerful private organization but also as global actor with a major role in foreign cultural policy. In the context of the Cold War, the Foundation established the “Free Russia Fund/ East European Fund” to support Russian refugee scholars
and intellectuals. In 1953 the Ford Foundation discontinued the fund and changed its strategy from supporting refugees from communist countries to impact scholars and intellectuals that still lived in these countries. Duller emphasized the similarities and differences between the various programs that existed with different communist states and discussed their intentions and impact.

In the second paper of the last panel, Scott H. Krause illustrated the roots of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in socialist exile circles and the development of their political agenda. Tracing stations of Paul Hertz and Hans Hirschfeld in Paris 1933-1940, New York 1941-1949 and postwar Berlin, Krause pointed out how these experiences transformed into knowledge, shaped their political behavior and led to a reorientation from anti-fascism to anti-totalitarianism. Hertz and other members of the anti-fascist “Neu Beginnen” group (NB) that managed to escape to New York founded the “American Friends of German Freedom” (AFGF). Members of the AFGF benefited from contact to other émigré scholars in the United States and adapted to the new environment but still kept their identity as German-speaking socialists. After the war some émigrés returned to their former home country to help build a liberal democracy in West Germany. Their knowledge of prewar Germany and exile became a precious commodity in the transatlantic political negotiations at the time.

In the last paper of the conference, entitled “Competitive Cooperation: The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, the American Emergency Committee and the Placement of Refugee Scholars in North America,” David Zimmermann focused on the often ignored relationship of the two largest national assistance organizations for displaced academics and scholars. Zimmermann traced the development of this important and successful, but also extremely problematic cooperation between the American and the British organizations. Jealousy and competition characterized their cooperation, but since they managed to overcome these problems they were able to establish an “underground railroad” to support numerous refugee scholars and assist them in finding jobs in academic institutions or securing financial aid.

The closing roundtable titled “Protecting Endangered Scholars and Scientists: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges” was moderated by Simone Lässig, who opened by asking how far historical approaches and strategies might hold for dealing with the current
refugee crisis. Sarah Willcox, Director of the Scholar Rescue Fund of the Institute of International Education, opined that contemporary challenges remain the same as past ones in that each scholar struggles after their arrival and that the acceptance by and joining of an academic community is very difficult. The Scholar Rescue Fund attempts to lessen these complications by providing structures and networks that aid scholars in succeeding long-term and with their families. Asli Igsiz, Professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, directed the audience’s attention toward Turkey, where over the past year and a half nearly 6000 academics have been purged and many private universities were closed. This makes Turkish scholars the largest group of scholars seeking rescue at the moment. Igsiz pointed out that in contrast to the past, European countries were taking more responsibility in the current refugee crisis. David Gill, German consul general in New York, reported on the activities of the German government in supporting scholars in flight, such as the Philipp Schwartz Initiative of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, which is funded primarily by the Federal Foreign Office. This initiative has so far brought about 130 scholars to Germany. Gill named Germany’s historical responsibility as one reason for helping persecuted scholars. In addition, these initiatives are guided by the hope that offering people coming from restrictive regimes the opportunity to work in a free scientific system may in turn make them ambassadors of democracy when they return to their home countries. Julika Griem, vice president of the German Research Foundation (DFG) and professor of English Literature in Frankfurt, was more skeptical about the continuities of past and present refugee crises and the degree to which insights from the past apply to today’s problems. The remaining discussion centered on institutional restrictions, language issues, Islamophobia (and whether it had somewhat replaced anti-Semitism), and the Americanization of the international academic scene. Not only is academia a highly competitive system but the mastery of English is a major requirement to participate in it. Griem suggested that one might rethink these developments, to ask how research and teaching can benefit from different perspectives, and to strengthen the reputation of people who speak several languages besides and other than English. The entire roundtable discussion is available for streaming on the GHI website.

Anne Schenderlein (GHI) and Judith Beneker (GHI)
OBITUARY: JEANNE MALLETT (1944-2017)

The Friends of the German Historical Institute mourn the passing, last November 14, of Jeanne Mallett, who was their treasurer from 2011 to 2017. After studying Political Science at Ohio State (BA, MA), she moved to Washington, where she received her JD from Georgetown University in 1979. Jeanne remained loyal to her home state — both as a sports fan and as an attorney for the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency — at the same time that she contributed greatly to the Washington community. Her family heritage inspired her to volunteer for German institutions, and the Friends of the German Historical Institute were the primary beneficiaries, as she oversaw their finances and encouraged their fundraising efforts. She demonstrated her dedication to the very end, when despite her serious illness she ensured a smooth transition to the new Treasurer, Carl-Henry Geschwind. Jeanne’s memory is a blessing to the Friends and the entire staff of the GHI.

GHI WASHINGTON CELEBRATED THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY

On October 12, 2017 the GHI celebrated its 30-year anniversary by hosting a panel discussion, moderated by the GHI’s Richard Wetzell, featuring four historians reflecting on the founding of the German Historical Institute, which opened its doors in 1987. Hartmut Lehmann, the GHI’s first director, offered his recollections on the opportunities and challenges involved in establishing the new Institute; Doris Bergen (University of Toronto), shared her experiences and insights as someone who has frequently cooperated with the GHI; Jacob Eder (Friedrich Schiller University Jena), author of Holocaust Angst (2016), shed light on the place of the GHI in the transatlantic memory politics of the 1980s; Scott Krause (ZZF Potsdam & UNC Chapel Hill), who is working on a history of the Institute’s founding, outlined the findings of his recent examination of the newly declassified files from the German Ministry of Research and Technology as well as Helmut Kohl’s chancellery. The institute also produced a short video celebrating the GHI’s 30 years of working with historians on both sides of the Atlantic which was screened at the October 12 event and can be viewed on the GHI website.
GHI AWARDED TWO-YEAR GRANT BY THE ZEIT-STIFTUNG EBELIN UND GERD BUCERIUS FOR GERMAN HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS AND IMAGES

The German Historical Institute (GHI) was recently awarded a generous two-year grant from the Hamburg-based ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius. The grant will help transform the German History in Documents and Images (GHDI) website into a first-class resource for teaching and learning about German history in a global and digital age. The ZEIT-Stiftung funds will support the expansion and revision of volumes 6 through 10 of GHDI, which together cover the last century of German history (1918 to the present). The grant will allow for the addition of compelling new textual and visual sources to these volumes as well as the integration of multimedia sources, such as film and audio clips. These and other editorial enhancements will respond to recent developments in historiography and methodology (e.g. the visual and spatial turns in history) while meeting the needs of today’s digitally oriented youth. The ZEIT-Stiftung was an original sponsor of the German History in Documents and Images website in 2003, and the GHI is grateful to the foundation for its renewed commitment to the project.

INNOVATION THROUGH MIGRATION: NEW SENIOR FELLOWSHIPS AND PRACTITIONERS IN RESIDENCE PROGRAM AT GHI WEST, UC BERKELEY

The German Historical Institute Washington DC is proud to announce two new fellowship programs at its Pacific Regional Office in Berkeley, GHI West. The Senior Fellowship program offers up to three senior scholars per year the chance to come to Berkeley to help shape the emerging Center for the History of Migration and Knowledge which is being established at GHI West. The Practitioners in Residence program offers professionals who work in government as well as in nongovernmental organizations, the fields of social work, or in relevant media on issues of migration politics a short-time stay to catch up with relevant literature and reflect, from a distance, on their everyday tasks. Both programs are generously supported by the Brüder Stiftung.
The 2017 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize was awarded to Bradley J. Nichols (Virginia Tech). The award ceremony took place at the 26th Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute on November 10, 2017. The selection committee was composed of: Monica Black (chair, University of Tennessee-Knoxville), Yair Mintzker (Princeton University), and Annemarie Sammartino (Oberlin College).

The committee’s prize citation for Bradley J. Nichols’ dissertation, The Hunt for Lost Blood: Nazi Germanization Policy in Occupied Europe (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee, 2017), read: “Bradley Nichols’s rich, learned, and sophisticated dissertation tells the story of the re-Germanization of individuals in German-occupied Europe during the Second World War. According to Nichols, at the heart of the murderous Nazi policies in Europe lay a strange paradox: at the very same time that SS racial “experts” were engaged in genocidal policies, they were also anxious about cleansing the wrong racial elements from the non-German populations under their control. They all agreed that the German Volksgemeinschaft should be purged from foreign elements, but some of them also thought they could identify, then reintegrate into Germany, “lost German blood” (German ethnic elements), thus enriching the biological makeup of the German Volk while weakening the life force of non-German ethnic groups. Nichols reconstructs this aspect of Nazi policies in astounding detail, from a discussion of how the SS discussed such policies, to the way it searched for “lost German blood” on the ground, to the stories of countless individuals — in the East, in Western Europe, and in the Third Reich itself — who, willingly or not, pushed for, or were affected by, such policies. This is by no means untrodden historical terrain, and yet through dogged and careful research, Nichols has managed to find new and important archival sources that contribute to a compelling Alltagsgeschichte of the German occupation. "The Hunt for Lost Blood" is a draft of what promises to be an important contribution to the study of German-occupied Europe during the Second World War.”
NEW STAFF PUBLICATIONS

Monographs


Edited Volumes and Special Issues


Lässig, Simone and Swen Steinberg, eds. “Knowledge and Migration.” Special Issue, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 43.3 (2017).


**Articles and Chapters**


Eicher, John. “‘Every Family on Their Own?’ Iowa’s Mennonite Farm Communities and the 1980s Farm Crisis.” *Journal of Mennonite Studies* 35 (2017): 75-96.


STAFF CHANGES

**Jana Adkins** joined the GHI as the Assistant to the Director in November 2017. She previously worked as an Executive Assistant at the Goethe-Institut New York and as a German Language Teacher for both the German Language School in Long Island, NY and German Language Courses — German International School Washington D.C.

**Stefan Boehm**, who joined the GHI in June 2015 as Administrative Director, left the institute in December 2017 to take up a position with the German Military in Stuttgart.

**Daniel Burckhardt** joined the GHI in April 2018 as a Technical Developer to support the relaunch of the *German History in Documents and Images* website. He studied mathematics in Zürich and the history of science and technology in Berlin. He has been a Research Associate at the Institute for the History of the German Jews since 2015.

**Katharina Hering** joined the GHI as Digital Project Librarian/Metadata editor in April 2018 to support the relaunch of the *German History in Documents and Images* (GHDI). She holds an MLIS in Library and Information Science from the University of Pittsburgh, PA, and a PhD in history from George Mason University. Before joining the GHI she worked as an archivist for the National Equal Justice Library at Georgetown Law Library.

**Anne Kadolph** joined the GHI as Administrative Director in April 2018. She previously worked at Technische Universität Dresden for more than 10 years, where she last served as Deputy and Acting Head of the Department for Higher Education Cooperation at the university’s European Project Center. She holds degrees in Public Administration and Political Science.

**Claudia Roesch** joined the GHI as a Research Fellow in January 2018. She is working on a transnational history of family planning. Previously she was a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Münster’s collaborative research center “Cultures of Decision-Making.” She studied contemporary history, English and American Studies at Humboldt-University in Berlin and received her PhD in contemporary history at the University of Münster in 2014.

**Stefan Sachser** joined the GHI as Administrative Associate in May 2018. He previously worked as an administrative assistant at the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief.

**Jörg Schröder**, Deputy Administrative Director since 2001, left the institute in January 2018 in order to start a position as Administrative Director with the German Archaeological Institute (DAI), Commission for Archaeology of Non-European Cultures (KAAK) in Bonn.
Sören Urbansky joined the GHI as a Research Fellow in January 2018. He is a historian of Russia and China in the modern era, specializing in imperial and racial entanglements, emigration and the history of borders. Before he joined the GHI he taught Chinese and Russian history at the Universities of Munich and Freiburg and was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge. He is currently embarking on a new project that examines anti-Chinese sentiments in a global perspective.

GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to European and North American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars to pursue research projects that draw upon primary sources located in the United States. We are particularly interested in research projects that fit into the following fields: German and European history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the USA in international relations, and American history (European doctoral and postdoctoral scholars only).

The proposed research projects should make use of historical methods and engage with the relevant historiography. We especially invite applications from doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars who currently have no funding from their home institutions. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to five months.

The GHI also offers a number of other long-term doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles to strengthen key research interests at the institute, including: the history of knowledge, the history of race and ethnicity, the history of religion and religiosiy, the history of family and kinship, the history of migration, and North American history. In addition to these opportunities, several new fellowship programs have been introduced: the Binational Tandem Research Program for “The History of Knowledge” and “Global and Trans-regional History,” and the Gerda Henkel Postdoctoral Fellowship for Digital History.

For further information about these programs and current application deadlines, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.
GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

GHI FELLOWSHIP RECIPIENTS

Long-term Visiting Fellows, 2018-19

Christiane Bauer, Universität Kassel / LMU München
Selbstentwürfe von Nachfahren deutscher Immigranten in den USA — Eine erinnerungsgeschichtliche Auseinandersetzung mit Migration und Identität

Merle Ingenfeld, Universität zu Köln
The Cure: A Transnational History of (Homo-)Sexual Conversion Therapy (1933-1973)

James McSpadden, Harvard University
Nazi Looted Books, Allied War Booty, and American Libraries

Simon Unger, University of Oxford
The Loyal Opposition: European Theologians between Fascism and Christianity, 1919-45

Andrea Wiegeshoff, Philipps-Universität Marburg

Gerda Henkel Fellow in Digital History

Jens Pohlmann, Stanford University
How to Digitally Preserve, Exhibit, and Analyze Einstürzende Neubauten’s Supporter Project?
Short-term Doctoral Fellowships

Cristian Capotescu, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
*Giving in the Time of Socialism: Economic Life, Humanitarianism, and Mobility in Europe, 1960s-1990s*

Manuel Geist, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
*An den Schnittstellen der Macht. Französische und britische Russlandexperten und die Beziehungen zu Russland, 1890-1924*

Christina Matzen, University of Toronto
*Imprisoned Women: Gender, Politics, and Criminology in Nazi, Communist, and Democratic Germanies*

Martin Prell, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
*“[A]lles schreibt an mich, und will von mir americanische Geheimnisse wissen” — Digitale Religionsgeschichte am Beispiel computergestützter Erforschung des transatlantischen Korrespondenznetzwerks preußischer Pietist/innen*

Lena Marie Rudeck, Max Planck Institute for Human Development / Freie Universität Berlin
*Between Pleasure and Immorality: Western Allies’ Soldiers’ Clubs in Germany as Sites of Encounters between Occupiers and the Occupied, 1945-1955*

Philipp Schulte, Universität Heidelberg / EHESS Paris
*“Es ist doch mein Bild!” Bildkonflikte, Recht am eigenen Bild und right to privacy in Deutschland und den USA, 1880-1930.*

Daniela Weiner, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
*Teaching a Dark Chapter: Holocaust and Resistance Representations in East German, West German, and Italian History Textbooks, 1943-2000*

Short-term Postdoctoral Fellowships

Thomas Dorfner, RWTH Aachen University
*Kommerz für den Heiland. Der Handel der Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine in der Atlantischen Welt (1758-1818)*

Vincent Lagendijk, Maastricht University
*From the American South to the Global South: The Tennessee Valley Authority in the 20th Century*
GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR AND COLLOQUIUM, FALL 2017

September 20  Bryant Simon (Temple University)
The Contradictory Appeal of the Public in 20th-Century
America: An Urban Story Told in Three Acts

October 5  Lara Track (Universität Heidelberg)
Between Peace and Women’s Rights. Women Strike
for Peace and the Feminist Movement in the United
States, 1960–1991

October 19  Justus Nipperdey (Universität des Saarlandes)
Early Modernity — Periodization and the Emergence of
the Modern World in U.S. Historiography

November 15  Wencke Meteling (Philipps-Universität Marburg)
Fear of Failing: Debates on International Competitiveness
in the UK and Germany

November 16  Lisa Gerlach (Technische Universität Braunschweig/
Georg-Eckert-Institut, Braunschweig)
Cultural History of Letters of Recommendation in
German Jewish Networks before and after 1933

Carolyn Taratko (Vanderbilt University)
Feeding Germany: Nutrition and the German
Countryside, 1871–1923

Anna Danilina (Max Planck Institut für
Bildungsforschung, Berlin / International Max
Planck Research School (IMPRS) for Moral
Economies in Modern Societies)
Shaping Aryan Race: Affect and Embodiment in the
Voelkisch Movement (1900–1935)

November 29  Anke Ortlepp (Universität Kassel)
Transnational Architecture: The New Brutalism in
Great Britain, the United States, and Brazil, 1950s–1980s
GHI SPRING LECTURE SERIES 2018

Illicit Knowledge: Copyright, Piracy, and Intellectual Property in Historical Perspective

Organized by Sarah Beringer and Atiba Pertilla

Knowledge is central to most human practices. Its discovery, production, adaptation, and expansion often give those who “possess” knowledge economic, political, or social advantages over those who do not. This dynamic drives the quest to protect knowledge with patents and other forms of ownership rights, and creates incentives for others to appropriate or abuse knowledge generated or controlled by others.

Through the lens of the history of knowledge, the GHI’s Spring 2018 Lecture Series “Illicit Knowledge: Copyright, Piracy, and Intellectual Property in Historical Perspective” will provide historical context to current debates over the adaptation, reuse, and remixing of intellectual property in an era when digital technology makes replication easier than it has ever been before.

The questions this lecture series aims to address are as multifaceted as knowledge itself. Who are the actors? What are their motives? What trends can be detected over time, by sector, and in terms of different cultural influences? And how do technological developments — such as digitization — change our perception of copyright and the fair use of knowledge?

April 19  Mondrian’s Dress: Copying (and) the Couture Copy
Nancy Troy (Stanford University)

May 3  Japanese Industrial Espionage, American Decline, and the Political Economy of Knowledge in the 1980s
Mario Daniels (Georgetown University)

May 24  Hip-Hop Aesthetics: Theft, Borrowing, or Artistic Practice?
Justin Williams (University of Bristol)

June 14  Copyright and Intellectual Property: Why Is Academia Reluctant to Embrace Open-Access Scholarship?
Peter Baldwin (University of California, Los Angeles)
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2018/19

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check out our website at www.ghi-dc.org

January 05  Inside/Outside: Defining, Ascribing, and Communicating “Germanness” in Different Contexts, Spaces, and Times
Panel at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association
Organized by the contributors to the German History Intersections project

January 05-06  Rewriting 19th Century Central European History
Panel Series at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association
Conveners: GHI Washington and the Central European History Society

January 25  Immigration of European Highly Skilled Workers to Germany: Intra-EU Brain Circulation or Brain Drain/Gain?
Lecture at GHI West
Speaker: Céline Teney, University of Bremen

February 01  Sorbian/Wendish Cultural Revival in the Age of Globalization
Lecture at GHI West
Speaker: Hélène Yèche (University of Poitiers)

February 14-16  In Global Transit: Jewish Migrants from Hitler’s Europe in Asia, Africa, and Beyond
Conference in Kolkata, India
Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Anne Schenderlein (GHI Washington), and Indra Sengupta (GHI London)

February 20  Climate Change, Climate Change Refugees, and Public Art
Lecture at GHI West
Speaker: Christina Gerhardt (University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa)

February 21  Small States and Secondary Actors in the Cold War: Entanglements Between Europe and Latin America
Lecture at GHI West
Speaker: Albert Manke (GHI West Tandem Fellow; Senior Researcher at the Center for Inter-American Studies at Bielefeld University)
February 22–24  Cultures of Capitalism in Weimar and Nazi Germany  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Pamela Swett (McMaster University), Moritz Föllmer (University of Amsterdam), and David Lazar (GHI Washington)

March 01  Place, People, and Power in City Building in Postwar America  
Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Lizabeth Cohen (Harvard University)

March 01–02  Bounded Democracy: Global Workshop on American Urbanisms  
Workshop at the GHI  
Conveners: Anke Ortlepp (University of Kassel/GHI Washington) and Bryant Simon (Temple University/GHI Washington)

March 06  The End of Gold? Monetary Metals Studied at the Planetary and Human Scale During the Classical Gold Standard Era  
Lecture at GHI West  
Speaker: Andrea Westermann, GHI West Research Fellow and Head of Office

March 13  Transboundary Natures: The Consequences of the Iron Curtain for Landscape  
Lecture at GHI West  
Speaker: Astrid M. Eckert (Emory University)

March 17–18  West Coast Germanists’ Workshop  
Conveners: Frank Biess (UC San Diego), Edward Ross Dickinson (UC Davis) Paul Lerner (USC) Ulli Strasser (UC San Diego), Andrea Westermann (GHI West)

March 22  Overburdened Peace: Competing Visions of World Order in 1918/19  
Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Jörn Leonhard (University of Freiburg)

March 22  Trust as Violence: The Politics of Film and the Militarization of Male Sexuality in National Socialism  
Lecture at GHI West  
Anja Laukötter (Center for the History of Emotions at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin)
March 22-24  Settlement and Unsettlement: The Ends of World War I and Their Legacies
2018 Annual Conference of the Max Weber Foundation at the GHI
Conveners: Max Weber Foundation, GHI Washington, American Historical Association (AHA) with the National History Center (NCH), German Historical Association (Verband der Historiker und Historikerinnen Deutschlands, VHD)

April 11  Europe 1918–2018 French, German, and Polish Perspectives on the Future of the European Union
Panel Discussion at the GHI
Speakers: Gérard Araud (Ambassador of France to the United States), Peter Wittig (Ambassador of Germany to the United States), Piotr Wilczek (Ambassador of Poland to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Bahamas), and moderated by Christoph von Marschall, Helmut Schmidt Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

April 11  War in the Nazi Imagination
Lecture at Georgetown University
Richard Evans (University of Cambridge)

April 12  Marx at 200: A Symposium
Symposium at the GHI
Conveners: Warren Breckman (University of Pennsylvania), James Brophy (University of Delaware), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), and David Lazar (GHI Washington)

April 12  Karl Marx and the History of Capitalism
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Jürgen Kocka (WZB/Berlin Social Science Center)

April 13  The Invisibles
Washington Jewish Film Festival Screening at Edlavitch DCJCC
Co-presented by German Historical Institute

April 16-17  Alternative Realities: Utopian Thought in Times of Political Rupture
Conference at The Wende Museum at The Armory, Culver City, California and the University of Southern California (USC)
Co-sponsored by GHI West and organized by The Max Kade Institute for Austrian-German-Swiss Studies (USC) and The Wende Museum
April 17  Post-Nazi Germany and the Myth of American Influence  
Lecture at GHI West  
Speaker: Noah B. Strote (North Carolina State University)

April 19  Mondrian's Dress: Copying (and) the Couture Copy  
Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Nancy Troy (Stanford University)

April 20  Making Immigrant Knowledge from Collective Memories: Watching the Process Unfold in Spain  
Lecture at GHI West, University of California Berkeley,  
Speaker: Evelyn Hu-DeHart, Brown University

April 20-21  Migrant Knowledges: Concepts, Voices, Spaces  
Workshop at GHI West, UC Berkeley  
Convener: GHI West

April 24  Consuming Temples on Both Sides of the Atlantic: German-speaking Jews from the Department Store to the Mall  
Lecture at GHI West  
Speaker: Paul Lerner (USC)

May 02-03  Dynamiken des Wissens: Historische Perspektiven auf das Verhältnis von Wissen und Migration vom 20. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart  
Conference at the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Berlin  
Conveners: Stephanie Zloch (Georg-Eckert-Institut Braunschweig), Dagmar Ellerbrock (TU Dresden), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Swen Steinberg (TU Dresden)

May 03  Japanese Industrial Espionage, American Decline, and the Political Economy of Knowledge in the 1980s  
Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Mario Daniels (Georgetown University)

May 07  Back to the Fatherland  
Washington Jewish Film Festival Screening at Bethesda Row Cinema  
Co-presented by German Historical Institute, AJC Global Jewish Advocacy Washington, 3GDC — Washington DC, Grandchildren of Holocaust Survivors, Generation After
May 09

Back to Berlin
Washington Jewish Film Festival Screening at Edlavitch DCJCC
Co-presented by The Kosciuszko Foundation German Historical Institute Polish American Arts Association

May 10

Global Transformations of Time in the Nineteenth Century
9th Gerald Feldman Memorial Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Sebastian Conrad (Freie Universität Berlin)

May 11

Fourteenth Workshop on Early Modern German History
Conference at the GHI London
Conveners: Bridget Heal (University of St. Andrews), Katherine Hill (Birkbeck, University of London), David Lederer (NUI Maynooth), Alison Rowlands (University of Essex), and Hannes Ziegler (GHI London)

May 17-18

Transoceanic American Studies
Conference at the GHI Washington
Conveners: Juliane Braun (University of Bonn/GHI Washington); Benjamin Fagan (Auburn University/GHI Washington)

May 24

Hip-Hop Aesthetics: Theft, Borrowing, or Artistic Practice?
Lecture at the GHI Washington
Speaker: Justin Williams (University of Bristol)

May 30-June 03

24th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Seminar at GHI West
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington)

June 06-10

Learning by the Book: Manuals and Handbooks in the History of Knowledge
Conference at Princeton University
Conveners: Angela Creager (Princeton University), Mathias Grote (Humboldt University Berlin), Elaine Leong (MPI for the History of Science, Berlin), Kerstin von der Krone (GHI Washington)

June 14

Copyright and Intellectual Property: Why Is Academia Reluctant to Embrace Open-Access Scholarship?
Lecture at the GHI Washington
Speaker: Peter Baldwin (University of California, Los Angeles)
June 14-15  **Observing the Everyday: Journalistic Practices and Knowledge Production in the Modern Era**  
Second Workshop at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin  
Conveners: Kerstin von der Krone (GHI Washington) and Hansjakob Ziemer (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin)

June 22-23  **Defining Black European History**  
Conference at the GHI Washington  
Conveners: Jeff Bowersox (University College London), Tiffany N. Florvil (University of New Mexico), Atiba Pertilla (GHI Washington), and Kira Thurman (University of Michigan)

June 22-23  **Exile and Emigration in an Age of War and Revolutions (ca. 1750–1830)**  
Workshop at Re:work International Research Center, Berlin  
Conveners: Linda Colley (Princeton University) and Jan C. Jansen (GHI Washington)

September 27-30  **The Nexus of Migration, Youth, and Knowledge**  
Panel Series at the Forty-Second Annual German Studies Association Conference, Pittsburgh, PA  
Conveners: Andrea Westermann (GHI West), Onur Erdur (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

October 08-10  **Agents of Cultural Change: Jewish and other Responses to Modernity, ca. 1750–1900**  
Conference at the GHI Washington  
Conveners: Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), Zohar Shavit (Tel Aviv University), Kerstin von der Krone (GHI Washington)

October 17-20  **Bucerius Young Scholars Forum at GHI West: “Histories of Migration: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives”**  
Bucerius Young Scholars Forum at GHI West  
Convener: Andrea Westermann (GHI West)

October 25-27  **Reconstructing Historical Networks Digitally: New Approaches, Opportunities and Epistemological Implications of Social Network Analysis**  
International Workshop and Conference at the GHI Washington  
Conveners: Matthew Hiebert (GHI Washington), Simone Lässig (GHI Washington), and Katherine McDonough (Stanford University)
2019

March 22-23  The Politics of Sovereignty and Globalism in Modern Germany
Conference at the GHI Washington
Conveners: Rüdiger Graf (ZZF Potsdam), Quinn Slobodian (Wellesley College), Heidi Tworek (University of British Columbia), Anne Schenderlein (GHI Washington)

May 29-June 01  25th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Seminar at the GHI Washington
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI Washington)
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