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This issue of the *Bulletin* marks the end of my term as Director of the German Historical Institute. I am delighted that the *Bulletin*’s readership has continued to grow during my tenure and that, beyond performing the service of informing the academic community about the GHI’s activities, the *Bulletin* has become widely recognized as a journal featuring first-rate scholarship.

As I leave my post, I have, from the vantage point of an economic historian, reflected on my years in the United States, delivering a “Farewell Lecture” on this theme at the GHI last June and at the German Embassy last September, which is published in this issue. My successor as Director of the GHI, as of October 1, is Simone Lässig, who is on leave from her position as Director of the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research in Braunschweig. I know that the GHI will be in very good hands with Professor Lässig and would like to convey all my best wishes for her tenure at the Institute.

My farewell lecture is not the only article featuring personal reflections in this issue. In “History Lived and History Written: Germany and the United States, 1945/55-2015,” which was first delivered as the Gerald Feldman Memorial Lecture this past May, the distinguished historian Charles Maier (Harvard University) offers his personal reflections on both “lived history” and “written history” in Germany and the United States since the end of the Second World War. This issue’s third feature article, by Loch Johnson (University of Georgia), one of America’s leading scholars of national security, is based on a lecture he delivered in the GHI’s 2015 Spring Lecture Series on “Intelligence Services and Civil Liberties: Security and Privacy in Historical Perspective.” In this article Johnson provides an incisive, historically informed analysis of the recent German-American controversies over the proper balance of national security and privacy that were fueled by Edward Snowden’s revelations concerning the National Security Agency’s mass surveillance of phone calls and internet traffic worldwide.

The remaining two feature articles present the research of GHI Research Fellows. Jan Jansen’s article “In Search of Atlantic Sociability: Freemasons, Empires, and Atlantic History” sketches the contributions that Jansen’s projected history of Atlantic masonic
networks and sociability in the decades around 1800 will make to the comparative history of empires as well as to Atlantic and global history. Elisabeth Engel’s article “From Sex in Colonial Africa to Anticolonialism in the Bedroom: Reflections on the African American Missionary Position,” which draws on her recently completed dissertation, which won the 2015 Franz Steiner Prize, argues that the travel writing of African American missionaries in Africa transformed both colonial and pan-African discourses about the relationship between African Americans and Africa by altering dominant assumptions about what the markers of sameness and difference were in the intimate domains of home, sex and family.

This issue’s conference reports range from Germans in the Pacific world to the history of “consumer engineering,” from environmental history to the “Black Atlantic,” from the early modern period to the twentieth century, and thus once again illustrate the diversity of research topics examined at the workshops and conferences organized and supported by the German Historical Institute.

I would like to express my gratitude to the entire staff of the GHI, who turned the Institute into the vibrant place that it is and contributed to our teamwork with a high level of energy and competence. I would also like to thank Richard Wetzell, who in his capacity of this Bulletin’s editor has borne the brunt of the challenging and time-consuming work of putting together this journal and has assiduously worked toward raising the academic profile of the Bulletin.

The GHI has, once again, lined up a great program of lectures and conferences for this winter and next spring. Please consult the calendar of upcoming events in this issue’s “News” section and on our website. I know that Simone Lässig and the GHI team look forward to welcoming you at one of these events in the coming academic year.

Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Director, April 2008 to September 2015)
Features
Gerald Feldman was a friend and a colleague, an early mentor. He graduated from Columbia two years before I graduated from Harvard. He was three years ahead of me in the Harvard graduate program, and we worked in related fields, in particular business-government relations in Weimar and the history of the German inflation, on which he wrote a magisterial book. He was generous with his advice and had a great, understated sense of humor. I learned a lot from him. We did not always agree — the painful debate over the sanctioning of David Abraham was a challenge, but we worked to overcome that breach. This speech honors Gerry’s massive scholarship and his friendship, but although we worked for a long time in similar fields, I am not going to talk about this common field of work. Neither am I going to cite in detail the significant and numerous contributions that have explored postwar Germany and the postwar United States. As readers will soon discern, this lecture is as much personal as it is scholarly.

Since the German Historical Institute has always and fruitfully encouraged the intersections of German and American history, and of German and American historians, I propose to discuss that partially shared history. I have chosen an ambivalent opening date: 1945/55. The first year, 1945, has an obvious significance. May 2015 marked 70 years since the second great German war ended in Europe. The significance of the second, 1955 — sixty years ago this summer — will become clear in a moment.

I.

Let us start, as we all do these days, with pictures, in this case a couple of evocative pictures from the early postwar period — not the iconic photo of Soviet soldiers waving the flag from the top of the gutted Reichstag, or the peace angel gesturing over destroyed Dresden. These were the classic scenes from the end of the European war seventy years ago this month — matched by the posed photo of Americans raising the flag
at Iwo Jima or ground zero at Hiroshima for the end of the Asian war. More relevant for my discussion today are the photos of Michelantonio Vaccaro, aka Tony Vaccaro, a GI with a camera who took thousands of pictures from the Normandy invasion through much of the American occupation. As of last year in any case, he was still alive at 93. I like the first photograph included here from 1948 (Figure 1): The circus has come to Frankfurt and trapeze artists and tightrope walkers are performing against the backdrop of the gutted Römer. It is a photograph of risk taking, not compelled as in wartime, but chosen as a skill and profession. Life and limb are wagered — kids and adults are watching from the remnants of a building. Ruins remain, but life is no longer threatened on a daily basis (see second photograph, Figure 2). Human wreckage has remained as well — here an amputee makes a livelihood selling toiletries and cigarettes (see third photograph, Figure 3). The war is over.

To say the war had ended is not unproblematic. We historians look for continuities. Some have suggested that the years from 1943 to 1948 (from Stalingrad to currency reform) constitute an inherent unity marked by privation, mass migration, and ruins; historians of twentieth-century Germany have long since become skeptical of the concept of *Stunde Null*. But in the search for sophisticated periodization we should not forget what a liberation it is to have the relentless guns silenced and the bombing raids halted in a total war. There could be senseless, random violence — the composer Anton Webern shot by a GI on September 15, 1945; doubtless continued looting and rape — but no longer death delivered from the air, and no longer death from the Nazi thugs who were enforcing their cruel and sadistic discipline on exhausted soldiers or civilians trying to navigate between the lines. Instead, by 1948 Germans can enjoy the thrill of watching death-defying acrobatics (even with a net) as a recreation. Soon there will be war movies as directors and actors reshape and mediate our memories. We can watch the war as spectators.
Let me show another amateur photo (Figure 4), taken ten years after the war had ended, the summer of 1955 — my second opening date. A German family on a summer visit. An American high school student in an Argyle sweater, sixteen years old, and his German “brother” for the summer. Sixty years ago. Not just a student — but your lecturer as a high school junior, sent from a suburban Jewish family whose grandfathers had been born in Germany, but in which no German had been spoken for at least a generation. An American student who appreciated history — who had watched the early Hollywood war movie Battleground a couple of years before, who knew the fate of the Jews who had not left Germany — but who found a warm welcome in the Bonn family to which (entirely without any input of his own) he’d been assigned by the American Field Service.

That was sixty years ago this summer. There were still ruins, empty spaces in the cities, burnt out buildings — in Bonn, the shell of the lovely baroque Poppelsdorfer Schloss (see Figure 5) and the Königsmuseum; there were still amputees, men without legs propelling themselves on city streets in kiddy wagons, women dancing with each other at outside beer gardens because they wanted to dance and their earlier partners had never returned from Russia or northern France or Italy or any of the fronts to which National Socialist ambition supported by military prowess had sent them. The war was over in 1955, but its reminders were everywhere. But there was also a new Bundestag building, a restored Villa Hammerschmidt for the Federal President, the avuncular Theodor Heuss who offered punch and cigars to us American teenagers, unseasoned emissaries of Eisenhower’s America.

1945 and 1955 and 2015: I thought it would be appropriate therefore, to reflect on the history and experience in the interim decades for the two countries, Germany and the United States, and the six decades for the then high school student, who remained a student of
his summer country, learned its language, and returned repeatedly. Hence it is a reflection about history as lived — and in both countries. Not only as lived, but as written; because my own life — so sheltered in educational institutions, so removed from the marketplace of everything but ideas — has been a life of writing history, much of it on Germany, some (mostly in articles) on the United States. How did we historians, by extension analysts of politics and political philosophers, understand the history which we so recently came through and the new history that our countrymen were making?

II.
The main point that this lecture tonight aims to sustain is that, for all the differences between the German experience and the American one as of those initial and early postwar years — one nation in ruins and defeated, the other triumphant in war; one an occupied country, the stateless remnant of a failed dictatorship, odious in the eyes of the world; the other the global leader of the world’s democracies — the history of the two countries for the greater part of a century has followed a parallel evolution. This lecture is not about the obvious themes of foreign policy — the Cold War alliance and after — although these are important and indeed underpinned a lot of the postwar fraternity. It is not about how the United States brought democracy to Germany, nor even about how Germany finally joined “the West,” as synthesized recently in Heinrich August Winkler’s impressive narrative.1

1 Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, 2 vols. (Munich, 2000).
The so-called West, in fact, has been a moving target, an evolving set of values that both societies have approached asymptotically. Both societies as they constructed history shared the experience of democratization, and as they reflected on their history, agreed on a narrative or history of democratization: America alongside Germany, Germany alongside America. The American narrative was the more ambitious, for we often claimed the democratic redemption of Germany as well as our own. This was not unjustified; the U.S. (with the cooperation of the British) set the ground rules for the resumption of a civic life in Western Germany. Lutz Niethammer has maintained that there was not even a German society, much less a nation, just a people of survivors, and that social structure was recreated under Allied supervision. This seems to me exaggerated but it points to a crucial fact. The postwar Germanies were contextual constructions, negotiated by Germans but within limits that their catastrophic defeat and the subsequent Cold War imposed. As a child of that era, I take pride in what the United States helped to midwife in the West. Perhaps the open-minded curiosity that we American students brought even helped a tiny bit in the process. Certainly the openness that German students found on our shores played a role. Still, the American narrative of democratization achieved was perhaps the more simplistic, since the democratic advances made at home were sometimes contradicted abroad. The narrative that most Americans avoided, with the exception of provocative dissident historians, was the imperial one. Only in the current century has empire been considered more than a temporary deviation from the American narrative. But a history innocent of imperial aggression was precisely the narrative that a divided Germany had to renounce.

See Niethammer, “Schwierigkeiten beim Schreiben einer deutschen Nationalgeschichte nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg,” in the essays curated by Ulrich Herbert and Dirk van Laak as Deutschland danach: Postfaschistische Gesellschaft und nationales Gedächtnis (Bonn, 1999), 434–449. To my mind, Niethammer (with his long-standing associates) has been one of the most subtle interpreters of Germany’s postwar transformations of society, nation(s), and collective memory — critical throughout, but realistic and humane.
If, at least until recently, each country’s narrative was one of democratization, was the process itself one of democratization? In many senses, yes. Democracy returned to Germany, more robust and less tormented than during the Weimar Republic. Democracy expanded in the United States as racial segregation was slowly overcome and the suffrage enlarged to include minorities. But democracy is a complex term: as Tocqueville made clear, it is not merely about procedures for determining electoral preferences, nor even just about human rights, important as these dimensions are. Democracy, rightly understood in historical terms, includes components of inclusivity, egalitarianism, and solidarity — three qualities of collective national life that are related, but not identical. These have been more elusive ideals, and I will conclude by asking to what degree they have been advanced.

III.

Let us start where I started as an exchange student, with the mid and late 1950s. American and German historians of recent German history had clear questions but conflicting answers. Each country’s commentators started from the premise that the United States had proven itself a successful democracy while German politics had been deeply flawed. So profound a *Zivilisationsbruch*, as Dan Diner would later call it, required deep causes. American and German historians alike contributed to this narrative. A regime as monstrous as the Third Reich, supported by the enthusiasm of so many Germans, was the expression of deep long-term flaws. Of course, the alleged flaws differed according to ideological convictions. Liberals in both countries proposed that Germans had never been able to institute a robust liberal democracy. They blamed the military and authoritarian traditions of the Prussian path to unification; the neo-feudal aspirations of a politically immature bourgeoisie; the unbridgeable divide between the National Liberals who had accepted

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*Figure 5. Ruins of the Poppelsdorfer Schloss in Bonn, October 6, 1947. Source: Stadtarchiv und Stadthistorische Bibliothek Bonn. Reproduced by permission.*

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Bismarck’s high-handed politics as the price of unification and the allegedly doctrinaire “Progressives,” outlined by Friedrich Sell in 1953 as *Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus*; more generally, some pointed to the flawed psychoanalytical development of German youth resulting from so many missing fathers, or the contradictions inherent in the so-called “German idea of freedom” as explained by Leonard Krieger or the destructive yearnings of the “Germanic ideology” set out by Fritz Stern (1961).  

The young student of the 1950s found that the conservative analyses of National Socialism enjoyed a greater prestige than they would later. When the venerable Gerhard Ritter contributed a massive essay on the roots of National Socialism to a UNESCO-sponsored volume on the subject that appeared in 1955, he saw Nazism as the final, brutal result of the mass democratic tendencies uncorked by the French Revolution. Even someone so critical of the new conservative movements in the United States as Hannah Arendt emphasized that totalitarianism grew out of the lack of genuine political authority. Liberals were right, she argued, in discerning the receding of freedom; conservatives were correct in decrying the disappearance of authority. “Who would deny the serious threats to freedom from all sides since the beginning of the century, and the rise of all kinds of tyranny at least since the end of the first World War? Who can deny, on the other side, that disappearance of practically all traditionally established authorities has been one of the most spectacular characteristics of the modern world.”

But the conservative narratives in America were essentially the explanations offered by exiles from Germany. True, they were accompanied by a home-grown new conservatism that stressed Burkean traditionalism and was represented by Russell Kirk, as a generation later it would be defended by Hilton Kramer’s journal, *The New Criterion*. The new American Right, however, was an uglier phenomenon, even when it was supported by would-be intellectuals such as the young William Buckley. As Hannah Arendt understood it, this was not a true conservatism — today we would quickly identify it as a populism, although fifty years ago Populism (capital P) was still identified as an agrarian protest movement of the 1890s. Richard Hofstadter termed it “the pseudo-conservative revolt” in 1954. To be sure, McCarthyism, using the term loosely, burnt itself out in about a decade, but its lessons were contradictory. (As a high school student in suburban Scarsdale, the lecturer found that his socially privileged


enclave did not remain untouched. A self-declared Committee of Ten went through the holdings of the public library, identifying subversive books — including Howard Fast’s novel, *Freedom Road* (1944), which early on shook up the received narrative of American Reconstruction as a corrupt, misguided effort at revenge and along with W.E.B. DuBois’s *Black Reconstruction* (1935) anticipated the positive assessment that John Hope Franklin would popularize a generation later.9 The Westchester Country American Legion publicly attacked my redoubtable high school history teacher, one Dorothy Connor, for allowing an anti-McCarthy LP spoof, “The Investigator,” smuggled in from Canada, to be played in the afternoon discussion club. (It is now available as an audio CD from The Smithsonian Institution!) Did these excesses that mauled American civic life for half a decade mean that the US system was basically so healthy that a demagogic anti-liberal politics could not durably gain traction — thus confirming the superiority of the American polity to the German political arena? Or did they mean that even so triumphant a democracy as the United States was also vulnerable to vicious demagogy?

In fact, the McCarthyite shadows that flitted over the face of American democracy in the high Cold War hardly shook Americans’ great confidence in the virtues of their democracy, which had allegedly never offered a fertile ground for extremism and which had a party system that supposedly functioned smoothly. And gradually the German narrative of National Socialism as an excess of democracy just became untenable. (If historians evoked the French Revolution as the source of totalitarianism by the 1960s, they referred to the origins of Stalinist totalitarian democracy.)10 But gradually, too, Americans gained more confidence in the German postwar political system. Up to mid-decade, US observers, like my professor of German history in 1958, had posed the question of whether postwar West German democracy might be a fair-weather product that could collapse if economic adversity or other sources of instability arose. James Bryant Conant, earlier Harvard’s president, recently High Commissioner, returned to lecture at Harvard and to reassure his audience (of which I was one) that we need not fret about a relapse into authoritarianism.11 Political scientists took note that extremist movements had declined — the only one that seemed alarming was French Poujadism.

By 1960 the anxious scrutiny of West German democracy seemed unnecessary: American undergraduates were being taught that politics had happily purged itself of ideological confrontations — both

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at home and abroad. There need never be another great economic crisis since Keynesian demand management could always assure relatively full employment. There need never be a relapse into dictatorship since the grounds of consensus were so broad and American or Anglo-American party government had taken root in Germany (and Japan). The Communist world was still the great adversary, but it, too, might gradually shed its authoritarian practices. Khrushchev’s Soviet Union had abjured Stalinism: the great thaw had begun, a development that allowed my new wife and myself with two other school friends to tour easily by car in the summer of 1961. European Social Democrats had shed their Marxist baggage, as the German Social Democrats had done at their recent Bad Godesberg conference, as the British Labourites were urged to do by Tony Crosland,12 as the French Socialists of the Fifth Republic were apparently managing, and even as Italian Socialists and Christian Democrats edged toward collaboration.

IV.

For many observers these trends meant that the classical age of ideological confrontation — the heroic antagonism of Communism, liberal democracy and fascism — was ending. Daniel Bell famously wrote about the end of ideology and the exhaustion of political ideas at the end of the 1950s.13 The veteran of Weimar politics, Otto Kirchheimer and the Catholic observer, Waldemar Besson described the vanishing of SPD opposition at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s.14 But this was an incomplete analysis. With hindsight we can discern a different phenomenon — not the end of ideology, but its societal relocation. Between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s, the sources of dissidence and political energy were shifting, not withering. They were moving away from overt political party and parliamentary structures toward the profounder layers of civil society — its youth, its religious currents, its economic institutions and the media. The decisive agents of public actions would no longer be parliamentary bodies, but social protest movements. These civic mobilizations and even unorganized currents of opinion interfaced less with parties and the legislature than with the executive and the constitutional courts. Social movements, executive action, and judicial decision-making moved as in response to each other. Opposition parties might give up their claims to change the social world through legislation. The courts and the socially active public slowly took up the reformist vocation in their stead. This migration of civic dissent manifested itself with new

milestones that had little to do with electoral competition: the American Supreme Court declared school segregation by race unconstitutional in 1954 and a social movement to reclaim African-American rights gathered force from the beginning of the 1960s. The German Spiegel Affair unrolled in protests and ended with the Constitutional Court upholding the rights of the editors.

What provoked this shifting of ideological activism into extra-institutional channels? The question opens up the whole problem of explaining the turbulence of the 1960s that would culminate in 1968. My own preferred explanations draw on categories suggested among others by Albert Hirschman or Victor Turner, unorthodox theorists who sensed the great oscillations of social mood, between what Turner termed structured and liminal behavior, or what Hirschman identified as public and private aspirations. The fifteen years from World War II until the end of the 1960s was an era of disciplined reconstruction, an effort to establish new orthodoxies and re-establish old ones. The Cold War — following on the huge World War earlier — had summoned forth mobilization against an external enemy just as the Second World War had done. For twenty years at least, from the late 1930s to the late 1950s, Americans and Germans had both lived in the constant shadow of allegedly dangerous adversaries — first each other, and then, jointly, the menace of Soviet Communism. Likewise, the urgency of production for wartime and thereafter for economic reconstruction had also summoned discipline: the need for social savings and investment, the deferral of individual consumption. There were many analyses of the mentalities at stake: David Riesman’s brilliant efforts to reveal the anomie of postwar suburban America, William Whyte’s Organization Man, or Sloan Wilson’s Man in the Gray Flannel Suit; the so-called “silent generation” at the American university, or Herbert Schelsky’s Skeptical Generation — all diagnoses of the mid- and late 1950s. The students of the 1950s — it was a mentality already fraying by my years — were adults before their time; our society was one of deferred consumption; hyper maturity. American commentators rightly praise the “GI Bill of Rights” (1944) that opened up higher education to students seasoned by wartime service. But their seriousness may have come with a price. The great psycho-political effort to draw clear boundaries between ideological systems, to reconstruct traditional family stability after the turmoil of wartime and, in short, to emphasize the obligations toward the future, all characterized this extraordinary decade and a half of psychosocial mobilization — and it all tended to


give way, to re-validate the present as well as claim the future by the mid-1960s.

The Federal Republic and the United States went through this great transformation of mentalities approximately in sync. The great repressed issues of each society came to the surface. Both societies now gazed upon the present and the past in a more inclusive way, somewhat akin to the process in which France, Britain and the Netherlands gazed upon their colonial past as they were compelled to relinquish empire. West Germans had to scrutinize anew — no longer through Allied war crimes trials, but their own Auschwitz trials — their own acquiescence in murder. When as an adolescent student I had asked my German summer family in 1955 what they had known of the Holocaust, they said it had not been and was not to be discussed. The next generation no longer allowed that silence in the 1960s. What Americans had to gaze on was the role of race and slavery — and their massive involvements in the Third World against communism (focused in the Vietnam War).

As reflected in historiography — or was the new self-examination led by historiography? — the German focus shifted once again. The ambitious analyses of totalitarianism in the early 1950s had largely affirmed the kinship of Stalinism and Nazism, and sometimes proposed conservative analyses of so-called mass society. By the mid-1950s, the dominant analysis of National Socialism was already leaving behind such meta-concepts and analyzing the specifics of parliamentary failure. Karl Dietrich Bracher, the then 33-year old political scientist, had published the outstanding analytically focused history of the collapse of Weimar — Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik — in 1955 examining parties, institutions, and crises. By the 1960s, the care that Bracher brought to the analysis of Weimar’s dissolution now marked the scrutiny of the Nazi experience, with differing focuses, to be sure — the growing claim of the Holocaust as the central aspect, or the effort at some sort of interpretive reconquest (what Broszat clumsily called Historisierung), or detailed monographic reconstruction of institutions and mentality.17

In the United States, attention shifted to writing again the history of slavery and Reconstruction. The major studies of C. Vann Woodward, Eugene Genovese and Herbert Gutman — even the provocative thesis of Stanley M. Elkins18 that compared American slavery to the German concentration camps — accompanied the mobilization of American opinion that went from sit-ins to civil rights marches, the passage of


voting rights legislation, the bitter disputes over busing, the protests over “the war” — no longer “the war” that even my generation understood to be the Second World War, but the war in Vietnam. This war, in fact, was accompanied by and doubtless helped to encourage the other great historiographical revision of these years — the reinterpretation of Cold War origins. (One of the early essays, which I published in 1970, was a labored effort to sort out these controversies: were critics right in suggesting that the United States had provoked Stalin into clamping down dissent in Eastern Europe, whether through aggressive provocation or the deeper needs of American capitalism?) History departments, including my own, fought over these revisionist charges. When the historical pendulum swung again in the late 1980s, the revisionist scenario came to seem discredited — but the debate had been long and bitter. And by the time the issue re-emerged indirectly at the time of the Iraq War, one of the main critical theses, namely that the United States was in its own way an imperial power, no longer seemed so controversial.

V.

There is no time on this occasion to review in tandem the developments in lived history and written history as they unfolded across each decade. The societal fractures that opened at the end of the 1950s in Germany and America, as well as in the rest of Europe and parts of the Middle East and Asia, more generally reached a climax in the upheavals of 1968 and were prolonged through the 1970s. I do not wish to write an apologia for the self-indulgence and posturing, the authoritarianism, the excuses for violence that these movements contained. (I am not speaking of their counterparts behind the Iron Curtain, the “Prague Spring” above all, which were mobilizations for fundamental rights.) Paul Berman, focusing in particular on the evolution of Joschka Fischer, has sought (as I read him) to contextualize the militant and violent protests of 1968 retroactively as a sort of clumsy dress rehearsal for 1989. This seems forced to me; nonetheless, I would urge that the generational upheaval represented more than merely an adolescent “acting out”, as adult interpreters, even such liberals as Raymond Aron, suggested. They were part of a revolt against the two-decade discipline of wartime, Cold-War, and economic austerity — against the twenty-year privileging of the future over the present that extended roughly from 1938 to 1958. They shifted, as I said above, the locus of public activity from the constitutional frameworks that were reconstructed in Europe after 1945 to
the public square and the sites of protest, and the sources of legal decisions from the legislatures to courts. Society was brought back in.

At the same time these histories necessarily opened an age of subjectivities, a celebration of the supposedly emancipated self (think of Herbert Marcuse’s popular One Dimensional Man (1964). Assertions of so-called identity were trump and found their expression in protests, legalization, and self-celebration: whether feminism, with its insistence on reproductive rights, or gay rights, which also shifted the focus of historical examinations from institutions to mentalities. The new history of the working class — inspired by E.P. Thompson’s 1964 classic Making of the English Working Class; the history of slavery in the United States; the second or third generation of the history of National Socialism — all wrestled with issues of complicity and agency. In different ways the interpretations of Detlev Peukert and Hans Mommsen, the efforts to probe the Bavarian population under National Socialism, the new biographies of Hitler, and the charged debate over functionalism and intentionalism as keys to understanding the Final Solution shifted the weight of inquiry from structure to agency.21

Is it legitimate to understand such investigations as a counterpart to the institutional broadening of societal democratization? In his meditation on the postwar Germany that he has lived through, Konrad Jarausch has used the concept of “recivilizing” Germans, by which he means expanding their civic awareness, not improving their manners.22 Perhaps we might understand a process of societal liberalization. Americans had to undergo the same process in terms of overcoming old myths and racialist thinking. For all the exceptions, for all the persistence of skins and authoritarians, the two societies had become more inclusive and encompassing.

VI.

Of course, history and historiography did not end with the 1960s and 1970s — an epoch in its own right now 40 to 50 years behind us. Neither did the new works cited overcome older paradigms of written history. The focus on formal institutions would continue; the effort to understand older-style movements, especially the working-class parties, continued. But underlying them was also the search to illuminate the non-state institutions that wielded the sources of power: banks and industries, foundations and universities, the elite agencies that conducted international relations. Indeed, the celebration of subjectivities came to an end in part through its very excesses. By


the 1980s, the pendulum swung again as the political forces representing discipline and confrontation — whether in domestic politics or international politics — recovered influence. The renewed Cold War that began at the end of the Carter and Schmidt administrations, with the controversy over intermediate range missiles, the Afghanistan invasion and the conflicts in Africa, the administrations of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, made many former 68ers see their past histories as mere foam and fluff. Power was back, indeed envisaged as more pervasive because it was less centralized: Gramsci superseded Marx, Foucault in effect challenged the premises of Habermas’s enlightenment.

How should we think about the decades that followed upon ‘68? In effect, the 1980s seemed to restore at first the discipline, confrontation, and primacy of organized party conflict that had last dominated political activity and organization in the fifties. But this was misleading. Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl governed societies that had irrevocably and fundamentally become more inclusive. Civil rights, affirmative action, and gender reforms had taken place. On the other hand, the old legislative Left, based on a solid working class vote, no longer secured a voice in representation; indeed, its social base was dissolving as its industries closed down or migrated abroad. Thatcher and Reagan administered solid defeats to trade-union adversaries. Until 1987 or so the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev, the renewed Cold War, the suppression of Solidarity and the arrest of dissidents in the Soviet Union and the GDR seemed calculated to re-consolidate the older patterns of confrontational politics — whether the struggle over responding to Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe or the questioning of civilian applications of nuclear power.

Against this background the Historikerstreit of the late 1980s throws a revealing light.

23 Strictly speaking, the Historikerstreit was not a controversy over facts but meanings. This, however, enhanced rather than diminished its importance, despite the dismissive stance that many critics held. The controversy demonstrated that the conservative revival of the 1980s could not be based on any sort of sentimental revival of a national German past. Indeed, the debate over the alleged “relativization” of the Holocaust compelled reaffirmation of the singular atrocities committed by the Third Reich and its auxiliaries. It testified to an ongoing process that was transforming the Holocaust into a signifier of European identity — almost a cultural patrimony. It suggested further the creation of a
memory culture — which helped to legitimate the revival of German nationhood a very few years later. (To my mind, the great historian of this memory culture was Tony Judt, whose book *Postwar* essentially reconstructed the narrative of the years from 1945 to 2005 as a struggle over which European memories would prevail.)

There is a danger, however, with a memory culture. Nietzsche essentially warned against its paralytic effect in the second of his *Untimely Meditations, On the Use and Abuse of History*.

It was the events in Eastern Europe that propelled developments beyond the refugence of memory. Unexpectedly, the given structures of politics, in this case of Communist Eastern Europe, gave way to the demands of social movements to overthrow the regimes that had used spurious claims of the future as an excuse for maintaining repression. Even more than in 1968, the intervention of society as such was a source of sudden change. The protests that had led to the formation of Solidarity and resurfaced at the end of the 1980s then unfurled in Leipzig, East Berlin, Prague and elsewhere, and they were adult projects, not just student ones. This time they led historians and commentators to take note of civil society.

Consider the testimony of social history. German social history in the interwar period, written by Marxists, had focused on working-class movements. When written by the conservative academic establishment, it had concentrated on studies of *Volksgeschichte* — that is, of beleaguered German minorities surrounded by threatening Slavs. But in the 1990s and thereafter, “civil society” became the historical subject for German social historians. So, too, American interpreters of Eastern Europe were caught up in a veritable enchantment with the forces of civil society. But such optimistic readings — e.g. Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” — did not prove durable. The quick end to the magical and luminal moments of transformation, depicted with such verve for instance by Timothy Garton Ash, or the hope that the Plastic People of the Universe or Pink Floyd might replace authoritarian statehood yielded to grubbier realities of resource seizure and party demagogy in Eastern Europe or at least to the workaday return of party politics, as in Poland, and most sadly to ethnic bloody-mindedness (the civil wars in the dissolving Yugoslavia).

What the 1990s and the years since, I believe, have taught — lessons reinforced outside of Europe by genocidal cruelty, naïve American plans of democratic intervention in the Middle East and the disappointments of the Arab Spring — is that society as such can indeed
intervene to shatter ossified political forms and petrified aspirations. But so-called civil society is not a sufficient institution for governance; it can degenerate into tribalism, communal conflict, and neocapitalist rent-seeking if not kleptocracy. Its associative bonds find it hard to withstand the corrosive impact of pervasive market forces. No surprise that Margaret Thatcher declared brutally that there is no such thing as society. Societies cannot durably live without constituted political and legal institutions that claim an assent wider than social movements. The wrapping of the Reichstag in 1995, to take a telling image, offered a magical moment of unconstrained fellowship. But as its creators recognized with unself-conscious inspiration, the Reichstag could not remain wrapped forever. Creative social thinkers, such as Albert Hirschman or, from the Catholic tradition, Victor Turner, whom I have cited above, recognized this dialectic. Civil society must struggle against given institutions, but its role cannot be to live without them but rather to construct new ones, hopefully more open, egalitarian, and inclusive.

VII.

To return to the beginnings of this lecture, Americans and Germans embarked on the repeated cycle of learning and reinstitutionalization together. Of course, Americans helped dislodge an atrocious and cruel regime that had somehow dazzled the Germans in the 1930s. But the history of the last seventy years has been one of remarkable parallels — of efforts to overcome past injustices, to open up civic participation and citizenship to those excluded, whether by virtue of race or political conviction, and of belief that liberal democracy is the best framework for achieving that good society.

Did written history keep up with lived history? Of course that is an impossible task, as history is retrospective. Historians are the ambulance chasers of catastrophe and the coroners of political collapse. But we can be more — we can aggregate events into patterns, we can articulate a vision of transformations that are still in process and in that way give grammar and syntax to voices of protest. Historians helped the process of democratic transformation in both Germany and America largely by analyzing how civic participation had earlier been distorted, how victims of history had been made victims. The angel of history, as Benjamin famously wrote, looks backward over the accumulating wreckage. But the historian must do more than the angel; she or he must count the victims, tell their story — and actually
must suggest why the historical chariot keeps driving forward. Historians largely agreed in legitimizing a narrative of democratization, of tracing forces for reform that had emerged to transcend and overcome structures of coercion, exclusion, violence and authoritarian abuses. In America they insisted that the slave South and continuing discrimination throughout the country was not just a blemish on our marvelous constitutional liberty; in Germany they came to agree that Nazism was not a small conspiracy foisted upon a helpless country.

Our societies — now sharing so much — are still beset by growing inequality, by the substitution of wealth for more naked forms of power, by problems of inclusion, as group identities often undermine the shared bonds of community. Parliamentary government seems more difficult than it was even a generation ago. History as lived has entered a more uncertain period in the last decade — religious zealotry, an economic system that in the short term can shrink opportunities for work even as it creates wealth, in some places the resort to the most brutal terror have thrown democratic reality into question and may compel a revision of the democratic narrative. As noted at the beginning, it is not clear that the securing of democratic procedures has been matched by the sense of solidarity and the possibility for participation that classical theory found implicit in democracy. Certainly one of the great postwar achievements of democracy — and one that Germany shared in leading — has been the European Union. But it, too, like all common enterprises in governance, requires efforts at solidarity. That is, it calls for contributions by those more fortunate to contribute to those less well endowed. Short-term market rationality alone was not sufficient to rebuild the German, the European, or the American political communities after the Great Depression, dictatorship, and world war. We historians must endeavor to point out the long-term imaginative efforts at institution-building as well as the short-sighted policies that brought disaster. At the least we can say that in this institute dedicated to German history in America, we can write many of the same postwar stories, many of which are hopeful stories. That was not always the case, and that is progress.

This essay does not present the results of original research, but rather reflections based on what I have observed as a contemporary witness while living in the United States during the Obama years. I will examine some economic and social trends and ask what they might mean for the future. I will also discuss whether we are likely to see a continuation of the “American Century” or the demise of the world’s economic superpower. I am well aware that thirty years from now, researchers with the benefit of hindsight and access to sources might give a very different account.

Introduction

I entered the United States on March 31, 2008, as the financial crisis and the subsequent recession, the gravest since the Great Depression, were unfolding. The housing market was in free fall and Wall Street was reeling. On September 15, 2008, Lehmann Brothers collapsed; this was the largest bankruptcy in American history. A meltdown of the world’s entire financial system became a real possibility. On October 3, President Bush signed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In real terms, TARP was more than three times as large as the assistance Herbert Hoover had granted to banks in 1932. The promise to purchase or insure up to 700 billion dollars of “troubled assets” prevented a wildfire and saved the world from a catastrophe. TARP was amended several times by the Obama administration. By 2014, the government had managed to sell most of the “troubled assets” it had acquired through TARP and even made a small profit on them.

Living in Washington through the turmoil of the financial crisis was a special experience for me. It is not every day that an economic historian witnesses such dramatic developments first-hand, even if I was not always immediately aware of the things that were going on in this city. A historic moment I did not miss occurred on November 4, 2008, when the first African-American was elected President of
the United States. After the results were announced, thousands of Washingtonians took to the streets. Many were singing, dancing, hugging each other and chanting “Yes, we can!” I stood at the corner of U Street and 14th Street, the epicenter of the last race riots in DC in 1968. Now, blacks and whites were united in an atmosphere of joy. It was an emotionally charged night, a moment when you felt that history was making a big, irreversible step forward. In DC, where 92 percent of the electorate had voted for Obama, a sense of relief was in the air after what was perceived by many as the oppressive Bush years. Thousands went to the White House and joyfully chanted: “Bye, bye, Bush.” Expectations for his successor were extremely high, not least because the Obama campaign had depicted its candidate as a kind of messiah. Obama himself made far-reaching promises to build nothing less than a new America. In this elated atmosphere it was easy to lose sight of realism.

And this mood lingered on, despite the dark clouds the recession was casting over the country. The number of people losing their jobs or homes, or both, was increasing.

Before Obama could take any action he had to be inaugurated. On January 20, 2009, I witnessed the ceremony in person, along with about two million other people on the Mall. The event was somehow tarnished, however, as neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Obama remembered the correct wording of the oath of office. To remove any doubt about his legitimacy, Obama had to take the oath again one day later.

In his inaugural address, the new president again raised expectations to unrealistic highs. In a brilliant speech full of biblical metaphors and historical references, he promised to overcome “greed and irresponsibility” and to “prepare the nation for a new age.”

Today I say to you that the challenges we face are real, they are serious and they are many. They will not be met easily.

Figure 1. Iconic mural from the 2008 presidential campaign. Photo by Flickr user J.E. Theriot, licensed under CC 2.0.
or in a short span of time. But know this America: They will be met. . . . On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord. . . . The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness. . . . This is the journey we continue today. We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth. . . . Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America.2

The president did not have much time to ponder the ceremonial blunder of his inauguration, as the pressing economic problems required immediate attention. He had already announced a huge “recovery plan” and stated that there was “no disagreement” on its necessity. About two hundred economists contradicted him, saying that it was naïve to believe that more government spending would improve economic performance. Eleven days later about two hundred other economists signed a letter stating the exact opposite.

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), commonly referred to as the Stimulus or Recovery Act, was signed into law on February 17, 2009. It comprised job creation and relief programs as well as investments in infrastructure, education, health, and renewable energy. The total cost is expected to exceed 830 billion dollars by the time the Act expires in 2019. Not surprisingly, the results of ARRA have been subject to controversy. Scholars disagree on the number of extra jobs it created and whether it had any impact on the business cycle. They argue over whether too much or too little money was spent. I am sure ARRA offers enough material for hundreds of doctoral dissertations. Yet it is undeniable that ARRA helped pull the country out of recession. ARRA modernized parts of the country; just think of the expansion of broadband services and renewable energy. At the same time, however, ARRA also exacerbated the debt problem.

The gravest recession since the Great Depression reached its trough in the last quarter of 2008, when real GDP shrank by 8.3%. In the first quarter of 2009, that is, before ARRA, the growth rate was

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5.4 percent; in the second quarter, it was 0.4 percent. The recession was technically over by the third quarter of 2009, but it was followed by a period of low and volatile growth.

The labor market went from near full employment to 10% unemployment in 2009. The tide turned in the fall of 2009, when a steady reduction in the unemployment rate set in. The official statistics overstate the improvement because some people dropped out of the labor market. By February 2015, the unemployment rate was 5.5% in the United States and 9.8% in the EU. The United States has thus overcome the crisis relatively fast. It is striking that Obama has received hardly any credit for this.

Even if we agree that the United States recovered relatively well, we should ask ourselves whether the country is well prepared for the future. This article will first address factors that suggest a negative answer. Then some factors pointing in the opposite direction will be discussed. But let us start with some rather depressing facts. I see eight impediments to growth and prosperity.

I. Impediments to Growth and Prosperity

1. Deep Social Divisions

Fig. 3 depicts the distribution of U.S. household wealth since 1913 and compares the share of the lower 90% of all households with the share of the richest 0.1%. The gap between the super-rich and everyone else began to narrow in 1929 and continued to narrow until 1979. Since then, however, it has widened steadily. The tiny top group expanded its share of all household wealth from 7% to 22%, and the majority received an ever smaller share of the overall increase in wealth.3

The social position of African-Americans and Hispanics has deteriorated compared to white Americans since 2010, after a period of shrinking differentials. White Americans’ median household wealth was ten times as large as African-Americans’ wealth in 2010, but thirteen times as large in 2013. The average black household then had a net worth of $11,000, the average white household one of $142,000. The differences had been smaller in most years of the 1980s and 1990s. Not only did economic inequality between the races not diminish during the Obama presidency, but it actually grew significantly.

Part of the widening gulf is due to the shrinking of the middle class. During the recession, many families sank into the lower strata of society, even into poverty. The middle class is the foundation of society. If its weakening continues, this will have serious repercussions. After rising for many decades, average income in real terms has been declining since 1999. At the heart of the American dream is the belief that each generation will do better than their parents, but this dream is fading. Today, Americans in their forties are earning less, on average, than their parents did at the same age in real terms.

2. Unequal Distribution of Social Capital and Educational Opportunities

We also see an alarming trend toward rising inequality when it comes to social capital. More and more children live in single-parent households. About 65% of these children have parents whose educations ended with the high school diploma or no diploma. By comparison, only 10% of children whose parents are college graduates are

living in a single-parent household. Being raised by a single parent might not be so terrible when that parent earns 150,000 dollars or more, but most earn considerably less. Statistically, growing up in a single-parent family presents a strong risk of future poverty and a higher incidence of emotional and social problems. Growing up with two parents increases a child’s chances of future educational and occupational success.

The main factor determining the likelihood that a young person will attend college is their social origin. It all comes down to class, and the social divide is growing. Despite some progress through affirmative action, we are still dealing with a vicious circle. By and large, the U.S. educational system does not foster social mobility but, rather, it reinforces existing social divisions.

Although the middle classes still send their children to college, the American Dream shatters when these college graduates cannot find jobs that are sufficiently well paid for them to pay off their student loans. Student loan debt has more than quadrupled over the past twenty years. Tuition in real terms has almost quintupled since 1983. Does it still pay to go to college? In most cases it does. But growing numbers of recent graduates are moving back in with their parents and are saddled with debt for decades. College is still a doorway to higher incomes for most students, but the returns are decreasing. There is a clear downward trend as college tuition grows faster than middle-class incomes.

3. Wasting Human Capital

The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world. It is seven times as high as Canada’s and ten times as high as Germany’s. The number of Americans in prison has more than quadrupled since 1980. 2.4 million Americans were incarcerated in 2013; that is almost four times the population of Washington DC. In some prisons it costs as much as 60,000 dollars a year to keep a person behind bars; it would often be cheaper to send inmates to college instead. But for most inmates prison is a dead end. Within three years of their release, about two-thirds return to prison. The numbers are even bleaker when we look at the total correctional population, that is, prison inmates plus offenders on probation or parole: in 2013 that number stood at 6.9 million, or 1 in 35 adults. African Americans and Hispanics are strongly overrepresented among this group.

The high recidivism rate is a sign that most prisoners do not get a second chance. Given its enormous expense, the correctional system could help educate, train, and reintegrate millions of Americans, but this does not happen. In short, a considerable part of the population is excluded from society and locked away at immense financial and social cost.

Another extremely wasteful system is public education in inner cities and rural areas outside wealthy suburban school districts. In Washington DC in 2013, tests revealed that more than 51 percent of the eighth graders in public schools were not proficient in reading and 39 percent were not proficient in math. These abysmal figures were, in fact, seen as a sign of progress because in 2004 the figures were 71 and 59 percent respectively. If a school system claims to have improved when half of its students still cannot properly read, the situation is dire. No progress at all was reported on racial and social equality. “Gaps between White, Black, and Hispanic student performance have remained constant over the past decade, with no significant gains in either direction. On average, White students scored between 50–60 points higher than Black and Hispanic students.”

Readers of the local pages of the Washington Post regularly learn of the schools’ problems, from crumbling buildings to lackluster teaching, from vermin infestations to truancy and even absent teachers. In 2007 a new Chancellor of DC public schools, Michelle Rhee, a daughter of South Korean immigrants, tried to aggressively cure the system through quick and radical reforms such as school closures and the firing of underperforming principals and teachers. In effect, she antagonized teachers unions and their supporters, as well as many parents, and stepped down in 2010. It is not only in DC that the public school system fails families who cannot afford an alternative. Again, black
and Hispanic kids are strongly overrepresented in these struggling institutions.

When the Obamas moved to Washington, some observers expected a clear sign in favor of public schools, but instead the first couple sent their daughters to a highly selective private school. This decision to follow a pattern set by the white upper class caused much controversy. Jimmy Carter was the last president who sent his child to a public, predominantly black school — an act that was regarded as highly symbolic.

One of the richest nations in the world allows social divisions to reproduce themselves in the school system. This deprives millions of children of the chance for a better future. It also weakens the overall qualification of the workforce. The skills gap, which affects mainly the lower and middle segments of the bifurcated labor market, weakens America’s international competitiveness. OECD studies show that, when compared to 21 OECD countries, students in American schools ranked second to last. In reading, writing, and problem-solving capabilities, 16 to 34 year olds from the United States were significantly below the OECD average. Other tests show that the literacy and numeracy skills of U.S. workers have declined over the last two decades and lag behind those of workers in other industrial nations. While Americans did not do so badly on average, the gap between well-qualified and poorly trained Americans is growing.

As a result, “advanced industries,” that is, companies engaged in technology research and development, face a labor supply challenge that places a drag on their competitiveness. Their demand for highly qualified staff comes up against an insufficient system of education and vocational training. This is even more worrying, as globalization and technological progress are increasing skill requirements.

4. The Health Crisis

Education, social status, and health are closely linked. The average level of Americans’ health is deteriorating fast. 71% of 17-to-24-year-olds would not qualify for military service because of physical, behavioral or educational shortcomings. Many lack the required high school diploma or fail the army’s relatively undemanding academic test. The single most important reason for disqualifying new recruits was physical deficiencies, above all, obesity. The situation is so bad that in 2009 retired military leaders formed a nonprofit to lobby for

7 See OECD, Education GPS, United States, http://gpseducation.oecd.org/CountryProfile?primaryCountry=USA&threshold=10&topic=AS. I thank Andrea Noske, Head of the Science and Technology Section of the German Embassy in Washington, for drawing my attention to these surveys.
8 http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/02/the-skills-gap-americas-young-workers-are-lagging-behind/385560/
improved nutrition in schools. Normally, one would not associate the army with an interest in healthier food. In 2009–10, 69.8% of all American adults were overweight or obese, 35.7% obese, and 6.3% extremely obese. Again, social and racial divisions stand out. This is bad news for future medical costs, for productivity at work, and for national security.

5. The Crisis of the Health System

Health costs are rising faster than GDP. They accounted for 5% of GDP in 1960. In 2013, this figure was 17.9%. This is nearly double the rate of most other developed countries. In terms of results, the United States mostly ranks below these nations. The system has so far been excessively expensive, inefficient, and socially divisive, and has denied a significant portion of the population regular access to health care.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), commonly referred to as Obamacare, was signed into law by the President in March 2010. It represents the most thorough overhaul of the U.S. healthcare system since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965. This highly controversial law was intended to lower the uninsured rate, to improve the quality and increase the affordability of health insurance, and to reduce the costs of healthcare by subsidies.

The average number of uninsured during the period from January to September 2014 fell by 11.4 million compared to that number in 2010. The percentage of uninsured adults dropped from 18% in the third quarter of 2013 to 11.4% in the second quarter of 2015. While Obamacare will continue to be challenged, both politically as well as legally, it is highly unlikely that anyone will take away access to healthcare from more than 11 million Americans who are now covered for the first time. This reform will certainly be seen by future generations as a milestone, as a truly historical achievement of the Obama presidency.

Whether Obamacare is — apart from the substantial expansion of healthcare coverage — going to fulfill any of its other promises, remains to be seen. There are no signs yet of substantial cost reductions or quality improvements, and an uninsured quota of 11% is still a long way away from universal coverage.

6. Political Polarization and Gridlock

In 2013, I experienced my first government shutdown. At first, I liked it. There was less traffic and Washington felt very relaxed.
But the 16 days that most federal agencies were closed were not so relaxing for the furloughed federal employees. The U.S. economy lost about 24 billion dollars. Between the fall of 2011 and January 2014, the federal government had no regular budget and resorted to desperate means such as the sequester, which amounts to indiscriminate cuts affecting all branches of the administration. By not extending the debt ceiling, Congress put the country on the verge of bankruptcy.

This failure is indicative of what is known as political gridlock. The number of bills passed in the Obama presidency by April 2014 was at a historic low. Even pressing issues like immigration, tax, and entitlement reform have not been resolved. Ideological polarization and partisan warfare have led to virtual paralysis. The split-party control of the two chambers of Congress has aggravated the situation, but the primacy of partisanship is the main culprit. Not surprisingly, the rate of Americans who have confidence in Congress is extremely low. According to Gallup polls, Congress’s approval rating reached a historic low of 10% in February 2015.¹³

The political system is almost broken. Campaign finance and lobbying are two potent mechanisms that corrupt lawmaking. Think of the manipulative redrawing of electoral districts and of the absurdity of the filibuster. A senator can block a bill from coming up for a vote by talking about any topic for as long as humanly possible, unless sixty senators move to bring the debate to a close. In other words, a minority of 41 senators, who might represent as little as 11% of all

¹³ In June 2015 it was up to 17%. http://www.gallup.com/poll/155144/congress-approval-june.aspx.
voters, can obstruct any piece of legislation. This system clearly is not fit for the twenty-first century. A constitutional amendment is called for.

7. The Weakness of Public Administration

In a country that cherishes self-help, it comes as no surprise that many challenges that individuals or the private sector cannot deal with in an adequate manner are only insufficiently met by public authorities. Many branches of administration are known for their lack of competence, low productivity, and even lower morale. Ambitious, highly qualified civil servants normally do not stay for long, and instead leave for positions in the private sector that pay several times the salary of the civil service. The reputation of the “bureaucracy” is generally bad.

As a consequence, the administrative environment for research and innovation in the United States is far from optimal. Responsibilities for research policy are highly dispersed and the mechanisms of supporting research complex, even opaque. The country as a whole does not have a coherent national strategy for economic development or research. This goes hand-in-hand with diminishing public funds for research and innovation. Federal outlays for research and development have continuously fallen since the 1960s. Although the decline was steepest until the early 1980s, the trend has never been reversed. In 1965, federal R&D spending accounted for 11.7% of the federal budget and almost 2% of GDP, whereas the respective figures for 2015 are 3.6% and 0.8%. At the same time most states enacted massive cuts in their funding for universities.

The country’s esteem for individualism and private initiative is also reflected in the poor state of many public goods, especially when it comes to basic provisions like traffic infrastructure, social services, and schools. High-speed railway projects proposed by the federal government have been stalled or prevented by political circles, who regard the use of taxpayers’ money for building modern railways as inappropriate because, they argue, such projects would only benefit those who live along the railways. As a result, the United States has the most antiquated and inefficient rail system of any industrialized nation.

But roads and bridges are crumbling, too. The streets of Washington are full of potholes. According to the American Road and Transportation

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Builders Association, there are “14 ‘structurally deficient’ bridges in the nation’s capital . . . Nationally, 61,064 spans get that broad designation, which indicates ‘major deterioration, cracks, or other deficiencies in their decks, structure, or foundations,’ according to the U.S. Department of Transportation.”

If one were to look for a symbol of this crisis, one might well pick the iconic 1930s-era Memorial Bridge in Washington. Leading from the entrance of Arlington National Cemetery to the Lincoln Memorial, a gateway to the nation’s capital, it had to be partially closed in June 2015 because it is badly corroded. Its drawbridge has not been opened since 1961. The indefinite imposition of a weight limit and temporary lane closures implemented in 2015 add not only to commuters’ misery, but are seen as a national embarrassment. In the words of Northern Virginia’s Congressman Don Beyer, “[t]here is nothing more emblematic of Congress’ failure to invest in our nation’s infrastructure than the bridge that brings people into our nation’s capital, a national memorial, falling apart.” Only emergency repairs will take place in 2015, as funds for a complete restoration are unavailable. The National Park Service, which is in charge of the bridge, announced the partial closure with a somewhat ironic statement: “Symbolically, the bridge was designed to show the strength of a united nation by joining a memorial on the north side of the Potomac River . . . with one on the south.” The bridge’s eagle sculptures, bas-relief bison and artistic oak leaves are meant to “invoke national strength and unity.”

Another historic symbol is the interstate highway system, which President Eisenhower considered one of the most important achievements of his two terms in office. It symbolizes a modern, fully motorized society, although its hidden agenda was shaped by the Cold War. The new system was to provide key transport routes for the military in case of an emergency, and evacuation corridors for major cities if the Cold War turned hot. In 2006, the highway system turned 50 years old. In that year, Americans spent a total of 3.5 billion hours stuck in traffic. What an economic waste.

In 2005, the American Society of Civil Engineers issued a scathing report on fifteen categories of infrastructure after a large-scale evaluation by thousands of engineers. The power grid, dams, and canal locks received especially bad marks. All other categories did only slightly better. The best grade, a C+, went to bridges, and even here, “160,570 bridges, out of a total of 590,750, were rated structurally
deficient or functionally obsolete.” The neglected traffic infrastructure slows the country down, creates the risk of severe disruption, and entails enormous financial follow-up costs.

8. The Debt Problem

The nation’s yawning gap in infrastructure funding is directly connected to another key problem of the United States: the gigantic national debt. Figure 6 shows the public and intragovernmental debt, and its ratio to GDP. The debt is currently at around 100% of the GDP, which was exceeded only at one point in the entire history of the United States, namely after the Second World War. The ratio was significantly lower after the Civil War, the First World War, and even after 1929.

Under Clinton the debt was significantly reduced, whereas George W. Bush increased it by 70%. Then the financial crisis blew debt-to-GDP ratios skyward. Government revenues shrank, and spending, mainly for social and stimulus programs, expanded sharply. But the situation is much worse than this graph suggests. If one includes the unfunded liabilities of Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare, the highest estimates put the real debt to GDP ratio at 480%. Even if this might be exaggerated, the result is crystal clear. The United States has entered a fiscally unsustainable path, and the situation is much worse than it was after 1945.

In 2010, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke demanded “a credible plan for reducing deficits to sustainable levels.” After five years, no such plan exists. Bernanke’s predecessor, Alan Greenspan, had called for radical measures: “Only politically toxic cuts or rationing of medical care, a marked rise in the eligible age for health and retirement benefits, or significant inflation, can close the deficit.”

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The United States faces all kinds of dilemmas. Interest rates will have to go up to reverse the excessive expansion of the monetary base, but this will put an additional strain on the budget and slow down growth. No matter what policy-makers do, things are going to get worse. The solution in the 1950s and 1960s was a combination of low interest rates, high taxes, and inflation. This might be feasible in a fast growing economy, but today it could be a recipe for disaster. If governments take debt reduction seriously, they will probably have to do so at the expense of growth. These problems might well exceed the problem-solving capacity of the political leadership and the political system.

The bundle of problems addressed so far is alarming. And we have not mentioned the country’s shrinking share of world trade, its declining productivity growth, and the demographic trap, which, of course, all industrial nations are confronted with. Still, it is fair to say that Obama’s promise to “remake America” did not come true. In fact, many problems that he addressed in his first inaugural speech have worsened. But, despite these deeply troubling trends, there is also good news to share. At least eight sources of strength are countering the political and economic decline of the United States.

II. Sources of Strength

1. America’s Wealth of Natural Resources

From its very beginning, the United States has benefited from an abundance of natural resources. It still does, and recently this old advantage has returned with regard to energy. In a remarkable push to minimize energy dependence, America became the world’s largest producer of oil and gas in 2014, even overtaking Saudi Arabia. The import of liquid fuels has dropped by more than half since 2010. Much of this is due to fracking, but also to Obama’s massive support for renewable energy. Wind-generated electricity has trebled since 2009. As this shift coincided with the tumbling of oil prices, cheap energy has returned. And that gives an enormous boost to consumers’ purchasing power.

Cheap energy is a reason for many companies to relocate their energy-intensive activities to the United States, as the German chemical giant BASF, for example, has done. There is also a trend toward on-shoring. Some of the industrial jobs that were exported to low-cost countries are returning because of lower energy costs in the U.S. and rising
wages and currencies abroad. According to the Boston Consulting Group, average wages in south China’s Yangtze delta, a manufacturing hotbed, jumped from $0.72 an hour in 2000 to approximately $6.31 in 2015. According to economic analyst and author Charles R. Morris, “[on]-shore production also makes it easier to keep up with today’s just-in-time delivery mandates and ever-more-rapid product cycles. And, like all American companies, GE has become wary of the Chinese propensity to knock off market-leading product designs.” After losing 6 million manufacturing jobs in the 2000s, American industry is currently creating some new jobs in the United States. All in all, there are tentative signs of a partial resurgence of American manufacturing.

2. Top Research Facilities and High-Tech Clusters

The United States is the world’s leading high-tech country. The science and IT departments of American elite universities are surrounded by clusters of vibrant industries. They are able to attract talent and money from around the world. The list of Nobel-prize winners reflects this dominance in research. Far less restrictive regulation is not the only reason why European pharmaceutical firms transfer their laboratories to the United States; recruiting top talent is also significantly easier here.

The United States is home to some of the most innovative software and Internet businesses in the world, like Google, Intel, Microsoft, Apple, AMD, Dell, Facebook, etc. These and other advanced industries cluster in large metropolitan areas. These clusters generate strong network effects from the existence of key innovation resources, knowledge pools, skilled workers, and specialized supplier networks. Metropolitan regions like Austin, Boston, San Diego, Seattle, and Silicon Valley are impressive centers of growth, “world-class hubs of prosperity.” The U.S. seems well versed in exploiting promising new technologies, ranging from advanced robotics and 3-D printing to the digitization of everything.

Emerging economies, however, are catching up. No longer prepared to be mere producers of “designed in California” products, they are massively investing in education, training and innovation. The American leadership in high tech still seems to be intact at present, but it might be threatened in the future. It should be a warning sign that U.S. employment in advanced industries is low by international comparison and, more worryingly, decreasing.


3. The World's Strongest Capital Market

America still has the most important financial market and the U.S. dollar is still the world’s leading currency. Both might change, but not in the short run. In 2014, 62% of the world’s foreign currency reserves were held in U.S. dollars. The United States is an incredibly rich country, and this wealth is not going to diminish any time soon. On the contrary, it is increasing fast. And this country has an efficient infrastructure to funnel capital into productive use, through Wall Street and through private equity and hedge funds. Start-ups can draw on a large pool of venture capital. The terminology itself is telling. The word “venture capital” has a positive connotation, while the German translation is “risk capital,” indicating a more cautious, subdued approach. Thus, the German market for private equity and hedge funds is still small by American standards. The U.S. economy benefits from a well-functioning, highly innovative financial market that mobilizes gigantic amounts of capital.

4. The Positive Effects of Immigration

Despite an utterly dysfunctional immigration policy, the U.S. economy still reaps substantial benefits from immigration. The presence of millions of immigrants in the lower segments of the labor market puts continued downward pressure on wages. It is a scandal, however, that more than 12 million unauthorized but indispensable workers in most cases cannot legalize their status and build a future for themselves and their families in the United States.

At the other end of the labor market, America is a magnet for highly skilled people. As the GHI’s research project on immigrant entrepreneurship has shown, the ability of the United States to attract business talent from abroad has been, and still is, a source of great strength. Between 1995 and 2005, 52% of all Silicon Valley startups were founded by immigrants. For the engineering and high tech sectors generally, the figure was 25%. There are several hubs of immigrant entrepreneurship. 44% of new tech businesses in New York and about a third of those in Boston, Chicago, and San Diego were founded by immigrants. The experience of navigating between cultures can be uncomfortable, but at the same time it is a powerful asset.24

Let us look at the cofounders of some iconic American corporations. Google’s Serge Brin was born in Russia, Yahoo’s Jerry Yang in Taiwan,
Ebay’s Pierre Omidyar in France, with Iranian roots. Comcast co-founder Daniel Aaron fled Nazi Germany, Intel cofounder Andrew Gove communist Hungary. Amazon’s founder Jeff Bezos is the son of Cuban immigrants and Richard and Maurice McDonald were born to Irish emigrants. 40% of all Fortune 500 companies were founded by immigrants or their children. Immigrants as a whole are more than twice as likely to start a business as people born in America. There are not many other countries that attract immigrant entrepreneurs in similar numbers. And there is no other country in the world that is so attractive to new immigrants. Sorting out its immigration policy could help the United States retain and even deepen this advantage.

5. The Wealth of Social Capital

Despite all social, racial, and political divisions, the United States has a strong culture of solidarity. Especially in moments of crisis, this sense of community comes to the fore. When Washington was hit by excessive snowfall in 2009, neighbors looked after the elderly, and people shared scarce supplies. When New York experienced its worst flooding during hurricane Sandy in 2012, thousands of volunteers spontaneously gathered in schools. The readiness to do volunteer work is astonishing. America’s social capital is not depleting — contrary to what Robert Putnam claimed in 2000 in his influential book, according to which Americans have increasingly become disconnected from family, friends, and neighbors. Many critics have vehemently denied this thesis, and others have pointed to the fact that civic engagement today takes different forms than it did in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead of participating in bowling leagues, people join social networks and neighborhood groups or interact with others through their children’s interest in sports leagues. Even if Putnam was right and there had been a decline of social capital since 1950, it would still be extraordinarily high by international comparison. It is my personal observation that active civic engagement is in no way fading. Rather, it is at a very high level. The numbers of voluntary associations and philanthropic charities, and the amount of money and time people give to them, is a source of national strength.

6. Positive Attitudes toward Entrepreneurship and Innovation

In the United States entrepreneurs are heroes, role models for children, who sell lemonade on street corners and dream about becoming the next Steve Jobs. The obstacles to launching new business
ventures are low. Many start-ups begin in garages or kitchens, almost mythical sites of U.S. business history. The founding of businesses is obstructed by much less red tape than in many other advanced economies.

In Europe, wealth is often seen critically. In the United States, making money is not regarded as a dubious activity. This certainly also has its risks. The cult of the self-made man opens the door to con artists like Bernhard Madoff. Ponzi schemes were literally invented in the U.S. — by Charles Ponzi in 1920, and imitated by a myriad of copycats.27 They are more widespread in the United States than elsewhere. This distinctively American disposition, an almost naïve veneration of wealth and success, spurs a culture of achievement, but at the same time creates huge opportunities for crooks.

Another notable prerequisite for growth is the openness to new products. These can take off with remarkable speed if they fill — or create — a demand. Look at the spread of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Uber or Airbnb. People here are fascinated by the new, and their first thought is not to stop it by injunction. One might say that there is a kind of pioneering spirit. Young entrepreneurs with new ideas are not discouraged by skeptical financiers or traditionalist consumers but, as a rule, find the support of venture capitalists and, in many cases, of consumers too. It is hard to imagine that the U.S. would lose its present position as a pioneer of consumer innovation, as this status has a technological and a cultural base.

7. “Comeback Nation”: America’s Resilience and Adaptability

The same argument holds true for the ability of the American economy to rapidly recover after crises and to smoothly adapt to changing circumstances. This robustness and readiness to meet new challenges, too, has deep cultural roots, remnants of the “frontier spirit” linked to the concepts of “progress”, “American exceptionalism,” and “individualism.” A sense of confidence and optimism about the future, along with the willingness to help oneself and find pragmatic solutions, are widespread American dispositions.

As far as the labor market is concerned, its remarkable flexibility stands out. In Europe and Japan, collective wage bargaining, extensive regulation, and far-reaching protections for workers make it difficult for employers to adjust their labor intake, wages, hours,
and working conditions to the business cycle. To put it bluntly, firing and hiring according to the firms’ needs is much easier in the United States. The flipside of this is a much lower level of security and predictability on the part of the workforce. Besides, unemployment and social security benefits are relatively small and time-limited. American workers are therefore more likely to switch employers, start second careers, and move to wherever jobs are available. Because very few status rigidities exist, most unemployed are willing to accept lower wages or move across the country. If necessary, people with university degrees accept inferior jobs instead of waiting for what many European unemployment regulations call “reasonable employment” corresponding to one’s education and social status. The degree of geographical and professional mobility is high by international standards, just as employment protection standards are low. This is still the case, even though the long-term historical trend displays a decline in the flexibility of the American labor market.28

Another mechanism explaining the marked resilience and adaptability of the U.S. economy is the way the legal system treats bankrupt firms. Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code grants corporations privileges that help them to stay afloat and recover fast. Indebted firms can acquire new financing on favorable terms by giving new lenders first priority on the business’s earnings. Old lenders can be prevented from any collection attempts or legal measures against the creditor. The bankrupt firms are also allowed to cancel existing contracts such as wage agreements with employees or unions, contracts with suppliers or customers, and real estate leases. These mechanisms favor corporations over all other stakeholders. Unions claim that employees’ rights are eroded and that they bear the brunt of such financial restructuring. Indeed, distressed firms regularly terminate collective-bargaining agreements and “retiree health benefits and pension plans without seeking equal sacrifice from other stakeholders and creditors.”29 Since 2002, every single major U.S. airline has filed for Chapter 11. Unions campaign for reform to prevent abuses. Chapter 11 in its present form, however, still allows corporations to adapt rapidly in times of crisis and to avoid total collapse. As far as employees are concerned, it is hard to decide what is better: unemployment or severe cuts in wages and benefits while keeping their jobs. There is no doubt that Chapter 11 creates flexibility for employers and helps the economy to rebound from crises, in both cases at considerable social costs.

8. Soft and Hard Power and the Military-Industrial-Intelligence Complex

The United States is powerful. Soft power — Hollywood and global brands — gives American companies immense comparative advantages. But we should not forget hard power. The United States still possesses unique military capabilities and a gigantic intelligence apparatus. This is not a pleasant topic, but it is one with real weight. Soft and hard power translate into economic power. The NSA and the other sixteen intelligence agencies protect American trade secrets and spy on foreign companies. In bids for large contracts, U.S. businesses can count on their government’s support in a way competitors from smaller and less powerful nations simply cannot. Bargaining chips include arms deals, military cooperation, the opening or closure of military bases, and so on.

And then there is what President Eisenhower in his farewell address in 1961 called the “military-industrial complex,” warning against its “unwarranted influence.” In 2014, the U.S. government spent about 600 billion dollars on defense-related purposes. That was roughly equal to the combined amount spent by the next seven largest military powers. The supremacy of the U.S. is unchallenged. Most of this money goes to U.S. firms, which, by the way, contribute heavily to political campaigns of those who decide on these contracts. Despite the obvious pitfalls of this structure, the military-plus-intelligence-industrial complex has general economic benefits. As the U.S. will not relinquish its claim to global military hegemony any time soon, this perennial stimulus program is going to continue.

The military-industrial complex not only prospers in a giant defense market, but also improves the competitive position of the U.S. more generally. Defense Research and Development (R&D) has produced enormous spin-offs for the civilian economy, such as GPS systems in cars and smart phones. We have seen this in the past. The Defense Department’s “willingness in the 1960s to pay almost any price for compact . . . electronics for its missile programs stimulated the infant semiconductor industry. This early and cost-insensitive purchasing helped companies pioneering the technology to move down the learning curve.” Silicon Valley was born with defense-related R&D funds. Defense spending has crucial spin-off effects for the U.S. space, satellite, aircraft, and telecommunications industries. The military sponsors big research projects in scientific and

30 Farewell address by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961; Final TV Talk 1/17/61 (1), Box 38, Speech Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, Eisenhower Library, National Archives and Records Administration.

engineering fields ranging from nanotechnology to biomedicine. All of this is potentially dual-use technology that will give the United States significant competitive advantages on global defense and in civilian markets. These massive subventions are a source of concern in the European Union, as they distort competition. These worries are well founded, as American defense-related R&D spending exceeds that of all EU members combined by seven times.

**Conclusion**

How all these factors will play out remains to be seen. History is an open process. I have tried to demonstrate that the social foundation of the U.S. economy is threatened. America cannot flourish when millions of people are left behind and even those in the middle are losing out. A social order will lose its legitimacy if it cannot find a balance between prosperity and solidarity, between efficiency and social justice.

The American dream has always been linked to the promise of a better life for all. Even without a major war or an acute crisis, the United States might for the first time in its history experience the opposite, namely, mass social decline. When most of its citizens get the short end of the stick and are insufficiently trained for the future job market, the foundation of American society and its economy will be at risk.

At the same time, the United States is still a vibrant and resilient nation with plenty of social capital and cutting-edge research institutions. It offers immigrants unique opportunities. It has a mighty

![Figure 7. Defense spending in top 15 countries, 2014. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014." Figures are based on estimates for China, Russia, Germany, and UAE. The figures for military expenditure as a share of GDP are based on data from the IMF, World Economic Outlook database, Oct. 2014.](image-url)
military-industrial complex, the world’s largest capital market, and cultural predispositions conducive to growth.

Although historians are not prophets, my tentative prediction for the twenty-first century is that the United States will lose its position as an unchallenged economic superpower. There will be no second American century. There will also be no Chinese, Indian, or European century. Rather, I think we will see a world without a single hegemon, a world with several economic powerhouses that will be interdependent but also fiercely competitive. Maybe it will be a “transnational century.” Given the rise of China and other emerging economies, the United States will not be able to retain its position as the sole economic superpower. The question is not whether, but when this will happen, and how much of its past supremacy the U.S. can preserve in this new world of shared responsibilities and intensified interdependence.

Again, I have to ask for caution. History might well take a very different course. History has seen many surprises, unforeseeable twists and turns. Still, it is our mandate as historians to explore the past and to reflect on its implications for possible futures.

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SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND THE GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

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I. Introduction: A Stunning Theft of Intelligence

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) comprises sixteen secret agencies.¹ Eight are located within the framework of the Defense Department; seven in civilian policy departments, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the Justice Department; and one, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), stands alone as an independent civilian organization outside any of the policy departments. Since its creation in 1947, the CIA has been the titular leader of the Intelligence Community, serving as the headquarters for U.S. espionage activities, for the government’s senior analysts, and (until 2005) as the home of the Director of Central Intelligence or DCI. The military intelligence agencies include the National Security Agency (NSA), founded in 1952 as an outgrowth of the Army Signals Intelligence Corps. It serves as America’s codebreaking, encrypting, and electronic surveillance organization, engaged primarily in worldwide eavesdropping on telephone conversations and social media (such as e-mail). Both the CIA and the NSA played an important role in the souring of U.S.-German relations since mid-2013, when a major theft of classified U.S. intelligence documents revealed widespread NSA spying against Germany.

Each of America’s intelligence agencies has been relatively autonomous, led by a program manager or director who is expected on some matters to answer to the DCI or, since 2005, to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI, the new coordinator for the Intelligence Community) and to contribute to the nation’s collection of intelligence from around the world. These agency managers have budget and hiring authorities, however, that are separate from the DNI’s control. The sixteen agencies and their directors have been notorious for behaving as if they were “silos” or “stovepipes,” separate from one another. Given the considerable power of each of the directors, they are known in Washington slang as “the gorillas in the stovepipes.”

In 2004, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States, Washington officials attempted to provide greater cohesion...

¹ This article is based on a lecture delivered at the German Historical Institute in Washington on June 4, 2015. On the sixteen intelligence agencies, see Loch K. Johnson, National Security Intelligence: Secret Operations in Defense of the Democracies (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2012).
to America’s spy agencies by creating a DNI, through passage of a law known as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act. These aspirations for a closer integration of the agencies in the Intelligence Community failed, though, because the Pentagon lobbied against the idea of centralization under a DNI. The Pentagon convinced key members of Congress, especially on the Armed Services Committees in the House and the Senate, to block the creation of a powerful civilian intelligence leader. The Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald H. Rumsfeld of the second Bush Administration, feared a diminution of the military intelligence mission under the strong DNI model. However unfounded that fear may have been (any DNI would have continued to place assistance to U.S. combat men and women foremost on the list of intelligence priorities), the end result of the lobbying efforts was the establishment of a stripped down version of a DNI — a position devoid of significant budget and appointment powers over the entire Intelligence Community.

In this permissive management environment, the CIA and the NSA (as well as their companion agencies) continued to enjoy broad discretion in the crafting and implementation of intelligence operations, especially in the counterterrorism domain, reined in from time to time (if at all) by the White House and the National Security Council (NSC). The two intelligence oversight panels on Capitol Hill, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), displayed only a spotty interest in questions of accountability, restrained from an energetic exercise of oversight by the shock of the 9/11 attacks and the worry about additional assaults on the American homeland by foreign or perhaps even domestic terrorists. With some exceptions, lawmakers put close supervision of the intelligence agencies on hold.

As a result, a tone was set at the highest levels of government that discouraged the rigorous application of safeguards against the possible abuse of secret power by the intelligence agencies. This atmosphere would lead to excesses, including the CIA’s extraordinary renditions and secret prisons abroad, its torture of suspected terrorist prisoners (or, in the Agency’s euphemisms, the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” against “detainees”), and the unleashing of the NSA’s global programs of signals intelligence (“sigint,” or the interception of telephone messages and other electronic forms of communications). The 9/11 attacks had changed the world, at least
from the American perspective, and counterterrorism took on a certain ferocity in the hopes of preventing future 9/11s.

In the pursuit of the bulk collection of “metadata” and related surveillance programs, the NSA — the largest of the American intelligence organizations — hired Edward J. Snowden in 2013 to help with some of its high-speed, complex computer work. At the time of his employment at the NSA, Snowden — a twenty-nine-year-old high school dropout from suburban Maryland and a former information-technology (IT) expert at the CIA — was under contract as a data specialist with the giant defense firm Booz Allen Hamilton. The NSA outsourced some of its work to this Beltway contractor — a common practice at the time for most of the U.S. intelligence agencies, as a means of supplementing their own permanent staff. In his short stint at the NSA, Snowden stole over a million classified documents from its vast computer banks, one of the most significant security breaches in U.S. history. Before releasing the first of these documents on June 5, 2013 — as a means, Snowden declared, of protesting against the NSA’s broad surveillance activities — he fled the United States in search of a safe haven, first to Hong Kong and then (after other options fell through) to Russia.2

During his brief stay in Hong Kong, he leaked many of these documents to U.S. and British journalists; and, in Russia, he continued to send classified materials to reporters (especially on the staffs of the Washington Post and, in the United Kingdom, The Guardian), as an ongoing protest against what he referred to as the American surveillance state. The pilfered documents disclosed that the NSA had been engaged in the gathering of telephone and social media records at home and abroad, using a dragnet approach rather than obtaining individualized warrants based on a reasonable suspicion that a target was involved in terrorism. The Snowden disclosures showed that, as part of its global sigint surveillance, the NSA had collected the communications data of millions of German citizens, as well as of officials at the highest levels of government in Berlin. These revelations shook the U.S.-German relationship.

II. America as a Modern Roman Empire

Imagine how early Germanic tribes might have viewed the Roman legions marching into the Rhine river valleys under the command of Julius Caesar. On the horizon would appear a vast forest of spears; thousands of banners in the air; chariot wheels, steel shields and...
long-blade swords glittering in the sun; the legions spread across the landscape — a disciplined colossus moving inexorably forward. Today, the United States is looked upon by many in the Federal Republic of Germany (and elsewhere) as an even mightier and more arrogant empire, with nuclear weapons capable of annihilating the world; warriors stationed in more than seven-hundred military bases around the globe; drone runways from Uzbekistan to Djibouti and beyond; submarines beneath every sea, each carrying more explosive firepower than all the combined weaponry detonated in the Second World War; bombers and fighter planes that command the skies; missiles able to reach, within minutes, any city or village on the planet; sophisticated surveillance satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, and sigint antenna strategically positioned on the continents; spies in every capital; Internet eavesdropping capabilities that make Big Brother of Orwell’s 1984 seem relatively benign.

Add to this America’s behemoth economy that disseminates U.S.-made products and advertisements — Coke, Apple, McDonalds, Starbucks, among thousands of other brands — into every nook and cranny of the global marketplace; the tentacles from L.A. film and recording studios; and the cornucopia of gadgets from computer app and game manufacturers — all reaching out across the latitudes to swamp local cultures, languages, and norms. In the words of an American journalist, “. . . our enemies tweet on iPhones, and kids worldwide bop to Beyoncé.”

The analogy between U.S. and Roman imperial dominance falls short when considering that America lags behind many other nations in, for example, life expectancy (30th from the top), high school matriculation (49th), mortality rates for mothers in childbirth (55th), and cellphone use (87th). Moreover, on the military front, the United States has fallen short of its objectives in Korea (1950-1953), Cuba (1961), Vietnam (1965-73), and, most recently, Iraq (2003-2013), with military advisers, drones, and fighter aircraft now re-engaged there to assist the Baghdad government in its struggle against the terrorist organization called the Islamic State (IS, and known as well as ISIS or ISIL). Thousands of American soldiers have been fighting in Afghanistan, too, since 2002 and counting, with only minimal success in subduing the Taliban adversary.

Still, the image of the United States as a modern imperial empire has a ring of veracity to many foreign observers who find the aggressiveness and scope of its military and intelligence activities altogether
disquieting. Without question the United States bristles with weaponry, spending more on arms and soldiers each year than the next ten nations combined (including China and Russia). Further, America boasts intelligence agencies that consume an annual budget dwarfing every other nation’s spending on spy activities — at a high of $80 billion in 2010, presently around $53 billion, and likely to grow again. (In comparison, the United Kingdom reportedly spends about $3.6 billion a year on its intelligence agencies.) With respect to America’s current involvement in warfare, the presence of U.S. troops and military aircraft has been highly unpopular in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, even among the local factions their presence is meant to help.

This portrait of the United States standing astride the globe, like Galileo in Honoré Daumier’s famous etching (although absent Galileo’s dismay at the proliferation of armaments beneath him), raised suspicions — long before the Snowden affair — about the intentions of Washington officials, even in some quarters normally disposed toward trusting Americans. The reservoir of goodwill toward the United States was once deep and reliable among Germans, as President Harry S. Truman and his successors led the way toward the reconstruction of war-wrecked Europe after 1945. In recent decades, though, this reservoir has periodically displayed significant drops.

III. The Bumpy Road of U.S.-German Relations

Even at the end of the Second World War some German intellectuals and politicians argued that, since their nation rested roughly equidistant geographically between East and West, it should refrain from leaning one way or the other politically. The first West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, had other ideas, however, as well as a strong will and exceptional political acumen. Concerned about possible Soviet aggression toward Western Europe, and calculating that Bonn was likely to have more success trying to influence London, Paris, and Washington than it would the hardliners in Moscow, he committed his nation unequivocally to Westbindung — an anchoring to the West. In return, the United States and other allies in the North American Treaty Organization (NATO, formed in 1949) offered West Germany a protective military shield during the Cold War, without which the Kremlin might have engaged in westward expansion.

The first twenty years after the war were a golden age of American popularity in Germany. Then came the Vietnam War, which drew strong opprobrium across the Federal Republic, especially among the younger generations. This disillusionment with the use of U.S. force abroad was followed by protests against the placement of American intermediate-range missiles in West Germany during the 1970s and 1980s as a further deterrent against the Soviet Union. As Germany’s economy and self-confidence strengthened, its junior status in the Western alliance became less and less palatable in Berlin and to the German public. Further, the peace movement was widely supported in West Germany during the Cold War, especially its criticism of nuclear weaponry. In this grassroots longing for world peace one can find additional seeds of the alienation from the United States that began to grip the German public, driven by a sense of international idealism that persisted long after the U.S. military withdrew from Indochina in 1973. As the foreign affairs columnist William Pfaff observed in 1989: “Having provided the world with a model of evil in the past, these Germans now imagine themselves providing a necessary model of good again in a millenarian spirit.”

A revival of appreciation toward the United States appeared when the Reagan Administration helped tear down the Berlin Wall and dispatch the Cold War to the history books, a transformation for which the reform-minded Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev also deserved much credit. By the time of German reunification in 1990, President George H. W. Bush proudly referred to Germany as America’s premier ally.

Over the years, most Germans have been grateful for this military and trade alliance with the United States and other Western nations in NATO. America’s security assistance included guidance from the Department of Defense and the CIA in developing Bonn’s, and now Berlin’s, military and intelligence capabilities. Further, the two nations have had a strong association on the economic front, with trade streaming across the Atlantic in both directions. At the end of the Cold War, Germany and the United States also worked together on a “grand bargain” to infuse the former Soviet Republics with Western capital and know-how, in a joint effort to avoid a slide back to the old communist regimes — or perhaps even a civil war in Russia and East Europe.

Yet America’s burgeoning weapons arsenal, its multiple go-it-alone military and paramilitary interventions abroad since 1945, and its
penschant to treat Germany as a subordinate rather than as a partner, have been vexing and demeaning to the Germans. This sense of dependency on the United States inevitably began to grate, however benevolent and well-intended officials in Washington may have been. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder complained in 2002, for example, that “consultation cannot mean that I get a phone call two hours in advance only to be told, ‘We’re going in.’” Only through newspaper accounts had the Chancellor learned about the likelihood of the impending invasion of Iraq. Schröder continued: “Consultation among grown-up nations has to mean not just consultation about the how and the when, but also about the whether.”

The Chancellor’s lament echoed frustrations felt by many German government administrators and parliamentarians at the time, and today as well. Germans had begun to discern an “arrogance” and an “imperialistic” streak in American foreign policy.

By 2002, the Americans and Germans — elites and the public alike — found themselves sharply at odds over the wisdom of invading Iraq. Among the many disturbing implications of the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Iraq was a growing uneasiness in Germany about America’s capacity for prudent global leadership. Thus, on the one hand, Germans remained grateful for America’s defensive shield during the Cold War years, for its long-standing trade ties, and for its shared interests in culture and the arts. Yet, on the other hand, one could note a growing conviction among Germans that Berlin and Washington might be less than perfectly aligned on foreign policy objectives — and doubt whether the two countries shared the same basic perceptions about world affairs.

This ambivalence between the two nations has led to a fragile equilibrium of interests, friendly for the most part but clouded by a perception on both sides of a widening gap in their fundamental security concerns. The uneasy state of this alliance was ripe for dislocation; all that was needed was a controversy that might call further into question the congruence of interests. The spy theft in 2013 provided just that shock.

IV. The Snowden Affair

Into the setting of fear and uncertainty in the United States that followed the 9/11 attacks stepped the NSA, encouraged by the second Bush Administration to take off the gloves and use whatever sigint methods were available to rout out terrorists around the world who...
sought to harm America. The NSA’s response brought it, again, into controversy. In 1975, the Church Committee investigation into U.S. intelligence abuses (led by Senator Frank Church, Democrat, Idaho) had revealed the NSA’s questionable use of wiretaps (Operation MINARET), as well as its improper interception of international cables sent and received by Americans over decades (Operation SHAMROCK). The Church Committee’s investigation led to the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, which required that the NSA’s wiretaps be approved by the newly created Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (or FIS Court). In 2005, the New York Times disclosed that the NSA had been wiretapping the telephones of selected American citizens without FISA court warrants, in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Soon after 9/11, the Bush Administration had ordered the director of the NSA, General Michael V. Hayden, to bypass the FIS Court and use his agency’s massive eavesdropping capabilities as best he could in the struggle against global terrorism without always seeking a warrant. Vice President Cheney, in particular, was convinced that in foreign and security affairs, the president reigned supreme and had the right to proceed as he wished — the so-called “unitary theory” of the presidency popularized by the Administration’s Justice Department attorney, John C. Yoo.

Instead of suggesting to the Administration that it seek to amend or repeal the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act before proceeding, General Hayden saluted and returned to Ft. Meade, the NSA’s headquarters in Maryland, to expand his agency’s sigint dragnet, free of judicial review. A few members of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) were informed about this departure from the law, but were provided with no details and warned they could not discuss the merits of this venture with colleagues or expert staff. Lamely, the anointed few accepted these restrictions, thereby putting a large dent in the evolution of serious intelligence oversight in Congress.

Among the programs adopted by General Hayden, based on this dubious green light from the White House, was an activity known as “metadata” collection. Bypassing warrant procedures, the NSA began to gather the records of telephone numbers dialed, and the duration of conversations, for about a third of all the telephone calls made by American citizens, both inside the United States and with parties overseas. Moreover, the agency gathered data on the use of social
media by U.S. citizens. The appropriateness of this “bulk collection” method of intelligence collection, without a FISA warrant, became a topic of heated national debate when revealed by Snowden in 2013, and has continued since. Hayden and his successors appeared to prefer a vacuum-cleaner approach to electronic surveillance; in contrast, the NSA’s critics advocated a more pinpointed targeting of individuals, based on a reasonable standard of suspicion that they might be involved in terrorist activities.

The Snowden leaks disclosed that the NSA’s metadata program was worldwide. One of the agency’s sigint targets in Europe was the mobile phone of German’s top government official, Chancellor Angela Merkel. According to German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble, “she [was] not amused.” The Minister bemoaned that “this is so stupid, it can only make you weep.” Nor were other Europeans pleased about the revelations of extensive NSA surveillance against them.

In the United States, a New York Times headline in August of 2013 blared: “Surveillance Revelations Shake U.S.-German Ties.” An A-list of America’s leaders expressed chagrin over the extent of NSA spying, including key members of the congressional oversight committees for intelligence. The NSA had failed to inform most lawmakers on SSCI and HPSCI. This prevented the more energetic watchdogs, Senators Ron Wyden (D, Oregon) and Mark Udall (D, Colorado), for example, from airing their misgivings with associates and aides. Not even the SSCI’s leader, Diane Feinstein (D, California), had been briefed about the sigint targeting of Chancellor Merkel’s telephone for over a decade; Senator Feinstein expressed dismay over the eavesdropping against one of America’s most important friends.

V. The Wellsprings of NSA Surveillance Against Germany

At the heart of the NSA’s operations in Germany was no doubt the still recent memory that Hamburg had been the place of residence for some of the terrorists who planned the 9/11 attacks against the United States, including the group’s leader, Mohammed Atta, who recruited supporters from a local radical mosque (since closed). In addition, when the United States had relied on German’s Federal Intelligence Service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND, for information about the likelihood of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq prior to America’s invasion of that country in 2003, it provided inaccurate information to the CIA based on a German agent known by the codename “Curveball.” The agent claimed direct knowledge

9 Chambers, ibid.
of Iraqi WMDs, especially chemical, but he turned out to be a fabricator. The BND refused CIA access to Curveball during this period, which led DCI Porter Goss to declare after the 9/11 attacks that the Agency would never again rely on Germany or any other nation for its intelligence. It was a fatuous position for the DCI to take, given the importance of intelligence liaison with allies in a world grown too large and complex for the United States to monitor on its own, but one born of frustration over the Curveball incident.

Present, as well, as an influence on the NSA’s spying was a concern about Germany’s expanding commercial ties with Russia (some 6,000 German firms and 300,000 employees rely on trade with Russia12), not to mention its reliance on Russian gas. A further tug to the East had evolved with Germany’s burgeoning flow of exports to China. Conceivably, Berlin could again tilt toward the East, as the Nazi government had done with the signing of a non-aggression agreement with Russia in 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, shredded when the Wehrmacht invaded Russia in the summer of 1941).13 A modern-day Ostpolitik, run rampant, is a fretful mote in the mind’s eye of Washington officials.

Some pronounced worry-warts even feared the rise of a new right-wing politics in Germany. As the Federal Republic became economically stronger, perhaps Germans would dream of a powerful and aggressive Fourth Reich. Visions of German gas attacks, the sinking of passenger liners, aerial bombings, and the horrors of Auschwitz-Birkenau danced in the overheated imaginations of these observers in the United States, unfairly discounting Germany’s overwhelming and persistent rejection of ever repeating its dark, xenophobic past.

A further explanation for the NSA’s zealous espionage activities in Germany lies in the history of its spying practically everywhere throughout the Cold War, and, accompanying this strategy, the bureaucratic inertia that perpetuates America’s quest for global intelligence hegemony. Finally, NSA hubris also played a role — a belief that “If we have the latest spy technology, let’s use it.” As a top CIA official familiar with its activities has said: “The NSA had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should.”14

Central to the debate over the legality, ethics, and wisdom of the Snowden leaks was the question of whether he was a patriot for disclosing to the public a questionable intelligence program or a traitor.

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13 Vyacheslav Molotov was the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time; and Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister.
for his unauthorized disclosure of classified information (much of it going beyond the metadata program that he claimed had justified his actions). General Hayden’s successor as the director of NSA, Keith B. Alexander (another general), called the Snowden leaks “the greatest damage to our combined nations’ intelligence systems that we have ever suffered.” In contrast, his replacement in 2014, Admiral Michael S. Rogers, deplored the leaks but downplayed their damage, concluding that there was no indication that “the sky is falling.” The Times noted that none of the secret agencies had presented “the slightest proof that [Snowden’s] disclosures really hurt the nation’s security.”

In May of 2015, by a vote of 338 to 88, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to overhaul the Patriot Act of 2001, whose ambiguous language had encouraged an expansion of the NSA’s sigint powers. The House “USA Freedom Act” sought to trim back the reach of the metadata program. Also in May, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York declared the NSA program illegal, a decision that added pressure on the Senate to pass the House measure. After considerable back-and-forth, senators finally agreed on June 2, 2015, to support the USA Freedom Act. Authority for the existing metadata program had come to an end, at least for the time being. President Obama quickly signed the bill, which allowed a continuation of bulk data collection by the NSA, but with more substantial safeguards. These safeguards included, chiefly, a limitation on collection to only two communications linkages out from an initial terrorist suspect, along with storage of the data in the files of the telephone companies — which, with a proper warrant, the NSA could then visit to examine the information as it related to key terrorist suspects.

The German and American public alike continued to wonder, though, how many other NSA surveillance programs might exist that lie outside this new Freedom Act’s jurisdiction. The debate over the proper scope of mass surveillance had not been fully resolved, even if the Freedom Act had signaled a shift of the pendulum in the United States from excessive concentration on security matters back to a better balance between security and privacy. Advocates of greater privacy and civil liberties in the United States resumed their attacks against the NSA; and many Germans, along with other Europeans, remained up in arms about U.S. spying on their telephone calls, computer transactions, and use of social media.


VI. The German Reaction to the Snowden Leaks

“The NSA Affair,” as it is known in Germany, produced a firestorm of controversy in the Federal Republic. Germans were appalled by the NSA’s wiretapping of their head of government, Chancellor Merkel, a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party who, because of her popularity at home (she is in her third term), her impressive leadership abilities in the European Union (EU), and her gift at quiet diplomacy, has become quite possibly the most important political figure in all of Europe and the anchor of the Western alliance. Not everyone would agree with that appraisal. For example, the Greeks feel she has been too demanding on EU economic austerity programs affecting their country; and the leaking of a diplomatic cable by WikiLeaks revealed a portrait of her by a U.S. diplomat in Berlin as someone “rarely creative.”

The NSA’s interception of the Chancellor’s cellphone messages was both rash and unnecessary. The news organization Reuters reported that the scandal “chilled relations with Washington to levels not seen since Merkel’s predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.” Under Schröder, Berlin had also eschewed participation with the United States in establishing a no-fly zone over Libya in 2011 — although the Schröder government refused to seek the extradition to German courts of CIA officers allegedly involved in the rendition of a German citizen, Khaled el-Masri, in 2010.

When she assumed office in November of 2005, Merkel had stepped away from the heavily “German way” adopted by Chancellor Schröder and devoted more attention to the NATO alliance. Her history of outreach to Washington made the cellphone spying all the more hurtful; German officials and the public felt a sense of desertion by an old friend, after Berlin had been making stronger efforts to woo Western capitals. The Chancellor was said to be “infuriated.” On background, a journalist with a prominent German newspaper commented that “wiretapping Merkel’s phone was perceived as backstabbing in Berlin . . . By [spying] on Merkel, U.S. intelligence stole more than data from the German government; it somehow stole the Chancellor’s credibility by proving those who support Snowden right.”

Despite some initial frostiness, the Chancellor soon responded in her signature cool-headed manner, suggesting that if the American government wanted to know what she was thinking about one policy option or another, it should just ask her. It was a simple and
endearing reply to the question of whether the United States should be covertly listening to the telephone conversations of top leaders in nations closely tied to Washington. She observed, further, that “Spying on allies . . . is a waste of energy. We have so many problems, we should focus on the important things.” In a similar vein, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed dismay that the United States felt compelled to spy in Germany. “We speak to each other all the time, and nobody keeps their views secret,” he said. “The attempt to use conspiratorial methods to find out about Germany’s position isn’t just unseemly, it’s unnecessary.”

VII. Intelligence Operations in Germany

In 1848, Lord Palmerston opined on the floor of the House of Commons that “England has no external friends; England has no perpetual enemies; England has only eternal and perpetual interests.” In a corollary to this adage, a U.S. intelligence officer has suggested that “there are friendly countries, but no friendly intelligence services.”

It is true that the policy preferences of the United States and Germany are not necessarily congruent in every case — just as with any other nation, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (known in intelligence circles, along with the United States, as the “Five Eyes,” who closely share intelligence with one another). Still, as with the Five Eyes, German-American views match up on many important topics, which is what made, for many, the eavesdropping on Merkel a surprise and a disappointment — even if it is no secret that spying goes on in every nation around the world, short of a few small island kingdoms, and that both the United States and Germany have their eyes open wherever their global interests may lie.

The disclosure that the NSA had intercepted the Chancellor’s cellphone messages stirred a tsunami of resentment among Germans aimed at the NSA specifically and the United States generally. The German Vice Chancellor and the Economics and Energy Minister of Germany, Sigmar Gabriel, summed up the disaffection:

"The apparent unlimited access of the NSA to the personal data of Internet users without any specific suspicion, the disregard for the fundamental rights of any constitution based on the rule of law: this has destroyed trust. Tapping the German Chancellor’s cellphone cannot be interpreted as a gesture of friendship."
Beyond the finding about the Chancellor’s intercepted phone conversations came the broader realization that the NSA was conducting intelligence collection across the Federal Republic, a U.S. sigint program for all of Germany. Merkel responded that “Spying among friends — that is simply not done.”

Adding insult to injury, the government of Germany discovered in 2014, soon after the initial Snowden leaks about the NSA metadata program, that the CIA had recently been engaged in the recruitment of agents (“assets,” in Agency terminology) within the Federal Republic, successfully persuading two German officials to spy against their own country, one in the Defense Ministry and another in the BND. These revelations may have been less startling than the NSA’s espionage operation directed against the high office of Chancellor, since it is widely understood that the spy organizations of virtually every nation engage in “humint” or human intelligence — the recruitment of locals in other countries for purposes of espionage. Nonetheless, coming on top of the NSA spy disclosures, the discovery of CIA moles in Germany took on added meaning. Chancellor Merkel called this second wave of American spying a “very serious development” and a “clear contradiction of the notion of trustworthy cooperation.”

An expert on American foreign policy at the John F. Kennedy Institute in Berlin branded the CIA spy cases “a low in U.S.-German relations.” Officials in Berlin felt the need to take a stand against U.S. espionage, which had come to seem highly aggressive against Germany. The government expelled the CIA’s chief-of-station in Berlin (the only time a chief-of-station had suffered that fate in Germany), and it arrested the newly recruited Agency assets. A contretemps of this magnitude involving U.S. intelligence had not been seen in Europe since 1995, when the French threw several CIA officers out of their country for spying on its Foreign Ministry in advance of world trade talks. Still, despite this latest dust up, diplomatic conversations continued between the United States and Germany on a host of topics; moreover, their embassies remained open, and both Merkel and Obama visited one another’s countries.

This is not to dismiss the strains between Berlin and Washington, which have been real. Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière and other German officials made it clear that, henceforth, counterintelligence (CI) — the mission to protect a nation against hostile foreign intelligence agencies, handled in Germany by his Ministry through the

28 Assistant professor Lora Anne Viola, quoted in Frank Jordans, “Germans Probe 2nd Spy Case,” Huffington Post (July 9, 2014).
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV) — would be directed against the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The Minister vowed to have “360 degree surveillance of all intelligence activities in Germany by “so-called allies,” including all members of the Five Eyes. For the first time, the German intelligence agency responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence would throw up barriers against the presence of U.S. spies operating in Germany. Further, the logical implications of a robust counterintelligence program suggested that the BfV might even attempt, in coordination with the BND, to penetrate America’s intelligence services with a mole or two of its own. In addition, Berlin decided in May of 2015 to limit cooperation with the U.S. spy agencies in the collection of intelligence, scaling back on a secret intelligence liaison accord signed by the two nations in 2002, which the Germans claimed had been “permanently” breached by the NSA.

These were startling new developments in the relationship between German intelligence and its “founding father,” the CIA, as well as with the NSA, both of whom had long supplied the BND with frequent intelligence reports and vice versa. (Der Spiegel reported that BND officials gave intelligence to the NSA or CIA in some 40,000 instances over a recent ten-year period, including Internet addresses, mobile phone numbers, and data on the European aviation giant Airbus Group.) The Süddeutsche Zeitung in Munich accurately observed that “when a friendly intelligence service breaks these rules [against penetration of one another with moles], it commits the most serious breach of trust known to the world of espionage.” The Associated Press reported that “the German intelligence community is up in arms.”

When, following the already tumultuous NSA controversy, the two CIA counterintelligence cases became public knowledge, Chancellor Merkel calmly asserted that “trust can only be restored through talks and certain agreements.” She vowed to seek out such talks, but did not anticipate any quick resolution. Her objective, according to media reports in 2014, was to seek a private agreement with President Barack Obama that the United States would not engage in espionage against partners. Obama treaded water, however, in meetings with the Chancellor, and no immediate agreement of this kind was reached. For those who had lost confidence in the U.S.-German relationship after the Snowden disclosures, this apparent “unwillingness
to compromise increased anti-American sentiment,” according to Eva Jobs, a German scholar studying in the United States.37

Additional obstacles to an intelligence agreement loomed on the German side of the equation. “The Germans didn’t want Five Eyes when we learned about it,” an unnamed German diplomat told The New Yorker magazine. “We’re not in a position, legally, to join, because our intelligence is so limited in scope.”38 With the experiences of Adolf Hitler’s Gestapo and Waffen-SS as a backdrop, West Germany’s 1949 Constitution, the so-called Basic Law, placed tight restrictions on the nation’s intelligence agencies; and it also held the German army, the Bundeswehr, to a strictly defensive posture when West Germany rearmed in 1955. Not until 1995, when Western nations asked Germany to provide some offensive support after the massacres at Srebrenica in former Yugoslavia, was this defense policy amended to provide limited military assistance.

Under German law, the BND has to operate under a collection ceiling of 20 percent of all Internet and telephone communications; and, in fact, the agency gathered only 5 percent until the NSA controversy led to an expansion of BND sigint activities. Moreover, the BND is not allowed to store the data it collects, but rather the agency quickly sifts through all the “noise” to extract important “signals” about possible terrorist leads from the flood of information it gathers. It then acts on this information and deposits the extraneous material into a burn-bag.39 Some programs pursued by the NSA, such as its controversial Echelon program launched in the late 1990s to surveil European communications about international economic activities (especially whether European nations were cheating on trade agreements), is an illustration of an operation that would be prohibited for the BND. Moreover, the legal penumbra emanating from the German Constitution prevents its intelligence agencies from providing targeting coordinates for U.S. drone strikes. Nor does Germany maintain detention prisons, or have a capacity to engage in covert action or its own drone attacks (so far). A leading German scholar in the field of intelligence studies, Professor Wolfgang Krieger, surmises that “the German public is simply not prepared to go along with the kind of beefing up of our intelligence capabilities, which would be required to make a German ‘Five-Eyes’ membership feasible.”40

While some Germans hoped for an out-and-out “No Spy Agreement” with the United States, others longed to amend their Constitution in a way that would permit Five-Eyes–like cooperation with the United

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37 Eva Jobs, e-mail communication to the author (March 2, 2015).
40 E-mail communication to the author (December 17, 2014).
States — perhaps even the fashioning of a Six Eyes arrangement that would welcome the Federal Republic into the exclusive espionage club. Given the history of U.S. intelligence activities abroad, a no-spying agreement was unlikely to materialize, although the CIA adopted a moratorium on spying in Germany for a time after the Snowden leaks. As well, it was unlikely that the United States would again tap the telephones of European heads of state, at least if they had a clear record of friendship toward the United States. At any rate, the BND’s relations with U.S. intelligence agencies seemed to be weathering the storm over both CIA and NSA spying in the Federal Republic. As Jobs writes, the “BND feels a little bossed around by American agencies, but is fully aware of its own dependency” — a reference to the stronger global spying capabilities of the United States, the products of which are shared in part with the German intelligence agency.

The BND also has significant capabilities of its own for some intelligence collection missions, though, and resents being viewed as a puppet of the CIA. The knowledge its officers possess about Russia and the Middle East is deep. Indeed, in 1945 (and after) the United States overlooked the Nazi backgrounds of key BND officials, because Washington needed help in understanding the Soviets and Eastern Europeans, as well as the dynamics of nations in the Middle East. During the controversy over the Snowden leaks, the head of the BND, Gerhard Schindler, waved away as “absolutely absurd” the notion that his agency was Washington’s “compliant tool” — although he did concede that “we need them more than they need us.”

Even though a specific U.S.-German espionage accord failed to emerge from the spy scandals, Chancellor Merkel — like most German elites — has been inclined to be forgiving, no doubt in consideration of the large areas of existing cooperation between the nations, especially in the realms of security and trade. The Chancellor seemed to imply that the mindless blunders of America’s spy agencies should not be allowed to wreck potential win-win trade agreements. Indeed, the year after the Snowden scandal, U.S.-German trading registered a higher level than the year before. The only major economic hiccup between the two nations that came out of the NSA spy scandal was Germany’s cancellation of its contract with the American telecommunications giant, Verizon Wireless, which had been sharing (begrudgingly) its telephone and social media data with the NSA at that agency’s request.

41 See Dilanin, “CIA Halts Spying in Europe,” op.cit.
42 Jobs, e-mail communication, op.cit.
Chancellor Merkel even attempted to defend Berlin’s relationship with the NSA as legal and useful for counterterrorism, rebuffing those who sought to compare the agency’s sigint operations in Germany with the kind of schemes associated with the Ministerium für Staatsicherheit or “Stasi,” the East German secret police and intelligence apparatus during the Cold War. As a result of growing up in East Germany, she developed an understanding of the dangers that secret spy organizations can hold for society. Merkel said: “... it is part of their job for our intelligence services, especially the BND, that they must and will cooperate internationally to protect the bodies and lives of 80 million Germans as best they can,” adding that “first and foremost” this meant cooperating with the NSA. Yet, her governing coalition partner, Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, leader of the Social Democrats, spoke at the same time of a “secret service scandal, which could set off a very grave tremor.”

Further, Berlin continued to allow the Pentagon and the CIA to use a U.S. military base at Ramstein and related facilities in Wiesbaden that handle electronic guidance links to Predator and Reaper drones, many laden with Hellfire missiles for targets in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, as well as Somalia and other locations in Africa. When asked about U.S. spying inside the Federal Republic, the Chancellor said that Germany and the United States would remain close allies “and nothing about this will change.”

Still, in the face of widespread public concern about the NSA’s spying, the Chancellor called upon her nation’s federal prosecutor, based in Karlsruhe, to formally investigate the metadata scandal. A year later, in June 2015, the prosecutor closed the case, announcing that his investigators could not acquire sufficient evidence to pursue legal action against the NSA. Along with throwing the CIA's chief-of-station out of Berlin, some action had to be taken in the light of negative public opinion toward America’s sigint snooping. During the Cold War, a dissatisfaction with secret U.S. trolling in Germany would have been dealt with quietly by asking the White House to recall home one or more of its intelligence officers or diplomats. Merkel at first tried to play down the NSA operations; but, according to a German intelligence expert, the further uncovering of the CIA recruitments “blindsided” Berlin officials, “forcing the German government’s hand.” The German government felt that it had been pushed too far and had no choice but to react.

45 Smale, “Germany, Too, Is Accused,” op.cit.
46 Ibid.
48 Quoted by Jordans, “German Chancellor Angela Merkel,” op.cit.
It did not help that President Obama never publicly explained, or apologized for, the NSA’s overreach in intercepting the Chancellor’s cellphone calls; instead he expressed regrets to Merkel only in private. “The U.S. has contributed to the uproar German politicians have obsessed about for months by not reacting sensitively enough,” said a professor of international politics at the University of Kiel, Joachim Krause, in 2014. “By now, the anger has grown to an extent where it has become difficult for German politicians to remain nuanced and objective.”51

Hoping to calm down the level of distress, German Foreign Minister Steinmeier observed that “ties between the United States and Germany are necessary and essential for both of us,” noting further that “we want to work on reviving this relationship, on a foundation of trust and mutual respect.” Sharing a podium in Vienna with Mr. Steinmeier, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, agreed. “We will continue to work together in the kind of spirit we exhibited today in a very thorough discussion [of the NSA controversy].” Like many American officials before him over the years, Kerry emphasized that “the relationship between the United States and Germany is a strategic one.” He pointed to the “enormous political cooperation” between the two nations and declared: “We are great friends.”52

VIII. Coming to Terms with the Snowden Affair

In light of the ubiquitous spying that goes on in the world, the debate about NSA and CIA activities in Germany struck some as a mixture of hypocrisy in some quarters and naïveté in others. After all, the forests of antennae on the roofs of German embassies around the world are not there for gaining clearer reception of the afternoon soaps, any more than are comparable American “listening posts” overseas. Some of the wind came out of the sails of NSA critics in Germany when the media revealed that the BND had been spying on a NATO member, Turkey, raising questions for some about Berlin’s trustworthiness as a partner in the Western defense organization.53 The events were really not comparable, however, as Germany and Turkey (unlike Germany and the United States) have never had a tight-knit relationship.

Additional media inquiries indicated that the BND had intercepted the communications of Hillary Clinton and John Kerry as they served, one following the other, as secretaries of state. This reporting raised eyebrows in Washington, and even accusations in some quarters

51 Quoted in Rick Noack, “Yes, Berlin Has Its Own Spying Scandals, but Don’t Expect Germany to Forgive the NSA,” Washington Post (August 20, 2014).
that Berlin officials were hypocrites. Observers saw this turning of the tables as “another deep blow in German-American relations that are already battered.”\(^5\) Yet because the evidence was compelling that this intelligence had been gathered by the Germans inadvertently (as a “by-catch” during legitimate BND sigint counterterrorism operations), Washington officials stepped back from pushing the matter. They accepted the explanation that, once the BND collectors identified the Kerry conversation, it was quickly destroyed. The fate of the Clinton communication proved more tangled. This document had been stolen soon after the telephone interception, by the same BND officer secretly working for the CIA and subsequently arrested by the German government as one of the double-agents ousted in the wake of the Snowden Affair. The German mole had passed the Clinton material along to his CIA handler in Vienna, at which point the Agency ordered its immediate destruction.

As for Snowden, Chancellor Merkel was less critical of him than Washington officials would have liked, when she commented that “we learned things [from him] that we didn’t know before, and that’s always interesting.”\(^5\) The Chancellor refused, though, to consider granting the notorious leaker asylum in Germany; a decision otherwise would have truly set back relations between Washington and Berlin. Most German officials followed suit in taking a moderate, if miffed, stance toward the United States on the Snowden Affair — a rallying of the elites, as is usually the case in Germany on foreign policy issues.

Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier continued to face some dissent inside Germany, however, over their willingness to shake hands all too quickly with American officials and move on from the NSA and CIA controversies. For example, from her perch as a member of the parliament in Berlin (the Bundestag), Eva Högl harshly denounced the “terrible activities” of the NSA. “Germany can’t sit idly by as even the friendliest nations surveil German citizens as a matter of course and spy on the government’s internal affairs,” she said. “This has to end! It’s just not appropriate. The U.S. needs to finally put its intelligence services on a tighter leash . . . Many Germans have come to distrust the U.S. and are critical of American arrogance.”\(^5\) Jürgen Trittin, another opposition politician, ridiculed Merkel and a couple of her cabinet members for behaving as “three wise monkeys” turning a blind eye to the NSA scandal.\(^5\) A former German Defense Minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, out of

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\(^5\) Jordans, “German Chancellor Angela Merkel,” op.cit.

\(^5\) Huffington Post (July 11, 2014).

\(^5\) Noack, op.cit.
office and free to ignore diplomatic niceties, spoke just as bluntly. “Anti-Americanism is already flourishing alarmingly,” he said, warning that President Obama needed to rehabilitate the U.S.-German relationship or “he will go down in history as the gravedigger of the transatlantic friendship.”

Public opinion polls in Germany did indicate a steep decline in support for the United States and the NATO alliance. As the New York Times reported, “Mr. Snowden is more of a popular hero here [in Germany] than elsewhere in Europe, and anti-N.S.A. sentiment remains high.” Just over 50 percent expressed a favorable view of America in 2014 — the lowest percentage of any nation in Europe other than Greece, which never seems to have much affection for the United States and where, in 1975, a terrorist faction in Athens murdered the CIA’s chief-of-station. America’s use of drones, which have accidentally killed hundreds of innocent bystanders in attacks against suspected terrorists, are opposed by 67 percent of Germans. Moreover, on the cultural side of the bilateral relationship, Jobs points out that fewer and fewer German high school students are engaged in educational exchange programs in the United States. In addition, budget cuts have taken place for several transatlantic cultural programs; and young Germans are finding America less attractive as a place for travel.

Nevertheless, a wider examination of public views in Germany since 2002 reveals that the United States has coped with even lower standings in the opinion polls, falling as low as 30 percent in 2007 in reaction to America’s ongoing war in Iraq. The U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 produced a much more negative response among the German people than the controversy over NSA spying, although neither was helpful to the transatlantic relationship.

The polling data further indicated that a majority of all Germans in each age group retained a favorable image of the United States in the wake of the NSA Affair. Still, that almost half of the German public had a negative outlook on Americans remains troubling. The German unhappiness about NSA and CIA spying seemed to be a rude awakening in the Federal Republic to a more hostile and uncertain world than the simpler, binary standoff of the Cold War.

On top of these anti-American sentiments came the announce-ment by the Obama Administration of a U.S. foreign policy “pivot toward Asia.” Many Germans became convinced that the Federal


59 Smale, “Germany, Too, Is Accused,” op. cit.

60 See Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry Revisited: The Church Committee Confronts America’s Spy Agencies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015).

61 Cora Currier, Ryan Devereaux, and Jeremy Scahill, “Secret Details of Drone Strike Revealed as Unprecedented Case Goes to German Court,” The Intercept, First Look Media (April 17, 2015), citing findings by Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who specializes in research on the use of drones by the United States.


Republic — indeed, all of Europe — was no longer of much importance to the United States. Pushing back on Washington soon proved to be good politics. The caucus leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Thomas Oppermann, declared that “a failure of the [no-spy] agreement [with the United States] would be unacceptable,” and would result in changing “the political character of relations.”

Like-minded Bundestag members, responding to the SPD faction, established a parliamentary investigative committee — the so-called NSA-Untersuchungsausschuss — with a mandate to probe into the extent of the NSA’s activities in Germany. (The CIA spy caught within the BND reportedly was passing information to the Agency regarding this investigation, among other documents.) The purpose of the inquiry was to focus on the extent of BND cooperation with the NSA and other Five-Eye intelligence services. A member of the investigative panel reported that the BND was cooperating fully with the investigation, providing “I am almost certain, as much transparency [as any service anywhere in the world] since 9/11 — or even the Church Committee [of 1975] for that matter.”

Among the thirty-two questions the Bundestag panel of inquiry hoped to address were these: (1) Whether, in what way, and on what scale the intelligence services of the Five Eyes collected, or are collecting, data on communication activities (including content-related, subscriber, and traffic data), their content, and other data-processing actions (including Internet use and stored address directories) from, to, and in Germany. (2) Which laws in Germany, Europe, and internationally did or do such activities contravene? (3) Have U.S. bodies carried out or initiated telecommunications surveillance, arrests, or targeted killings through the deployment of combat drones on, or from, German territory? Interim reports from the Committee have suggested, according to Professor Mayer, that German intelligence services operated outside of the law and openly defied constitutional restrictions.

The difference in the attitudes toward the United States expressed by German elites and by the general public, so clearly visible during the missile controversy in the 1980s, has been on display again in the case of the NSA spying in the Federal Republic. According to a recent magazine profile, Chancellor Merkel, “ever passive, expressed more annoyance than outrage, but with the German public the sense of betrayal was deep.” It was bad enough to target the German Chancellor’s cellphone and worse still to spy on millions of
communications traveling to and from ordinary German citizens — the “every day and everyone” dimension, as political scientist Jobs puts it. Elites and the public remain divided over their appraisals of Snowden. According to a New York Times correspondent, the leaker “became a hero to many Germans” for standing up to the NSA’s invasion of personal freedoms in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere around the world. The Times hypothesized that the determination of Germans “to guard their privacy is a legacy of Nazi and Communist rule, when the state snooped on citizens.”

These negative views of the United States among the German public have grown in recent years, in part because of a number of questionable foreign policy and intelligence decisions made in Washington, from the war in Iraq that began in 2003 to the CIA foreign prisons, the use of torture, the renditions (including the mistaken abduction of an innocent German citizen, taken to Cairo and dealt with in a medieval manner by the Egyptian intelligence service), and the lack of counsel for prisoners in Guantánamo. The question became: Was the foreign policy of the United States any longer in competent hands? The depictions of agent Jack Bauer torturing people on the popular TV show, “24,” then going on to save the world, didn’t help America’s image in Germany as a benign leader. Olaf Boehnke, head of the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, reflected in the wake of the controversy that “there was always some kind of anti-American sentiment in the German public, but this is skyrocketing” and “really worrying.”

IX. The Importance of Cultural Differences

Part of the reason for U.S.-German tensions stems from differing cultural perceptions in the two countries regarding the proper balance between security, on the one hand, and liberty or privacy, on the other hand. Germans and Americans have profoundly different approaches to their understanding of privacy and the place of government in the lives of citizens. In Germany, people remember the suppression and tyranny of the Nazis and, during the Cold War in East Germany, the sinister activities of Stasi. Intelligence agencies are, as a consequence, perceived as potentially toxic organizations. “German people are very sensitive, very hysterical [because of Germany’s past],” remarks Thomas Wölfling, the German Deputy Consul General for the southern United States.
Americans have had their own troubles with secret agencies. The CIA, the NSA, the military intelligence units, and the FBI were all found to be spying against Vietnam War protesters and civil rights activists during the Cold War — the focus of the Church Committee investigation. Yet nothing in the U.S. experience, even the recent dark chapters of using torture against suspected terrorists, came close to the brutalities perpetrated by the Nazis and the Stasi. So while both Americans and Germans are inclined to sacrifice some liberties if that might improve domestic security against terrorism, in Germany the public — with the memories of the totalitarian experience still in mind — is less willing to tolerate NSA-like intrusions into their private lives. As a result, German intelligence expert Krieger points out, “Germans do not much appreciate the value of good intelligence work.”

A further consideration is the fact that the United States suffered through 9/11, when nearly 3,000 of its civilians in New York City and Washington lost their lives in an astonishing moment of aerial attack by Islamic extremists (Al Qaeda) using hijacked commercial airlines as missiles — a gruesome event captured on television. Based on this experience and the fear of still more attacks, many Americans are inclined to give their intelligence agencies some leeway — although the efforts by Congress in the summer of 2015 to rein in the NSA show that even Americans are seeking more limits on spying.

Further, the United States has had a uniquely close relationship with Israel in the Middle East and, thereby, has attracted the direct wrath of Islamic extremist groups, from Al Qaeda and its 9/11 brutalities to ISIS, with its barbaric beheadings and threats to assault the U.S. homeland. America has also been engaged in three major wars in the Middle East and Southwest Asia (two against Iraq and one currently against the Taliban in Afghanistan, spilling over into the northwestern region of Pakistan). At one point in the first war against Iraq (1990-1991), U.S. troops bivouacked near Mecca, close to holy shrines in Saudi Arabia, as a holding-station for their invasion into Iraq — an inflammatory intrusion, in the minds of Islamic fundamentalists. Germany, in contrast, has managed to keep a relatively low profile in the Middle East and, despite the large number of Muslims in the Federal Republic (most of them law-abiding citizens), the acts of terrorists in the nation have been few in number and limited in scope: the Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang) in the 1970s and 1980s; the attacks at the 1972 Olympics Games.

74 Krieger, op.cit.
in Munich; and a West Berlin disco bombing in 1986. Fortunately, the Federal Republic has been spared a 9/11 event, leading to a sense among Germans that such events are something that happen elsewhere.

Moreover, Germans are less accustomed to a military-oriented society, as the United States has become, with its seemingly endless armed interventions abroad. This Fortress America posture has dulled the sensitivity of Americans toward the dangers of a state devoted to military power — a rejection of the suspicion of standing armies that was once a bedrock principle in the nation. In Germany, large military and intelligence establishments remain anathema to the public, in light of the Nazi experience.

Many Germans have enjoyed an economic boom that allowed them to embrace a new era of Biedermeier-style quiescence, with its focus on the good material life. Even with this attempted escape from unsavory international affairs, however, Germans continue to expect their post-Nazi government to honor the principles of the German Constitution, including the exercise of tight controls over BND operations and an avoidance of policies that might ignite Islamic extremism in Germany. Thus, while the NSA’s operations have been grudgingly accepted in the United States (though criticized by both liberal and Tea Party political factions, and spurring some useful reform efforts75), the broad German public has found these spying activities repugnant and unacceptable.

**X. New Directions**

What can be done to reset the relationship between the United States and Germany? The starting place is to understand that the uneasiness between the two great nations has roots that reach far deeper than the Snowden Affair. Changes must come across the board, not just in the intelligence domain. These changes must include improved dialogue on foreign affairs, especially regular and genuine consultation; the further cultivation of trade relations; and, instead of a “pivoting” toward the East, a realization that the United States has a destiny and a commonality of interests that lies much closer to Europe than to Russia and China — most notably, a devotion to equality and human rights.76 This is not to say that Washington should turn its back on the East, but rather to suggest that each of the world’s major power centers — Europe, Russia and China — are important to the United States and can be nurtured as friends and trading partners.

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76 This point is nicely expressed by Gabriel, op. cit.
Missing at the moment is a more sensitive appreciation in Washington for the roles that Germans and Americans can play together in the flourishing of peace and democratic principles around the globe. An America carrying a big stick has an insufficient draw as an alliance partner; officials in Washington must also carry hearing aids, and work more on their capacity for empathy — trying to see the world, including the United States, as other nations see it. Greater trust and transparency have to be the coins of the realm, and this will take a serious investment of time and dialogue between the United States and the Federal Republic.

Specifically with respect to intelligence activities, both the United States and Germany must keep closer tabs on their secret agencies, with Washington officials drawing back from overzealous collection operations, and Berlin beginning to take spy accountability more seriously by establishing a stronger intelligence oversight panel in the Bundestag with subpoena and budgetary authority. Moreover, just as Germany will need to join even more earnestly in the military defense of the democracies against terrorism and other threats (it already has the third largest number of troops in Afghanistan today), so will it need to expand its intelligence activities toward this end — even in light of the Nazi and Stasi experiences. Of course, strengthening the German secret services must go hand-in-hand with a careful and vigorous exercise of intelligence oversight by the Bundestag and the German media. Some observers critical of using intelligence gathering as a counterterrorism strategy will accuse Berlin of becoming Islamophobic, since radical Muslims (estimated at some 5,000 in Europe77) will be the chief targets of expanded clandestine collection activities. In fact, however, neither the Federal Republic nor the United States are Islamophobic, as shown by their rallying behind Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s and their efforts today to ensure religious diversity for their citizens.

In addition, both nations must continue the ongoing debate about the proper balance between security and privacy within their territories, as well as how they can enhance information-sharing so that the temptation to spy upon one another recedes. The United States will continue to spy in Germany no doubt, so long as the possibility exists of a future Mohammed Atta and more 9/11 attacks. However, instead of the overreach displayed by the NSA’s recent dragnet approach to counterterrorism, collection operations should be more focused and based on reasonable suspicion — a fundamental democratic.

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77 Data from Europol, quoted by Public Broadcasting System, PBS (January 16, 2015).
principle. Equally important, U.S. clandestine operations in Germany should be carefully coordinated with Berlin and, in all but the most extreme cases, ideally conducted jointly by American and German intelligence units, in close allegiance with German law. Necessary, too, are strong bilateral agreements and, ultimately, international treaties on such intelligence matters as the sanctity of a citizen’s personal data in all law-abiding nations, along with clear rules and limitations on the use of drones.

Jobs writes that the “German public is used to perceiving intelligence at large as potentially dangerous, shady, or even criminal, as well as incompetent.” 78 Many Americans feel the same way about their secret services. Both publics are right to some extent, for on both sides of the Atlantic intelligence abuses have occurred; that is why parliamentary panels for intelligence accountability are so important. America’s system is hardly perfect, though it has blazed important trails in this once-ignored sphere of governance. 79 Yet dangers lurk in the shadowy world of terrorism, not to mention international criminal activities related to drugs and human trafficking. Germans and Americans — indeed, Russians, Chinese, and all civilized people — must learn how to band together more effectively to counter these pernicious forces. Intelligence can be the first line of defense; and, when the spy agencies of different nations work together against these dark elements, the results can be all the more powerful and effective. Naturally, as long as there are nation-states there will be differences of opinion and interests among them; but there is so much that can unite the sensible governments of the world, including trade relations, cultural and educational exchanges, and intelligence-sharing on common foes — even participation in joint overt and covert actions against the likes of IS and Al Qaeda.

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79 See, for example, Loch K. Johnson, “Accountability and America’s Secret Foreign Policy: Keeping a Legislative Eye on the CIA,” Foreign Policy Analysis 1 (Spring 2005), 99-120.
In mid-1740, Charles Brunier, Marquis de Larnage, the governor-general of Saint-Domingue, the French colony on the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, sent a letter to the French Secretary of State of the Navy, in which he shared his discomfort with recent events in the coastal town of Léogane. A land surveyor, Sir Viaux, who had only recently arrived in France’s most important colony, had started to attract public interest by “proclaiming himself a leader of the freemasons and pretending to [have been] given orders and the necessary power to establish one or even several freemasons’ lodges in Saint-Domingue.” To the governor-general’s horror, Viaux had already managed to attract some “neophytes” among Léogane’s inhabitants, including notable members of the army, the royal magistracy, and the regional court (conseil supérieur). Without knowing what the fraternity was about, “since one has to be part of it to be initiated into its mystery,” the governor-general told Viaux that he would arrest him and send him back to France if he heard of any further reception or assembly without a formal authorization from the French government. Marquis de Larnage did not consider such an authorization desirable because he was convinced that such a lodge and its secret proceedings would constitute a source of public uproar, of “divorce and dissent . . . in almost every household”: “some ladies were made to believe that the object of this institution and brotherhood was to get along without women, others that the freemasons devoted themselves to the devil.”

The governor-general apparently did not need to fall back on coercive measures to stop the meetings of the lodge, for it left no further traces in the colonial archives, masonic records, or other available sources. While Viaux’s social activities in Léogane remain a footnote in the history of Saint-Domingue, they are part of a much larger story, involving not only this island but the entire Caribbean. At the time when Marquis de Larnage discovered freemasonry in Léogane, the expansion of this relatively new organization to the islands in the Atlantic Ocean was already in full swing. Since the late 1730s, masonic lodges were being established throughout the West Indies, particularly in the British and French colonies, including Saint-Domingue, where a lodge is reported to have been active in the port town of Les

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1 Charles de Brunier, comte de Larnage, to the Secretary of State of the Navy, Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, comte de Maurepas, July 25, 1740, COL C9A/52. Archives nationales d’outre-mer (ANOM). Aix-en-Provence, France; all translations are mine unless otherwise noted.
Cayes since 1738. During the eighteenth century, masonic lodges are estimated to have consisted of several thousand members in the French West Indies alone — a considerable number if we take into account the limited size of the white male population that was, at that time, the main and almost sole constituency of freemasonry in the Antilles.

On a larger scale, the short-lived lodge in Léogane and its many Caribbean sister lodges point to the global expansion of freemasonry and related forms of fraternal association and sociability during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With roots in medieval and early modern stonemasons’ lodges, modern freemasonry took shape in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Great Britain. Rapidly spreading throughout continental Europe, masonic lodges became a well-known element of sociability in Enlightment Europe, a secluded world meant to facilitate the practice of the ideals of fraternity and humanity across social, national, and confessional boundaries. Parallel to its steady expansion in Europe, this secluded world transcended the borders of the European continent within a few decades. At the end of the eighteenth century, wide networks of lodges were in place stretching from Europe to North and South America, into the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. As the cited cases in the Antilles suggest, empires — continental and intercontinental alike — constituted important infrastructures for the expansion of freemasonry.

Despite this global dimension, the academic and non-academic study of freemasonry has been largely encased in national (or sub-national) frameworks. In return, scholars in transnational, imperial, or global history have devoted only scarce attention to the worlds of masonic or other related forms of sociability. Building on some recent historiographical trends, this essay argues for connecting the study of sociability to transnational and global history. Focusing on the example of freemasonry in the Atlantic world, and especially in the imperial Caribbean, it seeks to highlight some of the prospects and potentials that a history of Atlantic masonic networks and sociability in the decades around 1800 can offer to the comparative history of empires as well as to Atlantic and global history. In doing so, I will first give a brief outline of freemasonry as a research topic of social history and of its global expansion. I will then discuss different scales of analysis before sketching some analytical perspectives of an Atlantic history of freemasonry.


3 See the vast prosopographic study: Elisabeth Escalle and Mariel Gouyon Guillaume, Francs-maçons des loges françaises aux Amériques 1770-1850: Dépouillement du fonds maçonnique conservé au département des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale (Paris, 1993).


I. Freemasonry and the “Associational Revolution” of the Eighteenth Century

At the time when Marquis de Larnage enquired about the freemasons, their society had already become a conspicuous element of Western European societies. Modern (“speculative”) freemasonry took shape institutionally in early eighteenth-century Great Britain, even though its origins have been subject to debate. Scholars have traced its historical connections back to the (“operative”) stonemasons’ lodges in the late medieval and early modern British Isles, to compagnonnages or journeymen’s fraternities, to knightly orders and to other initiation societies in early modern Europe. Freemasonry, as it manifested itself institutionally in the early eighteenth century, was part of a multitude of associations, learned and literary societies, academies, and clubs that marked the eighteenth century as the “century of sociability” par excellence. Freemasons organized themselves in “lodges,” a term referring to both the group of members as well as the venue of their meetings. These lodges were affiliated with so-called grand lodges (also referred to as “obediences”). The first of these was the Grand Lodge of London, established in 1717, followed by other grand lodges in Dublin, Paris, and Edinburgh in the 1720s-30s. By the late 1730s, lodges had emerged throughout the British Isles and continental Western Europe. By then in Marquis de Larnage’s native France, lodges existed in every major city — a development the governor of Saint-Domingue may have missed, for he had spent most of his career since the 1710s outside of metropolitan France.

Like other societies during the eighteenth century, the freemasons strove for individual virtuous and moral improvement in an associational setting. Core values were tolerance and fraternity. The emergence and rise of freemasonry were thus closely related to the high value placed on sociability during the Age of Enlightenment, which considered sociable intercourse and fellowship with like-minded and “dignified” individuals as a privileged path to civic virtue and to a better society. At the same time, freemasonry maintained a more complicated relationship with the rational Enlightenment than other

6 Freemasonry comprises a multitude of masonic institutions, grand lodges, doctrines, and ritualistic systems. Some scholars thus tend to talk of “free-masonries.” Yet notwithstanding various internal conflicts and differences, the historical actors conceived and experienced freemasonry as an integrated and (more or less) coherent space due to some basic features which will be presented in the following pages. For the sake of convenience, this paper uses in most parts a singular form and wherever possible abstracts away from the various differentiations. As we will see, this is not to say that freemasonry was a uniform movement.

7 On this debate, see Stevenson, Origins of Freemasonry; Jacob, Origins of Freemasonry; Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire, La République universelle des francs-maçons: De Newton à Metternich (Rennes, 1999), 23-52. For a survey of pre-eighteenth century societies, see Wolfgang Hardtwig, Genossenschaft, Sekt, Verein in Deutschland: Vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Französischen Revolution (Munich, 1997).

8 Ulrich im Hof, Das gesellige Jahrhundert: Gesellschaft und Gesellschaften im Zeitalter der Aufklärung (Munich, 1982).

movements of the time such as the academic movement. Through their symbols and organizational forms, the freemasons placed themselves in a gray area between rationality and ancient mysteries, between mechanist theory and alchemy, between transdenomina-
tional leanings and overtly Christian positions, a mixture that held an appeal for many of their members.

In addition to these more general features of freemasonry, six aspects are of particular importance for the context of this essay. First, the freemasons were a voluntary association, that is, an organization based on the principle of free and individual membership whose existence was dependent neither on the state nor the church. While this gave it a certain degree of independence, agency, and ambiguity, it also added to the precariousness of an organization that constantly had to solicit the authorities’ tolerance. The public appearance of freemasonry in different parts of the world was thus to a large extent driven by the desire to convince monarchs and governments that they posed no threat but were beneficial to the social and political order. Rather than being the only voluntary organization of the time, the freemasons were part of what historian Peter Clark has called the “associational revolution,” during which manifold associations and societies popped up throughout eighteenth-century Europe. Shaping a semi-private, semi-public space for conviviality, leisure, and friendly intercourse, these clubs and societies set the stage for the proliferation of modern associations in the following century.

Second, freemasonry was a homosocial organization, that is, an organization that was, at least in theory, only open to men. While there were, in practice, various intersections and links with mixed-gender spaces and organizations, the lodge room was considered a major institution for the shaping of male subjectivities, positioned between the allegedly diverging or even separate spheres of the marketplace and the family.

Third, and closely related to its homosociality, freemasonry was a fraternal organization. Along with other religious and non-religious fraternities, it maintained a kinship-like bond — a “symbolic” or “fictional kinship,” as cultural anthropologists and social scientists have termed it — between its members. Conceived of as a brotherhood, freemasonry was to a large extent built on a family model. Family metaphors not only characterized the ties between individual members (referred to as “brothers”), but also served to describe and negotiate the relations between different institutional branches.


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(that is, between “mother” and “daughter lodges” or among “sister lodges”). The fraternal ties between members also included the duty of mutual aid and help for “brothers” in need.

Fourth, freemasonry was a society based on initiation, integrated by means of rites, symbols, passwords, and secret signs of identification. Rites marked the admission into the brotherhood as well as the passage between the degrees that a freemason could obtain. The ritualized (and sacralized) space of the lodge was supposed to foster amicable and kinship-like bonds among the members. While the secrecy of their meetings and of the knowledge shared by the initiated lies at the core of freemasonry, it would be misleading to place freemasons in the category of political “secret societies.” In contrast to well-known conspiratorial secret societies such as the Illuminati, freemasons never sought to hide the existence of their institution or its raison d’être. Scholars have thus suggested alternative terms such as “discreet society” for this form of sociability based on secrecy. In empirical reality, however, the boundaries between (apolitical) “discreet societies” and (political) “secret societies” were porous and everything but clear-cut.

Fifth, the internal workings of the lodges obeyed certain rules and procedures that stood in partial contradiction to the political and social structures surrounding them. Thus, all members, regardless of their rank in society, were considered equal within the lodges. The lodges organized themselves along certain democratic and participatory procedures. They based their proceedings on written bylaws (also referred to as “constitutions”) and appointed their officers through periodic elections among their members. This fact, along with the cult of secrecy, has given rise to manifold theories framing the masonic lodges as places of resistance or conspiracy against religious and political authorities. It is true that some lodges, in very specific contexts, may have been drawn into political action. Yet if we look at the social background of their membership, freemasonry was, by and large, not a refuge for political dissidents, insurgents, or revolutionaries.

15 For the logics and functions of secrecy in this context, see the seminal article by Wolfgang Hardwig, “Eliteanspruch und Geheimnis in den Geheimgesellschaften des 18. Jahrhunderts,” in Aufklärung und Geheimgesellschaften, ed. Helmut Reinalter (Munich, 1989), 63-86.
16 Dieter A. Binder, Die diskrete Gesellschaft: Geschichte und Symbolik der Freimaurer, rev. ed. (Innsbruck, 2004); in the English and French contexts, the terms “society with secrets” and “société à secrètes” are also in use.
revolutionaries. Eighteenth-century lodges are, in fact, more properly characterized as "sites of social compromise," as social spaces in which parts of the aristocracy and higher middle-classes — also, in part, the clergy — could mingle and interact with each other.  

Finally, modern freemasonry was from the outset characterized by a pronounced cosmopolitan attitude. The founding document of English freemasonry, the “Constitutions of the Free-Masons” (1723) by Rev. James Anderson, described freemasonry as “the Centre of Union, and the Means of conciliating true Friendship among Persons that must have remain’d at a perpetual Distance.” Freemasons sought to ignore confessional, political, social, national, and continental boundaries. Although the belief in a Supreme Being was a prerequisite for membership (at least until the late nineteenth century, when some grand lodges in continental Europe started to initiate atheists), the freemasons’ creator god, the “Grand Architect of the Universe,” was supposed to transcend specific religious denominations. In fact, however, freemasons were divided on the crucial question of how the cosmos that they set out to (re-)unite would be designed and where its boundaries would be drawn. Discussion and dissent around this question would become a leitmotif of masonic history, fueled by the rapid spread of freemasonry.

II. Sociability Within and Across Borders

Most of the features just enumerated, including secrecy, were not unique to the freemasons, but could be found in other eighteenth-century associations as well. What distinguished freemasonry was the combination of all these aspects and its grand scale and transnational reach. Only a few other non-religious movements of the time adopted institutional structures of a comparable intercontinental scope. Compared to the academies that developed similar transnational networks and served as hubs of hospitality for the members of the eighteenth-century République des Lettres, the lodges proved to be more open socially. As a matter of fact, freemasonry stood out as the foremost institution of what I would call cross-border sociability.
Parallel to its institutional consolidation, the lodge network expanded on an international scale. Only a few years after the foundation of the Grand Lodge in London, the first lodges were established in various parts of continental Europe. On the eve of the French Revolution, an estimated number of more than one hundred thousand people were involved in freemasonry or related organizations in Europe; in France at that time, at least five percent of the male urban adult population were lodge members. Freemasonry was not only “the first secular civic association to achieve success on a European-wide scale,” but it went rapidly beyond the boundaries of the continent. The spread of English freemasonry since the foundation of the first Grand Lodge in London 1717 may serve as an example. Around 1800, the (at that point, two) English Grand Lodges had already created dense networks of local lodges in Europe as well as overseas. By the end of the eighteenth century, the English Grand Lodges and their provincial bodies had recognized more than two hundred lodges in North America, more than forty in South Asia, and more than fifty in the West Indies. Many more followed in the next decades. A century later, the network had become denser, with particularly important nodes in North America, South Africa, Australia, South and South East Asia, as well as in places like Egypt, where a dozen English lodges had been established. These figures only refer to local lodges officially affiliated with the English Grand Lodges. They do not include those lodges affiliated with other grand lodges, such as those in Ireland, Scotland, France, the Netherlands, or (from the 1780s) the United States, which proved no less devoted to the global expansion of freemasonry. Likewise, the figures include neither intrinsically mobile military lodges nor those lodges or lodge-like associations that did not manage — or even aspire — to become formally recognized by masonic officialdom.

The Saint-Domingue lodge that Comte de Larnage referred to in 1740 was in many ways paradigmatic of the rapid expansion of masonic sociability. Gravitating around one person, it points to the major role of individual initiatives in the expansion of the masonic “cosmos.” Like many such “pioneering” lodges, it remained (at least for a certain period) outside of the formalized network of European grand lodges, therefore leaving no traces in the official masonic archives, but only in “profane,” public or private, records. Finally, the lodge in Léogane remained a short-lived experience, a fate it shared with many other such associations, particularly in an overseas context that was marked by an eminently mobile and unstable constituency.

23 Hoffmann, Civil Society, 12.
24 For a list of English lodges up to 1894, see John Lane, Masonic Records, 1717-1894 (London, 1895); for the post-1894, the list has been complemented as Lane’s Masonic Records, version 1.0, URL: www.hrionline.ac.uk/lane. The period of existence of the lodges included in the list varies considerably, from several months to several decades. For further numbers from the British imperial context, see Harland-Jacobs, Builders, 3-5.
Thousands of other lodges, however, went beyond such an initial stage. They were held together by a transnational federal structure and quasi-diplomatic relations. A local lodge became part of the masonic network only when it was recognized by a grand lodge. Such grand lodges had very different — and often conflicting — jurisdictions. While the English grand lodge(s) claimed to function as the universal “mother lodge” with a barely restricted scope of action, grand lodges in continental Europe started to assert sovereignty over territories that increasingly converged with national state borders.25 And yet, even the activities of these “national” grand lodges exceeded the territories of the nation-states. In regions with a high number of active lodges, so-called “district” or “provincial grand lodges” were established. In the course of national independence movements, such as in the new world around 1800, provincial grand lodges could transform themselves into new national grand lodges. Already during the eighteenth century, a regular and at times intense masonic correspondence emerged, and this was not only between the local lodges and their respective grand lodges. Local lodges communicated with members belonging to different obediences as well, and the grand lodges developed a system of international relations in which they could establish, maintain, sever, or resume diplomatic relations between each other. In addition, freemasons belonging to different lodges were bound to mutual hospitality and assistance — including logistical, material, or financial support for members in need. Early on, the lodges encountered the problem of non-members trying to exploit these masonic structures of mutual aid. As a consequence, the eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of a complex system of certificates, secret signs, and passwords designed to help freemasons to reveal themselves to each other. The masonic certificates, in particular, became highly demanded “passports” to the world of the Enlightenment, enabling members on the move to draw on the lodge network and, if needed, on its resources.

The rapid expansion of freemasonry was not centrally planned or orchestrated. Rather, it occurred “in fits and starts, non-stabilized rapid advances, [and] temporary retreats.”26 At the current stage of research, we still know little about the different mechanisms that supported this expansion. At least four driving forces can be pointed out, however. First, this expansion was closely connected with migration. The lodges made movements of people easier, but many of them were also the products of this mobility, both in its voluntary and involuntary


forms. Refugees or people in exile established lodges as much as travelers, merchants, diplomats, or settlers. Second, along with the movement of civilians, the mobility of soldiers played an important role. Lodges established or recognized by freemasons in the armies (often organized in ambulant lodges) were among the marks left by military campaigns and invasions. Third, rivalry and conflict between grand lodges contributed to the emergence of a masonic geopolitics, in which competing grand lodges sought to extend their spheres of influence and authority. In the English context, for instance, the rivalry of more than six decades (1751-1813) between two grand lodges (the “Antients” and the “Moderns”) stimulated the foundation of new lodges, especially outside of Europe. Fourth, political structures of rule played a large role in the expansion and transregional institutionalization of freemasonry. This holds true for the nation-states and, as recent research has shown, perhaps even more so for large-scale political entities such as empires. These imperial dimensions intersect with the aforementioned factors, since in many cases empires provided the framework for these different forms of mobility and military expansion.

III. Different Scales of Analysis

A lodge, the basic unit of freemasonry, was simultaneously embedded in several contexts of differing scale. First, the lodge was an essential feature of local public life, organizing a segment — in most cases the notables and primi inter pares — of local society. Second, the lodge was integrated into an “obedience,” an institutional network orchestrated around a — regionally and/or nationally defined — grand lodge. Third, the lodge was part of a large-scale intercontinental, if not global network that was institutionally stabilized and underpinned by an ideology of cosmopolitan fraternalism. Given how intrinsically these three dimensions are interrelated, it is astonishing that until very recently scholars have taken little notice of freemasonry’s cross-border and large-scale dimensions.

Though one of the most eminent historians of freemasonry, Robert F. Gould, had already in the late nineteenth century described it as a phenomenon of global reach, subsequent generations of academic and nonacademic scholars have almost invariably privileged a local, regional, or national scale of analysis. Thus, for instance, there has been no systematic research on the close connection

27 Harland-Jacobs, Builders.
between migration, migrant cultures, and freemasonry, with the notable exception of Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire’s groundbreaking study on eighteenth-century France. Although Beaurepaire’s work pointed to the necessity of reassessing the role of “foreigners” in “national” freemasonry, it does not seem to have stimulated comparable studies for other countries. This also holds true for the U.S. context, in which the colonial origins of freemasonry and its intrinsic connections to migration are obvious. Yet, although the study of freemasonry and of fraternalism as a whole in the United States has been a vibrant field of innovative scholarship over the past two decades, it has remained largely encased in a national framework and has devoted only passing interest to its transnational or transatlantic entanglements. Histories of freemasonry in North America represent its colonial origins predominantly as a negative foil for freemasonry’s national self-assertion and Americanization. Likewise, while studies have scrutinized the masonic life in many European or non-European port cities, they have, until very recently, been only moderately interested in its fundamental overseas connections.

There are several reasons for the neglect of freemasonry’s large-scale dimensions. First, institutional history is significant for a field of research that tends to draw to a large extent on institutional archives. As a matter of fact, from the end of the eighteenth century on, the nation-state became the predominant organizational framework of freemasonry. Starting in continental Europe and then spreading to the imperial and non-imperial world, existing or emerging grand lodges increasingly defined and protected spaces of territorial sovereignty that geographically coincided with political boundaries, in most cases those of nation-states. Second, as a reaction to anti-masonic movements, which often nurtured fears of internationalism and world conspiracies, freemasons in Europe and the United States tended to emphasize their patriotism and support of the nation-states and authorities they were subject to. They themselves thus contributed to minimizing the transnational character and global reach of their institution. Third, as a consequence of institutional history, the masonic institutions of research which have emerged in recent years (in Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, for example) still tend to privilege national units of analysis. Finally, it should not be surprising that the (still marginal) topic of freemasonry and sociability has not diverged from the general patterns of academic historiography, which has
until recently prioritized the nation-state over other possible units of analysis.

The recent surge in transnational, entangled, and global history approaches has contributed to a greater awareness of freemasonry’s cross-border dynamics. Entries on freemasonry have been included in some of the recent dictionaries in transnational and world history. Likewise, new dictionaries and handbooks on freemasonry have appeared that endeavor to take comparative, transnational, and global perspectives more seriously. So far, this increasing interest has hardly trickled down to the field of empirical research. Projects and published research engaged explicitly in cross-border sociability have remained scarce. Since the late 1990s, however, some scholars from various backgrounds have broken new ground in the study of cross-border sociability from a variety of perspectives. These contributions do not only illustrate the new insights that larger scales of analysis can provide for both the study of freemasonry and for transnational, transcultural, or imperial history; they also represent different ways of reframing the topic, even if it is premature to speak of established fields of research. Three of these major areas shall be briefly sketched.

(1) A European perspective: Freemasonry was, first and foremost, a European phenomenon. It emerged out of a European context and saw its most rapid expansion in Europe. Until recently, however, scholars have rarely taken these European dimensions into account. Following Margaret C. Jacob’s pioneering studies, other scholars have started to describe freemasonry on a European scale. While these studies helped to go beyond one particular national context, they have remained in a primarily comparative framework that is less interested in the manifold connections between the cases studied. Against this backdrop, an entangled history of European freemasonry has gradually taken shape, a project put forward in several seminal works by French historian Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire. Building on his studies on the close connection between migration and

35 For a rapid overview over masonic and academic research, with a particular focus on the French context, see Charles Porset, "Masonic Historiography," in Handbook of Freemasonry, ed. Henrik Bogdan and Jan A.M. Snoek (Leiden, 2014), 117-35.


38 A different way to distinguish perspectives is provided by Harland-Jacobs, “Worlds of Brothers.”


Freemasonry in France and drawing on unexploited sources outside the institutional archives (especially ego-documents), Beaurepaire has, over the years, shed light on the driving forces, dynamics, and patterns of freemasonry’s transnational expansion in Europe and its gradual and protracted institutionalization as a Pan-European sphere of interaction. His studies constitute an important argument for a better integration of masonic history into the “general” history of Europe. Freemasonry’s close relation to mobility and to certain mobile groups (diplomats, merchants, migrants, as well as prisoners of war), and its interaction with networks of correspondence, diplomacy, business, or ethnic groups makes it an important feature of an entangled socio-cultural history of Europe since the eighteenth century. Although Beaurepaire’s studies were mainly focused on the eighteenth century and the Francophone sphere, they demonstrate the promising new perspectives and insights that a European scale of analysis provides, both for the history of cross-border sociability and an integrated European history in general.  

(2) An intercultural perspective: Freemasonry did not remain a European organization alone. Academic research has become increasingly interested in its early boom in the European borderlands, especially in the broader Mediterranean basin. In fact, lodges flourished not only on the Euro-Mediterranean coast, but also in the Levant, the Middle East, and North Africa — areas that were mostly part of the Ottoman Empire until the early twentieth century. While many of the early lodges in these regions were founded and populated by European migrants, traders, diplomats or colonists, scholars have highlighted the fact that throughout the nineteenth freemasonry enjoyed increasing popularity among certain segments of local — and to a large extent Muslim — societies. The most important contributions to an understanding of non-European, “native” freemasonry in the Middle East and North Africa have come from French academics, notably from political scientist Bruno Etienne and historian Thierry Zarcone. While these two scholars have engaged with different aspects and areas — Etienne with the question of the adherence of Emir Abd al-Qadir (1808-83), the most prominent leader of the anticolonial resistance in nineteenth-century Algeria, and Zarcone with masonic or para-masonic societies throughout the Ottoman Empire and Iran — both have described freemasonry as an object and arena of cross-cultural appropriations, encounters, and transfers. Zarcone, especially, has pointed to the various structural and ideological affinities and interactions between


secular fraternities and certain religious (especially Sufi) brotherhoods, a phenomenon that historian Maurice Agulhon had already discovered in the radically different Catholic context of Southern France. Less concerned with aspects of mobility than the European approach, the studies by Etienne, Zarcone, and an increasing number of other researchers emphasize the role of freemasonry and comparable structures of sociability for intercultural relations and transfers in borderland contexts.

(3) An imperial perspective: The Mediterranean context points to the significance of colonialism for the development of cross-border sociability. Empires were among the most important structures in which masonic sociability expanded and flourished on a global scale. While the importance of intra-imperial fraternal networks has been recognized since the 1970s, scholars have only recently begun to discover empires as a valuable unit of analysis for research into freemasonry and other fraternal organizations. Thanks to historian Jessica Harland-Jacobs, the British case is by far the best studied. Covering two centuries and a wide range of different regions, Harland-Jacobs’ path-breaking study analyzes the complex interplay between the British Empire and freemasonry since the 1720s. In fact, British overseas rule and the various forms of mobility it entailed did not only constitute a main mechanism of freemasonry’s global expansion; the brotherhood also provided a flexible social infrastructure for hierarchies, alliances, and conflicts over religion, political affiliation, social advancement, race, nationality, and ethnicity on an intercontinental scale. Although Harland-Jacobs alludes to the potential of subversive uses, she emphasizes the various social, moral, emotional, spiritual, material, and ideological functions that made freemasonry an imperial institution par excellence. Similar to the two other perspectives, these recent scholarly achievements have opened up broad and largely unknown horizons. French and Dutch imperial freemasonries still lack comparable scholarship, however, as do several important subtopics (including for the British

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47 See especially Harland-Jacobs, *Builders.*
Empire), such as the development of freemasonry outside of white settler colonies, dysfunctional or subversive uses, and inter- or trans-imperial dynamics.

The three perspectives sketched here pose a major challenge to the predominant way of analyzing the history of freemasonry, and fraternalism as a whole, in a national or sub-national framework. With varying foci, they propose radically different units of analysis and promising new ways of bringing the large-scale and cross-border dimensions into the history of sociability. Their results are highly relevant for our understanding of national and local freemasonries and will necessarily influence their study. Thus, to name but one example, the British Empire was a major arena in which the rivalry between the two English grand lodges was played out and was a significant factor in the rivalry’s outcome. To be sure, large-scale and cross-border units of analysis cannot simply supersede previous national or local ones. As holds true for other fields of historical research, local, national or transnational approaches, micro- and macro-perspectives, local prosopography and translocal network analysis must be seen as complementary. The study of cross-border sociability can benefit to a great extent from the results and the methodological finesse of research conducted on a local or national scale.

IV. Atlantic Perspectives

Against this historiographical background, we return to the masonic lodges in Saint-Domingue and other Caribbean islands, with which this essay began. What would be the best perspective for studying them? At first sight, the imperial perspective may appear to be the most natural and most appropriate approach. Most (though not all) of the lodges found in the West Indian colonies were indeed affiliated with grand lodges in their respective colonial metropoles in Europe, and most of them were dominated by nationals from these metropoles. Vieux’s short-lived lodge in Léogane would then appear as a product of French imperial freemasonry, just as the numerous lodges in Jamaica or Barbados would figure as part of British imperial freemasonry. But how would such an approach account for the fact that many of Saint-Domingue’s lodges, in the midst of the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804), affiliated with a relatively new player — the Grand Lodge of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia; and for the fact that, after Haitian independence, many of these lodges were reestablished in the United States or other West Indian islands such as Cuba?


50 See, on (parts of) these lodges, Agnès Renault, D’ une île rebelle à une île fidèle: Les Français de Santiago de Cuba (1791-1825) (Mont-Saint-Aignan, 2012), 304-19.
that later on many of these lodges could be found on the East Coast of the United States, and Louisiana in particular? Such facts, I would argue, call for an “Atlanticist” perspective; that is, a perspective that takes into account the manifold interactions and connections within the Atlantic basin.

Since the 1980s at the latest, Atlantic history has become a booming field of historical research, especially for the period from the European discovery of the Americas until the early nineteenth century. Scholars in Atlantic history consider the Atlantic Ocean a heterogeneous zone of interaction between the Americas, Europe, and Africa that was shaped and integrated by various economic, cultural, social, political, intellectual, and environmental relations and exchanges. Their research sheds light on the various mobile groups and their networks (of seaman, pirates, merchants, but also of slaves and other forced migrants), on cultural transfers, on the mobility of ideas, on the emergence of creole identities and on societies that are not confined to one single imperial or national sphere. In practice, there are, to be sure, different ways of writing Atlantic history. Conceptions of “the Atlantic” vary according to the researchers’ focus — whether they concentrate on northern or southern part, or on specific ethnic or religious groups. It also varies according to the way that the “Atlanticist” perspective is put into operation. In an often cited article, David Armitage has distinguished three variations of approach: those studies which take the ocean as the unit of analysis (“circum-Atlantic”); those focused on comparisons (between different places, countries, etc.) within this unit (“trans-Atlantic”); and histories that put a region or country into a wider Atlantic context (“cis-Atlantic”).

Beyond such methodological divisions, Atlantic history’s approaches share some commonalities and differences with the three aforementioned large-scale perspectives on freemasonry. Although Atlantic history deals with (Western) European history, it stresses the intra-European entanglements much less than the transoceanic connections of Europe. Likewise, while it is closely related to the history of European overseas empires, Atlantic history does not limit itself to the history of one particular empire. Thus, one of its major advantages is that it brings several empires — with their various interactions, overlaps, and shifting boundaries — into view. Adopting an intercultural perspective, it shares an interest in multicultural borderland situations. Yet, compared to the Mediterranean context,


its story is only partly about the Euro-Christian (colonial) confrontation with existing non-European and non-Christian civilizations; its other part is about the violent creation of neo-European Creole and African-Creole colonial societies.

From the outset, the Atlantic played a major role in the expansion of freemasonry and related fraternal organizations. Parallel to its expansion in Europe, freemasons’ lodges flourished in North America from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. From this time on, the British, French, and Dutch Caribbean colonies turned into major masonic hubs and, starting in the early nineteenth century, freemasonry also became an important social and political factor in the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking parts of the Americas. In sub-Saharan Africa until the end of the nineteenth century, most masonic lodges were clustered along the Atlantic coast and the Cape Colony.

This is not new. Historians of freemasonry have regularly alluded to its transatlantic dimensions, and a dictionary published in 2013 is decidedly transatlantic in scope.53 As Jessica Harland-Jacobs has recently pointed out, “Atlantic history is a necessary approach for understanding many developments in the history of fraternalism; at the same time, the study of fraternalism can shed revealing light on understudied aspects of the Atlantic world.”54 Yet, while some religious fraternities, especially the Jesuits, have started to receive attention from an “Atlanticist” perspective, the prospects of bringing together Atlantic history and the study of freemasonry and other secular fraternities have hardly been spelled out so far.55 There are only few books or edited volumes that cover freemasonry on more than one side of the Atlantic, and those that exist do not use the Atlantic as their unit of analysis. Only few regional studies on freemasonry in the Americas, Europe, or Africa have, at least partly, an Atlantic framing or “cis-Atlantic” approach in accordance with Armitage’s typology.56

The disregard appears to be mutual. Historians of transatlantic migration and trade, consumer cultures, imperial rule or revolutionary

53 Jacob, Living the Enlightenment, 18-19; Beaurepaire, L’Europe, 90-9; Hoffmann, Civil Society, 4, 62; Franc-maçonnerie et politique au siècle des Lumières: Europe-Amériques, ed. Cécile Révauger (Pessac, 2006) (= Lumières 7); Le monde maçonnique des Lumières, ed. Poret and Révauger.


turmoil in the Atlantic world do not devote a great deal of attention to fraternal networks and the worlds of sociability. The lodges are absent from the “Atlantic Enlightenment”; they remain unnoticed in accounts of Atlantic merchants’ networks and culture; they have been of no interest to those studying Sephardic networks throughout the Atlantic world; they play no role in the analysis of refugee movements in the revolutionary Atlantic. In all these cases, I would argue, historians have left aside valuable new research questions, promising insights, and, not least, large amounts of unused source material and data.

Some of the general prospects that a history of freemasonry provides for Atlantic history are rather obvious. The history of freemasonry points to a still largely understudied system of networks along which people moved, got into contact, and interacted with each other over long distances within the Atlantic world. It highlights an important layer in the history of mutual aid, philanthropy, and charity in the Atlantic. Being both essentially local and global, freemasonry constitutes a phenomenon that allows for the combination and reconciliation of the regional, comparative, and circum-Atlantic dimensions of Atlantic history. At the same time, since the Atlantic lodges are woven into a worldwide network, their study can help to counter a criticism often raised against Atlantic history — namely, that its approaches risk artificially isolating the region from its manifold connections with the rest of the world.

Besides these general aspects, several more specific assets and prospects can be pointed out. In fact, the topic lends itself to elaboration and to asking more precise questions that might help us to go beyond the plausible but trivial conclusion that everything was, in the end, interconnected. This requires an approach that does not limit itself to the mere detection of far-reaching connections and entanglements — a tendency that still characterizes a great deal of scholarship in global or new world history. As already stated, raising such questions does not mean rejecting research that is still dominantly framed by the nation-state. As a matter of fact, over the years nationally or regionally framed scholarship on freemasonry, fraternalism, and sociability has developed a variety of perspectives and reached a level of sophistication that has a lot to offer to research in large-scale and cross-border contexts. I will illustrate this by briefly sketching three research questions and perspectives that an Atlantic history of freemasonry could expand on.


1. Atlantic Sociability?

Social historians see one of the most relevant features of freemasonry in a specific form of sociability, that is, the ideal of free, pure, non-purposive conviviality with others. Shielded from the “profane” world, masonic lodges were meant to provide a space for the establishment of emotional bonds and friendship between people who otherwise would have remained strangers. Though such practices of sociability were not confined to one specific social group, they tended to involve primarily the upper classes. The masonic lodges constituted, in other words, an important element in local and cross-border sociability as well as in the integration of — existing or aspiring — elites. Building on this well-established branch of social history, it becomes possible to study the significance, forms, possibilities, and limits of such forms of cross-border sociability in the imperial context of the Atlantic.

An Atlantic perspective brings into focus places and people that tend to remain at the margins of studies framed by the nation-state. Atlantic freemasonry was to a large extent made outside of the political and masonic centers of power in Europe, that is, in Atlantic port cities both in Europe and the Americas. Scholars have only recently become aware of the fact that freemasonry in port cities bore distinctive traits, as the lodges met a growing demand among mobile groups that were involved in and on the move within overseas trade. In this context, they have emphasized the importance of masonic certificates for travelers and of trust built through membership, which was of quintessential importance to commercial contacts over long distances. Lodges in such strategically important borderland contexts tended to defy the “nationalization” of the masonic institution and the claims to territorial sovereignty from ascending national grand lodges by maintaining and extending their own international networks. In the Atlantic context, interactions between European, American, and Caribbean lodges were particularly intense and often followed particular patterns that were beyond the grasp of the political and masonic metropoles, such as London and Paris. Thus, lodges in Bordeaux created numerous lodges in the French Antilles and continued to play a major intermediary role between Caribbean lodges and Paris throughout the eighteenth century. Likewise, an Atlantic perspective brings into view specific groups for which these organizations and networks were of major importance: the civil and military personnel of colonial administration, settlers, seamen, and people involved in overseas trade.
Taken together, the Atlantic lodges enable us to examine how different layers of local, imperial, and transimperial sociability intersected within their network. A brief look at one case may help to illustrate this awkwardly abstract idea: Saint-Domingue in the second half of the eighteenth century, later to become Haiti. As in metropolitan France, freemasonry prospered in the second half of the eighteenth century in the French colonial sphere. In some parts of the Caribbean, notably in Saint-Domingue, an extraordinary density of lodges — even by Western European standards — developed, shaping the social life of the coastal towns in particular.\textsuperscript{66} With certain variations, the lodges brought together aristocratic planters or their local agents, military and civil representatives from the metropole, urban creoles, absentee landlords, and merchants, including slave traders. The aspiring group of free men of color who also sought entrance, however, remained excluded for a long time. The lodges were thus closely connected to the structures and conflicts of Saint-Domingue’s colonial society. Yet — and this would be the second layer, which we may call imperial — they also maintained close ties with lodges in Atlantic port cities, such as Bordeaux and Le Havre, where freemasonry also flourished in the second half of the eighteenth century. Those lodges were, to a large extent, dominated by merchants — including a significant proportion of men involved in the transatlantic slave trade. In the critical period of late 1780s and early 1790s, when debates about the abolition of slavery came to a head in French politics, the lodges in the Antilles and in Atlantic port cities formed an important imperialist and pro-slavery lobby within French freemasonry.\textsuperscript{67} At the same time — and this would be a third layer — the lodges in Saint-Domingue functioned as important platforms of a transatlantic community that formed itself beyond state and imperial borders and organized itself in the Antilles, just as in American and European port cities. Thus, some of the lodges included large proportions of non-French members and kept up connections with other lodges in the Americas outside the French imperial sphere.

Freemasonry should not be seen as another cohesive and self-contained segment of the Atlantic world along the lines of a “Black Atlantic” or a White, Green, Catholic, Protestant, Native American, Iberian or German Atlantic. Instead, the study of Atlantic freemasonry can help to counter the “balkanization” of Atlantic history into multiple sub-Atlantics.\textsuperscript{68} Due to its ductile nature — its “plasticity,”\textsuperscript{69} as some have termed it — masonic sociability associated with other connections and relationships, be they based on kinship, religious,
political, or professional solidarity, or on national origin. Lodges thus seem to have been of particular importance for diverse groups within the Atlantic world: for certain diasporas (such as the Sephardic Jewish diaspora in the British and Dutch Caribbean), within the armies, and for certain professional groups, all of whom used the masonic network to reinforce their group solidarity and cohesion over long distances. Studying freemasonry in this context may help us to gain a better and more complex image of the Atlantic as a world organized in several overlapping networks, instead of in adjacent, monolithic blocs.

2. Cosmopolitanism, Colonialism, and Slavery

I have already referred to the decidedly cosmopolitan attitude that freemasons cultivated. Notwithstanding certain regional and national variations, freemasonry embraced prominent cosmopolitan elements of Enlightenment thinking early on. With the support of the brotherhood, their members were supposed to be “strangers nowhere in the world,” to take on Denis Diderot’s famous 1751 definition of cosmopolitanism.70 Masonic cosmopolitanism was based on ideals of inclusiveness and tolerance, on the belief in the unity of mankind, and on a sense of “world citizenship” (Weltbürgertum).71 Seen against the backdrop of its cosmopolitan declaration of faith, freemasonry sought to form a “universal family tied together by affection.”72

Masonic cosmopolitanism was without doubt one of the driving forces behind the global expansion of freemasonry. Yet, at the same time, its rapid expansion posed serious challenges to its practice of cosmopolitanism. As freemasonry spread throughout Europe and beyond, it became an urgent matter for freemasons to define who the members of their “universal family” would be, who its citizens were, and where the borders of the cosmos they would inhabit would be drawn. Thus, in practice, the freemasons’ cosmopolitanism did not necessarily make them agents of a radical “secularization” or internationalism. Despite their notorious conflicts with the Roman Catholic Church and with officials of other dominations, leading eighteenth-century members tended to anchor freemasonry, to varying degrees, in Christian values and traditions.73 Already Anderson’s Constitution of 1723 sought to bar the way to a radical form of internationalism by stressing that a freemason “is a peaceable Subject to the Civil Powers, wherever he resides or works, and is never to be concern’d in Plots and Conspiracies against the Peace and Welfare of the Nation.”74
Against this backdrop, the history of globalizing freemasonry (and other fraternities) was from the very beginning marked by a fundamental tension between an ostensibly inclusive ideology and exclusive membership practices. Already in the European context, masonic cosmopolitanism stood in conflict with several forms of exclusion: generally, women were excluded from the brotherhood; in many countries Jews, in some cases Catholics, and almost everywhere the lower classes were excluded as well. Yet, the real litmus test for masonic cosmopolitanism came with the lodges’ expansion overseas. Here, freemasonry experienced other cultural and social differences, which led to new mechanisms of exclusion and distinction from non-Christians and non-Europeans. The masonic tension between universal claims and exclusive practices was thus not just a characteristic of European bourgeois culture, as some have suggested. It also fit in easily with one of the basic mechanisms of imperial rule: the tension between universalist incorporation and differentiation.

An Atlantic perspective thus sheds new light on the masonic “politics of difference” and its interaction with non-masonic hierarchies and forms of exclusion. The Atlantic lodges started as places of sociability for the “white” Atlantic of Creoles and migrants of European origin. Lodges in North America and the West Indies alike followed patterns of racial segregation by vigorously opposing the admission of people of color. However, and at the same time, the lodges’ claims to universalism attracted free men of color, ex-slaves, and colonized people, who demanded to be allowed to take part in freemasonry.

Moreover, opposition to the existing forms of exclusion came not only from the groups that were being excluded, but also from within freemasonry. Freemasons in the metropoles and colonies regularly clashed about how to deal with excluded groups, such as persons of color or polytheists. Taking these embattled boundaries of sociability as its starting point, an Atlantic history of freemasonry promises new insights into the complex relationship between imperial rule and cosmopolitanism — both as ideology and social practice — during the Age of Enlightenment. The coherence of the masonic network provides a vast field for the study and comparison of different forms and mechanisms of exclusion, both in the colonies and in the metropoles, and of the complex interactions between imperial culture overseas and civic culture in Europe. The Atlantic perspective can help to extend this comparison beyond the borders of one empire. More than anything, it also points to the institutions of slavery and the slave trade, and the complicated relationship freemasonry maintained with them.

75 On women and Jews, see especially Jacob, Living the Enlightenment, 120-42; Jacob Katz, Jews and Freemasons in Europe, 1723-1939 (Cambridge, MA, 1970).
3. An Infrastructure for Transfers?

The masonic lodges are generally regarded as one basic element of the nascent public sphere in eighteenth-century Europe. According to Jürgen Habermas’ classic study, forms of informal sociability, as practiced by masonic lodges and other private clubs, served as fertile ground for the emergence of a bourgeois “public sphere,” in which ideas would be subject to open, non-hierarchical, and rational debate.⁷⁹ Even if intellectual exchange was not the lodges’ primary and original purpose, they provided a platform and an infrastructure that brought people into contact and exchange. Books, ideas, and concepts circulated within their network.

An Atlantic perspective on freemasonry sets out to explore to what extent this also applied to the Atlantic world. In fact, the eighteenth-century Atlantic emerged as one of the main spaces of interaction for freemasons. Thus, in masonic history, the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Atlantic was a particularly dynamic area of institutional change and fragmentation that gave rise to the creation of new systems, such as independent grand lodge networks.⁸⁰ The Atlantic Ocean was the main breeding ground for what became the most widespread masonic rite in the world, the “Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite,” a high degree system which took shape in various interactions between Western Europe, the West Indies, and the U.S. East Coast. Brought to Saint-Domingue by a French trader from Bordeaux, Etienne Morin, in the 1740s, the “high degrees” flourished in the Antilles, before coming — via Jamaica — to the United States, where they received their definite systematic form.⁸¹ Yet, the lodges’ function as an infrastructure for transfers and exchanges (of all kinds) went well beyond the confines of inner-masonic history. As historian David Shields and others have pointed out, freemasonry and other sociable associations played a major role in the formation of a polite (male, white) public sphere in colonial British America.⁸² Moreover, in the eighteenth-century Antilles, numerous links can be found between lodges and local learned societies that saw themselves as part of the universal Republic of Letters.⁸³

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A classic, though still intriguing question is to what extent the lodges, whether intentionally or unintentionally, enhanced the transfer of ideas and organizational forms that contradicted or subverted existing political structures. From an “Atlanticist” point of view in the context of colonialism and slavery, we have to ask whether opponents of imperial rule and anti-slavery activists also used the lodges to organize themselves. Much like in the European context, this question cannot be easily answered. As already stated, the Atlantic lodge system was deeply entrenched in the structures of colonial societies and the slave trade. However, it also attracted actors and groups who called into question existing structures. This holds particularly true for the transatlantic revolutionary complex around 1800: throughout the Atlantic, freemasonry attracted not only colonial elites, but also the aspiring middle classes in British North America — most notably in the case of New England — who considered masonic lodges as places for the construction of a (post-) revolutionary social order. The lodges also attracted free men of color throughout the Americas who strove for social respectability and political equality. Lodges in continental Europe provided support for their revolutionary brethren in North America, and freemasons in Jamaica helped set up overtly revolutionary lodges in Central and South America. Yet, masonic lodges were also of major significance for antirevolutionary refugees and exiles from British America, Europe, and the West Indies. So far, the connections between freemasonry and the American and French Revolutions have been analyzed separately; an Atlantic perspective will allow us to examine the role of the masonic networks in connecting the different arenas of the revolutionary Atlantic, including the use of these networks by both revolutionary activists and their adversaries, many of whom crisscrossed the Atlantic Ocean between the United States, Europe, and the Caribbean.

**Conclusion**

The short episode of the lodge in Léogane in 1740 discussed at the beginning of this essay has provided a first glimpse into a vast world of fraternal sociability that expanded throughout the Atlantic world in the following decades. This lodge and the reactions to it also give us a sense of the significance — positive or negative — that historical actors attached to the issues of sociability and freemasonry. This significance stands in sharp contrast to the relative indifference of later generations of historians of the Atlantic world. In neglecting

85 See the classic study by Bullock, Revolutionary Brotherhood.
87 Beaurepaire, L’Autre et le Frère, 607-30; a classic study on the revolutionary lodges in Central and South America is Américo Carnicelli, La Masonería en la Independencia de América (1810-1830), 2 vols. (Bogotá, 1970).
88 Harland-Jacobs, Builders, 112-19; Nathalie Dessens, From Saint-Domingue to New Orleans: Migration and Influences (Gainesville, 2007), 145-47.
this topic, historians have not only missed out on promising new insights, but have ignored an important facet of the historical actors’ everyday life and experience. In fact, masonic and other fraternal organizations were ubiquitous throughout the different Atlantic empires and emerging nations of the Atlantic world; they were closely intertwined with all kinds of voluntary and involuntary mobility in the Atlantic; they were a central feature of Atlantic port cities in Europe, the Americas, West Africa, and the Caribbean; they intersected with various professional, political, ethnic, or religious networks stretching across the ocean; and they played a prominent role in the turmoil of Atlantic revolutions, wars, and the struggles over slavery and its abolition. Against this backdrop, we need to inquire how and to what extent the Atlantic world was shaped and integrated by freemasonry and other forms of fraternal sociability, and how, in turn, fraternalism and sociability was shaped by the Atlantic world.

As this essay has argued, bringing the histories of sociability and Atlantic history together will be beneficial for both fields of research. Taking up a classic topic of social history, the study of cross-border sociability can contribute to the emerging field of a global or transnational social history, which needs to be more than a history of migration and mobility. As other scholars have started to demonstrate for other cases, the study of sociability and fraternalism in cross-border and large-scale contexts opens up new perspectives and new research questions. Research concepts and methodologies that have so far been applied mainly on a national or regional scale reveal themselves in a new light and generate new insights. As I have sought to demonstrate, the history of “Atlantic sociability” consists of several intersecting histories: a history of many thousands of people seeking to cultivate kinship-like ties and a specific form of sociability across continental boundaries; a history of power structures and exclusion, which were in constant conflict with a utopian universalism; and a history of the exchange and appropriation of ideas that could, at times, challenge existing political and social structures. Numerous further perspectives on “Atlantic sociability” will be fruitful: the Atlantic lodge networks can tell us a lot about the shaping and large-scale transmission of gender norms, about the management of emotions and friendship across long distances and cultural boundaries, and about the globalization of anti-masonry and conspiracy theories, to name but a few possible topics. Finally, the obvious limits of Atlantic masonic “brothering” — forms of exclusion and sectarianism, schism, and new borders — should also urge us to
think more about the limits of expansion, about ruptures, and about processes of disconnection at a time when “connectivity” seems to be becoming our fetish.

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In this paper I would like to consider how African American missionaries in Africa altered notions of sex and family relations in the first decades of the twentieth century. My goal will be to suggest where a reassessment of the African American mission and its meaning in the context of the history of black Atlantic emancipation and pan-Africanism could begin. Present studies think through the mission and its impact from the perspective of the relations between black communities and their white oppressors in the Atlantic world. In this view, African American missionaries made a "significant contribution to a growing awareness of pan-Africanism among ordinary black people in the United States well before the rise of Garveyism and the Harlem Renaissance" — the two most important Africa-centered movements of the interwar years.

Not much attention is given to the African American mission from the point of view of the colonial encounter of which it was part in Africa, despite the fact that it was precisely the European colonization of Africa in the late nineteenth century that sparked new waves of pan-African protest and identity. Scholars consider the impact of black American missionaries in Africa "somewhat illusive" and by extension mostly negligible where it was not directly related to the rise of black international movements and the resistance to global white supremacy, which characterized the twentieth century as the century of the color line.

Adrian Hastings, the eminent scholar of African Christianity, for instance, describes black American missionaries in Africa as “never very numerous” and “mostly too immersed in the Westernizing orientation of the main American missions to offer any distinctive message.” Why African American missionaries were drawn to go to colonial Africa and how they defined relations of race and power in the spheres of sex and family relations — the core arenas of both colonial power and black Atlantic solidarity — deserves much more investigation.

This paper will only suggest a direction to take in answering these and related questions. As I hope to show, the travel writing of African American missionaries in Africa altered both the colonial and the pan-African discourse about the relationship between...
African Americans and Africa, mostly by altering dominant assumptions about what the markers of sameness and difference were in the intimate domains of home, sex, and family. By the turn of the twentieth century, the travelogues of a handful of African American Africa missionaries returning from their sojourns overseas had made the African American colonial experience the starting point of renegotiations of notions of home and foreign, gender roles, and family structures that were prevalent in the black American community and its response to the colonization of the presumed motherland, Africa. While scholarship unanimously endorses the view that African American missionaries were never very numerous, contemporaries could not easily ignore their dominance in maintaining transatlantic connections, precisely because they shared this function, at least to some extent, with pan-African agitators in the United States. As I will argue, black missionaries represented an approach to black self-determination that had a strong focus on the intimate sphere and that thus was much more genuine than what research on pan-Africanism commonly acknowledges. The problems and potentialities that African American missionaries saw in relationships to colonial Africa were premised upon the new notions of home, sex, and family relations that they developed from their colonial encounters. Although these notions were quite different from those that pan-Africanists proposed, they were no less culturally profound.

I. Sex in Colonial Africa

In 1884 and 1885, Africa was partitioned and then formally colonized by European powers. The continent was the last geographical, but not the last imperial frontier that was there for the “West” to move forward. With millions of new African colonial subjects and very few colonial officials to oversee their disposal, Europeans began an eager search for governmental strategies that protected white supremacy. Manipulating the conduct of African women in order to move them away from fieldwork and polygamous families towards Western role models of housewives and mothers was one such strategy. According to a confidential government report of Sierra Leone, the British considered assigning women this new “role” as essential to exercising colonial control. “There is a great possibility,” the report argued, “that any system . . . capable of influencing and moulding the girlhood . . . is likely the soonest to substantially influence the general population.” In addition to restructuring African families and gender roles, another important part of expanding colonial rule into...
the realm of intimacy was to draw the color line, the social segrega-
tion of the races around the globe, in people’s bedrooms. As Ann
Lora Stoler argues, colonial administrators took “sexual relations”
and “familiarity” as signs of what was racially “innermost,” locating
intimacies such as sexual desires, and forms of cohabitation, mar-
rriage, and childrearing strategically in imperial politics.10 Sexual
habits and personas in the metropole as well as the colonies were
thus strongly charged with notions of colonial otherness and West-
ern civilization, and ritually constructed in the service of imperial
structures of race and white supremacy.11

One of the very few African Americans who encountered colonial
Africa as a Christian missionary while such measures were underway
was a man called Charles Spencer Smith. Smith was born in a town
somewhere near Toronto in 1852, a time when many fugitive slaves
from the American South were seeking refuge in Canada from op-
pression and exploitation. Smith’s childhood and youth were marked
by privileges that blacks were entitled to only if they lived outside
of Jim Crow America and the colonial empires: he received a school
education and absolved an apprenticeship in furniture finishing.
These benefits of living, however, did not succeed in keeping Smith
north of the color line.12 At the age of fourteen, shortly after the Civil
War, he moved to the United States to try his fortunes as a utility boy
in Buffalo, as a deck hand and assistance cook on boats in the Great
Lakes region, and as a lumber trader in Detroit. He also worked in
hotels when the winter made outdoor work on boats and in forests
less pleasant. After a while, Smith decided to go south, where the
abolition of slavery and the racially liberal reconstruction period that
followed promised to offer unprecedented opportunities for men like
him to pursue more distinguished careers. Due to his education,
Smith could work as a teacher and held several short assignments in
schools in Kentucky and Mississippi. Although Smith was climbing
up the social ladder, none of these jobs seemed to bring him where
he wanted to go. His search for new frontiers coincided in his early
twenties with his conversion to Christianity. In 1870, he became a
member of the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME), the emi-
nent independent black institution of the day.

The AME Church had existed since 1816, and had guided many
blacks — enslaved and free — towards better prospects in life, through
inculcating religious values and lifestyles and through offering educa-
tion. The same was true for Smith, who was licensed to preach one

10  Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal
Knowledge and Imperial
Power: Race and the
Intimate in Colonial Rule
(Berkeley, 2010), 9.

11  Greg Thomas, The Sexual
Demon of Colonial Power:
Pan-African Embodiment
and Erotic Schemes of
Empire (Bloomington,
2007), 2. On the domes-
tic dimension of colo-
nialism see, for instance,
Anne McClintock, Impe-
rial Leather: Race, Gender,
and Sexuality in the Colo-
nial Contest (New York,
1995).

12  Sarah-Jane Mathieu,
North of the Color Line:
Migration and Black Resis-
tance in Canada, 1870–
1955 (Chapel Hill, 2010).
year after his conversion, in 1871, and who eagerly performed a host of new responsibilities thereafter. He presided over several congregations in Alabama, represented his church at important political events of the burgeoning civil rights movement, served as a representative in the State Legislature of Alabama, and even left the church for a few years to go to college and study medicine. In 1882, when Smith rejoined the AME Church, his previously vague yet restless ambition to move and learn had gained a focus: instead of simply teaching, he strove to develop the knowledge base and instruction materials that were to be used in classes. To this end, he proposed the plan to organize the Sunday School Union, a new AME Church institution dedicated to producing the first self-made black study materials for youngsters. The AME Church approved the idea in 1884, the founding year of the Sunday School Union, and appointed Smith as its first secretary and treasurer. In this role, Smith erected the Union’s new headquarters in Public Square in Nashville, and worked to garner financial support by introducing an annual Children’s Day to the AME Church congregation, an event which took the specific interests of youngsters into consideration. During the formative period of the Union, Smith married his second wife, Christine Shoemaker Smith. While their marriage did not produce any children, Christine shared his ambition to build the AME Church’s education and served the Union as Smith’s assistant manager.13

Africa had not played a pivotal role in Smith’s ambitions. The valorizing idea that the continent was the “Land of the Forefathers” was a vague backdrop to his career, just as much as the condescending notion of Africa as the “Dark Continent,” a term European explorers used in their literature.14 In 1884 and 1885, the years when the Congo Conference convened in Berlin, however, both of these images were transformed. The partitioning of Africa among European colonial powers ended not only decades of imperial scramble but also longstanding fantasies of Africa as the last resort to which blacks dispersed around the world could return to to live self-determined and in freedom.15

Smith reflected upon this problem in his first account, Glimpses of Africa, which was published to serve as teaching material by the AME Sunday School Union in 1895.16 In this volume, he wrote that his attention for Africa was first raised by a book called The Negro Problem Solved.17 Smith explained that he had read it in 1874, when he was working for the Alabama State Legislature, and that its argument

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14 The phrase was coined by Henry Morton Stanley’s Through the Dark Continent (London, 1878).
16 Charles Spencer Smith, Glimpses of Africa: West and South West Coast Containing the Author’s Impression and Observations During a Voyage of Six Thousand Miles from Sierra Leone to St. Paul de Loanda, and Return Including the Rio del Ray and Camerons Rivers, and the Congo River from Its Mouth to Matadi (Nashville, 1895).
17 Hollis Read, The Negro Problem Solved: Or, Africa as She Was, as She Is, and as She Shall Be: Her Curse and Her Cure (New York, 1864).
that Africa was evolving towards Western civilization convinced him that Africa’s “ultimate redemption and development” was coming into view. More vigorously than by prospects of return, however, his interest in Africa was stirred by the fact that European powers were encroaching on the continent. About the Berlin conference of 1884 and 1885, he remarked: “[w]hen representatives of the various European Powers . . . had reached an agreement on matters pertaining to the partitioning of Africa, it became a question in my mind as to whether division necessarily implied possession — i.e., whether the partitioning of Africa was not a scheme on paper, rather than an actuality.”

Smith’s question was unusual if considered in the context of his African American peers. Representatives of his church had either engaged in efforts to deny any relationship to Africa, which the church’s name may have easily suggested, in order to avoid evoking negative stereotypes. Or, they attempted to encourage African Americans to leave. The AME Bishop, race leader, and pan-Africanist Henry McNeal Turner, for instance, strongly encouraged African Americans to emigrate. As he proclaimed, to the great discomfort of his church, he did not see a “manhood future in the United States for the Negro” and nothing he would “see or hear” about Africa would change this conviction. His stubbornness was mocked by the Indianapolis Freeman, the first illustrated black newspaper in the United States, in 1907. In a cartoon titled “Some Things Overlooked,” the paper showed Turner in a boat headed towards a continent filled by wild jungles and heavily armed colonial powers and commented: “The Bishop Undoubtedly Forgets that the Dark Continent is Well Occupied.” (See Figure 1)

19 Ibid., 50.
Writing much earlier than that, Smith’s question about the actuality of the colonization of Africa was less catchy than that of Turner and other pan-Africanists. In his Glimpses of Africa, he offered what he called “genuine impressions and observations” of Africa, as gathered by himself during a 147 day-long voyage along the “West and Southwest Coast . . . from Sierra Leone to St. Paul de Loanda . . . Including the Rio del Ray and Cameroons Rivers, and the Congo River from its Mouth to Matadi.”22 Undertaken in 1894, the cruise brought Smith to Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cameroon, the Congo, and Angola, all of which had recently come under colonial rule by powers as various as Britain, the United States, Germany, Belgium, and Portugal. His travel notes were not a projection of dreams about an ancient fatherland or a political agenda of emigration. They were a meticulous report of the misconceptions of Africa that he had adopted from the prevalent cultural productions of the United States and of confusions and uncertainties that resulted from these misconceptions when he finally experienced his own colonial encounter. In his prefatory statement, Smith powerfully rejected both the authority of all kinds of Western book knowledge and the related visions of the bearing Africa was to have in African Americans’ life and future. His somewhat poetic opening paragraph stated:

“To see Africa from America is one thing;  
To see Africa through books and magazines is one thing;  
To see Africa through reports and hearsay is one thing;  
To see Africa through dreams and visions is one thing;  
But to see Africa in Africa is another thing.”

The page continued with Smith’s admission that he was no exception. “I do not regard any remark or comment necessary, other than to say that I frankly confess to error of judgment, the result of seeing Africa from afar.”23

Smith’s claim for on-site presence as being absolutely essential to be able to know Africa, and, by extension, for this on-site presence being the distinguishing feature of his own account, framed his analysis. Carefully avoiding the notion that he was pursuing politically motivated aims with his trip, he listed among his “inducing causes” that he indeed wanted to “see Africa” but that this seeing involved accounting for his awareness of the colonial process. Accordingly, he enumerated that he was expecting to see what “the European is doing there” and “what the African himself is doing,” and explained

22 Smith, Glimpses, cover page.  
23 Ibid., 21.
that he wanted to “gain knowledge” of missionary operations, make “meteorological observations,” and assess opportunities for employment for “industrious young Americans of African descent.”

While sex and family relations were not among his predefined interests, the account quickly reveals that he could not forgo observing them. The first mention of the topic occurred in a section Smith called the “African in Africa,” in which he discussed the impact of Anglo-Saxon civilization on the indigenous population. Smith soberly presented indications of the dynamics of the colonizing process between rulers and ruled, and, while acknowledging that this dynamic involved a transmission of civilization, he avoided idealizing the process by also including its downsides. The “African is a keen observer,” Smith noted, and regretted finding Africans stealing, robbing, and cheating just as the white man did, all of which showed that the African “naturally followed suit.”

This observation was then further exemplified by an analysis of sexual habits. Smith wrote: “He [the African] found the white man lusted after many women” and underscored his disregard for the practice by stating that Europeans pursued “even the disfigured, tattooed, heathenish, fetish worshipping African women.” While condemning European sex drives, Smith did not condemn Africans for exhibiting the same desires. In view of Europeans’ sexual habits, Smith noted, the African was “reassured of the eminent correctness and propriety of his own long established custom of a plurality of wives.” Smith’s discussion of the virtues and vices of polygamous sexual conduct then turned into an analysis of sameness and difference between rulers and ruled. “The point of difference between the African and the European,” Smith argued, “is that the former has many wives and no concubines; but a large number of the latter have one wife and several concubines. The African, seemingly, is wholly innocent of any wrong in the practices of polygamy.”

Smith’s notion of polygamy as an African custom revealed his hankering to grant Africans a superior civilization, even though he did not deny monogamy as a morality he would favor. The absence of “concubines,” the term then used to refer to extramarital sexual partners, restored the virtue of Africans in relation to their own moral systems and intimated that Europeans did not honor their Western Christian ethics to the same extent. In this way, Smith reversed the hierarchy of the races that had been long constructed by natural science,
and according to which Europeans were the most advanced race in human evolution, whereas Africans were the lowest.\(^26\) Although he challenged this perspective, Smith did not challenge the related stereotype of the “Dark Continent.” With his remark on the “disfigured, tattooed, heathenish, fetish worshipping African women,” he retained the image of backwardness and exoticness for females and confined his argument about Africans’ moral superiority to men.\(^37\)

Indeed, Smith used African women on a number of occasions in his description to demarcate where civilization — whether Anglo-Saxon or African — had its ultimate limits. Upon visiting an exhibition on the Congo, Smith noted that Congolese girls received a great deal of attention, as they were “disfigured by tribal marks” and ready to gratify male spectators’ curiosity “for a kiss” in public.\(^28\) In a similar way, Smith denigrated a local practice of tattooing that was common among the Dwalla tribe in Cameroon, for it rendered their women “very unattractive.”\(^29\) But Smith also knew of contrary examples. The “handsomest women on the West and Southwest Coast,” Smith lectured, could be found in French Gaboon. He presented them as noted “far and near” for their regular features, long hair, and smooth skin, yet not without mentioning that they were also known as the most “licentious” women of Africa and therefore “eagerly sought for by traders.”\(^30\)

Whether cast as sex objects or cargo, Smith’s *Glimpses of Africa* asserted that the otherness of African women had not only a strong appeal but also the power to drag men beyond the boundaries of good manners and civilization. For Smith, such transgressions were more acceptable for polygamous Africans than for presumably monogamous Europeans. The origin of all transgressions, however, was indisputable: African women symbolized the eternal lures of a mysterious and dark continent that could not be subdued, but remained poised to take possession of men of all kinds of civilization. (See Figure 2)\(^31\)

Smith’s gendered logic of difference shifted to family relations when he turned to discussing missionary operations. Here Smith noticed that missionaries had difficulties to reach out to the group of Africans he categorized as “uncivilized,” the term he used to designate people who had not yet come under the influence of Anglo-Saxon civilization. According to Smith, “uncivilized Africans” felt “hopelessly distanced by the European.” Smith then analyzed the origin of this divide as related to tribal traditions of childrearing, starting with “certain customs” connected to birth. These involved “the binding around

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\(^{27}\) Smith, *Glimpses*, 73.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 155.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 185.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 199.

\(^{31}\) On the sexual norms that characterize the construction of the bourgeois white European subject, see Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, 1995).
the body of every new-born infant a
cord . . . to which are
fastened the bones
and teeth of certain
wild animals, which
are regarded as a
sort of charm to pre-
serve the health and
life of the child; the
handing over of ev-
ery new-born infant
to a native priest or
medicine man to
tell its fortune; the
interdicting to every
person at their birth
some article of food
which they are not
through life . . . to put in their mouth.” Drawing on stereotypes of
heathenism and superstition, Smith interpreted the body of the new-
born child as dwelling in “the realms where the imagination alone can
travel” and designated this space as the site where the African feels
“at home.”32 The description powerfully undermined the pan-African
idea that African Americans could find their roots and prospects on
the continent. Instead, Smith expanded the notion that the home
of “uncivilized” and hence authentic Africans was elsewhere, in a
world of imaginations that rational and educated, “civilized” black
subjects could not go to.

Smith’s rejection of the concepts of home that he observed among
Africans became more explicit when he discussed the strategies
of “civilizing” that were applied by missionaries. At the core of
their vision was the attempt to transplant youngsters from “a
world of heathenism” to a “world of enlightenment” by breaking
up African family ties. Smith fully endorsed the approach, arguing
that boys and girls who entered the mission should ideally never
be allowed to return to the “bush,” in hopes that all recollections
of their primitive life would be effaced. The brutality of the sug-
gested procedure indicated that Smith did not, after all, seek to
achieve the protection of any African heritage. To the contrary, he
stated that he hoped that these transplanted Africans would then

again intermarry, found new families, and thus lay the foundation of “civilized homes, hallowed by the blessings of Christian influences.” In his opinion, there was “no other method” that could garner more permanent and beneficial results. At the same time, Smith’s assertion that replacing African with Christian models of marriage and family was inevitable applied to Europeans as well. “Strange as it may seem,” Smith argued, “most Europeans on reaching Africa give themselves up to a life of unbridled lust.” The phenomenon appeared to be due less to Europeans “going native” than to the culture and spirit in which they themselves were raised in the colonial metropole. Unfortunately, Smith added, “many of the young men who go to Africa belong to the vicious classes at home, and are related to people who are bankrupt not only in purse and intelligence, but in morals as well.”

Smith’s *Glimpses of Africa* thus redefined concepts of sex, family, and home based on his colonial encounter, instead of catering to the ideological battlegrounds of colonialists and pan-Africanists. In view of vicious European men, polygamous black men, tattooed and licentious women, and world-enraptured African children, race ceased to make sense as an organizing principle of sameness and difference. In the colonial situation, Smith instead observed degrees of mutual transmission, transgression, and variation. The categories of difference — and possibilities of identity — that he developed pertained to gender roles, sex appeal, Western and African moral systems as well as Christian and African customs of childrearing, and each could encompass Africans and Europeans alike. While Smith was not positive as to whether the reciprocity would be for better or worse in Africa, he clearly conveyed that colonial intimacies were full of tensions. By reporting on those, he invited his African American readers to engage with Africa and its colonization beyond racial solidarity.

**II. Anticolonialism in the Bedroom**

Smith’s *Glimpses of Africa* formed the beginning of what one may call the genre of AME missionary travel writing that grappled with the intimate domain, whether related to concepts of home, sex or family relations. Between 1895 and 1955, many more AME-related authors published recollections of colonial Africa geared to the travelogue genre, as titles such as *Observations of Persons and Things in South Africa, 1900—1904* (1905), *West Africa: An Open Door* (1917), *Dawn in...*
Bantuland: An African Experiment (1953), and Beneath the Southern Cross: The Story of an American Bishop’s Wife in South Africa (1955) suggest. In addition, some of these travelers published autobiographies that placed their sojourns in colonial Africa into broader narratives of their lives. One of these was Levi Jenkin Coppin’s Unwritten History (1919). In the following sections, I will analyze his autobiography in order to exemplify how the new notions of the intimate domains that AME missionaries gained from their colonial encounter altered their perspectives on their own lives and homes in the United States, and therefore departed from the dominant views of pan-Africanism.

Levi Jenkins Coppin was born in 1848 in a Log Cabin in Fredericks Town, Maryland. At the age of seven he moved to Baltimore, and later to Wilmington, Delaware — some of the least hospitable places for blacks in the Union. Unlike Charles Spencer Smith, who could make choices as to what apprenticeships and jobs he pursued in the North, Coppin quickly turned to the AME Church as his sole option. After his mother had taught him how to read, he “studied the scriptures consecutively and constantly year after year” in the local Sunday School, joined AME board meetings, became familiar with their policies and was licensed to preach in 1876 — only a few years after Smith had joined the church much further south.35

Coppin’s path to colonial Africa was paved by the AME Church’s Africa mission. In 1900, he was assigned to the post of the AME resident bishop in Cape Colony and Transvaal by “acclamation.”36 By this time, the AME mission in South Africa had only recently been established. Henry McNeal Turner, who visited Pretoria in 1898, had merged the AME Church with the Ethiopian Church, an African movement for religious independence that caused the British colonial power much distress.37

Like Smith, Coppin had heard much about Africa before he got there. In Unwritten History, he commented on the lecture engagements he took on before his departure in order to collect funds for the work. “Of course the subject of my lectures was: ‘Africa,’ or ‘South Africa,’ or ‘The Dark Continent,’” he assured the reader, thereby implying that there was a story that was both predictable and marketable. Reflecting upon his presentations from the perspective of his actual Africa experience, however, Coppin revealed in his autobiography that his initial views could not be sustained:

35 Wright, Bishops, 146.
36 Ibid., 147.
37 The best study of the merger is Campbell, Songs of Zion.
It is amazing, how much one can say upon a subject that he knows absolutely nothing about. But are there not books upon every imaginable subject? . . . I soon collected a small library on various phases of Africa, its peoples, etc. Those books contained a great deal of information, but most of them contained also many errors. This is such a large, interesting and important subject, that it is difficult for either a white or a colored writer to avoid being influenced by prejudice. The white man sees the African full of faults and deficiencies, which may be true; but certainly not all of the truth: while the colored man, in trying to correct the misrepresentations so apparent, may incline to the opposite extreme.38

The statement defines the complex epistemic frameworks in which AME missionaries developed their own views of Africa. Entering the colonized continent involved discoveries beyond the politicized and thus misleading representations of Africa in historical records that were constructed in service of either white supremacy or pan-African resistance. For Coppin — as for Smith — none of these described what he himself found to be true of Africa. Coppin had already noted as much in an earlier account he wrote about his time in South Africa. Here he explained: “No attempt is made in these brief pages to give a history of South Africa and its cosmopolitan people, but to note some things . . . which the historian . . . would very naturally neglect.”39

In grappling with the impossibility of aligning themselves with contemporary conventions of historical representation, and in digging for what these strategic representations concealed, AME accounts began to look backwards, into their author’s own homes.

Unwritten History is a particularly explicit example of the critical potential of this inverted perspective, even if it does not offer a combative ideology. Coppin’s focus on representing the unwritten transcends the confines of dominant book knowledge and thus gains leverage to place different aspects at the core of the history of his race. To this end, Coppin made the private public. A good part of his account is concerned with his most intimate spheres, namely his various homes and the various relationships he had to women, ranging from his mother to lovers, wives, and daughters, as well as the presumed “Mother Africa.” This focus allows him both to disclose how women helped him establish his masculinity at home and to break the silence that was kept about these women’s history.


including their contributions to racial emancipation, within the dominant narratives of pan-Africanism and Western imperialism. That Coppin locates his *Unwritten History* in the things that both of these stories neglect is underscored by the date of the publication, 1919. In this year, leading African American agitators strongly directed the black American community’s attention to Africa as a homeland: W.E.B. Du Bois convened the first Pan-African Congress in Paris, Marcus Garvey established the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in New York, and the Harlem Renaissance, with its endorsement of African aesthetics and heritages, reached its peak. AME missionary travel literature was part of this transatlantic engagement, even though its focus on the home, women, and family did not conform to it. *Unwritten History* presents us with a rare opportunity to demonstrate how the retreat into the domestic sphere was a strategy that black American men could use to assert a new masculinity based on the concepts of home and gender that they drew from their Africa experiences.

Coppin introduced himself to the reader as one of seven free-born children who had grown up in a log cabin. The family’s freedom was owed to clever marriage politics: His parents, Jane and John Coppin, were born free because Coppin’s grandmother was free, and children inherited their mother’s status as their birthright. Nonetheless, his family had a marginalized social status defined by the “unwritten laws” of Maryland, which denied school education and social integration to blacks. Coppin wrote that his situation prompted him to mimic President Abraham Lincoln’s masculine saga of the “Log Cabin Statesmen,” which showed him that famous men could come from “these primitive dwelling places.” But he also began to develop philosophies of life in watching his parents, so that these for him became related to the two sexes. Coppin saw in his father a prudent, hard-working man of good taste and judgment who treated his wife with respect, while his aspirations for his family and society were limited. His mother, Jane Coppin, to the contrary, struck him as exhibiting “instinct” and “inspired vision.” Coppin admired her for insisting upon teaching her children how to read and write, and upon being generous toward neighbors and kin, although this meant breaking the “unwritten law of Maryland.” Her courage to combine uplift with Christian convictions, inspiration, and vision necessarily transcended the confines of the family’s household. In Coppin’s view, she used her principles to combat racial subjugation and thereby exemplified that it was “the hand that rocks the cradle

40 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak argues that Western epistemic violence was particularly destructive to the representation of women. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana, 1988), 294–308.
42 Wright, Bishops, 147.
43 Coppin, *Unwritten History*, 11.
44 Ibid., 14.
[that] rules the world.” In addition to his own family, Coppin got to explore the home of relatives in Wilmington. Moving in with them brought him closer to what he had already begun to discern as a “model, Christian home.” The housewife where he was staying impressed him as “a model woman, and housekeeper and Christian” and her husband as “especially affectionate.” Because both were Christian, Coppin concluded, “the moral atmosphere was pure, and love abounded, and the influence could only be salutary.” It was in view of the affectionate Christian man that Coppin became conscious of his desire to be such a husband.

At the same time, Coppin’s family background sharpened his critical attention to the patriarchal family structures that appeared to be the accepted norm in the United States. In view of the affectionate relationships that characterized his immediate family, he challenged masculinities that were built upon the oppression of women. He contended that overvaluing male leadership in the family led to the omission of the important role mothers played as a force of uplift, and thus in the process of black emancipation. In addition, the naturalizing of male superiority seemed to serve to neglect the history of male domestic violence, which he considered a crime that had remained “nameless.” Coppin inferred the problem of sexual abuse of black women from slaveholders’ overbearing concerns to perpetuate their “stock,” and admonished that it involved masters and slaves — that is, white and black men — alike. Although rape was not a “crime” in the legal sense, Coppin argued that the practice was evident in the stereotyping of the black man as “woefully wanting in his regard for sexual purity” and in the enormous economic benefit “proud Anglo-Saxon[s]” gained from selling illegitimate children into slavery.

Coppin’s specific condemnation of fathers as rapists was nuanced in its consideration of racial solidarity. Sexual violence, he argued, “degraded the master even more than the slave.” However, he could not condone the silent pact whereby rape was considered nonexistent as long as one did not “get caught.” Coppin instead advocated an understanding of rape as “[t]he crime for which any man deserves to die, according to the law, of course.” Here he underscored a gender bias that underlay the rule of law commonly associated with civilization, calling into question the superiority of those societies that concealed the sexual violence of men in favor of accepting them as the moral leaders of their families, their races, their societies, and even their nations.
Coppin’s negative view of American males informed his view of Africa. “I say Mother Land,” he stated, “because the amalgamations Americana [i.e. racially mixed population] that slave conditions brought about gave us so many American fathers, that should such offspring go to Africa, it certainly would not be going to a Father Land.”

Following his own assignment in 1900 to Africa, Coppin correspondingly envisioned his mission. He anticipated that the colonialists would spread sexual misconduct under the banner of Western civilization and appealed to the British to be recognized as a marriage officer. By assuming this role he hoped to be able to bring “natives and coloreds” into legally binding monogamous relationships. Because these groups were often excluded from colonial Christian church life, Coppin articulated the bond of marriage as a way to encourage the “lowly and the lowliest” to regulate their “domestic relations in accordance with Christian doctrine, and in keeping with the demands of our civilized age.”

At the same time, Coppin’s time in Africa brought him new insights into male sexuality. With the African custom of polygamy never far from view, he could neither reinforce the stereotype of black promiscuity, nor could he support the idea that Africans were uncivilized. For Coppin, the custom affirmed, first, that “the verdict of the world civilized and uncivilized as expressed by action [was that] it is not good for man to be alone” and, second, that not being alone was not necessarily synonymous with an inclination to a monogamous relationship. Rather, polygamy seemed to be in tune with a tabooed desire for several women at once. Framed as a “natural bent of man,” Coppin began to appreciate the African custom as corresponding to an aspect of male sexuality that was significantly different from what he had previously rejected as the crime of slavery. Polygamous relationships, Coppin observed, were characterized by a remarkable “strictness”: they regulated sexual misconduct in a way that actually enhanced the “sanctity of the rite” of marriage, and they prevented Africans from engaging in rape, divorce, and adultery.

As a result, Coppin found some comfort in the insight that the Western ideal of monogamy could be reworked with non-Western examples from Africa. His positive attitude toward polygamy was tempered by the observation that “Africa is not unlike other portions of the world in its habit of holding the women back.” After all, the worldwide subordination of women strengthened his conviction that the spread of Christianity had to be a mission to herald “women’s
emancipation everywhere.”  

Coppin’s clarion call to restore a manhood not gained at the expense of women sounded global. But, according to Unwritten History, the construction of such manhood began at home, within the arrangements of one’s family.

To make the case, Coppin’s Unwritten History offered a description of his family life, a sphere he considered as a “Domestic Bliss” and the backbone his own masculinity. With three marriages total, and several infatuations to boot, he reinforced his rejection of patriarchy and disclosed his want for female company — not promiscuously, but rather as a method to subject himself to some authority at home. The women Coppin shared his home with worked as industrial teachers, AME missionaries, and physicians. According to Coppin, they were the quintessence of Christian emancipation. He was convinced that their marked intellect and public appeal made them indispensable forces in the course of human uplift, including his own. While his first marriage ended with the tragic death of his wife and his son, the second lasted nearly a lifetime. Fanny Jackson Coppin had a “fixed course in life, and stubbornly maintained it, until it became a fixed habit.” According to Coppin, her strictness almost prevented their romance and, to be sure, it served to forestall male domination in their relationship. During their childless marriage, she remained in the classroom, advanced the work of the AME Church’s Women’s Parent Mite Missionary Society, established a girls’ dormitory, and launched a campaign for industrial education in Philadelphia — all before, Coppin emphasized with reference to Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Institute, “it became real propaganda.”  

Coppin admitted that he would have liked for his wife to give up her public responsibilities and that he attempted to “eliminate [them] gradually.”  

His assignment in Africa seemed to be an opportunity to get her to withdraw from teaching. And yet Coppin described her as constantly working to organize missionary societies, to train local women in Christian work, and to travel from Cape Town as far as to Bulawayo in Rhodesia. Although this was not exactly what he had envisioned, Coppin noted “with special emphasis” that African women had learned from her that Christianity was not “simply something to believe or recite, but, something to be, and to do.”

Their time in the African field was followed by eight years of Fanny Jackson Coppin’s slow decay. Coppin eagerly stressed that her retreat to “the house” was an “enforced retirement” caused not by illness, but by the gradual breaking down of a constitution that had tirelessly

52 Coppin, Unwritten History, 363.

53 Ibid., 356.


55 Coppin, Unwritten History, 357–58.

56 Ibid., 362. Important works that show how African American women used their identity as homemakers and mothers to transcend the domestic sphere are Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 2nd ed. (New York, 2000); and bell hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics (Boston, 1990). On women missionaries, see Bettye Collier-Thomas, Jesus, Jobs, and Justice: African American Women and Religion (New York, 2010), 215–27.

57 Coppin, Unwritten History, 363.
and faithfully responded to “the call of duty.” Eulogies later confirmed that Fanny Jackson Coppin stood for good character, purity, thoroughness, and righteousness, thus serving as an “inspiration of thousands.”58 While sharing the urge of her eulogists to acknowledge women’s public achievements, Coppin also wanted his readers to pick up a lesson that concerned male duty in the realms of marital intimacy:

This seems like a strange way to express it, but what I mean is so difficult to express. We had learned to live within each other. . . . Before [Fanny’s decay], both lives were so busy that each could easily become absorbed in the duty at hand. At last, my ‘duty,’ and privilege and pleasure, was to live alone for her who had lived for so many; and she, now unable to live the old life that was as broad as humanity itself, could only live for and depend on me.59

Coppin elaborated his vision of male domestic duty with the example of his third wife, physician Melissa E. Thompson. After Fanny Jackson Coppin’s death, he resolved to not go after other women. But friends who observed his moral decay — including sleeping in, smoking, and decreasing intellectual interest — advised him to seek “companionship at home.”60 Coppin narrated his infatuation with Thompson as a “love at first sight” story, which was fueled by the professional manner in which she presented herself in public. Referring to a speech she had given at an AME annual conference, Coppin noted that it was “free from that sophomoric air and tone that so often characterized the speech of professional people.” This, he emphasized, was remarkable, as men were “so inclined to either discount the ability of the woman physician or to regard her as, at least, being on trial . . . that it would not have been a great wonder had this young woman [tried] to utilize the opportunity to prove that her certificate was held by merit.”61 The story of Coppin’s third marriage again castigated male sexism in public, while praising the bliss of men’s domestic duty. By World War I, Thompson gave birth to Coppin’s first daughter, whom he named Theodosia, that is, a “Divine gift.” Coppin called the child “a rollicking ‘Tom-boy girl,’” who was “decidedly precocious; naturally spoiled,” but lucky, because she had “a wise Mother.”62 The depiction epitomized Coppin’s philosophy of embracing apparent contradictions as natural traits that were, as such, divine and his juvenile admiration of Christian women and mothers as the best leaders of the race.

58 Ibid., 364–65.
59 Ibid., 367.
60 Ibid., 368.
61 Ibid., 372–73.
62 Ibid., 375.
Disclosing his intimate relationships with females in all their various roles allowed Coppin to underscore that racial mothering was not limited to one’s own children, but it required women to be active outside of the home. Correspondingly, black masculinity had to be shaped at home and freed from notions of sexual aggression and Western dominance. On the one hand, Coppin’s domestic bliss thus asserted an ideal of modern monogamy, as both sexes used the domestic sphere to mutually unleash otherwise restricted potentials, namely, male capacities for love and affection and female capacities for public leadership. On the other hand, Coppin’s disclosure of the domestic concerned the innermost parts of his race. It filled the gaps in knowledge that existed in the histories of black mothers, the unnamed sexual abuse that was part of slavery, and the polygamy of African men, which was taboo in the West. By framing these elements as unwritten, Coppin pointed out that the epistemic violence of Western imperialism had destroyed black males’ ability to express their masculinity other than in the subordination of women. Coppin’s call to domesticate black males by subjecting them to emancipated women moved black anticolonialism to the bedroom: It made the home and intimate relations between men and women the new avenue for subverting black and white imperial masculinities.

Coppin’s Africa experience served in this narrative to reinterpret the stereotype of black promiscuity. Constructed as a natural trait, male sexuality helped legitimize polygamous forms of cohabitation, because they regulated the misconduct of rape, divorce, and extramarital sex. Combined with an appraisal of Christian marriage, Coppin applied these beliefs to his own home life entering into a sequence of monogamous relationships with emancipated women. Coppin’s ideal of black Christian manhood thus aspired to both African and female role models in a non-pan-African way. He grounded his relationship to Africa in the new understandings of male sexuality and morality instead of imagining himself as a son of an African motherland. And he proposed building a home, as opposed to going home to Africa, as the essential civilizing mission of his race, because it promised to undermine the power structures that suppressed the vital potentials only women had to offer.

**Conclusion**

From the turn of the twentieth century onwards, Smith and Coppin’s sexual codes remained an important subtext in the Christian black
Atlantic. On the one hand, as historians of black Atlantic protest movements show, between 1890 and 1930, it became difficult for pan-Africanists to dismiss the black missionary voice. What African American missionaries had to say about Africa was distinguished by the longstanding authority of the black church that for generations had been the cornerstone of black community life as well as by being rooted in their first-hand experience of the continent. On the other hand, as many more AME missionaries began to explore the intimate relationships between and among men and women in the context of their colonial encounters in Africa, they put together a record of contradictions and tensions in contemporary images of Africa that were at odds with the clear-cut ideologies of racial sameness and difference that were dominant in the “West”. Both aspects helped making AME missionary publications a powerful statement in the contemporary debate about black self-determination: they addressed concepts of morality, domesticity, and familiarity from the perspective of colonial Africa, instead of propelling pan-African dreams of black liberation. The writings of African Americans like Smith and Coppin thus are important reminders that black self-determination could at times also mean going beyond acting in opposition to white oppression. Their texts registered, instead, the inapplicability of colonial and racial dichotomies and placed a new, idiosyncratic discourse on intimacy at the core of African American-African relations.

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Conference Reports
GERMANS IN THE PACIFIC WORLD FROM THE LATE SEVENTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURY

Conference at the University of California, San Diego, March 5–7, 2015. Co-sponsored by the German Historical Institute Washington, the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, UCSD History Department, Deans of Arts and Humanities, and the UCSD Library. Convener: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Washington), Frank Biess (UC San Diego), Ulrike Strasser (UC San Diego). Participants: Andreas Daum (State University of New York at Buffalo), Gerhard Fischer (University of New South Wales), Margrit Frölich (UC San Diego), Sebastian Gehrig (Oxford University), Karl Gerth (UC San Diego), Peter Goureivtch (UC San Diego), Deborah Hertz (UC San Diego), Todd Kontje (UC San Diego), Kristina Küntzel-Witt (University of Hamburg), Ricky Law (Carnegie Mellon University), Douglas McGetchin (Florida Atlantic University), Ghassan Moazzin (St. Catharine’s College, University of Cambridge), Glenn Penny (University of Iowa), Sandra Rebok (Huntington Library), Raquel A. Reyes (University of London), Alan Rosenfeld (University of Hawaii-West Oahu), Jürgen Schmidt (Humboldt University, Berlin), Leonard Schmieding (Georgetown University/GHI), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI Washington), Katharina Stornig (Leibniz Institute of European History, Mainz), Emma Thomas (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Reinhard Wendt (FernUniversität Hagen), Robert Westman (UC San Diego), Shellen Wu (University of Tennessee), Shakila Yacob (University of Malaya).

From naturalist Georg Forster and German Jesuit missionaries to political scientist Klaus Mehnert and the Goethe Institut, German individuals and institutions have had a centuries-long presence in the Pacific. Because Germany did not acquire formal colonies until the late nineteenth century, however, research in the flourishing fields of Pacific studies and colonialism often overlooks or understates the role of Germans in the Pacific. By providing a forum for scholars from around the world to present their innovative research, this conference made a substantial contribution to our knowledge of European involvement in the Pacific. Tracing German naturalists, businessmen, missionaries, bankers, engineers, and translators across the globe, conference participants revealed Germans’ significant cultural, intellectual, religious, and economic interactions in the Pacific World in the early modern and modern eras. The conference also featured an exhibit curated by Ulrike Strasser and Sky Johnston on Germans in the Pacific World. It displayed texts and maps from the UC San Diego Library’s Special Collections & Archives that were
produced by many of the same historical actors discussed in the conference talks.

The first panel, chaired by Robert Westman, examined the transfer of knowledge in the early modern period. Raquel A. Reyes spoke about German apothecaries and naturalists in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan. Specifically, she traced the activities of four men — Georg Josef Kamel, Andreas Cleyer, Engelbert Kaempfer, and Georg Eberhard Rumphius — who collected and traded plant specimens during the seventeenth century. The men had diverse professions and personal motivations for their shared botanical activities. When viewed together, they highlight the disparate ways in which knowledge of the natural world was produced and disseminated via vast Pacific trade networks. The panel’s second talk featured Ulrike Strasser discussing the production of geographic knowledge of the Pacific. She followed the history of one map and its evolutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The map of a set of islands in present-day Micronesia was originally created by German Jesuit missionary Paul Klein following indigenous conventions for spatial representations. Later publications of the map in Europe variously kept the indigenous characteristics or converted the information to fit European cartographical norms. The history of this map reveals that Germans were involved in mapmaking and printing before the famous German explorers of later centuries ever set sail. More broadly, it shows that knowledge production was a collaborative effort with many interlocutors.

The second panel, chaired by Karl Gerth, carried the theme of knowledge transfer into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Ricky Law examined Japanese translations of a broad range of German texts — on topics such as the justice system and criminal code, interest rates, city planning, urban zoning, and public housing — to illuminate a rich interwar cultural and intellectual rapprochement between Japan and Germany that preceded their military alliance during World War II. Japanese translators had been especially impressed with Germany’s postwar recovery in the 1920s and 1930s and were eventually drawn by the allure of Hitler and Nazism, translating *Mein Kampf* in 1932 and increasingly narrowing their translations to works on mobilization and technology after the outbreak of World War II. In the second talk of the panel, Shellen Wu examined the role of German engineers in building formal and informal empire in China from 1880–1914. Although ostensibly sent as “translation interns” without Reichstag
approval, Wu argued that German engineers crucially contributed to Germany’s imperial presence in China by building infrastructure and helping to secure access to resources.

The third panel, chaired by Margrit Frölich, examined the German naturalists and scientific explorers who traveled to the Pacific in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Andreas Daum opened the panel with a talk that drew from his study of roughly thirty German naturalists in the Pacific around the year 1800. He concluded from his survey that as Germans sailed under the flags of other nations during this time, their perceived weaknesses turned out to be strengths. Although Germans lacked colonies and large state-sponsored societies, they met the needs of expeditions with their local science training, practical knowledge, language competence, and history of extensive travel throughout Europe and its growing market of public knowledge. Kristina Küntzel-Witt focused her talk on two eighteenth century explorers, Georg Wilhelm Steller and Carl H. Merck, who travelled on Russian expeditions. These two men did maintain a German identity, but saw themselves first as scientists. Their example shows that nationalism was not so pronounced on such Russian expeditions that it precluded assistance from German naturalists. Sandra Rebok rounded out the panel with a talk on Alexander von Humboldt, the most famous German explorer of the era, and his interactions in the Pacific. Although he only spent 47 days physically present along the Pacific Rim, Humboldt maintained a lifelong interest in the Pacific from a distance. Furthermore, Humboldt’s approach to studying the world, later termed “Humboldtian science,” served to put the Pacific in a global scientific context.

The fourth panel, chaired by Hartmut Berghoff, examined German business networks in the Pacific. In Ghassan Moazzin’s talk on the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in China, he shifted our focus of German presence in the Pacific from one of conflict to cooperation, arguing that German bankers were not mere tools of imperialism but rather that they cultivated personal trust with their Chinese counterparts. Both German bankers and their Chinese customers often had to make significant concessions in order to conclude deals and establish financial relations. Shakila Yacob’s talk examined the German company Behn Meyer in Colonial-Malaya and post-colonial Malaysia to survey the success of German entrepreneurs, who saw great potential in the area. Despite Britain’s temporary bans on German trading in the area following both World Wars, German entrepreneurs’
resourcefulness and willingness to work with small traders and provide long-term credit quickly made them the preferred trading partner in the region. Uwe Spiekermann explored the economic ventures of the Claus Spreckels family in the Pacific from 1870–1920. Through its role in the sugar trade of Hawaii, the Spreckels family played a pioneering role in the economic development of the Pacific region and its integration into global networks. From their position as private businessmen, the Spreckels also helped establish major industries on the West Coast of the United States including the military industrial complex in San Diego and San Francisco.

The fifth panel, chaired by Deborah Hertz, focused on German diasporas in the Pacific Americas. In his talk on German schools in Chile from 1880–1960, Glenn Penny sought to decenter the role of the state. In fact, it was German merchants and industrialists who financed these German schools in Chile long before the Foreign Office began funding them at the turn of the century. While the schools sought to reinforce German identities of these diasporic communities and were one of many nodal points in a larger, ever-changing network of such German communities, “Germans” at this time constituted a diverse group, and these schools reflected their often vibrant and hybrid identities. Leonard Schmieding explored German gastronomic businesses — such as cafes, restaurants, and beer halls — in San Francisco between the Gold Rush and the great earthquake of 1906. Such places sought to present an authentic German experience, serving traditional German food and employing German emigrants, and thus functioned as informal contact zones for Germans and non-Germans in San Francisco. Gradually, however, these businesses became increasingly Americanized.

The sixth panel, chaired by Todd Kontje, extended the discussion of diasporas by examining Germans in the South Pacific. Reinhard Wendt’s talk illuminated the transcultural diaspora of a group of ethnic Germans who traveled from Pyritz, Pomerania to Vava’u (a group of tropical islands in Tonga), where they established roots and developed a Tongan-German identity. After World War II, many of them moved to Fiji and New Zealand and later to Australia and the United States. Thereafter, they constituted a “diapora within a diaspora” where their Tongan or German identities were alternately emphasized, underscoring the “plasticity” of ethnic identity. Gerhard Fischer discussed German immigration to Australia during the colonial period and Germans’ attempts to integrate into Australian society.
In the mid-1800s, Germans constituted the largest non-British immigrant group to Australia, where they fought for equal rights in parliament and campaigned alongside their neighbors for Australian independence. During World War I, however, many Germans were interned without trial or deported back to Germany, and the government largely succeeded in destroying any independence that the German cultural community had previously secured in Australia.

The seventh panel, chaired by Frank Biess, investigated aspects of German colonialism in the South Pacific at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Emma Thomas provided the perspective of women in German New Guinea by examining the records of female indentured laborers. Their story tells a dark chapter in the history of the colony. The women were often the victims of gendered violence and sexually assaulted by both German colonialists and other New Guinean laborers. That this form of violence was institutionalized on the island became clear when reforms were attempted and advocates for the status quo explicitly acknowledged that a function of the female indentured laborers was to provide sexual services. In his talk, Jürgen Schmidt shifted the focus to the German presence in and eventual colonization of Samoa. Germans’ self-identity as good workers was put to the test on this island, conceived as the paradise of the South Seas. While Samoans were stereotyped as being lazy despite a high level productivity on the island, German inactivity was often overlooked. Katharina Stornig returned to the topic of women in German New Guinea. She examined Catholic nuns in the colony who worked as teachers, translators, and domestic servants. Their depictions of life and death on the colony mediated European perceptions of New Guinea.

The eighth and final panel, chaired by Peter Gourevitch, explored various German involvements in world politics in the twentieth century. Douglas McGetchin spoke about a trans-Pacific plot to overthrow British rule in India. Germans living in the Pacific contributed to the effort by participating in arms smuggling operations. Although this effort yielded little success, the episode shows the involvement of an often overlooked German diaspora in global affairs. Alan Rosenfeld delivered a talk about German political scientist Klaus Mehnert’s years as a professor at the University of Hawaii from 1937 to 1941 and the journal he published thereafter through the conclusion of WWII. Mehnert cast a vision of a harmonious Pacific set free by Axis powers from the subjugation of Anglo-American imperialism. His perception
of the indigenous inhabitants of the Pacific, however, reinforced the notion that they were in need of assistance from outside to reach their fullest potential, which only hastened the decline of their traditional lifestyles. Sebastian Gehrig concluded the panel with a talk about the Cold War era involvement of the “two Germanies” in the Pacific. He showed that cultural diplomacy was an effective way to establish ties beneath the radar of global politics.

Several major themes emerged from the three days of talks in a concluding roundtable discussion with all of the conference participants. First, participants noted that the politically peripheral position of Germans in the Pacific was often a strength. Since Germany was late to establish formal colonies in the Pacific, most of the Germans who spent time there necessarily cooperated with foreign powers and institutions. This situation created the possibility for Germans to align themselves with whatever enterprises in the Pacific were best suited to help them achieve their own aims — whether that be saving souls, making scientific discoveries, building wealth, or fostering cultural ties. Second, participants questioned how best to conceptualize the two key terms of the conference: “Germans” and “the Pacific.” While no definitive answers were given, the conference’s talks nuanced and deepened our conceptions of what these terms might signify. Third, all agreed that the history of the Pacific is incomplete without attention paid to the roles Germans played in the Pacific, and, conversely, that German history is incomplete without attention paid to the Germans who went to the Pacific. The conference marked a major step toward enriching both of these histories.
The history of marketing has a long tradition in the United States, and recently Europe, too, has begun to focus historical research on marketing, its techniques, and its effects. Yet, we still know little about the mechanisms that connected producers and consumers with regard to communications and market strategy. This conference aimed to investigate the connection between consumers and producers and their effects on marketing strategies and techniques. The term “consumer engineering” emerged during the economic depression of the 1930s in the context of marketing experts’ efforts to find new ways of making goods desirable. These experts tried to promote consumer spending through new product innovations, colors and patterns, or by better understanding consumers’ psychology. Although the term is frequently associated with the emergence of American mass consumer society, the conference set out to go beyond an American perspective in order to explore the transnational effects of consumer engineering as part of a stage of an accelerating “fast capitalism” that created new forms of marketing and product engineering which spread across Europe and other parts of the world.

In his introductory remarks, Jan Logemann highlighted the importance of the adaptation of marketing techniques in transnational exchanges since the standards and tastes of European consumers differed from those of their American counterparts. Mid-century
marketing experts — many of them transatlantic émigrés — viewed the consumer as a “malleable object,” and encouraged companies to devise new strategies and methods to “engineer” the tastes of “new” consumers. Within this context, the conference asked who the principal actors involved in consumer engineering were and which economic and social factors influenced the development of marketing techniques between the 1930s and 1970s. Viewing marketing as a “social technique,” the conference asked how successful and influential the so-called consumer engineers were and how they shaped marketing techniques, product design, and the consumption patterns of society. A central goal of the conference was to reconstruct the specific conceptions of modern markets on which consumer engineering was based and how such notions shaped the genesis of the modern mass consumption society. The conference also examined the transnational character of consumer engineering and marketing research. Despite initially emerging in the United States, was it a peculiarly American phenomenon? To date, little is known about the temporal dimension of consumer engineering and its evolution from the 1930s through the 1970s. Trying to fill this gap, the conference traced a change in perspective from efforts in direct and outright consumer manipulation towards a notion of informed and empowered consumers and examined how the marketing profession had adapted to broad changes in economic and social circumstances by the 1970s.

The keynote panel contrasted the costs of increased marketing for consumers and entrepreneurs and provided two important methodological perspectives for marketing history and consumer engineering. Andrew Godley based his arguments on the framework of institutional economics and transaction cost theory. He stressed the importance of the interaction between companies through their marketing professionals and the consumer of the final product. Here marketing communication is essential in fostering the necessary trust that can overcome the information asymmetries between the two parties. Without “market-making,” that is, articulating what a product innovation can do for the consumer, such potential markets can easily fail. For this, Godley used the example of the failure of some of Merck’s pharmaceutical innovations in the 1950s. Gary Cross offered a consumer-oriented perspective by focusing on the cultural history of marketing and consumer engineering. Examining the example of the entertainment goods industry, he stressed that the phonograph and music recordings led to an acceleration of the process of commodification, resulting in shorter product life-cycles,
rising expectations of novelty, and the creation of a specific “teenage culture” in the United States. Cross highlighted that the large social influence of what he called “fast capitalism” led to new challenges for marketing and new consumer engineering strategies. The keynote panel thus examined different “rationalities” for consumer engineering. There was strong agreement that the consumer must not be viewed as the spineless and uninformed object of marketing. Instead, the communicative relationships between the actors have to be taken into account. Finally, the keynote speakers suggested that although consumers may not always know what they want, collectively they have a lot of power and influence on the supply side, limiting the influence of the “consumer engineers.”

The second panel focused on business strategies during the postwar period in Western Europe and showed that product strategies had to be adapted to changing consumer attitudes. Orsi Husz’s analysis of IKEA and its kitchens showed how IKEA’s marketing and kitchen design based on functionality was a distinct response and critique of American mass consumer capitalism. The design of IKEA products was not only influenced by concepts of Taylorism but also by social welfare politics. The “classless IKEA kitchen” can thus be seen as the outcome of a socio-political vision that was influenced not only by companies and commercial marketing, but also by state agencies. The following two papers underlined that accelerated product innovation and efforts of consumer engineering were not only American phenomena. By looking at Adidas and the German sports footwear industry, Thomas Turner showed that the traditional athletic-shoe manufacturer Adidas, in contrast to American manufacturers, embraced new synthetic materials and production techniques for shoes from the 1950s through the 1970s, constantly widening the range of shoes that were being offered. Even small improvements were marketed within a framework of technological progress to attract new buyers. Adidas also enhanced its market share by collaborating with state sports organizations that promoted recreational activity in the general public, thereby “making” the consumers for Adidas. These findings show that techniques of consumer engineering can be seen as responses to the challenges of increasingly differentiated and individualized markets and consumer demands.

The German automobile industry witnessed similar differentiation processes between 1950 and 1980. Ingo Köhler discussed the emergence of professional and scientific market research as a central
force behind modern product strategies with a consumer-oriented view. He explained that, as consumers began to “trade up” the model range and as markets reached saturation in the late 1950s and 1960s, rivalries between carmakers flourished. This prompted firms to engage in consumer research to create brand loyalty. However, a sales crisis beginning in the 1970s showed that the carmakers’ power to “engineer the consumer” was limited, leading to a lifestyle marketing approach, which stressed both emotional and rational qualities of brands and models. The discussion following the papers showed that in addition to producers and consumers, intermediaries such as state agencies and umbrella associations come into the market-making process and have to be incorporated in further research on consumer engineering. Further emphasis was placed on the fact that the rise of market research and its professionalization played an important role in companies’ internationalization strategies.

The third panel shifted the focus from companies to individual actors or “consumer engineers” and these actors’ perceptions of their own roles. These perceptions were often influenced by transnational exchanges and emigration, as individuals linked their backgrounds with new experiences abroad to create new styles and visions. Regina Blaszczyk focused her paper on William Pahlmann, an interior designer from the 1940s to the 1960s. Her research highlighted how interior designers like Pahlmann did not see themselves as direct “taste makers,” but as interpreters of existing tastes in the emerging American mass market in the postwar decades. With his specific “eclectic style” of combining old forms with modern materials, Pahlmann became an intermediary for DuPont, integrating its synthetic materials into home furniture. He is one of those actors whom Blaszczyk calls “fashion intermediaries,” who developed new markets for companies. Taking the example of Victor Gruen, a Jewish architect and designer with a background in the socialist milieu of “Red Vienna,” Joseph Malherek showed the influences of émigrés on the conception of new places of consumption in America during the 1940s and 1950s. Gruen promoted the idea of “planning” the shopping experience and imagined shopping malls as separate places of consumption and communal spaces of newly built suburbs. Examining the supersonic Concorde aircraft, Guillaume De Syon argued that, in order to make this technological innovation profitable, European marketers created a whole image around the Concorde, incorporating the notion of speed into its futuristic interior and the airport terminal design for a unique “Concorde-experience.” Through a specially
designed experience, consumers of Concorde bought not only a flight, but a distinct social and economic “image.” This shows that marketers increasingly created “imagined” or “virtual” places of consumption, in part as a strategic response to economic crises.

The fourth panel focused on the links between consumer engineering and broader concepts of social engineering before and after the two World Wars. Marketing frequently dovetailed with more general mid-century efforts to influence, shape, or “rationalize” social behavior. Uwe Spiekermann stressed the importance of German business journals such as Verkaufspraxis (published from the 1920s to the 1940s and from the 1950s to the 1960s) to get more insight into the transnational elements of marketing history. These journals propagated American methods of rationalizing production and sales. At the same time the American ideas were also connected with German business practices, showing that there is no simple, common narrative of consumer engineering or westernization. Oliver Kühschelm’s paper on Buy-National Campaigns in Europe showed the power of products and product marketing to shape identities and imagined communities. State campaigns to establish nationalistic consumption as a moral category in European countries like Britain, Austria, and Switzerland regarded the consumer as a socially relevant actor. Examining Romania in the 1950s, Mara Marginean asked how products and their visualization were used to legitimize the communist state. The marketing of products that were regarded as “necessary” to satisfy people’s needs focused on utility in order to create an image of improving health and comfort within a communist system. “Prestige brands” were allowed a certain degree of individuality while satisfying “necessary” needs in a functional way, allowing the state to legitimize its power. The panel showed the political dimension of consumer engineering, highlighting the political desires for the adoption of new marketing techniques which states — much like corporations — utilized in order to achieve political and economic goals.

The final panel examined consumer movements, their responses to accelerated marketing, and their own efforts regarding consumer engineering. The emergence of consumer movements highlights the importance of new institutions in marketing that were apart from companies and individuals as actors in marketing processes. Giselle Nath presented the example of two competing Belgian consumer movements and their product testing to show the importance of such actors as a counterweight to corporate consumer engineering. While
testing products is a rather technocratic process, both consumer movements became engaged in politics when trying to “educate the consumer.” Kevin Rick traced the historical roots of the German consumer association (Verbraucherzentrale) and its efforts to organize collective action on the markets. These consumer advice centers were established as a means to achieve a political goal set by German ministries: to promote the growth of the German economy in the 1950s through individuals’ own rational choices. In contrast to the more activist consumer movement approaches of Hugo Schui, the state-established consumer association provided practical product information that consumers viewed as useful. The Verbraucherzentrale is one example of how important the state was as an actor in shaping consumption regimes and influencing consumer behavior. The final paper, by Günter Silberer, analyzed product testing performed by the Stiftung Warentest, the German product testing association established in the 1960s. Silberer highlighted the indirect influence of such product testing on consumers. The test results were often circulated in an indirect, mouth-to-mouth fashion. With these results, Silberer questioned the direct influence of Stiftung Warentest on consumer engineering, while at the same time showing that the product tests — designed to create rational and informed consumers — were also an important and influential tool for companies’ marketing strategies.

The conference explored a broad spectrum of actors engaged in consumer engineering as a variant of modern marketing, ranging from individuals and businesses to civic associations and nation states. Hartmut Berghoff noted that the provocative term “consumer engineering” provides a good starting point for further research and could be used as a heuristic tool to explore the spheres of actors engaged in marketing as a social technique. It became clear that consumer engineering is not as straightforward as the term “engineering” suggests. The explorations of the different types of consumer engineering revealed the variety and complexity of direct and indirect methods for influencing consumers and consumption, calling for further research on the channels of consumer engineering.

Several contributions and discussions highlighted the high degree of transnationalism that was involved in the exchange of ideas and techniques on consumer and consumption engineering. The emergence of professional marketing research techniques and the resulting accumulation of knowledge about consumers were not only an outcome of companies’ and marketing experts’ activities; the
contributions also demonstrated the political elements of consumer engineering and highlighted the importance of new institutions such as consumer movements for marketing and consumer engineering from the 1950s through the 1970s. At economic turning-points during the time period under consideration, the “consumer engineers” were important actors when businesses and economies had reached their “limits of growth.” In the end, the conference showed that the term “consumer engineering” and its meaning is multifaceted. Consumer engineering was first based on the belief that it was possible to actively manipulate a uniformed consumer, but it then evolved into a reactive instrument of a variety of actors who tried to master the challenges of increasingly complex and anonymous markets.

Julian Faust (University of Göttingen)
While the so-called economic turn in Jewish history has opened up new perspectives on both Jewish political, social, and cultural history and modern economic history, consumption and consumer culture remain relatively understudied topics. This is quite surprising because consumption has played a crucial role in the formation of Jewish identities and practices in many historical and geographic contexts, and consumer culture has been a rapidly growing field of historical and social scientific enquiry for some years now. The conference “Jewish Consumer Cultures in 19th and 20th Century Europe and America” focused on this promising and challenging field of research. In their welcome addresses and introduction, the three conveners, Uwe Spiekermann, Anne Schenderlein, and Paul Lerner, helped frame the ensuing discussions and emphasized that Jewish consumer cultures should be analyzed in their entanglements with those of other ethnic and religious groups and the dominant trends in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Among the questions they posed were: What role has consumption played in the creation of Jewish identities, and how has this varied in different environments and contexts with the emergence of modern consumer societies? What roles, functions, and perceptions of Jewishness and
Jewish actors contributed to the shaping of consumer societies in the Western world? Was there something particular about Jewish consumers, about the commodities and services, which shaped the modern Jewish experience? What are the various methodologies and topics encompassed within the field of consumer culture studies?

The first panel, “Modern Consumer Cultures and Jewish Consuming Practices,” chaired by Jerry Z. Muller, connected well-known stories about retailing, modernity, and Jewish involvement in cinema and the arts in new and promising ways. Frank Stern, in his talk “From Vienna to Königsberg: Innovation and Visual Representation,” wove in his own family history going back to the late nineteenth century, in sketching the representative business culture of the Wien, Jacoby, and Kronheim families in eastern Prussia. Their garment stores and early Kaufhäuser, characterized by big showcases and with the family name displayed above the shop front, developed a new style of visibility both for consumer goods and for their Jewish proprietors. These family businesses, de facto ruled by the lady of the house, featured face-to-face business transactions and created trust and mutual respect among the worker and peasant customers. Stern drew astonishing parallels between the selling of fabrics and the selling of dreams in Vienna, where family members were active in the emerging film business, a commercial sphere with a pronounced Jewish presence. “Jews and the Art Market in Photography: Respectability, Modernity, Wiedergutmachung” was the topic of Michael Berkowitz’s contribution, which pointed out the striking overrepresentation of Jews in the world of twentieth-century art photography. Berkowitz argued that the skyrocketing prices commanded by such photographers as Richard Avedon, Robert Capa, and Alfred Stieglitz need to be understood in the context of earlier Jewish historical currents. He focused in particular on the contributions of Josef Breitenbach and Helmut Gersheim to establishing and developing a market for Jewish photographers in Europe, the UK, and the US after World War II.

The general topic of the conference was further developed in Gideon Reuveni’s keynote lecture “Does Consumer Culture Matter? The Jewish Question and the Changing Regime of Consumption.” Asking how consumer cultures can help us understand and broaden general and Jewish history, Reuveni pointed out that in lands of immigration, like the United States, they allowed Jews to be Jewish and integrated at the same time. This helped answer the “Jewish question,” the tension between assimilation and preserving identity, in a new way. Consumer
cultures indeed permitted Jews and other groups to preserve their distinctiveness while simultaneously becoming an integral part of mainstream society. Through references to such figures as Israel Zangwill and John Dewey, Reuveni showed how the Jewish and the general consumer market helped to define the Jewishness of modern citizen consumers. Jewish consumers, furthermore, were not passive, but rather produced their own goods and ideas on Jewishness and made this buyable for other groups. Identity became a matter of choice, although this often resulted in the loss of the Jewishness of particular consumer goods, like the bagel. In his concluding remarks, Reuveni turned to the unique situation in Israel. Although Zionists used marketing strategies to forge national solidarities, the contrasts between the goals of reestablishing historical Hebrew culture, developing a modern consumer society, and fulfilling the needs of a militarily mobilized state are striking. Consumption, as an expression of a secure and comfortable life, remains a dream in contemporary Israel.

The second day began with a panel on the theme of “Defining and Crossing the Borderlines of Consumer Cultures.” Moderated by Richard Wetzell, the panel began with Ruth Leiserowitz’s nuanced analysis “From Peddlers to Shopkeepers: How Consumption Came to the Countryside.” Focusing on the border between eastern Prussia and Lithuania, she offered a rich portrait of a world shaped by peddlers and fairs, which she contrasted with the new world of small Jewish-owned shops from the 1860s. These new shops offered a growing range of goods, made possible by the spread of railroads, which allowed for cheaper and more efficient transport. Leiserowitz emphasized the new marketing efforts of retailers, developing — as in the cases Stern mentioned — a new form of Jewish visibility and modern branded goods. The adoption of modern selling techniques, for instance, by the new Salamander franchise shops in eastern Prussia exemplified the commercialization of the countryside after World War I. Uwe Spiekermann, speaking on “Needs and Fashion: Jewish Second-Hand Dealers in Germany, 1871-1938,” acknowledged that such developments represented a dominant trend but tried to use the concept of “the peddler” to analyze a broader range of consumer-related activities. Peddlers linked towns, villages, and the countryside, dealt with a broad range of goods, and combined very different forms of payment, including cash, credit, and barter. They also traded in used goods, a dimension often neglected in the analysis of modern consumer cultures. Spiekermann demonstrated the transition of
peddling into both shop-based and various itinerant trades. The rag and scrap trade was profoundly shaped by Jewish businesspeople, which contributed to enduring associations, stereotypes, and prejudices — outside and even inside the Jewish community. The Nazi regime eventually prohibited Jewish peddling and second-hand dealing in 1938. Anna Holian set a different tone with her presentation on “Setting Up Shop in Postwar Germany: Jewish Shopkeepers and the Spaces of the Unofficial Economy.” Her example was the Munich Möhlstraße, a space with a pronounced Jewish presence in the late 1940s and 1950s. Surrounded by nice bourgeois villas, some Jewish survivors of Nazi persecution invested capital they had earned on the black market to establish an unofficial, shop-based economy, which local police eyed with suspicion. Holian’s innovative use of architectural plans offered insight into a transient trade run by a population that understood its status as temporary. Most of the Jewish traders soon migrated to Israel (or moved to Frankfurt am Main), yet even those who stayed in Munich longer and invested more capital in their stores built relatively temporary structures, reflecting their ambivalent situation in postwar Munich. Finally, Hizky Shoham broadened the panel’s geographic scope with his talk on “‘Sales Agents (of Nationalism) Inside the House:’ Children as Consumers in Interwar Palestine.” The focal point of Shoham’s presentation lay at the intersection of two potentially conflicting bourgeois notions: the idea of protective childhood, wherein children were to be sheltered from the “corrupting” market — a sign of “civilization” for many Jews in the Yishuv — and the region’s nascent consumer culture, which used modern marketing techniques to instill a sense of national identity in Jewish children. Using the example of children’s periodicals, Shoham showed how toys and foods were marketed to socialize a new generation in the project of creating a Jewish national homeland.

Jews were central actors in the creation of modern consumer societies in Europe and the US. The third panel, “Producing for an Emerging Consumer Society,” chaired by Uwe Spiekermann, concentrated on the garment and retailing industries as the perhaps most striking examples of such pioneering work. The first presentation, however, already challenged ideas of Jewish exceptionalism. Business historian Andrew Godley, who delivered his lecture from Reading via Skype, examined “Jewish Entrepreneurs and Fashion Production for the Emerging Consumer Culture: The London and New York City garment industries, 1880–1940.” Godley challenged cultural-ethnic perspectives and the common assumption that expertise in tailoring
explains the astonishing success of Eastern European Jewish immigrants in the garment industries. Members of this group, Godley argued, were not especially literate, and their skills as tailors were not advantageous in the US and UK because the conditions there were fundamentally different from those in Eastern Europe. Instead, Jews entered the emerging women’s fashion industry at a moment of skyrocketing volume and rising profits. As newcomers, Jewish immigrants were willing to accept low wages, and the sweatshops offered small flexible units. Jews were successful, then, above all because they were in the right place at the right time, not because of their Jewishness, Jewish tailoring in Eastern Europe or any ethnic particularities. Nils Roemer then turned to the topic of luxury in presenting “Stanley Marcus: Fashioning a City,” which shed light on the emergence of Neiman Marcus in Dallas as a global leader in high-end fashion retailing. This company’s rise was closely linked to Dallas becoming the third-largest clothing producer in the U.S. in the 1940s. During the era of McCarthyism, Roemer showed, Stanley Marcus adhered to his values, standing up for civil rights and social justice. At the same time, he turned his flagship Dallas store into a conduit for the arts and European haute couture. Paul Lerner discussed a rather different approach to modern consumerism in his presentation on “Salman Schocken: Zionism and Consumer Modernity in Saxony.” Schocken, located predominantly in Saxony, did not create the fantastic dreamworlds associated with the department stores of the Wilhelmine era but offered useful goods at reasonable prices surrounded by Erich Mendelsohn’s rational and transparent architecture. Lerner stressed that Schocken established his system as a contrast to the traditional imperial architecture of Wertheim and his attempt to Germanize the department store. Lerner connected Schocken’s cultural Zionism with his business approach, framing it as a kind of dissimilation from both German tradition and the German-Jewish bourgeoisie. As these two papers showed, Jewish contributions to modern consumer cultures were, indeed, multiple and varied.

The day ended with a fourth panel on “Images, Perceptions, Dreamworlds: Advertising and Visual Consumer Culture,” chaired by Anne Schenderlein. Oliver Baisez started with his case study “Advertising in German Zionist Periodicals around 1900.” He used two volumes of the largest German Zionist journal, *Jüdische Rundschau*, and provided a detailed overview of the elaborate advertising sections, comparing the years 1904 and 1913. Most striking was the close integration of the
Zionists into bourgeois society. Religious articles, wares, and services held a prominent position, but fragments of bourgeois life became increasingly important. In contrast to other Jewish journals, Zionist journals also used the ad section for political purposes, and in 1913 Palestine occupied a far more conspicuous position. Switching to the other side of the Atlantic, Kerri Steinberg put “Manischewitz & Maxwell House Coffee: A Story of Jewish Advertising and Marketing” on the agenda. These were both brands developed by Jewish entrepreneurs for the expanding American market. Coffee, previously not consumed during the Passover holiday, became fused with the Seder through the hugely successful Maxwell House Haggadah and its aggressive advertising campaigns. Matzos, first mass-produced by a rolling machine developed by German-American immigrant entrepreneur Isaac Merritt Singer of sewing-machine fame, embodied the synthesis of tradition and modernity, suggesting a kind of synecdoche of the American-Jewish experience, that is, integration through consumption.

The fifth panel, “Race, Gender and Consumption,” chaired by Mark Stoneman, analyzed the daily practices of Jewish consumer cultures and their limits. For Aleisa Fishman, the spread of suburbia created Jewish community and sustained Jewish identity in a broader American setting. “Mrs. Blumenthal Builds Her Dream House: Jewish Women and Consumer Culture in Postwar American Suburbs” presented this as a new life experience that included home ownership. The home was a crucial site for the practice of Jewishness; it often included a kosher kitchen and was linked to a network of kosher meat markets, synagogues with Jewish gift shops, and a number of specialized entertainment opportunities. Having furs as an attribute of Jewishness in general, and of Jewish women in particular, was the topic of Kerry Wallach’s paper “Buy Me a Mink: Jews, Fur, and Conspicuous Consumption.” Based on visual and literary texts, Wallach’s subtle analysis noted the active Jewish involvement in the fur trade and indeed the sexualization of the (female) Jewish body at the turn of the century. Traditionally, fur hats, or shtreimels, were worn by Eastern European rabbis and ultra-orthodox Jews, but during the nineteenth century nonreligious fur consumption rose steadily. In the anti-Semitic imagination, furs became a symbol of the savage nature of the (Jewish) wife, of her attraction and seductive power. At the same time, the use of furs as luxury and fantasy goods fueled internal Jewish criticism of the dangers of luxury in general and furs in particular. Consumption, as these papers show,
at times triggered intense debates not only outside of but also within Jewish communities. Roger Horowitz’s presentation “Making Wine Kosher: Manischewitz, African American Consumers, and the Limits of Jewish Assimilation, 1950–2000,” opened up other perspectives on the Jewishness of products. Manischewitz wine, another apparently typical Jewish ritual requirement, was a modern New York product, much sweeter than traditional Jewish wine. It became the leading kosher wine after World War II, but this resulted primarily from its consumption by African Americans. Indeed, Manischewitz resembled the sugary, homemade wines of the American South and reminded blacks in the Northeast, who had been uprooted by the Great Migration, of the taste of home. The rabbi on the label and its centrality to Jewish ritual may also have resonated with deeply religious African American consumers. Indeed, Manischewitz developed two distinct marketing strategies for its different core consumers, and the company soon found that its Jewish market was finite, especially when suspicions about its kashrut arose in the 1970s and higher-end kosher wines emerged in the 1980s. Riv-Ellen Prell, in her talk “Excess and Jewish Women: Jews, Gender, and the Early Twentieth-Century Consumer Culture in the United States,” began with a powerful historiographic intervention against the tendency of the economic turn in Jewish history to eclipse women. Women’s labor, Prell showed, lay at the root of modern consumer cultures. Her analysis of the American Yiddish press in the early twentieth century looked at recurrent images of Jewish consumers through the lens of gender and, like Kerry Wallach’s paper, showed how anti-Semitic notions informed Jewish perspectives of Jewish consumption and forged stereotypes, in this case of Jewish women as either loud and vulgar or as insatiable consumers addicted to luxury who threatened their husbands’ tenuous economic prosperity.

Clashing perspectives of consumption and the meaning of consumer goods can cause significant conflicts, as the final panel “Consumer Cultures in Conflict,” chaired by Paul Lerner, convincingly demonstrated. In her presentation “German Jews and the Suit as Object of Inclusion/Exclusion,” Anja Meyerrose inquired into the meaning of wearing various kinds of outfits in different settings. The suit, the typical dress of seventeenth-century British merchants, became the dress code for bourgeois men because it disguised their cultural and religious background and could easily be bought. Consequently, Jews adopted the new clothes from the early nineteenth century and used it as a marker of emancipation and integration. In Germany,
by contrast, uniforms remained the most prestigious form of dress, and Jews, who were unable to ascend to the upper echelons of the military or bureaucracy, were consequently excluded from the highest ranks of society. But shehitah, kashrut, and kosher food practices also demarcated Jewish identities, defining exclusion and inclusion from the Jewish perspective, as Felix Heinert demonstrated in his talk “Imagined Community and Beyond: Riga’s ‘Kosher Revolution’ of 1905.” Heinert presented the tsarist kosher meat tax as an expression of the conflict between the imperial government and local traditions and the struggle between traditional and modern slaughtering methods. New forms of local cooperation between Jews and gentiles emerged to mitigate the pressures from the modern Russian state in the years around the 1905 revolution. Finally, Anne Schenderlein turned the topic of consumption on its head and presented Jews as non-consumers in her paper “The American Jewish Boycott of German Goods.” The Nazi seizure of power and the anti-Jewish boycotts that began on April 1, 1933, were answered by a boycott campaign against German products on the part of many Jewish organizations. The effect was fairly limited because participants feared potential retaliation and many exiles still wished to express their solidarity with Germany. Such problems resulted in the failure of any similar boycotts after the Holocaust and World War II. In this period, individual boycotts as expressions of identity or the desire to memorialize someone or something tended to replace public boycotts that sought direct political consequences.

In brief closing remarks, each of the three organizers pointed out general themes that ran through the three conference days and highlighted areas for further research. Uwe Spiekermann raised the question of Jewish exceptionalism. Its essence and definition remained unclear, he argued, as did the problem of how to compare the Jewish experience with that of other groups. Can Jewishness really be compared as such — or is it necessary to compare more specific circles, such as Jewish immigrants, elites, or marginalized groups? Second, for Spiekermann, many (Jewish) historians still emphasize Jewish contributions to the rise and the establishment of modern consumer cultures. But such connections raise many issues — not only in relation to the notorious link between Jews and capitalism as posited by Werner Sombart. It seems that it is necessary to embed such stories in more general histories. In particular, an analysis of Jewish history through the lens of comparative consumer cultures would open new opportunities for a broader and less isolated Jewish
history. Third, spaces matter. The differences between Europe, the United States, and Israel were striking, even across similar branches and institutions. Regional variation was important, as well as differences between urban and rural settings, in borderlands or on frontiers. Fourth, time and timing need to be examined very carefully. Business history’s strong emphasis on detailed chronologies and empirical evidence leads to analyses of the Jewish experience of modern consumer cultures whose terms differ from those of cultural history. Nevertheless, consumer cultures were a crucial component of society already in the nineteenth century, so analysis should not be limited to the twentieth century, or the interwar or postwar periods.

In addition, Spiekermann pointed out auspicious new fields of research. First, goods, or more generally commodities, are a promising topic. The social and commercial life of many “Jewish” products has yet to be written, as has the place of goods in defining Jewishness. Second, looking at the self-perceptions and identities of Jews in modern consumer cultures, which are closely linked to the performance and perception of Jews in these fields, provides insight into the coherence and internal divisions of modern Judaism. Third, the role of business in the Jewish experience allows for a new understanding of the transition of Judaism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While in the beginning mostly associated with money and the rise of the financial sector, peddling offered one path for consumer-goods industries and retailing to become dominant, at least temporarily. But how was this related to the ongoing transition to advanced services, to science and law? Fourth, Jewish consumer cultures included alternatives to capitalism. Zionism and consumer cooperatives (Oppenheimer, Staudinger) questioned the dominant trends in modern history — and fit well with the strong anti-capitalist sentiments among many Jews in the twentieth century.

The closing discussion brought further topics into view: Paul Lerner noted the utility of anthropological and semiotic approaches to the study of goods and their meanings, the position of Jews as consumers and non-consumers, the gendering of consumption and work in consumer industries, and the differences between the intended and real use of products. He also called attention to the strengths and limits of consumption as a category of historical analysis and noted that the consumption of objects and the consumption of culture require different metrics and conceptual tools. Anne Schenderlein emphasized the coding and double-coding of goods and practices, the visual
dimensions of consumer cultures, and the intertwined relationship between production and consumption. Other participants mentioned the relevance of advertising, the question of specific Jewish ways of consuming, the idea of building trust, and the importance of ethnic and familial networks in the emergence of retail industries. At the end, the participants agreed that the conference had offered many persuasive answers to the question Reuveni posed of why consumer cultures matter in Jewish history.

Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Paul Lerner (USC), and Anne Schenderlein (GHI)
TWELFTH WORKSHOP ON EARLY MODERN CENTRAL EUROPEAN HISTORY

Conference held at the German Historical Institute London, May 8, 2015. Co-sponsored by the GHI London, the GHI Washington, and the German History Society. Conveners: Bridget Heal (University of St. Andrews), David Lederer (National University of Ireland, Maynooth), Jenny Spinks (University of Manchester), and Angela Schattner (GHI London). Participants: Martin Christ (University of Oxford), Kirsten Cooper (University of North Carolina), Duane Corpis (NYU Shanghai), Renate Dürr (University of Tübingen), Christopher Kissane (London School of Economics), Patrick Milton (University of Cambridge), Gerd Schwerhoff (University of Dresden), Tricia Ross (Duke University, Durham, NC), Paul Strauss (University of Nebraska, Lincoln).

Following the success of the previous workshops, this was the twelfth collaboration between the German Historical Institute and the German History Society. This year the workshop was also co-organized by the German Historical Institute Washington, which generously provided travel scholarships for North American Ph.D. students to participate in the workshop. Breaking with tradition, this workshop was held not in autumn but in spring in order to avoid a clash with other German history related events, such as the German History Society’s Annual General Meeting. The workshop was very well attended, bringing together twenty-eight scholars from as far afield as Oxford, Dresden, North Carolina, and Shanghai. The nine papers were carefully organized, allowing participants to discuss a large variety of topics in early modern German history, including personal, social, and economic relationships; notions of religious culture; and the struggle for peace and order, not only in Germany, but also in central Europe.

After a warm welcome, the first session, chaired by Angela Schattner, dealt with order and disorder in early modern Germany. Christopher Kissane gave insights into his current project, ‘bEUcitizen’, investigating the development of local citizenship in Europe over the past 500 years. In his paper, Kissane presented common and divergent patterns of citizenship across a range of German cities up to 1789. Evidence suggests that citizenship was more widespread in Free Imperial Cities than in territorial cities, but it was not easily available because of a number of barriers such as fees, religious background,
and gender. Thus women could technically obtain citizenship, but were effectively excluded. Gerd Schwerhoff gave illuminating insights into the culture of invective. Spurred by recent terrorist attacks on the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, Schwerhoff shed light on the culture of invective in the sixteenth century. In the early modern period insults fulfilled an important social function: teasing, taunting rituals, and insult competition were means of integrating into certain social groups. Insults were especially popular among students, but they were found at all levels of society, in particular in the learned elites. Within this culture of invective, people of different faiths were target groups. Consequently, contemporaries of Martin Luther were not taken aback by his strong language.

The second session focused on global religious networks and was chaired by Bridget Heal. In her paper, Renate Dürr investigated the Jesuits’ impact on the early Enlightenment. Dürr showed how missionaries contributed significantly to the production of knowledge in Europe through their activities all over the globe. Their reports clearly demonstrate the communicative process of acquiring knowledge aided by local populations. The Jesuits thus contributed, implicitly and explicitly, to Enlightenment debates. Adding to this global perspective, Duane Corpis investigated how charities in Protestant parishes increasingly widened their geographical scope. By the seventeenth century there was already a steady shift towards global charity networks such as those providing disaster relief for cities that had recently been attacked. With expanding trade networks, these long-distance charity networks grew in size. Corpis illustrated his arguments with the example of Erfurt. Whereas in the sixteenth century the city had given charity to recipients outside the parish on only four occasions, by the eighteenth century, it catered for many more foreign recipients over a much larger geographical area. Similarly, in Augsburg 20 per cent of the *Evangelische Wesenskasse* went outside the city between 1730 and 1770.

After lunch the focus shifted towards religious culture in early modern Germany. Tricia Ross opened the session by presenting parts of her Ph.D. project on the relationship between religion and medicine. In her paper Ross focused on various Protestant sermons and commentaries on Sirach (Ecclesiasticus). Although Lutherans denied Sirach a place in the Biblical canon, it was nonetheless frequently used, especially chapter 38, which deals with the relationship between physicians and patients. In discussions on Sirach, physicians
were presented as imitators of the Great Physician, Christ, offering not only a cure for the body, but also consolation for the soul. Sermons also formed the basis for Paul Strauss’s paper, which focused on the depiction of Ottoman Turks. Comparing sermons by Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed preachers, Strauss concluded that they functioned as abridged history stories. They were intended to transmit general knowledge about the origins of the Turks, the spread of Islamic empires, and (often violent) interactions between Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, many preachers used such sermons to prove exegetical points, but also to build confessional boundaries. The third paper, given by Martin Christ, concentrated on the boundaries of toleration in a multi-confessional region, Upper Lusatia. A closer look at the three editions of a Catholic hymn book produced in this area reveals that it cannot be simply classified as a product of the Counter-Reformation. Instead the visual, textual, and aural elements point to a complex and multi-layered vision of Catholicism in Upper Lusatia which accommodated Slavonic and Lutheran influences.

The fourth panel of the day widened the geographical scope once again by focusing not exclusively on Germany, but on central Europe. This last session, chaired by David Lederer, discussed confessional and national crises. In his paper on confessional crises in early eighteenth-century central Europe, Patrick Milton explored responses to religious persecution in the Holy Roman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Despite considerable differences in constitutional arrangements, contemporaries often viewed the Reich and the Commonwealth in similar terms. This facilitated interventions, especially on confessional matters. The Commonwealth was strongly influenced by the culture of mutual surveillance and external intervention in the Reich, a fact often criticized by leading members of the Polish establishment. Kirsten Cooper investigated national rhetoric in France and the Holy Roman Empire during the late seventeenth century, when these two territories conducted almost continuous warfare against each other. A survey of numerous political pamphlets reveals that well before the era of modern nationalism, national rhetoric was an important persuasive tool used to encourage political mobilization. Concepts of “Germanness” and “Frenchness” were often used to persuade Germans to support the Emperor.

Each session was followed by lively discussions that addressed questions about religious and national identities, the dissemination of ideas, and their reception. At the end of the workshop, attendees
felt that the papers had a good chronological spread that allowed for a perspective on the early modern period as a whole. Overall, it was a thought-provoking workshop that introduced original, new work on various aspects of early modern German history. Participants also continued to discuss concepts of honor, identity, order, and disorder in early modern Germany, issues that had already been raised at the German History Society’s Annual General Meeting in September 2014. The next early modern workshop, to be held on 6 May 2016, is already much anticipated.

Saskia Limbach (St. Andrews)
A GREAT DIVIDE?
AMERICA BETWEEN EXCEPTIONALISM AND TRANSNATIONALISM

Conference at the Center for Advanced Studies, Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU), Munich, Germany, May 21-22, 2015. Co-sponsored by the German Historical Institute, the Thyssen Foundation, the Center for Advanced Studies (LMU) and the Catholic University of America. Conveners: Uwe Luebken (LMU), Michael Kimmage (Catholic University), Andrew Preston (Cambridge University) and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI). Participants: Casey Blake (Columbia University), Dirk Boenker (Duke University), Angus Burgin (Johns Hopkins University), Julio Decker (University of Darmstadt), Sarah Earnshaw (LMU), Michelle Engert (LMU), Daniel Geary (Trinity College, Dublin), Stefan Huebner (Bundeswehr University, Munich), Charlotte Lerg (LMU), Emily Levine (University of North Carolina, Greensboro), Laura McDonald (University of Portsmouth), Mary Nolan (New York University), Brendon O’Connor (University of Sidney), Helle Posdam (University of Copenhagen), Katharina Schmidt (Yale Law School), Matthew Sutton (Washington State University), Julius Wilm (University of Cologne), Samuel Zipp (Brown University).

“A Great Divide?” was an international gathering of historians who revisited the old problem of American exceptionalism. The conference was rooted in the following claims: that American exceptionalism has successfully been challenged in the past several decades by historians dedicated to transnationalism; that these historians have demonstrated the interconnectedness of American history, its stature as a nation among nations, in Thomas Bender’s phrase; that nevertheless the trope of American exceptionalism remains alive and well in American politics; and that it is worthwhile to explore the particularities and peculiarities of American history, not in hopes of proving some argument for the superiority of American institutions, but to grasp fully the complicated balance of the local and transnational, the unique and universal, in U.S. history. The conference was introduced by Michael Kimmage, who drew attention to the subject of American exceptionalism outside the United States, to the question of whether there can be a non-normative theory of American exceptionalism and to the strange dynamic whereby an academic generation did its utmost to kill the notion of American exceptionalism only to see this notion flourish in the rhetoric of American politicians, not least in the speeches of President Barack Obama.
The first panel examined foreign policy. Dirk Boenker took up the peculiarities of American history through a non-exceptionalist analytical lens, focusing on naval officers and their professional politics. He argued for the interlocking simultaneity of cross-national commonality, difference, and interconnection that shaped American navalism in the global age before the First World War, reclaiming the pre-war sense of mutual entanglement and convergence among contemporaneous U.S. and European observers of the advance of militarism before 1914 and directing attention to the particulars of U.S. involvement in military geopolitics and arms builds. Next, Julio Decker examined German and American early-twentieth century colonial infrastructure projects, providing a comparative perspective on labor recruitment and management practices as well as on technology. He focused on the structural similarities of the policies applied in the colonies in hopes of normalizing, or even provincializing, the United States and the German Empire. Decker’s paper investigated the two nations’ histories from the margins, scrutinizing colonial conceptualizations and practices and the transformation of colonial policies in their transfer back to the metropole. His intent was to widen the global perspective and to retrace the patterns that made the United States and the German Empire regular empires. In his comment, Andrew Preston noted the “infrastructural power” of the U.S. in the first era of globalization, 1880–1920; he added the principle of civil religion to the international histories of globalization; and he emphasized the interdependency among empires at this time, especially the many ways in which Britain facilitated America’s rise to global power in the nineteenth century.

The second panel addressed academia and intellectual life. Emily Levine traced the contemporary university back to a competitive “knowledge race,” in which reformers posed new questions about the role of research in society. Levine argued that the university took a distinct path from other modern institutions: universities are exceptional in that they remain at least nominally dedicated to higher ideals, a dedication that explains their incomplete absorption into the global economy. An examination of the history of the research university from the perspective of the “knowledge race” between Germany and America forces us to rethink our standard histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Daniel Geary concentrated on Louis Hartz, whose influential The Liberal Tradition in America (1955) is often seen as a crucial text in American exceptionalism. Hartz’s comparative analysis belies the caricature of exceptionalists as solely focused on the United States, Geary explained. In Hartz’s often overlooked
The Founding of New Societies (1964), he claimed that ideological paralysis was a general feature of European settler societies. The paper also illustrated that critical exceptionalism remained a significant scholarly tradition among many scholars who came of age in the 1960s, though they are typically seen as rejecting exceptionalism. Finally, Geary distinguished American exceptionalism as a theory from American triumphalism as a political stance. In her comment, Charlotte Lerg synthesized the trans-Atlantic and especially the German-American valences of the arguments put forward by Levine and Geary.

The last panel on Thursday dealt with political economy. Samuel Zipp chronicled the life of Wendell Willkie and his recognition of a “one world” outlook. Americans, Willkie argued, had to forego both the “narrow nationalism” and the “international imperialism” practiced by the European powers. Positing Willkie’s transnationalism as the road not taken in the 1940s, Zipp investigated the emergence of an American power that was at once self-assured in the rightness of its vision for the world and yet sometimes unable to see itself as the world power it was coming to be. Brendon O’Connor analyzed the ideology of American exceptionalism, identifying it as a key element of American nationalism, a mythological and often dangerous ideology. It rests on the exceptionalism of birth, the exceptionalism of opportunity, and the exceptionalism of role. The essential problem, according to O’Connor, is that few academics have spent enough time defining the concept of American exceptionalism. He concluded that American exceptionalism is best understood as an ideology. Angus Burgin, grounding his comments in the dilemmas of political economy, aligned Willkie’s theses with “liberal developmentalism,” detecting a shift in the ideology of American exceptionalism and in this ideology’s history, from theological to social-science narratives.

In her keynote address, Mary Nolan offered a portrait and a critique of American exceptionalism. In the 1940s, the United States was a center of economic production; it has since replaced economic production with finance. Diverging from the social democracies of Western Europe in the 1970s, the United States used the cloak of normative exceptionalism and the loudly proclaimed faith in its own virtue to justify its unilateral action, its market fundamentalism and its use of human rights as a tool of power politics. The fall of communism in 1991 provided a triumphalist gloss to the exceptionalist project, leading us to the ominous state of affairs since the Iraq War and the presidency of George W. Bush.
Friday’s first panel was dedicated to law. Katherina Schmidt detailed the contention that modern American legal culture is qualitatively different from the legal cultures found in other places and, furthermore, that this difference is the result of America’s singular standing and experience among the nations of the world. She argued that there were periods of extreme jurisprudential contingency during which countries like France or Germany could have gone down a path similar to that of the United States; that early twentieth-century American jurists were heavily influenced by pre-existing European attempts at creating a more “realistic” jurisprudence; and that the reasons for the divergences that occurred in spite of these conceptual and ideological commonalities are more complex than proponents of the “American Jurisprudential Exceptionalism” paradigm have tended to acknowledge. Helle Porsdam traced related themes, illustrating that the American legal discourse has now become a global legal discourse: what used to be an American “rights talk” has become a global “human rights talk.” Corporate law and the tendency to treat corporations more and more as people used to be uniquely American. Now it underpins the global acknowledgement of cultural rights, an area of human-rights law that is the new human-rights frontier. In her comment, Michelle Engert asked a series of ethical questions about the nature of American law in those areas where it tends to diverge from the European legal tradition.

Culture was the theme of the next panel. Laura McDonald discussed postwar productions of musicals in Germany, Austria, Japan, Korea and the Philippines, exploring how their citizens practiced American values and national pride through song and dance. McDonald interpreted the the musical as an American form that represents an interaction between (non-American) domestic and American theater industries. Learning and practicing American values and ideals through the translation and performance of musicals has contributed to nation building and developed new skills and confidence in growing domestic industries. Sarah Earnshaw investigated the increasing militarization of American exceptionalist discourses in U.S. foreign policy from the 1960s onwards. A messianic streak in American foreign policy, built on binaries of self and other, led to the unilateralist and interventionist Bush Doctrine. American exceptionalism thus serves as an ideological cover for the depredations of American foreign policy. In his comment, Casey Blake asked about the affect (as opposed) to the ideology of American musicals, and their felt experience; he added the more self-doubting, ironic and worried
voices of George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr to the roster of assertive exceptionalists in Earnshaw’s paper.

Political culture was the topic of the conference’s final panel. Stefan Huebner investigated the staging of regional Asian sports events during the Cold War. Approaching American exceptionalism from the “periphery” reveals the United States’ role as an extremely important strategic partner. His paper focused on the Asian Games from 1951 to the present. What began as an American missionary and imperial venture in Asia later acquired the trappings of post-American Asian-ness. Huebner connected the transnational relations between American and Asian actors to American and Asian Cold War propaganda, to development policy, and to the rise and demise of “modernization theory.” Julius Wilm focused on notions of “free land” and, in particular, on the Homestead Act, starting in the 1830s. In their adoption of “free land” as a legislative agenda, Americans drew (selectively) on Mexican precedent, which, as Wilms pointed out, did not prevent both “free land” and the Homestead Act from becoming signifiers to Americans of American political and economic selfhood. In his comment, Matthew Sutton delved into the missionary history that illuminates Huebner’s subject, and he expanded on the translational logic implicit in Wilm’s paradoxical example of American exceptionalism.

The concluding discussion outlined several gaps in the conference. It was agreed that crucial additions, were one to handle American exceptionalism in a comprehensive fashion, would need to include religion, race, gender and the study of “comparative exceptionalisms,” from the “chosen people” of the Old Testament to the messianic energies of Putin’s Russia. It was observed that the papers could be divided into two categories: those that addressed difference or peculiarity — the many ways, comparatively speaking, that U.S. history is unique, unusual, strange and particular; and those papers that looked specifically at American exceptionalism as a phrase or as a doctrine — the idea that America was founded in liberty, unlike any other country, and has a unique mission to give, spread or impose its vision of liberty on the world around it. While the prospect of an edited volume was met with enthusiasm, such a project would have to fill in the gaps identified at the conference to make the scholarly grade, and it would have to navigate the two varieties of American exceptionalism on display at the conference — exceptionalism as peculiarity versus “doctrinal exceptionalism,” an exceptionalism of belief or conviction.

Michael Kimmage (Catholic University of America)
21ST TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR: TWENTIETH-CENTURY GERMAN HISTORY

Seminar at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, May 27–May 30, 2015. Co-organized by the German Historical Institute Washington and the BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, in cooperation with the Historisches Seminar of the Humboldt Universität. Convener: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington), and Michael Wildt (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin). Faculty Mentors: Donna Harsch (Carnegie Mellon University), Elizabeth Harvey (University of Nottingham), Paul Nolte (Freie Universität Berlin), and S. Jonathan Wiesen (Southern Illinois University). Participants: Maria Birger (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin), Mikkel Dack (University of Calgary), Elsa Duval (Leibniz Institut für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz), Stefanie Eisenhut (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin), Jane Freeland (Carleton University, Ottawa), Michael Geheran (Clark University, Worcester), Kerstin Hofmann (Universität Mannheim), Scott Krause (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Ines Langelüddeke (Universität Hamburg), Aline-Florence Manent (Harvard University), Darren O’Byrne (Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge University), Sonja Ostrow (Vanderbilt University), Lisa Renken (Queen Mary, University of London), Briana Smith (University of Iowa), Hagen Stöckmann (Georg-August Universität Göttingen), Lauren Stokes (University of Chicago).

The twenty-first Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History, co-organized by the German Historical Institute Washington and the BMW Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University, was dedicated to twentieth-century German history and was generously hosted by Michael Wildt at the Humboldt University in Berlin. As always, the seminar brought together eight doctoral students from North America and eight from Europe, all whom are working on dissertations in German history. The seminar was organized in eight panels, featuring two papers each, which opened with two comments by fellow students, followed by discussion of the precirculated papers. Meeting in a beautiful conference room at the heart of the old Hauptgebäude of the Humboldt University on Unter den Linden, the seminar was characterized by a perfect combination of intellectual rigor and a spirit of collegiality.

The first panel featured two papers on Nazi Germany. Michael Geheran’s paper “The Limits of Military Sacrifice: Jewish Frontkämpfer
in the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft” examined how Jewish veterans appropriated nationalist narratives of the “front experience” and asserted their status as *Frontkämpfer* in the early years of the Third Reich despite Nazi efforts to exclude them from the people’s community. Geheran argued that traditional German discourses that equated military wartime sacrifice with citizenship and national belonging persisted after 1933 and continually forced the Nazis to make compromises in their anti-Jewish campaign. Darren O’Byrne’s paper “Political Civil Servants and the German Administration under Nazism” explored the reasons why the German civil service willingly complied with the radical demands of the Nazi regime by looking at the personal biographies and professional experiences of some of the Third Reich’s top bureaucrats. By examining the role of the “new breed” of Nazi civil servant – those who were appointed solely because of their ties with the NSDAP – in more detail, O’Byrne demonstrated that the *Gleichschaltung* of the civil service was a two-way process that also resulted in the “bureaucratization” of Nazi administrative elites and, occasionally, in shifting patterns of loyalty towards the NSDAP.

The second panel examined the process of denazification. Mikkel Dack’s paper “Retreating into Trauma: The Fragebogen, Denazification, and Victimhood in Occupied Germany” examined the denazification questionnaire that was distributed by the four Allied military governments to nearly twenty million Germans after World War Two. Responding to the questionnaire, he argued, forced Germans to interpret, describe, and reinvent personal traumas of war and hardships of dictatorship. This process, Dack contended, created an environment in which recovery from trauma was exceedingly difficult because inventing and perpetuating a victim status could be used as a powerful currency for economic and social gain. Kerstin Hofmann’s paper “Erwin Schüle als Leiter der Ludwigsburger Zentralen Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Justiz, Politik und Gesellschaft” examined Erwin Schüle, the first director of the Ludwigsburg Office charged with prosecuting Nazi crimes, and his role in its investigations of Nazi crimes. She argued that the circumstances of his resignation due to his own Nazi past have to be understood in the context of the East-West conflict during the Cold War and the changing social and political climate of West Germany.

The third panel explored two different aspects of social research in postwar West Germany. Sonja Ostrow’s paper, “Measuring
Democracy: Public Opinion Research in Western Germany, 1945–55,” examined the goals and methods of public opinion polling in Germany after 1945. Ostrow argued that the work of the early practitioners of opinion research, including the U.S. occupation forces, the Allensbach and Emnid Institutes, and the reconstituted Frankfurt School, was guided by a utopian faith in the ability of empirical opinion research to spread democratic cultural and political practices but also by a fundamental distrust of their German research subjects. Lisa Renken’s paper “The ‘almighty achievement principle’: The critique of Leistung between 1965 and 1975” mapped the redefinition of concepts of Leistung and Leistungsgesellschaft by student protestors, activists, psychologists, pedagogical experts, and sociologists in the period from 1965 to 1975. Renken demonstrated that sociological research started questioning the empowering nature of Leistung already in the decade before the 1968 student protests, thus substantiating the idea of the “long sixties” as a period of change in West German society. She also argued that psychological appropriations of the concept of Leistung extended into mainstream debates and practice after 1968, forming part of the focus on a fragile, emotionalized self that defined the early 1970s.

The fourth panel was dedicated to the theme of exile and transnational networks. Scott Krause’s paper “Propagandists of Freedom: The Conversion of Exiled ‘Revolutionary Socialists’ into West Berlin Cold Warriors, 1933–1959” argued that West Berliners’ rapid acceptance of liberal democracy was not just a product of the Cold War but of a transatlantic network of returned Social Democrats and liberal American occupation officials, who shared Nazi-imposed exile in the past, determination against Communism in the present, and hopes for an electable Left in the future. To advance their agenda, they crafted the narrative of heroic West Berliners as an “outpost of freedom” in the Cold War. Maria Birger’s paper “West-Östliche Erfolgsgeschichten? Vernetzung und öffentliche Inszenierung von westlichen Journalisten, Intellektuellen, Politikern und sowjetischen Dissidenten (1960–1980)” examined the network that connected Soviet dissidents and Western journalists, intellectuals and politicians in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition to showing how these transnational networks reflected the larger political and cultural context of the Cold War, Birger analyzed how the West German media reported on Soviet dissidents and the effects this reporting had on the careers of both journalists and dissidents.

The fifth panel was devoted to cultural history. Elsa Duval’s paper “Aachen Cathedral on the 1978 UNESCO World Heritage List: The
West German ‘Commitment to Europe’ examined how and why, in 1978, West Germany chose the Aachen Cathedral as the first site that it nominated for the UNESCO World Heritage List. Her analysis focused on how the actors used material culture and the distant past in an attempt to shape the international image of the Federal Republic, a European discourse of history, and the World Heritage List. Briana Smith’s paper “Creative Alternatives: Experimental Art Scenes and Cultural Politics in Berlin, 1971-1999” investigated the democratic turn in cultural politics across West Germany in the 1970s and the unique factors shaping the reforms in West Berlin. Smith identified how artists and art associations as well as the West Berlin Senate sought to incorporate visual art into everyday life and thus contributed to the island city’s expanding experimental art scene in the late 1970s.

The sixth panel addressed the history of education and child welfare. Hagen Stöckmann’s paper “Führerschaft als individuelle Haltung? Das nationalsozialistische System der Nachwuchsführerausbildung am Beispiel der NS-Ordensjunker” examined the 1930s as a transformative decade during which a new form of Haltungserziehung established itself, which saw the primary aim of education in the shaping of “character.” In his analysis of NS-Ordensburgen as educational institutions inspired by the idea of Haltungserziehung, Stöckmann argued that the lack of concrete practical guidance at these Ordensburgen and the resulting efforts of students to shape their own education might help to explain the motivation of Nazi perpetrators. Lauren Stokes’ paper, “‘Illiterate in Two Languages’: Child Welfare and Child Migration in 1980s West Germany,” showed that sociological research on the “second generation” of migrants that linked child welfare to a stable national identity was used by politicians in order to justify new restrictions on child migration. Her paper also suggested that in the arena of migration policy, “Westernization” and “Europeanization” often led to restriction, not liberalization.

The seventh panel examined aspects of the history of West Germany and West Berlin. Aline-Florence Manent’s paper “The Intellectual Origins of the ‘German Model’: Conceptions of Scales in the early Federal Republic of Germany” reconstructed the ways in which West German statesmen and public lawyers theorized the challenges of democratic reconstruction in early postwar Germany. These West German political actors, Manent argued, drew on nineteenth-century German political and legal theory in order to formulate a localist
conception of democratic governance and to ensure that the new German polity would preserve a “humane” scale, amenable to the development of civic republicanism. Stefanie Eisenhut’s paper “Amerikaner in West-Berlin: Die Geschichte einer ‘imagined community’” analyzed the development of a German-American “imagined community” in West Berlin and the different narratives to which it gave rise. Although narratives of Berlin as an “island in a red sea,” the “picture-window of the West,” the “thorn in the side of communism” or the “outpost of freedom” may smack of pathos and propaganda today, Eisenhut argued, they played an important role in endowing postwar West Berlin with an identity that anchored the city in a transatlantic community connecting it closely to the United States.

The eighth and final panel explored the relationship between private and public life in postwar West and East Germany. Jane Freeland’s paper “Domestic Violence in a Divided Berlin, 1969-1990” studied attempts to forge a more active citizenry in both East and West by examining how people like friends, neighbors and relatives were brought in to help address domestic violence in East and West Berlin. Although engaging others in intervention helped to raise awareness of violence in the family, Freeland argued, it also served to further privatize domestic violence because community action was used as a substitute for a more thorough reckoning of systemic and structural gender inequality. Ines Langelüddeke’s paper “Schweigen, Scham und Traditionen: Der Adelsfriedhof in den Erzählungen der zurückgekehrten Adelsfamilie und der Dorfbewohner nach 1989/90” presented a case study of the Adelsfriedhof (aristocratic cemetery) of the Eastern German town of Siebeneichen. After German unification, Langelüddeke argued, the cemetery functioned as a space that created distance between the inhabitants of the village and the aristocratic families that were returning to the village from West Germany. Whereas the village inhabitants focused on the cemetery’s fate during the GDR era, which could give rise to feelings of shame or fear as well as strategic silences, the aristocratic families regarded the cemetery as a place of tradition that created connections to earlier generations and to the manorial life before 1945.

Reflecting on the seminar’s topics and themes in the final discussion, participants noted that cultural history and intellectual history had been quite prominent, while social and economic history were comparatively neglected. Liz Harvey and Jonathan Wiesen observed that, instead of “looking for old Nazis” in postwar Germany, most postwar
papers did an excellent job of approaching the process by which postwar Germans adapted to democracy with great nuance: paying attention to the available options of self-fashioning and remaining open to the possibility that some Germans may, if only gradually, have become genuinely converted to democracy. Donna Harsch and Paul Nolte applauded the participants for having presented papers that were balanced and judicious. At the same time, Harsch urged the doctoral students to think a bit more about the role of structure and interests, and Nolte noted that he would have wished for more “edginess” and encouraged the authors to engage larger interpretative debates and concepts. In a similar vein, Michael Wildt gave some excellent advice with regard to the publication of the dissertations presented at the seminar. Given the flood of publications, he advised, every author needs to keep in mind the question “Warum soll das jemand lesen?” Every book needs to provide a compelling answer to that question right at the outset and at the beginning of every chapter. Given the impressive quality of the papers presented, the mentors and organizers of the seminar are confident that the dissertation writers will turn their projects into books that will indeed draw their readers in.

Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)
THE PRACTICES OF STRUCTURAL POLICY IN WESTERN MARKET ECONOMIES SINCE THE 1960S

Conference at the Center for Contemporary History Potsdam (ZZF), May 28-29, 2015. Co-sponsored by the ZZF, the German Historical Institute Washington, and the Department of History, Emory University. Conveners: Ralf Ahrens (ZZF), Astrid M. Eckert (Emory University), and Stefan Hördler (GHI / Buchenwald & Mittelbau-Dora Memorial Foundation). Participants: Frank Bösch (ZZF), Marc Buggeln (Humboldt University Berlin), Martin Chick (University of Edinburgh), Rüdiger Gerlach (ZZF), Rüdiger Graf (ZZF), Ferenc Gyuris (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest), Fabio Lavista (Bocconi University, Milano), Marc Levinson (Washington, D.C.), Christian Marx (University of Trier), Christopher Neumaier (ZZF), Kim C. Priemel (Humboldt University Berlin), Dorothee Ryser (University of Basel), Anne Sudrow (ZZF), Christos Tsakas (University of Crete), and Laurent Warlouzet (Artois University).

Under the heading “after the boom,” the 1970s have been the subject of historical research for some time now, at least in German historiography, where they stand for a time of accelerated structural economic change with its concomitant social transformations. The workshop “The Practices of Structural Policy in Western Market Economies since the 1960s” focused on political reactions to the economic challenges of those post-boom years. These reactions, including protectionism, cartel formation and state subsidies, have been controversially discussed ever since their implementation but have remained under-researched among historians. “Structural policy,” as Germans tend to call it, or “industrial policy” in the English-speaking world, did not aim at improving macroeconomic structures but targeted particular sectors, regions, and even individual companies. The workshop addressed the origins of such policies, the political debates surrounding them as well as the practices and consequences of structural policies in Western Europe and the United States.

In his opening statement, Ralf Ahrens emphasized the opportunity to gain a comparative perspective of structural policy approaches in various countries and across international organizations. Such a comparison would be a first step towards determining the respective role of economic interests and a priori assumptions about future economic development, as well as regional and sectoral specificities.
within the political, economic and societal negotiation processes that led to structural interventions.

The first panel on industrial policies “after the boom” began with Martin Chick’s case study on Great Britain’s industrial policy since 1970. Structural policies with a focus on large industries already played a role during the postwar boom years. If shortfalls in supply were imminent or unemployment on the rise, the government intervened with the argument that the market, left to its own devices, would not adjust quickly enough to altered economic circumstances. The massive deindustrialization of the 1970s renewed debates about industrial policy. As Chick observed, however, government thinking about industrial policy shifted significantly with the rise of neoliberal economic theory. Instead of opting for job security and support of domestic manufacturing and industry, the government battled inflation, enhanced competition and supported labor mobility. Despite the unabated decline of whole industrial sectors like coal and steel and the high long-term unemployment that came with it, the dogma of the self-healing powers of the market prevailed, rendering structural policy all but meaningless.

In the United States, industrial policy followed a fundamentally different path than in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. As Marc Levinson pointed out in the panel’s second paper on U.S. industrial policy from 1969 to 1985, the U.S. government opted for protection against foreign competitors of certain sectors such as apparel, textiles, steel and cars, instead of subsidies. This policy did not show much coherence and design. It was often based on bilateral agreements and did not induce any innovation or modernization processes within the favored industries. The protection of these “old,” non-innovative sectors not only led to deadweight loss but also slowed down productivity growth and therefore the American economic performance as such.

The second panel explored the role of the European Community in industrial policy. Laurent Warlouzet showed how France, Great Britain, the Federal Republic and the European Community (EC) struggled to find a common answer to the steel crisis of the mid-1970s. A truly European solution would have been an obvious route to pursue since the crisis threatened jobs in the leading national economies of the community. Besides, these countries shared an established sector-related institution, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which had traditionally coordinated and regulated the market.
However, it proved difficult to find consensus among the vested interests of the respective national steel companies as well as among the governments involved. France and Great Britain would have preferred a national solution to the crisis, yet individual approaches like these were expected to trigger a subsidy race between EC partner states. Such concerns strengthened the idea of a supranational institution as an arbiter. The West German government objected all along to what it considered a “neo-mercantilist” solution. Warlouzet argued that the late German consent to sweeping controls for the European Commission was a result of the general pro-European climate in Bonn, paired with conflicting attitudes towards structural policy within the administration itself. In the end, there were no alternatives to a supranational European solution anyway because the steel crisis caught up with German companies as well, and steel producers proved unable to organize any form of regulation on their own; subsidy races thus became a distinct possibility. Warlouzet concluded that such a structural policy on the European level was rather the exception than the rule. It only succeeded in the case of steel because it appeared to be the best of a number of bad options.

Christos Tsakas discussed the connection of European integration and industrial policy from the Greek perspective. Beginning with the first administration of Konstantinos Karamanlis and lasting until the second oil crisis, government support for investments in and export of industrial goods constituted one of the main tools of Greek policy. Tsakas explained how Greece fostered close cooperation between its economy and the European Economic Community (EEC), thereby bringing about a boost in industrial productivity. Key components in this process were the close cooperation with West Germany in the modernization of the Greek industrial stock, the successive reduction of trade restrictions with EEC countries, general economic reforms during the second Karamanlis administration that were supported by leading economic figures as well as a generally business-friendly environment during the years of the dictatorship. Despite changing political regimes, the parallel process of the political and economic integration of the EEC turned into a constant in Greek politics. Well into the 1980s, it was carried by a broad societal consensus that was the prerequisite of the various modernization processes.

The third panel addressed the peculiarities of regional structural aid within the framework of regional policy. Ferenc Gyuris deconstructed the western models of spatial economics that emerged
during the Cold War. Key American economic models regarded regional disparities and their related social and political problems as common by-products of economic activity. However, since Communism explained differences in prosperity as the result of capitalist exploitation and propagated more egalitarian and fair alternatives, it became imperative to render the western model more attractive, even for economic peripheries. According to Gyuris, neo-classical economists like Myrdal, Hirschman, Williamson and Friedman therefore generated theories that depicted polarizing effects during capitalist economic growth processes as inevitable but held out the prospect of long-term convergence and a broader distribution of wealth. However, upon closer inspection, Gyuris argued, these constructions might be better understood as working hypotheses rather than fully-fledged theories, not least because they still lacked a robust empirical basis. Gyuris concluded that these western economic theories were dominated by American economic thought and complemented the American geopolitical agenda. Due to the academic authority of the respective authors, these economic explanations were soon treated as facts rather than hypotheses.

Astrid M. Eckert focused on the so-called “zonal borderland aid” program (Zonenrandförderung), one of the most persistent regional aid programs in West German history that supported regions along the inter-German border. Ideological competition between East and West dictated that these border regions be firmly integrated into the newly founded Federal Republic in order to reflect the success of the West German socio-economic model. The subsidized territory amounted to almost twenty percent of West German territory and was of great economic heterogeneity. During the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, government aid to West Berlin and to these borderlands was exempted from European state aid control. The paper sought to explain why, despite this exemption, the European Commissioner for Competition (DG IV) increasingly criticized borderland aid and tried to curtail it, a development that was unacceptable for the West German government for domestic political reasons. Brussels criticized that Zonenrandförderung defined state aid recipients by location, rather than by quantifiable need. Bonn countered that borderland aid was a political, not an economic category of aid and therefore did not fall under the purview of European state aid control. Since a political resolution of the dispute was unlikely, the European Commission decided to litigate several cases of sectoral aid under the umbrella of borderland aid, thereby asserting the increased importance of the
supranational European institutions for national structural policies. Despite these challenges, however, borderland aid was only phased out after unification, which speaks for the path dependency of state aids; once enacted, they prove difficult to withdraw.

Fabio Lavista offered a perspective on the paradigmatic Italian case of regional aid, namely the development of the Mezzogiorno. The institutional framework for aid to Italy’s southern regions was already established during the interwar years. The structural program was characterized by state-directed industrialization projects, top-down investment incentives and assigned a key role to state-run companies in the effort to provide employment. However, the program was also marred by a lack of coordination between central and regional players. As a consequence, local markets experienced distortions and a specialization on less technology-intensive sectors. In the end, the institutional weaknesses of the project turned structural policy for the Mezzogiorno into a failure: short-term political objectives drowned out economic objectives, and the parochial interests of individual actors undermined a constructive and efficient development policy. Lavista concluded with the thesis that the institutional framework of the Mezzogiorno program, devised during the fascist decade of the 1930s, did not undergo sufficient democratic reforms after the war in order to free itself of the purely political objectives of national and regional players.

The fourth panel shifted the perspective to structural policies on the sectoral level. Dorothee Ryser offered a case study of the Swiss dairy sector. When the dairy sector came under price pressures during the 1950s, the Swiss government began to support it in order to save the livelihood of dairy farmers and acknowledge the cultural meaning of this sector for the country. The state task of regulating the dairy sector was delegated to the market-dominating private cartel, the Swiss Cheese Union. The arrangement did not create any incentives to increase productivity or adjust capacities to market demand. Ryser showed how the growing discrepancy between production cost in Switzerland and prices on the world market fueled the need for ever increasing state subsidies in order to keep milk prices stable, a phenomenon soon called the “milk bill”. Yet despite the high expenditures, politics and the electorate continued to support the dairy sector well into the 1990s. Ryser concluded that the sector constituted a sacred cow that was fed by the state against better economic judgment.
The following paper by Stefan Hördler followed up on the contributions of Warlouzet and Levinson and addressed the steel crisis in a comparative West German-American framework. In order to throw the different economic and social historical background of structural change on the regional level into sharper relief, Hördler focused on the former steel plants in Duisburg-Rheinhausen and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Confronted with the struggling steel industry, the U.S. turned to protectionism, which undermined substantial incentives for innovation and prevented the development and application of new technologies. Consequently, this approach did not halt the decline of the sector. Germany, by contrast, opted for a more active role by the state and rolled out investment support while simultaneously limiting production contingents, which led to a modernization of production processes and a specialization on higher-quality products. Hördler’s suggestion that, after 1990, the steel plants in the former GDR became labs for experimentation with structural change might prove of particular interest to future work.

The panel’s third paper, by Ralf Ahrens, provided an analysis of West German structural policy and state subsidies, focusing on political actors at the federal level. The early encounters with the end of the postwar boom in the mid- to late 1960s led to called for a scientifically based industrial policy that would support the development of modern economic structures. The reports on structural change issued by the Federal Economic Ministry were signs of this development. Based on ample empirical data, Ahrens showed not only that subsidies rose significantly between 1968 and 1985 but also that, with the exception of support for Airbus, these subsidies predominantly benefited “sunset industries.” His analysis of federal subsidy reports (Subventionsberichte) revealed that the professed goals of a state-sponsored modernization of the economy and the idea of a socially acceptable reduction of old industrial structures degenerated into rhetorical platitudes. Despite growing criticism that state subsidies constituted “opium for the economy” because they supported the past rather than the future, Ahrens argued that subsidy politics developed its own dynamic. To explain this dynamic and state subsidies’ persistence, however, would require an analysis that would not only include the federal level but also representatives of the federal states, the European Union and the affected companies.

The conference’s final paper, by Christian Marx, dealt with the West European synthetic fiber industry and emphasized to what extent
the interests of individual sectors and businesses could differ from those of politicians in questions of structural policy. The synthetic fiber industry reacted to the crisis of the late 1960s with internal agreements on production quotas and prices that happened to violate German cartel law. Since the problem of excess capacity persisted, a supranational European solution appeared to be a viable solution. However, similar to the complex constellation of interests in the steel crisis, the conflicting interests of individual EEC member states, companies, local trade unions and the European Commission proved difficult to reconcile. In the end, a cartel agreement did emerge. The European Commission backed the agreement because the negative consequences of excess synthetic fiber production as well as Italy’s market-distorting subsidies could not have been reigned in otherwise. The contractual reduction in capacities allowed the companies to reduce the number of employees, preferably in a “socially acceptable” (”sozialverträglich”) fashion, and to focus on innovative new products.

The workshop’s concluding discussion centered on the general character of industrial policy. Here industrial policy emerged less as an instrument to create efficient, modern economic structures and more as a social-political measure that aimed at softening the blow of structural change in sunset industries. Based on the insights of Chick’s paper, Eckert emphasized the long and powerful shadow of the boom years, or golden age, which had entrenched the idea of full employment and prosperity as a universal benchmark. One common thread in several papers, she noted, suggested that industrial policy sought to recover this particular status quo ante by tinkering with symptoms of structural change without acknowledging that the boom years were irretrievably receding; in that sense, industrial policy appears not unlike the maneuvers of an army training for the last war. Another concluding thought held that the price tag of industrial or “structural” policy — if it deserved that name at all — consisted not only of the monies expended as subsidies or deadweight losses, but also of decelerated modernization and productivity of key economic structures. The workshop also pointed towards several issues that would merit further exploration: In order to grasp the origins and momentum of industrial policy, one would need to analyze the dynamic between multiple actors, negotiation processes, and institutional structures. Such an analysis would need to pay attention to the meaning of rent-seeking processes, economic theories, and nationally specific structures and economic traditions. Another potentially fruitful
approach may lie in the analysis of the spatial impact of structural policy over time, such as the consequences for regional employment, labor migration, urban development, and local economic hubs. Given that most papers took a critical view of structural state interventions, the question arises of how to assess the social benefit of state aid, especially considering the alternative scenario of non-intervention and the loss of jobs.

Rüdiger Gerlach (ZZF) and Astrid M. Eckert (Emory University)
NATURE PROTECTION, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST COUNTRIES DURING THE COLD WAR

Conference at the German Historical Institute, Washington, May 29-30, 2015. Co-organized and financed by the Volkswagen Stiftung, the GHI Washington, and the Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown University. Conveners: Astrid Mignon Kirchhof (Georgetown University) and John McNeill (Georgetown University). Participants: Melanie Arndt (Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung, Regensburg), Julia Ault (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Washington), Stephen Brain (Mississippi State University), Kate Brown (University of Maryland, Baltimore County), Laurent Coumel (Centre d’Études des Mondes Russe, Caucasiens et Centre Européen, Paris), Michel Dupuy (Institut d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, Paris), Hendrik Ehrhardt (Technische Universität Berlin), Eagle Glassheim (University of British Columbia), Jacob Darwin Hamblin (Oregon State University), Simo Laakkonen (University of Turku), Brian Leech (Augustana College), Jan-Henrik Meyer (New York University, Berlin), Stephen Milder (Rutgers University), Scott Moranda (State University of New York, Cortland), David Painter (Georgetown University), Viktor Pál (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien), Hrvoje Petrić (University of Zagreb), Rachel Rothschild (New York University), Wilko Graf von Hardenberg (University of Wisconsin, Madison).

Environmentalism emerged in postwar Europe as an arena for both competition and cooperation between communist/socialist and capitalist countries, interlacing state policies and social movements in complex ways that affected the Cold War itself. Conference participants questioned how and to what degree conditions in different social, political, and economic systems impacted nature conservation and environmental politics. Furthermore, papers discussed whether environmental issues led to the de-legitimization of states in addition to exploring factors that help explain the seeming synchronicity of environmentalisms in the East and West: was the similarity across the Iron Curtain a product of imitation, of mutually experienced Cold War pressures, or did it represent the logical state of modernization?

The conference’s first panel, chaired by Kate Brown, noted how differences in the political and economic structures in the East and West complicated environmental policies by analyzing the role of experts.
and scientists. In his paper “The Internationalization of Czechoslovak Environmental Discourse in the 1970s and 1980s,” Eagle Glassheim argued against the normative claim that communist governments were generally immune to popular concerns about the environment. Rather, he suggested, environmental dialogue and worsening environmental conditions on the global level prompted a shift in the state’s priorities from balancing economic growth and environmental protection to containing the political fallout associated with the deteriorating standard of living. Michel Dupuy’s paper, “Acid Rain: An Issue between East and West,” contended that interactions both within the Eastern Bloc and across the Iron Curtain regarding the damaging effects of acid rain shaped domestic policy in the German Democratic Republic on both national and local levels. Furthermore, he linked the state censorship and falsification of scientific findings on acid rain with international and popular de-legitimization of the regime. The panel concluded with Scott Moranda’s paper, “A Brief Moment of Balance,” on agricultural reform in the American sector of postwar Germany. American experts intended to restructure German agriculture on small-scale crop farms, but West German farmers and local officials adopted only those American policies that complemented local environmental conditions.

The second panel, moderated by Astrid Kirchhof, discussed the intersections of the economy and environmental politics. Hendrik Ehrhardt’s paper, “Keeping the Air Clean?” addressed the shifting role of utility companies in West German environmental politics since the early 1970s. He argued that utility companies passed through a series of strategic stages until the early 1980s when they realized they could no longer defeat environmental legislation and finally sought to place themselves at the head of the green movement. This transformation of political strategy contributed greatly to the dramatic reductions in air pollution that were possible by the early 1990s. In his paper, “A Boom without Guidance,” Wilko Graf von Hardenberg turned to Cold War Italy. Instead of producing long-term plans to ameliorate the effects of environmental degradation, the ruling Christian Democrats relied on a patronage system that awarded funds to groups that engaged in localized, short-term projects. The lack of any form of centralized planning meant that there was little concern for the immediate or long-term environmental consequences of industrialization or urban development. Viktor Pál’s paper, “Craving for Growth,” offered a comparison of Eastern and Western European attitudes towards environmental protection by
focusing on a case study of a water treatment plant in northeastern Hungary. Pál argued that capitalist and socialist economies shared certain assumptions about environmental protection: namely, that environmental protection could not be justified without economic growth, while industrial economic growth itself made environmental pollution harder to control.

The third panel, chaired by David Painter, was devoted to national environmental politics. Brian Leech’s paper, “Energy and Environmentalism during the 1970s and 80s,” illuminated the significance of regional differences, arguing that subnational attitudes towards national environmental policies were informed by local conditions. In the American West during the 1970s, tensions between the corporatization of natural resources and growing environmental concern gave rise to grassroots activism with widespread support. The regional combination of resource abundance and low population density shaped perceptions of and reactions to conservation policies. Examining the American-sponsored ‘Water for Peace’ desalinization project in the Middle East, Jacob Darwin Hamblin’s paper, “An American Miracle in the Desert,” described how the so-called “technical solution” to water shortages — the construction of nuclear power plants — was meant to ensure lasting peace in the region. Once nuclear reactors became an option instead of a requirement, however, political and monetary support for the project dissipated, indicating that policymakers and industrialists preferred either a nuclear solution to water scarcity and regional instability or no solution at all. In his presentation on “Successful Soviet Water Protection,” Simo Laakkonen countered the notion of Eastern technical backwardness. His case study of water protection in Lithuania demonstrated that the communist states could have had an alternative model of technical competence had it not been for limited access to and safekeeping of records. LaurentCoumel’s paper, “East-West Competition and the Attempts to Create a Soviet Eco-Power on Water Resources,” offered a rethinking of the Cold War’s impact on environmental policy in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev era Ministry of Water Management and Land Reclamation dominated the internal environmental discourse, ignored elite-driven popular calls for increased protection, and discounted Western water protection practices. The heightened transparency of the Gorbachev era, however, created the space for a more independent ministry that prioritized environmentalism and used water protection as an arena for competition with the West.
In the fourth panel, moderated by John McNeill, presenters discussed the influence of environmental politics on the national and international stage. In his paper, “Relevant Others?” Jan-Henrik Meyer focused on the environmental policy of the European Communities in the early 1970s. He argued that West European policy officials looked to the Eastern Bloc, drawing examples from which they could craft their own policy recommendations, despite political and economic differences. Meyer challenged the notion that environmental policy represented an example of “technocratic internationalism,” in which transnational issues are framed as technical problems to be managed by experts instead of as political questions. He concluded that West European treatment of Eastern policy was not entirely depoliticized.

In her paper on “Transnational Air Pollution and Environmental Diplomacy,” Rachel Rothschild maintained that the climate of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States allowed Nordic countries to exert pressure on acid rain polluters and ultimately bring about the 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. She concluded that the broader effort to ease Cold War hostilities created an environment in which major international agreements concerning acid rain were possible despite the united opposition of major polluters within the European Communities.

Astrid Kirchhof’s paper, “Fighting for Recognition of Sovereignty,” argued that a policy of cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union regarding environmental issues was “primarily a vehicle in and for the détente process.” The 1972 United Nations conference in Stockholm gave the two powers an opportunity to test their commitments towards cooperation, though these efforts were complicated by questions about East Germany’s participation after it was denied equal “quasi-member” status with West Germany and ultimately boycotted the event.

Participants reconvened on the second day for the fifth panel, the first of two discussing the environmental and peace movements, chaired by Hartmut Berghoff. Melanie Arndt’s paper, “Chernobyl Transnational,” described how the 1986 nuclear disaster catalyzed the mobilization of environmental groups that were, because of the fallout’s global impact, heterogeneous and transnational. The lasting ecological effects of the crisis demonstrated the entangled nature of radioactive fallout, provoking a critical rethinking of both the regulation and future of nuclear energy in the United States. Stephen Milder’s “From Anti-Nuke to Ökopax” contended that the unparalleled mobilization and intensity of anti-nuclear proliferation
demonstrations in the early 1980s across West Germany were shaped by anti-nuclear reactor protests of the 1970s. West Germans’ personal and localized concerns over nuclear energy in the 1970s transformed popular attitudes a decade later that equated the anti-nuclear movement in Germany with safety, appealing to a wide social base between the traditional political bipolarity.

During the final panel, moderated by Stephen Brain, participants continued their conversation about the environmental and peace movements. Julie Ault opened the discussion with her paper “Protesting Pollution,” which contrasted the environmental movements in East Germany and Poland. Ault emphasized the culture of protest and relative political freedom of the Polish movement in order to highlight variation within the Eastern Bloc. She concluded that concerns over local environmental problems fed into the anti-nuclear movement after the disaster at Chernobyl and eventually into larger protest movements directed at Eastern regimes, which were perceived as being unable to provide for the health and safety of their citizens. The final panelist, Hrvoje Petrić, presented the case of “Nature Protection, Environmental Thought, and Environmental Social Movements in Socialist Yugoslavia,” a unique example because of Yugoslavia’s intermediate position between the Eastern and Western Blocs. Petrić argued that the trajectory of the Yugoslav environmental movement mirrored that of the ruling communist party itself, both of which became increasingly decentralized following the constitution of 1974. The number of successful local environmental protests “from below” indicated the extent to which the Communist Party was losing its grip on the political monopoly it had once enjoyed.

John McNeill’s closing remarks highlighted three of the most prominent themes from the conference discussions. First, he re-emphasized the paradigm of a porous iron curtain in which pollution, radiation, attitudes, technology, and information were all able to travel from one side of the Cold War divide to the other, though inconsistently over time and place. The global nature of environmental concerns led to McNeill’s second theme, which was related to regional versus national perspectives. How do environmentalisms look different when framed at the subnational or supranational level? Is the model of the East-West divide still a useful tool? Finally, McNeill asked to what extent these environmentalisms represented Cold War phenomena. Were they spurred by nuclear build-up or military production, by Cold War competition to be or to appear more
'green’ than one’s political or economic rivals, or indeed by the quest for safe political space in which East and West could cooperate? Several participants felt that increased production of consumer goods and financial limitations due to debt in the Eastern Bloc characterized those environmental movements as a uniquely Cold War phenomenon. Others felt that environmental issues were equally important as a venue for competition as they were for international cooperation. This question sparked a debate among participants as to whether the Cold War simply represented the context during which environmental change occurred, as Laurent Coumel contended, or was itself a motor of change. Were environmental issues used as tools by politicians, as Astrid Kirchhof argued in the case of East Germany’s quest for sovereignty and legitimacy, or was politics used as a tool by environmentalists, as Rachel Rothschild contended in the case of acid rain legislation? Were these strategies different in an Eastern and Western context? McNeill concluded that future historical studies need to explore the interaction of environmentalism and the Cold War in an East Asian context in order to complete the picture presented by the European-American cases discussed thus far.

Timothy J. Schmalz (Georgetown University) and Natalie Smith (Georgetown University)
Most scholars of African American history agree that the demise of slavery in the United States put black Americans in motion to an unprecedented degree. Following their emancipation in 1865, freed slaves left the plantations in the South as missionaries, journalists, agronomists, scientists, and political activists, traveling not only to the North, but also to the Caribbean, Africa, Europe, and Asia. As Paul Gilroy has outlined, these movements stood at the core of the “black Atlantic,” the ongoing spatial and cultural formation of Afro-diasporic exchange that transcends both national and ethnic boundaries. This workshop revisited Gilroy’s concept of the black Atlantic from the perspective of the U.S. South. It explored the influence that the South has had on shaping how African Americans experienced and interpreted race as a global issue. In particular, the workshop traced the relationship that black Americans developed to the South as they traveled overseas, using these movements to place the U.S. South into the context of the colonial and racial regimes of the global South.

The workshop began with Brenda Gayle Plummer’s keynote address, “Race and Place in the Age of Space.” Plummer examined the global significance of race relations in the American South through the development of NASA and the Apollo missions. Noting that the South was “ground zero” for the space program, she explored how narratives of technological advancement were in tension with the racial realities of the South. The paper offered a strong critique of the space
program and of the Federal Government’s failure to challenge racial hierarchies in the South. Pointing out how space travel became associated with whiteness in the national cultural imagination, Plummer documented the extent to which African Americans were often left unmoved by the space race. Indeed, many African American activists used the specter of the space program to critique race and class inequalities in the United States. As one black protestor commented with reference to federal spending on the space program: what does America want — “Rockets or Ricketts?” Space travel was often viewed critically by African Americans, as a way of highlighting inequality and contrasting the difference between white and black America. The Black Panther Party pushed this argument further, with Connie Matthews noting that the space program represented further proof of America’s expansionist character and “imperialist plans.” In the view of the Panthers, the United States’ sought to colonize outer space because it was not content with merely colonizing the Earth. The keynote also documented how African American artists critiqued the whiteness of the space program through popular culture, noting in particular the Afro-Futurism of Parliament Funkadelic and Gil Scott Heron’s (1970) “Whitey on the Moon.” Ultimately Plummer demonstrated how the space race helped further transform the local politics of the South into a geopolitical issue during the cold war. In addition, she provided a pointed critique of the extent to which space was formulated as a white space, which, for many African Americans, further underlined the racial inequalities that existed in the United States.

The first panel on the U.S. South in print culture featured three papers that employed textual and visual sources to highlight the place and prominence of the U.S. South in creating a black transatlantic public sphere. In his talk “Negro Digest: Interpreting the Global South in the 1940s,” Nicholas Grant discussed the border-crossing journalism of the Negro Digest, a leading African American periodical, during the 1940s. Grant demonstrated that the Digest had an international focus and constantly connected Jim Crow racism to black oppression in Latin America and Africa. This emphasis on black solidarity, however, stood in an uneasy relationship with a discourse of African American hegemony in the global anticolonial struggle. The extent to which African Americans served as models of black progress was also the topic of Andrew Barnes’s paper “Jim Crow America Observed: African American Life as Depicted in African Newspapers 1880–1920.” Barnes analyzed perceptions of black American life in the African
press around the turn of the century, arguing that most papers used examples of African American self-improvement in the post-slavery South to counter European ideas about African inferiority. Entering the realm of visual culture, Elisabeth Engel investigated the role of photography as a form of auto-ethnography and self-fashioning prevalent in African American missionary work in Africa. In her paper “Southern Looks: The Image of Africa in African American Missionary Photography since 1900” she showed that labor, agriculture, and dress functioned as productive visual tropes that interlinked the United States and the Global South. This kind of missionary photographic self-fashioning, Engel argued, substantiated ideas of Southernness by reinforcing civilization-primitivism binaries rather than promoting the dominant notion of the pan-African unity of black people.

Providing further evidence for the entangled histories of the United States and the Global South, the second panel looked at how the South was performed in cultural productions based on examples from popular music and film studies. In her talk “Sounding Blackness in the 1890s: Choral Music and the American Global South in Black South African Nationalism,” Laura Chrisman analyzed the Virginia Jubilee Singers, an African American singing ensemble that performed in England and South Africa. She revealed how the transnational reach of commercialized black music around 1890 could inspire and merge visions of African American and black African liberation. Although black South Africans welcomed the Jubilee Singers enthusiastically, Chrisman cautioned against reading their positive reception as evidence that black Africans had no agenda of their own and looked to African Americans as their leaders in a joint struggle. Leigh Anne Duck’s analysis “Local and Global Souths: Framing Civil Rights in Lee Daniels’ The Butler” focused on a Hollywood-produced historical drama released in 2013. Duck recovered a series of explicit and implicit transnational references while exposing a long tradition in mainstream U.S. movies of whitewashing and falsely nationalizing the civil rights struggle. According to Duck, the clash between the regional-moderate and the global-radical version of the black freedom struggle is condensed in the relationship of Cecil Gains, the film’s protagonist, with his son Louis. Despite its conciliatory tone, the film provides some leeway for a radical and transnational re-reading of the Civil Rights Movement in showing how Cecil ultimately joins Louis in protesting against South African apartheid.
The third panel, on the South in motion, provided a close examination of travels that linked the American South and Africa. Robert Trent Vinson opened the session with his paper “Crossing the Water: Chief Albert Luthuli, African Americans and the Global Anti-apartheid Movement.” Focusing on Luthuli and Arthur Ashe, a black athlete, Vinson traced how their travels between the United States and South Africa connected the anti-apartheid movement to the civil rights struggle. Vinson illustrated that Luthuli’s understanding of the global nature of racism and his critiques of apartheid were shaped by his extensive visit to the American South in 1948. He made a compelling case for the important role that black South Africans played in the black freedom struggle in the United States. Imaobong Umoren’s paper “Eslanda Robeson’s Travels and Activism: Tracing the Intersections between the U.S. South and the Global South” also explored the importance of travel in connecting the United States and Global South. Focusing on the journalist and activist Eslanda Goode Robeson, she showed that Robeson’s intimate knowledge of the racial practices of the U.S. South informed her perspective on colonialism and white supremacy. As Umoren argued, Robeson’s travels throughout Africa in 1936-1937 prompted her early support for the International Council on African Affairs (ICAA), an important anticolonial lobbying organization. The panel’s final paper, “A Transatlantic Religious Emancipating Network (1921: U.S. — South Africa — East Africa),” by Ciprian Burlacioiu, explored the merging of organized religion with the Pan-Africanism of Marcus Garvey (UNIA), based on the example of the African Orthodox Church founded by George Alexander McGuire. Burlacioiu showed that the arrival of Garvey’s church in Africa was not due to the circulation of people, but the UNIA newspaper the Negro World. The paper spread Garvey’s message of spiritual freedom and racial nationalism to Africa and thus inspired the formation of numerous African Orthodox congregations in Uganda, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, even after the African Orthodox Church broke away from Garvey’s UNIA in September 1923.

The final panel examined how political activists and organizations connected the U.S. South to other areas around the globe. James Meriwether’s talk, “The Relationship between Our Problems and the Problems of Africans: African-Americans Engage the Black Atlantic Freedom Struggle,” introduced the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) and its conference in the Shoreham Hotel in Washington DC in 1964, marking a key moment of
inter-Southern anticolonial organizing. According to Meriwether, the ANLCA brought together labor organizers such as A. Philip Randolph, Maida Springer, and George McCray together with individuals and organizations from across the African continent, thereby putting decolonization politics on the agenda of both U.S. foreign policy and the black American labor movement. While the ANLCA failed to alter international politics, its efforts gave strength and visibility to African American ties to Africa. Jeannette Eileen Jones’s talk, “‘The Negro’s Peculiar Work’: African American Discourses on U.S. Empire, Race, and the African Question, 1877–1919,” went back to the turn of the century, when the colonization of Africa became discursively linked to the “Negro question,” the term used to refer to American race relations after emancipation. Jones showed that African Americans presented themselves as informal cultural diplomats, who encouraged the United States to intervene in European colonization, thus supporting American expansion and empire-building. The panel closed with Fredrik Petersson’s talk on “Pan-Africanism and International Communism between the Wars (1919–39): Agents of Change and Contradictions.” Drawing primarily on the example of the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUCMW), Petersson demonstrated that Pan-Africanism and international Communism diverged when it came to issues of racism, capitalism, and imperialism. Based on this conflict, Petersson asked us to consider conflicts and tensions that existed in organizations and movements associated with the international left.

The roundtable discussion that closed the workshop centered on whether it is possible to write a history of the black Atlantic and the U.S. South without reproducing the political and cultural hegemony of African Americans. Participants agreed that the currently predominant frameworks of Gilroy’s black Atlantic and of the black or African diaspora, with its implicit focus on displaced populations, have contributed to the privileging of African American experiences. They centralize slavery as the “American exception,” and marginalize the history of colonialism and imperialism, most notably by marginalizing the African experience, i.e. the archives and agency of continental Africans. Based on this criticism, participants discussed new approaches. Laura Chrisman suggested that concepts of internal colonization (Robert Allen) could help scholars place the African American experience within the context of imperial and colonial history. Manfred Berg reminded us that the acquisition of new research skills, such as languages, are crucial when attempting to
demonstrate how African Americans interacted with black individuals and organizations struggling for self-determination around the world. Leigh Anne Duck raised a similar concern, but also emphasized the productivity of ongoing attempts to devise new transnational paradigms, rubrics, and spaces in Southern Studies. Instead of dismissing “Southern exceptionalism,” Duck stressed the need to re-work our understanding of regional specificity when carrying out research. By using conceptual tools such as “enunciation” and “translation,” she suggested, scholars could trace spatial and temporal specifics that go far beyond the traditional borders of the South, and thus challenge its “exceptional” status. Similarly, Gerald Horne added that scholars would always have to account for the demographic reality that the majority of black Americans have lived and are living in the South. He argued that it is not enough to simply deconstruct the South or to re-think the “black Atlantic” on a conceptual level. There is also a need to alter institutional structures that promote American imperialism and exceptionalist myths when it comes to race in the United States. A practical approach to challenge the political and cultural dominance of African Americans, Horne noted, would be to move these conversations to Namibia, a former German colony, and to include researchers from Brazil and Canada. Another overdue approach would be to understand the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution as documents that safeguard white supremacy to the present day. To this end, Horne outlined how the history of the South relates to the legacies and present realities of U.S. imperialism, and thus becomes a field of research in which historians should aim to revise the master narrative of American “democracy.”

Elisabeth Engel (GHI), Nicholas Grant (University of East Anglia), and Mischa Honeck (GHI)
2015 ARCHIVAL SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY


The Archival Summer Seminar in Germany 2015 began with an insult. “Dieser Dreckshammel von Regulat [this jerk of a teacher],” a representative of the German military government wrote in 1945, referring to a county teacher who had passed on confidential information about denazification measures in Landau to his Naziklüngel, his National Socialist clique. This line exemplifies the charm and the considerable challenge many American Ph.D. students experience when they begin to do research in German history. Terms like Dreckshammel, Regulat, and Naziklüngel are contemporary idioms that we do not easily find in dictionaries. In the primary sources, furthermore, such colloquial terms are often only handwritten in German script, the typography that remained in use in Germany officially until 1942, but unofficially for much longer, as all those who went to school in the late 1930s wrote with it until they died.

For more than twenty years, the GHI’s Archival Summer Seminar in Germany has aimed at familiarizing North American Ph.D. students with the intricacies of archival practices crucial to the study of German history. To this end, the program brings ten ABD PhD
candidates to Germany for two weeks each year. In the first week of the program participants attend a German paleography class taught by Walther Rummel, the head of the Landesarchiv Rheinland Pfalz in Speyer. This class is followed by one week of visiting archives on the federal, county, and non-government level. Admission to the program requires a good dissertation project, excellent knowledge of the German language, and the ambition to learn not only a foreign, but a historical language. This year’s application procedure began in January 2015, with the submission of proposals, ABD transcripts, and cover letters, followed by phone interviews with selected participants to examine their listening comprehension and speaking skills in German. In February, ten successful applicants were notified. They came from all across North America — from the West Coast (San Diego), South (Atlanta, Tallahassee, and St. Louis), and North-east (Boston, Binghamton, and Chicago), as well as from Canada (Montreal and Toronto). Though these students’ projects covered a vast period of German history ranging from 1776 to 2014, they shared a conspicuous commonality: all of them were interested in methods of writing “history from below.” Rather than focusing on the nation-state, the ambition of these students was to trace German history from the margins, that is, from the perspectives of people who were excluded, criminalized, prosecuted, or who inhabited transnational spaces. It was this common motivation that brought them to Germany for this seminar.

Rummel began the paleography class in Speyer by presenting the primary source mentioned above. This choice has a long tradition. The note on the “Dreckshammel” is scribbled on the bottom of a printed government circular that otherwise would reveal nothing but inconspicuous formalities. Rummel explained that he likes to present this document to students because it nicely demonstrates that it is often what is most difficult to read — the fleetingly and informally added remarks rather than the printed text — that tells us the most interesting stories. Such notes speak of what contemporaries really thought, what their daily concerns were, and how they interacted with the state as individuals. Based on this line of reasoning, Rummel took this year’s participants through a sample of manuscripts ranging from the early nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. These pieces, in turn, ranged from being written in Kurrentschrift, or Alte Deutsche Schrift, to Sütterlin, the last iteration of old German handwriting. The students, who had studied these German scripts ahead of time in preparation for the class, spent the mornings deciphering
Rummel’s assignments in small groups. Afterwards, they presented their transcripts to Rummel and discussed intriguing findings, common problems, and typical errors made. Most of the documents examined were correspondences between officials and common people, but they dealt with a wide range of issues. Examples include allegations of witchcraft, requests for emigration to the United States, complaints about unjustified incarceration, and, as seen above, attempts to remove national-socialist teachers. Reading these letters gradually helped the students develop a picture of German peoples’ everyday concerns, or *Alltagsgeschichte*, across centuries. In the end, some particularly well-versed students even found an error in Rummel’s own master transcript. Rummel saw this as the most valuable teaching moment of the course, exemplifying that nobody is immune to misreading.

Now equipped with good skills in paleography, the group moved on to Berlin on Friday afternoon. After enjoying a free weekend in the German capital, the students went on a series of visits to different archives. The first, and probably the most popular destination for North American researchers, was the Bundesarchiv Lichterfelde, which is part of the German National Archives. Students were introduced both to its holdings (mainly federal government records) and its terms of usage, including online search aids and ongoing digitization projects. The following days were spent in archives that matched the Bundesarchiv’s holdings in significance: the Behörde für Stasi-Unterlagen, which was declassified only recently, and which specializes in the records of the state security service of the German Democratic Republic (DDR); and the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (Department of Foreign Affairs), which was recently in the news for hiring a commission of historians to research and account for its National Socialist past. To move beyond the national level, students were also introduced to the Landesarchiv Berlin, a state archive. The archival tour ended with visits to the Deutsche Kinemathek, a major non-government repository on film and photography, and to the Staatsbibliothek, Berlin’s major research library and Germany’s major site for manuscript collections that date back to the middle ages.

This core program was complemented by several afternoon workshops that gave students an opportunity to reflect on their own projects and the source types and research methods they involved. In Speyer, participants introduced their research to one another in
two afternoon sessions with brief presentations followed by group discussions. In Berlin, Jens Gründler (Institut für Geschichte der Medizin der Robert Bosch Stiftung), a post-doc who focuses on health discourses in letters of German emigrants to the United States, and Carolyn Taratko (Vanderbilt University), an Archival Summer Seminar alumna who currently researches in Berlin, were invited to meet the group. In their talks, they drew attention to the challenges not only of reading German handwritten sources, but also of understanding the scope of these documents’ explanatory power as “ego-documents”: in addition, both scholars offered practical tips on how to locate such primary sources in archives across Germany, and on how to approach German archivists, who have a reputation for being grumpy.

While the results of this year’s seminar will not fully materialize until the participants publish their dissertations, it is easy to vouch for how effectively it sparked their research ambitions. Many students browsed archives that were part of the program for their own research purposes, and some even ended up visiting additional archives on their own. Over the course of the archival tours, the participants asked the archivists research-related questions with increasing proficiency and precision, and some even got the archivists to help them locate new materials. Researching in a foreign language and in a foreign country is extremely challenging. While the growing self-confidence and determination of these students to become experts of German history is not a guarantee of their success, these two weeks were a great start. Having experienced German research environments and having connected with a group of their North American peers in the process, these junior scholars of history have taken two valuable steps that will open new paths in their future careers, just as seminar participants in decades before them have done.

Elisabeth Engel (GHI)
GHI WELCOMES SIMONE LÄSSIG AS NEW DIRECTOR

The German Historical Institute in Washington welcomes Simone Lässig, who succeeded Hartmut Berghoff as Director of the GHI on October 1, 2015. Lässig comes to the GHI from Braunschweig, where she served as Director of the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research and Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Braunschweig since 2006. She will be on leave from both positions during her tenure as GHI Director. Lässig is delighted to return to Washington and the GHI, where she served as Research Fellow from 2002 to 2006, and looks forward to cooperating with colleagues at North American universities. During her directorship, she is planning to make the history of knowledge (Wissensgeschichte) as well as the subject areas “religion and ethnicity”, “space and boundaries,” and digital history foci of research at the GHI.

2015 FRANZ STEINER PRIZE

On May 28th, 2015, the Franz Steiner Prize, offered biennially for the best German or English-language manuscript in transatlantic and North American studies, was awarded to GHI Research Fellow Elisabeth Engel for her outstanding dissertation “Encountering Empire: African American Missionaries in Colonial Africa, 1900-1939.” The prize is awarded by the GHI Washington and the Franz Steiner Verlag in Stuttgart, which publishes the GHI’s book series Transatlantische Historische Studien (Transatlantic Historical Studies; THS). It carries an honorarium of 3500 Euro and includes publication of the award-winning manuscript in the THS book series. The award was presented by Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, GHI Deputy Director, and Thomas Schaber, editor-in-chief of the Franz Steiner Verlag, in a ceremony that was part of the festive opening of the annual meeting of the German Association of American Studies (GAAS) in the Great Auditorium of the University of Bonn. Organized by Sabine Sielke, Director of the North American Studies Program in Bonn, it was framed by beautiful a capella music performed by the Jazz Choir of the University of Bonn and attended by over 500 people, including U.S. Ambassador John B. Emerson, U.S. Consul General Kevin C. Milas, Lord Mayor of Bonn Jürgen Nimptsch, GAAS President Carmen Birkle, and the Rector of University of Bonn, Michael Hoch. After briefly introducing the GHI and the THS series, Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson delivered the prize citation honoring this groundbreaking study, which follows in abbreviated form here:

“Engel examines how the African American missionaries sent to Africa by the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church navigated the everyday
realities of colonial rule, engaging with the world of native Africans on the one and of British elites on the other hand. Brilliantly using the latest theoretical approaches of post-colonial, critical empire, and Black Atlantic studies, Engel’s work impresses by the vast scope of its sources. Based on a multitude of sources, Engel is able to let her readers hear the voices and views of the black missionaries as well as the responses of their African contacts in a story that is usually told only from the perspective of white colonizers. By focusing on the roles, self-images, and multiple relationships of local AME churches and individual people, Engel’s book closes a major gap in the historiography of colonial and Black Atlantic history. Her research convincingly shows that while AME missionaries worked within the colonial system, they were often able to use imperial structures for their own self-determination and for re-connecting African Americans and Africans in the early twentieth century. Thus Engel’s study effectively challenges the popular assumption that Pan-Africanism was the only effective strategy for black liberation and turns a new page in African American and transatlantic history.”

NEW GHI PUBLICATIONS

   Gerald D. Feldman, Austrian Banks in the Period of National Socialism. Introduction by Peter Hayes
   Jonas Scherner and Eugene N. White, eds., Hitler’s War and Nazi Economic Hegemony in Occupied Europe

2. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)
   Larissa Schütze, William Dieterle und die deutschsprachige Emigration in Hollywood: Antifaschistische Filmarbeit bei Warner Bros. Pictures, 1930–1940

3. Worlds of Consumption (Palgrave Macmillan)
   Annelie Ramsbrock, The Science of Beauty: Culture and Cosmetics in Modern Germany, 1750–1930
   Malte Zierenberg, Berlin’s Black Market, 1939–1950
   Emanuela Scarpellini, Food and Foodways in Italy from 1861 to the Present
4. Studies in German History (Berghahn Books)

Frank Usbeck, “Fellow Tribesmen”: The German Image of Indians, the Emergence of National Identity, and Nazi Ideology in Germany


STAFF CHANGES

Hartmut Berghoff completed his term as GHI Director at the end of September 2015 and returned to his position as director of the Institute for Economic and Social History at the University of Göttingen.

Anne Schenderlein joined the GHI as a Research Fellow in October 2015. During the academic year 2014/15 she had held the GHI’s Postdoctoral Fellowship in North American History. Prior to her coming to the Institute, she taught at the University of California, San Diego, where she received her Ph.D. with a dissertation on German Jewish refugees in the United States and their relationships to Germany from 1938 to 1988. Her current research focuses on the American Jewish boycott and consumption of German products.

Uwe Spiekermann completed his term as GHI Deputy Director at the end of September 2015 and returned to the Institute for Economic and Social History at the University of Göttingen on a fellowship from the Max Weber Foundation.

GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a
number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships
The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Postdoctoral Fellow in the History of Knowledge
Anna Echterhölter, Humboldt University Berlin
Gouvernementales Geld, Wirtschaftsethologie und Rationierungsmaßnahmen

Anandita Nag, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science
Reading the Numbers: Statistics and Humanitarian Governance in the Nineteenth Century

Fellowship in North American History
David Jünger, Zentrum Jüdische Studien Berlin-Brandenburg

Fellowship in the History of Consumption
Mark Keck-Szajbel, Viadrina European University
Penetrating the Iron Curtain: Marketing and Consuming in the West in Times of Transition

Fellowship in Economic and Social History
Jeroen Euwe, Université Libre de Bruxelles
Quantifying the Connections between the German and U.S. Art Markets during the National-Socialist Era
Doctoral Fellow in African American History

Noaquia Callahan, University of Iowa
*Divided Duty: African American Feminist Transnational Activism and the Lure of the Imperial Gaze, 1888–1922*

Doctoral Fellow in International Business History

Jessica Levy, Johns Hopkins University

Fellowships at the Horner Library

Tristan Coignard, Université Bordeaux Montaigne
*Das kulturelle und politische Selbstverständnis von Ludwig August Wollenweber (1807–1888). Facetten eines verwurzelten Kosmopolitismus zwischen Pfalz und Pennsylvanien*

Duane Corpis, Central European University
*Overseas Charity and German Protestantism: Global Networks, Local Norms, 16th–19th Centuries*

Andreas Obersdorf, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
*Demetrius Augustinus von Gallitzin (1770–1840): Ein transatlantischer Bildungsreformer im Spannungsfeld von Aufklärung und katholischer Frömmigkeit in Münster und Pennsylvania*

Elisabeth Piller, Heidelberg University/ Norwegian University of Science and Technology
*Weimar Cultural Diplomacy and the United States, 1919–1932*

Postdoctoral Fellows

Nadine Klopfer, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
*The “French Craze”: French Things and the Politics of Taste in the United States, 1800–1870s*

Alexander Korb, Stanley Burton Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies
*Deutsche Journalisten: Transnationale Karriereweg, Kontinuitäten und Konflikte zwischen 1925 und 1975*

Silvan Niedermeier, Universität Erfurt
*Expanding the Kodak Zone: Photography and Colonial Self-formations in the Philippine-American War (1899–1913)*
Andrew Spadafora, Harvard Business School
*Competition, Concentration, and Cartels: Ideas of Industrial Organization in Germany and the United States, 1890–1960*

Oliver Werner, Leibniz-Institut für Regionalentwicklung und Strukturplanung (IRS) Erkner
*Von Görings Vierjahresplanbehörde zur Weltbank. Der Finanzökonom Otto Donner und die Perzeption der deutschen Wirtschafts- und Wissenschaftselite in den USA von 1930 bis 1960*

Gerhard Wolf, University of Sussex
*Von Paris nach Potsdam: Gelenkte Migration und die Befriedung Europas (1919–1960)*

**Doctoral Fellows**

Paul Edwards, Boston University
*Louis Douglas and Jonny spielt auf: Imagining Blackness in Germany*

Annika Estner, Freie Universität Berlin

Jane Freeland, Carleton University
*Domestic Violence in Divided Germany, 1969–1990*

Daniela Hettstedt, University of Basel
*Leuchtturm, Schlachthaus, Seuchenschutz. Shared Colonialism and internationale Verwaltung in Tanger (Marokko), 1840–1956*

Rudolf Himpsl, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
*Außenhandel und Außenwirtschaftspolitik in Bayern 1957–1982*

Sebastian Huempfer, University of Oxford
*The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy since the 1930s*

Stefan Laffin, Universität Bielefeld
*Eine (an)gespannte Beziehung? Die US-amerikanische Besetzung Italiens 1943–1945*

Nick Ostrum, Stony Brook University
*From Autarky to Globalization: The West German Pursuit of Oil in the Arab World, 1957–1974*

Will Rall, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
*Nazi Charity: Giving, Emotion, and Morality in the Third Reich*
GHI Conference Grants for GSA Participants

**Eva Balz**, Ruhr-Universität Bochum  
*Politics of Property in the Cold War: The Restitution of Jewish Assets in Berlin*

**Jan Hansen**, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin  
*“Züri brännt”: The “Opernhauskrawall” and Swiss Society in the Early 1980s*

**Lasse Heerten**, Freie Universität Berlin  
*Between Auschwitz and Vietnam: The Biafran War, Genocide and Third-Worldism in Germany’s Global 1960s*

**Christian Rau**, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Berlin  
*A National Library in Divided Germany: The Deutsche Bücherei 1945-1990*

**Julia Timpe**, Universität Bremen  
*The Third Reich’s Beauty Project: Schönheit der Arbeit and its Work in Germany’s Factories and Countryside*

**Matthew Unangst**, Temple University  
*‘Hinterland’: A German Word Becomes International in East Africa*

**Gavin Wiens**, University of Toronto  
*Schools of the Nation: State Sovereignty, Nation-Building, and the Imperial German Military, 1866-1918*

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**GHI RESEARCH AND DOCTORAL SEMINARS, SPRING 2015**

**January 28**  
**Ines Prodöhl** (GHI)  
*A Miracle Bean*: Eine Verflechtungsgeschichte der Sojabohne

**February 18**  
**Harald Fuess** (Universität Heidelberg)  
*Global History of German Lager Beer in East Asia and the United States*

**February 26**  
**Martin Gruner** (Universität Augsburg)  
*Alliierte Strafverfolgung von NS-Verbrechen: US-amerikanische Militärprozesse gegen ehemalige KZ-Kommandanten*

**Helena Barop** (Universität Freiburg)  
*Poppy Wars: Interventionist Drug Policy in the 1960s and 1970s*

**March 11**  
**Mischa Honeck** (GHI)  
*Boyification: How Scouting Fetishized Boys, Rejuvenated Men, and Infantilized Empire*
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<tr>
<td>March 25</td>
<td>Árpád von Klimó</td>
<td>Catholic University</td>
<td>Cold Days: The Novi Sad Massacre of 1942 and the Debate on the Holocaust in Hungary during the 1960s</td>
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<td>April 29</td>
<td>Mirjam Thulin</td>
<td>Leibniz Institute of European History/Herbert D. Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies</td>
<td>From Breslau to New York: Instituting Conservative Wissenschaft des Judentums</td>
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<td>May 13</td>
<td>Jeremy Varon</td>
<td>New School, New York</td>
<td>“They Couldn’t Fool Us, We Couldn’t Fool Them”: Holocaust Survivors in German Universities, 1945-1951</td>
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<td>May 27</td>
<td>Sabine Horlitz</td>
<td>Center for Metropolitan Studies, Technische Universität Berlin</td>
<td>The Labor Housing Conference: Unions and Modern Housing in 1930s USA</td>
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<td>June 10</td>
<td>Jan Jansen</td>
<td>GHI</td>
<td>Freemasons and Empires in the Atlantic World: Mapping Slavery, Anti-Slavery, and Freemasonry (c. 1780-1850)</td>
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<td>July 8</td>
<td>Astrid Kirchhof</td>
<td>Georgetown University/GHI</td>
<td>Fighting for Recognition of Sovereignty: The GDR’s Nature Conservation Policy in an International Arena</td>
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GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2015

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org.

June 4-6  The U.S. South in the Black Atlantic: Transnational Histories of the Jim Crow South since 1865
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Elisabeth Engel (GHI), Nicholas Grant (University of East Anglia), Mischa Honeck (GHI)

June 12-13  Financialization: A New Chapter in the History of Capitalism?
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Kenneth Lipartito (Florida International University), Laura Rischbieter (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin)

June 8-20  Archival Summer Seminar in Germany 2015
Seminar in Berlin
Convener: Elisabeth Engel (GHI)

June 18  Between Recovery and Decline? Observations of an Economic Historian on the Obama Years and Beyond
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)

July 3-4  Fourth Junior Scholars Conference in German-Jewish History: “Heritage” in the Study of Jewish and Other (Diaspora) Cultures - The Search for Roots as a Recurring Theme of 19th and 20th Century History
Conference at the Institute for the History of the German Jews, Hamburg
Co-organized by the GHI, the Institute for the History of the German Jews, Hamburg, the Alvin H. Rosenfeld Chair in Jewish Studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, and the Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft des Leo Baeck Instituts

Conference in München/Gauting
Conveners: Sebastian Frenzel (Technische Universität Dresden), Désirée Schauz (Technische Universität München), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
September 6–18 Bosch Foundation Archival Summer School for Young Historians 2014: U.S. History in Transatlantic Perspective
Seminar in Chicago, Madison, Boston, Washington DC
Convener: Mischa Honeck

Conference at Boston College - Ireland
Convener: Franziska Seraphim (University of Boston), Kerstin von Lingen (University of Heidelberg), Wolfgang Form (ICWC Marburg), Barak Kushner (University of Cambridge)

October 3 Defining the Modern Metropolis: Universal Exhibitions from the mid-19th to the mid-20th Century
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Friedrich Lenger (University of Giessen)

October 15 Towards an Iconology of Medieval Studies: Approaches to Visual Narratives in Modern Scholarship
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Bernhard Jussen (University of Frankfurt)

October 15–17 Medieval History Seminar 2015
Seminar at the GHI Washington

October 21–23 Nineteenth-Century Anti-Semitism in International Perspective
Conference at the German Historical Institute Paris
Co-organized by the Max Weber Foundation and its institutes: the German Historical Institutes in Paris, London, Rome, Moscow, Warsaw and Washington, the German Centre for the History of Art in Paris, the Orient Institute Istanbul; as well as the Centre for Research on Anti-Semitism at the Technische Universität Berlin

October 27 German Unification Symposium
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Gregor Gysi

November 12 Twenty-Ninth Annual Lecture
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Jerry Z. Muller (Catholic University of America)

November 13 Twenty-Fourth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute
Presentation of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize Symposium at the GHI
December 4-5  **Atlantic Brotherhoods: Fraternalism in Transcontinental Perspective (18th-early 20th century)**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Jessica Harland-Jacobs (University of Florida), Jan C. Jansen (GHI)  

2016  
Conference at the Universität Zürich  
Convener: Simone Lässig (GHI)  

April 1  **Taking Stock of Global History: Perspectives, Purposes, and Politics**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Mischa Honeck (GHI) and Jan Jansen (GHI)  

April 13-15  **Navigating Diversity: Narratives, Practices and Politics in German-Speaking Europe**  
Conference in Montreal  
Conveners: Anthony J. Steinhoff (Université du Québec à Montréal), Till van Rahden (University of Quebec), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)  

April 28-30  **Forging Bonds Across Borders: Mobilizing for Women’s Rights and Social Justice in the 19th-Century Transatlantic World**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI), Anja Schüler (HCA, Heidelberg), Sonya Michel (University of Maryland)  

May 25-28  **22nd Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century German History**  
Seminar at the GHI  
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)  

June 9-11  **Willy Brandt and the Americas, 1974-1992**  
Conference at the GHI  
Co-organized by the GHI and the Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, Berlin
GHI Library

The GHI library concentrates on German history and transatlantic relations, with emphasis on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In addition to providing essential literature for scholarly research, the library fulfills an important cultural mission: no other library in the United States offers a similarly condensed inventory of modern German history.

The library offers access to about 50,000 books, DVDs, CD-ROMs, microfiches, and 220 print journals. In addition, we offer access to about 500 e-books and 100 online journals.

The collection includes books on American history written by German authors as well as historical literature of the institute’s past research foci: global history, religious studies, exile and migration studies, environmental history, and economic history. The collection includes only print materials, mostly secondary literature; there are no archival holdings.

The GHI library offers free access to scholars as well as the general public; appointments or reader cards are not necessary. The library does not lend materials but visitors may consult material from the entire collection in our beautiful reading room, which also offers access to a variety of databases for journal articles, historical newspapers, genealogical research, and bibliographical research.

For the library catalog or a list of our databases, please visit www.ghi-dc.org/library. Or send an email to library@ghi-dc.org for any further questions.

The library hours are Monday to Thursday from 9 am to 5 pm, Fridays from 9 am to 4 pm, and by appointment.