3 Preface

FEATURES

7 How Americans Raise Their Children: Generational Relations over Two Hundred Years
   Paula Fass

21 How Americans Raise Their Children: A Comment
   Till Kössler

27 Knowledge Is Power: The Interwar German and Japanese Mass Media in the Making of the Axis
   Ricky Law

49 Americanization? Europeanization? Globalization? The German Economy since 1945
   Mary Nolan

GHI RESEARCH

67 “At Once Judge, Jury, and Executioner”: Rioting and Policing in Philadelphia, 1838-1964
   Alexander Elkins

91 The Rise of the Toxic Politics of Migration: The United States at the Dawn of the 1960s
   Elisa Minoff

CONFERENCE REPORTS

111 Bosch Foundation Archival Summer School for Young Historians 2013
   Mischa Honeck
115  The Dream and Its Untold Stories: The March on Washington and Its Legacy
Sharon Monteith

119  Eighth Medieval History Seminar, 2013
Matthew Champion and Julia Crispin

125  Migrants as “Translators”: Mediating External Influences on Post-World War II Western Europe, 1945-1973
Lauren Shaw

131  The Consumer on the Home Front: World War II Civilian Consumption in Comparative Perspective
Jan Logemann

139  GHI NEWS

2013 Helmut Schmidt Prize in German-American Economic History
2013 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
New Staff Publications
GHI Fellowships and Internships
Recipients of GHI Fellowships
GHI Research Seminar, Fall 2013
GHI Doctoral Seminar, Summer/Fall 2013
GHI Lecture Series, Spring 2014
GHI Calendar of Events 2014
PREFACE

It is sometimes assumed that the German Historical Institute focuses mostly on German history. As demonstrated by this issue of the Bulletin, however, the Institute also fosters research in American as well as transnational, comparative and global history.

Three of this Bulletin’s feature articles deal with American history. In the Annual Lecture that she delivered at the GHI last fall, the distinguished American historian Paula Fass, a pioneer in developing the field of children’s history, examines the history of childhood and generational relations in the United States over the past two hundred years. She argues that the era of the early American Republic established a paradigm of American child-rearing that continued to be invoked even after general social conditions had been transformed. In his comment on Fass’s lecture the German historian Till Kössler, an expert on the history of childhood and education in modern Europe, reveals the entanglements of European and American visions of child-rearing as well as the ambivalences and contradictions within these visions.

The article “‘At Once Judge, Jury, and Executioner’: Rioting and Policing in Philadelphia, 1838–1964,” by Alexander Elkins, GHI Doctoral Fellow in African American History, combines the history of African Americans, the police, and vigilantism to investigate the historical relationship between violent riotous justice and the practice of collective policing in nineteenth and twentieth century America. “The Rise of the Toxic Politics of Migration,” by Elisa Minoff, GHI Fellow in Social and Economic History, examines how a series of controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s marked a decisive shift in the politics of internal migration within the United States. By tracing how race was injected into the debate and migration was charged with causing urban problems, she seeks to explain how the American politics of migration gradually became “toxic.”

The two articles by the recipients of GHI prizes address topics of transnational history. Ricky Law, winner of the 2013 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, argues for the importance of examining the cultural prehistory of the German-Japanese Axis Pact of 1940. His article investigates the role of the interwar German and Japanese mass media in preparing the ground for the axis by studying the portrayal of Japan in German newspapers, motion pictures,
nonfiction, and voluntary associations as well as the depiction of Germany in Japanese dailies, lectures and pamphlets, nonfiction, and language textbooks. Mary Nolan, winner of the 2013 Helmut Schmidt Prize in German-American Economic History, delivered a prize lecture, published here, in which she seeks to place current efforts to increase economic cooperation between Europe and the United States in historical context by examining and comparing the usefulness of three concepts — Americanization, Europeanization, and globalization — for understanding the development of the German economy since 1945.

This Bulletin’s conference reports once again reflect the diversity of the Institute’s workshops and conferences. In this issue, they range from medieval history to the home front in World War II, post-1945 Western European migration, and the 1963 “March on Washington.” The calendar of events in our “News” section will inform you of upcoming GHI events and conferences. We hope to have aroused your interest and look forward to welcoming you at a GHI event in the near future.

Hartmut Berghoff (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)
HOW AMERICANS RAISE THEIR CHILDREN:
GENERATIONAL RELATIONS OVER TWO HUNDRED YEARS
27TH ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE GHI, WASHINGTON DC, NOVEMBER 14, 2013

Paula S. Fass
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

Over the past twenty years, as children became important subjects of historical inquiry, some scholars have been studying childhood history broadly as an expression of general developments in the West. In this perspective, the United States, and to some extent even Latin America, participated in the expansion of Europe after the seventeenth century and the modernizing thrust of the post-Enlightenment period. Bound together by religious beliefs, scientific and philosophical theories, technologies, and attitudes towards women, this diverse area also experienced similarities in demographic patterns and shared in the general evolution of capital, industry, and markets. All of these factors influenced both child life and how we have defined and institutionalized childhood on both sides of the Atlantic world. My own work, most recently two edited books — one on the development of Western childhood since antiquity, and another on children’s experiences since World War II — encouraged this view and with it the cross-national understanding of western societies as part of a single evolving cultural system.1 There is much to recommend it, since historians have learned a lot that we need to know through this expansive vision, and I am delighted to be identified with its development.

At the same time I have been pursuing a different kind of investigation by studying how parents and children in the United States related to each other over the course of two hundred years, from the founding of the Republic through the era of globalization.2 Specifically, I am trying to understand if and why Americans raised their children in ways that differed from their European counterparts and how this has laid the basis for the creation of a specific tradition of American child rearing.

I.

Starting in the late eighteenth century, European visitors proposed and many Americans adopted the view that children in the United

---


States are differently brought up. American children, Europeans observed in the nineteenth century, are rude, unmannerly, and bold; and even very young children were described as unnervingly confident. Some commentators were pleased by this directness and saw it as a refreshing sign of American vigor; others were far less charmed. “English children in the presence of strangers are reserved and shy,” one noted. “They feel that the nursery and school room are their proper sphere of action ... Most unlike to these is the sentiment of the American, both parent and child. The little citizen seems to feel at a surprisingly early age, that he has a part on the stage of the world, and is willing enough to act a little before his time.”

Alexis de Tocqueville famously believed that parents in the United States treated their children more equally than parents did elsewhere and that they took them more seriously, but he was hardly alone. Sometime after de Tocqueville travelled to the United States, Polish Count Adam de Guronski did so as well. After his travels, he noted that in the United States children were early “emancipated ... from parental authority and domestic discipline.” “Children accustomed to the utmost familiarity and absence of constraint with their parents, behave in the same manner with other older persons, and this sometimes deprives the social intercourse of Americans of the tint of politeness, which is more habitual in Europe.” Observers variously attributed these changes to the availability of land, the shortage of labor, the equality of laws, and the absence of an aristocratic tradition with its emphasis on lineage and its many markers of class distinction.

Indeed, according to de Tocqueville, American children considered independence “an incontestable right,” and fathers and sons treated each other with far less formality than in Europe. Since American opportunities for individual advancement beckoned, children started to work early, according to de Guronski, and were, as a result, treated more equally within the household. One English woman thought this youthful independence affected even very young children, and not just their manners but their habits of learning and inquiry. Young children were entrusted with delicate objects like porcelain cups, which they handled with care, while they probed into the mechanisms of other objects with focused curiosity. Like contemporary psychologists, she was invoking an early version of the theory of the scientist in the crib and applying this to American babies.

---

3 America As I Found It by the Mother of Mary Lundie Duncan (New York: Robert Carter and Bros, 1852), 25-26.
4 Count Adam de Guronski, America and Europe (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1857) 380-381.
6 America as I Found It, 30. For current views about the minds of infants, see, for example, Alison Gopnik, Andrew L. Meltzoff, and Patrizia K. Kuhl, The Scientist in the Crib: What Early Learning Tells us About the Mind (New York: William Morrow, 2000).
These visitors, you might say, came expecting to see “the new world difference,” an America freed of tradition and lacking the usual restraints, and they found just what they expected, exaggerating small differences in demeanor and mistaking these for more fundamental changes. To some degree, of course, this was true, but it hardly undermines either the observations or the facts behind them. Americans did have land, needed labor, and put their children to work early. And they took seriously a revolution that emphasized greater equality and dismissed artificial deference. They also lacked the kind of aristocratic class system in which family was an expression of lineage and children were beholden to inherited descent.

Americans also wanted to see themselves as different — fresher, newer, younger — bringing the breezes of new world freedom as Benjamin Franklin brought his coonskin cap to Versailles. Moreover, the ideas articulated in the Revolution had stimulated the notion that child-rearing should be informed by revolutionary principles, and many Americans hoped to infuse it with their sense of change and future possibilities. Americans were more open to endowing children with greater independence and flexibility so that they might continue to believe as Nathaniel Willis, the editor of Youth’s Companion magazine, observed in 1827 that they were “born to higher destinies than their fathers.”

This view, often voiced after the Revolution, together with the availability of land (on a breathtaking scale) and an absence of laws that specifically regulated generational relations and obligations (as was common in Europe) did give the relationships between American parents and their children a different cast and lowered the degree of control that parents exercised over the young. Renowned colonial historian Bernard Bailyn argued over fifty years ago in a book on the special qualities of American education that younger people had an advantage in the new world environment, which provided conditions that encouraged youthful innovation. In the United States, youth, not age, was a better guide to success.

Two things need to be said from the outset: First, this did not make American parents indulgent toward their children, and children did not have a longer or more leisured or more playful childhood. American children were early engaged in the work of the world. Land and labor ratios made children’s work desirable and necessary. Nevertheless that work provided children, in the words I quoted earlier, the sense that they had “a place on the world’s stage.”


than expressing subordination, work was seen as leading to self-improvement or future options. Their parents, in turn, allowed for what de Tocqueville described as a much easier and earlier transition to adulthood. Fathers, according to Tocqueville, felt “none of that bitter and angry regret which is apt to survive a bygone power.” Instead “the father foresees the limits of his authority long beforehand, and when the time arrives, he surrenders it without a struggle.”

Second, it would be folly to imagine that what I am saying was true for the entire population in a society that was not only expanding with many kinds of immigrants, but in which at the time of the American Revolution one tenth of all children were slaves.

Instead of thinking of this pattern as applicable to all children or true for all parents, it would be best for us to imagine that this early period of the Republic established a particular kind of American formula or recipe, one that shifted the standard of what might be expected in the relations between parents and children and established a baseline that could subsequently be invoked as desirable and legitimate, even as the initial circumstances that created it receded, and then disappeared. It is a recipe to which we still subscribe today, in a vastly different world.

Let me illustrate the pattern I am describing in the life of an individual. Ulysses S. Grant became a great Civil War general and then the 18th President of the United States. As a child, he grew up in the kind of household de Tocqueville or de Guronski might have observed as they traveled through rural Ohio, a state that produced more than its share of generals and presidents. Grant’s father was a prosperous leather tanner, and in “comfortable circumstances,” but young Ulysses was expected to do much of the work on the land his father owned. His father, Jessie, did not force him to labor in his own trade, which his son “detested,” but Ulysses began to work in the woods from the time he was seven or eight years of age “hauling all the wood used in the house and shops.”

“When about eleven years old,” Grant later wrote, “I was strong enough to hold a plow. From that age until seventeen I did all the work done with horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, plowing corn and potatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for stoves, etc., while still attending school.”

As he performed almost all the tasks of farming, young Ulysses played a significant part in the affairs of the Grant household and he
knew that this part was important and valuable. He was assuming a role on the world’s stage.

Grant’s early life reflected the kind of special American circumstances that de Guronski had in mind when he said that in the United States “the space, the modes to win a position by labor were unlimited, and thus children began early to work and earn for themselves. Thus ... they became self-relying and independent, and this independence continues to prevail in filial relations.” What to us might seem to be young Grant’s hard childhood, burdened by early responsibilities and physical labor, was a response to the American labor shortages of the day, which made the work of children valuable and a household necessity. They also made this work, as de Guronski understood, unusually liberating.

Grant also understood this. He explained that since he did everything expected of him he was never scolded or punished but was given the right to both “rational enjoyments” and a large degree of independence. This independence allowed him to roam freely, travel widely, often for many miles beyond the family home and frequently overnight. By the age of eleven, he was even allowed to trade horses on his own account. Grant was early trained to both responsibility and to freedom. By the time he was a teenager, he knew that he could engage in the world’s tasks and was rewarded for it. Grant knew he did well, and his growing sense of competence (despite various mistakes made along the way) made him strong. By the time he went off to West Point, Grant had been making an important contribution to his household since he was seven, and more over time as his capacities were proven and expanded. Ulysses Grant’s experience of a mid-western childhood was not unique. Other boys also worked hard at many tasks, enjoyed leisure, and were early invested with the ability to operate independently and to succeed as adults. So were many girls.

II.

This period did not last long. After the Civil War, to which Grant made a huge contribution as the general who commanded the Army of the West, it was cities, not the wide open country, that became the locale for opportunity for young boys and girls growing up. Industry was transforming these cities and young children hardly got the chance to trade horses as they experienced the pressures to help support

12 De Guronski, America and Europe, 7.
13 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 21, 22.
their families. Young immigrants, girls as well as boys, as young as eight sat cooped up for hours in sweatshops or large factories. Some were caught on the streets in mischief that portended a life of crime. More and more, they were in schools, where neither independence nor a sense of purposeful achievement were the defining qualities. These changes alarmed many Americans who began to propose solutions by using the old recipe, encoding an American way of child-rearing that remains alive to this day. What had once been a natural expression of family and social conditions, became a conscious approach to children-rearing as various reformers, educators, and child-rearing experts looked to preserve and to recreate a particular version of childhood, one they presumed would maintain the special characteristics of Americans — independence, a sense of future opportunity, and democratic participation. Let me provide you with four examples of this drawn from the past 150 years.

Even before the Civil War, immigration and city life had begun to challenge earlier patterns of life and some, like Charles Loring Brace, sought to save the children who were lost in this transformation — the growing army of street children, some of whom were trying to earn a living, some of whom were out for a good time, some of whom were engaged in illegal activities as pickpockets and other criminals. Through the Children’s Aid Society, Brace set out to find both more caring families for these youths and a substitute for the way of life he believed still available to the more fortunate boys of the countryside whose labor was enriching and fruitful. Brace and the Children’s Aid Society are usually remembered for starting the Orphan Trains to the West that placed children among rural families, where work would promote disciplined independence. In thus originating the modern idea of foster care to counteract the socially corrosive and personally destructive effects of neglectful families, Brace also hoped to preserve
the initiative and democratic qualities that he found in abundance among the street boys he hoped to save. What they lacked, Brace, believed, was a context in which their energies could be deployed for their own future success without endangering the social order by law breaking. What they needed was rewarding work and better families. It was, of course, the life of boys like Grant that he had in mind when he put boys, and girls, on farms in Michigan and upstate New York.14

By the end of the nineteenth century, industrial dreariness, fetid cities, and rapid immigration seemed to overwhelm the familiar American past and to question the hopefulness about future improvement that Americans had once openly expressed. In trying to direct the torrent of change, America’s most important philosopher and educational theorist, John Dewey looked not just to those boys and girls who were likely to break the law, but to all children who were then, by law, gathered in classrooms around the country as attendance became obligatory and regular schooling a fact of life for everyone. The school, in Dewey’s vision, needed to become a proxy for the experiences of someone like young Ulysses Grant growing up in rural Ohio, a place where children would learn from their in-class experiences to become independent, competent in their practical knowledge, and capable of taking that knowledge into higher forms of learning as well as out into the real world. The classroom needed to become a place of authentic experience that would be the basis for individual growth and social progress. Rote learning, the standard experience for school children, made students, in Dewey’s words, “ductile and docile” undermining their initiative and depriving the classroom of its ability to prepare for the democracy that he valued and hoped to preserve in the United States. In proposing that the classroom become the laboratory of a restored democracy, Dewey tried to create the conditions for the active participation of students in their own instruction, replacing early independence in the work world with a new active engagement in the classroom. In the “Child and the Curriculum” Dewey noted that he hoped to restore to the branches of learning “the experience from which it had been abstracted.”15

Dewey was well aware that the schooling increasingly required of all was locking children away from the very life lessons that once assured their active independence. Dewey’s reforms were aimed to create a classroom in which the student’s “present powers ... are to assert themselves; his present capacities ... are to be exercised; his present


attitudes … are to be realized.” 16 At a time when American life was changing profoundly and industrial work and commercialized play were making it harder to develop traits of independence and democracy in children, Dewey looked to a revitalized, reformed education to provide the experience of accomplishment and competence that work and play had supplied earlier, at a time when both were changing beyond recognition.

Fifty years later, Benjamin Spock brought these same matters into the nursery. Just as schooling had reframed the social experience of children by the end of the nineteenth century, child-rearing advice was redefining the parenting of babies and young children in the twentieth. By mid-century, debates regarding how best to raise children occupied a considerable space in public life as new theories of learning and new psychological perspectives emerged from university laboratories and appeared on bookshelves, in newspapers, and in the conversations of American mothers and fathers.

Starting in the second decade of the twentieth century, the U.S. Children’s Bureau distributed millions of pamphlets to mothers across the country urging them to follow special routines to ensure their children’s proper nurture. By the Second World War several visions competed for mothers’ attention: from the warnings and strictures of behavioral psychologist John Watson (who bluntly asserted “Parents today are incompetent. Most of them should be indicted for psychological murder”) to the psychoanalytically inclined discussions in Parents’ Magazine, to the developmental observations of Arnold Gesell. 17 All of them shared a vision of child management in which mothers would carefully supervise a child’s emotions and behavior;

all of them placed a huge emphasis on carefully modulated parental guidance.

In taking over the field after the end of World War II, Dr. Spock attempted to encourage young mothers to adopt a more relaxed vision, one that acknowledged children’s autonomy by recognizing their competence to grow and mature. Children, he noted in his manual liked to do “Grown Up Things,”18 and he proposed a child-rearing approach that showed mothers what they could expect so that they could loosen their grip and give their children room to grow and make mistakes on their own. Spock told mothers to stop being afraid, to love their babies, and to respond to them naturally. Many believe, inaccurately, that he promoted permissiveness in childrearing. In fact, Spock hoped that households would serve as a site for children to discover their growing competence.

The context had changed radically and children’s growing competence meant something altogether different than when Ulysses Grant’s father had supervised his son’s upbringing, but the idea was the same; in neither case was the parent to be permissive. In neither was the parent to overwhelm the child’s own purposes and inclinations. Spock invoked Freudian principles, but it was not the Vienna of the late-nineteenth-century haute bourgeoisie that Spock had in mind when he told what would eventually amount to tens of millions of American mothers to enjoy their children because in the famous phrase that opened the book “Trust yourself: You know more than you think you do.” It was, instead, an American household in which the child’s strengths would develop in a family organized along democratic, non-authoritarian lines. The kind of formality between the generations that Freud observed and to which he directed his analysis was never the issue for Spock. While Spock nodded toward the Oedipus complex, his eyes were set on the complex of behaviors that led to over-mothering.

By the mid twentieth century, American parents placed far fewer demands on their children than their predecessors had a century earlier, and most American children now went through a long and often fraught adolescence because of their extended schooling and its associated dependency, an adolescence that Tocqueville claimed American youth did not have in the early nineteenth century. But, in many ways, the basic question that guided most of Spock’s advice adhered to that earlier recipe now brought into a new century. And it sought to answer a simple question: How in this new world of

intensive parenting, elaborate schooling, and declining children’s responsibility would America’s young be allowed to be become independent, successful, and confident? What had once been built into an unselfconscious environment and grew out of active work and early maturity, had become the basic problem guiding the most important child-rearing expert in American history. It is a question that has not gone away.

It defines the last instance I want to bring to your attention: the recent, vigorous conversations about Chinese Tiger Mothers, French mamans, and American mommys. These conversations have emerged from the self-proclaimed success of the strict, old-world, child-training techniques described by Yale legal scholar Amy Chua in raising her daughters.20 Amy Chua’s book and the very loud controversy it has created bring us back to the American difference in child-rearing strategies. And it forces us to ask whether American mothers can continue to expect their children to succeed in a highly competitive, now manifestly global world, where none of the earlier rules seem to apply — not those of the Ohio countryside or those of the industrial city or even those of the managerial office of the mid twentieth century. It is a world in which schooling (not experience) goes on forever and where, even after decades of such training, children often come home because they cannot find jobs.

If Chua is to be believed, America’s looser, less demanding forms of child-rearing are failing because successful children need the firm hand of parental directives to lead them to goals set for them by parents who, in turn, are honoring their own parents. It is well for us to remember that it was the absence of deference to family honor and tradition that had freed American children to pursue their own goals in their own way back in the period of the early Republic. Unbound by obligations to a restricting past, children of the new world could adapt to changing circumstances and move beyond their parents’ knowledge to create and innovate. Over time, Americans had tried to substitute active knowledge in the classroom and autonomy in the nursery for the experience that had once stimulated children early in life to tackle problems and gain confidence. But in this new “new world,” is it still desirable for children to choose their own path and claim their own future? With challenging life experiences and productive work pushed ever further out of children’s reach, and with even chores and family obligations absent in many families, is there anything salvageable from the old recipe? I have heard American

mothers agonize about this question as a result of reading Chua’s book, second guessing how they raise their children and fearful of getting it wrong.

Clearly, these conversations about Chua, and related ones around books by Judith Warner and Pamela Druckerman on French styles of child rearing,\(^\text{21}\) take for granted that Americans approach parenting differently. We give children more leeway, allow them to run their own lives (and sometimes those of adults as well). Now that we live in a multicultural society and in a global world, it should not surprise us that alternatives to the American way of child-rearing have become prominent parts of the public conversation. After all, this comparative perspective guided the many visitors to the U.S. in the first half of the nineteenth century. And we have become acutely aware of the changes affecting our children so that even without Tiger Mother warnings, over the past twenty-five years, many American parents have been taking command of their children’s lives, patrolling their internet contacts, strenuously overseeing their school success, and tightening the reins generally as threats to children’s wellbeing seem to loom everywhere in a media-saturated world and our youth battle for a place in a rapidly changing economy.

Today, the success of our children seems to be on everyone’s minds as we look around the world where economies are faster, students seem smarter, and their work-habits stronger. Once, the children Americans raised were innovative, hard-working and appeared to provide the nation with a special edge. No surprise therefore that ideas are coming at us from all sides, from immigrants who have been unusually successful in the American context or from cultures where women seem far less harried by childrearing duties. Maybe a new global world requires that we become manifestly more like everyone else? Maybe we already have.

III.

In the end, the question circles back to what exactly we think our childrearing is about and what it is we value. In the nineteenth century, American adapted to their new nation and to what seemed to be the large opportunities it offered, but they also faced large risks. Clearly the opportunities today are different and so are the risks. Can we trust our children to know how to operate in this new world? Or, let me reverse the question. Do we trust ourselves to know how

best to operate in this new world? This, of course, is a delicate dilemma. But child-rearing is always delicate and we have faced such dilemmas before.

It is worth remembering that success was only part of the basis for the American recipe. American children were bold, they were innovative, they were not afraid to be heard. They expected to play a part on the world’s stage. Do we still value these qualities at a time when the aim of schooling seems more than ever to be children who are ductile and docile, able to sit still and take exams, a direction that Dewey (despite his best efforts) could never permanently influence? Dewey valued democracy and thought it was an important part of how schools should operate and what education should encourage. Dr. Spock valued a child’s happiness and her ability to set her own course. How we bring up our children reflects many features of our culture: economics and marketplace realities, obviously, but also how we participate in politics, and how we hope to relate to each other ethically and morally. It reflects things that we value, like creativity. Finally, it also reflects our history of doing things. After two hundred years this history creates its own constraints, written into our social codes and our cultural products. While predicting the future is something no historian would casually encourage, I think that our conversations will almost certainly draw upon an American tradition that I hope I have shown you today — a vision of how we should raise our children that has often been challenged and continues to be shaken by changes in our lives, but remains firmly an American variant of the western tradition.

Paula S. Fass is the Margaret Byrne Professor of History Emerita at the University of California at Berkeley, where she taught for thirty-six years. Since 2010, she has also been Distinguished Scholar in Residence at Rutgers University, New Brunswick. Trained as a social and cultural historian of the United States at Barnard College and Columbia University, she has over the last two decades been active in developing the field of children’s history and worked to make this an interdisciplinary field with a global perspective. Her books include *Children of a New World: Society, Culture, and Globalization* (2007); *Kidnapped: Child Abduction in America* (1997); *Outside In: Minorities and the Transformation of American Education* (1989); *The Damned and the Beautiful: American Youth in the 1920s* (1977). With Mary Ann Mason, she edited *Childhood in America* (2000), the first anthology in children’s history. She was Editor-in-Chief of the award-winning *Encyclopedia of Children and Childhood in History and Society* (2004) and in the past three years published two other edited volumes on the subject of childhood: *Reinventing Childhood After World War II* (with Michael Grossberg) in 2011, and the *Routledge History of Childhood in the Western World*, published in 2013. Her family memoir,
Inheriting the Holocaust: A Second Generation Memoir (2009) recounts and examines her experiences as the daughter of concentration camp victims eager to understand the history of her new country and culture. She is currently researching and writing an interpretive history of parents and children in American history over the course of two hundred years, from the founding of the republic through the global era, tentatively entitled The End of American Childhood.
HoW AMERICANS RAISE THEIR CHILDREN: A COMMENT
COMMeNT ON PAULa FaSS’S ANNUAL LECTURE, GHI, NOVEMBER 14, 2013

Till Kössler
UNIVERSITY OF BOCHUM

Was American childhood different? Do we have to speak about American exceptionalism in the field of child-rearing? It is somewhat astonishing that these important, thought-provoking questions have not been posed earlier. Paula Fass argues that in the United States there existed a specific democratic tradition of child-rearing from the revolutionary period onwards. She suggests that while Americans and Europeans shared many specific concerns about bringing up children, they did not share a vision of liberal democratic citizenship as the framework for child-rearing. Some European intellectuals like Alexis de Tocqueville believed that European childhood was characterized by a more formal and distant relationship between parents and children, a clear subordination of children to adult authority and an educational culture that held deference towards adults, social authorities, and community traditions at a premium.

I have to admit right away that I find this argument compelling in many ways. The German example is a case in point. There was not a German John Dewey — or a European John Dewey for that matter — and John Dewey’s preoccupation with democracy did not resonate much with contemporary German pedagogues. His preoccupation with democracy did not receive much attention until the 1960s. While German Reformpädagogen shared many convictions with their Progressive colleagues, a deep concern for democracy was definitely not one of them.1 Similarly, the work of Benjamin Spock and the pedagogical ideas it stands for only began to influence German advice literature in the 1970s at the earliest.2

However, while I find the argument that there was a specific American tradition of democratic education in many ways very convincing, I hesitate to follow Toqueville’s analysis of two separate paths: one American, and one European. In what follows, I want to elaborate three thoughts in this respect. First, I will stress both the plurality and dynamics of European visions of childhood and child-rearing in the last two centuries. Both tendencies make it impossible to speak of a European way of child-rearing in the singular. Second, I will

1 Jürgen Oelkers, John Dewey und die Pädagogik (Weinheim, 2009); Jürgen Oelkers, Eros und Herrschaf: Die dunklen Seiten der Reformpädagogik (Weinheim/München, 2011).
point to important entanglements between American and European ideas of bringing up children. And finally I want to dwell briefly on the ambivalences of liberal and democratic child-rearing since the Enlightenment. The thrust of my argument will be to stress the existence of multiple strands of connecting children with larger communities and to bring the American and European traditions closer together without denying important differences.

I.

First, the plurality of visions of childhood in Europe needs to be stressed. Paula Fass convincingly argues that while there did exist a variety of different childhoods in America, it is possible to identify a rather coherent hegemonic concept of what education should achieve. In Europe, at least until the very recent past, no such single trajectory existed. On the contrary, European developments were characterized by bitter clashes over childhood and education. It is therefore difficult to compare Europe as a whole to the United States.

To begin with, in Europe socialist concepts of childhood became very important in the late nineteenth century and shaped the debates about child-rearing in an important way. Even more important, I would argue, was the clash between secular and religious concepts of child-rearing. In countries with a strong Catholic tradition, it is impossible to understand the history of childhood without taking into account the fierce battles between a secular and a religious camp. Both sides ran their own schools, organized their own children’s clubs, parents’ organizations and published their own advice literature and children’s magazines. In most European countries, Britain perhaps being the major exception, religion was an important and often overlooked factor in child-rearing until the 1960s, and I would also be curious to hear more about the role of religion in the American case and how it was interwoven in the democratic tradition.

Finally, history of child-rearing in Europe was shaped by fierce battles between nations and between nationalist and regionalist movements for the hearts and minds of children. The Chicago historian Tara Zahra, for example, has demonstrated in great detail how both German and Czech nationalists in the Czech-German borderlands fought bitterly over control over the young generations between the late nineteenth century and the aftermath of the Second World War. Keeping all this in mind, I would argue that in the European case, at least until the 1960s, we have to talk about quite different visions of

---

3 See, for example, Laura Lee Downs, Childhood in the Promised Land: Working-class Movements and the Colonies de Vacances in France, 1880–1960 (Durham, 2002).


modern childhood. These sometimes overlapped, but also presented distinctive features, even if we concede that countercurrents did exist, such as, most importantly, the modern child sciences.6

Often, certain European traditions had more in common with intellectual currents in America than they had with other European approaches. Even during the Franco dictatorship, Catholic educators in Spain felt that they were part of a global educational movement that also encompassed American Catholic democratic child-rearing. At the same time, they distanced themselves from German protestant and French and Spanish lay initiatives.7 And it can equally be argued that French Republican teachers in the 1920s, who debated what lessons could be learned from the Great War in order to educate new democratic and peaceful citizens, had much more in common with the Dewey school of thought than with the agenda of conservative or nationalist teachers in the different European countries.8 While visions of a democratic society differed from one another, it is an important task to compare the similarities and differences from a transnational perspective in more detail. It also seems promising to describe the conflicts between more democratic and more authoritarian concepts and practices of child-rearing not — or not only — as clashes between different national cultures, but as clashes within national societies and even individual families as well.

II.

The second point I want to make concerns transatlantic entanglements. Writers like Toqueville not only analyzed life in the United States but also popularized images of American child-rearing in Europe. The entanglement became even closer in the twentieth century as the new illustrated mass press circulated representations of American family life and childhood an integral part of European mass culture. The most direct influence of American visions of childhood on European societies came perhaps in 1945 as hundreds of American social workers descended upon war-torn Europe to help reconstitute families, democracy, and nations all at the same time.9 We still do not know enough about how these different influences affected child-rearing in Europe but I would argue that we have to go beyond simple linear concepts of acceptance and rejection and look more closely at amalgamations as well as contradictory effects. In Spain, for example, in the 1920s and 1930s the new

7  See for example the travel impressions of an eminent Spanish jesuit educator: Enrique Herrera Oría, Norteamérica al día: Memorias de un viajero español (Madrid, 1946).
8  For the differences between German and French educational responses to World War I see Andrew Donson, Youth in the Fatherless Land: War Pedagogy, Nationalism, and Authority in Germany, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, MA, 2010); Mona Siegel, The Moral Disarmament of France: Education, Pacifism, and Patriotism, 1914-1940 (Cambridge, 2004).
images of family and childhood led to heightened expectations and a political radicalization of liberal and democratic reformers who found the Spanish state to be utterly deficient.\textsuperscript{10}

Since at least the late nineteenth century another form of entanglement developed between child psychologists, educational experts, and childhood reformers on both sides of the Atlantic. To a considerable extent, these contacts stemmed from a similar assessment of the dangers and promises of modern civilization. For Europeans, too, child-rearing became increasingly intertwined with the future of the nation, and they, too, diagnosed a decline of strong-willed, autonomous individuals. German Reformpädagogen, French Republican educators, and Spanish regenerationists, to pick just a few examples, also yearned for a new self-reliant, energetic citizen that was not all that different from the image Ulysses S. Grant popularized in his autobiography. They entered into a transnational debate on how best to educate this new individual and often proposed quite similar measures. The American orphan trains, for example, found their counterpart in the French colonies de vacances (vacation colonies) that placed urban children in the countryside during the summer months, both within camps but also — and preferably — with temporary foster families. Likewise, German educational reformers founded Landschulheime (boarding schools in the countryside) far away from the corrupting influences of city life.\textsuperscript{11} These visions of a “new man,” however, were not necessarily democratic ones, and Paula Fass reminds us to look more closely at how they became intertwined with broader political agendas of political regeneration and change.

III.

Finally, I want to make a last and more general point regarding the ambivalences of liberal-democratic education since the Enlightenment. Inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, educational theorists have, in the last decades, begun to explore the coercive sides of liberal child-rearing.\textsuperscript{12} They point to the fact that the concept of Bildung (education) that stood at the core of liberal child-rearing in Germany and other countries, did not only lead the way to individual emancipation, but also posed new coercive demands on individuals to fashion themselves as rational, autonomous human beings. In this view, the liberal education reformers since the late eighteenth century not only propagated the education of a new generation of self-reliant and independent citizens, but at the same time introduced various new techniques to supervise, discipline, and control children.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} Kössler, Human Sciences.

\textsuperscript{11} Downs, Childhood; Hermann Lietz, Deutsche Land-Erziehungs-Heime (Leipzig, 1914).

\textsuperscript{12} The classical text in the German context is: Katharina Rutschky, ed., Schwarze Pädagogik. Quellen zur Naturgeschichte der bürgerlichen Erziehung (Berlin, 1977).

\textsuperscript{13} Norbert Ricken, Die Ordnung der Bildung: Beiträge zu einer Genealogie der Bildung (Wiesbaden, 2006).
A century later, after 1900, especially in the Scandinavian countries but also in other European countries, democratic concepts of child-rearing were often closely entangled with eugenic ideas. The Swedish reformer Ellen Key, for example, promoted not only a more egalitarian family life and more independence for children, but also marriage restrictions and the sterilization of supposedly “unfit” men and women to prevent them from having offspring.14

Even if one is not ready to buy into this line of argument completely or even partially, both examples invite us to look more closely at the ambivalences and contradictions of liberal and democratic child-rearing as it developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe, but perhaps also in the United States. To do this, it is helpful to historicize the notion of democratic child-rearing and examine what it meant at different times and in different places. And it seems equally helpful to study not only educational discourse but practices of child-rearing as well.

Paula Fass has offered us a compelling and thought-provoking narrative that poses a challenge to students of European history and opens up a vast new field for future research. In particular, she invites us to think more systematically about the interconnections between child-rearing and democracy.

In contrast to the situation in the United States, where the history of childhood is well established, in Europe, for the most part, we still lack studies that systematically analyze the relationship between political regime changes and educational visions and practices of child-rearing. Against this background, the question of democracy offers a promising point of departure for comparative research and a leitmotiv for a European history of childhood, especially in the twentieth century. A major question of this research should be to determine the similarities and differences between European and American visions of childhood and practices of child-rearing.


Shorty after New Year in January 2009, my dissertation project on interwar German-Japanese relations was entering a critical period. I had just spent sixteen months collecting sources in archives and libraries across Germany, and I was embarking on a year-long research stay in Japan. Although I managed to gather much material in Germany, I could not dispel a sense of anxiety and foreboding about the progress of my work. Somewhat incoherently, I worried on the one hand that I might have missed some major collections, while on the other I fretted over the time I would need to analyze the hoard of files already in my possession. Worse still, the nature of my findings did not quite match my expectations, since I located relatively few documents from official circles but far more in the cultural realm. Yet I was about to venture again into the unknown and repeat the process in another country, with a different language and uncertain prospects. As a Lufthansa airliner sped me from Germany toward Japan, I was relieved to have some quiet time alone to muse over the situation. When I stared out of the window down at the seemingly endless snow-covered vastness of Russia, one question kept swirling in my head, “What could the Japanese and Germans who concocted the Berlin-Tokyo Axis possibly have been thinking?”

By the time the jet touched down in Japan after twelve hours in the air, I had come to conclude that the lengthy journey and the thought process of those who envisioned an alliance straddling eight Soviet-controlled time zones would prove indispensable to explaining the bilateral ties. For even with direct, subsonic passenger flights in the twenty-first century, traveling between the two places can still be a burdensome and expensive affair beyond the reach of most of the population. In the 1920s and 1930s, then, the state of transportation and communication technologies would have prevented all but a few Japanese and Germans from experiencing the other country. Indeed, to traverse the nine-thousand kilometers separating Berlin and Tokyo, travelers in the interwar era would have to spend anywhere from 46 hours (on a test flight in 1938) to 102 hours (on a one-time Zeppelin voyage in 1929) to at least ten days (via the Trans-Siberian Railway).
to two weeks (with Lufthansa) to almost a month (by sea). Given the difficulty, cost, and time required for transcontinental travel, Germans and Japanese mostly knew each other as an idea. This idea, moreover, was molded by those few who enjoyed the privilege to know the other country and populace first-hand and the access to the mass media to propagate their viewpoints. As I deplaned and drew in a breath of the crisp, cold air in Tokyo, I became convinced that in order to understand German-Japanese relations and foreign affairs in general, international history must be treated as cultural and intellectual history as well. Accordingly, my dissertation examines the role of German and Japanese cultural intermediaries as matchmakers in depicting and promoting the other country as a partner for the next war. It presents the case that the area specialists in both Germany and Japan held a near-monopoly in information about the outside world and manipulated the media to replace existing notions of each other with ones extolling war and martial values. Through mutual portrayals of the other as a habitual conqueror, they successfully transformed the idea of the other country into reality by preparing the conceptual grounds for an alliance. In short, they exercised cultural knowledge as power.

An entity as peculiar and of as much world-historical consequence as the Tokyo-Berlin Axis has, of course, attracted scrutiny from researchers. After all, that Germans became German nationalists and Japanese became Japanese militarists is perhaps not entirely surprising, but the dynamics through which some Germans became supporters of Japanese aggression and vice versa do demand an explanation. Ever since Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, interpretations stressing the commonality of the two nations have been offered to explain the rapprochement — that both were politically authoritarian or fascist, socio-economically backward, or sentimentally given to extremism. Yet scholars have since cast doubt on these descriptions of Germany and Japan and therefore undermined such comparisons. For if likeness alone sufficed to ground an alliance, surely Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan would have qualified as better candidates than racist Nazi Germany and xenophobic militarist Japan. Instead, however, this pair fought each other in World War I.

Therefore my analysis deemphasizes similarities as an explanatory factor and focuses instead on the actual state of bilateral understanding. For despite technological innovations in the 1920s and 1930s,
Japanese and Germans hardly interacted with each other. It made little sense to speak of interwar German-Japanese relations, but only diplomacy, and even that did not amount to much. Long-distance travel priced most of the populations out of ever seeing the other country, so that individuals with the means to know foreign lands personally, namely adventurers, academics, merchants, missionaries, and correspondents, shaped their compatriots’ conceptualization of others. For the vast majority of Japanese or Germans, “Germany” or “Japan” materialized less as a place than as words or images seen in newspapers, watched on films, read in books, heard in lectures, discussed in interest clubs, or internalized through language studies. In order to discover what some Germans and Japanese saw in the other as a worthwhile ally, I would need to recapture the mutual imaginations generated by the opinion makers in the public sphere.

To accomplish this task, I divided the dissertation into two halves, on the German ideation of Japan and then vice versa, each with four corresponding chapters. The first half explores the appearances of Japan in German newspapers, motion pictures, nonfiction, and voluntary associations, while the second investigates the depictions of Germany in Japanese dailies, lectures and pamphlets, nonfiction, and language textbooks. The chapters are designed and organized to simulate what I call the step pyramid of knowledge acquisition. That is, the four chapters within each half mimic the intellectual journey that a German or Japanese layperson would have taken to find out more about the other civilization. Together they demonstrate the dominance of some of the area specialists in crafting the image of the other country in every layer of knowledge creation and dissemination. They also illustrate the effectiveness with which German and Japanese commentators promoted the message of bilateral collaboration since the early 1930s in various channels of the mass media, so that they used knowledge as power by wielding words as a sword.

I. Japan in the German Mass Media

To the extent that ordinary Germans crossed paths with any aspect of Japan in their everyday lives, the encounter most likely took place on newprint. The relaxation of censorship after 1919 grew the ranks of the press available to an overwhelmingly literate people. Even nonsubscribers could access multiple dailies by reading them on boards in public places, in cafes and restaurants, barbershops, and libraries. Moreover, the decentralization of and fissures in Germany
in the 1920s meant that there was a newspaper for readers of almost every locale and belief. Since newspapers reigned as the most basic and widespread source of enlightenment and amusement they would have served as the first stage of the pyramid for Germans curious about Japan. Accordingly, I surveyed six newspapers across the political spectrum to study the portrayals of Japan in the press. For the years between 1919 and 1933, I consulted, from the far left to the far right: *Die Rote Fahne*, *Vorwärts*, *Vossische Zeitung*, *Germania*, *Neue Preußische Kreuz-Zeitung*, and *Völkischer Beobachter*, whose coverage I extended until 1937 to reflect its status as the organ of the Nazi Party and regime.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Japan as a major power made news in Germany in the contexts of international politics or war. All six dailies mentioned Japan when reporting world affairs, indicating that Japan was considered worthy of page space and editorial attention. More surprising, however, was the frequency with which Japan found its way into the newspapers beyond the front page. For example, the sports section regularly featured the exploits of Japanese athletes, who belonged to that tiny subset of the populations with opportunities to travel abroad. In the interwar years Japanese sportsmen traveled several times to Germany for competitions, culminating in the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Although these visits did not quite amount to sports diplomacy, they were enthusiastically covered by German newsmen, so much so that the communist and Nazi papers could even agree in welcoming judo masters from Japan.

Besides the sports pages, Japan was also examined in the culture section. German *Feuilletons* periodically carried short stories on or from Japan, as well as travelogues and lighthearted pieces by writers familiar with Japan. Thus the Marxist *Rote Fahne* and *Vorwärts* published tales about the Japanese working class, while the conservative *Kreuz-Zeitung* cheered the popularity of German war films in Japan, and the Catholic *Germania* covered the reception of German paintings of Madonna and Child in Japan. In short, readers could habitually see Japan in the press regardless of their ideological leanings.

This is not to say, however, that Japan was discussed apolitically. Far from it, for editors and commentators certainly used Japan as a vehicle to drive home their points. The examples above already showed that the dailies were prone to select topics consistent with their Weltanschauung. No surprise, then, that leftist papers dwelled on labor conditions and nationalistic papers trumpeted war movies.
Even the seemingly innocuous theme of sports was subjected to ideological treatment. Specifically, the *Rote Fahne* greeted the Japanese judo masters because they came to Germany to compete with “worker athletes,” while the *Völkischer Beobachter* equated the promotion of judo in Japan with Nazi youth sports regimens.¹

Therefore, when Japan attacked China in 1931, all the newspapers leapt at the opportunity to interpret the news in accordance with their worldviews. The Marxist press decried not only Japanese imperialism but also the League of Nations as an abettor of Japanese fascism, while the centrist papers disapproved of Japan further disrupting the international order. Interestingly, the *Völkischer Beobachter* also ridiculed the League as a bully toward Germany but a coward in the face of real aggression from Japan. Regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict, the Nazi paper assumed a social-Darwinist neutrality — the fittest combatant would survive and rightfully claim the spoils. Just two days after the outbreak of hostilities, it declared: “It is open war as the means to resolve by force the struggle for living space. Japan has seized the opportunity of the particularly helpless situation in which China finds itself ... to establish a firm foothold in China. The ‘Far East’ has once again taught old Europe how wars are waged.”²

This Nazi “might is right” outlook departed from the German diplomatic practice in East Asian affairs, which promoted cooperation with China, and foreshadowed the Nazi rapprochement with Japan and the eventual abandonment of China.

Beyond the newsstand, the next level of rendezvous for Germans interested in learning more about Japan occurred in the cinema. Like the press, film was liberated from wartime control in 1919 and thereafter experienced a golden age that saw it grow in variety, number, and sophistication as a mass medium. In fact, the major studio Universum Film-AG (Ufa) began life as a brainchild of the War Ministry in 1917 but went on to produce several innovative projects. Typically, a visit to the movies consisted of three components: a newsreel, a short documentary, and the feature film, usually in that order. Altogether the process of “film watching” involved much more than just watching a film and could consume the better part of an evening. The allure of the silver screen was enhanced by its value, as a ticket cost on average less than a Reichsmark for much of the interwar era, well within even the budget of unskilled laborers. Since other forms of amusement like theater, concert, or opera cost decidedly more than movies, increasing numbers of Germans opted to spend spare time and money on film.

¹ *Rote Fahne*, October 1, 1932; and, *Völkischer Beobachter*, June 17, 1933.

² *Völkischer Beobachter*, September 23, 1931.
Japan debuted in German newsreels in the relatively calm of the middle Weimar years. Despite their name newsreels actually reported little timely news, since shows were produced weekly (Wochenschau) and breaking stories would long since have been announced in newspaper extras or on radio. Rather, newsreels animated recent events that spectators had already read or heard about elsewhere. As a result, 1920s cinema-goers saw vignettes of Japanese daily life such as religious festivals showcased in newsreels, so much so that Japan made “news” simply for being what Japan was thought to be and doing what Japan was thought to do normally.

The relaxed atmosphere disappeared in the early 1930s as war gripped Japan and China, and German viewers saw footage and heard sounds of fighting. Although Japan launched similar attacks against Shanghai in 1932 and 1937, the incidents were covered differently by the newsreels. Whereas in 1932 the narrator expressed sympathy with Chinese civilians, in 1937 he lauded the Japanese troops. Even camera angles betrayed a bias for Japan — in 1932 the newsreel zoomed in on Chinese victims of air raids, but in 1937 the camera literally sided with the attacker by shooting from the bomber’s point of view as the bomber dropped bombs on faceless masses below.

A short documentary followed the newsreel as the next component of a cinematic program. Like newsreels, documentaries purported to convey facts, but unlike newsreels their information did not always come across as relevant to world affairs. Given the difficulty in shooting new footage abroad, German documentaries in the 1920s usually relied on familiar clichés in depicting Japan, with predictable themes such as rice farming and volcanoes. The turning point once again emerged in the early 1930s, when documentaries shifted from nature scenes to commentary on current events. One film, *Achtung Australien! Achtung Asien!*, directed by Colin Ross, a personal acquaintance of Hitler’s, specifically described and sympathized with the Japanese as a “people without space” — a formulation pregnant with the Nazi worldview. Another documentary, *Kampf um die Mandschurei*, went as far as to argue that Japan must wrest control of Manchuria from China for its own future, and this even before Japan attacked China.

Perhaps the most dramatic shift in cinematic portrayals of Japan took place in feature films. Interestingly, aspects of Japan and its people were included in several movies, though, unsurprisingly, these elements relied heavily on existent orientalist stereotypes, so that the Japanese on German screens were merely characters with characteristics
rather than persons with personality. In the early interwar years feature films did little beyond remaking musicals or plays. Fritz Lang’s drama *Harakiri*, for instance, adopted a plot that closely followed that of *Madama Butterfly*, while the comedy *Das Mädel aus Japan* tweaked but mostly reused the storyline of the musical *The Geisha*. Toward the late 1920s, the representations of Japan on film replaced flowery geishas with stoic samurai and uniformed soldiers. Although no Japan-themed movie was made in the 1930s to call for collaboration, the Nazi regime mobilized celluloid to solidify the alliance after its onset. In early 1937, the motion picture *Die Tochter des Samurai*, a joint German-Japanese production, was released in both countries. Just as the bizarre Anti-Comintern Pact resulted from the union of two strange bedfellows, the film too had to tread a fine line between boosting the Axis and honoring both the Aryans and the honorary ones.

After the silver screen, the intercultural encounter between Germans and Japan took place between book covers, especially in nonfiction books, which collectively approximated the extent of German public knowledge about Japan. Certainly, Germans also read fiction on Japan and translated stories, but I excluded these works from consideration in the dissertation because they did not claim to be factual and it would be futile to try to discern how seriously they were taken. Generally speaking, in the 1920s and 1930s German books on contemporary Japan were created by a small group of authors: missionaries, doctoral candidates and scholars, adventurers and travel writers, and commentators on current events.

Immediately after the Great War, German missions played an outsized role in generating knowledge on Japan because both private firms and the government struggled to re-establish a foothold in the country. Churches stood out besides businesses and the state as the only institution with the wherewithal to send groups of Germans to Japan, namely missionaries, and to print books with little regard for worldly gain. Missionaries had the added advantage that they were embedded in their host societies, spoke the native tongue, and socialized with the locals. Church publications accounted for so many of the books in the early 1920s that readers in Germany searching for nonfiction on contemporary Japan would hardly have missed those by the General Protestant Mission Association. The missionaries generally held Japan in very high regard. They marveled at the natural beauty of the land and the hospitality of the people, but more...
importantly, they uniformly appreciated the strides Japan had made toward becoming a *Kulturstaat*. Although the missionaries were disappointed by their lack of success in converting more Japanese, they also expressed optimism that, as Japan continue to westernize, it would eventually adopt Christianity as a part of modern civilization. That is, compared to other Asian countries, Japan presented the best chance for salvation in the eyes of the missionaries.

As Germany regained a semblance of stability and prosperity in the mid-1920s, more Germans beyond proselytizers could afford to take an interest in Japan, namely academics and especially doctoral candidates. In almost every interwar year after 1922, several books on Japan based on dissertations were published. A few were composed by Japanese finishing their degrees abroad, but most were written by German graduates who went on to pursue careers not only in academia but also in business and government. Broadly speaking, these books focused on the arts and the social sciences, particularly politics and economics. As Japan attracted more attention and notoriety in international affairs in the late 1920s and 1930s, the number of studies on the country also increased. That Japan was chosen as the topic of several dissertations at various universities indicates a sustained interest in Japan within learned circles in Germany. To wit, the doctoral candidates and their advisers deemed Japan a place worth knowing in some depth.

The relative international peace in the 1920s also enabled Germans with means and will to travel to Japan and to share their observations with readers. Correspondingly, the number of travelogues ballooned, peaking in the late 1920s, and a handful of adventurers and pioneers enjoyed celebrity status in Germany. Some of these, such as Colin Ross, Richard Katz, and Kurt Faber, wrote travelogues on East Asia that enjoyed multiple printings. Under the pen of these wanderers, Japan often appeared favorably, especially in contrast to other Asian countries, as an oasis of western civilization and modern amenities in the exotic Orient. Yet despite the overall positive portrayals of Japan in the travelogues, the authors also freely used Japan to deliver political commentaries on conditions in Germany. For instance, Ross, a supporter of Nazism, lamented that in Japan as in Germany the rise of powerful industrial and financial concerns allowed some to control more and more of the economy and to steer public opinion by acquiring newspapers — virtually the same as Nazi accusations against “Jewish capital.”

---

The breakdown of the international order in the early 1930s not only destabilized Germany but also altered the pattern of the publication of nonfiction on Japan. The world economic crisis and the outbreak of war between China and Japan deterred travelers and shrunk the number of first-person travelogues but simultaneously made developments in Japan a more urgent topic. Thus, in the early to mid-1930s there arose a wave of books that commented not only on Japan but also on German-Japanese relations. These authors typically had little to no prior experience with Japan, but the radicalization of German politics seemed to have freed imagination in diplomatic alignments as well. Beginning in 1935, several works of nonfiction started to suggest the concrete possibility of collaboration between Berlin and Tokyo in order to guard against the common threat of communism, thereby foreshadowing the Anti-Comintern Pact by more than a year.

Beyond bookstores and libraries, the pyramid for Germans curious about Japan narrowed and steepened drastically. After consulting newspapers, films, and books, they had literally few places left to turn to for more information, so that nonfiction represented the last accessible, authoritative source for knowledge about Japan for the vast majority of Germans. Students could search for classes on Japan, but they would have found the course offerings disappointing. As of 1935, just a year before the onset of the alliance, Germany’s twenty-three universities counted only three tenured professorships of Japanology.8 Moreover, even finding a venue to study Japanese presented a challenge, since only four schools (Berlin, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Bonn) were staffed to provide instruction in the language.9 In any case, since only a tiny sliver of the population enjoyed access to higher education, universities were not a venue that effectively shaped popular images of Japan.10

Under these circumstances, voluntary associations (Verein) had the opportunity and latitude to create and disseminate knowledge of Japan in Germany and to facilitate bilateral rapprochement. Particularly in the 1920s, when the Weimar government was preoccupied by crises, private citizens had to assume the responsibility of liaison with Japan, so that international relations might even be considered personal relations. The endeavor to jumpstart bilateral civilian collaboration was championed by an unlikely figure, the chemistry professor and Nobel laureate Fritz Haber. After a well-received tour to Japan, Haber began in 1925 publicly to advocate stronger scholarly and cultural bonds with the country, and to lay the groundwork for

---

8 Letter from Wilhelm Burmeister to Paul Behncke, Bundesarchiv-Koblenz, R64IV/38, DJG, June 7, 1935. Burmeister headed the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst), and Behncke was president of the German-Japanese Society. Hamburg had the first and only ordinierter Professor of Japanology, while Berlin and Leipzig each had an ausserordentlicher Professor. For comparison, there were twenty professors of Indology, seven of Sinology, fifteen of Semitology, four of Islamic studies, eight of Egyptology, one of Assyriology, sixteen of Oriental studies, two of East Asian studies (both Sinologists), and one of Near Eastern studies.

9 Letter from Behncke to Minister of Education and Culture Bernhard Rust, Bundesarchiv-Koblenz, R64IV/38, DJG, 12 June 1935. Lecturers in Jena and Frankfurt also taught language courses periodically.

10 In 1931, the year with the highest number of enrollments in the universities, there were 103,912 university students out of Germany’s population of roughly 65 million, in Michael Grüttner, Studenten im Dritten Reich (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995), 487.
a new organization to realize this goal. His leadership and ability to attract funding and colleagues culminated in the foundation of the Japan Institute in 1926.

The Japan Institute served as the premier German-Japanese association into the early 1930s, with the goal of supporting Japanese studies in Germany and facilitating academic communication, rather than advancing any foreign-policy agenda. Not all members were content with this apolitical stance, however, so a few likeminded individuals established a splinter group that came to be known as the German-Japanese Society (Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft, DJG) in 1930. Whereas the Japan Institute promoted Japanology, the DJG promoted Japan.

The sea change triggered by the Nazi assumption of power transformed Japan-related associational activities in Germany. The apolitical Japan Institute found itself unable to navigate a society where suddenly everything was becoming politicized, while the unscrupulous DJG remade itself to cater to the new masters of Germany by dismissing its Jewish members — at the prompting of some Japanese participants in the DJG. Through Gleichschaltung the DJG acquired a new leadership that boasted no expertise on Japan but substantial connections with the Nazi regime and party. Thus the vacuum in official German attention toward Japan that had given rise to the Japan Institute in the 1920s enabled the DJG in the 1930s to anoint itself the arbiter of bilateral interactions. With breathtaking speed, the DJG carved out a niche within the Nazi polycratic jungle on all matters German-Japanese by inserting itself in the cultural, academic, military, and political issues dealing with Japan. Remarkably, although the DJG remained a civil, voluntary association with no official standing, its leadership regularly hobnobbed and corresponded with high-ranking members of the armed forces, SS, and Nazi Party. As the DJG aggressively promoted itself, it also raised the profile of Japan in Germany.

Though the politicization of opinions on Japan benefited the DJG and its lobbying effort, the Nazification of Germany also harmed some bonds with Japan. Ironically, people of mixed German and

![Portrait of Fritz Haber](Photo 102-06975). Fritz Haber, director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Physikalische Chemie und Elektro-Chemie in Berlin Dahlem, ca. 1928. Photo courtesy of the Bundesarchiv (Photo 102-06975).
Japanese parentage — the literal products of bilateral ties — became ensnared in Nazi racial dragnets. People who had always thought of themselves as good German citizens suddenly discovered that they were being dismissed from their jobs, expelled from universities, and forbidden to marry because of their half-Japanese heritage. To its credit, the DJG tried to intercede for these individuals, but there was precious little it could do. They were surprised to discover that the much ballyhooed phrase “honorary Aryans,” uttered by the Führer himself in reference to the Japanese, actually carried no legal weight.

The Nazification of Germany wrought its gravest damage in the production of knowledge about Japan. Just as Japanology was receiving a boost in 1932 with the creation of a chair at the University of Leipzig and the hiring of Hans Ueberschaar, a rising star in the field, the next year saw the departure of Haber and the demise of his handiwork, the Japan Institute. The greatest irony took place in 1937, when Ueberschaar himself was chased out of Germany by the Gestapo. Although he had exceeded all expectations in advancing Japanese studies in Leipzig, he was prosecuted for, but not convicted of, “unnatural fornication between men.” He was fired and fled to Japan, never to return, and the professorship remained unfilled until 1942. Despite real, negative repercussions on German-Japanese exchanges, the persecution of Ueberschaar exposed the fraud of the new German-Japanese alliance and its accompanying propaganda, for the Nazi regime placed dogma before reason and ideology before diplomacy.

II. Germany in the Japanese Media

Much as in Germany, newspapers were dominant as the most affordable, available, and diverse source of entertainment and enlightenment in interwar Japan. Although newspapers were introduced to Japan only in the 1860s, modern print journalism rapidly achieved the status of a veritable fourth estate and an alternative source of influence besides the state, military, or industry. In fact, by the
twentieth century the Japanese press served not only as an incubator of ideas but also of future statesmen and businessmen, several of whom had worked as newsmen earlier in their lives. Also as in Weimar Germany, Japan after World War I experienced a phase of liberalization and democratization known as Taishō Democracy that further enhanced the reach and influence of the press. The two biggest newspaper groups each boasted a daily circulation of about two million, which generated enough revenue for their parent companies to perform social functions such as raising funds for disaster victims or naval construction. Each also integrated vertically to operate its own telephone and telegraph services, and even an airline to rush news from abroad. Considering the newspapers’ impact throughout society and on people’s lives beyond informing the public, they would have served as the most basic channel for the initial intercultural encounter between Japanese and Germany.

Accordingly, the second half of my dissertation begins with a survey of five Japanese dailies from the communist left to the nationalistic right: Akahata, Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun, Yomiuri Shinbun, The Japan Times and Mail, and Kökin Shinbun. During the interwar years and across the ideological spectrum, these newspapers paid close attention to Germany. Headlines and articles covered a range of topics, featuring the Kaiser, elections, scientific breakthroughs, the economy, and culture. Although in light of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis one might be tempted to interpret the detailed coverage on Germany as a predictive sign, this understanding is not supported by the evidence. Instead, similar to the conceptualization of Japan in the German press, the Japanese newspapers saw Germany through ideological lenses. For instance, the conservative paper took comfort in the fact that Wilhelm II escaped war crimes trials after World War I, even though the Kaiserreich had been at war with Japan.11 Moreover, the myopic focus on the Kaiser led many journalists to misread German politics. Thus the newspapers persisted in depicting the Nazi Party as a monarchist movement and believed that Hitler’s rise could bring a return of the Kaiser.12 Meanwhile, in the early 1930s the Marxist paper downplayed the rise of the Nazis as the last gasp of capitalism and celebrated marginal communist electoral gains as signs of an imminent Bolshevik revolution.13 Such misinterpretations demonstrate that the strong interest in Germany exhibited by the Japanese press did not necessarily translate into an accurate understanding.

Moreover, although Germany usually appeared as a powerful nation in the newspapers, the Japanese press did not always welcome a
revived Germany. While in the 1920s Japanese journalists lavished much attention on the experiments of a Germany under a new government in a new international order, by the early 1930s a strengthening Germany became a matter of concern. Germany’s economy was perceived as a competitor for Japan, especially during the difficult times of the world economic crisis. When Hitler assumed power, his regime actually soured relations with Japan. The boorish tactics of the Nazis, including the book burning and persecution of Jewish Germans, turned off a wide swath of editorial opinions. Worse yet, in July 1933 Reich Economics Minister Alfred Hugenberg caused a firestorm in the Japanese press when he argued that in order to meet its reparations obligations Germany should regain control of its former colonies.14

Yet less than a year later, in May 1934, the government-subsidized Japan Times issued a special supplement, “Japan and Germany Linked in Friendship,” to celebrate and encourage bilateral rapprochement. How did the volte-face come to be? First, the Japanese press felt far more threatened by communism than by any Nazi claims for former colonies. Already in 1933, the Japan Times opined, “There was a day when political developments in distant lands were of but passing interest to the public of Japan. That such keen interest should be manifested in the recent Nationalist landslide which marked the German elections of March 5 is evidence of the ever increasing interdependence of nations ... Thus, in Japan as in Germany, there are the forces of nationalism on the one hand and on the other those of communism.”15 Second and more importantly, many of the flashpoints between Tokyo and Berlin had subsided. The book burning lasted but a night and the boycott of Jewish businesses only a day. Even the controversy over Germany’s the former Pacific colonies disappeared quickly. Hugenberg was sacked by Hitler, and while traditional conservatives continued to speak of the lost colonies, the Nazis were not a traditional bunch. The Third Reich envisioned its imperialistic future in Eastern Europe, not the Far East, thereby neutralizing a major irritant in bilateral relations.

14 Kokumin Shinbun, June 18, 1933.
15 The Japan Times and Mail, March 10, 1933.
Beyond newspapers, the next venue of intercultural encounter between the Japanese and Germany was public lectures and pamphlets. Ideally, the second step on the Japanese pyramid should correspond to the German one, in the form of a discussion of portrayals of Germany in Japanese cinema, but two factors made this an impossible proposition. First, evidence indicates that very few Japanese films featured German themes or characters. To the extent that Japanese moviegoers saw Germany on the silver screen, the film was most likely imported from Germany and thus would not reveal Japanese attitudes toward the country. Second, only a small number of Japanese films from the interwar period still survive today and are not easily accessible. Therefore I chose public lectures and pamphlets as substitute sources comparable to motion pictures because they served similar functions in informing the two populations. A lecture took about the same time to sit through as a film, and the spoken words had an ephemeral quality similar to that of moving images. Lastly, lecture circuits were immensely popular and had a national audience, and the texts of lectures were regularly published and sold as affordable pamphlets.

The portrayals of Germany in lectures and pamphlets in interwar Japan evolved through three stages. The first stage, which was co-terminous with the 1920s, saw Japanese commentators on Germany attempting to get reacquainted with the new Germany after 1919. Although scholarly works on modern Japanese-German relations often dismiss World War I as an aberration from a long-term trend toward engagement, for the Japanese at the time the conflict represented a real caesura lasting four years that cut off contact between the two countries. Moreover, Germany had changed so much between 1914 and 1919 that the Japanese observers felt that they needed to re-learn the facts about Germany. As a result, lectures from the first interwar decade were usually delivered by Japanese who visited Germany or Europe for work. Evidently Germany, in spite or perhaps because of the vicissitudes of war and revolution, remained an engaging topic among the Japanese. Lecturers could and did draw large audiences even if the content constituted little more than one person’s impression of Weimar Germany. In this stage, the lectures discussed Germany in a matter-of-fact, businesslike, and rational tone. None of the speakers voiced any hostility toward Germany, the former enemy, and several even showed sympathy for the hardships faced by ordinary Germans. Yet the lecturers also made it clear that they considered Germany primarily responsible for its defeat and predicament after 1919. As Germany managed to stabilize itself in the mid-1920s, the
speakers were also relieved, not because they had any innate or emotional preference for the country, but because Germany’s well-being was crucial to the world’s and thus Japan’s own well-being. A few even gave talks on how Japan might learn from Germany’s revival from political and economic chaos, since Japan was also rebuilding from the catastrophic Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923.

As the world economic crisis paralyzed politics and policies in Germany and gave an opening to extremists on the left and the right in the early 1930s, the development of Japanese lectures and pamphlets on Germany entered a second stage, in which they exhibited a shift in tone away from neutral observation to partisan advocacy. In other words, whereas the lecturers had previously expressed concern for all of Germany’s welfare, now they showed a preference for a certain segment within the country. Specifically, a number of commentators appeared to have been won over by Nazism without the Nazis even attempting to win support in Japan. The person of Hitler became an extremely popular topic among audiences and readers. One speaker who was likely the first Japanese ever to have met Hitler in 1930 even launched a profitable lecture circuit based on that meeting alone. This stage also witnessed the entrance of a number of pamphleteers into the business of commenting on Germany. Usually they had no previous interest in or interactions with the country and appeared to be motivated mostly by profit. In addition, unlike the unemotional tone of the lecturers in the 1920s, these entrants used much more sensational language to promote a populist version of Nazism and to drive up sales of their publications.

In the third and final stage, starting in 1935, the ubiquitous pamphlets and exclusive lectures on Germany began to converge in their advocacy for concrete action to realize a Japanese-German rapprochement. The crucial change took place when influential voices within the political, military, and industrial establishments in Japan seemed to have been reassured about Hitler’s intentions. Whereas the more highbrow lectures had used to stick to facts, now they joined the populist and sensationalist pamphlets in calling for bilateral collaboration. In mid-1935, that is, more than a year before the eventual Anti-Comintern Pact, some lectures and pamphlets were already laying out plans for an anti-Soviet alliance. In hindsight, it appears that the government was merely catching up with public discussions on foreign policy.
After lectures and pamphlets, those Japanese still eager to learn more about Germany would have to head to bookstores and libraries to consult topical nonfiction. In addition to books by Japanese writers, the reader was likely to run into numerous works translated from German into Japanese without editorial comments. In the interwar period, Japanese institutions and individuals translated volumes from German with gusto; civil and penal law codes, books on trade practices, and technical manuals were the most sought-after items. Although these works each conveyed little beyond their own specialties, together they made up the central pillar of the transfer of knowledge from Germany to Japan and hence a source for the analysis of Japan’s perception of Germany. After all, the selection of works that a people invests the human resources, time, and money to translate from a foreign language says a lot about what it prioritizes as worthwhile from another nation, so that the aggregate of translated works represents an evaluation by one civilization of another. Seen from this perspective, from the 1920s to 1940s Japan esteemed Germany highly, as it imported publications on even rather obscure topics, such as the procedures for transporting corpses by rail and regulations on horse-racing.

In some ways, Japanese books on Germany followed a pattern similar to that of the lectures and pamphlets. Nonfiction works in the 1920s adopted a factual, businesslike tone in their depictions of Germany, while those in the 1930s tended to be more political and activist. Yet important difference separated the books and the pamphlets. Books did not operate within nearly as thin a profit margin or as tight a publication schedule as pamphlets. The quick turnaround of pamphlets allowed for a response to breaking news, but book authors could utilize the extra time to incorporate in-depth analysis with an extended timeframe. The wider profit and time margins also enabled books to indulge in themes deemed less pressing than those in pamphlets. What is more, book writers presumably felt less pressure than pamphleteers to sensationalize a topic because book readers were expected not only to be sufficiently curious about the content to spend the time to read the books but also to have more education than the consumers of pamphlets. As a result, whereas many pamphlets were decorated with front pages featuring outlandish graphics and slogans to boost sales, most books were designed to be judged not by their covers but by their contents.

The most remarkable feature of Japanese nonfiction on Germany in the 1920s was the air of uncertainty conveyed in the content.
authors, most of whom had visited Germany before World War I, focused on the many changes brought about by defeat and revolution. Several of them wrote touchingly about their distress in seeing a proud people reduced to panhandling or scavenging for food. Indeed, the Great War loomed so large in the mind of Japanese writers that the word “war” appeared in most books on Germany in the 1920s. Still, although the conditions witnessed by these writers were horrible, they uniformly showed faith that Germany would recover its former glory. While the authors meant well, this sentiment also betrayed a bias for the old order under the Kaiser. This longing for the past colored their distrust of the Weimar Republic, which most writers did not believe to be a viable, stable entity. Moreover, although a few writers appreciated the cultural flowering under Weimar, several also expressed distaste of the freewheeling atmosphere in Berlin’s nightlife.

Therefore, when a right-wing movement began to rise in Germany in the early 1930s, some authors were already sentimentally primed to receive the ideology favorably. Yet their welcoming attitude toward Nazism did not necessarily convey a deep understanding of the ideology. In fact, many writers were so misguided by their own memory of Imperial Germany that they mistook Nazism as a monarchist ideology. Like the lecturers, several authors were charmed by the person of Hitler; the first Japanese biography of Hitler appeared as early as September 1931, just a year or so after the initial Nazi electoral breakthrough. It was also quite telling that the first encyclopedic work on Weimar Germany took ten years to emerge, as if writers and publishers alike wanted to be sure that the Republic would not collapse before committing to the project. By contrast, the first such works on Nazi Germany appeared within three years of the regime’s establishment, indicating the confidence the writers had in the dictatorship’s survival. By the mid-1930s, a handful of publishers even emerged to focus exclusively on importing and translating materials from Nazi Germany.

By the time the Japanese climber of the pyramid of knowledge acquisition had consulted the books on various aspects of Germany, the reader would make a rather unsettling discovery. Even if he had exhausted Japanese nonfiction on Germany and German works translated into Japanese, he would only have accessed a minuscule portion of the total corpus of works on Germany, most of which was published in German and therefore inaccessible to Japanese lay

16 For example, Nagura Mon’ichi, Kyōwakoku Doitsu (Tokyo: Ōsaka Yagō Shoten, 1922), 159–60.
17 Katayama Masao, Gendai Doitsu bungakukan (Tokyo: Bunken Shoin, 1924), Foreword 1.
readers. In other words, to common Japanese the German tongue represented at once the lock and key to a treasure trove of information. In order for non-experts to discover firsthand this wealth and gain self-sufficiency in their quest for knowledge, they would first have to rely on and learn from one last group of cultural intermediaries—Japanese linguists and instructors of the German language.

As a result, language textbooks represented the last stage of the Japanese intellectual encounter with Germany. While even today the Japanese suffer from the stereotype of being poor foreign-language learners, this image belies the strong interest many Japanese, then as now, had in mastering foreign tongues. The apparent lack of success likely had more to do with the quirks of linguistics rather than effort. Since Japanese has no strong ties to other languages, native Japanese speakers find most foreign tongues quite alien. German, of course, would have been no exception. For instance, there are features in German, such as articles, noun declension, and verb conjugation, that are absent in Japanese and would strike Japanese students as unfamiliar concepts. This observation would apply to many European languages, but German presented a unique set of difficulties to the Japanese in the 1920s and 1930s. Even before delving into the niceties of grammar, German would have looked rather difficult to the Japanese. Unlike other Western European languages, German retained the use of blackletter or *Fraktur* well into the twentieth century. Thus, even for those Japanese who had studied French or English, deciphering the letters of German in blackletter would have been difficult. Handwritten German might not have offered any relief either, as German could be penned in either the traditional cursive common to other European languages or the *Sütterlin* style, another feature unique to German. The pronunciation of German, too, came across as odd, as German has a number of sounds unfamiliar to speakers of Japanese.

Yet sources indicate unequivocally that in the interwar era many Japanese studied German, so much so that a cottage industry sprang up to answer the demand for language tools. Why would any Japanese be interested in such a challenging language? As it turned out, mastering German would have brought several tangible advantages. German was a required foreign language for those Japanese studying a range of subjects from philosophy to physics, especially chemistry, medicine, dentistry, and pharmacology. In order to access original research and the latest scientific knowledge from Germany, a number of Japanese resolved to master the language despite its many difficulties.
Since Germany was already perceived as the source of much scientific knowledge, it did not take much of a logical leap for the more politically minded of the linguists to interpret Germany ideologically through lessons on German. For example, one author compared the “round, circuitous” Latin script used by the British to the “formal, earnest” blackletter preferred by the Germans.\(^\text{18}\) To others, the sounds of spoken German evoked the image of a virile, rugged, and disciplined people. The clearly demarcated tenses in German seemed to indicate a particularly Germanic, precise understanding of time, while one outdid all others in extrapolation by singling out relative pronouns as a key for the success of not only the Germans but also the whole white race.\(^\text{19}\)

The transformation of Germany after 1933 caused many Japanese linguists to change the content of their language books. Many writers reasoned that, as a new Germany was being built under Nazism, a new German language was about to be born, and the Japanese would do well to be acquainted with this new language. Thus many of the Japanese linguists voluntarily Nazified the content of their works, without any pressure at all from the German or Japanese government. Beginning in the mid-1930s, Japanese students of German were regularly taught a politicized and Nazified German, so that for homework exercises they would have to translate into Japanese the following sentence, “Democracy again? Who still thinks of it as a spiritual factor today? The era of National Socialism is now marching forth in Germany!”\(^\text{20}\) Well before the German-Japanese alliance became a reality, a number of Japanese had already undergone self-Gleichschaltung and became fluent in Nazi speak.

### III. Conclusion

The Berlin-Tokyo Axis, once so intimidating, left no monuments. Today, the only evidence for the Axis materializes as words and images in documents stashed in archives and libraries. In the interwar years up until the Anti-Comintern Pact, to the extent that the populations thought of the other country at all, the two countries interacted with each other as ideas. To be sure, the two nations upheld certain levels of interaction in diplomacy and commerce, but most Japanese and Germans never had the chance to know the other firsthand. Rather, they learned of each other as fine print in newspapers, moving pictures on cinema screens, uttered sounds captured in pamphlets, words and images printed in books, activities conducted in voluntary

---

\(^{18}\) A. Hahn and Sawai Yōichi, _Seiongaku hon'i Dokubun shinkai_ (Tokyo: Nichido-ku Shoin, 1924), 63-4.

\(^{19}\) Sekiguchi Tsugio, _Doitsu daikōza_ 1 (Tokyo: Gaigo Kenkyūsha, 1935), 261.

\(^{20}\) Takakuwa Sumio, _Teiyō Doitsu shōbun_ (Tokyo: Nanzando Shoten, 1936), 42.
associations, and vocabulary and grammar memorized in language studies. The German and Japanese governments could do, and did, little to control the appearances of their own nations in the other. Instead, Japanese opinion makers shaped the depictions of Germany in Japan, and German commentators molded the portrayals of Japan in Germany.

The German mass media propagated a static but schizophrenic image of Japan — "a country of juxtaposition" between West and East, familiar and exotic, integration and isolation, etc. The German conceptualization of Japan in the press, the cinema, nonfictions, and interest clubs underwent no great changes. Clichés such as "land of the rising sun," geisha and samurai, and the homogeneous island nation were applied to describe Japan. These multiple and malleable ideations allowed German opinion makers and eventually the government to highlight aspects of Japan to suit their political needs. Meanwhile, the Japanese mass media reported on Germany selectively, pining nostalgically for the Kaiserreich, downplaying the Weimar Republic, and then trumpeting the Third Reich. In all the conduits of information — newspapers, lectures and pamphlets, books, and language texts — Germany was portrayed as a country of science, order, and progress, and the Germans as a people persevering in the face of catastrophes. In contrast to Germany’s unchanging portrait of Japan, Japan’s portrait of Germany followed a narrative of a country spiraling downward in the 1920s and rising in redemption in the 1930s.

Beginning in the early 1930s, independent but simultaneous changes within Japan and Germany prompted a small but vocal clique of Japanese intellectuals, echoed by their German counterparts, to paint an increasingly rosy but distorted portrait of each other’s country. The Japanese pundits substituted the extant notion of a progressive and culturally diverse Germany with one romanticizing its past battlefield heroics, martial ethos, and radical ideologies. Meanwhile, the German commentators replaced the pre-existing stereotype of a quaint, traditional, and geisha-filled Japan with one populated by warriors and glorifying its embrace of political violence, defiance of international order, and offensive war.

The phenomenon of increasingly more militant German-Japanese mutual conceptualizations offers a fascinating example in intercultural intellectual relations. It represents an instance of a population mentally empowering a foreign people to commit violent acts and
gravitating toward such acts, unlike the more conventional case of one believing in the superiority of one’s own country. The dissertation argues that the opinion-makers developed the subject of bilateral cooperation and articulated it in politico-military terms. They voiced support for the alliance before it was formed and furnished defense for it afterward. In other words, they helped transform the idea of the other country into diplomatic reality by seeding the public and official consciousness with rhetoric and imagery glamorizing war. Well before the two regimes signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, some German and Japanese commentators had already begun collaborating in joint publications. In short, while the pundits did not control traditional sources of power like the armed forces, bureaucracy, noble lineages, party machines, or great wealth, they wielded their knowledge of the outside world as power and helped transform their fantasy into reality. To wit, they wielded the pen as the sword.

**Ricky W. Law** is Assistant Professor of History at Carnegie Mellon University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and was the recipient of the 2013 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize. Currently he is revising his dissertation, “Knowledge is Power: The Interwar German and Japanese Mass Media in the Making of the Axis,” which studies the role of opinion makers in leading the public discourse that helped make the alliance imaginable. He also has a chapter in *Beyond Alterity: German Encounters with Modern East Asia*, to be published by Berghahn Books in July 2014.
I want to thank the German Historical Institute and the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius for awarding me the Helmut Schmidt Prize for German-American Economic History. It is an unexpected honor to receive this prize and to be in the company of the previous distinguished recipients. Like anyone concerned with the history of the German and transatlantic economies, I appreciate that the ZEIT Foundation and the GHI recognize the importance of economic history — a field that for several decades did not exactly have a lot of sex appeal in the historical profession or the broader public. That is changing, however, due to the ideology and reality of globalization, to the successes and problems of the European Union and the Euro, and to the economic crisis that began in 2007/08 and persists in varied forms on both sides of the Atlantic. There is nothing like bank collapses, housing busts, and sovereign debt crises to remind people that economies have complex histories filled with structural shifts and conjunctural swings and a rather promiscuous variety of production regimes, fiscal and monetary systems, and trading partners and patterns.

I feel especially pleased and surprised to have received the Helmut Schmidt Prize, for I do a rather unorthodox kind of economic history; indeed, many who practice quantitative economic history or more traditional business history may not consider what I do as really economic history. My writings pay as much attention to political economy and economic imaginaries as to economic institutions. They are concerned not only with the organization of firms and practices of business associations but also with the organization of production and transformations of the labor process — I began my academic life as a labor historian. I have written extensively on questions of consumption and consumer cultures, but always linking them back to the production regimes and state economic policies with which the consumption of material goods and cultural products is inextricably entangled. My work attends to the factory floor and corporate boardrooms, but equally to spaces usually considered marginal to
economic history, such as kitchens. Although my first book focused only on Germany, indeed only on Düsseldorf with its radical Social Democratic movement and powerful business community, my work became increasingly transnational, focusing first on German-American economic relations in the 1920s, and then on the United States and Europe, capaciously defined, in the long twentieth century.¹ In the latter work, Germany of necessity features prominently.

The current moment is auspicious for reconsidering U.S.-German economic relations in particular and U.S.-European ones more broadly, for in the era of the European Union, neatly separating the national from the European is all but impossible, as politicians and publics can attest. Three recent controversies have spurred debate about the current state of transatlantic relations and their future development. The first involves the revelations about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance of German telecommunications, including Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone. Although Germany was far from the only target of interest for the NSA, its secret monitoring raised German concerns about whether the American government regarded Germany as an intimate and trustworthy ally on a par with its English-speaking ones, or as a third-class ally. It led Germans to question whether Germany and the United States had profoundly different values and laws on privacy, as well as whether the German government knew about the NSA programs and had become dangerously “Americanized” in its own electronic intrusions. The second issue involved Syria and whether Germany would follow the United States’ lead and sanction militarized intervention in the brutal civil war there. As in the case of the Iraq War in 2003 and Libya in 2011, Germany did not join the “coalition of the willing.” Neither of these contentious matters focused on the economy — although Germans worried about possible American industrial and business espionage in the wake of the Snowden leaks — but both created tensions affecting the third issue: Central to transatlantic economic relations, this issue involves negotiations around the establishment of a U.S.-European Union Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) or, to use its official name, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

This is not the first time since the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement and the postwar General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs that transatlantic free trade has been discussed, but the current proposals are vastly more ambitious than anything previously recommended. In its

most expansive form, TTIP calls for zero tariffs on goods, free trade in services and investment, and the elimination or “harmonization”
of non-tariff barriers, i.e. regulations of all sorts. The current negotia-
tions both suggest the closeness of transatlantic ties and foreground
the ways in which American and European economic structures,
financial systems, social policies, and approaches to regulation — of
everything from banks and labor to cultural goods and genetically
modified foods — differ, often substantially. Which European and
American policies, institutions, and values can serve as the basis for
collaboration, and which are sources of conflict that could signifi-
cantly narrow any possible agreement or derail it completely?

I want to place the current moment of proposed increased transat-
lantic economic cooperation in historical context. That context could
be extended back to the late nineteenth century, when multilateral
transatlantic trade and investment were increasing, and Germany
and the United States were challenging British global economic
hegemony. Or one could begin in the 1920s, when Germany and
some other European states, especially the Soviet Union, were fas-
cinated with Fordism, the American model of mass production and
consumption, even if no European country was able to emulate that
model in the interwar period. Or one could start with the Depression
and fascism, which led to a disarticulation of the global economy,
the rise of competing regionalisms, and, in the wake of World War
II, the economic devastation of Europe and emergence of America
as the global economic hegemon. I, however, want to focus on the
decades after 1945.

How might we best understand the changing nature of the West Ger-
man (and later unified German) economy and its relationship with
the United States, which was, alternately and often simultaneously,
a model for Germany to emulate or avoid, an adviser, a collaborator,
and a competitor? To what extent is the capacious and contentious
concept of Americanization appropriate? To what extent did a dis-
tinctive German or Rhenish variety of capitalism, more akin to that
of other European countries than to that of the United States, persist
or emerge? And if so, do such developments, along with the creation
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Common
Market and then the European Union (EU) and a common currency,
make Europeanization a more useful conceptual framework for un-
derstanding the German economy?
Finally, what about globalization, that much-used and abused term? What light does it shed on the German economy since the 1970s, when the second wave of modern globalization began? (The first started during the late nineteenth century and ended in the aftermath of World War I.) Should one view the current state of German-American economic cooperation and competition as part of or a response to globalization? Or, as Henry Kissinger rather dismissively claimed in 1973, do Germans and Europeans have only regional interests while the United States alone has global ones?  

I. Americanization

Let’s begin our exploration of the post-1945 German economy with Americanization. In the years after 1945, American military personnel, businessmen, Marshall Plan administrators, labor leaders, foundation officials, and educators moved out across Western Europe to spread the gospel of democratic capitalism and anti-Communism. They encouraged Europeans, and especially Germans, to adopt the “politics of productivity,” to open their markets, integrate their economies, and allow Hollywood films, jazz, and rock ‘n’ roll to circulate freely. “You can be like us” was the American promise — one that many perceived as a threat. But did the combination of aid, investment, multinationals, foundations, consumer goods, and cultural products — all varied forms of American soft and semi-hard power — transform European economies and societies in the ways anticipated by either Americans or Germans?

At issue are not American ambitions, but rather Western Europe’s openness to things American and its ability to adopt or adapt them. While most scholars agree that concepts such as thoroughgoing European emulation or American cultural imperialism are too crude to describe the complex transatlantic interactions, there is much room for disagreement about what postwar Americanization looked like in different areas of economy and society, in different countries, and for different classes, generations, and genders. Indeed, there is much disagreement about how to define that elusive term. Some speak of the transfer of the American economic model and partial convergence, while others opt for cross-fertilization or speak of adaption, negotiation, and the resulting creation of hybrid economic practices, products, and policies.

The essence of the American model is equally open to dispute. For Victoria de Grazia, its core is American mass consumption, with its

distinctive Fordized system of distribution, new advertising techniques and messages, democratic ethos, consumer citizens, and promise of a dramatically new standard of living. For Charles Maier, the American model that was exported post-1945 was ideological as much as institutional. It was a “politics of productivity,” promoted by mass production, organizational rationalization, new technology, and an open international economic order and that promised not only growth but an escape from the zero-sum distributional struggles and ideological politics of earlier decades. For Marie-Laure Djelic, the essence of the postwar American model — a model that was historically specific but claimed universal validity — was the large multidivisional, rationalized corporation, operating under the constraints of antitrust legislation and competing in oligopolistic markets. Christian Kleinschmidt and Gary Herrigel reject the idea of a unitary American model, embodying the best practices for productivity and marketing. Instead, they see the United States as having offered an ensemble of organizational innovations, technologies, and management and marketing practices, from which Europeans could pick and choose and which they would modify and recombine to suit local institutions, needs, preferences, and prejudices.

America’s influence varied across European countries, depending on the amount of U.S. aid and investment, the size of the U.S. military presence, the strength of prior cultural ties and economic exchanges, and the depth of national resistance to imports from across the Atlantic. France was among the least “Americanized” countries, Germany among the most. But how Americanized did the Federal Republic become?

Opinions vary greatly. Volker Berghahn has traced a gradual post-1945 Americanization of West German business and German society and culture more broadly, for example, while Werner Abelshauser insists that American and German production regimes looked more similar in the late nineteenth century than in the late twentieth. Those seeing — and advocating for — a convergence of capitalist economies around the American model have argued this thesis in various ways. In the first postwar decades, they insisted on the technological necessity of Fordist mass production and mass consumption; from the late 1970s on, they stressed the economic logic and scientific status of Anglo-American neo-liberalism; currently they point to the imperatives of globalization. Proponents of varieties of capitalism — whether they label those varieties market versus

welfare capitalism; liberal market economies versus coordinated market ones; or neo-American versus Rhenish models, to cite just a few of the labels used — deny the rumors of impending convergence and insist on the viability and flexibility of non-liberal, socially embedded and managed models. There is little agreement among historians, economists, and social scientists on the key issues to be analyzed, the crucial periods to be studied or the definition of terms, above all “Americanization.”

When I read the literature on Americanization and that on varieties of capitalism side by side, I sometimes feel that I’m in a room full of blind people describing an elephant. Depending which part of the elephant — or in our case, which part of the economy — you touch, you can describe an utterly different beast. If one focuses on industrial relations and issues of governance — Mitbestimmung (co-determination), national pattern wage bargaining, the high degree of organization among businesses or if you focus on how firms secure financing, train workers, maintain relations with suppliers or choose members of their boards — one sees a Germany that bears little resemblance to America from the 1950s through the 1990s and still differs in significant respects. If you look primarily at production methods, technology, and economic legislation — such as mass production, Fordist technologies and factory organization, and the 1957 anti-cartel law — you find evidence of rupture with past German practices. But historians and social scientists disagree about whether these borrowings substantially transformed the German industrial order or whether they represented an ambivalent and generation and branch-specific embrace of the American model.

When attention is turned to mass consumption and the accompanying spread of commodified mass culture and leisure, the creature being described seems, at first glance, to be remarkably Americanized. Upon closer inspection, the meaning assigned to goods, the ways they were sold, regulated and paid for, and the spaces into which they were inserted seem distinctly German. Abelshauser sees a resurgence of organized business and later labor interests in the 1950s and labels them corporatist; Berghahn sees only business influence; and van Hook insists that German institutions and policies remained Marktkonform (market-compliant), as the Americans and Germans (like Erhard) wanted, throughout the 1950s. Some claim the 1957 German cartel law assured the triumph of the large, American-style, multidivisional corporation operating in oligopolistic markets; others

---


10 For the strongest recent arguments for the Americanization of production, consumption and culture, see David Ellwood, Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
claim it allowed spaces for the reemergence of organized cooperation that functioned in ways similar to cartels. Those emphasizing the Americanization of the German economy focus on the first postwar decades, when the American model meant Fordist mass production by a new corporate order combined with new forms of mass consumption, the expansion of the welfare state, and Keynesianism; and they ignore the troubled career of Americanization since the economic crises of the 1970s. Those stressing *Modell Deutschland* concentrate on the strength of corporatist institutions from the late 1960s onward and contrast it to the American model in its current guise, a model which stands for a post-Fordist, information technology- and finance-based economy, neoliberal economic policies, and an ownership society that has drastically curbed social rights and eroded the social infrastructure.

All of these arguments capture part of the German-American encounter in the postwar decades, an encounter that had multiple, if unequal agents, with complex and often conflicting motives and goals. Germans, like other Europeans, selected, negotiated, modified, adapted and sometimes completely rejected what the Americans offered and often tried to impose with varying degrees of economic and political coercion. How do we conceptualize the resulting hybrid economic entity?

Despite a strong presence of American firms, products, cultural goods and economic ideas, I would argue that Germany developed a distinctive and European variety of capitalism. First, the degree of borrowing from, negotiating with, adapting and modifying things American varied greatly in different areas of the economy. Second, individual, more Americanized aspects of the economy should not be seen in isolation, but rather in relation both to other, less Americanized ones and within the context of state institutions, economic policies, social rights, and visions of the good life and just society. Finally, the relationship of Germany to the American model has shifted in substantial ways across the Cold War decades and beyond because of the differing ways in which Germany and America have changed. By the 1990s, the new neoliberal American model of speculative stock market capitalism and globalization was in the ascendancy; its proponents touted its universal applicability, moral superiority, and historical inevitability. As the German economy slumped and exhibited new rigidities, many Germans looked anxiously and enviously across the Atlantic. Yet they adopted only watered-down versions of

---

new American practices without fundamentally restructuring many aspects of technology, firm financing, governance, production, labor relations and social policy — a process many label as hybridization rather than (neo-)liberalization.12

If American and German institutions and practices increasingly diverged, so too did the values embedded in and promoted by each model. The American model came to champion competition, valorize risk, and tolerate enormous inequality to an unprecedented degree. By contrast, the more socially embedded German model tried to balance financial liberalization and cuts in a variety of benefits with an ongoing commitment to security and greater equality. Germany seems much less Americanized now than it did in the 1950s and 1960s, but it does look much more Europeanized.

II. Europeanization

Why has a historian who spent years studying Americanization, Americanism, and anti-Americanism in Germany and Europe come to see Europeanization as a concept more descriptively rich and analytically useful for understanding developments in Germany in the second half of the twentieth century? Let me suggest the reasons schematically.

First, the “selective adaptation, creative modification, and innovative hybridization”13 that characterized the German reception of all things American was typical of countries across Europe. The experience of engaging with American economic models, commodities, business methods, ideology, cultural goods, and, of course, Americans themselves, became part of postwar German and European economies, cultures, and identities. Second, the context in which the mass production and mass consumption of consumer durables emerged after 1945 in Germany and Europe was very different than that of the United States. In The Transatlantic Century, I argue that different varieties of capitalism, social policies, and degrees of state involvement in the economy made European capitalisms more similar to one another, despite important national differences, than to American capitalism. Moreover, the socialist consumer cultures of places like the German Democratic Republic borrowed from and resembled those in Western and Northern Europe in key respects. As the GHI’s Jan Logemann has shown, the balance between public and private consumption was configured in distinctive ways in the United States and the German Federal Republic, as were the cultural values


surrounding consumption. Mass consumption privileged different spaces as well. For postwar Germans, these spaces were rebuilt cities, while Americans prioritized suburbs. These differences created two divergent versions of consumer modernity, and the West German one looked much like that of other European countries.14

Third, the emergence of shared European economic and social models, goods, styles, and even identity, if only of a thin sort, was aided by the influence of Europeans on one another. Historians have been so absorbed by the influence of hegemonic America that they have ignored or downplayed the complex postwar circuits along which ideas, economic models, goods, people, and cultural products moved among Western and Northern European countries and across the Iron Curtain.

Take, for example, home construction, which was a key driver of postwar economic growth and modernization and a privileged site of consumption on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States endorsed international modernism, especially the glass-wall skyscraper, as the architecture of freedom, but it did not advocate for apartment houses. Rather, Marshall Plan officials and the United States Information Agency promoted single-family homes. German and other Western European office and government architecture balanced American influences and national traditions and concerns, but housing was less susceptible to American influences. National and shared European models carried more weight; funding and ownership patterns differed; and European suburbanization was limited. To be sure, Germans flocked to the 1949 “How America Lives” exhibit in Stuttgart, the 1950 “America at Home” exhibit in West Berlin, and numerous smaller trade shows across Europe that had model American homes, products, and even American actors performing “the American way of life.” Many European architects visited Levittown, but for economic and cultural reasons they did not build the iconic postwar American wood-frame suburban tract houses. Rather, functional, modern apartment buildings were built, many using prefab construction, first in Western Europe and also in Eastern Europe from the 1960s on. The millions of new European homes differed in pedagogical intent as well. The discourse surrounding American homes emphasized affluence, rising expectations, and desires; they were to be sites of individual choice and mobility. In Europe, modern homes were seen as vehicles for pedagogical projects and societal transformation and for modernizing the family and everyday life.15


15 For a fuller discussion see, Nolan, Transatlantic Century, 244-57.
The modern kitchen, with its functional layout and electric stove, refrigerator, vacuum cleaner, and washing machine, was the center of the modern home and consumer modernity on both sides of the Atlantic and the Iron Curtain. But the new household consumer durables were paid for differently, as credit purchase was much more limited in Europe. These durable goods arrived en masse in Western Europe only in the late 1950s and early 1960s and still later in the East, and they were inserted into very different household spaces. They were smaller, more efficient, and often better-looking than their American counterparts. Germans considered the American “fat kitchen” of Marshall Plan displays and magazine stories as economically unattainable and culturally unsuitable. In Germany, as across Europe, the more austere, functionalist, and small kitchen prevailed. The ultimate winner of the famous 1959 kitchen debate between Khrushchev and Nixon may well have been Sweden, widely admired on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Netherlands, or West Germany — and not the United States, as Americans widely assume. Similar products, advertised with comparable rhetoric about female domesticity and carefree modernity, took on distinctive characteristics in different national settings, and Europeans came to associate their new kitchens and homes with national or other European models more than with American ones.

Finally, Europeanization is a better term for Germany’s postwar economic development, due to the decades-long process of European integration that began with the ECSC. This development continued through the Common Market, expanded into various efforts at monetary coordination in the 1970s and 1980s, and culminated with the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s and the introduction of the euro at the decade’s end. Germany was a key architect of these processes and has been a prime economic and political beneficiary from them — current complaints about the burden of being the strongest EU economy notwithstanding. Germany was a central player in the Europeanization of trade, as trade among what were the fifteen founding members of the European Union doubled between the 1960s and 1990s. Germany is the leading European Union exporter to the United States. Yet in 2008, only 7.6 percent of German exports went to the United States, France, by contrast, received 9.9 percent and the European Union overall received 60 percent. Only 6.5 percent of German imports came from the United States, behind those from China, France, and the Netherlands. And as has been the case for decades, the balance of trade between Germany and the United States remains

in Germany’s favor. In 2008, 11 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Germany came from the United States, and about 10 percent of FDI in the United States came from Germany. But the seeming balance of 2008 is misleading. In 2012, for instance, over 61 percent of German FDI went to other countries within Europe (excluding Russia, Southeastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)) versus 22 percent to the United States. This investment data both testifies to Europeanization and represents a remarkable change from the immediate postwar decades, when Germany was only on the receiving end of American investment.

Most German politicians and much of the public, despite their complaints about profligate Southern Europeans, favor the European Union and do not envision abandoning the euro. Unlike Great Britain, which flirts with exit and hopes for the revival of its special relationship with the United States, Germans understand that European integration is a political as much as an economic project, one that has been central to German economic recovery and political rehabilitation and that accommodated reunification. However strong the ideology and practice of Atlanticism may have been in the first postwar decades, Germany is now first and foremost a European power, and the European Union and the euro mediate its economic relationship with the United States.

Thus Europeanization seems a more useful narrative thread to capture the transformations of the German economy from 1945 to the present, even if it is in constant conversation, and sometimes competition, with Americanization.

III. Globalization

And what of globalization, the concept de jour? Insofar as proponents of globalization claim that this process was a new invention of the 1980s, they are simply wrong, as historians of earlier phases of global economic articulation have shown. And far from being an inevitable, one-way process, globalization has always been a highly contingent and political project, whose ebbs and flows have been determined by states, parties, and armies as much as by markets and technology. Many scholars of globalization claim that the importance of nation states has declined and that firms and finance have emancipated themselves from the constraints of territorial rootedness and national regulatory processes. That, however, is at best a very partial assessment. Certainly financialization has led to large-scale flows of

capital, damaging currency speculation, and unregulated financial instruments, and Europe has not been immune from these phenomena. German firms have moved production facilities abroad, but on a much more modest scale than the U.S., and most of the relocated German facilities have gone to other European countries or developed economies outside Europe rather than to the global South. National regulatory regimes have been augmented or surpassed by EU ones, but regulation itself has not disappeared.

Despite its European focus, however, Germany is increasingly attentive to and engaged with China and the other BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). In 2010, 7.1 percent of German outward FDI was in BRIC countries, but trade was more significant. Indeed, in 2012 the combined value of German exports to the BRICs exceeded that to the United States, and China alone accounted for a greater share of German imports than the United States. The future place of the BRICs in German economic life remains an open question, but the German relationship is likely to remain substantially different than that of the United States, both because Germany buys much less from China and because it does not rely on China to purchase its debt.

Although the European Union and the United States are the world’s two largest economies, they exist in a multipolar world. In 1945, the U.S. economy was larger than all others combined; today it accounts for 22.9 percent of global GDP with China in second place, Japan in third, and Germany in fourth. The European Union overall accounts for 25.8 percent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that by 2030, the transatlantic share in global GDP will shrink to just over 30 percent and China and India will carry more economic weight than the United States and European Union. From the perspective of Germany, globalization is not simply another name for Americanization. Rather it points to a multi-centered world economy in which the transatlantic economies are major players — but not the only significant ones — and whose contours are being contested on many fronts.

This brings us back to TTIP. Proponents of a more intense and neoliberal transatlantic economic relationship make several arguments on behalf of a formal free trade zone encompassing the United States and European Union. First, given the failure of the Doha Round of WTO talks for trade liberalization, they argue, progress can only go forward on the regional level. Hence there is not only TTIP but also the proposed Trans Pacific Partnership, as well as EU initiatives

---

25 At the end of 2010, for example, only 15 percent of total German outward FDI was in developing countries. Jost, “Outward FDI.”


for free trade agreements with Canada and Japan. Second, many advocates of a transatlantic free trade agreement acknowledge the relative decline of the United States and European Union in global perspective but promise that a far-reaching trade and investment accord will provide a means to reassert Euro-American economic leadership globally.\(^{30}\) According to German publisher and editor Theo Sommer, it could “breathe new life” into the “drifting” transatlantic relationship and “turn the world’s premier security alliance into the world’s premier economic pact.”\(^{31}\) American political scientist Richard Rosencrance argues that a new transatlantic trade and investment agreement, one eventually augmented by Japan, is necessary to meet the economic challenge of China. Such a partnership would create “the reliable overbalance of power that the international political system need to deter war” with a rising Chinese power.\(^{32}\)

In this vision, TIPP is as much a political as an economic project. Finally, proponents of TTIP insist that economic growth, increased productivity, and expanded employment can only come via trade liberalization, deregulation, and fiscal responsibility — i.e. austerity. In the post-2008 world, this is not an uncontested proposition, and many economies in Latin America as well as Asia have weathered the crisis better than the North Atlantic ones, which followed neo-liberal prescriptions.

But is TTIP likely to come into being? Certainly not by the end of 2014, as President Obama earlier predicted. In 1995, the European Union and United States signed a New Transatlantic Agenda that called for the expansion of trade and “building bridges among our business, civic and academic communities.” A transatlantic business dialogue was established and labor and consumer dialogues followed. In 2007, the European Union, then led by Chancellor Merkel, and the United States, under President George W. Bush, signed a Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration.\(^{33}\) These initiatives yielded much talk but little action, and it is unclear if current negotiations will do better, for they are plagued by both long standing differences on topics such as regulation, agriculture and labor and the recent mistrust sown by the NSA surveillance.

If TTIP does come to pass, how dramatically will it change transatlantic economic relations and the German economy? Estimates about benefits to economic growth range from 0.3-0.5 percent for the European Union and 1.0-1.3 percent for the United States,\(^{34}\) but these figures are speculative aggregates, and none of them indicate to whom


benefits will accrue, a question of great import given growing income inequality across the transatlantic world, including Germany. 35 There will be little impact on trade in goods, for tariffs are already low and the volume of trade is large. FDI may increase somewhat, but it is unlikely to alter Germany’s preference for investing in Europe, a preference shared by other European nations. Agricultural goods remain a stumbling block on both sides, given the political clout of agricultural interests. Greater changes may occur in trade in services, but which side of the Atlantic will benefit most is unclear. Whether and how TTIP would impact intra-European trade or NAFTA is an open question.

The greatest change would likely come in non-tariff barriers, which are also the major obstacles to the passage of the comprehensive agreement business wants. Proponents of TTIP claim it reiterates the same values that guided Atlanticism during postwar reconstruction — “openness to trade and a commitment to market economics.” 36 But trade was much less open in the first postwar decades, capital did not flow freely, currencies were not convertible, and the place of the market in relationship to state and society was very different.

The AFL-CIO hopes that a “harmonization” of regulatory practices and labor legislation will benefit American workers, given the more comprehensive and progressive European policies. Environmentalists and opponents of GMOs fear that harmonization will create a regulatory race to the bottom. The precautionary principle that guides European regulators (i.e. that gives priority to protecting health and prohibiting goods whose safety has not been proven) may be abandoned in favor of regulating only when scientific evidence of danger is overwhelming, as is currently the case in the United States. If the pessimists are correct — and their feared scenario is what most proponents of TTIP want, then the German and European varieties of capitalism and the European social model will be severely weakened. Then Americanization may turn out to be a better analytical category in which to assess the German economy in the long run. I hope not, for a Europeanization of the American economy and social policy would be far more beneficial than the reverse.

Mary Nolan is Professor of History at New York University. She delivered this lecture at the German Historical Institute in Washington upon being awarded the 2013 Helmut Schmidt Prize for German-American Economic History, which is co-sponsored by the German Historical Institute and the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius. Nolan is the author of Visions of Modernity: American Business

and the Modernization of Germany (1994) and *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-2010* (2012) and co-editor of *Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century* (2002). She has published several articles on the politics of memory in Germany, on Americanization and Anti-Americanism, and on human rights and market fundamentalism in *Central European History, Politics & Society*, and the *Radical History Review* and in edited volumes.
GHI Research
“AT ONCE JUDGE, JURY, AND EXECUTIONER”:
RIOTING AND POLICING IN PHILADELPHIA, 1838-1964

Alexander Elkins
GHI DOCTORAL FELLOW IN AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY, 2013/14

“[H]ere where universal suffrage is the rule, where that is the fundamental idea of the Government, to rule us out is to make us an exception, to brand us with the stigma of inferiority, and to invite to our heads the missiles of those about us ...”

–Frederick Douglass, “What the Black Man Wants”

When a crowd of white Philadelphians in 1838 torched Pennsylvania Hall to the ground to protest whites and blacks meeting there together to advance the cause of abolition, the Committee on Police endorsed this action as expressing the “moral force” of the community or the will of the people. The Committee wrestled with the question of how to secure liberty in a democracy where the law and a handful of part-time constables lacked the police power to end the social harm of mixed-race sociality, “believed by many to be subversive of the established orders of society.” Thus it lamented that “our preventive police” were not “invested with greater powers” yet also feared exchanging the common-law posse (group of male citizens organized to apprehend outlaws and defend public order) for military police on the model of the French Gendarmerie which “would have had authority to close the building ... [and would have] placed a military force around it, and have guarded all the avenues to it.” However, the Committee observed that “such harsh measures are as inconsistent with the spirit of our people, and the genius of our institutions, as they are with the letter of our laws.” Lawless liberty to them was preferable to total security.1

By 1918, the Philadelphia Police Department could, under civil authority, preventively police public spaces and in theory stop disorder before it happened. Still, white Philadelphians gathered riotously in the street to police the conduct of African Americans. After Superintendent of Police William B. Mills declared that “martial law was virtually in effect,” he ordered saloons to close and sealed off the “riot belt”; officers searched every pedestrian in the area for firearms. Yet the police of this era — uniformed cops, plainclothes detectives, and riot squads — could not or were unwilling to keep public order among a white male population deputized in effect to enforce racial hierarchy.2

1 Frederick Douglass, “What the Black Man Wants: speech of Frederick Douglass, before the annual meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society at Boston,” delivered in April 1865.
Indeed, the Ledger approvingly cited the police chief’s verdict: “The importation of southern negroes in great numbers for industrial reasons was ... the cause of the disturbances.” “Held down in the South,” Mills explained, “as soon as the negroes reached Philadelphia, they buy weapons ... and their newly gained freedom is too much for them.” For many whites, including the majority-white police force, the mere public presence of African Americans disturbed the peace.3

This article brings together the history of African Americans, the police, and vigilantism to tell a story about the relationship between the meanings Americans have given to violent riotous justice and their practice of collective policing. A rich body of important scholarship on the “popular justice” of the lynch mob and the beat cop has advanced our understanding of American vigilantism. Yet few scholars have connected these histories into a narrative about riotous justice in American political culture up through the 1960s — arguably the most concentrated moment of riots in United States history. Organized police forces, this article will show, introduced the possibility of a riot-free civil society at the same time that their transformation along military lines directly curtailed the freedom of African Americans on the street. During the 1960s, a significant number of mostly poor, urban African Americans responded to the intrusive force of bureaucratic police power through street justice.4

Historians and political scientists have defined the term “vigilante” as referring to an individual or group who usurps the authority of the law through violence or coercion without official sanction. Just like official police forces, collective private policing thus always contains within it the potential to become extralegal. The ”posse” of English common law, reinforced in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, mandated all able-bodied adult men to apprehend outlaws at the “hue and cry” and defend the public welfare. Another lineage of locally prescribed policing follows the slave patrols of seventeenth-century South Carolina through to the collective “rough justice” of the Ku Klux Klan of the late nineteenth and twentieth century. Although Americans historically have celebrated the rule of law as the foundation of their free society, “the concept of popular sovereignty,” Richard Maxwell Brown has demonstrated, “also emerged as a powerful rationale for extralegal violence against those deemed to be enemies of the public good.”5

The thin line between legal and extralegal has characterized official policing as well. When elites created municipal police departments

3 Public Ledger, July 30, 1918.


in the 1840s to corral the “dangerous classes,” they introduced into American public life what Samuel Walker deliberately has termed “delegated vigilantes.” By this Walker means state violence that middle-class Americans have tolerated as the legitimate use of force when directed against “the outcasts of society.” The professionalization of the police during the twentieth century instituted strict codes of conduct and bureaucratic routine to discipline the beat cop. But the “war on crime” launched during the 1920s turned him into a soldier. Public pressure and administrative resources provided additional incentives for police to deploy the lawless violence of “nightstick justice,” which was disproportionately directed against social outliers: the poor, nonconformists, and nonwhites.6

All commentators in 1838 and 1918 could agree on the need to protect persons and private property. But what defined “good order” — which is what police before the beat cop historically meant — and how to preserve it was another matter. White Philadelphians believed that black bodies represented potential disorder; that racial conflict was inevitable. Black Philadelphians looked to the law and eventually the police to enforce it, as the best available means to secure their well-being. Professionalized, legally authorized crime control in Philadelphia and the rest of the nation gradually eroded the legitimacy and efficacy of collective vigilante policing, turning the “lawless law” of lynching and rioting during the nineteenth century into merely “lawless” behavior by the middle of the twentieth. As state-directed police forces transformed after World War II into politically autonomous semi-military bureaucracies, the dissonance between their self-proclaimed public image of law enforcement and their riotous or vigilante behavior on the street became increasingly intolerable in an age of “rights” claims. The article takes this story right up to the brink of the direct outcome of these policies and practices: African Americans’ riotous response during the 1960s.7

I. The Philadelphia Riot of 1838

In 1838 Philadelphia was home to the largest free black population in the North. The city’s profitable industries, comparatively egalitarian political culture, and well-trafficked location on the border between North and South drew many free African Americans into its orbit. Despite certain celebrated instances of interracial comity in the Revolutionary era, the suspect humanity of Africans in a republic of slavery rendered African Americans permanent strangers in the emergent

6 Police violence represents a kind of “delegated [or quasi-] vigilantism” because it carries the legitimacy of the police power but is not officially sanctioned. Walker, Popular Justice, 4, 63; Nathan Douthit, “Police Professionalism and the War Against Crime in the United States, 1920s-1930s” in Police Forces in History (Beverly Hills, CA, 1977), ed. George L. Mosse, 317-333.

metropolis. Although the Pennsylvania legislature was the first to pass a gradual emancipation bill in 1780, slavery continued in the state until 1847. While the actual number of enslaved persons living in the city dwindled to only a handful by the 1830s, African Americans were still segregated from whites in residence, employment, and education; disproportionately represented among those convicted of crimes; and subject to violent assaults against their persons and property with little chance of legal recourse.8

Criminal justice was court-centered, highly localized, and mostly private. It was hardly a system at all. Criminal proceedings typically were initiated by private citizens who approached a neighborhood alderman with a complaint. Courthouse trials were a kind of popular theater where interested parties came to influence the judicial process or curious spectators assembled for a good show. Before the consolidation of the city in 1854, and the creation of the Philadelphia Police Department in the same year, approximately two hundred part-time constables and watchmen maintained order. Under the philosophy of “preventive policing,” vagrancy and disorderly conduct were the most common arrests. The criminal courts, as Allen Steinberg has shown, “stood virtually alone as the state’s everyday means for dissuading people from rioting.” For large-scale disorder, authorities summoned the militia or the posse comitatus — literally “the power of the county.” But these measures, to be effective, depended precariously upon the willingness of potential recruits to enforce the law impartially in usually partisan conflicts. The inadequacy of existing peace-keeping mechanisms during what historians have termed the “turbulent era,” from 1834 to 1849, inspired reforms to centralize police command and resources in Philadelphia and other cities. Pennsylvania Hall’s fiery end was such a turning point.9

The group of wealthy abolitionists who financed construction of Pennsylvania Hall wished to establish a space for free discussion of political matters, including but not limited to abolition. No matter: very quickly the Hall earned a reputation as a hotbed of radical abolitionism. After opening on Monday, May 14, 1838, William Lloyd Garrison and Angelina Grimke arrived to take part in discussions of the constitutional right to free assembly and free speech, the merits of immediatism versus gradualism, and women’s participation in the anti-slavery cause. Built in a neo-classical style, the large rectangular building could seat up to 2,000, though nearly 3,000 people crammed into those first few meetings.
Trouble started almost immediately. By Tuesday, rumors of “amalgamation” inspired a hostile crowd to gather outside the Hall to intimidate those coming and going. Placards posted around the city raised the hue and cry about the plot to end slavery that had arrived at their doorstep, encouraging all concerned to meet in front of the Hall the following morning to “interfere, forcibly if they must” to save the Constitution and the system of private property. Truly incendiary to the local white community was the fact that blacks and whites of both genders sat together, side by side. On Wednesday night, May 16, a mob continually interrupted Grimke’s lecture to the Female Anti-Slavery Society, sending bricks and other “missiles” crashing through the windows, and breaking into the interior lobby before being turned back. The next morning, on Thursday, Mayor John Swift convinced the Managers to cancel that evening’s lectures and close the Hall; adequate police protection simply was not an option. Instead, Swift sent two constables to stand guard outside the doors. By dusk on Thursday, ten to fifteen thousand people had gathered in the vicinity of the Hall. Swift arrived to placate the crowd. On the business of peacekeeping, he reminded the Philadelphians assembled: “We never call out the military here.” Instead, he would entrust them to “abide by the laws, and keep order.” So much for that.10

Shortly past 8 p.m., the vast majority of Swift’s “fellow citizens” stood passively while a comparatively small number of young men, and some boys, tore open the grand doors, crashed into the interior, overturning benches and chairs and raiding the abolitionists’ library, then gathered all the flammable material into a pile, cut the gas line and lit the match. In total, perhaps 200 to 300 participated in the destruction. Others obstructed the fire companies, who then concentrated on saving nearby property.

10 For background on the Hall that puts it in the context of abolitionist movement politics and a fuller description of the riot and its legal aftermath, see Beverly Tomek, Pennsylvania Hall: A “Legal Lynching” in the Shadow of the Liberty Bell (New York, 2013), chap. 7-10, afterword. For quotes, see ibid, 150, 175.
In less than two hours, the enormous hall was reduced to a shell of its exterior — just four days after it opened.

The meanings that Philadelphians ascribed to the affair often turned on what observers meant by police. *Police*, or “politics” in its original Greek and “good order” in 16th-century French, conveyed not only the institutional capacity of keeping order — our contemporary sense of the term — but also the entire informal or private network of collective restraint and surveillance that kept your neighbor in check.¹¹

Every interpretation on record, it can be said, disparaged “mob rule” for trampling upon the “supreme law,” recommended the improvement of existing police capacities, and expressed concern over how “conduct in defiance of the laws” might consequently debase the “spotless character” and “reputation of our city” and possibly undermine “Republican Government and Free Institutions” before a world audience curious about American progress. All could agree that “mob rule” threatened the foundation of social order. It was taken for granted that a society where private property and personal integrity were preserved by “a moral force,” instead of a standing army, “which has heretofore always sufficed to preserve the public peace,” was “the happiest, soundest, and best of all.” “Police” referred to the officers under mayoral control, including the militia. But it also encapsulated an ethos of collective self-governance. Corralling crowds at bayonet point was monarchical, not republican. No account endorsed mob action, out of anxiety for the rule of law. Many, however, read riot as extralegal “public opinion.” Mob rule had no place in a democracy, in other words, no matter how legitimate its aims. But when it did crop up, as it often did in the 1830s and 1840s, many found a democratic statement in its expression. And the will of the people in Philadelphia in 1838 laid the blame for the riot at the feet of the abolitionists.¹²

Mainstream newspapers representing the perspective and interests of whites could not ignore the fact that the Hall was a public place where whites and blacks openly mingled in the company of women for the purpose of discussing political matters of a subversive nature. The *National Gazette and Literary Register* offered eloquent paens to the law combined with visceral disgust “at the taste that prompts some young ladies to sit alongside of black beaux.” The matter extended beyond “sinful indulgence” of interracial “companionships.” White women also debased themselves by “attending useless discussions and listening to itinerant lecturers.” Instead, the *Gazette* counseled,

---


¹² “Supreme law” crops up again and again in the sources. See, for instance, *Philadelphia Inquirer* [hereafter PI], May 22; *Public Ledger* [hereafter PL], May 25, and excerpts from the testimony of Judge Fox given before the Grand Jury of Montgomery County, in *The Colored American*, June 23, “conduct,” “reputation,” and “free institutions” come from PI, May 19, “spotless” and “moral force” are taken from Report, 27, 18; see *National Gazette and Literary Register* [hereafter: NGLR], May 22, for the contrast drawn between the self-police of republican democracy and the police state of the Parisian gendarmerie; rule by “public opinion” became a source of contentious disagreement. See “Constitutional Right,” in PL, May 25. Significantly the black press took pains to condemn all “mob rule,” not only riot against abolitionists or blacks. Contemporaneous native Protestant assaults on a Roman Catholic school, likely attended mostly by immigrants, raised the alarming possibility that the rule of law was genuinely in crisis. See *Pennsylvania Freeman*, June 14.
“let them read at home.” “Above all,” furthermore, “let them remember that their roses do not need the soil of a dark ground.” Such racist paranoia over “amalgamation” animated much of the anti-abolitionist violence in the 1830s.

Still, so-called responsible commentators had limits. Despite being “thoroughly revolt[ed]” by the abolitionist practice of “self-degradation as a means of elevating the degraded,” the Public Ledger upheld the law as a neutral arbiter of private transactions. For the Ledger and others, “the very worst of all tyrants” was “the mob,” precisely because, like the military, it had no regard for due process. Its power was arbitrary even when its motive was pure and moral. The city paper could entertain a fantasy of the military massacring “all the ruffians in our city,” their “blood knee deep in the streets,” entirely for subverting the “great principle of freedom of speech and the press.” But in the final balance, keeping mixed-race company deserved “legal protection” from “violent interference” as did any other private matter.13

The popular character of both the mob and police posed a paradox that commentators struggled to resolve. The white press could, however, find resources for order within the people, whereas the black press placed more faith in the law itself. Thousands had attended the public tribunal against abolitionism. The crowd had coerced the fire companies to shower nearby property but to let the Hall burn. When Mayor Swift arrived with a small band of police, mostly deputized citizens, cries of “support the Mayor” were met with popular indifference. The few constables who tried to extinguish the flames were dragged away. In the days after, mobs attacked the Friends Shelter for Colored Orphans and black churches. This time, the Mayor, aided by a sizable posse, was able to halt the rioting because the milling crowd “answered by cheers” when the city recorder “called on the citizens to support the laws.” Editorialists called for “the most vigorous measures of prevention” in the future. They warned that the irrational mob that “never stops to reason” is “at once judge, jury, and executioner.” The “few resolute men, headed by authority” who joined the posse seemed to vindicate democracy itself. For without citizens willing to police their own, “the beautiful theory of our law” would, many feared, “become nugatory in practice.”14

To close the space between the theory of the law and the flesh-and-blood mob, the question of law enforcement took center stage. White and black papers invoked the same ideals but differed on where to

13 Quotes taken from NGLR, May 19; PL, May 21; the title of the Public Ledger editorial was “Scandalous Outrage Against Law and Decency,” which playfully and profitably combined public angst over lawlessness and “amalgamation”; Leonard Richards, Gentlemen of Property and Standing: Anti-Abolition Mobs in Jacksonian America (New York, 1970).

14 On police inefficacy and anti-black riots in the days after May 17, I have consulted the Report and the PI coverage from May 19; Warner, The Private City, 134–7; Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro, 26–30; the accounts in NGLR and PI, May 22; see editorial “The Rule of Law and the Rule of the Mob,” PL, May 21.
place the blame. For both, the law represented “the sovereign power of the whole people” while the mob was “a portion utterly insignificant.” They relied upon similar rhetoric. The Philadelphia Inquirer warned that “there is no liberty or security for personal property, where the public order cannot be preserved.” The Colored American agreed: “[n]o man is safe, neither secure in life nor property, in a country subjected to such heathen outbreakings.” Yet realizing their subordinate status, black papers downplayed racial animus as “but a mere pretext” for the violence. Drawing from broadly shared civic language, they warned “men of property and standing, who look on the wink at these outrages” to “think how soon they and theirs may be the victims.” Without recourse to effective law enforcement, African Americans appealed to the “supremacy of the law.” They hoped to persuade the white majority to live up to founding ideals.

Still, it was impossible for that majority and its press to ignore the circumstances that had occasioned the disorder. And so, while every white paper refused to excuse mob rule, they still recognized “error elsewhere, that there has been cause for excitement.” In a world without professional police, offensive behavior carried the burden of blame. After all, the riot was just desserts.

The Committee on Police captured this perspective in its final report when it condemned the Hall Managers and their allies for “openly promulgating and advocating ... doctrines repulsive to the moral sense of a large majority of our community ... heedless of the dangers which they were encountering, or reckless of its consequences to the peace and order of our city.” Fittingly, this committee on the “Police,” used here in its older sense, emphasized the role of “strangers, who, unconnected with our city and its institutions, came here merely” to “disturb the peace.” In the absence of a permanent military presence or a more robust, full-time police force, keeping watch day and night, posted on every corner, what could be done to mute the popular passions of the people, rightly exercised in their anger on this occasion? For the committee and undoubtedly most white Philadelphians, the rule of law could only keep the peace through the self-discipline of a homogeneous populace. Free society, in their sense, could only survive if all members maintained “a disposition to respect and submit to public opinion.” Patriarchal white supremacy was, in this context, the moral order of “the peace.”

When African Americans turned to the law, they did so in part because police simply was not an option. For one, the bureaucratized

---

15 PI, May 30; PI, May 22; The Colored American, June 2, 23.
16 Report, 12, 18-19.
force recognizable today did not exist. Neither was the older meaning of “Police” available for their use. This was a public privilege reserved for the white majority. It would have been inconceivable for African Americans to focus their protest, for example, on the creation of a more law-abiding and less vigilante posse. Freshly disenfranchised by the Pennsylvania state convention of 1837 and 1838, black Philadelphians faced the additional quandary of calling upon the force of the law without the sovereign power to use it to their ends. With little other recourse, black newspapers consistently sought the protections of the law, with the rhetoric of law’s “supremacy” more aspirational than concretely descriptive. For authority, they liberally cited well-known jurists such as Judge John Fox who appeared before the Grand Jury of Montgomery County to criticize “the late riotous proceedings” where “not an arm was raised to assist” the mayor. In his testimony, Fox condemned “avowals that the law shall be suspended and the mob govern” that were implicit in public support for the anti-abolitionist motives of the rioters. The logical implication, he feared, was that one day this “defiance” may “resist or punish the judge on the bench.” Illustrating the predicament confronting African Americans at this time, Fox was the judge who the year before had ruled to limit the franchise to white males; it was his authority that white Democrats invoked to exclude blacks from democratic society.17

In these public conversations, the idea of “law” as color-blind guarantor of individual rights in the marketplace and of “police” as a moral force that disposes the people toward good order turned on the idea and actual practice of “riot” as public opinion — as street justice. Sheriff John Watmough encapsulated the problems of this system of governance. In his 1838 letter to the governor, he observed that his “power consists and consists only, in the disposition, which, in almost all cases, exists among the people themselves, to support the officers of the law.” “When that disposition unfortunately fails,” Watmough explained, the rubble of Pennsylvania Hall still a ready reminder, the sheriff “will find himself without the means to suppress any considerable assemblage of violent or turbulent persons.” For his power was “purely a moral one,” flowing from “the most beautiful principle in the theory of the laws.” On the anti-black riots after the Hall’s destruction, the sheriff could offer only an apology: he had “placed more reliance upon the principle of appeal to the free citizen than upon the clubs and badges of an organized police.” Watmough’s lament was an early iteration of a position that over the next two decades would become settled. More riots paved the way.

---

17 Pennsylvania Freeman, June 14; Colored American, June 23.
The disastrous blunders of the state militia, which turned its guns on civilians in July 1844, would provide another meaningful spark. Since May 1844, Irish Catholics and Anti-Catholic nativists had battled in the streets, in part over the use of the Protestant King James Bible in the public schools. The violent climax in July left at least twelve nativists and four militiamen dead. Many Philadelphians responded by demanding a permanent military presence in the city, provisioned at state expense. Before such a law could be passed, a group of elites, including former mayor John Swift, circulated a pamphlet condemning the military solution, the “police of the bayonet,” as they put it. They asked, quite simply: “shall law-givers thus by violence attain their ends?” They could not fathom democracy surviving military occupation. Instead, they insisted: “Give us a little prevention, and we will ask less cure.” They opposed exchanging the rule of law for rule by the gun. Clarifying, they wrote: “We want peace, to be sure — we want to be quiet, but not upon these hideous terms.” Civil police for them squared the circle of law and order. Their view won the day, though curiously it ignored the propensity for violence and lawlessness of the citizen wearing a uniform and badge. Civil police seemed to preserve the freedom that Americans so cherished. It preserved the fiction that law could reign on the street as equally and as justly as it did in the courts.18

Moreover, the courts themselves hardly provided a tribune of equal justice. The grand juries convened to decide the punishment of those arrested for participating in the riot and also whether to rebuild the Hall reached a conclusion reflecting the twin commitments of the time: that mob law dangerously usurped proper justice while communal policing protected the interests of the white majority. On September 27, 1838, the city’s leading colonization advocate Elliott Cresson explained the jury’s verdict that the Hall should not be rebuilt, which several petitions also had demanded. Because abolitionists “naturally tend to offend the nicer feelings of the public,” Cresson and the jury reasoned, “‘the peace, tranquility, and safety,’ of the community will be endangered by its reconstruction.” Recognizing the irony of due process duplicating mob law, William Garrison called the decision what it was — a “Legal Lynching.”19

II. Vigilante Violence and Policing, 1850-1918

The 1850 law that established the first executively coordinated and unified police force of Philadelphia combined the mundane and the

---


19 For the quotes from Cresson and Garrison, see Tomek, Pennsylvania Hall, 225-226. On the legal aftermath of the Hall’s destruction more generally, see ibid, chap. 10.
exceptional in putting police powers on the street. The law author-
ized the new “Marshal of police” and other city officials, including
the mayor, to “command all ward constables, and citizens of age and
ability ... [and] to use all necessary force and all means whatsoever”
to disperse unlawfully assembled crowds in putting down riots. The
new law also directed police “to arrest idle, suspicious, or disorderly
persons” and to suspend law as it “may think proper and necessary.”
Out of bloodshed and ashes, the riot curfew was born. So too was
preventive police.20

This story of the creation of civil police suggests that to Americans at
the time the most crucial issue was the maintenance of public order
without corroding the institutions and customs that made Americans
free in the first place. Hence the idea that police should have a basis
in civil authority. But Americans may have substituted one form of
street justice for another. For the mob, dangerously “at once judge,
jury, and executioner,” was given new official life. From the begin-
ning, civil police helped maintain the state-legitimated white racial
order. They served at the whim of politicians but also often at the
direction of the white majority, especially when the aims of crime
control dovetailed with the aims of that white racial order. Looking
out on the landscape of a post-emancipation United States, Frederick
Douglass wrestled with this question and proposed the franchise as
a partial solution. By “mingling with the mass,” he believed, African
Americans might “partake of the strength of the mass.” To be cast
out, excluded, he recognized, was to invite not only the violence of
the mob, but also the state’s complicity in street justice. In other
words: the story of policing and rioting for the next century and more.

The structure of policing riots and disorder transformed during the
Civil War era. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 extended to the federal
government the police power to compel every citizen of the United
States to assist in the recapture of fugitive slaves. It established what
legal scholar Gautham Rao has termed the “federal posse comitatus
doctrine.” Before, federal power over persons was limited to “emer-
gencies.” The Calling Forth Act of 1795 had granted the President
considerable authority to use state militias “whenever the laws of
the United States shall be opposed ... by combinations too powerful
to be suppressed” by either civilian courts or the posse comitatus in
order “to cause the laws to be duly executed.” State militia service,
which was compulsory during the nineteenth century, also operated
on the principle of the posse comitatus as it obligated “each and every

20 The “arrest idle, suspic-
cious ...” quote belongs to
Allen Steinberg. See Stein-
berg, The Transformation of
Criminal Justice, 149 and
also more generally chap. 6
(“The Origins of Police
Authority”); Act 309, Laws
of the General Assembly of
the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, Passed at the Ses-
sion of 1850 (Harrisburg,
PA, 1850): 666-72, 668,
671, 670; Glenn C. Frese,
“The Riot Curfew” Cali-
450-89.
free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States” between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to enlist. During the so-called turbulent era and in the period after, the militia was the primary peacekeeping force for mass disorder, usually called in to protect property. The rise of city and state police forces, and the National Guard after 1877, eventually supplanted the militia in this role. The state overall began to assume more responsibility for maintaining order, which no longer depended as much on the effort of private volunteers.21

During Reconstruction, the Radical Republicans employed the military as a federal posse comitatus to enforce the new constitutional guarantees of civil rights. The United States Army, stationed throughout the South, provided a service similar to the civil police. Military occupation so defined the era that abandoning this practice, along with other radical experiments in federalism, helped to mark its end. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was the crucial law in this regard as it forbade the military from acting in a law enforcement capacity. Representing a truce between North and South, the law ceded enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments to the states. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, however, still preserved some authority for the federal government, in times of “emergency,” to use the military whenever “domestic violence opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.” In fact, in 1961, the United States Supreme Court would draw upon this law to allow citizens to sue police departments for violations of their civil rights. Overall, however, after Reconstruction the federal government returned to being a distant bystander to local street justice. Private acts of violence between persons now were wholly a state matter.22

During the fifty years after Reconstruction, police departments typically were, to borrow from historian Robert Fogelson, “adjuncts of the machine.” Political patronage often determined employment in a municipal police department, an arrangement that led predictably to widespread corruption. It also was the era of the beat cop who walked his assigned area and protected neighborhood custom. More generally, the rise of “machine” police, as Allen Steinberg has shown, dramatically altered criminal justice. Citizens not only had more contact with the state; lawless police practices also reached new systemic proportions. Philadelphia joined other cities around the nation when it delegated greater authority and power to its police department. Eager to preserve a
turbulent capitalist order, elites commonly “instructed the police to arrest persons based on their appearance.” With this mandate, nuisance, vagrancy, and disorderly conduct arrests climbed. Resort to the “third degree,” or brutal and excessive use of force to extract confessions, increased as well. On the pervasiveness of this practice, a well-placed observer in 1929, the start of the reform era, concluded that police “appoint themselves judge and jury,” deciding in advance that a suspect has “no rights, constitutional or legal.” No doubt mid-nineteenth-century critics of “mob rule” would have sympathized. Additionally, beginning in the 1890s, African American mass migration to northern and southern cities put special pressures on a system already predicated on lawless police. “Mob rule” would flourish in these conditions, as it did in Philadelphia in 1918, as whites struggled to preserve the customs and way of life that for them defined neighborhood order.23

Political mobilization for World War I unleashed the terror always latent in the posse. Americans on the home front established vigilance societies to police the patriotism of their neighbors. Major “riotous mass lynching[s]” struck northern and Midwestern cities — places like East St. Louis where African Americans had recently settled as part of the first Great Migration. In 1918, 68 lynch mobs bypassed the rule of law for “rough justice.” The following year, the NAACP tallied 25 “major” riots and at least 52 black lynching deaths. By 1920, Southern lynchings were on the wane due to national media attention and civil rights activism led by the NAACP. Local police departments began to make some effort to protect black defendants from the mob. Though criminal justice still served racist presumptions about black criminality, state courts had become more prominent — and more black defendants actually made it past the lynch mob to trial, which would enable the Supreme Court during the 1920s and 1930s to review local criminal procedure. It would take the lynching of a German American finally to elicit a response from President Woodrow Wilson. Employing the traditional American rhetoric that easily could have come from domestic riot conversations, Wilson condemned mob murder as antidemocratic. “Lawless passion,” he chided, was precisely the crime committed by the international outlaw, Germany, who “has made Lynchers of her armies.” Agreeing with the President, the Philadelphia Public Ledger published an editorial reminding Americans “that their civilization is based on the observation of law and the security of justice for all through the orderly processes of the court.”24


24 Between 1880 and 1940, mostly in the South, roughly 80% of lynching victims, or 2,960, were African American. Arthur Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-In, 1919 and the 1960s: A Study In the Connections Between Conflict and Violence (Garden City, NY, 1975); Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam Wants You; “riotous mass lynching” belongs to Christopher Waldrep, African Americans Confront Lynching: Strategies of Resistance from the Civil War to the Civil Rights Era (Lanham, MD, 2009), 73; Public Ledger, July 27, 1918.
The special claim of vigilante violence on American law and custom helps to explain how lynch mobs and police departments coexisted in the same political culture. Here the posse can bring clarity. Volunteer and private law enforcement had been a tradition of rural areas and small towns from the start of English settlement. Yet the posse proved ill-equipped to keep order in the city with a more transient population. The direct inheritors of the custom of private peacekeeping, the public police, at least at first, showed similar weaknesses and were as capable of partisanship. Despite its passing, the posse lived on as part of political culture as Americans held on to their vigilante roots, with important ramifications for police. According to legal historian Joshua Stein, the “methods of defense Americans employed as individuals and vigilantes became guiding principles for police who were quick to turn to violence to keep the peace.” As Stein shows, over the course of the nineteenth century the law had given “an ever-increasing amount of authority to private individuals,” turning “citizens into little kings.” The posse therefore epitomizes the situation confronting police in 1918: a population of white men who saw themselves as already, at least potentially, deputized to employ violence on behalf of the public welfare.25

Though lacking a monopoly on violence, the state still exercised considerable power over the narrative of events, especially in moments of disorder. Public police supplied the boots-on-the-ground capacity for authorities to characterize the social order in seemingly neutral, comprehensive terms. Even amid a crisis of legitimacy, as Philadelphia’s department was experiencing in July 1918, the police version of events became the narrative that other accounts had to contest. News stories adopted the conventions of the police report. “Riots” consequently became a problem for the forces of “law and order” to manage. Changing the public conversation on the causes and consequences of a riot was of critical importance for those with the most to lose if blamed and consequently punished for the disorder.

To Philadelphia’s African American population in 1918, the challenge would have seemed impossible to overcome. By 1920, their number had risen by 58% from a decade earlier but they still accounted for only 7% of the total population. Most of the 134,229 black Philadelphians had arrived after 1915. A large majority settled in the Northwest and South districts, in ghettos apart from whites. Despite their relative isolation and small number, the mainstream press and city officials depicted black migration as an “invasion.”

“The race problem” was a problem of order — a police matter. By 1918, the North had become home to over a million southern-born African Americans. The race riot was a customary white response to black newcomers, a vigilante means to a public-order end.26

III. The Philadelphia Riot of 1918

On Wednesday, July 24, 1918, Adella Bond moved onto a mostly white block in South Philadelphia. Bond, a black woman, had not recently arrived in the city from the South. She worked as a probation officer for the Municipal Court of Philadelphia. Located in one of the poorest districts, her new neighborhood drew white gangs to the nearby railroad tracks to steal cargo from passing freight trains. It also was a Republican stronghold for the political machine of recent mayoral candidate William Vare. Philadelphia’s government was notorious for being corrupt. At the time of Bond’s move, city papers were reporting steep personnel losses in the police department, blaming Vare’s meddling. The police were known to control elections at the ward level to keep Republicans in power. The last serious effort at reform, by Rudolph Blankenburg, mayor from 1912 to 1915, had introduced the first police manual since 1897 and established the School of Instruction for new officers. Once Republicans had returned to office in 1916, however, graft had resumed. But the Progressive ideal of efficiency survived the election and the corruption. As idealized among, at first, a select number of police executives, the cop would become less a social worker than a crime-fighter. Philadelphians would come to expect their police to prevent crime and maintain order. This process already was underway by the summer of 1918.27

Two days after Bond settled into her new home, on Friday, July 26, a hundred white men and women, possibly more, gathered in the street outside. More than a few openly carried guns. According to Bond, a man arrived carrying a baby. In a surreal move, he handed the baby to a woman, then picked up a brick and tossed it through one of her windows. Expecting more to follow, Bond said she “fired one shot out of [her] window then to alarm the police and summon necessary assistance.” When an officer finally showed, “he wouldn’t try to cope with that mob alone, so he turned in a riot call.” With the police gone, the mob resumed, stoning the homes of Bond and her two neighbors. Before backup could come, a group of black men living nearby heard Bond was in trouble and rushed to protect her. It was then, according to the Afro-American, a few days later, that the riot began.


27 Warner, The Private City, 183-5; Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform, 61-70; on Vare’s influence over the police department, see Public Ledger, July 25 and 27, 1918; Franklin, “The Philadelphia Race Riot of 1918.”
For her part, Bond expected violence from the beginning. As she told the Public Ledger, when movers arrived with her furniture, on Wednesday, she appeared in her doorway armed with a revolver. Her white neighbors claimed that by this action, she had invited conflict. However, as Bond explained, she was only taking “the usual means to protect” herself, as “a gang of hoodlums had thrown [her] inside [her] doorway.” Moreover, she soon observed that “the women went from door to door … and incited their neighbors to violence and to negro baiting,” perhaps, she suggested wryly, to shield criminal activity from an officer of the law. In interviews conducted by the Ledger, Bond’s white neighbors accused her of plans to assert undue authority: “that she would put all the children in their homes, make them stay indoors and otherwise boasted of her power.” As for the realtor who sold Bond the house, he was guilty, they charged, of “colonizing the block with negroes.” Altogether, to borrow the Ledger’s unknowingly choice pun, it was a black person’s “appearance among the whites that stirred” the rioting that followed. Both sides declared their right to self- or community-defense, with varying degrees of legality. But it fell to the police to restore order and ultimately to decide on the spot which claims were credible.

The papers described the siege at Bond’s home as a “race riot” in part because blacks were active participants in nearly equal number. Whites also did not allege a crime. By contrast, on Saturday, an “angry mob” of white men chased William Box, a black man, in South Philadelphia “crying ‘Stop thief!’” Standing nearby, Louis Sacks, a storehouse police clerk, helped to apprehend Box, who in turn drew a “villainous looking knife” on Sacks, slashing his arm and shirt. One of the policemen who aided in arresting Box apparently struck him with a blackjack on top of his head, an injury that later required hospital care. The Philadelphia Inquirer led with the headline “Police Save Negro from Furious Mob.” In their view, the whites were “would-be lynchers,” Box the hapless villain, and police the heroes. The Inquirer did not note whether Sacks was in uniform; that Box possibly mistook him for a member of the lynch mob. The whites met the official definition but did not carry the label of rioters. Many, in fact, managed to hit Box as Sacks and other police attempted to take him to the station. Given the prejudices of the era, it is unsurprising that the Inquirer assumed the guilt of a black man. It is more revealing that they — and the police — took the “would-be lynchers” at their word. For the whites at the scene, including the police, justice had been served: with the crowd as jury, the police delivered the sentence. Here,
quite obviously, police work affirmed the popular belief in black criminality so evident in the practice of “lynch law.” This cultural work of policing would inform the narrative of the “race riot” later that night.29

The Philadelphia Riot of 1918 represented William Box’s arrest and Adella Bond’s encounter on a larger scale. Some mystery remains about the immediate catalyst, the killing of Hugh Lavery, a white policeman, by Jesse Butler, a black civilian, in the early hours of Sunday, July 28. Butler was returning from a party, or he was sitting inside making “insulting remarks to white men who passed.” Either way, a white mob chased and caught him. In the struggle, he fired a revolver, his own or one wrested from an assailant. The bullet killed Hugh Lavery, on his way toward the noise that had awakened him. Butler, beaten and disarmed by the white mob, was arrested by the police and taken to the station, then to the hospital. In their accounts the following day, city papers printed rumors designed to deepen the tragedy. The Public Ledger claimed that Mrs. Lavery died “from the shock of her husband’s sudden death.” According to the Philadelphia Inquirer, she died during childbirth, the baby, too. Neither was true.

Evidently, while the city’s house was in disarray, the mainstream press trusted the forces of “law and order,” the white mob and the police, for their account of events on the ground. Headlines such as, “Insult to White Girls, Killing of Two Men and Wounding of Many Others in Last 24 Hours, by Negroes, Enrages Whole Section,” endowed the “hue and cry” with the authority of news. Even the timeline was fraught. Several hours after Lavery’s death, rioting apparently resumed when “two negroes ... made insulting remarks” to “two white girls” of teenage years. “[A]t their cry half a dozen men standing on the corner rushed to their assistance,” the Inquirer reported. Here white “posses” policing black “crime” indicated the return of order.30

---

29 Philadelphia Inquirer, July 28, 1918, with the subtitle of “Colored Man Being Chased as Thief Stabs Bureau Clerk Who Stops Him; Threatened by Would-Be Lynchers, He is Rescued and Taken to Hospital”; Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America (Cambridge, Mass., 2010).

30 Quotes taken from Philadelphia Inquirer, July 29, 1918; Public Ledger, July 29, 1918. Also see Evening Public Ledger, July 29, 1918 for other initial coverage; for a chronology, see Franklin, “The Philadelphia Race Riot of 1918,” 339-343.
Intermittent conflict continued throughout the day. Around 3pm, another riot led to the death of another white policeman, Thomas McVay. White civilians and police again shaded into each other in pursuit of a black “outlaw.” Henry Huff allegedly was “brandishing a revolver and patrolling the sidewalks, inviting white men to come and be whipped,” when McVay arrived, drawn by the noise. Though dressed like a civilian, McVay still tried to disarm Huff, who freeing himself, ran into a nearby house. McVay and others followed. Huff fired blindly in their direction, killing McVay instantly and injuring Thomas Myers, a plainclothes detective, and Frank Donohue, a white civilian, who later died as a result. Two other plainclothes detectives finally apprehended Huff, after beating him severely.

McVay’s death was, in retrospect, a turning point. Afterward, whites seemed to gain more organized force. The following day, Monday, July 29, possibly a hundred men went to Huff’s house. Using axes to gain entry, “the vengeance-seeking crowd started to wreck the place,” setting fire to furniture they had dragged into the street. They did the same to “the homes of half a dozen other colored families” in the vicinity. Whites attacked blacks riding trolley cars that happened to stop in the area. Blacks alleged to have insulted a white woman or challenged a white man’s authority were pursued into their homes, disarmed by the mob and arrested by the police. By the end, late on Monday, the arrest ratio was sixty blacks to three whites. The Public Ledger summed it all up in describing one scene: “a crowd of policemen fortified by a number of white people were trying to quell riotous negroes.” All blacks had become rioters; all whites, police.31

Police pronouncements redrew the line between citizen and cop that blurred in the mob. The authority of the state lent their description of the world the power of objective truth. The controversy around the mysterious death of Riley Bullock, a black civilian, while in the custody of Officer Roy Ramsey, powerfully illustrates this phenomenon. On the morning of Monday, July 29, Ramsey and Officer John Snyder were sent to arrest Bullock for allegedly “brandishing a revolver.” Bullock then apparently lunged at the patrolmen with a “razor.” Only after “repeated clubbing” by Ramsey and Snyder was Bullock finally “subdued” and brought to the station. A lynch mob followed. The city papers reported that “[a]s the trio mounted the steps a shot was fired by a negro, who escaped.” Bullock died less than an hour later. The next day the press acknowledged that “a bullet from the service

31 Quotes can be found in Public Ledger, July 29, 1918; Philadelphia Inquirer, July 30, 1918; see also Evening Public Ledger and Public Ledger for July 30, 1918; and Franklin, “The Philadelphia Race Riot of 1918.”
revolver of Patrolman Roy Ramsey” had killed Bullock. Hoping to avoid more violence, Acting Superintendent of Police William B. Mills cited state necessity to justify letting the false story stand. Lieutenant Myers, Ramsey’s superior, claimed that Ramsey “accidentally discharged” his gun, pressed against Bullock’s back, when he slipped walking backwards up the station steps, keeping the crowd at bay. G. Edward Dickerson, a lawyer who defended many of the black defendants accused of rioting, publicly charged that police murdered Bullock to avenge Officer McVay’s death. During the crisis, however, little could be done to change the story.32

Police vernacular blanketed the public meanings of the riot, including interpretations critical of their conduct. It could be matter-of-fact, as when the Inquirer announced that the riot “eclipsed all records of the Police Department.” More often, it was less benign. City papers dutifully reported that “[t]he police declared that a majority of negroes were under the influence of liquor.” They concurred when Superintendent Mills explained that “[s]outhern negroes, ‘running wild’ after long periods of restraint in the South, are the cause of the rioting.” They approved when U.S. District Attorney Francis Kane admonished the city for not expecting disorder despite being “cognizant of the immense invasion of negroes from the South.” All were critical but still lobbied for more police. The Ledger could not fathom why police had not disarmed black migrants upon arrival, who not being “accustomed to the restrictions of [city] life,” had weakened “the forces of everyday discipline.” After all, a “riot doesn’t begin as a riot,” just as a “fire doesn’t become a conflagration,” i.e. on its own.33

A race riot evidenced, at base, police failure. A group of black ministers, in a public letter to Mayor Thomas Smith, “put the whole blame upon” the “incompetent police force.” Their “hobnobbing with the mob” allowed what “would have been nothing more than a petty row” to become “the disgrace of Philadelphia.” Citing inadequate police protection for “citizens of color,” the Philadelphia Tribune recommended hiring more black officers to keep order in black neighborhoods. “As usual, when riots occur,” the Afro-American observed, “the colored people were disarmed by the officers, while no serious attempt was made to deprive the whites of their weapons.” Better policing, all could agree, meant truly sorting “law-abiding” citizens from “hoodlums.”34

Disagreement over the proper response to disorder rested upon a deeper divide over whether a “race war” was underway. City papers

32 City papers initially re-ported Bullock’s death on July 29. They published revisions on July 30 and 31. Much later, a judge revealed that in fact Bullock died inside the police station. Despite considerable black protest, Ramsey and Snyder never were convicted. Mention of the trial is in Philadelphia Inquirer, September 21, 1918. For more on the legal challenges against Ramsey and Snyder, led by the Col-ored Protective Association, see Franklin, “The Philadelphia Race Riot of 1918,” 344-7.

33 Philadelphia Inquirer, July 29, 1918; Evening Public Ledger, ibid; Philadelphia Inquirer, July 31, 1918; Evening Public Ledger, ibid.

34 Every city paper printed the ministers’ letter. Philadelphia Tribune, August 3, 1918; Afro-American, August 2, 1918. Major lynch riots in East St. Louis and Chester, Pennsylvania, were cited in Afro-American, August 3, 1918; see also Waskow, From Race Riot to Sit-In.
referred to black-owned homes as “veritable arsenals.” As many as 5,000 white and black men were fighting “a series of street battles.” Crowds of blacks responded to white attacks “fully armed” and “marched” against “advancing bluecoats” who “charged through the fusillade of bullets.” Black papers also mentioned the “bitter racial warfare” but with different emphasis. Generally, they avoided the logic that interracial contact led inevitably to conflict. Blacks and whites, they maintained, can “live peaceably together.” Instead disorder was more a problem of class. Adella Bond had moved onto a block where “a low class of whites” lived — the “brutes” that attacked her. For too long, police had allowed “irresponsible white hoodlums” to harass “law-abiding” black citizens. The law could cut through the confusion caused by “color prejudice.” It could be an equalizer. Black leaders noted that “a white man carrying a concealed weapon is as much a violator of the law as is a colored man doing the same thing.” Police had failed precisely because in siding with the mob, they had taken the law into their own hands.35

In the event that law failed, certain black leaders were prepared to adopt “Dixie Methods” as well. Weeks before the riot, the Philadelphia Tribune published a fiery editorial that promised a vigilante response should whites attempt further physical violence against the black community. “We favor peace,” G. Grant Williams declared, “but we say to the colored people of the Pine Street warzone, stand your ground like men.” Williams peppered his manifesto with the gendered rhetoric of a classic American vigilante: “A man’s home is his castle.” He reminded his white antagonists that African Americans also “stand for law and order,” but, he told his readers, “when they tread upon your rights fight them to the bitter end … and if the law is insufficient we’ll meet the rowdies of the town and give them shot and shell.” After the street battles of July, Williams returned to similar themes: “I would and will shoot any man who attempts to enter my home by force,” including a policeman, he noted.36

For Williams and many African Americans, police misconduct threatened not only the peace but also black manhood and the dignity of the wider black community. Violence for some was the requisite response. For the black press, riots were less evidence of a “race war” than the tragic consequence of lawless police. The beat cop needed to position himself above the mob but under the law. Only then would persons and property be secure. This ironically would become the position of police professionalization advocates in the decades after.37

35 Public Ledger and Philadelphia Inquirer, July 29, 1918; Afro-American, August 2, 1918; “Lone Woman Holds a Mob of 500 White Brutes at Bay” and “The So-Called Race Riot,” Philadelphia Tribune, August 3, 1918.
37 “Lone Woman,” August 3, 1918; the Tribune concluded: “Riots, happening everywhere, particularly in Northern cities, gain a headway [sic] only when the sworn officers of the law fail in the performance of their sworn duty.” “The So-Called Race Riot,” August 3, 1918.
IV. Policing, Rights, and the Origins of the 1960s Riots

Philadelphia invoked the law in an era before “civil rights” held significant legal standing at the local level. During the 1918 riot, Henry Huff’s attorney, G. Edward Dickerson, charged city police with violating the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement at a time when state courts did not strictly apply the Bill of Rights to police, especially when the suspect was black.38 Perhaps it did not much matter anyway. Many states, Pennsylvania included, authorized martial law in “emergencies.” Police could close stores, seal off city streets, and arrest anyone who defied their orders. Executive privilege certainly shielded many departments. More important than law, however, was custom. Like many white Americans, most police believed in the inherent criminality of African Americans. As policeman Callahan explained to the Chicago Commission on Race Relations one year after the 1919 Chicago Riot, “[i]f a Negro should say one word back to me or should say a word to a white woman in the park, there is a crowd of young men ... who would procure arms and fight shoulder to shoulder with me.”39

Blacks’ “rights talk” still challenged white dominance even though it appealed to a power that did not yet exercise much local force. The national surveillance state that developed during World War I also was wary of the social ends of “rights” claims. Reporting military intelligence on “the negro problem,” Major J. E. Cutler warned that the NAACP had encouraged “the colored people to insist upon equality with white people ... in order to establish their rights.” “Fight for your rights,’ is the new slogan,” Cutler worriedly observed. “Rights” discourse won an ally in the American Civil Liberties Union, established in 1920. But it would not enter the mainstream and gain legal force until the late 1930s and 1940s. Later still did constitutional law attach concretely to policing.40

Placing faith in the rule of law to reign in police held both promise and peril. Vagrancy law is instructive. Until the early 1970s, police and politicians used broad anti-vagrancy ordinances to clear the streets of the poor and other “undesirables.” Arrests for disorderly conduct and breach of the peace also were common. African Americans were especially vulnerable. A 1926 survey found that one-third of all black Philadelphians arrested were let go because police lacked evidence to charge them with a crime. A 1952 study discovered that “[t]hree-quarters of the arrests for disorderly conduct appear to be illegal, in that the charge is used to cover lawful conduct of which

38 Evening Public Ledger, July 29, 1918.
40 Cutler’s full memo is in William Cohen, “Riots, Racism, and Hysteria: The Response of Federal Investigative Officials to the Race Riots of 1919,” The Massachusetts Review 13, no. 3 (1972): 373-400, 388; on “rights” claims, the ACLU, and legal change during the World War I-era, see Walker, Popular Justice, chap. 7.
the police disapprove” such as mixed-race “fraternization.” After World War II, the African American population grew to 18% of the city total. Police commented in a post-war survey that black crime was “the result of housing, employment, and heredity.” “You don’t have too much trouble with Negroes if you keep them in their place,” one high-ranking official explained. Black respondents noted that police “frequently give the third degree” and “pick up people easily, use violence.” The “third degree” refers to police use of excessive force, even torture, in pre-trial interrogations. A 1931 government report found it to be nationally “widespread.” As journalist Ernest Hopkins put it at the time: “In every city our police hold what can only be called outlaw tribunals — informal and secret inquisitions of arrested persons — which are, terminology aside, actual and very vigorous trials for crime.” Over the next thirty years, the Supreme Court slowly recognized that the routine street stop existed largely outside courtroom law — and that this had to change.41

The law of policing transformed as the nation became a more important organizing frame in political culture. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), established in 1893, increased coordination among police agencies. The Bureau of Investigation, founded in 1908 and renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1935, introduced national record-keeping through the Uniform Crime Reports and set a premium on scientific crime-fighting. Gradually, police departments replaced torture with lie-detection as more scientific and efficient. Crime-control became more central to their mission. Arrest quotas and the patrol car encouraged the “police practice of arresting first and building a case later.” Prohibition introduced a failed national experiment in policing but left an important cultural precedent. Public hysteria over the violence of bootlegging led to a national “war on crime.”42

During the 1920s and 1930s, the Supreme Court took the unprecedented step of intervening in state criminal trials. The Justices focused on poor black defendants sentenced to death by southern juries who in effect were acting as proxies for the lynch mob. Even so, their decisions barely affected police procedure on the street. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights could report in 1961 that police brutality was “still a serious problem throughout the United States.” The language of the rights of persons suspected of crime had, however, taken hold. One officer captured the sentiment of many in the 1960s when he observed that “[i]t’s getting harder to work in these neighborhoods now than it used to be because we send the kids to school and teach


42 Walker, Popular Justice, chap. 6, 7, and 8; Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Cambridge, MA, 2008), chap. 2: “arresting first” quote is from Markowitz and Summerfield, “Philadelphia Police Practice,” 1194.
them about rights.” Nationally televised state-sanctioned racist southern violence against peaceful Civil Rights marchers deepened the rift between the police and black communities. Amid a national war on poverty and injustice, black rioters would have their stage.43

The methods that police typically used in high-crime urban areas would provide the spark. A national study by the American Bar Foundation discovered that legislatures, courts, and police commonly deployed “substantive criminal law ostensibly designed to control ‘suspicious’ persons.” New York passed the first stop-and-frisk statute in 1964 — later implicitly affirmed by Terry v. Ohio — that allowed police to “stop any person abroad in a public place who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony.” Police had relatively free reign to invoke public safety concerns to disperse “suspicious” persons. “Move on!” worked by command not consent, less to enforce the law than to maintain order. The growing field of “Police Science” turned to preventive patrol to keep the overcrowded metropolis safe. One popular guide recommended that a beat cop should closely observe “[p]eople who do not ‘belong.’” By the 1950s, the public profile of “people who do not ‘belong’” encompassed the poor, the nonconformist, and the nonwhite migrant, city dwellers all.44

The public happily entrusted police with this responsibility because cities appeared to be changing for the worse. For the white majority during the 1950s, many of whom now lived in the suburbs, the disorder and delinquency they found in cities where millions of African Americans and other nonwhite populations recently had settled constituted a national threat. At the same time, big-city police departments began to complain that their officers lacked legitimacy in certain neighborhoods. Stanley R. Schrotel, Cincinnati Police Chief and IACP president, reported that “people assembled as spectators where an arrest is being made tend to side with the prisoner” and “sometimes ... openly attack the police in an attempt to free the prisoner.” Police from Los Angeles and San Francisco affirmed this worrying trend. Encountering the systemic issue of black poverty, police responded with the tools at their disposal. To their dismay they discovered that stop-and-frisk, whatever its legality, elicited more and more a vigilante response.45

Most of the 1960s riots arose out of routine interactions between police and citizens. For police the routine was normal departmental policy. In the early 1960s, police chiefs in Los Angeles, Detroit, and


Newark — the cities that would experience the most destructive uprisings of the decade — offered the same simple message in their testimony before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: there is no police-community relations problem. William Parker of Los Angeles confidently asserted “that there is no desegregation or integration problem.” Rather, “genes” hinder Mexican Americans’ assimilation to city life. Dominick Spina of Newark denied the existence of any “great tension between any minority group, so called, and the police department.” Herbert Hart of Detroit dismissed allegations of police brutality against black citizens altogether, as “an uninformed misstatement.”

Yet the view from the street looked very different. For African Americans across the nation, their routine police treatment had become intolerable. A former Detroit patrolman cited the belief among city cops “that if you stop and search fifty Negroes and you get one good arrest out of it that’s a good percentage.” Another former officer testified that “the Negro is living in a police state.” And the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Detroit argued that the “police department seems to be working under a program of containment of the Negro citizen by brute force.” Four years later riots swept through black neighborhoods in seven northern cities. When North Philadelphia resident Florence Mobley climbed on top of an overturned fridge in late August 1964, she represented what had been and what was to come. Mobley and the black rioters of the 1960s called upon a long American tradition of vigilantism to remedy perceived injustice. Except now community police was oriented against official police.

Alex Elkins is a Ph.D. Candidate at Temple University. He was the Doctoral Fellow in African American History at the German Historical Institute for the first half of the 2013-2014 academic year. His dissertation is entitled “Battle of the Corner: The 1960s Riots and the Triumph of ‘Get-Tough’ Policing.” His publications include “Rioting in America” in The Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice (2014) and an extended book review on rioting in the twentieth-century United States for the Journal of Urban History (forthcoming).
The Rise of the Toxic Politics of Migration: The United States at the Dawn of the 1960s

Elisa Minoff
GHI FELLOW IN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY, 2013/14

In the summer of 1959, Harold Stassen was running for Mayor of Philadelphia. Stassen was a seasoned Republican politician trying to revive his political career. In 1939, at the tender age of 32, he had been elected Governor of Minnesota, but his star had since fallen. He had sought his party’s nomination for President three times, to no avail. After relocating to Pennsylvania and serving as President of the University of Pennsylvania, he ran for Governor of his adopted state in 1958 and lost. Though considered by some a “liberal stalwart” of the Republican Party, he had a record of displeasing both liberals and conservatives. Stassen was, as political reporter Alan Otten put it, a “professional windmill tilter.”

When running for mayor, Stassen lived up to his reputation as an idiosyncratic politician willing to take unconventional positions. His challenge to Democratic incumbent Richardson Dillworth focused on the city’s rising unemployment rate and crumbling neighborhoods. To solve these problems, Stassen made a startling commitment: to slow the in-migration of the unemployed from the South, the coal mining regions, and Puerto Rico. As Stassen reasoned, restricting the “influx” to Philadelphia was economically necessary. “It is not fair to allow more and more unemployed to come here,” Stassen argued, “when … we find industry unwilling to expand or locate here.” Stassen was hardly the first to hold migration responsible for the city’s problems. Just weeks before, President Judge Adrian Bonnelly of the Philadelphia Municipal court had blamed migrants — specifically, the 500,000 migrants from the South and Puerto Rico who had moved to the city since 1930 — for the increased crime among the city’s youth. Migration, as Stassen, Bonnelly, and others saw it, was a problem. But Stassen was the first prominent voice to assert that the solution was exclusion. He would not be the last. As Milwaukee Mayor Frank Zeidler correctly observed that fall, such exclusionary sentiment was “just below the surface” in cities across the country.

Migration has often been controversial. Throughout the “Age of Internal Migration,” which spanned four decades from the early 1930s to the early 1970s, many of the most publicized controversies involved internal migrants. During this period, the number of immigrants entering the country fell to an all-time low even as the rapid pace of urbanization

1. Malcom Pointdexter, “Mixed Leadership Key to Dilemma of Race Here-Stassen,” Philadelphia Tribune, August 22, 1959. One Philadelphia resident interpreted Stassen’s pledge as one to “stop people at the border and those without money or promised jobs will be sent back” (Letter from Henry Harris to Philadelphia Tribune, June 20, 1959).
2. Harold E. Stassen, Who Sought the GOP Nomination For President 9 Times, Dies at 93,” New York Times, March 5, 2001. He came closest to securing the nomination in 1948, when Life magazine ran a cover article on Stassen as a potential challenger to Truman (Life, March 1, 1948).
7. Malcolm Pointdexter, “Mixed Leadership Key to Dilemma of Race Here-Stassen,” Philadelphia Tribune, August 22, 1959. One Philadelphia resident interpreted Stassen’s pledge as one to “stop people at the border and those without money or promised jobs will be sent back” (Letter from Henry Harris to Philadelphia Tribune, June 20, 1959).
and the industrialization of agriculture made internal migration more visible. Scholars have not yet come to terms with the widespread interest in internal migration in this period. The historian responsible for coining the phrase “Age of Internal Migration,” James Gregory, has recognized some of the social and cultural developments of the era, but no historian has fully considered the debates over internal migration that took place during these years, and their ramifications for policy and polity.9 As a Visiting Fellow in Economic and Social History at the GHI, I am researching and writing a comprehensive history of this Age of Internal Migration. During the Age of Internal Migration, I have found, as attention turned to people moving within the United States, a loose network of reformers concerned with the plight of migrants lobbied for new social welfare and labor market policies to facilitate migration and ameliorate the hardships that many migrants faced. These social workers, legislators, public welfare officials, social scientists, and lawyers often faced resistance from lawmakers and the general public. They spent as much time defending migrants as advocating for policy change. In the end, however, they were able to force legislatures to reform certain public policies. More significantly, they prompted courts to redefine the rights of citizenship.

This article considers one moment in the Age of Internal Migration — of which Harold Stassen was emblematic. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, many large cities like Philadelphia were struggling with high unemployment, rising welfare costs, increased crime, and deteriorating neighborhoods — a prelude to what many would call the “urban crisis” later in the decade. At this moment, it became common for local political leaders to blame migrants for their cities’ problems. Though white “hillbillies” from Appalachia were sometimes accused of contributing to urban decline in Midwestern cities like Chicago where they concentrated, in Chicago itself as well as eastern cities like Philadelphia and New York the migrants most often blamed for urban ills were African American and Puerto Rican.

Newspapers first began covering the African American and Puerto Rican migration to northern cities extensively in the early 1950s. In New York, Puerto Ricans attracted the most attention until 1956, when the focus shifted to African Americans moving north. The Supreme Court’s decision that year striking down segregation in Brown v. Board of Education drew attention to racial tensions in the South. As blacks moved north, they were increasingly depicted not only as economic refugees looking for work as farms in the South mechanized, but as political refugees fleeing the backlash to Brown.10 By the late 1950s, newspapers


10 See, for example, “South's Negroes Flock to Chicago to Find Jobs, Escape Tensions,” Washington Post, March 12, 1956, and “Negro Migrants: Lured by Jobs, Schools Negroes Flock North. Tension Speeds Move,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1956. Interestingly, some African American newspapers turned their attention to African American migration north a bit later. The Chicago Defender, the venerable newspaper of black migrants, did not devote significant coverage to the postwar migration of African Americans north until 1960, when it ran a five-part series on “The Unwanted from Dixie.” Johnnie A. Moore wrote the articles, which appeared in the Defender on January 25, 26, 27, 28, and 30, 1960.
reported that the New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago metropolitan areas would soon be home to over one million African Americans.\textsuperscript{11} The press depicted both the earlier Puerto Rican migration and the later African American migration as a problem for cities, charging migrants with exacerbating slum conditions, contributing to crime, and even “squeezing more and more middle-income whites to suburban areas.”\textsuperscript{12}

At the time, scholars recognized this turn against migrants. In 1959, immigration historian Oscar Handlin made a rare foray into current political debates with his book, \textit{The Newcomers}, analyzing the recent migration of African Americans and Puerto Ricans to New York. Handlin observed that the contemporary response to migration was much the same as the response to immigration in the nineteenth century. Then, as now, migrants were blamed for “broken families, illegitimacy, disease, criminality, prostitution, juvenile delinquency, insanity, and pauperism,” Handlin observed.\textsuperscript{13} He suggested that African American and Puerto Rican migrants to New York, like European immigrants before them, would soon adjust to their new environments. But Handlin’s study, and similar works by other social scientists, did not exert much influence on the popular discourse.

At this moment Stassen and several other public figures — all idiosyncratic men with a knack for attracting attention to themselves — publicly demanded that migration be halted. These men believed, as others did at the time, that migration was the root cause of their cities’ travails. They demanded that public officials take steps to stem the migrant tide. And their demands made headlines, drawing further attention to the problems they attributed to migration and building public support for policies that penalized migration or even brought it to a halt.

The controversies over migration that Stassen and others sparked marked a decisive shift in the politics of migration. As race figured more prominently in debates over migration, and migration was charged with causing urban problems, the politics of migration became more treacherous — even toxic. It would be difficult for liberal civil rights and social welfare leaders concerned with migrants’ wellbeing to navigate this new politics — a politics that would continue to set the terms for the debate over migration through the end of the Age of Internal Migration.


\textsuperscript{12} “Changing Cities: Rising Negro Influx Stirs New Trouble for Harried Civic Planners,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, April 7, 1958. This type of article became even more common in the 1960s. For example, “The City and the Negro,” \textit{a Fortune} magazine article published in 1962, began with time series maps of the distribution of the African American population from 1910 forward and a prose analysis of the data on migration from the South. It proclaimed that “the city is in trouble today because it isn’t dealing successfully with its newcomers,” and that the city’s problem is the “negro problem,” which is also a national problem, and that more needed to be done to speed “the Negroes advance and therefore save the city” Charles E. Silberman, “The City and the Negro,” \textit{Fortune} (March 1962).

I. Philadelphia

Stassen’s call to halt migration to Philadelphia was prefigured by almost a decade of debate about African-American migration to the city. Since the early postwar period, social scientists and public officials had been aware that large numbers of southern blacks were moving to Philadelphia, and they had undertaken studies to find out why migrants came to the city and what resources they needed most to establish themselves once there. The Philadelphia Urban League — the local branch of the civil rights organization established during the first Great Migration to help black migrants find jobs and housing — sponsored studies of migration to the city starting in the mid-1950s. By 1957, the League had helped form a Special Study Committee on the Problems of In-Migrant Newcomers, which involved representatives of social agencies that worked with migrants — from private organizations including Travelers Aid and the Health and Welfare Council to public agencies such as the Department of Public Welfare, the Commission on Human Relations, and the Housing Authority. The year it was founded, members of the Committee expressed concern “about the existing negative community reactions to the heavy influx” and recommended that something be done to “create[... a social atmosphere in which the immigrant newcomers can more easily become a part of the greater community.”

The “negative community reactions” only mounted the following year, and on New Year’s Eve of 1958, League members met with Mayor Dilworth to discuss the spate of articles linking the migration of African Americans to crime and other social problems of the city. They called on the mayor to “declare as a matter of public policy that it has always been the right of citizens in our country to move freely from one part of the country to another, and that indeed this movement of people has been one of the main bases of the virility of the American economy.”

Migrant advocates had thus already felt the need to defend migrants’ right to move before Stassen recommended that they city take steps to halt migration. After Stassen lost his bid for mayor, they continued their efforts to reframe the discussion of migration. A month after the election, the Philadelphia Urban League hosted a one-day conference on “Minority Migration,” in which speakers from a variety of fields attempted to debunk the views promulgated by Stassen and others about migration to Philadelphia and its effects on the city. The League published and distributed the proceedings to Urban Leagues across the country the following year.

14 Minutes, Special Committee on the Problems of In-Migrant Newcomers, Community Services Department, September 28, 1957, Folder: URB 16/1/74, Urban League of Philadelphia Records, Temple University (hereafter PUL Records).

15 A Staff Memorandum Prepared as a Base of Meeting with Mayor Richardson Dilworth, December 31, 1958, Folder: URB 16/1/74, PUL Records.

16 On the attention his statement roused, see, for example, “Stassen’s Baby-Blue Boat in Heavy Seas,” Washington Post, November 1, 1959, which observed that “he has injected a racial argument into the campaign by promising that if elected he will try to stop “immigration” by Negroes from the South.” On Stassen’s defeat, see “Stassen Beaten, 2-1, in Philadelphia Vote,” New York Times, November 4, 1959.

II. New York

As the Urban League and other civil rights and social welfare leaders dealt with the fallout from Stassen’s call to curb migration in Philadelphia, an outspoken Brooklyn judge offered a similar recommendation as a solution to New York’s slum problem. On September 24, 1959, Kings County Judge Samuel Leibowitz testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, which was holding hearings in New York, and urged city officials to discourage migration “from all parts of the country and the Caribbean” until the city had addressed its “crime-breeding” slum problem. His suggestion that migration be discouraged was specifically aimed at Puerto Ricans. While Leibowitz acknowledged that Puerto Ricans had a right to move where they wished, he wanted “to get the man in City Hall to open his mouth, to do a little talking not only to Puerto Ricans but others who are going to be jammed into these terrible slums which cause juvenile delinquency.”

As part of the effort to discourage migration, Leibowitz recommended that New York State institute a one-year residence requirement for welfare. New York was one of only a handful of states to not require migrants to wait for a year before becoming eligible for public assistance. Leibowitz hoped that instituting such a requirement would discourage migrants from coming to the state.

The context of Leibowitz’s recommendations, like Stassen’s, is important. Like Stassen, Leibowitz was attracted to the limelight. A nationally-known criminal defense attorney who had defended the Scottsboro boys before becoming a judge, once on the bench he launched highly publicized grand juries to investigate racketeering, first, and then, in 1958, violent crime committed by Brooklyn’s youth. In early 1958 several stabbings and a rape in Brooklyn had made headlines nationally. The perpetrators were presumed to be young Puerto Ricans. Leibowitz’s grand jury called for a quick crackdown on crime, recommending that police officers be placed in schools.

Leibowitz’s call to discourage migration a year later made the front page of the New York Times. It was the first highly publicized such statement made by a New Yorker, but it was in line with Leibowitz’s previous recommendations and, indeed, with the statements and actions of other politicians who worried about the migration, especially of Puerto Ricans, into the state. For example, since 1957, state legislators had debated a residence requirement for welfare. That year, the measure failed to pass the state senate, garnering only two votes from New York City — a fact which the New York Times found remarkable.

---

since the city, “is the main stopping place of migration from Puerto Rico and has borne the heaviest relief load of nonresidents.”

In 1958 the bill passed the state senate, but was defeated in the assembly. According to its opponents, the law had two purposes: first, “to exclude the ‘undesirable’ Puerto Ricans,” and second, to preserve the balance of political power between upstate conservatives and New York City liberals, since “lots of talk has been going on suggesting that balances of political power will be upset by non-residents coming here.” Finally, in 1959, the year that Leibowitz spoke out against migration, a residence requirement was the subject of a joint-two day legislative hearing in Albany. At the hearing, supporters claimed that New York’s failure to enact a residence requirement made the state a “favorite target for low-income groups, who move in for easy pickings on relief.” Critics of the measure, meanwhile, charged that “residence is being used as a symbol to hide the real issue — an objection to the entrance of new cultural and ethnic groups.”

By speaking out against the migration of Puerto Ricans, Leibowitz was wading into an ongoing debate about migration in New York.

As in Philadelphia, the call to discourage migration provoked a defense of migration and migrants. If anything, in New York, which was home to some of the nation’s most outspoken liberal proponents of civil rights, the defense of migration was more enthusiastic than in Philadelphia. New York’s leading politicians immediately spoke out against Leibowitz’s recommendation. Liberal Republican Senator Jacob Javits, testifying before the same committee as Leibowitz, said that “I believe that ultimately, as was true of other waves of migration, we will integrate the migrants,” and averred that every citizen should be “entitled to freedom to travel and the best that we’ve got.” After the committee’s hearings Democratic Congressman Emanuel Celler spoke to the press, arguing that “we should not discourage them from coming. We need them for the hard chores and rough work.” New York Mayor Robert Wagner, meanwhile, rejected any plan to discourage migration. As he put it, “I do not agree that we ought to attempt to bar anybody from the city. We’ve never done that before.” The mayor specifically criticized the proposed one-year residence requirement for welfare, saying, “Any law you pass doesn’t keep people from coming in,” but only shifts the burden of supporting migrants from the state to local public and private agencies. After New York’s leading politicians had spoken, its religious and civil rights leaders chimed in. The Sunday after Leibowitz testified, Harlem ministers spoke out against Leibowitz’s proposal from their pulpits.
Bar Association censured Leibowitz, resolving that it was, “of the opinion that the attitude of Judge Leibowitz clearly demonstrates his inability to render impartial justice to defendants of Negro and Puerto Rican origin and that the effect of his testimony before the Senate committee tends to subject the Puerto Rican and Negro people to the contempt of the rest of the community.”

By far the most vocal of Leibowitz’s critics was the American Jewish Congress. Leibowitz was himself a Jewish immigrant to New York, and Jewish civil rights leaders feared that his statements against Puerto Rican migration would be taken as the Jewish position, exacerbating racial tensions between Jews, blacks, and Puerto Ricans. There was some basis for this fear. In an article documenting the response to Leibowitz’s proposal, the New York Times reported that a young man named Daniel Goldstein had been attacked by a “gang of boys” in Brownsville, Brooklyn. The clear implication was that he was targeted because he was Jewish. The American Jewish Congress (AJC) and its civil rights lawyer, Shad Polier, immediately worked to dispel any notion that New York’s Jews approved of Leibowitz’s statement. Interestingly, Polier’s wife, the pioneering family court judge Justine Wise Polier, had already tussled with Leibowitz over his juvenile delinquency grand jury investigation. Whether Polier himself went into the Leibowitz controversy disapproving of the judge is unclear, but once the judge recommended that migration be curbed, Polier sprung into action. In a press release issued by the AJC, Polier was quoted as commending Mayor Wagner’s “prompt rejection” of Leibowitz’s proposal. The press release went on to say that high crime rates could not be solved by “blanket accusations against minority groups or by closing the doors of our city to them.”

The AJC emphasized the shared migrant experience of all New Yorkers:

All of us in this great city are descended from immigrants who came to these shores in search of security and opportunity. Even disregarding the obvious unconstitutionality of Judge Leibowitz’s proposal, it is unthinkable that certain people should be barred from our city because of the color of their skin or the place where they were born.

The AJC stood by its strongly-worded statement even after readers pointed out that Leibowitz did not technically endorse “barring” migrants, but only “discouraging” them. In a personal letter, Polier explained why: “More than any event in the past twenty-five years,
Judge Leibowitz’s testimony has created and stirred up a tremendous anti-Semitic sentiment among the colored people of this City and, indeed, of the entire country.”34

Though New York’s leading politicians and civil rights organizations rejected Leibowitz’s recommendation, the press coverage was more mixed. The New York Times roundly denounced the judge’s proposal. Immediately following his testimony the editorial board described Puerto Rican migration to the city as a response to economic factors, and opined, “it is unconstitutional to set up state barriers against these tides and no lectures by Judge Leibowitz or the Mayor or anyone else can have much effect on them.”35 A Washington Post editorial similarly observed, “The remedy [to the problem of crime in slums] is unlikely to be found in Judge Samuel Leibowitz’ suggestion that migration be discouraged. Freedom of movement within the Federal Union is a right which cannot be curtailed; and hope drives men to surmount discouragement. The only real remedy, we think, lies in taking the migrants into the community instead of casting them out.”36 A long New York Times magazine piece several weeks later interviewed hardworking Puerto Ricans who had moved to the city and sought to explain their struggles as well as the appeal of gangs to some. The article specifically challenged the notion that a welfare residence requirement would influence migration “since the curve of migration, as always, rises and falls with the business curve — the opportunity of work rather than the opportunity to go on relief in New York.” The article went on to assert that the city’s problems did not result from migration: “All of the problems in which Puerto Ricans are involved existed in New York long before their arrival — slum housing, juvenile delinquency, narcotics, low wages, racial tensions — and there is no reason to believe that these would vanish with the Puerto Ricans.”37

Some of the coverage of Leibowitz’ testimony was more approving, however. Baseball star Jackie Robinson, who had recently retired and taken up his pen as a columnist for the New York Post, spoke out in qualified defense of Leibowitz, who he considered a friend since the judge had supported his move to integrate the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947. Robinson downplayed the significance of Leibowitz’s remarks, observing, “I’ve found him to be a very outspoken man when he believes in something, and there isn’t an outspoken man alive who hasn’t stepped on some people’s toes and felt the wrath of their condemnation.”38 Others took Leibowitz more seriously and
directly endorsed his recommendation. *Harper’s* magazine praised Leibowitz for “blurting out the unpopular truth about his city.” An editorial in the magazine observed that New York’s “housing, traffic, schools, water supply, police and municipal finance are all strained to the danger point — or beyond. Millions of its people live in squalor and walk its streets in fear. Anybody thinking of moving to New York should be warned to keep away.”

On balance Leibowitz’s recommendation that migration be halted was, like Stassen’s, more often criticized than praised by public figures and the press. Both men were comfortable attacking sacred cows, and had publicly said what was not yet acceptable to say. But within two years, much would change. When, in 1961, another public figure sought to discourage migration to a struggling industrial city just up the Hudson from New York, the public response was altogether different. And the political fallout was not just local, but national.

### III. Newburgh

Newburgh, New York was a small city of 31,000 just 60 miles north of New York City. In 1952 it had won *Look* magazine’s All American City award, but the following decade had been hard on the city. Factories and mills that once employed the city’s residents had headed south, and in 1957 the Department of Labor declared the city and its surrounding region an “area of substantial unemployment.” The demographics of the city had also shifted. Though the city’s total population declined between 1950 and 1960, the African American population increased 151 percent. Many of these newcomers were former migrant workers who had traveled to work the farms surrounding Newburgh and decided to settle in the city. In 1961, one reporter pointedly observed that Newburgh “now qualifies as ‘All American City’ chiefly because it is suffering almost every one of the well-known urban ills and frustrations that have developed since the war — a rapidly growing Negro slum, a declining business section, a rising crime rate, and increasing school costs.”

By the early 1960s, Newburgh’s political leaders had come to believe that migrants were at the root of the city’s urban ills. They recommended that migration be curtailed, and, unlike Stassen and Leibowitz,

---

actually took steps to curtail it. Newburgh’s new City Manager, Joseph Mitchell, spearheaded the action.

Mitchell had been hired by Newburgh’s Republican-controlled City Council in 1960. At the time of his hiring the Council had been concerned about both migration and welfare. Newburgh was far from the only city concerned about welfare in the early 1960s. Public welfare departments in cities from Chicago to New York were studying the reasons for rising welfare costs and politicians were calling for harsh measures to curb the increases. But Newburgh was the first city to directly blame migrants for the increased welfare expenditures, and to do something about it. The tone was set by the senior Republican on Newburgh’s City Council, plumbing contractor George McKneally, who was responsible for hiring the new city manager. As McKneally saw it, migration and welfare were twin drivers of the city’s decline. McKneally believed that welfare encouraged migration, by “offer[ing] some security to a migrant to takes a chance and leaves the South even though there is no job awaiting him here.” McKneally’s asserted, with little evidence, that Newburgh had developed a “reputation in the South as a soft touch for welfare aid.” Rumors, no doubt fed by McKneally, circulated among Newburgh’s white residents that a sign in a railroad station in the South read, “Go to Newburgh, N.Y., and get paid for not working.” The migration that welfare encouraged, McKneally in turn asserted, was responsible for the city’s decline. No other evidence was needed than coincidence in timing, he believed: the “deterioration began when the migration from the South got underway about 10 years ago.” McKneally interviewed Mitchell for the position of city manager, and as he remembered it, when he had discussed the city’s problems with Mitchell, Mitchell had given him answers he “wanted to hear.” That is, Mitchell also believed that welfare and migration were a problem, and something needed to be done.

Mitchell had been a city manager in California and Pennsylvania before taking the job at Newburgh, and nothing from his previous experience indicated that he would become the lightning rod he became. But once on the job, Mitchell glommed to the role of explainer of the city’s problems. He began making speeches to civic organizations arguing that the city’s social ills could be explained by its welfare program, and the migrants it attracted. In one speech he suggested that welfare needed to be reformed because it was attracting “the
dregs of humanity into this city ... [in a] never ending pilgrimage from North Carolina.” 49 He appointed a three-member citizens committee to study the city’s welfare program. The committee’s report, which turned out to be authored by Mitchell himself, criticized the administration of the welfare program and expressed particular concern about the “steady influx of outsiders, principally from the southern States.” A large proportion of the report considered the “social and economic conditions” and the “moral values” of these newcomers.50

On June 20, 1961, Mitchell took action to discourage migration as part of an overhaul of the city’s welfare system. On that date, he requested that the city adopt a new thirteen-point welfare code, to go into effect a month later. Among the most significant tenets of what came to be known, simply, as Newburgh’s Thirteen Points, were new regulations requiring that cash payments be issued in voucher form, that all able-bodied males on relief be given work, that all recipients who were offered work but refused it be denied relief, that mothers with illegitimate children who continued to have children out of wedlock be denied relief, and, finally, that “all applicants for relief who are new to the city must show evidence that their plans in coming to the city involved a concrete offer of employment similar to that required of foreign immigrants.” The new welfare code targeted loafers, unwed mothers, and migrants, threatening to cut them off of public assistance. 51

The code’s restrictions on migrants were severe. All newcomers who could prove they had moved to the city for a legitimate purpose — i.e. for work — could receive up to two weeks assistance, but no more. Those who could not provide such proof would be limited to one week of assistance. 52 The goal, as the city manager openly admitted at the time, was not simply to cut costs. Mitchell described the new welfare code as a necessary measure to “curtail immigration, save money, and halt our blight.” 53 After Mitchell issued his plan, Councilman McKneally heartily endorsed the plan and the goal, explaining, “My aim is to discourage undisciplined, unskilled, unemployable migrants of the type that have been moving here. We can’t afford to take any more of them so, yes, it is our aim to discourage migrants.” 54

State public welfare officials quickly responded to Newburgh’s attempt to solve its welfare and migration problem simultaneously. Two weeks after Mitchell released his thirteen-point plan, the State Board of Social Welfare announced that a number of the code’s provisions “on their face appear to violate the provisions of State

49 Greenfield, “‘Welfare Chiselers.’”


51 For a useful history of the influence of Newburgh on the discourse over welfare, see Levenstein, “From Innocent Children to Unwanted Migrants.”


54 Averill, “Newburgh Relief Crackdown.”
Social Welfare Law and the Federal Social Security Act.” It launched an investigation. One of the Board’s primary concerns was that Newburgh’s actions, by violating federal law, would jeopardize the state’s annual reimbursement of $150,000,000 from the federal government for welfare expenditures. After a meeting in early July on Newburgh’s welfare code, the Board adopted resolutions demanding that Newburgh officials “observe the social welfare law and desist from implementing the illegal provisions of their Thirteen Point program.” It specifically condemned Mitchell’s welfare code for setting up “a local immigration service designed to restrict, harass, and intimidate United States citizens by compelling them to submit to tests that are said to be ‘required of foreign immigrants.’” The Board also gave other critics of the code ammunition against the claim that “great numbers of ‘undesirable newcomers’ come to Newburgh to get public assistance.” As the Board disclosed, only $205 was spent on state-funded relief to residents who had been in the state less than one year in 1960, and “not one cent was spent for newcomers on ADC [Aid to Dependent Children].” Finally, the Board requested that the New York Attorney General look into bringing action if Newburgh attempted to implement any of the code’s illegal provisions. By August, the Board had sought an injunction to stop Newburgh’s leaders from enforcing the welfare code. Administrators of the Bureau of Public Assistance in Washington were keeping a close eye on the Newburgh situation but did not feel the need to intervene because the State Board of Social Welfare was so proactive.

Mitchell’s crackdown made national headlines. An Associated Press wire story carried the Thirteen Points to newspapers across the country. Mitchell himself was the story’s best promoter, taking on what amounted to a second job touring the country giving speeches about the need to rid the welfare rolls of loafers, unwed mothers, migrants and others who, in his view, took advantage of the all-too-generous safety net. The publicity Newburgh’s Thirteen Points attracted prompted a discussion of Mitchell’s methods and goals that went well beyond the province of public officialdom.


58 Ibid.


61 Ibid.


64 Perlstein, Before the Storm, 131.

As in Philadelphia and New York, civil rights and social welfare leaders were among the first to speak out about the exclusionary recommendations. They uniformly denounced Newburgh’s Thirteen Points and specifically argued against its attempt to limit migrants’ access to assistance. The President of the Newburgh NAACP condemned the code, which, as he saw it, was simply, “an attempt to frighten as many of our people as possible out of the town and out of the area.”

The Board of Trustees of the National Urban League immediately sent a letter to the State Board of Social Welfare raising questions about Mitchell’s actions, and when the Urban League delegate assembly next met it released a statement condemning Newburgh’s welfare code and asserting that the subtext of Newburgh’s actions was anti-migrant. As they put it, Newburgh’s actions seemed to presume that the root of the city’s ills was “undesirable types of newcomers,” and the “clear impression which Newburgh’s official spokesmen have managed to convey is that of a small city (31,000 population), gallantly struggling against a rising tide of indigent newcomer families — families who came not in search of work, but to take advantage of a ‘soft touch.’”

Social welfare leaders, meanwhile, decried the code as a throwback to the period when excluding strangers was considered a legitimate government policy. New York’s long-established State Charities Aid Association released a statement asserting that the “Newburgh crusade is not justified by the facts,” and attempting to “set the record straight.” The American Public Welfare Association released a similar statement describing Newburgh’s proposed regulations as “arbitrary and punitive” and affirming what it described as tenets of responsible social welfare administration. One of these tenets was that population movement is “essential to the economy” and public welfare services should be available to anyone regardless of “residence, settlement, citizenship requirements, or circumstances of birth.” The National Association of Social Workers issued a press release calling the code a “hoax” designed to “break down modern standards of assistance.” It recommended that communities recognize certain principles of public welfare, including that “welfare

burgh Relief Crackdown
Has Strong Popular Supp–
port, Migration From
South in Problem,” Los
Angeles Times, August

67 Henry Steeger to Myles
B. Amend, July 6, 1961,
Box II A 47, Folder: 1962
Public Welfare Situation,
NUL Papers. “Newburgh
Plan,” a text adopted on
September 5, 1961 by the
National Urban League
Delegate Assembly at the
51st Annual Conference,
Dayton, OH, in Box II
A39, Folder: General De–
partment File, Newburgh
Plan, 1961, NUL Papers.

68 See, for example, “New–
burgh Ignored the Past,”
A Statement by 22 Wash–
ton University Fac–
ulty Members, St. Lou–
s Post-Dispatch, October 5,
1961 in Box 54, Folder:
SIP Reference: Newburgh,
NY 1961-2, NSWA Pa–
pers; Statement of the
Advisory Council of the
New York School of Social
Work in Box 1, Folder: Pub–
lc Welfare Situation 1962,
NUL Papers. Social work–
ers’ criticism of Mitchell
stemmed in part from his
own attacks on the profes–
sion and his resolution to
employ untrained welfare
workers in the city.

69 “Newburgh: Symbol of
Unrest, Statement of the
State Charities Aid Asso–
ciation,” Box 52, Folder:
Social Issues and Poli–
cies May-December 1961,
NSWA Papers.

70 Statement of the American
Public Welfare Association
Board. Re: the Newburgh
Public Welfare Proposals,
August 11, 1961, in Box
54, Folder: SIP Reference:
Newburgh, NY 1961-2,
NSWA Papers.
programs ... reflect the needs of a highly industrialized, mobile modern society” and specifically that “families be permitted mobility.” The Executive Director of Catholic Charities sent a letter to the *New York Times* explaining that his organization “cannot subscribe” to the policies proposed in Newburgh because they contravened “Catholic Social doctrine,” which “emphasizes the obligation of society and its more favored members not to remain indifferent to the plight of those who suffer from poverty, misery, and hunger.” The AFL-CIO likewise opposed Newburgh’s code for “humanitarian reasons, because of their callous disregard for the self-respect and dignity of the human person, and because it would not solve the very real problem of general assistance.” The labor organization’s leading social welfare expert, Leo Perlis, gave a speech in which he called Newburgh’s program “a hoax and complete denial of human rights.” The code seemed to strip migrants of their citizenship, Perlis suggested. As he put it, “a relief recipient in Newburgh is not only not human, as per Mr. Mitchell’s regulations, but he is not even an American. He is just a foreigner who, I suppose, is not human in the first place — as any vocal know-nothing will be only too pleased to tell you.”

But while civil rights and social welfare leaders consistently criticized Mitchell, the same could not be said for the nation’s political leaders. Newburgh’s Thirteen Points became the subject of a heated and sharply ideological national debate. As with the scandal over Judge Leibowitz’s call to halt migration, the Newburgh controversy led New York’s most prominent liberals to criticize restriction. Senator Jacob Javits weighed in on Newburgh Thirteen Points, rejecting the most exclusionary conditions and implying that the code was an attempt “to turn back to the dark ages” and deny government responsibility for the “truly unfortunate.” New York’s liberal Republican Governor Nelson Rockefeller was more circumspect, perhaps concerned about how a statement might influence his chances in the next Republican presidential primary. He did not directly censure Newburgh officials but pledged support for the principle enshrined in the state constitution that the public had a responsibility to care for the needy. He expressed disbelief that Newburgh officials would deliberately violate state law; Liberal Democrats outside of New York were more outspoken. Hubert Humphrey, Senator from Minnesota, gave a speech on the Senate floor in August calling the controversy over welfare in Newburgh “a symbolic testing ground of the measure of responsibility that man is willing to take for his fellow man,” and denouncing the city’s new policies.

---

74 Leo Perlis, “Newburgh’s Welfare Program; the Creed of the Know-Nothings” 8/21/61, Box 54, Folder: SIP Reference, Newburgh, NY, 1961-2, NSWA Papers.
As liberals condemned Mitchell, conservatives held him up as a model of responsible city leadership. Barry Goldwater met with Mitchell and endorsed Newburgh’s welfare code, proclaiming that he was “tired of professional chiselers walking up and down the streets who don’t work and have no intention of working.” Goldwater wanted “to see every city in the country adopt the plan.”78 At a news conference in Washington, Mitchell discussed his vision for public welfare while standing next to freshman Senator John Tower of Texas, a conservative Republican, Republican Congresswoman Katherine St. George from Newburgh, and Goldwater.79 Mitchell also received support from the conservative press. The National Review approvingly observed that Mitchell’s plan addressed a problem that Newburgh shared with “hundreds of other northern cities that have played host to Negroes migrating from the South.” The magazine specifically applauded how Mitchell’s plan dealt with migration. While many African American migrants, the magazine observed, “have come in an honest effort to find work and a better life ... others have come in response to their relatives and friends’ reports about the easy living on welfare payments.”80

The newspaper coverage of the Newburgh controversy dramatized the conflict it had aroused between liberals and conservatives. The press was particularly drawn to the clash between Goldwater and Rockefeller, the icons of the opposing conservative and liberal factions within the Republican Party. One New York Times cartoon showed Goldwater and Rockefeller going knuckle to knuckle over a copy of the Newburgh welfare code. Goldwater gave the plan a thumbs-up, while Rockefeller gave it a thumbs-down. The caption suggested that the fight would continue through the next presidential election: “What’s this — a prelude to ’64?”81

While national political figures were split along ideological lines over Newburgh’s code, all evidence suggested that the public was broadly supportive — especially of its anti-migratory conditions. Most Newburgh residents welcomed the welfare crackdown. New York Times labor reporter A. H. Raskin observed that the average Newburgh resident supported Mitchell’s code because he believed it would reduce in-migration. Raskin quoted a construction worker repeating the conventional wisdom: “Mitchell is right in keeping the riff raff out. They come in here by the truckload, get in a house and have kids of all colors and force all the decent people to move away.”82 The Hartford Courant published a series of editorials that criticized the plan and attributed its popularity to the public’s

parsimoniousness and xenophobia. “The fear and hatred of strangers” fed the belief that “‘outsiders’ are coming in squandering our tax money by getting on relief,” and led many people to support the crackdown, the Courant editorial board concluded.83 Lester Granger, who was about to step down as Executive Director of National Urban League, similarly ascribed Mitchell’s popularity to the belief among a certain type of American that “colored people from the South and Puerto Rico ought to be pressured into ‘going back where they came from.’”84 On consecutive days The New York Times carried columns of letters on the Newburgh situation, the majority of which, Granger sadly observed, approved Mitchell’s policy.85 By September, three months into the controversy, Mitchell boasted that he had received over 10,000 letters in response to his actions, favoring the code 100 to 1.86 Polling data supported the anecdotal evidence of the code’s popularity. A month after the firestorm had erupted over Newburgh, George Gallup conducted a poll on the controversy. Over half of respondents favored giving local communities more control over their relief programs so they could enact policies like Newburgh’s.87 “Generally,” Gallup concluded, “the public shows itself in sympathy with Newburgh’s ‘get tough,’ relief policies — favoring the adoption of some of these same policies in their area of the country.”88 Notably, an overwhelming 74 percent of respondents seem to have agreed with the code’s anti-migrant conditions. These respondents said they agreed with the statement that “persons who have recently come from some other place and who try to get on relief should be required to prove that they came to this area because they had a definite job offer.”89 The Newburgh welfare code was so popular that it inspired copycat welfare crackdowns in cities from Milwaukee to Richmond.90

The code’s popularity led civil rights and social welfare leaders not just to speak out against it, but to organize against it. The National Urban League rallied its affiliates to ensure that they were ready should their own political leaders attempt to enact policies similar to Newburgh.91 The American Public Welfare Association collected


86 Address by Joseph McDowell Mitchell, City Manager, Newburgh, NY, Before the Kiwanis Club of New York City, September 27, 1961 in Box 1, Folder 15, Wickenden Papers. Popular support for the crackdown was clear from the beginning. See “Newburgh Policy Has Wide Support,” New York Times, June 24, 1961.

87 “Public Favors a Stronger Local Say on Relief Programs, Chicago Sun Times, August 11, 1961 in Box 31, Folder 11, APWA Papers.


89 “Majority Back Local Handling of Welfare, New York Herald Tribune, 8/21/61 in Box II A 47, NUL Papers.


information about Newburgh and distributed it to public welfare officials in each state, reminding them of the principles of their profession and providing them with background information on the situation.92 The National Association of Social Workers, meanwhile, distributed a pamphlet, “Will the Newburgh Plan Work in Your City?” The pamphlet’s target audience was the general public, particularly people concerned with high taxes, and it debunked the idea that the Newburgh plan was a “new short-cut to progress.” It took each of the Thirteen Points individually, explaining why it was ill-advised and would do nothing to solve the city’s underlying problems.93

To a point, the debunking and critiques worked. The courts enjoined Newburgh’s welfare code and twelve of the famous Thirteen Points were invalidated. Most of Mitchell’s reforms were never implemented.94 Mitchell himself resigned his post two years later to take a position with the right-wing John Birch Society.95 But the debate over migration continued. And Newburgh left a lasting imprint on the debate.

IV. Fallout

The controversies over migration in Newburgh, New York City, and Philadelphia both illustrated and propelled a shift in the politics of migration. As a result of these controversies, migration became inextricably tied to the “race problem” as well as the “urban problem.” By the conclusion of the last controversy, it became acceptable to speak out against migration, even to recommend that it be brought to a halt. In two short years, from 1959 to 1961, statements that had once made their exponents political pariahs were now making them political celebrities.

Social welfare and civil rights leaders struggled to navigate this new politics. In the wake of Newburgh, some organizations concerned with migrants’ wellbeing attempted to address underlying anxieties about race and urban decline by reaching out to minority migrants to find out what their needs were and how they could be met. At the 1961 American Public Welfare Association conference, a session on adapting services for the newcomer asked explicitly, “what are the needs of newcomers who relate to cities, mainly from a non-urban and non-white culture?”96“Travelers Aid, which served a diverse group of movers and migrants, made a special effort in the early 1960s to

92 Loula Dunn to All State Territorial and Commonwealth Administrators, August 14, 1961. Box II A 47, Folder: 1962 Public Welfare Situation, NUL Papers. One article in the packet rebutted each of Mitchell’s claims with a series of facts about the number of people on relief in Newburgh and the amount spent on relief by the city (see “Newburgh is a Mirror Reflecting on Us All,” Washington Post, August 6, 1961).


96 Adapting Services for the Newcomer, Box 19, Folder 5, APWA Papers.
connect with African Americans. As one Travelers Aid piece published in December 1963 put it, the organization was making a special effort to “provide more reaching-out service, directed especially to the needs of Negro clients and given in such a way that it is accessible, usable, and acceptable to migrant Negroes.”

But some social welfare leaders believed the issue was not so much that minority migrants needed more services to help them adjust to urban life than that the blame for urban problems needed to be shifted off their backs. Whitney M. Young, Jr. was one such leader. He was fully aware of how politically sensitive migration was becoming, and he doubted that migrants themselves were causing cities’ problems. In a speech in April 1962, Young systematically debunked the argument that the problems of cities could be attributed to the failure of newcomers to culturally adjust. Instead, Young suggested that “the problem to be tackled by social work is neither the migrant nor the strains resulting from movement, but the city itself.”

The idea that migration — especially the migration of minorities — was responsible for urban decline persisted, however. This new, toxic, politics of migration would haunt the efforts of reformers to aid migrants and facilitate migration through the end of the Age of Internal Migration.

Elisa Minoff is the Fellow in Economic and Social History at the German Historical Institute for 2013-14 and will take up a position as Assistant Professor of History at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg in the fall of 2014. Her current book project, tentatively titled The Age of Internal Migration: How Population Mobility Shaped American Law and Politics, 1930-1972, uncovers the forgotten debates over internal migration in the mid-twentieth century and their effects on policy and the rights of citizenship.

97 NTAA, Highlights, New Directions and Emphases, December 10, 1963, Box 5, Travelers Aid Association of America Records, Social Welfare History Archive.

98 On Young, see Thomas Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York, 2008), 253-255.

BOSCH FOUNDATION ARCHIVAL SUMMER SCHOOL FOR YOUNG HISTORIANS 2013
AMERICAN HISTORY IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE

Archival Summer School in Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington DC, September 1-13, 2013. Co-organized by the German Historical Institute Washington, the University of Chicago’s Department of History, and the Newberry Library, with the generous support of the Robert Bosch Foundation. Convener: Mischa Honeck (GHI). Participants: Gregg French (University of Western Ontario), Marco Härter (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich), Peter W. Lee (Drew University, New Jersey), Karin Hagen (Jacobs University, Bremen), Russell McKenzie Fehr (University of California, Riverside), Victoria Taftterner (Free University Berlin), Kyle T. Mays (University of Illinois), Ana Maric (Augsburg University), Nicolette Rohr (University of California, Riverside), Julius Wilm (University of Cologne).

Formerly known as the “Archival Seminar,” the Bosch Foundation Archival Summer School for Young Historians convened for the first time under its new name in September 2013. Once again the tour spanned four cities (Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington DC), and the ten seminar participants from Germany and the United States were introduced to the holdings and policies of a broad spectrum of American archives and research libraries. The goal of the seminar was to prepare doctoral students from both countries working in diverse fields of American history for their prospective research trips; to teach them how to contact archives, use finding aids, and identify important reference tools; and to help them gain a greater appreciation of the various kinds of archives and special collections located in the United States.

The Bosch Foundation Archival Summer School 2013 began with a walking tour of downtown Chicago on Labor Day, September 2. The following day was spent at the University of Chicago, where Professor Kathleen Neils Conzen hosted the traditional thesis workshop once again. The seminar participants, who had been grouped into five transatlantic pairs consisting each of one German and one American student, commented on the work of their respective partners, exposed their projects to academic scrutiny, and received valuable feedback from their peers and present faculty members. On Wednesday, September 4, the Seminar met Daniel Greene, Director of the William M. Scholl Center of American History and Culture at the Newberry
Library, for a daylong introduction to the institute’s collections as well as for a general overview of American archival policies and practices. Among the topics discussed were the purchase of rare books, how to browse manuscript collections, the expedience of maps for historical research, and the opportunities and pitfalls of digitalization. On Thursday morning, before the group departed for Madison, Wisconsin, the group visited the Chicago Historical Museum. Archivist Peter Alter pulled some spectacular items from the museum’s archival collections to demonstrate the breadth of sources that can be used to do urban history.

Our first destination in Madison was the Wisconsin State Historical Society. Chief archivist Michael Edmonds welcomed the participants in the morning hours of September 9. He spoke about the history and holdings of their institution within the broader context of American state historical societies and impressed the students with the Wisconsin State Historical Society’s dedication to accessibility and public education. After that, time was set aside for individual research before the group reassembled at the local University of Wisconsin history department for a roundtable talk on the relationship of historical research and political intervention. Under the guidance of Professor Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, the participants weighed in on an innovative subfield, the study of emotions in history, making all kinds of connections to their own work. There was a general agreement that human feelings drive actions and impact decisions, although many voiced reservations as to how one could gain access to the emotional constitution of a specific historical subject beyond what is conveyed through language.

On Saturday evening, September 7, the group arrived in Boston, the third city on our itinerary. The following morning gave the seminar participants a chance to witness public history in action with a guided tour of the Freedom Trail. The rest of the day was free for individual exploration. On Monday, September 9, the Bosch Archival Summer School 2013 resumed at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library at Columbia Point. Enjoying a two-and-a-half hour tour of the museum and library archives, including the Ernest Hemingway Collection, under the supervision of Stephen Plotkin, the group benefited from staff presentations on audio-visuals, declassification, and the library’s manuscript collections and oral history program. The day concluded with a visit to the Baker Library Archives at the Harvard Business School. Katherine Fox, Associate Director of
Public Services, acquainted the students with the wealth of the Baker Library’s holdings, which touch upon almost every issue pertaining to the country’s economic development from an agricultural society to an industrial and postindustrial superpower. The Bosch Seminar returned to Harvard University the next morning. Our first stop was Schlesinger Library, one of the leading U.S. research facilities for women’s history. Head librarian Ellen Shea showed and explained letters, pamphlets, books, and visual material related to topics ranging from domesticity and black women to the female suffrage movement. The final destination on our Boston schedule was Houghton Library, where Peter Accardo walked the group through the library’s precious Early Americana collections and gave valuable advice on how to use them for various research agendas.

After reaching Washington DC in the late afternoon of Tuesday, September 10, the Summer School continued the following day at the Library of Congress. A guided tour of the Jefferson Building was followed by a presentation from archivist Lewis Wyman, who spoke to the participants about the breadth of manuscript collections available through the Library of Congress Manuscript Division. The group then stopped at the Prints and Photographs Division, where Sara Duke and her coworkers had worked hard to gather illustration samples related to the participants’ individual projects, thereby underscoring the significance of visual material for historical research. In the afternoon, the group was welcomed by Matthew Wasniewski from the Office of the Historian of the House, who gave the seminar participants a tour of the U.S. Capitol and explained the work of his office, which provides information on the history of Congress, as well as congressional documents and legislation, and chronicles its composition and individual members.

On Thursday, September 12, the group visited the Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington DC. Historian Richard McCulley welcomed the group and introduced them to the structure of the National Archives and ways to access source material pertaining to the different branches of government. Next, Executive Director James Grossman and Interim Special Projects Coordinator Julia Brookins hosted a lunch for the group at the Washington bureau of the American Historical Association (AHA). They drew the students into a lively debate over the ethical stakes involved in the study and teaching of history, touching on issues of plagiarism, civility, access to sources, trust, and claims.
of truth. Following this fruitful discussion, the group met Ida Jones, curator at the Howard University’s Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, who introduced the participants to the Center’s remarkable array of collections on African American history and culture.

On Friday, September 13, the Bosch Archival Seminar 2013 put in a final stop at the Smithsonian’s National Museum for American History. Craig Orr, one of the museum’s veteran curators, spent time with the students to talk about ways in which everyday objects from the realms of technology to fashion can enrich historical research. In the afternoon, the group met for a wrap-up discussion at the German Historical Institute. They were greeted by Deputy Director Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, whose presentation focused on the institute’s work, research projects, as well as the many fellowship and networking opportunities. The farewell dinner that evening concluded a very successful seminar, whose participants were extremely grateful for the useful information, contacts, and prospects for future collaboration that it opened up for them.

Mischa Honeck (GHI)
THE DREAM AND ITS UNTOLD STORIES:
THE MARCH ON WASHINGTON AND ITS LEGACY

Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington, September 19-21, 2013. Sponsored by the GHI, the University of Nottingham, and Georgetown University. Conveners: Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI), Sharon Monteith (University of Nottingham) and Marcia Chatelain (Georgetown University). Participants: Eric Arnesen (George Washington University), Erin Chapman (George Washington University), David Chappell (University of Oklahoma), Cerue Diggs (Howard University), Angela Dillard (University of Michigan), Paul Farber (Haverford College), Allison Graham (University of Memphis), Heinrich Grosse (Institute of Social Sciences of the Evangelical Church in Germany, Hannover), Duchess Harris (Maclester College), Michael Haspel (University of Jena), Maurice Jackson (Georgetown University), Peniel Joseph (Tufts University), Mark Malisa (College of Saint Rose, NY), Suleiman Osman (George Washington University), Christopher Phelps (University of Nottingham), Stephen Tuck (Oxford University), Brian Ward (Northumbria University), Stephen Whitfield (Brandeis University).

Co-convened by three professors of American History and American Studies from Germany, Britain, and the United States, this symposium reflected the global impact of the March on Washington by forging a transatlantic conversation in the city of the March. Hosted by the German Historical Institute in Washington DC, it brought together civil rights organizers and scholars with the general public at its keynote event, “Martin’s Dream: The Global Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr.” Keynote speaker Professor Clayborne Carson, Professor of History at Stanford University and Director of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Research and Education Institute, posited that King’s “most important contribution was that he not only understood his place in a larger African American freedom struggle, but also the place of this effort in a global freedom struggle.” Carson’s response to the fiftieth anniversary of the March developed into an examination of “King’s valiant life and Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee’s courageous challenge to white supremacy in the deep South.” Congressman John Lewis (Democrat, Georgia), whose speech from the platform in 1963 was, for many participants, as important as King’s, was unable to attend but he sent a personal video message for the opening of the conference. A centerpiece of the event was the
exhibition of Leonard Freed’s photographs of ordinary people from the crowd of some 300,000 present on the Mall on August 28, 1963. The curator of this exhibit, Paul Farber, told some of the stories behind Freed’s images and their publication in This is the Day: The March on Washington (2013).

This commemoration of this important civil rights anniversary included activist-participants who marched on that hot August day fifty years ago and activists who had questioned the efficacy of the March, in order for us to debate as well as analyze the impact of the event, then and now. Speakers at the commemoration roundtable included Courtland Cox of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), who was a member of the Steering Committee for the event in Washington in 1963; A. Peter Bailey, journalist and founding member of the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU) in 1964; and Freedom Rider and SNCC activist Joan Trumpauer Mulholland, the extraordinary “ordinary” woman who is the subject of the documentary An Ordinary Hero: The True Story of Joan Trumpauer Mulholland (2013). Each of these speakers addressed one of the conference’s key concerns: that the stories of activists receive sustained attention.

Speaker Ella M. Kelly’s experience spoke directly to the conference theme. She had volunteered for the Red Cross and was driving an ambulance the day of the March, attending to marchers suffering from heatstroke to heart attacks. Having witnessed the event from behind the scenes, she told a story of the March previously hidden from view. A number of important African American women were invited to share the platform at the March on Washington but none were invited to make a speech, and our conference paid attention to those whose voices went unheard and whose stories risk being lost behind celebration of a great event and a groundbreaking speech.

Martin Luther King Jr. was, of course, one of the key symbols of the twentieth-century social justice struggle, and the “I Have a Dream” speech has been highlighted in media coverage of the fiftieth anniversary of the March. The three-minute extemporization in which Dr. King recounted his dream has received particular attention, rather than the scripted talk that preceded it, in which he called upon the federal government, in the midst of the nation’s Civil War Centennial, to make good on the Emancipation Proclamation. “But one hundred years later, we must face the tragic fact that the Negro is still not free,” King declared. “It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar as her citizens of color are concerned.”
In the United States, African American conservatives and radicals had opposed the March for a wide variety of reasons and, as Angela Dillard pointed out in her paper, the Reverend J.H. Jackson of Mt. Olivet Baptist Church in Chicago and head of the National Baptist Convention characterized the idea of the March as a dangerous and unwarranted rejection of law and order.

The conference’s focus on some of the neglected or untold stories behind King’s speech and the March often took us across the Atlantic. The discussion turned to political sympathizers in the United Kingdom, for example, and, as Stephen Tuck demonstrated in his paper, to the inequalities which immigrants from the Caribbean, India and Pakistan faced, including racial violence exemplified by the murder of Kelso Cochrane in London in 1959. Scholars from South Africa, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom explored transnational and cultural crossovers, some of which were lived out by participants. Heinrich Grosse published the first scholarly account in German of King’s life in 1971 and explained what had drawn him to the Mississippi Delta in the 1960s in support of the civil rights movement. Grosse, a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and another German theologian, Michael Haspel, examined how the so-called “Peaceful Revolution” that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was influenced both by civil rights protest methods in the American 1960s and the legacy of Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1980s. Theirs was only one of many stories told. In total, some thirty civil rights and social movement scholars came together in interdisciplinary ways to discuss and debate, to agree and to disagree, and to tease out more and varied stories behind the Dream.

Segregationist organizations opposed the March, as did much of the southern media. The Roanoke World News printed a cartoon depicting marchers with placards heading toward a big barrel labeled “Washington, D.C.,” and “Powder Keg.” Despite opposition from many sides, the March was filmed by more news cameras than had covered President John F. Kennedy’s inauguration and was relayed by satellite around the world in newscasts. Conference participants discussed Hollywood’s connection to the March and its supporters, including activist and fundraiser Harry Belafonte and actor Sidney Poitier. Presenters explored Motown’s recording of the “I Have a Dream” speech as delivered in Detroit in June 1963 and how the release of the album The Great March to Freedom in the wake of the March on Washington caused considerable controversy. Exploitation and
commercialization were significant issues for March organizers, with King mounting and then dropping an injunction against Motown founder Berry Gordy. Conference participants also thought about how the media’s focus on the March impacted publicity for voter registration taking place in Mississippi, and, closer to Washington, civil rights demonstrations taking place at the same time in Cambridge, MD, led by Gloria Richardson. Brian Ward and Maurice Jackson debated the extent to which musicians threw their fame behind the civil rights movement, and Ward explored the choice of musical performers who entertained the crowds. The line-up featured several white and black folk singers such as Bob Dylan; Peter, Paul and Mary; and Odetta; alongside gospel star Mahalia Jackson and classical soprano Marian Anderson, the only two artists listed as part of the official program. The role and significance of individual speakers at the March was also explored, particularly in Steve Whitfield’s examination of the orator who preceded King to the podium, Joachim Prinz, president of the American Jewish Congress. By tracing Prinz’s story back three decades to when he had been a proponent of embattled liberal Judaism in Berlin, Whitfield showed that Prinz’s story exemplified the urgency of confronting “Never” with “Never Again.” The man behind the idea of the March was A. Philip Randolph, and we discussed his economic agenda as it had developed over previous decades, as well as the political fallout that followed the March as traced over the following decades. Stories which participants told, and which they located in relation to the March, included the role of African American women on President Kennedy’s Commission on the Status of Women, which also took place in 1963, to the position taken by Malcolm X. In each and every story we found the seeds of other stories, and we followed some of those stories, tracing them through to the King Holiday in 1983 and to U.S. sanctions against South Africa in 1986.

The legacy of the 1963 March on Washington is long, and the individuals whose lives have been touched by this historic event are many. But there remain stories about the March, its preparations, contestations, and legacy that are yet to be told, and which deserve further and more sustained study. Our project promoted a transnational, multidisciplinary approach to civil rights scholarship and encouraged a lively exchange of ideas which will hopefully encourage more research in this area.

Sharon Monteith (University of Nottingham)
EIGHTH MEDIEVAL HISTORY SEMINAR, 2013

Joint seminar of the German Historical Institutes in London and Washington at the GHI London, October 10-12, 2013. Organized by Cornelia Linde (GHI London) and Stefan Hördler (GHI Washington). Conveners: Stuart Airlie (University of Glasgow), Michael Borgolte (Humboldt University Berlin), Patrick Geary (Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton), Stefan Hördler (GHI Washington), Ruth Mazo Karras (University of Minnesota), Cornelia Linde (GHI London), Frank Rexroth (University of Göttingen), Miri Rubin (Queen Mary, University of London). Participants: Lilach Assaf (University of Konstanz), Christopher Braun (Warburg Institute, University of London), Matthew Champion (Queen Mary, University of London), Jan Clauß (University of Münster), Emily Corran (University College London), Julia Crispin (University of Münster), Étienne Doublier (University of Wuppertal), Linda Dohmen (University of Bonn), Sebastian Dümling (University of Göttingen), Dana Durkee (Durham University), Torsten Edstam (University of Chicago), Duncan Hardy (University of Oxford), Daniela Kah (University of Augsburg), Verena Krebs (University of Konstanz), Joseph Lemberg (Humboldt University Berlin), Maya Maskarinec (University of California, Los Angeles), Eugene Smelyansky (University of California, Irvine), Jeffrey Wayno (Columbia University), Nicholas Youmans (Dresden University of Technology), Milan Žonca (Queen Mary, University of London).

At the eighth biennial Medieval History Seminar, jointly organized by the German Historical Institutes of London and Washington, twenty participants from UK, US and German universities presented and discussed their current research. These research projects represented a wide range of methodological approaches, reflecting the participants’ different backgrounds, which ranged from political, social, and religious history to literary studies, communication studies, and art history. Each paper was briefly introduced by its author and was the subject of two commentaries by fellow participants. The papers were then discussed in plenum, allowing for rich and fruitful engagement with each paper, within the context of wider reflections on relationships between projects and the broader interests of the seminar’s participants. Although the papers employed and combined a number of methodological approaches and utilized an array of source material, particular areas of shared interest emerged. A comparatively large group of the projects were concerned with cultural history and the history of religious cultures, while studies of social and economic
history were less represented. A stress on modes of communication and reception, combined with the interpretation of political, visual, and theological languages, showed that recent theoretical emphases on questions of mediation and representation remain central to this group of new medieval historians.

Several contributions were concerned with a broadly defined intellectual and cultural history of the high and late Middle Ages. Milan Žonca explored the beginnings of the study of Maimonidean philosophy in late-medieval Jewish communities in Central Europe, especially in Prague. In an important contribution to understandings of intellectual authority within Jewish communities, Žonca argued that the turn to philosophical texts in the late fourteenth century was stimulated by internal Jewish developments, as well as external influence from contemporary Christian intellectual culture. Continuing this focus on communities and authority, Nicholas Youmans discussed the definition of early Minorite obedience and its development, arguing that increasing institutionalization of the order over the course of the thirteenth century gradually changed the meanings of obedience. Charismatic understandings of the early Franciscans were gradually overshadowed by hegemonic strategies. Like Youmans, Torsten Edstam devoted his paper to changes in meaning over time, particularly changes in the reception of the writings of the twelfth-century theologian Hugh of St. Victor within reforming monastic communities in the fifteenth century. Focusing on Hugh’s texts at the Benedictine Abbey in Melk, Austria, Edstam argued that the interests of this particular community in linking discipline to love of God shaped the transmission of Hugh’s work.

Reform and reform texts were likewise the focus of contributions by Matthew Champion and Sebastian Dümling. Champion’s paper used the writings of the Louvain theologian Peter de Rivo to explore the ways in which the concept of time was created and experienced within reformed monastic communities of fifteenth-century Brabant. Arguing for a history of time which considers explicit reflections on time alongside the rhythms of human action, his contribution described the production and maintenance of a liturgical self in late-medieval reform, a master measurer of time. Dümling’s paper turned from the liturgical implications of reform to the construction of expertise and experts within a complicated body of texts devoted to political and ecclesiastical reform in the fifteenth century. In these texts, university-educated experts are presented as a means of reform, and failures
of expertise are castigated; knowledge and experts emerge as a social good which offers a pathway to managing change and contingency. The role of experts and the reception of the past also emerged as central in the paper offered by Joseph Lemberg. Addressing debates over the interpretation of Charlemagne in 1935, Lemberg’s paper focused on the successful career of the German medievalist Friedrich Baethgen. Negotiating the poles of race and Reich ideology, Baethgen rehabilitated the idea of Charlemagne as a founder of the German Empire against the attacks of Alfred Rosenberg. Lemberg’s paper harmonized with the plenary address by Stuart Airlie, who discussed the complex and mediated reception and projection of medieval power and rulership in the twentieth century, through reflections on Percy Ernst Schramm and Aby Warburg.

Questions of authority, knowledge, and the production of value adumbrated in the preceding papers were pursued more closely in a trio of papers dealing with church structures, politics, and canon law. Étienne Doublier examined the use of indulgences by Pope Gregory IX, arguing that indulgences served as an efficient political instrument which supported and shaped the newly founded Mendicant orders, particularly through crusade sermons, the inquisition and the cult of the saints. Jeffrey Wayno analyzed the communication practices and strategies of Pope Alexander III during the schism of 1159 and the role of Eberhard, Archbishop of Salzburg, in that conflict. Wayno’s particular emphasis lay in the importance of the Archbishop’s information networks for the Pope. Strategies of communication, this time in legal settings, were a theme for Emily Corran, who examined the function and the development of oaths of calumny in thirteenth-century canon law. She argued that the oath had a limited practical impact on court decisions and instead functioned as a statement of the ethical values of the ecclesiastical courts in the face of increasing professionalization of the law and the concomitant danger of morally questionable legal practice.

Legally and ethically questionable inquisitorial practice emerged in Eugene Smelyansky’s investigation of itinerant inquisitors in the fourteenth century. Smelyansky’s paper focused on the means by which one such inquisitor, Heinrich Angermeyer, negotiated and constructed his inquisitorial power and practice in the persecution of Waldensians in late fourteenth-century Augsburg, and in this discussion, Augsburg’s complex social and political worlds emerged. Smelyansky’s largely cultural-historical analysis of late-medieval
urban persecution of heresy was balanced by investigations of urban and communal social structures in the work of Dana Durkee and Lilach Assaf. Taking fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Norwich as an example, Durkee examined questions of social mobility in the late-medieval English town. Revising theories of mercantile domination of guilds in Norwich, Durkee argued for the importance of weaver’s guilds in Norwich’s civic elite and traced examples of social mobility within these groups. Assaf’s examination of Jewish memorial books explored social structures and gender relations in German Jewish communities from the thirteenth century onwards by means of naming practices, leading her to suggestive conclusions concerning changes in women’s positions within families and Ashkenazi communities.

In contrast, to the lives of these Jewish women, Linda Dohmen’s paper examined the women of the Carolingian court. Using the case of Richardis, wife of Emperor Charles III, as a case study, Dohmen examined accusations of sexual impropriety against the wives of Carolingian rulers. She focused on the political implications of those accusations and emphasized the explanatory value of their political discourse for relations between Emperors and Carolingian elites. This emphasis on rule, as practiced and performed, continued in three papers examining the complexities of hegemony in fifteenth-century Europe. Duncan Hardy explored lateral interactions between political actors, such as regional leagues and alliances, in the southwest part of the Holy Roman Empire in the fifteenth century. Arguing against exclusively vertical analyses of imperial action, Hardy used the example of Emperor Sigismund to show how rulers could instrumentalize horizontal structures for political ends. Hardy’s emphasis on the mechanics of horizontal relations was complemented by Daniela Kah’s examination of self-representation and strategic communication in the imperial cities of Augsburg, Lübeck, and Nuremberg. Combining communication studies and art history, Kah interpreted the ways in which imperial presence was constructed and negotiated in civic architecture and town planning in the second half of the fifteenth century. Like Kah’s paper, Julia Crispin’s paper straddled the disciplines of political history and art history. Through a close examination of the manuscripts illuminated in Paris for John of Bedford, Regent of France from 1422 to 1435, Crispin interpreted their function and use as devotional aids and pedagogical tools, showing their representations of politically central ideals of lineage and Lancastrian rule in fifteenth-century France.
Such questions of cultural interchange, transfer, and interaction were the subject of a final group of papers spanning an array of settings from early medieval Rome to early sixteenth-century Ethiopia. Maya Maskarinec’s deft examination of the introduction of the cults of Eastern soldier-saints to early medieval Rome showed how these militant saints were shaped by, and responded to, the needs and ideals of changing communities, particularly the Byzantine presence in Rome. In turn, these soldier-saints aided the development of Rome’s new Christian topography. Moving northwards, Jan Clauß’s paper examined the texts of Theodulf, Visigoth, Bishop of Orléans and scholar at the court of Charlemagne. Theodulf introduced specific Visigothic traditions and modes of communication, shaping Frankish court and scholarly culture. Christopher Braun was the sole historian of the medieval Arab world. His paper examined the enigmatic genre of handbooks for treasure-hunting in Egypt. These guides, which provide instruction for finding buried treasure and for the occult rituals associated with extracting it, present a window into the widespread phenomenon of treasure-hunting in the medieval world. Finally, in a paper based on difficult research into the material culture of late medieval Ethiopia, Verena Krebs showed how European visual culture was received at the Christian court of the Emperor of Ethiopia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Through textual traces of European artists at the Ethiopian court, as well as surviving visual materials, Krebs shone a light on this complex and as of yet under-researched world of cultural exchange and contact.

The seminar concluded with a wide-ranging discussion, led by Patrick Geary, on the purposes and methods of historical research. Debate about the purposes of history, and its social and cultural roles, led to reflections on the importance of public history from a variety of participants. This emphasis on the participation of historians in public life was mirrored by a strong emphasis on the important role of teaching in academic life. The role of teaching in maintaining a vibrant public discourse of history in turn generated reflections on the ways in which research can be tied to both dissemination and teaching. Yet, as several participants insisted, research also exists as a contribution to the longer history of academic discourse, emerging in unexpected ways at unexpected times to challenge and supplement later historical practice.

The 2013 seminar saw the retirement of Patrick Geary and Michael Borgolte from their leading roles in the Medieval History Seminar. It
was fitting, then, that the final discussions closed with warm thanks for their rigorous dedication to mentoring new medieval historians, and for their extraordinarily distinguished service fostering international dialogue in the study of the medieval world.

Matthew Champion (Queen Mary, University of London) and Julia Crispin (University of Münster)
MIGRANTS AS “TRANSLATORS”: MEDIATING EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON POST-WORLD WAR II WESTERN EUROPE, 1945-1973

Workshop at the Institute for the History of the German Jews (IGdJ) in Hamburg, Germany, co-sponsored by the GHI Washington, October 24-26, 2013. Conveners: Jan Logemann (GHI Washington) and Miriam Rürup (IGdJ). Participants: Doris Bachmann-Medick (University of Giessen), Tamara Bjažić Klarin (Croatian Museum of Architecture), Elisabeth Gallas (Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung Berlin), Nancy L. Green (EHESS Paris), Laura Hobson Faure (Sorbonne Nouvelle University), Andreas Joch (GHI Washington/University of Giessen), Jan Lambertz (U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum), Simone Lässig (Georg-Eckert-Institut/TU Braunschweig), Jan Logemann (GHI Washington), Isabella Löhr (University of Basel), Barbara Louis (University of Minnesota), Corinna Ludwig (GHI Washington/University of Göttingen), Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney (University of Arizona), Hanno Plass (TU Berlin), Christiane Reinecke (Centre d'Histoire Sociale du XXe siècle), Miriam Rürup (IGdJ), Joachim Schlör (University of Southampton), Dirk Schubert (HafenCity University), Lauren Shaw (GHI Washington/University College London), Björn Siegel (IGdJ), Andreas Stuhlmann (University of Hamburg), Corinna Unger (Jacobs University Bremen), Anne Zetsche (Northumbria University).

In the decades that followed the end of World War II, Western Europe experienced a period of rapid social and cultural transformation. This workshop set out to explore the ways in which returning European émigrés and other migrants contributed to and acted as mediators in this era of change. As entrepreneurs and scholars, government envoys and leaders of civil society organizations, migrants played an active part in facilitating the vibrant postwar exchange that connected disparate parts of the globe and shaped the rebuilding of Europe’s cities, the strengthening of its economies, and the “modernizing” of its societies. How did their migration experiences enable them to take on the role of “translators” either in a linguistic or a broader cultural sense? To what extent can the examination of individual and group experiences with exile, migration, and return provide a fruitful lens through which to study postwar social change?

A keynote lecture and comment provided a methodological and thematic framework for the workshop. Coming from the field of cultural studies, Doris Bachmann-Medick challenged participants to view
migration as a form of cross-cultural interruption, a series of ruptures and frictions during which individual migrants may in turns have the agency to act as “cultural brokers” or find themselves translated and defined by others. In discussing what she has termed the “translational turn,” Bachmann-Medick provided several theoretical models that migration scholars may find useful for analyzing the shifting and varied social contexts between which migrations and translations occur. These included self-translation, the management of multiple belongings, and the use of a shared point of reference or third idiom — such as international human rights norms — by migrants to make their political or cultural claims heard. In history and migration research, as in cultural studies, she emphasized the importance of a less metaphorical and more empirically-grounded understanding of translation. Nancy L. Green followed up on Bachmann-Medick’s lecture, commenting from a migration studies perspective that the conceptualization of migration as a series of ruptures may prove a good way to complicate overly simplified and cheerful narratives of transnationalism. Green noted the importance of considering complicating factors, such as class and gender, when looking at the power structures within a society that make possible or frustrate attempted translations. Certain professions, she observed, are characterized by an inherent translational quality, while the socio-economic status of other migrants may make it near-impossible to participate actively in translation. Green also asked participants to reflect on which elements of the “translational turn” could provide useful new tools for researchers in migration studies and whether some of its concepts might not already be present in the field under other names.

The first day of the workshop focused on political translations by migrants in the Atlantic world in the aftermath of the war. The initial panel centered on individual Jewish émigrés who acted as “cultural brokers” in public discussions about the Holocaust. Elisabeth Gallass presented a look at Hannah Arendt’s “return through writing” to participate as a Jewish voice in German postwar public debates about the country’s Nazi past, as well as in efforts backed by Allied forces to recover Jewish cultural objects looted during the war. Through a close analysis of her writings, Andreas Stuhlmann distinguished several translational modes in Arendt’s transatlantic engagement; these included the weaving together of reflections on the European Enlightenment, political science, and individual historical experience to contribute to a shared cultural narrative, and, on a more literal level, the use of her position as an editor for a New York publishing
house to recommended the translation and publication of the works of certain German and European authors, including Walter Benjamin. To conclude the panel, Jan Lambertz examined the detention of the Jewish community activist Norbert Wollheim on Ellis Island upon entry into the United States, highlighting the challenges that Cold War tensions created for cultural interlocutors as they moved between distinct and shifting political worlds. All three papers suggested that the reception of cultural processes of translation depends not only on the translations offered, but also on the acceptance — or not — of the migrant’s authority by the wider society as a result of the individual’s real or perceived political and cultural affiliations.

The panel that followed featured émigrés that were involved in the postwar reestablishment of cultural ties between the United States and Europe. Through an examination of German-American businessman Eric M. Warburg’s role in the founding of the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany, Anne Zetsche suggested that diverse professional and personal contacts, coupled with experience in multiple cultures, put émigrés like Warburg in a unique position to forge elite networks and strengthen the emerging “Atlantic Community.” Björn Siegel then traced the transatlantic career of shipping magnate Arnold Bernstein and his efforts to restore American-European shipping routes for both cargo and tourism. By enabling middle-class Americans to visit the continent, Bernstein contributed to shifting perceptions of Europe from a wartime battlefield to a resurrected center of culture. Both presentations highlighted the importance of social networks for successful cross-cultural transfers, but also raised questions about how to clearly define translation as a social practice.

The third panel offered a look beyond the Atlantic and examined political exchanges and translational processes between Europe and the Global South during the 1960s and ’70s. Hanno Plass shared his research on the anti-apartheid activism of members of South Africa’s Jewish minority. Taking the example of the journalist Ruth First, Plass demonstrated how experiences with anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe shaped the social and political views of Jewish activists like First, and enabled her to internationalize the anti-apartheid cause while in exile in Great Britain. Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney then presented on the reception of Chilean political exiles in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the distinct ways in which the Chilean peaceful revolution and subsequent military coup were understood by GDR
party elites, members of solidarity groups, and average East Germans. This was coupled with a look at the position of “translator” the exiles later assumed when conveying their experiences with socialism in practice after their return to Chile. Even within the highly transnational language of protest and activism, these papers acknowledge, there remained a need for translation and adjusting of messages to localized debates and cultures. By couching their struggle in the burgeoning international language of human rights, these migrant activists were able to amplify their message.

The second day of the workshop shifted the focus to migrants active in various professional fields. Translations in business and marketing stood at the center of the fourth panel. Jan Logemann assessed the transatlantic career of motivational researcher Ernest Dichter as part of a larger group of European émigré “consumer engineers” that were able to use their expert knowledge of European markets and psychologically-informed research methods to influence the development of mass consumption on both sides of the Atlantic. Turning to the field of advertising, Corinna Ludwig then analyzed the cultural codes and market features unique to American and German automobile consumption that complicated the transfer and translation of the Volkswagen Beetle advertising campaign in the late 1950s and early ’60s. In business, as with transnational protest movements, localized adaptation and awareness of the culture of a translation’s intended audience were stressed as important elements of a successful translation. Both case studies furthermore sought to complicate traditional notions of the postwar “Americanization” of European consumption as a one way process, noting the multidirectional dialogue and creative synthesis between European-trained market researchers, American advertising experts, and companies from both sides of the Atlantic.

The fifth panel opened a discussion on the way experiences with migration, exile, and displacement were portrayed in and experienced by those involved in creating contemporary popular culture. Miriam Rürup explored representations of remigration and return in the early postwar films *Der Ruf* (*The Lost Illusion*) and *Long is the Road*, analyzing the challenges of negotiating incredibly divisive and emotionally charged issues on screen, including wartime suffering and guilt, and the hopes and disappointments of returnees. Joachim Schlör followed this with an examination of the way exile from and return to Europe shaped the career of the German songwriter Robert Gilbert.
The English language — the source of much of Gilbert’s frustration as he tried to write songs for an American audience — became an asset in his later career after returning to Europe as he translated multiple American musicals, including *My Fair Lady* and *Oklahoma!*, into German. Both papers inquired about the potential limitations and misinterpretations of cross-cultural translation by highlighting not only the successes, but also the challenges migrants faced and the instances of failed translations.

The role of remigrés in the postwar professionalization of European social work was the topic of the next panel. Laura Hobson Faure presented on the creation of the Paul Baerwald School of Social Work by the American Joint Distribution Committee and on the involvement of migrant experts — including several German exiles — in efforts to popularize “American” social work methods to France. Barbara Louis then shared the case study of Gisela Konopka, a Jewish refugee from Germany, who became a translator of social work methods and practices — most notably social group work — through her position as an educator and consultant specialist sought out by the Allied High Commission to help rebuild German welfare services after the war. By considering migrant experts as translators rather than simple carriers of ideas, Louis suggested, historians acknowledge the individuals’ agency and active participation in the adjustment and moderation of transfers between cultures. Such an understanding can lead to a more nuanced understanding of processes of cultural and professional exchange. These papers also demonstrated different strategies experts chose in representing themselves and the methods they tried to advance as either “American,” “European,” or something in between.

The final panel examined the careers of several prominent émigré architects and urban planners who engaged in postwar debates on the future of urban space. Looking at the diverse professional activities of Walter Curt Behrendt, Victor Gruen, and Hugo Leipizger-Pearce, Andreas Joch suggested that while planners of the period shared a professional language that to some extent bridged national divides, a secondary translation of planning ideas was often necessary to make them accessible to non-experts, including politicians and the average citizen. In this sense, contemporary planners made use of both the strategy of appealing to a cross-cultural “third language” and of localizing their message in an effort to make it resonate with the receiving society. Tamara Bjažić Klarin analyzed Croatian-born
Ernest Weissmann’s rise from an independent architect to the director of the United Nations Housing and Town and Country Planning Section, noting his continued dedication to the practice and spread of socially responsible architecture. Weissmann and the other planners discussed in this panel had well-defined social goals that included the protection of metropolitan city centers, the creation of high-quality housing for vulnerable individuals, and the fostering of democratic behavior. While these goals were maintained, more or less, as the planners crossed national borders, the methods used to pursue and explain these aims often required translation to fit the cultural and historical context.

The concluding discussion underlined the potential usefulness of translational models of cultural analysis for histories of exchange and encounter. The research presented at this workshop provided an initial empirical test of these models. A renewed focus on the process rather than the outcome of translations leads to a more subtle understanding of cultural and professional dynamics and of the position of migrants within a society. “Translation,” it was suggested, is a more nuanced term than “transfer”; it brings in the complexity of language and the speaker’s anticipation of the reception of a message by a particular audience. However, a more well-defined typology of the different modes of translations would be useful, particularly when considering different types of migrants. To what extent can the same processes be seen among high- and low-skilled, forced and professional migrants? While migrants in certain professions, including marketing and pop culture, reflected explicitly on their roles as “cultural brokers,” for others, translation was simply an inherent part of everyday life. The translational turn, most participants agreed, may not revolutionize their research projects, but can open valuable new spaces to explore the nuance and friction of migrant experiences, and to better understand the agency of individual historical actors.

This workshop was hosted by the Institute for the History of the German Jews in cooperation with the GHI Washington’s Transatlantic Perspectives project, the website of which was presented during the workshop (www.transatlanticperspectives.org). We are grateful for everyone whose hard work made this workshop possible and for the support of the Institute for the History of the German Jews, the GHI Washington, and the German Federal Ministry of Research and Education.

Lauren Shaw (GHI)
THE CONSUMER ON THE HOME FRONT:
SECOND WORLD WAR CIVILIAN CONSUMPTION
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Joint Conference of the German Historical Institutes London, Moscow,
and Washington at the GHI London, December 5-7, 2013. Conveners:
Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Washington), Andreas Gestrich (GHI London),
Nikolaus Katzer (GHI Moscow), Jan Logemann (GHI Washington), Felix
Römer (GHI London), Sergey Kudryashov (GHI Moscow). Participants:
David Clampin (Liverpool), Donald Filtzer (London), Mila Ganeva (Oxford / Ohio), Sheldon Garon (Princeton), Wendy Z. Goldman (Pittsburgh), Neil Gregor (Southampton), Cynthia L. Henthorn (New York), Oleg Khlevnyuk (Moscow), Jan Lambertz (Washington), Bettina Liverant (Calgary), Erina Megowan (Georgetown), Erich Pauer (Marburg), Nicole Petrick-Felber (Jena), Ines Prodöhl (GHI Washington), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI Washington), Pamela Swett (Hamilton), Frank Trentmann (London), Sergej Zhuravlev (Moscow), Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (Chicago).

The home front of World War II is increasingly recognized by historians as a vital part of not only military strategies during a war with an unparalleled degree of civilian mobilization, but also as a catalyst for broader social developments, e.g. in gender and race relations. Collaboratively organized by three German Historical Institutes, this conference looked at the relationship between war and mass consumption and the role of the consumer in the war efforts of Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. While mass consumption has long been associated primarily with liberal democracies, research on Nazi Germany as well as Communist countries has demonstrated the degree to which these regimes also engaged the growing importance of mass consumption — even if, in the Soviet case, the structures of a mass consumer society did not fully develop until after the war. In the context of the war, however, the state rather than the market often played a central role in organizing consumption across all regimes. In addition to posing comparative questions of how war time consumption was organized and experienced, many papers also highlighted transnational exchanges and learning processes.

Hartmut Berghoff introduced the conference topic by highlighting the significance that all major powers attributed to civilian consumption during World War II, building on the lessons from the preceding war.
The “modern” home front under conditions of total war was seen as paramount in maintaining civilian morale, which meant that a shift to military consumption was inherently limited. Minimum standards of provisioning and a sense of distributional justice had to be ensured, and consumers were mobilized to participate in production, conservation, and distribution efforts. Consumption in fashion and entertainment also served as a form of distraction while planners and marketing professionals in many countries fostered forms of “virtual consumption,” the promise of a consumerist postwar future which created a lasting legacy. In the first keynote address of the conference, Sheldon Garon emphasized the global and transnational nature of home front planning, which runs counter to prevailing myths and narratives of national distinctiveness in collective memories of wartime experience. Using Japan as his vantage point, Garon highlighted shared challenges in maintaining production and morale, as well as in food security and rationing. Like other powers, the Japanese paid close attention to the lessons of World War I and its blockades, shortages, and ultimate home front collapses. They drew on a growing international body of knowledge in nutritional science to prepare for the coming war and mounted an (ultimately failed) attempt to maintain food self-sufficiency during the war. As clothing became increasingly uniform and much of the nascent consumer goods industry was converted to wartime production, food consumption became ever more central to the Japanese war experience by the end of the conflict.

Securing civilian nutrition was generally a central element in wartime efforts to maintain the home front, as explored in the first two panels of the conference. Rationing and price controls were part of the war experience in all societies under consideration here, albeit to significantly different degrees. Food provisioning was the central challenge in the Soviet Union, as Wendy Goldman showed, and deprivation was the predominant experience of most Russian civilians. Rationing was almost entirely handled through institutional canteens, while the retail sector was virtually non-existent. Still, the intricate rationing system was riddled with inequalities and corruption, often failing to provide factory workers with the bare minimum needed for survival. The consumer as an individual receded into the background in the Japanese case as well. Erich Pauer discussed the role of neighborhood organizations in organizing rice rationing in Japan and the increasingly centralized distribution system which had supplanted private retailers and markets by the end of the war.
In Germany, by contrast, consumer choice remained more viable and certain indulgences were seen as essential to morale. Nicole Petrick-Felber showed that while coffee consumption almost entirely shifted to surrogate products, due to a collapse of imports, tobacco remained “vital” to the war effort. Cigarette production continued, but after 1944, the state increasingly lost control over the rationing process as black markets emerged. For the Western Allies, the situation was entirely different, as Ines Prodöhl’s paper demonstrated. She analyzed the Combined Food Board, an international body set up in 1942 to organize the distribution of U.S. agricultural surpluses to allied nations. While shortages in areas such as fats and oils riddled Western Allies as well, American abundance and the global access to goods ensured that starvation was of little concern in the West.

Differences in available supplies and the distribution of foodstuffs made for very different experiences in home front consumption by civilian consumers. In the United Kingdom, as Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska explained, scarcity, not starvation, was the primary experience. A “flat rate” rationing system promised a sense of equitable sacrifice, but black markets, self-supplied consumers in the countryside and the possibility to circumvent rationing in restaurants posed challenges to the “fair share” principle and its promise to mitigate class distinctions. Still, many postwar Britons would go on to memorialize a mythical “wartime community.” Many Germans, too, Felix Römer argued, viewed the home front situation in a relatively positive light. Based on U.S. surveys among German POWs, he analyzed the views of Wehrmacht soldiers regarding the food situation on the home front and cross-referenced them with research about the German rationing system. From soldiers’ point of view, he concluded, the maintenance of sufficient caloric intake outweighed the negative experience of deteriorating food quality, which was not in the least due to the vivid memory of conditions during the First World War. Donald Flitzer analyzed Soviet home front experiences by looking at infant mortality rates. Poor hygiene and pervasive illnesses, as well as shortages in milk and fuel, presented rife conditions for mass mortality, which indeed spiked early in the war. Yet, overall, the war saw an eventual decline in mortality, which could in part be attributed to state programs, but also speaks to the already high levels of mortality prior to the war and the continuity in experiences of deprivation and scarcity that, for many Russian consumers, spanned from the interwar to the postwar period.
The subsequent panel on wartime advertising provided a stark contrast to the realities of malnutrition in some countries and furthermore provided surprising parallels between liberal democracies, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, and the more organized economy of Nazi Germany. David Clampin related the British case wherein advertisers were keen to contribute to the war effort, but also careful to maintain brand awareness and to encourage future consumption. Postwar visions of consumerism took the form of either forward-looking visions of modernity or a nostalgic promise of return to the “good old days.” The anticipation they stoked, however, proved to be a political liability, as rationing continued after the war. Many American advertisers, Cynthia Lee Henthorn argued, also blurred the line between government propaganda and commercial ads. The overriding concern of the U.S. industry, however, was to ensure a return to an unfettered market economy in the postwar years. The consumerist world of the future was to be a world of free enterprise. German advertisers, as Pamela Swett showed, also pursued their own commercial interests. While consumer goods ads linked consumption and national expansionism, industry struggled to retain a degree of distance from the regime, especially towards the end of the war. Maintaining brand awareness during rationing was central for German advertising executives, too, and Swett’s examples suggested a surprising degree of continuity from the pre- to postwar period.

Wartime nations thus frequently relied on “virtual consumption,” the deference of immediate consumer satisfaction in anticipation of later rewards. In addition to advertising, the commercial entertainment industry was utilized to boost morale and to influence consumer desires. Mila Ganeva discussed the prominence of fashion in wartime German media, from magazines to movies. While managing scarcity was an acknowledged reality, the imaginary consumption of luxury high fashion retained a prominent place in the media landscape. Even in the Soviet Union, as Sergej Zhuravlev showed, new fashion magazines appeared during the war. While textiles were extremely difficult to attain, wartime photographs attest to a continuous concern with appearing fashionable among many Russian civilians. Despite a widespread struggle for survival, Russian workers in provincial factories also often had their first encounters with theater and ballet, as cultural institutions were displaced from the major population centers. Erina Megowan argued that the Soviet policy of bringing “high culture” and brigades of performers to the hinterland during the war was well received and had a lasting impact on cultural consumption
across the country. In Germany, by contrast, as Neil Gregor suggested, the continued practice of regular attendance of symphonic concerts attested to a continuation of “banal social habits” and a sense of everyday normalcy amidst total war. At least in certain areas, “normal life” persisted and a shortage in material goods meant that surplus incomes during the war could be spent on entertainment. This panel certainly raised questions about the paradoxes of wartime consumption and the at times jarring juxtaposition of cultural consumption and entertainment with pervasive mass death.

The final part of the conference focused on the legacies of wartime consumption. Frank Trentmann opened this section with the second keynote address. He challenged the audience to consider the implications of the war for the long-term development of mass consumption, especially in the Western World. On the one hand, 1945 was not the dramatic break that is often assumed and consumer desires were deeply rooted and well developed prior to a war which did not fundamentally challenge them. On the other hand, the war left its mark on postwar mass consumption. It widened the transatlantic gap in consumption levels, it shifted tastes through wartime migration and exchanges, and it impacted generational patterns of consumption. Finally, the war heightened belief in the possibility of statecraft and planning for consumption, leading to a secular rise in taxation and public forms of consumption across Western nations.

The papers in the final panel then looked at various legacies of the war primarily through its impact on expert communities. Jan Lambertz discussed the wartime and postwar studies of U.S. and British nutrition experts, which yielded new analytical techniques for measuring human “need” and “deficiencies” and which would find later application in defining civilian health standards. Looking at Canada, Bettina Liverant showed the impact of the war on economists and policy experts. Canada’s experiences with strategic austerity, with rationing, price freezes and consumer surveys, which pre-dated those of its American neighbor, informed postwar efforts in controlling consumer spending and inflation within the framework of a Keynesian economic policy. Jan Logemann similarly argued that the wartime expansion of state-sponsored market research in the United States acted as a catalyst for postwar transformations in marketing research. Focusing on three prominent émigré consumer researchers, the paper traced both transnational transfers in consumer psychology and the entanglement of commercial, academic and government research that
connected the warfare state to the postwar consumer’s republic. In the Soviet Union, Oleg Khlevnyuk showed that basic structures of provision remained in place from the 1930s to the 1950s, but victory in the war promoted a growing gap between consumer expectations and the continued reality of shortages. Especially as Russian soldiers came into contact with consumption levels in other parts of Europe, pressures for reform mounted, leading to a “new course” after Stalin’s death. The impact of war preparations on innovations in the food industry, finally, was at the center of Uwe Spiekermann’s paper, which traced the effects of efforts by German nutrition experts to improve military food. Iconic consumer goods of the postwar “economic miracle,” such as instant potato dumplings, he showed, were literally field tested during the war. His paper also provided an important reminder of how closely consumption on the military and civilian home fronts were intertwined.

The concluding discussion, led by Hartmut Berghoff and Andreas Gestrich, emphasized the surprising degree to which continuities could be traced in various areas of consumption from the pre- to postwar eras. Especially for the more developed consumer economies, World War II was not as decisive a break in the long-term development of mass consumption. It did, however, provide a point for broader implicit and explicit societal debates about the role of consumption between market and state, individual and community. Despite structural similarities in the challenges posed by wartime consumption and parallel developments across regimes, the comparative look made clear that the experience for consumers also varied tremendously among the countries surveyed, with the United States and the Soviet Union representing opposite ends of a spectrum between curtailed affluence and mass deprivation. The everyday wartime experience, for example in the various constellations of black or grey market activity, was finally noted as an important field for future research — especially as the memories of wartime sacrifices helped shape the cultures of mass consumption in subsequent decades.

Jan Logemann (GHI Washington)
GHI NEWS

2013 HELMUT SCHMIDT PRIZE IN GERMAN-AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY

On October 24, 2013, the 2013 Helmut Schmidt Prize in German-American Economic History was awarded to Mary Nolan, professor of history at New York University. The Schmidt prize pays tribute to the former German chancellor for his part in transforming the framework of transatlantic economic cooperation. The prize, which is awarded every other year, has been generously sponsored by the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius since 2007.

Professor Nolan was honored for her remarkable oeuvre, especially for her groundbreaking books *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (1994) and *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890–2010* (2012). Nolan’s *Visions of Modernity* opened new perspectives on the history of the Weimar Republic by examining the German reception of “Fordism” and American ideas on the rationalization of work, production, and consumption. Bridging the fields of business history, labor history, and women’s history, *Visions of Modernity* is a landmark study that threw new light on the complexity of Weimar culture and society. In her most recent book, *The Transatlantic Century*, Nolan offers a fascinating overview of the interactions between the Old and New Worlds. Her analysis centers on the differing — and at times opposing — understandings of modernity that have shaped European-American relations over the past century.

After introductory remarks by Hartmut Berghoff (GHI) and Nina Smidt (American Friends of Bucerius), S. Jonathan Wiesen (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale) delivered the laudation. Upon accepting the prize, Mary Nolan delivered a lecture titled “Americanization? Europeanization? Globalization? The German Economy since 1945,” which is published in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

An excerpt of the laudation follows here: “Mary Nolan’s scholarly achievements are manifold, but before I highlight some of her specific interventions, allow me to suggest that her signal contribution to our field has been to conceive of economic history in its most capacious and creative terms. Professor Nolan is not a scholar who produces narrow studies of companies or market trends. Instead, she has been drawn to the multiple actors that converge in the economy—business owners,
managers, politicians, labor leaders, and, of course, workers. To this last category she has lent especially fruitful attention. She has sought to understand workers-and indeed work-in their multifaceted dimensions by exploring the meaning and experience of labor. In her studies of the long twentieth century, her reach has been sweeping. She has looked at working class politics, working class culture, and the relationships between men and women in the workplace. She has taken us from the factory floor and the sweatshop to the union hall and the party headquarters. We have learned about salaried labor, wage labor, skilled labor, semi-skilled labor, manual labor, agrarian labor, and migrant labor. We have been introduced to Catholic bricklayers and Protestant pipefitters. We have seen European and American workers on the assembly line and on the picket line-and in the home, at the ballot box, and in the grocery store. We have descended into the coalmine and stood next to the blast furnace and the kitchen stove. We have observed industrialists, shop stewards, and Hausfrauen in imperial settings, in democracies, and under dictatorships. This colorful panoply should not obscure a key point: Mary Nolan’s work has always been grounded in an exacting study of macroeconomic trends and microeconomic statistics, and she has also infused her writings with an appreciation of long-term social developments.

2013 FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE

The 2013 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, honoring the best doctoral dissertation on German history written at a North American university, was awarded to Ricky W. Law for his dissertation “Knowledge is Power: The Interwar German and Japanese Mass Media in the Making of the Axis” (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2012). The award ceremony took place on November 15, 2013 at the 22nd Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI, chaired by David Blackbourn (Vanderbilt University), President of the Friends. The prize selection committee was composed of Ann Goldberg (University of California, Riverside), Paul Lerner (University of Southern California), and Jesse Spohnholz (Washington State University). The prize winner has contributed an article presenting his dissertation research to this issue of the Bulletin.

The committee’s prize citation read: “In this impressively researched, elegantly written, and ambitious project, Dr. Law approaches the German-Japanese alliance (the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936) from a
variety of angles and perspectives, offering an approach from cultural and intellectual history to issues traditionally dealt with by diplomatic historians. Law’s work recasts the German-Japanese relationship before and during World War II from the conventional view of it as a logical alliance between aggressive, authoritarian dictatorships. He points out that the alliance was actually rather surprising at the time, especially because of German “racial” chauvinism and Japanese sensitivity. The alliance thus needs more explanation than historians have yet provided. Rather than turning to high diplomatic concerns, Law centers his attention on how the German and Japanese publics came to see an alliance as not only politically expedient but also reflective of shared or at least complementary cultural norms and traditions. In doing so, he provides a panoramic view of German and Japanese mass culture that offered consumers images of the other — newspaper coverage, films, non-fiction books, lectures and pamphlets, voluntary associations dedicated to the study of the other and even instructional materials for learning a foreign language — and shows how the two nations imagined and constructed each other in the years leading up to and during the alliance. To be sure, as subjects within authoritarian regimes, members of the German and Japanese publics played no role in signing the Anti-Comintern Pact. Yet Law shows a shift in popular culture that, he argues, made this alliance increasingly appear both tolerable and natural. The committee was impressed by Law’s extensive research in both German and Japanese sources. His facility with both languages is clear and is a major achievement in itself, but even more impressive is the depth and comprehensiveness of his research, as well as his mastery of a historiographic landscape that includes a range of subfields (e.g., film history and the history of publishing) Law’s sensitive and imaginative treatment of source criticism and creative framing of his project around different forms of media provides a thoughtful model for other cultural historians. In sum, the committee members find Law’s approach to international relations innovative and compelling and believe that his findings will be of great significance to both German and Japanese historiography.”
NEW STAFF PUBLICATIONS

Monographs and Edited Volumes


Articles and Chapters

Hartmut Berghoff. “Blending Personal and Managerial Capitalism. Bertelsmann’s Rise from Medium-sized Publisher to Global Media


Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson. “‘We Shall Overcome’: The Impact of the African American Freedom Struggle on Race Relations and Social Protest in Germany after World War Two.” In The Transatlantic Sixties: Europe and the United States in the Counterculture Decade, edited by Britta


---

**GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS**

**GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships**

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw
upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

**GHI Internships**

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

**RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS**

**Doctoral Fellows**

Sophia Dafinger, Universität Augsburg
"Lessons learned?" Wissenschaftliche Expertise für den Luftkrieg nach 1944 in den USA

Jana Hoffmann, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
*Familienvorstellungen im amerikanischen Mainline-Protestantismus*, 1950–1980

Claas Kirchhelle, University of Oxford
*Pyrrhic Progress: Consumer Attitudes towards Agricultural Antibiotics* (1951–2012)

Ella Müller, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
"Anti-Environmentalism": Widerstände gegen Umweltschutzpolitik in den USA von 1969 bis in die frühen 1990er Jahre

Kristina Poznan, College of William & Mary
*Becoming Immigrant Nation-Builders: The Development of Austria-Hungary’s National Projects in the United States, 1880s–1920s*

Michele Weber, Marquette University
*When does our Liberation Come? The Policing of Homosexuality in American Occupied Germany, 1945–1949*
Andrew Zonderman, Emory University
*Embracing Empire: Eighteenth-Century German Migrants and the Development of the British Imperial System*

**Postdoctoral Fellows**

**Julio Decker**, Technische Universität Darmstadt
*A Global History of Railways in the Colonial Spaces of the United States and the German Empire, 1884–1918*

**Natalie Krentz**, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
*Die “Wissenschaftliche Revolution” im Kontext: Repräsentationen und Praktiken wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisgewinnung in der Massachusetts Bay Kolonie im 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhundert*

**Rachel Moran**, Pennsylvania State University
*Poor Choices: Welfare and Pregnancy in the U.S. and Western Europe, 1945–1996*

**Klaus Seidl**, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
*Weltbürger wider Willen: Eine Biographie Veit Valentin (1885–1947)*

**Jana Weiss**, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
*Beer in the U.S.: From a German Cultural Asset to an (Inter)National Mass Product — A “(Re)Invention of Tradition and Consumption”*

---

**GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR, FALL 2013**

**October 16**  |  **Joris Merceels (University of Ghent)**
*Photography and the Public Domain: Managing Knowledge and Intellectual Property, 1871–2003*

**Rene Schlott (University of Giessen)**
*A Biography on the Life, Work, and Impact of Raul Hilberg (1926–2007)*

**October 30**  |  **Leonard Schmieding (GHI)**
*German Restaurants in San Francisco, 1890–1941*

**November 20**  |  **Adelheid Voskuhl (University of Pennsylvania)**
*Engineers’ Class Struggle and the Question of “Technology” in German and American High Industrialism*
December 4  Mischa Honeck (GHI)  
*Eagle on Ice: Paul Siple's Passage to Imperial Manhood*

December 11  Discussion of:  

GHI DOCTORAL SEMINAR, SUMMER/FALL 2013

June 13  Elise Vallier (University of Paris-Est Marne La Vallée)  
*In Defense of American Womanhood: Color, Class, Gender and Region: A Study of African-American Women’s Writings, 1865–1920*

Kritika Agarwal (State University of New York, Buffalo)  
*Uncertain Citizenship: Denaturalization and Expatriation in Twentieth-Century America, 1906–1967*

Brian Goodman (Harvard University)  
*Amerika and the Other Europe: Literature and Culture beyond the Curtain, 1946–1989*

July 11  Matthew Yokell (Texas A&M University)  
*Qingdao and the German Experience in China, 1880–1918*

Marina Kaneti (New School for Social Research)  
*Migrants, Consumers, and the Politics of Affect*  

Brendan Murphy (University of Sheffield)  
*Killing in the German Army: Organizing and Surviving Combat in the Great War*

October 10  Bernhard Sassmann (Universität Augsburg)  
*“Kulturen der Intelligence”: Militärische Nachrichtendienste in den USA, 1900–1947*

Elisabeth Piller (Universität Heidelberg)  
*German Cultural Diplomacy and the United States, 1919–1932*

October 17  Karin Hagen (Jacobs University Bremen)  
*“Male, pale, and stale”: Gender and Manned Space Travel in the United States in the Context of the Cold War*
Julian Länge (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf)
Amerikanische Unternehmensstrategien in westdeutschen Einzelhandelsunternehmen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis in die 1980er Jahre

November 7
Scott Krause (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
City upon a Hill of Ruins: A German-American Network’s Campaign to bring Cold War Democracy to West Berlin, 1945-63

Alex Elkins (Temple University)
Street Sovereignties: The 1960s Riots and the Triumph of “Get-Tough” Policing

December 12
Silke Körber (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)
Deutschsprachige Verleger im Exil in den USA/Großbritannien und ihr Einfluss auf die Entwicklung des populären illustrierten Sachbuchs im 20. Jahrhundert.
GHI SPRING LECTURE SERIES 2014

EAST GERMAN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHIES

Organized by Leonard Schmieding and Uwe Spiekermann

Twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany continues to be shaped by narratives of clear-cut differences between East and West. This lectures series will take a biographical perspective on coming of age as a scholar in East Germany. It will explore the impact of the collapse of the GDR on individuals’ careers and the challenges they faced in adjusting to the academic culture of the West. The experiences of the speakers, who represent three different generations, highlight the differences and similarities between East and West — before and after 1989 — and will challenge the audience to reflect on their own “western” intellectual practices.

This lecture series has been generously funded by a bequest from Michael Olshausen to the Friends of the German Historical Institute.

February 20  The Academic and the Everyday in the GDR
Sigrid Jacobeit (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) and Wolfgang Jacobeit (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

March 27  Research between Central Planning and the Market: The Experiences of an East German Economic Historian, 1965-2005
Jörg Roesler (Berlin)

April 24  In the Labyrinth of Memories: The Battle over the Stasi Files in the Peaceful Revolution of 1990/91
Stefan Wolle (DDR Museum Berlin)

May 15  Between East and West: Contemporary History as Biographical Challenge
Jürgen Danyel (Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung Potsdam)
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2014

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org

Conference at the GHI and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Conveners: Stefan Hördler (GHI) and Jürgen Matthäus (Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies/United States Holocaust Memorial Museum)

January 24   Studying the History of National Socialism and the Holocaust: Toward an Agenda for the 21st Century
Panel Discussion at the GHI
Panelists: Frank Bajohr (Institute of Contemporary History Munich/Center for Holocaust Studies), Christopher Browning (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), and Wendy Lower (Claremont McKenna College)

February 20-22   Gender, War and Culture: From Colonial Conquest and standing Armies to Revolutionary Wars (1650s-1830s) to the Wars of Nations and Empires (1830s-1910s)
Workshop at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Conveners: Dirk Bönker (Duke University) and Karen Hagemann (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

February 25   Visions of Beauty: Arnold Genthe and the Art of Photography
Exhibition Opening and Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Marina Kaneti (New School for Social Research)

March 7-8   Histories of Humanitarianism: Religious, Philanthropic, and Political Practices in the Modernizing World
Conference at the GHI and the University of Maryland, College Park
Conveners: Sonya Michel (University of Maryland, College Park) and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)

April 4   Migration and the Great Recession
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Demetrios G. Papademetriou (Migration Policy Institute)
April 4-5  Migration during Economic Downturns: From the Great Depression to the Great Recession
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Elisa Minoff (GHI) and Marc Rosenblum (Migration Policy Institute)

April 25-26  A Hands-on Approach: The Do-It-Yourself Culture and Economy in the 20th Century
Workshop at the GHI
Convener: Reinhild Kreis (GHI)

May 3  Search for a New Sound: The Blue Note Photographs of Francis Wolff
Exhibition Opening at the Goethe-Institut

May 7-10  20th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: Nineteenth-Century German History
Seminar at the GHI
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

May 21  Jazz — the Classical Music of Globalization
Performance and Lecture at the GHI
Speaker and Performer: Reinhold Wagnleitner (University of Salzburg) and Tom McDermott (Piano, New Orleans)

May 29  What Crisis? Speculation, Corruption, and the State of Emergency during the Great Depression
Gerald Feldman Memorial Lecture, at the GHI
Speaker: Martin Geyer (LMU Munich)

June 5-7  War and Childhood in the Age of the World Wars: Local and Global Perspectives
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Mischa Honeck (GHI), James Marten (Marquette University), Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), and Arndt Weinrich (GHI Paris)

June 18-20  Informal and Everyday Markets: Modern Histories of Indian Business and Entrepreneurship since the Nineteenth Century
Conference at the University of Göttingen
Conveners: Sebastian Schwecke (University of Göttingen), Ingo Köhler (University of Göttingen), and Christina Lubinski (GHI)

June 23-July 4  Archival Summer Seminar in Germany
Seminar in Germany
Convener: Mark Stoneman (GHI)
September 1-12  Bosch Foundation Archival Summer School for Junior Historians 2014: American History in Transatlantic Perspective
Seminar in Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington, DC
Convener: Mischa Honeck (GHI)

September 4-6  Jewish Consumer Culture
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Jenna Weissman Joselit (George Washington University), Roger Horowitz (Hagley Museum and Library), and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

September 11-13  Gender, War and Culture: From the Age of the World Wars (1910s-1940s) to the Cold War and Anti-Colonial Struggle to the Wars of Globalization (1940s-Present)
Workshop at the Duke University
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Dirk Bönker (Duke University), Karen Hagemann (UNC Chapel Hill), and Mischa Honeck (GHI)

September 18-20  Shady Business: White Collar Crime in History
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Edward Balleisen (History Department / Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), and Christopher McKenna (Said Business School, University of Oxford)

October 16-17  Wirtschaftskriminalität und Unternehmen
Conference in Frankfurt
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI/University of Göttingen) and Thomas Welskopp (University of Bielefeld)

October 30-31  Green Capitalism? Exploring the Crossroads of Environmental and Business History
Conference at the Hagley Museum and Library in Wilmington, Delaware
Conveners: Adam Rome (University of Delaware), Yda Schreuder (University of Delaware), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Erik Rau (Hagley Museum and Library), and Roger Horowitz (Hagley Museum and Library)

November 13  28th Annual Lecture of the GHI
Lecture at the GHI

November 14  23rd Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI and Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
Symposium at the GHI
November 17  The Rosenberg Files: The West German Ministry of Justice after 1949 and the Nazi Past
Panel Discussion at the GHI
Speakers: Manfred Görtemaker (University of Potsdam) and Christoph Saff erling (University of Marburg)

December 5-7  Taxation for Redistribution since 1945: North America and Western Europe in Comparison
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Gisela Hürlimann (GHI/University of Zurich) and W. Elliot Brownlee (University of California, Santa Barbara)