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The feature articles in this issue of the Bulletin provide a cross section of research sponsored by the German Historical Institute. As the selection of articles suggests, the Institute currently conducts more research in American and transnational history than in German history.

GHI Director Hartmut Berghoff’s article “From the Watergate Scandal to the Compliance Revolution” examines political efforts to fight corporate corruption in the United States and Germany from the early 1970s to the present. As Berghoff explains, the Watergate scandal gave rise to investigations into the use of slush funds and bribery by U.S. corporations, which led to the passage of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977. That in turn generated a broader effort to reach an international agreement prohibiting corporate bribery that culminated in the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery convention and led to an international “compliance revolution” in the 1990s and 2000s.

Thomas Welskopp’s contribution comes out of the German Historical Institute’s “Immigrant Entrepreneurship” project, which seeks to integrate the history of German-American immigration with U.S. economic and business history by examining the lives, careers, and business ventures of German-American businesspeople of the last 250 years. Paying special attention to the German-American experience, Welskopp’s article examines the history of Prohibition. Since the beer brewing industry was identified with German immigrants, the Prohibition movement contained a significant anti-German element. Furthermore, Prohibition reversed the attempts of German-American breweries to infuse American drinking culture with German elements such as beer-gardens. Prohibition therefore undermined the integration of German-Americans into the American mainstream, Welskopp concludes, and turned them back into an ethnic minority.

Another contribution that grew out of the GHI’s “Immigrant Entrepreneurship” project is GHI Deputy Director Uwe Spiekermann’s article examining the marketing strategies that allowed the Schlitz brewing company to become a nationally recognized brand in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. Even as the taste of Schlitz beer actually got worse as a result of technological changes, Spiekermann argues, Schlitz marketing successfully projected an image of scientific leadership, health, and quality that
brought the company success for three quarters of the twentieth century.

Julia Gunn, 2012-13 GHI Fellow in African American History, presents an article drawn from her dissertation project, which examines the intersection of labor policy and civil rights in Charlotte, North Carolina. After outlining Charlotte’s long-standing hostility toward organized labor, Gunn analyzes how the city leaders’ postwar decision to embrace a politics of racial moderation began to interfere with the city’s ban on collective bargaining, especially for public sector employees. By focusing on the tension between labor politics and racial politics, Gunn illuminates the history of the Sunbelt from a new angle.

This issue’s final feature article, by Jasper Trautsch, 2012-13 GHI Fellow in North American History, examines the evolution of the concept of the “West.” Moving from the conflict between Westernizers and Slavophiles in nineteenth-century Russia to an analysis of turn-of-the-century German claims of an opposition between “German culture” and “Western civilization,” and on to post-1945 American claims to be defending “Western civilization” against the Soviet bloc, Trautsch concludes by tracing the transition from Abendland (occident) to “Western civilization” as the primary reference point in post-1945 West German self-conceptions.

This Bulletin’s conference reports once again reflect the diversity of the Institute’s workshops and conferences. In this issue, they range from the history of social reform to the history of communication, from the history of postwar reconstruction in different eras to conservative mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s, and from twentieth-century German history to German-Jewish history. The calendar of events in our “News” section informs you of upcoming GHI events and conferences. We hope to have roused your interest and look forward to welcoming you at a GHI event in the near future.

Hartmut Berghoff (Director) and Richard F. Wetzel (Editor)
Features
“Time is running out for the merchants of crime and corruption in American society.” With these words, Richard Nixon accepted his nomination as the republican candidate in the 1968 presidential race. At that point, Nixon did not know how right he would be, even if this prediction would turn out to be true in a way he had not expected.

In 1968, Nixon was elected the 37th president of the United States and four years later, he was reelected to a second term that would become a nightmare for him and the nation. The country’s unrivaled dominance in the world economy was coming to an end, partly as a result of the Vietnam War. Rising unemployment, inflation, as well as trade deficits and significant pressure to reduce the value of the U.S. dollar had already prompted Nixon to abolish the dollar’s ties to the gold reserve. The resulting loss in the dollar’s value, as well as persistently weak growth with high inflation, seriously undermined the nation’s self-confidence. Nixon’s strategy of wresting a victory in Vietnam through bombing and expanding the war to Laos and Cambodia proved to be a serious mistake. In terms of domestic politics, the antiwar movement reached a high point. Martial law was declared at several universities, and the army and National Guard took violent action against some students. At the same time, it became apparent that the military superpower would experience a humiliating defeat in its fight against the small country of North Vietnam. With the civil rights movement and other progressive tendencies on the rise, the situation for African Americans and other minorities began to improve, much to the chagrin of conservatives, including Nixon. Simultaneously, critical media became more influential. Investigative reporting on the My Lai massacre and the publication of the Pentagon Papers in the New York Times proved that the government had systematically lied. Nixon, for his part, felt as though he were surrounded by enemies and developed downright paranoid tendencies.

The presidential race of 1972 started in this climate. The Democratic opponent, George McGovern, made it easy for Nixon: his proposals to


2 Jeffrey P. Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, Kansas, 1998), 40-258.
radically redistribute wealth, reduce the military budget, and legalize marijuana drove the political center of U.S. society into the arms of the incumbent Republican, so Nixon’s reelection prospects were very good. Nevertheless, Nixon felt that he could not do without dirty tricks. The Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), bursting with criminal energy, placed its bets on undermining its political opponent by any means. On June 17, 1972, CREEP employees disguised as plumbers were caught installing bugging devices in the Democratic Party Headquarters at the Watergate complex. This spurred the worst government crisis since the Civil War. Nixon denied having had anything to do with the break-in even as he bribed those involved to remain silent and used his power to prevent the FBI from investigating the incident. Meanwhile, Nixon was reelected by a substantial majority in November 1972. As one Nixon intrigue after another came to light in the months that followed, Nixon was not afraid of severely impeding the judicial investigations. Thus he ordered the U.S. Attorney General to fire the special prosecutor for the Watergate case, whereupon the Attorney General himself resigned in October 1973. The dismissal of the special prosecutor, which went forward anyway, damaged the government’s reputation, as did the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew, who had taken bribes from companies for government contracts and evaded taxes as the governor of Maryland. It was the first time a vice president had resigned since 1832.

In February 1974, the House of Representatives began to look into impeaching Nixon, and in July the House recommended this procedure. Even so, Nixon continued to deny his involvement in the Watergate case almost to the end, even though he had to turn over the recordings of his telephone calls, thus providing definitive proof of his string-pulling and his remarkable command of scatological language. Nonetheless, as late as August 7, he refused to resign. After it had been made clear to him that the trial would result in his removal from office, he backed down. On August 9, he became the first president of the United States to resign.
For someone on the verge of a nervous breakdown and who had failed in every respect, Nixon departed with a surprisingly optimistic gesture. Unlike twenty-five members of his administration, he escaped going to prison since his successor, Gerald Ford, pardoned him on September 8. In Ford’s words, Nixon received a “full, free, and absolute pardon ... for all offenses against the United States which he ... has committed or may have committed ... during the period from January 20, 1969.” This applied not only to Watergate but also to any possible crimes that had not yet been disclosed. The institutions of the state and political class of the U.S. had sustained serious damage both internationally and at home.

I. Business Watergate Disclosed

Although the Watergate case and surrounding events are widely known, it is not so well known that Watergate became the starting point for a long fight against corruption. The U.S. government now ranks this campaign just behind terrorism on its priority list of problems to address. Before 1973, no one really minded foreign corruption among corporations. Watergate, however, spurred a movement that evolved into a “compliance revolution” at the turn of the twenty-first century, fundamentally changing the parameters of corporate action in the process.

The Watergate investigations led to the discovery that U.S. enterprises like 3M, American Airlines, and Goodyear had made illegal payments to CREEP by means of secret offshore accounts. Many other firms used such accounts for hidden campaign contributions. Further investigations revealed that many more businesses had such accounts and that, as a rule, they also used them for bribery in foreign countries.

This caught the attention of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which is responsible for the protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets. Stanley Sporking, Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, watched the Watergate
Hearings on television and could not believe his ears. In his view, the biggest problem with the offshore accounts and foreign bribery consisted not in their political, fiscal, or moral explosive-ness, but in the way they deceived the stockholders of the companies to whom these payments remained hidden. In the SEC’s “disclosure perspective,” bribery was perceived as a violation of securities laws because the utilized funds were not correctly accounted for. Such violations led to inaccurate bookkeeping, which in turn led shareholders to make distorted investment decisions that could be damaging. The SEC made further inquiries to other companies, getting 150 listed joint stock corporations to admit that they had created dubious slush funds and/or had bribed foreign officials. The more companies the SEC asked, the larger the problem became. In 1976-77, it knew of about 500 U.S. companies that had made questionable payments. Almost all large U.S. companies engaged in foreign bribery. The leftist think tank Council on Economic Priorities published a list of over $300 million in questionable payments.

The extent of such bribery exceeded all expectations. Both in the U.S. and abroad, there was a tremendous outcry against this problem, which was quickly dubbed “Business Watergate.” One could argue that this was a phenomenon inherent to capitalism — one that unmasked this economic system and undermined its legitimacy once and for all. In the 1960s and 1970s, there were strong anti-capitalist and anti-American tendencies in the Western world. Large segments of the U.S. population had already lost their trust in the establishment. Thus, the critical public eagerly took up the bribery issue, as it seemed to confirm their prejudices, especially those commonly leveled against multinational corporations.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives conducted a whole series of hearings on foreign bribery, to which numerous CEOs of large corporations were summoned. Democratic Senator Frank Church, who had been one of the first senators to speak out against the Vietnam War in the 1960s, proved to be a driving force behind these hearings. As a leading foreign policy figure, he gave the debate a different, more effective impact than Sporking and the SEC. From his “foreign policy perspective,” corruption damaged the reputation and power of the United States and served, above all, the enemies of America. Furthermore, he maintained that the corruption spread by U.S. companies weakened U.S. allies. In 1976, he made this pithy observation in the Senate: “Payments by Lockheed alone may very well advance the communists in Italy. ... The Communist bloc chortles with glee at the sight of corrupt capitalism.” The leading power of the West, in his view, was discrediting itself — a very influential and substantive argument in the Cold War.

In the frosty climate of the Cold War, it was completely unacceptable — indeed, it was a hardly conceivable scandal — that U.S. companies did not even shy away from bribing communist politicians. In the Senate Committee on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, young Senator Joe Biden, today the Vice President of the United States, reported on his experience in the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Foreign Relations Committee. The latter had likewise addressed the issue of corruption in 1975 because, as Biden stated, “bribery ... directly flies in the face of our own foreign policy.” Biden noted that a hearing with representatives of U.S. multinationals had indicated that the companies’ bribery funds often served to cut other U.S. competitors out of markets in foreign countries. In one case, a CEO had testified that the only “reason why he was involved in one European

9 For a complete list of all the hearings, see Posadas, “Combating Corruption,” 350.

country was to keep free enterprise going in that country and the need to work against the advancement of communism ... That’s the reason why they gave money to these other political parties.” Biden had then asked, “as a joke”: “How much did you contribute to the Communist Party?” The response was surprising if not hair raising: “The faces sort of blanched and the attorney turned to the president of the corporation and conferred a second and said, ‘Well, $88,000.’” The company’s president thus got entangled in the contradiction between common anti-communist rhetoric and the facts of reality. There was no doubt that this sort of duplicity and financial contributions to communists and other “shady characters in far-off countries” were utterly intolerable, particularly in the paranoid climate of the Cold War. Interestingly enough, the minutes of this hearing also reveal that foreign secretary Henry Kissinger had “urged that recipients of corporate bribes not be disclosed because they might embarrass officials of friendly governments.” Previously Kissinger had — without success — intervened in the Lockheed case to keep the files hidden from the public. Some, in fact, argued that certain bribes were in the direct interest of the United States as “the CIA has used American corporations as fronts” to channel “payments to foreign officials in order that they who are friendly with this country stay in office.”

In 1975-76, a Senate subcommittee headed by Church dealt with the airplane manufacturer Lockheed, which the U.S. government had rescued from bankruptcy with a $250 million federal loan guarantee in 1971. It was determined that Lockheed had systematically bribed governments and high-ranking officials in foreign countries, including important NATO allies, since the 1950s. This scandal had broad implications. In the Netherlands, it led to a constitutional crisis because Prince Bernhard, who was heavily implicated in the scandal, only managed to escape a parliamentary investigation and a court proceeding by Queen Juliana threatening to abdicate. Nevertheless, the prince resigned from all his public posts. In Japan, Prime Minister Takanaka was arrested in 1973 and convicted in 1983.

Ernest Hauser, the former Lockheed lobbyist in Bonn, testified before the Senate subcommittee in 1975 that German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauß and the CSU had received at least $10 million for the purchase of 916 Starfighter jets for the German Air Force. The documents presented as proof, however, turned out to be forged. From 1961, some of the Starfighters were imported from the U.S., while others were built by a consortium of German airplane manufacturers in Germany as licensed products. Such licensed production was

11 Foreign and Corporate Bribes
Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2nd Session on
S. 3133 (1976): 44 and 45
(Joseph Biden, Jr.).

12 Ibid., 40 (George Ball, Lehman
Bros).

13 Ibid., 42 (William Proxmire,
Committee Chair).

14 Ibid., 45 (William Proxmire,
Committee Chair).
an important component of the reconstruction of the German aircraft industry after World War II. The media derided the Starfighters in the early 1960s as “widow makers” on account of their unreliability — 292 crashes and 116 dead pilots between 1961 and 1989 — before design improvements made them significantly safer. Strauß was never able to shake the reputation of being the corrupt “Starfighter from Bavaria.” The Federal Audit Office disapproved of the overpriced acquisition of the technically immature aircraft. Hauser later rescinded his statement after Strauß had sued him. The accusations could never be resolved because the files had been destroyed in the Ministry of Defense in 1969. In the German parliamentary election campaign of 1976, in which Strauß was in the running to be chancellor, the topic bubbled up again due to disclosures in the U.S. At the same time, a trip Lockheed had financed for Defense Minister Wörner was made known. In Italy, various former members of the government including Prime Minister Rumor were incriminated in the crisis, as was the incumbent President Leone, who resigned in 1978. Other Lockheed scandals came to light in Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Mexico, and Turkey, among other places. A company kept alive by the American taxpayer was providing unlimited ammunition for anti-Americanism and contributing to the destabilization of the nation’s most important allies.

In 1975, the SEC launched an inquiry into United Brands, who owned the Chiquita brand, the successor of United Fruit. In the course of this inquiry, the CEO of United Brands, Eli Black, jumped to his death from his office in a New York skyscraper. United Brands had paid Honduran president General Oswaldo López Arellano $1.25 million in kickbacks and promised him the same amount the following year. Finance Minister Bennaton Ramos personally oversaw the operation.


which was conducted via Swiss banks. A cartel of the banana-exporting countries Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama lay behind this arrangement. Members of the cartel had wanted to secure a larger share of the banana business for their poor countries after twenty years of stagnant prices by significantly raising the export tax, thus challenging the oligopoly of United Brands, Standard Fruit, and Del Monte. In 1974, Honduras had doubled the tax. After the bribe was paid, the country rescinded the increase, saving United Brands $7.5 million in taxes. Even more importantly, the bribe caused the cartel to collapse. In the course of the investigation, it was also discovered that United Brands had been bribing Italian officials since 1970 with $800,000 to prevent import restrictions. The European Community, in which United Brands had a market share of 40 percent, established that this corporation had also seriously misused its market position.17 Under prevailing law, the corruption practiced abroad was not punishable in the United States as such. From the “disclosure perspective,” it merely presented a “book and records violation” because, after all, the bribery funds were not properly accounted for in the company books. United Brands asked the State Department, albeit in vain, to keep the case confidential to prevent damage to the country and the company. After it became public, a rebellion against the military government in Honduras broke out; when another military junta came to power, United Brands was partially expropriated.18

Other serious cases of corruption included Gulf Oil’s alleged payment of $4 million to the South Korean governing party DRPRK, which several politicians had repeatedly demanded. Simultaneously, the company had made it possible for a Bolivian presidential candidate to purchase a helicopter.19 In 1975, Democratic Congressman Les Aspen published a list of payments by twenty corporations accused of or having admitted to having made questionable payments totaling $306 million. The list was dominated by defense and oil companies and topped by Lockheed ($229 million), Exxon ($50 million), Northrop ($30 million) and Gulf ($5 million).20 In the numerous hearings, most corporations admitted to making these payments but defended them with a number of arguments. They claimed, for example, that bribes appeared to be the only way to ensure the continuation of business in the respective countries. Very often the managers claimed that they wanted to “protect democracy” by supporting the right kinds of politicians. They also explained that in some countries under question, such payments were consistent with the


18 See Steve Striffler and Mark Moberg, Banana Wars (Durham, NC, 2003); Thomas P. McCann, On the Inside (Beverley, MA, 1987).


accepted way of doing business. Finally, they argued that political parties and officials exerted strong pressure by threatening to harm U.S. corporations by raising taxes, refusing to grant licenses, or even by nationalizing their assets.21

II. The Genesis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977)

In the context of the Cold War, this situation had become untenable, particularly since the media and critical public raised the explosiveness of the issue to a fever pitch.22 The United States, a world power, was undermining its own legitimacy. Thus, in March 1976, President Gerald Ford deployed a “task force” of high-ranking officials to deal with it, although he balked at the suggestion of criminalizing bribery of foreign officials. The soft option — merely requiring disclosure — failed in the Democrat-controlled Congress.23 But Ford’s Democratic successor, Jimmy Carter, took up the issue as one of his first initiatives in 1977. The subcommittee in charge in the House of Representatives characterized the over 400 cases of bribery in its final report of September 1977 not only as “unethical” but also as a danger to the market economy and the competitiveness of the U.S. economy. Moreover, the report emphasized the foreign and military policy interests of the country. This text is extremely illuminating.

Such corruption, it stated, is counter to the moral expectations and values of the American public. But not only is it unethical, it is bad business as well. It erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market system. It short-circuits the marketplace by directing business to those companies too inefficient to compete in terms of price, quality or service, or too lazy to engage in honest salesmanship, or too intent upon unloading marginal products. In short, it rewards corruption instead of efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards or risk losing business ... Corporate bribery is also unnecessary ...

Corporate bribery also creates severe foreign policy problems for the United States. The revelation of improper payments invariably tends to embarrass friendly governments, lower the esteem for the United States among the citizens of foreign nations, and lend credence to the suspicions sown by foreign opponents of the United States that American enterprises exert a corrupting influence on the political

21 For a summary of these arguments, see ibid, 305-306.

22 For general information on the 1970s, see James T. Patterson, Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore (New York, 2005), 13-130; and Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality (Princeton, 2012), 19-63.

processes of their nations … [T]he Lockheed scandal … jeopardized U.S. foreign policy … with respect to the entire NATO alliance …

Finally, a strong anti-bribery statute would actually help U.S. corporations resist corrupt demands.24

The central arguments were entirely shaped by the Cold War. Corruption, the subcommittee maintained, supported weaker companies, undermining the productivity of the U.S. economy and alienating the most important members of the Western alliance of the United States. Furthermore, though not stated explicitly, the subcommittee was motivated by the fear that arms technology would proliferate in an uncontrolled way, as corrupt companies could potentially sell the technology to enemy states. These cumulative arguments persuaded Congress to pass the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which Carter signed into law in December 1977. This act made it unlawful for U.S. companies to bribe foreign officials and politicians with the aim of obtaining unfair advantage and stipulated heavy fines and imprisonment of up to five years for violations. This was a unilateral step taken without consulting trading partners and allies, and it put American companies at least 

de jure

at a disadvantage. The FCPA does not prohibit all forms of corruption. “Grease payments” intended to motivate subaltern officials to complete or accelerate the completion of their duties, such as stamping a customs form or visa, are explicitly excepted.25 The Act deals primarily with “grand corruption,” or payments for obtaining unfair advantages in the acquisition of contracts and for influencing political decisions.26 However, the SEC and the Department of Justice hardly used the FCPA at first,27 though it is possible that it had a deterrent effect that is difficult to measure. Skeptics believed that the FCPA had trained companies to better disguise their corrupt practices. In the 1980s, there were even serious though unsuccessful attempts to water down the FCPA because of constant and severe criticism from the pro-business forces in the Reagan administration. In 1988, however, there was an easing of tensions.

III. Approved by Courts and Ministries: Foreign Corruption by German Corporations

Just how far the United States had stuck its neck out and how unusual this unilateral criminalization of foreign corruption was in 1977 becomes apparent when we compare it to the situation in the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, the technical term for bribe money was “useful expenditures,” which not only implied its legal nature but also its ability to be deducted from taxes. Thus, bribe money was classified as a normal expense in initiating new business, like expenses for advertising or brokers, for example. At the beginning of the 1970s, the head of the German Chambers of Commerce Abroad observed, “Whether we like it or not, without corruption business dealings with large portions of the world cannot be completed; economic relations would simply collapse without it.”28 In accordance with this sort of worldview, different legal and moral concepts, prescribed to the actors by the competition and local customary practices, had to be applied outside the Federal Republic. To disregard them was only possible by retreating from the respective market.

Corruption in foreign countries by German corporations went on for a long time with the government’s approval and the tax authorities’ full knowledge, although in most of these cases, violations broke the laws of the respective foreign states. In the Federal Republic, “useful expenditures” were not only tax deductible until 1999 (if paid to officials) or 2002 (if paid to recipients in the business world) the companies could also take the deductions without presenting receipts. One memo by the Federal Finance Ministry, for example, stated that it could be “justified in foreign transactions not to demand the name of the recipient when it is certain that the bribe monies are actually paid and required for business.”29 According to this line of argument, these payments were a matter of international practice allowed with the aim of keeping German companies from falling behind. To play it safe, German companies could also turn to the tax offices and have bribe monies they planned to pay acknowledged as tax-deductible in advance.

In the governing social-liberal coalitions under Chancellors Willy Brandt (1969-73) and Helmut Schmidt (1973-82), this practice was not uncontroversial. Hans Matthöfer had already expressed his opposition to bribes being tax-deductible in 1971, a year before he was appointed Parliamentary State Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Cooperation, which was in charge of development aid to third-world countries. As a development expert, he knew how damaging corruption could be. Indeed, corruption destroys governance that adheres to rules with sometimes disastrous effects, such as inflated prices, misallocation of capital, and undermining opportunities for growth. Matthöfer proposed an anti-corruption code to the United Nations. Rainer Offergeld, the State Secretary of the Finance Ministry from

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1975 to 1978 and also a Social Democrat, represented the opposing view: “Either one participates [in the practice], or one winds up high and dry.” However, during Matthöfer’s tenure as the Federal Finance Minister (1978–82), bribes remained tax-deductible.

In 1985, foreign corruption even received the stamp of approval from the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) when a German trading company sued a German client for reimbursement of a kickback that it had paid on his behalf. One of the trading company’s staff had bribed officials in Nigeria to win a contract there for the client. The client, however, had failed to pay the agreed upon sum. By way of explaining the background of the case, the Court stated that such bribes to “influential positions in the country” were “required” in order to conduct such transactions in Nigeria. “The parties knew this,” the Court said. “Because, on the other hand, the use of bribes is illegal in Nigeria and involves the danger of the provider getting blacklisted or possibly being prosecuted, European providers typically have locals take care of the ‘bribing.’”

This 1985 decision of the German Supreme Court reflects the nation’s ambivalence in dealing with foreign corruption. Whereas a lower district court had declared that the trading company was in the right for the simple reason that “the arrangement of the parties concerning the payment of bribes” did not violate “the German ordre public,” the Supreme Court followed a different course. As the act was unethical and at least formally illegal in the respective country, the company had no effective right to a commission. Had the client paid the agreed upon commission, however, that would not have been objectionable. This ruling sanctioned the long-standing practice of bribery, as it were, continuing as follows:

To be sure, a German entrepreneur cannot be expected to completely dispense with bribery of the relevant state organs in countries where this is the only means to acquire state contracts, thereby leaving the business to less conscientious competitors. Thus, he will not be able to accuse his employees and sales representatives of violating their official or contractual duties if, as is customary locally, they work with bribes in applying for such contracts; he may under certain conditions even have … to repay bribes that they disbursed. However, it does not follow from this that the bribe agreement in itself … would have to be legally recognized.

30 Ibid.

31 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen (BGHZ), Vol. 94 (Cologne, 1985), 268-75, here 269.
Legal acts that ... contradict ethical-legal principles are ... null and void.\(^32\)

According to this, agreements to bribe officials are not enforceable; the procedure in and of itself is judged as incorrect, though it is tolerated. Employees, thus, have a right to be reimbursed for bribe monies by their employers.

By the late 1980s, however, signs of a fundamental shift in the legal judgment and public perception of corruption began to emerge. In Germany, this was not driven by politics nor by the corporate world, but by a critical public and landmark regulatory decisions of the U.S. government and the international community.

IV. The Compliance Revolution of the 1990s and 2000s
A true shift only occurred between 1990 and 2002. It is no exaggeration to characterize it as a “compliance revolution.”\(^33\) There were eight interconnected causes for this:

1. Once the Cold War was over, a period of liberal-market and globalization euphoria set in. Corruption was now regarded as a non-tariff barrier to trade and development, and a practice at odds with democracy. This climate generated political pressure for reform. The end of the Cold War also made it easier for the international community to coordinate on the matter. Previous initiatives had often failed on account of the East-West dichotomy.

2. In this context, the change in the administration from George H.W. Bush to Bill Clinton was important. Whereas the Republican Bush would have utilized a failure of negotiations as a pretext for weakening or eliminating the FCPA, the Democrat Clinton emphatically supported efforts to internationalize the law. During Clinton’s administration, the FCPA came to be applied more strictly, not in terms of the number of proceedings (see Diagram 1 below) but in terms of the severity of the punishments and their visibility. For example, there were two spectacular FCPA cases against icons of American industry — General Electric (1992-94) and, once again, Lockheed (1994-95) — which led to heavy fines and renewed the public’s sensitivity to the topic.

3. The U.S. situation had arrived at a point at which there were two alternatives: either eliminate or weaken the FCPA, or develop an international agreement. Without the latter, the FCPA could not have...


survived in the long term in the United States because U.S. companies’ complaints about the law putting them at a disadvantage could only be warded off if the American rules also applied to all major competitors. Rescinding the law, however, was the last thing that the Western allies wanted. The U.S. economy thus exerted strong pressure to prevent corrupt practices among its competitors.

4. The FCPA amendment of 1988 had made it the U.S. president’s duty to work toward an international agreement in order to eliminate the disadvantage that it allegedly subjected U.S. companies to. This put the topic at the top of the political agenda, and in 1989, the U.S. did indeed offer to develop an agreement against foreign corruption for the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). That same year, it launched the Ad Hoc Group on Illicit Payments, which worked at a remarkably slow speed, presenting its first non-binding recommendations only in 1994. Although these did not yet constitute a breakthrough, they generated momentum. Overcoming corruption became a political goal that the European Council, as well as the now forming anti-corruption lobby in civil society, embraced.34

5. Within a few years of its founding in 1993, Transparency International (TI) developed into a powerful organization, active worldwide, that put the topic on the international agenda together with church groups and development policy organizations. Despite considerable opposition, the movement gained increasing support. In Germany, for example, this came through Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker and prominent managers like Marcus Bierich (Bosch) and Richard Brandtner (KfW, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau [Reconstruction Credit Institute]). In 1998, Siemens joined TI-Germany as one of the first and most important corporate members. In the Federal Republic, political pressure was building to end tax deductions for bribe monies and, globally, to adopt a binding OECD convention.

In Germany, a first partial success was achieved in 1997, when bribery in business transactions within Germany was prohibited by the new §299 of the German criminal code. Bribing domestic civil servants had been prohibited since 1872. In 1975, this ban was extended to cover all officials. With the passage of the new section of the criminal code in 1997, bribes in domestic business transactions ceased to be tax-deductible.

In this context of increasing international pressure, the prospect of passing an OECD convention looked brighter.35 Although various

European governments, above all the Christian-Liberal coalition in Germany, repeatedly rejected suggestions for combating foreign corruption, in May 1997 sixteen European companies explicitly advocated for the criminalization of foreign corruption and the end of such bribes being tax-deductible in an open letter to the ministers of economic affairs of the OECD states. The eight German signatories included, among others, representatives of Daimler Benz, Siemens, Bosch, ABB, and Metallgesellschaft. On behalf of Siemens, the chairman of the supervisory board, Hermann Franz, signed\(^\#\) putting his company on the frontline of the anticorruption movement while the majority of German companies remained silent. Since several of these companies (Siemens, Daimler, and ABB) were confronted with accusations of massive bribes a few years later, it seems likely that they were motivated to sign the letter because they were aware of corruption within their own companies, even if they might not have known the details. Additionally, they hoped to use politics to create a level playing field where competitors would no longer be able to use bribes and where they could refrain from corrupt practices by pointing to the convention if asked for bribes. It was obvious that the legal situation was going to change and that considerable legal risks would arise, so that something needed to change in the medium term. However, a one-sided renunciation of corruption seemed too dangerous to the business side of things, so the companies put their hopes in a general shift in the landscape of global competition. Perhaps, too, they were only jumping on the bandwagon in order to be on the right side of history.

7. In December of 1997, the Anti-Bribery Convention (officially known as the “OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions”) was signed by all OECD member states. It had succeeded because of the pioneering role of the most important industrial nations — the United States above all — and because of the public pressure and the tireless lobbying efforts of TI. The convention went into effect in seemingly record-breaking time on February 15, 1999, a little over one year later, obligating the signatory states to penalize active bribery of foreign officials. It is a universally valid \textit{erga omnes} law that can also be applied to acts committed in states that did not join the convention.\(^\#\) Most of the forty-five signatory states passed corresponding laws by 2001, Germany in 1999, and the United States even as early as 1998 in the course of the Clinton administration’s tightening of the FCPA.


\(^{37}\) Passive bribery, that is, accepting bribes, is by contrast not subject to the OECD Convention. The same is true of domestic bribery, bribing political parties, candidates, and other official offices, as well as “petty corruption,” that is, small amounts paid to prompt officials to fulfill their normal duties. These undesirable practices, according to the law, are domestic issues of each respective state and usually illegal there but do not need to be subject to the prosecution of third states. See Pieth, ‘Introduction’, 19-26.
With the tightening of the law, U.S. citizens and companies could now be prosecuted for bribery abroad even if they engaged in it outside of U.S. territory and without any connection to American accounts, books, or communications services. Even more serious was the extension of American jurisdiction to foreigners. Anyone who issued securities in the United States, thus listed on U.S. stock exchanges, had already been subject to the FCPA since 1977. This was now expanded to any sort of business activity in the United States, so that even using an account, e-mail server, or other service in the U.S. established jurisdiction. This gave the U.S. agencies authority over an almost unlimited geographic area. Thus, if a German company engages in bribery in Argentina and sends an e-mail for this purpose to someone who happens to be in the United States, uses a Google account, or hands over the money in an American airport, U.S. agencies can bring charges against that company. The same is true if the company simultaneously has business dealings in the United States that have nothing at all to do with the corruption in Argentina. Due to the size and importance of the U.S. economy, almost all larger companies in the world have business ties to the United States. This definition of national jurisdiction is therefore extremely extensive from a legal standpoint, giving the United States de facto the role of policing the world. In 2000, the relevant divisions in the Department of Justice and the SEC were significantly expanded. In other words, the FCPA now acquired real teeth.

In Germany, the criminal code saw the addition of §299 and §300 in 1997, which criminalized bribery in domestic business dealings, with punishments including fines or imprisonment of up to three years or even five years in particularly serious cases (bandenmäßige Kriminalität, or organized offenses such as a gang or crime-ring would engage in). In 1998, the Christian-Liberal-dominated Bundestag ratified the OECD Convention. To implement it nationally, the Law for Combating International Bribery (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung internationaler Bestechung, IntBestG) went into effect, which equated bribing foreign officials and representatives with bribing German officials and representatives. At first, however, the Bundestag, demonstrating remarkably inconsistency, rejected the abolition of tax deductions for bribe monies used abroad. In May 1999, the EU passed an anticorruption convention. After the Bundestag elections in the fall, the majority fell to the SPD and the Green Party, at which point the tax deductions were eliminated.

In 2002, the addition of subparagraph 3 enhanced §299 of the criminal code so that bribing people in foreign private firms was also
criminalized and subject to the same punishment as corruption in domestic business transactions. With this change, the Federal Republic had achieved the same penal standards as the United States a good quarter century after the FCPA. Now that bribery was prohibited worldwide in both public and private business, a new era — with regard to corruption — began in Germany.

8. At the advent of the twenty-first century, anticorruption measures around the world were seriously strengthened. As security and surveillance systems were ramped up after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, illegal money flows were watched more closely and gradually shut down, which made it considerably more difficult to carry out bribe payments and other illegal money transfers. This affected not only border crossings with suitcases full of cash but also international bank transfers. A further step in the radical strengthening of efforts to fight corruption in the United States was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) of 2002. This federal law constituted a response to the huge accounting scandals at Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, Peregrine, and Worldcom.

Enron was the straw that broke the camel’s back and demanded a political response. Enron’s bankruptcy was one of the largest in American history, and the Enron Corporation had also symbolized an era. In less than sixteen years, it had become one of the largest U.S. companies. It used the opportunities that the deregulation drive of the 1980s had created and established truly innovative methods of futures-trading in energy. In fact, it was perceived as a shining example of American entrepreneurship in the neoliberal 1990s. In 2001, Enron’s CEO Kenneth Lay — a close friend of the Bush family — was invited by George W. Bush to become an advisor to the transition team of the incoming president. Enron partially succeeded in influencing the government’s energy policy. In the fall of 2001, it became obvious that a huge scam had happened. The revelation of artificially inflated profits and fraudulent accounting practices sent Enron shares plummeting. Lay was about to be sentenced to a long prison term in 2006 when he died during the legal proceedings.

In this and the other scandals, investors lost billions — and their trust in the financial markets. Reestablishing this trust was relevant to the entire financial system. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SAO), a bipartisan initiative, thus passed in the House of Representatives with only three opposing votes and in the Senate without any. Upon signing it into law, George W. Bush triumphantly described it as “the most far-reaching

reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The era of low standards and false profits is over; no boardroom in America is above or beyond the law.”39 Indeed, it marked a draconian intensification of the accounting guidelines and applies to American and foreign companies if they are listed on U.S. stock exchanges. The SOA considerably expanded companies’ obligations in transparency and reporting, strengthened the independence and pur-view of auditors, and protected informants, or “whistle-blowers,” within their own companies. The provision that attributed direct personal responsibility to members of relevant managing boards had the most profound effect. These managers had to sign the detailed annual report, Form 20-F, and were personally accountable for the correctness and completeness of the information it contained. CFOs and CEOs were now no longer able to hide behind their function or their firm’s legal entity, but faced the threat of individual punishments of up to $5 million and twenty years of imprisonment. Simultaneously, conditions for enforcing the law improved: the SEC’s budget doubled by 2009.40 The SOA directly affected corrupt practices since these had always led to inaccurate bookkeeping. Many top managers had panic written all over their faces in 2002. Seemingly dormant problems that had long been hidden now bubbled up to the surface. Legal departments and attorneys had a lot of work, and cases of self-reporting abounded.

Diagram 1 shows how many cases were prosecuted and reveals the dramatic shift after 2000. Whereas the Department of Justice had only pursued 36 cases between 1977

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**Diagram 1: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Cases Prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice, 1977-2011.**

- **Total Number of Cases**
- **Number of Defendants outside of the USA**
- **Number of German Defendants**


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and 2000 — in most years, only one case or none at all — between 2001 and 2011 that figure rose to 157, of which 57 cases were brought up against foreign defendants. The claim bandied about in Germany that the law was applied particularly to foreign companies had no factual basis whatsoever. There were only four cases with German defendants during the decade (Siemens AG, individual Siemens managers, Daimler, and Telekom). In the United States, cases of self-reporting abounded from 2002, and comprised about half of all the proceedings. Now, companies perceived an increased pressure to investigate corruption, so they tightened their compliance structures. The criminal sentences became much more severe. In 2006, an FCPA division was established at the FBI, and the respective divisions at the SEC and the Department of Justice were enlarged. One year before, the head of the Compliance Division of the SEC had experienced a momentous change of personnel. Young and highly motivated, Mark Mendelsohn took the top job in the division just in time to process the all-time biggest bribery case yet known in economic history: the case of the German company Siemens. In 2008, the case concluded, handing down fines of $800 million in the U.S. and an additional €596 million in Germany (2007-08). This was the highest fine for a corruption case in American and German history. From the perspective of legal history, this settlement was also groundbreaking because the SEC, the Department of Justice, and German law enforcement agencies worked together closely for the first time on a corruption case, and because a private American law firm, Debevoise & Plimpton, conducted most of the investigations. Although this is common practice in the United States, in Germany this was virgin territory and led to many critical comments from politicians and legal experts.

How high were the fines? Table 1 lists only the fines agreed upon by the SEC and the Department of Justice. Moreover, there were additional fines in other countries as well as legal cost and expenses for investigations to clarify the

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<td>1</td>
<td>Siemens</td>
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<td>KBR / Halliburton</td>
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<td>Technip S.A.</td>
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<td>Daimler AG</td>
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<td>Baker Hughes</td>
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extent of illicit payments. In the spectacular Siemens case, these expenses added up to a total of €2.5 billion — in 2013 still a world record — and show how great the risks that the compliance revolution generated really are.41 This marked a completely new dimension of risk. In comparison, one of the largest scandals in the history of the Federal Republic, in which the use of the pharmaceutical Contergan had caused several thousand babies to be born with serious birth defects that would keep them severely disabled all their lives, the drug’s producer Grünenthal was obliged to pay €51 million (100 million DM in 1970). Grünenthal voluntarily paid another €50 million in 1998.42 Of course, these two cases are in no way comparable, but the juxtaposition of the sums demonstrates impressively just how much the Compliance Revolution has escalated companies’ financial risks.

For Siemens, paying the fines — which might have been much higher had the company not cooperated with authorities — was not even the biggest risk; being barred from government contracts and an incalculable loss of reputation were much more drastic risks. In the course of the corruption crisis, Siemens’ existence became endangered. To demonstrate how seriously they took this threat and how prepared they were to make a new start, Siemens replaced virtually the entire managing board, along with 130 senior executives — an unprecedented procedure in the history of the company.43

In general, the FCPA fines from the 2000s onwards are set at a level that will be painful to the companies without destroying them. However, those who fail to cooperate with the SEC and the Department of Justice can expect much worse. For the future, we can also anticipate that the laws will be tightened even further, as the fight against corruption has been steadily gaining momentum worldwide. Corruption was a central theme of the Arab Spring; there is a strong anti-corruption movement from below in India; in Spain and Italy, discussions have started about the widespread practice of bribing politicians. The UN Convention of 2003 tightened the reins further when it went into effect in 2005. By June 2013, this Convention had been ratified by 165 states; only a few states like Sudan, North Korea, Syria, and Japan had not ratified it. Germany signed the convention in 2003 but has not yet ratified it. To do so would require strengthening and expanding §108e of the German penal code, which criminalizes the bribery of members of the Bundestag.44 Several initiatives that have attempted to do so have

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41 For details, see Klaus Moosmayer, Compliance: Praxistipps für Unternehmen, 2nd ed. (Munich, 2012), 11-32.
43 On this, see Berghoff and Rauh, “Korruption.” The authors are currently working on a book-length history of Siemens and the company’s compliance scandal.
failed in the Bundestag, most recently in June 2013. Citing concerns over the constitutionality of such legal reforms, the CDU and FDP, in particular, balk at the prospect of regulations that seek to draw a clearer dividing line between lobbying and bribery.

V. The Compliance Industry and Its Critics

Companies need to take corruption and compliance seriously. For legal experts, this is clearly the market of the future. A veritable compliance industry has come into being. Consultants, trainers, lawyers, experts, specialist journals, and blogs have all taken off. Highly specialized law firms not only advise their clients and represent them in court but also conduct research for the SEC and the Department of Justice on behalf of the companies under investigation. The companies, in turn, receive milder sentences for such forms of penitent cooperation and are willing to pay dearly for it.

Leading FCPA lawyers nowadays can earn $2 to 4.5 million a year. Typically, they come from the Department of Justice or the SEC. After a few years of serving the state and with spectacular successes as their credentials, they switch to working in these firms. The business magazine Forbes led a frontal attack on the “anti-bribery complex” in 2010. According to Forbes, this complex is essentially a conspiracy of former federal officials who first developed the state fight against corruption in order to then enrich themselves on the other side with their insider knowledge. The danger of an FCPA conviction is so threatening, Forbes claims, that the companies are prepared to pay just about any sum to protect themselves. Joseph Covington, who used to be responsible for FCPA suits at the Department of Justice and now works at the law firm Jenner & Block with 450 lawyers, uttered the following critical self-assessment of U.S. anti-corruption policies: “This is good business for law firms. This is good business for accounting firms, it’s good business for consulting firms, the media — and Justice Department lawyers who create the marketplace and then get yourself a job.” Such self-criticism is remarkable. Other lawyers in this field counter this argument with the claim that they merely charge market prices and that companies receive value in return. Their activities enable companies to save massive sums in fines, to secure the future of divisions and entire corporations with thousands of jobs, and to show firms a “path to salvation” through the jungle of legal provisions. Those working within the anti-bribery complex also point out that the transnational nature of business relations results


in highly complex questions of international law and that their work aims at showing firms a way to prevent corruption more effectively.47

A public debate about the costs and benefits of current compliance standards is certainly overdue.48 Part of the criticism comes unmistakably from groups with overt interests. The conservative U.S. Chamber of Commerce lobby, together with some (mostly Republican) lawmakers, put the topic of FCPA reform on the agenda and stigmatized the heightened pace of prosecutions as an example of the Obama administration’s hostility toward business. For this purpose, the lobbyists dusted off the old arguments of the 1970s and 1980s. However, they failed in their efforts to bring this topic into the spotlight in the election campaign of 2012. It seems unlikely that the clocks will be turned back. The fight against corruption will continue to be important, and will probably only grow more important in the future.

Another debate criticizes the fight against corruption in the West with an eye to developing countries. It is argued that in countries where bribery is perceived to be widespread, the present enforcement regime damages economic development by deterring investors and thereby implementing de facto economic sanctions. Although the FCPA and all ensuing legislation was enacted, among other things, in order to protect poor countries from the negative effects of corruption, these constitute a perverse and unintended consequence of Western anti-corruption efforts. The increasing commitment of rich countries to enforce anti-bribery measures could also pave the way for less committed countries to fill the resulting foreign direct investment void and drive down standards over all. China’s aggressive investment drive in Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia is frequently mentioned in this context. It is also undeniable that FCPA enforcement is emphatically biased against bribes paid in emerging countries, while bribes paid in the Western world are less likely to be prosecuted.49 Another somewhat ideological position in this debate is the thesis that Western anti-corruption codes are basically a form of cultural imperialism or neocolonial instruments to justify exploitation of the “south” by the “north.”50 Others comfort themselves with the idea that rising living standards and better salaries for public employees will resolve the corruption problem. This may be true for “petty corruption,” but it is doubtful that such changes would have much effect on “grand corruption,” which does not arise on account of economic and social hardship.51 While these arguments are exaggerated,

47 Author’s interview with a partner in a large law firm specializing in FCPA and White Collar Crime Litigation, Washington, DC, June 15, 2012.


49 This summarizes the position of Spalding, “Sanctions.”


they are nonetheless worth considering because we do not know much about the effects of anti-corruption policies in practice. The debate will go on and open up a new and fascinating research field for historians and social scientists alike, as this field has thus far received little attention beyond legal studies.

Conclusion
Since the 1970s, foreign corruption has been transformed from a minor infraction, more precisely a bookkeeping infraction, to a criminal offense with serious legal consequences. With the FCPA, the United States took a unilateral step, above all in order to combat anti-capitalist tendencies at home as well as anti-American resentments around the world. The law marked a reaction to the indescribable abuses which surfaced in this context. The end of the Cold War and the change in administration of 1993 spurred the internationalization of the FCPA. Whereas the Republican administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush had sought to weaken the law, the Clinton administration sought to universalize it. The main argument was that the one-sided disadvantage it brought to U.S. companies had to be eliminated. One can spend a lot of time speculating about whether the law was really so restrictive since so few prosecutions were actually opened. In the 1990s, the combined pressure of U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. economy managed to make the fight against corruption a matter for the international community. In practice, U.S. authorities received *de facto* an almost unlimited jurisdiction. Other push factors included a rather improbable alliance of effective initiatives from civil society, above all from the anti-capitalist camp. Finally, a certain momentum was generated on the stage of international organizations that made it impossible to go in reverse. In addition, a change in attitude was underway that made many averse to the dirty practice of corruption and its damaging effects. This was even true of some of those who actively engaged in it. They articulated the desire to be able to deflect the demands of corrupt governments with the help of strict, universal sets of rules. Despite all these advances, corruption is by no means extinct today. Combating it continues to be a high political priority. No large company can now afford to underestimate this sensitive topic.

Translated by Patricia C. Sutcliffe

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PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE GERMAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 1919-1933

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UNIVERSITY OF BIELEFELD

The Prohibition era denotes the thirteen years of National Prohibition in effect from January 16, 1920 to December 5, 1933. During this time, alcohol was banned by the Eighteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This amendment, approved by the United States Congress on December 18, 1917, declared the manufacturing, transportation, and sale — but not the consumption — of “intoxicating liquors,” that is, alcoholic beverages, illegal. The obligatory ratification of the amendment by three-fourths of the 48 states proceeded with unprecedented rapidity and concluded on January 16, 1919, with the vote of the Nebraska legislature. Prohibition was to commence one year later. In order to make Prohibition enforceable by the executive branch of government, Congress passed a statutory law, the National Prohibition Act, called the Volstead Act after the Minnesota congressman who had drafted it. It was passed on October 28, 1919, overriding President Wilson’s veto. The law specified the content of ethanol by volume that made a drink “intoxicating” to be 0.5 percent — the least taxable amount as defined by the Internal Revenue Service in collaboration with the liquor industry, long before 0.5 percent (one proof) meant “bone dry”; this explicitly included lighter beers and wines in the gallery of outlawed refreshments.

National Prohibition in the United States was a daring venture in social engineering by a constitutional legislature. This “great social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far-reaching in purpose,” as Herbert C. Hoover would famously canonize it in 1928, was singular not only in United States but in world history.1 Equally unprecedented was the fact that the Eighteenth Amendment would be repealed in 1933 — the only time that a part of the United States Constitution has been revoked. After the landslide victory of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the presidential election of November 1932, it was the old, lame-duck Congress that put together the two-thirds vote necessary to adopt the Twenty-first Amendment, whose only purpose was to declare the Eighteenth Amendment void and give complete authority over liquor regulation back to the states. The Twenty-first Amendment was passed on February 20, 1933, and sent on its ratification journey through the states. It beat its predecessor by four

1 Hoover campaign speech, August 11, 1928, quoted in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Herbert Hoover, 1929 (Washington, D.C., 1974), 511.
months when Utah became the thirty-sixth state to consent to the Twenty-first Amendment on December 5, 1933. The Amendment went into effect immediately and National Prohibition was history.

I. German Beer Culture, German Resistance against Prohibition, and Wartime Defeat

World War I and ambient anti-German hysteria played into the hands of the political organizations that advocated for Prohibition, most prominently the Anti-Saloon League (ASL) and the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). The beer brewing industry in the United States had long been identified with the industrious German immigrant community, which had succeeded so well as a whole in the United States. Eberhard Anheuser of Anheuser-Busch in St. Louis, for example, came from Bad Kreuznach in the Palatinate; his business associate and son-in-law Adolphus Busch was from Hesse. Their enterprise first flourished under the name of Bavarian Brewery, a gesture that put German folklore to use for marketing purposes, as did the even more elaborate undertakings of Pabst, Miller, and Schlitz of Milwaukee, who founded hotel chains and resorts all over the country, set up German-style beer gardens in places like New York City, sponsored theatres and movie houses, and eventually left a highly visible German imprint on not only Milwaukee but other Midwestern centers. Joseph Schlitz, son of a Mainz-born cellerman, took over the enterprise of his former employer, whose widow he married, and led the brewery to the leading position worldwide by 1902. Michael Sieben, also from Mainz, founded the Sieben Brewery in Chicago in 1865, which later earned infamy as a wildcat establishment in the illicit

Pabst Park Beer Garden, 1900.
beer market in the 1920s when it was owned by a conglomerate of formerly well-renowned brewers and gangsters such as John Torrio, then the criminal overlord of the Windy City. In 1914, almost 1,400 breweries with a capital of $800 million dollars ($18 billion in 2010 dollars) directly employed 88,000 people and another 300,000 people in dependent branches.

German-led breweries soon expanded their lager trade and invaded the established saloon culture, which had been shaped by the English and Irish tradition of patrons drinking both beer and hard liquor while standing alongside a long bar in an all-male environment. However, they also set up German-style beer gardens and other entertainment facilities in an attempt to import and spread a different kind of beer culture in the United States. Unlike saloons, beer gardens — in most cases not gardens proper but large beer halls — were commodious and well-lit, sometimes with folksy artwork on whitewashed walls and unsoiled sand rather than soggy sawdust on the floor. Patrons sat at long tables and enjoyed lager beer almost exclusively along with a hearty meal. Beer garden halls were family affairs, and even all-male drinking parties appeared to first-time visitors as remarkably calm. The largest beer gardens included shooting galleries and bowling alleys and often featured a wide variety of live music performances ranging from German folk music to classical pieces. Beer gardens were not without the occasional brawl among drunken patrons, but these incidents seem to have occurred more sparingly than in the saloon, and often later in the evening when families were less likely to be present.

On the eve of Prohibition, brewery interests owned or controlled more than 80 percent of all saloons in the United States. Since the last third of the nineteenth century a cutthroat competition had begun in the strongly expanding brewery trade. In 1907 more than forty enterprises in Chicago alone ran fifty production sites. The large and highly capitalized breweries in the more agricultural Midwest, which were located in medium-sized cities such as Milwaukee or St. Louis, including well-known brands like Miller, Pabst, Schlitz, and Anheuser-Busch, had long exceeded the capacity of their thirsty local immigrant clientele. To utilize economies of scale they were forced to attempt to create and conquer a national market by means of aggressive marketing strategies. A full third of the capital invested in this overcapitalized industry did not produce any dividends. Even if their


short-sighted business policy succeeded in increasing their sales, the breweries accepted consequences that were fatal in the long run. Falling prices had to be balanced by growing production. Under these circumstances the brewery owners accepted “every means to violently increase sales.” The most important tool for this was the extension of the saloon network. This meant lavishly outfitting saloons that sold their product with advertisements in a distinct corporate design and lots of merchandising. In most cases this established a dependency of the saloons on the breweries. In order to pump ever more beer into a hopelessly saturated market, the breweries attempted to sweep into additional territory by taking over or founding new bars and saloons. Medium-sized breweries in larger metropolises such as Chicago or New York City retaliated by formally binding saloons to the exclusive sale of their product in order to shield them against the invasion of their Milwaukee and St. Louis competitors. These “tied houses,” as they became known, were not managed with the goal of long-term survival but rather to block competitors from gaining a toehold in a neighborhood.

The brewery owners long denied their responsibility for the crisis of the “old-time saloon,” which had become a topic of concern for muckraking journalists and a host of reform publications. It did not help their cause that they defended themselves in a heavy-handed and cumbersome way — such as opposing female suffrage as a threat to their business — and usually made their case most aggressively in German-language media rather than engaging with English-language publications. Their cultural activities and beer garden culture, while actually signifying a specific model of successful Americanization, became stigmatized as subversive attempts to undermine American identity.

When Pabst, Schlitz, and Miller marketed beer gardens as a family-friendly role model for an alternative drinking culture, sponsored cultural activities on a large scale, and advertised their lager beer as a “healthy” drink compared with other alcoholic beverages, especially with hard liquor, they were attempting to infuse their American environment with a distinct German spirit. This is not to say that they carved out an ethnic niche for an autonomous German subculture; their ambition seems to have been to improve mainstream American culture, which they fully embraced, by introducing elements of German tradition. This led to a cultural clash with both Progressive reformers for whom Americanism had to be “100-percent pure” and


7 See, for example, Richard O’Connor, The German-Americans (Boston, 1968), 361–362.
with the temperance movement that adapted the Progressive viewpoint to argue that prohibiting beer consumption was the central necessity in order to achieve a “100-percent pure” American culture.

II. The Ascent and Eventual Triumph of the Prohibition Movement

The American temperance movement originated in the revivals of the Second Great Awakening during the 1820s and 1830s and had maintained a strong hold on evangelical Christian communities throughout the nineteenth century. Temperance in the United States very soon came to mean total abstinence. Rather than tolerating the German-American culture of convivial beer gardens, temperance crusaders argued that drinking culture not only failed to create lasting bonds but, indeed, deepened social cleavages instead of bridging them. That the United States might degenerate into an “alcoholic republic” constituted a major problem the Christian crusaders attacked as inextricably entwined with social disintegration.8

The religious temperance movement also became a cradle of the feminist movement. From its beginnings as a strictly conservative and spiritual mechanism for women to gather together for socially-sanctioned activism, it quickly turned into an amalgamation of women complete with all the assets and traits of a forceful social movement. The temperance movement was a vehicle for women to gain access to the political sphere, and modern interpretations read its radical policies — such as Carry A. Nation’s dramatic campaigns of single-handedly smashing saloon interiors and intimidating saloonkeepers — as a conservative proxy for direct discussion of traditional gender relations. This development was epitomized by the formation of the national Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in 1874, which supplanted the dramatic figure of Carry A. Nation with polished female proto-politicians who gained experience in public speaking from addressing church events. Despite representing a very conservative conception of womanhood and placing family values above all else, the WCTU was one of the most vital forces behind the mounting pressure for the enfranchisement of women. This was accomplished in 1920 when the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted, establishing women’s suffrage. The support of male temperance forces for female suffrage was built on the presumption that all American women would speak with one voice and stand firmly behind the fight against alcohol and the saloon. The

Nineteenth Amendment, spokeswomen of the movement declared, would ensure that the Eighteenth Amendment would remain in force eternally. By 1920, the WCTU was the strongest female organization in the world, with many international ties and membership topping a million people.

Meanwhile, upon the initiative of Republican Party operatives, the Anti-Saloon League (ASL) was established under male leadership and by 1895 it was a nationwide organization. It quickly shed its partisan origins and became one of the first single-issue organizations in history. The Anti-Saloon League declared the prohibition of alcohol and the legal ban of the saloon its only political goals. In order to pursue these goals as a nonpartisan organization, the ASL developed a two-fold strategy. First, it reached out to the thousands of evangelical church communities in the country, provided them with skilled and entertaining speakers, knit together a close network of sympathetic ministers, and thus sparked community life toward a common purpose: the fight against alcohol. The ASL paid for expenses such as setting up meeting halls, which in many cases helped build up a community life from scratch. These investments proved profitable, however, since the ASL raked in large sums by inviting members to pledge by way of pre-printed checks in pre-addressed envelopes when one of the ASL’s famed orators visited. This financial grassroots support made up about 80 percent of the material strength of the ASL, although there were certainly some large donors, such as John D. Rockefeller, who was said to have donated $5,000 in 1918 (or $72,400 in 2010 dollars) after attending an ASL event.9

Second, the ASL utilized these lavish funds to support “friendly” political candidates or to oppose adversaries in elections. The long-term success of its policies was anchored in the ASL’s bipartisan approach. The ASL was not picky as to principles: candidates it supported did not have to be “dry personally” as long as they pledged to vote along its lines.10 In this way, many political careers were made, as well as small fortunes, since the ASL would send hopeful candidates on speaking tours before evangelical audiences to polish their rhetorical skills. Political veterans able to draw big and munificent crowds were awarded up to $50,000 per annum during the critical years of 1919–1920 (or $544,000 in 2010 dollars). The self-made man and small-town lawyer Wayne B. Wheeler, officially only the ASL’s legal counsel — until 1916 when he became general secretary — established the organization’s headquarters in Washington, D.C., from which

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10 Thomas Welskopf, Amerikas große Ernüchterung: Eine Kulturgeschichte der Prohibition (Paderborn, 2010), 408.
he lobbied on the ASL’s behalf and controlled the voting behavior of the congressmen and senators who were on the ASL’s payroll. T. Justin Steuart, Wheeler’s personal publicity representative, who broke with him and then became his unauthorized biographer, wrote that Wheeler “controlled six Congresses, dictated to two Presidents of the United States, directed legislation for the most important elective state and federal offices, held the balance of power in both Republican and Democratic parties, distributed more patronage than any other dozen men, supervised a federal bureau from outside without official authority, and was recognized by friend and foe alike as the most masterful and powerful single individual in the United States.” Individual chapters of the ASL, often studded with members of local elites, likewise monitored elected and appointed officials to ensure they abided by the pledges they had given to support the ASL’s agenda.

Strategically, the ASL followed a cumulative procedure, pursuing local options or the demarcation of alcohol-free zones around churches, schools, or more exclusive residential quarters on the local level, then building up to county- and state-level prohibition. By 1919, thirty-two states had enacted some form of prohibition statute and another fourteen had consented to local options; of the 2,543 counties in the nation, only 305 had not yet declared themselves “dry,” as protagonists of the movement habitually noted in public speeches. But numbers alone were misleading: in 1917, only eighteen U.S. states produced beer, but they contained 59 percent of the nation’s total population. The citizens in these states tended to be clustered in big cities with lively drinking cultures and were unwilling to surrender their right to drink to the demands of religious zealots whose base was the rural and small-town Midwest.

When they became the main target of the ASL’s attack, the brewers started a belated and doomed attempt to publicly disassociate themselves from the producers of hard liquor. Instead they became more and more identified with the “evil” liquor interests in the public eye. The United States Brewers’ Association’s work with the National German-American Alliance, a political wing of the German immigrant community which spent the first three years of World War I advocating for American neutrality, finally cast the brewers as traitors in the ASL’s propaganda. Wheeler managed to have Congressional hearings on their activities initiated and published unofficial reports about their alleged findings. The popular

12 Welskopp, Amerikas große Ernüchterung, 59.
wellness guru J.H. Kellogg paid for a full-page advertisement attacking brewers in the New York Times on November 3, 1918, with a slogan declaring: “Booze is the worst non-essential — Stop it!” and repeating David Lloyd George’s declaration that “We are fighting three enemies — Germany, Austria, and Drink.”

Although the Busch family donated $500,000 to the U.S. war effort in 1917 ($8.5 million in 2010 dollars) and a consortium of Milwaukee brewers subscribed to $2 million dollars’ worth of war bonds ($34 million in 2010 dollars), the conflation of liquor interests, Germanness, and acting as the “fifth column” of the Kaiser marked the final breakthrough for pro-prohibition sentiment. The Prohibition Amendment was adopted by a two-thirds majority in both parties, with northern Republicans and southern Democrats its strongest supporters.

It is not true that Americans never drank during the more than thirteen years of National Prohibition. Nor were these years a great endless party as nostalgic folklore would have it. On average, from 1920 to 1933, alcohol consumption in the United States — as measured in 100 proof per capita — dropped by about a third. Whether this decline was really caused by the constitutional ban is still open to debate. The first years of Prohibition, up to 1922, witnessed an all-time low in consumption never experienced again, but this may have been the late effect of wartime prohibition and its precursors, which denied the alcohol industry foodstuffs such as grain or sugar as resources for its manufacture. The illicit alcohol business did not reach notable dimensions until 1924, after which it rapidly expanded and almost reached prewar levels around 1928 and 1929. The introduction of National Prohibition meant a considerable annihilation of capital for both alcohol producers and, most of all, the distribution system of bars and restaurants.

In the industrial sector, breweries were more affected than distilleries. Prohibition hit the brewing industry in the midst of a process of rapid concentration. In 1918, 1,100 of the 1,400 breweries active in 1914 were still producing. The total market value of Anheuser-Busch, for example, fell from $50 million on the eve of Prohibition to $20 million by 1930 (or from $544 million to $261 million measured in 2010 dollars). Pabst Brewery in Milwaukee also saw its capitalized value drop by two-thirds. But this money was not directed into other sectors of the economy. Indeed, a 1932 study found that while the amount of alcohol consumed dropped, the amount of money spent on alcohol

14 Daniel Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition (New York, 2010), 102–103.
was roughly the same as if Prohibition were not in effect. Instead, the illegal black market took over from the preexisting industrial distribution network — with the further benefit of not paying the excise taxes that had been levied on alcohol consumption.

The rather sluggish build-up of the alcohol shadow economy points to the fact that markets only thrive when there is well-funded demand. We lack precise data but there cannot be any doubt that large sections of the nation — especially rural parts of the Midwest, Pacific Northwest, and Southwest — truly were “dry,” at least as far as the black market was concerned. Bootlegging, as well as the illicit production of alcohol, developed first and foremost in the urban metropolises of the nation, with the cities on the East Coast, Chicago and Detroit, New Orleans and (at a far smaller level) San Francisco blazing the trail. Alcohol consumption would have surpassed prewar levels in 1930 had it not been for the onset of the Great Depression. Instead, illegal sales dropped sharply without experiencing a real recovery before Prohibition was repealed in 1933.

This might give credence to the argument that, after all, relative prices exert a more powerful influence on any market than legal restrictions can. In this sense, it is no surprise that Prohibition aggravated social inequality. The young and modern members of the urban middle classes experienced the frisson of illegal drinking as a kind of emotional liberation. These middle-class Americans drank the same amount of “pure” alcohol they would have under legal conditions, but they could afford — and were willing to pay — “an extra billion a year” in costs incident to the system of illegal procurement and distribution. If the measure was — in the eyes of the prohibitionists — successful at all, it was because it kept the working class and the poorer elements of society from drinking. Working-class consumption dropped by half, thanks to the drop in the beer supply and the prohibitive prices for spirits offered in the illicit establishments that clustered in working-class or “disreputable” quarters.

Beer production slowly but steadily increased after the shock of interdiction. But the black market for alcohol had hard liquor as its staple — not beer or wine. The reason for this was simply that distilled spirits were a much more suitable product for smuggling or illicit manufacture. It was compact by volume and had a high content of the outlawed ingredient per unit. Spirits were rather simple to produce,
particularly after 1924 when the shadow economy could process corn sugar as the sole precursor for all of the items of its portfolio — be it whiskey, rum, or gin, the most widespread and popular liquor of the time. Corn sugar became the base substance for the fabrication of “neutral” or “pure” industrial alcohol and was produced in ever larger quantities as legitimate demand, especially by the automobile and the chemical industries, expanded tenfold and more during the 1920s. The pattern of alcohol consumption among Americans changed dramatically under Prohibition. Before 1914, immigration and a more elaborate taste for gourmet gastronomy had turned the United States into a nation of beer drinkers and, increasingly, wine connoisseurs, with beer and wine making up about 80 percent of the pure alcohol by volume consumed per capita. National Prohibition completely reversed these proportions: “The drinking of hard liquor has increased until the country has lost its taste for good beer and wine,” one anti-Prohibition activist lamented.18 Spirits promised “quicker action” and a more thorough “kick” than beer or wine — qualities prized highly by drinkers paying high prices for a glass of dubious substances in speakeasies or night clubs. To get visibly drunk became an admirable trait for a gentleman, who showed that he was able to afford such debaucheries, or for teenage boys as a signal of their passage into manhood. Drinking, one magazine writer argued, was “calculated to evoke in its practitioners their baser and more violent parts.”19

Although Prohibition folklore, both in literature and the movies, highlights and romanticizes smuggling and rum-running, its actual significance for the amount of illegal alcohol consumed in the United States was surprisingly low. Smuggled spirits never accounted for more than 2 percent of consumption. The diversion of industrial alcohol to human consumption likewise never constituted more than up to 8 percent of what made it to the market as a beverage, except for 1921 when the slow start of “moonshine” production made its share slightly more than 20 percent. Denatured industrial alcohol — alcohol made unfit for drinking by adding obnoxious substances such as kerosene, nicotine or, much more dangerously, wood alcohol — only served as a surrogate when the “moonshine” supply ran momentarily low. Scandalous rumors about epidemics of wood alcohol poisonings or the murderous role of the Bureau of Prohibition in purposefully poisoning poor gin guzzlers did not have any solid factual basis.

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In a similar vein, “medicinal alcohol” was a profitable side business for doctors and drugstore owners only in the very first years of Prohibition. American whiskey producers were required to place their existing inventory in bonded government warehouses at the onset of Prohibition, but withdrawals were permissible if whiskey was prescribed for medical purposes. But this never accounted for more than one percent of all sales, and restrictions were tightened after the George Remus scandal in the early 1920s. Remus, a first-generation German-American business lawyer and a licensed pharmacist, set up a (mostly bogus) chain of drugstores based in Cincinnati. This allowed him to sell liquor legally to medical doctors upon prescription. In turn, he was authorized to withdraw whiskey from the warehouses because he had acquired shares in the distilleries that had deposited their whiskey there. By using a loophole in the law, Remus thus managed to bring the otherwise immobilized pool of good spirits into circulation — for his own profits. These profits grew even more when Remus had his own delivery trucks hijacked and the cargo diverted to big bootleggers, thus eliminating sales taxes. Remus was sentenced to a short prison term, however, when his organization grew too big to be covered up by bribes.20

The Remus case illustrates the limits of “freelancers” in the illicit trades without the network relations the big-city organized crime gangs could mobilize once they established the shadow economy under their own control. It also points to the fact that, with rare exceptions such as Remus and Dutch Schultz, German-Americans played barely any role in organized crime, most likely because they had been too successful in blending into the American mainstream.21 Finally, the idea that “sacramental wine” converted a considerable number of Irish redheads into Jewish rabbis belongs in the realm of urban legends.22

The bulk of distilled spirits was produced in a myriad of establishments ranging from the congested one-room apartments of Italian immigrants in Chicago’s notorious Little Sicily to medium-sized

20 Okrent, Last Call, 198–99.
22 Welskopp, Amerikas große Ernüchterung, 158.
plants with licenses to manufacture industrial alcohol but which never actually delivered their product to denaturing sites. Production became much easier once corn sugar became available in large quantities from specialized refineries. Almost the entire trade then switched to fabricating synthetic spirits — that is, colorless, neutral, 100-proof alcohol — and turning this into the desired product by adding colorants and aromatic flavorings. This went hand-in-hand with a concentration of production in small-scale manufacturing facilities camouflaged as gas stations, chemical plants, or soft drink drumming stations.

The growth of the alcohol shadow economy to truly industrial dimensions depended on legal businesses providing it with the essential precursors. This was especially true for beer producers. By 1923, there were 662 American breweries active — half the number of five years earlier — who had switched their plants to the production of a drink that legally contained up to 0.5 percent alcohol, went under the official name of “cereal beverage,” and was sold under the trademark of “near beer.” This name was an insult to any beer lover. “Near beer” was produced by extracting the alcohol from conventionally brewed beer through a boiling process of several hours. The problem of this production method was that in the course of long heating, not only the alcohol but the “aromatic substance” was removed and the beer became “an almost unpotable kind of lemonade.” Even the refinement of production methods could not reverse the widespread rejection of the drink. In 1920 9.2 million barrels of “near beer” were produced; by 1928 those numbers had fallen to 4.2 million barrels — a far cry from the 60.3 million barrels of conventional beer produced in 1918.23

The surviving brewery owners quickly adopted a strategy of using their established facilities and production methods to test the limits of the law. A move towards illegal production was impossible for big, well-known enterprises such as Anheuser-Busch, Miller or Pabst. But they could supply bootleggers with legal intermediate products for their illegal activities, thus becoming tacit accomplices of the black economy. This production rather than the sale of “near beer” became their actual economic basis. By 1926, for example, Anheuser-Busch was producing “hops-flavored malt essence,” and in 1930 its plants processed the same amount of malt as they had before the ban on alcohol. In the 1920s the company also built new factories for producing corn sugar, glucose, and yeast — intermediate products for

23 Schmölders, Prohibition, 224–25.
winemaking and illegal distilling. The shift of the big legal breweries towards this type of production, and its increasing scale after the mid-1920s, correlated conspicuously with the speed and scale at which the black economy reconstituted the beer market that had collapsed at the beginning of the 1920s.

Meanwhile smaller, unknown companies, which under ordinary circumstances would have been marginal suppliers, such as the Sieben Brewery in Chicago, were often bought up by gangsters. Under cover of producing “near beer,” they would instead clandestinely ship barrels of fully-brewed beer. At any step of the production process, considerable amounts of beer could be withdrawn from the legal process and fed into illegal channels. An alternative method was to reincorporate the previously extracted alcohol after officials had certified “near beer” as alcohol-free, a practice called “shooting.” The courts tried to remedy this situation by generally banning the storage of real beer “in bottles and barrels” on the premises of a brewery without permission. Thus, finding “high-power” beer ready for delivery was the “smoking gun” for Prohibition authorities, providing evidence for a breach of the law. However, the politically savvy “shooters” were seldom caught because usually they shipped fully-brewed beer as quickly as possible.24

III. The Mechanics of the Bootleg Economy and the Role of Organized Crime

Given that smuggled alcohol accounted for only a miniscule proportion of illegal liquor consumed in the United States during Prohibition, the question must be asked why bootleggers engaged in this sophisticated and risky business at all — at least after notable production capacities for “moonshine” had been set up domestically. Smuggling was an elaborate and bloody business. It helped to nurture a Canadian distilled-spirits industry whose products were smuggled across the Detroit River between Michigan and Ontario. Meanwhile, the nickname “Rum Row” developed to describe the long stretch of waters along the northeastern seaboard where ships anchored with cargoes of barrels and cases of liquor, mostly from Canada, but also including product from Europe and later Cuba and the Bahamas. New York criminal syndicates even chartered their own ships for trips to and from Great Britain, until they were, according to Meyer Lansky, “running the most efficient international shipping business in the world.”25 Small speedboats traveled out by night, beyond the


25 Quoted in Okrent, Last Call, 170.
jurisdiction of the Coast Guard, to transfer the contraband from the large ships, which was then transported by trucks to the metropolitan centers of the alcohol shadow economy. Armed conflicts between bootleggers and U.S. Customs (and Prohibition) agents on the Canadian border and between “rumrunners” and the U.S. Coast Guard on the East Coast, as well as hijackings by rival gangs, produced large numbers of casualties. The situation escalated into an actual arms race as the Coast Guard’s fleet was updated with World War I navy destroyers while the bootleggers made use of state-of-the-art boat-racing technology.

The smuggled stuff never reached the glasses of even the most affluent customers in an undiluted form, even though much of it was marketed as “right off the boat” and priced accordingly. “Good whiskey to-day is used more as an essence than as a beverage,” one magazine writer explained, used to add aroma to otherwise dull “moonshine.”

This points precisely to the economic logic that sustained smuggling. In a non-transparent market, the activities of “rumrunners” were widely publicized by the authorities, including their alleged successes in chasing them down. Such accounts deluded drinkers into believing that large if unquantified amounts of good stuff “right off the boat” could be found for the right price, allowing suppliers to charge exorbitant prices. Economist Clark Warburton calculated that the volume of illegal spirits sold at “import” prices was about ten times higher than what actually crossed the American borders. In truth, almost all “imported” liquor was diluted, or else domestic product sold in forged bottles with counterfeit labels from famous European or Canadian brands.

This worked because distribution and sales in the shadow economy were organized into territorial monopolies that quickly became controlled by crime syndicates. The shadow economy of alcohol irrigated a popular party culture which had become the pastime of the young urban business classes not long before the war. This culture revolved around public amenities such as the movies, theatres, spectator sports (particularly boxing), cabarets, revues, and night clubs, with jazz as the soundtrack of the era. Illicit alcohol deeply imprinted its rough quality on these new forms of sociability. As prohibitionists and the more sober celebrity writers lamented, social life was virtually mesmerized by discussion of all forms of psychoactive liquids. The culture of drinking to get drunk as quickly — and as visibly — as possible spilled over from youth culture into big-city Bohemian

26 Cort, “Mother Volstead’s Chickens,” 92.
27 Welskopp, Amerikas große Ernüchterung, 150–52.
communities. Most drinking took place in speakeasies, clandestine joints that operated under the protection of organized crime gangs and were usually shielded from police interference by bribes. Nevertheless the threat of a raid that would smash up the interior meant proprietors did not care to invest into lavish décor, and most customers did not take their time to be seated but lined up at the long bar, foot on the brass rail, and downed their drinks hastily while other patrons waited impatiently behind them. The growing harshness of the trade had swept away all remnants of German-style beer garden culture by the late 1920s. The conditions of illicit drinking for effect under the surveillance of the underworld had spread everywhere, as F. Scott Fitzgerald observed in his melancholy reminiscences of 1920s New York City speakeasies, “where one was eyed by granite-faced boys and there was nothing left of joviality but only a brutishness that corrupted the new day into which one presently went out.”

National Prohibition made it inevitable that organized criminals would assume control of the illicit alcohol trade — and easy for them to do so. Gangsters first “muscled in” to wholesale traffic by hijacking transports of contraband, often killing the accompanying personnel in the move. They then offered “protection” services for the injured parties — as an insurance against a risk they themselves embodied. Most crucial, however, they had at their command youth branches of “street-corner gangs” to defend their territory with deadly violence. They also cultivated friendly relations with politicians at the municipal and state levels, and with legal officials such as sheriffs and judges. In several instances gangsters and politicians had grown up together as buddies in the same immigrant quarters of the big cities, and so a lifelong friendship, bolstered by reciprocal services and stalwart loyalties, stabilized the syndicates’ control over territory.

Within their territories, the syndicates exercised exclusive control over the marketing of their products, by force if necessary. Competition, therefore, was not decided by relative prices but by rounding off one’s turf, often violently. The “portfolio” approach enabled the entrepreneurial gangster to juggle a wide spectrum of different prices for allegedly very different products and qualities, disguising the fact that all the items were grossly overpriced and most of them only shams of high-quality liquor. The habitual drinker personifying “perfectly inelastic demand” would swallow dirty “bathtub gin” made on the roof of a tenement building for a dollar a pint while the affluent night club flâneur might order a fifty-dollar bottle of French vin de table.


29 For a Chicago example, see Welskopp, Amerikas große Ernüchterung, 373–375; these relationships were also found in many other cities from Boston to Baltimore and from Pittsburgh to St. Louis.
champagne “right off the boat,” which was actually fermented grape juice aerated with carbon dioxide and siphoned into fancy bottles in the backroom of a Chinese laundry right around the corner.\textsuperscript{30} Coupled with the exclusive control of territory, this meant that the sale of illegal alcohol in non-transparent monopoly markets was not an entrepreneurial but a rent-seeking activity.\textsuperscript{31}

The distribution of beer in particular was profitable only on the basis of territorial monopolies, and accordingly only in the “wet” big cities, where the gangs had established their strongest structures, was there a supply of “real” beer. Beer was most unsuitable for smuggling: per unit it contained too little of the demanded illegal substance to balance the risks; the production process was sophisticated and conspicuous; and sales were profitable only in huge amounts because the profit margin per sales unit was low, despite the tenfold rise in beer prices under Prohibition. Thus it caused considerable overhead expenses which could only be recouped by mass distribution. Accordingly, the syndicates used their territorial power to ram their beer barrels into the cellars of speakeasy owners, just as the breweries had done to the saloons before Prohibition.

At the local level, then, criminal syndicates had to use violence both to enforce effective control of their territory and to secure sales. The competition for distribution at the borders of different syndicates’ spheres of influence produced particularly bloody conflicts like the Chicago “beer wars” that raged between 1925 and 1929. Although the big New York syndicate, under Meyer Lansky, “Lucky” Luciano, and John Torrio, was more successful than Al Capone in establishing territorial superiority over the city, the metropolis proved too vast for the monopoly of a single organization. In the course of the New York gang wars of the 1920s, more than 1,000 gangsters were killed.\textsuperscript{32}

The shadow economy during National Prohibition was larger than the criminal syndicates, however. Thousands upon thousands of individuals, like George Remus, entered this lucrative if illegal business as “civilian” outsiders. Even when organized crime took over control of the trade, most of the executive and professional functions and all of the menial work were performed by “freelancers” and employees outside the ranks of the gangs and syndicates. Speakeasies and nightclubs were run by professional managers who might pay fees as high as sixty percent of sales to the mob that controlled the local territory. There was no question that they had to sell the products of their superiors exclusively — or else. The main economic goal for


organized crime was to get control over the production and distribution system of the alcohol shadow economy but not to manage its day-to-day operations. Prohibition caused a financial tsunami that made the gangs much more lethal because the new revenues provided the means to buy handheld firearms instead of batons and blackjacks and later submachine (“Tommy”) guns, shotguns and fast automobiles. But the bootleg business also provided a generous income stream that could be used to diversify into other criminal activities. During the 1920s, networks of gangsters even developed partnerships to pursue specific projects beyond their respective territories. The narcotics market boomed, fired up by unused World War I supplies of morphine and followed by the spread of stylish elite drugs such as cocaine and heroin. Gambling and prostitution thrived as never before, and burglary, larceny and kidnapping were all elevated to a new kind of art. In the late 1920s, the labor racket became established and would turn out to be the most lucrative business of organized crime in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s.

IV. Mission Impossible: Prohibition Enforcement

The Volstead Act was designed to punish rather than educate. This absolutist approach to Prohibition was problematic, as the Eighteenth Amendment decreed that “Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Debates about the meaning of the “concurrent” clause accompanied Prohibition to its very end. In practice, it created two legal consequences that spurred increasing animosity against the Eighteenth Amendment: first, the states were forced to adopt prohibition codes of their own which could not be “softer” than the Volstead Act (and might be considerably tougher). Second, the states did not necessarily have to cooperate with federal agencies in enforcement activities, but could not prevent interventions by these agencies on their territory, much like nations occupied by a foreign military force. A wide spectrum opened up between those states that continued harsh regulations from pre-Prohibition times or adopted rigid new laws and those that obstructed the amendment. Most states pointed to the “concurrent power” clause when charged with a lack of cooperation in day-to-day enforcement on the state level, and even the driest states preferred to shift responsibility to the federal agencies and shied away from the potential expense of a state liquor police. This does not mean that in militantly prohibitionist states the ban on alcohol was not enforced, but it fell to


local police, drawing on city ordinances as much as on the state and federal laws. This, in turn, produced a rancorous form of enforcement often imbued with longstanding ethnic or racist resentments.

To tackle the main task of federal enforcement, the government first established a modest Prohibition Unit within the Bureau of Internal Revenue, subsequently transferred to the Department of Justice in 1930. Originally this unit was conceived as a propagandist and coordinating force whose activities were supposed to focus on cooperation between state and local enforcement authorities. Since such cooperation was almost non-existent, the Bureau of Prohibition fell back on ordinary police work. This was an impossible undertaking, given that the number of active agents in the field never exceeded roughly 2,800 for the whole of the United States. Since pay was lousy and the positions were exempt from civil service provisions, the bureau attracted political protégés, odd jobbers, and entrepreneurial minds eager to exploit the abundant opportunities for bribery. The unit soon earned a reputation for ignorance and incompetence. Its regional offices repeatedly raided establishments that the local police had ignored, and quickly brought the federal courts to a standstill by flooding them with mostly minor cases. Yet enforcement of this kind remained erratic, imbalanced, biased, disproportionate, and unsustainable. Ill-trained and badly equipped, Prohibition agents lacked adequate procedures and clear objectives for their performance. Soon the public grew outraged by agents’ “too free use of firearms.”

Public antipathy for the agency and its scandals contributed much to the turn of sentiment against Prohibition after 1928. When the Hearst newspaper empire switched sides in 1929 and aligned with the anti-Prohibitionists, gloomy cartoons by Winsor McKay and editorials by William Randolph Hearst himself charged the Prohibition agents with the murder of more than 1,360 innocent bystanders.

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V. The Swing towards Repeal

Criticism of Prohibition gathered momentum slowly, first in the form of concerned citizens noting the painful shortcomings of enforcement with the goal of remediation rather than repudiation. In the mid-1920s, more satirical treatment of Prohibition issues gained ground, especially in the sophisticated East Coast magazines that aspired to entertain readers who were most likely mingling in the subterranean drinking culture. The accumulation of scandals and stories about the institutions and habits, that developed both to enforce Prohibition and in spite of it, became a topic of media and public obsession. “In every social gathering of any kind … one subject recurs time after time and is of universal interest: Prohibition,” lamented Mabel Walker Willebrandt, assistant attorney general responsible for the legal handling of Prohibition until 1929. “No political, economic or moral issue has so engrossed and divided all the people of America as the prohibition problem, except the issue of slavery.”

From 1922 on, the highbrow general-interest magazine *Literary Digest* conducted several unofficial and non-representative public opinion surveys on the question of Prohibition, asking whether respondents favored “enforcement,” “modification,” or outright “repeal” of the Eighteenth Amendment. Not surprisingly, the 1922 straw poll produced majorities for “enforcement” in all but the “wettest” regions of the nation — yet it also signaled that there was opposition to Prohibition in even the most “arid” parts of the country and that, taken together, voters for “modification” and “repeal” constituted a small majority that was not at peace with the status quo. The surprisingly large number of returns demonstrated, furthermore, that Prohibition was indeed a hot political issue. Wayne Wheeler of the ASL, however, was intransigent in the face of proposals to modify the Volstead Act to permit light beer and wine. While the ASL was able to neutralize Prohibition in the 1924 presidential campaign, the issue soon helped propel a complete realignment of the United States’ political parties. In 1928, New York governor Alfred E. Smith — Irish, Catholic, and a self-proclaimed “wet” — was nominated as the Democratic candidate for president, signaling the politicization of second-generation, working-class immigrants in the big cities of the East Coast and the industrial Midwest, mostly over the issue of Prohibition. Republican candidate Herbert C. Hoover, in contrast to his predecessors

Harding and Coolidge, left no doubt about his “dry” convictions. A cartoon aptly boiled the presidential race of 1928 down to the alternatives “H.Oover” or “A.L.E. Smith.”

Smith lost because his ethnic and religious background could not appeal to the traditionally Democratic “solid South.” Yet the overall figures masked an important swing in big-city votes. German-Americans were just one of the many ethnic groups who shifted their support towards Democratic politicians in large numbers as an act of opposition to Prohibition. In certain New York voting districts, citizens of German descent supported Smith with 73 percent of their votes, more than twice the proportion the Democratic ticket received in 1920. Chicago witnessed similar changes in voting trends.

For many years, the Hearst press was a staunch supporter of Prohibition, which Hearst himself had welcomed in 1920 as “heaven sent.” After the Valentine’s Day Massacre, the mass execution of Chicago North Side gangsters by St. Louis–based killers hired by the Capone syndicate on February 14, 1929, however, the Hearst press defected to the “repeal” camp. In 1930, the Literary Digest straw poll surpassed all previous public survey efforts, yielding 4.8 million responses. A majority of 40.4 percent advocated outright “repeal” of Prohibition, while 30.5 percent favored “enforcement,” with regional variations. Another wave of Americans defected to the anti-Prohibition camp after the publication of the report of the Wickersham Commission, a committee appointed by Hoover to investigate Prohibition in January 1931. Following a comprehensive and highly publicized research process in the field, covering all corners of the nation, the commission had come up with lukewarm conclusions and a set of recommendations that was undercut by the minority votes of dissenting members.
Hoover triggered an outcry of public indignation when he declared that the report was an expression of support for his rigid course of enforcement. By 1932 the preponderance of the “repeal” vote had grown to overwhelming proportions in Literary Digest’s straw poll, in part because the category “modification” had been struck from the ballot in a reaction to the intransigence of the ASL and the Hoover administration.40

Hoover quickly became one of the most unpopular presidents in U.S. history. A self-declared expert in economic matters, his passionate defense of Prohibition seemed incongruent with his detachment from the swelling economic crisis of the Great Depression. He became more and more isolated even in his own party as he sided with its reactionary “dry” wing, still fired up by an Anti-Saloon League whose stubborn militancy seemed more and more shrill and hysterical. Prohibition caused the ASL to lose the bipartisan support it had once enjoyed. Competent and well-financed interest groups, much better suited to fulfill the requirements of the modern media culture, had begun lobbying for repeal. The Association Against the Prohibition Amendment soon outdistanced the League in media attention, as did the Women’s Organization for National Prohibition Reform, whose leading personalities, such as the glamorous Pauline Morton Sabin, contrasted favorably with the dry and sanctimonious spokeswomen of the WCTU. These organizations pushed the argument that the presidential elections of 1932 would be a referendum on Prohibition. Despite the horrors of the Great Depression, Prohibition remained the most important and decisive campaign issue, even if Franklin D. Roosevelt was rather late to embrace the “wet” plank of his party’s platform.41 Roosevelt’s election dealt the final blow to Prohibition. One of the first bills Roosevelt signed was the Beer and Wine Revenue Act, which modified the Volstead Act to re-legalize beer with an alcohol content of 3.2 percent and re-established federal excise taxes on alcohol, much needed in the times of the Great Depression. On midnight, April 7, 1933, Americans could once again enjoy their first legitimate schooner of beer after thirteen years of scarce, expensive, and horrible black-market stuff.

It is said that the ascent of the bootlegging industry and the creative role of organized crime in this project contributed to the upward mobility of second-generation children of Italian, Irish, and Eastern European immigrants carved out careers as gangsters

40 Ibid., 461–75.
41 Ibid., 568–80.
who were well-respected by a largely sympathetic public, until the mood changed dramatically after the Valentine’s Day Massacre in February 1929. These second-generation immigrants gained access to the American mainstream, profiting from Prohibition even as Prohibition drove the Germans to the margins of the mainstream. Indeed, it seems fair to say that the Germans were among the immigrant groups that suffered most from the temperance movement and Prohibition. German immigrants had been particularly successful in becoming part of the American mainstream while nevertheless maintaining a quantum of “Germanness” before World War I. The owners of the big breweries who left a visible architectural and organizational imprint — in landmarks, for example, like the Milwaukee City Hall — had self-consciously attempted to spread a measure of German civic culture and make the American mainstream a little more Germanic. Part and parcel of this endeavor had been the establishment of beer gardens and a civilized, convivial drinking culture that was an alternative to the raucous and violent saloon.

The Prohibition movement undid some of this assimilation and ostracized the Germans precisely on account of their “Germanness,” turning them back into an ethnic minority. Prohibition wiped out the beer-garden culture and paved the way for cheap speakeasies that were worse than the most degenerate saloons. Although the role of brewers of German descent in the self-inflicted saloon crises was considerable and their attempts to defend themselves were clumsy and self-defeating, they sustained severe financial losses when the beer trade became illegal, driving some brewery owners to the brink of illegality. Quite unexpectedly, in the wake of Prohibition both prominent and ordinary German-Americans discovered that their best option for preserving a sense of ethnic community was to maintain a low profile built around small, private circles rather than the web of civic institutions and large-scale public leisure that had flourished only thirty years earlier.
A slightly longer version of this article is available on the website of the German Historical Institute’s "Immigrant Entrepreneurship" project at http://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Atiba Pertilla (GHI) in the preparation of this shortened version.

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MARKETING MILWAUKEE: SCHLITZ AND THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL BEER BRAND, 1880-1940

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Milwaukee is considered to be the beer capital of the United States. It has generally been accepted that the brewing industry “has overshadowed all others”1 in Milwaukee since the 1880s, even though beer production (particularly that of lager) began earlier in other parts of the country, and other industries have been more important for Milwaukee’s economic performance. This perception has resulted from the town’s quite exceptional position as a center of beer-based entertainment and amusement.2 Milwaukee’s large and steadily growing immigrant population, comprised primarily of Germans but also Polish, Czech, British and Irish citizens, enjoyed a unique public drinking culture: Although a large number of saloons catered to male workers, women and even children were an integral part of this beer-drinking culture as well. The multitude of beer gardens and taverns suitable for the family gave late nineteenth-century Milwaukee the name “Munich of America.”3 Such institutions were run by a small number of fast-growing breweries, which became well-known regional companies starting in the 1870s. Mostly run by German-American immigrant entrepreneurs, they focused on the Bavarian method of lager beer production.4 Companies such as Pabst, Blatz, Miller, Falk, and Schlitz benefited from the natural resources of the region — access to cheap ice from Lake Michigan, hops and barley from Wisconsin and New York, and cheap lumber. Following technological innovations of the 1870s and 1880s, such as mechanical refrigeration, use of pure yeast, bottling machines and chemical standardization, market-related factors became decisive for the success of Milwaukee’s brewing industry. The use of the economies of scale and Milwaukee’s relatively small population forced the leading firms to develop strategies of long-distance shipping.5 Nearby Chicago had a large beer-consuming population and offered a railway network which could be used in conjunction with newly developed refrigeration wagons and bottled beer. A small group of active and aggressive immigrant entrepreneurs seized these new opportunities and established firms and brands which shaped and even dominated the U.S. beer market for more than a century.6

1 James S. Buck, Milwaukee under the Charter, from 1854 to 1860 inclusive, vol. IV (Milwaukee, 1886), 343.
2 From the mid-nineteenth century, beer gardens were opened at many places in the U.S., for instance on New York’s Lower East Side. Andrew F. Smith, “The Food and Drink of New York from 1624 to » 1898,” in Gastropolis: Food and New York City, ed. Annie Hauck-Lawson and Jonathan Deutsch (New York, 2010), 34-41.
5 While the British ale beers use warm fermentation with yeast, lager beers are fermented and conditioned at low temperatures. Lager beer was stored for a longer period in cold places, mostly in brewery cellars.
6 In 1860, Milwaukee had 45,246 inhabitants, which grew to 204,000 in 1890. Milwaukee was always a relatively small market compared to New York and Pennsylvania.
One of the most prominent examples was the Jos. Schlitz Brewing Company. Though not incorporated until 1873, the company had begun operating in 1849, when the German immigrant Georg August Krug opened a saloon and a brewery. After Krug’s death, the brewery was taken over by another German immigrant, Joseph Schlitz, who managed the business from 1858 until his early death in 1875; subsequently, the company was run by Schlitz’s nephews, four brothers from the German-American immigrant entrepreneur family, the Uihleins. They managed the implementation of new technology and expanded the market presence of Schlitz beer to regional markets, most notably to Chicago, where the firm bought prime corner locations and became “the most prolific builder of tied-house saloons in Chicago.” Tied-house saloons were the equivalent of today’s franchise system: a given brewery bought real-estate properties that it leased to saloon keepers under agreements stipulating that those saloons would serve only that brewery’s beverages.

Although there is not much academic research on the early history of the Schlitz brewery and no history of the company has yet been written, this article will focus on the brewery’s contribution to marketing history. I will address how the Schlitz Company communicated with the growing number of anonymous consumers who made Schlitz the largest brewery in the United States and in the world by 1902. How did Schlitz manage to become a brand famous not only in Milwaukee and Chicago, but also nationally? What economic consequences and cultural effects did the marketing strategy of the Schlitz Company have for the branch, for the consumers and for alcohol consumption in general?

This article will begin by examining the company’s marketing strategy. Although most articles on the marketing of alcoholic beverages focus either on the pre- or post-Prohibition eras, this article will cover both. Surprisingly, Prohibition did not lead to a major rupture in the marketing of alcohol, although traditional beer could no longer be promoted. Furthermore, I will explore the cautious return of beer advertising in the post-repeal period and analyze how the company managed to reestablish promotion of an alcoholic beverage, which was still attacked as a dangerous product undermining American health and morality. Finally, the article will conclude by linking marketing and product development from the 1890s until the 1950s, through the use of modern newspaper databases and the growing number of digitized book and journal collections, which include a
plethora of advertisements and thus make detailed research possible, even on companies without an archive.\textsuperscript{11}

I. From Direct Sales to Anonymous Advertising

In the 1870s and 1880s, beer marketing was primarily concerned with selling beer directly. The location of beer drinking — primarily tied-house saloons — was crucial because most of the product was served directly from kegs. Local consumers chose their places of consumption based on the quality and price of the beer and food offered, the atmosphere of the locations, and their own class and ethnicity. Brand loyalty was not well-established; customers were attracted by cheap offers, free samples, free food, and a large number of giveaways, such as calendars, glassware, and signs. Consequently, Schlitz was investing huge sums in tied-house locations: From 1897 to 1905, the company invested nearly one-third of a million dollars in building 57 saloons in Chicago.

The dominance of public places in beer consumption receded slowly with the growing prominence of beer bottling. Bottling, which began at Schlitz in 1876\textsuperscript{12}, allowed for home consumption of beer. Bottled beer could not be stored easily, however, due to the lack of cooling techniques and safe cork-seals, and was used for immediate consumption.\textsuperscript{13} This changed with the introduction of pasteurization into the brewing industry in the early 1890s. Although pasteurization affected the taste — one reason why German brewers in the United States did not export much beer to overseas destinations\textsuperscript{14} — it stabilized shipped beer and extended its shelf life.\textsuperscript{15} In 1892, nearly ten percent of the beer produced by the leading Milwaukee shipping breweries was bottled. Thus, this product needed a different marketing strategy.

Although Schlitz’s beer output rose tremendously from the 1870s to the turn of the century, from less than 100,000 to more than 1 million barrels per year, branding was still in its infancy in the 1880s. Due to a trademark law, established in 1905, as well as the brewers’ pride in their product, beer was named after the brewer and the brewery.\textsuperscript{16}

In 1880, Schlitz’s ads in local newspapers simply announced the name of the brewery and its location.\textsuperscript{17} Brand names and signs were not used before the early 1890s, and far into the first decade of the twentieth century wholesale dealers and depots mentioned only


\textsuperscript{17} Milwaukee Daily News, March 23, 1880, 3.
the name Schlitz and the varieties of beer offered. At that time Schlitz had already established some key elements of branding, following the example of Anheuser-Busch in St. Louis and Pabst in Milwaukee. The name “Schlitz” was not used as an official trademark until May 1888. The belted globe, which was used to emphasize the world-wide reputation of Schlitz beer, was first used in 1892. In 1894, the well-known slogan “The beer that made Milwaukee famous” was introduced.

All advertisements covered many types of beer. (See figure 1.) Thus “Schlitz” was used as an umbrella term for a large number of quite different varieties of beer: the keg-beer brands Budweiser, Pilsener, Wiener, Erlanger, Culmbacher, and Schlitz-Bräu, as well as the bottled-beer brands Pilsener, Extra-Pale, Extra-Stout, and Schlitz Porter. The new trademarks were used extensively starting in the mid-1890s. Although local advertisements in saloons and in the streets were by far the most common, the fundamental changes in printing technology and the media allowed Schlitz to expand into new regional markets. Newspapers and magazines made illustrated advertisements possible, which became a core element of marketing. The first marketing campaigns of the late 1890s varied in form and included a number of newly established advertising characters, such as cupids, elves or cartoon figures. Their aim was to promote the ideal of a standardized product — “Schlitz beer.”

Figure 1: 1892 Schlitz Brewing Company ad prominently featuring its Milwaukee plant. Source: Milwaukee’s Great Industries, ed. by W. J. Anderson and Julius Bleyer (Milwaukee: Association for the Advancement of Milwaukee, 1892), 340.

18 Oak Park Vindicator, January 11, 1895, 1; Creston Morning American, July 6, 1896, 8. Schlitz brewed its beer in Milwaukee and shipped it in kegs to regional plants and depots, where it was stored, shipped by the barrels to the saloons or bottled to be sold in saloons and retail shops.

19 See also Racine City Directory 1895 (Racine: Frederick C. Bliss), 365; The Black Cat 4 (February 1899), VII.


21 In public it was discussed that Pabst and Schlitz were “making a vigorous campaign for more business in the East.” “Good Outlook for Brewing,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 1897, 2. Although the mushrooming number of advertisements in magazines could be read all over the United States, the bulk of sales were done in the Midwest and the Eastern part of the U.S. A national market for beer was not really established before the 1950s. As an example of such campaigns — here with lightly clad elves — see The Black Cat 4 (1899), April-Issue, XIX, ibid. 6 (1901), January-Issue, IX, ibid. 8 (1903), October-Issue, XXVI.
II. Science, Health, and the Ideal Beer

Intensified marketing was not, in fact, accompanied by an increasing market share of Schlitz and other leading shipping breweries. Between 1895 and 1915, Schlitz produced more than one and a half million barrels of beer per year — but even intensified marketing in newspapers and magazines could not increase the sales. This is surprising because the whole industry faced a 50 percent rise from 40 to 60 million barrels per year. At the turn of the century, market leaders had reached their optimal production level, local brewers were catching up, and the Prohibition movement closed off many markets. Additionally, the Anti-Saloon League seriously hit the tied-house saloons of the leading brewers, which had become the primary enemies of the anti-alcohol movement. In this situation, marketing was crucial for targeting new middle-class consumers who wanted to avoid the attacked saloons and could afford the more expensive bottled beer. In this context, not the price but the quality of products became crucial for Schlitz marketing. The changing advertising agencies focused on three different dimensions, which were typical for the pre-Prohibition period and shaped Schlitz’s beer marketing until the 1950s.

First, the brewery informed their consumers in detail about the production process. Scientific and technological knowledge was to create trust in the superior quality of Schlitz beer. “Facts” were offered as interesting reading and as a strong argument for the brand. The brewery provided information on the brewing process, such as details about water and air filtration methods. Since a grassroots movement for “pure food” was forming, Schlitz talked constantly of clean production, pure ingredients, and the efforts of the firm to maintain the high quality of its products. (See figure 2.) “Clean-cut and reasonable” text advertisements portrayed the difference between the technologically advanced production in the Schlitz Milwaukee plant and the average brewing process elsewhere, which had a risk of spoilage and damage. Schlitz beer was promoted as a product of highly-skilled experts who took care of every detail of production. Breweries introduced scientific production techniques long before Henry Ford introduced the assembly line for car manufacturing. Consequently, beer advertisements focused not only on the individual steps of production but also on the quality of all the ingredients.

Schlitz therefore fought to maintain its image of technological leadership and propagated this image again and again. Although


23 The construction of additional breweries at other places was still an exception because natural resources were seen as crucial for the quality of the beer. Schlitz, for instance, opened a new brewery in Cleveland in 1906 but sales were still dominated by the Milwaukee production complex. Martin Hintz, A Spirited History of Milwaukee Brew & Booze (Charleston, 2011), 19.


25 See the comments in Charles Austin Bates Criticisms 6 (1899): 595-596.


28 Current Advertising 12 (1904), no. 2, 31. As an example see “Compare Our Methods With Yours,” The Black Cat 9 (1904), July-Issue, XXII.
similar phrases and slogans were coined by competitors, Schlitz introduced new consumer commodities to support its claim on technological and scientific leadership. A key innovation was the brown bottle, introduced in 1911, which could keep the high-quality beer pure and tasty, better than other bottles.29 Enzyme control had been in use since before World War I but was specially promoted after 1933 to win the trust of consumers.30 The addition of vitamins to malt syrup and other products in the late 1920s was transferred to regular beer in 1935 — though the radiation and the vitamin D-fortification lasted only for a few years.31 More crucial was the introduction of the cone-top beer can in 1935, which was more convenient for the consumer and was propagated as a new safeguard of flavor.32 Schlitz’s progress in beer production, such as vacuum-filled bottles and cans starting in 1936, continued until the Second World War.33

As a second key element of its marketing strategy, Schlitz marketed beer not as an alcoholic beverage but as a healthy food. This was to support the sharp distinction between beer and hard liquor and was based on the medical expertise of the day. Beer was prescribed as a refreshing drink for convalescents, for the “weak, the nervous and sleepless.”34 The doctor remained a prominent figure in Schlitz advertisements until 1910 (See figure 3). In addition, beer was positioned as a nourishing food, helpful in balancing a one-sided diet.35 Prohibition did not change this approach to promoting Schlitz products: Near-beer Famo, introduced in 1918, was promoted as a “rational” food for the reproduction of the

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30 “Schlitz Enzyme Control: What is it?” *Waterloo Daily Courier* (1933), September 22, 3.
33 “Beneath this Crown you’ll find that Famous Flavor,” *Capital Times*, June 1, 1939, 8.
human body. Beer production was normally understood as kindush digestion, and according to such simple metaphors of metabolism, beer could even be advertised as similar to mother’s milk. Post-Prohibition marketing portrayed beer as a beauty drink for women.

Third, all of these efforts to produce a pure, technologically advanced, healthy, and wholesome beer were used to position Schlitz as the producer of an ideal beer. Beer quality was not defined by the taste of individuals but by a changing standard of local, national, and global references. Milwaukee was regularly promoted as the “most renowned brewing center in the world”, though of course, there were no fixed criteria for this pronouncement. On the one hand, Schlitz’s claim to be selling Milwaukee’s best beer caused trouble with other Milwaukee breweries, who made similar claims. Intense battles were fought, especially with Miller and Blatz, who both advertised their beer as “the best” Milwaukeean. Due to the lack of objective criteria such claims could not be challenged. On the other hand, the combined marketing power of Milwaukee breweries established a nostalgic ideal of Milwaukee as the American city where the “best” beer was brewed — even if it was not clear by which brewery. Schlitz supported such public perceptions by making the claim that its beer was comparable to the best beers of the world, and at relatively low prices. Schlitz beer had made Milwaukee famous because it had a world-famous quality and could compete even with the most sophisticated lager and pilsner.

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36 “Drink Schlitz Famo,” Emporia Gazette, September 18, 1919, 6.
37 “Schlitz in Brown Bottles As a Predigested Food,” Sandusky Register, September 6, 1933, 2.
38 “Lasting Beauty comes from within,” Sandusky Register, October 13, 1933, 3.
40 Pabst, for instance, used the phrase “The Brewers of the Beer that Made Milwaukee Famous.”
42 On the long run, however, Schlitz managed that Milwaukee was perceived as “the city that Schlitz made famous [...].” (“Prohibition’s Quoit!” Time, April 17, 1933.

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Figure 3: Promoting beer as a low-alcohol drink with health benefits: 1908 Schlitz ad “Why the Doctor Gives His Patients Schlitz Beer.” Source: Pearson’s Magazine 20: Suppl. 5 (November 1908).
beers of Germany. Schlitz beer was acclaimed as a leading beer, even the best American beer, at least from the perspective of beer experts. Therefore, the Milwaukee brand was propagated as a brand of reference for the United States. This ideal was used to develop new markets before and after Prohibition and to define a high-quality standard even for non-alcoholic products.

This three-pronged marketing strategy hid more than met the eye because the ads did not inform consumers about the risks and dangers of the brewing process. Pasteurization and shipping affected the flavor as did the addition of vitamins, yeast and enzymes. The use of barley and hop substitutes, which distinguished Schlitz and other American beer from foreign products, was never mentioned or discussed. In contrast to the opinions of most scientists, the public generally perceived local beer to be better than shipped beer, even if the latter was more standardized and therefore “pure.” Similar to other leading brewers of the time, Schlitz had no real interest in the ideals and perceptions of the beer consumers. Beer’s taste and flavor were defined in abstract, chemical ways — and in response to sales figures. Paradoxically, this lack of consumer orientation was closely linked to the idea of one American nation. Schlitz beer was marketed as a beer of world-class quality suitable for all consumers. Schlitz marketing presented an idealized image of the American consumer far beyond the ongoing struggles of class, race, gender, age, ethnicity, and education. Although Schlitz directed its campaign nearly exclusively to urban, middle-class, white men, beer marketers still believed in the harmonious world of the beer garden, where there was space for everyone.

III. Marketing during the Prohibition Era

The advocates of Prohibition thought that outlawing alcohol would solve all of society’s ills in an era of rapid change and upheaval. The Prohibition movement’s success at the federal level in 1919-20, inflicted lasting damage on the liquor and brewing industries. Even during World War I, the Anti-Saloon League had promoted the concept of “German brewers” as enemies of the “American nation” and as supporters of their former fatherland. Although most brewers of German descent behaved as loyal Americans, their claims were rejected.

Schlitz reacted to these changes quite late, most notably with the previously mentioned near-beer Famo, which had a 2.5 percent alcohol...
content, which was further reduced to 0.5 percent after the start of Prohibition. The end of beer production caused the company to lay off more than 80 percent of its labor force because the 0.5 percent near-beer was rarely consumed. Nevertheless, Schlitz continued marketing their product as a Milwaukeean and American brand, just as they had done before World War I. Non-alcoholic “Schlitz” was promoted as a health drink harmless even for children.49 (See figure 4) The production of the new product, which was brewed as a lager and then treated with chemical catalysts to remove the alcohol, led to marketing campaigns that propagated “Schlitz” as a non-alcoholic beer.50 The flavor was altered during the removal of alcohol, however, and consumers avoided the substitute. Although the company increasingly focused on its profitable real estate business and investments in other areas, such as the steel industry, it still tried to defend its position as a beverage and food producer.51 The company developed soft drinks, such as Schlitz Ginger Ale, and Schlitz Malt Syrup, which became a financial success.52 The marketing of these products still used the established Schlitz trademarks and helped consumers remember the former beer brand and its virtues of technological leadership, purity, healthiness, and quality.53 The new products were promoted as “The Drink That Made Milwaukee Famous,” “The Malt That Keeps Milwaukee Famous,” “The Name That Made Milwaukee


51  “Thriving Industries Replace Noted Milwaukee Breweries: Survey Shows Beer Never Made the City Famous — Business Improves With Prohibition,” Christian Science Monitor, October 1, 1924, 12.

52  In mid-1932 Schlitz still employed more than » 2,000 people in Milwaukee. “Return of Beer Aids Milwaukee,” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1933, 9.


Figure 4: Schlitz as a health drink for the whole family: “Schlitz — At Noon” ad. Source: Ironwood Daily Globe (August 10, 1920), 8.
Famous,” and simply “Schlitz Made Milwaukee Famous.” While Schlitz could survive with greatly reduced beverage sales, its ambitious new “Eline’s” candy and chocolate bar brand couldn’t compete with Hershey and failed after heavy losses. Parallel to such efforts, the company lobbied for a repeal of the Volstead Act. From 1926, it invested growing sums of money in supporting the Democratic Party and “wet” candidates. The Prohibition regime, however, failed for other reasons.

IV. Cautious Continuity and the American Way of Gemütlichkeit

When 3.2 percent beer became legal once again in April 1933, many analysts expected a return to the pre-Prohibition market. However, beer consumption remained far lower than in the 1910s. Although the number of breweries was smaller, higher taxes, the need for new transport equipment, the power of regulatory institutions, and the loss of most of the distribution network kept beer prices relatively high. While advertising expenditures made up less than one percent of beer company budgets in the mid-1930s, the companies invested in the mechanization and automatization of their production lines. By 1935, Schlitz exceeded pre-Prohibition beer production and by 1940 strengthened its position among the top brewers, when the company held position number three with a market share of 3.0 percent. Schlitz announced in 1932 that it would “again take its place among the largest national advertisers and expend large sums for advertising its products in newspapers.” It was not until 1937, however, that the company began its well-recognized campaigns of colored one- to two-page advertisements in Life and other leading magazines.

After Prohibition ended, the Schlitz Company once again promoted its old themes of scientific production, purity, health, and world-famous quality. These messages became integral elements of most of its magazine and newspaper advertisements. However, Schlitz learned its lesson from rigid state intervention. From 1933 on, domesticity became another prominent element in Schlitz’s marketing efforts. Of course, this was nothing new. As part of marketing its beer as a healthy drink and nourishing food, Schlitz had advertised its products as “Family Beer” since the turn of the century. Bottled Schlitz “Home Beer” was offered as a clean and respectable alternative to the saloon. From 1933, as the importance of domesticity grew tremendously, women became an integral element of these


56 “Resurrection,” Time, April 3, 1933.


60 “Make Schlitz Your Home Beer,” Sandusky Register, September 27, 1933, 5; “A friend of the family,” Sandusky Star-Journal, October 24, 1933.

Schlitz used cautious slogans such as “[beer is] a man’s drink that women enjoy” to address women directly but place them in the safe haven of middle-class life. The Depression brought the Roaring Twenties with their thriving illegal nightlife to an end; now, marketing began to depict beer drinkers as respectable members of the neighborhood. Schlitz offered its products both as part of patriarchal family patterns and, from the mid-1930s, as an integral element of (sub-)urban hospitality: “Schlitz is a beverage you can be proud to serve and happy to drink yourself.”

As a result of the domestication of alcohol consumption during the Prohibition era and the increasing ownership of refrigerators, the home became the central place of alcohol consumption. Beer advertising purged the middle-class home of the illegal behavior of the Prohibition era. Schlitz rewrote its own company history as one of supporting domestic beer consumption. The invention of the new steinies (smaller and cheaper bottles), which could be delivered more easily than the commonly used long-necked version, was promoted as a return to pre-industrial American hospitality. Old and new times, American hospitality, and German Gemütlichkeit merged into the fiction of a revitalized, relaxed, and moderate American past where beer was a common drink. Schlitz beer was promoted as an unquestioned part of domestic leisure and social gatherings. Americanization was a key element of Schlitz’s rise to world market leadership in the early 1950s, despite the fact that changes in acquisition and technology were more important for the formation of an American beer oligopoly in the late 1950s.

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63 The Galveston Daily News (1938), August 12, 11.
64 Life (1939), March 21, 11.
65 “The Refreshing Part of Every Party.” Life (1937), October 11, 125.
67 “Pleasant Memories of Olden Times: Schlitz In ‘Steinies’,” Daily Globe, »
V. Conclusion: Creating Dream-Worlds and the Neglect of the Consumer

From 1880 to 1940, Schlitz established itself as one of the leading beer brands in America. Gradually, its newspaper and magazine marketing shifted from focusing on Milwaukee working class families and male workers in Chicago and other larger towns, who usually drank in saloons, to targeting respectable middle-class consumers who enjoyed a more expensive bottle of beer at home or at respectable social gatherings. This allowed Schlitz, a national shipper, to compete with the large number of local beer brewers and set the company on a track to produce a more convenient and more easily stored product. From the early 1890s, the Schlitz brewery emerged as a technological leader of the industry; most of the innovations were implemented to improve the bottled beer of middle-class consumers. The company was able to produce a standardized mass product, which could then be optimized, just like other commodities. Rejecting the accusations of the Prohibition movement, Schlitz presented a dream world of beer consumption in which their products appeared healthy and refreshing, relaxing and nourishing, pure and clean, convenient and high quality. Although the reputation of Schlitz beer resulted from the local beer culture of Milwaukee, the new standardized product was to be of world-famous reputation and quality.

Even as the brewery established and propagated a famous product, the taste of Schlitz beer changed for the worse as a result of technological innovations. Pasteurization, longer storage in bottles, and an increasing number of substitutes for malt and hops were at least partly responsible for the stagnating beer output in the two decades before World War I. Schlitz’s marketing was hierarchical. It promoted the ideal of permanent progress, even within the brewing industry. The consumer’s desires for taste and variation were not recognized. Instead, the consumer was supposed to be convinced by the expert’s idea of a world-famous product.

The extreme changes in American drinking culture during the Prohibition era were recognized by the Schlitz Company, although they continued promoting their images of science, health, and quality after 1933. During the 1930s, marketing agencies created a new kind of gendered (sub-)urban domestic drinking culture of the white middle-classes. Drinking after Prohibition occurred in new locations, far from where Milwaukee’s beer culture had become famous. Schlitz created not only a standardized and continuously optimized beer but also an
idealized vision of the American way of drinking, of social gathering and Gemütlichkeit, and even a strange idea of the American past. This set the tone for the immense success of Schlitz during the early 1950s, when its advertisements became iconic of the desired American way of life. However, while the idealized world of white middle-class and male-breadwinner America was propagated, the product changed in accordance with technological innovations. Even during the 1930s, its taste became watered-down and weak, long before the so-called light beers were introduced in the late 1950s. It is likely no coincidence that Schlitz vanished from the U.S. market in the early 1980s after changing the production process again and attempting to convince consumers this new product still had something to do with the beer that once made Milwaukee famous.69

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“A GOOD PLACE TO MAKE MONEY”:
CIVIL RIGHTS, LABOR, AND THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

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Throughout much of the late nineteenth and twentieth century, North Carolina enjoyed a reputation for being among the most politically progressive states in the American South. It was among the last southern states to descend into Jim Crow and during the civil rights movement it avoided the sorts of clashes that engulfed cities like Birmingham and Little Rock. Its largest city became a national model for school desegregation in the 1970s, and Charlotte schoolchildren were famously invited to Boston to help with Northern urban desegregation efforts. In 2008, it was one of only three southern states to cast its electoral votes for Barack Obama. At the same time, North Carolina remains a right-to-work stronghold with the lowest rate of union membership in the nation.1 Moreover, North Carolina is currently one of five Sunbelt states that bans public-sector collective bargaining and one of only two states that has passed right-to-work legislation and a ban on public sector bargaining. My project attempts to reconcile this apparent contradiction by examining the ways in which progressive racial politics and anti-unionism were contested in North Carolina’s largest city. Eventually becoming the nation’s second-largest banking center by assets after New York, Charlotte is perfectly situated to shed light on a strain of pro-business, anti-labor politics that has been instrumental in reshaping the American political landscape.

1 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2011, North Carolina’s union membership rate was 2.9% and the national average was 11.8%. See Bureau of Labor Statistics Press Release, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t01.htm. On union density rates over the past 50 years, see Leo Troy and Neil Sheflin, Union Sourcebook: Membership, Structure, Finance, Directory (West Orange, New Jersey, 1985).
In recent years, historians have become increasingly interested in the relationship between business, labor, and the state in the second half of the twentieth century. Much of this scholarship focuses on the 1970s, arguing that we can locate the origins of our current economic and political predicament in this decade. Notable among these recent studies are Judith Stein’s expansive survey of American domestic and foreign trade policies and Jefferson Cowie’s sweeping examination of organized labor’s decline. My dissertation project looks at how these larger postwar economic transformations unfolded on the local level, focusing on the changing relationship between local labor unions, civil rights activists, municipal officials, and the downtown business elite. In order to frame Charlotte’s economic transformations, this project also engages debates about the emergence and political influence of the “Sunbelt.” A term popularized by Republican strategist Kevin Phillips in his 1969 bestseller The Emerging Republican Majority, the Sunbelt is generally considered to be the region stretching from North Carolina to California, and which witnessed explosive economic and population growth in the decades following the Second World War. Over the past three decades a vibrant and diverse body of scholarship on the Sunbelt has made a persuasive case for the numerous ways in which the region has fundamentally reshaped American culture, politics, and religion. Yet the role of labor unions, and especially public employee unionism in the Sunbelt, has been understudied. A few notable exceptions (although they do not focus on public employees) include Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, “Counter-Organizing the Sunbelt: Right-to-Work Campaigns and Anti-Union Conservatism, 1943-1958,” Pacific Historical Review 78 (February 2009): 81-118; Kim Phillips-Fein, “As Great an Issue as Slavery or Abolition”: Economic Populism, the Conservative Movement, and the Right-to-Work Campaigns of 1958,” Journal of Policy History 23, no. 4 (2011): 492-512.

In order for Charlotte to become a national center of finance, its civic boosters argued that the city must embrace the politics of racial moderation. Civil rights and black politics are therefore central to the story of Charlotte’s economic and political development. This project, then, also engages the now extensive body of scholarship on the African American civil rights movement. While earlier generations of historians focused on southern struggles in an era bookended by the landmark 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education and the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, scholars in the past decade have challenged and expanded both the chronological and geographical boundaries of this narrative. In so doing, they have greatly enriched our understanding of black political activism and resistance throughout the twentieth...
I trace the evolution of Charlotte’s “biracial coalition around economic growth” which, on the one hand, enabled the election of candidates like Charlotte’s first black mayor, Harvey Gantt, yet, on the other hand, had often devastating consequences for working class African Americans. This dissertation thus brings the burgeoning literature on political economy in the 1970s into dialogue with the more developed body of work on civil rights activism to explore the ways in which the larger economic transformations of this era shaped and constrained black political activism.

I. Organized Labor and Business Boosterism in the North Carolina Piedmont

North Carolina’s economic predicament was decades in the making. In the late nineteenth century, New England textile mills began migrating south in search of cheap labor. The region of central North Carolina and northern South Carolina known as the “Piedmont” emerged as an ideal fit for textile production. The Carolina Piedmont contained flat expanses of land suitable for constructing large factories, abundant rivers to provide hydroelectric power, and an almost entirely non-unionized labor force willing to work for substantially less than their northern counterparts. In textile mills, this labor force was composed largely of women and children. By the turn of the twentieth century, the Piedmont had become the state’s industrial and economic center and by 1920, North Carolina had supplanted all of New England as the nation’s largest textile producer.

According to historian Thomas Hanchett, North Carolina’s “leaders (and many ordinary folks) felt that cheap labor was the only way that [the state] could compete with more advanced and more capitalized regions. The alternative to low wages was not higher wages, in their minds, but instead a non-industrialized wasteland.” In the era before American textile manufacturers began outsourcing production

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8 The Piedmont contains many of the region’s smaller mill towns as well as larger cities including Charlotte, Winston-Salem, Raleigh, and Durham in North Carolina and Greenville, Columbia and Spartanburg in South Carolina.

9 Thomas Hanchett is author of the most comprehensive scholarly work on late nineteenth and twentieth century Charlotte, entitled *Sorting Out the New South City: Race, Class, and Urban Development in Charlotte, 1875-1975* (Chapel Hill, 1998). Quote comes from correspondence with Hanchett, 6 February 2013.
across international borders and oceans, the Carolina Piedmont was America’s Mexico.10

By the middle of the twentieth century, Charlotte had emerged as a city steadfast in its opposition to organized labor. This path, however, was not inevitable. Instead, the first decades of the twentieth century were marked by workers’ repeated attempts to gain union recognition, increase wages and benefits, and improve overall working conditions. The first set of contests occurred in 1919 when Charlotte’s millworkers and streetcar drivers went on strike in response to post-World War I cuts in hours and wages. Like cities across the nation, Charlotte witnessed significant labor unrest during the economic recession following the war.11 Then in 1934, Piedmont laborers joined more than 400,000 textile workers across the nation in a general strike, the largest single-industry strike to date. Largely self-organized, the General Strike of 1934 was marked by repeated incidents of violent repression of unionists. In the Carolina Piedmont, the violence and intimidation culminated at the Chiquola Mill in Honea Path, South Carolina, on September 6, 1934, when factory guards shot and killed seven factory workers and injured twenty more.12 Despite the unionists’ overwhelming defeat, such conflicts nevertheless undermined the message of North Carolina’s industrialists who traveled the nation proudly marketing their low-wage, non-unionized, and purportedly docile workforce. Duke Power advertised, “The birth rate of the Carolinas is the highest in the United States. Already a second generation of textile workers has come along, and in many older textile centers a third generation has grown up.” Another industrialist boasted of “willing labor, unhampered by any artificial restrictions on output.”13

In 1947, North Carolina joined ten other Sunbelt states in passing so-called “right-to-work” legislation that created a new series of obstacles for organized labor. Such legislation emerged as the result of section 14b of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which allowed individual states to pass legislation banning the “union shop” — whereby unions and employers were prohibited from making union membership a requirement for employment. Under right-to-work laws, workers who were not union members could still take advantage of union-negotiated wages, contracts, and benefits, therefore creating what unions called a “free-rider” problem. If people could reap the benefits of membership without paying the dues, it became doubly challenging for labor organizers to convince workers to join unions


12 For more on the General Strike of 1934, see Hall, et al., Like A Family, 289-357; and John A. Salmon, The General Textile Strike of 1934: From Maine to Alabama (Columbia, 2002).

13 Tullos, Habits of Industry. 171.
in states already hostile towards organized labor. Within a decade of these laws being passed, the percentage of the workforce that belonged to unions in “right-to-work” states decreased dramatically.\textsuperscript{14}

At the same time that workers in the Carolina Piedmont struggled to overcome this legacy of defeat, this period of unprecedented economic growth in the Carolina Piedmont enabled the consolidation of power in the hands of a confident and paternalistic merchant and manufacturing class. Charlotte’s bankers, manufacturers, real estate developers, and businessmen had never been better off. The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond had recently opened a branch in Charlotte, making it the region’s financial center, and the city’s economy witnessed continued growth throughout the post-World War II era. Manufacturing, wholesaling, transportation, and banking provided a diversified economic base for the city, which meant that the textile industry’s decline after the Second World War did not hurt Charlotte’s economy to the same degree that it did other textile-heavy cities.\textsuperscript{15}

North Carolina’s elected officials and businessmen joined Governor Luther Hodges, the self-described “businessman in the statehouse,” in scouring the nation in pursuit of new industry to recruit to the Tar Heel State.\textsuperscript{16} Hodges relished the title of “industry hunter” as he restructured the state’s tax code to be more business-friendly and used venues like the \textit{Wall Street Journal}, where he took out a full-page advertisement, to promote his achievement.\textsuperscript{17} Unsatisfied with the promotion of his achievements in print advertisements alone, Hodges recruited a team of the state’s most successful salesmen to travel with him to New York to publicize the state’s economic advantages and its people who “are anxious to work and interested in their jobs.” Hodges extended his marketing tour to Cleveland, Philadelphia, and Chicago, hoping business leaders would understand North Carolinians’ “anxious[ness] to work” as a code referring to the fact that the state was not burdened with strong unions with the capacity to hamper productivity or profits.\textsuperscript{18}

\[\text{\textsuperscript{15} Hanchett, }\textit{Sorting Out the New South City}, 225-6.\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 61.}\]
It would not be an overstatement to say that Charlotte’s leaders, like their counterparts in Raleigh, spent much of the twentieth century obsessed with the city’s national image. Civic boosters worked tirelessly to move the city out of Atlanta’s shadow and distinguish it from other similar sounding southern cities like Charleston, South Carolina, or Charlottesville, Virginia. Lacking Atlanta’s size, Charleston’s historic charm and Charlottesville’s college town advantages, Charlotte’s leaders set out to put their city on the map by transforming it from a regional trading hub into an international center of finance. So great were their efforts that one visiting journalist famously observed, “Charlotte ... may edge out Dallas and Atlanta as home to the purest strain ever discovered of the Southern booster gene.”

This particular brand of civic promotion resulted from and, in turn, fostered deep ties between business and city government.

As in other Sunbelt cities, Charlotte’s business leaders have historically dominated local politics. Between 1935 and 1979, every mayor of Charlotte, with only one exception, had been either the president or owner of his own business. Many of these men came directly from the Chamber of Commerce boardroom. Serving as the chairman of Charlotte’s Chamber of Commerce virtually guaranteed a mayoral candidate’s win, as was the case for Stanford Brookshire and John Belk, Charlotte’s longest serving mayors in the twentieth century. Many in the city were proud of the Chamber’s prominent role in city politics. Not least among these were the editors of the city’s morning and evening newspapers, the \textit{Charlotte Observer} and \textit{Charlotte News}.

“Some towns are run by one man, some by a handful of men,” boasted the \textit{Observer} in 1960, “Not Charlotte ... Charlotte is run, primarily and well, by the Chamber of Commerce ... We are pleased to acknowledge its bossism and to wish it continued health.” By the early 1970s, the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce had adopted perhaps the bluntest slogan imaginable: “Charlotte: A Good Place to Make Money.”

The business community’s influence in Charlotte, however, had more serious implications than such Chamber of Commerce slogans. In striving to create the political and economic climate most hospitable to business, Charlotte’s leaders were also creating a city unabashedly hostile towards organized labor. The backlash against organized labor in Charlotte in the late 1950s was consistent with larger national trends. Much of this backlash occurred in response to the recession of 1957 and 1958, the most severe economic downturn of the post-World War II era. Kim Phillips-Fein explains how unions

\textsuperscript{19} On boosterism in Charlotte, see Hanchett’s \textit{Sorting Out the New South City}, 46–181, 224–226, and selected chapters in William Graves and Heather A. Smith, eds., \textit{Charlotte, NC: The Global Evolution of a New South City} (Athens, 2010). Stephen S. Smith’s \textit{Boom for Whom? Education, Desegregation and Development in Charlotte} (Albany, 2004) examines the relationship between school desegregation policies and economic development policies in Charlotte, which, he argues, had devastating consequences for the city’s African American students. Smith offers this damning yet persuasive assessment: “[F]rom an economic and political standpoint, busing in Charlotte did more to help Charlotte catch up with Atlanta and to help Charlotte’s business elite catch up with the business elite in Atlanta than it did help Charlotte’s blacks catch up with Charlotte’s whites,” Smith, xi.


\textsuperscript{21} “Guess Who’s Boss of Our Town,” \textit{Charlotte Observer}, 12 February 1960. The recent defeat of union “bosses” through the 1959 public worker union ban may have inspired the use of the term “bossism.”

\textsuperscript{22} This overview of Charlotte politics draws on Smith, \textit{Boom for Whom?}, 23–55.
came under attack during this period. “In the newly austere economic climate,” explains Phillips-Fein, “corporations were more eager than they had been to find ways to cut their costs.” In other words, labor costs were first on the proposed chopping block and unions stood squarely in the way.

In mid-century Charlotte, the tensions between business and labor played out most dramatically over the rights of public workers to unionize. These confrontations culminated in an effective Chamber of Commerce-led campaign to persuade the Charlotte city council to ban municipal employees’ unions. At the center of this campaign were the Chamber of Commerce’s concerns over police and firefighters unions. In December of 1958, the Chamber’s Board of Directors passed a resolution calling on city council to forbid police officers and all other municipal employees from unionizing. The Chamber of Commerce worried that a police union would jeopardize one of its most vital instruments of labor control, arguing that union membership created a conflict of interest for the city’s law enforcement officers. A unionized police force might sympathize with the strikers they would be ordered to disperse, intimidate, or arrest. Observer Columnist Joe Doster best articulated this hypothetical scenario when he asked, “Would a policeman walk a beat to maintain peaceful picketing during duty hours and then join the strikers to walk the picket line at night?” These concerns were misleading, however, given that the police union had a no-strike clause written into its charter.

The influence business organizations wielded over labor legislation in North Carolina was not lost on the state’s union leaders. During the 1958 North Carolina AFL-CIO Convention, William M. “Millard” Barbee, president of the North Carolina AFL-CIO, blamed the 1958 recession on the compounded effects of 1947 Taft-Hartley Act on the national level and right-to-work legislation on the state level. He charged that the past decade’s anti-labor legislation was responsible for the state’s continually declining per capita income. Other speakers indicted business lobbying groups such as the Chamber of Commerce


Chicago AFL-CIO Regional Director Eugene Moats stressed the vulnerable position of Charlotte’s workers given that the city was both home to a particularly powerful Chamber of Commerce and was the headquarters of the National Textile Manufacturers Association. “I think I can say without hesitation,” declared Moats, who had experience organizing unions across the nation, “that ... the city of Charlotte ... is the seat of more vicious anti-union propaganda than any other city of the United States of America.”26 Despite the protests and critiques of North Carolina’s labor leader, the Chamber was successful in getting a municipal union ban passed, and thus solidified a power dynamic in Charlotte politics that flowed directly from the Chamber’s boardroom to city council and on to the mayor — a dynamic that had disastrous consequences for both the city’s unionized and non-unionized workers. The Chamber’s actions, moreover, had political implications that extended beyond the local level. Attempts to organize city workers and the ensuing Charlotte municipal employee ban, along with a prolonged textile strike elsewhere in the state, prompted the North Carolina General Assembly to pass legislation in 1959 prohibiting all public employees from collective bargaining and banning police and firefighters from unionizing entirely. Although the latter portion of the legislation was overturned a decade later on constitutional grounds, the public-employee collective-bargaining ban has remained intact for more than five decades, fundamentally shaping and constraining the options for workers throughout the state of North Carolina for the remainder of the twentieth century.

In the second half of the twentieth century, public employees would become the face of the American labor movement. From the early 1960s to the early 1990s, public-employee union density increased from just below 13 percent to almost 40 percent while private-sector union density dropped from more than 33 percent to less than 12 percent over roughly the same period. By 1996, almost 40 percent of union members were public employees, despite representing a much smaller sector of the American workforce.27 Between 1955 and the early 1970s, public-employee union rosters grew from about 400,000 to over 4 million, enabling the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) to become among the AFL-CIO’s largest affiliates. The demographic composition of the public-employee workforce also changed dramatically during this period and unions responded accordingly. Labor historian Robert Zieger explains how AFSCME, “long a genteel lobbying agent for small groups of

technical and professional workers ... now functioned as a sort of ‘gray-collar’ industrial union, recruiting thousands of custodians, sanitation men, laborers, and clerical workers.” 28 African Americans and women also became a larger part of the public workforce — a workforce that increasingly eschewed the title of “public servant” in favor of “government worker” for obvious historical reasons. 29

Despite government workers’ importance to the labor movement in the second half of the twentieth century, recent scholarship on the business-led assault against organized labor in this period has largely ignored public-employee unions — an oversight especially pronounced in literature on the Sunbelt. 30 Nevertheless, public-employee unions and the campaigns waged against them can offer new insights into the changing relationship between business, labor and the state in the mid-twentieth century. In his study of labor relations in the public sector, sociologist Paul Johnston argues that “public workers are, through their movements and their unions, state builders, thus we need a theory of the state ... that includes the world of public work and the social movements of those who toil there.” 31

If we are to recognize public employees as state builders, then, it is useful to conceptualize the campaigns of business interest groups against public-employee unions as not just attacks against organized labor, but also as attempts to undermine the state. Or, as was the case in Charlotte (and later, the state of North Carolina), business interest groups (such as the Chamber of Commerce) effectively used one arm of the state (city council/the North Carolina legislature) to undermine another (city/state workers). North Carolina’s businessmen, having waged an effective decades-long assault on private sector unions across the state, saw public-sector unions as the last major impediment to their control over local and state government. At the same time, attacks on public-employee unions often became synonymous with attacks on the state itself and the role of government in providing services like police and fire protection, ambulance service, garbage pickup, street cleaning, and other arguably essential services.

Although it was primarily white and male workers who filled Charlotte’s union halls during the first half of the twentieth century, mid-twentieth century Charlotte’s contests over organized labor would also have important implications for African American and female workers (and especially African American women), for whom public jobs became integral to economic mobility in the following decades. 32

28 Zieger, American Workers, American Unions, 163-4.
29 Ibid, 164.
31 Paul Johnston, Success While Others Fail: Social Movement Unionism and the Public Workplace (Ithaca, 1994), 9, 215-316.
32 Some black Charlottians worked for the sanitation and streets department, but these were among the lowest paid positions in the city. Most of Charlotte’s city jobs and their unions remained segregated into the 1960s. There are, however, a number of studies on interracial unionism (and the challenges therein) elsewhere in the South. See especially Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana, 1993); William P. Jones, Tribe of Black Ulysses: African American Lumber Workers in the Jim Crow South (Urbana, 2005); Robert Korstad, Civil Rights Unionism: Tobacco Workers and the Struggle for Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth-Century South (Chapel Hill, 2003), and Robert Samuel Smith, Race, Labor, & Civil Rights: Griggs Versus Duke Power and the Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity (Baton Rouge, 2008).
in government-related jobs in 1950, this number almost tripled to 43 percent by 2000, with public jobs paying significantly higher wages and salaries than the private sector. Additionally, the size of a city’s black public workforce has been shown to correlate with lower poverty rates (that is, higher numbers of African Americans in city government correspond with the increased effectiveness of public assistance programs in addressing black poverty). Some scholars have even argued that African American public employment, more than federal anti-poverty programs, “proved the most powerful vehicles for African American economic mobility and the most effective anti-poverty legacy of the Great Society.”

Just over a year after the North Carolina AFL-CIO assembled in downtown Charlotte to discuss strategies for bolstering the state’s unions, another group congregated downtown to discuss the role of organized labor in the city. But unlike the union leaders a year before, however, these were area businessmen who had assembled to hear a lecture by New York attorney and labor-relations consultant Benjamin Werne. Emboldened by its recent legislative victory, Charlotte’s business community was now moving to the offensive and recruiting national experts to advise them on methods of combating unions and their organizers. Despite Southerners’ oft heard pronouncements against northern meddling in the southern workplace, Charlotte’s business community welcomed such influence if it helped them thwart organized labor.

Benjamin Werne did not disappoint. A rapt audience listened for more than two hours as he recounted experiences working in New York, one of the most heavily unionized cities (and states) in the nation. Painting a somber picture of a business’s future once its workers unionized, Werne offered a variety of maneuvers for avoiding, obstructing, and defeating organized labor. He warned against the dangers of shortsightedness, asking his audience, “Do [you] want to be crippled for a short period of time,” he asked rhetorically, “or crippled for the rest of [your] life [by a union]?” To this end, employers should devise delay tactics, such as demanding a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) hearing (which often took months or years to settle) if they got word that workers were attempting to organize. Such strategies would slow a union’s momentum and, hopefully, cause workers to distrust labor organizers and their promises. Should workers vote for union representation, Werne reassured his audience, all was not lost. Business owners should then focus on limiting

33 For an overview of the significance of public employment to African American economic mobility in the second half of the twentieth century, see Michael B. Katz and Mark J. Stern, One Nation Indivisible: What America Was and What It Is Becoming (New York, 2006), 91-95. Katz and Stern outline how “public employment became African Americans’ distinctive occupational niche.”
union effectiveness by being flexible and adaptable. This strategy would allow management to avoid the appearance of yielding to union demands. In other words, management should “always leave a crack in the door for face value.” Werne concluded by shifting from the pragmatic to moralistic. He cautioned, “When you say you can’t pay 10 cents and then finally agree to pay it, you’re telling your employees in language that they can’t forget that you can’t be counted on to tell the truth.”

Werne’s recruitment of Charlotte was consistent with larger national developments. The late 1950s witnessed a boom in the anti-labor consulting business, one that would continue to grow in the decades that followed. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and major national corporations like Sears, Roebuck & Co. began holding management-training sessions on anti-labor strategies. Resistance to and obstruction of organized labor also began encroaching more explicitly into the political sphere. Business leaders called on one another to run for political office as a way to stave off the power of labor unions. In February 1960, none other than actor turned General Electric spokesman Ronald Reagan, with political aspirations of his own, brought this message to the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce. In a talk entitled “Business, Ballots, and Bureaus,” Reagan emphasized “the modern importance of business in politics and government.” Reagan’s audience, however, hardly needed instructions on becoming more involved in policymaking. The Chamber of Commerce’s swift and successful crusade to outlaw municipal unions exemplifies the effectiveness with which business leaders had convinced elected officials that what was good for business was good for Charlotte.

II. Civil Rights and the Politics of Economic Development

In 1964, Charlotte writer Harry Golden declared that “[Charlotteans] would elect Martin [Luther] King or Malcolm X mayor if somehow one of them could give them a guarantee of no labor unions and no minimum wage for laundry workers.” Born Herschel Goldhirsch to Austro-Hungarian Jewish parents and raised in New York’s Lower East Side, Golden moved to Charlotte in 1941 to work for the American Federation of Labor’s Charlotte Labor Journal and the Charlotte Observer. According to one study of Golden, “while the Bible Belt accepted him, he always smacked of the Borscht Belt, exuding the stereotypical characteristics of a Yiddish-speaking, sidewalks-of-New York, diamond in the rough kibitzer whose political sentiments were

37 Pat Watters, Charlotte (Atlanta, 1964), 76.
An outsider uninterested in assimilating into Charlotte’s racially segregated, anti-union, Protestant culture, Golden instead dedicated himself highlighting the cruelty and absurdity of Jim Crow in everyday life through his one-man newspaper operation, *The Carolina Israelite*. A midcentury Jonathan Swift, Golden used the newspaper to advance outlandish proposals for undermining the segregationist regime. The most famous of these proposals was Golden’s 1956 “Vertical Negro Plan.” White Charlotteans, noted Golden, like the vast majority of white southerners, were content to stand among African Americans at grocery stores, in movie theaters ticket lines, and at bus stops, yet they insisted that seated venues like schools, buses, and churches, be segregated by race. Golden, in turn, proposed removing seats from students’ desks as a speedy route to compliance with *Brown v. Board* “since no one in the South pays the slightest attention to a vertical negro.”

Despite Golden’s humorous tone, however, his many “modest proposals” were intended to draw attention to the more serious reality of racial injustice while also embarrassing local boosters sensitive to their city’s reputation, and embarrass local boosters he did. While Golden’s role in accelerating desegregation in Charlotte should not be overstated, in the years that followed Charlotte’s business and civic leaders, responding to black pressure and out of fear of looking like a backwater Southern town (as Golden’s barbs were intended to suggest), took a proactive role in desegregating the city’s public establishments. Yet, as Golden recognized, the city leaders’ receptiveness to civil rights demands did not extend to organized labor. And while Charlotte avoided the sorts of public civil rights clashes that engulfed other southern cities during the 1960s (and northern industries looking to relocate or expand south rewarded the city accordingly), the city spent the better part of the 1960s battling its municipal workers over their rights to organize and bargain collectively. Charlotte’s labor clashes, however, rarely captured national attention — and have drawn little scholarly attention since, despite the interesting questions they raise. For example, to what degree, if any, did Charlotte’s moderate to progressive position on civil rights served to stave off, to varying degrees, labor radicalism? In turn, with labor neutralized and little possibility of the sorts of substantive civil rights/labor alliances that occurring in other parts of the country, did Charlotte’s business and civic leadership take a proactive stance on desegregation because they did not see it, over the long term, posing any fundamental challenge to the economic order in Charlotte?

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In order to explore the tensions between racial and economic liberalism in Charlotte that would eventually come to epitomize politics in the Sunbelt South, this project first looks at local electoral politics and coalition building in the 1950s and 1960s. It traces the ways in which both black and white elected officials united with the city’s business elite in repeated efforts to thwart labor activism, and, often at the same time, promote racially progressive positions. Specifically, it follows two episodes in Charlotte’s evolution. First, I examine the biracial pro-labor coalition that formed around Charlotte’s first female mayoral candidate, white city councilwoman Martha Evans, who was ultimately defeated by Chamber of Commerce chairman Stanford Brookshire in 1961. I then consider the 1964 campaign and subsequent political career of Fred Alexander, Charlotte’s first African American city councilman and outspoken opponent of organized labor.

Charlotte’s first city councilwoman, Martha Evans, offers an example of political roads not taken — she represented a vision of local politics that was inclusive, democratic, and supported by political coalitions built along economic lines. Although the city’s at-large election system favored candidates endorsed (and usually bankrolled) by Charlotte’s business community, a coalition of white working class and African American voters secured Evans’s election in 1955 (and her reelection in 1957). In 1959 Evans ran for the highest office in the city, challenging incumbent mayor James Smith, again with support from the same coalition of voters who boosted Evans twice to city. Although Evans campaign was ultimately unable to overcome her well-funded opponent, she nonetheless received 47 percent of the vote, carrying most African American precincts and many working-class white ones. According to one scholar, “her tally was especially impressive because she ‘did little advertising and hired no poll workers,’ the latter being a frequent euphemism for individuals who received gas money or other financial compensation for mobilizing white working class and black voters, by whatever means necessary.”

Undeterred by her first loss, Evan ran for mayor again in 1961, this time challenging sitting Chamber of Commerce president and the business elite’s preferred candidate, Stanford Brookshire. Taking a lesson from her loss to the well-funded Smith to inform her campaign strategy against Brookshire, Evans attempted to use her campaign’s economic handicap to her advantage. One campaign flyer, for example, circulated across the city told voters, “If you want a mayor who represents ALL THE PEOPLE, not just people with money,
you will vote on Tuesday for Martha W. Evans.” Evans’s underdog rhetoric, however, proved insufficient to defeat Brookshire and she again lost to the candidate with deeper pockets, but again carried the African American and working class white vote. Despite her loss, however, some local observers credited Evans’s candidacy with pushing Brookshire to become more progressive on civil rights over the course of his campaign in order to attract potential Evans voters.

Ignoring the role Evans might have played in his shifting political stance on desegregation, Brookshire told one visiting journalist that a combination of “social consciousness, civic pride, and economic considerations” had moved him, along with the Chamber of Commerce, to spearhead local desegregation efforts. For years, black Charlotteans pressured the city to integrate its hotels, restaurants, swimming pools, and other public spaces, yet 1963 turned out to be a watershed year for civil rights in Charlotte when increased black political pressure at the local level combined with escalating civil rights clashes across the South. According to one study, such pressure “moved Brookshire to do ‘voluntarily’ what he knew was inevitable.” Fearing Charlotte might go the way of Birmingham or Little Rock, the Chamber of Commerce unanimously passed a resolution recommending “all businesses in this community catering to the general public be opened immediately to all customers without regard to race, creed, or color.” Brookshire’s successor, Chamber president and local banker John Edward Burnside, convinced a group of local hotel and restaurant owners to integrate their businesses, thereby setting a precedent which other city establishments could follow. Of all the arguments he made, Burnside’s economic argument proved most persuasive to this audience of Sunbelt businessmen. According to one business owner in attendance, “[t]he vivid reminder of the years that Little Rock went without a single new industry coming to town after its racial difficulties in 1957 was the most effective point made.” An executive for Eastern Airlines confirmed that his company had chosen Charlotte over other southern cities to build a six-million-dollar computer center because of “the admirable way race relations had been handled.” In an article entitled “Credit and the Development of the South,” published in the University of Virginia Newsletter, Preston T. Holmes, the Vice President of State-Planters Bank of Commerce and Trust in Richmond wrote that “[t]he manner in which [desegregation] is handled will have a tremendous effect on the ability of the South to attract new industry and to encourage existing industries to expand their present facilities. North Carolina,
with legal compliance with the \[Brown v. Board\] and little social unrest, had a new plant investment in 1958 totaling $253 million, while Arkansas, with its massive resistance and unsettled conditions, had only $25.4 million in 1958 compared with $44.9 in 1957 and $131 million in 1956.\[47\] Indeed, Charlotte’s recent economic growth was likely the most important determining factor in Brookshire and the business community’s decision to openly support desegregation efforts. With Charlotte finally becoming the city its boosters had long envisioned, local leaders were eager to stave off anything that might compromise Charlotte’s burgeoning status.

With business and city leaders showing increased support for civil rights initiatives, African Americans also found new openings for formal participation in local politics. In 1965, Charlotte voters elected funeral home director Frederick Douglass Alexander to the city council, making him the first African American elected to a city office since Reconstruction. For many black Charlotteans, Alexander’s election proved a first step in bringing home the gains of the recent Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. Alexander’s victory, however, was not without controversy. In order to win an at-large election in a city with a black minority, Alexander’s camp determined that his supporters would need to cast “single shot” votes. In other words, rather than voting for a full slate of seven candidates, as voters had traditionally done, supporters would cast a lone vote for Alexander and leave the remainder of the ballot empty. Although the strategy was successful, it enraged Charlotte’s old guard, which included the other councilmembers, numerous city officials, as well as the Charlotte News and Observer. Alexander had “pushed his way” in, the Observer contended, and, in so doing, had manipulated the democratic process.\[48\] Alexander countered this claim, reminding critics that his strategy was entirely legal; not to mention the fact that claims about “the democratic process” were disingenuous given the many barriers still in place to African American voting. Alexander maintained that had a white candidate used the same strategy, it would have been praised as “smart politics.”\[49\] In reviewing post-election poll numbers, moreover, the Alexander campaign was able to show decisively that the single-shot strategy was the only tactic sure to get Alexander, or any other black candidate for that matter, elected in a white-majority city.\[50\]

Despite Alexander’s controversial entrée into city politics, he proved to be a fairly moderate city councilman. In many ways, Alexander


was an archetypal first black elected official in a southern city. The first-born son of Zechariah Alexander, a district manager for North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company (one of the nation’s largest African American-owned businesses at the time) turned prominent funeral home director, Fred Alexander was afforded countless opportunities unavailable to most black Charlotteans. Alexander attended high school in Charlotte but headed north for college, to Philadelphia’s Lincoln University. Alexander’s elite education and affluent family background shaped his faith in the educated black middle class. Upon graduation from college, Alexander returned to Charlotte intent on improving opportunities for black Charlotteans and focused his energy on registering black voters and lobbying for the city to hire more black employees. Some black activists in the city, such as local dentist and community activist Reginald Hawkins, criticized Alexander’s moderation, arguing that he did not sufficiently advocate for African Americans from his seat on city council and ignored the interests of working class blacks in favor of capitulating to Charlotte’s business leaders.51

Alexander’s pro-business outlook and cordial relationship with Charlotte’s business community translated into a general hostility toward organized labor. On frequent occasions, Alexander argued that “labor unions offer little to nothing in the struggle for Negro rights in the South, not even membership.”52 Indeed, Alexander had a point. African Americans had reason to be skeptical of organized labor given their historic exclusion from trade unions across the nation. “You can’t get anywhere dealing with the poor white man,” Alexander maintained. “He’s just like the Negro — struggling.”53

Although some prominent black leaders like Alexander were hostile towards organized labor, alliances between civil rights and labor activists were being formed in cities across the south. One place these alliances became most evident was in civil rights-era public worker activism. Public workers in the 1960s declared an unprecedented number of strikes. In 1967 alone, the nation witnessed 250 public-employee strikes, a fourfold increase over the previous one-year record.54 A few strikes, such as the New York and Memphis sanitation strikes of 1968, the Charleston hospital workers strike in 1969, and the wildcat postal workers strike in 1970 — carried out by 180,000 postal workers nationwide, two-thirds of whom were black — were particularly effective in capturing national attention and casting light on the difficult, dangerous, and often demeaning work carried out by

51 Smith, Boom for Whom? 39–41, this description also draws on Penninger, “The Emergence of Black Political Power.”
52 Pat Watters, Charlotte (Atlanta, 1964), 37.
53 Ibid, 34. For more on black workers and unionism in the South, see Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights.
54 Zieger, American Workers, American Unions 165.
many of the nation’s public employees. One of the most prominent examples of this coalition was the 1968 sanitation workers strike in Memphis — it was the Memphis strikers whom Martin Luther King, Jr. had come to support before he was assassinated.

In Charlotte, similar connections were also being forged between civil rights and labor activists. Inspired by recent civil rights activism, in 1969 the city’s firefighters decided to file a lawsuit in federal district court to challenge the state’s ban on public-employee unions. Frustrated with stagnant wages, outdated equipment and inadequate grievance procedures, the city’s firefighters had formed the Firefighters Assembly in the two years prior. Yet without the ability to bargain collectively on behalf of the firefighters, the Assembly was little more than a fraternal organization.55 “Well, the law said we could not belong to a labor union,” stated Atkins, “and in the sixties, at that time there was big movements, Martin Luther King and all those other people. I thought to myself, ‘They can’t get me for freedom of assembly.’”56 So, Charlotte’s still all-white fire department57 hired one of the state’s best civil rights lawyers, African American attorney Julius Chambers, as lead counsel. Bill Brawley, president of the Assembly and the Charlotte Labor Council, explained that hiring Chambers served two interrelated strategic functions. First, it bought the fire fighters time. With the fire department being entirely white, they knew an anti-discrimination lawsuit was imminent. According to Brawley, “We would have been sued had it not been for the fact that the best civil rights lawyer in the state, who would probably have handled the suit, was representing the firefighters, and he wouldn’t take those cases because of the conflict.” Second, Chambers’s hiring sent an antagonistic message to city officials. Julius Chambers established himself as a formidable opponent in the courtroom as the plaintiff’s attorney in the landmark Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools decision concerning school desegregation. In short, the city of Charlotte had already faced Chambers in courtroom and lost and was not eager to do so again. According to Brawley, some white firefighters objected to hiring Chambers, especially in light of the Swann case, but Brawley said his response to such complaints was always the same: “Hell, that’s why we hired him! He wins.”58 The court ultimately ruled in partial favor of the firefighters and declared unconstitutional the portion of NC 95-98 prohibiting the state’s firefighters and police officers from unionizing, on the grounds that it violated their right to free assembly, while leaving intact the ban on public employee unions.59

57 The fire department hired its first African American firefighter not long after they hired Chambers.
Conclusion

My dissertation project includes an examination of economic growth and black politics in Charlotte in the 1970s and early 1980s. In contrast to the post-World War II economic boom, which saw both employment and wages on the rise along with a mild redistribution of wealth through the late 1960s, the 1970s ushered in what historian Judith Stein has called “the Age of the Inequality.” American workers throughout this decade witnessed many of the gains of the previous era collapse as record levels of high inflation and unemployment led to a period of growing economic inequality. For the first time since the 1930s, “Americans ended [the decade] poorer than they began.”60 Within this national context, my project also explores the trajectory of black politics in this emerging Sunbelt city in the wake of the civil rights legislation of 1964 and 1965. Why were some former activists folded into city government while others pursued the ideologies of self-help and black capitalism outside of electoral politics? How did this growing inequality shape the lives of working class African Americans living in a city in the midst of substantial economic growth? My project is particularly attentive to the ways in which electoral alliances between the city’s black political leadership and the business elite evolved in the 1970s and early 1980s, culminating in the 1983 election of architect and former city councilman Harvey Gantt, Charlotte’s first African American mayor. As the first large city in the South with a white majority to elect a black mayor, Gantt’s election reinforced Charlotte’s reputation for progressive Sunbelt politics.

The final part of my project traces the ascendancy of Charlotte’s banking sector through the 1990s. While Charlotte’s boosters always dreamed that the city would grow to national significance, it was not until a particularly aggressive set of bank executives used North Carolina’s liberal banking laws, passed in the 1960s and 1970s, to take advantage of national cross-state banking deregulation in the 1980s that this dream had the potential to become reality. This section explores the relationship between business and politics on the local level in this new era of deregulation, drawing on a promising collection of oral histories with NationsBank executives. I will conclude by considering the social and political implications of African American reverse migration to Charlotte, one of the important demographic consequences of the city’s massive economic growth.

60 Stein, Pivotal Decade, x-xiv.
Epilogue

In September 2012, Charlotte was chosen to host the Democratic National Convention. As was to be expected, a variety of speakers addressed the convention and, like its Republican counterpart, the convention serves as an opportunity for speakers to rally the so-called base of the Democratic Party. First Lady Michelle Obama, San Antonio mayor Julian Castro, former President Bill Clinton, and a host of Democratic Party celebrities as well as rising stars all made their case for President Obama’s reelection. Vice President Joe Biden told the audience of loyal Democrats, as he announced numerous times on the campaign trail, “Bin Laden is Dead, General Motors is alive.” United Auto Workers President Bob King also addressed the convention, saying, “The auto industry has added a quarter of a million jobs and is thriving once again. These are good middle class jobs — jobs making things for an economy built to last.” Importantly, however, King failed to mention that many of these jobs are at foreign-owned plants throughout the American South such as Toyota and Volkswagen, which do not employ union labor.

As cameras panned across the seemingly diverse crowd of delegates and party members, organized labor beyond the United Auto Workers was one group not visibly present in large numbers. In fact, when the Democratic National Committee announced that they had chosen Charlotte as the site for the 2012 Convention, UNITE HERE, the nation’s largest hotel workers’ union, threatened a boycott due to the fact that none of the city’s hotels are unionized.61 There was such union dissatisfaction with the DNC’s decision that a number of unions and labor activists held an alternate conference at a nearby church. Rick Sloan, communications director for the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, told the press, “Going to a right-to-work state and starting a convention on Labor Day for the Democrats? Wow. That’s quite the equation.”62

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EDITORIAL NOTICE

We would like to communicate this note from Jasper Trautsch to the readers of the following article:

"Due to an oversight, I failed to cite the following source in footnotes 26 and 43 in my article ‘The Invention of the West,’ Bulletin of the GHI 53 (Fall 2013), p. 89-102:


I would like to express my sincere regrets for this oversight and explicitly refer readers to Bavaj’s article in this notice.”

Jasper Trautsch

This notice was published in Bulletin of the GHI 55 (Fall 2014): 178.
THE INVENTION OF THE “WEST”

Jasper M. Trautsch
GHI FELLOW IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY, 2012-13

I. Introduction

Histories of “Western Civilization” tend to be based on the assumption that the cultural space of “the West” is defined by democracy, individualism, and liberalism. Consequently, they trace the development and gradual expansion of “western” freedoms from the birth of democracy in ancient Greece, through the expansion of liberties and civil rights in the wake of the Enlightenment, to the defense of “western” democracy against fascism and communism in the twentieth century, in order to show how “western” nations became exemplary, stable, and wealthy democracies.1 There are also numerous monographs which celebrate and explain the uniqueness and alleged superiority of “the West” or “Western Civilization.”2

These sweeping overviews of Euro-Atlantic history usually first define what they hold to be “western” values and then analyze how (Western) Europe and North America came to develop into a “community of values” characterized by political participation, pluralist civil societies, human rights, the separation of powers, and the protection of civil liberties over the course of time. Such analyses, however, typically ignore contradictory developments such as imperialism, colonial exploitation, totalitarianism, and genocide (which could just as well be defined as “western”) or downplay them as an “aberration” from the true “end” of the West’s history: the expansion of freedom. Alternatively, historians have examined the value systems of countries like Germany in a specific period to determine how “western” they had become, usually by comparing them to the

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Anglo-Saxon countries, which serve as the normative standard of measurement. This treatment of “the West” is essentialist. Since “the West” is a construct and not a timeless entity and since defining certain values as “western” is a normative exercise, an analysis of how the concept of the West emerged and how it was supplied with meaning is needed.3

How the concept of the West evolved is a question which historians have largely ignored. While there is an abundance of work on the history of “Western Civilization,” there is little literature on the conceptual origins and shifting meanings of “the West.”4 Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, the German handbook on fundamental concepts of history, for example, does not have an entry for the concept of the West.5 A possible reason for this neglect might be the belief that, at first sight, geographical terms seem to have a clear meaning that does not require elaborate historical analysis. As critical or cultural meta-geographers such as Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen have demonstrated, however, mapping the world is never objective but always follows time- and culture-specific modes of perception.6 The same is true of cardinal directions.7 Geographical concepts — particularly those frequently employed in political discourse, such as “the West” — are tied to non-geographical concepts such as democracy to provide them with meaning and import. They are not neutral but imply normative judgments that call for critical scrutiny. This article will reconstruct how the concept of Western Civilization emerged and acquired its current connotations.

II. Westernizers versus Slavophiles

The geographical concept of the West can be traced back for millennia. The idea of a westward movement of empires achieved prominence in the Middle Ages as the theory of translatio imperii, which held that power would be repeatedly transferred from east to west. Ever since


the early eighteenth century, this “heliotropic myth” has been influential for American self-descriptions.\(^8\) From Troy in the east through Greece to Rome, “westward the course of empire takes its way,” as the Anglo-Irish philosopher George Berkeley famously put it in his *Verses on the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America*.\(^9\) It was only in the nineteenth century, however, that the modern idea of the West as a *cultural community* linking Western European nations (and later North America as well) emerged.\(^10\)

As capitalism and the industrial revolution dramatically transformed Western Europe and North America, a socio-economic schism between them and Russia emerged, and consequently an east-west divide came to dominate European mental maps. Before the nineteenth century, Russia had mostly been considered a northern power. The roots of the designation of Russia as a northern state can be traced to the ancient worldview according to which Europe’s major dividing line went from northwest to southeast separating the Roman Empire in the south from territories outside Roman control in the north; the “East” was usually synonymous with the “Orient.” In the nineteenth century, however, Russia, in light of its diverging development, was slowly re-imagined as an eastern power. Industrializing Western Europe appeared increasingly “modern” and “progressive,” whereas Russia was described as inherently “backward” and “reactionary.”\(^11\)

The spatial reordering of Europe in the nineteenth century, however, was not an imposition by the quickly developing Western European countries. To the contrary, it can be said that the concept of the West was invented in Russia, where it stood at the center of debates over Russian identity. In his 1829 review of Russia’s development since Peter the Great’s ambitious attempts to “Europeanize” Russia, the Russian philosopher Pyotr Chaadayev complained bitterly that Russians were “neither of the Occident nor of the Orient,” resisted

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\(^8\) Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, *The Myth of the West: America as the Last Empire* (Grand Rapids, 1995).


\(^10\) The context of European nationalism and imperialism was essential for the concept of the West as a cultural community to emerge. The ideology of nationalism promoted the idea of cultural individuality and thus made it possible to imagine the world being composed of various distinct civilizations. As European nations set out to colonize the rest of the world, they claimed the superiority of their own civilization to justify their imperialism. As a result, the concept of the West had a distinctly racial cast and was closely tied to the concept of whiteness. See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978). Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983). Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics, and History* (Basingstoke, 2004).

“all real progress,” and had not been as affected as their “Western brethren” by the ideas “of justice, right, and order.”12 In his critique of Russian society, Chaadayev used the concept of the West as a point of comparison from which to evaluate Russia’s development in the last century.

The publication of Chaadayev’s First Philosophical Letter in 1836 set off an intense debate about Russian identity and led to the formation of two political camps. The “Westernizers” wished that Russia would follow the course of Western European countries and modernize according to their example in order to catch up to those states that had become more powerful than Russia over the course of the nineteenth century. The “Slavophiles,” by contrast, gave the term “Westernizers” a negative connotation and set Russia’s allegedly harmonious, organic, and spiritual community proudly apart from what they perceived as a divisive, artificial, and hollow “West.” In the 1860s, Pan-Slavists used the discourse of Russian Anti-Westernism to dissociate a Slavic civilization from a Romano-Germanic Europe, which was believed to be in eventual decline, and to justify Russian expansionism. To Slavophiles, Russia was a distinct civilization defined in opposition to “the West.”13 In the Russian print discourse, the term “the West” would, therefore, be used synonymously with (non-Russian) Europe.14 It should be noted, however, that Russia did not identify itself with “the East.” The Russian term “vostok” (east) only referred to the “Orient.” Russia’s disassociation from “the West” was always framed in the opposition of “Russia and the West” or “Russia and Europe”; it was, in other words, located between the “vostok” and the “zapad” (west).15 Over the course of the nineteenth century, imperial authorities and the Russian Geographical Society produced maps incorporating contested territory in the west into the Russian state, and as a result, the geographical location of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in Europe was also increasingly “easternized.”16

The rest of Europe followed the Russian debates about “the West,” and Russian anti-Westernism certainly contributed to the fact that


16 Steven Seegel, Mapping Europe’s Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire (Chicago, 2012). Since nineteenth-century nationalists often used language as a marker of national identity, nations that spoke Slavic languages came to be considered “eastern.” Slavic studies defined Eastern Europe through linguistic and cultural homogeneity. The East-West divide of the Cold War was thus not totally arbitrary, but was based on a historical legacy. Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, “Mental Maps: Die Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28, 3 (2002): 501–503.
the developing Western European concept of the West tended to be constructed in opposition to Russia. According to Ezequiel Adamovsky, "between about 1740 and 1860, Russia was constructed as a ‘land of absence,’ a historical entity characterized not by what it is but by what it lacks — that is, by the absence of certain elements that were considered fundamental to civilization, development, modernity, or simply freedom." In the eyes of Western Europeans, Russia thus became the antithesis of “the West.” In fact, the “Easternization” of Russia and the “Westernization” of Western Europe went hand in hand. It was “by means of the concept of Eastern Europe” that “the narrative of Western civilization transferred onto the Slavic nations many of the stereotypes and prejudices traditionally ascribed to the Orient” and thus invented “the West” in a process which Adamovsky has described as “Euro-Orientalism.” The Crimean War of 1854, in which France and Great Britain were pitted against Russia, contributed further to the ideological antagonism between Russia — now synonymous with “the East” — and “the West.”

Defining “Western Civilization” in opposition to Russia resulted in the increasing association of “the West” with industrialism, capitalism, progress, and the Enlightenment. These were the elements that Slavophiles rejected most emphatically, considering them incompatible with Russian identity. These values thus lost their universal claims, as they became tied to a specific locality: “the East” and “the West.” Subsequently, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 further promoted the idea of the West as antithetical to Russia.

Importantly, the concept of the West developed within a European context. Russia — deeply entangled in European history — was not excluded from what was held to be the European “continent.” Most Europeans considered the Ural Mountains to be the border between Europe and Asia, and thus Russia was a power that was both European and Asian. Since Europe as a continent included Russia, some observers went so far as to claim that the idea of Europe was irrelevant as a civilizational category. In The Decline of the West (published between 1918 and 1922), which was groundbreaking in promoting the idea of the West as a coherent cultural community, Oswald Spengler dismissed the idea of Europe. “The word ‘Europe’ ought to be struck out of history,” he wrote. “There is historically no ‘European’ type. [...] It is thanks to this word ‘Europe’ alone, and the complex of ideas resulting from it, that our historical consciousness has come to link Russia with the West in an utterly baseless unity.
III. “German Culture” versus “Western Civilization”

In the German states, the development of the concept of the West was more complicated. The Atlantic Revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were an essential precondition for the emergence of the idea of a Western Civilization, since they created an ideological schism in the Euro-Atlantic world separating the nations that had undergone democratic change and those that had not. As a result, although the emerging German nationalism was highly Russophobic, most German intellectuals tended not to identify with “the West,” which they associated with weak and ineffective democratic government. In part, this can be attributed to Germany’s geographical position in Central Europe, which promoted the idea that Germany occupied a mediating role between “western” and “eastern” principles. The concept of central Europe (Mitteleuropa), dominated by its German region, also gained currency in the nineteenth century.

Even though German liberals attacked Russia’s “eastern” despotism, the notion that Germany was part of a “Western Civilization” was not very popular. Instead, in the early twentieth century, German intellectuals contrasted the “ideas of 1914” with the “ideas of 1789,” and “German culture” with “Western Civilization” in order to assert German superiority over Great Britain and France and to justify the First World War. Thomas Mann, for example, pitted German culture (Kultur), spirit (Geist), soul (Seele), freedom (Freiheit), and art (Kunst) against “Western” civilization (Zivilisation), society (Gesellschaft), politics (Politik), voting rights (Stimmrecht), and literature (Literatur). To many Germans, “western democracy” became the antinomy of German values.


27 See Marcus Llanque, Demokratisches Denken im Krieg: Die deutsche Debatten im Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin, 2000).
a special path (Sonderweg) — avoiding “western materialism” and “eastern despotism” — became an important component of German national identity.29

The German debate was closely followed in Great Britain, France, and the United States, where intellectuals used Germany as a negative foil to define “the West.” By 1834, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston assembled a “western” quadruple alliance, consisting of the constitutional states of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal, against the Holy Alliance of monarchical states, consisting of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. While the immediate origin of the alliance was the desire to support the more liberal contestants for the Spanish and Portuguese thrones, it was also intended as a diplomatic alliance for the defense of liberal governments in Europe.30 The quadruple alliance was thus not only based on power politics but justified ideologically. For the first time, Europe witnessed the emergence of an alliance that set a liberal “West” against an illiberal “East.”31

Since there was no direct threat from the “eastern” powers and the Holy Alliance was fragile, the “western alliance” failed to garner lasting political influence. For “the West” to become a useful concept for structuring international relations, a powerful enemy image was needed. This came about only in the early twentieth century, in the form of the expansionist German Empire. It was thus not just in Germany that the First World War was depicted as an ideological struggle between the “ideas of 1914” and the “ideas of 1789.” As with the Russian debates of the nineteenth century, the German debates about the “ideas of 1914” were absorbed in Western Europe and North America and given a negative twist. Great Britain, France, and the United States thus, too, conceived of the conflict in ideological terms between “western” democracies and “eastern” autocracies. The identification of “the West” with liberalism and democracy was hence further strengthened.32


31 Hochgeschwender, “Was ist der Westen?,” 21. See also Karl Eduard Goldmann, *Die europäische Pentarchie* (Leipzig, 1839), 111.

The notion of a Western Civilization, characterized by democracy and capitalism and whose roots could be traced back to ancient Greece, gained widespread popularity in Britain, France, and even in the United States. This was a profoundly new development: previously, Americans had defined themselves in opposition to Europe and had interpreted the founding of their union as a radical break with the past. A new “Grand Narrative,” as David Gress called it, emerged, which placed the United States firmly into a larger civilization and which told a story of continual democratic progress from antiquity to modernity, culminating in America’s exemplary republic. Subsequently, Americans were taught the narrative in newly created “Western Civilization” courses at institutions of higher education. It is no coincidence that the concept of Western Civilization caught on with the onset of the First World War, since it provided a justification for American participation in the conflict. In opposition to the German “ideas of 1914,” American propagandists represented the war as a “fight for civilization and human liberty against barbarism.” Walter Lippmann, editor of the influential magazine The New Republic, for example, called for America’s entry into the war in 1917 by arguing that the United States was part of an “Atlantic community” that had been attacked. Germany’s war against France and Great Britain was a war “against a civilization of which we are a part.” The new narrative was a corrective to the frontier thesis, which held that American democratic practices were the result of unique New World experiences and justified American unilateralism rather than American involvement in European affairs. The Second World War also promoted the notion of a Western Civilization linking democratic North America and Western Europe in a common cultural space threatened by fascism and Nazism. Again, America’s involvement in Europe was justified by re-imagining America not as an independent “city-upon-the-hill,” but as part of a larger civilization in imminent

34 Gress, From Plato to NATO, 39.
Gress, From Plato to NATO.
36 Gruber, Mars and Minerva, 57.
On Walter Lippmann see D. Steven Blum, Walter Lippmann: Cosmopolitanism in the Century of Total War (Ithaca, 1984).
38 Gress, From Plato to NATO, 175–179.
danger, thus turning America from a continental into an Atlantic power.\(^3\) In a similar argument used to justify America’s entry into the First World War, Lippmann explained to Americans that the “Atlantic Ocean is not the frontier between Europe and America” but the “inland sea of a community of nations allied with one another by geography, history and vital necessity.”\(^4\)

The importance of the World Wars thus lay not only in the powerful boost they gave to the concept of the West but also in the fact that “Western Civilization” now also included — besides Great Britain and France — the United States. Moreover, at least within the American discourse, the United States actually emerged as the hegemonic power and, in the words of Henry Luce, the “inheritor of all the great principles of Western Civilization.”\(^4\)

### IV. “Western Civilization” and “American Exceptionalism”

In 1945, all the major elements of the concept of the West had emerged. It combined the North American and West European nations in a common cultural space that was defined by the heritage of the Enlightenment, liberalism, and democracy, whose history could be traced to ancient Greece. It was only in the postwar situation, however, that “the West” would become the most important principle structuring international relations and that it would achieve the same prominence in the United States, which still had reservations about entanglements with the Old World, and Germany, which had previously kept out of the “western” camp, as in Great Britain and France.

As Patrick Thaddeus Jackson demonstrated, it is misleading to characterize American debates about the role of the United States in the postwar order as a struggle between isolationists and internationalists. Instead, it is more fruitful to frame the American discussion as one between proponents of either “exemplarism” or “vindicationism.” To exemplarists, America was different from Europe and even defined itself by its distinctiveness from the Old World. Vindicationists, by contrast, emphasized that the United States was part of a larger “Western Civilization” and therefore argued that it was America’s duty to protect “Western Civilization” from the communist threat. According to Jackson, “America was still considered to be exceptional within ‘Western Civilization,’ and ‘Western Civilization’ was exceptional when compared to the rest of the world, but (in effect) the firm connection between the physical borders of the United States and the boundaries of America were severed.”\(^4\)

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42 Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 19.
The traditions of isolationism (the doctrine of completely withdrawing from Europe and rejecting alliances and foreign commitments) and exceptionalism (the belief that America was inherently different from and superior to Europe and did not conform to European laws and norms) were deeply ingrained in American identity. As a result, it took an “army” of publicists and politicians engaged in a collaborative “propaganda” effort to legitimize the notion that America was an integral part of an Atlantic community of “the West,” which required American power for its defense against Soviet communism.43 Besides Walter Lippmann, the journalist Clarence K. Streit suggested a union of North Atlantic democracies to protect individual freedoms. It would be based on the common “western” heritage of the Atlantic Revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.44 It was not only liberal internationalists who invoked the idea of a Western Civilization to justify American involvement in Europe. Conservative intellectuals such as Carlton J. H. Hayes and Ross J. F. Hoffman also promoted the notion that Western Europe and North America formed a civilization that required America to defend the Old World against “eastern” communism. In a critical response to Frederick Jackson Turner’s “frontier thesis,” which highlighted America’s uniqueness and separateness from Europe, Hayes claimed that America was the western frontier of Europe.45 The American government, too, employed the notion of a Western Civilization tying the United States to Europe to garner support for its postwar policies. Secretary of State George Marshall justified the European Recovery Program to Congress in January 1948 by arguing that if Europe’s economy did not recover and Western Europe fell prey to communism, “the historic base of Western civilization, of which we are by belief and inheritance an integral part,” would be shattered.46 His successor Dean Acheson explained in a speech delivered in April 1950 that the purpose of NATO was not just the defense of democratic forms of government in Western Europe. “But, more than the institution of democratic government is at stake,” Acheson explained. “The threat, as I have said, is to our civilization, and each of us is a bearer of that civilization.”47 As a result of these collaborative efforts by propagators of “the West,”

43 See Ronald Steel, Emiliano Alessandri, and Marco Mariano (eds.), Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century (New York, 2010).


Americans came to conceive of their nation as part of “Western Civilization,” the defense of which justified America’s integration into a transatlantic security system.

V. From the Abendland to the “West”

Whereas Germans had commonly considered themselves to be outside “Western Civilization” before 1945, the postwar situation was conducive to a reinvestigation of Germany’s relationship with “the West.” An important precondition for Germany to conceive of itself as part of a larger “Western Civilization” was the concept of the Abendland (“occident”). While the term Abendland had already been used in the sixteenth century, it was only in the nineteenth century that the concept of the Abendland as a fixed cultural space, defined in opposition to the Morgenland (“orient”), emerged in Europe, particularly in England, France, Germany, Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula. It evolved in response to the French Revolution and connoted Europe, whose roots were to be found in medieval Christendom and which had been unified before the Reformation. Having a strong religious undertone, which the concept of the West lacked, it was particularly popular among Catholics. In contrast to the concept of a liberal West based on individualism, the Enlightenment heritage, and democratic traditions going back to ancient Greece, the Abendland concept was strongly conservative, emphasized values such as order and authority, and was defined in opposition to both Russia and America. America — the epitome of modernity and liberal democracy — was the antinomy of the Abendland, which stood for tradition and Christianity.48

While there were thus profound differences between the concept of the Abendland and the West, the former was essential for making it possible for Germans to adapt so easily to the idea that they were part of “the West” after 1945. Jackson argued that “it is the Abendland strain that survives Germany’s defeat in the Second World War and eventually serves as the legitimating rhetoric for Germany’s reconstruction as a part of the West.”49 According to Axel Schildt, the Abendland ideology served as the bridge that allowed West German conservatives to make their peace with the transatlantic alliance and integration into “the West.”50 The Abendland concept paved the way for the concept of the West to gain a hold in the Federal Republic after 1945 by means of its claim that Germany was a central part of a supranational civilization. As many Western Europeans felt threatened by

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49 Jackson, Civilizing the Enemy, 98.

50 Schildt, Zwischen Abendland und Amerika, 19.
the Soviet Union and found America’s support indispensible for their security, the strong anticommunist impetus of the Abendland ideology and its emphasis of Christianity as a civilizational link also allowed for the inclusion of America into this cultural space. Therefore, when Adenauer justified West Germany’s close cooperation with the U.S. after the end of the Second World War, he could declare at the first party rally of the Christian Democratic Union in the British Zone in 1947 that “Abendland, the Christian Abendland, is not a geographical concept: it is a historical concept that also includes America. It is this Christian Abendland that we want to try to save.”

While certain elements of the Abendland concept facilitated the dissemination of the idea that Germany was part of “the West,” we are still left with the question of why that idea gained widespread acceptance so quickly. Most importantly, the notion of a common Western Civilization now allowed Germans to disavow their “special path” tradition. After World War II and the Holocaust had thoroughly discredited any positive ideas of a German exceptionalism, emphasizing that Germany was and always had been part of “the West” not only legitimized Germany’s integration in the Atlantic alliance, but also justified transferring full sovereignty to the West German government. Moreover, if Germany was an essential member of “the West,” it also had to be equal to the other members. Since the Federal Republic was dependent on its alliance with the United States and the key to re-attaining sovereignty lay in American hands, it was politically expedient to emphasize German-American commonalities. Moreover, the United States exerted a tremendous cultural influence in West Germany in the early years of the Cold War, because a large number of Americans were stationed in West Germany, American economic and cultural products flooded the German market, and the United States actively tried to influence West German society through institutions such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Furthermore, partially as a result of America’s cultural influence, West Germany’s society became more liberal in the 1950s, undermining the Abendland concept, whose appeal to pre-Enlightenment Christianity made it seem increasingly antiquated, if not outright reactionary. Finally, emphasizing liberalism as the true building block of “Western Civilization” was the best way of countering the internationalism of communism, as it allowed for a “western” universalism based on the Enlightenment heritage.
Thus a transnational coalition emerged that legitimized the postwar order by propagating the concept of a Western Civilization threatened by “eastern communism.” North America and Western Europe were linked in a common cultural space, institutionalized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which understood itself not just as an alliance of convenience but as a community of nations sharing the same values and the same cultural heritage.

VI. The Future of the Concept of the West

The geopolitical threat of first Imperial and Nazi Germany and later the Soviet Union was an essential precondition for the emergence of the concept of the West. In consequence, the end of the Cold War could have marked the end of the “Atlantic community,” since “the West’s” imaginary Other had simply disappeared. As Owen Harries argued in 1993, “the political ‘West’ is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile ‘East’ to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity.” As a result, he predicted, the dissolution of the Soviet Union would necessarily result in the end of “the West.”


On the other hand, new enemy images emerged, which replaced the Soviet Union and which gave a new boost to the concept of the West. Most prominently, Samuel Huntington’s prediction about a “clash of civilizations” suggested that “the West” found its new nemesis in radical Islam. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, gave, at first glance, credence to his claims and brought renewed attention to the idea of a Western Civilization. The rise of new non-democratic powers, moreover, is undermining the enthusiasm for the universalism of “western” values reaffirming the perception of “the West’s” uniqueness. Nations such as China openly challenge the validity of “western” forms of democracy and instead propagate “Asian values.” Whether the concept of the West has reached its
heyday or will continue as a potent force in world politics is, therefore, an open question.

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IN SEARCH OF BETTER LIVES: 
THE CIRCULATION OF IDEAS FOR SOCIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Workshop at the GHI, March 8-9, 2013. Conveners: Christina Lubinski (GHI), Christina May (University of Göttingen), Warren Rosenblum (Webster University in St. Louis). Participants: Sonja Blum (University of Vienna), Adrienne Chambon (University of Toronto), Wiebke Glässer (Humboldt University, Berlin), Marjorie Johnstone (University of Toronto), Gül Karagöz-Kızılca (University of Ankara), Stefan Köngeter (University of Hildesheim), Beate Loeffler (Dresden), Mark Malisa (University of Saint Rose in Albany), Julia Moses (University of Sheffield), Frauke Scheffler (University of Cologne), Malte Thießen (University of Oldenburg), Carmen Van Praet (University of Ghent), Margaret Vining (National Museum of American History, Washington DC).

The social improvement of everyday lives is a much debated topic. Many current social problems have an international character and occur in a variety of countries, although the economic, political, and cultural conditions differ considerably. International organizations and institutions, in particular, work in the field of social improvement on a global level. However, the current social challenges are not the first that aroused ideas of social improvement beyond national borders among policy makers, reformers, and experts. This workshop focused on the circulation and implementation of these ideas in a historical perspective. One of the main goals was to study how social reforms were transferred across borders and who were the actors involved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The papers and presentations illustrated how ideas of social improvement occurred in different regions and countries. The various interdisciplinary approaches and the transnational perspective served as an excellent basis for a lively conference. Instead of describing each panel, the following report discusses the workshop’s major themes.

One of the main topics that arose was the importance of cultural ties that can lead to the transfer of ideas. Countries that belong to a common cultural community, such as the member states of the European Union for example, tend to borrow ideas from each other. Sonja Blum presented examples of ideational exchanges between countries that have certain cultural similarities. She analyzed to what extent family reforms in Germany and Austria in the period 2000-2010
were influenced by different forms of mutual policy transfers. Blum pointed out that these forms of transfer depend on cultural, political, and economic settings; often one group of countries serves as a role model for others. Carmen Van Praet showed an example of such a role model, focusing on the nineteenth century’s ideas on housing. Van Praet presented the case of the *cité ouvrière* in Mulhouse, France, which served as an international model for solving worker housing problems. By analyzing international congresses on housing, Van Praet highlighted that ideas were exchanged interactively rather than unilaterally.

Van Praet’s considerations also addressed scientific exchange among experts. In this context, Christina May’s talk on social ideas and their circulation among international experts and institutions around 1900 brought up a new aspect of transfer: knowledge. May described knowledge as well as its professionalization and export as important factors in the resolution of social problems. In her study, May analyzed four dimensions of knowledge transfer in the field of social policies: the production, the carriers, the implementation, and the translation of “welfare knowledge,” that is, the export of ideas into different national contexts. On the basis of her case studies, May distinguished between two ways of exchange: First, *policy tourism* — politicians traveling to other countries — and, second, *exchanges of academic paradigms*. May, Van Praet, and Julia Moses, who gave a talk on workers’ insurance in Imperial Germany, showed that even in the nineteenth century policy makers and experts observed other countries closely to learn from them in the field of social improvement.

Moses offered another important dimension regarding the circulation of ideas: competition. Social politics and the implementation of social ideas, she argued, were often seen as a *yardstick of modernity*. The sense of superiority as a *Kulturstaat* and the desire of governments to be advanced in social politics became apparent in several European states before World War I. The factor of competition also played an important role in Malte Thießen’s presentation on vaccination and public health in twentieth century Germany. Thießen defined the history of vaccination as a history of exchange and emphasized two types of transfer: cooperation and competition. As Thießen showed in his analysis of the Cold War era, vaccination as a form of social improvement was used as propaganda weapon between East and West Germany. At the same time, international organizations managed
to implement cooperation in the field of social improvement between the countries of both blocs.

Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such forms of competition and exchange often arose between Western industrialized countries. But what happened when social ideas of Kulturstaaten or imperial powers were transferred to countries characterized by considerably different economic, political, and cultural conditions? This was another important theme at the workshop. As Frauke Scheffler showed in her paper, the transfer and implementation of social ideas into other national contexts was often used as an instrument of control. Examining infant health programs in the US-occupied Philippines from 1900 to 1930, Scheffler highlighted the circulation of medical knowledge between France, the United States, and the Philippines and the role of colonial elites as contributors of transnational knowledge. By introducing their social ideas in the colony, these elites tried to control the Philippine people by trying to make them behave in new ways.

Another important aspect of the workshop focused on the identity of the actors involved in the circulation of social ideas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It became apparent that the search for better lives was often launched by individual actors or groups beyond policy makers or academics. As Mark Malisa stressed in his talk on Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, the international transfer of social ideas was often provoked by single persons who travelled to different countries and exchanged ideas and concepts. Karagöz-Kızılca analyzed a group of individuals who tried to implement social reforms in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Besides the relationship between law and social improvement, Karagöz-Kızılca focused on a group of intellectuals, the Young Ottomans, who tried — inspired by transnational ideas — to modernize the old system. Margaret Vining studied women as a group that carried and transferred social ideas. By presenting feminism as a toolbox for new social ideas, Vining emphasized the important role of women in the search for better lives. Furthermore, women seemed to be in the center of the practical execution of social work in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Adrienne Chambon, Marjorie Johnstone, and Stefan Königter showed in their presentations. Beate Loeffler’s study of mission and social work in Japan reflected that the personalities and biographies of carriers of social ideas played an important role. The analyses of Malisa,
Karagöz-Kızıldağ and Loeffler thus demonstrated that the circulation of ideas was not only connected to scientification, academization, and authority, but also to charisma.

Furthermore, Loeffler’s analysis of William Merrell Vories, a Christian missionary in Japan, showed that common values, like affiliation with the same religion, encouraged transfer processes. The factor of religion in the exchange of social ideas again referred back to the concept of cultural community. The presentation by Adrienne Chambon, Marjorie Johnstone, and Stefan Köngeter on organizations of social reform in Toronto at the beginning of the twentieth century pointed out that organizations can be local and transnational at the same time. In their case study, Christianity functioned as a cultural community that was informed by the transnational transfer of ideas.

The workshop’s final discussion focused on general questions about the conditions for the circulation of social ideas. The participants agreed that there were different reasons behind the exchange of ideas. In many cases, crises or shifting political conditions were the catalysts for the exchange process — forcing people to travel to other countries in order to learn from others. Such moments of perceived crisis in which old modes of living came to appear dysfunctional or outdated seem to be an important precondition for the search for reform ideas. In contrast to theories of globalization or world societies, the workshop showed that the nation state played an important role in the circulation and implementation of ideas throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nationalism fostered competition in the field of social policy and made some countries behave as if they were superior and had found advanced ways in their search for better lives. At the end, the discussion returned to general questions about the meaning of a better life. The participants agreed that there have been many different interpretations of social improvement, depending on the social, economic, and cultural context. But as the workshop showed, although there is no common idea of a better life, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries social ideas circulated internationally between policy makers, experts, intellectuals, different groups, and individuals. Since there is still very little agreement on what “better lives” are, and since the search continues, exchanges about this topic will persist in the future.

Wiebke Glässer (Humboldt University, Berlin)
“Normal relations between Germany and Israel are not possible and not appropriate,” wrote Israeli author Amos Oz in his 2005 essay “Israel and Germany.” The relationship is unique and it will always remain so. Despite, or perhaps even because of the burden of the past, the complex and multifaceted relationship between Germany and Israel has changed considerably in recent years. Germany has emerged as one of Israel’s closest political and economic partners. An ever denser network of cultural and social contacts has helped bring the two states and two peoples closer together. The United States, a close ally of Israel, has also played a special part in this development. Israelis today travel to and live in the United States and Germany as a matter of course, and vice versa. For many Israelis, Germany is no longer the land of the perpetrators, but rather a part of a new and modern Europe.

Under the title “Germans and Americans in Israel: Israelis in Germany and the United States,” the Third Junior Scholars Conference
in German-Jewish History sought to explore this shift in perceptions and to set it in historical context. The objective was to bring together a group of doctoral students and recent PhDs from Germany, Israel, Poland, and the United States for two days of intensive scholarly dialogue and discussion following current trends in both German-Jewish and migration history.

The first panel, chaired by Sybille Steinbacher, addressed Israel and Germany’s current perceptions of one another. Katrin Stoll opened the panel with a presentation on the debate over Tuvia Tenenbom’s 2011 book *I Sleep in Hitler’s Room (Allein unter Deutschen)*. Stoll pointed to a gap between public and private responses in Germany to the Nazi past. Whereas public engagement with the Third Reich is manifested primarily in the establishment of memorial sites and in a forced political correctness, individual identity and family history remain largely untouched by efforts to address the past. Stoll sees her work as an “intervention” in the debate on Tenenbom’s book. She focused in particular on Tenenbom’s description of a manic obsession in Germany with Jews and Israel. In the discussion following Stoll’s presentation, it was pointed out that an analysis of *I Sleep in Hitler’s Room* should take into account the ironic prose style the author uses in presenting his interlocutors’ often mind-boggling comments to the reader.

Patricia Pientka addressed a similarly contemporary topic in her presentation. In recent years, Berlin has become extraordinarily popular with young Israelis. More than 30,000 young Israelis have taken up residence in the German capital for a variety of reasons. As Pientka noted, this rediscovery of Berlin on the part of many Israelis is often mistakenly taken as an expression in interest in Germany as a whole. The particular importance of Berlin and Tel Aviv as metropolises, and the historical context of this phenomenon, have been overlooked. Pientka sought to address this research gap by examining the dynamic relations — personal, cultural, and spatial — between Berlin and Tel Aviv since the beginning of the twentieth century. These ties and the diverse reasons for Berlin’s popularity were explored during the discussion. Young Israelis have several incentives to take up residence in the German capital, including family ties to the city and Berlin’s low living costs, high quality of life, and reputation as a party metropolis.

The second panel, moderated by Pamela Nadell, considered internal and external perspectives on the Israeli state. Eva Maria Verst’s
presentation focused on German pilgrims to the Holy Land after the Holocaust. Verst called attention to similarities and differences in how groups of pilgrims dealt with the German past. Some Christian travelers linked their encounters with Israelis and visits to memorial sites with a sense of national German guilt, but at the same time avoided taking their personal pasts into consideration. Other groups of pilgrims saw the trips as purely religious experiences. Neither individual nor collective responsibility for the suffering of Jews in Nazi Germany played a role in their thinking about their travels. During the discussion, it became clear just how important such pilgrimages were for German-Israeli relations. Before the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel established official diplomatic relations in 1965, pilgrims were pioneers of informal relations between Germans and Israelis, Christians and Jews.

Shaul Mitelpunkt’s paper addressed a chapter in American-Israeli cinematic history. According to Mitelpunkt, the film adaptation of Leon Uris’s 1958 novel *Exodus* was of tremendous importance for the development of the Israeli state. Both the book and the film illustrated the Jews’ heroic and tragic struggle for survival in the Middle East and thereby made an essential contribution to American support for Israel. The Israeli government, Mitelpunkt explained, generously backed the film for political reasons and in expectation that it would be a box office success. Israeli filmmakers who presented a different image of their country, by contrast, did not receive similar backing. The Israeli narrative did not center on the struggle for survival of an oppressed nation whose continued existence was dependent on American goodwill. Rather, it presented a picture of a confident and modern country living in harmony with its neighbors.

The last panel of the day, chaired by Richard Wetzell, considered the traces of the Jewish legacy in Germany. In their presentations, Lina Nikou and Gal Engelhard examined the visitor programs run by German cities for expelled Jewish residents and their descendants. Nikou analyzed the development of the visitor programs in Munich, West Berlin, and Hamburg, concentrating on the initiation and development of the programs, the interaction between the cities and their former residents, and visitors’ experiences during the trips. For all the visitors, Nikou argued, the search for a lost home and for one’s own identity played a central role. The lost home was not necessarily Germany per se; rather, the emigrants’ memories were much more closely bound to the cities or regions from which they came.
Engelhard’s paper dealt with the interaction of hosts and visitors in the programs run by Berlin, Halberstadt, Leipzig, Nuremberg, and Rexingen and the function of the trips as a contact zone for Jews and non-Jews. Drawing on ethnographic research methods, Engelhard analyzed the life stories of multiple generations of Jewish visitors and non-Jewish hosts, along with the narratives resulting from those stories. Engelhard argued that they represent, convey, and create cultural memory, time, space, and identity. During the discussion of the two papers, it was stressed that the visitor programs were local initiatives and were thus often very different from one another. Munich’s visitor program was cited as exemplary. The city launched its visitor program comparatively early and worked on it intensively, in contrast to its otherwise rather hesitant approach to dealing with its Nazi past.

The second day of the conference opened with a panel, chaired by Lisa Leff, devoted to Shira Klein’s paper on the world of Jewish Italians who sought refuge in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s. She showed how the émigrés’ optimistic expectations of the United States as a safe haven for Europe’s victims of persecution were quickly dispelled after their arrival. Despite their identity as Jews, they were suspected of supporting Mussolini and spying on Italy’s behalf. Nevertheless, Jewish Italian émigrés served as soldiers, propagandists, and intelligence agents in the American war effort. In the discussion that followed her presentation, Klein addressed the contrast in Jewish émigrés’ perceptions of the non-Jewish residents of their respective native countries. Whereas German Jewish émigrés generally saw Germans almost without exception as supporters of Nazism, Klein contended, Italian Jews considered the great majority of Italians innocent of complicity in the Fascist regime’s persecution of Jews.

The final panel of the conference, moderated by Dana Hercbergs, dealt with Jewish migration since 1945. Ori Yehudai illustrated how the study of migration can illuminate the state-building process. His paper examined the controversial emigration of Israeli citizens using Germany and Europe as a transit corridor to other countries. Yehudai noted that the Israeli state and Jewish communities in Europe disapproved of this migration. They saw it as a form of desertion, as an anti-Zionist act or statement, and as a threat to the newly established Jewish homeland. Emigrants had a variety of reasons for leaving Israel, including family reunification, language difficulties, the climate, and reluctance to serve in the military. As
Yehudai stressed, the consequences of these entirely personal decisions quickly brought the migration out of Israel into public debate. The discussion of his paper focused on the discrepancy between the restriction of emigration from, and immigration to, Israel and it made clear how Europe remained important for Jews after the Holocaust as a “stepping stone.”

Jannis Panagiotidis’s paper also concentrated on Israeli emigration during the 1950s. Like Yehudai, he pointed to the controversial emigration of German Jews and their Israeli-born children to West Germany. In Israeli public opinion, the adult émigrés stood accused of immoral materialism and disloyalty, but their children were seen as victims. As members of the first generation of true Israelis, these children had been taken against their will to the “Country of the Perpetrators” and thereby prevented from making their contribution toward the realization of the Zionist dream. Panagiotidis stressed that this conflict must also be understood outside the context of the Israeli state-building process. The children’s tie to Germany was seen as an obstacle to Zionist efforts at consolidating the Israeli state and the anti-German boycott. As was made clear in the discussion, the strengthening of Jewish life in Germany through this migration did not result in their isolation and separation from Israel. Rather, the Israeli public debate on emigration led to a more intensive engagement on the part of Zionist and Israeli institutions with this new generation of the Diaspora.

Thematically contrasting from the two preceding presentations, Dani Kranz’s paper examined the migration of Jewish Israelis to Germany since 1990. Focusing on the scale of the migration and the migrants’ motivations and ambivalence, Kranz raised a series of questions: How are Israelis received in German society? How do their Jewish identities and ties to Israel change? What identity ultimately takes shape? The discussion following Kranz’s paper centered on the peculiarities of Israeli-Jewish life in Germany in the shadow of the Shoah. Whereas the identities of Israeli migrants to the United States are shaped by their being Jewish, the identity of Israelis in Germany rests on their being Israelis. They maintain a greater distance from the Jewish community than their counterparts in the United States, and fewer of them take part in religious life.

The conference concluded with a lecture by Eric Lichtblau of the *New York Times* on his book project *The Flight of the Nazis to America*. Lichtblau gave an overview of the escape of Nazi functionaries
and war criminals to the United States, specifically Lithuanians and Ukrainians, and the scandalous part played by the American authorities. It later proved difficult to prosecute Nazi war criminals in U.S. courts because there was no basis in American law for addressing crimes committed in other countries. Revoking their U.S. citizenship was one of the few means of pursuing accused war criminals, but deporting them was usually not possible. Determining their country of origin was often extremely difficult. Moreover, some faced the prospect of prosecution in their Eastern European native countries for having collaborated with the Germans during the war and were unlikely to receive fair trials.

The two-day conference demonstrated how the interwoven relations of the Israeli, German, and U.S. triangle have been reflected in migration and in cultural ties since the Shoah. The transnational perspective made it possible to expand views on German-Jewish history. Germany’s ambiguous role as the place of annihilation but also as the country of origin of German Jewry played a central role in all of the conference papers. The diverse research interests and papers made evident the dynamic of developments in German-Jewish history and shed light on the complexity of Jewish identity.

Daniel Hilgert (GHI)

Conference at the GHI, April 18-20, 2013. Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI). Participants: Lawrence Black (American University / York University), Frank Bösch (Zentrum für Zeitgeschichtliche Forschung), Clelia Caruso (GHI), Donald Critchlow (Arizona State University), John Davis (University of Oxford), Marjet Derks (Radboud University), Joshua Farrington (University of Kentucky), Bernhard Fulda (University of Cambridge), Martin Geyer (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich), Thomas Großbölting (University of Münster), Heather Hendershot (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Jeffrey Herf (University of Maryland), Konrad Jarausch (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill / Woodrow Wilson Institute Center for Scholars), Michael Kazin (Georgetown University), Michael Kimmage (Catholic University of America), Bernard Lachaise (University of Bordeaux), Jerry Muller (Catholic University of America), Michelle Nickerson (Loyola University), Till van Rahden (University of Montreal), Mark Rozell (George Mason University), Bill Schwarz (Queen Mary, University of London), Martina Steber (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich), Whitney Strub (Rutgers University), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI), Julian Zelizer (Princeton University).

In a television address in November 1969, President Richard Nixon appealed to the “silent majority” of Americans to show their support for him and to register their opposition to the “loud minority” of left-wing radicals who were demanding the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. Shortly thereafter, opinion polls did in fact show a substantial increase in public support for the president. Nixon thus succeeded in mobilizing those who saw their interests overshadowed by the publicity-attracting actions of the counterculture and had previously kept their views to themselves. The idea of the silent majority soon found powerful resonance on the other side of the Atlantic as well. Why did this concept have such a strong international impact? What integrative force did it have? These questions and the general subject of the development of conservatism in the United States and Western Europe stood at the center of this conference. To be sure, historians have given considerable attention to conservatism over the past two decades. But, as conference organizers Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson and Anna von der Goltz noted in
their introductory remarks, scholars have yet to combine comparative and interdisciplinary approaches with a transnational perspective in exploring modern conservatism. The papers presented at the conference were as diverse as the participants, who came from the United States, Canada, and several European countries.

The first panel considered the development and substance of the idea of conservatism. Michael Kimmage examined “Western Civilization” as a key concept in American neoconservatism, arguing that this concept has been neglected by historians due to its instability and breadth. At the same time, he suggested, the uncertain and shifting meanings of “the West” could help historians illuminate developments and changes in conservatism over an extended time period and from a transnational perspective. Focusing on the 1960s, Donald Critchlow grappled with the question of how far disagreement within the Democratic Party, the African American civil rights movement, student protests, and other “anti-patriotic expressions and calls for revolution” contributed to a broad turn to the Republican Party. In the eyes of voters, Critchlow argued, the Republicans succeeded in taming the uncertainties of the times with the idea of “law and order.” Martin Geyer brought up the similarities between the American notion of the “silent majority” and the idea of the “spiral of silence” advanced in the 1970s by the German pollster Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. Though there is no evidence that Noelle-Neumann had been directly influenced by Nixon, her theory that many people are unwilling to state their views openly depending on what they perceive to be the majority view comes remarkably close to Nixon’s conception of the silent majority. Geyer’s paper focused in particular on the largely unsuccessful attempt by West German conservatives to regain the control over language and public opinion they believed they had lost to the left and to break the media’s silence about the overshadowed majority. The papers were followed by a discussion, led by Jerry Muller, on the use of public opinion research and the social and political effectiveness of the integration of cultural narratives in self-descriptions and descriptions of others.

The first day of the conference concluded with a public keynote lecture by Julian Zelizer on how historians have addressed the history of conservatism in the United States. His lecture compared the origins and development of liberalism and conservatism in the United States, focusing in particular on techniques of mobilization. Building on this historical and historiographical review, Zelizer suggested an agenda
for future research. It is important, he argued, that the dominance of liberal historians in the debate on conservatism be challenged in order to bring broader perspectives to the subject.

The second panel, which addressed political parties and mobilization, began with a paper by Martina Steber on conservative parties in Europe and their attempts at cooperation. Steber explained that the difficulties European conservative parties encountered in their attempts to ally themselves during the 1960s and 1970s resulted from differences in terminology rather than substance. Furthermore, she pointed to the negotiations over the meaning of politically influential concepts as a reason for paying closer attention to intellectual history. Bernard Lachaise noted that historical work on this time period in France is still dominated by the impressive mobilization of forces on the left in May 1968. He attributed the various attempts to mobilize the majorité silencieuse in the early 1970s to increasing media attention to the “progressive threat.” Adding another European perspective, John Davis offered an analysis of his interviews with onetime conservative student activists in Britain. In contrast to Margaret Thatcher, who moved steadily toward the euroskeptic camp during her tenure as prime minister, the young Tories of the 1960s eagerly sought to make common cause with their counterparts in West Germany and Scandinavia through shared opposition to the left. During the following discussion, led by Jeffrey Herf, several participants noted the importance of pinpointing differences between the language used by conservative organizations and that of the rank-and-file members of those groups. Particular attention was given to the differences between European and American conservatism and to the ways scholars have approached those differences.

The third panel, chaired by Richard Wetzel, focused on the divergence of European and American conservatism and the rise of Christian conservatism. Mark Rozell began his presentation by describing the “awakening” of “a sleeping giant” in the 1970s. The conservative movement in the United States, he explained, received a powerful boost from Evangelical Christian leaders and groups who were responding to the counterculture and to the legalization of abortion. The counterculture’s perceived indulgence of sexual promiscuity and rejection of traditional values brought Christian and secular conservatives together in an alliance dedicated to combating the moral decay they saw afflicting American society. They took up arms against feminism, the gay rights movement, and other causes
they deemed unpatriotic and unchristian. The success of the Moral Majority in mobilizing conservative voters was a decisive factor in Ronald Reagan’s victory at the polls. In West Germany, by contrast, the Christian conservative movement remained small. According to Thomas Großböltig, the two major churches in West Germany played a part in public debate and exercised a certain influence, but German fundamentalist and conservative Christian groups were unable to mobilize broad support. Groups such as Kirche muss Kirche bleiben (The Church Must Remain the Church) had little success in challenging the anti-church counterculture. As Marjet Derks explained in her paper, conservative Christians in the Netherlands found themselves in a similarly difficult position. Focusing on Catholic groups who saw themselves as the defenders of “the true ideas of the family, order, and the mass” in the wake of Vatican II, she argued that gender and age need to be given more attention in examining the history of conservatism. She attributed the Christian right’s lack of success in spurring a mass movement in large measure to the print and broadcast press’ focus on comparatively young and media-savvy male representatives of progressive Catholicism who explicitly set themselves apart from the conservative “grannies.”

The fourth panel, chaired by Michael Kazin, opened with a paper by Joshua Farrington on the Nixon administration’s cooperation with the Black Power movement. Although Nixon is well-known for his “Southern strategy,” his opposition to busing, and his sympathy with white opponents of integration, his administration supported affirmative action and government programs to aid businesses owned by African Americans. Nixon’s policies toward the black minority, Farrington concluded, were less one-sided than generally depicted. Turning to Britain, Bill Schwarz considered the public response to Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech and Mary Whitehouse’s campaigns against sexual permissiveness in television programming and in British society more generally. Schwarz’s analysis rested on a sample of the more than 100,000 letters that Powell and Whitehouse received from members of the public. The letters often convey a sense of a lost past and dwell on the writers’ own experiences. Affirming the writers’ agreement with the views of Powell and Whitehouse, the letters were a powerful instrument for the “silent majority,” and they have received too little attention from researchers. One question prompted by these two papers was how far the impact of decolonization on British society and the influence of the civil rights movement in the United States can be compared. The wide-ranging discussion
also touched upon conservative visions of the future in the 1970s and conservative views of the media.

The impact of media stood at the center of the fifth panel, “Conservative Media Strategies,” chaired by Brita Waldschmidt-Nelson. Heather Hendershot presented a paper tracing the history of the pioneering conservative talk show “Firing Line.” From 1966 to 1999, “Firing Line” was a major media vehicle of the American conservative movement. It thus offers a unique view into the development of conservative perspectives in the U.S. over a comparatively long period. Bernhard Fulda explored the complex interaction of the mass media, public opinion, and the agents of the “knowledge industry.” Taking the career of Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and her close collaboration with West Germany’s Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union as an example, Fulda argued for the utility of the concept of the “scientification of the social” (Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen). This concept, he went on to suggest, needs to be supplemented by a theory of the “politicization of the (social) sciences.” Frank Bösch traced the transformation of conservative views of television as a mass medium in West Germany. Long convinced that the country’s public broadcasters sought to manipulate public opinion, conservatives took the lead in championing the introduction of private commercial broadcasting. Whereas conservatives drew on traditionally liberal themes, such as the promotion of plurality and diversity, in promoting private broadcasting, the Social Democrats used arguments more commonly associated with the right to defend the public broadcasters’ monopoly, notably that unregulated broadcasting posed a threat to families and children.

The third day of the conference opened with a panel on conservative gender constructions, chaired by Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson. Michelle Nickerson traced back the prehistory of the successful popular movement to limit property taxes in California in the late 1970s, associated with anti-tax activist Howard Jarvis, to the grassroots activism of conservative housewives in California (and elsewhere) in the 1950s and 1960s. Nickerson’s paper and the following discussion underscored the tremendous difference in the views of American and European conservatives on taxation and social welfare policy. Although Till van Rahden was unable to attend the conference, his paper, “Visions of Gender Equality and Child Rearing among German Catholics in an Age of Revolution,” was read by John Davis. Left-leaning lay Catholics in West Germany used lay organizations to counter patriarchal conceptions of
family life, though they did not go as far as the counterculture in calling for the complete dissolution of traditional family structures. Their goal, according to van Rahden, was to promote more liberal child rearing practices, a conception of marriage that underscored partnership, and a transformation of parental roles.

The final panel of the conference, chaired by Konrad Jarausch, explored “Cultures and Legacies of Conservatism.” Whitney Strub’s paper “Envisioning the New Right Sexual Citizen in the 1960s–1970s United States” traced conservative discourse on pornography and obscenity from the 1960s into the early twenty-first century. That discourse, he argued, testifies to the continuity of heteronormativity in conservative sexual politics. Lawrence Black examined the culture of British conservatism in the late 1960s and its transformation in the 1970s by focusing on activist Mary Whitehouse, the Young Conservatives, and the Tory party training center at Swinton College. In the final paper of the conference, Anna von der Goltz considered what it meant to be a “liberal conservative” in West Germany in the late 1960s. Conservatives differed little from their counterparts on the left in what they identified as the political, economic, and social problems of the day; the solutions they proposed, however, rested on a fundamentally different vision of the Federal Republic’s future. Setting her findings in the broader historical context of the 1960s, von der Goltz cast the interdependencies and continuities of conservatism into sharper relief.

The concluding discussion began with the question of the historian’s perspective and the different approaches taken by conservative and liberal scholars. Much of the discussion centered on the radical incongruity between American conservatives’ advocacy of deregulation and their stance on issues of sexuality, particularly their efforts to control the most intimate aspect of private life through legislation on sexual practices and birth control. The conference sought to place conservatism during the second half of the twentieth century in a global context, taking measure of the complex array of actors, agents, and movements involved and underscoring both the differences between the United States and Western Europe as well as the mutual connections and influences. The range of topics addressed, the lively and fruitful discussions, and the diverse backgrounds of the participants contributed to the success of the conference, bringing a transnational perspective to the history of conservatism.

Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University), Kevin Rick (GHI), and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)
DECADES OF RECONSTRUCTION: POSTWAR SOCIETIES, ECONOMIES, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Conference at the University of Toronto, May 3-4, 2013. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), New York, and the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES) in the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. Conveners: Ute Planert (University of Wuppertal / University of Toronto) and James Retallack (University of Toronto). Participants: Katherine Aaslestad (West Virginia University), Margaret Lavinia Anderson (University of California, Berkeley), Julia Angster (University of Mannheim), Robert Beachy (Goucher College), Doris Bergen (University of Toronto), Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Christopher Clark (University of Cambridge), Jeremy DeWaal (Vanderbilt University), Jörg Echternkamp (Potsdam / University of Halle-Wittenberg), Sven Externbrink (University of Heidelberg / University of Innsbruck), Charles Ingrao (Purdue University), Jennifer L. Jenkins (University of Toronto), Eric T. Jennings (University of Toronto), Mark Jones (University College Dublin), Jesse Kauffman (Eastern Michigan University), Ulrike Kirchberger (University of Bayreuth), Jörn Leonhard (University of Freiburg / Harvard University), Kimberly Lowe (Yale University), Deborah Neill (York University), Simone Selva (GHI), James J. Sheehan (Stanford University), Adrian Shubert (York University), Reinhard Stauber (University of Klagenfurt), Elizabeth Vlossak (Brock University), Christopher Wilkins (William Jewell College).

This conference addressed the complex relationship between war and postwar, focusing on the conceptualization of periods of transition between wartime objectives and reconstruction efforts. In order to transcend national and chronological boundaries and to emphasize that post-1945 Europe was just one postwar era among many, this meeting examined the histories of war and postwar reconstruction in Europe and North America over a period of two centuries.

The discussions provided new insights on a wide range of issues. Many speakers discussed the difficulty of determining when wars begin or end, both for contemporaries and later scholars. Also addressed was how transnational and comparative perspectives reveal the complexity and variety of transitions from war to peace. Another theme was the interconnectedness between domestic politics, foreign policy, and economic concerns in postwar decades. The conference
also showed that a long time frame illuminates continuities and discontinuities in how wars are experienced, peace is negotiated, nations are conceived, and states are built. Longer chronological frameworks encourage new research into less well-researched periods of reconstruction, including those that followed the Seven Years War, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Austro-Prussian and Franco-German Wars.

After opening remarks and greetings from Werner Wnendt, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Canada, and Randall Hansen, Director of the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Toronto, the first session, which included a comment by Margaret Lavinia Anderson, explored postwar reconstruction in Central Europe between the ancien régime and the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Charles Ingrao delved into the actions of the Habsburg Monarchy after the Peace of Hubertusburg in 1763 and after 1815. The period following defeat in 1763 was characterized by Maria Theresa’s largely successful gradual reforms, whereas political inertia reasserted itself after victory over Napoleon. Robert Beachy discussed Saxony’s Rétablissement after 1763 and the efforts of Thomas von Fritsch to restore fiscal order to Saxony’s prostrate economy. He argued that 1763 marked a break with the excesses of Saxony’s self-styled absolutist rulers. Christopher Clark used three moments in Prussian history to compare continuities and discontinuities in prewar, wartime, and postwar settings. He warned against understanding war exclusively as a driver of change and creativity. Wars, he argued, do not determine the character of reform; they merely provide the occasion or opportunity for reforms that might otherwise be implemented in peacetime. Katherine Aaslestad made a case for understanding the years between 1814 and 1830 as a postwar period. Focusing on the Hanseatic cities, she argued that civilian relief organizations and military authorities renegotiated stability and security through public discussion and commemoration. In the subsequent discussion, it became apparent that reconstruction often depended on what group or organization would provide security for cities in Central Europe: the German Confederation or city fathers themselves? Discussion also arose on the issue of later weakness or dissolution being projected onto earlier periods and Ingrao wondered why “Austria wins the war and loses the narrative.”

The second session, which featured a comment by Ute Planert, illuminated the outlook of Great Britain and France as colonial powers
but added a novel North American perspective. The session began with Julia Angster’s study of Britain’s relationship with the rest of the world after the Seven Years War. Changes wrought by that war allowed the British to become global naval masters, not through military means but through something less tangible — a global maritime space regulated by a British legal and economic order. Ulrike Kirchberger’s paper questioned the view of 1763 as a major break in Anglo-American history that introduced a “globalizing decade.” By turning her attention to Native Americans, she demonstrated that alleged turning points and the conclusion of peace were understood very differently by different groups at the time. Sven Externbrink argued that the Seven Years War was a truly global war. His paper focused on France after its defeat in 1763 and outlined the many reform efforts it undertook before it re-entered the stage in the American War of Independence. Reinhard Stauber examined the high diplomacy of the Congress of Vienna, illustrating how the Congress was a turning point in European history.

The third session, for which Roger Chickering provided a comment, ranged from the 1860s to the 1940s and focused on civil wars and humanitarian assistance. Christopher Wilkins challenged traditional explanations of American efforts after the Civil War to acquire Caribbean territory. Wilkins argued that American advocates of expansion sought to incorporate the Caribbean islands as states, not colonies: Reconstruction served as the ideological prism through which this project was seen. In her paper on postwar reconstruction in Alsace-Lorraine in the 1870s, Elizabeth Vlossak examined the resettlement of populations, the reconfiguration of geographic borders, and the reassertion of traditional gender roles. She questioned the degree to which France’s decade of reconstruction was characterized by the nature of its defeat: certain features of the reconstruction were the result of modern war more generally. Kimberly Lowe’s paper on international humanitarian assistance after the First World War examined the actions of the International Red Cross, the League of Nations, and other humanitarian assistance regimes. She demonstrated the extent to which nineteenth-century traditions of sympathy for wounded soldiers remained the predominant framework in which international humanitarian action took place in the postwar period. That framework proved catastrophic for European Jews, who did not fit within this convention and were denied such assistance. Adrian Shubert outlined Franco’s reconstruction efforts after the Spanish Civil War, drawing attention to the many ways in which the Spanish case
is exceptional. He characterized reconstruction there as a “comprehensive vision for change” that included political, economic, social, and cultural elements and was imposed with violence.

James J. Sheehan provided the keynote address on Friday evening. Sheehan discussed five postwar periods, those following the Seven Years War, the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian War, and the two world wars of the twentieth century. In his wide-ranging analysis, he explored the turning points that characterized each postwar era and the kinds of postwar orders that were established — or at least seeded — in those decades. Of these five periods, Sheehan expressed skepticism as to whether the wars of the 1860s and 1870s had as fundamental an influence on the following decades as historians have ascribed to them, especially when they are viewed from social, political, and geo-strategic perspectives.

The fourth session, which included a comment by Doris Bergen, opened with Jesse Kauffman’s examination of German occupation policies in Poland during the First World War. The Germans who administered the occupation were primarily concerned with establishing a postwar Polish satellite state; such a state, they hoped, might counterbalance future Russian military strength. Mark Jones shifted attention to the still under-researched German Revolution of 1918-19. Although militarily defeated, Germany was not among the “shatter-zones” in eastern and southeastern Europe after 1918. Nevertheless, the perceived threat of political revolution resulted in state-supported “performance violence.” Two papers then examined German reconstruction in the aftermath of the Second World War. Jörg Echternkamp proposed a rethinking of the chronological demarcation between wartime and peacetime. The final months of the Second World War were more significant for the transformation of attitudes among the German civilian population than historians have tended to believe. Jeremy DeWaal considered the renegotiation between national, regional, and local identities in a single West German city after 1945. Even though the city of Cologne was almost completely destroyed, its citizens embraced policies of reconstruction that highlighted local traditions: they transformed the rebuilt urban spaces into a “world-open bridge” to Western Europe and a symbol of democracy and tolerance.

The fifth session focused on the economic and political consequences of the two world wars from an international angle. Jörn Leonhard challenged the traditional views of the First World War’s aftermath.
He questioned the orthodoxy that the Treaty of Versailles represented a rupture with the international system of the nineteenth century and, in the process, transformed antiquated multinational empires into modern nation states. Instead, Leonhard argued, international relations after 1918 reflected both continuities and discontinuities, including new ways in which the pursuit of national self-determination resulted in ethnic violence. Focusing on French Equatorial Africa and Cameroon, Eric Jennings examined the colonial contribution to the French war effort during and following the Second World War. Although the decisions made at the Brazzaville Conference in January 1944 dramatically transformed official attitudes toward forced labor and trade unions, colonial reform produced violent responses from French settlers. Postwar interpretations of metropolitan resistance and of African sacrifice were also bitterly contested. Lastly, Simone Selva examined American efforts to stabilize Western European economies and the encouragement of European domestic manufacturing through large American armament orders. These, he argued, were intended not only to stimulate international trade between the United States and Europe but also to buttress Western European defense capabilities in the early Cold War period.

The conference concluded with a roundtable discussion launched by Retallack, Aaslestad, Chickering, Leonhard, and Sheehan. The five participants agreed on the difficulty of defining postwar periods precisely, with questions about when a war ends, when a postwar begins, and which events, attitudes, and trends should be considered significant in helping answer the first two questions. They noted that different groups of people, particularly when considered in a global perspective, have different ways of defining war. First Nations peoples in North America or natives in European colonies were in a continual war with the colonizers, without their conflicts being characterized as times of war. The Great Powers pressed their own interests when they defined colonial, continental, or civil conflicts as wars or as something else. In Eastern Europe after 1918, wars continued for years, despite official pronouncements that they were over. The panelists and the audience reiterated a point that was raised often over the two days: Victory or defeat in a war has a tremendous influence on the politics of reform and the commemoration of war after peace returns. Yet the list of common characteristics shared by all victories or all defeats is not as long as scholars sometimes imagine. As the discussion expanded, it became clearer that it is not the “objective” situation of war on which current and future research will focus. Instead, scholars...
will explore the experience of war, the multiple interpretations of war’s consequences — beneficial or “unnatural,” legitimizing or destabilizing — and the continual reshaping of those interpretations up to the present day.

Rebecca Carter-Chand (University of Toronto) and Gavin Wiens (University of Toronto)
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND CULTURES OF COMMUNICATION
IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Conference at the GHI, May 10-11, 2013. Conveners: Clelia Caruso (GHI), Peter Jelavich (Johns Hopkins University), Richard R. John (Columbia University), Benjamin Schwantes (GHI). Participants: Gene Allen (Ryerson University), Gabriele Balbi (Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano), Volker Barth (University of Cologne), Andreas Fickers (Maastricht University), Jonas Harvard (Mid-Sweden University), Dirk van Laak (University of Giessen), Lan Xuan Le (UC Santa Barbara), Adelina Mbinjama-Gamatham (Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University), Simone Müller-Pohl (Free University of Berlin), Andrew Russell (Stevens Institute of Technology), Heidi Tworek (Harvard University).

Innovations in communication technologies often produce changes in communication cultures. This relationship holds true particularly for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to the emergence and spread of electronic media. The workshop focused on how technologies such as the telegraph, telephone, and radio affected existing communication routines, that is, how they changed communication practices and altered cultural meanings associated with them. In his keynote lecture, Dirk van Laak pointed out that scholars in the history of technology have correctly focused on end users of technologies, but argued that there are other agents who need to be taken into consideration when trying to assess the patterns of adoption of new technologies. Those agents comprise such diverse groups as researchers, developers, entrepreneurs, and politicians, but also cultural interpreters, scientists, hackers, amateur tinkerers and even declared non-users. With regard to avenues for future research, he argued that there is truly no state of closure for usages of technologies. Even though some usages may appear to be established at a certain point, others are in a perpetual state of change. Finally he suggested that like scholars of technology and infrastructure history, media history scholars should look at vulnerabilities and failures or supersessions of infrastructures and technologies of communication. Consequently, the subsequent discussion focused on how to write an informed history of the usages of media. Participants agreed on the idea that a possible structure for a narrative focusing on a history of media usages would have to take into consideration the introduction of a medium and a phase of flexibility and stabilization, but still account for possible reinventions or redevelopments of media technologies.
The first session was dedicated to the analysis of media and media systems. Gabriele Balbi started the session with a presentation on the distinction between one-to-many and one-to-one media technologies, such as the telephone, wireless, and radio. He underlined how one-to-one systems emphasize privacy and dialogic communication, and often employ complex infrastructures to convey information. By contrast, one-to-many systems are public, intended for information dissemination, and the content of the message is typically more important than the communication medium or infrastructure. In a second step, however, Balbi underscored the interpretive flexibility of communication technologies in general, but especially in their formative or developmental state. In this context, he cited the example of the “circular” or broadcast telephone that presented scheduled broadcasts of informative programs through wired handsets and later speakers. He then went on to explain that wireless, point-to-point communication served as a type of broadcast media in an era before radio broadcasting became established: People with receivers could eavesdrop on private press updates sent via wireless telegraphs.

In the following presentation, Andreas Fickers talked about “Conservative Media Revolutions: Towards a Genealogy of Media Change.” He rejected the term “media revolution” and explained that change in communication media is often conservative rather than revolutionary in nature, insofar as newer communication forms look to older technologies and media content for inspiration. New media adopts a “revolutionary rhetoric” but is really based on adaptation or re-appropriation of existing communication media. Fickers pled for a genealogical approach to media history. Comparative media analysis, he argued, is the key to a better understanding of changes in media technologies and content, since advances or changes in one media form provoked reactions in others.

Jonas Harvard spoke about “Horses, Trains and Steamships in the Service of the Electric Telegraph: Analyzing the Historical Media System of Scandinavia.” He illustrated the complex interplay between communication and transportation systems, showing that the telegraph was embedded in a larger regional transportation and communication infrastructure. Technological limitations prevented it from being effective on its own: Many telegrams had to be transported to their final destination on railroads, steamships, or even by horseback. This led him to argue for the ambiguity of the telegram as a media form since many telegrams were never transmitted electronically in Scandinavia during the era.
The second panel addressed the definition and use of media. The first paper, presented by Clelia Caruso, was entitled “Teaching How to Use a New Communication Device: Telephone Instructions in User Manuals and Etiquette Books in the United States, 1880s to 1980s.” Caruso discussed how telephone manuals and etiquette books helped to shape telephone practices over time. Not surprisingly, the manuals and etiquette books reflect a growing social and cultural familiarity with the telephone: The documents showed strong indications that the behavioral norms pertaining to proper telephoning were widely known, if not followed, by mid-century. However, around the same time users were asked to construct their own telephone personality. In the second half of the twentieth century, the ideal telephone user was no longer necessarily the one who just conformed to the rules of efficient telephoning, it was the one who used the opportunities and constraints of the medium according to his or her own personal faculties, skills, and characteristics.

In his presentation, “The Telegraph and the News Form: A Textual/Institutional Analysis,” Gene Allen looked at whether the telegraph altered journalistic forms of expression, using Canadian newspapers as his source. He argued that the telegraph had no direct, discernible impact on the form of newspaper articles or the broader content contained in newspapers. New technologies, including the telegraph, Allen explained, did have some influence over journalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but not directly. Rather, telegraphy influenced the development of news agencies and wire services that helped to feed information to newspapers and played a role in determining the content that appeared in daily newspapers.

Benjamin Schwantes presented a paper entitled “Defining the Modern Telecommunication Revolution: Harry Newton’s Telecom Dictionary as a Technological-Cultural ‘Delivery System’,” which focused on a single reference source, *Harry Newton’s Telecom Dictionary* as a technological-cultural “delivery system.” Schwantes examined how its coverage of telephone and Internet terminology evolved over a thirty-year time period. He used both quantitative and qualitative analyses of the text to discuss how definitions changed over time and showed that the dictionary’s coverage of Internet terminology closely mirrored the growing spread of Internet accessibility in the United States between the early 1990s and the present era. He argued that technical reference works can be a useful tool for historians of technology because they provide social and cultural insights into the
time periods in which they were created and into the authors of the reference works.

The third panel was dedicated to media, news, and politics. In the first presentation, Adelina Mbinjama-Bamatham spoke about communication technologies and the unmaking of Apartheid in South Africa. She focused on how radio and cassette-tape technologies provided a means of undermining the South African Apartheid regime in the 1980s. She explained how pirate radio stations such as Radio Freedom broadcast news and information, and how they managed to send out directives to black South Africans and ANC fighters. Mbinjama-Bamatham carefully reconstructed the social and cultural meaning of the broadcasts and stressed the militant nature of the messages the radio stations conveyed.

Volker Barth presented on techniques of global news transmissions via the telegraph from 1860 to 1900, focusing on the use of codes for news transmissions. Barth explored the reciprocal influence between the telegraph and newspapers. The telegraph as a medium had a huge impact on news reporting, but more importantly, the use of the telegraph in the news business shaped telegraphy. Codes were developed to maximize information and minimize the length of messages in order to save money. Those codes required more skillful telegraphers and also increased the chance of errors in transmission. More generally, the telegraph introduced new notions into the news-gathering world and beyond. Accuracy became an important news feature, whereas terms related to wire service transmissions, such as “flash,” became part of the broader cultural vocabulary.

Heidi Tworek discussed the development of radio in Weimar Germany, stressing the importance of a new approach to media history and the history of technology in general, specifically on the history of the radio. She argued that scholars should concentrate on less prominent agents who proved to be key figures in establishing new media rather than well-known inventors of the technologies. To make her case, Tworek explored the example of German financial news agency Eildienst during the Weimar era. She examined the personal and political relationships between E.L. Voss (head of the financial news agency) and Hans Bredow (secretary for post, telegraph and telephone). The close collaboration between the two men allowed the German ministry to license radio receivers and bring in money, while also protecting Eildienst from interference by other ministries. Eildienst held a uniquely influential position in the development of
spoken news transmission in Germany, even though the agency faded away by the end of the Weimar era.

The last panel was dedicated to “Imaging New Media.” Lan Xuan Le’s paper, “Television before TV: Scanner Technologies and the Origins of Images at-a-Distance,” examined the broader meta-history of scanning technologies. She also explored the long and complex technological development story of fax technologies that embodied the concept of image transmission over a distance. Le discussed different forms of “scanning” and how these various concepts and technologies were developed by different interest groups, including engineers and inventors. Furthermore, she argued that the concepts and technologies associated with scanning underlie many modern technological communication systems.

In her paper, “Imagining Global Telegraphy as a Social Medium,” Simone Müller-Pohl used Ernst Knapp’s concept of Weltkommunikation. Müller-Pohl focused on imagined usages of the telegraph that never materialized. She explicated how social and cultural ideas of world communication were fostered by the development of submarine telegraph systems in the nineteenth century. She argued that the idea of mass social communication never translated into reality, however, due to the high cost of submarine communication. Furthermore, the owners of submarine systems were not interested in mass use due to the slow speed of transmission, which limited the volume of traffic across their networks. Arguing that most people had no need for and little interest in long-distance communication, they went against public advocates who argued for mass access to long-distance communication. All in all, the high cost of recouping capital expenditures and covering depreciation dissuaded the mass use of submarine telegraphy.

Andrew Russell looked at the development of “open and closed systems” related to the early Internet. He discussed how the distinction between open and closed systems emerged and why a closed, proprietary technological system — the Internet — ultimately triumphed over an open-source technological system. He also scrutinized the social and cultural values associated with open systems in the Western World and explicated how these could be used to advocate successfully in favor of open systems instead of proprietary systems. The “open system,” Russell demonstrated, is associated with, though not really defined by, a bundle of buzzwords like transparency, international exchange, and competition, which are highly compatible with capitalism.
Critically engaging scholarly concepts of the “user” in media and technology history, the final discussion focused on attempts to write a history of media usages. Participants argued that researchers should examine why users remain the focus of much scholarly investigation and recognize how this focus shapes research results. The idea that users matter is highly compatible both with neoliberal ideology and with left-wing criticisms of neoliberalism. Researchers looking at technology usages, particularly media usages, need to be aware of the dangers inherent in this ambivalence and should try to avoid the resulting pitfalls, such as projecting the emancipatory notion of a critical, informed, and hence powerful user into the past. A focus on an imagined user that does not take into consideration the actual user should be avoided. Due to their descriptive and even prescriptive character, manuals, advertisements, and expert literature on media usages, for instance, need to be combined with other sources. So, while debates and ideas about users should be taken into consideration, an informed history of the usages of media technology should not stop there. User reactions to media technologies as well as technological interactions with and among users engaged with media technologies should not be left out when writing a history of media usages and cultural change.

Clelia Caruso (GHI), Sophie Mrozek (GHI / Friedrich Schiller University of Jena), and Benjamin Schwantes (GHI)
NINETEENTH TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR
TWENTIETH-CENTURY GERMAN HISTORY

Seminar at the Historisches Kolleg, Munich, May 29-June 1, 2013. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington and the BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, in cooperation with the Historisches Seminar, Ludwig Maximilian University Munich. Convener: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University), Margit Szöllösi-Janze (LMU), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Faculty Mentors: Stefan Berger (Ruhr University Bochum), Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Mark Roseman (Indiana University, Bloomington), Christina von Hodenberg (Queen Mary, University of London). Participants: Deborah Barton (University of Toronto), Marcus Bück (Ruhr University Bochum), Thomas Brodie (Hertford College), Jeremy DeWaal (Vanderbilt University), Sarah Ehlers (Humboldt University of Berlin), Kristen Ehrenberger (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Kate Horning (Cornell University), Bradley J. Nichols (University of Tennessee, Knoxville), Ned Richardson-Little (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Jennifer Rodgers (University of Pennsylvania), Dominique Schröder (University of Bielefeld), Peter Stadlbauer (University of Vienna), Janosch Steuwer (Ruhr University Bochum), Kira Thurman (University of Rochester), Minu Haschemi Yekani (European University Institute, Florence).

The nineteenth Transatlantic Seminar brought together sixteen doctoral students working on dissertations in twentieth-century German history at universities in North America and Europe. The seminar was organized in eight panels, featuring two papers each, which opened with two comments by fellow students, followed by discussion of the pre-circulated papers.

The first panel featured two papers that placed German history in a transnational perspective. Sarah Ehlers’s paper “Kolonialmedizin ohne Kolonien: Deutsche Schlafkrankheitsforschung zwischen internationalen Netzwerken und nationaler Politik nach 1919” examined German research on “sleeping sickness” after Germany’s loss of its colonial possessions. Ehlers showed that the development of the first effective medication against this disease by German medical researchers during the 1920s was the product of the international networks of former colonial doctors and, at the same time, of revanchist aspirations to regain Germany’s former colonies. Kira Thurman’s paper “Black Classical Musicians in East Germany,
1945–1961” investigated the role African American musicians played in East German cultural life between 1945 and 1961. Thurman argued that East German depictions of African American musicians Aubrey Pankey and Paul Robeson conformed to larger political and cultural definitions of African American culture and German musical identity in the German Democratic Republic.

The second panel explored two sets of autobiographical writings in Nazi Germany. In his paper “Positionsbestimmungen: Die Suche nach dem eigenen Verhältnis zum Nationalsozialismus 1933/34,” Janosch Steuwer presented an analysis of diaries written during the first two years of the Nazi regime. The widespread interpretation of the Nazi seizure of power as a “nationale Erhebung,” he argued, compelled diary writers to assess their own relationship to the new regime and to reconcile their current political position with their pre-1933 political opinions and behavior. Challenging the notion that the Holocaust is beyond representation, Dominique Schröder’s paper “Tagebuchschreiben in Nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslagern, 1939–1945” examined the diaries of Jewish and political prisoners in Nazi concentration camps. Disagreeing with Wolfgang Sofsky’s thesis that the external environment became irrelevant to concentration camp life, Schröder argued that spaces outside the camps played a significant role in these diaries.

The third panel dealt with the transition from wartime Nazi Germany to the early postwar era. Deborah Barton’s paper “The Elasticity of Politics, ‘Soft’ News and the Utilization of Women Journalists: Ursula von Kardorff 1937–1962” explored a female journalist’s ability to command a public voice during the Third Reich and her postwar role in promoting narratives of German victimization as well as reflection on Nazi crimes through her personal and professional writing. Jeremy DeWaal’s paper “Heimat in the Rubble: Turning to Local Worlds, from the Rhine to the Elbe, 1945–1960” argued that postwar Heimat enthusiasts reconfigured local historical memory in order to forge identification with the postwar goal of creating a new democracy. While border areas formerly saw themselves as national fortresses, after 1945 localities like Cologne and Hamburg shifted to understanding themselves as “world-open bridges.”

The fourth panel began with Minu Haschemi Yekani’s paper “Globale Mobilität und die ‘Gelbe Gefahr,’” which examined the recruitment and deployment of indentured laborers from East Asia (“Kulis”) in the German colony of Deutsch-Ostafrika. Paying attention to global
effects in local contexts, the paper argued that the colony’s labor regime and conceptions of race were strongly shaped by global processes of migration and transformation. Kristen Ehrenberger’s paper “The Politics of the Table: Massenspeisung and the Familientisch” examined food rationing and the establishment of communal kitchens in Saxony during the First World War. Introducing the concept of the “telescopic perspective,” which links the biochemistry of nutrition from the molecular level through the individual and family levels to the national Volkskörper, Ehrenberger argued that the communal kitchens challenged traditional notions of the role of the family.

The fifth panel explored different aspects of popular support for the Nazi regime and its policies in wartime Nazi Germany. Bradley J. Nichols’s paper “Housemaids, Renegades, and Race Experts: Nazi Re-Germanization Policy and the Recruitment of Polish Domestic Servant Girls” examined a Nazi program designed to assimilate Polish girls into the German national community by sending them to live with families in Germany. According to Nichols, the German population’s mostly negative reaction to these girls should be interpreted as evidence that popular conceptions of the Volksgemeinschaft reflected long-standing ethnic-nationalist stereotypes rather than Nazi racial categories. Thomas Brodie’s paper “German Catholicism and the Second World War” presented two regional case studies that highlighted social and political divisions within the Catholic community in wartime Nazi Germany. Most Catholics, Brodie argued, found it much easier to reconcile their Catholic religious and German national identities than has often been assumed.

The sixth panel dealt with postwar West German history. Kate Horning’s paper “An Emergency Law Fit for a Rechtsstaat?” examined emergency legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany. Juxtaposing the emergency measures passed legislated in 1968 with the laws passed to prosecute the Red Army Faction in the 1970s, she argued that the measures taken when West Germany found itself confronted with terrorists in the 1970s were more drastic than the limits the state had imagined for itself during the 1960s. Unfortunately, the author of the second paper planned for this panel, Michael Vössing, was unable to attend.

The seventh panel was dedicated to German Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) after 1945. Jennifer Rodgers’s paper “Transforming the ‘Leviathan Index’: West German Public Diplomacy and the International Tracing Service in the Early
Adenauer Era” examined the ways in which the Federal Republic used the International Tracing Service, an agency established by the Allies to locate victims of the Second World War, to rehabilitate its image abroad during the early postwar and Adenauer eras. Bonn, she argued, hoped that participation in the agency’s humanitarian operations would demonstrate atonement and thus help to normalize foreign relations. Peter Stadlbauer’s paper “‘Saubere Wehrmacht’ gegen ‘schmutzige SS’? Zur Karriere und strafrechtlichen Verfolgung von Eichmanns Chef Erich Ehrlinger” investigated the political career and postwar prosecution of the high-ranking SS officer Erich Ehrlinger, arguing that the failure of West German attempts to prosecute him was due to the combination of three factors: the phenomenon of “medical amnesty,” a powerful network of former Nazis, and the postwar myth of a neat distinction between the “clean Wehrmacht” and the “dirty SS.”

The eighth and final panel focused on East Germany and the process of German unification. In his paper “Self-Determination, Post-Colonialism and Socialism: Human Rights in East Germany from a Transnational Perspective” Ned Richardson-Little argued that in the 1960s the SED developed a conception of socialist human rights that was closely connected to self-determination and non-interference. Therefore, when the international discourse of human rights shifted from ideas of self-determination towards individual liberties in the 1970s, the SED faced significant threats to its legitimacy from within the GDR and from abroad. In his paper “Wirtschaftsexperten in der Arena des Übergangs: Die Mitarbeiter/innen der Treuhandanstalt in den ökonomischen, kulturellen, und gesellschaftlichen Transformationsprozessen, 1990-1994” Marcus Böick focused on the initial process of policy planning in the Bonn ministerial bureaucracy in the spring of 1990, arguing that much of the subsequent history of the Treuhand must be understood in light of the fact that the West Germans quickly settled on a policy model that was based on the success story of the West German currency reform of 1948.

During the final discussion participants reflected on the topics and themes that were prominent at the seminar and those that were not, even though it must be borne in mind that the papers presented here do not necessarily reflect current trends among all dissertations on German history. While there was only one paper each on the First World War and the Weimar Republic, the Nazi era was strongly represented; half the papers covered the post-1945 period, with
papers on the FRG slightly outnumbering those on the GDR. Roughly a third of the papers used biographical approaches. While some noted the absence of classic political history, some authors explained that they saw their work as “politische Kulturgeschichte.” Looking back over the almost twenty-year history of the seminar, Roger Chickering commented on the methodological convergence of historical research on both sides of the Atlantic toward cultural history. While the cultural turn was noticeable in the growing attention to language and discourse, it was also noted that many projects were concerned with recovering individual agency, which led to a discussion about whether agency should be seen as an ideological notion and whether we need new, more systematic approaches to historical subjectivities. The completion of the doctoral dissertations presented at this stimulating and congenial seminar is eagerly awaited.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
2013 ARCHIVAL SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY


Scholars doing historical research in German archives for the first time face two major hurdles. Although they learn how to interpret printed primary sources in graduate school, their training does not usually prepare them for documents written in scripts that today are indecipherable to anyone but experts and the very elderly. Furthermore, these scholars frequently know little about the bureaucratic processes in which these documents were produced and archived, although attending to such factors is essential for finding and interpreting historical sources. The GHI’s annual archival seminar helps ten advanced graduate students overcome both hurdles so that they can make the most of their limited research time in Germany.

While the preparatory organization of the seminar lay in the hands of Clelia Caruso, the archival tour was led by Mark Stoneman. This year’s group of ten North American students (nine modern historians and one early modern musicologist) visited Speyer, Koblenz, Cologne, and Munich. The main activity in Speyer was learning modern and
even early modern handwriting at the Landesarchiv (State Archive) with Walter Rummel. Having provided everyone with introductory materials before they arrived in Germany, Rummel led the group through a variety of interesting sources, looking not only at their handwriting and main contents, but also at the various other markings and initials that officials had added to them. Topics included war crimes from World War II, a severely wounded soldier in World War I, witchcraft, and the concerns of a widow who owned a tavern. Along the way, the participants learned something surprising: Handwriting from the early twentieth century can be harder to decipher than that of the nineteenth or earlier centuries because handwriting became highly individualized, with peculiar mixes of Latin and German scripts.

During its five-day stay in Speyer, the group also had an afternoon class with Noria Litaker (University of Pennsylvania). This doctoral student had participated in the archival seminar the year before and had then spent a year doing research in Bavarian archives. She shared her practical experiences about working with archives and the sources she found. There was also a class with Christiane Sibille (University of Basel and Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz), a digital historian who introduced the group to the breathtaking array of scholarly digital resources that have emerged in recent years. The archival seminar students also presented their research projects to each other and offered and received constructive feedback. Besides helping each student think about his or her project, this activity fostered the development of a network of young scholars who will be able to support each other during their research in Germany.

In addition to teaching old German handwriting, Rummel introduced the group to some of his archive’s medieval treasures, gave a tour of the facility, and introduced the seminar’s participants to the archive’s history and functions. These activities marked the beginning of the archival seminar’s introduction to Germany’s archive system. The following Monday, participants journeyed to the Bundesarchiv (Federal Archive) in Koblenz, where they were greeted by Bundesarchiv President Michael Hollmann. After this warm welcome, Thekla Kleindienst explained the history and functioning of Germany’s multi-sited federal archive, introduced the archive’s holdings in Koblenz, and conducted a document workshop with materials relating to John F. Kennedy’s famous Berlin visit. The group also had visited the amazing image archive at the Koblenz site.
On Tuesday morning, the group paid a sad but fascinating visit to the Restoration and Digitization Center of the Cologne Historical Archive. Here Ulrich Fischer described the archive’s awful collapse in 2009 and the technical and organizational work being done to recover as much of the archive’s damaged holdings as possible. This visit underlined the fragility, value, and scope of Cologne’s holdings. It also encouraged participants to think about earlier disasters and how archivists might have dealt with those.

The remainder of the trip was spent in Munich, which offers a rich landscape of resources for historical research. On Wednesday, Markus Brantl explained the workings of the pioneering Munich Digitization Center at the Staatsbibliothek (State Library), which is making an enormous number of books from past centuries available online. Later, Klaus Lankheit led seminar participants through the holdings of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Institute of Contemporary History), using examples related to the specific topics of several students, and Michael Volk explained the institute’s library.

On Thursday, Monika von Walter introduced the group to the Bavarian Hauptstaatsarchiv (State Archives), again using examples relevant to the students. During this visit, participants also learned how a topic like colonialism could have important holdings not just in Berlin but also in Munich because of Bavaria’s special constitutional status in Imperial Germany. In the afternoon, the group learned about the history of the Deutsches Museum from Wilhelm Füßl, who introduced students to the growing holdings of the museum’s technology and science archive.

On Friday morning the group toured the Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial Site and learned about its history and the kinds of questions that German school groups ask during such visits. In the afternoon, Ulrich Unseld and Albert Knoll said more about the memorial site’s educational mission and archival holdings.

The seminar participants ended the week with an evening of Bavarian food and drink at a local restaurant, “Zum Franziskaner.” Afterwards, there was a face-off nearby between Wagner and Verdi puppets. The serendipitous multimedia show made for a nice conclusion to a demanding and profitable two weeks. The GHI wishes to thank all those institutions and individuals who helped a new crop of scholars prepare for their archival research in Germany.

Mark Stoneman (GHI)
NEW PUBLICATIONS

Publications of the German Historical Institute (Cambridge University Press)
Lars Maischak, *German Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic* (2013)
Alison Clark Efford, *German Immigrants, Race, and Citizenship in the Civil War Era* (2013)

Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)

Worlds of Consumption (Palgrave Macmillan)
Hartmut Berghoff and Thomas Kühne, eds., *Globalizing Beauty: Consumerism and Body Aesthetics in the Twentieth Century* (2013)

Studies in German History (Berghahn Books)
GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships
The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships
The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Fellowship in North American History
Torsten Kathke, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
*Populäre Gegenwartsdiagnosen, 1968 bis 1989*

Fellowship in the History of Consumption
Reinhild Kreis, Universität Augsburg
*Selbermachen im Konsumzeitalter: Werte, Ordnungsvorstellungen und Praktiken vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhunder bis in die 1980er Jahre*
Fellowship in Economic and Social History

Elisa Minoff, Harvard University
The Politics of Migration from the Great Depression to the Affluent Society

Doctoral Fellows in African American History

Alex Elkins, Temple University
*Street Sovereignties: Police, Law, and African American Uprisings, 1964-1968*

Caitlin Verboon, Yale University
*Urban Encounters: Struggles over Freedom in Southern Cities, 1865-1877*

Doctoral Fellow in International Business History

Marina Kaneti, New School for Social Research
*Migrants, Consumers, and the Politics of Affect*

Postdoctoral Fellows

Norman Domeier, Universität Stuttgart
*Weltöffentlichkeit und Diktatur: Die Auslandskorrespondenten im Dritten Reich*

Maike Lehmann, Universität Bremen
*Geteilte Welten: Intellektuelle Begegnungen im späten Kalten Krieg*

Charlotte Lerg, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
*Harvard and Germany*

Joris Mercelis, Ghent University
*Photography and the Public Domain: Managing Knowledge and Intellectual Property, 1871-2003*

Doctoral Fellows

Wiebke Glässer, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
*Marktmacht und Politik im Wandel: Das Kartell der internationalen Ölgesellschaften, 1960-1980*

Karin Hagen, Jacobs University Bremen
*‘Male, pale and stale’: Gender and manned space travel in the United States in the context of the Cold War*

Silke Körber, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
*Deutschsprachige Verleger im Exil in den USA/Großbritannien und ihr Einfluss auf die Entwicklung des populären illustrierten Sachbuchs im 20. Jahrhundert.*
Scott Krause, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
*Freedom FM: The Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) and the Construction of West Berlin’s Political Culture, 1945-63*

Daniel Kuppel, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
*Die Praxis der “Weltanschaulichen Schulung” von SS- und Polizeiangehörigen in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus*

Julian Länge, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf
*Amerikanische Unternehmensstrategien in westdeutschen Einzelhandelsunternehmen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis in die 1980er Jahre*

David Möller, Universität Erfurt

Jake Newsom, State University of New York at Buffalo
*Homosexuals after the Holocaust: Identity Politics and Social Activism in the United States & the Federal Republic of Germany, 1969-2000*

Robert Radu, Universität Rostock
*Auguren des Geldes: Eine Kulturgeschichte des Finanzjournalismus im Kaiserreich (1870–1914)*

Laura Ritter, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
*“Charlottengrad” — das Petersburg am Wittenbergplatz: Untersuchung der Sozialstruktur innerhalb der russischen Emigrantenkolonie in Berlin, 1918–1925*

Bernhard Sassmann, Universität Augsburg
*“Kulturen der Intelligence”: Militärische Nachrichtendienste in den USA, 1900–1947*

Hannes Vatthauer, Universität Regensburg
*Illegaler Handel in Kriegszeiten. Internationale Beziehungen und das Phänomen “Schmuggel” (1775–1815)*

**Fellowship at the Horner Library**

Julia Abel, Universität Wuppertal
*Kanon- und Kulturpolitik deutsch-amerikanischer Lesebücher zwischen 1800 und 1945: Ein Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte der Anthologie*

Christiane Bauer, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
*Deutschlandbilder der Nachfahren deutscher Immigranten in den USA — Eine erinnerungsgeschichtliche Auseinandersetzung mit Migration und Identität*
Scott Moranda, State University of New York at Cortland
Transnational Negotiations over Nature and Private Property in Germany and America

Esther Sahle, London School of Economics and Political Science
The Competitive Edge of the Reliable Friends: Quaker Merchants and Institutional Change in the Early Modern Atlantic

GHI Conference Travel Grants for GSA Participants

Jeremy Best, University of Maryland College Park
Local Prayers, Global Worship: Nineteenth-Century German Mission Societies and the Revival of Missionary Spirit in the Heimat

Jadwiga Biskupska, Yale University
Most Dangerous Neighbors: Nazi Racial Understandings of Polish National Structure and their Consequences, 1935-1940

Benjamin Bryce, York University
Transatlantic Religion: German Lutheran and Catholic Networks on the Río de la Plata, 1880-1930

Sonja Janositz, Leibniz Universität Hannover
Kinship in Letters

Dani Kranz, Erfurt University
The Challenge of Ethnography in German Studies

Agnes Laba, Herder Institute for Historical Research
The German Future Lies in the East: The Discourse of the Eastern Borders during the Weimar Republic 1919-1933

Andreas Strippel, Universität Hamburg
Home to the Reich: The Central Emigration Office of the SS and the Naturalization of Ethnic German Resettlers during the Second World War

Heidi Tworek, Harvard University
Thinking Outside the State: Dimensions of German Public Life in the First Global Age: News
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GHI DOCTORAL SEMINAR, SPRING 2013

February 28
Andreas Bauer (Universität Heidelberg)
All Politics is Local: Die Free Soil Party und ihre Haltung zum Rassenproblem 1848-1854

Sven Deppisch (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
Die Ausbildung deutscher Polizeioffiziere von den 1920er bis in die 1950er Jahre

March 21
Felicitas Jaima (New York University)
The African Diaspora in Germany: The Experiences of African American Servicewomen and Military Wives in Germany, 1945-1970

Matthias Voigt (Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main)
Re-inventing the Warrior: Native American Activists between Indigenous Traditions and the Modern Nation State during the Red Power Era

May 23
Christiane Bauer (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
Deutschlandbilder der Nachfahren deutscher Immigranten in den USA — Eine erinnerungsgeschichtliche Auseinandersetzung mit Migration und Identität

Robert Fischer (Universität Erfurt)
Grenzleben — Eine translokale Geschichte von Ciudad Juárez und El Paso, 1880-1940

Thilo Niedhöfer (Johannes Kepler Universität Linz)
Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson und das “balinesische Ethos”: Amerikanische Anthropologie zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat ca. 1930-1950

June 13
Elise Vallier (University of Paris-Est Marne La Vallée)

Kritika Agarwal (State University of New York at Buffalo)
Uncertain Citizenship: Denaturalization and Expatriation in Twentieth-Century America, 1906-1967

Brian Goodman (Harvard University)
America and the Other Europe: Literature and Culture beyond the Curtain, 1946-1989
July 11  

Matthew Yokell (Texas A&M University)  
Qingdao and the German Experience in China, 1880–1918

Marina Kaneti (New School for Social Research)  
Migrants, Consumers and the Politics of Affect

Brendan Murphy (University of Sheffield)  
Killing in the German Army: Organizing and Surviving Combat in the Great War
GHI FALL LECTURE SERIES 2013

Ending Slavery: Nineteenth-Century Emancipations in a Transatlantic World

Organized by Mischa Honeck and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson

In commemoration of the 150th anniversary of Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, our lecture series revisits one of the major social and political upheavals of the nineteenth century: the abolition of chattel slavery and of similar forms of legalized human bondage. Rather than examining the topic through a narrow national lens, this series traces how very different societies abolished unfree labor and grappled with slavery’s legacy. It compares how emancipation played out in the United States, Germany, Russia, and Latin America but also highlights transnational connections and influences. What were the global repercussions — social, economic, and political — of the prohibition of unfree labor? Why did some actors champion gradual and peaceful reform, while others resorted to revolutionary violence? How do we write a history that gives voice not just to the elites but also to the voiceless — the slaves, serfs, bondsmen, and bondswomen who left behind little if any documentation? Exploring emancipation and its difficult aftermath on both sides of the Atlantic will bring new, challenging perspectives to conventional narratives of the nineteenth century as an age of “progress” and “civilization.”

September 5  Policy and Process: How the Slaves Became Free in America
David Blight (Yale University)

October 10  Prussian Emancipation: The Revolution against Serfdom in Germany and Its Atlantic Afterlives
Andrew Zimmerman (George Washington University)

November 7  The “Other” Emancipation of the 1860s: Freeing Russia’s Serfs
Peter Kolchin (University of Delaware)

December 12  Emancipation through Colonization: Brazil and Cuba
Ursula Prutsch (University of Munich)
GH1 CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2013-2014

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org

2013

September 19-21 The Dream and Its Untold Stories: The March on Washington and its Legacy
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Marcia Chatelain (Georgetown University), Sharon Monteith (University of Nottingham), and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)

September 19-21 Kriminalität und Strafjustiz in der Moderne, 18.-20. Jh.: Tagung zur Historischen Kriminalitätsforschung 2013
Conference at Institut für Jugendarbeit, Gauting
Conveners: Sylvia Kesper-Biermann (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), Désirée Schauz (Münchner Zentrum für Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

September 19- This Is the Day: The March on Washington.
December 13 Photographs by Leonard Freed
Exhibition at the GHI
Curated by Paul Farber (Haverford College)

September 26-28 Obesity, Health, and the Liberal Self: Transatlantic Perspectives on the Late Nineteenth and the Late Twentieth Centuries
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Nina Mackert (University of Erfurt), Jürgen Martschukat (University of Erfurt), Susan Strasser (University of Delaware), and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

October 10-13 Medieval History Seminar 2013
Seminar at the GHI London
Conveners: Stefan Hördler (GHI) and Cornelia Linde (GHI London)

October 24-26 Migrants as “Translators”: Mediating External Influences on Post-World War II Western Europe, 1945-1973
Workshop at the Institut für die Geschichte der deutschen Juden, Hamburg
Conveners: Jan Logemann (GHI) and Miriam Rürup (Institut für die Geschichte der deutschen Juden)
December 5-7  The Consumer on the Home Front: World War II Civilian Consumption in Comparative Perspective
Conference at the GHI London
Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Felix Roemer (GHI London), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), and Jan Logemann (GHI)

January 23-24  The State of Holocaust Studies and the Future of the Field
Conference at the GHI and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
Conveners: Jürgen Matthäus (USHMM/CAHS) and Stefan Hördler (GHI)

February 20-22  Gender, War and Culture: From Colonial Conquest and Standing Armies to Revolutionary Wars (1650s–1830s) to the Wars of Nations and Empires (1830s–1910s)
Workshop at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Dirk Bönker (Duke University), and Karen Hagemann (UNC Chapel Hill)

March 7-8  Histories of Humanitarianism: Religious, Philanthropic, and Political Practices in the Modernizing World
Conference at the GHI and the University of Maryland, College Park
Conveners: Sonya Michel (University of Maryland, College Park) and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)

March 27-29  Performing Capitalism: Economic Heroes and Villains during the Long Nineteenth Century
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Thomas Großbölting (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster), Pamela Laird (University of Colorado), and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

May 7-10  Twentieth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar
Seminar at the GHI
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)

June 5-7  War and Childhood in the Age of the World Wars
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Mischa Honeck (GHI), James Marten (Marquette University), Andreas Gestrich (GHI London)
June 18-20 Informal and Everyday Markets: Modern Histories of Indian Business and Entrepreneurship since the Nineteenth Century
Conference at the University of Göttingen
Conveners: Sebastian Schwecke (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen), Ingo Köhler (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen), and Christina Lubinski (GHI)

September 4-6 Jewish Consumer Culture
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Jenna Weissman Joselit (George Washington University), Roger Horowitz (Hagley Museum and Library), and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

September 11-13 Gender, War and Culture: From the Age of the World Wars (1910s-1940s) to the Cold War, Anti-Colonial Struggle to the Wars of Globalization (1940s-Present)
Workshop at Duke University, Durham, NC
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Dirk Bönker (Duke University), Karen Hagemann (UNC Chapel Hill), and Mischa Honeck (GHI)

September 18-20 Shady Business: White Collar Crime in History
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Edward Balleisen (Duke University), Chris McKenna (Oxford University), Cornelia Rauh (Liebnitz-Universität Hannover), and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)

October 9-10 Wirtschaftskriminalität und Unternehmen
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Cornelia Rauh (Liebnitz-Universität Hannover), and Thomas Welskopp (Universität Bielefeld)
German Historical Institute Washington DC
Fellows and Staff

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff, Director
Modern social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption
PD Dr. Uwe Spiekermann, Deputy Director
Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge
Prof. Dr. Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, Deputy Director
African American Studies, transatlantic relations, gender history, American religious history
Andreas Fischer, Administrative Director

Dr. Clelia Caruso, Research Fellow
Modern European history; history of migration; history of technology

Dr. Mischa Honeck, Research Fellow
19th and 20th-century American history; transnational history; history of ethnicity and race relations; gender history; history of youth and youth movements

Dr. Stefan Hördler, Research Fellow
20th-century German history, Holocaust Studies, Jewish Studies, business history

Dr. Jan Logemann, Research Fellow
Comparative and transatlantic history; history of consumption; history of urban development; history of emigration; modern Germany and the United States since the 1920s

Dr. Christina Lubinski, Research Fellow
Modern economic and social history; business history

Dr. Ines Prodöhl, Research Fellow
Global history, cultural and economic history, civil society

Dr. Richard F. Wetzel, Research Fellow and Editor
Modern European and German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow

Jessica Csoma, Research Associate
Bryan Hart, Research Associate
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