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However much they might have in common, Berlin and New York look nothing alike. Germany’s Ruhrpott and California’s Orange County were both shaped by rapid industrial growth and the social change that followed, but these sprawling conurbations bear little resemblance to one another—and it’s not just the weather that makes it impossible to confuse Bottrop, Gelsenkirchen, and Essen with Lakewood, Fullerton, and Anaheim. Why are the urban landscapes of Germany and the United States so different? For its Nineteenth Annual Lecture last November, the GHI invited two acclaimed scholars—Kenneth T. Jackson and Adelheid von Saldern—to grapple with this question. Urban history, as Jackson’s and Saldern’s masterful forays into comparative synthesis made clear, is a meeting point of many lines of historical inquiry as well as a promising point of departure for broader historical reflection. Explaining the diverging patterns of German and American urban development over the past half century ultimately requires trying to make sense of the deep-seated commonalities and fundamental differences that simultaneously link and divide the two countries. Some of the themes Jackson and Saldern touched upon were the focus of an international conference at the GHI three weeks later. “The Place of Nature in the City in Twentieth-Century Europe and North America,” organized by former GHI postdoctoral fellows Dorothee Brantz and Sonja Dümpelmann, explored how notions of nature and humanity’s place in it have influenced the evolution of cityscapes. A report by Profs. Brantz and Dümpelmann appears along with the texts of Prof. Jackson’s lecture and Prof. von Saldern’s comment in this issue of the Bulletin.

The interviews featured in this issue of the Bulletin provide a methodological complement to Jackson’s and Saldern’s reflections on the recent past. The directors of Germany’s five largest non-degree-granting research institutes for contemporary history generously took the time to answer our questions about their institutes’ work. Besides touching upon questions of organization and focus, the directors consider the broader political-cultural context in which the field of contemporary history has developed in Germany and the role it has come to play in German public life.

One way that the GHI has sought to engage the public in critical examination of the recent past has been to hold a symposium each year to mark Germany’s national holiday, the Tag der Deutschen Einheit, on October 3. The first five symposia featured speakers who, as activists or officials, had played notable roles in the events leading up to German unification or in post-unification political life. In 2005, we shifted focus
from politics narrowly defined to the intersection of the political and the personal. Novelist Monika Maron has been a citizen of four Germanys. Born in Hitler’s Third Reich, she moved as a child of ten with her family from Adenauer’s Federal Republic to Ulbricht’s German Democratic Republic. There, she grew up in comparatively privileged circumstances: her stepfather was the GDR’s minister of the interior. That connection notwithstanding, however, her critical perspective prevented her novels from being published in the GDR. Maron moved west in 1988, and not long afterwards the old Bonn Republic gave way to the new unified Berlin Republic. At our 2005 October 3 symposium, Maron explored the ways that eastern Germans’ experiences of the GDR have been remembered and characterized in the decade and a half since unification. We are delighted to present her comments here in the form of the essay “Historical Upheavals, Fractured Identities.” The October 3 symposia, like many of the GHI’s programs, are possible only as a result of the generous support we receive from a number of foundations and corporations. We are grateful to E.ON North America and the Gemeinnützige Hertie-Stiftung for helping us make October 3 an occasion not only for celebration but also for thought. Special thanks are also due to the Annette Kade Charitable Trust and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung for their continued support of a unique pair of fellowships. The late Jürgen Heideking was a true Transatlantiker. He made his mark as a scholar with a wide range of publications on German and American history, and he is also remembered with great affection by students and colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic. Following Heideking’s untimely death in 2000, the GHI, with the help of Annette Kade Charitable Trust and the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, established two fellowships in his memory. The Kade-Heideking Fellowship allows a German doctoral student in American history to spend a year in the United States. The Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship provides an American postdoc with a year for research and writing in Germany. The current Heideking Fellows, Mischa Honeck and Brian McCook, report on their projects in this issue of the Bulletin. In closing, let me note that the first book by a Heideking Fellow arrived from the publisher as we were going to press. A year’s residence in the United States helped Kade-Heideking Fellow Markus Hünemörder polish his English skills to such an extent that he was able to write his University of Munich doctoral dissertation in English. The copy editor at Berghahn Books had little work when Hünemörder later submitted the manuscript of The Society of the Cincinnatii: Conspiracy and Distrust in Early America for publication. The Revolutionary era was one of Jürgen Heideking’s principal areas of interest, and Dr. Hünemörder’s fine study is a worthy tribute to his memory.

Christof Mauch
In the spring and summer of 1945, World War II finally ended. The human and economic costs of the conflict were horrendous in many lands, but especially so in Germany and Japan, where dozens of cities—including Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Frankfurt, Königsberg, Tokyo, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki—were in ruins. Millions of young soldiers would never be coming home, and millions of civilians were without shelter. Factories were quiet, productivity was at a standstill, and the population was hungry. The situation was not promising.

But Germany and Japan rose miraculously after 1945, and by the twenty-first century they stood at the pinnacle of international prestige and success, having produced the world’s second and third largest economies with an astonishing array of ideas and products. This achievement has been widely attributed both to the sacrifice and hard work of ordinary citizens and to the acceptance by those same people of western ideals of democracy, freedom, and capitalism. As early as 1970, the Germans and the Japanese were buying a disproportionate share of the planet’s luxury goods. Their cities featured thriving central business districts, desirable residential neighborhoods, low crime rates, and efficient public transportation systems.

The United States followed a different trajectory. In 1950, it stood astride the earth like a colossus. Its diverse industries were marvels of efficiency and productivity; its people were richer than those of any other nation in history; its laboratories and universities set a standard of excellence rarely matched; and its air, naval, and ground forces were superior to any possible combination of rivals. America had vast natural resources, unspoiled lakes and forests, and bustling consumer emporiums. Indeed, by 1960, the majority of American families had a private car, an air-conditioned house, a large refrigerator, a television set, a private tele-
By many measures, the United States remains in an enviable position in 2006. Its standard of living is high; its technological achievements are unmatched; its military forces retain their international dominance; and its economy is twice as large as that of Germany and Japan combined. Every day, thousands of newcomers, both legal and otherwise, fight desperately to cross over from Mexico to the land of opportunity, all hoping to follow the American dream to prosperity and a suburban house.

But the great republic has stumbled in recent decades as it has gone from a creditor to a debtor nation. Its balance of payments deficit is annually reckoned in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Its once humming industries have either closed entirely or relocated to other parts of the world. Its citizens suffer from high rates of incarceration, homelessness, drug abuse, and chronic disease, and the wage gap between the rich and the poor continues to widen. With the exception of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Boston, most old American cities have been abandoned by the middle class. Detroit, St. Louis, Cleveland, Buffalo, Newark, New Orleans, and Baltimore, for example, have been on life support for decades. Their central business districts are forlorn, their crime rates are high, and their public schools are dysfunctional. Their once thriving neighborhoods are now characterized by abandoned buildings, littered streets, and an eerie silence.

What happened? Why did the cities of the United States decline after 1945? Why did those of Germany and Japan, at least in a relative sense, thrive during those same years?

Such questions are obviously beyond the limitations of a brief paper. But I do want to probe transnational comparisons of urban and suburban growth in all three countries and to make two large points. The first is that patterns of residential development are often counterintuitive, or not what one might have expected given relative population density and wealth. From the perspective of Germany, for example, it might seem natural that America, with its continental size and vast open spaces, would follow a low-density residential pattern. But Sweden, Norway, and Spain, which have low population densities, do not feature the sprawling metropolitan areas characteristic of the United States.

And how do we explain the residential circumstances of Japan? Greater Tokyo, for example, is in 2006 the world’s most populous urbanized region, with a population exceeding 30 million. Yet aside from a few commercial or office towers, the area is remarkable for its low-rise residential structures, most of them three stories in height. There are exceptions, such as Roppongi Hills, a mixed-used complex that includes the 54-story Mori Tower, a five-star Grand Hyatt Hotel, and four high-rise
residential buildings. But Tokyo would never be confused with New York City, where multi-story apartment structures predominate.

Japan as a whole is not so different from its capital city. Its 127 million citizens occupy less space than the one million residents of Montana. And much of the land that the Japanese do have is mountainous or otherwise unsuitable for settlement. So we might expect that they would build high-rise apartment buildings to preserve open spaces for leisure and recreation. But this is not the case. Rather than live in tall structures along the lines of New York, Hong Kong, or Shanghai, the Japanese avoid apartment living altogether, preferring instead to commute several hours back and forth to work every day in order to live on the ground on residential lots that are miniscule by American standards. The result is that the hundreds of miles between Tokyo and Hiroshima represent an unbroken urban corridor of crowded houses. No doubt this has something to do with earthquakes, but well-constructed big buildings are as safe as small house in such disasters.

Similarly, the Russians, who reside in the world’s most spacious landscape, might be expected to live in secluded cottages on large individual plots. Instead, whether in St. Petersburg or Khabarovsk, Moscow or Irkutsk, Kaliningrad or Magadan, they live in cheaply constructed eight- or ten-story apartment buildings that seem to stretch forever on the edges of every city.

Germans have made the intelligent choice. With their high disposable incomes and their beautiful forests, lakes, and farms, they live in both apartments and houses and in both rental and owner-occupied units. More than most other peoples, they have preserved their towns and cities and kept enough parks and open space to satisfy almost any critic.

This paper suggests that the transfer of ideas and practices among the World War II adversaries should have worked both ways. The Germans and the Japanese learned from Americans how to sustain democratic government, build skyscrapers, and create multi-national businesses. But Americans rarely looked to Germany or Japan for ideas or advice. At the least, those nations could have taught the United States how to conserve resources, maintain attractive cities, and construct efficient public transportation systems. In other words, the German and Japanese people prospered by learning from American experience, while Americans did not bother to learn from European and Asian experience. Quite simply, the economic and social problems of the United States might have been mitigated if Washington had been as attentive to German and Japanese experience as Bonn and Tokyo had been to the American example. My assumption is that the pattern of metropolitan growth was not inevitable in any country, and that geography was not, by itself, destiny.
The American Residential Experience

By 2000, the United States was an overwhelmingly suburban nation. Well over half the population lived outside cities and in places that were obviously not rural, up from a quarter in 1950 and a third in 1960. No other country on earth, not even Australia and Canada, both of which share many spatial characteristics with the American republic, had de-concentrated so relentlessly, so overwhelmingly, so ubiquitously. And the process accelerated in the twenty-first century, so that residential development was eating up 2.1 million acres per year by 2005, a 50 percent increase over the 1980s.

The term suburb is imprecise, however. As even casual reflection reveals, American “suburbs” come in all shapes and sizes, so much so that some suburbs like Hoboken, New Jersey are more like cities than the spacious enclaves for the comfortable that fit the stereotype. And some sections of cities, like River Oaks in Houston, or Fieldston in the Bronx, or Bel-Air in Los Angeles, are more like suburbs than the suburbs themselves.

What then does it mean to say that the United States is a suburban nation? Essentially, the uniqueness of the American residential pattern becomes clear when we shift to an international perspective. The American nation has thus far been unique in four important respects that can be summed up in the following sentence: Affluent and middle-class citizens live in suburban areas that are far from their work places, in homes that they own, and in the center of yards that by urban standards elsewhere are enormous. This uniqueness thus involves population destiny, homeownership, residential status, and journey to work.

The first distinguishing element of metropolitan living in the United States is low residential density and the absence of sharp distinctions between city and country. With wide streets and expansive lawns, the population is typically scattered at average residential densities of fewer than ten persons per acre. The situation in the Denver area is instructive. That fast-growing metropolis, which in 2006 has perhaps three million residents, stretches over hundreds of square miles, and has been absorbing into its orbit such distant communities as Golden, Littleton, and Boulder. Such sprawl results from the privatization of American life and the tendency to live in fully detached homes. For example, of the 100 million dwelling units in the United States in 2000, about two-thirds consisted of a single family living in its own house surrounded by an ornamental yard.

More crowded urban conditions, sharply differentiated from the countryside, are typical of other nations. The outer boundaries of Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, and Vienna abruptly terminate with apartment buildings, and a thirty-minute train ride will take the passenger well into the countryside. Similarly, open fields surround the narrow streets and
crowded houses of Lübeck and Koblenz. Metropolitan Tokyo has swallowed up thousands of tiny farms since World War II, but private building lots rarely exceed one-twentieth of an acre. Unlike Western cities, Shanghai legally includes thousands of acres of productive farmland, but its population is concentrated at the center, where the average density reaches almost a quarter-million people per square mile.

The example of Sweden, which has a standard of living comparable to that of the United States, is particularly revealing. Since 1950 new towns have sprouted around Stockholm, but the high-rise, high-density, low-amenity Swedish suburbs, such as Vallingby, nine miles west of the city center, and Farsta, six miles to the south, with their immigrant concentrations and strong dependence upon public transportation, are the physical antithesis of the low-density, automobile-dependent suburbs of the United States.

The higher densities and different experiences elsewhere in the world can be illustrated by an experience of Professor Bruce Stave of the University of Connecticut. As a visiting professor at Beijing University fifteen years ago, he assigned my book, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, in one of his classes. After a week of effort the students came to him with a quizzical look. “What is crabgrass?” they asked. Quite simply, there seems to be no Japanese or Chinese equivalent of a yard with ornamental grass that performs no useful or productive function.

The second distinguishing residential feature of metropolitan living in the United States is home ownership. This characteristic can best be expressed statistically. In 2006, about two-thirds of American families own their dwellings, a proportion which rises to three-fourths of AFL-CIO union members, to 85 percent of all two-person households headed by a 45- to 64-year-old, and to 95 percent of intact white families in small cities. Overall, the American rate is about double that of Germany and Japan, and is many times higher than that of such former Communist nations as Russia, Poland, or Bulgaria, where private ownership was for many years technically illegal. Sweden again serves as an instructive example, for in that wealthy nation only about a third of families own either a mortgaged or a debt-free home. This proportion has remained fairly stable since 1945, a period of unprecedented prosperity. Only New Zealand, Ireland, Australia, and Canada, all with small populations and a British-induced cultural dislike of dense cities, share the American home-owning experience.

The third distinguishing characteristic of metropolitan living in the United States is the length of the average journey to work, whether measured in miles or in minutes. No other people travel so far to employment. According to the 2000 census, the typical American worker traveled ten miles and expended a half hour in each direction. In larger
metropolitan areas in the United States the figures were higher. In metropolitan Tokyo, the average journey to work is even longer in both time and distance than in the United States, but the Japanese people as a whole do not travel such long distances on a daily basis. Precise statistics are unavailable for Europe, but one need only think of the widespread practice in Spain and Italy of going home for lunch, often for a siesta as well, to realize that an easier connection between work and residence has been more valued and achieved in other countries.

The fourth and final distinguishing characteristic of the American pattern of metropolitan living is the socioeconomic distinction between the center and the periphery. Although the pattern is not statistically so stark in cities that have essentially annexed their suburbs since 1960, such as Houston, Memphis, Indianapolis, Oklahoma City, and Jacksonville, in the United States as a whole, status and income correlate positively with suburban residence, the area that provides the bedrooms for an overwhelming proportion of those with college educations, of those engaged in professional pursuits, and of those in the upper-income brackets. Despite hopes and claims of a great revival in American cities in recent years, the 2000 census revealed a widening disparity between residents of cities and those of their surrounding suburbs, not only in income, but in employment, housing, living arrangements, and family structure. Even Boston, San Francisco, and New York, all acclaimed for their gentrified neighborhoods and economic resurgence, suffered a relative loss of household income. In fact, because low-income areas, public-housing projects, and minority groups are so concentrated in city centers, economist Richard R. Muth calculated a third of a century ago that median income in American cities tended to rise at about 8 percent per mile as one moved away from the central business district, and that it doubled in ten miles.

The situation in other nations provides a striking contrast. In 1993, for example, a commuter train wreck near Johannesburg killed dozens of persons, virtually all of whom were black. The racial proportions of that tragedy reflected the fact that in the old, white-ruled Union of South Africa, it was the oppressed black population that had a long, rush-hour journey to work, while the inner city was reserved for the gracious homes of the privileged white minority. Only after the end of apartheid did the white population flee to gated suburbs.

The Past

It was not ever thus. Prior to 1825, American cities were like urban settlements elsewhere in the world. That is, they shared five spatial characteristics common to all pre-industrial “walking cities.”
The first important characteristic of the walking city was congestion. Lot sizes were small (usually less than twenty feet wide), streets were narrow, and houses were close to the curb. Tiny Elfreth’s Alley in Philadelphia, virtually a replica of Restoration London with its little, brick-fronted row houses, survives today as an example of the tight spatial arrangement typical two centuries ago. Meanwhile, large areas only a few miles distant from Philadelphia’s Delaware River waterfront were rural.

The second important characteristic of the walking city was the clear distinction between city and country. Before the nineteenth century, in every part of the world, there was no blurring of urban-rural boundaries, and there were no signs announcing the entrance of a traveler into a community. Before the age of industrial capitalism a sharp-edged dot on the map was an accurate symbol for a city. It stood for a site of political and economic power inhabited by a small, specialized part of the total population of any region. There was an obvious visual distinction between the closely built-up city and the rural sections surrounding it, and there were no fast-food restaurants, motels, or service stations stretching far along the radial highways.

The third important characteristic of the walking city was its mixture of functions. Except for the waterfront warehousing and red-light districts there were no neighborhoods exclusively given over to commercial, office, or residential functions. Factories were almost non-existent, and production took place in the small shops of artisans. There were no special government or entertainment districts. Public buildings, hotels, churches, warehouses, shops, and homes were interspersed, or often located in the same structure.

The fourth important characteristic of the walking city was the short distance its inhabitants lived from work. Around the globe in 1825, even in the largest cities, only about one person in fifty traveled as much as one mile to his place of employment. Because the business day was long, and because any distance had to be overcome by horse or by foot, there was a significant advantage in living within easy walking distance of the city’s stores and businesses. Work and living spaces were often completely integrated, with members of the family, as well as apprentices, literally living above or behind the place of employment.

The final important characteristic of the walking city was the tendency of the most fashionable and respectable addresses to be located close to the center of town. In Germany, this affinity for the city’s core represented the continuation of a tradition that dated back thousands of years. To be a resident of a big town was to enjoy the best of life, to have a place in man’s true home. To live outside the walls, away from cathedrals, diverse shopping, and elegant homes, was to live in inferior sur-
roundings. In the young American republic, the same tendency was everywhere apparent, and the suburbs were in every way less attractive and prestigious than the core of the city.

Suburbs, then, were socially and economically inferior to cities when wind, muscle, and water were the prime movers of civilization. This basic cultural and social arrangement was essentially the same around the world, and metropolises as different as Edo (Tokyo), Berlin, and New York were remarkably alike. Even the word suburb suggested inferior manners, narrowness of view, and physical squalor.

The Transformation of Metropolitan Living in the United States

Since 1825, America’s largest cities have undergone a transformation that has, thus far, not been characteristic of most other nations and cultures. The shift was not sudden, but it was no less profound for its gradual character. Indeed, the phenomenon was one of the most important in history, for it represented the most fundamental realignment of urban structure in the five-thousand-year history of cities on this planet.

Yet most of the world has not changed radically. A map of the German countryside in 2006 shows remarkably little change from a map of the same area a century ago. The farms, castles, villages, and country estates are much the same, and though the twenty-first-century map might include an occasional industrial park or airport, these are relatively slight intrusions on an immemorial landscape. Germans regard age as an asset, not a liability. In the United States, by contrast, the bulldozers are always at work, and a mighty engine of change seems destined to convert every farm into a shopping mall, a subdivision, or a highway.

Why have Americans neglected cities and concentrated so much of their energy, their vitality, and their creativity in the suburbs? Clearly, no single answer can account for such an important phenomenon, but six causes have been fundamental: racial prejudice, inexpensive land, cheap transportation, balloon-frame construction, government subsidies, and weak land-use controls.

No discussion of the settlement patterns of the American people can ignore the overriding significance of race and ethnicity. In comparison with the relative homogeneity of Germany or Japan, the cities of the United States have long been diverse in racial, ethnic, and religious terms. In suburban terms, this has provided an extra incentive for persons to move away from their older domiciles: fear. After the mass migration of blacks from the South gained momentum during World War I, and especially after the United States Supreme Court decision in 1954 that school segregation was unconstitutional, millions of families moved out

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of the city “for the kids” and especially for the educational (as measured by standardized tests) and social (as measured by family income) superiority of smaller and more homogeneous suburban school systems. The sprawling, single-story public schools of outlying suburbs, surrounded by playing fields and parking lots and offering superb facilities, new laboratories, and well-paid teachers, became familiar symbols of suburban life.

The second cause of American suburbanization has been inexpensive land. Although purchasers rarely regard real estate as cheap, and although some speculators made millions of dollars on land speculation (Henry Morgenthau in the Bronx and Otis Chandler in Los Angeles are examples), a broader view would reveal that American real estate has been affordable and available whereas in Germany and Japan it has been expensive and scarce. Over the course of the twentieth century, building lots in North America have typically been priced at one quarter to one half of comparably sized and located parcels in Germany and Japan. And even after the decline of real estate values in Japan since 1990, land there remains expensive by the standards of the United States.

The third cause of American suburbanization has been subsidized and convenient transport, which has brought those home sites within easy commuting range of workplaces. Although the omnibus (France, 1826), the steam railroad (England), the subway (England, 1864), and the automobile (Germany) were all developed first in Europe, it was in the United States that they were most enthusiastically adopted and where they most immediately affected the lives of ordinary citizens. Especially before World War I, the subways, commuter railroads, elevated trains, and electric trolleys of American cities were faster, more frequent, more efficient, and more cost-effective than transportation options elsewhere in the world. In 1900, for example, Berlin, which had the best transit operation in Europe, would have ranked no higher than twenty-second in the United States. And Tokyo, which in 2006 has the most extensive public transportation system on earth, had virtually nothing at the beginning of the twentieth century.

If we include interstate highways and private automobiles, the transportation system of the United States probably remains the best anywhere early in the current century. This is because the American pattern has been to subsidize private automobiles rather than buses and subways. Moreover, the real price of both cars and fuel in the United States has fallen since 1910. With the price of pumping crude oil from prolific wells in the Middle East or Texas usually less than 25 cents a barrel until World War I, American gasoline consumption and automobile ownership led the world after 1910. Meanwhile, the cost of operating an automobile has remained cheaper in the United States than in other advanced na-
tions. This is a subject of surpassing national significance because it virtually dictates the type of residential pattern that will follow. As Homer Hoyt, the nation’s most distinguished demographer before World War II, noted fifty-five years ago: “The location, size and shape of our cities has thus been a function of the transportation system prevailing during its main period of growth.”

The fourth cause of suburbanization has been the balloon-frame house. Before 1840, the building of an American house was a complicated matter, requiring specialized carpentry skills and several workers. Post and beam construction, for example, involved notching the ends of every piece of lumber. Few people could do it properly. The development of an inexpensive and peculiarly American method of building houses with two-by-four-inch wooden studs was therefore revolutionary. It simplified construction and brought the price of a private dwelling within the reach of most citizens. Each region of the United States has a favored exterior material for new single-family houses—wood clapboard in the Northeast and North Central states, brick in the South, and stucco in the West—just as the British prefer brick and the French choose stucco. But in the United States, more than 90 percent of all single-family houses are of the balloon-frame type, regardless of exterior sheathing. Such structures are uncommon in other countries, in part because their citizens regard the balloon-frame as flimsy, and in part because they lack the timber resources of the heavily forested United States. In Germany, for example, nineteenth-century walls were typically load bearing, meaning that if the wall were weakened, the structure would collapse. In the United States, by contrast, the exterior sheathing has no structural function other than to keep out the wind and the rain. In contemporary Germany, even interior rooms are divided by building blocks, not by fiberboard and two-by-fours as in the United States.

A fifth cause of American suburbanization has been the role of government, particularly at the federal level. The prevailing myth is that suburbs blossomed because of the preference of consumers who made free choices in an open environment. Actually, because of public policies favoring the suburbs, only one possibility was economically feasible. The result, if not the intent, of Washington programs has been to encourage decentralization. Federal Highway Administration and Veterans Administration mortgage insurance, the highway system, the financing of sewers, and the placement of military bases, to name only the most obvious examples, have encouraged scattered development in the open countryside. While it was a national purpose to build subsidized highways and utilities outside of cities, it was not national policy to help cities repair and rebuild aging transit systems, bridges, streets, and water and sewer lines.
Moreover, beginning in 1937 with the passage of the United States Housing Act, this nation adopted a policy, unique in the world, of making the provision of public housing a voluntary act, so that communities across the land had to apply for public housing. The practical result of this policy was that central cities applied for public housing while affluent suburbs simply avoided the opportunity. Thus, American central cities became the concentrated homes of the poor and of various kinds of urban pathologies, while the suburbs became places of escape. By contrast, the Germans and the Japanese have a higher percentage of public housing dwellers, and they spread their public housing units across metropolitan regions. Indeed, in those countries, a demonstrably higher proportion of the public housing units go to the periphery than to central cities.

The most important federal inducements to single-family residences have been contained in the murky provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and especially in the unusual American practice of allowing taxpayers to deduct mortgage interest and property taxes from their total taxable income. The size of this subsidy to homeownership is staggering and exceeds by four or five times all the direct expenditures Congress grants to housing. Moreover, tax benefits make it increasingly likely, as taxable income rises, that homeownership will be preferred to renting. Indeed, while Germany does not allow the owner-occupant to deduct the mortgage interest from even a single dwelling, the United States allows for both a first and a second home, up to a maximum deduction of a $1 million mortgage.

Finally, federal, state, and local governments in the United States have been influential through what they have not done. In Germany, land is regarded as a scarce resource to be controlled in the public interest rather than exploited for private gain. There, government has traditionally exercised stringent controls over land development and has operated on the theory that the preservation of farms and open space is an appropriate national goal and that suburban sprawl is undesirable. In Germany, by 1900, most municipal governments not only had extensive restrictions on the use of private land but they also had large land holdings of their own that they used to control development on the city’s periphery. The residue of this policy can be seen in 2006, when truck farmers tend crops within one mile of the skyscrapers of Düsseldorf, not because alternative land uses would not yield a higher return, but because the government rejects the very possibility of development.

In the United States, by contrast, millions of acres since 1960 have been converted into subdivisions, office parks, and highway strips. One result is that the vitality of central business districts has been drained away in favor of enclosed shopping malls on the metropolitan periphery.
Indeed, Russell Baker once remarked, only partially in jest, that either America is a shopping center or the one shopping center in existence is moving around the country at the speed of light.

Decisions about spatial location are more significant in the United States than in Germany and Japan because America is decentralized, and its schools and the protection provided by police, firefighters, and public health professionals are financed and controlled at the local level. For example, Japan has only sixty-four school districts, and all essentially follow the same curriculum and the same national educational objectives. The United States, by contrast, has more than 15,000 independent school systems, each with its own board of education, its own taxing arrangements, and its own objectives and goals. Washington has little authority about zoning, land use, education, fire protection, police, and all manner of issues that in Germany or Japan are handled by regional or central governments.

The situation in Australia is similar. In this lightly populated nation, where suburbanization is the rule, there are only seven school districts, seven police departments, and seven fire brigades in the entire country. There is no Melbourne Fire Department or Sydney Police Department or Adelaide School System. Instead, there is a Victoria Fire Brigade, a New South Wales police force, and a South Australia school system. Thus, when a person moves from one municipal jurisdiction to another in Australia, that move has few consequences. In the United States, by contrast, every residential change from one suburb to another has important financial, educational, and legal ramifications.

The Future

These six factors, along with a pervasive fondness for grass and solitude, have made private and detached houses affordable and desirable to most Americans, and they have produced a spread-out environment of work, residence, and consumption that has thus far been more pronounced in the United States than elsewhere. By many measures, this result has been ideal. Not only has it been in accord with the wishes of the American people, but they have remained the most mobile and the best housed people in the history of the planet. The German people, for example, have matched Americans in per capita output, but their residential options are limited and expensive. An average American house and yard would be luxurious by German standards. German homes tend to be more substantial than their American counterparts, but are less spacious and more expensive.

Moreover, the metropolitan pattern of the United States seems to be in accord with the technological demands and possibilities of the future.
In the 1980s and 1990s, such prominent authors as Paul Hawkin, John Naisbitt, and Alvin Toffler, among others, created a cottage industry out of the prediction that cities are doomed and that a new science of telecommunications will make personal human interaction unnecessary. In the future, they suggested, we might expect to have breakfast with our spouse, kiss good-bye, and then return to our separate workstations within the house. In the friendly surrounds of the family room, we will report to work, buy groceries, and converse with friends.

In 1997, Joel Garreau’s *Edge Cities: Life on the Frontier* made somewhat the same argument. Focusing on large commercial/office/residential complexes (defined as places with 5,000,000 square feet or more of office space and 600,000 square feet or more of retail space) on the peripheries of large American metropolises, Garreau opined that “when we examine Edge Cities, we’re looking at the future we’re building for our children and our children’s children well into the twenty-second century.”

**The Dilemma**

What, if anything, is the suburban dilemma? If American highways and houses are the best and most accessible in the world, if the American people are happy with their residential options, and if the American suburb is predicted to be the domicile of choice in the twenty-first century, what is the problem? Why not have a celebration instead of a discussion?

Unfortunately, the suburban pattern of metropolitan living, which worked well for 180 years, is not affordable in an environment in which global competition is a fact of everyday life. Suburbanization is destructive to cities, destructive to the environment, destructive to economic competitiveness, and destructive to personal safety. Suburbanization has also rewarded racial discrimination, inhibited individual economic opportunity, and eaten away the rural landscape.

**The Cost to Cities**

In 1968, Spiro Agnew became the first suburban politician to rise to national office. Although he was presented to the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach as an expert on urban problems, an important consideration when deadly riots were regularly tearing apart America’s cities, his actual experience was as chief executive officer of suburban Baltimore County, Maryland, a 610-square-mile swatch of green and rolling countryside that surrounds the city of Baltimore like a well-pitched horseshoe on a stake. Between 1950 and 1970, the affluent county doubled its population while its proportion of African-Americans fell from about 7 percent to 3 percent. Thus, Agnew’s real claim to expertise,
as Gary Wills noted in *Nixon Agonistes,* was that he “early grasped and overcame what white suburbanites take to be their main city problem: ‘how to escape the city.’”

Escape Americans did. Eighteen of the nation’s twenty-five largest cities in 1950, including Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, Buffalo, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis, lost population over the next five decades, a circumstance which many observers have taken as the most compelling evidence that American cities are dying. By contrast, during the same half-century, the independent suburbs of the United States gained more than 80 million residents. Between 1950 and 1970, the suburban population doubled from 36 to 74 million, and 83 percent of the nation’s growth took place in the suburbs. In 1970, for the first time in the history of the world, a nation-state counted more suburbanites than city dwellers or farmers. In 1990, also for the first time in history, a nation-state counted more suburbanites than city dwellers and rural dwellers combined. Remarkably, each of the fifteen largest metropolitan areas in the United States in 2000 had a majority of residents living in the suburbs. In New York City, for example, the municipality had eight million inhabitants. But the surrounding suburbs had almost twice that many people. And New York has always been more centralized than other American cities.

**The Cost to the Economy**

Inexpensive energy is necessary for almost every convenience in American life, from lawn care to electric lights, from air-conditioning to central heating, from air travel to cheap clothing. But ground transportation is the big guzzler, consuming about half of America’s per capita consumption of oil. And that number has been increasing steadily—from four barrels per person per year in 1920, to eight barrels in 1930, to ten barrels in 1940, to sixteen barrels in 1950, to twenty barrels in 1960, to twenty-six barrels in 1970, to thirty-three barrels in 1980, to forty barrels in 2005. Meanwhile, the population has almost tripled, meaning that national consumption increased by almost thirty times in less than a century.

Automobile and trucking interests often make the case that the transportation system of the United States contributes to its international competitiveness. They suggest that the price of moving goods from place to place is lower in North America than in other countries, and that American businesses would be at a disadvantage if gasoline taxes or highway tolls were raised significantly.

Indeed, transport costs to individual manufacturers are lower in the United States than in Germany and Japan. But this is because the general taxpayer picks up many of the expenses attributable to automobility (or truckability). Historically, cities have been the most efficient of human
spatial arrangements, and all indications are that this remains true in 2006. Berlin and Tokyo discourage suburbanization because sprawl has a negative effect on their international competitiveness.

In the United States, where the residential, manufacturing, and commercial pattern is dispersed, the average citizen must use a private car to perform virtually every one of life’s mundane tasks. In metropolitan areas with poor mass transit options, which of course describes most of the nation, the plague of gridlock creates inefficiencies on a massive scale. Thus, the five urban areas in 2003 where the time lost per traveler to congestion was highest were Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington, Atlanta, and Houston. This tendency is further exacerbated by low energy prices. The cost of gasoline in the United States has been low for more than a century. In July 1991, for example, a study by the Cambridge Energy Research Associates concluded that the pretax price of gasoline at the pump, adjusted for inflation, was as low as it had been since 1947. As Professor David Lewis of the University of Michigan Business School has observed: “Our prices of gasoline represent a dream world.”

Compared to competitor nations, gasoline is essentially not taxed in the United States. In 2005, Americans did pay more than $60 billion in direct taxes on gasoline. But the twelve-nation European Community, for example, which has fewer vehicles on the road than the United States, took in about five times the American sum in the same period. The total tax in most American states in 2006 averages less than 60 cents per gallon. Germany, by contrast, increased its gasoline taxes by 46 cents just to pay for its Gulf War obligations. Ross Perot’s modest 1992 plan for a 50-cents-a-gallon tax on gasoline in the United States died with his candidacy. In 1993, President Clinton aimed for a modest 9-cent rise in the levy; the compromise figure was 4.3 cents, a number laughably small in German or Japanese terms.

The result, of course, is that Americans consume energy at prodigious rates. At the pump, they do not pay prices that average about $6 a gallon in Japan and Germany. Meanwhile, fuel in Colorado is so inexpensive that families buy houses in Boulder and travel sixty miles and more daily to their offices in Denver. In no other country would ordinary citizens even consider such nonsense.

Far from hobbling the American economy, higher gasoline taxes would make the United States more competitive with nations that have already responded to the long-term need for energy efficiency. This is because a low per-mile cost does not translate into a low per-person cost. For example, in the United States, the average family spends between 15 and 18 percent of its gross income on transportation. In Japan, where gasoline is expensive, families spend on average only 10 percent for transportation. Japanese citizens, encouraged by government policy, often
walk to the store, ride a bicycle to the train station, use a commuter railroad to get to work, and drive an automobile for a family excursion. By contrast, Americans typically do not even think about transportation options: they simply start their engines and drive several miles for a Pepsi or a package of cigarettes.

The perception is that the American motorist is paying for his roadways; in fact the general taxpayer subsidizes motorists. The exact sum is in dispute, with estimates ranging from $24 billion to $300 billion per year. The costs of snow removal, of traffic control, of roadway repair, of accident investigations, of air pollution, and of uninsured victims, among others, are typically borne by society. In other words, automobile use creates externality costs that are not charged to the motorist. In New York State, for example, the Tri-State Transportation Campaign, a coalition of environmental planning and transportation groups, reported in March 1994 that general tax revenues contributed $2.4 billion annually to road and bridge maintenance, traffic patrols, and related expenses, and that motorists paid only 65 cents of every dollar of state expense. In California, the state government concluded even more dramatically that car taxes and tolls paid only about 10 percent of vehicular costs. The rest of the tab was funded out of general revenues. As Elliott D. Sclar and Walter Hook have noted, “In recent years, some businesses have chosen to relocate to office parks or freestanding corporate headquarters in suburban and exurban locations accessible by interstate highways. This has not happened because these locations are inherently more efficient, but because the costs of these locations have been underwritten by public subsidies.”

Four arguments might be made in answer to such an assertion. The first is that because the overwhelming majority of adult Americans own automobiles, it does not matter where the taxes are collected. The motorist is not subsidized because the motorist is also the general taxpayer who does the subsidizing. My analogy is to the student away at college. The tuition fee includes nineteen meals per week. The student is free to eat off campus, but they have already paid for cafeteria fare. Essentially, Americans do the same thing. Having already paid for roads through property, sales, or income taxes, they would be foolish not to use them. The only cost remaining is the cost of gasoline, which is negligible.

A second objection to the gasoline tax argument is that public transportation also receives subsidies in the United States. This is true: Federal subsidies to the New York City subway system alone amount to more than $1 billion per year. But that sum is trivial compared to the grants that national governments make to the Paris, Berlin, or Mexico City underground systems. And that sum is also trivial compared to the much larger amounts that are regularly made to highway transport in every American state.
A third objection to higher gasoline taxes is that such levies would affect various regions of the nation in disproportionate ways. Because people in the West use 10 percent more fuel per capita than residents in the more congested East, some argue that higher gasoline taxes are unfair. Yet if the United States were to follow the German model, Washington would reward the inhabitants of Brooklyn for being more energy efficient than their counterparts in Montana.

A fourth objection to higher gasoline taxes is that they are regressive, meaning that they impact the poor more than the rich. Yet by every measure—average number of vehicles per household, number of miles driven per household, and motor fuel expenditures per household—data show that car usage rises steeply with income.

By every measure, the United States is less energy efficient than either Germany or Japan. In America, the road has been defined as a public good and thus worthy of public support. Meanwhile, public transportation has been defined as a private business unworthy of government aid. This is the opposite of the policy of the rest of the developed world, which essentially taxes the automobile to subsidize subways, buses, and streetcars. Not surprisingly, 64 percent of total passenger miles in Asian cities are via public transport, 25 percent in Europe, and 4 percent in the United States.

The experience of Australia is instructive. With a much lower population density than the United States and with land in limitless supply, the Canberra government has nevertheless chosen to tax gasoline at about twice the American rate. It also manages to put twice as many persons onto public conveyances as the United States. So much for the argument that American transport policy is the inevitable result of a continental nation that has nothing to learn from tiny countries.

The result of a favorable Washington policy toward automobility is that American cities have the lowest population density and highest energy use of any metropolises on earth. The United States reached its oil production peak—11 million barrels per day—in 1970. In 2006, its daily output was down to about 5 million barrels. Meanwhile, the nation is increasingly dependent on foreign oil. In 2004, the United States imported about 60 percent of its oil, at a cost of about a half a billion dollars per day. By 2010, that figure is projected to rise to 70 percent.

Why is this number significant? In World War II, the Allied powers had a monopoly of the world’s oil supplies. Germany, Japan, and Italy together had hardly a drop of oil. Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, because of Hitler’s nervousness about the presence of the Red Army within one hundred miles of the Rumanian oil fields. And Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, not because of an ambition to take over the United States, but because it needed a secure source of raw materials,
primarily oil, from the south. Later in the war, Wehrmacht tanks literally ran out of gas at the Battle of the Bulge, while the Japanese navy was unable properly to train its carrier pilots after 1942 because its oil supply was shut off by American submarines.

Yet a half-century after the end of World War II, the United States is more dependent upon foreign oil than the Axis ever was. America now imports eleven million barrels of oil per day, more than the Imperial Japanese Navy used per year at the height of World War II. By some estimates, the cost of America’s current oil profligacy is well over $100 billion per year, which represents a substantial part of the annual United States trade deficit.

In somewhat oversimplified terms, the American lifestyle, organized around single-family houses, shopping malls, and corporate office parks, requires its citizens to import energy, thus handicapping the national economy in competition with more energy-efficient countries. Germany and Japan, for example, the world’s other economic superpowers, generated in 2004 approximately the same per capita gross national product as the United States, but they did it by consuming less than half as much energy per person. Their relative advantage only increases with every additional gallon of gasoline used. American commentators wondered aloud why Japan was less enthusiastic about the first Gulf War than the United States. Yet why should Japan be as concerned about the price of gasoline as Americans are? More expensive energy simply increased the relative advantage of Japanese producers over their American competitors. Meanwhile, every dollar the United States spends on imported oil is a dollar added to its balance of payments deficit.

This analysis does not take military expenditures to protect the oil supply into account. Few could doubt that, without oil, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq would not have elicited such a strong American response in 1991. In fact, Earl Ravenal, a former Pentagon official, estimated before the attack on Iraq began that if American military expenditures chargeable to the invasion were added to the price of a barrel of Middle East oil, the cost of the barrel would be between $180 and $280, or more than ten times the price at the time. But the cost of the Gulf War was not charged to the suburbs or to the automobile. The situation was essentially the same when the United States invaded Iraq itself in 2003. Once again, the impulse was more about oil than Saddam Hussein, more about shopping malls than freedom.

The larger problem for Germany, the United States, and the world is that the international oil demand is already pressing against the available supply, and as the standard of living in China begins to rise, oil consumption in Asia will grow by millions of barrels every day. Although a few skeptics, Daniel Yergin prominent among them, dispute the idea that
oil is in short supply, the weight of expert opinion is that the world is in an energy crisis that the economic development of China and India will only exacerbate.

The Cost to the Environment

The cost of America’s suburban living style involves more than the price of gasoline. In the summer of 1992, a United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro concluded that the United States was second only to East Germany in per capita carbon dioxide emissions. It further estimated that 17.8 percent of the world’s total greenhouse gases came from America, although it accounted for only 4 percent of the population of the planet. More recent estimates are that, by itself, the United States accounts for 34 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions.

The chief culprit is the private automobile, which consumes 45 percent of the petroleum used in America. Although internal combustion engines are more efficient in the United States than they were twenty years ago, they produce oxide gases of carbon and nitrogen, plus water vapor. It is fair to say that Washington subsidizes deforestation with its energy policy. Several scholars now say it is hotter in the tropics and colder at the poles, thus magnifying the pressure differences and increasing tornadoes and hurricanes.

Help seemed to be on the way in 1997. An eleven-day conference at the Kyoto International Conference Hall hammered out an agreement that required industrial nations, with varying targets, to cut greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by 2012. The European Union fell quickly into line and even established a kind of carbon market through which more efficient companies could sell their unused credits at a profit. But the United States refused to go along, and in 2001 even formally rejected the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that the pact exempted emerging industrial powers like China and India or undeveloped countries like Sudan.

Consider other tangible debris of America’s metropolitan lifestyle. Americans throw away 300 million tires each year, only 20 percent of which are recycled or retreaded. For reasons not entirely clear, mosquitoes multiply at hundreds of times their normal rate when they can procreate inside old tires. In February 1990, the largest used-tire dump in North America burned for seventeen days in Ontario, Canada. It contained 14 million tires, cost $14 million to clean up, and befouled the air in eight states. Not surprisingly, the National Association of Counties has recently determined that used tires represent the largest solid waste problem in the United States. Motor oil is almost as serious an environmental hazard. At least 200 million gallons of used motor oil are annually dumped into the ground of the United States by do-it-yourself oil chang-
ers, and another 60 million gallons of motor oil are thrown away with household trash.

Later in the twenty-first century, President George W. Bush will likely be blamed for his arrogance regarding this critical environmental issue, but the larger truth is that the American people have reached a consensus “to bear any burden, to pay any price” in order to keep the gasoline spigots open and to secure whatever petroleum supplies are necessary to support their spread-out, automobile-based lifestyle. It is a revealing commentary about the United States that Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger of California, arguably the most environmentally correct of states, drives a Hummer, a vehicle more akin to a tank than a car.

The Germans and the Japanese, by contrast, have always known that buses and trains can reduce environmental pollution, conserve open space, and move people about quickly and efficiently. Similarly, they have conserved waste of every description and recycled it, thus reducing pressure on the planet itself.

The Cost in Personal Safety

Americans are comfortable in their suburban homes and in the automobiles that make their private residences convenient. Bucolic detached dwellings give the appearance of serenity and peace. Similarly, the private motorcar seems clean, quiet, controlled, modern, safe, and responsive, especially in contrast to public transportation, which is considered dangerous, ugly, inconvenient, and low-status. In fact, in most large cities, a person riding a bus might just as well hang a sign around his or her neck proclaiming, “I am a loser.”

The actuality of safety is rather different. The biggest bloodbath in American history has not been on a battlefield but on a highway. Since the bicentennial in 1976, more Americans have died on the road than in all the wars in the history of the United States combined. In 1990, for example, few parents were anxious to see their sons in the military deployed to the Persian Gulf. Yet those 500,000 young men on the desert sand, about 100 of whom died in pushing the Iraqi Army back to its own boundaries, were actually safer than if they had been at home, where a statistically larger number of them would have died accidental deaths, mostly in automobile crashes.

Too often, American cars become coffins. Little understood in the United States is the probability that high-density city living, supported by efficient public transportation, is safer than the automobile-focused suburban lifestyle that is so common. Private automobiles are six times as dangerous as subways per 100 million miles traveled. Between 1928 and 1970, for example, during which time hundreds of thousands of people
died on American roads, there was not a single fatal accident on New York’s subways, which carried more than 50 billion riders in those years. Gotham’s underground record has not been quite as spotless since that time, but even so, the dozen or so persons killed on mass transit in the course of thirty years are exceeded every day on the nation’s highways.

Another way of measuring the impact of population density and automobile travel is to compare the states of New York and Texas, each of which had virtually the same size population in 2000. Accidental death statistics for the two jurisdictions, which include motor vehicle deaths, homicides, and all forms of accidents (drowning, accidental shootings, falls, etc.) reveal that the Lone Star State has 50 percent more automobile-related deaths and twice as many homicides as the Empire State. Quite simply, low-density metropolitan living patterns are themselves more costly in terms of human lives than higher density patterns. In suburban situations, people have to drive farther to accomplish life’s daily tasks. This pattern is not well understood because automobile safety statistics in the United States are typically reported per 100 million miles driven, not per capita.

Homicides have traditionally been more common in big cities than in suburbs. But this is because American policy has been to concentrate the pathologies of modern life—homelessness, public housing, illegal drugs, illegitimacy, AIDS, and poverty—in central areas. Americans then regard inner cities as dangerous. In actuality, if concentrated populations had a predisposition to violence, then Japan would not have fewer murders each year than Houston. And Germany, with a higher population density than the United States, would not have a lower homicide rate than America.

**Conclusion**

Subsidized private transportation and low-density housing represent the most fundamental characteristics of American life. They represent the crowning physical achievement of the United States and are more representative of the national culture than big cars, tall buildings, or professional sports. The single-family house represents the domestic ideal; it is a manifestation of such fundamental characteristics of American society as conspicuous consumption, upward mobility, the widening gap between rich and poor, the primacy of the automobile, and a tendency toward racial and economic exclusivity. And the aspiration to homeownership, the belief that somehow, someday, one can purchase a detached colonial-style home on a large lot with a three-car garage, is as important in drawing newcomers to American shores as freedom, democracy, and capitalism.

But the metropolitan living pattern of the United States imposes costs as well as benefits. We need not go so far as James Howard Kunstler, who
argues that America’s advanced civilization will soon collapse into a kind of subsistence farming and that “suburbia will come to be regarded as the greatest misallocation of resources in the history of the world,” to conclude that the nation has moved so far in support of one particular lifestyle that it has become dangerously dependent upon foreign oil and is compromising its economic future. Because of suburbanization, American cities have often fallen into disrepute and disrepair, and thousands of citizens unnecessarily die on the highways each year. Moreover, automobile is putting a strain on the urban environment as well as the biosphere.

Unfortunately, neither President George W. Bush nor the Congress has done anything to reduce American oil consumption. Instead, the House and Senate both approved in the summer of 2005 a broad energy bill that granted billions of dollars in tax breaks to oil companies to encourage more production. Although the legislation included small inducements to produce energy from wind, ethanol, and other renewable sources, Republican lawmakers specifically rejected a provision that would have required the president to reduce American oil consumption by one million barrels per day, or 5 percent.

German and Japanese responses to similar residential challenges and transportation options have been more successful and more responsive to the needs of a global economy and a global environment than those of the United States. Meanwhile, this nation’s chief executive has been too busy trying to privatize social security, repeal the estate tax, and fight a global war against “terrorism” to concern himself with the energy crisis. As Thomas L. Friedman has noted, “We are, quite simply, witnessing one of the greatest examples of misplaced priorities in the history of the U.S. presidency.”

Suggested Reading:


THE SUBURBANIZATION OF GERMAN AND AMERICAN CITIES

Comment on the Nineteenth Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 17, 2005

Adelheid von Saldern
University of Hanover

Kenneth Jackson has concluded with a more or less depressing outlook on the American future after his accurate analysis of past and present phenomena. He has impressively linked ordinary suburban living to general trends of American policies, city planning, and middle-class interests. In my essay I will address Jackson’s comparisons between German and U.S. cities and add some more perspectives, especially with regard to Germany.

Looking at the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, all the trends and phenomena Kenneth Jackson has presented for the United States can also be found in Germany: suburbanization, land and home speculation, automobilization, as well as subsidized and idealized home ownership. But while it looks at first glance as if there have been similar developments in both countries, this is, in fact, not the case, primarily because politics and culture as well as social and economic processes differed considerably. In the following, these two aspects, similarities and dissimilarities, will be considered more closely and, at the end, related to path dependence theory.

Differing Strengths of Local Government

At the beginning of the twentieth century, American progressive reformers, among them numerous middle-class women, were committed to municipal reform, inspired by the idea that cities should have more responsibilities and more independence from the state to develop a modern “service city.” They were willing to learn from European experiences and therefore developed a transatlantic network of communication. While new special commissions were organized and city managers introduced, permanent, professional city management positions were much less established in America than in Germany, and they were less independent from economic interests.

While American local governments were eager to improve the business climate in their cities, German local governments at that time were
more influenced by the idea of so-called municipal socialism. Evolving from the British Fabian Society, municipal socialism called for local governments to take over many technical and social services, from gas companies to cemeteries. Municipal socialism was (more or less) implemented by groups of local officials that had rapidly increased since the 1880s. Although these local officials were used to cooperating with local elites and homeowners, they usually developed their own perspectives and norms and built up their own networks of communication among their colleagues and with reformers of other countries, especially Britain. Their self-confidence was based on the highly valued idea of local self-rule (Selbstverwaltung) dating back to the Stein and Hardenberg reforms in the early nineteenth century. Its idealization provided a smokescreen for the lack of wider political democratization until general voting rights were introduced after the revolution of 1918–1919. It also obscured the fact that despite their system of self-rule, German local governments were in reality constitutionally and financially dependent on the state.

There were, however, great differences between Germany and the United States under Dillon’s Rule (1903), which expressly transferred municipal responsibilities and functions to the respective state legislatures. In fact, private developers and the direct or indirect representatives of business interests on the one hand and American counties on the other had more influence in shaping urban realities than business and counties (Bezirke) had in Germany. American cities were often regarded as nothing more than public corporations. As territorial boundaries were not rigidly set, overlapping authorities and so-called special districts, above all school districts, weakened the city as a communal entity and a decision-maker with respect to white middle-class interests. By contrast, German local governments had much more influence on middle-class interests, including school development, especially high schools for girls in the decades before and after World War I.

In the following paragraphs I will focus on several areas in order to demonstrate the differing strengths of the United States and Germany in terms of local governments’ efforts to influence or resist developments affecting cities.

**Regional Planning**

Regional planning as a professional discipline was developed earlier and to a greater extent in the United States than in Germany. In fact, there were excellent regional planners in the United States of the 1920s, such as Henry Wright, Catherine Bauer, and Clarence S. Stein, actively supported by the well-known urban planner and theorist Lewis Mumford, among others. The Regional Planning Association of America, founded in 1923,
developed the idea of shaping metropolitan areas by creating city-like communities, but it could not—especially after 1930—affect the mainstream of regional development characterized by private auspices and private speculation. Model garden cities were either an economic disaster, such as Radburn, N.J. (1928–32), or no more than excellent but isolated experiments, such as Sunnyside Gardens in Queens (1928), comparable to some model tenements built and administered by philanthropists, unions, and cooperatives and the few greenbelt cities of the New Deal era. Inspiring models were also built in the era after World War II, not least of all in the past twenty years, but without affecting American cities on a broad scale.

Apart from some forerunners, regional planning in Germany had its breakthrough only during the Nazi period, i.e. under the auspices of racism. After 1945, Raumplanung, although denazified, suffered both from its negative National Socialist heritage and from particular local interests clinging to the right of self-rule. Up to that time regional planning in Germany, continuing traditions from the late nineteenth century onward, consisted mostly of voluntary or compulsory incorporations of villages and small towns into larger cities (Eingemeindungen). The most impressive development was the Regional Reform (Gebietsreform) carried out by laws between 1968 and 1977 that decreased the number of independent local communities from 24,000 to 8,500 local units (Kommunen). Since the 1960s regional planning could also have an impact by coordinating public traffic in both the city and its surrounding region. In addition, some regional planning concepts, such as the Hamburg “concept of axes” (Achsenkonzept) focusing on suburbanization along public traffic lines, could influence development, but only to some extent. Recently, regional planning has received more public attention. The remedy has been seen in the creation of “polycentric regions.” At first glance, these attempts can be compared to the American efforts of shaping “edge cities,” but differences with respect to the relevance of public transportation remain.

Housing Policies

Regional planning must be viewed in combination with urban planning. Local governments have especially directed urban planning, including new residential areas. Private speculation, which had been extremely prevalent in the early Kaiserreich (Terrainsellschaften), was later consciously restricted by local governments purchasing land and developing its infrastructure on their own. Looking at German urban planning, an example of influential planning was the huge program of subsidized, relatively well-equipped housing developments of the 1920s, with houses

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of two to four stories mostly located at the edges of the cities, like Frankfurt-Westhausen or Karlsruhe-Dammerstock. \textsuperscript{16} At that time, in contrast to the American situation, suburbanization was steered by immensely active city planners like Ernst May in Frankfurt or Martin Wagner in Berlin. The desire of members of the lower middle class and workers for nature or for a supplemental economy was only taken into account by Schreber garden plots that had often already been built in the \textit{Kaiserreich}, and to some extent by lots for tenants of the new housing developments. \textsuperscript{17}

Since the carefully planned, modern housing developments in many German cities of the 1920s were medium-sized in terms of density, low-density suburbanization by single-family houses could be held to a minimum at that time. To be sure, the cities expanded since the late nineteenth century, not least of all by \textit{Villenkolonien} and some pre-war “garden-cities,” as well as a few special types of suburban agglomeration in the course of the Weimar Republic. \textsuperscript{18} The extension of cities by single-family houses also slowly proceeded during the Nazi period, promoted by the policy on the “reprivatization” of housing, decreased interest rates, and the rise of homeowner’s loan corporations (\textit{Bausparkassen}) for the “Aryan” middle class. However, the most impressive step in suburbanization by single-family houses occurred in the Federal Republic, within the framework of “social housing policy” (\textit{Sozialer Wohnungsbau}). First-time home ownership of a single-family home of limited size that included a small apartment as a rental unit (\textit{Einliegerwohnung}) was subsidized by special laws in 1950 and especially in 1956, as well as by tax reductions up to 2006. In the period of the Cold War, home ownership, which normally meant suburban home ownership at this time, was interpreted as a symbol of individual and political freedom, similar to the situation in the United States. Suburbanization was also gendered in order to cultivate the conventional form of family in modern times: the bread-earning husband working in the male-dominated, seductive or dangerous city center all day and his wife with his children cultivating domesticity in the “safe” suburbs. \textsuperscript{19}

As there was still a scarcity of accommodation even in the sixties local governments stimulated the construction of huge housing developments at the edges of the cities. In contrast to the concept of Ebenezer Howard’s garden cities as well as to the biological-organic concept of a divided and broken-up city during Nazi Germany and, in a denazified version, in postwar West Germany, the new satellite cities, such as Bremen-Vahr (24,000 inhabitants), Munich-Neuperlach (74,000 inhabitants) and Halle-Neustadt (90,000 inhabitants) in West and East Germany combined the principles of density with the principles of economical construction and functionalist structure. \textsuperscript{20} Simultaneously, but more intensively during the 1970s, West German academics, urban planners, citizens’ initiatives, and
feminists criticized these housing developments as an undesirable culture of monotony and mono-functionalism. Supported by local governments and the public, non-profit organizations and private companies reacted against these earlier developments by erecting groups of multi-family houses of greater architectural variety and smaller size that also were supposed to be accepted as an alternative to single-family houses.

Looking back at the American Progressive Era, the reformers’ hope that the construction of model tenements and model garden cities would create a broad reform of housing policies was in vain. In 1930, the reform-oriented journal *The Survey* published an article on subsidized housing programs under the headline, “Wake up, America.” At that time, however, the majority of American policy makers rejected subsidies for housing projects, arguing that housing conditions were better in the United States than in Europe, an argument that was opposed by the reformers. It was only the New Deal program that led to a break in the tradition of having only private housing policies, although the new housing blocks were anything but attractive (see below). Besides the public housing program, however, New Deal policy decisively promoted the ownership of single-family homes in 1934 by a law guaranteeing mortgages. Thus, suburbanization by single-family houses could continue on a large scale, especially as it was heavily promoted after World War II, as Kenneth Jackson has also outlined. It was only the rise of the New Urbanism since the 1980s and 1990s that led to some attempts to revitalize the idea of the city in the United States.

Seen as a whole, the various episodes of suburbanization by single-family houses in the course of the twentieth century occurred less rapidly and later in Germany than in the United States. This was not only due to the lower economic prosperity of the German middle and upper working classes, more expensive land, and higher construction costs, as Kenneth Jackson correctly pointed out, but also due to German (local) governments’ policies of managing urban development.

**Automobilization**

Since Kenneth Jackson explicitly elaborated the links between suburbanization and automobilization, the comparison between American and German policy in this regard is necessary. The striking point is that mass automobilization in Germany only happened from the late 1950s and 1960s onwards, not from the 1920s as in the United States. Up to that time, German suburbanization more or less followed the public transportation lines, while in the United States, the early car orientation led to early sprawl. Later, however, during the postwar “economic miracle,” cars, although not yet very numerous at the time, received the highest priority.
in the eyes of many German urban planners: the concept was the “car-friendly city” (autogerechte Stadt) corresponding to American urban developments. German cities received wide streets designed for cars, while pedestrians and bicyclists were marginalized. In this period, developments in both countries were quite similar. This car-dominated era of the 1960s and early 1970s in German urban planning was, however, accompanied by heavily state-subsidized construction of new subways, partly to get still more space for cars, partly to promote public transportation. While this transportation policy was two-sided, the resistance of many citizens’ initiatives (Bürgerinitiativen) to the domination of cars in German cities from the 1970s on had a clear goal: to re-create the city as a livable, post-functionalist space. And there is no doubt that these protests, supported by academic studies, led to a strong counter-reaction stimulated by the observation of American developments unwanted in Germany in the future. To be sure, the increase in the number of cars could not be stopped by these arguments and the countermeasures were not easy to implement, but in the end the policies that were adopted to counteract earlier developments improved the situation by installing many pedestrian zones and bike lanes and by reevaluating various inner city centers according to the new concept of a polycentric city.

Looking to the United States, reactions against the domination of cars could also be found in the 1960s and 1970s. Pedestrian zones were introduced in some American cities, but these measures could not succeed to a large extent. And most suburbanites have been dependent on their cars, as Kenneth Jackson has elaborated. To be sure, there were always criticisms of such developments in the United States, such as Lewis Mumford’s social concept of cities and regions, or Jane Jacob’s 1961 book that rejected suburbanization and praised lively streets, or Richard Sennett’s critical search for urban creativity, but they could not change overall public opinion. Thus, the question arises whether the car culture in the United States, which had already started in the 1920s, forty years earlier than in Germany, had reached a point of no return in the United States after the 1950s and 1960s, while in Germany the culture of unchallenged car domination not only occurred much later, but was already challenged and resisted after ten or twenty years.

Segregation

In both societies, segregation can be viewed as a component of urban development that affected inner cities and suburbs alike. During the nineteenth century’s urbanization and industrialization, German cities became divided by class. Moreover, since the late nineteenth century, zoning ordinances indirectly promoted social segregation in the new
residential areas, while the designation of some areas as *Villenkolonien* had the voluntary segregation of parts of the upper class as an explicit goal. A certain degree of social segregation, both, voluntary and compulsory, had also continued to be recognizable in the following decades of the twentieth century.

There were, however, also efforts to avoid social segregation. It was the fear of the *classes dangereuses* that led to a policy of integration, especially after the European revolutions of 1848/49. The prototype of a tenement developed by town planner James Hobrecht in the 1870s was designed to encourage people from various social strata to live close to one another, although the classes were clearly separated by the different locations and appointments of the apartments within a tenement. The basic idea was to promote people’s personal knowledge of people of other classes. To be sure, the Berlin *Mietskasernen*, with up to eight dark and narrow buildings surrounding courtyards, were a parody of this idea. The integrative idea, however, was still recognizable: Decent middle-class families lived in the decent-looking apartments on the first and second floors of the front building with its decent-looking architecture, while poor families inhabited the overcrowded rear buildings. Thus, it is no accident that workers comprised only about 65 to 70 percent of the residents of so-called working-class neighborhoods in the *Kaiserreich* period.

Consistent with the goal of social integration, the new model garden city Hellerau was also intended for people from all classes, although the social status of the inhabitants was clearly recognizable by the different appearances of their respective houses.

This idea of a mixture of social and economic classes within a neighborhood—realized through a mixture of various housing types and different densities of occupation—more or less dominated German urban planning. The subsidized housing developments of the 1920s, such as Frankfurt-Römerstadt or Frankfurt-Westhausen, included lower- and mid-level officials and employees as well as some carefully selected families from the upper working class as tenants of the functionalist and modern-looking apartment blocks. The few model housing developments of the Nazi era, such as Braunschweig-Mascherode and Braunschweig-Lehndorf, also brought together people from various social classes in different housing types corresponding to class, but the Nazis introduced the selection of applicants according to race as supposedly necessary for their new *Volksgemeinschaft*.

The principles of social and architectural mixture in new residential areas also dominated in many subsidized housing developments built in the decades after World War II, but then in denazified, i.e. non-racial terms and contexts. As a consequence, urban planners like Konstanty Gutschow referred not to the German heritage, but to the American
neighborhood-unit plan of the Chicago School.\textsuperscript{35} During the 1950s, West German laws with respect to subsidized housing projects explicitly addressed the broad strata of population. Thus, public housing projects, especially in war-devastated inner city districts, had, with few exceptions, a relatively good reputation that has only partly changed since the second half of the 1970s, when middle-class families gained better homes and were replaced by welfare families and poor migrants—so-called guest workers' families and later ethnic Germans.\textsuperscript{36}

In some ways, the idea of social integration was linked to the Germans' longing for the social and political harmony of an imagined homogeneous and socially harmonious German Volk. This had racial consequences, especially after 1933. On the one hand, this had the consequence that Germany had many barracks and camps, including concentration camps for those it considered the "others."\textsuperscript{37} On the other hand, however, the policy of urban social integration avoided the development of visible slums. With some exceptions, it has also avoided the establishment of "Little Italys" or "Little Turkeys," as well as visible urban and suburban ghettos.\textsuperscript{38}

Politicians have normally been eager to disperse poor people. This was supposed to happen in the course of slum clearances during the Third Reich as well as in the era of modernization during the 1960s and finally in the era of gentrification beginning in the 1980s. German state and local politicians have always been committed to hiding all the many contradictory facts behind relatively attractive buildings, such as public houses for homeless people in nineteenth-century cities. Another example is the so-called \textit{Judenhäuser} into which Jews were relocated in the months before their deportation. As these buildings looked normal from the outside and were located in various city districts, non-Jewish Germans could know that Jews resided there, but could not at first glance see the inhuman conditions inside the houses.\textsuperscript{39} It was certainly no accident that the Nazis avoided constructing Jewish ghettos in the so-called \textit{Altreich} after 1933 because they presumably feared that ordinary "Aryans" would be shocked by such an unusual sight.\textsuperscript{40}

In contrast to Germany, social and racial segregation in the United States were officially legitimized because the rhetoric of "separate but equal" dominated both political culture and social reality. Functional zoning ordinances, widespread since the 1920s and legitimized by the Supreme Court in 1926, supported the trend toward increasing social segregation in the new suburban districts.\textsuperscript{41} Forest Hill Gardens, the prototypical garden suburb built in 1908, was anything but socially mixed. One American urban planner summed up the American legitimation of spatial segregation, writing, "A reasonable segregation is normal, inevitable, and desirable, and cannot be greatly affected, one way or the other,
by zoning.” Furthermore, private contracts between developers and buyers fostered racial segregation until 1948, when this sort of contract was forbidden. Although there were always some critics of racial segregation, city planning commissions were used to defend racial segregation by referring again and again to long traditions and broad public acceptance. The argument that appropriate residential areas for people of color were to be constructed in order to avoid racial unrest and to give minorities the opportunity to practice good citizenship in “their” areas was intended to make even critics accept segregation. New Deal housing policies also promoted racial and social segregation, shaping inner-city ghettos by building new public housing projects. This was also the case after 1945.

The academic discourse on neighborhoods did not promote social heterogeneity, either. Even the well-known socioecological Chicago School defined social and cultural homogeneity in urban neighborhoods as a natural process creating “natural areas,” formed more by drawing people in than by pushing people out. Even when Clarence Perry’s plan based on neighborhood units of five thousand people came to be considered the ideal size for an administrative unit and the optimum for a face-to-face, participatory democracy, the idea of homogeneous neighborhoods never totally disappeared, although it was softened by Park’s belief in people’s assimilation in the future.

The core issue for most white Americans has been the maintenance of white schools, “secure” white neighborhoods, and stable investments, knowing that if neighborhoods became racially mixed, the value of their houses and hence the value of their main savings would be reduced. Thus, housing policy, as well as market effects, academic discourse, middle-class interests, and customary lifestyles expressed and promoted the view of segregation as a matter of course. Although there have been some gradual changes beginning in the last decades of the twentieth century, the outlines of long-term segregation are still conspicuous when looking not only at the “normal” suburbs, but also at both the new “gated communities” and the edge cities.

Mental Maps and Life Styles
As a rule, cities have always been in large part cultural constructions, permanent components of people’s mental maps. Children’s paintings of a German city often have the same elements: a wall, a church, a tower, a city hall, a market, and many houses with steeply sloping red roofs and smoking chimneys. These images, reflecting the image of the medieval city, have obviously been transferred from one generation to the next, and were integrated into the cultural memory of Germans despite the fact that the profiles of German cities have radically changed.
To be sure, the construct of this kind of German city was usually not the big city, but the small and medium-sized one. This view corresponded with that of many reformers on both sides of the Atlantic. The concept of Ebenezer Howard’s garden city, which could be integrated into different political systems, numbered only about 30,000 inhabitants. The garden city of Radburn mentioned above had 3,000 inhabitants. Lewis Mumford’s planned regional cities had an intended size of 50,000. On both sides of the Atlantic, anti-urbanism, widespread since the acceleration of urbanization by the 1880s, was often pure antimetropolitanism. Big cities were equated with an uncontrollable and therefore dangerous jungle. Apart from their agrarian romanticism, the Nazis also preferred small and medium-sized cities, whose necessity was then legitimized by racist arguments.

There had, however, been some opposite trends before the Nazis suppressed them. By the turn of the century and especially in the 1920s, modern metropolitan life, including mass culture and the new sensory challenges posed by traffic noise and electricity, had been highlighted and positively (or at least ambiguously) interpreted by numerous artists and writers, and supported by both unknown and well-known urbanites.

Notwithstanding these inspiring images of the twentieth-century metropolis, many German cities nourished a cultural memory of the city that was primarily based on history. Numerous institutions and media provided for the awakening, maintenance, and strengthening of people’s awareness of the historical roots of their city, above all Heimat or city museums and city archives, supported by associations for local history and historic preservation. Official city celebrations also fostered the city’s rich heritage. Documentary films, city guides, old drawings, the local press, and broadcasting were excellent media to convey the special characteristics of a city to the inhabitants’ mental maps. During the first half of the twentieth century, this was the way cultural conservatives shaped the city’s allegedly organic personality, which was said to be closely connected to the old regional culture (Stammeskultur). After 1933 racial interpretations followed that völkisch line. In the early postwar era the imaginary picture of the old German city remained prominent, despite the destruction of many cities, and came to be regarded as an icon of Western civilization (Abendland). Since the 1980s, urban image policies have used the profile of the old city as a marketing strategy. As a result, Germans’ various images of the city have been deeply engrained into the minds of ordinary people, even after large parts of many cities were destroyed in World War II. The Dresden Frauenkirche is the latest example of a complete reconstruction, supported by the argument of not only
rebuilding a significant church, but also the entire city profile of old Dresden.  

To be sure, trends toward the reconstruction of city landmarks are only one side of the coin. The other are the many opposite trends that achieved the destruction of old inner-city districts and individual historic buildings. Moreover, while many old buildings destroyed in the war were not reconstructed, others were replaced by new commercial buildings or by urban freeways in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, the historical parts of the city were often marginalized by city policies. Since the middle of the 1970s, however, strong efforts to take care of old buildings have been made, stimulated by the European Year of Historic Preservation in 1975 and corresponding national laws.

The European Year of Historic Preservation even spurred on some urban planners in the GDR. They recognized that the huge prefabricated housing developments (Plattenbau-Siedlungen) at the edges of the cities and the broad boulevards, the Magistrale, could not make up for people’s feelings that the conspicuous decay of many inner cities was a far-reaching loss. Although some well-known inner city neighborhoods like the Berlin Nikolai quarter were reconstructed, attempts at renovation in many other city centers remained marginalized even during the 1980s. Thus, people tended to interpret the progression of the visible decay of city centers as a symbol of the decay of the entire East German state in the 1980s.

To be sure, various images of cities can also be found in the United States. The New England town of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was often invoked and highly valued by Lewis Mumford and others. The Main Street city has been the topic of literary classics (Sinclair Lewis) and the favorite of innumerable Westerns. The skyscraper city has become symbolic of a modern city, especially for the American brand of modernism. But these completely different prototypes of cities have remained fragmented urban images and, as a rule, have not melded to form a single city imaginary.

Moreover, in the early twentieth century, in contrast to many German museums, American city museums were less committed to strengthening local and regional identities, instead focusing more on displaying the collections donated by wealthy citizens. Meanwhile, this has changed. Similar remarks can be made on preservation issues. Although the historic preservation movement in the United States can be traced back to the 1850s, its efforts were often neglected by commercial interests. Since the 1960s, however, citizens’ initiatives have often successfully campaigned for the preservation of entire areas as historic districts.

While American progressive reformers before World War I had still been committed to the city as a whole, after the war academic and public
interests were redirected toward smaller communities, i.e. neighborhoods. This shift supported the legitimation of suburbanization and weakened people’s links to the city as a whole. To be sure, by 1900 there was the City Beautiful Movement, which was eager to enhance urban design and to improve the appearance of cities, especially that of Chicago, by integrating nature into the cities and building parkways, boulevards, and civic centers close to the central business districts. Although this policy did not address urban social and racial problems and therefore was interpreted as merely cosmetic, it was often connected with women’s commitment to municipal reform and therefore might have improved public views of the city, not only in terms of aesthetics. But evidently these efforts were not effective in changing the minds of middle class Americans regarding where they wanted to live: in suburbs, a trend that increased rapidly since the 1920s. As a result, middle-class Americans, accustomed to moving many times during their lives, have been more committed to their suburban neighborhoods, their school districts, their church districts, and their small communities than to the city as a whole and metropolitan life as a value per se. This attitude can be traced back to the colonial period and to American values of individualism and communitarianism. It also can be traced to the daily necessities of immigrants and to the community’s “particular salience for women.” The side-effect, however, was that, except for the “special species” of the New Yorker or the Bostonian, the city as a constructed entity was not as deeply inscribed within the mental maps of Americans as it was in the mental maps of Germans.

In contrast to the United States, the German middle class has been characterized by a wider range of lifestyles. Although many middle-class families with children have chosen to move to suburban neighborhoods, others voluntarily have opted to live in inner-city neighborhoods. Tax incentives for the renovation and modernization of old apartments, for example those built during the Kaiserreich, and for ownership of apartments, especially since the 1970s, have also increased the attraction of inner-city life. As a consequence, home ownership has not only led the middle class to move to the suburbs, but has also encouraged members of the middle class to remain in the cities. Moreover, the existence of the many West German citizens’ initiatives, which have been eager to participate in decision-making processes outside the local parliaments since the 1970s, might also be interpreted as an expression of people’s commitments to good living conditions within the cities. In addition, the blossoming of shopping malls outside German cities in the past twenty years notwithstanding, for average Germans, “going shopping” still means going to a city center, not driving to a suburban shopping mall. Moreover, the development of more polycentric city structures by reju-
venating inner-city neighborhoods as well as attempts to provide lively
city centers after closing hours have no doubt contributed to making
urban living more attractive. Admittedly, however, many of these ap-
proaches have had only limited success due to opposing trends and in-
terests, as well as limited local budgets.

Concluding Remarks

This commentary is based on the insight that city comparisons between
countries only make sense if they are contextualized in their respective
societies and related to their policies in the way Kenneth Jackson has
inspiringly done for the United States. Mass consumer society and tech-
nological progress, the main components of the so-called modernization
of Germany and the United States, have led to basically similar develop-
ments. This relatively obvious explanation of the central similarities,
however, has been challenged when considering the conspicuous differ-
ences between these developments. To be sure, the two world wars and
two dictatorships might have compounded German economic backward-
ness, but this kind of explanation is not sufficient. Might it therefore be
useful to apply the theory of path dependence, which holds that the
direction a country has taken in the past will probably continue to influ-
ence future developments? If so, the divergent courses of American and
German suburbanization can be considered a consequence of divergent
societies, divergent political systems, divergent mentalities, and diver-
gent histories. One should keep in mind, however, that the concept of
path dependence, usually embedded in economic theories, has very lim-
ited epistemological value for historians, because all “paths” themselves
are extremely complex and dynamic processes. Moreover, this theory is
“only” a theory of probability. It does not preclude the possibility of a
gradual or radical change of policies and activities, as numerous Ameri-
can city reformers might hope at present: It merely views this as unlikely.
Looking at Germany, the present neo-liberal trends might increasingly
erase future differences between German and American cities, as some
critics have argued. If this is true, it might represent a significant ex-
ception to path dependence theory’s power of probability. Is it possible
that the unlikely will become reality?

Notes

1 See also his book: Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United
Wagner-Kyora, and Richard Wetzell for their criticism and assistance.

2 This has been investigated by Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a


This was especially the case after Erzberger’s finance reform was carried through in 1920. As known, in the periods of the Nazi state and the GDR, local self-rule was completely eliminated.


The following text focuses above all on members of the middle class because they primarily became suburbanites.


This is not the place to mention all the current reformers, among them the feminist planners and architects. Some examples can be found in Marianne Rodenstein, *Wege zur nicht-sexistischen Stadt: Architektinnen und Planerinnen in den USA* (Freiburg i. Br., 1994); Kristine B. Miranne and Alma H. Young, eds., *Gendering the City: Women, Boundaries, and Visions of Urban Life* (Lanham etc., 2000).

Above all, forerunners of regional planning were the traffic association Berlin (*Zweckverband Berlin*) in 1912, the establishment of Greater Berlin in 1920, and a similar association in the Ruhr region (*Ruhrsiedlungsverband*) in 1920. Planning institutions were established on the state level (*Landesplanungsbehörden*).

Krabbe, *Die deutsche Stadt*, 98.

Thomas Sieverts, *Zwischenstadt: Zwischen Ort und Welt, Raum und Zeit, Stadt und Land* (Braunschweig etc., 1997). Three groups are currently participating in a debate. One group, representing the interests of private developers and business, simply wants deregulation according to the American model. Another group is primarily committed to the so-called European city as a permanent model for city planning in the present and future alike, completely condemning suburbia and post-suburbia. The third group simply regards sprawl as inevitable and therefore focuses more on the possibilities of shaping it and regulating its future development within the framework of regional planning. One of the consequences is the creation of the *Region Hannover* with its own democratically elected authority that distributes the incomes of the entire region and tries to regulate the processes of suburbanization and post-suburbanization in the region.


The beginning of modern urban planning was the Prussian Building Line Law (*Fluchtliniengesetz*) in 1875 and the many construction ordinances that followed.


One well-known example of these garden cities is Hellerau near Dresden. As a rule, the term garden cities only denotes city-dependent areas at the edges of the city with single-
family houses including a garden. Regarding suburban agglomeration, we should above all recall the new single-family houses built for soldiers’ families after World War I and the erection of very simple houses in times of misery, particularly during the Great Depression.


20 There were, of course, big differences between East and West German satellite cities in terms of concepts, contexts, and quality. The biological-organic concept was based on analogies between the body of a human being and city planning. See Johannes Göderitz, Roland Rainer, and Hubert Hoffmann. Die gegliederte und aufgelockerte Stadt (Tübingen, 1957). This type of modern urban planning differed considerably from the other type of modern urban planning, the Bauhaus functionalism and the functionalist principles of the Athens Charter (1933).

21 The new feminist movement of the 1970s and 1980s pushed the questioning of functionalism and its long distances for women and propagated a “city of short ways” and multifunctional neighborhoods.

22 This idea of model building might be compared with models of the early socialists, such as those built by Charles Fourier and Robert Owen.

23 The Survey, 15 April 1930, 90.

24 New cities in the shape of artificial-looking neo-traditionalism, like Seaside in Florida, are not primarily characteristic for this movement. The Charter of the New Urbanism of 1996 proclaimed the fight against sprawl and the total commercialization of city centers.

25 The other strata of the working classes mostly had no choice as to where to live.

26 For these academic studies, see Alexander Mitscherlich, Die Unwirtlichkeit unserer Städte (Frankfurt am Main, 1965); Hans Paul Bahrdt, Humaner Städtbau: Überlegungen zur Wohnungspolitik und Stadtplanung für eine Zukunft (Hamburg, 1968). Opponents of American developments were supported by Jacob’s criticism. See Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York, 1961).

27 I am grateful to Jan Logemann for these hints.


29 Jacobs, Death and Life.

30 See also the picture of a Paris tenement from the 1850s on the cover of the book edited by Lutz Niethammer, Wohnen im Wandel: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Wuppertal, 1979).

31 Von Saldern, Häuserleben, 49.

32 This was also Lewis Mumford’s idea in the 1950s. See Dirk Schubert, “Die Renaissance der Nachbarschaftsidee—Eine deutsch-anglo-amerikanische Dreiecks-Planungsgeschichte,” in Ursula von Petz, ed., “Going West?” Stadtplanung in den USA – gestern und heute (Dortmund, 2004), 133.

33 Similar trends could be observed in the National Socialist neighborhood plan “Ortsgruppe als Siedlungszelle” with 6,000–8,000 “Aryan” people. For more, see Schubert, “Die Renaissance,” 141–42.

34 It is worth mentioning that after World War II, so-called Displaced Persons, among them Jews, were informally discriminated against in the process of distributing scarce accommodations, as an investigation of Lower Saxony shows. Holger Lüning, Das Eigenheim-Land.
Der öffentlich geförderte Soziale Wohnungsbau in Niedersachsen während der 1950er Jahre (Hannover, 2005), 199–201.


36 After the events in the Parisian suburbs in 2005 the question has arisen whether such a rebellion could also happen in Germany because of the process of ghettoization. Although the responsible politicians have been eager to relieve such fears, trends are recognizable towards increased separation and exclusion of marginalized people. The city is expected to be endangered by fragmentation to a new extent. See e.g. Albrecht Göschel, “Vom Disparität enproblem zum Desintegrationsproblem,” Die Alte Stadt (2000): 114–125.

37 The United States has developed a country of prisons.

38 An exception can be seen in the company settlements (Werksiedlungen) for so-called Ruhr Poles in the Ruhr area during the Kaiserreich. Berlin-Kreuzberg, for instance, can be interpreted as “Little Turkey.” So far, however, migrants’ accommodations have normally been relatively small and ethnically mixed areas. According to current discussions on “parallel societies” (Parallelgesellschaften), an economically forced concentration process due to neoliberal urban policies might promote the fragmentation of the cities in the future.

39 Some houses had belonged to Jews before their dispossession.

40 As is well known, ghettos were, however, erected in the occupied Eastern countries in the context of the Holocaust.


42 Robert Whitten, urban planner, cited in Mel Scott, American City Planning Since 1890 (Berkeley, 1969), 198.

43 Scott, American City Planning, 198.

44 Five thousand people was also the size of the model garden city Sunnyside Gardens.


46 See e.g. Dirk Schubert, Die Gartenstad tidee zwischen reaktionärer Ideologie und pragmatischer Umsetzung: Theodor Fritschs volkische Version der Gartenstadt (Dortmund, 2004).


48 According to Lees, anti-urbanism was not as intense in the United States as it was in Germany, and it had other connotations. Lees, Cities Perceived, 288–89.

49 The search for control and moral order of cities was often linked to functionalism and social rationalization of people. This concept could be integrated into various political systems. For more, see von Saldern, “Social Rationalization of Living.” In the United States, settlement houses, schools, and neighborhood centers tried to educate and Americanize immigrants during the 1910s and 1920s.

50 In this context Georg Simmel should be recalled. For more on this topic see e.g. Peter Fritz sche, Reading Berlin 1900 (Cambridge, 1996). Sigrid Weigel analyzes the gender aspects integrated in city images. See Sigrid Weigel, Topographien der Geschlechter: Kulturgeschichtliche Studien zur Literatur (Reine bek, 1990); see also Peter Jelavich, Berlin Alexanderplatz: Radio, Film, and the Death of Weimar Culture (Berkeley, 2006).

51 In general see Rudy Kos har, Germany’s Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill and London, 1998).


After World War II, the cities in eastern Germany were, however, rebuilt on the basis of the old city plan. Johann Jessen, “Suburbanisierung: Wohnen in verstädterter Landschaft,” in Tilman Harlander, ed., Villa und Eigenheim: Suburbaner Städtebau in Deutschland (Stuttgart, 2001), 323.


The idea of creating civic centers had supporters on both sides of the Atlantic. Howard’s garden city included a civic center, and the garden city Radburn was also enriched by a community center. The well-known reformer and architect Bruno Taut for example was also committed to the idea of civic centers. In the period of Nazism and in the GDR community centers in new cities were closely linked to the domicile of the respective state party.

See e.g. Lubove, Community Planning, 45. At the same time, the Austrian planner and architect Camillo Sitte (1843–1903) also wanted to beautify the cities, but his aesthetic principles referred to the model of the old European city. In 1907, a Prussian law against the disfigurement of villages and outstanding landscapes (Preußisches Gesetz gegen Verunstaltung von Ortschaften und landschaftlich hervorragenden Gegenden) was passed. It was adopted by the other German states and could be used as a frame for special local ordinances. Gerhard Albrecht et al., eds., Handwörterbuch des Wohnens (Jena, 1930), 688. For more on the City Beautiful, see Bonj Szcygiel, “‘City Beautiful’ Revisited,” in Journal of Urban History 29, no. 2 (2003): 107–132.


Especially single households and couples with no children have been attracted by urban lifestyles.

HISTORICAL UPHEAVALS, FRACTURED IDENTITIES

German Unification Symposium, October 3, 2005

Monika Maron

In school, we learned to write our curriculum vitae. I can still see the page in front of me, with the title underlined: Lebenslauf. Beneath the title were the sparse bits of information that a twelve-year-old life has to offer: born as the daughter of X and Y, moved from here to there, began school, joined the Young Pioneers—and that was all.

Except for our birth, these were probably the least significant events in the lives of a generation born during the war, a generation that grew up during the harsh postwar era and the Cold War. But they were certainly the most unambivalent and secure events in our lives and, therefore, the easiest to name.

The sociologist Niklas Luhmann writes, “The elements of a biography consist of turning points where something happened that did not necessarily have to happen—beginning with birth.” But, once we are born, what must in fact take place? That we grow, get teeth, learn to speak, go to school? Is “going to school” part of “what must necessarily take place”? Probably—in any case, in the part of the world where we live. Subsequent “necessities” include growing old and, the ultimate necessity, death.

Those secure, official facts on our curriculum vitae are therefore precisely not the events that make up our biography. They are, in all probability, what was supposed to happen and what did happen. What, however, must not happen? And how do we discover whether what transpired did not necessarily have to?

According to scientists, especially in the area of brain research, we are much less free in forming our biographies than we think. The ways that our paths are shaped by our individual genetic makeup and the ways we are accustomed to think in terms of preconceived narrative form are enough to banish any illusions about the power of our will. It is above all during our very first years, when our brain forms essential connections with the world, that we are markedly influenced. It is a process that then progresses more slowly through puberty, by the end of which we are prisoners of our predispositions, coincidental experiences, heritage, and education.

Although we suspect, or even know, how limited our space is to maneuver between fate and circumstance, we struggle desperately for the right to take responsibility for our actions (and inactions), for our achieve-
ments, and also for our guilt, for our ability to construct our biography ourselves. Whether an adolescent constructs their life plan modeled upon their parents’ lives or in opposition to them probably depends on the compatibility of their temperaments, on their first loves, and on the ideal-forming influences from the external world. I know some people who, trying to escape from their parents’ path, steered around all the dangerous points like a slalom skier, so that ultimately they left behind exactly the same trail, only on another track. Even if they had the feeling that they were pursuing their own life plan, they followed a path that seemed inescapably planted inside them.

But what is a life plan (Lebensentwurf)? What can such a thing be? The life plans we adopt as youths can, by and large, only serve us for the first third of our lifetimes, at most for the first half. They usually contain little more than a desired profession and a diffuse idea of happiness appropriate to the individual. We probably have a better idea of ourselves than we do of the path we must follow, and this image is likely to be greater, more desirable, and more successful than we can ever hope to be. Could it be that our first sketch of ourselves functions like a model, or that it only represents an empty space surrounded by unsuitable images, like the negative of a photograph? In any case, unless extraordinary experiences or disasters demand from us an early independence, our first images of ourselves are as the children of our parents, as the students of our teachers.

In order to leave no doubt regarding my suspicion about our freedom to invent ourselves and about biographical truths, I would also like to point out our irresistible urge to give retrospective meaning to our life stories. When that which must happen and that which must not necessarily happen have blended together to form our life, and when we have forgotten our first draft of our life plan or have gradually adapted to our possibilities, we give meaning to the course of our lifetime, formed by the convergence of countless springs, by granting it a causality, thus creating a coherent biography for ourselves.

When the euphoric phase of German unity had dissipated and mistrust and resentment instead of the hoped-for sense of fraternity set the tone for discussions, if indeed they did not prevent them completely, Richard von Weizsäcker urged Germans to recount their biographies to one another in order to promote mutual understanding. At the time, I did not have the impression that there was any lack of biographical communications, although these certainly did not have the desired result. On the contrary, it even seemed like the East Germans’ stories of persecution by the Stasi, blocked access to higher education, blacklisting, or just the everyday nonsense that, since it described a monotonous existence, occasionally became monotonous to hear, soon began to bore West Ger-
mans, particularly because they seldom had a chance to speak. It was not only that East Germans clearly enjoyed finally being able to speak openly about the large and small aggravations in their lives, which until that point they had had to bear in silence (or, at best, while muttering under their breath). They rightly expected that the West Germans would be interested, and when their interest seemed too small, they demanded more. Perhaps, as they tried to explain them to the West Germans, their own lives seemed so absurd and, in retrospect, even exciting, especially when transfigured by the glow of the victorious revolution, that the West Germans’ biographies appeared to them as uninteresting and of no historical significance. Now that this GDR life was finished and no example of it was left, one could give it the kind of final shape and polish that is usually only possible in old age, when one is near death, the sort of coherence that bridges ruptures and loose ends with the redemptive word “because.” By blending into grandiose historic events—the fall of a regime, the achievement of national unity—every small individual life rises to the level of a historically meaningful biography, as long as one can successfully weave the strands of one’s life into the larger story.

Whoever lives in a dictatorship, even a relatively moderate one, is inclined to blame or credit it for everything that does or does not happen to them, that enters their life without being invited. Career frustrations, wasted talent, failed marriages, serious illness—all are justly or unjustly attributed to outside pressures. If a dictatorship disappears, then people are left alone with biographies they perceive to be inadequate or failed. Some will take advantage of the opportunity and make up for what was previously denied to them. For others, it is too late. And there are those who lose a great deal as a result of such changes: some because they were part of the dictatorship or profited from it, others because they find out that the changed circumstances do not bring all that they had dreamed of. For those people, gaining freedom also means a loss of self-image. But they experience real humiliation when they are robbed of their illusions about themselves. This requires them to activate the self-preservation mechanisms they have retained, which means that, once again, external circumstances are held responsible for anything perceived as a personal failure. They presume to find the same old patterns in the new ones, only in a different guise.

Over the last ten years, I cannot say how often I have heard or read the statement that the capitalist marketplace functions similarly to censorship in a dictatorship. Even if that might be true, censorship and a market economy have nothing to do with one another. If poetry has a hard time on the market, it is not because it is banned, but rather due to the fact that too few people want to read it—even if the result appears the same to the poet who cannot get published.
One of the most persistent legacies of the GDR is that it kept its citizens in a kind of permanent adolescence. I say this based on my own experience. Whoever is denied the possibility to have responsibility for one’s own actions or to experience one’s contours and boundaries in dialogue with the world will not be able to grow throughout their lives but rather, depending upon their temperament, will take refuge in infantile spite, pointless rebellion, or other strategies of avoidance. One’s defensive skills develop to the point of perfection. Whether one rebels against this sort of unreasonableness or tries to escape from it depends, in my experience, less on one’s political convictions, or even courage, but once again on temperament. Whoever wound up as an enemy of the state probably started with just an unrestrained outburst at a teacher or police officer and set in motion a process that infinitely repeated the original event. But the level of conflict deepened with each new case, until the recalcitrant individual found themselves outside of the society to which they originally wanted to belong, albeit just as they were.

Two years ago, Wolf Singer, who has done extensive research on the human brain, spoke at a large gathering of historians. He described the reactions of people who became blind at birth due to eye infections and later gained the ability to see through transplants or lenses. Yet they remained blind. As Singer reported,

They now had two functioning eyes, but could not begin to process the information that was now at their disposal. Many patients experienced what they could now see not as visual impressions, but as sounds or as something painful, as something that could not really be described. They did not learn to orient themselves in the visual world, to measure space, or identify objects. Many of the patients who received these late operations became severely depressed because their expectations were disappointed. Most lapsed once again into blindness and wore dark glasses.

The reason for this, reported Singer, is that the visual signals needed to consolidate the corresponding neuron connections were missing during certain developmental phases, and the connections therefore deteriorated. The brain misinterpreted the signals, which in themselves functioned correctly, as meaningless, and destroyed them. This process was irreversible. Despite the fact that I am an absolute novice in the natural sciences, I hope that the allegorical meaning of this case is clear. Obviously the development of our social behavior cannot be described as clearly as our sense of sight. Our social capacities do not reside in one sensory organ, nor are they objective; one person can deny what another
affirms. Nevertheless, I think it is possible that certain social abilities can indeed atrophy if they are not regularly exercised.

A capacity for free speech in public was and still is notably underdeveloped in almost everyone who spent more than merely their earliest years in the GDR. The few exceptions are, as a rule, clergy or scientists: people who enjoyed a moderate amount of space to practice these skills in sermons or seminars. Perhaps for that reason clergy were so notably overrepresented in politics just after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

For my part, even though I have had plenty of practice in public appearances by now, I feel that I can still only speak freely from an oppositional standpoint, never constructively. Only when I am so annoyed that I forget my inhibitions can my thoughts become organized, find the right words, and secure enough breathing room to develop. Because I share this inability with millions of others from East Germany, I no longer think of it as a personal deficit, but rather as the result of an atrophied mental function caused by disuse.

Alongside the image of the Mauern in unseren Köpfen, the Berlin Wall that one carries around in one’s head, one of the most notable points of discussion related to our difficult unification is the legend of the East Germans who have been robbed of their biographies. Like any claim that is continually repeated, this notion has since been accepted as a kind of undisputed fact. But I, for one, have doubts about it. A person can be robbed of opportunities in their life. They can be blocked by force from creating a biography, locked up in prison, or even killed. But no one can be robbed of their lived experience, even if it would not be entirely unjust to do this in quite a few cases. One can, of course, dispute an individual’s exclusive right to the interpretation of their biography, because other people with other ideas and experiences will evaluate this life differently. This may not always be fair, but it is normal. People form images of others without precise knowledge of their inner lives and without regard for their own understanding of themselves. Men form images of women, women form images of men, the English form images of the Germans, Germans of Americans, Muslims of Christians, East Germans of West Germans, and vice versa. Probably hardly anyone recognizes themselves in an image created by another, yet few would claim that they were thereby robbed of their biographies—except East Germans, or at least a portion of them.

As a rule, it was not former prisoners of Bautzen or Hoheneck, nor those who emigrated, nor dissidents who suffered punishments but—aside from the pillars of society—the conformists, and yes-men who made themselves comfortable between their built-in living-room furniture and color televisions, traded tires for batteries, raised their hands high whenever votes were cast, and lined up at four in the morning to get
a spot for a vacation on the Baltic Sea, all the while cursing and complaining but never really fighting. It is not my intention to attack people in those days for a lack of courage, especially because most of what we consider courage is often only the inability to fit in or a fear of cowardice. Anyone who feels afraid and cannot find the power to resist within themselves cannot be obliged to have courage. But why are those people who were quiet conformists in those days now the ones who decry West Germans as the thieves of their life histories? They are like people who live for years in a dark room and keep themselves warm and cozy with blankets and carpets and, when someone finally breaks open the wall and light enters the room, they recognize with shame that they have been living in rather unappealing quarters and even felt satisfied with it—and then blame the hole in the wall and the light for their embarrassment.

The Berlin Wall, at first so incomprehensible that even its supporters could not believe that it would last, became a kind of normality over the years, a maddening, unreal normality. Because no one who lived in the city could bear the absurdity of their situation every day and every hour, one began to accept the Wall as just another obstacle blocking one’s way through the city, like railroad tracks or a construction site or a large building, until something came along that shattered the veil of normality and, for a short while, one recognized the madness of it all until it again subsided into a sense of the everyday. Whatever cannot be changed and becomes a part of the preconditions of our everyday existence slowly takes on the form of something normal. We relate to it as our reason dictates, so that we and our children can survive as best we can. When the Wall fell and residents of the city slowly began to recognize the street connections and neighborhood surroundings, the full insanity of this twenty-eight-year normality was again as clear as during the days when the Wall was first built.

The old sense of normality was now as worthless as the old money. In the glare of the new normality, the question was posed—sometimes by East Germans themselves, sometimes by outsiders—as to how and why we could have withstood this. Whoever did not want to put themselves and others on trial could only see themselves as the victim of an unstoppable power machine or, alternatively, describe the circumstances as acceptable, and therefore not requiring resistance. But whoever adopted either view robbed themselves of their biography, for the power machine was not unassailable and the circumstances were not acceptable as long as one had not choked off the slightest urge for freedom within oneself.

Perhaps it is this discomfort that arises from retrospection and the need to find an explanation for one’s own conformity that makes outsiders’ interpretations of their past so unbearable for East Germans. Perhaps
the discussion of East German biographies would have proceeded more openly and with better results if it had not been treated in the media from the very beginning as an East-West conflict but rather as what it had been for the forty preceding years: an East-East problem. This would not only have made the fairy tale of the deep solidarity and human warmth of all GDR citizens seem ridiculous in the face of a different reality; it would have prevented the PDS and its voters from assuming the role of the sole representatives of the East and allowed a more intelligent and sovereign image of East Germans—the other segment of the population—to emerge in the mind of the nation: those East Germans who had always been aware of the humiliations, the wounded self-respect, and their own deformations, yet had carved out an honorable niche for themselves where their own rules prevailed and the sense of being responsible for one’s own life was preserved.

It appears that it required a natural disaster to reveal, beyond the caricatures of East German helplessness and a refusal to learn, another picture: the citizen of Dresden or Pirna, who, just like the citizen of Passau, courageously worked to the point of exhaustion to protect their city from the recent floods. Now that the shops are waterlogged and the factories are destroyed by the water, we learn who has built it all up and is determined to rebuild it again.

It was only in their continuation in a united Germany that East German lives and careers revealed themselves for what they really were, for what had been denied to them and what had been added to them. For some it meant that they lost their self-image, while others found it anew.

When I was in my mid-thirties and once again dissatisfied with my origins, upbringing, and disposition, a girlfriend said to me that, at some point, it is no longer important why we have become a certain way, but only what we do with it... That has been a helpful principle in my own life, even if I probably had less room to maneuver than I thought.

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GERMAN INSTITUTES OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY: INTERVIEWS WITH THE DIRECTORS

Gerhard Besier, Konrad Jarausch, Horst Möller, Jan Philipp Reemtsma, and Axel Schildt interviewed by Christof Mauch and Richard F. Wetzell

One feature that distinguishes the field of contemporary history in Germany from contemporary history in the United States and many other countries is the important role of research institutes outside the universities. In the summer of 2005, we interviewed the directors of the five non-degree-granting research institutes devoted primarily to contemporary history, in order to provide our readers with a firsthand account of their history, current research, and some of the issues they face. The first part of this interview feature presents the five institutes in the chronological order of their founding (1949 to 1993). The second part is organized thematically, and presents excerpted comments on selected issues. The five directors were interviewed separately, at their institutes.

I. THE INSTITUTES: HISTORY AND CURRENT RESEARCH

1. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich-Berlin (IfZ)

The Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich was founded in 1949. Readers interested in the history of the Institute may wish to consult its very informative Festschrift, published under the title 50 Jahre Institut für Zeitgeschichte: Eine Bilanz, edited by Horst Möller and Udo Wengst (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999). The Institute publishes several book series and the journal Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte; published annual reports are also available. The Institute has two departments in Berlin, one for the editing of German diplomatic documents of the FRG, and one for research on the GDR and Eastern European countries. The Institute’s website is: www.ifz-muenchen.de. We interviewed Horst Möller, professor of modern and contemporary history at the University of Munich and the author of numerous books, including Die Weimarer Republik: Eine unvollendete Demokratie (8th edition, 2006). He is the Institute’s director since 1992.

Horst Möller: The origins of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich were of a political nature. The discussions regarding its founding, which date back to 1946, were initiated not by academics, but by politicians,
about evenly divided between SPD and CSU. They wanted to found an institute that would collect and publish documents, and also conduct studies to determine how the Nazi dictatorship came about. Theirs was a fundamentally historical-moral and political-didactic project. But there was a scholarly aspect to this project from the beginning. The founders thought that one could not address National Socialism simply in the form of essays; instead, well-researched studies and document collections were needed. During the 1950s there was a considerable tension between the work of the Institute and politics, not because the politicians opposed the work, but because it was proceeding too slowly for them. Adenauer, for instance, intervened with representatives of the federal government, asking, “Why has the Institute still not produced brochures that explain what leads to murderous anti-Semitism and what leads to dictatorship? We need this for political-didactic reasons.” Compared to the early years, the role of politics in the Institute’s governing bodies has been greatly reduced. We now have a board comprised of representatives of the federal and state governments, and the academic advisory council is made up entirely of scholars. The academic advisory council offers suggestions for research, but the board does not.

The Institute’s research focus has changed in the sense that, when the Institute was established, National Socialism stood at the center. To be sure, from the beginning the institute was charged with examining the causes and effects of National Socialism, which included its roots before 1933 and its legacy after 1945. But the emphasis of the research during the first twenty-five years was clearly on the National Socialist period. The first change was the addition to the research program of the period of occupation from 1945 to 1949, followed in succession by the fifties, sixties, and seventies. We proceed as historians always proceed: when the state records are released after thirty years, then archival research becomes possible. We jump ahead a bit because there are many sources that are not in the state archives. But we usually don’t establish large projects until archival materials become accessible on a large scale. This process has now reached the 1970s.

For the institute, Zeitgeschichte (contemporary history) has become the history of the twentieth century, beginning with the end of World War I. The Institute concentrates on all epochs of contemporary history, and this is unique compared with the other institutes of contemporary history, most of which focus on National Socialism, the GDR, the interwar period, or the postwar era. At the center of our Institute’s work is German history in a European context. We also conduct comparative projects in which non-German history and German history are equally important. One such project is “Germany and France in the Interwar Era,” which is not a history of a relationship but a comparison of social, cultural, and
political developments. The Institute’s research projects also include, among others: Germany and France between the wars; the rise of the Nazi Party before 1933; the Goebbels diaries; the Wehrmacht in the National Socialist dictatorship, with an emphasis on the war in the east; societies during the air war, comparing Germany with Great Britain; class justice and state terror in the Soviet Occupied Zone and the GDR; a comparative study of social policy and the integration of refugees in the GDR and the FRG; the edition of the foreign-policy records of the Federal Republic; society, state, and modernization in Bavaria from 1949 to 1973; and Germany in the time of reform and revolt (1960s and 1970s). These are projects from all periods of contemporary history, with various methods but with an emphasis on political social history. Quantitatively speaking, research on National Socialism comprises perhaps 30 to 35 percent of the Institute’s research. That means that the Institute is still the largest institute for research on the Nazi era, probably worldwide, but certainly in Germany and Europe. We have not reduced research in this area, but we have expanded into other areas. In addition, the Institute runs a permanent documentation exhibit at Berchtesgaden in Obersalzberg. The Institute is also participating in a new, long-term project, financed by the German Research Foundation, that will produce a complete documentation of the persecution and murder of the European Jews.

The Institut für Zeitgeschichte is distinguished from the others first and foremost by being the oldest institute of contemporary history in Germany and, as such, having a long tradition. During the first decades, around 70 to 80 percent of research on contemporary history in Germany took place at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte. This situation changed only in the 1970s with the establishment of university chairs in contemporary history and with the establishment of other institutes, and then, again, quite massively, after reunification in 1990. What then remains unique about our Institute? First, the Institute works on all periods of contemporary history. Second, up until now, none of the other institutes have pursued comparative, that is to say German-European research projects. Third, the sheer size of the institute: about one hundred employees, including about forty scholars. Because the institute is so much larger than the others, it also has a greater research capacity. Fourth, the institute’s obligation to provide information and expert statements. During its existence, the institute has produced approximately nine thousand formal expert opinions (Gutachten). The most famous are those produced for the Auschwitz trial, published in book form as Anatomy of the SS-State. Finally, the institute is unique by virtue of its archive and library. The archive holds the personal papers of hundreds of politicians, diplomats, and scholars; special collections, for example on the White Rose, a students’ resistance group against the Nazi dictatorship; the complete
OMGUS files on the American occupation in Germany, which were microfilmed by the National Archives; and the complete files of the Nuremberg Trials. Our library, which holds around 200,000 items, is one of Germany’s two great libraries on contemporary history. The Library for Contemporary History within the Wurttemberg State Library in Stuttgart is somewhat larger than ours because it includes a collection on World War I. For the National Socialist period, the library of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte is probably the world’s leading library because the Institute has been collecting material since its founding. In addition, it has the advantage that the entire catalogue back to 1949 has been digitized and can be searched online.

2. Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg (FZH)

The Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg was founded in 1960. Readers interested in its history can consult the special issue Die Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg of Auskunft: Mitteilungsblatt Hamburger Bibliotheken 22 (2002), no. 3. The FZH publishes several book series; among its recent publications is Hamburg im “Dritten Reich” (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005). The Institute’s website is: www.zeitgeschichte-hamburg.de. We interviewed Axel Schildt, professor of modern history at the University of Hamburg and the author of numerous works, including Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre (Munich, 1999). He has served as the Institute’s director since 2002.

Axel Schildt: The official mission of the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg is to investigate the history of the twentieth century, with special emphasis on northern Germany and Hamburg. The institution has historical roots that reach back almost to the end of the Second World War. Already the immediate postwar period witnessed attempts to deal with the Nazi period; for example, a book written by a former director of the State Archive about the end of the Second World War and the peaceful surrender of Hamburg, which amounted to a glorification of the Nazi Reichsstatthalter (governor). This resulted in a public scandal from which sprang the first small research institute, called Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte Hamburgs, 1933–1945. It was founded in 1949 and consisted of three researchers and a director, Heinrich Heffter. They gathered source materials in order to later produce a complete history of the era. In the early 1950s the notion was: They might need two years and then they would have finished the job. At the same time, a reinterpretation of history was taking place. This reinterpretation evoked a particular “Hanseatic spirit”, used to explain why things did not proceed as brutally
here as they did elsewhere in Germany during the Nazi period. In other words, the locals set themselves apart. So the headline was: “Here everything was not so bad.” The research center itself sort of petered out in the mid-1950s and was then refounded after the great wave of anti-Semitic vandalism in 1959–60. In 1960 the Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Hamburg was founded. Werner Jochmann, a student of Hermann Aubin’s and also of Fritz Fischer’s, became the director and remained in the position until 1987/88. During this time, the Hamburg institute had a strong reputation, especially regarding research on the origins of National Socialism. The institute became known as the “little brother” of the Munich Institut für Zeitgeschichte, and was renowned for its book series “Hamburger Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte,” published from the beginning of the 1960s.

Starting in the mid-1980s, major transformations took place. There was strong criticism from engaged young historians in Hamburg, who accused the institute of writing semi-official history, of producing hagiographic works on social democracy. The core of these intense conflicts of the 1980s was that a new history movement “from below” replaced the official city legend of “Things weren’t so bad in Hamburg” with Karl-Heinz Roth’s thesis of the “Mustergau [Model District] Hamburg.” This thesis argued that Hamburg under National Socialism led the way when it came to social-political mechanisms of repression, for example. This situation was then portrayed as a kind of coalition in which the Nazi Party was only the smaller partner: the larger partner consisted of the financial and industrial powers of the city. This controversy in turn gave rise to efforts to view things in a more differentiated manner and not to adopt the radical position of either thesis.

After Jochmann’s departure in 1987/88, the institute was under the leadership of several directors who were there only for a short time: Detlev Peukert, from 1988 until his untimely death in 1990; Ulrich Herbert, from 1992 until his departure in 1995; and Arnold Sywottek, from 1997 until his sudden death in 2000; with acting directors in between. The year 1997 marked an important change, because the institute has borne a different name since then: Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg, instead of Forschungsstelle für die Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Hamburg. The new name aims at situating the history of the Third Reich within the history of the twentieth century. In addition, since 1997 we are no longer a municipal agency, but a foundation whose primary funder remains the city of Hamburg; and since 2000, we are also an institute of the University of Hamburg.

“Hamburg in the National Socialist Period” remains a key area of research. In this area we published the book Hamburg im “Dritten Reich” in 2005, which makes good on a decades-old political and moral obliga-
tion of the institute to the city of Hamburg. The book is a survey of existing research but is written so as to make it accessible to a broad audience. Besides this, there are four other research areas: (1) Hamburg Elites in the Twentieth Century, including a biography of the entrepreneur Erik Blumfeld, a long-time CDU chairman and member of the Bundestag, who was persecuted by the Nazis; and a project on the history of the Reemtsma company; (2) Power and Persecution from the World Economic Crisis to German Reconstruction; (3) Popular Cultures, including a project on the history of West German youth culture in the 1960s; (4) Hamburg’s External Relations, including a study of suburbanization, that is, the suburban life-worlds around Hamburg. The focus on the Third Reich in Hamburg and the region remains the core of the institute’s research agenda. In addition, we attempt to broaden our scope to include translocal relations and comparisons between cities.

The first thing that makes the FZH unique is certainly its connection to the history of Hamburg and the region of northern Germany, as well as the fact that we have a research profile strongly influenced by categories of cultural history such as experience and perception. At the same time we are careful not to write a cultural history with the politics left out but rather a cultural history of the political. A third unique aspect is that the institute faces distinct expectations from the city. We must always consider not only the scholarly, but also the urban community. Our library (of around 80,000 volumes) and archive are both open to the public, and we offer regular lecture series, which are widely advertised in the city.

3. Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (HIS)

The Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung was founded in 1984. The institute publishes several book series and the bimonthly journal Mittelweg 36: Zeitschrift des Hamburger Instituts für Sozialforschung. Readers interested in the institute’s recent research may wish to consult the institute’s booklet Projekte, Veranstaltungen, Veröffentlichungen, 2002–2005. The institute’s website is: www.his-online.de. We interviewed Jan Philipp Reemtsma, professor of modern German literature at the University of Hamburg and the author of numerous publications, including most recently Folter im Rechtsstaat? (Hamburg, 2005). Reemtsma founded the institute in 1984 and has served as its director since then.

Jan Philipp Reemtsma: The HIS was founded in 1984 and has gone through various phases. Initially its sole purpose was to fund research projects, and it did not consist of much more than an office. Word spread that this institute had been founded; applications were submitted and
reviewed, and individual projects were selected. My hope at the time was that just by bringing the various projects together once or twice a year, something like a network would develop. That did not happen: Everyone worked in isolation, no one had much time, and some projects were never finished. At some point I realized that this was not what I intended, and that the operation needed to be reshaped into a genuine research institute. That led to the move into our present building in Hamburg at the end of the 1980s. In the course of the 1990s, things took their current shape. In 1995 came another stage in our development, when we presented our research on the theory and history of violence to the public through lecture series, panel discussions, and two exhibitions on the destructive nature of the twentieth century. One of these was the exhibition about the crimes of the Wehrmacht, which occupied us for nearly ten years.

I did not found the institute with the idea of addressing specific subjects but rather with the notion “Let’s find out what the subjects are that we would like to know more about, that get under our skin.” It turned out that certain subjects recurred. We decided early on to address the reality of state terror. We translated the report Nunca Mas of the Argentine investigative commission that came out in 1984. When the Argentine military dictatorship ended, an investigative commission was set up by the new civilian government, and its report was called Nunca Mas (Never Again): Report of Conadep (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons). This is a collection of contemporary documents on the reality of state terror. Something similar is today being published in Chile. Many of those who write on torture as an instrument of governing do not take notice of these sources, perhaps because they are rather horrible to read. But when you analyze them carefully, these works call into question many of the ideas that organizations like Amnesty International use to explain state terror. I noticed that this kind of political violence was not well analyzed. I organized a small conference and wrote on the topic myself. Our research on torture in Argentina became linked to research on Nazism, and thus gave rise to a larger research area on the dynamics of violence in different regimes. This led to the question: How did this work in the Soviet Union? In various regimes extreme violence is applied by the state, but the dynamics of violence are not necessarily the same. This area of research has also recently come to encompass the discussions that have taken place in the United States and in Germany: Is it possible to legalize or at least legitimize torture in a nation where the rule of law applies? I entered this discussion and wrote a book that primarily addresses the legal arguments.

One motive for undertaking research on state terror was the consideration that a significant element in the formation of the European Rechts-
\textit{staat} (states governed by the rule of law) was the banning of torture. Referring to this historical background during the controversy about torture in the Algerian war, Jean-Paul Sartre once said something to the effect that “Once, under the Nazis, torture returned. Who could have imagined that it would be the French, who experienced this firsthand, who have implemented torture again [in the war with Algeria].” When most people speak of torture, they assume that it has nothing to do with them anymore, that it has been overcome, like slavery, and only very strange regimes in the midst of a crisis of civilization, like the Nazis, use it. But when you look into it, you realize that there are many regimes in the world — not only those at the far corners of the earth, but modern societies, rapidly developing nations — who resolutely employ torture in their domestic politics. The return of torture in the twentieth century — the shocking fact that one could even employ this formulation gave rise to this line of inquiry at the Institute. What really happened there? And above all: How can societies return to normal once it has happened? It is a matter not just of recognizing the phenomenon of violence and making the proper expression of consternation, but of understanding violence’s power to form society. Traditionally, this phenomenon is viewed thus: Something falls apart, is repaired, and things then go back to normal. This new normality, however, is itself the product of violence. For that reason, this research area now includes research on the Cold War, a time of threatened and real violence in the Third World. This involved constant warfare, with no military conflict between the superpowers, but with a culture of arming, mistrust, threats, and fear. How can one understand this time? We now live in a world that was shaped by this phase, but this organizing element is now gone. The historical present is again the product of a certain balancing out of the means or potential for violence.

There are three main areas of research at the Institute: Theory and History of Violence; Society of the Federal Republic; Nation and Society. These research areas are not tied to a particular academic discipline. The goal of the research is theory, a deepened theoretical understanding of society. Works of pure theory should be exceptions, however; normally, theoretical questions are addressed through the treatment of an empirical problem. Finally, the “thorn” of contemporary relevance should remain palpable. I choose this metaphor because we are not about trying to respond to the political topic of the day. On the contrary, it is possible to define what is politically relevant by placing it on the political agenda. The research area Society of the Federal Republic includes the topic “superfluous humans,” which explores new social questions, new forms of social inclusion and exclusion. The research area Nation and Society could easily be overwhelmed by the number of possible topics. One of the central issues concerns how certain things are becoming transnational in
Europe (and worldwide), things that have traditionally been national, such as courts and criminal prosecution. This area also includes a project on the subject “Europe of Resentments.” Who thinks what about whom? Israel, Islam, Turkey. What are the structures of resentment?

The Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung is distinguished [from the other institutes featured here] because it addresses not only questions of contemporary history but questions from the discipline of sociology as well. Basically, the institute is shaped by sociological and historical perspectives. The combination of these perspectives has been one element of continuity, and will remain so for a long time. An element of discontinuity could be that we might strengthen a third perspective: for example, the juridical perspective. One could imagine establishing another research area that would focus on the intersection of juridical with sociological and historical questions. Another unique aspect of the Institute is that in Germany such institutes are hardly ever the result of private initiative and funding. Germans assume that Wissenschaft (scholarship or science) is conducted by the state. During the controversies about our exhibition on the crimes of the Wehrmacht I often heard the comment: “This institute is not a wissenschaftliches (scholarly) institute because it is privately financed.” In response, I always thought: “Go to the United States and say this sentence and watch what would happen.” But the point is that someone could say that here in a newspaper interview without people thinking: “Has the man taken leave of his senses?” But by now our institute is so respected that this remark could come only from someone on the fringe. The three research areas of the Institute are each under the direction of an area head. We agree on the research perspectives, and there is a long-range plan; but the area heads have a lot of leeway. I retain for myself a veto right regarding personnel decisions, but I have not made use of it. And it would be absolutely unacceptable if I tried to force someone on one of the research areas. So there are many self-restrictions in place, which are also set down in written regulations. To be sure, things would be different if there were an academic advisory council or a supervisory board. Such boards will certainly be created some day, when the roles of the Institute’s director and founder-benefactor (Stifter) will be separated, that is, when I leave the institute someday, either because of death or because I choose to step down.
4. Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam (ZZF)

The Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung was founded in 1992 (initially under the name Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien). The Institute publishes several book series and two periodicals, the *Potsdamer Bulletin für Zeithistorische Studien* and *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*. Readers interested in the ZZF’s recent research may wish to consult its *Tätigkeitsbericht 2001–2003*, published in 2004. The institute’s website is: www.zzf-pdm.de. We spoke with Konrad Jarausch, Lurcy Professor for European Civilization at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and the author of many publications, including most recently, *Die Umkehr: Deutsche Wandlungen 1945–1995* (Munich, 2004). Jarausch has served as co-director of the ZZF since 1994; since 2005 his co-director is Martin Sabrow (geschäftsführender Direktor), who was unavailable at the time of our interview.

**Konrad Jarausch**: The ZZF is a product of German unification. Its predecessor, the Forschungsschwerpunkt Zeithistorische Studien, was founded in 1992 to pick up some of the positively evaluated members of the East German Academy of Sciences. The Academy had three institutes of history—one concerned with German history, one focused on world history, *allgemeine Geschichte*; and a third one that had to do with economic and social history. About a dozen and a half scholars were considered to be competent enough and not tarnished by collaboration with the Stasi or the communist party to be allowed to continue to do research. Added to this core was a group of western scholars so as to create a setting in which both sets of historians would work together on the history of the collapsed East German state. This mixture had great advantages, because the easterners brought with them a considerable amount of inside knowledge. So when trying to decipher documents of the SED’s Central Committee, for instance, the easterners could translate cryptic party language to western scholars. But they also had difficulty with new methodologies as they had been cut off from international discussions of social history, quantitative history, and cultural history. In terms of methodological sophistication and international awareness, the western colleagues were further advanced. A kind of dialogue therefore emerged. The discussion was not always easy, because in recent history the work is never only about scholarship, but also about identity and personal experience. But I found that quite fruitful. I have hardly ever experienced anything intellectually as challenging as these debates because they made the conditioning of judgments on contemporary history by personal life experience more obvious than during research on older periods. (Today, fifteen years after unification this cleavage has been overcome so that we
no longer hire Easterners or Westerners anymore. Instead, we just look for intellectual excellence.

Initially we mostly focused on the repressive system but also tried to take its societal underpinning into account. Somewhat ironically, one of Jürgen Kocka’s early programmatic lectures gave the impression that “Bielefeld was meeting the GDR.” The structural-historical approach of the so-called Bielefeld School which had been developed in the late 1960s and the early 1970s was very fruitful in the West German discussion. But when this Gesellschaftsgeschichte had to confront a different political system and deal with issues like repression and mass dictatorship—not in the Nazi guise, but in a communist version—theoretical difficulties ensued. At the same time, more traditional scholars revived totalitarianism theory for the very understandable reason that historians now had to explain two repressive dictatorships on the same soil which seemed to have many structural similarities. As an alternative to the moralizing totalitarian model, the ZZF developed its own version of a Diktaturvergleich, a more open-ended comparison of dictatorships, because the problem with totalitarianism theory is its close association with anti-Communist politics.

To more differentiating scholars, the return of totalitarianism theory seemed like a revival of the Cold War mentality, where the research results were already prejudged, whereas a neutral Diktaturvergleich could establish not just resemblances but also differences, avoiding the assumption that the two regimes were essentially the same. Though capable of tracing direct influences and structural similarities between the Third Reich and the GDR, an even-handed comparison of dictatorships would allow one to say e.g. that the Nazis ended up killing many more people than the communists did, at least in Germany. Making use of Martin Broszat’s concept of Historisierung, I therefore started talking about the need for a critical historicization in order to suggest treating the GDR as being really in the past, without glossing over its negative features in retrospect. The Enquetekommission, the Bundestag’s commission of inquiry on the former GDR, which was dominated by conservative politicians and anti-Communist scholars, tended to take a hard line, replicating the views of the victims of the communist dictatorship. In contrast, the ZZF tried to establish in the public debate an alternative both to vindictive communist-bashing and the sort of post-communist apologetics that made the GDR appear more cuddly than it really was.

To us the intellectual challenge was to develop a contemporary history of East Germany that took seriously its dictatorial character, but also dealt with more positive recollections of everyday life. We attempted to address the mixed experiences of the people in their repressive state, because we found out very quickly that for East Germans it was very difficult to dissociate their personal lives from the political system.
seemed quite important to me to avoid what had happened in West Germany, namely a discrepancy between a dominant critical history—informing public media representation, intellectual discourse and academic research—and a subterranean apologetic memory which was handed down as private narrative of victimhood. This is my personal reading of what had happened in West Germany until the 1980s. In order not to repeat this duality, we wanted to find a more differentiated way of reconstructing the problematic East German past to make it possible for people to recognize some of their own experiences in our academic rendering. This meant interpreting the SED-system as full of contradictions rather than as a homogenous dictatorship. Hence the first set of research projects at the ZZF investigated "structures of rule and dimensions of experience" (Herrschaftsstrukturen und Erfahrungsdimensionen). At the beginning, we focused mostly on political repression and its social-structural effects. At the same time we also did a lot of Historiographiegeschichte, in order to study how historians behaved in the GDR in order to highlight the vulnerability of our own discipline. More recently, we have moved from Gesellschaftsgeschichte towards more cultural questions, but have tried to maintain some degree of international and political history in the Institute as well. Research on the dictatorial character of the GDR has mainly shifted to an analysis of cultural legitimacy and soft stabilizers, rather than harsh repression. We have also tried to develop a regional research focus, because one of the casualties of the unification was the Historische Kommission in Berlin. We recently acquired a coordinating position for Berlin and Brandenburg to work with various kinds of Gedenkstätten (memorial sites) in order to coordinate their activities more with academic historical scholarship. Although our research remains centered on the GDR, we have expanded our perspective to other Soviet satellites in East Central Europe, especially Czechoslovakia and Poland. We have also established that we are able to compare post-war developments between East and West Germany. In the early years that was considered politically incorrect.

Two aspects make the ZZF somewhat unique among other institutes concerned with contemporary history: First, we mainly specialize in GDR history broadly construed and in the time period after 1945. Although there is some overlap between all institutes, we try to respect the regional and chronological differentiation among centers dealing with the recent past. The reputation of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich originally rested on its work before 1945; since they have a great library and archive in this area, it would be stupid to duplicate that. In contrast, the FZH in Hamburg is more concerned with the history of the Federal Republic and transnational topics. The Hannah-Arendt Institute in Dresden also does a lot of GDR history, but it has a regional focus that is
further east, in Saxony and towards Poland and Czechoslovakia. Second, the ZZF has developed an intellectual style of its own that is the result of a special cluster of traits: a pluralism of methodological approaches; a self-reflexiveness concerning historiographical questions; a comparative approach to other dictatorships; and finally, an openness to new forms of communication, such as cooperating with H-Soz-Kult to develop the Clio Online and Zeitgeschichte Online web portals and other websites.

5. Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung, Dresden

The Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung was founded in 1993. In addition to several book series, the Institute publishes the journal Totalitarismus und Demokratie/Totalitarianism and Democracy; published annual reports are also available. The Institute’s website is www.hait.tudresden.de. We interviewed Gerhard Besier, professor of totalitarianism research at the University of Dresden and the author of numerous works, including Der Heilige Stuhl und Hitler-Deutschland: Die Faszination des Totalitären (Munich, 2004). He has served as the Institute’s director since 2003.

Gerhard Besier: The founders were able to convince the Saxon state parliament that such an institute was needed after two German dictatorships. The idea behind the Hannah-Arendt-Institut was that it should concentrate on these two dictatorships, perhaps with an emphasis on the East German dictatorship. That program has been fulfilled in different ways, depending on the priorities set by each director of the institute. The founders also had strong interests in local and regional history. Those promoting the project inside and outside of the state parliament came primarily from the Bürgerrechtsbewegung (the East German civil-rights movement that initiated the peaceful revolution of 1989), which is fading into the background today. I am not sure that the organizational structure of the Institute was especially well chosen. We report directly to the state of Saxony, so we are more exposed to political whims than we would be if we were a university institute. The institute researches contemporary history primarily as modern Gesellschaftsgeschichte (history of society). We are not, however, an institute for contemporary history as such, but perform interdisciplinary work. In addition to historians, the Institute is largely composed of political scientists, philosophers, literary scholars, and sociologists.

We work on totalitarian regimes, but we also do research on how to prevent totalitarianism and on the conditions that create or stabilize freedom. We also do regional history on these topics. For example, last fall a book was published about the rebirth of the Free State of Saxony after 1989/90. We don’t engage in political consulting, but we do react to
political events. In the spring of 2005, for example, we held a lecture series on the issues that had been raised by the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands). In sum, we don’t view ourselves as researchers in the Ivory Tower but feel that we must react to political situations that affect society. We sponsor a wide range of events on topics ranging from the history of extremist parties in the Federal Republic to the history of anti-Semitism to public lectures on stereotypes and images of the enemy.

In our specific situation, there is, of course, the view on the part of some members of the Saxon state parliament that “this is our institute.” This is problematic, and that is why it is sometimes necessary to explicitly distance ourselves from politics. On the other hand, we are quite ready to help parliament with political-educational work. In precarious situations, for example, in the case of the NPD’s recent electoral success, I see a certain need for political education. But this must be done without creating the impression that one is close to a particular party, which we are not. The Kuratorium (board), Trägerverein (foundation), and wissenschaftlicher Beirat (academic advisory council) all include representatives from a spectrum of political parties. The Institute is affiliated with the university but has its own source of funding and is therefore not a university institute. The Institute’s director simultaneously holds a chair in the university’s history department. The director is appointed for a five-year period, and if the board does not extend his term of office, which can depend on the political constellation, then he must retreat to his professorship. I personally would prefer an institute within a university due to the specific political problems in eastern Germany. On the other hand, the founding of the Hannah-Arendt-Institut was a herculean effort that probably would not have succeeded within a university. Part of our founding history involves a public-education mission. We are expected to organize lectures that are accessible to the general public and to produce publications that average people can read.

II. SELECTED ISSUES

Definitions of Contemporary History

Axel Schildt: German research on contemporary history developed outside of the universities after 1945 because the universities and their professors were considered incapable of producing a critical appraisal of the Nazi period. For the same reason, contemporary history long carried the stigma of postwar re-education. This genesis is clearly documented for the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich but also for the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg. Although the field of contemporary his-
History has been recognized since the nineteenth century, it is no coincidence that there was a surge in professionalization after the Second World War — on the subject of the National Socialist regime, especially its antecedents. From this sprang the first attempts to define the field, with Hans Rothfels’s definition being the most important: contemporary history as, on the one hand, the epoch of those still living and, on the other hand, the history of the period that begins with the double caesura of the Russian Revolution and the end of the First World War. There have been many attempts at a definition since Rothfels, for example by Eberhard Jäckel, who advocated extending the first aspect of the definition and dropping the second, thereby constantly moving contemporary history further into the present. If my impressions are correct, this did not succeed. Instead, contemporary history is today defined as the history of the modern era since the turn of the century or since the late 1890s. This means that contemporary history has extended its area of research backwards, and that is certainly due to the fact that the earlier distinctions between Neueste Geschichte (most recent history) at the universities and Zeitgeschichte (contemporary history) at special institutes have all but disappeared. So today we have adopted a pragmatic view as far as the time period that is studied: Contemporary history is the history of the twentieth century. In addition, contemporary history is undergoing a continual process of transformation centering around such terms as trans-nationality and trans-locality. Contemporary history was for many years the least methodologically innovative part of historical studies. Perhaps one can even formulate this as a “law”: The more sources are available for study, the less interest there is in theoretical discussions. But this has certainly changed: The debates that began long ago in regard to other epochs have meanwhile reached contemporary history as a whole.

Konrad Jarausch: Classic Zeitgeschichte is the older contemporary history up until 1945, including the end of the First World War, the revolution, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich, which were considered to be the contemporary history until the 1970s. In the later years of the Federal Republic, a kind of second contemporary history, a postwar history, began to emerge, which is now called in German die neuere Zeitgeschichte. That expansion of scope got a great push with the collapse of communism and German unification. With the opening of the East German archives, contemporary history was able to extend its research from the postwar period into the 1980s and the 1990s. Just now emerging is a third, most recent segment whose temporal boundaries are still in doubt. Because of the fall of Communism, Hans Peter Schwartz asserts that it began in 1990. But I would contend that it already started in 1973/1979 with the oil shocks and the shift towards a postindustrial society, the full impact of which remained somewhat hidden in the German context by
division and reunification. It has to do with the origins of the globalization problems of today. So there seem to me to be three distinctive periods in contemporary history, dominated by three different sets of issues: The first set of problems has to do with World War One, the failure of democracy, the Third Reich, and the Holocaust, covering 1917 to 1945. The second group of concerns involves the reemergence of Europe out of the “rupture of civilization” and the process which I call in a forthcoming book the “re-civilizing of the Germans.” Overshadowed by the Cold War, it extends in some aspects into the early 1990s. The third and most recent segment that starts in 1973/1979 has to do with globalization, postmodernity, and postindustrial society.

The Question of Audience

Jan Philipp Reemtsma: When I founded the institute, I had the notion that knowledge could function according to a sender-receiver model. You find out something, you put it into more or less comprehensible language, and you tell it to someone, who then knows more and can act more competently. I now think that that is a hopelessly naïve description of the process. In fact, the work of every academic institute is primarily directed at specialists in the field. But that knowledge somehow trickles down and lands somewhere, in school textbooks for instance. In other words, you influence in an indirect manner the socially conditioned ways of speaking about certain problems. If you are lucky, you change them a little bit. Indeed, it can be said that the subject “crimes of the Wehrmacht” will never again be discussed in the same way that is was before 1995. We have achieved that. One should not imagine wanting more. Behind all this there is the conviction that societies that reflect on themselves become more civilized just through this simple act of self-reflexion. This is done not by societies as a whole, of course, but by delegation. The important question is: Is there a social climate where the majority of the people say: “It’s good that it’s that way, that there are such people. Yes, we find that interesting and sometimes we even feel like listening to them.”

Horst Möller: The Institute has two kinds of public. The first is comprised exclusively of specialists, above all those who use the library and archive. But the Institute has also always thought about reaching a broader audience. For this purpose a book series was founded in the 1960s: the *dtv-Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (World History of the Twentieth Century), edited by Martin Broszat and Helmut Heiber, with fairly high print runs, even though these were all scholarly books. In the 1980s the Institute started publishing another series: *Deutsche Geschichte der Neuesten Zeit* (German History of the Recent Past), planned to be thirty volumes, only twenty-nine of which were published. These are books for
the general public. The top print runs have reached between 30,000 and 50,000 copies.

**Konrad Jarausch:** At the beginning the public, such as journalists, citizens and other scholars, simply came to us. We could announce almost any theme for a lecture or conference, and people would flock in. No matter what GDR topic we would propose, the lecture room would be crammed and we would have some very emotional discussions. Some people defended the humane aspirations of the system; others denounced its inhumane character; and still others tried to reconcile such these contradictions. And we saw our role as helping the public process of sorting out the historic legacy of the GDR, which was still up for grabs in the media, in politics and in personal judgments. This direct interest has faded in the last five years, because half a generation after the end of the SED-state most people have gotten on with their lives, the new challenges of the unification crisis tend to overshadow earlier suffering, and the collapse of the GDR has created a strange kind of nostalgia for a lost world. But I think the media interest in contemporary history has increased with the deepening Holocaust sensibility. During the year 2005 we just had a real run with the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Also the multiple aftereffects of the SED-dictatorship will still be felt for a long time, triggering new aesthetic representations and political discussions.

**Zeitgeschichte and Politics**

**Horst Möller:** What responsibility does academic research on contemporary history have to the larger society? On the one hand, public discussions about controversial topics in contemporary history are a welcome phenomenon because they show that the public is interested in history. On the other hand, there is also a negative aspect, because the public can easily get the feeling that if they see a television broadcast or series on a subject, then they know “the history.” Historians are of a different opinion. We believe that it is not possible to achieve historical understanding with two sentences from an interview with a contemporary eyewitness. This means, however, that academic historians come under pressure: “If television does this, why don’t you? And if you criticize it, then do it better!” But, of course, when a well-known television figure like Guido Knopp airs a program with one-and-a-half-million viewers, and afterwards they say, “Here is the companion book to the program,” then that provides a kind of advertising with which academic publications cannot compete. So we find ourselves in a bit of a bind because the public and the politicians say that academia has an obligation here. In this regard, institutes like ours must constantly battle for their independence and make clear that the work that they do is time-consuming, has only a limited
audience, but is nevertheless indispensable. The public marketing of contemporary history, when really successful, rests on a division of labor. Journalists carry out this task, but in so doing, they use the publications of historians; and these are produced according to scholarly standards.

Gerhard Besier: Politicians always pay attention to research on contemporary history, and instances of interference can arise when research, on political parties for instance, turns up things that are perceived as a disturbance. Contemporary history also cannot be easily separated from journalism. From the outside, the Hannah-Arendt-Institut is often regarded as a great authority. If an institute says something, then it must carry great weight. That is not at all the case, however, except perhaps in historians’ dreams. Even when books result from our work, the moment of public attention is quite short.

Axel Schildt: One of the central questions is how we should present the results of research in contemporary history to the public, especially as regards the competition with contemporary history in the media, which has become an independent area of activity over the past decade. Here we face the problem of making sure, on the one hand, not to trivialize our research findings for the sake of public attention, and, on the other, not to sit off somewhere in splendid isolation bemoaning the shallowness of the commercial media. Navigating between these two extremes is the main challenge for institutes like ours. Many public debates about contemporary history are really about something else entirely, big ethical-political questions such as: What is evil? How is evil coded—whether it is the Holocaust or Stalinism or another historical phenomenon? Such debates always have a political aspect related to the pursuit of current interests. This, of course, calls on contemporary history as a discipline that can historicize certain debates and can thereby add a deeper dimension to them.

Jan Philipp Reemtsma: One of the key questions is: To which academic discipline do we assign the creation of meaning (Sinnstiftung)? Up until the eighteenth century this task was performed by theology, then by philosophy, especially in the form of the philosophy of history. And the academic field of history has inherited quite a lot from this, even where it has completely jettisoned any remnant of the philosophy of history. When a Wehler or a Mommsen comments on political matters as a historian, this always has a lingering philosophical flavor, and that leads to interesting paradoxes. For history cannot take on this role of a creator of meaning, because that would spell a return to philosophical constructions of meaning, and the field of history avoids that for good reason. Historians can say only how things were and point out larger contexts that the layperson might miss. But so much more is expected of them: One can sense this even with regard to the history programs on television produced by the much-reviled Guido Knopp. Why are these programs so...
popular? Of course, they are popular in part because it is a politically correct way of watching war movies. But it is not only that. The programs are also popular because people watch them and think: “Perhaps some secret will be revealed to us that will tell us why all of this happened.”

What really happened in this century? This is a very different question at the end of the twentieth century than it was at the end of the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century was in many ways colorful and remarkable, but it was not mysterious. At the end of the twentieth century, people faced the question: “What happened here?” And that is why the question for history has been much more urgent. Historical writing cannot do anything except narrate the events of the past. It cannot create meaning. But then who should perform this task? Literature, film? This situation does indeed create a special position for contemporary history, albeit a precarious, aporetic, unresolvable one. Historians have to handle this by making it clear that it is possible to give interpretations, by insisting that interpretations are different from the creation of meaning, and by deconstructing certain conventional questions with the help of theory.

Konrad Jarausch: The close relationship of Zeitgeschichte to politics is what makes it exciting, but it is also what creates special pitfalls for historians. During the founding of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, it was not clear whether this new institute should be primarily dedicated to research or to political education, a concept that later developed into the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. The early memora nda always mention this as a double task. The assumption, of course, was that scholarship that is vigorously pursued and tries to be objective will contribute to civic education and reinforce a budding democracy. That premise is, however, not unproblematic. On the one hand, the overriding ethical commitment of a historian has to be to do sound research. On the other hand, contemporary historians also have to defend the preconditions for their own research, and that requires taking a stand on political controversies. Christoph Klessman, the just retired co-director, therefore phrased the central task of contemporary history as “wissenschaftliche Aufklärung”—an academically-based enlightenment about the recent past that is just turning from the lived present into something called history. Of course, this mysterious transformation involves contentions to sort out what images about the past will survive and how certain developments will be interpreted in the future. Contemporary historians need to be aware of this process of sifting so that they can play a conscious role in it and thereby meet their ethical obligations. Their predicament consists of the need to reconcile their commitment to values such as truthfulness with the defense of a set of political rights that make their own inquiry possible in the first place. Scholarship that tries to be objective is not possible in a dictatorial setting; but neither is free inquiry.
likely if it lets itself be instrumentalized for party-political purposes. Because all contemporary historians have personal political predilections, they need to be self-reflexive about the potential influence of such prejudices. Their work will make a lasting contribution only if they do not act unselfconsciously in this complicated arena, but also reflect what they are doing.

**International Aspects**

**Horst Möller:** International perspectives were previously not at the center of the institute’s work. Before 1989 the Institute was one-of-a-kind and there was a certain self-satisfaction in knowing that in the field of historical research on National Socialism we are the best, and everyone comes to us. When I returned to the Institute as director in 1992, I made it a programmatic point that German contemporary history must be internationalized, in terms of both subjects and methods. German contemporary history remains central for us, but the important comparative questions are always found in international interconnections and comparisons. For example: Why did French democracy last until 1940, while German democracy collapsed in 1933? The question *why* always becomes a different question if one proceeds comparatively instead of looking at a single national case.

**Axel Schildt:** I think that contemporary history will continue to be shaped primarily by the nation. Aspects that are comparative, that seek to trace the history of influences and connections, that are international, are all important ways of enriching our understanding of our own national history, of course. But I do not think that it is possible to entirely replace national history with a kind of European or even global history. For our institute in particular, two aspects are essential: first, to differentiate the national in light of local and regional narratives that make it possible to understand the big master narratives of national history. The watchword *translocality* is important for our institute: that is, using our city as a starting point for gaining insights into European and global history by way of local history. Second, we try to link the local with the global by stressing Hamburg’s position as a city of international trade and an international harbor. A project about the Chinese migration to Hamburg and a new project about Hamburg’s coffee trade, especially with Latin American countries, may serve as examples for this commitment. In cooperation with the GHI, we are also building an international network to explore, edit and analyze foreign consulate reports from German cities during the so called Third Reich, hoping to thus highlight the political and social changes from an international perspective.

**Konrad Jarausch:** The key challenge for the ZZF is the debate about the creation of a European memory culture that provides a critical rather
than merely affirmative commentary on the continuing process at integration. One priority is therefore helping East-Central European historians with their own establishment of institutions of contemporary history in order to reinforce their new democratic public sphere. In Romania for instance, this was a highly contested project. Another related task is the further Europeanization of contemporary history, breaking the consideration of the recent past out of the national confines and lifting it into a broader interactive framework. We are heavily involved in the creation of a network of institutes for contemporary history in Europe and trying to make it work intellectually through finding common themes. Furthermore, in Berlin and Brandenburg we are located at the point where the two European memory cultures collide: As the competing memorials show, the Western concern with the lessons of the Holocaust meets the Eastern preoccupation with the suffering induced by Communism. Therefore we see it as our charge to work on these issues and facilitate communication between these two memory cultures. This is not just something that can be proclaimed abstractly in manifestos, but something that has to be done concretely through academic conferences and bringing in visiting scholars.

Gerhard Besier: We study dictatorships by means of comparisons between countries but also between regions, for example between Upper Silesia and Saxony. We have a very strong emphasis on East Central Europe. We have established a branch in Poland and one in the Czech Republic because we are convinced that only a continuous exchange of both teachers and students can achieve something. In this way we are trying to set up a real network of academic exchange in this three-country triangle. Of course, we also work with colleagues in Great Britain, France, and the United States. Overall, our research is about the European context and about the construction of a European consciousness. It is certainly the case that the impulses for writing works of contemporary history and political science come primarily from western countries. We take up these impulses and try to disseminate them. For example, we have a publication series in which research results from our Institute’s symposia appear in the Polish language so that our colleagues in Poland can read about, say, French research on right-wing extremism. Thus we also see ourselves as a “transformation belt” conveying the latest research in various fields between East and West.

The interviews were transcribed by Rouben Bathke, Torsten Graebe, Caroline Grimm, Ryan Handy, and Stephen Scala; translated from the German by Keith Alexander (except for the Jarausch interview, which was conducted in English); and edited by Richard F. Wetzell.
A central conflict for people living through the Reformation, as I see it, was finding a balance between religious toleration and religious concord. Toleration I take to be the acceptance of religious difference within a community. Its opposite, concord, entails the elimination of difference on the basis of shared values. My research describes how neighbors of different faiths balanced these forces in Wesel, a Lutheran city on the Lower Rhine with a Catholic minority and a sizable population of Calvinist immigrants from the Netherlands. Residents of Wesel, of course, did not use the same terminology. They expressed their central goals in terms of securing both “peace and unity.” Achieving unity meant stressing concord—that is, preserving a united Christian church. Securing peace, on the other hand, meant developing strategies to manage disputes over religious differences. For residents of post-Reformation Wesel, finding a balance between peace and unity, between toleration and concord, was at the heart of preserving civic order.

My project considers the strategies for coexistence developed by individuals of conflicting faiths in Wesel. I focus my examination on these “tactics of toleration” from the vantage points of religious immigrants and their hosts, who learned to coexist during a period of increasing confessional consciousness and hostility. Although their initial strategies were unsuccessful, residents learned to avoid confrontation and violence by demarcating the spheres of religious activity in which either Christian unity or pluralism was most suitable. My research explores these negotiations through daily interactions, conflicts, and religious compromises that emerged in the late sixteenth century. For the purpose of illustration, I will focus my explanation here on describing how this process worked for the ritual of communion.

For all Christians, the Lord’s Supper was essential for reconciliation between an individual and God. But communion was also the preemi-
symbol of unity in the church. Civic and religious leaders of all stripes repeatedly lauded the celebration of the Lord’s Supper as the most fundamental expression of unity and peace. It was for this reason that in 1553, when the city had accepted the Lutheran faith, magistrates demanded that residents continue to take communion together. Because sixteenth-century debates about the Eucharist were so fierce, prioritizing unity of this sort inherently threatened to undermine peace. The solution developed in Wesel demonstrates that the tension between toleration and concord is more complex than the apparent mutual incompatibility suggests.

Although it took place only four times per year, the celebration of communion was the high point of religious devotion in Wesel. The service, ornamented with devotional candles and incense, began with the singing of psalms, a catechism, a Gospel lesson, a short sermon, and Lutheran hymns. Following this came the Lord’s Prayer, the pax domini, and finally the distribution of the Eucharist itself. This was a thoroughly Lutheran liturgy, which turned its back on the Catholic mass while still rejecting the radical simplicity of the Calvinist service. The pretense that Wesel maintained Christian unity through its communion, in fact, masked deep religious differences.

Although Calvinists from the Netherlands generally complied with the magistrates’ demands, being forced to celebrate communion in a Lutheran form bothered many of them. They repeatedly petitioned the council requesting a separate communion due to the exiles’ distaste for Lutheran vestments, candles, altars, and the emphasis on the real presence. The council, however, never conceded this point, and attendance at this mixed communion service remained the sine qua non for residence. Periodically, Calvinists were caught illegally holding separate communion services. These incidents sometimes ended in expulsions, but always with an order that everyone celebrate communion together.

Celebration of the Lord’s Supper, lauded as a foundation of civic unity and harmony, could be a tense occasion in Wesel. Calvinists attacked what they called “superstitions,” while Lutherans lashed out against what they saw as infiltrations of heresy. Sharing a united communion did not resolve these theological differences, but instead reminded residents of the religious and social fractures within their community. Yet the fact that Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics all continued to participate suggests that this strategy did meet with some success.

Problems within the Calvinist community were largely resolved by the efforts of their independent—and officially illegal—governing body, the consistory, made up of lay elders, who carefully regulated the doctrine, morals, and behavior of their community. The elders worked tirelessly to convince reluctant Calvinists to attend communion. These cases reveal the discontent of some exiles, but also outline the methods by
which Wesel’s residents negotiated between the twin specters of open schism on the one hand and compromising one’s beliefs on the other. Considering the Calvinist emphasis on the remoteness of the divine from the worldly realm, the continued use of candles, organ music, and mass vestments was an affront to many exiles. Peter Hasevelt, for instance, refrained from the Lord’s Supper because his conscience rejected the excessive ceremonies. Nicolas Muller abstained from communion because of “several adiaphora,” especially the use of the wafer rather than plain bread. He condemned the elders for tolerating Wesel’s superstitions. Satan was present here, Muller charged, and tempted true Christians to idolatry. Despite the consistory’s failure to convince Hasevelt or Muller to comply, elders later attested that each conducted himself with “all piety and honor.” Their respect for these men notwithstanding, elders never ceased their efforts to ensure that all members attended the sacrament, as they explained, “in order to secure the unity of the church.”

When it came time to celebrate the Lord’s Supper, some Calvinists retreated to nearby Reformed churches. In July 1575 an elder traveled to the town of Rees to find out how many of the Wesel brothers had attended communion. Calvinist elders always discouraged this, because it could incite what they called “prejudices” and “divisions.” This practice of attending communion in neighboring cities, known as Auslauf, suggests that Calvinists unwilling to compromise still made efforts to steer clear of the public recognition of religious difference. While requiring the united celebration of communion was deemed essential for upholding the pretense of religious unity, if the most uncompromising members had been strongly compelled to attend, they would surely have made matters worse. My research has shown that recorded cases of non-attendance were in fact quite exceptional. Elders succeeded in convincing most Dutch Calvinists to attend communion. What these cases show us is not the overwhelming discord in Wesel’s religious landscape, but the relative success of strategies to minimize that discord.

Some Lutherans, too, were reluctant to share the sacrament with those they believed to be schismatics and heretics. One “honorable pious woman” complained that she refused the sacrament in Wesel, “because she could not hold it with fanatics.” Some Lutherans grew so frustrated that they too held clandestine communion services. The council rebuked this kind of insolence because it incited “division and disunity.” Yet hard-line Lutherans continued to protest that Calvinists, as one man wrote, “greatly disturb the Lord’s Supper and create great anger in the church of God.” This overt contempt for the public communion ritual provoked anxiety from civic leaders for the same reason that the absence of Calvinists from the Lord’s Supper did. Both sides threatened Christian
concord, which was at the heart of what leaders viewed as a stable social order.

Unlike Calvinists, Lutherans tried to draw as much attention to their discontent as possible. In late 1571, the “adherents of the unaltered Augsburg Confession” petitioned the council that Calvinists be refused the Eucharist. “Because the practice of the Lord’s Supper is a confession of faith... a Christian cannot take communion in good conscience with such repulsiveness.” In 1572, a group of Lutherans protested that they held contempt for the local communion “because the ministers... openly allowed [Calvinists] to the Lord’s most esteemed Supper and Sacrament.” The council refused all such requests from Lutherans, just as they did those from Calvinists.

Also like Calvinists, some frustrated Lutherans avoided confrontation by attending communion in nearby Essen. I do not know how many Lutherans practiced Auslauf, but they apparently had significant sympathy. In 1575 the Bürgermeister himself, Otto von Bellinckhoven, told the council that by refusing to condemn Calvinists, the ministers had failed in their divinely ordained responsibility, justifying his separation from Wesel’s Eucharistic community. Still, von Bellinckhoven was elected Bürgermeister four times over, and remained in the ruling patriciate for decades. A city council edict from 1579 declared that Lutherans who took communion outside the city incited the “wrath of God” and brought “divisions and dangers” to the church. Yet harsh disciplinary actions would have only increased the alienation of these men and women, since their anger was inspired above all by the failure of the secular and spiritual leadership to fulfill its Christian duty.

If Catholics were similarly discontented with Wesel’s mixed communion services, we have little evidence that tells us this because their archive has been destroyed. Yet it is surprising enough that Catholics attended at all. When Wesel initially joined the Lutheran church, Catholics were required to attend communion. Initially they had the option of receiving the bread alone and foregoing the wine offered to Protestant parishioners. Leading Catholics complained when this changed, but conceded that they only wanted to “hold themselves in all love with the honorable council.”

We are best able to track the activities of Catholics though the city’s eight religious orders. Just as with the Calvinists and Lutherans, magistrates and church leaders preserved the legal and social fiction of religious unity even as they overlooked peaceful Catholic dissenters. Although magistrates sometimes complained, religious orders continued to provide sacraments to faithful Catholics. Although friars and nuns celebrated Mass in their chapels, they were required to keep their front doors shut during services.
priests were offering private Masses, they complained that this was an affront to the public communion and warned that it might incite “anger and disunity.”

Yet if the members of the religious houses are any indication, we can surmise that most Catholics attended communion in the parish churches four times per year alongside their Lutheran and Calvinist neighbors. The Johanniter were still allowed to sing Latin hymns and place devotional candles on the altar and before images of saints. Overseers from Münster, visiting St. Martin’s Fraterhaus in 1575, complained that members took communion in the city church: in fact, the brothers kept their designated pews in the central parish.

To Calvinist elders, the presence of Catholics at communion was disturbing, and the fact that the ministers allowed them to engage in rituals associated with the Roman Mass smacked of idolatry. In late 1578, the elders presented a request to the ministers concerning “the monks in St. John’s Cloister (because they go to communion here), that the placing of candles in front of the images and the singing of Latin songs be eliminated.” The chief minister answered that Catholic worshippers could continue “because their singing is Christian, even though it is in [Latin], and they understand it well.” The elders likewise complained about the people who “hold themselves in papacy” but were admitted to the Lord’s Supper. The minister, already willing to accept Calvinists within the Eucharistic community, also acknowledged Catholics as part of the Christian family. For him, civic harmony rested on communal unity, particularly the united celebration of the Lord’s Supper. Through their very participation, Catholics accepted this line of reasoning. But this did not mean that they abandoned confessionally oriented activities, like holding private Mass or venerating saints. The ministers’ expectations for Wesel’s Catholic population were not that different from those for Calvinists. As long as they participated in the ritual of communion, they were allowed additional devotional privileges. For Calvinists, this meant that they were quietly allowed to practice their strict form of moral discipline within the privacy of their homes. For Catholics, this meant that they could hold additional services within their religious houses.

Like most sixteenth-century Europeans, Wesel’s residents were not willing to abandon the ideal of a united Christendom. For this reason, Wesel’s urban leaders left the city’s legal structure in its older, intolerant form. But beyond the law, confessionally mixed communities like this one developed ways of coexisting. In Wesel, the necessary balance was established only through an unofficial arrangement, based on careful collaboration, unpunished duplicity, and maintaining the pretense of religious unity. Ironically, the united celebration of the Eucharist, ritually the most self-conscious demonstration of Christian unity, became the essen-
tial element in securing the toleration of religious difference. The solutions that emerged in Wesel—this balance between toleration and concord—did not satisfy everyone. In point of fact, they only had to satisfy enough of the population to keep the system running.

Residents of Wesel maintained this balance by creating and maintaining boundaries of acceptable behavior, which tacitly accepted religious difference, while stressing Christian concord just enough to keep antagonisms from escalating. Local civic and religious leaders would not accept institutionally dividing the church, but they also understood quite well that the Reformation had irreversibly divided Christendom. To maintain this apparent paradox, a set of daily compromises emerged, strategies that reduced confessional tensions. At the center of this was the city leadership’s refusal to openly acknowledge religious division, while providing avenues for limited expressions of that difference.

Notes

1 See for example Stadtarchiv Wesel (hereafter as SAW) A3/58 f.99v. *Acta consistorii der gereformierter nederduytschen gemeente binnen Wesel*, Wesel Evangelisches Kirchenarchiv (hereafter as WKA) Gefach 72.1 f.61r, Gefach 72.2 f.60v.


5 SAW A3/48 f.11v, f.15r, f.30v.

6 SAW A3/48 f.2r. Also SAW A1/275.1 f.6v. SAW A3/49 f.2v, f.20r. In August 1556, exile ministers were allowed to distribute the Eucharist “in times of sickness and only to the bedridden” and only “according to God’s word and the Augsburg Confession.” SAW A3/49 f.28r-v. Ten days later the exiles requested that the council rescind its decision, with no effect. SAW A3 36v.

7 *Ordnung der Eltisten*, January 1574. *Acta*, WKA Gefach 72.1 f.21r. A list of offenses in 1578 included disobedience to the elders, household misconduct, idleness, and indolence, f.103r.

8 E.g. *Acta*, WKA Gefach 72.2 f.218v.

9 WKA 3,2,28.

10 On Peter Hasevelt see *Acta*, WKA Gefach 72.2 f.99v, f.134v-135r. For Nicolas Muller see f.75v, f.98r, f.120v and “An das Consistorium van Antwerpen, 24 May 1580.” WKA Gefach 3,2,28.
Men who refused to attend communion could even be elected as deacons. This was not true of elders, who were required to attend communion. *Acta*, WKA Gefach 72,2 f.34r.

11 E.g. *Acta*, WKA Gefach 72,2 f.61r, f.68r-v.

12 *Acta*, WKA Gefach 71,2 f.7v. Sadly there is no reference that indicates how many people made the trip.

13 Originalprotocolle der ref. Classis Vesaliensis, WKA Gefach 12,5 f.10r-v, f.13v.


15 Consistorial records from August 1582 to August 1586 are missing, suggesting that there may have been more cases than have been recorded. No chronological pattern emerges in cases of communion non-attendance. In 1573 there were seven cases, in 1578 there were eight, and in 1580 nine. Years with no cases are 1576, 1581, 1582, and 1586. On 21 February 1575, elders complained about the continuing problems with “those who still abstain from the Lord’s Supper.” *Acta*, WKA Gefach, 71,2 f.59v. As late as 1590 this remained a problem. *Acta*, WKA Gefach 72,3 f.137 and f.162.

16 WKA Gefach 3,1,61 f.239r. WKA 3,1,66a, f. 205r-v.


18 SAW A3/55 f.60r-v.


21 WKA Gefach 3,2,8.


23 “[Alle rechschaffene prediger schuldich den propheten, Christum selbst und seine apostolen in ire fussstappen zu folgen mit allein mit reiner, gesonder lehr vorzupflanzen, sonder auch mit straff und verwerffen der wederwenden lehr und lehrer mit namen und zusammen noch laut hiebei ingefurten der H. Schrift spruchen und exempelen.” WKA Gefach 3,1,63 f.293v-v.


26 SAW A3/45 f.7v-8r.


30 SAW A3/54 f.2v. A3/55 f.9v, f.11r-v, f.32v, f.36r.
31 Drath, Sankt Martini Wesel, 69, 78–79; Willibrordi Kirchenrechnungen 1552, WKA Gefach 33,6 f.807.
32 Acta, WKA Gefach 72,2, f.122r.
33 Acta, WKA Gefach 72,2 f.125r.
34 Acta, WKA Gefach 72,2 f.156v.
35 SAW A3/60 f.18v.


**Plastics and Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic:**
**Toward an Economic, Consumer, Design, and Cultural History**

Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize Presentation, November 18, 2005

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In choosing to write a dissertation that viewed aspects of East Germany through the prism of a material, plastic, I was consciously choosing a material for its “interstitiality.” Everywhere and nowhere, ubiquitous and worthless, a model of self-negation, I thought that perhaps plastics could serve as the connecting tissue of the “anatomy” of the East German dictatorship, touching everything and thus constructive to an interdisciplinary interpretation of East Germany. “Everywhere and nowhere,” however, is not a friendly concept to archivists, librarians, and museum directors, or for that matter interview subjects. I was often told by archivists that there simply was not anything on the subject in the archives and that I would have to find a different topic; or I was told by former East Germans that there was so much East German plastic—“Plaste, das hat es überall in der DDR gegeben, das war ja kein Thema”—that I would have to find a different topic. I hoped however that such source confusion might be a clue that plastics were important. The story of sources in this case is an introduction to the wider stakes of a dissertation on East German plastics.

In the very recent field of East German history, a considerable debate has developed that has been characterized somewhat simplistically as one between historians who practice or write top-down history and those who write bottom-up history. The selection of sources, of course, has a great deal to do with this debate. The histories of the SED, the major ministries, and the Stasi, for example, are shaped by the records kept by those organizations. Equally, the histories of ordinary people, workers in a particular factory for instance, are shaped by the surviving complaint letters of unhappy consumers. The stakes of the debate are no less than the meaning of the Cold War, because top-down histories usually interpret communist East Germany as primarily top-down oppression, while so-called bottom-up or alltagsgeschichtliche histories emphasize the normality of life. For most East Germans, life went on under slightly changed circumstances: People still fell in love, got married, had children who had
birthday parties, and so on.³ In other words, was life in East Germany all that bad? Alternatively, one could see this as the second iteration of the Normalisierung and Alltagsgeschichte debates concerning the Third Reich—a second Normalisierung debate for the second German dictatorship. It comes down to a legitimacy debate, or as some would prefer, a stability debate.

The reason for an entire dissertation on plastics has to do with the relationship of sources to this debate. In my view the bottom of society is connected seamlessly with the top, but finding a way to connect them is difficult because the sources lend themselves often only to pure Alltagsgeschichte or Parteengeschichte. Plastics were a material that pervaded everyday life in the GDR, that in many ways defined life in the GDR, but that also held significance at the highest levels of party and government in East Germany. Moreover, in and of themselves, in the aesthetic meaning that they imparted to their surroundings, they not only represented but actually were a historical phenomenon. I term this phenomenon “centripetality,” or confluence: a growing together out of economic, political, and pragmatic necessity of the values of the commonplace and the ideological initiatives of the Party and the government. This centripetality is my answer to the legitimacy debate, because it posits an Aufhebung of sorts—the creation of a third form that is neither the “Eigensinn” of the Nischengesellschaft nor the Herrschaft of the Diktatur.⁴ Plastics are a window to, as well as a piece of, this process of Aufhebung. By looking top-first at the different angles, we can better understand the injection of meaning into an object and the way in which a material object subsumes, in our understanding and in history, these different influences.

The ideology of Stalinism proved terribly unsuited for the postwar world. This ideology relegated the needs of consumers to dead last on the priority list, demanding sacrifice in all areas of life in the interest of building heavy industry based only on primary and secondary production. Clothes, toys, combs, laundry baskets, and cars were all considered by the SED to be wants, not needs. In 1953, as the West German economic miracle was in full swing and the screw was being put to East Germans ever harder, East Germans rose up, demanding more attention to consumption and then more democracy and freedom to travel.⁵ The SED under Walter Ulbricht realized that the two were connected: If people were deprived of the nice things (nylons, cars, decent food) that they saw in the West, they would end up demanding not just nice things but political change as well. To hold on to political power was therefore a question of improving material conditions, which, as many scholars from Ina Merkel to Katherine Pence have documented, led to the forced creation of a kind of socialist consumerism that really took off after 1958.⁶ The problem for the SED was that East Germany was a Soviet satellite
with few natural resources and was thus cut off from many of the materials it needed, either through embargo or because non-COMECON countries demanded hard currency for raw materials, such as cotton from Egypt, cork from Portugal, oil from Iraq, or lumber from Sweden.7

How could a country like East Germany then replicate even a part of the Western consumer society its citizens viewed with envy? The answer was one that had presented itself to autarkic and dictatorial German governments in the past, which was to synthesize the goods that were only available from abroad. From the Kaiserreich to the Third Reich, from BASF to Benzine to Buna, the GDR had inherited the so-called Chemical Triangle near Halle, and as of 1958, the GDR had the world’s seventh largest plastics industry.8 In 1958, the Party called a chemistry conference to announce a grandiose “Chemistry Program” that would lead to improvements in industry, especially in consumer products.9 Great increases were seen for plastics, especially the newer thermoplastics like polyethylene, polystyrene, polyamide, and polypropylene.10 The building of a new pipeline straight from the Soviet oil fields that Hitler once coveted—the “Friendship Pipeline”—was announced by the regime as part of a “Soviet Union Special Program.” In fact, the Chemistry Program unfolded in an era of official and popular enthusiasm regarding the ability of socialist science to engineer the perfect utopian society, catalyzed by the success of the Soviet space and atomic programs.11

The big problem facing the government was to convince the population that the fact that many GDR goods were made out of plastic was not a sign of inferiority vis-à-vis the West, but a sign of superiority.12 To this end, numerous sources throughout society, from special plastics stores such as Chemie im Heim on the Stalinallee just south of Alexanderplatz, to women’s home decorating magazines such as Kultur im Heim and Für Dich to youth magazines such as Jugend und Technik sought to explain the practical benefits of plastics not only to the consumers but also in terms of the overall “people’s economy.”13 East German TV shows like Prisma extolled the virtues of the miracle material plastic. A 1970 Prisma show entitled “The Plastics are Coming” sought to convince viewers that plastics were the wave of the future, not only for themselves, the consumers, but also for the new, technologically sophisticated Volkswirtschaft. “One even speaks of a corresponding ‘plastic age’ as similar to the historical stone and bronze ages,” reported the narrator over panned shots of a plastic camera workshop at the VEB Pentacom Factory.14 Magazines explained in careful detail how plastic was made, and explained the pragmatic advantages of plastic in everyday life, especially for women.15 Laminated tabletops and presswood shelving units called Schrankwände were easier to clean, polyester clothes needed no ironing,
polyethylene laundry baskets were lighter, plastic cups and plates never broke. Plastic consumer goods enabled one of the great pastimes of East German life—camping, a vital outlet for East Germans who were not allowed to travel. Plastics provided camping utensils, beach balls, portable radios, sandals, and soft-boiled egg holders. A 1960 issue of the beloved comic book *Mosaik* depicted a scene, entitled “Summer Joy Through Plastics,” featuring frolicking East German campers (clearly identifiable by their Trabant parked nearby) using a palette of various plastic products, each one marked with a star.  

Most of all, however, the aesthetic design of plastic goods mattered and came about as a result of the rising influence of a group of designers who traced their heritage to the veritable inventors of modernism, the Bauhaus school. Led by Martin Kelm, a student of Bauhäusler Mart Stam, these designers rose from being practically banned under the Stalinist regime of anti-modernist aesthetics to leading a very powerful office in the government by the beginning of the 1970s, the Office of Industrial Design (*Amt für industrielle Gestaltung*). This office had control over the design of many products made in the GDR, including most of the plastic products, because it was within the very powerful German Office for Measurements and Goods Testing (*Deutsches Amt für Messewesen und Warenprüfung*). Because of this group of designers, such as Kelm, Horst Michel, Günter Reißmann, Hans Merz, Werner Laux, etc.—most of whom were involved with the College for Art and Design at the Burg-Giebichenstein in Halle—plastics came to symbolize the modern, practical, and valuable rather than the cheap, kitschy, and disposable.

Also important is the way in which modernist designers like Kelm and Reißmann came to have such power—this helps decode the aesthetic meaning that plastics carried in the everyday world of the GDR. The regime had been against modernism, it favored historicism in product design, and thus was against the use of plastic because of its modern aesthetic. During the initial phase of the GDR, architecture and product design were dominated by an official Stalinist aesthetic. According to Kurt Liebknecht, the head of the main architectural body of the GDR, the Deutsche Bauakademie (DBA), this meant that the products of socialist industry and construction should reflect the cultural heritage of Germany, imitating styles such as baroque, rococo, Chippendale, Gründerzeit, and others. “National in form, socialist in content” was the official Party slogan for how to produce goods as well as places. The corollary to using traditional aesthetics and building materials was that modernism was unacceptable. At the Third Party Congress of the SED in 1950, a so-called “formalism debate” ended with the denunciation of the Bauhaus legacy and the SED officially declaring that modernism, or “formalism,” was “alien to the people” (*volksfremd*) and even “hostile to the
people” (volksfeindlich), and that the Bauhaus style was international, cosmopolitan, and a weapon of imperialism.\textsuperscript{22} The Stalinallee project was the culmination of this kind of aesthetic, not only in its monumentality, but also in its choice of building materials. The marble, stone, and wood used on the exteriors and interiors of the Stalinallee were meant to have an impressive effect on visitors from East and West Germany and recalled impressive cultural overtones, but they were not cheap, and certainly they were not in any way practically suited for mass reproduction.\textsuperscript{23}

After the events of June 1953, and after Khrushchev’s rise to power a year later and his exhortation in 1956 to build “better, cheaper, and faster,” the Stalinist aesthetic and its proponents were forced to give ground to a number of forces both from the outside but especially from below.\textsuperscript{24} The housing shortage that had existed since the end of the war remained particularly acute in East Germany, as did the general lack of consumer goods. The SED now realized it needed to quickly begin producing both housing and consumer goods in large quantities. The pressure that this economic and political situation put on politicians meant that they had to lift the official ban on modernist design. “Modern” design was born of the desire to unify form and function, and the goods produced by modern designers could more easily be mass-produced, whereas traditional or historicist goods such as Chippendale furniture could not be mass-produced, at least not with the technology available to the GDR at the time. Economic necessity and political pressure thus combined to force the SED to accept modern design in its economic program.

In one instance, in a debate about the future of furniture design at the DBA, some designers clung to the notion that mass production did not preclude the abandonment of historicist aesthetics, claiming that in Western countries renaissance and neo-classical styles were mass-reproduced. Nevertheless the tide inside the DBA had changed, and most designers and architects now realized that for the GDR to begin the mass production of furniture and consumer goods it would have to forgo imitative historicism in favor of functionalist modernism.\textsuperscript{25}

Outside the DBA, ordinary East Germans exerted pressure on the Party to abandon its anti-formalist stance and adopt their version of practical functionalism in design. There are numerous occasions in which the SED had to back off its anti-Bauhaus line because letters to newspapers and the Party from ordinary East Germans demanded pragmatic, modern styles, not outdated, impractical products, and many of these letters demanded modern, sleek, hi-tech, and eminently practical products made from plastic. In 1962, a set of sleek, cylindrical vases designed by Hubert Petras of the Burg School for Art and Design in Halle, an ally of Kelm and Reißmann and others, was denounced as “formalistic” by the official Party organ, Neues Deutschland. In response, the Party had to
register a tide of angry letters sent in by ordinary East Germans defending the vases and functionalist modernism as “exactly what they wanted and needed.” By 1958, Liebknecht was out of power and Gerhard Kosel, former Bauhäusler, was in charge of the DBA, which was helping to produce new block-style housing projects such as the “P2,” which were functionalist, modern solutions to the housing problem. These mass-produced housing units required plastics such as PVC flooring and polyurethane and other plastic construction materials, but more importantly the speed at which they were produced demanded an equally speedy production of consumer goods that could only be achieved with plastic, not real wood or real tile.

Most important, however, is that these modernist designers gained control of the aesthetic discourse in the GDR, and imparted their design philosophies to the myriad plastic products that came to be mass-produced in the GDR. Rather than using plastics to produce a cheap, kitschy imitative historicism, they used plastics under the aegis of the unity of form and function, only using the plastic that fit the functional needs of the product, rather than using plastics in an attempt to cut overhead and increase profits. It was largely because of this that plastics came to be seen in the GDR by the majority of the population as a quality material and a sign of technological progress, not a cheap imitation. This could only have happened with the confluence of a pre-existing desire among the population for pragmatic and modern design and mass-produced consumer goods; the pre-existence of the Bauhaus tradition that had an answer to the population’s demands when the SED did not; and the co-existence of a mass push to chemicals and plastics as a response to a number of factors, mentioned above.

I started my dissertation research with the idea that I would find a government that attempted to gain the support of its citizenry through synthesizing a world of socialist consumption. What I found instead was that the creation of plastics, their aesthetic meaning in everyday life, was a product of centripetal forces drawing from a demand for modern pragmatism from below, the pressure of economic necessity exerted from above, and the pre-existence of certain inherited conditions, such as the Bauhaus and the Chemical Triangle. It became clear to me that a distinctly East German mainstream culture came into existence in which plastics played an integral role, and it was not created simply by the “Herrschaft” or “Erziehung” of a dominant force from above, nor purely in spite of or in defiance of the regime, but rather as a confluence. Thus, plastics everywhere, polyester clothes everywhere, PVC flooring everywhere—but this was not simply taken as another in a long string of insults by the East German populace. Instead one finds a general acceptance and even pride
in the clever use of plastics to make socialism work even when resources were tight.

To end with the question of sources: Because so much of what constitutes a mainstream culture is resistance to Erziehung and Herrschaft, it is no surprise that archival sources, and some archivists, might not be entirely accommodating to a project on plastics in everyday life. Equally so, it is very much the combination of the needs of Herrschaft that illuminate the meaning of everyday things. Thus, a former East German citizen—like the many whom I interviewed regarding their memories of plastic things—who only recalled the omnipresence of plastics in everyday life in the GDR but had gone through the archives, might not understand the relevance of a dissertation on plastics, as many did not. The meaning of plastics as a constituent of the mainstream culture of East Germany subsumes and supersedes both of these positions, and so my ultimate contention is therefore that the reason for describing the centripetal nature of this culture is that it was something viable under its own power, with its own gravity, a product of the population and of the SED and of the larger historical context but not the same as them, with the power to pull top and bottom along with it.

Notes

1 I would like to thank the members of the GHI’s Fritz Stern Prize Committee, Kees Gispen, Doris Bergen, and Edward Ross Dickinson, for granting me this honor. I would also like to thank Christof Mauch, Gerald Feldman, David Lazar, and Richard Wetzell of the GHI, and of course Dr. Stern himself. Most of all my thanks go to those without whose help my dissertation would not have come to fruition: Karin Göhl of the Berlin Program for Advanced German and European Studies, Konrad Jarausch of the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Andreas Ludwig of the Dokumentationszentrum Alltagskultur der DDR Eisenhüttenstadt, and most of all, my dissertation advisor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Rudy Koshar.

2 Corey Ross’s recent The East German Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR (London, 2002) is an excellent discussion of this problem that avoids falling into the top-bottom trap.

3 There are numerous works that might roughly fall into this category, scattered and somewhat discontinuous as they are. Among those that stand out the most is the work of Alf Luedtke, including Alf Luedtke and Peter Becker, eds., Akten, Eingaben, Schaufenster: Die DDR und ihre Texte: Erkundungen zu Herrschaft und Alltag (Berlin, 1997) and Alf Luedtke, ed., The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life, trans. William Templer (Princeton, NJ, 1995). Alf Luedtke’s “Alltagsgeschichte—ein Bericht von unterwegs,” Historische Anthropologie 11–2: 278–295 is also helpful. Andreas Ludwig’s work as the head of the Dokumentationszentrum Alltagskultur der DDR in Eisenhüttenstadt is also highly valuable to this viewpoint; see Andreas Ludwig, ed., Fortschritt, Norm und Eigensinn: Erkundungen im Alltag der DDR (Berlin, 1999), published in conjunction with the exhibition of the same name at the Dokumentationszentrum. The most synthetic and ambitious large work of Alltagsgeschichte in the GDR is Dorotee Wierling’s recent Geboren im Jahr Eins: Der Jahrgang 1949 in der DDR: Versuch einer Kollektobiographie (Berlin, 2002). Also excellent are slice-of-life studies such as Judd Stitsziel’s Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics

4 The idea of a history of the middle in regards to the debates over micro- and macrohistory in GDR historiography, similar to this idea of a third form, has been proposed already by Thomas Lindenberger, one of the foremost cultural historians of the GDR. He has called for a “theory of middle breadth” that encompasses a number of social and cultural praxes and institutions. See Thomas Lindenberger, “Die Diktatur der Grenzen. Zur Einleitung,” in Lindenberger, ed., Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur (Cologne, 1999), 18. Jacques Revel has developed a similar phrase, “jeux d’échelles,” to describe a similar idea of a “history of the middle.” See Revel, Jeux d’échelles: la micro-analyse à l’expérience / textes rassemblés et présentés par Jacques Revel (Paris, 1996) and Histories: French Reconstructions of the Past (New York, 1995).

5 An excellent study of the complex relationship between the SED, East German consumers, and 1953 (as well as other events in the first two decades of East Germany’s existence) is Mark Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany (Cambridge, Mass., 2005). In addition, there are numerous publications that have documented the June 17, 1953 uprising. Among the most comprehensive are Manfred Hagen, DDR—Juni ’53 (Stuttgart, 1992); Volker Koop, Der Juni 1953: Legende und Wirklichkeit (Berlin, 2003); Hubertus Knabe, 17. Juni 1953: Ein deutscher Aufstand (Berlin, 2003); and Christian F. Ostermann, ed., Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Uprising Behind the Iron Curtain (Budapest, 2001).

6 Ina Merkel’s work has come to define the field of East German consumer history, beginning with her Projektleitung of Neue Gesellschaft für Bildende Kunst, ed., Wunderwirtschaft: DDR-Konsumkultur in den 60er Jahren (Cologne, 1996), and including most of all her Utopie und Bedürfnis: Die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR (Cologne, 1999).

7 See Ralf Ahrens, Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe? (Cologne, 2000) for a good overview of the difficulties of the COMECON system.


9 There are not many works on the Chemistry Program in East Germany, and even fewer of these are in English. The most comprehensive work, by the most distinguished expert on the Chemistry Program, Rainer Karlsch of Berlin, is “Das Chemieprogramm der DDR von 1958: Hintergründe, Ziele, Resultate” (Berlin, 1990). It is unfortunately an unpublished manuscript. The best English language source I have found is Raymond Stokes, Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East Germany, 1945–1980 (Baltimore, 2000). A concise version of Stokes’s chapter on the Chemistry Program is Raymond Stokes, “Autarky, Ideology and Technological Lag: The Case of the East German Chemical Industry 1945–1964,” Central European History 26 (1995): 29–45.


12 Stokes, Constructing Socialism, 49. See also Peter Kirchberg, Plaste, Blech und Planwirtschaft: Die Geschichte des Automobilbaus in der DDR (Berlin, 2000).


16 See for example the entry on plastics in Irene Uhmann, ed., Die Frau (Leipzig, 1964), 328.

17 “Sommerfreude durch Plaste,” Mosaij, no. 40 (1960), back cover.

18 An excellent source in English on the Bauhaus in the GDR is Paul Betts, “The Bauhaus in the German Democratic Republic—Between Formalism and Pragmatism,” in Bauhaus, ed. Jeannine Fiedler and Peter Feierabend (Cologne, 1999).

19 An excellent description of the rise of modern design in the GDR is Günther Höhne, Penti, Erika und Bebo Sher: Klassiker des DDR-Designs (Berlin, 2001).


21 Hirdina, Gestalten, 47

22 Hirdina, Gestalten, 43.

23 Joachim Palutzki, Architektur in der DDR (Berlin, 2000), 116.


26 The criticism of Petras’ cylinders was made by Manfred Hagen in the Party organ Neues Deutschland. See Manfred Hagen, “Hinter dem Leben zurück,” Neues Deutschland, 4 October 1962. The guest books of the conference were overwhelmed with support for Petras, with comments such as, “I saw the exhibit of industrial design and liked it. The article from Mr. Hagen is… too subjectively colored. He does not take into consideration enough the requirements of industrial form under socialist conditions.” See Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfeld (Barch-BL) DR 1 (Ministerium für Kultur), “V. Deutsche Kunstausstellung: Vorbereitung, Durchführung” 81, “Bemerkungen zu den Gastbüchern.”
GHI RESEARCH

IN PURSUIT OF “FREEDOM”: AFRICAN-, ANGLO-, AND GERMAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCES IN THE ABOLITION MOVEMENT

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To write the history of slavery and the conditions it generated, and bearing in mind the complex and erratic course of its development, one has to write it as the history of an idea: that of the dispossession of freedom.

—Marc Bloch

Protest Across Color Lines

What happened in northern Virginia on October 18, 1859 was on the surface nothing more than a minor skirmish. Still, the news it generated led to a political earthquake. John Brown, veteran of the clashes between pro- and antislavery forces in Kansas, and eighteen of his followers—thirteen whites and five blacks—had seized the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, from where they hoped to launch an insurrection among the Virginia slave population. But the intervention of U.S. marines under the command of Robert E. Lee put an end to Brown’s plans. Most of his party were either killed or captured. Brown himself, severely wounded and imprisoned, was sentenced to death for treason against the state of Virginia. On December 2, Brown was hanged in Charles Town. The death of the militant abolitionist and the manner in which his execution was discussed by a highly agitated public reflect the inner tensions of a nation on the brink of civil war. To some, Brown was chaos and terror incarnate; others saw in him a martyr for freedom, or, to quote Ralph Waldo Emerson, the one who made “the gallows like the cross.”

Those siding with Emerson gave expression to the sentiment of John Brown as a God-inspired fighter in a series of public gatherings. In virtually every northern city, abolitionists of various degrees came together to honor a man who, in their eyes, had given his life for the cause of ending American slavery. From New England to Missouri, hymns and
prayers resounded through the streets and church bells tolled in commemoration as the abolitionist community mourned for the deceased antislavery warrior. In New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Detroit, African-American men displayed their grief by wearing black armbands. Henry David Thoreau delivered an address at Concord in tribute to John Brown, while William Lloyd Garrison spoke to an antislavery congregation at Boston’s Tremont Temple. Although a pacifist by his own standards, Garrison praised Brown’s determination to act unrelentingly against what he deemed the nation’s gravest sin.

Another John Brown memorial convention took place in Cincinnati’s Over-the-Rhine district on Sunday afternoon, December 4. In its composition, however, the meeting differed from most others of its kind. Over-the-Rhine was home to Cincinnati’s German-Americans. It was a bustling community: Owners of small shops, artisans, craftsmen, apprentices, and ordinary laborers constituted the backbone of a culture that was predominantly working class. Many of these German-born workers were organized in the local Freimänner- and Arbeitervereine, the freethinking and workingmen’s societies that gave public life in this plebeian milieu its distinctively radical features. August Willich, editor of the Cincinnati Republikaner, had announced the previous day that the Arbeiterverein was to hold a memorial meeting for John Brown. At two o’clock, a formidable crowd of both sexes started marching into the hall of the German Institute. However, not all who attended the meeting were German. Roughly a third of those present were black, and a small group of Anglo-Americans completed the picture. This peculiar mix also manifested itself in how the hall was decorated for the occasion: To the rear of the podium, the American flag was dressed in mourning, just as were the portraits of Washington and Jefferson to its left. In front of and a little to the right of the podium, the black-red-golden flag stood unfolded. After the meeting had begun, a delegation of African-Americans entered the hall, exhibiting a red flag and fastening it to the ground alongside the others. Prolonged cheers and salutes followed and did not ebb until the African-American standard-bearers took their seats.

Among the main speakers was Moncure Daniel Conway, the Virginia-born Unitarian minister of Cincinnati’s First Congregational Church. In his address, Conway portrayed Brown as a second Thomas Paine, as the one true heir to the liberal ideas the English-born pamphleteer had disseminated through his writings. Next spoke Peter H. Clark, who was at that time principal of the Western District Colored School. Thanking those who had come to the meeting in solidarity with John Brown, the black abolitionist commended the audience for doing justice to his race; for, by attending, they demonstrated not only their love of freedom but also their willingness to accept and treat people of different color as
equals. Representing the German element, August Willich electrified the
crowd with some words of his own. The leader of the Arbeiterverein
delivered a fiery speech in which he attacked the Democratic Party and its
Southern supporters and told his hearers “to whet their sabers and nerve
their arms for the day when Slavery and Democracy would be crushed in
a common grave.”

Anybody, Willich went on, who refused to stand up
against those who favored the laws of slavery over the principles of
freedom was a traitor to the United States. Adopting a policy of compro-
mise would only result in the kind of injustice and oppression under
which the German people in Europe suffered to this very day. The inter-
racial crowd responded with thundering applause, indicating a unity
Willich later described as “the inner bond of humanity, [which] brought
forth a harmonious melody sung by races and nationalities separated by
nothing but outward appearance.” Willich had found allies, African- and
Anglo-Americans who shared his hatred of slavery and his love of free-
dom.

Slavery’s Forgotten Enemies

Few subject matters in nineteenth-century American history have been
discussed as intensely and conscientiously as the institution of chattel
slavery and the people who fought against it. Ever since the emergence of
academic historiography, scholars have paid extraordinary attention to
abolitionism in particular, as if following the postulate of one of their
colleagues that “the abolitionists, certainly the most important of the
antebellum reformers, should be studied before the others.” Indeed,
scholarly interest in the abolition movement remains high, even though
questions and approaches have changed over time. The result is an aca-
demic edifice to which each generation has added a distinct layer. In the
beginning, American abolitionism was depicted as the work of a few
“great men,” most notably of leading figures such as William Lloyd Garr-
sion, Wendell Phillips, Lewis Tappan, and Gerrit Smith. But this tradition-
ist view, which was chiefly concerned with portraying these pro-
tagonists either as heroes or fanatics, has long been superseded by
broader perspectives. Historiographical trends coming out of the Civil
Rights Movement and beyond have shown that, to tell the “whole story,”
one needs a different understanding of abolitionism than that of a ho-
mogeneous movement headed by an elite of white male Anglo-American
Protestants. According to this view, abolitionism is described more ade-
quately as a conglomerate of diverse subgroups that pursued social and
political objectives of their own but were held together by one common
goal, namely to end slavery.

As historians were widening their scope and readjusting their meth-
odology, they started paying greater attention to abolitionist groups that
had been marginalized by previous generations. The African-American perspective benefited from this historiographical turn, as did those who contended for a stronger recognition of the role of women in the movement. Moreover, new analytical categories such as race, class, and gender helped provide fresh insights into controversial issues related to abolitionism, for example the strategy of non-violence, white paternalism, and biracial cooperation.\textsuperscript{8} Interest in interaction between black and white abolitionists has become especially strong during the last decade. While historians had noted the biracial character of the movement before, most of them had done so in a way that emphasized the differences between the two groups. There was, however, a tendency in the 1990s to stress the ability of black and white abolitionists to work together and challenge the racial status quo of their time.\textsuperscript{9} Also very influential in the context of shifting approaches have been works that explore the impact of early capitalism on changing concepts of family, labor, and slavery.\textsuperscript{10} Still others have devised more sweeping assessments of American abolitionism by placing it in the broader context of contemporary transatlantic exchanges over slavery (mainly those between the United States and Great Britain).\textsuperscript{11} No doubt, the boundaries of research on the abolition movement have been constantly redrawn over the last fifty years. Even so, there is still some redrawing to be done.

Their importance notwithstanding, slavery and abolition are not the only major themes in antebellum history. While the decades prior to the Civil War were an age of controversy over the South’s “peculiar institution,” they were also equally an age of immigration. Between 1840 and 1860, emigration from Europe to the United States rose to unprecedented levels, with more than 4 million people entering the country (compared to the 750,000 from 1820 to 1840).\textsuperscript{12} About a third of the newcomers came from the German states. The Germans thus constituted the second-largest immigrant group, outnumbered only by the Irish. Most left their native country for socioeconomic reasons, some because of their disillusionment with political conditions, and others for private reasons. But, if one looks at these cases through individual rather than collective lenses, it was almost always a combination of these factors that induced migration across the Atlantic.

Carrying with them a myriad of social, political, and cultural experiences and attitudes, the Germans arriving in the New World encountered a society in which the engines of political, economic, and social change were running at full speed. Modern systems of production and transportation provided new means of earning one’s living and making profit. In the west, a vast continent lay open for the incursion of white men, promising a life of self-sufficiency and freedom from governmental constraint. However, the 1850s were also a time of crisis. The acceleration
of commercial and industrial development cut into old social fabrics and raised new questions concerning the relationship between capital and labor, including slave labor. Secession of the slaveholding states from the Union and the specter of civil war loomed large in the debates over the admission of Kansas and Nebraska, the Republican Party, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dred Scott vs. Sanford. The farther the country expanded in search of its “manifest destiny,” the louder the voices of those seemed to grow who wanted to see this destiny fulfilled at home as well. It was during that period that slavery acquired a sociopolitical dimension that made it virtually impossible for any politically conscious person either living in or coming to the United States to remain neutral on the issue. A German immigrant’s response to slavery very much affected their acculturation in the New World and eventually pointed to the kind of America they envisioned for themselves.

Frederick Douglass, the famous black reformer, once declared, “A German has only to be a German to be utterly opposed to slavery. In feeling, as well as in conviction and principle, they are anti-slavery.” One can only speculate whether Douglass was aware that it had been a group of German Mennonites who were the first to issue a public protest against American slavery in 1688; or whether he knew of Charles Follen, the archetypal German-American abolitionist of the early nineteenth century who lived in Boston in the 1830s and stood in close contact to Garrison. Yet, when writing these lines, Douglass had in mind a specific group. He was referring to those Germans who had come to the United States as refugees of the European Revolutions of 1848–1849, as political exiles who, at one point or another, had withdrawn from the struggles of the Old World, some temporarily, some permanently. A number of these “Forty-Eighters,” especially the radicals among them, were quite vigorous in their opposition to slavery. In public speeches and writings, they attacked an institution that, they judged, fundamentally contradicted the founding ideals and democratic promises of the country to which they had immigrated. Of course, there were also large parts of the German-American populace, above all Catholics and traditional Protestants, who did not agree with this kind of opposition to slavery. Discomforted by the missionary fanaticism of the revolutionaries and abolitionists, conservative “Grays” (pre-1848 German immigrants) scolded the “Greens” for their uncompromising aims and methods, which would only cause unnecessary ruptures within a rapidly growing German-America.

The radical Forty-Eighters, however, held on tightly to what they thought was right. Although the Forty-Eighters were a rather heterogeneous group encompassing a wide spectrum of individuals and perspectives, they all shared a predilection for political activism. And as activists who had influenced the course of events in Germany, they continued to
work in their new American environment for the political ideals they
found worth defending. The transplanted revolutionaries were quick to
link old hopes with new challenges. “If the friends of freedom are ready
to do their duty” in the fight against slavery here, Karl Heinzen predicted,
it will be a turning point towards a better future. This moment of history
[...] could be relevant not only for America, but for Europe as well.”16

The areas where the Forty-Eighters left their mark are diverse, rang-
ing from social, cultural, and political life within the German-American
community to the American scene at large. Highly educated and rhetori-
cally versed, they exercised an influence that was greater than their num-
bers suggest. They introduced new social and cultural organizations—the
Turnverein is probably the most prominent example here—and nearly
doubled the output of the German-American press during the 1850s.
Historians have given a fair deal of attention to the Forty-Eighters with
regard to their immigration experiences, settlement policies, sociocul-
tural contributions, and their involvement in German-American and American
politics up to their participation in the Civil War.17 However, scholarship
on the German-American reaction to slavery—the Forty-Eighter reaction
in particular—still lacks depth.18 Most observers simply state a general
sympathy for abolition among the Forty-Eighters without differentiat-
ing further or looking at its practical implications. In view of the German-
Americans’ relative absence from research on the abolition movement,
Kathleen Neils Conzen is definitely right to criticize that American his-
torians have scarcely integrated the German-Americans into their more
comprehensive interpretations.19

There are, though, a few notable exceptions. The most extensive one
is Bruce Levine’s 1992 book The Spirit of 1848, which contains detailed
analyses of different German-American responses to events as various as
the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the presidential elections of 1856 and 1860, and
John Brown’s Raid. Levine convincingly argues that the bulk of the Ger-
amERICAN opposition to slavery came from the Forty-Eighter radical
plebeian milieu and the intellectuals associated with it. What is missing in
the book, however, is the attempt to put this story into a national context,
as Levine rarely broadens his focus beyond German-America. Another
significant contribution was authored by Hartmut Keil. In his 1997 essay
“German Immigrants and African-Americans in Mid-Nineteenth Century
America,” Keil hints at the need to investigate the relationships that
existed between abolitionists of different ethnic origins. This way, a better
understanding of the intercultural exchanges that occurred within the
movement could be gained as well as how these exchanges affected the
daily lives of those taking part in them. Keil’s call for a broader multi-
ethnic perspective was answered to some extent by Maria Diedrich’s
biography of Ottilie Assing, the Jewish-German-American journalist who
befriended Frederick Douglass. In *Love Across Color Lines*, published in 2001, Diedrich tells the story of the unique work-love relationship between two decided opponents of slavery and recounts the interethnic dialogue on slavery and freedom that it engendered. With her book, Diedrich moves the study of abolitionism as a multicultural-international protest movement to a new stage. More importantly, she provides a model for those who wish to learn more about how this multiculturalism altered the perceptions, ideas, and social and political practices of the people who engaged in it.

My dissertation project takes over the baton from social and cultural historians such as Levine, Keil, and Diedrich and carries it deeper into the multiethnic, multicultural world of American abolitionism. Doing so presupposes that this movement is not covered in its entirety if one portrays it as an affair managed exclusively by African- and Anglo-Americans. It also presupposes that certain immigrants—radical German-American Forty-Eighter immigrants in this case—were as much a part of the movement as those native-born men and women who have enjoyed the spotlights of historiography on the subject for so long. These parts evolved not in isolation but through an intense exchange of ideas, practices, customs, and expectations across various social, cultural, and ethnic lines.

Abolitionism, in this sense, was more than just a struggle against slavery in the name of lofty ideas. On a pragmatic-everyday basis, it also functioned as a conduit for intercultural exchange. It gave individuals from diverse backgrounds the opportunity to negotiate their differences in a way that not only enabled them to find political common ground, but also helped them to stake out a place they might consider their “home” in an increasingly conflict-stricken society. My study attempts to advance a new reading of American abolitionism, namely that of a forum in which interethnic cooperation existed and tranethnic alliances were forged, alliances that encompassed culturally diverse concepts of freedom. On another level, it strives to develop a more pluralistic, more multicultural version of American democracy at a time when the nation was moving toward and through civil war. The abolition movement, I argue, owes its significance not just to its radical disagreement with slavery but also to its potential to bring together reformers and revolutionaries of different shades and colors.

From Revolution to Abolition

Dramatic changes swept through almost every segment of the early and mid-nineteenth-century Euro-American world. In many respects, this period is more deserving of R. R. Palmer’s title “The Age of the Democratic Revolution” than the period to which it was originally applied. On both
sides of the Atlantic, late-eighteenth-century programs for individual freedom and social equality were greeted as events inaugurating the march toward universal human emancipation. This Enlightenment optimism expanded well into the next generations: Demographic growth, technical and economic innovations, and political challenges of various kinds caused profound shifts within the societies of Europe and America. Although these developments found different expressions in specific regional and national contexts, they were at the same time closely intertwined across these very contexts. The ties among the revolutionary movements of the day and their precursors were recognized by those directly involved. Participants of the European uprisings of 1830 and 1848 confessed that the great American and French Revolutions served as powerful inspirations. It is for this and other reasons that Atlantic history scholars believe that a fusion of the hitherto separated histories of Europe, Africa, North America, and the Caribbean is required to fully grasp the era’s most important processes of change.

The concept of Atlantic history opens up new vistas for coming to terms with a fundamental paradox of the nineteenth century: ideas in circulation about human equality stood in utter contrast to increasing social inequalities. Appeals to Enlightenment humanism did not close the gap between the richer and poorer classes as a result of the Industrial Revolution. The Déclaration des droits de l’homme did not prevent the atrocities modern nation-states committed against indigenous peoples in their various colonization projects. Nor did the Declaration of Independence function as a moral barrier to the expansion of American slavery. On the other hand, it is equally true that this paradox accounts for many of the dynamics of the age. While it bred disappointment and greater unrest, it was also the source of social and political visions striving to bring the real closer to the ideal. Not a few of them centered on a particular form of democracy, and the struggles they provoked were not so much between different nations than between parties in the Atlantic world that disagreed over the boundaries of democracy or over democracy itself.

Bent on controlling these processes instead of being controlled by them, people resorted to a variety of social and political instruments. But they could hardly do so without facing the alternatives of working inside or outside contemporary institutions. As the two primary modes of active change, reform and revolution often existed side by side in those minds to whom change was synonymous with improvement. National historiographies, attuned to such paradigms as exceptionalism and Sonderweg, usually distinguish between an age of revolution in France and Germany and an age of reform in the United States. Such positions, however, tend to obscure the fact that the self-understanding of American activists was
in many ways no less revolutionary than that of their European relatives. Charles Beard’s and James McPherson’s ex post facto interpretations of the Civil War as a “Second American Revolution” are no isolated incidents. They emerged from comments during and immediately before the eruption of the sectional conflict. From Karl Marx to Wendell Phillips, from James A. Garfield to Jefferson Davis, contemporaries noted the war’s revolutionary qualities. In a similar vein, a veteran of the German Revolution exclaimed that “the spirit of 1848 has once more awakened” when witnessing the formation and parade of the New York Twentieth United Turner Rifles Regiment, which was composed entirely of men from the local Sozialistischer Turnverein.

With these assessments in mind, one can frame an alternative reading of the American 1850s that diverges from the conventional sectionalist model of a dualistic North-South confrontation. The years prior to the Civil War were a pre-revolutionary period in which various revolutionary cultures influenced each other in mutually reinforcing ways across national boundaries. Abolitionism was one of these transnational revolutionary cultures and, in a way, a democratic revolution in its own right. Many abolitionists campaigned for a restructuring of society that would extend the sphere of democracy to hitherto excluded groups, above all to blacks and women. Abolitionism could flourish in America not only because of the country’s internal social and political structures but also because of its openness to “foreign” influences through mass immigration. New modes and strategies of protest and intervention were among the many cultural products with which the German-American radicals enriched the U.S. antislavery movement and, on a larger scale, American democratic culture as a whole. The integration of these products proved at times troublesome, occasionally even impossible. Nonetheless, they added a distinct flavor to American abolitionism, inducing those African- and Anglo-American abolitionists who came to taste it to reconsider, if not reconfigure, their own methods and ideas.

Traditional scholarship has pointed out that radical abolitionism drew much of its interventionist fervor from religious sources. Awakening Protestantism and New England reform culture have been considered as the main stimuli behind the abolition movement ever since Gilbert Barnes’s seminal The Antislavery Impulse, published in 1933. Indeed, one can sense a certain kinship between the conversion rituals taking place at an evangelical camp meeting and the missionary zeal radical abolitionists exhibited while trying to persuade slaveholders to renounce their “sinful” way of life. However, as Robert Fanuzzi underlines in his recent work Abolition’s Public Sphere, abolitionism fed on a secular tradition as well. Compared to the emotional-sentimental thrust of antebellum evangelicalism, this tradition was more rational, more intellectual. It entailed
a commitment to critical discussion, the preference of the disinterested citizen over the acquisitive individual, the quest for the common good over partisan policies: in short, a republican concern for communal morality. This republicanism, according to Fanuzzi, was strongly anachronistic in that it defied the Jacksonian mainstream and its faith in individual self-fulfillment and material progress. In a massive publicity campaign including petitions, pamphlets, newspapers, and rallies, abolitionists used republican symbols of protest and resistance to try to create a revolutionary atmosphere similar to late-eighteenth-century precedents. The main architects of this public sphere were less the preachers and ministers but instead the professional printers who emerged from that urban artisan culture, which resonated deeply with Thomas Paine’s freethinking-rationalist ideas. For men like Garrison or Elijah Lovejoy, the Illinois editor who was shot in 1837 for his critical articles on slavery, the press came to be a much more effective weapon in the fight against the “peculiar institution” than the pulpit.  

While the German societies followed a different path to modernity, they were not excluded from republican influences. At first glance, it seems problematic to look for traces of republicanism in nineteenth-century German states given their “long haul” from feudal foundations to modern nationhood. In spite of unfavorable political-constitutional conditions, however, republican sub- or countercultures, accompanied by processes of party formation, developed in different regions of the German Confederation, especially in the southwest. Republicanism in Germany prior to 1848 had two major strands. The first unfolded on the communal level, where medieval traditions of self-government had been revived in a series of reforms, as in the Prussian Municipal Ordinance of 1808. A second, perhaps more consequential strand was generated by the activities of private associations or societies (Vereine). Serving countless purposes, from recreation to social work and political education, this association culture played a vital role in the formation of critical public spheres. Not only did private associations imbue their members with an egalitarian ethos: The organized interest in common causes also bound together people from different ranks. They also gave them the opportunity to practice democratic procedures of opinion-shaping and decision-making that were not yet available in the realm of state politics.  

This kind of “associational republicanism” became an integral part of German-American political culture as well, including the counterculture of the radical Forty-Eighters. It provided a platform on which different radicalisms, within and beyond German-America, could meet and mingle. This interplay was facilitated by the fact that Anglo-Americans had a vivid associational culture of their own. Alexis de Tocqueville elaborated on this in his classic Democracy in America. In Tocqueville’s
judgment, the desire of individuals to pursue common interests in voluntary associations—such as the abolition of slavery—had developed into a mainstay of American democracy.31

Religion, on the other hand, was a rather delicate issue in the conversation between American and German radicals. Enlightened rationalism in connection with anticlericalism was strong among German-American radicals and in some cases translated into full-fledged atheism. Many German democrats who had immigrated to the United States eyed America’s Protestant culture with great suspicion. Their remarks concerning American religiosity often betrayed feelings of cultural superiority. “I would feel more comfortable here if there were more paintings, better drama, and less religion!” Ottilie Assing wrote to her friend Karl Gutzkow in 1853: “This disgusting garlic smell and the stench of religion permeates all of life.”32 Most churchgoing Anglo- and African-American abolitionists would surely have taken offense if confronted with such points of view. For them, abolition was as much a religious expression as it was a project for secular improvement. Unlike Assing, a convinced atheist, they upheld a version of reform in which efforts toward social and political progress were preconditioned by faith in divine justice.33

As the dispute over religion indicates, there was much that separated African-, Anglo-, and German-American abolitionists from each other. It also confirms that abolitionism was no isolated idea. Rather, the fight against slavery was part of an intricate web of different social, political, and cultural threads. Many of these threads were knit together so tightly that the vibration of one thread was often enough to make the others vibrate as well. Instead of standing out as an independent phenomenon, abolitionism featured as one among many interrelated concerns in different individual and collective systems of ideas, beliefs, and values. These ideologies were always and necessarily included when African-, Anglo-, and German-Americans engaged in discussions about slavery.

Hence, what appears to have been a conversation on a single issue was in fact an intercultural exchange comprising a catalog of concerns. Stereotypes and perceptions of the “other” were no less the subject of negotiation in this exchange than more concrete political interests and everyday social practices. The majority of African-American activists did not view abolition as an end in itself but saw it as a first step toward defeating segregationism and implementing racial equality. The Anglo-American crusade against slavery was in large parts inseparable from prohibitionism and Sabbatarianism, the vision of a morally sound America that rejected human bondage, abhorred drinking, and respected Sunday worship. And a radical German-American Forty-Eighter rarely spoke about abolition outside the context of the labor and free thought movements, the European revolution, or the preservation of certain eth-
nocultural traditions of sociability. All this was taking place in a country whose people were increasingly exposed to the ideologies of racism and nativism. Both sought to ascertain the cultural superiority of white Anglo-Saxon America—against blacks on the one side and non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants on the other.34

History and Freedom

One approach to telling the story of two or more cultures is to focus on distances. Another one is to focus on bridges by which these distances are overcome. This project is a story about bridges, about African-, Anglo-, and German-American men and women united by their will to end slavery on the North American continent. It is a story about specific cases of cultural-ideological interaction between African-, Anglo-, and German-Americans under the roof of abolitionism. It follows the different abolitionists from their points of departure, from their first encounters to the alliances they formed in the struggle against slavery. It strives to give an account of personal relationships and reconstruct in terms of both style and content the opinions that were exchanged and the discussions that were led in these relationships. It also aims to show how and to what extent these private negotiations brought about policies for shaping public opinion, particularly through journalism, associations, meetings, and demonstrations. In short, this is a story about men and women who transcended cultural boundaries while fighting a common enemy.

More than just strategic partnerships, the alliances between African-, Anglo-, and German-American abolitionists were spheres of cultural work. In places ranging from the private household to the antislavery convention, the participants learned about each other’s successes and failures, hopes and disappointments, about each other’s experiences of oppression and expectations for freedom. Stories were shared that extended one’s sense of common cause and permitted strangers to become fellows. Empathy was invited to the degree that it was now possible to imagine oneself as being part of something greater than African-, Anglo-, or German-America. Promoting an alternative vision of America, the alliances turned into seedbeds of a new “imagined community.”

Benedict Anderson originally coined the term “imagined communities” to signify a new way of looking at nations and their geneses. Nations, Anderson argues, owe their cohesiveness not so much to political and legal institutions as to collective imaginations, to shared habits, rites, traditions, myths, memories, and outlooks. By reading the same books and newspapers, distant citizens would consider themselves bound together in “a deep, horizontal comradeship” even though they “would never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of
Anderson’s interpretation notwithstanding, I suggest that the term “imagined communities” can also be used to describe processes of community-formation that go beyond nations in the conventional sense. The emergence of communities among African-, Anglo-, and German-American abolitionists was such a process. Unlike the Andersonian nation, these communities were transnational and were demarcated by time rather than by space. Geographical boundaries played a far less important role in how they defined and limited themselves than historical ones. Eager to give their aspirations direction and a deeper meaning, eager to set them apart from their perceived opposites, the abolitionists turned to the past. This is where the communities become “imagined.” Connecting the different pasts with a shared present became essential to constructing a collective identity.

The narratives the abolitionists resorted to for this purpose were diverse but nonetheless revolved around similar motifs. They condemned oppression, persecution, slavery, and their alleged agents: slaveholders who denied their slaves basic human rights; European monarchs who kept their subjects in political bondage and held them in ignorance about their true potentials; and the U.S. government, which sanctioned the expansion of slavery while branding its opponents enemies of all social and political order. Abolitionists invoked equality, justice, and freedom, values that they deemed to be fully attainable in a world governed by the laws of progress. History, they believed, was moving to some better future, and through their endeavors they wanted to make sure that the far-off condition they were striving for would become reality in a time not so far-off. Free African-Americans, Anglo-American reformers, and German-American veterans of the uprisings of 1848–1849 imagined a universal revolutionary continuum in which the fight against slavery was one among many social projects on the road to secular perfection.

Nowhere does this longing for change become more apparent than in the abolitionists’ use of the term freedom. A catchword of the movement, freedom played a central role in defining what abolition stood both for and against. Eric Foner once argued, “No idea is more fundamental to Americans’ sense of themselves as individuals and as a nation than freedom.” This is particularly true of those Americans who fought against slavery. In looking at how African-, Anglo-, and German-American abolitionists drew on the idea of freedom, I do not claim to give a comprehensive account of the history of American abolitionism. But viewing that history with freedom as the organizing theme allows us to shed light on unfamiliar elements, and to see familiar elements in new ways. Obviously, there was not one single way in which the different groups approached freedom and defined its meaning. Since the readings were diverse, it would make little sense to think of freedom as an unchanging
universal or prefixed category. Instead, I understand freedom as an essentially dynamic and therefore elusive and contested term whose meaning is constantly reshaped in accordance with prevailing discursive conditions. The story of freedom in the abolition movement as I want to tell it is not so much concerned with the emergence of a single definition as with how specific definitions, as well as the interplay of these definitions, prompted specific actions. By reconstructing the debates through which freedom acquired concrete meanings, I intend to uncover the "multiple purposes to which the idea [was] put, and the broader belief systems these usages illuminate." Interpreting freedom in this manner, then, opens a window into the processes of cultural exchange between African-Americans, Anglo-American abolitionists, and radical German-American revolutionaries.

Rather than moving on an abstract ideological level, I focus on the concrete language the abolitionists employed in making their case for freedom. Evidence of this language can be found in private manuscripts and letters as well as in newspaper articles, pamphlets, speeches, and other printed sources. While I assume that those partaking in the abolition movement were using the same political vocabulary, I also assume that this vocabulary carried different connotations for antislavery activists from different ethnocultural backgrounds. What did slavery, oppression, persecution, and, above all, freedom mean to a fugitive slave living in one of the free African-American communities in the North; what to a veteran of the German uprisings of 1848–1849 who had relocated to the United States; what to an Anglo-American reformer working in one of the many American antislavery societies of the Civil War era? Even though there might have been deviating interpretations and political objectives, did they not fade before the common goal of ending slavery? Not only did the alliances constitute themselves on the basis of a shared political vocabulary; this shared vocabulary also mitigated ideological discrepancies among the participants.

When mediating across ethnocultural lines, the abolitionists helped to articulate a transethnic, transnational imagined community. They were intellectuals who combined social criticism with community-building. In negotiating how to unite forces against slavery, they provided the cultural and imaginary products for a broader consciousness of belonging together. They shaped collective memories, interpreted traditions, explained the present, and discarded that which went against their communal visions. The democratic culture these intellectuals nurtured resembled that of a deliberative democracy. An offshoot of Jürgen Habermas’s political theory, deliberative democracy stresses the value of public discourse and rational forms of decision-making. It postulates that the essence of democracy does not rest in governmental institu-
tions—parliaments, courts, elected leaders—but in citizens debating and evaluating all kinds of approaches to a specific policy issue. Although it was originally designed as a normative model, I suggest that deliberative democracy also works as a methodological tool for historians.

The abolitionist intellectuals I deal with in this project established networks, small-scale deliberative democracies, in which they opened up channels of critical exchange and deliberated about their common affairs. Opposition to slavery was one, if not the constituting element of these networks. But it was equally a point of departure for men and women who discovered that, with regard to their egalitarian visions, they were only part of a greater concert. In this sense, conversations about slavery and abolition between the three subgroups I have outlined were at the same time conversations about the chances and limits of democracy in an international, multicultural setting. So as these three groups, African-American intellectuals, Anglo-American abolitionists, and German-American Forty-Eighter revolutionaries, were pursuing “freedom,” each according to their own political and cultural understanding, they learned how and to what extent their definitions of freedom and democracy diverged from each other. They added another dimension that is still fairly unknown to Abraham Lincoln’s famous observation that liberty had become a universal slogan; “But in using the same word,” he went on, “we do not all mean the same thing.”

Notes

1 William H. Gilman et al., eds., The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, XIV (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 333. Emerson apparently borrowed this phrase from Mattie Griffith, a Southern abolitionist who manumitted all her slaves.


3 The following account is based on reports in the December 6, 1859 editions of the Cincinnati Daily Enquirer and the Cincinnati Volksfreund, and on the December 2, 3, and 5, 1859 editions of the Cincinnati Republikaner. See also Bruce Levine, The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the Coming of the Civil War (Chicago, 1992), 223.

4 Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, 6 December, 1859.

5 Cincinnati Republikaner, 5 December, 1859: “Es war vielleicht zum ersten male, dass sich dieselbe Grund-idee, dasselbe Gefühl, mit einem Worte, dass innere geistige Band der Menschheit, zu einem so schönen harmonischen Einklang aus den in der Form verschiedenen Nationalitäten und Rassen bildete.”

6 C.S. Griffin, The Ferment of Reform, 1830–1860 (Wheeling, 1967), 94. Everyone dealing with abolitionism faces the problem of how to define the term. In many cases, historians do not adequately differentiate between those who were abolitionists in a strict sense and those who merely wanted to prevent the expansion of slavery. As Larry Gara shows in his perceptive article “Who Was an Abolitionist?” in The Antislavery Vanguard, ed. Martin Duberman (Princeton, 1965), 32–52, even contemporaries could not agree on who was an
abolitionist and who was not. Here the term “abolitionist” is applied to somebody who, either as a gradualist or immediatist, made the abolition of slavery an integral part of his or her moral and/or political agenda.


11 See, for instance, Marcus Cunliffe, Chattel Slavery and Wage Slavery: The Anglo-American Context, 1830–1860 (Athens, 1979), and a more recent work by Alan J. Rice and Martin Crawford, eds., Liberating Sojourns: Frederick Douglass and Transatlantic Reform (Athens, 1999).

12 According to official statistics, the number of immigrants coming to America in the 1840s and 1850s amounted to almost 30 percent of the nation’s free population in 1840. Proportionally this influx of immigrants was the largest in the history of the United States. See also Levine, Spirit of 1848, 2. For more detailed figures see Theodore Hamerow, “The Two Worlds of the Forty-Eighters,” in The German Forty-Eighters in the United States, ed. Charlotte Brancaforte (New York et al., 1989), 20–22.

14 Frederick Douglass, “Adopted Citizens and Slavery,” Douglass’ Monthly (August 1859). In the same text, Douglass praised the “many noble and high-minded men, most of whom, swept over by the tide of the revolution of 1848, have become our active allies against oppression and prejudice.” According to rough estimates, some 3,000 to 5,000 political refugees crossed the Atlantic in the late 1840s and 1850s; see also A. E. Zucker, ed., The Forty-Eighters: Political Refugees of the German Revolution of 1848 (New York, 1950), 269.

15 That Enlightenment traditions revived in the European revolutions of the late 1840s may account for the sympathy for abolitionism in certain segments of the German immigrant population was reaffirmed by Hartmut Keil, “German Immigrants and African-Americans in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America,” in Enemy Images in American History, ed. Ursula Lehmkuhl and Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase (Providence, 1997), 137–57.

16 Karl Heinzen, “Republik und Sklaverei” (Pionier, January 6, 1856), in Teutscher Radikalismus in Amerika, ed. Karl Heinzen, IV (Boston, 1879), 139.


18 More recent biographies of prominent mid-nineteenth-century German expatriates contain sporadic, while relatively isolated, information on their hostility to slavery: e.g. Sabine Freitag, Friedrich Hecker: Biographie eines Republikäners (Stuttgart, 1998); Justin Davis Randers-Pehrson, Adolf Douai, 1819–1888: The Turbulent Life of a German Forty-Eighter in the Homeland and in the United States (New York, 2000); Axel W.-O. Schmidt, Der rothe Doktor von Chicago—ein deutsch-amerikanisches Auswandererschicksal: Biographie des Dr. Ernst Schmidt, 1830–1900 (Frankfurt am Main, 2003); Ansgar Reiß, Radikalismus und Exil: Gustav Struve und die Demokratie in Deutschland und Amerika (Stuttgart, 2004).


23 Good and very recent introductions to the discipline of Atlantic history are Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), and the preface to Hermann Wellenreuther et al., eds., Niedergang und Aufstieg: Geschichte Nordamerikas vom Beginn der Besiedlung bis zum Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts (Münster, 2001). Wellenreuther defines Atlantic history basically as a “history of the transfer of peoples, goods, information, and ideas between the Old and the New World.”

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A similar argument was made by Ira Berlin in his “Comments on Jürgen Osterhammel’s ‘In Search of a Nineteenth Century,’” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute, Washington DC 32 (2003), 32.


Foner, Story, 5.

Migration, Citizenship, and Polish Integration in the Ruhr Valley and Northeastern Pennsylvania, 1870–1924

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Introduction

My current research examines Polish migrant communities in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania in order to explain why distinctive patterns of ethnic minority inclusion and exclusion emerged in Germany and the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between 1870 and 1914, approximately 300,000 Poles migrated to the Ruhr and 160,000 settled in northeastern Pennsylvania, attracted by employment opportunities in the booming coal industries of each region. Initially, the social origins, outlook, employment patterns and organization of Poles in both regions were quite similar. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the development of each Polish community began to diverge in reaction to experiences within the political, economic, and cultural environments of their host societies. After World War I, this divergence was reflected by dramatically different integration trajectories. In northeastern Pennsylvania, the vast majority of Poles opted by the mid-1920s to accommodate themselves to American society, though full assimilation would remain a generation away. In contrast, two-thirds of the Polish community in the Ruhr chose to emigrate to France or return to Poland. Meanwhile, the third of the community that remained subsequently integrated into Ruhr society at a comparatively faster rate than the Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania.

By exploring why these differing adaptation patterns emerged, I want to investigate the role of the state, the marketplace, and civil society in defining identities of citizenship and belonging as well as the efforts of excluded actors to redefine the parameters of inclusion over time. Examining Polish migrant communities in both Germany and the United States is particularly useful for this task. Poles were one of the first ethnic groups whose migration occurred within the context of a rising global economy, the solidification of the democratic nation-state, and the emergence of modern mass cultures. Polish adaptation experiences foreshadowed the struggles of many present-day migrant groups in both Germany and the United States and can offer important insights into...
contemporary debates over immigration and the dynamics of citizenship within both societies. In this essay, I first wish to briefly address key issues as they pertain to citizenship in Germany and the United States, providing the reader a guide to where I situate my work. I then discuss in depth the broader outlines and conclusions of my ongoing examination of Polish communities in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania. Finally, I end with a discussion of the insights that the Polish migrant experience can give regarding issues of immigration and integration in contemporary European and American society.

Exploring Issues of Citizenship in Germany and the United States

T. H. Marshall, the proverbial grandfather of citizenship studies, provides a useful starting point for discussing issues of citizenship in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania. Marshall defined citizenship as “a status that is bestowed on those who are full members of the community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.” The “rights” of citizenship included a trinity of civil, political and social protections. Civil rights were defined as guarantees of liberty provided most generally by the courts, including the right to free assembly. Political rights encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power, i.e. to vote and to be represented in a democratic assembly. As we can see, these civil and political rights are intimately tied to the state. Social rights, however, were more broadly conceived and included those rights necessary to live as a “civilized being,” such as the right to education, a degree of economic welfare, and security derived from inclusion within a shared cultural community.¹ Reinhard Bendix has written in a similar vein.²

By explicitly emphasizing the community, as opposed to just the state, scholars such as Marshall and Bendix encourage us to conceive of citizenship in broad terms, including types of citizenship grounded not only in national, but also local, industrial, gendered, and transnational communities.³ As more recent scholarship has highlighted, however, we must also remember that citizenship is as much about exclusion as inclusion. Each redefinition of citizenship rights brings with it new duties and expectations; identities of citizenship become more, not less bounded. This leads, in turn, to the creation of a “citizenship continuum” of full, partial, and non-citizens.⁴ Altogether, the process of becoming “full,” or at least fuller, citizens involves a complex re-negotiation of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion as well as a balance between group and individual rights.⁵

In considering specific issues of citizenship in Germany and the
United States, I find that dominant interpretations viewing German society as fundamentally “differentialist” and American society as “assimilationist” are inadequate in accounting for the experiences of Poles in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania. By far the most influential book framing discussions of citizenship in Europe and the United States during the past decade remains Rogers Brubaker’s *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Taken as a whole, Brubaker’s penetrating and insightful analysis is significant, helping us understand how formulations of modern citizenship law were influenced by historic self-understandings of the nation (e.g., civic vs. ethno-cultural) that became crystallized under the increasing pressure of nationalism and immigration in the late nineteenth century. However, I also find that there are drawbacks to his study. Most notably, Brubaker’s focus on legal statutes and state administrative attitudes toward immigration neglects the diverse ways immigrants actually became social citizens in the communities in which they lived. As Yasemin Soysal observed in her analysis of post-1945 immigrants, exclusionary citizenship laws do not necessarily preclude immigrants from attaining a level of social integration in their host society. This is a point borne out, albeit in a different context, by my research.6

Specifically, taking a snapshot of the position of Poles in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania in 1914, one would see that Ruhr Poles, who as Prussian subjects always possessed German citizenship, enjoyed significantly more civil, political, and economic rights than the still often un-naturalized Polish immigrants of the northeastern Pennsylvanian region. Yet, integration nevertheless proved more extensive in Pennsylvania over the long term, a development that highlights the need to move beyond systems of citizenship analysis grounded exclusively in the relationship of the individual or group to the state. Clearly the state matters since it most often helps define the parameters of citizenship by enacting and enforcing laws regarding civil and voting rights, economic liberties and, since the rise of the welfare state, levels of social entitlements. However, it is necessary to remember that citizenship can and does take many forms, both in the past and today. Ultimately, I find that Polish integration in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania was dependent, first and foremost, on the ability of Poles to become part of the cultural community and attain the status of social citizens within their host societies.

**Migration and Integration in the Ruhr and Northeastern Pennsylvania**

In struggling to become full citizens within their host societies, the challenges Poles faced were severe. Cast as an internal “other,” Poles were a
personified filter through which German and American national identities became further refined in an imperial, post-(re)unification age and, as a consequence, Poles experienced significant levels of ethnic discrimination and hostility due to their growing presence. Within the workplace, a culturally split labor market developed in which German and American workers sought to defend a privileged position in the mining complex by propagating racially framed identities contrasting the professional, skilled “Teutonic” and “Anglo-Saxon” worker with the physically strong but mentally weak “Pollack” or “Slav.” In broader society, attitudes toward Poles were often worse. By the 1890s, the Catholic Church in both the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania was confronted with a rapidly growing, populist Polish Catholicism that threatened both its hierarchical authority and the recent gains made by the Church in proving itself to be a loyal institution within German and American Protestant society. As a consequence, both hierarchies sought to restrict Polish spiritual activity, limiting the availability of Polish priests, Polish-language church services, and in the United States the formation of ethnic parishes, in a misguided attempt to bring Poles to heel. In an age of expanding mass media, Polish migrants were portrayed in popular literature as a “wild” race, a dormant army ready to rise up in violence, while academic studies “scientifically” showed how Poles threatened to retard the superior advances and progress of German and American civilization.

Meanwhile, local, regional, and national officials in both Germany and the United States, facing mounting public pressure to find a solution to the “Polish question,” focused on developing measures designed, if not in intent then in practice, to exclude Poles from the national community. In the Ruhr, government officials sought to suppress what was considered an irredentist Polish nationalism and compel the assimilation of Poles into German society by tailoring many anti-Polish policies already in force in the Prussian East to local conditions, willfully neglectful of the fact that those same policies were at least partially responsible for bringing Poles into the western German heartland in the first place. From the 1890s onwards, Poles were subject to growing restrictions on their right of association and assembly as well as their use of the Polish language in public and in religious instruction. Polish activities were closely observed and catalogued by the police.

In northeastern Pennsylvania, direct intervention in the day-to-day affairs of Poles was much less severe. Nevertheless, government actions and rhetoric toward Poles could often be more exclusionary in aim. Beginning in the late 1890s, administrative measures were passed on the local level that made it increasingly difficult for Poles to obtain citizenship. Even more threatening were the various government studies, culminating in the 1911 United States Senate Immigration Commission re-
ports, that drew sharp contrasts between the moral and racial qualities of “old” (e.g. Northwestern European) versus “new” (e.g. Eastern and Southern European) immigrants. With specific reference to northeastern Pennsylvania, the Commission found that the arrival of Poles and their interaction with the “native element” caused a laundry list of “evil effects...of a social and moral character,” including “a lowering of the average intelligence, restraint, sensitivity, orderliness, and efficiency of the community.” Altogether, such state-sponsored examinations legitimized popular beliefs that Poles were inferior and gave direct impetus to immigration restriction efforts that later culminated in the passage of the National Origins Act of 1924.

Despite such overt hostility, Poles persevered in their adopted societies and ultimately thrived during the pre-World War I period. In order to overcome discrimination and isolation, challenge their subordinate position in the social hierarchy, and make themselves subjects of their own history, Poles initially turned inward and focused on building their collective ethnic strength. Over a period of five decades, Poles established vibrant cultural communities, sustained by familial and extended kinship networks, Catholicism and the local parish, and a diverse array of informal and formal Polish institutions. The self-actualization derived through participation in ethnic life went far in forging a common ethno-national identity among diverse groups of Poles who prior to migrating possessed largely local or at best regional identities. At the same time, the Polish communities in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania were never closed subcultures or “parallel societies.” On the contrary, the increased ethnic awareness that occurred as a result of participation in Polish community life and institutions actually aided the adaptation process by providing needed stability and, more importantly, the means for Poles to become actors on the public stage. This is especially true from the 1890s onwards.

In the workplace, Poles informally organized themselves during the 1890s to assert their rights, both as ethnics and as workers. These actions culminated in the 1897 Lattimer and 1899 Herne strikes, when thousands of ethnic Poles engaged in large-scale work stoppages to protest intolerable workplace conditions and native discrimination. Although these two strikes ended in failure, the experiences gained by such labor protests would later propel Poles to organize into formal trade unions such as the United Mine Workers of America (UMW) in northeastern Pennsylvania and the Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie (ZZP) in the Ruhr. After the turn of the century, these institutions enabled Poles to successfully begin to readdress the economic and cultural disparities under which they labored and, more importantly in terms of integration, acquire a strong and influential voice in working-class affairs. Similarly, within the confes-
sional sphere, Poles rallied their ethnic communities from the early 1890s on to protest assaults on their religious practices and traditions. Through such mobilization, Poles ultimately gained greater acceptance within the wider Catholic community. This can be seen in the Ruhr, where Poles were able to begin obtaining equal representation on many church councils and executive boards between 1904 and 1912, as well as in northeastern Pennsylvania, where the number of Polish ethnic parishes rapidly increased after 1900, from thirteen to forty-one.¹⁴

Perhaps the most notable example of ethnic mobilization as a means to integration occurred with the growth of Polish ethnic associations. The extent of Polish associational activity in both regions was impressive. For example, in the Ruhr there were over 1,000 Polish associations, or one for every 300 Poles. The types of associations ranged from apolitical rosary societies, choral groups, football and hunting clubs, and the ubiquitous Taubenvereine (pigeon-keeping associations) to politically active voting associations, socialist societies, and nationalistic, paramilitary Sokol (Falcon) organizations. In northeastern Pennsylvania the types and rates of organization were similar.¹⁵ Although Polish associations were, by and large, ethnically exclusive, and in this respect did promote a degree of separation, they usually modeled themselves after existing native institutions—the Sokols, for example, were modeled after the German Turner (gymnastic) movements—and through their activities taught Poles invaluable lessons in the organizational practices and democratic customs of their host societies. Moreover, as the associational movement matured, it grew increasingly diverse, secular, and politically active on a wide range of issues. While preserving ethnicity remained a constant goal of such associations, regardless of political orientation, many simultaneously advanced other interests based on class, confession, and gender, thereby loosening over time the exclusive grip of the ethnic group over the individual.

Taken together, I find that the experience of migration, living in the culturally diverse milieus of the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania, and mobilizing large numbers of their community significantly broadened Polish outlook. By the eve of World War I, Poles in both regions possessed identities that were highly pluralistic and transnational in character, influenced by homeland and host societies, yet also distinct from both.¹⁶ Moreover, the formation of such identities was important for aiding the process of Polish integration because they enabled Poles in both regions to establish significant points of contact with natives while simultaneously preserving and enhancing ethnic awareness. Nevertheless, transnational identities could only advance integration as long as they did not conflict with the demands of citizenship within their host societies.
Prior to 1914, this was less of an issue. German and American political culture, for all of their many flaws in this period, nevertheless allowed Polish migrants in both the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania to carve out an independent, transnational social space within which Poles could maintain close links to their homeland and assert their national identity while simultaneously participating in the public life of their host societies. After World War I, however, political conditions in both countries changed dramatically. Between 1918 and 1924, Poles were confronted with a significantly more intense, integral German and American nationalism that transcended social class. This was driven by the war, its aftermath, and the growing hysteria over potential internal enemies. In this atmosphere, anything less than conformity and the embrace of a clear national identity was suspect. Maintaining a transnational identity was no longer feasible. Poles had to choose whether they were German, American, or Polish.

Comparatively, the Polish position in northeastern Pennsylvania was far more stable after World War I than in the Ruhr given Germany’s wartime defeat, the weakness of the Weimar social order, and the radicalization of politics on the left and the right within German society. Confronted with the need to decide whether to retain German citizenship or opt for Polish, a majority of Poles in the Ruhr chose the latter and decided to leave by 1924, returning to Poland or migrating to France. The 100,000-strong ethnic Polish community that remained was, in subsequent years, largely unable to maintain ethnic cohesion and steadily dissolved into German society. By contrast, the vast majority of Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania decided to remain. Nevertheless, they too faced significant challenges during the interwar period. With victory against an external enemy secured, American society looked inward to fight perceived threats from labor radicals, Bolsheviks, and immigrants at home. Groups and individuals with origins in Eastern Europe, including Poles, were viewed with particular suspicion. Within this reactionary atmosphere, Poles needed to become Polish-Americans in order to participate in larger society. Though able to preserve ethnic culture to a much greater extent than their counterparts in the Ruhr, which as a consequence delayed full integration until after World War II, Poles increasingly expressed their ethnicity through a new language of “100 percent Americanism.”

On the whole, the differing adaptation patterns after World War I highlight how integration levels were ultimately dependent upon Poles becoming fuller citizens within their host societies over the long term. If we recall Marshall, citizenship encompasses a trinity of political, civic, and social rights. Comparatively, Poles in the Ruhr, as Prussian citizens, possessed more political and civil rights than their counterparts in north-
eastern Pennsylvania, who only slowly naturalized and became legal citizens. When it came to social rights, however, which I define to include not only economic protections, but also even more importantly those broader cultural rights necessary to live as a civilized and equal human being, the reverse was true. Specifically, while Poles in the Ruhr had better access to state-sponsored welfare and educational opportunities, they did not enjoy the same degree of security derived from inclusion within a shared cultural community as Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania. This was because of underlying, interconnected structural differences between the two regions in the organization of industry and markets, the role of the state in economic and cultural affairs, and the relative strength of civil society in the pre-World War I period. These disparities later manifested themselves under the burden of wartime and postwar dislocation.

To elaborate, I find that in order to build a shared cultural community, one in which Polish migrants could maintain ethnic culture while embracing a larger sense of membership in the host society in which they lived, Poles needed to become active participants in the public sphere. Often, this meant having the ability to engage in social conflicts within the bounds of civil society as Poles, workers, Catholics, or men and women. Through such conflicts, Poles could come into direct contact with native members of local society, thereby fostering what Jürgen Habermas once described as a “self-transformation” in outlook. Over time, the “exchange with the other” produced by conflict could gradually help to politically integrate Poles as citizens into the communities in which they lived. In both regions, specific conflicts emerged within the workplace and larger society, such as labor strikes, battles for ethnic rights within the Catholic Church, or struggles over ethnic associations, all of which supported the process of Polish integration. At the same time, in northeastern Pennsylvania there were fewer structural constraints placed on Polish participation as public figures in civil society than in the Ruhr. As a result, more extensive integration patterns evolved in northeastern Pennsylvania over the long term.

This development can be seen in the workplace, where differences in industrial organization as well as the actions of the state in the Ruhr placed greater limits on the intensity of social conflict and subsequent integration levels. In the Ruhr, longstanding corporatist traditions that were grounded in German culture and emphasized the mutual obligations between employers and employees constrained the level of labor conflict. The Ruhr miners’ Knappschaft pension fund, the existence of a more conciliatory Christian Gewerkverein trade union as a counterbalance to the socialist Alter Verband, and the “status” that the occupation of miner traditionally held in the Ruhr, all bear witness to this corporatist
Reinforcing these traditions was the marketplace. As can be seen by workplace statistics for the period between 1903 and 1914, the cost of labor in the Ruhr was high; approximately 58 percent of every ton of coal sold at market in the Ruhr went to cover labor costs. Because extracted coal was used both for industry and domestic purposes, there was a year-round demand for workers. Together, these factors encouraged employers to provide mine workers with comparatively high levels of employer-sponsored welfare, such as company housing, work facilities, and other benefits in lieu of better wages. The lower wages together with the various welfare measures had the added benefit of giving employers greater coercive control over their workforce, thereby serving to inhibit the outbreak of labor conflicts.

By contrast, in northeastern Pennsylvania, there were no longstanding corporatist traditions influencing the organization of the work environment. Instead, the main regulator was the marketplace. Within this arena, the cost of labor relative to the market price of coal was significantly lower than the Ruhr, approximately 25 percent of every ton of coal sold. Further, coal production was geared to satisfying the demands of a highly seasonal (September to March) domestic home-heating market, meaning that coal miners often worked on average 209 days a year, compared to 310 in the Ruhr. Nevertheless, when miners in northeastern Pennsylvania worked, they produced nearly three times more coal on an average day than their counterparts in the Ruhr. Combining such factors resulted in comparatively high wages being paid to Pennsylvania workers, though workplace safety standards were lower given the more intense work regime, and there were noticeably fewer employer-sponsored welfare benefits and less job security. Within such an environment, labor relations were more volatile, workers militant, and strikes violent and lengthy. Whereas in the Ruhr, the 1905 strike, the longest in the pre-World War I period, lasted less than a month, in northeastern Pennsylvania two large-scale work stoppages occurred in 1900 and 1902 that lasted one and a half and six months, respectively. Altogether, for Polish workers in northeastern Pennsylvania, the experience of engaging in multi-month struggles with workers of other backgrounds and ethnicities went far in forging a common class identity that could promote integration. While inter-ethnic solidarities also coalesced due to strikes in the Ruhr, their limited intensity and duration resulted in bonds that were less substantial by comparison.

Within larger society, differences in the role assumed by the state in directing minority policy also had an important influence on the extent to which Poles could become full actors in their local communities. Responding to public pressure emanating from within middle class society, state officials in the Ruhr took a leading role in dealing with the Polish
question. However, the heavy-handedness of the Germanization policies, while ostensibly designed to accelerate the melting of the Polish minority into the majority, produced an ethnic backlash as Poles engaged in an intense conflict with the government to protect their rights as citizens. Although this conflict was important for making Poles more active participants in society, the fact that it occurred directly with the state also had certain negative implications in terms of integration trajectories. First, Poles found it increasingly difficult to conceive of themselves as Prussians of Polish descent, thereby strengthening the hand of the strongly nationalist, non-integrationist element within the Polish community. Second, to preserve ethnic rights, Poles were increasingly reliant upon the Prussian courts. While the courts often sided with Poles to the dismay of many state officials, a dependency existed that left the community in a more precarious position should the political environment change, such as occurred after World War I. Third, since Poles spent a significant amount of time fighting the state bureaucracy, there was less effort from within the Polish community to confront and attempt to change anti-Polish attitudes originating from within German middle-class society.

By contrast, in northeastern Pennsylvania, the government at various levels rarely interfered in the daily activities of Poles. Despite growing restrictionist sentiment within government circles, the state stood more in the background as issues of Americanization and immigration reform were debated within middle-class society. This enabled Poles to be able to better identify themselves with government institutions and imagine that they could be both loyal Poles and Americans. Further, Poles responded to the efforts designed to either Americanize or exclude them from society altogether by directly challenging middle-class conceptions of the “Pole.” For example, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Polish ethnic associations undertook a lively public campaign designed to educate society about Polish contributions to American democracy. Such direct Polish participation in the public debate about immigration helped to promote splits in middle-class opinion. A strong and vocal faction developed within the middle-class Progressive movement that advocated greater efforts to reach common ground with the immigrant Polish population. Although this outreach, organized through institutions such as the YMCA, could often be contemptuous of ethnic culture, it was nevertheless important in promoting better mutual understanding between Poles and natives in northeastern Pennsylvania, a step that was never undertaken in the Ruhr. Moreover, the direct contact with native society further expanded Polish outlook, thereby weakening the exclusive hold of ethnicity over the individual.

In addition to the differing role of the state vis-à-vis migrant minorities, there were also clear economic disparities in levels of social welfare,
taxation, and property ownership that influenced integration outcomes. Perhaps most notably, by the eve of World War I, at least 13 percent of Poles owned their own homes in northeastern Pennsylvania, while in the Ruhr less than 2 percent did. The reasons for this vary. In the Ruhr, Poles often had the benefit of company housing. Meanwhile, in northeastern Pennsylvania, the lack of company housing, the comparatively inexpensive land values, and the lower tax rates combined to spur Poles to acquire property. Similarly, the number of Poles who owned small businesses, most often saloons, was generally higher in northeastern Pennsylvania than in the Ruhr. Furthermore, all Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania held in common another type of property, namely the local parish. Unlike in the Ruhr, where Polish Catholics joined existing German territorial parishes, Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania had the right to form their own ethnic parishes, often with ethnic elementary schools attached. The richly endowed, majestic churches that arose represented a sizable investment by Poles in their local community and were in many ways a declaration of their intention to stay in the region. By acquiring property and building visible, public monuments such as churches, Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania were also conforming to a typically American pattern of settlement that contributed over time to making Poles appear less foreign in the eyes of natives.

**Immigration Past, Present, and Future?**

Exploring why Polish integration patterns differed during the pre-World War I and immediate postwar era is useful for yielding insight into contemporary immigration issues. Although exact comparisons between the past and present can never be drawn, I believe that Polish experiences in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania can offer important insights into what factors may aid or hinder minority integration into contemporary European and American society. Specifically, I first find that integration should not be viewed as an end in itself, but as a drawn-out process, involving a complex series of cultural and economic negotiations between migrants and their host societies. In this process, migrants must become similar in some, though not all, respects to a reference community that itself is constantly changing under the influence of immigration.

Such a definition of integration is not without controversy. In Germany, as in many other continental European states, a decades-long self-identity as a non-immigration country has encouraged the view that integration is synonymous with outright assimilation into a core national culture or *Leitkultur*. Correspondingly, the granting of full political and economic rights through naturalization represents the logical end to this integration process. While a counter-discourse emphasizing a more plu-
ralistic understanding of “Germanness” exists, enabling citizenship reforms such as those undertaken in 1999, the sense that cultural assimilation is a necessary precursor to political and economic integration remains strong. Meanwhile, within contemporary American and British society, the opposing view that political and economic integration, achieved through more liberal citizenship regimes and less-regulated markets, eventually will lead to cultural integration into an increasingly multi-cultural society is being fundamentally challenged in the wake of September 11 and the more recent London bombings. Nevertheless, my research supports the idea that integration is a process involving multi-layered cultural and socio-economic negotiations between immigrants and their receiving societies in which successful cultural adaptation flows from the ability of immigrants to gain political and economic rights in a timely and transparent manner.

Second, in attempting to move the integration process forward, the state must embrace a cautious, limited, and judicious approach to minority integration policy and recognize that integration, as the historian Klaus Bade once remarked, cannot be “regulated like street traffic.” Policies adopted to actively promote cultural integration, either negatively by restricting ethnic cultural rights or positively by granting immigrant groups wide-reaching autonomy, often accomplish the opposite of their stated intention, leading to the establishment of hierarchies of privileged and disadvantaged minorities as well as resentment among the native population. Moreover, the state must be willing to tolerate a degree of social conflict within the bounds of civil society, since this exchange ultimately helps to break down mental barriers separating ethnic and social classes.

This is not to say that the state should abrogate its responsibilities in the matter of immigrant integration altogether. Obviously, the state needs to set certain guidelines with regard to expectations that immigrants adhere to certain fundamental Western values such as respect for democratic practices and, in our present age, the rights of women. Moreover, the state must foster a sufficiently secure environment within which integration can happen. The post-World War I situation of Poles in the Ruhr provides an excellent example of what occurs when a government refuses to fulfill its obligations to protect minority rights against the tyranny of the majority. Overall, I find that governments on both sides of the Atlantic can aid the integration process significantly by striving to act as a good-faith regulator ensuring that the proper social environment exists through which migrants can succeed on their own. The reality is that in the foreseeable future, there will be continued high levels of immigration from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, be it legal or illegal, due to the simple fact that populations in Western countries are
aging while the demand for labor is increasing. As a consequence, governments should focus on ensuring that once immigrants arrive, they have sufficient opportunity to eventually become economic stakeholders in their adopted society through such things as home ownership, small business development, and other types of financial investment. While a secure economic base does not ensure integration, it certainly makes it more likely.

Finally, my research stresses that in order for integration to occur, it is necessary for migrants to be politically active participants within the public sphere of their adopted societies. The experiences of Poles in northeastern Pennsylvania, and to a lesser extent the Ruhr, show that the ability of migrants to cross ethnic divides, engage in social conflicts, and make contacts with natives was vital for broadening Polish identities and promoting social integration on their own terms. Unfortunately, present-day levels of communication between migrants and natives in many Western countries are weak and the difficulties in overcoming cultural barriers seemingly insurmountable. The recent outbreak of violence in France provides just one of the more unfortunate examples of how incomplete migrant integration, especially those from the second and third generation, remains. Ultimately, in order to begin to bridge the cultural chasm separating present-day immigrants from their host societies, I find that there must be an increase in volunteeristic, grass-roots activities within the bounds of civil society on both sides of the ethnic divide. Only by building a shared cultural community can immigrants begin to feel that they can become full citizens in the societies in which they live.

Notes

3 This is a point also advanced by gender scholars in considering issues of citizenship. See, for example, Nira Yuval-Davis, “Women, Citizenship and Difference,” Feminist Review 57 (1997): 5. Also in the same issue, Ruth Lister, “Citizenship: Towards a Feminist Synthesis.”
5 For a critical, more philosophical treatment of the difficulty in balancing group versus individual rights, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, 1995).
6 Yasemin Soysal, The Limits of Citizenship (Chicago, 1994). Soysal argues that present-day immigrants are able to attain membership within a community despite the lack of formal citizenship due, in particular, to the increasing belief in the West that equates human rights with the rights of citizenship. In essence, we are entering a new era of "post-national
membership” that provides immigrants the same protections as those enjoyed by actual citizens.

7 In many ways, my examination confirms and builds upon the findings of previous whiteness studies such as David Roediger’s *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York, 1991) and Noel Ignatiev’s *How the Irish Became White* (New York, 1995).

8 In the Ruhr, for example, the archbishops of Münster, Paderborn, and Düsseldorf issued a set of declarations in 1904 that prohibited baptismal, marriage, and funeral services in Polish and, perhaps most inflammatory, ordered that “Polish children shall be prepared for the holy sacrament [of communion] only in German.” See Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf (hereafter HSTAD) LA Essen 101 – Rep. RPD to LR Essen, Aug. 25, 1904.


10 The basis for these policies was laid out in an administrative directive by the Minister-President of Westphalia Heinrich Konrad von Studt in 1896. See HSTAD RD Präis. 867 – Rep. OPW, Oct. 31, 1896. Von Studt, who became Oberpräsident (Minister-President) of the Province of Westphalia in 1889, first dealt with the Polish question in the Prussian East as a Landrat (County Manager) in Posen, a Regierungspräsident (District President) in Königsberg, and an Undersecretary in the Interior Ministry in Berlin. Perhaps the best example of the government’s attempts to limit the growth of Polish organizations was the new Reichsvereinsgesetz (Association Law) of 1908. This law forced the use of the German language in all publicly-held, “open” Polish meetings in the Ruhr except for those related to political elections.


16 The emergence of transnational identities can be seen in the way Poles came to view themselves over time and in the changing relationship Polish migrants had to the homeland society they left behind. Having absorbed western ways and practices, Poles in both regions came to consider themselves more culturally and politically advanced than their “backward” countrymen who remained under the undue influence of a morally bankrupt and ineffectual elite in partitioned Poland. As Stanislaus Wachowiak, a Polish activist in the Ruhr noted in 1916, “when the migration [of Poles] began, a political awareness among the lower classes in the homeland was quite small. The majority vegetated there without at all
being concerned with political matters. The migrants were completely un-schooled politically. The changed environment, the active trade-union life, the presence of ethnic associations, all of this forced the Polish workers in the West to politically orient themselves.” See Stanislaus Wachowiak, Die Polen in Rheinland-Westfalen (Leipzig, 1916), 82.

17 The history of the Polish community in the Ruhr after 1924 is chronicled in the following works: Christoph Klessmann, Polnische Bergarbeiter im Ruhrgebiet, 1870–1945 (Göttingen, 1978); Valentina-Maria Stefanski, Zum Prozess der Emanzipation und Integration von Aussenseitern (Dortmund, 1984); Ralf Karl Oenning, Du da Mitti, polnische Farben: Sozialisierungs-erfahrungen von Polen im Ruhrgebiet 1918 bis 1939 (Münster, 1991); Susanne Peters-Schildgen, “Schmelztiegel” Ruhrgebiet: Die Geschichte der Zuwanderung am Beispiel Herne bis 1945 (Essen, 1997).

18 The growing post-war hysteria and xenophobia in the United States helped fuel the political repression of the “Red Scare” period (1919–1920) and the subsequent passage of immigration restrictions in 1921 and 1924. For further insight into anti-immigrant feeling and legislation in the post-World War I period, see Robert Zeidel, Immigrants, Progressives, and Exclusion Politics: The Dillingham Commission, 1900–1927 (DeKalb, IL, 2004).

19 For a history of Polish-Americans in the 1920s and 1930s, see James Pula, Polish Americans: An Ethnic Community (New York, 1995).

20 For an elaboration, see Jürgen Habermas, “Anerkennungskämpfe im demokratischen Rechtsstaat,” in Charles Taylor, Multikulturalismus und die Politik der Anerkennung (Frankfurt, 1993), 175–176.

21 Standard works on the history of Ruhr miners include: Klaus Tenfelde, Sozialgeschichte der Bergarbeiterchaft an der Ruhr im 19. Jahrhundert (Bonn, 1977); Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, Leben vor Ort: Ruhrbergleute und Ruhrbergbau (Munich, 1983).


24 For more information on these various strike actions in the Ruhr and northeastern Pennsylvania, see Victor Greene, The Slavic Community on Strike: Immigrant Labor in Pennsylvania Anthracite (South Bend, IN, 1968); Blatz, Democratic Miners; Brüggemeier, Leben vor Ort; Kulczycki, The Foreign Worker.

25 The recourse to using the courts to protect ethnic rights was common throughout the period under examination. In the wake of the 1908 Reichsvereinsgesetz (Association Law), which restricted the use of Polish in public meetings, appeals to the courts increased. A series of court decisions in Essen, however, highlights the many ways Poles were able to circumvent the enforcement of this law. See, for example, court decisions handed down between 1908 and 1909 in HSTAD LA Essen 101 as well as HSTAD RD 16029.

26 Perhaps best known in this regard was the successful 1910 campaign to erect public monuments in Washington, DC to Casimir Pulaski and Thaddeus Kosciuszko, Polish officers who fought under Washington in the American War of Independence and in wars against the partitioning powers in Poland. By undertaking this campaign, Poles sought to inform the American public of Polish contributions to the cause of democracy and Poland’s historic ties to the United States.
For examples of this more liberal strain of thought within the Progressive movement, see “Statement of the International Committee of Young Men’s Christian Associations,” 14 Oct. 1910, in United States Senate, Reports of the Immigration Commission, vol. 41 (Washington, 1911), 85–87; Emily Balch, Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York, 1910); Roberts, Anthracite Coal Communities.


The right to form ethnic parishes was not without controversy. During the late nineteenth century, a “modernist” view came into ascendance within the Irish-dominated church hierarchy that viewed ethnic parishes, as opposed to territorial, as an impediment to their broader goal of using the church to Americanize immigrants. German and Polish immigrants proved most vocal in opposing the Americanization programs of the Irish hierarchy, promoting instead a belief in a pluralistic church, best encapsulated by the slogan “Language Saves Faith.” For further information on this conflict, see Jay Dolan, American Catholic Experience: A History from Colonial Times to the Present (New York, 1985), 294–320.

CROSSING BOUNDARIES:
INTERDISCIPLINARY ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY

Workshop at the GHI, August 10, 2005. Conveners: Dirk Schumann (GHI), Bernd Herrmann (University of Göttingen).

Participants: Wiebke Bebermeier (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Dorothee Brantz (GHI), Jörg Cortekar (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Anna-Sarah Hennig (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Richard Hölzl (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Kai Hünemörder (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Anne Klammt (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Uwe Lübken (GHI), Mathias Mutz (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Karen Oslund (GHI), Jens Potschka (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Susan Strasser (University of Delaware), Katharina Thom (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Cai-Olaf Wilgeroth (Göttingen Graduate Seminar), Steffi Windelen (Göttingen Graduate Seminar).

After a three-week “environmental history tour” of the United States, including stops at the University of Kansas in Lawrence and in Kansas City, Missouri, the Göttingen Graduate Seminar on Environmental History (Graduiertenkolleg Interdisziplinäre Umweltgeschichte) came to Washington, DC on August 10, 2005 for a one-day workshop with the environmental history fellows of the GHI. Dirk Schumann opened the workshop by outlining the general activities of the GHI, and Dorothee Brantz followed up by detailing the activities and projects within the institute’s focus on environmental history.

In the first session of the morning, the GHI’s current environmental history fellows, Dorothee Brantz, Karen Oslund, and Uwe Lübken, presented their research. Dorothee Brantz introduced her new research project on war and the environment in the twentieth century. After providing a quick overview of her entire project, which will cover trench warfare in World War I, the bombing of cities during World War II, jungle warfare in Vietnam, and the burning of oil fields in Iraq, she focused more specifically on the example of World War I trenches to explain how she plans to investigate the impact of environmental factors on both the strategic planning and everyday practice of warfare. Karen Oslund followed by explaining her research project on the environmental history of the North Atlantic, with a focus on the contemporary politics of whale hunting and whaling protection in the region. She explained how the North Atlantic
waters are subject to both local and international wildlife management, and how she plans to use conflicts between these two authorities as a way of understanding how disputes over nature protection in marginal and frontier environments are resolved. Finally, Uwe Lübken gave a brief account of his current research project on the history of river floods in Germany and the United States. Focusing on the history of the Rhine and the Ohio River from the end of the nineteenth century to the present, he is particularly interested in the increasing vulnerability of modern societies to natural forces. As he pointed out, the societal causes and effects of such events can only be understood if one looks not only at nature’s threatening character but also at the vast economic potentials of rivers and their adjacent landscapes. Floodplains, for example, can thus be analyzed as contested spaces, as they are contested by human land-use practices as well as by natural processes.

In the second session of the morning, Susan Strasser gave a presentation entitled “Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash.” This project, which builds on her previous work in business history, the history of everyday life, and environmental history, looks at a transition in the meaning of “trash” in the United States around the end of World War II. She argued that the expanded consumer markets and transportation networks for goods changed the classification of “trash” because objects considered “waste” in one part of the system became “resources” in another part of the system. The system of waste management thus moved from a “closed” to an “open” one.

In the afternoon, the third and fourth sessions were devoted to the projects of the Göttingen Graduate Seminar on Environmental History. Coordinator Kai Hünemöller described the nature and purpose of the program, which is organized into four large thematic fields and fourteen individual case studies. The seminar brings together thirteen doctoral students and one post-doc coordinator with different academic backgrounds and methodological approaches in order to explore the field of environmental history in a truly interdisciplinary fashion. One of the main goals of the project is to close the gap between the natural sciences and the humanities.

Project A analyzes the exploitation and experience of space and environment in the Middle Ages and focuses especially on the Slavic-Saxon borderlands (Jens Potschka, Cai-Olaf Wilgeroth, Anne Klammt). Project B deals with the “containment of nature” and looks at, among other things, pest control and river regulations (Katharina Thom, Wiebke Bebermeier). Project C deals with conflicts about natural resources from the eighteenth to the twentieth century and examines in particular the use of natural resources in the German paper industry (Mathias Mutz), the role of nature in pre-modern economic thought (Jörg Cortekar), and strategies of
sustainability in forestry (Richard Hölzl). Finally, Project D, “Constructions and Reifications of the Environment,” addresses overarching questions such as changing discourses on nature and theoretical approaches to environmental history, using examples such as the eighteenth-century cattle plague in Hanover and medical topologies of cities (Anna Hennig, Kai Hüнемörder, Steffi Windelen).

This very stimulating workshop closed with a few concluding remarks by Bernd Herrmann, who also presented the host members of the workshop with the official t-shirts of the 2005 trans-America tour of the Göttingen Graduate Seminar on Environmental History.

Karen Oslund and Uwe Lübken
**Bucerius Seminar 2005:**
**American History and American Archives**

Conveners: Kathleen Conzen (University of Chicago), Andreas Etges (Free University of Berlin), Christof Mauch (GHI). Made possible by a grant from the ZEIT Foundation Gerd and Ebelin Bucerius.

The second annual Bucerius Seminar on American History and American Archives took place from September 5–17, 2005. Again, the GHI, the Department of History of the University of Chicago, and the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies of the Free University of Berlin joined forces to organize the summer archive course. Ten doctoral students—seven from different German universities and three from the University of Chicago—visited American archives and libraries in Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington, DC.

There were a few changes in the program from the year before, but the idea behind the Bucerius Seminar remained the same: to prepare Ph.D. students in American history for their prospective dissertation research trips. They learned how to contact archives, use finding aids, and identify important reference tools, and they became acquainted with a dozen American research facilities. They gained insight into how historical materials are acquired, stored, and made accessible to scholars. In addition, the group met a number of prominent scholars who discussed their research strategies with them.

The program started in Chicago, where Kathleen N. Conzen again welcomed the group as well as colleagues and graduate students from the University of Chicago to her house on Labor Day evening. The excellent staff of Chicago’s Newberry Library organized the next day and a half of the seminar. Jim Grossman, Hjordis Halvorson, Martha Briggs, and a number of their colleagues laid the groundwork by giving a general introduction to the American archival system, major finding aids, and search strategies, as well as applying for scholarships. In addition, the group learned about the collections and the collection policy of the Newberry.

The visit to the Special Collections Research Center of the University of Chicago’s Regenstein Library, where Daniel Meyer and his colleagues welcomed the group, was followed by two very long but highly praised sessions in the history department. Kathleen Conzen, her colleague Jim Sparrow, Jim Grossman of the Newberry Library, and Andreas Etges served as commentators to start a more detailed discussion of the participants’ research topics.
The last day in Chicago began with an early visit to the archive of the Circuit Court of Cook County in downtown Chicago, where Philip J. Costello not only treated the group to some high-calorie “German” bakery goods but also showed that court records can be an excellent source for social history. The immigration record forms on the shelves around the table showed the past worries of the American government: People had to sign pledges that they were not anarchists (“a disbeliever in or opposed to organized government”) or polygamists. Before taking the bus to Madison, there was time to go on an architectural tour of Chicago by boat.

The next day, Michael Edmonds and Harry Miller welcomed the group to the Wisconsin Historical Society, which is impressive both as a building and as an institution. It is the largest library for American history, it functions as a state archive, it is the premier place to do research on Wisconsin, and it is also known for its collection of labor and social movement records (for example, the American Federation of Labor and the Students for a Democratic Society). But who would have guessed that you could also find the records of NBC and United Artists in Madison? Paul Boyer, the retired Merle Curti Professor at the University of Wisconsin, joined the group for lunch at the University Club. In his entertaining talk he looked back at the “history” of his different books, his “unsystematic” approaches, his failures and successes, and the problems and rewards of collaboration.

On Saturday, Jack Holzhuetter, a former editor of the Wisconsin Magazine of History and arguably the expert on the history of Wisconsin, took the group on a historical and architectural tour of Madison and Dane County. We visited Frank Lloyd Wright’s Unitarian Church in Madison and the Freethinker’s Hall in Sauk City, and passed a number of dairy farms as well as Wright’s estate Taliesin on our way to watch an outdoor performance of Macbeth at the American Players Theater in Spring Green. The fact that the group traveled in an SUV stretch limo, normally used as a party vehicle, guaranteed an unusual ride as well as a number of surprised looks, for example when stopping at an old cemetery to take a look at the gravestone of freethinker Eduard Schroeter (which is crowned by a globe). Like the year before, the group left Madison on September 11, and again all of us, including the Americans, were picked for special screening at the airport.

The first day in Boston started with a visit of the Massachusetts Archives. Michael Comeau and Martha Clark discussed their institution’s history and impressive collections, and presented some of its true treasures. Among them are the Massachusetts copies of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights as well as forged evidence from the famous Sacco and Vanzetti trial. In the early afternoon, the group was
welcomed at the Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America. Ellen M. Shea and her colleagues did a wonderful job, and had brought out relevant material for most of the participants. New in the program was Harvard’s Baker Library, a short but on that day very hot walk away. Timothy Mahoney gave a tour of the library’s historical collections, including the famous Kress Collection of Business and Economic Literature. Among the wide variety of archival material he presented were records of the R.G. Dun & Co. credit reports from the second half of the nineteenth century, which can be an invaluable source for economic and social historians.

On its second and final day in Boston the group went to see the John F. Kennedy Library. Sharon Kelley, Stephen Plotkin, and James Roth talked about this institution’s special history, collections, and processing of records. They also presented a real highlight: Kennedy’s original note card with the handwritten “Ish bin ein Bearleener.” Maura Porter expertly discussed declassification and entertained the group with a number of tape recordings showing both the relevance and problems of these types of records. Next, James Hill presented the rich textual and audio-visual collections of the Kennedy Library.

The first stop in Washington was the archive of the National Museum of American History. John Fleckner gave a brief overview of the Smithsonian Institution and its other collections before presenting the large holdings of his archive in business, engineering, communications, and advertising history. Next, David Allison, one of the curators of the “Price of Freedom” exhibition, gave the group a tour of the new and controversial exhibition. As one of its curators, he afterwards discussed the challenges of presenting American military history to the public.

In the late afternoon, Robert Dallek, author of the best-selling Kennedy biography and a foremost expert on the American presidency, once again came to the GHI to talk about doing research in Presidential Libraries. He described how he has tried to get “behind the facades” of the presidents he has studied, and made everyone curious about his current research on Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. A reception at the GHI gave the group a chance to talk to Dallek in more detail and to get to know the GHI, its director, and some of its fellows.

Most of Thursday was spent at the Library of Congress. Following a brief tour of the building and a visit of the Folklife Center, Daun Van Ee gave a behind-the-scenes tour of the stacks of the Manuscripts Division, passing rows of Presidential Papers and presenting examples from the large collection. Sara Duke and her colleagues from the Prints and Photographs Division once again did a marvelous job pulling all sorts of material of interest to the visiting researchers. In addition, the group got an introduction to the library’s ever-expanding website.
On the last day, the group took the shuttle bus from National Archives I in downtown Washington to National Archives II in College Park, Maryland. Bob Coren had organized a program that introduced the group to different divisions. A highlight was the tour of the Special Media Division, where Bob Richardson and Nick Natanson showed maps and photos, including the original patent of Thomas Edison’s “incandescent electric lamp,” some of the most famous photographs from the Civil War, and one of Eva Braun’s photo albums. Some of their colleagues gave introductions to Textual and Electronic Records, Records of Congress and Congressional Committees, and the Nixon Presidential Materials.

A farewell dinner near Dupont Circle concluded the Bucerius Seminar and gave an exhausted but happy group the chance to discuss their particular highlights of the tour. The group and the organizer would like to thank the ZEIT Foundation and the GHI for their generous support, as well as all those institutions and individuals involved in making the second Bucerius Seminar successful.

Andreas Etges

Participants and Their Projects


SIMON DOING (University of Marburg), “High Technology Transfer between the United States and the German Democratic Republic (1955–1973): Transnational Relations During the Cold War”

REINHILD KREIS (University of Munich), “American Public Diplomacy and German Images of America: German-American Institutes and America-Houses During the 1960s and 1970s as a Period of Changing Values”

ALISON LEVKOVITZ (University of Chicago), “Marriage and Domesticity in the Middle of the Twentieth Century”


CHRISTOPHER NEUMAIER (Technical University of Munich), “Rationality Constructs: Understanding the Diametrically Opposed Acceptance of Diesel Automobiles in Germany and the United States”

MARCO BASTIAN SCHROF (University of Munich), “‘Mental Prairies’: Perceptions of Space in the American West, 1860–1885”

JAN SURMANN (University of Hamburg), “Holocaust-Remembrance and Restitution: The U.S. History Policy at the End of the Twentieth Century”

Symposium at the GHI, September 15, 2005. Conveners: Bernd Schaefer (GHI), Gerald Livingston (GHI), Christof Mauch (GHI).

Participants: Henning Crome (Bundesnachrichtendienst, retired), Betty A. Dessants (Shippensburg University), Timothy Naftali (University of Virginia), Thomas Polgar (CIA, retired), Kevin C. Ruffner (formerly of CIA history staff), Peter Sichel (CIA, retired), James C. Van Hook (Department of State/CIA), Michael Wala (University of Bochum).

This symposium on the U.S. role in the origins of the West German foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), demonstrated the emergence of intelligence history as a scholarly field of vital importance to an understanding of international affairs in the twentieth century and placed the early German-American intelligence cooperation within the context of one of West Germany’s troubled relationships to its National Socialist past.

The first panel, “Setting the Stage for Cooperation, 1945–1949,” addressed the controversial wartime background of the BND, explained the U.S. relationship with the so-called “Gehlen Organization,” the precursor to the BND, and assessed the overall quality of the intelligence produced by Reinhard Gehlen for the Americans. Michael Wala argued that Gehlen enjoyed a good reputation as an intelligence official in 1945 because of the assumption that he had transformed German military intelligence during the war. German military intelligence had not had an especially good reputation within the German military. It had badly underestimated the Red Army before Operation Barbarossa. Imbued with Nazi racism, it had underestimated Soviet military strength and disparaged Soviet military equipment, such as the T-34 tank. Gehlen took over German military intelligence (Fremde Heere Ost, FHO) in 1942, and won a reputation as an effective reformer. FHO’s standing with the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) soared. Gehlen’s lack of any real intelligence experience and his inability to limit the effects of Nazi racialism on Soviet intelligence (FHO failed miserably at Stalingrad) did not tarnish his reputation for infallibility.

In an account of the origins of Gehlen’s relationship with the CIA based on declassified CIA documents, Kevin Ruffner argued that the agency approached the Gehlen group with skepticism and suspicion, but with a pragmatic determination to gain any intelligence on the Soviet army in Germany it could. Gehlen’s evolving relationship with the Americans mirrored the chaotic and uncertain development of the
American intelligence community between the end of the war in 1945 and West Germany’s creation in 1949. The U.S. Army’s G-2 military intelligence operation initiated contact with what remained of FHO in 1945. G-2 wished to learn what FHO might know about Soviet defectors. G-2 then pressured the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), a rump holdover from the disbanded Office of Strategic Services in the War Department, to take over. When President Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in late 1946, to which the SSU was transferred, the CIG at first refused to assume responsibility for “Operation Rusty.” The CIG grew into the CIA with the passage of the 1947 National Security Act. In late 1948, CIA official James Critchfield concluded that despite the Gehlen organization’s many shortcomings, the relationship now established between the United States and Gehlen amounted to a fait accompli. In view of the lack of intelligence on the Soviet military, Critchfield suggested the United States accept this fait accompli and try to make what use it could of Gehlen. Thus was born the West German BND.

Peter Sichel offered a scathing indictment of the Gehlen organization. (Owing to Sichel’s absence, GHI Research Fellow Bernd Schaefer read Sichel’s paper.) Though never directly involved with the Gehlen organization, Sichel had considered it wise for the CIA rather than the Army to control him. That said, he considered the U.S. willingness to support him a mistake. The supposed benefits were outweighed by the costs. The problematic backgrounds of Gehlen and many other early postwar BND officials rendered West German intelligence vulnerable to Soviet counterespionage. The Soviets easily depicted the BND as a haven for Nazis and as fascist provocateurs responsible for all unrest in the Eastern bloc. The BND under Gehlen also failed to produce good analysis. It had helped to create the misapprehension of a missile gap during the late 1950s, a misperception Sichel speculated may have been caused by Soviet misinformation. On the whole, Sichel argued, Gehlen was protected too long.

The second panel, “Patterns and Problems of Cooperation, 1949–1956,” turned to the relationship between the BND’s wartime legacies and the quality of its intelligence during the early Cold War. Timothy Naftali built upon Sichel’s critique. Based in part on a recent article Naftali wrote for Foreign Affairs, as well as on his work on the Intergovernmental Working Group for the declassification of remaining U.S. records on fascism and Nazism, Naftali suggested that in 1949 the CIA faced an “enormous dilemma.” CIA officials understood a great deal about the backgrounds of Gehlen and his leading officials. But they feared that, should the United States refuse to patronize Gehlen, he might become an anti-democratic force in the new West Germany. Even so, because he could not fulfill his many promises, the CIA might have dropped Gehlen
but still have retained his organization. The CIA could not force him to focus more resources on investigating the Soviet order of battle in East Germany. When the CIA began to apply serious pressure, already in late 1949, Gehlen cultivated Adenauer and convinced the chancellor of his profound importance. After CIA official Critchfield unsuccessfully confronted Gehlen in late 1950 over the question of war criminals in the BND, the CIA was reduced to pleading with Hans Globke. (Globke was Adenauer’s closest advisor in the Chancellery. He had also drafted the guidelines for the notorious Nuremberg Laws of 1935 and was thus the symbol of National Socialist continuities in the early Federal Republic.) Globke defended Gehlen, and the CIA subsequently fell into complacency. Naftali’s paper argued strongly that the cost of overlooking the BND’s past lay in the counter espionage, counter-intelligence, and especially the penetration capabilities of Soviet intelligence toward the West.

In a rebuttal of Naftali, former OSS and CIA official Thomas Polgar argued that the importance of the American relationship with the Gehlen organization has been exaggerated. Polgar began with a critique of the critics. First of all, many of the critics focused too much on strategic or national intelligence at the expense of the day-to-day operational requirements of military intelligence. Second, Polgar characterized the misgivings toward the Gehlen group of such early American intelligence organizations like the SSU or the CIG as characteristic of a “cover-your-ass” mentality rather than serious criticism. With regard to war crimes, Polgar insisted that American occupation officials at the time had to take seriously the fact that at the Nuremberg tribunal, the German general staff and the OKW as organizations had not been found guilty of war crimes. At the end of the day, the U.S. national interest in exploiting whatever information about the Soviet military Gehlen had accumulated had to take precedence over questions of morality.

Henning Crome offered a “German” perspective on Gehlen. Crome asserted that Gehlen’s success in the early Federal Republic owed much to his belief in the need for a long-term national intelligence capability for West Germany. In other words, Gehlen possessed a clear-cut vision that attracted both the Americans and Adenauer. Crome stressed, however, that Gehlen’s strengths as an analyst and in particular as an organizer rendered him especially vulnerable to Soviet counter-intelligence. Eastern bloc penetration culminated in the arrest of BND counterintelligence chief Heinz Felfe in 1958. After Felfe’s arrest, Crome suggests, the BND improved.

Both panels at this symposium generated lengthy discussion. Much of the discussion focused on the moral and existential question of the National Socialist origins of the Gehlen organization that grew into the
BND, as well as the specifically tactical problem, highlighted by Naftali, of how the Nazi pasts of BND officials might have strengthened eastern bloc counterespionage. With many former intelligence officials and eye-witnesses in attendance, the ensuing rich debates tended to fall along generational lines, with some arguing that the real imperatives of the Cold War necessitated American cooperation with the Gehlen organization. Others, primarily younger scholars, placed the history of U.S.-German postwar intelligence cooperation within the context of the current historical interest in “overcoming the past” in German and, by extension, European historiography.

This report does not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Department of State or the Central Intelligence Agency.

James C. Van Hook
COMPETING MODERNITIES: 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND GERMANY 
SINCE 1890

Workshop at the GHI, September 23–24, 2005. Conveners: Christof Mauch (GHI), Kiran Klaus Patel (Humboldt University, Berlin). Made possible by a grant from the Robert Bosch Foundation, Stuttgart.

Participants: Thomas Bender (New York University), Manfred Berg (University of Heidelberg), Eileen Boris (University of California, Santa Barbara), Tobias Brinkmann (University of Southampton), Ed Dimendberg (University of California, Irvine), Colleen A. Dunlavy (University of Wisconsin, Madison), Christiane Eifert (University of Bielefeld), Philipp Gassert (University of Heidelberg), Heinz-Gehard Haupt (European University Institute, Florence), Christina von Hodenberg (University of North Carolina and Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschungen, Potsdam), Simone Lässig (GHI), Daniel L. Letwin (Penn State University), Paul Nolte (Free University Berlin), Kathryn Olesko (Georgetown University), Annemarie Sammartino (Oberlin College), Dirk Schumann (GHI), Christoph Strupp (GHI), Thomas Welskopp (University of Bielefeld).

The purposes of this two-day workshop, the second held in connection with the “Competing Modernities” project, were to consider the draft essays prepared by each “tandem” of authors and to discuss areas of overlap, gaps, and overarching questions. In turn, this discussion served as an occasion to consider the core issues of the project, which aims to explain the differences, commonalities, and connections in the histories of the United States and Germany during the twentieth century. (See the previous reports on this project in Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 35 (2004): 97–98 and Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 36 (2005): 119–121.)

In the course of the discussion of the individual topical essays, abstracts of which are posted on the Competing Modernities website (www.ghi-dc.org/competingmodernities), two important general points became clear. First, nearly all of the author tandems found it a major challenge to integrate the history of the last thirty years into their accounts. One important reason for this problem is the scarcity of archivally based studies of the very recent past. It is thus difficult to take accurate measure of developments of the past thirty years, and that, in turn, makes it difficult to substantiate the interpretation of the early 1970s as a major turning point in world history. Consequently, with an eye toward addressing this lacuna, the Competing Modernities project participants
agreed at the workshop that the final versions of their essays should give particularly close attention to changes that have occurred in recent decades.

The second point that emerged in the course of the two-day discussion is that the individual author tandems are coming to very different conclusions. While Germany and the United States appear to have clearly taken separate paths in some areas—in religious life, in the forms of state, and in engagement with the environment, for example—they seem less dissimilar than one might expect in other areas, such as their experiences with popular entertainment and capitalism. Similarly, it is also clear that within the “long twentieth century” periods of growing difference, on the one hand, and, on the other, of increasing similarity must be distinguished. In sum, the workshop made clear that the thesis of a “grand divide” between the two countries and the counter-thesis of a persistent parallelism or even confluence within the framework of the development of Western societies both need to be qualified. The main objective of this project is to explain demonstrable differences and determine their importance in the comparative history of the two countries.

Christof Mauch and Kiran Klaus Patel
TRANSLATION, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND THE HISTORY OF CONCEPTS (BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE)

Conference at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, September 29-October 1, 2005. Co-sponsored by the GHI, the Fritz Thysen Foundation, the Historical Society, and CUNY's Center for the Humanities. Conveners: Melvin Richter (CUNY), Martin Burke (CUNY) and Dirk Schumann (GHI), in cooperation with the Conference for the History of Political Thought and the History of Political and Social Concepts Group.

Participants: Peter Baehr (Lingnan University, Hong Kong), Warren Breckman (University of Pennsylvania), Peter Burke (Cambridge University), Sandro Chignola (University of Padua), Pim den Boer (University of Amsterdam), João Feres Jr. (IUPERJ), Javier Fernández-Sebastián (Universidad del País Vasco), Joshua Fogel (York University), Julian Franklin (Columbia University), Arthur Goldhammer (Harvard University), James Hankins (Harvard University), Douglas Howland (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukeee), Jan Ifversen (University of Aarhus), David Johnston (Columbia University), Dirk Kaesler (University of Marburg), Young Koon Kim (CUNY), Margaret King (CUNY), Joachim Kurtz (University of Erlangen and Emory University), David Lazar (GHI), Jörn Leonhard (University of Jena), Steven Lukes (New York University), Raymonde Monnier (Paris), Jeremy Munday (University of Sussex), Eric Nelson (Harvard), Kari Palonen (University of Jyväskylä), Anthony Pym (Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona), Eckart Schütrumpf (University of Colorado), Claire Sherman (Center for Advanced Study in the Visual Arts, National Gallery of Art), Sharon Snowiss (Pitzer College), Henrik Stenius, (University of Helsinki), Mario Turchetti (University of Fribourg), Wyger Velema (University of Amsterdam).

The purpose of this conference was to examine the history of theories in the disciplines of translation, political thought, and Begriffsgeschichte. While few would deny that these scholarly endeavors are connected, their interrelationships have seldom been systematically considered. Thus, the conference brought together theorists, historians, and practitioners of these subjects to discuss their interactions, and to consider how interdisciplinary work might most profitably be conducted. The organizers and sponsors hoped to begin the process of acquainting practitioners in these three fields with the methods and problems common to them all, but often unidentified as systematic approaches applicable to their concerns. In this way, translators of works in the history of political thought
and philosophy, as well as in the human and social sciences, could return to their tasks with an increased awareness of both the difficulties and the alternative responses to problems also confronted in these adjacent but related disciplines.

On Thursday afternoon, the conference’s first panel session addressed “The History of Translation in Political Context.” Chaired by Wyger Velema, it featured papers by Jeremy Munday and Anthony Pym on “The Politics of Translation.” Jeremy Munday surveyed the major theoretical approaches and positions that have emerged within the field of translation studies over the last thirty years; Anthony Pym raised the issue of to what degree these intra-disciplinary developments were of interest, or import, to other scholars. In his comments on these papers, Arthur Goldhammer also noted discrepancies between theories about and practices of translation, and referred to his own experiences as a professional translator by way of example.

The second session focused on “Translation and the Conceptualization of Politics,” and was chaired by David Johnston. The participants included Peter Burke, Jörn Leonhard, Melvin Richter, and Kari Palonen. Peter Burke’s paper on “Translating the Turk” dealt with the complex linguistic and symbolic processes involved in cultural interchanges between Europeans, in particular the English, and the Ottoman Empire in the early modern era. Jörn Leonhard expanded upon his work of the concepts of “liberalism” and “civil society” in European political discourses and questioned the efficacy of comparative studies of such concepts. Melvin Richter reflected on a number of the practical and methodological issues involved in translating and transmitting central texts and concepts in the history of political thought. Kari Palonen wondered how stable a concept “politics” was in the works of such theorists as Max Weber, Carl Schmidt, Reinhart Koselleck, and Quentin Skinner, and recommended that scholars turn their attention from definitions to political practices.

Friday morning’s panel, chaired by Sharon Snowiss, dealt with the phenomenon of “Self-Translation by Political Philosophers.” Julian Franklin discussed the Latin and the French versions of Jean Bodin’s Six Books of the Commonwealth from the perspective of a translator and a Bodin scholar. Eric Nelson compared Thomas Hobbes’s Latin and English versions of De Cive, and considered this work—or these works—in the light of Hobbes’s political and scholarly pursuits. In an extended commentary, Mario Turchetti also focused on Bodin, especially on the problems that arose in the preparation of a comparative edition of the texts. The following session, on “Translating Aristotle’s Politics in Medieval and Renaissance Europe,” was chaired by Margaret King, and included presentations by Claire Sherman and James Hankins. Sherman examined
illustrations from Nicole Oresme’s 1375–1378 French translation of Politica, and discussed how these images conveyed specific political messages. Hankins analyzed Leonardo Bruni’s 1433 Greek-to-Latin text in the context of Bruni’s own theories of interpretation. Eckart Schütz trumped delivered a commentary from the perspective of a classicist, and reminded the conference that seemingly stable works such as Aristotle’s had been periodically revised since late antiquity.

The final session on Friday moved to more contemporary texts. Warren Breckman chaired this session on “Translating Political and Social Theory: Translation as a Conceptual Act in the New English Versions of Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic and in English Translations of Emile Durkheim.” Dirk KAESLER reviewed two recent translations of Weber: the 2001 edition by Stephen Kalberg, and the 2002 edition by Peter Baehr and Gordon Well. He noted that Weber’s works continued to be of great interest and importance to both German-speaking and Anglophone scholars; how those texts were used by sociologists varied considerably. Steven Lukes considered the translation histories of Durkheim’s Division of Labor, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, and Rules of Sociological Method. As did Dirk KAESLER, Lukes emphasized the quite different and often quite problematic ways that these works had been employed in forging a canon of twentieth-century sociological theory. In his comments, Peter Baehr discussed mistranslations, re-translations, and receptions of these and other related “canonical” texts, using as examples Talcott Parsons’s and his own translation of The Protestant Ethic.

The conference’s final day began with a session on “Translating the West in the Age of Imperialism,” chaired by Young Kun Kim. Douglas Howland examined nineteenth-century Japanese engagements with Western political theory via the works of such authors as John Stuart Mill. He argued that since many concepts, such as “liberty,” neither translated well nor corresponded to Japanese circumstances, new terminologies needed to be invented. Joachim Kurtz focused on the case of Liang Qichao’s translations of J. G. Fichte, and how the “body politic” was conceived in early republican China. In his comments, Joshua Fogel suggested that such West-to-East exchanges needed to be appreciated in terms of their specificities, as well as in the larger frameworks of the creation and circulation of new concepts in the modern era.

The conference’s closing event was a roundtable discussion on “The Circulation and Reception of Transnational Concepts: The Case of ‘Civilization.’” It featured members of the History of Political and Social Concepts Group, and was chaired by Jan Ifversen. In his introductory remarks, Ifversen surveyed the various national projects on conceptual history, in particular by Dutch, Finnish, and Spanish researchers, that have been carried out in the wake of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. He
also noted the interest of scholars in moving beyond the political and linguistic boundaries that have informed these studies to more systematic comparisons. Pim den Boer expanded on the possibilities of analyzing “transnational” concepts, in this case “civilization,” and assessing to what degree they may have been adopted, assimilated, or rejected in particular chronological and cultural settings. The other panelists, Sandro Chignola, João Feres, Raymonde Monnier, Javier Fernández-Sebastián, and Henrik Stenius, then delivered short presentations on how, when, and to what extent “civilization” was used in Italy, Brazil, France, Spain, and Finland from the early modern period to the present. In the subsequent discussion among the panelists and the audience, the utility of the category “transnational” was the subject of some disagreement.

*Martin J. Burke*
AMERICAN OCCUPATIONS:


In some ways this GSA panel continued the discussions begun in November 2003 at the GHI-Friedrich Ebert Foundation symposium, “How Valid Are Comparisons? The American Occupation of Germany Revisited” (see the spring 2004 issue of the Bulletin). At that early stage of the occupation of Iraq, scholars of postwar Germany critically analyzed the many comparisons made by the Bush administration and supporters of the United States-led war against Saddam Hussein and the Baathists with the war against Hitler and the Nazis, comparisons made to justify the war and the occupation in Iraq. There the focus was on testing the validity of comparing Iraq in 2003 with the early postwar situation in Germany. Ultimately the participants in the 2003 discussion concluded that there were more differences than similarities in the two cases and that the references to postwar Germany and Japan were merely being instrumentalized to justify a very different, considerably more controversial war and a much less well-thought-out occupation. However, despite the contrasts in the causes and effects of the two wars, there was considerable consensus that there were lessons that could have been learned from the occupation of Germany, including those about the relevance of the views of the neighboring states and the importance of a broad coalition, lessons that might well have prevented or at least have mitigated numerous problems encountered—or provoked—in post-Saddam Iraq.

This 2005 GSA panel compared the two American occupations from the vantage point of an almost two-year occupation of Iraq. Gerald Livingston traced the analogies, starting with George W. Bush’s use of the term “Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union speech, followed by the portrayal of Saddam as Hitler and Baathists as Nazis and, with the outbreak of the war, promises of a postwar reconstruction of Iraq comparable to the Marshall Plan in Germany and Western Europe. From August to November 2003, unexpected Iraqi resistance was explained away by references to Werewolves’ attacks in postwar Germany, attacks that never materialized but which both Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice
cited to reassure the American public that this resistance was normal and would be overcome. In December 2003 with the capture of Saddam Hussein, preparations for his trial were compared to Nuremberg, and the transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to Ayad Allawi’s caretaker government was praised for restoring sovereignty so much faster than after four years in postwar Germany. Finally, in the summer of 2004, the anniversary of the Normandy invasion and the opening of the World War II memorial on the National Mall in Washington, DC were instrumentalized at the Republican National Convention as reminders of how Americans do not abandon their tasks in the midst of adversity. Livingston summed up the major quantitative and qualitative differences in the two occupations: namely the level of preparations, the training and skills of the personnel, and the fact that the top German occupation officials, Eisenhower, Clay, and McCloy, had clout and experience, unlike Jay Garner, Paul Bremer, and John Negroponte, the controversial U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.

Rebecca Boehling and Reiner Pommerin divided the priorities of occupation into military security, civil affairs, and nation-building in their approaches to purges and democratization. Boehling looked at the degree to which the scope and purpose of both the German and the Iraqi purges were contested among planners and implementers. She described how Iraqi exiles had contacted her as an expert on German de-nazification several months prior to the war as they prepared blueprints for “the transition to democracy in Iraq,” clearly modeling their categories of levels of complicity and punishment on initial denazification directives. As in the case of Germany, however, the de-Baathification architects had few plans to train new personnel or to encourage the participation of those who had remained in the country and managed to remain untainted. In both cases, the scope of the purge was changed because of the impracticability of purging all those deemed politically incriminated on the basis of formal memberships. Iraqi exiles were more concerned with punishing Baathists, while the Americans concentrated on Saddam and his henchmen, whose photographs they posted as “wanted” on a deck of cards. In Germany, occupiers had found it difficult to administer municipal and state government without the expertise of those initially designated to be removed from positions of influence. Ironically, those least incriminated, who were tried first, received relatively harsher punishments, while many with more formal incrimination benefited from various amnesties as the Cold War intensified and economic reconstruction was the order of the day. Similar mistakes appear to have occurred in Iraq, but far too little is known yet to say for sure.

Pommerin showed how European conceptions of nation-building involve peacekeeping and civil affairs in a way that Americans in Iraq did
not seem to realize. Winning the hearts and minds of the occupied re-quires intercultural competency, a competency that Americans and the other World War II Allies seem to have displayed in Germany with educational and cultural exchanges, unlike today in Iraq. Pommerin stressed the role of émigrés and expert scholars in the postwar German planning and occupation in contrast to the current situation in Iraq, where the Iraqi exiles who have exerted so much influence were quite out of touch with developments in Iraq and the U.S. occupation was ill-prepared for either state- or nation-building functions.

David Conradt reiterated how politicians pick and choose, even distort, the research that serves them best. He also noted that although occupiers can plant seeds, the people themselves build their own nation. A lively audience discussion, including insights from a current civil affairs officer in Iraq, ensued.

_Rebecca Boehling_
MEDIEVAL HISTORY SEMINAR 2005

Seminar at the Deutsches Studienzentrum, Venice, October 20–22, 2005. Conveners: Michael Borgolte (Humboldt University, Berlin), Johannes Fried (University of Frankfurt), Patrick J. Geary (University of California, Los Angeles), Christof Mauch (GHI), Barbara Rosenwein (Loyola University, Chicago), Jonathan Skolnik (GHI). Co-sponsored by the Deutsches Studienzentrum, Venice.

The GHI’s fourth Medieval History Seminar brought together fourteen graduate students and recent postdocs from Germany and the United States under the mentorship of four senior scholars. The group discussed research papers by the fourteen students, largely taken from their dissertations, in an effort to gain a better understanding of current directions in medieval scholarship in the two countries. At the bilingual seminar, each pre-circulated paper was briefly introduced by the author, followed by a commentary by a student from across the Atlantic, and then an open discussion with the other students and mentors.

The seminar did not focus on the history of any one country or region. To emphasize the breadth of interest, the program began with a lecture by Daniela Rando of the University of Pavia, “‘La mer gothique’: Venedig’s Mittelalter in der Moderne.” Rando presented a panorama of nineteenth-century visions of Venice in British, German, and French historical and literary traditions. The seminar papers themselves spanned a broad spectrum of research areas and interests, reflecting current directions in medieval scholarship.

The current interest in textuality and problems of textual mediation was particularly prominent in a number of papers. Michael Brauer examined possible approaches to interpreting reports of “pagan” goat worship in sixteenth-century Prussia. Matthew Wranovix presented a detailed examination of books owned by parish priests in fifteenth-century Eichstätt in order to pose questions about the lower clergy’s interaction with the written word. Damien Kempf’s paper examined how a late-eighth-century account of the earliest bishops of Metz was transformed into a life of the first, mythical bishop of that city. Thomas Cramer provided a careful reading of De Virginitate, a seventh-century text, as both a carefully crafted work intended for the edification of women and, at the same time, a defense of religious institutions containing both men and women. Alex Novikoff argued for a twelfth-century convergence between the ancient tradition of the literary dialogue, revived in the eleventh century, and the scholastic tradition of the disputatio, which resulted in a transformation of intellectual learning.
A second theme that linked many presentations was the study of symbols and images. Christoph Weber’s paper examined how different circumstances led to the adoption of a similar heraldic device by several Italian communes, and how these reveal the unique horizon of meaning that symbols played in each city’s identity. Anja Lutz discussed the ideological construction of the image of King Louis IX in the context of fourteenth-century claims to the French throne.

Memory and its transformation formed a third thematic strand. Alizah Holstein considered the role of memory and urban identity in the narration of events in Rome during the absence of the papacy. Jennifer Edwards explored how distant memories of disputed elections of abbesses were instrumental in the progression of a complex disputed election in thirteenth-century Poitiers. Barbara Schlieben examined how a negative image of Alfonso X created in the fourteenth century resulted from the presentist concerns of chroniclers.

New directions in the study of space were evident in both Sara Ritchey’s examination of images of trees and private gardens in Carthusian monastic spirituality and in Miriam Czock’s study, which looked at the sacrality of churches through relics, consecrations, rights of asylum, and immunity in the Merovingian and Carolingian periods.

A final theme that emerged in the seminar was socialization and power. Mirko Breitenstein presented an analysis of the social processes of monastic formation. Florian Hartmann argued for the importance of changing access to economic resources as a key to understanding the pontificate of Pope Hadrian I.

In the lively discussions of each paper, in informal discussions during breaks and meals, or wandering through the narrow streets of Venice, the participants found that German and American historical studies are converging, perhaps more so today than in many decades.

*Patrick J. Geary*

**Participants and Their Topics**

MICHAEL BRAUER, Humboldt University, Berlin, “Die Reformation in Preußen und der heilige Bock”

MIRKO BREITENSTEIN, University of Dresden, “Das Noviziat bei Cluniazensern, Cisterziensern und Franziskanern”

THOMAS CRAMER, University of Washington, “Defending the Double Monastery: Aldhelm of Malmesbury and the De Virginitate”

MIRIAM CZOCK, University of Bochum, “Schutz und Schändung von Kirchen im frühen Mittelalter unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Werke Gregors von Tours”
JENNIFER C. EDWARDS, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, “Choosing Isabelle: A Thirteenth-Century Dispute in the Abbey of Sainte-Croix, Poitiers”


ALIZAH HOLSTEIN, Cornell University, “Myth and Memory in the Roman Trecento: Sciarra Colonna’s Imperial Connections”

DAMIEN KEMPF, Johns Hopkins University, “A True Détournement: From Paul the Deacon’s Liber de episcopis Mettensibus to the Vita Clementis”

ANJA LUTZ, University of Hamburg, “‘Image’: Ein Konzept zwischen Geschichte und Kunstgeschichte am Beispiel der Manuskripte BnF, Ms. fr. 5716, Ms. fr. 13568 und Ms. n. a. lat. 3145”

ALEX NOVIKOFF, University of Pennsylvania, “Dialogue and Disputation in the Twelfth-Century Renaissance”

SARA RITCHEY, University of Chicago, “The Spiritual Significance of Late Medieval Carthusian Gardens”

BARBARA SCHLIEBEN, University of Frankfurt am Main, “Der Hof Alfons’ X. im Bild des 14. Jahrhunderts”

CHRISTOPH WEBER, University of Münster, “Heraldische Symbolik in italienischen Stadtkommunen des Mittelalters: Eine eigene Sprache der Politik”

MATT WRANOVIX, Yale University, “Parish Priests and their Books in the Fifteenth-Century Diocese of Eichstätt”
American Presidents and the Germans, 1945–2005


Robert Gerald Livingston’s lecture traced the varying attitudes of American presidents, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush toward the Germans and their leaders. During World War II and the first two postwar years, Roosevelt and Harry Truman based their policy on their determination that Germans recognize that they had been utterly defeated, so that there could be no reprise of the “stab in the back” myth of the 1920s and 1930s, and on the conviction that even erstwhile Nazis could be democratized.

Astonishingly quickly in 1947–1948, Truman’s administration dropped the punitive elements of this policy and opened Germany to Marshall Plan assistance. Then, after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, he worked to integrate the country into a U.S.-led military alliance. Roosevelt’s aim of a weak postwar Germany was jettisoned in favor of rebuilding Germany’s economy, political institutions, and army. As early as 1946, Washington’s overly ambitious efforts to denazify the Germans were scrapped. Nazi Germany’s crimes played almost no role at all in American presidential decision-making on Germany, even immediately after World War II. Beginning with the Soviet blockade of Berlin (1948–1949), defense of the city and of the Federal Republic against a Soviet threat became central to the strategy of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. Every American president since 1945 has found it politically important to pay a symbolic visit to Berlin. First the Berliners, then the West Germans became favored alliance partners. This paid off for the East Germans too in 1989–90, when George H. W. Bush proved to be the only first-rank foreign leader to support the country’s unification wholeheartedly. Bush, along with Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, developed close working relations with the long-serving chancellor Helmut Kohl.

During the discussion following the lecture, participants mostly posed questions about the low points in relationships between German chancellors and American presidents. There have been three of these: during the first two years of the Kennedy administration; most of Jimmy Carter’s; and most of George W. Bush’s, when personal animosity between George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, whose opposition to the Iraq war was outspoken, led to tensions. Presidential personalities accounted as much as policy differences for these low points,
Livinston explained: a youthful Kennedy bent on better relations with Moscow versus an aged Adenauer highly skeptical of Soviet intentions; a moralistic Carter versus a pragmatic Helmut Schmidt; and a unilateralist and belligerent-sounding George W. Bush versus a Gerhard Schröder whose country is deferential to international institutions and constrained in a wide range of policymaking by its membership in the European Union and whose people fear being dragged into overseas military expeditions by an ally devoted to spreading democracy far and wide. Livingston focused on American presidents, but in concluding the discussion, he expressed the hope that a future Spevack lecture might examine German chancellors’ attitudes toward their counterparts in the White House.

Robert Gerald Livingston
Fourteenth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute and Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize

Symposium at the GHI, November 18, 2005. Conveners: Gerald D. Feldman (President, Friends of the GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI). Participants: Eli Rubin (Western Michigan University), Jesse Spohnholz (Grinnell College), Dirk Schumann (GHI). Made possible by a grant from the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

The Friends of the German Historical Institute convened in Washington on November 18, 2005 for their fourteenth annual symposium, chaired by Gerald D. Feldman. The morning session featured the presentation of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, which has been awarded for six years for the two best dissertations in German history at a North American university. This year’s prizes were awarded to Jesse A. Spohnholz, who earned his doctorate at the University of Iowa under the supervision of Sarah Hanley and Benjamin Kaplan, for his dissertation “Strangers and Neighbors: The Tactics of Toleration in the Dutch Exile Community of Wesel, 1550–1590,” and to Eli Rubin, who earned his doctorate at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, under the supervision of Rudy Koschar, for his dissertation “Plastics and Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic: Towards an Economic, Consumer, Design and Cultural History.” The lectures of the two prize winners are reprinted, in revised form, in the “Stern Prize” section of this Bulletin. Fritz Stern attended the award ceremony and gave a comment. The Prize Committee was composed of Doris Bergen (University of Notre Dame), Edward Ross Dickinson (University of Cincinnati), and Kees Gispen (University of Mississippi), who chaired the committee.

The committee cited Spohnholz’s dissertation as “a pioneering case study of relations between people of different faiths in the German border town of Wesel in the second half of the sixteenth century,” a “micro-history that resonates on a macro-level,” which showed that toleration in Wesel “should be seen, not as the precursor of a modern understanding of tolerance and religious pluralism, but rather as a complex, highly significant paradox that centered on the simultaneity of intense conflict and grudging compromise—strong disagreement coupled with reluctant suffering of difference.” Rubin was cited for convincingly arguing that the East German “world of plastics generated a kind of consensus, or a community of interest among its various constituencies, which in turn resulted in a type of societal legitimacy” and for showing “the GDR as a complex, functioning system in which plastics—as products of industrial
success, a symbol of national pride, and building blocks of the ‘1,000 small things of everyday life’—played a central role.”

In the afternoon, GHI Deputy Director Dirk Schumann presented results of his current research project in the paper “Spare the Rod? School Discipline in Germany and the USA, 1945–1975.” School discipline, he argued, was not merely a technical question of school governance but indicative of broader developments in society. As societies relied increasingly on court decisions and expert advice to settle matters that had previously been decided by administrators and teachers alone, social scientists, legal experts, and judges who remained far removed from day-to-day classroom interaction came to have a direct impact on what happened in the classroom. Focusing on legal issues and drawing in particular upon West German debates about corporal punishment, Schumann showed how the concept of “customary law” (Gewohnheitsrecht) retarded change, while references to the constitution gradually helped students gain more rights. As a result, the number of legal regulations and rulings skyrocketed from the late 1960s on. This process of “juridification,” Schumann argued, guaranteed new freedoms, but it also created new bureaucratic constraints and stifled pedagogical initiative. In this respect, there were no fundamental differences between West Germany and the United States.

Richard F. Wetzell
THE PLACE OF NATURE IN THE CITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Conference at the GHI, December 1–3, 2005. Conveners: Dorothee Brantz (SUNY Buffalo, GHI), Sonja Düppelmann (Auburn University, GHI), Christof Mauch (GHI), Jennifer Price (Los Angeles).

Participants: Harriet Atkinson (Royal College of Art, London), Thomas J. Campanella (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Peter Clark (Helsinki University), Lawrence Culver (Utah State University), Konstanze Domhardt (ETH, Zurich), Catherine Evans (University of New South Wales), Zachary J. S. Falck (Carnegie Mellon University), Anne Hass (Technical University, Munich), Stefanie Hennecke (University of the Arts, Berlin), Bernd Hermann (University of Göttingen), Sonia A. Hirt (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), Jens Lachmund (University of Maastricht), Katri Lento (University of Helsinki), Gary W. McDonogh (Bryn Mawr College), Bianca Maria Rinaldi (University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Vienna), William Rollins (University of Canterbury, New Zealand), Jeffrey Craig Sanders (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Dirk Schumann (GHI), Anne Whiston Spirn (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Jessica Ullrich (University of the Arts, Berlin), Alfonso Valenzuela (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Vera Vicenzotti (Technical University, Munich), Jason Wiens (University of Calgary).

Historically, cities have been identified as man-made environments that stand in contrast to nature. Upon closer examination, however, it quickly becomes apparent that cities have not been devoid of nature, and indeed abound with flora and fauna, which are often purposefully incorporated into urban space. This three-day conference brought together an interdisciplinary group of scholars from both sides of the Atlantic to discuss the place of nature in twentieth-century cities. One of the overarching aims of this conference was to investigate how the use of natural elements changed over the course of the twentieth century as many industrial cities were transformed into post-industrial landscapes. The conference’s transatlantic focus also led to the question of how cultural and national peculiarities influenced the place of nature in specific cities.

The conference opened with a public lecture by Anne Whiston Spirn. In her engaging talk, in which she shared some of her personal experiences as a landscape designer, scholar, and teacher, Spirn examined how a range of distinct ideas about nature influenced the shape of urban
environments in the twentieth century. She argued that interpreting ideas of nature as cultural products helps to understand human society and nonhuman processes. Spirn criticized the impact the environmental movement had on landscape designers from the 1960s to the early 1990s because many landscape architects adopted dogmatic, preconceived views of nature, which led them to design in a naturalistic style and abandon supposedly “exotic” plant species in favor of the exclusive use of what were considered to be native species. By discussing some of her own landscape projects Spirn showed that what “nature” means can be discerned by taking into account not only its physical manifestations but also its social, cultural, and political context. Quoting Raymond Williams (See Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture (London, 1980), 67–81), she maintained, however, that “nature” is probably one of the most difficult words to explain. As could be expected, the definition of “nature” was, in fact, a question that recurred over the next days of the conference.

The first panel focused on the incorporation of green spaces into large-scale urban planning schemes in twentieth-century Bulgaria and Mexico. Alfonzo Valenzuela explained how the physical transformation of Mexico City in the early decades of the twentieth century was inspired by European models like Ebenezer Howard’s garden city and Jean Claude Forestier’s park systems. Examining the work of urban planners like Miguel Angel de Quevedo, Carlos Contreras, and Jose Luis Cuevas Pietrasanta, Valenzuela showed how these planners adapted European ideas to the specific environmental, hygienic, and infrastructural circumstances of Mexico City. In a similar vein, Sonia Hirt explored how the development of Bulgaria’s capital city was shaped by successive political regimes, all of which sought to inscribe Sofia’s urban landscape with their specific ideological visions regarding the use of green spaces in the city. In particular, Hirt compared and contrasted three master plans for rebuilding greater Sofia, the first by Adolph Muesmann, who in the 1930s proposed a scheme reminiscent of Nazi urban planning models that favored single-family homes with individual gardens. Muesmann’s controversial plans were never realized, especially following the communist take-over of Bulgaria, which also gave rise to new ideas about urban planning that favored a polycentric system of multi-family homes with collective green areas. Next, Hirt offered a brief overview of the current plans for Sofia’s reconstruction, which rely on a mixture of public and private green spaces. In general, Hirt argued that the planning history of Sofia oscillated between competing models of Sofia as a compact versus a dispersed city.

The contributions in the second panel all dealt with the ideological implications of open space and its design in capital cities. Gary Mc-
Donogh gave an overview of the concept of “Mediterranean nature” and how it influenced the Barcelonians’ perception of their Catalan city at the end of the nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century. At that time “nature,” in the form of parks, gardens, and garden cities, was supposed to re-enliven Barcelona, not only as the Catalan capital but also as the capital of a Mediterranean nation. The political importance of the concept of “Mediterranean nature” again showed in the projects for the 1992 Olympics and the Universal Forum of Cultures, which was opened in 2004 and made parts of the coastline accessible while at the same time protecting other parts as nature preserves. In her detailed study of the genesis and reception of Berlin’s Schiller Park, designed in 1907, Stefanie Hennecke showed how the park design reflected the “holistic world view” of its reactionary modernist creator Friedrich Bauer. She elaborated on how Bauer’s belief system influenced his choice of design forms and native plant materials to create the park as a piece of “German nature” in which man played his part but was not considered the protagonist. Although Schiller Park was a progressive design, it was not based on a progressive social view. Like McDonough, Hennecke examined the parallels between ideological beliefs concerning nature and their implementation in urban and open-space planning at the beginning and at the end of the twentieth century. Maria Bianca Rinaldi compared the role natural features played in the design of two capital cities built in the twentieth century, Chandigarh and Brasilia. She showed how both urban schemes were based on open space structures and models that were appropriated from Europe and North America; for example, the National Mall in Washington, parkways, and new towns constructed before World War II in Britain and the United States. The emblematic role of nature again became especially clear in the use of indigenous plants. However, while native species were supposed to foster a new national identity, Chandigarh’s planners also suggested that the planting of foreign species could additionally act as a vehicle for international relations.

The third panel shifted focus to the specific use of plants within the urban fabric. Focusing on the extraordinary career of the American elm in the vernacular landscape of the United States, Thomas Campanella examined how the phenomenon of Elm Street emerged as part of the New England village improvement movement. Explaining how Elm Streets spread across the United States, Campanella argued that they fulfilled aesthetic, moral, economic, and nationalist agendas that were linked to underlying notions about the urban landscape as a “pastoral city.” He also pointed out that these artificial planting schemes promoted the devastating spread of Dutch Elm disease, which eventually eradicated most of these trees. Continuing with this emphasis on particular plants, Zachary Falck explored how weeds and vacant lots added an unusual di-
mension to concerns about urban landscapes, in part because people often did not agree which plants should be considered weeds. Drawing particularly on examples from St. Louis, Lincoln, and Chicago, Falck examined the outcome of legal disputes over the use of urban space, the presence of vacant lots, and the eradication of unwanted plants. In the third presentation, William Rollins turned his attention to more conceptual agendas regarding plants in postmodern urbanism. Drawing on examples from art, literature, and advertisements, Rollins argued that postmodern attitudes toward green spaces tend to be less structured than their modernist predecessors. Native plants for example are often used to create a new aesthetic of place even though it is mostly no more than a simulacrum.

“(Re)Constructing Nature” was the fourth panel’s overarching theme. Katri Lento showed how “nature” was constructed in Helsinki according to various foreign planning ideas that were introduced in Finland from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards. Models such as the garden city and the allotment garden fit well into the Finnish tradition of venerating nature. However, while Helsinki planners were very active in providing green open spaces, elaborate state regulations imposed many restrictions on how urban dwellers could use those spaces. Harriet Atkinson and Konstanze Domhardt focused their contributions on aspects of open-space planning in the post-World War II era, when the reconstruction of Europe offered a chance for a new place of nature in the city. Domhardt showed how the Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne in the 1950s set forth the idea that green space was to serve as the “primary element in city planning, mediating the various parts of the city.” Whereas Domhardt’s discussion dealt with the conceptual planning level, Atkinson presented her thesis that Britain’s postwar planning was characterized by a “new picturesque” aesthetic. Using the Festival of Britain as an example, Atkinson laid out how the “new picturesque” acted as a suitable means to (re)construct Britain’s self-image and its social urban realm, which had been affected not only by World War II, but also by new infrastructural and industrial needs.

The fifth panel centered on private versus public uses of urban landscapes. Peter Clark opened the session with a presentation that compared the incorporation of green spaces in sports facilities in twentieth-century Helsinki and London. Insisting that nature is a social construct, Clark focused particularly on the example of golf clubs and tennis courts to show how these planned spaces were created and how they have contributed to the biodiversity of these cities. Lawrence Culver, in turn, examined how Los Angeles’s natural and recreational spaces became increasingly privatized in the course of the twentieth century. Culver demonstrated that this privatization, closely linked to the growing sub-
urbanization of the greater Los Angeles area, where green spaces were increasingly locked away in the private gardens of single family homes, had, among other things, the effect that access to these spaces has become yet another instance of racial and class segregation. The final presentation, by Jeffrey Sanders, turned to the phenomenon of the Seattle homesteads that emerged in response to the oil crisis and growing environmental awareness of the early 1970s. Describing several examples of sustainable housing and community garden projects, Sanders showed how these ecotopian attempts to turn Seattle into a more sustainable urban environment were meant to link private housing initiatives to larger ecological and political transformations.

The contributions in the sixth panel dealt with wilderness and urban ecology. Anne Hass worked out the commonalities in the theoretical positions of the exponents of the Chicago School and in the late work of the architect Paul Schultze-Naumburg. Hass pointed out that both theoretical positions were influenced by the monoclimax theory put forth by Frederic Clement. She showed that their adaptation of his theory led to a “social ecologism” that seemed to justify racial and ethnic displacements and discrimination. Whereas the theoreticians of the Chicago School and Schultze-Naumburg applied ecological methods and concepts to human-kind and its social and physical environments, Jens Lachmund explained how these same concepts also served as a basis for the development of contemporary urban ecological models that equate the city with a biotope for humans, animals and plants. Laying out the development of urban ecology in Berlin, Jens Lachmund explained how the comparatively early emergence and the outstanding role of urban ecology in West Berlin was partly caused by the city’s geographical isolation during the Cold War. Forced to work within the boundaries of the Berlin Wall, biologists and ecologists shifted their areas of research to urban open space. The development of urban ecology was later also bolstered by West Berlin’s strong environmental and countercultural movements. By introducing ecological criteria into city planning, urban ecologists took an active part in forming the city. Ideas about wilderness and their place in contemporary discussions about the development of post-industrial landscapes and the low-density city, especially in Germany, were at the center of Vera Vicenzotti’s talk. Vicenzotti presented the changing concepts of city and wilderness in Germany, beginning with Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl’s conservative understanding of the modern city as an “evil wilderness,” as opposed to the scenic wilderness, which he considered relevant for imbuing society with a nationalistic worldview. Vicenzotti ended her discussion by commenting on contemporary theories, for example those advanced by Thomas Sieverts.
The last panel featured two presentations dealing with artistic representations of nature in urban spaces. Jessica Ullrich discussed the works of several German and American artists who incorporated diverse natural elements into their urban art installations. As Ullrich demonstrated, each of them expressed a distinct vision about the role of nature in the city, viewing it either as a contrast to the built environment, as an embodiment of “otherness,” or even as a means of commemoration. Whereas Ullrich focused on visual representations, Jason Wiens discussed the use of nature in the poetry of three Canadian writers: Abraham Moses Klein from Montreal, Raymond Souster from Toronto, and Lisa Robertson from Vancouver. Arguing that each of them took a different stance regarding the place of nature in urban narratives (ironic, nostalgic, or feminist subjective, respectively), Wiens insisted that all of them nevertheless relied on a common theme: namely, the “pastoral city.”

During the final roundtable, panelists Catherine Evans, Bernd Herrmann, and Jennifer Price commented on some of the main ideas and topics presented and discussed during the conference. Responding to Herrmann’s critique that in a lot of presentations and panel discussions the question of what “nature” actually meant needed to be tackled further, Evans and Price offered their own interpretations of “nature.” In the discussion that followed, many of the questions from the previous two days reemerged: for example, how is nature incorporated into the city? Are urban planners trying to bring nature to the city, or are they hoping to bring people closer to nature? Moreover, can “nature” act as a means of social control, and to what extent does “nature” foster local, national, and even transnational identities? Each of the presenters had addressed these questions in their distinct historical and geographical contexts. A conference volume based on a selection of these essays is currently in preparation.

*Dorothee Brantz and Sonja Dümpelmann*
Fellows Seminars, Fall 2005

The GHI’s Fellows Seminars are a forum in which fellowship recipients and other visiting scholars present their research to the Research Fellows of the Institute and interested scholars from local academic institutions. They are organized by Deputy Director Dirk Schumann. The GHI awards doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships for the duration of one to six months. These fellowships are designed for doctoral candidates and postdoctoral scholars whose research deals with one of the following fields: German history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the United States in international relations, and American history. For the application process, see the “Announcements” section of this Bulletin.

August 25  Stefanie Troja, Universität Hamburg
  Squatter im Northwest Territory/ Ohio, 1780–1820
  Regina Mühlhäuser, Universität Hamburg
  Between Extermination and Germanization: Children of German Men in the “Occupied Eastern Territories” 1942–1945
  Stefanie Seeh, Universität zu Köln

October 6  Hrvoje Petric, University of Zagreb
  Drava River Multiple Borderlands in the Early Modern Period
  Holger Löttel, Universität Bonn
  Der amerikanischen Süden und die atlantische Welt: England im Denken von Diplomaten, Politikern und Intellektuellen, 1830–1865
  Sven Jüngerkes, Universität Konstanz
  Konflikte und Kompetenzen im Reichskommissariat für das Ostland. Das Beispiel Harry Marnitz, Leiter der Abteilung “Gesundheit und Volkspflege” beim Generalkommissar in Riga
  Claudia E. Haupt, Staatsanwaltschaft Köln
  Hate Speech in the United States and Germany: Legal and Historical Perspectives
ANNOUNCEMENTS

DOCTORAL AND POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as post-doctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the role of Germany and the United States in international relations. These fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and post-doctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon source materials located in the United States.

The GHI will not provide funding for preliminary research. It will give clear priority to those post-doc projects that are designed for the “second book.” The monthly stipend is approximately €1,600 for doctoral students and €2,800 for post-doctoral scholars. In addition, fellowship recipients based in Germany will receive reimbursement for their roundtrip airfare to the U.S. All fellowship recipients are required to present the results of their research at the GHI during their grant period.

The next deadlines for applications are May 20, 2006 and October 15, 2006. Applications should include cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree (or transcripts), project description (3,000 words), research schedule for the fellowship period, and at least one letter of reference. While applicants may write in either English or German, we recommend that they use the language in which they are most proficient. They will be notified about the outcome within approximately two months after the deadline. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Doctoral/Postdoctoral Fellowships
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562

KADE-HEIDENKING FELLOWSHIP

Funded by the Annette Kade Charitable Trust, the Kade-Heideking Fellowship is awarded annually to a German doctoral student working in one of the three wider areas to which the late Jürgen Heideking made
significant contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and twentieth-century German and European history.

This is a residential fellowship of twelve months’ duration. It can be divided into two separate periods of six months. The recipient is expected to spend part of the fellowship period at the GHI and at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. The stipend amount is $30,000. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8–10 pages), research schedule for fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. The application deadline is November 15, 2006. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Kade-Heideking Fellowship
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562
USA

THYSSEN-HEIDEKING FELLOWSHIP

The German Historical Institute invites applications for a one-year postdoctoral fellowship in memory of the late Jürgen Heideking. The fellowship, supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, is intended for American scholars working in one of the three wider areas to which Professor Heideking made important contributions: American history and German-American relations from the early modern period to the present; international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and twentieth-century German and European history.

The Thyssen-Heideking Fellow will receive a stipend of €25,000 (plus a family allowance if applicable) for a fellowship period of six to twelve months in residence at the University of Cologne to begin in 2007. The fellow will be expected to give one public lecture on his or her research. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree, project description (8–10 pages), research schedule for fellowship period, and two confidential letters of reference. The application deadline is November 15, 2006. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562
POSTDOC-STIPENDIUM FÜR NORDAMERIKANISCHHE GESCHICHTE


Bewerbungen mit den üblichen Unterlagen (Lebenslauf, Schriftenverzeichnis, Abschlusszeugnisse seit Abitur) sowie der Skizze des durchzuführenden Forschungsprojekts (8–10 Seiten) und einem Empfehlungs schreiben richten Sie bitte bis zu dem auf der DHI-Webseite angegebenen Termin an:

German Historical Institute
Postdoc-Stipendium für nordamerikanische Geschichte
1607 New Hampshire Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009–2562
USA

NEH PROGRAM

Das Deutsche Historische Institut sucht 1 deutsche(n) Postdoktoranden/in oder Privatdozenten/in für ein vom National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) unterstütztes transatlantisches Projekt. Die Position ist, zeitlich flexibel, für 6–12 Monate zu besetzen und wird mit einer Pauschale von bis zu US $42.000 vergütet.


Jahrhundert. Ein wichtiger Teil der Zusammenarbeit wird die Organisa-

Voraussetzungen: Abgeschlossene Promotion in Geschichte, Kultur-

Bitte richten Sie Ihre Bewerbung bis zum 15. Juli 2006 mit den übli-

Bitte wenden Sie sich bitte an Dr. Anke Ortlepp (ortlepp@ghi-dc.org).

INTERNSHIPS

This GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of

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The GHI is pleased to announce a new internship program for German

Das Praktikum richtet sich an Preisträger des Geschichtswettbewerbs
des Bundespräsidenten, die sich am Ende oder kurz nach Abschluss des

Das drei-

als Gesamtvergütung erhalten Prak-

vertragen werden. Interessierte

wenden sich bitte an Dr. Anke Ortlepp (ortlepp@ghi-dc.org).

International Internships

This GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of

Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and

ting conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a

A two-month minimum stay is

Internships
required; a three months stay is preferred. Applicants interested in coming to Washington in 2007 are encouraged to submit their application by July 31, 2006. German students are strongly advised to familiarize themselves with the American visa requirements beforehand. The process to obtain visa has become complicated and expensive. Information is available at the website of the American Embassy in Berlin at www.usembassy.de. The GHI cooperates with an organization authorized by the State Department to issue the relevant papers to obtain a visa. Applicants accepted into the internship program will receive further information on the procedure in their acceptance letters. Applications should contain a cover letter, a CV, a letter of recommendation, and copies of Zwischenprüfungs- or Abschlusszeugnis. Applications may be submitted either in English or German. For further information please contact Dr. Anke Ortlepp (ortlepp@ghi-dc.org).
NEW PUBLICATIONS

1. New Books by GHI Research Fellows

RICHARD F. WETZELL and EDWARD R. DICKINSON, eds., Sexuality in Modern German History, special issue of German History 23:3 (Fall 2005).


3. GHI Studies in International Environmental History (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers)


4. GHI Studies in German History (Berghahn Books)

5. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)


7. Other Publications Supported by the GHI


Library Report

We are happy to announce the acquisition of the Politische Correspondenz Friedrich des Grossen, a key source for eighteenth-century political history. Another recent addition to the collection is the microfiche edition of the Preussische Statistik: Amtliches Quellenwerk, herausgegeben in zwanglosen Heften (Berlin 1861–1934) by the Königliches Statistisches Bureau in Berlin; one of the most important publications of its kind in Germany, it documents the work of the Prussian department of statistics for more than seven decades. We also enlarged our holdings of the series Digitale Bibliothek, a collection of German monographs, complete works, and source materials on CD-Rom and DVD. The complete works of Max Weber and Stefan George, documents, protocols, and live recordings of the Auschwitz trial, several encyclopedias, and a collection of German political postcards are among the newly purchased CD-Roms. We would like to express our gratitude to the following people and institutions that donated books to the GHI library: Shulamith Behr, Sabine Carbon, Astrid M. Eckert, Andreas Elter, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Nancy Thorndike Greenspan, Landesarchivverwaltung Rheinland-Pfalz, Hanns Löhr,

**RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS FOR 2006**

**Postdoc-Stipendium für Nordamerikanische Geschichte**

**MARKUS HUNEMÖRDER**, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, “Privacy – Das Recht auf Privatheit in den USA und Deutschland”

**Postdoctoral/Habilitation Fellowships**


**THOMAS LEKAN**, University of South Carolina, “Sublime Consumption: German Nature Tourism from Romanticism to Ecotourism, 1850–2000”


**Doctoral Fellowships**

**ALISON EFFORD**, Ohio State University, “Carl Schurz, German Immigrants, and American Citizenship during Reconstruction, 1865–1877.” Adviser: Mark Grimsley


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PHILIPP STELZEL, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Rethinking German History after 1945: A Transatlantic Enterprise.” Adviser: Konrad Jarausch


MICHAEL WERNER, Universität Frankfurt/Main, “Stiftungskultur in transatlantischer Perspektive. Hamburg und New York um 1900.” Adviser: Andreas Schulz

Kade-Heideking Fellowship

Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship

BRIAN MCCOOK, University of California at Berkeley, “The Borders of Integration: Polish Migrant Workers in the Ruhr Valley of Germany and the Pennsylvania Anthracite Regions of the United States, 1870–1924”

Collaborative Research Program for Postdoctoral Scholars (NEH Fellowship)

MARCUS GRÄSER, Universität Frankfurt, “Gallert-Demokratien: Migration, Parteibildungen und kommunale Politik in Chicago und Wien, 1850–1938”

NEH-partner: DANIEL CZITROM, Mount Holyoke College, “Politics, Culture, and the Underworld in Turn-of-the-Century New York City”

INTERNSHIP RECIPIENTS

The GHI was fortunate to have a number of excellent interns who made valuable contributions to our work. The interns conducted research in libraries and archives, helped prepare and run conferences, assisted our editors, librarians, and administrators, and cheerfully performed all other tasks that came their way. For their excellent work we would like to thank Tina Gross (University of Heidelberg), Thomas Galinsky (University of Munich), Jennifer Stange (University of Leipzig), and Katharina Ricke (University of Bonn).

STAFF CHANGES

CAROLIN BRINKMANN, Project Assistant, joined the GHI part-time in January 2006 to support the online project “German History in Documents and Images.” Carolin is currently finishing a Master’s program at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, with a focus on transatlantic relations and public diplomacy.

ASTRID M. ECKERT, Research Fellow since November 2002, left the GHI in October 2005 to accept a tenure-track position as assistant professor of modern German history at Emory University in Atlanta, GA. She can be reached at aeckert@emory.edu.

MARY TONKINSON joined the GHI in March 2006 as editor of the Institute’s environmental history series. She holds a Master’s degree in Literature from The American University and formerly served as managing editor of Shakespeare Quarterly. A member of the Folger Shakespeare Library’s editorial staff from 1987 until early 2006, she has also edited volumes for Cornell University Press and Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, among others.
CORINNA R. UNGER, Research Fellow, joined the Institute in November 2005. She studied history, political science, sociology, and anthropology at Freiburg, Berlin, and Albany, NY, where she spent a year as a Fulbright scholar. She received her M.A. from the University at Albany, SUNY, in 2001 and her Ph.D. from the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg i.Br. in 2005. Her dissertation, part of a larger collaborative research project on the history of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, dealt with the history of Ostforschung in West Germany after 1945 in the context of the Cold War and will be published shortly. Her new research project focuses on development policies and concepts of modernity in the 1950s and 1960s. With Claus-Dieter Krohn, she is co-editing a volume on Arnold Brecht that will be published in the GHI’s Transatlantische Historische Studien series. Her research interests include German and American history since 1945, history of anticommunism and the Cold War, history of science, intellectual and cultural history, and historiography.
EVENTS

LECTURE SERIES, SPRING AND FALL 2006

COMPETING MODERNITIES:
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, 1890—PRESENT

Funded with the generous support of the Robert Bosch Stiftung (Stuttgart), this lecture series focuses on a series of topics in order to compare the paths of Germany and the United States over the past century. It also seeks to contribute to public discussion about future social and political developments in the two nations.

All lectures will be held at the German Historical Institute, 1607 New Hampshire Ave, N.W., Washington, DC 20009. Refreshments will be served at 6:00 pm. Lectures begin at 6:30 pm.

February 16  Knowledge: Science & Education in Germany and the United States
Kathryn Olesko (Georgetown University)
Christoph Strupp (GHI)

April 6      Cinema and the Urban Imagination in Germany and the United States
Anton Kaes (University of California, Berkeley)

April 13    Modern Constitutional Law and Legal Culture in Germany and the United States
Manfred Berg (University of Heidelberg)
Dieter Gosewinkel (Berlin Center for Social Science Research)

May 11  Gender and the Family in Germany and the United States
Eileen Boris (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Christiane Eifert (University of Bielefeld)

May 18 Markets and Consumer Culture in Germany and the United States
Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (European University Institute, Florence)
Paul Nolte (The Free University, Berlin)

May 25  Two Nations’ Natures: Environment in America and Germany
Christof Mauch (GHI)
Kiran Klaus Patel (Humboldt University, Berlin)
September 21  *Migration in Germany and the United States*
   Tobias Brinkmann (University of Southampton)
   Ari Sammartino (Oberlin College, OH)

October 5  *Mass Politics in Germany and the United States: Paradoxes of Participation*
   Fitzhugh Brundage (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
   Konrad Jarausch (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

October 26  *Discipline: Schools, the Military, and the Shaping of Future Citizens in Germany and the United States, 1890–2000*
   Dirk Schumann (GHI)
   Judith Seelander (Bowling Green State University)

November 2  *Empire and Nation: Studies from the United States and Germany*
   Thomas Bender (New York University, NY)
   Michael Geyer (University of Chicago, IL)

November 9  *The Welfare State in Germany and the United States*
   Daniel Letwin (Pennsylvania State University)
   Gabriele Metzler (University of Tübingen)

November 30  *Labor and Industry in the United States and Germany*
   Colleen Dunlavy (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

December 7  *Media in the United States and Germany*
   Philipp Gassert (University of Heidelberg)
   Christina von Hodenberg (Queen Mary College, University of London)

December 14  *Religion in the United States and Germany*
   Simone Lässig (GHI)
   Rainer Praetorius (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg)
EVENTS SPONSORED BY THE GHI 2006–07

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org.

2006

Conference at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto  
Conveners: Martina Kessel (University of Bielefeld), Patrick Merziger (Free University Berlin), Dirk Schumann (GHI)

March 22–25  Crossovers: African Americans and Germany  
Conference at the University of Münster  
Conveners: Maria Diedrich (University of Münster), Larry Greene/Jürgen Heinrichs (Seton Hall University), Anke Ortlepp (GHI)

March 24  Max Liebermann (1847–1935) and the Course of German History: An Artist’s Career from Empire to Third Reich  
Symposium at the GHI, in cooperation with George Mason University and the Goethe-Institut, Washington DC  
Conveners: Marion Deshmukh (George Mason University) and Kelly McCullough (GHI).

March 24–26  Western Integration, German Unification and the Cold War: The Adenauer Era in Perspective  
Conference at the Georgetown University  
Conveners: Jost Dülffer (BMW Center of German and European Studies), Bernd Schäfer (GHI)

March 30  Sacred Space: Women, Philanthropy, and the Public Sphere  
Kathleen D. McCarthy (CUNY)  
A lecture at the GHI

March 30–April 2  Philanthropy in History: German and American Perspectives  
Conference at the GHI (Washington, DC) in cooperation with the Stiftung Deutsch-Amerikanische Wissenschaftsbeziehungen im Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft  
Conveners: Simone Lässig (GHI), Gabriele Lingelbach (Universität Trier), Thomas Adam (University of Texas, Arlington, TX)

April 20–22  Removing Peoples: Forced Migration in the Modern World  
Conference at King’s Manor, York (UK)  
Conveners: Richard J. Bessel (U. of York), Claudia Haake (U. of York), Dirk Schumann (GHI), Karina Urbach (GHI London)
April 22  Imagining the Nation: Visual Representation of Race from the Mid-Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Century Offsite session of the Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH)

April 29  Midatlantic German History Seminar, at the GHI Conveners: Marion Deshmukh (George Mason University), Christof Mauch (GHI)

April 26–29  Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History German History, 1930–1960 Seminar at the University of Freiburg Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown Univ.), Ulrich Herbert (Univ. of Freiburg), and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)

May 2–3  Jews and Modernity: Beyond the Nation Conference at the Canadian University Conference Centre in Berlin (Germany) Conveners: Derek Penslar (U. of Toronto), Tobias Brinkmann (U. of Southampton), Simone Lässig (GHI, Washington, DC)

May 4  German Imperial Biographies: Soldiers, Scientists, and Officials and the ‘Arendt Thesis’ Workshop at the GHI Conveners: Eric D. Weitz (U. of Minnesota), Jürgen Zimmerer (U. of Essen), Karen Oslund (GHI)

May 4–7  Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and the Environment Conference at the GHI Co-conveners: Karen Oslund, Niels Brimnes (U. of Aarhus, Denmark), Christina Folke Ax and Niklas Thode Jensen (U. of Copenhagen, Denmark)

May 12–13  German Ostpolitik, 1969–1974: The European and Global Response Conference at Mershon International Center, Ohio State University, Columbus Conveners: Carole Fink (OSU), Bernd Schäfer (GHI)

May 15  Meinecke’s Proteges: German Emigré Historians Between Two Worlds Symposium at the GHI Speakers: Gerhard A. Ritter (University of Munich) and James J. Sheehan (Stanford University)

May 31  Seventh Gerd Bucerius Lecture, at the GHI Speaker: Kurt Masur (Paris/New York)

June 19–30  Archival Summer Seminar in Germany Convener: Anke Ortlepp (GHI)

June 22–25  Pückler and America Conference in cooperation with the Stiftung Fürst-Pückler-Park Bad Muskau, in Bad Muskau, Germany Conveners: Sonja Dümpelmann (GHI, Auburn University), Cord Panning (Stiftung Fürst-Pückler-Park Bad Muskau)
June 26  
World Rivers in History Plenary Session at the Great Rivers Conference at the University of Wisconsin-La Crosse  
Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI)

Fall 2006  
Uncertain Environments: Natural Hazard Insurance in Historical Perspective  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Uwe Lübken (GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)

September 2006  
Bucerius Seminar: American History and American Archives  
Seminar in Washington, Chicago, Boston, and Madison  
Conveners: Kathleen N. Conzen (University of Chicago), Andreas Etges (Free University of Berlin), Christof Mauch (GHI)

October 2006  
Franz Steiner Prize Award  
Event in Stuttgart  
Conveners: Ulrich Bachteler (James F. Byrnes Institute), Christof Mauch (GHI), Thomas Schaber (Steiner Verlag)

October 3  
German Unification Symposium, at the GHI  
Speaker: Gesine Schwan  
Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI)

November 16  
Annual Lecture, at the GHI  
Speaker: Aleida Assmann; Commentator: Robert Novick  
Convener: Christof Mauch (GHI)

November 17  
Fritz Stern Dissertation Award and Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute, at the GHI  
Conveners: Gerald Feldman (Friends of the GHI) and Christof Mauch (GHI)

2007

Spring 2007  
Crossing Boundaries: Transatlantic Communities in the Early Modern World  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Thomas Adam (University of Texas, Arlington) and Gisela Mettele

March 22–25  
Environmental History and the Cold War (CfP)  
Conference at the GHI  
John McNeill (Georgetown University), Corinna Unger (GHI)

May 2–5  
German History, 1960–2000  
Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar, at the GHI  
Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
May 17–19  Gender, War, and Politics: The Wars of Revolution and Liberation—Transatlantic Comparisons 1775–1820
Conference at the Institute for Arts & Humanities, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Conveners: Karen Hagemann (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) and Gisela Mettele (GHI)

May 18–19  Immigrant Letters
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Wolfgang Helbich (Bochum University), Walter Kamphoefner (Texas A&M University), Anke Ortlepp (GHI)

May 31–June 2  Toward a New Transatlantic Space?
Conference in Leipzig
Conveners: Hartmut Keil (Leipzig), Corinna Unger (GHI)

June 2007  Archival Summer Seminar in Germany
Convener: Corinna Unger (GHI)
GHI PUBLICATIONS

PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
PUBLISHED IN COLLABORATION WITH CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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GHI STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY
PUBLISHED IN COLLABORATION WITH ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD
PUBLISHERS
Series Editor: Christof Mauch


TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN
PUBLISHED IN COLLABORATION WITH FRANZ STEINER VERLAG, STUTTGART
Series editors: Christof Mauch, Gisela Mettele, Anke Ortlepp


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**Bulletin**

Edited by Richard F. Wetzell. Published semiannually, in spring and fall, and available free of charge from the Institute.


26 (Spring 2000) Feature articles: Mary Fulbrook, “Fact, Fantasy, and German History” (13th Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 18, 1999); Konrad H. Jarausch, “The Limits of Common Sense:


28 (Spring 2001) Feature articles: Wolfgang Hardtwig, “Political Religion in Modern Germany: Reflections on Nationalism, Socialism, and National Socialism” (14th Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 9, 2000); Jane Caplan, “Politics, Religion, and Ideology” (Comment on the Annual Lecture); A Conversation with Fritz Stern; Johannes Dillinger, “American Spiritualism and German Sectarianism: A Comparative Study of the Societal Construction of Ghost Beliefs.”

29 (Fall 2001) Feature articles: Lord Ralf Dahrendorf, “Democracy Under Pressure: The European Experience” (First Gerd Bucerius Lecture, June 5, 2001); Robert Gerald Livingston, “From Harry S. to George W.: German-American Relations and American Presidents”; Deborah Cohen, “Comparative History: Buyer Beware.”


36 (Spring 2005) Feature Articles: Ute Frevert, “Europeanizing German History” (18th Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 18, 2004); David Blackbourn, comment on the Annual Lecture; W. Michael Blumenthal, “The Closest of Strangers: German-American Relations in Historical Perspective” (5th Gerd Bucerius Lecture, September 27, 2004); “Dramatizing German History: Michael Frayn on Democracy.”

BULLETIN SUPPLEMENTS


REFERENCE GUIDES

Please note: Nos. 1–7, 11 and 15 are out of print.


No. 12: Christof Mauch and Thomas Reuther, eds., with the assistance of Jan Eckel and Jennifer Rodgers, Americana in German Archives: A Guide to


ANNUAL LECTURE SERIES (out of print)


Note: This series has been discontinued. In 1997 the Annual Lecture was published as part of the Occasional Papers series. Since 1998 it is featured in the Bulletin (see above).
**Occasional Papers**

Series discontinued. Please note: Only nos. 6, 10, 13, 17, 22, and 23 are still in print.


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No. 19: Marion F. Deshmukh and Jerry Z. Muller, eds., *Fritz Stern at 70.* Washington, D.C., 1997.*


**CONFERENCE PAPER ON THE WEB (at www.ghi-dc.org)**


**ADDITIONAL PUBLICATIONS SUPPORTED BY THE GHI**


Matthias Judt and Burghard Ciesla, eds., *Technology Transfer Out of Germany After 1945.* Amsterdam, 1996.


