Almost fifty years ago, on June 12 and 13, 1953, the German Society for American Studies (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien, DGfA) was launched. With the founding act of Marburg, a new chapter was opened in the varied history of German research on the United States. For the first time, Germans specializing in American Studies joined together in an organized representation of interests, creating an interdisciplinary association exclusively dedicated to the study of American civilization, with elected officers, its own conferences and annual meetings, as well as its own scientific periodical, the *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* (Yearbook of American Studies).

In this endeavor, German scholars of America were not alone. They could count on the energetic support of American organizations, especially the American High Commission to Germany (HICOG), which assigned the cultivation and institutionalization of American Studies at German universities a very high political priority within its policies of higher education. In this respect, the founding of the DGfA shows a strong American influence. It was an integral part of the American reorientation efforts geared toward West Germany after World War II. In this sense, like political science, the study of America was meant to be a “democratizing science.” Simultaneously, the DGfA was a product of the Cold War since the study of America was seen as a supporting measure in the competition of the West with the Soviet Union and its allies.

In light of the transatlantic connection of the DGfA’s establishment, it is easy to overlook that there was a study of America in Germany prior to the founding of the DGfA. Unlike German political science, which only existed in rudimentary form before 1945, American Studies in Germany were rooted in prewar developments, both in terms of personnel and content. Whereas postwar political science recruited its members from the émigré scholars who had been forced to flee Nazi Germany and developed relatively free of National Socialist connotations, the history of West German American Studies presents a more complex picture. Like most disciplines in the humanities and social sciences in Germany, the study of American and English literature, whose representatives dominated the DGfA since 1953, showed a high degree of personal and intellectual continuity with the time before 1945.
The vicissitudes of American research done by Germans in the first half of the twentieth century, and the problems of continuity and discontinuity encapsulated therein, are mirrored in the biographies of its most prominent representatives. This is already apparent in a brief glance at the editorial committee of the *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien*. On the one hand, the inclusion of two well-known American representatives of American Studies, Professors Tremaine McDowell from the University of Minnesota (the “father” of American Studies) and Ralph L. Rusk from Columbia University, highlighted the transatlantic influence on the recasting of American Studies in Germany. This was further underscored by the inclusion of two returning émigrés, the political scientist Arnold Bergstraesser and the philosopher Helmut Kuhn (also Deputy Chairman of the DGfA 1956–57 and Chairman 1957–59). However, Arnold Bergstraesser, the driving force of German postwar American Studies (besides the founding editor Walther Fischer), was not a typical representative of the emigration. After completing his *Habilitation* with Alfred Weber in Heidelberg in 1928, he accepted a position as professor of political science and foreign studies (*Auslandskunde*) at the University of Heidelberg. He made a name for himself as an expert on France and sympathized with the “Conservative Revolution” of the Weimar era. After falling victim to expulsion on “racial grounds,” Bergstraesser emigrated to the United States, but annoyed Americans with his tone of German nationalism. He was even interned for a time as an alleged spy. In 1951–52, he was a guest professor in Frankfurt, afterwards in Erlangen. In 1954, he accepted the offer of a chair in political science and sociology at the University of Freiburg, where he had a lasting influence on the development of German political science, not least through his large group of students.

On the other hand, however, the editorial committee and board of the DGfA were dominated by professors whose academic careers had not abruptly ended after 1933. Walther Fischer, the first editor of the *Jahrbuch* and the first chairman of the DGfA (from 1953 to 1956), professor of English and American literature in Giessen from 1926 to 1946 and thereafter in Marburg, had applied for Nazi party membership, but refrained from any political activity during the Third Reich, concentrating on teaching within the narrow boundaries of his discipline. Three other members of the editing committee of the *Jahrbuch*, the political scientist Eduard Baumgarten, the English Studies scholar Theodor Spira (Chairman, 1956–57), and the historian Egmont Zechlin (Deputy Chairman, 1953–56), had researched and taught in Germany during the National Socialist period. Spira, a scholar of Shakespeare who was involved in foreign studies activities at the University of Königsberg, was forced to retire in 1940 due to his religious views. He was regarded as not having been implicated in
National Socialism. Baumgarten, a nephew and one of the editors of the estate of Max Weber as well as a former assistant of Martin Heidegger, had outlined a combative study of America at the beginning of the Third Reich. By understanding the nature of a foreign country, Baumgarten wanted to contribute to the “self-contemplation and self-disciplining” of the German people, thereby making foreign studies an integral part of the “political school” of the nation. His major, two-volume work, published during the Third Reich, Die geistigen Grundlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens (The Intellectual Foundations of American Society) shows more than just outward concessions to National Socialist ideology. According to Hans Jaos, Baumgarten did not support the Nazi seizure of power simply out of opportunism and self-protection, but reinterpreted the American “Spirit of Pragmatism” in a National Socialist sense.

Zechlin was by far the most seriously compromised member of the editorial committee. He taught in Berlin during the Third Reich as a scholar of foreign studies and belonged to a group of pro-Nazi scholars who signed the 1933 “University Professors’ Declaration of Loyalty to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State.” In 1945, Zechlin was only one of 24 history professors who were dismissed from their positions as “politically compromised.”

Whereas some of the founding fathers of the DGfA embodied an element of personal continuity from Weimar through the Third Reich into the Federal Republic, it is instructive to see who was not present at the creation of the DGfA in 1953. Thus, one would search in vain on the list of the DGfA’s founding fathers for the name of Friedrich Schönumann, the most well-known German Amerikanist in the two decades before 1945. Schönumann, who had originally received his Ph.D. in German Studies, had taught at various American universities from 1911 to 1920, in the end at Harvard University, and was one of the few German nationals who had remained in the United States during World War I. After returning to Germany in 1920, he became the first German to complete his Habilitation in the field of “North American Literary and Cultural History” in 1924. In 1936, he was appointed to the first official chair of American Cultural and Literary History in Germany. Schönumann joined the NSDAP in 1933 and frequently put his scholarly authority at the party’s disposal. During critical phases of German-American relations, for example, he commented on U.S. foreign policy in the Völkischer Beobachter, the main Nazi party newspaper. In the German Institute of Foreign studies (Deutsches Auslandswissenschaftliches Institut), a think tank modeled after the Council of Foreign Relations and closely related to the SS, Schönumann was the leading specialist on America. He played the same role at the Faculty of Foreign Studies at the University of Berlin, where he became director of the American Department. In 1951, at the first meeting of German scholars
of America in Munich after the war, he gave a keynote speech, calling for more jobs, more books, and more attention to American themes in schools and universities. Yet as a prominent American Studies scholar who was deeply involved in National Socialism, he embodied the ambivalences of German research on America too prominently to be welcomed into the founding circle of the DGfA two years later.

Schönemann’s absence at the initial conference of the DGfA signifies more than just a superficial cleansing of postwar American Studies from its personal burdens of the past. Zechlin’s presence at the conference meant that the founding members of the DGfA included at least one prominent scholar who, like Schönemann, had taught at the Foreign Studies Faculty in Berlin and who had strongly supported National Socialism. Other formerly National Socialist researchers were among the founding members of the younger generation. Therefore, I would argue that the exclusion of Schönemann was not only due to his National Socialist past but also to differences over the content of research. Schönemann’s cultural approach to an integrated field of American Studies, which he had tirelessly propagated since the early 1920s and successfully implemented in the Third Reich, had no future in the early Federal Republic. In light of the reconstruction of the traditional, pre-National Socialist order of academic disciplines and the elimination of the “reform subjects” of the Third Reich such as “newspaper science” (Zeitungswissenschaft), “war history” (Kriegsgeschichte), and “foreign studies” (Auslandswissenschaften), an all too obvious connection to the foreign and American Studies of the Nazi era represented by Schönemann would have sent the wrong political signal. The propagated formula of American Studies as a “cooperative experiment” therefore demonstrated a clear distancing from Schönemann’s conception of an integrated “super”-discipline of American Studies that was meant to transcend traditional disciplinary borders. At the same time, “cooperation” was also a concession by the DGfA’s philologists, who were led by Walther Fischer, to those, such as Arnold Bergstraesser, who wanted a close collaboration of all scholars of America from different disciplines. “Cooperation,” however, did not mean “integration” of various approaches into a new type of discipline—American Studies—such as one could observe in the United States and as was repeatedly demanded by the more radical representatives of transdisciplinary collaboration.

In the following paper I will therefore ask to what extent the debates of the 1920s about an integrated American Studies in Germany still lingered at the time of the founding of the DGfA in 1953? What were the concerns in the 1920s? How did German research on America develop in the era of the World Wars? How and under what circumstances did a transdisciplinary discipline of “American Studies” take shape under Na-
tional Socialism? How was this legacy handled after 1945? These questions can, of course, only be answered provisionally and would merit a more concerted research effort on the history of twentieth-century American Studies in Germany and Europe. In one of his last essays, the recently deceased historian of America Willi Paul Adams highlighted the need for a history of American Studies in Germany after 1945 and criticized the fact that until now, no article about the “coming to terms with the past” in West German American Studies has been published.\textsuperscript{20} Any such investigation into the history of West German American Studies would have to address the lines of tradition stretching from National Socialist immigration research into the postwar era, or from colonial and “overseas” history (\textit{Überseegeschichte}) to present day American history.\textsuperscript{21} Finally, it would be useful to have a systematic investigation into how the German foreign studies of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s and American Studies and Area Studies (the regional studies of the 1950s and 1960s) are related to one another.

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At the time of the founding of the DGfA in 1953, German research on America could look back on more than half a century of intensive intellectual engagement with the United States. American Studies had reached their first high point before World War I as a result of America’s rise to world power and the internationalization of intellectual communication.\textsuperscript{22} Distinguished scholars began to study the history and present state of American civilization. Max Weber inevitably came to discuss the United States when he investigated the connection between the spirit of capitalism and protestant ethics. The legal scholar Georg Jellinek compared American and French constitutional thought and attempted to trace the development of basic and human rights until the time of the American colonies. Werner Sombart asked himself the famous question why there was no socialism in the United States; the industrialist Ludwig Max Goldberger coined the phrase “land of endless opportunity” in a report on his travels. Erich Kaufmann completed his \textit{Habilitation} on the use of force in U.S. foreign policy; and the historian Hermann Oncken, who taught in Chicago as a guest professor in 1905-06, reflected on the role of the United States in the international system, not without attempting to find similarities in the foreign policies of Germany and the United States. In 1904, the psychologist Hugo Münsterberg, teaching at Harvard, wrote the first German-language synthesis on the culture and society of the United States.\textsuperscript{23} Given the boom of German research on America after the turn of the century, the entrance of the United States into the First World War had a sobering effect. The political usefulness of American Studies had proven to be very limited. Basic knowledge of the American political life was lacking in Germany, as Max Weber reflected self-critically in 1916.
“The fact that no one in Germany knows what an American election campaign is about and what results it has, in spite of all the examples from history, is an unprecedented scandal.”24 Their traditional cultural arrogance led the Germans to interpret American society as the “cultural grade zero” of a mechanized civilization “devoid of any spiritual qualities.”25 This feeling of cultural superiority was combined with a lack of understanding of the geopolitical realities of the North Atlantic region and of the political interests of the United States. President Woodrow Wilson’s defense of the rights of neutral nations and his (quite one-sided) reaction to submarine warfare were dismissed as a “technical denial of necessities,”26 although one should have considered that the submarine warfare, with its costs to American private property and above all else to American lives, represented a grave injury to the interests of the United States.27 In addition, the illusory hope that German-Americans would have some influence on American politics during World War I turned out to be a false perception, because their primary loyalty no longer lay with their old homeland, but rather with the country that had accepted them as immigrants.28

The ignorance about America (and other non-German cultures) that Max Weber and others complained about was fuel for the fire for Foreign Studies (Auslandswissenschaft) in Germany, which began to emancipate themselves from modern-language philology during World War I. In the last years of the Kaiserrreich, under the influence of the political turmoil of the war, the political usefulness of foreign studies was intensely debated. Carl Becker, originally a professor of Middle Eastern Studies and a senior official in the Prussian Ministry of Education (as well as reform-oriented Minister of Education during the Weimar years), claimed in a 1917 memorandum that while the non-philological studies of foreign cultures had to date served only the training of experts for state and economy, the knowledge of foreign countries had now become an “indispensable component of national education” for a “world nation” (Weltvolk). With violent force, he argued, the First World War had revealed the importance of a sound international education and the necessity of strengthening foreign studies inside and outside the universities. According to Becker, foreign studies should not be limited to the domain of colonial civil servants, business people, and diplomats. Rather it was meant to create a people educated in world politics.29

The reform of foreign studies was primarily directed against established modern-language philology, which the reformers regarded as too withdrawn and too theoretical. For the reformers, knowledge of other cultures was to be incorporated into civil education and to become politically applicable by helping to renew Germany’s international standing. Pure philology seemed hardly suitable for this utterly political project.
The nationally conservative philosopher and educator Eduard Spranger, who had been involved in the discussions in the Prussian Office of Education, strongly supported the idea of freeing foreign studies from its philological constraints in order to make it politically applicable. To Spranger, foreign studies was the analysis of a culture, combining a historical, geographical, and sociological viewpoint. For Spranger, the aim of this interdisciplinary method was to uncover and systematically determine the characteristics and traits of the “soul” of foreign people.  

During the 1920s, Wilhelm Dibelius, then professor of English language and literature from Bonn, became the driving force behind culturally and sociologically oriented English Studies. Like Spranger and Becker, he had been in government service during World War I. Based on his work in the war press office, he published his two-volume work entitled England, which served as a model for an analogous publication about France by Ernst Robert Curtius, a romance languages and literature scholar, and his co-author Bergstraesser, as well as for Friedrich Schöne mann’s synthesis on America, which appeared in 1932. In the introduction to his book, Dibelius wrote of the deeply disturbing impression that the German people had given “their best” in World War I in the “struggle against an enemy,” whom they did not know, “although for decades the best teachers of English” had been educated in Germany. The German people did not have the faintest idea about the “tremendous political will of England,” which pervaded “its entire state and cultural life.” Therefore, according to Dibelius, “the Prussian school master,” not the army had lost World War I because he had failed to implant “the political ability that would make Germany an international power in the generation after 1870.”

As becomes clear in Dibelius’ remarks, the military collapse of 1918 and the November revolution gave the development of foreign studies a different direction than was the case during the war. After 1919, academically based foreign studies were meant to pave the way for the revision of the Versailles Treaty: “In the desperate condition of our state, which is under multiple constraints, besides the strengthening and purification of our own national will, a fundamental knowledge of the foreign environment is of utmost importance,” wrote the Berlin geographer Walther Vogel, who had been entrusted with the formation of a “committee for foreign studies at the Friedrich-Wilhelms University in Berlin.” Since it had “tipped the scales,” America received much attention in the foreign studies discussion. “We faced the fact,” recalled Walther Fischer in 1929, “that the participation of a country toward which we had only the friendliest of feelings had been the decisive factor in our defeat. […] How had this been possible? Which political, economic, and psychological questions had forced the United States onto the side of our opponents? How
did it happen that the German public knew practically nothing about these things? It was within such a train of thought that the programmatic demand for American Studies in schools and colleges emerged. For the universities, one demanded special professorships or at least some lecturers for the newly established ‘study of America’ and for the schools, increased attention to American themes in English lessons.”

These demands for an intensification of American Studies in the context of Weimar revisionism were echoed by Friedrich Schönemann in the title of his programmatic essay Amerikastudien—Eine zeitgemässe Forderung (American Studies—a Contemporary Demand, 1921). Just as Dibelius would argue a short time later with reference to England, Schönemann saw the main reason for Germany’s defeat in the First World War as a lack of political insight into American society: “We finally lost the World War because we were not familiar enough with the United States. We neither knew their people, nor did we grasp their culture, their natural power, nor their national strength. For this reason, we also underestimated their will to go to war.”

Had the Germans examined the inner and outer conditions of American politics, Schönemann argued, they would neither have been surprised by the entrance of the United States into World War I, nor would they have fallen for Wilson’s “infamous fourteen points.” Unlike contemporary public opinion, which perceived Wilson’s “betrayal” as the foreign policy counterpart to the “stab in the back” of the 1918-9 Revolution, Schönemann argued that it was wrong to react to the defeat with emotional nationalism. Like the founders of the Berlin Hochschule für Politik (College of Politics), who took up the cause of political education with the goal of German “liberation and renewal,” Schönemann called for the sustained study of foreign countries as a prerequisite for Germany’s rebirth. For Schönemann, the political situation of the world required “soberness,” not national zeal. Germans possessed the “best historical education in Europe,” yet they were the “worst politicians of the world”: A deep “knowledge of America can only make us more sensible and political. It would sober us and place us in the only mental state in which we could pursue politics.”

Therefore, it was its character as a political instrument and “applied science” that made American Studies a “contemporary” demand to Schönemann. Like Spranger, Dibelius, and many other representatives of a culturally oriented, interdisciplinary approach to foreign studies, Schönemann pursued his American Studies agenda with a clear political target: “In order not to remain the political amateurs we were during the previous decade and who we are still today, we must cultivate applied historical studies more than ever.” Furthermore, American Studies would combine the “research methods of history and literary studies with the sharp observation and interpretation of economics,” it would
“productively unite study and experience,” and thus create “a truly stimulating field of study,” uncovering “the relationships of life, culture, and literature and leading to practical action on an intellectual basis.” Therefore, American Studies “would directly contribute to the rebuilding of Germany while destroying all possible prejudices against the United States, thereby leading the way to improving German diplomacy in Washington and in Germany itself. The proper knowledge of America would create a true interest in all things American and provide Germans with the proper internal orientation toward American society as well as toward German-Americans.”

The applied character of American Studies corresponded to its specific method—the amalgamating of several disciplines into a new, integrated field. Whereas literary studies had focused on an intrinsic interpretation of foreign-language texts, Schönemann attempted to analyze literature in its historical, social, economic, and cultural contexts, with the goal of a better understanding of the present. Therefore, Schönemann saw little advantage in studying modern American literature “without being fairly familiar with the present times in America. [...] More than other literatures of the world, American literature has the advantage of a fresh, political tone, which is completely in tune with the present. Everything is steeped in a self-confident and convincing republicanism.” Placed into its socio-cultural context, American literature, “a true mirror of the lives and entire culture of the people,” would lead to an understanding of the characteristics of the American “soul of the people.” Whoever was familiar with American literature would come “close to the spirit of America.”

By making a plea for his approach to American Studies, Schönemann confronted two well-established traditions at the same time. First, like all specialists on America since the 1920s, he opposed the one-sided privileging of British English and English literature at German schools and universities. He wanted to restrain the intellectual snobbery of traditional English literary studies, which was clearly detectable even in “modern” works taking a cultural approach such as Dibelius’ *England*. Secondly, Schönemann’s integrated approach to foreign studies was also directed against the epistemological premises of English Studies. As a result of the great “Americanism”-debate of the Weimar years, it had been understood at least among the experts that American literature should not be treated as a mere appendage of English literature. Nevertheless, Schönemann’s comprehensive American Studies program met with vehement resistance not only from a few anglocentric traditionalists. Even Schönemann’s professional colleagues in the American Studies field maintained that an integration of literary historical, economical, and socio-intellectual approaches to the topic, as well as an expansion of American Studies into
a comprehensive cultural analysis of the USA, was impractical and intellectually unsound. It was argued that cross-disciplinary professorships, such as Schönemann was demanding for American Studies, would be purely receptive and not productive because those responsible for teaching and researching in such an integrated discipline would be forced to rely on second-hand knowledge for the variety of information they had to digest.47

In light of these resistances it is not surprising that during the Weimar era American Studies led a marginal existence within English departments as well as in the social and historical sciences. Despite an intensification of German-American relations during the 1920s and despite a growing number of classes in American history and culture taught at the universities of Göttingen, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Berlin, where smaller centers of American Studies emerged, American Studies was not successfully institutionalized at German universities.48 Only in Berlin, where Friedrich Schönemann began to establish an American section within the English Department around 1926, a slow institutionalization of American Studies became apparent in the middle of the 1920s. Because not everyone could agree on Schönemann’s integrated study of America, his career as a university teacher was hindered rather than helped by his avid promotion of American Studies. That Schönemann so willingly jumped on the National Socialist bandwagon in 1933 also had to do with the fact that because of the deeply rooted disciplinary particularism at German universities, the “father of American studies” had not been successful with his reform concepts in the 1920s. Therefore, National Socialism offered him the first chance to put his plans into action.49

The expansion of research on the United States in the Third Reich thus took place against the resistance of the established scholars of English. Schönemann’s appointment to the first chair for American Literary and Cultural History was in no way welcomed by the representatives of modern languages and literature.50 Furthermore, despite the growing interest of the Nazi authorities in foreign studies, the average number of relevant classes taught at German universities during the prewar years of the Third Reich remained constant. When Sigmund Skard took stock of American Studies in Germany during the 1950s he counted a total of 252 courses for the years 1933 and 1939, with an average of 22 classes per semester, which corresponded exactly to the average of the Weimar years. Only during the Second World War did a significant expansion of the class offerings relating to America occur: a total of 371 courses, which increased the average number per semester to 34.51 This considerable increase can be explained by the growing significance of the United States for Nazi Germany as well as by the ideologically, economically, and politically motivated expansion of foreign studies in several institutes.
serving “the needs of state and economy,” such as the German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart, the America Institute, and the Foreign Studies Faculty in Berlin.\textsuperscript{52} Because the American experts of the Third Reich increasingly provided “political advice” to the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Propaganda, the SS and the German Army, there was an even heavier concentration of scholarly American activities in Berlin during the war years than ever before. In 1939, 53\% of all courses related to America were taught in Berlin, whereas it had been only 35\% before 1933.\textsuperscript{53}

The expansion of American Studies in the Third Reich put into practice some of the demands that Schönemann and others had raised during the 1920s. In a politically charged speech at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (German College for Politics) in 1933, Schönemann welcomed the fact that this institution had established a department for foreign studies, stressing the point that “the assessment of America as the biggest and most powerful country in the world” would be one of the most pressing tasks of any foreign studies program.\textsuperscript{54} In the Third Reich, however, the institutional implementation of American Studies did not lead to the intensification of scholarly research for which Schönemann had originally hoped. The price to be paid was emigration and expulsion, as well as an increasing alignment with the pedagogical aims of the Nazi state and an almost exclusive orientation toward applied research. As formulated by Karl-Heinz Pfeffer, one of the leading foreign-studies scholars of the Third Reich, the study of America became an integral element of foreign studies as “political reconnaissance (Geländekunde) […] which had to do pioneering work” for the foreign, business, and cultural aims of Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{55} Because the future great German empire would “grow even more powerful as the decisive country in international relations,” as a programmatic essay from 1940 stated, the task of foreign studies had become “giving the emerging generation a consistent, intellectually sound, very concrete conception of the world.”\textsuperscript{56}

It is therefore only superficially ironic that the institutionalization of an autonomous American Studies did not take place in a phase of intensive German-American cooperation, such as the 1920s or 1950s, but rather in an era in which the political relations between the two countries had cooled considerably.\textsuperscript{57} The expansion of American Studies after 1933 was carried out within the framework of a foreign studies paradigm that had subordinated itself to the political goals of the National Socialist state. Schönemann’s conception of the study of America as a form of interdisciplinary “integration” threatened the existence of Anglo-American modern-language philology, which he criticized as too withdrawn and not sufficiently application oriented. With Schönemann’s appointment to the Berlin chair for American Cultural and Literary History, only one faction within Germany’s American Studies had been successful, while the stron-
ger consideration of American themes in the lesson plans and textbooks for English, history, and geography lessons in the Third Reich met with the approval of all American Studies experts. Therefore, the development of American Studies in the Third Reich was a highly selective and one-sided innovation process that was clearly subordinated to the political goals of National Socialism.

Because integrated American Studies as they had been promoted by Schönemann had proven to be compatible with the anti-western, antidemocratic goals of National Socialist ideology, it is not surprising that they were met with resentment inside German universities after 1945. Therefore, the privileging of American research by the occupying power, which, as Willi Paul Adams has written, was “envied by the established disciplines,” was not the only cause of the resistance to American Studies. In his investigation of the perception of the Third Reich in the immediate postwar era, the Heidelberg historian Eike Wolgast has recently argued that the universities reacted to the experience of National Socialism by taking a deliberately apolitical stance. Therefore, the criticism voiced at the founding of the America Institute in Munich whose “size and extravagant provisions,” provoked “suspicions of injustice,” is not to be explained only by organizational problems, internal power struggles, and an anti-American reflex of the West German elite, but also by a general resentment of any political intervention in academic affairs. These reservations fed off the experiences of the National Socialist era as well and were not exclusively directed against the American military government. The suspicion of “ulterior political motives” was part of the historical baggage that American Studies carried with it because of its institutionalization under National Socialism, even though the occupying power fostered American research in the interest of a diametrically opposed political objective.

In light of this dual historical background one can begin to understand the meaning of the compromise formula of American Studies as a “cooperative attempt,” which was proposed by Arnold Bergstraesser at the founding conference of the DGfA in 1953. Bergstraesser defended the gains that American Studies had made in the 1920s and 1930s under the auspices of the foreign studies paradigm and argued against a return to a purely philological way of studying American society. He even defended the cultural-sociological approach to foreign studies of the interwar period against critical objections which they had attracted because of their involvement with National Socialism. For Bergstraesser, American Studies was necessary as a “cultural analysis of countries” because the encounter with foreign cultures had intellectually, economically, socially, and politically taken on unprecedented levels of importance. Furthermore, the role of the US as the politically, economically, and technologi-
cally leading country of the Western world made it imperative to study the impact of American civilization. In order to adequately assess America, he asked for a methodologically innovative approach in the shape of a “cooperative attempt of various disciplines.” That comparable attempts had fallen on fertile ground during the Third Reich was not a valid objection for Bergstraesser. Under National Socialism, “intellectually, politically, and ethically wrong and corrupting conclusions had been drawn” from accurate knowledge of the “actual relations of the world.”

As Bergstraesser’s programmatic speech at the founding congress of the DGfA reveals, the interwar debates over the epistemological premises of an integrated, transdisciplinary, and culturally oriented American Studies were very much present in the minds of the founders. Whereas Walther Fischer took a critical stance, fearing that the intensification of American Studies could come at the expense of modern language philology, Bergstraesser attempted to take these reservations into consideration by distancing himself from the integrated synthesis called for by Schönemann since 1921. He therefore rejected the idea of intervening in the traditional organization of the disciplines. On the other hand, Bergstraesser argued that individual disciplines should show “greater flexibility in receiving ideas and actively seeking out ideas from other disciplines” and strive for interdisciplinary collaboration. Therefore, Bergstraesser’s conception opened a new perspective for interdisciplinary cooperation in American research, while rejecting a synthetic merger of different disciplines in the form of regional studies. Bergstraesser pleaded for interdisciplinary American research, not for a new integration of disciplines. The latter had been promoted by Schönemann, who could no longer prevail due to his prominent role in the Third Reich, although one could argue that his concept of integrated American Studies was probably closer to the American Studies as they were favored by HICOG and his American colleagues than by the philologically aligned Amerikanistik that Walther Fischer defended.

Recently, interdisciplinary regional studies have met with increasing skepticism in Germany. In its recommendations for the structural planning for the Berlin universities on May 12, 2000, the German National Science Board (Wissenschaftsrat) criticized the regional approach, because all scholarship should approach its subject from a disciplinary point of view and categories such as “area” and “region” stand in no relation to scientific disciplines, methods, or theory formation in the relevant subjects. As we have seen, the reservations of the Wissenschaftsrat have a long prehistory. Comparable arguments were advanced against American Studies in the 1920s and 1950s, particularly by the representatives of modern-language philology. Nevertheless, there has been noteworthy progress since the 1950s, even though the DGfA, dominated by philolo-
gists, has addressed the issue of theoretical and methodological premises of interdisciplinary American Studies with some hesitancy. During the 1960s and 1970s, American Studies were increasingly institutionalized. Of particular importance are the John F. Kennedy Institute für Nordamerikastudien (John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies) in Berlin and the Zentrum für Nordamerikaforschung (Center for North American Research) in Frankfurt-am-Main, which have contributed substantially to the establishment of American Studies in Germany not only within the humanities and social sciences but also outside of academia. At heart, both institutes represent a realization of Arnold Bergstraesser’s plans. In the area of teaching, the situation has also substantially improved since 1953 because disciplinary limits are less apparent in education than in research. Today integrated American Studies programs, modeled after American and international programs, exist in Bonn/Cologne, Berlin, and Munich. Erlangen and Frankfurt offer majors in North American Studies, and an “Atlantic Studies” program exists in Erfurt. Furthermore, there are concrete plans in Heidelberg to integrate American Studies more strongly into research and teaching in interdisciplinary ways. In light of this success, the fifty-year anniversary of the DGfA offers an occasion to reflect once again about the meaning and scope of interdisciplinary cooperation in the field of American Studies. In this sense, Arnold Bergstraesser’s programmatic thoughts at the DGfA founding conference in 1953 still represent an important point of departure.

Translated by Janel B. Galvanek and Richard F. Wetzell.

Notes

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3 Gisela Strunz, American Studies oder Amerikanistik? Die deutsche Amerikawissenschaft und die Hoffnung auf Erneuerung der Hochschulen und der politischen Kultur nach 1945 (Opladen, 1999), 233f.


5 See Peter Schüttler, ed. Geschichte als Legitimationswissenschaft 1918–1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1997); Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle, eds. Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main, 1999); Johannes Weyer, Westdeutsche Soziologie 1945–1960: Deutsche Kontinuitäten und nordamerikanischer Einfluß (Berlin, 1984). On the problem of “coming to terms with the past” in American literary studies, see Hans-Peter Wagner, “Stepping out of Hitler’s Shadow to Embrace Uncle Sam: Notes toward a History of American Literary

6 Kuhn, born 1899, emigrated to the United States in 1937, after he was denounced as an anti-Nazi when he was traveling abroad, see *International Biographical Dictionary for Central European Emigrés*, vol. II, Part I: A–K, The Arts, Sciences, and Literature (München u.a., 1983), 672.


11 Hans Joas, *Pragmatismus und Gesellschaftstheorie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 130ff.; the attempt of the National Socialist reinterpretation of pragmatism is especially apparent in an early essay, Eduard Baumgarten, “Die pragmatische und instrumentale Philosophie John Deweys,” *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* 10 (1934): 236–248; see also Baumgarten, Benjamin Franklin: *Der Lehrmeister der amerikanischen Revolution* (Frankfurt am Main, 1936) (Die geistigen Grundlagen des amerikanischen Gemeinwesens, vol. 1); *Der Pragmatismus: R.W. Emerson, W. James, J. Dewey* (Frankfurt am Main, 1938) (dto., vol. 2).

12 See Winfried Schulze, *Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach 1945* (München, 1989), 35, 127; on Zechlin (1896–1992), who made a name for himself as a media researcher in the postwar era, see *Deutsche Biographische Enzyklopädie* (hereafter quoted as DBE).


17 See the list of the 33 founding members, DGfA Archive, Mainz. I am indebted to Anke Hildebrandt of the University of Halle-Wittenberg who is working on a dissertation about the history of the DGfA and made this document available to me.


21 This continuity was prominently embodied by Heinz Kloss, who was a researcher at the German International Institute (Deutsches Auslands-Institut) in Stuttgart and who completed his work started in the Third Reich with publication of Atlas der im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert entstandenen Siedlungen in den USA (Marburg, 1975); see Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich, 128ff.; Cornelia Wilhelm, Bewegung oder Verein? Nationalsozialistische Völkerbewegung in den USA (Stuttgart: 1998), 152–157.


24 In a letter to Friedrich Naumann dated February 7, 1916: Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften (München, 1921), 461 (original emphasis).


29 “Die Denkschrift des preußischen Kultusministeriums über die Förderung der Auslandsstudien,” Internationale Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 11, Issue 5, February 1917, 513–531, quotes on 514, 517; see also the parliamentary discussion about the memorandum: “Die Auslandsstudien im preußischen Landtag,” in ibid., Issue 7, April 1, 1917, 770–819; on Carl Becker (1876–1933), the founder of the study of Islam in Germany, who in 1921 and from 1925 to 1930 acted as non-party Prussian Minister of Education, see DBE.

eds. Reinhard Blomert, Helmut Kuzmics, and Annette Treibel, (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), 199–278.

31 On Dibelius (1876-1931), see DBE; Thomas Finkenstaedt, *Kleine Geschichte der Anglistik in Deutschland* (Darmstadt, 1983), 141ff.


37 Ibid., 3.


39 According to Bleek in *Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft*, 200f., citing Theodor Heuss.


41 Ibid., 7; Schönemann gives an example of such related historical studies with his essay *Die Kunst der Massenbeeinflussung in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (Stuttgart, 1924).

42 Ibid., 12.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 9f.


46 For example, see especially the efforts of Walther Fischer, *Geschichte der nordamerikanischen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1926); see also Heinrich Mutschmann, “Die Bedeutung des Amerikastudiums,” *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* 5 (1929): 46–53; on the Americanism debate, see Gassert, *Amerika im Dritten Reich*, 46–77; Egbert Klautke, *Unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten? Amerikanisierung in Deutschland und Frankreich* (1900–1933), Stuttgart (forthcoming).


49 See Freitag, *Entwicklung*, 115; Beck “Friedrich Schönemann,” 388ff.; Freitag refers to information from Schönemann’s wife as well as former colleagues; until 1936 Schönemann had only an assistant position.


64 Bergstraesser, “Amerikastudien,” 12.

65 On the concepts of the HICOG, see Strunz, *American Studies*, 181f.
