EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE WAR IN VIETNAM

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This essay argues that European perspectives on the Vietnam War were to a large degree informed by different national experiences with colonialism and decolonization. My intention is to illustrate how these experiences helped to shape British, French, and German world views that in turn underlay the reactions of these nations to the Vietnam War.

Our understanding of the process of decolonization has recently benefited from a considerable broadening of perspectives. The traditional examination of relations between center and periphery, colony and mother country, has been expanded to include both global political and economic structures and the domestic dynamics of colonial societies.1 In addition, Marc Frey has recently made a compelling case for carrying the study of decolonization beyond the formal transfer of power.2 Even more important for the context of this essay is a growing awareness of developments within European colonial states and of the interdependence between colonizer and colonized. If colonialism is, as Jürgen Osterhammel has argued, a reciprocal relationship, there must have also been a “decolonization of the colonizer” or, to put it positively, a “re-Europeanization of the (West) European great powers.”3 Thus, historians are beginning to notice and trace the impact of the reversal of a centuries-old pattern, namely, the return of European colonial settlers and administrators to their homelands, sometimes followed by a considerable number of the formerly colonized.4 Harry Goulbourne, for example, has shown how decolonisation crucially affected concepts of ethnicity and nationality in Britain, and he has rightly observed that “the post-imperial experience [. . .] must [. .] be taken to be the opposite side of the post-colonial coin.”5

Building on these insights, the basic premise of the following exposition is that this metropolitan experience of decolonization, its different character in Britain and France as well as its seeming absence in West Germany, played a major role in how these countries perceived American actions in Southeast Asia.

Britain—Godfather of Orderly Transitions

The British experience of decolonization has long been viewed as exceptional. A tradition of decolonization going back as far as the American
Revolution is generally seen to have informed pragmatic approaches that were able to direct the forces of Asian and African nationalism into evolutionary rather than revolutionary channels. Traces of this narrative were already apparent in the 1950s when the opposition Labour Party developed an intellectually coherent approach to decolonization, a vision that was essentially accepted by Conservative governments as well. India’s transition to statehood served as what might be called the founding myth of this approach and became the prime example of guiding a people to independence. At the same time, the idea—as George Boyce has put it—“that the empire was not declining but was merely being transformed” stood in the way of a fundamental reassessment of Britain’s position in the world. “What was Great Britain in the mid-twentieth century? Was she . . . the leader of the Commonwealth, a major European nation, America’s special partner . . . ?” The answer to these questions, formulated by former American Under-Secretary of State George Ball in the late 1960s, was that postwar British politicians chose to play all of these roles. That was indeed the only way to pretend that Britain was still a great world power. Cultivating a “special relationship” with the United States alleviated the sting of imperial decline and added weight in the councils of Europe and the Commonwealth. Conversely, leadership in the Commonwealth and in Europe would increase Britain’s importance for the United States, allowing the United Kingdom, as Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin hoped, “to apply a brake to American policy if necessary.”

These hopes were soon to be frustrated in Southeast Asia. There, the victory of the Chinese Communists, their immediate diplomatic recognition of Ho Chi Minh’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam (with the Soviets and their satellites following suit), and the outbreak of the Korean War had molded the region in the image of the Cold War. Sinophobia and a Manichean understanding of the global ideological struggle soon led the United States to conflate communism and anticolonialism. The British, on the other hand, were not as inclined to view developments in Asia exclusively through a Cold War lens. To be sure, countering communism was of prime importance to Whitehall. In addition, however, imperial responsibilities especially with regard to Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaya called for a more pragmatic approach to the region’s stabilization, including the diplomatic recognition of communist China and a rather flexible stance on Indochina. Equally important, London’s self-perception as the godfather of an orderly transition to statehood in its colonies induced it to ascribe greater weight to the yearning for independence in Asia and Africa.

It was not least to create some breathing space for such orderly transitions that Bevin’s successor Anthony Eden brokered the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina. With an eye on the image of the West among
peoples struggling for their independence, British officials were even willing to risk a communist victory in Vietnamese general elections, hoping that a Vietminh Government would keep some distance from both Moscow and Beijing. Their internal memoranda betray harsh criticism of America’s foiling of the elections. Whitehall was similarly exasperated by the American decision to stick with South Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. However, lacking a reasonable alternative and always concerned about the Anglo-American “special relationship,” the British chose not to put pressure on Washington, thereby establishing a fateful pattern in their attitude toward U.S. engagement in Vietnam, which could be summarized as a reluctance to apply the brakes for fear of running out of brake fluid.

To be sure, Britain never lost its skepticism toward American policy in Southeast Asia. But instead of protesting to the Americans, the British tried to employ the Commonwealth, and particularly India, as a force for stability in the region and as an influence that would moderate between American and Asian preconceptions. This approach culminated in the abortive Commonwealth peace mission of 1965. While the effort was possible only because of the relatively benign character of the end of empire, it also proved that the structure of the Commonwealth was rather unsuited for the task.

In bilateral British-American relations, London was always reluctant to expend too much capital on Vietnam. Moreover, the defense of Malaysia against the Indonesian policy of Konfrontasi from 1963 on and the simultaneous worsening of the situation in Vietnam suggested a policy of mutual support between the two Western powers. In 1964, Whitehall combined rhetorical support for American policy with opposition to a larger British role in Vietnam and a tacit preference for negotiations. The Foreign Office decided not to broach this preference in Washington prior to the American elections. However, once the elections were over and Prime Minister Harold Wilson went to see President Lyndon Johnson in December, the moment again seemed inauspicious given the president’s reinforced determination to stand firm in Southeast Asia. When the prospect of escalation finally propelled Wilson to seek a frank discussion with the President two months later, Johnson told him in no uncertain terms to mind his own business. On the other hand, the Americans always recognized that Britain was carrying its part of the regional anticommunist burden in Malaysia. This, and later on the objective of postponing the British withdrawal East of Suez and of stabilizing British commitments to NATO kept Washington from exerting sustained pressure on London for a larger contribution in Vietnam.

As for Great Britain, her global networks and multiple roles in NATO, in the Commonwealth and as co-chair of the International Com-
mission for Supervision and Control of the Geneva Agreements on Indochina reflected her continuing status as a world power and almost designated her to act as an honest broker. The Wilson government, however, had to walk a tightrope in this regard. On the one hand, economic and security considerations did not allow the British to stray too far from American policy. On the other hand, British notions of decolonization, which entailed the creation of strong indigenous governments and orderly withdrawal, were diametrically opposed to what was happening in Vietnam. It is not surprising then that Wilson’s Vietnam policy was increasingly criticized from within the ranks of his own party, leading the prime minister to distance himself from certain aspects of American policy if not from that policy in general.

France—Grandeur et Grincheux

The French did not hesitate to dismiss American policy lock, stock, and barrel. But then France was also in a very dissimilar position from the British, not least because of its decidedly different experience of decolonization. Whereas Britain had reoccupied her Southeast Asian possessions after World War II in order to prepare them for independence and had eventually taken pride in the relative success of this paternalistic mission, France never contemplated giving up her empire in the region. If colonial expansion had already been a project of national rehabilitation after 1870/71, then the recovery of overseas possessions was even more crucial to repair the damage done to French prestige during World War II. Thus the series of French schemes in postwar Indochina was designed to maintain the colonial power’s position as far as possible. When the periphery turned out to be an economic liability rather than an asset, Paris sought to enlist American assistance, holding out acceptance of the European Defense Community in return. The United States, however, was unwilling to finance French colonialism. Washington blamed much of the Vietnamese mess on French ineptitude and before long actively promoted French withdrawal in order to get on with the business of state-building. There were certainly more than a few French officials who, in the words of journalist Jean Lacouture, “felt that in the Indochina affair . . . there was . . . an American game, a trick to supplant the French.”

In contrast to the British, then, France was, in the 1950s at least, unable to use aspects of decolonization as building blocks for a post-imperial identity. On the other hand, European integration provided her with a convenient fallback position. In fact, French metropolitan decolonisation took the form of re-Europeanization much earlier and much less ambiguously than the British retreat from Empire. Up to the mid-1950s,
developments in Indochina slowed down European integration; thereafter they accelerated it. French modernists such as Jean Monnet, Robert Marjolin or Gaston Deferre perceived the dissolution of colonial empires and the beginnings of European unification as inseparably intertwined. Quickly dismissing the idea that Europe might be enlisted to save the French Union, Paris instead decided to mobilize the resources necessary for the modernization of French society by pulling her remaining client states with her into Europe.21 Thus Europe did not save but replace the Empire.

The problem with the replacement was, however, that it lacked the necessary grandeur as long as it remained heavily dependent on the United States. Therefore, when Charles de Gaulle returned to restore French greatness he faced two major tasks: first, to finish the business of decolonisation in order to concentrate on Europe as the future basis from which to project global power; and second, to break up the bipolar structure of international relations in order to make room for other powers next to the United States and the Soviet Union.

Educated before 1914, de Gaulle was thinking in nineteenth-century categories. He would have had a hard time comprehending Benedict Anderson’s idea of the nation as an imagined community. To him, the nation represented the only community that could be imagined as an actor on the world stage and the only entity that would survive the tradewinds of time. He was looking for a concert of nations, not unlike the European Concert of a century earlier but now including non-European powers—a concert, nevertheless, to replace the American-Soviet duet. Whereas the dichotomy of the Cold War legitimized U.S. leadership of the Free World, it limited French independence. This is what de Gaulle was chiseling away at when he pronounced that France saw herself as belonging to but not being confined to the western world.22 It is also what French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou had in mind when he declared in 1965 that “The old division of the world into two monolithic blocs is outdated. Out of this emerges France’s role. She is condemned by her geographic situation and her history to represent Europe.”23 Here Pompidou also named the two principal factors that, according to de Gaulle, determined the interests of nations. De Gaulle believed, in the words of a research memorandum prepared for the U.S. Department of State, “that geography and history rather than ideology basically govern political alignments. As a consequence, the present East-West conflict is not a crusade to the death between competing ideologies but a contest for power arising essentially out of the misunderstanding of their own national interest by present and recent Russian leaders.”24

To be sure, de Gaulle’s understanding of national interest was not devoid of racial biases. Thus he reminded Russian leaders that theirs was
“a white nation of Europe . . . richly endowed with land, mines, factories and wealth, face to face with the yellow masses of China, numberless and impoverished, indestructible and ambitious, . . . casting her eyes about her on the open spaces over which she must one day spread.” Similar distinctions along ethnic lines may have helped him cast off the myth of an Algeria populated by French citizens. The French Minister of Information, Alain Peyrefitte, recorded him one day exclaiming, “Arabs are Arabs, Frenchmen are Frenchmen. Do you believe that the French body could absorb ten million Muslims, who would be twenty million tomorrow and forty the day after that? . . . My hometown would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées!”

To American interlocuters “le général” explained that Southeast Asia was “a ‘rotten’ territory” and “that the Vietnamese had no stomach for the war.” Nevertheless, it was his conviction that nationalism, this most French of all -isms, could not be stopped, which led him to push ahead with decolonisation. “In the matter of decolonization,” he told his cabinet, “the only victory is to go away.”

The same conviction also formed the basis of his belief that the American endeavor in Vietnam was doomed to fail. American designs of democracy would be smashed to smithereens by Vietnamese nationalism in much the same way that French paternalism had been. Even more important, de Gaulle was convinced that the same fate awaited communism, be it of the Soviet or Chinese variety. As de Gaulle had put it in his World War II memoirs already in 1954: “In the world’s incessant movement, all doctrines, all schools, all rebellions last only for a while. Communism will pass away. But France will not pass away.” The predominance of nationalism over communism suggested that the conflict in Southeast Asia could be resolved by traditional balance-of-power methods. This required the participation of Red China. Whereas Washington’s ideologically driven policy attempted to isolate Beijing, France extended diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic, and de Gaulle declared that a solution to the crisis in Southeast Asia was impossible if it excluded the major power within the region. France wanted the People’s Republic and the United States to agree to a neutral buffer zone in Southeast Asia stretching from Indonesia in the south to India in the west and Taiwan and the Philippines in the east. According to an analysis prepared in the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, it was de Gaulle’s view that within this neutral buffer zone “the elements of real national strength in Southeast Asia (Sihanouk, Sukarno, Ho Chi Minh) must be given full rein and latitude to rule the area’s destinies, irrespective of their ideological character.” Washington’s Manichean Cold-War approach to Southeast Asia was not compatible with de Gaulle’s world view of a multilateral concert of great powers trying to reconcile their competing
interests regardless of ideological preferences. In this regard, it is certainly true, as Anne Sa'adah has aptly observed, that de Gaulle “had a critique of American policy in Indochina even before the United States had a policy in Indochina.”

In addition, and unlike the Americans, de Gaulle never really saw any difference between the first and the second Indochina wars. It is indeed almost amusing to watch how France and the United States, in their perceptions of each other’s actions in Southeast Asia, traded places within a decade. De Gaulle now declared that Americans were against every colonialism except their own. His success in disentangling France from the Algerian imbroglio even allowed him to assume the mantle of decolonizer who could contrast France’s wise withdrawal from Africa favorably with a superpower that ravaged a small nation. This, at least, was the not too subtle message emanating from his speech in Phnom Penh on September 1, 1966 as well as from numerous other pronouncements. While Americans felt that it was a “disgusting slander” to compare their own role in Vietnam with the role of France down to 1954, while women returned French-made handbags to New York department stores, Chicago restaurant owners stopped serving French wines, and more imaginative minds started to stick pins into de Gaulle voodoo dolls, “le général” continued publicly to advise Washington to heed the lessons Paris had learned in Indochina and in Algeria. In a sense, Algeria represented France’s India. And indeed de Gaulle viewed the 1962 accords between France and Algeria as a model for relationships between the western world and less developed countries. The French experience of decolonization therefore provided France both with a reason to sulk because of its humiliation at American hands in Southeast Asia, and with an example of a successful retreat, which could be held up to their successor in Vietnam. More important, this experience forced France to seek grandeur through Europe by opposing the American contention that there was a unity of interest in the Free World and instead seeking to resuscitate a many-voiced concert of great powers independently guarding their own national interests. These cornerstones of postcolonial French identity lay at the heart of de Gaulle’s relentless criticism of American actions in Vietnam.

Germany—Postnational Power in Postimperial Europe

In contrast to France, it was impossible for Germany after World War II to contemplate imperial greatness or even to unilaterally articulate its national interests. Besides, Germany had lost what little it had of a colonial empire already during World War I. In any event, the Emperor’s Asian possessions had been mainly confined to a single spot on the Chi-
nese coast. Kiaochow had been acquired in 1897 with the colonialists explaining “that Germany needed a coaling station for her navy—which at that time hardly existed, but which was then created, as A. J. P. Taylor put it, in order to protect the coaling station.” After 1945 Germany was not merely a postimperial country, however; it was in fact a postnational one. This refers not only to the ensuing territorial division of the nation but also to the profound lack of orientation experienced by a population that had witnessed the complete military and moral collapse of National Socialism. In trying to reconstruct a national identity, Germans therefore used to make reference to supranational frameworks. One of these frameworks was the so-called “Christian Occident.” This concept rejected both materialism and the notion of mass men, thereby conveniently distancing its adherents in West Germany from fascism as well as from communism and integrating them into the antitotalitarian consensus of the postwar era. However, the concept also smacked of premodern mythology and its implicit reservation against secularization soon appeared out of place in a society marked by dramatic economic and technological change.

Another supranational framework that outlasted and eventually replaced the Christian Occident was the Free West. The Free West was more than a mere geographic landscape. Its demarcation lines were defined by a specific set of generally accepted values and norms like pluralism, democracy, individualism, and freedom. The conditions of the Cold War made Germans susceptible to this long despised concept of the West. It offered inclusion, refuge and a new sense of belonging. The United States spent considerable sums to nurture the West Germans’ ideological integration into the West. A major tool in this regard were cultural centers, so-called America Houses, that represented, in the words of an American cultural attaché in Bonn, “the visible symbols of our determination to weld Germany irrevocably to the free world.” The citizens of the Federal Republic, therefore, became West Germans in more than one sense.

It is no surprise, then, that West Germans internalized the bipolar certainties of the East-West conflict and that they viewed much of what was going on in the world through the lens of the Cold War, including the process of decolonization. Moscow lurked as the moving spirit behind almost every development that seemed threatening. Thus, to German politicians the 1954 Geneva accords looked like “appeasement.” In their eyes, the Soviet program appeared as follows: “Beijing is conquered, now the stakes are in Calcutta and what is connected to it, Indochina and so on—to create the position there from which to attack the West with the massed force of the East.” Chancellor Konrad Adenauer explained that “communism has two major theaters of operation. One of these theaters
is Europe, the other, right now, is Asia.” The chancellor also warned his party that Algeria was not a colonial but a European question. If the country would fall into communist hands, the Soviets would hold Western Europe in a double lock.Officials in the Foreign Office feared that the brutal war in Algeria might drive the country into communist arms. They wanted France to relent so that cooperation between North Africa and the West would still be possible, even after a possible French withdrawal. The Free World, it was felt, had to assess the Algerian problem not from a colonial but “from a higher and therefore more correct viewpoint.”

By the late 1950s, the Free West had long since turned into the Free World, now solely defined by the absence of communist regimes. Soon, Vietnam became the forward defense line of the Free World. Almost simultaneously it came to represent a symbol for the staying power of this “imagined community.” It was not only some distant spot in Southeast Asia, which was threatened there, then, but also the framework of West Germany’s nascent identity. It was therefore more than a phrase when Chancellor Ludwig Erhard declared that there was no country more closely attached to Vietnam than Germany, even if it lay far away geographically. The standard expression to capture this relationship was the analogy between Saigon and Berlin, which U.S. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy carried to extremes when he remarked “that the defense of Berlin, right now, is in Vietnam.”

The Berlin-Saigon analogy and the underlying idea of an indivisible freedom adapted Vietnam to the dualistic framework of the Cold War, located it unambiguously on the map of the Free World, and interconnected U.S. policy in Southeast Asia with the most fundamental political experiences of West Germans. The dichotomy of Free World vs Evil Empire allowed for easy identification. A study prepared on behalf of the U.S. government by the political scientist Karl Deutsch found that German leaders indicated an “emotional attachment to the image of a bipolar world.” Contrary to their European partners in Paris, the Germans not only willingly accepted the notion of a holistic Free World, they were also prepared to concede its leadership to Washington. Responding to de Gaulle’s 1958 scheme of a Franco-British-American triumvirate, a German Foreign Office memorandum observed that “the political strength of the present western alliance is based on respect for the equality of each member state . . ., with these member states in turn voluntarily acknowledging the leadership role of the United States.” Given the strongly divergent French and German world views it was only to be expected that the issue of Vietnam would prove to be a burden on the Franco-German alliance as codified in the 1963 Elysée Treaty. Chancellor Erhard in particular could not comprehend why de Gaulle wanted to transform
dualism into pluralism. “The Free World,” he told his party, “should realize that only a uniform policy can advance our cause.” To be sure, in its quest for security, reunification, and European integration the Federal Republic could not afford to wholly abandon either the U.S. or France. Franco-American tension regarding Vietnam was therefore a major reason for Bonn’s official silence on the issue up to 1961. When the intensifying conflict made this position untenable, Foreign Office memoranda continued to argue for an attitude that was much less unequivocal than the one the Chancellor presented to the Americans. Caught between a rock and a hard place by their two indispensable allies, the Germans wanted to have it both ways. As the Foreign Office’s Southeast Asian desk explained in 1965, the government approved of the present policy of the United States, while agreeing with the general objective of French policy. That did not satisfy de Gaulle, however, who included Vietnam in a long list of grievances against German policies that seemed to sabotage the idea of an independent European policy. De Gaulle’s disappointment and the consequences he drew from it triggered the well-known NATO crisis of the mid-1960s. Thus, the Vietnam issue became a factor in European alliance politics.

While de Gaulle sulked over German subordination to the United States, Bonn had to cope with mounting pressure from Washington for a tangible German contribution in South Vietnam. When U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara took the opportunity of a trip to Bonn in May 1964 to ask for the assignment of a German medical unit to Vietnam, the Germans instantaneously got entangled in an intricate web of the legacies of the past and the liabilities of the presence. Erhard’s principal advisers held that a civilian hospital operated by the German Red Cross would be the only option, worrying that the public might otherwise get the impression that regular army units were being sent to Vietnam. With the memory of German soldiers fighting on foreign soil still fresh in the minds of not only Germans but the whole world twenty years after World War II, the Bonn government would not even consider such a scenario. Relentless American pressure for some German personnel on the scene finally led to a host of German aid measures undertaken in 1966. There was one problem common to identifying and implementing all of these projects, however. They had to appear substantial enough to impress Washington, yet domestically and to most of the rest of the world they had to appear as innocuous humanitarian gestures, lest they give an opening to the East German regime. At year’s end German authorities congratulated themselves on having successfully walked a tightrope. The embassy in Saigon reported that several political expectations linked to Vietnam aid had been realized. “The U.S. has given up the desire for a military or paramilitary German contribution; the pointedly nonmilitary
nature of aid has so far kept the other countries of the Free World, including the neutral ones, from being openly annoyed by the German engagement...; the hospital ship Helgoland, at first planned as an excuse, has turned out to be the best idea in terms of German humanitarian aid."

It was acknowledged that the cautious term “humanitarian aid” disguised to some extent that German assistance increasingly aimed at improving social structures in Vietnam. Politicians in Bonn pointed out that a collapse of Vietnamese society was Washington’s most serious problem, and they assured themselves that assistance in this sector would support the actual American objectives without unduly highlighting the German contribution.56

American pressure for a tangible contribution to the effort in Vietnam also revealed to the Germans, however, that the analogy between Berlin and Saigon could easily work to their disadvantage. Consequently, Karl Carstens, the number two man in the Foreign Office, took stock of German foreign policy and sketched its future course in early 1966, advising that comparisons between the German and the South Vietnamese situation should be avoided.57 This dovetailed with growing discontent within the governing Christian Democratic party about the increasing American preoccupation with Southeast Asia. If the alliance was mainly concerned with containing Chinese expansionism instead of snatching the eastern part of Germany from the jaws of Soviet communism, then the Berlin-Saigon analogy was of dubious value. Even worse, it tended to turn Berlin, as Frank Ninkovich put it in another context, into “a symbol without any Germanic content.”58 Thus, the American fixation on Vietnam eventually undermined the notion of the Free World as a framework for a West German identity.

Conclusion

British, French, and German attitudes toward the Vietnam War were largely determined by political, security, and alliance considerations. Underlying these considerations, however, were cultural assumptions and self-perceptions rooted in national historical experiences. In the case of Britain and France these were experiences of metropolitan decolonization, which created the need to construct post-imperial identities. The United Kingdom responded to this challenge by turning the history of Indian independence into a grand narrative of successful decolonization, and by establishing a web of loose-knit though still global interrelationships. The contraction of the French empire was fraught with much more pain. This fact goes a long way to explain why this contraction took on the shape of firm re-Europeanization, which in turn was the precondition for the renaissance of a foreign policy patterned along nineteenth-century great
power politics. The case of Germany differs from the British and French ones in that the country was charged with creating not a postimperial but rather a postnational identity. The notion of the Free World was one possible framework in this endeavor. However, when the focus of Free World solidarity shifted to Southeast Asia, the framework cracked. It finally collapsed when American actions in Vietnam came to resemble scenes from the German past—a past from which Germans were actually trying to escape. Thus, it fell to a younger generation to reconstruct the framework for a new identity in the later 1960s.59

Notes

In fact, it was suspected within the CIA that U.S. pressure on Britain to increase its military commitment in Vietnam beyond the British Military Mission there would provoke London to “insist on a quid pro quo with respect to Malaysia,” which would “certainly outweigh the usefulness of an increased British role in Vietnam.” It was recommended therefore that “we should not . . . ask for much more than is already being done by HMG.”


21 Thomas Moser, Europäische Integration, Dekolonisation, Euroafrika. Eine historische Analyse über die Entstehungsbedingungen der Euroafrikanischen Gemeinschaft von der Weltwirtschaftskrise...


Hughes to Meloy, Subject: Study on Trends of French Foreign Policy, Jan. 8, 1963, box 1, Bureau of European Affairs, Subject Files (J. Robert Schaetzel), Record Group (RG) 59, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NA).


Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Department of State, June 6, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, 1:467; Message From the Ambassador in France (Bohlen) to the President, April 2, 1964, ibid., 217.


Green to Rostow and Tyler, Subject: Some Speculations on de Gaulle’s Moves in Asia, Feb. 6, 1964, box 252, Records of the Policy Planning Council 1963–1964, RG 59, NA. French officials indeed believed up to the start of LBJ’s sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam that both Beijing and Hanoi were ready to negotiate a settlement that in French eyes would entail Hanoi keeping its distance from Beijing, and Saigon installing a socialist government along Cambodian or Indonesian lines. See the memorandum on German-French consultations on South and East Asia held on December 18, 1964, Dec. 23, 1964, B 37/128, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PAAA). See also Lloyd Gardner, “Lyndon Johnson and de Gaulle,” in Paxton and Wahl, De Gaulle and the United States, 257–78, esp. 265–73.


Returning from the SEATO meeting in Manila in April 1964, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville observed that the situation in Vietnam was comparable to one the French found themselves in ten years earlier. De Gaulle agreed: “La guerre du Vietnam, c’est vraiment une ‘sale guerre.’” Two months later he told Alain Peyrefitte, “Plus les Américains s’engageront, plus l’aspect colonial de cette guerre apparaîtra et suscitera l’hostilité des populations.” Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, 2:496–7.


36 See Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, 1:399.

37 Although French policy can not be explained by pointing out that de Gaulle bore a grudge for the Americans, there certainly is a sense of Schadenfreude, if not of getting even, in some of his remarks. In December 1963, for example, he told Peyrefitte, “Après Dien Bien Phu, les Américains avaient expulsé les Français. Maintenant, les Français prennent la relève des Américains. Juste retour des choses.” Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle, 2:483.


45 Ministerialdirektor im Auswärtigen Amt Carstens an Staatssekretär van Scherpenberg, Aufzeichnung 205-82.00/90.38, Betr.: Das Nordafrikaproblem und die Bundesrepublik, July 17, 1959, BFD, 1:732–5.


47 Congressional Reception, Feb. 12, 1965, box 1, Congressional Briefings, LBJL.

48 Karl W. Deutsch et al., France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 266. A typescript of the study is in box 211, White House Aides Files: Fred Panzer, LBJL.


51 See Abteilung I (Jansen) to Staatssekretär, Subject: The Federal Government’s Position toward the South Vietnamese Question, Aug. 24, 1964, B 37/62, PAAA.

52 See the memorandum prepared by Referat I B 5, Subject: The situation in Vietnam, June 26, 1965, B 37/128, PAAA.


54 This is stressed by Alexandra Friedrich, Awakenings: The Impact of the Vietnam War on West German-American Relations in the 1960s, Ph. D. diss., Temple University, Philadelphia, 2000.


56 Rüdt to Auswärtiges Amt, Subject: German Humanitarian Aid to South Vietnam, Jan. 21, 1966, B 136/3657/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; German Vietnam Aid, June 22, 1966, CDU/CSU-Fraktion, VIII-006-48/1, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, St. Augustin.


59 For a detailed account of the role that the Vietnam War played in this process see Wilfried Mausbach, “Auschwitz and Vietnam: West German Protest Against America’s War During the 1960s,” in Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach, eds., America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).