REVERBERATIONS OF GUILT AND VIOLENCE, RESONANCES OF PEACE: A COMMENT ON CAROLINE WALKER BYNUM’S LECTURE

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I

Caroline Walker Bynum’s lecture, together with her pathfinding scholarly oeuvre, offers us a wealth of evidence that there indeed existed in the later Middle Ages a “violent quality [in] religiosity itself,” and that this structure of violence was central to Christian culture, its mental world, its texts, images and practices. Its forms are myriad. Communication with the blessed and forlorn dead through their fragmentary remains; popular pilgrimages to the sites of fabulous blasphemies; penitential pantomimes performed with whips, chains and nails; mystical woundings, visionary incorporations and ecstatic interpenetrations; cold awakenings to the horrors of the world and the inevitability of death and judgment; and the ever present spectacle of blood, visibly spraying or palpably flowing—all of these images of late medieval religion reveal a morbid fascination, a collective preoccupation with sin and punishment bordering on the obsessive neurotic. They are the symptoms of an emergent “Western guilt culture,” as Jean Delumeau has dubbed it, and yet they are also part of a religious system. One of the remarkable achievements of Bynum’s work over the past two decades has been to recuperate a great overlooked treasury of doctrines, images and practices, materialist practices that appeared to an older generation of historians as corruptions of the faith. Through her eyes we have been able to glimpse their inner, cultural logic, and grasp their potentiality as alternative sites of human experience, in short, to understand them on their own terms. Her analysis here challenges us to extend that project of understanding to the domain of visual images, images marked—like the practices surrounding them—by a curious admixture of violences both rhetorical and real, images that served and activated a mode of piety which, as Bynum describes it, “ever more intensely visualized experience as fragmentation.”

Close readings of historical texts, coupled with a special regard for the human body as a locus of meaning, have been the touchstones of the new historicist enterprise in Anglo-American scholarship since the 1970s, and Professor Bynum’s work has long exemplified this approach for me-
dievalists. Among its advantages, this mode of criticism succeeds by virtue of a certain willingness to work within limits, to curtail the ever expansive process of contextualization, and to resist the temptations of grand historical narrative. There is, however, a trade-off: for all the insight we gain into human experience and representation within the precincts of intellectual or artistic or mystical striving, we often pass up the chance to revisit the larger territories of history. This seems fair enough, but what if the choice were proven to be a false one? What if we could fruitfully connect our micro-analyses of texts and images to a macro-analysis of social and political processes, those oft-cited “backgrounds” to the cultural artifacts we study? The interdisciplinary study of violence, I submit, provides us with a unique opportunity to hazard such connections. Within a limited space, I should like to rough out a grid upon which these manifold conditions and forms, experiences and expressions, events and processes of violence in the later Middle Ages might be interrelated.

II

Central to Bynum’s portrayal of late medieval religion is her account of a fervent eucharistic piety, which encompassed both the liturgical celebration of the Mass, and para-liturgical devotions to the Holy Blood by mystics and pilgrims in a wide variety of contexts. Emblematic of this “vivid” and “expressionistic” blood piety was the image of the Man of Sorrows or Schmerzensmann, which depicts Christ wounded, bleeding and dead in the tomb, yet paradoxically alive, upright and suffering, animated by a mysterious life-force. This image-type, which survives in many thematic variations and in every artistic medium, was formerly known as the imago pietatis, or “image of pity”. It is the descendant of the Byzantine “passion portrait,” developed in conjunction with the Good Friday liturgy of the Eastern church, where an increasing theatricalization and “psychological realism” drew participants into a close, affective relationship with Christ and Mary in their human suffering. Around 1300 the imago pietatis burst upon the public scene in the West, the result of a campaign by the Carthusians of S. Croce in Gerusalemme, in Rome, to promote indulgences around a venerable mosaic icon, purportedly commissioned by Pope Gregory the Great in memory of a miraculous vision during the Mass.4 Of course, 1300 was a pivotal year. It not only coincided with progressive institutionalization of the Feast of Corpus Christi throughout Europe, but it was also the Anno Santo, or “Jubilee Year,” in Rome, when the church unveiled its program for rehabilitating the penitential system. Central to this was an initiative to transfer more and more
penitential obligations—the everyday management of sin and purgation for the living and the dead—to the laity. Thus we may speak of a combination of forces that catapulted the Man of Sorrows into such a wide-spread popularity: not only an official cultic prestige—indulgences could be earned for both the S. Croce original and its licensed copies—but a flexible formula through which more ambitious artists could condense a wide range of eucharistic meanings and stage devotional response in terms of an empathetic identification. Followed closely by its thematic sister-image, the Pietà, the Man of Sorrows flowed rapidly downstream into the many tributaries of devotional practice and mysticism, cultic and mortuary display, art and visionary literature.

As an archetypal image of sacrifice and offering, the western Man of Sorrows image stakes its rhetorical power on several basic stereotypes of “visual violence.” Unmoored from narrative and frozen in time, these images transfix the pious beholder with a spectacular surplus of blood, wounds and pain as objects for contemplative immersion. Together these stereotypes of sacrificial violence ensure that the image will be, in an important sense, unbearable to behold. And yet medieval people knew that this was a spectacle of violence worth enduring because, on one level, physical suffering, undertaken voluntarily, paved the way for redemption, and on another, as Bynum points out, “the blood [of Christ] was . . . fertile and salvific in its very terribleness.” Whoever gazed upon the imago pietatis could hope to reap the same spiritual benefits that were attainable through what was later called “ocular communion” (Augenkon-
fimmunion), in which the power of the consecrated host was accessed through sensual vision alone.

If the eucharistic body of Christ occupied the general field of salvific vision, it was the gaze of the suffering redeemer that formed the true “locus of the look,” as Michael Camille would say. An exchange of gazes, facilitated by the artist’s quest for what Hans Belting calls a “psychological realism” and undergirded by mimetic desire, establishes a dialogue between the spectator and the person present in the image. And it is here, at this locus of meaning, that Bynum lodges one of her most compelling claims about the mode of response typical of late medieval piety. Contemplation of these images, she tell us, unleashed “a violence of guilt and self-accusation, ultimately of condemnation.” Intended to be “more reproach than comfort,” the images target a painful awareness of that abject spiritual infirmity which every Christian inherited from Adam and Eve. This is consistent with much one finds in late medieval devotional culture, especially the art and literature of the Passion, marked as it is by this element of pious antagonism. Supplicants were to be agitated toward feelings of guilt, the psychical bedrock of the church’s penitential system. 

When St. Bonaventure urged the penitent toward compassion for
Christ’s suffering in the Passion, he leveled this reproach: “And you, lost man, the cause of all this confusion and sorrow, how is it that you do not break down and weep?” For the pious personality of the late Middle Ages the vision of the bleeding Man of Sorrows was an aching revelation of one’s own guilt. It functioned as a visual call to penance.

At work inside this matrix of affective compassion and penitential self-reckoning, Bynum identifies a pivotal mechanism of response. The “burden of guilt,” she explains, “seems to cry out for a transfer . . . [and] transferred, projected and displaced it was”—upon the sinners, unbelievers, the evil and the damned, in particular the Jews, the inveterate enemies of Christ and Mary. At this point I am tempted to digress a little, and explore the dialectics of violence found in our sources for medieval Christian anti-Judaism, especially the notorious stereotyped legends of murder, sacrilege and conspiracy—that thinly veiled “texts of persecution”—that imparted to the Jew of Christian fantasy an insatiable bloodlust and a capacity for violence against the holy. But I will steer clear of the larger context to better follow Bynum’s epidemiology of Christian guilt. As she notes, the dialectic of self-reproach and anti-Jewish polemic can be found, among other places, in Albrecht Dürer’s visionary image of the Mocking of Christ, created as the frontispiece to the Large Passion of 1511. While the woodcut, which places Christ in the company of a German mercenary or Landsknecht, merely alludes to the notion that our sins “tearest open my wounds,” the verses—penned by the Benedictine monk Cheldonius—vividly juxtapose the legacy of Jewish violence against the body of Christ with the idea of a “perpetual passion” caused by Christian sin. Together, then, text and image build toward a surplus of horror mixed with love-longing, one that threatens to spill over the boundaries of the devotional encounter and flood the penitential self with the unbearable violence of unexpiated guilt. To prevent this, guilt must be displaced—it must be projected outward; a scapegoat must be identified and cast into the role of all-powerful tormentor. But scapegoats are as much mirrors as they are targets; and guilt is not so easily cast off. So guilt “reverberates” back, as Bynum puts it, from the persecuting Other back upon the penitential Self.

III

Reading Professor Bynum’s paper in preparation for this commentary, it struck me that this pivotal insight reveals something not only about the psychodynamics of a distinctly Christian guilt-complex, but the nature of violence as well—and perhaps also, I hasten to add, about the intrinsic connections between guilt and violence. But rather than view one simply as the cause of the other—in Freud’s classic explanation, aggression held
in check to spare love and friendship eventually closes in upon the self as a burden of guilt—let us see them as parallel structures with similar mechanisms. At the risk of some simplification, we might formulate the parallelism this way: guilt “reverberates” between Self and Other within the individual psyche much the same the way violence does within the social body. Both guilt and violence, for example, tend to seek out a chimerial Other, a surrogate victim or scapegoat, whose persecution and ejection functions to restore the “moral” equilibrium of the group or, in the case of guilt, satisfy the individual’s craving for wholeness, for redemption. Such rechannelings of guilt or violence reverse the course of the original crisis, shielding the subject or the group from its own rivalries and destructiveness. Similarly, and as a functional equivalent, both guilt and violence can also be “exported”—rerouted outside existing psychical or social boundaries so they no longer afflict the center. All of these mechanisms are forms of transfer: one may speak of projections or displacements, substitutions or exchanges, reverberations or resonances.

In articulating the problem this way, I am drawing upon the work of the literary critic René Girard, especially his important book of 1972, *Violence and the Sacred.* Girard’s theory of violence, surrogate victimage and ritual has had a profound impact on the study of religion; critical interest in his project peaked in the late 1980s and continues to thrive in some quarters. Like other cultural theorists, Girard sees violence as an irreducible force in human affairs, but goes further, claiming for it a protean role in the formation of ritual, myth and prohibition, the triad that defines the dynamics of the sacred. To some degree unhistorical in his thinking, Girard reifies violence and treats it as a semi-autonomous force, akin to physical energy itself. In his model the structuring power of violence—most crucially human violence itself—remains hidden behind the religious and cultural forms to which it gives rise. Real violence, however, moves from victim to victim quite concretely, sometimes in symmetrical reciprocities, other times along new vectors and in ever-renewing forms; invariably it appears to actors caught up in the social drama as a contagion beyond human control. But violence is controllable and is controlled by a defining mechanism, *substitution.* For Girard it forms the logic of sacrifice: “When unappeased, violence seeks and always finds a surrogate victim. The creature that excited the fury is abruptly replaced by another, chosen only because it is vulnerable and close at hand.” Sacrifice, in this sense, is a practical technique for managing the internal tensions of social existence, “the dissensions, rivalries, jealousies and quarrels”—all of them grounded in a “mimetic desire” which more often than not turns conflictual. Once it erupts, this violence threatens to proliferate unchecked (reciprocal killing during a blood feud is perhaps the purest example). It poses extraordinary dangers. The fun-
damental purpose of sacrifice, the ur-form of all ritual, is to “to stem the tide of indiscriminate substitutions and redirect violence into ‘proper’ channels”; thereby does it “protect the community from its own violence”. At stake is the moral cohesion of the community, hence its very survival.

Though generated largely from his study of literature and anthropological evidence, Girard’s insights into the ritual structuring of violence place important demands on the historian’s analysis of violence within the more advanced and socially differentiated civilization of medieval Europe, a civilization that suffered not only the afflictions of war, insurgency, blood feud and organized crime, but also ecological disasters of unprecedented scope. It demands, in short, that we think in terms of a larger web of contexts and interactions through which the principal forms of violence, overt and latent, are interwoven. Of these forms—though they are not easily separable—I count seven:

1. celestial or divine violence
2. demonic or magical violence
3. political violence
4. social and/or religious violence
5. criminal violence
6. domestic, sexual and/or interpersonal violence
7. psychological or symbolic violence

These different forms coexisted in the later Middle Ages, and contemporaries often lamented their recurrence as tandem symptoms: “When the pestilence filled the world,” said one Austrian observer in 1359, “men became accustomed to spreading great violence among us.” Thus to deal with one form of violence often means necessarily involving the others. J. R. Hale, for example, accepts as axiomatic “the existence of a pool of latent personal violence which can add to the dimensions and change the mood of the violence in other categories.”

To bring these micro- and macro-manifestations of violence together, to see them operating at multiple levels of exchange, would be to describe what several scholars have called an economy of violence. At the local level, so to speak, an economy of violence encompasses not only the day-to-day “dissensions, rivalries, jealousies and quarrels within the community” (Girard), but also illicit violence, crime, its ongoing repression by authorities, and the forms of collective violence like organized pogroms, and so on. At the regional, national or transregional levels, an economy of violence extends further to the various forms of state violence: wars between societies or states, crusades, regional persecutions of heretics and other outgroups (today, as we all know too well, the economy of violence has attained international and global proportions). During times of crisis,
in particular, one finds all the diverse “sectors” of this economy humming from the stimulating effects of a free and open trade across borders—a highly volatile series of exchanges that threatens to overwhelm all safeguards and controls hitherto devised. Disclosing the vertical linkages between different levels of conflict within societies and between states, patterns of socialization, violent cultural representations and rituals, and the most salient psychological pressures and syndromes—this is the principal task of such analyses.

Though it may sound like an imprecise map for research, we need to ask whether there is such a thing as an historical economy of violence, what its parameters might be, and how we might correlate its horizontal linkages with the vertical ones. Scholarship may presently not be able to manage this complex web of interactions—as it could only be done collaboratively—but in the meantime we can attend productively to the local patterns of violent behaviour, to the dynamics of specific “communities of violence,”23 and ask how the “big violences” of politics and history ramify through the rivalries, dissensions, jealousies, repressions and yearnings from which spring the “little violences” of everyday life. Ideally these questions would always return us to those countless moments of transference and symbolization in which the impulse of the “primitive sacred”—Girard’s foundational mechanism of surrogate victimization—gives rise to culture and its myriad ritual forms, its images, myths, legends and dramas.24

IV

For the later Middle Ages the most dynamic context of mutual interaction between religious mentalities and society, and the place where the micro- and macro-processes of violence came together, is in the sphere of public life. Here a diverse array of rituals brought people of different social strata together, and into close contact with the modalities of power, both sacred and secular. Although urban Europeans came together to celebrate and affirm a host of beautiful things—princely advents and victories, royal weddings or childbirths, religious processions and popular festivals—an equally significant portion of public occasions were “rites of violence.” These were principally of four kinds: 1) symbolic rites undertaken as “shows of force,” such as ceremonial displays of military might or militant piety; 2) sacrificial spectacles like judicial executions or penitential processions (to which I shall return); 3) theatrical rites of violence, including such events as the mock battles of carnival and popular religious drama, where stage-managers abided by the old dictum “there must be blood”25; and 4) the deadly serious rites of collective violence, popular revolts, urban riots or pogroms, both local and regional.26
Each form of violent public ritual, sacred and secular, offers us the chance to study that elusive phenomenon of social life Walter Benjamin called, in reference to the mass culture of his own time, “simultaneous collective perception.” But since there is no way for me to show this with an example of each, allow me outline two characteristically late medieval examples of a spectacle of violence, my second category. These examples can help us penetrate the cultural logic of what I am calling the “penitential personality” because each offered what amounted to a public stage for its actualization. In late medieval and early modern society, personal experiences were often played out, as spectacle, for others to see and judge, emulate and affirm. Cruel and compassionate, violently expressive and given to bouts of that “hyperbolic humility” described by Huizinga, the penitential personality came out in public as a stylized mode of response. It thus constituted what anthropologists call “representative behavior.” Within the later medieval public sphere, one might say, simultaneous collective perception was always already a type of simultaneous collective performance.

Pre-eminent in many accounts of public life in the later Middle Ages are the public rituals of criminal justice. These “spectacles of punishment” directly involved the populace in several ways, from the rite of sentencing outside the townhall, through the procession which lead the condemned to the execution grounds (Richtstätte), to the mutilation and execution itself, which was sometimes staged and choreographed for great dramatic impact. Far from being the vehicles of a collective sadism, executions in the later Middle Ages were frequently very solemn occasions, quasi-sacramental rites of confession, absolution, purgation and passage into death. Emotions could run high, we know from contemporaneous accounts, not because of a rampant Schadenfreude, but because audience members collaborated actively with church and civic authorities to provide the criminal an opportunity for a good, Christian death (bene moriendi). Thus the fate of the “poor sinner” (Armesündner) often provoked a great outpouring of compassion, itself modeled on the pity felt for Christ and Mary in their Passions. Collective perception of this official violence, performed in the name of legal authority, was therefore informed by the same dialectic of penitential guilt and blame that structured private devotions. When the criminal performed his penance and was held up as a pseudo-martyr, suffering (passio), in the form of abject pain, could reverberate back into compassion (compassio), which people in groups seem to have experienced as a form of catharsis. The community’s own internal violences were purged along with the criminal’s sins. But when the penitential drama did not go as expected, when the anticipation of an edifying death was foiled, unexpiated guilt and violence overflowed the channels set out for it. Revenge was then often
taken on the authorities or their visible agent, the executioner, or on the culprit himself.

Compassionate identification between performers and audiences also occurred outside the boundaries of legitimate public rites, especially in crisis-times. First in Italy in 1260, against the backdrop of wars and ecological disasters, and then again, across Europe, during the Black Death of 1348–51, with its attendant eschatological hysterias, penitential brotherhoods, the so-called disciplinati or flagellants, turned asceticism and mysticism into a kind of popular street theatre. Modeled on the supplicatory processions of time immemorial, when celestial powers were called upon to shield communities from disasters, flagellant processions were a new kind of missionary-revivalist event. They combined the universal call to penance with hymn-singing, preaching, and miraculous cures; but the centerpiece of the processions were the carefully choreographed rites of self-scourging. So far as we know, the rituals performed by these amateur holy men utterly absorbed and galvanized their urban audiences, and the line between performers and spectators was often blurred or dissolved entirely (chroniclers speak of townspeople joining in the scourging). What the flagellants presented to their audiences, in the end, was not only a theatrical, living imitation of the suffering Man of Sorrows, but a salvific spectacle that reproduced the spiritual benefits of the original.

Thus did these rituals of violence embody many of the traits Bynum attributes to the mystical “blood piety” of the era: expressionism and morbidity, a “simultaneity of opposites”, a tendency toward quantification (lashes were counted out), a pursuit of bodily pain and fragmentation, a metonymic logic and a guilt-ridden craving for wholeness. And yet, as a form of mysticism, the flagellant processions differed decisively in their social meaning from the cloistered penitential strivings of saints like Heinrich Suso, Catherine of Siena, Richard Rolle and Margery Kempe. Their approach to the “reorchestration of the meaning of symbols” characteristic of performative modes of religious behavior occurred under different conditions. The difference lies in their public and visible nature— the opportunities they provided for simultaneous collective perception, as well as that “representative behavior” which not only shores up, but also reproduces the moral order. In Girardian terms, they are more efficient in processing violence into culture. This is not to privilege one sacrificial sphere over the other; public and private must be seen together. Through innovative readings of sources, visual as well as verbal, and with the help of theories borrowed from anthropology, sociology and psychology, cultural historians can extend the micro-analyses of the kind pioneered by Bynum into the broader economies of political, social, and religious violence.
Let me offer in conclusion a brief reflection on the undoing of violence. Like those for whom the violence escalating on the global stage today is overwhelming and scarcely comprehensible—a perilous unravelling of the world, or simply the latest episode in an eternal war between good and evil—the people of the later Middle Ages tended to see only a surplus of bloody misfortune, a ceaseless *danse macabre* stamping out all innocent life. We no longer wonder why this was an age notorious for extravagant and violent religious behaviour, why the “craving for the beautiful life” took such desperate forms, why its overheated eschatological fears exploded into millenarian insurrection, or why this age produced such baleful poetic laments. It was a time of endemic, *intractable* violence at nearly all levels of society.

Yet we betray the people of this time, I think, if we forget that the same civilization which found itself afflicted by war, insurgency, blood-feud and crime, also struggled valiantly to contain these outbreaks through a variety of peace-making initiatives. From the tenth-century experiments in protecting non-combatants like the “Peace of God” (*Pax Dei*) and the eleventh-century prohibition on feudal violence at certain sanctified times, the “Truce of God” (*Treuga Dei*), down to the efforts at creating territorial peace (*Landfriede*) and peace leagues (*Landfriedensbündnis*) in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—these programs and platforms, measures and laws for putting violence in check belong as much to the medieval economy of violence as violence itself. How peacemaking figured in late medieval religious culture, however, is a question that has hardly yet been broached. That a desperate craving for peace resonates strongly through this culture becomes glaringly obvious as soon as we tune ourselves to look for it. “The future is wholeness,” according to Bynum, not only for the dismembered martyr of history and legend, but also, by implication, for the fragmented subject voluntarily immersed in the devotional spectacle of sacrificial pain. Violence has no cultural meaning without its opposite in view, however utopian the latter may be.

Some of the historic efforts to control or even “cure” violence succeeded, we know, only in spawning new forms of violence more virulent than what came before. Others were self-consciously—and therefore paradoxically—dipped in the blood of atonement. When the flagellants appeared wielding their whips in *imitatio christi*, diverting the “scourge” of God’s punishment upon their own bodies, they were applying a routine pre-modern distinction between good violence, necessary to put human spiritual affairs in order, and bad violence, capable of sowing disorder. Audiences grasped the difference. Before they were persecuted as millenarian radicals, the flagellants were missionary peacemakers. For a
brief time they succeeded in settling scores among Italy’s major warring factions, compelling consensus with an activist violence of unmatched spiritual prestige. By aiming this performative, sacrificial violence like a living vaccine against the virus of intractable social and cosmic violence, they were articulating a notion as paradoxical and illusory as it is persistent: that only violence can put an end to violence once and for all. In doing so they were obeying the reproach of Albrecht Dürer’s imploring Man of Sorrows when he speaks the lines, “Now, friend, let peace be between us.” And yet, through a simultaneity of opposites, the Man of Sorrows appeared to his supplicants, Caroline Bynum reminds us, as both a living god of reconciliation and an atavistic icon of bloody persecution.

Notes

1 This is a slightly enlarged version of the comment delivered at the German Historical Institute on 8 November 2001.
6 This family of devotional images also commanded a range of sepulchral and funereal associations which are today largely overlooked by scholars interested exclusively in its service to Passion mysticism; for these related contexts the foundational study is Romuald Bauerreis, Pie Jesu. Das Schmerzensmann-bild und sein Einfluss auf die mittelalterliche Frömigkeit. (Munich: Widmann, 1931), esp. 87–91.
7 An analysis of these stereotypes, or an explication of their operations as signs, would take us far afield; I consider there to be eight principal stereotypes of violence in the domain of visual representation: armed conflict; physical attacks by individuals or groups; judicial torture, mutilation and execution; bodily disfigurement; wounds; blood; expressions of pain; and weapons. For a discussion of these in the context of late medieval Crucifixion iconography, see my The Thief, the Cross and the Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment in Medieval and Renaissance Europe (London: Reaktion Books, 1999). esp. 69–125.


11 From the Lignum vitae (Tree of Life), quoted in Denise Despres, Ghostly Sights: Visual Meditation in Late-Medieval Literature (Norman, Oklahoma: Pilgrim, 1989), 26–7.


13 Bynum noted only in passing the connection between eucharistic devotion and antagonism toward Jews in Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 64; in her sprawling critique Kathleen Biddick, “Genders, Bodies, Borders: Technologies of the Visible,” Speculum 68 [1993]: 389–418, esp. 400–08, faults Bynum for not properly situating the imagery used in the plates for Holy Feast within the “intense, popular propagandizing about sacred and polluted blood” which undergirded anti-Jewish accusations and attacks on Jewish communities during this period.

14 Published in Nuremberg in 1511 as Passio domini nostri Jesu per Fratrem Cheldonium collecta cum figuris Alberti Dureri, the booklet was the completion of a project Dürer began with seven Passion woodcuts made between 1497 and 1500; for reproductions, see The Complete Woodcuts of Albrecht Dürer, ed. Willi Kurth (New York: Crown, 1946), no. 214. A new edition with commentary appears in Jordan Kantor, Dürer’s Passions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Art Museums, 2000).


17 “The sacred consists in all those forces whose dominance over man increases or seems to increase in proportion to man’s effort to master them. Tempests, forest fires, and plagues, among other phenomena, may be classified as sacred. Far outranking these, however, though in a far less obvious manner, stands human violence—violence seen as something exterior to man and henceforth as a part of all the other outside forces that threaten mankind. Violence is the heart and secret soul of the sacred” (Violence and the Sacred, p. 31).

18 Ibid. p. 2.
19 Ibid. 10.
21 Hale proceeds from a simpler model than mine, identifying four categories of violence: personal, group, organized illegitimate and organized legitimate violence. “All these categories were recognized, and seem to be interconnected, in the Renaissance.” See his “Violence in the Late Middle Ages: A Background,” in Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities 1200–1500, ed. Laura Martines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 19–37, both quotes on 36.
23 I borrow the term from an exemplary study of this kind, David Nirenberg, Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages (Princeton: University Press, 1996). Also see the pioneering study by Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Rites of Violence,” in Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1974), 152–87, which sees religious violence “related . . . less to the pathological than to the normal” (186).
26 The conditions and impulses of local, urban massacres must also be distinguished from those undertaken by roving popular armies of Judenschläger, as happened in the Rhineland during the first crusade of 1096, during the so-called “Rindfleisch” massacres of 1298 in Franconia, and the so-called “Armleder” uprising of 1336–8, which began in Franconia and spread into Bavaria and Lower Austria. For the 1096 events, see the essays in Alfred Haverkamp, ed., Juden und Christen zur Zeit der Kreuzzüge (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke, 1999); on the latter two persecutions, which resulted in the formation of numerous Holy Blood cults and pilgrimages, the definitive study is Friedrich Lotter, “Hostienfrevelvorwurf und Blutwunderfälschung bei den Judenverfolgungen von 1298 (‘Rindfleisch’) und 1336–1338 (‘Armleder’),” in Falschungen im Mittelalter. Internationaler Kongreß der Monumenta Germaniae Historica München, 16.–19. September 1986 (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1988), pt. 5, pp. 533–83.
See my *The Thief, the Cross and the Wheel*, op. cit., 142–57.


The phrase is Catherine Bell’s; see her article, “Performance,” in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University Press, 1998), 209.


The Treuga Dei, for example, succeeded only in lending a newly sacral character to the feudal fighting it henceforth restricted to permisssible times—thus crusading violence was not far behind; see Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Feudal War and Monastic Peace: Cluniacl Liturgy as Ritual Aggression,” *Viator* 2 (1971): 129–157, here 156.