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Preface

Dear friends and colleagues:

Since the spring 1995 issue of the Bulletin, I have had the pleasure of informing you twice a year of developments and special events here at the GHI. In this issue, I would like to take the opportunity to say farewell to you as the Institute’s director. My tenure ends on September 30, after which I will return to the University of Heidelberg to assume the Curt Engelhorn Chair, the first privately endowed German professorship in American history.

I do not, on this occasion, want to recount the GHI’s wide-ranging activities over the last five years. We’ve kept you abreast of these both in the Bulletin and in our ten-year report. However, it is fair to say that the Institute—building on the groundwork laid by the Institute’s founding director, Hartmut Lehmann—has grown into an important member of the international scholarly community. Moreover, the establishment of the German-American Center for Visiting Scholars (GACVS) has given the GHI an added dimension.

Rather, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude: Whereas in the introduction to the ten-year report I expressed my thanks to all those individuals and institutions in the United States and Germany whose help and cooperation was of great benefit to the Institute, I would like here to direct your attention to the staff of the GHI itself, both past and present. For, without their expertise and effectiveness, this Institute would not have achieved the high profile it has over the last few years.

It has been both a joy and an intellectual challenge to plan and execute the activities of the Institute with its comparatively young and accomplished resident scholars. My special thanks go to my deputies, Martin H. Geyer and Christof Mauch, as well as to the research fellows with whom I have worked over the last five years: Peter Becker, Manfred Berg, Andreas Daum, Eckhardt Fuchs, Philipp Gassert, Elisabeth Glaser, Thomas Goebel, Cordula A. Grewe, Matthias Judt, Raimund Lammersdorf, Petra Marquardt Bigman, Wilfried Mausbach, Dietmar Schirmer, Ulrike Skorsetz, Edmund Spevack, and Susan Strasser. I have also profited from the experience and wisdom of our senior visiting research fellows, Thomas L. Hughes and Robert G. Livingston.
The Institute publishes two book series, an English-language series with Cambridge University Press and a German-language series with Steiner Verlag, in addition to a variety of in-house publications. The responsibility for the editorial work resides primarily with the Institute’s editors and editorial assistants, to whom I owe many thanks for their efforts during my directorship: Pamela B. Abraham, Manfred F. Boemeke, Annette M. Marciel, Daniel S. Mattern, Lusi K. McKinley, Janine S. Micunek, and David B. Morris.

The growing collections of the Institute’s Library have been in the capable hands of Iris Golumbeck, Monika Hein, Elisabeth Mait, and Luzie Nahr. I thank them for their hard work and dedication.

The financial and administrative care of the Institute, its staff, its programs, and its building requires the commitment of many of its members. Under the supervision of Dieter H. Schneider, of whom can still be justifiably said that he is more exact than the Prussian general accounting office, the Institute’s administration effectively mastered all these tasks and more. I especially thank the secretarial staff, who consistently turned problems into solutions: Bärbel Bernhardt, Christa Brown, and Bärbel Thomas. My thanks also go to Winfried Haubold, whose responsibility it is that the Institute’s bills are paid on time. Our friendly contact with the public has been maintained by our receptionists, Barbara Amarasingham, Angela Laine, and Susanne White. Afaf Yousif has been much more than a technical assistant; she has been of great help in many areas, jumping in whenever an extra hand was needed.

I will miss the fruitful collaboration I have had with the staff of the GHI, and it will likely take me a long time to digest the overwhelming number of professional and personal impressions and experiences I have gathered. My wife and I have had a challenging yet thoroughly stimulating time in Washington, D.C., as well as in the many regions of the United States that we were able to visit. However, we are also looking forward to our return to Heidelberg, and to Germany’s oldest university. I believe one of my daughters said it best when she wisely wrote in our guestbook back in 1994: “Don't be sorry that it is over, be glad that it has been.”

Yours sincerely,

Detlef Junker
In the fall of 1998 Germany went to the polls. The September 27 parliamentary election will perhaps be described by future historians as a pivotal event in post-1945 German history. Coming not quite ten years after the collapse of East Germany and the unification of the two postwar German states, this was the election—it will presumably be said—that effected the transition from the “Bonn Republic” to the “Berlin Republic.” At any event, in the weeks following the election there was a widespread public feeling that now—and only now—had the erstwhile West Germany’s history come to an end and that from this point on the new, united Germany would begin to assume its sociopolitical contours.¹ This feeling may well have been linked to the fact that, even before the vote, most people had wanted to terminate the era of Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

On a subliminal level, however, other key factors were at work. Over the last few years a change in ideological orientation has occurred within German society, in its political parties and its associations. This change has taken place not so much among the antagonists of the old Cold War camps—the communists on the East German side and the anticommunists in West Germany—but rather in the political center and left-of-center in western German society. Here I speak of Christian Democrats on one side and various Social Democratic and trade unionist groups on the other. All had adopted the Atlantic-oriented model for structuring society, economy, and the state in the 1950s and 1960s and, in so doing, had taken leave of certain traditional orientations reaching back to the era that began with the founding of the German Empire.²
The current shift in ideological orientation involves a critical examination of this “turning to the Atlantic.” The latter had been furthered by certain sections in West German society since the 1950s and was eventually adopted by the majority of the population. For the people of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), the “Atlantic Turn” remained a foreign concept. The Soviet bloc formed a powerful barrier against Western ideas and influences. The sharp contrast between “West” and “East” in contemporary Germany leads back to this historical development.

The domestic problems confronting present-day Germany do not exclusively concern prosperity and employment opportunities but rather the perception of the sociopolitical order of the old Federal Republic. Is freedom synonymous with the right to private property? And must the free-market economy therefore be the foundation upon which economic and social order is based? Is democracy tied to the self-determination of the individual citizen? And is this, along with the rule of law, the fundamental principle on which the order of society and of the state is predicated? Over the coming years we may expect a thorough intertwining of the ideological foundations of western and eastern Germany. Whereas, as a consequence of European unification and the existence of the European-Atlantic alliance, the Western orientation of the German state has not been called into question, the “Westernness” of German society is currently undergoing revision in the face of a different type of ideological self-perception. There is no lack of voices cautioning against the formation of a new German “special identity” that desires to distance itself from the West, which would inevitably cause Germany to redefine its role within the societies of the European-Atlantic alliance. In my view such a scenario, although it seems somewhat exaggerated, cannot be entirely dismissed.

It is against the background of the present context that I now turn to my subject. I intend here is to present the most significant characteristics of the process of ideological transformation that took place within postwar West German society. This transformation did not—this is my thesis—result primarily from American occupation policy but rather from contacts and cooperation among elite circles of American, West European, and German intellectuals. These circles did not operate on the government level. Perhaps this is why, until now, one has heard so little of them and why their activities have
gone relatively unnoticed by historical research. What has so far escaped attention is the extent of their influence. This is most likely because the period during which their effects were greatest was not the occupation years (1945–9) but rather the decade thereafter. Thus, their impact could really only be assessed later during the 1960s.4

One could even say that the historical profile of the old Federal Republic was largely shaped by this transformation (and the concomitant change in political and social values). This profile was distinctly different from that of the Weimar Republic and the former East Germany.

There is one important aspect of German postwar history that I intentionally ignore. We are all aware that the history of West Germany must be considered on two levels. On the one hand, there is the problem of the nation-state: more specifically, the division of Germany and its reunification. In the international parlance of the years between 1949 and 1989, the common word for this was “the German Question.”5 On the other hand, there is the problem of Germany’s integration into the West, which was effected in the economic, military, political, and ideological spheres. Here, I shall concentrate only on the latter. My specific intention is to draw a one-dimensional picture, namely, from the perspective of “Westernization,” in order to explain more clearly the complicated process of ideological reorientation.

It is important to grasp the coherence between the various aspects of this development. I therefore begin by sketching the most important areas in which, after both 1945 and 1949, there was a revival of older German traditions—a revival achieved despite various confrontations with the interests and wishes of the Western Allies. In the second part of this essay I describe the activities and impact of these elite groups, whose importance in the Westernization of West German society has been great.

I

In the years between 1945 and 1949 the foundations of the democratic state and the social market economy were laid by the Germans themselves. This took place in agreement with the Western Allies, especially the Americans. Although the Allies had a clearly recognizable influence on the framework of Germany’s constitu-
tion and economic system, they left the politicians much leeway with regard to the terms of reconstruction. Cooperation between the Western Allies and the Germans intensified as the conflict with the Soviet Union heated up and the division of Germany became a reality. This explains the emergence of a bourgeois and liberal social order, and not a socialist order, in the Western occupation zones. Here, anticommunism functioned as a catalyst.

The framework of state and economy was erected by people who had distanced themselves from National Socialism. Some of them had been members of the resistance. After the catastrophe of the Third Reich, their concern was to build a better Germany than the one that had existed after World War I: The Weimar Republic served as a point of reference during the period of reconstruction, yet it also was considered a negative model because its instability paved the way for the Nazi takeover. Given the contemporary example of what was believed to be a totalitarian dictatorship in the Eastern Zone, the framers of the constitution pursued what seemed to be the only right path for West Germany: a strengthening of the liberal and humane elements.

In 1948 the military governors instructed the Germans to draft a constitution. During consultations the Parliamentary Council sought to secure the agreement of the Allies. However, the constitution itself was basically the work of Germans. It represented the breaks and burdens extant within German democracy. The Parliamentary Council carried out an intensive examination of the national past. Waystations included not only the abortive constitution of the 1848 National Assembly; naturally, too, the deficiencies and frailties of the Weimar constitution, the experience of National Socialism, and the threat posed by the dictatorial system in the Soviet occupation zone also were examined. As a result, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) established a constitutional order intended to systematically guard the state against antidemocratic or dictatorial threats. In the 1950s the constitutional character of the Federal Republic was marked by these realities. Democracy was practiced as a principle of government and administration; steps taken against potential opponents were normally referred to as the need to protect institutions. That is why, in the 1950s, a democratic consciousness had not yet taken root across all of German society. Thus, it is no surprise that even at the beginning of the 1960s the population had a formal and pas-
sive attitude toward democracy.

The economic system and the organization of the social state also were not imposed by the Western Allies on the Germans. Instead, they were devised by Germans, who in some cases consulted with the occupation authorities and in other cases even worked against the authorities’ intentions. The social market economy was a specifically German variant of the market economy, assigning to the state the task of determining the framework within which the economy could operate. Nevertheless, the actual economic process had to remain unfettered by state interference. In this way the German social market economy sharply distinguished itself at once from laissez-faire capitalism and from socialist or communist state monopoly while still managing to differ from Keynesianism. It was put into operation by Ludwig Erhard (later to become federal minister for economic affairs) after the currency reform of 1948.\textsuperscript{11}

In West Germany the social market economy was linked to the reconstruction of the welfare state. Originally, the Western Allies in the Control Council had intended to introduce a unified system of social security throughout Germany according to the model of the Beveridge Report. The German experts successfully rebuffed these plans; they not only found the German system of social security to be superior, but they also saw the tradition of the German welfare state (in place, after all, since the 1880s) as a model for all other industrial nations. During the process of state reorganization in the aftermath of National Socialism, this was one of the very few homegrown traditions Germans could point to with a certain pride. Indeed, this also tells us why Germans across the board—trade unionists, employers, representatives of state administrations—tenaciously defended this plank against the intentions of the Western Allies, thus preserving the tradition of the German welfare system for the Federal Republic.\textsuperscript{12}

Why is it important to point out that reconstruction in Germany was predominantly the work of Germans? It is important because losing sight of this would cast doubt on the results of research into the “Westernization” of West German society. Historians and scholars working in the fields of jurisprudence and economics are indeed skeptical that the basic structure of the state, of the economic and social constitution of the Federal Republic, was extensively marked by Western influences.\textsuperscript{13} Their point is justified only if one
focuses on the initial period of the late forties and early fifties. It is not justified, however, if one considers the longer period spanning from the 1940s to the late 1960s. But it was only then that the historical profile of the Federal Republic began to take shape. In many respects the 1950s showed more similarities with the 1920s and 1930s than with the late 1960s.\textsuperscript{14} (Consider the monarchical leanings of about 20 percent of the population or writers such as Thomas Mann who were popular after the war but represented a prewar outlook and mentality.\textsuperscript{15})

On this basis, our assumption is that it was not only the realities of everyday life that visibly changed but also the structures of the Federal Republic from the “German beginnings” between 1945 and 1949 until approximately 1970. From where did these influences derive that had such an effect?

II

To illustrate the changes beginning in the early 1950s and leading up to the late 1960s, I focus on the development of the two largest parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and, particularly, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) from 1953 until the Grand Coalition (1966–9). Within this fifteen-year period both parties changed both their programmatic and their political self-understanding to a considerable extent. At the outset there existed a sharp contrast between the bourgeois “middle classes” on the one hand and the supporters of “socialism” on the other. At the end of this period, curiously, the two sides were prepared to (and indeed were able to) reach a pragmatic consensus. Not only did this consensus affect daily politics, it also affected structural decisions of general principle: In this respect, the Grand Coalition achieved a great deal.

Initially, this change from ideological confrontation to pragmatic consensus was—this must be emphasized—an expression of the dynamics of reconstruction itself and the socioeconomic process of modernization after the founding of the Federal Republic. It was under these conditions that strong internal driving forces molded West German society in the first two postwar decades.\textsuperscript{16} This change, to be sure, also ran parallel to the Western orientation in foreign politics, as exemplified by the incorporation of the Federal Republic into the Western Alliance (NATO and the European Economic
Community, or EEC). In addition, many cultural changes were taking place in everyday life that came under the banner of “Americanism.” All of this had an influence on the development of the parties and demanded that they remain open to new influences. In this way the ideological elements of a Western orientation, although derived from outside the national context, were able to acquire validity as external driving forces. Thus, older national traditions, which had formed part of the political profiles of the respective parties, gradually receded from view.

In 1953 German voters were called on to cast their votes for or against the Adenauer government—a middle-class coalition of conservative, liberal, and Catholic forces. As in 1949 the elections concerned the state and social profile of the Federal Republic. In 1953 things were still in a state of flux: Integration into the Western Alliance was still inchoate, and the population had as yet seen little of an enduring economic upturn and the widespread prosperity that was promised. Back in 1949 both parties had received approximately 30 percent so that, arithmetically, they were equally placed at the outset. The Social Democrats now pitched their electoral campaign at achieving a governing majority, their goal being to introduce a change of course toward a socialistically oriented democratic system. The Christian Democrats campaigned for the consolidation of the social market economy and for the principle of middle-class order they had been attempting to stabilize since 1949.

Both parties employed the language of class struggle: The SPD referred to the Adenauer coalition as a “middle-class bloc” (Bürgerblock) bent on capitalistic restoration; the Christian Democrats described the SPD as the homegrown political counterpart to the Soviet Union, critically focusing on the call for a state-directed economy in the SPD program. In this way democracy, socialism, and communism were practically identified; by implication, reference was made to a “socialistic bloc” that threatened the social and political order of the Federal Republic. The anticommunism rife in public opinion was thus mobilized against the SPD.

In this election campaign political arguments of exclusion, together with opposing alignments in a manner reminiscent of the Weimar period, dominated. Although the outcome of the 1953 election was a clear Christian Democratic victory (they increased their vote totals from 30 percent to 45 percent, whereas the Social Demo-
crats remained at 30 percent), the confrontation was repeated in 1957, when the Christian Democrats again picked up additional votes, bringing them to 50 percent, while the Social Democrats stagnated.\footnote{From this point on, a process of transformation within the SPD began. There had already been signs of this as early as 1953, but only from 1957 onward (but then within the space of a few years) did the party undergo far-reaching changes.\footnote{The SPD became a dynamic force with the potential for internal reforms, so much so that the CDU, by contrast, took on an antiquated appearance, both programmatically and in practice. With the Godesberg programmatic reform of November 1959 the Social Democrats divested themselves of whatever remnants of Marxist tradition still remained—in particular, the concept of class society and the perception of themselves as constituting a class party.\footnote{They accepted the market economy, thus clearly embracing the Keynesian concept of state regulation. They also accepted the bourgeois order of the Federal Republic, as established after 1948–9, in that they expressly adopted a positive position toward the churches, among other things. Finally, they embraced both the constitutional reality of the Federal Republic and its integration into the Western Alliance by consenting to the establishment of the Bundeswehr.}

Objections to reform came from the left wing of the party, especially from the student union of the SPD. Such groups were unwilling to abandon the Marxist-based planks of the party platform. Later, out of opposition to the Godesberg Program, the “New Left” established itself within the Federal Republic.\footnote{During the transition from the 1950s to the 1960s there also were attempts by the Christian Democrats to undertake party reforms and so stay abreast of the stormy economic upturn and the emerging affluent society. Yet this did not yield any expedient results. After 1945 the party’s conception of Christian Democratic policy had been based on a relatively exclusive Catholic doctrine of Natural Law. By 1960, to be sure, the language of this hoary doctrine no longer was in use; yet it could not be overlooked that, confronted with the highly differentiated and pluralistic German society of the 1960s, the party was programmatically and politically outdated.\footnote{In 1965 Chancellor Ludwig Erhard attempted to propagate an alternative to social pluralism, which he called the “Aligned Society” (formierte Gesellschaft). But no one understood precisely what he}}
meant by this term, and it became increasingly obvious—indeed from the beginning of the 1960s—that the CDU had lost its ideological bearings. The period of reconstruction, with its primary appeal to national tradition within the parties and society, was over.  

Until now I have focused on the development of the Federal Republic and the attendant internal dynamic—which in 1959 caused the Social Democrats to reform their party program but which, in the case of the Christian Democrats, led to more confusion and uncertainty with regard to future policy. This internal dynamic was the result of West Germany’s stabilization within the Western Alliance; of the economic boom during the period of reconstruction; of social change brought about by the integration of expellees from the east; and of pluralization as well as emerging affluence. However, to explain the changes that took place within the Federal Republic during the 1960s merely by pointing to these internal factors would be to oversimplify. My thesis is that the direction these changes took was essentially determined by external factors.  

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s it was not only in West Germany but in all of Western Europe that belief systems emerged at large advocating the restructuring of state, economy, and society. These belief systems appeared in Europe at the time of the Marshall Plan and were discussed among intellectuals on the liberal left and the left, but chiefly within the unions and social democratic groups. From the beginning of the 1960s, and for almost a decade thereafter, these ideas influenced habits of political argumentation and behavior. At stake was the system of “consensus liberalism,” whose origins lay in the global economic crisis of the 1930s and the New Deal. As it stood at the end of World War II, consensus liberalism called for state planning within the framework of a social system predicated on political and economic freedom. The reason for its enormous impact on the Europe of the 1950s and 1960s was that it combined different ideological elements. On the economic plane, deep-seated liberal convictions of Anglo-American origin were linked to the Keynesian concept of partnership among workers, business owners, and the state (with a clear bias against socialism). Private property, market economy, the state as partner in economic life, and social and economic planning—these were fused into a single ideology directed, on the one hand, at prying Western European socialists and social democratic parties away from their Marxist traditions and
immunizing them against communism during the Cold War; on the other hand, it was also directed at overcoming the traditional notion of class society still widespread among Europeans of the period. The idea of class struggle was transformed into a consensus among social groups on the basis of such fundamental values as freedom, law, private property, and the “pursuit of happiness,” with a clear commitment to continuous social progress. The various elements of the theory of liberal consensus— with reference here to West Germany—helped overcome communist propaganda filtering in from East Germany and the Soviet Union, plus older national traditions left over from Wilhelmine Germany and the Weimar Republic, by offering a clear model for purposes of ideological orientation. These traditions not only included the continued relevance of certain modes of argumentation and attitudes derived from confrontation within class society, as could be observed during the election campaigns of 1953 and 1957, but also the national consciousness of the Germans, who found themselves in many ways culturally opposed to the West. Although this Sonderbewußtsein had reached its peak in the so-called ideas of 1914, it was to continue to exert ideological influence into the 1960s. It was only with the Fischer controversy of 1961, which centered on Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of World War I, that these ideas were rejected.  

Two of the most important forums for the dissemination of the ideas of liberal consensus were the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) and the Labor Network in Europe, where AFL and CIO unionists cooperated with the Association of German Unions as well as the unions of other West European countries. The CCF and its German members are my primary concern here.  

The communication centers of the CCF comprised intellectual circles of journalists, writers, and artists, as well as functionaries of the union associations and leftist politicians. From the 1950s onward they congregated at the offices of this organization. The headquarters were located in Paris; the principal German office was located in Berlin; and there were others in Cologne, Frankfurt, and Hamburg. The intellectual circles were centered on the editorial staff of the congress journals: Preuves (France), Tempo Presente (Italy), Forum (Austria), Encounter (England), and Der Monat (Germany). Among the network of personalities important in Germany were such American and European intellectuals as Daniel Bell, John
Dewey, Sidney Hook, Melvin Lasky, Edward Shils, and Shepard Stone on the American side; and Franz Borkenau, Arthur Koestler, and Ignazio Silone—early “fellow travelers” who, during the Cold War, were the fiercest anticommunists—as well as Raymond Aron and Bertrand de Jouvenel on the European side. In particular, many German personalities were met who had survived the Third Reich in exile and then had returned to Germany after 1945 with the intent to assist the process of renewal and change. None contemplated reviving the conceptual framework of the Weimar Republic, and none desired to pick up where they had been forced to leave off in 1933. They were in search of a state and social order in Germany quite different from that of the Weimar Republic. The network of personalities on the German side included Willy Brandt, mayor of Berlin; Max Brauer, the mayor of Hamburg; Fritz Reuter, former mayor of Berlin (Brandt’s predecessor); and Ludwig Rosenberg, a member of the Federal Committee of the German Association of Unions. All were Social Democrats. In addition there were numerous artists: architects such as Georg Meistermann; musicians such as Nicolai Nabokov; writers such as Theodor Plievier and Siegfried Lenz; and—of special importance—some professors from the recently founded Free University of Berlin, such as Ernst Fraenkel, Richard Löwenthal, Franz Neumann, Edwin Redslob, and Otto Suhr. As a result of the intellectual exchange among these men, their journalistic activities, and especially their personal politics, singular ideas from within the context of consensus liberalism could be brought into circulation and flexibly aligned with the German realities of the time. But there was never a systematic adoption in the sense of American constitutional ideas being directly taken over. For that reason this process ran its course fairly inconspicuously. Naturally, ideas deriving from the context of consensus liberalism increasingly corresponded to the realities of the day—among these were the fact of dynamic economic development, which, for this reason appeared to require state regulation; then, too, the emergence of a more or less broad-based, middle-class society, thereby rendering meaningless ideological recourse within domestic policy to a bloc confrontation between socialist and bourgeois principles. 

The more the SPD came under pressure to adapt after the lost elections of 1953 and 1957—it had plainly fallen out of step with the realities created by the Adenauer government—the more arguments
from within the context of this “Western” or “Atlantic” conceptual framework began to carry weight. This was particularly so in the case of Willy Brandt, but also in that of numerous other functionaries within and outside the SPD, and it applies to the manner in which they influenced public opinion at the beginning of the 1960s. To be sure, the programmatic reform of the SPD in 1959 clearly was not the immediate result of these influences because reform involved, first and foremost, effecting a concrete realignment to the new conditions of the Federal Republic. Yet, as I have already indicated, the direction in which the program was headed—renunciation of Marxist positions, acceptance of the market economy and a middle-class social order—was visibly influenced by the body of thought based on Atlantic consensus liberalism. In 1960 Brandt became the SPD candidate in the federal elections of 1961. His slogan for this election and for the succeeding years was novel and unusual: “Community of interest,” which indicated a readiness to cooperate with the bourgeois parties and, more concretely, with the Christian Democrats. At the 1960 party convention, he said: “The younger generation do in fact want community of interest.” This signaled a willingness to renounce ideological confrontation with the other political parties. It therefore is hardly surprising that the beginning of the 1960s saw a lively interest in Daniel Bell’s book, *The End of Ideology*, particularly among intellectual circles of the liberal left within the Federal Republic. Under the banner of “community of interest,” the SPD had renounced “ideology” and instead pleaded for pragmatic social reform.

Thus, the Christian Democrats were placed under strong and, for them, unusual pressure to realign. Since the SPD’s Godesberg Program, the CDU no longer could attack the Social Democrats as a party with a Marxist identity; at the same time, the conservative Catholic identity of the Christian Democrats appeared antiquated when compared to the modern pragmatism of the SPD. Between 1960 and 1965 the voices in the CDU pleading for “realistic politics” and openness to “compromise” became louder: “Realistic politics” (*sachliche Politik*) and compromise were synonymous with “freedom from ideology” and “consensus.” This faction kept its distance from both the Catholic wing of the party, which had continued to orient itself strongly to the tradition of the Center Party during the Weimar Republic, and the liberal economists around Ludwig Erhard.
Although they remained a minority, they were an influential minority. Among them were such political figures as Kai Uwe von Hassel (later minister of defense), Gerhard Schröder (secretary of the interior under Adenauer, then secretary of state, and, lastly, minister of defense), Gerhard Stoltenberg (later minister for science and research, minister for finance, and minister of defense), and Richard von Weizsäcker (later federal president). They favored a “Grand Coalition” between the CDU and the SPD, and from 1966 onward (with the exception of Weizsäcker) took up positions within this coalition. The broad-based reform politics of this government between 1966 and 1969 were founded on the readiness in both parties to fashion a “liberal consensus.”

In the driver’s seat was the Keynesian concept of state regulation. The latter had already been adopted by the SPD before the Godesberg Program reform as an economic alternative to the neoliberalism of Erhard. Faced with the first economic crisis of the postwar boom, from 1965 on it was increasingly accepted by the Christian Democrats, too. In 1967, when the Grand Coalition passed the “Act for the Furtherance of Stability and Growth in the Economy” (Gesetz zur Förderung der Stabilität und des Wachstums der Wirtschaft), not only had a significant modification been made to the economic constitution of the Federal Republic, but the tradition of ideologically derived antagonism has also been consigned to the past: Pragmatic consensus based on mutually recognized fundamental social values had become possible. Despite opposition in the daily business of politics, this consensus between the parties on the foundation of the country's social constitution was to remain intact until the old Federal Republic ceased to exist in 1990. Parallel to this readjustment within the parties, society itself underwent profound change in the 1960s. The rigid view of democracy as a principle of government and administration, which I mentioned at the outset as having characterized the 1950s, gradually gave way to a view of democracy as the cornerstone of both state and society. Authoritarian patterns of behavior, long considered national traditions and indeed deeply rooted in the society of the German Reich, receded. They were increasingly replaced by a culture of discussion, participation, and reconciliation. When Brandt was inaugurated as chancellor of the Social Democrat-Liberal coalition in 1969, he made the famous statement: “We will dare more democracy” (Wir wollen mehr)
Demokratie wagen). He was not referring to a program for the future with this statement; rather, he was responding to the prevailing social trends of the 1960s.

One cannot, of course, explain the dynamic transformation of West German society during the 1960s as having stemmed solely, or even largely, from this evolution of political thought—the underlying factors were undoubtedly structural. The West European social order—wherever one looked, from northern Italy to Scandinavia, from the United Kingdom to France, from the Benelux countries to Germany—was characterized by economic prosperity and an effective social security system, as well as an unmistakable trend toward a service—and leisure—oriented society. Nevertheless, these structural factors supplied a platform for changed understandings of the kind to which I have alluded. Thus, the socioeconomic consolidation following the Marshall Plan, plus the sociocultural rapprochement between the nations of western Europe (considered as social entities), overlapped temporally in all these countries. The main challenges of the 1950s were to restore order, rebuild, and stake out clear ideological bloc allegiances. In the 1960s the tendency was to replace European traditions of class society with the new phenomenon of a consensus-oriented, more-or-less apolitical society. In Germany the latter was often referred to as Wohlstandsgesellschaft. Toward the end of the decade, however, an opposition movement formed composed of young people, chiefly at universities, who spurned obsession with economic prosperity and the scant enthusiasm shown for any political or ideological critique of society’s shortcomings, much less those of the ruling “establishment.” This movement called into question the prevailing ideological consensus. It assumed a neo-Marxist position implacably opposed to bourgeois society and capitalism. The establishment, they said, stood for the nexus of capitalism and the bourgeoisie; worse yet, in the establishment they included all the principal social groupings: academics, the clergy, industrialists, parliamentarians of all political parties represented in the Bundestag, schoolteachers, and trade unionists. Although the Western-based “New Left,” which had originated in America at the beginning of the 1960s and then migrated to Europe, attacked bourgeois society, it no longer did so in the name of the “proletariat” because the affluent society had stripped this category of its existential relevance. This is why the unrest that came at the end
of the 1960s was expressed as a revolution in lifestyle, not as a revolution against the prevailing economic and social order. The “movement of ‘68” therefore locked itself into a dialectical relationship with the liberal consensus as a conceptual framework for society.\textsuperscript{40}

The ideological reorientation of the Federal Republic during the 1950s was a complex political and social process involving significant change over some fifteen years. These were not only due to the political influence the Western Allies exerted through re-education programs, with American Information Centers (Amerika Häuser) playing an important role. Even more important in this regard was the fact that the Cold War gave the West Germans and western Europeans little room for independent action. In order to ward off the Soviet threat, they were obliged to align themselves with the United States. Thus, anticommunism became the prime and most effective impetus behind the gravitation toward the Atlantic in Germany and the political integration of western Europe. Moreover, at the end of World War II a more defined concept of the future world order and of America’s dominant international role in it emerged in the United States. This is why the framework to which consensus liberalism belonged inevitably affected all the states in the European-Atlantic alliance. In Germany, this influence proved especially decisive because, as a result of Nazism, the war, and the country’s subsequent division, people had forfeited their national identity. Whereas they still sought after 1945 to bring about reconstruction through recourse to national tradition, by the second half of the 1950s it was obvious that this tradition itself required reform if German society intended to derive its future bearings from the Western Alliance.

By 1970 this process of ideological reorientation in West Germany had essentially been completed. As of the late 1960s and early 1970s political and social changes and ideological modifications had generally been carried out in the same way as in other Western countries. This remained the case until 1990-the year of German unification. For Germany the end of the East-West conflict created a very new situation, not only in foreign but also (and especially) in domestic policy. The “Berlin Republic” will definitely look very different from the “Bonn Republic.” This also will have an impact on Germany’s ideological orientation toward the West.
To conclude, I would like to point to a contemporary example I briefly mentioned at the beginning of this essay. In the course of the 1990s it has become apparent that there are in unified Germany two variants of Social Democratic identity: On the one hand, the western German SPD has been unable to establish its Western world view or its political profile in eastern Germany. On the other hand, the eastern Social Democrats began to ignore the biggest taboo of West German politics—cooperation with communists. They first broke this taboo on the local level, then on the regional/state level, and now they have broken it, to a certain degree, on the federal level as well. The Western-oriented SPD in the former West Germany simply expected similar behavior from Social Democratic easterners. Yet, many of the latter repudiated the politics of their leaders in Bonn. Instead, they sought cooperation, and later a formal coalition, with the former East German communists, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). This is because eastern German democratic socialists are much more familiar with Marxism, and its antagonism to the market economy, than with Keynesianism and the politics of liberal consensus. This attitude is far more an expression of the easterners’ life experience than a desire to hold on to the ideological aspects of the old system. Since 1990 the Western system parliamentary democracy and the market economy—has been fully introduced into eastern Germany. One must therefore interpret this recourse to the remnants of “socialist realism” as an expression of resistance to a comprehensive loss of cultural identity.

One cannot rob the easterners of their history. This history is no less connected to continual ideological anti-Western propaganda than West German history is connected to anticommunism. The experience of a people cannot be subjected to taboo. Thanks to this realization, there is in western Germany a new readiness to tolerate political cooperation with the heirs of the state party of the former GDR. Earlier I mentioned Richard von Weizsäcker, who during the 1960s had been a Christian Democratic protagonist of consensus cooperation with the SPD. In his capacity as a former federal president, he appealed at the beginning of 1998 for the PDS to be accepted as a legitimate political force and to be integrated into the conceptual framework of the new Federal Republic. This was a courageous attempt to combine patriotism with ideological Westernism. At the same time, the underlying development is not devoid of irony.
Weizsäcker was, as we have seen, the product of a consensus ideology that served to strengthen the Western identity of West Germans. But the current politics of harmony is being used to bridge the gap with eastern German politics and self-understanding. One might even speak of a dialectic of consensus—first in the bulk of West German society and now between factions in the two halves of the new Germany. If this progresses further, and that should be our hope, it will make the Berlin Republic a strong force within the Western Alliance.

Notes

1 A brief profile of the former West Germany may be found in Dirk Berg-Schlosser, „Entwicklung der Politischen Kultur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,“ *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 7/90 (1990): 30–46.


13 For critical discussions on the problem of Westernization in western German society, with special reference to numerous stimuli provided over the years 1992–8, I wish to record my indebtedness to colleagues of mine from various disciplines: Hans Günter Hockerts, Klaus Schönhoven, Peter Tschohl, Arnold Sywottek, Axel Schildt, Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Joachim Starbatty, and Peter Graf Kielmansegg.


15 Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, eds., Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1947–1955 (Allensbach am Bodensee, 1956). According to these authors, in October 1954 some 27 percent of those questioned favored reinstatement of the monarchy.


17 Hanrieder, Deutschland, Europa, Amerika.


24 Klotzbach, Weg. 433–94.


31 A study on this topic, undertaken as part of our Tübingen “Westernization“ research project, has just been published: Michael Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen* (Munich, 1998).

32 Ibid., 159–203.

33 Ibid., 298–411, 445–95.


35 Ibid., 79.


38 See Torsten Oppeland, „Der Evangelische Arbeitskreis der CDU/CSU 1952–1969,“ *Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen* 5 (1998): 105–43. If the ideas of consensus liberalism were taken over by the Protestant workgroup, this was due to the influence of the Kronberg Circle. See Thomas Sauer, *Westorientierung im deutschen Protestantismus? Vorstellungen und Tätigkeit des Kronberger Kreises* (Munich, 1999).


I

Anselm Doering-Manteuffel’s essay poses an important question: When did the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) become a democracy—that is, not just a formal democracy with a constitution and human rights inscribed in its Basic Law, but a democracy in spirit, with citizens who internalized democratic convictions and sentiments? It is clear that West Germany did not have much choice in the late 1940s but to adopt democratic forms. The disastrous defeat of 1945 and the subjection to Allied occupation (as well as the democratic convictions of many Germans hitherto forced into silence at home or by emigration abroad) meant that West Germany would at least initially adopt a liberal regime. But this institutional option could not immediately convert “hearts and minds.” When they praise the Federal Republic as a democratic society today, observers mean that its citizens really believe in democracy. Doering-Manteuffel rightly understands that this inner conviction necessarily grew more slowly and proposes that it is a product of the second decade after the war, not the first. That is, he suggests that inner democratization was achieved not under the Occupation and the first five years of the FRG, but from the mid 1950s to mid-1960s. I believe he is correct. His chronology, moreover, has important historiographical implications. As he suggests, it implies that the democratic consciousness of the early 1950s had not advanced much beyond that of the late Weimar Republic. Nineteen forty-five’s “Stunde Null” fades in importance as an internal German development, although, of course, it remains the precondition for later democratization. In these respects, this essay asks an important question and provides the right answer.
To what agents does Doering-Manteuffel ascribe this democratic transformation? He focuses on two sources of change: first, on the changes within the main political parties of the FRG; second, on the interaction among key elites within German and American society, that is, to the links of intellectuals and trade unionists with such groups as the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). Underlying both, however, is a growing acceptance across the German political spectrum of “consensus liberalism,” that is, on the muting of ideological confrontation on behalf of a broad political tolerance.

Doering-Manteuffel’s paper stresses the German contribution to this transatlantic democratic dialog, including “the revival of older German traditions,” sometimes against the wishes of the Allies; it especially cites the social market economy and the tradition of welfare capitalism that it drew upon. This was less dependent on the British model adumbrated in the Beveridge Plan and more upon German initiatives from Bismarck onward. Insofar as “Westernization” played an important role, Doering-Manteuffel argues, its decisive impact made itself felt only over the long period extending into the 1960s. I agree that the German traditions deserve emphasis. Federalism, after all, had as long and weighty a political tradition in Germany as in the United States: The Herrenchiemsee drafters and the American occupying authorities shared the same ideas about restoring the role of state and local government. We know that such socioeconomic concepts as the *Ordoliberalismus* important in Ludwig Erhard’s circle drew on peculiar German roots and not Anglo-American economic traditions. Indeed, the argument could be pushed further: Insofar as American economic ideas included a reformist thrust, some of the impetus derived from the early exposure of reformers, such as Richard Ely or Charles Beard, to German welfarist and good-government concepts in the 1880s and 1890s.¹ So too British and German reformers exerted a mutual impact in the late nineteenth century: One need recall only Eduard Bernstein’s discovery of the Fabians or William Dawson’s description of municipal and welfare institutions in Germany. Protestant reform and social work also was a common product. There was indeed a rich tradition of shared social reform.

Examining the political parties, Doering-Manteuffel attributes particular importance to the Grand Coalition from 1966 to 1969. These years of political cooperation would not have been possible unless
the large parties had moved away from their early confrontational stance. In the first elections of the Federal Republic both parties employed the language of class struggle: The SPD accused the CDU of being a narrow Bürgerblock that wanted a defense of property and a simple restoration, and the CDU proposed that the members of the SPD were Marxist cousins of the communists who threatened the social order. By the late 1950s the SPD was ready to adopt its Godesberg Program, bidding farewell to long enshrined notions of collectivization. A new group of pragmatic leaders—Ernst Reuter, the mayor of Berlin, and his protégé Willy Brandt, among others—were leading the party out of this obvious dead end. Within the CDU a new cadre, including Ludwig Erhard and, later, Gerhard Stoltenberg, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, and Richard von Weizsäcker, called for sachliche Politik (practical politics). This farewell to confrontation in both parties, Doering-Manteuffel suggests, culminated during the period of the Grand Coalition, which necessarily forced enough agreement on basic principles to confirm consensus liberalism.

Where did the new pragmatism originate? The author points to the growing interaction among key German and American elites, which strikes me as plausible, although I am uncertain whether the intellectuals of the CCF played so crucial a role. It is hard to believe that such sophisticated thinkers as Daniel Bell or Edward Shils and others, important though their ideas were, would have had so catalytic an effect on democratization. In any case, to cite these intellectuals’ roles demonstrates how difficult it becomes to distinguish between the networks of civil society and the impact of high politics. For the ideas of CCF adherents were in many ways a by-product of the Cold War. The search for pluralism, the effort to back away from ideological thinking, reflected the Soviet-American confrontation as well as many of their earlier brushes with radicalism in the 1930s. And the public diffusion of their concepts through magazines such as Der Monat and the many conferences that took place depended on financing through the Ford Foundation, whose leadership had virtually enlisted as a government auxiliary in the Cold War, and on secret sources from the CIA.

I would suggest that from World War II through the 1960s American ideological production represented a symbiotic effort on the part of public and private sources. American hegemony, in effect, conscripted the intellectuals, many of whom dropped their traditional
critical stance toward the state, such that it remains difficult to distinguish between official and civic mobilization. Shepard Stone is a good example of the tireless intellectual organizer who deployed private and public resources alike to strengthen German democracy and its containment of both Left and Right. The totalitarian threat first of Nazism and then of Soviet Communism encouraged a fusion of private and public ideology in the West as well. The story thus requires us to think about the interaction of foreign policy and domestic policy, and of state and society, a bit more fluidly than Doering-Manteuffel allows.

II

Doering-Manteuffel’s focus on parties also gives too short a shrift, I believe, to other key developments: some political or judicial, although not in the realm of party politics, and many societal. Let me cite some of the political and judicial events that I believe played a key role precisely in the decade that the author identifies as crucial. One was the 1963 Spiegel Affair, which signaled that editors and the public would not tolerate high-handed moves against the press, even in the name of national security. Others included the protracted Auschwitz and Maidanek trials, which meant that Germans themselves were seriously investigating and prosecuting war criminals. Moreover, in a rather unprecedented break, parliament did not invoke the usual statutes of limitation (Verjährung) to avoid this confrontation with the past. The inner democratization that Doering-Manteuffel seeks to describe required a serious confrontation with the past on the part of Germans themselves, and although much resistance to such scrutiny continued, the trials of the 1960s represented a major step forward.

More generally, I would have preferred greater emphasis on the contemporary social transformations within the Federal Republic. The author acknowledges that political change went apace with “structural” factors, among which he cites “economic prosperity and effective social security as well as an unmistakable trend to a service—and leisure—oriented society.” I would encourage a more detailed look at some of these trends: The spread of television, of automobile ownership, vacation travel, and the expansion of higher education and student exchanges. Despite the Wirtschaftswunder,
these were really developments of the 1960s, which certainly fits Doering-Manteuffel’s chronology. Democratic society is mass society, and for perhaps the first time in its history Germany was becoming a mass society in the modern sense, not just a society where masses were created by political mobilization.

III

However, as the author recognizes, taking note of these developments requires the historian to place the Federal Republic within a broader framework. Germany had a particular democratic “deficit” to overcome, but it did so by participation in trends that gripped most Western societies. Some were political: The role of parties changed throughout the Western world. The end of ideology was not just a German phenomenon. Otto Kirchheimer discussed the decline of principled opposition on the part of the SPD within the context of the growth of catch-all parties in most advanced industrial societies. The accumulation of wealth in the 1950s; the massive growth of university enrollments; the possibilities for individual fulfillment represented first by youth’s motor scooters then by family cars and travel to vacation beaches; the profound changes in formal religious organization—above all, the revolution within Roman Catholicism that we associate with Pope John XXIII; the beginnings of a more open approach to sexuality; the conviction that society must become more representative—all these were common developments in the West. Italy, too, was undergoing a similar efflorescence, and the phrases it generated, “La dolce vita” and the “apertura a sinistra” or “opening to the Left,” indicate different aspects of the transformation.

Throughout the Western world, in effect, political aspirations tended to change. It was as if the 1950s had required a vast investment in collective discipline: The men and women of that decade needed to reconstruct societies physically and thus work to accumulate national capital; they needed to draw sharp political and military lines against the new threat of Soviet Russia; and they tended to reinforce traditional morality and family structure after the war had blurred gender roles as women entered the work force and headed families in difficult circumstances. Nonetheless, after a decade of such intense sociopsychical and political effort, there was a
reaction to such collective effort: less discipline, a partial shift from heroic accumulation to private consumption or social spending, and less Cold War *Abgrenzung* and more inclusiveness. In foreign policy the shift from Hallstein Doctrine to *Ostpolitik* was a salient political example of such changed priorities.

These changes helped to democratize Germany, but not just Germany. In the United States they helped to advance democracy in the major area of civic life where democracy had been excluded, that is, race relations. In Italy they undermined the close connection between the Catholic Church and the Christian Democratic Party and legitimated working-class participation in government. In England they slowly began the process of weakening class hierarchies maintained by Oxbridge education and family lineage. In France they helped ensure that the new constitutional regime of the Fifth Republic did not become simply reactionary but rather a broader expression of social aspirations. Germany began its democratic transition from a different starting point, to be sure, but responded to many of the same forces that gripped all Western societies. The world transformed itself in the latter 1960s; it spun, so to speak, from a tight sociopolitical orbit into a larger one. With the subsequent impact of globalization, it is still slipping. The merit of this essay is to show us that the transitions of the 1960s may be less postwar history than a prelude to postmodern history.

IV

In conclusion, I would like to raise a difficult question that arises from the issues that this essay so usefully discusses, namely, how do we test the democratization that Doering-Manteuffel seeks to explain, that is, “inner” democratization or the democratization of “hearts and minds”? As its essential quality, the author seems to posit a concept of reconciliation, that is, the willingness to reach across the party divide and seek common ground. This is the meaning of “consensus liberalism;” it was the change that took place, as he describes it, in both major parties during the late 1950s and 1960s; it was the sine qua non of the Grand Coalition. And, so he states, it remains today the prerequisite for incorporating the former East Germany into the enlarged Federal Republic. I agree with him: If democracy involves reconciliation, then anathematizing the PDS is
probably counterproductive. (Of course reconciliation has its limits: I cannot imagine that
the author would have wanted to tolerate a revived Nazi Party after 1945.) Nevertheless,
reconciliation is important.\(^3\)

However, I would propose that mobilization also is important. Modern democracies
are tested at times in the streets or by other major acts of participation, such as marches or
fundamental electoral campaigns. Democracy does not require, and indeed cannot
sustain, continuous mass demonstrations, but it does sometimes build on the willingness
to confront power directly. The American civil rights movement, the German Lichterketten against neo-Nazi violence several years ago, and the East Germans’ earlier
demonstrations in Leipzig are testimonies of democratization. But just as reconciliation
can in theory go too far, so open political contention also can become problematic: Were
the student demonstrations of the late 1960s always a testimony to democratization? It is
true, I believe, that more democratic societies can result from uncomfortable public
conflict, but so too can more intolerant ones. Indeed, mobilization and reconciliation, and
contention and tolerance, can work at cross purposes in a modern democracy.
Nonetheless, mature democracies probably have to experience both. At the end, Doering-
Manteuffel’s essay challenges us to think about what exactly constitutes democratization.
This is not primarily a historical question, but we can answer it only with reference to
history. This essay prods that inquiry.

Notes


3 On this theme, see Anne Sa’adah, *Germany’s Second Chance: Trust, Justice, and Democratization* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).
After Revolution and Democratization: Conceptualizing the 18th Brumaries and Regimes of the Two Bonaparts

Convener: Melvin Richter (Hunter College, CUNY). Participants: Andrew Arato (New School of Social Research), Peter Baehr (Memorial University of Newfoundland), David E. Barclay (Kalamazoo College), T.C.W Blanning (Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge), Jean Cohen (Columbia University), Arthur Eckstein (University of Maryland), Benedetto Fontana (Baruch College, CUNY), Jack Hayward (University of Hull), David Kettler (Bard College), Jerzy Lindersky (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), John McCormick (Yale University), James Moore (Concordia University), J.G.A. Pocock (Baltimore), Jerrold Siegel (New York University), Martyn Thompson (Tulane University), Charles Tilly (Columbia University), Cheryl Welch (Simmons College), Wolfgang Wipperman (Free University of Berlin), Isser Woloch (Columbia University), Wulf Wülfing (University of Bochum), and Zwi Yavetz (University of Tel Aviv).

From April 9 to 11, 1999, Hunter College (CUNY) hosted a conference to mark the bicentenary of Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup d’état. Organized by Melvin Richter and cosponsored by the GHI, the event constituted the International Meeting of the Conference for the Study of Political Thought.

The conference, dedicated to the greatly missed François Furet, brought together a wide range of scholars: historians (of France, Germany, and antiquity), sociologists, political scientists, and political and social theorists. The chief foci of discussion were the nature and legacy of the two Napoleonic empires. The conference consisted of six panels, the last of which was a roundtable. Each of the first five sessions was capped by a commentary and by questions and contributions from the floor.
Panel one, chaired by Martyn Thompson, was devoted to “The Two Napoleonic Empires in European History, Memory, and Political Thought.” Isser Woloch examined the individuals and groups around Napoleon who advanced or resisted the transition from consulate to empire. Woloch was particularly concerned with documenting the attempts to legitimize the empire by linking it to the “basic gains” of the Revolution. The next paper, delivered by Wulf Wülfing, dealt with the “Napoleon myth” as perpetrated in the writings of Goethe, Heine, and Nietzsche. Of special interest to Wülfing were texts that glorified or demonized Napoleon through attributing to him such qualities as divinity, omniscience, and omnipotence. Cheryl Welch was the commentator for this session. She drew attention to the ambivalent nineteenth-century responses to Napoleon from Enlightenment and Romantic thinkers, and from those who considered him to be the archetype of revolution and antirevolution. She concluded that the Napoleonic “cautionary tale” no longer had much purchase in the late twentieth century.

“The Bonapartes and the Creation of the Modern European State” was the rubric for panel two. Chaired by Jean Cohen, it began with a contribution from Jack Hayward contrasting the Gaullist and Bonapartist regimes. Although insisting that Gaullism cannot be reduced to Bonapartism, Hayward argued that both the Napoleons and de Gaulle can be understood as classic examples of “heroic” leadership, a term he prefers to “charismatic” or “crisis” leadership. Whereas Hayward focused on two regime types within French politics, T.C.W. Blanning analyzed the interstate relationship between France and Prussia. From being allies or at least nonbelligerents for much of the eighteenth century, they were transformed into enemies largely by Napoleon’s refusal to grant Prussia a legitimate zone of interest in North Germany and by the despoliation meted out by French armies on Prussian soil. Napoleon III, through a combination of ideology and personality, provided an unwitting stimulus to Prussia’s military reform and, hence, to the events that led to Sedan. The commentator for this session, Charles Tilly, sought to build on the previous two papers by developing a typology of relations among sovereign, leaders, nation, and state. He also suggested that the papers raised important issues regarding the relationships between military organization and political authority, and between political authority and citizenship.
Jerzy Linderski chaired panel three on “The Politics of Historiography. Conceptualizing a Regime Type: Bonapartism or Caesarism?” Arthur Eckstein opened the session with a paper on the imperial administrator as internal threat to the established political order. Using examples as diverse as Julius Caesar, Warren Hastings, and Douglas MacArthur, Eckstein argued that the experience of governing a large province independently creates an “imperial counterculture” that is ill disposed to the conventions and the mentality of the “law-ruled state.” Rebellion against it is a common impulse. Other kinds of opposition to the law-ruled state were described by Wolfgang Wippermann in his discussion of Bonapartism and fascism. Reviewing a number of theories that emphasize the distinctiveness of Bonapartist and fascist regimes, Wippermann argued for their continuity (though not identity). More specifically, he defended the claim that “a theory of Bonapartism... can explain the genesis and structure of fascist regimes.” Zwi Yavetz, who was the commentator for this panel, stressed the importance of distinguishing between various types of fascism and, in regard to Caesar’s rule, noted that the rise of a strong personality after 133 B.C.E. pre-supposed control of both the tribunician power and command of the army.

Panel four, chaired by James Moore, turned to the issue of “The Bonapartes and Their Empires in the History of Political Thought.” After discussing the proliferation of terms (Bonapartism, caesarism, imperialism, Napoleonism) that were coined in the early-to mid-nineteenth century to depict new forms of illegitimate rule, Melvin Richter concentrated on Alexis de Tocqueville’s unique analysis of the two Bonapartes. Richter’s thesis was that, after many vacillations, Tocqueville diagnosed the two Bonapartes, their coups d’état, and their empires as distinctively modern postrevolutionary and postdemocratic phenomena. David E. Barclay then considered the response of Prussian conservatives to Bonapartist governance. Concentrating on the 1850s, Barclay demonstrated the complexity of such responses that ranged from “high conservative” antipathy to crypto-Bonapartism. A commentary by Jerrold Seigel developed the theme of multiple conservatisms, and, referring to Tocqueville, remarked on the “proto-Foucauldian quality” of his descriptions of the “quiet, pervasive control over people’s lives and minds that democratic forms of domination may assume.”
A concern with the novelty of modern types of domination animated the contributors to panel five, who delivered three papers on the theme of “Bonapartism/Caesarism in Twentieth-Century Political Thought.” Peter Baehr spoke on Max Weber’s theory of positive and negative Caesarism, and on the transformation of Weber’s political concept of Caesarism into the sociological category of “charisma.” Caesarism also was the subject of Benedetto Fontana’s paper on Antonio Gramsci. Fontana showed that Gramsci deployed the notion of Caesarism as part of his efforts to understand the victory of fascism and the failure not only of the revolutionary left but also of liberalism and liberal institutions generally. The attack on liberalism was a prominent theme, too, in the talk that followed by John McCormick on Carl Schmitt. McCormick scrutinized Schmitt’s distinction between “commissarial” and “sovereign” dictatorships; highlighted the manner in which Schmitt’s doctrine of dictatorship eventually collapsed into Caesarism; and argued that liberal constitutionalism is much more robust in dealing with political crisis than Schmitt envisaged. The commentator, David Kettler, objected to an overhistoricised view of Caesarism and offered some pertinent observations on Gramsci’s critique of liberalism and Schmitt’s juristic understanding of dictatorship.

A roundtable discussion concluded the conference. Participants included Andrew Arato, Peter Baehr, T.C.W. Blanning, J.G.A. Pocock and Zwi Yavetz. A pervasive theme of the discussion was the extent of the continuities or ruptures between Bonapartist modes of rule and those of their absolutist precursors and fascist successors.

Peter Baehr

Historicizing The Nation: The Middle Ages and Nineteenth-Century Nationalist Imagery

Two panels held at the 34th International Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, Michigan, May 6-9, 1999. Convener: Cordula A. Grewe (GHI). Commentators: David E. Barclay (Kalamazoo College) and Otto Gründler (Western Michigan University). Participants: Tina Waldeier
Bizzarro (Rosemont College), Elizabeth Emery (Montclair State University), Laura Morowitz (Wagner College), Carolyn Snipes-Hoyt (University of Alberta), and Margaret McEnchroe Williams (Columbia University).

In recent years scholars such as Benedict Anderson, Ernst Gellner, Liah Greenfield, Eric Hobsbawm, Miroslav Hroch, and Terence Ranger have turned with renewed intensity to the study of European nationalism. In the debates about the nature and construction of national identities, the “imagined” or “invented” dimensions of collective identities has become a focal point of debate. Placed in this context, the theme of “Historicizing the Nation” aimed to reassess this argument in an interdisciplinary context, examining the ways in which “medieval” imagery, iconography, and subject matter were appropriated and transformed by national(ist) movements.

Based on the assumption that medievalism was an integral component of “Romantic” nationalism, the papers centered on the ways in which certain specific pictorial or visual themes associated with the Middle Ages were transformed in the context of nationalist mythmaking. The synchronic reading of the different national movements illustrated the similarity of concepts and strategies among different social and ethnic groups for building their “imagined” communities. This includes the formation of smaller regionalist (Snipes-Hoyt) or political (Morowitz) collectives. As much as the employed strategies differed in detail, they resembled each other in the Janus-like character of their approach to history. Looking back to look forward, the past—itself already a construction—was used as a (re)source to develop or justify contemporary concepts of social, political, or military renewal. “Chacun se façonne un moyen age,” as Fustel de Coulanges wrote 1871 in the magazine La Revue des Deux Mondes (Emery).

Not surprisingly, the efforts to claim, create, and establish national identity through historical writing or through literary and visual production peaked in times of social, economic, or military crisis. Whether it was the reaction to a disastrous economic situation as in Ireland (Williams), the struggle for the creation of a united nation as in Germany (Grewe), or the reaction to military defeat as in fin-de-siècle France (Emery), the invocation of the past answered
contemporary sociopolitical needs. The construction of national identity coincided with the definition of and distinction from the other, which was all too often defined as the enemy. In these processes, visual and literary productions played a key role in the distribution of national(istic) concepts to a wide audience. Literature and imagery provided the symbols that could be inscribed on the community or the collective. Through them the abstraction “nation” became, so to speak, flesh.

In contexts such as Ireland or Germany, where national cultural unity and its political expression in the nation-state had not yet taken shape, national identity remained a program of action, a term based on expectation rather than experience. Identity, such as Irishness, had yet to be constructed. In her analysis of “The Temple of Industry: The Irish Industrial Exhibition of 1853,” Margaret McEnchroe Williams described the threefold goal of the organizers that reached beyond economic aims. Beside demonstrating Ireland’s industrial potential, the exhibition claimed the importance of Ireland as a cultural center by including a Hall of Fine Arts, which showed not only Irish artists but also European Old Masters. This claim was, of course, directed against the cultural hegemony of England, attacking its political dominance on a cultural level. Yet even more important was the Hall of Irish Antiquities, where a collection of Celtic objects not only asserted the existence of a distinct Celtic history but also laid the foundation for the development of a specifically Irish iconography. In later years this iconography became a powerful, widely accepted symbolic language for Irish nationalists and liberation movements.

Another crucial aspect of the ideal of the Irish Industrial Exhibition of 1853 was the intertwining of national aspirations and Christian faith. As in Ireland, a revival of religious belief and the process of re-Christianization of society accompanied and supported national ideas. For instance, this fusion of nationalism with religiosity informed French artists and writers such as Paul Gauguin and Emile Bernard, art historian Louis Courajod, critic Jean Schoepfer, and spiritual philosopher Edouard Schure (Morowitz). Toward the fin de siècle, medieval Brittany was seen as a site of both the racial and religious roots of the nation, “a place where the Gallic race and Christianity fused to form the essential French character.”

In Germany, too, religion and nationalism were often viewed in
a mutually reinforcing light. The core of the German Nazarenes’ enterprise, for example, constituted their belief that only the rise of a new religiosity could lead to an artistic as well as a political renewal of the German people after a century of decadence and moral decline (Grewe). Turning toward Christianity, the majority of Nazarenes rejected antiquity as a symbol of heathenism and denounced French neoclassicism as an expression of secularization and revolution, both of which they despised. Turning away from the Greek nude as the prevalent model, they developed instead an androgynous body ideal that sought to express purity, self-restraint, and sexual abstinence, that is, the renunciation of eighteenth-century decadence. Although the Nazarene reform program corresponded with the religious overtones of anti-French resistance and war rhetoric, the ideal of the androgynous body contrasted peculiarly with the rhetoric of the modern masculine stereotype that otherwise dominated German nationalistic body imagery. The paper on “Xaverio or the Ideal of the Androgynous Body: Artistic Crisis and National Desires” (Grewe) showed how difficult it proved to construct a “national body” outside of the Winkelmannian neoclassical model.

Even in a country such as France, where the nation-state had been achieved, the questions of what constituted the nation, what it was composed of, and how it could be defined remained hotly debated. Although the notion of France as a nation remained essentially unchallenged throughout both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, medievalism responded also in France to internal crisis. First, medievalism played an important part in the conflicts between different parties that aimed to enforce their political positions through their particular construction of the past. Thus, the papers by Tina Waldeier Bizzarro on “France, la fille aînée de l’église catholique: The Rhetoric of Medieval Architectural Reclamation” and by Laura Morowitz on “Celtic Medievalism, Leftist Nationalism, and the Art of Brittany in the Nineteenth Century” presented interesting examples of competition among different versions and uses of medievalism. Whereas the former analyzed the ways in which architectural criticism served to develop a specifically Catholic national identity supported by conservative circles, the latter demonstrated how leftist writers, artists, and art historians stylized the culture of Brittany as the source for democratic traditions. With its thriving peasant culture, its isolation from the bureaucratic entanglements of Paris, and its alleg-
edly long tradition of Celtic liberty, Brittany served as the “ur-France” of a variety of populist nationalist ideologues.

In the decades before 1900 this very construction of the Middle Ages driven by contemporary goals came under attack in the wake of a national crisis after the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1. The French defeat prompted a fundamental questioning of France’s power and stability, and resulted in an explosion of interest in the Middle Ages that Emery traces back through the journal La Revue des Deux Mondes in her paper, “Nationalist Models of the Medieval in Fin-de-Siècle France.”

The crisis of French national identity fostered a mingling of medievalism with biological and racial theories. One widely held theory about French origins claimed that the French aristocracy descended from the energetic, pure-blooded Germanic invaders of the fifth century, whereas the common people were products of the weak, mixed-race Gallo-Romans. France was depicted as injured, as a sick body, a metaphor appropriate for the popular organic conception of state and nation. Yet, opposing racial theories, biological metaphors, and the rhetoric of sickness, writers such as Coulanges instead located the source for France’s national crisis in precisely these constructions of the past that supported widespread insecurities about the character of the French people.

Understanding the sociological function of historical interpretations, Coulanges denounced the misconceptions of France’s history as the major cause of its sickness and called for a more scholarly, less biased approach to medieval history. He argued that the influence of the German invaders on French culture was in fact slight, and he insisted instead on the unbroken links between the Roman Empire and the subsequent development of France. This analysis of the past allowed him to describe France as a historically independent, strong, and stable country throughout its history.

As Emery emphasized, Coulanges’s revisionist approach to medieval history not only helped to heal France’s moral wounds. His call for a more scholarly approach to the Middle Ages also fostered a higher demand for serious medieval scholarship in fin-de-siècle France and thus contributed to the creation of modern medieval scholarship. However, the tie between Coulanges’s allegedly more objective scholarship and contemporary political debates also alerts us to the political implications of all historical writing. Writ-
Engaging about the past almost inevitably includes a “making” of the past. Beyond shedding new light on the processes that lead to the construction of national identity, myths, and iconography, the discussion of “historicizing the nation” also helped us to understand the complex relation between the present and the past.

Cordula A. Grewe

A Partnership Transformed: Germany and the United States in the 1960s


The history of German-American relations in the 1960s and early 1970s is now being investigated by a growing number of historians. These researchers are taking advantage of newly opened archival records and recently published collections of documents. The aim of this workshop was to add a third perspective, namely, that of the recollections of officials active during this period. “A Partnership Transformed” gathered together five former U.S. government officials intimately involved in German-American relations at this time: Francis M. Bator, a professor emeritus of political economy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, served for three years as deputy national security adviser to President Lyndon B. Johnson, with responsibility for foreign economic policy and for U.S.-European relations; Martin J. Hillenbrand, a professor emeritus of international relations at the University of Georgia, served as deputy chief of mission at the American Embassy in Bonn from 1964 to 1967 and was assistant secretary of state for European Affairs from 1969 to 1972 before returning to Bonn as U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic between 1972 and 1976; Thomas L. Hughes, who served as deputy director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1961 to 1969, went on to
become president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from 1971 to 1991; Robert G. Livingston, a U.S. Foreign Service officer in Berlin during the 1960s and a member of the National Security Council in 1972–3, continued his involvement in German affairs as director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and as founding director of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies in Washington, D.C.; James S. Sutterlin, a distinguished fellow at Yale University, served as counselor for political affairs at the American Embassy in Bonn in 1968–9 and as director of the State Department’s Office of Central European Affairs from 1969 to 1972 before he went on to the United Nations, where he headed the Executive Office of the Secretary General from 1982 to 1987. The roundtable was moderated by Ernest R. May, a professor of history at Harvard University and an authority on the history of international relations.

The workshop started off with a brief presentation by Wilfried Mausbach on German-American relations during the chancellorship of Ludwig Erhard (1963–6). Mausbach identified three issues that dominated the bilateral relationship in these years: (1) the West German government’s efforts to counter what it perceived to be the growing neglect of the German Question among its closest allies; (2) Washington’s proposal to create the Multilateral Force (MLF), which was to give the West Germans a sense of participation in their own nuclear defense without giving them actual control of these weapons; and (3) the agreements, beginning in 1961, to have Bonn offset foreign-exchange expenditures of American soldiers stationed in Germany through purchases of U.S. weapons, as a means of easing the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit.

Francis M. Bator picked up on the offset issue, explaining that Washington assumed that Erhard would honor the current offset agreement. Regarding future offset agreements, however, Johnson signaled his readiness to compromise and proposed trilateral U.S.-U.K.-German negotiations. Bator emphasized that in conveying this position to the German government, the United States made it clear in numerous messages via numerous channels that officials in Bonn should get back to them on this issue. However, according to Bator, nothing happened: “We absolutely blanked out. We got no acceptance of the idea of a trilateral negotiation with respect to the future offset and nothing on the current offset.”
sponding to critical remarks by other participants, Bator defended the way the Johnson administration handled the offset problem. In his view, the criticism overlooked the fact that the president’s major objective was to enable him to maintain a very large American conventional force in western Europe in the face of enormous pressures from the U.S. Congress and serious balance-of-payments difficulties. From the perspective of keeping alive the political viability of ground-force deployments, the ensuing trilateral negotiations were a success. As to American negotiating tactics during Erhard’s visit to Washington in September 1966, Bator confessed that it took him years to figure out why the president would not yield ground. Characteristically, Johnson would not explain himself to his staff: “Exposition was not his game.” Bator eventually attributed Johnson’s stubbornness in the offset matter to his presidential style, which was shaped by his experience as Senate majority leader. A majority leader did not cut a deal with someone who appeared unable to deliver. Bator explained that in late August 1966 the president was convinced that the days of the Erhard government were numbered.

Martin J. Hillenbrand emphasized that Johnson’s assessment of the situation was not based specifically on any prediction coming from the American Embassy in Bonn but rather might very well have been due to the impact of reports from Bonn over the previous two years. These reports left little doubt that Erhard’s standing within his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was rapidly eroding and that the chancellor lacked the political skills to govern the country in the same manner as Konrad Adenauer had. Nevertheless, Hillenbrand felt that American emphasis on offset was both diplomatically and technically done in such a way as to exacerbate the situation. He believes it could have been handled better and criticized Washington for hanging Erhard and his foreign minister, Gerhard Schroder, out to dry when the president repudiated the MLF project. Of course, this came in the wake of a concerted American effort to convince the Germans of its merits. In Hillenbrand’s view, this episode is an example of a tendency to “dream up a scheme to meet what we think is a psychological necessity on the part of our European allies” that is then transformed into a genuine American cause. European willingness to accept it then becomes a test of European loyalty to NATO.
Thomas L. Hughes took issue with Bator's portrayal of Johnson as the "central player" in these matters who often overrode his own advisers. Hughes pointed out that this portrayal to some extent contradicts the picture of the president behaving like a majority leader, always trying to be sensitive to a variety of viewpoints. Hughes explained why he did not see Johnson acting this way, and he felt that this was "especially ironic because German-American relations in the 1960s were marked by an effervescence of politics all over the place. You couldn't find two more politically active capitals in the world than Washington and Bonn." But according to Hughes, the American president missed the opportunity to handle relations with Bonn in a shrewd majority leader-like way. In fact, Hughes never sensed that Johnson was very much engaged or interested in Germany. He pointed out that the German-American relationship and the German "success story" of the 1950s were traditionally identified with Republicans, such as Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles or John J. McCloy. Thus, the Democratic Party was not much interested in Germany. By the end of his administration, and his triumphant visit to Berlin in June 1963, John F. Kennedy had overcome his party's reluctance to make German-American relations its own. But, according to Hughes, it might have been precisely Kennedy's tremendous success that kept Johnson from visiting Germany until Adenauer's funeral in 1967.

James S. Sutterlin emphasized the extraordinary, long-lasting, and direct effect that internally motivated U.S. developments had on developments within Germany. Moreover, he drew attention to the personality of the American ambassador at the time, George McGhee. Although the ambassador was a friend of the president, Sutterlin believed that this also carried some disadvantages. Because McGhee felt he had a direct line to the president, he constantly wrote telegrams on the assumption that they would have an immediate effect on Johnson, especially on the issues of offset and the MLF. Sutterlin, however, thought they probably did not and that this illusion on the part of the ambassador might have actually reduced rather than increased the effectiveness of the embassy as a source of advice. The role of the embassy was further complicated by a constant stream of people from the Treasury Department coming to Bonn, which indicated that issues like offset were not centered in the State Department and were in fact handled outside traditional
diplomatic channels. This may have contributed to misunderstandings on both sides of the Atlantic.

Philipp Gassert introduced the second half of the workshop. He showed the audience the verbatim text of a conversation recorded by Bator on March 2, 1967. The occasion, Gassert explained, was the return to Washington of McCloy, the American envoy to the offset negotiations, during a break in the trilateral negotiations. The winter and spring of 1966-7 witnessed what has since been described as the coming of age of the Federal Republic. With the end of the postwar era, Americans could expect more support, especially financially, from Germany, but Bonn was at the same time more inclined to resist American demands. Thus, the government of Erhard's successor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, let it be known that it would not agree to a full future offset. With negotiations deadlocked, McCloy was back to receive new guidelines. Gassert used the record of McCloy's discussion with the president and his advisers to illustrate how we can look at the German-American relationship from several angles: personalities, questions of communication and perception, political constraints, and the geopolitical and strategic level. The conversation between Johnson and McCloy made clear that the president wanted to know what the Germans had to offer; yet, the Germans were intent on sounding out the Americans first. However, Gassert pointed out that there was another mirror image: Johnson and Kiesinger each argued that the future of the alliance was at stake, that each was doing everything he could to hold it together, and that the other side was the one jeopardizing relations.

Bator thought that the memorandum once again showed Johnson acting as a majority leader-like president. The president knew that McCloy was opposed to the troop cuts favored by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler. According to Bator, although he leaned toward McCloy's position, the president did not want to reveal his hand and tried very hard "to stiffen' McCloy. Bator warned, however, that this had to be read as a negotiating position and not as a description of where the president's mind actually was. Bator went on to call attention to the sensitivity of negative press reports, such as those triggered by a February 1967 interview with Kiesinger, alluded to in the conversation between Johnson and McCloy. Bator explained that such reports made it more difficult for the president to ward off domestic
opposition, while there was a total incomprehension of the president’s problem in playing out his political hand on the part of the Germans.

Other participants elaborated on this issue: Hillenbrand pointed out that not only the press sometimes generated an atmosphere of crisis: “Many of these crises of confidence between the Federal Republic and the United States that I have lived through were in many cases, it seems to me, exaggerated by both sides. There is an excellent tendency on the part of staff members and particularly those who are immediately concerned in the bureaucracies, who were writing briefing papers—in order to interest the principals who are going to meetings—to emphasize or overemphasize the critical nature of this particular meeting.”

Robert G. Livingston corroborated Bator’s view that there was on the German side “a certain instinctive incomprehension of the division-of-powers problems in the United States.” He also pointed out that Bonn was such a small, incestuous town that things leaked very fast, not only to the press but also to East Bloc intelligence services. He confirmed that on the part of the American intelligence community there was a strong perception that the West German government was heavily penetrated at all levels. It was in the context of discussing these leaks that participants also commented on the peculiar role of General Julius Klein, according to Hughes, one of the “mystery figures” in the German-American relationship.

A question from the audience raised the issue of whether or not there existed a special relationship between Bonn and Washington. Bator felt that relations to the British were still much closer. Sutterlin agreed that American relations with Bonn, in contrast to its relations with London, were not above suspicion. He mentioned the example of Karl Theodor Freiherr von and zu Guttenberg, the parliamentary state secretary in Kiesinger’s chancellery, who was considered at the American Embassy and in Washington to be a kind of French liaison. But the fact that he attracted such suspicion reflected larger U.S. doubts of the attitudes and policies of the German government. Somewhat later, Egon Bahr played a very similar role but in the opposite direction. Other questions from the audience concerned Ostpolitik, the impact of Willy Brandt’s personality on the American perception of Germany, and the role of the Vietnam War in German-American relations.
Ernest R. May concluded the stimulating discussion by following up on one of the subjects explored and recommending that scholars pay more attention to the role of the press in this bilateral relationship, especially to the role of American correspondents based in Germany. Overall, the format of the workshop—having several former U.S. officials share their reminiscences among themselves and with the audience—proved to be enjoyable and rewarding.

Wilfried Mausbach

Gender Politics and Word Experiences in East and West Germany


The opening of East German archives in 1989–90 attracted scores of German and American scholars. In the fields of gender politics and gender relations, this development has also enlivened the study of West Germany, and it has intensified transatlantic academic debates. After almost a decade of intense and comprehensive research on both societies, the challenge of the transatlantic debate now is to discuss results in a comparative perspective. As part of the Collaborative Research Program “Continuity, Change and Globalization in Postwar Germany and America” (see Bulletin No. 24, spring 1999, pp. 33–4), the workshop involving graduate students at Carnegie Mellon University served this goal.

In her presentation Donna Harsch focused on East German central planning and gender relations on factory shop floors during the 1950s. She showed how—despite political efforts to draw women into the expanding labor force and to realize women’s socialist emancipation—the forces of change largely failed to eradicate gender hierarchies and discrimination on the factory floor. Industrial production, the central element of communist state policy, remained a predomi-
nantly male domain, even though East Germany’s economy moved beyond basic industrialization toward a communist version of a limited consumer-service economy. Harsch’s analysis illustrated how little political statements of the 1950s actually tell us about diverging social and cultural developments in East and West Germany. Mirroring these results, Christine von Oertzen presented the changing attitudes toward married women in West German industry. Despite claims that married women should stay at home and care for their families, the West German female work force grew steadily during the 1950s. The percentage of married women in the work force increased from 19.5 percent in 1950 to 35 percent in 1961. In that year a total of 1.2 million more women were employed than a decade before, many of them in part-time factory work. Improving economic conditions provoked a strong demand for labor, and, referring to Western female role models, more and more people accepted that married women had a right to work for wages.

Each presentation provoked a lively discussion among the students and was further animated by short contributions from those who have begun to work in this field.

Christine von Oertzen

The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States 1919–1939

Conference at Schloß Münchenwiler, Switzerland, August 25–28, 1999. Co-sponsored by the German Historical Institutes in London, Paris, and Washington, D.C., the Hamburg Institute for Social Research, the Swiss National Science Foundation, and the Max and Elsa Beer-Brawand Foundation. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Stig Förster (University of Bern). Participants: Timo Baumann (University of Bern), Richard Bessel (University of York), Giulia Brogini (University of Bern), Deborah A. Cohen (American University), Dittmar Dahlmann (University of Bonn), Wilhelm Deist (Freiburg im Breisgau), James M. Diehl (Indiana University), Jürgen Förster (Center for the Study of Military History, Potsdam), Norbert Frei (University of Bochum), Bernd Greiner
The fourth conference in the series, “Germany and the United States in the Age of Total War, 1860–1945,” convened at the conference center of the Swiss canton of Bern. Scholars from Europe and North America met to discuss the aftermath of World War I and the prelude to World War II in Europe, East Asia, and the United States in light of the concept of “total war.” The conveners hoped that this conference would build on the previous three conferences.

The conveners, Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, opened the conference with a discussion of the contested meaning of total war. They were particularly concerned that the terms meaning is often unclear and is used loosely to embrace everything and signify nothing. However, they were relieved to see that as this conference series moves toward the present, and with the emergence of the actual rhetoric of total war, that the ideas surrounding it actually play a role in shaping both perceptions and reality.

Each session began with brief introductory remarks by the chair and was then followed by short presentations by each panelist. Longer versions of the papers were distributed before the conference. The bulk of each session was devoted to a debate of the ideas and information presented. It was the hope of the conveners that a general conversation among participants would develop.

Chaired by Detlef Junker, the first session dealt with “The Prob-
lem of Total War in the 1920s and 1930s.” Stig Förster presented the first paper on “The Age of Total War, 1861–1945.” Förster outlined a typology of ingredients that he believes comprise a working definition of the term “total war”: aims (limited to unlimited warfare), methods (increasing radicalization), mobilization (mass armies, whole peoples), and total control. In the next paper, Hew Strachan discussed “War and Society in the 1920s and 1930s,” especially the border between civilians and soldiers, noncombatants and combatants. Gerhard L. Weinberg then gave an overview of “The Politics of War and Peace in the 1920s and 1930s,” with a particular eye toward the coming conflict between Germany and much of the rest of the world. He reminded the audience that the end of World War I did not see the end of fighting (e.g., the Russian Civil War, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, and the Spanish Civil War).

In the second session, which was chaired by Lothar Kettenacker, the “Legacies of Total War” were explored. Gerd Krumeich assessed “Versailles: The Failure of Peace.” In a paper on the peace movement, Hartmut Lehmann discussed “Religious Socialism, Peace, and Pacifism: The Case of Paul Tillich.” James M. Diehl presented a paper on the contrary trend, “No More Peace: The Militarization of Politics.” Markus Pöhlmann then talked about “World War Experience and Future War Images in the Official German Military History, 1918–1939.”

The third session, chaired by Fritz Klein, covered “Victims and Consequences of Total War.” It began with a paper on “The War Is Over and Everybody Goes Home? Armistice 1918 and the Repatriation of the Prisoners of War from Germany” by Uta Hinz. Next, Deborah A. Cohen discussed “The War’s Returns: The Case of Disabled Veterans in Britain and Germany.” One of the nonhistorians present at the conference, Simon Wessely, then related a lively history of “The Effect of Total War on British Psychiatry.” Finally, Reinhard Merkel compared, in part schematically, the normative ideas of “International Law and the Memories of World War I.”

The second day opened with a session on “Anticipations of Total War: New Visions.” Roger Chickering presented his ideas on “Sore Loser: Ludendorff’s Total War.” Thomas Rohkrämer then discussed “Strangelove, or How Ernst Jünger Learned to Love Total War.” Dittmar Dahlmann explored “The Soviet Idea of Warfare.” The session concluded with a presentation by Bernd Greiner on “The Study
The afternoon session of Day Two was titled “Anticipations of Total War: Warfare in a New Mode.” Chaired by Martin Vogt, the first presenters were Time, Baumann and Daniel Segesser, who investigated “Shadows of Total War in French and British Military Journals, 1918–1939.” After an entertaining opener, Dennis E. Showalter discussed “Plans, Weapons, Doctrines: The Strategic Cultures of Interwar Europe.” To round out the panel, Wilhelm Deist looked forward in his presentation on “‘Blitzkrieg’ or Total War? War Preparations in Nazi Germany.”

Day Three consisted of only a morning session, which was titled “Anticipations of Total War: The Mobilization of State and Society” and was chaired by Holger H. Herwig. Norbert Frei addressed issues of “Volksgemeinschaft and Propaganda in Nazi Germany,” arguing that historians must take the idea of Volksgemeinschaft more seriously than in the past. Hans-Heinrich Nolte then asked whether Stalinism represented “Permanent Total War?” Claudia Koonz was unable to attend in person but sent along slides and an audiotaped presentation titled “The Mobilization of Women for Total War: Germany and Japan.” Benedikt Stuchtey went further afield in his paper on “Mobilizing the Empire: Britain and its Dominions, 1918–1939.”

The final day of the conference began with a morning session chaired by Jörg Nagler on “Rehearsing for the Next War.” Giulia Brogini went to East Africa for her presentation on “Total Colonial Warfare: Ethiopia.” Klaus A. Maier then went west for his presentation on “Fascist Warfare in Practice: Spain.” Lastly, Louise Young traveled to East Asia for her examination of “Japan’s Wartime Empire in China.”

Robert Tombs chaired the afternoon panel discussion that questioned whether there was “No Escaping from Total War?” Panelists included Richard Bessel, Jürgen Förster, and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann. The discussion centered on the legacies of World War I during the interwar period, the limits of total war as a reality, the questions that had remained on the margins but now seemed critical to the debate, whether or not the Cold War was a total war, and whether or not the prosperity of the post-World War II era can be seen as the solution to total war.
The conveners plan to publish a collection of the essays presented at the conference in the GHI’s series with Cambridge University Press. The fifth and final conference, covering World War II, in the series is planned for 2001.

Daniel S. Mattern
Fifth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History, 1999: “Germany in the Age of Revolution, 1789–1850”

Seminar at the GHI and Georgetown University, April 21–24, 1999. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Andreas W Daum (GHI). Moderators: Cordula A. Grewe (GHI), Martina Kessel (University of Bielefeld), Christof Mauch (GHI), Volker Sellin (University of Heidelberg), James J. Sheehan (Stanford University), and Jonathan Sperber (University of Missouri at Columbia).

The Fifth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History took place at the GHI and Georgetown University. In the tradition of the previous meetings in Washington in 1995 and 1997, as well as in Bochum in 1996 and Göttingen in 1998, the seminar was co-sponsored by the German-American Academic Council, the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University, and the Conference Group for Central European History.

Six months prior to the seminar, the organizers announced the meeting on the Internet, in individual letters to over one hundred history professors in the United States and in Germany, and in the periodical bulletins of the GHI and the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University. Out of a large applicant pool, sixteen doctoral candidates from the United States and Germany were then invited to present their dissertation research and discuss their colleagues’ projects. These projects principally fell into the era of German history between the French Revolution and the European revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century. The seminar brought together young scholars working on a great diversity of topics and helped the participants cross the scholarly boundaries between social, political, and intellectual history. The doctoral students repeatedly expressed their appreciation of this format, which
allowed them both to transcend the confines of their individual topics and to achieve common research perspectives.

As in previous years, the participants were asked to submit in advance papers that presented essential elements of their doctoral research—be it a case study, a draft of a dissertation chapter, or a summary of the overall project. Copies of all the papers were distributed to everyone prior to the seminar, thus avoiding the need for participants to make formal presentations. The meeting was organized into eight panels, each of which began with two students commenting on two papers. The authors were then given an opportunity to respond before the general discussion began. As in 1995 to 1998, this procedure greatly stimulated discussion and drew all participants into an intense exchange of ideas. The participants also experienced the give-and-take of academic “commentary,” which is a standard of scholarly conferences in the United States and has been adopted by the German academic community as well. An additional feature of the Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar is worth noting: The meetings are bilingual, and either English or German may be used when writing the formal papers, presenting or commenting, and during the discussions. All participants are thus free to use the language in which they feel most comfortable. This procedure found unanimous approval from all participants.

As was the case in Göttingen in 1998, no clear trends in terms of topics chosen or methodologies applied were evident along the lines of national academic communities; rather, the American and German academic “roots” left an imprint on the mode of presentation and the way in which questions and comments were articulated. For example, among both German and American scholars the role of religion figured as a prominent concern. But the American scholars were more inclined to embed related topics in a broad appreciation of contemporary religious practices.

In general, the Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar once again realized one of its key goals: allowing important insights into the state of historical studies in both countries. A half generation ago, protoindustrialism, civil servants, farmers and artisans, anti-Semitism, and the inchoate interest in Catholicism figured as prominent themes of historiography. In 1999 these topics were relegated more or less to the background, as were literary history and the revolutionary events of 1789 and 1848–9. The discussions during the seminar re-
revealed a new diversity of topics and methodologies that apparently reflect trends in contemporary historical studies, without being “representative” of the research community as a whole.

First, there was an implicit but striking consensus that many of the historiographic battles of the 1970s and 1980s—be it structural history versus political history, or the discussions about the Sonderweg and the legitimacy of Alltagsgeschichte—are finally over and have made room for less ideological and more dialectical ways of thinking about historical research, leaving behind what had previously been entrenched camps or schools. This new openness went along with a skepticism toward ascribing to a dominating paradigm of interpretation; many of the papers were based on and pleaded for methodological pluralism.

Second, and as a direct consequence, there were some approaches that permeated many of the papers that otherwise had different objectives. Among these were the sensitivity for gender issues and the appreciation of comparative perspectives. Perhaps most important, traces of what could be summarized as the linguistic turn marked the majority of projects in one way or the other and led to an enhanced attentiveness to language, symbolic structures, and creation of meaning in society.

Third, and in close connection with the abandoning of the camp mentality, many of the master narratives of modern history were scrutinized and, in fact, did not elude deconstruction. Above all, this held true for the paradigms of modernization and secularization, both of which were frequently addressed, particularly in the papers dealing with the history of religion. The various definitions of modernity have turned out to be increasingly fragile and questionable.

Fourth, some common themes ran through almost all the papers: What was the character of civil society in the first half of the nineteenth century, and how can we define Bürgerlichkeit? What was the meaning of religion and how far did religious practices and assumptions permeate society during these years? What character did the state assume, and what role did the state play? And finally, what was the meaning of “Germanness” and “Germany” in an age that witnessed the rise of nationalism and growing interethnic conflict? In fact, the various meanings of nationalism figured as prominent themes in many of the sessions.
Both the moderators and the students agreed that this seminar was marked by a spirit of great collegiality; it combined the friendly atmosphere of mutual understanding with a fair and unusually intensive treatment of academic topics. The collegial character of the seminar and the high quality of the discussions led to two results, which all participants underscored in the end: The seminar allowed the doctoral candidates a thorough re-examination of their projects and helped them to see these projects as lying within larger contexts. At the same time, the exchange among the participants went beyond mere academic aims; it fundamentally helped further mutual understanding of the modes of research, forms of sociability, and the societal context of scholars. The opening reception, two common dinners, the final reception, and the one free afternoon provided time for numerous German-American encounters. For many students, this seminar was the first opportunity to meet young colleagues and senior scholars from the other side of the Atlantic and to discuss research questions as well as current events in both countries.

Personal comments underlined the overall very positive resonance from the participants. Many students praised the “atmosphere of cooperation and critical engagement” that one student summarized as “open, critical, collegial, and always fair.” In particular, the doctoral candidates appreciated the “sustained interaction between junior and senior scholars,” the “accessibility of the participants,” and the “delightful lack of academic ‘posing’.” The students mentioned that the “unobtrusive and effective” organization helped to create an intensive setting for discussing the papers that permitted “tough but constructive criticism.”

The organizers will do their best in the future to maintain the standard of the 1999 seminar. The next Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar is scheduled to take place at the Humboldt University of Berlin April 26 and 29, 2000, and will follow the format outlined previously. This seminar will cover a period that is certainly no less contested than the early decades of the nineteenth century: the Imperial Age between 1850 and 1914. Please see the announcement on page 65 of this issue.

The selected participants and their projects were as follows:

Karin Breuer, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “Creating a National Community: Collective Memory and the Burschenschaft’s Conception of Freedom, 1815–1848.”
Mary Ann Coyle, University of Maryland at College Park, “Narrativity and Orality in Administrative Discourse: Saxon Patrimonial Courts, 1790-1855.”


David Ellis, University of Chicago, “Reaction and Religion in Early Nineteenth-Century Prussia.”

Deborah Fleetham, University of Rochester, „Was gehört dazu, ein Mitglied der evangelischen Kirchen zu sein? Protestant (Dis)Unity in Prussia, 1815–1848.“

Bernd Stefan Grewe, University of Trier, “Forestry and the Making of Poverty: The Case of a South-West German Region in the Nineteenth Century.”


Eric-Oliver Mader, University of Munich, „Altes Reich und Neue Ordnung. Zur Wahrnehmung und Bewältigung des Wandels um 1800 durch die letzte Generation von Richtern des Reichskammergerichtes.“

Brent Maner, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “Prehistoric Answers to the German Question: Fridolfing as a Site of Archaeological Excavation, 1834–1850.”

Ursula Meyerhofer, Free University of Berlin, "Bürgerrepublik und Nation in der Schweiz, 1815–1848." 


Philipp Prein, Humboldt University of Berlin, „Aufbruch oder Flucht? Bürgerliches Reisen als symbolische Praxis im Zeitalter der Revolution.”

Teresa Sanislo, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, “Protecting Manliness in the Age of Enlightenment: The New Physical Education and Gymnastics in Germany, 1770–1800.”

Daniel Schönpflug, Technical University of Berlin, „Der Straßburger Jakobinerclub—Werkstatt französisch-deutscher Wahrnehmungen, 1790–1794.“
Ronald Trapp, University of Hamburg, „Preußen und die erste Bundesstaatskrise 1848.“

Andreas W Daum

Summer Program June 6–19, 1999

The GHI Summer Program in paleography and archival studies, co-funded by the German Department of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, was an unambiguous success—at least according to the feedback from the participants. Ten graduate students attended this year’s course, which aimed to provide participants with an introduction to various types of German handwriting from earlier centuries and a working overview of the complexity of the German
archival landscape. The program had three basic components: (1) instruction in German handwriting of the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries; (2) instruction in the use of archives to conduct scholarly research; and (3) a tour of German archives in the western part of the Federal Republic.

The program kicked off in Koblenz, home to the Bundesarchiv and the Landeshauptarchiv of Rhineland-Palatinate. Mornings were spent with Walter Rummel, who introduced the participants to the art and practice of reading old German handwriting. Afternoons were spent with Michael Hollmann, who guided the students through the thicket of the German archival landscape and the development of German administrative bureaucracy—a legacy of the Kleinstaaterei of pre-unification Germany. One question was on everyone’s mind at the end of these sessions: “Wer war zuständig?”—an invaluable query when trying to track down records that might shed light on the historian’s Fragestellung. Participants were delighted to have the chance to speak with the president of the Bundesarchiv, Friedrich Kahlenberg, who warmly welcomed the group to his institution. The group toured both Koblenz facilities and received an impression of the kinds of materials housed in each. The participants also were given the opportunity to think about the kinds of questions that historians need to ask archivists. In addition to the official program, the group also had the opportunity to visit a local wine cellar in the Moselle River Valley.

From Koblenz we traveled first to Heidelberg, where we visited the archive of Germany’s oldest university. In a meeting with the director, Werner Moritz, the group became acquainted with the purpose and chronological depth of this academic archive. We also were impressed with the terrific growth of its holdings over the course of the twentieth century, reflecting the general trend regarding paper records of all types.

The next stop was the Politisches Archiv of the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn. The director, Ludwig Biewer, gave a clear and precise lecture on the history of the foreign affairs archive and its rather complicated development, mirroring of course the twists and turns in modern Germany’s history. The archive had prepared for the group a display of some of what one will find in its stacks, e.g., a copy of the Wannsee Conference protocols, the German copy of the Rapallo treaty, and so forth.
From Bonn we moved on to Cologne, which was just then gearing up for the G-8 Summit and the arrival of the political leaders of the leading industrial countries (plus Russia). Appropriately, we began our stay in this city by visiting the Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln. There, we were hosted by Eberhard Illner, who provided the participants with an excellent overview of the city’s history and its significance for German and wider European history, and Joachim Deeters, who guided us through the medieval collections. We were permitted a look at some of the archive’s oldest holdings, including parchment documents from as far back as the eighth century. Furthermore, the group had the chance to consult with historian James Brophy of the University of Delaware, who was completing a year in Germany, about the ins and outs of archival research.

The following day we visited the stacks of the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (RWWA) located north of the city in an industrial zone. There we were met by the director, Klara van Eyll, her deputy, Ulrich S. Soenius, and archivist Jürgen Weise. The students caught a glimpse of the difference between the production of official records and their preservation in an official archive, and the collection of materials relating to the operation of a business and the difficulty of saving this material for use by future historians.

After the visit to the RWWA, the Bayer Corporation in nearby Leverkusen invited the group to lunch at its casino. This filling repast was followed by a tour of the visitors’ center and the enormous Bayer factory along the Rhine. We were especially impressed with the environmental measures undertaken by Bayer to reduce pollution from its operations and to invest heavily in systems that recycle water used to produce a variety of chemicals.

Midweek saw a visit to the sprawling complex of the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) in downtown Cologne. There we were greeted by Klaus Heimann and Heide Kunde, who introduced us to the purpose and function of this very different kind of archive. The WDR facilities are very modern and technologically up-to-date, necessitated by the fact that journalists and producers use the collections to support the rapid and incessant production of radio and television programming. The participants were surprised to learn that in the world of broadcasting, there are more than 24 hours in a day.

The morning of the final day was spent at the Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums zu Köln, where we were greeted by its director, Toni
Diederich. We were then treated to a fine introduction to church history by archivist Joachim Oepen. The participants came to understand that it is often very difficult to draw clear boundaries between church history and the history of Germany generally—both contain the cultural, political, and social history that is essential for understanding historical developments. In addition, the students got to view some ancient as well as modern exhibits from the collections, e.g., a document mentioning the first bishop of Cologne, the Holy Maternus, and a letter from U.S. President Ronald Reagan to the bishop of Cologne regarding the situation in Poland during the rise of Solidarity.

Despite favorable reviews of the program from the students, there are a few improvements to be made. First, before embarking on the program, people selected to participate will be asked to acquaint themselves with the alphabet of Altdeutscher Schrift before arriving in Germany. To this end appropriate materials will be sent to them in advance. Second, we hope to extend the length of course on handwriting by a day to give students more time to absorb what they have learned. Third, because the program aims to include graduate students working on historical topics in a variety of disciplines, we hope to visit other types of institutions, such as libraries or special collections repositories, in order to address the interests of all participants in a more balanced way.

The GHI plans to organize the Summer Program, renamed the Summer Seminar, again next June. The announcement regarding the application deadline can be found on page 66 of this issue.

Daniel S. Mattern
Library Report: Wehrmacht Ausstellung

Over the last few years a controversial exhibition dealing with the role of the German Wehrmacht in war crimes and the Holocaust during World War II has created a great deal of public controversy in Germany. After touring several German cities, the exhibition will soon come to the United States. Starting on December 2, 1999, and running through the end of January 2000, the exhibition, titled “The German Wehrmacht and Genocide: Crimes of the Wehrmacht Between 1941 and 1944,” will be on display at the Cooper Union in New York City. In connection with the exhibition, New York University and the New School for Social Research will organize a number of workshops on the role of the Wehrmacht during the war.

In light of the impending arrival of this exhibition in the United States, the Library has acquired a number of publications offering indepth views of the controversy. Among recent acquisition are the catalog of the original German exhibition (Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944), a collection of speeches presented at the opening of the exhibition (Krieg ist ein Gesellschaftszustand: Reden zur Eröffnung der Ausstellung „Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944”), an analysis of the discussions triggered by the show, interviews with visitors, and other documents concerning reactions to the exhibition in Germany (Besucher einer Ausstellung; Bilanz einer Ausstellung. Eine Ausstellung and ihre Folgen). These books offer a detailed look at one of the most divisive historical exhibitions to be presented in postwar Germany.

The Library has also recently acquired a number of new dictionaries and handbooks that might be of interest to our readers. These include:

Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 20 volumes
International Biographical Index, CD-ROM
Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich seit 1880, 1880-1942
Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, 19 volumes.
These new acquisitions significantly expand the reference materials available in the Library.

Thomas Goebel

Recipients of the GHI’s Dissertation and Habilitation Scholarships, 2000

Dissertation Scholarships

Patricia Heberer, “‘Exitus’ Today in Hadamar: The History of a National Socialist ‘Euthanasia’ Facility.” Doctoral adviser: James F. Harris, University of Maryland at College Park.


Anja Schäfers, „American Forces Network (AFN) in Deutschland in den 1950er und 60er Jahren.” Doctoral adviser: Axel Schöldt, University of Hamburg.

Gudrun-Christine Schimpf, „Politische Bewegung im gesellschaftlichen Kontext: Die Auseinandersetzung um das Frauen—stimmrecht in den USA und in Deutschland.“ Doctoral adviser: Clemens Zimmerman, University of Heidelberg.


Habilitation Scholarships

Marc Frey, University of Cologne, „Die USA und die Auflösung der europäischen Kolonialreiche in Südostasien.“


Christoph Strupp, University of Heidelberg, „Wissenschaft und Krieg: Die USA und das Deutsche Reich im Ersten Weltkrieg.“

Recipients of the German-American Center for Visiting Scholars (GACVS) Research Grants, 1999/2000

Lisa Brand, “The American Influence on the German ‗Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen’ (German Antitrust Law) After 1945.” University of Bonn.


Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, “Germany in the West: Americanization and Westernization in the Twentieth Century.” University of Tübingen.


Christine Künzel, “The Order of Genders in Rape Trials: The Concept of Sexual Violence in the Discourses of Law and Literature.” University of Berlin.

Daniel Letwin, “Black Political Thought and ‘Social Equity’ in the Age of Segregation.” Pennsylvania State University.

Elke Muchilinski, “Central Bank Policy in North America and Its Implications for the Choice of a Monetary Regime in Western Europe.” Free University of Berlin.

Gunnar Trumbull, “Product Market Regulations (Germany, France, and the USA).” Massachusetts Institute of Technology.


Rüdiger Wink, “Institutional Evolution to Manage Long-Term Opportunities and Risks of Modern Technologies—Lessons from U.S. Experiences.” University of Bochum.

Andrea Witt, “German-Polish and U.S.-Mexican Borders (with Special Attention to the Various Horizontal and Vertical Networks).” Humboldt University of Berlin.
STAFF CHANGES

PHILIPP GASSERT, Research Fellow, will leave the Institute on September 30, 1999, to accept a position as assistant professor of history at the University of Heidelberg. He will continue his research for a biography of Kurt Georg Kiesinger.

ALEXANDER MERROW, Intern, Summer 1999, is currently a Ph.D. candidate in history at Georgetown University’s Center for German and European Studies. He has a B.A. in German and history from Denison University and an M.Phil. in medieval history from Cambridge University. His interests include nineteenth-century German historiography and intellectual history. While at the GHI, he worked on various projects, including research at libraries and archives, preparation of conferences, and editing and fact-checking of scholarly texts.

PUBLICATIONS OF NOTE


The Institute is pleased to report that Susan Strasser, a former research fellow (1992–5), has published her much-anticipated history of recycling and reuse in America. An outgrowth of her 1992 GHI Annual Lecture, “Waste and Want: The Other Side of Consumption,” the book details how people in the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries thought about trash, and how they continuously extracted value from cast-off materials. It also tells the story of how in an age of mass consumption Americans abandoned reuse in favor of disposable goods, creating mountains of waste all around us. Strasser’s latest book is a fine addition to her previous scholarly studies of housework and modern marketing. Susan Strasser has been appointed professor of history at the University of Delaware (effective September 1999).
Events

FALL 1999 LECTURE SERIES

Nature in History

September 28  David Blackbourn (Harvard University)  
“Conquests from Barbarism”: Taming Nature in Frederician Prussia

October 5  Mark Cioc (University of California at Santa Cruz)  
The Environmental History of the Rhine River, 1815 to the Present

October 12  Franz-Josef Brüggemeir (University of Freiburg)  
Waldsterben: The Construction and Deconstruction of an Environmental Problem

October 26  Linda Bryan Parshall (Dumbarton Oaks)  
The Green Prince of Germany: The Gardens of Pückler-Muskau and the Late Romantic Landscape

November 11  Joachim Wolschke-Bulman (University of Hannover)  
Heinrich Himmler and Landscape Planning in Nazi Germany

December 2  Sandra Chaney (Erskine College)  

UPCOMING CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS


"Aesthetics and Politics: From Cologne Cathedral to the Holocaust Memorial," panel at the 114th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association on "History for the Twenty-First Century: Con-


ANNUAL LECTURE 1999

On November 18, 1999, Mary Fulbrook (University College London) will deliver the Institute's Annual Lecture on "Fact, Fantasy, and German History." Konrad H. Jarausch (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) will comment. The lecture and comment will be published in the spring 2000 issue of the Bulletin.

FRIENDS OF THE GHI

The 1999 Friends' Dissertation Prize competition is currently being adjudicated by a panel chaired by William Hagen (University of California at Davis), who is joined by Herbert Andrews (Towson State University) and Ronald Smelser (University of Utah). The committee is considering doctoral dissertations completed during the 1997–8 academic year. Nominations have been received from some of the most prestigious graduate programs in the field of history, including Yale University, Harvard University, University of Chicago, University of Michigan, Brown University, Columbia University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the University of California. The prizewinners will be announced at the beginning of October and will present their projects at the annual Friends' symposium on November 19, 1999, at the GHI.

Nominations for dissertations completed during the past academic year (1998–9) will be accepted later this fall, and the winners of that competition will present their work at the Friends' annual symposium in November 2000.

Geoffrey J. Giles
TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR IN GERMAN HISTORY:
"GERMANY IN THE IMPERIAL AGE, 1850-1914"

BERLIN, APRIL 26–29, 2000

The GHI, the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University, and the Conference Group for Central European History are pleased to announce the Sixth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History. The conference is once again supported by the German-American Academic Council Foundation and will convene in Berlin from April 26 to 29, 2000.

The seminar is meant to bring together young scholars from Germany and North America who are nearing the completion of their doctoral degrees. We plan to invite eight scholars from each side of the Atlantic to discuss their doctoral projects. The discussions will be based on papers submitted in advance of the conference. The languages of this seminar will be German and English. The organizers will cover travel costs and lodging expenses. The theme of this seminar will be "Germany in the Imperial Age, 1850-1914." We are now accepting applications from doctoral students whose work falls principally in this era and who will not have finished their degrees before June 2000. Applications should include a short (2-3 pp.) project description, a curriculum vitae, and a letter of reference from the major adviser.

Please forward applications by December 1, 1999, to:

German Historical Institute
Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar
Attn: Bärbel Thomas
1607 New Hampshire Ave, N.W.
Washington, DC 20009-2562
SUMMER SEMINAR IN PALEOGRAPHY AND ARCHIVAL STUDIES, JUNE 2000

The Summer Seminar in Paleography and Archival Studies is designed to introduce students to the German handwriting styles of previous centuries, expose them to a variety of German archives, familiarize them with major research topics in German culture and history, and encourage the exchange of ideas among the next generation of American scholars. Our main purpose is to assist participants in planning and preparing for their future dissertation research in Germany.

Participants will attend courses on German handwriting and in archival studies at the federal and state archives in Koblenz. They also will visit special collections, archives, and libraries.

During the program, participants will be introduced to German archival organization and practices, and, at each stop, archivists or librarians will discuss the history and use of their respective collections. Students will have an opportunity to explore finding aids and to meet individually with archivists and librarians. Ten North American graduate students will be selected to participate. The program will provide round-trip air fare (economy class, tourist rate) to Germany, transportation via rail to the various destinations, and accommodations (double occupancy). Students already in Europe will be reimbursed for rail travel to and from Koblenz, our starting point.

Candidates must be enrolled in a Ph.D. program. Preference will be given to those who have already chosen a dissertation topic that makes the consultation of German archives necessary. Candidates also must be fluent in German. All applicants will be notified by February 15, 2000. For specific information about the program, please contact Daniel S. Mattern, e-mail: dmtattern@idt.net.

Please forward applications by December 1, 1999, to:

German Historical Institute
Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar
Attn: Bärbel Thomas
1607 New Hampshire Ave, N.W.
Washington, DC 20009
ERRATUM

In the spring 1999 issue of the *Bulletin*, co-sponsorship by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for the conference on "The American Impact on Western Europe: Americanization and Westernization in Transatlantic Perspective" was mistakenly attributed to the conference on "Continuity, Change, and Globalization in Postwar Germany and America." We regret the error.

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