STUNDE NULL:

The End and the Beginning Fifty Years Ago

Occasional Paper No. 20

Edited by

Geoffrey J. Giles

GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
STUNDE NULL

The End

and the Beginning

Fifty Years Ago

Edited by

Geoffrey J. Giles
Contents

Introduction  
Geoffrey J. Giles  
5

1945 and the Continuities of German History:  
Reflections on Memory, Historiography, and Politics  
Konrad H. Jarausch  
9

Stunde Null in German Politics?  
Confessional Culture, Realpolitik, and the Organization of Christian Democracy  
Maria D. Mitchell  
25

American Sociology and German Re-education after World War II  
Uta Gerhardt  
39

German Literature, Year Zero:  
Writers and Politics, 1945–1953  
Stephen Brockmann  
59

Stunde Null der Frauen?  
Renegotiating Women’s Place in Postwar Germany  
Maria Höhn  
75

The New City: German Urban Planning and the Zero Hour  
Jeffry M. Diefendorf  
89

Stunde Null at the Ground Level:  
1945 as a Social and Political Ausgangspunkt in Three Cities in the U.S. Zone of Occupation  
Rebecca Boehling  
105
Introduction

Half a century after the collapse of National Socialism, many historians are now taking stock of the difficult transition that faced Germans in 1945. The Friends of the German Historical Institute in Washington chose that momentous year as the focus of their 1995 annual symposium, assembling a number of scholars to discuss the topic "Stunde Null: The End and the Beginning Fifty Years Ago." Their contributions are presented in this booklet.

Professor Konrad Jarausch addresses the question of anniversaries and their significance. He confirms that 1945 was a major turning point and reminds us that everyone who was alive in that year still has a vivid memory of the ending of World War II. The hardships of the immediate postwar period allowed most ordinary German citizens, however, to view themselves in 1945 as victims even if they had been perpetrators, or Mitläufer, up to that point. Jarausch also discusses the learning processes following World War II that represented a real transformation of German political culture, starting with the broad acceptance of defeat, moving through rapid and successful demilitarization, and arriving at integration into Western Europe. He points out that, of all the many changes, the necessary retreat from racism proved to be one of the most difficult to achieve. In the 1990s, the need to come to terms with a second dictatorship has added a further difficulty for Germans grappling with their history.

The role of the church forms a strong undercurrent in Maria Mitchell's comments on how Christian Democracy rose to political importance after 1945. Clergymen were spared the indignity of denazification and offered posts in the new civil administration, which lent them fresh prestige overnight. However, some compromises were necessary: Whether they liked it or not, they were forced by Allied censorship of political speeches to embrace the notion of democracy. Many members of the new CDU party had been members of the old Center Party, and their shared past moved them to seek continuity in policy making. Moreover, the Center Party had served them, as Catholics, as such an important emotional sanctuary that they were reluctant to give it up for a new party. Nonetheless, the practical
need for and wisdom of interconfessional cooperation won the day. This union did not come easily, and Mitchell gives examples from both Protestants and Catholics of discomfort over cooperating with their rivals.

The Allies’ efforts after 1945 are emphasized by Uta Gerhardt in her discussion of the role of American sociology in German re-education. Through a deliberate program to make Europe safe for democracy, the Americans strove to wipe out not only National Socialism, but also Junkerism and authoritarianism. The plan to accomplish this undertaking involved changing the very character of Germans by sociological and psychological means, without their even noticing it. The methodology owed much to the psychological research of the 1930s on paranoid personalities, which emphasized the need to build on the "clear" or "healthy" elements. Those healthy elements in German society were people like later President Theodor Heuß, who was eking out a living in his two-room attic apartment by cleaning carpets when he was invited to become the minister of culture. American occupation leaders performed a fragile balancing act: on the one hand, they were determined that the new political culture should not be imposed upon but enacted by Germans themselves, starting at the grass roots level; on the other hand, they feared that if ever the Germans suspected that they were being "re-educated," they would reject any plans entirely. Gerhardt delineates a rather subtle program with ten distinct elements.

How was the aftermath of the war handled in German literature? Stephen Brockmann notes the opportunities that the vacuum offered to young writers in a world where suddenly there were no longer any valid literary models to follow. Authors such as Heinrich Böll and Alfred Andersch tried to offer an ethical support system and dealt with such phenomena as the alienation felt by soldiers returning to their homes. For some the provision of models for renewal was initially pushed into the background by the fear of a restoration of the right wing and the urgent need to deal decisively with that danger. By the present decade, there was general agreement that the early Trümmerliteratur (literature set among the rubble of World War II) had been vital in helping to create a democratic political consciousness.

As Germany lay defeated, there were 170 women to every 100 men in 1945. The task of restoring the majority of the population to its rightful place in the historical record is addressed by Maria Höhn. She points out the crucial role of mothers in rebuilding family and civic life and the prob-
lems caused by many husbands who refused to shed their authoritarian attitudes, rather posing as victors returning from the front. Women felt that men had lost the war; men blamed women (newly enfranchised after World War I) for voting Hitler into power. Divorce rates doubled between 1945 and 1949. With the solidification of the Cold War split, men in both halves of Germany began to work on an idealized model of the modern woman: the sexy consumer citizen of the West was juxtaposed with the ideologically correct, Socialist worker-mother of the East. Her temporary status as the self-confident, activist Trümmerfrau (woman who "clears the rubble") was largely pushed back in favor of the more traditional image as the docile hausfrau, the mother and beautifier of the home, even to some extent in the East.

The symposium also took a look at the towns that were planned on the land cleared of rubble by those women. Jeffry Diefendorf shows that in urban planning there was not exactly a zero hour, because the rebuilding of German cities was based in large measure on prewar ideas and plans. Already in the 1930s, a journal with the title Die neue Stadt (the new city) existed. The Nazis themselves had begun to tear down decaying inner-city areas to accommodate their plans for extravagant, monumental buildings. The end of the war allowed the first part of this process to continue. City planners were not misled by the destruction caused by bombing into seeing a tabula rasa. They simply saw opportunities to fulfill their dreams of modernizing the existing cities as they rebuilt them. The air raids had not brought any fundamental change in city planning.

Rebecca Boehling takes a closer look at three individual cities in the U.S. zone of occupation as they confronted the new political and social situation. She asserts that the American Military Government had little sophistication when it came to selecting appropriate authority figures, and much depended on the personality of particular American officers. Sometimes they blundered, as in Stuttgart, where church leaders persuaded them to exclude leftwing antifascists from local government. Elsewhere, the "Antifa" forces were more organized, and it was they who presented themselves as a slate of new political appointees. Later on, these active anti-Nazis lost their opportunity to act as major reformers by forming the core of the unpopular tribunals.

All the scholars at this symposium underlined the fact that there was no natural development or logical progression to democracy after the war.
Germans at all levels were tugged in different directions by personal, political, and confessional preferences, and by the apparently tentative and hesitant prodding of the Allies. The outcome was not a foregone conclusion. From the present-day perspective it sometimes seems so, and thus such reflections as those offered here are crucial elements in setting the historical record straight and deepening our understanding of a highly complex process.

Gainesville, Florida
August 1997

Geoffrey J. Giles
Anniversaries of important twentieth-century events are a continual source of embarrassment for the Germans. The calendar is replete with historical dates that trigger negative associations at home and abroad. Occasions such as the commemorations of the anti-Semitic pogrom (*Kristallnacht*), the unleashing of World War II, the Nazi invasion of Russia, the D-Day landing in Normandy, or the resistance plot against Hitler revive troubled memories and produce negative publicity. Since it has much practice in issuing apologies, the German government has developed considerable skill in ritualized contrition. But occasional missteps, like the Bitburg ceremony that inadvertently honored dead SS men, continue to arouse public outcry, since they touch on raw nerves. Instead of reinforcing pride, contemporary history remains a burden, producing recurrent shame.\(^1\)

The fiftieth return of the end of World War II has reinforced this ambivalence, since it confronted the Germans with the alternative of remembering defeat or liberation. Though they have begun to recede with time, most private recollections of the collapse of the Third Reich, military surrender, and subsequent suffering tend to associate 1945 with catastrophic events and highlight the Germans' own suffering. In contrast, eloquent literary portrayals, volumes of critical scholarship, and speeches of democratic politicians have created a public awareness that the defeat was necessary in

---

order to liberate the country from the Nazi dictatorship. In 1985 President Richard von Weizsäcker forcefully pleaded, "let us, as much as we can, face the truth." But ten years later, younger New Right intellectuals rejected the acceptance of guilt as "the view of the victors of 1945" and called for an end to German self-hatred.²

The former winners have had a much easier time dealing with the anniversary of 1945. An older generation could, with a sense of satisfaction, use this last opportunity to celebrate its triumph over fascism, won with so much sacrifice. These liberators also had a stake in reaffirming their memory of Nazi war crimes and the Holocaust in order to justify their great crusade. Their perspective represents the view of the victims who were freed by Allied military victory and explains that war was necessary for the restoration of the moral order. But by painting the Germans exclusively as perpetrators, it ignores their other experiences and creates the danger of a backlash among those born after the war who no longer feel a personal sense of guilt. If many Germans have a problem with accepting defeat as liberation, some Americans find it difficult to realize that liberation might have also meant defeat.³

Thinking about 1945 is therefore a case study in the fashionable topic of "the politics of memory."⁴ Since social historians have relativized this date in favor of a longer transition period and produced exhaustive, specialized monographs, the reconstruction of the events themselves is no longer all that controversial.⁵ What needs to be discussed instead is their afterlife, their transformation into private recollections, and public memories that are used to justify different courses of political action. The following remarks

---

³ As a typical example, Marc Fisher, After the Wall: Germany, the Germans and the Burdens of History (New York, 1995).
⁵ Martin Broszat et al., eds., Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland (Munich, 1988); and Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besatzung Deutschlands (Munich, 1995).
will therefore look at the ambivalent connotations of individual experiences during 1945; they will sketch the implications of the gradual emergence of a critical collective perspective; and they will address, finally, the impact of German unification on the relationship between personal and political remembrances.

I

When leafing through old photo albums, one encounters disturbing pictures that have shaped the common image of the war's end. These snapshots rarely show actual fighting but present scenes of laughing victors and celebrating civilians or of skeletons in concentration camp garb and dejected prisoners of a defeated army. Other motifs capture broken bridges, torn-up roads, blown-up tanks, burnt buildings, piles of rubble, and anonymous bodies, representing an unimaginable level of destruction. The old newsreels hardly show any men, only distraught women, orphans, refugees, or the aged and the wounded. The yellowed photographs also illustrate that life continued after the catastrophe through the clearing of ruins, the creation of makeshift shelters, scrounging for food, and fraternizing with the occupiers. These images have seared themselves into the collective memory and dominate all recollections.

One indicator of the importance of 1945 is the fact that virtually everyone old enough still remembers fifty years later what he or she was doing at that time. My own memories begin with a derailed train, lying with broken windows in the Landshut station, from which my mother wanted to distract my attention so as to keep me from seeing the dead. Since my father had already died in Russia in 1942, we had been evacuated from our Magdeburg apartment at the cloisters of Our Dear Lady and moved to a far in Lower Bavaria in order to escape the bombing that would destroy our possessions. I can hardly recall the actual end of the war and only remember that suddenly the Polish laborers were gone, and an emaciated man in a torn uniform appeared, claiming to be my uncle. Individual stories like these suggest

---

6 See, for instance, the coffee-table books by Guido Knopp, ed., Das Ende 1945. Der verdammte Krieg (Munich, 1995) and Damals 1945. Das Jahr Null (Stuttgart, 1994).
that May 1945 was a traumatic event that profoundly affected most German lives.\(^7\)

Depending upon one's personal fate, recollections of the end of the war differ fundamentally. Most older Germans fasten upon the untold losses that they experienced: There is hardly a family who did not lose a son in the fighting at the front or a daughter in the air raids at home. The surviving men were humiliated and in prison camps, while many women, especially in the East, feared, with some justification, that they would be raped. All too often houses were destroyed, apartments requisitioned, and personal possessions stolen. Millions of people were desperately seeking to flee from the lost eastern provinces of the German Reich. Even in the western areas that were less damaged, many went hungry, lacked fuel, and fell prey to disease. With the collapse of the physical world, psychological security vanished and ideological orientation was shattered.\(^8\) Ignoring their own responsibility for such retribution, many Germans recall their own tribulations and still find it difficult to celebrate the war's end.

In contrast, other groups remember welcoming the end of the carnage and insist on a positive memory of 1945. A large minority, consisting of regime opponents, concentration camp inmates, or slave laborers, as well as some ordinary citizens, felt relieved just to be alive. For them the cessation of the fighting lifted a great burden, since it also meant the end of persecution and repression. Many letters and diaries gratefully note the overthrow of SS terror, the suspension of Allied bombing, and the silencing of the guns in the final desperate battles. For these survivors, the Nazi defeat turned the world right-side up again, provided a chance for punishing the perpetrators, and allowed them to rebuild their shattered lives. The Third Reich's collapse was not only threatening but also set free unsuspected energies in women, the old or the young, who now had to take on new re-

\(^7\) For corroboration see Bruno Jarausch, “Geschichte einer schlesisch-märkischen Familie” (MS, Berlin, 1960).

sponsibilities. Such positive experiences continue to inspire gratitude for liberation.9

Ironically, these contradictory recollections have spurred an odd contest over victimization. For the former political and racial targets, Nazi persecution must remain central, since their own moral identity and material claims are founded upon it. But many Germans also selectively recall the wartime suffering for men at the front, women working in munitions factories at home, and families subjected to the terror of air raids, which created the feeling of "a community of fate." In a strange reversal, memories of the hardships of 1945 have transformed their roles from perpetrators into victims of catastrophic forces for which they do not feel personally responsible. Except for the liberators, almost all other participants want to consider themselves victimized, as indicated in the bland reference of the memorial Neue Wache: "To all victims of terror and tyranny."10 The debate about liberation or defeat somehow also involves a competition for legitimate sympathy.

Serving distinctive purposes, the creation of collective memory accentuates different aspects of the war. Through repeated retelling, private stories coalesce into public histories that combine individual suffering into collective experiences, making them bearable through a stylized narrative. While radio broadcasts and newspaper reports began to fashion the idea of "liberation" already during the events, it took a whole generation for the annihilation of the Jews (and to a lesser degree of others) to be combined in the collective concept of "the Holocaust."11 For the Germans, the notion of the "expulsion" similarly created a tale of flight and survival at the war's end, while the somewhat exculpatory concept of the "zero hour" highlighted the collapse of order and the multiple possibilities of a new begin-

---

ning. Since these mythologized histories accentuate different experiences, American, Jewish, and German memories are growing further apart with the passage of time.

An elaborate staging process further complicates the role of recollections in the debate about the implications of 1945. Fifty years after the events concerned, memories are no longer spontaneous but carefully choreographed and manipulated. While presenting interesting footage and captivating interviews, the media trivialized the end of the war by ceaseless commentary and superficial dramatization. At the same time, the travel industry commercialized the event through nostalgia-tourism that brought former combatants or curious onlookers to battle sites like Normandy or to mass cemeteries. Finally, politicians time and again invoked the past in order to instrumentalize a certain version as support for their policies in the present, thereby often reviving old antagonisms. For many Germans, the staging of recollections therefore reinforced their mixed feelings about the significance of 1945.

II

In contrast to individual ambivalence, official German historiography of World War II has become generally self-critical. Instead of understanding the Third Reich as a regrettable accident, intellectuals and scholars view its collapse as an inevitable result of the negative continuities of the past. Unlike the nationalist elite's self-justifications after World War I, a democratized cultural establishment gradually accepted the challenge of confronting German responsibilities the second time around. Compared to the continual denials of guilt in Japan, Italian evasions by claiming to have resisted, or Austrian explanations of being Hitler's first victim, the Germans have constructed a remarkably honest account of their own transgressions. With some prodding by American and Russian commentators, a critical stance

---

has emerged, one that accepts the memories of the victimized minorities and projects them as the official version upon the entire polity.\footnote{For example, Hans-Erich Volkmann, ed., \textit{Ende des Dritten Reiches—Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Eine perspektivische Rückschau} (Munich, 1995).}

Only a few essential elements of this self-criticism that bear directly upon the end of the war need to be mentioned. In stark contrast to the endless "war guilt controversy" about the German role in the outbreak of World War I, there is no real dispute about Rider's responsibility for unleashing World War II. The massive evidence compiled in the course of the Nuremberg trials succeeded in demonstrating the culpability of the Nazi government for the slaughter beyond a shadow of a doubt. The condemnation of prominent individuals for "waging a war of aggression" and of entire criminal organizations was an important step in moral cleansing that even the accusation of "victor's justice" could not diminish. Professional historians confirmed this verdict, and academic institutions like the new Institut für Zeitgeschichte communicated this view to the population at large.\footnote{Telford Taylor, \textit{The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials} (New York, 1992); and Walter Hofer, \textit{War Premeditated} (New York, 1955).}

One crucial element of self-criticism was therefore the admission of German war guilt.

More problematic for the critical view was the emergence of the theory of totalitarianism during the Cold War. Initially intellectuals had adopted a rigorous antifascism to motivate democratic and socialist reconstruction, but the Soviets' instrumental use of working-class resistance as legitimation for the SED dictatorship raised the question of the structural similarities between National Socialism and Stalinism. Elaborated especially by German émigré scholars in the United States, the totalitarianism approach provided a useful taxonomy of repressive regimes that justified the Western switch from one enemy to another. As an unfortunate by-product, this model projected hostilities eastward, rehabilitated the anti-Communist Right, and offered a rationale for German rearmament and NATO membership. But its attention to the underpinnings of democracy also spurred some of the classical research on the collapse of the Weimar Republic.\footnote{Eckhard Jesse, "Vergangenheitsbewältigung nach totalitärer Herrschaft in Deutschland," \textit{German Studies Review}, special issue on totalitarianism (Fall 1994): 157ff. Cf. also Karl-Dietrich Bracher, \textit{Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie Zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie}, 4th ed. (Villingen, 1960).}
The notion of a *Sonderweg* (German deviance from Western norms) popularized by the youth revolt, motivated a more fundamental attack on the continuity of authoritarian patterns in Germany. This conception of a special path had originally been a positive explanation for the difference of the German Empire from both the Western democracies and the Eastern autocracies. Allied propaganda during the world wars had reversed the evaluative connotation, constructing a straight line into perdition from Luther through Frederick the Great and Bismarck to Hitler. During the 1960s and 1970s, younger social historians revived the perspective in a more complex fashion as an explanation of German deviance from democratic development that led to repeated aggression. Departing from a somewhat idealized Anglo-American model, the *Sonderweg* thesis offered a methodologically innovative explanation of the structural flaws of German society that justified a political critique of an authoritarian present.\(^{16}\)

Only during the last two decades did the Holocaust perspective become dominant in German discussions. In 1945 the pictures of the liberation of the concentration camps triggered a deep shock that motivated efforts at financial restitution and legal prosecution. But the extermination of Jews, Poles, Roma, and homosexuals remained a marginal subject until the Eichmann trial and the Hollywood TV series renewed public attention. The aging of the perpetrators, the critical questions of the `68ers, and the methodological shift to everyday history prompted a flood of local studies that gradually exposed the depth of involvement of ordinary Germans. In the East, the economic definition of fascism blocked the topic until the SED regime began to confront anti-Semitism for diplomatic reasons during the 1980s. Constant media attention, educational efforts, and intellectual commentary have produced a high degree of Holocaust consciousness—but they have also created a certain defensiveness.\(^{17}\)

---


Anglo-American interventions have played an important role in the establishment of a critical perspective on the recent German past. At first democratic émigré scholars took the lead, but then native intellectuals also pondered the German example as the great "other," the paradigmatic descent of civilization into darkness. In practical terms, Western scholars insisted on microfilming the "captured German documents" and thereby made them accessible for public perusal. In their works, prominent historians like Gordon Craig or Fritz Stern presented democratic interpretations that broke the mold of nationalist self-conceptions. As a part of wider debates, Anglo-American historians also stimulated much methodological innovation in areas such as quantitative methods, women's history, and the new cultural perspectives. These sympathetic outsiders saw their role as a watchdog, fostering critical initiatives and guarding against the recrudescence of nationalism.

The result of successive waves of criticism was the erosion of the master narrative of German history. The postwar division indicated that the story of the national state had come to a disastrous end with the loss of sovereignty to the Allies in June 1945. In various ways, the different emphases on war guilt, totalitarian dictatorships, structural peculiarities, and Holocaust responsibility put the blame on the Germans themselves. Though some collective pride lingered in regard to economic success, these condemnations of the excesses of German nationalism helped to discredit the very notion of a national state. Leading intellectuals therefore ceased promoting the superiority of Kultur and redefined their mission as guardians of German guilt. Since, for diplomatic and trade reasons, the political and economic elites also embraced such self-questioning, Germany succeeded in developing, in spite of occasional backsliding, a remarkably critical view of its own recent past.

---


III

By overriding private ambivalence, critical public memories triggered a fundamental learning process that helped transform German politics. The mixture of personal feelings, oscillating between a dim sense of responsibility, a furtive kind of shame, and a desire to escape the consequences, allowed some of the negative lessons of the defeat to sink in. Though with occupation and partition the conditions in 1945 were incomparably harsher than in 1918, no stab-in-the-back legend emerged, and German sufferings, though resented, were somehow accepted as justified. While the population remained skeptical of the official version of liberation, it could hardly deny that it had brought its trials upon itself and needed to change its ways so as to keep something this terrible from happening again. Instead of spurring a new revanchism, the collective working-through of the meaning of 1945 became the basis for an astounding political, economic, and cultural revival.

The most persuasive lesson of the German defeat was a rejection of prior militarism. The wartime experiences at the eastern front, but toward the end also at home, were so horrible as to render National Socialist efforts to glorify the fighting ineffective and to lead to a repudiation of war as a legitimate means of politics. In contrast to occupation expectations, demilitarization was rapid and a fanatical werewolf resistance never materialized. Allied re-education efforts met with much success, since they could build upon the impression of total defeat and subsequent suffering. Even war literature no longer heroized its protagonists but was rather forced to resort to a pervasive Landser (doughboy) cynicism. The widespread popular resistance against Western and Eastern rearmament suggests a deep-seated turn toward pacifism that later spawned an impressive peace movement and consistently governed the foreign policy of the Federal Republic.

Another important consequence of the collapse of the Third Reich was a reluctant acceptance of formal democratization. The failure of the illiberal

---

22 Kim R. Holmes, The Wert German Peace Movement and the National Question (Cambridge, Mass., 1984); and Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1989).
traditions claimed by the Nazis was so drastic that it even overrode the skepticism that was based on the self-abdication of the Weimar Republic and thereby gave democracy another chance. Partly imposed from the outside, self-government succeeded the second time around due to Konrad Adenauer's conservative leadership style and Ludwig Erhard's undeniable economic rewards. The doubtful elites came to tolerate democratic forms as the price for regaining political sovereignty and as a useful method for defending their privileges. However, it took the youth revolt of the 1960s and the new social movements such as feminism and environmentalism to really democratize attitudes and practices. As even the East German revolt against the SED dictatorship shows, the defeat led to a surprising inner acceptance of democracy.²³

As a further result of the trauma of 1945, many Germans also broke with their prior ambivalence and firmly turned toward the West. The division of the country invalidated the geopolitical tradition of Germany's middle position between East and West and forced an unequivocal choice between NATO or Warsaw Pact. Instead of trying to play one side off against the other, the Federal Republic, itself located further westward than any major German state before, chose to tie itself politically, militarily, and economically to the West. Since nationalism was discredited by its excesses, many Germans also sought a new identity through Americanization in style of dress, food, music, and consumption. The more compulsive Sovietization of the East was less attractive and therefore rejected at the first opportunity.²⁴ Westernization was also propelled by Bonn's consistent support for European integration that offered an escape from history, a stimulus for economic growth, and an avenue for political influence.

A final aspect, the slow distancing from racism owing to the Holocaust, was more difficult and protracted. The appearance of Soviet Asians or American Blacks during the occupation helped challenge racial stereotypes and belie Aryan arrogance. Increased travel abroad, a veritable German passion, and consumption of goods from other countries slowly broadened

---

horizons toward cosmopolitan ease. The contribution of millions of Mediterranean laborers, euphemistically called "guest workers," to continued prosperity also increased tolerance for foreign customs and foods. But flare-ups of xenophobic violence and intermittent electoral successes of right-wing parties demonstrate that some prejudices linger, especially when activated by a massive influx of ethnic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Owing to the ethnic definition of citizenship, the tension between official philo-Semitism or multiculturalism and private resentment is still, to some degree, unresolved.  

Not that this learning process was particularly easy. Even through the shattering experience of defeat, Goebbels' massive indoctrination left some intellectual traces, and it proved impossible to eliminate all the collaborators from public life. Many Germans resisted the return of the émigrés, and the power of some of the antifascist radicals proved rather fleeting. The various occupation efforts were more successful in purging visible Nazi influences and in erecting the shell of new institutions than in filling them with life. The older generation merely accepted many of the changes pragmatically, maintained a considerable inner reserve, and occasionally relapsed into former nationalism. Only the younger cohorts truly saw 1945 as liberation, embraced its lessons with enthusiasm, and actually sought to live up to the new pacifist, democratic, Western, and tolerant ideals. Because of the different Eastern experiences, this development is still far from complete.

Yet German acceptance of responsibility has transformed 1945 from the end point of a disaster to the starting point of a rebirth. In a comparative sense, the learning processes that have turned a shattering defeat retrospectively into a political liberation are quite impressive. The development of a self-critical understanding is a testimony to the efforts of liberal intellectuals, committed scholars, and enlightened public leaders. Continual reminders of the occupying powers helped promote a rethinking, and the competition between East and West Germany for respectability also rein-


forced critical perspectives on the common past. But it is surprising that a population that experienced many of the events differently refused to respond to right-wing efforts to perpetuate nationalist denials and eventually accepted this critical version.\(^\text{27}\) One key to the remarkable German revival is therefore the individual and collective learning process from the shock of defeat.

IV

The impact of the new caesura of 1989/90 on the meaning of the previous rupture of 1945 still remains somewhat unclear. Many participants experienced the rush to German unity as the return of history, this time with more positive connotations. Clearly the unexpected unification ended the "post-historical" status of the Germans who had escaped from history into a private space that allowed first personal and then political regeneration. In a curious way the development of the Federal Republic and the GDR had seemed like a coda to the past that took place in a timeless, eternal present. To everyone's surprise, the return of unity resumed a master narrative of German national history that was thought to have come to a permanent end. This unforeseen revival of the national state could not but change perspectives on the postwar division and on the nature of the prior German catastrophe.\(^\text{28}\)

Because the fiftieth anniversary of 1945 came five years after reunification, its commemoration aroused special concern. Would the new Germany continue to accept or now feel free to repudiate its troubled past? In a curiously worded appeal "against forgetting," the New Right used the occasion to promote a relativization of German guilt and a normalization of public memory. Half a century after the end of the war, Germans should be allowed to recall their own suffering as the "basis for the self-understanding of a proud nation" that would prevent comparable catastrophes in the


future. Interestingly enough, these apologetics provoked a storm of media criticism from leftist intellectuals who insisted on affirming continuing German responsibility and the necessity of defeat. For the various efforts to reconstruct a German identity, the official remembrance of 1945 therefore became an important battleground in the struggle for cultural hegemony.  

On the one hand, greater temporal distance provided a chance for a certain softening of the fronts in the public debate. Since there was no longer any fear of adverse diplomatic consequences, the gap between apologetic private memories and self-critical official histories could begin to be narrowed by discussing their interconnectedness. Recollections of German suffering previously expressed merely in private conversation were now suddenly also voiced in print or on the airwaves. This veritable unblocking has made it finally possible to link the individual tragedies of the end of the war to their causes in the collective crimes, committed in the name of the German people. Instead of insisting on viewing 1945 exclusively as defeat or liberation, the recent debates managed to demonstrate that both aspects were inextricably intertwined, with the Nazi collapse forming the necessary precondition for a new beginning.  

On the other hand, a post-1990 perspective on 1945 also doubled the German difficulties of coming to terms with the past. The moral, legal, and political legacy of a second dictatorship raised all sorts of unsettling questions about the potential relationship or similarities between the two. Especially abroad, many observers feared that the fresh injustices of SED oppression would eventually begin to obliterate the distant memories of earlier Nazi crimes. In a curious bit of learning, some of those who had been too lenient toward Hitler's henchmen were now taking extra pains to be rigorous toward Honecker's minions. The instrumentalization of antifascism to shore up a leftist dictatorship was also engendering some cynicism about

---


the need for continued vigilance toward a revival of Nazi currents.  

By having 1990 partially supersede 1945, the collapse of the GDR added another layer of ambivalence to the debate about the end of World War II.

The resumption of the national master narrative in 1990 therefore affected the historical understanding of 1945 in many, yet indistinct ways. Put most simply, this pivotal date has not disappeared but has rather acquired a new and different significance: Instead of marking the end of German history, the ending of World War II has now become its central turning point in the twentieth century, a kind of hinge around which the story line turns from catastrophe to rebirth. Toward that year run many of the negative continuities of aggression and repression that culminated in a predictable and necessary defeat; from it flow some of the more positive learning processes that led to cooperation and democracy. The acceptance of defeat as a precondition for liberation helped the Federal Republic to learn from earlier failures and to embark upon such a constructive course that it even managed once again to attract the severed eastern states.

Through unification, the year 1945 has not lost its prior meaning but rather has gained an added dimension. Marking the defeat of one of the most heinous regimes ever known to man, that year will continue to serve as a drastic warning of what can go wrong and will forever be associated with the country in whose name these crimes were committed. The death of over fifty million human beings looms too large in personal memory for it ever to be entirely effaced in historical understanding. But after the passage of half a century, that crucial date has also assumed a new meaning, so that it can now also refer to the beginning of an individual and collective learning process that led to the rehabilitation of the people involved. Along with continuing to be an occasion for sorrow, 1945 may, if seen through the perspective of 1990, gradually become a source of pride in the successful democratization of Germany and the reunification of Europe.


In the ceaseless process of rethinking the Central European past, Anglo-American observers will retain a somewhat special role. Since their countries were twice forced to intervene in this century, they can take some pride in the success of the second reconstruction that copied many of their own practices. At the same time, the problematic admixtures of that victory, just to mention the symbols of Dresden and Hiroshima, should remind them of the price not just in lives lost but also in moral credibility. As interested outsiders with close ties owing to multiple migrations, they will continue to watch the complicated process of constructing a new national and wider European identity in Germany.\footnote{See also Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., \textit{After Unity: Reconfiguring German Identities} (Providence, RI., 1997).} If offered without any postcolonial superiority, their distanced comments, based on long democratic experience, might continue to be helpful in the endless struggle against the revival of dangerous myths.
As a party founded in the wake of the Nazi defeat, the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) has often been considered a product of Germany's *Stunde Null*. Not only was there no Christian Democratic party before 1945, but, as the first party in German history devoted to democratic, interconfessional cooperation between Protestants and Catholics, the CDU seemed grounded in an entirely new political and cultural ethos. The fact that Christian Democracy was integral to West Germany's political stability reinforced this image of the party. The CDU was as novel as West Germany's political success; one could not be separated from the other.

And yet we all know that Konrad Adenauer did not begin his political career in 1945. Founded overwhelmingly by former members of the Catholic Center Party, the CDU was established by men and women deeply rooted in the political traditions of the *Teilkultur* ("part" culture) of Catholic Germany. In discussing the origins of Christian Democracy, I would like to

---

1 Most of the CDU leaders had formed their world views in the aftermath of the *Kulturkampf*. The Nazi period allowed no incubation for a new generation of leaders. Adam Stegerwald was born in 1874; Konrad Adenauer in 1876; Andreas Hermes in 1878; Leo Schwering in 1883; and Jakob Kaiser, Hermann Pünder, and Christine Teusch in 1888.

2 I adopt the term *Teilkultur* from Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle to imply a distinct social group, the voting patterns of which are directly related to its
explore this intersection of continuity and change as one way of commenting on the larger question of a *Stunde Null* in twentieth-century German history.

Let me begin my survey with a brief review of three features of 1945 particularly relevant to the early CDU. First, like everything that took place in German political life between 1945 and 1949, the founding of the CDU was affected directly by the Allied occupation. The four powers not only prohibited parties deemed overly conservative or nationalistic, but they also closely screened authorized politicians and their speeches. By restricting access to postwar politics exclusively to avowed democrats, the Western Allies forced Catholics and Protestants either to support democracy or to abandon politics altogether. This necessarily shaped the personnel and ideology of the early CDU.

Second, in a reflection of the wide scope of their influence over life in occupied Germany, the Western Allies contributed to the dramatic increase

---


4 For one example of a CDU branch party's difficulties with Allied (in this case, British) acceptance of its personnel, see Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), NL 278 (Holzapfel), vol. 142, Haley Major (Comd 226 NO Gov Det), Political Activity—CDU (Siegen, 22 Feb. 1946). The memorandum threatened that if two members of the CDU in the Siegen district were not "excluded from the party" by 25 February 1946, the Siegen branch of the CDU would lose its party authorization.
in the stature of the Christian churches immediately following World War II.\(^5\) At a time when every other German institution appeared discredited by Nazi collaboration,\(^6\) the spiritual authority and administrative continuity of the Protestant and especially the Catholic Church accorded religious leaders enormous prestige.\(^7\) The Allied decision to spare clergymen denazification\(^8\)

---


\(^8\) No Catholic priests and only a few Protestant ministers were required to go through denazification proceedings. John H. Herz, "Denazification and Related Policies," in *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism*, ed. John H. Herz (Westport, Conn., 1982), 36, n. 9.
and use them as intermediaries in the earliest days of occupation\(^9\) enhanced the authority of all Christian elites. As politicians identified with the Protestant and Catholic churches, particularly the latter, CDU leaders benefited considerably from the widespread regard for Christianity.

Within the Christian culture of occupied Germany, this "religious revival" was paralleled by yet another development with far-reaching implications, the transformation of confessional culture. As wartime evacuations and postwar expulsions of ethnic Germans precipitated large-scale transfers of population, sizable numbers of Protestants and even more Catholics found themselves in areas traditionally populated by their Christian "others." By destroying the "closed village" atmosphere of much of the German countryside,\(^{10}\) this rapid desegregation set in motion a fundamental transformation of confessional relations. One of the most striking developments in twentieth-century German history, the reconfiguration of Germany's confessional map and relations had important implications for a party dependent on Protestant-Catholic cooperation.

It was against this background of Allied control and confessional change that German Catholic politicians gathered in 1945 to discuss their political future. Isolated from one another by the breakdown in transportation and communication, these men and women were nevertheless linked by their experiences as former members of the Center Party. Their discussions consequently focused not on a melange of new ideas devised in the chaos of 1945, but on a common, time-honored proposal rooted in the traditions of political Catholicism, that of interconfessionalism.

In raising the issue of political cooperation with Protestants, leading Catholic politicians revived a debate as old as political Catholicism itself. Though considered and rejected at the founding of the Center Party in

---


\(^{10}\) While in 1939 there had been fifty-seven districts that were more than ninety-five percent Catholic, in 1946 there was only one (in the Upper Palatinate); while thirteen districts before World War II had been more than eighty-five percent Protestant, no such district existed after 1946. Joachim Beckman, ed., Kirchliches Jahrbuch für die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland 1949 (Gütersloh, 1950), 538. Cf. Braun, "Demographische Umschichtungen," 9–25.
the platform of cooperation with devout Protestants had by no means disappeared in the decades following the *Kulturkampf*. Instead, it had haunted political Catholicism for the duration of its history, provoking a series of internecine battles over the very legitimacy of Catholic political organization.

By reopening this debate in 1945, early Christian Democrats acted consistently with a political tradition that had routinely turned to interconfessionalism in times of internal crisis. The most famous of these initiatives — those of Julius Bachem, Heinrich Brauns, and Adam Stegerwald — had all been made at points of crisis in the Center Party's history. In taking the step that their predecessors had long disavowed, postwar Christian Democrats acted on what they regarded as the most serious crisis in the history of political Catholicism. Based on a sober assessment of the situation of 1945, former leaders of the Center Party concluded that the Catholic *Turm*, or tower, was falling down.

Although the Catholic *Teilkultur* had emerged from the Nazi years intact if not stronger than it had been in 1933, its members and leaders harbored serious concerns about the stability of its political institutions. Most of this weakness, they believed, had been inherited from the Weimar Republic. As Catholics' social and political assimilation had chipped away at their political unity, the Center Party's support had slid gradually and unevenly throughout the years of Weimar. With workers' defections to the SPD and

---

even the desertion of several priests to the Catholic Committee of the DNVP, the notion of a monolithic Catholic voting block had become but a figment of Catholic imagination by the end of the Weimar era.\footnote{Ellen Evans, \textit{The German Center Party, 1870–1933: A Study in Political Catholicism} (Carbondale, Ill., 1981), 246.}

Furthermore, as diligently as former members of the Center Party worked to defend themselves against specific accusations of Nazi collaboration,\footnote{ACDPStA, 1–206–20. Adam Stegerwald, "Wohin gehen wir?" Würzburg, 5 Nov. 1945, 29; cf. ACDPStA, 1–182–006, B II.1.1. Josef Kannengießer, ed., "An unsere Parteifreunde in Stadt und Land!" (flyer, Sept. 1945).} they could not deny that political Catholicism had been irrevocably sullied by its behavior in 1933.\footnote{Eschenburg, \textit{Jahre der Besatzung}, 186; Archiv der Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf (hereafter StBKAH), 08.06, 333. Letter from Heinrich Strunk to Wilhelm Hamacher, 21 Nov. 1945.} Although heatedly debated within the party's ranks at the time, the Zentrum's vote for the Enabling Law clearly connected political Catholicism with the Nazis' parliamentary seizure of power.\footnote{Despite Hitler's promise of freedom of worship and Christian-influenced schools, a minority of the party—including Joseph Wirth, Joseph Joos, Eugene Bolz, Friedrich Dessauer, Helene Weber, Johannes Schauff, and Heinrich Brüning—initially argued against the Zentrum's support for the Enabling Act. Rudolf Morsey, "Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei," in \textit{Das Ende der Parteien}, ed. Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (Düsseldorf, 1960), 356–64; Erich Kosthorst, \textit{Jakob Kaiser. Der Arbeiterführer} (Stuttgart, 1967), 170–71. For an insightful account of how one Zentrum deputy, Dessauer, was persuaded to accede, see Heinz Blankenberg, \textit{Politischer Katholizismus in Frankfurt am Main, 1918–1933} (Mainz, 1981), 286–87.} The widely perceived link between that vote and the Vatican's concordat negotiations did little to enhance the image of the party as a defender of the constitutional state founded on rule of law (\textit{Rechtsstaat}) in the dying days of the republic.\footnote{The bishops' revocation, in March 1933, of their 1930 prohibition against membership in the Nazi Party and exhortation to Catholics to support the state powers further loud the picture of the relationship between organized Catholicism and the Nazis. The church also never officially protested the Nazis' persecution of the Jews before 1945. Lönne, \textit{Politischer Katholizismus}, 237. The docu-}
Although pervasive, this assessment of political Catholicism was by no means universal, and I do not want to suggest that the Catholic Teilkultur was in any way univocal. The dismantling of the Catholic tower was more than a political decision, and an enormous emotional, sentimental attachment to the Zentrum initially discouraged many from abandoning their old political home.\textsuperscript{20} Never simply a political party for Catholics, the Center had been but one body within the network of Catholic Teilkultur organizations, “a kind of second ‘church’” into which Catholics were born and to which they belonged their entire lives.\textsuperscript{21} As Konrad Adenauer himself conceded in May 1946,

I do not begrudge any earlier adherent of the Center Party for not being able to make an immediate decision on joining the CDU. I have been a devoted adherent of the Center Party my entire life long, and I admit to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[20] BAk, NL 5 (Pünder), vol. 218, 84. Letter from Wilhelm Elfgen to Pünder, 27 Oct. 1945.
\item[21] Leo Schwering later described the Zentrum as "a sort of second 'church', which we defended through thick and thin, even at the risk of our lives.... Earlier, whoever attacked the Z exposed himself to the reproach of being a bad Christian and Catholic." Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln (hereafter HASTK), Best. 1193, 109, Letter from Leo Schwering to Rainer Barzel, 22 May 1962. Schwering also described the Zentrum and the Catholic Church as "synonyms." Leo Schwering, Frühgeschichte der Christlich-Demokratischen Union (Recklinghausen, 1963),119.
\end{footnotes}
you, it also took me some very serious deliberations and a certain inner effort to say farewell to the Zentrum. I did not do it with a light heart.\textsuperscript{22}

Beyond the emotional sanctuary the Center Party had afforded so many of its former members, there existed the strong fear that the attempt to cooperate with Protestants would fail, putting the Center Party at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis the other Weimar-era parties reorganizing in 1945.\textsuperscript{23}

The still significant level of Catholic suspicion and prejudice concerning Protestants and their politics compounded this reticence. Many former Center Party members were concerned that Catholics would have to sacrifice elements of their historic political platform on the altar of interconfessionalism.\textsuperscript{24}

It was not surprising, then, that a small but significant group within the Catholic \textit{Teilkultur} opted to recreate the Center Party after World War II.\textsuperscript{25}

But, by the time the postwar Zentrumsparthei was founded in October 1945, Christian Democratic party groupings were already well established throughout all four zones of occupied Germany. Not only with the benefit of hindsight, but also by the late 1940s, it was clear that the majority of Catholic elites and voters in the three western zones had opted to support the CDU. \textit{Realpolitik} within the Catholic \textit{Teilkultur} had prevailed. Traditional Catholic politics in Germany had been reconfigured.

By forcing open the door to interdenominational politics, the occurrences of 1945 played a crucial role in the transformation of political Catholicism. But in the same way as the resolution to cooperate with Protestants had been rooted in the traditions of Catholic politics, the character of early Christian Democracy was indebted to the Zentrum heritage. Of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Konrad Adenauer, speech, in \textit{Schriftenreihe der Christlich-Demokratischen Union des Rheinlandes} 10 (Düsseldorf, 12 May 1946), 7. Adenauer echoed this sentiment in a speech in Wuppertal in May 1946. BAK, NL 278 (Holzapfel), vol. 221. Pamphlet entitled "Christlich-Demokratische Union oder Zentrum?" as published in the \textit{Kölnische Rundschau} 16 (10 May 1946). Translations by the author.
\item \textsuperscript{23} ACDPS\textit{StA}, 1–182–007/1. Letter from Studienrat Dr. Gormann of Ahaus to Lambert Lensing, 21 Sept 1945.
\item \textsuperscript{25} HAST\textit{k}, Best 1193, 360, 2. In October 1945, approximately sixty former Center Party members gathered in Soest (the founding city of the Center Party in 1870) to found the Deutsche Zentrumsparthei (German Center Party, DZP).
\end{itemize}
strong lines of continuity that the early CDU exhibited with prewar interdenominationalism, four are worth noting here: the conditions set on Protestant participation, the importance of the clergy, the role of the Christian of its former members, there existed the strong fear that the attempt to trade unions, and the ideological centrality of anti-Marxism.

Throughout the history of interconfessionalism, Catholics advocating cooperation with Protestants had consistently qualified their invitation for Protestant participation. In his famous article, "Wir müssen aus dem Turm heraus!" (We must come out of the tower!) of 1906, for example, Julius Bachem made clear that he desired political cooperation solely with "religious" or devout Protestants, not with Protestants in general. Consequently, in distinguishing between Protestants at large and those adequately religious for a "Christian" party, postwar Catholic politicians were simply echoing prewar discourse on interdenominationalism.

But Catholics' differentiation between religious and "other" Protestants worked in a curious way in the postwar era. At a time when it was widely believed that Protestants had supported Nazism to a larger degree than had Catholics, Catholic Christian Democrats argued that only devout Protestants had resisted the Nazi scourge. In their efforts to secure certifiably "religious" Protestants for their interdenominational party, Catholics focused on members of organizations they identified—often mistakenly—as avowedly Christian and therefore anti-Nazi: the Protestant clergy, the Confessing Church, and the Christian Social People's Service.

---

26 Ronald Ross, Beleaguered Tower: The Dilemma of Political Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany (Notre Dame, Ind., 1976), 135. Bachem operated on the widespread assumption that most Protestants had become completely secularized. Evans, The German Cutler Party, 201. As Catholics traditionally had sought to distinguish between legitimately "religious" Protestants and those who had strayed from the church, they inevitably favored devout Protestants who were also politically conservative.

27 Schwering, Frühgeschichte, 133.

28 Shelley Baranowski, "Consent and Dissent: The Confessing Church and Conservative Opposition to National Socialism," Journal of Modern History 59 (March 1987): 53–78. In the eyes of Catholic leaders of the CDU, certain organizations of Protestant Germany took on new meaning as "documentation" of Protestants' religiosity and anti-Nazism. Foremost among these was the Confessing Church, which was organized by leading Protestant clergymen in defiance of the Nazi Gleichschaltung (forcing into line) of German Protestantism. Although the Confessing Church consistently opposed more the Nazis' interference in church affairs than National Socialism’s ideology or policies, the refusal to support the German Christian’s close alliance with the regime earned it widespread recognition as an “anti-Nazi" organization.

29 More consciously Christian than the DNVP, the Christian Social People’s Service (Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst, CSVD) had recognized openly he Weimar Republic’s legitimacy and supported the Christian trade unions. Members of the CSVD who joined the CDU included Wilhelm Simpfendörfer, Wilhelm Lindner, Paul Bausch, and Otto Rippel. For a detailed
Such persistent Catholic suspicion of Protestants highlights a second element of continuity in post-1945 interconfessionalism, the influence of the Catholic clergy. Once dubbed "an association of pastors," the Center Party had always relied on priests to maintain the unity of political Catholicism. Well aware that cooperation with Protestants threatened clerical influence over the Zentrum, most priests—although not all—had traditionally rejected interconfessional politics and trade union activity.

While relatively little is known about the clergy in twentieth-century politics, it is clear that important members of the high clergy decided in 1945 that an exclusively Catholic party could no longer defend a Catholic political agenda. Based primarily on strategic calculations designed to protect confessional schools, state support for the church, and continued recognition of the concordat, leading priests and bishops throughout Germany threw their weight behind early efforts to organize Christian Democracy. In such key party centers as Cologne, Paderborn, Dortmund, Münster, and Mainz, clergymen themselves even played an indispensable role in bringing Protestants and Catholics together.

History of the CSVD, see Günter Opitz, Der Christlich-Soziale Volksdienst. Versuch einer protestantischen Partei in der Weimarer Republik (Düsseldorf, 1969).

30 Felix von Löe, a leading member of the early Center Party, as quoted in John K. Zeender, The German Center Party, 1890–1906 (Philadelphia, 1976), 118.

31 On the various attitudes toward interconfessional union organization, see Ross, Beleaguered Tower, 108; Horstwalter Heitzer, Der Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland im Kaiserreich, 1890–1918 (Mainz, 1979), 55; Evans, The German Center Party, 104.

32 There is no comprehensive history on the topic to date.

In addition to priests—and highlighting a third element of continuity with the prewar Zentrum—the most active leaders of the early CDU were former members of the Christian trade unions. Founded in the late nineteenth century in an effort to bring Protestant and Catholic workers together, the Christian trade unions had long been linked to support for interconfessionalism. In "Wir müssen aus dem Turm heraus!" Bachem drew directly on the example of the Christian trade unions to argue that Catholics served their own best interests by cooperating with Protestants. Fourteen years later, Adam Stegerwald's call for interdenominationalism at the Essen congress of the Christian trade unions reinforced the perception that it was the Center's labor wing that most enthusiastically supported allying with Protestants. Early organizers of the CDU, who had been mem-


34 Proponents of interconfessionalism argued that if Protestants were denied membership in the interconfessional Christian trade unions, there would be no way of keeping them from joining the SPD. Heinz Härten, Kurze Geschichte des deutschen Katholizismus 1800–1960 (Mainz, 1986), 181.

35 Stegerwald's speech would come to represent the most famous attempt at interconfessionalism in the Weimar era. But it proposed no concrete measures for how to realize the ideal of interconfessional political cooperation and did little more than occasion a new round of heated discussion. Evans, The German Center Party, 275–76; Lonne, Politischer Katholizismus, 224–25; Noel Cary, "Political Catholicism and the Reform of the German Party System, 1900–1957," (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, 1988), 325–28, 423–25; Herbert Hömig, Das preußische Zentrum in der Weimarer Republik (Mainz, 1979), 90; Rudolf Morsey, Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei, 1917–1923 (Düsseldorf, 1966), 372; Kurt Weitzel, "Von
bers of the Center Party and the Christian trade unions, such as Jakob Kaiser, Karl Arnold, Elfriede Nebgen, and Adam Stegerwald, had long supported interconfessional politics. As the only Zentrum members to have maintained their political connections throughout the Nazi years, these men and women enjoyed decided organizational advantages in 1945 over other leaders of the Catholic *Teilkultur.* Making direct reference to the Christian trade unions and particularly to Stegerwald's initiative, these leading Catholic politicians self-consciously identified the early CDU with the tradition of trade union support for interconfessional cooperation.

Protestant-Catholic coaction within the framework of the Christian trade unions highlights the fourth element of continuity evident in the early CDU: active opposition to international and domestic Marxism. In the same way the Christian trade unions had been established to counteract socialism's appeal to Catholic workers, Protestant-Catholic politics after

---

36 On the basis of this link between pre-1933 members of the Center Party and Christian trade unions and founders and members of the CDU after 1945, I would qualify von Aretin's assertion that the German resistance movement exerted no real influence on post-1945 developments, organizationally or ideologically. Many of the Center Party and Christian trade union members involved in resistance activities would later help establish the CDU, demonstrating direct ties between active anti-Nazis, their Nazi-era political discussions, and post-1945 political organization. Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, "Der deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler," in *Nation, Staat und Demokratie in Deutschland. Ausgewählte Beiträge Zur Zeitgeschichte*, ed. Andreas Kunz and Martin Vogt (Mainz, 1993), 216, 237.

37 Hugo Stehkämper, "Protest, Opposition und Widerstand im Umkreis der (untergegangenen) Zentrumspartei, Ein Überblick. Teil II: Widerstand," in *Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler*, ed. Jürgen Schmücker and Peter Steinbach (Munich, 1985), 908. In sharp contrast to resisters in the KPD or SPD, members of neither the Center Party nor the Christian trade unions organized during the Nazi years with the intention of re-establishing their pre-1933 organizations.

38 The development of a network of Catholic self-help organizations, for example, was to no small degree occasioned by the success of Social Democracy. Wilfried Loth, *Katholiken im Kaiserreich. Der politische Katholizismus in der Krise des wilhelminischen Deutschland* (Düsseldorf, 1984), 84; Michael Schneider, *Die christlichen Gewerkschaften, 1894–1933* (Bonn, 1982), 33–34; Stanley Suval, *Electoral Politics in*
1945 were grounded to a significant degree in a shared rejection of Marxism. In a typical justification of cooperation with Protestants, a Catholic CDU pamphlet published in 1946 explained that only a common front of "Christian people of the West" could withstand the "danger of Marxism and, with it, that of communism."\[39\]

The political code word "Christian" had signified interdenominational antisocialism since at least the 1890s,\[40\] a fact that can also explain Protestant behavior in 1945. To the enormous concern of Catholics organizing the party, Protestant enthusiasm for Christian Democracy was initially anything but forthcoming.\[41\] Certainly the disproportionate Catholic influence over the early CDU was not lost on Protestants, many of whom saw little difference between the old Center Party and the new CDU. Even Hans Schlange-Schöningen, one of the earliest and most prominent Protestant recruits to the party, confessed that he and his "devoted Protestant friends" could not "hide ... a certain nervousness about cooperation with Catholics in general, and now especially with former Zentrum circles."\[42\]

And yet, for many anti-Marxist Protestants whose pre-1933 parties had been discredited by collaboration with the Nazis, a realistic assessment of their postwar options left them little alternative to the CDU. Particularly for devout Protestants who advocated their own Christian political agenda, members of the former Center Party were far more likely allies than the socialists of the SPD. Reapolitik operated on the Protestant side as much as it did on the Catholic, and a marriage of convenience (Vernunfttiehe) of antisocialist Protestants and Catholics was arranged step by step.

There was certainly no love or passion in this Vernunfttiehe, however, and a quick survey of decision making within the early party makes clear the still profound cleavage that separated Protestants from Catholics on matters

---

Wilhelmine Germany (Chapel Hill and London), 74; Zeender, The German Center Party, 18–19. For a brief survey of the similarities and differences between the SPD and the Center Party before 1918, see the introduction to Ursula Mittmann, Fraktion und Partei. Ein Vergleich von Zentrum und Sozialdemokratie im Kaisereich (Düsseldorf, 1976), 7–16.


\[40\] Schneider, Die christlichen Gewerkschaften, 212–13.


\[42\] Ibid., 47. Idem, "Christliche Demokratie" (24 Nov. 1945).
ideological, cultural, and political. The year 1945 marked no decisive break in the centuries-old hostility between Catholics and Protestants, and party members of both confessions made clear that their political alliance implied neither religious nor cultural assimilation. The reason why the union between the two confessions not only survived but even flourished was based on a number of postwar factors: the confessional balance within the Federal Republic; the continuing influence of the Allies, particularly the Americans; the secularization of West German society and the diminution of confessional tension; but, above all, the Cold War and the emergence of anti-Marxism as a foundational ideology for West Germans. Of crucial importance for internal party dynamics was shared opposition to the Soviet Union, the GDR, and the SPD, which allowed Protestants and Catholics to paper over the significant differences that remained between them on other cultural, economic, and foreign policy issues.

In conclusion, while the success of the CDU was tied primarily to such later postwar developments as those just mentioned, the actual origins of the party were located in a series of decisions made at the war's end within the Catholic Teilkultur. The dramatic events tied to 1945 certainly contributed to the outcome of those decisions: the Allies' presence guaranteed that the party would be democratic; the prestige of the churches bolstered Christian politics; and wartime dislocations fostered a silent revolution in confessional relations. But the most obvious significance of 1945 lay in forcing Catholics to reassess the strength of their historic tower. The fact that the resulting organization of Christian Democracy owed its inspiration to prewar Catholicism testifies to the power of tradition at a time of enormous change. It also highlights the complex intersection of the past and the present at any historical juncture, including that of Germany at its so-called Stunde Null.
American Sociology and German Re-education After World War II

Uta Gerhardt

In a paper presented to the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1948, Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring discussed the question, "What Is Our Purpose in Germany?" He mentioned reeducation and reminded his audience that the United States had fought the war to ensure "that we and other peace-loving nations may be permitted to live the kind of lives in the kind of country we or other peace-loving peoples desired." According to Hilldring, it was the objective of American military government (MG) to see to it that Germany would become a peaceful nation able to cooperate with others in Europe and the world.¹ When Saul Padover, a former officer in the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), described what re-education meant, he cited the need to overcome basic German attitudes and institutions that had developed over generations:

The problem of re-education, in brief is not merely one of eradicating nazism, but also of eliminating authoritarianism, militarism, Junkerism, and racism. The evil work of Hitler, be it remembered, lasted only a dozen years, but that of his predecessors went on for generations. The occupying powers are now called upon to wipe out in a comparatively short period of time this age-old accumulation of dangerous notions.²

¹ John H. Hilldring, "What is Our Purpose in Germany?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 255 (1948): 79–80. Hilldring had been involved in setting up the Civil Administration Division of the War Department, which was instrumental in MG planning, in 1942.

Unrecognized by most subsequent analysts or critics, these contemporary voices stressed the fact that German re-education after World War II had little to do with education. Re-education was envisaged as a comprehensive policy with the broadly outlined goal of nothing less than changing the German national character. Its objective was to eliminate German aggressiveness, which had caused two world wars, and to help Germans adopt a mentality of political fair play and economic cooperation.

This policy drew on concepts developed in psychiatry during the 1930s as part of the mental hygiene movement. Re-education was used then as a therapeutic measure to change the character structure of patients suffering from severe delusionary disorders such as paranoia. The concept of re-education was adapted to the political necessities of the German situation with the help of social science, especially sociology, and provided a guideline to answer the much-discussed question of "what to do with Germany."  

Sociology, together with political science, cultural anthropology, and psychology, played two roles. First, sociologists helped to formulate a conceptual framework for understanding the differences between democratic and totalitarian societies. Between 1935 and 1942, the Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons applied Max Weber's theory of charismatic rule's perversion of economy and society to analyze revolutionary de-modernization in Germany after 1933, setting it against rational-legal type, democratic authority. In his highly influential theory of constitutionalism, political scientist Austrian-American, published an account of his encounters: *Experiment in Germany* (New York, 1946).


Carl J. Friedrich contrasted the "rule of law" in Western democracies with the "rule of men" in fascist states. Cultural anthropologists Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson applied their insights from South Sea cultures to typical attitudes of people in the United States and Nazi Germany, in order to discover what made them vastly different. Emigré psychologist Kurt Lewin distinguished three types of group structure: (1) authoritarian, as practiced in pre-Nazi and Nazi Germany; (2) democratic leadership, which is customary in Anglo-Saxon culture; and (3) laissez-faire, which Germans mistook for democratic, criticizing its apparent inefficiency. Sociologists' theoretical interest in National Socialist Germany led to the prominent role played by sociology, and other social sciences, in the early 1940s. Sociological analysis of National Socialism spurred pleas for the implementation of "self-reeducation" (a term coined by Lewin) for Germans at the end of the war.

After 1942, the social sciences took on a second role. When Vice-President Henry Wallace announced a postwar policy of "de-educating and reeducating" Germany (and Japan), psychiatry was brought into the picture and was instrumental in the formulation of basic ideas for German re-education. In 1944, the State and War Departments sponsored a conference that brought together psychiatrists and social scientists to devise a blueprint for German cultural reconstruction. Sociology transformed psychiatry's re-education concept of cultural reconstruction into the notion that economic recovery could also serve to reform the German national character. In memoranda produced in 1944 and 1945, Parsons adapted psychiatry's idea that re-education could be successful with German culture. He proposed "permissive control" as one of three strategies of military government that could bring about "controlled institutional change." He stated that economic reconstruction was the best strategy for a re-education plan whose objective was to render Germany a peaceful nation for the foreseeable future. He also submitted a number of hitherto unpublished memoranda to the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA). One of the responsibilities of this agency was to plan postwar economic policy, including the disarmament of German industry.

In this paper I elaborate on the two roles that sociology played in German re-education after World War II. The first part details the approaches of three social sciences to the analysis of National Socialism. The second part deals with a major policy conference on Germany after the war, which reflected the psychiatric approach and inspired Parsons's paper, "Controlled
Institutional Change." The third part shows how the various policies and programs of military government, even Germany's subsequent participation in the European Recovery Program (ERP), followed the principles of re-education derived from the psychiatric concept.

I

The political science analysis of Germany mainly focused on the abandonment of the division of powers and the "rule of law" (rational legal authority), as well as the replacement of these elements by the fusion of a centralized party and state under the *Führerprinzip* (principle of totalitarian leadership), flanked by a partisan judiciary.\(^5\) Franz Neumann, an émigré political scientist, examined the topic of the nature of Nazi totalitarianism first in "The Governance of the Rule of Law."\(^6\) In 1942, he published *Behemoth*,\(^7\) the masterpiece that confirmed Friedrich's formula of Nazi Germany's "utter lawlessness."\(^8\) The book's title recalled Thomas Hobbes's analysis of England after Oliver Cromwell's death and before the return of Charles II.\(^9\)

---


\(^6\) Franz Neumann, "The Governance of the Rule of Law: An Investigation into the Relationship between Political Theories, the Legal System, and the Social Background in the Competitive Society" (Ph.D. diss., London School of Economics, 1936). To my knowledge, the voluminous work, which was Neumann's Ph.D. dissertation, has never been published in English but has been (re)translated into German, as *Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes*, trans. Alfons Söllner (Frankfurt, 1980).


Following Hobbes, Neumann understood "Leviathan" as at least guaranteeing state sovereignty, whereas "Behemoth" signified a lawlessness that would destroy the state. Neumann described the Nazi Reich as being in a state of chaos, caused by four conflicting power blocs that waged uncontrolled internal warfare on each other. These power blocs were the Junker class in conjunction with the higher civil service, the Nazi Party, the military, and big industry. Exerting total control over all other parts of the population, they engaged in opportunistic collusion with each other, while relentlessly striving for supremacy. As a distraction to the powerless and exploited masses, Neumann maintained that racial anti-Semitism served the aim of imbuing Aryan Germans with the delusion of being members of the master race (*Herrenmenschen*).

Another line of argument was followed by anthropologists Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson. Their studies of South Sea cultures yielded the insight that culturally typical character traits were reinforced through value enactment in everyday situations and in formalized ceremonies. Democratic cultures depended on citizens' commitment to their community by their own free will, whereas totalitarian countries enforced conformity through intimidation and authority, thus appealing to dominant-submissive character types. This analysis suggested that American democracy could defend itself against fascist subterfuge by deliberately strengthening citizens' awareness of the values of a democratic way of life.10 Both the New York-based Council for Democracy and the Conference of Philosophy, Science, and Religion in their Relationship to the Democratic Way of Life undertook to strengthen Americans' commitment to fair play and other democratic values as an efficient antidote to German propaganda and also German-type

status orientation. Civilian morale came to be recognized as an integrating force in a democracy. The National Committee of Morale, under its secretary, Bateson, financed major investigations, such as the comprehensive, annotated bibliography on German psychological warfare published in 1941.

A third line of argument relied on vector psychology. Lewin, who was familiar with both pre-Nazi German and American mentalities, suggested that cultural reconstruction for Germany should include the reinforcement of attitudes of independence:

To encourage change toward democracy ... would include ... increased emphasis on human values rather than superhuman values, such as the state, politics science. It would emphasize what the German "Iron Chancellor" Bismarck called way back in 1880 Civilcourage (moral courage of the civilian) and what he deplored as lacking in the German character (as opposed to the courage and blind obedience of the soldier). Lewin suggested that Germans should be given training on how to organize themselves under democratic leadership. Such training should be as inconspicuous as possible so that Germans would not even notice that they were being redirected to embrace more democratic ways of life. Lewin expected that Germans' sense of efficiency would make them quickly realize that democratic leadership was more efficient than authoritarian rule. This awareness, he argued, "might help to set in motion a process of self-re-education."

---

12 Ladislas Farago et al., *German Psychological Warfare* (New York, 1942).
Parsons's understanding of National Socialism centered on institutional patterns.\(^{15}\) He analyzed Nazi rule as charismatic, invoking Max Weber's theory that routinization of charisma established quasi feudal fiefdoms operating through nepotism and extortion.\(^{16}\) Parsons realized that mystical entities such as race or blood were being stylized into criteria of social status or even the right to live, and anti-Semitic prejudices were legitimized through reference to Jews' alleged untrustworthiness or disloyalty.\(^{17}\) Adopting Harold Lasswell's thesis, Parsons found that the breeding ground for fascism in Europe had been mass feelings of personal insecurity, which he related to Durkheim's understanding of anomie.\(^{18}\) Owing to the invalidation of their sense of national pride in the wake of World War I and subsequent crises such as hyperinflation and the Great Depression, the Germans had adopted a utopian fundamentalism and voted in favor of Hitler's "brown revolution."\(^{19}\)

The first role of American sociology in German re-education was to analyze National Socialism, together with other social sciences. This analysis stressed that democracy and totalitarianism were diametrically opposed.

---

\(^{15}\) His 1940 memorandum, written for the Council for Democracy, named five characteristics particular to National Socialism that existed beside nationalism: racism, socialism, anti-intellectualism, militarism, and the führer principle; see Talcott Parsons, "Memorandum: The Development of Groups and Organizations Amenable to Use Against American Institutions and Foreign Policy and Possible Measures of Prevention," in Gerhardt, ed., *Parsons on National Socialism*, 101–30.

\(^{16}\) Talcott Parsons, "Max Weber and the Contemporary Political Crisis" (1942), in Gerhardt, ed., *Parsons on National Socialism*, 243–74; see also Uta Gerhardt, "Charismatische Herrschaft und Massenmord im Nationalsozialismus. Eine soziologische These zu Goldhagens Theorem der freiwilligen Verbrechen an Juden," in *Geschichte and Gesellschaft* (forthcoming), which details Parsons's understanding of the violent nature of charismatic Nazi rule.

\(^{17}\) Talcott Parsons, "Propaganda and Social Control" (1942), in Gerhardt, ed., *Parsons on National Socialism*, 243–74; idem, "The Sociology of Modern Anti-Semitism" (1942), in ibid., 131–52; idem, "Racial and Religious Differences as Factors in Group Tensions" (1945), in ibid., 275–90.


types of social organization. The objective of the analysis was to derive feasible recommendations for the conversion of Germany into a peaceful democracy after Nazism's eventual defeat in war.

II

Psychiatry had contributed to the evaluation of totalitarianism since the 1930s. Edward Strecker suggested in the spring of 1939 that modern mass psychopathology should be counteracted by mental hygiene. He recommended re-education in the guise of a program of mental hygiene that encouraged individual capacity for insight while strengthening a sense of moral responsibility.20 Harry Stack Sullivan theorized that the Nazis demoralized their enemies by destroying their sense of self-respect.21 He realized that totalitarian powers used helplessness as a weapon to undermine democratic societies.22 In an article published in 1942, Richard Brickner wrote about his discovery of delusionary aspects in the "German cultural paranoid trend."23 Germans perceived themselves and their country as being in the role of the betrayed, but they nevertheless felt destined to become the world's saviors. They also tended to hate and persecute those who failed to submit to their aggressive grandeur and missionary imperialism.

In 1943, Brickner's book Is Germany Incurable?24 (with introductory essays by Mead and Strecker) related the idea of German cultural paranoia

---

20 Edward Strecker, *Beyond Clinical Frontiers* (New York, 1940) contains the Thomas William Salmon Lectures held at the New York Academy of Science in the spring of 1939. Strecker, who adopted Ortega y Gasset's criticism of modern mass man, which he found epitomized in Nazi Germany, recommended mental hygiene as a way out of modern mass psychopathology. He believed that mass man typically suffered from unchecked aggression leading to irresponsible crowd behavior.


22 The crucial role of helplessness as part of the psychological repertoire of Nazism ruling through intimidation and terror is also analyzed in: Uta Gerhardt, "Charismatische Herrschaft."


to Germany's eventual cultural reconstruction. In his introductory remarks, Strecker agreed with Brickner's suggestions that "the paranoia of a group, such as Germany, ... perhaps ... can be cured ... through a well thought-out, thorough plan of re-education, of reculturing." What was the plan? Brickner suggested that since Germany's megalomania, cult of race, and belligerence resembled the psychiatric phenomenon of paranoia, "psychiatric rehabilitation" of Germany had to follow the model of medical therapy, that is, it had to rely on initiatives "from outside-from among the victors." The victors were to follow principles adopted from psychiatric re-education; namely, to enhance and nurture systematically the personality area unaffected by mental illness. Brickner called the unaffected healthy area the “clear.”

The crucial factor in an individual case is the presence of a sufficient mental area remaining clear to act as a point of departure. If the Germany group contains a sizable number of individuals, however unorganized and unaware of one another, whose emotional values are prevalingly non-paranoid, the outside world has a clear area at hand to work with and out from in treating the Germany group case.

In 1944, under the sponsorship of Joseph C. Grew at the State Department and John J. McCloy at the War Department, Brickner organized a conference at his alma mater, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University. The secret Conference on Germany After the War brought together thirty participants and thirty-eight consultants, including physicians and social scientists (such as Lawrence Frank, Kurt Lewin, Margaret Mead, and Talcott Parsons). The conference aimed to draft a threefold policy program: "a. Immediate dealings with Germany, b. Long-term plans with respect to Germany; c. Possible reactions of the democratic peoples in support of or opposition to these decisions and plans."

---

26 Brickner, Is Germany Incurable? 304.
28 "Germany After the War—Round Table 1945," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 11 (1945): 383. The lengthy text in this journal is a verbatim reprint of the short summary and ten appendices of the Report on the Conference on Ger-
According to Brickner's report, the conference came to the conclusion that the psychocultural approach could provide guidelines for policies to overcome German elitism and racism. The nine appendices of the report, apart from Brickner's own, mainly contained parts of the memoranda by Frank, Mead, and Parsons, as edited by Brickner. The conference report built on Mead's distinction between an idealistic and a materialistic component of the dualistic German national character. This distinction underlay Brickner's explication of German paranoia-prone nationalism and inspired Parsons to compare various applications of social-science knowledge regarding "controlled institutional change."

Whereas Parson's solution for "The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change" was only briefly mentioned in the chapter carrying his title phrase, his detailed recommendations entered into other chapters, where they became the central message of the report. Under the heading, "Long-term Procedures in the Management of Germany," four institutional areas found unsuitable for deliberate democratization were discussed: the educational sector, the German home, the civil service, and the demilitarized police. In contrast, under the heading, "Political and Economic Considerations," changes in the occupational-economic realm were advocated for military government policy. If political and economic progress could be fostered, military government could prevent a return to aggressive-paranoid nationalism in Germany, which otherwise might arise out of re-educational economic controls. For their part, Americans should limit their control and allow Germans to administer as much as possible themselves. Americans should also resist the temptation to see the Germans as misguided underdogs, an excuse that they would employ soon enough.

---

many After the War, written in November 1944 and classified as confidential. Among the conference's consultants was the psychoanalyst Erik Erikson, who had interpreted the idealization of Hitler as a near-psychiatric loss of a sense of reality in German youth. Letter from California to Members of the Joint Committee on Postwar Planning, by Erik Homburger Erikson, 3, in Papers of Talcott Parsons, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, Mass. (hereafter cited as Parsons papers), HUG (FP) – 15.2, box 10, folder "Conference on Germany after the War." For the statement of Alvan L. Barach, another participant in the conference who was an associate professor of clinical medicine at Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons, see Alvan L. Barach, "The Conference Statement is Inadequate," 1, in ibid.
Parsons's extensive memorandum outlining the principles for German reconstruction was written or rewritten as a reaction to the so-called Morgenthau Plan.\textsuperscript{29} He contended that to de-industrialize Germany completely would inadvertently destroy the last bastion of Westernized democratic social structure on which re-education efforts could build. Reviewing various fields of potential cultural change, such as the family, school, government, and economy, he insisted that, for three reasons, only the economy offered a reasonable chance for controlled institutional change. First, the economic-occupational realm was under the jurisdiction of the Allies, who could easily use their power in the interest of institutional innovation. Second, the economy provided the best possibilities to cloak re-education efforts. And third, other institutional areas would eventually be changed indirectly through the all-pervasive impact of industrial-occupational re-adaptations. Parsons identified the economy as the "clear" area where Germany could be aligned to the Western democracies, and he recommended full employment as the best strategy for attaining peace in postwar Germany:

The essential thing is that there should be a policy of fostering a highly productive, full-employment, expanding economy for Germany. The inherent tendencies of the modern, industrial economy are such that if this is achieved, its influence on institutional change will be automatically in the right direction.\textsuperscript{30}

According to this concept, Germans would shed their notorious aggressiveness and evolve into cooperative neighbors among the nations of Europe.

Parsons advocated three types of control to facilitate controlled institutional change: regressive, permissive, and direct. By regressive control was meant any policy that halted further regression of social institutions from a rational-legal type authority to a traditional one. Examples are stopping the inadvertent strengthening of the civil service (Junker class) or big industry and repressing militarism in order to ensure that American military government measures meant justice rather than revenge. This message also needed


\textsuperscript{30}Talcott Parsons, "The Problem of Controlled Institutional Change" (1945), in Gerhardt, ed., \textit{Parsons on National Socialism}, 314.
to be conveyed to the Germans. Permissive control included the deliberate encouragement of activities and orientations most likely to increase Germans' sense of independence and capacity for responsibility. The economic-occupational realm lent itself best to this type of control, since it could easily be directed by the military government. Direct control meant punishment for crimes against humanity, a ban on anti-Semitism, the elimination of all insignia or ideas of a "master race," and the persecution of the Nazi worldview wherever it resurfaced.

These types of control, Parsons maintained, would be particularly instrumental in separating the idealistic from the materialistic component of the German national character. Whereas direct control repressed expressions of idealistic tendencies, permissive control would redirect the materialistic component. By basing German work ethics on achievement and equality of opportunity, the materialistic tendencies of the national character would be even further removed from idealistic sentimentalism and could no longer be made a vehicle of nationalist imperialism. In this way, Parsons expected controlled institutional change within the economy to prompt the entire national character of Germans to lose its duality and shed its notoriously belligerent aggressiveness.

Regarding changes in the economy, the memorandum for the Brickner conference merely suggested that cartels and monopolies in German industry should be replaced by small-scale enterprises engaged in genuinely competitive capitalism. Parsons's memoranda for the FEA were more specific and action-oriented. Foremost was the idea that reparations taken from German industry should not cripple its productive capacity, and yet assure the thorough demilitarization of the country's industrial potential. "I feel

---

31 For the reasons why the "economic-occupational structure" was "the most promising as a lever of institutional change," see ibid., 313.

32 Although Brickner's idea was that re-education involved finding and extending the "clear" in Germany (individuals and social institutions), and although this idea was widely publicized in the press after the appearance of his book Is Germany Incurable, the press in 1945 did not automatically follow the lead of some of the conference's participants, such as Talcott Parsons. The American public in April 1945 was not convinced that Germany's economic reconstruction was the best strategy to attain future world peace. Cf. the article from the New York Post of Friday, 27 April 1945, in Parsons papers, HUG (FP) – 15.2, box 10, folder "Conference on Germany after the War."
very strongly,” he stated in the summer of 1945 in a short expose presumably written for Franz Neumann and preserved among the papers relating to his consultancy with the FEA, “that Germany should not be prevented from industrial and commercial development, but should be encouraged in those lines which are compatible with the policy of economic disarmament.”

Parsons adopted two proposals that were compatible with economic disarmament. Opposing separation of the Rhine-Ruhr area from Germany, a proposal discussed at the Potsdam Conference, he recommended international control of Rhine-Ruhr under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. Otherwise, German revanchism could be reawakened. International control might teach the Germans "right on their own doorstep" how a successful democratic system functioned.

The second proposal concerned the type of economy envisioned for Germany. Economic disarmament, Parsons observed, needed to include not only such measures as dismantling industrial equipment but also a blueprint for a peacetime economy that would likely produce consumer goods for export. The foreign currency yielded by the sale of exports was necessary for purchasing raw materials and paying for food imports.

He introduced the idea that small-scale capitalism based on achievement values in a strictly demilitarized economy could provide the "clear" area needed for successful democratization.

33 From the text, it appears likely that the addressee shared the view of Max Horkheimer, Frederick Pollock, and others that "late capitalism" was the driving force behind Nazism's ascendancy to power, and the Nazi regime itself. The paper is preserved in Parson's papers among those documenting his consultancy with the FEA Enemy Branch. For the position of the Frankfurt school, see Max Horkheimer, "Die Juden und Europa," Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 8 (1939): 115–37, and Frederick Pollock, "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations," Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9 (1941): 200–25; Neumann's position is elaborated in Behemoth (repr., New York, 1963), 221–361, and 587–624.

34 Memorandum from Parsons to Philip M. Kaiser, commenting on the FEA Disarmament Plan (draft of 6 Aug.), 17 August 1945, 6, in Parsons papers, HUG (FP) – 15.2, box 9.

mament Plan, he wrote in a memorandum to the agency's planning director, Philip Kaiser:

The right kind of repressive action can have positive functional value in facilitating the process of reorientation, while conversely the right kind of "leniency" can have a repressive effect. This statement may sound paradoxical, yet in a sense it is the key to the whole problem. 

The use of the psychiatric concept of re-education made it possible to visualize the "clear" as a method of cultural reconstruction. Parsons translated this principle into a plea for an economic policy that would have the hidden, long-term consequence of changing German national character.

Parsons's memoranda for the FEA became known to and were taken seriously by a group of economists in the State Department. Beginning in October 1945, this group not only influenced the development of economic conditions in the immediate postwar period, but they also helped to negotiate the terms of economic exchange among European countries during preparations for the European Recovery Program.

Indeed, the vastly successful Marshall Plan, as outlined in the Germany and Austria Division of the State Department, eventually spurred the establishment of the Euro-

---

36 Memorandum from Parsons to Kaiser, 17 August 1945, 2, in Parsons papers, HUG (FP) – 15.2, box 9. Kaiser recollected later that Parsons discussed these issues in one-day meetings on successive Saturdays in July and August 1945 with a group of experts who were engaged in drafting various measures of demilitarization and decartellization for the German economy. Parsons wrote his memoranda to sum up these discussions for further use of the participants (personal communication).

37 The personal connections between the FEA Enemy Branch and its successor agency in the State Department (Germany and Austria Section) are so far only partly known. Some of the former FEA Enemy Branch staff were transferred to this section after the FEA closed in October 1945. It is likely that former FEA personnel were among the group of economists who drafted the Clayton memorandum outlining the main concept of ERP in the spring of 1947; they may also have participated in the Paris conference, where the scope and terms of ERP were definitively established. Thomas Blaisdell, Leo Fowler, Charles P. Kindleberger, Paul Porter, and Walt W. Rostow may have been members of this group, although confirmation of their participation in both agencies, and in the discussions with Parsons at the FEA, is pending. On the Marshall Plan, see Matthew J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952 (Cambridge, 1987).
pean Economic Community (Treaty of Rome, 1958). The institutions of the EEC and NATO (founded, 1949; German entry, 1955) marked the long-term outcome of the policy of re-education. This policy promoted a competitive capitalist industrialism that made Germany a member of the European economic system, and it helped to integrate a reconstructed Germany into a transatlantic community of nations.

III

A broad range of policies of American military government in Germany were derived from the two principles of re-education; namely, enhancing and encouraging the "clear" and entrusting Germans with as much responsibility as possible in programs leading to their (re)democratization. These policies were often evaluated as having been more or less suitable for their apparent purpose: to control remaining vestiges of Nazism and to lay the groundwork for postwar society as early as 1947.38 With their comprehensive scope and vague objectives, these policies were often vehemently attacked by poorly informed critics. Yet they served the same ambitious aim of German democratization supported by the same critics. However, blunt indoctrination in the name of re-education had little in common with these policies, despite accusations to the contrary.39 Their long-term function was to change surreptitiously the Germans' national character.

38 Even shortly after World War II, and even by personnel engaged in the U.S. military government in Germany, these policies were misinterpreted; they were called wholly or partly inadequate by, among others, Marshall Knappen, And Call It Peace (Chicago, 1947); Gustav Stolper, German Realities (New York, 1948); Freda Utley, The High Cost of Vengeance (Chicago, 1949); and James Stewart Martin, All Honorable Men (Chicago, 1950).

Ten policies or programs of the U.S. military government were based on the principles of re-education. The first principle of re-education, to find and enhance the "clear," spurred the following policies and programs:

"WHITE LISTS": The Handbook of Military Government for Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender\(^{40}\) referred to committed anti-Nazis who could be entrusted with responsibility in the political, educational, and other fields. These persons were sought out and contacted by the Counterintelligence Corps,\(^{41}\) while the Psychological Warfare Division usually suggested particular functions for them. Among these highly committed young officers were sociologists, such as Edward Hartshorne, Edward Shils, or Morris Janowitz. Personalities on the White List for Heidelberg, to name but a few, were Karl Jaspers, Alfred Weber, and Theodor Heuss.

INFORMATION CONTROL DIVISION (ICD) SCREENING\(^{42}\): In Bad Orb near Frankfurt am Main, the ICD Screening Center used psychiatric methods, suitably adapted, to identify genuine non-Nazis or anti-Nazis among applicants for licenses to edit a newspaper or run a publishing house. For instance, Axel Springer, who later became a newspaper tycoon, was positively evaluated by ICD before being given a press license.

PARTIES AND ELECTIONS: New parties were allowed to be formed and elections in the American occupational zone were organized on the basis of the "grass-roots" principle.\(^{43}\) Since it was assumed that anti-Nazis were

---

\(^{40}\) The Handbook of Military Government for Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender (Washington, Dec. 1944) emerged from two years of meticulous work in the German Country Unit at Bushy Park, London, under the directorship of Yale political scientist Harold Zink. It supposedly underwent decisive changes after Morgenthau alleged in August 1944 that it was too lenient in its evaluation of Germany's imperialism and guilt. No detailed analysis of the changes in the handbook after this date have been made so far, it is unknown whether a copy of the July 1944 version of the handbook still exists, because all editions before December 1944 were ordered to be destroyed.

\(^{41}\) For interesting details on the work of the CIC in finding the white-listed Germans, see Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, The American Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counterintelligence Corps (London, 1989).


\(^{43}\) Substantial details on this topic are found in Carl J. Friedrich and Associates, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York, 1948). Friedrich was adviser to Clay twice for a three- to six-month period, when he
more likely to have survived as inconspicuous citizens in small towns rather than in big cities, elections were first held in the smallest municipalities, were these non-Nazis could get elected. Elections for state (Land) parliaments were scheduled last, which enabled non-Nazis elected to local office to campaign for a seat in parliament. In this way, the establishment of new parties at the local level—at the grass roots—and the careful scheduling of elections became the hallmarks of German political re-education. In his memoirs, (Deputy) Military Governor Lucius D. Clay emphasized that the new German political institutions were thereby given a legitimized "base of popular support and understanding."

The point, however, was not only to bring out and enhance but also to create the "clear"—the rationale behind the following programs:

PRISONER-OF-WAR INSTRUCTION: In prisoner-of-war camps in the United States, young Germans were taught the ideals and practices of democratic group leadership. Various postwar movements, such as the literary "Gruppe 47," originated with these ventures.

INFORMATION CENTERS (Amerikahäuser): Information Centers were established beginning in 1945 to give Germans a chance to inform themselves about democratic structures and practices. Germans would thereby see for themselves that democracy worked better than dictatorship. In addition, concerts and other cultural events at the Amerikahäuser would prove that democracy lacked none of the pleasures of connoisseurship or relaxation.

---

was on a leave of absence from Harvard in 1946 and 1948. See also Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, NJ, 1950).


45 Clay, Decision in Germany, 88.

46 For a contemporary description of principles and programs, see Curt Bondy, "Observations and Re-education of German Prisoners of War," Harvard Educational Review 14 (1944): 12–19; Henry Ehrmann, "An Experiment in Political Education: The Prisoner-of-War Schools in the United States," Social Research 14 (1947): 30420. Bondy and Ehrmann had fled Nazi Germany and were therefore familiar with both democracy in the United States and Germany's culture of authoritarianism. Incidentally, one of the program advisers was Richard Brickner.
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS: Exchange programs operated on the same basis as Information Centers. Starting in 1946, scholars, students, administrators, politicians, and many others were invited to learn how democratic institutions functioned from personal experience in the United States.

THE GERMAN YOUTH ASSISTANCE (GYA) PROGRAM was founded in June 1945 and formally established in November 1945. It officially brought together American soldiers and German youth to play baseball or to do handicrafts. But its unofficial purpose was to demonstrate that democratic group structures could be efficient, and that working or playing together meant fun, unlike the kind of martial games organized previously for Nazi youth. Young Germans joined the various programs by the millions. They obviously accepted GYA's unofficial objective that German youth be weaned from Nazi indoctrination and introduced to nonauthoritarian group culture.

TRADE UNIONS: Clay recalls in his memoirs how he pushed for the restoration of trade unions. Since they represented an important element of genuine democracy, defending the rights of workers against those of their employers, particularly in big industry, American military government gave unions all possible help to see them firmly established.

The second principle of re-education as it was derived from psychiatry and reinterpreted by social science concerned Germans' participation in their own reorientation. The idea was that the Germans should be forced or enticed not only to take part in measures of reconstruction but also to participate in dealing with the Nazis. At the same time, they were expected to take advantage of the institutional changes that were to give them independence and responsibility while surreptitiously undermining their entrenched dominance-submissiveness. The following two measures exemplify this principle.

DENAZIFICATION: To pre-empt Germans' tendency not to identify with Allied measures of punishing Nazis for their crimes, the "Law of Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism," enacted on March 5, 1946, made

---

47 See Clay, Decision in Germany, 64f., 228.
Germans a vital part of the system of denazification tribunals (*Spruchkammern*). The idea was to make Germans take responsibility for Nazi crimes as they were dealt with in court. Such German participation in bringing Nazis to justice was intended to prevent them from washing their hands of the Nazi regime while disavowing Nazism.49

GEWERBEFREIHEIT (freedom to practice a trade): If capitalism was to represent a liberating force, every German was to have a stake in it. This program spurred regulations for freedom of economic activity, opening up work opportunities for native Germans, refugees, and expellees alike. Free trade became an important forerunner of small-scale capitalism as it took advantage of the export markets opening up through the ERP.50

This brief overview illustrates the integration of the two principles derived from psychiatry into the ten policies or programs of re-education after World War II. Sociology's role was to translate the principles of enhancing the "clear" and enrolling German participation into a set of guidelines for political planning and economic recovery. This role of sociology provided a remarkably successful impulse for transforming charismatic-traditional totalitarianism into rational-legal democracy.

Little of this story has been told openly in the many memoirs written by military government officials. Clay, who adhered to both principles of re-education in almost every field of policy in which American military government had input, did not acknowledge any debt whatsoever to sociological or psychiatric ideas. In his memoirs, he credited the change of "German consciousness" rather to the "strategy of truth," that is, the technique of truthful information that had been official practice since it was introduced

49 For an adequate account of the American effort, see Elmer Plischke, "Denazification: Law and Procedure," in Johnsen, ed., *Dilemma of Postwar Germany*, 145–60. German tendencies to criticize denazification as inadequate while refusing to participate in it were observed closely in various surveys conducted by the Information Control Division's Survey Analysis Branch. For a description of this research, see Gerhardt, "Re-Demokratisierung nach 1945," 32–39.

50 The mixed reactions to these measures are documented in Herrmann Josef Rupieper, *Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie* (Opladen, 1993), 36–37; see also Christoph Boyer, "'Deutsche Handwerksordnung' und 'kügellose Gewerbefreiheit'," in *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform*, ed. Martin Broszat, Klaus Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller (Munich, 1992), 449–67.
in 1943 in the Office of War Information and the Psychological Warfare Divisions.\footnote{Clay, \textit{Decision in Germany}, 281–82. For the Office of War Information's policy of "strategy of truth" during the war and the beginning of PWD's(re)democratization of Germany, see Carl J. Friedrich, "Issues of Informational Strategy," \textit{Public Opinion Quarterly} 7 (1943): 77–89, and Daniel Lerner, \textit{Psychological Warfare Against Nazi Germany} (New York, 1949).}
In Serbian writer Milorad Pavic's novel *Landscape Painted With Tea*, one character, referring to the situation of the younger generation in Germany after 1945, suggests that because of the older generation's complete bankruptcy, the younger generation is in a position to dominate and control German culture for many decades to come. In Germany, according to Pavic's character, who is advising a member of the younger generation on where it is best to live, "they'll be looking for younger people, who bear no responsibility for the defeat; the generation of fathers has lost the game there; there it's your generation's move."¹ Controversial German historian Ernst Nolte has likewise suggested that the memory of Germany's "Third Reich" is being used for moral and political purposes by a younger generation "in the age-old battle with 'their fathers.'"² The American literary scholar Harold Bloom has sought to describe literary progress itself as a kind of primal Freudian scene in which a younger generation is constantly seeking, metaphorically, to "kill" its fathers and to escape from what Bloom called the "anxiety of influence."³ Of course Bloom knew very well that such an escape was impossible.

On the surface, Pavic's scenario for postwar German culture would seem to have plausibility. If literary generations really do behave like Freud's primal horde, in which brothers band together to kill the father, then the

¹ Milorad Pavic, *Landscape Painted with Tea* (New York, 1990), 41.
² Ernst Nolte, "Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will. Eine Rede, die geschrieben, aber nicht gehalten werden konnte," in *Historikerrtreit. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung* (Munich, 1987), 39–47; here, 41.
collapse of the Third Reich and the death of Hitler would seem to have posed an unparalleled opportunity for staking a new literary and cultural claim. While we find no specific German references to a Nullpunkt or a Stunde Null in 1945, we do find many declarations by members of a younger generation decrying the bankruptcy of the older generation and indeed of the entire German cultural tradition. "Our hatred, the hatred of the younger generation, has the justification of unconditional necessity," declared Alfred Andersch during the Nuremberg Trials in 1946.4

Declarations such as this one have come to be seen as part of a specifically literary zero hour associated with the first generation of Group 47 writers centered around the figure of Hans Werner Richter, born in 1908. Among the most famous of these declarations of the moral bankruptcy of an older generation is Richter's own juxtaposition of a corrupt but all too voluble older generation with a morally intact but silent younger generation. "Rarely in the history of any country ... has such a spiritual gap between two generations opened up as now in Germany," wrote Richter in 1946. Admitting that his younger generation was as yet relatively silent, Richter wrote:

Yes, this generation is silent, but it is silent not because it is without a clue, it is silent not because it has nothing to say or can not find the words that are necessary in order to say what has to be said. It is silent because it has the definite feeling that the discrepancy between a human existence that is threatened and the comfortable problems of the older generation that has emerged from its Olympic silence after twelve years is too big to be bridged. It knows that the image of human existence that the older generation inherited from its forefathers and which it would now like to erect again can no longer be built. It knows that this image is permanently destroyed. Perhaps the younger generation knows this only intuitively, but it knows.5

Richter's specific declaration that the silence of the younger generation was not a result of having nothing to say or being "clueless" (ratlos) suggested precisely the opposite: that in fact the younger generation was without a spiritual compass and unable to say anything meaningful about the situation in which it found itself.

---


5 Hans Werner Richter, "Warum schweigt die junge Generation?" Der Ruf 1, no. 2 (1 Sept 1946), reprinted in Schwab-Felisch, ed., Der Ruf, 29–33.
Of course the younger generation was not alone in its inability to understand the current situation. No less a figure than the distinguished historian Friedrich Meinecke had suggested in his book *The German Catastrophe*, published in 1946, that it might never be possible to understand fully what had happened to Germany during the Third Reich, and that "the problems we are faced with today and the catastrophe we have experienced force our feeling to go far beyond all previous disasters of this sort."\(^6\)

But Richter tried to make a virtue out of what seemed an unpleasant necessity. He painted a picture of radical discontinuity and a break in the cultural tradition that precisely describes the most radical vision of a zero point:

Faced with the smoke-blackened picture of this European landscape of ruins, in which human beings wander aimlessly, cut loose from all outdated bonds, the value systems of the past turn pale and lifeless. Any possibility of connecting up with what went before, any attempt to begin again where the older generation left its continuous developmental path in 1933 in order to surrender to an irrational adventure, seems paradoxical in the face of this European picture.

Richter concluded,

Because of the complete dislocation of life feeling, because of the violence of the experiences that have become a part of and that have shaken the younger generation, this generation believes that the only possible source for a spiritual rebirth lies in an absolute and radical new beginning.\(^7\)

While Richter's words are noteworthy for the radicalness of their intention to break with tradition, it is significant that he made no attempt to describe precisely how such a break can be accomplished, let alone to address the question of whether a beginning ex nihilo is humanly possible.

Three years later Alfred Andersch, born in 1914, declared:

Because of the dictates of a completely unprecedented situation, the younger generation stands before a tabula rasa, before the necessity of

---


\(^7\) Schwab-Felisch, ed., *Der Ruf*, 29–33.
achieving through an original act of creation, a renewal of German spiritual life.\textsuperscript{8}

Like Richter, Andersch suggested that,

especially for the younger generation, the collapse of the old world has ... created the feeling that there are absolutely no givens, the nascent feeling of an original new becoming for which there are no patterns or models.\textsuperscript{9}

Such statements certainly underline the intention of a younger generation to break with its predecessors and the past they represented. Words such as Zwang (compulsion) and Notwendigkeit (necessity), however, point to the fact that the new beginning is not just a question of volition; rather, the new beginning is felt to be an assignment, a task, a mission. The renewal of German intellectual life and the original act of creation appear more as unpleasant necessities than as longed-for events. As the young writer Eric Kuby said, "We did not choose to live in this era. We have to deal with it as we have found it."\textsuperscript{10} The emphasis is on a highly undesirable situation that the younger generation did not choose, and that it is forced to deal with against its will. Wolfdietrich Schnurre underlined this sense of unpleasant duty when he wrote:

\begin{quote}
We did not write because we had set ourselves the goal of becoming writers. We wrote because we felt that it was our duty to issue a warning It was not easy for us to write; we were left completely to our own devices. Because there was no ethical support system, there was no literary model, there was no tradition.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

While it is clear that the older generation will be no help in creating a new German culture, the contours of that new culture remain nebulous and vague.


\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., 25.

\textsuperscript{10} Alexander Parlach (Erich Kuby), "Die erste und einzige Rede deutscher Jugend an ihren Dichter," \textit{Der Ruf} 2, no. 25: 10; cited in \textit{Auf der Suche nach der Stunde Null. Literature und Alltag 1945} (Bad Salzdetfurth, 1991), 20.

More than any other writer, perhaps, Heinrich Böll, born in 1917, became for both Germans and non-Germans the primary representative of a younger generation trying to face the problems of the German past and their continuing effects on the present. Böll’s 1950 short story "Stranger, Bear Word to the Spartans We ..." ("Wanderer, kommst du nach Spa ... ") illustrates better than anything else the younger generation's feeling of being cut off and alienated from the past.

The story deals with a wounded young soldier's return to his home town and former high school, which has been turned into a hospital. Although the soldier does not know it, he has lost both arms and a leg. The entire story relates the young man's gradual realization that he is now in his home town, in his former high school, in his former classroom, surrounded by once-familiar things, including even his own writing on the blackboard. But these things have become strange and foreign to the young man; he has no sense of recognition when he sees them. This is a precise description of what is meant by the Brechtian term "alienation" or "defamiliarization"—that which is or once was completely familiar becomes completely strange. Subject to this alienation are not only the school with its classrooms and personnel and the young man himself in his former status as a schoolboy, but also the entire classical tradition of German humanistic education passed on in that school and represented not only by the broken-off words "Stranger, Bear Word to the Spartans We ..." but also by "busts of Caesar, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius" and a host of other cultural artifacts that represent Germany's view of itself as heir to Greek and Roman culture. The young man no longer recognizes these things:

Besides, I feel nothing. Apart from my eyes, nothing tells me I'm in my school, in my old school that I left only three months ago. Eight years in the same school is a pretty long time—is it possible that after eight years only your eyes recognize the place?  

What Hans Werner Richter and other proponents of the zero hour had described as a complete and almost heroic renunciation of all cultural tradition becomes for Böll the gradual and painful recognition of a young man's utter helplessness and isolation. Ironically, the break with the cultural tradi-

---


13 Ibid., 272.
tion begins with the fulfillment of the classical injunction, "Know thyself!"
For Böll, understanding begins with self-recognition:

I lay on the operating table and saw myself quite distinctly, but very small, dwarfed, up there in the clear glass of the light bulb, tiny and white, a narrow, gauze-colored little bundle looking like an unusually diminutive embryo: so that was me up there.\(^{14}\)

This very small, shrunken embryo reflected in the light bulb is the embryo of postwar German culture, literally amputated not as an act of heroic will but out of weakness, inability, even guilt.

From the very beginning, the zero hour of 1945 stood under the sign of both necessity and failure. It was a possibility that might have been and should have been but was not taken advantage of, something that ought to have happened but did not. In 1947, one year before the West German currency reform, the journalist Eugen Kogon wrote:

The old ways continue, they have not been eliminated; through mistakes, failures, weakness, and all sorts of stupidity on all sides, they are poisoning existence and crippling our thought, our actions, they besmirch our feelings, they overshadow all hope.\(^{15}\)

One year after Kogon wrote these words, an opinion poll gave drastic confirmation of his evaluation by suggesting that 57 percent of Germans living in the Western occupation zones believed that National Socialism was "a good idea that was only carried out wrong."\(^{16}\) Kogon was one of the first German critics to suggest that what was happening in West Germany was more a "restoration" than a "renewal." Five years later Kogon wrote that "restoration ... exactly reflects our social condition," suggesting that the West German restoration implied a politics "of traditional 'values,' means and forms of thought, of seeming certainties, of the re-creation of well-known interests as much as possible, a politics of lack of imagination."\(^{17}\)

Summing up the restoration almost two decades later, Kogon used words

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 276.
\(^{17}\) Kogon, Die unvollendete Erneuerung, 146–47.
strikingly similar to those later adopted by literary critics in attacking the concept of the zero hour: "The year 1945 was not the year zero. Even back then there was, all appearances to the contrary, no such thing as a tabula rasa."

Similar feelings had been expressed by many others, including the journalist Walter Dirks. Dirks was already writing about what he called "the restorative character of the epoch" in 1950, suggesting that "the re-creation of the old world has occurred with such force that all we can do right now is accept it as a fact of life." Such sentiments even shone through in the cultural and literary criticism of champions of the zero hour like Hans Werner Richter, Gustav René Hocke, and Alfred Andersch when they argued against what Hocke called German "calligraphy," the continuing power of an apolitical German tradition even in the face of the disaster of 1945, as well as in the Group 47 writers' opposition to the immanent division of Europe and Germany itself into two opposing blocs. As the critic Herbert Ihering wrote about the cultural situation in 1947, "the surface can be moved, but at the deeper levels of spirit and feeling we run up against a hardening, almost an ossification." In 1950 Alfred Kantorowicz proclaimed: "Our dream of the regeneration of Germany is at an end," asserting, in what would be a continuing refrain in the coming years, that "thinkers and poets, every sort of intellectually creative person, are all out in the cold."

The 1946 Nobel Prize for literature went to a German-speaking writer, but not to a member of the younger generation. Instead it went to Hermann Hesse, born only a year after Konrad Adenauer, in 1887, already middle aged by the end of World War I and quite old by the end of World War II. Hesse, who had become a Swiss citizen as early as 1923, had published his last major novel, *The Glass Bead Game*, in 1943, and this book became the most significant work of epic literature to appear in the German language during the 1940s, along with Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus* (1947) and Hermann Broch's *The Death of Vergil* (1945). In an analysis of the

---

18 Ibid., 5.
situation of literature in postwar Germany, Alfred Andersch in 1948 declared that through their masterpieces these three authors had proven "Germany's belonging [Zugehörigkeit] to Atlantic culture." And yet all of these authors were members of the older generation, with Mann born in 1875 and Broch in 1886.

Far from being a literary work that comes to terms with Nazism, Hesse's *The Glass Bead Game* is a celebration of pure, apolitical intellectualism, of withdrawal from the world and monkish existence. The game of the book's title is an exclusively mental exercise, a "highly developed secret language" combining theology, music, and mathematics with no bearing whatsoever on the actual affairs of the world. As the book's narrator describes it, the game seeks to avoid anything negative and, through playful combinations, to achieve communion with God:

> In general, aside from certain brilliant exceptions, Games with discordant, negative, or skeptical conclusions were unpopular and at times actually forbidden. This followed directly from the meaning the Game had acquired at its height for the players. It represented an elite, symbolic form of seeking for perfection, a sublime alchemy, an approach to that Mind which beyond all images and multiplicities is one within itself—in other words, to God.

This passage is an adequate description not only of Hesse's *Glass Bead Game* but of the role of literature itself in German cultural conservatism. The entire plot of Hesse's chef d'oeuvre takes place in a kind of fairy-tale world, a country called "Kastalien" in which neither Nazis nor Communists ever rear their heads, and in which any political involvement is decried as feuilletonistisch or "literary supplement punditry." Indeed, the *Glass Bead Game* itself is invented partially as a reaction against intellectuals' involvement with politics in "the era of literary supplement punditry" (das feuilletonistische Zeitalter), an era that "did not really know what to do with its spirit, or, more precisely, did not know how to give the spirit the place and function it deserves."

---

22 Andersch, *Deutsche Literatur*, 18.
24 Ibid., 30.
While it is certainly understandable that, in a period of "uncertainty and falsehood" in which intellectuals "suddenly found" themselves "confronted with nothingness," Hermann Hesse preferred to flee from an unpleasant reality in his writings of the Nazi period, his 1943 novel is more a summary of previous themes than a new beginning. Hesse himself seems to acknowledge his own weakness and inability to come to terms with the present by ending the novel with the death of its main character, the aptly named Joseph Knecht, who, while trying to keep up with a teenage pupil in a swimming match, has a heart attack and drowns. As the young pupil realizes that his master, the incarnation of the Glass Bead Game and hence of pure intellectualism, has died, he also comes to understand that he himself is partially guilty for this death:

And because, in spite of all arguments to the contrary, he felt himself to be partially guilty of his master's death, he was overcome with the holy terror of presentiment and knew that this guilt would change him and his life and demand far greater things from him than he had ever demanded from himself.  

While this ending might justifiably be read as the signal of the inevitable death of an older generation and the ambiguous triumph of a younger, stronger generation that must now face the grim burden of its own victory, the younger generation immediately after the war was in no way as strong or as healthy as such an interpretation would suggest. On the contrary, the younger generation was, by its own admission, silent. One of the saddest events in postwar German literature occurred in 1949, in the middle of Thomas Mann's worldwide fame and adulation as a result of the publication of Doktor Faustus. the suicide of Mann's highly talented son Klaus, who had earlier had such hopes for a new Germany that would need what the younger Mann, in his exile novel Der Vulkan (the volcano), had called "people like us." Klaus Mann's depression had been caused at least in part by bitter disappointment about the state of affairs in postwar Germany.

If Thomas Mann, Hermann Hesse, and Hermann Broch dominated the immediate postwar period in terms of respected literary production, they

---

26 Hesse, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 6, 93. In the Winston translation, "they found themselves suddenly confronting a void." Hesse, Magister Ludi, 14.
27 Hesse, Gesammelte Werke, 543. In the Winston translation, Magister Ludi, 394.
28 Klaus Mann, Der Vulkan. Roman unter Emigranten (Amsterdam, 1939), 718.
were not the only members of the older generation to be so productive. The dominant literary figure in West Germany throughout the 1950s was not a member of the younger generation but rather the poet Gottfried Benn, who was born, along with Konrad Adenauer and Hermann Broch, in 1886, and whose *Statische Gedichte* had been published in 1948. In philosophy the dominant figures were Martin Heidegger (born in the same year as Hitler, 1889) and, to a lesser extent, Karl Jaspers (born in 1883). Throughout the 1950s it was an apolitical existentialism, not political engagement or coming to terms with the past, that dominated literary production. "But that is politics, that is poppycock!" declares one German *Bildungsbürger* to another in a satirical story by Franz Fühmann about the postwar period. Surrounded by bookshelves filled with the literary celebrities of the 1950s—T.S. Eliot, Albert Camus, Ezra Pound, Rudolf Binding, and Ernst Jünger—this character is expressing a typical flight from difficult political and social questions toward universal, timeless, existentialist vagueness. Advising his friend to steer clear of politics, the Soviet zone, and questions about the past, this *homme de lettres*, who sits comfortably in West Berlin sipping Nescafé while rhapsodizing in Heideggerian terms about the universal, suggests that a young postwar writer should return to the Middle Ages:

"Do you know what, you ought to write a dance of death, that would be just your style, a terrible, demonic dance of death that would grasp the whole apocalypse of our time," he said and drank his Nescafé to the bottom, "the whole apocalypse," he repeated and put his cup back, "the aloneness of the human creature, the despair, the remorselessness, the thrust-outness [*Geworfensein*]..." He wiped the whipped cream from his mouth.29

In an address to the German people in 1945, the writer Franz Werfel had advised Germans, "Think back with humility and gratefulness to your great and holy masters, who will be your witnesses in eternity. Only they can take the shame away from you...."30 To think back to the great masters, especially to Goethe—this was for many the lesson of World War II. Not a zero hour, in other words, but rather a return to eternal verities.

---

Thus Meinecke proposed dealing with the moral catastrophe of German fascism by establishing cells of Goethe admirers throughout the country, while in Frankfurt city fathers responded to the destruction of their city and of Goethe's house itself with a very literal reconstruction and restoration of the house, as if it had never been destroyed. In spite of critics' complaints that such a restoration amounted to nothing less than a falsification and a lie that would prevent Germans from recognizing the extent of their moral and cultural catastrophe, Frankfurt's city fathers insisted on the reconstruction. One of the first major intellectual debates in Germany after the war was the debate between Karl Jaspers and Ernst Robert Curtius about Goethe's role in contemporary German culture, in which Jaspers dared to question Goethe's continuing significance, while the outraged Curtius denounced such questioning as "an attack on Goethe that is both subaltern and arrogant," amounting to an attack on German culture itself.

Many German intellectuals seemed insistent on behaving as if Hitler, the Third Reich, and the Holocaust had never happened. It has been well documented that most fields of humanistic scholarship—from philosophy, sociology, and literary studies to history itself—followed more or less the same traditions they had before 1945, only eliminating specifically Nazi ideology. Suggesting that "the facts are as clear as they are unbelievable," the philosopher Helmut Fahrenbach has described the immediate postwar situation in philosophy as an almost willful failure to address the major problems posed by recent German history—"as if nothing had happened." As

---


Hannah Arendt remarked when she visited Germany in 1950, "everywhere one notices that there is no reaction to what has happened, but it is hard to say whether that is due to an intentional refusal to mourn or whether it is the expression of a genuine emotional incapacity."\textsuperscript{35} The writer Stefan Heym noted in October 1945 that "the ability to stick one's head in the sand and close oneself off from unpleasant facts is a protective mechanism of the human soul."\textsuperscript{36} In anger at this behavior Bertolt Brecht spoke of Germans' "good-natured cluelessness, the shamelessness, that they were simply continuing on as if it were only their houses that had been destroyed."\textsuperscript{37} As Theodor W. Adorno wrote in the journal \textit{Frankfurter Hefte} in 1950, "the word has not yet gotten out that culture in the traditional sense of the word is dead."\textsuperscript{38}

Once again it was the writer Heinrich Böll who was able to capture this ostrich-like behavior most memorably in his satirical short story "Christmas Not Just Once a Year" ("Nicht nur zur Weihnachtszeit"), in which the primary psychological effect of World War II and its brutal interruption of the traditional German family Christmas ceremony on the narrator's aunt is her inability to accept the fact that "Christmas comes but once a year." As the narrator reflects, "the war was registered by my Aunt Milla merely as a force that began as early as Christmas 1939 to jeopardize her Christmas tree."\textsuperscript{39} As a result of this trauma, Aunt Milla becomes obsessed with restoring the Christmas ceremony exactly as she remembered it from before the war. She cannot let Christmas come to an end. If the Christmas tree is taken away she becomes hysterical. And because of Aunt Millas's refusal to accept the reality of time, her entire family begins an elaborate ritual, celebrating Christmas 365 times a year, decorating Christmas trees and consuming

\begin{itemize}
\item 36 Cited in Zeller, ed., \textit{Als der Krieg zu Ende war.}, 28.
\end{itemize}
Christmas candy at an alarming rate. Gradually this mendacious ritual begins to erode the basis for family life completely.

Aunt Milla is the satirically exaggerated representative of a society incapable of recognizing what has happened to it, and the family's elaborate ceremonies echo a world in which economic power is used to create a lying facade behind which the truth is safely hidden. For Heinrich Böll the primary moral task of any writer and any human being was to face reality, not to hide from it. He wrote, "Reality is like a letter that is addressed to us, but which we allow to lie around unopened." Failure to face reality is fatal, according to Böll, because human beings can live only in reality or not at all.

Despite the dominance of an apolitical worship of traditional culture immediately after World War II, many representatives of the younger generation sought a thoroughgoing politicization of literature that would break the old German separation between Geist and Macht. Theo Pirker argued that "the modern poet sees his task precisely in the portrayal of social reality, in making visible the real fate that is so hard to grasp because of constant motion, i.e. the political fate of society." Pirker suggested that the writer's goals "are political, not aesthetic, they are collective and not individual, they are related to content, not to form." The writer, argued Pirker, was "the epitome of the self-conscious human being in a society that is only beginning to become conscious of itself.

Similarly, Erich von Kahler suggested that, "yes, the spiritual human being will become militant, he will even have to join together with others like himself if he wants to make his voice heard, he will have to become more and more 'political'."

The belief that literature should become political led Gustav René Hocke and Alfred Andersch to argue against what they called "German calligraphy" in the pages of their journal Der Ruf. Heinrich Böll also argued against the aesthetic solipsism of a literature unconcerned with human

---

reality in his first major postwar essay, "In Praise of Rubble Literature" from 1952, in which he called such aesthetic solipsism the work of the "blindman's-buff writer" (Blindekuh-Schriftsteller), who, instead of reflecting human reality in his work, tries to create with his work a new reality. "The blindman's-buff writer sees into himself, he builds a world to suit himself," Böll wrote, arguing that the most egregious example of such writing was Adolf Hitler with his book Mein Kampf. In suggesting this notion, Böll was clearly connecting pure aestheticism in its German incarnation with National Socialism.

At the time, this viewpoint represented a minority position. And yet by the time of his death in 1985, Böll had not only won the Nobel Prize but also had become, in a sense, the widely recognized conscience of his nation. What in 1952 had been a minority opinion was, by the mid-1980s, increasingly dominant.

The fact of political and cultural restoration after the war and the continuity of literary existentialism throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s has justifiably led critics like Frank Trommler and Hans Dieter Schäfer to speak of the entire thirty-year period from 1930 to 1960 as one of apolitical existentialism. Their scholarly deconstruction of the zero-hour myth, which is now widely accepted by literary historians, demonstrated clearly that the year 1945 was characterized at least as much by literary continuity as by a tabula rasa. In Trommler's analysis, the year 1945 appears not as a zero hour but rather as the chronological middle of a literary period that predated the Nazis' rise to power and lasted for another decade and a half after their total defeat. Other critics, trying to save the concept of a zero hour, have spoken of the postwar period as a kind of political, moral, literary, and cultural vacuum in which elements from the past survived not as a result of

---

44 Heinrich Böll, "Bekenntnis zur Trümmerliteratur," in idem, Erzählungen Hörspiele Aufsätze, 339–43; here, 342.

some internal literary dynamic, but rather as the product of blind, automatic continuation in the face of spiritual crisis, in much the same way that a dead animal can sometimes continue certain movements or growth even long after the hour of its death. The dispute between the two groups of critics revolves less around the facts of the German political and literary situation than around the interpretation of the relative independence of literary and aesthetic phenomena from political phenomena.

If the year 1945 was indeed not a zero hour, then there are a number of problems to solve. First and foremost is the obvious fact that the postwar Federal Republic of Germany has become a relatively vibrant and successful democracy, the most successful democracy that Germany has ever produced. If 1945 was not a break, then at what point did the break come? When did the National Socialist Germany become the democratic Germany that Germans and others know today? What was the role of literature and literary intellectuals in helping to create such a Germany? And why is it that a concept unknown in 1945 and rejected by most serious scholars today enjoys such dominance among ordinary Germans as they reflect on the significance of the year 1945?

These are questions that are far too large and complex to answer within the space of a brief essay. But the possible contours of an answer are, I would submit, suggested by the work and career of Heinrich Böll, the literary outsider of the 1940s and early 1950s who was to become a lionized leader of German letters by the time of his death. Böll and other writers like him insisted during the first postwar years on the importance of a simple, unadorned, politically engaged, realist literature that would break with an unpoltical literary tradition that they believed to be partly responsible for the susceptibility of German Bildungsbürger to the Nazi Party. These writers and their Trümmerliteratur were a marginal, minority phenomenon during the first decade of their ascension, but ultimately the "zero hour" consciousness that they represented came to dominate the literature of the Federal Republic. At the moment of German reunification in 1990, in fact, even a con-

---

servative critic had to admit that the literature they produced was the "production center of West German consciousness"—the most important factor in helping to create a democratic, pluralistic political consciousness in Germany. Hence, while one must accept the fact that the "zero hour" is more a literary historical myth than a reality, one must also accept the fact that this myth has acquired increasing significance during the postwar years and has, precisely for that reason, taken on a certain stubborn reality of its own—in the present, if not in the past.

The functioning of that zero hour myth is once again perhaps best illustrated in one of Böll's first postwar short stories, the 1947 anecdote "The Message," in which the story's narrator speaks words that were to prove prescient for postwar German cultural history: "I knew then that the war would never come to an end as long as, anywhere, even a single wound that it had caused continued to bleed." Such a statement prefigures the continuing and even increasing significance of World War II and the Nazi dictatorship in postwar German consciousness and seems to anticipate Nolte's complaint in 1986 that as the past recedes, its political significance continues, paradoxically, to grow: "It seems to be getting stronger and more alive all the time ..., as a past that has in fact established itself as a present, and that hangs above the present like a sword of judgment." Debates in the 1990s about Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* and about the controversial traveling exhibit on the crimes of the German *Wehrmacht*, as well as many other discussions and arguments about the German past, suggest that Nolte's mid-1980s statement continues to be pertinent into the late 1990s. Nolte is no doubt correct in his evaluation of the vital significance of the German past for the German present, but there is no reason to share Nolte's negative assessment of that significance. On the contrary, it is probable that the "stronger and more alive" past of which Nolte speaks has contributed substantially to the stabilization and success of postwar German democracy. The zero hour that did not occur in 1945 has become a positive fact of German consciousness half a century later.

---

49 Nolte, "Vergangenheit," 39.
Stunde Null der Frauen?
Renegotiating Women's Place in Postwar West Germany

Maria Höhn

In the Western zones of occupation, the heroic image of Germany's Trümmerfrauen had given way to that of the traditional hausfrau within a few short years after the end of World War II. Even though Germany's women had cleared the country's bombed-out cities and kept the war-ravaged economy running in the immediate postwar years,¹ they received little recognition for their contributions. Beginning in the late 1960s the daughters of these women asked in bewilderment why their mothers had not been able to take advantage of the emancipatory impulses presented by the war and its aftermath. It took historians even longer to question if there ever had been a Stunde Null for Germany's women.

This essay draws on oral histories and the public debates of the press in the American and British zones\(^2\) to show that many Germans, not just women, perceived 1945 as a crucial moment to renegotiate women's place in society. Although most historians of postwar German history agree that the concept of a *Stunde Null* is not a helpful one, the debates of that time reveal that many people experienced the immediate postwar years as such a moment when a totally new beginning was possible. After the crushing defeat of Nazi Germany, women publicly expressed that German men had lost their traditional status, and many male observers agreed. *Stunde Null* or *Stunde Eins*, as it was also called at the time, was a time of considerable public debate on the role women were to play in the new, democratic Germany. This debate addressed women's place in the family, in the workplace, and in politics. However, the "opening up" of the gender question in the face of utter and humiliating defeat encountered serious obstacles almost immediately. While the early postwar years were marked by a tremendous openness to change, the period was also defined by an anxious search for order and stability. The emerging Cold War only added fuel to that desire and contributed to closing the window of opportunity for women.

In 1945 there were approximately seven million more women in Germany than men.\(^3\) More than three million German soldiers were killed in the war. Seven million German soldiers were still prisoners of war, leaving their wives and families to fend for themselves in the rubble heaps of the German cities.\(^4\) As Erich Kästner wrote for a 1947 theater production, "ganz Deutschland ist ein Wartesaal mit Millionen von Frauen."\(^5\)


\(^3\) Meyer and Schulze, *Von Liebe*, 223. For every 100 men there were 171 women in the 20–25 age group, and 153 in the 35–40 age group.

\(^4\) Ibid., 253. At the end of the war approximately 9.2 million soldiers were prisoners of war. By the end of 1945 about 4.4 million POWs had returned to Germany, ca. 1.8 million more were released by the end of 1946, 1.6 million in 1947, 811,000 in 1948, 443,000 in 1949, and 23,000 in 1950.

\(^5\) *Der Spiegel*, 1 Nov. 1947. "All of Germany is a waiting room with millions of women."
While German women may have been waiting for their men to return from POW camps, they were not idle doing so. Despite the harsh realities of the war and the postwar years, women managed to ensure the survival of their families, often at great sacrifice. Oral histories abound with women's proud stories of how they managed and persevered and how they emancipated themselves in the process. Returning men often did not like what they found. One woman recalled that her husband "no longer [felt] like a man. He suffered, because [she] had managed so well on [her] own." Another woman reported how helpless her husband was after returning from a POW camp. It was hard for him to cope with the changed circumstances because "he felt like a newborn baby." Another woman, unwilling to go back to being a dutiful hausfrau after her husband returned, spoke for many when she concluded, "when we were back together, the war went on at home."

In postwar Germany, the war between the sexes that these women and many others referred to took on the qualities of a zero-sum game. Women gained ground not only because the recent experiences had strengthened their sense of self, but also because men had lost their traditional status. A woman doctor, for example, complained that the men had lost the war but returned home with the attitude of victors. She wrote in the *Nordwest-Deutsche Hefte*: "Now, after defeat, they cannot ask of us that we again entrust ourselves to their leadership." A Berlin woman who kept a diary in the last days of the war observed:

> my feeling, the feeling of all women, changed toward men. We felt sorry for them, they appeared so pitiful and weak. A sort of collective disappointment was spreading... among women. The weak sex ... the male-dominated, man-glorifying Nazi world shook—and with it the myth of man.... At the

---

8 Ibid.
9 On this war between the sexes, see especially Hilde Thurnwald, *Gegenwartsprobleme Berliner Familien* (Berlin, 1948) and oral histories from note 1. Politically this war between the sexes culminated in men blaming women “for having voted Hitler into power,” while women blamed Germany's patriarchal society (*Männerstaat*) for the horror of the last twelve years.
end of this war, besides all the other defeats, there will be the defeat of men as a gender [Geschlecht].

It was not only the women who expressed how greatly the traditional gender order had been upset by war and defeat. Husbands also reported how much their own sense of self-worth had been damaged. Even forty years later, men recalled how hard it was for them to adapt to their wives' new independence. One man complained that "all this she had achieved without me. When I returned I did not even know whether she still needed me." Another man reported: "Well, she emancipated herself, as we say today. She became more of a personality." The consensus among many men returning from POW camps was that "women emancipated themselves, even though they did not even know the word." As a consequence, it was very hard for many men "to fit in again." 

Outside observers, both male and female, agreed that not only the male ego but also man's traditional status had suffered a severe blow because of defeat; the many anxious observations in the national press reflect this clearly. A psychiatrist, writing in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, acknowledged that "many men, even the young, are prone to increased whining.... Women, it has been established, are much more resistant to the psychological challenges." Walther von Hollander, writing in Constanze, complained about the way in which the male pashas tried to undo some of their damaged egos. "Matters become unbearable when the helpless men revive their tried ways of the tyrannical pater familias. An emasculated tyrant ... that is a terrible sight." Luise Rinser, writing to Herman Hesse in 1946, seemed to agree with these assessments: "It is hard to live here. ... Many women see reality more clearly than men. The men are pouting, because they are no longer allowed to play soldier."

Social workers observed not only the transformation of women's attitudes toward their husbands but also their tremendous strength in this time

---

11 Anon., Eine Frau in Berlin, 53.
12 Meyer and Schulze, Von Liebe, 131, 136, 316.
13 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 Sept 1947.
14 Schubert, Frauenarbeit, 57.
of upheaval. Hilde Thurnwald, in her studies of Berlin families, was appalled at the degree to which the women had become the center of the families. "With few exceptions," she writes, the women are "master of the home" (Herr im Haus). She also concluded that "very often the newly returned POWs resent the 'excessive emancipation' of their wives." Thurnwald was also concerned with the "overly expressed independence of younger women" and argued that their "hardened [gefühlserhärtet] and accentuated rationality exposes the extreme weakness of men." What made matters even worse for the men was the fact that men had sunk so low after "the considerable inflation of their status during the Hitler regime." 

The immediate impact of this shift in power relations between the sexes was of course an unprecedented rise in divorce. A legal consultation office reported that women sued for divorce because "[husbands] won't change their attitudes, and [women] are not willing to give up their hard-fought independence and position." The media's coverage of the high divorce rates that disturbed and upset the already shaky foundations of German society agreed that "the woman, economically and emotionally independent now, cannot return to what she and her husband used to perceive as the essence of a happy marriage." Another writer, reporting on the divorce epidemic, expressed concern that women now claimed "that they do not need a hus-

16 In particular, see Thurnwald, Gegenwartsprobleme, 186–202, for comments on the breakdown of the patriarchal order. Thurnwald bemoaned that, "with few exceptions the mothers are the boss in the home"; "husbands flee to mother and father"; "the role of the father is a joke"; "the husband thinks only of himself and steals the food of his children" or "retreats to bed." Very telling of what happened to the patriarchal family was a photo in the Neue Zeitung of 7 April 1947 showing a first grader looking at his report card. The caption read: "What is mother going to say?"

17 Thurnwald, Gegenwartsprobleme, 195–201.
18 Ibid., 203.
19 The divorce rate in 1939 was 8.9 per ten thousand inhabitants. By 1946 it had risen to 11.2. In 1947 the rate had grown to 16.8 and reached 18.8 by 1948. The number stabilized at 16.9 in 1949 and then dropped to 15.7 in 1950. Angela Seeler, "Ehe, Familie, and andere Lebensformen in der Nachkriegszeit im Spiegel der Frauenzeitschriften," in Frauen in der Geschichte, ed. Anna-Elisabeth Freier and Anette Kuhn, vol. 5 (Düsseldorf, 1984), 101.
band, that they can manage life on their own." In public debates on the explosion of divorce rates, the conviction persisted that at the root of the problem was "the continuing emancipation of women. During the many years of the husbands' absence, wives became accustomed to being in charge of their own time and money," and women's growing "individualization ... [was] shaking the patriarchal order."

The extensive and very public discussions on the "woman question" reveal just how profoundly the upheaval of war and the harsh postwar years had upset the traditional gender order. These debates also demonstrate that many Germans in 1945 were convinced that it was impossible to go back to business as usual. The debate in the national press was marked by a self-conscious attempt and a clear commitment to define a new, democratic Germany, and the role women that were to play in this society was given ample attention. The many essays in the press on the future of Germany reveal that women stated their aspirations for a new distribution of power within society, and after the experience of the Nazi years, many voices supported their claims. Public debates, to which both women and men contributed, centered around women's role in politics and the economy, and it is in these debates that politically active women most clearly stated their aspirations for full integration into the new Germany.

---

21 Stuttgarter Zeitung, 4 April 1946. An essay in the 16 June 1946 issue of Die Welt suggested that women had become hard and careless and did not conform anymore to men's expectations.

22 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 Jan. 1949 (original emphasis).

23 Die Welt, 24 March 1949.

24 Christoph Kleßmann, "Untergänge-Übergänge. Gesellschaftsgeschichtliche Brüche und Kontinuitätslinien vor und nach 1945," in Nicht nur Hitlers Krieg. Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Deutschen, ed. Christoph Kleßmann (Düsseldorf, 1989), 96. Kleßmann, in his survey of literary journals, concluded that there was a "serious, wide, and varied debate about National Socialism and about the conceptions for a new beginning" in the first years after the war.

25 Much of the bourgeois women's discourse remained focused on the traditional notions of motherliness (Mütterlichkeit), emphasizing women's special qualities and contributions but also demanding their "sphere" in the state. Anna-Elisabeth Freier, Frauenpolitik 1945–1949. Quellen und Materialien (Düsseldorf, 1986), vol. 2 of Kuhn, ed., Frauen in der deutschen Nachkriegszeit. See also Seeler, "Ehe, Familie," for an examination of publications specifically aimed at women.
Organized women's demands made very clear that their traditional notions of motherliness went beyond the private sphere, and newspaper editorials of the time expressed support for overcoming the deterioration of women's status during the Nazi years. Women leaders called upon other women to abandon their distaste for politics, because the "concern for a living space, the soup kettle, and the future of the child are 'political' concerns!" The Süddeutsche Frauenarbeitskreis demanded that the "existing male dominance" be replaced by a "democratic and comradely cooperation between men and women." The group further called for an equal right to work, equal wages, and equal access to education. The speaker insisted that women needed to be integrated into the trades: "There are no more 'dainty' or coarse occupations, it is now a matter of giving your best, no matter in what job." She concluded that women did not want a matriarchal society (Frauenstaat) but a state in which men and women cooperated to meet the challenges at hand.

"The Woman in Democracy," an essay published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, asserted that a democracy cannot exist with 50 percent of its

26 Nazi policies with regard to women were not consistent. Initially women were pushed out of the labor market and a numerus clausus was established at the universities. As more and more men were needed in the war economy and, later on during the war, women were again integrated into the work force and higher education. Employment of women on the whole rose during the Nazi regime, but those jobs were in the agricultural sector and in the low-paying ranks of the white-collar job market. Opportunities for self-employed and academic women dropped significantly. Women's foremost duty was to bear children for their Volk, and the Nazis introduced the death penalty for "Aryan" mothers who chose abortion. In Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler made clear his vision of women's emancipation: "The German girl belongs to the state and with her marriage becomes a citizen." Quoted in Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossmann, and Marion Kaplan, eds., When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany (New York, 1984), 210.


29 For similar arguments of other groups, see Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2 Feb. 1946 and 3 Aug. 1946; Neue Zeitung, 21 March 1947.

30 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 May 1946.
members excluded. Male readers were assured that they do not have to worry about feminists of the old school (Frauenrechtlerinnen) or "wild Nazi women, who at best placed a note on the table: Dinner is in the oven!" without bothering whether husband and children were taken care of after work and school." The author concluded that the woman, whether in an occupation or as wife and mother, had important duties in a democracy, and she had a right to be part of the political life of the nation: "After all we have been through, we do not simply want to be sent home after we have done our duty."  

Women's demand for greater inclusion in all walks of public and economic life found much support in the press. Newspaper editorials even admonished politicians for not being more accommodating toward women. The Süddeutsche Zeitung, for example, expressed concern in 1946 that, although 60 percent of all voters were women, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had nominated only one woman among its ten candidates for the coming state elections. The writer chastised the SPD for this obvious faux pas, since the party had been in the forefront for women's rights in the past. These sorts of admonishments could be found in a wide variety of papers.  

Despite this profound crisis over gender roles and the clearly stated support for change expressed in the public debate, the discussion concerning women's "proper role" shifted dramatically by the late 1940s. The shift from Trümmerfrau to hausfrau was possible because the many voices calling for a more egalitarian relationship between the sexes were balanced by conservative voices searching for order. Part and parcel of this project of order was a restoration of the "natural" distinctions between men and women that had broken down during the war and the postwar years. These contributions to the public debate celebrated women by ascribing to them a set of momentous special responsibilities that resulted in distancing women from

---

31 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 Dec. 1945. The reference to the "wild Nazi women" is perhaps suggestive of the "emancipatory" elements that National Socialism held for organized women.  
33 See especially Stuttgarter Zeitung, Die Welt, and Heute.
direct action in the world. Women's participation in the traditionally male sphere, moreover, was seen as a serious threat to the future stability of Germany because it was perceived to undermine the strength of German men.

In an address to the women's congress of the British zone in Germany at Bad Pyrmont, Adolf Grimme, the minister of culture, gave a reply to the question: "What do we men expect from women?" He stated that men expected women to be more like women, "elemental [ursprünglich], closer to the vitamins of life, grace, and beauty."34 In a newspaper article entitled "The Woman in the New Germany," Herrmann Kapphan asserted that women's opportunity to raise a new generation of young men and to influence them through "feminine and human gestures, tenderness, originality, and fantasy" was much more important than the right to vote. He added, "[woman's] emancipation harbors many complications and dangers, for both sexes. ... The transformation of woman shifts the Lebensmitte, yes, threatens it ... and thereby leads emotionally and naturally to the further up-rooting [Entwurzelung] of man."35

The emerging Cold War only further shifted the balance toward the "order" arguments that called for a reconstruction of "natural" or "God-given" gender boundaries. The construction of the ideal of the free Western family as opposed to the collective family of the East became a critical building block in the defense of the western hemisphere. The woman of the West was elevated as wife and mother in the home and sexy consumer citizen in society, the symbol of democracy and capitalism. In this reconstruction of women's "proper" roles, a whole sector of the female population simply vanished in the public debate, namely, all those women who, in light

---

34 Der Spiegel, 28 June 1947.
35 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 Dec. 1945. These last essays summarize succinctly the prevailing attitude that public man and the cohesion of the social order depended on an immanent, invisible, and "natural" woman. The clear distinction between public and private, male and female traits, culture and nature, assures not only male integrity but social stability as well. In the discourse of this model of identification through opposition, woman is taken out of culture and naturalized to make her role appear as eternal as nature itself. Simone de Beauvoir pointed out in The Second Sex how ideologically charged and authoritarian this process of "naturalization" is. Enunciating the language of unchangeable nature instead of dynamic conflict, the discourse of the bipolar model perpetuates the inequality of women while claiming to be free from ideology.
of the shortage of men after the war, could never hope for such a family. The reconstruction of the "natural order" also ignored the women of the working class, who often had to work because wages in the recovery period were not sufficient to sustain a family and refurbish often bombed-out households.

At the same time, the East German woman's participation in all walks of life was depicted as degrading to women and destructive to the family. The woman of the Soviet zone of occupation and her visibility in all walks of life became the very symbol of anomaly from which the Western woman had to be protected, and against which the Western woman would protect not only her family, but also democracy and the market economy.

Just how profoundly the debate on women shifted during the postwar era is best expressed in *Heute*, a publication modeled after the American *Life Magazine*. In one article in the 15 April 1946 issue, women in the Soviet Union were glowingly described as lawyers, judges, doctors, engineers, and pilots, and even as coal miners and construction workers. The author suggested that women working in these occupations may at first be a shocking sight, but concluded by asking. "Why shouldn't they [be in these professions]?"

In a lengthy essay on women's emancipation in 1950, however, the same publication reminded women of the excesses that complete equality could bring. The author pointed to the experience under the Nazi regime, when the demands of total war erased all distinctions between men and the "weaker sex." The essay then juxtaposed a grim, young, and soiled female mechanic to a young mother, who, happily surrounded by her children, is being photographed by her husband. The caption underneath the first photograph asked whether this young girl was the female ideal of the future, and warned about the health risks involved for women if they entered into an "exaggerated professional competition." The commentary under the latter photograph concluded that, "when individuals get along this well, the woman often forgets the call for emancipation."³⁶

The shift in the public debate suggests that, in the ideological posturing of the early Cold War period, women's roles in the family and society were assigned utmost importance. This shift found its most precise expression in the newly drafted German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*), where the voices of

---

order clearly predominated over the voices that advocated change. Women were, after much protest and wrangling, granted full equal rights. But the constitutional protection of the family assured that this equality would find its limits in the paternal authority of the husband. Without a concurrent reform of the German Civil Code, the promise of Article 3 of the Grundgesetz that "men and women are equal" was an empty one. It took law makers until 1977 to finally fulfill the constitutionally assured reform of the German Civil Code called for in 1949. Until that reform, West Germany's highest law makers insisted that it "was to be women's most noble calling to be the heart of her family."  

In popular memory, the 1950s are mostly remembered for women's so-called flight into domesticity, and many women were all too glad to be "only" wives and mothers. For many of them, "emancipation" in the immediate postwar years had meant extreme hardship and suffering. Work outside the home had often meant the right to a ration card for food (Himmelfahrtskarte) and wages that were below subsistence level in the inflationary black-market economy that prevailed until the 1948 currency reform. Thus, when their husbands returned from POW camps, many women were willing to give up their double burden.

Contrary to the popular image of the 1950s, women were an important and indispensable part of the labor force and Germany's economic miracle, but their contributions went unnoticed and without due rewards. Even worse, those women who worked outside the home were berated for leaving latchkey children behind and for pursuing selfish, materialist ambitions. The ideal of the traditional family was celebrated in the national debate, even though an additional two million women joined the work force, and the employment of women with children under the age of fourteen increased to an astonishing 46 percent.  

The resurrection of the patriarchal, nuclear family in the public discourse ignored the fact that almost a third of all households in the Federal Republic were still headed by a woman in

---

37 "Es gehört zu den Funktionen des Mannes, daß er grundsätzlich der Erhalter und Ernährer der Familie ist, während es die Frau als ihre vornehmste Aufgabe ansehen muß, das Herz der Familie zu sein." §1356 BGB cited in Gisela Hellwig, Zwischen Familie und Beruf (Cologne, 1974), 26.

38 Karin Jurczyk, Frauenarbeit und Frauenrolle (Munich, 1976), 89.
in 1950, that 36 percent of the labor force was female, that 36.4 percent of all working women were married, and that 12 percent of these married women had children under the age of twelve.

Women's contributions to German reconstruction went largely without reward because the debate on women's work in the postwar period was hardly conducive to serving as an emancipatory force for women. Women's heroic labor in non-traditional jobs after the war was celebrated; at times it was even portrayed as the dawning of a new age of equality. Despite these good intentions, much of the discourse depicted woman's work as a selfless sacrifice or an extension of her "natural" housewifely or motherly duties. In this association, women's participation in the public sphere was considered as "non-work," since it arose out of women's special qualities and obligations in the private sphere. Women did not work but helped out in times of need. The necessity for women's labor because of the loss of men in the war was justified by labeling women's employment in low-skilled factory jobs as a "natural extension of female crafts." Even the contributions of professional women and women in political leadership were celebrated in the language of women's "special nature" by describing their acts as women's sacrifice. Professional women in Munich were acknowledged under

---

40 See Polm, "... neben dem Mann," 132.
41 See Karin Hausen's "Die Polarisierung der 'Geschlechtercharaktere'. Eine Spiegelung der Dissoziation von Erwerbs- und Familienleben," in Familie in der Neuzeit Europas, ed. Werner Conze (Stuttgart, 1976), 363–93, for her argument on how the late eighteenth-century separation of productive work from the home led to the creation of the ideology of the separate spheres. With the creation of that ideology, women's work in the home became "non-work" because it became associated with women's "nature."
42 Neue Zeitung, 26 Feb. 1949.
43 The three-phase model of labor for women emerged as the standard in the 1950s social policies. In this model women worked in wage labor before their child-rearing years and after the children left the home. Needless to say, in this model, every woman was considered a potential mother, and few employers bothered to train them or to advance their careers. See also Robert Moeller, Protecting Motherhood Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany
the headline "Women Are Helping Out," and the city's first councilwoman was described as the "hausfrau in City Hall." Even the Lord Mayor of Berlin, Luise Schröder, was celebrated because in her were united the most "beautiful of female qualities, kindness, intelligence, and motherliness ... and best of all self-sacrifice." By framing women's achievements in this language, it becomes clear how West Germany during the 1950s could celebrate the ideal of the nuclear family and still have both mothers and workers to serve the short-term needs of its expanding market. Increasingly, German women worked outside the home, but the dominant debates about women in Bonn and in the pages of the national press rendered their contributions almost invisible.

---

(Berkeley, 1993) for the discussion of the social legislation that assured this model.

44 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 Jan. 1946; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 Feb. 1946.
45 Süddeutsche Zeitung, 4 Dec. 1948.
The New City: German Urban Planning and the Zero Hour

Jeffry M. Diefendorf

When we think of the zero hour—Germany at the end of the war—pictures of desolated urban landscapes spring readily to mind. The war against the cities was a major component of the assault on Germany from 1942 right to the end in 1945. This was a war not simply against Germans or war industry but against the physical structure of the cities—housing, roads, railroads, industry, and cultural monuments—whatever could be hit once the central core of a city had been targeted. A few smaller cities, like Jülich and Düren, were truly reduced to null.¹ In the big cities, like Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Hannover, Essen, and Bremen, there were vast areas containing only mounds of ruins. The leveled cities, first reduced to rubble and then rising out of the ashes anew, seem the perfect metaphor for the new Germany of the postwar era, a Germany built on ground zero. And yet, upon closer inspection, this image is deceptive.

Indeed, the title of my paper is deliberately misleading. The "new city" in the context of a conference on the zero hour suggests that new cities arose after 1945, but the term is of prewar origins. From 1926 to 1932, the journal Der neue Frankfurt was published by Ernst May's city planning office to celebrate the modern housing being built on the edges of that city. In 1932 until it ceased publication in 1934, the journal was named Die Neue Stadt, or The New City. That name was taken over by Gottfried Feder in the title of his influential book, Die Neue Stadt. Versuch der Begründung einer neuen Stadtplanungskunst aus der sozialen Struktur der Bevölkerung, published in Berlin in 1939. The journal Die Neue Stadt was revived after the war. As this

publication's history suggests, one can easily find continuities in the realm of city planning, and I would argue that the planning for new, rebuilt cities after 1945 was in fact based upon planning models developed before and during the Nazi era.

I have spent the past fifteen years working on the rebuilding of Germany's cities in the aftermath of World War II, and this effort has taught me that however total the destruction appeared, however much there seemed to be a tabula rasa upon which to rebuild, the intellectual and emotional investments in the former structures remained. There was also a massive infrastructure that remained below the surface, there was private ownership of property, and walls of damaged buildings were still standing. An uninterrupted process of urban planning definitely played a crucial, often preponderant role in what followed. Consequently, in discussing the zero hour, I always insist on shifting our attention away from the powerful images of the leveled surface to what lay below that surface, from the apparently clean slate to the weight of the past, or from dramatic change to continuity. Particularly in the realm of urban planning, postwar reconstruction depended upon important continuities with the recent and the more distant past. As town planners faced the task of rebuilding, they looked both forward and backward, constructing mental and physical bridges over the fabled Stunde Null.2

2 Major works that deal with continuities in German planning, including reconstruction planning, include: Werner Durth and Niels Gutschow, Träume in Trümmern. Planungen zum Wiederaufbau zerstörter Städte im Westen Deutschlands 1940–1950, 2 vols. (Brunswick and Wiesbaden, 1988); Werner Durth, Deutsche Architekten. Biographische Verflechtungen 1900–1970 (Brunswick, 1986); Klaus von Beyme et al., Neue Städte aus Ruinen. Deutscher Städtebau der Nachkriegszeit (Munich, 1992); and my own In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II (New York and Oxford, 1993).

It is worth noting that a large group of German historians, archivists, and museum directors is expending a great deal of energy turning over all the available documentation about the war's end. The last 1994 issue of the Informationen zur modernen Stadtgeschichte, entitled Deutschlands Städte 1945, reported that fifty-six exhibitions on the war's end were planned in various German cities, and this list is by no means complete. A flood of new books is appearing, for example, Karl Joachim Krause, Braunschweig zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Die Ereignisse vor und nach der Kapitulation der Stadt am 12. April 1945 (Brunswick, 1994), and Menno Aden, Hildesheim lebt. Zerstörung und Wiederaufbau; eine Chronik (Hildesheim, 1994).
Before I discuss urban planning, however, let me stress that by no means do I want to deny that some Germans experienced the end of the war as a zero hour. Quite naturally the residents of Germany's bombed cities viewed the destruction of familiar public buildings—churches, town halls, schools, theaters—and the damage to their own homes and businesses as nothing less than an unmitigated and unprecedented catastrophe, and many urban dwellers had to rebuild their mental and material lives from scratch. Much of what appeared after 1945 was new—in the structures of the cities as well as in the social, political, economic, and mental lives of their inhabitants.

Nevertheless, for most of those involved in planning reconstruction, and here I would include not only planning professionals but also private citizens who made proposals for rebuilding, the destruction wrought by the war and the war's end changed only some of the conditions under which they had been seeking to undo the ills of the prewar cities but not their fundamental planning models or practices. Of course the war's end saw terrible working conditions for planners. In many cities they lacked adequate office space and supplies. Earlier maps of streets and property lines may have been burned in the raids. Key personnel, such as draftsmen, were dead or were POWs. Some planners, like Konstanty Gutschow in Hamburg and Hermann Giesler in Munich, lost their jobs to denazification, but others moved to different cities where the taint of having worked for the Nazi regime was not so strong. Thus Rudolf Hillebrecht moved from Hamburg to Hannover, and Friedrich Tamms moved from Berlin to Düsseldorf. Having worked on German planning in occupied Alsace, Rudolf Schwarz moved to Cologne. Werner Hebebrand is another example. In the 1920s, he worked for Ernst May on plans for modern housing in Frankfurt, and he followed May to the Soviet Union in the early 1930s. The Nazi years saw Hebebrand working on plans for the new Hermann-Göring-Stadt (now Salzgitter) under Herbert Rimpl. Once the war ended, he moved on to work as a planner first in Frankfurt and then in Hamburg. For most planners, Reinhold Billstein and Eberhard Illner discuss planning during the first months of occupation in You Are Now in Cologne. Compliments. Köln 1945 in den Augen der Sieger (Cologne, 1995).  

³ For a brief survey of planning in Frankfurt, see Klaus von Beyme, "Frankfurt am Main. Stadt mit Höhendrang," in von Beyme et al., Neue Städte aus Ruinen. Few Nazi-era planners were imprisoned; Albert Speer was the most famous, though he was not imprisoned for his work as a town planner. Gutschow, the
these dislocations and inconveniences did not mark a zero hour. If there was a zero hour for planners, it was earlier, before the war, or perhaps during it, when the destruction of the cities began. This statement requires a bit of explanation.

At least since the end of the nineteenth century, German planners had been part of international discussions about how to build better cities. Some of the main themes are surely familiar. Since no large-scale transformations of existing cities seemed possible, planners advocated such things as: new housing settlements located in greenery (an offshoot of the garden city movement); enlargement of cities through programs of incorporation of neighboring towns; zoning for housing, industry, and other urban functions; expansion of dense housing blocks and the introduction of urban parks; and improved networks of streets for motorized traffic. Modernists like Walter Gropius believed that architecture and modern urban design more than anything else represented the ideal meeting place for modern technology, design, and craftsmanship. The Great Depression and the collapse of the Weimar Republic, however, made it appear as if any opportunity to build new cities was lost.

For planners, then, what was dramatically new after 1933 was that the advent of the Nazi regime seemed to offer the possibility of actually realizing their dreams of modernizing the cities, and it seemed that the new regime was prepared to offer them a privileged place. From 1933 to 1939 there was growing momentum for a massive, radical transformation of Germany's cities. To be sure, all planners working after 1933 had to include massive party buildings and parade axes in their designs, but these features of quintessential Nazi planning coexisted with other plans for modernizing Germany's cities. For example, often monumental streets were to replace areas with aged, crowded, or substandard housing that planners had long wished to renovate anyway, even before Nazi ideology targeted these areas as dangerous haunts of asocial groups. There is no question that much of the great enthusiasm that planners demonstrated for monumental buildings and streets derived from the belief that all things were now possible for

---

man responsible for most of the planning in Hamburg under the Nazis, was never again able to plan in that city, though he assisted Rudolf in Hannover. Munich's Giesler did not work as a planner again, but Julius Schulte-Frohlinde found employment in Düsseldorf.
planners and architects, that they could work "as if there were no limits" on what they could accomplish. Isn't this at least one meaning of a zero hour? Most important here was the Law for the Redesign (Neugestaltung) of the German Cities, decreed on 4 October 1937. In numerous designated cities, the führer principle was applied to town planning, and specially appointed building commissars received almost unlimited power to plan and execute plans under the authority of the local Gauleiter or of Hitler himself. If the main goal was to transform old cities into cities representative of the Nazi regime, these were also to be modernized cities.

The dreams of completely redesigning big cities with the political and financial backing of the Reich were jolted but not entirely interrupted by the onslaught from the air. In the fall of 1943, after some cities had already been reduced to ruins, a Working Staff for Reconstruction Planning of Destroyed Cities (Arbeitsstab Wiederaufbauplanung zerstörter Städte) was established under Albert Speer's auspices. In a crucial speech in November 1943 to launch this reconstruction planning effort, Speer said:

In planning, particular attention must be given to the fact that here is a unique opportunity to make the cities again livable in terms of traffic, since there can be no doubt that, with further development of traffic, our cities, like London and New York, will be ruined economically by the urban contradiction between the growth in traffic on the one hand and, on the other, the unfavorable width of the streets and the relationship between streets. ... It is not necessary here to determine architectonic details. This can be the subject of a second phase of reconstruction planning.

Speer was calling for pragmatic planning, not the megalomania of the representative cities program. And he spoke of two phases of planning. Led by such planners as Gutschow in Hamburg and Rudolf Wolters in Berlin, Speer's working staff labored diligently on the first phase of reconstruction plans for several dozen cities, combining ideas for urban modernization with specifically Nazi features. When the war ended, nearly all of those associated with this wartime effort at reconstruction planning moved to

---


5 Speer's speech, with minor changes, was distributed to the Gauleiter in December 1943. It is reproduced in Durth and Gutschow, Träume in Trümmern, vol. 1, 51–52. Translations by the author.
different cities in the Western occupation zones, where they would continue working on reconstruction planning. In effect this meant not the realization of wartime plans for specific cities but rather the application of the planning theories and practices developed in the previous decade.\(^6\) These wartime planners directed or influenced reconstruction in Hannover, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Brunswick, Hamburg, Coesfeld, and other cities. This is a story of continuity, not of a zero hour.\(^7\)

Even where planning continuity was not provided by the men from the Working Staff for Reconstruction Planning, it was provided by others. In a few places, the wartime city planners continued to work into the postwar era. This was the case with Hans Pieper in Lübeck, Herbert Jensen in Kiel, and Joseph Schlippe in Freiburg. Or consider the case of Dortmund: When the Allies seized the city on 14 April 1945, they found 70 percent of the housing destroyed, all of the armaments industry, 80 percent of the utilities, and 85 to 90 percent of other commercial and industrial buildings.\(^8\) Yet the enormous magnitude of destruction had not much changed the nature of planning.

During the 1920s and early 1930s, several plans were developed to modernize the city.\(^9\) These plans included such elements as the renewal of rundown areas near the main train station; new garden settlements to house workers in the mining industry; traffic improvements integrated with those

\(^6\) Written during the war and influential after its publication was Hans Bernhard Reichow's *Organische Städtebaukunst. Von der Großstadt zur Stadtlandschaft* (Brunswick, Berlin, and Vienna, 1948).

\(^7\) For example, Hanns Dustmann, once a colleague of Gropius and then *Reichsarchitekt der Hitlerjugend*, was assigned by the Working Staff for Reconstruction Planning to prepare plans for Düsseldorf. When Tamms, also a member of that working staff, assumed control of planning in Düsseldorf in 1948, he obtained assistance from Dustmann and Gutschow. See Werner Durth, "Düsseldorf. Kontinuität in Kontrasten," in 1945. Krieg—Zerstörung—Aufbau. Architektur und Stadtplanung 1940–1960, ed. Marita Gleiss, Schriftenreihe der Akademie der Künste, vol. 23 (Berlin, 1995).


of other members of the pioneering regional planning agency, the Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk; and new arteries through the central part of the city. The key figure here was Friedrich Delfs, who was the chief planner from 1925 to 1937. Though not one of the cities designated for redesign under the 1937 Neugestaltung decree, Dortmund nevertheless drew up plans combining Delfs' ideas with typically Nazi features, including monumental axes and a large party forum. The city was also to be connected to the new autobahns.

Between 1938 and 1941, new plans were also produced under contract with the city by the office of Hermann Jansen of Berlin (along with his assistant Walter Moest, the author of the famous Zehlendorf plan for Berlin of 1945, and with the cooperation of the Dortmund planning office, now under Heinz Uecker). Jansen was recommended by Speer, who had been Jansen's student. Jansen's plans included traffic improvements, a pedestrian street on the Hellweg, new settlement "cells" (using the terminology pioneered by Gutschow and Wilhelm Wortmann, the Ortsgruppe als Siedlungszelle), and the introduction of new green areas. In all, this was modernizing planning heading toward the "organically articulated and dispersed industrial city" (gegliederte und aufgelockerte Industrie-landschaft), as it was called both during and after the war. 10 Large axes were still present, though not particularly made a focus of the text or drawings, and these in part were to serve as vehicles for the renewal of crowded, substandard housing blocks.

When the war ended, Delfs resumed his former position as head of the building department. Uecker continued to head the planning department until November 1945, when he was detained under denazification. He was reinstated in 1949. Under Delfs, the planning office quickly drew up reconstruction plans that incorporated most of the central features of Delfs' prewar plans and the Jansen plan, minus the monumental axes and forum. Except for the major churches, there was no intention of rebuilding Dortmund as it had been before the war. Clearly, however, this situation represented not a new beginning, not a zero hour, but rather planning for modernizing the city that had begun two decades earlier and had never stopped.

10 This planning leitmotif was best represented in a book by Johannes Göderitz, Roland Rainer, and Hubert Hoffmann, Die gegliederte und aufgelockerte Stadt (Tübingen, 1957), which, like Reichow's book, was also drafted during the war.
Or let us consider the case of Cologne, seized by American troops on 6 March 1945, though the city remained the object of German artillery fire for another four weeks.\textsuperscript{11} Cologne had been devastated during the war. It had been the target of the first thousand-bomber air raid on 31 May 1942, and the last great air raid was on 2 March, destroying most of the still-standing buildings in the inner city except the cathedral, which was severely damaged.\textsuperscript{12} The city's medieval meeting hall, town hall, and all of the Romanesque churches that had, along with the cathedral, defined the city's silhouette were shattered wrecks. Seventy percent of the city's 250,000 pre-war dwelling units had been destroyed or badly damaged. Twenty-four million cubic meters of rubble filled the city when the Americans arrived; only forty thousand people still lived among the ruins.

Did March sixth represent hour zero for Cologne? Certainly many were deeply traumatized by the experience of the bombing. One woman compared Cologne in July 1943 with the destruction of Pompeii. She believed that the city was irrevocably destroyed and that forty thousand had died in the most recent air raids, though in actuality the number of fatalities was more like fifty-five hundred.\textsuperscript{13} In terms of reconstruction planning, however, the concept of a new beginning or a zero hour is challenged by the

\textsuperscript{11} In addition to Billstein and Illner, \textit{You Are Now in Cologne}, see also Robert Frohn, \textit{Köln 1945–1981. Vom Trümmerhaufen zur Millionenstadt. Erlebte Geschichte} (Cologne, 1982). The following discussion on Cologne can also be found in my study, "Deconstruction and Reconstruction: The Stunde Null in the Rhineland," Univ. of Calif., Center for German and European Studies, Working Paper 5.27 (Berkeley, 1995).

\textsuperscript{12} There were surprisingly few deaths during the last raids, both because of the evacuation of much of the population and because the remaining citizens had learned how to survive. See Gebhard Aders, "Die letzten Luftangriffe auf Köln," in \textit{Köln nach dem Krieg. Facetten der Stadtgeschichte}, ed. Georg Mölich and Stefan Wunsch (Cologne, 1995).

\textsuperscript{13} Horst Matzerath, ed., "... vergessen kann man die Zeit nicht, das ist nicht möglich ... ". \textit{Kölner erinnern sich an die Jahre 1929–1945} (Cologne, 1985), 247, 251. Heinrich Böll's posthumously published novel, \textit{Der Engel schwieg} (Cologne, 1992), is set in an unnamed city that is recognizable as Cologne at the moment the war ended, and it is most effective in evoking the somber mood of that time. The novel's characters are burdened both by their personal histories and the grim conditions of the moment. The novel does not resolve the question of whether the people of Cologne saw this moment as a zero hour.
complicated debates that took place about what should or should not be done and how and why. Some new ideas confronted older proposals, but even the new ideas evoked self-conscious references to the past. Some stressed the need to restore continuity with the pre-Nazi and prewar past, while others stressed the desirability of a new beginning, but virtually all proposals combined elements of both, belying the notion that even physical reconstruction started with a zero hour.

Cologne had been one of the cities designated by the Nazis for a radical transformation, and official planning for the redesign of the city took place from 1935 through early 1945. This Nazi-sponsored planning effort eventually called for replacing much of the inner city with huge new blocks of buildings, the relocation of the train station and rail lines, the construction of major east-west and north-south traffic arteries through the central city, and the building of a huge Haus der Arbeit and auxiliary buildings in Deutz (on the right bank) for the German Labor Front. These radical plans, had they been implemented, would have totally transformed the character of the city and would truly have marked a zero hour for Cologne. In fact, only the east-west artery was partly completed before the war stopped further construction. However, some, though not all, of the proposed changes in the historic street and transportation system were incorporated into the thinking of some of the individuals who developed reconstruction proposals of their own at the very end of the war.

To mention but three, the architect Karl Band, the journalist Hans Schmitt, and the landscape architect Theodor Nußbaum believed that one could consider devastated Cologne as a tabula rasa upon which to build a new city free of the overcrowded conditions produced by industrial capitalism. However, all agreed on rebuilding the major cultural monuments

---

and retaining most of the old street pattern, and they wanted in other respects to build a new Cologne by looking backward to the character of an idealized medieval Cologne. They proposed that people should walk in the central city, rather than use cars, trams, and trains. Small residential buildings rather than huge commercial edifices would line the streets and large businesses and government buildings should be moved to the edge of the central core. The new houses would either take traditional Cologne forms or be modern, with flat roof-gardens, and new parks would provide extensive green areas. The zero hour in reconstruction, in other words, was to be a new beginning through the restoration of an older urban tradition.

There were other planners and politicians who sought to re-establish connections with earlier ideas about urban life rather than assume that they could simply start afresh in 1945. We can see this clearly by examining certain policies advocated by Konrad Adenauer and a few other members of the Cologne government. Cologne's most famous political figure, Konrad Adenauer, had served as lord mayor from 1917 to 1933, again for a few months in 1945, and subsequently before becoming the founding father of the Federal Republic. As an urban politician, Adenauer displayed a truly remarkable consistency that belied the tumultuous political changes affecting Germany.

It is significant that, on 3 December 1918, with Germany still in the grip of revolution, Adenauer petitioned the Prussian government for permission to acquire the former military zone around the city of Cologne in order to build a green belt. The mayor saw the moment of national distress as a great opportunity to decide "whether Cologne would remain a desolate desert of stone or become a city that could offer its inhabitants an existence worthy of humans." He was presenting an exaggerated image of a city that he in

---


fact loved, but Adenauer wanted to launch a program of city expansion not only for the green belt but also for new housing and industry. In addition to the military zone, other land must be acquired, he felt, through the incorporation of neighboring villages. Once expansion was well under way—even if not to the full extent that Adenauer had wanted—he stated that "he held a rational policy of incorporation [Eingemeindungspolitik] to be the most important thing for the development of big cities .... more important than any urban planning law," because through such actions a city could expand and offer its residents the opportunity to "maintain their spiritual and bodily health through an absolutely necessary connection with nature and the land."17 It is also noteworthy that he launched his expansion program right after a military defeat and continued to pursue it during a subsequent period of political and economic chaos as well as under the eye of a British military force occupying the Rhineland under the Versailles Treaty.

This program of urban expansion was the cornerstone of Adenauer's successful tenure as mayor in the post World War I era, and he is still remembered in Cologne for the city's green belt. It is significant that Adenauer pursued exactly the same policies in the spring of 1945, even before the war had ended. Adenauer headed the Americans' "white list" of potential appointees for Cologne, and he was immediately sought out at his home in Rhöndorf by members of the military detachment charged with setting up a new local government. As it happened, two of the key figures in that detachment—its head, Lieutenant Colonel John K. Patterson, and Captain Albert C. Schweizer—were inclined to listen sympathetically to Adenauer's ideas because of their own professional training. Patterson was a civil engineer and road builder; Schweizer was a partner in a New York architectural and planning firm and professor at the New York University School of Architecture.18 Adenauer appealed to them as town planning professionals; they in turn were impressed by his vision of urban life, one that looked beyond the city of rubble that was Cologne in 1945.

18 Billstein and Illner, You Are Now in Cologne, 80, 85.
Clearly Adenauer viewed the end of the fighting in Cologne, the arrival of the American army, and the likely end of the war as an opportunity like that of 1918. Adenauer argued that the most rational form of reconstruction would be from the outside in. That is, rather than investing the time and money to clear rubble and rebuild the central city, one should construct new housing, schools, and public buildings on the outskirts and in newly incorporated areas, a process that Adenauer felt would be less expensive than rebuilding the core area first. This plan would also make it possible to integrate areas of nature with newly built-up areas, providing a more healthy city. Only by incorporating all of the Landkreis of Cologne and the Rheinisch-Bergische Kreis would the city gain the necessary free space to carry out Adenauer’s conception of reconstruction. Finally, he noted, "the requisite legislative powers and administrative authority for this incorporation plan lay at the moment in the hands of the occupying power." In other words, he was hoping that he could persuade the Americans to endorse his plans immediately before they had to give way to the British, in whose occupation zone Cologne fell.

Adenauer was dismissed by the British from his post as lord mayor of Cologne on 6 October 1945, after six months in office, and ordered to stay out of politics. His reconstruction ideas—rebuilding the city from the outside in and the expansion of the city through the extensive incorporation of neighboring areas—were not realized. Indeed, the letter from Brigadier John Barraclough relieving him of office complained that Adenauer's administration had been lax "in repairing buildings, clearing the streets, and in the general task of preparing for the coming winter." The day before his
dismissal, Adenauer had written to Captain Schweizer, now in Bavaria, that the British were much too short-sighted to accept the plans for Cologne's expansion through incorporations.\(^{21}\)

This conclusion to Adenauer's second term as Cologne's lord mayor says something important about Adenauer's political vision: he focused on what he saw as long-term, continuous developments in the city, not the immediate problems presented by the destruction and rebuilding of the city. Much of the physical structure of Cologne had vanished in the war, and now the Third Reich had vanished, but this did not constitute so much a zero hour or new beginning as an interruption of work that had begun in the Weimar Republic.

Moreover, Adenauer was not alone in thinking this way, as we can see if we situate him in a slightly larger context. In 1939 a former Cologne city accountant by the name of Kiwit, under a contract from the city, composed a long memo arguing for a program of city expansion much like that which Adenauer had pursued after 1918 and which he was to propose in 1945. Kiwit also noted the need for new areas for recreation, housing, and industry. The city had to grow organically and be opened up or it would choke on its dense concentration of buildings and people. If the city could grow, it could rationally plan traffic improvements consisting of radial and axial streets that would tie into the new autobahn network. The proposed growth of the city would "stand in parallel to the past, ... a clear continuity."\(^{22}\) In fact, there are few references in Kiwit's memo to events or policies of the Nazi regime. He wrote about continuities in urban developments rather than changes in the recent past.

---


\(^{22}\) HASK/Acc. 2/1403: Memo with archival page numbers 16–53, quotation from the final paragraph. *Verwaltungsrechtsrat* Kiwit had served as *Stadtkämmerer* and *Beigeordneter* from 1934 to 1936, when he was dismissed under Paragraph 6 of the *Berufsbeamtengesetz*. 
The original of this memorandum was apparently destroyed in the bombing, but Kiwit retained an imperfect copy, which he offered to Lord Mayor Hermann Pünder, Adenauer's successor, on 28 May 1946. Pünder promptly accepted the document, since he was hoping to keep the possibility of expansion alive. Pünder was no more successful than Adenauer had been in expanding the city through incorporations, but the proposal lived on. In November 1949, Oberstadtdirektor (city manager) Wilhelm Suth (Adenauer's brother-in-law) sought the help of all department heads in the city government in providing new arguments to update Adenauer's original position. This effort also foundered on the opposition of the neighboring communities, but Suth's cover letter to the department heads is worth citing because it was typical of those who thought in terms of continuities rather than new beginnings.

Suth began by placing both the political legacy of the Nazi period and the destruction brought by the war in a broader time frame, and he stressed the fundamental importance of planning.

Out of the last catastrophe there is nevertheless a path to a new future that is worthy of the eminence of Cologne if those obstacles which ... have until now hampered Cologne's development can be ruthlessly swept aside. The most important obstacle has always been the shortage of space in both the narrow and large sense.

The furies of the war have now created space in the narrow sense. The actual city, that which the Kölner themselves have experienced and understood as the city, is no more. But we, the still living, must acquire space in the larger sense—something that can be accomplished through a simple administrative measure—if we are to meet our responsibility to our descendants.

Like Adenauer before him, Suth saw great continuity in the period between November 1918 and November 1949, at least in terms of urban developments. Throughout the Weimar period and immediately after the Americans seized Cologne in 1945, the city had pursued a policy of expansion through the planned incorporation of outlying communities and

---

23 Suth had served in the city administration before 1933. He was thus one of several pre-Nazi officials working for the city after the war. Moreover, Konrad Adenauer's niece Hannah became head of the city's historic preservation office, and his son Max later became city manager.

24 HASK/Acc. 2/1403:6.
sought to base social and economic policy as well as postwar reconstruction on that expansion. After both wars, Konrad Adenauer and his collaborators tried to take advantage of the political uncertainties of the times to establish conditions for what they believed would be a more modern, more livable Cologne. This attempt worked after 1918, even if it failed after 1945. Their urban politics, however, shows that continuity in thinking prevailed at the end of the war, not discontinuity as implied by a zero hour.

Whether we talk of planners in Dortmund or Cologne, or in most of the other West German cities, the zero hour was not necessarily an hour or day or month in 1945 but something rather ambiguous. Planners were conscious not simply of some sense of a new beginning. They also thought of rebuilding ties to the traditions that had shaped life prior to 1933 while, in many cases, they built upon plans drawn up either in the early years of the Third Reich or during that brief, intense effort at reconstruction planning that began in the fall of 1943. The Germans who led rebuilding after 1945 could dream of constructing new cities out of the rubble, but they were far from just starting at the war's end. Whereas planners in the 1930s approached the redesign of their cities with exhilaration and with the backing of a powerful state, in 1945 they had to rely on their confidence in recent planning models and practices. But at least in that sense, they were not starting from scratch. Unlike the poor citizens who wandered the streets in 1945 or those of us today who see the photographs of the bombed cities, the planners were not fooled by the destruction into thinking that their cities really were blank slates on which they could start anew.\(^\text{25}\)

---

\(^{25}\) There were a couple of well-known exceptions. Hans Scharoun's proposal for rebuilding Berlin was a radical departure, as was Marcel Lods's plan for Mainz.
Stunde Null at the Ground Level:
1945 as a Social and Political Ausgangspunkt
in Three Cities in the U.S. Zone of Occupation

Rebecca Boehling

The question of whether there was a point zero in Germany at the end of World War II is one that has preoccupied a number of scholars and contemporaries since 1945. There is a case for answering this question with either "yes" or "no": "Yes" because there was an end to the Nazi regime, a period in German history that stands out in its terror and racism, exercise of arbitrary power, and intolerance of dissent and political and cultural diversity. But "no" because German history did not start over from scratch in 1945. The end of the war represented the potential for all sorts of changes, some of which materialized and some of which did not. But change does not preclude some level of continuity, and continuity does not preclude change. Rather than focusing directly on the question of whether the collapse of the Third Reich and the Allied military occupation of Germany was a null point (Nullpunkt), I will examine this interregnum in German history from the perspective of 1945 as a social and political starting point (Ausgangspunkt). This approach will hopefully provide a sense of the atmosphere and context of that early postwar situation that is crucial to making judgments about any kind of Stunde Null framework.

There are a number of reasons why I have chosen to focus on a major city in each of the three states (Länder) of the U.S. zone of occupation in order to analyze this interregnum. First of all, the municipality was the first or ground level of social organization in Germany where Germans and Allies interacted in a post-hostilities context. It was the first administrative
level to be restored to any sort of normal circumstances, in which Germans
could exercise some semblance of self-government. Furthermore, the United
States was the most influential power among the Western Allies, and
developments in its zone were especially consequential. The fourth reason
for my particular approach is that an individual case study might be too
anomalous and regionally limited to allow for generalizations. Finally, a
study of smaller and less important towns would not contain the complexity
that urban life provides. It would also not offer an example of an area that
the Allies themselves particularly focused on for the implementation of their
policies of denazification, democratization, decartellization, and de-
militarization arising from the Potsdam and, to a lesser extent, Yalta
conferences.

Conditions in cities like Frankfurt am Main, Stuttgart, and Munich at the
end of the war and in the early phase of the occupation created an
atmosphere of chaos and uncertainty that persisted for weeks and sometimes
months. This endemic confusion produced a universal longing for order,
routine, and normalcy. In my earlier work on the return of self-government
to the Germans in these three cities under U.S. occupation, I have argued
that, by granting top priority to restoring and maintaining order, the
American occupiers and the Germans they appointed to positions in
municipal administration lost the window of opportunity presented by a
Stunde Null for the potential realization of certain reforms and far-reaching
structural change on the local level. Although official U.S. guidelines had
specified that, if necessary, efficiency would have to be sacrificed for the
sake of denazification, most military government (MG) officers, driven by a
sort of managerial spirit, gave efficiency priority over denazification and
sometimes even democratization. This prioritizing shaped most U.S.
Military Government officers' decisions about which Germans they placed
into positions of power. Because few such officers on the local level were
proficient in German language, history, or political or social organization,
they were quite reliant on their appointees, who could, in turn, exercise
indirect influence over them.

In this essay I will examine the point of departure that set the stage for
these early decisions. I will explore the identity and behavior of the initial
American occupiers and the Germans whom the tactical or MG detachment
commanders appointed to administer the tasks of reconstruction and to help
implement the goals of the occupation. Although some similarities
exist among the three cities, much of what happened in the early days of the occupation was determined by the individual personalities and backgrounds of the Americans in charge and by the Germans who happened to be in the right place when the American occupiers were seeking municipal administrators.\(^1\) The availability of Germans with both administrative expertise and non-Nazi credentials, as well as the ability of certain German individuals or groups to mesh well with the U.S. Military Government officers—often regardless of whether the appointees' administrative practice was authoritarian or democratic—clearly also influenced the Americans' decisions about which Germans they appointed to key municipal posts. In terms of military government preferences on the local level of administration, ultimately the more conservative, at times authoritarian, and even clerical German influences prevailed over anti-Nazi or activist democratic ones.\(^2\) Often this preference was not a conscious one, but rather had to do with a reliance upon Germans with experience and prominence, and a distaste inherent in the military for those overtly political and sociologically less familiar. These preferences had an impact not only on the early days of the occupation, but also on shaping the early years of postwar West German history.

**FRANKFURT AM MAIN**

Of the 550,000 inhabitants who had lived in Frankfurt before the war, only 269,000, or less than half, remained when the city was occupied by the

\(^1\) In the case of Stuttgart, these initial appointments were made by the French Military Government or, with its approval, by the former Nazi mayor (*Oberbürgermeister*) of Stuttgart.

\(^2\) The term "anti-Nazis" is used here to describe a heterogeneous group of individuals who had opposed the Nazis and now sought to play active political roles in postwar Germany. They either felt a sense of duty because of their failure to stop the Nazis or were determined to use the opportunity of the collapse of the Third Reich to create a more socially just and equitable, democratic, civil society with social, economic, and political changes that would prevent the rise of fascism and even authoritarianism again. Many anti-Nazis, probably even most, had only vague ideas about what those changes should be or how to achieve them, but few ever had a chance to try their hand at it. The Antifas, which will be discussed in the section on Stuttgart, constituted only one semi-organized group of anti-Nazis.
Americans. Of the 31,000 Jews living in Frankfurt before 1933, only 140, or less than half of one percent, survived the war in Frankfurt, either in hiding or as "partial" or "mixed" Jews. In the early summer, buses sent to the Dachau, Theresienstadt, and Buchenwald camps brought approximately 360 Frankfurt natives home. By September 1945 just over a thousand former concentration camp inmates had returned to Frankfurt. Some of these persecuted individuals were among the 1426 Frankfurt residents who had officially resisted the Nazi regime.

Frankfurt experienced some of the worst destruction in Europe in terms of infrastructure and economy. Twelve-and-a-half million cubic meters of rubble covered the city. More than a quarter of the residential buildings in use before the war were demolished, and only 15 percent remained wholly intact. Just short of 10 percent of the residences were requisitioned by the occupation troops. Almost three quarters of the industrial and commercial enterprises were destroyed. Neither trains nor streetcars were running; it took two months after the city was occupied before even two streetcar lines were back in service. Most electric lines and water and gas mains took months to repair. Such was the material situation in Frankfurt when the Thousand-Year Reich came to an end.

The combat troops of the United States Third Army's Fifth Division occupied Frankfurt am Main on 28 March 1945. Anticipating the arrival of the Americans, the Gauleiter had ordered the men of Frankfurt to leave the city four days earlier, although most did not, preferring to seek shelter in the cellars and air raid bunkers until the end. As in most towns, when the

---

3 Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 March 1974.
5 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 March 1955.
9 Magistratsakten (hereafter Mag) 1060/1, Stadtarchiv Frankfurt a.M. (hereafter StA FaM).
10 Mag 1060/1, StA FaM.
Americans arrived, city life was at a standstill. After twenty air raids, the business district was a wilderness of rubble. In the railroad yards, Germans and so-called displaced persons (DPs), those now liberated forced laborers and Allied prisoners of war, raided stranded Wehrmacht supply trains; seventy Soviet DPs died as a result of drinking methyl alcohol taken in one such raid. One of the few intact high-rise office buildings, the I.G. Farben building, was selected to house the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) and U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET) headquarters. Indeed this decision prevented Frankfurt from being reassigned to the French zone, because this building was considered one of the few in all of western Germany that was large enough to serve as headquarters.  

One of the few other large buildings still standing in central Frankfurt was that of the large metalworks company, the Metallgesellschaft, which the American tactical commander, Lt. Colonel William H. Blakefield, and his troops occupied. Finding the provisional director, Hermann W. Lumme, in the building, Blakefield ordered Lumme to bring him Frankfurt's mayor (Oberbürgermeister, OB), whom Blakefield intended to leave in office for the time being. But the Nazi Oberbürgermeister Dr. Krebs had already absconded, after instructing the remaining city employees that he could be reached in the suburb of Bad Homburg. Lumme reached Krebs by telephone and tried unsuccessfully to convince him to return to Frankfurt. When an annoyed Blakefield ordered Lumme to become mayor (Bürgermeister), Lumme also refused, explaining that he was a resident of Homburg and not of Frankfurt. A now impatient Blakefield ordered Lumme to find someone else to become Bürgermeister within half an hour.

---

12 Earl Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany* (Washington, 1975), 226ff. So many of the U.S. organizations and accompanying troops, such as those connected to the SHAEF and USFET headquarters, moved into Frankfurt's available buildings that the traditional health spa resort of Wiesbaden became the more attractive alternative for the capital of the Land Hesse.

13 In Frankfurt, in contrast to other cities of its size, the Americans first appointed a Bürgermeister rather than an Oberbürgermeister, although this was the same post with a less prestigious title. Shortly before he was dismissed, Hollbach received the title of Oberbürgermeister.

Indicative of the haphazardness of some of the early German personnel decisions of the Americans is what happened a few minutes later. Wilhelm Hollbach, editor of two now defunct and quite politically tainted Frankfurt newspapers, the Neueste Zeitung and the Illustriertes Blatt, which had been run by the same publishing company as the Frankfurter Zeitung, appeared at the Metallgesellschaft in order to ask the Americans if he could start a new newspaper.\(^\text{15}\) Lumme asked the journalist if he would be willing to become the Bürgermeister. When Hollbach agreed, he was introduced to Blakefield, who summarily appointed him as acting Bürgermeister of Frankfurt.\(^\text{16}\)

On the following day, 29 March 1945, the MG detachment for Frankfurt arrived. The tactical commander, Blakefield, moved on with the rest of his division and the Third Army to continue fighting.\(^\text{17}\) Like Blakefield, this first military government commander in Frankfurt, Lt. Colonel Howard D. Criswell, was a career officer, whom Frankfurt residents described as "fanatically stringent" and reservedly businesslike.\(^\text{18}\) Hollbach disliked the way that Criswell always screamed his orders at him. Eventually Hollbach yelled back at Criswell, who, although shocked, burst out laughing. Thereafter, Hollbach reported that their dealings were rational and polite.\(^\text{19}\) Typical of the communication problems between most MG officers and their German appointees, neither Criswell nor Blakefield spoke German, and Hollbach spoke no English.

Criswell required Blakefield's mayoral appointee to fill out a questionnaire about his past, which was then examined by a Counter-intelligence Corps (CIC) lieutenant. The CIC officer summarily endorsed Hollbach's appointment with the comment: "Says he can produce witnesses that he was always anti-Nazi. Has had six years of experience in municipal government." Hollbach had served under Mayor Konrad Adenauer as a German Democratic Party (DDP) city councilor in Cologne. Criswell then formed

\(^{15}\) No newspaper or any printed matter could be published without the permission of the military government. The Information Control Division actually selected licensees to found the new German newspapers.

\(^{16}\) Lumme, "Military Government," 70.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 70f.

\(^{18}\) Chronicle entry, 12 May 1945, S5/193/IIN, StA FaM; Frankfurter Rundschau, 26 March 1970.

a non-Nazi citizens' group composed of [a] local dean of Catholic priests, the leading Protestant minister and other non-Nazi leaders of the community, and requested this group to advise him with reference to appointment of officials, including Hollbach.\textsuperscript{20} The "other non-Nazi leaders of the community" included: the director of I.G. Farben; the general manager of the local Chamber of Commerce (Industrie- and Handelskammer), who had been a member of the Stahlhelm and the German National People's Party (DNVP) before 1933, and thereafter, although not a Nazi Party member, a member of various Nazi organizations and the chief of war economics (Wehrwirtschaftsführer) and armaments inspector (Rüstungsinspektor); and Director Lumme from the Metallgesellschaft.\textsuperscript{21} This supposedly representative "council" unanimously recommended Hollbach, and Criswell formally approved the mayoral appointment.\textsuperscript{22}

Except for Criswell's later addition of an antifascist committee member from the suburb of Hoechst to this council, no active anti-Nazis played a role in the municipal administration that Hollbach appointed or in the MG-appointed council. In the initial stages of occupation that subsequently took place in Stuttgart and Munich, anti-Nazi activists played comparatively much more active, if unofficial, roles. Active, anti-Nazi resistance had existed in Frankfurt,\textsuperscript{23} but unlike in Munich and Stuttgart, the collapse of the Third Reich in Frankfurt was not accompanied by a large resistance movement intended to prevent the execution of Hitler's scorched earth plan. Here the timing of the Americans' takeover of the city played a role. In March 1945, with most of Germany still under Nazi control, many imprisoned anti-Nazis and many Frankfurt natives, who had kept a low profile and moved to rural areas, where they were less known, had not yet re-

\textsuperscript{20} Office of Military Government-U.S. (hereafter OMGUS), 5/268–1/18, 1 of 1, IfZ, RG 260.
\textsuperscript{22} OMGUS, 5/268–1/18, 1 of 1, IfZ, RG 260.
turned. Numerous Frankfurt residents had left because their homes had been bombed or to avoid the dangers of the heavy bombardments. Thus the potential for a large-scale resistance as the Americans approached was more limited.

Nevertheless, the availability of anti-Nazis was only a minor factor in the U.S. Military Government's German personnel decisions. Of the appointments to some two dozen positions in municipal administration, paid and advisory, many more were politically incriminated persons than proven anti-Nazis. Industrialists and businessmen were overrepresented on the council. Journalists abounded among Hollbach's staff, and most were like Hollbach: they were tainted with having worked on the staff of more explicitly Nazi newspapers than just the one they had initially admitted to the military government as having worked for, the Frankfurter Zeitung.

Frankfurt is the only city under consideration where the combat commander rather than the MG detachment commander made the most crucial appointment, that of mayor. Blakefield was a career army man with a limited background in civilian affairs and a seemingly scant awareness of the importance of his charge to assign a German to head the municipal administration. After Blakefield moved on to continue fighting the war, he left the task of civil administration to Criswell.24

Criswell was also a non-German speaking career soldier who arrived in Frankfurt with little background information on the local political situation or on whom to turn to for advice. He did check more on Hollbach, but the council that recommended the Hollbach appointment included several dubious figures, and the CIC endorsement was based solely on Hollbach's contention that he could produce witnesses verifying his anti-Nazi stance. No one was brought in to clarify the political implications of retaining occupants of high journalistic posts during the Nazi regime. Weeks later U.S. press control experts investigated and recommended the dismissal of Hollbach and his journalist colleagues.25 This action created a rift between the generally more reform-seeking, German-speaking, sociopolitical experts in the information services sector and the overall more politically naive career military men and technical experts in the Frankfurt detachment, who lacked adequate knowledge of German politics, society, and language to make

25 See OMGUS, 5/268–1/18, 1 of 1 RG 260, IfZ.
sophisticated personnel decisions. Under pressure from the press control division, the military government dismissed Hollbach three months later. He was replaced by a politically problematic individual, the pre-1933 mayor of Hanau who had served the town during the war as a chief of war economics, Kurt Blaum.

Blaum led an extremely authoritarian administration, successfully bypassing most denazification guidelines for municipal employees by arguing with the detachment about the need for experienced German experts to run the city. However, a strongly anti-Nazi editorial board of the first German newspaper licensed by the more politically astute press control division in the U.S. zone, the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, drew public attention to Blaum's anti-democratic behavior. This publicity led to Blaum becoming one of the few mayors appointed by the U.S. Military Government to lose the election in 1946, when he tried to remain in office once the democratic process had been restored.

**STUTTGART**

Stuttgart had somewhat more than ten percent fewer residents than Frankfurt before the air bombardments, but its population was equal to that of Frankfurt when the war ended. Some 2,600 Stuttgart residents had been incarcerated by the Nazis for either political, racial, or religious reasons, and in late May 1945, about 600 camp inmates were expected to return to Stuttgart. Close to 150 men and women were executed for their political opposition to the Nazis, while many more died as a result of Nazi torture and incarceration. Although the destruction was proportionately less, the mate-

---

27 Hauptaktei 0054, Stadtarchiv Stuttgart (hereafter StA St). There is no breakdown of these persecuted individuals indicating how many were Jews. There were thirty-two Jewish municipal employees who were dismissed by the Nazis during the Third Reich. However, there had been and was still a much smaller Jewish population in Stuttgart than in Frankfurt, which had the largest Jewish community in Germany after Berlin. See Personalamt-Akten 02–0175, StA St.
rional problems in Stuttgart were comparable to those in Frankfurt. However, the circumstances surrounding its occupation differed.

Between late March and late April 1945, American and French troops occupied the southwestern states of Baden and Württemberg. The Allies had agreed that the Americans would control all the towns and counties north of the autobahn connecting Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, and Ulm, and the cities and counties through which this important arterial road passed. Nevertheless, French troops took over Stuttgart five hours before U.S. troops arrived from the East during the early hours of 21 April 1945. Württemberg's capital, Stuttgart, and Baden's capital, Karlsruhe, were taken by the French upon orders from General Charles de Gaulle as important military and political hostages to increase France's political influence in determining the future of Germany. The Americans responded by exercising their control over the autobahn, eventually convincing the French to withdraw on 8 July 1945. Soon afterwards, Stuttgart became the seat of U.S. Military Government in North Württemberg-Baden.

Several weeks prior to the French entry into Stuttgart, but when the Allied arrival was already imminent, a number of prominent Stuttgart residents formed a movement to resist the Nazi scorched earth policy and prevent any Nazi defense of the city. This "Save Stuttgart" (Rettet Stuttgart) movement managed to get the tacit support of the Nazi OB, Dr. Karl Strölin, through the intercession of two of its members, the Protestant diocesan liaison to the OB's office, Dr. Kruse, and a member of a well-known liberal Stuttgart family, Dr. Wolfgang Haußmann. Although this group

31 Friedrich Blumenstock, Der Einmarsch der Amerikaner und Franzosen im nördlichen Württemberg im April 1945 (Stuttgart, 1957), 218.
33 Karl Strölin, Stuttgart im Endstadium des Krieges (Stuttgart, 1950), 28f. Strölin maintained that he had connections with the Leipzig OB Dr. Karl Goerdeler and the 20 July 1944 conspiracy after becoming disillusioned with the practices of National Socialism (32ff.). This disillusionment may well have coincided with the point when a Nazi victory no longer seemed possible. Field Intelligence Study (hereafter FIS) 5, Office of Strategic Services (hereafter OSS), RG 226,
was not able to prevent the destruction of most of the city's bridges, it did save the gas, water, and power plants, as well as the military region (Wehrkreis) headquarters in the Olgastrasse, which later became MG headquarters.34

On 22 April Strölin announced the surrender on the radio; the French then ordered him to continue as OB of Stuttgart.35 The "Save Stuttgart" group met again that night, this time under the leadership of the forty-year-old lawyer, Dr. Arnulf Klett. Klett's main concern was how to get Bishop D. Theophil Wurm from Grossheppach, on the other side of the Neckar River, to Stuttgart now that the bridges had been blown up. Klett's neighbors, Franz Lau and Heinz Eschwege, both left the meeting frustrated that Wurm's return should be given such a high priority.36 Lau, a notary, had been incarcerated in a concentration camp as an anti-Nazi political prisoner.37 He became acquainted with Klett through Eschwege, whom Klett had defended when he was tried for anti-Nazi conspiratorial activity in 1944. Klett, Eschwege, and Lau secretly met to listen to Allied radio reports during the last year of the war. Lau and Eschwege were intellectually sympathetic to the Left, although neither had had any prior political party affiliation.38

A French MG officer informed Strölin on 23 April that he could no longer remain in office and gave him two hours to recommend a non-Nazi successor.39 Moments later, when Lau and Eschwege arrived to report on housing for the French, Strölin asked Lau if he would accept the post of OB on the basis of his administrative experience and status as a former

---

34 FIS 5, OSS, RG 226, NARA. Vietzen, Chronik, 22ff.
36 Heinz Eschwege, "Vom Niedergang und Aufstieg der Stadt Stuttgart" (MS, 1962), Kc 248, 13f., StA St.
37 Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (hereafter R&A Report), 3197.2, p. 33, RG 59, OSS, NARA.
39 Vietzen, Chronik, 31. See also Strölin, Stuttgart, 64f.
political prisoner.\textsuperscript{40} After initially hesitating, Lau agreed and immediately drafted plans to dismiss all Nazi officials and civil servants. Strölin and his legal councilor tried to no avail to convince Lau to keep the experienced civil servants, apparently causing Strölin to have second thoughts about Lau.\textsuperscript{41} As Lau and Eschwege were leaving Strölin's villa, Klett arrived and learned that Lau was to be the new OB. When Lau and Eschwege returned in order for Lau to officially assume the duties of OB, they learned that Klett had just been named the new OB of Stuttgart. Klett thanked Lau and Eschwege and asked them to serve as members of the new city administration. Eschwege regarded the switch as a safeguard to prevent a "palace revolution," because Lau's plans for changing the guard had raised the specter of revolution to Strölin and his legal advisor.\textsuperscript{42}

Bishop Wurm, in the meantime, had encouraged Klett to play a major role in the new municipal administration. Lacking any political affiliation,\textsuperscript{43} Klett felt he would need some group's backing, and the Protestant Church seemed like a good solid pillar of support. Lau then understood why Klett had been so anxious to get Wurm back to Stuttgart. Strölin ostensibly also thought it would be to his advantage to have someone with church backing as his successor.\textsuperscript{44} Strölin claimed that he had decided on Klett after consid-

\textsuperscript{40} Eschwege, "Chronologie."
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 28f.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., "Chronologie."
\textsuperscript{43} An investigation of Klett conducted in 1946 by the American vice consul in Stuttgart pointed out that Klett claimed to be a strict adherent to the Evangelical (Lutheran) faith, but that "people who are familiar with his past, however, say that he has been generally indifferent to religion." Klett apparently did not mention his previous membership in the anti-Semitic Württembergische Bürgerpartei or the pan-Germanic Altdeutscher Verband to his fellow Rettet Stuttgart members. When he did include this information on his questionnaire for the French MG, he tried to use the latter membership to prove his long-term anti-Nazi stance. The Verband had been dissolved by the Nazis, but it belonged in a comparable league with the Stahlhelm, which was also dissolved. See Detachment E1A2 Public Safety Section, Special Branch Investigation subsection report, 1 Sept 1945, p. 2, RG 84, Office of the Political Advisor (hereafter POLAD)/779/12,1 of 5, IfZ.
erating other unnamed candidates, because Klett had been a trustworthy colleague in the last few difficult weeks, he had belonged to the city administration, he was not politically incriminated (he had even been briefly interned by the Nazis), and, in addition, he was known as a good lawyer.45 Except for being a good lawyer, Lau possessed all of these traits and was a more active anti-Nazi than Klett—but he also was less solidly upper middle class and more politically leftist in his views.

As his deputy mayor, Klett appointed Strölin's legal advisor, who had been a member of the NSDAP, but who had served in the municipal administration prior to the Nazis' rise to power.46 Klett's new administration included five members from Strölin's staff, all of whom had been NSDAP members. All five were dismissed by the Americans some three to eight weeks after they took over on 8 July 1945. Seven appointees had been members of the "Save Stuttgart" movement Of these, the U.S. Military Government dismissed two because of their Nazi past.47 The appointed police president, Eschwege, and Lau were the only three members of Klett's 1945 municipal administration with records of long-term anti-Nazi activism. They were also the only three politically left of center. Lau and Eschwege were given rather ephemeral, less influential positions.48 The police president was the only former Social Democrat among the original appointees and the sole left-of-center, full-time department head.

The city administration's conservative political complexion, combined with the fact that six of the ten department heads held academic titles, provided a stark contrast to industrial Stuttgart's large working-class population and the pre-1933 predominance of the SPD and KPD, which had been the two strongest parties in the last elected city council.49 A group of

45 Strölin, Stuttgart, 64f.
46 R&A Report 3197.2, p. 32, OSS, RG 59, NARA.
47 Vietzen, Chronik, 31f., 66f., 67.
48 Eschwege eventually became the provisional head of the State Theater and later worked for Radio Stuttgart until February 1946. Eschwege, "Chronologie" and Vietzen, Chronik, 66f. Lau remained the provisional head of the housing office until the summer, when Wolfgang Haußmann took over both the housing and personnel offices. Thereafter Lau returned to his job as a notary public until his death in January 1948. See Eschwege, "Niedergang and Aufstieg," Appendix.
49 The SPD was the strongest party in the last Weimar Republic city council in Stuttgart, which was elected 6 December 1931. It held 28 percent of the seats,
Social Democrats reacted to this conservative slant by approaching Klett in May 1945 about forming a council to involve more of the population of Stuttgart. They especially wanted to include representatives of the Antifa committees that had sprung up all over the city. They also advocated training qualified anti-Nazi personnel to fill the leading municipal posts that they assumed would soon be vacated by the former NSDAP members. An advisory city council did not materialize until October, after the Americans had controlled Stuttgart for over three months. The Nazi-held posts were not vacated for months, and no training program was ever set up. Plans for both this advisory city council and an advisory state council for Württemberg, which Klett had advocated, were halted by the French city commander, apparently because such councils represented too much of a step toward German self-government for the French.

Stuttgart remained under French occupation until 8 July 1945. Municipal self-government was more limited in Stuttgart under the French than it was in Frankfurt or Munich under U.S. control. On the other hand, the French in Stuttgart showed more tolerance toward the antifascist committees, which had taken on the tasks of securing food, protecting the population from plundering and violence, and compiling lists of leading National Socialists in their districts even before Klett was appointed. Representatives of the Antifa committees approached Klett as early as 2 May 1945 to offer him their cooperation.

The Antifa committees were aware of the danger of being considered rivals with Klett's municipal bureaucracy. They went out of their way to try...
to convince the city administration that they were not challenging its authority.\textsuperscript{53} The fact that the majority of the Antifa committee members had either belonged to or felt sympathy with the left-wing parties in Stuttgart, whereas the majority of the city's administrative officials were decidedly right of center, did not mean that the Antifa committees planned to subvert the city administration or create a counteradministration.\textsuperscript{54} But the active Communist participation in the leadership of the Antifa committees made them politically vulnerable. Klett had his police president keep tabs on them, and the U.S. Military Government, even before it became the official occupier, also kept close watch over the Stuttgart Antifa committees. According to a U.S. Military Government study, the church hierarchy in Württemberg was among the most determined opponents of the Antifa committees. It reported that

both Vicar General Kottman and Commissioner Kruse ... warned against the dangers of the antifascist leagues, declaring that they are 'camouflaged' bodies for the propagation of Communism, and that many Nazis are joining them.\textsuperscript{55}

Kruse, as city liaison to the French MG, tried to convince both Klett and the French MG of this specter of a combined Communist-Nazi front. The report of Nazi involvement was farcical propaganda, for there is no evidence of open or secret Nazi participation within the Antifas. Indeed, many observers considered the committees overzealous in their discrimination against all Nazis, whether nominal or activist. Kruse himself was later removed by the U.S. Military Government for his ties to the Nazi Party.

Klett indicated that he understood that those forces that had been persecuted and/or suppressed by the Nazi regime would want to play an active role in the reconstruction of public life. Klett claimed to welcome such cooperation because of the shortage of recruits and funding to fill the posts vacated by the removal of "professionals" in the denazification pro-

\textsuperscript{53} For example, on 5 May, after turning over Werwolf members to Police President Karl Weber, the committee involved wrote Weber to ask him not to consider their action as a threat to his authority. Hauptaktei 0051–1, StA St.

\textsuperscript{54} Vietzen, Chronik, 115. Vietzen states that French MG banned the early Antifa committees, which called themselves Kampfkomitees, just in time before this "revolutionary group" could overthrow the order that had been instituted (116).

\textsuperscript{55} FIS 5, OSS, RG 226, NARA.
cess. But he also stressed that his primary concern was maintaining an efficient, professional, and experienced civil service. The excuse that efficiency would be lost if experienced and professional but politically tainted civil servants were replaced by untrained or inexperienced antifascists was generally accepted by the U.S. MG detachment when it took over Stuttgart in July. The same expediency rationale was also used by other German administrative officials elsewhere to prevent the changes that the influx of energetic antifascists might have brought with it.

Despite the provision of lists of potential antifascist administrators and pleas for training programs for antifascists lacking the pertinent expertise, no committed antifascists were allowed to fill key municipal posts. Neither the French nor the American MG officers were directly responsible for this personnel policy in Stuttgart, but they were implicated because they made—or, in the case of the Americans, confirmed—the top-level appointments of the OB and his deputy and then gave these appointees a carte blanche to fill the other administrative positions. This policy was not formally prescribed by Washington or by Frankfurt's SHAEF headquarters, but instead grew out of military government practice.

MUNICH

Munich was (and is) a considerably larger city than either Frankfurt or Stuttgart. Relative to its size, it suffered much less destruction than Frankfurt and somewhat less than Stuttgart. A disproportionately large number of displaced persons in Munich and its immediate surroundings, however, including the concentration camp inmates liberated from Dachau, complicated the material and logistical problems of postwar Munich. The population of Munich decreased almost 50 percent from 824,000 in 1939 to 479,000 at the end of the war. But by mid-1946 the number was back up to 730,000.

Munich was the last of the three cities examined here to come under Allied control. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that, when the collapse of the Hitler regime was only days away, an anti-Nazi resistance organiza-

---

56 Ibid.
tion tried to prevent the implementation of the scorched earth plan and to turn over the city to the approaching American forces. During the night of 27 April 1945, the Freiheits-Aktion-Bayern (FAB), a resistance group of various civilian and military circles, effectively seized the Munich-area radio stations. They called upon local soldiers and civilians to end the fighting and break the last stronghold of National Socialism. Through this and various other FAB initiatives, the danger of a devastating air bombardment of Munich was averted.\footnote{Ibid., 41. See also Erinnerungsschrift zur Feier des 25. Jahrestages der FAB am 27. und 28. April 1945 (Munich, 1970), 6, 10; Extract from OSS FIS No. 1, 27 June 1945, in Office of the Adjutant General (hereafter AG), 1945–46/1/4, 5 of 5, RG 260, IfZ.}

During the twelve hours in which the FAB assumed governmental powers, it declared open season on Nazi functionaries. Teaming up for the revolt with the socialist resistance group "07" and a group of monarchists, the FAB broadcast that its aims were to eliminate the Nazi rule of terror and militarism; make peace with the Allies; struggle against anarchy; restore orderly economic conditions; re-establish rule by law, a just social order, and fundamental human rights; and revive human dignity.\footnote{News Digest, 30 April 1945.} This vague statement was intended to unite all anti-Nazi opposition in support of the revolt. A number of sympathetic revolts did break out in the suburbs of Munich, but by 5:00 p.m. on 28 April, the Munich Gauleiter announced that the FAB had been totally suppressed. Many of its members were captured and executed, as were many citizens who had followed its call. With the news of the arrival of U.S. troops, the Gauleiter appealed to all public employees to stay at their posts and then fled the city.\footnote{Münchner Merkur, 27 April 1955 and 29 April 1949.} Although the FAB had not been able to retain power, Munich was turned over into the hands of U.S. troops with almost no Nazi resistance.\footnote{Bayerische Landeszeitung, Nachrichtenblatt der Allierten 12. Heeresgruppe für die deutsche Zivilbevölkerung, 1 June 1945.}

The FAB was initially in the Americans' good graces as indicated by the fact that the Americans gave it an office and asked its members to serve as advisors and informants to CIC in Munich. However, once the FAB de-
cided it did not want to work directly for CIC, the Americans ordered the FAB office to disband and prohibited any further activities.62

The actual conquest or liberation of the city was somewhat anticlimactic after the FAB action two days earlier. On 30 April 1945 the Munich city hall was officially surrendered to a major of the U.S. Seventh Army.63 On the following morning, the Munich MG detachment under Colonel Walter H. Kurtz and his assistant, Major Eugene Keller, Jr., took command.64 Unlike the rather ill-prepared detachment in Frankfurt, the detachment for Munich had been formed in May 1944 in England, where it had studied information about the city and its surrounding area and had developed a tentative plan of operations. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) provided black, gray, and white lists of prominent Munich citizens to help the military government differentiate between the Germans who would be considered as "blacklisted," "acceptable," or "recommended" for municipal and/or eventually political posts.65 Several of the twenty-four detachment officers had served during the war in the Military Government Corps of the U.S. Army, where they had to deal with problems involving the civilian population in either enemy or liberated territory so that the armed forces could concentrate on actual combat problems. The detachment personnel, according to Keller, had been "chosen from civilian volunteers with experi-

62 Personal interview with Dr. Rupprecht Gerngross, Munich, 28 Feb. 1982. This was corroborated in a personal interview with another FAB member, Dr. Ottheinrich Leiling, Munich, March 1982.
63 Schattenhofer, Chronik, 42.
64 The name of Lt. Col. Walter Kurtz does not appear in most renditions of MG command in Munich. Rather his assistant, Major Eugene Keller Jr., who is referred to as Lt Col., is named as the detachment commander in official histories, such as Earl Ziemke's The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany (Washington, 1975), 253. But OMGUS files, specifically RG 260, OMG-Bayern (OMGBY), 10/78–7/4, IfZ, and Schattenhofer's Chronik document Kurtz's four-month leadership stint in Munich, which was cut short by his unusual death caused by a falling rock from the top of the city hall building. See Schattenhofer, Chronik, 67, 83,86.
65 Bürgermeister and Rat (hereafter BuR) 2524b, Bl. 172, Stadtaarchiv München (hereafter StA Mü). In this "Chronicle of Personal Reflections" from 1959, the then retired Keller wrote that "we knew Munich better than we did our own home towns."
ence in the problems of civil government and administration, as far as practicability permitted.”

The deputy city commander, Keller, was of Alsatian descent, spoke German, and was an engineer in civilian life. He and his detachment had been informed about the FAB resistance and about the 64-year-old, pre-1933 OB of Munich, Karl Scharnagl. No one knew at war’s end where Scharnagl was, although he had been seen in Munich recently. The pre-1933 OB of Würzburg, Dr. Franz Xaver Stadelmayer of the Bavarian People's Party (BVP), greeted the Munich detachment upon its arrival and led Keller to the OB's chambers in the city hall. Once there, Keller appointed the 54-year-old Stadelmayer as acting OB of Munich and told him that he would be expected to assist MG in recreating some semblance of civilian administration. Stadelmayer told Keller that, after resisting pressure for several years, he had applied for Nazi Party membership in 1942, although he only became a member in July 1944. Keller appointed Stadelmayer as provisional OB only until Scharnagl could be found. Keller was most appreciative of Stadelmayer's administrative experience and his knowledge of Munich and its people, both while he served as acting OB and thereafter, when he became Scharnagl's deputy.

On 4 May Keller received news of Scharnagl's whereabouts and brought him to Munich to take over the duties of OB. A master baker by trade and also a former BVP member, Scharnagl had gone into hiding during the final days of the war out of a fear of last-minute Nazi persecution. Keller found

---

66 Ibid, Bl. 171. This description resembles the personnel trained at Charlottesville, but apparently neither Kurtz nor Keller had been trained there.

67 Personal interview with the former press officer in Munich, Ernest Langendorf, Munich, 2 March 1982.

68 His name was on one of the OSS white lists.

69 BuR 2524b, Bl. 172, StA Mü.

70 BuR 2525b, StA Mü.


72 Ibid., BuR 2524b, Bl. 173.
Scharnagl to be well-qualified for the job and was also generally pleased with Scharnagl’s selection of municipal department heads.\textsuperscript{73} The initial Munich detachment commander, Kurtz, played a more behind-the-scenes role during the four months he served in Munich before his death on 27 September 1945.\textsuperscript{74} He did, however, take the initiative in contacting Cardinal Michael Faulhaber within forty-eight hours of the detachment's arrival in order to obtain personnel recommendations for the city administration.\textsuperscript{75} Kurtz, Keller, and the MG commander of the Upper Bavarian District, Col. Charles E. Keegan, were all Roman Catholics, and all turned to Faulhaber for advice.\textsuperscript{76} Keller, who became the Munich city commander after Kurtz died, was quite taken with Faulhaber, whom he called "a prince of the Church."\textsuperscript{77} Faulhaber approved of the appointment of the OB and of so many members of the BVP, an explicitly Catholic party. Scharnagl’s brother was a bishop under Faulhaber's jurisdiction, and Karl Scharnagl himself had been very active since his youth in various Catholic lay organizations.\textsuperscript{78} Karl Scharnagl typically described MG officers according to whether they were "good Catholics" or anti-Catholic or "anti-church"—which was his euphemism for non-Catholics.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{73} BuR 2524b, Bl. 173f., StA Mü. Scharnagl may have feared a repeat of the treatment he received in the midst of the 20 July 1944 round-up of pre-1933 public officials.

\textsuperscript{74} OMGBY, 10/78–7/4,3 of 9, RG 260, IfZ. See also Schattenhofer, Chronik, 83.

\textsuperscript{75} Personal interview with Dr. Erwin Hamm, former professional Munich department head under Scharnagl, Munich, 1 July 1983.

\textsuperscript{76} Fg 14, IfZ. Keegan, who was Irish-Catholic and a former New York city councilor, was removed from his post in the summer of 1945 for too much leniency in denazification. Scharnagl was convinced that this hervorragender Katholik (outstanding Catholic) was brought down by the anti-Catholic men in military government, "freemasons, Jews, etc.," who, according to Scharnagl in June 1946, had gotten the upper hand in MG. Scharnagl stated this at the Dienstag-Club meeting on 4 June 1946. As cited in: Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, eds., Lehrjahre der CSU. Eine Nachkriegspartei im Spiegel vertraulicher Berichte an die amerikanische Militärregierung (Stuttgart 1984), 57.

\textsuperscript{77} Personal interview with Leiling, Munich, March 1982.

\textsuperscript{78} Hans Wacker, "Kurze Lebensbeschreibung von Dr. h.c. Karl Scharnagl," part of his then (1982) unfinished Ph.D. diss. on Scharnagl, Univ. of Munich. The successor party to the BVP is the CSU.

\textsuperscript{79} Henke and Woller, Lehrjahre der CSU, 57.
The churches seemed to play a considerable role in the personnel policies and selections not only in Stuttgart with Bishop Wurm and the administrative liaison between city and church, Dr. Kruse, but perhaps even more so in strongly Catholic Munich. In Frankfurt the clergy of both Christian religions had been strongly represented with one Catholic priest and two Protestant ministers in the short-lived, ten-member council, appointed by the MG. But thereafter, clerical influence seemed to have waned considerably in predominantly Protestant Frankfurt. In Munich, at least in the first year, Faulhaber not only influenced appointments, but he also determined to a certain extent who could and could not exert influence on military government and ultimately on the city government.

Dr. Rupprecht Gerngross, the leader of the FAB, accused Faulhaber of diminishing MG's confidence in the FAB because of his dislike for Gerngross, who was both Protestant and married to a non-Bavarian. Faulhaber asked both Gerngross and another FAB leader, who was also Protestant, to meet with him after the revolt. The cardinal praised the FAB for saving both German and American lives, but warned them about the dangers of becoming revolutionaries or traitors. He advocated a return to orderliness, because, as he reproached, "wir wollen doch ordentliche deutsche Männer bleiben." Apparently for this leader of the German Catholic Church, the idea of cooperating too closely with the former enemy bordered on disloyalty. Faulhaber may also have wanted to minimize influence exerted by the FAB on military government, because he wanted to retain such sway for the Catholic, former BVP members. Problems emerged for various Germans willing to work with MG, many of whom were rejected or discouraged. As in the case of the Antifa committees, their antifascism was considered too politicized. Others were rejected because they were thought of as opportunists—which was apparently MG's view of the FAB leaders. Still others were discouraged by nationalistic Germans, who portrayed cooperation with military government as unpatriotic.

---

80 Personal interview with Gerngross, Munich, 28 Feb. 1982.
81 "We want to continue to be decent German men." Personal interview with Leiling, Munich, March 1982.
82 OMGBY, 10/90–1/20, 1 of 3, RG 260, IfZ.
During this postwar year of predemocratic municipal government, Munich had a much more politically diverse administration with far more representatives of the SPD and KPD among its department heads, almost 30 percent, than either Stuttgart or Frankfurt. Three of the department heads appointed by Scharnagl had been imprisoned together with him in Dachau after the July 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler. This shared experience brought them closer together and convinced them that after the Nazis' overthrow, they should all emphasize their common concerns rather than their partisan differences as they had during the Weimar Republic. Of the thirty-six appointed members of the Munich advisory city council, which met from August 1945 until May 1946, ten had been political prisoners in the Dachau concentration camp.

The combination of shared persecution and the ensuing comradeship, as well as the multi-party representation within the OB's professional staff, created the basis for very friendly cooperation among the various political parties and individuals in an atmosphere of mutual respect. One apparent consequence of this situation was the establishment of training programs for inexperienced anti-Nazi personnel, such as the special police training schools. This politically diverse and tolerant atmosphere sets Munich apart from Frankfurt and Stuttgart, not just during the first year of the occupation, but well into 1948. The fact that Scharnagl represented continuity with Munich's administrative and political past as its pre-1933 elected OB (unlike Hollbach, Blaum, or Klett) and that he was lower middle-class rather than solidly middle-class, probably also positively affected the rapport among the municipal administrators and with the city in general.

In Munich there was not only less reliance upon the old bureaucracy of the Third Reich, but also more reinstatements of concentration camp victims and persons who had been politically persecuted than in the other two cities. These selections could have been due to Scharnagl's familiarity with

---

84 Numerous pre-1933 centrist and leftist officials, from the municipal level on up, were arrested and imprisoned from several weeks to several months.
85 Hubert Sturm, "Thomas Wimmer" (paper given for a Hauptseminar with Prof. Dr. Friedlich Prinz, Univ. of Munich, 1980), 4. See also BuR 2533a, StA Mü.
86 BuR 1537, StA Mü.
87 OMGBY, 13/142–1/7, 3 of 11, RG 260, IfZ. As early as 20 July 1945, the MG detachment noted that, out of 231 reinstated office employees, 86 were concen-
running Munich, which would have made him less dependent on experienced civil servants than the young lawyer Klett or the journalist Hollbach—who had had practically no experience in municipal administration—and even than Blaum, who had had administrative experience, but not in Frankfurt. Another reason might have been that Munich appeared to have a more intact Weimar Republic political elite that had been—and in 1945 still was—anti-Nazi. Finally, Munich's MG detachment was far better prepared for its occupation tasks than those in Frankfurt or Stuttgart. All of these factors influenced the Ausgangspunkt from which both Germans and Americans operated in 1945.

The initial occupation period in Frankfurt and Stuttgart was characterized by a disproportionately large representation of conservative, middle- and upper-class special interest groups in upper-level municipal posts. In Stuttgart and Munich there was considerable clerical influence either upon the appointees filling the posts or upon MG in its selection process, or both. In none of the three cities during this initial occupation period, when MG rule was the most direct and its influence the strongest, were active anti-Naziis appointed to the key posts of mayor or deputy mayor, nor did they play any major role in recommending individuals to MG. Not only were they not encouraged to do so, but they were frequently discouraged when they tried.

Many German opponents of the Third Reich who had survived the regime viewed the arriving Allied troops as liberators. From this perspective, they naturally expected to be regarded as the "other Germany" with whom the Allies would want to cooperate. As late as May 1945, U.S. intelligence reports from the Office of the Political Advisor expressed amazement at the number of anti-Nazi Germans who expected the Allies to aid in German reconstruction and to assist them in rebuilding Germany. To a large extent this expectation remained unfulfilled, not because of explicitly political reasons, but because of political and civic inexperience and a lack of

---

88 Report No. 6, May 1945, "What do the Germans Expect to Happen after the War?" RG 84, POLAD TS/32/50, 1 of 1, NARA.
familiarity with German society and politics on the part of MG detachment commanders. This inexperience and an inherent pragmatism, as well as the high priority that most of the MG detachments gave to restoring order, led MG officials to rely upon Germans with apparent administrative expertise, and preferably with socioeconomic backgrounds similar to their own, regardless of the democratic credentials of these persons. Germans with municipal experience, who were in the right place at the right time in 1945, were far more likely to be appointed to leading municipal posts than were activist anti-Nazis, most of whom had been excluded from the city administration for the last twelve years.

Active anti-Nazis, especially those who had been persecuted by the Nazis, were allocated a role in the denazification process, either by compiling lists of Nazis or by seeking out incriminating evidence, which gave them the reputation of denouncers. After March 1946, when denazification was turned over to German tribunals, active anti-Nazis formed the core of the tribunal personnel, a role that further alienated them from the rest of German society, Nazi and non-Nazi alike. This frequently negative role of accusation and judgment that was accorded many activist anti-Nazis left them further isolated with little opportunity to participate in implementing political or socioeconomic reforms that they might have been able to spur on had they been appointed to key municipal posts in the early postwar period.