Meine Damen und Herren, Freundinnen und Freunde, Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends, liebe Marion,

Obwohl der Anlaß ein sehr trauriger ist, freut es mich trotzdem, daß wir hier in diesem Haus die Möglichkeit haben, Leben, Werk und Verdienst von Hermann-Josef Rupieper gebührend zu würdigen. Hermann and I first met in September 1970, appropriately enough in the hall at History Corner in front of Gordon Craig’s office. I had just arrived at Stanford to begin graduate school, and Hermann, having earned an MA there, had decided to come back and pursue the PhD there. We immediately hit it off, and a few days later we decided to go out for a beer. I stopped by his apartment in graduate student housing at Escondido Village, and I noticed an interesting poster on the wall. It depicted Astérix and Obélix riding on two shiny, enormous Harley motorcycles, “hogs” in American parlance. Astérix is looking at Obélix and is exclaiming, “Die spinnen, die Amis.”

This poster says a lot about Hermann, his personality, his sense of humor, and his always sophisticated but rather wry perceptions of the German-American relationship. We Americans may be slightly nuts, but the Europeans are still fascinated by those motorcycles. As we’ll hear in greater detail later on, Hermann developed into a transatlantic scholar of tremendous insight, repute, and importance. But his scholarly attainments, and his indelible contribution to the German-American relationship, were grounded in a set of experiences and observations in this country that extended over his entire adult life. One of my favorite reflections on the craft of the historian is Richard Cobb’s essay on that “second identity” that every historian, especially of another culture, should acquire – or at least attempt to acquire – if he or she has any hope of understanding that culture. Without ceasing to be the European that he always was, Hermann succeeded, more than any German academic I have ever known, in acquiring Cobb’s second identity. As we know, over the course of many years his “official” career took him regularly to such places as Stanford, the Wilson Center, the GHI, and Vanderbilt University, to name just several. But he also took pains to acquaint himself with the norms, history, and outlooks of what we call “Flyover Country,” or, as we now style them to the confusion of Europeans, the “red” states. Recently a German journalist, reporting from Washington for an important national newspaper, dismissed the entire area from Florida to the Dakotas as a “geistige Ödnis.” For all his critical distance with respect both to his native country and to this one, Hermann would never have written such a thing. He knew not only the two coasts but also places like Abilene, Kansas, and, yes, Kalamazoo, Michigan.

It was obvious even during his student years that Hermann had an astounding capacity to understand and empathize with the rhythms and rituals of American life. A devoted soccer player since his days growing up in Waltrop, at Stanford he became a keen fan of American football, and to the very end of his life he could name virtually every player on the Stanford team that humiliated Ohio State and Woody Hayes in the 1971 Rose Bowl. To be sure, there were limits to his cultural understanding. He always took a rather wry view of American cars, and I well recall his jaundiced view of the monstrous Oldsmobile that I had gotten from my parents and drove in graduate school. His first years in the US took place before our microbrewery revolu-
tion, and so he shared the quite justifiable German disdain for traditional American bread and beer, as well as other substances. He always liked to recall his very first day in the United States, back in the Sixties. It was a boiling hot day in New York, and he was thirsty. He saw a drink machine, and was delighted to see that it was selling beer! Unfortunately, he didn’t quite understand the significance of the word “root” before the “beer,” but he bought it anyway, and he said that his first taste of this beverage was one of his more horrific experiences in this country. It’s an acquired taste, I suppose. As a loyal son of the Ruhrgebiet, or, really to be more accurate, the Sauerland, Hermann always remained a Warsteiner loyalist, though König-Pilsener from Duisburg ran pretty close; and in later years he introduced me to the pleasures of Köstritzer Schwarzbier from the neue Bundesländer. But American beer in the 1970s? That was a different matter. I well remember an establishment in downtown Palo Alto that we often frequented even though Hermann insisted that the beer that came out of the tap had a green color. I should note before ending this long digression that Hermann was also an exceptional Kulturvermittler; and much of my own understanding for and appreciation of the more intimate side of German culture I owe in the first instance to my experiences with Hermann in Berlin, in Waltrop, in Marburg, and in Halle. These experiences ranged broadly, from excursions in the countryside to visits to concerts to guest appearances in seminars to the fact that, thirty years ago, Hermann was my Trauzeuge when my wife and I, both of us non-Germans, got married at Rathaus Schmargendorf in Berlin. I am certain that Hermann was a more empathetic student of American culture than, for my part, I’ve been of German culture. He loved American football, as I’ve said; but I have never been able to develop an attachment to soccer, despite the fact that Hermann constantly tried to explain it to me and carried me along with him to Bundesliga matches, especially those that involved his very own Schalke 04.

But lest this proceed to an account of the merely anecdotal, let’s turn now to Hermann-Josef Rupieper the scholar. We took a number of colloquia and seminars together at Stanford, and it quickly became evident to me that Hermann was a man blessed with unusual intellectual gifts, exceptionally wide-ranging historical interests, a capacity for sustained and focused work, and a Zielstrebigkeit that most of us could only envy. We shared the house on 1938 Channing Avenue as he completed his dissertation on the Cuno government and reparations, which he then turned into his first book. And then, faced with the choice of staying in the United States and beginning an academic career, or returning to Germany for a Habilitation at the Free University of Berlin, he opted for the latter. As most of you know, his Habilitationsschrift was a social history of workers and white-collar employees at the Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg (MAN). After his time as a Privatdozent at the FU, he received a call to Marburg. And it was in those years that he returned to that kind of history he loved above all else, the place where cultural history and the history of foreign relations intersect. I’ll be brief here, because later in the program we’ll be hearing much more about Hermann’s legacy as a transatlantic scholar; but his work on the United States and the democratization of West Germany remains both powerful and enduringly important. We’ll also be hearing more about his work at Halle. Among many other things, he played a central role in the university’s five hundredth anniversary and the publications associated with it. He devoted much of his work in Halle, both as a scholar and as a teacher and mentor, to the history of Sachsen-Anhalt, especially during the decades of the two dictatorships; and in doing so he made a major contribution both to the recovery of historical consciousness and historical memory after the Wende and to the study of the linkages that always exist between regional history and larger trends and forces.
Finally, let me say a brief word about Hermann as administrator. Hermann was a man in whom one could always place one’s confidence with the complete assurance that he would complete a task and complete it well, even if that meant going far beyond the call of duty. His achievements as, if you will, an historical administrator are legion. As we all know, he was closely bound up with the creation of this institute. At Marburg and at Halle he made signal contributions to the development of American Studies, not least through a focused program of library acquisition. And I especially recall the pride with which he showed me, for the first time, the building in Halle, on the other side of the Saale, that before the Wende had housed a Pädagogische Hochschule and which now housed the reconstituted Institut für Geschichte. I’m sure that we will hear much more about how Hermann committed himself utterly to his university, as Dekan, ombudsman, and member of the University Senate.

But I shall always remember my dear friend Hermann-Josef Rupieper as a man who, more than probably anyone I’ve ever known, embodied the spirit of Richard Cobb’s essay. He truly was at home in both our cultures and on both sides of the Atlantic. He embodied the spirit that sustains this institute, and his legacy should serve as an inspiration to those who aspire to live and work in this country and in the German-speaking world. His counsel and his experience are badly needed now, as the Atlantic seems almost inexorably to be getting deeper and wider. Among other things, he would remind us that the post-1945 German-American relationship always had its bumps and bruises and problems, and he would always warn us about the dangers of romanticization and nostalgia. As a hardheaded realist, he would have had much to tell us still about our two countries. He leaves an enduring legacy; und deswegen fehlt er uns um so mehr.
Jana Wüstenhagen
In memoriam Hermann-Josef Rupieper

I would like to thank the German Historical Institute in Washington for the opportunity to share memories of Prof Hermann-Josef Rupieper from the time he was working at the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg.

Rupieper was a warm-hearted, modest person who treated anyone in a respectful way, never showing any hierarchical attitudes. We met for the first time in 1993 when he had just accepted the post of professor for contemporary history at the newly founded Department of History at the Martin Luther University. Being a student at that time, I always respectfully called him “Prof” Rupieper, whereas he insisted to be simply addressed as “Mr” Rupieper. Later, when I already worked as his assistant, it became a habit of mine to call him “Prof”. He used to tease me from time to time arguing that this was the result of my “Prussian” childhood under the East German Dictatorship. With an anticipating smile, he would then endure my heated monologues about Ossis and Wessis in particular, and about matters of democracy and dictatorship in general. I still believe that he enjoyed having such debates – and perhaps even provoked them – in order to discover new perspectives of a certain subject.

Unlike many of his colleagues, Rupieper settled down in Halle as soon as he was offered the professorship. From the outset, he got involved not only in university politics, but also in matters of regional interest. Still very well known are his efforts to find an appropriate building for the Department of History when this was spread over different locations in the entire town. One of his fellow professors at the Department still remembers how Rupieper overcame bureaucratic hurdles and resistance among his own colleagues by almost “pray-
ing” the phrase he had internalised during his studies at Stanford: “A job has to be done”, he used to say, “and not to be talked over and over again”.

This motto guided him through his years at Halle University. Rupieper was a workaholic. Even after returning from a long transatlantic flight, he would appear at 8 am in his office - his sporty bag hanging over his shoulder, filled up with books and documents he wanted to work on. He never ceased to search - and find - new subjects and approaches for his research, and he was the first to travel all the way to Russian, American, or French archives in order to discover new material.

Very typical of Rupieper’s work in Halle was his commitment to pave the way for students and young researchers to follow, or join, him on his way. He dedicated lots of his time as well as efforts to the qualification of, and fundraising for, young scholars. He used to call us proudly “my young people”, and when facing difficulties, we could be sure he would fight for us “like a bulldog”, as another colleague put it after one of Rupiepers “performances” at a meeting.

Those who worked with him estimated his efforts for the Department and the university; his students loved him. Although his classes were always overcrowded, he would never send anybody away who showed up at the very last minute to get a certificate. He was one of those people who combine both professionalism and a great kindness at the same time.

Even though Rupieper liked to live in Halle, he was always excited about an opportunity to visit the US. I still remember a conversation we had after one of those frustrating discussions with the Ministry of Culture about the future of our university. His comments on the discussion showed his sadness about the situation, but all of a sudden, he would rub his hands, smile and say that he had some good news as well. While I assumed he had found a
good source to raise money for our department, Rupieper was looking forward to a conference in Atlanta (or somewhere else) where he would finally get to meet some “good old friends” again, as he put it. When he came back from overseas, he always appeared more powerful and much happier.

Beside his academic merits and warm-hearted personality, all who worked with him very closely in Halle remember yet another side of him. He was an excellent cook. Whether American turkey, Irish stews or Italian pasta, Indian curry or Mexican chilly, the meals he prepared were always so delicious that we seriously recommended him to open a restaurant once he would retire. The regular dinners we had at his home never ended before midnight. It was so much fun, especially when he got the old stories out and told us about his long hair when he was young. We would certainly not believe him until he proved it by showing pictures of his time in Stanford.

Looking back, students as well as colleagues remember Rupieper as a committed academic, teacher, researcher, and friend they have lost. For me, he was all this as well as my supervisor whose academic and personal advice and guidance I greatly valued. We all miss him.
It is an honor and pleasure to evoke the memory of Hermann-Josef Rupieper. He was an energetic, enthusiastic colleague, an accomplished historian, and a good friend. I got to know him during his time in Washington, DC, first when he was the acting director of the German Historical Institute in 1987 then, during his tenure at the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1990. Like all academics that labor over twentieth century international history, we “stayed in touch” as he moved from Berlin to Marburg to Halle. Most recently, Hermann was a valued collaborator in helping to organize an international conference “The Year 1956 in Europe.” He was to discuss “The German Question.” We shall greatly miss him at the proceedings three months from now in Slovakia!

Hermann-Josef Rupieper brought a sensible and balanced perspective to the study of European International History and, especially, to U.S.-European relations. Himself a post-war baby-boomer, born in the Ruhr, Hermann did his undergraduate study at the Free University of Berlin during the ‘roaring’ 1960s before heading west for the beauty and tranquility of Stanford, California to do his Ph.D. study with Gordon Craig. Fellow Stanford students fondly remember his serious mien, impeccable English, and wry sense of humor.


Hermann Rupieper’s work fit prominently into a dazzling decade of studies of the 1920s, made possible by the flood of archival openings in Great Britain, France, the U.S., Belgium, and Italy – added to the huge store of German documentary sources that became available after World War II – a decade marked by the pioneering work of Denise Artaud, Jacques Bariéty, and Georges Soutou in France, Gerald Feldman, David Felix, Jon Jacobson, Edward Keeton, Melvin Leffler, Sally Marks, Walter McDougall, Charles Maier, and Stephen Schuker in the U.S., and Karl-Ludwig Holtfreicher, Peter Krüger, Ernst Laubach, Werner Link and Klaus Schwabe in Germany.

In The Cuno Government, Hermann had not only the opportunity to consult a myriad of sources but also to evaluate the conclusions of his fellow-archive dwellers. His was an almost exhaustive investigation not only of German political, economic, and diplomatic records and private papers but also of industrial and labor union records. And, in addition, to the French and British sources, Hermann combed the U.S. records of the period, the contemporary press, the major published documentation, and a trove of diaries and memoirs to relate the terrible year history of Germany and Europe.

More than a generation away from the 1970s, it will undoubtedly be difficult for many of you to imagine the ferocity of the debate over the Ruhr occupation of 1923, considered the last battle of World War I, and that entire annus terribilis for the Weimar Republic of hyper-inflation, communist uprisings, and the Hitler putsch. Oblivious to this little Historikerstreit, U.S. text books and television documentaries quoted (as, as far as I know, still quote) Nicholson and Keynes over the political and economic idiocies of Versailles and feature cartoons of a hideous Marianne stomping on a hapless, helpless Ger-
many in 1923, and the general public in this country still believes that the Allies venge-
fulness and cupidity created Weimar’s demise and Hitler’s triumph.

In that charged scholarly realm that Rupieper entered in the 1970s, there was a
great chasm between the two interpretations of Weimar. On one side of the divide were
Hans Gatzke and Fritz Fischer, reinforced by the work of Marks and Schuker, who identi-
ﬁed Germany’s ﬁrst republic as a link between the Second and Third Reichs, as an old-
guard dominated regime whose sham fulﬁllment policies masked treaty revisionism and
the desire to dominate Europe. The other side was composed of historians who defended
Weimar (among them Felix, Feldman, and Krüger) for operating as uprightly as possible
under impossible circumstances. In the middle were those such as Artaud, Holtfrerich,
Maier, and Schwabe, who did comparative European and transatlantic history and broad-
ened our knowledge of the 1920s by inserting the economic, cultural, social, and ideo-
logical dimensions of its diplomacy.

Was Germany’s ﬁrst republic an unrepentant Second Reich in a new guise, will-
ing to risk occupation and even to ruin its own currency in order to avoid the ﬁnancial
consequences of Ludendorff’s failure to win in the West? Was France able and deter-
mined to destroy German unity and its economic power? What were Great Britain’s mo-
tives in emitting sighs of disapproval over Paris’s policy, failing to halt the Ruhr occupa-
tion, but ultimately demanding a “solution”? And what were America’s motives in avoid-
ing as much responsibility as possible for the reparations tangle but repeatedly cajoling
the Europeans to clean up their own house? These were some of the questions over which
temper flared at conferences and ink spilled in articles and reviews during those almost
halcyon days of Cold War détente and Ostpolitik.

What about the other side? Little was said about the Soviet role in the early 1920s,
because little was known at the time, or even now. Piotr Wandycz investigated the roles
of the Poles and Czechs; Sally Marks brought in the Belgians; and Charles Maier the Ita-
lians. In communist Eastern Europe, Alena Gajanová studied Czechoslovak foreign policy
and Magda Adam dissected the Little Entente. Nonetheless, the main discourse of the
1970s was over the policies of the very powers – the U.S., France, Germany, and Great
Britain – that had formed the core of the post-World War II Atlantic alliance and how
they tried, and failed in the early 1920s to solve the Franco-German quarrel, to reintegrate
a defeated Reich, and to forge a lasting peace in Europe.

Moreover, despite the then popularity of the Annales school, there were no
Braudelians among us international historians looking at the longue durée; instead, archi-
val scholars such as Hermann-Josef Rupieper produced meticulous analyses of individu-
als, decision-making, and actions under a very intense microscope Ruhr specialists in the
1970s heatedly disputed the precise moment when Raymond Poincaré lost patience with
Berlin (and London) and took the fateful step of using force to collect reparations.

This microhistory was both the strength and weakness of the diplomatic history of
the 1920s. To be sure, the stakes in these inquiries were extremely high, and not only in
scholarly and professional terms, because they also reﬂected personal judgments on the
responsibility of speciﬁc people and governments for the never-resolved struggle be-
tween Berlin and its former enemies as well as for the damaging dissonance within the
Allied camp that Weimar and Nazi Germany so deftly exploited.
On the other hand, the more we combed the archives of one, two, three, four, even five of the actors, the more difficult it became to step back and produce a longer as well as larger analysis.

In The Cuno Government and Reparations, Hermann Rupieper entered at the last stages of this debate. There is no doubt of his sympathy for the German side. He treated the Rathenau-Wirth policy of “fulfillment,” with its underlying goal of revising the London schedule of payments sympathetically, without questioning its tactics or motives. He depicted Poincaré as tough and unyielding, the British as moderate and realistic, the Americans as well intentioned if also divided and distracted.

Under Rupieper’s pen, into the dangerous arena of French threats and German defiance in the fall of 1922 enters Wilhelm Cuno. Born in Thuringia and trained in law, the forty-six-year-old Cuno had served the imperial government for ten years before his appointment as head of Ballin’s Hamburg-Amerika shipping line. Contesting Cuno’s negative reception in the contemporary Allied and German press, Rupieper characterizes the new German chancellor as intelligent, charming, and well-connected as well as a decidedly unpolitical figure to whom President Friedrich Ebert turned in November 1922 when Wirth was forced to resign.

Cuno’s “cabinet above parties -- his Geschäftsinisterium -- was advertised as a continuation of his predecessor’s diplomacy, but with this crucial difference. According to Rupieper, “the new chancellor had always been convinced that either economic lunatics or Machtpolitiker, set upon destruction of Germany’s economic potential had invented the Versailles treaty’s reparations clauses.” If the Allies had wanted a solution, Cuno was prepared to negotiate and submit his own proposals; but under no circumstances was he prepared to continue reparation payments without a reduction of the London Schedule of Payments.

The portents were not favorable. Cuno’s abandonment of even the pretense of fulfillment set the stage for a confrontation with Poincaré; his expectation that Britain and the United States would halt France was chimerical; and, perhaps most dangerously, his stubborn insistence on creating a non-political cabinet weakened the already frail fabric of Weimar democracy on the eve of its first major international crisis. Moreover the decisive role of German industrial leaders worked against Cuno; divided and, yes, stubborn, the fractious and divided members of the RDI refused to accommodate even the mildest British and American suggestions and also set impossible conditions for negotiating a new reparations agreement -- including the immediate evacuation of the Rhineland.

Rupieper did not hold Cuno responsible for the impending catastrophe. Instead, he applauded Cuno’s last-minute proposals that foreshadowed the Locarno pacts three years later, to sign a 30-year nonaggression pact with his Rhenish neighbors, while also admitting that the time and the stars were scarcely right for this maneuver.

At issue in the early winter of 1922 was the very meaning of reparations: if to Cuno, the British, and the Americans the reparations dispute was a “purely business question” that needed to be solved calmly and lucidly by the experts, to the French it was a life-and-death matter of who had actually won the Great War. On December 9, Poincaré admitted to his allies, “There was no chance of raising the money to balance France’s budget if nothing was done as regards Germany.” If Germany’s obligation was reduced, as Berlin and London were urging, the Chamber, having authorized billions for reconstruction, would toss Poincaré out. Responding to a last-minute British suggestion to
couple reparations and inter-allied debts, Poincaré issued the fateful warning that he would never relegate France’s fate to a “Committee of Bankers.”

On January 11, after months of ignoring the shortfall in coal deliveries, the Reparation Commission declared Germany in default. French and Belgian troops, with reluctant Italian support and over British objections, entered the Ruhr. The event was scarcely unexpected, since France had threatened this action for three years. What was unanticipated was the uproar in Washington and London, which the French initially ignored.

Rupieper underlines Poincaré’s two grave miscalculations: that his coup de main would help solve interallied debts and reparations, and that international bankers would provide any loans with French and Belgian troops occupying the Ruhr.

Even more historically significant was France’s third mistake. The Ruhr occupation was an audacious political gamble by a deeply timid politician, which left France highly vulnerable to the German response. When Germany’s industry, population, and government refused to cooperate, the invader was caught in a web of its enormous financial and economic weakness. Rupieper, who listed but never defined France’s ultimate aims – simply to get more money and coal, to force negotiations with its allies, or actually to break up and dominate the Reich -- makes it clear from the start that all were impossible to achieve for the economically weak, politically divided Third Republic without German compliance and British cooperation.

According to Rupieper, Cuno made quite reasonable choices in the face of the invasion. Rupieper deems the policy of passive resistance as nothing less than “a fight for German existence and … a struggle for the preservation of German unity.” Indeed, this was not only a desperate form of reaction but also a nationalistic unifying force, generously financed by the Cuno government, and with funds that went mainly to heavy industry. Moreover, passive resistance also greatly contributed to the hyperinflation of 1923. On the other hand, Rupieper notes the Reich’s success in exploiting the economic differences among the allies and replacing Ruhr coal with imports from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Great Britain.

Politically, however, Germany stood alone, except for the questionable support from Soviet Union. In contrast to their ambassadors in Berlin who immediately urged London and Washington to intervene, Britain, hesitating to antagonize France, whose collaboration it needed at the Lausanne Conference, maintained “benevolent neutrality,” and the U.S. government had little desire to intervene in a grave European political squabble. In the meantime French territorial ambitions expanded, now including the establishment of an autonomous Rhenish Republic, which the British resolutely opposed. Poincaré deluded himself that he was gathering bargaining chips, when, in fact, France itself was also becoming isolated.

The crisis escalated in the spring and early summer of 1923. Germany made futile efforts to divide the Allies and lure them into negotiations. France stood firm in its insistence on ending passive resistance. Several Americans tried to mediate. And Britain was helpless to control Poincaré.

Suddenly the clouds began to lift. On the domestic front, Cuno, in July 1923, faced with the catastrophic plunge in the mark, a huge budget deficit, and the looming danger of food riots and revolution, emerged from his strange passivity to craft tough tax-reform legislation; and in August, Curzon publicly ended Britain’s silence by publicly challenging the French occupation of the Ruhr.
But these two positive events came too late to save Cuno and his “non-party” government. The great beneficiaries were Germany’s warring party leaders, who had sat on the sidelines during the crisis and finally agreed to take responsibility and form a Great Coalition.

In Rupieper’s final estimate, the Cuno government represented a highly dangerous interlude in German and European history. During these harrowing eight months there was a suspension from fiscal, political, and national responsibility while Germany more or less awaited rescue from industrial leaders within and the Anglo-Saxon powers outside.

And help finally came. Suddenly the British Foreign Office and Treasury moved into action and pressured France to accept an international commission of inquiry. Still, the new government headed by Gustav Stresemann waited passively in Berlin, and the new Coolidge administration emitted only cautious signs of support. According to Rupieper, Poincaré ultimately bowed to London’s demands for a comprehensive inquiry on reparations not because of British or American political pressure but because of the looming threat to the franc. True, France continued to pursue its separatist schemes in the Rhineland even after the Dawes committee was convened, but the game was up. Paris could not, on its own, re-write the Versailles treaty and strip any further land from Germany.

During the Dawes negotiations, according to Rupieper, Germany remained largely passive, simply trying “to hold out as long as possible and yield as little to France as existing circumstances allowed.” To be sure, Stresemann was operating under the same illusion as Cuno. The Dawes provisions, although scaling down reparations and opening the way for stabilization and foreign loans were economically arduous and politically controversial for Germany; but Stresemann contented himself with the support of London and Washington, later claiming that the hugeness of Germany’s debt gave him an immeasurable control over the stabilization of Europe.

With the acceptance of the Dawes Plan in 1924, Rupieper pronounces the end of the struggle over reparations. But was it? The problem of interallied debts was still not solved, nor was the question of French [or Polish] security, nor the problem of German irredentism. Indeed, even the reparations question itself was not settled. It was American loans that funded German payments. And early on, Stresemann made clear his aims of revising the Dawes figures and demanding the early evacuation of the Rhineland. What would be the next steps of this liberated Germany? Rupieper gave no answer.

What we have is a microstudy of political behavior in hard times: of one of the brief Weimar cabinets that had no parliamentary basis struggling against fractious domestic interests and an overwhelming adversary. Rupieper’s Cuno launched passive resistance but also made the disastrous decision to prolong it regardless of the financial, political, and social consequences of the ensuing hyperinflation. Rupieper’s Cuno failed to convince the French to remove reparations from the realm of politics; it was the British – far more than the Americans – who made this happen. Indeed, Rupieper’s Weimar never submitted to France but it also never really shaped policy in London or Washington; and, yes, it remained “a revisionist power par excellence.”

The principal question raised by Hermann-Josef Rupieper’s fine, compact analysis of the calamity of 1923 is as follows: Was Wilhelm Cuno’s brief moment on the world stage -- with his well-intentioned but hapless combination of passivity and defiance
– as well as the inconsistent and divided responses of Germany’s ex-enemies less the gateway to the deceptively tranquil ‘twenties than a perilous detour on the long, tortuous road to the pacification of Europe?

In his next work, Hermann-Josef Rupieper turned to the political, diplomatic and economic arrangements of the post-World War II period, which produced a real American commitment to European security and prosperity, reconciliation between France and West Germany, and, despite the reservations of Great Britain, a major step towards European unity. In the shadow of the Cold War in Europe, it seems that, notwithstanding some new forms of friction, ignorance, and confusion – as well as the enduring popular mythology about Versailles and Weimar -- the aged leaders of all four powers may have absorbed some of the “lessons” of the 1920s.
Jeffry M. Diefendorf (University of New Hampshire)
Remarks in Memory of Hermann-Josef Rupieper

I first met Hermann when I was in graduate school at Berkeley and he was doing graduate work at Stanford with Gordon Craig, so our friendship was one of more than 30 years. Way back then he was a very serious student, and he seemed older than I now realize he was. Leaving Stanford, he went to Berlin and the Free University. We renewed contacts in 1975 when I was the first faculty member at Stanford’s new “Stanford in Berlin” program. Stanford’s initial German program had been in Beutelsbach, a little village outside Stuttgart. Gordon Craig had hated that, thought Stanford should be in Berlin, and when the opportunity arose, he asked Hermann to help get things going, providing contacts at the Meinecke Institute, where Stanford first had its offices, and helping find the Villa Mutheusius, into which Stanford later relocated.

As my own research interests evolved and I became an urban historian, I made several research trips to Berlin, and several times I used Hermann’s apartment in Charlottenburg as my base. That meant shared meals, beer in neighborhood Kneipen, and hearing about Hermann’s research and about developments at the FU. I was lucky to be in Berlin when he delivered his successful Habilitation lecture to a packed room in the Rostlaube and privileged to celebrate it afterwards with Hermann and his first wife Roswitha.

We also shared time in here in Washington, when he was getting the GHI going—searching for space, defining the mission and programs. In 1987 we collaborated on planning one of the first major GHI symposia, on American and the Reconstruction of Germany between 1945 and 1955. The conference itself was in Marburg, where Hermann then taught, and he was the very polished host. The papers were published in 1993 by Cambridge as number 7 of the GHI series, and Hermann, Axel Frohn, and I served as editors. Of course when we were planning the conference, we had no idea what would happen in the Fall of 1989 or that the events of that Fall and the subsequent collapse of the GDR would focus scholarly attention on the study of post-1945 German history in the way that it has. It was a very successful conference, and our goal was to have the publication both represent cutting edge scholarship on the postwar era and serve as a handbook for those just entering the field. The book is still frequently cited, and I think it has made an important contribution.

I might note a couple of problems we faced. One was that we initially thought of focusing the conference on just the 1945-1949 period, but it became clear as we corresponded with potential contributors that 1949 was a surprisingly artificial cut-off point. The second problem was quite an embarrassment to both of us. When one looks at the list of 23 contributors and conference participants, it is almost a Gruppenbild ohne Damen. Rebecca Boehlting was the only woman invited, which probably betrayed our lack of awareness of German or American women working on postwar German history. We could only apologize to Rebecca and hope that our efforts helped stimulate work on the period. Today, of course, the lineup would look rather different.
Hermann’s first books were on the Cuno government in Weimar and a social history of workers in 19th century Saxony, but by the early 1980s he was turning to contemporary history. While in Washington as a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center and then while heading the GHI, Hermann was busy gathering material for his important book, Die besetzte Verbündete: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949-1955, published in 1991. It is too bad that this has not been translated into English. American scholars of US foreign policy ought to read it, and too few American historians can handle the German. In this book Hermann traced the complicated evolution of America’s Germany policy within the office of the High Commissioner and the relevant agencies in Washington and in the growing partnership with Konrad Adenauer. He showed how the US labored to confront the complex issues of German sovereignty, the status of Berlin, possible reunification, and the firm integration of the Federal Republic into Western Europe and then into NATO. US policy makers came to realize that the stabilization of Europe, resistance to further Soviet expansion, and reasonable management of tensions that might produce another war worked together to enhance American security. That gave the US a freer hand to do what it wanted or needed to do in Asia. It did not, however, serve to promote immediate German unification. I think Hermann was particularly proud of the chapter here on the response to the Stalin note apparently offering unification in exchange for German neutrality.

Hermann enjoyed Marburg, but as you all probably know, he hoped to return to Berlin. Nonetheless, in 1993 he embraced the challenge of rebuilding a history department in Halle. Not long after he moved there, he invited me to speak. It was my first visit to the city, so Hermann gave me a thorough tour, one that ranged from the inner city, which was starting to be redone by western firms, to the Halle Neustadt and its apartment towers. He also showed me his fascinating discoveries of caches of SED and FDJ papers and propaganda materials, which he expected to have his students mine for their own work.

I say the challenge of rebuilding the department, because he expressed his dismay and disquiet over the necessity of making personnel changes, and he was frustrated by the inadequate physical facilities, the huge gaps in the library, and the reluctance of the students to embrace new methods of scholarship and critical analysis. Obviously he succeeded, as evidenced by the stream of publications that came out of his institute. He edited the Hallische Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte, which included essays on such topics as SED university policy, DDR foreign policy, consumer issues in the DDR, and the daily lives of workers in the big DDR chemical plans. He also edited or co-edited several books documenting both the repressive activities of the DDR regime and the growth of the protest movement and “peaceful” revolution that overthrew it.

Hermann was a historian through and through. He was a tireless worker, with academic projects on his mind even when getting ready for or returning from a soccer match. He viewed his departmental and university administrative duties (and his duties as initial GHI director) as vital and essential, but also as diversions from research and writing. He was a true archive rat, collecting documents on both sides of the Atlantic and never wanting to sit back in favor of some grand synthesis from the comfort of a study. Should anyone have doubts about this, let me suggest a look at the bibliography at the end of Der besetzte Verbündete. The list of archival collections, oral histories, printed primary sources, publications of the U.S. Office of the High Commission for Germany, memoirs, monographs, and
dissertations is comprehensive enough to provide a future doctoral student with a foundation on which to work.

In spite of some ventures into labor history, Hermann remained primarily a historian of diplomacy and high politics, at least until Der besetzte Verbündete was finished. At that point, some of the materials he found in his research for that book drew him in a slightly different direction. Indeed, whenever I visited, he was always pulling out binders of fascinating photocopied documents he had found in one archive or another. This all came together in his last big book, on the American contribution to democratization in postwar West Germany. Here one found not only some “high policy” in the actions of HICOG but also lower-level activities involving contacts, say, between American and German trade unions, the American Civil Liberties Union and Germans interested in civil and human rights, and American and German women’s groups. Hermann was particularly excited about this last topic, on which no one had written. He shows how the US, having recognized that women made up a sizable majority of Germans, sought to democratize women through formation of voluntary organizations, visits to the US, and contacts with American women’s organizations, such as the League of Women Voters. Even American 4-H clubs, surely organizations seldom noticed by either American or German historians, get their due. Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie has become an essential work to stand alongside studies of denazification, reform of government bureaucracy, and changes in educational institutions.

It is remarkable how contemporary the work in these 2 major books sounds: creating internal and international security, stabilization, orientation toward the West, creation of democratically minded elites, broad reeducation in democracy going beyond just formal institutional structures such as parties and parliaments or the suppression of anti-democratic organization or the destruction of the symbols of a defeated regime. Hermann was talking about the formation of a new political culture as well as new national and international political institutions.

Hermann-Josef Rupieper was comfortable in America and Germany, in the English and German languages, in American and German universities. He will be missed on both sides of the Atlantic, which he did so much to bridge in his scholarship, his person, and his contributions to the German Historical Institute.