MOBILITY AND COERCION IN AN AGE OF WARS AND REVOLUTIONS

A Global History, c. 1750–1830
Mobility and Coercion in an Age of Wars and Revolutions

The political upheavals and military confrontations that rocked the world during the decades around 1800 saw forced migrations on a massive scale. This global history brings this explosion into full view. Rather than describing coerced mobilities as an aberration in a period usually identified with quests for liberty and political participation, this book recognizes them as a crucial but hitherto underappreciated dimension of the transformations underway. Examining the global movements of enslaved persons, soldiers, convicts, and refugees across land and sea, Mobility and Coercion in an Age of Wars and Revolutions presents a deeply entangled history. The book interrogates the binaries of “free” and “unfree” mobility, analyzing the agency and resistance of those moved against their will. It investigates the importance of temporary destinations and the role of expulsion and deportation and exposes the contours of a world of moving subjects integrated by overlaps, interconnections, and permeable boundaries. This title is also available in Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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A Global History, c.1750–1830

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I

Introduction

Jan C. Jansen and Kirsten McKenzie

The revolutions and military confrontations that rocked the world during the decades around 1800 saw forced movements – both old and new – on a massive scale. It was during these years that the transatlantic slave trade reached its peak; that decades of almost uninterrupted inter-imperial warfare drove hundreds of thousands of soldiers and military agents across the globe, causing the number of prisoners of war and captives to rise to unprecedented heights; that long-standing imperial practices of convict transportation went into high gear; and that political refugees and exiles emerged as a mass phenomenon. Bold attempts by state authorities to control and regulate mobility led to new legal practices and statuses and to further waves of deportation.

*Mobility and Coercion in an Age of Wars and Revolutions: A Global History, c.1750–1830* brings this explosion in forced mobilities into full view. Rather than describing forced migrations as an aberration in a period usually identified with national independence struggles, the quest for liberty, and new concepts of citizenship and democratic participation, this book recognizes these mobilities as a crucial dimension of the momentous transformations that were underway. By putting the history of exclusion and forced removal center stage, *Mobility and Coercion* recovers the fundamental messiness, violence, and contingency of the era often described as the cradle of political modernity.

AN AGE OF WARS, REVOLUTIONS, AND COERCED MOBILITY

The decades between 1750 and 1830 comprise a chaotic and momentous period in world history. A long-standing, mainly Western, intellectual tradition has referred to this period as the transition to (Western) modernity. This
Sattelzeit (saddle period), to borrow a term coined (half-seriously) by the historian Reinhart Koselleck, was marked by simultaneous transformations in politics, societal structures, and economic production, and by the attendant emergence of new worldviews, some of which permanently altered the experience of time and historicity.¹ Most scholars of non-Western and global history have cautioned against universalizing concepts of historical change that, in many cases, only apply to a subsection of Western European regions and peoples during this period. Yet most global accounts of the period agree on its transformative character, especially with regard to political and geopolitical upheaval in many parts of the world.²

Building on this characterization of the years between 1750 and 1830, Mobility and Coercion emphasizes two forces that shaped this era: revolution, on the one hand, and warfare, on the other. These dual “expressions of mass human violence” have long been understood as defining features of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, although they are usually studied in isolation.³ A long-standing historiographic tradition has referred to the revolutions of this period as the cradle of Western political modernity. This Age of Revolutions came to scholarly life as an elite-centered picture of the American and the French Revolutions and their interconnections.⁴ Over time, historical scholarship has broadened this focus on the North Atlantic to include the major political convulsions across Latin America and the Caribbean, West and Central Africa, and southern Europe.⁵ In so doing, historians have brought into view an increasingly diverse set of actors, including Indigenous communities

⁵ For overviews of this scholarship, see Lester D. Langley, The Americas in the Age of Revolution, 1750–1830 (New Haven, CT, 1996); Win Klooster, ed., The Cambridge History of the Age of Atlantic Revolutions, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 2023); Maurizio Isabella, Southern Europe in the Age of Revolutions (Princeton, NJ, 2023); Joseph Miller, “The Dynamics of History in Africa and the Atlantic ‘Age of Revolutions,’” in Armitage
Introduction

across the Americas, West African jihadists and war captives, rebellious ship crews and privateers, and enslaved and free insurgents from Haiti and other American slave societies.6 At the same time, our understanding of the Atlantic Age of Revolutions has grown to recognize the revolutions’ inherent imperial character.7 Instead of following narratives of national self-liberation and exceptionalism, scholars now tend to highlight the imperial frameworks within which the era’s great political revolutions unfolded, and they argue for a better understanding of the dialectics of continuity and change that shaped this period.8

Scholarship that looks beyond the Atlantic world and seeks to understand the Age of Revolutions within even wider vistas must recognize that empires, rather than nation-states, functioned as political superstructures and that established chronologies were created from Eurocentric perspectives and should therefore be viewed critically. For British historian C. A. Bayly, the Atlantic Age of Revolutions was just one variant of a “world crisis,” a confluence of fiscal and military shocks that unsettled not just the colonial empires of Western European states


8 See, for example, Matthew Brown and Gabriel Paquette, eds., *Connections after Colonialism: Europe and Latin America in the 1820s* (Tuscaloosa, AL, 2013).
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but also those ruled by the Russian tsars, the Ottomans, the Qing in China, the Crimean Tatars, and the Mughals.\(^9\) While these crises seldom led to complete imperial breakdowns, and while they affected the regions of the world in varied and uneven ways, they ushered in lasting geopolitical shifts: the worldwide expansion of European overseas empires, in particular the ascendancy of the British Empire to global supremacy, soon thereafter sustained by the increasing socioeconomic divergence between Europe and Asia.\(^10\) In the Pacific and Indian oceanic worlds, expanding Western empires encountered, clashed with, or coalesced with manifold Indigenous efforts toward political and social reordering and state-building.\(^11\) The decades around 1800 also saw a higher level of subaltern unrest at sea – seaborne revolutionary action, mutinies, and rebellions – across the world’s oceans.\(^12\) This myriad of sociopolitical upheavals at land and at sea brought about a complex web of global interactions whose origin and impetus often lay outside of Europe and the (North) Atlantic world.

The upheavals of the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century “world crisis” were violent affairs, and the dividing line between revolution and warfare cannot be drawn sharply. Each of the great revolutions in North and South America, in the Caribbean, and in Europe involved large outbursts of civil war violence. Revolutions also grew out of major interstate wars, starting with the Seven Years War (1756–63), which has already been correctly described as a true world war.\(^13\)

The wars of US American, Haitian, and Latin American independence, the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars across Europe, and revolutionary and religious wars in West and Central Africa yielded a state of almost ceaseless warfare across the globe, one in which long-standing

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geostrategic interests were overlaid by the new ideological and political front lines of the era. The formation and reformation of empires and polities in South Asia became entangled with increasing European incursions in the wake of revolutionary conflicts, linking the world of the Indian Ocean with that of the Atlantic and Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{14} The world had long known major military conflicts. But after 1750, large-scale armed conflicts became more frequent, and they expanded massively in their geographic scope, both on land and at sea. These sustained armed conflicts also transformed the practice of warfare: In the decades around 1800, states built up massive naval forces, and military strategists put new and greater emphasis on artillery on the battlefield. As armies grew, civilians were increasingly drawn into warfare, a process exacerbated by the elaboration of the concept of “irregular” guerilla warfare (“small war”).\textsuperscript{15} Considering revolution and war as equally defining – and inextricably connected – features of the years between 1750 and 1830 improves our understanding of the period’s military and political history. It helps us better grasp the transformative character of warfare well beyond the battlefield, and it illuminates the violent, disruptive, and contingent realities that are too often overlooked in a teleological view of the Age of Revolutions.

\textit{Mobility and Coercion} also emphasizes a third characteristic of the period that was closely connected with the era’s sociopolitical and military confrontations and with the broader transformations then underway: greater human mobility. Against the idea of a long-term shift from “unfree” to “free” (labor) migration – still widespread in general accounts of migration history – the chapters in this volume highlight the ubiquity, persistence, and expansion of coerced mobility. Building on important advances in the historical scholarship on mobility and labor, \textit{Mobility and Coercion} departs from the classic idea of migration as a free, linear movement between a clear starting point (place of origin) and a clear endpoint (place of permanent settlement).\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} Kaushik Roy, \textit{War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740–1849} (London, 2011).
\textsuperscript{16} For a critique of the classic concept of migration as a free and linear movement, see Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, “Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives,” in Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, eds., \textit{Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives}, 2nd ed. (Bern, 1999), 11–13; Clare Anderson,
This normative account only ever concerned a slice of human mobility, not only between 1750 and 1830 but also during any other period in world history. *Mobility and Coercion* seeks to shift and expand the scholarly conversation on migration by following three key principles. First, the essays collected in this volume challenge the notion of “free” and “unfree” mobility as two discrete types of human migration and instead regard them as points on a continuum of varying degrees of coercion. The agency exercised by individuals who were moved against their will and the forms of resistance, strategies, and choices they deployed in response to systemic forces are central concerns of this book. Second, the case studies introduced in subsequent chapters emphasize the circular and multidirectional nature of human mobility across the planet and the importance of transit and temporary destinations. Third, the featured case studies underscore the importance of coerced immobility, the crucial and yet largely understudied role played by border controls, forms of identification and registration, the regulation of legality and illegality, and of practices of expulsion and deportation, and the undoing of migration in the history of mobility.

**MAJOR AREAS OF FORCED MOBILITY**

The forms of forced movement that characterized this age of wars and revolutions had very different origins and trajectories. Although political refugees, as a mass phenomenon, date to our period of focus, most forms of forced mobility that we address have much longer histories. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the transatlantic slave trade, for example, had already been conducted as a large-scale system of forced migration for several centuries. The same can be said of the transportation networks for convicted criminals. Nonetheless, all of the forms of forced mobility addressed in this volume entered into a particular stage during the globe-spanning political and military upheavals between 1750 and 1830. For the sake of clarity, we distinguish between five major areas of forced mobility that feature prominently throughout this volume:

- **Slave trade:** Almost six million enslaved Africans were boarded onto ships to the Americas between 1750 and 1830, accounting for half of the estimated 12.5 million Africans who were forced to cross the Atlantic.

between the early sixteenth and the late nineteenth centuries. In the 1790s, the transatlantic displacement and enslavement of Africans reached both an all-time high and a crucial breaking point. While the extent and decisive causes of the nineteenth-century abolitions of the slave trade and slavery are still subject to debate, we argue that revolutions and wars were crucial factors. Seen most clearly in the case of the slave revolution in Saint-Domingue/Haiti, the contestation of slavery was integral to all revolutionary struggles throughout the Atlantic world. It was central to the revolution in France and had repercussions across the French Empire as well. The American Revolution and the various independence struggles across Spanish America were likewise shaped by the involvement of enslaved people and by conflicts over emancipation. Even more important, arguably, was the destabilizing impact of war. Disruptions caused by inter-imperial and civil wars and the access to arms and military service provided crucial paths to emancipation and put greater pressure on the slavery-based

17 For regularly updated numbers, see the database www.slavevoyages.org; and for maps, see David Eltis and David Richardson, Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (New Haven, CT, 2010).
19 On Haiti, see Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 2004); Jeremy D. Popkin, You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery (Cambridge, 2010); on France and the French Empire, see Yves Bénot, La Révolution française et la fin des colonies, 1789–1794 (Paris, 2004); Lorelle Semley, To Be Free and French: Citizenship in France’s Atlantic Empire (Cambridge, 2017); on the American Revolution, see Sylvia R. Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton, NJ, 1991); Jim Piecuch, Three Peoples, One King: Loyalists, Indians, and Slaves in the Revolutionary South, 1775–1782 (Columbus, SC, 2008); Douglas R. Egerton, Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America (New York, 2009); on Spanish America, see Alfonso Múnera, El fracaso de la nación: Región, clase y raza en el Caribe colombiano, 1717–1810 (Bogotá, 1998); Aline Helg, Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770–1835 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004); Marixa Lasso, Myths of Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the Age of Revolution, Colombia, 1795–1831 (Pittsburgh, PA, 2007); Silvia C. Mallo and Ignacio Telesca, eds., “Negros de la patria”: Los afrodescendientes en las luchas por la independencia en el antiguo Virreinato del Río de La Plata (Buenos Aires, 2010).
plantation system. The short- and medium-term effects of warfare and revolutions on the slave trade and slavery were complex. Under the pressure of self-liberation, particularly in Haiti, and of state-led efforts to ban both the trade in and ownership of slaves, the locus of the slave trade shifted to places where Atlantic slavery continued (or started) to thrive, such as Brazil and Cuba. The British ban on the slave trade in 1807 itself produced new forms of bondage and unfree movement, such as the trade in indentured “recaptives,” “liberated Africans,” and “prize slaves,” and the ongoing clandestine trade in enslaved Africans in the Atlantic was accompanied by not-so-hidden slave trades in other parts of the world.

- **Convict transportation**: From the early fifteenth century, the transportation of convicted criminals and their use for forced labor had been a long-standing form of punishment practiced by all major Western, and some non-Western, empires. The multidirectional displacement of convicts to penal colonies created wide-ranging networks between colonies and metropoles across the globe. Important overlaps existed between the movement of convicts and other forms of forced labor (such as indentured labor) and labor-based punishment. Convict transportation also proved crucial in times of war and political upheaval, when the criminal justice system could be used for forced military service and impressment or to expel recalcitrant

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political opponents or unruly slaves. The independence of the thirteen North American colonies in the 1780s, hitherto an important destination for British convicts, ushered in the rise of the Australian penal colonies. At the same time, Russia began to use Siberia more systematically as a place of exile for criminals and political dissidents alike, and the British East India Company established new convict transportation systems. An increasing number of political exiles found themselves alongside “regular” criminals and undisciplined soldiers in other European extraterritorial possessions, such as French Guiana and (after 1830) North Africa.  

- Dispossession and expulsion: The political emancipation of European settler societies in the Americas went hand in hand with the shrinking autonomous spaces of Indigenous populations. Aggressive frontier colonization, land dispossession, and the state-sponsored displacement of nomadic and hunting populations on the American continents were part of a global push of White-settler land expropriation that could also be seen in places such as Australia, New Zealand, Russia, and southern Africa. If convict transportation was fundamental to the economic and geostrategic needs of imperial expansion, so too was it central to the ethnic violence of settler colonialism and the forced removal of Indigenous populations. Imperial strategies of dispossessing and expelling colonized populations and Indigenous resistance leaders resulted in particular iterations of forced removal, particularly variants of banishment and transportation, that either utilized intracolonial networks or took advantage of internal methods of isolation, often on islands. Neither these practices nor the local

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resistance they encountered were confined to the Americas or the Global South. The connection between state-building and ethnically motivated mass expulsions also became apparent in the struggles between the Ottoman Empire and national independence movements in southeastern Europe, especially, for example, during the Greek War of Independence.

**Military mobility:** Decades of virtually uninterrupted warfare saw the massive buildup and projection of armies across the world, making war “an arena for heightened human mobility.”

The resulting mobilities of soldiers and sailors were the most obvious expression of sustained imperial wars. The treatment and movement of captives and prisoners of war and of demobilized military personnel and veterans on a global scale were major issues faced by belligerent states. Lacking standing armies, warring states satisfied their insatiable hunger for military recruits through coercive means, ranging from the impressment of (formerly) enslaved individuals and convicts to early experiments in compulsory military service. Prisoners of Central and West African wars also made up a significant proportion of the enslaved captives crossing the Atlantic. As a result, major outbursts in the constant state of war that was slavery, such as Tacky’s Revolt in Jamaica (1760), look like extensions of African military history. In the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) and other later slave uprisings of the era, African-born captives were in both the armed resistance against planter regimes and

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(when drafted into the military) the counter-insurgency. 30 The military action of the era was also significantly defined by self-appointed military agents and entrepreneurs—veterans, mercenaries, “volunteers,” “adventurers,” semi-official advisers—who offered their military expertise and weaponry from one geopolitical conflict zone to another. 31 “Undisciplined” soldiers and deserters made up an important portion of convicts sent across the globe, including to France’s infamous military penal colonies in North Africa. 32

- **Political flight and exile**: Each of the major revolutions and the upheavals they generated put tens of thousands of people on the move. 33 The American Revolution pitted champions of independence against those who remained loyal to the British Crown, with the exodus in 1782–83 of at least 60,000 Loyalists in the aftermath of the American Revolution. 34 Roughly 150,000 individuals who opposed the course of the French Revolution left France in the early 1790s and scattered across Europe and the Americas. 35 Some 20,000 to 30,000 people left

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35 Kirsty Carpenter and Philip Mansel, eds., *The French Émigrés in Europe and the Struggle against Revolution, 1789–1814* (Basingstoke, 1999); Friedemann Pestel, *Kosmopoliten*
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the French colony of Saint-Domingue during the Haitian Revolution, and thousands more escaped a number of smaller revolutions (or the consequences of their failures) across Europe and the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{36} A few years later, in several movements, tens of thousands of exiles from Spanish America arrived in the Caribbean, the United States, and Europe.\textsuperscript{37} In total, more than a quarter of a million people left or were forced to leave their homes as a result of political conflicts and civil wars in the Atlantic world alone. While exile and asylum had much older precedents, the period between 1750 and 1830 stands out as the moment when people escaping political change and revolutionary violence became a mass phenomenon, with far-reaching consequences. Along with the motives for flight, the radii of forced movement changed dramatically. The refugees did not disperse, as in the preceding centuries, along religious or confessional trajectories but rather across a dynamic political map that shifted with the moving front lines of revolutionary and civil wars. Due to their political context, revolutionary-era refugees became prime targets of heightened mobility control, surveillance, and deportation by receiving states.\textsuperscript{38}

Each of these forms of coerced mobility has its own historiography. Some of them – the scholarship on the transatlantic slave trade and on convict transportation, in particular – have been, for generations, among the most productive fields of international research into forced mobility,
unfree labor, and confinement and into transcontinental, imperial, and oceanic history writ large. Others, such as the historical study of refugee mobilities, are still only, if rapidly, emerging. Whatever the extent of their genealogies, these fields share a tendency toward disciplinary compartmentalization and containment. These fields revolve around (allegedly) discrete types and categories of mobility and generate their own research questions and concepts. The histories of enslaved individuals, of convicts, of prisoners of war, of displaced Indigenous communities, and of refugees are usually studied in isolation from one another, despite the fact—as we will see throughout this volume—that people often fell into more than one category, moved in the same space, crossed paths, and interacted with one another, and in so doing forged new connections that invite new comparisons. Comparative or entangled approaches that cut across these forms of coerced (and free) mobility have been extremely rare, although a few publications by leading specialists on the slave trade and convict transportation make a strong case for such perspectives. As a result, the full extent of the explosion of all kinds of coerced mobilities during the age of wars and revolutions has been occluded by seemingly particular and disconnected histories of (forced) migrations. 

*Mobility and Coercion* goes beyond such compartmentalized approaches to offer new perspectives on this explosion of coerced mobilities. To be sure, the chapters in this volume build on specialized scholarship and present fresh, empirically grounded research, and their focus and arguments are often reflective of their respective author’s specialized background. The chapters by Christian G. De Vito and by Brad Manera and Hamish Maxwell-Stewart bring in perspectives from the histories of convict transportation in the Spanish and British Empires, respectively, while the contribution by Anna McKay emerges from the history of military mobility and war captivity. Many other chapters take the histories of various refugee movements and political migrations as their starting point: British Loyalists and French émigrés, respectively, as in Liam


Riordan’s and Friedemann Pestel’s chapters; refugees from the Haitian Revolution in the chapters by Nathalie Dessens and Jan C. Jansen; exiles during the revolutions in Spanish America in Edward Blumenthal’s and Karen Racine’s chapters; political mobilities during the revolutions in southern Europe in Maurizio Isabella’s chapter; and practices of political deportation in British-controlled India and the Cape Colony in Kirsten McKenzie’s chapter.

For all their distinct concerns and topics, the chapters in Mobility and Coercion nevertheless delineate the contours of a shared history integrated by a multitude of overlaps, interconnections, and permeable boundaries. Across multiple points of intersection, we pursue this shared ambition in two major directions. In the first place, we show how approaching the age of wars and revolutions from the point of view of coerced mobilities can break down entrenched assumptions about geographies and chronologies. Second, we challenge the clear-cut typological distinctions that still inform understandings of migration, and we interrogate the dynamic interplay between these systems of forced removal and the individuals who negotiated them.

GEOGRAPHIES AND CHRONOLOGIES

Scholars have long recognized the emergence of new borders and sovereignties as central to the age of wars and revolutions. What has received far less emphasis is the manner in which changed geographies both triggered forced mobilities and were, in turn, shaped by them. If this holds true for geography, then it is equally applicable to chronology. In response, Mobility and Coercion avoids clear delineations in either area – instead of insisting on overly rigid definitions of geographic spheres such as the “Atlantic world,” or chronological units such as the Age of Revolutions, the volume points to interlocking geographies, as seen from micro- and macro-historical perspectives, and favors an encompassing approach to chronologies in which continuities, slow change, and rupture mix. Our case studies also undercut normative ideas about the temporal and geographic structure of migration. Instead of presenting a linear movement that occurs in a clear time frame, they emphasize moments of transit, transience, sojourning, and circular movements as integral dimensions of human mobility. We approach these questions across the volume at different scales, from the granular to the expansive.

In some instances, coerced mobilities occurred in close connection with the formation of new borders, sovereignties, and regions that have
Introduction

long been the focus for research on this period. Even if this outcome had not been pursued, or even anticipated, by virtually any contemporaries, most of the revolutionary upheavals brought about newly independent states and upended long-standing notions of sovereignty and political membership. Blumenthal demonstrates how exiles and émigrés in Chile and the Río de la Plata (caught up in political and civil war dislocation) entered into fluctuating alliances with Indigenous groups in Mapuche country to both reinforce and disrupt nascent international borders and underpin evolving sovereignty. As imperial state structures broke down, émigrés found refuge with Indigenous groups, creating new alliances and alternative sovereign structures. Spaces of exile opened and closed as borders shifted in response to territorial conflicts and realignments. Turning to Louisiana as a borderland in the northern part of the American continent, Dessens emphasizes the crucial role of Saint-Domingue refugees in the early US American republic. While they participated in US nation-building, the refugees also connected New Orleans to a reconfigured map of the Atlantic world and the Caribbean.

Just as people made borders, so too did borders make people. For Riordan, the conflict and violence in North American border regions made coerced migration a common experience for all who inhabited those spaces. Riordan tracks repeated waves of expulsion across one region (what would become the borderlands of the United States and Canada) over an extended period of time. Rather than emphasizing distinct histories of population displacement, he takes a longer view and employs a layering approach that demonstrates the connections between one forced removal and the next. Thus, the struggles of Algonquian-speaking Wabanaki who resisted and fled attempted genocide cannot be separated from the ethnic cleansing of the French Catholic Acadian settlers or the purging of American Loyalists after the conclusion of the American Revolution. Shifting or tightening territorial borders during this period turned people more neatly into insiders and outsiders, even in territories where more flexible forms of belonging had long existed. For Jansen, the revolutionary era saw sprawling alien regulations and border controls that bolstered states’ powers to deport unwanted foreigners, especially refugees, and that often raised thorny questions about the criteria for distinguishing outsiders from insiders. As described by Isabella, the Greek War of Independence saw the brutal expulsion of those who were not considered part of the emerging nation of Greeks. In both cases, however, gray zones of conditional, partial, or multiple belonging continued to exist, and canny individuals were able to shape and negotiate their belonging to states.
The individual chapters in this volume deploy different lenses; whereas some highlight the experiences of specific individuals or zero in on moments of crisis, others take a broader view of systems and chronology. In McKay’s account, we see how imperial practices collapsed under pressure of victory as well as defeat. The huge numbers of prisoners of war captured by the British between 1793 and 1815 stretched their existing arrangements to the breaking point and led officials to institute new systems of global forced mobility. But analogous systems could also prove persistent and resilient. De Vito argues that historians should zoom out and view the period between 1770 and 1820 as part of a much longer project within the Spanish Empire in Europe and beyond, a project that stretched back to the 1500s and involved relocating soldiers, convicts, and vagrants to meet its military needs. Rather than generating these practices, the revolutionary era intensified and accelerated them, establishing systems and procedures that sent French refugees and convicts from Haiti into the Spanish Caribbean, while simultaneously channeling men from Europe and North Africa throughout the empire to sites where they were needed to work or fight. Similarly, McKay and also Manera and Maxwell-Stewart demonstrate the longue durée dependence of a British army on enforced mobile labor – whether their own (felons) or foreign (prisoners of war and enslaved) populations.

As with both Blumenthal and Riordan in the borderlands of the Americas, Dessens shows how waves of forced migrations overlapped and intersected in New Orleans. In so doing, she moves that city from the margins of the Atlantic world to the center of a Caribbean world in the revolutionary era. As an asylum of choice for those displaced by regional conflict, New Orleans was redefined by significant waves of free and forced migration that also changed the city’s place in the world. Dessens demonstrates how Saint-Domingue refugees – both free and enslaved – reoriented the city southward at the very moment it was incorporated into the United States after the Louisiana Purchase. Refugee flows and their corresponding cultural, economic, and political ties helped transform New Orleans into a new center of gravity for the Saint-Domingue diaspora and a nodal point of exchange within a reconfigured Caribbean world.

While the Atlantic world, broadly defined, has long been a point of emphasis in the historiography of this period, many chapters in this volume speak to the increasing trend of globalizing the revolutionary moment. Some of the borderlands in this volume were long-standing
regions of mobility, and the movements between 1750 and 1830 only reactivated them. In other instances, new territories were drawn into existing systems of displacement. Dessens and De Vito discuss the interconnection between the Caribbean and the Atlantic through the coerced mobilities of refugees, convicts, and prisoners of war, both free and enslaved. Where battlefields were global, so too were the movements of people and resources, as the chapters by Manera and Maxwell-Stewart, McKay, Isabella, and De Vito all make clear. Developments were frequently ad hoc and contingent. McKay documents the mobilities of prisoners of war who were captured by the British and detained, sold, and put to work across the empire – in numbers so high that the old system was pushed to breaking point, leading officials to move prisoners across oceans and continents, remaking empire in the process.

Pestel reminds us that such geographies were as much imagined as real. He recounts how, as exile dragged on, leading French émigrés engaged in debates about potential places for the permanent settlement of their diaspora. While still strongly rooted in a France-centered worldview, their schemes considered resettlement as a global endeavor, ranging from the North American backcountry and the Antilles to Russia and the Pacific Ocean. The idea of French political emigration to Australia, however, was also used as a rhetorical tool by French republicans to ridicule their exiled opponents. Political developments in France allowed for most émigrés’ return, and their far-reaching resettlement plans never materialized. This stands in contrast to the case of the Saint-Domingue refugees who, after a series of transient and provisional arrangements, gravitated toward US-owned Louisiana as a place for permanent settlement. Along with the resettlement of American Loyalists in America’s Northeast (Riordan), Pestel’s and Dessens’s accounts of émigré communities, real and imagined, remind us of the patterns that turned forced migrants – religious refugees, convicts, enslaved fugitives – into settlers. Imperial systems of resettlement that did not just posit imperial expansion and settler colonialism as causes of displacement (of Indigenous populations) but also as a solution to it obviously persisted into the era of political exile.41

41 On the resettlement of religious refugees, enslaved fugitives, and convicts, see Susanne Lachenicht, Hugenotten in Europa und Nordamerika: Migration und Integration in der Frühen Neuzeit (Frankfurt am Main, 2010); Owen Stanwood, The Global Refuge: Huguenots in an Age of Empire (Oxford, 2019); Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana, IL, 1999); Anderson, Convicts.
Finally, as this volume repeatedly shows, following individual life trajectories often recasts our knowledge of historical geographies. The story of Agustín Iturbide, exiled ex-Emperor of Mexico, highlights the unexpected connections that could be drawn between London and the Americas. Conspiring with local and global networks of imperial and commercial interest, Iturbide sought to manipulate these networks in an ill-fated quest to return to power (Racine). Isabella’s shapeshifting revolutionaries allow us to see the Mediterranean world from Palermo, expanding our understanding of philhellenism as not just a revolutionary form of liberalism but also as an imperial ideology and an emerging Mediterranean tradition. The Mediterranean emerges as an oceanic world populated with figures from the Napoleonic Wars who washed up on its shores and never left – officers, soldiers, mercenaries, agents, traders, and diplomats. Informal agents advanced an array of imperial interests and created new humanitarian and financial networks from a range of unstable and opportunistic subject positions. Dessens demonstrates that the strategies of Saint-Domingue refugees to increase both their economic and symbolic capital underscored the French identity of New Orleans at the very moment when it became absorbed into the United States by the 1803 Louisiana Purchase.

Networks of people and information linked regions both within and across empires. Unsurprisingly, given the ascendancy of British imperialism at this moment, London emerges as a significant node of connection in this volume. Dyani Tshatshu, a Xhosa chief who visited London in 1837, was reportedly most impressed not by railroads or steam engines but by what he saw in a House of Commons debate: “a little company of men – not taller than I am here – touch the spring that moves the world.” Historians have found it convenient to divide their histories by regional focus, but such conventions would have made little sense to those who sought to control Tshatshu’s machinery of change. In fact, three chapters in this volume (Racine; Jansen; McKenzie) show British members of Parliament and colonial officials (sometimes the very same historical actors) wrestling with issues central to this volume at the very same time. In 1824, within months and sometimes days, these men were ignoring the exiled ex-Emperor of Mexico’s overtures and demands (Racine), arguing about the subjecthood and forced removal of free people of color from Jamaica (Jansen), and managing the fallout from the

42 Quoted in Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815–45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government (Manchester, 2005), 1.
exile of newspaper editors in Bengal and the Cape Colony (McKenzie). Colonial officials managing a set of problems unfolding “everywhere and all at once” clearly recognized that a flare-up in one region could easily be weaponized by activists in another.43

Activists and authorities alike understood implicitly that debates around press legislation or the line between alien status and subjecthood could not be bound within one jurisdiction. Refugees from one locality forced the issue of legal definitions in another. Exiles and opportunists made their way to these global metropolitan centers and emanated from them as well. As Racine’s account of fallen Mexican Emperor Agustín de Iturbide shows, the fallout from the end of the Spanish Empire played out in unexpected places, including the drawing rooms of a provincial watering place such as Bath. Pestel, too, positions London as a point of intersection in the revolutionary world, connecting French émigrés with plantation interests with revolutionary Saint-Domingue and turning them into driving forces behind the ill-fated British military intervention in the Haitian Revolution. All such new arrivals tapped into, sought to exploit, and were, in turn, exploited by local politicians. Metropolitan and regional nodes were perfect hubs for plotting exiles who sought funds and forces to return home. These nodes were likewise well suited for the mobilization of prisoners of war and the deployment of transported and military labor.

SYSTEMS AND INDIVIDUALS

The case studies presented in this volume challenge the clear-cut typological distinctions that still prevail in both academic and nonacademic discourse about migration. Starting in the 1990s, social scientists and historians began dissecting rigid terminologies of migration, pointing out their pitfalls. An important subbranch of refugee studies has drawn attention to legal and bureaucratic processes of labeling and discursive distortion to which refugees and forced migrants have been subject.44


In recent years, political scientists and anthropologists have offered pointed critiques of the binary distinction between “migrant” and “refugee” as a “legal fiction” with wide-ranging legal, political, economic, social, and cultural implications for people on the move. Most of the border-crossers that fill the pages of this book fit between allegedly discrete categories of migrants, defying any neat binary between free and unfree movement.

Categories, typologies, and classificatory systems have their analytical limits and are also profoundly complicated by the entanglement of individuals with systems in real-world situations. More than three decades ago, Roger Zetter drew an analytical link between structure and agency in pioneering the concept of refugee labeling. Labels, he later reflected, not only provide a “tangible representation of policies and programmes” but are also open to manipulation by individual and institutional interests. They are both a “process of identification and a mark of identity,” whether resisted or embraced. Across the chapters that follow, we seek to unknot the tangled relationship between the structures of forced mobility and the agency of those caught up in their toils. Some authors take as their starting point large-scale histories, whether of geographies or of systems, then drill down toward the individuals who were navigating these treacherous waters of population displacement and political upheaval. Others move in the opposite direction, using case studies focused on particular historical actors to draw out expansive themes of forced migration and the possession and dispossession of human beings that eventuated.

That exile and forced movement resulted in unintended outcomes or brought together strange bedfellows becomes apparent in multiple ways throughout this volume, including in Pestel’s account of the alliance between the Knights of Malta and the French planters of Saint-Domingue. Planning global émigré outposts, he argues, was an attempt to build bonds among communities in exile, fostering a sense of shared


Zetter, “Labelling Refugees.”

belonging as well as marshaling outside support for those excluded by revolutionary forces. The Greek War of Independence in the 1820s, Isabella explains, allowed Ottoman Christian mercenaries from diasporic Greek communities to travel, in the process shifting the definition of what it meant to be Greek. Many of the chapters in this volume, whether directly or obliquely, thus question the usefulness of ideological coherence as an analytical tool for understanding individual or group motivations within the age of wars and revolutions. Whether it was the search for opportunity or safety on the part of individuals, or the needs of military and economic force on the part of state actors, expediency often trumped conviction in determining patterns of mobility.

Scores of those who roamed revolutionary-era southern Europe eluded clear categorizations as “volunteers,” political exiles, mercenaries, economic migrants, or foreign advisers (Isabella). Pestel shows how French émigrés began to imagine themselves as both political refugees and settler colonists in the Americas, Russia, and Australia. Because of the porous boundaries of warfare, sailors and whalers became mixed up with soldiers in the mass of prisoners of war and “captives” taken by the British Army (McKay). Many other cases highlight groups and individuals that cut across two or more types of coerced mobility. The British West India regiments and the Royal African Colonial Corps, discussed in depth by Manera and Maxwell-Stewart, filled their ranks with recruits who were often soldiers, convicts, and enslaved people at the same time. Coerced mobilities relating to the Haitian Revolution and the revolutionary Caribbean were particularly complex. The refugee movements from revolutionary Saint-Domingue that spread to other Caribbean islands and to North America included men and women of all races who had been born free, newly emancipated men and women, and enslaved individuals brought along by other (free) refugees (Dessens; Jansen). Their legal status notwithstanding, many Saint-Domingue refugees of African origin or descent were re-enslaved and forced into a thriving informal inter-imperial slave trade. Refugees also became mixed up with prisoners of war and convicted criminals, something British and Spanish authorities in the Caribbean grappled with (De Vito; McKay). Moving armies included thousands of quasi-indentured former slaves (“prize slaves”), convicted criminals, and enslaved men, the last of whom were either forcibly recruited or self-enlisted as a means to gain personal freedom (Manera and Maxwell-Stewart). The deployment of regiments largely composed of unfree Black and White soldiers in the slave societies of the Caribbean led to rifts between British authorities and White slave-holding elites.
But the chapters in Mobility and Coercion do more than merely demonstrate that many cases simply did not fit into clear-cut classificatory systems. In line with recent research on the historical semantics of migration and exile, they delve into the classifications and categories that were used and contested by actors on the ground. In so doing, they provide deep insights into a period in which new systems of categorizing and regulating mobilities took shape, but during which most of these categories and legal statuses still remained highly malleable. Authorities in places such as Jamaica and New Orleans, where different sets of refugees had washed up, both differentiated and blurred their vocabulary of exiled groups (Jansen; Dessens). As a result, people did not just move between places but also between legal statuses and classificatory frameworks. Legal scholars of slavery and labor history have amply shown that distinctions between personal freedom and unfreedom were in practice much less clear-cut and more porous than in legal theory. Social practice complemented – and complicated – the law. In a similar fashion, the individuals in this volume moved between legal categories of “free” and “unfree” mobility, and (above all) between different legal categories of coerced mobility. Enslaved individuals briefly became refugees, only to become enslaved again; convicts turned into soldiers and, as a consequence of war, prisoners of war. Even if the vocabulary was blurred, such classifications had profound consequences, since they had a concrete impact on the lives of the individuals categorized as such. Mobile individuals and state actors alike wrestled to turn these legal frameworks and their loopholes to their advantage. Free people of color from Saint-Domingue in Jamaica knew exactly why they sought the status of prisoner of war and not the one of refugee (McKay).

States responded to these blurred categories by attempting to pin down and systematize barriers, yet historical actors still managed to slip through them, time and again. In other instances, state actors sought to


keep their own classification systems flexible, indistinct, and open, while individuals tried to claim specific categories for themselves. In a world where track-and-trace systems were emerging in state structures, where the rise of the information state increased technologies of surveillance, paper identities became an increasingly important factor in mobility. Tickets of leave, musters, ship manifests, and slave and foreigner registrations—all were mechanisms by which both identity and movement were pulled more and more under state control.50 In multi-imperial borderland regions such as the Leeward Islands, continuous warfare and the fear of revolutionary “contagion” gave rise to surveillance systems that cut across different colonies.51 De Vito shows how new categories were created within the Spanish Empire to classify and manage different kinds of exiles from the conflagration of Saint-Domingue. Yet these systems were never totalizing, as several chapters show. In McKenzie’s chapter, we meet James Silk Buckingham, a British-born resident of Bengal who was subject to the East India Company’s practices of forcible exile, known as “transmission.” Buckingham tried to bypass this rule and protect his Calcutta newspaper by putting ownership into the hands of Francis Sandys, who as a Bengal-born subject was exempted from transmission. Refugees, in particular, were assiduous in expanding their opportunities to turn such systems to their own benefit. The Saint-Domingue refugees studied by Jansen deftly navigated discriminatory legal measures in Jamaica through their own bureaucratic efforts to fix a more favorable identity or subject position for themselves or their heirs. Refugees, though untrained, were shrewd in their vernacular use of the law to counter forces of state control through alien status. If paperwork trapped some, then it enabled others, as in Isabella’s chapter, which demonstrates how renegotiated “national” identities could mean taking advantage of documents and facilities to secure passage.

Tracking individual fates and state actions complicates any easy relationship between forced removal and legal regimes. Though few prisoners were directly sentenced to conscription, as De Vito, and Manera and Maxwell-Stewart point out, royal prerogatives and other judicial maneuvering and pretrial legal wrangling could be used to push men into the army. Inconsistent legal regimes were usually figured out in situ at

50 For a recent analysis of this information technology in the Australian convict system, see Hamish Maxwell-Stewart and Michael Quinlan, Unfree Workers: Insubordination and Resistance in Convict Australia, 1788–1860 (Basingstoke, 2022), 287–92.
the margins. Distinctions along the lines of race, gender, and social status, or between free and enslaved peoples, shaped these ad hoc legal frameworks according to the needs, prejudices, and fears of local officials. State authorities and individual actors also had to navigate plural legal systems and uncertain jurisdictions that grew out of the intersection between different European legal traditions, as in the Cape Colony; between Indigenous and European imperial law, as in the American borderlands; or between contradicting local colonial and overarching imperial law, as in British Jamaica (McKenzie; Riordan; Blumenthal; Jansen). This had both advantages and disadvantages. For authorities in the Cape and Bengal (McKenzie), the peculiarities of peripheral legal regimes at first looked advantageous in removing troublesome subjects, but what seemed expeditious could easily backfire when subject to scrutiny from the metropole. Likewise, a particular set of alien legislation seemed to offer Jamaican authorities leeway to quell domestic unrest, until what had been practiced for several decades got caught up in fierce debates in the imperial center (Jansen). In an era in which all major European empires underwent profound constitutional transformations, individual cases of coerced migration could resonate with major debates. The actions and fates of particular historical actors became points where controversial topics, like the shifting terms of state belonging, the fundamental rights of political members (subjects/citizens), the rule of law, or freedom of the press, crystallized.

Individual fates in this conflagration of war and revolution were profoundly gendered. The timing of the pregnancy of Charlotte Lecesne, and the birthplace of her son Louis Celeste Lecesne, two of the exiles studied by Jansen, were details that figured importantly in ensuing debates about their status and subjecthood in early 1800s Jamaica. The legal status of mother and son differed, but in each case, their status was contentious and carefully fashioned in the face of a hostile bureaucratic regime. Family connection and community formation were part of the refugee movements (real and imagined) explored by Dessens, Riordan, and Pestel. The connection to

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family was even stronger for those who claimed royal status and saw themselves in relation to their dynasties. As Racine shows, plotting in London and Bath, Iturbide was concerned to ensure the proper education of his children as well as to regain his throne in Mexico. Meanwhile, as British Admiralty registers of prisoners of war demonstrate, even ostensibly male-dominated systems of forced mobility had to account for women, children, and non-combatants in their logistical organization and consider the fates of families (McKay). And, of course, the relocation of immense numbers of men was never a gender-neutral phenomenon. The consequences of an unbalanced sex ratio in new convict colonies on the Australian continent sparked persistent concerns about sex between men, or (as was the usual phrase) “unnatural crime.”

Where our authors focus on the opportunities of mobility in this volume, they emphasize that these were restricted not only to men but also to particular types of men. Race and class determined how individuals fared within systems of coercion, and whether a prisoner of war, for example, was enslaved or liberated. The fate of those men who either seized the opportunities of mobility or were forcibly removed were bound up in the identities they asserted, and in many instances these identities were carefully manipulated. The journalists at the heart of McKenzie’s account, for example, presented themselves within a particular model of reforming middle-class masculinity that gained traction in the early nineteenth century against the backdrop of aristocratic “Old Corruption.”

They served as avatars of the independent European merchant class in colonial entrepôts, representing the politically and economically motivated critics of local administration. Those exiles put on trial in absentia in the wake of the Chacay Massacre (Blumenthal) were similarly adept at manipulating emerging networks of public opinion through publication. For Blumenthal and McKenzie, as well as for Jansen, media could be used across borders to launder the opinion of exiles in one space so as to facilitate their return to another.

Decades of global war not only changed militarized masculinity on an individual level but also undergirded the violence of forced mobility and imperial expansion. In the “legion of the damned” (Manera and Maxwell-Stewart), we meet Joseph Wall, whose background before enlistment included not only sexual assault but also the killing of a friend in a duel over a matter so trivial that Wall could not recall the cause.54

54 A Military Gentleman, An Authentic Narrative of the life of Joseph Wall, Esq late Governor of Gorée. To which is annexed a faithful and comprehensive Account of his
As lieutenant governor in Gorée, West Africa, Wall commanded a regiment made up of enslaved Africans, British convicts, and disgraced soldiers. During Wall’s command of the African Corps, he was accused of the arbitrary detention and suspension from command of his junior officers, the wanton imprisonment and brutal flagellation of his troops, the extortion of African leaders and traders, and the embezzlement of provisions and naval and military stores for his private enrichment. Facing an inquiry, he fled. After twenty years on the run, Wall was finally arrested and put on trial. Convicted of murder, he suffered the agonizing and prolonged death of a botched execution in 1802. Wall’s sadism was noted and condemned even by his contemporaries. But what of the more widespread impacts of trauma on large groups of men who served in “condemned battalions” made up of slaves, “deserters and culprits from the hulks”?55 Many went from disease-ravaged service in the West Indies to convict guard posts in Australia, where they were caught up in frontier conflict or made the journey (both physical and mental) in the other direction.

If these patterns underscore the way in which human mobility connects theaters of empire not normally studied together, what consequences did these connections have for individual action? In different ways, the chapters in this volume point to the intersection between the military, penal labor, and slavery that lay at the heart of “war capitalism.”56 The voracious demand for troops, and the acceptance of disposable recruits, made for inherently brutalizing systems. These were not operated by disembodied forces, but by men who – whether attracted to violence or damaged by trauma – took one set of experiences with them to their next deployment. While historiography has paid increasing attention to “imperial careering,” there has been less emphasis on tracing these intersecting systems and their consequences both for individual behavior and for more widespread assumptions about militarized masculinity.57

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Execution (London, 1802); Messrs Blanchard and Ramsey, The Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Wall for the Murder of Benjamin Armstrong ... (London, 1802). With thanks to Brad Manera for alerting the authors to this case.

In pulling together new research from different historiographic strands, *Mobility and Coercion* does more than present a comparative panorama of discrete case studies and episodes. The individual chapters are informed and linked by an interest in the larger contexts, connections, interstices, and gray zones that emerge from different histories of coerced mobility. Together, they advance perspectives that go beyond the conceptual and historiographical specificities of their respective case studies. In so doing, they deliberately disrupt assumptions about the appropriate focal points of scholarly emphasis, and they caution against the divisions that have hitherto separated certain fields or approaches. As a result, the chapters might seek the political machinations of Latin American revolutions in the salons of Bath, England, or trace the impact of convict settlements in Australia on the imagination of French émigrés. None of the chapters focuses squarely on slavery and the slave trade, but the ubiquity and importance of the mobility of enslaved people is apparent in at least half of them. None offers a squarely military history, but the ubiquity of global war or the threat of war infuses all of them. Whether approached at the macro or the micro level, the subsequent chapters examine the intersection of mobile individuals and systems of mobility. In tracking individuals and groups who were caught up in moments of profound upheaval, we see that even under the most constrained conditions, individuals who moved under coercion aspired to agency and actively sought to shape their own fates in various ways – by slipping through categories, seeking out opportunities, manipulating legal regimes, and spreading the consequences of war and revolution around the globe.
Sustained warfare and violence triggered multiple forced migrations across the Northeastern Borderlands of North America during its first two centuries of colonialism. Diverse Indigenous communities as well as varied settler groups relocated throughout this multinational region as a result of direct force and due to overlapping voluntary and semi-coerced impulses to relocate. The multiple mobilities of Algonquian-speaking Wabanaki individuals and communities, French-speaking Acadians, and English-speaking Loyalists in the second half of the eighteenth century have almost always been treated in isolation from one another, which risks overemphasizing the uniqueness of each movement. A comparative assessment focused on their common presence in modern-day northern New England, the Canadian Maritimes, and Quebec reveals these movements to have been deeply imbricated with one another and demonstrates that moving under pressure was a quotidian experience in this borderland. As every chapter in this volume shows, mixed mobility shaped by both coercion and choice was a defining feature of the long age of wars and revolutions from the 1750s to the 1830s. At the same time, mobility is fundamental to the human condition and underlies colonialism, generally, and the transatlantic slave trade, in particular. The groups, region, and events analyzed in this chapter have value as a case study and also merit attention because

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the conflicts showcased here over boundaries, mobility, and sovereignty remain pressing in our increasingly interconnected world.

The Wabanaki homeland formed the easternmost part of the Northeastern Borderlands. In the 1750s, the borderlands stretched across rival British and French claims to places intermixed with Indigenous communities that extended at least to contested Haudenosaunee (also identified as the Iroquois or Six Nations) territories in the Ohio Country and around the Great Lakes. This large region included multiple Indigenous polities that increasingly (but not always) acted in solidarity. Its numerous colonies were generally at odds with one another (even when they shared a European sovereign), and they were internally divided among settlers, government officials, and land speculators. British and French imperial and colonial leaders struggled to control their own subjects and Indigenous groups almost as much as they warred with one another. Myriad cross-cutting interests fueled constant conflict and triggered dramatic forced migrations of several kinds.¹

The foundational coercive migration in the region displaced Indigenous individuals, communities, and polities. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the Wabanaki people responded to the growing crisis of colonialism with such skill that its four major tribes still maintain officially recognized control over some portion of the pre-colonial Wabanaki homeland today.² Although this territory is now vastly reduced, and the struggle against colonialism remains deeply challenging, recent legal decisions in Canada and the US point to a potent twenty-first-century Indigenous revitalization that draws directly on historical experiences, legal precedents, and diplomacy during the age of wars and revolutions.

The southern edge of the Wabanaki homeland in this era began in the Kennebec River Valley of Maine, roughly the northern ecological limit required for traditional sedentary agriculture. One of the Wabanaki’s most important creative adaptations to colonialism modified and expanded traditional practices of seasonal mobility. Another key innovation was alliance-building to thwart genocide. These strategies changed over time

¹ On colonial borderlands and interconnected settler and Indigenous mobilities in the southernmost Western Hemisphere, see Edward Blumenthal’s chapter in this volume.
and included advantageous as well as traumatic relationships with Euro-American newcomers. As the historians Emerson Baker and John G. Reid stressed in a major revisionist assessment, “there was a crucial weakness in the non-native hold on the Northeast,” where the “strategic acumen of native polities” limited the speed and sweep of colonialism.3

The Wabanaki Confederacy purposefully responded to growing threats upon its homeland and serves as a helpful introduction to these First Nations. The confederacy’s four main groups from west to east are the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, Maliseet (Wulstukwiuk), and Mi’kmaq. The core homelands of the first pair are marked on the landscape by the rivers and bays that bear their names today, while the territories of the latter two are highlighted on the Maritimes inset map (Map 2.1). The geographically central pair share many qualities, as well as neighboring territories on Passamaquoddy Bay and the Wələstəkw River (the Saint John River in English, a translation of its French colonial name), while the two more distant groups had more distinct local experiences that sometimes led to inter-tribal conflict.4

The earliest lasting colonial settlements in the region were by French speakers around the Baie Française (Bay of Fundy), who came to call themselves Acadians. Partly due to the modest number of male-dominated settlements in the early seventeenth century, Acadian relationships with neighboring Wabanaki people were often positive, and included some intermarriage and spiritual syncretism. When France ceded peninsular Acadia to Great Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), the status of Acadians in the new British colony of Nova Scotia was ambiguous. A limited British presence and sparse settlement by English speakers led weak colonial rulers to accommodate Acadian persistence. This detente would be shattered when British and French hostilities emboldened Nova Scotia and Massachusetts officials to forcibly remove Acadians in 1755.5

After the Seven Years War (1756–63), imperial and colonial authorities hoped to swiftly resettle the rich farmlands that had been emptied of Acadians with voluntary migrants from southern New England. To encourage resettlement, Nova Scotia’s government provided transportation, provisions, and generous purchase terms. Governor Charles Lawrence further assured migrants that they would enjoy Protestant religious freedom outside the Church of England and that a legislature would belatedly be created for the colony. Roughly eight thousand “Planters” took advantage of these opportunities in the Acadian deportation zone, but this migration waned after 1768 as ongoing Acadian and Indigenous resistance contested new settlement from southern New England. Modest additional migration from Yorkshire, Highland Scotland, and by German speakers from Central Europe completed the colonial presence in Nova Scotia prior to the arrival of huge numbers of Loyalists in the early 1780s.6

The Northeastern Borderlands region was the most important destination for Loyalist exiles from the American War of Independence. More than 60,000 individuals who were loyal to the British Empire left what became the United States, a much greater proportion of refugees, relative to the total US population, than would flee from the French Revolution.7 Nova Scotia received about 32,000 new settlers and Quebec some 14,000, a major influx of English speakers in both provinces that especially transformed Nova Scotia (see Map 2.1). For the majority of Loyalist refugees, the solution to British capitulation in 1783 lay in its North American acquisitions in two previous wars. Loyalist exile led directly to the creation of the new province of New Brunswick out of mainland Nova Scotia in 1784 and of Upper and Lower Canada from the former province of Quebec in 1791. Loyalist

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Map 2.1 The Loyal British Atlantic, ca. 1775–95. The Northeastern Borderlands region was the destination for the majority of Loyalist refugees from the American Revolution.

Source: Map based on Jerry Bannister and Liam Riordan, eds., The Loyal Atlantic: Remaking the British Atlantic in the Revolutionary Era (Toronto, 2012).
forced migration and colonial state formation were fundamentally fused and perpetuated the symbiosis of mobility and colonialism.\(^8\)

Loyalists who fled rebel tyranny gave powerful voice to their suffering, and the creation of new British North American provinces promised them a fresh start with just compensation for their abuse. However, this familiar characterization relies too heavily on a Loyalist view and a self-congratulatory imperial reassessment in the wake of military defeat. Loyalists who moved north did not arrive in the wilderness, as is still too often asserted. Loyalist recourse to the Northeastern Borderlands rested upon the deportation and dispossession of Acadians and Wabanakis, practices that had surged since the 1750s. The American War of Independence was the immediate cause of Loyalist exile, of course, but the fuller meaning of their mobility built upon the steady expansion of colonial order in the borderlands.\(^9\)

The interconnections of Wabanaki, Acadian, and Loyalist mixed mobilities are revealingly united in the figure of John Allan, whose colonial leadership in the Wabanaki homeland rested in large part on his own multiple forced migrations. He had been born in 1747 in Edinburgh Castle, where his family took refuge from a rebellion in Scotland. At the start of the American Revolution, he was a prosperous settler with Acadian tenants in Cumberland County, Nova Scotia, where he served several terms in the legislature. When Allan, as a Patriot, fled west to safety in August 1776, he left behind five children, a wife (who would be imprisoned), a farm (later burned), livestock, and other property (confiscated). Allan was a two-time refugee, a strong opponent of Loyalists, and a patron of Acadians, as well as an exploiter of both their labor and their improved lands. He championed Wabanaki claims even as his work accelerated their dispossession.\(^10\) While Indigenous individuals,


bands, and even whole tribes strategically withdrew and were forcibly expelled as colonial intrusion surged, they continued to use many sites in their occupied homeland. Allan noted that “many [Wabanaki] families have been known to reside for months [on the coast] without being seen by the white Inhabitants.” His lengthy report of 1793 ended by emphasizing that “Indians are not subject to, or amenable to any power; they have been always viewed as a distinct Body, govern’d by their own customs & manners, nor will they ever tamely submit to any authority different from their own.” Seasonal and riverine mobility, traditional practices modified in the colonial crucible of forced migration, sustained Indigenous sovereignty in the Northeastern Borderlands. As the ethnohistorian Micah Pawling concludes about Wabanaki vitality, the colonial state never completed its conquest because it “struggled to hit a moving target” in this multinational region.11 Closer scrutiny of forced migrations in the Wabanaki homeland reveals how Indigenous, Acadian, and Loyalist mobilities shaped one another and changed the Northeastern Borderlands during the age of wars and revolutions.

**MOBILITY, COERCION, AND OPPORTUNISM IN THE WABANAKI HOMELAND**

Mobility can be compelled, but it is also deployed to avoid adversity and seek opportunity. As the colonial presence grew stronger in the Northeastern Borderlands after 1750, the overlapping, competing, and complementary migrations of Wabanakis, Acadians, and Loyalists revealed continuities that fused together forced, voluntary, and ambiguous movements. The First Nations held unquestioned power almost everywhere along the northeastern seacoast (and even more so in the interior) at the midpoint of the eighteenth century. Tribal cooperation and allegiances were sought by colonial and imperial authorities who conformed to Native expectations about the proper conduct of nation-to-nation diplomacy and even land ownership.12 In 1750, there were


12 On Wabanaki mobility as resistance to colonialism, see Thomas M. Wickman, *Snowshoe Country: An Environmental and Cultural History of Winter in the Early American Northeast* (Cambridge and New York, 2018), and on halting colonialism in eastern
no substantial English-speaking settlements east of the Kennebec River until one arrived at the British pales in Nova Scotia around Annapolis Royal (formerly the French outpost of Port Royal) and the brand-new naval base at Halifax. This was not a landscape of stable colonial farming communities. Rather, it hosted a changing cast of fishing settlements and small river-based forts and truck houses with nearby homesteads (many with squatters who settled beyond the reach of the law). The colonial presence was so uncertain here that the town founders of Machias sought legal recognition from both Massachusetts and Nova Scotia in 1763.13

The formal framework for Wabanaki–British relations in this era was a set of treaties negotiated in Boston and Annapolis Royal from 1725 to 1727. These treaties closed the Fourth Anglo–Wabanaki War, also known as Dummer’s War. This critical regional conflict was one of the few wars with no European analogue in a century of near-constant warfare that started in 1675. As a result, it is little studied by historians of Euro–American empires and nations. Nonetheless, its painstakingly negotiated resolution was pivotal for those who lived in the Northeastern Borderlands. Treaty conferences involved officials from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Nova Scotia as well as “several Tribes of the Eastern Indians,” principally identified as the Norridgewock (on the upper Kennebec), Penobscot, St. Johns (often used by the British for the Maliseet as well as the Passamaquoddy in this era), and Cape Sable (one of many Mi’kmaq communities). Although this fundamental agreement was reaffirmed continually at least through the Treaty of Peace and Friendship negotiated at Halifax in 1760, its meaning sparked sharp disagreements.

Loron Sauguaaram (Laurent Sagourrab), who served as a key Penobscot negotiator for more than three decades starting in 1720, poignantly clarified the Indigenous interpretation of the word “submission,” which appeared in the printed treaty but had not been part of the oral diplomacy. Sauguaaram explained, “do not hence infer that I acknowledge thy King as my King, and King of my lands. Here lies my distinction — my Indian distinction. God hath willed that I have no King, and

that I be master of my lands in common.”14 Indigenous rights secured in these treaties remain at issue in contemporary lobstering disputes that have pitted the Canadian Supreme Court against the provincial governments of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and led to anti-Indigenous violence in 2020.15

Impending imperial conflict on the eve of the Seven Years War emboldened leaders of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia to implement ethnic cleansing policies in 1755 to enhance their power in the Wabanaki homeland. On November 3, 1755, Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Spencer Phips issued a proclamation that awarded “premiums” for Penobscot men, women, and children brought to Boston as captives for enslavement, with lesser sums being granted for their scalps. A recent painting by the Penobscot artist and historian James E. Francis recreates the Phips Proclamation in paint, and reclaims it to testify that Wabanaki mobility helped the tribe to triumph over the genocidal goal of the 1755 law (Figure 2.1). Francis appropriates and transforms the Phips Proclamation by relegating the government broadside to the background, superimposing a red human figure upon it, and then emblazoning a single Penobscot word that translates as “we walk on eternally” across the surface on the diagonal. The word appears in blood-red paint that drips down the text of the broadside.16

The second ethnic cleansing campaign begun in the Wabanaki homeland in 1755 is more widely known today. The infamous Grand Dérangement mobilized provincial and British soldiers in a carefully planned effort to decimate generations-old Acadian settlements in Nova Scotia. The systematic campaign eventually removed nearly 13,000 people, more than half of them to other British mainland colonies in 1755. After imperial wars were officially declared, another nearly 6,000 Francophones were deported to France between 1758 and 1778. Based

on a close reading of the United Nations’ 1994 definition of ethnic cleansing and an analysis of various factors (such as premeditation, sustained commitment of significant resources, high mortality among exiles, seizure and destruction of community records, burning of the built landscape), the historian John Mack Faragher judges the Acadian deportation to be “the first state-sponsored ethnic cleansing in North
Exile and Opportunity

American history.” 17 The initial round-up and expulsion of Acadians followed the June 1755 defeat of French forces at Fort Beauséjour, the strategic point on the isthmus that connected Nova Scotia to mainland North America and that delineated British and French land claims. Nova Scotia Governor Charles Lawrence and his council authorized the deportation the following month without support from imperial officials, and by the end of the year, thirty-six transport ships, mostly owned by Boston-area merchants, had removed French speakers from the major Acadian settlements at Chignecto (surrounding Fort Beauséjour, now rebranded by the British as Fort Cumberland), Minas Basin (with the large community of Grand Pré at its center), and Annapolis Royal. The initial expulsion of 7,000 Acadians to other British mainland colonies was a stunning opening salvo, but only hinted at the scope and duration of the long Acadian expulsion. The initial deportations of 1755–57 triggered some immediate counter-migration back to Nova Scotia as well as the flight of about 4,000 Acadians out of Nova Scotia to adjacent French colonial possessions. Self-preserving flight may have been a matter of choice but was far from voluntary, a type of movement under duress long familiar to these French speakers’ Wabanaki neighbors.

British military success in 1758, following the capture of the fortified town of Louisbourg on Île Royale (Cape Breton Island) as well as at Île Saint-Jean (Prince Edward Island), led to the direct deportation of some 3,500 people to France. Acadian deportation declined in the postwar period (see Map 2.2), but chain migrations initiated in 1755 created a web of Acadian mobility across the Atlantic, with especially large numbers returning to Nova Scotia or venturing to Saint-Domingue and New Orleans. The last major movement in the three-decade-long expulsion was of 1,624 Acadians from France to Louisiana in 1785.18 For Acadians


Map 2.2 Acadian deportation and migration, 1763–67. Acadians were directly deported to France, starting in 1758. Related transatlantic chain migrations flourished in the 1760s and revived during and after the American Revolution.

Courtesy of Stephen J. Hornsby and the Canadian-American Center, University of Maine.
forced from Nova Scotia, as well as for Indigenous communities across the Northeast, motives to migrate ranged from life-threatening coercive violence to quasi-voluntary mobility to seek more promising opportunities. Crucially, the genocidal campaigns against both groups failed, but the trauma they unleashed remain rallying points for the collective memory of contemporary Acadian and Wabanaki people.

The Acadian deportation of 1755 closed one phase of a regional guerilla war that had pitted French speakers and Wabanaki allies against the British since 1749. Yet even after the French defeat in North America in 1760, the Wabanaki nations remained autonomous and forcefully asserted their sovereign rights. In response to royal direction, Nova Scotia Lieutenant Governor Jonathan Belcher Jr. acknowledged the Mi’kmaq free exercise of Catholicism, land possession, and the right to hunt, fowl, and fish unmolested across nearly all the northern coast from Canso to the Bay of Chaleurs. This recognition of Mi’kmaq rights and power in 1762 reflected British colonial and imperial limitations in the Wabanaki homeland in spite of success against France.

The Seven Years War also opened the way for an aggressive British advance into Penobscot territory when Massachusetts built Fort Pownall on the western shore of Penobscot Bay in 1759. Joshua Bailey was among the 100 men from southern New England who participated in the three-month construction crew, and his journal attests that the project aimed to displace Wabanaki power. When he reached the site, their first task was to set the “‘bounds’ … between the nations.” Bailey was confident that Massachusetts Governor Thomas Pownall, the expedition’s leader and the fort’s namesake, would subdue the Indians. While en route at another fort, Bailey reported that an Indigenous scalp was brought in by James Cargill, who had led a massacre of twelve Penobscots at Owl’s Head in July 1755. Initially jailed for that killing spree, Cargill was released and promoted to militia captain when the Phips Proclamation declared war on the Penobscots four months later.

Like most British forts strung along the coast of the Northeastern Borderlands, the modest Fort Pownall combined multiple functions.


Direct military operations were rare from such lightly staffed outposts. While they threatened force, such sites most effectively advanced colonialism as centers of regulated Indian trade and as stimulants to colonial settlements. When Massachusetts Governor Francis Bernard acquired a personal interest in the region, after the legislature granted him Mt. Desert Island, he charged Joseph Chadwick with determining the most optimal route for a road from Fort Pownall up the Penobscot River to Quebec City in 1764. Chadwick relied on the Wabanaki for assistance, but they were reluctant to lead him into the interior. Indeed, they were so “jealous of their country being exposed by this survey” that a two-day “fray” erupted among Penobscons, several of whom refused to guide him beyond the major community at Penawabskik (modern-day Indian Island), some forty miles upriver from Fort Pownall. The remaining guides forbade Chadwick from using surveying equipment, explaining, “when they were among Englishmen they obeyed their commands and now best way you do obey Indian orders.” Chadwick did not reach Quebec, but he learned about the Wabanaki transportation infrastructure, especially that the Penobscot River allowed swift communication that connected the St. Lawrence, Kennebec, and St. John River systems.21

The situation at Fort Pownall in September 1767 underscores the tentative claim that the British had in the Wabanaki homeland even after the Seven Years War. Returning from a visit to look after the governor’s interests at Mt. Desert Island, Thomas Goldthwaite, the fort’s commander, found a dangerous situation. Livestock had been killed, and local colonists fled to the fort for protection. Goldthwaite warned that the Indians had “never been so open and daring in their insults.” They were emboldened because large numbers of Wabanaki from the tip of Nova Scotia to the outskirts of Quebec City had traveled to the Penobscot to assert their control over twelve rivers in the region. Among them was a St. Francis Indian named Philip, who claimed to carry a letter from British Indian superintendent William Johnson in New York. Philip promised to return the next day with the letter and 300 Indians, and Goldthwaite prepared for an attack.22


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The small party that arrived with Philip the next day did not launch an assault, but what they said upset Goldthwaite. The Penobscot leader Espequeunt had just returned from a two-week stay in Canada, where he had met with a French gentleman who spoke of yet another European war. A Penobscot woman named Osa, who had Goldthwaite’s confidence, assured him that the Penobscots did not plan to war immediately, but she confirmed that they were upset about the growing British presence and colonists “hunting and settling upon their Rivers.” Philip became the scapegoat for these tensions, and the Penobscots reaffirmed their commitment to the British in the resonant terms of the 1760 treaty between the Mi’kmaq and Nova Scotia, to “peace and friendship with us.” Nevertheless, Goldthwaite feared the Wabanaki; his garrison was weak, and the Penobscots knew it.

The Wabanaki Confederacy, which took shape gradually around 1700, endured into the early 1870s, and was reconstituted a century later, mitigated colonial dispossession. Importantly, the confederacy extended beyond the four Algonquian-speaking Wabanaki groups to include several other First Nations and linked them to additional inter-tribal alliances. Especially significant were adjacent Indigenous groups to the south and west who had been forced off their land by rapid settler expansion up the fertile valleys from the Hudson to the Kennebec rivers. Many Abenaki, who had been pushed out of what are now Vermont, New Hampshire, and southern Maine, resettled along the St. Lawrence River in Catholic mission communities such as St. Francis (Odanak) and Bécancour (Wôlinak), where they participated in the Indigenous confederation of the Seven Nations of Canada. These communities had strong ties with Algonquian-speaking Odawas (Ottawas), who joined the Wabanaki Confederacy from their homeland around Lake Huron. The confederacy also bridged the Algonquian–Iroquoian linguistic divide with its triennial convention at the Catholic Mohawk community of Kahnawake (near Montreal),

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which, of course, had its foundation in Haudenosaunee traditions. While much of Wabanaki life revolved around family bands and clans that structured tribes and nations, larger confederacies were necessary to resist colonialism.

The extraordinary testimony given by an Indigenous person to Thomas Goldthwaite at the Penobscot Bay outpost of Fort Pownall in 1771 offers a tantalizing glimpse into how Indigenous–imperial alliances, warfare, and enslavement connected the Northeastern Borderlands to the continental interior. This man’s natal community was among the Mataugwesauwacks, far to the west of Lake Superior, and he had been taken in battle by enemies of his people and “sold for a Slave as is the Custom.” He was then exchanged among multiple native groups before being owned by a master of the Widauwack nation, who “had intercourse with the French.” Next, he was sold into military service to fight with the French in 1759 at the Battle of Quebec, where he met Penobscot warriors. He ended up being baptized as a Catholic, marrying a Penobscot woman, and in 1771 described his extraordinary journey to Goldthwaite, who, in turn, shared the information about large martial groups on the North American plains with his military superiors.25

The trajectory of this Indigenous informant who married into the Penobscot nation was made possible, in part, by the integrative function of the Wabanaki Confederacy. As John Allan, a key Indian agent on the contested Maine–New Brunswick border, explained two decades later, Wabanaki “correspondence & intercourse” stretched from Canada [Quebec] to the “Mickmack Country.” Thanks to the “very easy conveyance by the Lakes, rivers and Streams,” a “natural propensity for roving,” and “universal” intermarriage from the Miramichi River to St. Francis (Odanak), “an Indian can hardly be found past 30 years of age but is acquaint’d and known within this circle.”26 Colonial assaults on the Wabanaki had raged almost continuously since the 1670s, yet their networks and traditional practices of mobility sustained them in their homeland.


THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND INTENSIFYING COLONIAL MOBILITIES

When the American War of Independence began in April 1775, the Northeastern Borderlands immediately drew strategic attention. Most English-speaking colonists in the Wabanaki homeland had ambivalent attitudes toward the conflict far to the south, and Indigenous nations held the balance of power between the Kennebec River and Halifax. Goldthwaite surrendered Fort Pownall’s artillery to British naval forces and would soon become an ardent Loyalist. Nonetheless, he convincingly defended his actions to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, which had few options other than to rely on him as the sole colonial authority in the Penobscot Bay region. John Lane, an Indian negotiator sent there by the Provincial Congress, reported invaluable assistance from Goldthwaite and was especially optimistic about a local meeting that “gave me the greatest assurance” of being able “to engage the St. François tribe” as rebel allies. Some fifteen years after its founding, Fort Pownall clung to a tenuous colonial toehold.27

Just after Lane’s visit, Maine militia destroyed the fort to prevent the British from occupying it. Most of its former inhabitants resettled on the nearby eastern shore of Penobscot Bay at Majabigwaduce (also known as Bagaduce and Penobscot, and, after the war, Castine), where the community’s status as Patriot, Loyalist, or neutral was uncertain.28 That the militia leader who destroyed the fort was James Cargill, who had spearheaded anti-Indian violence in the region since the 1750s, must have given Penobscots grave concerns about a future Patriot order.29 Continental Army forces under Benedict Arnold had begun their trek up the Kennebec River to Quebec City with five Penobscot guides, and rebel privateers attacked British ships and communities around the Bay of Fundy, even burning the remains of Fort Frederick at the mouth of the Saint John River, and seizing three small British naval vessels at Machias. This triggered the October 1775 destruction of


28 Place names in borderlands provide indications of sovereignty and local knowledge. Penobscot elder and language-keeper Carol Dana suggests that “Majabigwaduce” is a form of the Penobscot word “Maci-pikwatohs,” meaning “bad shoal.” Personal communication, February 6, 2021.

Falmouth (modern-day Portland), the largest city in the Eastern District of Massachusetts, as Maine was known at the time. Long before the Declaration of Independence, the Northeastern Borderlands suffered significant violence, severe food shortages, roiling uncertainty about political allegiance, and intensified forced migration.

The first notable Loyalist outmigration from Maine followed the bombardment of Falmouth by the Royal Navy and the subsequent plundering of the city’s rubble by rebel militia from neighboring towns. Suspicion and abuse from all sides was more than many Loyalists could bear. Eighteen of them had pledged to Governor Thomas Hutchinson to work against “indecent reflections on the Administration” in February 1774, only to learn that he was about to depart Massachusetts for London, where he would live in exile for the rest of his life. When the letter from his Falmouth supporters was found in his country house by rebel plunderers over a year later, the Provincial Congress published it to expose the “pernicious conduct” of Falmouth Loyalists. With the destruction of their town two months later, many fled to Boston, now administered by Governor-General Thomas Gage. Then, when the British evacuated Boston in March 1776, most Loyalists there departed for Halifax, the staging ground for lasting British control of New York City from September 1776 to November 1783. The Loyalist diaspora from Maine began early, and, like prototypical refuge movements, included multiple migrations.30

The critical period from 1774 to 1776 brought repeated Wabanaki requests for better access to trading opportunities, sharp limits on new settlement, and the placement of resident Roman Catholic priests with the tribes. The capstone of these negotiations came when the Massachusetts Provincial Congress and representatives of the Maliseet and Mi’kmaq Nations held a conference that produced the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship at Watertown on July 19, 1776, which marked the first recognition of US independence by any sovereign nation.31 The lead Wabanaki negotiator, Maliseet chief Ambroise (Bear) Saint-Aubin, would prove a staunch Patriot ally until his death in 1780. He was joined by two other


31 A scanned copy of the treaty can be downloaded from the Maine State Archives: https://digitalmaine.com/arc_200_exhibit_wabanaki_relations/7.
Maliseet signers as well as signers from seven Mi’kmaq bands, among whom the treaty proved especially divisive.

As Patriot forces hurriedly prepared for an anticipated battle for control of New York City in August 1776, lead Massachusetts negotiator James Bowdoin felt confident about the Wabanaki alliance. He wrote to General George Washington that he expected to raise a regiment of 500 Indians and 250 Americans, who would receive equal pay, as per the terms of the treaty. Even though Penobscots had not been signatories, Bowdoin felt that they were the strongest of the Wabanaki allies, and “looked upon themselves to be one people with us.” To raise these troops, Massachusetts sent negotiators to the four Wabanaki tribes as well as to tribes at St. Francis. Indigenous enlistments never met Patriot expectations in terms of sheer numbers. Still, it is worth noting that warriors were sent from a range of places: three Mi’kmaq communities (one from distant Gaspé) and one Maliseet had left for New York City from the treaty conference itself. They were joined by seven Penobscots in October, even though their guides on the disastrous Arnold Expedition (two of them wounded and three imprisoned) had not been paid for their service. This handful of warriors and the hope for more remained so critical to General Washington that on the eve of his famous crossing of the Delaware River, he wrote to the Maliseet and Passamaquoddy Nations urging them to keep the “chain of friendship” and to communicate to the Mi’kmaq to do the same.32

The situation on the Penobscot River, however, was not as secure as Bowdoin and Washington hoped from afar. Rumors of an overland British attack from Quebec, and Massachusetts’s attempts to remove settlers from above the head of tide in deference to Penobscot sovereignty sparked local fears. The settler Jeremiah Colburn was opposed to leaving the land above the falls that he had improved since 1774, and he also called for the creation of a joint unit of Penobscot and settler rangers, not out of a sense of common cause but because Indians were “in no means to be trusted alone.” Meanwhile, Penobscots demanded better access to coastal hunting areas because a possible British attack from the north made them “afraid to go back in the Limits of Canada as we use to do.”33 The war intensified Massachusetts’s dependence on

33 Jeremiah Colburn to Council, September 10 and 12, 1776, American Archives, 5th Series, 2: 765, 758; Penobscot petition, November 2, 1776, American Archives, 5th Series, 3: 807.
Wabanaki allies, which, in turn, increased conflict between settlers and their distant government. Animosity among settlers also spiked as they accused one another of loyalism, particularly by trading with the British for desperately needed provisions in defiance of rebel prohibitions.

Local conflict intensified when a large British force landed on the eastern shore of Penobscot Bay at Majabigwaduce in June 1779 and began to build Fort George. British expansion into the Wabanaki homeland was a direct response to the Franco–American alliance in the American War of Independence that had brought a French fleet and troops to Rhode Island the previous summer. This was a major turning point, especially for Wabanakis, many of them French-speaking Catholics, who had struggled internally about their allegiance in the Anglo–American civil war. At key Indian conferences with all four major Wabanaki groups at Machias and Passamaquoddy in summer 1778, the US Superintendent for Eastern Indians, John Allan, reported on the westward movement of many bands from the Saint John River to Machias, and on the strong commitment of Indigenous nations on the St. Lawrence to attack the British. In short, Allan felt that “the Indians are prodigiously roused, thro’ every Tribe” by the Franco–American alliance, “war seems to be the Cry from all Quarters.”

The large British force in the region quickly secured support from settlers through an amnesty proclamation that reached far-flung coastal towns that were well-integrated by sea. Fort George was initially staffed by 450 troops from the 74th Regiment, primarily raised in the Scottish Highlands, and another 200 of the 82nd Regiment, raised at Lanarkshire, in and around Glasgow. They would be joined in 1782 by Brunswick and Anspach-Bayreuth troops from continental Europe. The Hanoverian tone of colonization in the Northeastern Borderlands continued with the diverse armed forces at Fort George.

Dr. John Calef, who had lobbied the British government for more robust colonization on the Penobscot since the mid-1760s, moved to the region as a Loyalist refugee about a year before British forces...

34 John Allan to President of Massachusetts Board of War, Machias, August 9–10, 1778, in Baxter, Documentary History, 16: 29.

arrived. Meanwhile, his fellow Penobscot land speculator, John Nutting, carried Secretary of State George Germain’s orders to create a new colony from the Penobscot to St. Croix Rivers to General Henry Clinton in New York. This colony of New Ireland, in the heart of the Wabanaki homeland, was to offer a haven for “distressed American subjects,” who had been abused “by the violence of the rebellious rulers in the revoluted provinces.”\textsuperscript{36} Massachusetts responded to the British advance in the borderlands with remarkable speed, raising a large force of thirty-seven ships and as many as 3,000 men, who arrived in Penobscot Bay in late July, just five weeks after the British. The Penobscot Expedition’s effort to defeat the British utterly failed and has even been described as the worst US naval loss prior to Pearl Harbor. The rag-tag rebel armada fled upriver from British naval reinforcements, destroyed their own ships in the chaotic retreat, and then fled on foot back to southern New England, many supported by Penobscot guides who took them on an interior route to the Kennebec River. The Patriot retreat was dependent on the Penobscot Nation, and rebel General Solomon Lovell noted that Wabanaki assistance was conditional. “I found myself obliged to promise them a truck house on [the] Kennebec River which was the first Article they insisted.” This led to the re-establishment of Fort Halifax as a trading site, where the Recollect priest Juniper Berthiaune would later be assigned by the French consul. Several Penobscot bands relocated there for winters during the war, a return to a vital part of their homeland that had been devastated by the Norridgewock Massacre in 1724.\textsuperscript{37}

Fort George and New Ireland remained a British stronghold throughout the war, effectively challenging rebel authority on the coast to its west in a contact zone that suffered harrowing violence. The closest study of loyalism in this region judges persecution by Patriots to have been the major spur to overt loyalism and concludes that Penobscot-area Loyalists wielded effective counter-revolutionary violence with British support from the fort.\textsuperscript{38} To the east, the rebels were even weaker. Patriot

\textsuperscript{36} Castine Historical Society, Castine, ME, George Germain to Henry Clinton, September 2, 1778, transcript; Germain to Alexander Wedderburn, February [27?], 1779, in Davies, \textit{Documents}, 17: 68. See also John Calef, \textit{The Siege of Penobscot} (1781; New York, 1971). For a prewar map of New Ireland, see Hornsby, \textit{Surveyors of Empire}, 75–77.


John Allan and his Wabanaki allies held out in increasing isolation at Machias, especially once the British overcame some initial hesitancy and actively recruited Wabanaki allies. Allan’s foil in Nova Scotia was Michael Francklin. As a former Mi’kmaq captive, Francklin possessed considerable cultural knowledge; as an influential Halifax merchant and landowner who had served as lieutenant governor, he also had resources. Charges of corruption and financial reversals had diminished his status, but as a French and Mi’kmaq speaker, Francklin was well positioned once he was named Indian Superintendent for Nova Scotia in 1777. He also benefitted from the assistance of two able partners on the Saint John River: Captain Gilfred Studholme and Father Joseph-Mathurin Bourg. Studholme oversaw the construction of Fort Howe near the mouth of the river in 1777–78. The fort would host major Wabanaki conferences in 1778 and 1780. Bourg, who was equally crucial to Francklin, was an Acadian who had been deported at the age of eleven in 1755. He had lived in Virginia, England, and France before moving to Quebec in 1772, and in 1774 he began serving as a Catholic missionary in British Nova Scotia. At the 1778 conference, Father Bourg threatened Maliseets and Mi’kmaws with excommunication if they allied with the rebels. Allan believed that generous British diplomatic gifts, a pardon for past support of the rebels, and the “spiritual threats of the priest” combined “to stagger the most zealous [Wabanaki] for America.”

While the war went well for the British across the Northeastern Borderlands after 1777, and New Ireland succored Loyalist refugees, the debacle at Yorktown, Virginia, in October 1781 triggered a sudden collapse in popular support for the war in Britain and ended Lord Frederick North’s ministry. This stunning reversal would be matched and even exceeded in Loyalist eyes by the terms of the peace treaty two years later. British diplomats granted generous concessions to the rebels to limit French spoils. Loyalists were appalled by Article V of the treaty, with its tepid assurances that Congress would try to limit the abuse of Loyalists by state authorities and local mobs. Loyalists and soldiers at Fort George were thunderstruck that the St. Croix River, some 130 miles to their east, had been established as the boundary between the US and the remaining provinces of British North America. What had been the point of their military success and of the brief colonial experiment of New Ireland?

The refugees who had settled near Fort George during the war suffered forced migration once again. Most of them headed to an analogous location on the east side of Passamaquoddy Bay, and in doing so they relocated from the Penobscot homeland to that of the Passamaquoddy tribe. The basic geography of this area was so little understood by Euro-Americans that disputes over the international border would continue into the 1840s. Although wartime allegiances were highly contingent, the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy more consistently committed themselves to the Patriots than had their Maliseet and Mi'kmaq brethren in the Wabanaki Confederacy. The vigor of Machias as a Patriot–Wabanaki stronghold helped to ensure that postwar Loyalist settlements would have to be farther east in more-certain British terrain. Just like Loyalists who moved east during and after the war, many Passamaquoddy and Maliseets migrated west to collaborate with John Allan. In doing so, they shared the forced migration route of Nova Scotia rebels such as Allan himself, who spent most of the war at Machias and later settled on Treat Island in western Passamaquoddy Bay.

The agents sent by Loyalists from Fort George to locate a new site for their postwar settlement infuriated Allan, who insisted that the place that they selected was not on the eastern side of the St. Croix River, as named by Samuel Champlain in 1604 and referenced in the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Those who left New Ireland founded the town of St. Andrews, soon the seat of Charlotte County, New Brunswick, some sixty miles west of scattered older colonial settlements at the mouth of the Saint John River. The newcomers raised about sixty houses at St. Andrews by January 1784, which increased to three hundred by year’s end. Famously, some of the buildings had been taken apart in New Ireland, shipped to the new settlement, and stand there today, forming part of local historical memory that still commemorates Loyalist “Landing Day” of October 3, 1783.

The bulk of the new migrants to St. Andrews arrived in a sudden burst from May to November 1783. The British government supported

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them with land grants, building supplies, and provisions, which went to loyal refugees and provincial soldiers, and to individuals in disbanded British military units who chose to stay and pursue the opportunities of colonial society. Those from Fort George organized in two groups: the Penobscot Association with 649 Loyalists, and the 74th Association with 205 individuals connected to the British soldiers who chose not to return to Scotland. The Loyalist refugees were overwhelmingly women and children (only 12 percent were adult men), and even the military group was a notably domestic migration, with 39 percent women and children. Out of nearly 11,000 total Loyalist settlers in the new province of New Brunswick in the final provisioning account of November 1785, the 1,940 individuals at Passamaquoddy were the second-largest concentration, essentially on par with those in the newly incorporated city of Saint John and its immediate environs. Given a total prewar New Brunswick population of about 3,000 colonists, plus another 2,000 or so Acadians on the margins of British society, Loyalist refugees lastingly transformed what had been mainland Nova Scotia.

St. Andrews was built on the site of Qonasqamkuk, long a principal settlement of the Passamaquoddy, who defended their homeland. The Wabanaki Confederacy held a conference on Passamaquoddy Bay on November 6, 1783, to oppose the emergent postwar order. Allan demanded that US and Massachusetts officials support their wartime allies. Yet, when an Anglo–American commission resolved the matter in the 1790s with the active assistance of Robert Pagan, a former Falmouth merchant and Loyalist who had moved to Fort George during the war and became a prominent leader at St. Andrews thereafter, the commission ignored the Passamaquoddy claims. As Passamaquoddies noted at the Wabanaki Confederacy conference in November, the arrival of Loyalists and decommissioned British soldiers left them “to

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43 The changing contours of Nova Scotia from 1750 to 1800 are clearly established in a pair of linked articles by Graeme Wynn in the *Canadian Geographer*, 31 (1987), 98–113, 319–38.
submit & take our chances on the lakes & streams above” the bay. The current seat of the Passamaquoddy tribal government at Sipayik (Pleasant Point, Maine) is a direct result of their forced dislocation from what became St. Andrews.44

The War of 1812 included a return of British military control to Fort George on the Penobscot River as well as to Moose Island (Eastport, Maine), just below Sipayik on the western side of Passamaquoddy Bay, where the British remained until 1818, three years after the treaty ending the war had been negotiated. The contest to control the region always included active roles for Wabanakis. When a Euro–American war loomed once again in 1839, this time over rival claims by Maine and New Brunswick to lucrative timber stands on the upper Saint John River, the Wabanaki mobilized in ways that they had honed for centuries to blunt the impact of colonialism. Noting that he did so on behalf of his whole tribe, Penobscot Lieutenant Governor John Attean requested that Indian funds controlled by the Maine government “send two delegates to Quebec to prevail on the Indians in that quarter to remain neutral in the present disturbances between the Provinces and this State.”

Two months earlier, as part of the same conflict, fifteen Maliseet men from New Brunswick had petitioned the Maine legislature to support the relocation of their family bands to part of their homeland now in Maine. The Maliseet petitioners were “driven by the barbarity of the British from our settlement on the St. Johns River,” likely the Tobique Reserve about 100 miles north of Fredericton. They hoped to secure at least 500 acres on the Moose River, where it enters the western side of Moosehead Lake, over 200 miles to the west. The petitioners had support from settlers in the nearby town of Monson, yet the legislature rejected the Maliseet request in 1839. Their ties to the area persist – in 2013, the Kineo Band of Maliseets initiated an unsuccessful request for Maine state recognition, renewing their bid in 2020.45


Mixed Mobilities and Fixed Borders in the Wabanaki Homeland Today

The long struggle to define boundaries and to firmly fix groups to places in the Wabanaki homeland continues to the present. The Maine Indian Land Claims Act of 1980 remains actively contested, and the implications of a Canadian tribunal’s 2017 decision in favor of Madawaska Maliseet land claims are still unfolding. Both relied heavily on treaties and related developments during the age of wars and revolutions. Maliseet success before the tribunal hinged on land set aside for them in a 1787 New Brunswick survey that sought to accommodate Loyalist and Acadian settlement on the upper Saint John River. For Penobscots, crucial legal precedents lay in treaties with state authorities in 1796, 1818, and 1833 (all in violation of the federal Non-Intercourse Act of 1790) that severely diminished the tribal homeland of the 1750s. Meanwhile, the Passamaquoddy position in 1980 was bolstered by their recently rediscovered 1794 treaty with Massachusetts, negotiated when the river that formed the international boundary between the US and British North America (both in non-ceded Wabanaki territory) had not been definitively established.46

The age of wars and revolutions from the 1750s to the 1830s brought intensive forced migration to the Northeastern Borderlands. Acadians, Loyalists, and Wabanakis all moved under pressure in this time and place, and their paths frequently intersected and affected one another. While mobility was often linked to trauma, it also offered opportunities. This is especially clear in the case of Loyalists with their powerful imperial sponsor; yet Acadian and Wabanaki mobility was also more than just a badge of victimhood and conquest. The Grand Dérangement was a brutal violation, but Acadians did not succumb to it as a final solution. The strongest concentration of Acadian settlement in the Northeast today lies along the transnational Saint John River and in coastal New Brunswick, including the francophone city of Moncton, ironically named after British General Robert Monckton, who led brutal anti-Acadian campaigns. For Wabanaki individuals and communities, mobility was a refashioned traditional practice to weather the onslaught of colonialism. Migration helped Wabanaki people avoid

46 For Wabanaki treaties with Massachusetts and Maine, see Pawling and Donald G. Soctomah, “Defining Native Space,” in Hornsby and Judd, eds., Historical Atlas of Maine, plate 23; for documents related to the Canadian tribunal, see https://specific-claims.bryan-schwartz.com/.
Exile and Opportunity

genocide. Penobscot nation member James E. Francis’s powerful afore-
mentioned painting *We Walk On; Eternally* (Figure 2.1) announces
Wabanaki people as an increasingly forceful presence in the public life
of the Northeastern Borderlands today.

When the artist Fitz Henry Lane visited Fort George in the 1850s,
local residents no longer called their town Bagaduce, Majabigwaduce, or
even Penobscot. Those names had been rejected after the Revolutionary
War as too tainted by loyalism and Patriot military failure. As James
Parker explained in a July 4, 1796, oration, those names would “never
form an honourable trait in the history of our country” and needed to
“be rescued from dishonor” so that “history not be ashamed to admit
it within her pages.”47 The town’s postwar name of Castine commem-
orated the early French colonial presence in the area, especially that
of Baron de Saint-Castin, who had arrived on the Penobscot in 1670
and became an influential settler and trader, and whose adoption by the
Penobscots and marriage to a tribal member helped him to become a
cross-cultural leader. Nearly two centuries after Saint-Castin’s arrival,
Lane painted a local landscape that shows Castine from the perspective
of Fort George and documents the presence of two Penobscot women,
dressed in Victorian style, selling baskets to an Anglo–American woman
(Figure 2.2). As the scene suggests, Wabanaki basket makers contin-
ued a traditional cultural practice and drew upon new artistic and
commercial means to help sustain their people in transformed circum-
stances. Penobscots maintained a seasonal presence at Majabigwaduce,
camping on the cove just below the fort in order to harvest sweetgrass
for future use and to sell baskets made the previous year. Lane’s friend
John Stevens noted seeing five Penobscot family camps at the cove in
September 1852.48

Exile and suffering are resonant dimensions of forced mobility, yet
they can mask how migration, even when under duress, can also lead to
opportunity. Large-scale human movement was the fundamental engine

48 On Northeastern basketmaking, see Ann McMullen and Russell G. Handsman, eds., *A
Key into the Language of Woodsplint Baskets* (Washington, CT, 1987). For baskets col-
lected at Castine similar to the ones in the painting, see Hudson Museum, University of
Maine, online catalogue #HM6886 and #HM6887. Wilson Museum, Castine ME, John
M. Stevens, journal, September 22, 1852. See also, Amanda Marie Ellis, “Wabanaki
Access to Sweetgrass (*Hierochloe odorata*) within Coastal Maine’s Diminishing Open
Native Homelands,” presents persistent Wabanaki mobility in nineteenth-century
of colonialism, and perhaps no group on the planet has escaped its ever-widening impact. Voluntary and coerced migration combine along a broad spectrum, and mixed mobilities flourished with extraordinary intensity in the Wabanaki homeland starting in the 1750s. A comparative perspective on forced migrations in this region highlights that refugees were far from unique or exceptional. Rather, they were quotidian figures whose movements and actions helped to create the modern world, and who remain a familiar presence in a world distressed by war, economic inequality, and climate change.

The Acadian deportation at the start of the Seven Years War, and their decades-long movement throughout the Atlantic world, and the Loyalist diaspora during and after the American War of Independence are usually set at a distant remove from one another, and they have almost never been considered in the context of Wabanaki mobility, even though the Acadians, the Loyalists, and the Wabanaki shared a stage in the Northeastern Borderlands. Their situations were never the same, indeed their interests often directly conflicted, yet the strength of national and imperial claims in the nineteenth century has obscured the deeply colonial calculus that shaped their interconnected mobilities.
Everyone who engaged colonial societies understood their world to have been created from the rewards and consequences of the physical movement of large population groups across local, regional, and Atlantic spaces. This was a world on the move, and those who lived in colonial settings had to migrate as circumstances demanded and allowed. They did so with a keen strategic sense that mobility involved losses, risks, and opportunities.
In 1806, François René de Chateaubriand, whom the French Revolution had turned into one of the most-traveled Frenchmen of his time, had an unsettling encounter in Palestine. He was presented to Frère Clément, a former Capuchin from Mayenne who lived in a monastery next to the Church of the Nativity. The monk, refusing to adhere to the 1790 civil constitution of the clergy, had been deported to Spain and from there was sent by his order as a missionary to the Holy Land. There, he hoped to “obtain by the merit of my Savior’s crib the power to die here without … thinking of a country where I am long forgotten.”

The two émigrés, who had known the world from Niagara Falls to Jerusalem, were not the most extreme cases of mobility induced by the French Revolution. Farther east, we find Antoine de L’Étang, former master of the stables at Versailles. After his emigration, he took up the same function with the British East India Company at Fort William in Calcutta before moving into the service of the Saadat Ali Khan II in 1809, overseeing the wazir’s stud at Lucknow. As for Gabriel Louis Marie Huon de Kerilleau, former secretary to Louis XVI and, as rumor had it, illegitimate son of Louis XV, he first moved to England, where he enlisted as a private in the army, then joined the

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New South Wales Corps, arriving in Australia in 1794 and establishing himself as a landowner.3

These cases document the existence of a French diaspora that faced revolutionary exclusion and reached far beyond Europe. Decisions about leaving France in critical moments of the revolution were highly dynamic, and the choice of a place of exile was often a pragmatic if not contingent matter. Yet, over time, the original idea of a temporary migration aiming at the earliest possible return to France changed. With the military successes and political setbacks of the French Republic, the temporal horizons of exile expanded, and its geographical scope broadened accordingly.

The growing global French émigré presence in the 1790s can be attributed to several factors. First, the advances of the Revolutionary Army led many European powers to tighten their accommodation policies, forcing tens of thousands of émigrés to leave territories close to the French border, such as the Habsburg Netherlands, northern Italy, and southern Germany.4 Many of these émigrés moved to Britain, which, through its opposition to the French Republic, became the “last boulevard of Old Europe” for many French exiles by the later 1790s.5 Second, numerous émigrés chose to go to the United States, doing so out of political sympathies, biographical continuities, or commercial interests.6 The young American republic hosted an important community of French adherents to the constitution of 1791. Those émigrés who had already taken part in the War of Independence were even Atlantic migrants in two senses. Finally, like the French Revolution, French emigration spanned the entire French colonial empire. Émigrés with colonial possessions who wanted to leave Europe sought to save their fortunes in the Caribbean. Likewise, colonial planters escaping from the Haitian Revolution and


unrest on the Lesser Antilles resettled within the Caribbean or moved toward the North American continent.  

Over time, however, with the prospect of a foreseeable return to France vanishing, these multidirectional migrants became a subject of debate among the émigré communities and their host societies. On the one hand, in the words of Pierre Victor Malouet, an important intermediary between continental émigrés, colonial refugee planters in London, and the British government, the exiles – “living from foreign charities being persecuted from place to place” – represented a humanitarian challenge for their hosts. On the other hand, prolonged exile became a political risk, if not a public safety one. François Dominique de Reynaud de Montlosier, a close political ally of Malouet, warned the Habsburg government about the danger of abandoning “this multitude of active and enterprising people without home and property prowling eternally around their country, always disposed to pour their despair, energy, and talents into domestic troubles.”

This chapter explores a central émigré response to this humanitarian and security challenge: the establishment of global settlement projects reaching from North America and the Caribbean to North Africa, the Russian Empire, and Australia. Either planned as organized schemes or merely imagined in smaller émigré circles, these settlements aimed to provide large groups of destitute exiles with a material livelihood and, at the same time, a politically autonomous and socially demarcated existence that would allow them to preserve their habits and identities. Even when a return to France seemed impossible, a precarious exile did not include assimilation into the host societies, since émigrés, in most cases, were not immigrants. Although these settlement projects spanned the globe, the specifics of their geographical and political conditions, to say nothing of the native inhabitants of the various regions, were regarded as largely insignificant, since the settlements served the principal purpose of solving the émigré problem.

7 Carl A. Brasseaux and Glenn R. Conrad, eds., The Road to Louisiana: The Saint-Domingue Refugees, 1792–1809 (Lafayette, LA, 1992); Nathalie Dessens, From Saint-Domingue to New Orleans: Migration and Influences (Gainesville, FL, 2007), and her chapter in this volume; Ashli White, Encountering Revolution: Haiti and the Making of the Early Republic (Baltimore, MD, 2010).

8 Balliol College, Oxford (hereafter, BCO), Mallet Family Papers (MP), no. 11, Pierre Victor Malouet to Jacques Mallet du Pan, January 18, 1798.

9 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Frankreich Varia 52, François Dominique de Reynaud de Montlosier to Johann Amadeus Franz de Paula von Thugut, August 17, 1795.
Émigré settlements were interchangeable across space. They need to be understood, first of all, as spatial imaginaries that responded to the revolution and the impossibility of return. Therefore, I argue that planning global émigré outposts represented both a discursive reality and a communicative strategy. The very act of speculating about going to North America or Crimea helped the émigrés to strengthen cohesion among their communities, maintain a shared sense of belonging, and mobilize military and humanitarian support in host countries. The relocation of tens of thousands of people made for a powerful mental image that gave the émigrés a particular relevance in European politics, colonial empires, and beyond as they assimilated political exile to settler colonialism, creating a form of imperial engineering and political experimentation.

The broad geographical perspective on French emigration taken in this chapter connects with the global turn in scholarship on the French Revolution. In the context of the broader Age of Revolutions, this more encompassing view places the revolutionary Atlantic at center stage, shifting the focus from Western Europe to the Caribbean. As has become increasingly clear, the Age of Revolutions was not confined to the Atlantic world, and the revolutionary wars that were understood as global warfare not only encompassed the colonial empires but also mobilized regimes in the Islamic world.

Given the ongoing historiographical reinterpretation of the Age of Revolutions, it is remarkable that the 150,000 or so émigrés who left revolutionary France after 1789 have received so little attention to date. In

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the 1790s, as R. Darrell Meadows has emphasized, thousands of French Creoles, émigrés, and citizens were constantly on the move between the Caribbean, France, and the American continent, facing revolutionary upheaval both in the colonies and the metropole. On the trajectories of their travels, French émigrés interacted with exiles from other revolutions, including Caribbean refugees, American Loyalists, Knights of Malta, and exiles from Geneva. For these reasons, recent scholarship has started to recast the Age of Revolutions as an “age of emigrations” or “age of refugees,” in which several hundred thousand political migrants – with the French émigrés being the largest group – interacted in the Atlantic space but also far beyond. They competed for resources, collaborated to increase their political significance, and pondered their options for resettlement.

Building on these connections within the age of emigrations, this chapter introduces four areas where extra-European émigré settlement projects were planned by political exiles and sparked the imagination of their adversaries. The first section reconsiders émigré colonies in the United States, where French exiles were to serve as frontier agents in Franco–American speculative ventures. Through the lens of emigration, I enlarge the traditional scope of American frontier history by considering the revolutionary situation in France. I show how the settlements’ overall failure resulted from the settlers’ highly idealized view of America, their socially conservative organization, and the limited timespan of their exile.

The second section focuses on the connection between London as the primary European destination for French émigrés and revolutionary Saint-Domingue. I discuss schemes designed to bring the émigrés to the Caribbean to help suppress the slave insurrections and to repel the Revolutionary Army that would also absorb other exiles. Furthermore, I show how the military failure of the British Army in the Caribbean shifted migratory dynamics toward Trinidad and Canada. The third section looks beyond the Atlantic world toward settlement projects that

provided further options in response to expulsion and political or military setbacks. In the Southern Hemisphere, for example, relocation could be imagined as deportation by French republicans who sought to ban the émigrés from their political and geographical horizon. This area also saw probable migratory links between political exile and the coerced migration of convicts. The fourth section discusses how ideas about relocating the émigrés to extra-European areas shifted when the possibilities for a return to France grew under Napoléon Bonaparte, particularly in relation to the French colonization of North Africa. I argue here that the global imaginaries of exile turned into a political challenge for France’s post-revolutionary regimes. In the conclusion, I highlight the émigrés’ relevance for global approaches to the French Revolution and offer new perspectives on the global dimensions of émigré settlement and the associated impact on early nineteenth-century French politics.

COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE AND SOCIAL RESTORATION: ÉMIGRÉ SETTLEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The three émigré settlements on the US frontier served émigré self-identification but were also tied up in local backcountry conflicts and land speculation. In different ways, the settlements in Gallipolis (Ohio), Azilum (Pennsylvania), and Castorland (New York) were commercial enterprises that offered the promise of social organization beyond revolutionary exclusion. Émigré visions of America were largely informed by Enlightenment readings. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Marquis de Condorcet, and the physiocrats’ tracts, particularly Michel Guillaume St. Jean de Crèvecoeur’s *Letters from an American Farmer* (1782), offered readers seemingly uncorrupted rural societies in idealized views that appealed to opponents of the revolution. From Paris, prospective émigrés imagined the American frontier as an immediately available and accessible space between revolutionary France and the United States. This dreamy


perspective led them to disregard important practical considerations, such as local environmental and climatic conditions, property rights vis-à-vis American speculators and Indigenous populations, and US politics. In fact, the Ohio and Scioto region, in the late 1780s and early 1790s, was the site of strong tensions and violent confrontations between Native Americans, land companies, and the American military. French aristocrats, however, imagined North America as an agrarian utopia that would allow them to regain or preserve their property, social status, lifestyle, and political convictions. American émigré settler colonies differed from other emigration projects in that information about them was disseminated early on, already in the very first months of the revolution. Therefore, as they materialized, they were able to attract émigrés who traveled directly from France to the United States. Later projects, in contrast, were usually set up from exile and aimed to recruit émigrés who were already living outside of France.

The Gallipolis project arose when two agents of the Scioto Land Company arrived in Paris in 1788. They acted on behalf of the Ohio Company, which had been granted preemptive rights to large areas in the Scioto region in southeastern Ohio by the American Congress. Sciotomanie caught Paris in full revolutionary effervescence. Quickly, the company adapted its prospectus, which had originally promised a new life “under a well-established and free government” and instead appealed to the “large number of people who have lost their status due to the present revolutions.” By February 1790, some 100,000 acres of land had been sold. Though Sciotomanie caught on among all classes of society, a group of troubled aristocrats usurped the project, as it promised compensation for the rupture of the traditional social order brought about by the French Revolution.

The two leaders of the Paris “Sciotomaniacs” were Jean Jacques Duval d’Eprémesnil, counsellor at the Paris Parliament and son of the former French governor of Madras, and Claude François Adrien de Lezay-Marnésia, a proponent of civilizational regeneration in America.

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Together, they assembled the largest shareholders in the Société des Vingt-Quatre, which put forth an imagined vision of an American model-world for French aristocrats. What later became Gallipolis was first planned as Newpatrie – a hierarchical settlement with a church, hospital, French schools and a university, printing press, and administrative as well as judicial institutions. Artisans and the laborers needed for farm work were assigned to live in a segregated establishment, despite having come to the settlement in the hope of liberty and tax reduction. The agrarian enterprise was to remain entirely French; there was no mention of integration into American society.

The socially conservative character of the Scioto project quickly sparked polemics among opponents of aristocracy. Imagining how the disempowered elites would create a faux ancien régime in Ohio – complete with heraldry, castles, gabelle (tax on salt), and lettres de cachet (orders of imprisonment) – became a popular subject for satire. Camille Desmoulins depicted an aristocratic micro-society competing for the biggest dovecote or practicing jus primae noctis among its subjects. Like “Coblentz,” the ill-reputed gathering place of the Royalist and military emigration near the 1791/92 Franco–German border, from where rumors circulated about political and moral debauchery, Scioto served as symbol for anti-aristocratic critique.

The approximately 500 settlers who finally set out for Gallipolis were, however, mostly commoners. Many of them left the settler track on the East Coast, none of the castles of Newpatrie were ever built, and Duval d’Épremesnil was ultimately guillotined. The conditions they encountered in the purchased territory proved disastrous. The settlers unwrapped their marquetry furniture and silver chandeliers in rudimentary wooden cabins. The native populations refused to give up their land. Violence and illnesses took their toll on the arrivals; and French wigmakers, jewelers, and wood turners, who had suffered back home from the destitution imposed by their noble employers, proved inept at land clearing. Around 1800, with the number of émigrés decreasing, American settlers began to take over Gallipolis.

20 Desan, “Transatlantic Spaces,” 482. Though the actual criterion of distinction was property ownership and not noble birth, this would hardly have made a difference in America, given the social rank of the major shareholders. Hoffmann, “Introduction,” 15.
22 Moreau-Zanelli, Gallipolis, 217–34; Desan, “Transatlantic Spaces,” 486–93; Révolutions de France et de Brabant, March 8, 1790.
Azilum, the second émigré outpost, was situated on the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania and courted the thousands of émigrés from metropolitan France and Saint-Domingue who had taken refuge in Philadelphia. The two initiators were, once again, high-ranking politicians: Antoine Omer Talon had been chief justice of the criminal court in Paris, and, like his collaborator, Louis Marie de Noailles, a member of the Constituent Assembly. Both were constitutional monarchists who fled to America after the downfall of the French monarchy in 1792. That being the case, they were able to supervise the building activities on the ground. Moreover, Noailles could rely on his American connections as a veteran of the American War of Independence.24

With all classes of settlers residing in one community, Azilum was more inclusive than the original Scioto project, though the elite members of this second settlement chose new arrivals and generally preferred those who were of or close to their own rank. As the name suggested, Azilum was again designed as an exclusively French enterprise; contact with Americans was to be kept to a minimum.25 In its structure, Azilum reflected the social background, identity, and habits of its inhabitants as well as the political situation in France. Archaeological excavations have documented the inhabitants’ drive for refinement and their quest for an aristocratic lifestyle, as expressed through architecture, furniture, and clothing, as far as this was possible under frontier conditions.26 In particular, the construction of Georgian-style houses was out of keeping with the conventions of American settlements in the vicinity. As an ideal neoclassicist émigré town, Azilum had a multistory Grande Maison in its center. Symbolically assuming the place of a palace, it was primarily used for social gatherings of aristocratic émigrés who refused to deviate from their received ideas about fashion and sociability. The building may also have had a political function in this colony of monarchists without a monarch. Rumors circulated that Azilum would serve as a refuge for Marie Antoinette or later the young Louis XVII, should they manage to escape from prison.27

Unsurprisingly, the living conditions of the 150 to 200 inhabitants were again unfavorable, though the colony fared slightly better than other French settler projects. Utopian notions of an agrarian community

25 Ibid., 264.
clashed with the necessities of hard farm work. The founding of Azilum was closely linked to the wave of emigration triggered by the downfall of the monarchy and the beginning of the Reign of Terror, and the colony came to an end around 1800 when those émigrés returned to France.28

The third project, Castorland in northwest New York, was the least developed yet most inclusive endeavor, politically and socially speaking.29 In 1793, after the execution of Louis XVI, the Compagnie de New York, another Franco–American speculative venture, dispatched two French commissaries to America. Simon Desjardins and Pierre Pharoux were architects and engineers who considered themselves émigrés in search of “tranquility and true liberty.”30 Convinced that they would be joined by thousands of like-minded compatriots, alongside planters fleeing from Saint-Domingue, they started clearing land at the American–Canadian border. Unfortunately, in the 1790s, Castorland’s workers were wiped out by yellow fever, and the settlement never hosted more than twenty families.31 New arrivals often came with unrealistic expectations: “They saw Castorland as a Normandy, or the environs of Paris, and they thought that they only needed to come and settle.”32 The settlement lingered on into the nineteenth century, when a more systematic colonization from France and other countries finally took place.

On the material level, all three settlements suffered from their speculative nature and the problems resulting therefrom: they failed to secure shareholders’ property rights, they failed to attract an adequate number of settlers, those who did come were unprepared for an agrarian life in the United States that differed dramatically from aristocratic landownership in France, and the duration of their exile proved too brief. Although the idea presented itself, no serious attempt was made to develop these settlements into the nucleus of an émigré state that would later join the United States.33

28 Ibid., 266.
30 Desjardins and Pharoux, Castorland Journal, 68.
31 Moreau-Zanelli, Gallipolis, 416.
32 Desjardins and Pharoux, Castorland Journal, 288.
Despite failing economically, the borderland settlements succeeded in one important respect: once they were placed on the émigrés’ mental map, they provided an alternative to revolutionary expropriation, thereby strengthening aristocratic social identity and legitimizing nobility, even if many prospective settlers ultimately stayed in France or migrated within Europe.

ÉMIGRÉ COLONIALISM IN SAINT-DOMINGUE AND CANADA

One group of exiles the American settlements hoped to attract were highly mobile Creole or absentee planters from Saint-Domingue who had lost their possessions both in the Caribbean and in France. Several hundred of these “dual” émigrés gathered in London, which had developed into the leading forum for lobbyism among émigrés with strong links to the continental French diaspora.\textsuperscript{34} As the center of the British Empire, London also provided the basis for imperial émigré projects that were a direct consequence of the Haitian Revolution.

In the mid-1790s, under growing military constraints, London émigré planters and the British government discussed émigré settlements as a military strategy for supporting the British intervention in Saint-Domingue and as a solution to the risk of a definitive loss of colonial possessions. Convinced that the slave insurrections could be suppressed and the intervention of French revolutionary troops pushed back, the exiled planters made important concessions to their British hosts as they offered the economic power of the world’s most productive sugar colony. The fact that they had mortgaged their colonial possessions to London commercial houses increased the pressure on British authorities to act on their behalf.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, the Caribbean planters in London interpreted the confusing situation of competing interests in the colonies as a power vacuum, and this pushed them to mandate first Guadeloupe and Martinique, and then Saint-Domingue, under British authority.\textsuperscript{36}


These were unprecedented measures that affronted the republican French authorities as well as the Bourbon monarchy in exile, the Spanish interventionists, and the rival factions of colonial planters. The end goal of this secession remained deliberately opaque; so long as war in the Atlantic persisted, the Saint-Domingue planters deliberated a return to France as well as an accession to the British Empire, wide-reaching domestic autonomy, free trade, or even independence from the colonial powers—albeit in a manner different from the slaves’ radical self-emancipation, which ultimately led to Haitian independence. The plantation economy and slave labor remained the socioeconomic pillars of the planters’ secessionist project. From the mid-1790s, the danger of a British retreat from Saint-Domingue due to the steep military and financial costs of the intervention, together with the crumbling First Coalition against the French Republic, put the London émigrés under pressure.\(^\text{37}\) Alternative options to dwindling British support had to be considered, including extra-European solutions to the émigré question. In this situation, Malouet, the representative of the Saint-Domingue planters to the British government, argued that the fate of the colony and the planters had wide-ranging economic consequences for European trade and industry far beyond colonial powers.\(^\text{38}\) Given the entangled distribution chains of colonial goods, which extended to Swedish copper mining and the textile industry in Silesia, the colonies represented a “factory of subsistence and work for the European society” and therefore a “co-property of all peoples.”\(^\text{39}\)

A new military intervention in Saint-Domingue in the mid-1790s provided a new opportunity for émigré troops in the service of the coalition. At the brink of being dismissed or involved in the disastrous outcome of the Quiberon Expedition, an attempt by French émigré royalists to land at the Breton coast in support of the Vendée revolt, troops were presented with an additional option: a move to the Caribbean. “Such of the Emigrants as will not serve on the Continent from the fear of being assassinated, if taken prisoners, will cheerfully enter to serve in St Domingo,” Malouet wrote to the British secretary of war.\(^\text{40}\) Sending émigrés from Europe to Saint-Domingue would support British forces,


\(^{39}\) *Journal de France et d’Angleterre*, February 10, 1797.

\(^{40}\) The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), WO 1/60, 416–17, Malouet to Henry Dundas, July 18, 1794.
as well as metropolitan and colonial émigrés, and boost the European industries that depended on Caribbean commodities.

This double humanitarian and economic emergency provided the background for a plan that Malouet, together with his fellow émigré Marquis de Bouillé, proposed to the British government. Bouillé, a former general, intended to raise a corps of 20,000 émigrés, mainly Quiberon survivors and members of the Prince de Condé’s émigré corps. They were to support the British troops stationed in Saint-Domingue, in the western part of Hispaniola, against the French Republican Army and the slave insurrectionists. Moreover, after Spain concluded a peace between the French Republic and Spanish Santo Domingo, which occupied the eastern part of Hispaniola and passed under French authority in 1795, these émigré troops could also be used to take possession of the entire island.

Given the unfavorable situation in Europe, the next challenge consisted of securing a material existence for the destitute émigré army in the Caribbean itself. Malouet intended to use the émigrés for the reconstruction of the colonial economy in the former Spanish territories. In a hierarchical scheme, officers and nobles were to receive parcels for cultivating sugar in the plains and contingents of slaves provided by the remaining French planters. In contrast, commoner soldiers would cultivate coffee, tobacco, and cotton in the less-fertile mountain regions on common property in order to earn money to buy slaves afterward.

Lacking British support and facing resistance from planters who resented Malouet’s influence, this Saint-Domingue scheme never materialized, yet neither did it evaporate. Around the British evacuation in 1797–98, Malouet was approached by a knight from the Order of Malta, who explained that his group, under French pressure, faced expulsion from their Mediterranean island. The Maltese offered to recruit three to four thousand men to accompany the émigrés to the Caribbean and provide military protection in place of the British. Their intention seems to have been to set up a more-or-less autonomous planter commonwealth. Malouet welcomed this peculiar combination of chivalry, Christianity, colonialism, and slavery as the new solution.
to the situation in Saint-Domingue.\(^4^4\) Though this initiative, again, came to nothing, it is illustrative of the types of cooperation engendered between different groups of exiles who faced political and material destitution in the age of emigrations. Through such plans, French émigrés and their collaborators demonstrated that they represented a critical mass of political and military actors who could not be simply marginalized.

The British evacuation of Saint-Domingue now being imminent, the War Office and the London planters explored options for those planters who either planned to leave Saint-Domingue or were unable to secure a livelihood in European exile. One scenario called for resettling planters in the Mississippi region, where they would be merged into the larger community of Saint-Domingue planters who had already settled around the Gulf of Mexico. Alternatively, Malouet suggested that the planters be offered land that Britain had recently conquered from Spain in Trinidad – a rather attractive option, since these émigrés, in addition to retaining the property rights granted to them, could also take their slaves with them more easily.\(^4^5\)

The third option was Canada. Drawing on the previous relocation of Loyalists from the thirteen colonies, the British government was willing to give land to the French émigrés. Malouet’s fellow exile Jean Charles de Montalembert had developed a settlement plan similar to the earlier project in Saint-Domingue. Montalembert planned to install staunch monarchists next to a republic, thus securing the border between the British Empire and the American federation. Convinced of the protective effect of French émigrés against revolution and democracy, Malouet confirmed to Secretary of War Henry Dundas: “You will found a colony of royalists in a country surrounded by republics.”\(^4^6\)

Finally, it was another émigré, Joseph de Puisaye, the instigator of the disastrous Quiberon Expedition and the leader of the Chouans in Brittany, who planned to bring no fewer than 20,000 émigrés and royalists from western France to Upper Canada.\(^4^7\) In a region populated

\(^4^4\) TNA, WO 1/67, 744, Malouet to Charles de Thuisy, December 6, 1797.
\(^4^5\) Pestel, *Kosmopoliten*, 293.
\(^4^6\) TNA, WO 1/67, 835, Malouet to Dundas, December 24, 1797.
mainly by British Loyalists, he envisaged a settlement based on feudal structures, vassalage, and seigneurial dues. When Puisaye went to Canada in 1798, the Loyalist magistrate and businessman Richard Cartwright welcomed such a “valuable accession to the higher and antidemocratical society.” Puisaye then negotiated with Mohawk leader Thayendanegea (also known as Joseph Brant) about land acquisition and, remarkably, encountered sympathy among the Indigenous population, who had fought on the British side in the American War of Independence. The émigrés were said to have suffered like them “in the [very] same [anti-French] Cause.” Upper Canada’s Executive Council, however, dismissed the proposal; the few French settlers split up, and Puisaye retired to Niagara.

As with Saint-Domingue, but also serving as a refuge for émigré priests, Canada played an important role as a potential refuge throughout the 1790s. What made émigrés attractive as settlers within the British Empire, even if they did not perceive themselves as explicitly anti-American, was their monarchical–Loyalist profile. Nonetheless, Canada’s distance from France and Europe, its harsh climatic conditions, the changing attitudes of the authorities, and, not least, the reversals in the Revolutionary War meant that only a hundred or so émigrés eventually moved to the Canadian provinces.

BEYOND THE REVOLUTIONARY ATLANTIC: SETTLEMENT PROJECTS IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND AUSTRALIA

The migratory repercussions of the Haitian Revolution were global. They reinforced the French émigré presence in Canada, the United States, and North America’s frontier regions. Yet, Atlantic unrest ultimately extended the émigrés’ mental maps, leading them to look toward other regions of the world. They did so, however, without carefully considering — at least not initially — the actual living conditions that prevailed in those places. As the example of the Russian Empire and Australia demonstrate, here again it was the contingency of exile triggered by the revolutionary wars and penal colonialism that led to the expansion of spatial imaginaries and, in part, migratory practices.

48 Hutt, *Chouannerie*, 567.
49 Ibid., 570.
This expanded geographical orientation is illustrated by an epistolary exchange between Malouet, Montlosier, and Jacques Mallet du Pan, a leading political analyst of the revolution. The topic of their correspondence was exile in peripheral world regions. Given the high number of émigrés in the United States, Mallet du Pan remained skeptical about political conditions there and feared political unrest in the wake of George Washington’s foreseeable death. Whereas Malouet favored a settlement in the American South, Mallet du Pan preferred the southern Russian Empire. Despite their geographic, climatic, and sociopolitical differences, both proposed projects had common features. They seemed to be inspired by North American frontier settlement projects, and émigrés imagined these areas as both devoid of revolutionary convulsions and available for colonization: “no indigenes, little populace” and no “commotions Europe is exposed to.” Montlosier ultimately considered a plan put forth by a friend who was in favor of St. Petersburg. The plan called for recruiting peasants from border regions to France. The objective was to install them on land granted by Tsarina Catherine II on Crimea. Anticipating possible benefits from quasi-colonial or feudal structures, Montlosier speculated: “If there is revolution, I remain there; if counterrevolution takes place, I return to France; [meanwhile] I remain [on Crimea] and enjoy my habitation as the others enjoy their habitation in Saint-Domingue.” In contrast to France, parts of Europe, and the Caribbean, these peripheral regions had one decisive advantage: émigrés and their supporters considered them habitable.

Remarkably, the southern portion of the Russian Empire, enlarged by the last partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795, became an émigré destination when the Armée de Condé relocated to the province of Volhynia. This large émigré military unit, the largest in fact, had played an important role in the run-up to the military campaign against France in 1792. After being pushed back by the Revolutionary Army, it continued in Austrian and British service, although it proved more a financial burden

53 BCO, MP no. 20, accompanying letter by Montlosier to Mallet du Pan to Malouet’s letter to Montlosier, s.l., February 4, 1794.
than a supplier of military support. In 1797, Tsar Paul invited the army into his territories after his mother had made a similar offer in the Sea of Asov in 1793. In 1799, the army returned to Central Europe in the Second Coalition War before it disbanded in 1801, having declined a British invitation to serve in Egypt.\textsuperscript{55}

The conditions of émigré life in Volhynia were bleak; the lodgings for the rank and file were inadequate, and the cold made things worse. The officers welcomed by the Polish nobility fared slightly better. Given the situation, it is hardly surprising that desertion and insubordination followed.\textsuperscript{56} This intermezzo gave Montlosier an occasion to reflect on the settlements in the southern part of the Russian Empire. Writing in his London émigré journal, he pondered the significance of the four or five thousand “children from Paris, Lyon, and Bordeaux; the Gascons, Normans, and Champenois” staying in their “second fatherland,” Sarmatia. What Montlosier imagined for this settlement in the longer term was a combination of quasi-colonial serfdom, since the local peasants were already living in a condition “nearer to animals than to humans,” and the transfer of the habits of “our gentlemen from the provinces” to Volhynia. The new Russian territories represented an opportunity to give an entire region “a new guise brought by the French.”\textsuperscript{57}

Whereas the military settlement in Volhynia originated in European alliance politics, the impetus behind the émigré presence in Australia, even more remote from France, is harder to make out. Australian migration trajectories were nonetheless linked to the Atlantic world and the British Empire. Some émigrés looked toward Australia after the failure of the Gallipolis project. Others, such as Huon de Kerilleau, became interested in joining British colonial efforts in the Antipodes during their British exile. The Chevalier de Clambe, for his part, had been residing in former French India and refused to return to the metropole when the British took over in 1793. Having entered the military service of an Indian prince, he finally set out for New South Wales.\textsuperscript{58}

Given the high social rank of these Australian émigrés and the overall connections between French exile and the British Empire, we might ask to what extent these migrants interacted with British convicts sent to

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Courier de Londres}, April 6, 1798.
\textsuperscript{58} Stuer, \textit{The French in Australia}, 43–45.
the penal colony of Botany Bay. There are at least hints of such entanglements. In New South Wales, Huon de Kerilleau married a French-born girl who had been arrested for theft in Britain and was subsequently transported.\(^59\) Also, when British Whig politician, opponent of the French Revolution, and émigré supporter Edmund Burke became alarmed about the neglected education of noble children in exile, he founded a French émigré school in England, explaining that the children would otherwise be “trained to Botany Bay.”\(^60\)

But to understand Australia’s full symbolic significance as the émigrés’ social, political, and moral other, we need to turn to French revolutionary discourse that imagined the émigrés’ passage to the Southern Hemisphere as an attempt to delegitimize their accommodation in Europe. French republicans also made use of the émigrés’ global itineraries to exclude them from the new nation. In late 1792, a Paris theater staged a comedy entitled *Les émigrés aux terres australes.*\(^61\) Sharing traits with earlier satires, such as *Le Parlement de Paris établi au Scioto*, the piece depicted the émigrés as having been deported by the revolutionaries to an “uncultivated country,” where they were surrounded by Indigenous *sauvages*. Pitting their “natural” virtues against the corruption of the ancien régime’s former elites, the Indigenous inhabitants finally “convicted” the émigrés and sentenced them to governance by a French sans-culotte. The *terres australes* likely referred to Madagascar, since the piece seemed to relate to a penal transportation project there that was finally voted on by the National Convention in 1793. Nonetheless, both the idea of a penal colony in Tôlanaro and the comedy were inspired by Botany Bay.\(^62\)

Here, the *terres australes* and their Indigenous inhabitants served as a blank canvas for virtuous self-portrayals of the young French republic.

In an anonymous French brochure published in London in 1799, this strategy of othering the émigrés turned into a scenario more closely

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59 Ibid., 44.
related to émigré life and politics. The pro-republican piece presented a mock call by the Comte d’Artois, the brother of the current pretender to the throne, directed at “all runaways and outlaws from France, princes and valets, traitors and bandits, princesses and daughters of joy, ignorant and venal judges, bawdy and impious priests” to follow him, together with the “scum of Britain,” to Australia. Artois introduced himself as the colony’s “king” under British auspices and as surrounded by a reactionary émigré cabinet. The pamphlet made use of Australia’s location in the Antipodes to draw a clear line of separation from revolutionary achievements in France. Australia appeared as a “Sadian refuge,” where debauchery and degradation were recompensed with Artois’s favors.

This Manichean symmetry between revolution and emigration translated into an opposition of the two hemispheres. In this vision, Australia’s new émigré capital, Sodôme, emerged as an anti-Paris. Artois proclaimed his government as “the model … of the southern hemisphere, whereas the government of France will shatter the northern hemisphere.” From a republican viewpoint, Australia’s geographical remoteness could be presented as largely disconnected from the Atlantic world, which was depicted as a theater of war and revolution. Émigrés destined for the Antipodes would virtually disappear as political and military opponents or, alternatively, they would open up a new imperial horizon for revolutionary politics. Just as the republican official press recommended that the émigrés conquer Canada to weaken the British enemy, the sans-culotte émigré leader, at the end of Les émigrés aux terres australes, sings a new variant of the Marseillaise, ending with the line: “May our arms liberate the universe!”

**POST-REVOLUTIONARY PACIFICATION AND THE TURN TOWARD NORTH AFRICA**

For French émigrés, Napoléon Bonaparte’s coup d’état in 1799 presented new opportunities. With the closure of the émigré lists, the ever-growing number of radiations (removals from the émigré lists), and finally the

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63 Anon., *De par le Comte d’Artois, roi de Botani-Bay, Aux terres Australes et des peuples de malfaiteurs échappés de l’échaffaud et des galères anglaises* (London, 1799), 3.
65 Anon., *De par le Comte d’Artois*, 20.
wide-ranging amnesty granted in 1802, most of them returned to France under the Consulate.67 Facing these new dynamics, imagined visions of émigré settlement underwent a transformation that reflected an ambivalence toward Bonaparte’s attempts at post-revolutionary pacification. The possibility of return posed a threefold challenge: how would the émigrés define their loyalty to the new regime, how would Napoleonic France resolve the problem of sequestered and partly sold émigré property, and what role would émigrés play in Bonaparte’s imperial endeavors? This challenge shifted the focus to intermediate steps and thus to liminal spaces between a return to France and the shrinking émigré diaspora. In 1800, Montlosier pointed to a solution for the dilemma that many émigrés faced after tiring years in exile:

I do not want to serve as a slave. I cannot fight as an enemy … But even in this position, I can still remain a friend of France without being a friend of its government..., it seems possible to me to preserve, outside of France, a heart that remains friendly with France and the French. This project would basically aim at an establishment for all malcontents both inside and outside France, both among the French nobility or the royalists, on foreign ground.68

Though Montlosier did not specify the type of establishment he had in mind, Madame de Staël believed that he and Bonaparte had discussed plans for gathering those émigrés who were reluctant to return to France in the Peloponnese, where they were to live loosely connected to French authority. “The émigrés will form a republic there, isn’t this a rather juicy connection?” she asked Bonaparte’s brother Joseph.69

Such speculations were clear reactions to Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt in 1798 and the colonization plans discussed under the Directory.70

69 Anne Louise Germaine de Staël-Holstein to Joseph Bonaparte, April 1, 1801, in Germaine de Staël, Correspondance générale, 7 vols. (Geneva, 2009), 4: 362.
In his speeches at the Institut National des Sciences et des Arts in 1797, soon-to-be foreign minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord described the benefits for France of acquiring new colonies given the deteriorating situation in the Caribbean. As Pernille Røge argues, these considerations were part of a French republican imperial transition that drew on ancien régime colonial reform projects. However, Talleyrand’s networks and discussions among returnees from exile suggest that émigrés also had a stake in the new French imperial agenda. As a former exile, Talleyrand had contacts among the London émigré planters, and, as a land speculator, he was thoroughly acquainted with the North American émigré settlements. Having been lobbied by destitute planters, he was aware that their ideas about moving into Spanish or Ottoman territories might have resonated with Montlosier’s plan.

The colonial losses that accompanied the reshaping of Europe’s political map during the revolutionary wars also concerned the Abbé de Pradt. A specialist on the Caribbean and Latin America, Pradt advocated the independence of the European colonies as a solution to the Atlantic revolutions. From his own émigré experience, he also had the consequences of emigration in mind. Aware that the émigrés’ return might cause other members of Europe’s political elites to face destitution and expulsion, he proposed putting independent colonies at their disposal. Pradt imagined that European monarchs dethroned by French expansion could consolidate independent new states on the other side of the Atlantic: “How could princes who occupy useless and imperceptible positions in Europe be hurt if they exchanged these small sovereignties for rich and vast empires in America that are as strong and independent as their small states in Europe are dependent and weak?” From this perspective, decolonization as a final consequence of revolution would make political exile altogether obsolete and contribute to consolidating peace in Europe.

On his return to France from London in 1802, Montlosier made clear that he would not be surpassed by his fellow émigré Pradt when

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it came to colonial imagination. Against the backdrop of France’s ephemeral peace with Britain and its disastrous attempt at reconquering Saint-Domingue, Montlosier argued for North Africa as a replacement for the lost territories and trade routes in America and India. He also expressed a preference for African colonization over the costly French conquests of “some more prefectures and barley and turnip fields” on the Rhine. In a memorandum to Talleyrand, he proposed profiting from political tensions with the Dey of Algiers to conquer the Maghreb. Montlosier’s idea was more than a proof of loyalty to the Consulate – it also addressed the only partially settled question of émigré indemnification. Whereas any transaction between the new and old proprietors of the biens nationaux (confiscated properties) presented a risk to domestic peace in France, the African option promised material compensation and social reconciliation: “After a great revolution it is good to offer an exit to all resentments, a refuge to all opinions, an asylum to all behaviors. Nothing seems more adequate to me to do justice to all parties than French Africa.”

For Montlosier, this neo-colonial project, when viewed within the broader framework of Napoleonic imperialism, not only offered a beneficial solution to the émigrés’ reintegration but also provided other groups affected by the revolutionary wars, such as the Order of Malta, the chance to participate in the settlement of North Africa. When the French conquest of Algiers actually took place three decades later, Montlosier’s colonialism came full circle. For him, this “favor of Providence” was the final compensation for the losses of Canada, India, and Saint-Domingue.

**CONCLUSION**

Reflecting on the historical significance of the French Revolution, David Bell identifies nationalism, republicanism, human rights, war and peace, and political ideology, as well as revolution itself, as “global conceptual legacies.” Lloyd Kramer, surveying the historiographical

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75 *Courrier de Londres et de Paris*, August 23, 1802.
77 Miramon Fitz-James, “Montlosier,” 155.
78 Bibliothèque Communautaire et Interuniversitaire de Clermont-Ferrand, Ms. 352, Montlosier, “Quelques vues sur l’insurrection de 1830 et sur les émeutes,” July 27, 1831.
innovations in post-bicentenary scholarship, identifies race, gender, slavery, nationalism, colonialism, empires, and revolutionary movements as major fields. Neither scholar mentioned migration, however. This is a striking omission, especially given the sheer number and geographical scope of the various actors on the move in the 1790s. And these mobile individuals were not just absentee from the French Revolution. By focusing on both physical mobility and migration settlement schemes, this chapter endeavors to restore agency to French émigrés in this period and to offer an alternative to seeing them primarily as victims, counterrevolutionaries, or members of an uprooted community. Their awareness of the global impact of the Age of Revolutions provided them with options for escaping the radicalizing developments in France. Through the lens of global émigré settlements, this chapter concludes by making four points about the significance of the émigrés’ global imaginaries on the planned and partly realized mass relocations undertaken on their own initiative.

First, in an age of emigrations, settlement projects in North America, Saint-Domingue, the Russian Empire, and the Maghreb affirmed émigré agency as much as they represented attempts at liberation from the political, economic, and social pressures of both revolution and exile. This “liberation” also applies to the revolutionary exclusion of the émigrés by imagining their transportation to the Southern Hemisphere. These projects revealed the demographic importance of the émigrés, their military potential, and their mobility, since they made the émigrés relevant both for the governments of their host countries and other groups of disrupted migrants. The attention the settlement projects received in transnationally circulating émigré pamphlets, journals, letters, and memoirs represented a communicative strategy of self-assurance at a time when the émigrés sought to mobilize support within host societies for their situation.

Moreover, the settlements highlight the strong connection between the French emigration and the British Empire. In particular, with regard to the Caribbean, the émigrés tried to turn the ongoing war and long-term Franco-British rivalry to their favor. In a more ambivalent way,

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80 On French émigré agency in the age of emigrations, see also Dessens’s chapter in this volume.
their connection to British imperialism also resonated in projects on both sides of the Canadian–American border. These settlements show how émigrés drew on American Loyalism to present themselves as defenders of political and social order. Meanwhile, French support in the American War of Independence facilitated émigré accommodation in the United States and provided a trigger for sociopolitical experiments.

Second, the settlement projects make clear the extent to which global emigration options were linked to ideas of social identity and French belonging. Rather than facilitating the émigrés’ integration into their new environments, the schemes largely aimed to create cohesion among the émigrés, whom they framed as “a nation taken out of the French nation.”

The more distant the settlements were from France, the more French they tended to be in their internal organization, as the North American establishments or the Armée de Condé in Volhynia illustrate. While French emigration may appear in that light as a particular variant of settler colonialism, the émigrés continued to see themselves as representatives of a “true” France largely unspoiled by revolutionary social transformations. They imagined and organized their global establishments as hierarchical societies that would guarantee noble privileges and property. The strong connections between agrarian émigré colonialism and slavery and serfdom have to be interpreted in light of this attempt at social regeneration.

Third, the settlement projects raise the question of temporality. Moving to distant parts of the globe and working to build durable new societies did not necessarily preclude the desire to return to France. However, global experiences of emigration did not simply melt into post-revolutionary French pacification, reconciliation, and nationalization. Rather, these experiences suggest that there was a link between nineteenth-century French imperial thought and colonial politics. Napoleonic imperialism, both European and global, relied on the collaboration of former émigrés who were concerned with France’s colonial situation both during and after the French Revolution. Talleyrand, Pradt, Noailles, Montlosier, Malouet, and Chateaubriand not only met and collaborated during exile, but, at least in part, offered their expertise to rebuild the French Empire with Bonaparte and later the restored Bourbons. This “French imperial meridian” points to the global entanglements of early nineteenth-century French history.

81 Journal de France et d’Angleterre, June 2, 1797.
reconquering “Saint-Domingue,” first in 1802 and again in 1814 during Malouet’s tenure as Minister of the Colonies, reveal the continuities between the emigration and post-revolutionary colonialism.83

Fourth, and finally, the return of the émigrés paved the way for the next generation of political migrants. The Bonapartist militaries in the borderland of Alabama settled in a region where they encountered émigrés from both the French and Haitian Revolutions.84 Viewed from this perspective, the émigrés of the 1790s also opened the global dimensions of France’s long nineteenth-century siècle des exilés.85

84 Rafe Blaufarb, Bonapartists in the Borderlands: French Exiles and Refugees on the Gulf Coast, 1815–1835 (Tuscaloosa, AL, 2005).
In July 1789, a soldier named Manuel Cuevas attempted to desert after he used a forged receipt to withdraw thirty rations of bread from the warehouse of the Royal Castle of the Aljafería in Zaragoza. At the time, he could not have imagined how many different forced relocations he would experience in the following years because of those acts. Caught and sentenced to ten years of transportation and hard labor, the twenty-three-year-old was first shipped to the work brigades of the North African presidio (military outpost) of Ceuta. Then his sentence was commuted into military impressment, and Cuevas was forced to join the Infantry Regiment of Havana in March 1791. Thirteen months later, he was transferred to the Infantry Regiment of Louisiana, based in New Orleans. In early 1793, he was returned to Havana and sent to Cádiz on board the warship Santa Viviana. Later that year, he lamented his long incarceration in the local jail and petitioned to serve in the army at a destination of the king’s choosing. By that time, however, the authorities regarded him as an “extreme liar, creeper, cheater and seller of his clothes” and decided that the work brigades in Ceuta were a more appropriate place for him.¹

The young man’s reputation was largely attributable to a poorly received attempt to fashion himself as an informant in exchange for a pardon for his short-lived desertion from the garrison in New Orleans. During his interrogation on October 11, 1792, Cuevas told the sergeant that he

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had discovered a major plan to attack and burn down the city on the Mississippi Delta. He had seen many cannons and cannonballs, and several bags filled with gunpowder. In the houses where these munitions were stored, he had met the White male leader of the conspiracy, along with the free mulatto barber Antonio, several slaves, two White women, and many Frenchmen. The group thus included the representatives of those segments of society that were most likely to arouse the suspicion of the authorities in an age of wars and revolutions. But the local authorities were unconvinced by the pair of worn-out shoes that Cuevas presented as evidence of the long distances he claimed to have walked, of the forests he supposedly had crossed, and the places he had allegedly visited in his mere three-day-long desertion. He soon realized that the ploy had failed, and he confessed the falsity of his story. In the end, the attempt backfired badly – and much to his detriment. The authorities punished him harshly for “suggesting ideas from which bad consequences might result among the other sentenced and transported convicts that exist in the Regiment, and due to the state of affairs in Europe, and the consequences they can have in these Provinces.”

From New Orleans, he was transported to Cádiz and Ceuta.

For all its specificity, Manuel Cuevas’s story highlights broad issues, including one that is central to this chapter – that war, revolution, and punishment were concrete realities in the lives of many individuals in the late eighteenth century. Indeed, these realities shaped their experiences of mobility and coercion, as much as they produced the imaginaries, hopes, and fears of both subaltern and elite groups. This chapter underscores the central arguments of this volume by emphasizing the need for a simultaneous analysis of multiple flows of forced migrations in order to fully understand their blurred boundaries and mutual connections and thus better evaluate their overall impact on the making and maintenance of states and empires.

Focusing on the 1790s, I put two practices of punitive relocation at center stage. First, I look at the transportation of convicts, vagrants, and deserters from Peninsular Spain and the Northern African presidios to the garrisons and the military outposts of Spanish America. Second, I examine the flows of war captives, refugees, and convicts that originated from the Haitian Revolution and spread out across the Spanish Caribbean. Focusing on these simultaneous and partly connected flows allows me to discuss broad issues, such as the impact of racial and status differentiation on the trajectories and experiences of prisoners of war.2

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2 On race and prisoner of war mobilities, see Anna McKay’s chapter in this volume.
At the same time, I emphasize that local responses to the captives’ arrival were part of broader strategies of social control employed to deflect undesired flows of refugees and enslaved persons stemming from the French colonies. The concluding section puts these empirical findings into a longer-term perspective and reflects, in particular, on continuities and discontinuities in the regimes of punitive relocations in the Spanish Empire in the Early Modern period and the nineteenth century. From this perspective, I suggest the need for an integrated study of all punitive relocations and for the investigation of those processes whereby the “political” nature of punishments, and the punished, was construed or marginalized.

**FLows of Peninsular Presidiarios to Spanish America**

In the years of Cuevas’s double Atlantic passage, several hundred convicts were shipped from Cádiz and La Coruña to the Spanish possessions in the Americas and the Philippines. Considered as a whole, these flows created an extensive network (Map 4.1).

The rationale behind such an expensive and logistically complex endeavor was to protect the empire from the (potential and real) invasions of unconquered Indigenous peoples and foreign European powers, while at the same time securing trade routes. To that end, the centerpieces of the imperial defensive system – the presidios – were staffed by two groups of workers: the convicts (presidiarios or desterrados) who were employed in the continuous operation of constructing and reconstructing the fortifications as well as other military and nonmilitary infrastructure, and the more or less voluntary recruits who manned the presidio garrisons and, in times of war, the fighting battalions. The categorization of the workforce into military and nonmilitary convicts

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3 The sources for the map and the description in this section are: Archivo General de Indias, Seville (hereafter AGI), Arribadas: 287A; 287B; 548; 549; 550; 551. AGS, SGU, LEG: 6698, 2; 6844, 10; 6880, 53; 6899, 25; 6900, 1, 4, 9, 27, 44; 6934, 7, 17, 63; 6953, 13; 6957, 50; 6961, 37; 6966, 50; 6968, 27; 6969, 26; 6970, 5; 7057, 6; 7167, 81; 7201, 23; 7215, 6; 7249, 61; 7251, 5, 7, 10, 19, 35; 38 7318, 120.

had a considerable impact on the experiences of these individuals, but it should not suggest the existence of impenetrable boundaries between these two groups. Indeed, as Manuel Cuevas’s story shows, sentences to forced labor could be commuted into impressment into the army and the navy, and vice versa.

In Peninsular Spain, two institutions were primarily responsible for the organization of convict transportation in the years under investigation: the tribunal of the *Arribadas*, which was based in Cádiz and responsible for all incoming and outgoing maritime flows in that key imperial hub, and the recruitment commissions (*banderas de reclutas*), which operated in the Atlantic ports of Cádiz and La Coruña and were in charge of the recruitment of voluntary and involuntary troops. Both institutions answered to the high officers based at the Spanish Court, and ultimately to the king himself. At the same time, they were also connected to a host of legal, political, and military authorities, including the governors of the *presidios* of Oran (until 1791), Ceuta, Melilla, Peñón de Vélez, and Alhucemas in North Africa, and the navy officers of the peninsular ports of Cartagena, Málaga, and El Ferrol, which served as convict depots. After the prisoners had been shipped or marched, enchained in
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cuerdas (convict transports), to those hubs or directly to Cádiz and La Coruña, they embarked on the weeks-long transatlantic journey, which took place on a variety of vessels. These ranged from merchant and mail ships, which could only accommodate a few convicts at a time, to large warships that could hold dozens or even hundreds of convicts and other recruits at the same time.

The transportation process was characterized by a certain flexibility that also applied when crucial decisions needed to be made about convict destinations. It was not uncommon for royal, military, and ecclesiastical magistrates to content themselves with establishing the length and type of punishment, offering either few or no specifics about the actual punitive site, or limiting themselves to broad directives like “to the Philippines” or “to the Indies.” Even when specific presidios were mentioned at sentencing, the king and certain high officials were still entitled to change the destination, and they did so quite often. This, in turn, meant that a broader range of actors had the ability to influence the process, including the convicts themselves, their relatives, and the owners of the merchant ships. Contingent circumstances also affected the routes. Overcrowded and insecure jails, or the sudden availability of a ship, could give rise to an unexpected opportunity to organize the quick transportation of a group of convicts to a place other than their previously determined destination. The flexibility of the system allowed it to respond to major events, such as wars, natural disasters, and new projects of colonization, by channeling convict flows to the specific regions where they were needed.

Behind these institutional and logistical frameworks there lay a comparably complex cultural and political process involving the construction of the “convicts” themselves. The association between masculinity and the military, for example, made transportation to the presidios a male-only affair. Moreover, transportation brought together in each shipment individuals who were classified differently according to their legal status, the type of institutions that had sentenced them, and their conduct. Sentenced criminals (reos), military convicts (reos militares), deserters (desertores), and vagrants (vagos) were the main categories. Each was further divided into subcategories emerging at the crossroads of material conditions, cultural perceptions, and imperatives of governance. Thus, in the case of impressments into the military, the key criteria

5 On the impressment and transportation of “vagrants” from Spain, see María Rosa Pérez Estévez, El problema de los vagos en la España del siglo XVIII (Madrid, 1976).
were age (between sixteen and forty years), health condition (verified by doctors before transportation), and the type of sentence. Sentences had to be "clean" (limpias condenas), meaning that they could not involve degrading punitive practices, like flogging, and could not correspond to crimes against honor and morality, such as "pederasty," rape, and the forging of money and documents. What was at stake was the honor of the army or the navy and the corresponding need to prevent the impressment of dishonorable troops.\(^6\)

The process whereby approximately 200 convicts from Cádiz were recruited and transported to Guatemala and New Granada in the period from April 1791 to June 1793 illustrates the complexity of the cultural–political dynamics and the spatial relocations at work.\(^7\) The initial goal, means, and destinations were straightforward. Around 500 soldiers were needed to complete the Infantry Regiment of Guatemala; at least 200 of them were expected to be recruited among the presidiarios of Ceuta who had volunteered to be impressed for the time of their sentences.\(^8\) In the second half of 1791, however, the resistance of the governor of Ceuta, Luís de Urbina, hampered the whole operation. He sought to retain the convict workforce in the North African outpost in order to improve local fortifications and to shore up the understaffed regiment of armed convicts. Whereas he had previously communicated that 3,000 presidiarios existed in Ceuta, he now disclosed to Captain Manuel Remon, who was commissioned with recruitment in Cádiz, that most of them had been sentenced for "indecorous crimes." At the same time, he informed him that 150 convicts who had first enlisted for Guatemala had changed their minds when they had heard of the more attractive option of entering the Fixed Regiment of Málaga. Thus, he blamed the impossibility of sending them to Cádiz on the "natural inconsistency of these people."\(^9\)

In November 1791, then, the hulk Florentina waited in vain in the Bay of Cádiz for the presidiarios-turned-soldiers from Ceuta. It ultimately left the Spanish port with just twenty-six convicts recruited from nearby jails. Its journey also proved more difficult than expected, as authorities in Guatemala observed high morbidity and mortality among

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\(^{6}\) AGS, SGU, LEG, 7251, 6, Cádiz, June 21, 1792, 7251, 38, Cádiz, March 28, 1792, 7318, 120, Oran, November 15, 1792.

\(^{7}\) AGS, SGU, LEG, 6943, 13.

\(^{8}\) AGS, SGU, LEG, 6943, 13, Royal Order, Aranjuez, April 20, 1791.

\(^{9}\) AGS, SGU, LEG, 6943, 13: Urbina to Alange, Ceuta, August 13, 1791 and November 26, 1791; Alange to Urbina, San Ildefonso, August 29, 1791.
the soldiers and convicts shipped to Omoa and suggested that they reach the province via Havana or Trujillo instead.

The Infantry Regiment of Guatemala had to look elsewhere for its troops. The recruitment of some sixty volunteers in the capital was insufficient, although the president of the province, Bernardo Troncoso, expressed satisfaction with the fact that their hair was “straight, or not too curly,” and their skin color was “light, and could be taken for the one of the Europeans.” The governor of Cuba, Luis de las Casas, communicated the impossibility of sending the “vagrants and vicious” of his island to Guatemala, since they were needed to reinforce the local garrisons, as well as those in Louisiana and Florida that depended on Cuba. The impact of the impressment ultimately fell on the shoulders of the “vagrants and vicious” of New Spain, whom the viceroy Count Revillagigedo agreed to send, insisting that they be transported by sea via Havana, in order to avoid the escapes and deaths invariably occasioned by the march along nearly 2,000 kilometers of “painful road.”

Back in the Mediterranean, 140 convicts from the “minor presidios” (presidios menores, or Melilla, Alhucemas, and Peñon) had been expected to reach Málaga in July 1791, in the hope that they could replace the flow of men from Ceuta to Guatemala. On account of logistical problems, however, they first arrived in January 1792, and only reached Cádiz the following month: too late to join the Florentina. By then, escapes, death, sickness, relocations to other peninsular regiments, and the exclusion of counterfeiters and “tumultuaries,” had reduced their number to eighty-two. Nonetheless, their individual records (filiaciones) reveal their variety: the group featured the usual mix of deserters, vagrants, and sentenced criminals. They came from several places across the peninsula, and from as far as France, Sardinia, Genoa, and Mexico; and their crimes ranged from smuggling, bodily injury, and murder, to adultery, poisoning, and carrying prohibited weapons. The twenty-one-year-old seaman Joseph de Flores, born in the province of Seville, had even impersonated the son of His Most Serene don Luís, Infante of Spain. Chained in pairs, the convicts were directed to the Viceroyalty of New Granada, and sixty-six of them ultimately joined the Infantry Regiment of Guatemala.

10 AGS, SGU, LEG, 6943, 13: Fondebiela to Alange, Cádiz, November 29, 1791 and December 2, 1791; Troncoso to Alange, Guatemala, April 23, 1791.
11 AGS, SGU, LEG, 6943, 13: Troncoso to Alange, Guatemala, August 31, 1791.
12 AGS, SGU, LEG, 6943, 13: Las Casas to Alange, Havana, August 16, 1791; Revillagigedo to Alange, Mexico, July 27, 1791, and January 31, 1792.
Regiment of Cartagena de Indias. Although their number was lower than expected, they were warmly welcomed by the viceroy, due to the failure of local attempts to attract volunteers and capture vagrants, and because of the “utility that derives from disposing of a substantial number of European individuals.”

Thus far, this reconstruction of events has hinted at high levels of integration between the metropolitan punitive relocations and those within Spanish America. This took various forms. On their way from Spain to the Philippines, for example, some convicts remained for several months in the castles and fortifications of New Spain, where their workforce was exploited while awaiting the ships. Other presidiarios coming from the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa were redistributed within the jurisdiction of each Audiencia, or High Court, and Viceroyalty. Like Manuel Cuevas, who found himself re-transported from Havana to New Orleans, at least 350 peninsular convicts were shipped along that same route between March 1792 and July 1793 to be employed in the fortification works – an extended endeavor of deforestation and construction for which, for economic reasons, Governor Héctor de Carondelet relied on convicts rather than slaves.

In Spanish Florida, peninsular presidiarios redirected from Cuba were part of the approximately 200 convicted laborers (forzados) employed at the fortification in Pensacola. Others joined the Cuban vagrants and presidiarios in the important military outpost of Saint Augustine, contributing to the progressive growth of the convicted workforce there: from a dozen individuals in the years after the Treaty of Paris (September 1783) had returned the province to the Spanish monarchy, to approximately seventy convicts ten years later. Then, between the end of 1793 and 1796, their presence in the East Florida presidio more than doubled, as a new group of convicts was added: namely, French prisoners of war, nearly half of whom were of African descent. It was one manifestation of the broader impact of the Haitian Revolution on the Caribbean punitive relocations, the subject of the next section.

13 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7057, 6. The filaciones are in the documents entitled: “Pliego de adición correspondiente a veinte presidiarios...,” Alhucemas, July 4, 1791; “Relación de los Presidiarios que voluntariamente...,” Melilla, July 1, 1791; “Plaza del Peñon. Relación de los Presidiarios que en virtud de la Orden de SM...,” Peñon, June 17, 1791.

14 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7244, 70, Carondelet to Alcudia, New Orleans, July 7, 1793.

15 AGI, Cuba, 126, Relaciones de forzados in the file entitled “Varios. Años 1764–96.”

16 AGI, Cuba, 365A. The monthly reports are entitled “Lista de revista pasara por mi el Contador y Thesorero de Real Hacienda...”
When one considers the situation of the Caribbean in the early 1790s, it is hardly surprising that in October 1792 the Spanish authorities of Louisiana reacted so harshly to Manuel Cuevas’s clumsy attempt to upgrade the value of his information by including French prisoners among his group of imaginary conspirators. Indeed, Cuevas was consciously evoking the “specter of Haiti” that haunted colonial and republican elites across the nineteenth-century Americas and ultimately took the form of thousands of French soldiers, prisoners of war, convicts, and refugees (emigrados) who came from the island of Hispaniola.17

As early as January 1792, the governor of Yucatan reported that the conflict between “Black royalists” and the revolutionary troops in the northern province of Saint-Domingue had resulted in more than 25,000 deaths, and the execution and transportation of some of the royalist leaders who had come from France. After that, several ships left Saint-Domingue with the aim of taking thousands of Black and mulatto prisoners of war away and abandoning them in nearby foreign possessions. The majority headed to the Dutch colony of Demerara, but two ships were reported to be en route to the Spanish dominions along the Mosquito Coast and in the Viceroyalty of New Granada. All of the French prisoners of war were mentioned in these communications as Black royalists, not revolutionaries. Yet the Spanish authorities were suspicious and sought to keep them at bay. “It is convenient for us,” wrote the governor of Yucatan, “to support the appropriate plan to keep away from us this mob infected with party and revolutionary spirit.”18

The moral panic around the French captives understandably grew when Spain officially entered the conflict with France in the spring of 1793. From Kingston, a French exile reported on the “disaster of Saint


18 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7237, 52. The quote is in letter n. 167, dated Yucatan, January 8, 1792.
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Domingue,” where “nothing is left of the city, nor of the white population of the Guárico,” or of the northern province. “The whites are on the run in all directions,” he added. Many others echoed his words. First came the news, then the prisoners. Major flows followed the Spanish seizure of Juana Mendez and the Dondón, along the border between the Spanish and French territories on the island. As soon as the first thousand captives reached the capital of Santo Domingo in July 1793, the governor sent them to Puerto Rico, Havana, and Caracas. Further contingents of prisoners, coming from the battlefields and from captured ships, were transported to those destinations during the war. At the same time, a considerable number of prisoners were relocated within the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean, some were exchanged with Spanish prisoners of war, and still others were transported to Europe during the final months of the Spanish involvement in the conflict on the side of the British. On July 22, 1795, the second Treaty of Basel determined the transfer of Santo Domingo to France; in exchange, Spain regained Guipúzcoa and other territories occupied by the French army during the concomitant War of the Pyrenees (1793–95). The news of the end of the conflict reached the Caribbean a few months later, after which the remaining prisoners of war were repatriated.

Just as the transportation of the presidiarios from Peninsular Spain was shaped by organizational difficulties, so too were the flows of the French war captives (Map 4.2). The issues were not merely logistical; rather, they were the product of lengthy transatlantic negotiations among various authorities and of policy changes over time. In the process, legal and political categories were forged to segment and manage the various groups of people coming from Saint-Domingue, and the boundaries between those categories were blurred.

The prisoners of war were classified into two distinct categories: “French prisoners” (prisioneros franceses) included the White war captives, whereas “enslaved negroes” (negros esclavos) was reserved for the

19 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7202, 2, Loppnice, Kingston, July 18, 1793.
20 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7159, 3, Santo Domingo, July 23, 1793; 7159, 8, Puerto Rico, August 6, 1793; 7159, 18, Santo Domingo, August 22, 1793; 7202, 2, Garcia to Presidente, Gobernador y Capitan General de Caracas, Santo Domingo, October 19, 1793; 7235, 3.
21 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7202, 2, Aymerith to Carbonell, La Guaira, November 6, 1793; AGS, SGU, LEG: 7235, 3, Torralbo to Alange, Puerto Rico, October 10, 1793.
22 AGI, Estado: 5A, n. 6; 17, n. 3, Alange to Alcudia, Aranjuez, March 23, 1795; AGI, Estado, 17, n. 43, Gardoqui to Alcudia, Aranjuez, January 21, 1794; SGU, LEG, 6854, 36, 60, 74; 7151, 87; 7160, 39.
23 AGS, SGU, LEG, 6854, 66, Havana, October 26, 1795.
Africans and Afrodescendants caught in Saint-Domingue. It is worth noting that the individuals in the latter group had been emancipated by the French in 1793; by categorizing them as “slaves,” the Spanish authorities demonstrated their unwillingness to acknowledge those revolutionary measures. At the same time, the fate of the White captives was further associated with that of the (White) French refugees (emigrados), who arrived from Saint-Domingue, Martinique, and France before and during the war. Moreover, some of those caught during the conflict were not classified and treated as prisoners of war but were prosecuted for specific criminal acts and labeled as convicts. This group, too, was divided and managed along racial and class lines.

The authorities had distinct perceptions of the various groups and different preferences regarding their treatment and destinations. Much of this depended on how the authorities understood the specific interests and needs of the territory under their jurisdiction. The priority of the governor of Santo Domingo, Joaquin García, was expelling all French subjects from the island in order to channel all financial and military resources into the defense of the Spanish possessions. At the same time, he insisted that the Black prisoners be sold into slavery and kept under
the “domestic zeal and vigilance” of their new owners. He believed that the masters’ interest in maintaining the subordination of their servants would have freed the island and the other Spanish dominions from the danger of insurrection. Conversely, he mistrusted state-administered punishments and insisted that “the presidios can frighten and contain the free men but not the slaves.” According to him, the slaves had “no freedom to lose” in the presidios, where they experienced a lighter regime of forced labor than under their masters and might even dare to hope for freedom at the end of their penal servitude.24

In principle, the captain general of Venezuela, Pedro Carbonell, did not oppose the idea of selling the enslaved prisoners, but he doubted that anyone would ever buy them. “Nobody,” he wrote, “would like to introduce in his [sic] own family a dangerous seducer, filled with the principles of insubordination and liberty.”25 Additionally, he emphasized the strategic importance of the territory under his jurisdiction and sought to prevent it from becoming the gate through which revolutionary ideas would spread to the landmass of South America. Thus, he proposed that Black and White prisoners of war be transferred to Cuba, an island with more secure castles (rebuilt and expanded by convicts and royal slaves after the Seven Years War). Meanwhile, he ordered that all prisoners be concentrated in the town of La Guaira and kept there, separated along racial lines, in the vaults of the castle and other buildings. At that time, the port town of some 7,000 inhabitants hosted approximately 1,000 French prisoners.26

Carbonell wrote to Spain in November 1793. The court replied the next spring, accepting most of his arguments and stretching them further. The plan prepared by the secretary of state and Duke of Alcudia, Manuel Godoy, was designed to preserve all of Spain’s Caribbean possessions. It upheld the prohibition originally issued on May 17, 1790, on selling slaves from Saint-Domingue in any Spanish possession. But

24 AGI, Estado, 14, n. 95, García to Alange, Bayaja, April 26, 1794.
25 AGI, Estado, 58, n. 4. The same expediente is also in AGS, SGU, LEG, 7202, 2. The quotes are from the Report of the Junta, Caracas, September 11, 1873.
26 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7202; Junta, Caracas, November 6, 1793; Junta, Caracas, November 9, 1793; Junta, Caracas, November 17, 1793; Caracas, November 22, 1793; Junta, Caracas, November 22, 1793; Carbonell to Alange, Caracas, November 30, 1793; Reservada, Carbonell to Alange, Caracas, November 30, 1793. On the impact of the Haitian Revolution and of the prisoners of war and emigrados from Saint-Domingue on the Captaincy General of Venezuela during the 1790s, see Cristina Soriano, Tides of Revolution: Information, Insurgencies, and the Crisis of Colonial Rule in Venezuela (Albuquerque, NM, 2018). The information on La Guaira is mentioned on page 109 of that volume.
Godoy went further, mandating the recapture of those who had already been sold, though evidence suggests that this measure was not fully implemented. The plan subsequently envisaged the transportation of all prisoners of war to Cuba and Santo Domingo. Among them, those deemed less dangerous were to be kept there and exchanged for Spanish or French royalist prisoners at the earliest opportunity. Meanwhile, the majority were to be shipped to the French colonies of Martinique and Guadeloupe and liberated there, under their word of honor that they would not serve against the Spanish and British armies.27

The expulsive intent of the plan was warmly welcomed by local authorities across the Caribbean. Its implementation proved difficult, however, and it was only during the last months of the war that some groups of prisoners of war were transferred to Spain. The rapidly shifting geopolitical situation across the region created substantial problems. Indeed, by the time Alcudia’s plan reached the Caribbean, the British had occupied those very French Antilles that were supposed to receive the prisoners. Furthermore, although the local authorities decided to confine all the White prisoners on the Isle of Pines (to the south of Cuba) and to have the negros esclavos serve as forced laborers in the public works of Puerto Rico, the plan failed. The weakness of the local garrison and the relative abundance of presidiarios in Puerto Rico ultimately forced the authorities to transfer the Black prisoners to the Isle of Pines as well.28

The slow transition from an approach centered on mobility and isolation within the Spanish territories to one based on expulsions from the Spanish American territories can also be observed in relation to the emigrados. In 1793 and the early months of 1794, authorities across the Caribbean unanimously emphasized the dangers posed both by the emigrados’ politics and their libertine lifestyles. From Santo Domingo, the governor warned that some of the emigrados who had been repatriated

27 AGS, SGU, LEG, 2159, 16: Alcudia, Aranjuez, March 1, 1794; Reservada, Aranjuez, March 8, 1794; AGS, SGU, LEG, 7202, Alange to Carbonell, Aranjuez, April 7, 1794. The royal order prohibiting the sale of the slaves from Saint-Domingue in the Spanish dominions features in Porlier to Guillermo, Aranjuez, May 17, 1790. An antecedent, an undefined treaty established between Prussia and France, is mentioned in the document. Similar agreements were also made by the Spanish and French armies during the War of the Pyrenees in 1794–95. For the positive response of the governor of Puerto Rico to Alcudia’s plan, see AGS, SGU, LEG, 7235, 3, Torralbo to Alange, Puerto Rico, July 18, 1794.

28 AGS, SGU, LEG, LEG, 7159, 75, Santo Domingo, June 12, 1794; 7202, 5, Carbonell to Alcudia, Caracas, 31.8.1794 (and annexes); AGI; Estado, 14, 95, Llaguna to Alcudia, San Ildefonso, September 11, 1794; San Lorenzo, October 14, 1794; Alange to Alcudia, San Lorenzo, October 14, 1794; AGI, Estado, 65, 16, Consejo de Estado, November 28, 1794.
there were spreading rumors among the local slaves that the Spaniards were cheating them, that they would re-enslave them, and that they would be punished and flogged.29 The project of some imprisoned French royalist officers to serve the Bourbon king in Santo Domingo or in Europe was rejected by the authorities in Spain, and even the plan to enlist them in the Spanish navy, promoted by its general commander, failed on the grounds that their presence in the Tierra Firme was too dangerous. However, a royal order issued in July 1794 allowed the local authorities and elites to channel their fears literally in other directions, as the king disposed with the transportation of the French emigrados to Europe.30 The junta that met in Caracas on October 13, 1794, still complained about the “spirit of pride and independence, and a sort of contempt against the Spanish government” shown by the French refugees (emigrados) in La Guaira, but now the local authorities put most of their energy into the organization of the transportation of 500 prisoners and emigrados to Havana and Spain.31

This shift in status from refugees to exiles/repatriates thus overlapped with the parallel reclassification of other French subjects from prisoners of war to exiles/repatriates. As in the previously mentioned relocation, the two groups were frequently merged. In 1795, the emigrados from Martinique and the prisoners of war from Santo Domingo were transported together from the Province of Caracas to Cádiz and offered the option to return to France or to join the French Royalist Legion fighting with the Spaniards against the French Republican Army in the Pyrenees.32

Those individuals coming from Saint-Domingue, whether Black or White, who were sentenced to the presidios by penal courts for crimes allegedly

30 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7202, 2, Alange to Captain General Venezuela, Aranjuez, April 16, 1793; Aristizabal to Carbonell, Puerto Cabello, October 14, 1793; Fresneaux to Captain General Caracas, Caracas, October 29, 1793; Aristizabal to Carbonell, Puerto Cabello, November 24, 1793; Carbonell to Alange, Caracas, November 30, 1793; AGS, SGU, LEG, 7202, 9, Carbonell to Alange, Caracas, December 11, 1794.
31 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7202, 9, Reservada, Carbonell to Alange, Caracas, December 11, 1794 (quotes from the Junta in the annex).
32 SGU, LEG 7202, 2. The information is in the titles of the expediente.
unconnected with the military conflict experienced different trajectories.\(^{33}\) They were moved across the Caribbean according to the flow patterns of other convicts. Whereas most of them were held in Havana, others ended up in the castles of Cartagena de Indias, San Juan de Ulúa (Veracruz), and Omoa. Those among them who belonged to elite groups especially resented this association with the *presidiarios*. The former officer Joseph-Barthélemy d’Azgaignon offered a vivid description of the humiliation he and his peers felt because of the “impolitic association” with those “villainous” individuals who manifested toward them “the hate of an enemy caste.”\(^{34}\) The authorities were sensitive to these arguments. In Havana, therefore, 110 convicts from Saint-Domingue were concentrated in the *Morro*, kept segregated along racial lines, and separated from the rest of the *presidiarios*.

From their sites of imprisonment across the Caribbean, French convicts also complained about the illegality of their sentences, which were based on charges that either were unknown to them or were as vague as “rabious republican,” “leader of a Club,” “he denounced all royalists,” or “slave who took up arms against the Spaniards.”\(^{35}\) These legitimate complaints about their trials and treatment were part of the basic toolkit of any convict. However, in their memoirs, they also questioned their very status as convicts and revealed that they understood themselves as prisoners of war. Their interpretations overlapped with those of the French republican authorities, especially in the aftermath of the war. At that point, French ambassadors and consuls repeatedly demanded the liberation of those they considered prisoners of war, who, as such, had been illegally detained by the Spaniards. The Spanish authorities, in turn, argued that these men were *presidiarios* or *reos de Estado* (prisoners of the state), who, as such, should serve custodial sentences. Only in August 1796, for diplomatic reasons, did they order the liberation of the French convicts.\(^{36}\)

Political decisions, legal classifications, and cultural perceptions of race and class, therefore, did much to diversify the trajectories of the individuals who reached the Spanish dominions from Saint-Domingue. At the same time, the discourses and practices regarding each group were highly entangled. The Spanish elites (and a large part of the White population) tended to perceive any French presence as dangerous, and

\(^{33}\) AGI, Estado, 14, 77; AGS, SGU, LEG: 6854, 60; 6855, 26; 7151, 53.

\(^{34}\) AGS, SGU, LEG, 6854, 60, Joseph-Barthélemy d’Azgaignon, Fort Morro, May 1, 1795.

\(^{35}\) AGS, SGU, LEG, 6854, 60, “Relacion de los reos franceses...,” Casas, Havana, July 17, 1794.

\(^{36}\) AGI, Estado, 41, 3; 65, 42. For the case of a French prisoner still kept in Montevideo in July 1800, see AGS, SGU, LEG, 6818, 14.
they were careful to define and manage each subgroup in relation to the others. Thus, they decided upon the fate and destinations of the White prisoners of war in connection with those of the emigrados, and they addressed the forced mobility of the esclavos franceses together with that of the White prisoners.

The punitive relocations described in this section were also connected to broader debates and policies about social control and further flows of migrants. The decision about the destination of the slaves of Saint-Domingue, for example, was linked to the attempt to build a cordon sanitaire around the South American landmass, which included the repatriation from Venezuela of maritime Maroons escaped from Curacao.37 The related need to patrol the coasts, oversee prisoners, and maintain public order triggered further flows. In 1794, the navy in Havana received at least 500 convicts, military convicts, deserters, vagrants, and recruits from New Spain to reinforce the local garrison, which had been emptied by the transportation of many soldiers to the battlefields of Saint-Domingue. Deserters and “vagrants and idlers” (vagos y malentretenido) also made up a significant part of the 500 militiamen who were in charge of the defense and public order in Puerto Rico in June 1796, in the postwar period that witnessed an increased shortage of regular troops.38 Finally, while Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela were most directly affected by the flows of migrants stemming from Santo Domingo, preventive measures against the potential influence of revolutionary texts and people were also taken during the war in New Spain, Louisiana, Texas, and Yucatan. Still more distant provinces were involved as well. The order of the Duke of Alcudia regarding the French prisoners of war and the emigrados, for example, was received and praised by the captain general of Chile and the viceroy of Río de la Plata, among others.39

THE PUNITIVE RELOCATIONS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

Thus far, this chapter has highlighted the scope, complexity, and connectivity of the punitive relocations that took place in the early 1790s between

37 Soriano, Tides of Revolution, 93–95.
38 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7138, 51.
39 AGS, SGU, LEG, 7159, 16, n. 509, Arredondo to Alange, Buenos Aires, August 14, 1794; n. 91, O’Neill to Alange, Merida de Yucatan, November 9, 1794; n. 17, Virrey de Santa Fe to Alange, Santa Fe, November 19, 1794; AGS, SGU, LEG, 6886, 45, Higgins Vallenar to Alange, Santiago de Chile, October 14, 1794.
Spain and Spanish America, and within the Caribbean. This supports one of the broader goals of the whole volume – namely, to highlight the ways in which multiple flows of convicts, prisoners of war, refugees, and exiles coexisted, often in entangled relationships, in a wide range of polities from the 1770s to the 1820s. This final section asks how, on the basis of this expanded approach, we can best reinterpret both the persistence and the transformation of the practice of punitive relocation before, during, and after the Age of Revolutions. Previous scholarship that has focused on (the repression of) the political movements and ideas associated with the Age of Revolutions has posited major discontinuities vis-à-vis the ancien régime. At the same time, this scholarship has foregrounded continuities with subsequent decades, and even described the nineteenth century as the *siècle des exiles* – one in which politically directed relocations of politically motivated individuals took center stage. Here, I would argue that the picture changes fundamentally if we investigate punitive relocations holistically and place them in a broader chronological perspective, starting with the beginning of the Early Modern period. In what follows, I offer the outlines of this alternative approach.

There is little doubt that the period from the 1770s to the 1820s witnessed an intensification of punitive relocations in connection with the various military conflicts and revolutions that unfolded over those decades. It is also clear that the broad spatial scope of those events, and their connectedness, affected punitive relocations by making them spatially broad and closely connected as well. The empirical material that I have presented suggests that this observation holds true for the 1790s, while other chapters in this volume show that it is equally applicable to the Age of Revolutions more broadly. It is worth mentioning, however, that a similar expansion and intensification of punitive flows had occurred in previous periods as well, also in connection with other episodes of military conflict and political change. Moreover, it must be remembered that certain key elements of the logistical dynamics and cultural–political processes that I have discussed in the context of the 1790s predated the Age of Revolutions. Thus, as part of those processes, large flows of refugees and exiles also existed in the centuries before 1770.


41 The Spanish Crown both created and received multiple flows of refugees and exiles during the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. On this, see Santiago Castillo
As early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Spanish monarchy demonstrated an impressive capacity to mobilize large numbers of soldiers, convicts, vagrants, and prisoners of war to meet its defensive and offensive goals. For example, during the Eighty Years War against the Seventeen Provinces (1568–1648), thousands of troops were transported from the Iberian Peninsula and Spanish Italy along the “Spanish Road” and the “Swiss Road” to Spanish Flanders; they included important contingents of convicts and vagrants.\(^{42}\) From the 1530s onward (and in some cases until the last decades of the eighteenth century), the Spanish, Neapolitan, Sicilian, and Genoese galley fleets were active in the Mediterranean at the service of the King of Spain; their oarsmen were convicts (forzados), enslaved Muslims captives (esclavos), and “volunteers” (buenas boyas). Starting in the sixteenth century, the recruitment of sentenced criminals and vagrants for the galleys became increasingly integrated with their transportation to the North African presidios.\(^{43}\) A similar integration between the galleys and the presidios was a long-term feature in the Philippines; there, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the oarsmen and presidiarios, as well as the impressed soldiers, originated not only from within the archipelago but also from Peninsular Spain and the Viceroyalty of New Spain.\(^{44}\) In Spanish America, the galley fleets stationed at Callao, Havana, and Cartagena de Indias had a more limited relevance for a shorter period of time. The network of presidios became the central feature of the defensive system there, and the transported convicts,


\(^{42}\) Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659: The Logistics of the Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2004), especially 38–40.


vagrants, and deserters had a significant place among their garrisons and played a key role among their forced laborers. 45

The extensive network of punitive relocations that spanned the territories of the Spanish monarchy in the second half of the eighteenth century and up to the 1820s (Map 4.3), therefore, should be understood as emerging from a multisecular consolidation of punitive experiences, and from the constant reproduction and selection of simultaneous and spatially scattered punitive practices. This being the case, the network did not originate from the specific social and political processes of the Age of Revolutions, although these clearly added to its strength and scope during that period. At the same time, the punitive flows that occurred during those decades represented only one part of a broader relocation network that was connected to other simultaneous social processes, such as the colonization of new territories, the exploitation of natural resources and Indigenous labor, and local interactions among different social and ethnic groups.

I am arguing that a fundamental continuity existed between the punitive relocations of the Age of Revolutions and those of the Early Modern period, with certain specificities regarding the former notwithstanding. This same continuity cannot be found in punitive relocations in the nineteenth century, since the situation was different. In the Age of Revolutions, the various political outcomes clearly had a profound impact on punitive relocations within the Spanish monarchy. At the spatial level, the independence of Spanish America (except Cuba and Puerto Rico) represented a major disruption of what was once a closely connected network. Many key hubs and flows no longer existed after the 1830s, and those that were added in the second half of the nineteenth century – Fernando Po in the Gulf of Guinea, the Carolinas in the Pacific, and the Chafarinas Islands in the Mediterranean – entered a Spanish monarchy that had undergone a thorough reconfiguration of its spatiality, structure, and conceptualization.

Map 4.3 Network of punitive relocations to the *presidios*, Spanish monarchy, 1760s–1820s.
In terms of imperial governance, the growing hegemony of liberal discourse led to two processes that directly affected punitive relocations. On the one hand, the redefinition of the relationship between the metropole and the remaining overseas provinces and possessions forced a decision about the continuation or discontinuation of penal transportation from Peninsular Spain. Briefly stated, metropole-to-colony penal transportation could only exist if there was continuity in the legal regime between the metropole and the colonies. All Western colonial powers faced this problem, but they split over its solution. France and Portugal opted for a model of assimilation and extension of the legal regime of the metropole to their colonial dominions, and this allowed for the continuation of metropole-to-colony penal transportation. Conversely, Britain and, later, Germany elected to separate the legal regimes and, therefore, to end metropole-to-colony penal transportation. In the case of Spain, the assimilationist project envisaged by the Cádiz Constitution (1812) was later reversed into an imperial regime based on a legal gap between Spain, governed by a liberal constitution, and the overseas provinces, which were subjected to “special laws.” Therefore, penal transportation from the peninsula to the overseas territories was effectively ended in the 1830s, with the flows of sentenced individuals only continuing among the colonies, from the colonies to the metropole, and within each regional network (including one comprising Peninsular Spain, and the North African presidios).

On the other hand, the introduction of liberal legal frameworks in the metropole and the redefinition of governance in the colonies paradoxically converged to increase the role of military and administrative relocations. In the overseas provinces, these stemmed especially from the new “supreme authority” (mando supremo) given to the captains general of Cuba and Puerto Rico and, on the former island, from responses to repeated insurrections and military conflicts. Accordingly, several thousand individuals – including insurgents, vagrants, rebellious slaves, and free Blacks – were sent from Cuba to virtually all the other territories of the Spanish monarchy. At the same time, in Spain, the frequent declarations of local and national “states of siege” or “states of emergency” in

connection with internal regime changes, attempted revolts, and military conflicts (for example, with the carlistas in the 1830s and 1870s) triggered a series of administrative and military relocations of hundreds of individuals to colonies as distant as Fernando Po and the Carolinas.48

After the 1820s, then, the flows of punitive relocations were still spatially expansive and qualitatively complex but featured a composition and spatial configuration that was distinct from those in the past (Map 4.4). Due to the discontinuation of metropole-to-colony penal transportation, the flows that originated from the metropole were now primarily connected to administrative deportations linked to states of emergency. As such, they mostly contained politically motivated deportees. The authorities, however, often used those opportunities to also get rid of groups of undesired subaltern subjects with little or no political affiliations and aspirations. A more balanced composition characterized the flows stemming from the colonies. On the whole, the politically motivated and elite deportees left behind more traces in the archive and have thus attracted more attention from historians than have the “nonpolitical” ones. More generally, the increasing use of military and administrative relocations foregrounded the political nature of the repressive measures, while sentencing through the criminal justice system cloaked political motivations in the apparently neutral discourse of the law. However, penal transportation did not cease to play a role in nineteenth-century punitive relocations, and the expansion of the penitentiary system only made the criminal justice system more intrusive. This suggests that we should reconsider the actual impact of the political prisoners and exiles in each context and period by addressing their mobility as part of a broader network of punitive relocations. Moreover, by taking a longer-term perspective on the whole of punitive relocations, we are better able to ask how “the political,” as a category, was constructed. Doing so also encourages us to interrogate how different types of legal sources (the criminal justice system, military authorities, and police and political power) and distinct punitive methods (e.g., capital punishment, incarceration, penal transportation, and deportation) contributed to this process of politicization or depoliticization of both punishment and the punished.

More generally, this chapter demonstrates that if we situate the punitive relocations of the decades 1770s–1820s in the longer history of Early Modern and nineteenth-century punitive practices, then the question of continuity and discontinuity seems less straightforward than it has previously appeared. The Spanish monarchy provides an important vantage point in this respect, as its multisecular history of colonization and polycentric governance offers the opportunity to contextualize the various configurations of mobility and coercive practices across a relatively long time span. Potentially, this methodological approach might apply to other polities, too. Once we acknowledge that the simultaneity and connectivity of multiple flows was standard across time, we can better establish how different regimes of punitive relocations were connected to specific discourses and practices of power. Rather than linear and universal ruptures, we can then observe contingent, context-specific, and coexisting configurations, as well as simultaneous continuities and discontinuities with regard to more particular aspects. This calls for a connected study of the logistical and politico–cultural processes that shaped those flows, and, in turn, offers an invitation to investigate their impact on the broader dynamics of mobility and coercion in the context of state- and empire-building.

49 The chapters in this volume by Anna McKay, and Brad Manera and Hamish Maxwell-Stewart also address punitive relocation in the Age of Revolutions.
When British forces seized control of Ceylon in 1796, capitulating Dutch servicemen found themselves being sent halfway across the world; Peter Andreas was sent to Chatham, Frederick Aabels to Plymouth, and C. Andriese to Leith.¹ Six years later, in May 1802, Transport Board officials sent word to the Admiralty in London asking for advice. They stated that they were keen to discharge 1,684 Black prisoners of war who had been made prisoner at St. Lucia and onboard privateer ships and were currently being held at Martinique and Barbados.² The status of these prisoners was unclear. While privateer ships were typically commissioned by governments to raid an enemy’s military and merchant shipping during warfare, the Transport Board did not confirm whether this group consisted of privateer sailors or individuals who had themselves been captured at sea by privateers. The prisoners from St. Lucia may well have been soldiers who had fought in French military units against the British during the French Revolutionary Wars (April 1792–March 1802), but it was possible that they were also civilians who had arrived on the island as refugees or were deported by French authorities in their struggle against Black insurgents.³ Whether civilians, soldiers, or sailors,

¹ The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), ADM 103/484, Register of Prisoners of War: Dutch prisoners released by particular orders, 1796. Dates processed: Peter Andreas, February 16, 1796, 10; Frederick Aabels, March 16, 1796, 24; C. Andriese, March 16, 1796, 25.
² TNA, ADM 1/3742, Letters from the Transport Board, November 1801–December 1802, Transport Board Commissioners Rupert George, Ambrose Serle, and William Albany to Evan Nepean, May 24, 1802, 172.
these prisoners were draining the resources of the Transport Board, as the cost of renting prison space in Barbados amounted to £1,000 per year. Transport Board officials were therefore instructed by the Admiralty to sell the prisoners into slavery to recoup the expense of keeping them. Status and race could determine the mobilities and fate of a prisoner of war; while Dutch captives were sent to parole towns across Britain, prisoners of color were sold into bondage.

My chapter focuses on the multiple mobilities of prisoners of war captured by the British between 1793 and 1815, during the French Revolutionary Wars, Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1812. It refers to prisoners being held at contested British imperial sites across this vast panorama of warfare, from the Cape of Good Hope to Jamaica, Ceylon, and Halifax, Nova Scotia, alongside detention centers, including prisons, prison ships, and parole towns in Britain. A combined analysis of these sites begins to make visible the scope and scale of war captivity and prisoner movements across the British imperial world. By the mid-eighteenth century, Britain’s procedure for housing, clothing, and feeding combatant prisoners had been formalized, as administrative change was prompted by high prisoner numbers, negotiations, and exchanges during the Seven Years War with France. However, between 1793 and 1815, as war with multiple nations across land and sea dragged on, tensions escalated. Noncombatant prisoners and civilians were captured alongside naval and military servicemen, leading to ever-increasing prisoner numbers and the eventual breakdown of the British system of management. Far higher numbers of prisoners of war were detained at holding stations across the world, and ruling powers sought to cope by moving them.

The conflicts of 1793–1815 were undeniably global. These wars transformed empires and cultures, but of course had varying political, economic, social, and ideological contexts. This chapter chooses to view them as a whole. By grouping them together, we may lose the minutiae of certain battles, laws, and customs, but we gain an understanding of the immense geographical scale at which they played out

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4 TNA, ADM 1/3742, Ambrose Serle and William Albany to Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, June 5, 1802, 184.

5 The “French Revolutionary Wars” refers to the wider conflict from the time of British involvement, 1793–1802, while “Napoleonic Wars” as a standalone term is used to refer to the date range 1803–15. On punitive relocation in the contemporary Spanish Empire, see Christian G. De Vito’s chapter in this volume.

across land and oceans, from the Caribbean and South America to South Africa and Southeast Asia. These wars not only took place in multiple locations throughout the world but also involved the vast deployment of naval and military forces, disrupting the lives of civilians and societies at large. When we combine our analysis, we see that an enormous number of people — many millions, in fact — were caught up in voluntary and nonvoluntary movement over two decades, with lasting repercussions. War became what Catriona Kennedy has called “an arena for heightened human mobility.”

Historical analyses of spaces of confinement have provided a lens through which to glimpse the repercussions of international conflict at the local level. These are currently found in sociocultural studies of prisoners of war detained across Britain and France. Few works, however, assess these spaces, circulations, and interactions on a global scale. Prisoners of war were, in fact, caught up in multiple zones of imperial contest, at the mercy of shifting political exigencies. The examples in this chapter allow us to understand war captivity on both a global and local scale. The first section, for example, examines how British administrators coped with the influx of prisoners, and how that experience differed according to place of capture, detention, and the various networks supporting them. New histories of conflict have introduced themes of identity, citizenship, and nationhood across the Atlantic, but much of this existing work centers on military and naval captives. The second section argues for the importance of using these existing frameworks and analyses to look outward, so that we can consider the experiences of


noncombatants and civilians within theaters of war – groups ranging from whalers and free and enslaved people of color, to lascar seamen, independent travelers, religious missionaries, women, and children. Their inclusion within this history adds depth to our understanding of the combatant experience, while also shedding light on wider questions around the legal status of captives, and around subjecthood and liberty during this revolutionary period.

This chapter shows that the experiences and movement of prisoners of war deserve to be integrated more fully into existing histories of forced migration. The numbers for the period are staggering: Between 1793 and 1815, approximately 250,000 prisoners of war were held in Britain alone. This figure does not represent the total number of prisoners, as we need to locate and include combatant and noncombatant prisoners who were captured and held globally, in colonial outposts, including Canada, the Caribbean, and elsewhere. To place the number of prisoners of war in context, approximately 83,000 convicts were transported from Britain and Ireland to New South Wales in the period 1788–1850 – a far longer time period with far lower numbers. Previous studies, such as those on the movements of convicts, enslaved people, sailors, and indentured servants, have provided global contexts for local experiences, leading in turn to a greater understanding of the labor, resistance, and cultural creativity of displacement. Prisoners of war constitute an underrepresented group within this category; soldiers, seamen, noncombatants, and civilians moved across imperial spaces, subject to administrative pressures and local and regional policies, as well as larger state stratagems. Furthermore, while carceral geographers have begun to explore links between incarceration and mobility, more work is needed to forge connections with histories of


imperial circulations and control. By exploring the multiple mobil-
ities of prisoners of war, we will gain greater knowledge and under-
standing of the political, economic, social, and cultural impact they
had in a world of global movement.

This chapter examines select Admiralty prisoner of war registers,
and draws further qualitative insight from official correspondence, con-
temporary news media, memoirs, and parliamentary reports. Before we
proceed, however, it is important to acknowledge that many of the
sources examined in this chapter derive from the state and are there-
fore loaded with institutional and metropolitan biases. This begs
the question: How can we locate individuals and groups who moved
through the colonies when they left little written record behind? By
reading between the lines of official reports, it becomes possible not
only to track the movements of captives but also to begin to understand
their diverse experiences as they moved across British imperial spaces.

Letters petitioning for better treatment, publicly printed complaints,
memos, and colonial enquiries can provide insight here. The second
part of this chapter focuses on the importance of classification: During
this period, we see extreme porosity in the vocabulary, categories, and
practices used in relation to prisoners of war. This essay uses the term
“prisoner of war” interchangeably with “captive” when referring to
anyone that the Admiralty recorded in their registers, irrespective of
their race, status, and gender. Sailors and soldiers were easier to label,
but at a time when practices and even vocabulary was emerging and
changing, what of whalers, enslaved people, and refugees; what were
their rights, how much power did they have, and were captors obliged
to maintain them, or even authorized to move them? As the featured
examples show, administrators struggled to cope with the volume of

14 Dominique Moran, Carceral Geography: Spaces and Practices of Incarceration
(Farnham, 2015); Dominique Moran, Nick Gill, and Deirdre Conlon, eds., Carceral
Spaces: Mobility and Agency in Imprisonment and Migrant Detention (London, 2016);
Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires,
1400–1900 (Cambridge and New York, 2010); Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage
for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800–1850
(Cambridge, MA, 2016); Kerry Ward, Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the
Dutch East India Company (Cambridge and New York, 2009).

15 Marcus Rediker, Peter Linebaugh, and Isaac Land have highlighted the difficulties sur-
rounding the value of administrative sources. See Rediker and Linebaugh, The Many-
Headed Hydra; Isaac Land, War, Nationalism, and the British Sailor, 1750–1850
(London, 2009).

16 See Morieux, The Society of Prisoners, 6. For more on porous and inconsistent classifi-
cations of mobile individuals, see Jan C. Jansen’s essay in this volume.
prisoners under their care, and overlaps between that group and other coerced migrants ultimately led to a system lacking in consistency, whereby questions around legal categorization were worked out on the peripheries of imperial spaces according to circumstance.

ADMINISTRATION UNDER PRESSURE

Prisoners of war hailed from a variety of nations directly involved in warfare, in addition to those bound by political treaties and alliances. From 1793 to 1815, these included France, North America, Denmark, Prussia, Spain, and Holland. The primary reason that these prisoners were moved across imperial locations was that the British Admiralty did not have the resources to feed, clothe, and house them at their place of capture. The Admiralty’s Sick and Hurt Board was responsible for the maintenance of prisoners of war – anything from housing, feeding, and clothing, to repatriation – until a transferal of power to the Transport Board, another Admiralty department, in 1806. These boards managed depots and prison ships across Britain and its overseas outposts. The Admiralty’s rich archival collections offer an exceptional opportunity to examine global war captivity. Of the 597 holding places listed within prisoner of war registers at The National Archives, Kew, ninety-nine relate to imperial locations, as represented in Map 5.1.17

The registers span a number of contested sites, from Antigua, Martinique, and Grenada in the Caribbean, to Montevideo (Uruguay), Newfoundland, Bermuda, and New Providence (the Bahamas). By examining these sites together rather than viewing them singly, and considering them irrespective of their size and geographies, we can begin to lay the foundations for a macro-historical narrative of captivity in war. 18 Admiralty registers offer outstanding levels of detail; they reveal the names of captured ships, where they were seized, and their classification (e.g., naval, privateer, merchant). Captives recorded within these registers include combatants but also noncombatants and civilians who were caught up in the process, including ships’ surgeons, pursers, schoolmasters, women, children, passengers, and free and

18 Clare Anderson employs the term “macro-historical narrative” to refer to the connected historical framework of interpretation used to position penal transportation within a range of historiographical and methodological concerns and debates. See Anderson, A Global History of Convicts, 5.
enslaved people of color. Combatant prisoners were broadly defined as a mix of sailors and soldiers, while merchantmen (transporting cargo or passengers) and privateers (privately owned armed ships) fell into an indistinct category, as they could operate under neutral flags or work under the commission of combatants.

In the registers, we find prisoner names, see how they were categorized by officials and, crucially, where they were sent. The registers show us, on the one hand, how far-reaching state control over prisoner mobilities could be. On the other hand, they also suggest that the volume of captives led to problems at local levels. Nations traditionally disposed of captives via exchange cartels, whereby hired ships transported prisoners back home.19 These exchanges ensured relatively

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stable prisoner numbers and reduced costs. Those sent from the colonies were not expected to be exchanged in this way, and were instead supposed to be returned to the places they had come from. In the colonies, localized exchanges often took place, a policy that avoided transporting prisoners long distances across the Atlantic to be processed by officials in Europe. During the Napoleonic Wars, however, specific negotiations for cartel exchanges between Britain and France broke down, the result of new French state policy to forgo the traditional custom of exchanging prisoners. The move forced the British state to bear the financial and administrative burden of caring for thousands of prisoners of war. Britain appealed to France to resume exchanges, threatening to significantly reduce prisoners’ rations, and some cartel ships sailed, but in 1806 only three British prisoners were returned, compared to 672 French officers and 1,062 men of lower rank. In 1810, the number of French prisoners in Britain was 44,585, an almost twofold increase from the 23,699 that had been estimated in 1807. By 1814, these numbers reached as high as 70,000. The action strained state resources and depots at home and overseas.

When a ship was captured, it was the captor’s responsibility to take any prisoners to port and to release those with papers confirming their status as noncombatants to exchange stations. In 1782, in the aftermath of the Battle of the Saintes off Guadeloupe, the British fleet under Sir George Rodney captured the French ship Ville de Paris, among others. The first British entry in the Ville de Paris’s logbook took place one day after the battle, on April 13, 1782. It detailed how the ship had been badly damaged, with its hull shattered and its mast yards, sails, and rigging pierced with shot. The entry also noted that the decks of the ship were littered with bodies, and that “a number of the prisoners on board [were] wounded mortally.” The Ville de Paris’s captors set about

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26 TNA, ADM 51/520, Captain’s Log of the Ville de Paris (April 13, 1782–July 12, 1782), entry dated April 13, 1782.
navigating the battered vessel to port and “disposing of the French prisoners among the ships in the fleet.” These prisoners were then handed over to Admiralty officials, who entered their names and other details into registers. From there, they were sorted according to rank and status, and were then either exchanged, released on parole, or sent to depots and prison ships. The bodies of those killed in action were buried in mass unmarked graves on shore, close to local graveyards or depots, a process overseen by officials and medical attendants.

Ship crews and army militias comprised soldiers and sailors of all ages. Any prisoner under the age of twelve was typically ordered to be sent home; for example, the Transport Board ordered a number of French boy prisoners to be sent home in 1796, because their “age and size [could not] be of any real use” to the enemy for some years. It was not uncommon for fathers, sons, and brothers to serve as seamen on the same ship, but when captured, categorized, and managed by Admiralty clerks and officials, these families risked separation. One instance, from May 1809, spoke of a family’s concerns of being separated in Plymouth. Surgeon Thomas Eshelby wrote to Captain Hawkins, the superintendent of prison ships, about the case of one French boy, Mateui Danil, who was on board the captured ship Généreux, moored in the estuary. The boy was due to be sent to HM Prison Dartmoor, further inland by around twenty miles, and his father, then serving as a washer on board the hospital ship Le Caton, requested that the boy be transferred to him. Eshelby appealed on behalf of Danil’s father, giving his permission for the boy to go and assist his father on board. He went as far as to discharge another man from the Généreux to go to Dartmoor in the boy’s place.

27 Ibid., entry dated April 14, 1782.
28 Local inhabitants and captured prisoners could be hired to dig mass graves for burials, supervised by medical staff and officials. For example, in a letter to his mother on May 8, 1811, Lieutenant John Mills of the Coldstream Guards described how shortly after the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro in Portugal he had been charged with burying the dead from the battlefields. In Ian Fletcher, ed., For King and Country: The Letters and Diaries of John Mills, Coldstream Guards, 1811–1814 (Staplehurst, 1995), 34–35. Prisoners of war who died in depots were often buried in adjoining cemeteries or burial grounds, such as “Deadman’s Island” in Halifax, Nova Scotia. See John Boileau, Half-Hearted Enemies: Nova Scotia, New England and the War of 1812 (Halifax, 2005), 94.
30 Plymouth and West Devon Record Office, Plymouth (hereafter PWDRO), 413/172, Surgeon Thomas Eshelby to Captain Edward Hawkins, May 1809.
31 Ibid.
son. It is likely that Danil feared for his son’s safety in the Dartmoor prison, as he was at risk of abuse by older prisoners. Additionally, news passing between the decks may have alerted him to Dartmoor’s unsanitary conditions, as the mortality rate was one of the highest across all prisoner depots.\footnote{Davey, \textit{In Nelson’s Wake}, 172.} The transfer of Mateui Danil reveals that Admiralty officials could be sensitive to individual entreaties, albeit those expressed via a mediator in a position of authority. Allowing parents and children to stay together was common policy with respect to higher-ranking paroled prisoners; one letter from the Admiralty in 1803 stated, “we agreed to allow women and children to remain with their husbands and parents in this country.”\footnote{TNA, ADM 98/212, Admiralty Commissioners to Captain Isaac Cotgrave, Plymouth, June 30, 1803, 48–49.} If noncombatant prisoners, such as passengers or members of higher orders, had families with them, it was simpler for the Admiralty to grant them permission to stay together rather than deal with hundreds of letters of entreaty.

Prisoners were able to receive sums of money that supported them, even when sent from far-flung places of capture. This was especially the case with higher-ranking prisoners, such as officers and lieutenants, who were typically released on parole. Parole offered prisoners the opportunity to become what Renaud Morieux has called “captives with privileges.”\footnote{Renaud Morieux, “French Prisoners of War, Conflicts of Honour, and Social Inversions in England, 1744–1783,” \textit{Historical Journal} 56 (2013): 55–88.} They were financially supported by the Admiralty, as governments generally struck agreements with their counterparts enabling allowances to be passed on, with the understanding that fees would be settled at the end of the war.\footnote{Morieux, “French Prisoners of War,” 63 n. 38.} Prisoners were given subsistence money proportional to their rank, and some paroled officers with connections were even able to draw money via banks, including Coutts and Company.\footnote{PWDRO, 413/267, Captain Edward Hawkins, Plymouth, to Coutts and Company Bankers, January 24, 1810. Note that Elodie Duché has examined British captives’ financial connections between confinement in Verdun and London’s Royal Exchange during the Napoleonic Wars, revealing blurred lines between private and public prisoner of war relief. See “Charitable Connections: Transnational Financial Networks and Relief for British Prisoners of War in Napoleonic France, 1803–1814,” \textit{Napoleonica La Revue} 21 (2014): 74–117.} Ordinary prisoners on board prison ships could also receive small allowances, or, in the case of Danish prisoners in Plymouth in 1810, charitable donations of one shilling and five pence,
orchestrated by pastors of congregations in London. Allowances also differed according to occupation; for example, at Callington, in East Cornwall, nine Dutch officers and their servants brought from the Cape of Good Hope were given greater monetary allowances, as they were in the employ of the East India Company. The officers were paid seven shillings a week, something which agent Ambrose Searle remarked made “their condition particularly easy and comfortable.”

The Admiralty’s ability to send prisoners from their places of capture back to Britain shows that it was supported by a maritime network – of administrators and overseers, naval ships, and transport ships working on commission – strong enough to facilitate the mass movement of captives across long distances. For example, at Barbados, the crew of the American privateer vessel Fox, captured on January 11, 1815, were discharged via various ships manned by British marines, including the Swiftsure and Niemen. Although these two vessels were warships, not all ships transporting prisoners were necessarily naval; instead, they could be ships acting on private commissions. The logistics of moving prisoners across these imperial sites therefore became a profitable sideline for merchant vessels making return voyages, a war economy stemming from the Admiralty’s inability to cope with prisoner numbers. Irrespective of their place of capture, prisoners of war were sent to sites across England, Scotland, and Wales, including those at Plymouth and Dartmoor in Devon, Stapleton near Bristol, and Norman Cross near Peterborough. The Admiralty’s decision to move its captives highlights the importance of its local and global networks but also shows that imperial outposts were not viewed as developed enough to support the needs of the state.

To build suitable prisons and advance colonial infrastructure, investment – in the form of time and money, but also in skills such as sourcing labor and materials – was urgently needed. Expenditure in the colonies was high; Table 5.1 comprises a list of projected expenditures for establishments relating to prisoners of war for the year 1815. We see that

37 PWDRO, 413/329, Wolff and Dorvill, London, to Captain Edward Hawkins at Plymouth regarding payments to Danish Prisoners, April 4, 1810.
38 See Abstract of General Orders & Regulations in Force in the Honourable East-India Company’s Army on the Bengal Establishment, Completed to the 1st of February, 1812 (Calcutta, 1812), Let. C.D., February 16, 1810, 137.
39 Report on Treatment of Prisoners of War, BPP, 1798, Agent Kinsman to Ambrose Searle, 44.
40 TNA, ADM 103/13, Prisoner of War Registers: Barbados, American prisoners of war, 1812–1815, 50–53.
Dartmoor, a purpose-built depot in Devon, had the highest expenditures, followed by Halifax, Nova Scotia; Jamaica; Barbados; and New Providence. The *Ganges* prison ship at Plymouth was the cheapest depot; these ships, which were also used in imperial locations, were generally captured or decommissioned naval warships and were thus economical and mobile. They could be towed from site to site, according to need. The high financial costs associated with the imperial locations included in Table 5.1 are attributable to American activity during the War of 1812, as these sites functioned as exchange stations for American prisoners. This followed negotiations in 1813 to replace a prior provisional agreement which dealt solely with naval prisoners.41

Depots and detention centers were at the heart of the Admiralty’s wide-reaching networks of local contacts. Prison ships, for example, were moored in harbors at home and overseas and were naturally close to Admiralty operations, and thus became part of local supply chains. At Plymouth, ships moored in the Hamoaze Estuary were neighbors to the Royal Naval Dockyard, the army barracks at Devonport, and to

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**Table 5.1** Estimate of Establishment of Departments of Transport Office, 1815: Prisoners of War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dartmoor</td>
<td>£3,643 19s. 8d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dover</td>
<td>£80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valleyfield</td>
<td>£91 5s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ganges</em> prison ship at Plymouth</td>
<td>£54 15s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>£1,281 19s. 4d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>£719 15s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape of Good Hope</td>
<td>£705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>£629 15s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halifax, Nova Scotia</td>
<td>£2,240 9s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>£1,552 13s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>£742 10s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Providence</td>
<td>£1,004 16s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>£416 7s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>£13,163 6s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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highly important naval victualling yards. Captain Edward Hawkins was in charge of the *Brave* and also the *San Ysidro* prison ships during the French wars. The nineteen prison ships based in Plymouth during the period held a combination of French, Dutch, American, and Danish prisoners of war.\footnote{Ibid.} Captain Hawkins’s letters to Admiralty officials reveal how managerial problems could vary according to location. In one letter complaining to Admiralty commissioners, Hawkins wrote that his contractor was having difficulty delivering foodstuffs due to bad weather, and that the supply boat was “much later than it ought to be.”\footnote{PWDRO, 413/15, Letter from Captain Hawkins, sent from prison ship *Brave*, July 15, 1808, 7.} Hawkins compared his situation with that of other prison ships and nearby Mill Prison, writing that all of those depots were receiving substitutes, such as barley in place of herring, as a result of supply issues.\footnote{Ibid.} Mill Prison was to the west of Plymouth Hoe and part of a large naval base that also housed prisoners of war.\footnote{Paul Chamberlain, *Hell upon Water: Prisoners of War in Britain, 1793–1815* (Cheltenham, 2008), 85–86.}

During the War of 1812, Bermuda was one of many imperial locations that, like Plymouth, relied on prison ships to house captives and was dependent on the smooth operation of local supply chains. Bermuda lacked a prison on land to house its captives, who, during this period, were primarily American servicemen. The islands were not self-sufficient, and foodstuffs were imported from America, either directly by license or sent via Halifax, Nova Scotia.\footnote{Ross Hassig, “The Prison Ships of Bermuda, 1812–15,” *Bermuda Journal of Archaeology and Maritime History* 21 (2018): 152.} On August 22, 1812, an advertisement issued by Edmund Bacon, the agent for transports, was printed on the front page of the *Bermuda Gazette*. Agent Bacon appealed for suppliers of ships’ biscuits or soft bread, beef, pork, pease (dried peas), or rice, and salt.\footnote{*Bermuda Gazette and Weekly Advertiser*, August 22, 1812.} Later that week, Bacon clarified that any person who intended to apply for the contract was required to call at his office to give testimonials.\footnote{Ibid., August 29, 1812.} Communication between prisoners and the Admiralty was facilitated by agents who acted as intermediaries, and bilingual assistants were often employed to communicate more efficiently and to ensure that grievances were attended to. Public advertisements for supplies reveal the importance of agents and official networks, but they also serve as a
further reminder of the impact that warfare had upon local economies. While large numbers of prisoners burdened the Admiralty by placing it under severe economic and logistical strain, the prisoners’ movement nevertheless prompted new opportunities for entrepreneurs, suppliers, and civilians, and closed the gap between warfare, the state, and society.49

LEGAL STATUS AND CATEGORIZATION

The experiences of noncombatant captives provide us with the opportunity to examine overlaps between prisoner of war mobilities and those of other types of unfree (and free) migrants. The state’s management of these captives differed from its treatment of combatants; instead of set regulations and codes of conduct, there was inconsistency and improvisation. Official approaches suggest that the state was perhaps unprepared for managing the broader range of captives it encountered, a diversity stemming from the wider geographical reach of warfare. Many prisoners were captured simply as the result of sailing in contested waters or crossing borders on land. Even the process of capturing prisoners became more wide ranging, involving privately owned ships who supplemented state power by assigning the label of a captive on the spot.50 For example, in 1798, a Spanish merchant vessel called L’Union (La Union) was captured off the Cape of Good Hope by a privateer ship acting in British interests, the Indispensable.51 The Indispensable had itself been captured from the French in 1793, and was originally built to serve as a merchant ship sailing to the West Indies. In the registers, however, it was classified as a whaler. Whaling ships occupied an interesting position: While their crews did not engage in warfare as combatants, the trade diminished during wartime as many investors sought more reliable returns by chartering their vessels to the government, meaning that many of the ships themselves began to transport cargo and passengers.52

49 On war capitalism, see also Brad Manera and Hamish Maxwell-Stewart’s chapter in this volume.
50 Morieux, The Society of Prisoners, 6.
51 TNA, ADM 103/48, Prisoner of War Registers: Cape of Good Hope, Various nationalities, July 7, 1796–December 28, 1802, 31–32. See also TNA, HCA 49/11-2, Prize Papers of the ship La Union, Juan Ramos, Master. Spanish property, captured by the Indispensable, 1798. The capture of the Indispensable is recorded in High Court of Admiralty Papers at TNA, see HCA 32/686/13, 1793.
During this period, the *Indispensable* also transported male and female convicts to New South Wales under its captain, William Wilkinson.\(^{53}\) What we see, therefore, are examples of ships that might be whalers or convict ships one month, and merchant ships the next, and upon which contractors acting on behalf of the state were granted the authority to accost enemy ships and take captives. The crews of whaling ships were largely exempt from impressment laws and enlistment, as they were seen to be serving the nation’s economy, but during the blockade of the French and Dutch coastlines in the 1790s, many small vessels, including whalers, were captured, since fleets that operated in the North Sea, around Greenland, became legitimate targets.\(^{54}\)

Once the crews had been captured, their practical, valuable knowledge of certain areas may have compromised them; for example, it was common for neutral Danish and Norwegian privateer sailors during the Napoleonic Wars to choose to enlist when captured, something that allowed them to maintain a degree of freedom, or at least saved them from detainment on board a prison hulk.\(^{55}\) Interestingly, during the War of 1812, David Porter, captain of the American ship *Essex*, noted in his journal the sight of a Spanish ship of war disguised as a whaler close to the Galapagos Islands, suggesting that whaling ships, with their lucrative cargoes, could either act as lures to prospective captors or be viewed as unthreatening enough to act as decoys.\(^{56}\)

When the *Indispensable* captured *L’Union*’s crew – including Captain Juan Ramos, surgeon Marcus Barber, four passengers, and five enslaved men – the ship was on its return from Rio de Janeiro, thirty-five leagues from Cape Horn.\(^{57}\) On the day of its capture, April 8, 1798, it sailed with its prize to the Cape of Good Hope, and the captives were entered into Admiralty registers on May 10. All prisoners were then transferred to the ship *Heroine*, bound for England, by order


\(^{54}\) Chamberlain, *Hell upon Water*, 12.


\(^{56}\) Captain David Porter, *Journal of a cruise made to the Pacific Ocean: by Captain David Porter, in the United States frigate Essex, in the years 1812, 1813, and 1814* (Philadelphia, PA, 1815), 117.

\(^{57}\) TNA, ADM 103/48, Prisoner of War Registers: Cape of Good Hope, 31–32.
of Rear Admiral Hugh Cloberry Christian, second-in-command at the
Cape of Good Hope station. On November 24, 1798, the Britannia
(another merchant ship that also operated as a whaling and convict
ship), captured a Spanish merchant vessel, St Michael, off the Cape
of Good Hope. Unlike L’Union’s captives, Captain J. de Sigura, his
first mate, A. V. Lephilley, and passenger Don P. G. Anchorez, were
released on parole within two days of capture. The ship’s boatswain,
J. Bicyra, signed up to work for the British, and was marked down as
being “on board the Rose of the Sea for Rio de la Plata.” A fellow
captive, seaman F. Gonzales, chose to enter the service of Britannia, the
ship that originally captured him, by order of Rear Admiral Christian’s
successor, Captain George Losack. As these men were sailing under a
merchant vessel, they were considered noncombatants and as such were
able to avoid detention by enlisting.

The Admiralty’s lack of consistency regarding enslaved people cap-
tured at sea shows us that questions of legal status, subjecthood, and
liberty were worked out on the peripheries of empire rather than in
the metropole. On board L’Union, eight of the prisoners were enslaved
people sailing under the Spanish crew. With one exception, these men
were given no surnames in the Admiralty’s register; their Spanish names
were recorded as Martin, Antonio, Luciano, Mariano, and Estevan,
Jose Maxia, Juaquim (sic.), and Antonio. The register stated that
all men were “turned over to the captors of the Spanish prize,” the
Indispensable. Like F. Gonzales, who chose to enlist on the Britannia,
it appears that these enslaved men began to work for the British, but
likely without the option to contest. What we see in the case of enslaved
sailors was a form of captivity-within-captivity, in which further con-
straints were placed upon individuals already rendered powerless by the
empires actively involved in the slave trade. After the Abolition Act in
1807, prize courts, which were authorized to consider whether ships had

58 Ibid.
59 TNA, ADM 103/48, Prisoner of War Registers: Cape of Good Hope, entry dated March
3, 1799.
60 Ibid., entry dated February 2, 1799, 31–32.
61 TNA, ADM 103/48, Prisoner of War Registers: Cape of Good Hope, entries dated May
10, 1798, 31–32.
62 Ibid., 31.
63 See Lauren Benton, “Abolition and Imperial Law, 1790–1820,” The Journal of
Abolition: Cape Town and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade,” Slavery & Abolition 34
been lawfully captured, adjudicated slave ship captures; enslaved people were not released unconditionally, but as “prizes” who were apprenticed in the colonies for periods of fourteen years.

Although Britain had already tightened restrictions on the slave trade, vessels still passed by the Cape and were targeted by ships who sought to claim bounties for their successful detention and prosecution. The enslaved men on board *L’Union* were part of a small crew, rather than forming the ships’ cargo, but they were still transferred from Spanish to British control, demonstrating the enforcement of prize law no matter how large or small the scale. From this, we also see that warfare did not restrict the implementation of imperial legal order.

Unlike enslaved captives, naval and military captives were able to demand their rights, and they frequently used language evocative of coercion to gain sympathy and highlight injustice when petitioning for better treatment. It was not uncommon, for example, for prisoners to liken their captivity to something akin to or even worse than slavery.

During the War of 1812, American prisoners of war held on Melville Island, around four miles from Halifax, Nova Scotia, frequently demanded their rights, often in the public sphere. On December 17, 1812, the *National Intelligencer* printed details of American Captain William Davidson’s treatment as a prisoner there. Discussing the “scandalous usage of which the British are systematically guilty towards the unfortunate Americans,” the article stated that the American prisoners at Halifax were treated in a shameful manner by the agents, and that they were brought to port under a strong guard and marched to the prison at Melville Island as if they were criminals.

Once in the depot, he remarked that jailors examined the prisoners and stole whatever they pleased, from books and money to quadrants. Benjamin Waterhouse, captured by the British and also held at Melville Island, described the site in his 1816 memoir, stating that some prisoners lamented their fate “at being shut up like negro slaves in a Guinea ship, or like fowls in a hen coop, for no crime but for fighting the battles of their country.”

The condemnatory rhetoric, in which American prisoners were likened


65 Elodie Duché has explored the significance of the appeals by British prisoners based in Longwy to William Wilberforce in 1811, wherein they asked him to consider their captivity in France as a form of distress “worse than slavery”; see “Captives in Plantations,” 108–24.


to slaves and criminals, was highly emotive, but did not recognize the plight of many who were entirely denied of rights due to their legal status, uncertain as that might have been.

While some prisoners of war, such as those on *L’Union*, were legally defined as enslaved at their time of capture, many sailors in all fleets were free people of color. Racial intermixing was commonplace at sea, particularly among American sailors after the Revolutionary War. For example, by 1803, Black men (mostly free) filled about 18 percent of American seamen’s jobs, until mid-century changes in waterfront hiring practices began to squeeze them out of the maritime labor force. If a Black prisoner of war was recognized as a military captive, then their legal status, and therefore their rights, should have been secure. However, a lack of administrative clarity could result in mishandling or abuse at lower levels. This chapter’s opening example – of Black prisoners of war being sold into slavery in Martinique and Barbados in 1802 to recoup the costs of keeping them – shows that the Admiralty responded to captives in different ways, depending on locales and laws. Yet without knowing the finer details – whether these prisoners were legally free refugees from the French Caribbean, or combatants who had fought in French military units – it is impossible to judge under what circumstances their liberties were being stripped. This administrative oversight could be interpreted as an institutionalized presumption of Black people’s status as enslaved, but it could also mask the flagrant practice of re-enslavement, whereby administrators relied on state bureaucracy to conceal involvement in the prohibited transatlantic trade.

Inconsistencies in the way the Admiralty confirmed and recorded prisoners’ legal status, and differences in how free and unfree Black prisoners were processed, indicate that the state, or at least its colonial representatives, may have seen international law as less rigidly defined or more malleable during the revolutionary period. When British officers and their men were taken prisoner after the capitulation of their camp at Berville

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69 TNA, ADM 1/1742, Transport Board Commissioners (Rupert George, Ambrose Serle, and William Albany) to Evan Nepean, May 24, 1802, 172.


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in Guadeloupe by the French in early 1796, it was expected that they would be conveyed home to England, according to the man-for-man exchange system. However, this was refused, and when the matter was investigated by French Agent Jean Charretié, he conveyed the news to the Commissioners of the Transport Board that, among other causes, “[British] Generals, in contempt of the Law of Nations, and of the respect due to humanity, have sold men of color, armed for the defense of the French Colonies, and of their private property, and even set a price on their heads.” It was on these grounds that the French were “under the necessity of retaining hostages, who could be no other than the English prisoners.” The French viewed the sale of Black prisoners as a violation of international law, but they did not clarify whether they were legally free according to French revolutionary law. Their being armed indicates that some were in military service. Between 1793 and 1803, slavery was abolished throughout the French Empire, and so those Black prisoners who were connected to private property were also likely to have been free, and thus entitled to prisoner-of-war status. Although slavery was, at this time, justified through international law, it did not sanction the enslavement of a free person. So, if the British had indeed re-enslaved formerly free prisoners, then the French authorities were justified in their backlash. It is clear that local factors, such as the legitimacy of slavery in the Caribbean, could shape the Admiralty’s response to certain categories of prisoner, but not all Black captives in Guadeloupe risked being sold into slavery. In fact, by May 1796, when the French garrison holding Fort Charlotte on St. Lucia surrendered again to the British forces, a fleet of ships carrying mostly Black and mixed-race prisoners, more than 2,500 men, women, and children, was sent to England to be held at Portchester Castle in Portsmouth. The terms of the garrison’s surrender was that they would all be treated as prisoners of war, rather than as enslaved.

71 Report on Treatment of Prisoners of War, BPP, 1798, BPP, Appendix no. 13, Extract of a letter from the Commissioners for the Transport Service, &c. to M. Charretié, February 9, 1796, 61.
72 Ibid., extract of a letter from M. Charretié to the Commissioners for the Transport Service &c. [Translation], April 4, 1796, 64.
73 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
The Admiralty’s difficulty in categorizing prisoners of war in the colonies is further evidenced by a case relating to parole payments at Port Royal, Jamaica. Here we have an example of refugees taking advantage of this confusion to manipulate the system to their advantage. In 1795, the commander-in-chief at Port Royal, Rear Admiral William Parker, wrote a letter to the Admiralty stating that the majority of prisoners released on parole there received four and a half dollars per week, “a few of the blacks and mulattoes excepted.” Still, Parker had cause for concern; he stated that payments made at the station were indiscriminate, and that this had become so well-known that “people who never had an idea of coming to Jamaica, came for the sake of it,” so that they could be processed as prisoners of war and receive payments. Parker complained that people of color, in particular, wrote “to their friends at St Domingo to come and avail themselves of it.” This interesting example shows that prisoner-of-war classification questions interfaced with alien laws and the desire to prevent people of color from going from San Domingo to Jamaica. Parker felt it was time to intervene in what appeared to be a colonial version of benefits fraud. Thus, he requested that all prisoners who were marked as discharged in Admiralty registers should no longer be entitled to payments, although he was keen that individuals whose plantations and estates had been burned or destroyed should receive special dispensation. Zoë Laidlaw’s work on colonial governance reminds us that imperial networks relied on their administrators, and that maintaining links to the metropole was critical. Parker’s appeal to the Admiralty was separated by a distance of more than 4,500 miles, with letters taking perhaps a month to arrive, and then another month for the response. Separation from the state meant that officials placed in the colonies were left powerless, waiting for authorization as costs mounted. Good relations with colonial governors was key, but Parker noted that there were tensions between him and the current governor of Jamaica, whom he blamed for the “improper expense” of the parole payments.

77 NMM, ADM MT/415, Rear Admiral William Parker to the Commissioners of the Transport Office, Raisonable at Port Royal, Jamaica, October 26, 1795, 17.
78 Ibid.
79 NMM, ADM MT/415, Parker to the Transport Office, October 26, 1795, 17.
81 Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815–45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial Government (Manchester, 2005), 17.
82 NMM, ADM MT/415, Parker to the Transport Office, October 26, 1795, 18.
Parker’s problem shows that news traveled not only between colony and metropole but also from island to island. Claimants were many and varied: landowners, apprentices, servants and surgeons, women, and children. Parker gave a list of some of the prisoners receiving payments, including Madam Specit, whose property had been burned by brigands at Donna Maria; Jean Marie, a seven-year-old orphan boy who came from Lelit after it had been burned to the ground; Leila, a Black woman with six children seized en route to America and brought to the island, where she had remained since her capture; and Monsieur Marzella, a merchant who left the Cape before arriving in Jamaica. In the face of the hardship and danger brought by warfare, inhabitants from across the Caribbean risked their lives for financial support. Labeled as emigrants, they were, in fact, refugees who actively sought to be recognized and recorded in Admiralty registers under a different legal category. They were able to fulfill this thanks to the porosity of classification. By changing their status from emigrant to prisoner of war, these individuals were able to manipulate their circumstances “from below” and regain a small sense of independence, or balance, in an unstable and changing environment.

CONCLUSION: ALL AT SEA

The mobilities and experiences of prisoners of war across the British imperial world varied according to place of capture, legal status, and circumstance. But captives and the state were linked by their connection to and dependence on the ocean, the space in which international tensions played out. While some captives worked and fought at sea, others were simply captured there. They could be held in prison ships and detention centers at ports reliant on the strength of local supply systems or moved across the ocean as part of exchanges facilitated by the Admiralty’s larger maritime networks. Elodie Duché has written that the sea could act as a space of “negotiated coercion”; the imperial processes of capturing and transporting captives, but also of deciding their fate, was one that forged a link between enslaved people, convicts, indentured migrants, and coerced seamen, all of whom were bound up in various webs of power relations mediated across the ocean. When we view the conflicts of 1793–1815 together, rather than singly, we gain a greater sense of

83 NMM, ADM MT/415, entries dated February 3, 1795, June 13, 1794, August 26, 1793, and August 1, 1795, 38–41.
84 Duché, “Captives in Plantations,” 114.
the scope and global scale of coercion and its relation to war captivity. In doing so, we can understand more about the legal status of captives, subjecthood, and liberty during this revolutionary period.

This chapter shows that sites of detainment were clearly interconnected, and that prisoners moved across British imperial spaces as a series of linked sites. Moving them while avoiding mass escapes, violence, or loss of life depended upon the strength of communication and cooperation among officials and the mass deployment of ships to facilitate ease of movement. One key aim of this chapter was to bring the understudied colonial ties between war captivity and mobility into fuller view, forging tighter connections between the study of prisoners of war and larger histories of imperialism, conflict, and forced migration across the maritime world. Reading between the lines of the archival record, we see how prisoner experiences differed from site to site; we can also better understand the reach of the state in controlling movement and discern overlaps with other types of free and unfree migrants. By shifting the focus away from the naval and military experiences that have previously dominated the field, we can increase our knowledge of the experiences of previously overlooked captives, including enslaved and free people of color, and women and children. This research, however, represents only the tip of the iceberg; future work, including quantitative analyses of Admiralty registers, has the potential to dig deeper, examining captives’ relationships with each other, and to state and society, to ultimately reveal more about their global circulations and connections with other nations.
Eighteenth-century European colonial expansion has been characterized as “war capitalism”: an aggressive form of state expropriation of land and labor.¹ Such re-evaluations of the Atlantic relations of production have done much to blur the lines between voluntary and involuntary labor participation. While slave labor was not waged labor, the development of the Atlantic slave trade was shaped by industrialization and at the same time generated profits that could be invested into canal development, coal mining, and textile production, thereby assisting further British economic development. The huge expansion of the Birmingham gun industry, for example, provided both a key item of exchange in the slave trade and fueled levels of warfare in Central and West Africa that led in turn to an increase in the supply of slaves in the form of captives.² In this chapter, we argue that European unfree labor also played a role in this process, supplying a flow of unwilling military recruits to police Britain’s Atlantic interests.³

The numbers involved in this underexplored unfree labor system were far from insignificant. Many more prisoners served in the African and Caribbean colonial garrisons during the Napoleonic and Revolutionary Wars, for example, than were shipped to the Antipodes. Most recruits sourced through the criminal justice system were sent to

³ On prisoners of war and war capitalism, see also Anna McKay’s chapter in this volume; and on flows of war captives within the contemporary Spanish Empire, see Christian G. De Vito’s chapter.
Britain’s Military Deployment of Convict Labor

penal units that have been the subject of remarkably little study. As Padraic Scanlan put it, their “history exists in scraps scattered across continents.”⁴ Roger Buckley made a similar observation in relation to condemned soldiers who served in the West Indies. As he noted, “full recovery of the vast and vital data” on the recruitment of culprits, convicts, deserters, and rebels into the ranks of the army in the West Indies has yet to be undertaken.⁵

In this chapter, we use a range of different sources to piece together the military deployment of convicted labor in the British Atlantic world in the period 1766–1826. We start with an account of the diverse ways in which criminal justice systems were used to recruit prisoners to police British interests in the tropics. We then attempt to reconstruct the flow of British militarized convict labor to the Caribbean and West Africa in the age of wars and revolutions. Finally, we end by exploring the many complexities that resulted from the parallel deployment of European and African coerced workers in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Atlantic world. We conclude by arguing that European penal labor played a critical role in shaping British colonial practice in the Atlantic, including its disengagement from the slave trade.

“TO GO FOR A SOLDIER”: COURTS, GAOLS, CRIMPS, AND RECRUITING PRACTICES

The use of convicted labor to bolster the ranks of forces deployed in colonial ventures has a long history. The Portuguese used prisoners as both unfree soldiers and seaman in their 1415 campaign to capture the north African city of Ceuta. Thereafter, convict soldiers were regularly sent to military presidios in North or West Africa, Mozambique Island, Diu, and Muscat.⁶ The Spanish also manned presidios in Florida, Louisiana, and Alta California with convict soldiers, while the Russian Empire made use of penal labor battalions until 1860.⁷ The French use

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⁴ Padraic Scanlan, Freedom’s Debtors: British Anti-Slavery in Sierra Leone in the Age of Revolution (New Haven, CT, 2017), 120.
⁵ Roger Norman Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies: Society and the Military in the Revolutionary Age (Gainesville, FL, 1998), 104.

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of militarized penal labor was particularly extensive. The *Bataillons d’Infanterie Légère d’Afrique* (BILA), originally formed in 1832, were used in colonial operations until they were disbanded by the French in 1970. BILA recruits were sourced from military offenders and civilian prisoners who – though discharged from jail – had yet to complete military service. While these men were not technically sentenced to transportation, convicting courts knew that colonial service in a penal unit would inevitably follow metropolitan imprisonment. At least 600,000 men, overwhelmingly drawn from working-class populations, served in the BILA during its 138-year existence. This practice illustrates the difficulties involved in distinguishing convict labor from other forms of unfreedom (in this case, conscription), as well as the extent to which legal mechanisms were employed to co-opt the labor of offenders within the overall process of colonization.

The British also experimented with the recruitment of criminals into the armed forces. The practice dates back to at least the fourteenth century. It has been estimated that 12 percent of the men who fought for the English Crown between 1339 and 1361 were convicted criminals. As the English (later British) acquired colonial possessions, they became increasingly reliant on the courts and other criminal justice mechanisms that sourced the recruits who provided the necessary manpower to operate both a fleet and overseas garrisons.

The defense of British slaving interests required a military presence on both sides of the Atlantic. The West Indies was a major theater of action in every eighteenth-century European conflict. Additional manpower ensured that there was a large enough force not only to defend Britain’s plantation interests but also to launch amphibious operations against island colonies controlled by competing European powers. Even in periods of peace, a garrison served as a bulwark against slave insurrection. Fewer troops were needed to maintain British interests in West Africa; nevertheless, some military presence was required to defend slave forts and factories from attack by other European powers. Boots on the ground were also useful in that they aided in the sorts of negotiations with West African polities that were crucial for securing access

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to slave markets. Military bands and ceremonial displays of arms, for example, could form an important backdrop to political and commercial transactions.¹⁰

Yellow fever and other tropical disorders including malaria and dysentery took a high toll on European troops serving in the tropics. The British expeditions to Havana in 1762 suffered greatly from malaria, for example.¹¹ The four British battalions sent to defend the West Indies in 1780 experienced a mortality rate of nearly 50 percent in the first six months of service, as did the 86,000 British troops who served in the West Indies in the years 1793–1801.¹²

The health risks associated with service in the tropics were well-known. British newspapers regularly carried stories about the ravages of the “black vomit” – a popular name for yellow fever.¹³ In 1775, it was claimed that the government kept news of a yellow fever outbreak “a profound secret” for fear “that it would discourage the Officers and Troops that are now embarking for America.”¹⁴ The catastrophic losses experienced by the British in the West Indies in the 1793–98 campaign similarly hindered recruitment.¹⁵ To bolster the ranks of units slated for service overseas, recruiters resorted to a number of different strategies. These included the use of mercenaries, slaves, prisoners of war, debtors, criminals, and deserters. At first, recruits sourced through the criminal justice system were drafted into regular regiments. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, there was a shift in policy, and a series of dedicated penal battalions were raised for service in Africa and the Caribbean. Over time, the British came to increasingly rely on soldiers of African descent, as they were better acclimatized to tropical disease environments. Condemned soldiers played a critical role in the recruitment and training of these units, which slowly replaced their European penal equivalents, and the practice of recruiting British and Irish military and civilian prisoners for service in the tropics formally ceased in 1826.

¹³ See, for example, Leeds Intelligencer, March 18, 1766.
¹⁴ Northampton Mercury, April 17, 1775.
Previous accounts of the British army in the eighteenth century have tended to downplay the extent to which the rank and file were recruited from criminals. Most have argued that convicted prisoners accounted for an insignificant proportion of serving troops at any given point in time. A survey of court records would tend to support this view. While prisoners tried in the Old Bailey were given the option of joining “Their Majesties Service by Sea or Land, by their own free Consent” as early as 1693, such sentences were uncommon. In the years 1693–1816, just 207 prisoners sentenced in the Old Bailey, London’s principal court, were ordered to enlist in the army or navy. Yet, there were many other ways in which an encounter with a court could lead to enlistment.

Notably, the exercise of royal prerogative could be used to alter sentence outcomes. Thus, in 1824, twenty-five men in the Justice, Leviathan, and Retribution hulks were pardoned of their crimes on condition of their enlisting in the Royal African Colonial Corps. The timing was by no means coincidental. The outbreak of the First Anglo–Ashanti War (1824–31) created an unexpected demand for military labor on the Gold Coast. Similar judicial maneuvers were used to direct other convicted workers to theaters where there was a demand for their skills. Thus, in 1825, twelve smugglers were sent to the Cape Coast to serve as seamen for five years. Invariably, such pardons were made conditional on colonial service.

Many recruits sourced through the criminal justice system were never brought to trial. Throughout the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, able-bodied men were discharged from custody on condition of joining the army or navy. This ensured that they did not have to stand up in court. Such early forms of plea bargaining are often poorly documented, as they are not usually recorded in court proceedings. A survey of the Shropshire Quarter Sessions for the years 1741–57 unearthed only one mention of the practice. In this case, the offender was dragged before the courts after having maimed himself in order to avoid

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18 The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), HO13/42: Correspondence and Warrants, January 26, 1824 – April 1, 1824, 252–53, 255–56, and 406.
19 Hampshire and Portsmouth Telegraph, August 29, 1825.
military service – without this act of self-mutilation, the case would have gone unnoticed.\textsuperscript{21} The few recorded instances that have come to light are heavily concentrated in years when Britain was at war. The practice was particularly common in the years 1792–1804, when “culprits,” to use the technical term for a person charged with committing a crime, were diverted in large numbers into units slated for service in the West Indies.\textsuperscript{22} A similar system operated with military courts. Soldiers facing a charge might simply be transferred to an unpopular arm of the service without the need to enter into formal court proceedings.

Others who had been convicted “volunteered” for service rather than face other punishments. While it is difficult to know how many swapped a stint in jail or transportation for the “King’s shilling” – to use a popular euphemism for enlistment – surviving petitions shed light on individual cases. On August 31, 1824, John Barker requested permission to join the Royal African Colonial Corps after being sentenced to imprisonment for embezzlement for obtaining money under false pretenses at the Somersetshire Assizes. Upon passing a medical examination conducted by the surgeon of the 97th Regiment, he was duly admitted into the corps – with the commanding officer confirming that he did not object to the enlistment of men who were to be confined to a county jail.\textsuperscript{23}

There were other post-conviction avenues whereby inmates of jails and houses of correction could be funneled into the armed forces. Eighteenth-century carceral institutions were poorly funded; jailers relied on fees levied upon inmates to supplement meager or nonexistent salaries. Prisoners regularly had to pay for the use of their cell, bedding, food, and even their release (although the latter was made illegal in 1774).\textsuperscript{24} Many prisoners were incarcerated beyond the expiration of their sentence as a result of becoming indebted to their jailer.\textsuperscript{25} In such cases, they swapped a cell in the criminal division, crossing the corridor to the debtors’ yard. This rendered them liable to crimping – a practice


\textsuperscript{22} Buckley, \textit{The British Army in the West Indies}, 96–97.

\textsuperscript{23} TNA, HO 17/67/134, Petitions Mh-Mm, August 1, 1824 – August 31, 1824.


whereby jailers pocketed an enlistment bounty in return for discharging
the jail debt of a newly minted recruit.

The impressment of those found wanting by legal authority was
encouraged by the operation of the law. The Press Act of 1756 empow-
ered magistrates to forcibly recruit “able bodied Men as do not follow
or exercise any lawful Calling or Employment or, have not some lawful
and sufficient Support.”26 While specifically targeted at vagrants, the
legislation could also be applied to prisoners.27 As with later French
practice, there was a considerable danger that the discharged prisoner
would be met at the jail door by the recruiting party, swapping one coer-
cive institution for another.

Officering penal units appears to have developed in parallel. Some of
those who filled positions of authority had pasts that were as undistin-
guished as those of the rank and file over which they had charge. Joseph
Wall, who took command of the African Corps in 1779, had previously
been convicted for sexually assaulting an heiress, for example.28 Individual
career trajectories suggest that others joined to escape the disgrace of
being cashiered. John Ouzeley Kearney was commissioned as a lieutenant
in the New South Wales Corps on New Year’s Day in 1808.29 After serv-
ing through 1809 at regimental headquarters in Sydney, Kearney returned
to London on the Dromedary in May 1810.30 The following month, he
exchanged positions with J. N. Nealson, a lieutenant in the Royal African
Corps.31 Although the New South Wales Corps (recently renamed the
102 Regiment) guarded convicts in Australia, it was not itself a penal
battalion. Since this new position carried less prestige and a higher risk of
mortality, it seems likely that this “exchange” was forced upon Kearney
and that he was pushed toward, rather than drawn to, service in Africa.

Some of these recruitment mechanisms required consent, whereas
others did not. Those condemned to the scaffold had an obvious incen-
tive to enlist; others might be induced by the prospect of pay – although

27 Peter Way, “The Scum of Every County, the Refuse of Mankind: Recruiting the British
Army in the Eighteenth Century,” in Erik-Jan Zürcher, ed., Fighting for a Living: A
28 A Military Gentleman, An Authentic Narrative of the life of Joseph Wall, Esq., late
Governor of Goree (London, 1802), 7.
29 A List of All the Officers of the Army and Royal Marines on full and half pay with an
index and a succession of Colonels (London, 1810), 325.
30 Pamela Statham, A Colonial Regiment: New Sources Relating to the New South Wales
Corps, 1789–1810 (Canberra, 1992), 303.
31 Caledonian Mercury, April 15, 1811.
wages were meager. John Quinn, for example, received just six months’ pay for nine years of service in the Royal African Colonial Corps.\textsuperscript{12} There was the added incentive that those who survived military service were repatriated and thus provided with an opportunity to reunite with family and friends, as opposed to being left to languish in a remote penal colony. Nevertheless, the dangers associated with service in the tropics — the place most were sent to serve — ensured that push factors predominated over pull, regardless of the nature of the encounter with military and civilian criminal justice systems.

Thus, convicts or those formally sentenced by courts to military service or pardoned on condition of military service made up a minority of military recruits sourced via the criminal justice system. Many more culprits were induced to join the army before their trials, and these were joined by vagabonds and debtors crimped into service. A substantial number of the latter enlisted in order to clear jail debts. A common term that might be applied to all such rank and file enlisted via the civil and military court systems might be felon recruits — a broad term that covers all accused of committing an offense.

**Felon Soldiers and the Defense of Empire**

The diverse ways in which recruits were funneled into the armed forces via jails and courts make it difficult to enumerate the scale of militarized penal labor. The frequency with which recruits were sourced via criminal justice systems, however, fluctuated according to demand for manpower. As Figure 6.1 illustrates, there was an inverse correlation between the number of convicts transported overseas and the strength of the armed forces over the course of the long eighteenth century. In times of conflict, civil transportation numbers fell, a trend that became more marked over time. In part, this reflected increased shipping costs. Merchant seamen’s wages increased when Britain was at war, cutting the profit margins of the contractors on whom the state relied to transfer the bodies of prisoners to colonial buyers. The accumulation of convicted labor that might otherwise have built up could be dispelled by swapping colonial buyers for naval and military recruiters.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{12} TNA, HO 17/46/4, Petitions Gp-Gr, December 12, 1830.

Figure 6.1 Numbers of convicts transported to the American and Australian colonies and strength of the British Army, 1690–1820. 

Note: Ekirch only gives data for the numbers transported from London, Middlesex, Buckinghamshire, and the Home Counties. These figures have been inflated in line with his estimates for the total number transported from Britain and Ireland, 1718–72. A similar technique is used by Oxley and Meredith; see “Condemned to the Colonies. Penal Transportation as the Solution to Britain’s Law and Order Problem,” Leidschrift (2007): 23; B. Reece, The Origins of Convict Transportation (London, 2003); W. Oldham, Britain’s Convicts to the Colonies (Sydney, 1990), 65–68; C. Bateson, The Convict Ships (Glasgow, 1985), 381–96. 

As Stephen Conway has shown, Highland Scottish and Irish recruits appear to have been sent to serve in the regular army in India in disproportionate numbers as “part of a deliberate policy to spare good Englishmen, and even Lowland Scots, from an early death in a disease-ridden imperial outpost.” In similar fashion, units dispatched to the Caribbean relied much more heavily on criminal recruitment than did those deployed in more salubrious climates. Conway’s examination of pardons issued during the American Revolution on condition of military service highlights the degree to which those who entered the army via the criminal justice system were channeled into service in the tropics. Only a minority of pardons included specifications about the unit to which the reprieved convict was to be stationed, but in 58 percent of those cases, the convicts were sent to Africa, the Caribbean, or India.

Some units condemned to perpetual tropical service appear to have operated as quasi-penal battalions. The 60th Royal American Regiment of Foot was originally raised in 1755–56 for service in North America. In 1772, the regiment was redeployed to the West Indies, where two battalions continued to serve on a permanent basis. Even before this date, the 60th Regiment had a record of supplementing its ranks through the purchase of transported convicts who had landed in North Atlantic ports. After its redeployment to the Caribbean, its strength was maintained with regular drafts of prisoners. Although the 99th Regiment, or 99th Jamaica Regiment of Foot, had a shorter history, it too appears to have been principally manned by recruits sourced via the criminal justice system. This unit was raised in 1780 to assist with the defense of the Caribbean, and it disbanded in 1783 following the end of the American Revolutionary War. On the other side of the Atlantic, an independent company was established in 1766 and sent to Senegal, a colonial outpost that had been captured from the French eight years previously. While commonly known as O’Hara’s Regiment, after the name of its commanding officer, who doubled as provincial governor-general of Senegal, it was occasionally referred to as the African Corps.

37 Buckley, *The British Army in the West Indies*, 213.
38 *The Scots Magazine*, August 1, 1766.
These three units accounted for 39 percent of all recruits pardoned on condition of service in the period 1775–81.\textsuperscript{39} The oldest, O’Hara’s Regiment, was initially composed of military deserters. Over time, its ranks were augmented by convicts pardoned on condition of service in Africa for life.\textsuperscript{40} Private Murray McKenzie, who in 1782 was tied to the muzzle of a cannon on a fort rampart on the Gold Coast and judicially eviscerated for insubordination, was said to have escaped the gallows on two previous occasions. A former drummer in the guards, he had been capitally convicted for horse theft, only to be pardoned on “condition of serving in one of the regiments at the African settlements.”\textsuperscript{41} Others had either been sentenced directly to transportation or to hard labor on the Thames, where they had enlisted.\textsuperscript{42} The corps also took some “volunteers,” although in this context the term “volunteer” was at best slippery.\textsuperscript{43} No one was likely to volunteer for service in West Africa unless they wished to avoid another truly unpleasant outcome. Thus, volunteer George Robinson was crimped into service after falling into debt.\textsuperscript{44} The involuntary nature of the service is illustrated by the actions of the recruits. In April 1780, there was a mass desertion from a detachment of the African Corps stationed at Hilfey Barracks when news spread that they were about to be embarked for Senegal.\textsuperscript{45} It is no wonder that “volunteers” were occasionally shipped out for service in Africa ironed to each other in pairs.\textsuperscript{46}

The principal base of operations for O’Hara’s Regiment was Gorée, an island off the coast of Senegal that was strategically important in the slave trade. It formed a particularly handy operational base for privateers during times of conflict. First occupied by the British in 1758, it was ceded back to France in 1763, only to be recaptured again by the British in 1779. Strategically situated, Gorée had the additional advantage of offering a climate that was more conducive to European constitutions than that of the Senegalese mainland. While the island served as an

\textsuperscript{39} Conway, “Recruitment of Criminals,” 52–53.
\textsuperscript{40} Northampton Mercury, April 22, 1782.
\textsuperscript{41} General Evening Post, October 25, 1783.
\textsuperscript{42} Public Advertiser, June 12, 1784.
\textsuperscript{43} Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, September 14, 1778; The Trial of Kenith Mackenzie, Esq. (London, 1785), 13.
\textsuperscript{44} General Evening Post, August 13, 1785.
\textsuperscript{45} London Courant, April 7, 1780.
\textsuperscript{46} Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 8.0, November 2, 2020), Old Bailey Proceedings, December 5, 1781 (o17811205-1); The Trial of Kenith Mackenzie, 10.
operational base, soldiers from the unit manned thirteen different forts dotted along the African coast from Senegambia to Whydah.

Slaving was a complex business. Europeans purchased slaves from West African polities and merchant oligarchs. This necessarily involved a degree of formal negotiation. International competition, particularly with the Dutch and the French, created a network of local alliances. In 1766, O’Hara, for example, was approached by “Several Chiefs of the country,” who complained “that some of the French traders on the coast made a practice of forcibly carrying off the natives whenever they found opportunity.” As newspaper coverage put it, because the “chiefs are in alliance with the English (sic), it is imagined his Excellency will endeavour to prevent such deprivations in future.” 47 The maintenance of existing trading arrangements required a military presence. Slaving bases also needed protection in times of war. The strategic nature of colonial outposts such as Gorée ensured that such tiny specks on the map featured prominently in international agreements and were bitterly fought over.

The signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and the end of the American Revolutionary War reduced the Atlantic demand for condemned soldiers. Both the Africa Corps and the 99th Jamaica Regiment were disbanded in 1783–84. The lull, however, lasted less than a decade. The outbreak of hostilities with France in 1792 led to a rapid escalation in British military strength in the Caribbean. Between 1793 and 1801, a total of 86,000 British troops served in the West Indies, 51 percent of whom did not survive the experience. 48 The early losses were particularly crippling. The British were forced to retreat from Guadeloupe in 1794 and from St. Lucia the following year. At the same time, they had to contend with a slave revolt in Grenada and an insurrection in St. Vincent, while prosecuting a war with the Trelawny Town Maroons in Jamaica. Disease also crippled operations in Saint-Domingue, forcing the evacuation of the survivors in 1798. 49 As losses mounted, the army increasingly resorted to the recruitment of slaves and felons.

While irregular units of Black rangers had been raised during previous periods of conflict, in 1795 the British Army took the unprecedented step of purchasing freshly disembarked slaves to form a permanent military force, equipped, uniformed, and paid for in the same fashion as

47 Leeds Intelligencer, November 4, 1776.
48 Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 87.
49 Geggus, “Pitt’s Caribbean Campaigns,” 700.
other line regiments. By 1798, a total of twelve West India regiments had been raised. As a result, over the course of the Napoleonic Wars, the British government became the largest single purchaser of slaves. It is estimated that during that time, more than 13,000 slaves were bought and turned into soldiers.50

In many Caribbean jurisdictions, it was illegal to arm slaves. As a result, purchased recruits were treated in the same way as other soldiers and were discharged as freemen in receipt of a military pension. When they fell sick, they were treated in military hospitals alongside Europeans and were subject to military law rather than slave codes.51 They could even be demoted to a penal unit as punishment, as reflected in the Army List. This was hierarchically arranged descending from the Life Guards down through the regiments in numbered sequence. Although the West India regiments appear toward the end of the Army List, they were ranked higher than the garrison and veteran establishment, units to which Black recruits could be invalided. Penal units were placed at the bottom, denoting their degraded status.52

At the same time, the army redoubled its efforts to recruit debtors, rebels, culprits, convicts, and deserters to fill the ranks of its remaining European colonial garrison. This was necessary, in part, to placate planter opposition to the enlistment of former slaves. The British government agreed to limit the number of Black troops deployed in any single station in the West Indies to one-third of the total garrison.53 Thus, to accommodate the sensitivities of the plantocracy, it was necessary to continue resorting to the law as an agent of compulsory recruitment of European troops. Buckley estimates that in the period 1799–1802, at least 20 percent of the British Army in the West Indies was composed of felons.54 These included many Irish political prisoners incarcerated in the wake of the Irish Rebellion of 1798. In the period 1799–1804, around 3,200 of these prisoners were drafted into the army; most were destined for the West Indies.55

53 Buckley, “Slave or Freedman,” 102.
54 Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 102–4.
In August 1800, a new penal unit known as Fraser’s Corp of Infantry was raised to serve on the West African coast. As with its predecessor, O’Hara’s Regiment, the rank and file of the new unit were composed of condemned soldiers, a prison hulk acting as its British depot. By 1801, the unit, now renamed the Royal African Corps, was in action in Senegal and was once more headquartered at Gorée. On January 17, 1804, this strategic island was attacked by six French privateers who managed to overwhelm the garrison of one hundred men. At the time, the corps consisted of just two companies and had a notional strength of 220 rank and file. Its strength was increased to three companies that were dispatched to retake the station. With the increase in numbers, its British depot was switched to Alderney in the Channel Islands, where a temporary camp for 600 men was erected. In 1809, this was moved to a more permanent base located within the walls of Cornet Castle, Guernsey.

Over time, the unit’s theater of operations expanded, too. By September 1806, a detachment of the Royal African Corps was serving in the West Indies alongside several British line regiments. To facilitate this expansion, an additional two companies were added. A Whitehall directive of November 8, 1806, approved the augmentation of the corps as well as its split into two distinctive units, both of which were to continue to be composed of deserters and “persons confined for Petty Offences on board the hulks, who are desirous to serve abroad.” The following year, these units were reorganized into a new regiment, the Royal West India Rangers, which operated as a second penal battalion recruited on the same lines as its parent regiment – the only difference being that its theater of operation was the Caribbean rather than the West Coast of Africa. In 1808, a third unit, the Royal York Rangers, was split from the Royal African Corps. It was also dispatched to serve in the West Indies. The combined strength of the three units in 1808 was 3,140. In 1814, a fourth penal battalion was raised for service in the Caribbean. Styled the

56 Bell’s Weekly Messenger, March 18, 1801.
57 Scanlan, Freedom’s Debtors, 120.
58 Salisbury and Winchester Journal, April 2, 1804.
59 Morning Chronicle, August 24, 1804.
61 Caledonian Mercury, September 6, 1806; and Morning Post, January 22, 1807.
62 TNA, HO 13/18, Correspondence and Warrants, October 20, 1806–January 14, 1808, 16.
63 Estimates of Army Services, for the year 1809, British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter BPP), House of Commons Papers, 1809, vol. 10, 1809, 8.
York Chasseurs, this battalion was to be composed of the better class of military deserter. By 1816, the combined strength of the four penal battalions was 5,433, although some companies of the Royal African Corps were composed of former slaves rather than felons.64

After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal West India Rangers, Royal York Rangers, and York Chasseurs were demobilized.65 The Royal Africa Corps, however, continued in service. The British abolition of the slave trade in 1807 meant that the unit acquired a new role. Rather than securing Britain’s commercial interests in the slave trade, the regiment was now tasked with assisting antislavery operations, although this did not always go as smoothly as planned. The line between gamekeeper and poacher was thin, and at least one former officer, John Ouzeley Kearney, turned his hand to slaving after resigning his commission. By the early 1820s, Kearney had become one of the most active slavers in the Galinas trade to Havana.66 Others, including officers such as Lieutenant-Colonel James Willoughby Gordon, owned slaves or profited in other ways from the slave trade, reflecting the long and complicated link between the recruitment and staffing of penal units and the slave trade.67

Increasingly, the focus of the Royal Africa Corps operations shifted to Sierra Leone, where the unit was tasked with securing recruits for the West India regiments. This colony had originally been planned by abolitionist Granville Sharp as a suitable place to relocate London’s indignant Black poor. The venture quickly collapsed, but in 1792 “Black Loyalists” who had supported the British in the American Revolution were settled in Freetown. In 1800, this small community was joined by 500 exiled Jamaican Maroons.68 After the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, the British also sent “apprenticed” captive Africans there.69

In February 1819, a detachment of the Royal African Corps was sent to the Cape of Good Hope to reinforce British forces engaged in the Fifth Xhosa War on the colony’s eastern frontier.70 There they took

64 Estimate of Army Services, for the Year 1816, BPP, House of Commons Papers, 1816, vol. 82, 6.
65 Caledonian Mercury, September 20, 1819; York Herald, May 20, 1820.
66 Morning Chronicle, April 4, 1822.
68 Scanlan, Freedom’s Debtors, 12.
70 Yorkshire Gazette, May 29, 1819.
part in the defense of Grahamstown in May 1819. In September, the six White companies of corps stationed in West Africa were ordered home. The reminder of the Royal African Corps was disbanded in the Cape in June 1821, with the fifteen remaining officers becoming settlers in the vicinity of the Fish River. Some of the rank and file returned to Britain, while others appear to have stayed on as servants to their former officers.

The demise of the Royal African Corps was short lived. It was reborn the following year as the Royal African Colonial Corps, a unit once more composed of court-martialed soldiers and criminals. By July 1823, this new unit had again taken up residence in Cape Coast Castle. Further detachments were sent in September of that year and in January 1824. Another hundred men embarked for the Gold Coast in May 1824 following the defeat of British led forces at the hands of the Asante. They were joined by a company of 120 men from the same regiment shipped from the Cape in February 1824.

Despite these reinforcements, the ravages of disease were such that by the end of May there were only twelve effective European troops left on the Gold Coast. While the strength of the corps was raised to 1,000 men, many of these appear to have been recruited locally or were supplied from a company of the 1st West India Regiment transferred from Barbados. Nevertheless, an additional detachment consisting of 126 Europeans was shipped out to West Africa from the Solent on October 8, 1824, followed by 600 more from Chatham in November 1824 and another 250 in July 1825. A year later, “not one tenth” of these recruits remained alive. Other posts along the coast were hardly more salubrious. In June 1825, 134 soldiers of the Royal African Colonial Corps were sent to serve in Bathurst town on the Gambia River. By November of that year, all but thirteen had died and none were considered fit for duty. The last 250 European recruits were

71 Hereford Journal, August 2, 1819; Morning Post, September 8, 1819.
72 Morning Chronicle, November 2, 1821.
73 Morning Post, July 24, 1823; Caledonian Mercury, September 6, 1823; Morning Chronicle, January 20, 1824.
74 Morning Chronicle, May 21, 1824; Caledonian Mercury, June 28, 1824.
75 Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette, August 5, 1824.
76 Morning Post, August 9, 1824.
77 Morning Post, September 9, 1824; October 11, 1824; November 11, 1824; August 1, 1825.
78 Caledonian Mercury, September 1, 1825.
79 Morning Post, November 21, 1825.
shipped out of Cowes in February 1826, bound for Sierra Leone.\footnote{Morning Post, February 13, 1826.}

Thereafter, it was determined that the Royal African Colonial Corps would no longer “receive any more deserters or culprits” but would instead recruit on the “Western Coast of Africa.”\footnote{Hereford Journal, February 26, 1826.} By July 1826, the Corps had been reduced to just eighty effective European rank and file.\footnote{Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette, November 16, 1826.} The unit continued in service staffed by African recruits until it was eventually disbanded in 1840.

COUNTING FELON SOLDIERS

It is difficult to determine the number of felon soldiers who served in the Caribbean and West Africa in the sixty years from the raising of O’Hara’s Regiment in 1766 to the disbanding of the Royal African Colonial Corps in 1826. Information is particularly scant for the period 1766–84. Reported numbers of those dispatched to West Africa suggest that at least 3,000 condemned soldiers saw service there – a conservative estimate given the high death rates associated with service in the region.\footnote{London Chronicle, November 17, 1779; Hereford Journal, March 11, 1784.} The numbers sent to serve in the West Indies were almost certainly higher. In the period 1775–81, for every ten condemned soldiers pardoned on condition of service in West Africa, seventeen were sent to the West Indies. Given this ratio, it is safe to assume that an additional 5,000 were sent to the Caribbean, providing a combined estimate of 8,000 for the period to the end of the American Revolution.

The registers for the \textit{Laurel} and \textit{Perseus} hulks in the period 1802–14 provide details about the places to which convicts were discharged (see Table 6.1). Of the 2,057 convicts entered into the records of these two floating labor depots from 1802 to 1814, 323 were diverted into the Royal African Corps or another penal battalion, and 123 were sent for service in the navy. Extrapolated to the entire hulk fleet, these figures would suggest that a little more 2,180 convicts were recruited into the army directly from the hulks and a further 830 pressed into the navy. Given recruitment practices, however, this is likely to account for only a minority of condemned soldiers. Many others entered service as culprits, pretrial deals ensuring that they avoided the hulks. Military courts provided an even larger source of recruits – a common fate for deserters was to be redirected into a penal battalion.
TABLE 6.1 Outcome for convicts admitted into the Laurel and Perseus hulks, 1802–14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruited into Army</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>15.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruited into Navy</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent to work in Portsmouth Harbor</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not transported (released from hulk)</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>40.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transported to New South Wales (NSW) and Van Diemen’s Land (VDL)</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>25.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>7.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escaped</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Buckley estimated that at least 20 percent of European troops serving in the Caribbean in the years 1799–1802 were composed of deserters, culprits, and prisoners. While it is distinctly plausible that one-fifth of the 86,000 troops sent to serve in the Caribbean during the French Revolutionary War were recruited in this fashion, it is important to emphasize that if only half that number was supplied via military and civil courts, then it would still amount to more than 8,600 condemned recruits sent to the West Indies theater alone in the period prior to the partial demobilization of the army following the 1803 Treaty of Amiens.

Another means of estimating the number of felon soldiers recruited in the Napoleonic Wars is to use the annual reported strength of each unit and the estimated attrition rate. Between 1810 and 1814, the British regular army lost on average 5.7 percent of its rank and file each year to a combination of deaths, desertion, and discharge. The rate for penal battalions is likely to have been substantially larger due to the much higher rates of death experienced by troops in service in West Africa and the Caribbean. Philip Curtin’s estimates for mortality rates for British troops in different theaters are provided in Table 6.2. A soldier sent to the Leeward or Windward Islands was nearly six times more likely to die than one barracked in the British Isles. The risk rose to 8.7 times more likely for those stationed in Jamaica.

84 Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies, 102–4.
It was greater still for those serving in Gorée and Senegal. They were 24 times more likely to die than those barracked at home. Even these stations were less deadly than Sierra Leone. The death rate for European troops stationed there was 32 times greater than that for troops in the British Isles.

Information about the European rank and file of the four penal battalions formed for service in the Napoleonic Wars and projections about losses from desertion and disease suggest that in the period 1800–26, a minimum of 6,000 served in the Royal African Corps. At least another 7,000 recruits would have been required to maintain the strength of the Royal York Rangers, Royal West India Rangers, and the York Chasseurs in the years leading up to their demobilization in 1819, given combined estimated annual losses of 13 percent due to disease and desertion.86 Our conservative estimate is that in the period from 1766 to 1826, a minimum of 29,600 condemned soldiers saw service in the Atlantic theater with the British Army.

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86 Estimates of Army Services, for the year 1809, BPP, House of Commons Papers, 1809, vol. 10, 8; Estimates of Army Services, for the Year 1812, BPP, House of Commons Papers, 1812, vol. 9, 6; Estimates of Army Services, for the year 1816, BPP, House of Commons Papers, 1816, vol. 80, 6; The Scots Magazine, June 1, 1817.
The loss of the American colonies in 1783 rendered the resumption of transatlantic penal transportation impractical. While the British government explored the possibility of establishing penal settlements on the African coast, it eventually abandoned these plans in favor of Botany Bay. The increasing racialization of coerced labor in the Atlantic world reduced the market demand for unfree European labor, a reflection of the rise of the Atlantic slave trade. Labor for the initial English colonization of the Chesapeake Bay region, Barbados, Jamaica, and the Leeward Islands had been heavily sourced from convicts, prisoners of war, and workhouse inmates who had been sold into service. While the brutal exploitation of European coerced labor catalyzed the tobacco revolution, the shift to sugar after 1660 saw a marked uptake in slave ownership. Thereafter, the proportion of White coerced labor deployed in field work decreased. While convicts and indentured servants continued to be used as overseers and skilled craftsmen in the later years of the seventeenth century, Caribbean demand for European unfree labor dried up entirely in the eighteenth century. At the same time, it became increasingly rare for European convicts and indentured servants to be employed in plantation work in Georgia, the Carolinas, and the Chesapeake.\(^87\) The continued presence of unfree Europeans threatened to undermine the racial hierarchies that increasingly defined the division of labor in the Atlantic world. In the long run, the British solved this problem by transporting criminals to Australia, a continent where White unfree workers did not compete with enslaved Black labor.\(^88\)

The British had less room to maneuver, however, when it came to military deployment of penal labor. High death rates mandated a continued reliance on the use of felon soldiers or a switch to Black troops. Both options were problematic. The plantocracy, in particular, opposed the military recruitment of slaves, although the catastrophic mortality experienced by European troops in the Caribbean in the 1790s provided the impetus for change.\(^89\) Despite the growing importance of the West India regiments, the British government was unwilling to rely


\(^{88}\) Christopher and Maxwell-Stewart, “Convict Transportation in Global Context,” 80.

\(^{89}\) Lambert, “[A] Mere Cloak,” 629.
exclusively on Black troops to garrison the West Indies as this would have alienated the plantocracy. Tellingly, the deployment of Black troops in Africa lagged a decade behind the Caribbean. In both theaters, felon soldiers were employed alongside African units, although over time the latter replaced the former.

While the navy also enlisted criminal recruits, it did so on a limited scale. In part, this reflects its specialized demand for maritime skills. Seamen who fell afoul of the law when Britain was at war were likely to swap shore-based detention for the confines of a ship. Yet, mass naval recruitment was difficult to manage since, unlike the military, the condemned could not be caroled within a particular arm of the service. The idea of penal ships was never contemplated, as the risk of mutiny was too great.

The continued use of felon soldiers in an Atlantic world otherwise characterized by the coerced use of Black labor could be justified, since military service disguised unfreedom. In theory, at least, condemned soldiers were uniformed, paid, and disciplined the same as other British regulars. In practice, however, pay was often delayed and field punishments were brutal. On occasion, this heightened race sensitivities. In the early 1780s, a series of scandals brought the African Corps to public attention. Authority on the African station proved difficult to maintain. Mutinies were not infrequent and desertion rates high. While the brutality of the punishments inflicted on soldiers elicited approbation, this was further heightened by the racialized nature of these judicial spectacles. When Private Murray McKenzie was tied to the muzzle of a cannon and blown apart, the enormity of the act was compounded by its public nature. It occurred in full view of a large crowd of around 300 assembled Africans. Soldiers were also punished by placing them in the slave hole – graphically exposing the thin line that separated the conditions under which they served and those of the Africans loaded from the barracoons onto British slavers.90 Others were subjected to floggings so brutal that they later died of the wounds inflicted. These punishments were shocking because they were administered by Africans – not drummers, as was standard practice. This particular extrajudicial crime was considered to be of such a magnitude that it condemned Joseph Wall, the commanding officer of the African Corps, to the gallows.91

91 *General Evening Post*, August 13, 1785.
Fears of racial inversion could be minimized by geographical segregation. Death rates for Europeans stationed in Sierra Leone were particularly high (see Table 6.2). For this reason, Black recruits to the Royal African Corps were maintained in separate companies and tasked with garrisoning this colony.\textsuperscript{92} The few Europeans sent to this particular part of the coast were dispatched there as punishment. Thus, while twenty-five rank and file of the Royal African Corps stationed at Gorée were shot by firing squad for mutiny in September 1810, a further twenty-three were banished to Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{93} For many, this is likely to have amounted to a death sentence. Where Black and White troops served in the same detachment, the Europeans were placed in positions of authority as non-commissioned officers.

There were also concerns that the custom of sentencing soldiers to service in Africa would have further unintended consequences. As James Holman put it, “If we desire to enlighten a savage race, we could scarcely devise a worse plan than that of sending amongst them the refuse of a civilised country.”\textsuperscript{94} The routes by which the “refuse of a civilised country” were channeled into bonded service, however, could be remarkably similar to those that characterized enslavement. Slaves could be procured in many ways, but conviction and debt provided common pathways into the Atlantic trade. In 1784, Thomas Paplet, an officer in the African Corps stationed in Senegal, testified that justice was fairly administered in the “neighbouring counties, and that no wars are made for the purpose of making slaves.” Instead, the “breaking of villages” was merely a mode of “executing the law against those who will not pay their taxes.” As such, it was an act that was no more inhumane than the “perpetual imprisonment of such debtors by the laws of Great-Britain.”\textsuperscript{95} State-assisted crimping was an act condoned by “savage races” that were both Black and White, as was the use of the courts to produce unfree workers.

Over time, Black and White crimped workers came into closer contact. By August 1814, antislaving operations had succeeded in securing 124 slaving vessels. The cost of maintaining liberated slaves in Sierra Leone had risen to £4,039 per year. One way of operationalizing Britain’s growing investment in antislavery was to enlist the liberated.

\textsuperscript{92} Mungo Park, \textit{Travels in the Interior Districts} (London, 1816), cxlii.
\textsuperscript{93} Ipswich Journal, September 24, 1810.
\textsuperscript{94} James Holman, \textit{A Voyage Round the World, Including Travels in Africa, Asia, Australasia, America etc. etc.} (London, 1834), 124.
\textsuperscript{95} Chester Chronicle, April 13, 1792.
This had an added advantage in that such recruits were cheaper than slaves. To this end, a recruitment center for the West India regiments was created at Bunce Island, off the coast of Sierra Leone. The operation was to be overseen by the convict soldiers of the Royal African Corps. Under the guise of ending the slave trade, the corps helped to institute a second middle passage where “liberated slaves” were conscripted into service in the West Indies. By July 1814, nearly one-third of the 5,925 former slaves received in Sierra Leone had been redirected into the ranks of the West India regiments. The process involved drilling. The first contingent of 350 boys and men aged 14–18 to be enlisted were described as “wonderfully docile.” The liberated were regimented, converting them into an effective guard that would police Britain’s remaining plantation interests in the West Indies, where they were kept in line by White non-commissioned officers sourced from the Royal African Corps and other penal battalions.

CONCLUSION

In the sixty years from 1766 to 1826, the British transported more than 62,000 convicts to its North American and Australian colonies. Since soldiers with a criminal history were recruited in various ways, it is difficult to determine with precision the number of prisoners directed into the army. Nonetheless, we conservatively estimate that around 30,000 military recruits were sourced through the criminal justice system in this period. Indeed, at times, more prisoners were channeled into military service than were transported to penal colonies. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, only 14,000 convicts were sent to Australia, whereas approximately 20,000 prisoners were pressed into military service — a practice that ensured that transportation into the Atlantic world continued long after the decision to send the First Fleet to Botany Bay.

While drafts of condemned soldiers were initially used to supplement the ranks of regular line regiments slated for service in the tropics, over time specialized penal units were raised. Yet, at least until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, some pardoned felons continued to serve in regular

96 Scanlan, Freedom’s Debtors, 126.
97 Caledonian Mercury, November 16, 1812.
units. A motion in parliament to publish “a return of the convicts transported, pardoned or received into the army” was opposed in 1812 on the grounds that it would “tend to expose those men” who by dint of good conduct had been permitted to enter into regular regiments rather than condemned ones.99

The co-opting of criminal justice systems to provide expendable recruits provides an illustration of the complex ways in which war capitalism operated. In effect, the British used the courts to divert culprits and felons from metropolitan labor markets to areas of colonial shortage. We argue that much of the drop in the supply of transported convicts in periods of war visualized in Figure 6.1 is illusory. When the tropical demand for military recruits increased, labor sourced via criminal justice systems was strategically spirited into the armed forces. The human cost of this was significant. The death rate for prisoner soldiers in Sierra Leone was 44 times greater than that for convicts transported to Van Diemen’s Land (see Table 6.2).

That these forms of recruitment remain under-researched is unfortunate since much can be gleaned from examining the way in which the British relied on the criminal justice system to maintain its colonial garrison. Race and criminal history were used to compartmentalize, manage, and justify the labor exploitation of Black and White unfree workers. Crucially, the British use of militarized penal labor illustrates how these processes intersected. While it was always in the interests of capital to segment labor, Black and White coerced workers served alongside each other in both the Caribbean and West Africa. The labor of felon soldiers was particularly important to the maintenance of British slaving interests. This included protecting both the supply source of the Atlantic slave trade and the plantation economies of the West Indies. Following the abolition of the slave trade, felon labor played a critical role in British antislaving operations. This included overseeing the recruitment of former slaves into Black units designed to police British interests in the tropics. Convict-trained Black soldiers served even farther afield. The 6th West India Regiment participated in the successful attack on Washington, DC, in 1814, and the 1st and 4th Regiments were part of the ill-fated 1815 attempt to seize New Orleans. In the long run, liberated slaves proved better adapted to serve British military interests in the tropics than did European felons. This was a story that was hardly novel. Most penal transportation systems

99 Bury and Norwich Post, March 18, 1812.
were designed to sow the seeds of their own demise.\textsuperscript{100} Just as the use of convict labor paved the way for the introduction of slave labor in the seventeenth-century Caribbean and free labor in the nineteenth-century Australian colonies, so it played a critical role in the mobilization of African soldiers more suited to withstand the ravages of the tropics than their criminal instructors.

The scale at which felon labor was co-opted into military service requires further study. This chapter has not explored, for example, private military recruitment by the Royal African Company and the East India Company, although both also utilized the services of prisoners. Indeed, we suspect that a process to similar to the one in the Atlantic operated in parallel on the Indian subcontinent, a process whereby felon soldiers were used to train the sepoys who incrementally replaced them. Through the operation of such practices, the British criminal justice system formed a vital cog in a public and private war machine that ultimately led to a major shift in global power structures. By contributing to the defeat of Britain’s European rivals, courts and prisons played an important and previously unrecognized role in establishing British colonial dominance in the nineteenth century.

\textsuperscript{100} Deborah Oxley and David Meredith, “Condemned to the Colonies: Penal Transportation as the Solution to Britain’s Law and Order Problem,” \textit{Leidschrift} 22 (2007): 36.
New Orleans between Atlantic and Caribbean

Reinterpreting the Saint-Domingue Migration

Nathalie Dessens

Even though it was strategically important to early French colonization in the Americas, New Orleans remained a minor actor in the Atlantic world during the eight decades that it was under French and then Spanish control (from its founding by the French in 1718, to the Louisiana Purchase and its integration into the United States in 1803). Throughout this period, the city was the seat of the administration of the colony of Louisiana, a huge territory many times the size of the present-day state of Louisiana, stretching from the Gulf Coast in the south to the Great Lakes in the north, and from the Mississippi River in the east to the Rocky Mountains in the west. Nevertheless, both the colony and its capital city were demographically weak and economically shaky and thus remained at the margin of the Atlantic world for most of the eighteenth century. Colonial Louisiana did not receive large settler cohorts, nor was

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2 Since the advent of Atlantic history in the late twentieth century, the Atlantic has served as a conceptual framework to reinterpret the history of the Americas. Analyzed as a space of exchange (of people, products, ideas, and cultures), the rise of the Atlantic as an interpretative tool has complicated the history of the development of the Americas. It has enabled the writing of a more-connected history of the region’s empires and nations. New Orleans, with its peculiar colonial history, its location at the crossroads between the British, French, and Spanish Empires, and its receipt of incessant migrations, has largely benefited from these reinterpretations. Recent historiography has reconnected the city not only with Europe and Africa, but also with the rest of the Americas. On Atlantic history, see Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours (Cambridge, MA, 2005). On Louisiana and the Atlantic world, see, among many others, Bradley Bond, ed., Colonial Louisiana and the Atlantic World (Baton Rouge, LA, 2005); Cécile Vidal, ed., Louisiana: Crossroads of the Atlantic World (Philadelphia, PA, 2013); and, more recently, John Eugene Rodriguez, Spanish New Orleans: An Imperial City on the American Periphery 1766–1803 (Baton Rouge, LA, 2021).

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it a major center of slave importation. It was difficult to defend, not self-sufficient, and ultimately of such limited interest to the European powers that France ceded it to Spain in 1762 (something that would have been unthinkable in the case of a colony such as Saint-Domingue). For similar reasons, in 1800, Spain retroceded Louisiana to France, without much hesitation. In the second half of the eighteenth century, after it had become a Spanish colony, Louisiana experienced relatively low population influxes, absorbing neither voluntary nor forced migrants in large numbers. The former category included a few thousand Spaniards from Málaga and the Canary Islands, the latter a few thousand Acadians expelled by the British from Canada, as well as African slaves after the trade resumed under Spanish rule. Moreover, what little immigration there was typically affected the rural regions of Louisiana rather than its main urban center, New Orleans.

The aftermath of the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions drastically changed the situation. All three directly or indirectly triggered significant migratory waves to New Orleans. Throughout the Age of Revolutions, the city received important population groups that moved on their own free will (migrants from the early US republic) or under pressure (exiles from the French Revolution, refugees of the Haitian Revolution). Among those moving under pressure, some chose their destination (the Saint-Domingue refugees), whereas others obviously did not (the slaves who came with the refugees). New Orleans is thus fertile ground for the study of involuntary migrations, particularly of enslaved individuals and refugees of color.²

There are several reasons for this. The first is a matter of terminology. New Orleans was a welcome refuge for several migrations that were characterized by a varying mix of mobility and coercion. The term “exile” was mostly used in nineteenth-century Louisiana to describe the condition of the Acadians who had settled in Louisiana after 1763, after being expelled from Canada between 1755 and 1762 by the British authorities for refusing to pledge allegiance to the British Crown.³ The term


³ The term has been used in North America by commentators and historians since then. See, for instance, Arthur G. Doughty, The Acadian Exiles: A Chronicle of the Land of the Evangeline (Toronto, 1916). On the expulsion of the Acadians from Canada, see also Liam Riordan’s chapter in this volume.
was also used to designate the French who had moved to Louisiana for political reasons, for example, after the French Revolution, Napoleon’s downfall, or the two French revolutions of 1830 and 1848. The Saint-Domingans, however, were always called “refugees” in Louisiana, a term that has been widely used by historians for more than two centuries. But like the French Royalists or the partisans of Napoleon, they, too, had actively chosen Louisiana as their land of welcome. The enslaved people who were transported to Louisiana when the slave trade resumed under Spanish rule, or who were brought or sold by their American owners after the 1808 ban on the international slave trade, were never described in such terms by either nineteenth-century New Orleanians or historians, with the one exception being enslaved people from Saint-Domingue, who were sometimes included in the “refugee” group. This terminological differentiation is consistent with the fact that Louisiana was, at heart, a slave society in the early nineteenth century. In the eyes of Louisianans, the Saint-Domingue refugees had fled a slave rebellion for their lives, whereas the French and the Acadians had been forced out of their countries by political circumstances. As for the enslaved, they were considered mere additions to the Louisiana slave population. That the enslaved from Saint-Domingue were sometimes included in the refugee group may be attributable to the lore of the faithful slaves who had chosen to accompany their masters, and who were often said to have saved their masters’ lives by hiding them and helping them flee.

Among those migrations, the Saint-Domingue refugees are of particular scholarly interest, since they rapidly disappeared from both public and historical discourse, certainly because of the timing of their arrival. Indeed, although recent studies have shown that they remained cohesive for a relatively long time, they were also rapidly absorbed into the French-speaking community that was then uniting to fight the social, cultural, and political changes that the new Anglo–American rulers were trying to implement in the city. They were thus a beneficial addition to the New Orleans Creole population of French and Spanish descent, and they helped the Francophones retain political and cultural power over the American newcomers, at least for a time. Finally, because the migration of the Saint-Domingue refugees was diasporic, scattered across the

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Caribbean, in the Gulf South, and in the eastern United States, but also—in some cases—in France, the convergence of a large portion of them in New Orleans repositioned the city in the Atlantic and Caribbean worlds.5

Using the voluminous correspondence of Jean Boze, a Saint-Domingue refugee who lived in New Orleans from 1809 until his death in 1842, and Henri de Sainte-Gême, another refugee who arrived in 1809 and remained there until his relocation to France in 1818, this chapter examines the role played by the Saint-Domingue refugees in repositioning the city within the Atlantic and Greater Caribbean.6 It contends that by studying a group of people who migrated under pressure (the refugees from the Haitian Revolution), we can develop new conceptual frameworks (in this case, the Greater Caribbean) and spur fertile historical reinterpretations (of, in the present case, New Orleans’s position in the Americas).

NEW ORLEANS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ATLANTIC

The population of New Orleans grew exponentially in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1803, it had a mere 8,000 residents; by 1810, it was the seventh most populous city in the United States, with a population of 17,242. In 1820, it boasted 46,082 residents and was the fifth most populous city in the United States, having grown by 57.6 percent over the previous decade. In 1840, with 102,193 residents, it ranked as the third most populous city in the United States, behind New York and Philadelphia. This represented a stunning increase of 121.8 percent in just twenty years.7

In the late eighteenth century, the three Atlantic revolutions spurred this demographic development. The American Revolution had the most immediate effect on Louisiana in general and New Orleans in particular: In the last decades of the eighteenth century, the then-Spanish colony welcomed significant immigration from the early United States.

5 For a global perspective on French émigré settlement in this period, see Friedemann Pestel’s chapter in this volume.

6 Whereas the “Caribbean” is often used to designate the islands (also called the West Indies or Antilles) situated in the Caribbean Sea, the “Greater Caribbean” includes all the colonies and states bordering the Caribbean Sea, including the continental colonies and islands of Central America and the Gulf Coast.

French Revolution triggered migratory fluxes to the Americas in general and New Orleans in particular. The turmoil that followed the French Revolution, from the Napoleonic years to the French revolutions of 1830 and 1848, also brought a continued influx of French migrants to the Louisiana capital. Having once belonged to the French Empire, New Orleans offered migrants from metropolitan France a welcoming refuge that was culturally, religiously, and linguistically familiar. The Haitian Revolution was the last upheaval – chronologically – and also the one whose impact on nineteenth-century New Orleans was the most profound.

The first refugees from the Haitian Revolution made New Orleans their home in the last decade of the eighteenth century, at approximately the same time that Anglo–Americans started migrating to Louisiana. Over the next twenty years, a period that witnessed New Orleans’s last decade as a colony and its first as part of the United States, somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000 refugees from the Haitian Revolution arrived in Louisiana in several waves, with 80 to 90 percent settling in New Orleans. Among them were Henri de Sainte-Gême and Jean Boze, whose correspondence features prominently in this chapter. The refugees’ arrival was a major factor in the demographic development of the city, as they more than doubled its population in less than two decades. Over time, the influence of this migration eventually waned, since it was not followed by further waves of Haitian arrivals, whereas Anglo–Americans kept migrating to New Orleans on a steady basis. Nevertheless, the refugees from the Haitian Revolution played a decisive role in the story of New Orleans during the early years of the American republic.

Although individuals and families arrived throughout the entirety of the twenty-year period, the migration was marked by successive mass influxes. The first influx occurred at the time of the Haitian independence, in late 1803, and the following two when the authorities in Jamaica

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8 For more on this, see Marjorie Bourdelais, *La Nouvelle-Orléans: Croissance démographique, intégrations urbaine et sociale (1803–1860)* (Bern, 2012).
9 Although some New Orleanians participated in the Latin American revolutions of the nineteenth century, and although Louisiana’s former Spanish colonial status attracted some Spanish loyalists after these former colonies won their independence, the Latin American revolutions did not have a significant impact on the city’s demography.
10 For more information on the twenty-year migration, see Dessens, *From Saint-Domingue to New Orleans*.
11 For a detailed explanation of the various waves of migrants, see Dessens, *From Saint-Domingue to New Orleans*, 22–45.
(1803–4) and Cuba (1809–10) declared French citizens there *personae non gratae* in response to Napoleon’s disputes with Britain and Spain. Most of these French citizens migrated to New Orleans in response. The largest wave occurred when Napoleon decided to intervene in the Spanish succession crisis in 1808, eventually replacing King Ferdinand VII with his own brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne in 1809. Several thousand French refugees from Saint-Domingue who had settled in Cuba – and more specifically in the Oriente (mainly Santiago de Cuba, the Sierra Maestra, and Baracoa) – after fleeing the Haitian Revolution had to leave (at least temporarily) their Cuban asylum. All those who had not acquired Spanish citizenship had their possessions sequestered by the island’s authorities and were expelled, including Henri de Sainte-Gême and Jean Boze.\(^\text{12}\) Finally, several thousand Saint-Domingue refugees who had settled on the Atlantic coast of the United States also chose to join their families, friends, and fellow refugees in New Orleans, having been drawn to the cultural environment they found there. New Orleans was so similar to the society they had known in Saint-Domingue that they remained and put down lasting roots.

New Orleans was indeed the closest approximation to the refugees’ lost colony in the Americas. Despite four decades of Spanish rule and the sale of Louisiana to the United States by Napoleon, the population of New Orleans remained overwhelmingly French speaking. The society the newcomers found upon arrival was a Catholic slave society, organized in three tiers, just as Saint-Domingue had been before the revolution, a feature that was familiar to an incoming population that was composed more or less evenly of three socio–racial groups: free Whites, enslaved Blacks, and free persons of color, with the third being an important intermediary group of racially mixed individuals and freed Blacks. Such a grouping would have been less common in Anglo–American slave societies. By January 1810, the last refugee wave from Cuba, the one best documented by the new American officials of Louisiana, had brought to New Orleans 2,731 Whites, 3,102 free people of color, and 3,226 migrants whom the mayor counted as slaves. Their enslaved status was never questioned in New Orleans, and the historical narrative has

\(^{12}\) For more information on the Napoleonic Wars and their effect on the Americas, see Christophe Belaubre, Jordana Dym, and John Savage, eds., *Napoleon’s Atlantic: The Impact of Napoleonic Empire in the Atlantic World* (Leiden, 2010). The volume includes a chapter by Nathalie Dessens, “Napoleon and Louisiana: New Atlantic Perspectives,” (63–80), which deals specifically with Louisiana.
consistently called them slaves, although they had been freed in 1794 in Saint-Domingue and were thus surreptitiously (and unknowingly) re-enslaved after their relocation to the slave colonies of the Caribbean or the slave states of the United States. The purchase of Louisiana by the United States seemed to guarantee the persistence of slavery for the refugees, while the shifting French policies had made them wary of settling in the French West Indies and had encouraged many of them, in the decade of the Haitian Revolution, to settle in the seaboard states of the United States instead of Louisiana before they moved on to New Orleans after the Louisiana Purchase.

The Saint-Domingue refugees’ impact on New Orleans, in particular their influence on the positioning of Louisiana in the Atlantic and Caribbean, raises a set of interesting questions. How did they orient their adopted city southward at a time when the expansion of the early American republic weighed heavily on its newly acquired territories, such as Louisiana? How did they look to the Atlantic at the very moment when New Orleans was becoming a US city?

**RE-CENTERING NEW ORLEANS IN THE ATLANTIC**

New Orleans’s significance to the Atlantic world began in the early nineteenth century, at the apex of the city’s demographic and economic expansion. This process was consecutive to the arrival of the Saint-Domingue refugees, although the integration of Louisiana into the early American republic played a major part in this reconfiguration by dynamizing Louisiana, and its capital in particular. New Orleans immediately became the second largest port in the United States after New York in terms of passenger arrivals and exports. Strategically located at the mouth of the Mississippi River, it was the main outlet for all goods produced in the northwestern United States that were bound for Europe and the Americas.

From 1791, when the first refugees from Saint-Domingue started arriving in New Orleans, to around 1803, the refugee diaspora was extremely spread out across the Americas and France. Many sets of correspondence archived in New Orleans show that the Saint-Domingans remained in contact on both sides of the Atlantic and between the various

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American asylums they chose to settle in. These relationships helped reinforce New Orleans’s connections to the Atlantic world. The Saint-Domingue refugees also displayed high levels of mobility compared with the Louisiana Creoles and the new Anglo–American residents who had retained few connections with Europe. The Saint-Domingue refugees crisscrossed the Atlantic, moving between France and the various Caribbean colonies where some of their counterparts had found refuge. They maintained ties with far-away families and friends in France and the Caribbean, and they established economic networks that spread over the Atlantic, bringing over ideas, political ideals, and cultural innovations closely associated with the Antillean territories that they had left.

The correspondence between two Saint-Domingue refugees – one who had resettled in Louisiana, Jean Boze, and another who had returned to France after spending seven years in Cuba and eight years in New Orleans, Henri de Sainte-Gême – attests to New Orleans’s Atlantic connections and the means by which they were maintained. Although a single correspondence cannot document the totality of the refugee experience in New Orleans, Boze’s 158 letters, totaling 1,150 pages over a twenty-year period, are a particularly rich source. Boze penned his letters in the form of newsletters, quoting heavily from the press, providing information collected through his interactions with the refugee community, painstakingly chronicling the expansion of New Orleans, and transmitting news received from other members of the refugee diaspora in and around the Caribbean Basin. His letters show the regularity of the exchanges, both personal and commercial, between New Orleans and France. They document the reinforcement of bonds between Louisiana and its former colonial power and the centrality of the refugees in this stronger connection. They also show how this reconnection gave the Atlantic renewed importance for New Orleans.

14 See, for instance, Howard Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Special Collections, MS 244, Lambert Family Papers, 1798–1905.
16 The Historic New Orleans Collection, New Orleans (THNOC), Sainte-Gême Family Papers, MSS 100, Correspondence from Jean Boze to Henri de Sainte-Gême. All translations from this correspondence, originally written in French, are by the author of the present chapter. All further references to this correspondence will be made in the body of the text, only the folder number being mentioned. Boze wrote 158 letters, covering over 1,150 pages tightly written in very small characters to Sainte-Gême between 1818 and 1839. Boze’s letters are found between Folders 19 (January 18, 1818) and 286 (August 6, 1839).
The letters show, for instance, that many of the Saint-Domingue refugees traveled to France for short or longer stays. They repeatedly mention that every year when regular exchanges resumed after the summer season – once the specter of yellow fever and hurricane risks had subsided – people returned to New Orleans from France and commodities were imported, launching new fashions, notably in the cultural field and everyday life. In November 1832, for instance, several boats are said to have arrived from Le Havre, bringing back New Orleanians and “luxury and fashion tat for the lovers of Carnival balls” (F 212). According to Boze, the arrival of the first boats from France each year was an occasion for celebration. In November 1830, he wrote: “The youth is already making preparations to celebrate the captain commanding the first vessel that will arrive with the tricolor flag” (F 170).

Whereas the ties between the Louisiana Creoles and their French families tended to loosen generation after generation, the Saint-Domingue refugees were able to reaffirm connections between Louisiana and France at the moment when France let go, for the second time, of its Louisiana colony. Paradoxically, Louisiana then became more connected to France than ever. The regularity of vessels bound for or coming from France – mostly Bordeaux and Le Havre – encouraged mobility between France and its former colony and made New Orleans a nodal point in the Atlantic world.17 Because exchanges with France and French colonies had been commonplace in Saint-Domingue, the new Louisianans were extremely mobile and often crossed the Atlantic on personal or business missions. They visited their families in France, went on pleasure tours of Paris, or went to France for various other reasons: to cure their diseases, develop economic ventures, or bring back cultural features (opera, theater, music, or fashion). There was also a significant intellectual, artistic, political, and economic elite of free refugees of color of Saint-Domingan origin who regularly traveled to France for short or longer periods.

Both Whites and free people of color with Saint-Domingue roots sent their children to France to be educated. Even after the US Civil War, this continued to be the case. To take a single example, Louis Charles Roudanez, a free New Orleanian of color born of Saint-Domingue refugees, sent all of his children to Paris for their education, including his daughters. For those Louisianans who had been free Creoles of color in Antebellum Louisiana,

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17 The passenger lists of boats traveling between New Orleans and the French harbors of Le Havre and Bordeaux, among others, attest to the existence of these continuous transatlantic movements.
asserting their “Frenchness” was probably also a strategy to maintain their rank among the elites of New Orleans, once the emancipation of slaves had leveled the population of color, free and enslaved.\(^{18}\)

Not all social classes of Saint-Domingue refugees participated in these movements, of course, but many did, as they had managed to rapidly climb the New Orleans social ladder.\(^ {19}\) The economic and social integration of a large part of the refugee population was easy, probably because they all chose to eventually settle in New Orleans. Some had been forced to flee Saint-Domingue and, later, to leave Jamaica and Cuba, whereas others had, early on, found refuge in the cities of the East Coast of the United States. Although they had moved under duress (often on several occasions), New Orleans was an asylum of choice, and this made them more eager to participate fully in its life and development. They were not migrants who were passing through on their way to another destination. They chose to settle and put down lasting roots. They also reached New Orleans at a time when the Creole population, whether White or of color, considered them a welcome addition to the resistance against those Anglo–American influences that would have reduced the power of the White Creoles and the prerogatives of the free Creoles of color. Their integration into the community ensured both their progression up the social ladder and their influence over New Orleans’s long-standing population groups. Altogether, the Saint-Domingans’ stronger ties with France and the Atlantic made the city more Atlantic as well.

New Orleans’s newspapers, the majority of which were founded, directed, and staffed by Saint-Domingue refugees, were full of news from France, and all the main political events occurring in France were largely covered by the Louisiana press.\(^ {20}\) To give just a few examples, in May 1830, the newspapers dealt at length with the response of the French députés to King Charles X’s decision to adjourn the assemblies until the following September. The New Orleans newspapers expanded on the proposal, voted on by 221 representatives in reaction to Prime Minister Jules de Polignac’s reactionary government, in which the French députés

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\(^ {19}\) See, for instance, Dessens, *From Saint-Domingue to New Orleans*, 91–109.

\(^ {20}\) See, for instance, the issues of *L’Abeille de la Nouvelle-Orléans* (1827–1923), [www.jefferson.lib.la.us/genealogy/NewOrleansBeeMain.htm](http://www.jefferson.lib.la.us/genealogy/NewOrleansBeeMain.htm).
expressed their defiance to the government (F 164). Likewise, the city’s newspapers were also full of details about the assassination attempt against King Louis Philippe I on July 28, 1835 (F 258). These long articles, absent from the Anglophone press, suggest renewed interest in French politics thirty years after Louisiana’s transfer to the United States, including in French domestic debates that did not directly influence international politics and thus had no repercussions for Louisiana or the United States. The Francophone population often took sides, and some political events in France even prompted fiery debates between French-speaking New Orleanians, whether they were French exiles, Saint-Domingue refugees, or Creoles. The press, in turn, played its part in giving visibility to the debates.

Some French events triggered, in a sort of butterfly effect, important demonstrations in New Orleans. News of the dethroning of Charles X in 1830, for instance, prompted scenes of jubilation in the Louisiana capital. Boze detailed the celebrations of the population at large (which gave “many serenades, accompanied with military music”), of the artillery battalion (which fired the cannon twenty-one times in “homage to the tricolor flag that was flown on several public buildings of the city”), and of the Louisiana Legion and other elite corps, which “took up arms to celebrate the triumph of freedom over despotism, in the presence of a wealth of people of all ranks and all classes” (F 174).

Shortly thereafter, while visiting France, two New Orleanians were entrusted with “a beautiful tricolor flag that the Louisiana Legion sends as a present to the National Guard of Paris” “in sincere homage of the Louisianans’ admiration for the heroic events that have just insured France the guaranty of its liberties.” This was an occasion for a new display of French patriotism in the city: “a detachment of the battalion of artillery, gathered on the levee, saluting [the] departure [of the vessel] with twenty-five cannon shots, with the immense support of a thousand cries of joy from our fellow citizens, who sang the Marseillaise anthem” (F 174). New Orleanians then organized banquets and celebrations to display their joy, showing how present France had remained in residents’ minds.

The population of New Orleans also welcomed French heroes with great pomp and ceremony. In 1825, the Marquis de Lafayette’s visit to the Crescent City was celebrated by the whole population, including Anglo-Americans. François Weil, “The Purchase and the Making of French Louisiana,” in Peter J. Kastor and François Weil, eds., Empire of the Imagination: Transatlantic Histories of the Louisiana Purchase (Charlottesville, VA, 2009), 302–3.
Napoleon’s last physician in Saint Helena, ten years later, in October 1834, showed the persistence of links to France’s history. Boze writes: “the news of the arrival of a man to whom are connected so many memories, has occasioned among us the keenest enthusiasm” (F 245).

Throughout Antommarchi’s stay in New Orleans, daily banquets were organized in honor of “this respectable foreigner so deserving,” who had shown “such virtuous behavior in the exile of the great man,” and who was an example of “enlightenment,” “goodness,” and “affability,” to such a point that he was “eagerly sought out by people, whatever their religion,” religion here meaning most certainly much more than religion itself and suggesting both political religion and ethnic origin (F 246). The whole city seems to have been collectively enthralled by this French guest whose connection to Napoleon was of paramount importance to those Saint-Domingans who still remembered his desperate attempt to regain power in Saint-Domingue in 1802.

Important French military victories were also occasions for celebration in New Orleans, even though it was no longer part of the French Empire. While the refugees had long hoped that France would regain ground in Saint-Domingue, this hope abated after the formal recognition of Haiti by France in 1825 and the payment of indemnities to the former colonists at the turn of the 1830s. French colonization, however, remained a topic of interest, probably in a more symbolic way, in the 1830s. Boze thus paid close attention to the French colonial victories that were detailed in the New Orleans press, despite the fact that France’s colonial possessions never attracted much interest from the New Orleans Francophone population otherwise, thus suggesting that their interest was more symbolic than real. In 1830, for instance, commenting on the fall of Algiers, Boze rejoiced in “the surrender of that Barbaric place which will purge the Mediterranean of those pirates and will forever free Christianity of slavery after so many centuries of suffering.” He added, “You can well imagine how this must have delighted the whole population of this city in general, and principally the French who ardently wished the arms of France to triumph in this conquest after all the great sacrifices the country had made to succeed in extinguishing this Moorish power” (F 174).

On December 15, 1837, New Orleanians commemorated the capture of Constantine (in Algeria) two months earlier: “All the French vessels which were in the harbor of New Orleans have hoisted the colors today and an artillery salvo was shot at noon sharp on board the schooner Bastamente in the middle of the river, to commemorate the victory of the French army in front of Constantine and the capture of this fortress.”
From noon, “the cannon was fired every quarter of an hour in remembrance of the loss of General [Charles-Marie Denys de] Damrémont in that city on October 12” (F 279).

While New Orleans had been a peripheral point in the dynamic eighteenth-century Atlantic world, the arrival of the Saint-Domingue refugees clearly recast the city’s geographic orientation. By the early nineteenth century, New Orleans had become one of the main demographic and economic centers of the United States; it was also the country’s main internal slave market and one of its two major ports. For these and other reasons, the city could have been reasonably expected to look eastward. Yet the networks and connections of the Saint-Domingue refugees reinforced the city’s Atlantic ties, among which were connections with the West Indies.

**NEW ORLEANS IN THE CARIBBEAN**

The arrival of the Saint-Domingue refugees, which tethered New Orleans to the Atlantic, coincided with the moment when the development of the Americas began to weaken the Atlantic as a paradigm. Although ties were maintained with Europe due to the persisting colonial status of some territories (notably of the French, Spanish, and British Caribbean colonies and of Portuguese Brazil), the loss by England of its thirteen colonies, by France of its richest and most dynamic colony (Saint-Domingue), and the wave of successful Latin American independence movements transformed the relationships between Europe and the Western Hemisphere. This movement, initiated in the late eighteenth century, was reinforced by the relative breach with the African continent induced by the progressive ban on the transatlantic slave trade. Even if Portuguese Brazil and Spanish Cuba did not end the trade until late in the nineteenth century, the joint actions of Britain and the United States in favor of the ban were instrumental in loosening the ties between the Americas and Africa. All in all, transatlantic connections became less central to the nineteenth-century evolution of the Americas.

At this moment, the Americas started relying increasingly on intra-continental exchanges. The Caribbean Sea, which joined together, in a single and easily navigable space, North, South, and Central America, as well as the West Indies, became central to a new pattern of American exchanges and supported the construction of a new American identity (understood in a continental sense). The Greater Caribbean, even though it was not a new configuration, became an increasingly central space for
the nineteenth-century Americas, and the Saint-Domingue refugees were instrumental in reinforcing New Orleans’s presence in it. To be sure, New Orleans had been strongly connected to the Caribbean during its colonial periods. What changed in the nineteenth century, however, was that the city became still more tightly connected to non-French and non-Spanish colonial spheres (the British World, in particular) and that the connection extended to the continental territories bordering the Caribbean.22

Although the Louisiana Purchase should have turned New Orleans’s eyes north toward its new nation, when – in 1810 – the Cuban wave of Saint-Domingue refugees spread into the city, it instead revitalized New Orleans’s southern connections. Cuba and Louisiana had been connected by their common status as Spanish colonies and by the fact that Cuba had become the seat of the military, judicial, and ecclesiastical administration of Louisiana, in 1769, as well as the main trading center for Louisiana merchants. Although New Orleans’s ethos remained extremely French during the four decades of Spanish rule, New Orleanians were accustomed to the Spanish language, mores, and culture. They had seen constant movement back and forth between Louisiana and the other Spanish colonies, and the arrival of the Cuban wave of Saint-Domingue refugees was the starting point of a reshaping of the connection between the Spanish Caribbean and Louisiana.

It is, of course, extremely difficult to assess the respective significance of the Saint-Domingue refugees relative to the other migrations. What is clear, however, is that they were the ones who maintained the closest bonds with the Spanish island, reinforcing New Orleans’s existing Caribbean connections. Boze’s letters to Sainte-Gême show how intricately connected Cuba and New Orleans became in this period.23 When the letters commenced, in 1818, the tensions between Spain and France that had been brought about by Napoleon’s moves had eased in part. By then, Louisiana had been a US state for six years. Relationships between New Orleans and Havana had resumed. In April 1818, Boze wrote: “I am struggling with my thoughts … Whether I will simply return to Saint-Yago or settle here, finding some employment. I have not yet decided what choice I will make” (F 20). This apparently anecdotal moment of

22 For New Orleans’s connections to the Caribbean during the colonial period, see Cécile Vidal, Caribbean New Orleans: Empire, Race, and the Making of a Slave Society (Chapel Hill, NC, 2019).

23 Out of Boze’s 158 letters, 25 were written from Cuba between 1820 (F 43) and 1828 (F 134).
hesitation tells us much about the nineteenth-century Americas and New Orleans, in particular, suggesting a strong sense of interconnectedness between the different American territories. This porosity between the empires and nations of the Americas, I argue, suggests the need for new conceptual frameworks to understand the nineteenth-century Americas.

In 1809, along with thousands of other refugees from the Haitian Revolution, Jean Boze sailed to New Orleans from the Cuban Oriente on one of Sainte-Gême’s ships. After six years in Cuba, he had to find another refuge to escape the turmoil of the Caribbean colonial world. Despite this second migration under pressure, he returned to Cuba in 1820, and remained there for eight years before sailing back to New Orleans. Throughout his stay in Cuba, he wrote to Sainte-Gême on a regular basis. Although the refugees of the Haitian Revolution had to suffer the consequences of the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1810s, Boze’s experience shows that the European empires were largely interconnected in the Americas and that the refugees had few limitations on their movements and economic ventures (with the exception of Haiti). It also shows how tightly connected New Orleans and Cuba were, and how freely people and goods circulated between the two and throughout the Caribbean in general. Living in Cuba in the 1820s was thus no real challenge for a French citizen who was a refugee from one of the Atlantic revolutions. A study of the Francophone community of Santiago shows that, as early as 1812, hundreds of the former Cuban residents expelled in 1809 had started returning to Cuba.24 Ships regularly brought passengers from New Orleans: forty on the Luciano and sixty-four on the Dolores in 1812 alone.25 These figures may seem low on their own, but the recurrence of these journeys made for a steady stream of passengers that eventually restored a significant Francophone presence in the Cuban Oriente, and these residents were, for the most part, Saint-Domingue refugees.

Boze’s correspondence offers evidence of these numerous exchanges. Although migration to Cuba had been difficult in the early 1810s, right after the expulsion of the non-naturalized Saint-Domingue refugees, it resumed later in the decade, as Agnès Renault shows. Explaining why he was delaying a trip to the island, Boze wrote, in November 1818, “Since last May, four vessels overloaded with passengers of all colors went to Saint-Yago and all write that they found in that country more

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25 Ibid., 640.
destitution and all regret to have made the journey” (F 24). Although in May 1819 he was still postponing his trip because of rumors that Great Britain was attempting to take Cuba from Spain (F 34), he eventually went there and remained for eight years. In letters written during his stay in Santiago, he refers to the many ships that sailed between the Spanish island and the Louisiana capital, carrying products, news, and letters (F 65, for instance). After his return to New Orleans, his letters bear witness to the numerous points of contact between New Orleans and the Cuban capital. Several times, he announces the arrival of ships from Cuba and transmits news from common friends there (F 163). The ships brought newspapers informing New Orleanians about the yellow fever or cholera epidemics raging in Cuba, or letters from friends providing details on the Cuban economy. In a letter detailing the shipwreck of a schooner bound for Havana in the fall of 1832, we learn that several New Orleans residents had been on board, evidence that movement between the two capitals was still frequent in the 1830s (F 211). Boze repeatedly mentions ships to and from Havana, as well as the people on board who came from the Cuban capital or traveled to it, either for temporary or more permanent stays.

It is true that, by then, New Orleans had become a major US city and that its harbor was an essential asset of the Louisiana economy. By 1836, it had become, with New York, the main export center from the United States to the Caribbean and to Europe, the first port for the export of flour, for instance. Even though development occurred steadily over the first half of the nineteenth century, the city witnessed particularly rapid growth in the early decades of the century. For instance, already in the first six months of 1819, thirty-nine ships carrying flour left New Orleans for Havana. Economic relationships between New Orleans and Cuba were both plentiful and significant, especially because many residents of one or the other had connections and interests in both places. These exchanges, favored by the extraordinary development of New Orleans and by the presence, in the Louisiana capital, of thousands of people who had lived in Cuba during and after the Haitian Revolution, were made easier by the porosity of the empires and nations of the Americas.

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26 Folder 181 mentions, for instance, a letter from Mr. Revé from Cuba, dated February 3, 1831, indicating the price of coffee and sugar there.
Boze’s letters show that he was apparently comfortable in his many social and business interactions on the island. Nothing seems to have impeded his prolonged stay in Cuba, and nothing would have prevented his permanent settlement there, had he wished it. Apparently, he would have been able to stay without acquiring citizenship. All in all, his stay on the Spanish island was easy, and his relationships with Cubans seem to have been friendly. He decided not to remain in Cuba for personal reasons and returned to New Orleans in 1828. Still a French national, he settled again in the capital of the state of Louisiana and lived there, unbothered, for the remaining fourteen years of his life.

Many of his letters mention the multiethnic character of the island population and its connections with New Orleans and the United States. It is, once again, difficult to specifically attribute these intensified connections and the cosmopolitanism of the Cuban *Oriente* to the presence of Saint-Domingue refugees as opposed to the increasing dynamism of the United States. It shows, however, that it was clearly possible to circulate in the Americas in the first half of the nineteenth century and that New Orleans was the obvious port of entry to the United States from Cuba, and vice versa. The city owed its distinctive role to its new Atlantic dynamism and to the abundant refugee population that reinforced its connection with the Caribbean. The refugees’ presence throughout the Greater Caribbean strengthened the connections between the various territories in the area, whether they were the remaining colonies of the European empires, like most of the Antillean islands, or new nation-states, like the continental territories. This new network was in close contact with the New Orleans refugee community.

**A MORE CARIBBEAN THAN ATLANTIC SPACE?**

Boze’s example shows that tight connections remained between a former French and Spanish colony, by then integrated to the United States, and a Spanish colony in the Caribbean. The colonial history of Louisiana

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28 For more on the French in Cuba, see Agnès Renault, *D’une île rebelle à une île fidèle. Les Français à Cuba (1791–1825)* (Rouen, 2012).

29 The Louisiana archives contain no evidence that Boze ever pursued US citizenship; at the same time, no extant documentation attests to his lack of interest in citizenship, either. Unfortunately, the archival records are incomplete, especially for the early decades after Louisiana’s entry into the United States. What can be said, however, is that Boze never mentioned US citizenship, insofar as it concerned him, in his correspondence, whereas he did allude to Sainte-Gême’s having acquired US citizenship and then renouncing it after his return to France to be made Knight of the Military and Royal Order of Saint-Louis.
and Cuba could certainly account for these bonds, but so, too, could the presence in New Orleans of some 10,000 Saint-Domingue refugees who had been residents of Cuba for about ten years, or the resettlement of hundreds of refugees in Cuba, after a few years in New Orleans.

Cuba, however, was not exceptional. Boze’s letters suggest that these close economic and personal contacts were never limited to the Spanish island. The rest of the Caribbean islands (whether French, Spanish, Dutch, or British), but also Mexico and, to a certain extent, several areas in Latin America, were also tightly connected to New Orleans. Throughout his correspondence, Boze repeatedly mentions boats arriving from Mexico, in particular from Tampico. These ships brought information in various forms – through newspapers that fed the New Orleans press, letters that conveyed more personal news, or even testimonies of people who had resided or sojourned there and who went about narrating their experiences and encounters in Mexico. Apparently numerous were those who had decided to leave New Orleans to seek a fortune in Mexico and who either resettled in Mexico or returned, after a few years, to New Orleans. Many among them were Saint-Domingue refugees.

Business had obvious ramifications throughout the Caribbean. Sainte-Gême had invested in Cuba and New Orleans, but also in Jamaica, with the Maison Hardy from which Boze repeatedly tried to recover the money owed to him. Historian Agnès Renault, in her study of the French in Cuba between 1790 and 1825, shows that many French residents living on the island had assets in New Orleans, diversifying their activities to increase their profits. A Captain Laminé, one of the former acquaintances of Sainte-Gême in Cuba, was also doing business in Saint Thomas; whereas Francisco Sentmante y Sayas, a Cuban who had married the daughter of Bernard Marigny, a prominent New Orleans Creole (who gave his name to the eponymous faubourg), was conducting business in Mexico. A Captain Couapé, whom Boze had met in Saint-Domingue, had gone to Jamaica, and then Santiago de Cuba, around 1820. Later, after residing in New Orleans for a few years, he began business there. Renato Beluche, also a Saint-Domingue refugee in New Orleans, and the former second-in-command to Barataria’s privateer Jean Lafitte, entered the Mexican navy with the title of admiral before returning to New Orleans, while his wife had settled in Curaçao (F 204). Boze also regularly provides news of three grinders recommended by Sainte-Gême who had settled in Mexico, or of Widow Blondeau, who had a shop

in Matamora (F 229), thus giving evidence that there were regular channels through which news circulated easily. Not only were New Orleans residents who had tried their luck there numerous, but the connections were also so frequent that New Orleanians received regular news from them. Steady exchanges existed, at one point or another, between New Orleans and Tampico, Matamora, and Nantilla, although, regarding the last, Boze writes, in 1833, that “it is no longer frequented by commerce” (F 234). Throughout the letters, he gives news from Porto Cabello, in Venezuela, Saint-Domingue (F 161), Colombia (F 172), Cayenne, in French Guiana (271), St. Thomas, and Curacao (F 172), mentioning the many connections between those places and the Saint-Domingue refugee community of New Orleans.

Despite regular attempts by the various European empires to impose restrictions on mobility, particularly in times of war, the Caribbean was a very small, tightly connected space, where people circulated, regardless of either citizenship or the status of the territories they visited, sojourned in, or even settled in. Movement was still more frequent than it had been during the Age of Revolutions. In several instances, Boze refers to men with family roots in Sainte-Gême’s village, Sauveterre, who had arrived in New Orleans after sojourning in Saint-Domingue and Havana, and then eventually left for Mexico on business, settling there permanently. The family networks of Saint-Domingue refugees were instrumental in upholding these connections. The example of the Tinchant family, studied by Rebecca Scott and Jean Hébrard, shows how the family organized and operated a commercial network between New Orleans and Mexico (where two brothers had settled and established a cigar production business), and how they then used the settlement of a third brother in Belgium to connect this business to the Atlantic world. As this example shows, the Saint-Domingue refugees played an important role in turning New Orleans into a major actor in the Greater Caribbean, and in maintaining the connectedness of the city (and the Greater Caribbean) within a larger Atlantic context.31 It is important to remember that the networks supported by the refugees were not limited to elite White refugees. The opportunities provided by these networks were such that not only less-affluent Whites participated in the associated movements, exchanges,

31 In the prologue to their book Freedom Papers, Scott and Hébrard write that “a pivot point for the family’s story is the city of New Orleans,” 3. The whole book follows the family from Africa to Saint-Domingue to New Orleans and throughout the Atlantic and the Caribbean.
and business ventures, but also free people of color – meaning that this group, too, was instrumental in the Atlantic and Caribbean repositioning of New Orleans.32

The Western Hemisphere was obviously a place of regular economic exchange and important population movements. Independent nations and European colonies alike accepted one another’s residents without much control or hostility. The Caribbean was a significant space of exchange and New Orleans had become an important point in it. Because the American Revolution and Louisiana Purchase had made New Orleans a major port city in the United States, because the arrival of refugees from the French and Haitian Revolutions had reconnected it with the Atlantic, and because the Saint-Domingue refugees tightened its connections with the Caribbean, the city became a major node in the Americas after spending the previous century at the periphery of this rapidly evolving world.

Whereas the colonial pact that regulated commerce between the European countries and their colonies had long attempted to restrict interconnections between the various colonial empires, the extreme fluidity perceptible in the nineteenth century between the various American territories, whether colonies or newly independent nations, together with New Orleans’s new vitality and centrality, makes the Atlantic a useful conceptual framework for analyzing its early nineteenth-century history. European revolutions and wars induced important changes in the Americas, triggered wide-ranging migratory intracontinental movements, and spurred the development of tight economic exchanges between the American territories, independent or imperial, giving New Orleans a newfound significance. This framework, which historians have already applied to the late eighteenth and even early nineteenth centuries, can also be useful for the later nineteenth century.

Boze’s example – and his letters – suggest, however, that, after the 1820s, the fluxes of products, ideas, and people increased and diversified within the Americas. This does not mean that transatlantic exchanges ceased, but they were complemented by strong relationships, internal to the Greater Caribbean, that testified to the heightened connectivity of this region within the nineteenth-century Americas. It also shows that New Orleans was strongly involved in this reshaping and that the Saint-Domingue refugees were instrumental in this repositioning.

On August 10, 1816, Louis Nicholas Lecesne, a Frenchman born in Normandy and a naturalized British subject, died in Kingston, in the British colony of Jamaica.1 Lecesne and his multiracial household of two free women of African descent and three mixed-race children had come to Kingston from Port-au-Prince in the French colony of Saint-Domingue in 1798 at the end of Great Britain’s failed military intervention in the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804). In the years leading up to his death, Lecesne, together with his second wife, Charlotte, and their teenage son, Louis Celeste, interacted with a host of church and government authorities and notaries, leaving behind a tortuous paper trail across various archives. On March 5, 1814, Louis Celeste, then approximately fifteen to seventeen years of age, was baptized at the Anglican Church in Kingston (even though his parents were Roman Catholic).2

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Sixteen days later, on March 21, Louis Nicholas Lecesne certified in front of a notary that Louis Celeste had been born a few days after the family’s arrival in Kingston. By the end of the month, Louis Celeste had successfully applied to Kingston’s magistrates for the granting of his “privilege papers,” which would exempt him from some of the discriminatory measures against free people of color in Jamaica. In January 1816, Louis Nicholas registered that he had freed (manumitted) Charlotte in 1794, putting a number of documents from Saint-Domingue on record in the process. In 1817, the year after Louis Nicholas’s death, Charlotte sprang into action and registered the fact that her deceased husband had sold her a female slave almost seventeen years earlier, submitting a receipt on record that explicitly identified her as a “free black woman.”

It is no accident that Louis Nicholas, Charlotte, and Louis Celeste Lecesne left ample traces across a number of archives. They were representative of a particular set of coerced migrants who became ever more visible during, and even characteristic of, the decades of war and revolution around 1800: refugees from centers of political and social conflict. Each of the political and social upheavals that shook the Atlantic and Mediterranean worlds, and the violent internecine and international conflicts that accompanied them, created major refugee movements. The four classic theaters of the Atlantic Age of Revolutions alone – the thirteen British colonies in North America, France, Saint-Domingue, and continental Spanish America – put more than a quarter-million people on the move. The 1798 arrival of the Lecesne household in Kingston – along with almost 3,000 people, including some 1,600 enslaved persons – was thus one chapter of a much larger “age of refugees,” the flip side of the much-celebrated Age of Revolutions.

3 TNA, CO 137/174, fos. 37r, 346v–348v, Louis C. Lecesne, Petition to Governor, October 8, 1823; William Burge to William Bullock, February 17, 1825; Huntingdonshire Archives, Huntingdon, UK (hereafter HA), Manchester Collection, DDM10A/2, Stephen Lushington to William Courtenay, September 17, 1826 (“Yellow Book”), 263–66; TNA, CO 137/175, fo. 455r, Affidavit by L. N. Lecesne (copy), March 21, 1814.
6 On the numbers, see TNA, CO 137/100, fos. 161v–162v, Balarcas to Portland, October 29, 1798. More than 500 slaves were initially admitted. See National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh (hereafter NLS), Acc. 9769, 23/12/106, “État des nègres cultivateurs français réfugiés à la Jamaïque en conséquence de l’évacuation de St Domingue,” s.d. [1799]. For broader discussions of revolutionary-era refugee movements, see Maya Jasanoff, “Revolutionary Exiles: The American Loyalist and French Émigré Diasporas,” in David
A White man of European origin with relatively easy access to the status of a British national and the property rights associated therewith in the host territory, a formerly enslaved woman of African descent largely concerned with fending off efforts at her re-enslavement, and a politically and economically disadvantaged free man of color, the three Lecesnes belonged to a single family but also embodied some of the many boundaries that subdivided revolutionary-era refugees. While they were eventually considered, and dealt with, as a distinct type of mobile person, these refugees remained inextricably connected to those caught up in other forms of coerced mobility: enslaved captives and escapees from slavery, soldiers, and prisoners of war, and banished individuals and deported convicts – all of whose numbers surged during this period.

As in most other places that witnessed the arrival of large numbers of refugees, Jamaica had no clear-cut vocabulary – not to mention legal status – for them. This was by no means due to lack of need. Since the dramatic exodus of the American Loyalists in 1782–83, Jamaica – like many other places across the Caribbean – had been an important destination and place of transit for revolutionary-era refugees. When the island became one of the major points of arrival for refugees from Saint-Domingue in the 1790s and early 1800s, local authorities relied on an ill-defined system of ad hoc categorizations (such as “emigrants,” “loyalists,” or “refugees”) and proceeded with no clear notion of the differences between these terms. Moreover, many of the arrivals were...


On exiles in Jamaica from the American and Spanish American revolutions, see Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York, 2011), 245–77; Paul Verna, Bolivar y los emigrados patriotas en el Caribe (Trinidad, Curazaõ, San Thomas, Jamaica, Haiti) (Caracas, 1983), 38–45.

See, for example, National Library of Jamaica, Kingston (hereafter NLJ), Ms. 72 (Nugent Papers), Box 1, 264N, “Account of money paid and advanced by George Atkinson, Agent General, by order of His Honor the Lieutenant Governor for the relief of French Emigrants,” December 31, 1793. On the categorization of mobility, and the refugee/migrant distinction in particular, see Michel Agier and Anne-Virginie Madeira, eds., Définir les réfugiés (Paris, 2017); Rebecca Hamlin, Crossing: How We Label and React to People on the Move (Stanford, CA, 2021). On the variety of concepts of “exile” and “refugees” during this period, see the roundtable series “Exiled: Identity...
categorized – or categorized themselves – not as “refugees” or migrants but as imported slaves (although they may have been free before), evacuated army men, or prisoners of war. Despite the slipperiness, instability, and sometimes casual use of these categories, they often entailed major consequences for those concerned: They could mean freedom and a certain set of rights, assistance or even a state pension, on the one hand, or re-enslavement and military impressment, on the other. The range of possible outcomes included quasi-permanent residence in Jamaica, rejection or internment at the border, resettlement within British territories, or expulsion from them.

The sweeping official interactions and records of the Lecesne family are a testament to the uncertainties of classification and, by extension, legal status. Taking their case as a point of departure, this chapter focuses on the legal, and eventual long-term constitutional, dimensions of revolutionary-era refugee movements in the British Caribbean and across the Atlantic world. These embattled and intricate processes of classification did not bring about a well-defined special category of “exile” or “refugee.” On the contrary, it was a more encompassing category that arguably became the main legal framework for shaping and negotiating the status of refugees: alien. This chapter shows that governments’ responses to the arrival of these refugees led to a proliferation of so-called alien laws across the Americas and Europe and that, despite their seemingly universal and neutral character, these alien laws reflected the ambiguous status and multiple mobilities of refugees during this period. As can be seen in the major legal battle that would involve Louis Celeste Lecesne in the 1820s, the massive regulation of alien status also had long-standing ramifications during a period in which the terms of political membership and state belonging were in full transformation across the Atlantic world. The case also illustrates the


Refugees, Regimes of Proof, and the Law in Jamaica

ways in which refugees took part in shaping their status and carving out agency during a time in which legislators and state authorities sought to put unambiguous statuses and identities on record. It showcases how the law was interpreted and used by people with no legal training, and how their “vernacular” uses also found their way into the development of formal law.  

REGULATING AND DIFFERENTIATING ALIENS DURING AN AGE OF WARS AND REVOLUTIONS

Flight from revolutionary Saint-Domingue was not the only form of coerced migration that members of the Lecesne family endured. In November 1823, Louis Celeste Lecesne was arrested – along with two business partners, who, like him, were sons of refugees from Saint-Domingue – and expelled from Jamaica as an alien “of a most dangerous description.”

This action, ordered by the governor and referred to in official documents as “transportation” and “deportation,” had its foundation in the 1818 version of a law commonly known as the Alien Act of Jamaica.

The Alien Act bundled and extended a series of measures that Jamaican legislators and governors had established, starting in the early 1790s, in response to the increasing arrival of refugees from neighboring Saint-Domingue. In contrast to the regulations concerning foreign prisoners of war, the alien acts did not provide for assistance, although this could


12 59 Geo. III, c. 23 (1818), in Laws of Jamaica: Comprehending All the Acts in Force..., vol. 7 (Jamaica, 1824), 158–85.

13 For a more detailed discussion, see Jansen, “Aliens in a Revolutionary World.”
be granted on a case-by-case basis by the governor. Alien laws were essentially about limiting and controlling the movement of foreign refugees. They set strict limits on entry for foreigners, required their registration upon arrival, and regulated their movements within the territory. Most importantly, they included provisions for the extrajudicial removal of unwanted foreigners by the governor, thereby strengthening executive power over the courts.

The Jamaican alien legislation was part of a much broader, intercontinental push for migration control in the wake of revolutionary-era refugee movements and global warfare. Starting in the 1790s, residents and authorities across North and South America, the Caribbean, and Europe struggled to cope with surging numbers of foreign refugees. Governments and legislatures – wary of the spread of political turmoil – usually responded with a mix of selective aid and sweeping regulations to control and limit the arrival of foreign refugees and foreigners, writ large. These regulations made the decades around 1800 the heyday of alien legislation across the Atlantic world. Even in the Spanish Empire, long known for its restrictive immigration policies, the 1790s and early 1800s stood out. During that period, the Spanish Crown introduced harsh measures targeting migrants from revolutionary France and Saint-Domingue and even ended its long-standing policy of receiving enslaved escapees from foreign territories. In many territories – including the British metropole,
starting with the 1793 Aliens Act – it was the first time that aliens, as such, became the subject of written law.\(^\text{17}\)

Alien laws across these various states and colonial territories grew out of particular political cultures and responded to particular threat scenarios. They usually applied to all foreigners, but also – explicitly or in practice – singled out particular groups. Broadly speaking, North Atlantic regulations focused on movements relating to the French Revolution, while South Atlantic ones concentrated on the Haitian Revolution. Jamaican regulations thus followed a broader regional pattern in primarily targeting migrants from Saint-Domingue, in particular people of African descent, both free and enslaved. At the time the Lecesne family moved to Kingston, Jamaican legislators outlawed the entry or presence of people categorized as slaves who had “inhabited or resided, or in anywise shall have been living or abiding, in the island of St. Domingo.” They set particularly low barriers for deporting “people of colour or negroes” who “may be sent from St. Domingo ... for the purpose of exciting sedition, or raising rebellions.”\(^\text{18}\) While they appeared to homogenize outsiders, alien laws made sure that statuses among aliens varied tremendously.

While they were (re-)regulating alien status during the 1790s and early 1800s, most governments could draw on preexisting efforts to control mobility. Since at least the Late Middle Ages, states across Europe and beyond required travelers to carry identity papers and badges of different sorts, and local authorities exercised the right to remove nonresident paupers and mobile poor (“vagrants”).\(^\text{19}\) In many cases, revolutionary-era alien laws built on these earlier legal frameworks, which allowed for the expulsion of categories of undesired individuals (both residents and


\(^{18}\) 39 Geo. III, c. 29 and c. 30, passed on March 14, 1799, in Laws of Jamaica..., vol. 3, quotes at 500 and 511.

\(^{19}\) For overviews, see Valentin Groebner, Who Are You? Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe (New York, 2007); Andreas Fahrmeir, Citizenship: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept (New Haven, CT, 2007), 9–26; Gérard Noiriel, ed., Identification: Genèse d'un travail d'État (Paris, 2007).
foreigners). In Jamaica, these legal traditions were shaped by the needs and views of the island’s slave-holding elites. In contrast to the British metropole, with its long-standing punitive “transportation” system – and despite the use of the term for the removal of aliens during the revolutionary era – Jamaica appears to have had no regulations that allowed for the punitive removal or transportation of a free person.\(^{20}\) Yet the island boasted a long tradition of racialized control of mobility.\(^{21}\) Long before the slave insurrection in Saint-Domingue broke out, local authorities in Jamaica had sought to control and regulate the whereabouts on land of foreign ship crews, especially seamen of color.\(^{22}\) But the most important source of mobility control and deportation were the laws targeting Jamaica’s enslaved population. As with most other laws governing slavery, Jamaica’s slave acts sought to discourage and closely monitor the movement of enslaved individuals through a passport or ticket system.\(^{23}\) These laws also established punitive transportation – in fact, the sale – of enslaved people to non-British (mainly Spanish) colonies, and this form of punishment was commonly imposed by Jamaican slave courts.\(^{24}\) Slave codes, in particular after a major uprising in 1760 (Tacky’s Revolt), also threatened to punish free people of color by stripping them of their freedom and selling them off the island, although it is unclear to what extent such provisions were actually used.\(^{25}\)

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\(^{22}\) Scott, *The Common Wind*, 40–49.


Rooted in these earlier efforts, Jamaica’s legislation in the 1790s transferred these racialized policies of control and deportation to free individuals categorized as “aliens.” The legislation was complemented by extrajudicial ad hoc measures taken by the governors, often through the extensive use of martial law. After the Second Maroon War (1795–96), Governor James Lindsay, 6th Earl of Balcarres, decided to deport more than 550 Maroons from Jamaica’s Cockpit Country. Balcarres also rounded up Saint-Domingue refugees of all backgrounds – especially free and (re)enslaved people of African descent – and shipped them off the island. In 1795, he bragged about having “pushed out of the Island above one thousand of the greatest scoundrels in the Universe, most of them Frenchmen of colour and a multitude of French negroes.” In late 1799 and early 1800, every White Frenchman without special approval and every freeman of color and free Black man older than twelve years, without exception, were ordered to leave the island. As a result, 1,000 to 1,200 Black Saint-Domingans were shipped off the island during the first months of 1800. In December 1803, Balcarres’s successor, George Nugent, set in motion another wave of expulsions, proclaiming that “all and every White Person or Persons, not being natural born subjects of His Majesty, and who have made returns of their slave” had to leave the island within a month. Alien refugees of color also became a major source of forced military recruitment, along with the conscription of convicted criminals and purchased slaves. Several hundred Black Saint-Domingue refugees were used to fill the ranks of the newly established West India regiments.


27 TNA, WO 1/92, fo. 143, Balcarres to Dundas, October 1795.

28 NLS, Acc. 9769, 23/12/122; Order by J. Grant, G.O., December 31, 1799; TNA, CO 137/103, fos. 131r–134v, 252r–253v, Balcarres to Portland, December 8, 1799; Message from the Governor to the House of Assembly, February 6, 1800. Estimate by Debien and Wright, “Colons de Saint-Domingue,” 147.

29 NLJ, Ms. 72, Box 2, 633N, 492N, 869N, 870N and 871N, Proclamation by Nugent, November 25, 1803; George Kinghorn to Nugent, December 28, 1803; and “Reports of people to be removed from the island and those permitted to stay,” December 28, 1803.

30 NLS, Acc. 9769, 23/12/26–30, 57–58, Marquis de la Jaille, Loppinot, and Marquis de Contades to Balcarres, January 9, 19, and 26, 1800; Marquis de la Jaille and Marquis de
In contrast to the Aliens Act in the British metropole, the Jamaican alien legislation survived the “emergency” that had brought it to life. Jamaican governors and legislators continuously extended and sharpened their Alien Act well into the 1830s.\(^{31}\) This was because alien laws provided a flexible tool for the extrajudicial removal of unwanted individuals and for the suppression of internal social and political unrest. This use of the law can be seen in the case of Louis Celeste Lecesne. Lecesne was arrested and deported in a context of increased political mobilization for the full rights of British subjects among both Jamaica’s Jewish and free-colored communities.\(^{32}\) His deportation on charges of conspiratorial dealings with Haiti was prompted by his personal and professional ties to leading members of the political movement of the freemen of color, an association that had started only a few months earlier. In this respect, the Jamaican authorities’ use of the alien law was not unlike Cape governor Lord Charles Somerset’s contemporaneous use of politieke uitzetting (political removal), a British inheritance from the Dutch in the Cape Colony, to quell domestic opposition there.\(^{33}\) In contrast to politieke uitzetting, however, the alien laws were based on what Paul Halliday has called a “classificatory approach to detention” and, one may add, deportation.\(^{34}\) The largely unchecked use of this classificatory approach was limited to a predefined set of people: those not considered British subjects – something that the parliamentary Commission of Inquiry strongly endorsed for Jamaica and even seemed to consider a model for the Cape Colony.\(^{35}\) This approach ran into problems, however, when a classification could not be established beyond doubt.

\(^{31}\) See, for example, 1 Vic. I, c. 18 (December 15, 1837), in *Laws of Jamaica…*, vol. 10, 18–42.


\(^{33}\) On this case and its legal and imperial ramifications, see Kirsten McKenzie’s chapter in this volume.

\(^{34}\) Paul D. Halliday, *Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2010), 310.

\(^{35}\) *First Report of the Commissioners of Enquiry into the Administration of Criminal and Civil Justice in the West Indies: Jamaica* (London, 1827), 30–35; *Reports of the Commissioners
Jamaica’s alien legislation was built on the notion of a clear-cut binary distinction between natural-born British subject on the one hand, and foreign-born alien on the other. This distinction put primacy on the place of birth. According to a legal tradition reaching back to a landmark decision in the early seventeenth century (Calvin’s Case of 1608), a natural-born British subject was a person born within the dominion of the British Crown and into life-long personal allegiance to the monarch, whereas an alien was born outside of it. Place of birth thus constituted a “natural” denominator of belonging, but British subjecthood law also included, from its early beginnings, paths to subjecthood beyond the “natural” acquisition of allegiance. As the British Empire expanded, bringing a diversity of foreign-born aliens into the dominion of the Crown, British subjecthood started to brim with an increasing variety of temporary, partial, conditional, or quasi-subjecthood. In this regard, Early Modern British subjecthood was far from exceptional and was in line with that of most other European states and societies that defined political membership in degrees rather than clear-cut divisions, and that tended to place local rights of domicile above broader territorial notions of belonging. The facts of long-term residence, establishment of a household, economic activity, and social integration were often as important as birthplace in determining one’s social and political membership. This dimension – which is often associated with Spanish and Spanish American municipal citizenship – also became manifest in the Jamaican life of the Lecesne family. For roughly a quarter-century after their flight, the members of this family managed to live the lives of British subjects.

of Inquiry, Vol. I: Upon the Administration of the Government of the Cape of Good Hope (London, 1827), 16; see also Kirsten McKenzie’s chapter in this volume.


While flexibility and adaptability thus continued to shape British imperial subjecthood well into the revolutionary period and beyond, the onslaught of alien laws strengthened countervailing tendencies. The statutory regulation of alien status pushed the legal framework away from the elastic boundaries between subject and alien and further toward a more rigid distinction between the two. In this regard, revolutionary-era alien laws were a driving force toward more clearly defined and homogeneous political communities, a process that is often ascribed to the national citizenship laws that emerged and spread during the same period. While keeping clear of the widespread constitutional experiments of the period and of the idea that its residents were “citizens,” the British Empire still participated in the push to differentiate its members more clearly from nonmembers.

The sharper legal division between subject and alien put new emphasis on one particular “regime of proof” in determining individual subject and alien status: the production of written records. Similar to revolutionary-era legislation in other territories and states, Jamaica’s alien laws included requirements for the written registration of every foreigner arriving at the border, an internal ticket system for resident aliens requiring renewal every six months, and efforts at creating a centralized registry of these data. These internal regulations complemented the system of official passports that was hastily set in place by countries of origin and states of arrival alike during the 1790s.

To be sure, official registration and identification practices were not at all new by then, nor had they been limited to Western Europe or the Atlantic world. They had been part of earlier efforts by state and nonstate actors (e.g., church authorities) to monitor the mobility of particular marginalized or subaltern groups. Poor relief, penal

38 On citizenship during this period, see Pietro Costa, Cittadinanza (Rome, 2005), 47–57; Fahrmeir, Citizenship; Frederick Cooper, Citizenship, Inequality, and Difference: Historical Perspectives (Princeton, NJ, 2018), 45–75; René Koekkoek, The Citizenship Experiment: Contesting the Limits of Civic Equality and Participation in the Age of Revolutions (Leiden, 2020).


41 For a global and long-term comparative panorama, see Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter, eds., Registration and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History (Oxford, 2012).

42 With a focus on Europe, see Groebner, Who Are You?.

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transportation, colonial domination, and slavery had been among the driving forces behind a variety of identification systems. In Jamaica, the control of the mobility of enslaved and free-colored communities had included the use of a ticket system and would serve as a blueprint for the racialized system of internal control of aliens set up in the 1790s. The comprehensive legal frameworks of the revolutionary era thus expanded and systematized the production of written records relating to migrants, leading to a proliferation of “paper identities” during this period. Yet, as the sociologist John Torpey and others have argued, the real change brought about by revolutionary-era alien legislation was not just in the sheer volume of documents, but also in the very authority to document. While means of identification for travelers (especially letters of introduction) had been issued by a variety of official and private actors and organizations, alien laws epitomized the sweeping ambition of state actors to monopolize the authority to issue and validate travel documents.

In Jamaica – as in most other places during this period – the realities fell far short of the ambitions of lawmakers and national or colonial authorities. The authority vested in the executive authorities, above all the governor, by the alien laws was contested in at least two ways. First, the lack of infrastructure and the noncompliance of the men and women on the ground set clear limitations on the reach of written documentation, and on state surveillance of refugees and aliens, more broadly. Despite sweeping ambitions, state control of foreigners in Jamaica remained incomplete and weak in practice. Many foreigners managed to slip under the radar of the Alien Officers and to bypass official documentation, and a considerable number remained in Jamaica without written authorization. The multiracial Lecesne household in Kingston is a case in point. Although they were not on the lists of those exempted from the government’s expulsion campaigns, Louis Nicholas Lecesne and his family resided on an estate in Saint Ann and, later, Saint Catherine before he went into business as a merchant and distiller in Kingston. No less importantly, official documents lacked definitive proof about whether

44 Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, 6–10; Fahrmeir, Citizenship, 46–50.
45 British Library, London, UK (hereafter BL), Add. MS 38232, fos. 140v–141v, 185v–186v, 187v, Vaudreuil to Earl of Liverpool, June 29, 1798 and August 5, 1798; Mémoire du
Louis Celeste had been born before or after his parents’ migration from Haiti, so it remained unclear, from the alien registry, whether he would fall into the category of foreign-born alien or natural-born subject. The newly created alien legislation – with its built-in classificatory approach to detention and deportation – did not provide for procedures for coping with such uncertainty of belonging. Furthermore, the authority exerted by state authorities on the basis of alien legislation was weakened in yet another way. Scholars of civil registration as a bureaucratic practice have pointed out that the production of written records was not a unilateral imposition of state power for the sake of turning populations into simplified, “legible,” and governable units.46 While the push for registration may have come from state (or, for that matter, nonstate) authorities, registration processes were also often driven by those who were registered, since they could use these processes to advance their own interests and claims. Individual registration processes were thus shaped not only by the classification interests of the registering agency, but also by the registered individuals themselves, creating what the historians Keith Breckenridge and Simon Szreter have called a “dialectical tension between the legalistic fiction or convention of fixed, defined or stated identities, and the more messy social and cultural reality of individuals’ capacities for having multiple attributed, aspirational, or imagined relations of identity and goals for their self-representation.”47 These negotiation processes were


particularly intricate in moments of major social reconfiguration, even if the legal categories used in the registries often tended to conceal change and upheaval.\(^4^8\)

The myriad official paperwork created by the Lecesne family in Kingston between 1814 and 1817 was a testament to these dialectical tensions of registration. By that time, Louis Nicholas Lecesne had officially shaken off alien status. As a White man of European descent, he had been able to become a naturalized British subject as early as 1799 – a path barred to the Black and mixed-race members of his family.\(^4^9\) Through their various interactions with church officials, magistrates, and notaries, these non-White family members created official paper trails that would help secure their status against persistent uncertainties. The first two recorded documents to mention Louis Celeste Lecesne’s birth in Kingston (in 1798) were actually produced in 1814. One was the certificate of his late baptism with the Anglican Church. As the rector of the parish of Kingston later recalled, the dates and the places of birth mentioned in these certificates were largely unverified and followed the oral testimony given by Lecesne’s parents – strong evidence of how registration processes could be shaped “from below.”\(^5^0\) As was usual for the time, this certificate nevertheless served as proof of British birth when Louis Celeste applied for his so-called privilege papers a few weeks later. The underlying Privilege Act of 1813, which removed some discriminations against Jamaican free people of color, required such proof since it only applied to baptized persons born or manumitted in Jamaica.\(^5^1\) Within a month, Louis Celeste Lecesne had inscribed himself into Jamaica’s regime of written proof. His certificate of baptism and his privilege papers marked the beginning of a paper trail that would underpin his claim to be a natural-born (i.e., Jamaican-born) British subject, and not a foreign-born (i.e., Haitian-born) alien.

The strategy employed by Louis Celeste points again to the overlaps between different forms of coerced mobility – and their legal frameworks – during this period. It also underscores the widespread engagement with the regime of written proof among enslaved or formerly


\(^4^9\) JA, 1B/11/1/36, fo. 221r, Patent of Naturalization, Cesne, Le Jean Nicholas, January 23, 1799.

\(^5^0\) TNA, CO 137/174, fo. 183, Isaac Mann to Bullock, July 27, 1824.

\(^5^1\) 54 Geo III, c. 20, *Laws of Jamaica...*, vol. 6, 249–50.
enslaved migrants, who also made up an important subgroup of revolutionary-era refugees. The Saint-Domingue diaspora to which the Lecesne family belonged included large numbers of Black or mixed-race women and men who were legally free, though in most cases politically discriminated against, and enslaved individuals, who had been brought along by their owners or were resettling as a means to gain freedom. These refugee groups moved across a complex and contradictory legal landscape. The slave trade and slavery itself had come under pressure in a few contexts and were temporarily abolished and then never restored in Haiti. In other regions, slave-based economies continued to thrive, and the legal situation of enslaved people deteriorated. In a volatile situation, in which the boundaries between freedom and unfreedom were unstable and could be redrawn on arrival at a new place of refuge, irreconcilable differences between the interests of subgroups of refugees surfaced. For enslaved or formerly enslaved men and women, moving across borders under these conditions could provide or sustain freedom in certain cases or bring about re-enslavement in others. Slave-owning refugees, by contrast, aimed at maintaining, restoring, or newly establishing their property claims over fellow migrants.

Refugees, local authorities, and civil society actors developed a variety of strategies to gain control of the uncertain situation, and among these strategies the production, occasional fabrication, and multiplication of documentary evidence stood out. Black Saint-Domingue refugees relied heavily on individual records that proved their freedom (i.e., manumission certificates) when taking refuge and fighting for their personal freedom and dignity in places where slavery was still in place, and they did so even when they were legally free, since the French abolition of slavery in February 1794, which made individual freedom papers, in principle, no longer necessary nor even possible. The registration activities of Charlotte Lecesne, Louis Celeste’s mother, in 1816–17 reflected these legal strategies of guarding against re-enslavement. Probably spurred by the impending death of Louis Nicholas, Charlotte’s efforts created, for

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the first time in Jamaica, an official paper trail corroborating her status as a free Black woman. Members of the Lecesne family thus turned to similar strategies when confronted with uncertainty of status on various levels (subject/alien, freedom/slavery).

PROOF, BELONGING, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE

When they engaged in the mundane world of official paperwork in the mid-1810s, Charlotte and Louis Celeste Lecesne were certainly aware that official registration might one day bolster their claims to being a free woman and a natural-born British male subject, respectively. Just as certainly, they would not have anticipated that their records would be scrutinized, only a few years later, by the highest representatives of British politics. When he and his business partner and brother-in-law John Escoffery were first arrested under the Alien Act in October 1823, Lecesne claimed to be a natural-born British subject and thus exempt from the alien legislation. His baptismal certificate and privilege papers, along with a number of affidavits from relatives, friends, and business partners, led Jamaica’s Supreme Court to order his dismissal from prison, only for that ruling to be overturned by a new order of the governor, who claimed to have reviewed new evidence proving Lecesne to be both alien and dangerous. Deported to Haiti, Lecesne again used his written records to petition Jamaica’s governor. It was only after Lecesne’s claims failed to be heard that his case started to diverge from those of other foreigners – refugees of African descent from Saint-Domingue in particular – who had been deported from the British West Indies in massive numbers starting in the 1790s. Lecesne and his fellow deportees sailed to Great Britain in March 1824 to plead their case to antislavery activists and critics of the West Indies colonies. Soon their case began to make headlines in Great Britain. The radical activist and abolitionist Stephen Lushington brought


55 John Escoffery used a similar strategy, and his case was discussed in close association with Lecesne’s. For the sake of clarity, this chapter focuses on Lecesne’s case.

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their case before the House of Commons in May 1824.46 Four years of legal battles, inquiries, litigation, parliamentary debate, and pamphleteering ensued.

Lecesne, his fellow deportees, and their supporters both in Jamaica and Great Britain were able to cast their case in general terms and speak to a wider audience beyond the courtroom – a precondition for turning a local affair into an imperial scandal.47 The case of the deported men of color added to the domestic pressure on the Tory government, which had already faced blowback over Catholic Emancipation and a string of other scandals in colonial territories. As with other public scandals surrounding extrajudicial deportations by colonial governments around the same time, governmental infringement of the rights of British subjects was the starting point of domestic public outrage.48 The Lecesne affair became tied up in a much larger debate over the boundaries and substance of British subjecht hood, and over imperial transformation and reform more broadly.49 In the 1820s, this debate entered a crucial new phase and fed into major reform acts both in the metropole (Catholic Emancipation, 1829; electoral reform, 1832) and across the empire.50 With Lecesne and his companions, the West Indies came into view, emerging as a stage upon which to consider the implications of these broader imperial transformations – with the question of slavery as well as Jewish and free-colored campaigns for full subjecht hood looming large. The intricate issue of subjecht hood extended into most of the central arenas of imperial reform discussed during this period. This included the challenge of creating a uniform rule of law across the empire and of balancing executive power with the jurisdiction of the judicial branch.

56 Hansard, 2nd ser., May 21, 1824, vol. 11, 796–804; TNA, CO 137/176, fos. 6r–9r, Petition of Lecesne and Escoffery to the House of Commons, s.d. [1824].


58 These scandals are the subject of Kirsten McKenzie’s chapter in this volume.


60 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order; McKenzie, Imperial Underworld.
But what made the Lecesne affair different was the fact that the deportees’ subject status was itself in question. Louis Celeste Lecesne had lived the life of a British subject even though he lacked definite proof of this status. But the legal framework of alien legislation that formed the basis of his deportation, and determined the battle over it, did not allow room for such indeterminacy. For years, committees and commissions of inquiry, legal experts, ministers, and politicians compiled evidence to decide if the governor had illegally deported a British subject, or if he had used the vast legal powers vested in him by the alien legislation to protect British subjects from dangerous aliens. The quest for definitive written proof quickly turned into a critical assessment of the regime of written records. Ironically, it was representatives of the colonial government who cast doubt on the validity and veracity of the very official records that would have functioned, under normal circumstances, as proof of subjecthood. They did so by highlighting the social negotiation processes underlying official registration: What was the factual value of a baptismal record – arguably the most important identity paper in the British world at the time – if it contained unverified data from the family? What role did social relationships or even monetary transactions play in the acquisition of official privilege papers? Instead, the debate quickly turned into a broader discussion about what and who could testify for, and decide over, subjecthood: Was a White foreigner a more credible witness to Lecesne’s subject status than a British subject of color? The colonial government went full circle in its invalidation of proof-based verification by arguing that the alien legislation’s empowerment of the executive went so far as to entrust the governor with “the power of judging in the last resort who is an Alien.”

Anxious to stop yet another embarrassing overseas affair, the British government decided that a solution to the dilemma would not be found in watertight proof of Lecesne’s place of birth, but rather in a retreat from the matter. It decided that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Lecesne was born sometime between 1796 and 1798 in either Port-au-Prince or Kingston, and that further details were irrelevant, since

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63 Quote from TNA, CO 318/66, fo. 70, Report of the Commissioners of Legal Inquiry, February 25, 1826; longest justification of this position in TNA, CO 137/176, fos. 274–84, Burge to Murray, December 27, 1828.
Port-au-Prince had been occupied by British troops during this time. Even if his birthplace was Saint-Domingue, Lecesne had been “born under the protection of His late Majesty” and needed to be considered a “natural born subject of the King of England” and “consequently not subject to the Alien Law of Jamaica.” The government sought to hide the decision behind a veneer of legality and conformity in accordance with long-held notions of British subjecthood. However, by deciding to define children born under temporary military occupation as British subjects, they dramatically shifted the boundaries of who could become a British subject by birth. They thus drew on a more flexible, “vernacular” practice of the law that accommodated the murky realities of revolutionary-era refugees in Jamaica. In fact, it had been Lecesne and his allies who had pushed for these vernacular notions of their subjecthood by circulating a previous legal opinion in which the Jamaican government itself had considered a White Saint-Domingue refugee as a natural-born British subject.

Conclusion

The extraordinary legal battle surrounding Louis Celeste Lecesne and his fellow deportees in the mid-1820s and the more mundane registration practices of the Lecesne family a decade earlier illustrate one core challenge of mobility and coercion around 1800: the need to translate the messy realities of revolutionary-era refugee migration into orderly categories of law. Like official actors in many states across the Atlantic world, British authorities in Jamaica had responded to the arrival of growing numbers of refugees in the 1790s by regulating the status of foreigners as such. Highly diverse refugee communities were thus subject to an apparently homogenous status as “aliens,” unless they happened to be categorized differently, for example as enslaved individuals or prisoners of war. While they drew sharper distinctions between those considered members of the British Empire and those considered nonmembers, alien laws also ensured that differences in race and origin, in particular, created wildly variegated statuses among aliens. Alien laws thus bore very thinly veiled connections to earlier and parallel efforts to control and regulate the
mobilities of particular groups, such as enslaved people, free Blacks, and the poor. Alien legislation adopted and systematized bureaucratic practices of registration and written proof, and it provided the legal rationale for extrajudicial deportation – yet another widespread form of coerced mobility during this period. While extrajudicial deportation based on alien status may have represented a flexible tool of classification-driven executive power, it proved frail when opposition and increased public scrutiny revealed the underlying classifications to be blurry.

The administrative interactions of the Lecesne family and their all-out legal battle show the extent of their engagement with the law and the ways in which they sought to shape and negotiate their legal status. In doing so, the Lecesnes and other refugees were able to rely on vernacular experience in other relevant branches of the law, such as the legal distinctions governing freedom and slavery. As with freedom, belonging was not just granted or asserted by state authorities but could also be claimed and recrafted by those who sought it. The experience of mundane registration practices was not unique to the Lecesnes; on the contrary, it was something that they shared with their fellow refugees. But the legal battle during which they managed, in the context of a large-scale imperial reordering, to secure recognition of their vernacular notions of alien law by the most powerful empire of the time was certainly exceptional. Yet for all its drama, the latter would have been unthinkable without the former.
Political Removal

Exile, Press Freedom, and Subjecthood in Britain, the Cape Colony, and Bengal

Kirsten McKenzie

This chapter considers two moments, closely connected in time, in which British colonial authorities acted to silence voices of political dissent by means of forcible exile. Even after its victory in the global revolutionary wars, the British imperial state feared threats to stability at home and abroad. How best, then, to neutralize the “evil consequences” of those who “wantonly and seditiously” endangered “the peace and tranquillity” of the realm? Could the strategic deployment of executive power remove dangerous agitators from colonial peripheries and thereby nip insurrection in the bud? In January 1823, James Silk Buckingham (1786–1855), editor of the Calcutta Journal, was ordered from Bengal in response to the paper’s persistent criticisms of the East India Company and the Bengal government. Assistant editor Sandford Arnot would later meet the same fate, and the Calcutta Journal (founded in 1818) was subsequently shut down. Just over a year after Buckingham’s exile, George Greig (1799–1863), proprietor of the recently established South African Commercial Advertiser, fell afoul of authorities in the Cape Colony in remarkably similar circumstances. In May 1824, the Advertiser shut itself down under threat of government censorship after only a few months of operation. Greig was ordered to leave the colony by High Tory Cape Governor Lord Charles Somerset or face imprisonment. Although the

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order was later rescinded, Greig returned to London to protest Somerset’s actions and seek restitution from the British authorities. Exile proved to be a double-edged sword when those subjected to it possessed the advantages of race, education, financial resources, and political connections. Even where state actors could freely exercise coercion against troublesome subjects, their room to maneuver had limits. Draconian efforts to move harmful people out of the way could backfire, achieving effects that were precisely the opposite of those intended. In the short term, Buckingham and Greig were successfully removed from local trouble spots on the periphery of empire. Their reappearance in the metropolitan center, however, only served to raise the political stakes and compound their perceived danger to public order.

This was so precisely because debates and rhetoric about press freedom and the law under British rule were as mobile as the individuals who were caught up in them. The actors in this drama, whether in...

Bengal or the Cape, were keenly aware of the parallels in their stories, cross-referencing and celebrating them in publications that recognized the wider imperial context of their individual struggles. The experiences of Greig and Buckingham, as with many of the examples in the present volume, underscore what C. A. Bayly calls the “global imagining of constitutional liberty.”³

In decrying his treatment by the Bengal authorities before an investigatory parliamentary committee in 1834, Buckingham pointedly remarked that “state policy and strict legality are of course very different things.”⁴ Perhaps unsurprisingly, the British government largely upheld the strict legality of the actions taken against the two papers and their editors, though there were some notable dissenting voices. Whether this state policy was politically shrewd, however, was quite another question. Both cases were widely publicized across the British Empire, not least by the victims themselves, who manipulated the scandals astutely. Whether it was a regime run according to foreign laws (in the case of the Cape) or the requirements of a chartered company (Bengal), in both scandals the British government had to deal with the political fallout that arose when systems of colonial governance attracted increased negative attention at home. Ultimately, the two incidents caused enough controversy to not only prompt measures of redress and vindication for the individuals concerned but also to bring about wider legal reforms and constitutional changes in both spheres. More broadly, in the context of repressive legislation against press freedom in Britain itself, these colonial scandals of forced removal provided a powerful feedback loop for wider debates about personal liberty, state security, and British subjecthood at home as well as abroad.

In what follows, my focus falls primarily on the legal and constitutional aspects of these cases, and the way in which they connect metropolitan and colonial spheres of political debate in a British world still grappling with the consequences of war and revolution. The title of this chapter, as we shall see, comes from a Dutch colonial practice of banishment by executive order known as politieke uitzetting, one that Cape

³ Bayly, Recovering Liberties, 49.

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officials translated at the time as “political removal,” although “political expulsion” is arguably more accurate. Precisely defined, “political removal” was a legal precedent for the actions taken by Somerset against Greig at the Cape in 1824. In the context of this volume, however, the term carries a much wider symbolic resonance. The tactics used to remove both Buckingham and Greig from their respective public spheres speak to the overlapping layers and types of forced migration deployed by state actors in this period, and to their evolving, and contentious, legal frameworks. These deeds were political both in their motivation and their impact, and as such were taken up by supporters of different ideological positions to debate a set of issues far wider than the fate of the individual newspaper editors themselves. These contested frameworks of forced removal shed considerable light on the vexed relationship between executive and judicial branches of government in colonial constitutions, and on the challenge of defining British rights and subjecthood abroad. Both of these matters were drawing increasing attention from voices of reform in Britain and its colonies. This being the case, the examples of Buckingham and Greig highlight the political ramifications of using forced removal to resolve disputes between state security and freedom of expression.

A LICENTIOUS PRESS?

In 1819, in the wake of the Peterloo Massacre of peaceful protestors in Manchester, Parliament passed a set of draconian laws to stamp out what they saw as the threat of revolution. The notorious Six Acts included provisions for the banishment of those convicted of second offenses of blasphemous and seditious libel, despite howls of protest from the parliamentary opposition that banishment was fundamentally alien to the national character and even threatened British subjecthood. So controversial were these provisions for banishment that English judges proved reluctant to employ them against radical dissenters, and the state found other mechanisms that were more effective in stamping out public

5 The original Dutch term is used in Cape Provincial Archives, Cape Town (hereafter CA), Colonial Office (hereafter CO) 212, no. 88, Daniel Denyssen to Lord Charles Somerset, September 14, 1824.

criticism. The banishment provision would prove a dead letter in English law, but this did not mean that it disappeared from public debate. Events on the colonial periphery ensured that matters of subjecthood, forced removal, and freedom of the press would be thrashed out at home and abroad throughout the 1820s and 1830s, two significant decades in the consolidation of Britain’s postwar imperial reach.

The two colonial newspapers that prompted these trans-imperial controversies were similar in their rhetoric and political position. Indeed, one of the *Advertiser’s* Cape editors, the poet and antislavery activist Thomas Pringle, would later work on a subsequent Buckingham periodical in London. Both papers broadly represented the independent European merchant communities in their respective cities, promoting their interests against monopolistic local regimes. Greig and Buckingham, and their supporters, insisted on the right and duty of British subjects to expose government corruption and mismanagement. Both men, and their papers, were backed by Whig and Radical politicians in Britain. The *Advertiser* and the *Calcutta Journal* pushed the envelope of public sphere debate in colonial contexts where there was only recent and partial official tolerance of local publications. Furthermore, the forces ranged against them, exemplified by Governor Lord Somerset at the Cape and Acting Governor-General John Adam in Bengal, largely shared a conservative Tory outlook in their views on the dangers to public tranquility posed by a free press.

There are, of course, differences between the two cases, the most obvious perhaps being the presence in Calcutta of an emerging Bengali and Persian-language press and public sphere that included elements offering significant support to British critics of the East India Company. Most notable among these supporters was the celebrated Bengali reformer and newspaper proprietor Rammohun Roy. There was no equivalent at the Cape in this period. In fact, it was not until 1830 that a newspaper representing Cape Dutch interests first emerged. The Cape Colony and Bengal also differed in the jurisdictional contexts in which the state sought to silence political dissent. As I will show, popular notions of British rights

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7 William Wickwar, *The Struggle for the Freedom of the Press, 1819–1832* (London, 1928) is still one of the most useful accounts of the debates over banishment in the Six Acts. The stamp duty taxation provisions of the Publications Act were much more effective in that they made radical publications unaffordable for many. Wickwar argues persuasively that the dead-letter banishment provision in the Blasphemous and Seditious Libels Act was always intended more as a political sop to hard-liners than a legal reality, 155.


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clashed with the parameters of a Roman–Dutch legal regime in the former instance, and rule by a chartered company in the latter. Nevertheless, there are important resonances in the way in which these two episodes attracted controversy over the relationship between the executive and judicial branches of colonial government and the practice of using state-sanctioned banishment against dissenters. The two cases were also taken up in similar ways by British reformers who sought to embarrass conservatives at home, and they raised questions that extended far beyond their original colonial contexts about press freedom and forcible removal by the state.

**EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER:**
**REMOVING BUCKINGHAM FROM BENGAL**

James Silk Buckingham established the *Calcutta Journal* in 1818, with financial backing from a prominent local merchant, John Palmer. It was Buckingham’s second attempt to make a life in India; he had been deported from Bombay in 1815 after failing to show the requisite license from the East India Company. The company’s system of licensing Europeans in its territory was a function of its royal trade monopoly. The practice dated back, in various forms, to the Royal Charters of the seventeenth century and had most recently been renewed in the charter of 1813. Anyone who wished to enter the company’s territories in India had to formally apply for a license, which was (at least in theory) strictly controlled in order to limit the number of Europeans in India who were not employees of the company. It was clearly in the financial interests of a monopolistic trading company to limit, so far as possible, the presence of independent foreign agents in its domain. The wording of the 1813 charter presented it as necessary to “promote the interest and happiness of the Native Inhabitants of the British Dominions in India.” More plausibly, arguments in favor of the licensing system also recognized the strategic importance of maintaining White prestige in a place where rule by a tiny minority could be eroded by an influx of low-status adventurers and miscreants.

Those found to be without the required license, or those deemed to have conducted themselves in a manner unworthy of possessing one,

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9 53 Geo. 3, c. 155, s. 36.
10 Harald Fischer-Tiné, *Low and Licentious Europeans: Race, Class and ‘White Subalternity’ in Colonial India* (Hyderabad, 2009), 47.
according to the governor or governor-general, forfeited this privilege and could be forcibly expelled from company territory. This practice was known officially by the rather banal-sounding term “transmission.” Transmission was issued by executive order, at the personal discretion of the governor or governor-general and was effectively extrajudicial banishment. Those subjected to it were given a fixed period to put their affairs in order before being forced to depart at their own expense or risk imprisonment. It was by means of transmission that Buckingham had been expelled from Bombay in 1815 (when he had no license) and from Calcutta in 1823 (when his license was revoked).

Between 1814 and 1831, the Court of Directors of the East India Company in London approved 1,253 applications for licenses to proceed to India. In practice, however, the system proved extremely hard to enforce, and its borders were far more porous than these relatively low numbers would suggest. Numerous unlicensed Europeans were luckier than Buckingham was in 1815 and managed to slip through the cracks. These unlicensed individuals posed a long-standing challenge to a legal system that was founded upon a divide between company servants and native Indians, and the lack of criminal jurisdiction over nonemployees continued to be a key topic in nineteenth-century debates over free trade and free European emigration. The system of license and transmission was the main way in which the company could deal with White lawlessness in its domain. As was also the case during the Cape’s Dutch period, far more extensive practices of forced removal were exercised against colonial populations by the company. While “political removals” such as Buckingham’s were the most notorious and widely debated instances of transmission, Europeans who had committed acts of physical violence were the most common expellees from India, as shown by the historian Elizabeth Kolsky’s work on cases from Bengal between 1766 and 1824. Definitions of misconduct were vague, however, and rested with the discretion of the governor or governor-general.

12 Kolsky, Colonial Justice, 38.
14 Kolsky, Colonial Justice, 48.
The *Calcutta Journal* began publication in the wake of Governor-General Francis Rawdon-Hastings’s liberalization of the laws governing the press in Bengal in 1818. Hastings abolished the censorship system (particularly sensitive where military matters were concerned) that had regulated local newspapers since the late 1790s. He replaced the system with a set of published rules that guided editors and broadly prohibited criticism of the local authorities. Hastings’s reform was prompted by the fact that British subjects were subject to transmission under the censorship laws but Indian-born editors were not, an inconsistency that Buckingham was pleased to point out before the parliamentary investigations. Buckingham’s publication was one of a cluster of English-language papers that would be joined in the following years by a small number of Urdu, Bengali, and Persian-language papers, serving a population of more than 260,000 in a city where Europeans were a tiny minority. Hastings himself was disposed to handle the press with a light touch, in contrast to both his more conservative-minded officials and the company’s Court of Directors in London. As the mouthpiece of the independent merchants of Calcutta, Buckingham’s newspaper was impatient with East India Company rule, and, despite Hastings’s guidelines, was harshly critical of company policy and practice. In the years leading up to his deportation, Buckingham was repeatedly censured for his outspokenness. Judicial measures used against him proved ineffective, however, and the editor was acquitted in an 1822 prosecution for libel. Hastings consistently reprimanded Buckingham but resisted pressure to employ executive power against him. The situation changed when Hastings was replaced by one of Buckingham’s most vehement critics, former Chief Secretary to the Government John Adam, who became acting governor-general in 1823. The immediate catalyst was Buckingham’s attack on a recent East India Company appointment as cronyism, but the real issue was the *Calcutta Journal*’s long-standing insistence on its right to publicly criticize the authorities in its pages.

Assistant editor Sandford Arnot would be deported in similar fashion. Although Buckingham tried to protect his paper by placing it in the hands of Francis Sandys, who was Indian-born and therefore free from the constraints of the license system, the *Calcutta Journal* was ultimately shut down. Buckingham proceeded to England, where he continued as a vocal critic of the East India Company, taking aim at the company as a public

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lecturer, through his London-based newspaper the *Oriental Herald*, and as a representative of Sheffield in the reformed Parliament from 1832 to 1837. Buckingham battled the East India Company for monetary compensation for more than a decade, eventually prompting an 1834 parliamentary select committee into the suppression of the *Calcutta Journal*. A public subscription for Buckingham was raised on the strength of these debates, and while the company never paid up, it faced extensive public criticism of its actions. In an analogous move to the Cape’s constitutional transformation, transmission itself came to an end in 1833 in the context of the renewal of the company’s charter and debate over the need to encourage British emigration. In the same decade, the previous restrictions against the press in India were largely lifted.

Hastings was clearly troubled by the broader implications of the practice of transmission, specifically the relationship between executive and judicial power, and the way in which the action would be perceived by the British public. In an 1822 memorandum, Hastings candidly admitted that Buckingham had “abused the liberty of the press,” as he put it. At the same time, he disagreed with Adam and the other conservatives that this constituted either a serious or a systematic threat to state security. “Injury … to the public welfare,” he claimed, “seems to me too loosely assumed.” The power of executive banishment that transmission conferred was a double-edged sword. If Adam (and later Somerset at the Cape) appreciated the advantage of removing an individual without the rigors of legal proof, then Hastings was more circumspect. “When a law had declared a specified act criminal,” Hastings argued, “the simple proof of that act justifies the enforcement of the penalty allotted to it. In the present case, it is the construction arbitrarily pronounced by me that is to establish the existence and amount of transgression.” As a summary procedure, what was at issue was not law but personal judgment. It was solely for the governor-general to fix the “scale” of the offense that warranted transmission. In exercising that judgment, Hastings was clearly operating with an eye toward British public opinion: “When I have to answer to the opinion of my country for a procedure it behoves me to scrutinize that procedure in all its bearings.” In Hastings’s opinion, moderation was a better tactic, and he refused to give way to the urgings of both his council and the Board of Directors. Adam had no such scruples and would later justify his actions at length in published pamphlets.

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and before parliamentary committees, insisting both that he had the law on his side (which was true) and that the security of the state was in jeopardy (more doubtful).\textsuperscript{17}

EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER: REMOVING GREIG FROM THE CAPE

The awkward relationship between judicial and executive power, upon which Hastings touched in his justification, was also central to the controversy at the Cape. When the printer George Greig established the \textit{South African Commercial Advertiser} in January 1824, it was just months after Buckingham had passed through the colony on his forced return to England. The son of a Pentonville market gardener, Greig had served his apprenticeship as a printer in London, and he claimed to have worked for His Majesty’s Stationery Office.\textsuperscript{18} More an entrepreneur than a man of letters, Greig arrived at the Cape in 1823, opening a general store that sold household goods, stationery, and books. He quickly saw opportunity in a newspaper that would serve the commercial community that was emerging as British rule proved permanent. The Cape Colony’s entire non-Indigenous population numbered some 75,000 (including Europeans, enslaved people, and a small number of free people of color), with nearly three-quarters of all inhabitants living in and around Cape Town.\textsuperscript{19} Greig would make common cause with a small, but politically well-connected, group of recent radical and liberal migrants to the Cape, in particular two Scots, Thomas Pringle and John Fairbairn, who would (at first anonymously) serve as editors of his newspaper. At the Cape, the legal parameters for independent publication were even blurrier than in Bengal. The Cape had been wrested from the Dutch during the Napoleonic Wars, first in 1795 and then (after a brief interregnum following the Treaty of Amiens) for good in 1806. English speakers were a small minority in the European population, and the wealthy Cape Dutch

\textsuperscript{17} See, for example, [John Adam], \textit{A Statement of Facts relative to the removal from India of Mr Buckingham, late Editor of The Calcutta Journal} (Calcutta, April 1823).

\textsuperscript{18} Vigne, \textit{Thomas Pringle}, 124.

\textsuperscript{19} The Cape population of enslaved people was largely of East African and Indian Ocean origins. Indigenous Khoekhoen and those of Khoekhoen-slave parentage within the colony’s borders numbered around 25,000 in this period. See Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, eds., \textit{The Shaping of South African Society 1652–1840}, 2nd ed. (Cape Town, 1989).
formed a powerful oligarchy allied with the new British regime. The colony retained its Dutch colonial legal system and, to a large measure, its former officials and bureaucracy. A free press had been forbidden during the period of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie or VOC) and the present governor, Lord Charles Somerset, had little sympathy for what he regarded as licentious public debate.

Somerset tacitly allowed (though did not formally approve) the publication of the *Advertiser* for five months until May 1824, at which point the paper started to report on the libel trials of several government critics in embarrassing detail. Under threat of censorship, the paper was shut down, and the presses were sealed and seized by the government. The warrant suppressing the *Advertiser* further declared that as “the present conduct of the said George Greig has proved subversive of that due submission to the lawful commands of the constituted authorities in this colony, without which peace and tranquility cannot remain undisturbed,” he was to “leave the colony within one month of the date hereof, and that in default of so doing he shall be arrested and sent out of it by the first suitable opportunity.”

This command was later rescinded, though the closure of the newspaper and the confiscation of the presses were not. Greig, nevertheless, saw no possibility of continuing his business ventures at the Cape. He left the colony to plead his case before Parliament. After an extended campaign of pressure on the Colonial Office and through Parliament, with the help of his London-based brother, Greig relaunched the *Advertiser* at the Cape in 1826, with John Fairbairn as editor. Thomas Pringle, meanwhile, returned to Britain, where he worked for a short time on James Silk Buckingham’s London paper, the *Oriental Herald*. While the road to press freedom at the Cape was rocky, and the *Advertiser* would suffer a second period of suspension, its existence was largely guaranteed by law in 1829. Greig continued as a printer, publisher, and entrepreneur at the Cape for many decades, and several of his protégés went on to establish their own newspapers in Cape Town and the interior of the colony.

Transmission might have been controversial and (as Hastings recognized) politically risky, but for all of the rhetorical flourishes that Buckingham made in disputing the technicalities of his removal, it was firmly grounded in both law and company practice. Greig’s removal,


Buckingham admitted to the legality of transmission under close questioning before the parliamentary Select Committee of 1826. Select Committee on the Calcutta Journal, 18.
however, was far murkier. In May 1824, Governor Somerset felt himself surrounded by enemies. His return after a period of home leave had prompted a bitter feud with the acting governor, Sir Rufane Donkin, and with Donkin’s supporters. Even though British colonial outposts were known for high levels of infighting, the Cape administration still stood out as dangerously factionalized. There had been a recent influx of British migrants to the colony, a large proportion assisted through a scheme designed to alleviate the same social unrest that had prompted the draconian Six Acts. Many were Whigs and Radicals, politically opposed to the High Tory conservatives exemplified by Somerset, and keen to foster criticism of his regime in Britain’s Parliament. In this tense political climate, Somerset sought to muzzle his critics, particularly after they started a newspaper that gave still greater publicity to their complaints. To deal with Greig and the Advertiser, he eventually settled upon “political removal,” or banishment by executive order.

Private correspondence reveals that, for all his later insistence on the legality of his actions, Somerset was initially inclined to use judicial procedures against his opponents. Several men damned by the regime as “radicals” were indeed put on trial for libeling the governor and were subsequently sentenced to banishment or transportation from the colony. After the Advertiser publicized these legal proceedings and released detailed reports of the dirty linen aired in the courtroom, the government forcibly closed Greig’s newspaper. It was on the advice of his Dutch-trained judiciary that Somerset decided to employ “political removal” against the turbulent newspaper proprietor. His justification of the practice rested on two grounds. The first was the wording of the twenty-ninth article of the Governor’s Instructions, which conferred broadly defined powers to “remove and send away from the said Settlement such persons as he shall suspect of adhering to the King’s Enemies, and all such other persons, the continuing of whose residence he may have reason to imagine might be inconvenient or prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the said Settlement.” The second was precedence in


23 Bodleian Library, Oxford (hereafter BLO), Bigge–Somerset Correspondence, Somerset to John Thomas Bigge, April 29, 1824.

24 TNA, CO 48/96, James Stephen to Robert Wilmot Horton, October 16, 1824.
Roman–Dutch law and Cape Dutch colonial practice. Somerset’s private letters indicate that the precedence idea came from Chief Justice Johannes (later Sir John) Truter and Justice George Kekewich. After being issued a testy order for explanation from the secretary of state in London, Earl Bathurst, Somerset tasked Truter and the fiscal, Daniel Denyssen, with researching legal justifications to back him up.

Searching through Roman–Dutch law and colonial precedents at the Cape, the two men believed that they had found ample justification for what Denyssen called “the removal of unruly subjects by Political decree.” There were numerous examples to be found during VOC rule, a period when, like Bengal in the 1820s, the Cape was under the control of a chartered company. Citing both the Governor’s Instructions from the British government and the precedents of Roman–Dutch law, Chief Justice Truter found further justification in the colonial context: “the nature of a Government of an infant State, distant from the Mother Country, seems to render that discretionary Power an indispensible attribute of the Public Administration.” The “paramount duty of the Supreme or ruling Authority,” pronounced Truter in an extended reflection on these issues, was “the preservation of the security of a state, both internal and external.” While the ordinary means to attain that end was “the enactment of Laws,” there were instances of “turbulent times” in which the law might prove inadequate to preserve state security. In these circumstances, bypassing the dictates of the law could be justified to prevent “disturbance and sedition.” In this, the justification echoed the frequently articulated concerns of John Adam and his supporters that the fermentation of discontent allowed by a free press threatened the security of British rule in India.

25 BLO, Bigge–Somerset Correspondence, Somerset to Bigge, April 29, 1824.
26 The Cape fiscal was at that time a combination of public prosecutor and chief of police.
27 CA, CO 212, Letters from the Office of the Fiscal, no. 88, Denyssen to Somerset, September 14, 1824 (enclosure in BL, Bathurst Papers, 57/54, Somerset to Bathurst, December 5, 1824).
28 Although Truter focused on the political removal of Europeans from the Cape in his legal opinion, VOC practices of forced migration around the Indian Ocean world (using overlapping categories of enslaved persons, convicts, and political prisoners) were more concentrated on Africans and Asians. See Kerry Ward, Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company (Cambridge and New York, 2009).
29 CA, CO 214, no. 30 (enclosure in BL, 57/54, Bathurst Papers, Somerset to Bathurst, December 5, 1824).
30 CA, CO 214, no. 89, Truter to Somerset, December 5, 1824.
31 C. A. Bayly suggests that the authoritarian arguments put forward by Adam and others against Buckingham were more influenced by the rapid emergence of the Indian-language
When consulted by Bathurst, James Stephen, the legal advisor to the Colonial Office, expressed an entirely different view from that of Truter and Denysen. Stephen’s legal opinion of what he called an “illegal and unconstitutional act” was so trenchant that he wrote a follow-up letter apologizing for its vehemence, though without backing down from his original conclusions. He considered the Governor’s Instructions “illegal,” and Roman–Dutch precedent irrelevant, since both were “contrary to fundamental principles” forbidding imprisonment or exile without trial.32 Such rights, in his opinion, could not be enacted through an order in the Council, but would require the authority of the king in Parliament. Upholding Somerset’s actions in extrajudicial banishment, he concluded, would be “unconstitutional and void.”33 Bathurst took a more lenient view, and accepted a status quo that allowed “arbitrary power of control over the press” through the executive arm. He, too, was inclined to view Greig’s case in a wider imperial context. “Look at what passed in Buckingham’s case in India,” he wrote privately to Robert Wilmot Horton, “and Sir B[enjamin] D’Urban’s menaces to the press in Demerara, & you will find that they have that character.”34 Nevertheless, like Hastings in Bengal, Bathurst considered that threats were a more effective tactic than risking the political costs of enacting these summary powers.35

The controversy over Greig’s treatment was exacerbated by the presence in the Cape Colony at that time of a parliamentary Commission of Inquiry sent to investigate the state of colonial governance. Their wide-ranging 1827 report was critical of the blurred line between the executive and judiciary in Cape governance, a key concern in this period and one that would lead to changes in the constitutional arrangements of colonies not only in South Africa but also in Australia in the 1820s.

32 TNA, CO48/96, Stephen to Wilmot Horton, September 21, 1824.
33 Ibid.
34 TNA, CO 324/75, Bathurst to Wilmot Horton, November 12, 1824, Minutes by Lord Bathurst.
35 BL, Bathurst Papers, 57/54, Bathurst to Somerset, October 19, 1824.
“Amongst the most important and formidable of those [executive] powers which have been exercised either under Dutch or English authority,” concluded the Commissioners of Inquiry at the Cape, “is that which has been termed the ‘political removal’ from the colony of individuals whose conduct was considered dangerous to the public tranquility.” While the commissioners, in contrast to James Stephen, considered the practice legal according to both the colonial Dutch precedents and the Twenty-Ninth Article of the Governor’s Instructions, they recognized that it was politically inexpedient. It was a practice more suited to those “accustomed to an arbitrary form of government” than to the vociferous new British settlers who claimed “the right of free discussion” at the Cape, and who had inspired “in the Dutch and native population a spirit of vigilance and attention that never existed before, to the acts of the government, and which may render all future exertion of authority objectionable that is not founded upon the law.” They recommended confining the power of political removal to “aliens, or persons who are not natural born subjects of His Majesty,” as well as to those with limited property and length of residence in the colony. In other words, read the subtext, political removal should be used against those who lacked the ability to make the provision more trouble than it was worth.

SUBJECTHOOD, FORCED REMOVAL, AND POLITICS AT HOME AND ABROAD

The Commission of Inquiry’s conclusions on political removal raise contentious issues of subjecthood and alienage being debated elsewhere in the British Empire during this period. Difficulties over the definition of British subjecthood and allegiance had dogged the imperial expansions of the eighteenth century, and nationality law and policy had become even more contentious across the period of revolutionary war. Borders of belonging were being hardened against outsiders as alien legislation was tightened up, yet they also needed to remain flexible enough to accommodate additional subjects who were brought into the fold by conquest. Territories

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36 For more on the blurring of executive and judicial functions in British colonial governance in this period, see Jan C. Jansen’s chapter in this volume.
37 Cape of Good Hope. Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry, May 1, 1827, BPP, House of Commons Papers, 1826–27, vol. 21, 16.
38 For an example in the Caribbean, see Jansen’s chapter in this volume.
such as the Cape of Good Hope changed hands several times across the period of the revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and comprised varied populations of Indigenous people, enslaved people descended from imported populations, and Europeans of various ethnic origins. In India, subjection was complicated not only by racial distinctions but also by the inconsistent legal jurisdictions of the East India Company. As Hannah Weiss Muller has argued, subjection had an (often vexed) legal definition, but it also encompassed a set of practices and assumptions that were worked out in quotidian ways by ordinary historical actors.

Subjection was also a source of protest in the 1819 debates over banishment in the Six Acts. Was it politic, asked critics, to send disaffected radicals into the arms of potentially hostile foreign powers? Banishment had not only been flagged by the opposition as “totally unknown to the law of England” but was also criticized as a “civil death.” What were the implications for subjection and allegiance? As one member of the Commons asked, “Could the children of a man so banished, and born abroad, be entitled to claim as British subjects?” What happened when a banished man was domiciled in a country with which Britain went to war? There were speculations as to “the consequence, if the obligation to allegiance were not cut off by banishment.” Both Greig and Buckingham made much of their British subjection in the protests marshaled against their treatment, as did their supporters. Greig and his political allies at


On Buckingham, British subjection, and transmission, see, for example, [John Palmer] Letters to Sir Charles Forbes, Bart. MP on the suppression of public discussion in India, and the banishment without trial, of two British editors from that country by the Acting Governor-General, Mr. Adam. By a Proprietor of India-Stock (London, 1824); A Letter to the Editor of John Bull on the statement published by Mr Buckingham the late editor of the Calcutta Journal, entitled 'A few brief remarks on the recent act of transportation without trial' (Calcutta, 1823). Greig appealed to the legal precedent of Fabrigas v. Mostyn to assert
the Cape complained about being oppressed by a foreign legal system that was much harsher in its attitude toward public debate. A “British-born subject,” urged one such man in raising his treatment before Parliament, “carries his constitution about him in every part of His Majesty’s dominions as his indefeasible birthright, and that in cases affecting his life, his liberty, or his fair fame, he is entitled to be adjudged by the laws of his own country.”44 While the doctrines of conquest made this claim dubious in black letter law, popular ideas of what constituted the rights of British subjecthood nevertheless gave it political clout. The presence of the Commission of Inquiry, which was widely expected to recommend overturning the Cape’s Roman–Dutch legal system in favor of British law, only underscored the point. Similarly, in petitioning Parliament for redress in 1826, Buckingham’s first point concerned the question of British subjecthood – that in coming to India, he “for the first time found that his being an Englishman (which had every where else been to him a source of pride and benefit) was now the cause of humiliation and disadvantage.”45 Far from benefitting from the much-vaulted “rights of freeborn Englishmen,” company rule meant that “the mildest exercise of his legal birthright was deemed a crime.”46 Thus, claimed Buckingham in a public letter published shortly before his transmission, “the most abject individual of Indian birth” had access to a “freedom and independence of mind” that was denied to “Englishmen” threatened with “the power of banishment without trial.”47 This was a point that Buckingham’s supporters in both colony and metropole inevitably raised in the explosion of pamphleteering that followed his exile. Taking the same point from a different perspective, Adam would later fume that the Calcutta Journal had “continued openly to defy and insult the Government” by placing itself in the hands of Francis Sandys and thereby “confiding in the supposed privileges attached to his Indian Birth.”48

his rights as an English subject illegally banished under foreign laws. See Papers Relating to S. African Commercial Advertiser, May 8, 1824, BPP, House of Commons Papers, 1826–27, vol. 21, 6; and TNA, CO 48/96, Case of Greig and Fairbairn; Censorship of the Press. For discussion of Fabrigas v. Mostyn in relation to contested British subjecthood in the Mediterranean, see Weiss Muller, Subjects and Sovereign, 29, 40–41.


45 Select Committee on the Calcutta Journal, iv.

46 Ibid., 5.

47 Ibid., appendix, 40.

48 A Statement of Facts relative to the removal from India of Mr Buckingham, late Editor of The Calcutta Journal (Calcutta, 1823), 3.
As with Buckingham, the controversy over Greig’s banishment and the closure of the Cape press was taken up with glee in London by Whigs and Radicals keen to embarrass the Tory administration. The scandals arose at a particularly delicate moment, when controversy over Catholic Emancipation was testing the ties that bound various factions of the government together. The Tories anticipated a “great brawling” in the House of Commons about the press at the Cape, “so popular a subject for declamation that the opposition will be more likely to catch at than at the other points.” As Secretary of State Bathurst complained to Governor Somerset in a confidential reprimand: “You have unfortunately stirred two most delicate questions to which every English feeling is most likely to be alive. The one, the freedom of the Press: the second, the power of expulsion without trial, without Conviction, by the exercise of your own individual Authority.” With clear reference to the Buckingham controversy, Bathurst pointed out that “this question has been stirr’d in India” and that the Cape case “respecting the freedom of the Press will come for parliamentary discussion at a moment peculiarly inauspicious.”

In a private letter to Undersecretary of State Robert Wilmot Horton, Bathurst admitted the challenges of “taking a temperate & dispassionate view of the merits of the question,” while taking into account the inevitable fallout: “The case of Greig is one which I am aware may become the fruitful source of much popular declamation calculated to affect a popular assembly.” In this tense political climate, Somerset was under considerable pressure to provide ammunition for “refuting,” as he put it to the secretary of state, “any hostile arguments which may be urgent in the House of Commons.”

Both the government and the opposition agreed on the empire-wide scope of the debate. Policy decisions around press freedom in one locality could have unwelcome influence on volatile debates elsewhere. Writing

50 Catton Collection, Derbyshire, D3155/WH 2876, Lord Granville Somerset to Wilmot Horton, December 5, 1824.
51 BL, Bathurst Papers, 57/54, Bathurst to Somerset, October 19, 1824. Bathurst’s reference here is most likely to the agitation inside and outside parliament by radical Joseph Hume about Buckingham’s case. Taylor, “Joseph Hume and the Reformation of India,” 293–94.
52 TNA, CO 324/75, Bathurst to Wilmot Horton, November 12, 1824, Minutes by Lord Bathurst.
53 BL, Bathurst Papers, 57/54, Somerset to Bathurst, December 5, 1824.
to the prime minister, Lord Liverpool, George Canning, then president of the Board of Control, mourned that “nothing can be more inconvenient or mischievous” than Hastings’s liberalization of the press regulations in India. He nevertheless urged caution: “whatever direction” was pursued “will rebound hither: and it therefore cannot be considered as a purely India question.”  

Penneed in April 1820, not long after the passage of the controversial Six Acts, Canning’s letter makes clear that the Tories were eager to avoid any renewed parliamentary discussion of those provisions, which, as mentioned previously, were designed to crack down on radical dissenters in the metropole in the context of postwar social unrest. With the forced removal of Buckingham and Greig in quick succession, Canning’s fears came to pass. A reignited debate over Tory government repression in Britain became shot through with colonial examples that were tactically useful in attacking the government at home. Some of the same members of Parliament who had been vocal against the Six Acts now raised the same arguments in defense of Buckingham. As Lynn Zastoupil rightly argues, “Bengal and Britain were … two fronts in the Tory campaign against the radical press.”  

As this chapter has demonstrated, it was a campaign fought on far more than two fronts, underscoring C. A. Bayly’s characterization of the period as “the first international conjuncture of radical liberalism.”

A coda to these imperial debates over forced removal, press freedom, and the law came to New South Wales only a few years later. In one example of a wider trend in colonial constitutional reform that disentangled executive from judicial power in crown colonies, the New South Wales Act of 1823 gave the chief justice the right to disallow colonial legislation deemed repugnant to the laws of England. This power was strengthened by the Australian Courts Act of 1828. Governor Ralph Darling of New South Wales was, in many ways, cut from the same political cloth as Somerset at the Cape and Adam in Bengal. Certainly, despite some early signs of tolerance toward the press, he came over to “a constitutional framework which criminalised the public scrutiny of official behaviour.”  

Darling, however, was repeatedly thwarted in his attempts

54 Canning to Liverpool, April 19, 1820. BL, Liverpool Papers, Add. Mss 38, 193, f. 120; Zastoupil, Rammohun Roy. 
56 Bayly, Recovering Liberties, 71, 104–5. 
57 Colonies without colonial legislatures that were ruled by exercise of the royal prerogative. 
to gain control of a licentious colonial press by his more reform-minded chief justice, Francis Forbes. Among these unsuccessful efforts was the New South Wales governor’s attempt to get banishment for a second offense of criminal libel onto the statute books. With the banishment provision removed from the Blasphemous and Seditious Libel Act in England in July 1830, Darling’s attempt was successfully blocked by his chief justice on the grounds that it was repugnant to English law.59

CONCLUSION

The debates around the treatment of James Silk Buckingham and George Greig played out in a postwar context in which anxiety about revolution continued to loom large within Europe and its imperial possessions. How much of a threat to public safety was a “licentious” press? What was the most effective way of policing it? Where should the line between state security and freedom of debate be drawn? Banishment by executive order, especially when employed self-consciously against voices critical of the British imperial state, is a useful entry point in discussing the concepts and patterns of political exile employed in this period. What was called “political removal” at the Cape and “transmission” in Bengal touched on wider questions about the relationship between executive and judicial power in colonial constitutions and the implications for Britons subjected to distinctive legal regimes outside the mother country. Controversies about press liberty, government despotism, and imperial security were enacted on a far wider stage than the localized scandals of colonial newspapers might suggest. “Political removal” might have seemed like a convenient weapon for anxious administrators in so-called turbulent times to employ on the colonial periphery, but the Buckingham and Greig cases demonstrate how easily it could backfire in an interconnected imperial public sphere.

Introduction: Palermo as a Mediterranean Revolutionary Hub in 1820

What do the lives of a Cretan naval officer and an Irish general have in common? This chapter takes as a starting point the lives of two individuals, Sir Richard Church and Emmanuele Scordili, both of whom were involved in the revolution in Sicily between 1820 and 1821 but whose destiny after that year took them to different places. Their examples serve in exploring the relationship between military conflict and mobility in the post-Napoleonic period across the Mediterranean, and between revolution and counter-revolution in North Africa, Sicily, Naples, Spain, Portugal, and the Aegean Sea. The chapter therefore looks at the various types of voluntary and involuntary displacements and their different trajectories.

On July 15, 1820, a few days after the victory of the revolution in Naples that led to the introduction of the Cádiz Constitution in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, a popular revolt erupted in Palermo. Taking control of events, the aristocratic leadership of Sicily set up a provisional government alongside the artisan guilds whose members had backed the insurrection. They declared the island’s independence from Naples, temporarily recognized the Cádiz Constitution as the charter of the island, and summoned representatives from all the towns of eastern Sicily to an assembly that would decide its future and permanent constitution. These events not only

1 On these events, see Francesco Renda, Risorgimento e classi popolari in Sicilia, 1820–1821 (Milan, 1968); Nino Cortese, La prima rivoluzione separatista siciliana, 1820–1821 (Naples, 1951); Antonino de Francesco, La Guerra di Sicilia: Il distretto di Caltagirone
resulted in a military expedition by the Neapolitan constitutional army to crush the rebellion but also triggered a civil war between Palermo and the east Sicilian city of Catania, which sided with Naples against the island’s capital. Although these events are accorded scant space in the standard narrative of the Mediterranean region in the 1820s, to say nothing of accounts of the Age of Revolutions, they nevertheless belonged to a much larger wave of popular military rebellions inaugurated by Rafael del Riego’s pronunciamento in Cádiz in January 1820, which was also followed by similar episodes in Portugal and Naples between July and September that same year, and by the Greek and Piedmontese revolutions in spring of 1821.2 As a matter of fact, the popular tumults in Sicily had been marked by rallying cries in support of these Spanish events and the Cádiz Constitution. As the lives of Church and Scordili suggest, in 1820 Sicily was not only an island at odds with Naples but was also a Mediterranean hub connecting one revolutionary event to the other. While for centuries the island had been a favored destination and point of departure for migrants and travelers, the post-Napoleonic era marked a new and intensified phase in the pattern of migration and displacement. The Sicilian revolution was therefore connected with those of Naples, Greece, and the Iberian Peninsula.

A growing body of literature has brought a more nuanced understanding of the motivations and directions of the flows of sympathizers and volunteers drawn to the Mediterranean revolutions. This work has unveiled the multiplicity of motives underpinning internationalism, as well as the existence of exchanges both within the Mediterranean and outside of Europe.3 However, one aspect of this phenomenon still remains central in existing explanatory frameworks: the idea that Western European philhellenic volunteers driven by romanticism and revolutionary internationalism

nelle rivoluzione del 1820–21 (Catania, 1992); and Giuseppe Barone, Città in Guerra, Sicilia 1820–1821 (Bari, 2022).


comprised the majority of those who moved across the Mediterranean toward Greece after 1821. The implicit or explicit assumption of these narratives is that these revolutionaries were liberals driven by support for constitutions and national emancipation. By taking a “peripheral,” decentered viewpoint on this period’s displacements, this chapter shows that from the perspective of Palermo, philhellenism was not simply a novel movement committed to constitutional, liberal, and national values. If we consider our two examples, in the case of Sir Richard Church, his position was also associated with the defense of imperial interests in an age of imperial rivalry and expansion, while Emmanuele Scordili was motivated by preexisting Mediterranean professional traditions and identities. Hence, the lives of these two men broaden our understanding of the causes of displacement in the Age of Revolutions and offer insights regarding the ways in which these displacements provided opportunities to renegotiate identities. More generally, these case studies point to the very different ways in which one could join a revolution and become a revolutionary, emphasizing the plurality of motivations involved. In other words, the case studies also show how people became revolutionaries and why. Finally, these men’s biographies suggest that the category of revolutionary volunteer overlapped with, and was entangled with, those of mercenary and refugee and retained strong elements of continuity with preexisting forms of mobility across the Mediterranean.

SIR RICHARD CHURCH: BRIDGING EMPIRE, COUNTER-REVOLUTION, AND REVOLUTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Sicilian revolution against Naples succeeded because of the insurrection of the population of its capital, Palermo. On July 15, 1820, the arrival into Palermo of news about the Neapolitan revolution had coincided with its most important religious festival, dedicated to its patron, Santa Rosalia. The entire city took part in the public celebrations, which culminated in a procession of a statue of the saint along the main thoroughfare, the so-called Cassero, and across the rest of the city. Refusing to declare himself in favor of the independence of the island, General Richard Church, chief of the

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Neapolitan army in Palermo, was sitting in an open landau along with some other Neapolitan officers when he was attacked by the crowds and barely escaped with his life. The following day, the crowds, with the support of the city guilds, seized control of the castle, along with its armory, and drove the Neapolitan army out of the city.\(^5\) Church immediately fled for Naples, where he was arrested and charged with having triggered the revolt of Palermo.

Central to the narrative of events in both Sicily and Naples was the fact that the general himself had torn off the pro-independence yellow cockade from a Palermitan citizen, a public insult that escalated the revolt. This anecdote served the purposes of those Sicilian patriots who wanted to justify the insurrection by describing Church as a symbol of Neapolitan oppression on the island. The fact that Church was a foreigner also played an important role in these narratives. His presence in Palermo brought back unpleasant memories about British rule over the island during the Napoleonic Wars, when he had been a member of the foreign occupying army.\(^6\)

Hence, although Church had just arrived in Palermo to assume his new responsibilities, his connection with Sicily and the Mediterranean was not new. To understand his presence in Palermo, we must go back to the Napoleonic period and to the expansion of the Napoleonic empire in the Mediterranean and across southern Europe. While the occupation of Sicily would prove to be temporary (1806–15), Britain acquired Malta in 1800, and Corfu and the rest of the Ionian Islands in 1815. Portugal was not directly annexed but the presence there of the British army, poised to fight the French in the Iberian Peninsula, continued for some years after 1815. This military and colonial expansion brought with it a wave of army officers, soldiers, and mercenaries, as well as imperial agents, merchants, diplomats, and administrators to the Mediterranean. It also gave rise to a lively debate about the role of the Mediterranean in the British Empire. In the context of the Napoleonic Wars, British agents described the Mediterranean as a maritime empire built in defense of freedom against the French Empire, which they held to be based on despotism.

\(^5\) On these events, see Niccolò Palmieri, *Saggio storico e politico sulla costituzione del Regno di Sicilia infino al 1816 con un’appendice sulla rivoluzione del 1820*, Michele Amari, ed. (1847; Palermo, 1972), 326–31. The general’s own account is in Richard Church, *Relazione dei fatti accaduti al tenente generale Riccardo Church in Palermo la notte del 15 luglio 1820* (Naples, 1820).

and conquest. Inspired by the writings of Edmund Burke, advocates of the British Empire in the sea defined it as a community of free polities based on free trade and relative autonomy. A few such advocates passionately believed in the need for Britain to export its constitution to the Mediterranean islands. This idea was first put into practice in Corsica between 1794 and 1796, but its most important application took place in Sicily, where a constitution inspired by British institutions was introduced in 1812 under the aegis of Sir William Bentinck. However, the perceived failure of this constitutional experiment in Sicily (whose aristocracy resisted the reform of feudalism advocated by the British) led to the prevalence of an alternative imperial model. This form of imperial rule, otherwise known as “proconsular despotism,” was based on the belief that neither local elites nor ordinary people were suited to self-rule or representative government. Before granting rights, the imperial government first had to civilize and reform the populace through good administration and through order. Hence, no form of autonomy was granted to the populations of Malta and the Ionian Islands when they became British after 1817.7

The son of a Quaker merchant from Cork, Richard Church had run away from “school and quakerdom” to join the army at the age of sixteen. In 1801, at age seventeen, he was sent to fight the French in Egypt.8 In the following years, up until his posting to Palermo in the spring of 1820, Church moved across the Mediterranean fighting for the British Empire against the Napoleonic armies and brigands alike, and training native troops. In 1805, he participated in the military occupation of Sicily. It was after taking part in the Battle of Maida against the French in Calabria that he was appointed officer of a battalion of Corsican rangers and fought brigandage in that region. But it was only once stationed on the Ionian Islands, during the British occupation from 1809 to 1812, that Church would perfect his skills in the training and leading of Mediterranean fighters.9 Here, he created a regiment of volunteers coming from the Greek lands of the Ottoman Empire. Called the

8 E. M. Church, *Sir Richard Church in Italy and Greece* (Edinburgh, 1895), 1.
9 Stanley Lane Poole, *Sir Richard Church* (London, 1890), 24–30.
Duke of York Greek Light Infantry, it was used in 1810 to conquer the island of Lefkada, then controlled by the French. Church became hugely popular among the members of his regiment, which included some of the future military leaders of the Greek revolution, such as Theodoros Kolokotronis, and many former brigands (klephts) expelled from the Ottoman Empire. Church’s experience in these years left him with the belief that it was possible to impose military discipline and thereby civilize southern populations, but unlike Bentinck or other British administrators, he never believed in the usefulness of exporting constitutions and rights to this region.

After 1815 and the permanent acquisition of the Ionian Islands, the British consolidated their presence in the Mediterranean and revived debates about their imperial role there. From his experience, Church was also convinced that these islands’ self-government under a British protectorate could better serve the commercial and geopolitical interests of the British Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean than direct colonial rule. He elaborated on this vision in a memorandum drafted for the British representative at the Congress of Vienna, the Duke of Wellington, in 1815, when the future of the Ionian Islands was to be decided. In this memorandum, Church argued that the islands and the continental dependencies traditionally associated with them deserved to enjoy self-government under British protection, and that under these circumstances, the Ionian Islands could become the arbiters of the Christian territories of Morea, Rumeli, the Archipelago, and Alexandria. Britain would thus win the sympathy of their populations and increase its influence in the region without unnecessary expense.

After the restoration, Church’s activities in the Mediterranean continued to be driven by a determination to civilize local populations with military discipline, without encouraging aspirations for freedom and self-government. Church went on to sell his skills in the service of the King of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinando II, who in 1816 had repealed the Sicilian constitution. Church had now decided to work for the dynasty he had previously defended during the British occupation of the island. At the same time, he did not disregard the interests of Britain in the area. In the new political context set by the consolidation of a British colonial

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10 British Library, London (hereafter BL), Church Papers, Add MSS36543, fos. 23–24, letter to Church, July 24, 1812.

presence in the Adriatic, the recruitment of Greek fighters became pivotal to the imperial contest for Mediterranean influence. By recruiting Greek mercenaries who had previously fought for the British, Church was also trying to stem efforts by Russian agents to attract Greek officers into Russian service. He also served the Bourbon king by using these Greek mercenaries to fight against brigandage in Puglia in 1817. Here, brigandage was associated with the proliferation of secret societies belonging to the world of the Carboneria, organizations that had both criminal objectives (murdering enemies, burning harvests) and broader political aims (inciting popular revolts to introduce the constitution, or even establishing a republic). Church succeeded in curtailing the phenomenon and in reestablishing law and order in the region.

The anger leveled at the general in Palermo on July 15, 1820, was therefore fueled not only by popular resentment toward the British military occupation of the island between 1806 and 1815, but also by the memory of Church’s role in repressing the Carboneria in Puglia. Members of the Carboneria had played an important role in fomenting the popular insurrection in the capital of Sicily. As subsequent events show, Church’s loyalty to the monarchy took precedence over that to the constitution. Discharged from prison after a few months in 1821, the general headed to the Congress of Laibach, where he consulted with Ferdinando II, who had given his approval for an Austrian military intervention, and subsequently joined the Austrian invasion that ended the constitutional experiment in 1821. He remained in the king’s service as an officer until 1826. However, in 1827, in an abrupt new turn in his career, after some hesitations, Church agreed to assume command of the Greek Revolutionary Army, on condition that the Greek factions settle their differences.

At first glance, Church’s decision to leave Naples and fight for Greek independence looks like the beginning of a radically new phase in his career. Not only did it offer him the chance for an exceptional promotion, transforming him into the chief of a national army but, more surprisingly, it also turned the former defender of the political status quo and enemy of insubordination, insurrection, and revolutionary principles into a revolutionary. In Greece, Church found himself at the center of a dense network of philhellenes fighting for the emancipation of the Greek nation. He not only had to negotiate between competing national

12 BL, Add MSS 1828, fos. 114–120, Church to William A’Court, July 24, 1818.
13 Jacob L. S. Bartholdy, Memoirs of the Secret Societies of the South of Italy, Particularly the Carbonari (London, 1821); E. M. Church, Sir Richard Church, 139–42.
groups but also had to navigate the tricky politics of the Greek factions. In fact, he played a crucial role in pacifying them and in forging a consensus around the election of Ioannis Kapodistrias as the new Governor of Greece. After meeting with success in the task of pacifying the Greek factions, he assumed his new role as leader of the army, only to suffer a bitter defeat outside Athens in a battle that led to the capitulation of the Acropolis in May 1827. Church devoted the following two years to the reconquest of Western Greece, but the deterioration of his relationship with Kapodistrias led to his dismissal in 1829. Nonetheless, he went back to serve the Greek army in the following decades and was appointed general and senator of the kingdom. When he died in 1873, Church was celebrated as a national hero.

However, if one looks at the nature of his commitment to the Greek cause, what is striking is the continuity in his language and motivations across time. When informing Francis I, King of the Two Sicilies about his decision to go to Greece, he wrote that what motivated him was the hope that he might “limit the disaster of the Turks’ exterminating war against a Christian population.” This was the language employed by European philhellenes at the time.

Yet the European philhellenes who flocked to Greece to fight the Ottomans disagreed on the nature and objectives of their commitment to the war of liberation. Some wanted freedom of the press and constitutional liberties to be introduced immediately following the war. For an important group of British philhellenes involved in the London Greek Committee, the priority of the war was not the introduction of constitutional guarantees into Greece, but rather the gradual elevation of the Greeks to a higher standard of civilization, according to the principles they had applied when working in the Asian dependencies of the British Empire. Church, however, was not interested in advancing a liberal agenda in Greece. Once in Greece, he continued to pursue the civilizing project he had championed as a professional fighter across the Mediterranean, without embracing the principles of constitutionalism along with those of national emancipation. This is why most European and British philhellenes criticized him as a professional with no idealism.

14 Dakin, British and American Philhellenes, 144–46.
16 Rosen, Bentham, Byron and Greece.
or specific ideological motivations. It is, therefore, not surprising that Church would not have seen any contradiction or shift in ideological allegiances between fighting secret societies in Puglia, attempting to crush (although unsuccessfully) the Sicilian insurrection, and assuming a prominent role in the Greek revolution. As his narrative of the war of liberation makes plain, his priorities as a military leader had been to reorganize the army according to modern European standards (he complained that his troops, when taken too far from home, would desert and return to their villages of origin). He also wanted to “civilize” the war and make it less ferocious by using financial rewards to convince his troops to spare the lives of their Turkish prisoners. In Greece, he was confronted again, as earlier in his Mediterranean career, with the problem of brigandage, a phenomenon that, in the context of the revolution, shifted between support for the anti-Ottoman rebellion to warfare against any and every authority, including that of Greek military leaders.17

Finally, his commitment to the emancipation of Greece did not contradict his status as a former British imperial officer but was, in fact, encouraged by it. The Greek revolution represented a novel chapter in the history of European interference into Ottoman affairs, during which the British and Russian Empires and the French government tried to influence the conduct and outcome of the war and compete with the other European powers not only through diplomatic channels but also by way of the volunteers coming from their countries. While the widespread perception among Greeks and foreigners in Greece that Church was a British agent may be incorrect, this perception helped him to play an important role in pacifying Greek factions and in forging a consensus around the appointment of Kapodistrias as president in 1827. In the previous three years, Greek factions had organized themselves into so-called Russian, French, and English parties, whose members sought to advance their own interests with the support of the different European powers and philhellenes. It is significant that Church himself opted for the candidature of Kapodistrias only after consultation with the British cabinet and the newly appointed governor of the Ionian Islands, Stratford Canning, cousin of George Canning.18 Therefore, it would be appropriate to see his activities, along with those of other prominent British military men involved in the anti-Ottoman conflict, such as Admiral Thomas

18 Dakin, British and American Philhellenes, 1.46–47.
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John Cochrane or Commodore Sir Gawen William Rowan Hamilton, as evidence of the expansion of the ties and networks of informal empire that, through the Greek insurrection, served to advance British influence into Ottoman lands in competition with other European powers.¹⁹ Nor was his support for the creation of a Greek state in contradiction with the liberal imperialist vision of the Mediterranean he had put forward at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

The different motivations and political stances dividing philhellenes in Greece could also be found among those British imperial officers who, after fighting in the Napoleonic Wars, remained entangled in the political and military affairs of other southern European countries after 1815. Some of them closely identified with the cause of liberalism in southern Europe and were thus convinced that Britain had a duty to support freedom and civil rights abroad. Some British officers who participated as volunteers in the war against Napoleon in Spain ended up supporting the constitution during the trienio liberal, and a few of them became passionately committed to the defense of revolutions across the Mediterranean. Sir Robert Wilson, a man who combined military experience across Europe with political radicalism, was undoubtedly the most famous among them. Having fought the French in Egypt, Portugal (where he commanded the Loyal Lusitanian Legion of local volunteers), and Russia, he was elected to the House of Commons in 1818 and soon rallied to all the revolutions of the South, criticizing foreign interventions to crush them, condemning the Alien Bill, and advocating for the right of political refugees to seek asylum in Britain. In 1823, he planned to gather 10,000 volunteers to rescue the Spanish constitutional government in the face of the French invasion. He ultimately succeeded in leading a much smaller number in the temporary defense of Cádiz against the French army. While he was temporarily considered for the position of Chief of the Greek Revolutionary Army, a position eventually offered to Richard Church, Wilson continued to lend his organizational support to international conspiracies involving exiled constitutionalists.²⁰

For other British fighters, however, it would be hard to detect an ideological coherence between the various phases of their professional military careers, or a direct relationship between their defense of southern populations against Napoleon and subsequent liberal tendencies. What seemed to mark the careers of the former British volunteers in the Peninsular Wars was a constant search for the professional opportunities offered by mercenary fighting. Most of them were prepared to continue in the service of Fernando VII after 1814, when the monarch abolished the constitution and turned his back on liberalism; and while some supported the revolution in 1820, others went on to fight for the emancipation of the Spanish colonies against Fernando. They were first and foremost mercenaries, not freedom fighters. Others, however, thought that it was in the best interests of the British Empire to defend the political status quo in southern Europe and the Mediterranean and thereby stem the influence of Austria, Russia, and France in this region by preventing revolutions and constitutional reforms. It was in Portugal, in particular, a de facto British protectorate, that this policy was implemented. Occupied by the British army during the Napoleonic Wars, it remained a British satellite state after 1815. Lord William Beresford, like Church, Irish by origin, was the head of the Portuguese army between 1809 and 1820, first as Wellington’s deputy during the Peninsular Wars, and later as Marechal general of all Portuguese troops, who remained dominated by British officers until 1820. As head of the Portuguese army, his political influence was tempered only by the board of governors who ruled over Portugal in the absence of the Brazil-based monarch. At the same time, Beresford was in constant touch with British diplomats and with Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, back home. In 1817, when Church had defeated brigandage and secret society activities in Puglia, Beresford repressed secret society activities and the conspiracy led by Gomes Freire de Andrade that aimed to introduce a constitution and free Portugal from the British presence. The dismissals of Beresford in Portugal and Church in Sicily represented one of the first revolutionary acts in each country. A Tory at heart, Beresford, like Church, had no sympathy for constitutions. Church, therefore, shared with many other British fighters an extraordinary ability to

seize the opportunities offered by the rapidly changing political circumstances of his life, without being committed to a specific political agenda. Church’s commitment to protecting the interests of the British Empire, civilizing the Mediterranean populations through military discipline and war, and exercising a hostile attitude toward constitutional freedoms was perhaps the only ideological constant of his remarkable career, one that bridged the Age of Revolutions from the Napoleonic Wars to the creation of the new – illiberal – Greek monarchy in the 1830s and beyond.

EMMANUELE SCORDILI: THE GREEK DIASPORA AND ITS MULTIPLE RESPONSES TO THE REVOLUTIONS

The economic depression that affected Sicily in the post-Napoleonic period was a crucial factor in the island’s insurrection. Thus, the citizens of Palermo hoped that the new provisional government would not only guarantee their autonomy and introduce a constitution but also improve their material circumstances. As soon as it was established, the provisional revolutionary authority of the city was flooded with hundreds of petitions by individuals seeking employment. Among them, one request stands out because of the professional background of the applicant: The former Greek officer, Emmanuele Scordili, born on the Ottoman island of Crete, sought to work for the Sicilian revolutionary army as an interpreter. To affirm his credentials, Scordili noted in the petition that “since the age of 20 he had worked for the Russian Imperial fleet, and was later enrolled in the Albanian regiment of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as a second lieutenant.” Since 1812, when the regiment had been disbanded, Scordili had received a pension, but the revolution had brought an end to its regular payment. In exchange for a salary, Scordili offered his services to the new government as an interpreter. His knowledge of “the oriental languages, and especially [the] Muscovite and Turkish ones,” would prove useful, “since the Sicilian nation would now need to establish commercial relations with the oriental nations.” To lend more credibility to his commitment, Scordili added that “the Greeks and Sicilians have been, and still are, one single nation; moreover my residence in Sicily for almost 20 years has made me a veritable Sicilian.”

Submitted on August 13, 1820, this request was rejected by the provisional government, and we have no evidence as to what became of Scordili after the end of the Sicilian revolution. Scordili belonged to a professional

23 Archivio di Stato di Palermo, 5032, f. 85, Real segreteria incartamenti.
category of Ottoman Christian mercenaries who fought for the Christian monarchs, a group that had existed since the sixteenth century, when the Neapolitan kings had started to employ Christians from Ottoman lands, and from Albania and Epirus in particular. The Reggimento Albanese Real Macedone, founded in 1736, was further strengthened at the time of the wars against the French, when a new Battaglione di Cacciatori Albanesi was established between 1797 and 1798. Scordili belonged to this battalion. His service to the Russian fleet was not unusual either. Since Catherine the Great’s wars against the Ottomans, which were waged between 1769–74 and 1787–91, the Imperial Russian Army, too, had organized Greek regiments and sailors and had also hired Greek corsair ships in the Mediterranean.24

The Napoleonic Wars offered new opportunities for these Ottoman Christian fighters. All empires, including the British, required local mercenaries to fight in the Mediterranean. Scordili’s biography was therefore entangled with that of Richard Church, who had created new Greek regiments in the Ionian Islands and thus participated in the same military events. When the Albanian regiments were disbanded in 1812, some of their members were hired by the Neapolitan consular service in the Levant. Others, like Church, immediately went on to join other foreign armies.25 Like Scordili, many Greeks offered their linguistic skills to different empires in the Levant. Their services were welcome at a time when European consular services gladly took advantage of their unique knowledge to advance their commercial and diplomatic interests.26

Nevertheless, the two men’s biographies differed in one substantial way. While Church helps us understand the complex nature of European philhellenism, Scordili invites us to reflect on the impact of the Greek War of Independence on those whose status thereby shifted from Christian Ottoman to Greek national. Although both Church and Scordili moved between and across different empires and states, Scordili’s life was anchored in the polycentric world of the Mediterranean Greek diaspora and can only be understood in that context. Scordili was not just a mercenary who belonged to a venerable professional tradition; he was also a member of one of the very many Greek communities that thrived on the

24 Nicholas Charles Pappas, Greeks in Russian Military Service in the Late 18th Century and Early 19th Century (Thessaloniki, 1991).
25 Attanasio Lehasca, Cenno storico dei servigi militari prestati nel Regno delle Due Sicilie dai Greci, Epiroti, Albanesi e Macedoni in epoche diverse (Corfù, 1843), 55–56.
shores of the Mediterranean, from Messina to Marseilles, from Leghorn to Naples, from Taranto and the Salento in Puglia to Venice and Trieste in the Habsburg Empire. Their permanently settled populations were cyclically revitalized by the arrival of new individuals like him, and their members remained in contact with their Ottoman Christian communities of origin thanks to commercial and family ties. Thus, Scordili’s petition invites us to explore how the transition to a revolutionary context not only affected mobilities but also offered new possibilities for the renegotiation of cultural and political affiliations among the members of the Greek diaspora. What did it mean to be Greek, and how did the Greek revolution change this? How did the revolution affect preexisting patterns of mobility between Greek communities inside and outside the Ottoman Empire?

For centuries, the members of these communities had organized themselves in self-governing associations called fratie, or universitas, or confraternità, which were linked to churches belonging to the Greek Oriental Rite and appointed their own priests. These communities defined themselves as nazione greca, and their members as nazionali. In spite of this definition, which referred to their religious and linguistic affiliation, members’ identities were often fluid in terms of religion and culture, as well as legal status. With the exception of those Greeks living in Venice, who had their religious rights guaranteed and could safely practice their Orthodox faith, the confraternità in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, as members of the Oriental Church loyal to the papacy, were subject, at least in theory, to the authority of the Catholic Church. Legally, and depending on their actual origins, the Greeks defined themselves as Ottoman, Habsburg, or Venetian, and belonged to separate churches (for instance in Naples, where Ottoman and Venetian Greeks had separate churches). These definitions, however, were always negotiable. For instance, during the Napoleonic period in Venice, a number of nazionali

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decided to become Ottoman in order to avoid the taxation imposed on Venetian citizens.\textsuperscript{30}

Scordili’s own use of the terms \textit{nazione Greca} and \textit{nazione Siciliana} demonstrated strong elements of continuity with the idiom that the Greek diaspora had employed for centuries, and with eighteenth-century understandings of the \textit{nazione Siciliana} as a state. While many petitions sent by individuals or communities to the Neapolitan provisional government in the same period contained references to the Cádiz Constitution and to its definition of the \textit{nazione} as a sovereign community of people, such references were absent from Scordili’s appeal. His cosmopolitan claim that the Sicilians and the Greeks were a single nation could well have been voiced a full century before. However, the language of other members of the Christian Ottoman diaspora was starting to shift in new directions, reflecting more explicitly the new values of the Age of Revolutions. On the Spanish island of Mallorca, only three months before Scordili petitioned the Sicilian government, two Greek expatriates spoke at an assembly of the Patriotic Society of the town of Palma de Mallorca, an association set up immediately after Riego’s \textit{pronunciamento} and the declaration of the Cádiz Constitution in 1820. In the face of the hostility shown by some of its members to the presence of foreigners, the two merchants made an impassioned case for their right to join the Patriotic Association, while at the same time offering to resign, should they be called to do so. Having lived in Mallorca, from where they had been engaged in trade between the Ottoman Empire and Spain, for ten years, Nicholas Francopulo and Yanni Papadopulo claimed to be friends of all Spaniards. The two Greek merchants observed that their participation in the \textit{Sociedad Patriótica Mallorquina} – one of the many similar institutions that sprang up across Spain and southern Europe during the 1820s – would not be incompatible with the organization’s national aspirations, since they were both committed to the values of the revolution and to the defense of the constitutional order. For the two of them, in fact, constitutional Spain, a country that had defeated tyranny and the persecution of the Holy Inquisition, was best placed to provide guidance and leadership to Greece in its own aspirations for freedom against an oppressive government.\textsuperscript{31}


The eruption of the Greek revolution in the spring of 1821, immediately after the Austrian invasion ended the Neapolitan constitutional regime, had a profound impact on the Greek diaspora, stirring new patriotic sentiments and creating new movements across the Mediterranean. Movements from and into the Greek diasporic communities before the revolution were determined both by commercial routes and by enduring links with their members’ place of origin inside the Ottoman Empire. But the war moved populations to new destinations, both near and distant. Thousands of Greek ex-combatants from the Russian, British, and Neapolitan armies arrived in the territories of the Ottoman Empire as volunteers, often having obtained financial support from their confraternities.\(^{32}\) But Greek volunteers from the diaspora and from the shores of the Mediterranean also included people without any previous experience as fighters. On the eve of the Greek revolution, Trieste, the main port of the Habsburg Empire, was home to a large Greek community, or *parikia*, of around 1,500 individuals. The community’s existence had been formalized in 1751, when an Orthodox Church was inaugurated. The city, an important commercial and information hub between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, had played an important role in the early history of Greek patriotism. Between 1797 and 1798, Rigas Fereos, who had developed the earliest plans to “liberate” Greece from the Ottomans on the basis of the principles of the French Revolution, established a small circle of supporters among the Greek merchants of Trieste. His famous poem, “Thourios,” was well known in the city and sung by a number of supporters.\(^{33}\) The year 1821, however, marked a new turning point as Greek patriotism became a more socially significant movement. On receiving news about events in the Principalities and the Peloponnese, a number of local volunteers, mostly from humble social backgrounds, left for Greece on passports granted by the city’s Russian and Ottoman consuls. In addition, Trieste was used by Greek students from European universities as a point of departure to Greece. This flow had been encouraged by the Ypsilantis brothers, Alexander and Dimitrios, who arrived in the city to raise funds and organize these groups of fighters. Financial support for the revolution was provided by a number of wealthy city merchants, who offered substantial sums for military purposes.\(^{34}\)


number of volunteers came from the British Ionian Islands. Hundreds of fighters left the islands, Zante and Kefalonia in particular, and joined the conflict in the Peloponnese as early as April 1821. Ionian volunteers had also taken part in Alexander Ypsilantis’s expedition in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which inaugurated the Greek insurrection.35

New opportunities would, therefore, open up for individuals such as Scordili in 1821. Since his name does not appear in the list of forty veterans who, by 1830, had died and been commemorated at the Orthodox church of Palermo, it is not inconceivable that he was among those who reached the Peloponnese or Rumeli at the outbreak of the rebellion from the port cities of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic.36 At the same time, not all the members of these “Greek nations” were seduced by the call to join the war of national liberation or responded with such enthusiasm to the patriotic feelings evoked by the Greek insurrection. Some of them remained loyal to their traditional affiliations. Since this period coincided with the creation of the Ottoman consular system, a number of diasporic Greeks remained faithful to the Ottoman Empire after the revolution as well. For example, while the deputy consul of the Ottoman Empire in Marseilles became a representative of the new Greek state, the consul, a diasporic Greek, continued to work for the empire and condemned the revolution.37

The revolution produced another novel category of displaced persons, namely refugees. Between 1821 and 1828, displacement caused by revolution, along with ethnic cleansing and war casualties, lowered the population of the affected territories by 185,000, some 50,000 of whom must have been Muslims.38 Southern Crete had joined the insurrection immediately, in 1821. However, counterattacks by the Ottoman army and fleet, culminating in the invasion of the southwestern part of the island by the Turko–Egyptian forces of Hussein Bey in March 1824, caused more than 10,000 Cretans to flee as refugees, with most going to the Peloponnese.39 While such displacement at times encouraged a new sense

38 Nikolai Todorov, The Balkan City, 1400–1900 (Seattle, 1983), 328.
of national belonging, it just as often resulted in violence and intolerance among Greeks. Greek refugees fleeing their province, city, or island were often killed by other Greeks, who treated them as enemies, to the extent that agreements were made in revolutionary assemblies to stop this from happening, and also to render displacements illegal.

Other areas, such as the Ionian Islands, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the Adriatic coasts of the Habsburg Empire, started to be affected by this flow of refugees from the war in Greece. In the British colony of the Ionian Islands, Governor General Sir Thomas Maitland’s immediate reaction to the outbreak of revolution was to decree the strict neutrality of the Ionian Islands, a status that allowed for the protection of refugees from the war but otherwise kept the islands outside the conflict. The very first refugees of the Greek revolution were probably those 7,000 individuals, mostly women and children, who fled to the island of Zante on account of its proximity and safety. They had come from Patras and its surroundings, in the Northern Peloponnese, in the very early stages of the revolt. In Zante, they enjoyed the financial support of wealthy citizens.40 The Ionian authorities tried to be impartial and provide shelter to Muslim refugees as well, but their arrival triggered violent reactions among the local populations. On the island of Cerigo, Turks seeking protection were attacked and murdered, and the governor executed five of the culprits in retaliation.41 A flow of refugees was also threatening to reach the southeastern shores of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which were slightly farther removed from the conflict than the Ionian Islands. In 1824, the Neapolitan authorities of the Puglia region, facing Albania and Epirus, estimated that 4,000 or so Greek refugees had arrived on their shores, although numbers in later accounts were far more conservative.42

Although these flows of refugees represented an unprecedented phenomenon, their movements followed preexisting links between given localities and the Greek diaspora. Soon, refugees started to cross the Mediterranean Sea not only to reach the Peloponnese or the islands unscathed by the war but also the communities on the Mediterranean and Adriatic shores. By 1824, more than 20,000 refugees had left the

40 Hiotis, Istoria tou Ioniou Kratous, I, 388.
island of Cyprus. The nazione Greca in Venice, for instance, raised money to subsidize the education of refugee children, and to send girls to learn to read and write in the convents of the city.\textsuperscript{43} A more substantial number of refugees reached Trieste, which received 3,000 migrants in 1821 alone. One-third of them left immediately, another third spent just a few days, and the remaining third settled there. For many, the choice of Venice or Trieste was dictated by preexisting family links. Yet by 1823, the Greek community of Trieste found it difficult to continue looking after refugees, and the community board decided to stop raising funds. As a consequence, by spring 1823, the majority of refugees had left for Alexandria, Odessa, Marseille, and, above all, for the Ionian Islands.\textsuperscript{44}

While the flow of refugees elicited patriotic responses and reinforced feelings of belonging to a shared national community, it did not necessarily bring about the adoption by the refugees of one specific national affiliation at the expense of others. As in previous centuries, Ottoman Christians moving across the Mediterranean were willing to renegotiate their cultural identities and affiliations. In the absence of a Greek consular service, and with recognition of the Greek state by foreign powers coming only after 1827, Greek refugees, whenever they could, sought protection from the authorities of other European countries, whether in the form of consular protection or citizenship. Greeks fleeing to North Africa during the revolution, for instance, often acquired Italian, French, or British documents in Alexandria or Tunis.\textsuperscript{45}

In addition to refugees and volunteers, the Greek revolution increased the population of a third category of displaced persons: enslaved Christian prisoners. As a result of the war, the slave markets of Smyrna, Constantinople, Alexandria (Egypt), and the Barbary States were suddenly flooded with an exceptionally high number of slaves (45,000 Greeks, mostly women and children, were taken from the island of Chios alone, in the spring of 1822), to the extent that their prices fell dramatically. This form of displacement was not new but rather belonged to a centuries-long tradition of Christian enslavement in the Ottoman world.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{43} Konstantia Zanou, “Profughi Ciprioti a Venezia e Trieste dopo il 1821 (nuovi elementi provenienti dalle carte Mustoxidi a Corfù),” in Mattia de Poli, ed., Giornate per Cipro (Padua, 2007), 39–62.

\textsuperscript{44} Katsiardi-Hering, I Elliniki Parikia tis Tergestis, I: 342–63.


\textsuperscript{46} Robert C. Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast and Italy, 1500–1800 (New York, 2003). On the mobilities of
new was its sudden intensification, and also the new meaning the philhellenic movement had attributed to it as a marker of Ottoman barbarity. Liberating enslaved Greeks became a humanitarian imperative financed by Russian and Greek merchants and supported by committees that included diplomats, consuls, and donors. Yet while these efforts led to the liberation of some enslaved Christians (for instance, in summer 1827, Russia freed 360 Greek slaves), they also brought to light another unexpected (although likewise long-standing) phenomenon: apostasy. Not only children, but also many adults had converted to Islam, apparently spontaneously. Some of them, when offered the opportunity for ransom, refused and retained their new Muslim faith, satisfied with the opportunities they had found in Ottoman society.47 Therefore, rather than simply nationalizing both the Greek Mediterranean diaspora and the populations of the Greek territories, the Age of Revolutions, by giving rise to new forms of voluntary and coerced mobility, prompted a variety of professional, religious, and political renegotiations. Among the surprising and unexpected cultural crossings of this period, there was not only a Cretan member of the nazione Greca who applied to become a Sicilian revolutionary and work as an interpreter, there were also the former Ottoman Greek subjects, the so-called reyes or reyedes, captured and enslaved during the war, who opted to retain their new status and their faith as Muslims.

CONCLUSIONS

The stories explored in this chapter point to the different material conditions, circumstances, and motivations that turned individuals into revolutionaries and led them to cross the Mediterranean; these stories also suggest the different meanings that individuals attributed to such experiences. By so doing, they question the assumption that all fighters joined revolutions in the name of nationalism and constitutionalism. Likewise, they put the phenomenon of military volunteerism into a broader context of older and new mobilities. These biographies confirm the role played by the events of the Napoleonic era and the revolutions of the 1820s in increasing displacement. At the same time, however, they also show that enslaved people during the Age of Revolutions, see also Jan C. Jansen’s and Anna McKay’s chapters in this volume.

the Mediterranean crossings of this period must be understood as continuous with longer-term migratory trends that had connected its seacoasts for centuries. Traditional patterns of migration and Early Modern understandings of migrant communities continued to survive into the 1820s. Support for new principles of nationality, along with commitment to the constitution, may or may not have played a role in determining revolutionary mobilities. As this chapter has suggested, other motivations were at play for migrants (such as Scordili) who belonged to centuries-old “foreign” diaspora communities, but also for army officers (such as Church) who had started a Mediterranean career during the Napoleonic Wars. In the southern and eastern peripheries of Christian Europe, national values may have been subordinate to a vague defense of the values of civilization against barbarism, or to the British Empire’s interest in expanding farther into the region. In an age of increased politicization and multiple wars, the ability to take advantage of new and even competing political causes, and to offer one’s services as a fighter, may well have been as important as a commitment to the ideologies of “modernity.” The biographies of Scordili and Church blur the boundaries between revolution and counter-revolution, between freedom fighter, economic migrant, and mercenary, and between national and imperial aspirations. They show that the political, intellectual, and cultural affiliations created under circumstances of increased mobility did not necessarily follow a linear trajectory moving from the ancien régime into the age of liberalism, or from the age of empires to the age of nationalism. Thus, these case studies invite us to blend together material circumstances and personal choices relating to the great ideological and political transformations of the period. The broader context of the subjects’ lives also demonstrates that in an era of increased violence and intolerance, forced migration, not military volunteerism, represented the most common form of mobility in this decade. At the same time, as in previous centuries, crossing the Mediterranean Sea continued to offer possibilities to renegotiate or acquire new and unexpected cultural and political affiliations.
The Chacay Massacre

Exile, the Mapuche, and Border Formation in Chile and the Río de la Plata, 1810–1834

Edward Blumenthal

In 1830, a group of forty officers and men from the recently deposed Federalist government of the province of Mendoza, in the Argentine Confederation, were massacred by their erstwhile Indigenous allies. The Federalists had sought asylum with Creole Loyalists to the Spanish Crown – themselves exiled from southern Chile – who had facilitated the Federalist alliance with Indigenous groups. The massacre occurred at Chacay, in the south of present-day Mendoza, in what was then an Indigenous frontier zone. Though a relatively unimportant battle, it nonetheless highlights certain key dynamics of the complex political situation of post-independence South America. As the wars of independence spilled over into civil wars in Chile and the Río de la Plata, fluctuating alliances of émigrés and Indigenous groups continued to pose a cross-border threat to the newly independent political authorities. This chapter argues that exile played an important role in the process of border formation and the establishment of republican sovereignty in the region.¹

At the center of this dangerous chessboard were the Pincheira brothers, from a family of Chilean Loyalists in the south of the country, who directed a montonera – a guerrilla band – against both Santiago and Buenos Aires long after the last regular Loyalist troops had been defeated. Their struggle involved alliances with independent Indigenous

¹ The historiography on the independence period has undergone an enormous expansion in the decades surrounding the bicentenary. Recent important contributions include Jeremy Adelman, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Princeton, NJ, 2006); Juan Luis Ossa Santa Cruz, Armies, Politics and Revolution: Chile, 1808–1826 (Liverpool, 2015); Geneviève Verdo, L’indépendance argentine entre cités et nation (1808–1821) (Paris, 2006).
groups as well as participation in politics in the Río de la Plata on the other side of the Andes. The Chacay Massacre was a peripheral action in a peripheral region of a peripheral war; nonetheless, it says much about the relationship between borders and exile in the period, a relationship that can be traced from the beginning of the revolutions of independence to the Chacay Massacre trial, whose proceedings were published in 1833 and 1834. The massacre and subsequent trial, while marking the decline of the Pincheiras as a political force, more broadly highlight the role played by political dislocation in reinforcing the international borders that emerged after revolution and independence in the Americas, as well as the complex interactions of different exile groups in the post-imperial borderlands. With revolution, different types of sovereignty emerged — national, provincial, and that represented by Indigenous autonomy — and they came together at Chacay in a broad context of political exile.

The events leading up to the Chacay Massacre were part of a broader panorama of civil war in Chile and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, the polity that emerged from the independence process that began in 1810 and whose capital was Buenos Aires. The United Provinces splintered into competing and often warring provinces following the failure of the centralist constitutions of 1819 and 1826 and the de facto or de jure independence of Paraguay (1813), Bolivia (1825), and Uruguay (1828). In this context, starting in the 1820s, Unitarians and Federalists — the former favoring centralized rule in Buenos Aires and the latter provincial sovereignty — formed competing alliances of provinces that battled for control. Between 1829 and 1831, Federalists emerged triumphant and put into place a loose Argentine Confederation under Governor Juan Manuel de Rosas, in which Buenos Aires maintained control of foreign relations and customs port revenue.

As mentioned, the Chacay Massacre was a peripheral battle in this conflict. It occurred in the Andean province of Mendoza, which bordered Chile to the west and the Ranquel and Pehuenche Mapuche to the south.

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2 For a discussion of popular royalism, see Marcela Echeverri, “Popular Royalists, Empire, and Politics in Southwestern New Granada, 1809–1819,” Hispanic American Historical Review 91 (2011): 237–69. The case analyzed here is different in that the Indigenous Loyalists were not Spanish subjects but essentially enjoyed independent and unconquered status while formally recognizing an alliance of loyalty to the Spanish king.

3 Raúl Fradkin, ¡Fusilaron a Dorrego!: O cómo un alzamiento rural cambió el rumbo de la historia (Buenos Aires, 2012); Jorge Myers, Orden y virtud: El discurso republicano en el régimen rosista (Buenos Aires, 1995); Ignacio Zubizarreta, Unitarios: Historia de la facción política que diseñó la Argentina moderna (Buenos Aires, 2014).
In the decades preceding the massacre, Chile had briefly experienced an autonomous constitutional government before its suppression by Loyalist forces in 1814. Chilean independence was formally declared in 1818, only after the Patriots had invaded from neighboring Mendoza in 1817. The military leader of this effort, José de San Martín, used Mendoza as a springboard from which to attack Chile before leading a campaign to royalist Peru in 1820, assisted by Bernardo O’Higgins and other Chilean émigrés, just as the United Provinces were collapsing into interprovincial warfare.4

The Mapuche Indigenous peoples living to the south of the Spanish Empire on both sides of the Andes played a key role in these conflicts (see Map 11.1). The Mapuche were a loose grouping that shared a language and certain cultural characteristics and had preserved their autonomy from the Spanish, while formally recognizing the king as sovereign. They maintained relations with Creole societies through warfare, commerce, and cultural contacts, often enacted in formal political agreements

4 Ossa, Armies, Politics and Revolution.
known as parliaments. The name “Mapuche” emerged in the eighteenth century when the groups to the west of the Andes in present-day Chile expanded toward the Pampas on the Atlantic side of the mountains, spreading their language and cultural practices in a process known as the “Araucanization of the Pampas.”

In the independence period, however, Indigenous groups typically used designations that referred to their geographic origins and political alliances. For example, the Borogano were Loyalist Mapuche who had migrated from the Araucanian region of Boroa to the Pampa after 1810; the Ranquel lived to the south of the Argentine provinces of Mendoza and San Luis; the Pehuenche controlled the Andean valleys and mountain passes that led to Chile. Starting in 1810, with the outbreak of autonomous Patriot governments, Loyalists encouraged Mapuche rebellions and attacks on Creole settlements in the area between Buenos Aires and the southern Chilean city of Concepción. Autonomous Mapuche polities would form military alliances with Loyalists and Patriots, as well as with the different Argentine provinces that emerged from the disintegrated United Provinces after 1820. As a result, these polities also emerged as important sites of exile for political opponents from Chile and the Argentine provinces.

EXILE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND BORDERS IN THE SPANISH AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS

The study of nineteenth-century exile in the context of liberal and republican revolutions and nation-state formation has emerged as a growing field in recent decades. It is important to note that exile was not

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5 Guillaume Boccara, “Etnogénesis Mapuche: Resistencia y restructuración entre los indígenas del centro-sur de Chile (Siglos XVI–XVIII),” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79 (1999): 425–61; Martha A. Bechis, “La etnia mapuche en el siglo XIX, su ideologización en las pampas y sus intentos nacionistas,” *Revista de estudios Trasandinos* no. 3 (1998): 139–58. Bechis notes that, given this diversity, the term “Mapuche” only became common in the nineteenth century. For the sake of simplicity, this chapter uses Mapuche as an overlapping cultural group. However, this approach has the downside of implying a greater unity and cohesion than may have existed. The Ranquel and Pehuenche underwent a process of “araucanization” starting in the eighteenth century. “Araucanía” was the colonial Spanish term for the Mapuche territory in the south of present-day Chile.


particular to one faction or ideological group, given that Loyalists and Patriots, Unitarians and Federalists all faced the need to emigrate at one point or another. Exile, rather, was related to territorial dynamics and uncertain borders; it was a political practice connected to the emergence of independent republics in the region.

Recent studies have also sparked renewed interest in the interactions between Creoles and Indigenous groups to the south of what would become the independent countries of Chile and Argentina. These studies have shown that both the Indigenous context and the Creole dimension must be taken into account in order to understand the revolutions of independence and the formation of independent republics. These interactions created vibrant yet unequal relations, as well as a dynamic of economic and cultural exchange that included intermarriage. However, these studies are not always cross-national and instead tend to focus on either Chile or Argentina, which is both surprising and unfortunate given that trans-Andean networks stood at the heart of the Mapuche culture on which they focus. Indigenous societies were also important sites of exile, as we will see, in a pattern that finds its roots in the colonial period, when deserters from the army or escapees of coercive labor practices sought refuge on the Indigenous frontier.

The renewed focus on the independence period has also advanced the understanding of sovereignty and republicanism in early nineteenth-century South America. The independence movements began as municipal revolutions in the context of a crisis of sovereignty triggered by the

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8 Some recent contributions include Pilar M. Herr, *Contested Nation: The Mapuche, Bandits, and State Formation in Nineteenth-Century Chile* (Albuquerque, NM, 2019); Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, *La formación del estado y la nación, y el pueblo Mapuche: De la inclusión a la exclusión* (Santiago, 2000); Silvia Ratto, *Indios y cristianos: Entre la guerra y la paz en las fronteras* (Buenos Aires, 2007).

9 See, for example, Martha A. Bechis and Susana Bandieri, eds., *Cruzando la cordillera …: La frontera argentina-chilena como espacio social* (Neuquén, Argentina, 2001). Though they do not always share the same vocabulary, these accounts have much in common with writings in the North American field of borderland studies. I prefer the use of “frontier,” not on account of any theoretical position but rather because *frontera* was the favored term at the time. For a similar outlook from borderland studies, see Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History,” *American Historical Review* 104 (1999): 814–41.


11 Cf. note 1.
Napoleonic invasions of the Iberian Peninsula and the deposition of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain. As more and more towns sought to assert their own sovereignty, not only against Spain but also against former viceregal or regional capitals, such as Buenos Aires, the limits of the emerging republican polities became unclear and subject to constant negotiation and warfare. In some cases, this led to the breakaway of territories into new internationally recognized countries – such as Uruguay or Bolivia – while in others it provoked deep conflicts over the nature of the republican constitutional organization that would govern them, as in the conflict between Unitarians and Federalists in the Argentine Confederation. In all of these cases, governance tended to occur at a local or provincial level, and national authorities often had few resources with which to impose their will.

This chapter seeks to combine these approaches in order to understand how exile contributed to evolving understandings of borders and sovereignty in the region, using the example of political dislocation in Chile and the Río de la Plata. Émigrés and autonomous Indigenous groups, sometimes working in tandem, brought together political projects in Chile and the Río de la Plata, doing so in a context in which the territorial limits of sovereignty were not always clear. The very act of crossing these borders, and the attempts by political authorities to control this mobility, brought about a slow transformation of these boundaries. Territories that had previously been considered as part of a hierarchy of overlapping legal jurisdictions began to be thought of as bounded territories separated by a discrete border.¹²

There were several different types of borders at play here. The old imperial frontiers remained the most important, for example between the United Provinces and the Luso-Brazilian Empire, independent in 1822, or the one with the still autonomous Indigenous groups to the south – the subject of this chapter. Crossing the frontier region that separated “Indians and Christians” (indios y cristianos) was perhaps the most significant move for a Creole, given that it meant leaving “civilization” to live among “savages.” The Andes, in this context, were still more of a bridge than a boundary, despite the nominal existence of a new international border separating Chile and the Argentine Confederation after independence. Indeed, it was only during the eighteenth-century

¹² Verdo, L’indépendence argentine. For the transition from jurisdictional to territorial borders, see Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, CA, 1991).
Bourbon reforms that Cuyo – the border region of which Mendoza was the capital – was stripped from Santiago’s jurisdiction and attributed to Buenos Aires, with the formation of the Vice-Royalty of the Río de la Plata in 1776. This internal border was essentially administrative, and deep cultural, economic, and family ties persisted between Mendoza and Chile. After independence, fleeing across the new international borders that separated Chile and the Argentine provinces represented a possible route to asylum, as a change of jurisdiction often entailed the protection of local authorities. Crossing provincial borders could also offer refuge, particularly when local governments were controlled by rival factions in the context of the Argentine civil wars. Over the long run, these multiple movements across different borders reinforced the salience of the new international and provincial borders, while at the same time beginning to undermine Indigenous autonomy. Exile and border crossing played a key role in this gradual transformation, and the Chacay Massacre highlights different types of exile mobility in a period when sovereignty and borders were still in flux.

LOYALISTS, THE MAPUCHE, AND EXILE

Starting in 1810, when autonomous Patriot governments came to power in Santiago and Buenos Aires, the defeated Loyalist forces retreated to Indigenous territory south of the Bío-Bío River in Chile, using their political ties to Mapuche leaders, known as loncos, to plan raids on Creole towns and villages on both sides of the Andes. Once the Patriots returned to power in Chile in 1817, Loyalists again retreated south, regrouping under the command of Vicente Benavides and continuing to fight against the nascent Chilean republic and its Mapuche allies. Benavides captured the southern regional capital of Concepción in 1820, only to have his forces wiped out the following year. At their height, his Loyalist forces controlled most of the south, while the Chilean troops were occupied with consolidating independence and supporting San Martín’s expedition to Peru.

15 On these questions in the North American context, see also Liam Riordan’s chapter in this volume.
Once the situation in Lima had stabilized, the Santiago government turned its attention to the south in what one nineteenth-century historical account called the Guerra a Muerte (War to the Death). Although Benavides was captured and executed in 1822, the Chilean Pincheira brothers continued the guerrilla struggle against the nascent republic, first under the command of Spanish-born Juan Manuel Picó, and then independently after his execution in 1824. Picó’s fall coincided with the defeat of the Spanish Loyalist forces at Ayacucho, Peru. After this date there were no Spanish authorities in South America to be loyal to, and the Pincheiras waged a guerrilla struggle characterized by their Indigenous alliances and involvement in the civil wars between the Argentine provinces.

After the eldest brothers, Juan Antonio and Santos Pincheira, died in 1823 in the course of these military confrontations, José Antonio and Pablo Pincheira took command of the montonera. Chilean authorities considered them bandits, particularly after Benavides’s capture and execution. They were exiles, however, in the sense that they continued their political struggle from territory that was not controlled by Chile or the Argentine provinces, but rather by an independent polity in Indigenous territory. Even before the executions of Benavides and Picó, the Pincheiras were closely allied with the Pehuenche, who controlled the mountain passes through the Andes, as well as the Borogano and some Ranquel loncos. They then established themselves south of Mendoza in what is currently the Argentine province of Neuquén, attracting up to several thousand Chilean Loyalists to the villages that sprang up under their control. From this highland stronghold, the pincheirinos – as they were known – conducted raids across southern Chile and the Argentine provinces of Mendoza, San Luís, and Córdoba, as well as along the Río Negro in the southern reaches of Buenos Aires province.

Their montonera fit into older economic and migratory patterns of Mapuche society. The waves of eastward migration across the Andes that had started in the eighteenth century intensified after 1810 in the wake of the pressures of war. Since colonial times, it had been customary for cattle fattened or raided on the Atlantic side of the Andes to be herded to Chillán or Antuco in Chile, where they were transformed into

16 Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, La guerra a muerte: Memoria sobre las últimas campañas de la independencia de Chile, 1819–1824 (Santiago, 1868).
jerky or tallow for exportation. Commerce was as important as war in frontier relations, even after 1810. The Loyalist property owners of the south profited from this situation, purchasing and reselling the stolen cattle while enjoying the military protection of the Pincheira brothers.18 The latter continued raiding and trading from their Neuquén base until the surrender of José Antonio in 1832.19 Forced to leave Chilean territory, the Pincheira brothers and other Loyalists politicized these pre-existing economic circuits, while at the same time bringing them under their control.

Not all Indigenous groups were Loyalists, though, and the strategies of Santiago and Buenos Aires hinged on alliances with certain loncos in order to better control more-recalcitrant leaders. An example of these dynamics can be seen in Venancio Coyhuepán, a former ally of O’Higgins who appeared at the Independence Fort in the province of Buenos Aires (present day Tandil) in 1827 with the Chilean captain Juan de Dios Montero, one thousand Mapuche, and thirty Chilean soldiers. They had crossed the Andes in pursuit of the Pincheira brothers as part of Chilean general Jorge Beauchef’s campaign in the south. With their access to the mountain passes cut off by the Pincheiras and their Pehuenche allies, Coyhuepán was forced to seek refuge at the fort – and thus into an alliance with Buenos Aires. Coyhuepán came into contact with Governor Rosas and stayed to fight the pincheirinos.20 These alliances highlight the fact that the final defeat of the Pincheiras was the result of cooperation between the authorities in Buenos Aires and Santiago, and a step toward more effective control of the border, though this could not have happened without the cooperation of the indios amigos.

The Pincheira brothers were not the first Creole military leaders to ally themselves with the Mapuche in a common cause. For a very brief

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18 Varela and Manara, “Montoneros fronterizos.”
20 Bechis, “La etnia mapuche.” Coyhuepán never returned to Chile, even when his brother came to him in 1831 with 2,000 armed Mapuche, invited by Rosas. He later said that he had nowhere left to go. Bechis interprets this in terms of the disappearance of his allies from the Chilean political scene: O’Higgins (exiled in 1823) and Freire (exiled in 1827). In 1830, Chile legally – if not in fact – incorporated the Araucania region into its territory, and Coyhuepán no longer had the autonomy that allowed him to propose to O’Higgins that he seek refuge “with your Araucanians” instead of fleeing to Peru in 1823. Beauchef was a former French Napoleonic officer who found employment in the Chilean army, highlighting the connections between regional and transatlantic exile mobility.
period, José Miguel Carrera succeeded in uniting different Mapuche groups in a tenuous alliance against both Buenos Aires and Santiago, doing so from his exile in the Río de la Plata. Carrera was not a Loyalist, however. An important figure in the first Chilean Patriot government between 1810 and 1814, Carrera was among the thousands of Chileans who fled across the Andes to Mendoza after the Loyalist takeover in 1814. In Mendoza and Buenos Aires, he lost out in a factional struggle with his rival, Bernardo O’Higgins, who would lead the Chilean Patriots allied with San Martín and become Chile’s first president after 1817. In the United States in 1815 and 1816, Carrera recruited unemployed veterans of the Napoleonic Wars, armed a frigate for use against the Spanish, and sought US support for independence, before returning to Buenos Aires and factional politics.\(^{21}\)

The United Provinces were at this point riven between those who sought to establish centralized rule under the sovereignty of Buenos Aires, and those who supported the Federal League of José Artigas. Artigas, from what is now Uruguay,\(^ {22}\) allied with the littoral provinces of Santa Fe and Entre Ríos against Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, the latter of which had invaded the Banda oriental. By 1819, the Portuguese had taken control of Montevideo, which they would occupy until its independence in 1828, and forced Artigas into exile in Paraguay, but the Federalist provinces had a new ally: the Chilean Carrera.\(^ {23}\)

Carrera brought together exiled Chilean soldiers under his control, as well as an alliance with Ranquel forces that contributed to bringing down the centralized government of the United Provinces in 1820 as part of an attempt to install a more pliable government in Buenos Aires that would support his effort at taking power in Chile. The result of the collapse of this government was the unmooring of San Martín’s continental project to liberate South America from the Spanish. San Martín’s allies in Chile and Mendoza maintained an axis of power independent of Buenos Aires. Carrera was unsuccessful in his bid for a patron, however, and turned instead to the Mapuche and their control of the mountain passes.


\(^{22}\) Uruguay, which lay along the old imperial fault line between the Spanish and Portuguese, emerged in these years as another important site of exile.

\(^{23}\) Ana Frega, Pueblos y soberanía en la revolución artiguista: La región de Santo Domingo Soriano desde fines de la colonia a la ocupación portuguesa (Montevideo, Uruguay, 2007).
In 1817, Carerra’s brothers, Juan José and Luis, had already attempted to invade Chile, and their trial and execution in Mendoza the following year revealed Creole fears of an alliance between the Carrera faction, the Mapuche, and Loyalists in the south. Carrera was, in fact, in contact with Benavides, and among his Chilean troops were former Loyalist prisoners of war. More importantly, however, he was able to unite Federalists, the Loyalist Borogano, and other Indigenous groups in a brief alliance between 1820 and 1821. He was nevertheless unable to channel this force into an invasion of Chile, in part because the logic of the Indigenous alliance called for raiding along the Buenos Aires frontier rather than invading Chile. He was defeated, tried, and executed in Mendoza in 1821.

The Carrera experience reveals some of the same territorial dynamics that would appear with the Pincheira brothers. In the early years of independence, facing the breakdown of sovereignty and state structures in the Río de la Plata, émigrés could find refuge among the Mapuche and create alliances that both united disparate Indigenous groups and created alternative sovereignties, such as that of Artigas’s Federal League.

**EXILE AND PROVINCIAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE RÍO DE LA PLATA**

The different types of borders and sovereignties at play underscore the relationship between exile mobility and border formation in Argentina and Chile. In addition to the old imperial borders and the new international borders between the recently independent polities, provincial borders also retained their salience in the context of the breakdown of sovereignty in the Río de la Plata. The second and definitive collapse of the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata in 1828, after a war with Brazil over the fate of what would become the independent Oriental Republic of Uruguay the same year, led to a new round of civil warfare over the constitutional issues of centralism and federation. The victory of the Federalists led to the formation of the Argentine Confederation under the weak control of Buenos Aires and its governor Rosas, under the terms of the 1831 Federalist Pact. In Chile, too, an 1829 revolution began the process of consolidating conservative republican rule. Although the Pincheira brothers had supported this revolution militarily, it soon became clear that the new regime was equally concerned with

25 Bechis, “La etnia mapuche.”
suppressing the last remnant of loyalism in the south. The relative stability of Chile in the 1830s and 1840s would make it an important site of exile for neighboring countries.

The civil wars in Buenos Aires and the littoral provinces had their equivalent in Mendoza and the interior, where the Unitarian José María Paz of Córdoba and the Federalist Facundo Quiroga of La Rioja faced off.26 Many of the leading Unitarians were former allies of San Martín, and both sides included veterans of the independence wars in Chile and Peru. The province of Mendoza became a battleground in this struggle, with control passing from one faction to another, and each change of government led to an exodus to Chile, to neighboring provinces controlled by factional allies, or into territory to the south controlled by Ranqueles and Pehuenches. From these sites of exile, new revolutions and invasions could be launched.

In 1829, the departure of Mendoza’s Federalist troops to fight against Paz in Córdoba led to a short-lived Unitarian revolution that placed independence hero General Rudecindo Alvarado at the head of the province. Alvarado was passing through Mendoza on his return from Chile, where he had sought to collect his unpaid salary from his time in the Army of the Andes. His government lasted only a few weeks and was soon toppled by a counter-revolution. While many Unitarians fled to Chile or Córdoba after the fall of his government, Jacinto Godoy fled south, where José Antonio Pincheira granted him protection. His account sheds light on exile on the Indigenous frontier, as we see in the next section.27

Following the victories of Paz over Quiroga in 1829 and 1830, the Unitarian general José Videla Castillo retook Mendoza from the Federalist governor Juan Corvalán. Videla Castillo was quickly elected governor but delegated his civilian power to Tomás Godoy Cruz, in order to concentrate on military operations in the field.28 Corvalán and many

26 Quiroga’s role in these wars was chronicled a decade later by the exiled Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, *Civilizacion i barbarie: Vida de Juan Facundo Quiroga i aspecto fisico, costumbres i habitos de la Republica Arjentina* (Santiago, 1845).

27 Jacinto Godoy, *Breve extracto del proceso seguido en la provincia de Mendoza contra los autores, promotores y complices de la catastrofe causada por los salvajes el año 30 en el Chacay, en la parte que en dicho proceso se quiere complicar a Don Tomás Godoy Cruz vecino de dicha provincia* (Santiago, 1833); Jacinto Godoy, *Exposición, defensa y acusación sobre los acontecimientos del Chacay* (Valpariso, Chile, 1834), in *Revista de la Junta de estudios históricos* 4 (1927): 61–129. This is very little known about Godoy, whose most important political role seems to be the one outlined here, though his son was active in Argentine exile associations in Chile in the 1840s and 1850s.

28 A longtime provincial leader, Godoy Cruz had been responsible, in his capacity as governor, for Carrera’s execution ten years earlier.
Federalists in turn sought refuge to the south, where they attempted to negotiate Pincheira’s support against the new Unitarian government in Mendoza. When the negotiations soured, around forty Federalist officers and soldiers, including Corvalán, were massacred by Pincheira’s Indigenous allies at Chacay.

An account of the political turmoil published in Mendoza during the 1830 Unitarian government provides striking testimony of the importance of exile during these conflicts. Its author, José Luis Calle, was Videla Castillo’s secretary and played a role in the events.²⁹ Calle highlighted the fact that when Videla Castillo and Godoy Cruz came to power in 1830, “a considerable number of the principal inhabitants were already living as émigrés in Chile”³⁰ because of the violence of Federalist repression the previous year.³¹ The reference to the “principal inhabitants” hints at the class structure of exile: While common soldiers were typically executed (often through summary throat cutting), members of the elite could hope for the chance to flee.³²

The fate of these exiles was an important part of the negotiations. In the final agreement – as relayed by Calle – exile was the subject of the first two articles. A sort of amnesty was declared, “a general guarantee for all individuals who, victims of internal conflicts, found refuge in neighboring territories.” Article two indicated that the parties would facilitate the return of “individuals banished (desterrados) for political reasons” and that individuals in prison would be freed.³³ Calle’s declarations suggest the centrality of the exile experience in the political imaginary of Unitarians, a memory built on decades of exile. They also reveal the interprovincial nature of exile in the context of civil war. The agreement does not refer to Chile, but instead to “neighboring territories,” a reminder that the mountain passes were not the only path to

²⁹ José Luis Calle, Memoria sobre los acontecimientos mas notables en la provincia de Mendoza en 1829 y 1830 (Mendoza, 1830).
³⁰ Calle, Memoria, 164. He gives the figure of 100 people, “mostly respectable people of the province.”
³¹ Indeed, chapter three of Calle’s text is titled “Regime of Terror.” More famously, see Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, El general Fray Félix Aldao (Santiago, 1851). The Federalist revolution in 1829 was led by José and Félix Aldao, formerly allies of Carrera who now backed Quiroga, in revenge for the execution of their brother Francisco. José would die at Chacay in 1830.
³² For the class structure of exile in the nineteenth century, see Sznajder and Roniger, The Politics of Exile, 62–67.
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exile. Calle also referred to the persecutions suffered by people from the neighboring province of San Juan who had found refuge in Mendoza, only to be attacked by invading Federalists from San Juan. It was only later in the decade, after the consolidation of the Federalists’ power in the Argentinian Confederation, that “exile” began increasingly to imply crossing an international border.

Indeed, when a new Federalist government came to power in Mendoza in 1831, following the massacre at Chacay, many Unitarians fled to Bolivia and Chile, thus beginning a new cycle of exile that would characterize life in the Argentine Confederation under Rosas. Many civilians fled to neighboring Chile, whereas Videla Castillo joined Paz on the battlefield, only to escape to Bolivia with other Unitarian officers after Paz’s defeat later in 1831. Shortly thereafter, the main Unitarian participants were put on trial in absentia in Mendoza for their alleged role in inciting the massacre.

The trial itself was a transnational political affair – it was shaped by exile and demonstrated the increasing importance of public opinion in exile. Godoy published the trial proceedings in Chile as part of an effort by the émigrés to prove their innocence in the court of public opinion, a decision that he justified in terms of exile and political displacement: “The separation from my native soil, for a period that can be called almost indefinite, makes me feel the necessity of offering my compatriots the main evidence of my innocence.” The proceedings include the defense testimony of Godoy and Godoy Cruz, as well as that of five pincheirino witnesses, which had been compiled in Chile and then presented to the court in Mendoza by the defendants’ wives, before being published.

This document is an example of how exile writing circulated between Chile and Mendoza: The written testimony had traveled from Chile to Mendoza to be presented at the trial, while the defense was then published in Chile, where it was read and possibly sent back to Mendoza as exile propaganda. Indeed, Calle subsequently owned and ran El Mercurio, Chile’s most important newspaper from 1833 to 1838, and he published his account in the paper’s press. With the defendants safe in their Chilean

34 Calle, Memoria, 118–19, 141.
35 Godoy, Exposición, 61.
36 Ibid., 106–9, 125. The witnesses, based in Chile, are implicitly identified in the testimony as pincheirinos, and three – Francisco Rojas, Santos Alarcón, and José Antonio Pincheira – are explicitly identified as such.
37 In the case of Calle’s text, published in Mendoza while the Unitarians were in power, we know that it was read in Chile because an inscription on its cover shows that it
exile, the trial was most important as a conflict over assigning guilt for the massacre in the court of public opinion on both sides of the Andes. As exile freedom of movement on the Indigenous frontier was reduced, more territorial patterns of exile gained in importance.

THE INDIGENOUS FRONTIER AS A SITE OF EXILE

The Pincheira brothers followed in Carrera’s footsteps, uniting disparate Mapuche groups and intervening in interprovincial and interfactional politics in the Río de la Plata. The *Guerra a muerte* did not end with Benavides’s execution in 1822. It continued under the authority of the Pincheira brothers, who had built up support among the Mapuche in the southern Andean region. By 1825, the Pincheiras were raiding across the Río de la Plata frontier, and Chilean families were migrating to live in the mountain villages under their control. The historian Martha Bechis has argued that it was the participation of the Creole *montoneras*, first under Carrera and then the Pincheiras, that allowed for a greater unity of different Indigenous groups in the region. Although Chile claimed large sections of the southern territories that formed their base of operations, the Pincheiras and their Indigenous allies enjoyed de facto autonomy, as previously noted, and it would be decades before Neuquén was conquered by Buenos Aires. This independence allowed the territories to become important sites of exile. By 1830, however, the pincheirinos’ movements were restricted to Mendoza because the governor of Buenos Aires, Rosas, had used a combination of force and negotiation to come to terms with the Pincheiras’ Borogano allies, with the goal of reducing violence along the Buenos Aires frontier.

The proceedings of the Chacay Massacre trial underscore a particular iteration in the relationship between forced removal, systems of exile, and frontier conflict. Globally, penal transportation was an important

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38 Bechis, “La etnia mapuche.”
weapon in the imperial arsenal against Indigenous resistance. Forced removal practices extended beyond individuals to entire populations. In 1830, the same year as the Chacay Massacre, the infamous Black Line was drawn through the British colony of Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania), the colonial government’s systematic attempt to round up and remove the remaining Aboriginal population from the island and confine them offshore. In the Río de la Plata example, however, the intersection between exile, imperial expansion, and Indigenous sovereignty played out very differently. First, forced removal went in the other direction, with unwanted populations pushed into Indigenous polities rather than taken from them. Second, systems of exile and porous sovereignties opened up opportunities for the Mapuche, at least in the immediate term.

Military service on the frontier had been a common sentence for prisoners since colonial times, and in later decades both Chile and Argentina developed penal colonies in Tierra del Fuego, known in Chile during the 1850s as President Manuel Montt’s “Siberia.” According to the Unitarian exile testimonies already discussed, the different governments of Mendoza, both Federalist and Unitarian, had been negotiating with José Antonio Pincheira and his allies. In 1829, a treaty signed with the Federalist government of Mendoza named him General Commander of the Southern Frontier, which had been his official title in the Loyalist forces. This gave him a new legitimacy, beyond that coming from his Indigenous alliances and loyalty to the Spanish king. He was now an officer in the Mendoza frontier militia, a key position from which to mediate between Creoles and Mapuche, albeit...

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41 See Liam Riordan’s chapter in this volume.

42 For a good summary of the literature on this moment, see Ann Curthoys, “Genocide in Tasmania: The History of an Idea,” in A. Dirk Moses, ed., Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New York, 2008), 229–52. I would like to thank Kirsten McKenzie, as well as the two anonymous reviewers, for pointing out the usefulness of this comparison.

43 On these questions of military punishment, see also Christian G. De Vito’s chapter in this volume. More broadly, see Ricardo D. Salvatore, Carlos Aguirre, and Gilbert M. Joseph, Crime and Punishment in Latin America: Law and Society since Late Colonial Times (Durham, NC, 2001). For a comparative look at expulsion practices, see the dossier, Delphine Diaz and Hugo Vermeren, eds., “Éloigner et expulser les étrangers au XIXe siècle,” Diasporas 33 (2019).

44 Manara, “Movilización en las fronteras.”
one who resided principally in Indigenous territory. During the military campaigns of 1830, while Mapuche groups took advantage of the absence of troops in Mendoza to raid the province, Pincheira stepped forward as an intermediary to negotiate peace on the southern frontier. According to Calle, an additional motivation of the ousted Federalist governor Corvalán was to incorporate Pincheira’s Chilean and Indigenous troops into the campaign against Paz in Córdoba.45

This is not an unreasonable assumption because it was common practice to negotiate peace with Indigenous groups by encouraging them to attack a neighboring province. In turn, the Unitarians based in Córdoba tried to seduce groups from the center of the Pampas since those in the Buenos Aires hinterland were already allied with Rosas. The Ranqueles and Boroganos, as well as Pincheira and his followers, were the object of these entreaties, which were complicated by the fact that the pincheirinos, the Boroganos, and some of the Ranqueles still recognized the Spanish king. In January 1830, between the two victories of Paz over Quiroga that preceded the Unitarian takeover in Mendoza, 1,200 Mapuche fighters and pincheirinos, including Carrera’s former ally Pablo Levenopán, attacked frontier posts in Unitarian Córdoba and San Luis.46 This also coincided with Rosas’s previously noted success in winning over groups formerly allied to Pincheira.

José Antonio Pincheira’s forces, particularly those under the command of Julián Hermosilla, thus began to participate in the conflicts between Federalists and Unitarians. According to Calle they “happened” (acidentalmente) to remain in Mendoza after it was retaken by the Federalists in 1829, and they were the ones who ended the looting and pillaging of the city.47 The Federalist government of the province continued to negotiate with Pincheira and his Mapuche allies, with the goal of preventing a Unitarian invasion of the province.48

Jacinto Godoy, the Unitarian who had found refuge with pincheirinos, describes how he accompanied José Antonio Pincheira and the allied loncos during their negotiations with Governor Corvalán, in which the latter offered food and clothing to gain their support, as was the custom. The possibility of pillaging Mendoza, which everyone understood would soon be under Unitarian control, was the argument that convinced them,

45 Calle, Memoria, 20.
48 Ibid., 109, 173.
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according to Godoy. According to Godoy, the Federalists simultaneously evacuated the provincial capital before the arrival of Unitarian forces. Godoy was, therefore, still with José Antonio Pincheira when Videla Castillo and Godoy Cruz took power in April 1830. Though Jacinto Godoy does not explain why he decided to stay with Pincheira instead of returning to Mendoza, it is possible that he did not want to flout Pincheira’s protection and run the risk of being captured by the Federalists. He might also have doubted the Unitarians’ ability to keep control of the province. Regardless, he was in a difficult position, under the protection of the Federalists’ ostensible allies while the Unitarians were in power in Mendoza.

The Unitarian governments were also negotiating with Pincheira and the loncos. This can be seen in the defense testimony of Jacinto Godoy’s wife, who affirmed that Governor Videla Castillo’s contact with the Pincheiras, which included gift-giving, was not proof of a plot to assassinate the Federalists. She pointed out that all the governments, “including that of Spain,” negotiated with Indigenous groups with ritualized gift-giving and that the treaties signed by the Federalist governor were still in effect despite the change of government, in a clear reference to the old system of parliaments.

The Godoy Cruz defense includes two reports that suggest that Pincheira was mediating between the Federalists and Unitarians. The first, a letter from the pincheirino commander Julián Hermosilla to Governor Videla Castillo, informing him of the massacre, was intended to clear the former of the suspicion of having participated and affirm the pincheirinos’ desire to maintain the agreements signed with the previous government. At the same time, Hermosilla requested a pardon for the surviving Federalists, soldiers who had fled Mendoza in fear of Unitarian reprisals. In what was a common refrain, Hermosilla declared that he could not control the “barbarians” and was unable to prevent them from killing Corvalán and the others. But his main argument can be found

49 Godoy, “Exposición, defensa y acusación,” 65–66. Godoy’s Indigenous asylum can be compared with that of Manuel Baigorria, who fled his native province of San Luis after Paz’s defeat and went to Quiroga in 1831. Baigorria was adopted by the Ranquel, lonco Yanquetruz, and spent the next twenty years under his protection, becoming a frontier commander after the fall of Rosas. Manuel Baigorria, Memorias (Buenos Aires, 1975).

50 Godoy, “Exposición, defensa y acusación,” 76–79. Ritualized gift-giving was an important part of the parliaments.

51 Ibid., 126–69.

52 Carrera’s allies offered the same defense. See, for example, William Yates, “A Brief Relation of Facts and Circumstance,” in Lady Maria Callcott and Judas Tadeo de Reyes, eds., Journal of a residence in Chile, during the year 1822 (London, 1824), 373–512.
in his affirmation of the *pincheirinos’* role as mediators, as can be seen in their desire to facilitate negotiations between Unitarians and Federalists in order to put an end to the “war [that has been] disastrous for this province,” and to preserve the pact between the “*pueblo* of Mendoza” and Pincheira.53 Although Hermosilla admitted that they had not lived up to their side of the agreement and were unable to control their Indigenous allies, he also pointed out that Mendoza had been remiss in not sending the subsidies needed to keep them happy. Videla Castillo and Godoy Cruz, in response, affirmed that they had always “been convinced of the prudence and the good faith of Colonel Pincheyra [sic].” They declared the treaties still in effect and pardoned the Federalist survivors.54

This suggests that one of the principal motivations of both Unitarians and *pincheirinos* was to preserve the existing alliance in order to keep the peace on the Indigenous frontier. The Pincheiras had a central role in preserving the peace that ensued from their mediation between the Mapuche and Creoles, Federalists and Unitarians, and also between the Argentine provinces and Chile. The contacts between Mendoza and Chile were an important part of this story, and not just for the Unitarian exiles who had fled. According to Godoy, José Antonio Pincheira had refused to permit his brother Pablo Pincheira and Julián Hermosilla to carry out raids into Chile, because he wanted to honor the provisions of the treaty with Mendoza which required maintaining peace on the frontier.55

Toward the end of May, a month after the Federalists had fled Mendoza, the situation rapidly deteriorated. The Indigenous and *pincheirino* fighters were unhappy with the gifts given by the Federalist governor, and they started stealing cattle, horses, and other goods from the Federalist camp. The Federalist soldiers’ morale declined, in part because they could not leave their camp to join the battle against Paz. In this

53 Godoy, “Exposición, defensa y acusación,” 127.
54 Ibid., 128–29. This exchange is also an example of the role of the Loyalist commander in mediating the written communications that were beginning to develop between Indigenous groups and the new state authorities. Julio Vesub has shown the importance of the role of the *lenguaraces*, literate Mapuche that served as secretaries to the *loncos*. These were culturally mixed people who inhabited the frontier between Indigenous and Creole societies, but who had their own interests and social roles. Hermosilla, although a Chilean Creole, seemed to have been playing a similar role here, and the same could be said for the Pincheiras. They also resembled the *loncos*, who received officers’ commissions, thus combining two different sources of authority, one coming from within Indigenous societies and the other originating from the Creole military structure. Vezub, *Valentin Saygueque*, 52–56 and 226–39.
context, the Federalists began to consider flight to Chile. Jacinto Godoy claimed to have helped several Federalist officers flee to Chile, offering them Pincheira’s best baqueano (guide) to cross over into Curicó. During their stay in the Pincheira camp, two other Federalist officers fled to Chile with “a large number of troops and émigrés, taking with them all the cattle, mules and horses” in the camp. Furthermore, the “principal refugees” – Federalists who had found refuge with Pincheira after fleeing the Unitarian government – also wanted to flee to Chile (or Buenos Aires), but Corvalán forbade it. It is interesting to note the use of the words “refugees” and “émigrés” to refer to the Federalists in the camp, again highlighting the Indigenous frontier as a site of exile for both Unitarians and Federalists. There were also rumors – falsely attributed to Jacinto Godoy, according to his wife – claiming that the Federalists wanted to turn the Mapuche over to the Chileans.

Godoy ended up as a Federalist prisoner, impeded from returning to the Pincheira camp. At this point, the Mapuche attacked the Federalists, massacring the soldiers on June 11, 1830, and Godoy was saved by a pincheirino soldier who lifted him onto his horse. Shortly thereafter, Godoy fled to Chile, where he would gather the evidence to defend himself and the other Unitarians from accusations of complicity in the massacre.

EXILE AND BORDER FORMATION IN CHILE AND THE RÍO DE LA PLATA

Whether a Unitarian plot or the work of Indigenous allies who felt betrayed or provoked by Hermosilla for unknown reasons, this episode is important because it shows the complexity of the frontier – between Indigenous and Creole societies, as well as between Chile and the Argentine provinces – in an era when political displacement and borders started to take on a more territorial form. The breakdown in sovereignty, starting with the implosion of the Spanish Empire and its state structures in America, led to a fluid situation in which borders and jurisdictions between countries, provinces, and Indigenous territories were porous and unclear. The gradual consolidation of nation-states in the region led to an assertion

56 Ibid., 67.
57 Ibid., 68–69. The two officers, Tomás Aldao and Barrionuevo, were José Aldao’s brother and nephew, respectively.
58 Ibid., 80.
59 Ibid., 67–72.
of control of these borders, often at the expense of Indigenous autonomy. Political dislocation played a key role in this process: Émigrés fled to neighboring jurisdictions, thus reaffirming the autonomy of the latter, while central authorities sought to bring these territories under their control, in part to eliminate the threat posed by exiles. The possibility of exile, even when only temporary, allowed different actors to defend their political positions from without, using violence, negotiation, public opinion, or a combination of these strategies. Loyalists and Patriots, Federalists and Unitarians, indios y cristianos, all participated in these dynamics.

This was not, however, a linear process leading to the triumph of the nation-state. Porous borders allowed for possible territorial reconfiguration, particularly during the period when San Martín’s allies controlled governments on both sides of the Andes. In a context of civil war and competing provincial sovereignties – including Indigenous autonomy – exile to a neighboring province or Indigenous polity was as important as crossing the new international borders. Flight could strengthen these alternative sovereignties, complicating the trend toward territorially bounded nation-states. While exile produced borders and played a role in competing sovereignties, it did not necessarily give rise to the national borders or state structures we know today.

The surrender of José Antonio Pincheira in 1832 came after years of steady erosion of his power through the combined actions of Buenos Aires and Santiago. Governor Rosas’s negotiations with the Boroganos left the pincheirinos increasingly isolated, despite the latter’s alliance with Mendoza. In 1832, the Chilean government sought to enlist the support of La Rioja’s Governor Facundo Quiroga against Pincheira. That same year, a Chilean expedition against the Pincheiras and their allies succeeded where previous ones had failed, capturing and executing Pablo Pincheira and Hermosilla in 1832, before crossing the cordillera to defeat José Antonio Pincheira the following year. José Antonio

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60 Indeed, facing the collapse of the United Provinces, vague projects emerged in the 1830s to “reattach” Mendoza to Chile. Andrés Cisneros and Carlos Escudé, Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores Argentina Consolidada (Madrid, 1999); Pablo Lacoste, “Viticultura y política internacional: El intento de reincorporar a Mendoza y San Juan a Chile (1820–1835),” Historia 39 (2006): 155–76.

61 The expedition was led by General Manuel Bulnes, who began his military career in the liberation of Chile (1817) but was quickly sent south (1818). As a young official, he participated in the defeat of Benavides in 1821. He went on to advance the fight against the Pincheiras, obtaining a series of promotions. Later, he would serve as a general in the war with the Peru–Bolivian Confederation (1836–39) and as the president of Chile (1841–51).
Pincheira negotiated a pardon, surrendered, and was allowed to retire to a small hacienda in Chile, where he lived out his days.62 It was from there that he was called on to testify about the Chacay Massacre, though, in another nod to the increasing importance of international borders, the Mendoza authorities did not seek to hold him accountable.

The republican powers that were consolidating on either side of the Andes – Rosas and his allies, or the conservative Chilean governments that emerged after 1829 – would no longer allow independent actors such as the Pincheira brothers to operate freely in what they saw as their territory. The combined efforts of Santiago and Buenos Aires to eliminate this threat had the effect of making the international border a more concrete reality. By eliminating the pincheirinos from the south Andean space, the Chilean government was able to further its control over the south, rooting out the last Loyalist stronghold, even if it could not stop the passage of émigrés and others from one side of the Andes mountains to the other. In Buenos Aires, the elimination of the pincheirinos played a key role in Rosas’s Indigenous military campaigns in these years and in his consolidation of power.

The defeat of the Pincheira brothers was part of the slow transition from jurisdictional to territorial borders, and the imagining of Chile and Argentina as territorially bounded nations. This would be more completely realized only toward the end of the century with the consolidation of a united federal republic in Argentina after 1861 and the conquest of Indigenous autonomy in the 1870s and 1880s by Santiago and Buenos Aires. Indeed, as late as the 1870s, Indigenous groups continued to offer refuge to those defeated in civil conflict in Argentina, as made clear by Lucio Mansilla’s famous account of his trip to Ranquel territory just a few years before these campaigns began.63 Yet again, concerted action between Santiago and Buenos Aires – which also involved a great deal of competition as to where the border would run – set the pattern for the negotiations and brutal military campaigns that would lead to their conquest.

The effects of exile on territorialization differed from border to border. International borders gained in salience, provincial ones gradually declined, while the Indigenous frontier only ceded its importance through

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62 Manara, “Movilización.”
63 Lucio Victorio Mansilla, _Una excursión a los indios ranqueles_ (Buenos Aires, 1870). Mansilla favored a negotiated, peaceful incorporation of the Indigenous population into Creole society, through evangelization and sedentarization.
conquest. In the following decades, whenever Buenos Aires’ power over the provinces was weak – and interprovincial conflict strong – provincial borders and exile became more significant. Throughout the century, international exile, whether to neighboring countries or with the Mapuche, was an important feature of political struggle. The defeat of the *pincheirino* coincided with new waves of exile from Chile and the Argentine Confederation in the 1830s as more conservative republican regimes consolidated their control. Concentrated in urban sites, these exile waves would not have the same Indigenous alliances, military power, or freedom of movement along the frontier as had the Pincheira or the Carrera brothers before them. They would, however, play a crucial role in both the internal political order of the new republics as well as international relations in South America, as political émigrés engaged in host country politics and opposed their home governments. This was part of a wider range of transnational political, economic, and families that predated independence and played a role in the formation of independent republics.64 The Chacay Massacre trial, marked by transnational public opinion, highlights these new dynamics. A new era of exile was emerging in the framework of nascent republics that were beginning to imagine themselves as territorially bounded nation-states.

Agustín de Iturbide was a renowned military man who switched sides at the last minute and led the Army of the Three Guarantees to declare Mexico’s independence in 1821. After some months of political wrangling, he pushed past institutionalized niceties and declared himself Emperor Agustín I of Mexico. Iturbide then created a full imperial court and bestowed royal titles on his children in an attempt to instill order and legitimacy through his new national monarchy, which was based on traditional Hispanic foundations. Not surprisingly, this move prompted a negative reaction from the Creole republicans who had not fought a bitter ten-year civil war against the Spanish Bourbons just to place themselves under another crown. Within a year, they forced Iturbide off his self-created throne and sent him to Italy with his large family and a generous pension on the condition that he retire from politics and never return to Mexico. Once in exile, however, the ex-Emperor quickly reneged on the promise and traveled incognito to London, where he spent four months conspiring with friendly politicians, eager merchants, and even more eager bankers. Iturbide optimistically tried to stage a return to Mexico in May 1824 but was captured and executed almost immediately upon landing at Soto la Marina. Iturbide’s wife, Ana María Huarte, and their children remained in exile – first in Bath and later in Philadelphia. His memoirs were quickly translated and published posthumously in England, France, and the United States before the end of the year.

Iturbide’s four-month stay in London in 1824 was short but significant, both for himself and his family, and also for what it reveals about exile networks and British involvement in the politics and economy of early national Mexico. The exiled ex-Emperor arrived in London at the
exact moment when the British Parliament was debating the political recognition of Spanish American independence, and his presence in the city intruded upon those discussions. Iturbide’s machinations complicated the British government’s already-tense relations with Spain and the Holy Alliance, while fueling public fury over the disastrous Spanish American loan contracts that had bankrupted so many speculators. Iturbide and his local collaborators knew very well how to engage with public meetings and the press in order to slake the thirst of the mercantile class, with its slurping desire to gain access to Mexican markets and silver. Iturbide’s time in London encompassed more than just schemes and intrigues, however; it also cemented his admiration for — and desire to replicate — British culture and its constitution once he recaptured what he viewed as his rightful place as Mexico’s leader. Iturbide greatly admired the structure of the British constitutional monarchy, its reputation as a naval power, its industrial energy, and the leadership of George Canning personally. By the time of the ex-Emperor’s arrival in London in early 1824, Britain’s relationship with the Holy Alliance had broken down completely. There was renewed tension with France, and Ferdinand VII had reasserted authoritarian control in Spain, sending another wave of exiles to London. The sudden appearance of so many foreigners in the city was a visible daily reminder that foreign events were also barometers for domestic politics. Likewise, these events reinforced arguments being made on both sides of contentious issues, such as Catholic Emancipation, the regulation of a free press, the reconfiguration of Britain’s role vis-à-vis the United States and the world, and the monarchy’s battered reputation in the wake of the Queen Caroline Affair.

Iturbide’s activities during these London months also provide a case study of the individual human experience during the Age of Revolutions by demonstrating the sorts of things that he, as an exile, had to negotiate as he moved across languages, borders, geographies, and political divides. The ex-Emperor’s experience as an exile in London intensified his own hubris and affected both British and Mexican domestic politics during that crucial year 1824. As he got settled, Iturbide tapped into an existing network of exiles across Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and England to help him secure the necessary residency and transit permits and to deal with his complicated financial status. As he plotted his return to Mexico, Iturbide used this network — with its specialized local knowledge and

1 On the spread of British constitutionalism during the Age of Revolutions, see also Maurizio Isabella’s chapter in this volume.
connections – to gain access to potential supporters, to plant favorable stories in the press, and to provide emotional and cultural solace for himself and his family while resident in an unfamiliar environment. He had the benefit of being from Mexico, and thus he was able to market his unique status as a native to position himself as the possessor of valuable local information and powerful connections that could inform business decisions and give prospective investors an edge. Ex-Emperor Iturbide’s personal circumstances as an exile were certainly more privileged than those of most others, but even he could not escape the essential challenge of living in two places and times at once: His body may have been in London, but his heart and mind were back in Mexico, and he was obsessed with returning there again someday.

EVENTS THAT LED TO EMPIRE AND EVENTS THAT LED TO EXILE

Agustín de Iturbide had been a reasonably successful, though not centrally important, royalist military commander in Mexico during a decade-long insurgency marked by acts of distressing brutality on both sides. In 1820, when Spanish General Rafael Riego headed a popular military revolt, refused to go to America to fight against the patriot forces, and forced Spanish King Ferdinand VII to restore the liberal Cádiz Constitution of 1812, Iturbide correctly read the signs and realized that the tide was shifting against the royalist cause. In order to maintain conservative, Catholic, traditional Hispanic values and to preserve public order, he reached out to insurgent leaders Guadalupe Victoria and Vicente Guerrero and offered to broker a resolution that would end the war and create an independent Mexican state. On February 24, 1821, the former enemies agreed to the Plan of Iguala, which was intended to appeal to the broadest possible constituency. According to the plan, political independence would be declared, but strong cultural ties with

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2 Iturbide generally has been seen as a negative figure in Mexican history, one who is easy to mock for his hubris and political miscalculations. In the 1980s, historians began to take a more nuanced view, arguing that Iturbide’s scope of action was extremely circumscribed by the country’s complete bankruptcy and the unwillingness of its elites to pay taxes. Joaquín E. Espinosa Aguirre, “De miliciano a comandante. La trayectoria militar de Agustín de Iturbide,” *Tzintzún: Revista de estudios históricos* 69 (2019): 67–99; Timothy Anna, “The Rule of Agustín de Iturbide: A Reappraisal,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 17 (1985): 79–110; Barbara Tenenbaum, *The Politics of Penury: Debts and Taxes in Mexico, 1821–1856* (Albuquerque, NM, 1986).
Spain would be maintained, a limited monarchy would be established, the complex system of castes and racial categories would be abolished, the *fueros* (special privileges of the clergy and the military) would not be touched, Catholicism would be the only permissible religion, the lives of Spanish-born residents and their private property would be respected, and the various armed forces would be incorporated into the Army of the Three Guarantees (union, religion, monarchy). On September 27, 1821 – Iturbide’s birthday – the General and his 16,000 troops marched triumphantly into Mexico City as “President of the Regency.”

Everyone was so relieved that the devastating war was over that they overlooked the staunchness of Iturbide’s commitment to maintaining former imperial structures while elevating and enriching his friends and family. Initially, at least, Iturbide was “the Immortal Mexican Hero,” the happy subject of a thousand broadsides, songs, and toasts.

Troubling signs appeared early. Iturbide personally chose the members for the Sovereign Provisional Governing Junta, the body charged with planning elections for a Constitutional Congress and creating appropriate new institutional structures. It was an act of corruption so overt that one contemporary observer, the conservative statesman Lucas Alamán, contemptuously called the Junta, “the tertulia [salon] of friends.”

On February 24, 1822, this friendly body granted Iturbide one million *pesos fuertes* worth of confiscated property and twenty square-leagues of prime agricultural land in Texas. Iturbide then hired raggedy crowds and deployed the military to congregate in plazas and agitate for the coronation of “Agustín Primero,” or Agustín the First. A stacked vote came out 64 to 97 in favor of bestowing just such a crown; the syphonic Minister of State sent a letter to the Bishop of Puebla rejoicing that “the Army and the People, united in the purest sentiments of joy, have proclaimed Señor Don Agustín de Iturbide the Emperor of Mexico.”

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4 An over-the-top example can be found in a pamphlet welcoming the Iturbide family’s procession: *Entrada pública en Valladolid de la Sra. Da. Ana Huarte de Iturbide, digna esposa del Inmortal Héroe Mexicano* (Valladolid, 1821).


6 Centro de Estudios Históricos, Mexico City (hereafter CEHM-CONDUMEX), XLI-I, f. 1325, Ministro del Estado del Imperio al Illmo. Sr. Obispo de Puebla, May 19, 1822, 2:30 in the morning.
On July 21, 1822, a grand coronation ceremony was held in Mexico City. The content and format drew heavily on the example of Napoleon’s coronation, but it was also intensely Catholic in its rituals and drew on Spanish royal practices, such as the besamanos [hand-kissing] to signal obedience, corporately organized processions, and endless salvos, illuminations, and ringing of bells. Iturbide’s official title was Agustín, by Divine Providence and the Congress of the Nation, First Constitutional Emperor of Mexico.”

Eyewitnesses had mixed reactions. Devoted republicans were contemptuous: Lorenzo de Zavala called it “a ridiculous parody” of European courts, while Vicente Rocafuerte regarded it as a cynical ploy to deceive a gullible public. Carlos María de Bustamante, a historian–publicist who had supported the patriots since the early days, mocked Iturbide as a deluded lightweight who risked being crushed by his jewels and furs. Traditionalists like Alamán were cautiously optimistic, noting that any novelty would require some time to earn the respect of the populace, while conceding that a Catholic monarchy was the true Hispanic preference.

It did not take long for the mask to come off. In a country devastated by a decade of all-consuming civil war, with a military whose soldiers had not been paid for months (years, in some cases), and whose populace groaned under the constant extraction of forced loans, resentment broke out when it came to light that Iturbide’s household expenses were five times greater than those of the last Spanish viceroy. By August, Iturbide had ordered the arrest of fifty political opponents, including fifteen members of Congress, and declared martial law to deal with the conspiratorial plots he thought lurked around every corner. Alamán thought this...
tyrannical act marked the turning point for Iturbide. Even the distant British press took note of the disturbing and rapid turn of events:

Private letters from Mexico mention the affairs of that empire as very uncertain and approaching to a crisis. The conduct and acts of Iturbide had displeased the great body of the people, as well as some of the principal men of the empire; and the consequence had been that various petty insurrections had sprung up which had been suppressed by the soldiery. These were, however, regarded but as the forerunners of a more general stand against the authority of Iturbide; and the merchants and inhabitants were securing their property in expectation of a civil war.\textsuperscript{12}

When Iturbide was forced to abdicate on March 19, 1823, and sent into exile, the same crowds who had rejoiced at his arrival enthusiastically serenaded his departure.\textsuperscript{13}

On April 8, 1823, the place-holding Supreme Executive Power voted to give Iturbide a comfortable pension of 25,000 pesos per year on the condition that he go into exile in Italy and never return, an offer he accepted without complaint.\textsuperscript{14} Shortly thereafter, a maudlin farewell letter penned in Iturbide’s name appeared in print. It said: “I leave for Italy, heartlessly banished from my dear native land by an inexorable superior order of the Sovereign Congress. Never would I expect such a reward from the Mexican People themselves, nor any guarantee equal to my services.” Not to worry, he assured the public, they should not “imagine that I will try to return from Europe to America with the fatuous and tyrannical design of seating myself anew upon the throne of Anáhuac atop the most horrendous and bloody heaps of rubbish … I will live out my days in a Christian manner, quietly in the sweet bosom of my family – they who I now shall call my homeland, my fellow citizens, my scepter and my crown, my fortune, my delights – in those foreign lands.”\textsuperscript{15} And then he packed up and sailed away across a sea of resentment.

Of course, life in exile was never going to be a great hardship for a wealthy and well-connected ex-Emperor from Mexico, the storied land

\textsuperscript{12} Hull Packet and Original Weekly Commercial, Literary & General Advertiser, February 3, 1823; Ipswich Journal, February 1, 1824.

\textsuperscript{13} Alamán, \textit{Historia de Méjico}, 5 vols. (México, 1852), 5: 734–35, 749. Barbara Tenenbaum makes a strong argument that Iturbide’s lavishness was less of a problem for the economy than wartime destruction, the total shutdown of the mining sector, the declining tax base, and the refusal of elites to permit any tax system to be established. “Taxation and Tyranny,” 213.

\textsuperscript{14} Gaceta del Gobierno Supremo de México, May 15, 1823.

\textsuperscript{15} CEHM-CONDUMEX, Fondo XLI-I, f. 1473, \textit{Despedida original del desgraciado Iturbide} (México, 1823).
of silver mines and a romanticized Aztec past. In Italy, Iturbide had access to the country’s highest social and political circles, which softened his landing, kept him entertained, and paid his bills. He and his family arrived in Leghorn in September and were immediately offered free lodging at a country house owned by Princess Paulina Bonaparte. The next month, the group journeyed onward to Florence, where the Grand Duke of Tuscany feted them lavishly. From a distance, though, Iturbide obsessively monitored the state of Mexican politics and talked openly of his rightful place as the country’s Father–Savior. To that end, he issued several self-serving pamphlets that underscored his patriotism and devotion to the Mexican people, and he began to write a comeback memoir that was rapidly translated and disseminated throughout Europe and the Americas.

Existing in that dual state of being that is common to exiles, Iturbide’s body may have been in Italy but his heart and mind stubbornly remained in Mexico. On November 30, the ex-Emperor tossed aside his agreement with the Mexican government to stay out of politics, left Italy, and headed for England, a country that was already home to an extensive and eclectic community of Spanish American residents. He took with him his two oldest sons, Agustín and Ángel, his nephew Charles Malo, the historian Mariano Torrente, and a shadowy religious figure named Father José Ignacio Treviño. Bad weather, Spanish spies, and the unwillingness of French leaders to let Iturbide set foot on their soil forced a series of circuitous detours through Switzerland, Prussia, the Rhine, and Belgium before the ex-Emperor and his entourage arrived at their final destination – London – on New Year’s Day 1824.

WELCOMED BY A WAITING NETWORK

Iturbide’s intentions were an open secret. In early December, his private letters flew ahead to London, and a network of recipient–supporters gave the scoop to the British press. On December 24, the Morning

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16 The meeting took place on October 20. Lucas Alamán, Semblanzas e ideario (Mexico, 1939), 137.

17 Memoirs of Agustín de Iturbide, chiefly concerning the late Revolution in Mexico, written by himself (London, 1824); A Statement of some of the Principal Events in the Public Life of A. de Iturbide, written by himself (London, 1824); Mémoires Autographes de Don Agustín de Iturbide, Ex-Empereur du Mexique (Paris, 1824); Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem öffentlichen Leben des Exkaisers von Mexico, von ihm selbst geschrieben (Leipzig, 1824).

18 Caledonian Mercury, January 5, 1824.
Chronicle and Morning Post both reported that “The Ex-Emperor of Mexico ... set out for England with his sons” and that his wife and daughters would follow after she had sold their personal effects. The news spread quickly; this same private letter from Leghorn was picked up and widely reprinted across the country, appearing in the Derby Mercury (December 24, 1823), Berrow’s Worcester Journal (December 25, 1823), Royal Cornwall Gazette (December 27, 1823), and many other newspapers. By the time of Iturbide’s arrival, the entire British news-reading public was aware that the ex-Emperor would soon be in their midst. For his part, Iturbide gamely insisted that he was merely a private individual touring the sights to gain useful knowledge and to work on his memoirs. Newspapers repeated this polite fiction, describing his journey merely as “a short visit of curiosity.” More-cynical editorialists declared that “Iturbide, ci-devant Emperor of Mexico, came to England last week, from Italy” looking to contract with “an English Commercial Company, with a capital of one million” to work the Mexican mines. On the surface, the ex-Emperor and his entourage did appear merely to be engaging in suitably innocuous tasks that kept them in the public eye; they were the human embodiments of a place long associated with riches, conquest, romance, and drama. In a sort of meta-performance, Iturbide and his eldest son, Agustín, attended the opera several times, knowing full well that they too were part of the show. At the time of Iturbide’s arrival in London, the British monarchy was recovering from various recent scandals, most notably the Queen Caroline Affair, and journalists responded with reports on the domestic lives of the members of Britain’s royal family. This tendency influenced the coverage of Iturbide, as well, with early press articles stressing his primary role as a father and announcing that his wife and daughters in Italy were selling their furniture in preparation for the family’s reunion in London.

Obviously, the presence of an ousted Mexican emperor in London could never be apolitical. Iturbide surfaced in the British capital at the exact moment when the Cabinet was wrestling with the issue of whether to recognize the Spanish American countries as independent. The Holy

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19 Morning Chronicle, December 24, 1823.
20 Aberdeen Journal, January 7, 1824; Derby Mercury, January 7, 1824; Caledonian Mercury, January 8, 1824; Leeds Mercury, January 10, 1824.
21 Jackson’s Oxford Journal, January 10, 1824.
22 Morning Post, January 26, 1824.
23 Morning Chronicle, January 25, 1824.
Alliance was siding with Spain’s autocratic King Ferdinand VII to resist liberalism and liberation movements everywhere, and the debt bubble was making and unmaking fortunes most painfully. Iturbide, now the local face of a distant problem, could never be a neutral character. And, despite his promise to the Mexican Congress to retire from politics, the ex-Emperor clearly had come to London to angle for high-level backers to support his return. Exiled monarchs and disgraced politicians always dream of “The Return.” In fact, one of Iturbide’s very first actions in Britain was to send a note to Foreign Secretary George Canning, in which he praised “Your Excellency’s talents and virtues” and expressed a deep desire to make his personal acquaintance. Iturbide took pains to stress that he was addressing Canning in his private capacity as a traveler, but it was clear that he felt that a person of his stature was entitled to ask Britain’s top diplomat to set a date and time for a meeting. The Foreign Secretary, of course, quickly realized the thorny nature of that request and was unwilling to grant the equivalent of official recognition to Mexico by agreeing to give its ex-Emperor an official interview. He took two full days to compose a reply. Unfortunately, Canning said, he would be in the country for a few days and thus any possibility of an interview would have to wait at least until the following week. The exchange demonstrates much about the ambiguity of an elite exile’s condition; Iturbide, as ex-Emperor, was still legally permitted to be addressed as His Excellency, but he was nonetheless shut out from meetings with politicians to whom he considered himself equal because of the awkward political moment. In exile, Iturbide’s identity was fraught, contingent, and liminal. He was used to wielding military and political power, but exile had reduced him to begging for access. He had occupied a central position in Mexico but was a marginal figure in London. As ex-Emperor, he had sidelined liberals and republicans and richly

24 There is a significant body of literature on exiled monarchs, albeit one with a pronounced individual and biographical focus. See, for example, Robert Aldrich, Banished Potentates: Dethroning and Exiling Indigenous Monarchs under British and French Colonial Rule, 1815–1955 (Manchester, 2018); Ronit Ricci, ed., Exile in Colonial Asia: Kings, Convicts, Commemoration (Honolulu, HI, 2016); Patricia Tyson Stroud, The Man Who Had Been King: The American Exile of Napoleon’s Brother Joseph (Philadelphia, PA, 2014); Philip Mansel and Torsten Riottte, eds., Monarchy and Exile: The Politics of Legitimacy from Marie de Medicis to Wilhelm II (New York, 2011).


26 British Library, London (hereafter BL), George Canning Papers, Add MS 89143/2/22/7, Canning to Iturbide, January 15, 1824.
rewarded his friends, yet the vagaries of his present condition meant that he had to take whichever friends he could get and was reduced to selling off his wife’s jewelry and art collection to keep the family housed. Small wonder that he wanted to return home.

Undaunted, Iturbide continued filling his address book with contacts and meetings set up with the help of a self-interested network of Spanish and Spanish American exiles. He met speculators who were eager to get an inside deal on a potential Mexican fortune, unemployed soldiers looking for a cause and a paycheck, and a gaggle of newspapermen and publishers who correctly gauged the reading public’s appetite for mystery and money. Iturbide sought out José María Blanco White, a long-time Spanish liberal exile who had established a significant publishing profile on Spanish and American affairs in London, and who confidently presented himself as a potential collaborator.27 Blanco White was a complicated character, at once besotted with English norms and culture and, at the same time, intensely unhappy living outside his homeland.28 His books and journals were widely read among English- and Spanish-speaking audiences on both sides of the Atlantic, which meant that he had the potential to become a key ally in any attempt to frame a return to Mexico. Iturbide obviously solicited some advice about how to position himself to maximize positive public opinion; just three days later, he wrote to Blanco White asking for comments on the papers he had left for his perusal.29 They obviously had much to discuss, because only a few days later, Iturbide was already talking about the urgency of placing items in the press. Blanco White provided Iturbide with a letter of introduction to William Jacob, an odd speculator–optometrist with a long history of lobbying for British intervention in Mexico. As an exile, Iturbide operated at a significant disadvantage in his host context because he was unaware of the various histories and backstories of the various people who flocked to his side. He was unfamiliar, for example, with the Cabinet’s internal tensions over issues such as Catholic Emancipation, and with the King’s open hostility to the possibility that his government might recognize any of the Spanish American republics. Nevertheless, Iturbide took what enthusiasm he could get and declared this connection

27 Harris Manchester College, Oxford University (hereafter HMC), Joseph Blanco White Papers, BW 2, 39–40, Iturbide to Joseph Blanco White, January 18, 1824.
to be most useful because of what he saw as Jacob’s “literary and political knowledge” and “good judgement.”

Iturbide’s very public presence in the city attracted lots of attention from small-time schemers like Jacob, as well as others who thought they had financial claims to press on the Mexican government. In one example, Charles Elliott, who had joined Francisco Javier Mina in a failed 1817 expedition to liberate Mexico, wrote to Iturbide on January 12 in a state of great penury and distress to “express his Zeal, Fidelity & Attachment to your Royal Person and devotedness to your Cause.” In exchange for some monetary support, Elliott promised, “your Memorialist is at all times willing to draw the Sword and shed the last drop of his Blood in defence of your Royal Person.” Colombian expatriate Juan García del Río had come to London as an agent of José de San Martín and sought out the ex-Emperor to express his “sentiments of profound respect and sincere estimation” and to favor him with two gold medals and four in silver, struck to commemorate Peruvian independence. San Martín had also been suspected by his enemies of harboring monarchist dreams, so correspondence between del Río and Iturbide likely flowed easily and brought the sort of comfort that comes from speaking one’s native language with a peer. Meanwhile, across the ocean, the Mexican government was receiving regular reports from its own network of spies and authorizing its own agent, General José Mariano Michelen, to hustle over to London to block the ex-Emperor’s machinations.

**BRITISH VENTURE CAPITALISTS AND THEIR INTEREST IN INFORMAL EMPIRE**

Along with these hapless and hopeful individuals came the entrepreneurs and bankers, carried on the enormous wave of money flowing around the city’s investment houses, all looking to capitalize on early access to Mexico’s famed silver mines and markets for manufactured goods. As chance would have it, at the same time as Iturbide was making the rounds

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31 University of Texas at Austin, Nettie Lee Benson Library (hereafter NLB), Hernández y Dávalos Collection, HD 17–1.3761, Charles Elliott, “To His Imperial Majesty Augustin I, Emperor of Mexico,” January 12, 1824.
32 NLB, Hernández y Dávalos Collection, HD 17–2.3863, Juan García del Río to Iturbide, February 9, 1824.
33 NLB, Hernández y Dávalos Collection, HD 17–3.4009, José Mariano Michelen to Ministro de Relaciones, April 13, 1824.
in London, several mining companies were incorporating themselves and seeking to receive exclusive contracts from anyone they perceived to be in a position to grant them.\textsuperscript{34} For example, the Association for Assistance in Working the Mines of Mexico and Other Parts of Spanish America was established in January 1824 and capitalized with the astonishing sum of one million pounds; its board of directors included familiar names in high finance, like David Barclay, Charles Herring, J. D. Powles, and three Members of Parliament.\textsuperscript{35} It eventually became better known as the Anglo–Mexican Mining Association and had a contract to work the Valenciana mine in Guanajuato. Its first directors meeting was held on February 26, less than two months after Iturbide arrived in search of material support.\textsuperscript{36} As a General and ex-Emperor, Iturbide could trade on his former status, his insider’s knowledge of the country, and his personal popularity with the not-insignificant royalist and military constituencies back in Mexico to offer British bankers privileged access to mines and markets; in return, the venture capitalists could provide Iturbide with much-needed material support.

Manufacturers were not far behind the bankers and miners in their enthusiasm or lobbying activity. Messrs. Hartley, Green & Ruperti operated a ceramic factory and had a satellite office in Mexico. In early 1824, they pushed hard to get the British government to inquire about removing obstacles to the textile trade, mainly in the form of bothersome customs duties; their request came in the form of a list of twenty-eight mercantile firms in the Midlands whose interests they claimed to represent.\textsuperscript{37} In a similar vein, the Goldschmidt banking and investment house also tried to blur the lines between its own business interests and government-sanctioned activity when it offered to be the conduit for Foreign and Admiralty Office dispatches to Mexico.\textsuperscript{38} And, throughout the early part of 1824, another

\textsuperscript{34} For excellent overviews of British speculators’ long involvement in Mexican silver mines, see John Tutino, \textit{Mexico City, 1808: Power, Sovereignty, and Silver in an Age of War and Revolution} (Albuquerque, NM, 2018); Carlos Marichal, \textit{Bankruptcy of Empire: Mexican Silver and the Wars between Spain, Britain, and France, 1760–1810} (New York, 2007).

\textsuperscript{35} The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), Foreign Office (FO), 50/8, 127–28. The three directors who were also sitting Members of Parliament were Matthias Attwood, Stewart Marjoribanks, and William Thompson.


\textsuperscript{38} TNA, FO, 50/8, 13, B. A. Goldschmidt to Planta, February 6, 1824.
group of business interests were actively lobbying the government to set up and subsidize a regular packet mail service to Mexico and Colombia. Dr. Mackie had just returned from heading up the first British mission to Mexico and was in the process of debriefing the government and claiming reimbursement for his expenses and reports.39 Mexico clearly was on everyone’s mind in 1824 and Iturbide, as a famous and well-connected exile, had as much to offer British notables as they had to offer him.

Iturbide’s closest collaborator was Francisco Borja Migoni, a longtime London resident of ambiguous status who had been presenting himself as the financial agent for the Mexican Empire.40 In this role, he had considered himself empowered to contract loans against the security of Mexico’s Customs House and various silver mines, making deals with abandon. Now that Iturbide had arrived on scene, Migoni used the presence of the ex-Emperor and the whiff of legitimacy he imparted to dangle prospects before speculators and bankers who were all too ready to believe his promises. A British merchant house in Mexico operated as a backchannel, reporting that Migoni had met with President of the Board of Trade William Huskisson several times in February and was attempting to shore up his position by advising the Minister that “until I present to Your Excellency a plan of subsidies communicated to me by this [the British government] you will please not to compromise yourself // for a new Loan // with the understanding, that I shall be able to communicate to you the nature of the above plan in a few days hence.”41

Iturbide himself upped the ante when he crafted an exposition to the Mexican Congress – very clearly dated from London on February 13, 1824 – in which he offered them his services as “a simple soldier” bringing with him arms, munitions, uniforms, and money to defend the country against a rumored Spanish invasion backed by the Holy Alliance.42 From his European vantage point, Iturbide blamed his exile on the “mistakes and passions of some individuals,” never once doubting that “on the part of the Mexican people, I encounter nothing but motives of recognition and eternal gratitude,” completely ignoring the very material fact that he

39 These documents are reprinted in La Diplomacia Mexicana, 33 vols. (México, 1912), 2: 97–129.
40 Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City (hereafter AGN), LE–1612 (13), 129, Supremo Poder Executivo to Francisco de Borja Migoni, August 6, 1823.
had accepted a pension on the condition that he would remain in Italy and not attempt to make a return to Mexico. The ex-Emperor’s audacity went even further; he suggested that Admiral Thomas Dundonald, Lord Cochrane, might be willing to accompany him in taking over the naval defenses at San Juan de Ulúa, Veracruz.\(^{43}\) When he wrote to Cochrane, Iturbide spoke in the name of the Mexican nation, flattering the Admiral, offering him the leadership of a new navy, promising that he would be richly compensated for his services, and stressing that they had to act as quickly as possible.\(^{44}\) Time operates differently in an exile’s world; everything is simultaneously urgent and painfully drawn out. Clearly, the man did not see himself remaining in exile permanently.

**THE EXILE’S DESIRE TO RETURN: THE BEGINNING OF THE END**

Iturbide’s short letter to the Mexican Congress announcing his intention to breach their agreement and return to reassert his claim to legitimate rule was not a document likely to make things easier for his British hosts. The newly established Congress was none too pleased with the news, either. At the end of April, upon receiving a copy of the ex-Emperor’s plans to return, the Supreme Executive Power and the General Constitutional Congress signed a joint proclamation declaring him to be “a traitor and outlaw” who would be considered an enemy of state if he ever attempted to return. Anyone who spoke favorably of the disgraced figure would likewise be considered a traitor.\(^{45}\) A flurry of debates followed in which legislators reminded each other of the bargain struck with Iturbide in September 1823 in which the ex-Emperor promised never to return. They also moved to withhold the remaining 12,500 pesos of his pension because he had violated his agreement. Deputies Carlos María de Bustamante and Servando Teresa de Mier vigorously reminded their peers that Iturbide had been a murderous, vicious general in the 1810s, had supported independence insincerely and opportunistically, and now, with this dishonorable suggestion, had revealed his fundamentally untrustworthy nature for all to see.\(^{46}\) At the very moment that the Congress was writing a new constitution cementing

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\(^{44}\) Southern Methodist University, DeGolyer Library, Dallas (hereafter DGL), Agustín de Iturbide Papers 1822–24, Iturbide to Thomas Dundonald, Lord Cochrane, May 6, 1824, copy.

\(^{45}\) *El Sol*, April 30, 1824.

\(^{46}\) *Águila Mexicana*, May 8, 1824.
Mexico’s independent existence as a republic, the threat of potential civil unrest posed by the exiled ex-Emperor’s return to foment civil unrest was most unwelcome. His status abroad was rendered ambiguous, and his ability to unify support around himself was undermined.

The Mexican government decided to send a deputy named José Mariano Michelena to London on a fact-finding mission to investigate Iturbide’s actions and confirm his true intentions. The distance and timing meant that the two men never encountered each other. Michelena left Veracruz on March 10, 1824, and therefore did not arrive in London until after Iturbide had departed. Nevertheless, the Mexican Congress already had an extensive network of spies and informants in London who kept them abreast of the exile’s machinations. From the time they received copies of his February manifesto, the possibility of Iturbide’s return became a frequent source of speculation. Congress debated whether to include Iturbide in “the mass of citizens” eligible for the general amnesty being offered to royalists and European Spaniards. Deputy Juan de Dios Cañedo forcefully argued for the majority that common sense dictated that Iturbide was not welcome to return, just as Napoleon had been excepted from the amnesty granted to regular French folks in exile after 1815. Notwithstanding all the evidence to the contrary, Iturbide continued to believe that the Mexican people were clamoring for his return. He wrote to his friend Antonio Gama asking for “a blessing for an honorable family that finds itself exiled two thousand leagues from his homeland all because the father, due to his honor and love of country, prefers that condition to shedding a single drop of blood in his cause.” The ex-Emperor should not have been so sanguine. He would be dead at their hands within three months.

Like most exiles, Iturbide became focused on the health and education of his children in an unfamiliar environment. In fact, his friend Michael J. Quin remembered fondly that:

[Iturbide’s] heart was softened in early life by an affection for the lady who is now the mother of a numerous family. It is in the circle of that family, while his children are around him, that Iturbide is seen most delighted.
Concerned with the unhealthy conditions in London, and keen to consolidate his public-facing status by associating himself with the aristocratic circles who tended to congregate at Bath, Iturbide moved his wife and youngest children there in mid-March. There, in a picturesque society town populated with many prominent foreigners of ambiguous rank and status, Iturbide hoped to keep his family away from the capital's bad influences. Ranging in age from four to seventeen years of age, Iturbide's nine children included: Agustín, María Sabina, Juana de Dios, Josefa, Ángel, María del Jesús, Salvador, and Felipe. The ex-Emperor found comfort in the conservative monarchist circles in Bath and sought an English education to create what he called "the moral security" necessary to build character in his children. There in Bath, sitting in drawing rooms among an assortment of exiled French, Tuscan, Greek, and Hungarian nobility, Iturbide joined his cause with others who wanted to turn back the advance of republics in their various homelands during the Age of Revolutions.

Iturbide paid the greatest attention to his oldest son and heir apparent, Prince Agustín Gerónimo José María de la Concepción Ramón Iturbide y Huarte. He kept the sixteen-year-old boy with him in London and made sure to expose him to its many technical wonders and sensory delights. Passing days together in the bustling capital, Iturbide and Agustín marveled at "the amazing traffic of coaches and persons of all classes walking in the streets." But as an ex-Emperor and a patriotic father, Iturbide's main priority was to ensure that his heir was kept physically safe and that he received the best education possible in preparation for eventual service to his country. After a brief period at Mr. Collins's boarding school in Ealing, northeast London, Iturbide transferred his

51 The Iturbides' relocation to Bath was widely reported in the newspapers. Trewman's Exeter Flying Post, March 18, 1824; Liverpool Mercury, March 26, 1824; Leeds Mercury, March 27, 1824; Aberdeen Journal, April 7, 1824.


54 NLB, Hernández y Dávalos Collection, HD 17–1.3753, Iturbide to José Antonio López, January 8, 1823. Instructions for his daughters are given in HD 17–2.3880.
son to the prestigious, Benedictine-run Ampleforth College where, as late as 1826, young Iturbide had returned to live as a “parlour boarder” (a privately-supported young-adult resident). Ampleforth was a small school – just forty or fifty students enrolled each year – closely associated with the nearby Ampleforth Abbey. There are hints that Iturbide may have received his introduction to the College from the former Spanish Ambassador to London, the Duke of San Carlos, whose son had attended the College a few years earlier.

With his heir settled in London and his wife and younger children in Bath, Iturbide continued to make the rounds, meeting with anyone who might be able to support him in his quest to return to Mexico and reclaim his throne. In April, he offered to travel to Chatham to meet Sir Charles William Pasley, an experienced soldier from the Peninsular Wars and noted military engineer. He heard that José de San Martín, the famous Liberator of Argentina, Chile, and Peru had passed by on his way to Belgium and sincerely regretted missing the opportunity to meet a man who, like himself, had favored constitutional monarchies in the wake of the empire’s collapse. He also visited with Basil Hall, a Royal Navy Captain and author of a current bestselling travel account of his voyage to South America, who said, “I had the satisfaction of conversing with Iturbide himself in London, just before he sailed for Mexico, where he lost his life; and I was gratified to learn from his own mouth, as far as his motives and conduct were concerned, he was perfectly satisfied with the accuracy of my statements.”

On May 12, Iturbide made a final overture to George Canning, this time to inform him of his decision to take up his destiny and return to Mexico. He was, he said, answering the call as a simple soldier anxious to solidify his country’s happiness. Obviously assuming that he would be

55 NLB, Hernández y Dávalos Collection, HD 17–2.3894, Iturbide to his banker, Mr. Fletcher, March 3, 1823. There was an initial payment of £200 for the acquisition of provisions and supplies, and arrangements were made for annual support to the amount of £120.
57 BL, Add MS 41963, 278, Iturbide to General Sir Charles William Pasley, April 9, 1824. For more on the pool of British soldiers who were eager to seize the opportunities offered by the Age of Revolutions, see the chapter by Maurizio Isabella in this volume.
58 Iturbide to José de San Martín, May 10, 1824, in José de San Martín, Su correspondencia, 1823–1850 (Madrid, 1911), 347.
restored to full power, the ex-Emperor promised Canning that his first act would be to establish fixed bases for solid relations with Great Britain that would serve their mutual interests. Iturbide also promised that he had no intention of “compromising the high politics of this [your] Government in any way.”\(^60\) Obviously, it was a bit too late for that. He departed for Mexico without having managed to meet with the leery Foreign Secretary, who certainly was anxious to consolidate Britain’s access to Mexico’s resources and to block the rising power of the United States in the region, but who also had more reliable information networks and better political sense than to back a haughty, easily ousted, and unpopular self-crowned monarch who had washed up on their shores. At that moment, Canning’s foreign policy strategy was complicated. He was attempting to create an entente with the United States government as a bulwark against Spanish colonial irredentism and renewed French ambition in the Western Hemisphere while simultaneously expanding British economic influence, and Mexico – situated as it was right on the American border – was a particularly delicate diplomatic needle to thread.\(^61\)

Nevertheless, the ever-optimistic Iturbide left a letter with his friend Michael J. Quin, hoping a local might succeed where a foreigner had failed. On May 15, Quin sent Canning a short note asking him to fix an early time for an interview, because he had in his possession a “private and confidential letter, addressed to you … It is of some public importance, perhaps, that you should be made acquainted with its contents as soon as possible.”\(^62\) Not one to be lured so easily, Canning did not take the bait. He told Quin to transmit the letter to him via the Foreign Office, under cover marked “Private,” where he would be sure to receive it safely. As the Foreign Secretary said bluntly:

Mr. C (without meaning any disrespect to Mr. Quin) objects to receiving a Letter of a confidential nature for an Interview, with a Gentleman whom he has not the honour of knowing … If Mr. Q is commissioned to add anything to the contents

\(^{60}\) WYAS, Iturbide to Canning, Canning Manuscripts, bundle 132, May 12, 1824.


\(^{62}\) BL, George Canning Papers, Add MS 89143/2/22/7, Michael J. Quin to Canning, May 15, 1824.
of the Letter, Mr. C must request that this may be done in writing—as Mr. C knows by experience that nothing is so likely to lead to misunderstanding & confusion as a written communication accompanied by a verbal commentary.\(^63\)

Quin had no choice but to give up the idea of a private conversation and duly passed on the letter later that same afternoon.

As Iturbide’s friend and publicist, Quin also provided his own revealing gloss on Iturbide’s actions, motivations, and political sentiments. Quin admitted to Canning that indeed he had been given additional verbal instructions, which were the following:

that if events shall give General de Iturbide a leading influence in Mexico, as is perhaps not wholly improbable, it is his intention to contribute all that influence towards the establishment of a constitution there similar as far as the circumstances of that country will permit, to the constitution of England; that it is his anxious wish to cultivate the closest political and commercial relations with Great Britain, and that he entertains a confidant hope that as soon as he can make it appear to you that the government is consolidated, and Mexico redeemed from the discord which at present distracts it, you will not be slow to recognize the independence of that Country.\(^64\)

As the General’s close friend, Quin wanted to reassure Canning that “during his sojourn in England he carefully examined our institutions, he went away willed with admiration for them, and with the most cordial feelings of Kindness towards the Country which they adorn … You, Sir, would have recognized in him a kindred greatness of soul, and a kindred devotion to the welfare of mankind.” Quin must have been hurt by his inability to secure a face-to-face meeting, because in his closing salutation, he permitted himself one small jab at Canning, observing that the “tone of your note, in which, however, I see great practical wisdom, and a salutary habit of precaution induces me, in my own behalf, to take the liberty of reminding you that I have already had the honour of an interview with you, when I returned from Spain with dispatches for you, about this time twelve months.”

Despite his very public activities during the early months of 1824, when the momentous time came, Iturbide’s actual departure was cloaked in secrecy and misdirection. Some people dismissed it as just another rumor intended to manipulate the stock market.\(^65\) A few newspapers reported hearing that “the Ex-Emperor Iturbide, after having privately

\(^63\) BL, George Canning Papers, Add MS 89143/2/22/7, Canning to Quin, May 15, 1824.

\(^64\) BL, George Canning Papers, Add MS 89143/2/22/7, Quin to Canning, May 15, 1824.

\(^65\) Examiner, May 16, 1824.
left this country, lately sailed from a French port for Mexico with the view of joining the Royalist forces!! It is added that his Ex-Imperial Majesty has been provided with a large sum of money and with the disposal of numerous orders, decorations, and other favors and rewards from the King of Spain, to be bestowed upon the adherents to the cause of the Mother Country in South America.”66 Other editors debunked these same “foolish reports [that] are in circulation that Iturbide, the late Emperor of Mexico, has secretly left England to head the Royalist party which he was the principal means of overthrowing in that country. The public have been so easily duped of late by intelligence relating to the new transatlantic states that the fabricators deem no device too gross or palpable.”67 The Morning Chronicle, usually a reliable source for Spanish American news, assured its readers “much nonsense has been lately said about Iturbide … We, however, are now at liberty to state that his first destination is not Demerara, but New Orleans.”68 The reports were all wrong. Although he left behind a florid declaration of a patriotic obligation to forsake his own comfort and heed his fellow citizens’ call to return and save the country, the truth is that Iturbide acted on his own accord and in his own interest.69

As he set out aboard the Spring, Iturbide left a set of proclamations about his destiny, one directed at his son Prince Agustín, who had relocated to a Jesuit school at Stonyhurst, and the other to the Mexican nation. In both cases, he spoke as a father and a virtuous man who did not seek power but rather was willing to sacrifice himself and his comforts in order to answer the people’s call.70 While Iturbide was basking in self-adoration, a very different letter was being sent across the ocean from a Mexican resident in London who felt obliged “not to keep my mouth shut for an instant while the shots of the former oppressor aim for that republic to re-establish his odious domination, and plant the colossalus of his despotism upon … [a land] that today, without a doubt, enjoys its liberty under a philanthropic national government.”71 On July

66 Trewman’s Exeter Flying Post; or, Plymouth and Cornish Advertiser, May 20, 1824.
67 Caledonian Mercury, May 17, 1824.
68 Morning Chronicle, May 31, 1824.
69 DGL, Agustín de Iturbide Papers 1822–1824, Agustín de Iturbide, “Proclama a los Mexicanos al pretender el volver a México con motivo de una guerra extranjera,” 1824, copy.
70 CEHM-CONDUMEX, Fondo LXXII–2, f. 139, Iturbide, “Proclamation on board the Spring, June 1824.”
71 Biblioteca Nacional de México, Colección Lafragua, vol. 139, no. 31, Planes del Sr Iturbide para la nueva conquista de América (Mexico, 1824).
15, Iturbide disembarked at Soto la Marina and was swiftly arrested by the Mexican authorities, who were waiting for him. He was executed by firing squad four days later on July 19, 1824, without so much as a summary trial.\textsuperscript{72}

The short exile of the ex-Emperor Iturbide in London had reverberations that rippled out beyond his immediate actions and moment. Indeed, the quixotic character served as a lightning rod for several ongoing debates in domestic politics that turned out to be connected to foreign affairs, as well. For example, religious tolerance, Catholic Emancipation, and the Irish Question were bound up with the rising Catholic conservative revanchism in Spain, France, and elsewhere in the Mediterranean world. British bankers, manufacturers, and import/export companies were pushing hard to gain access to Latin American markets but wanted government and diplomatic guarantees to ensure stability. Many of these same groups were active in the abolitionist movement at the same time and looked to Spanish Americans as allies and test cases for their cause. Major John Cartwright, the longtime radical and advocate of Parliamentary reform and British-style constitutionalism abroad, had been preoccupied with Iturbide and Mexican events even as the end of his long life approached.\textsuperscript{73} His last written words were a call to the Spanish people to recognize their universal nobility. As Cartwright saw it:

It was Almighty God who in forming Spaniards for such felicity, made them men. It was a succession of tyrants, who, for reducing them to slaves, made them cavaleros, hidalgos, grandees, and taught them the contemptible nonsense of family blood. Virtue alone is true nobility: patriot services for establishing common right and universal freedom, are alone legitimate titles to public trust and distinctions.

As she edited his memoirs, Cartwright’s niece inserted a note to the effect that “General Michelena (the Mexican minister) having about two

\textsuperscript{72} Archivo General y Real de Simancas, Valladolid, Estado 8.267, undated notice. After his execution, Iturbide’s distraught wife and children went to live in Washington, DC, where they were supported by the Spanish American community and a charity supported by the Catholic Church. On December 3, 1833, President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna issued a decree that restored the widow’s pension and permitted her family to return to Mexico, with the exception of the oldest son and namesake who was considered a threat to public order. See “Decreto que el Presidente Antonio López de Santa Anna, a favor de la familia Iturbide Huarte. November 3, 1833,” El Fénix de la Libertad, November 7, 1833.

\textsuperscript{73} Major John Cartwright, \textit{Diálogo político entre un italiano, un español, un francés, un alemán, y un inglés} (London, 1825); \textit{The English Constitution, produced and illustrated} (London, 1823); \textit{Military Hints to the Greeks} (London, 1821).
days before his death, sent a kind of message to inform him that the scheme of Iturbide had failed, and that the liberty of Mexico might be considered as established, he exclaimed with fervor, ‘I am glad, I am very glad!’ These were almost the last words he ever spoke: his voice after became nearly inaudible, but he was perfectly sensible to the last and appeared absorbed in mental prayer.” Even Baron Alexander von Humboldt became embroiled in the fallout from Iturbide’s exile days in London, being persuaded to write a letter to President Guadalupe Victoria soliciting the release of Charles Beneski, the ex-Emperor’s adviser, aide-de-camp, and chief scribe, who had been held as a prisoner since the landing; Humboldt downplayed any treasonous intent and suggested that the young man had “been induced, by an error of political opinion, to follow the fortunes of Iturbide.” The Mexican government was aware of its public image and released Beneski on anticipation of the letter’s arrival.

Mexican ex-Emperor Agustín de Iturbide’s four-month stay in London in 1824 demonstrates how exiles and their networks shaped British involvement in restructuring political and economic life in early national Mexico. Iturbide’s London-based activities during these months also provide a specific case study of the exile experience during the Age of Revolutions. As an exile, Iturbide had to operate in different languages, climates, and cultures, relying on the advice and kindness of his hosts and new acquaintances, many of whom had their own motives for seeking out a relationship. He was a vector for the dissemination of first-hand information about the current state of Mexico’s politics and economy, and, in this capacity, he not only stoked the interests of British investment banks, mining companies, and merchants but also expedited the founding of specific companies that exploited the direct connection that he provided. The nature of Iturbide’s experience as an elite political exile in London magnified his own sense of destiny and intensified his desire for return. Four short months in that crucial year of 1824 set in motion a series of events that ended any realistic chance that the Mexican Empire would be restored, while at the same time opening a wedge of opportunity for British banking, merchant, and mining interests to position themselves at the center of a new informal empire.

74 *The Life and Correspondence of Major Cartwright*, 2 vols. (London, 1826), 2: 280–83. The anecdote was regularly trotted out in radical circles for years afterward. See, for example, *Examiner*, July 2, 1826.
75 *Morning Chronicle*, July 19, 1825.


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