

## Introduction

Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr.

The U.S. military forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany have helped to shape German–American relations in ways that far transcend their well-known military role in the Atlantic alliance. The transformation of the American, British, and French occupation zones into the Federal Republic of Germany represents one of the few successful examples in the twentieth century of democratic nation building abroad.<sup>1</sup> In 2003, General Charles F. Wald, Deputy Commander of the U.S. European Command, called American military spending in the Federal Republic over several decades “an unintended Marshall Plan.”<sup>2</sup> And approximately twenty-two million U.S. servicemen, military employees, and dependents have lived in Germany since 1945.<sup>3</sup> As a result, most Americans have friends or relatives or at least know someone who has served there, and the GIs,<sup>4</sup> their bases, and related institutions like Armed

<sup>1</sup> Researchers at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ranked West Germany (1945–9) alongside Japan (1945–52), Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989), as an “unambiguous success” in an otherwise “sobering” record of American attempts at democratic nation building since 1900. Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, *Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building*, Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief 24, May 2003. See also Tony Smith, *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ, 1995).

<sup>2</sup> Jeffrey Fleishman, “US Forces in Europe Set Sights East, South,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 30, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> See the Appendix.

<sup>4</sup> As the attentive reader will note, the term “GIs” is used frequently in this book to refer to all of the American armed forces stationed in Germany. Technically, this usage is incorrect. Strictly speaking, “GI” applies only to army personnel and even more narrowly to enlisted soldiers. The expression came initially from the galvanized iron trash bins used

Forces Radio helped introduce several generations of West Germans to American society and culture. Therefore, the American military presence in Germany is also one of the largest cultural-exchange programs in world history.

Although the impact of Cold War–era defense policies on American life has been intensively studied,<sup>5</sup> scholars are only beginning to examine the “shadow” that American overseas military spending and basing during this period cast on its allies.<sup>6</sup> This is also true of the relationship between GIs and Germans. The existing literature has focused heavily on the

by the army shortly after 1900 and by World War II was widely used to refer to both “general issue” army gear (GI boots, GI soap, etc.) and to troops. With apologies to the other service branches, and especially the Marines, who take offense at the designation, we feel that our use of GIs can be excused for several reasons besides the alliteration produced by pairing it with the word “Germany.” In recent decades, the term increasingly has come to describe all enlisted personnel. In addition, by far most of the servicemen and women stationed in Germany after 1945 were army personnel, with the air force in distant second place. On the use of “GI,” see Hugh Rawson, “Why Do We Say ‘G.I.’?”, *American Heritage Magazine* 57, no. 2 (April–May 2006), 16.

<sup>5</sup> See esp. Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s* (New Haven, CT, 1995), and Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ, 2000).

<sup>6</sup> For the general picture, see Anni P. Baker, *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence* (Westport, CT, 2004); Christopher T. Sandars, *America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (Oxford, 2000); Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe* (Oxford, 1989); and Jane M. O. Sharp, ed., *Europe After an American Withdrawal: Economic and Military Issues* (Oxford, 1990). On American overseas bases and their economic and ecological impact, see Mark L. Gillem, *American Town: Building the Outposts of Empire* (Minneapolis, MN, 2007). Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moon, ed., *Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present* (Durham, NC, 2010), examines the social impact of the American military presence abroad (in terms of race, sexuality, gender, and class) on both American servicemen and their families and the host countries.

Important case studies include David Reynolds, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (New York, 1995); Annette Palmer, “The United States in the British Caribbean 1940–1945: Rum and Coca Cola,” *Americas: A Quarterly Review of Inter-American Cultural History* 43, no. 4 (1987): 441–51; Jane Fidock, “The Effect of the American ‘Invasion’ of Australia 1942–1945,” *Flinders Journal of History and Politics* 11 (1985): 91–101; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, 1999); Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York, 1999); Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, *Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur* (New York, 2002); L. Eve Armentrout Ma, “The Explosive Nature of Okinawa’s ‘Land Issue’ or ‘Base Issue,’ 1945–1977: A Dilemma of United States Military Policy,” *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 1, no. 4 (1992): 435–63; Katherine H. S. Moon, *Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.–Korea Relations* (New York, 1997); William E. Berry, Jr., *U.S. Bases in the Philippines: The Evolution of a Special Relationship* (Boulder, CO, 1989); and Olivier Pottier, “Les bases américaines en France: Un outil militaire, économique et politique (1950–1967),” *Revue Historique des Armées* 2 (1999): 63–78.

## Introduction

3

years of military occupation under the Office of Military Government of the United States (OMGUS) from 1945 to 1949, sometimes extending into the era of the Allied High Commission (1949–55). Moreover, it has concentrated on aspects of official U.S. military occupation policy in Germany rather than on the role of the American forces.<sup>7</sup> Recently, important work has started to appear on the social and cultural history of the American military presence in Germany, including the role of black GIs in the civil rights movement, military families, and the failure of the nonfraternization policy in the late 1940s.<sup>8</sup> However, the best general

<sup>7</sup> On OMGUS attempts to promote democracy, see Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie. Der amerikanischer Beitrag 1945–1952* (Opladen, Germany, 1993); Richard L. Merritt, *Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945–1949* (New Haven, CT, 1995); Daniel E. Rogers, *Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System* (New York, 1995); Rebecca Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany* (New York, 1996); Edmund Spevack, *Allied Control and German Freedom: American Political and Ideological Influences on the Framing of the West German Basic Law* (Münster, Germany, 2001). On American denazification policy, see Lutz Niethammer, *Die Mitläuferfabrik – Die Entnazifizierung am Beispiel Bayerns* (Berlin, 1982; first published 1972); Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich, 1996), translated as *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration* (New York, 2002); and the memoir by James Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American Occupied Germany* (Chicago, 1982). On education and cultural policy, see Winfried Müller, *Schulpolitik in Bayern im Spannungsfeld von Kultusbürokratie und Besatzungsmacht 1945–49* (Munich, 1995), and Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1999). Several authors also have focused directly on American military administration in major German municipalities. Besides Boehling's study, which focuses on Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart, see Gimbel's book on Marburg, *A German Community under American Occupation* (Stanford, CA, 1961); and Hans Woller, *Gesellschaft und Politik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone: Die Region Ansbach und Fuerth* (Munich, 1986).

<sup>8</sup> In general, Höhn and Moon, *Over There*. On race relations and civil rights, Höhn and Martin Klimke have written *A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany* (New York, 2010). This volume complements a web site cosponsored by the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC; the Heidelberg Center for America Studies at the University of Heidelberg, Germany; and Vassar College entitled "The Civil Rights Struggle: African-American GIs and Germany," <http://www.aacvr-germany.org/AACVR.ORG/> (accessed December 4, 2011). See also Donna Alvah, *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946–1965* (New York, 2007); Petra Goedde, "From Villains to Victims: Fraternization and the Feminization of Germany," *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 1–20; Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949* (New Haven, CT, 2002); and John Willoughby, *Remaking the Conquering Heroes: The Social and Geopolitical Impact of the Post-War American Occupation of Germany* (New York, 2001).

history of the U.S. Armed Forces in Germany during the post-1945 period, by the political scientist Daniel J. Nelson, is now twenty-five years old.<sup>9</sup>

This collection of essays presents an overview of the new scholarship on the American military presence in the Federal Republic of Germany. It seeks to refocus our attention away from the immediate post-World War II years and onto the subsequent periods in which GIs were stationed in that country. This means that the essays in the volume deal with an American military that is no longer an occupier per se but instead one element in a complex relationship between two sovereign states. Moreover, many of the contributions demonstrate how cultural and social approaches to international history can shed light on the U.S. Armed Forces' role in German–American relations.

## I

Any discussion of the GIs in Germany must begin with a basic question: How can we best understand the U.S. overseas military presence in the twentieth century? More specifically, were the U.S. troops in the Federal Republic part of a post-1945 overseas “empire”?<sup>10</sup> In his summary comments at the conference that gave rise to this volume, Günther Bischof spoke of the “New Rome in old *Germania*.”<sup>11</sup> Certainly, the image of American “legions” stationed in central Europe to keep the “barbarian hordes” – not primitive Germanic tribes but the troops of the Soviet Union and its allies – from overrunning Western Europe is evocative. Others have found the comparison with the Roman Empire compelling as well. John J. McCloy, the first American High Commissioner in Germany from 1949 to 1952, said in reference to Lucius D. Clay that “being

<sup>9</sup> Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO, 1987). See also the shorter overview by Bryan T. Van Sweringen, “Variable Architectures for War and Peace: U.S. Force Structure and Basings in Germany, 1945–1990,” in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990. A Handbook. Vol. 1, 1945–1968*, ed. Detlef Junker with the assistance of Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach, and David B. Morris (Cambridge, 2004), 717–24.

<sup>10</sup> A flood of new publications indicates that a debate on the current state and nature of America’s “empire” is now in full swing. See the review article by G. John Ikenberry, “Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order,” *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March–April 2004): 144–54; Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA, 2006); and Michael H. Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007).

<sup>11</sup> Günther Bischof, “The ‘New Rome’ in Old *Germania*,” unpublished paper delivered at the “GIs in Germany” conference, November 11, 2000, Heidelberg, Germany.

## Introduction

5

[American] Military Governor [in Germany] was a pretty heady job. It was the nearest thing to a Roman proconsulship the modern world afforded.”<sup>12</sup>

Another obvious comparison is with the British Empire. In the eyes of some observers, the mid-twentieth century marked the onset of a new Pax Americana akin to the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century. In the late 1940s, British policy makers commented that the United States had now come into a position of world dominance never enjoyed by their own country. Some American officials, like the State Department’s Norman Davies, believed “we shall in effect be the heirs of empire and it is up to us to preserve its vital parts.” “To historians,” wrote Paul M. Kennedy, American overseas basing in the mid-1980s “look[s] extraordinarily similar to the chain of fleet bases and garrisons possessed by that former world power, Great Britain, at the height of its strategic over-stretch.” America’s international position never rested, however, solely or even primarily on military power. It is no coincidence that it was in the 1950s, when the global influence of the United States had reached a new height, that Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher proposed their concept of “informal empire” to explain Britain’s political and economic relations with the non-Western world in the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>13</sup>

The American overseas presence has, however, rested on the consent of the “occupied” to a far larger extent than Roman or British rule did. Christopher T. Sandars has proposed the useful concept of the “leasehold empire” to describe the system of American overseas bases that began to develop during the early 1940s. Every time the United States wished to establish bases overseas, it engaged in often-protracted negotiations with the host countries.<sup>14</sup> In Western Europe, for example, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) of 1951, with subsequent revisions, continues to govern the stationing of American and other NATO troops on the soil of

<sup>12</sup> Jean Edward Smith, “Selection of a Proconsul for Germany: The Appointment of Gen. Lucius D. Clay, 1945,” *Military Affairs* 40, no. 3 (October 1976): 123–9, quote on p. 123. Most recently, see Peter Bender, *Weltmacht Amerika – Das neue Rom* (Stuttgart, Germany, 2003).

<sup>13</sup> This paragraph is based on and its quotations taken from Sandars, *America’s Overseas Garrisons*, 1–12. See also Tony Smith, *The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain and the Late Industrializing World Since 1815* (Cambridge, 1981); Patrick Karl O’Brien and Armand Clésse, eds., *Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2001* (Aldershot, UK, 2002); Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire* (New York, 2004); and Bernard Porter, *Empire and Superempire: Britain, America, and the World* (New Haven, CT, 2006).

<sup>14</sup> Sandars, *America’s Overseas Garrisons*.

their alliance partners. SOFA recognizes the jurisdiction of the laws of both the sending and the receiving states over the stationed troops. The former takes precedence in “on-duty” offenses and in offenses committed by members of one foreign force against members of another, while the latter takes precedence in all other cases.<sup>15</sup> Writing about the postwar American relationship with Western Europe, Geir Lundestad coined the term “empire by invitation” in a seminal article he published in 1986.<sup>16</sup> Going a step further, Robert Kagan contends that the Western European states used American protection to positively reorder their dealings with one another, initiating an era of unprecedented peace and prosperity. By the start of the twenty-first century, however, they had come to see the use of military power in international relations as “outmoded and dangerous.” Paradoxically, “Europe’s new Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order,” writes Kagan. “American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important.”<sup>17</sup>

The American “empire” never aimed at formal territorial expansion. Although American policy makers believed that after World War II they would need to maintain roughly the same number of overseas bases that existed in 1944–5 in order to provide for national security, there were no plans to establish a long-term military presence in Europe. As early as November 1945, General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s chief of staff reported that due to rapid demobilization and redeployment “the forces within [the European] theater are unable to perform any serious offensive operations. Their capacity to carry on limited defensive operations is slightly better.”<sup>18</sup> Only the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 led to substantial new deployments of American troops to Europe. In a recent study, political scientist John J. Mearsheimer argues that the United States had no real choice in the matter during the Cold War, given the fact that it was

<sup>15</sup> Although SOFA is designed to protect the sovereignty of both states, it obviously provides for some gray areas as well. See Jost Delbrück, “International Law and Military Forces Abroad: U.S. Military Presence in Europe, 1945–1965,” in *US Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945–1970*, ed. Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger (Boulder, CO, 1993), 83–115.

<sup>16</sup> Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” *Journal of Peace Research* 23, no. 3 (1986): 263–77.

<sup>17</sup> Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York, 2003), 73.

<sup>18</sup> Quoted in Hans-Jürgen Schraut, “US Forces in Germany, 1945–1955,” in *US Military Forces in Europe*, ed. Duke and Krieger, 153–180, quote on p. 160.

the only country that could contain the USSR militarily in Europe. American troops were not there primarily to preserve the European peace but to prevent Soviet expansion.<sup>19</sup> Even so, as Hubert Zimmermann points out in his contribution to this volume, policy makers in Washington in the 1960s and 1970s did not see the stationing of GIs in Europe as permanent. Many factors spoke against it, including the American tradition of avoiding “entangling alliances,” new technologies (e.g., nuclear weapons), domestic opposition in the United States to paying for stationing, and, eventually, Soviet–American détente.

The idea of an American empire is, moreover, difficult to reconcile with the diverse functions that the GIs in Germany performed. As Hans-Joachim Harder writes in this volume, they served as a symbol of West German–American friendship, as a pawn in superpower negotiations on disarmament, and as the guarantors of both West German security and eventual German unification. Although the American “legions” in Germany were a symbol of the superpower status of the United States after 1945, they were never merely the instruments of an imperial power.

In their introduction to a recent collection of essays comparing U.S. military bases in South Korea, Japan, and (West) Germany, the countries where more than 90 percent of American servicemen were stationed overseas during the Cold War, Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moon point out that in many ways the German outposts of the American empire were exceptional. Globally, it mattered whether the United States was dealing with a democratic host government, what types of troops were stationed, where the military bases were located in the host country, and which cultural and racial assumptions informed the bilateral relationship. In South Korea, for example, the United States collaborated with dictatorships until the late 1980s and maintained peacetime command of most South Korean forces until 1994 and wartime command until 2012. Höhn and Moon describe this situation as neocolonial. Moreover, in South Korea and in Japan U.S. servicemen were concentrated in outlying areas (in Japan mainly on Okinawa), which limited interaction with the bulk of the population and hid the social and other costs of basing. Historically, Okinawa also has faced the special problem of hosting thousands of young, unmarried Marines who stay there only briefly before being

<sup>19</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, 2001), 256–7, 265–6, 326–7.

sent on combat missions elsewhere and who have extremely limited contact with and understanding of the locals. It is therefore no surprise that in recent decades South Koreans and Okinawans have directed much antagonism toward American bases and their residents. Although most GIs in Germany were also stationed in rural areas, the relationship with what Höhn and Moon call America's "favored ally" has been characterized by greater mutual respect and regular interaction, including on the intergovernmental level. As a result the (West) German government and population have demonstrated a high degree of acceptance of U.S. bases since 1945. Even the massive peace movement of the 1980s focused its attention on American nuclear weapons, not on the American military presence *per se*.<sup>20</sup> This important caveat raised by Höhn and Moon is reflected in a number of new books on popular protest against U.S. military installations around the world, which in recent decades have focused on areas outside of Europe.<sup>21</sup>

## II

Although it was fundamentally shaped by the course of the Cold War, U.S. military basing policy in Europe after 1945 did not follow an overall strategy. Instead, it developed in response to developments in bilateral relations with each host country. As Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger write, "the overall picture only makes sense when it is dissected into the individual country histories and then reassembled. The history of basing in, for instance, the Federal Republic of Germany is quite different from that of the United Kingdom, or that of Turkey from that of Italy."<sup>22</sup> In the Federal Republic, we can discern four main phases in the history of the U.S. military presence since 1944.

Between 1944 and 1949, the GIs were in Germany as military occupiers, although by the end of this period West Germans clearly had come to perceive them as friends and protectors as well. The next phase started

<sup>20</sup> Höhn and Moon, "The Politics of Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in the U.S. Military Empire," in *Over There*, ed. Höhn and Moon, 1–36, here on pp. 11–19.

<sup>21</sup> Andrew Yeo, *Activist, Alliances, and Anti-US Base Protests* (Cambridge, 2011); Catherine Lutz, ed., *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against US Military Posts* (Washington Square, NY, 2009); Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the US Military Overseas* (Ithaca, NY, 2008); Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism* (Princeton, NJ, 2007).

<sup>22</sup> Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, "Introduction," in *U.S. Military Forces in Europe*, ed. Duke and Krieger, 1–13, here on p. 9.



*Introduction*

9

not with the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949 but rather the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and it lasted until the mid-1960s. During this period, West Germany became a member of NATO (1955); American servicemen and their dependents in Germany enjoyed a high standard of living; and official and unofficial relations between the GIs and their West German neighbors were excellent. However, the late 1960s initiated a new phase. Due to the Federal Republic's growing political and economic importance as well as to social transformations in Germany and the United States, the next twenty years of the American military presence would be marked by frequent tensions. Daniel Nelson even asked whether the U.S. forces in Germany had become "Defenders or Intruders" in the eyes of the locals by the early 1980s.<sup>23</sup> The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a fourth phase. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the future of the American military presence in Germany was called into question. Although American bases in Germany played an important role as staging areas for forces used in the Gulf War of 1990–1, there was no question during the 1990s that the United States would reduce the number of military installations it maintained in Germany and the number of troops stationed there. From more than 225,000 in 1990, American troop strength in Germany was cut to fewer than fifty thousand troops toward the end of the decade. The number then rose again to approximately seventy-five thousand troops by September 2003 due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But by 2011 the total had fallen again to around fifty-five thousand, and as this introduction is being written it is once again below fifty thousand.<sup>24</sup>

## III

On September 12, 1944, units of the U.S. First Army entered the German village of Roetgen. By the end of the next month, the nearby city of Aachen and its outlying districts were also under American occupation.<sup>25</sup> However, this was not the first time that American troops were stationed

<sup>23</sup> Daniel J. Nelson, *Defenders or Intruders? The Dilemmas of U.S. Forces in Germany* (Boulder, CO, 1987).

<sup>24</sup> See the downloadable files on "Active Duty Military Service Personnel by Region/Country" on the web site of the Department of Defense at <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm> (accessed January 6, 2013).

<sup>25</sup> Earl K. Ziemke, *The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944–1949* (Washington, DC, 1975), 133–44; Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands*, 185–204. The Aachen region became part of the British occupation zone in 1945.

on German soil. In late 1918, the U.S. Army occupied the area around Koblenz as part of the Allied occupation of the Rhineland. The presence of Allied troops was intended to remind the Germans that they had lost the war and to ensure their good behavior during the Paris peace negotiations. Late in the summer of 1919, the United States reduced the number of troops it had in Germany from 110,000 to 15,000. This smaller force was supposed to exercise a moderating influence on the Allies, above all France, in their policies toward Germany. In early 1923, making good on Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes's threat that a French advance into the Ruhr would lead to the end of the American occupation, the United States withdrew its remaining troops.<sup>26</sup>

Although the American military found itself involved in many more aspects of German public life after 1945, there are striking parallels between the experiences of the Doughboys who served in Germany from 1918 to 1923 and the GIs who followed them a generation later. In both cases, American troops benefited from comparison in German eyes with their occupation partners. The Doughboys profited from the fact that their country had not signed the Versailles Treaty. After 1945, Germans both in and outside of the U.S. zone clearly had a better opinion of the Americans than of the British, French, and Soviets. The British and the French zones lagged behind the American zone in terms of the economic situation, food supply, and the freedoms granted to inhabitants. Especially in the French zone, the occupiers' policies often seemed improvised and even arbitrary to residents. More generally, Germans thought that Britain no longer played as important a role in world affairs as it had before the war and that France was actively trying to impede the restoration of German unity.<sup>27</sup> Conditions in the Soviet zone seemed by far the

<sup>26</sup> Keith L. Nelson, *Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918–1923* (Berkeley, CA, 1975); Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920* (Washington, DC, 1943, originally dated March 4, 1920).

<sup>27</sup> Barbara Marshall, "German Attitudes to British Military Government 1945–47," *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, no. 4 (1980): 655–84; Ian D. Turner, *Reconstruction in Postwar Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945–1955* (Oxford, 1989); John E. Farquharson, "The British Occupation of Germany 1945–6: A Badly Managed Disaster Area?," *German History* 11, no. 3 (October 1993): 316–38; Marlis G. Steinert, "Zwischen Gestern und Morgen. Volksmeinung und öffentliche Meinung in der Französischen Besatzungszone, 1945–1947, im Spiegel französischer Quellen," *Cahiers de l'Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent* 13 (1989): 47–80; Alain Lattard, "Zielkonflikte französischer Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland. Der Streit Laffon-Koenig 1945–1947," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 39, no. 1 (January 1991): 1–35; Cornelia Rauh-Kühe, "Forschungen zur französischen Zone. Geschichte

## Introduction

II

bleakest, and not simply due to the political and economic system. Although American soldiers in Germany were responsible for their share of irresponsible behavior toward the local population, as the contributions in this volume by Jennifer Evans and Gerhard Fürmetz make clear, these incidents taken as a whole pale in comparison with the initial conditions prevailing under the Soviet occupation, characterized by mass rapes and looting.<sup>28</sup>

One more factor clearly worked in the GIs' favor until the late 1960s, much as it had for the Doughboys earlier: they were far better off financially than the other foreign soldiers stationed on German soil. The Doughboys in and around Koblenz had a reputation as big spenders paid in a strong currency.<sup>29</sup> Describing the situation in occupied Austria after World War II, which closely paralleled that in Germany, Reinhold Wagnleitner writes, "Even though the real behavior of the GIs in many ways was hardly distinguishable from the soldiers of other occupation armies, they had one tremendous advantage – their seemingly endless access to goods. They brought dollars and even harder currencies – food, cigarettes, nylons, penicillin – all the necessities of survival for the plagued, hungry, confused people."<sup>30</sup>

Like the occupation of the early 1920s, the post-1945 occupation helped introduce American culture into Germany. And, again as in the 1920s, American servicemen and the residents of the American occupation zone got along well after 1945 – too well for the military authorities, who, just as after World War I, quickly had to rescind the policy of nonfraternization. Finally, there was at least one direct link between the two occupations. Even before the Normandy invasion, many U.S. military officials were determined not to repeat the "mistakes" made in the Rhineland once World War II was over. They argued that the lenient policies of the Doughboy occupation had neither created gratitude toward America nor prevented the Germans from supporting Adolf Hitler.<sup>31</sup>

der Besatzungspolitik oder Geschichte der Besatzungszeit?," *Informationen zur Modernen Stadtgeschichte* 2 (1994): 16–21; Rainer Hudemann, "L'occupation française après 1945 et les relations franco-allemandes," *Vingtième Siècle* 55 (1997): 58–68.

<sup>28</sup> Norman M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

<sup>29</sup> Nelson, *Victors Divided*, 171.

<sup>30</sup> Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1994), 68–9.

<sup>31</sup> Johannes Kleinschmidt, "Do Not Fraternize." *Die schwierigen Anfänge der deutsch-amerikanischen Freundschaft 1944–1949* (Trier, Germany, 1997), 19–21.

## IV

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the American, British, and Soviet governments decided to divide both Germany and Berlin into four zones of occupation under the direct administration of their respective militaries. France would be the fourth occupation power. In addition to an enclave in Berlin, the American zone consisted of the port city of Bremen in northern Germany as well as three larger territories in the south of the country: Bavaria, Hessen, and Württemberg-Baden. The first American military governor in Germany, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, held that post only until November 1945. His successor was General Joseph T. McNarney, who served until March 1947, and McNarney was in turn succeeded by General Lucius Clay, who by that time was already making the key decisions on American policy in Germany.<sup>32</sup>

American policy objectives in Germany were set out in Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067, which was issued in its final form in April 1945. The most important of them became known as the “Four Ds”: denazification, decartelization, demilitarization, and democratization. The American military government – known by the acronym OMGUS – had a mixed record in realizing these goals, especially the first two. It also had to deal with numerous other tasks. Most importantly, OMGUS had to ensure that the residents of the American zone had adequate food, fuel, and housing, and it had to take care of the many “displaced persons” and German refugees who arrived in the zone each day.<sup>33</sup> Officers attached to OMGUS were often unhappy about these nonmilitary assignments and thought themselves poorly prepared to deal with them. For example, only about 5 percent of the American military personnel stationed in Germany in the late 1940s could conduct business with the local population without relying on an interpreter.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the GIs were supposed to accomplish their mission without fraternizing with the

<sup>32</sup> Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York, 1950); Jean Edward Smith, ed., *Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945–1949*, 2 vols. (Bloomington, IN, 1974); Smith, *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life* (New York, 1990); Wolfgang Krieger, *General Lucius D. Clay und die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1945–1949* (Stuttgart, Germany, 1987).

<sup>33</sup> For the best current overview of U.S. occupation policy between 1944 and 1949, see the appropriate articles in Junker, *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges*, I.

<sup>34</sup> Boehling, *A Question of Priorities*, 30–40.

Germans. Informal contact, even the simple act of shaking hands, was initially prohibited between American soldiers and German residents.<sup>35</sup>

However, this relatively harsh occupation regime, as it was initially conceived, quickly transformed itself into a new relationship in which American forces became the protectors and friends of the German population. The onset of the Cold War played a key role here. Already by late 1946, prospects for consolidating the four occupation zones into a unified German state in the foreseeable future seemed very slim. They became totally unrealistic in the first half of 1948 due to the decision of the three Western Powers to create a unified West German state with its own currency. The Soviets responded to the introduction of the new Deutschmark into the western zones of Berlin by blockading that city from June 1948 to May 1949. The blockade not only removed all remaining German domestic opposition (the radical left and right excepted) to the creation of the Federal Republic but also allowed West Germans to view themselves as partners in the Western struggle against international communism. Likewise, for many living in Western countries the blockade transformed West Germans, at least as represented by the West Berliners, from former wartime enemies into victims of Soviet aggression and prospective alliance partners.

On the grassroots level, a parallel transformation in the relationship between GIs and Germans was taking place. Petra Goedde argues that already “by 1947, Americans had concluded that Germans no longer posed a threat to their European neighbors but instead required protection and guardianship. And the United States was eager to provide both.” This new attitude arose in part due to sympathy for the postwar economic plight of a society in which, due to wartime casualties and the internment of German soldiers, women now seemed to bear most of the burdens (thereby producing a more sympathetic, “feminized” image of the former enemy). At the same time, the average GI viewed contacts with the locals as completely nonpolitical and did his best to undermine the strict fraternization policy issued in September 1944, especially where it concerned these same women. American military authorities had no choice but to relax the fraternization ban in mid-1945 and completely abandon it by October of the same year.<sup>36</sup> It should be pointed out that not all GIs were willing to trust the Germans so quickly after

<sup>35</sup> Goedde, “From Villains to Victims,” 2.

<sup>36</sup> See the sources cited in n. 8. Citation from Goedde, “From Villains to Victims,” 20.

the end of hostilities.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, too much fraternization soon led to other problems like venereal disease and as many as thirty-seven thousand out-of-wedlock children born to American servicemen in German and Austria through 1955.<sup>38</sup> Nonetheless, these early personal contacts between GIs and Germans clearly represent one of the important sources of the postwar German–American friendship. The German brides and fiancées of U.S. service personnel (perhaps more than twenty thousand left for the United States through the end of 1949)<sup>39</sup> represented the positive side of fraternization in the American zone, just as CARE packages and the Marshall Plan symbolized the newfound American concern for Germany’s economic plight.

If relations between GIs and West Germans had been positively transformed by the end of the 1940s, it was still not clear how long the Americans would be staying in the Federal Republic. Demobilizing the forces in Europe had been a priority for the U.S. government immediately following the war. Of the almost 1.9 million U.S. servicemen in Germany in 1945, only 88,706 remained, together with 44,337 dependents, by 1950.<sup>40</sup> American plans for defending Western Europe, as outlined in the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1948 emergency war plan “OFF TACKLE,” involved a “peripheral” defense from bases in the United Kingdom and the Western Mediterranean. Even the creation of NATO the following year did not convince American officials that holding Central Europe against a Soviet offense was a viable option for the immediate future unless the European allies greatly strengthened their defense preparations and West Germany was rearmed. Given the circumstances, this last proposition was highly controversial.<sup>41</sup> Then on June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea.

<sup>37</sup> Kleinschmidt, “Besatzer und Deutsche,” 144–51, 197–219, 236–7.

<sup>38</sup> See Jennifer Evans’s article in this volume, and Perry Biddiscombe, “Dangerous Liaisons: The Anti-Fraternization Movement in the U.S. Occupation Zones of Germany and Austria, 1945–1948,” *Journal of Social History* 34, no. 3 (2001): 611–47.

<sup>39</sup> Kleinschmidt, “Besatzer und Deutsche,” 170. Each year during the 1950s more than five thousand German women married American servicemen. Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, 105.

<sup>40</sup> See Appendix.

<sup>41</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA, 1994), 276ff., 321ff.; Bruno Thoß, “The Presence of American Troops in Germany,” in *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945–1955*, ed. Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, and Hermann-Josef Rupieper (New York, 1993), 411–32; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (updated ed.; New York, 1994), 37.

## V

Even without the outbreak of the Korean War, it is likely that the American military commitment to Europe would have increased; that NATO would have been restructured and strengthened; and that progress would have been made toward West German sovereignty and rearmament. Because of the widespread impression that the West was falling behind in the Cold War due to the “loss” of China and the explosion of a Soviet nuclear device in 1949; because NATO’s deficiencies were widely recognized; and because it was thought that the Federal Republic could not be occupied indefinitely without severe consequences, these options were being seriously considered in NATO capitals by 1950. The Korean War, however, greatly accelerated progress on all three fronts. By mid-1951 U.S. military power was nearly double what it had been in early 1950, and the Truman administration had abandoned its budgetary restraint in favor of moving toward the force levels foreseen in National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68), which had been presented to Harry Truman in April 1950, two months before the start of hostilities. The European allies also increased their military spending from less than 5.5 percent of gross national product (GNP) on average in 1950 to more than 12 percent. By 1953, NATO had not only a new administrative structure but also nearly seven million soldiers at its disposal as well as a dense network of bases and airstrips in Europe. Moreover, the two American divisions in West Germany had now become six.<sup>42</sup> By 1951, 252,235 servicemen were stationed there, and these numbers would not fall below two hundred thousand again until after the end of the Cold War.<sup>43</sup>

When the Korean War ended in 1953, there was no end in sight to either the division of Germany or the Cold War, and the Americans and the West Germans had come to accept the fact that GIs would be stationed in Germany more or less permanently. During a meeting in Paris

<sup>42</sup> William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ, 1995), 349ff. See also Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, esp. 312–97; Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, 31–49; and Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945–1954* (Cambridge, 1998), 265–365.

<sup>43</sup> See Appendix. These troop levels reflected the Federal Republic’s strategic importance as a front-line state between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Of the 374 major U.S. military installations overseas in 1988, 224 (60%) were in West Germany. The same year the United States based approximately two-thirds of its troops in Europe on the Federal Republic’s territory. West Germany received well more than half of the U.S. financial contribution to NATO in the 1980s as well. Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, 56.

on December 13, 1953, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that everyone agreed the continued presence of American forces in West Germany was vital and necessary. Adenauer also assured Dulles that the relationship between the American troops and the German population was good. “Surprisingly good,” interjected American High Commissioner James J. Conant, who was also present.<sup>44</sup> Indeed, from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s an era of good feelings existed between the GIs and Germans.

Because housing in the American zone was in short supply and often did not meet the GIs’ space or comfort requirements, the Truman administration began a massive construction project to create new military bases in the Federal Republic. As Thomas Leuerer describes in his contribution to this volume, they quickly became known as “Little Americas.” The U.S. servicemen and their families living on the new bases had access to American-style schools, supermarkets, and recreational facilities. The Little Americas made life more comfortable and helped reduce discipline problems. Moreover, the presence of the troops’ families reassured West Germans that the United States was firmly committed to their defense and signaled to the Warsaw Pact that NATO had no intention of attacking unless provoked. These considerations outweighed the disadvantages that the presence of so many civilians might bring during an outbreak of hostilities. As Theodor Scharnholtz argues in this volume, the establishment of the Little Americas was not an attempt to segregate the GIs from the German population but was aimed, rather, at supplying them with accommodations that better fit their needs. One important attempt to lessen the isolation of the Little Americas involved American officers’ wives and their families who, as Donna Alvah writes, served as unofficial ambassadors to the German community.

By the late 1950s, the GIs had become a factor of considerable importance for the West German economy. Already in 1945, the American military employed approximately 168,000 locals as translators, nurses’ aides, clerks, and other support staff. By 1951, the figure had risen to more than 220,000; the U.S. Armed Forces had nearly as many Germans in its employ as the West German electrical industry. In some parts of southern Germany, where most of the Little Americas were located, the American military was the most important local employer.

<sup>44</sup> Memo of the December 13, 1953, conversation between John Foster Dulles and Konrad Adenauer in Paris, in *Akten zur Auwärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1953 II*, ed. Auswärtiges Amt (Munich, 2001), 1073–79, here on p. 1077.



During the 1950s, it also spent approximately DM 6 billion constructing new bases and another DM 95 million on local procurement. American military spending contributed on average 0.8 percent annually to the Federal Republic's GNP through 1960 and therefore played a substantial role in the West German "economic miracle."<sup>45</sup> Scharnholtz finds that that Heidelberg profited nicely between 1948 and 1955 from direct U.S. military expenditures as well as from private spending by American soldiers and their families, although there was sometimes discontent with U.S. Army requisitioning of buildings and other policies.

American servicemen and the Little Americas also had a direct cultural impact on West Germany. Two distinct phases of American cultural and social influence on the Federal Republic after 1945 can be discerned. The first, which can be described as "Americanization from above," lasted into the mid-1950s and was characterized by cultural transfers resulting from U.S. government programs – for example the America Houses, the generally positive influence of OMGUS on the development of a free West German press, and the exchange programs that produced an America-friendly "Fulbright Generation" of elites in Germany. During the second half of the decade, "Americanization from below" – cultural transfer arising from the decision of West Germans to adopt American styles, habits, music, and the like – became more important than "Americanization from above."<sup>46</sup> Although we are only beginning to understand the GIs' role in the Americanization of the Federal Republic, they seem to have served as transmitters of American culture from "above" and "below" during the 1950s. For example, the radio stations of the American Forces Network, along with its British counterpart and Radio Luxembourg, played an important role in introducing the younger German public to jazz and rock and roll.<sup>47</sup> "Americanization" was most intense in the communities that hosted U.S. military bases. Residents

<sup>45</sup> Dewey A. Browder, "The GI Dollar and the Wirtschaftswunder," *Journal of European Economic History* 22 (1993): 601–12.

<sup>46</sup> Axel Schildt, "Americanization," in Junker, *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War*, 1, 635–42.

<sup>47</sup> Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, CA, 2000) briefly mentions the role of these networks in spreading American music in both Germanys. Specifically on American Forces Network in Germany, see Richard C. Helt, "A German Bluegrass Festival: The 'Country-Boom' and Some Notes on the History of American Popular Music in West Germany," *Journal of Popular Culture* 10, no. 4 (Spring 1977): 821–32; R. S. Craig, "The American Forces Network in the Cold War: Military Broadcasting in Germany," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 32, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 307–21; and Joseph Hoppe, "AFN Berlin:

often had direct daily contact with Americans and were familiar with their free-spending ways, their modern apartments complete with the latest household appliances, their blue jeans, and their impossibly large automobiles.<sup>48</sup>

A form of Americanization also occurred within the Federal Republic's newly established armed forces during the 1950s. As two contributions to this volume demonstrate, however, it was a selective process even though it had strong backing from officials on both sides. Wolfgang Schmidt argues that the West German air force (Luftwaffe) was very open to American influence. However, as Klaus Naumann demonstrates, American influence on the army (Bundeswehr) remained limited. One key difference in the two services' experiences with Americanization was the fact that jet propulsion had revolutionized air warfare in the decade between the end of the war and the creation of the new Luftwaffe. Only a handful of German pilots had experience flying jets and then only in the technology's very earliest stages. The Luftwaffe was thus heavily dependent on American assistance. The Bundeswehr, by contrast, could draw on Wehrmacht military doctrine that had proved its utility during the war and had not been rendered obsolete by technological change.

There was another way in which contacts between GIs and Germans contributed to important social changes, and this time both on the other side of the Atlantic and globally. In the words of Colin Powell, who was stationed as a young officer there in the late 1950s, "Germany was a breath of freedom" for African American servicemen. He recalled that they "could go where they wanted, eat where they wanted, and date whom they wanted, just like other people."<sup>49</sup> It is true that despite President Truman's 1948 executive order, military desegregation occurred in practice only due to the impact of the Korean War and after intensive lobbying by civil rights organizations and the black press (the U.S. European Command became integrated only in late 1954). Moreover, these measures did not apply to the local communities that hosted bases worldwide. Therefore African American GIs often encountered discrimination in the parts of Germany where they were stationed, for example

'Frolic at Five' – Mehr als ein Soldatensender," in *Coca-Cola, Jazz und AFN. Berlin und die Amerikaner*, ed. Tamara Domentat (Berlin, 1995).

<sup>48</sup> Besides Alvah's contribution to this volume, see Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, 17–84, 226–332.

<sup>49</sup> This and the following paragraph are based on Höhn and Klimke, *A Breath of Freedom*; Powell quote from *ibid.*, 83.

in housing or access to businesses and restaurants. Germans sometimes even implied that their own racism was merely modeled on the American example of “Jim Crow.” U.S. commanders, especially those from the South, saw no great need to intervene to change these local standards, and the Defense Department in the 1950s clearly feared the implications of instituting a general policy of working for nondiscrimination in base communities, which would of course include those in the United States.

In the Federal Republic, however, African American GIs encountered nothing like the systematic discrimination associated with Jim Crow in the Southern United States and found friends and supporters in the German community as well as greater integration with white GIs. Increasingly influenced by developments in the U.S. civil rights movement, they also protested against remaining discrimination on bases (e.g., the lack of black officers and what they saw as a biased system of military justice) and in the local German community, where by 1960 sit-ins were taking place in segregated restaurants. By 1964, the U.S. government had formally investigated racism in the military and also began putting pressure on host communities worldwide to end discriminatory practices. When reform measures stalled in the late 1960s, in part due to the military’s focus on the Vietnam War, a new generation of African American GIs influenced by the Black Power movement responded by making an alliance with student radicals in the Federal Republic to call attention to their situation. This resulted in a new round of investigations as well as a major pledge by the West German government to fund construction of new barracks and off-base housing. Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke conclude that “to a considerable extent, it was the protest activities of African American GI activists stationed in Germany that transformed the US military into the most integrated institution of the United States by the mid-1970s.”<sup>50</sup>

There were other tensions between the West Germans and Americans during the 1950s and 1960s concerning the stationing of U.S. military forces in the Federal Republic. Some of them were strategic in nature. In order to ensure that the Federal Republic’s entire territory did not end up a battlefield in the event of war with the Soviet bloc, the West German government insisted that NATO pursue a strategy of “forward defense.” Although the alliance finally adopted that strategy in 1963, as Bruno Thoß points out, demands for increasing numbers of American troops

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 4–5.

in Vietnam meant that this commitment could not really be fulfilled in strength. By contrast, as Dennis Showalter writes, due to their experiences on the Russian front, German generals in the 1950s preferred a flexible defense using mobile forces and were not enamored with the Eisenhower administration's policy of immediate "massive retaliation" to deter a Soviet attack. The Kennedy administration would frustrate their desire to have direct access to tactical nuclear weapons, which they thought could usefully supplement conventional tactics. Only in the 1980s would the American and German military leaderships truly agree on battlefield strategy. The question of financial support from the Federal Republic for the continued stationing of American troops in the form of "offset payments" also troubled German-American relations in the 1960s, as Zimmermann recounts in his essay.

NATO's intention to defend Central Europe using tactical nuclear weapons and the Adenauer government's intention to obtain access to such weapons sparked mass protests in the Federal Republic. Press reports on NATO's June 1955 "Carte Blanche" exercise, which envisioned alliance forces using 335 nuclear weapons on West German territory to repel a Soviet bloc offensive (with an estimated 5.2 million civilians dead and wounded in the immediate aftermath), shocked many West Germans. On April 12, 1957, which coincided with the arrival of American medium-range nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic, eighteen of Germany's most famous physicists issued the "Göttingen Manifesto" condemning the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In 1958, the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) launched a public protest movement named the "Struggle Against Atomic Death" (Kampf dem Atomtod).<sup>51</sup> Starting in April 1960, religious leaders, pacifists, scientists, intellectuals, and miscellaneous members of the middle class picked up the mantle from the SPD and the unions and began what became known as the "Campaign for Disarmament," the first West German variation of the international antinuclear protest known as the "Easter Marches." It reached its high

<sup>51</sup> Detlef Bald, *Die Atombewaffnung der Bundeswehr. Militär, Öffentlichkeit und Politik in der Ära Adenauer* (Bremen, Germany, 1994); Lawrence S. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970* (Stanford, CA, 1997), 18–19, 61–7; Michael Geyer, "Cold War Angst: The Case of West-German Opposition to Rearmament and Nuclear Weapons," in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton, NJ, 2001), 376–408; Alice Holmes Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements Since 1945* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1996), 25–81.

*Introduction*

21

watermark in 1967 when 150,000 Germans, most of them young, turned out for approximately eight hundred events associated with that year's march.<sup>52</sup>

Another source of tension was the GIs' legal status in Germany. Under the Occupation Statute, Britain, France and the United States retained full jurisdiction over their forces stationed in West Germany and Berlin until 1955. Yet even after the Federal Republic gained sovereignty and joined NATO in 1955, the troops of the three Western Allied powers of World War II continued to have special legal status. The 1954 Convention on the Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany gave the three Western Allies the right to station troops in the Federal Republic permanently on account of their continued rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole. A parallel agreement, the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, governed the stationing of American, British, Canadian, Danish, French, and Benelux soldiers on German soil. Although on the surface this last convention legally transformed these NATO militaries from occupiers to allies, they retained privileges that led some West German observers to doubt whether their country truly had been granted full sovereignty. Many more categories of persons were exempted from German legal jurisdiction than was normally the case in stationing agreements; the German authorities' prerogative in enforcing national laws was restricted; and allied military police had far-reaching rights. In his contribution to this volume, Gerhard Fürmetz illustrates how the German police through the mid-1950s had virtually no ability to apprehend GIs who had broken German laws. Even for traffic violations they had to call in American military police. In addition, the Federal Republic was required to make available to the allied forces all necessary accommodations, food, supplies, and services. It was not until 1963, when it became party to a 1959 NATO supplemental status of forces agreement, that the Federal Republic's territorial sovereignty, domestic legal order, and other essential interests were recognized on a more equal basis.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 219–22, 443; Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 83–116; Karl A. Otto, *Vom Ostermarsch zur APO: Geschichte der ausserparlamentarischen Opposition in der Bundesrepublik, 1960–1970* (Frankfurt, 1977).

<sup>53</sup> Delbrück, "International Law and Military Forces Abroad," 103, 107–11; Daniel Hofmann, *Truppenstationierung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Die Vertragsverhandlungen mit den Westmächten 1951–1959* (Munich, 1997).

## VI

By the early 1980s, many innkeepers and restaurateurs in southern Germany in the vicinity of U.S. military bases were posting signs that read “Off Limits for GIs.” They were afraid that American servicemen would scare away their German clientele, start brawls with other patrons, or engage in illegal activities like selling drugs. In the fall of 1981, officials at the Army’s European headquarters in Heidelberg (USAREUR: U.S. Army, Europe) knew of 140 establishments that barred GIs. That was a miniscule minority of the estimated 206,000 bars and restaurants then doing business in the Federal Republic, but they were concentrated in the thirty-three communities with the largest American military presence. The figure also did not include many restaurants and bars that closed their doors to GIs occasionally. Some, for example, welcomed American servicemen during the week, when business was slow, and then forbade them entrance on the weekend, when most of their German customers showed up. Some never formally prohibited servicemen from entering but did not serve them, and others instituted dress codes or imposed expensive membership fees intended to keep them out. Sometimes GIs retaliated by filing suits in German court or, more commonly, by smashing windows and destroying other property at offending nightspots. It was not unprecedented for West German innkeepers and restaurateurs in towns near American bases to deny military access; as Alexander Vazan-sky points out in his essay in this collection, black servicemen in particular had long experienced such treatment. But it would have been unimaginable in the 1950s that so many German businesses would discriminate broadly against GIs as in the early 1980s. The situation spurred German and American authorities to take action, and by 1984 the number of establishments that formally prohibited GIs had fallen to only forty.<sup>54</sup>

The “Off Limits to GIs” signs were only one indication that relations between GIs and local Germans, like the political relations between the United States and West Germany, had become strained since the late 1960s. The overwhelming majority of West Germans still supported the U.S. military presence in their country, but, as Daniel Nelson noted in 1987, the crucial question was whether the “respect and prestige that U.S. forces in the Federal Republic once enjoyed” could be restored. If

<sup>54</sup> Philipp Gassert, “With America Against America: Anti-Americanism in West Germany,” in Junker, *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War. Vol. 2, 1968–1990*, 502–9; here on p. 504, and Daniel Nelson, *Defenders or Intruders?*, 143–6.

the German public's respect for the American forces deteriorated further, Nelson warned, the U.S. military presence in the Federal Republic would not be viable in the long run.<sup>55</sup>

Probably the single most important factor behind the new tensions was the decline in living standards for American servicemen in Germany. During the 1950s and 1960s, one dollar bought about four D-Mark, and GIs in Germany had an extremely high standard of living as a result. Due to the growing strength of the West German economy and the Nixon administration's decision in 1971 to take the dollar off the gold standard, the exchange rate had fallen to DM 2.50/\$1 by 1975 and hit an unprecedented low of DM 1.72/\$1 in October 1978. The dollar began to strengthen against the mark in 1982 and by 1985 its value approached DM 3/\$1, but then the exchange rate plummeted again shortly thereafter and would remain below DM 2/\$1 until the end of the 1990s.<sup>56</sup> The dollar's weakness affected enlisted men and their families most adversely, but even officers sometimes felt its effects, as, for instance, when they had to accept poorer housing than they were used to back home.

The difficulties caused by the weak dollar were compounded by the underfunding of the military in the wake of the Vietnam War. As Anni P. Baker points out, "by 1979 military pay was below the U.S. minimum wage."<sup>57</sup> Moreover, the dollar crisis coincided with rapidly deteriorating housing conditions in the Little Americas, most of which had been built in the 1950s and not renovated since then. Many servicemen in the late 1970s sought to move off base into either U.S. government-owned apartments or private German housing.<sup>58</sup> Relatively few, however, were in a position to pursue this strategy. Low incomes confined servicemen and their dependents to the Little Americas to a much larger extent than had been the case in the 1950s and 1960s. GIs and their families also began making increasing use of the subsidized foodstuffs and services available at the American Post Exchanges and limiting their reliance on German businesses.<sup>59</sup> As one U.S. staff sergeant told the German paper

<sup>55</sup> Nelson, *Defenders or Intruders*, 3–4, 234–6, quote on pp. 235–6.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 178–9; Harold James, "The Deutsche Mark and the Dollar: Domestic Price Stability and International Currencies," in Junker, *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War*, 2, 228–34; here on p. 229 (Graph 1).

<sup>57</sup> Anni Baker, "U.S. Forces in Europe," in *Europe since 1945: An Encyclopedia*, vol. 2, ed. Bernard A. Cook (New York, 2001), 1325–8, here on p. 1327.

<sup>58</sup> Nelson, *Defenders or Intruders*, 179–89.

<sup>59</sup> Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, 224.

*Welt am Sonntag* in 1978, “my real enemy is no longer the Russian, my enemy is poverty.”<sup>60</sup>

The deterioration in GIs’ living standards negatively influenced German perceptions of them. Even with cost-of-living adjustments and other subsidies, GIs in the lower ranks who had their families with them could often afford only the poorest private accommodations in neighborhoods most Germans tended to avoid. Like recent immigrants from Southern Europe and the Middle East who came to the Federal Republic without skills or without being able to speak German, the wives of servicemen seeking employment often were forced to take low-paying, unskilled jobs. German landlords began to doubt, with some justice, whether GIs would be able to pay their rent and sometimes stopped accepting them as tenants. By the 1980s, West Germans were even making jokes about the clunky old cars that American personnel drove, a dramatic reflection of how far GI living standards had fallen since the 1960s.<sup>61</sup> Attempts by the Carter and, in particular, Reagan administrations to improve wages and facilities did not substantially change the fact that in less than ten years GIs and their dependents in Germany had gone from living like kings to living like paupers. As Hans Gephardt and Petra Jung demonstrated in a paper at the GIs in Germany conference in 2000, it seemed as if by that date GIs and Germans in Heidelberg lived in parallel but separate universes, despite a high degree of routine contacts between the two groups.<sup>62</sup> Already two decades earlier, Signe Seiler described the prevailing attitude of GIs stationed in the Federal Republic toward the locals as “no objection to friendship in moderation, but integration? *Nein, danke.*”<sup>63</sup>

Social and cultural changes in both the United States and the Federal Republic added to the problems the U.S. forces in Germany faced during the 1970s and 1980s. In their essays in this volume, Howard J. De Nike and Alexander Vazansky describe the crisis that had developed by the early 1970s, the late stage of the Vietnam era. Dissent within the

<sup>60</sup> Quoted in Nelson, *Defenders or Intruders*, 180.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 179–89.

<sup>62</sup> Hans Gebhardt and Petra Jung, “Living in Heidelberg: Images and Perceptions of American Soldiers and Their Families,” unpublished paper delivered at the GIs in Germany conference, November 11, 2000, Heidelberg, Germany.

<sup>63</sup> Signe Seiler, *Die GIs. Amerikanische Soldaten in Deutschland* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, Germany, 1985), 265. See also Donna Alvah, “U.S. Military Families Abroad in the Post-Cold War Era and the “New Global Posture,” in Höhn and Moon, *Over There*, 149–75, here on pp. 162–4, and John Palmer Hawkins, *Army of Hope, Army of Alienation: Culture and Contradiction in the American Army Communities of Cold War Germany* (Westport, CT, 2001).



ranks due to the war and the draft, use of illegal drugs, and protests by minority soldiers against the discrimination they faced both on and off base were just some of the major internal problems the American military faced. Discontent among the GIs was evidenced in a growing number of incidences of insubordination and violence. After initial hesitation, military officials addressed many of the enlisted men's complaints over the course of the next decade. They issued regulations guaranteeing freedom of expression for its servicemen, clamped down on racial discrimination, and upgraded military housing. Perhaps most importantly, the U.S. government repealed the draft and established an "All Volunteer Force" in 1973.

Although the worst discipline problems had been resolved, many observers found the situation far from ideal in the 1980s. In April 1982, for example, *U.S. News and World Report* ran an article questioning whether the U.S. forces in Europe were ready for action. It stated that "despite the denials of ranking US officers, critics ranging from top sergeants to West German cabinet officials assert that lack of education, low morale and alcohol and drug abuse make many of the nearly 340,000 US service men and women in Europe ill-prepared for combat."<sup>64</sup> Taking stock in 1987, Daniel Nelson went so far as to recommend a public debate on reinstating the draft.<sup>65</sup>

The most dramatic response to the U.S. troops in Germany came in the form of terrorist attacks, a legacy of the social changes of the 1960s. The large West German student movement of that decade had protested against the Vietnam War, which it saw as an act of imperialist aggression being conducted by one of the Federal Republic's allies, no less, against a Third World state. By the 1970s, the radical fringe of that movement had gravitated toward terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF). Such groups never had more than several dozen active members and a few hundred collaborators and sympathizers, and the vast majority of West Germans did not share their goal of overthrowing the Federal Republic's democratic-capitalist system, let alone approve their methods. Starting in May 1972, with the explosion of three large bombs at the Fifth Corps Headquarters in Frankfurt, attacks on U.S. military installations and personnel in Germany would occur sporadically over the next two decades. Most of the attacks occurred in or near three

<sup>64</sup> Robert Haeger, "Can GIs in Europe Answer a Call to Combat?," *US News and World Report*, April 19, 1982, 59.

<sup>65</sup> Nelson, *Defenders and Intruders*, 253–6.

cities: West Berlin, Frankfurt, and Heidelberg. Each had a substantial U.S. military presence, and the first two also had a very large left-wing underground political scene in which terrorists could easily find support and refuge. Heidelberg was especially important because it was the site of USAREUR headquarters. On September 15, 1981, about two weeks after the RAF set off a massive bomb at Ramstein Air Base that seriously injured twenty-two persons and caused tremendous property damage, terrorists tried to assassinate the USAREUR commander-in-chief, General Frederick J. Kroesen, by firing antitank rockets at his car as he and his wife drove into Heidelberg from their home east of the city. On August 8, 1985, another RAF bomb at Rhein-Main Air Base outside Frankfurt took the lives of two people and wounded twenty others after terrorists kidnapped and killed a U.S. Army specialist and took his military I.D. to gain access to the facility. These are just a few of the most important incidents in a campaign that thankfully came to an end in the early 1990s when the remaining members of the RAF gave up what they now saw as a hopeless cause.<sup>66</sup> U.S. military personnel in the Federal Republic faced terror threats from non-Germans as well. On April 5, 1986, a terrorist bomb demolished a Berlin disco popular with servicemen, killing three persons and injuring 230. Nine days later, the Reagan administration ordered air strikes on Libya, whose government was known to have assisted the bombers.

The most significant sign socially of new tensions between GIs and Germans, however, was the mass demonstrations against the stationing of NATO medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe in the early 1980s. The West German antinuclear movement revived in the late 1970s in response to the discussion of the neutron bomb and NATO's 1979 decision to deploy American Pershing II rockets and BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe to counter the USSR's new SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In November 1980, prominent German peace activists issued what became known as the Krefeld Appeal protesting the stationing of NATO's new missiles. The meeting that gave rise to the appeal coincided with the first *Friedenswoche* ("Peace Week") organized by West Germany's Protestant churches. Antinuclear activities were held in 350 towns and cities during

<sup>66</sup> In general, see Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Nelson, *Defenders or Intruders?*, 164–9, covers the attacks through 1985.

the *Friedenswoche*, which became an annual event. The German peace movement reached truly massive proportions in response to the Reagan administration's aggressive rhetoric on nuclear weapons. Between 1980 and 1983 roughly four million West Germans signed the Krefeld Appeal. The first of what became a series of mass demonstrations against NATO's plans took place in June 1981; the demonstrations reached a peak on October 10, when three hundred thousand Germans gathered in Bonn.<sup>67</sup>

Lou Marin, who edited the peace movement journal *Graswurzelrevolution* at the time of the anti-Pershing protests, describes the movement's internal dynamics in his contribution to this volume. He argues that anti-Americanism was much less of a motivating force among the members of the independent peace movement than it was members of West Germany's political parties and other mainstream organizations. Anni P. Baker makes two points with important implications for our understanding of the protests in her study of the protests at the Wiesbaden Air Base. First, West Germans were not only upset about NATO's nuclear weapons. Wiesbaden residents were concerned with quality-of-life issues like noise pollution caused by military aircraft. Second, the West German government helped transform these local complaints into a large-scale protest by seeming to favor good relations with the American military and NATO over the concerns of its own citizens. West Germans were becoming increasingly annoyed with disturbances like low-flying NATO jets (*Tiefflieger*) and military maneuvers that tied up traffic and destroyed property. In the late 1980s, several crashes involving military aircraft – most notably one at an air show at Ramstein Air Base on August 28, 1988, that killed seventy spectators and seriously injured hundreds more – drew heated criticism. A public debate ensued over the Federal Republic's "sovereignty deficit" that even reached the *Bundestag*'s question period on March 4, 1989.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Cooper, *Paradoxes of Peace*, 117–234; Jeffrey Herf, *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (New York, 1991); Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe 1969–87* (Ithaca, NY, 1990); Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik. Neuorientierungen und Entscheidungsprozesse im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1977–1984* (Mainz, Germany, 1988); Jeffrey Boutwell, *The German Nuclear Dilemma* (Ithaca, NY, 1996).

<sup>68</sup> Christian Raap, *Die Souveränität der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des militärischen Bereichs und der deutschen Einheit* (Frankfurt, 1992), 1ff.; Michael Pehlke, *Die Souveränität der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im westlichen Bündnis. Historische und aktuelle Aspekte* (Munich, 1994), 1ff.

Combined with serviceman poverty and terrorist attacks, the antinuclear protests helped to increase the isolation of the GIs from the communities around them and even created a siege mentality on American military bases in Germany. Developments in international politics would soon transform the entire situation, however. On December 8, 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which called for the complete destruction of the Pershing IIs, cruise missiles, and SS-20s by 1991. By the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War was clearly in sight. But the future of the GIs in Germany was far less certain.

## VII

Although the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton wanted to reduce the size of the armed forces to reflect the post-Cold War international political situation, the GIs and bases in Germany continued to play an important role in American operations overseas. American troops and facilities in Germany were crucial to the combat and peace-keeping missions in the former Yugoslavia and to the Gulf Wars of 1990–1 and 2003. They have also had a major part in training the militaries of the new NATO member states in Eastern Europe. A massive withdrawal of American servicemen from Germany did occur between 1990 and 1992 that reduced their numbers from 227,586 to 134,483. A series of additional cuts subsequently brought the number down to 48,878 by 1996, when it again began to rise modestly, reaching 74,796 in 2003.<sup>69</sup>

The impact of this partial withdrawal on the German economy was difficult to disentangle from the consequences of the withdrawal of other NATO and, in the former German Democratic Republic, Soviet forces and the simultaneous downsizing of the Bundeswehr. In 1990, for example, 0.9 percent of the population of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia was military personnel (149,000 German and other NATO, mostly British, soldiers), and 1.4 percent of its territory was used for military purposes. Military bases in the state employed fifty-four thousand civilians. By 2002, only an estimated sixty-two thousand troops and twenty-six thousand civilian employees remained. More than three

<sup>69</sup> See Appendix. The figure for 2003, which includes servicemen deployed to Iraq, is taken from U.S. Department of Defense, “Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and Country (309A),” December 31, 2003, <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/M05/hst1203.pdf> (accessed November 1, 2011).

hundred municipalities had received more than eight thousand hectares of land and twenty-eight thousand housing units formerly used by West German and foreign forces that they could use as they wished.<sup>70</sup>

German communities utilized this new real estate in different ways – and not always in the best manner to recoup the direct losses to the local economy. Many simply employed former bases and Army housing in response to pressure from the German federal government to assist it with tasks such as accommodating refugees and, in particular, ethnic German “resettlers” (*Aussiedler*) from Eastern Europe.<sup>71</sup> Other municipalities were more creative. In Schwäbisch Gmünd, for example, former U.S. officer housing has been sold to private citizens and is now part of the local tax base. In the state of Rhineland-Palatinate, communities like Zweibrücken, Sembach, Bitburg, and Hahn have converted former U.S. Air Force bases into commercial airfields, industrial parks, and entertainment centers and have secured millions of dollars of investment in the process. The former headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Army Corps in Frankfurt, the onetime IG-Farben complex, now houses the University of Frankfurt’s humanities departments. Perhaps the most innovative conversion project occurred in Bremen: a former American base there now serves as the campus of the Jacobs University Bremen, which was founded as the International University Bremen in 1999 by the University of Bremen and Rice University.<sup>72</sup>

One thing does seem clear: the American withdrawal had very negative consequences for many small towns in Southern Germany. American military-related spending was a crucial factor in the economies of these rural areas.<sup>73</sup> Assessing the impact of U.S. cutbacks and base closings in Bavaria, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* reported in 2001 that some communities, especially those without easy Autobahn access, faced severe economic hardship. By contrast, large and mid-size Bavarian communities

<sup>70</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 2, 2001. See also Hartmut Berbermeyer and Christian Thimann, “The Economic Impact of the Stationing of U.S. Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Sharp, ed., *Europe After an American Withdrawal*, 97–118.

<sup>71</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 2, 2001. On Rhineland-Palatinate, see Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, 223ff.

<sup>72</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 2, 2001. Another smaller international university existed on the grounds of the former American base in Schwäbisch Gmünd from 1992 to 2002 until its American sponsor, the University of Maryland University College, decided to discontinue its funding.

<sup>73</sup> Berbermeyer and Thimann, “The Economic Impact of the Stationing of U.S. Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany,” 113–14.

with a more diverse local economy were able to cope somewhat better.<sup>74</sup> Meanwhile the communities with American bases that survived the cut-backs of the 1990s became increasingly concerned about the future. In 2003, the mayors of Kaiserslauten and Ramstein, cities where two of the largest remaining U.S. military facilities in Germany were located, traveled to Washington to lobby on behalf of preserving “their” bases.<sup>75</sup>

Their visit came at a time when the end of American military basing in Germany seemed to be drawing near. Although the basic ideas dated back to the Clinton administration, the George W. Bush administration implemented plans for a “new global posture” that would reduce the number of servicemen and military families stationed abroad.<sup>76</sup> Shortly after his appointment, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made clear that he wished to restructure and streamline the U.S. Armed Forces to better meet American security requirements in the post-Cold War world. In his words, “more agile” forces that substitute high-tech weapon and information systems for manpower and heavy equipment were necessary to respond to new threats like international terrorists or rogue states possessing weapons of mass destruction. There was no more place for large, permanent, Little America-style bases in Rumsfeld’s plans. Instead, most U.S. soldiers and their dependents would now be based in the United States and be deployed to more rudimentary bases overseas when necessary.<sup>77</sup> The international fallout from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 provided further impetus toward implementing these plans. The U.S. government announced its intention to further dismantle the American network of military bases in Germany and to establish substitute bases on the territories of the new NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe. This was due to the opposition to the invasion by what members of the

<sup>74</sup> *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 2, 2001, 6.

<sup>75</sup> “Deutsche Bürgermeister werben um Erhalt von US-Stützpunkten,” *DPA-Europadienst*, June 12, 2003.

<sup>76</sup> Alvah, “U.S. Military Families Abroad in the Post-Cold War Era and the ‘New Global Posture,’” 149–50, 164–5.

<sup>77</sup> Michael Barone, “The CEO at DOD,” *US News and World Report* 131, no. 6 (August 13, 2001): 22; Evan Thomas and John Barry, “Now, Flexible Force,” *Newsweek* 141, no. 9 (March 2, 2003): 28–32; Mark Mazzetti, “We Have Met the Enemy –,” *U.S. News and World Report* 134, no. 21 (June 16, 2003): 21–2; “Grafenwoehr ist einzigartig” (interview with NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, U.S. Marine General James Jones), *Focus* 37 (September 8, 2003): 214–16; Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?,” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (September–October 2003): 95–103. On the lessons learned in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, see Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 4 (July–August 2003): 41–58.

George W. Bush administration termed “old Europe” (i.e., the French, German, and Belgian governments).<sup>78</sup>

The Iraq controversy reopened a recurring debate within the Western alliance: How far were the European NATO members obliged to support, or at least not oppose, American military actions outside the NATO area, especially when they involve troops stationed in Europe? The decision by Great Britain and the United States to intervene in Lebanon and Jordan using troops stationed in the Federal Republic in 1958 angered the Adenauer government, which had not been consulted in advance.<sup>79</sup> As Bruno Thoß and Hubert Zimmermann point out in their essays in this volume, U.S. troop deployments to South Vietnam severely strained American relations with West Germany and other NATO states in the 1960s.<sup>80</sup> During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, only Portugal formally allowed the United States to use its territory as a staging area for supplying Israel.<sup>81</sup> However, the United States also sent supplies from bases in the Federal Republic, despite public protests.<sup>82</sup> Finally, in the late 1970s the Schmidt government began to assert that the Basic Law forbade sending the West German armed forces outside of the NATO area or using them for purposes other than self-defense as part of a strategy to prevent the Federal Republic from becoming directly involved in American or NATO-sponsored military interventions in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Only in 1994 would the German Federal Constitutional Court decide that the Basic Law did not forbid “out-of-area” activities.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>78</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, “U.S. Military in Europe May Change; Government Is Considering Revamping Structure to Reflect New Era,” *Washington Post*, February 10, 2003; Ian Traynor, “Threat of War: Washington to Cut Bases in Germany as Its Forces Head East,” *The Guardian* (London), February 11, 2003.

<sup>79</sup> Sven Olaf Berggötz, *Nachostpolitik in der Ära Adenauer. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen 1949–1963* (Düsseldorf, Germany, 1998), 408–414; William Glenn Gray, *Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003), 90–1.

<sup>80</sup> See also Alexander Troche, “Berlin wird am Mekong verteidigt.” *Die Ostasienpolitik der Bundesrepublik in China, Taiwan und Süd-Vietnam 1954–1966* (Düsseldorf, Germany, 2001).

<sup>81</sup> Sanders, *America’s Overseas Garrisons*, 17.

<sup>82</sup> George Lavy, *Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest* (London, 1996), 180.

<sup>83</sup> Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr., “Die Regierung Schmidt und die Frage der ‘Out of Area’ – Einsätze der Bundeswehr, 1974–1982,” in *Deutschland und die USA in der Internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Festschrift für Detlef Junker*, ed. Manfred Berg and Philipp Gassert (Stuttgart, Germany, 2004), 521–41.

While addressing the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign War in August 2004, George W. Bush formally announced the “new global posture.” The Defense Department planned to withdraw as many as seventy thousand troops from Europe and Asia and reduce its civilian workforce overseas by one hundred thousand employees over the course of the coming decade. The Pentagon envisioned replacing two Army armored divisions, or thirty to forty thousand soldiers, stationed in Germany with a three to five thousand soldier-strong Stryker light armored brigade.<sup>84</sup> Thomas Leuerer notes in his contribution to this volume that the reaction in Germany to the American plans ranged from sadness and anxiety, especially in areas where U.S. troops were currently stationed, to indifference, resignation, and even relief.<sup>85</sup>

Nonetheless, there were still 54,198 U.S. servicemen stationed in Germany as of June 2011, and the Department of Defense operated 218 “sites” or facilities there as of September 2009, by far the most in any foreign country.<sup>86</sup> Since 2007, Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta have resisted fully implementing the cuts envisioned by Rumsfeld, warning that a further reduction in troop strength would seriously weaken overall U.S. military capacity; make it difficult to conduct maneuvers with allies in NATO and elsewhere; and limit American political influence abroad. Moreover, any additional major redeployment from Germany will probably be postponed until the end of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, because many of the American troops involved there have their home base in the Federal Republic. But the consolidation of forces and bases in Germany continues and seems likely to accelerate

<sup>84</sup> For details of the plan and criticism of it from Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kerry and his supporters, see Mike Allen and Josh White, “President Outlines Overseas Troop Cut,” *Washington Post*, August 17, 2004; Elisabeth Bumiller with Thom Shanker, “Bush Tells Veterans of Plan to Redeploy GIs Worldwide,” *New York Times*, August 17, 2004; Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, “15 Years After Cold War, A Troop Shift,” *Christian Science Monitor*, August 17, 2004; Peter Wallsten and John Hendron, “Bush Unveils Plan to Move Troops Home,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 17, 2004.

<sup>85</sup> For the initial German reaction, see also R. Mies, “Wenn die GIs gehen,” *Frankfurter Rundschau*, August 17, 2004; Joachim Käppner, “Ami Goes Home,” *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, August 17, 2004; Klaus-Peter Klingelschmitt, “Keine Plannungen für die Ära nach der Army,” *Die Tageszeitung*, August 17, 2004; Roger Boyes, “Balance Shifts Against GI Liberators,” *The Times* (London), August 17, 2004; Jerry Fleishman, “US Troops Are Enjoying Their Last Beer, Bratwurst,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 17, 2004.

<sup>86</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, “Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and Country (309A),” June 30, 2011, <http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst1106.pdf> (accessed November 1, 2011); U.S. Department of Defense, Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2010 Baseline, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/iel/download/bsr/bsr2010baseline.pdf> (accessed November 1, 2011).



both due to an increasing military focus on East Asia and, most importantly, due to a weak U.S. economy combined with the need to address massive federal budget deficits. In June 2010, the Defense Department announced that it would completely close its facilities in two of the classic U.S. garrison towns, Heidelberg and Mannheim, by 2015; 5,050 troops are to be restationed at nearby bases like Wiesbaden and another 1,450 brought home to the United States.<sup>87</sup>

The remaining major bases in the Federal Republic will likely remain important for the U.S. military. Some of these installations, like Ramstein Air Base in the Palatinate, the nearby military hospital complex at Landstuhl, and the Grafenwoehr Training Area near Nuremberg (with its live-fire training grounds) cannot be easily replaced and continue to serve a vital role for U.S. forces in Europe and the Middle East. But the American military is no longer interested in maintaining its other permanent bases with their large populations of dependents.<sup>88</sup> The era of the Little Americas is in all likelihood over and with it an important chapter in German–American relations.

<sup>87</sup> “Politik/Roundup: US-Armee verlegt Truppen nach Wiesbaden,” dpa-AFX Pro-Feed (June 23, 2010).

<sup>88</sup> “Grafenwoehr ist einzigartig,” *Focus* (September 8, 2003), 214–16.