Beyond the Nation: United States History in Transnational Perspective

Edited by Thomas Adam and Uwe Luebken
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INTRODUCTION

Thomas Adam and Uwe Luebken

Since its inception as an academic discipline in the nineteenth century, the study of history has been closely intertwined with nationalism. Historical scholarship, as Daniel T. Rodgers has pointed out, bent “to the task of specifying each nation’s distinctive culture, its peculiar history, its Sonderweg, its exceptionalism.” In recent years, however, transnational analyses of the past have increasingly come to the fore. Instead of focusing exclusively on the relationships between nation-states, transnational approaches place the emphasis upon the myriad of connections, entanglements, and transfers that link societies to one another.

The ascent of transnationalism has been a long and incremental process, influenced by changes in the political as well as academic landscape. Randolph Bourne was the first to use the term when, in 1916, he envisioned the United States of America as a “trans-nationality, a weaving back and forth, with the other lands, of many threads of all sizes and colors.” But, as David Armitage has pointed out, only in the second half of the twentieth century did “transnational” gain wide currency “as a term of art across the social sciences and, from thence, to the humanities.” Historians were especially slow to pick it up. Not before the 1990s were transnational questions explicitly raised within the profession.

The nation-centered view of the past had been challenged before the recent surge in transnational history, of course, albeit more implicitly than explicitly. International finance and the exchange of goods across national borders, for example, have always been important topics for economic historians; diplomatic historians, too, by the very nature of their subject, have had to conceptualize their analyses in broader than just national terms. Still, the nation remained at the center of historical research and was basically regarded as “a skin that contains the experience of the past.” Even studies of migration accepted the dominant theme of the nation-state and fit the transnational movement of people into national master narratives.

Over the last two decades or so, however, this nation-centered view of history has increasingly come under attack from a variety of angles. Postmodern analyses have deconstructed the nation’s seemingly essential character and have shown, in Benedict Anderson’s famous words, that nations are “imagined communities.” Also, newly developed fields of historical research often employ units of analysis other than the nation-state. In environmental history, for example, nations and nation-states certainly are important actors in shaping perceptions of nature and in
transforming the natural environment;\textsuperscript{8} nature itself, however, knows no boundaries. This assumption, Ted Steinberg claims, “challenges the very notion of what history has been about for more than 100 years. History is still wedded to the idea of the nation-state, a concept that is of only limited value for tracking the migratory patterns, say, of a particular species of fish.”\textsuperscript{9} Animals can cross borders as easily as snowstorms or diseases. Hence, environmental historians focus on sub-national, cross-national, or even global spaces such as watersheds, forests, ocean currents, or climate systems.\textsuperscript{10} Historians of ethnicity and migration have begun to analyze the movement of people as a system rather than simply a journey between two points. Thus, concepts that focus on communication networks, diaspora, hybridity, and in-betweenness have replaced older assimilationist approaches, and the steady and continuing ties that link regions, cities, and even villages across the globe are emphasized much more today than they were in the past.\textsuperscript{11}

The sea change is perhaps most evident in recent re-conceptualizations of transatlantic ties. The field of “Atlantic History” has discovered, or rather invented, the Atlantic Ocean as a distinct space for historical inquiry—just as Fernand Braudel did with the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{12} Shedding the view of this ocean as merely a huge barrier separating the continents, Atlantic History instead focuses on imperial and colonial entanglements across the ocean, migration (both voluntary and forced), trade, and biological exchanges.\textsuperscript{13} However, many proponents of this approach suggest that Atlantic History came to an end with the formation of modern nation-states that began after 1800, triggering dissent by advocates of a continued exchange among the people of the Atlantic world.\textsuperscript{14} From this perspective, transatlantic history is not just defined by space (the Atlantic world); it is also a methodological approach, “which focuses on the interconnectedness of human experience over the centuries in the Atlantic Basin” and which is “dedicated to analyzing the dynamic process of encounter and interchange among the peoples on all sides of the Atlantic Ocean.”\textsuperscript{15} This agenda necessarily entails a break from the narrow confines of the North Atlantic World and the inclusion of transatlantic ties in the Southern Hemisphere. Consequently, Joseph Roach, building on Paul Gilroy’s seminal work \textit{The Black Atlantic}, argues the case for the “concept of a circum-Atlantic world (as opposed to a transatlantic one),” and “insists on the centrality of the diasporic and genocidal histories of Africa and the Americas, North and South, in the creation of the culture of modernity.”\textsuperscript{16}

With all these exciting new perspectives, the growing interest in transnational history also reflects the insecurity among historians who have abandoned old master narratives and are searching for ways to replace outdated national stories. Thus, the transnational turn adds not only several new angles to the study of history but also many methodological
challenges and pitfalls. Methodologically, for example, transnational history is often difficult to situate within the larger analytical realm that has been opened up by comparative history, global history, and explicitly non-national approaches like *Histoire croisée*. Furthermore, one has to be aware that transnational actors and structures are also the result of constructive processes. Transnational networks, for example, have to be reproduced constantly: by exchanging information, by traveling, by (re-)financing the structure of such a group or simply by keeping alive the identity that nourishes transnational associations. If national communities are “imagined,” so are transnational communities. And finally, as Kiran Patel has reminded us, referring to the lack of research on transnational ties between anti-Semitic groups in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, transnationalism is not a progressive or liberating force by itself.

Transnational analyses will not obliterate the historical significance of nationalism and the nation-state. However, stripped of its essential character, the nation appears as but one of many different forms of social, cultural, and political organization. Traditional national histories are incapable of grasping the importance of the hitherto marginalized but increasingly visible web of intercultural entanglements. This is the task of transnational history. What is still lacking, though, is a large body of empirical research on the actual workings of transnational forces and actors in the past. The seven papers assembled in this volume aim to contribute to closing this gap.

Non-state actors play an important role in transnational history, whether these are tightly knit organizations like religious groups or private foundations, individuals, or a rather loose assembly of intellectuals. The transatlantic network to promote the rescue and resuscitation of victims of drowning and similar accidents, which Amanda Moniz describes in her contribution, provides an example. After the first Society for the Recovery of the Drowned had been founded in Amsterdam in 1767, Humane Societies sprang up in many cities in the North Atlantic region. Through philanthropic and medical networks, information about innovations in lifesaving techniques was shared and knowledge about the rescue and resuscitation of accident victims was exchanged across the ocean. The Philadelphia Humane Society, for example, sent lifesaving directions and pamphlets not only to similar associations in Baltimore, Wilmington, and Cincinnati, but also to such faraway places as St. Petersburg, Russia. This practice of communication, Moniz holds, “typified the outward and expansive nature of later eighteenth-century philanthropy.”

An important problem raised by Moniz’s essay is the question of whether there could have been transnational forces at work before the concept of the nation became so powerful in the nineteenth century. If one argues with Ian Tyrrell that transnational history “concerns the period
since the emergence of nation-states as important phenomena in world history” (the creation of which he dates to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648), then there obviously is a problem concerning U.S. history, since, of course, “there was no nation as such until 1776.” Even then it took at least two decades for a powerful national entity to emerge on North American soil. For two reasons, however, it does make perfect sense to use a transnational approach to colonial history and to the history of the Early American Republic, as Moniz does in her contribution. First, many European elements of the transatlantic philanthropic network that she analyzes already existed within a national framework. This was certainly true for the philanthropic organizations in London and Paris (less so, however, for those in, say, Hamburg and Vienna). Secondly, and maybe more importantly, transnational ties do not only come into being when a nation is created. Rather, they often predate, “survive,” and may even outlive the historical prevalence of nationalism.

Ely Janis addresses a different but no less challenging problem for transnational history in his essay: the problem of transnational ties to support a national cause. Janis highlights the financial and political support of Irish America for the fight against British rule in Ireland as exemplified in Charles Stewart Parnell’s 1880 tour through the United States and Canada. On his three-month trip, the president of the Irish National Land League tried to mobilize public opinion and raise money for famine relief in order to change the Irish land system. At first glance, these kinds of connections appear to be of a more national than transnational character. On closer examination, however, such entanglements indicate the ambiguous nature not only of nationalism but also of transnationalism, which can hardly be observed in a “pure” form, independent of and uninfluenced by nationalist forces.

Parnell’s mission to America in early 1880 was a crucial component in strengthening the transnational links between the Irish at home and in the United States and Canada. As Janis points out, “Nationalism served as the primary tool in this transnational project.” Its ambivalence is starkly revealed in the title of a regular column of the official Land League paper called “Transatlantic Ireland.” At the same time, Irish nationalism was important in shaping a distinct ethnic identity of Irish Americans, of which “a diasporic sense of Irishness” was a central part.

Mass migration in the nineteenth century not only challenged individual loyalties; it also transformed the traditional concept of territorial sovereignty, as Nicole M. Phelps shows in her essay on migration and United States consular officials in the Habsburg empire. Between the 1880s and the First World War, millions of people with Austrian or Hungarian citizenship traveled to the United States and became naturalized citizens. Many of these migrants returned to Europe or sent their children back to their
home countries to pursue an education there. Under Austro-Hungarian law, however, a child born to a man who held Austrian or Hungarian citizenship was an Austrian or Hungarian citizen. As Phelps shows, this dual citizenship could create many problems for the individuals affected, the most common ones being impressment into Habsburg military service and arrest for nationalist agitation. Challenged by these and other new problems deriving from transatlantic mass migration, both the United States and the Austro-Hungarian Empire expanded their consular services and increasingly claimed jurisdiction over “their” citizens abroad, thereby strengthening a new, body-based concept of sovereignty.

However, the transnational, national, and international should not be regarded as separate spheres, as Katharina Rietzler argues in her essay on Rockefeller and Carnegie support for the study of international relations in Weimar Germany. This is especially true for philanthropy, a field of activity that has always had a strong transnational character. She claims that nation-states may disrupt, change, or encourage transnational relations. Indeed, in the interwar years, state powers and national loyalties interfered with the transnational scholarly networks dedicated to the study of ‘International Relations’ that American foundations sought to encourage. German government officials tried to exploit the foundations’ efforts to secure their own policy aims. The Ministry of External Affairs, in particular, influenced the relationships between foundations and collaborators, effectively limiting transnational agency. By seeking the approval of state authorities before becoming active in Germany, philanthropic foundations generally accepted such limitations. If it is true that “even the most isolated of nation-states is a semipermeable container, washed over by forces originating beyond its shores,” then one has to acknowledge that transnational actors are profoundly shaped and influenced by nation-states, too, and a complex web of entangled relationships emerges. Rietzler’s case study is even more complicated as it involves two foundations with different values, goals, and modes of operation. Still, the personal networks the foundations had built up in the preceding years remained in place, as Rietzler argues, “while the institutions supported by American philanthropy were completely transformed in the process of Nazi Gleichschaltung.”

Like Ely Janis, Birte Timm emphasizes the importance of transnational connections in fostering nationalism and national identities, especially when a new nation-state is supposed to be carved out of the realm of an empire. Timm focuses on the workings of the Jamaica Progressive League (JPL) in New York and its ties to the local political scene in Jamaica. Founded in 1936 by Jamaican migrants Wilfred A. Domingo, Ethelred Brown, and Walter Adolphe Roberts, the JPL played an important role in the creation of a national movement for self-government in Jamaica. Many
of its members also participated in the African-American civil rights movement and international black nationalist organizations. In this respect, Timm holds, “migration was one of the most important catalysts for the intertwined histories” of the “Black Atlantic.” In Jamaica as well as in Ireland, transnational ties to ethnic groups in the United States were instrumental in shaping anti-imperialist nationalism. Not surprisingly, ties also developed between these nationally minded ethnic groups. For instance, Eileen Curran, a politically active Irish actress, was invited to give a speech at a public meeting of the Jamaica Progressive League in 1937 on “how Irish-Americans fought for Irish Freedom.”

Christina Oppel, in her essay on W. E. B. Du Bois and Nazi Germany, also dwells upon Paul Gilroy’s concept of the Black Atlantic. She reminds us that “Gilroy calls upon historians to consider the Black Atlantic one unit of analysis as it modifies traditional nationalist concepts of modern transatlantic history.” In other words, the Black Atlantic is a notion intended to expand our focus beyond the nation-state or the relations between such nation-states. At the same time, Oppel challenges recent normative approaches to diaspora that oversimplify the concept by using it as an antithesis of the national. Rereading and reinterpreting Du Bois’s writings, she maintains that the famous African-American scholar’s accounts of his visit to Berlin in 1936 are hardly reconcilable with newly established binary oppositions (like the one between nation and diaspora). Rather, Du Bois’s writings call for the application of a “transnational concept more tolerant of the national,” which leaves enough analytical space for the inclusion of hybrid, intermediary, and ambivalent identities.

Finally, in her contribution, Katja Naumann analyzes processes of transnationalization in American higher education from 1918 to 1968. During this period, she argues, history teaching at American universities underwent profound changes. Developing parallel to the rise of the United States as a world power and the increase in globalization, history teaching broadened its geographical scope. She also follows the continuities and discontinuities from the teaching of Western Civilization in the context of the First World War to the establishment of the new field of world history in response to the challenges of globalization and Westernization after the Second World War. This essay challenges older notions of the distinctiveness and separateness of the concepts of “Western Civilization” and “World History.” Naumann argues that both concepts are, in fact, closely intertwined and are “part of a more general transformation of history teaching” in American universities.

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This volume grew out of the 2007 Young Scholars Forum, a seminar for advanced doctoral students and recent PhDs organized biennially.
by the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC. 2007 marked the second time that the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Arlington hosted the event. The editors would like to thank both institutions for making the conference and this book possible. Patricia Casey Sutcliffe, an editor at the GHI, to whom we are truly grateful, made this collection a much better book. The logistical challenge of the conference was greatly alleviated by the invaluable help of Dr. Trygve Has-Ellison, Mylynka Kilgore, Greg Kosc, Shirley Frey, Ashley Sides, and Paul Rutschmann, as well as the generous support of the Dallas Goethe Center. We would especially like to express our appreciation to three distinguished scholars who contributed considerable time and energy to steering us in the right direction, most of all in the conference room, of course, but also in the shuttle bus from the hotel when necessary. All participants benefited significantly from the thoughtful comments and constructive criticism of Sonya Michel of the University of Maryland, Steven Hoelscher of the University of Texas at Austin, and Walter Kamphoefner of Texas A&M University. Last but not least, we would like to thank all the participants of the forum for two days of lively discussion in a stimulating atmosphere, which, among other things, helped the contributors sharpen their arguments for inclusion in this collection.

Thomas Adam, Uwe Luebken

Notes


11 David Buisseret, “Introduction,” in *Creolization in the Americas*, ed. Steven G. Reinhardt and David Buisseret (College Station, TX, 2000), 3–18, 5.


COSMOPOLITANISM AND PHILANTHROPY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC

Amanda Bowie Moniz

In 1795, the Humane Society of Philadelphia credited its supporters with helping to save the lives of people across half the globe. “It must afford exalted satisfaction to every member [of the Society] to find that so many are organized with the same plan, in Europe, the East & West Indies under whose care many thousands have already been restored to the general family of mankind,” the managers opined. “Every subscriber and donor, [sic] has in part contributed to reanimate Society with so many trophies of humanity.” Did the Humane Society of Philadelphia (PHS), a charitable organization devoted to promoting the rescue and resuscitation of victims of drowning and certain other accidents, really mean to say that its supporters had an impact on such a grand scale? In its reports, the London-based Royal Humane Society (RHS) struck a similar chord: it told supporters they were benefactors of the human race and explained that the charity aimed at nothing less than “the deliverance of the whole human race from sudden calamities.” Likewise, the speaker at the 1805 anniversary festival of the Merrimack Humane Society in Newburyport, Massachusetts, noted that the group extended the benefits of other humane societies by acting in concert with them, and he lauded the impartiality of the society, which, he explained, aided sufferers regardless of political leanings or national background. Cosmopolitanism was evidently the order of the day.

This emphasis on moral responsibility to strangers marks an important change in Anglo-American philanthropy from the early eighteenth century. Earlier, acting on universal benevolence had been seen as impractical, British and American involvement in transatlantic philanthropic projects had been geared to strengthening international Protestantism and the British Empire, and charities, especially in America, generally confined the provision of aid to certain religious or ethnic groups.1 In the late eighteenth century, by contrast, Anglo-American philanthropists embraced a cosmopolitan conception of charitable obligation and reached for a global practice.

This essay asks what the activities of humane societies reveal about that transformation and about understandings of philanthropy in the early republic, a time of great growth in humanitarian activity. Historians have not devoted much attention to the rescue and resuscitation cause in the United States, and discussions of it tend to provoke puzzlement. It is
significant, however, for facilitating lifesaving and contributing to workplace safety. Of greater importance for the history of philanthropy were several features of humane societies that made the movement an ideal outlet for universalist impulses. These included the ease of participating in an international project, the emphasis on cooperation with fellow humane societies, and impartiality in regard to beneficiaries of the societies’ aid, which made the movement a microcosm of the direction of Anglo-American beneficence in the late eighteenth century. Americans built the urban charitable infrastructure of the early republic within this context of the development of cosmopolitan philanthropy.2

To explore this topic, I analyze the Philadelphia and Massachusetts humane societies, with attention also to the Royal Humane Society in London. In this essay, I first give a short history of the beginnings of the lifesaving cause. Then I examine the three traits of the movement that abetted activists’ efforts to work beyond the local realm and aid suffering strangers. Finally, I will discuss why cosmopolitan philanthropy burgeoned in the late eighteenth century. By cosmopolitan philanthropy, I mean charitable activity that was not confined operationally, or in terms of beneficiaries within a particular community, but that looked outward. More generally, I understand cosmopolitanism to mean participating in various and diverse communities (local, national, international, religious, professional) and rising above prejudices or partial sympathies. That definition dovetails with transnationalism, a concept more commonly associated with the modern nation-state since the late eighteenth century. Early-modern people lived in a world of empires and used the term “nation” to refer to a people, such as the “Scottish nation,” rather than a political entity. The anachronistic term “transnational,” then, can connote for the earlier period the interactions among peoples. But the use of the term here also reminds us that American-British philanthropic cooperation in that era took place as the two states were redefining their ties after their political bonds had been broken.3

The Emergence of the Humane Society Movement

In 1767, a group of wealthy men in Amsterdam launched the humane society movement when they founded the Society for the Recovery of the Drowned to cope with the common problem of people perishing in the city’s canals. Although physicians had already been interested in how to restore apparently dead people to life for decades, resuscitation was a novel technique, greeted with skepticism, in the late 1760s and early 1770s. Likewise, associations to promote the recovery of drowned persons were a new type of eleemosynary undertaking. By 1815, however, dozens of communities around the Atlantic and beyond had similar programs.4
The Amsterdam Society for the Recovery of the Drowned had a two-fold agenda: to publicize its methods of resuscitation (which replaced older methods that had been rejected by elite medical practitioners), and to offer rewards to encourage lifesaving. The society’s lifesaving techniques were broadcast throughout the United Provinces—“distributed amongst all the hospitals and public charities, coffee-houses, taverns, &c. to the smallest ale-houses, and also to surgeons and physicians.” Soon a number of the United Provinces “enjoin[ed] an observance of the Society’s directions through their respective districts.”5 Cities across the European continent quickly followed suit. By the early 1770s, Hamburg, Milan, Padua, Paris, Venice, Vienna, and other cities had set up lifesaving programs, and the sovereigns of Hungary and Russia had encouraged the new methods. In typical fashion for the European medical fraternity, leaders of the cause of resuscitation corresponded about their progress. In contrast to what would be the common (but not universal) practice in the Anglophone world, governments often directed the programs in Continental Europe, and in some cases magistrates prescribed “punishing those who shall obstinately refuse to lend their assistance.”6

In 1774, a group of doctors and laymen in London founded the Society for the Recovery of the Apparently Drowned in imitation of the Amsterdam group. The London organization soon became known as the Humane Society of London, and in 1784, it received royal patronage and became the Royal Humane Society (RHS).7 Its mission was “to restore such as have in an instant been numbered amongst the dead, by some dreadful disaster, or by some sudden impulse of phrensy.” In addition to people drowning from accidents or suicide attempts, the RHS’s beneficiaries included people apparently dead from hanging, noxious vapors, freezing, and other causes of sudden death. To accomplish its mission, the RHS offered rewards to people who retrieved drowned bodies, who took the apparently dead bodies into their houses, who followed its resuscitation procedures, and who fetched the RHS medical assistants to the scene of emergencies. Publicizing those rewards, the resuscitation methods, and its achievements formed a large part of the charity’s activities. At the outset, the RHS had a national vision for its mission but only gave rewards for lifesaving efforts in defined, but changing, boundaries. To spread knowledge of resuscitation and to spur the formation of humane societies in places “too remote to be intimately connected” with the RHS, however, the society dispatched broadsides and pamphlets to sea captains, owners of public houses, residents of waterside communities, medical men, and other people far and wide. By the late 1780s, the RHS was the center of a transnational, though primarily Anglophone, network of fellow organizations, medical practitioners, and other gentlemen interested in the cause. Funds for its activities came from members’ dues; the RHS was a typical
eighteenth-century public subscription charity. Members, known as directors, paid annual or life dues and were recognized accordingly in the society’s reports.8

The RHS’s program functioned by enlisting passersby, usually ordinary laborers, through the proffered rewards to undertake the dangerous, messy, time-consuming, and generally unappealing task of rescuing and reviving apparently dead people. Rewards were necessary, the well-off RHS founders believed, because the lower sorts (to use eighteenth-century parlance) lacked the benevolence to attempt rescues and resuscitation of their own volition. Engaging in lifesaving, however, would increase their humanity, the RHS claimed, and thus make the society doubly worthwhile. At the end of 1784, the RHS trumpeted that seven hundred ninety-nine human beings had been restored from apparent death over the first decade of its existence in Britain.9

In 1780, a group of doctors and laymen in Philadelphia founded the first American rescue and resuscitation charity, the Humane Society of Philadelphia (PHS), on the basic model of the Amsterdam and London groups. In mid-1781, after receiving vital details about resuscitation from the top French army physician then in America, the PHS began to pursue its mission by publicizing resuscitation techniques and by equipping riverfronts with rescue devices. Its first reward, in 1782, went to a man who had rescued a six-year-old boy who had fallen into the Delaware River. In 1784, however, the society faded and ceased functioning for two and a half years, although members revived it in 1787.10 Meanwhile, in 1785, the Humane Society of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (MHS) was founded at the instigation of a visiting celebrity, Dr. Henry Moyes, a blind Scotsman who gave popular lectures on chemistry and, additionally, advocated the cause of resuscitation to Americans.11 While all humane societies shared a common mission, each added different programs to meet local conditions: the Royal Humane Society ministered to people who attempted suicide by drowning; the Philadelphia humane society emphasized the problem of death from drinking cold water; and the Massachusetts humane society, like some provincial British humane societies, focused on helping shipwrecked mariners.12

Cooperation and Cosmopolitanism

As mentioned above, three features made humane societies ideal organizations for putting the cosmopolitanism developing in late eighteenth-century Anglo-American philanthropy into practice. The first was the facility of joining an international movement that humane societies’ easily replicable model offered. For centuries, the founders of charitable institutions in Europe had borrowed ideas and sought information from
colleagues in other countries. Leaders of American humane societies followed that pattern and, even as American nationalism was emerging, explicitly acknowledged their participation in international trends. The PHS, in its first published statement, explained that it had been inspired by the examples of organizations in London, Amsterdam, and Paris; and speakers at the MHS annual meetings repeatedly noted European precedents. Likewise, when the Merrimack Humane Society based in Newburyport, Massachusetts, was founded in 1803, it paid homage to humane societies “both in Europe and America.” The lifesaving groups were not unique in that regard. A newspaper announcement about the 1791 founding of the New York Dispensary—a free outpatient clinic for the poor—observed that the value of dispensaries had, by that point, “been proved for upwards of twenty years in most of the large cities of Europe, and in our neighbouring city of Philadelphia.” And the entry in the Philadelphia Directory for 1813 about the Association of Friends for the Instruction of Poor Children explained that this group relied on educational systems from Madras and London.

The flip side of such emulation was providing models, and humane societies, like many other philanthropic organizations of the day, did so both in response to requests for information and on their own initiative. This practice typified the outward and expansive nature of later eighteenth-century philanthropy. Over the years, the Humane Society of Philadelphia gave information to fledgling humane societies in Baltimore, Wilmington, Cincinnati, and St. Petersburg, Russia. In addition, the PHS disseminated lifesaving directions and pamphlets not only locally, but also to all the delegates of the Constitutional Convention in an effort to promote its mission to Americans outside Pennsylvania. For its part, the Massachusetts humane society instigated the founding of a humane society in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in the mid-1790s by making a Halifax clergyman (who had visited Boston and mingled with men involved in the MHS) an honorary member of the MHS. Several years later, the MHS served as a model for the Merrimack Humane Society.

What made humane societies so well suited to cosmopolitan aims, however, was not that the societies built on foreign models. Rather, it was the remarkable ease of spreading the cause of resuscitation and participating in it. The Royal Humane Society dispatched thousands of copies of its publications and also sent lifesaving equipment to organizers of new societies; other humane societies and individuals sent pamphlets and broadsides to medical practitioners and other gentlemen, sea captains, local officials, and clergymen, too; newspapers, almanacs, and other books published the societies’ directions. With this wide availability of information, men interested in joining the cause could do so in large or small communities or even on their own. Starting in 1789, the Royal Humane
Society printed a list of places where it claimed to have spawned humane societies. In 1794, the list included Lisbon, Vienna, Copenhagen, Algiers, British settlements in the East Indies, Jamaica, Barbados, Hudson’s Bay, Boston, Philadelphia, several Irish cities, a few communities in Scotland, almost twenty English communities, Ostend, and Prague. The breadth of this list reflects not only excitement about the cause among gentlemen, but also the ease of replicating the humane society program. At the most basic level, a few people could start a venture without much more than printing and distributing lifesaving instructions and, usually, offering rewards. In the late 1780s, for instance, Charles Murray, the British Consul in Madeira, began a resuscitation program in Portugal with information and equipment provided by the RHS, assistance translating materials into Portuguese from a Portuguese friend, and publicity materials he printed from his own funds. Thanks to the efforts of self-selected individuals such as Murray, humane societies could claim to have a worldwide reach: the RHS boasted in its reports, year after year, that its philanthropic labors had been extended far and wide, and the PHS, as the quotation at the beginning of this article shows, could cast itself as part of a global network.

In addition, individuals unable to join or form a society for whatever reason could participate in the cause by distributing lifesaving information and publicizing cases of success in their local area. Rev. Timothy Alden in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, for instance, sent a couple of cases to the MHS. The society duly published them and made Alden an honorary member. To be sure, the humane society movement’s emphasis on spreading models of charitable institutions was not unique. But the facility with which an individual like Alden not only could join the cause but also could receive recognition for his part in an international philanthropic project was distinct.

The second feature that made humane societies so conducive to practicing cosmopolitan philanthropy was their shared mission of communicating with fellow societies. The shaky first fifteen years of Philadelphia’s humane society inadvertently reveal the importance of this common practice. As we have seen, the PHS had a slow start, fell into decline, and was then revived in 1787. It tottered along for a few more years, with signs of stability emerging in the early 1790s. The yellow fever epidemics that struck Philadelphia throughout the 1790s, however, impeded the society’s ability to stabilize for several more years. Starting in the late 1790s, the PHS took steps to root itself better in the charitable landscape. Thus, the society effectively had three founding moments: first, when it was initially founded; second, in 1787, when it was revived; and third, in the late 1790s, when it sought to put itself on sure footing. At each of those moments it established itself on both the local and transnational levels. After the PHS had got its program off the ground in 1781, it wrote to the Amsterdam
group in 1782 and to the RHS in 1783 to request their materials and solicit correspondence. In 1787, besides reorganizing and reaching out locally, the society made a point of informing the RHS of its revival and reopening communication. Third, in the late 1790s, it took a series of steps to anchor itself locally and abroad. The group’s president gave the first address in the society’s history in 1799 to better publicize its purpose and, not least, to raise funds. That same year, the society moved to strengthen ties with faraway colleagues by electing seven honorary members, two affiliated with the MHS and four leading RHS members.

Several years earlier, the Massachusetts humane society had initiated the movement’s practice of naming honorary members and thereby propelled greater integration among the societies. The MHS’s initial constitution had not provided for honorary members, but around 1792, the society amended the rules to allow the “President and Trustees … [to] admit such persons as honorary members of this Society, as will in their opinion, have a tendency to add respectability to the society, or be the means of promoting its benevolent intentions.” Honorary members could not live in Massachusetts, and three-quarters of the trustees had to vote for their admission. In August 1792, the MHS elected three top leaders of the RHS as its first honorary members. The next year, the MHS first printed correspondence with its counterparts in London and in Philadelphia in its annual report. It also published its first list of its honorary members, now including several Americans and a well-known Scottish clergyman, in the 1793 report. From its founding, the MHS had presented itself as following an international trend, had corresponded with the RHS, and had tried to correspond with the (floundering) PHS. With the new practices, however, it projected itself as allied with other humane societies and individuals in a common cause, no longer trailing European leaders. Within months of the Massachusetts body’s naming the three honorary members from the RHS, the London group responded to the example and assertiveness of the former colonials by choosing several foreign honorary life governors of its own in time to list them in its 1793 annual report. Naming honorary members changed nothing the societies did programmatically, but it gave the societies a way to publicly endorse the idea that charitable activity entailed cooperation with colleagues abroad.

Humane societies’ emphasis on communication with fellow organizations distinguished them from other medical charities. While other medical charities on occasion sent materials to distant colleagues or, more often, had access through local doctors to novel practices adopted elsewhere, the nature of the humane societies’ mission involved the exchange of knowledge about innovations in lifesaving and about progress in the cause. Such communication built on the traditions of both scientific and religious-philanthropic
networks and paralleled concurrent practices in the antislavery movement. Sometimes exchanges had a practical impact on lifesaving operations, such as when the MHS built a lifeboat based on an RHS model. The RHS, though it saw itself as the center of the resuscitation movement, borrowed from American societies, too: noting that Americans had more experience than Britons with great heat and cold, the RHS printed the PHS’s directions on restoring people to life from an array of causes but particularly called attention to the directions for dealing with apparent deaths caused by extreme temperatures. Other times, exchanges among humane societies buttressed ties and emphasized that the societies were involved in a common cause of humanity. Communicating with fellow societies furthered a sense of community, but it also allowed the groups to extend their geographic impact, and that of their supporters, and thus engage in cosmopolitan philanthropy.

The third feature that rendered humane societies particularly well-suited to the cosmopolitan thrust in Anglo-American philanthropy was that they did provide aid on an impartial basis. As the speaker at the MHS anniversary festival in 1800 put it, “No improper prejudices or partial interested views are admitted.” Other charitable organizations were “confined by a religious creed, by local situation, or by circumstances of personal convenience to the donors.” By contrast, the MHS extended its munificence “to him who is ready to perish, and to him who saves a soul alive, of whatever nation or climate he may be.” As the speaker pointed out, this impartiality arose from the peculiar nature of humane societies’ mission: they encouraged passersby to save the lives of drowning people. The nationality, religion, color, gender, age, political views, and status of beneficiaries and rescuers were, of course, beyond the societies’ control. But as a result, perhaps uniquely among philanthropic causes, the humane society movement could claim credit for encompassing all of humankind in its mission.

Humane societies lauded their cosmopolitanism in that regard and, indeed, people of all backgrounds could and did both drown and participate in rescues and recoveries. Workingmen and boys, however, predominated both as drowning victims and as rescuers, so the societies’ claims did not really reflect the populations of people they aided. American humane societies’ unbiased treatment of African-American rescuers and victims, however, lends credence to their claims of impartiality. Admittedly, the number of cases in which either party was black is tiny, but there is no apparent pattern of discrimination in them. Humane societies followed the principle that the greater the effort and risk by the rescuer, the greater the reward. The leaders of the PHS and MHS applied this principle regardless of the race of the rescuer or the person rescued. For instance, in Philadelphia in 1809, a white sailmaker named George Muschert rescued
13-year-old Robert Anderson, a black boy, from drowning in the Delaware River. When he heard the alarm that someone was drowning, Muschert had been at a distance and had run to the scene and dived fully clothed into the water, diving down twice to rescue the boy. These dramatic factors weighed strongly in humane society leaders’ decisions about reward amounts: Muschert received a $10 reward, at the top of the range for PHS rewards that year.26

When the rescuer was African American, the same criteria applied. Dolphin Garler, a black man, received the MHS’s highest reward to an individual in 1794–95 for rescuing a boy in Plymouth, Massachusetts. In this case, a small child had cried out that someone was drowning, but no one could see the drowning person or the bottom of the water. It was nearly high tide when suddenly the onlookers saw an air bubble in the water. Garler dived in immediately. At first he had trouble grabbing the child but then managed to save the boy. Four respectable men in Plymouth wrote to the MHS to nominate Garler for a reward, and the society gave him one just as it would have done for a white rescuer. The society noted that Garler was black and thus different, but it recognized and publicized that people of all backgrounds participated in the philanthropic cause of lifesaving. Humane societies had no choice in who drowned or who rescued drowning victims, so cosmopolitanism was in a way foisted upon them. Yet they chose to embrace the idea that their mission encompassed all humankind and accepted that everyone, even those people most marginalized, could contribute to the cause.27

Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Philanthropy

If humane societies were not unique in the breadth of their sense of charitable obligation, they were unusual. That said, humane societies were part of a more general development. British and American activists had long borrowed charitable models from abroad and participated in transnational religious-philanthropic projects. Late eighteenth-century philanthropy built on these traditions but differed in the expanding scale of urban charitable activity and in embracing moral responsibility to strangers. Before the American Revolution, British and American involvement in transnational beneficence had been geared to bolstering international Protestantism and the British Empire. In the decades after the Revolution, however, Anglo-American philanthropy espoused cosmopolitan understandings: the antislavery movement developed in earnest, and organizations, such as New York Hospital and the Society of Universal Goodwill of Norwich, England, disavowed parochialism in the provision of charity.28
The global scope of late eighteenth-century philanthropy grew from individuals’ experiences of living in a mobile, interconnected world. James Cook and Louis-Antoine de Bougainville circumnavigated the globe in that era, and many Britons and Americans participated in quests for useful knowledge, especially of natural history, from around the world. Knowledge meant power—to treat diseases better, to grow new crops, to settle and exploit new lands—and the apparent onward march of knowledge fostered people’s confidence in their ability to effect change, both at home and abroad. Moreover, both the new voyages of discovery and regular travels and migrations brought faraway places closer. Commerce, too, was making the world smaller, and an eighteenth-century commonplace held that trade created bonds of sociability among peoples.29

But cosmopolitan philanthropy in both Britain and the United States thrived in the wake of the American Revolution. Historian Donna Andrew has argued that London charities in the 1770s and 1780s lacked the direction that the pursuit of national policy goals provided them in earlier and later decades. Rather than lacking a sense of direction in the 1770s and 1780s, however, a global vision gave British philanthropists a purpose as Britain came to terms with the loss of the Thirteen Colonies.30 Likewise, after the Revolution, Americans had to define their place in the world as citizens of an independent but weak nation. Philanthropic cooperation gave Americans a way to remain simultaneously engaged in a transnational community and assert themselves on the world stage. Wealthy Boston merchant Thomas Russell, president of the MHS, for example, made a bid for international influence by sending his “mite”—£100—to the Royal Humane Society in 1793. Russell made this donation, he explained, because he felt “particularly interested in the encouragement of HUMANE SOCIETIES throughout the world, which may be productive of so much usefulness to individuals, and benefit to mankind.” Russell, a citizen of an “infant country,” could cast himself as a benefactor to a prominent London charity by invoking a cosmopolitan understanding of philanthropy.31

Philanthropy in the early republic has to be understood in this worldly context. Nationalism, civic pride, sympathy, anxiety about the poor, and sociability, among other factors, all played a role in prompting beneficence in the early United States. Humane societies highlight something else, too—that Americans self-consciously joined transnational charitable movements, shared ideas and news about causes with colleagues abroad, and embraced a universal vision of philanthropy. The humane society movement lent itself especially well to these trends but was not unique in this regard. As Americans built the new republic’s charitable infrastructure, they did so as both citizens of a new nation and as citizens of the world.
Notes


3 On the burgeoning sense of moral responsibility for strangers and the essentials of the debate over the rise of humanitarianism, see David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823 (Ithaca and Cornell, 1975); Thomas L. Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Parts 1 & 2,” American Historical Review 90 (1985): 339–61, 547–66; for the Davis-Haskell debate including contributions by John Ashworth, see also Thomas Bender, ed., The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation (Berkeley, 1992). Martha Nussbaum’s view that a sense of world citizenship should trump narrower identities has been criticized by scholars who understand cosmopolitanism as balancing plural communal memberships. This perspective has informed my understanding of cosmopolitanism as it accords with my subjects’ practice of it: they belonged to various communities and both affirmed partial communal identities and eschewed parochialism. In his essay on a cosmopolitan international legal structure, Immanuel Kant maintained that strangers should have rights to hospitality in foreign countries. This also implies that strangers are rooted somewhere and cosmopolitanism should take this into account. Kant’s conception contrasts with the idea of a citizen of the world who is rooted nowhere. Martha Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen, For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism (Boston, 1996). On Kant, see Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, trans. with an introduction by Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, 2003), 15–18, and Robert Fine and Robin Cohen, “Four Cosmopolitan Moments,” in Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: History, Context, and Practice, ed. Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (Oxford, 2002), 139–45. For a study of the cosmopolitan ideal among eighteenth-century philosophers, see Thomas J. Schlereth, The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought (Notre Dame, 1977). For different types of cosmopolitanism, see Pauline Kleingeld, “Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany,” journal of the History of Ideas 60 (1999): 505–24, and Vertovec and Cohen, eds., Conceiving Cosmopolitanism.


7 For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to it as the Royal Humane Society for its whole existence.


10 Managers’ meetings, September 5, 1780; February 5, 1781; April 2, 1781; May 7, 1781; July 20, 1781; April 3, 1782; March 2, 1787, PHS Minutes, vol. 1, PHA.


16 Women, too, participated in the cause by contributing funds, especially in London, and sometimes by rescuing or, more often, by aiding in the care of half-drowned people, but the only example of a society with a woman as founder was the Barbados Humane Society, where the governor’s wife served as patroness.


18 Eliphalet Porter, A Discourse before the Humane Society of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at their Semiannual Meeting, June 8, 1802 (Boston, 1802), 24–25; Thomas Gray, The Value of Life and Charitable Institutions. A Discourse Delivered before the Humane Society of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at their Semi-Annual Meeting, June 11th, 1805 (Boston, 1805), 23–25, 45–46.

19 Managers’ meetings, October 4, 1781; December 2, 1782; May 5, 1783, PHS Minutes, vol. 1, PHA.

20 Managers’ meetings, April 2, 1781; May 7, 1781; July 20, 1781; April 3, 1782; August 22, 1787, PHS Minutes, vol. 1, PHA. Benjamin Say, An Annual Oration Pronounced Before the Humane Society of Philadelphia, on the Objects & Benefits of Said Institution, the 28th day of February, 1799 (Philadelphia, 1799); Minutes of the Annual Meeting of Humane Society of Philadelphia, March 6, 1799, PHA; Managers’ meetings, March 29 and June 12, 1799, PHS Minutes, vol. 1, PHA.

21 My knowledge of provincial British humane societies comes primarily from the reports of the Royal Humane Society, and I am basing this assertion on those sources.

22 John Bartlett, A Discourse on the Subject of Animation (Boston, 1792), 23; Clarke, A Discourse, Delivered Before the Humane Society of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 31, 36. The RHS had printed letters from the MHS from the establishment of the Massachusetts society: RHS Report for 1793 ([London, 1793]), 12, 28.

23 On those other types of networks, see, for instance, Susan Scott Parrish, American Curiosity: Cultures of Natural History in the Colonial British Atlantic World (Chapel Hill, 2006); Hitchcock, “Paupers and Preachers”; Betty Fladeland, Men and Brothers: Anglo-American Antislavery Cooperation (Urbana, 1972).


25 Thomas Thacher, A Discourse Delivered at Boston, Before the Humane Society of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, June 10th, 1800 (Boston, 1800), 12.

26 Managers’ meeting, October 11, 1809, PHS Minutes, vol. 2, PHA.

27 John Brooks, A Discourse Delivered Before the Humane Society of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, June 9th, 1795 (Boston, 1795), 15–16, 25.
28 New York Hospital Report to the Legislature for 1800, transcribed in New York Hospital Board of Governors’ Minutes, vol. 1, February 3, 1801, New York-Presbyterian Hospital-New York Weill Cornell Medical Center Archives, New York; Proceedings at the Annual and Other Meetings of the Scots Society in Norwich, in 1778, 1779, and 1780. Published by the Order and for the Benefit of the Society (Norwich, 1780), 7.


31 John Warren, An Eulogy on The Honourable Thomas Russell, Esq., Late President of The Society for Propagating the Gospel Among the Indians and Others, in North America; the Humane Society of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the Agriculture Society; the Society for the Advice of Immigrants; the Boston Chamber of Commerce; and the National Bank in Boston (Boston, 1796), 16–17, 26–27; Thomas Russell to John Coakley Lettsom, August 1, 1792, Royal Humane Society Report for 1793, 31.
ANointING THE “UNGROWNED KING OF IRELAND”: CHARLES STEWART PARNELL’S 1880 AMERICAN TOUR AND THE CREATION OF A TRANSATLANTIC LAND LEAGUE MOVEMENT

Ely M. Janis

Standing on the deck of the steamship Baltic during its slow retreat from New York Harbor, Charles Stewart Parnell, the Irish Member of Parliament (MP) and president of the Irish National Land League, an Irish nationalist organization seeking land reform in Ireland, took a last look to the shore. Braving a cold and blustery March afternoon, hundreds of supporters, including members of the famous Civil War Irish Sixty-Ninth Regiment, representatives of several Irish-American societies, and local dignitaries, stood at the wharf bidding him farewell. It was an impressive scene. Arriving in America only three months earlier, Parnell had undertaken a whirlwind cross-country tour, traveling over 16,000 miles, speaking in sixty-two cities, addressing a joint session of Congress, and raising over $300,000 for famine relief and the Land League. Parnell pushed the situation in Ireland to the front pages of American opinion, in the process assuming the undisputed leadership of the Irish at home and abroad. His secretary Tim Healy, in light of the tour’s success, christened Parnell the “Uncrowned King of Ireland.”

Alternatively presenting himself as a moderate reformer and a committed revolutionary, Parnell crafted an image of himself that appealed to both revolutionary Irish-American nationalists and more conservative, affluent Irish Americans during his time in the United States. His ability to reach out to various types of Irish Americans helped to cultivate Irish-American sympathy, which became a reservoir Irish leaders would draw upon for the next fifty years. Parnell’s tour also succeeded in uniting the Irish in America to a degree previously unknown and launched the most energetic transatlantic Irish organization of the nineteenth century.

An “Appeal to the Irish Race”

Long-standing historical interpretations of the United States, which claimed American exceptionalism and insulation from international influence, have been increasingly revised as historians examine the American past through a transnational lens. While acknowledging the importance of the nation-state, we must recognize that, as Daniel Rodgers argues,
“even the most isolated of nation-states is a semipermeable container, washed over by forces originating beyond its shores.” But most of the research completed in the last two decades by historians reexamining American history in a transnational framework has focused primarily on the period before 1800, leaving the nineteenth century strangely absent. The last decades of the nineteenth century, however, were a crucial moment of transatlantic and global history: the laying of the Atlantic cable, the mass movement of immigrants across national borders, and the growth of global capitalism had important and far-reaching effects in the United States and elsewhere. Efforts like Rodgers’s *Atlantic Crossings* have begun to redress this absence, but much more work remains necessary. This essay explores the transatlantic social milieu that was a reality for many Irish and Irish-American men and women during the Land League movement of the late nineteenth century.

Transatlantic connections between Irish immigrants in the United States and their countrymen in Ireland in the 1880s were particularly strong. Numerous individuals participated in Irish and American social and political movements simultaneously. Irish and Irish-American activists in the Land League, well before the creation of a formal Irish nation-state in the early twentieth century, attempted to create an Irish national identity that spanned the Atlantic. Nationalism served as the primary tool in this transnational project. Dominant interpretations of Irish-American nationalism have emphasized its role as a means of assimilation into American society. However, was crucial in forming not just an American ethnic identity, but also, as Kevin Kenny writes, “a diasporic sense of Irishness that transcended any simple desire for acceptance in the host land.” Charles Stewart Parnell’s tour of the United States in 1880 on behalf of the Land League provides a clear example of this dual process.

The Land League agitation originated in the “New Departure,” an informal alliance between John Devoy, the Irish-American leader of Clan na Gael (a secret Irish-American revolutionary society), Michael Davitt, the former Fenian and land agitator, and Parnell. This alliance aimed to link the land and national questions, thus providing for a front uniting physical-force and constitutional nationalists. A combination of bad weather, poor harvests, and low prices in the summer of 1879 sparked rural discontent in County Mayo, Ireland, and Michael Davitt and local organizers moved quickly to marshal this feeling into a mass movement for Irish land reform. A Land League of Mayo was formed on August 16, 1879, and plans were made to establish a centralized, national organization.

The Irish National Land League was formed in Dublin on October 21, 1879, with Charles Stewart Parnell as president. Additional Land League branches were quickly established across Ireland. The aim of the Land League was to exploit rural unrest in Ireland to gain what became known
as the “three Fs”: fair rents, fixity of tenure, and free sale. In order to achieve success, Parnell and Davitt attempted to mobilize the Irish peasantry behind the Land League cause. To do so, however, would necessitate huge investments of time and money.

Facing a protracted struggle at home, the Irish National Land League recognized the potential benefit of appealing to the United States for support. Though he was a landlord himself, Parnell acknowledged the political utility of the growing anti-landlord sentiment in Ireland and crafted a newspaper appeal to the Irish abroad within this agrarian context. Parnell argued that Irish Americans, because they had been driven by famine from Ireland and into exile in America, understood the situation facing Irish tenants better than anyone else and should, therefore, be willing to help their family and friends in the homeland.

The Land League was not content simply to issue newspaper appeals for Irish-American support, however. At its inaugural meeting in 1879, delegates decided to send Parnell to America to raise awareness for their cause. Thus, from its beginning, the Land League attempted to create a viable, transatlantic movement to agitate for land reform in Ireland. In deciding to send Parnell to America, the officers of the Land League had a dual purpose: to solicit money from the Irish in America and to mobilize American public opinion against British rule in Ireland. Davitt sought the aid of Devoy in organizing this tour, and Devoy helped lay the groundwork for Parnell’s arrival by calling on members of Clan na Gael to help make the Irish agitators’ upcoming tour a success.

Money was vital to keeping the Land League agitation in Ireland going. The costs of promoting and protecting an agrarian uprising were substantial, with funds needed to help support evicted tenants. In an interview with an American reporter in Ireland, Parnell indicated the amount of funding sought from Irish Americans and suggested that, given their numbers, it would not require a great sacrifice from them. “There are computed to be ten millions of Irish in the States and Canada,” Parnell reasoned. “If they could send us $100,000 a year for five years, it would not be a half dollar a family in all, and it would go a long way in enabling us to win.” It made sense for Parnell to appeal to America for money. Irish America had long been a steady source of remittances for Irish relatives and had contributed to various nationalist and cultural movements since the years of the Great Famine. What the Land League desired of the Irish in America, as Michael Davitt not so subtly confided to his American friend James J. O’Kelly, was “money, money, money. Without it this movement must fail—with it success is almost certain.” Earlier Irish movements had been unable to unite all sections of Irish-American opinion into a single organization as wealthy Irish Americans tended to avoid giving money to the Fenians and other nationalist causes.
with the Land League, “the wealthy Irish-American class who hold aloof from other National work could I think be got to move in this one to free the land of Ireland from landlord grasp.” Building on the consensus formed during the New Departure between constitutionalist and physical-force nationalists, Davitt and others believed that the land issue could unite the Irish people at home and abroad, regardless of class distinctions, behind the Land League movement.

Parnell was an excellent choice to deliver the Land League’s entreaty to the people of the United States. A key element of Parnell’s worthiness as a candidate to head the Land League’s American tour was, quite literally, his birthright; his grandfather, Charles Stewart, had been an American naval hero. Stewart’s daughter, Delia Stewart (Charles Stewart Parnell’s mother), married the Anglo-Irish landowner John Howard Parnell in May 1835 and moved to Ireland with her husband. Charles Stewart Parnell frequently invoked his American heritage during his 1880 tour of the United States. His public identification with his famous grandfather highlighted his connections with America and underlined his credentials as a representative of the Irish at home and abroad. Parnell’s ancestry and gentlemanly manner gave him an aura of respectability that appealed to Irish Americans of all classes.

Parnell had also been to the United States twice before—in 1872 and again in 1876—and had some familiarity with American politics and the challenges that he would face on his mission. His first visit in 1872 was in pursuit of an American woman who ultimately turned down his proposal of marriage. He made his second visit when the Irish Home Rule Party sent him as one of the delegates to deliver a congratulatory address to President Ulysses S. Grant during the United States’s centennial celebration. Unwilling to alienate the British government, President Grant refused to accept the Irish address. Despite his failure to gain an audience with the president, Parnell’s prior experiences in America made him cognizant of the political realities there and would serve him well during his 1880 tour.

On December 21, 1879, Parnell and his first secretary John Dillon, the son of John Blake Dillon, the convicted leader of the Young Ireland rebellion of 1848, left Queenstown aboard the steamship Scythia bound for America. As they left Ireland to the cries of a cheering crowd, Parnell promised the assemblage that his visit to the United States would “show that the hearts of Americans would beat warmly towards Ireland.”

**Parnell’s Arrival in America**

Parnell and Dillon arrived in New York Harbor late in the evening on January 1, 1880. Parnell had decided to visit New York first not only because of its status as the preferred port of arrival for Irish immigrants, but
also because New York was “the overseas capital of Irish nationalist agita-
tion and mobilization.” It was the home of such nationally influential
Irish-American editors as John Devoy, Patrick Ford, and others. New York
was also home to Irish political refugees, like Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa,
exiled from Ireland by the British Government. In the late nineteenth
century, much of the coverage of Ireland found in American newspapers
emanated from New York. This confluence of Irish opinion-makers made
New York a logical first stop for Parnell in America.

Upon his arrival in New York, Parnell discussed his goals for the tour
in an interview with a reporter from the New York Herald. Declaring him-
self to be in America as the official representative of the Land League,
Parnell explained the need for continued agitation in Ireland: “Ireland
never won any great reform except by agitation, and this agitation, like
obstruction, has been necessary in order to gain the attention of the Gov-
ernment. When a Government or a country totally disregard you, you
must use strong and even disagreeable measures to get their attention.”
While in America, he planned to focus his lectures on the land system in
Ireland and the history and goals of the Land League movement. He and
Dillon also hoped that cities they visited would form committees of repre-
sentative supporters and take up collections and subscriptions to aid the
movement at home.

Parnell was at pains to present himself as a respectable and moderate
reformer, but he was also careful not to alienate supporters who favored
more violent and immediate means of reform. In the same interview, in
reaction to a direct question from the Herald reporter on Fenian sympathy
with the Land League, he responded, “A true revolutionary movement in
Ireland should, in my opinion, partake of both a constitutional and an il-
legal character. It should be both an open and a secret organization, using
the constitution for its own purposes, but also taking advantage of its se-
cret combination.” Parnell, however, quickly qualified this statement,
claiming that the “leaders of the Fenian movement do not believe in con-
stitutional action” and assuring the Herald’s readers that he “would not
belong to any illegal body.” Several times during his tour, Parnell veered
towards violent rhetoric, though he always retreated to more respectable
ground when challenged.

Such ambiguity became a hallmark of Parnell’s public persona, and he
cultivated it throughout his political career. On the surface, his adher-
ence to the terms of the New Departure remained strong. His goal in
America, however, was to craft a message that would inspire and mobilize
not only committed Irish-American nationalists but all segments of the
Irish-American population. As one contemporary British journalist ob-
served, “It was Mr. Parnell’s business to unite all platforms, and to link an
errand of charity with the sterner business of Irish politics; to be received
by the most respectable and thriving Irishmen in every large city, and yet
to become also the very incarnation of the impossible aspirations of the
various Irish Nationalist societies.”27 In pursuit of his objectives, Parnell
deliberately crafted an image of himself that would alienate neither Clan
na Gael nor more moderate Irish Americans.

Parnell gave his first major speech on January 4, 1880, at Madison
Square Garden in New York City before an estimated audience of seven to
eight thousand. Here he announced a significant departure from his initial
intention to only canvass the United States for funds for the Land League’s
political agitation. Due to worsening economic conditions in Ireland and
“fear of wide-spread famine,” he proposed to “open two funds, one for
the relief of distress, and the other for the purpose of forwarding our po-
litical organization. These things will be kept entirely distinct, so that the
donors will be afforded the opportunity of doing as they please in the
matter,”28 and he kept this promise. For those that feared their money
would be put toward violent ends, he vowed, “Not one cent of the money
contributed and handed to us will go toward organizing an armed rebel-
lion in Ireland.”29 This was meant to attract wealthy and middle-class Irish
Americans, who were traditionally apprehensive of contributing to such
causes. Upon the completion of his Madison Square Garden speech, a col-
clection was taken up for the starving peasants, and Parnell and Dillon
were escorted outside the hall through the throng of cheering spectators.

Buoyed by their reception in New York, Parnell and Dillon decided to
accept invitations from across the United States. They left New York in
mid-January, traveling rapidly to sixty-two towns and localities. Parnell
had hoped to travel across the entire United States but only made it to the
East, Midwest, and Upper South, missing the West Coast entirely. The
main reason for this failure was Dillon’s unsuitableness as a secretary.
From its beginning, the tour’s itinerary was disjointed. Tim Healy was
brought over from Ireland to act as secretary, but he arrived when only
two weeks remained on the tour.

Two modern developments enabled Parnell to overcome the tour’s
poor organization: the extensive railroad network in the United States and
the rapid speed of modern communications like the telegraph. During his
tour of America, Parnell traveled almost exclusively by railroad, which
allowed him to travel over 16,000 miles.30 This pace could be grueling, and
to cover more distance, Parnell and Dillon often split up for a few engage-
ments at a time. Parnell also gave several short “whistle-stop” speeches,
addressing crowds at train depots from the train’s rear platform. In one
day in Minnesota, on his way from Winona to Minneapolis, he delivered
three such speeches before giving two major addresses in the evening.31

The relatively new transatlantic communication network, involving
the laying of transatlantic telegraph cable in the 1860s, greatly increased
the dissemination of news between Ireland and the United States, further aiding Parnell. News of the Land League agitation in Ireland often reached the United States by the next day or, at the latest, within the span of a week. The rise of a strong Irish-American press—almost every major Eastern and Midwestern city supported a local Irish-American newspaper—facilitated the spread of this information. Alan O’Day has called Parnell “Ireland’s first modern media politician,” arguing that Parnell “advanced himself and the national project principally through indirect means, that is at a physical distance, through the press and often by what would now be called ‘sound bites.’” His speeches in Ireland and America were quickly communicated back and forth across the Atlantic, helping to create a greater Ireland that spanned the geographic divide between the two nations.

Key Themes in Parnell’s American Speeches

Parnell’s speeches during his tour were part of a carefully tailored and calculated campaign to lead listeners to a desired conclusion: support for the Land League. The New York Herald accused Parnell of making the same speech in all his stops in America, which was true in many respects. He emphasized several key themes in almost all his speeches, deliberately crafting his message to appeal to Irish Americans of all social classes.

The most important theme Parnell presented was the looming humanitarian crisis in Ireland. By focusing primarily on famine relief rather than the Land League’s political agitation, he achieved a much wider airing and acceptance for his message in America, both within and outside the Irish-American community. But he did not completely ignore the political dimension. Rather, Parnell made explicit that relief for the famine was only a temporary remedy and that sustained political agitation in the British Parliament was needed to effect permanent change.

Also key was Parnell’s assertion that rallying public opinion against British policy in Ireland was a necessity. In Boston, he stated, “We must continue our agitation; we must continue to tell the truth about the relations between England and Ireland until we force England to do its duty and get some measure for the relief of the distress that has come upon us.” In effect, Parnell wanted not only to mobilize the American public in service of the Land League but to shame the British government into acknowledging and responding to the situation in Ireland. To newspaper critics who claimed he was attempting to draw the United States into conflict with Great Britain, he responded, “We do not desire to embroil your Government with that of England … but we think that a people like the American people is entitled to express its opinion upon this question.” Parnell’s harnessing of public opinion in favor of Ireland made the struggle in
Ireland a popular topic of discussion in the United States. New York Mayor William Grace, the city’s first Irish-American mayor, later said of Parnell’s visit that it “succeeded in creating a public sympathy with the course of Irish leaders, which I deem hardly less valuable than the money, without which the parent organization in Ireland must have signally failed.”37 Michael McCarthy, a contemporary of Parnell, believed that the effect of Parnell’s speeches was even more widespread: “His visit to America was the beginning of an impeachment of British government in Ireland, and the court asked to hear evidence and pronounce sentence was no longer the British House of Commons, but the United States of America.”38

In his speeches, Parnell also attempted to relate the dire situation Irish peasants were facing at that time to the Great Irish Famine of the mid-nineteenth century in order to link Irish-American memory of the famine to the issue of land reform in Ireland. The “Famine generation brought a common memory … a memory to which all Irish-Catholic immigrants could relate.”39 In Canada, which Parnell and Healy briefly visited at the end of their tour, Parnell claimed, “Our Irish famines are caused by man, not by God … We charge that these continually recurring Irish famines, and that the constant of chronic poverty, which always obtains in Ireland, are due to the conditions of land tenure in that country.”40 In Cleveland, Parnell was more explicit: “It must be our duty in this country if England attempts to starve and exterminate our people to see that she does not do so secretly, silently, and by stealth, as she did in the great famine of ’45, ’46, ’47, and ’48.”41 These words echoed those of the Irish nationalist John Mitchel, who famously declared during the famine that “the Almighty sent the potato blight but the English created the famine.”42 Parnell also reminded his audiences that not money alone but the abolition of the land system was needed to prevent future famines. To his audience in Louisville, he asserted, “You may put it off for awhile; you may postpone the famine for a month or two; but it will be utterly impossible for any charity to deal with the distress existing there.”43 The Irish in America needed to support the Land League and remember the lessons of the Great Famine. If they did so, Parnell argued, the Irish problem would be solved. For the famine immigrants and their children, such reasoning had a powerful emotive effect.

For the Irish nationalists among his listeners, Parnell argued that the successful resolution of the land issue in Ireland would be the first step towards achieving Irish nationhood. “If you help us to keep our people alive during this winter,” he reasoned in Chicago, “we will kill the Irish land system. And when we have killed the Irish land system we shall have plucked out and ground to powder the corner-stone of British misrule in Ireland.”44 The British government back home saw such assertions of Irish independence in America as treasonous. In Cincinnati, Parnell allegedly
declared, “When we have undermined English misgovernment, we [will] have paved the way for Ireland to take her place among the nations of the earth … None of us … will be satisfied until we have destroyed the last link which keeps Ireland bound to England.”

Parnell later claimed that he was misquoted and never used the words “last link”; an examination of Cincinnati newspapers provides strong evidence to support his assertion. Regardless of the accuracy of the reporting, this incident demonstrates the fine line between respectability and revolution Parnell navigated in his speeches.

During his tour, Parnell denounced the British government in often violent language, drawing the support of many members of Clan na Gael in America and the Fenian Brotherhood at home. At his speech in Boston, Parnell warned, “although I am not in favor of revolutionary methods … I cannot help saying that if things are allowed to continue as they are in Ireland much longer, our people will scarcely be able to contain themselves … which must drive them towards violent and revolutionary measures.”

He was even more explicit in Cleveland, describing his feelings about the armed Irish-American regiments that often escorted him in processions: “I thought that each one of them must have wished with Sarsfield of old when dying on a foreign battlefield, ‘Oh that I could carry these arms for Ireland!’ Well it may come to that some day or other.” If the landlords and the government did not negotiate in good faith with the Land League, the time would come when they would “get very much sharper and worse terms from somebody else.”

Parnell himself did not believe in a violent overthrow of the British government. Instead, he engaged in a rhetorical effort to keep physical-force nationalists on his side. His purpose in coming to America had been to unify Irish America behind the Land League, and, in order to do so, it was important to placate those Irishmen committed to violent revolution. Later, when he was called to account for the violent rhetoric that he used in America after his return to Ireland, Parnell denied that his speeches in America were very radical in nature. He believed that it was “far more necessary to speak strongly to Irish people in Ireland than it is to speak strongly to them in America. In Ireland they require to be encouraged and lifted up because they are oppressed and beaten down; in America they require to have cold water thrown upon them.”

If the occasional allusion to violence was necessary to keep physical-force supporters happy, Parnell was willing to engage in such rhetorical fireworks.

The apex of Parnell’s visit came on February 2, when he addressed the House of Representatives in Washington, DC. Parnell’s speech in the nation’s capital had been arranged through the efforts of Clan na Gael and select Democratic representatives. In a secret meeting, Clan na Gael decided to send the House of Representatives an invitation to name a time
and place for Parnell to speak before them; a group of Democratic congressmen arranged for this offer to be accepted by the House. One of them, Congressman Samuel Cox of New York, put forward a resolution that Parnell be invited to speak in Congress. After a lively discussion, the resolution passed.\textsuperscript{50} The invitation was quite an honor, as it had previously been given only to two other foreigners: the Marquis de Lafayette of Revolutionary fame in 1825, and Louis Kossuth, the Hungarian patriot, in 1851.

In his address before Congress, Parnell emphasized many of the same ideas he had elsewhere. He went to great lengths to present himself as a reasonable and moderate reformer and focused on the inequity of the land system. Moreover, he assured Congress that he did not mean to embroil the United States in a conflict with Great Britain yet claimed that in case of clear injustices like events occurring in Ireland, public opinion in a free country like America should be heard.\textsuperscript{51} Boasting of his American blood, he also asked America to help Ireland and maintained that a solution to the land question, if achieved, would prevent him and other Irish leaders from having “to appear as beggars and mendicants before the world” any longer; it would be “the last Irish famine.”\textsuperscript{52} After his speech, Parnell was given a short audience with President Rutherford B. Hayes. Though the U.S. government refused to officially denounce British policy, Parnell’s trip to Washington, DC, was a marked personal triumph, especially compared to the chilly reception he had gotten from the Grant administration only four years earlier.

Through his carefully calculated speeches and appeals to Irish America, Parnell attempted to link the Irish at home and in America into a unified whole. The idea of a greater Ireland spanning the Atlantic was not merely a rhetorical creation but a reality, according to many contemporaries. For example, in the Irish-American newspaper, the \textit{Irish World}, the editor Patrick Ford declared,

\begin{quote}
England has now to deal with two Irelands. A blow dealt at Ireland is felt and resented by the Ireland across the Atlantic. The struggle is no longer to be between the English Government and five millions of disinherited Irishmen. Behind these … are other millions … throughout the United States and Canada, who stand ready to help their brothers in their battle for their natural rights.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

This newspaper circulated widely in Ireland, transmitting ideas and declarations of sympathy across the Atlantic, and Irish newspapers did the same. The official Land League paper, \textit{United Ireland}, published a regular column entitled “Transatlantic Ireland” carrying weekly reports of Land League activities in the United States. The transatlantic nature of the Land League agitation made it difficult for the British government to
know how to deal with the movement. The British Home Secretary Sir William Harcourt voiced this frustration: “Now there is an Irish nation in the United States, equally hostile, with plenty of money, absolutely beyond our reach and yet within ten days [sic] sail of our shores.” Irish America was coming of age in the 1880s; Parnell’s visit both coincided with and consolidated its growing assertiveness. When the Land League issued the call for help to its brethren in America in this decade, they were ready to listen.

American Reaction to Parnell’s Tour

Parnell’s mission did much more than just promote close cooperation and coordination between Irish nationalist elites in Ireland and America. It also sparked a mass movement that incorporated large numbers of Irish Americans of all classes and ideologies into a sustained and powerful transatlantic Land League movement. The turnout and interest Parnell’s visits to American cities generated were quite dramatic. Saloons and the meeting halls of Irish-American fraternal and benevolent societies posted fliers advertising Parnell’s speeches. Evidence of Parnell’s popularity is found in the large numbers attending these events. In New York, seven thousand people turned out to hear him, while in Chicago, the largest meeting of the tour, an estimated ten to fifteen thousand people listened to his address.

Despite such enthusiasm, several commentators noted Parnell’s subdued style in public meetings and believed him unable to stir Irish Americans to action. Though not the rhetorical equal of Daniel O’Connell or other Irish leaders, Parnell proved increasingly effective in rallying Irish-American support for the Land League as the tour progressed. The Catholic Union claimed Parnell’s soft-spokenness was actually a benefit, as he seemed “to weave a strange charm round the listener, so that he bends eagerly forward, fearing to lose the slightest word.” Parnell improved as an orator during his tour; the rhetorical skills he developed in America were crucial not only to making the Land League a transatlantic success but also to his emergence as the dominant Irish leader of his generation.

Parnell’s tour raised impressive sums of money for the Land League, although it is impossible to tabulate the exact amount sent from America because of it. Moreover, famine relief for Ireland became a popular cause among large numbers of Americans, not only those of Irish descent. One journalist claimed that the total donated for this cause exceeded $5,000,000, a figure probably overestimated but not by much. Several different groups in Ireland and the United States besides the Land League set up relief funds for the suffering Irish farmers, the most prominent one being that of the New York Herald. Parnell refused to cooperate with these other funds, denouncing their motivations for seeking Irish relief. He explained
to a reporter that he was reluctant to associate with the Herald fund because it “had been started in order to check our success.”

Despite these disagreements, Parnell and the other organizations generated publicity that helped to greatly increase U.S. aid to Ireland. By the end of the tour, Parnell had raised $300,000 for the Land League Fund, including nearly $50,000 pledged for the political purposes of the Land League agitation.

During his time in America, Parnell was also able to win the blessings of the American Catholic hierarchy. This was no small feat as members of the hierarchy had traditionally looked down upon Irish nationalist movements like the Fenians. With the blessing of their religious leaders, the legality of the archdiocese of New York raised $55,000, the diocese of Hartford $23,000, and the archdiocese of Boston $37,000. Individual bishops also praised Parnell’s mission and endorsed the Land League cause. Bishop John Spalding of Peoria, Illinois, said that Parnell was “striking at the root of the evil for there will be no permanent relief for Ireland until the system of land tenure is changed.”

Bishop John Ireland of St. Paul declared, “No fault can be found with the agitation. The means are legal, the demands are reasonable.” The Catholic Church’s embrace of Parnell and the Land League cause gave the agitation a respectability lacking in previous Irish movements, so that middle- and upper-class Irish Americans flocked to it, making the Church’s support a vital ingredient in Parnell’s success.

Not everyone welcomed Parnell’s activities in America. His tour especially rankled several important American newspaper editors, but Parnell’s Protestantism, half-American and half-Irish descent, and class background as gentlemanly landowner insulated him from many of the common stereotypes unfriendly American commentators placed upon the Irish character. As the Catholic Universe, which supported Parnell, noted, “He is Protestant, and the cry of ‘Papist’ can not be invoked to injure his cause … It is almost as if the child of the oppressor were fighting the battle of the oppressed.” It went so far as to deny that Parnell was subject to the fierce passions of the Irish race. “Pertinacity, self-restraint, no extra sensibilities to play upon—a cool-blooded self-asserting, English way of trying conclusions with the ‘Saxon,’ these are Mr. Parnell’s public peculiarities novel in a Celtic leader.”

Harper’s Weekly, a staunchly anti-Irish paper, concurred with the Universe’s description of Parnell: “Mr. Parnell is so unlike the typical Irish agitator that the papers which oppose his agitation find it hard to treat him in the usual way. He is certainly not an adventurer, nor a blatherskite, nor a wild rhetorician. He is a self possessed and dignified gentleman.” The negative qualities of laziness and fecklessness used to describe Irish-American women domestic servants and male laborers did not translate easily to Parnell, the gentlemanly landlord and upper-class elite.

Encouraged by his fund-raising and overall success, Parnell hoped to stay in America a few months longer to continue his work. Events in
Ireland, however, upset these plans. In early March, Parnell received news that the British Parliament had been dissolved. He and Healy canceled the rest of their engagements and traveled back to New York to depart for Ireland and campaign for the Irish Parliamentary Party. But first, Parnell attempted to ensure that the reservoir of Irish-American support he had built during his tour would not run dry.

Before returning to Ireland, Parnell was the key player in organizing the Irish National Land League of America in New York. On March 4, 1880, Parnell and Dillon sent out a circular to a list of prominent Irish Americans asking them to join them in New York for the formation of a Central Land League in New York. A meeting to arrange an American Land League was held just before Parnell left the United States. At the meeting, Parnell deputized a committee to organize the national movement after his return to Ireland and suggested the following resolution: “Resolved, That a committee be appointed with power to add to its number gentlemen from all parts of the Union, to carry out the resolution adopted at the full meeting; this committee to have power to consult with leading gentlemen in various parts of the country, and to extend and promote the organization.”67 In May, this American Land League was organized, and its members actively supported the land agitation in Ireland.

* * *

With the building blocks of an American Land League in place, Parnell and Healy left New York on the morning of March 11 to take up the political campaign in Ireland. Describing their departure, Healy said, “It was a fine sight to see the 69th salute as we sailed off, and Parnell wave his hand in response, looking like a king.”68 On his return to Ireland from America, Parnell truly was the leader of the Irish at home and abroad. His mission to America not only catapulted him into this position but crucially strengthened the links between the Irish at home and in the United States, helping to create a greater Ireland that straddled the Atlantic. While the New Departure had led to a new level of cooperation among Irish and Irish-American nationalist leaders, it was Parnell’s tour that excited and inspired ordinary Irish Americans to take up the cause of the land struggle in Ireland. By crafting a message that various segments of the Irish in America could embrace, Parnell was able to overcome the dissension and disunity that had plagued earlier Irish-American nationalist movements. The overwhelming response to Parnell’s visit, both by his supporters and critics, pushed the situation in Ireland to the front pages of America’s newspapers and provided much-needed succor to the Land League movement at home.

The strong connections that existed between Ireland and the United States during the Land League era demonstrate the usefulness and importance of examining American history from a transnational perspective.
Such an approach allows us to see not just the similarities and the interconnectedness of societies but also can highlight important differences. The Land League was not confined to the United States and Ireland but also had branches among the Irish populations of England, Australia, and Canada. The responses of Irish immigrants in these countries to the movement differed markedly from that of their Irish-American brethren. In Australia, for example, the economy was so tightly enmeshed in the British Empire that any move to sever this connection would have imperiled Australia’s prosperity. Irish Australians interested in improving their economic and social status needed to retain their imperial ties, unlike Irish Americans in the republican United States. Irish Australians were happy to give monetary support to relieve famine in Ireland but were not interested in funding Irish rebellion. For the Irish in the United States, on the other hand, safely removed from British imperial control, the shared feeling of exile that developed after the Great Famine stoked Anglophobia among them, giving their expressions of Irish nationalism a much more virulent character than that of other Irish emigrant communities. As we can see, the Irish abroad found common cause in their support of the Land League, but the reactions in different Irish emigrant communities were also shaped by their experiences in their host countries. Examining movements like Irish nationalism through a transnational framework provides an approach that puts American exceptionalism into perspective, revealing not only what makes American history unique but also what it shares with other nations.

Notes


8 The Fenians were a transatlantic Irish and Irish-American revolutionary organization active primarily in the 1860s. For more on the New Departure, see T. W. Moody, Davitt and Irish Revolution, 1846–82 (Oxford, 1982), 221–51. Parnell always publicly claimed that he never agreed to any preconditions with Devoy or Clan na Gael, but his actions during the Land War seem to indicate that even if he did not formally agree to terms, his actions followed Devoy’s suggested policies. On Clan na Gael, see Michael F. Funchion, ed., Irish-American Voluntary Organizations (Westport, CT, 1983), 74–93.


10 Irish-American, November 1, 1879, 1.

11 Pilot (Boston), November 15, 1879, 5.


14 For more on Irish-American remittances to Ireland, see Robert A. Doan, “Green Gold to Emerald Shores: Irish Immigration to the United States and Transatlantic Monetary Aid, 1854–1923” (PhD diss., Temple University, 1999).


17 Devoy, Devoy’s Post Bag, 416.


19 Irish-American, January 3, 1880, 1.

20 Dennis Clark, Hibernia America: The Irish and Regional Cultures (New York, 1986), 58.

21 Ibid., 59.

22 Freeman’s Journal (Dublin), January 13, 1880, 4.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Lyons, Charles Stewart Parnell, 105.


29 Ibid. Money given to the Land League was usually spent per the wishes of donors.


31 Robert M. Post, “A Rhetorical Criticism of the Speeches Delivered by Charles Stewart Parnell during his 1880 American Tour” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1961), 169.


36 Quoted in the *Cincinnati Daily Enquirer*, February 21, 1880.


40 *Pilot*, March 13, 1880, 4. Parnell and Healy were in Canada for a few days near the very end of Parnell’s tour. Their reception in Canada was as positive as in America.

41 *Catholic Universe*, January 29, 1880, 1.

42 John Mitchel, *The Last Conquest of Ireland (Perhaps)* (1861; Dublin, 2005), 219. Mitchel, a leader of the Young Ireland movement, was arrested by the British government for treason felony and transported to Australia. He later escaped to the United States and remained a vocal critic of British rule in Ireland. For an excellent discussion of the construction of the memory of the famine, see James Donnelly, *The Great Irish Potato Famine* (Gloucestershire, England, 2001), 209–45; Miller, *Emigrants and Exiles*, 281–344.

43 Quoted in Post, “A Rhetorical Criticism,” 624.

44 *Chicago Tribune*, February 24, 1880, 2.

45 *Irish World*, March 6, 1880, 7. Two newspapers in Cincinnati used different language in their transcriptions of the speech.

46 For an extensive discussion of Parnell’s speech in Cincinnati, see Lyons, *Charles Stewart Parnell*, 111–13.

47 *Pilot*, January 17, 1880, 5.

48 *Cleveland Universe*, January 29, 1880, 1. Patrick Sarsfield (1660–1693) was an Irish Jacobite and esteemed Irish military leader who later exiled himself to France as part of the famous “Flight of the Wild Geese.”

49 *Missouri Republican*, March 5, 1880, 2.


51 *Irish-American*, February 14, 1880, 2.

52 Ibid., 2. See also Post, “Charles Stewart Parnell before Congress,” 419–25.


55 Description based on a meeting in Chicago found in Post, “A Rhetorical Criticism,” 427. See also James Hunter, *For the People’s Cause: From the Writings of John Murdoch: Highland and

56 Daniel O’Connell, a popular Irish Catholic politician, pushed through Catholic Emancipation in the British Parliament in 1829 and led an unsuccessful movement to repeal the Act of Union in the 1840s.

57 Catholic Union, January 29, 1880, 4.

58 Catholic Union, September 2, 1880, 6; Doan, “Green Gold to Emerald Shores,” 101; Irish-American, July 17, 1880, 4.


60 Pilot, June 12, 1880, 4.

61 Pilot, March 20, 1880, 1.


63 For an example of the conflict found between the Catholic Church and other Irish-American nationalist organizations, see Kevin Kenny, “The Molly Maguires and the Catholic Church,” Labor History 36 (1995): 345–76.

64 Catholic Universe, January 29, 1880, 4.

65 Ibid.

66 Harper’s Weekly, February 7, 1880, 8. Harper’s Weekly, and especially its star cartoonist Thomas Nast, saw the Irish in America as a drain on the republic and little more than pawns of the Democratic Party. See also Smith, Parnell, 8.

67 Catholic Union and Times, April 15, 1880, 3.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD: U.S. CONSULAR EXPANSION AND THE PROBLEM OF NATURALIZED MIGRANTS IN THE HABSBURG EMPIRE, 1880–1914

Nicole Phelps

Since the seventeenth century, territorial sovereignty has been a key component of European and then global international politics. By mutual agreement, governments recognized one another as exercising sovereign authority over specific, mutually exclusive territories. A government’s citizens or subjects were simply those people who lived within the territory it controlled.1 Territorial sovereignty was sufficient when people stayed in one place, but by the mid-nineteenth century, technological innovations including steamships and railroads significantly reduced the costs of travel. As a result, people began crossing international borders in ever larger numbers. People traveled back and forth across the Atlantic to find work, pursue business interests, obtain an education, visit relatives, and see the world.2 Much of this movement was between the United States and the Habsburg Empire (Austria-Hungary). Many German-, Czech-, Slovak-, Polish-, Yiddish-, Ukrainian-, Magyar-, Romanian-, Serbo-Croatian-, Slovene-, and Italian-speaking people with Austrian or Hungarian citizenship traveled to the United States to make money before returning to Europe to establish themselves permanently there. Others stayed in the United States and later sent their children to Europe to pursue an education. Between the 1880s and the beginning of World War I, millions of people traveled between the two diversely populated countries for short sojourns and long-term stays.3

What made this pre-World War I movement unique was that almost all of it was done without passports or any other documentation that would mark an individual’s citizenship status.4 As a result, an individual’s identity was open to challenge every time he or she crossed the border. The increased volume of unregulated international travel created new types of problems for individual people and their governments. In the U.S.-Habsburg relationship, naturalized U.S. citizens who returned to the empire were often held for military service or arrested for political crimes because Habsburg authorities presumed they were Habsburg citizens, and the individuals had no documentation to prove otherwise. To address these new types of problems faced by individual citizens, the U.S. government—along with other governments—expanded the size of its consular
service and augmented its agenda. Consuls, once focused on facilitating and promoting trade, became responsible for protecting a broader set of interests for their country’s citizens abroad. They worked to claim sovereign jurisdiction over their citizens regardless of their physical location. Their increasing ability to enforce this body-based understanding of sovereignty undermined traditional claims to territorial sovereignty and contributed to the idea of a nation as a community of citizens rather than a physical-geographic entity.

As a result of consular activity in the decades immediately preceding World War I, notions of territorial and body-based sovereignty coexisted uncomfortably. It was up to consular officials to decide which would prevail in any individual case. Consular officials typically sought to have their body-based claims recognized as more important than other states’ territorial claims, while at the same time making sure that their country’s own territorial claims trumped other states’ body-based claims. In other words, consular officials wanted their own sovereign claims to transcend the physical borders of the nation, while confining claims of other governments to a limited space.

U.S. consuls in the Habsburg Empire worked to align individuals’ location, citizenship, and political loyalties. If a person was clearly committed to U.S. citizenship, U.S. consuls worked to free him or her from Habsburg territorial jurisdiction, but they also took steps to return those individuals to the United States, where jurisdictional questions would be silenced. The U.S. consular staff in the empire grew to an adequate size so that, when coupled with Habsburg authorities’ commitment to the rule of law, U.S. consuls were generally successful in pursuing their agenda in the empire.

Only in the extraordinary circumstances of World War I and the subsequent Paris Peace Conference was the tension between territorial and body-based sovereignty addressed systematically. The men charged with negotiating the peace settlement at the end of World War I sought to make changes at the international level that would reduce the frequency of problems that arose from the conflict between territorial and body-based sovereignty. Dual citizenship loopholes were closed in the treaties that ended the war, and wartime passports and visas became staples of peacetime travel. These changes were aimed at two goals: first, giving every individual a single, legally documented citizenship, thus eliminating arguments over status; and second, making it more difficult to cross international borders, thus reducing the frequency of conflicting territorial and body-based sovereignty claims. These efforts were an attempt to shore up territorial sovereignty in the postwar world by restricting movement so that an individual’s citizenship and physical location would align in the newly created successor states of the Habsburg Empire.
Together with the embassy in Vienna, the official U.S. presence in the Habsburg Empire expanded in size over the course of the nineteenth century as the consular agenda diversified from trade facilitation to promotion and finally to the protection of citizens abroad. The number of U.S.-Habsburg interactions increased significantly over the course of the century as a fairly meager trade relationship gave way to huge waves of transatlantic migration. By the outbreak of World War I, the United States had seven consular posts in the empire: consulates general at Vienna and Budapest, and consulates at Trieste, Prague, Reichenberg (Liberec), Carlsbad, and Fiume (Rijeka). With the exception of Carlsbad, which primarily served American tourists, all of these posts initially opened for commercial reasons. Reichenberg alone stayed almost exclusively commercial. Emigrants to the United States departed from the ports of Trieste and Fiume, adding to the consuls’ busy commercial agenda there. Prague maintained a heavy commercial workload, but it also became the post that had to deal most often with the effects of nationalism, which, as we will see, was fostered by travel between the crown land of Bohemia and the United States. The consulates general at Vienna and Budapest dealt primarily with citizenship matters; in the U.S.-Habsburg context, these were usually military service cases.

This essay focuses on the citizenship cases arising in the Prague, Vienna, and Budapest consular districts. In both military service and arrest cases, U.S. officials intervened with Habsburg authorities with the intention of claiming jurisdiction over the bodies of U.S. citizens. There were limits to how far U.S. authorities would go, however. If the person asking for release from military service declared his intention of staying in Austria-Hungary, U.S. officials declined to assist him. Similarly, in the Prague arrest cases, the U.S. consulate did not challenge the final decisions of the Austrian courts, letting people whose political convictions were still Austrian be governed by Austrian territorial sovereignty, even if they were technically U.S. citizens. In both types of cases, U.S. officials aimed to align a person’s physical location with his political identity.

The case of Zdenek Bodlak provides an example of a citizen protection case in Prague. Bodlak’s Czech-speaking parents—or at least his father—were born in Bohemia, emigrated to the United States, and became naturalized U.S. citizens. Bodlak himself was born in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1893 and was therefore a U.S. citizen. He was fluent in Czech and English, and in June 1913, the twenty-year-old Bohemian American went to Prague to study music.

Prague in 1913 was a key theater for the development of Czech nationalism. The crown land of Bohemia, along with neighboring Moravia and Silesia, made up the Kingdom of Bohemia, which the Habsburg
family had acquired through marriage in the early sixteenth century. The dominant languages in the province were German and Czech, and a significant portion of the population was bilingual. While the Kingdom of Bohemia had not always been fully supportive of the Habsburgs, dissatisfaction intensified when the Ausgleich created Austria-Hungary in 1867. Many in Bohemia wanted the kingdom to have equal status with Hungary—a Triple Monarchy rather than a Dual Monarchy—but only a few wanted some sort of fully independent Czech state at this point; in fact, independence as a viable option did not gain much popular support in Bohemia until well into World War I. However, many did want the Czech language to be legally equal to German in the kingdom, for civil servants to speak both Czech and German, and for the government to make Czech-language schools more widely available.

These dissatisfaction, along with opportunities for economic advancement in America, prompted many Bohemians to migrate to the United States. These emigrants included a significant number of middle-class people, who reached a greater level of prosperity in the United States more quickly than many of their fellow countrymen. Once in the United States, Czech speakers, like other immigrant groups, banded together for the benefit of the community as a whole. Various Czech communities began publishing their own Czech- and English-language newspapers. Those newspapers included comments on events in Austria, as well as reports on conditions there derived from personal letters exchanged among transatlantic networks of Bohemians. The basic editorial stance of many of these publications was critical of the Austrian government and in favor of Czech nationalism.

Those Czech nationalist American newspapers frequently found their way to Bohemia, where they were circulated among the local population. They also found their way to the Habsburg authorities, including the Prague police. Charles Hoover, the U.S. consul in Prague from 1913 to 1917, reported that “the authorities are greatly enraged over the articles which appear in the Bohemian papers of Chicago and it is certain for that reason to go hard with any American who transgresses the Austrian law.” Hoover went so far as to advocate that the Department of State approach the editors of these papers: “it would serve the interests of the American citizens of Bohemian origin who travel in this country if these papers were to adopt a more temperate tone regarding affairs in this country, although I am aware that it would be difficult to suggest such a course to them.”

To combat the transatlantic nationalist network, the Prague police were especially vigilant, scrutinizing the public statements of U.S. citizens as well as the letters they wrote to Austrian citizens. Zdenek Bodlak’s arrest resulted from this increased police scrutiny, as did several others. Hoover told the Department of State that “the records here are full of
instances” of this nature, and that “such convictions are more than daily happenings here.”

Bodlak was arrested and incarcerated on 27 November 1914 for “disturbing the public order.” That had been a crime in Austria-Hungary before the war, but after the war started, it was expanded, and the sentences were more serious. Over the course of four months, Bodlak had sent a series of letters to his family and friends in the United States. When mailing them, he marked them “open,” which meant that they were not directed exclusively to the addressee. More importantly, it meant that Austrian authorities were entirely free to open and read the letters, which they did. Bodlak also sent a number of letters to a local girl in Prague that contained news and newspaper clippings from the United States. Bodlak marked these letters “closed,” but he did not tell the recipient to destroy or hide them, and the police discovered them when they conducted a voluntary search of her parents’ home.

Bodlak’s letters are extremely critical of Austria and Germany, and they are rife with sarcasm. He criticized the Austrian government for drafting eighteen-year-old “children” for the service. He also pointed out the Austrian government’s press censorship, writing to his father in America that “quite a number of things you knew in August were first made known to us at the beginning of November.” When Turkey entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, Bodlak wrote, “Isn’t it just grand to see the peerless German culture shake hands with such a heathenisch [sic] murdering skunk as is Turkey?” He also called the conflict “the war of Kaiser extermination” and wrote that “It should last until Germany and Austria disappear from the map.”

The Austrian court determined that “in circulated writings ... also publicly, [Bodlak] endeavored to stir up hatred and contempt against the Government ... the person of the Kaiser ... the form of government ... [and] the unity of the Empire.” Bodlak’s rather late admission that “he had written improper matter in the letters” did little to help him; it was more than offset by the fact that he repeatedly sent such letters and made no attempt to keep them private. On the contrary, the court observed, “he rather wished that they should be circulated, as to be expected of such persons who are so evilly disposed toward the State.” Bodlak was sentenced to three years hard labor, “sharpened by one fast day each three months,” and, on completion of his sentence, banishment from the empire. With the help of Hoover and the embassy, Bodlak appealed the verdict, but it was upheld.

After the initial conviction, Consul Hoover informed the Department of State of the case, but the despatch did not arrive, given uncertain wartime mail conditions. The Department of State found out about it from the American Czech population, which was in an uproar over the incident and especially the sentence. Hearing of events from the public and not
from U.S. officials overseas was not to the department’s liking, and they sent Hoover multiple telegrams asking for a report. Hoover then wrote a number of communications to the Department of State explaining the case and offering his assessment. He criticized the Austrian legal system for the inclusion of political activities as illegal acts. In a statement that office personnel at the Department of State took pains to label as definitely not for publication, Hoover wrote:

This is a conviction for a purely political crime and as such it is entirely impossible to comprehend the logic of the argument upon which the conviction was based when considered from the standpoint of American law. What might under American practice be considered the grossest distortion of fact, trivial, childish, and malicious, might be in entire consonance with the laws of other countries. To take away three years of the life of a human being for having put a little ink on a piece of paper in a certain form when it did not injure any one in the slightest and could not have injured any one if it had been seen by the whole world is not in accord with American ideas of justice.21

Hoover also found fault with the methods of the Prague police, commenting that “there is no need for the authorities to go into private letters for statements which have been given no publicity to find sedition for it is rife here and the fact that it is is well known to the authorities.”22

Although Hoover was no fan of the Austrian legal system, he stood by Bodlak’s conviction. Hoover wrote that, “when Bodlak came to this country he placed himself under its laws and there seems to be no question of his having committed the acts for which he was convicted under the Austrian law by a regularly constituted court.” Perhaps Hoover was hoping that Bodlak’s fate would serve as an example to other members of “that exasperating class to which danger of imprisonment has the same attraction that the flame of a candle has for a moth.” Bodlak and others like him seem to have enjoyed taunting the police; Hoover complained that they put “every possible temptation to arrest them in the way of the officials by boasting of their immunity from arrest,” as they were U.S. citizens.23

The Austrian government had allowed U.S. consuls and the embassy to intervene in previous cases and secure lighter punishments for U.S. citizens, but Hoover observed that, “now in war time all criticism[s] of the State are punished with the greatest rigor.”24 Hoover was content to let the Austrian government have its way. By doing so, he helped align politics and physical location. If naturalized U.S. citizens were more interested in Austrian politics than American politics and went so far as to return to Bohemia to promote nationalist ideologies, then they should not be able
to hide behind the barrier of U.S. citizenship. If their priorities were in Austria, then their bodies should be there, too—even if those bodies were in an Austrian jail.

No doubt making the traditional assumption that consuls were primarily concerned with commerce, Ralph Busser, the U.S. consul in Trieste in 1915, asserted that his post was “undoubtedly the busiest Consulate in Austria.”25 Had he been referring to the decades before the 1880s, he might have been right, but at this late date, he was definitely wrong. It is difficult to say which post actually was the busiest, but it was probably Vienna, or, even more likely, Budapest. Paul Nash, consul general in Budapest in 1911, observed that “The responsibilities of this post are so much greater than those of the average consulate, principally on account of the complicated protection cases.”26 Ambassador Penfield also pointed to the high number of citizenship and military service cases as a mark of the uniqueness of U.S.-Habsburg relations.27

Dominating the consular agenda at Vienna and Budapest were military service cases. Although exact figures regarding the number of cases do not exist,28 we know from the consuls themselves that these cases were time-consuming; the surviving files concerning them make up the second largest subset in the Department of State’s U.S.-Habsburg “protection of interests” files.29 Some concrete statistics are available, however. The Budapest consulate general alone processed 108 military service cases in the 1912/13 fiscal year, 105 cases between 1 August 1914 and 31 December 1914, and an additional 114 cases in the calendar year 1915.30 Records also indicate that some cases did not come to the attention of U.S. authorities until 1919,31 after the fighting had stopped but before all prisoners of war had been released, and at least one case was not successfully resolved until August 1921.32

The Habsburg military was based on the idea of universal service—all male Austrian and Hungarian citizens of a certain age could be called for military service, and all were obliged to attend multiple training sessions and medical examinations.33 Military service was important to Habsburg authorities. Not only did it help to protect the country in actual wars, but service exposed people to a broad cross section of the empire’s population, thus building supranational identity and loyalty to the emperor.34 Because of the universal nature of the service and its importance to the state, Habsburg authorities expected all males of the right age who were physically located on Habsburg soil to participate. When a man claimed exemption because he was a U.S. citizen, authorities were less than pleased, and they waited for citizenship to be established through official channels before releasing him. They did typically confine men to the barracks pending citizenship decisions rather than assign them to active duty.35 During World War I, however, that was not always possible, as fighting occurred on Austro-Hungarian soil, and several people claiming to be U.S. citizens
became prisoners of war in Russia, Serbia, and Italy. Existing records indicate that only one man was actually killed in action: Joseph Tott died in June 1915, six months before his family was able to report his impressment.

While men claiming U.S. citizenship waited, officials at the U.S. embassy and consulate general in Vienna and the consulate general in Budapest took action to investigate citizenship claims and request the release of those holding legitimate U.S. citizenship. There were four categories of military service cases, which I will outline in the following pages. The first category consisted of cases clearly covered by the 1870 naturalization treaty between the United States and Austria-Hungary, which were relatively easy to resolve. The second category included cases of incomplete or illegal naturalization, which were equally easy to resolve, if more trying for the people who asked for and were denied assistance. The third category pertained to dual citizenship cases, which fell into a loophole in the 1870 treaty and were therefore far more contentious. Finally, there were cases where the man in question had been in Austria-Hungary for more than two years, and as a result, a presumption of expatriation arose against him. To convince U.S. authorities to help him, he had to provide a good reason for his lengthy stay in his native country. For U.S. consuls, these were the most frustrating cases because they had to make an essentially subjective decision about where an individual’s loyalties lay. All of these cases required a significant amount of work by the staff of the Vienna and Budapest consulates general and the embassy. By the end of the war, U.S. officials were ready to change the international legal system to resolve dual citizenship cases and institute passport and visa systems to more effectively mark citizenship and regulate international movement.

The 1870 U.S.-Habsburg naturalization treaty was supposed to resolve citizenship and military service issues, and in many cases, it succeeded. The treaty held that properly naturalized citizens were not liable for military service in their native land. In the United States, naturalization was a multi-step process. After a specific period of residence, a man declared his intention to become a U.S. citizen and the court issued his so-called first papers. After another period of residence, the man received his second papers. He was then examined by a judge, and if that interview was a success, he became a naturalized U.S. citizen. When he was naturalized, any minor children he had who had been born abroad but currently resided in the United States also became U.S. citizens. Men who had gone through the whole naturalization process themselves or who were legally U.S. citizens via their father’s naturalization were clearly covered by the 1870 treaty, and the Habsburg government released them from service after the embassy or the Budapest consulate general made an official request.

In these clear-cut cases, the Habsburg government trusted U.S. representatives to acquire legitimate proof of citizenship. If the embassy or
consulate general was satisfied enough to make an official request for release, the Habsburg government was satisfied. This trust was a product of the diplomatic culture of the Great Power System: it was a further indication that the Habsburg government recognized the sovereign authority of the U.S. government over its citizens, and by not contesting U.S. claims, the Habsburg government hoped the U.S. government would return the favor.

The burden of proving citizenship was therefore on the staff of the embassy or consulate general, and they did their best to acquire proper documentary evidence. Consulate general, embassy, or Department of State staff needed to see a man’s passport or his naturalization papers—or his father’s naturalization papers—to be convinced of the man’s citizenship. As previously mentioned, such documentation was not required for international travel, so many of those asking for assistance could not provide it. The consulate general or embassy would send a telegram to the Department of State, which would then attempt to secure the necessary information. If the man had ever had a passport, which required proof of naturalization to obtain, the department would go to its own files to find the application. To get naturalization papers, they wrote to the man’s family or the court that had originally issued them. When the department was convinced of the man’s citizenship status, they telegraphed the embassy or consulate general, who then wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to present the case.43

Before the war, the Habsburg government could take months or even a year to process such cases, much to the frustration of U.S. officials.44 One explanation for the slow pace would be that the Habsburg bureaucracy could be a very slow moving, inefficient, and un-modern entity.45 It seems more likely, however, that the process was intentionally slow in an effort to send a message to the individual man and others like him. That message was, if you are going to leave the country and become a U.S. citizen, do not come back. The Habsburg government, like that of the United States, was interested in an alignment between citizenship and physical location.

During the war, however, the Habsburg government responded to these cases with much greater speed. Consul General William Coffin made sure to mention this progress to the Department of State: “I wish to say that the Hungarian Government has shown a gratifying disposition to give immediate consideration to the claims of naturalized citizens to exemption from military service and the consideration of them has been much prompter than in time of peace.”46 In part, it was out of concern for the individual, as the chances of injury or even death were much greater during wartime. More importantly, however, the Habsburg government did everything it could to keep the United States out of the war. Irritating it over military service cases was not in the Habsburg interest.
The second category of military service cases were those that involved incomplete or illegal naturalization, or other false claims to U.S. citizenship. Since U.S. naturalization was a multi-step process, there were many people who thought they already were U.S. citizens or were at least entitled to consular protection when in fact they had only gone through part of the process. The idea that they were already entitled to protection was furthered by the fact that many midwestern, western, and southern states allowed non-citizens or those with only their first papers to vote, as part of efforts to attract settlers.47 Surely, they thought, if they could vote, they were entitled to consular protection. Some even made sure to mention that they had voted Democratic, in hopes of winning favor with Wilson administration officials.48 U.S. consuls had to inform them that they were not eligible for protection.

Other people who asked for protection discovered that their naturalization had been illegal and was therefore invalid.49 This was most common among people who had been recruited in Europe directly by mining corporations that handled all immigration and citizenship matters in-house. They presented large numbers of immigrants to judges all at once, and the information they provided about length of residence was not always accurate. Those discrepancies came out when the consulate asked the men to provide an account of their time in the United States, and many did not know that they needed to lie in order to be considered legal U.S. citizens. Like those with incomplete naturalization, U.S. officials declined to assist these illegally naturalized people.

Finally, U.S. officials denied protection to a third group of individuals: children of naturalized U.S. citizens who had never been to the United States themselves.50 It was common practice for men to travel to the United States to find work while leaving their wives and children at home in Austria-Hungary. If the men became naturalized U.S. citizens, their children could only claim U.S. citizenship for themselves if they had resided in the United States. That residency requirement was not always clear to either the fathers or their children.

Cases where a person clearly was not a U.S. citizen or, conversely, clearly was solely a U.S. citizen were easy to resolve. Other cases, however, were far more complicated. The 1870 treaty contained a significant loophole as it did not stipulate how people with dual citizenship should be handled. At the outbreak of the war, R. W. Flourney, chief of the Department of State’s Bureau of Passport Control, wrote that he was “afraid that our naturalization ... treaty with Austria will be put to a pretty severe test, unless peace is established in Europe.”51 Dual citizenship cases arose from the conflict between American *jus soli* citizenship laws and Austro-Hungarian *jus sanguinis* laws. U.S. law held that people born on U.S. soil were U.S. citizens, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Austro-Hungarian
law, however, posited that a child born anywhere in the world to a man who held Austrian or Hungarian citizenship was an Austrian or Hungarian citizen. That meant that all the male children born on U.S. soil to Austrian or Hungarian immigrants were liable for military service if they went to Austria-Hungary, as they held dual citizenship.

U.S. policy was to try and get proven dual citizens released from service in Austria-Hungary. Proving birth in the United States could be more difficult than one might expect, however. Not only did people rarely travel with their birth certificates in the nineteenth century, but many jurisdictions did not even issue them. Significantly for U.S.-Habsburg relations, Cook County, Illinois—the county in which Chicago is located—did not begin to issue birth certificates until the first decade of the twentieth century. Chicago natives had to rely on the testimony of parish clergy to prove their place of birth—if the clergyman could still be found.

Once they had proof of U.S. citizenship, U.S. officials would present their claim to the Habsburg government and request the man’s release from service. During the war, the Habsburg military wanted every man it could get, and so the government asserted its right to claim the dual citizenship status of these men and retain them for military service. Ambassador Frederic Courtland Penfield, the U.S. consuls, and the Department of State staff in Washington all knew that the treaty was ambiguous in these cases and that international agreements had to be respected. With this in mind, they did not pursue cases after the Habsburg government had claimed dual citizenship.

This approach, while perfectly legal, produced significant protest in the United States. The issue was broader than U.S.-Habsburg relations; other countries, notably Italy, had similar laws and similarly ambiguous treaties with the United States. Perhaps the most prominent person to question how U.S. citizens could be held for military service on dual-citizenship grounds was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. In a letter to the Department of State requesting action to release a U.S. citizen from the Italian army, Lodge wrote:

I cannot assent for a moment to the proposition that such a thing as dual citizenship is possible. As you well know, we constituted ourselves as champions against the doctrine of indefeasible allegiance and have succeeded in compelling the acceptance of our view by all the nations with the exception, I think, of Russia and Turkey. The abandonment of indefeasible allegiance is in itself the establishment of the principle that there can be no such thing as dual citizenship, either in whole or in part, and to attempt to retain the right over a boy born in this country of parents not naturalized ... for military service in the country of origin of the parents is absurd on its face and is something to which we should never assent for a moment.
Secretary of State Robert Lansing drafted a lengthy letter detailing the official State Department perspective on the issue in June 1915. The department had to defend its position on dual citizenship so often that the letter was printed and used as a department circular, distributed to politicians and people who were denied assistance because they held dual citizenship. The issue received sufficient attention among policy-makers so that the post-World War I treaty regime contained provisions that eliminated all previous ambiguities in favor of the U.S. position on sole citizenship. The consuls had upheld international agreements during the war, but they were undoubtedly in favor of subsequent changes that resolved this issue.

Finally, there were the cases in which a presumption of expatriation had arisen against the man claiming U.S. citizenship. In March 1907, the U.S. Congress had passed a law that declared people expatriated if they had been absent from the United States for two years or more. To retain a claim to U.S. citizenship, a man had to provide evidence to overcome the presumption of expatriation. This issue became increasingly hazy as the war progressed, however. Once the war started, it was difficult and unsafe to travel. Without proper papers, which most people had not brought from the United States, one could not leave the empire, and a short trip to visit relatives could quickly become two years.

U.S. officials were generally willing to assist people who had clearly come to Austria-Hungary for a fixed amount of time. Such trips to visit relatives, obtain an education, or dispose of property that were begun shortly before the war were easily recognized as cases worthy of intervention. U.S. officials were also willing to accept that people were in the empire for medical reasons. Many women who were ill returned to Austria with their children to recover their health while the father remained in the United States; some of the children had obtained their majority during their stay in Austria-Hungary, and the men among them were thus eligible for service. Other men were there because of their personal health or the health of their wives. Medical practitioners at the time frequently prescribed “a change of air” to restore people to health, and in many of the cases presented here the patients had been taking the empire’s air for ten years or more.

The Department of State instructed U.S. officials in the empire to determine whether or not the men had taken an oath of allegiance to Austria-Hungary, Emperor Franz Joseph, or the Habsburg flag. Taking such an oath would be a violation of the naturalization agreement, since it was a show of loyalty to a state other than the United States and a practical election of foreign citizenship. It was, however, virtually impossible to be on active duty in the Habsburg army without having taken such an oath. Most people claiming U.S. protection swore in an affidavit that they were forced to repeat the oath against their will. Whether or not someone had taken such an oath was never the exclusive reason assistance was denied,
but it was taken into consideration. In one case, the Department of State even argued that applying to the Habsburg government for the travel pass necessary to get to an embassy or consulate to report an impressment case was a profession of Austrian or Hungarian citizenship and therefore a sign of expatriation.

More important than taking an oath or applying for a travel pass was whether or not the person in question had issued a formal protest to the Austro-Hungarian authorities at the time of their arrest or impressment. Ernest Harris, the American consul general in Vienna after the war, wrote:

> According to the “Wehrgesetz” (National Defense Law) of the Monarchy, there were two appropriate authorities to which cases of this nature, protesting against service in the Austro-Hungarian Army, should have been lodged. After having received the official notification to appear on a certain day before the recruiting board, a protest could have been lodged with either the “Bezirkshauptmannschaft” or governmental administration authorities or with the recruiting board itself. The latter consisted of representatives of the provincial government, of the military authorities, the municipality, and two physicians.

Many impressed soldiers said that they failed to protest to the Habsburg military officials because they were afraid of being penalized by the authorities. Fred Jaklitsch, a man who applied for the release of himself and his son in Trieste in April 1916, testified, “It is war, and one does not know if anything is allowed or not. I have always heard that one must not oppose the military authorities if one does not wish to be punished.”

Other factors that affected the U.S. government’s willingness to intervene included proof of involuntary service, prior registration as a U.S. citizen, and presenting oneself as a United States citizen rather than as an Austrian. Those who had been in Austria-Hungary for a number of years and who owned property or engaged in business in the empire were often considered expatriated. Owning property was considered a sign of involvement in the country where the property was located, and while owning property in the empire was a detriment to those claiming U.S. citizenship, owning property and having a family in the United States were definitely assets in protection cases.

U.S. officials also wanted to know about the impressed man’s plans for returning to the United States. They were uninterested in getting people out of the army who were then going to stay in Austria. Officials dealing directly with the men and department staff in Washington both recognized that many people were asking for assistance merely to avoid military duty. After receiving help, they demonstrated “the greatest
disinclination to return to the United States.” Ulysses Grant-Smith, the U.S. consul general in Vienna, pointed out that

many naturalized American citizens of Polish, Croatian, Hungarian or other origin, return to their countries of their nationality for the purpose of taking up their permanent abode therein; and when the question of their military service is involved endeavor to obtain protection under the cloak of forfeited American citizenship.... Had it not been for the present war, there is no doubt that many such persons would have continued to reside in their former homes as American citizens without any wellfounded claims as such.

In two cases, efforts to secure release were completely dropped when men admitted that they did not plan to go to the United States. Department of State officials in Washington instructed U.S. officials in Austria-Hungary to inquire about an impressed man’s intent to return and to make every effort to facilitate a speedy departure, either when the case was resolved, or, if possible, after the man was released pending a decision. By facilitating a man’s return to the United States, the consular service ensured that the case could not be reopened. More importantly, the man’s physical location and citizenship would be in alignment.

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The conditions created by the unregulated movement of millions of individuals between 1880 and 1914 prompted the U.S. government to expand its consular services to enforce its claims to sovereignty more effectively. As U.S. consuls sought to limit the applicability of Habsburg laws to U.S. citizens, they destabilized the international system by pushing for a body-based conception of sovereignty that undermined territorially based sovereignty. U.S. consuls argued that American jurisdiction over U.S. citizens should operate irrespective of place, while U.S. officials operating at home tried to enforce their jurisdiction over foreign citizens on U.S. soil. Efforts to have it both ways frustrated Habsburg officials, and negotiations to resolve the tensions between the two sovereignties on a case-by-case basis were not particularly successful.

U.S. officials used the opportunities created by World War I and the subsequent peace conference to change the system. In conjunction with the Allied and successor states, the United States kept emergency wartime passports in place after the war, thus providing an internationally recognized way to mark an individual’s citizenship status and a government’s body-based sovereign rights. Passports alone would have signaled the primacy of body-based sovereignty in the postwar system. However, U.S. officials and representatives of other governments also implemented strict
border controls, and the U.S. government introduced immigration quotas, which reinforced territorial sovereignty. By limiting mobility and marking individuals’ identity with passports, governments in the post-World War I world more effectively delineated the physical, political, and population borders of the nation, using the power of the state to confront and reduce the problems produced by the transnational movement of people.

Notes


3 The best available statistics on return migration are in Wyman, Round-Trip to America. Actual numbers are difficult to determine because U.S. officials used racial categories rather than citizenship categories to classify immigrants. Based on Wyman’s statistics for various groups, approximately 50 percent of Austrian and Hungarian citizens returned to their native land.


6 Bohemian was the term commonly used by pre-World War I U.S. authorities, including Department of State and Immigration personnel, and American newspapers. It referred to both the people and the language we know today as Czech. Czech did not really enter these sources until Tomas Masaryk and his supporters introduced the idea of a Czecho-Slovak state into the American imagination during the war.


8 See Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815–1918 (London, 1989); and King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans.

For an example of these transatlantic networks, see “Imprisonment of Zdenek Bodlak,” Hoover to the Secretary of State, Prague, 10 March 1915, file no. 363.112 B63/3, United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, Decimal File, 1910–29 (hereafter cited as NARA).

Ibid.; a similar sentiment is expressed in No. 320, Hoover to the Secretary of State, Prague, 28 December 1918, file no. 363.112 B63/3, in NARA.

“Imprisonment of Zdenek Bodlak,” 10 March 1915.

No. 49, “Imprisonment of Zdenek Bodlak,” Hoover to the Secretary of State, Prague, 28 July 1915, file no. 636.112 B 63/8, in NARA. Another well-documented case in the archives is that of Albert Bohdan, who was arrested for “inciting soldiers to treasonable conduct” by telling them not to “shoot at the Servians [sic], they are our brothers.” See No. 475, Penfield to the Secretary of State, Vienna, 16 April 1915, file no. 363.11 B63/9; and “Imprisonment of Albert Bohdan, American Citizen,” Hoover to the Secretary of State, Prague, 14 November 1914, enclosed in Grant Smith to Carr, Vienna, 16 April 1915, file no. B63/10; and “Imprisonment of Albert Bohdan,” Hoover to the Secretary of State, Prague, 3 August 1915, file no. 363.11 B63/12-, all in NARA.

Translation of the Trial Transcript for the Bodlak Case, page 6, file no. 363.112 B63/8, in NARA.

Ibid.

Bodlak to Ohl, 26 October 1914, included in Translation of the Trial Transcript for the Bodlak Case. Eighteen-year-olds could enter the U.S. military at the time, but perhaps Bodlak viewed that voluntary service as qualitatively different from conscription.

The first three quotations can be found in Bodlak to John Bodlak, 11 November 1914, included in Translation of the Trial Transcript for the Bodlak Case. Map quote: Bodlak to Junek, 17 November 1914, in Translation of the Trial Transcript for the Bodlak Case.

Translation of the Trial Transcript for the Bodlak Case.

Hoover and Penfield also contemplated making a direct appeal to Franz Joseph, but that had been tried unsuccessfully in earlier cases, as the emperor had merely referred the case back to the court, which upheld its previous ruling. No. 49, “Imprisonment of Zdenek Bodlak,” 28 July 1915. Bodlak was released from prison early, in October 1916, due to illness; he died in December 1917 while staying with a relative in Bohemia. See Hoover to the Secretary of State, Prague, 20 October 1916, file no. 363.112 B63/14; and Hoover to the Secretary of State, Prague, [no date, 1917/18], file no. 363.112 B63/18, both in NARA.

On problems with wartime mail, see file no. 125.2346, in NARA.


No. 320, Hoover to the Secretary of State, 28 December 1918.


Ibid.

No. 202, “Recommendations for improvement in ranking and facilities of American Consulate at Trieste,” Ralph Busser to the Secretary of State, Trieste, 9 November 1915, file no. 125.9453/36, in NARA.

No. 212, Paul Nash to the Secretary of State, Budapest, 21 March 1911, file no. 125.2433/10, in NARA.

No. 38, Penfield to the Secretary of State, Vienna, 10 December 1913, file no. 124.63/–, in NARA.

The documentary evidence on military service cases—and protection cases in general—is incomplete. Standard record-keeping practice was to record cases in the consulate’s log book, and all correspondence relating to a case would be kept in the consulate archives. Correspondence generated by the Department of State and the consulate was generally done in triplicate, so one copy was sent to the designated recipient, one copy was retained in the consular
archives, and one copy was sent to Washington. Once World War I began—and the workload of the consulates skyrocketed—this system could not be maintained. Only some items were mailed to Washington at all, and because of the uncertainty of wartime mail, even for diplomatic correspondence, not all of the items mailed arrived and found their way into departmental files. In terms of military service cases, 157 cases from the 1910–22 period found their way into Washington files in some form, although most are incomplete. The consular archives themselves were sealed when the United States severed diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary in the spring of 1917, and most posts in the former Habsburg Empire did not reopen until at least 1921. The keys to the archives were left with Habsburg police authorities. Needless to say, not everything survived. See, among others, “Conduct of the Consulate General at Budapest, Hungary, since July 4, 1914,” Mallett to the Secretary of State, Budapest, 14 September 1914, file no. 125.2436/32, in NARA.

The largest subset of files consists of requests from Americans to locate friends and relatives in the empire and report on their welfare during World War I; Department of State files contain approximately 3,000 such requests. See file 363.11, in NARA. On the consular workload during the war, see also Katharine Elizabeth Crane, Mr. Carr of State: Forty-Seven Years in the Department of State (New York, 1960).

On the 1912/13 year, see “Memorandum with regard to questions 33 and 36 on pages 7 and 8 respectively, of the inspection return,” Mallett to the Secretary of State, 6 September 1913, file no. 125.2436/23; for other statistics, see “Work of the Budapest Consulate General during the war,” Coffin to the Secretary of State, Budapest, 6 January 1916, file no. 125.2436/42, all in NARA.

See file nos. 363.117/532 and 543a, in NARA.

The case of Chaim Hook, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Galicia, is the most extreme military service case, and it was not resolved until 1921. Hook traveled to Galicia to visit relatives in the spring of 1914. When the war started, Habsburg officials called him twice for military service; the first time, right after the start of the war, they honored his claim to U.S. citizenship without investigation. In 1915, he was called again, and this time he was imprisoned for six weeks before being sent to the Russian front. He served for ten months, and just before the Habsburg Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved his release, he was captured by the Russians and sent to a POW camp. The Department of State approached both the tsarist and liberal governments of Russia to secure his release, but those requests were denied. Hook was finally sent back to Austria in the spring of 1918 as part of a prisoner exchange when Soviet Russia left the war. Upon arrival in Austria, he was reimpressed and sent to the Italian front, where he was again captured and sent to a POW camp. Before the U.S. government could secure his release from the Italians, he was exchanged again in late 1919 and sent to the new Polish state, which was in upheaval as it attempted to secure its existence. The Department of State told the U.S. consul in Warsaw to give Hook an emergency passport and help him return home as soon as conditions in Poland were favorable for travel. His brother in the United States also sent Hook $200 through the Department. Hook, who was in serious financial distress, traveled to Warsaw to get his passport and money. When he went to the Legation in Warsaw for the passport, they refused to give it to him because he could not pay the required $1 fee. Hook then went to the Consulate in Warsaw for the $200, but they refused to give it to him because the orders from the Department said to give him the money after an emergency passport had been issued. Hook finally returned to the United States on 1 August 1921. For Chaim Hook’s case, see file nos. 363.117/60, 258, 344, 411, 466, 486, 537, H76, in NARA.

The laws regarding military service in Austria and Hungary varied over time and were not always the same in both halves of the empire. By 1910, the laws were brought in line with each other, and throughout the Habsburg crown lands a man was liable to be taken for service “after the 1st of January of the calendar year in which the man in question reaches his twenty-first year and ends with the 31st of December in that year in which the man in question ends his 36th year.” This meant a change in the Hungarian law, which had held men between the ages of 19 and 42 liable for service. See Flourney to Van Dyne, Washington, 20 October 1910, file no. 363.117/2, in NARA.

No. 135, “Work of the Budapest office since the war commenced,” Coffin to the Secretary of State, Budapest, 2 January 1915, file no. 125.2436/35, in NARA.

Examples of POW cases include Max Gelb in Russia, file nos. 363.117/34 and 341; Dusan Ratkovich in Italy, file nos. 363.117/300 and 346; and Robert Fuchs in Serbia, file nos. 363.117/351 and 396, all in NARA. See also the Chaim Hook case in note 32.

The case of Joseph Tott can be found in file nos. 363.117/229a, 262, 271, 277a, 292, 349, in NARA.

After 1867, the Habsburg army was divided into three major parts: the imperial army, which served the monarchy as a whole and was under the jurisdiction of the joint war ministry; the Landeswehr, which was for the Austrian half of the country; and the Honvéd, for Hungary. To get someone removed from the military rolls for the imperial army or the Austrian Landeswehr, the U.S. embassy in Vienna had to address a communication to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which then passed the message on to the war ministry or the Austrian government for investigation and an eventual decision, which would then be transmitted to the embassy via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the Hungarian Honvéd, the Budapest consulate general dealt directly with the Hungarian authorities. There was also an imperial navy, but there are no cases of naval impressment in the existing military service records.

The treaty was negotiated in 1870 and entered into force in 1871.


See, for example, the case of Andrew Kanalkiewicz, file no. 363.117/333, in NARA.

See, for example, the case of John Tulea, file nos. 363.117/88 and 153, in NARA.

See file no. 363.117/W181, in NARA. For a complaint from a U.S. official, see Grant-Smith to the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 August 1914, file no. 363.117/8, in NARA.


No. 135, “Work of the Budapest office since the war commenced,” 2 January 1915.

It was common for states and territories created between the 1840s and 1900 to include provisions for non-citizen voters. In addition, several southern states, including Texas and Florida, altered their constitutions after Reconstruction to allow white non-citizens to vote in an effort to offset African American suffrage. In midwestern, western, and southern states, U.S. citizenship became a requirement for suffrage between 1900 and 1920. See, among others, John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925*, 2002 ed. (1955; New Brunswick, NJ, 2002).

Congressman Igoe to Lansing, Washington, 12 April 1917, file no. 363.117/418; see also the case of Joe Grund in file nos. 363.117/43, 44, 46, 47, all in NARA.
See, for example, the case of Frank Tadejevic, file nos. 363.117/310 and 388, in NARA.

See, for example, the case of Franjo Simac, file no. 363.117/261, in NARA.

Flourney to Putney, Washington, 31 July 1914, file no. 363.117/51, in NARA.

Petrich to the Department of State, Cleveland, 5 January 1916, file no. 363.117/226; and County Clerk of Cook County IL to the Department of State, Chicago, 12 November 1918, file no. 363.117/487, both in NARA.

See, for example, the case of Joseph Zunic, file nos. 363.117/414, 511, in NARA.

See, for example, the case of John Kulusich, file nos. 363.117/86, 101, 103, 117, and 131, in NARA.

Lodge’s comments were reprinted as part of Robert Lansing, “Status of Persons Born in the U.S. of Alien Parents and of Foreign-Born Persons Naturalized in This Country,” 9 June 1915, file no. 363.117/181, in NARA.

Ibid.

Carr to Busser, Washington, 26 June 1916, file no. 363.117/315, in NARA.

See, for example, the case of Joseph Zunich, file nos. 363.117/168, 451, 456, and 468, in NARA.

Gerard to the Department of State, Berlin, 20 April 1916, file no. 363.117/299, in NARA.

Ibid.; Lansing to the U.S. Legation in Berne, Washington, 2 July 1918, file no. 363.117/457, in NARA.

Busser to the Department of State, Trieste, 22 December 1916, file no. 363.117/399, in NARA.

U.S. Legation at Berne to the Department of State, Berne, 14 March 1918, file no. 363.117/444, in NARA.

Harris to the Department of State, Vienna, 10 December 1929, file no. 363.117/551, in NARA.

Affidavit of Fred Jaklitsch, in Penfield to the Department of State, Vienna, 19 April 1916, file no. 363.117/308, in NARA.

U.S. Legation at Berne to the Department of State, Berne, 3 October 1918, file no. 363.117/475, in NARA.

Penfield to the Department of State, Vienna, 26 April 1916, file no. 363.117/290, in NARA.

Grant-Smith to the Department of State, Vienna, 31 January 1916, file no. 363.117/H76, in NARA.

The case of Mike Roth can be found in file nos. 363.117/222, 242, 246, 280, 293, 311, 314, 348; the case of Eugene Neuwirth can be found in file no. 363.117/361, all in NARA.

Crosby to Paris, Vienna, 17 February 1916, file no. 363.117/238, in NARA.

See Torpey, Invention of the Passport.

PHILANTHROPY, PEACE RESEARCH, AND REVISIONIST POLITICS: ROCKEFELLER AND CARNEGIE SUPPORT FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN WEIMAR GERMANY

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Transnational approaches to the history of the United States seek to enrich our understanding of American society by challenging the nation as an analytical category. While historians still debate how to define transnationalism, the debates themselves have opened up new research perspectives. Certainly, transnational approaches are able to analyze forms of social relations that exist outside or defy limitations imposed by nation-states. Transnationalism also has a lot to offer historians of globalization as it can capture the role non-state actors play in the formation of a global civil society. Nevertheless, the transnational, national, and international are not separate spheres. Transnational relations between groups in different parts of the world can shape the environment that nation-states operate in, and transnationalism as an approach does not mean ignoring the nation-state. Nation-states exert power that can disrupt, transform, or encourage transnational relations. This essay explores how, in Weimar Germany, state power and national loyalties interacted with transnational scholarly networks fostered by American foundations and argues that transnational connections, despite all their border-transcending potential, can support national, and nationalist, projects.

During the interwar years, American foundations sought to encourage transnational scholarly collaboration in the study of international relations. The three most notable actors in that field were the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, and the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division. They awarded grants to a number of scholars and institutions in Europe and the United States. But the foundations did more than just support national academic communities. They also financed the work of the International Studies Conference (ISC), a transnational network that linked many of their grant recipients and had been formed under the auspices of the League of Nations’ International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) in 1928. Within the framework of the ISC, scholars and foundations alike were experimenting with international relations, a new, interdisciplinary area of research that only became a sub-discipline of political science after 1945. In the interwar years, international relations was not an
institutionalized discipline with an established set of concepts, theories, and methods. There were few international relations specialists, and scholars who addressed international questions generally had a disciplinary background in law, history, sociology, or political economy. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the activities under the auspices of the ISC were also, in David Long’s words, “a practical normative peace project associated with the League,” not just an attempt to define a novel object of study. The commitment to international understanding was shared by American foundations and was the basis of their support for the ISC. Nevertheless, the foundations also realized that they had first to build up strong national institutions in the larger European countries and to encourage scholars that were interested in cross-border collaboration. Mobilizing those forces in Germany proved to be a particularly complex task.

Two academic institutions were the primary recipients of Rockefeller and Carnegie grants: the Institut für Auswärtige Politik (Foreign Policy Institute—IAP) in Hamburg and the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (German Academy for Politics—DHfP) in Berlin. They were private institutes, existing outside the state-run university system, and have been credited with laying the foundations for the institutionalization of international relations in Germany. The IAP edited the German volumes of the Carnegie-commissioned *Economic and Social History of the World War* while at the Hochschule the Endowment established a “Carnegie Chair.” There were also plans for an institute for peace research, the Stresemann Academy. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, and later the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division, supported both institutes.

Although the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment supported the same institutions and to some extent coordinated their programs, there were significant differences between the two foundations. The Carnegie Endowment’s interest in international relations was a result of its origins in peace advocacy. Founded in 1910, it purported “to bring the sentimental and the practical forces of the world into cooperation on the basis of demonstrable economic and historic truth.” Its two research departments published widely in the fields of international law and history, but the emphasis clearly remained on disseminating, not generating, knowledge. Producing publicity to promote international understanding and establishing personal contacts between the world’s political and cultural elites were the primary aims of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The Rockefeller philanthropies were more research oriented. Their programs in international relations were part of an endeavor to develop the social sciences in North America and Europe, with a special emphasis on empirical approaches and collaborative research projects. The interest in international relations became more pronounced once the Spelman
Memorial was amalgamated with the Foundation in January 1929. The newly created Division of Social Sciences singled out three areas for support, namely, international relations, economic stabilization, and public administration. This concentration reflected the impact of the world economic crisis, which had decreased the income of foundations and highlighted the practical importance of certain fields of research.¹⁰

Despite differences in emphasis, officers in both foundations shared a broadly liberal internationalist outlook and saw the programs they implemented as instrumental to the creation of a peaceful world order. In that sense, most foundation officers could be described as idealists, sharing a belief in the possibility of progressive change in international relations through education and scholarship.¹¹ They assumed that intellectuals, speaking the universal language of science and scholarship, could forge ties across nations that would pacify international politics. Moreover, the “objective” analysis of relationships among nations was necessary to curb the irrational forces of chauvinism. As James T. Shotwell, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of Economics and History, put it, “the technique of research [was] but the extension and application in greater detail of … sanity in political thinking.”¹² This “scientism” resonates in the words of Raymond Fosdick, longtime Rockefeller Foundation Trustee as well as its president between 1936 and 1948, when he declared that “the Foundation’s entire work in all fields has been aimed at the single target of world peace.”¹³

Fosdick directly experienced working in a multinational environment during his brief stint as under-secretary-general for the League of Nations and remained a League supporter throughout his life. Other foundation representatives became members of elite foreign policy think tanks.¹⁴ For the most part, though, foundation officers kept out of electoral politics, conducting their international activities as a private enterprise. This attitude to American philanthropy abroad was shared by U.S. government officials. Before 1938, the State Department showed virtually no interest in cultural relations, including scholarly exchanges, intellectual contacts, or scientific collaboration. Such activities were left to the private sector. The documents in the State Department’s archives relating to foundation activity abroad between 1920 and 1938 consist largely of dispatches from U.S. diplomats, some of whom did display a strong interest in the relevance of transnational philanthropic networks to American foreign policy.¹⁵ But only shortly before the Second World War did American government officials fully recognize and take advantage of the expertise and resources that had accumulated within these institutions.¹⁶

The relationship between the State Department and the two foundations becomes relevant when one considers whether these nongovernmental organizations can be automatically classified as transnational
actors. On the one hand, the foundations were privately funded, developed their policies independently, and for much of the interwar years operated in a field that was of little interest to foreign policy-makers. The Rockefeller Foundation also kept a cautious distance from anything that smacked of official endorsement. Foundation officers, for example, reacted strongly against an attempt of the IIIC to put pressure on Rockefeller trustees through diplomatic channels.17 On the other hand, even though the foundations were transnational players, non-state actors operating across national borders, a certain closeness to the foreign policy-making process cannot be denied. Officers in both foundations acted as expert advisers to American delegations to intergovernmental conferences. The Carnegie Endowment in particular had strong personal links to the State Department.18 But in their dealings with European grant recipients, the foundations were left to their own devices. This becomes especially clear when one compares the foundations’ position to that of their German associates.

In the Weimar Republic, foreign policy-makers displayed a strong interest in transnational cultural relations. Not only did the German Ministry of External Affairs possess a department for cultural relations, it also encouraged scientific exchange. However, this has to be seen in the context of two aims that the Ministry pursued during the 1920s: first, to manipulate domestic and international debates on the origins of the Great War, and second, to end the international scientific isolation of German scholars.

Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, the so-called war-guilt clause, was pivotal to German attempts at treaty revision. Interpreted as assigning responsibility for the war exclusively to Germany and its allies, the clause caused public outrage. Propaganda campaigns against Article 231 were coordinated by the Ministry of External Affairs, which hoped that influencing public opinion in former Allied countries would improve the prospects for revision. Officials coordinated research into the war-guilt question and commissioned publications and publicity campaigns.19 As we shall see later, the Ministry tried to influence independent publications on the war, too. The official initiative that received most attention abroad was an authoritative collection of German diplomatic sources relating to the period from 1871 to 1914 entitled Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette.20 The Ministry commissioned it to present German prewar diplomacy in the best possible light and to put pressure on Allied governments to open their archives in turn. One staff member spent his entire time vetting documents before passing them on to the collection’s editors. There were also direct interventions in the publication process, about which the head of the editorial team, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, repeatedly complained. The published volumes contained documents that were
shortened and accompanied by apologetic editorials. Some German historians, such as Otto Hoetzsch, criticized this as unscientific. However, co-editor Friedrich Thimme explained that the task had been “not a purely scientific one but just as much a political one and that political purposes made it necessary to … deviate … from certain scientific maxims.”

Politics and scholarship, however, were connected in many other ways in the Weimar Republic as well. Cultural diplomacy and cultural relations as alternative forms of foreign policy had already been discussed before 1914 among the educated. After the war, the debate was taken up by politicians and state bureaucrats. According to the advocates of Kulturpolitik, Germany was to expand its scientific and cultural influence to compensate for its lost great-power status. In 1920, the Ministry of External Affairs created a department of cultural relations, the Kulturabteilung, which was responsible for German educational institutions in foreign countries, international scholarly exchange, and the promotion of German culture and language abroad. But in the early 1920s, one of the biggest concerns in the Kulturabteilung was the international isolation of German scholars. Their participation in international scientific networks was effectively curtailed between 1919 and 1926 through an organized boycott of Germany by the national scientific academies of the former Allied and neutral countries. Combined with the general funding crisis of the German university system, this put scholars in serious danger of losing touch with international trends. By the mid-1920s, though, the boycott had started to crumble. This was noted and welcomed in the Ministry. As German diplomacy took a more conciliatory turn, especially once membership in the League of Nations became an option in 1924, good relations with foreign cultural elites became important, and the Ministry encouraged German scholars to cultivate them.

American foundations were one of the groups keen to collaborate with German scholars even while the boycott was in place. In particular, the role of the Rockefeller Foundation in ending the country’s scientific isolation was acknowledged at the time. But why were the foundations so interested in rehabilitating German academia? First, the intentional isolation of a country, especially one sporting significant scientific achievements, ran contrary to the universalist ideals of foundation officers. Those who went to Germany in the early 1920s noted with regret that scholars were lagging behind. Guy Stanton Ford, visiting several universities on behalf of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, wrote, “Intellectually as well as physically they have lived for ten years on their own flesh.” German scholars, he believed, needed “new hope and outside intellectual contacts.” James T. Shotwell regarded American assistance to German academic institutions as “a stimulus to productive scholarship which may offer a contribution to us all.”
There was also a fear among foundation officers that an isolated Germany would split the international scientific community into two warring camps. In a letter to Fosdick, Shotwell recalled the 1923 World Conference of Historians, which had excluded scholars from the Central Powers. As a consequence, they considered setting up a rival organization. This, Shotwell feared, “would be accentuating a rival line of European history based upon German theories, especially those dealing with the origin of the war.” As the head of the American delegation, he convinced the conference organizers to make the next meeting more representative. The task for American foundations, he wrote to Fosdick, would be to heal political rifts between scholars as much as to support them with grants. The growth of “rival national schools … in the social and political sciences” had to be prevented as it “would put back our movements of internationalism for many a long year.”

American foundations began to offer Germany material assistance from 1920, when the Rockefeller Foundation started donating medical journals. To distribute them, the Foundation cooperated with the quasi-governmental Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Association for German Science, hereafter Notgemeinschaft,) which had representatives at all German universities. Formed by scientists and bureaucrats after the war, it coordinated and funded university research. It was also one of the few organizations authorized by the Ministry of External Affairs to collect donations abroad. The experience, knowledge, and networks of the Notgemeinschaft proved very valuable to the Rockefeller Foundation, and their successful collaboration accounts for the large share of Rockefeller aid that Germany subsequently received under the medical literature program.

The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial also relied heavily on the judgment of this organization, as the frequent correspondence between Beardsley Ruml, the Memorial’s director, and August W. Fehling, a Notgemeinschaft staff member and fellowship adviser to the Rockefeller philanthropies, testifies. Although the Notgemeinschaft was nominally independent, Friedrich Schmidt-Ott, its president, dutifully reported donations from American foundations to the Ministry of External Affairs.

The first collaborative research project in international relations that involved American foundations and German scholars was the Carnegie Endowment’s multi-volume *Economic and Social History of the World War*, designed to become “the greatest co-operative history ever written.” Its aim was to analyze the impact of the Great War on society with the “ultimate purpose … to further peace by revealing what war does to civilization.” As with similar efforts in the twentieth century, the Carnegie History’s publishers assumed that a collaborative attempt at (re)writing the past, involving participants from different countries, could create mutual understanding between them. In each country, the Carnegie Endowment appointed an editorial committee to commission and edit the volumes. The
German committee, formed in 1922, was headed by Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, the editor of *Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a law professor with a specialization in Anglo-Saxon law, was a liberal democrat with pacifist leanings. He co-founded the Institut für Auswärtige Politik (IAP), the first German research institute for the study of international conflicts and their prevention. Like most German scholars, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy pleaded for the revision of the post-World War I settlement, but he insisted that a diplomacy of conciliation rather than confrontation would best achieve this end. This moderate revisionist also belonged to the transnational network comprising members of the three liberal foreign affairs institutes that emerged in the context of the Paris Peace Conference. The American Council on Foreign Relations, the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the IAP in Hamburg had all been founded under similar circumstances and with similar aims. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was well known within the small Anglo-American elite that populated the Council and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. This circle also had close personal links with American foundations, a fact that helped to bring Mendelssohn-Bartholdy to the attention of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. From 1926 to 1930, the IAP received a $20,000 grant from the Memorial. This provided stipends for special research projects, some in collaboration with the Royal Institute of International Affairs. There is evidence that the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial had ambitious plans for the IAP that would see it transformed into a “house [for] all of the social sciences,” though by mid-1930 this plan had faltered due to a lack of local support.

Mendelssohn-Bartholdy’s close ties to Anglo-American internationalism as well as his experience with editing diplomatic sources had also recommended him to the Carnegie Endowment. In early 1923, the IAP became the base for the German editorial committee of the Carnegie *History* project. As all volumes of the Carnegie *History* were to be based on official sources, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and co-editor Carl Melchior sought the cooperation of government ministries, claiming that the purpose of the *Economic and Social History of the World War* was to “give an objective account of the effects of the war and to contribute to a balancing of the different evaluations of the World War that are still prevalent in the world.” For Germany this would be the first opportunity “to participate in a discussion on an entirely equal footing with other countries” as “the German volumes [were] on a par with those offered by England and France and describe[d] the economic and political aspects of the conduct of the war in an objective and convincing fashion, especially to the audience in the United States.” Since the American public was the main target of government-orchestrated propaganda, and since the volumes would be published in an international series, the Carnegie project generated interest in the government ministries...
that the editors addressed. While some officials vilified the Carnegie History as “vicious propaganda,” the majority concluded that the German contribution to the project was “politically important.” Government cooperation came at a price, though. Manuscripts had to be sent to the relevant authorities for review, and certain topics, such as the extraction of raw materials in occupied territories or the Hindenburg Program, were out of bounds. To ensure compliance with these conditions, the editorial board had to liaise with a governmental committee. State officials encouraged the collaboration between American foundations and German scholars because it gave them the opportunity to convey a positive image of Germany to an American audience but, at the same time, put this collaboration under close surveillance.

In effect, the Carnegie History underwent the same vetting process that had been developed during the compilation of Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette. What could have become a rival project, an unofficial history of the Great War that avoided taking the government line, had been stifled. Certain volumes, for instance, those on the German war industry, were written but never published because of government interference, to the bitter disappointment of the Carnegie Endowment. But were the editors who had conducted the negotiations with the ministerial bureaucracy and agreed to censorship entirely to blame for this? To some extent, the episode exposed defects in the entire project. Ultimately, the border-transcending Carnegie History had been designed along strictly national lines, with national editing committees headed by scholars and politicians—Melchior was also the Weimar Republic’s first ambassador to Britain—who were likely to become embroiled in a conflict of interest. This seems to have happened in the case of Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, who, when approached by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1926 with a request to “further influence the Carnegie foundation,” politely declined.

Carnegie and Rockefeller interest in the IAP also lessened during the 1920s. While Mendelssohn-Bartholdy continued to carry great weight with the foundations, the institute, given its small size and location, could only have a limited impact on the political and academic cultures of the Weimar Republic. Another institution became more prominent in the policies of both foundations, the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik in Berlin. Founded in 1920, the Hochschule loosely collaborated with the IAP. However, while the Hamburg institute had been designed as a specialized research institute from the start, the founders of the Hochschule stressed the broader educational role of their school. From the mid-1920s, the number of courses at university level rose and professional academics increasingly replaced politicians and civil servants as teachers. Although the Hochschule was able to increase its academic reputation over time, the overall emphasis remained on teaching.
The founders of the academy emerged from the “national-liberal” milieu around Friedrich Naumann. They supported the constitutional consensus of the Weimar Republic, even if most of them were Vernunftrepublikaner who lacked a firm commitment to parliamentary democracy as such. At the Hochschule, they aspired to create an institution that was above party lines, capable of educating a new political elite. After the humiliation of the lost war, the aim was to contribute to a national renewal. Some members of the founding generation were politically on the right—for example, the historian Otto Hoetzsch. Young scholars like Herrmann Heller, Hajo Holborn, and Sigmund Neumann represented the liberal left. From 1927, there was an increased influx of the anti-democratic and radical right, a development that threatened the Hochschule’s original maxim to remain open to all parties, except those on the extremes. It is important to note that the Hochschule had excellent links with the political and administrative elites of the Weimar Republic. Ernst Jäckh, its well-connected director and president from 1930, was a compulsive networker. He had made a name for himself as a publicist and had been an adviser to the Ministry of External Affairs before the war. Tirelessly seeking official backing for his institution, he managed to recruit a number of public figures for its board of trustees, such as Chief Justice Walter Simons, the industrialist Robert Bosch, and the banker Hjalmar Schacht.

Ernst Jäckh was crucial for establishing the Hochschule’s international contacts, too, especially with regard to bringing in the support of American foundations. In the winter of 1924/1925, he traveled to New York where he met Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of both the Carnegie Endowment and Columbia University. Jäckh’s visit occurred at a time when Butler himself was seeking to establish official relations between the Carnegie Endowment and the German government. A letter from Butler to Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in April 1925 was followed by several conversations between Butler and Ago von Maltzan, the German ambassador in Washington. The latter had come across the Endowment before, as his support for the Carnegie History had been sought by Carl Melchior while Maltzan was still state secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs. Maltzan saw clear advantages in a stronger link between the Endowment and Germany, as expressed in a memorandum to Berlin: “Because of its large assets—since 1913 the Endowment has spent on average more than half a million dollars, in some years significantly more—the Carnegie Endowment has remarkable opportunities to influence public opinion in all countries, especially in intellectual circles. We must not miss this opportunity to work for a more favorable attitude toward Germany.”

Jäckh succeeded in using his official contacts to ensure that prospective benefactors of the Hochschule were welcomed in Berlin. When Butler visited in June 1926, he was treated to a high-profile dinner. Those invited
included government officials, politicians, professors, business leaders, the U.S. ambassador, and Gustav Stresemann. At Jäckh’s behest, Maltzan ensured that other Endowment representatives were received with similar honors. The negotiations between Jäckh and the Endowment became more concrete, and in March 1927 the “Carnegie Chair for International Relations and History” was officially inaugurated at the Hochschule. Fitting in with the Endowment’s emphasis on publicity, the Carnegie-sponsored lectures were open to the general public and mostly concerned with current affairs. The speakers were drawn from universities, international organizations, or government bureaucracies—among them were the historian Johan Huizinga; Albert Thomas, the head of the International Labor Organization; and Alfred Zimmern, professor of International Relations at Oxford. The Endowment favored this format as it brought foreign scholars to Berlin and generated a significant amount of news coverage. In response to complaints from the Hochschule that the existing setup was not academic enough, a permanent professorship was established by the Endowment in 1931.

From the beginning, Butler had impressed on Jäckh the importance of international cooperation, suggesting that he “establish friendly relations and cooperation both with the British Institute for International Affairs … and with the Institut des Hautes Etudes [sic] Internationales, in Paris.” Helped by the contacts and prestige of the Endowment, the Hochschule succeeded in becoming part of the Conference of Institutes for the Scientific Study of International Relations, the precursor of the ISC. Its first meeting was held in Berlin, with the participation of the Carnegie Endowment’s European Center in Paris. Jäckh dutifully reported this achievement to the Ministry of External Affairs.

The collaboration between the Endowment and the Hochschule satisfied both sides and was cemented by cordial relations between Butler and Jäckh. After a trip to Berlin in 1930, Butler declared that this visit had been “the high-water mark of my European experiences during more than forty years.” Butler may have enjoyed this particular sojourn so much because Jäckh had involved him in a new project for international conciliation, a foundation commemorating the recently deceased Gustav Stresemann. The mission and organizational structure of the planned “Stresemann Memorial Foundation” bore a striking resemblance to those of the Carnegie Endowment. The new foundation’s aim was to “examine the real conditions and requirements for peaceful relations between states and nations in all areas and to disseminate the results of these inquiries.” An associated “Peace Academy” would conduct research, disseminate knowledge, encourage international understanding and collaboration, and educate the public. Butler directed the fund-raising effort for the Stresemann Memorial in the U.S., putting together an American support committee. The Carnegie Endowment itself pledged 100,000 marks.
Designated president of the Stresemann Memorial was Julius Curtius, the acting Minister of External Affairs. He announced the creation of the Memorial and the Peace Academy on American radio on 21 June 1930. Only four days after his radio appearance, Curtius demanded “full political freedom and equality of rights” for Germany in the Reichstag, marking a move toward a more assertive foreign policy. Those who watched German politics closely had strong misgivings about Curtius’s role as a patron of peace research. The former Agent General for Reparation Payments S. Parker Gilbert refused to join the American support committee for the following reasons:

I had the greatest admiration for Dr. Stresemann and his work and would be happy to share in a movement to honor his memory. But I have some fear that the German mind would regard an Academy of this kind as an instrument of German foreign policy rather than as a memorial to Dr. Stresemann, and there are many indications nowadays that German foreign policy is no longer the foreign policy of Dr. Stresemann.

Butler encountered further setbacks during his fund-raising campaign for the Stresemann Memorial. Potential donors were struggling with the impact of the Depression and proved unwilling to give. More than a year after Curtius’s announcement, the Stresemann Memorial still only existed on paper.

Jäckh’s ambitious plans and hopes for the Stresemann Memorial had crossed the Atlantic with Butler, who did his part in trying to fulfill them; via Berlin and the Carnegie and Rockefeller branch offices in Paris, they were also communicated to the Rockefeller Foundation’s headquarters in New York. There they created sufficient momentum to bring the Hochschule back into the Foundation’s network of grant recipients. The Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial had already supported the Hochschule with emergency grants in 1926 and 1928. However, on the grounds of Rockefeller fellowship adviser Fehling’s reports, subsequent applications had been rejected. Fehling had described the Hochschule as an innovative, promising institution but also—correctly—identified its main activity as teaching. The Rockefeller Foundation, however, was only willing to support research activity.

During the first two years after taking over from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, the Rockefeller Foundation’s Social Science Division made no new appropriations in Germany but considered a number of projects. One of these ideas harked back to an older plan for a social science research institute in Germany and entailed expanding the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in
Berlin into a research center for international law and international relations. The trustees earmarked $750,000 for this venture, significantly more than the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial had ever given to any other institution in Europe, with the exception of the London School of Economics.\(^6^4\) However, the plan never got past the stage of informal discussions, and the announcement of the Stresemann Memorial as a rival project caused the Rockefeller Foundation to shelve it.

Once it became clear, though, that the Stresemann Memorial had not progressed, Rockefeller Foundation officers became receptive to new proposals in the area of international relations. Again, personal relationships between foundation representatives and long-term collaborators were crucial. Schmidt-Ott, head of the Notgemeinschaft and also a member of the Stresemann Memorial’s governing board, approached Beardsley Ruml, the former director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, with the idea of requesting Rockefeller funds for the stalled Peace Academy. Schmidt-Ott, Ruml, and Jäckh agreed on the wording of a grant application made to the Rockefeller Foundation. As a result, $25,000 was awarded to a “Notgemeinschaft Committee for Research in International Relations” in December 1931. This committee was, in effect, staffed by the members of the defunct Stresemann Memorial. The Hochschule itself received an even larger grant. In April 1932, the Rockefeller Foundation awarded $90,000 over three years for its research program.\(^6^5\)

What had caused this change of heart on behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation? First, once Jäckh realized that the Foundation would only support research-oriented institutions, he and the new director of the Hochschule, Arnold Wolfers, tailored grant applications accordingly. From the late 1920s, research activities at the Hochschule had indeed increased, and the policies of the Rockefeller Foundation may have accelerated this process. Second, Jäckh and Wolfers increasingly presented their case to Rockefeller officers in person during meetings that had been organized through the Carnegie Endowment’s European Center, and could thereby bypass Fehling, the Rockefeller fellowship adviser.\(^6^6\) Rockefeller policy changed, too. Worried by the tense political situation in Germany, Foundation officers began to emphasize what they perceived to be a “liberal spirit” at the Hochschule. Regardless of concerns about the quality of research, Gunn insisted that the Hochschule was justly

considered to be a real ray of light in Germany, as far as an objective attitude in connection with international affairs is concerned. […] The very existence of an institution in Germany which has the objective attitude and scientific spirit in problems in the social sciences is an encouraging fact, and, in my opinion, the chief argument for aid from the Foundation.\(^6^7\)
Thus, the Rockefeller Foundation ended up pursuing a twofold research strategy: some research took place within a collaborative framework set up by the Notgemeinschaft, and some was conducted at the Hochschule. Which format was the more successful? The Notgemeinschaft Committee was composed of the same members as the corresponding Stresemann Committee. Initially, its meetings were dominated by Julius Curtius, whose proposals for research topics were “German reparations,” “international migration and settlement,” “the Polish Corridor,” and “limits of arbitration,” reflecting the tendency of the Ministry of External Affairs to use scholarship in the service of power politics. The Committee adopted two of the suggestions (the Polish Corridor and reparations) as part of a long list of research topics. Those included international economic relations, the prices of raw materials, the concept of the state, and political science terminology. Gunn admitted to “some forebodings regarding research on the Polish Corridor but decided that this would be a test for the Committee. “It will be interesting to see how objective the Germans can be in this investigation,” he noted. During the second year of the Committee’s existence, Curtius’s suggestions had vanished from the agenda, and some promising interdisciplinary approaches had developed, for example, that of Alfred Weber’s research group at Heidelberg, which combined political science, sociology, and psychology in a study on foreign policy. Research conducted at the Hochschule, however, did not meet Rockefeller expectations. “During the past year it has taken the form of unsystematic, individual research by members of the staff, according to their several interests and inclinations.” Interestingly, Foundation officers did not comment on the fact that many Hochschule teachers writing on international questions openly rejected the supposed “liberal spirit” there. One striking example is Max H. Boehm, an explicitly anti-Weimar irredentist.

It is difficult to give a rounded assessment of the Rockefeller Foundation’s work in international relations in Weimar Germany as the collaborations ended prematurely. Immediately after Hitler assumed power, the Hochschule was targeted by the NSDAP and eventually came under the direction of Goebbels’s propaganda ministry. Jäckh’s unsuccessful attempts to reach a compromise with the new regime that would have allowed him to retain Rockefeller support damaged his credibility. In May 1933, the Rockefeller Foundation decided to terminate its support, and the Carnegie Endowment followed suit in June. The Rockefeller grant to the Notgemeinschaft ended in 1934, coinciding with Schmidt-Ott’s forced resignation. The Institut für Auswärtige Politik suffered a similar fate. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy had to resign his directorship in March 1934, shortly before his emigration to Britain. In 1937, the institute was merged with the former Hochschule and moved to Berlin.
However, while the institutions supported by American philanthropy were completely transformed in the process of Nazi Gleichschaltung, the personal networks the foundations had built up remained in place. Most of the Rockefeller and Carnegie protégés emigrated, among them Jäckh, Holborn, and Wolfers, and continued to receive foundation funding. The foreign contacts they had established as members of the philanthropic network were a great advantage as they built new careers abroad. Jäckh, for example, first went to Britain and later to the United States, where he took up a post at Columbia University. Jäckh also continued to contribute to the ISC, which received increased funding from both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment from the mid-1930s. Wolfers emigrated to the United States, where he became a leading authority in the field of international relations. Moreover, the end of the Weimar Republic did not put an end to the collaboration between scholars in Germany and American foundations. As is well known, the Rockefeller Foundation did not terminate all of its German grants in the natural or social sciences after 1933. Throughout the 1930s, Rockefeller and Carnegie staff kept in contact with Fritz Berber, Jäckh’s successor at the Hochschule, and an adviser to the Nazi Ministry of External Affairs.76

Therefore, state officials were not completely successful in their efforts to control and subvert philanthropic networks. Those networks persisted, more fragmented, with a stronger reliance on people instead of institutions, leading to outcomes the foundations could not have foreseen. But state intervention did have a significant impact on transnational relationships between American foundations and German scholars. Government officials saw the presence of philanthropic foundations as an important asset to Germany’s cultural diplomacy that could be used to reach foreign policy aims. The Ministry of External Affairs tried to manipulate the relationships between foundations and collaborators, influencing their form and outcome and effectively limiting transnational agency. American foundations generally accepted these limits by seeking the approval of state authorities before becoming active in Germany, either by establishing contact through official channels, or by working with a semi-governmental agency like the Notgemeinschaft. Nonetheless, the foundations were wary of official interference; the fact that the Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies cooperated largely with private institutes suggests a desire to avoid state bureaucracies. As we have seen, these fears were not unfounded.

Notes
*I would like to thank those who attended the Young Scholars Forum 2007 as well as Kathleen Burk and Adam Smith for their thoughtful comments on this paper.*


13 Fosdick, Rockefeller Foundation, 219.


22 Friedrich Thimme to Friedrich Meinecke, 15 May 1926, quoted in German, ibid., 87. All translations are my own.


27 Ford to Beardsley Ruml, 12 March 1924, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Series III.6 (hereafter LSRM III.6), box 61, folder 657.

28 Shotwell to Fosdick, 17 January 1924, LSRM III.6, box 52, folder 558.

29 Ibid.

30 Susan Gross Solomon, “The Power of Dichotomies: The Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Medical Education, Medical Literature, and Russia, 1921–1925,” in *American Foundations in

31 Schmidt-Ott to Ministry of External Affairs, 27 March 1925, PA AA, R 65521.


34 Shotwell, Autobiography, 150; Erich Nickel, Politik und Politikwissenschaft in der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, 2004), 25.


36 Memorandum “Social Science,” 23 November 1926, LSRM III.6, box 63, folder 676; LSRM III.6, box 52, folder 561, passim.

37 “Memorandum of conversation of Selskar M. Gunn with B. Rumbl,” 15 August 1928, LSRM III.6, box 63, folder 676.

38 Mendelssohn-Bartholdy to Rumbl, 17 October 1928, LSRM III.6, box 52, folder 561; Diary excerpt John Van Sickle, 4 July 1930, RF RG 1.1, Series 717, box 20, folder 184.


40 Heinemann, Die verdrängte Niederlage, 91.


42 Göppert to Melchior, 8 May 1923; Ministry of Interior to Ministry of External Affairs, 15 May 1923; Memorandum, 2 June 1923, all PA AA, R 65152.


44 Memorandum, 11 January 1926, PA AA, R 65804, microfiche reel 7859.

45 On the DHfP, see Stephen Korenblat, “The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1978); Antonio Missiroli, Die Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (Sankt Augustin, 1988); Rainer Eifeld, Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt (Baden-Baden, 1991); Alfons Söllner, Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler in der Emigration (Opladen, 1996), esp. chapter 1; Nickel, Politik und Politikwissenschaft. Missiroli and Nickel stress the liberal character of the Hochschule in opposition to Söllner and Eifeld. Korenblat’s remains the most comprehensive and authoritative account, especially regarding the institution’s international connections.


Memorandum Maltzan to Ministry of External Affairs, 11 September 1925, PA AA, R 53701.


Hans Simons to Butler, 6 June 1928, CEIP CE, box 183, folder 1. The Carnegie lectures were reported in national and regional newspapers; see newspaper clippings in CEIP CE, box 182, folder 6 and box 183, folder 1; Hans Simons to Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron, 12 June 1929; Hans Simons to Earle Babcock, 23 October 1929, both in CEIP CE, box 183, folder 2.

Butler to Jäckh, 23 July 1926, CEIP CE, box 182, folder 6.


Butler to Jäckh, 5 May 1930, CEIP CE, box 183, folder 3.


Quoted in Steiner, The Lights That Failed, 488.

Gilbert to Butler, 19 January 1931, CEIP, box 324, folder 4.

Selskar M. Gunn to Edmund E. Day, 8 November 1931, RF RG 1.1, 717, box 20, folder 188.

Ruml to Walter Simons, 18 March 1926; Ruml to Jäckh, 6 April 1928, both in LSRM III.6, box 51, folder 537.

Fehling to Ruml, 31 January 1926; Fehling to Day, 3 May 1928, both in LSRM III.6, box 51, folder 537; Thomas B. Appleget to Hans Simons, 12 August 1930, RF RG 1.1, 717, box 19, folder 177; Söllner, Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler, 38–39.


Gunn to Day, 10 March 1932, RF RG 1.1, 717, box 19, folder 177.

Schmidt-Ott to Van Sickle, 24 July 1931, RF RG 1.1, 717, box 20, folder 188.

70 Gunn to Day, 30 March 1932, RF RG 1.1, 717, box 20, folder 188.

71 “Memorandum,” Kittredge, 21 November 1932, RF RG 1.1, 717, box 20, folder 188.


73 Söllner, *Deutsche Politikwissenschaftler*, 42.


CARIBBEAN LEAVEN IN THE AMERICAN LOAF: WILFRED A. DOMINGO, THE JAMAICA PROGRESSIVE LEAGUE, AND THE FOUNDING OF A DECOLONIZATION MOVEMENT FOR JAMAICA

Birte Timm

Just as the Caribbean has been a sort of leaven in the American loaf, so the American Negro is beginning to play a reciprocal role in the life of foreign Negro communities. … This world-wide reaction of the darker races to their common as well as their local grievances is one of the most significant facts of recent development. Exchange of views and sympathy, extension and co-operation of race organizations beyond American boundaries … are bound to develop on a considerable scale in the near future.¹

—Wilfred A. Domingo, 1925

In the first third of the twentieth century, important but often ignored connections between the African-American and the Caribbean freedom movements developed. These entanglements are often overlooked because conventional historiographic approaches tend to focus either on nation-states or on local microhistories but rarely look at transnational relationships. In the past decade, however, the relatively new field of transnational history has brought such connections between non-state entities to the center of historical investigation, highlighting the links between cultures and people in various countries. This paradigm shift, often called the “transnational turn,” has quickly proven to be a useful approach to historical studies that yields new insights into processes of intercultural transfer and migration.²

Employing a transnational research perspective, this essay examines the reciprocal influences of the African-American civil rights movement and the Jamaican movement for independence, thus bolstering the fact that the history of modern societies cannot be understood within the boundaries of their isolated national histories.³ At the center of my research is a transnational organization, the “Jamaica Progressive League” (JPL), founded in 1936 in New York by the Jamaican migrants Wilfred A. Domingo, Ethelred Brown, and Walter Adolphe Roberts. Dedicated to establishing an anti-colonial national movement in Jamaica, the JPL strengthened the connections between Jamaicans at home and abroad and played an important role in the creation of a national movement for self-government in Jamaica.
However, all of the JPL’s founding members were highly engaged in a variety of civic and cultural affairs. Their interest was not limited to Jamaica or the Caribbean, and they participated in the African-American civil rights movement and international black nationalist organizations. Moreover, they all contributed to the African-American and Pan-African culture and literature during this period. Walter Adolphe Roberts, for example, was a popular writer and journalist with a special interest in the Pan-American region; Reverend Ethelred Brown was the first black Unitarian minister in the United States. During the Harlem Renaissance, Brown founded the Harlem Unitarian Church (also known as Hubert Harrison Memorial Church), which served, in his own words, as “a Temple and a Forum.” It provided a platform for African-American and Afro-Caribbean activists and writers like Richard B. Moore, Hubert and Hermina Huiswoud, and the JPL co-founder Wilfred A. Domingo, who was not only a leading figure in the Jamaican decolonization movement but also a well-known writer, journalist, and theoretician of the Harlem Renaissance.

My analysis will focus on the early history of the JPL in the late 1930s and early 1940s and will include an overview of the Caribbean immigrant community in New York City and its involvement in the Harlem Renaissance. I will place special emphasis on Domingo, whose life and ideas impressively show how crucial connections between the African-American and Afro-Caribbean movements were to their success. In addition, his biography illustrates how different concepts of liberation are connected and how transnational ties of migrants can influence the history of single nations. I will conclude with a description of the early JPL, including its main activities and achievements. By highlighting its roots in the U.S., which are usually overlooked, I will demonstrate the transnational character of the history of nationalization in Jamaica and, at the same time, add to the studies that examine the Caribbean influence on the African-American civil rights movement of those years.

The Caribbean Community in New York City during the 1930s and 1940s

At the end of the nineteenth century, the population in the Caribbean grew rapidly, increasing the poverty for large groups within it. After the abolition of slavery in 1834, living conditions for these groups had not remarkably improved, and so by century’s end, they lived in abhorrent poverty. In this period, the labor movement and the first small nationalist circles emerged, but they met with little success. Economic problems forced many Caribbeans to leave their country in hopes of finding work elsewhere, and so the industrial growth of the northern cities in the U.S. attracted many of them. Between 1900 and 1930, the first of three big waves of Caribbean
migrants reached U.S. shores.\textsuperscript{6} About 40,000 of them settled in New York, with Harlem the most popular destination.\textsuperscript{7} For Caribbean intellectuals, Harlem provided a lively and intellectually inspiring environment. Philip Kasinitz emphasized that for authors, orators, journalists, and poets like Claude McKay, Eric Walrond, Cyril Briggs, Frank Crosswaith, Hubert Harrison, and Richard B. Moore, and for black nationalist leaders like Marcus Garvey, “nothing could have been further from their intentions than self-seclusion in West Indian enclaves; it was precisely Harlem’s diversity and excitement that had attracted them.”\textsuperscript{8}

By 1930, Caribbeans made up about 25 percent of Harlem’s population.\textsuperscript{9} Their impact was so remarkable that Franklin D. Roosevelt called Harlem the “Capital of the Caribbean.”\textsuperscript{10} However, the Afro-Caribbean migrants quickly realized that coming to the United States did not present them with the opportunities they had expected, but rather meant coming to “Black America”—with all the barriers to social and economic integration that entailed.\textsuperscript{11} Many of them immediately faced open racist discrimination, which limited their social and financial opportunities, causing frustration and disappointment.

Compared with African Americans in the economic sector, Caribbean immigrants were more often self-employed and owned a higher percentage of small businesses in relation to the overall number of black enterprises. This was partly due to their better education and training and their experiences in skilled trades. Accordingly, many tried to open up businesses when they came to the U.S., for example, importing and retailing Caribbean goods necessary for their growing Caribbean community or offering their trained skills.\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, they had also not internalized feelings of racial inferiority to the same degree as African Americans, because racial identities and stereotypes in their home countries were quite different.\textsuperscript{13}

Caribbean immigrants responded to the discrimination they encountered in the U.S. in a variety of ways. Some immigrants attempted to emphasize their West Indian heritage and separate themselves from African Americans while many of them maintained a strong ethnic, or, more precisely, national, island identity, and planned to eventually return to their home country. Despite the racist discrimination along the “one-drop rule” in the U.S., employers sometimes favored West Indian immigrants, whom they stereotyped as hard-working and ambitious. Accordingly, some Caribbeans exploited this perceived distinctiveness to their economic advantage,\textsuperscript{14} contributing to the sometimes hostile sentiments between Caribbeans and African Americans. Nevertheless, a good number of them identified with African Americans and joined their fight against racism and discrimination—especially in the big cities in the North. The most popular example for such solidarity was the Jamaican immigrant Marcus Garvey, who inspired the first and biggest international black mass movement, the
Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). The organization encouraged black people everywhere in the world to be proud of their African heritage. Pride in “black” skin, self-confidence, a stronger emphasis on the importance of black self-help, and Black Nationalism instead of assimilationist attitudes had become popular in the African-American struggle for equal rights and prepared the ground for the radical Black Power movement in the late 1960s.15

Indeed, Caribbean immigrants were overrepresented in the group of black radicals in Harlem’s emerging cultural and political scene.16 They were often key players in the most radical groups and were “especially active contributors to the black press and to a number of left-leaning white publications.”17 While Caribbean intellectuals publicly often reflected on race issues, many of the first-wave Caribbean immigrants still expressed their ethnic culture in private, often “mediating between racial and ethnic identities.”18 Some of them emphasized a more “anti-colonial/imperialist and international outlook” and “interracial class and colorism issues” than was generally articulated in the black press.19 Both topics were main themes in the writings of Domingo.

Many intellectual Caribbean immigrants had become involved in radical politics before they came to the United States. They had participated in the formation of trade unions and small nationalist circles in the early decades of the century, and the black majority living under colonial rule slowly grew in confidence. The “American brand of race prejudice,”20 as Domingo called it, ran counter to their experience of a racism based on differentiation of skin color in the Caribbean. This type of racism privileged “light-skinned” persons, who therefore often belonged to the middle class. This encounter spurred the Caribbean immigrants to action even more, leading to the radical mixture of race and class positions they took up. The different experiences with racism and marginalization in the U.S. and in the Caribbean provided a foundation for reciprocal influences in the American civil rights movement and the Caribbean anti-colonial movement. Thus, migration was one of the most important catalysts for the intertwined histories of black people in the Atlantic region, what Paul Gilroy calls the “Black Atlantic.”21

The circumstance of being Caribbean and experiencing racial discrimination in the U.S. led many individuals to become involved in both the U.S. civil rights movement and Caribbean politics, and particularly the Jamaican decolonization movement. Domingo was one of them, but he, like many others, kept these roles distinct.22 Kasinitz describes Domingo’s roles in these two spheres as follows:

[Domingo] was a vocal advocate of black rights when working in the American political context and a leading advocate of Jamaican
independence in the Caribbean context. But he was never an advocate of the interests of Jamaicans in the United States, because here it was racial identity that was politically relevant. Caribbean New Yorkers of the 1920s and 1930s might have been immigrants in a city of immigrants, but it was race that structured their life chances. Being black determined where they lived and could not live, where they could and could not go to school, what type of job they could get and the way they were treated by Americans of all colors.23

Despite this formal separation, in Domingo’s mind the problems of African Americans and the situation of black people in his homeland were very much intertwined, which led to his participation in both spheres. Nevertheless, Kasinitz’s observation of the emphasis on race instead of ethnic or national identities in the public is correct and may help explain why many Caribbean radicals during the time of the “Harlem Renaissance” were often “invisible”24 as Caribbeans, and, therefore, neglected by scholars. Only in recent decades have scholars paid more attention to the disproportional influence of Caribbean immigrants in the radical scene of African Americans in the first third of the twentieth century.25

Wilfred A. Domingo

The philosophy of Wilfred A. Domingo, Harlem Renaissance activist and one of the founding members of the JPL, amalgamated “seemingly incompatible”26 internationalist positions on black liberation and socialism with Jamaican nationalism. A presentation of Domingo’s basic assumptions will make clear that these concepts were, in fact, compatible, which helps us to gain a fuller understanding of the ideas and influences that led to the formation of Jamaica’s movement for independence.

Domingo was one of the most influential personalities in the circles of African-American and African-Caribbean activists in Harlem in the first third of the twentieth century. He helped organize the first Jamaican immigrant society, the Jamaica Benevolent Association, in 1917, and he was also one of the most active members of the Jamaica Progressive League: he contributed numerous articles to the Jamaican press advocating self-government for the island and helped to shape the first political party in Jamaica that agitated for complete self-government, the People’s National Party (PNP). Additionally, he was centrally involved in efforts to influence American and British foreign policy: he co-founded the West Indies National Council, which issued the “Declaration of Rights of the Caribbean Peoples to Self-Determination and Self-Government” presented at a meeting of the nations of the Western hemisphere to determine a strategy
after the German victories in Europe, the Havana Conference in July 1940.27

To better understand Domingo’s complex thinking, we need to look more closely at certain features of his life and political activities. Domingo was born in Jamaica. There, he first got involved in politics as the first secretary of the National Club, an organization founded by S. A. G. Cox in March 1909 that promoted greater self-government in Jamaica.28 In this role, Domingo cooperated with Marcus Garvey, whom he had known since childhood. After Garvey arrived in the U.S., and specifically New York City in 1910, Domingo started to work as an editor for Garvey’s influential magazine, *Negro World*. In July 1919, he broke with Garvey because of disagreements over the socialist views Domingo promoted in his editorials. In fact, Domingo worked for an exceptionally wide range of leftist radical political organizations and wrote for several newspapers and magazines that were inaugurated during this period.29

Socialist ideas were quite popular among many Caribbean intellectuals, in part, because they could explain different forms of economic and political oppression of black people all over the world. It is crucial to understand this relationship between anti-racism and anti-capitalism in order to fully recognize the ideas and philosophies of many black intellectuals in this period. A figure like Domingo helps us, therefore, to comprehend how seemingly contradictory concepts like black radicalism and socialism, or nationalism and internationalism, merged together into one powerful approach to analyzing and interpreting the world.

In Harlem, he had established close ties with other activists of the “New Negro” movement, many of them from the Caribbean, like Cyril Briggs, Hubert Huiswoud, and Richard B. Moore, who were also journalists and activists of the Socialist Party (SPA). In 1920, he joined forces with these three in particular to form a radical underground organization, the African Blood Brotherhood, which combined racial and socialist perspectives. Domingo’s analytical skills, his dedication to political theory, and his persuasive writing style placed him “at the center of radical thinking among Caribbean immigrants settling in Harlem”30 and made him the “theoretician”31 of this group of socialist Caribbean thinkers. Additionally, Domingo was active in many diverse Harlem movements like the Independent Political Council led by A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen (he was also a contributing editor to their socialist magazine, *The Messenger*, between 1919 and 1923), the Rand School of Social Science, an institution formed by the SPA in New York in 1906 that aimed to provide a broad education to workers and to promote class-consciousness and political awareness, the People’s Educational Forum, a platform where Harlem’s radicals organized lectures and discussions, and the Twenty-First Assembly District Socialist
Club, an association of radicals founded in 1917 to coordinate the mayoral campaign of the Harlemite Morris Hillquit.\textsuperscript{32}

For Domingo, capitalism, racism, and colonialism were connected modes of ruling the world. He referred to the parallel situation of workers throughout the world insisting that “[employers’] interests are opposed to those of their employees. And color or race make no difference.”\textsuperscript{33} He concluded that African Americans fail to understand the transnational character of oppression and urged them to join the fight of the working class against capitalist exploitation. But he soon realized that the SPA did not care too much about the situation of African Americans, and he regretted that the party made no serious attempt “to make the Negroes class conscious.” Domingo considered this to be “the greatest potential menace to the establishment of socialism in America.”\textsuperscript{34} Finally, he withdrew from the party, yet Domingo “remained convinced that Black liberation was a question of class struggle, class consciousness, and economical radicalism.”\textsuperscript{35}

In March 1920, he established his own weekly magazine, the\textit{Emancipator}, to advocate the idea of uniting race and class consciousness. He advertised it as a platform with a clear international outlook that aimed to provide “a scientific chart and compass” for blacks “in relation to national and international social, and political movements.”\textsuperscript{36} Many activists he had worked with like Moore, Briggs, Randolph, and Owen were appointed to be contributing editors, but the magazine only existed for a couple of months. In the 1930s, he continued to be involved in African-American political struggles, but he renewed his interest in Jamaican nationalism and became one of the most important figures in the movement for Jamaican self-government because he was convinced that Jamaica must be independent in order to abolish racial discrimination and thus better the living conditions of the majority of the people. Domingo asserted that “self-government would reduce the strength of the forces opposed to measures that can appreciably benefit the masses, by leaving the workers confronted only by their local capitalists and not by the entire British Empire ….”\textsuperscript{37}

The organization in which Domingo acted upon his anti-colonial and nationalistic convictions was the Jamaica Progressive League.

The Jamaica Progressive League and Its Role in the Decolonization of Jamaica

The JPL was founded in New York by the Jamaican immigrants Walter Adolphe Roberts (president), Wilfred A. Domingo (first vice-president), and Ethelred Brown (secretary) on September 1, 1936. Its declaration, which was published in early 1937, outlined its main purpose:
Firmly believing that any people that has seen its generations come and go on the same soil for centuries is, in fact, a nation, the Jamaica Progressive League pledges itself to work for the attainment of self-government for Jamaica, so that the country may take its rightful place as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.\(^{38}\)

The founders had been inspired by countries such as Ireland that had gained independence after a long struggle. At one meeting in Harlem on November 7, the JPL invited Eileen Curran, an Irish actress active in the political milieu of the Irish Progressive League, to talk about the Irish movement for independence.\(^{39}\)

The JPL would soon play a leading role in the process of decolonization in Jamaica, with the Caribbean influence in the African-American community of New York fueling this process. Historian Jason Parker has convincingly demonstrated how the radical movement that evolved in the African-American and Caribbean community influenced American foreign policy in World War II, particularly policies regarding Great Britain and the Caribbean region. This influence, which he calls the “Harlem Nexus,” set the stage for the first steps of the decolonization of the British colonies in the Caribbean. The JPL was an important part of this “crossroads of African-diasporan and transnational-diplomatic history.”\(^{40}\)

The pamphlet *Onward Jamaica!* published after the JPL’s founding in New York, outlined the organization’s essential principles and basic aims. The first goal was “Universal suffrage in Jamaica and the removal of property qualifications for candidates for public office,” and the second, the “right of labour unions to function legally.”\(^{41}\) Thus, the JPL sought to improve the living conditions of the masses in Jamaica, to give them a voice, and to prepare the population for the challenge of fighting for their right to self-governance. They encouraged the Jamaican people to “study the economic and social problems of the island and press for necessary reforms,” to engage in the “study of the history, geography and literature of Jamaica, and to give aid to all forms of artistic expression by the people.”\(^{42}\) In the economic sector, the JPL supported the need to “foster inter-Caribbean trade and commerce, and all other relations which tend to bring about a closer union of the British West Indian countries.”\(^{43}\)

Another basic principle was fostering cooperation between Jamaicans and expatriate Jamaicans. Thus, the JPL aimed at stimulating “among Jamaicans in the United States and other foreign countries a keen interest in home affairs.”\(^{44}\) The JPL planned to form branches in other U.S. cities and everywhere that large numbers of Jamaicans lived, including London. But the most important step was to form offices in Jamaica in order to plant the seed for self-government in the country itself, circulate pamphlets, and exchange news quickly.\(^{45}\)
This would happen very soon: Jamaican Walter G. McFarlane founded the first office in Jamaica in the capital city of Kingston, prompted by reading about the first anniversary meeting of the JPL in New York in a Jamaican newspaper in 1937. In his pamphlet, *The Birth of Self-Government for Jamaica*, he described his thoughts in reaction to this article. Having lived in the U.S. for thirteen years, where he had studied architecture and political science, he was immediately drawn to the idea of founding a branch in Jamaica. He felt that Jamaica should be an independent nation and have the final say over its own politics and economics to improve the living conditions of the majority of Jamaicans. Moreover, McFarlane had not been satisfied by the work of some small political groups acting in Jamaica because he felt that there had been no independent Jamaican political culture. None of the existing groups articulated the aim of self-government and independence, and some “were trying to be more English than the English-born.”

McFarlane decided to write a letter to the president of the JPL and ask for permission to found a branch of the JPL in Kingston. As this goal accorded perfectly with the New York JPL’s plan to open a branch in Jamaica itself, the board of directors agreed, and they worked out the particulars. In Jamaica, McFarlane tried to organize a founding meeting for the JPL branch in Kingston. Several obstacles hampered McFarlane’s efforts, representing Jamaicans’ deeply rooted skepticism towards the idea of self-government. After problems with finding a meeting hall, a small number of people eventually met on November 27, 1937, but they were unable to pass a resolution to implement the JPL officially because opponents disturbed the meeting. After this incident, McFarlane and six others met in private and launched the JPL, “giving birth to the National Self Government Movement in Jamaica and indeed in the British Caribbean and other British colonies in Africa.” Although McFarlane’s words here might be exaggerated, they point to Jamaica’s leading role in the decolonization of the Caribbean part of the British Empire. They also emphasize the crucial role Caribbean migrants in New York and especially the JPL played in it.

Not only had the Jamaican migrants who formed the JPL been the first group to organize around the demand for full self-government, they were also crucial to a broader introduction and approval of that idea in Jamaica. JPL president Roberts played a prominent role in this process. After arriving in Kingston in December 1937, he greatly helped popularize the idea of self-government by addressing a variety of organizations. As the main speaker at the first public meeting of the JPL, he facilitated “a brilliant push-off” for the League in Kingston. As a local newspaper reported, “The large and enthusiastic audience at the Metropolitan Hall showed much appreciation for the inauguration of the Association, and the address given by Mr. Roberts, and other speakers.”
In Jamaica, the founding of the JPL signaled the start of a noteworthy nationalist and anti-colonial movement. The JPL in New York published four pamphlets that were widely distributed in Jamaica to outline and promote its aims and purpose. One of these pamphlets—“Injustices in the Civil Service of Jamaica” by Ethelred Brown, a reprint of an address he had delivered at the first mass meeting of the JPL in New York on October 11, 1936—had immediate effects in Jamaican politics. Primarily, he called for the Civil Service in Jamaica to employ Jamaicans and not Englishmen and immediately return to competitive examination as the means of entrance into the Civil Service. C. A. Reid, a member of the JPL, then presented these demands to the Legislative Council. Brown later recapitulated the outcome: “Sir Leslie Probyn, then governor of the island, warmly approved the resolution from his seat as chairman of the Council, with the result that it was unanimously passed. This is an achievement of which the League is justifiably proud.”

The founding of the JPL in Kingston coincided with a growing discontent in large parts of Jamaica’s working class. Unemployment rates were high, wages low, and the majority of Jamaicans suffered tremendously under these conditions. In May 1938, riots broke out on a sugar plantation in Frome, which quickly spread to other estates and finally reached the capital, where a large number of workers initiated strikes. British troops were called in and violently put down the unrest. The JPL took an active part by providing food to striking workers. Afterward, the JPL employed a lawyer, E. R. D. Evans, barrister and JPL-member, to represent the workers who had been charged for their actions, financed by the JPL’s New York branch. The JPL’s actions and relative success in the trial popularized the movement, swelling its membership rosters.

Authorities in Great Britain observed the incidents in Jamaica and other colonies in the Caribbean with anxiety. They were concerned about stability in a country where the majority of the population were descendants of slaves and still lived under white dominion in a society divided along racial lines. They reacted to the disturbances by appointing the West Indies Royal Commission, a 12-man committee chaired by Lord Moyne, to travel to Jamaica and other islands and investigate conditions.

The JPL responded to this new development by organizing a committee consisting of various groups representing the interests of Jamaica’s majority, the Jamaica Deputation Committee, for the purpose of presenting material and advice to the Royal Commission. When the governor passed a resolution requiring all memoranda to the Commission to first be sent to him, the JPL successfully blocked its implementation. This decision would have limited the candidness of the delivered papers. In addition to the memorandum prepared by the Deputation Committee, the JPL in New York produced its own memorandum and sent Brown to Jamaica to pres-
ent it to the Royal Commission personally. Lord Moyne refused to meet Brown but accepted the memorandum. The memorandum of the JPL in New York demanded better wages for agricultural workers, land settlement programs for the poor, better and affordable medical treatment for the population, lower taxes on small incomes, the founding of public schools, and prison reform.54

The actions of the JPL contributed to the heightened political awareness during this period in Jamaica that ultimately led to the founding of the PNP. McFarlane underscored the JPL’s impact in the process of founding this party, of which Norman W. Manley became president. The JPL and other groups gathered and decided that Jamaica needed a political party in order to change the political and social conditions in the country. They formed a number of planning committees as well as a steering committee. McFarlane himself had been member of the steering committee and was also elected to three of the other planning committees, which worked out a constitution and program to launch the party.55

The JPL’s main effort was to include its political positions, especially to campaign for immediate self-government, in this program. Many of the other party members strongly opposed this position, advocating instead representative government and a constitution like the one Jamaica had had before it became a crown colony in 1866. McFarlane described feeling like “the lone voice in a wilderness on this issue,”56 and calling for help from New York. Roberts and Domingo immediately came to Jamaica to attend the inaugural meeting of the new party. Together with McFarlane, they started talking directly to individual members of the Planning Committees, trying to convince them that self-government would be the only solution for Jamaica. They were successful: after a lively discussion and vote at the first party conference on April 12, 1939, the new party adopted the proposal for complete self-government and universal adult suffrage, defeating the proposal of the group supporting Manley for representative government.57

In order to guarantee that the newly formed PNP would carry the issue of self-government further, even against the wishes of some influential groups within the party, the Kingston JPL decided to affiliate with the PNP. Nevertheless, it remained independent and kept on influencing the public with pamphlets and various articles, especially in the newly founded Public Opinion, which Domingo used extensively as a platform to popularize the demand for the political independence of Jamaica. The League achieved the concession that at least two members of the JPL had to attend every party meeting and that a written report must be sent to the JPL on every public issue discussed. In addition, many JPL members became direct members of the PNP. McFarlane became a member as well and was an elected member of the General Council from 1939 to 1947,
when he decided to forgo any further leading executive role in the party.

The relationship between the PNP and the JPL in New York was very close. The JPL was very active in raising money, and, especially in the early years, it provided the main financial means for the party. Its members advised the party and nearly acted as an overseas branch of the PNP. Through their actions in New York and in Jamaica, they became leading forces in the decolonization process. Thus, the “African American-West Indian ‘Harlem Nexus’” became very important for U.S. foreign policy and the decolonization of the British Empire.58

The background for this influence was the labor rebellions in many Caribbean islands in the middle of the 1930s and the subsequent activities of New York’s Carribbian community. The British and U.S. governments felt threatened by these events: Great Britain feared the challenge to its imperial rule in the region, and the U.S. feared race riots because of the coalescence of West Indian and African-American radicalism in Harlem. In 1940, another incident put the Caribbean on display. After the fall of the Netherlands and parts of France to Nazi Germany, both Great Britain and the United States worried that the Caribbean islands of the Netherlands and France might be used as bases by German troops.59 Because Great Britain had to cope with great war losses, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed to the “Bases-for-Destroyers Deal,” which allowed American warships to be traded for British bases in the Western hemisphere, including Caribbean bases. This deal has often been interpreted as a signal for the contraction of the British Empire and the expansion of the new American superpower.60 Quite overlooked, however, is the fact that this power configuration made the Caribbean freedom movements possible as the Caribbean nations strove to achieve independence from both British and American rule.61

As Western nations planned the Havana Conference for July 1940, the JPL and other organizations formed a West Indies National Emergency Council (WINEC) led by Domingo, Charles Petioni, and Richard B. Moore in order to lobby for West Indian self-government and prepared a declaration to present this aim to the conference. Domingo later claimed that this “Declaration of Rights of the Caribbean Peoples to Self-Determination and Self-Government,”62 which WINEC-delegate Hope Stevens had presented to the hemispheric meeting in Havana, had strongly influenced the Havana Declaration. This declaration, he claimed, constituted “a substantial political gain for the colored race in the Western world. This fact and its logical consequences, the possibility of creating new black nations in the Caribbean, should be of the highest significance of American Negroes.”63 After the Havana conference, the WINEC changed its name to West Indies National Council (WINC), and Domingo tried to broaden its
membership and shape it into a unifying force of all the progressive leagues that had been formed in New York on the model of the JPL for many Caribbean islands.64

PNP leader Manley, who had been impressed by Domingo’s personality and his compelling persuasive power since meeting him during the inaugural phase of the party, invited him to take an active role in the PNP in 1940. Domingo accepted and agreed to return to Jamaica to work full-time for the PNP in 1941, but he was unable to begin this work: he was arrested on the ship before arriving and immediately sent to prison for twenty months.65 The governor charged him with promoting and fostering “anti-British,” “anti-American,” and “defeatist sentiments,”66 even though Domingo encouraged his readers and listeners to support Britain in its fight against fascism in Europe. Domingo’s detention instigated massive protests in Jamaica as well as New York. Manley unsuccessfully tried to convince the colonial government of Domingo’s sincerity by launching a pamphlet entitled The Case of Domingo67 to defend his actions and outline the unfair accusations against him. Later, recalling the event, Manley highlighted its importance for the policies of the PNP: “This single act [Domingo’s imprisonment] more than anything else set the party on a line of final opposition to Government and its ways.”68 After Domingo’s release, the United States refused to allow him to return. He worked in the PNP for several years before he was finally allowed to go back to the U.S. in 1947.

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Migration is a salient factor in the globalized world. Studying its historical impact is a crucial task, indispensable to understanding modern societies. Seeing how migrants have connected and identified with their new country while at the same time maintaining strong ties with their country of origin, thus developing new forms of allegiance, allows us also to perceive the ways they have shaped the future of both their new and old country.

This study of the emergence of the transnational JPL in the context of the Harlem Renaissance in New York and the start of the decolonization movement in Jamaica illustrates that the African-American and African-Caribbean movements were not only linked but highly interrelated. A group of Jamaicans who left the colony of their birth developed a concept of nationalism, built the JPL, a transnational organization with bases in the U.S. and Jamaica, worked to decolonize their homeland, and helped to establish self-government. The JPL had a significant influence on the establishment of the movement for self-government and was actively involved in shaping the emerging political system in Jamaica. Although it may seem remarkable that these ideas evolved “in exile,” it is not unusual
for anti-colonial, nationalist movements to emerge in this way. More noteworthy is the direct influence of African-American civil rights struggles and the international socialist movement, which promoted the right of all people to self-determination.

During World War II, with the power shift from Great Britain to the new world superpower, the United States, and increasing U.S. interest in the Caribbean, these connections became especially important. In this special power constellation—with racism in the U.S. as a backdrop—the Caribbean migrant community in Harlem was able to influence the foreign policy of both the United States and Great Britain. The activities of the JPL marked important steps towards the self-government of the British colonies in the Caribbean.

By tracing the history of the JPL and the political influence of Domingo, we can clearly see the importance of individual actions in transnational historical developments. Domingo’s dual role connected his own anti-racist position (in Jamaica and in the U.S.) with staunch socialist and anti-capitalist ones, which reinforced the former, helping him to see the different shades of race discrimination in the U.S. and in the Caribbean as two sides of the same coin. The juxtaposition of these theoretical viewpoints led him to adopt anti-colonial and nationalist positions and engage in Jamaica’s struggle for independence. His role in the evolution of Jamaican nationalism and his activities within the transnational JPL were not contradictions of his internationalist and socialist convictions but were rather consistent with them.

Notes


3 See Tom Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley, 2002).


12 See Irma Watkins-Owens, *Blood Relations: Caribbean Immigrants and the Harlem Community, 1900–1930* (Bloomington, 1996). This was also true for Domingo, who had worked for his uncle’s Caribbean import business since he had arrived in the United States and later established his own import business.

13 Ibid., 127.

14 See Kasinitz, *Caribbean New York*, 35. Kasinitz differentiates between “sojourners” and “settlers,” but it seems that these categories are quite interchangeable.


16 See James, *Holding Aloft the Banner*, 6.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.


23 Ibid.


25 See James, *Holding Aloft the Banner; Turner, Caribbean Crusaders; Mars, Caribbean Influences*, 565–83.

26 James, *Holding Aloft the Banner*, 126.

27 The West Indies National Emergency Council (WINEC, later renamed WINC) was a joint effort of Domingo, Richard B. Moore and Charles Petioni in order to “lobby for West Indian interests, including self-government” during the crisis of World War II and in regard to the new US interest in the Caribbean region. For more details, see Parker, “Capital of the Caribbean,” 103; see also W. Adolphe Roberts, “The Act of Havana,” *Jamaican Historical Review* 3, no. 2 (1959): 66–69.


30 Ibid.


32 For biographical information on Domingo, see Hill, *Marcus Garvey and UNIA Papers*, vol. 1, 527–31; see also Turner, *Caribbean Crusaders*, 34f.


35 Davis, Five Afro-Caribbean Voices, 88.

36 Wilfred A. Domingo, Emancipator, March 13, 1920, 2; cited in Davis, Five Afro-Caribbean Voices, 86.


39 This interesting connection supports the presumption that the JPL was very much inspired by the Irish Progressive League and chose their name in reference to this organization, which had been founded in 1917. The link between the two movements became clear during the Young Scholars Forum 2007. See Ely Janis’s article in this volume and the leaflet for the meeting with Eileen Curran in Jamaica Progressive League, MS 234, National Library of Jamaica.

40 Parker, “‘Capital of the Caribbean,’” 99.

41 JPL NY, Onward Jamaica!, 3.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 See JPL NY, Onward Jamaica!, 4.


47 Ibid., 10.

48 Ibid., 11.

49 Ibid., 12.


51 JPL NY, Onward Jamaica!; Ethelred Brown, Injustices in the Civil Service of Jamaica (New York, 1937); Jaime O’Meally, Why We Demand Self-Government (New York, 1938); W. Adolphe Roberts, Self-Government for Jamaica, n.d. These pamphlets can be found in the Manuscript Collection of the National Library of Jamaica, Kingston (MS 234).


53 The committee consisted of the JPL, PNP, Federation of Citizens Associations, Jamaica Teachers’ Association, and the Women’s Liberal Club.

54 “Supplementary Memorandum of the Jamaica Deputation Committee under the Auspices of the Jamaica Progressive League presented to the West Indies Royal Commission 1938,” Box 4, Folder Jamaica Progressive League, EEBP.

55 McFarlane, Birth of Self-Government, 23.

56 Ibid., 24.

57 Ibid.

58 Parker stressed this point in “‘Capital of the Caribbean,’” 98f.

59 See Uwe Lübken, Bedrohliche Nähe: Die USA und die nationalsozialistische Herausforderung in Lateinamerika (Stuttgart, 2004), 163–66.
60 Jason Parker has convincingly presented and argued this point in “‘Capital of the Caribbean,’” 98.

61 West Indians also feared that the United States might taken possession of the region and worried about implementing their racism. For example, Domingo insisted that Dominion status would best serve West Indian and American interests and make possible the maximum self-determination for the Caribbean. See Wilfred A. Domingo, “Anglo-American Interests: How They Affect the Caribbean Islands,” The African (October 1944): 5, 16.


63 Domingo to Walter White (NAACP), 6 November 1940, qtd. in Parker, “‘Capital of the Caribbean,’” 103.

64 See Parker, “‘Capital of the Caribbean,’” 104.

65 See PNP-Pamphlet, The Case of Domingo (Kingston, n.d.).

66 Ibid., 1.

67 PNP-Pamphlet, The Case of Domingo.

Transnationalism has become a buzzword in American Studies. When the American historian Robert Gross proclaimed a “transnational turn” at the conference of the British Association for American Studies in Denmark in 1999, the transnational had already become an established category in American academia.1 Although the turn reached Germany with great delay,2 there, too, transnationalism has now led to new interdisciplinary approaches.3

Transnational approaches expand the focus of historical studies beyond the nation-state and use comparative and interdisciplinary analyses to explore processes of transfer, mutual influence, exchange, and interpenetration. They have not only shifted perspectives but have also opened up nation-focused historical master narratives. That is, transnationalism includes alternative and minority perspectives that were formerly marginalized, yet it is not restricted to them.

While political scientists, sociologists, and historians critical of exclusively nation-centered narratives have lauded the mythical and cataclysmic “turn” to the transnational, others, most notably traditionalist German and American historians, have been skeptical. These skeptics claim that concepts like transnationalism and diaspora subvert and irrevocably replace what they believe to be fixed categories like “the national” with fluid concepts. Moreover, they suggest that the “transnational” is short-sightedly applied to vague, global contexts within which it is understood as a consequence of the allegedly all-encompassing process of globalization. They denounce the uncritical acceptance of transnational paradigms wherein former patterns of thought are hastily abandoned, the new paradigm is proclaimed to be transformative, and its institutional, methodological, and conceptual meanings are conflated without clear definition.4

One way to avoid a blurring of meaning and the mere “uncritical mimicking” of fashionable epistemologies is to take the different perspectives, needs, and interests of specific fields of research as starting points for future transnational agendas.5 We need self-reflective investigations that strive to contextualize their subjects without falling prey to essentialization. Furthermore, we need to be careful to historicize the transnational accurately. Both advocates and skeptics of the transnational are mostly unaware of the contribution of minority perspectives, and, particularly

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Black intellectual thought, to its evolution. For, unlike what some advocates of the transnational pretend, the alleged “turn” to the transnational did not simply “drop from the sky.” Rather, Black intellectuals of the first half of the twentieth century as well as scholars of postcolonial and diaspora studies continually made theoretical and methodological advances that led to this development. Their advances not only have to be given due credit but should be considered for their potential value in interdisciplinary transnational studies. However, transnational concepts from the area of postcolonial and diaspora studies should be read critically to determine their historical accuracy and to counter their essentializing tendencies.

In this essay, I aim to analyze early and mid-twentieth-century African American transnational perspectives against the backdrop of the Black Atlantic, a postmodern concept of Black transnationalism Paul Gilroy elaborated in his 1993 study of Black diasporic encounters. Specifically, I turn to W. E. B. Du Bois, one of the founders of pan-Africanism, as a paradigmatic example of an early twentieth-century historian with an inter- and transnational approach. This African American intellectual moved within the Black Atlantic world and published numerous writings on National Socialist Germany in the United States during the 1930s. Here, I focus on Du Bois’s comparative writings on German and American racial policies, which also feature critical reflections on questions of (trans)nationalism, national identity, and belonging that counter some of the characteristics Gilroy attributes to Black transnationalism in the Black Atlantic. Taking the advances of scholars skeptical of transnational paradigms as the starting point for my analysis, I will suggest a way in which the Black Atlantic could indeed serve as a valuable paradigm for future historical studies of the Black diaspora.

Twentieth Century Black (Trans)nationalism

In their efforts to retrace the formation of a collective Black identity, scholars of postcolonial studies and the Black diaspora naturally turned to their discipline’s foundational literature. Aiming to (re)write history from the bottom up and to examine “the hyphens between places of ‘origin’ and America,” scholars of African American history and culture often looked back to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century African American concepts of Black internationalism. Following the social movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s, this new generation of scholars investigated the approaches and writings of intellectuals who had been excluded from the political and historical master narrative of Western civilization. These same intellectuals struggled against racial oppression and constantly fought ostracism while they claimed equality beyond citizenship. Many
even emigrated as a last resort. These formerly ignored intellectuals, like W. E. B. Du Bois and Martin Delaney, had naturally become transnational in response to the “imagined community’ of United States nationalism.”

Writing against their exclusion, they constructed international global networks and laid the foundations of current transnational perspectives in a continuous critical dialogue with “the national.”

Looking back to the period before the American Civil War, these African American intellectuals conceived of a Black internationalism that ultimately transformed into the political and cultural concept of pan-Africanism. Around 1900, this pan-Africanism encompassed “ideas of equality of political and economic opportunity for Africans everywhere, democracy, majority rule in Africa, and liberty.” Emulating the ideals of the French and American Revolutions, pan-Africanism aimed to achieve liberal and non-violent reforms that would promote African nationalism. As one of its most ardent representatives, W. E. B. Du Bois heralded pan-African nationalism in his address to the Pan-African Congress in 1900 as a call for the integrity and independence of the African states. Pan-Africanism later became a more radical, “nationalistic, unified struggle of African peoples against all forms of foreign aggression and invasion, in the fight for nationhood and nation building.” It sought the “total liberation and unification of all African peoples” to achieve “African nationhood and nationality.” Early twentieth-century Black internationalism, with Africa as the point of reference and its awareness of the “Negro problem” in the world, was fundamentally marked by its focus on nationalist structures. It either called for a radically separatist Black nationalism or a more moderate, integrationist though nation-centered stance, and made a double consciousness of being both Black and American possible.

When colonial power in Africa collapsed and African emancipation movements achieved success, pan-African nationalism, in some respects, evolved into the “imagined community” of the African or Black diaspora and expanded its approach. While earlier cultural studies on Black transnationalism had focused on the teleological and authoritative role Africa played as the ancestral homeland, more recent studies have privileged hybridity and displacement, presenting postcolonial conceptualizations of diaspora. These studies concentrate on practices of travel, migration, and interaction in an increasingly global world and integrate formerly marginalized and intermediary spaces while claiming to transcend racist essentialism.

Paul Gilroy’s 1993 The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness is a landmark in diaspora and transnational studies that exemplifies the theoretical premises of many of the cultural studies of the early 1990s. Gilroy draws a conceptual triangle across the Atlantic that connects Africa, the Americas, and Europe, attributing a merely metaphoric presence.
to Africa. Gilroy calls upon historians to consider the Black Atlantic as one unit of analysis as it modifies traditional nationalist concepts of modern transatlantic history. The Black Atlantic offers a basis for (re)writing African American-European, and particularly African American-German history in a transnational and intercultural way. In focusing on formerly silenced voices, it also provides a constructive cultural theory for studying German-American relations that defies the hegemonic white discourse in historical studies. Wanting to transcend structures of nation and state as well as the constraints of ethnicity and national particularity, Gilroy conceives of the Black Atlantic as a “counterculture of modernity” that breaks with the dogmatic nationalist focus of earlier cultural criticism. Like many scholars of African American history who proposed a “Black countermodernism” beside white modernism in the 1980s and 1990s, Gilroy places a Black counterhistory beside the formerly nation-centered historical master narratives.

Gilroy’s postmodern conceptualization of Black transnationalism offers an excellent basis for a critical interpretation of Du Bois’s accounts of Nazi Germany. In his texts, Du Bois explores Nazi racial policies and their impact on the construction of a quintessential, racially defined German identity. Further, he compares these constructions of identity, nation, and ethnicity with American ones. Though he plays with nationalist and socialist ideas in his search for a “world free for democracy and a democracy free for Black Folk,” he ultimately rejects the essentialist ideals of National Socialist thought, implicitly adding to a definition of a Black Atlantic world. However, his views are not restricted to the binary relationship between Germany and the United States. Du Bois’s reflections on Germany’s collapse into perdition mirror a search for a historical and prospective role for Africa in a global context and, therefore, have to be seen as part of a larger global discourse. While Du Bois’s texts corroborate much of Gilroy’s conceptualization of Black transnationalism, they also refute some of Gilroy’s premises, thus calling for a critical adaptation and re-evaluation of the Black Atlantic as a tool for analyzing African American-German relations. This essay, therefore, aims not only to outline the ways in which the Black Atlantic can challenge traditional readings of the transatlantic history of the Third Reich but also to reflect critically on the concept of the Black Atlantic itself.

The Black Atlantic—A Counterculture of Modernity?

While Gilroy’s Black Atlantic gives important impulses for critically rethinking the metanarrative of nation-centered historiography, its adaptation to historical transnational studies is not unproblematic. Although it seeks to deconstruct universals, essentialisms, and restrictive binaries of
modernist discourse, it is in danger of falling into essentialization and dehistoricization itself. Its present and future-oriented focus on the transnational and the hybrid has been criticized as merely replacing the nationalist with the hybrid and thus adopting a utopian, non-heuristic character. This is not to say that the Black Atlantic cannot be a heuristic concept. It does persuasively point out the shortcomings of purely national approaches to culture and politics. However, its conceptualization as a “countermodernity” categorically excludes the consideration of complex enmeshments of nationalism, internationalism, and transnationalism that characterize its historical sources. Furthermore, if we understand it as a “counterhistory,” then it cannot be incorporated into a global history of colonization, enslavement, and imperialism. This understanding fails to fully acknowledge the strategic importance of categories Gilroy ascribes to modernity such as nation, state, and ethnicity. Gilroy is right to criticize conventional historical interpretations of slavery that ignore the impact of slave resistance and the abolition movement as forms of Black agency in the formation of European modernity. Yet his focus on the interaction between the center and the periphery, and between New World slavery and Europe, excludes Africa. Gilroy is charged with generally dismissing pan-African nationalism because he criticizes the nationalist and imperialist zeal of Afro-centrist ideas and a “back to Africa” movement. With this criticism, he seems to implicitly allocate a merely marginal, depoliticized, and decorative role to Africa that stands in opposition to early twentieth-century African American endeavors to make Africa as important as Western nations on the world map. Consequently, he also brackets off African intellectuals who stood in close contact with African American travelers to Europe. Thus, Gilroy is castigated for his alleged ignorance of the importance of negritude and (pan-)African nationalist thinking to the constitution of Black-Atlantic intellectual thought.

Another criticism leveled against Gilroy involves his reading of “slave ships.” Gilroy contends that this emblem of the historical experience of slavery is not only a sign of alienation, “racial terror, commerce and ethico-political degeneration,” but that the ships themselves were the “living means” connecting the two sides of the Atlantic, and must be thought of as “cultural and political units rather than abstract embodiments of the triangular trade.” Many cultural historians object that this reading gives slavery and the Middle Passage a merely metaphorical presence that wrenches them “out of a historically specific continuum” and lends a “false idea of choice to forced migration.”

Gilroy centers on Black British and African American conceptions of diaspora and emphasizes the Middle Passage and slavery as a break and geopolitical link that unites African Americans and Black British individuals. Yet this focus sets Africa apart and conceives of the Black Atlantic as a
hegemonic concept not applicable outside of Anglo-American contexts. As crucial as the experiences of slavery and the Middle Passage have proven to be for African Americans and Black Britons, using this constructed collective memory as a defining characteristic for a Black diasporic community implicitly excludes Afro-Germans because, as Tina Campt notes, they lack such “shared narratives of home, belonging and community.” Campt has sought to define a diasporic concept that would apply to Afro-German contexts. She argues that “connected differences” between different Black cultures, which Audre Lorde foregrounded in her foreword to *Showing Our Colors*, must be recognized. Drawing on Jacqueline Nassy Brown’s critique of *The Black Atlantic*, Campt emphasizes Gilroy’s failure to examine the “asymmetries of power that exist across and between different Black communities and the very different relationships to diaspora that arise as a result.” She notes that the “relationships among different Black communities are structured no less by dynamics of power and hegemony than those that came to constitute the diaspora itself.” Anglo-American concepts of diaspora such as the Black Atlantic have dominated the discourse, contributing “to an imbalance in the nature of the transatlantic exchanges that constitute the diaspora.”

In sum, the list of arguments *The Black Atlantic* evoked seems endless and at times no less essentializing than the flaws critics identified in Gilroy’s concept. Gilroy is criticized for a lack of historical contextualization or rigorous interrogation of his sources and for propagating historical discontinuity. Moreover, critics find fault with Gilroy’s Anglo-American focus, his failure to bestow a “real” and denotative presence on Africa, and the hegemony over different Black diasporas he establishes. Most prominently, they denounce his radical claim that the Black Atlantic constitutes an abstract “Black counterculture to modernity”—a claim at odds with the historical cultural and political reality of Black Atlantic culture. In longing to disengage from categories such as race, nation, and geography for the future, Gilroy indeed implicitly dehistoricizes the sources of the Black Atlantic, discarding it as a heuristic model for historical analysis.

Hence, present studies of the diasporic and the transnational face the challenge of producing self-reflexive critical investigations that strive for historical specificity and contextualization while looking at the entanglements, mutual influences, and reciprocal or ambivalent perceptions of transnational and diasporic interconnections. In order to overcome the problems of dehistoricization, decontextualization, and essentialization, I want to argue, as Rogers Brubaker has done, that the diasporic and the transnational should be conceived of as categories of individual practice.

Recent conceptualizations of diaspora, including Brubaker’s, use it as a political stance that functions as a normative category; it aims at
remaking the world rather than describing it. However, this political, normative, and prescriptive notion prohibits the heuristic use of the diasporic. Yet, as recent criticism of the Black Atlantic has shown, the diasporic must turn heuristic to be viable for future historical study. This, however, is only possible if the at times utopistic, prescriptive, and predetermining political dimension of the diasporic is exchanged for a historically more accurate, sensitive and practice-oriented approach that also involves its tangible geographical scope. Hence, we should be careful not to employ sources according to our individual political interests but scrutinize these interests and focus on the actual practices the sources convey.

Based on W. E. B. Du Bois’s writings on Germany, this paper challenges the recent normative approaches to diaspora that oversimplify the concept as the antithesis of nation in their effort to render it hermeneutic. In these writings, Du Bois did not oppose ideas of nation and nationalism but engaged in a very complex process of both conscious and subconscious construction of identity. Although binary oppositions do play a part in this—Du Bois did incorporate notions of nation and nationalism—so do hybrid and highly ambivalent concepts. Thus, Du Bois implicitly refuted the postmodern terminology of diaspora as the antithesis of the putatively homogeneous nation. His writings call for a transnational concept more tolerant of the national. They furthermore suggest that diaspora and nationalism need to be viewed as inextricably linked discourses constantly deconstructed and reconstructed rather than as mutually opposed, essentialist, and static categories.

An ‘Other Within’: W. E. B. Du Bois in Nazi Germany

Du Bois’s affinity for Germany constitutes an important pillar in Gilroy’s construct of ideas. Gilroy uses Du Bois’s writings to substantiate his argument that the Black Atlantic constitutes a counterculture to modernity: he emphasizes Du Bois’s affection for Germany and acknowledges the salience of German political thought and, in particular, German idealism and nationalism, to Du Bois’s concept of modernity. Moreover, Gilroy understands Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness and his “cultures of diaspora Blacks” in general as “expressions of and commentaries upon ambivalences generated by modernity.” He also points out the striking ambivalences in Du Bois’s ideological outlook. Du Bois synthesized national and transnational concerns in his concept of pan-Africanism. At the same time, Du Bois toyed with ambivalent ideas of roots and routes when he, on the one hand, temporarily advocated an understanding of what he thought were the roots of a racially homogeneous and ethnically absolute Black culture, into which he leapt “with enthusiasm” while studying at Fisk University. On the other hand, Du Bois conceived of the Black
diaspora heterogeneously, as marked by routes of “travel, movement, displacement and relocation.” Last but not least, Gilroy mentions Du Bois’s intense engagement with Hegel and neo-Hegelian thought and with Heinrich von Treitschke’s (at times racist and fundamentally exclusive) nationalism alongside his continuing admiration of Prussian ideals. While Gilroy acknowledges Du Bois’s ambiguous fascination with nationalist doctrines and the fact that the “idea of nationality occupies a central, if shifting place” in the works of Black post-Enlightenment men, he does not critically reflect on these ideas as a potential argument against his concept of a Black anti-nationalist counterculture.

Although I agree with Gilroy’s characterization of Du Bois’s frequently ambivalent modes of thinking as rather non-radical, I argue that Du Bois’s more extensive writings on Germany in the African American press refute Gilroy’s conceptualization of the Black Atlantic as a counterculture. Rather, they exemplify that Du Bois engaged in an ongoing process of creative and affirmative negotiation and oscillation between modern conceptions of nation and race, as well as the implications of race for national belonging.

A Germanophile, Du Bois, who was educated at Fisk, Harvard, and Humboldt in Berlin, was, perhaps, the African American traveler most ambivalent about and interested in the “new” Germany under National Socialism. When he first lived in Germany as a student from 1892 to 1894, Du Bois experienced “the new and mighty focus of Science, Education and military organization” in Wilhelmine Germany. Remembering the freedom “from most of the iron bands that bound [him] at home,” as well as from the “race problem into which [he] was born,” he returned in 1923 searching for a true democracy “free for Black Folk.” In 1936, he returned yet again as a “sharp and prescient observer.” This time, however, he looked in vain for the characteristic “Gemütlichkeit” and liberal spirit he had previously attributed to Germany.

Du Bois’s visit to Germany was funded by a grant from the Oberlaender Trust. His choice of this trust was regarded with much skepticism inter alia by the liberal German-Jewish anthropologist Franz Boas, as Oberlaender was a known Nazi sympathizer. In accepting the grant, Du Bois was prohibited from participating as a founding member of the American Committee for Anti-Nazi Literature, for which Franz Boas had tried to win his support. In his response to Boas, Du Bois pointed out that the trust indeed prohibited the study of race prejudice but was willing to fund a study on education and industry. Whereas no limits were set on what he could say after he returned, Du Bois considered it unwise “to publicly join any committee” in which his participation might jeopardize the funding of his study. One could defend Du Bois’s choice by arguing that he may have sought the patronage and funding of a Nazi
sympathizer simply to ensure safe travel to Germany and a stay unencumbered by Nazi racial discrimination. Boas was skeptical about Du Bois’s trip. He doubted that Du Bois would be able to “see behind the scenes” as “people in Germany are so terrorized that nobody dares to say anything except to his oldest and most reliable friends.” Yet these remarks did not discourage the optimistic traveler, who trusted his “good deal of experience in seeing beyond surface indications.”

Du Bois would keep his promise to report critically about German racial politics. However, it was only after he had left Germany and escaped German censorship that he regained a feeling of personal security. Then, his writings in the *Pittsburgh Courier* took on a sharp, analytical, critical, and provocative tone that had been lacking in his first analyses from Germany. At first glance, Du Bois, in his writings up through December 1936, seemed to evade issues of race and anti-Semitism. On closer examination, however, one finds that he did comment on racial issues in a contained way. His extensive articles on the Deutsches Museum in Munich and the Olympics are of special interest, for he interpreted them as sites where German nationalism, social hierarchy, and inequality were on display.

On the surface, Du Bois’s lengthy documentary article on his four-day visit to the Deutsches Museum could be mistaken for the account of a Germanophile blinded by German grandeur. However, Du Bois consciously observed the exposition’s omissions and silences, essentially criticizing its exclusively national character and unjustified aggrandizement of the German nation. While wholeheartedly admiring modernity’s scientific and technological achievements, Du Bois read the Deutsches Museum exposition as a public statement of national self-representation and as an allegory of the National Socialist ideology of a grand Nordic Übermensch. He maintained that Germany lacked the disposition to establish a culture beyond commercialism and nationality and was not deluded by the nationalistic demonstration of German “fame.” Instead, he hailed the international character of scientific achievements and inveighed against the exposition for its exclusive and nationalistic presentation. Well aware that the German postal service would censor his writings, he provided German authorities with what they wanted to see and made use of double consciousness as a rhetorical strategy. In this way, he could hide his pointed criticism behind overt appreciation.

Du Bois’s reflections on the 1936 Berlin Olympics offer fertile ground for analyzing the interplay between nation, class, and race in a transnational perspective. Discussions about African American participation and performance in the Olympics had already started in 1933. The NAACP called for African Americans to boycott and abandon the Olympics on the grounds of German and American racism, but many others argued that
African American participation provided an opportunity to repudiate both Nazi and white American racial theories. They viewed the Olympics as an international arena in which racial equality could be publicly displayed. Hence, successful African American participation was essential, if only to avenge Joe Louis for his devastating defeat by Max Schmeling on June 19, 1936. These advocates held beliefs similar to the “Double V” campaign of WWI—victory abroad entailing victory at home: they held that the 1936 Olympics, which offered African Americans an opportunity to excel publicly, was too great an opportunity to forgo. Arriving in Germany a month before the start of the Olympics, Du Bois witnessed the changes Germany underwent to prepare for them: signs discriminating against Jews were temporarily taken down, and other measures intended to disguise the true extent of Nazi racism were officially enforced. The propagandistic demonstration of Nazi-German superiority and self-sufficiency fooled many journalists and, in Du Bois’s view, made the “testimony of the non-German speaking visitor to the Olympic Games … worse than valueless.” To escape this, he chose to be absent for most of the month and watch the goings-on from Paris as an inside outsider.

Much of the African American reporting on the Olympics revolved around Hitler’s racist disregard for African American Olympians, especially Jesse Owens. Du Bois, however focused on Berlin’s “normalcy after the Olympic Games.” Only much later, in October, did he venture to “estimate the impression” that the Olympic Games and the “colored competitors” had made on Germany and Europe. His first observations centered on class. In a “world atmosphere of suspicion and distrust,” Du Bois emphasized the games’ importance for the “future efforts of Negroes” because they “typif[ied] a new conception of the American Negro for Europe and … a new idea of race relations in the United States.” To Du Bois, the international sports arena mirrored the interrelatedness of race and class in society. While noting that England picked its contestants from a small segment of society, he held that sports in the United States had begun to acquire a far more democratic character. Carefully distancing himself from the “white” and “Black” press by avoiding racial jargon, Du Bois, in his early reports, was reluctant to interpret African American victories as the result of physical advantages because that would have been essentialist and racist.

Others, however, were not afraid to be more explicit. The entire September issue of The Crisis, entitled “Jim Crow in Steel,” was dedicated to the Olympics and the “Jesse Owens saga.” According to the Baltimore Afro-American, K. K. K. Hanfstaengl, a Hitler confidant, had stated that “it was Africa that dominated the Olympic track … not the United States.” The editor of The Crisis responded to this remark with interest. The German belief that the “American Negro Olympic stars” were “not really
Americans but ‘Black auxiliary forces’” made a certain amount of sense to him. Europeans were unable to understand the “situation in America where Negroes on paper … are American citizens, but in cold reality are not,” for “Germans look at the reality, not the phrases of the Constitution.” He held that “Germany knows … that mobs make sport of black men upon the slightest pretext, without the government lifting a hand to apprehend lynchers…. She knows that in practically all places of public accommodation Negroes are humiliated and insulted.”62 Similarly, The Baltimore Afro-American noted in an article entitled “We Shine for America” that “the glory isn’t ours, it belongs to our country.”63 Thus, it bitterly alluded to the injustice of white America happily accepting the victories won by African Americans while refusing them equality in practice.

In contrast, Du Bois attempted to look at the Olympics from a transnational angle. He criticized the racist representations of Black Olympic competitors in the French and German press, in particular the astonishment with which Black participation and victories were commented on. Du Bois also described the two nations’ different ways of presenting Black athletes, noting that German papers “pick African American competitors out for comment” and label these competitors “Negroes,” whereas the French put a special emphasis on printing their colored faces.64 Du Bois’s astute observation entails a criticism of overtly German vis-à-vis clandestine and concealed French forms of racism.65

Du Bois changed his initially hesitant tone in the articles he wrote after leaving Germany in December 1936. Certain that “his friends … understood” his reticence for “it simply wasn’t safe to attempt anything further,” he now fulminated against Germany’s racial policies.66 Looking at the advances Hitler had made since “riding into power by accusing the world of a conspiracy to ruin Germany by economic starvation,” Du Bois characterized the Nazi state as a “content and prosperous whole” on the surface with strongly reduced unemployment rates and “perfect public order.” However, his gaze reached beneath the surface: “And yet, in … contradictory paradox to all this, Germany is silent, nervous, suppressed; it speaks in whispers; there is no public opinion, no opposition, no discussion of anything; there are waves of enthusiasm, but never any protest.”67

Germany, to him, was a “paradox and contradiction.”68 Painted in a brilliant, innocent white on the outside, it was overshadowed by a dark abiding presence inside. Analyzing differences between German anti-Semitism and American racism, he asserted that “there is race prejudice in Germany, and a regular, planned propaganda to increase it.”69 In Germany, the “campaign of race prejudice is carried on … specifically against the Jews, [and it] surpasses in vindictive cruelty and public insult anything [he has] ever seen.” To Du Bois, the “fight of the Jew in Germany … is an attack on civilization, comparable only to the Spanish Inquisition
and the African slave trade.” However, Du Bois contrasted German anti-Semitism with American racism, arguing that the former was not “the result of long belief backed by child teaching, and outward insignia like color or hair” but as “reasoned prejudice, or an economic fear,” thus revealing some of his anti-Semitic sentiments. Nonetheless, his critical vision of the discrimination against German Jews remained clear: he recognized that they were constantly publicly belittled, cursed, and blamed whenever Hitler made a speech. Experienced with American Jim Crow practices, he read between the lines of “cases in the papers”: enforcement of miscegenation laws, professional discrimination,

... the total disenfranchisement of all Jews; deprivation of civil rights and inability to remain or become German citizens; limited rights of education, a narrowly limited right to work in trades, professions and the civil service; threat of boycott, loss of work and even mob violence and, above all, the continued circulation of Julius Streicher’s Stuermer, the most shameless, lying advocate of race hate in the world, not excluding Florida.

Despite his clear perception of the power and reach of anti-Semitism, Du Bois still appreciated the “essential character of the German people.” He described them as “a kind folk, good-hearted, hating oppression, widely sympathetic with suffering, and filled with longing ideals for all mankind.” Du Bois enjoyed his stay in Germany because he felt that Germans “[t]reated [him] with uniform courtesy and consideration,” which would have been “impossible ... in any part of the United States, without ... frequent cases of personal insult or discrimination.” Always “an object of curiosity,” yet never publicly insulted, he nevertheless looked beyond the surface and continuously pointed to the ambivalences of his “Black” presence in Germany. He was clearly aware of the limits of his personal freedom, which would have been reached immediately had miscegenation come into play.

Although Du Bois reflected positively on his personal experiences, he clearly distinguished between individual encounters with Germans, Germany as a whole, and Nazi politics, both in articles from 1936 and 1941. He bluntly and fundamentally disapproved of Hitler’s tyrannical “dictatorship,” describing it as based on “espionage” and “backed by swift and cruel punishment” that could lead “without trial, to cold murder.” Unlike the “white” American Press, which he characterized as “beyond belief” regarding Nazism, Du Bois recognized how grave the situation was. However, just because he articulately denounced discriminatory Nazi politics did not mean that he judged Germany as a whole. He argued that Hitler “and his state would have disappeared” long since
had the establishment of a tyranny been all Hitler had done. Furthermore, he maintained that Germany’s “compromise” was an “immense sacrifice” for “domestic peace” and for Germans as an unquestioning people, disinterested in whether “other and less dangerous roads [would have] led to the same end.”

Presumably impeded by his relatively “positive” personal experiences as well as his interest in a “just” characterization of Nazi Germany, Du Bois reflected critically, yet in a deliberately balanced and primarily positive way, on the country in which he had experienced his personal “spiritual awakening” forty years earlier. His positive reflections on Nazi Germany and his criticism of German Jews have often been held against him. Critics have accused him of being pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic; the latter charge is fundamentally substantiated in a much disputed 1937 interview published in the German-speaking New York newspaper *Staatszeitung und Herold*. However, this presents only one side of Du Bois’s very complex and nuanced perspective. In his weekly column in the *Pittsburgh Courier*, he commented more critically on Nazi Germany.

In 1952, Du Bois reflected on his visit to the remains of the Warsaw Ghetto three years before and on two other visits to Poland and Germany. Although he showed great interest in the mechanisms of anti-Semitism in both Poland and Germany, he stated that “the result” of his three visits was “not so much a clearer understanding of the Jewish problem in the world as it was a real and more complete understanding of the Negro problem.” Hence, we need to place his interest in Germany’s political, social, and cultural development and its discriminatory and supremacist politics under National Socialist rule within a larger comparative and transnational perspective. His investigation of Nazi politics would eventually lead him to assert that “the problem of slavery, emancipation, and caste in the United States was no longer ... a separate and unique thing,” but “cut across lines of color.” His observations helped him “to emerge from a certain social provincialism into a broader conception of what the fight against race segregation, religious discrimination, and the oppression by wealth had to become if civilization was going to triumph and broaden in the world”—including Africa. Eight years earlier, in 1941, Du Bois had wondered what would become of Africa if Hitler won, which he did not believe possible “in the long run.” He saw Africa “parceled out between Germany and Italy.” “Subjected to ... a caste system resembling slavery,” Africans would be made “valuable to the conqueror,” but this would also lead to the conqueror’s “eventual disaster.”

In this dystopia, Du Bois foresaw rebellion, “a frightful whirl of unloosened passion which no power in Fascist Europe [could] long hold back.” This optimistic vision must be examined in context: Afro-America was incredibly exasperated with Italy for its ravaging of Ethiopia. Against
this backdrop, Du Bois sounded as though he was calling for the Allies to prevail and rescue Europe from fascism. The African American press repeatedly expressed concern about Africans and colonial Africa. The shifting balance of power in Europe during World War II made their fate uncertain. In particular, it expressed fear that Germany would demand that the British and French empires cede control of former German colonies to Germany. The press also compared these demands to French and British rule, pointing out the hypocrisy of their “democracies” regarding the colonies: “the natives have as much liberty and freedom in their own countries as the Jews enjoy in Hitler’s Germany.”

The breadth of Du Bois’s transnational vision becomes more apparent in his elaboration of “Hitler’s New World Order.” In this 1941 article, which must be read as part of the debate surrounding a possible American entry into WWII, Du Bois regarded Hitler and the Nazis as part of a larger phenomenon—as only the second phase of a “revolution sweeping over Europe … far greater than the Nazis.” In an attempt to understand the transformation Germany had undergone when he had visited it in 1936, Du Bois looked back at the rise and decline of democracy there. He pointedly depicted Nazi power as the rule of a “murderous mob” composed of “ex-soldiers, socialists, capitalists, Jew-baiters and psychopathic fanatics” that had “sabotaged the Weimar Republic” and “erected an oligarchy on its ruins.” Here Du Bois demonstrated a critical understanding of Nazism’s “success” without underestimating its complexity. He warned that it was a “grave mistake to assume that Hitlerism either in method or in will is all propaganda.” Regarding Germans as “a population much more intelligent” than others, Du Bois assumed that a higher force was at work in “Hitlerism’s” success: it was “based on a revolution so profound and a doctrine so fundamental that it cannot entirely fail” for “all this smoke and propaganda rose above a much more significant movement which pre-dated Hitler and the Nazis,” the revolution of “industrial rationalization.” In Du Bois’s view, with planning and international economic cooperation aimed at achieving a world economy, this revolution would ultimately give formerly disadvantaged “racial” minorities a chance to rise. In this fantasy, Du Bois envisioned a socialist pan-European system. He clearly distinguished, however, between the socialist elements he appreciated within National Socialism and his own vision of a transnational pan-Africanist movement. Reflecting on “Neuropa,” Du Bois led a transnationalist discourse in dialogic exchange with fundamentally nationalist ideas.

Du Bois’s attitudes toward Germany were complex and highly ambivalent. While sharply critical, he also profoundly respected and empathized with Germany and its people; he sought out what was essentially good in what he saw as a deplorable development that, though not irrevocable,
could lead to Germany’s self-destruction. Du Bois was indeed “a sharp and prescient observer” of Germany whose reflections were at times softened by his admiration of the country. The complexity of these reflections demonstrate that Du Bois understood Germany’s paradoxes and ambivalences and had a fundamentally positive view of the nation without condoning its dictatorial and racist policies.

Du Bois held the provocative view that Nazi tyranny was an inevitable consequence of Germany’s social, economic, and political struggle after WWI, and furthermore, he argued that it was Germany’s only alternative to turning communist. At first glance, one might see this as uncritical acceptance of Nazi Germany. Yet, Du Bois severely criticized the racist, propagandist dictatorship, even though he expressed understanding for the depressive mood in Germany following the Versailles Treaty and credited National Socialism with social achievements. His empathy for the country and people he still thoroughly respected and his ability to dissociate and abstract his appreciation of Germany as a Volk and nation from its contemporary tyrannical politics distinguished Du Bois from many of his contemporaries. In 1936 and even in 1941, Du Bois still hoped that the situation could improve and was sorely disappointed when he witnessed the full dimension of Nazi Germany’s genocide on traveling to Warsaw after the war.

Du Bois’s repeated attempts to see “beyond the surface” and to look for higher ideals driving political developments in Nazi Germany not only make his observations interesting but also offer a broad spectrum of analysis on issues ranging from class to race and nation. He regarded the “exaggerated and childish theory of race” as fatal to the success of any economic or political system on an international scale. Further, he recognized and censured Nazi Germany’s determination to eliminate “Jewish brains” and its intention to construct a state based on the “utter subordination of the Poles and Slavs.” However, he saw a great opportunity in the idea of “sweeping” away national and linguistic barriers that had “so long hindered and disorganized Europe.” While he rejected Hitler’s dream of a pan-German superstate under the National Socialist dictatorship, he approved of the idea of making Europe transnational. Hence, he dreamed of a united but democratic Europe only temporarily shattered by the wars that ravaged the continent during the first half of the twentieth century.

* * *

Du Bois’s reflections on Nazi Germany are part of a larger transnational, antiracist, and anticolonial discourse. Like other Black intellectuals such as C. L. R. James, George Padmore, and Oliver Cox, he “viewed fascism as a blood relative of slavery and imperialism, global systems rooted both in capitalist political economy and in racist ideologies that were
already in place at the dawn of modernity.” At the same time, his writings manifest a continual dialogic exchange with fundamentally nationalist ideas. Although he was torn between his “love for his oppressed race” and his “love for the oppressing country,” that is, the United States, Du Bois portrayed both the U.S. and Germany with surprising tolerance, which reveals that he did not decide against either country. Rather than oppose modernist ideas of nation and culture, he found them compelling. At the same time, he criticized social hierarchies and continually fought the African (American) struggle for racial equality. In his writings, the diasporic and the national must be understood not as mutually exclusive but as mutually constitutive, intertwined, and overlapping discourses. He held an intermediary, oscillating position, continually negotiating ideas of nation, ethnicity, nationalism and transnationalism. He attempted to create a pluralistic view that went beyond apparent forms of racial discrimination and national borders. He was especially interested in the very complex process of both conscious and subconscious constructions of German national(ist) identity, discerning binary and antithetical elements in it, but in his view, these were not its only determining factors. In reflecting on the multilayered interdependencies of social, cultural, economic, and, not least, racist elements that he regarded as the foundation of the German National Socialist state, he developed a multifaceted perspective that included notions of nation as a constitutive and forward-looking element. In focusing his analysis on Germany’s political, social, and racial structure, Du Bois was influenced by his personal inclination towards the country of his “spiritual awakening,” but not so much that he neglected his underlying interest in the role of “the Negro” and Africa in the world. In his critical views of Germany, Du Bois not only looked at striking parallels between German and American social and racial politics but continuously asked what these political developments meant for Africa and Africans in the Black Atlantic diaspora.

Du Bois’s positions were divergent and, at times, ambivalent, and his transnational perspective was broad. To understand them fully, we must modify the mutually exclusive, antagonistic opposition of nationalism and diasporic culture. Du Bois constantly worked to combine national and diasporic elements in his writings and tried to integrate an important geo-and historiographical component: Africa. Underlying his and other Black diasporic intellectuals’ writings, for example, George Padmore’s, was a constant exploration of the meaning that fascism and World War II had for “the darker races.” These writers continuously questioned the impact that a shift in Europe’s distribution of power, as well as its economic deficits during World War II, might have on European colonialism in Africa.

It is not easy for historians aiming at historical specificity, continuity, and contextualization to follow transnational approaches. They face the
difficulty of combining comparative and interdisciplinary methods, and they should carefully analyze the relationship of the variables they pack together. In reaching beyond nineteenth- and twentieth-century conceptions of “nationality, ethnicity, authenticity and cultural integrity,” historians who choose the Black Atlantic as a paradigm for historical study must be cautious not to re-establish mutually exclusive oppositions like those they wish to overcome. Such new binaries merely shift the analysis from the center historians have criticized (i.e., Europe) to the formerly marginalized edge. Furthermore, it would be prudent for historians studying diasporic and transnational themes to leave sufficient space for the hybrid, intermediary, and ambivalent states of Black Atlantic individuals like Du Bois. Like him, many such individuals oscillated between the “camps” of nation, culture, and ethnicity and affirmatively integrated nationalist ideas in constructing a quintessentially Black diasporic transnationalism.\textsuperscript{98} The recent foregrounding of hybridity, inbetweenness, and métissage is often perceived as presupposing anti-essentialism and plurality, yet historians of the transnational must be careful not to simply replace the former essentialist categories with hybrid ones. They should continue to question the interactions and connections that stretch beyond the borders, as well as the structural categories of nation-states. Referring to Brubaker’s idea of conceptualizing diaspora as a category of practices,\textsuperscript{99} I would like to suggest that the Black Atlantic can be reconceptualized as a dynamic transcultural and transnational concept. It combines the ambivalences of inbetweenness and belonging, as well as opposition to modernity and efforts to transform modernity into a more inclusive concept. The Black Atlantic, if used in a way that is sensitive to its historical sources and geographical specifics, that allocates a real, rather than merely metaphoric, space to Africa, and that strips it of its utopianism, could indeed serve as a valuable heuristic concept for future historical study.

Notes


As late as 2001, the German historian Jürgen Osterhammel held that the transnational had hardly reached the (German) historical sciences. Jürgen Osterhammel, “Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative?” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 27 (2001): 464–79, 471.


In his 1903 The Souls of Black Folk, a sociological study of the Black struggle after Reconstruction and one of the key texts in early twentieth-century African American Studies, Du Bois envisioned a transnational America which, however, was still restricted by the color line that “prevented ‘black’ folks from drawing from both their African and American identities.” Cf. David Thelen, “The Nation and Beyond,” 970.


Du Bois further defined pan-Africanism as the “intellectual understanding and co-operation among all groups of Negro descent in order to bring about … the industrial and spiritual


17 Paul Gilroy defines the Black Atlantic as a “system of historical, cultural, linguistic and political interaction and communication,” originating in the enslavement of Africans. It includes the dynamic process whereby slaves gradually adapted to the slaveholding culture, their emancipation and ongoing struggle against racial oppression, as well as slaveholders’ assumptions about slaves’ lack of creativity and humanity. It is a fluid, hybrid, and transnational alternative form of power, “opening out into theories of diaspora culture and dispersion, memory, identity and difference.” Cf. Paul Gilroy, http://www.blackatlantic.com/general/gilroy_essay.pdf (1 Oct. 2008). See also Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, (Cambridge, MA, 1993). I will refer to Paul Gilroy’s publication The Black Atlantic in italics and to the general concept as the Black Atlantic.


23 Goyal reproaches Gilroy for relegating Africa to the margin and thus reinstating the binary between Africa and the West. Echoing Simon Gikandi’s earlier argument in some ways, Goyal also denounces Gilroy’s lack of historical specificity from his paradigm, his ignorance of the role of Africa for Du Bois’s understanding of modernity, and, above all, his reconfiguration of Martin Delaney, the “father of black nationalism,” as a critic of nationalist perspectives. Goyal, “Theorizing Africa in Black Diaspora Studies,” 9f.


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Gikandi, “In the Shadow of Hegel,” 147; Dayan, “Paul Gilroy’s Slaves, Ships, and Routes,” 8ff.

Dayan, “Paul Gilroy’s Slaves, Ships, and Routes,” 7ff.


Gikandi, “In the Shadow of Hegel,” 147; Dayan, “Paul Gilroy’s Slaves, Ships, and Routes,” 8ff.

Dayan, “Paul Gilroy’s Slaves, Ships, and Routes,” 7ff.


In his 1935 grant application, Du Bois stated that he aimed “to study the way in which popular education for youth and adults in Germany has been made to minister to industrial organization and advance; and how this German experience can be applied so as to help in the reorganization of the American Negro industrial school, and the establishment of other social institutions.” W. E. B. Du Bois, 1935 grant proposal to the Oberlaender Trust of the Carl Schurz Society, W. E. B. Du Bois Papers, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, quoted in Sollors, “W. E. B. Du Bois in Nazi Germany,” B4.


Ibid., 136f.

In his article entitled “Fame” (published in the Forum of Fact and Opinion [FFO], *The Pittsburgh Courier* [PC], October 10, 1936), Du Bois described the “splendid,” “predominantly
German” hall of fame in the German Museum. He remarked that it “would have been a finer and bigger thing if, ignoring nation and language, [it] could have brought together the great contributors … the world over.” Though he noted that, “on the whole … commercialism and nationality had been restricted” in the Museum’s exhibition, he pointedly added that just this “restriction was sometimes poor.” Whereas German inventions “which came years after” were highlighted and “given the place of honor,” the real invention was “simply there.”


51 The Chicago Defender (CD), December 14, 1935.

52 This Louis-Schmeling fight brought the struggle for racial supremacy to the center of an international stage. Schmeling’s victory was exploited propagandistically to display “Hitler’s hypothesis of Aryan supremacy.” Both German and African American newspapers exploited the fight on racial grounds. “Hitler still frowns on Max Fighting Joe Louis in the U.S.,” CD, May 2, 1936, 14; “Hitler Attacks the Louis and Schmeling Battle,” CD, April 16, 1936, 13; “Uncle Sam Pulls Out Chestnuts,” CD, July 27, 1936, 14.

53 In its self-portrayal during the 1936 Berlin Olympics, Nazi Germany intended to create a tidy, friendly, non-racist atmosphere, and it succeeded in assuaging foreigners’ fears. The Los Angeles Times had rather positive reports (Los Angeles Times, July 27, 1936, section 2, 9; August 2, 1936; and August 4, 1936, sec. 2, 4). The New York Times, July 6, 1936, however, opposed U.S. participation in the Olympics and initially warned readers that Germany intended to use the games to restore its good image. See also New York Times, August 3 and 16, 1936. Among the African American newspapers, the Chicago Defender, especially, rather skeptically relayed similar ideas: “Olympic Stars Given Welcome in Berlin; Prejudice Missing as Athletes Arrive” and “U.S. Athletes Well Received by Hitlerites: Hand of Prejudice is as Yet Unseen,” CD, August 1, 1936, 2.

54 W. E. B. Du Bois, “Germany and Hitler” (FFO), PC, December 5, 1936. In this article on the Olympics, Du Bois retrospectively assesses the silencing and whitewashing effects of Nazi propaganda and underestimates the critical potential in the African American press.

55 Hitler’s alleged snub of Jesse Owens, in particular, generated a great deal of discussion. It was said that Hitler disappeared to avoid congratulating the Black athlete for his track-and-field victories. Jumping at the occasion, the African American Press and the president of the Olympic Committee harnessed the incident to promote civil and human rights: “Newspapers are criticizing Hitler for not congratulating Owens, yet when he finishes running and comes back here to live among Nordics, will he not meet the same thing from them?” “Hitler and Owens,” The Philadelphia Tribune, August 13, 1936, 13. See also “Hitler’s Aryan Superman Myth is Exploded as Colored Americans Stampede Olympics,” The Philadelphia Tribune, August 8, 1936, 8; “Jesse Owens Thrills Nazis,” BAA, Aug. 1, 1936; William N. Jones, “‘Adolf’ Snubs U.S. Lads: Hitler Won’t Shake Hands: Intentional Discourtesy is Shown Owens, Johnson,” BAA, August 8, 1936, 1f.; Editorial in The Crisis, September 1936, 273. Later perspectives point out the mythical character of the alleged “snub”: Richard Shenkman, Legends, Lies and Cherished Myths of American History (New York, 1988); William J. Baker, Jesse Owens: An American Life (New York, 1986), 74ff.

56 In his column on “Sport” (FFO, PC, September 19, 1936), Du Bois described Berlin’s return to everyday life as the decorations disappeared, the streets became ordinary, and the cafés
half empty again. However, he also remarked that it was great numbers of Germans who had “poured into Berlin” during the games, outnumbering foreigners by a large margin, thus criticizing the games’ national(ist) character.

57 Published while Du Bois still lived in Germany, his early observations (“The Olympics,” FFO, PC, October 24, 1936) evaded obvious race matters that the African American press, in contrast, had already largely explored. Cf. Du Bois’s articles in the Pittsburgh Courier, September 19, 1936. Later, he published more extensive and critical remarks.


59 In his analysis and criticism of amateur versus professional sports, Du Bois revealed his fascination with socialism. Wondering whether Olympic sports required class or health, wealth or skill while reflecting on the establishment of “professional sports” as “diversions of the wealthy” and privileged, he observed that the new idea of “bodily health and physical ability as a method of social uplift” renewed the traditional social function of sports. Du Bois saw the United States as “compelled to select even Negroes if they wanted to win,” while Germany won partly because of its wide basis of selection.

60 A one-page caricature entitled “Twilight of the Gods” shows an obese, long-haired, blond Viking with a horned and winged Viking cap, clad in a skirt with a swastika emblem. Holding a sign that reads “We Aryans Can Lick Anybody,” the Viking watches Jesse Owens disappear down the track with a laurel wreath in his hands. The Crisis, September 1936, 272.

61 “K. K. K. Hau斯塔engl,” The Baltimore Afro-American, August 23, 1936. The article comments on Ernst “Putzi” Hanfstaengl—whose name is misspelled in the article—who by 1936 had fallen out of Hitler’s favor: “Ernst Hau斯塔engl, white, is a Hitler aide and Harvard graduate who offered a scholarship to his Alma Mater ... only to have it refused because Harvard wants no gifts from anti-Jewish Hitler followers.” The article reproduces Hanfstaengl’s comment on “colored Athletes at the Olympics”: “There is not the slightest objection here to the colored people. We are looking for the best. But in our own case we would enter them from the colonies, not from Germany. It was Africa that dominated the track field, not the United States. Why not give the home nation the credit due?” Referring to “America’s melting pot,” the editor of The Baltimore Afro-American retorts that “all have melted ... Ernie knows that today Africa is as strange to us as Germany or France. He knows that colored people are as much Americans as are any Americans. But today Ernie lives in a land which has decided that colored people and Jews cannot be citizens. His statement on the Olympics is a snooty suggestion to America to adopt the German Ku Klux program.”

62 If “Jesse and his people ... were given all the rights and privileges of American citizens[,] then, the next time some nation casts aspersions on our athletes and our country we can produce more than sickly smirks.” The Crisis, September 1936, 273.

63 BAA, August 16, 1936.


65 In “The Olympics,” Du Bois compared the French and German reception of Black victories and optimistically appreciated African American victories as a step forward in the struggle for equality. He believed that “all this is going to be big with promise for the future.” However, he also appealed to African Americans not to be satisfied with this success on the world stage in sports but to follow it up intellectually in science, literature, and the arts.


67 Du Bois, “Germany and Hitler.”

68 Ibid.


71 Du Bois, “Race Prejudice in Germany.”
Du Bois, “The Present Plight of the Jew”: “From my window as I write I see a great red poster, seven feet high, asking the German people to contribute to winter relief of the poor, so that Germany will not sink to the level of the “Jewish-Bolshevist countries of the rest of the world.... Every misfortune of the world is in whole or in part blamed on Jews—the Spanish rebellion, the obstruction to world trade, etc.”

Du Bois, “Germany.”


Defending the German people, Du Bois stated that Hitler “showed Germany a way out when most Germans saw nothing but impenetrable mist, and he made the vast majority of Germans believe that this way was the only way....” Du Bois, “The Hitler State.”

Ibid.

See, for instance, Du Bois, “As the Crow Flies,” New York Amsterdam News, May 24 and June 14, 1941. In this column, Du Bois described Rudolf Hess (who had just flown to Glasgow intending to negotiate peace with Britain in a clandestine act of diplomacy) as “the one Nazi leader concerning whose honest beliefs and lofty idealism there could be no question.” In contrast to Hess, “Goering is a fat Junker and Goebbels is Mephistopheles.” Du Bois’s appreciation of Hess is highly dubious, for it “mattered little” to Du Bois “whether he did it with Hitler’s consent or in opposition to the whole Nazi set-up.”


Ibid., 15.


Ibid.


Comparing Wilhelmine Germany to the Weimar Republic, he observed that the latter was more democratic but weak. In Wilhelmine Germany, “the people who counted ... were the nobility,” but then “a series of startling economic changes” occurred, including “sudden deflation” which threatened the middle class. An extraordinary revolution, a “wild and desperate struggle,” followed, which “sinister elements,” such as “impoverished, unscrupulous ... noblemen and the Nazis,” entered into. Du Bois, “Neuropa: Hitler’s New World Order,” 381ff.


In “The New Philosophy,” Pittsburgh Courier, December 12, 1936, which deals with Germany, Du Bois at first does come across as completely taken with National Socialist propaganda. He praises the Nazi dictatorship: “There must be a dictatorship.... Democracy must go, and parliamentary institutions. The dictator must be a popular figure. Hitler filled the bill ... all opposition in the state must disappear.... They must, by superior authority, be forced into unity.... Moreover, this new state which Germany is building is something holy and superior. It is composed of pure Nordics, with no contamination of Jews or inferior races. Its in-born superiority is proven by history and experience.” The success of the new Germany “depends on strong government, obeyed without discussion or argument or hesitation, with the power in the hands of a supreme Leader, who today is Adolf Hitler.” While these lines echo anti-Semitic Nazi propaganda, they have to be read in conjunction with other articles Du Bois wrote both before and after it in which he strongly criticizes Germany. In this larger context, Du Bois’s remarks in “The New Philosophy” could be read as a
pastiche. Even in this article, he continues with a more ambivalent remark: “the philosophy of Hitlerism is not logical nor complete. Nor, on the other hand, is it wholly illogical and hypocritical.” In the ensuing article entitled “Propaganda,” he criticizes Germans’ ignorance and willingness to be blinded: “to secure such a government, and keep it in power, it is only necessary for the mass of the people firmly to believe that the thing works…. Part of such proof is a matter of plain sight—homes, roads, order.” Du Bois’s characterization of the “philosophy of Hitlerism,” thus, can be read as an emphatic analysis of National Socialist ideology verging on parody—as imitation with a difference.

Du Bois’s critique of National Socialist propaganda also comes to the fore in “Propaganda,” PC, December 12, 1936: “the greatest single invention of the World War was Propaganda. This systematic distortion of the truth for the purpose of making large numbers of people believe anything Authority wishes them to believe, has grown into an art, if not a science.” Du Bois’s understanding of Germany’s turn to National Socialism as a consequence of its difficulties after the Versailles Treaty is revealed in some of his preceding articles, for example, “The Background,” PC, December 5, 1936. In the same volume of the Pittsburgh Courier, he explained Hitler’s success in “The Hitler State” (December 12, 1936): “Adolf Hitler rode into power by accusing the world of a conspiracy to ruin Germany by economic starvation.” A week earlier he had written, as “industry was frightened; the Junkers were frightened; the managers, engineers and small shopkeepers were frightened; they all submitted to a man who had first been a joke, then a pest, and who suddenly loomed as a dictator.” Du Bois, “Depression and Revolution,” PC, December 5, 1936.

In “The Hitler State,” Du Bois clearly distinguished between “Hitler” and “Germans” or “Germany” as a whole.

Reflecting on the political consequences of a potential German victory in World War II for the future of Africa, Du Bois in 1941 expressed his hope for a better turnout: “If Hitler wins, and in the long run he cannot win, Africa will be parcelled out between Germany and Italy…. If Hitler wins, and he cannot win, there will be no recognition of Chinese or Indian nationality,” Du Bois, “Africa.” In another article in the same publication, he continued, “but Hitler cannot win, simply because no such organization as he has today built up, can command the brains, the loyalty and the man-power which will enable it to conquer the world.” Du Bois, “Hitler.” In 1952, however, Du Bois melancholically expressed his shock at the effect and extent of Nazi extermination policies: “I have seen something of human upheaval in this world: the scream [sic] and shots of a race riot in Atlanta; the marching of the Ku Klux Klan; the threat of courts and police; the neglect and destruction of human habitation; but nothing in my wildest imagination was equal to what I saw in Warsaw in 1949. I would have said before seeing it that it was impossible for a civilized nation with deep religious convictions and outstanding religious institutions; with literature and art; to treat fellow human beings as Warsaw had been treated.” Du Bois, “The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto,” 15.


Ibid., 385.

Kelley, “‘But a Local Phase of a World Problem’,” 1067.


Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, 2.


On November 23, 1962, Alan Simpson, Dean of the College of the University of Chicago, wrote to John W. Gardner, the president of the Carnegie Corporation, requesting support for the development of a new history course for his college, a course covering the history of the world in its entirety. He justified this initiative with reference to the longstanding tradition of curricular innovation at his institution, particularly in the social sciences and humanities, but he also highlighted a series of continuous educational experiments in which the new course in world history appeared to be the logical and self-evident next step:

The efforts of our own College in the past decade to enlarge the undergraduates’ exposure to world history have probably been as ambitious as those of any in the country. Our required course in the history of Western Civilization was organized in its present form in 1948. In 1956 the Carnegie Corporation helped us to institute year-long elective courses in the civilizations of India, China, and Islam.... In 1959, we added to our curriculum a year-long course in Russian Civilization and another in Japanese Civilization. In 1962, Milton Singer has organized ... an Honors Seminar on “The Comparison of Civilizations.” But we have not so far felt ready to develop an integrated course on World History. […] The opportunity which the College is now determined to seize is the completion of a scholarly contribution to the solution of this basic problem, by a member of our faculty....

This faculty member was William H. McNeill, whose famous book, The Rise of the West, was about to be published. Most likely following McNeill’s lead, the dean believed that this book would provide an interpretative framework for a new course that fit in well with already established courses in history. Simpson’s plea was successful: the course was implemented, becoming one of the early college courses in the U.S. with a global perspective on historical developments aside from nineteenth-century courses in universal history.

There is something striking about Simpson’s remarks: On the one hand, his descriptions of course innovations at the University of Chicago
are entirely consistent with common descriptions of the emergence of world history as an academic field in the U.S. After all, the usual disciplinary history attributes the field’s intellectual beginnings to William H. McNeill, and also to Leften S. Stavrianos, whose pioneering works inspired the comparative and area studies of Philip D. Curtin and a group of younger scholars in the 1970s and 1980s. This group challenged the field’s focus on European and Western history with its Eurocentric master narrative “from Plato to Nato.” On the other hand, Simpson’s statement asserts continuity between the teaching of “world history” and the older, more established course in “Western Civilization.”

Yet these two approaches to the past are viewed as worlds apart—they are, in fact, presented as opposites. Moreover, their difference and dichotomy triggered intense controversy, for example, in the public debates of the 1990s about the contents of the National School Standards for the teaching of history in secondary schools. Furthermore, the divergent educational implications of both courses contributed to the contemporary “cultural wars,” which revolved around pivotal issues of cultural identity, historical consciousness, and national belonging. Simpson’s statement, however, suggests that world history derives not only from regional and area studies, and from extra-European history, but has its roots in European history courses as well. How can Simpson’s assertion that world history in the U.S. successively and gradually developed from European and extra-European history be aligned with the common belief that it developed in sharp contrast to the traditional European history and as a criticism of that teaching practice, and that it represents more than just accumulated stories about world regions other than one’s own culture or civilization?

I found it tempting to seek an explanation for these contradictory notions by looking for lesser known origins of world history. And indeed, I gradually uncovered a historical transformation in the teaching of history from the 1910s to the early 1960s that can be described as a gradual spatial expansion and globalization in course designs. Changes in institutional structures, as well as course offerings, seminar topics, degree requirements and examination fields, attest to this remarkable spatial broadening. Not only did parts of the world receive attention that had previously been ignored, but entities other than the nation-state increasingly came to be used as a framework for course design and as categories of historical interpretation. Two important global developments drove this expansion: first, the world was becoming increasingly interconnected, and people perceived it as such; and second, the United States itself was turning into a geopolitical superpower with zones of influence and activity across the world.

Interestingly, this spatial expansion is particularly obvious in “general history,” a field mostly taught as “general education” courses at the
college level. Although often overlooked by professional historians, these history survey courses grew considerably more influential for formulating and maintaining collective perceptions of the past. Because these courses were required and reached the majority of students, they became crucial conveyors of both historical-political knowledge and worldviews, attracting immense interest among educators, scholars, and societal mediators alike. They introduced large-scale historical developments and transmitted master narratives in condensed form in year-long courses. They also referred continuously to the present—after all, they had to be relevant to a diverse body of students with various expectations and career and life aspirations. These history courses very quickly took up and historicized new social, political, economic, and cultural developments. The attention the American Historical Association gave to discussing the shape of these introductory courses underscores their importance to the teaching and practice of academic history.

To be sure, the spatial broadening of general history courses was by no means a linear development, much less a teleological one, and at no time was the traditional paradigm of national history entirely replaced. This was true for both U.S. history and the reconstruction of European or non-European history. Yet, it went on continuously (parallel to the teaching of U.S. history) and largely along the lines Simpson had stated: after “Western Civilization” courses were introduced, “Non-Western Civilization” courses supplemented them, which, in turn, eventually stimulated courses in world or global history.

The spatial broadening of the content of history courses in the U.S. constitutes a transnational development on at least four levels. First, the increase in transnational linkages in the U.S. initially spurred this broadening. Historical narratives are closely tied to contemporary needs and challenges; they transfer present-day concerns onto the past so that the past can provide orientation and guidance. Thus, the emergence of history courses that included the past of other cultures can be understood as a reflection of the transnational entanglements and global integration of the United States in the last century. Ongoing contacts and connections with other cultures inspired people’s interest in their histories and also established a need to know more about them. Second, teaching historical traditions other than those of the United States fostered understanding for cultural differences and both facilitated and stimulated transnational encounters. Third, these courses also resulted from the multicultural composition of U.S. society. By responding to the needs of immigrants and ethnic minorities, they helped “manage” processes of transnationalization. Finally, the history courses I deal with here have become transnational phenomena themselves since they have been used as models for history education in other parts of the world.11
In the following, I will reconstruct the transformation of general history courses at the liberal arts colleges of the University of Chicago, Harvard University, and Columbia University as examples of this spatial expansion of the subject matter. I will restrict myself to the educational aims of these courses and the set of conditions that facilitated their emergence without presenting course contents in detail. This focus will demonstrate that the gradual globalization of these courses developed in response to large-scale historical processes, above all those of global integration and the rise of the United States as a geopolitical power.

My sample, like any, is not unproblematic. Some might argue that the findings, based on three elite universities, could not be representative. I am aware of this problem, but I maintain that the developments at these institutions resulted less from specific and internal conditions (as influential as they were) but from external factors, among others, the topical foci of funding programs of private foundations (like the Ford Foundation), or programmatic decisions within the professional institutions (like the American Council of Education). These institutions aimed to address issues of national concern, saw themselves as national players, and sought to influence private and public education alike, often with the same policy instruments. That the curricular changes at a few universities resulted in large part from the policy-making efforts of these organizations, as well as from structural changes within the historical discipline, reduces the exceptionality of these cases.

“General History” and the Introduction of Courses on the “History of Contemporary Civilization”

“General history” courses already comprised part of study programs at U.S. colleges in the nineteenth century since a broad education in history was regarded as important. However, the content of these courses changed considerably in the 1910s and 1920s as a result of several institutional, social, and demographic changes.

Around 1900, professionalization of the disciplines began to transform academic structures such as research and teaching subjects and departmental organization. Two shifts were particularly important: First, research overtook teaching in priority, and, concomitantly, graduate education took precedence over undergraduate education. Secondly, as disciplines became more differentiated, research topics and course offerings became similarly specialized. In the 1880s, modern research universities had already emerged next to the traditional liberal arts colleges. This development challenged colleges that awarded bachelor’s degrees and, thus, administered exams for admission to graduate studies to find a balance between two different, if not opposed, educational purposes: on the
one hand, they still had to guarantee their mission of providing a general education, but, on the other hand, they also had to convey specific and expert knowledge so that students would qualify for graduate studies.

Another major change to the B.A. degree around this same time consisted in efforts to combine specialized preparation for academic studies with vocational training. The classic curriculum of the nineteenth century had aimed to instill mental discipline and moral character and mediate knowledge by means of a set of prescribed courses covering the major fields of learning—classical languages and literatures such as Greek and Latin, mathematics, logic and rhetoric, as well as divinity and metaphysics. But these goals were no longer regarded as sufficient. One reason for this was the democratization of undergraduate education. Between 1890 and 1925, enrollment in institutions of higher education grew 4.7 times as fast as the population. With these larger numbers, students with very diverse social backgrounds entered colleges—all the more so as the B.A. degree became a sign of social advancement and a precondition for a successful professional career. Therefore, student expectations diverged—seeking more than merely a general education, some students wanted their studies to give them the requisite knowledge for advanced academic work while others sought vocational qualifications.

Additionally, an influx of immigrants at the turn of the century brought diverse experiences and cultural backgrounds into classrooms. This created a demand for their social integration, which, it was hoped, colleges could achieve by educating immigrants in the traditions, values, and institutions of American society. Thus, college administrators had to find or create a space within the undergraduate curriculum, now so filled with vocational and specialized academic training, that would provide knowledge designed to integrate students socially and culturally in the spirit of the old liberal arts colleges. Hence, in this same period, the idea of “general education” emerged, which was understood as “those phases of non-specialized and nonvocational learning which should be the common experience of all educated men.” Even now, general education continues to be understood in similar terms. Michael Geyer, for example, in 1993, described it as “the ‘symbolic territory’ on which knowledge about the common good and a sense of body politics are molded … It is knowledge that moves inward toward a consideration of the subject(s) of citizenship and outward to a critical reflection of what constitutes peoples and relations.”

General education courses quickly became a distinct part of many undergraduate curricula, replacing or supplementing the introductory courses offered during the first two years of study in particular disciplines. Institutions organized these in different ways: some colleges revised the existing introductory courses, while others developed “gen ed” courses
from scratch. However, two aspects of this process were crucial to the later spatial expansion of the subject matter: First, history as a subject was assigned a prominent position. In spite of the professionalization and, thus, increasing specialization of history as a discipline, the idea and the institutionalized field of general history remained strong. In the 1890s, academic history teaching had taken shape, bringing about two required courses: one in the history of the United States and another in “general history.” Equally important for the central position of history as part of general education were changes in the humanities on the whole. Expanding beyond their nineteenth-century concentration on the study of Greek, Latin, and religion, the humanities broadened to include subjects that had previously received little attention, such as literature, philosophy, and history. In this way, they were able to compete with the emerging social sciences as a means to serve society’s developing need for cultural orientation.

Secondly, the prominence and wider purpose of general history in general education led colleges to reconsider such courses’ content and thoroughly revise them. They asked themselves which parts of the past should be taught and with which interpretations. The premises of “New History” had begun to spread in the 1910s, significantly shaping reflections on these questions. This epistemological renewal of history as a discipline aimed, among other things, to substantiate history’s decisive role in society at large and in everyday life on the basis of its political-pedagogical value. In line with the progressive movement, historians like James Harvey Robinson and Charles Austin Beard conceived of history as an analysis of transformations of all aspects of society. Consequently, the past, historicized as a process of perpetual change, became significant for the present as it was thought to prompt, enable, and guide political and social action.

What historians and educators, therefore, tried to develop was a corpus of knowledge that corresponded to these ideas and fulfilled the new social and political purposes of an educational system in transformation. However, although they discussed possible revisions to the old introductory or survey courses in general history before 1915, they failed to reach a satisfying solution. But educational needs that arose in World War I brought new answers leading to curricular innovations.

World War I and the “War Issues Course”

On April 6, 1917, the U.S. declared war on Germany. In the early summer of 1918, the Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST) of the War Department called for educational institutions to contribute to the mobilization for war and make their knowledge and resources available for the national defense. In concrete terms, colleges and universities were
to set up Special Army Training Camps (SATC) that would prepare recruits for their deployment to Europe. Technological and military subjects comprised the bulk of this training, but in July 1918, the CEST decided to introduce an obligatory course on “Issues of the War” designed to familiarize the students with the causes and goals of the conflict. Frank Aydelotte, director of the “War Issues Course” at the CEST, helped to develop a general syllabus for this course, as well as the accompanying material, though the preparation of the seminars and lectures was left to the participating institutions. The guidelines suggested that the first section of the year-long course present the historical and economic reasons for the war with a major focus on Europe’s relationship to other parts of the world—for example, in trade or colonial expansion. A second section was to concern itself with the forms of government of the countries participating in the war, and a third part was to treat the national characteristics of these countries. Beyond these guidelines, two points were made explicit: the course was to be designed from historical, philosophical, economic, and sociological perspectives with the participation of instructors from the respective disciplines; and secondly, the course was to take over the functions of a humanistic education within the training program.

Although 540 institutions had implemented the course with a total of 125,000 SATC recruits as of October 1919, it only lasted for a few weeks—on 18 November, the armistice was signed, bringing the war to an end. Still, the course paved the way to the future. Half of the institutions decided to complete the currently running course and integrate it the following year into the regular curriculum, either as a part or replacement of the older general history courses. Of course, its content changed slightly, usually to include the Paris Peace Conference and the postwar order. Nevertheless, by and large, the course seemed compatible with the regular curricula. This can be best illustrated by the curricular revision at Columbia College: a general shift in attitude was taking place that Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Columbia University, remarked upon in November 1918:

Those, who have had to do with the course, are beginning to ask themselves if it does not constitute the elements of a liberal education for the youth of today. [...] It has awakened a consciousness of what we, as people, need to know if our part in the world of today is to be intelligent, sympathetic and liberal.

Two months later, following this lead, the faculty of Columbia College decided to convert the “war issues” course into a “peace issues” course. Further, in the fall of 1919, the obligatory introductory course in history and philosophy was replaced by the latter. Although the new course
took more than seven months to plan and eventually appeared under a new title, “Introduction to Contemporary Civilization,” it bore a striking resemblance, in the course announcements, to both the war and peace issues course that had preceded it. It carried forth the historical perspective of the war and its causes. Two of the three course sections presented history up to the seventeenth century, but the then-current international relationships and the new role of the United States in the changing international landscape formed pivotal points: they were not only treated in the last section but shaped the presentation of the earlier history, too. 

Despite its heavy reliance on its predecessors, the course was pioneering in its conceptual framework: it aimed to analyze American and European civilization. This new orientation appeared after the war in Europe had undermined the general belief in the values and institutions of the “progressive” world, fostering a need for them to be validated and refined. The U.S. came to understand itself as the moral defender of Western Civilization, and educational institutions wanted to participate in this. Thus, Columbia University created a general education course that dealt with contemporary international developments from a distinctly historical perspective on the basis of the earlier “War Aims” course. It conceived of the Atlantic-European space as coterminous with civilization and made it the core of any general education. This framework captured the “commonality between Americans and Europeans inspired by the First World War … the commonality between Poles and Irish, between English and Italians, among all of the European immigrant groups pouring into America” and “portrayed European civilization as a unit transcending ethnic borders” that fosters a common identity beyond national differences.

It was not long before this course was implemented nationwide. As early as 1926, thirty-four colleges and universities had adopted Columbia’s course, and in the mid-1920s, a slew of textbook publishing for such courses began.

A year-long “history of contemporary civilization” course addressed the social and educational needs that had been established before the war. For one thing, its historical perspective helped integrate immigrants and develop homogeneity of values among the students. Its ideal was, as Carolyn Lougee has pointed out, “homogenizing and normative: it socialized the young from whatever particularist background traditions to a uniform standard of thinking and behaving that ought to characterize America’s expanding educated class.”

For another, it conveyed the knowledge that older courses in civic education and general history had covered, offering a solid historical-political education, but now in a framework that advanced contemporary U.S. foreign policy interests. In addition, it took up the theoretical and methodological innovations formulated by “New History” and progressive
historians like James Harvey Robinson and Charles A. Beard. Furthermore, Columbia’s course on the history of contemporary civilization (and similar courses) incorporated world regions that had previously been neglected: extending its spatial scope far beyond Europe and the United States, it presented histories of the Middle and Far East, as well as Africa and Latin America.34

In sum, a new kind of general history emerged in the 1920s that found its place in interdisciplinary, introductory college courses on “civilization.” It resulted from a unique configuration of social, political, and institutional factors: from the teaching of military training programs at the colleges during the First World War, from shifting power relations in the postwar world order, as well as from the requirement for a general reform of college education (largely caused by the influx of immigrant students) and innovative approaches in academic historiography. The presentation of civilizational history within this climate supported a reaffirmation of cultural traditions. At the same time, it constituted a historical academic unit that reached spatially from the U.S. to the Russian frontiers. In this sense, it marked the beginning of the spatial expansion of history teaching.

Divergent Developments of General History Courses in the 1940s and 1950s: “Western” and “Non-Western Civilization” Courses

In the following three decades, the teaching of general history at colleges all over the U.S. firmly established such history of civilization courses. Interestingly, however, a transformation of the geographical span and thus also of the interpretation of that civilization set in. The initial courses on the “history of civilization” or “contemporary civilization” gradually metamorphosed into two almost opposite formats: In some cases, they narrowed to focus on the history of “Western Civilization,” specifically on historical developments in Europe. At the same time, such courses took up a transatlantic perspective (of the U.S. and Western Europe) within the framework of “educating for democracy” based on the narrative of the rise of the West. In other cases, though, as area studies became popular and began to be institutionalized in the 1940s and 1950s, the history of civilization courses evolved to focus on non-Western civilizations from these new regional perspectives. These courses presented extra-European history to supplement the goal of democratic education with “education for international understanding.”35

Taken individually, these courses did become more focused on specific geographical areas, but taken all together, they presented a greatly expanded and globalized picture of world history.

In the former case, the transformation of the history of civilization(s) course into “Western Civilization” cannot be attributed to a particular
time or even be linked to a certain event or location. Rather, the term itself, “Western Civilization,” prevailed in the 1930s within historical-academic discourse as a designation for historical narratives of Europe—including its western borders. Then, in the 1940s, it also came to be associated with an introductory course of the same name in general history. The reasons this introductory course emerged are clear. First, the need to integrate new immigrants into American society remained, and the historical-political general education colleges provided continued to serve as an appropriate historical-political instrument: “Western civ promised to be a unifying and assimilative force which taught the several groups that they had a common and deeply rooted heritage that bound them together.”

Second, America’s attitudes in international relations had changed. Nationalism and its correlate, isolationism, had again come to dominate in the 1930s; the international involvement of the early 1920s had resulted in some disappointments, and the worldwide economic crisis had necessitated some domestic political stabilization. This circumstance opened up space for emphasizing the nation both in the elaboration of U.S. history courses and in the increasingly Western focus of general history teaching.

In 1945–46, Harvard University programmatically developed an introductory history course along these lines, which would later serve as a model throughout the country. For several years, administrators and faculty at Harvard had been discussing curricular reform for Harvard College. In the process, they evaluated and redesigned the standard “History I” course, which had been a staple of the curriculum since the nineteenth century. The committee in charge had recommended implementing a less specific course that would nonetheless properly suit general education requirements. That is, it had to fulfill the task of obligatory gen ed courses, aiming to create culturally integrated, socially committed, and politically loyal citizens or provide the knowledge necessary for the development of such citizens. The faculty adhered to this recommendation, designing a course called “Western Thought and Institutions,” whose objective was to describe the past in a way that would develop a “comparatively coherent and unified background for an understanding of some of the principal elements in the heritage of Western civilization.” What this meant at Harvard College was similar to what it meant at most liberal arts colleges. Huberman and Schubert have summarized what such introductory history courses have emphasized:

…the importance of Renaissance Italy and the histories of Britain and France; when they look at other powers, it is to contrast the development of democracy in Britain and France with the authoritarian structures of Tsarist Russia, Bismarckian and Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy, among others; the importance and values of the
Reformation and Protestantism; the significance of the European imperial conquests on the rest of the world and on Europe; the significance of Lockean and Rousseauian ideas in the development of concepts of rights and sovereignty of the people; the importance of parliamentary history in Britain and elsewhere; a heavy emphasis on the French Revolution and other revolutions leading to popular sovereignty; the significance of big powers and their histories rather than developments in smaller countries; the role of labor movements and quests for voting rights among the middle and lower classes and women; the mercantile and industrial revolutions and the importance of a capitalist economy.  

Thus, such introductory courses presented the political concepts of freedom, self-determination, and civil rights, as well as the sociological components of cultural heritage, the religious substructure, and the historical development of the current social and economic world. Catchwords used to describe such courses reinforced the understanding of their general aims: “civic education,” “moral instruction,” “Western democracy,” and, to a lesser extent, “civilization.”

This thematic focus, wherein the United States was perceived as upholding the core values of Western civilization while Europe went astray, was connected with a reinterpretation of the relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe. By the 1930s and 1940s, Americans took special pride in their nation’s enduring commitment to Western civilization. Although the history of Western civ was still a story of progress, Europe of the twentieth century was a mess. It was the United States that avoided fascism, that maintained capitalist values, that really embodied the best of the Western spirit. One way to handle the messier parts of the twentieth century was to wonder where the rest of the West went wrong while the United States continued to show the true Western way. Thus, these courses no longer portrayed the U.S. as defending and preserving universal civic values that had been sparked and flourished in Europe but had been extinguished by the First World War. Rather, the United States came to represent the Western values that Europe had apparently turned away from—such as democracy and freedom linked with a capitalistic social order. This transformation reflects America’s increasing historical self-confidence in relation to Europe.

During the early 1940s, the experiences of the Second World War propelled the parallel development of history of civilization courses into extra-Western history courses. The President’s Commission on Higher Education explained this new need for “education for international understanding” as a direct consequence of the war and its impact on American foreign policy:
With World War II and its conclusion has come a fundamental shift in the orientation of American foreign policy. Owing to the inescapable pressure of events, the Nation’s traditional isolationism has been displaced by a new sense of responsibility in world affairs. The need for maintaining our democracy at peace with the rest of the world has compelled our initiative in the formation of the United Nations, and America’s role in this and other agencies of international cooperation requires of our citizens a knowledge of other peoples ... such as has not hitherto been so urgent.41

In other words, the U.S. wished to play a new role on the world stage after the war that required a change in knowledge structures and expanded spatial horizons. In practice, this spatial expansion occurred in two linked steps. First, regional courses—those on non-European history—were introduced into the curriculum. After some time, these courses led to the development of a more synthetic understanding of “world history,” both in terms of new course designs and institutional structures. In the late 1940s, “area studies” quickly became institutionalized in the U.S. academic system on a large scale, financially supported by private funds and state aid alike.

However, in the early 1940s at the latest, colleges and universities were already beginning to turn toward non-European regional studies both in research and education.42 When Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941, another reform of the higher education system was initiated that involved nationwide planning, conceptualization, and implementation. In December, the president of the American Council on Education (ACE), one of the larger interest groups for educational policies, commissioned a small, informal group within the council to compose a memorandum on teaching Asia at American high schools and colleges.

Basically, the work of this commission demonstrates how important developing the curriculum in this sector was.43 After additional meetings, two conferences, and councils at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, as well as the National Council of Social Studies, the commission applied in February 1943 for funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. It was successful, gaining financial support for activities that integrated Asia into curricula and research programs of educational institutions according to the following line of thought: “The program of Asiatic studies in American education needs to be related to the programs of education about Latin America, about geopolitics, about world reconstruction, in order that full strength and support may be assured for far-sighted development in this country of total civic education for participation in world affairs. Asiatic studies are to be conceived not as goals of a pressure group, but as one aspect of the reconstruction of civic education in the light of world events and trends.”44 Furthermore, the commission argued
that an educated citizen desiring to act effectively and responsibly in society needs to know about worldwide developments and their implications for the role the U.S. plays in the world. At the same time, because this role is constitutive, the U.S. needs to produce experts on specific languages and cultures who enable it to act with commitment and effectiveness within the new international conditions. Therefore, study of Asia was not to be treated as merely a regional supplement to existing curricula, but it was to take a key position in historical-political education.

University education could address both of these needs by educating students to be future players on the international stage who could constructively promote U.S. interests with their knowledge of other countries and cultures. To be sure, the ACE and Rockefeller Foundation were not the only organizations with this agenda. In 1944, seven area committees—including Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America—were founded by the “American Council of Learned Societies.”

Two other initiatives were relevant to the implementation of regional or “areas studies” courses. One was a report by the “Committee on World Regions” of the Social Science Research Council published shortly after the council was incorporated in 1943 on the future growth of regional studies in the social sciences. Inspired by the war, which “had focused attention as never before upon the entire world,” the committee noted that, for the U.S. to do justice to its role as a member of the UN after the war, Americans had to learn to respect and form an understanding of other nations and their peoples, cultures, and institutions. Therefore, it considered reform in undergraduate and graduate education, as well as research, necessary.

Then, a year later on March 15–16, 1944, social scientists, politicians engaged in educational policy, and representatives of the major philanthropic foundations gathered at a “Conference on Area and Language Programs in American Universities” to discuss the future of area studies in academic teaching and research. In a concluding report, “The Future of Area Studies in American Universities and Colleges,” they formulated concrete suggestions and procedures for anchoring regional studies in the curriculum.

Their understanding of the educational functions such studies were supposed to fulfill motivated this initiative, and it was almost identical to that of the ACE’s commissions. That is, the more global role of the U.S. now required educated citizens who understood worldwide developments and experts in more languages and the cultures of the world for U.S. engagement in new areas. As to whether the political requirement was directly declared or was articulated in the sense of an “education for peace” is less important than the fact that, in the beginning of the 1940s within the educational elite, a consciousness concerning the relevance of the “rest of the world” for U.S. society and politics emerged. Although this
political need was not always directly stated (often it was subsumed under a concern for an “education for peace”), this conference as well as the other stated initiatives show clearly that an awareness of the relevance of the “rest of the world” for U.S. society and politics was growing within the educational elite from the early 1940s.

Despite this growing awareness, universities needed another impulse to prepare and actually implement new teaching models that considered other areas of the world in addition to the U.S. and Europe. This came in the 1950s in the form of grants from philanthropic foundations such as the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Foundation. An excellent illustration of the effect these grants had on educational design is Robert Redfield’s and Milton B. Singer’s project on India. From 1951 on, the Ford Foundation sponsored these University of Chicago scholars’ research. The results were integrated a few years later into a “general” course on “Indian Civilization” at their home institution.

Gustav E. von Grunebaum’s research application to the Rockefeller Foundation for Marshall G. S. Hodgson (University of Chicago) in 1956 also demonstrates the impact of these foundations on teaching. Originally, Hodgson had proposed to write a monograph on Islamic civilization, but the foundation rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was far more important to develop teaching materials about this region. Although Hodgson received a travel scholarship enabling him to study in several Islamic countries for six months, he could not convince the foundation shortly after his return to fund him to write up all the material he collected. In the end, the foundation instead supported a conference at the University of Chicago that aimed to prepare college teaching materials on this topic. Hodgson then planned an “Islamic Civilization” course based on insights from this conference. In structure, it was similar to the “Chinese Civilization” course (designed by Herrlee G. Creel) and the above-mentioned “Indian Civilization” course. All three of these non-Western civilization courses later received financial support from the Carnegie Foundation and were so successful at the College of the University of Chicago that, in 1959, they became requirements in general history, which permanently anchored them in the curriculum.

Yet another factor contributed to the introduction of these non-Western civilization courses. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the academic discipline of history, which had only emerged between 1860 and 1890, faced a loss of status. At that time, academia was undergoing a process of differentiation that produced new disciplines such as sociology and economics. These disciplines claimed to address current social and political problems, forcing historians to defend the value of historical knowledge and research. From the 1920s to roughly the 1960s, discussions within the AHA aptly display just how hard history was struggling to
position itself within the new academic environment. Allying itself more with the social sciences, which would entail, among other things, concentrating primarily on modern or even contemporary history, promised the historical discipline more academic prestige, more private funding, and, therefore, more opportunities for research and larger numbers of students. Allying itself with the humanities, in contrast, would allow it to adhere to the long-standing breadth of the field and its intellectual traditions but would result in less support and importance.\(^{57}\) The conflict of disciplinary identity became even more explosive in light of historical dimensions of area studies. When other departments outside history addressed these topics with social science approaches, discussion about the relevance of history as a discipline intensified, and the distribution of materials and financial resources turned into touchy issues. These discussions influenced the spatial expansion of history as a discipline as it converged with and oriented itself toward the regional foci of these area studies. Moreover, this expansion offered possibilities for mediation in history’s identity crisis, as well as for prestige and greater funding.

From “Non-Western Civilization” to “World History” Courses

As we have seen, area studies and history began to stimulate one another, and regional studies and historical approaches began to work in concert, essentially moving toward “world history.” After World War II, the educated elite played a significant role in this as they became aware of the strong influence global connections had begun to exert on society. As the President’s Commission on Higher Education, composed of academics, educational administrators and political leaders, put it:

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\text{In speed of transportation and communication and in economic interdependence the nations of the globe already are one world; the task is to secure recognition and acceptance of this oneness in the thinking of the people, so that the concept of one world may be realized psychologically, socially, and in good time politically.}^{58}\]

Although this idea had been articulated earlier, it was in the 1950s when it gained widespread acceptance.

Historians like William H. McNeill, whom we saw at the beginning of this paper, and Leften S. Stavrianos were then able to develop world history courses—and get funding for them—to integrate into college curricula, arguing that they gave students insight into the global nature of their time as well as an awareness of just how deeply the U.S. was involved with other countries. McNeill’s dean at the College of the University
of Chicago, Alan Simpson, used similar arguments when he advocated McNeill’s course in world history in his funding proposal to the Carnegie Corporation: “The present condition of the world has made some understanding of the whole history of the human family one of the imperatives of a liberal education.” Stavrianos—who worked at Northwestern University and also in Chicago—also made these claims in his proposal to the Carnegie Corporation, using a quotation by George L. Mosse from 1949: “Surely a student, in order to make intelligent political choices in our society, must know more about Russia and about the Far East than such a Western Civilization course can give him.”

Both initiatives were successful and received grants. By the academic year 1960/1961, Stavrianos was able to teach a course entitled “World History in Modern Times” that soon became a permanent course (though under the slightly different title “World Civilizations”) in the history offerings. Some miles to the south, at the University of Chicago, McNeill was able to introduce his “World History Course” in 1964. Colleges had discovered the whole world, albeit in segments, as subject matter for “general history” as people grew ever more aware of globalization. At the same time, they began to address connections between separately taught areas.

In the following decades, these two different types of general education courses (non-Western civ and world history) were taught side by side—and Western civ continued to be taught as well. Two factors help explain why they so successfully and enduringly became fixtures in American education: First, both types of courses not only spatially expanded the historical perspective, responding to America’s needs as a world power and the increasing globalization of society. In fact, they also conveyed new historical master narratives, that is, all-encompassing interpretations of the past. These historical metaécrits present models of societal development and make assumptions about cultural characteristics that create communities of belonging. Whereas Western civilization presented the narrative of the “rise of the West,” basically treating the “the rest of the world” as a counter-example to the Western story of success, world history conveyed the idea of cultural pluralism. These master narratives were one reason a broad swath of educators and shapers of educational policy (like the Department of War in World War I, the American Council on Education, or philanthropic foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation) paid so much attention to these introductory courses in general history.

A second but related factor in the successful institutionalization of the new courses was the development of “progressive history” within the historical discipline between the 1910s and 1950s. This new trend promoted history teaching on the undergraduate level that went beyond mere intellectual-academic knowledge transfer to achieve “outreach and public relevance.” “Progressive historians” were at the forefront of both historical
research and teaching, combining scholarship with “wider involvement in reformist groups and institutions.” They saw themselves “not as elitist public intellectuals … but rather as scholars reflecting and shaping historical consciousness in university and public service.”63 For them, reconstructing and interpreting the past could help the nation address contemporary societal challenges. Thus, they developed and constantly revised survey courses in Western civilization, non-Western civilization, and also world history that linked the present to historical master narratives by interpreting it through the lens of history.

All in all, colleges in the U.S., with their general historical/political education, always were, and still are, central places for the transmission of perceptions of the past and thus for the forming of cultural self-images including their integration in ideas of world orders. Whoever sought to play a part in the forming of collective views of history, in the struggle for interpretive dominance of enforcement of historical narratives—hence, in the politics of history—strove to affect the negotiation of the shape, and content, of “general history” as taught at the college.

* * *

Since the 1910s, in response to the general needs of reform in American undergraduate education, colleges thoroughly revised the general history courses in accordance with history’s strengthened position within general humanistic education. With curricular innovations during World War I, these courses became the institutional anchor for history teaching as part of general education programs. From then on, this history teaching underwent a winding but nevertheless steady process of spatial expansion until world history courses were developed and implemented, particularly after the spread of non-Western civilization courses during the late 1940s and 1950s. Taken together, the very different forms general history courses took, including those on Western civilization, mirrored not only transformations in American society, international politics, and the educational needs of a global power but also people’s ever growing awareness of the transnationalization and globalization of their world—a world characterized by cross-cultural interactions, dependencies, and hierarchies of power and influence.64 General history courses offered a venue for trying out and establishing transnational and global historical perspectives in reaction to the concrete experience of living in a world deeply linked across cultural and political borders. Added to that, the reconstruction of parts of this development undertaken here highlights three often ignored dimensions of the history of transnational and world history courses: First, Western civilization and world history courses are much more intertwined than is often acknowledged, being, in fact, part of a more general transformation of history teaching at colleges. Second, although this process of curricular
change leading to the emergence of world history courses accelerated after the end of World War II, its origins lie in developments that extend back to the first two decades of the twentieth century. And third, this process was stimulated by social and political factors, that is, by national needs and global developments that characterize the twentieth century: increasing cross-cultural interconnectedness and the U.S. hegemony in geopolitics. Since the teaching and writing of history mirror the social, cultural, political, and economic conditions within which they occur, transnational and world historical perspectives reflect and are part of wider processes of transnational entanglements and global integration.

Notes


4 To be sure, funding applications are ambiguous historical sources, which have to be interpreted at least as critically as any other remnant of the past. They may require even more caution since their function and specific language do not seem to represent factual developments or actual motivations particularly well, be they intellectual, social, or political. However, this difficulty does not seem to apply to the striking aspects of Simpson’s remarks I have in mind.


8 A quantitative analysis of history course offerings at 24 land-grant universities supports this claim: “The most prominent change between 1910 and 1990 was the huge decrease in the percentage of the average curricular time devoted to the history of Western Europe and England – from 61.1% to 33.6%.” John David Frank, Evan Schofer, and John Charles Torres, “Rethinking History: Change in the University Curriculum, 1910–1990,” *Sociology of Education* 67, no. 4 (1994): 231–42, 236.

9 This characteristic is connected with the “presentism” of “New History.” For “New History,” among others, see Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge, 1988), 98–100.
The American Historical Association repeatedly formed committees to discuss history education until the late 1940s, including the Committee of Ten (1893), Committee of Seven (1889), Committee of Five (1907–1911), Committee of the Social Studies (1916), Commission on History and other Social Studies in the Schools (1929–34), and the Committee for Teaching of American History in Schools and Colleges (1942–1944). On the connection of undergraduate education to graduate teaching and academic research, see Katja Naumann, “Weltgeschichte in der universitären Lehre – institutionelle Räume, intellektuelle Partner und geschichtspolitische Anbindungen,” in H-Soz-u-Kult, July 14, 2007. http://geschichtetransnational.clio-online.net/forum/id=896&etype=diskussionen.


Rudolf, The American College, 442n11; see also Lingelbach, Klio macht Karriere, 134–37n3; for the restrictions on this trend toward more students and greater social inclusiveness, see Jerome Karabel, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton (Boston, 2005).


On the liberal arts college and liberal education in general, see W. B. Carnochan, The Battleground of the Curriculum: Liberal Education and American Experience (Stanford, 1993); Charles Wegener, Liberal Education and the Modern University (Chicago, 1978).

Such was the understanding of a group of educational and civic leaders called together by President Truman, as phrased in their report, Higher Education for American Democracy, published in 1947. See also Gail Kennedy, ed., Education for Democracy: The Debate over the Report of the President’s Commission on Higher Education (Boston, 1952).


These reconsiderations lay at the root of the general education movement that emerged in the 1920s. See Champion Ward, ed., The Idea and Practice of General Education: An Account of the College of the University of Chicago (Chicago, 1950); Russell Thomas, The Search for a Common Learning: General Education, 1800–1960 (New York, 1962); Daniel Bell, The Reforming of


25 Ibid., 15.

26 Ibid., 18–20. Different arguments concerning the connection of these two course offerings (the “War Aims” Course and the “Introduction to Contemporary Civilization” course) are expressed in the secondary literature: While Gilbert Allardyce emphasizes continuity between them, Segal tries to prove that, in fact, both course offerings were independently developed: Gilbert Allardyce, “The Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course,” American History Review 87, no. 3 (1982): 695–725, 706; Daniel A. Segal, “‘Western Civ’ and the Staging of History in American Higher Education,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000): 770–805, 781. The final reports on the “War Issues” course that were sent to the War Department, as well as descriptions of course offerings and curricula from the 1920s, prove, however, that the “War Aims” course was used as template for the “Introduction to Contemporary Civilization” course. See the documentary material in Aydelotte, endnote 19; and Columbia College, ed., A History of Columbia College on Morningside (New York, 1954).


30 Peter N. Stearns, Western Civilization in World History (New York, 2003), 15–16.


32 This number is taken from Frederick Rudolph, Curriculum: A History of the American Undergraduate Course of Study since 1636 (San Francisco, 1977), 238; see also Segal, endnote xxi, 781–84.

33 Lougee, “[The Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course]: Comments,” 727.


35 For the influence of the educational aim to foster international understanding and peace and on the early writing of world history and its emphasis on extra-European history, see Gilbert Allardyce, “Toward World History: American Historians and the Coming of the World History Course,” Journal of World History 1, no. 1 (1990): 23–76, 26–36.

36 Lawrence W. Levine, The Opening of the American Mind: Canon, Culture and History (Boston, 1996), 58.

37 Phyllis Keller, Getting at the Core: Curricular Reform at Harvard (Cambridge, MA, 1982).


42. In the late nineteenth century, the federal government had been reluctant to regulate higher education, and there was a consequent lack of national discourse on educational policy. But this changed when associations articulating and expressing interests of particular professional groups began to form and, in the 1910s and 1920s, private foundations were established. In the 1920s, large institutions began providing financial support and advice on the organization of teaching and research to colleges and universities. As a result, in a few decades, a sphere of public discourse on social and political demands developed that addressed educational institutions across the country and decisively shaped curricula and research agendas. See the special issue on “Philanthropy, Patronage, Politics,” *Daedalus* 116, no. 1 (1987); Roger L. Geiger, “American Foundations and Academic Social Science, 1945–1960,” *Minerva* 26, no. 3 (1988): 315–41; Hughes Hawkins, *Banding Together: The Rise of National Associations in American Higher Education, 1887–1950* (Baltimore, 1992).


44. Proposal for Continued Development of Asiatic Studies in American Education, submitted by the Committee on Asiatic Studies in American Education of the CE, Tentative Draft, November 1, 1942, 6, in Folder 2265, Box 189, Series 200R, Record Group 1.1., Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.


48. Ibid., 2.

49. For the conference program, a list of participants, and a transcript of the discussions, see the papers in Folder 2508, “Area Studies and Language Conference, Reprints 1944,” Box 210, Record Group 1.1, Series 200, R, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC.


53. Inter-Office-Correspondence, JM (John Marshall), February 2, 1956, in Folder 3783, Box 442, Series 200R, Record Group 1.2., Rockefeller Foundation Archives, RAC; and Excerpts of the Minutes, Board of Trustees, March 15, 1956, ibid.


55. Correspondence between Hodgson and Marshall, September 25, October 2, and December 12, 1956, ibid.; and Excerpt from the Minutes, Board of Trustees, January 15, 1957, ibid.


57. David Hollinger, *The Humanities and the Dynamics of Inclusion since World War II* (Baltimore, 2006).

58. *Higher Education for American Democracy*, 16n32.
Proposal for an Experimental College Course in World History, 1n2.


Northwestern College Announcements 1959/60, 73 and 1962/63, 77; College Announcements of the University of Chicago 1964/65, 134.

