More Atlantic Crossings?
European Voices in the Postwar Atlantic Community

Edited by Jan Logemann and Mary Nolan
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INTRODUCTION

07 More Atlantic Crossings? European Voices and the Postwar Atlantic Community
   Jan Logemann

19 Rethinking Transatlantic Relations in the First Cold War Decades
   Mary Nolan

DIPLOMATS AND INTELLECTUALS: REIMAGINING THE TRANSatlANTIC WORLD

41 The Political and Cultural Underpinnings of Atlanticism's Crisis in the 1960s
   Kenneth Weisbrode

61 The World Economy and the Color Line: Wilhelm Röpke, Apartheid, and the White Atlantic
   Quinn Slobodian

TRANSFERS AND NEGOTIATIONS: ÉMIGRÉS AND POSTWAR AMERICA

91 Weimar Social Science in Cold War America: The Case of the Political-Military Game
   Daniel Bessner
111 Franz L. Neumann: Negotiating Political Exile
Thomas Wheatland

139 The Transatlantic Reconstruction of “Western” Culture: George Mosse, Peter Gay, and the Development of the German Tradition of Geistesgeschichte
Merel Leeman

TRANSCENDING THE ATLANTIC WORLD: SHIFTING MENTAL MAPS

Christian Albrecht
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The essays in this volume originated in the 2012 workshop “More Atlantic Crossings?” at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC, which explored European inputs to and their relative weight within transatlantic social relations. The editors would like to thank all the participants for their comments and contributions. Special thanks go to Daniel Rodgers, whose scholarship not only inspired the leading question of the workshop, but who, as our third co-convener, greatly facilitated the workshop and our discussions. Several other contributions to this event appeared in the spring of 2014 as a special issue of the journal *Planning Perspectives*, edited by Carola Hein.

We are grateful for the support we received from the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, and its director Hartmut Berghoff. A generous research grant from the German Ministry for Education and Research made this event possible as part of the larger research project “Transatlantic Perspectives” at the GHI. The members of this research group, Andreas Joch, Barbara Louis, and Corinna Ludwig helped to organize the event. Bryan Hart of the GHI is responsible for the cover design. Finally, we owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Lauren Shaw and Patricia C. Sutcliffe for their superb editorial work on this *GHI Bulletin Supplement*.

Jan Logemann & Mary Nolan, editors
Introduction
The decades following World War II are generally regarded as the height of the “American Century” in transatlantic relations. American hard and soft power dominated diplomatic and political as well as economic and cultural relations to a degree that gave rise to the notion of American hegemony. The era saw the project of constructing a “modern” West unfold under the leadership of U.S. experts and institutions, with European societies often perceiving postwar reconstruction as, in many ways, an “Americanization” of their politics, cultures, and economies. The Marshall Plan, productivity missions, as well as American products and popular culture, all added up to a massive flow of transatlantic transfers from the United States to Western Europe, expanding the reach of America’s “irresistible empire.”

Was the Atlantic, however, truly a one-way street during the “American Century”? European voices had been a prominent part of the Atlantic dialogue in the early part of the twentieth century, which had witnessed a vibrant back-and-forth with numerous “Atlantic crossings” resulting in social, political, and cultural exchanges. World War II was a significant caesura, but, this volume contends, not an abrupt break in this reciprocal dialogue. After the war, Americans continued to look to Europe in many areas — or to the expertise of their European colleagues — for inspiration and contrast. Europe, for example, continued to matter in urban studies, particularly to American architects and planners tackling the problems of postwar urban development within a transnational framework. In fashion and design, as well as in the arts and postwar intellectual life, European influences remained strong. As important as the American model became, Europe and Europeans continued to be relevant in science and academia, too.

“European voices” continued to influence the postwar transatlantic world. These voices included European diplomats and experts in various transatlantic networks and institutions as well as, quite prominently, European immigrants and émigrés in the United States. The 2012 workshop “More Atlantic Crossings?” at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC, from which the contributions...
to this volume stem, explored precisely these European inputs and their relative weight within transatlantic social relations. It asked, for example, about European migrants and émigrés and the degree to which their work not only maintained a continuing and sometimes expanding interest in European developments but also helped shape the very “American model” that became so dominant in the postwar period. Many of them became the “European voices” in the transatlantic dialogues of the time. We are interested in the contributions of these migrants, visitors, diplomats, and members of transnational organizations of European background to transatlantic exchanges and mutual perceptions. What was their role — as Europeans of varying stripes — in reshaping the transatlantic world following World War II?

We already know that the influx of European immigrants and émigrés impacted the development of various professional and academic fields in the U.S., but how did they, as a group, enable transatlantic exchanges and help shape American society more broadly? The research project Transatlantic Perspectives at the German Historical Institute, which gave rise to this volume, aimed to highlight the multidirectional and circulatory flow of transfers in the interwar and postwar transatlantic world by emphasizing the role of European-born migrants in transnational transfers. In areas as central to “postwar modernity” as mass consumption and business marketing, the social sciences and urban planning, European migrants to the United States helped build Euro-American networks and facilitated exchanges within the transatlantic world.

Qualifying the “American Century”: Transnational Approaches to the Postwar Atlantic Community

This volume looks closely at European actors within transatlantic political, cultural, and economic networks and institutions. Daniel Rodgers’s *Atlantic Crossings*, a study that gave a decisive impetus for looking at the transatlantic dialogue as a multipolar conversation, in many ways pioneered a growing body of transnational scholarship. Our intention here is to extend Rodgers’s transnational perspective into the postwar period and to see what evidence of genuine reciprocal interaction can be found. Rodgers focuses on the first half of the twentieth century, or more broadly the Progressive Era, and the impact European actors and ideas had on the way America negotiated the Social Question through networks of politically engaged professionals. In his narrative, World War II appears as a break
that effectively ended the circulatory flow of transatlantic exchanges in favor of more unidirectional transfer processes. Yet, the United States and Western Europe certainly remained intimately intertwined during the Cold War — arguably more closely than ever, under the label of an “Atlantic Community.” The emphasis, however, both in the minds of contemporaries as well as in the historical scholarship has been on the influence that American modernity and the American model have exerted on European economies, societies, and cultures.

Such notions of “Americanization” have been a recurring trope in almost all areas of transatlantic history, as Mary Nolan’s contribution to this volume notes. Scholars have traced American influences since the late nineteenth century — but especially after 1945 — on European economies (Taylorism and Fordism, management and technology), consumption (supermarkets and advertising), urban development (automobility), and popular culture (film, music, and entertainment), to name just a few. Today, analyses of Americanization nearly uniformly recognize this to be not a unidirectional process of assimilation but a complex set of transfers and negotiated adaptations with substantial agency on the part of the receiving society. Debates over “modernity” and “modernization,” moreover, were transnational in nature — exchanges about the meaning and problems of Western modernity in disciplines ranging from economics to urban planning continuously crisscrossed the continents and spanned the Atlantic world and beyond. That “Americanization” did not mean transatlantic social convergence, finally, is underscored by scholarship that traces the continued distinctiveness of European social models in the second half of the twentieth century — for example, the European city, the European welfare state, and European economic models such as Rhenish Capitalism. Adelheid von Saldern has recently addressed Americans’ attempts during the first decades of the twentieth century to distinguish themselves from European societies and culture by constructing a European “other.” The degree to which “European ways” of the postwar decades were received and reflected in the United States and impacted the construction of an “Atlantic Community,” however, has to date been little explored in historical scholarship.

7 Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings.
8 On American influence in twentieth-century transatlantic relations, see the recent work by Mary Nolan, The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-2010 (Cambridge, 2012).
9 See e.g. de Grazia, Irresistible Empire, and Alexander Stephan, The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and


12 Hartmut Kaelble, The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York, 2004). Transatlantic differences in varieties of capitalism are discussed in Volker Berghahn and Sigurt Vitols, eds., Gibt es einen deutschen Kapitalismus?: Tradition und globale Perspektiven der sozialen Marktwirtschaft (Frankfurt am Main, 2006).


contrasted themselves to it, as research on European perceptions of the United States has found, how did Americans see themselves reflected in Europe after World War II?15

To be sure, the undeniable imbalance of power between Europe and the United States following World War II poses challenges to recent transnational approaches in historiography. One cannot analyze transatlantic flows of ideas, goods, or people without acknowledging this underlying shift in power relations.16 Thus, to find and highlight evidence of transnational networks and exchanges is not to deny the influential role of the United States or of an American model of modernity during the early Cold War. Such an approach can, however, help us to reach a more nuanced understanding of the Cold War Atlantic West by unearthing continuities that stretched across World War II and by showing the multifacetedness of transatlantic relations. It can also globalize our understanding of American history by tracing external influences and interrelationships with broader transatlantic trends that qualify notions of American “exceptionalism” at the height of the American Century. It can further lend more agency to European actors by putting to rest outdated notions of a unilateral Americanization of Western Europe during the postwar decades.

The concept of a transnational “Atlantic Community” connotes a shared discursive space, which exemplifies the reciprocity of transatlantic transfers. Much like the idea of “Atlanticism” as discussed in Kenneth Weisbrode’s essay, it allows for an investigation of transatlantic relations that goes beyond mere political and military alliances but instead suggests a broader social and cultural framework.17 The origins of the concept, which precede the decades of the Cold War, can be traced to Wilsonian internationalism and to efforts since World War I to understand American developments within the broader framework of “Western Civilization.” Just like “Western Civilization,” the Atlantic Community has certainly also always been an ideological construct, designed to strengthen transatlantic ties, for example, in view of a perceived communist threat. Its discursive construction, however, has allowed room for both the discussion of shared transatlantic or “Western” values and social characteristics as well as for the negotiation of “European” and “American” differences. The essays in this volume explore the European voices in such transatlantic discourses on “modern” Western society and its discontents. Showcasing these voices will not suddenly transform the “American Century” into a “European Century,” but it suggests


Transcending the Atlantic World

Introduction

a picture that is more complex than the catchphrases of “Americanization” or “American Empire.” Mary Nolan’s term “Transatlantic Century” in many ways captures this complexity.

The actors at the center of our investigation, primarily experts and professionals, frequently shared a belief in a universal Western model of social modernization. At the same time, they often highlighted aspects of European or American distinctiveness. We acknowledge that the very “Europeanness” or “Americanness” of ideas and concepts is as difficult to ascertain as that of the actors carrying the discourses themselves, many of whom were transatlantic “transmigrants,” shifting repeatedly between continents (at times with ease, but frequently not without friction). The émigré historians discussed by Merel Leeman in this volume, for example, cannot be easily categorized as either “European” or “American.” Other distinctions along political, social, or gender lines, furthermore, were frequently more crucial than the distinction between European and American when it came to deliberating what the “Atlantic Community” was. The essays in this volume underscore the often multifaceted and fragmented nature of this community, particularly as we move into the later 1950s and 1960s — they set out to explore various dimensions of what Nolan calls the “Transatlantic Century” and to situate it within the broader history of the mid-twentieth century.

Our questions regarding European voices within postwar transatlantic relations and the Cold War Atlantic Community are informed by a growing literature of new political and diplomatic history. On the one hand, an increasing body of work explores the cultural dimensions of the Cold War and the role of cultural “soft power” networks that undergirded U.S. Cold War diplomacy. The Congress for Cultural Freedom and similar organizations, for example, arguably pursued the construction of an Atlantic Community with an anti-communist bent. Much of this scholarship, however, emphasizes the extension of American power rather than the contribution of European voices within the cultural Cold War. On the other hand, numerous studies broaden the scope of transatlantic history in this era by looking at exchanges on the level of civil society organizations and new social and protest movements. These “other alliances” significantly expand our understanding of the fragmented nature of the postwar Atlantic Community, which we now recognize as having contained multiple and often quite contradictory visions and agendas that were nonetheless shared across borders and the Atlantic.
Beyond the realm of political history, research on international institutions and transnational professional exchanges provides another important context for our efforts to situate European voices within postwar transatlantic relations. The institutionalization of transnational transfers, moving away from informal networks of experts at the center of Rodgers’s account of Progressive Era exchanges and towards formalized institutions, had its beginnings in the interwar period but expanded significantly during the postwar years. Large foundations such as Rockefeller and Ford became central actors in mid-twentieth century transatlantic relations, channeling scientific and cultural transfers (again, frequently with a political agenda). The transatlantic crossing of Critical Theory, as discussed by Thomas Wheatland in this volume, for example, was tightly intertwined with the Rockefeller Foundation. Various international organizations and networks became nodes for exchange and platforms for transatlantic debates. Their relevance becomes evident in the transnational histories of professional fields; from the social sciences to urban planning, professional debates took place within a transatlantic institutional framework that always also included European voices. The essays by Daniel Bessner, who focuses on the RAND Corporation, and Christian Albrecht, who discusses the Club of Rome, provide two very different examples of such institutions and networks within the postwar Atlantic world.

In addition to a reevaluation of the transatlantic debate about an Atlantic Community, the search for European voices contributes to efforts to internationalize American history. Thomas Bender and others have countered narratives of American exceptionalism with an eye primarily towards the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But understanding the United States as a nation among nations, shaped in constant exchange with external influences, is equally relevant for the middle of the twentieth century. Studies on the impact of European émigrés on U.S. society have long provided examples of outside influences on particular fields of American academia and culture. Migration history more generally, its emphasis shifting from the assimilation (or “Americanization”) of immigrants to the dynamic creation of cultural hybridity, has similarly underscored American society’s entanglement in broader transnational developments. Migrants and émigrés are thus a central category of actors in this volume and among the most prominent European voices in postwar American society. Combining the perspectives of emigration or migration history with that of transnational studies of institutions


and networks may prove to be one of the most fruitful avenues of future research in transatlantic relations.27

A more globalized perspective on the postwar Atlantic is a final important contribution of several of the assembled essays as Quinn Slobodian’s investigation into the global networks that gave rise to new forms of Conservatism in the transatlantic world demonstrates. The Atlantic Community was not a closed-off regional entity; its construction took shape within an increasingly globalized world. This perspective has long informed the field of Atlantic history and has focused primarily on the early modern exchange relationship between Europe, Africa, and the Americas but can just as well be applied to more recent history.28 Cold War studies have recognized the global nature of the Cold War and of postwar conceptions of the West.29 Protests against and challenges to the Cold War Atlantic Community frequently reflected its position within a decolonizing world.30 The transatlantic differences between “Europeanness” and “Americanness” were often articulated most clearly at the postcolonial periphery. At times, a look beyond the North Atlantic relativizes the importance of the transatlantic relationship and, at other times, it helps underscore a shared sense of commonality vis-à-vis a non-Western “other.”

By the early 1970s, the “mental maps” of actors and institutions increasingly favored a global, rather than simply a transatlantic, perspective (despite an often lingering Atlantic bias).31

Diplomats, Professionals, Academics: Manifold European Voices

The essays in this volume cannot comprehensively cover the broad spectrum of postwar transatlantic relations or the variety of European voices within them. Instead, most contributions focus on specific case studies that illuminate the different roles of European actors within specific areas and disciplinary settings.

Mary Nolan begins this collection with an essay that provides a sweeping overview of transatlantic relations during the twentieth century, a time in which the United States certainly became an increasingly dominant partner. However, Nolan also points to the limits of “Americanization” and of American influence on European societies as well as to a variety of countercurrents in transatlantic exchanges. Americans, too, borrowed from their European partners. To better situate the Transatlantic Century within global and transnational histories, Nolan finally calls for more research on the “intra-European

27 See e.g. the recent AHR Forum on “Transnational Lives in the Twentieth Century” with transatlantic contributions from Nancy Cott, Stephen Tuck, Jean Allman, and Matthew Pratt Guterl, American Historical Review 118, no. 1 (2013).

28 I would like to thank to Moshik Temkin for making this point at our workshop. On the state of Atlantic history, see Jack Green and Philip Morgan, eds., Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford 2009).


30 One example is Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany (Durham, NC, 2012).

circuits” of the Cold War that connected West and East across the Iron Curtain, as well as on the ties between Third World countries and the Atlantic Community. Slobodian and Albrecht, especially, take up this call in their contributions to this volume.

Atlantic relations after World War II were ultimately framed by international politics, but for all of America’s power, European diplomats and statesmen remained important players in transatlantic relations. Diplomatic historian Kenneth Weisbrode contextualizes the Atlantic transfers and networks discussed in this issue with a broader look at the mid-twentieth-century redefinition of the “Atlantic Community” as the core of the West, as well as the concept’s roots in the Wilsonian tradition of international and transatlantic relations. In Weisbrode’s account, the postwar decades appear to be a “midlife crisis” rather than a “Golden Age” of an Atlanticist movement pushing for an ever closer European-American relationship. The era saw a large number of, at times contending, Atlanticist groups with many active Europeans. The Atlantic idea had gained its urgency out of a shared sense of crisis in the middle of the century and during the early years of the Cold War. Yet, ironically, as the institutionalization of Atlantic advocacy networks reached its height in the early 1970s, interest in this Atlantic idea waned among both Europeans and Americans, only to be revived in the 1980s in a new, more globally outward-looking form.

Any clear distinction between the “American” and the “European” side of this postwar Atlantic dialogue was often far from simple, as Daniel Bessner’s essay demonstrates. His is one of several in this volume that emphasizes the importance of European émigrés in American society since the interwar years. Bessner focuses on the particular transfer of political gaming within Cold War strategic thinking and shows the influence of émigré intellectuals such as Hans Speier on American institutions like the RAND Corporation. The essay underscores the influence of lessons from Weimar Germany that — through the work of a large number of European émigrés — helped shape American as well as transatlantic thinking about the challenges of the Cold War. Bessner’s work further illustrates the continual effect of European voices on American military and intelligence thinking, which was especially prominent in the wartime Office of Strategic Services, but also impacted the postwar national security state and the very institutions central to America’s Cold War power.
Due to their own biographies, émigré intellectuals were often heavily invested in constructing a new postwar Atlantic Community, as Adi Gordon has recently shown using the example of Hans Kohn, a prominent historian of nationalism with postwar ties to the Congress for Cultural Freedom. In this volume, Merel Leeman demonstrates how European émigrés influenced cultural constructions of the Atlantic West in postwar historiography. German-American historians such as George Mosse and Peter Gay became prominent voices in postwar debates about the nature of and challenges to American and Western culture. Utilizing both the European traditions of intellectual history and their own perspective on Europe as migrants, these émigrés made substantial contributions to cultural history approaches and the (re)construction of ideas of the West and Western liberalism both through their academic teaching and scholarship, as well as through dialogue with transatlantic intellectual elites. In facing totalitarian regimes and a crisis of modern society, émigrés frequently offered warnings and lessons to American society that were based on their European experiences.

That the postwar Atlantic Community was more complex than such a liberal Cold War consensus, however, becomes evident in Quinn Slobodian’s contribution to this volume. Slobodian analyzes the position of the Swiss-German economist Wilhelm Röpke, a linking figure between American conservatives dissatisfied with the New Deal economic order and German neo- or ordo-liberalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s. His work reminds us that European voices played a role in dissenting social movements not only on the political Left but also on the Right. Both American Conservatism and modern Neoliberalism drew from transnational networks and an exchange of ideas that went well beyond the famous Mont Pèlerin Society, the Cassandra warnings of Russian emigrant Ayn Rand, or the oft-cited influence of “Austrian school” émigré economists, such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. Noting Röpke’s preoccupation with South Africa, Slobadian’s contribution further situates the construction of an Atlantic Community among “market-liberal” conservatives within a global framework and importantly highlights the ongoing significance of race in transatlantic debates about the West.

On the political Left, the émigrés of the so-called Frankfurt School were among the most prominent European voices. Highly critical of Western capitalist societies in their sociological writings, these intellectuals would come to have a significant impact on the transatlantic

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34 On transatlantic influences on America’s postwar Right, see Bernd Volkert, Der amerikanische Neokonservatismus. Enstehung – Ideen – Intentionen (Münster, 2006).
student movement and its challenge to the Cold War Atlantic Community. Thomas Wheatland discusses the two Atlantic crossings of the Frankfurt School: from Europe to the United States and back to Europe after the war. His essay focuses on Franz Neumann’s role in negotiating and resolving the tension between Critical Theory as espoused by the Institute for Social Research and the “American” brand of empirical social science research. To be sure, European émigrés such as Paul Lazarsfeld played key roles in formulating this American brand as well, which the Frankfurt School encountered in exile. Ironically, they would ultimately even help to export this type of research back to postwar Europe. Neumann’s role as translator and mediator was quite typical as many émigrés helped to facilitate transatlantic exchanges in this fashion. Their work contributed to making the social sciences, so central during the Cold War, into an inherently transnational field.

When the transatlantic framework began to yield to a global one, the significance of European voices changed. As Weisbrode’s look at the course of Atlanticism in diplomatic advocacy networks already suggests, the 1960s ushered in a shift in the mental maps of many international elites. Christian Albrecht traces the origins of the Club of Rome and its critique of the growth paradigm that framed much of postwar Atlantic modernity. Europeans made up the core of the group that would form the Club of Rome network, but for all their Atlantic ties to institutions such as the RAND Corporation, their outlook was a decidedly global one that cut across the Iron Curtain and reached beyond any narrowly defined Atlantic Community. Moreover, they did not primarily define themselves as “European” but as a network of expert professionals engaging with a “world problematique” and global — if not universal — challenges to modern society. Like Slobodian, Albrecht shows how a transatlantic discourse — again sustained in part by migrants and transnational institutions — had global implications reaching beyond “Europe” and “America.”

The diplomats and activists of the Atlanticist movement, the émigré scholars and visiting professionals, the experts in think tanks and networks discussed in the essays of this supplement were all part of a transatlantic elite. They represent only a sliver of the societies that made up the “Atlantic Community” of the postwar decades. Their “European” voices, to be sure, prominently contributed to fashioning transatlantic relations in this era. They suggest that American hegemony was far from complete or monolithic and

35 On the symbiotic relationship between the social sciences and Cold War culture, see Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens, *Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature* (New York, 2012).
that “Americanization” had its limits, even at the height of the American Century and the Cold War. To focus on these cases, however, means to neglect other, equally important arenas of exchange, such as the film and popular music industries. Did European voices continue to matter in these arenas as well, despite the global success of Hollywood, as the work of historian Richard Pells, for example, has suggested?36 The focus on elite networks furthermore leaves unanswered the question of the broader resonance of “European voices” and transatlantic institutions within American society. What did Europe and America’s transatlantic ties mean to the proverbial “milkman in Omaha” during the 1950s and 1960s? The present collection of essays cannot answer these questions, but it hopes to challenge future researchers to read more of postwar transatlantic relations “against the grain” of the American Century.

Jan Logemann teaches history at the Institute for Social and Economic History at the University of Göttingen. From 2010 to 2014 he directed the research group “Transatlantic Perspectives: Europe in the Eyes of European Immigrants to the United States” at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC. He is the author of Trams or Tailfins: Public and Private Prosperity in Postwar West Germany and the United States (U Chicago Press, 2012) and edited the volume The Development of Consumer Credit in Global Perspective (Palgrave, 2012).

RETHINKING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE FIRST COLD WAR DECADES

Mary Nolan

In 1941 prominent American magazine publisher Henry Luce proclaimed his hopes for an “American internationalism,” led by his fellow countrymen who would “accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity . . . to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.” His call for an “American Century” found ready resonance among U.S. politicians, pundits, and intellectuals, who during and after the war sought to revamp transatlantic and global economic, political, military, and cultural relations. If ever this sweeping vision was realized, it was in the first post-World War II decades, above all but not exclusively in Western Europe. America’s mid-century dominance there rested on its economic prowess and model of Fordist modernity; on unchallenged military might, conventional and nuclear; and on a pervasive transatlantic consensus, at least among elites, about anti-Communism and containment but also about Keynesianism and generous social policies. It was also supported by Western Europeans’ admiration for American political values and popular culture and their willingness to be junior partners in America’s “empire by invitation.” The final prerequisite for America’s extraordinary influence was the relative weakness not only of its transatlantic Allies but also of its Soviet enemy, who had suffered such enormous losses in World War II.

The American Century was, however, neither as long-lived as its name implied, nor as hegemonic as its proponents imagined, even in the first Cold War decades. America’s preponderance of power in transatlantic relations must be recognized, but simultaneously, arguments about Americanization need to be complicated, other circuits of exchange of ideas, products, and people acknowledged, and the Atlantic Community recontextualized in terms of its two “others” — the socialist Second World and the Third World. This essay will suggest some of the ways this can be done. First, it will situate the exceptional years from 1945 until the early 1970s in a history of transatlantic relations over the long twentieth century. Second, it will illustrate the limits of Americanization in Western Europe, note some of the cooperative projects and ongoing conflicts that suggest mutual dependencies and two-way exchanges, and highlight some European influences on postwar America in addition

to those of the experts, professionals, and intellectuals who feature in the subsequent essays. Third, the complex circuits of exchange within Europe, including across the Iron Curtain, will illustrate the multidirectionality of European interests and influences and warn against an overemphasis on Atlantic crossings in whatever direction. Finally, the importance of European and American global economic aspirations and mental maps as well as of concrete interactions with the Third World will not only help situate the transatlantic within the global. They also show how central the colonial and Third Worlds were to the politics, economics, and self-definition of those in the Atlantic Community from the late nineteenth century on, even if the exact nature of the relations and self-definitions changed over the course of the long twentieth century.

Europe’s American Century

Sweeping narratives of the decline of the Old World and rise of the New capture elements of the shifting relationship between Europe and America in the twentieth century, but they do justice neither to the complexity of the exchanges of goods, people, institutions, and ideas in both directions across the Atlantic nor to the ambivalent and contradictory attitudes of Europeans and Americans toward one another. A history of shifting transatlantic power relations, of provisional outcomes and ongoing indeterminacies, of cooperative projects and competing visions of capitalism, modernity, and empire cannot be reduced to the inevitable triumph of the United States; such a history is much more nuanced, contingent, and contradictory. It shows the unique and transitory character of the post-1945 constellation of transatlantic relations but also suggests continuities across periods.

In the multipolar decades before 1914, the economic, imperial, and intellectual exchanges in both directions between Europe and the United States were multiplying, but U.S. dominance was neither evident nor viewed as inevitable. The United States was not a major imperial power; it was not seen as a political or military model to imitate or fear. Although American industrial production grew and its investments and goods moved into Europe — think Singer sewing machines, International Harvester reapers, and Kodak cameras — Britain remained the world’s banker, insurer, and leading trader, and Germany was an industrial rival. America was not yet viewed as an economic model to emulate. And in the arena of social policy, as Dan Rodgers has shown, Americans were the students and Europeans, often Germans, the teachers.3

Introduction

To be sure, some worried about an “Americanization of the world,” to quote the title of William Stead’s book, which was actually about U.S. threats to the British Empire. Other Brits wrote of “American invaders” and the “American threat.” German officials and industrialists, however, were, overall, confident about their ability to compete economically, and the French saw little danger. Many Europeans wrote about the puzzling “American woman,” the peculiarities of gender relations in the U.S., and lamented the lack of Kultur, but none feared that these U.S. peculiarities might be imported into Europe. In short, before 1914 there was an uncertain balance of power in transatlantic relations and mutual interest but not obsessive preoccupation; neither anti-Americanism nor anti-Europeanism existed on a significant scale. The American Century had not yet begun.

World War I and its economic and political repercussions changed all that, paving the way — albeit in stops and starts — for the eclipse of European hegemony and the rise of an interventionist America. Only then did a significant transatlantic divide and the deep ambivalence that has ever since characterized Europeans’ view of America and Americans’ of Europe develop. World War I encouraged American disdain for European militarism and led the United States to see itself as Europe’s savior, entitled to prescribe the terms of peace. These contradictory assessments were to encourage both interventionism and isolationism in the interwar years. Britain and France needed American aid but resented the terms on which it was offered and promoted a very different peace settlement than Wilson wanted. The war experience on each side of the Atlantic was radically different, and these different experiences and memories of total war would complicate European-American relations throughout the twentieth century.

The war’s economic aftermath set the stage for the 1920s. On the one hand, Europe was economically devastated, globally weakened, and heavily indebted; on the other hand, the United States was pioneering a new form of mass production and consumption: Fordism. Europe’s dramatically altered situation fueled a preoccupation with America, one that was greatest in Germany and the Soviet Union but present everywhere. It took varied forms, ranging from enthusiasm to abhorrence. For its part, the United States alternated between isolationism and unilateralism; economic engagement via loans, exports, and investments, and political distancing from individual countries and new international institutions, the League of Nations above all.
The allure of America as the land of unrivaled prosperity, unlimited growth, and unequivocal modernity dissipated during the 1930s, as the Depression devastated both sides of the Atlantic. The global economy became disarticulated, and transatlantic political divisions multiplied. The United States with its mass unemployment and escalating class conflicts seemed to be becoming Europeanized. Yet, the attraction of America did not disappear completely. Despite rhetorical condemnation of economic Americanism in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and growing critiques of American popular culture there and in the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and especially the Soviet Union borrowed elements of the Fordist model of production but not its accompanying stress on consumption. They shared with the United States (and Sweden) more interventionist approaches to the Depression such as labor services and a penchant for giant infrastructure projects. To be sure, different countries harnessed these economic and social policies for quite different political ends.7 Those countries closest to the United States politically and culturally, Britain and France, were more reluctant to adopt such economic and social measures. Political divisions, ideological cleavages, and economic visions thus seemed at once sharper and more blurred, as the transatlantic world moved haltingly toward a post-liberal order whose contours were contested and uncertain. As would be the case post-1945, the European adoption of things American was selective. Things borrowed were transformed, often beyond recognition when put in different national contexts, and Europe was far from being Americanized. When Henry Luce published his famous “American Century” essay, it was less a description of America’s role in Europe and the world than a plea for Americans to take up a global mission.

World War II dramatically changed the transatlantic balance of power, devastating Europe economically, disrupting it socially, and discrediting elites and parties in many countries politically and culturally. It brought the United States and the USSR closer than at any time in the long twentieth century. Then the onset of the Cold War, for which both superpowers were responsible, ended the wartime community of interests and led Western Europeans and Americans to define the emerging Atlantic Community as separate from and opposed to the Soviet bloc. War and preparations for peace ended American ambivalence about “entangling alliances”8 and belief in isolationism. From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, the United States reshaped the global economic order, helped restructure political regimes across Western Europe, and experimented with

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8 The phrase, which echoed through U.S. foreign policy debates in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, is from George Washington’s farewell address.
both containment and rollback toward the Soviet bloc.\(^9\) American businessmen, soldiers, and aid officials, American commodities, movies, music, and high culture flooded into Europe. Never had the American presence and influence been greater.

Even at the highpoint of America’s preponderance of power, however, there were significant tensions between the United States and its Western European allies over welfare and warfare, nuclear weapons and economic policies, attitudes toward the Soviet bloc and relations with the Third World. France replaced Britain and Germany as the country where ambivalence about American power and products was greatest. Europeans engaged in complex negotiations with American ideas, cultural products, and commodities and created hybrid forms of mass culture and modern living. Within European countries, between East and West, and among members of the Atlantic Community, culture wars were fought, both about American movies, music, and commodities in Europe and about whether and how politics and states should instrumentalize culture for Cold War ends.\(^{10}\)

From the 1970s onward, American influence began to erode.\(^11\) The protest movements of the late 1960s challenged both American hegemony and the Cold War categories central to it, and growing antinuclear movements further contested U.S. leadership. The multiple economic crises of the 1970s — the gold drain, oil shocks, and the exhaustion of Fordism — weakened America’s domination of the global economy. Détente as practiced by the United States and the USSR, on the one hand, and European states, on the other, took different forms that reflected Western Europe’s increasing autonomy. In the 1980s the United States and much of Europe grew still farther apart, as America, along with Britain, embraced neoliberalism, while continental European states defended important parts of their social democratic social policies and their particular varieties of more regulated capitalism, even as they liberalized the financial sector.\(^12\)

For many Americans the fall of Communism represented the longed for American Cold War victory, the end of a troubled history of challenges to liberalism and capitalism, and the beginning of U.S. unilateral global dominance. For Europeans the series of events for which 1989 is shorthand were more complex; far from ending history, they opened a new era in which Europe had to redefine its identity and institutions and in which Europeans borrowed more from one another than from America.\(^13\) As America turned away from...
Europe, Europe intensified its economic and political integration, and European states frequently dissented from American global projects, military and economic. Of equal importance, a multipolar world has come into being; the North Atlantic no longer contains all the key players, nor is it central to all exchanges and networks. The transatlantic movement of ideas, goods, investments, and cultural products in both directions will continue — and perhaps intensify if the EU-U.S. free trade agreement is implemented — just as it has over the long twentieth century, with now Europe and now America dominating in different areas. Yet, the Atlantic Community, in so far as it survives, is no longer the only or most important institutional and imagined political, military, and economic supranational entity for either Europeans or Americans.14

Limits of Americanization

In the years after 1945, American military personnel, businessmen, Marshall Plan administrators, labor leaders, foundation officials, and educators moved out across Western Europe to spread the gospel of democratic capitalism and anti-communism. They encouraged Europeans to adopt the “politics of productivity,” to open their markets, integrate their economies, and allow Hollywood films, jazz, and rock ‘n’ roll to circulate freely. “You can be like us” was the American promise — one which many perceived as a threat.15 But did the combination of aid and investment, multinationals and foundations, consumer goods and cultural products — all varied forms of American soft and semi-hard power — transform European economies and societies in the ways anticipated?

At issue are not American ambitions but rather Western Europe’s openness to things American and its ability to adopt or adapt them. While most scholars agree that concepts such as thoroughgoing European emulation or American cultural imperialism are too crude to describe the complex transatlantic interactions, there is much room for disagreement about what postwar Americanization looked like in different areas of economy and society, in different countries, and for different generations and genders. Indeed, there is much disagreement about how to define that elusive term. Some speak of the transfer of the American model and partial convergence, while others opt for cross-fertilization and American engagements or speak of adaptation, negotiation, and the resulting creation of hybrid practices, products, and policies. The essence of the American model is equally

14 See Weisbrode’s essay in this collection for a different view on the relationship of the Atlantic Community to globalization.

open to dispute. For Victoria de Grazia, its core is American consumer culture, with its distinctive Fordized system of distribution, its new advertising techniques and messages, its democratic and egalitarian ethos and consumer citizens, and its promise of a dramatically new standard of living. For Charles Maier, the American model that was exported post-1945 was ideological as much as institutional — a politics of productivity that was promoted by mass production, organizational rationalization, new technology, an open international economic order, and also promised not only growth but an escape from the zero-sum distribution struggles and ideological politics of earlier decades. For Marie-Laure Djelic the essence of the postwar American model, a model that was historically specific but claimed universal validity, was the large multidivisional, rationalized corporation, operating under the constraints of antitrust legislation and competing in oligopolistic markets. Both Christian Kleinschmidt and the authors in the collection edited by Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herrigel reject the idea of a unitary American model embodying the best practices for productivity. Instead, they see the United States as having offered an ensemble of organizational innovations, technologies, and management and marketing practices among which Europeans could pick and choose and which they could modify and recombine to suit local institutions, needs, preferences, and prejudices.16

America’s influence varied across European countries, depending on the amount of U.S. aid and investment, the size of the U.S. military presence, the strength of prior cultural ties and exchanges, and the depth of national resistance to imports from across the Atlantic. Germany was among the most “Americanized” countries, for example; France among the least. That said, one can generalize about the kinds and degrees of Americanization in different areas of European economic, political, and cultural life in the first Cold War decades.

After 1945 American popular culture — jazz, rock ‘n’ roll, Hollywood films, Coca-Cola, and blue jeans — was enthusiastically embraced, above all by European youth on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Among traditional elites, cultural figures, religious leaders, and politicians in Christian Democratic and communist regimes, the presence of such cultural artifacts aroused great anxiety, for these quintessential symbols of American mass culture and consumption seemed to threaten established gender norms, generational hierarchies, religious and political authority, and ostensibly self-contained national cultures. Yet, consumption did not necessarily indicate full-scale

Americanization. Going to Hollywood films, for example, did not mean wanting to become American; it might be just a fun escape or akin to a visit to a familiar foreign country. If postwar popular culture began in America, it soon incorporated European influences. While Elvis dominated rock in the 1950s, for example, the Beatles and the Rolling Stones did so in the 1960s and 1970s. A European-led international music scene emerged that was part of a transatlantic youth culture. In the 1950s, the embrace of American popular culture reflected and reinforced support for American political values and practices; by the late 1960s European youth continued to consume American mass culture, but many no longer endorsed American policies in Europe or globally.  

Americans sought not only to sell their commodities and cultural wares but also to impart their political values, pedagogy, and associational forms. Learning about American history and contemporary life was to be an integral part of the Americanization of Western Europe. The U.S. government engaged in cultural diplomacy, seeking to win hearts and minds with radio programming, tours by American artists, and exhibits of art, technology, and kitchens. The officially nongovernmental Congress for Cultural Freedom published journals and ran conferences to woo intellectuals away from any communist sympathies, while the Ford Foundation funded the Salzburg Seminars to teach American Studies to Europeans. The government brought thousands of West German businessmen, engineers, trade unionists, and journalists to the U.S. for short study tours in the late 1940s and 1950s. Thereafter the vast Fulbright and IREX programs, as well as private fellowships, brought a growing number of foreign students to the United States — as well as sending thousands of Americans abroad.

These efforts met with mixed success. The Congress for Cultural Freedom, for example, won many converts in the 1950s but lost credibility in the 1960s when its ties to the CIA were exposed. Trade unionists learned about the American model of business unionism but never adopted it at home. American officials and foundations argued that American art, music, and literature were as developed as that of Europe, but many Europeans were more interested in American popular culture and continued to believe that Kultur was the distinctive preserve of Europe, while American prowess lay in economics and technology. (Many Americans may well have agreed, but that is a subject still in need of exploration.)

17 Martin Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties (Princeton, 2010); Uta Poiger, Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley, 2000); Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds., Here, There and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture (Hanover, NH, 2000).

Educational exchanges have been assessed primarily in terms of whether they made Western and later Eastern Europeans more democratic and sympathetic to American interests.19 Two questions relevant to our theme remain unanswered. First, how did those Europeans who studied in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s and returned to Europe, or who were European-educated and then made their careers in the United States from the late 1960s onward, shape American scholarship as well as American politics and culture? They were well positioned to build transatlantic networks and, in the field I know best, history, to continue the work of explaining Europe to Americans that the refugee generation began. Thomas Wheatland’s essay considers this generation, and Merel Leeman writes about the younger generation that came before the war.20 They were enormously influential in shaping the field of European history, but European Americanists, such as Rob Kroes or David Ellwood, have been largely ignored by historians in the United States, who seem to feel American history can only be written by Americans. Second, what did all those Americans who studied and researched in Europe bring back to their work and lives in the United States? How were they shaped by the intellectual approaches, political milieus, and cultural practices they encountered?

While Americans valued their cultural and educational initiatives, they saw economic reconstruction, reform, and modernization as the prerequisite for a new Europe in a new Atlantic community. Fordism — a system of mass production and mass consumption of consumer durables, built on integrated production, minutely divided assembly-line work, high wages, and credit purchases — was, along with free trade, at the core of America’s economic message. Europeans had first encountered Fordism in the interwar years through Henry Ford’s writings and trips to his River Rouge plant in Detroit. Reactions were mixed. Conservative elites, who deplored America’s gender relations, homogeneous, standardized products, and lack of Kultur, abhorred Fordism as did industrialists and most politicians who insisted that mass consumption and high wages were impossible in war-ravaged Europe. German Social Democrats were willing to embrace the assembly line if it brought a higher standard of living, and Soviets saw socialist Fordism as a way to industrialize and modernize. Most Europeans, however, were ambivalent about Fordism, and none were able to emulate the American economic model.21

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19 See, for example, Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA, 2003).
20 See the Wheatland and Leeman essays in this volume.
After 1945, the United States sought to export Fordism and Taylorism with its minute division of labor and close managerial supervision of workers via the Marshall Plan and European Productivity Agency and to promote European economic integration in order to create a large American-style market. Those historians and social scientists positing far-reaching Americanization look at the most advanced industrial sectors like steel or autos, emphasize the growing production and purchase of consumer durables, and note the adoption of American corporate organization, advertising, and management practices. Others see the persistence of varieties of capitalism and emphasize the diversity of firms, production processes, and technologies in Western Europe. They point to distinctive labor relations, worker training, and firm financing, and emphasize the prevalence of corporatist bargaining among labor, capital, and the state in countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Britain.22

Like blind people describing an elephant, these historians and social scientists envision an utterly different beast, depending on which part of the elephant — or the economy — they touch.

A reading of the literatures on both Americanization and varieties of capitalism, however, enables some generalizations. “Selective adaptation, creative modification and innovative hybridization” most accurately captures European developments, for although Western European economies were significantly modified postwar, distinctive varieties of capitalism nonetheless persisted. 23 Europeans negotiated with American products, processes and practices, but they also drew on their own traditions and visions of the future. Western Europeans accorded the state a much greater economic role than did Americans. After World War II they either lived with inherited nationalized industries, as in Italy, or nationalized key sectors of industry, finance and transport, as in Britain and France. Planning and state subsidies were embraced. What Jan Logemann has argued for West Germany holds more broadly: Europeans accorded much more importance to public goods than did Americans, who prioritized private consumption at the expense of social and economic policy.24 Although European growth rates were higher than those in the United States, the overall level of consumption was much lower, especially in the 1950s. Western Europe began purchasing consumer durables — washing machines, refrigerators, TVs, and cars — on a massive scale at decade’s end, and Eastern Europe followed in the 1970s.25 But, as the Swedish anthropologist Orvar Löfgren has perceptively noted, American visitors to Sweden found that the use of appliances, the
preferred color schemes of homes and offices, the shape of brooms, even the smell of multinational disinfectant, was different. Everyday modernity was at once American, international, and profoundly if often elusively national.26

To be sure, the concept of Americanization cannot be dispensed with entirely, when looking at production and consumption. It captures the postwar power relations that made America the model against which Western Europeans defined their economic practices, especially in the early postwar period. By the late 1960s, however, America accounted for only 35 percent of global manufacturing and was failing to improve productivity, while European nations regained competitiveness and enjoyed unprecedented prosperity.27 They no longer felt impelled to look to America. They were not only producing for their own domestic markets and those of other European states; they were exporting to the United States as well.

The late 1960s and early 1970s marked the apogee of Americanization because of Europe’s recovery and growing autonomy and because of the multiple economic and political crises the United States suffered in the 1970s. Of equal importance, the American model itself changed. It came to stand for a post-Fordist, information-technology- and finance-based economy, neoliberal economic policies, and an ownership society that drastically curbed social rights and social infrastructure. After the 1970s Western Europe did not make the sharp neoliberal turn that the United States and Great Britain did. The resulting market gap contributed to a widening of the Atlantic and tensions within the Atlantic Community.

**Joint Ventures and American Borrowings**

European-American relations in the first postwar decades are often written as a story of Western European immaturity and dependence on the United States — for political tutelage; for military protection via NATO, U.S. forces, and the American nuclear umbrella; and for economic assistance via the Bretton Woods monetary system, the Marshall Plan, investment, and technological education. That certainly captures the first postwar decade, but even then America believed it needed an open and prosperous Europe as a market for U.S. goods and investments. Other American dependencies followed. Let’s take one example. The United States developed a balance-of-payments problem in the 1950s as American imports from Europe exceeded exports to the continent, stationing hundreds of thousands


27 Schnüter, *Americanization*, 123.
of troops was costly, multinationals invested heavily, and tourists spent freely. The resulting dollar drain put pressure on America’s gold reserves, and the United States had to negotiate “offset” payments from West Germany to help cover military costs and beg both France and Germany not to cash in their dollar holdings for gold.28 The exchangeability of currencies and tariff rates were also a constant source of friction.

Americans expected Western Europeans to comply with American wishes for freer trade or more military spending or protection of U.S. gold reserves out of gratitude for all the United States had done for Europe, even though they did not wish to share decision-making power. In practice, there was an ongoing renegotiation of American hegemony that made the relationship within the Atlantic Community more equal and the interests of different partners more distinct. The 1971 American decision to abandon the Bretton Woods monetary system, the 1973 oil crisis, and the end of the postwar boom created bitter transatlantic conflicts and separate policy paths. Nonetheless, the creation of the G7 and the deliberations of the Trilateral Commission, composed of businessmen, government officials, and social scientists from the United States, Western Europe, and Japan revealed ongoing efforts to keep the Atlantic Community — now expanded to include Japan — relevant to a world that little resembled that of the late 1940s.29 America wanted both to assert its interests and to remain a European power — no easy task, even before the end of the Cold War.

Americans not only solicited European help; they received European goods and ideas. The modern home provides one example. Before and after World War I, America pioneered the discipline of home economics and the productions of household technology, but Europeans did more to advance the design of the modern home as evidenced by the Bauhaus, the Frankfurter Kitchen, and the functional furniture and apartments displayed at the 1930 Stockholm exhibition. International modernism was a transatlantic project but one which always had distinctive national inflections. Initially, Europe led the way until many of its proponents were forced into exile due to Nazism’s and Stalinism’s hostility to that architectural vision. When Americans embraced modernism and developed large, modern, appliance-filled kitchens for postwar suburban homes, they claimed these as proudly and exclusively American. The State Department and Marshall Plan exhibited modern kitchens and homes in postwar Europe, describing


them as a distinctively American invention to which, however, Europeans could aspire.\textsuperscript{30} The transatlantic crossings that went into these “American” products and the values underlying them were erased. Europeans, however, were in touch with the national and pan-European roots of modernism, and the kitchens and homes they built in the first postwar decades looked less like the American models offered than the pioneering European designs of the prewar decades. In 1959, in Moscow Soviet Premier Khrushchev and US Vice-President Nixon held their famous debate about the respective merits of American and Soviet household consumer durables in front of models of extravagant American kitchens. As Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann have argued, it was not America that won the famous Kitchen Debate; rather, it was Sweden along with other European countries that produced austere functionalist modern kitchens.\textsuperscript{31}

The first postwar decades, like the interwar ones, were an era of diminished economic globalization in comparison to the period before 1914 and after the 1970s.\textsuperscript{32} But transatlantic trade did increase and not all of it consisted of exports from the United States to Europe. Take cars, for example. The Big Three automakers — Ford, GM, and Chrysler — dominated the American market until the mid-1950s, with foreign cars accounting for only 1 percent of sales. By 1959, 10 percent of cars sold were foreign, with Volkswagen leading the way but many other European manufacturers represented. A decade later, 15 percent were, and for the first time the United States imported more cars than it exported. Moreover, it was the popularity of the VW Beetle that pushed American manufacturers to develop their own economy cars.\textsuperscript{33} Much more work needs to be done to explore which European consumer goods, foods, furniture, and clothing styles were popular among whom and how they shaped American tastes and gained a presence in everyday life.\textsuperscript{34} Did Americans greet these imports as harbingers of growing cosmopolitanism and Europeanization or as a threatening intrusion, as they later did Japanese imports? Or did they


\textsuperscript{32} Frieden, Global Capitalism.


assume that Americans could take what they wanted from Europe and the world without being changed in the process?35

**Intra-European Circuits**

Historians of transatlantic exchanges and networks in the American Century, or more accurately, quarter century, have focused almost exclusively on the North Atlantic. This is hardly surprising given American hegemony coming out of World War II. To be sure, U.S. global interests are acknowledged, even though the primacy of European ones are usually assumed, and Western European integration is discussed, although mainly in terms of whether Americans or Europeans were most responsible and whether it fostered or fractured transatlantic connections. Historians have concentrated on developing more nuanced understandings of the reception of American ideas, products, policies, and practices, and, as this collection shows, are beginning to explore what flowed from Europe to the United States in these decades. These are welcome developments, but how else might transatlantic relations be approached? David Armitage has suggested that historians of the early modern Atlantic world have been guided by three conceptual approaches — a transatlantic one that compares different areas, a circum-Atlantic one that focuses on the Atlantic itself as “a particular zone of exchange and interchange, circulation and transmission,” and a cis-Atlantic history that situates particular places and institutions within their broader Atlantic context.36 Twentieth-century historians can fruitfully borrow from all three but also need to move beyond them. At issue is not only how to study the Atlantic world, but equally, what other networks and circuits of exchange and what other areas of the globe it should be studied in relation to.37 Two would be particularly useful for evaluating the importance of transatlantic relations in comparison to other interests, exchanges, and networks in the first Cold War decades and for understanding the distinctive if not conflicting interests of different parts of the Atlantic Community: exchanges and networks within Europe, including across the Iron Curtain, and relations with the Third World.

In the U.S. Cold War geographic imaginary, Europe ended where Soviet control began. Wendell Willkie’s wartime vision of one world had been replaced by the tripartite division among the first or free world, dominated by the United States and its Atlantic Allies, a second enslaved communist world that had to be contained if not rolled

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35 Before World War I, Americans seemed confident about their ability to borrow freely from abroad without their essential identity being thereby transformed. Henry James, for example, noted, “We can deal freely with forms of civilization not our own, can pick and choose and assimilate and in short (aesthetically, etc.) claim our property wherever we find it.” Selected Letters of Henry James, ed. Leon Edel (New York, 1999), 23. See also Kristin Hoganson, Consumers’ Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865–1920 (Raleigh, NC, 2007).


37 Among those who have pioneered new and more capacious transatlantic visions are Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, MA, 1993); and Andrew Zimmerman, Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, The German Empire and the Globalization of the New South (Princeton, 2010).
back, and a Third World over whose loyalty the two superpowers would compete. For Americans, Europe and the Western European states of the Atlantic Community were identical, and severing trade, travel, and cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and the countries of East Central Europe was a useful Cold War weapon and, in the age of McCarthyism, politically expedient. Western Europeans carried different mental maps, in which the socialist east was still a part of Europe, even if an internal other of a different sort than in earlier centuries. One might detest the ruling regimes but did not wish to cut that part of Europe off completely — Adenauer’s Germany being the main exception.

These different geographic imaginaries led to repeated conflicts about relations between Western and Eastern Europe. In the 1950s, for example, there were bitter disagreements about the so-called COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) list of goods that the U.S. government prohibited from being sold to communist countries. These covered 30 to 50 percent of all commodities in international trade. German industrialists and British politicians complained vociferously over these restrictions, agreeing with *Le Monde* that “The economies of Eastern and Western Europe needed one another...” Western European states eventually capitulated for fear of losing American aid. Nonetheless, disputes over whether political isolation or economic trade and investment was the proper way to deal with communist countries resurfaced with Willy Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* and again with the Conference for Cooperation and Security in Europe’s negotiations that led to the 1975 Helsinki Accord. They erupted as well over nuclear weapons, especially Euro missiles in the late 1970s. Geography is not destiny, but geographical proximity and long-standing economic and cultural ties created different interests vis-à-vis Eastern Europe on the two sides of the Atlantic.

They also created different circuits of exchange. The COCOM restrictions failed to weaken the Soviet economy substantially and ironically enabled the USSR to integrate Eastern European economies more closely within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In the 1960s, Western Europe traded goods, made investments, and lent money to Eastern Europe, and these exchanges were to increase significantly in the 1970s. Fiat built an automobile factory in Togliatti in the Soviet Union in 1970, for example, and Western European countries marketed some of their least expensive household consumer durables in Eastern Europe. While the Soviet Union did not


borrow money, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the GDR did steadily from the late 1960s on in order to procure Western technology but above all to meet the growing demand for consumer goods. Western Europe was the primary source of these products and funds, not the United States, which preferred to loan to Latin America and viewed such intra-European exchanges with ambivalence. Officials and citizens of the GDR viewed the FRG as the West with whom it competed, and elsewhere in East Central Europe, Scandinavia and the Ulm Institute for Design shaped socialist modern design. The Soviets looked to the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the GDR as a “West” that was not only friendlier but easier to imagine emulating, for consumer goods there were smaller, less expensive, and less ostentatious than American ones.

Some trade moved the other way. Eastern European consumer goods failed to gain access to Western European markets — who after all would buy a Trabant or a Yugo, when owning a Fiat or a VW was possible? From the early 1960s on, however, the Soviet Union exported oil to countries such as Austria, Sweden, Italy, and Greece, and by the 1980s was sending natural gas to West Germany, despite U.S. opposition to its export, and Germany helped construct a pipeline. President Reagan imposed economic sanctions on Poland in the wake of the 1981 declaration of martial law; while his Western European allies condemned Jaruzelski, they refused to cut economic ties — Margaret Thatcher included. Different ideas about the place of the Soviet bloc in an imagined Europe and about the use of economic weapons in the Cold War were a repeated source of tension within the Atlantic Community, and from the 1970s on the United States was ever less able to impose its preferred solutions.

More important than exchanges across the increasingly permeable Iron Curtain were those within the European Community (EC) (whose initial six members grew to nine by the early 1970s and to twelve before the post 1989 eastward expansion pushed membership to 27), and between the EC and other non-communist European countries. The creation of a common market by the late 1950s fostered intra-European trade much more than its transatlantic counterpart. In 1955, the six founding EC members sent 32 percent of their exports to other EC countries and 59 percent overall to Western Europe; by 1970 the proportion of exports to EC members was 49 percent and to Western Europe 69 percent. Western Europe, in turn, sent 28 percent of its exports to the EC six in 1955, but 41 percent in 1970. In

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1955, over half of Western European exports were within the region; by 1960 two-thirds were.44 In the late 1950s, Western European countries entered a new phase of mass consumption with cars, TVs, and especially household consumer durables becoming a common feature of everyday life. These were not made in the United States, whose designs were deemed too large, streamlined, and expensive, but rather by domestic manufacturers or other European producers. Bosch, Siemens, and AEG exported appliances across Western Europe, Italy’s Vespa scooters were popular in many countries, and Scandinavian design circulated widely. These intra-European circuits of goods and models of modern housing were more important than transatlantic ones.45 They contributed to the emergence of a European version of modernity with distinctive varieties of capitalism, social policy, underlying social values, and patterns of consumption. European identity was and may well still be thin, economic, and pragmatic or rational, rather than robust, multifaceted, and emotional, but beginning in the 1960s European ways of living came to resemble one another more than they did American ones.

Atlantic Community and the Third World

Even though U.S. leaders have insisted that America has global interests and responsibilities while Europe has only regional ones, concern with the global economic and political order, in fact, occupied European states as much as the United States in the first postwar decades.46 The postwar settlements in Europe and Japan were negotiated separately and America controlled the latter, yet France, Britain, and the Netherlands, who all had colonies in East and Southeast Asia, were vitally interested in arrangements there.47 Thereafter, decolonization, development, and the impact of the Third World on the security and economic prosperity of the Atlantic Community were issues that concerned individual states and prompted contention as much as cooperation across the Atlantic.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s early wartime condemnation of colonialism as immoral and outdated softened considerably by 1945, as the United States sought to gain trusteeships over key Pacific Islands, on the one hand, and to promote the recovery of European colonial powers and cultivate their friendship. American policy proved to be inconsistent in practice as well as in principal. Officials criticized colonialism but relegated decolonization to a distant future, thereby alienating both European powers and national liberation movements.
The United States forced the Dutch to leave Indonesia but allowed France to return to Indochina and pressured neither the French, the British, the Belgians, nor the Portuguese to give up their vast African holdings. The United States refused to back Britain and France in the 1956 Suez crisis to the dismay of both, but it quickly took on its own neocolonial role, proclaiming the Eisenhower Doctrine to support democratic states in the Middle East — of which there were few — and sending troops to Lebanon. In both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the United States pressured its Western European allies to support its military endeavors, at the very least with money. The responses, disappointing to the Americans, were sources of ongoing transatlantic tensions. In short, transatlantic diplomatic, military, and economic relations were constantly triangulated in and through a Third World undergoing dramatic changes.48

At issue was not merely political subordination or independence but also economic development. Modernization and development were first discussed in relationship to postwar Europe, especially Italy — although reconstruction was usually the preferred term — then in terms of Latin America from the late 1940s and more globally by the 1960s. U.S. social scientists, along with Latin American ones, pioneered modernization theory, but Europeans, East and West, launched development projects from the mid-1950s on. The Soviets under Khrushchev lent money to Egypt to help Nasser build the Aswan High Dam once the Americans pulled out and built infrastructure and factories as well as educational institutions in Afghanistan at the same time the United States was constructing vast irrigation projects in other parts of that nation. India took aid from both superpowers but tried to steer a nonaligned course.49 In her forthcoming book, Young-sun Hong reconstructs the complex involvement of East and West Germany in development policies in the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s. Each Germany competed with the other for influence and diplomatic recognition by developing public health programs in Vietnam, Korea, and Tanzania. Each sought to promote its particular ideology about democratic or socialist public health and to train health workers to practice it.50 Other states in Western and Eastern Europe established their own development programs as well as supporting UN ones. Each promoted national interests and visions and joined in larger Cold War ones. We know too little about how much conflict over development there was — not between blocs where the competition was open and evident to all — but within them.51


50 Young-Sun Hong, The Global Humanitarian War: Cold-War Germany and the Third World (Cambridge, 2015 [forthcoming]).

51 For an attempt at a more comprehensive history of development, see Piero Gleijeses, Confronting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa (Raleigh, NC, 2002). See also David C. Engerman and Corinna R. Unger, “Introduction: Towards a Global History of Modernization,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 3 (June 2009): 373-85; and the articles in their special issue.

36 GHI BULLETIN SUPPLEMENT 10 (2014)
Guiliano Garavini’s *After Empires* suggests that Europe had a distinctive economic approach to the Third World until the 1980s. Europe’s first response to decolonization was to turn inward and focus on retaining ties to former colonies through bilateral arrangements and agreements such as the Yaoundé Convention between African states and the EEC. From the late 1960s, European politicians, socialist parties, NGOs, students, and the Catholic Church all to varying degrees supported Third World efforts for new kinds of development aid and a more equitable global division of resources. The EEC and Western European countries spearheaded international economic cooperation via the North-South Dialogue, which met from 1975 to 1977, at a time when both the United States and the Soviet Union were not interested in a cooperative solution to the multiple problems of that troubled decade.

In 1975, with encouragement from some Western Europeans, the G7, supported by the UN Conference on Trade and Development, proposed a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which laid out a blueprint for a more equitable division not only of resources but also of decision-making power in international economic institutions. Although the General Assembly passed it, the United States opposed it, providing one more source of transatlantic tension. By the 1980s, however, the cooperation between the EC and UNCTAD was fraying and the creation of the G7 and imposition of the Washington Consensus had defeated any hopes for a NIEO. In Garavini’s assessment, Europe had successfully abandoned its imperial illusions without finding a meaningful new relationship to the global south.52 Its efforts to do so, however, and the resulting disagreements with the United States, suggest that relations with the Third World were as likely to cause divisions within the Atlantic Community as to unite it against an “other.” As the following essays by Quinn Slobodian and Christian Albrecht show, neoliberal economists, businessmen, and politicians from a variety of perspectives worried intensely about how development or lack thereof in the Third World would rebound on Europe.53 They seldom agreed on either the nature of the problem or the desirability of proposed solutions. What historians of the Atlantic Community need to consider, however, is that these debates were ongoing and central to both transatlantic relations and the self-definition of individual states and different political orientations.

**Open Questions**

Historians of transatlantic relations have often posited two breaks in the direction and character of networks and exchanges: the first

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53 See the Slobodian and Albrecht essays in this volume.
and sharpest is World War II; the second and more contested is the long 1970s. There is much to be said for each, but both need to be questioned. As some of the essays that follow suggest, there are many continuities in the networks and ideas that moved across the Atlantic before and after 1945, and there were more European influences than have been assumed. Other authors show that some phenomena that are held to be markers of rupture, such as neoliberalism, in fact have deep roots in the interwar era and earlier transatlantic exchanges. And how do we periodize the Atlantic Community and the global order? Were they always intertwined by colonialism, decolonization, and development? Did Japan’s 1964 membership in the OECD and its 1970s participation in the Trilateral Commission mark a new phase? Has the Atlantic Community been superseded by an American dominated global order or by something else entirely? Rethinking transatlantic relations in the first Cold War decades raises as many questions as it answers.

Mary Nolan is a professor of history at New York University. A historian of Modern Germany, her research now focuses on twentieth-century European-American relations — economic, political and cultural. She has written widely on anti-Americanism and Americanization in Europe as well as on American anti-Europeanism. Recently she published The Transatlantic Century Europe and the United States, 1890-2010 (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Diplomats and Intellectuals: Reimagining the Transatlantic World
The term “Atlantic Community” was introduced in the early twentieth century by the American journalists Walter Lippmann and Clarence Streit. It referred to a union of people and cultures, not solely of states. The definition was an ecumenical one, combining a democratic concept of society with an alliance of the nations of Europe and North America. Atlanticists, as they came to be called, portrayed the Atlantic Community as the core area of “the West.” This was consistent with the world-historical — also called the civilizational — concept, which joined North America (usually without Mexico) and Europe into a single entity: no longer merely the Old and the New World, but instead a united Western civilization.

Expressions of mental geography, like most concepts, are possible to historicize and reconstruct. If some regionalisms do in fact rise, decline, and die, then when, why, and how? A critical reconstruction of their history calls for a process that examines the structure and norms of transnational society by way of its rhetoric, cultural trends, fashions, and, finally, its politics over time. Atlanticism has a particular trajectory, which relates to American Cold War hegemony and to the role of Europeans in the discursive construction of the West. Yet the outline of its life cycle is longer, dating back to the “invention” of America by Europeans in the early modern period, followed by the reciprocal (or derivative, depending on where one lived) invention of New World ideology. By the end of the nineteenth century, a reinvented Atlantic concept had begun to overtake its rivals, namely Americanism, or the idea that the New World is inherently distinct and different from the Old. “Transatlantic,” “cis-Atlantic,” and “circum-Atlantic,” to cite the terms used by David Armitage to describe contending definitions of the Atlantic world in the earlier period, had begun to merge into a single “Atlantic” culture. That shift, in turn, reflected and encouraged a more overt and active political role for the United States in European affairs, reversing a tenet of American politics dating back to Washington’s Farewell Address. The political shift, in turn, encouraged a social convergence across the Atlantic, as the number of Atlanticists — from bankers and diplomats to artists — multiplied so that by mid-century it became possible for a prominent writer like Lippmann to acknowledge the fact of an Atlantic Community.

1. Kenneth Weisbrode

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1. This essay is based on my longer study, The Atlantic Century (Cambridge, MA, 2009). I am grateful for the comments of Jan Logemann, Mary Nolan, Lauren Shaw, and Casey Sutcliffe, as well as to fellow members of the Oslo Contemporary International History Workshop, especially Klaus Petersen, Helge Pharo, and Katharina Rietzler.


By the interwar period it is possible to identify a confluence of six structural and cultural factors: A resurgence of nationalism in the United States vis-à-vis Europe alongside a recognition of American “civilization”; a progressive-era exchange of professional standards of public administration, including diplomacy, in most major European powers and in the United States; a shift toward collectivist, meliorist, and, for some, messianic thinking on both sides of the Atlantic; a related shift in the political sphere, resulting in the ideology of collective security; a political crisis within Europe and between Europe and its colonies; and an assertion of American economic and political influence in both places. For Americans, this result had to do with the country’s rise to globalism in a Eurocentric world; for Europeans, it meant keeping up with American “progress.” For some of both, it meant coming to realize that they and their societies were, or ought to be, more alike than different. But little of that could have happened on its own. Atlanticism needed empire builders as well as mediators: diplomats, merchants, investors, social entrepreneurs, cultural role models, and similar transnational actors — not only political figures but also other celebrities, from the patrons of literary salons to the film stars with their “mid-Atlantic” accents.

Tracing this trajectory is important for assigning historical significance to the variety, texture, and tone of Atlantic crossings that took place later in the twentieth century. Atlanticism varied by place and generation, as did the intensity of its expression. Its post-World War II apotheosis rested on older, diverse foundations. It was promoted by members of a self-identifying transatlantic elite to be sure, but it was not restricted to them, as the other essays in this issue show. People from many backgrounds who called themselves Atlanticists sought greater transnational solidarity. The bonds that held them together resulted as much from cultural empathy as from the demands of war and peace. That would appear obvious from their rhetoric. But alliances and allegiances were also complicated, and in some cases — as with the debate over partnership in the 1960s, described below — Atlanticists also appeared more preoccupied with differentiating themselves from one another than with promoting common transnational positions. This was not an inevitable source of weakness but became one by the middle 1960s when other factors — namely the stabilization of the Cold War in Europe and its destabilization vis-à-vis the rest of the world, as well as generational strains throughout the postwar West — took differentiation to such an extent as to challenge the viability of Atlanticism as both an ideology and a political movement.
Why did it appear to decline so quickly at midcentury? Why did the perception (and reality) of decline coincide with the institutionalization of so many elite networks? Was decline more the result of intramural competition or external pressures? Did it come mainly from an American preoccupation or a European one? Some answers may be found by contrasting well-known images, for example, the footage of John F. Kennedy’s 1963 trip to Europe with the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in many European capitals just a few years later. They present a striking difference in tone and substance, and evoke the paradoxes of the Atlantic Community — being at once concrete and malleable, robust and fragile. The paradoxes may have been less the product of midcentury crisis than the enduring pattern of transatlantic politics — one that lasted, arguably, until the 1990s when Atlanticism was subsumed or even overtaken by globalization.

The Atlantic Community and the concept of Atlanticism may survive in some quarters, or may be resurrected in a new century; but its twentieth-century life was a comparably short and intense one. It reached a peak in the late 1940s and early 1950s with the maturation of the generation that had endured the First World War, then underwent a series of challenges from the mid-1950s all the way through to the early 1980s, before its brief moment of Cold War “triumph.” The preponderance of historical attention that has been devoted to Atlanticism has focused on these bursts of intensity: the Berlin crises that brought Europeans and Americans together; the Marshall Plan and the Helsinki Process that set precedents for creative, far-sighted diplomacy; the dramas of the European Defense Community, the Multilateral Nuclear Force, and the Euromissiles. European historiography has tended to favor such “doomed spasms of spontaneity,” as Charles Maier has labeled them for an earlier setting.

Less attention has been devoted by political historians to the latent human fabric — the transatlantic society of activists, civil servants, commentators, and ideologues — that sustained the policies and their related ideology throughout this period, not merely at its most newsworthy moments. A full history of Atlantic society in the twentieth century, less divided by momentous events than tied together by concepts, mentalities, and networks, has yet to be written from perspectives on both continents. It was the result not only of a structural convergence but also of a unique combination — or, as a sympathetic astrologer might put it, a fortunate conjunction — of political, cultural and generational factors favoring the redefinition

and promotion of an Atlantic civilization. Reconstructing it in time through the eyes of its protagonists on both sides of the Atlantic therefore ought to begin with a few additional questions: what was at the root of a common regional consciousness that went by the name of Atlanticism? What sustained it? What counteracted it? And why? For Atlanticism was as much a social as an intellectual or ideological phenomenon; the actors and institutions that promoted it — as well as those that reacted against it — are as historically significant in their own right as the policies they promoted. That their ranks included both Europeans and Americans is clear, but an understanding of which actors mattered most at particular moments, as well as how different actors collaborated with or contested one another, is more elusive than one might expect.

Atlanticism and Its Rivals: The Emergence of a Concept

The mid-twentieth century was rich in the study of sociology and social psychology, from Ludwik Fleck’s collective communication theories and Paul Lazarsfeld’s work on public opinion to Karl Deutsch’s institutional analyses and the sociographic studies of Pierre Bourdieu. Their development in the climate of Atlanticism is significant.

It is also no coincidence that Atlanticist discourse has been described as a byproduct of the Second World War. Bernard Bailyn has written that the Atlantic idea, and the impetus for Atlantic history, arose precisely at that moment because wartime solidarity led Europeans and Americans to explore commonalties.6 It is perhaps also significant that Bailyn, before doing his pioneering work in Early American history, was one of the first Americans of his generation to tout a familiarity with the work of the Annales School.7 Around this time he also became the son-in-law of European émigré Lazarsfeld. The social and geographical premises of Atlantic history reveal these associations.

Bailyn claimed that a regional consciousness, and a regional history, originated and were augmented by a crisis of the international system. This is hard to dispute, although the chronology could be extended back to the previous war and its effects on several Atlanticists. Lippmann was a principal drafter of Wilson’s Fourteen Points; Streit cut his journalistic teeth in Geneva covering the League of Nations. Both men became bitter critics of the failures of the Versailles Conference and of Wilson, yet they did not abandon their progressive passions. To them, Atlanticism came to represent an

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6 Atlantic History: Concept and Contours (Cambridge, MA, 2005). See also Merel Lee-
man’s essay in this volume.

7 See Bernard Bailyn, “Braudel’s Geohistory: A Reconsidera-
agent, or perhaps a refinement, of Wilsonianism: a more workable, pragmatic, and, ultimately, lasting effort to transform the nature of international politics that, in this case, at least, succeeded in merging universal ideals with regional (or local) realities. If a regional security community could work for the Atlantic as a reification of universalism, then it might work elsewhere, but that was, for the moment, beside the point. According to its proponents, the West — then referring mainly to the major powers of Western Europe, including Britain, and the United States — stood at the vanguard of modern history; the Atlanticists’ accomplishment, in other words, was to transform universalism and regionalism into complementary rather than contending ideologies and realities. A successful Atlantic Community could become the kernel, hub, or beacon for other communities or for an ever-larger West, which, by the end of the twentieth century, as already noted, became synonymous in some quarters (in the richest countries, namely) with globalization. Wilsonianism had traveled full circle, from universal to regional and back to universal, in a mere seven decades. Even the diplomat George Kennan, who had once been one of Wilson’s bitterest critics, declared, sincerely, one presumes, at century’s end that the age of Wilson had finally come.

To claim that Atlanticism and globalization coincide in theory and in practice may strike some people as a roundabout effort to rename the American century. It is, and it is not; the claim itself has as much to do with geopolitics and geoculture as it does with historical periodization. The twentieth century, especially its second half, drew America and Europe together more than any other two parts of the world. Yet the history of Atlanticism is not entirely subsumed within the rise of American hegemony. The two are impossible to separate for obvious reasons, but they are not historically coterminous, mainly because, again, Atlanticism is ecumenical: European voices, interests, and attitudes exercised at least as much power and responsibility as American ones.

Nevertheless, the literature on Americanization attests to the difficulty of taking ecumenism at its word: what was one person’s Atlantic or global trend was another’s American one. Atlanticism moreover was not the only form of regionalism to fill the century; the doctrine of the separate spheres — the aforementioned Old versus New — survives. Finally, even among Atlanticists, there were contending concepts, the most significant being the distinction between community and partnership. The latter, as formulated by Jean Monnet


and his acolytes both in and out of official bureaucracies, promoted a Euro-American duopoly that they called the dumbbell. To Monnet, two strong unions — one in America, the other in Europe — would best guarantee the security and prosperity of the West and would be superior to a satellite system that featured a single large sphere (the United States) orbited by several smaller ones. To such dumbbellists — who called themselves “Europeanists” — this planetary image was too imbalanced to function well. Worse yet, it appeared to be nothing more than a façade that masked an American hegemony and subordinated European interests (and European integration) to Cold War rivalry.

The former group who called themselves “Atlanticists” included many of Streit’s followers, notably in the UK, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia, as well as people who played a role in founding the North Atlantic Alliance. These individuals were politicians, diplomats, intellectuals and similar “opinion leaders” (to use Lazarsfeld’s familiar term). They depicted the dumbbell idea as too closely resembling an old-fashioned balance of power construct and one that threatened the unity of the West. A dumbbell was not a Wilsonian community: it was neither an integrated network of concentric circles that emanated from somewhere in the mid-Atlantic, nor a union of like-minded nations, some small, some large, all committed to the greater sum of their parts. Some members of this group also sounded like today’s Anglophiles, Euroskeptics, or some combination of the two. To them, the Europeanists’ idea was too formal, too static, and too risky: if “America” and “Europe” were understood to be on equal ends of the dumbbell, then a break in the middle was conceivable. Also, if Western Europe was imagined to be one single unit at one end, where did this leave the rest of Europe? Was the Soviet bloc somewhere else entirely?11

As arcane as debates over dumbbells from the early 1960s can sound, they were significant. They mattered to some people like Monnet a great deal at the time and therefore ought to be re-examined on their own terms. Calling oneself an Atlanticist or a Europeanist, a unionist or a dumbellist, had consequences beyond determining one’s policy allies, or even which clubs, dinners, boards, or study groups one attended — although the best known organizations, like Chatham House, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Foreign Policy Association, did not generally exclude one or the other. These debates underpinned the structure of the transatlantic relationship

11 A good summary of the various positions may be found in the volume edited by Valérie Aubourg, Gérard Bossuat, and Giles Scott-Smith, European Community, Atlantic Community? Atlantic Community and Europe 1 (Paris, 2008), and online at www.soleb.com/pdf/cergy-atlantic-community/atlantic-community.pdf
in important ways. The first was obviously political: what shape would the North Atlantic Alliance take? That is to say, what would its structure be: federal, confederal, something in between? Would the various Western European states deal with the United States separately or in unison? If the former, what states would dominate? If the latter, what institutions? And where would the European movement fit? "Atlanticists" argued that a community was superior to an alliance or partnership. "Europeanists" argued the opposite, except with respect to the European Community. In truth, both sides had much in common, including their names: both were Europeanists if this term is understood as equivalent to Eurocentrism; and both were Atlanticists if by that one means believing in transatlantic collaboration and solidarity. And some, including Monnet at times, sought to harmonize more than split the differences.

At another level, they raise fundamental questions of culture: Are Europeans and Americans more alike than different? Do they share a civilization? Or do they merely hold certain interests in common? There are many answers to these perennial questions, not all logically consistent. The doctrine of the two spheres persisted in the twentieth century, in spite of a certain meeting of the minds, induced, at least in part, by the cultural Cold War. De Gaulle liked to speak of a second force in the West while others — social democrats, for example — championed a Third Way. Even doctrinaire Atlanticists like the American diplomat Theodore Achilles (the man who wrote much of the North Atlantic Treaty after having been mesmerized by the writings of Streit) favored closer relations with some European nations over others. For them, European integration served as a vehicle for bringing about an Atlantic union. For Monnet it was the other way around, with permanent peace in Western Europe being the most desired end. He was a vigorous supporter of British accession to the Common Market but was very skeptical about any other path of enlargement. In this view, the viability of the European movement and its institutions took precedence over other goals, including the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance — although again members of each camp, Monnet especially, often went out of their way to insist that European and transatlantic integration were not inherently contradictory.

Mapping these various orientations serves not only to underscore the intellectual and ideological diversity of transatlantic thinking in these years but also, and more importantly, to reinforce the composite
political and cultural nature of the Atlantic project. Atlanticists like Achilles made common cause across national lines, sometimes against compatriots. If their political imagination was directed at the best ways to organize “the West,” it was not only for the purpose of prevailing against the Soviet Union but also, and for some like Monnet even more so, for the West’s own sake. The interrelationships of these various groups also remind one just how tenuous many of them were at the time, a realization that becomes less sharp as one moves further away from the twentieth century and comes to depict it, or at least its second half, as a golden age in relations between Europe and America. By contrast, the more carefully one reconstructs it, the more fractious and fragile the Atlantic Century appears.

For all that some Europeans were said to turn to the United States in postwar desperation, such was conditioned by economic and cultural interpenetration of both societies well before the Second World War. That this continued after the war probably had as much to do with the prewar scope and vitality of Atlanticism as it did with any inherent rationale for its wartime and postwar continuity. Just as transatlantic convergence cannot be divided neatly for comparison into prewar and postwar units, neither can convergence be said to have proceeded unidirectionally during either period. It does not easily advance the image of a more rapidly Americanizing “West.” Another reason for this may have been an even broader desire on the part of Atlanticists for sociopolitical convergence in both Europe and America, not simply involving the representations of the two continents, but also the aims of political movements — as with the effort to find a workable arrangement between the interests of democracy and welfare, for example. Even a number of Third Way advocates — Tony Blair and Joschka Fischer come to mind more recently — have found themselves reaching a point of compromise with existing alternatives. A similar thing happened with the various proponents of Atlantic and European union whereby European integration would take place alongside, and for the most part without counteracting, Atlanticism and its institutions.

Atlantic Diplomacy: Postwar Generations and the Crisis of the 1960s

The political narrative of Atlanticism therefore follows a different chronology and emphasis from the usual one of war and peace: more generational than episodic, more cumulative than cyclical, more
fracious and contested than logical or heroic, no better symbolized, perhaps, than by the Berlin Wall, which fell, after so many crises, in a moment of unplanned cacophony and in the name of greater union. To this, one could add another forum for convergence: what may be called diplomatic culture. The United States established the Foreign Service in 1924, not long after the modernization of similar organizations in the major powers of Europe. The first corps of professional diplomats—who entered by competitive examination and were trained and promoted by the standards of a profession—did so with an image of Europe in the background; and to many of them like the aforementioned Achilles it was a complex mix of identifications ranging from imitation to rivalry. The most capable American representatives overseas had traditionally been consuls in Asia and Latin America; there were fewer in Europe, and certainly few professional diplomats (the consular and diplomatic corps had been separate until 1924). That now changed. “New” diplomats sought assignments to Europe, where they could interact with counterparts whom they deemed the best in the business, yet where, as Americans imbued with Wilsonian ideas, they may have quietly felt superior to these Europeans (and vice versa). Diplomats flourished in Europe because early twentieth century Europe was more cosmopolitan than most other places, not only because of the trappings of European colonialism but also because of the location of the headquarters of most international organizations, such that they existed at the time, in Europe, namely, in Geneva and Paris. America’s first professional diplomats like Joseph Grew, George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, and others gained a regional and global consciousness by way of Europe, even while insisting, as some but not all of them did, that they offered an alternative, and possibly more imaginative, extra-European outlook on the world.13

This is the initial diplomatic setting for Atlanticism. A group of prominent Americans in and out of government service (who included, besides journalists, foundation officials and bankers) joined Europeans to modify the methods of diplomacy with the “legalist-moralist” innovations that Wilson had advocated. New institutions formalized old alignments; laws and norms codified habits, rules, and customs; “public opinion” entered the secret corridors of high politics. This is the familiar early twentieth-century story. Atlanticism offers a different perspective through which one set of practices did not supplant another as much as several adapted and merged over time. That the effort was regarded as a half-success in response to a
double-failure after 1919 (European and American), and that it represented a deliberate repudiation of isolationist axioms, is relevant to understanding the proliferation of transatlantic projects after the Second World War. It corresponded to the life cycle — and cultural and political maturation — of an Atlantic generation.

Postwar networks thus built on a transnational practice that by now was in fact at least two generations old and reinforced ideological and cultural tendencies that had grown progressively fashionable in Europe and America. Not only does this underscore the view that diplomacy is inherently and explicitly cultural but also the role of the West as a social and political laboratory throughout the twentieth century. On the one hand, as Daniel Rodgers’s work has shown, this transfer took place reciprocally, that is, from the experience of reformers on each side of the Atlantic back to their own societies. This also happened to diplomacy. The United States accepted a European project and the first “permanent” defense alliance since American independence. Each effort advanced the midcentury collective and communitarian ethos. It is hard to imagine this having taken place without the earlier attempts at cultural and political transmission between Europe and America. But once again, it was not a process dictated entirely by crises or by cultural aspirations and tendencies but also by conscious, promotional efforts on the part of diplomats and political figures, intellectuals, and curators of knowledge, as well as social and cultural entrepreneurs, including the major private foundations, which in many cases possessed a sophisticated understanding of ways to promote transatlantic solidarity, from the visual and performing arts to the social sciences.

Cultural attachment may not be the same thing as affinity, although the two can blur. The important point to acknowledge is the *prima facie* existence of such an attachment and to propose that it had as much to do with a mutual desire to help, teach, learn from, and interact as it did with some Americans’ and Europeans’ presumed desire to prove to themselves that they had something to teach, learn, and share; that they could refashion one another’s measure of prestige; and that their own cultures, especially their diplomatic cultures, which relied so heavily upon the mutual acknowledgment of such prestige, were in mutual transition. In this respect, diplomatic culture is similar to others — in technology, production, and politics — where the forces of adaptation at once counteract and augment those of competition. The stakes for this dual experiment were high. It is

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14 This view is generally consistent with the causation set out in recent works such as Elizabeth Borgwart’s *A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA, 2005); and Mark Mazower’s *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, 2009).


tempting to argue that nearly every other transatlantic phenomenon relied upon it, for a political breach or all-out cultural war, culminating in something resembling a permanent isolationism in America and in Europe, would have vitiated a good deal. For this reason, the Atlantic era, if one may call it that, was so fraught by fear of failure. It was not simply that the Soviets might march all the way to the English Channel. It was also that Atlantic convergence was considered an important end in itself: as a way to prevent another world war and to promote a permanent improvement of social, cultural, and political life. In other words, it was a geopolitics in the service of civilizational progress. To Monnet, who was reputed to be inspired by the teachings of Teilhard de Chardin, this was part of the collective advance of humanity through the enlargement and enhancement of social units.\footnote{Personal communication with Henry Owen, Washington, DC, 2006.} They were strengthened by expansion, then combination and consolidation; human beings could recognize, exploit, and profit by it, or fight it. They had been tearing down for half a century; now the time had come to rebuild and consolidate.

Why, then, did this optimism appear to break down so quickly a mere decade or so later? Why, by the early 1960s, did the most fervent Atlanticists, Monnet included, come to insist that the whole project had lost its way? And why did they advance an alternative concept — partnership — that so angered their fellow Atlanticists? Why, in other, more prosaic terms, did Atlanticism experience a post-adolescent and a midlife crisis at more or less the same time? Is a generational explanation sufficient? That is, had its founders reached the age of retirement and muddle-headedness? Had they become weary and distracted? Did they fail to imbue their successors with the wisdom drawn from two world wars? Or had the concept itself grown muddled? Did the prosperity of the mid- to late 1950s force a rethinking (or a blurring) of social and political priorities? Did the Suez and Algerian crises, and de Gaulle’s return to power, really turn the Cold War on its axis from longitudinal to latitudinal, transforming an East-West conflict into a North-South one, as Matthew Connelly has argued?\footnote{Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford, 2002).} Or did people just take the passing of a torch to a new generation too seriously?

One may never know why the whole world appeared to change on or about month X. This is too subjective. More relevant here is the ongoing effort by Atlanticists to survive and adapt to new circumstances. Most people probably would not have predicted that an Atlantic culture, let alone NATO or a European Union, would be alive and
reasonably well by the second decade of the twenty-first century, without a Soviet empire next door and with a united Germany inside, and certainly not during the dark days of the mid- to late 1960s up through 1973, the year that Henry Kissinger christened the “year of Europe.”

**Atlantic Paradox Revisited: Institutions and a Waning Idea**

The problem with the history of a concept is that it rests, ultimately, on a reconstruction of motive and motivation, which can never be known perfectly. Yet, the historical significance of a geographic community cannot exist without the beliefs, assumptions, and promotional apparatus behind it.¹⁹

The source of “Atlantic-mindedness” was not limited to a passion for transatlantic cohesion or consensus. It was not, in other words, defined exclusively by the ends it promoted but also by its preferred means. For lack of a better term, this has been called the “Monnet method” after one of its originators and its best known practitioner, who, one suspects, learned much of it from his early career as a cognac salesman in North America. Monnet honed the method back in Europe and then re-exported it to the United States.²⁰ He did this by the regular convocation of allies and fellow travelers — not exclusively Europeans — in organizations and individually for the purpose of lobbying governments to pursue favored policies. Monnet’s vehicle was his Action Committee for the United States of Europe, a diverse group of voluntary activists that resembled the nineteenth-century American associations described so well by Tocqueville. Its main activity was to draft and debate position papers, but its influence went well beyond them. The language in these papers was repeated so often and so exhaustively at so many gatherings that it seeped into public and private discourse. The method was one of salesmanship whose product was political consensus. The strength of the method on both sides of the Atlantic has been called into question for its lack of popular legitimacy, with some critics going so far as to label it *dirigiste*, even anti-democratic. That is another subject; what matters here is that nearly all historical treatment of the method focused on its role in furthering European integration. The method, in other words, has been seen as for, by, and about Europeans in Europe. Less acknowledged has been its application to transatlantic relations, which, it may be argued, were just as important to Monnet and were just as successful a manifestation of the method’s utility, if not more so, although again by its means rather than ends.²¹

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¹⁹ A good example in this context may be found in Giles Scott-Smith, “Ghosts in the Machine? Ernst van der Beugel, the Transatlantic Elite and the ‘New’ Diplomatic History,” Inaugural lecture at Leiden University, 5 October 2009, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/19602.


Monnet’s Committee started work after the debacle of the European Defense Community in the mid-1950s and did not really hit its stride until the final few years of the decade. The history of the Monnet method is found in the record of this and similar committees during the same period. Some resembled policy clubs or quasi-academic institutions, the aforementioned Chatham House, and the Council on Foreign Relations, which had been founded a generation earlier (in 1920 and 1921, respectively) as efforts to promote the informed analysis and advocacy of international affairs. Others were more like typical American voluntary organizations that existed for sharing mutual interests and ideas and coordinating pressure on governments, that is to say, lobbying. Among these were the members of the Atlantic Treaty Association, established in each of the NATO countries; the Atlantic Union Committee, the American Committee on United Europe, the Committee for a Free Europe in the US, and subsequently the Atlantic Council of the United States; the Bilderberg Group, founded in the Netherlands, the Atlantik-Brücke in Germany, Le Cercle and the Atlantic Institute in France. Although some of these organizations still exist, most had a comparably short lifespan, having reached their peak of influence from the late 1950s to the early to middle 1960s. Their chronology coincides with two countervailing trends: the aforementioned division among transatlantic advocates between “Atlanticists” and “Europeanists”; and the appeal of other parts of the world — notably Africa and Asia.

It is easy to overstate the influence of policy fads, and in retrospect, the period from about 1958 to 1966, which included the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises, was hardly moribund in Europe. Many Americans continued to be drawn to it (studies of haute couture, the popularity of the “art house” cinema, Julia Child, and package tours to Europe could be considered here). Back in the U.S. State Department, Europe would top the list of priorities for the Parisian-born Secretary of State, Christian Herter, who did much to repair the damage left behind by his predecessor, John Foster Dulles, in some parts of Europe. Upon leaving office with Eisenhower’s departure in 1961, Herter went on to become the first chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States. Herter had devoted much of his public career to Europe, from his days as a young member of the team at the Paris Peace Conference to his shepherding the Marshall Plan through Congress as the head of the Herter Committee. Joining him were several like-minded Atlanticists who stood against the tiermondisme of the new Kennedy administration; some, like Achilles, who took
retirement after an unhappy final posting in Peru, went so far as to act like sages in semi-official exile. In the United States, the policy debate over regions had existed for a long time (and continues), but it took on particular significance in the early 1960s because of its coincidence with the development of a youth culture and a youth-driven politics (however transatlantic they may have been), and with a certain passion for the non-European world and, eventually, the involvement in a very costly war in Vietnam.

In Europe another thing happened. Europe turned inward. The colonial powers one by one said their farewells to empire; the Common Market had been launched and began its long process of dominating the political and social agendas of many European capitals. In spite of their heavy representation in international organizations like the IMF, World Bank, OECD, et al., many Europeans took their global prerogatives for granted while citing the very globalization of these organizations — the OECD, for example, which became nominally extra-European after supplanting the OEEC — as indicators of Europe’s shrinking world role. Paradoxical as this was on a number of levels, by the mid-1960s, another transatlantic divergence had set in.

The institutionalization of transatlantic advocacy therefore coincided with the waning of the Atlantic idea in the heart of federal Europe and in Washington little more than a decade after it had been launched as a postwar project. America and Europe again appeared to be heading their separate ways, and the West had begun, once again, to show signs of decay. There was the saga over the British entry to the Common Market and the crisis of the “empty chair” brought on by de Gaulle’s refusal to accede to a supranational Europe. The Allies fell out over Vietnam and, after 1967, the Middle East. De Gaulle took the opportunity the previous year to withdraw France from NATO’s combined military command and to expel the Alliance from its Paris headquarters. The gold and balance of payments crises continued to worsen, culminating finally in the dramatic scuttling of the Bretton Woods system. In the United States, Achilles and his friends at the Atlantic Council came increasingly to sound like the embattled defenders of a midcentury fortress. For example, several of them, led by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, urged President Lyndon Johnson to punish de Gaulle for his 1966 action. Although Johnson refused (with good reason, in retrospect) to do it, he did not resist a break with the Old Guard, one that almost certainly conditioned their
break with him over Vietnam and their withdrawal from public life. As they became more strident, their influence, even outside government, diminished. Yet their institutions and organizations carried on.

At the middle of the 1960s, Atlanticism, and the transatlantic relationship itself, still demanded consensus, and the appearance of consensus, according to this older but feisty generation. It is easy to paint it in caricature as nostalgic and petulant. Yet its reaction was reflexive and should not have been surprising. This was not the first time consensus was seen to be in short supply: the 1950s and early 1960s saw a series of political crises — from the post-Korean War battle over the Lisbon force goals to the saga of the European Defense Community, followed a few years later by the seemingly arcane dispute over the Multilateral Nuclear Force. These were more apparent than real sagas involving the balance of collective armament — conventional in the first two instances, nuclear in the third.

In each, the viability, even survival, of the Alliance was called into question, only to be followed by a rethinking and a reaffirmation, much as President Johnson handled the challenge from de Gaulle, on the one hand, and from the dumbellists in his own administration (like Under Secretary of State George Ball, who also had once been Monnet’s lawyer), on the other. The irony here may have been lost on some of the more strident members of the Old Guard like Acheson and Achilles — Johnson was simply following the pattern they had set. For example, he gave a speech in October 1966 that finessed the contending designs of Atlanticists and Europeanists by offering his own version of a Third Way. In it, Johnson sought to harmonize an opening to the Eastern bloc amid a lessening of tensions over Europe — that is, a combination of what soon would be widely known, respectively, as Ostpolitik and détente — in a formula that prefigured the strategic calculus of the second Reagan and Bush administrations. For its part, NATO published the Harmel Report in 1967, which appears in retrospect to be something akin to a Vatican II for the Atlantic Alliance. Among other things, it sought to reaffirm the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and
well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.\textsuperscript{26}

The Harmel Report built upon Article 2 in endorsing a policy of détente and, in its fifteenth point (out of seventeen), noted the relationship of the “North Atlantic Treaty area” to the “rest of the world.”\textsuperscript{27} The motivations of the report were apparent — its official title stated the “Future Tasks of the Alliance” — and, in retrospect, prescient. The Alliance would evolve into a security community in the Wilsonian sense from a permanent defense alliance. This is suggested by the report’s language, along with the notion of acquiring a more global role. A couple of decades later, NATO’s mantra had become “out of area or out of business.”\textsuperscript{28}

**A Bigger Atlantic: From Regionalism to Globalism**

It did not take a trained sociologist to realize that the late 1960s were a time of great strain for the Atlantic Alliance and its member societies. What was interesting about the counter-reaction this time, however, was that it meant less a retrenchment — even a reformist retrenchment — than a striking out in new directions. Monnet’s Action Committee dissolved in 1975, but both the Atlantic Council of the U.S. and the Atlantic Institute began to sponsor studies and research committees on matters outside the Atlantic region, notably on economics and politics in Northeast Asia, energy and the environment, and the education of what they called the “successor generation.” This coincided with the work of other organizations, notably the Trilateral Commission, which was founded in 1973. Its mandate reflected the simultaneous effort by the Atlantic Council and sister organizations to bring Japan into cooperation with the Alliance as a quasi-Western power. The Atlantic Institute even contemplated removing “Atlantic” from its name as a way to attract more foundation funding but in the end did not — a decision that may have been one reason it eventually dissolved in the late 1980s. NATO contributed to the trend in 1969 with the establishment of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS).\textsuperscript{29} This was at the behest of the new Nixon administration and its effort to co-opt whatever liberals it could, and in this case, the prominent politician and one-time academic, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who oversaw the U.S. contribution to the Committee and also joined the Nixon administration as its token liberal member.

\textsuperscript{26} http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

\textsuperscript{27} http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26700.htm

\textsuperscript{28} Credit for coining the phrase generally has gone to NATO’s late secretary-general, Manfred Wörner.

\textsuperscript{29} See Christian Albrecht’s essay regarding the Club of Rome in this volume.
How seriously anyone — including Moynihan — took the CCMS is open to question. Kissinger, for example, has given it the slightest mention in his memoirs. Few historians of the 1970s have much to say about it. Nevertheless, the CCMS survived for another few decades and produced several reports and projects, mainly having to do with the protection of the natural environment. They included the subjects of disaster relief, aircraft noise, air and water pollution, and “environmental awareness.” The range of subjects reminds one, again, that NATO is, and to some extent always saw itself to be, something more than a military or defense alliance. It is not the exclusive embodiment of the Atlantic Community, but it is its best-known vehicle; and its history, therefore, is suggestive of the evolving tone of Atlanticism and of its adherents’ outlook on the future. Most of the Atlantic Treaty Association members, for example, sponsor educational branches that run student exchanges and other educational programming, and most are funded either in part or in whole by NATO or by national governments, as the North Atlantic Assembly of parliamentarians has been since the 1950s.

To map the patterns of influence among NATO and its appendages, as well as like-minded organizations and institutions from the Munich Conference and the Salzburg Seminar to dozens of smaller ones, not to mention multinational corporations, athletic, artistic, and other cultural groups, would require a very thick prosopography. To demonstrate the ebb and flow in the strength and coherence of these groups vis-à-vis Atlanticism is nevertheless important. In doing so, one must not lose sight of the underpinnings, particularly if their political chronology presents a deceptive picture. Nineteen-sixty-eight has been portrayed in both historiography and popular culture as a seminal moment, a “crack,” as Immanuel Wallerstein once aptly described it, in the postwar world system. To a large extent this was true, or it certainly seemed so to many people who experienced it. But in reconstructing the various Atlantic networks one can see the crack emerging at least a decade earlier as the elites whose transatlantic sensibility took root during the interwar years and whose approach to international affairs, typified by Lippmann’s, was advertised as a hardened and more circumscribed variety of Wilsonianism, began

30 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 386-87. Kissinger characteristically took much of the credit for launching the initiative and blamed the NATO allies for undercutting it. Moynihan’s oblique references to it are found in the collection of his letters.


to fade. It may have been ironic that this took place as social forces began to threaten the stability of interstate relations in precisely the manner that Wilson had sought to preempt by inventing a new form of diplomacy set against national chauvinism. Perhaps it took a good ten years or so for it to open a breach and for the breach to take on a domestic character as much as a transnational one. There was, by the late 1950s, the onset of a division among Atlanticists and a distraction by the “winds of change”; by the early 1960s, one can trace these splits to one emerging between official bureaucracies and nongovernmental pressure groups, even within the tiny elite core of Atlantic organizations; and by the mid-1960s, one can see the split harden into a blatant challenge to the unity of both the Alliance and the European movement, and a response by way of such efforts as the CCMS. It would take another ten years or so for the breach to be repaired, after having grown much worse in the early 1970s and reaching its lowest point between 1973 and 1978, then slowly being healed again, ironically, some would say, by the debates over Euro-communism and Euromissiles, and finally culminating in 1989 with Europe on the cusp of being “whole and free.”

It would go too far to draw a direct line of causation between each and every period: from the interwar effort to recast Wilsonianism on a regional basis through the episodes of intramural jousting across the Atlantic up to the mid- to late 1970s when the region saw a resurgence of Wilsonianism in the negotiation and passage of the Helsinki Final Act and its subsequent review conferences and civil society projects. This latter development also was an ironic one, as it happened, because it was criticized at the time for being a throwback to the geopolitics of the nineteenth century. Both the Helsinki Conference and process were heavily European but also saw an important, even critical, American contribution, despite deep disagreements between some Americans and Europeans over its implementation. They were followed by one final dramatic expression of self-determination, of an appeal to law and morality, and of a redrawing of Europe’s borders, in 1989. The process from beginning to end featured ruptures and continuities; it was continually broken, then repaired and reinvented, at least in the West. Or this is how it appeared at the dawn of the new century, not only from the top down through the prism of events, but also from the bottom up through the human fabric that connected it.

Much of this story was encapsulated in 1967 by the Harmel Report and its attempt to link political consensus, military strength, social

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34 See, for example, Angela Romano, Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE (Brussels, 2009); Sarah B. Snyder, “The CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance: Forging a New Consensus in Madrid,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 8, no. 1 (2010): 56-68.
stability, and cultural convergence. The Atlantic Community had survived as the kernel or center of an expanding number of concentric circles, containing more than a few dumbbells. If Atlanticism’s crisis, then, was a protracted one linking the passage of generations, concepts, and events, its capacity for renewal and reinvention says much about the thriving of transnational institutions and organizations in the twentieth century. That many of these, in turn, originated as cultural and social projects immediately before and after the First World War — a far greater political crisis than most people had ever experienced — is significant and deserves further study.

Kenneth Weisbrode is an assistant professor of history at Bilkent University in Ankara. His research focuses on diplomatic history, as well as the history of the Atlantic idea and of European-American relations in the twentieth century. Weisbrode is the author of The Atlantic Century (Da Capo Press, 2009), and he edited with Kiran Klaus Patel European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE COLOR LINE: WILHELM RÖPKE, APARTHEID, AND THE WHITE ATLANTIC

Quinn Slobodian

In 1964, economist Wilhelm Röpke, revered as one of the intellectual fathers of the West German social market economy and a key figure in the construction of neoliberalism as an international movement from the 1930s onward, wrote that “the South African Negro is not only a man of an utterly different race but, at the same time, stems from a completely different type and level of civilization.” The remark appeared within “an attempt at a positive appraisal” of South Africa, published as the country’s racist policies were coming under attack from the expanding African and Asian contingent in the United Nations. Describing South Africa as “one of the most prosperous and — in certain respects — irreplaceable nations in the world economy,” Röpke praised “the extraordinary qualities of its white population, who live under unusually favorable climatic conditions and possess a pioneering spirit that can be compared only with that found in the United States.” The country’s most notable features were its attractiveness to tourists, its “relatively favorable tax structure,” and the high returns it offered on foreign investment. The policy of apartheid was not oppressive, he argued. Rather, it was “the specific form in which South Africa pursues the policy of ‘decolonializing’ and ‘development aid’ which corresponds to this country’s needs.” Drawing a parallel to Israel, he wrote that as with the relationship of the Jewish population to the Arabs, to provide full political equality to the black population would be to commit “national suicide.” South Africa was a white stronghold in Röpke’s racialized world geography. To prevent it from turning into “another Congo or Indonesia,” he called for the maintenance of “a Zambezi line” in Africa to “divide the black-controlled northern part of the continent from the white-controlled south.” For reasons of racial superiority, economics, and Realpolitik, he believed that white supremacy had to persist in South Africa.


2 See Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York, 2012); A Special Committee on Apartheid was formed in the UN in 1963. Roland Burke, » Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia, 2010), Kindle Location 1577.


4 Ibid.


7 Ibid., 15.
Grateful for the rhetorical ammunition, the South African government ordered three translations and sixteen thousand copies of the book in which the article was to appear.8 The next year, they ordered twenty thousand additional off-prints of the article for distribution in the U.S.9 Defenders of apartheid quoted his work in their own pamphlets.10 Röpke could not rely on all of his usual European allies on the South Africa issue. The editors of the economic-liberal Swiss newspaper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, with whom he had worked for three decades, did not share his zeal for Hendrik Verwoerd’s regime.11 The newspaper published a statement of protest by foreign students when Röpke delivered the paper as a lecture in Zurich in July 1964.12 “These NZZ intellectuals will not be satisfied until they let a real cannibal speak,” Röpke wrote to his primary collaborator from the mid-1960s, Swiss businessman Albert Hunold.13 Hunold, for his part, communicated to Röpke from South Africa that their erstwhile neoliberal partner, economist Friedrich Hayek “now advocates one man one vote and race mixing.” He contemptuously concluded: “Nothing surprises me about Hayek any more.”14

Röpke found his primary allies on the apartheid question not in his European milieu but in the U.S. New Right, a community that was frequently willing to defend the principle of white rule. He would develop ever closer contact with this group until his death in 1966.15 Libertarian newspaper columnist Lawrence Fertig wrote to congratulate him on the publication of his “South African appraisal,” commending Röpke’s “courage” and “great integrity” in writing it, which, he acknowledged, had “contributed much” to his thinking.16 Stanford University agricultural economist and German émigré Karl Brandt called the piece a “very refined and at the same time enormously strong exposition of the philosophy of freedom.”17 After publishing an article of his own defending the Verwoerd government, William F. Buckley, syndicated columnist and publisher of the *National Review*, wrote that he was “bursting with pride” over the praise Röpke paid to the piece.18
Histories of the Right’s “Atlantic crossings” have boomed in recent years. Following the pioneering research of Bernhard Walpen and Dieter Plehwe, a host of works have focused on the group of economists, intellectuals, and politicians disgruntled with the postwar Keynesian consensus, who together formed the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) in 1947. Initiated by Hayek and Röpke, the MPS became what Daniel Stedman Jones has called a “Neoliberal International.” Histrorians are unambiguous about the transnational nature of neoliberalism as an intellectual movement, and some, like Kim Phillips-Fein, have made the case for the U.S. conservative movement, which shared many of its individuals and influences (Fertig, Buckley, and Brandt were all MPS members). Yet the questions of race and empire that the case of Röpke and South Africa raises remain largely unanswered. With the exception of scholarly work on the “Chicago Boys” in Latin America and a detailed chapter on development discourse by Plehwe, intellectual histories of early neoliberalism before the policy breakthroughs of the 1970s and 1980s have been mostly blind in one eye, focusing on the global North and ignoring the South, tracing transatlantic traffic across only one half of the ocean.

I seek to remedy this omission as part of a larger project of placing the intellectual arguments of early neoliberalism within a global analytical frame, investigating how the end of empire and the dawn of the development era underwrote neoliberal visions of an open world economy. I begin by showing how Röpke’s synthesis of religion and free market principles drew him close to what George H. Nash termed the “fusionism” of the U.S. New Right in the 1950s and 1960s, and how Christianity fit into Röpke’s proposed reconstruction of a lost liberal international economic order. I then explain the specificity of the early 1960s moment when conservative disenchantment with the second-term policies of President Dwight D. Eisenhower swelled to alarm at the case of Röpke and South Africa raises remain largely unanswered. With the exception of scholarly work on the “Chicago Boys” in Latin America and a detailed chapter on development discourse by Plehwe, intellectual histories of early neoliberalism before the policy breakthroughs of the 1970s and 1980s have been mostly blind in one eye, focusing on the global North and ignoring the South, tracing transatlantic traffic across only one half of the ocean.


I show how economists like Röpke acted as emissaries from the “other Europe” of West Germany and Switzerland in these years, supposedly adhering to more orthodox free market principles than the U.S. leadership. I contend that intellectuals like Röpke profited from the impression of objectivity and distance as uncompromised observers of the American scene from afar. Yet far from being uninvolved, Röpke was an active advocate of an alternative Atlanticism, linking like-minded individuals across the North Atlantic in Central Europe and the U.S., as well as across the South Atlantic in Latin America and South Africa. I show how Röpke helped form a front against the policies of the formal Atlantic Community and the doctrines of social democracy and developmentalism that economists like the Argentine Raúl Prebisch, the Swede Gunnar Myrdal, and the Hungarian émigrés Nicholas Kaldor and Thomas Balogh advocated internationally. Looking through the lens of Röpke’s “other alliance” of the Right, this article shows how conservatives responded to what they saw as the perilous globalization of Keynesian policies of full employment and state-subsidized industrialization in the “Bandung Era” of decolonization and national development.23

The article’s subtitle borrows the term “white Atlantic” from David Armitage, who used it to describe a specific discourse born in the 1940s as U.S. interventionists like Walter Lippmann articulated a civilizational geography that linked North America to the British Isles and Europe in a community of “the West.”24 The concept became institutional reality after 1945 as the “Atlantic Community” Kenneth Weisbrode describes in his contribution to this volume.25 This Atlantic was “white” because of its assumptions of cultural superiority in societies that maintained varying levels of colonialism and segregation, and because it often drew on racialized notions of a common “Anglo-American” or “Judeo-Christian” heritage.26 Yet with the foundation of the U.N. organizations and the steady movement toward decolonization, ideologies of pluralism gradually displaced biological racism (such as that expressed by Röpke in 1964) in the official circles of the Atlantic Community. Race and racism did not


disappear but, by the late 1950s, the language of malleable culture predominated as Atlantic statesmen courted postcolonial leaders and gestured at addressing racial injustice at home.²⁷

The article takes “white Atlantic” as a useful term to describe the worldview that Röpke and his collaborators cultivated in this period. Yet it concludes by identifying a key slippage between the rhetoric of race and economics in Röpke’s texts. As conservatives, whose racism was often open and unadorned in personal correspondence, sought a publicly acceptable way to oppose decolonization movements in the global South, Röpke offered a solution. In his defense of South Africa, Röpke redefined “the West” not as a racial or civilizational space but one identified by a stable economy, market-friendly social behavior, and a welcoming investment climate. Like Adam Smith before him, Röpke would end by finding interest rates as the most reliable index for an area’s level of civilization.

At a time when the budding civil rights movement was challenging the racial hierarchy in the U.S., the conservative attack on the “New Deal for the world” was, I argue, a means of holding the line against what one of Röpke and Buckley’s collaborators called “the unholy combination of the African Negro question with U.S. Negroes.”²⁸ If the demands of non-white populations were becoming harder to suppress at home, perhaps they could at least be curbed in the larger world before bringing about what Röpke called the “suicide” of “the free world” that would result in the event of a world government where “non-Europeans would hold an overwhelming majority.”²⁹

Looking at the transatlantic alliances of German-speaking neoliberalism and conservatism makes it clear that world economic issues at the middle of the twentieth century were always also about race.


²⁸ Helmut Schoeck, Department of Sociology, Emory University, to Röpke, 16 Dec 1964, RA, file 23, p. 551. On Schoeck’s defense of colonialism at the 1957 MPS meeting, see Plehwe, “The Origins of the Neoliberal Economic Development Discourse,” 259.

Röpke and the U.S. New Right

Born in the town of Schwarmstedt near Hanover in 1899, Röpke finished his training in economics at Marburg in 1921 and returned there as a full professor in 1929. He was ejected from the university for his liberal opposition to the new National Socialist government in 1933, emigrating thereafter to a post at the University of Istanbul.30 Like many German-speaking liberal economists, Röpke’s initial connections to the U.S. came through the Rockefeller Foundation.31 In the interwar period, the philanthropic organization built up a network of economists in Central Europe, bankrolling business cycle research at the Kiel Institute for World Economy, the German Institute for Business Cycle Research in Berlin, and the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research in Vienna, the latter headed by Hayek himself.32 Such funding was so common that Fritz Machlup, an Austrian economist and later MPS member, jokingly coined a German verb in writing about his intention “to Rockefeller” (rochelfellen) in 1935.33 Röpke received his first grant in 1927–28 to write a study of U.S. agricultural policy, for which he spent six months traveling through the entire country.34 According to his biographer, the trip left Röpke both impressed and troubled. On the one hand, America’s economic prowess was awe-inspiring; on the other hand, Röpke wondered if Europe had the “power of resistance and cultural sense of self to protect itself from the automobile-jazz-skyscraper-civilization.”35 Like many of the German visitors to the U.S. in the interwar period that Mary Nolan describes elsewhere in this volume, Röpke regarded American society with a “mixture of admiration and anxiety”: a vision of the future laced with dystopia.36

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30 Having officially been “retired” rather than fired from his post, Röpke continued to receive a pension from the German government until the outbreak of the war in 1939. Hennecke, Wilhelm Röpke: Ein Leben in der Brändung, 89–95, 125.


33 Machlup to Gottfried Haberler, 19 Feb 1935, Hoover Archive, Machlup Papers, 41.4. Machlup ended up with a Rockefeller-funded guest professorship at the State University of New York, Buffalo, that year. Hagemann, “Dismissal, Expulsion, and Emigration,” 49.

34 Technically, Röpke was a fellow of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation. Sylvia Hanna Skwiercz, Der dritte Weg im Denken von Wilhelm Röpke (Würzburg, 1988), 46; Hennecke, Wilhelm Röpke: Ein Leben in der Brändung, 60.

35 Hennecke, Wilhelm Röpke: Ein Leben in der Brändung, 60.

Röpke’s second Rockefeller grant was for a large project on the international economic order, which he began in Geneva in 1937, where he had taken a position at the Institute of International Studies (Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études Internationales). Röpke would remain at the institute, itself Rockefeller-funded, until his death in 1966. His position was secured through the efforts of the director William Rappard, who had hired Austrian liberal economist Ludwig von Mises for the institute in 1934 and played a key role in developing Geneva as a hub of exchange and organization for neoliberal thought in the 1930s and 1940s. After the war’s end, Röpke would build on connections made in Geneva as well as at the Colloque Lippmann of 1938 in Paris, where now self-described neoliberals from the intellectual and business communities of Western Europe and the U.S. came together to oppose what they saw as the eclipse of free market principles in the decade of protectionism, the Popular Front, and the New Deal. He would also draw on his pre-1945 links to German members of the so-called Freiburg School, a subgroup of neoliberals — called ordoliberals after their journal Ordo — who emphasized the need for a strong state to protect and maintain the conditions of free market competition.

The most important organizational base for Röpke and his fellow neoliberals in the postwar period was the Mont Pèlerin Society. Transatlantic connections proliferated in the early MPS. Over one-third of its members were from the U.S. in its early years; it held its

38 The Institute had received $1.5 million from the Rockefeller Foundation by 1950. Walpen, Die offenen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft, 86.
40 At the Colloque, which was originally convened to discuss U.S. journalist Walter Lippmann’s 1937 book The Good Society, “néo-libéralisme” won out narrowly as a label of self-description over contending terms including néo-capitalisme, libéralisme positif, libéralisme social, and libéralisme de gauche. Röpke himself was the first to introduce the term Neoliberalismus into German in the foreword to the 1945 translation of The Good Society. Walpen, Die offenen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft, 60, 73.
first meeting in the U.S. in 1958. The most active economists came from the University of Chicago, including Milton Friedman, Frank Knight, Aaron Director, and George Stigler, along with Röpke’s interwar acquaintance from the Rockefeller Foundation, John van Sickle. Non-academic members and attendees of the meetings in the early 1950s included Henry Hazlitt of *Newsweek* (and *The Freeman* until 1952); John A. Davenport of *Fortune* (later of Barron’s); John Chamberlain of the *Wall Street Journal* (later of the *National Review*); and philanthropist Howard Pew, funder of *Christian Economics*. Buckley and publisher Henry Regnery joined in the late 1950s. Röpke made more presentations than any other member at MPS meetings in the first fifteen years. The network put him in shared company with the active segment of the U.S. business community mobilized against the New Deal that Phillips-Fein has labeled the “business conservatives,” a group that helped publicize and promote the writings and ideas of German-speaking neoliberals in the postwar decades.

In the 1950s, Röpke became a steady source of information for the emerging U.S. conservative movement on issues of European integration, postwar reconstruction, and international economics. Buckley and Russell T. Kirk, the figureheads of the movement, corresponded and collaborated extensively with Röpke, and his name appeared on the masthead of the first issues of both the *National Review* and *Modern Age* in 1955, the New Right’s flagship publications. In personal correspondence, Kirk expressed his indebtedness to Röpke’s influence and lauded him as the best hope for “humanizing economic thought.” Buckley declared himself a “disciple” of Röpke in 1956, informing him of the “considerable body of people in the United States who are keenly aware” of his work “at a time when the whole world seems to have gone mad.”

Röpke’s focus on religious morality in his major works written in the 1940s made him more attractive to the opinion-makers of the New Right than Hayek and Mises. Hayek was opposed to the absorption of Kirk’s conservatism into the neoliberal MPS, attempting unsuccessfully to block his membership, and prepared a paper titled “Why I Am Not a Conservative” for a 1957 meeting to express his distance from Kirk’s politics. Unlike Kirk, Hayek made few explicit references to Christianity, and Mises was outright skeptical of it. After their engagement with business cycle research and federalism in the 1930s and 1940s, both had also paid surprisingly little attention to matters

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43 Ibid., 166-69.
44 Ibid., 170.
47 Kirk’s biographer notes that he “frequently praised” Röpke while he “rejected the moral isolation inherent in Mises’ social philosophy.” W. Wesley McDonald, *Russell Kirk and the Age of Ideology* (Columbia, MO, 2004), 168; Kirk to Röpke, 14 Feb 1955, RA, DVD 2, p. 150.
51 A recent intellectual biography of Hayek has no index entries for religion, church, or Christianity: Bruce Caldwell, *Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek* (Chicago, 2004). Mises observed in 1944 that “virtually all the Christian churches and sects have espoused the principles of socialism and interventionism.” Ludwig Von Mises, *Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total War* (New Haven, 1944), 120.
of international political economy. The Protestant Röpke, by contrast, engaged in his own fusionist project of reconciling Catholicism and liberalism in Switzerland during the war years. Röpke spoke across disciplines in his work, consistently folding purely economic questions into larger issues of ethics and cultural critique. In George H. Nash’s canonical history of U.S. conservatism, he called Röpke’s work the “very model of fusionism,” placing it at the intersection of the streams of Christian traditionalism and free market orthodoxy that defined conservatism as an intellectual movement.

For U.S. conservatives in the 1950s, Röpke was in a position to be the European mandarin of an explicitly Christian capitalism at a time of global transformation. Yet he devoted most of his writing to questions of international relations in the 1950s, where religion had an ambiguous position, both central and increasingly subsumed into questions of civilization and concerns about “the West.” Röpke placed Christianity at the origins of a genealogy of economic organization. As Razeen Sally observed, the decades before the First World War represented the closest real-world instantiation of the “liberal international economic order” envisioned by Röpke, who described the years from the Congress of Vienna until August 1914 as “the long and glorious sunny day of the western world.” Adherence to the gold standard and the free movement of capital and goods, Röpke wrote, had acted as a “a sort of unwritten ordre public international, a secularized Res Publica Christiana, which for that reason spread all over the globe,” resulting in a “political and moral integration of the world.” As Sally pointed out, the system relied as much on “informal constraints, that is, extralegal standards, conventions and moral codes of behavior” as on national laws. Membership in international society was synonymous with being a responsible actor in the free market. The liberal world order, the heir of a Christian order, was

52 Among the prominent Central European liberal economists, only Gottfried Haberler, Friedrich Lutz, and Fritz Machlup were as concerned with matters of the international economic order. None of them, however, paired this with attention to religion.


57 Sally, Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order, 139.
defined as a system of formally ungoverned economic expectations and modes of interaction. It was a community of values, which individual economies could both join and leave, but which supranational institutions could not legislate into existence.

Peripheral to Röpke’s account of the “glorious sunny day of the western world” was the fact that the nineteenth century was also the era of high imperialism, when much of the earth’s territory was divided among the European powers. What was to be done, then, in the postwar world, when both the religious basis of international society had been lost and the community of “the West” was splintered by decolonization? The quandary Röpke faced in the 1950s was that shared by many other conservatives and indeed, centrists, as well: how could empire be ended without losing control of the non-white world? As mentioned in the introduction, Röpke dismissed the proposal for a world government that would welcome postcolonial nations as peers as a Western death wish; the “free world,” he wrote, could not be “expected to commit suicide.”

He suggested instead a form of federalism, similar to what fellow liberals Hayek, Lionel Robbins, and Moritz Julius Bonn had discussed in the 1930s and 1940s: it gave nations formal political sovereignty but a diminished economic autonomy that would be regulated by the free flow of capital and investment over borders. This represented a middle position between autarkic economies operating with exchange controls and a super-state that would plan activity and allocate resources. He saw the latter state as “the kind of international dictatorship which Hitler called ‘Grossraum.’” Röpke’s global vision was consistent with the “rearticulated federalism” that Walpen sees as a basic feature of neoliberal thought, which calls for the decentralization of authority to remove the collective decision-making capacity for the “emancipatory design of society as a whole.” A loose world federation would help prevent mass popular expectations from becoming reality as the ever-present threat of capital flight would curb campaigns of expansionary social policy.

Röpke predicted that the disciplining function of the open world economy would be accompanied by the retrenchment of civilizational blocs in response to the presence of “Hannibal ante portas.” Invoking a potentially bellicose non-European antagonist, he argued that “the more the non-European great powers emerge, and the civilizations of other continents begin to regard us with condescending...
self-confidence, the more it becomes both natural and necessary for the feeling of spiritual and moral homogeneousness among Europeans to increase powerfully.” Röpke’s normative vision for the West and his anxiety about shifts in the global racial order overlapped considerably with the Atlanticism that historians have traced from turn-of-the-century calls for Anglo-American union to the visions of Clarence Streit for the federalist fusion of the U.S. with Great Britain and Western Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. Like other liberal economists, and West German Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, Röpke opposed the creation of the European Economic Community on the grounds that it would bloat bureaucracy and empower socialist tendencies in Western Europe. Instead, he advocated a European Free Trade Area that would include Britain and, consistent with his federalist vision, entail free trade and convertible currencies but no supra-national planning bodies.

As Milene Wegmann has advanced, Röpke and Erhard also believed that integration should not happen “at the expense of the Atlantic Community” and based their vision on the “Occidental concept that emphasized the political, social, and historical similarities of the West.”

Linked by their common Christian patrimony, Western Europe and North America bore the responsibility for restoring the liberal international economic order lost in 1914.

Against the Global New Deal

Röpke’s belief that the putative leader of the free world of the West, the United States, was doing everything in its power to accelerate the disintegration of world order deepened his concerns in the 1950s. The problems had begun with the New Deal. He believed that organized labor, protectionism, and planning had “ politicized” economic processes and eroded the foundations of the liberal international economic order. In this sense, the interventionist state was the adversary of the liberal world economy as it sought to empower working populations and raise standards of living within national-territorial borders of the besieged community extended over the ocean. He asserted that “the spiritual and political integration of Europe . . . only makes sense as part and parcel of a higher combination and organization of the resistance potential of the entire western world on both sides of the Atlantic.” A morally strengthened Fortress Occident would arise as a necessary defense against the emboldened populations of the non-West, unanchored as they were from a genuine sense of community.

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space. In the postwar moment, Röpke saw the U.S. government exporting these expectations, first to Western Europe, and then to the decolonizing world.

In one of his first articles in the U.S. conservative publication The Freeman, Röpke took aim at wartime visions of the “New Deal for the world.”72 Citing the socioeconomic promise of Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms from 1941, Röpke remarked, “it is unlikely that the true liberal will be caught by such glib phrases as the ‘Freedom from Want’ by which the essence of liberty is surrendered to collectivism.”73 Since the announcement of the Atlantic Charter, Röpke had feared that “the flip side of total war,” as Josef Mooser puts it, would be the “sweeping expectation that there would be a welfare state among those mobilized for war.”74 Roosevelt had let the genie of what Röpke called “equalitarianism” out of the bottle to win the war, and it would be difficult to put back in.

The first consequence of the New Deal’s internationalization was the diverse experimentation with planning that emerged in postwar Western Europe.75 In an attack on Marshall Plan aid for Britain and France in 1950, Missouri senator James Kem, dubbing these nations “socialist,” quoted Röpke’s observation of the irony “that the Marshall Plan, which should have pulled Western Europe out of the muck of collectivistic, nationalist economic polity, has threatened to create a new supercollectivism on a super-state level.”76 Coining colorful terms, Röpke declared the U.S. support for the planning bodies of the EEC as “vulgar gigantolatry and technolatry.”77

International organizations threatened to expand the pernicious effects of planning to an even larger scale. In 1952, the American Enterprise Association (later the American Enterprise Institute) published Röpke’s critique of the UN Report on National and International Measures for Full Employment (1949), which had been written primarily by British and French Keynesians.78 Röpke had written that there was “no other economic issue which appears so attractive and yet may be so dangerous as the one based on this misleading and bitterly discussed concept” of full employment and warned that the report marked the dangerous shift from “national planning” to “international planning.”79

With the launch of Kennedy’s New Frontier program in 1961, Röpke found another “New” entity to place in the crosshairs of critique. In April 1963, he published a half-page editorial in the Wall Street Journal titled “Washington’s Economics: A German Scholar Sees...”
Nation Moving into Fiscal Socialism.” This critique began by explicitly linking the New Deal and Kennedy’s New Frontier: “Thirty years ago, I published an article severely criticizing the economic policies then being pursued by President Roosevelt in the name of a ‘New Deal.’” The “New Frontier” of President Kennedy, Röpke continued, was no less worrisome. “The similarity between the ‘New Deal’ and ‘New Frontier’ finds expression not only in the general decline in business confidence,” he wrote, “but in an openly defiant glorification of ‘big government’ and in the fiscal megalomania which serves this questionable ideal.” The two programs both surrendered to the rising wage demands of trade unions and shared an inflationary policy of monetary expansion that expressed “the tendency for the increasingly centralized state of our times to surround like a parasitical vine both society and economy.”

The special danger of the New Frontier, in Röpke’s view, was that it was literally a global New Deal. Extending Röpke’s metaphor, one could say that the vines of the state were creeping outward through an expanding foreign aid program of government loans, which had drawn in the West German partner by 1960, and the more aggressive use of trade unions, including the establishment of the American Institute of Free Labor Development as part of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. Röpke called foreign aid “the great action by which the ideas and methods of collectivist policy are carried into the world economy” and singled out economist Myrdal as proposing the “transposition” of the modern welfare state from the Western to what he called the “undeveloped” world (consciously avoiding the normative term “underdeveloped”).

In his Wall Street Journal article, Röpke attacked by name the two critical authors of the Keynesian growth model and of modernization theory, John Kenneth Galbraith and Walt Whitman Rostow, maintaining that the latter preached a “new version of the Rooseveltian illusionism in the dress of economic determinism . . . which is not nearly as far removed from that of Marx as Prof. Rostow seems to think.” Indeed, by promoting what Röpke called “standard of life-ism,” the promise of global economic evenness contained in modernization theory had “played a more important role in the advance of communism to its present power than has the whole panoply of Communist tanks, rockets and divisions.” Röpke condemned, in other words, the very feature that made development a consensus goal internationally in the 1950s: that it concentrated on increasing

82 Röpke, “Washington’s Economics.”
output without being overly prescriptive about the route used to arrive at that output.\(^8^3\)

Röpke believed that the “one-sided economism” that exported materialist yardsticks of progress to the global South alongside a fetish for industrialization would lead to worldwide inflation, the erosion of the world food supply, and the creation of a global urban proletariat alienated from its own traditions.\(^8^4\) He believed that an economically equal world might simply be impossible, and that developing countries might have to remain underdeveloped as a way of preventing a possible “overindustrialization and underagriculturization of the world.”\(^8^5\) Beyond the structural imbalance of an entirely industrialized world, he added, the conditions for industrialization in the Third World did not exist. He explained global disparities in wealth through cultural essentialism, writing that “the ‘rich’ countries of today are rich because, along with the necessary prerequisites of modern technology and its industrial use, they have a particular form of economic organization that responds to their spirit \([\text{Geist}]\).”\(^8^6\) He went on to state that it was an “uncomfortable fact” but a reality that this “spirit” could only be found in “sharply curtailed areas . . . namely the fully developed industrial countries of the free world.”\(^8^7\) As Plehwe writes, Röpke believed that the “lack of punctuality, reliability, the inclination to save and to create” meant that industrialization schemes in the global South were “doomed to fail.”\(^8^8\)

Sally described Röpke’s model as an international “liberalism from below,” rooted in extralegal behavioral practices. While Sally is correct in this sense, he fails to observe the built-in cultural constraints of Röpke’s model.\(^9^9\) For Röpke, some paths to development, and thus possible futures, for postcolonial nations were disqualified from the outset. In his opinion, the right to equality encapsulated in the ethos of the welfare state was as unworkable and unwise on the global scale as it was on the national. Inequality was to be understood as an unavoidable characteristic of capitalist society. Whereas one of the greatest attractions of modernization theory has been regarded as its “promise of evenness,” Röpke’s model saw unevenness as the inevitable continuing status quo within an international division of labor.\(^9^0\)

Three congressmen entered Röpke’s anti-Kennedy polemic into the Congressional Record in a single day, and another did so in the following weeks:\(^9^1\) Steven B. Derounian (New York), Bruce

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84 Wilhelm Röpke, “The Free West,” in *Freedom and Serfdom: An Anthology of Western Thought*, ed. Albert Hunold (Dordrecht, 1961), 76; Plehwe has shown that Röpke and Peter T. Bauer were the strongest voices of the criticism of the development consensus in MPS circles in the 1950s. Plehwe, “The Origins of the Neoliberal Economic Development Discourse,” 248–51.


87 Ibid.


89 Sally, *Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order*, 132.


91 Patrick Boarman to Röpke, 12 Apr 1963, RA, file 21, p. 598.
Alger (Texas), Thomas B. Curtis (Missouri), and Bob Wilson (California). 92 Alger, an arch-conservative, followed Röpke in describing the New Frontier as “continuing the master plan of the New Deal.” Referring to Rostow and Galbraith, he asked, “Will our people wake up to the designs of these architects of socialism, of slavery, enough to change our course back to capitalism or not?” 93 Curtis, though a moderate, also used the Röpke article to criticize Kennedy and the “tired, unimaginative and unworkable theories of the New Deal.” 94 Röpke’s inflammatory critique of Kennedy and his overseas policy provided Republican policy-makers with ammunition to fight the rhetorical war against the New Deal on a global level.

The Economist-Oracle from the “Other Europe”

The moment at which Röpke’s article appeared — in 1963 — was one of intensifying mobilization for the U.S. conservative movement. Phillips-Fein has shown that business conservatives who organized against the New Deal in the 1930s entered a more public phase of their campaign after Eisenhower’s reelection and his embrace of Keynesianism in 1958 under the moniker of “modern Republicanism.” 95 Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, who would be advised by a coterie of émigré German-speaking economists (including Röpke) in his 1964 presidential bid, entered the national spotlight that year in attacks on Eisenhower’s new budget. 96 The John Birch Society was formed that fall, and the MPS met in the U.S. for the first time at Princeton University, with the funding of companies ranging from United Fruit to U.S. Steel. 97 This network of critics shared a willingness to label Eisenhower “socialist” if not “communist” for his move toward Keynesian policy tools. The election of Kennedy in 1960 only amplified the rhetoric, as Röpke’s blithe reference to “fiscal socialism” in the title of his Wall Street Journal article illustrates.

This moment was also one when panicky U.S. conservatives looked to Western Europe as the bastion of market conformism. For New Rightists, neoliberal conservatives like Röpke and Hayek represented the “other Europe,” embodied in the policies of Economics

94 Ibid., S208, Curtis was one of the leaders of the “Young Turks” group of moderate Republicans in the late 1950s and early 1960s. His defense of free trade separated him from many entrenched »
96 Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York, 2001), 33; Röpke wrote to German journalist Paul Wilhelm Wenger in 1964 “in confidence” that he had written an exposé for Goldwater on European economic integration that had been “received with great enthusiasm.” He described Goldwater as “a force that is changing the entire picture of American politics.” Röpke to Paul Wilhelm Wenger, 5 Aug 1964, RA, file 89, p. 568.
97 Founded by candy manufacturer Robert Welch and other conservative businessmen, the John Birch Society organized against what it saw as the imminent threat of communism in American public life. Welch accused Eisenhower of being a communist agent. Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands, 57, 59.

Minister Ludwig Erhard in West Germany, President Luigi Einaudi in Italy, and de Gaulle adviser Jacques Rueff in France, who professed more faith in market mechanisms and more suspicion of Keynesian demand management than U.S. policymakers. These isolated individuals were cast as brave bulwarks; Buckley said that it was Röpke’s “tenacious faith in the free enterprise system [that] is largely responsible for the recovery of Western Europe.” In a 1963 *Wall Street Journal* article, conservative journalist and MPS member William Henry Chamberlin counted Röpke among “the leaders of the neo-liberal trend in economic thought that has been an important influence in turning European governments away from the goals and methods of collectivism and the planned economy.”

In a dynamic that would be reversed after the 1970s, the U.S. seemed more “socialist” than parts of Europe — West Germany and Switzerland, in particular — in the early 1960s to members of the U.S. New Right, with credit for this going to a small group of economic luminaries.

Röpke and other German-speaking economists profited from their perceived objectivity and separation from the scrum of U.S. politics. A letter to the editor after Röpke’s 1963 polemic noted that “his message is the more forceful because it is delivered from a comfortable distance which permits unhurried appraisal of the situation.”

When *Rundt’s Intelligence Weekly*, a businessmen’s information service, sent the article out to its subscribers, it included the following biographical note: “Röpke who voluntarily left Nazi Germany is deemed one of the foremost and perhaps the foremost economist and economic philosopher of Europe, if not our time. He is also for many years one who has concerned himself in depth with the United States. Obviously, he has no ax to grind; he lives in Geneva; has no political ambitions anywhere; and is a true cosmopolitan.”

Europe and, for Röpke, Switzerland in particular (though one could see neutral Austria as playing a similar role), spatially represented the otherwise rhetorical redoubt from which embattled conservatives spoke at the turn of the 1960s. This was literal in the case of the MPS, which took its name from the first meeting on Switzerland’s Mont Pèlerin, or the “mountain where thinkers dwell,” as the *Wall Street Journal* would label it in 1972.

Röpke embraced the role of emissary from the “other Europe” and representative of the “other liberals” who held to principles of private property and competition rather than redistribution and social justice.
Three years later, he described himself as an “economist from the middle of Europe . . . who saw it as self-evident that, after all of the experiences and considerations of the last decades, one could not speak of planned economies, full employment policies, nationalization and the welfare state in anything more than a tone of sarcasm.” Röpke reported that during his time in the U.S., people had said that they were used to hearing the “commitment to the market economy and the critique of socialism . . . from the presidents of chambers of commerce and bank directors” but that Röpke had proved that “one can be ‘conservative’ without necessarily being intellectually crude or uneducated, and one can represent this position in a way that is worthy of an intellectual.” Nash argues that it was, in part, through identification and citation of relatively obscure European thinkers like Röpke that the conservative movement legitimized itself as an intellectual movement in the 1950s and 1960s.

Röpke had his own theory about the dearth of intellectuals in the U.S. capable of defending the cause of classical liberalism. He saw the root of the problem in the “dynamic competitive economy” of the U.S., which was producing wealth so quickly that academics were being left behind, losing “social prestige,” and expressing their resentment in anti-capitalist opinions. The creation of new economic elites was happening so rapidly, Röpke noted, that a joke he had told about the *nouveau riche* during the Weimar inflation years drew blank stares from his American audience of wealthy businessmen who apparently wondered what this term meant. Röpke saw it as his goal to bridge the gap between the “world of business and the world of intellectual life,” offering himself, in effect, as the *philosophe* of the *nouveau riche*.

Röpke became part of the business conservative public relations offensive through his written work, as well as in public actions. For example, he recorded a piece for a program that U.S. Steel was broadcasting on Ivy League college radio stations at its request. It was through these networks that he became part of the international advisory council for a plan to create a “Hall of Free Enterprise” for the 1964 New York World’s Fair, which its organizers claimed would be “the first time that the totality of a free economy has ever been put together in simple, visual form.” The hall was a paradigmatic representation of the economist as an infallible, neutral source of information. Its central feature was a computer that would print answers to questions visitors typed in on slips of paper. As *The New Republic* wrote, “there is a kind of oracular infallibility to this machine.

106  Ibid., 138.
109  Röpke to Fred Clark, 22 Sept 1962, RA, file 20, p. 50.
that makes it more impressive than a live pundit. A group of awe-stricken visitors punched it and read replies. What it said must be so, they seemed to feel, because after all a machine is unbiased and impartial.\footnote{110}

One could argue that German-speaking economists profited from a similar assumption of “oracular infallibility” at this critical moment in the 1960s when an ambitious application of worldwide Keynesianism encountered a conservative anti-Keynesian backlash.\footnote{111} One of Röpke’s correspondents from Venezuela, who studied with Austrian émigré Gottfried Haberler at Harvard and later worked with the European Economic Community, called Röpke a “prophet.”\footnote{112} One newspaper described him as “one of the high priests of free enterprise” and another as “a skilled medical authority.”\footnote{113} The so-called wise men who advised international financial institutions and later helped direct programs of structural adjustment enjoyed a similar status, achieving a kind of superhuman, transcendent detachment in their expertise. In 1960, the West German, American, and British central bankers sent to India by the World Bank to provide advice on its Five-Year Plan were referred to as the “three wise men.”\footnote{114} The West German \textit{Sachverständigenrat}, or Council of Economic Experts, created in 1963, was known commonly as the \textit{Fünf Weisen}, or Five Wise Men.\footnote{115} Historians have noted the special prestige enjoyed by economic experts in what a 1968 book called “the era of the economists.”\footnote{116} While it might seem superficially odd to pair the computer and the avuncular European intellectual, they shared the claim of producing knowledge in a space ostensibly outside of politics. In the 1960s, the omniscient economist prophet could equally be a European or a computer.

\section*{The Forum Atlanticum: Taking the Front Southward}

The Atlantic front of the conservative resistance to the export of New Deal policies extended southward in the early 1960s in an attempt to build a counter-bloc to the Alliance for Progress. Röpke found allies among those who had published his work in local newspapers and translated books and pamphlets, as well as some former students now in positions of power, such as Peruvian Economics Minister Pedro Beltrán.\footnote{117} In 1963, he wrote to his Mexican contact, MPS member Gustavo Velasco, that he was glad his “anti-Kennedyism” had become known in his country.\footnote{118} His \textit{Wall Street Journal} editorial appeared in Venezuela in Spanish translation just
Introduction

one month after its original publication. His publisher, Nicomedas Zuloaga of the Institute for Economic and Social Analysis, wrote, “We are now facing a great danger in our country with the foreign policy of the U.S. toward Latin America. All that policy, we believe, is based on the writings of Mr. Raúl Prebisch of the ECLA [United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean].” The shared enemy in North and South America was the international organization of the UN and the egalitarian economics for which it provided space and resources. Opposition would take a concerted effort.

Röpke’s close collaborator and funder Albert Hunold became convinced of the need to formalize this emerging transatlantic bloc after the Peruvian Chamber of Commerce bought two thousand copies of his talk when he was on a South American speaking tour in 1962. He and Röpke began to canvass for interest in an organization they called the Forum Atlanticum. They hoped this new body would replace the MPS, from which they had both resigned in a long-simmering conflict with Hayek; Röpke described the society in 1963 as filled with “intellectual careerists and intriguers.” Hunold’s conversations with Prebisch, the ECLA, and Chilean senator and university professor Pedro Ibañez Ojeda, who insisted that the threat posed by the Alliance for Progress was very large, strengthened their resolve. Ibañez was the new head of the Inter-American Committee on Trade and Protection, which, according to Juan Gabriel Valdés, provided the “infrastructure and network of connections” for Chicago-trained economists in Chile in the 1960s ahead of their breakthrough after Pinochet’s coup.

Röpke intended for the forum to more exclusively represent the strain of conservatism emerging around Kirk and Buckley — which “fused” free market principles and Christianity — rather than the less overtly religious philosophies of Hayek and Mises. In trying to build support for the forum, Hunold discredited Hayek and Mises to would-be partners, describing their theories as having “no philosophy of society” and excluding “the human in his entirety.” It was likely the high profile of Catholic elites in Latin America that directed Röpke and Hunold’s attention southward. Among proposed forum members, Hunold listed South Americans first, including economics professors in Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. Cuban émigré businessman and founder of the first anti-Castro organization Rafael Lincoln Diaz-Balart promised to join.

121 Röpke to Karl Brandt, 26 Apr 1963, RA, file 21, p. 597. Beyond personality frictions, the conflict boiled down to Hunold and Röpke having a more apocalyptic diagnosis of geopolitics, their preference for greater MPS publicity, and their desire to exert more stringent, even punitive, control over its membership. For details, see Walpen, Die offenen Feinde und ihre Gesellschaft, 145-51.
123 Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists, 224-25.
contribute, and raise funds for the endeavor in Latin America, no
doubt disillusioned by the Kennedy administration’s failure at the
Bay of Pigs.125

Offering the presidency of the would-be Forum Atlanticum to Kirk,
Röpke explained the idea behind it to him as being “that the good
minds of Europe and of both Americas should . . . join their forces
to present and to bring into focus the common patrimony of our
occidental civilization while frankly analyzing and criticizing the
hostile tendencies corroding and disintegrating this civilization.”126
This was necessary, as he had written before, “to enlighten the
ever more Americanized and sinistrized Europeans about the
ideological obsessions of American intellectuals, without which
Kennedy’s brain-damaged policies cannot be understood.”127 His old
ally Erhard, formerly the economics minister and now chancellor,
did not realize the threat Kennedy presented, he said; Erhard saw
world politics “like a Boy Scout” and had “entered the racket of
undeveloped countries” by calling for their “supposedly necessary
industrialization.”128 Röpke described Kennedy, the man, as a “vain,
neo-Jacobin Hamlet, an intelligent ass, an open Germanophobe . . .
surrounded by even bigger asses, a man without political will” and
said that Washington’s policy “could hardly be any different than
if it set out to make the world communist before one could smell it
coming.”129 He wrote in November 1962 that Europe existed under
the “terror of Kennedy.”130

The Forum Atlanticum was to be the agent of an alternative Atlanti-
cism that broke with the consensus around Keynesianism and the
full-employment goals of the postwar decades’ “embedded liberal-
ism.”131 The forum would act as a conservative opponent to more
centrist international formations like the Atlantic Institute in Paris.
Hunold had criticized this institute for its pro-EEC links to people
like Eisenhower’s UN ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and the archi-
tect of the Treaty of Rome, Pierre Uri (who had also been a member
of the committee that wrote the much-maligned UN report on full
employment for the world).132 Aside from Ibáñez, Kirk, Buckley,
Thomas Molnar, Velasco, individuals from Venezuela and Colombia,
and the publisher of U.S.A. magazine, Alice Widener, other proposed
members of the forum in the U.S. included Brandt, at Stanford, who
would become, like Friedman, one of Goldwater’s economic advisers
in 1964.133 Hunold also hoped to recruit an “African representative”
during a trip to South Africa.134

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125 Hunold to Röpke, 1 Jan
1965, RA, file 22, p. 206;
Hunold to Röpke, 5 Jan
1965, RA, file 22, p. 205;
Jesús Arboleya, The Cuban
Counterrevolution (Athens,
OH, 2000), 41.

126 Röpke to Kirk, 14 Feb 1963,
RA, file 21, p. 269.

127 “Sinistrized” is a neolo-
gism by which Röpke meant
“turned to the left.” Röpke to
Hunold, 18 Aug 1962, RA,
file 20, p. 220.

128 Röpke to Karl Brandt, 26 Apr
1963, RA, file 21, p. 597;
Röpke to Hunold, 30 Apr
1959, RA, file 18, p. 230;
Röpke to Schoeck, 17 Nov

129 Röpke to Karl Mönch, 18 Oct

130 Röpke to Willi Bretschter,
3 Nov 1962, RA, file 89,
p. 148.

131 On embedded liberalism,
see John Gerard Ruggie,
“International Regimes,
Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the
Postwar Economic Order,”
International Organization

132 Hunold to Röpke, 20 Mar
1964, RA, file 22, p. 298;
Toye and Toye, UN and Glo-
bal Political Economy, 93.

133 Kirk to Röpke, 19 Mar 1963,
RA, file 21, p. 649.

134 Ibid.; Hunold to Röpke, 1 Jan
The Forum Atlanticum received encouraging signs in 1964. Hunold and Kirk met with American donors John Lynn from the Lilly Endowment and Indianapolis lawyer and MPS member Pierre Goodrich, who both seemed supportive. The difficulty came with finding a president. Röpke had suffered his second heart attack in January 1962 in the midst of his departure from the MPS, and his deteriorating health made him an unlikely possibility. Kirk offered “to take the presidential office initially,” but only “[i]f no one else at all suitable can be found.” He further demurred that he was “so much engaged in assailing the infidel with fire and sword that it might be better to have a president somewhat less ferocious,” and also cited his lack of an institutional base and his “incessant wandering.” He suggested Brandt instead, who had left the MPS in solidarity with Röpke in 1962. Yet, as a Goldwater adviser, Brandt was no doubt shaken by his candidate’s catastrophic loss in November 1964 and wary of new undertakings. In December of that year, Brandt wrote Röpke to tell him that MPS members (including Antony Fisher, founder of the Institute of Economic Affairs) were encouraging him to rejoin the society, and that he was seriously considering it. Adopting the presidency of what was, in effect, a rival organization might alienate him permanently from the society he had helped name in 1947.

The noncommittal response from would-be leaders among U.S. conservatives imperiled plans for the Forum Atlanticum. Hunold suggested that they gather forces and try again in early 1966, but Röpke’s health continued to decline until his death in February of that year. Despite the organization’s failure, we can see in the nodes of its proposed network the way that Röpke found his “other America” in the conservative pundits of the North and the pro-business elites of Latin America, just as they found their “other Europe” in German-speaking neoliberal economists. Burgin notes that Röpke targeted the American conservatives around the National Review most pointedly for the new entity. The Forum Atlanticum represented the would-be internationalization of the fusionist project, whose most effective advocates Röpke saw in the United States. Allying with the traditionalists of the New Right, he hoped to break out of what he called the “economistic ghetto” of the libertarians attracted to Mises, Hayek, and Friedman. For all his criticism of the U.S., Röpke implicitly admired the American New Right’s capacity for what Pew called, in the title of his postwar conservative organization, Spiritual Mobilization.
Translating Race into Economics

In 1964, Hunold wrote to Röpke from a speaking tour through the U.S. Midwest that he had to change the name of one of his lectures in Peoria, Illinois. The title — “European Economic Integration” — had prompted the director of the local television station to call him and ask, “Do you fellows have a racial problem over there too?” Hunold pointed out that people in the U.S. were preoccupied above all “with integration and segregation.” In fact, the intersection of questions of race and economic order were at the forefront of Röpke’s concerns in this period as well. The economist prided himself on taking unpopular positions and being “against the tide” (as his memoir was titled when published in English by Regnery).147 This was certainly the case in the matter of South Africa. From 1964 until his death in 1966, Röpke’s concerns about foreign aid and “occidental civilization” converged in southern Africa as he became one of the most vocal apologists for apartheid in publications internationally and revealed, in the process, the cultural and economic geographies he shared with much of the New Right.148

South Africa was a diplomatic problem across the U.S. and Western Europe in the 1960s. After the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 when police killed sixty-nine people who had been demonstrating against the segregationist pass laws, and the subsequent prohibition of all anti-apartheid groups, it became increasingly difficult to maintain the fiction that the country was anything more than a racist police state. Thomas Borstelmann has traced the wavering line of the U.S. government as it sought to placate African and Asian opinion through symbolic actions against South Africa, including a partial arms embargo in 1963, without endangering economic ties and political relations, not least because it relied on the country as a source of uranium and other strategic minerals.149 The U.S. had been formally critical of the regime since 1958, when the Eisenhower administration first signed an anti-apartheid resolution in the UN.150

As mentioned in the introduction, Röpke expressed increasing frustration with the shift in world opinion against South Africa and turned to the U.S. New Right for allies. Joseph Lowndes has shown how the National Review tacked right on issues of race in the late 1950s, culminating in Buckley’s 1957 editorial opposing desegregation on the grounds that whites were “the advanced race” and that science proved “the median cultural superiority of White over Negro.”151 Though historians frequently cite Buckley’s editorial, they rarely note...
that it is couched in a defense of European colonialism in Africa. In it, Buckley defended British actions for maintaining colonial control in Kenya (which continued until 1964) as an example to the U.S. South that “the claims of civilization supersede those of universal suffrage,” and concluded with an openly anti-democratic argument for white supremacy: “it is more important for any community, anywhere in the world, to affirm and live by civilized standards, than to bow to the demands of the numerical majority.” Buckley’s racial views “did not stop at the water’s edge,” as Allan Lichtman notes. He visited South Africa on paid fact-finding missions in the 1960s and distributed publications supporting the apartheid government. Buckley’s exhortation that “the South must prevail” also meant that whites had to prevail in the global South.

Röpke’s frustration with the tolerance for the claims non-white actors were making on the world stage frequently tipped over into vitriol. In 1963, he expressed “disgust” at the sight of American politicians “groveling in front of the Negro chiefs on the South Africa issue.” “To call for ‘equality’ of the blacks in South Africa is a call for suicide,” he wrote, “saddening how few people have realized that.” Röpke’s name continued to add European intellectual luster to the campaign of apartheid apologists after his death. For example, in 1967, John M. Ashbrook, a GOP representative from Ohio and leader of the Draft Goldwater movement, entered a collection of documents about South Africa by the American-African Affairs Association (AAAAA) into the Congressional Record. Founded by National Review publisher William Rusher and African-American former Communist Max Yergan to advocate on behalf of white rule in southern Africa, the AAAA included the core group of New Right luminaries that Röpke had been in contact with since the 1940s, among them Kirk, Regnery, Chamberlin and Hazlitt. Ashbrook cited Röpke, “the respected economist,” as stating that South Africa was “not ‘stupid or evil.’” Ashbrook further called attention to the economic consequences of pressuring apartheid South Africa, saying that “little consideration seems to have been given by the UN to the economic disaster which would ensue for all black Africans if the most advanced and productive sector of the continent were disrupted by sanctions or war — which would incidentally concomitantly smash the British economy and end its substantial aid to Africa.” In Ashbrook’s logic, supported with reference to Röpke, upholding the racist system that disempowered them was economically necessary for the black population itself.

152  Buckley, “Why the South Must Prevail,” 149, emphasis added.
154  Röpke to Hunold, 27 Jun 1963, RA, file 21, p. 354. He was referring, in particular, to David Abner Morse, the chief of the U.S. delegation to the International Labor Conference. On Morse and the “South Africa crisis” of 1963 to which Röpke was surely referring, see Daniel Maul, Human Rights, Development, and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940-70 (New York, 2012), 236-45.
What states' rights were to desegregation in the U.S. South, economic stability was to decolonization and racial equality in the global South. In both cases, they were arguments conservative intellectuals could use to address white racial anxieties without using racist language as such.\(^{158}\) As cited above, Röpke described the "South African Negro" as "a man of an utterly different race" who "stems from a completely different type and level of civilization." Such bald statements of crude, evolutionary racism were quite rare in print. More common for Röpke, I would argue, was his translation of race into economics.

This framework is especially evident in an article he penned for *Modern Age* in the year of his death. Lamenting the loss of the "republica Christiana," which could no longer be relied on as the substrate of social interaction in a secular age, he assured readers that there still was an "international order" that persisted in "Europe and the overseas countries of European settlement," though, outside of this, there was only "debris." He explained the principle by which he excluded the developing and decolonized world from the international order through the example of the Congo:

As long as the Congo was connected with the international order of the West through Belgium, the guarantee offered by the Belgian government made it possible to raise the enormous sums needed for the economic development and modernization of the Congo largely on the free capital markets by way of the usual loans bearing a normal rate of interest.

He then contrasted this earlier moment of inclusion with the mid-1960s, by which time the Congo, "by an ill-considered and panicky act of 'decolonization,' ha[d] been severed from the international order of the West." Under this circumstance, there was "simply no rate of interest conceivable at which people in the Western countries might be persuaded to lend their money voluntarily to that country any more than they would to India, Egypt, or Indonesia."\(^{159}\)

Röpke thus distilled the question of membership in "the West" down to the quantifiable figure of how much interest the nation would have to pay to borrow money. The most pertinent criterion was not cultural, ideological, or geographic, but lay in investor confidence. In this argument, he followed his liberal predecessor, Adam Smith,
who similarly saw high interest rates in both contemporary China and the “barbarous nations that over-run the western provinces of the Roman empire” as markers of an inferior form of civilization. It is important to note that Röpke’s move did not represent a capitulation to the alleged “economism” of Mises and Hayek, however. Because he saw a perfect homology between the qualities of entrepreneurship, the civilizational category of the West, and the functioning of a free market, interest rates were not just an economic but a spiritual index, an index of Geist.

Consequently, Röpke saw the UN as destroying the international order rather than constituting an international order of its own. Because it sanctioned industrialization projects in the postcolonial world through low-interest loans and state-to-state financing, it tampered with the pure operations of the market, thus eroding the order that Röpke could only define defensively in economic terms. This economic definition of the free world — the translation of “the West” into a financial category — underwrote Röpke’s public treatment of South Africa.

Before his death, Röpke’s rhetoric climaxed in the wake of the white Rhodesian government’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965, along with the near-universal reprobation and British calls for sanctions that greeted it. Writing to Hunold as he entertained the South African Economics Minister and his wife in Geneva, Röpke wrote that, in “the revolting case of Rhodesia . . . the combination of ideology, obsession, hypocrisy, stupidity and masochism has reached a new height. If a white developing country proves that development aid is unnecessary, then [the country] has to be destroyed.” Hunold said he was lobbying Erhard to read Röpke’s work on South Africa so that it might change his mind about Rhodesia. Hunold reaffirmed that South Africa would “play an important role for the survival of the free world and the perpetuation of Western culture now and in the future,” and he likened the happenings in Rhodesia to “the same dangerous point as thirty-five years ago, when the National Socialists achieved their first great electoral success, and after which the fronts in Germany were systematically weakened.” The white bloc, in other words, was wavering, signaling the potential beginning of a race war, not of Germans against Jews this time but of blacks against whites. To Hunold, the Zambezi Line constituted the new Maginot Line; non-whites the new Nazis.

Another of Röpke’s collaborators, sociologist Helmut Schoeck, saw a direct relationship between the outcome of the Second World War and the decolonizing present. He felt that solidarity of Western intellectuals with non-white populations — or “Afrophilia” as he called it — was actually a “tardy and completely misplaced gesture of repentance of those people and groups who are ashamed because they failed to intervene at the right time and with any success in Hitler’s persecution of the Jews.” Seeking to make up for a past error, Schoeck averred in a letter to Röpke, “thanks to a strange inversion in the subconscious of many of our colleagues, the Africans (coloreds) today have been attributed all of the intelligence and cultural potential that Hitler actually did exterminate in the Jews.” This attempt at a conciliatory gesture would actually end by accelerating the literal extinction of the white population, Schoeck believed: “You cannot bring six million Jews back to life,” he cautioned, “by first putting cannibals in their place and then serving approximately the same number of Whites to them as a feast.”165

The frequent use of the term “cannibal” in Röpke’s circle of conservative correspondents to describe African political actors, along with the call for a “Zambezi line” and the persistent refrain of the “suicide of the West,” suggests that a deeply racialized worldview informed Röpke’s philosophy of society and economy. Particularist talk of “the West” sits uneasily alongside the universal concepts of “liberty,” “freedom,” and “the laws of the market” in the publications and speeches of liberal conservatives. In Röpke’s writings about South Africa, and in the New Right’s hearty approval of them, the intersections of the categories of cultural and economic geography in the early 1960s come to light.

The conservative network described here — including one of the most respected figures of German liberalism — always viewed opposition to the global New Deal and the attack on the Bretton Woods system through the lens of a potentially global race war. For Röpke, the financial translation of the West into a question of interest rates was underwritten by a defiant adherence to racial particularism and an opposition to racial equality.

**Conclusion**

For the conservatives of the U.S. New Right, Röpke was a voice from the Swiss mountaintop, speaking from the heart of a Western Europe of (supposedly) sound monetary and tight fiscal policy. He provided a perspective that was violently opposed to the domestic Keynesianism

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and international development policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. His combination, indeed conflation, of morality and economics in discussions of international order both aligned with and contributed to the fusionist strain of conservative thought emerging around Buckley and Kirk in the latter 1950s. Even when Röpke’s star faded after his death in 1966, his influence persisted in American conservative and libertarian publications and continues to do so today on web sites. In 1996, *Time* magazine and the *Guardian* called Röpke the “unknown guru” of Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan and an inspiration for Buchanan’s “conservatism with a heart,” a close relative of George W. Bush’s “compassionate conservatism” of a few years later.  

This article has outlined Röpke’s ties to the New Right and his failed attempts at building an institutional “white Atlantic” in the Forum Atlanticum, which was to link opponents of the global New Deal in Europe and both of the American continents. It has also made the case for the importance of race in this transatlantic formation. While scholars have begun to foreground the importance of race and racism for the emergence of the conservative movement both in the South and beyond, they have yet to do so within an international frame. Recent scholarly treatments of Röpke, hagiographic and otherwise, tactfully avoid reference to his spirited defense of apartheid; his otherwise admirably comprehensive biography makes no mention of it. The revisionism of the Ludwig von Mises Institute goes so far as to claim that the “original and most passionate opponents of apartheid in South Africa” were “classical liberals.” This article traces the activism of at least one prominent liberal who was not. Understanding how challenges to white supremacy in the U.S. and the global South were being read alongside one another in the years of decolonization makes clear that conservative and neoliberal visions for the world were also strategies of containment, developing the means for disciplining demands for political equality and material evenness emanating from a postcolonial world.

**Quinn Slobodian** is an assistant professor of modern European history at Wellesley College. His research focuses on modern Germany and the world, and his book *Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany* (Duke University Press, 2012) explores the relationship between the West German student movement and the Third World. His current book project is on neoliberalism and the idea of the world economy at the end of empire.
Transfers and Negotiations: Émigrés and Postwar America
WEIMAR SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COLD WAR AMERICA: THE CASE OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY GAME

Daniel Bessner

In September 1964, a number of high-ranking civilian and military officials, including McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Curtis LeMay, John McConne, John McNaughton, Cyrus Vance, and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), gathered at the Pentagon to play a “political-military game” that simulated the rapidly intensifying Vietnam War.1 The game, organized by the Joint War Games Agency (JWGA) of the JCS and dubbed SIGMA II-64, was designed to test whether Walt Whitman Rostow’s thesis that escalating the conflict by bombing the North and committing troops in the South was the path to U.S. victory.2 Players assumed a role on either the Red (Communist) or Blue (American/South Vietnamese) team and enacted Rostow’s recommendations. Unlike a traditional war game, this political-military game simulated not only battles but also the domestic negotiations and diplomatic exchanges that preceded and continued during a military engagement. After nine days of play, which Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and George Ball intermit-tently observed, the game’s participants concluded that escalating pressure against the North Vietnamese Army was not a sure path to victory.3

In the 1960s, the political game was a widely used tool with which high-ranking civilian and military officials attempted to “test” policy proposals and, in the process, improve their diplomatic skills.4 The game had come to the JWGA through Henry Rowen, a deputy in the Department of Defense and former economist at the RAND Corporation (RAND), and Lincoln Bloomfield, a former State Department official and professor of political science at MIT. Rowen and Bloomfield had themselves learned of the game through their connections to RAND’s Social Science Division, where two sociologists, Hans Speier and Herbert Goldhamer, and their colleagues developed it in the mid-1950s.

Speier (1905-1990) was one of several European émigrés who left their mark on the theory and practice of U.S. Cold War foreign policy. He had been one of the first doctoral students of Karl Mannheim, the creator of the sociology of knowledge, at the University of Heidelberg

1 The author would like to thank Dirk Bönker, Eric Brandom, Vanessa Freije, Malachi Hacohen, Hunter Heyck, Jan Logemann, John Mathew, Mary Nolan, and Alex Roland, as well as the participants in the June 2012 German Historical Institute conference on “More Atlantic Crossings?” for their comments and critiques. For stylistic purposes, throughout the article the political-military game will be referred to as the political game.

2 In full, the Rostow thesis claimed: “By applying limited, graduated military actions, reinforced by political and economic pressures, against a nation providing external support for an insurgency, we [the United States] could cause that nation to decide to reduce greatly, or eliminate altogether, its support for the insurgency. The objective of the attacks and pressures is not to destroy the nation’s ability to provide support but rather to affect its calculation of interests.” Quoted in H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (New York, 1997), 156. For a detailed examination of SIGMA II-64, see Thomas B. Allen, War Games: The Secret World of the Creators, Players, and Policy Makers Rehearsing World War III Today (New York, 1987), chapter 10, and Thomas B. Allen, “The Evolution of Wargaming: From Chessboard to Marine Doom,” in War and Games, ed. Thomas B. Allen and Tim J. Cornell (Rochester, NY, 2002), 235–42.


In 1928, he received his Ph.D. in sociology and national economics and spent the late Weimar period working for a variety of political and educational organizations, including the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Berlin-based Hochschule für Politik. In 1933, he fled Germany to become the youngest founding member of the New School for Social Research’s University in Exile in New York City. That same decade, he emerged as one of the United States’ foremost experts on psychological warfare, and with the nation’s entry into World War II joined the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) as head of the analysis section that examined Nazi propaganda. In 1944, Speier left the FBIS to join the Office of War Information as director of the subdivision that produced the directives that guided U.S. propaganda aimed at Germany. At war’s end, Speier became Associate, and later Acting, Chief of the State Department’s Division for Occupied Areas, where he was in charge of the State Department’s education and information programs in the German occupation zone. In 1947, Speier briefly returned to the New School before accepting an offer to serve as the founding chief of RAND’s Social Science Division (SSD).

Goldhamer (1907-1977) was a Canadian immigrant and an important member of the SSD who, like Speier, had a connection to Mannheim. He had earned his B.A. at the University of Toronto before matriculating at the University of Chicago to pursue a Ph.D. in sociology, which he received in 1942. In the early 1930s, Goldhamer studied with Mannheim at the London School of Economics before returning to the United States to teach at Chicago and complete his degree. He remained there until World War II, when he joined the U.S. Army as a medical psychologist. In the army he served as the Chief of the Research Division, European Theater, in a hospital unit that served in North Africa, France, and Germany. Once the war ended, Goldhamer returned to Chicago, although like Speier he left academia in 1948 to join the SSD. His most important RAND work centered upon advising the U.S. delegates to the Korean War armistice negotiations. From the early-1940s onward, Speier and Goldhamer were self-conscious “defense intellectuals” concerned with bringing their academic expertise to bear on America’s foreign and military policies.

In the early Cold War, Speier and Goldhamer developed the political game as a pedagogical tool they hoped would enable policymakers and researchers to sharpen their political and analytical skills. Although historians have examined the meaning of the political

5 For more on Heidelberg between World War I and the Nazi rise to power, see Christian Jansen, Professoren und Politik: Politisches Denken und Handeln der Heidelberger Hochschullehrer, 1914–1945 (Göttingen, 1993); and Reinhard Blommert, Intellektuelle im Aufbruch: Karl Mannheim, Alfred Weber, Norbert Elias, und die Heidelberger Sozialwissenschaften der Zwischenkriegszeit (Munich, 1999). The literature on the “Nazification” of Heidelberg and its activities during the period of Nazi rule is more extensive. For this, see Steven P. Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University (Cambridge, MA, 2002); and Wolfgang Uwe Eckart, Volker Sellin, and Eike Wolgast, eds., Die Universität Heidelberg im Nationalsozialismus (Heidelberg, 2006).


7 Andrew W. Marshall, foreword to The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference: A Personal Memoir, by Herbert Goldhamer (Santa Monica, CA, 1994 [1951]), xi.

game, no one has yet analyzed its intellectual origins. An analysis of contemporary documents, oral history interviews, and intellectual networks reveals two primary inspirations for the political game. The first consisted of game theory, systems analysis, and war games that assigned numerical values to political and social phenomena. Specifically, the political game was a reaction against quantified social science’s dominance of RAND. Speier in particular was frustrated with the ways in which RAND’s economists and physicists used game theory and other quantified methods to abstract decision-making from the historical contexts in which it occurred. He and Goldhamer created the political game to demonstrate to these “ignorant mathematicians” that to understand war, one needed to appreciate context. The second source for the political game was more obscure than the first. Namely, the pedagogy created by Karl Mannheim in interwar Germany inspired the formulation of Speier and Goldhamer’s simulation model. For both, Mannheim was an intellectual inspiration and resource.

When confronted with the problem of how to teach RAND’s analysts to appreciate the importance of a newly nuclear geopolitical context, Speier and Goldhamer drew upon the pedagogy of Mannheim, who faced an analogous problem of teaching students how to navigate the political environment of a newly democratic Germany. Mannheim addressed this problem by creating a pedagogy of simulation that reproduced the “atmosphere” — i.e., the structures of interaction — of democratic politics. This simulacrum, he believed, imbued students with political empathy and the skills to act as effective political agents. Speier and Goldhamer’s political game correspondingly sought to model the atmosphere of international relations and improve analysts’ abilities, decision-makers’ talents, and the capacity for both groups to understand their enemies. In its methods and goals, Speier and Goldhamer’s game mirrored Mannheim’s pedagogy.

The spread of the political-military game underlines the influence émigré defense intellectuals exerted on the practice of foreign policymaking in the Cold War United States. Central European exiles permeated the institutions of the “military-intellectual complex,” the collection of governmental and nongovernmental organizations that helped create the language, frameworks, and ideologies of postwar foreign and military policymaking. In addition to Speier, Paul Kecskemeti, Otto Kirchheimer, Olaf Helmer, Leo Löwenthal, Herbert Marcuse, Hans Morgenthau, John von Neumann, and dozens of other

9 Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi’s analyses of the political game are particularly insightful. See her “Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s,” Social Studies of Science 30, no. 2 (April 2000): 173-79; and The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War (Cambridge, MA, 2005), chapter 6, which updates the earlier article.

Central European émigrés worked or consulted for RAND, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other institutions. Their positions allowed them to influence a number of U.S. policies, from psychological warfare strategy to West German occupation policy. The émigrés’ impact highlights how Europeans, working through American institutions and decision-making structures, informed the direction of the Cold War.

Analyzing the development of the political game suggests the utility of pursuing a transnational history of the social sciences and provides a counterpoint to historical accounts that emphasize the triumph of a “science of politics,” or positivistic political science, in the postwar United States. Scholars have traditionally, and rightly, considered RAND a major center from which such a science of politics emerged. However, RAND was a heterogeneous institution, the divisions of which promoted different epistemologies and methodologies. For example, Speier, Goldhamer, and other members of the Social Science Division advocated a historically focused social science in line with the work of international relations theorists such as E.H. Carr, William T. R. Fox, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr. The Economics and Physics Divisions, in contrast, promoted more positivist methodologies, often under the influence of other émigrés,


12 For more on German exiles and their positions as intermediaries between the United States and Europe, see the Wheatland and Leeman essays in this volume. For a study that further examines European influence on postwar U.S. and global thought, and the creation of transnational epistemic communities, see also Albrecht’s essay in this volume.


The Political Game as a Transatlantic Phenomenon

The modern war game is a nineteenth-century transfer from Germany to the United States. Developed in Europe from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, the war game first came to America in 1879, when, inspired by the recent Prussian military victories in the Second Schleswig, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian Wars, Army Captain William Roscoe Livermore published his textbook *The American Kriegsspiel*. In 1887, McCarthy Little, a professor at the newly established Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, developed a lecture series on war gaming that proved popular, and war gaming became and remained part of the NWC’s most famous developers of game theory. The presence of both the political game and game theory at RAND illustrates that there were competing strands of European intellectual traditions influencing Cold War-era social science.\(^{16}\) While some, like Speier, endorsed qualitative methodologies, others, like von Neumann and Morgenstern, favored more quantitative approaches. RAND reflected both intellectual threads, and focusing on the work of the SSD, as opposed to the better known Economics Division, indicates that even during the apex of the “behavioral revolution” in political science, a significant space existed for historical and qualitative methods in premier research organizations.\(^{17}\) Moreover, Mannheim’s influence on the political game highlights the importance of linking Cold War-era social science to interwar and transnational developments.\(^{18}\)


17 A useful summary of the behavioral revolution in political science, with a focus on Herbert Simon as an exemplar of this approach, is found in Hunter Crowther-Heyck, *Herbert A. Simon: The Boundaries of Reason in Modern America* (Baltimore, 2005), 170-79. For an account that argues that the development of international relations theory was a project, endorsed by many German exiles, to resist the behavioral revolution, see Guilhot, “The Realist Gambit.”


curriculum. Over the course of the following decades, army officers also began to publish on war gaming, and after World War I instructors began to teach war games at both the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. Additionally, beginning in 1934 the U.S. Army’s War Plans Division organized annual games to simulate U.S. mobilization efforts. These games all replicated strategic and tactical military decision-making but offered no space for players to participate in the political processes that occurred before, during, and after a nation deployed its armed forces.

In 1944, Central European émigrés John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published their *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, which formalized game theory, the “mathematical discipline which studies situations of competition and cooperation between several involved parties.” At the exact moment that von Neumann and Morgenstern developed game theory, academics were demonstrating how social science could improve the U.S. military’s strategic and tactical capabilities. Soon after the United States entered World War II in December 1941, hundreds of social scientists left university positions to join the Office of Strategic Services, Office of War Information, and other new organizations of the wartime government. These academics became a regularly used resource for both civilian and military officials, and they participated in a number of projects, the most famous of which was the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, which used social science to improve war capabilities. Once the United States defeated the Axis Powers, government and military officials, fearful of losing the brainpower that had migrated to Washington, united with this first generation of defense intellectuals to create corporate and state institutions that reproduced the wartime experience on a permanent basis. One of these organizations, the RAND Corporation, became the premier foreign policy and military think tank in the 1950s and 1960s.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s game theory enthralled defense intellectuals who were searching for ways to quantify war and thus

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assert themselves over and against military officers, whose authority was based on professional and not disciplinary — or interdisciplinary — knowledge. Inspired by the two European exiles, a number of authors applied game theory to military decision-making in works released in the 1950s.26 RAND, where von Neumann and Morgenstern served as consultants and which was populated by hundreds of quantitatively-assured physicists, economists, and mathematicians, quickly became a major center for the development of game theory specifically and quantitative social science generally.27 As Herbert A. Simon, the Nobel Prize winning social scientist, declared in his autobiography, “for centrality to the postwar quantitative social sciences . . . the RAND Corporation [was] definitely the place[es] to see and be seen.”28

In the mid-1950s, Speier and Goldhamer developed the political game as a reaction to game theory and quantification’s dominance of RAND.28 Speier found that game theory and quantitative social science could be useful means to understand foreign policy and military decision-making, but also believed that the “ignorant mathematicians” who used such methods in their own studies and war games did not appreciate the historical contexts, the “psychological difficulties and contingent circumstances,” which affected policymakers’ decisions.29 Along with Goldhamer, he sought to remedy


27 Simon also mentioned the University of Chicago’s Cowles Commission as the other major center that promoted quantitative social science during this period. Herbert A. Simon, *Models of My Life: The Remarkable Autobiography of the Nobel Prize Winning Social Scientist and the Father of Artificial Intelligence* (New York, 1991), 116. David Hounshell’s “Generation of Knowledge,” 255, pointed me toward this quote.

28 The creation of a qualitative political game was first considered in early 1954, when SSD members Speier, Goldhamer, Joseph M. Goldsen, and Victor Hunt met to discuss it at RAND’s Washington, D.C. office. That summer, Goldhamer began developing the idea. In October, he wrote a proposal to Frank Collbohm, RAND’s president, regarding the game. Collbohm accepted the proposal, which led to the playing of the first game, which addressed U.S. activities in Western Europe. »

29 Hans Speier, “Geschichtsweise Mitteilungen zu einer intellektuellen Autobiographie,” Box 2, Folder 32, Hans Speier Papers, German and Jewish Intellectual Émigré Collection, M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives, University Libraries, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, New York (hereafter referred to as the Speier Papers), 265. The quantified political-military game to which Speier was responding was Alexander Mood’s Cold War Game (termed COW). For more on Mood’s game, see Alexander Mood, *War Gaming as a Technique of Analysis* (Santa Monica, CA, P-899, September 3, 1954); and U.S. Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group, *Directory of Organizations and Activities Engaged or Interested in War Gaming*, n.d., 1964/1965, 86.
this situation by creating a heuristic that would teach analysts the importance of understanding context in its geopolitical and institutional forms. Both Speier and Goldhamer had personal knowledge of the political-bureaucratic process. Speier gained his during World War II and its aftermath at the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Office of War Information, and Division for Occupied Areas, while Goldhamer had participated in the Korean War peace talks. Both intellectuals knew first-hand how rational calculations based on analyses of power and capabilities were not the only factors, nor necessarily the most important factors, that determined policymakers’ decisions. Culture, events, institutions, and politics all mattered, yet, they felt, the majority of RAND’s analysts elided these issues. Speier maintained that this led the insights of game theory, systems analysis, and quantified political and war games, when taken alone, to be “nonsense.” Speier and Goldhamer were not anti-quantification per se — although they generally used qualitative methodologies — but were rather concerned about what they considered to be quantification’s overreach. If RAND wanted to provide useful knowledge to decision-makers, they argued, its analysts needed to appreciate the contexts that restricted and shaped policymakers’ actions.

Speier and Goldhamer further worried that RAND’s analysts focused solely on the moment when a nation decided whether or not to participate in a war or on the hostilities themselves. As Speier declared, “in the nuclear age . . . no imaginary international conflict can be adequately simulated, unless attention is paid to threats of armed intervention, warnings of general war, nuclear blackmail, and the like”; that is to say, politics. For this reason, Speier and Goldhamer designed a political game that moved beyond traditional simulations of military strategy and tactics to model political decision-making processes. They maintained that participating in an explicitly political simulation forced analysts to immerse themselves in, and learn about, the experience and contexts of policymaking. In turn, this experience of simulation taught analysts the “political thought process” (politischen Denkprozess) and improved their research and advising skills. Speier and Goldhamer further hoped the game would “be used by government agencies, at least on a staff level, for purposes of contingency planning in foreign affairs” and for sharpening decision-makers’ abilities. The game, Speier and Goldhamer asserted, was a tool for both analysts and policymakers.

30 For Goldhamer’s critique of quantitative social science, specifically RAND’s systems analyses, see Herbert Goldhamer, Human Factors in Systems Analysis (Santa Monica, CA, RM-388, April 15, 1950).
31 “Gesprächweise,” 269.
32 Hans Speier, “Political Games and Scenarios,” May 6, 1961, Speier Papers, Box 10, Folder 17, 33.
33 “Gesprächweise,” 268.
34 Speier, “Political Games and Scenarios,” 39.
From the Science of Politics to Cold War Simulation

Educators have regularly used simulations to instruct participants to think like professionals. In addition to war games, since at least the early twentieth century U.S. professors, particularly those in business, medical, and law schools, employed case studies to replicate real world experiences.35 Moreover, in the 1930s and 1940s, the German and Japanese militaries played political games that foreshadowed the one created at RAND.36 Yet Speier and Goldhamer were unaware of these antecedents, and historians must therefore look to other sources to find the intellectual origins of the Cold War political game.37 If one examines the intellectual environment in which Speier and Goldhamer matured, it becomes clear that in many ways the goals and methods of their political game mirrored those of the pedagogy developed in the 1920s by Karl Mannheim, a scholar connected both personally and intellectually to the two RAND social scientists.

One of Mannheim’s intellectual projects was to develop what he termed a “science of politics,” an effort closely linked to what he conceived of as the chaotic nature of Weimar democracy and which he pursued in his landmark book, Ideology and Utopia.38 To Mannheim, empirical investigation demonstrated that the major problem of democratic society “consists essentially of the inescapable necessity of understanding both oneself and one’s adversary in the matrix of the social process.”39 Without mutual understanding and empathy, Mannheim maintained, a stable democratic politics was impossible. Intellectuals, he believed, had the duty to contribute to political stability by becoming “instructors of the democratic mass.”40 They needed to create a “science of politics” that would enable political analyses to be based on reasoned examination and not ideology, which overheated the political atmosphere and undermined the entire Weimar system. The way to do so was to teach students the sociology of knowledge, which would allow them to recognize the interconnection between political thought and social position. Mannheim hoped that this would engender sociopolitical integration by fostering “a synoptic perspective that will give [political] competitors an awareness of a common direction and some shared conception of

37 Speier even claimed that he was not familiar with the case study method. See “Gesprächsweise,” 269.
38 The version of Ideology and Utopia used in this essay is the 1954 printing of the 1936 translation, completed by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, which Mannheim revised and which made changes to the original 1929 Ideologie und Utopie. By the 1950s, Speier and Goldhamer were more familiar with the translation than the German original. Speier, for example, reviewed the translation for the American Journal of Sociology. See Hans Speier, “Book Review: Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia,” American Journal of Sociology 43, no. 1 (July 1937): 155-66. For an account of Mannheim’s early reception in the United States, which discusses Speier’s review, see David Kettler and Volker Meja, Karl Mannheim and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Secret of These New Times (New Brunswick, NJ, 1995), chapter 7.
meaning.”41 This would in turn combat “the extreme wings of the political movement” and create a “dynamic equilibrium” that would stabilize democracy.42

But Mannheim identified significant obstacles that augured against the creation of a stability-promoting science of politics. Most importantly, politics was intrinsically “irrational” in the sense that it was dynamic, and one could not understand it with reference to “laws, regulations, and established customs.” The rationalist, systematizing, “bourgeois” methods of social science, Mannheim declared, could not take account of politics’ irrational dynamism. Furthermore, all individuals were themselves participants in the political process, which made it difficult for a person to gain the necessary intellectual distance through which she or he could recognize that no political position represented absolute truth. Mannheim thus concerned himself with teaching “men, in action, to understand even their opponents in the light of their actual motives and their position in the historical-social situation.” He developed a pedagogy, or what he termed “a new framework,” “in which this kind of knowledge can find adequate expression.” Politics, Mannheim declared, was practice, and students could only learn how to operate within the political realm as he hoped they would through “actual conduct,” or simulation.43

Mannheim created a teacher-guided classroom that he believed allowed students to experience the realities of democratic politics while learning how to incorporate the sociology of knowledge into their analyses of the political process:

It seems certain that the interrelations in the specifically political sphere can be understood only in the course of discussion, the parties to which represent real forces in social life. There is no doubt, for example, that in order to develop the capacity for active orientation [of using the sociology of knowledge to understand one’s political opponents], the teaching procedure must concentrate on events that are immediate and actual, and in which the student has an opportunity to participate. There is no more favorable opportunity for gaining insight into the peculiar structure of the realm of politics than by grappling with one’s opponents about the most vital and immediate issues because on such occasions contradictory forces and points of view existing in a given period find expression.44

41 Kettler and Meja, Crisis of Liberalism, 69.
42 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 163.
44 Ibid., 164.
Transcending the Atlantic World

Introduction

Juxtaposing different ideological positions and exposing these ideas’ connections to one’s social location, Mannheim avowed, contributed to political understanding by “toning down the exaggeration” inherent in partisan advocacy. Furthermore, experiencing the irrationality of the political sphere enabled students “to reorient [themselves] anew to an ever newly forming constellation of factors” and transform into effective political actors.\(^45\) That is to say, through simulations guided by educators, students learned political empathy and how to think and act like citizens living in a democracy, which contributed to Weimar’s stability. Mannheim presented his pedagogy as having two main benefits: first, it inculcated in students a respect for their fellow citizens and democratic politics itself; second, it taught them how to be political operators.

As the critiques of “bourgeois intellectualism” present elsewhere in Ideology and Utopia implied, Mannheim’s non-positivist science of politics made methodological claims. He framed it as a defense against the spread of quantitative methodologies and declared in no uncertain terms that he rejected the notion “that nothing is . . . ‘true’ or ‘knowable’ except what could be presented as universally valid and necessary.” “The repudiation of qualitative knowledge,” Mannheim lamented, “grew out of this” incorrect assertion. He further affirmed that the assumptions of quantification foolishly excluded “all knowledge which depended . . . upon certain historical-social characteristics of men in the concrete.” Mannheim considered quantification an “attempt to eliminate the interests and values which constitute the human element in man,” and it was against this eradication of the human that he posed his rationalizing but non-positivist science of politics.\(^46\)

Mannheim deeply influenced Speier. Speier was Mannheim’s first unofficial doctoral student — as a non-tenured lecturer (Privatdozent), Mannheim could not officially advise graduate students — at the University of Heidelberg.\(^47\) Although Speier had intended to earn a Ph.D. in economics when he matriculated at the university, after hearing Mannheim’s inaugural lecture on “The Contemporary State of Sociology in Germany,” he pursued a dual-degree in sociology and national economics.\(^48\) Speier became a founding member of the Mannheim Kreis, which eventually included Norbert Elias, Werner Falk, Hans Gerth, Gerhard Münzer, and Svend Riemer. He also made his intellectual reputation as a critic of Mannheim. First in Germany and then in the United States, Speier harshly criticized Mannheim’s epistemology and approach to intellectual life.\(^49\) Specifically, he

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\(^{45}\) Ibid., 154, 157.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 108, 149-50.

\(^{47}\) Speier’s Ph.D. was likely officially overseen by the economist Samuel Paul “Sally” Altmann, who changed his name to Salomon in 1927.


lambasted Mannheim for arguing in *Ideology and Utopia* that “the criterion of truth” was “historical realization,” which Speier considered a manifestation of “the professional self-hatred of the intellectuals” who “subordinate thought to action.”50 Although Speier did not elucidate this specific point, if Mannheim were correct, than National Socialism — which had certainly been historically realized — represented a more perfect, or at least truer, political form than liberal democracy.51 Despite this split, Speier never stopped thinking of himself as a “dis-sentning Mannheim student.”52 He continued to practice the sociology of knowledge and until the end of his life appreciated how his mentor served as an important intellectual interlocutor.

Goldhamer was also connected to Mannheim. The two met in the early 1930s, when Goldhamer took at least one course with Mannheim at the London School of Economics, where the latter had accepted a position after his dismissal from the University of Frankfurt in April 1933.54 As a doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago, Goldhamer retained a keen interest in German sociology and was a member of an intellectual circle that included European sociologists such as Alexander von Schelting, himself a prominent critic of Mannheim. It is highly likely that Goldhamer and his colleagues discussed Mannheim’s *Ideologie und Utopie*, which had engendered significant debate amongst Central European intellectuals and those interested in European sociology.55 Moreover, Goldhamer was the “protégé” of Louis Wirth (himself a German-Jewish immigrant), who in the mid-1930s arranged to have *Ideologie und Utopie* translated into English.56 This is all to say that Mannheim was a significant part of Speier and Goldhamer’s intellectual worlds. Although the latter two intellectuals did not cite Mannheim in the course of their work on the political game, the similarities between their goals and methods and Mannheim’s pedagogy suggest that the ties between the three sociologists remained strong across oceans and decades, and that these parallels must be attributed to more than mere intellectual convergence.57
Similar to Mannheim, Speier and Goldhamer presented their game as a qualitative response to the over-formalization of the social sciences. The two sociologists belonged to the tradition of European historical sociology, a significant part of which rejected the “neopositivist epistemology” endorsed by many postwar social scientists.58 Speier was himself an important member of the group of German exiles who brought historical sociology to the United States, where it was rarely pursued before 1933.59 As he and Goldhamer said in their first public essay on the political game, experiments “in which a few political and economic factors were assigned numerical values so that the relative worth of alternative strategies could be assessed quantitatively” had demonstrated “that the simplification imposed in order to permit quantification made [formalized] game[s] of doubtful value for the assessment of political strategies and tactics in the real world.” Unlike game theory, systems analysis, and quantified political and war games, they asserted that the qualitative political game revealed “possible contingencies that in analytical work [alone] might have seemed less important and less likely.” By stressing that their game “simulat[ed] as faithfully as possible much of its [the real world’s] complexity,” Speier and Goldhamer echoed Mannheim’s critique of quantification and emphasized that their game demonstrated how qualitative methods were crucial for policy research.60

Speier and Goldhamer’s game, however, was far more developed than Mannheim’s pedagogy, the details of which were sketchy and framed in generalities. The most mature statement on the RAND political game appeared in the two authors’ 1959 essay “Some Observations on Political Gaming.” According to this piece, the game ran as follows: Each player or group of players represented the government of an individual country — or, as Mannheim had it, the “real forces” in political life. For example, team one played as the Soviet Union, while team two played as France. The nations portrayed were each granted their own specific characteristics, such as military capabilities, that were unknown to other teams. Before a game commenced, players received a scenario describing a particular geopolitical problem or event to which they were required to respond.61 Players submitted their moves in writing to a referee or group of referees, who acted as Mannheim’s teacher did, guiding and directing the simulation.62 The referee was the game’s ultimate arbiter, and he or she could reject a move if it was deemed impossible given “the constitutional or physical power of the government” involved.63 To ensure that a game’s moves mirrored the potential

58 I borrow the term neo-positivist epistemology from Steinmetz, “Ideas in Exile.”
59 Ibid.
61 For more on scenarios and their development, see Speier, “Political Games and Scenarios,” 11-17.
62 In the largest RAND game, the fourth game from 1956, Speier assumed the role of referee. Raymond L. Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington, DC, 2001), 19.
actions in which real world political actors would engage, players were required to be “area specialists who could [justify moves by drawing] on their knowledge and accumulated area experience.”64 Thus, where Mannheim assumed that students would naturally represent different political perspectives, Speier and Goldhamer explicitly declared that the game was only effective if different area experts played it. Such a statement aligned the game with the rising tide of “area studies” in American intellectual life.65 The referee further played the role of “nature,” which “provide[d] for events of the type that happen in the real world but are not under the control of any government,” such as famines, uprisings, the death of leaders, etc.66 To simulate the real world process of intelligence gathering, the referee also “leaked” information about other teams, which would be more or less accurate depending on her or his whims. In these ways, Speier and Goldhamer hoped to reproduce the geopolitical environment and “permit tests of a wide range of United States strategies.”67

But testing strategies was not the major goal of Speier and Goldhamer’s game, even if this was the purpose to which decision-makers later put it.68 For the social scientists (as for Mannheim), the game was most useful as an “educational device.”69 They noted that no analyst or decision-maker, no matter how familiar with the wars of the first half of the twentieth century, had any experience interacting in a nuclear context.70 With the game, Speier and Goldhamer argued, players could discover how new nuclear pressures influenced “the structure of the contemporary political world and . . . the reasons behind political decisions.” Similar to Mannheim, who framed his pedagogy as inspiring “insights,” the authors declared that the game gave “players a new insight into the pressures, the uncertainties, and the moral and intellectual difficulties under which foreign policy decisions are made.”71 Just as Mannheim hoped to prevent the collapse of democracy by instilling a respect for and understanding of its process, Speier and Goldhamer...
desired to avoid nuclear war by increasing knowledge of how atomic weaponry informed the strategic calculus of decision-makers. Empathy was central to both simulations.

In addition to inspiring respect for the pressures faced by decision-makers living in a nuclear world, Speier and Goldhamer — like Mannheim — believed the game improved the skills of participants. The authors maintained that the experience of simulation encouraged players to “acquire an overview of a political situation” that allowed them to recognize the interconnectedness of the different spheres of international relations. Speier and Goldhamer declared that by viewing the realm of geopolitics in its totality — a framework that echoed Mannheim’s vision of society — players could operate more effectively within it. Moreover, the game enabled players to engage in “extensive and explicit statements of the political and military assumptions from which they argued,” which encouraged them to reassess beliefs in light of their peers’ and referees’ critiques. In sum, the game increased analysts’ and decision-makers’ “ability to cope better with pressing tasks in their work.”

In its goals and methods, Speier and Goldhamer’s political game echoed Mannheim’s pedagogy. Both were simulations, premised upon the assumption that experiencing a simulacrum of an environment that had no historical precedent — German democratic politics, on the one hand, a nuclear world, on the other — was the most effective means to teach participants how to interact within it. Another major purpose of both simulations was to tame a dynamic political atmosphere that, if allowed to descend into disorder, could have disastrous consequences for humanity. Mannheim, Speier, and Goldhamer also each subscribed to the notion that their simulations would enable participants to gain a total view of the political process. Similarly, both simulations were designed to expose the assumptions that undergirded participants’ decisions, in the hopes that doing so would increase their political effectiveness. Furthermore, the simulations were both responses to the rise of social science quantification and, as such, were minimally formalized. The striking similarities between Mannheim’s pedagogy and Speier and Goldhamer’s game, coupled with the personal and professional connections that united the three intellectuals, suggest that Speier and Goldhamer drew on Mannheim’s work when they confronted problems that mirrored, in some ways, the ones he faced in the 1920s.

73 Speier, “Political Games and Scenarios,” 27.
74 For use of the term “dynamic” in reference to the “political process” replicated by the game, see Goldsen, Political Exercise, 37.
Migrating from RAND to the Government

RAND analysts played four political games in 1955 and 1956. The games wound up being very expensive and time-consuming, leading RAND’s analysts to conclude that, in terms of testing strategies, they had “grave doubts about the wisdom of attempting a program of the requisite scale [for the successful testing of alternative strategies] involving a relatively prohibitive commitment of manpower and expenditure of other resources.” Nevertheless, Speier, Goldhamer, and others believed in the game’s utility, arguing that it was “a uniquely valuable instrument for training and educational purposes,” and promoted the game throughout the foreign policy establishment.75 The means by which the game moved from RAND to universities and then to the government demonstrate the close links that had developed by the end of the 1950s between the institutions of the military-intellectual complex. In 1956, Speier presented on the game at a Social Science Research Council summer institute; in 1957, he did so at Stanford University’s Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (which he had helped found earlier in the decade); and in 1959, he discussed it at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.76 Goldhamer, meanwhile, gave lectures on the game at the Army War College and presented on it at the Political Science Association, and Joseph Goldsen, also of the SSD, discussed the game at Yale and Princeton. Additionally, members of the SSD held “informal discussions about political gaming . . . with personnel of the Department of State, the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, the Brookings Institution, Northwestern University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.”77

This last university proved crucial to the dissemination of the political game.78 In 1957 and 1958, W. Phillips Davison, Speier’s colleague from World War II whom he recruited to the SSD, took a leave of absence from RAND to become a visiting professor of political science at MIT. In Cambridge, Davison directed a political game in one of his graduate seminars, which came to the attention of Lincoln Bloomfield, a professor of political science and former State Department official then associated with MIT’s Center for International Studies (itself an organization with which Speier was involved).79 In the 1958-1959 academic year, Bloomfield discussed the simulation with several RAND analysts, and, with the aid of Paul Kecskemeti — another of Speier’s SSD recruits and also a European exile — directed a simulation christened the “Endicott House Game.”80 This game “revolved around a hypothetical international

75 Ibid., 37.
76 For details about the game’s dissemination, see Davison, Summary of Experimental Research, 9-12; Allen, War Games, 142-45; and Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable,” 176-79. For Speier and his role in creating the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, see Bessner, “The Night Watchman,” 247-55.
78 The following two paragraphs are based on Allen, War Games, 148-60; Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable,” 178-79; and Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn, 158-59.
79 For Speier’s role in establishing the Research Program in International Communication at the Center for International Studies, see Bessner, “The Night Watchman,” 255-60.
crisis stemming from the demise of the head of the Polish government” and was played by senior faculty from MIT, Harvard, Yale, and Columbia. Bloomfield found the game to be a very useful pedagogical tool. As he and a colleague reported,

Reality can of course only be simulated in a game. A single scholar or analyst can seek to evoke reality; but group operation brings to analysis of foreign policy problems two prime values: the simple benefit of interaction between several minds, and the more complex benefits flowing from the dynamics of such interaction. . . . Inherent in this process is the potent challenge of unpredictability and the equally potent value of exposure to the antagonistic will of another who proceeds from entirely different assumptions. Neither of these factors can be derived from solitary meditation or cooperative discussion. In this sense an affirmative answer is possible to the general question “Is political gaming useful?”

Similar to Speier and Goldhamer, Bloomfield believed the game exposed players to the realities of international politics and taught them to think like decision-makers.

Bloomfield continued to direct games played not only by academics and students but also by government officials. The most important of these, named POLEX (short for “political exercise”) II, occurred in 1960. This simulation centered upon a crisis in the Middle East and quickly became well known throughout the foreign policy establishment. Soon after POLEX II concluded, John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon in the 1960 presidential election, academic expertise became a high-value commodity in Washington, and many RAND analysts entered Robert McNamara’s Department of Defense.

In 1961, Henry Rowen, a former RAND economist then serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, recommended that the newly established Joint War Games Control Group (JWGCG) play political games. The members of the JWGCG agreed, and in September, Thomas Schelling, a pioneer of game theory, former RAND consultant, and professor of economics at Harvard, directed a game at the Pentagon based on the Second Berlin Crisis. Numerous high-level officials and academics, including DeWitt Armstrong, McGeorge Bundy, Alain Enthoven, Carl Kaysen, Henry Kissinger, Robert Komer, John McNaughton, Walt Whitman

82 Allen, War Games, 150-53; and Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable,” 178.
83 Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, chapter 16.
84 The Second Berlin Crisis began in 1958 when First Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev declared that the four Allied powers must leave Berlin.
Rostow, Rowen, Seymour Weiss, and others, played the game. Although Kennedy and cabinet secretaries did not participate in the simulation, Kaysen informed the president of its outcome.

After officials deemed Schelling’s simulation a useful means to predict and practice international politics, the JWGC (which became the Joint War Games Agency in 1963) regularly organized political games, and throughout the 1960s at least four were played annually. Officials framed the games’ benefits in the same ways as Speier, Goldhamer, and Bloomfield. According to Lt. Colonel Thomas J. McDonald, a JWGA member, games “provide a ‘feel’ for Cold War ‘bargaining,’ negotiation, and escalation processes.” That is to say, officials believed games taught players to think like decision-makers while improving their political abilities. However, despite the social scientists’ protestations, decision-makers also believed the game could predict international relations, which is what exercises like SIGMA II-64 were designed to do. This underlines the intellectual distance that sometimes separated analysts from their patrons as well as defense intellectuals’ lack of power. Although the intellectuals may have wanted the game to be played in a certain way, they ultimately could not influence its use. In the journey from RAND to the JWGA, the game assumed purposes that moved beyond those intended by its creators.

The Lessons of Weimar

The political game is an example of how the “lessons of Weimar” — in this case the desire to control a chaotic political atmosphere — informed how Americans approached the foreign policymaking process. Mannheim, Speier, and Goldhamer were each responding to peculiarly late modern problems: Mannheim, to the advent of German democracy; Speier and Goldhamer, to the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States’ rise to globalism, and the Cold War. Each saw in modernity potential chaos, and they reacted to this possible disorder by promoting elitist projects intended to train a select cadre to prevent and, if necessary, manage it. Paradoxically, to defend the structures of liberal democracy, Mannheim, Speier, and Goldhamer encouraged programs that ignored the public’s traditional — and central — role in
democratic theory. The three intellectuals imagined democratic politics as a realm governed by elites. They wanted democracy without an engaged public, and developed educational methods that trained an elite to defend democracy in two eras of political uncertainty.88

The shift from Weimar Germany to Cold War America, however, brought changes to the contours and emphasis of the political simulation. Its goal transformed from training future elite citizens to training current experts and high-level policymakers, while its focus shifted from domestic politics to international relations. Speier and Goldhamer’s game also expanded the purview of Mannheim’s pedagogy, which was exclusively focused on Germany. The two social scientists adopted an explicitly transnational perspective, maintaining that “it would be desirable to have a few foreign political analysts play the roles of their own governments so that close cooperation of each nation’s interest would be increased.”89 Although Speier and Goldhamer never explicitly deployed the concept of an Atlantic Community in their scholarship on the game, their desire to incorporate foreign participants was a means to increase communication between the United States and its European partners. Speier and Goldhamer endorsed a vision of geopolitics that characterized the Cold War as a moment when “peace and Western civilization” — represented by the United States and Western Europe — “are in jeopardy.”90 The different national interests Western countries might have had, they assumed, were less important than what they characterized as the existential struggle between democracy and Soviet totalitarianism. Thus, Speier, the German, and Goldhamer, the Canadian, argued that to win the Cold War, the United States, their adopted homeland, needed to rely heavily upon — and trust — both those born elsewhere and its European allies. The political game was their means to train a transatlantic elite able and willing to promote U.S. interests, which they affirmed were, ultimately, the interests of the world.

Daniel Bessner is an assistant professor at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. His research focuses on intellectual history, U.S. foreign relations, Jewish studies, and the history of the human sciences. He is completing a book manuscript, provisionally entitled Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual (under contract with the U.S. in the World series at Cornell University Press), which examines the impact of German exiles from National Socialism on the culture, institutions, and foreign policies of the postwar United States.

88 Similar trends may be observed amongst other intellectuals writing from the 1920s to the 1950s. See, for example, Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York, 1922); Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New Brunswick, NJ, 1993 [1925]); and Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York, 1955).

89 Goldhamer and Speier, “Some Observations,” 83. See also Speier, “Political Games and Scenarios,” 38.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN: NEGOTIATING POLITICAL EXILE

Thomas Wheatland

The émigrés of the 1930s and 1940s are, perhaps, overrepresented in the transatlantic histories of the twentieth century. For many, they are legitimate heroes in an era filled with so many frightening villains. Leaving everything behind, they left Europe not only to flee the Nazis but also to continue waging an open struggle against Fascism. Yet, in a world on the brink of the information age, the exile community included the first European knowledge professionals to begin building permanent bridges across the Atlantic in ways that a previous generation had only imagined. With a reputation for challenging the contradictions inherent in the postwar “Atlantic Community,” the Frankfurt School (or Institut für Sozialforschung, henceforth Institute) became an influential voice of dissent against the Cold War status quo during the 1950s and 1960s. Born out of the non-allied Weimar Left, the thinkers who comprised the Frankfurt School developed a mode of thought — Critical Theory — which established a path between the deterministic Marxism of the Second International and the revolutionary Marxism of Lenin. The primary focus of their Critical Theory of contemporary society was to re-examine the question of consciousness by challenging fundamental assumptions about the relationship between the social base and its cultural superstructure.

During their transatlantic sojourn, the members of the Frankfurt School grew to question the development of class consciousness by finding inspiration from Freudian psychoanalysis, as well as to pioneer the study of mass culture. As a result, they were not surprised by the triumph of fascism or the persistence of postwar, late capitalism. During the 1930s and 1940s, when the Frankfurt School pursued much of this groundbreaking work, few Americans took serious notice (the New York Intellectuals being a notable exception). The fortunes of Critical Theory changed after the war with the meteoric rise of Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse in the United States and with the simultaneous celebrity that Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno achieved in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Critical Theory made two Atlantic crossings. Until very recently, the majority of scholars have paid attention to the transition from Europe to the United States, but the trend may be changing. The story about the return of Critical Theory to Germany is just as interesting
as the exile narrative. Both crossings were fraught with confusions and problems, but Critical Theory returned to Europe with a split personality — while it may have been homeless and rootless in exile, it became bipolar in its return to Germany — trapped between a classically American epistemology grounded in empiricism, as well as the pursuit of practical ends, and a more strident denial of “traditional theory” on the grounds that it could not see beyond the status quo and contributed to a “totally-administered” society.

The aim of this article is to examine in detail how the Frankfurt School made this transition and developed this complex postwar identity. In numerous oral histories and reminiscences, members of the Frankfurt School emphasized the isolation and marginalization of their coterie and enterprise during the exile years. Horkheimer and Adorno, in particular, emphasized the Institute’s commitment to preserving Critical Theory as a product of Weimar thought and culture, enabling it to become a living link between the Weimar Republic and the postwar Federal Republic. By emphasizing this dimension of the Frankfurt School’s legacy, they greatly underplayed the integrative roles that some other members of the Institute played in relation to American thought and social science. This paper will focus on the efforts of one member who was particularly intent on coming to terms with the Institute’s new American hosts — the legal and political theorist, Franz L. Neumann. By focusing attention on Neumann, one is able to see crosscurrents within the Frankfurt School when it came to the topics of American “positivism” and “empiricism.” While some, like Horkheimer, preferred to dismiss nearly all of it as “traditional theory” that had nothing in common with the Institute’s “critical theory” of society, others like Neumann endeavored to pay closer attention to the dynamics taking place within American social science that provided opportunities for the Frankfurt School. On the basis of Neumann’s initial efforts in this regard, the Frankfurt School was awarded its first American grant in 1943, which eventually led to its famous series of contributions to American sociology — a five-volume series of books entitled The Studies in Prejudice.

**Franz Neumann: the Émigré Scholar as Cultural “Integrator”**

For most people familiar with Critical Theory, Franz Neumann is typically seen as a bit player in a complex institutional and intellectual drama. Neumann was a lawyer and political theorist. After obtaining a doctorate in law from the University of Frankfurt, Neumann became
a protégé of Hugo Sinzheimer — one of the most influential labor lawyers of the Weimar Republic. Neumann had a successful legal practice in Berlin where he successfully advocated on behalf of the Socialist labor federation. After being briefly detained by the Nazis in 1933, Neumann fled to Britain, where he completed a second doctoral dissertation, this time in political theory, at the London School of Economics with Harold Laski. Although Neumann had lived most of his short life in Germany up to that point, his forced emigration in 1933 led to twenty years of education, adjustment, and experimentation that prompted him to focus in retrospect on a critical examination — sometimes excessively harsh — of the intellectual scene of which he had been an active part. Significantly, Neumann was a latecomer to the Institute and did not fit comfortably within its intellectual orbit around the Frankfurt School’s director, Max Horkheimer — and there is no question that Neumann’s experiences and commitments to working-class political movements were out of step with the Frankfurt School’s abandonment of the proletariat as the primary agent of revolutionary social change. This is not to say, however, as some have assumed, that Neumann’s intellectual contributions to Critical Theory were not substantial. Rather, it points to the fact that Neumann was underutilized and underappreciated by Horkheimer and his administrative right-hand man, Friedrich Pollock.

Neumann served the Frankfurt School as a lawyer and negotiator, while contributing his legal and political expertise to the structural dimensions of the Institute’s comprehensive theory of contemporary society. Yet even in this regard, Neumann is best remembered within the context of the Institute for his critique of the Frankfurt School’s structural analysis of late capitalist/fascist society. By sharply contesting Friedrich Pollock’s theory of state capitalism, Neumann challenged a paradigm that grew in significance throughout the late history of Critical Theory — eventually, in modified form, constituting the substructural basis for the conception of the totally-administered society, with its accompanying critique of instrumental reason. Ironically, at the same time that Neumann voiced some of the gravest concerns about Pollock’s lack of socioeconomic and political rigor, as well as the political dead-end to which state capitalism appeared to be leading Critical Theory, Neumann was also the member responsible for charting an alternative course for late Critical Theory.

1 His time during ten of the twelve years of the Weimar Republic was largely consumed by the routine of legal work, which led him to countless litigations before all the courts of the labor law system, including the highest, as well as to a role as advocate and publicist in the periodicals of the Socialist and labor movements. He was a practitioner.

2 Neumann came to Horkheimer’s attention through Harold Laski and the London School of Economics. As Neumann was completing his second doctoral degree with Laski, he became acquainted with Horkheimer in 1936. After promoting the Institute and its journal in London, Horkheimer offered Neumann a job in the United States. Unlike most of the other research associates of the Horkheimer Circle, Neumann was valued more for his legal expertise than for his scholarship as a political theorist. Neumann litigated and negotiated a legal dispute concerning Felix Weil’s business interests in Argentina, as well as one concerning the Institute’s ongoing struggle with the Gestapo over the seizure of its library back in Frankfurt. Matters such as these consumed large amounts of Neumann’s time, making his intellectual contributions to Critical Theory rather insignificant until 1939, when he became deeply involved in grant-writing. His only notable intellectual contribution between 1936 and 1939 was his article “Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft,” Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 6, no. 3 (1937): 542-96.


Although Neumann never had the chance to embark on this portion of the Frankfurt School’s second Atlantic crossing, he was the figure most responsible for plotting the course toward a successful merger between late Critical Theory and American sociology — a development uncomfortably at odds with the theoretical thrust of late Critical Theory. The reconstituted Frankfurt School of the 1950s taught a new generation of German students the American empirical techniques that Horkheimer, Adorno, and Pollock had encountered in America and had learned to utilize for their massive study of prejudice. Thus, the postwar Frankfurt School was part of the larger trend in West German sociology. As teachers and social researchers, its members functioned as allies and ambassadors of American postwar sociology. Yet at the same time, the reconstituted Frankfurt School’s scholars did not abandon their critiques of positivism or instrumental reason — two trends that they saw in abundance in both American and West German social science both serving to mask the flaws and contradictions in Cold War society.

Nowhere was this ambition to negotiate between German and American social science more evident than in Neumann’s contributions to the Frankfurt School’s methods statement, as well as in his revisions of the Institute’s grant proposal for a research project on anti-Semitism. His contributions both helped garner the support of the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and propelled the Institute in a direction and toward a future that Horkheimer, Pollock, and even Adorno could not have foreseen — and initially did not desire. This path represents the basis for late Critical Theory’s bipolar, epistemological tension between the social theoretical critiques of empiricism and pragmatism and the practice and teaching of sociological research that rely on both of these theories.

Like so many of the other émigrés celebrated in Neumann’s retrospective account of the Cultural Migration, Neumann stood apart from his colleagues in his heightened self-conscious ambition to function as a transatlantic intellectual. As he recounted,

... it is clear that emigration in the period of nationalism is infinitely more painful than ever before. If the intellectual has to give up his country, he does more than change his residence. He has to cut himself off from an historical tradition, a common experience; he has to learn a new language, he has to think and experience within and through it; has,
in short, to create a totally new life. It is not the loss of a profession, of property, of status — that alone and by itself is painful — but rather the weight of another national culture to which he has to adjust himself.\(^5\)

Partial or tentative integration into U.S. society and academic culture was not only impractical but also impossible in his eyes.\(^6\) Neumann realized that he could only continue to fight fascism by exposing its character through studies based on his negotiations between European political theory and American social science. It is also clear that such integration was fully compatible with his former thought and practice as a political intellectual. American social science, thus, like German jurisprudence, was simply another set of realities that needed to be navigated in his quest for progressive social change.

Bred to history and theory, Neumann said, the German émigrés initially disparaged the empiricism and pragmatism of American scholarship.\(^7\) Some exiles attempted to make a total change, to become intellectually like the Americans as they saw them; others simply maintained their previous positions and sought converts — or accepted the status of recluse. From Neumann’s point of view, however, the optimal strategy was to attempt “integration” between the two cultures.

Neumann contended that persons like himself, trained in the German tradition, were able to achieve two things. First, they brought skepticism about the ability of social science to engineer change. But more importantly, they attempted to “put social sciences research into a theoretical framework.”\(^8\) By overstressing the significance of empirical data collection and ignoring theory, Neumann argued, American social scientists made themselves vulnerable to the following criticisms:

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\ldots\text{that the predominance of empirical research makes it difficult to see problems in their historical significance; that the insistence upon mastery of a tremendous amount of data tends to transform the scholar into a functionary; that the need for large sums to finance such enterprises tends to create a situation of dependence which may ultimately jeopardize the role of the intellectual as I see it.}\]

\(^9\) Despite these reservations, Neumann did see some merits in the American approach — “the demand that scholarship must not be
purely theoretical and historical, that the role of the social scientist is the reconciliation of theory and practice, and that such reconciliation demands concern with and analysis of the brutal facts of life.”

For Neumann, full understanding of the “brute facts” required their contextualization in a historical theory that comprehended both past developments and present potential for the future; the knowledge of the “brute facts” precluded an illusory projection of that future. Even theoretically unsatisfactory empirical inquiry could be adapted for purposes of the more critical view, as long as the “facts” it examined did indeed bear on the course of development. The exposition of such a theoretically informed and factually controlled reading of events had practical consequences in the critique (and reorientation) of actions. One might be tempted to see Neumann’s characterization of the successful integration of Continental social theory and American social science as something that arose only from hindsight. Neumann’s interventions on behalf of the Frankfurt School’s grant proposals of the early 1940s, however, suggest not only that he had formed these views much earlier but also that he was the one responsible for transmitting them to the other members of the Institute.

Engaging the American Social Sciences

In 1939, as the Institute commenced work on several simultaneous bids for outside grant support, Neumann began thinking in earnest about recent developments in American sociology. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that other members of the Institute were not similarly looking more closely at their colleagues in the social sciences. Horkheimer, for example, had corresponded with Louis Wirth and received a lengthy handwritten report on the state of sociology in America from Wirth’s senior assistant, Edward Shils. Adorno, meanwhile, was working closely with Paul Lazarsfeld on a massive study of radio listenership and listening habits in the United States but was a very skeptical eyewitness for this groundbreaking endeavor. As we will see momentarily, they remained generally convinced that no accommodation between Critical Theory and concurrent developments in the United States, insofar as they became aware of them, was possible. Neumann, by contrast, saw more potential for the Institute in the United States. There is little question that his differing attitudes resulted, in part, from his distance from both the Institute’s inner circle and its intellectual project. Yet, one can also see his efforts in 1939 as another case of
him entering into a negotiation on behalf of the Institute’s theory as he understood it.

From the beginning of his employment with the Institute, Neumann contributed book reviews to the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Prior to 1939, he had published a total of twelve reviews, but the subjects of the books each of these examined were restricted to his acknowledged areas of expertise — law, labor issues, and political theory. His assignment to review some works in contemporary sociology, which coincided with the commencement of the two grant proposals, thus signaled a shift in Neumann’s niche within the Institute, cautiously ventured by Horkheimer, as it appears, and eagerly sought by Neumann.

Neumann’s first effort to come to terms publicly with contemporary trends in U.S. sociology was his review of Robert Lynd’s Knowledge for What?11 Strategically, the assignment of this book to Neumann for review in the closely held journal was able to serve two vital functions. First, it was good diplomacy. Prior to Erich Fromm’s departure from the Institute in 1938, Lynd had been one of the Horkheimer Circle’s key allies at Columbia University. Thus, an extensive review of Knowledge for What? by someone with Neumann’s profile could function as a kind of olive branch. Second, the review assignment was good preparation for Neumann as he was given the primary responsibility for directing the Institute’s proposed research project on the rise of Nazism in Germany. While it is hard to see the review of Lynd’s book in its entirety as a representation of Neumann’s independent views and opinions, it is possible to discern passages in which he largely appears to be writing for himself and others in which he is writing more as an official spokesperson for the Institute. Detailed negotiations between the editor, who was exceptionally close to Horkheimer, and contributors based in the Institute were not unusual. For example, the significance that Neumann attributed to the book — the topic that dominates nearly the first half of the review — would clearly appear to represent his own unmediated views, a speculation strengthened by the terms of his subsequent dealings with Lynd. Anticipating an assessment of American sociology that he would later repeat and defend against attacks by other Institute members in an in-house debate that was held in 1941, Neumann saw the book as an important example of U.S. disillusionment with both positivism and empiricism. It was significant for the Institute not only because it was formulated

by a “chief representative of the Research School of American sociology” but also because Lynd was endorsing the use of theory, which Neumann saw as potentially compatible with the Institute’s underlying methods. Neumann’s criticisms of Lynd, similarly, anticipated characterizations he would articulate more forcefully in the Institute’s 1941 debate. For example, he questioned Lynd’s call for his sociological colleagues to make bold hypotheses and to let values guide both their research and analyses. As Neumann indicated in the review, as well as later in the debate of 1941, Lynd failed to explain the methods by which such hypotheses can be made or how values can guide social research in directions that are not entirely relativistic. When Neumann concluded his review with his proposed solution to these problems, he presented a vague description of Critical Theory that was typical of characterizations made by other members of the group:

But if his [Lynd’s] criticism is correct, and we do not doubt it for a moment, what method then remains in the present stage of society for maintaining the isolated, progressive features or even for thoroughly transforming them into a rational whole? This central question cannot be answered by positivism, for it does not even recognize the problem. It cannot be answered by any value philosophy, which offers to mankind a whole array of values for selection. It cannot be answered by psychology, which can never pass judgment on the rightness and truth of man’s strivings. It can only be answered by a theory of society, which is essentially critical. . . . All the twelve problems regarded by the author as relevant, are problems which fundamentally cannot be explained in the realm of psychology, but only in terms of the inner contradiction of society.12

Thus, the culmination of Neumann’s review presented the Institute’s point of view and deployed the kind of Aesopian language typical of explanations of the Institute’s methodology to outsiders.

At the end of 1939, Neumann was able to foray strategically into the world of American sociology once again when he was invited to an event sponsored by the University of Chicago Social Science Department. It is likely he was invited as a representative of the Institute, though it may have been due to the strength of his earlier acquaintance with the noted sociologist, Louis Wirth. Nominally, the event

12 Ibid.
was intended to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the department’s building, but it actually was to register the department’s adjustment to the strong trend against its founding thesis of the unity of the social sciences, which nevertheless coincided with new moves towards qualitative research and theory in sociology. The meeting was accordingly called “The Social Sciences: One or Many?” and was chaired by Wesley C. Mitchell, a prominent senior economist oriented to Thorsten Veblen and John Dewey but best known as a specialist on business cycles. Neumann was not invited to give a lecture, but he took part in a round table on the meeting’s theme, in which he made an impromptu intervention on behalf of the Institute. In a memorandum he prepared for Horkheimer, he recounted these remarks, opening with notice that the issue of the unity of the social sciences was not the defining theme of the Institute’s work. In his recollection, he had begun his comments by presenting the standard picture of the Institute that had been used throughout its early years of exile by emphasizing its multidisciplinary structure and its commitment to integrating the social sciences. Neumann had then departed from the more cautious Institute narrative by insisting that organizational structure alone is not capable of achieving the kind of theoretical integration that is the hallmark of the Institute’s work. By noting this, however, Neumann obligated himself to a more substantive attempt to explain the research methodology of the Frankfurt School. Accordingly, the memo continued:

Integration must ultimately lead to a theory of society enabling us to understand the rise of modern society, its structure, its future, in short, the laws governing its development. If we accept this concept of integration, we are faced at once with two decisive problems. Every social science constantly operates with certain basic concepts like person, being, essence, motion, liberty, etc. These concepts cannot be won by mere generalization. Induction would not make them true concepts. They are, in our view, philosophical concepts which can only be developed through a general philosophical effort. The Institute is consequently engaged in an analysis of the traditional concepts and methods of the social sciences. We try to find out the meanings of the basic concepts of the social sciences and to redefine them according to the present historical needs of the social sciences. That, however, is by far not enough. Since our main problem is the rise,

13 For a full transcript of the conference, including the panel in which Neumann participated, see Louis Wirth, ed., *Eleven Twenty-Six: A Decade of Social Science Research* (Chicago, 1940).

14 See ibid., 113-52.

15 Franz Neumann, “Contribution of Dr. Neumann to the Round Table Discussion, Chicago, Social Science Research Building” [“The Social Sciences: One or Many,” 1 December 1939] (MHA, IX, 57a, 4b).
structure and the prospective development of modern society, we insist that sociological work can only be fruitful if it is historical. . . . [W]e agree with Professor Lynd’s view [on this matter]. . . . Each member of the staff, in spite of the fact that we require from him a thorough training in his own specialized field, has to present his work historically. Philosophy and history, both, unite the research work of all our members.16

Whereas Neumann had made only the vaguest allusion in his 1939 Lynd review to a kind of social theory most familiarly exemplified by historical materialism, his statement at the Chicago meeting picked up on Lynd’s enthusiasm about the historical method in Knowledge for What? and experimented with a new description of Critical Theory. While it still camouflaged its debts to Marxism and relied heavily on a vague formulation of the integration of philosophy and history, it strongly suggests that the discussions that Neumann had heard on this occasion in Chicago appeared to show openings for more detailed negotiations with American colleagues.

The Lynd review and Chicago intervention are important primarily as public moments in Neumann’s personal development of a more open attitude towards links between Critical Theory and American social science, as well as a careful signal to representatives of the latter that the Institute might be open to such negotiations. The minutes of a discussion entitled “Debate about Methods in the Social Sciences, Especially the Conception of Social Science Method for Which the Institute Stands,” trans. David Kettler and Thomas Wheatland, Thesis Eleven 111, no. 1 (August 2012): 123–29; and Institut für Sozialforschung, “Debatte über Methoden der Sozialwissenschaften, besonders die Auffassung der Methode der Sozialwissenschaften, welches das Institut vertreibt” (MHA, IX, 214) (hereafter cited as “Methods Discussion”).

16 Ibid.
the requirements of the social-scientific strategies sanctioned by American funding agencies.

Horkheimer set the terms of the discussion by characterizing the small and uncertain opening he thought was available for securing support from the American foundations. These were evidently no longer satisfied with “empiricism” alone, he noted, but increasingly recognized the importance of “theoretical viewpoints.” Yet American social science in general — and presumably the evaluators for the foundations — also insisted that theoretical claims were “hypotheses” that required verification by empirical research, a methodological conception antithetical to that of the Institute. The primary question of the consultation was whether the group could explain its method so as to overcome the obstacles and to seize the opportunity that Horkheimer perceived.

Two group projects were in the background, both designed in the course of the preceding year with a view to external funding and both exhibiting signs of trouble. The first, initiated by Horkheimer and Adorno, involved a structural analysis of the anti-Semitic belief system based on leading anti-Semitic texts. For obvious reasons, this project looked to Jewish organizations for its funding, notably to the American Jewish Committee (AJC); the original scheme was scheduled for a complete reworking after clear signals that it would not be supported, being remote from needed and useable information. The topic intended for the Rockefeller Foundation was an analysis of National Socialist Germany — with both genealogical and structural approaches under consideration. The succession of project proposals devoted to this subject occupied at least six of the members of the Institute in 1940 and early 1941. During this time, it was the principal focus of Neumann’s efforts, both as planner and as promoter. It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that the January meeting was called to discuss this project in which Neumann played the leading role, and that it was designed both to see how its funding could be facilitated and how improper compromises could be prevented.

Strikingly, Neumann twice interrupted Horkheimer’s opening statement at the 1941 discussion. As soon as Horkheimer said that they were expected to supply an explanation of their method, Neumann interjected that the explanation must not appear Marxist. Moments later, when Horkheimer referred to the empirical testing of hypotheses expected of them, Neumann moved the discussion towards

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an examination of this conception. Making his own assessment of American social scientific trends, Neumann stated that “[T]he general consensus is that it is necessary to have a working hypothesis, but it is not known how this can be discovered.”19 Julian Gumperz, Felix Weil, Herbert Marcuse, and T. W. Adorno all disputed Neumann’s characterization.20 Each of Neumann’s challengers fell back on the empiricist, positivist, and pragmatist stereotypes that had been common in the Institute since Horkheimer’s “Traditional and Critical Theory,” which asserted that, in an effort to be unbiased, Americans avoided hypotheses altogether or they developed functional hypotheses aimed at achieving limited but instrumentalist goals. Citing the examples of Thorsten Veblen, Robert Lynd, and Max Lerner, Neumann made the case that things were changing and that the Institute’s old stereotypes of “traditional theory” had to be reconsidered — and thus a clearer statement of the Institute’s methodology was necessary.21 Following Neumann’s lead, Horkheimer declared that “[I]t would never occur to us to construct a hypothesis because we find a quite specific state of the question [Fragestellung] already given . . . We would rather revert to certain conceptions of society that we already possess.”22 In an effort to anticipate the likely American skepticism of Horkheimer’s impulse to simply defend Critical Theory, Neumann tried to imagine the objections of US social scientists: “what is correct about the theory on which you base yourselves? To come to such an understanding with the American who does not accept the theory is very difficult.”23

What European Social Theorists Offered

Based on his interactions and negotiations with potential sponsors of the Institute’s two research projects, Neumann imagined a statement of methodology less strident and less philosophical than what Horkheimer and the other members of the Institute were advocating. As Neumann suggested,

This is not about working out our own method but about the question, “How do I tell it to the children?” Until now we have been satisfied to say that we seek to integrate all the social sciences. That does not suffice. The question is whether we can present our method so as to attack the hypothesis-fact problem. We distinguish ourselves from sociology in that we view phenomena as historical phenomena, which Americans do not do. We must emphasize

19 “Methods Discussion,” MHA IX, 214.
20 This was not the first time that the Institute had reflected on the relationship between Critical Theory and other trends in the social sciences. Early during Neumann’s tenure with the Institute, Horkheimer published “Traditional and Critical Theory,” a programmatic statement regarding the methodology of the Frankfurt School in contrast to wider practices in America — see Max Horkheimer, “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie,” Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 6, no. 2 (1937): 245-94. The objections to Neumann raised throughout the “Methods Discussion” bear a remarkable resemblance to the characterizations of “Traditional Theory” developed in Horkheimer’s essay.
21 “Methods Discussion,” MHA IX, 214. It is important to note that Neumann had reviewed some of these new social scientific trendsetters that he directly referenced in the “Methods Discussion.” See Franz L. Neumann, “Review of Max Lerner It Is Later than You Think,” Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 8, no. 1-2 (1939): 281-82; and Neumann, “Review of Robert S. Lynd Knowledge for What?”.
22 “Methods Discussion,” MHA IX, 214.
23 Ibid.
that we are not engaged in sociological but in social-scientific work, and we must explain this. The difference is enormous, and we must show this.24

History, as Neumann noted years later in his retrospective contribution to the Cultural Migration, was the key to allowing the European social theorist to gain traction in the United States.25 It avoided the thorny question of Marx, and and yet developed an epistemological vocabulary true to the Institute’s theory that could simultaneously be readily explained and defended to U.S. social researchers and social research foundations.

A methodological statement was prepared afterwards as a preface to the project on “Cultural Aspects of National Socialism” for its submission to the Rockefeller Foundation. It would not have taken the form it did without the January debate. After its rejection, this methodological statement was published in the Institute’s journal Studies in Philosophy and Social Science as a prelude to the anti-Semitism prospectus.26

The methodological statement comprised four theses, none of which, it was reassuringly said at the outset, would “be treated as dogmas once the actual research is carried through.” Two of the four recall suggestions that Neumann advanced during the January session.27 The first announced that “concepts are historically formed . . . concretized in a theoretical analysis, and related to the whole of the historical process.” In the second thesis, the argument expounding the claim that “concepts are critically formed” resembled the approach of Robert Lynd in Knowledge for What?, so highly prized by Neumann:

Social theory may be able to circumvent a skeptical spurning of value judgments without succumbing to normative dogmatism. This may be accomplished by relating social institutions and activities to the values they themselves set forth as their standards and ideals. . . . The ambivalent relation between prevailing values and the social context forces the categories of social theory to become critical and thus to reflect the actual rift between the social reality and the values it posits.28

Both of these methodological principles were much in evidence in Neumann’s successful revision of the Institute’s floundering grant proposal regarding anti-Semitism, as well as in his own book
Behemoth. Neumann not only discovered how to “tell it to the children,” but also developed ways of putting this historical methodology into practice and thereby attracting the attention and interest of American social scientists.

Until Neumann’s intervention, the grant proposal regarding anti-Semitism had been pushed in a direction significantly different from the methodological principles championed by Neumann. During the summer of 1940, Adorno commenced a new round of work on the project that culminated in the draft that appeared in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science. As Adorno wrestled with the topic of anti-Semitism, his historical prism widened to the point of slipping into anthropology. Ultimately, Adorno’s search ended with the prehistory of the Ancient Hebrews. In a letter on September 18, 1940, Adorno shared his new and daring thoughts with Horkheimer:

At a very early stage of the history of humanity, the Jews either scorned the transition from nomadism to settled habitation and remained nomadic, or went through the change inadequately and superficially, in a kind of pseudomorphosis... The survival of nomadism among the Jews might provide not only an explanation of the nature of the Jew himself, but even more an explanation for anti-Semitism. The abandonment of nomadism was apparently one of the most difficult sacrifices demanded in human history. The Western concept of work, and all of the instinctual repression it involves, may coincide exactly with the development of settled habitation. The image of the Jews is one of a condition of humanity in which work is unknown, and all the later attacks on the parasitic, miserly character of the Jews are mere rationalizations. The Jews are the ones who have not allowed themselves to be ‘civilized’ and subjected to the priority of work. This has not been forgiven them, and that is why they are a bone of contention in class society. They have not allowed themselves, one might say, to be driven out of Paradise, or at least only reluctantly. . . . This holding firm to the most ancient image of happiness is the Jewish utopia. . . . But the more the world of settled habitation — a world of work — produced repression, the more the earlier condition must have seemed to be a form of happiness which could not be permitted, the very idea of which must be banned. This ban is the origin of anti-Semitism, the expulsion of the

Jews, and the attempt to complete or imitate the expulsion from Paradise.\textsuperscript{30}

For Adorno, nomadism was synonymous with an existence free of reification, repression, and alienation — the nomadic Jew was representative of a utopian liberation from the exploitation and domination inherent in contemporary society. More importantly, civilization itself — not merely bourgeois civilization — was now interrogated by Adorno’s Critical Theory of society. Adorno had begun identifying flaws inherent in the constitution of Western Civilization and was linking them to the contemporary phenomena that the Institute traditionally studied. This conceptual shift was a crucial steppingstone toward his version of the grant proposal on anti-Semitism, as well as toward \textit{Dialectic of Enlightenment}.

Writing for an audience of Jewish philanthropists and American social scientists, Adorno self-consciously restrained his more speculative anthropological theses. Instead of imaginatively looking back to the biblical narratives of the Ancient Hebrews, the project’s historical timeline began with the Crusades and then proceeded to the medieval pogroms of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the Reformation. Adorno also proposed the existence of anti-Semitic trends during the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the German Wars of Liberation. Although the focus on the anti-Semitism of Voltaire and Goethe might have surprised some of his American readers, the selections of Herder, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel would have confirmed some of the earliest, anecdotal American beliefs in a German \textit{Sonderweg}. Nonetheless, it remained a challenge to convince contemporary readers that the prehistory of Nazi anti-Semitism had much practical relevance in combating the contemporary manifestations of the phenomenon. Furthermore, Adorno’s analysis suggested that the anti-Semitic trend was not simply a German aberration but a danger inherent within Western Civilization. As Adorno explained,

\begin{quote}
\textit{It is generally overlooked that present day National Socialism contains potentialities which have been dormant not only in Germany but also in many other parts of the world. Many phenomena familiar in totalitarian countries (for instance, the role of the leader, mass meetings, fraternizing, drunken enthusiasm, the myth of sacrifice, the contempt of the individual, etc.,) can be understood only}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30} Letter from Theodor W. Adorno to Max Horkheimer, 18 September 1940, \textit{MHGS} 16:762-64.
historically — that is, from the foundations of the whole of modern history.\textsuperscript{31}

In a profound misreading of his American audience, Adorno rationalized his historical and psychological approaches to the study of anti-Semitism in a highly provocative manner. Adorno’s research proposal implicated Western Civilization for some of Nazism’s most irrational policies. The Rockefeller Foundation had balked at the Institute’s grant proposal, “Cultural Aspects of National Socialism,” for a similar reason. American research foundations were perfectly ready to entertain the idea that Nazism and anti-Semitism were capable of threatening America, but they were not ready to accept the notion that they could arise in America due to indigenous forces that (by Adorno’s own formulation) would be nearly impossible to prevent or overcome because of their deep-rooted origins.\textsuperscript{32}

Also prominent in Adorno’s 1940 grant proposal was an emphasis on Friedrich Pollock’s theory of state capitalism. Whereas the Frankfurt School had formerly embraced a monopoly capitalist theory of fascism, Adorno now insisted on the state’s conquest of the economic sphere.\textsuperscript{33}

In the totalitarian state the free market is abolished, and the ability of money to “declare” ceases to exist. Now the government, together with rather small groups of the contemporary German bureaucracy, determines which undertakings are useful for its military and other purposes and which are not. The market, an anonymous and democratic tribunal, is replaced by the command and plan of those in power.\textsuperscript{33}

Thus, Adorno dropped the Institute’s traditionally Marxist emphasis on cartels and instead emphasized the totalitarian state as the economic engine, as well as the force behind, contemporary anti-Semitism. He drew a distinction between the liberal economic order and totalitarianism — whereas the Jews had a function in the liberal state, the shift to state capitalism put an end to the Jews and their former economic roles. As Adorno wrote,

The decline in importance of the spheres of economic activity in which the German Jews were chiefly engaged is the basis of their becoming superfluous. Their economic

\textsuperscript{31} Institute for Social Research, “Research Project on Anti-Semitism,” 126–27.


\textsuperscript{33} Institute for Social Research, “Research Project on Anti-Semitism,” 141.
existence was intimately connected with the liberal system of economy and with its judicial and political conditions. In liberalism, as already mentioned, the unfit are eliminated by the effectiveness of the mechanisms of competition, no matter what their names are or what personal qualities they have. In the totalitarian system, however, individuals or entire social groups can be sent to the gallows at any moment for political or other reasons. The replacement of the market by a planned economy of the state bureaucracy and the decline of the power of money capital makes possible the policy against the Jews in the Third Reich.34

Adorno linked Nazi race theory with the eclipse of the free market. He saw Germany’s Jews as representatives of entrepreneurial, finance capitalism — but the monopolies had not inherited the Earth (as Horkheimer had earlier claimed); rather, Adorno now argued that it was the totalitarian state that obliterated the bourgeois order and had initiated the race policies of the Third Reich.35

It is odd to see Franz L. Neumann taking the lead role in the revision of the anti-Semitism project. In addition to his awkward institutional and intellectual fit within the Frankfurt School, Neumann was also noted for an apparent naïveté and disinterest exhibited toward the topic of anti-Semitism in his classic book *Behemoth*. In a passage that has been quoted by numerous scholarly commentators, Neumann wrote:

> The administration kept a number of anti-Jewish measures up its sleeve and enacted them one by one, whenever it was necessary to stimulate the masses or divert their attention from other socio-economic and international policies. Spontaneous, popular Anti-Semitism is still weak in Germany. This assertion cannot be proved directly, but it is significant that despite the incessant propaganda to which the German people have been subjected for many years, there is no record of a single spontaneous anti-Jewish attack committed by persons not belonging to the Nazi Party. The writer’s personal conviction, paradoxical as it may seem, is that the German people are the least Anti-Semitic of all.36

Although parts of *Behemoth*’s monopoly capitalist analysis of the Third Reich have remained influential, this account of anti-Semitism is one of the glaring exceptions.

34 Ibid.
35 See Max Horkheimer, “Die Juden und Europa,” *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 8, no. 1-2 (1939): 115-37. In this essay, Horkheimer states that “[t]he number of corporations which dominates the entire industry grows steadily smaller. Under the surface of the Führer-state a furious battle takes place among interested parties for the spoils . . . Inside the totalitarian states, this tension is so great that Germany could dissolve overnight into a chaos of gangster battles.”
Despite the reasons that make Neumann seem a peculiar candidate for guiding the revision of the 1942 proposal for the anti-Semitism project, his involvement seems more plausible when one looks at his participation as another case in which he functioned as a negotiator on behalf of the Frankfurt School. As we observed earlier, Neumann’s first jobs for the Institute were as a legal counsel. As a legal agent, Neumann functioned as a mediator — a role to which he was accustomed from his law practice during the Weimar Republic. It is important to remember that mediators and negotiators do not simply represent the interests of their clients. This would make them little more than couriers. Mediators and negotiators are granted the power to bargain: to represent, modify, and transform the interests of their clients in order to accomplish their patrons’ broader aims. Mediators and negotiators help their clients navigate institutions and individuals. In the context of the proposal for the anti-Semitism project, this role enabled Neumann to reformulate the project to make it more congruent with the epistemologies of U.S. social science, as well as to make it more practical in its political ambitions to combat the problem of anti-Semitism.

**Fusing German Bildung and American “Science”**

As has been examined in more detail elsewhere, Neumann’s revision of the grant proposal regarding anti-Semitism was a successful integration of Continental social theory and American empiricism. Neumann’s revisions, however, also demonstrated the specific methodological bridge that he had proposed both before and after the AJC’s acceptance of the Institute’s proposal. It was not simply a case of rebranding, marketing, and grantsmanship. Neumann had struck upon a bargain — a manner of seeing and embracing the interrelationships between German Bildung and American “science.”

The revised grant proposal offered a more concrete historical analysis of anti-Semitism and its political functions. Neumann’s proposal held the promise of more effectively combating National Socialism by better understanding its wider aims and significance. Although the Institute had utilized the concept of totalitarianism before (using it as a synonym for fascism), Neumann’s proposal developed a more specific notion of totalitarianism to capture the essence of the dangers it posed to both Europe and the rest of the world. As the new proposal explained,

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37 See Wheatland, *Frankfurt School in Exile*, 203–63.
The new anti-Semitism is totalitarian. It aims not only at exterminating the Jews but also at annihilating liberty and democracy. It has become the spearhead of the totalitarian order, and the aims and function of this order can be vastly clarified by a study of anti-Semitism. . . . the attacks on the Jews are not primarily aimed at the Jews but at large sections of modern society, especially the free middle classes, which appear as an obstacle to the establishment of totalitarianism. Anti-Semitism is a kind of rehearsal; when the results of the rehearsal are satisfactory, the real performance — the attack on the middle classes — takes place.38

Notably, the concept of state capitalism had been removed from Neumann’s grant proposal, and the Institute’s more traditional emphasis on monopoly capitalism returned. The primary threat, however, no longer jeopardized merely the Jews and their economic roles within the liberal state — Jewish and non-Jewish small businesses and free professionals were in danger. Neumann’s proposal broadened but also specified this rhetoric to present the totalitarian menace in terms that an American audience would appreciate. It threatened liberty, democracy, and the middle class — the very foundations of American society.39 By better comprehending totalitarianism and its anti-Semitic policies, the Institute offered to assist the United States in combating and eliminating them. As the revised proposal explained,

The aim of our project is not merely to point out contradictions, to enlighten the prospective victims, or to argue with them rationally. We want to trace the origins, conscious as well as unconscious, of anti-Semitism, to analyze the pattern of anti-Semitic behavior no less than of anti-Semitic propaganda, and to integrate all our findings into one comprehensive, empirically substantiated theory of anti-Semitism which may serve as a basis for future attempts to counteract it.40

Like the 1941 proposal, Neumann’s revision promised to include a study of the origins and history of anti-Semitism. The description, however, was far less impressionistic. While the earlier work proposed some intriguing but tenuous hypotheses about the early history of anti-Semitism, the new appeal to the AJC promised to rigorously uncover the recent history of prejudice and mass persecution. Instead of

38 Institute for Social Research, “A Research Project on Anti-Semitism,” MHA, IX, 92, 7a, 2-6.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 8.
identifying specific but distant events and intellectual movements that anticipated contemporary anti-Semitism and failing to appropriately explain the basis for each, the Institute outlined its procedure without indulging in the kinds of social philosophical speculations that Adorno had emphasized. The result was a coherent and concrete description of a historical research methodology that could be embraced by social scientists in the United States. This historical analysis promised to accomplish what the prior grant proposal had offered (a historical examination of anti-Semitic behavior and its rhetorical basis in the messages of demagogues), but it devoted itself to these topics without drawing attention to the more provocative critique of Western Civilization that had become the main focus for Adorno.

In a similar fashion, like the 1941 proposal, the revised AJC project also sought to uncover anti-Semitic character types and their basis in common perceptions of Jews. These research goals, which represented the major psychological contribution of the enterprise, made up the other essential piece of the plan. These character types were modeled closely on those developed by Erich Fromm in Autorität und Familie; Neumann recognized that this section of the study had the potential to generate great interest in the United States. Psychoanalysis was rapidly growing in popularity, and innovative use of Freudianism had would likely appeal to a sizable scholarly audience. Unlike Adorno, however, Neumann recognized that psychoanalysis alone would not be able to convince sponsors. Instead of separating the various elements of the psychological portion of the study, as the 1941 article had planned, Neumann’s new appeal to the AJC consolidated the analysis of anti-Semitic character types by simultaneously considering their sociological basis in contemporary reality, as well as their political functions. He aimed to unify psychology, sociology, and politics by focusing on anti-Semitic propaganda. From the outset of the grant proposal, Neumann’s hypothesis was that anti-Semitic propaganda could be more successfully negated its audiences and their receptions of it were better understood.

The revised AJC grant proposal concluded with a direct appeal to U.S. social researchers and foundations. The new research program needed to fit the orientation and interests of potential American sponsors. The old proposal had failed to accomplish this, much like the equally unsuccessful Nazism project. Both initiatives aggressively asserted the recent theoretical and philosophical breakthroughs that members of the Institute had pioneered, but this strategy could only attract a
limited set of U.S. researchers. Consistent with the “Methods Discussion” in early 1941, the Institute did not completely abandon the theoretical traditions it had brought from Continental Europe. Instead of advocating a total assimilation to American sociology, the revised proposal recognized the possible benefits of trying to combine the two approaches. Realizing that the Frankfurt School would need assistance, the proposal expressed a desire for collaboration with American specialists. Such a marriage of the two sociological traditions might be successful.\textsuperscript{43} As the members of the Institute explained,

Such a combination of the highly developed American empirical and quantitative methods with the more theoretical European methods will constitute a new approach which many scholars regard as highly promising. . . . What will be important in the proposed tests is not the explicit opinions of those subjects but the psychological configurations within which these opinions appear. The terms which occur most frequently in free associations may supply us with valuable cues. It will be particularly instructive to compare the frequency curves of various subjects and socio-psychological types. A more precise knowledge of the emotional backgrounds of anti-Semitic reactions may enable us to elaborate more differentiated psychological methods of defense against anti-Semitic aggression.\textsuperscript{44}

Manifesting neither epistemological intransigence nor complete accommodation, Neumann’s revised proposal arrived at a vision of social research that would cause the enthusiastic receptions of the book series, The Studies in Prejudice.

More importantly, Neumann’s revised proposal offered a political plan of attack for combating totalitarian anti-Semitism. In a supplement to the grant proposal added in December 1942, Neumann offered an action plan that was expected to rise out of the Institute’s research study. The supplement proposed the following:

(1) The emergence of the new totalitarian form as distinct from the previous forms of anti-Semitism, requires the adoption of an offensive strategy and the abandonment of the traditional defensive and apologetic policies. In this connection, we shall show how to identify potential anti-Semitic movements behind their various disguises and
classify them according to the magnitude of the danger they present. We shall evolve new methods for distinguishing the less dangerous non-totalitarian forms of anti-Semitism from its deadly totalitarian form. The exact and early recognition of the danger may prevent the counteraction from being “too little and too late . . .”

(2) We shall attempt to determine which social groups and organizations can be won as allies, which can be neutralized and which are thoroughly uncompromising. Here, our analysis of the specific social and economic conditions underlying anti-Semitism will stress the role of certain social reforms in partly destroying the breeding ground of anti-Semitism . . .

(3) In formulating our suggestions we shall take into account various possibilities of post-war reconstruction in Europe and America. We shall assume first an American-British control over most of the world for a long transitory period with a gradual introduction of self-administration in Europe. We assume a painful transition and serious social unrest. Social and economic trends already apparent during this war, instead of arbitrarily drawn blue-prints, must serve as a guide, for this as well as for our inquiries. 45

Thus, Neumann’s revision of the anti-Semitism grant proposal put a strong emphasis on the connection between the research program and political action. Rather than identifying the profound depths of the problem, as Adorno’s proposal had, Neumann’s took the threat just as seriously but envisioned it in a manner that empowered its readers to combat the new totalitarian anti-Semitism.

The revised proposal offered hypotheses, but they were hypotheses that had arisen directly from the Institute’s theoretical work. Neumann was careful, however, not to draw too much attention to the social theoretical views that lay in the background. The Institute’s unique brand of Marxism was a central source of inspiration, but prudence prevented an open admission of this reality. More significantly, the new proposal represented the kind of reconciliation of “theory and practice” that Neumann later presented as one of the most important notions that European exiled social scientists learned from their American counterparts. Horkheimer and the other
members of his inner circle had developed a series of philosophical critiques of pragmatism, but Neumann recognized the practical value of pragmatism in the pursuit and utilization of social research. As a committed member of the Weimar’s anti-Fascist community, Neumann was determined to combat Nazism. What was the point in studying anti-Semitism if not to strike a blow against the Third Reich? As Herbert Marcuse later recalled in a memorial address for Neumann delivered at Columbia University,

Theory was for him [Neumann] not abstract speculation, not a digest of various opinions on state, government, etc., but a necessary guide and precondition for political action. He believed that progress in freedom depended on the progress of democratic socialism, that the failure of German socialism was not final, that knowledge of past errors and a thorough analysis of the historical forces determining the present era would help rescue what had been lost. . . . The rapid consolidation and expansion of the Nazi regime did not demoralize him: he saw in the emigration a fresh opportunity for action.46

Although the integration of empiricism and theory was an important dimension of postwar Critical Theory, it was, perhaps, the concept of practical, political action that made this blending of opposites both possible and desirable. As Marcuse observed about Neumann, the postwar Critical Theorists did not import and deploy American social science methods for their own sake or for strictly mercenary motives. They utilized the newest American techniques to address significant problems in West German society. They had made their peace with pragmatism — not American pragmatism in its philosophical guise, but practical pragmatism as a guide to social change. Without Neumann’s intervention, it is intriguing to wonder whether late Critical Theory might have included this adaptation from its earlier exile form.

Neumann’s successful strategy for securing grant support from the AJC backfired against his professional hopes at the Institute.47 The terms upon which the agency supported the project offended the leaders of the Institute. While they could not refuse the money, they closed off Neumann’s chances of continuing his work. Just as Neumann had seen few practical contradictions between Marxism and law, he similarly did not see insurmountable contradictions between Critical Theory and trends within U.S. sociology. If he had

46 Herbert Marcuse, “Franz Neumann,” Minutes of the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University, April 15, 1955.

47 Horkheimer and Pollock had threatened to terminate Neumann and other Institute members during the immediate fiscal crisis that hit the Institute during the recession of 1937-1938. See the letter from Neumann to Horkheimer, 24 September 1939 (NHA, VI, 30, 124-26). This threat, however, was rescinded when Horkheimer decided to maintain the full Institute staff in several bids to win outside grant support. In an ironic twist, Neumann eventually did succeed in procuring the grant support, but he was still terminated despite this significant contribution.
intended the anti-Semitism project to foster a mutually valuable complementarity between social scientific work of the newer American type and the theoretical orientations of the Institute, he failed to carry Horkheimer and the others. They concluded that he had harnessed them to a kind of work they despised. The curious consequences were, first, that he was excluded from the work he had made available and, second, that the empirical components of the project resembled more nearly what they feared than what he had planned. Paradoxically, at least in the eyes of many observers, the momentum of the celebrated “authoritarian personality” studies led to the curious juxtaposition of theoretical radicalism and conventional research during the years after the Institute returned to Germany.

In relation to the consequences of Neumann’s achievement, the fallout was profoundly ironic. American social scientists, as well as fellow émigrés outside of the Frankfurt School, appreciated Neumann’s efforts to supplement Continental social theory with American empirical methods. Nowhere were his efforts more enthusiastically embraced than at the Sociology Department at Columbia University. Ever since the Institute’s arrival on Morningside Heights, members of the department had hoped that the Institute would continue the kinds of interdisciplinary research that Erich Fromm had managed in Europe. Initially, Columbia’s sociologists thought that their wish had come true as Fromm initiated a series of comparable projects in collaboration with Columbia faculty and graduate students. Yet these hopes were dashed by Fromm’s departure in 1939. Neumann’s efforts on grant proposals to study the origins of Nazism in Germany and the broader phenomenon of anti-Semitism renewed the hopes of Columbia’s disappointed sociologists. Despite the Rockefeller Foundation’s rejection of the Germany Project and the Anti-Semitism Project’s initial failure to generate interest, Robert Lynd and other members of the sociology department appreciated what Neumann was attempting to accomplish in his work on both. While Lynd scolded the other members of the Institute for having “wasted a great opportunity” because they had “never achieved a true collaboration” in which they “might have confronted our European experiences with conditions in America,” he became a powerful champion for Neumann. As the Institute sought a closer and more formal relationship with the university that would include a member of the Institute becoming a lecturer on Columbia’s sociology faculty, the leadership of the Frankfurt School assumed that Horkheimer (or whoever he chose to designate) would

48 For a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the Institute’s move to America and its relationship with Columbia University, see Wheatland, *Frankfurt School in Exile*, 35–94.

be selected for this role. When news arrived in January 1942 that the department had selected Neumann for the lectureship, Horkheimer and Pollock immediately commenced with radical plans to downsize the Institute. Neumann was notified that his position would be terminated in September of 1942 unless outside funding was secured, thereby making his flight to Washington a necessity. Although Neumann did secure the outside funding that represented his only hope of remaining with the Institute, their confused judgment about the terms with the AJC led Horkheimer and Pollock to rescind this last bit of hope.

Ambassadors and Critics of American Social Sciences in Postwar Germany

As much as Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, and Theodor W. Adorno sought to emphasize the origins of their thought between the traditions of Weimar Bildung and Wissenschaft, they returned to Germany as both ambassadors and critics of the empirical methods they had encountered in American sociology. On the one hand, the postwar Institut für Sozialforschung marketed itself and expressed its appreciation of the methods and goals of American social science by listing the numerous and significant benefits of social research:

Social Research, in all its aspects, and particularly in the areas of research on the structure of society, on human relationships and modes of behavior within the labor process, of opinion research and the practical application of sociological and psychological knowledge in the last few decades, has received a great boost. . . . The part these disciplines can play today both in Germany’s public life and in the rationalization of its economy can hardly be overestimated. . . . The demand for scientists trained in the new methods is no less than that for engineers, chemists or doctors, and they are valued no less than those professions are. Not only government administration, and all the opinion-forming media such as the press, film and radio, but also businesses maintain numerous sociological research bodies. Social research can create the optimal social conditions in their factories, ascertain and calculate in advance what the public needs in their branch of business, and monitor and improve the effectiveness of their advertising.

50 Wheatland, Frankfurt School in Exile, 87-91, 230.
51 Letter from Pollock to Horkheimer, 27 January 1942 (MHA VI, 32, 385-87).
Although this quotation appears in an early pamphlet promoting the Institute and its unique qualifications, the Frankfurt School did carry out a research agenda quite faithful to this mission statement during the first two decades in West Germany. Thus, it promised to deploy the most cutting-edge empirical techniques to meet a myriad of “functionalist” ends. In addition to the well-known *Gruppenexperiment* (Groups Experiment) on postwar political attitudes, the Institute also pursued a research program of educational and industrial sociology relying on the most contemporary techniques of American public opinion polling for a variety of practical results to bolster West German society and business.\(^5^4\)

On the other hand, the reconstituted Frankfurt School also presented itself as an enemy of these same trends viewed by many as synonymous with American social science. As Adorno explained in the famous *Positivismusstreit* (Positivism Dispute),

> Sociology’s abandonment of a critical theory of society is ressignatory: one no longer dares to conceive of the whole since one must despair of changing it. But if sociology then desired to commit itself to the apprehension of facts and figures in the service of that which exists, then such progress under conditions of unfreedom would increasingly detract from the detailed insights through which sociology thinks it triumphs over theory and condemn them completely to irrelevance.\(^5^5\)

In other words, at the same time that members of the Institute offered its services to West German managerial and political elites, their social theory attacked the same research methods that they deployed in the name of critical sociology.

The cognitive dissonance between the two positions led many who were intimately familiar with the Frankfurt School’s theory and methods to throw up their hands in confusion. Paul Lazarsfeld, an Austrian émigré himself and a leading figure in “American” empirical social sciences after the war, expressed this sentiment like no other. In an essay written at the height of the Frankfurt School’s postwar reception by the New Left, Lazarsfeld noted the puzzling contradiction:

> When, after the war, the majority of the Frankfurt group returned to Germany, they at first tried to convey to their

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German colleagues the merits of empirical social research which they observed in the United States. . . Within a period of five years, however, the situation changed completely. Adorno embarked on an endless series of articles dealing with the theme of theory and empirical research. These became more and more shrill, and the invectives multiplied. Stupid, blind, insensitive, sterile became homeric attributes whenever the empiricist was mentioned. . . Thereafter one paper followed another, each reiterating the new theme. All have two characteristics in common. First, the empiricist is a generalized other — no examples of concrete studies are given. Second, the futility of empirical research is not demonstrated by its products, but derived from the conviction that specific studies cannot make a contribution to the great aim of social theory to grasp society in its totality. Empirical research had become another fetish concealing the true nature of the contemporary social system.56

Upon first glance, the archival material could easily lead one to conclude that this epistemological bipolarity was a result of material necessity. The reconstituted Frankfurt School required the financial, political, and intellectual capital to possess the academic freedom to critique postwar social science.57 And yet grantsmanship cannot fully account for the contradiction. Even at moments when the material circumstances of the Institute were most dire, its leadership did not support the kind of intellectual assimilation that took place after the war. While the Institute was struggling to survive during the most precarious period of its exile, Horkheimer expressed his sense of entrapment in light of the need to assimilate: :

In this society [the US] even science is controlled by trusted insiders. . . Whatever does not absolutely submit to the monopoly — body and soul — is deemed a ‘wild’ enterprise and is, one way or another, destroyed. . . We want to escape control, remain independent, and determine the content and extent of our production ourselves! We are immoral. . . Fitting in, however, would mean in this instance, as in others, primarily making concessions, many of them, giving material guarantees that submission is sincere, lasting, and irrevocable. Fitting in means surrendering, whether it turns out favorably or not. Therefore, our efforts are hopeless. . .58

57 Wheatland, Frankfurt School in Exile, 191-263.

WHEATLAND | NEUMANN 137
Had Horkheimer changed his mind after the war and in the new setting of West Germany? The answer would clearly seem to be “yes.” But what were the reasons for the change? I would like to suggest that Horkheimer had been trapped by his own success. During the early 1940s, neither he nor his inner circle had foreseen the acceptance of their grant proposal for a study of anti-Semitism or the fruitful integration of Continental social theory and American empiricism that it envisioned. Both the grant and subsequent projects that made up the books in the Studies in Prejudice series, brought Horkheimer and his colleagues more notoriety than could have plausibly been expected. Interestingly, none of the key members of the Institute’s inner circle had been responsible for the seminal breakthroughs that made the project possible. Rather, the task was accomplished by a relative outsider, Franz L. Neumann. The Institute returned to Germany quite different from how it had left. The successes Neumann’s interventions made possible created opportunities for the returning Frankfurt School, but it also created expectations that could not be ignored.

Thomas Wheatland is an assistant professor of history at Assumption College. His research focuses on intellectual history and the history of the social sciences in the twentieth century. He has published widely on members of the Institute of Social Research and their transatlantic careers, including his book The Frankfurt School in Exile (University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
As the United States emerged from World War II a winner and a world power, it also became a part — more firmly than ever before — of the transatlantic West. History departments across the United States took on the task of tying Europe and the U.S. together both politically and culturally. During this period, European and American national identities underwent dramatic changes.1 As part of this process, American Cold War liberals and European émigrés sought to understand the lessons German history held for the United States. German history was now studied by a diverse group ranging from “New York intellectuals” to émigré scholars, academic supporters of the theory of exceptionalism, transatlanticists, and the founders of the American Studies Movement. In postwar America, historians of German history emerged as some of the most influential Europeanists of their generation.2

German history and its lessons were hotly debated at the beginning of the Cold War. References to major events, like the Treaty of Munich, indicated its importance for the development of the American view of the Cold War.3 Naturally, the evaluation of the Allied victory in the Second World War shaped the debate about the new totalitarian enemy, the Soviet Union. Yet deep historical knowledge was often lacking, despite the pervasive presence of German history in American society. Before the war, American universities had focused on English and French history, and German history had not been a priority.4 It took until the 1960s for any important general or comparative works on fascism to appear.

This lack of a thorough historical understanding regarding the German past among Americans allowed émigré historians who had fled Nazi Germany to function as mediators between the two countries. During the Second World War, networks developed out of the cooperation between German and American intellectuals at the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS). This American intelligence service recruited former Weimar academicians, like Hajo Holborn, Franz Neumann, and Felix Gilbert, to provide background information about the German enemy. In 1965, American historian John Higham underlined the enduring significance of these networks: “The one identifiable group among American historians of Europe today is

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composed of those who applied their historical training to and nurtured it with the problems raised for the United States during the war.5 Although these German-American intellectual networks shaped much important historical scholarship after the war, they remain underexplored today.

Historians have long been an underresearched group in the examination of the intellectual emigration to the United States. Referring to the sophisticated position of American historical scholarship in the 1920s and 1930s, it has even been claimed that émigré historians had no “exciting message”6 to teach to Americans. Recent accounts on the development of intellectual history in the United States do not even mention them.7 Collections of essays on the intellectual emigration like *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930–1960* (1969), edited by Bernard Bailyn, concentrate instead primarily on physicists, psychoanalysts, and sociologists.8 Existing scholarship on intellectual emigration consists mostly of short essays that focus on individual scholars, often written by former colleagues of the émigrés. Few essays discuss these historians’ lives thoroughly, based on their personal papers, and in relationship to their writings within the context of American history and scholarship.9

Such an approach, however, is especially relevant in the case of two Jewish German-American cultural historians, George Mosse (1918–1999) and Peter Gay (b. 1923), who fled from Nazi Germany to the United States when they were still in their teens. Both born in Berlin, they came from acculturated Jewish backgrounds.10

2 Kenneth D. Barkin, “German Émigré Historians in America,” 166.
4 Peter Gay did have an essay in this volume, but this served as an introduction to the intellectual and cultural atmosphere of Weimar culture rather than as an autobiography. The essay was later published separately as *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (New York, 1968).
Although their experiences with Germany and the United States were very different from those of older émigré historians, including Hans Baron (1900–1988), Felix Gilbert (1905–1991), and Gerhard Masur (1901–1975), Mosse and Gay are seldom examined as part of a particular group of émigré historians. Their first development of a cultural approach to European history after the Second World War, I claim, cannot be understood outside the context of the debate on the relevance of European history in the United States. While after the war many American intellectuals perceived Weimar culture as the cause of the catastrophe, Steven Aschheim, a former student of Mosse’s, points to Mosse’s and Gay’s relevance for transatlantic perspectives on Weimar: “So much of the liberal Anglo-American image of that republic, the interrelated nature of its flaws and greatness, derives from their writings.” Influenced by their American education, contacts, and relationships to older German émigré scholars, Mosse and Gay took unique positions as mediators between German and American historical scholarship.

In the 1950s, Mosse and Gay’s mediating position was complicated by a widespread loss of belief in the power of historical explanations in the United States, fueled by an often incomplete understanding of German historical methodology. Many contemporary American historians called in the help of the social sciences to make history more “objective.” Peter Novick has stated that émigré historians were too busy trying to survive in their new country to concern themselves with mediating between German and American historiography. Mosse and Gay’s knowledge of and involvement in American historical scholarship, however, defined their dual challenge: to improve both the credibility of historical scholarship and the moral relevance of European history for an American public at the beginning of the Cold War.

In this essay, I argue that Mosse and Gay worked towards this goal by drawing on and further developing the German tradition of Geistesgeschichte in their first historical writings on National Socialism and the Enlightenment, respectively. Although other German-Jewish historians did promote German Geistesgeschichte in the United States, Mosse and Gay’s insider perspective on German and American culture, due to their relatively early emigration, allowed them to observe and assess the flaws and achievements of both countries. In order to determine the degree to which their
transatlantic background shaped their postwar concept of Western culture, I first examine the development of Mosse and Gay’s comparative perspective on German and American history under the influence of their American education and contact with older German-American émigré scholars. Then I analyze the role of German history in American historical scholarship. By developing Geistesgeschichte in a critical way, they believed they could utilize the tradition to help prove to an American public that the European experience with ideology was relevant for American intellectuals who sought to redefine a more cosmopolitan America at the beginning of the Cold War. Finally, I will demonstrate that they became aware of the fundamental ambivalence of Weimar’s lessons, which not only inspired their analysis of irrationality but also prompted historians to break out of their isolated, elitist position.

Developing a Comparative Perspective: The Importance of Émigré Networks

The comparative German-American perspective — the belief that German history had certain lessons to offer the United States — shaped Mosse and Gay’s careers. Compared to older émigré scholars like Baron, Felix Gilbert (1905-1991), and Franz Neumann (1900-1954), Mosse and Gay did not leave established careers or networks behind, and they had never been part of Weimar’s intellectual and cultural life. Their experiences with Germany consisted largely of their confrontation with the rise of National Socialism, which, together with their early adoption of English, opened them up more easily to liberal American culture.

Mosse and Gay’s own transatlantic orientation paralleled a growing focus on Western culture at American universities, which benefited their academic careers as it provided them with ample teaching opportunities. At the end of the 1940s, Mosse took a job in the History Department of the University of Iowa, where he was assigned to teach the course “History of Western Civilization” in 1949. It soon attracted 800 students. As he wrote in the preface to its outline, his immensely popular “Western Civ” course aimed to introduce the student to a body of thought with which he should be familiar if he is to become a useful citizen. Gay, for his part, took up graduate studies in the Department of Public Government at Columbia University in 1946 and in 1947 began teaching the Western civilization course, as well as a course on the history of

14 See Thomas Wheatland’s contribution to this volume.
political thought: the “from Plato to NATO” course. Through the exposition of ideologies, like Marxism, these courses aimed to make students less vulnerable to communist propaganda while teaching them the value of liberalism and encouraging their transatlantic understanding.17

Although the young refugees’ gratitude to the country that had taken them in would remain a cornerstone of their political commitment, they did not hesitate to criticize issues like racial segregation and dogmatic anti-communism and began to do so early on. In a student paper, written just after the end of the war, Gay stated: “We cannot kid ourselves into believing that Fascism is gone, just because we have beaten the Nazis. It is still alive all over the world . . . we can understand our own home-grown Fascists better if we know just what the Fascist thinkers abroad have said and written.”18 Although the United States had just helped to save European democracy, Gay believed that the history of National Socialism was relevant to critiques of the new world power.

The intense contact Mosse and Gay established as American students with Weimar émigré scholars lent sophistication to their critical perspective on American liberal culture. Their growing connection to Weimar scholars increased Mosse and Gay’s recognition of the republic’s fate and fame. While Gay had first refused to read German literature, these Weimar émigrés — “good” Germans — broadened his knowledge of German culture. Gay began to meet German émigré intellectuals and read the works of many others, such as philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) and art historian Erwin Panofsky (1892-1968), soon after he was admitted to Columbia University in 1946.19 German social scientist Franz Neumann even became the supervisor of his dissertation about the German Social Democrat and theorist Eduard Bernstein. Gay recalled that he and his fellow students turned to theorists like Max Weber and Wilhelm Dilthey because Neumann had recommended them, and his recommendations “had the force of a command.”20

Mosse, too, met some émigrés in the Midwest, although New York remained the center of refugee culture. At Harvard, he encountered the famous political theorist C. J. Friedrich, for example. In his memoirs, Mosse highlighted the influence of the interdisciplinary circle of German-American refugees in Iowa, where he got his first job as a professor, crediting them with broadening his outlook on the arts,
public service, and politics. Émigrés Hans von Hentig, one of the founders of criminology, and literary scholar René Wellek became close friends of his in Iowa. He became very friendly with German Renaissance historian Hans Baron, a student of the famous German historian Friedrich Meinecke, and frequently corresponded with him about German history.

The absence of a historical framework of interpretation for German history, however, becomes salient in assessing the American reception of the many European intellectual and cultural traditions that the intellectual emigration of the 1930s transmitted. There was hardly any scholarship at that time on the tradition of German Idealism, which had shaped the works of many émigré scholars. Although Americanists like James Harvey Robinson had already tried to include psychology and anthropology in historical research in the 1920s, the focus on the irrationality of the German tradition of Geistesgeschichte was initially not fully integrated in American historiography. American historians repeatedly bit only “half of the Teutonic apple,” unaware of the philosophical context in which German historical concepts had been developed. Equally important was the fact that Ranke’s historiographical ideal was incompletely understood. The first “crisis” of modernity in historiography had occurred in 1920s, when German historians like Friedrich Meinecke and Ernst Troeltsch debated the loss of the meaning of man’s actions as a result of the process of secularization and doubt about the possibility of achieving objective historical knowledge. Although Ranke was very well aware of the relativity and subjectivity of knowledge, the American reception of his ideas for the most part served to confirm the American belief in objectivity.

This misunderstanding contributed to a “second crisis of modernity” in 1930s American historiography. Having served first as a catalyst of the belief in objectivity, Idealism came to challenge this faith and spur the search for a balance between subjectivity and objectivity. Through his son-in-law, well-known German historian Alfred Vagts, Americanist Charles Beard was introduced to Karl Heussi’s Die Krise des Historismus (1932). Subsequently, Beard came to interpret the German “crisis” as prompting the abandonment of the goal of achieving objective, scientific knowledge. This resulted in his essay “Written History as an Act of Faith” (1933). At the end of the 1940s, émigré scholars like German historian Hajo Holborn, philosopher Ernst Cassirer, and Austrian historian Friedrich Engel-Janoski wrote


24 Krieger, “European History in America,” 225. See also Novick, Noble Dream, 416.
articles about German historicism published in the United States that aimed to revise the American reception of the field and Ranke’s ideas, in particular. Nevertheless, this revision proceeded slowly.25 Dismissing Beard’s relativism, one discipline after the other cut its ties to history in the 1950s.26 The humanities now tried to strengthen the “scientific” character of history by allying with the social sciences.

The Development of a Rational Examination of Irrationality

Not only the flawed reception of German Geistesgeschichte but also large polarizations within American historical scholarship complicated Mosse and Gay’s efforts to argue for the relevance of European history at the beginning of the Cold War. By the mid-1950s, the two historians gained tenure at universities that Peter Novick described as opposites in the spectrum of Cold War academia: the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Columbia University.27 While Madison emerged as a center of American leftist historical scholarship, historians at Columbia embarked on the writing of “consensus history,” which was characterized by its emphasis on national unity and superiority in the face of the communist threat. Compared to European culture, scholars of the Columbian stripe asserted, American culture was “beyond ideology,” as the sociologist Daniel Bell declared.

Mosse and Gay complained that the exclusive focus on rationality had led to America’s contempt for ideology. The prevalent view that American culture was “beyond ideology” did not stimulate much self-reflection or cultural comparison. Despite teaching the Western Civilization course since 1949, Mosse criticized the tendency these courses had to portray Europe as the ideological “other” that had gone morally bankrupt during the disastrous course of the twentieth century while upholding the United States as a model of rationality, pragmatism, and liberalism. He disparaged American historians’ exclusive focus on empiricism as it failed to stimulate an understanding of ideology but led to the impression that “the course of Western Civilization was fueled by political events and economic acquisitiveness.”28 Mosse further observed that these courses did not deal with abstract thought and political rationalizations: “Almost none of our texts show any realization that ideas can be weapons. But how men rationalize their actions often determines what action they take.”29 Yet the notion of ideology was important to examinations of the United States as well, and Mosse proposed that Americanists...
should use it and exchange their detailed analyses for summaries of broad American movements like nationalism and liberalism.\(^\text{30}\) In order to close the gap between Americanist views on European and American culture, Mosse actively tried to integrate “ideological questions” about American culture into the Western Civilization course that he was teaching: “in our introduction courses such ideological questions as the meaning of History can no longer go unanswered.”\(^\text{31}\)

Mosse and Gay found themselves engaging in a similar struggle: trying to develop a historical approach that would integrate an awareness of history’s irrational dimension without lapsing into (Beard’s) relativism. In the 1940s, Arthur Lovejoy founded the *Journal of Intellectual Ideas*, which reflected his conviction that historians should focus on ideas’ rational quality. Mosse noticed American intellectuals’ growing misunderstanding of the wider world:

Arthur Lovejoy wrote . . . that ideas are derived from philosophic systems and he adds that logic is one of the most important operative factors in the history of thought. He warned of giving the non-rational too much place in the new discipline. How strange and isolated even such intellectual Americans must have been in the 1930s! For most of the world was in the grip of irrational systems which had, to be sure, a logic of their own but not one opposed to irrationalism.\(^\text{32}\)

Like Lovejoy, Mosse had first concentrated on facts and “reality” in history in a reaction to German metaphysics, at the very beginning of his historical career.\(^\text{33}\) But in the course of the 1940s, his attitude began to change. While most historians tried to interpret totalitarianism in strictly political, social, or economic terms, Mosse regarded the mythic character of National Socialism as hostile to classical political theory: “that is why Anglo-Saxon scholars have such a difficult time discussing it. They’re always looking for logical, consistent political theory.”\(^\text{34}\) Gay agreed with Lovejoy’s stress on the autonomy of ideas: “ideas are a link in a procession, they have an inner logic, an intrinsic worth and individual character.” But while his dissertation was still a traditional intellectual biography, and he admired Arthur Lovejoy, he thought Lovejoy’s analysis of “unit ideas” too closely allied to the history of philosophy and too prone to treat ideas as independent, unchanging entities.\(^\text{35}\)
Mosse and Gay’s belief in the need to examine irrationality was invigorated by the early reception of German history in the United States. Only in their teens when they left Nazi Germany were Mosse and Gay in a position to grapple with the rise of National Socialism in an intellectual climate that was shaped more by the postwar historiography of German history in the United States. In 1947, historian Ferdinand Lilge’s *Abuse of Learning: The Failure of the German University* was the first historical account of the involvement of German elite culture in the rise of National Socialism. Mosse, in *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (1964), which made use of Lilge’s text, emphasized that the Nazis found their “greatest support among respectable, educated people.”36 Mosse and Gay’s attitude towards Germany distinguished them from many older émigré historians, who had been more firmly rooted in Germany, because they saw its culture as playing a role in the rise of National Socialism whereas many other émigré and American scholars did not. Émigré intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Hannah Arendt were convinced that German “high” culture was not implicated in the rise of National Socialism but that the Nazis were a product of the uneducated lower middle class.37

By contrast, Weimar’s history convinced Mosse and Gay not only of the “guilt” and irrationality of the German elite but also of the unavoidability and even necessity of a degree of “populism” in a democracy. They attributed the fall of Weimar partially to a lack of democratic imagination that disconnected German liberals both rationally and emotionally from the republic. Gay stressed that it was precisely the “easy pessimism” and “cool rationalism” of the *Vernunftrepublikaner*, supporters of democracy by virtue of mere reason, that had doomed Weimar from the start.38 Countering American attacks on ideology, Mosse agreed that the defeat of the Weimar Republic proved the importance of idealism: “In Germany an ideology based upon the contempt for facts, on sheer irrationalism, took over from a regime which was pragmatic, relativist and unable to produce the kind of disinterested idealism of which I have spoken.”39 At a conference in 1955, Mosse made an effort “as a historian” to distinguish between totalitarianism and populism, arguing against “those who believed that power will not be a despotic power if it is a popular power.”40 In sum, the lessons of “Weimar” were deeply ambivalent: although its defeat showed the danger of irrationality, it also indicated the importance of emotional attachment to a positive national identity.

37 Steven E. Aschheim, *Culture and Catastrophe: German and Jewish Confrontations with National Socialism and Other Crises* (New York, 1996), 111–12.
39 George Mosse, “Speech,” August 24, 1951, George L. Mosse Collection; AR 25137; box 30; folder 7; Leo Baeck Institute.
40 *Daily Cardinal*, 31 March 1955, George L. Mosse Collection, AR 25137; box 16; folder 23; Leo Baeck Institute.
Exploring and Developing the Tradition of *Geistesgeschichte*

Émigré historian Hans Kohn has pointed out that the postwar interest in German *Geistesgeschichte* was rooted in the awareness of the “guilt” of Germany’s cultural elite: “The balance between ideas and a certain degree of ‘Verstehen,’ the shift from ideas and facts to ideology, was connected to the realization that the people who had been attracted to National Socialism were not barbarians or the lower classes, manipulated by National Socialist propaganda, but also intellectuals and, especially, academics.”41 Mosse and Gay believed that the historian’s own involvement in his work was unavoidable. The two historians never gave up the ideal of objective scholarship, but they stated that history should also be understood in a committed way. Thus, the writing of history, they understood, is always a political endeavor.42

The factor of irrationality in history, which emphasizes ideas’ fluctuating relationship to both form and content, perception and reality, now moved to the center of Mosse and Gay’s research. Gay’s transfer from the Department of Public Government to Columbia’s History Department underlined his high regard for this discipline. Both Mosse and Gay turned from a more theoretical focus to the research of ideology halfway through the 1950s. While the crisis of modernity had disconnected people’s thought from their actions, it was, according to Mosse and Gay, the task of the historian to examine these links and to restore a sense of moral responsibility.

Although Mosse’s appreciation of the works of intellectuals like the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce had acquainted him with the relationship between myth and reality before his “discovery” of Hegel, both historians’ embrace of this representative of German Idealist philosophy testified to their modified attitude towards the use of German cultural traditions in the development of their historical methodology in the 1950s. German Idealist thinkers like Hegel were often seen as predecessors of National Socialism. American intellectuals like Sidney Hook assumed that Hegel’s impact on American culture was too large.43 But the writings of the first generation of émigré scholars about Hegel advanced Mosse and Gay’s own understanding of the tradition of *Geistesgeschichte*. While some American professors claimed to have uncovered the Hegelian roots of fascism, Herbert Marcuse’s defense of the philosopher, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (1941), convinced Gay that Hegel had little to do with it but had been misunderstood:


“I, too, had badmouthed Hegel without really having labored through his writings, and now, reading Marcuse, I recognized how wrong I had been.”44 For his part, Mosse claimed in his autobiography that it was not Marcuse but the Marxist scholar George Lichtheim, a colleague at the University of Iowa, who taught him the Hegelian approach.45 Mosse mentioned that although Hegel came only late into his life, his influence was crucial, “not really until the end of the 1950s, but it has been determinant. . . . I consider myself a Hegelian.”46 Mosse himself claimed that the German philosopher had taught him to view history in a dynamic and dialectical fashion.47 Hegel’s stress on history as an ongoing dialectical process between myth and reality encouraged Mosse and Gay to use the German tradition of Geistesgeschichte to analyze man’s irrational needs and wishes as part of rational, historical research. Mosse and Gay’s understanding of the concept of mediation between perception and reality was further developed by German intellectuals like the German émigré philosopher and cultural historian Ernst Cassirer. Discussing Cassirer’s use of the symbol, Mosse praised “his conception of how men mediate between their own minds and reality, which is useful at all levels of historical analysis.”48 According to Mosse, symbols shaped the landscape in which connections between ideology and culture were made, creating forms of expression.49

But Mosse and Gay distanced themselves from the Idealist tradition by repudiating an exclusive focus on culture in their work. Following the example of émigré historians like Holborn, Mosse and Gay not only returned to Geistesgeschichte but also added to this German tradition. Gay criticized Cassirer’s “slighting of materialism” and advocated abandoning Cassirer’s “unpolitical Idealism — in the name, and by the light, of another aspect — his pragmatic functionalism.”50 Gay then developed a new approach he called the “social history of ideas,” a “kind of intellectual history . . . guided by a single, simple principle: ideas have many dimensions. They are expressed by individuals, but they are social products; they are conceived, elaborated, and modified amid a specific set of historical circumstances.”51 In their analyses of history, Mosse and Gay endeavored to explore the human mind within its social context and examined the complexity of ways in which man brings his beliefs into practice.

Mosse and Gay aimed to anchor their cultural explorations not only in social history but also in anthropology, with its focus on symbols and community building, and modern psychology to improve their scholarly validity. In the 1950s, many historians at Columbia and

45 Ibid., 129.
46 Mosse, Nazism, 29.
47 Ibid., 30.
49 Ibid.
elsewhere had taken up a psychological emphasis. In defense of his then very unusual focus on National Socialist ideology, Mosse stated that people confronted with several choices are subject to “ideological conditioning . . . as well as psychology, and the two go together.”52 Psychology examined the human subconscious, while anthropology perceived no differences between primitive and modern behavior. Their use of these disciplines enlarged the universal significance of Mosse and Gay’s writing of European history, while it made an effort to avoid parallels between the European past and the American present as well.

Gay and the Liberal Imagination

Informed and disciplined by anthropology, psychology, and historical research, Gay encouraged critical identification with the Enlightenment in the debate about Western culture. It was the historian’s task, Gay argued, to bring complexity back into the view on the Enlightenment, without making it irrelevant to the present. As in Mosse’s The Crisis of German Ideology, the examination of the relationship between man’s thinking and doing takes a central role in Gay’s first book on the Enlightenment, Voltaire’s Politics: The Poet as Realist (1959).

Contesting postwar attacks on the eighteenth century, Gay gave an overview of Voltaire’s many “reputations,” “most of them unjustified,”53 before he launched into his interpretation of the philosophe in Voltaire’s Politics. Selective interest in the abstract thought of the philosohes without regard for the cultural and political context in which they arose had led historians like the Israeli Jacob Talmon, who became very popular in the United States, to trace the paternity of twentieth-century dictatorships back to the French philosopher.54 Moreover, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in particular, who became the most popular philosophe among the revolutionary Jacobins, was often portrayed as the first totalitarian, most notably in Irving Babbitt’s Rousseau and Romanticism (1919). Such works expressed much of the criticism of the Enlightenment that Adorno and Max Horkheimer voiced in their Dialektik der Aufklärung (1944).

Gay, for his part, noticed scholars’ lack of awareness of the political campaign of the eighteenth-century philosohes and argued that it prevented them from appreciating the real attraction of the Enlightenment. Historian of the Enlightenment Robert Darnton

53 Gay, Voltaire’s Politics, 3.
praised Gay’s reconstruction of the intellectual experience of the *philosophes*, noting that “[its] strength consists in its stress on the complex, human dimension of their philosophy.” In *Voltaire’s Politics*, Gay’s historical methodology created a portrait of this *philosophe* as a campaigner in the battle of ideas between two different trends: the Enlightenment and Romanticism. As the Romantic movement led the campaign against the Enlightenment, he argued, it deeply distorted Voltaire’s reputation: “The German *Stürmer und Dränger* [proto-Romantics] repudiated Voltaire as a son repudiates his father to gain maturity.” Gay revealed that the *philosophes* were “propagandists” who campaigned with witticisms and parables of which the historical meaning should not be literally understood.

But in spite of the *philosophe*’s participation in ideological battle, Voltaire distinguished himself from other campaigners: “Like all ideologists,” Gay concluded, “Voltaire exaggerated his disinterestedness; unlike many ideologists, Voltaire was sincere.” Voltaire’s “sincerity” rose from his feeling of responsibility for the practical dimension of his philosophy. In *Voltaire’s Politics*, Gay sought to dismiss the assumption that Voltaire was a “naïve” dreamer and emphasized the instructive nature of “the very defects of the Enlightenment history” as they shed light on “the position of intellectuals under absolutism. If the French Enlightenment historians used history as propaganda, this was part of their unrelenting struggle against the authorities.” Voltaire’s battling spirit was grounded in his empiricism and ability to learn from his own experience.

Like Voltaire’s writings, Gay’s defense of the Enlightenment can only be understood within the context of the intellectual battles of his own time. Gay consciously made himself part of contemporary controversy, contemplating the subjective dimension of historical scholarship that many other historians denied or ignored. Gay criticized the widespread pessimism in American scholarship brought about by the previously unimaginable horrors that had taken place. The postwar generation of American historians was largely molded by *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) of the Frankfurt School and émigré Theodor Adorno. This study on mass communication, authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, and Freudian analysis was part of a broader collaborative project entitled “Studies in Prejudice,” which Neumann had started during the war. Adorno’s concept of European...
anti-Semitism profoundly shaped interpretations of McCarthyism as “American Fascism.”61 Gay strongly rejected such parallels between the German past and the American present. In his first article on the subject, “Light on the Enlightenment” (1954), he regretted that these scholars’ dismissed the legacy of the Enlightenment as a model of identification: “The last fifty years have been years of continuous disappointments — we have fought wars which we knew to be impossible, we have witnessed revolutions go sour and barbarisms brutal beyond imagination. Under these blows of reality many thoughtful people felt compelled to abandon the heritage of the eighteenth century.”62

Some American historians, too, made efforts to strengthen Western culture after the war, reflecting the need for a positive national, democratic identity. American Studies scholars had argued as early as the 1930s that Beard and Becker’s relativism opened the door to Nazism. Gay was closely associated with students of American Studies even during his own student days.63 He admired their interdisciplinary efforts, which would increasingly characterize his own studies. Interest in myths and symbols often shaped their cultural approach to American history, which linked democratic ideology to the Second World War and the Cold War.64 Lionel Trilling, a literary critic who underscored the necessity of the imagination in inspiring national, democratic commitment in The Liberal Imagination (1950) was influential in these developments, according to Gay.65

Yet Gay’s efforts to shore up American culture differed from those of American historians in one important respect: 1950s historians were frequently steeped in the theory of American exceptionalism, whereas Gay’s interpretation of the “liberal tradition” sought to point out European predecessors and models from whom Americans could learn. Based on the Weimar lesson about the danger of pessimism, Gay argued that it was not the Enlightenment that had seduced people into believing that everything would be better but that this belief was rooted “realistically” in the possibilities of human psychology. Learning from the “failure” of the enlightened tradition in the twentieth century, Gay concluded “that one must confront the world and dominate it, that the cure for the ills of modernity is more, and the right kind of modernity.”66

Therefore, Gay denied that the Enlightenment was just another “myth.” Like Voltaire, Gay was a “sincere” ideologist, who thrived not on irrational optimism or fear but urged his audience to make hope,
informed by an awareness of competing cultural traditions, part of Western culture. He promoted the Enlightenment in his historical writings as “an age of hope, but not of optimism.” Gay pointed to Cassirer’s “liberal imagination” view of the Enlightenment, which saw it as a movement that “joined to a degree scarcely ever achieved before, the critical with the productive function and converted the one directly into the other.” Gay admired Cassirer for breaking through the traditional opposition between the “rational” Enlightenment and “creative” Romanticism. In Cassirer’s, and Gay’s, view, the philosophes were not only critical rebels but also imaginative builders of a better world.

**Mosse’s Analysis of Popular Culture**

Although Mosse’s attraction to cultural history opened up for him the works of cultural historians like Burckhardt and Huizinga, he shared Gay’s emphasis on intellectual elites to force social change less and less. His growing interest in irrationality shifted his focus halfway through the 1950s increasingly from the research of (German) intellectuals to the masses. Mosse started to publish on German history not long after his move to the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where American historians like William Ayedelotte and Merle Curti were conducting research on American popular culture. Curti had participated in a larger movement researching popular culture in the 1930s. In 1937, he had written the article “Dime Novels and the American Tradition,” in which he urged American historians to take the culture of working people seriously. A close friend of Mosse’s, who had already been attracted to socialism during his exile in England, and a prominent representative of the progressive tradition in Madison, Curti condemned the “elitist” and “anti-democratic” tone of his former student Hofstadter and accused him of having turned into a “neo-conservative.” Like Mosse, Curti criticized postwar liberalism for its obsession with the Cold War and its relative complacency about social issues. Instead of popularizing Enlightenment culture, Mosse turned to the analysis of popular culture.

Similar to Gay’s it is necessary to understand Mosse’s position within the contemporary controversy about the meaning of German history for the United States to grasp the relationship between morality and reality in his research on the rise of National Socialism. Like Gay’s view on the contemporary significance of the Enlightenment, Mosse’s postulation of a German Sonderweg, which claimed that there was a special German path that led to National Socialism,
seems at first to suggest the superiority of liberal, Western cultural traditions. The Crisis of German Ideology, his first book about the rise of National Socialism, was an analysis of German völkisch culture from the age of the Napoleonic Wars to the Nazi seizure of power. He clearly stated the book’s aim: “to analyze the history of völkisch thought and through it to define Adolf Hitler’s German revolution.” In his view, the intellectual and ideological character of völkisch thought derived directly from the Romantic movement of the nineteenth century, showing a similar “distinct tendency toward the irrational and the emotional” and a focus “primarily on man and the world.” With people disappointed by Bismarck’s unification of Germany, and scared by the nation’s growing industrialization, new schools were established with völkisch thought as their foundations, so that such thought “became institutionalized where it mattered most: in the education of young and receptive minds.”

Like Gay, Mosse aimed to demonstrate to an American public (at a time when rational liberalism and Western culture were too often equated) that ideas, expressed by means of symbols and established in cultural traditions, could be weapons and that history could easily be instrumentalized for political purposes.

Mosse’s construction of these continuities in German history was partly motivated by an effort to rebut German historians like Gerhard Ritter, who tried to portray National Socialism as a mishap of European modernity. “It is important to clarify this once again,” Mosse wrote in his first major work on National Socialism The Crisis of German Ideology (1964), challenging the widespread assertion that National Socialism was simply an “accident” in which the political will of the masses was manipulated, “since German historians, of late, have been happy to point out parallels with other Western nations.” Remarkably, Mosse also claimed that this environment, ripe for völkisch thought, was not meant “to provide an argument for a German Sonderweg, that there existed a peculiarly and uniquely German and anti-Western nationalism, racism and anti-Semitism.” From his position as a historian in a transatlantic historiographical context, Mosse aimed to undermine the simplistic “From-Luther-to-Hitler” thesis that became very popular in postwar America. By 1947, Mosse had rejected this version of the Sonderweg thesis and observed that the Romantics were concerned with the ideal of freedom: “I want to destroy the connection between the Romantic movement and fascist myth . . . . there is no connection between Romantic nationalism on the one hand and fascist myth on the other. For the Romantics were

74 Ibid., 13.
75 Ibid., 152.
76 Ibid., 27.
77 Ibid., 8.
concerned, first of all, with freedom as a concrete, outward thing, though that was never the ultimate good.” 79 While they shared a focus on German culture, Mosse repudiated Hans Kohn’s perception that Germany had waged a “War against the West” by referring to Germany as the country of Marx as well and by pointing to aggressive policies that Western countries had frequently adopted themselves: “if the West had not been idealized in the name of liberalism and Enlightenment, Germany’s separation from Western thought would have been more convincing.”80 In other words, the Western view of Germany was not only shaped by a demonization of Romanticism but also by the idealization of the West.

Like Gay, Mosse pointed to a historical complexity in the connection between man’s thinking and doing, rationality and irrationality, which questioned historical determination as well. In The Crisis of German Ideology, Mosse set the ideological factor at the beginning of his interpretation of National Socialism, which he eventually defined as an “anti-Jewish revolution.” In three articles written from 1957-1961, he stressed the need to understand the content of the popular imagination through the analysis of literature in order to understand the intellectual foundations of German anti-Semitism. He examined popular literature from often obscure thinkers and novelists. Discussing the vagueness of thought of one German critic, Eugen Diedrichs (1867–1930), Mosse referred to Diedrichs’s “idealism of deeds” and his conclusion that “the adoption of an irrational, emotional and mystical view by each individual German would automatically produce the desired results.”81 Nonetheless, Mosse argued, this absence of any concrete scheme did not imply that the critics did not intend for their ideas to be realized. Contrary to the political realism of Gay’s Voltaire, Mosse exposed his German critics’ lack of political strategy in reconstructing them as part of their social environment.

The thinking of critics like Diedrichs, therefore, was often imperfectly represented by actual political developments. Mosse’s training in Church and religious history formed the background of his claim that the völkisch movement, like Gay’s Enlightenment, embodied a sense of hope for many people. Increasingly, he came to understand that the essence of fascism was not nihilism. In Nazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich (1966), he claimed that the German movement was a religion; German nationalism was personalized through symbols, camaraderie, and liturgy.

79 Mosse, “Cultural History,” 1947, George L. Mosse Collection; AR 25137; box 6; folder 10, Leo Baeck Institute, 28.
80 Mosse, “Review of Hans Kohn’s Mind of Germany.”
81 Ibid., 55.
But in the examination of irrationality, Mosse criticized thinkers like Freud and Cassirer, Gay’s intellectual models, for their strong attachment to the power of rationality. At the beginning of the 1950s, Neumann first introduced Gay to the writings of Freud, which Gay called a “liberating invitation to explore directions that I had not anticipated taking.” But especially after Neumann’s death in 1954, Gay’s friendship with Columbia historian Richard Hofstadter became instrumental in the development of his interest in psychoanalysis. Hofstadter’s particular definition of history as a curious, intriguing mixture of the rational pursuit of self-interest and less well-understood, nonrational aims taught Gay how to conduct interdisciplinary research. In *The Culture of Western Europe: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (1961), Georges Sorel, Gustave le Bon, and Ernst Jung (who had himself been attracted to National Socialism) taught him much more about the irrationality of the masses: “I think that more than anyone else Jung had a sense of what National Socialism was all about.” Jung inspired Mosse’s examination of myth both in relationship to the masses and the individual. He concluded that the need for security was basic to the conservatism of popular culture: “Symbols and myths help to overcome the anxiety that is caused by the changing pace of life of the modern, secularized world.” He now understood how Hitler “took the basic nationalism of the German tradition and the longing for the stable personal relationships of olden times, and built upon them the strongest belief of the group.”

In the course of the 1960s, Mosse’s support of the tradition of the Enlightenment became more conditional through the works of the Frankfurt School and student protests. While Gay sought to stimulate a positive, liberal identity resting on Enlightenment ideals, Mosse became more pessimistic in his analysis of history and less and less able to imagine himself at home in Western culture. Gay’s awareness of the battle between various European cultural traditions led him to look back to the eighteenth century and to the development of the Enlightenment. But in his effort to show Voltaire’s liberal tolerance, Gay did not once refer to Voltaire’s anti-Semitism in the first edition of *Voltaire’s Politics*. Whereas Gay did connect imagination and the Enlightenment, forcing a link between creativity and political rationality, Mosse came to point to the danger of “normality.” Mosse maintained that bourgeois society was held together by conformity and respectability that encouraged a dynamic between inclusion and exclusion. Perceiving both liberalism and racism to be the results of the tradition of the Enlightenment, Mosse considered it much more

84 Gay, “History, Biography, Psychoanalysis,” 93.
86 Ibid.
88 In the second edition of *Voltaire’s Politics*, Gay added an appendix in which he claimed that Voltaire’s anti-Semitism was irrelevant to an understanding of the essence of his thought.
problematic to put the same level of trust into this movement as Gay. Thus, while Gay called for more and better modernity, Mosse continued to dig deeper into the illiberal tradition, searching for a more complete understanding of the rise of National Socialism.

Conclusion

Mosse and Gay’s historical writings with their focus on Western culture sometimes seem to be relics of another era of historical scholarship. But this perception overlooks the ambiguity of their scholarly endeavor. Although the two historians ignored large parts of the world, it should be remembered that their use of Geistesgeschichte was part of their effort to make American historical scholarship more cosmopolitan. Mosse and Gay’s stance in the Cold War, and their critical support of both German and American intellectual and cultural traditions, set them apart from many older émigrés and transcended divisions between consensus and progressive history. Despite their “old-fashioned” conviction that an intellectual elite should bring about social change, they did try to enlarge the contemporary impact of historical scholarship.

The comparison between the two historians’ careers illustrates the entanglement of the postwar American historiography of National Socialism and the Enlightenment: these two historical periods formed the poles between which Western culture was defined. Mosse and Gay wrestled with many of the same questions and challenges in their attempts to relate European and American cultural traditions to each another. The analysis of their historical methodology within the context of American scholarship shows that their historical writings formed, in two different ways, strong reactions to contemporary interpretations of the relevance of the experience of National Socialism and the new position of the United States in the postwar world. Although American historical research on irrationality did exist, many American intellectuals used twentieth-century German history to reaffirm the cultivation of the rational, anti-ideological quality of the American national “character” at the beginning of the Cold War.

Mosse and Gay’s development of the German tradition of Geistesgeschichte contested traditional oppositions between the allegedly abstract rationality of the Enlightenment and irrationality of the predecessors of National Socialism through their focus on motives,
wishes, and dreams in European history. Moreover, the course of German history served as an inspirational-critical narrative at the beginning of the Cold War. Mosse and Gay’s use of psychology and social history strengthened the dynamic between universality and particularity of the tradition of *Geistesgeschichte*, which allowed them to rewrite the European confrontation with ideology. Naturally, American history contained many historical narratives to learn from. Still, some intellectuals continued to cultivate the “unspoiled,” “antitheoretical” character of the American nation that set it apart from European history. But American intellectuals could now identify with European history through Mosse and Gay’s writings, while they avoided too many parallels between the present and the often imperfect or even catastrophic past that would lead to excessive optimism or pessimism about American identity.

In spite of the differences between them, Mosse and Gay are part of the same refugee generation: their relatively late emigration from Nazi Germany was fundamental in shaping their positions as cultural mediators between European and American culture. Their contacts with Weimar historians provided them with an insider view, although they never overcame their initial mistrust of German culture completely. Moreover, contrary to many older émigré historians, their American education, contacts, and friendships with Americanists and American historians like Trilling, Hofstadter, and Curti made them sensitive to developments, achievements, and flaws in American culture and scholarship. Thus, in their central focus on the changing meaning of ideas, they were well able to connect their historical reconstructions to contemporary American debates about the role of European history in Western culture.

But while Mosse and Gay were both part of these networks of older émigré and American scholars, as younger émigrés they never presented themselves as part of the “refugee generation,” nor did they feel particularly close to one another. As Gay noted as recently as 2008: “Considering how close we were in age and academic orientation, it is astonishing that we were not closer to one another. . . . I felt particularly friendly towards George Mosse, but we never worked together, nor did we two . . . ever show one another each other’s manuscripts or co-operate on conferences. We did our work, but our close friends were others.”

Maybe these two defenders of individual autonomy felt that their careful balance — between victimhood and “lucky” escape, between countries, experiences, and traditions, between the past and the present — could not, in the end, be captured by a simple label of generations or community.

Merel Leeman teaches history at the University of Amsterdam. She has written on the history of Jewish emigration during the 1930s, on American intellectual history, and on the history of historiography. Her dissertation, “A Responsible Rebel: Peter Gay and the Drama of German History in the United States, 1945-1968” (University of Amsterdam), addresses the work and career of this Jewish German-American émigré historian.
Transcending the Atlantic World: Shifting Mental Maps

Christian Albrecht

At the beginning of the 1970s, a transnational circle of successful businessmen, high-ranking bureaucrats, and renowned scientists who called themselves the Club of Rome gained wide attention in Western industrialized countries and beyond.1 The reason for their sudden fame was *The Limits to Growth*, a study commissioned by the club’s executive committee and published in 1972 as the first in a series of reports presented to the club.2 Based on a computerized world model, the book — which belonged to the diverse, semi-scientific field of future studies — called for a policy to stop economic and human population growth. It fostered a fierce debate about the worldwide effects of economic and demographic growth and, today, counts as the most influential of many ecological doomsday prophecies that mark the early 1970s as the starting point of an “Era of Ecology.”3

Founded in 1968, only a few years prior to the publication of the *Limits* report, the Club of Rome was initially launched by a small group of influential Europeans as follow-up to a conference that took place at the Academia dei Lincei in Rome — hence its name. Its early members were part of the economic, intellectual, and political elite of Western industrialized countries, and many of them had close contacts to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) — which successively transformed into an Atlantic institution during the 1960s.4 At the same time, the club’s members thought of themselves as “a group of world citizens, sharing a common concern regarding the deep crisis faced by humanity.”5 They referred to this crisis as the

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1 This essay is part of my PhD project on the history of the Club of Rome which I am currently conducting at the Research Group for Global Processes at the University of Konstanz.


3 Limits also remains the primary point of public attention for the Club of Rome, which still exists as a transnational non-governmental and non-profit organization with offices in Winterthur, Switzerland, and Vienna, Austria. See www.clubofrome.org. The book’s outstanding success — it was translated into more than thirty languages and sold over ten million copies worldwide — was a result of several factors (including its global perspective, a fascination generated by the use of modern computer technology, good writing, targeted marketing tactics, and especially the first oil crisis in 1973). Joachim Radkau, *Die Ära der Ökologie. Eine Weltgeschichte* (Munich, 2011), esp. 124–64; and Kai Hüsemünder, “Kassandra im modernen Gewand? Die umweltapokalyptischen Mahnrufe der frühen 1970er Jahre,” in *Wird Kassandra heiser? Die Geschichte falscher Ökoalarme*, ed. Frank Uekötter and Jens Hohensee (Stuttgart, 2004), 78–97.

4 After succeeding the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1961, which originally consisted only of the Western European countries, the OECD also included the United States, Canada (both since 1961), Japan (1964), Australia (1971), and New Zealand (1973) as new member states. On the history of the OECD, see note 66 below.

(world) problématique, which Limits to Growth describes as “the complex of problems troubling all nations.” Thus, visions of the Atlantic partnership in a fast-changing world as well as European voices — especially its primary founder and first president, the Italian industrialist Aurelio Peccei — played a significant role in laying out the club’s course of action during the first decade of its existence.

The Club of Rome is, therefore, a suitable lens for the study of transatlantic relations in the postwar era. By scrutinizing the club’s early history, this essay aims to show how the Atlantic Community and its underlying mental maps have been reconceptualized along global parameters within certain parts of the establishment in Atlantic countries since the end of the 1960s. It thus addresses the question of how the club’s founding and its aims were affected by visions of the Atlantic Community in a widening world order, a worldview based on systemic and cybernetic thinking, as well as by hopes of ending the Cold War. Therefore, the debates over the Limits to Growth during the mid-1970s, which historians have already dealt with exhaustively, are not addressed in detail in this paper. Instead, it contributes to recent research identifying the transition from the 1960s to the 1970s as a decisive break within the “transatlantic century” and a period of time characterized by the “shock of the global” — a common perception of a rapidly changing and increasingly complex world.

This essay begins with a discussion of Aurelio Peccei, the first president of the Club of Rome, and his emerging concerns about a global crisis and a faltering Atlantic partnership that eventually led him to outline a “new approach” to transatlantic cooperation

6 Meadows et al., Limits to Growth, 10. The problématique is further described as including a range of diverse problems such as “poverty in the midst of plenty; degradation of the environment; loss of faith in institutions; uncontrolled urban spread; insolvency of employment; alienation of youth; rejection of traditional values; inflation and other monetary disruptions.”

7 On Atlanticism, see, e.g., Kenneth Weisbrode’s contribution to this volume and his The Atlantic Century: Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats who Forged America’s Vital Alliance with Europe (Cambridge: 2009); Marco Mariano, Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century (New York: 2010); On the concept of mental maps, see Jörg Döring and Tristan Thielmann, eds., Spatial Turn. Das Raumparadigma in den Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften (Bielefeld, 2008).

8 An interesting overview on diverging visions of how the Cold War might have (or ought to have) ended can be found in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Bernd Rother, eds., Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945-1990 (New York: 2012). For a historical account of the concept of world order, see Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s (New York, 2007).


10 Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel Sargent, eds., The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge: 2010). According to Mary Nolan, The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-2010 (Cambridge, 2012), this change was marked by a range of elusive events hinting at a general decline of American hegemony: the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system, European détente policies, the first oil shock worldwide mass protests, the rise of the environmental movement, and, last but not least, America’s faltering attempts to win the Vietnam War.
and global development. It then addresses the launch of the Club of Rome as a loosely organized network rooted in the methodological and transnational context of futures studies, building on contacts that went beyond the Western world and transcending even the Iron Curtain. The third and final section looks at the club’s impact within an Atlantic context up until the early 1970s. Thus, it deals with its attempts to define and address the problématique, which eventually led to the publication of the Limits to Growth. In the conclusion, I reflect upon the ways differing visions and discourses about the Atlantic Community and broader ideas of “one world” interacted during the 1960s and 1970s.

Addressing the Problems of the Future: Aurelio Peccei’s “New Approach” to Transatlantic Cooperation and Global Development

Aurelio Peccei (1908–1984), born in Turin, Italy, was a trained economist and a successful industrial manager with wide-ranging contacts in Europe, the United States, and Latin America who was actively involved in the global project of modernizing the Third World during the 1950s and 1960s.11 His distinguished career started in the early 1930s, when he joined the Italian motor company Fiat. He was sent to China but returned to Italy after the outbreak of the Second World War, during which he fought against and was imprisoned by the Fascist government. Following the end of the war — and a short intermezzo as cofounder of the Italian airline Alitalia — he eventually returned to Fiat, where he was put in charge of the company’s Latin American enterprises in 1949. From then on, he built up the subsidiary Fiat Concord in Buenos Aires, turning it into one of the leading motorcar and railway material companies on the continent, which contributed to the modernization of Argentine agriculture as the first firm to manufacture tractors inside the country.

But by the end of the 1950s, at the age of fifty, Peccei had become increasingly dismayed by “the miserable, hopeless condition of some of the least-developed zones” that he came across during his travels and, as he later recalled, “I started asking myself whether I was actually doing what I ought to be doing.”12 It was around this time that — after freeing himself from some of his Fiat commitments — he began to devote increasing personal time and energy to the crusade for development in poor countries. In 1957, he founded a small...
research center within Fiat Concord, where he hosted conferences to further address the problems of underdeveloped countries. At the same time, against the backdrop of the Suez crisis, he launched the nonprofit engineering and consulting firm Italconsult, which he headed until the end of the 1970s; its aim was to help the development of Third World Mediterranean countries.\(^{13}\) In 1964, shortly before he returned to Italy to become vice president of the struggling typewriter and electronics company Olivetti (while retaining a position as special advisor to Fiat, as well as his office in Buenos Aires), Peccei was also involved in setting up the Atlantic Development Group for Latin America (ADELA).

Originally started as an American project, ADELA was a collective effort by corporations from the Atlantic countries and Japan — which had joined the OECD earlier in 1964 — to increase investment in the private sector in Latin America. While one of its main initiators, U.S. Senator Jacob K. Javits, praised its launch as a victory for the promotion of “our common Judeo-Christian ethic and progressive economic principles,” Peccei was less optimistic.\(^{14}\) He neither shared Javits’s hopes of winning the Cold War by modernizing the Third World, nor did he “think that the best way to boost a sagging economy . . . was to give free rein to its private sector.”\(^{15}\) Nevertheless, as Peccei states in his autobiography, he hoped that ADELA “would prime a process of modernization and rationalization of local industry” and, simultaneously, modify the “unconstructive and short-sighted attitude of European and American industrial and financial circles” toward investing in Latin America.\(^{16}\)

Soon after his involvement in the creation of ADELA, Peccei became convinced that the negative effects of technological development affected not just the Third World but could also be felt in the industrialized countries. Until then, he had never published any articles or books, nor had he spoken publicly on topics other than those concerning his work as a manager. But from the mid-1960s onward, he began to refine and publicly promote his thoughts about global development and mankind’s most pressing problems. In 1965, he began writing several articles and held a series of lectures in Latin America and the United States. Two years later, feeling that his calls to address mankind’s problems had gone unheard, he started to “condense . . . my fears and my hopes about the future” in his first book, published as The Chasm Ahead in 1969.\(^{17}\)
In one of his earliest lectures, “The Challenges of the 1970s for the World of Today,” given on the invitation of ADELA at the Military College of Buenos Aires in 1965, Peccei had painted the picture of a global crisis caused by modern technology: Man had lost control over the accelerating “techno-scientific progress” that had started with the Industrial Revolution and had up to that point only been held at bay by the “military stimulus” provided by national defense or war preparedness. This process of ongoing scientific and technological development had now reached an unprecedented level, as was shown by the apocalyptic possibilities of total nuclear destruction.18 Thus, Peccei called for “a longer term global political approach” that would make use of modern computer technology in order to synthesize mankind’s ever increasing knowledge and enable mankind to tackle “the real problems of the next decade: survival in the nuclear age . . ., overpopulation, hunger in large parts of the world, [deficits in] education in the broadest sense, [finding] justice in liberty, [making sure there is] better circulation and distribution of wealth.”19 In 1965, he did not yet express concern about environmental pollution or resource depletion but imagined his international initiative to be primarily aimed at “enlarging and consolidating the area of prosperity which exists today in the world”.20 It was only a few years later, in Chasm, that he included the “degradation of our ecosystem” in the “tidal wave of global problems” humanity would face in the future. He never consciously reconciled these newfound concerns — which had only begun to spread from the United States to Europe in the mid-1960s — with his plans of global development and equality.21

In his public talks and writings Peccei also expressed special concern about the stability of the Atlantic partnership. In his lecture in Buenos Aires, he had stated that “the second industrial revolution” in automation and management had “exploded in the United States” and left the rest of the world lagging behind.22 On this occasion, speaking to a group of Latin American managers, he further argued that Europe and the United States threatened to “move further apart psychologically from one another” because of the increasing “technological gap” between the two sides of the Atlantic.23 He further addressed the technological gap in Chasm, which he promoted in newspapers as “an urgent call from Europe for Atlantic Union” to prevent “the growing gap between Europe and the United States” from becoming a “chasm.”24
Such a gap between Europe and the United States was first postulated and debated by French economists such as Pierre Cognard, Jean Jaques Servan Schreiber, and Louis Armand. They promoted a common European market and the development of science and technology as a way to oppose American political and economic dominance during the mid-1960s. By the end of the 1960s, with transatlantic political and economic cooperation at its lowest level since the end of the Second World War, the OECD and private organizations committed to preserving Atlantic cooperation picked up on their concerns.\(^{25}\) It was in this context that Peccei — who would become the first chairman of the newly founded Committee for Atlantic Economic Cooperation at the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs in 1967 — criticized President Johnson’s aim of creating a “Great Society” as an “ego-centric one, which would carry [the United States] too far forward.”\(^{26}\)

Peccei was convinced that to stop Europe and the United States from drifting away from each other and to tackle the global crisis effectively, the developed nations had to accept their responsibility for world leadership. In his writings produced from 1965 onward, he outlined what he in *Chasm* would call a “New Approach” to Atlantic cooperation that was to place “the Atlantic Community in a global context.”\(^{27}\) While he expected the United States to take the lead in his plan for global development, Europe, on the other hand — which he viewed as still being the “focal point of the world” — was to remain “a link between the America which lives in the future and those regions which live partly in the past.”\(^{28}\) His New Approach was clearly rooted in ideas of an Atlantic Community, which he primarily understood not as a political alliance but as an entity possessing “a homogeneous cultural basis” rooted in Greek philosophy, Roman law, Christian religion, and Latin and Anglo-Saxon languages.\(^{29}\)

Still, he envisioned a policy leading to the “fusion of the communities on both shores of the Atlantic” for which he espoused the motto “first European Unity, then Atlantic interdependence.”\(^{30}\) He seems to have supported ideas of an equal political and economic partnership between the United States and a united Europe — as promoted...
by Jean Monnet and his acolytes on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

In 1966, Peccei sketched out his vision of global development based on the Atlantic Community in detail in a paper entitled “Developed-Underdeveloped and East-West Relations,” which he presented in the United States on the invitation of Business International Corporation, a leading American advisory firm, and published in 1967 in the Atlantic Community Quarterly (see Figure 1):

The world is represented by a strong core where the main forces of progress are centered and which exerts leadership; and that is in fact the Atlantic Community . . . This image may be compared to the layers of an onion, and there are three principal layers around the Atlantic core [Europe, the United States, and Canada]: The special relationship countries [the Eastern European, Mediterranean, and Central American countries, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand]; the great outside development regions [the Soviet Union and its satellites and South America]; and areas of later development [Africa and Asia]. 31

Peccei understood the countries of the first layer to be “a logical extension of the Atlantic Community,” thus they were to be developed “as rapidly and as homogeneously as possible.” He described the Soviet Union and its satellites as a developmental region since they had not experienced an economic rise similar to that of the Western European countries. Asia and Africa, finally, were the last regions to be included in the growing community of prosperity. 32 It is clear therefore that, even though Peccei’s worldview adopted a strongly Western-centric perspective, it differed significantly from the views of those neoliberal conservatives — described by Quinn


32 Peccei, “Developed-Underdeveloped and East-West Relations,” 76.
Slobodian in this volume — who wanted to deny the black population of the African continent the blessings of industrialization and technology.

As one can see from his writings, Peccei’s thinking was also based on ideas of “One World.” In *Chasm*, he went on to describe his global plan, articulated in his earlier papers, as “a kind of model for the next decade with an Atlantic-centered, development-oriented, unitary view of the world.”33 During the late 1960s, when the first photographs from outer space appeared, older discourses revolving around a unified earth regained momentum, joined, at the same time, by new ecological metaphors such as the notion of “spaceship earth” — a term coined by Barbara Ward and prominently promoted by Kenneth Boulding.34 In *Chasm*, referring to the works of Boulding (and other influential thinkers such as Sir Julian Huxley and Bertram Gross), Peccei himself described how the idea of “one world” first emerged after the Second World War when multinational corporations started “thinking and planning globally” along the lines of worldwide strategies.35 He further stated that this “process of progressive globalization or planetarization,” which he understood as a “process of creating new institutions superseding the family of nation-states,” had now become visible in the push for European integration.36

Considering his biographical background and his geopolitical thinking, it is possible to describe Peccei as a member of a transnational capitalist class that contributed to new discourses on globality and “managing the planet” that were based on a feeling of urgency and crisis, a strong belief in the leading role of the Atlantic Community, visions of an integrated world, and a technocratic worldview.37 In *Chasm*, he described his perception of the then-current situation as follows: “Conceptually, and in our strategic and political decisions, we must be guided by a unitary view of the world . . . [which] is the only one consistent with the new kind of problems that will confront us in the near future — the macroproblems of the technological age.”38 In the twenty years that followed, Peccei applied most of his efforts and resources to this goal.

**Futures Studies, the OECD, and the Birth of the Club of Rome**

In 1967, Peccei’s attempts to address mankind’s problems experienced an unexpected boost when the speech he had given in Buenos Aires two years earlier happened to be translated into English without his knowledge. His ideas then caught the attention of influential members of major intergovernmental organizations, including British

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33 Peccei, *Chasm*, 190.
35 Peccei, *Chasm*, 148. See further on the “emergence of one earth” ibid., 135–57.
36 Ibid., 148, 152.
civil servant and science policy planner Alexander King (1909–2007). King, who was at that time the general director for scientific affairs at the OECD, was well informed about the debates regarding the technological gap and shared Peccei’s concern about the dark sides of industrialized societies and the unwanted global repercussions of technological development. He was very impressed with Peccei’s outline of the global situation even though, in contrast to Peccei, he was mainly interested in the effects of science and technology within the Western countries. When the two men first met a week after King had read Peccei’s paper, “this was the beginning of a range of discussions which finally led to the creation of the Club.”

In the 1960s, industrialized countries in Europe and Northern America were still experiencing a widespread planning euphoria — both on the state and (especially in the U.S.) corporate levels. Along with this came the expansion of bureaucracies and an almost exponential increase in the number of scientists, (big) research projects, and scientific institutions. It was in this context that Peccei — who had wide-ranging experience in corporate planning — had advocated in 1965 that computer-based forecasting techniques be applied in order to address the global crisis he had identified.

King, too, was convinced that this was the way to go. Both men initially came across technological forecasting, which was based on military research first invented during the Second World War, while visiting the United States in the late 1950s. The sites they visited included the notorious Research and Development Corporation (RAND), which started as a U.S. Air Force project in the 1940s and opened up the first forecasting department for social research in the 1950s. It was within the United States that forecasting methods, which were generally based on the methods of systems analysis and cybernetics that deal with control and communication in “open systems” (i.e., systems that are able to learn), had first been applied to provide policy advice for the U.S. military.

39 Peccei, Human Quality, 62-63; Alexander King, Let the Cat Turn Round: One Man’s Traverse of the Twentieth Century (London, 2006), 294–96. For more on the story of Peccei and King’s first acquaintance, see Moll, From Scarcity to Sustainability, 61–62.

40 King, interview, quoted in Moll, From Scarcity to Sustainability, 61. See further King, Let the Cat Turn Round, 279–81 and 297.


43 Daniel Bessner’s contribution to this volume discusses the Rand Corporation.

As the Austrian systems scientist Erich Jantsch showed in a report for King’s department at the OECD produced in 1967, the use of technological forecasting had increased immensely within the OECD countries during the postwar decades. By the mid-1960s, some European thinkers such as Gaston Berger and Bertrand de Jouvenel, the founder of the journal *Futuribles*, sought to provide an alternative to the extrapolative forecasts produced within most American think tanks, promoting instead a more “critical” approach to planning that could be applied not just to military concerns but also for the good of mankind. In 1967, this “normative” approach was discussed in Oslo at the first international meeting on futures studies (also referred to as futurology or future sciences), “Mankind 2000.” The practitioners of this growing and heterogeneous research field were generally concerned with the production of long-term forecasts, tended to use systemic or cybernetic methodologies, and, thus, often expressed a holistic worldview. In this respect, they differed from most specialized natural and social scientists, such as the scholars of the “Frankfurt School.” During the 1960s and 1970s, futurologists, like other scientists, were able to act as experts on politically relevant topics and, thus, gained the attention of political decision-makers and, sometimes, of the general public.

Peccei had attended the conference in Oslo and had already been in touch with several European futurologists such as Bertrand de Jouvenel — whom he had known since the 1940s and later described as his “intellectual mentor” — and Ossip K. Flechtheim. By the time he met Alexander King, he was convinced of the potential of cybernetics and futures studies for synthesizing different fields of knowledge in a way that could be usefully applied to global problems. It was during this time that he became increasingly involved in discussions about the creation of an international scientific institute that could make use of systems analysis in order to address “the shared problems of industrial nations” — an idea that President Johnson had prominently put forward in 1966 in order to facilitate relations between capitalist...
and communist countries. Johnson’s vision was eventually fulfilled six years later, in 1972, with the launch of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. From 1967, Peccei — who was instrumental in facilitating talks between the United States and the Soviet Union — had been a principle proponent of the IIASA. At the beginning of 1968, however, its launch was still far away as talks between the other countries involved, and especially the two superpowers, turned out to be rather unproductive.

In addition, the rise in student revolts increased Peccei’s feeling of urgency about addressing the global crisis. He was greatly worried about the “thousands and thousands of young minds . . ., the students of our universities, rebel[ling] in their seats of learning against certain aspects of the society they are about to enter.” Therefore, convinced that the situation was “ripe for a group of qualified non-political European personalities to open discussion among themselves . . . on how . . . to devise new ways of conducting human affairs more rationally in this nuclear-electronic-supersonic age,” he and Alexander King started to organize a European meeting entitled “Problems of World Society: New Approaches to System-Wide Planning.” According to Peccei, this undertaking was inspired by some of his “American friends” — most likely those involved in the talks about the launch of IIASA — who had suggested “that the initial move [concerning the establishment of an international institute for system analysis] should come from us Europeans.”

After he managed to acquire funding through the Agnelli Foundation, a research and cultural institute honoring the founder of Fiat, the meeting eventually took place on April 6 and 7, 1968, in Rome at the Villa Farnesina, the headquarters of the Academia dei Lincei. Present among the thirty “economists, planners, geneticists, sociologists, politologues, and managers” from Western Europe were several


51 U.S. Senator Hubert Humphrey, who had known Peccei since the early 1960s and had been among the initiators of ADELA, and Jurgen Gvishiani, vice-chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology and son-in-law of Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin, led negotiations on the American and Soviet sides, respectively. Gvishiani had actually come across the copy of Peccei’s ADELA speech even before Alexander King, whom he contacted in order to find Peccei. Paul J. Pauli, Crusader for the Future, 62–69. For more on the founding of the IIASA, see Giuliana Gemelli, “Building Bridges in Science and Society during the Cold War: The Origins of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),” in American Foundations and Large-Scale Research: Construction and Transfer of Knowledge, ed. Giuliana Gemelli (Bologna, 2001), 159-98. During the 1970s and 1980s, the IIASA was involved in the development of what later became the Internet. See Frank Dittmann, “Technik versus Konflikt. Wie Datennetze den Eisernen Vorhang durchdrangen,” Osteuropa 59, no. 10 (2009): 101–19.

52 Peccei, Chasm, 271. See also King, Let the Cat Turn Round, 292. For more on worldwide protest in the late 1960s, see Martin Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties (Princeton, 2010); Philipp Gassert and Martin Klimke, eds., 1968: Memoires and Legacies of a Global Revolt (Washington, DC, 2009).

53 Aurelio Peccei, Letter to Franco Archibugi (22 February 1968). This letter is located in box 37 of the Aurelio Peccei Papers, quoted from here on as “AP/Box number.” These boxes are currently stored at the Dipartimento di Scienze dei Beni Culturali at the Università degli Studi della Tuscia in Viterbo, Italy.

54 Peccei, Letter to Franco Archibugi.

55 Ibid., and Peccei, Chasm, 251.
influential futures scholars. On Peccei’s request, Erich Jantsch, King’s colleague at the OECD, had prepared a paper entitled “A Tentative Framework for Initiating System-Wide Planning of World Scope” as a basis for discussion. In this essay — a synthesis of Peccei’s ideas and those of other thinkers such as the British evolutionist Julian Huxley and the American planner Hasan Özbekhan — Jantsch addressed the problem of uncontrolled technological growth and proposed an international approach toward planetary “normative planning,” i.e., including rational goal-setting. He concluded that “[i]t dawns on us now that there is no inherent cybernetics in the system; no self-regulating ‘automatism’ of macroprocesses: the cybernetic element in the evolution of our planet is man himself and his capacity for actively shaping the future.” Drawing again on Peccei’s thoughts, he proposed an international effort for a “feasibility study for system-wide planning of world scope,” entitled “Project 1968.”

However, as Peccei admitted in *Chasm*, the conference turned out to be “only a partial success” because participants proved unable to agree upon a methodological framework. The fact that most of the two days at the Academia dei Lincei were spent discussing the difference in meaning between the English word “system” and the French word “système” further led Peccei to conclude that “[i]n such matters as thought and culture, Europe’s fragmentation is evident.” King, who less diplomatically called the whole thing a “complete flop,” later also recalled the conference as having been somewhat influenced by a certain anti-American spirit. He states in his autobiography that “[t]o some it was unthinkable to have the Vienna Opera House and the RAND Corporation on the same continent,” to which he recalls replying that “it was impossible to imagine a future Europe that did not have both.” As this statement makes evident, King, like Peccei, saw the United States as a role model for Europe, which appeared to be at least partially stuck in the past.

It was during a private meeting following the unfortunate end of the conference that the Club of Rome first saw the light of day. After the conference had ended, Peccei invited some of the participants to a private dinner at his house. Besides Alexander King and Erich Jantsch, Peccei’s guests that evening were Swiss engineer Hugo Thiemann, French economist and head of the French Planning Department Jean Saint-Geours, and Dutch diplomat Max Kohnstamm (who was also a close associate of Jean Monnet). Contemplating what had gone wrong during the conference, they eventually founded a “steering board”
to “maintain intra-European contacts and eventually suggest some path of action.” It is this “closing of the ranks” that eventually came to be remembered as the birth of the Club of Rome, which therefore started as a European undertaking. Soon, new members from across the Western industrialized countries — including Japan — joined the group, most of whom were, in one way or another, connected to Alexander King and the OECD.

Following the club’s founding, King and a few other of its then current or future members started to put the negative qualitative aspects of economic growth within “affluent societies” on the OECD’s agenda — a topic first prominently described by the American sociologist Kenneth Galbraith in 1958. In 1969, the OECD’s outgoing General Secretary Thorkil Kristensen — who had been involved in the discussions of the group around King and officially joined the Club of Rome just a few months later — urged the ministers at the OECD’s Ministerial Council Meeting to pay attention to what King had conceptualized as “the problems of modern society.” There, following the lines of Peccei’s arguments and President Johnson’s ideas about the creation of the IIASA, Kristensen (a Danish economist who had headed the OECD since its creation in 1961) pictured a world in crisis struggling with interrelated problems such as overpopulation, urban dwelling, environmental pollution, and the alienation of the individual. It was only against this backdrop that the OECD — which then, as King remembers, was still the “high-tabernacle of economic growth” — started to question economic growth as a goal in itself and to address its negative qualitative effects.

According to Matthias Schmelzer, the promotion of these newfound concerns within the OECD was motivated by the desire to safeguard the institutions of the Western welfare state, which seemed to be threatened by the protests of 1968 and “seemingly new and interrelated phenomena of crisis.” The same can be said about similar

63 Peccei, Chasm, 252.

64 Apart from Peccei, everybody present at the club’s founding meeting either worked for the OECD’s Secretary (King and Jantsch) or were part of its Committee on Science and Technology Policy created in 1967 (Saint-Geours, Thiemann, Kohnstamm). In 1972, only two of the five members of the executive committee did not have an OECD background, namely, Peccei himself and the German engineer Eduard Pestel, who was instrumental in organizing funding for the Limits project. For more on the Club of Rome’s close ties to the OECD, see below. For a membership list of the club, see Moll, From Scarcity to Sustainability, Appendix B, 279–300.


67 King, Let the Cat Turn Round, 293. In 1961, the OECD had set itself the ambitious goal of raising the gross national product of its member states by 50 percent within one decade. According to Schmelzer, “The Crisis before the Crisis,” 1001–1002, the OECD had been mainly responsible for promoting a “quantitative growth paradigm,” which implied that most social problems could only be solved through the stimulation of economic growth.

projects launched almost simultaneously such as NATO’s “Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society,” discussed by Kenneth Weisbrode in this volume, which the Nixon government intended as a means to increase East-West dialogue through the discussion of environmental policy.69

Toward the Limits to Growth (and Beyond): A “Non-organization” Addresses the World Problématique

Ultimately, the Club of Rome came into being because its founding members, most of whom were high-ranking bureaucrats themselves, were frustrated by the large and inefficient bureaucracies of national governments and existing international institutions such as the OECD.70 Convinced that a loose organizational structure would be better suited to addressing the manifold and entangled problems that lay ahead, they eventually came to describe the function of the Club of Rome — which was incorporated as a nonprofit private association in Geneva under the Swiss civil code in March 1970 — as that of an “invisible college” or a “non-organization.”71 It was thus supposed to act without a formal secretariat or budget, stimulate research in order to analyze mankind’s problems from a global, systemic, and long-term perspective, and was intended to be “nonpolitical in the sense that its members are not involved in current political decisions, and that it has not itself any ideological or national political commitments.”72 The club’s membership, numbering only 25 at the end of 1969, increased steadily and was eventually limited to one hundred members; as was pointed out repeatedly by Peccei and King, this limit was necessary to “maintain . . . a coherent working group.”73 Its exclusiveness led (and continues today to lead) to a range of conspiracy theories about the club, whose members certainly thought of themselves as some kind of avant-garde.

The Club of Rome may therefore best be described as an exclusive, loosely organized, all-male network of influential individuals mostly from the global North who shared a broad understanding of an Atlantic Community, a common feeling of looming global crisis,
and an affinity for the methods of futures studies. Its operations were run by an executive committee, consisting of Peccei, King, and a handful of other club members who met frequently. It was Peccei, however, who became the first president of the Club of Rome and dealt with its workload almost entirely by himself (assisted only by the two secretaries at his Italconsult office in Rome). His outstanding intellectual and organizational commitment led some early observers to conclude that “the Club of Rome was really for the most of it the Club of Peccei.”

Following the initial meeting of the club, the group around Peccei and King met frequently at the Battelle Institute in Geneva, the European branch of an American think tank, which was headed by Hugo Thie- mann. It was there that they further discussed the ideas articulated by Peccei and Jantsch, which were not undisputed within the group. In fact, Kohnstamm and Saint-Geours thought Peccei’s holistic and global approach to addressing mankind’s problems hopelessly over-ambitious. Thus, they proposed that a project concentrating on just one aspect of the observed crisis (e.g., urban problems) be created. Since no compromise could be found, they left the group during its second meeting.

By the end of 1968, Peccei, King, and the remaining members of the executive committee started looking for someone who could provide the methodology for the research project outlined by Jantsch’s essay and Aurelio Peccei’s *Chasm*. It was at another conference, held by the OECD in November 1968 in Bellagio, Italy, that the club’s search for a project supervisor gained momentum. King and Peccei were deeply impressed by a paper presented on this occasion, entitled “Toward a General Theory of Planning” and written by the American scholar of Turkish origin Hasan Özbekhan. Özbekhan, who taught economic planning at the System Development Corporation at UC Santa Monica, had compiled a list of “Continuous Critical Problems” and emphasized the use of computer models and systems theory to analyze this set of problems. After Peccei asked him to join, Özbekhan produced a proposal for a research project on “The Predicament of Mankind” in which he drew on Peccei’s and Jantsch’s writings. His project aimed to create several world models based on the underlying norm of “ecological balance.”

It was in this draft that Özbekhan coined the term of a global and “all pervasive problématique” that would become the club’s key concept.
throughout the following decades.\textsuperscript{78} He stated that in the context of a complex reality of worldwide cause and effect interconnections it was inappropriate to speak of certain “problems” that implied the search for certain “solutions.” Therefore, in order to avoid this “fragmentation of reality into closed and well-bounded problems,” he introduced the notion of the \textit{problématique}, which he defined as a “meta-problem (or meta-system of problems).”\textsuperscript{79} But in 1970, at a meeting of the club’s members in Bern, Switzerland, Özbekhan’s proposal, heavily criticized for being too complex and infeasible, was buried then and there, both for these reasons and because it failed to attract funding from other organizations. Nevertheless, Peccei and the remaining members of the executive committee continued to promote Özbekhan’s notion of the \textit{problématique} as the key underlying concept of the Club of Rome.\textsuperscript{80}

After Özbekhan’s project was dropped, Peccei and the executive committee of the Club of Rome eventually decided to support a different project in order to better publicize their message. They commissioned the American engineer and MIT systems scientist Jay Forrester, whom they knew from the Bellagio conference, to produce the outline for a new research project. Forrester applied his modeling approach of “systems dynamics,” initially developed for urban surroundings, to a world-scale model in order to address the problems identified by the Club of Rome. A working group was set up at MIT headed by Forrester’s assistant Dennis Meadows that consisted of Meadows, his wife Donella, and some graduate students. Funding was made available through Eduard Pestel, a professor of mechanics at the Technical University of Hanover, by the German Volkswagen Foundation — of which Pestel was a board member. Based on Forrester’s methods, Meadows and his team created a computerized model of the world. Two years later, their results were published as “The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind.”\textsuperscript{81}

Based on the calculations made using their computerized model of the world system, Meadows and his team concluded that “[i]f the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years.”\textsuperscript{82} They further stated that ongoing growth would most likely lead to “a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.” Seeking to avoid

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 13. As an example of the fragmentation of reality, Özbekhan stated that “the particular solution called ‘agriculture’ may possibly no longer represent the single, feasible resolution of the problems clustered under words such as ‘hunger’ or ‘malnutrition.”’ Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} Peccei, \textit{Human Quality}, 71-72. See further Moll, \textit{From Scarcity to Sustainability}, 64, 67-68.

\textsuperscript{81} Moll, \textit{From Scarcity to Sustainability}, 70-72, 76-81, 93-94.

\textsuperscript{82} Meadows et al., \textit{Limits to Growth}, 23.
such a scenario of “overshoot and collapse,” they proposed a global policy to stop population and economic growth in order to reach a “global equilibrium,” a state of “ecological and economic stability that is sustainable far into the future.”

Following the publication of the book, the club gained further influence on policymaking in the Atlantic countries, even though many of the club’s members themselves did not support the book’s radical call for “global equilibrium” and zero growth. The book’s arguments soon entered political debates revolving around the need for more sustainable societies. The club’s executive committee continued to commission new reports that addressed the problématique—or one or more aspects of it. To promote these reports, Peccei and his peers organized meetings in different parts of the world, some of which were attended by the host countries’ prime ministers or their representatives. Still, none of the reports that followed was nearly as influential as Limits to Growth.

Before they had started working with Özbekhan, Peccei and King had also tried to use their personal contacts to discuss their goals with other scientists and decision-makers. However, even though they managed to meet with a range of politicians from within the industrialized Western countries (including Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus, members of the Nixon administration, and Canada’s Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau), they soon felt that their “ideas and suggestions seemed too far off to have any policy significance.” Following the success of Limits, they revived their attempts at influencing top-down policy implementations and organized several nonpublic meetings of club members with prime ministers or their representatives from smaller Western countries and Third World countries—including Canada, Austria, Senegal, and Mexico—to discuss the problématique and, at the first meeting in 1974, the Third World’s call for a New International Economic Order. Still, the significance of this “World Forum” for actual policy implementation seems to have been minor to nonexistent.

What seems to have been more important in influencing policy was the founding of national chapters of the Club of Rome over the course of the 1970s in many Western industrialized countries. These national associations were often founded independently by members of the international Club of Rome, again mostly drawing on contacts from within the OECD. Operating almost entirely autarkically, they generally helped to promote new reports published by the international club and, in some cases, managed to have considerable success.
in introducing environmental topics and getting futures studies to be applied within national policy settings. Among the most active of these chapters — some of which started to produce their own reports — were those in Canada, founded in 1974 with the approval of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, and in the United States, which Peccei had vehemently pushed forward until it was created in 1976. The membership of the American chapter, which sought to “convince the leadership of the country that . . . ‘arrangements for systematic, integrated, long-range planning’ can operate effectively within the U.S. government,” consisted mainly of academics. Its main protagonists included diverse characters such as Claiborne Pell, senator for the state of Rhode Island; Carroll Wilson, professor for electronics at MIT and a member of the executive committee of the Club of Rome; and John A. Harris IV, an industrialist and environmental activist.87

Until the end of the 1970s, however, the public impact of the Club of Rome and its national associations had decreased, among other reasons, because of the increasing age of the club’s members, the general decline of future studies, whose prognoses had been proven wrong many times, the spectacular failure of cybernetic warfare in Vietnam, and the appearance of environmental NGOs that dealt with one or more aspects of the global problématique.88 Last but not least, the technocratic understanding of the earth as a manageable system, promoted by the Club of Rome, came increasingly under question as diverging visions of globality emerged that were based on calls for individual self-limitation in a finite world.89

**Conclusion: A Transnational Public Sphere of Experts**

This article has shown that within the context of the Club of Rome, European voices were indeed quite important, if not crucial within industrialized countries for articulating a concern with the side effects of technology and unlimited growth on the global environment during the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this time, the dialogue between Europeans and Americans increasingly addressed the global connections of the problems observed.90 The Club of Rome’s deliberations on the negative effects of technology and industrialization were closely connected to its members’ personal involvement in the global “modernizing missions” of the Atlantic countries — both in the Third World and in rebuilding Europe. It was against this background that Peccei and King came to interpret a range of economic, ecological, political, social, and cultural problems as symptoms of a complex
crisis in modern industrialized society — in a way anticipating modernization theory’s downfall as a scientific paradigm beginning in the early the 1970s.91

The European founding fathers of the Club of Rome understood the powerful technology of American culture as the best tool for addressing the problems of the future. Moreover, even though the mission of the Club of Rome came to be explicitly framed by a language of globality, its launch was inherently based on an Atlanticist understanding of the international order. In the wake of a whole range of globally interconnected problems, Aurelio Peccei was convinced that the Atlantic Community needed to be first reaffirmed and then enlarged by the inclusion of other parts of the industrialized world. It is indeed interesting to note, in this respect, that some of the club’s early members — namely, Saburo Okita, Carroll Wilson, and Max Kohnstamm — also became founding members of the Trilateral Commission in 1973. Similar to Peccei’s anticipation of the outline of the Club of Rome, this network of European, American, and Japanese businessmen and politicians was based on the image of an Atlantic Community expanding to become a community of the world’s most developed regions.92

At the same time, Peccei and most of his peers considered a united Europe to be a valuable part of the Atlantic Community. Those in the United States who supported the club’s perception of modern society in crisis shared this view, as evident in Aurelio Peccei and other members of the club’s executive committee being invited to the first Woodland Conference on sustainable development in Williamsburg, Texas, in 1975. The sponsor and convener of this conference, George P. Mitchell, invited Peccei and his peers because he “felt that Europeans, being from older societies, were far ahead of Americans in paying attention to new problems caused by population growth and resource depletion . . . and . . . were less afraid of government intervention that would turn problem recognition into policy.”93 As in the pre-World War II era, the transfer and application of ideas across the Atlantic Ocean was, of course, not just a one-way street of Americanization.

The field of future studies offered Peccei and his peers the opportunity to discuss and promote their ideas within what Alexander Schmidt-Gernig calls “a transnational public sphere of experts.”94 It also provided them the possibility of acquiring resources for further action. Against this background, the members of the Club of Rome pursued a global, holistic, and technocratic top-down approach to

92 Quite similar to the Club of Rome, the Trilateral Council, consisting of approximately 300 influential businessmen and politicians from the United States, Europe, and Japan, was significantly influenced by its principal founder the American billionaire David Rockefeller, whose goal was to “bring the best brains in the world to bear on the problems of the future.” Holly Sklar, “The Commission’s Purpose, Structure, and Programs: In Its Own Words,” in Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management, ed. Holly Sklar and Trilateral Commission (Boston, 1980), 83–89, here 83. On Saburo Okita’s role within the Trilateral Commission, see Takano Hajime, “A Guide to the Japanese Membership,” in ibid., 123–32.
93 This view is expressed by Mitchell’s biographer Jürgen Schmandt, George P. Mitchell and the Idea of Sustainability (College Station, 2010), 43.
policymaking based on a long-term perspective. They may, therefore, be analyzed in terms of belonging to an “epistemic community” that promoted a vision of “planet management.” Accordingly, the influence of the club as a “transnational pressure group” was always rather “indirect and gradual through changes in public opinion” and was often “exerted through changing attitudes on the part of political leaders . . . and . . . leading industrial and banking groups in many countries.”

In retrospect, the early history of the Club of Rome shows us how different discourses about the Atlantic partnership, globalization, and one world interacted and circulated within Western elites — and even beyond. Therefore, the example of transnational nonprofit organizations such as the club (or the Trilateral Commission) makes it clear that we need to combine the approaches of Atlantic history with those of an intellectual history of globality and globalization in order to better conceptualize turning points in the history of Atlantic relations during the twentieth century.

Christian Albrecht is a graduate fellow in history with the Leibniz Program “Global Processes” at the University of Konstanz. His research focuses on intellectual history and the history of science in the contemporary Atlantic world. His dissertation, entitled “The Club of Rome in an Intellectual History of Globalization: Promoting Ideas of Global Crisis and Global Order during the Cold War Era,” analyzes the intellectual and cultural roots of the globalization paradigm in Europe and North America during the Cold War era.


