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PREFACE

The issue’s first feature article presents the German Historical Institute’s 33rd Annual Lecture, delivered last November by the distinguished historian Dagmar Herzog (CUNY Graduate Center). In her lecture, “Moral Reasoning in the Wake of Mass Murder,” Herzog examines the complicated ways in which increasing public awareness of the Nazi regime’s mass murder of people with disabilities influenced German debates over disability rights and reproductive rights in 1980s and 1990s. As Herzog shows, West Germany’s 1989 “Singer Affair” — a controversial visit by the Australian philosopher Peter Singer, who called for legalizing the killing of infants with severe disabilities — helped to bring the Nazi euthanasia murders and the contemporary disability rights movement to the attention of a broader public. At the same time, Singer’s blurring of the distinction between abortion and infanticide contributed to a drastic reconfiguration of the relationship between disability rights and reproductive rights. Whereas West German disability activists had previously defended women’s rights to abortion, including the so-called eugenic indication (if an embryo showed signs of disability), in the late 1980s the tide turned as influential disability activists began to oppose abortion on eugenic grounds, thereby pitting disability rights against reproductive rights in a way that lent support to antiabortion activists and left a mark on the reconfigured abortion legislation of unified Germany.

The long shadow cast by the Nazi regime is also at the center of Anna-Carolin Augustin’s article “The Object’s Afterlife,” in which Augustin (Research Fellow at the GHI) traces how the Nazi looting of objects — especially Jewish ceremonial objects — made of gold and silver influenced the trajectory of art history, connoisseurship, and Jewish history in postwar West Germany. By examining the intersecting careers of Wolfgang Scheffler, an art historian who used the expertise he gained cataloguing these looted objects during the Nazi years to further his postwar career, and Bernhard Brilling, a Jewish historian and emigré who returned to West Germany to pursue his research on Jewish goldsmiths, Augustin sheds light on the disturbing ways in which Nazi looting opened up research opportunities from which scholars continued to benefit after the war — and on the no less fraught ways in which some Jewish and non-Jewish German scholars, including some who
were deeply implicated in the crimes of the Nazi regime, engaged in scholarly interaction after the war.

The following two feature articles shift focus to the history of migration. Michelle Lynn Kahn’s article “Between Ausländer and Almancı” presents her research on the transnational history of Turkish-German migration, for which she was honored with the 2019 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, awarded annually by the Friends of the German Historical Institute for the best dissertation in German history completed at a North American university. While there is now a great deal of excellent historical research on Turkish migrants in West Germany, Kahn explores a hitherto neglected aspect of Turkish-German migration, namely the re-migration of Turkish migrants living in Germany back to Turkey, be it temporary — many Turkish Gastarbeiter returned to Turkey every year during their summer vacations — or permanent, as happened on a large scale when, in 1983, Helmut Kohl’s government provided monetary incentives for Turkish migrants to return to Turkey permanently. By studying this transnational flow of migration and remigration, Kahn is able to elucidate the complicated figure of the Almancı, the dually estranged and dually discriminated migrant, who was treated as an Ausländer in Germany and as a “Germanized Turk” (Almancı) in Turkey.

This issue’s final feature article addresses a different aspect of the history of migration, namely the migration of free Chinese migrants to North and South America since the mid-nineteenth century. In his article, Albert Manke (Research Fellow in the “Knowledge Unbound” project at the GHI’s Pacific Regional Office in Berkeley) examines not only the cycles of discrimination and exclusion directed against Chinese migrants in the United States since the 1840s but also the question to what extent similar dynamics in Latin America were the result of U.S. influence and to what extent they reflected regional and local factors. By examining the entanglement between North and South American migration patterns and policies, Manke reveals the important role that transnational networks played, both among the governments shaping policies and among the migrants who sought to preserve their own agency in the face of discrimination and violence.

Our conference reports reflect the diversity of research topics supported by the Institute. Two conferences at the Institute’s Pacific Regional Office in Berkeley focused on migration: last fall’s Bucerius
Young Scholars Forum, which was dedicated to “Histories of Migration: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives,” and the Annual Academic and Policy Symposium “Innovation through Migration,” which explored “Archives of Migration.” In addition, this issue’s reports document conferences on medieval history, digital history, Jewish history, and twentieth-century bioscience and biopolitics.

Please turn to our news section for recent GHI news. For up-to-date information on upcoming events, publications, fellowships, and calls for papers, please also consult the GHI website (http://www.ghi-dc.org), Facebook page, and twitter account. Although we have had to temporarily suspend conferences and lectures due to the Covid-19 pandemic and stay-at-home orders in Washington DC and Berkeley, all GHI staff have been working productively out of our home offices: among other things, launching a completely redesigned version of the GHI website and issuing a report on the Pacific Regional Office that can be downloaded at https://www.ghi-dc.org/pazifikbuero-bericht. Please stay safe and healthy. We look forward to welcoming you once again at the GHI Washington and at the PRO in Berkeley when the crisis is over.

Simone Lässig (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)
Features

33RD ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON DC, NOVEMBER 1, 2019

Dagmar Herzog
GRADUATE CENTER, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

We cripples will not let ourselves be used as propaganda objects! ... The abortion opponents chose this spot in order to defame and to criminalize women who undergo an abortion, by putting the mass extermination of the disabled on the same level as abortion today. ... This shameless equation is the reason we are appearing here and condemning the trivialization of the inhuman National Socialist murders.

Members of the Federal Association of Disabled and Crippled Initiatives in a counterdemonstration at an anti-abortion rally at the former killing center of Hadamar, 1986

In point of fact, a systematic and “legalized” murdering of the disabled has existed only under the Nazis, and they, simultaneously, punished abortion severely. In countries in which abortion has been liberalized, the disabled and the elderly and marginalized groups are generally treated with respect. There is no indication that abortion has or ever had anything to do with the killing of human beings.

Reproductive-rights activist Susanne von Paczensky, 1989

Almost a decade ago, in the midst of another project, I encountered both Protestant and Catholic theologians’ affirmative — and expressely theologically formulated — defenses of liberalized abortion access in various Western European countries in the 1960s-1970s (including Italy, France, the UK, West Germany, and Switzerland). As I did that research, I — unexpectedly — also noted a plethora of references to disability — among opponents of the legalization of abortion and among both religious and secular proponents of liberalized abortion access. As I discovered, the debates of the 1960s-1970s over abortion rights in western European nations had indeed been saturated...
by references to disability, although this fact had not been incorporated into scholarship on the era.\textsuperscript{2} Moreover, the Nazi mass murders of the disabled — often called “euthanasia” murders — were an overt negative reference point. This was especially so in France, of all places, where a commitment to \textit{laïcité} meant that religious arguments against abortion were less likely to be invoked by parliamentarians hostile to abortion rights. But also the possibility of abortion on grounds of fetal disability — the “eugenic indication” — turned out to be a major focus of discussion (not least, but not only, because of the early 1960s scandal over the birth defects caused by the sedative and antinausea pregnancy medication Thalidomide, called Contergan in German). And while many comments had a disdainful, unpastic tone, treating disability as a tragedy for families and a burden for societies, it is also crucial to register that vast majorities found the so-called eugenic indication to be completely morally acceptable (e.g. in West Germany in 1971, 80 percent of Catholics surveyed approved of abortion on grounds of fetal anomaly).\textsuperscript{3}

Meanwhile, however, the very centrality of (what we can retrospectively see as problematic) assumptions about disability-as-tragedy to the success of abortion liberalization in Western Europe in the 1960s-1970s has turned out to have major negative implications for abortion rights more generally in the twenty-first-century present. This is because right-wing NGOs (an understudied but important phenomenon) and other antiabortion groups in Western Europe — and now also with increasing alacrity and creativity in postcommunist Eastern Europe — have seized on the tactic of presenting their opposition to abortion as a major advance for disability rights. This right-wing disability rights strategy is arguably the biggest challenge facing defenders of abortion access in Europe today (and it has also made inroads now in at least four U.S. states).\textsuperscript{4} All of this led me to wonder how it happened that the radical disability-rights movement, especially in Germany, which had grown out of the New Left of the 1970s, ended up deciding to be passionately opposed to abortion on grounds of fetal anomaly — even though, as late as 1986, radical “cripple” activists had rejected antiabortion activists’ overtures.

The answer takes us into the history of post-Nazi Germany just as the Cold War was coming to a close and has, it turns out, a considerable amount to do with the originally Australian (and now Princeton University-based) philosopher Peter Singer, albeit in indirect, ricocheting ways, as the evolving present of the 1980s-1990s brought


recalibrated understandings of the national past of the 1940s-1950s. But above all, the answer involves a complex, multifactoral conjunction of overdetermination and contingency. The short version is: Almost as soon as abortion had been partially decriminalized across much of the Western world in the course of the 1970s, a conservative backlash developed, especially in West Germany, slowly at first but then with gathering momentum. While the activists driving that backlash initially made no mention whatsoever of disability, a major national controversy over the lessons of the Nazi past — triggered by Singer — caused a consequential reconfiguration in the terms of discussion over reproductive rights to be consolidated.

I. The Singer Affair

“Thou shalt not kill. That is not divine law, that’s a Jewish invention.” So said Eugen Stähle, head of the Division of Health within the Württemberg Ministry of the Interior, when confronted in 1940 by Protestant religious leaders’ protests against the first phase of the mass murders of the disabled that he was co-coordinating at that very moment. In this first phase, the meant-to-be-secret — but by that point no-longer-so-secret — program later called “Aktion T4” (in reference to Tiergartenstrasse 4, the address at which this program was planned), 70,273 individuals with psychiatric illnesses or cognitive deficiencies were, between January 1940 and August 1941, murdered with carbon monoxide in six specially designed gas chambers within what had been, previously, with the exception of one of the buildings, facilities for healing and care. Ultimately, due to unrest in the populace and further religious protest — especially the prominent Catholic bishop Clemens August von Galen’s sermon of August 1941 decrying the killings — Hitler ordered the program officially stopped. It continued on nonetheless in a second, decentralized phase that lasted even beyond the end of the war in May of 1945. Ultimately, 210,000 individuals with intellectual or psychological disabilities in the German Reich and a further 80,000 in occupied Poland and the Soviet Union were killed through deliberate medication overdose, poisoning, or systematic starvation. Meanwhile, the approximately 120 personnel that had gotten their training and practice in murdering the disabled in the T4 facilities, along with their now field-tested technology of carbon monoxide gas chambers, were moved to Poland to turn their attention to the mass murder of European Jewry — in the Operation Reinhard death factories of Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka.6

6 Sara Berges, Experten der Vernichtung: Das T4-Reinhardts-Netzwerk in den Lagern Belzec, Sobibor und Treblinka (Hamburg, 2013).
The Stähle quote — “Thou shalt not kill. That is not divine law, that’s a Jewish invention” (in other words: Moses just fabricated the Ten Commandments, and no self-respecting Nazi need concern himself with these) — was brought to the attention of West German readers of the weekly Die Zeit in the summer of 1989 by Ernst Klee, a prominent investigative journalist and advocate for the rights of the disabled in the context of Klee’s vehement and eloquent repudiation of the theories of the Australian philosopher Peter Singer. Singer had been invited to West Germany by an organization called Lebenshilfe (Life-Assistance), the premier association of parents and caregivers of disabled children, in the expectation that he would address a scheduled conference in Marburg on “Biotechnology — Ethics — Mental Disability”; he had in addition been invited by the special-education expert Christoph Anstötz, a professor at the university in Dortmund, to speak there on the subject “Do severely disabled newborn infants have a right to life?” Singer’s own short answer to this question was No, as the second sentence of his then recently-published book, Should the Baby Live? (1985), co-written with the philosopher Helga Kuhse, stated clearly: “We think that some infants with severe disabilities should be killed.” It was not — the organizers later said — the outpouring of indignant letters from across the land but rather the announced threat that there would be demonstrations and public disruptions of the proceedings that caused both invitations to Singer to be withdrawn.

Only in one German town, Saarbrücken, was Singer able to participate in a public discussion with his local hosts, the philosophers Georg Meggl and Christoph Fehige, and that event also began with a half-hour of ear-piercing whistles and shouts demanding “Fascist out!”. In Saarbrücken, the audience was able to learn, among other things, that Singer was the son of Jewish refugees from Vienna, that three of his grandparents had been murdered in Nazi concentration camps, and that he resolutely defended his conviction that since passive killing of severely disabled newborns by withholding treatment was already quietly being practiced in hospitals across Germany and elsewhere in the western world, active mercy-killing by doctors to shorten their agony should be permitted as well, within strict limits. Moreover, Singer noted that he was of the opinion that, certainly, conditions for already-living individuals with disabilities should be better. Singer’s critics, however, were far from mollified.

Massive media coverage had accompanied the controversy from the start — with Die Zeit, for instance, titling one early contribution
“Can Euthanasia be defended on Ethical Grounds?” Indeed, the paper’s own tilt toward answering with “Yes” — although explicable within its own terms — was part of what had caused Klee to write his countervailing piece. Over the following months and into the next year, the ramifications kept expanding. Local and regional papers wrote about “Parallels to Nazi Theories,” “Fury and Outrage at the University: Protest against ‘Academic Chairs for Euthanasia,’” and “We are afraid for our children.” The Green Party issued a statement referring to Singer’s theories as an “incitement to murder.” Foreign observers from the U.S. and UK expressed their appallment that civil conversation about ideas was, apparently, impossible. The whole thing, depending on how you looked at it, turned out to be a fiasco for the would-be hosts or, as Singer’s defenders argued, a sign that a tiny minority of over reactive extremists — who had not even read Singer closely — could shut down rational debate for an entire country. Singer himself, piqued, wrote a piece in the New York Review of Books, “On Being Silenced in Germany.” And Anstötz, who had originally hoped to host Singer in Dortmund (but instead had faced livid protesters — from religious representatives to the main AIDS organization — with banners declaring “Boycott Anstötz’s Murder-Seminar,” “No murder of babies, the elderly and disabled,” and “For Anstötz and Singer, disabled newborns are human vegetables”), subsequently co-published a collection of documents about the confrontations — Peter Singer in Deutschland — whose subtitle announced that it concerned “The Endangerment of Freedom of Discussion in Scholarship.”

Over and over, the very fact that there had been mass murder of people with disabilities in the nation’s past was put forward by Singer’s defenders as a main explanation for (what was asserted to be) the immaturity of moral reasoning abilities in West German society in comparison with the rest of the West, a lamentable and inappropriate oversensitivity which led to “thought- and discussion-taboo[s],” an incapacity to confront the genuine and inescapable challenges brought by technological advances and crises of extremity of suffering at either end of life. For Anstötz, moreover, it was the critics’ refusal to let Singer speak that was best compared to the Nazis’ “burning of books.” He and his co-authors contended that the very characteristics Nazis had ascribed to Jews (“sly outfoxing reasoning,” “analyzing, distanced, holds nothing sacred … emphasizes logic”) — characteristics that the Nazis had been determined to “exterminate” (ausrotten) — were still, sadly, lacking decades later. On this basis,
in turn, they concluded: “Conversely: It becomes clear how urgently we need precisely that spirit of reflection, of clarity, of analysis, of differentiation and of tolerance that is embodied by Peter Singer.”17 And Georg Meggle, who had hosted Singer in Saarbrücken, wrote that Singer’s critics were promulgating “a new form of antisemitism,” charging the critics with assuming that “if a Jew thinks like Singer thinks, then he must be sick.”18 Singer, too, weighed in, writing in Bioethics in 1990 that “[p]erhaps what really was instrumental in preparing the Nazi path to genocide, and has not yet been eradicated in the modern Germany, is not the euthanasia movement at all, but the kind of fanatical certainty in one’s own rectitude that refuses to listen to, or engage in rational debate with, anyone who harbours contrary views.”19 Nonetheless, the critics would have the last word. As a radical disability-rights newspaper, Die Randschau, declared also in 1990: “The ‘tolerance for debate’ that the philosophers are demanding for Singer’s theses is the same as one which would permit the discussion of the thesis of the ‘superiority of the Aryan race.’ But in both cases, the fundamental will to treat human beings as unequal must be combatted.”20 This was to remain the general tenor of what would become a broadly propounded official anti-Singer stance. It would be a full fifteen years before Singer delivered another lecture in Germany.

II. Post-Nazi politics and historiographical frames

I began with Klee’s and others’ stinging rebukes to Singer — or rather, with what came to be called “the Singer affair” — for several reasons. One reason is that the Nazi doctor Stähle’s quote — which the historian Klee had uncovered as he was researching the Nazi murders of the disabled for his magnum opus “Euthanasia” in the NS-State — captures with unintentional transparency the intimate interconnections between antisemitism, on the one hand, and contempt for individuals with disabilities, on the other. One of the great and consequential dramas of the 1980s and 1990s, in scholarship internationally and in activism within Germany alike, would be the determined effort to elucidate the multiple links — in staffing, in gassing technology, but also in the attitude toward “lives unworthy of life” — between the murder of individuals with disabilities and the Holocaust of European Jewry. Indeed the quote, and Klee’s use of it, brings into view just how very important the invocation of these two interrelated mass murders in the nation’s past would be for advancing the cause of disability rights.

in the 1980s. It is hard to remember now, but crucial to our understanding of the dynamics at the time, that contempt for and cruelty toward the physically and cognitively disabled lasted well into the 1980s, and even beyond. The postwar years had seen a (in hindsight truly stunning, then simply devastating) breadth of popular support for the perpetrators, and ongoing shaming of the victims and their families.  

21 Few of the perpetrators ever faced justice but instead had illustrious postwar careers. The very statements I earlier asserted as facts — that the mass murder of the disabled was the precursor to and continued to be entangled with the Holocaust — were not generally obvious in the 1980s. Indeed, initially, connections had been made more by intuitive emotional analogy than by specifying literal links.  

This was a connection that still needed to be solidified and concretized in the public mind; the Singer affair provided a major occasion for doing so. Singer himself, in his widely used textbook of 1979, *Practical Ethics* (translated into German in 1984) had argued strenuously — and in this he was in accord with the assumptions animating much late-1970s scholarship — that there was no connection: “If euthanasia somehow leads to the Nazi atrocities that would be a reason for condemning euthanasia. But is euthanasia — rather than, for example, racism — to be blamed for the mass murders the Nazis carried out?” Singer’s own answer to the question, as he framed it, was No. For him, hostile or lethal treatment of the disabled simply did not count as racism.  

22 It was precisely this presumption of a categorical gulf between the two major Nazi murder programs that, it was felt, needed to be challenged. And over the course of the 1980s, through sustained research and advocacy work, the links were starting to be established. Increasingly, moreover, a second tie was forged: conceptual and empirical connections were elaborated between the 400,000 coercive “eugenic” sterilizations of individuals with disabilities enacted under the rubric of the July 1933 “Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring” and the 200,000-plus “euthanasia” murders.
As it happened, the postwar West German government had continuously refused to acknowledge the harm done to victims of coercive sterilizations — rejecting their claims to being “persecutees of the Nazi regime” deserving of any recognition, much less of financial recompense, and relying on the opinion of experts, some of them ex-perpetrators, in declaring the sterilization legislation to have nothing to do with “National Socialist racial laws.”

Protestant church leaders had not offered a countervailing moral position either. Instead, eager to advance their own version of a sexually conservative “personal eugenics” in the postwar years and instrumentally invoking their unabashed pride in having resisted, however ineffectually, the murders in order to advance their own advocacy for “voluntary” sterilizations, worked hard — and successfully — to keep “eugenics” and “euthanasia” analytically distinct.

It was against these trends of the first three postwar decades that a historiography arose, over the course of the 1980s, that reframed the Third Reich in such a way that eugenics and euthanasia alike would come to be seen as central rather than marginal aspects of what was finally, by 1991, shorthanded (in historians Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann’s book title) as “The Racial State.” Burleigh and Wippermann, building on a decade of pioneering scholarship, expressly identified the Nazi goal as “the ‘purification of the body of the nation’ from ‘alien,’ ‘hereditarily ill,’ or ‘asocial’ ‘elements’” and thus focused their account on “all those whose lives or reproductive capacity were ended as a result of Nazi racial policy,” including “Jews, Sinti and Roma, and members of other ethnic minorities categorized as ‘alien,’ as well as the ‘hereditarily ill,’ ‘community aliens’, and homosexuals.” Indeed, they said, “there is much evidence to suggest that race was meant to supplant class as the primary organizing principle in society.”

The debates around Singer had finally made this kind of summary statement seem incontrovertible, as major news outlets had taken the critics’ cues and had begun in 1989, in text and in

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**Figure 1.** Demonstrator in a wheelchair wearing a yellow star with a wheelchair symbol inside at the first nationwide West German disability rights demonstration in Frankfurt am Main, 1980. Demonstrators also carried a banner declaring: “Don’t pity the disabled person; pity the society that rejects him.”


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accompanying imagery, to center the murder of the disabled at the heart of the Third Reich, and to register that “eugenic thinking” needed, on a regular basis, at least formally to be repudiated as immoral.28 (Only since the turn of the millennium has the newest research led to the prospect of once more decoupling eugenics from euthanasia and to the prospect of de-biologizing the Third Reich more generally.)29

My second purpose in revisiting the fall-out from the Singer affair and situating it in its various overlapping contexts is that doing so helps us to understand not only the particular shape taken by radical disability-rights activism in West Germany in the 1980s-1990s and the ardent investments the movement developed, but also their ricocheting consequences. For it was, of all people, Singer, whose convoluted mix of mundanesensible and traumatizingly obscene lines of moral reasoning, coming at the historical juncture that he did, created the opportunity for radical disability activism in West Germany to erupt into mainstream public view, garnering the attention — and respect — of major media outlets and government officials alike and thus becoming a political force to be reckoned with. But no less significant is the impact of the debates about Singer’s theses on the terms in which women’s rights to access abortion could be defended — rights that were, coincidentally, at that very moment in 1989 under renewed attack from conservative forces and about to be yet more fully reconfigured after the collapse of communism just a few months later. For in the wake of the Singer affair it would become impossible for any mainstream German politician frankly to defend abortion on grounds of (what had been called) the “eugenic” or “embryopathic” indication. By the early 1990s politicians had backed away from any language that might possibly be construed as suggesting a diminished respect for disabled life — and so, too, had many feminists. There was a rush to outdo one another in declaring that the state should not and would not ever prefer non-disabled over disabled life. Disability activists were key players in this reorientation. This particular fall-out was not inevitable, but it was overdetermined.30

What was it that had so alarmed the protesters against Singer? Initially, the mainstream media had been nonplussed at the uproar. His Practical Ethics seemed pertinent to deliberations that had been already ongoing in West Germany for the prior ten to fifteen years involving dilemmas surrounding technological advances in end-of-life care as well as patient requests for assisted suicide. His suggestion that permitting doctors to provide active killing rather than extending a severely disabled new-

28 See the summary in Meggle, “Bemerkungen.”
born’s torment through passive letting-die (for example, in cases of inoperable spina bifida), though instinctively repellent to and immediately repudiated by many, at least seemed discussable. Furthermore — though it took a while for the major newsmagazines and newspapers to make much of this — Singer was a staunch advocate for animal rights and, although the vast majority of West Germans were meat-eaters, there were also numerous dog-lovers, and there were certainly broad sectors of the populace that would be receptive to, or at least not agitated about, arguments for the humane treatment of animals.

The trouble lay in the way Singer joined his various areas of interest. Singer could easily have argued that animals — nonhuman sentient beings — deserved far better treatment than humans normally meted out to them, and left it at that. But, instead, Singer repeatedly evinced a (almost obsessively reiterated) preoccupation with denigrating the cognitively disabled, stating that severely cognitively disabled individuals lacked “personhood” and hence had less value and less right to life than animals (many of whom he thought did have the “personhood” the cognitively disabled were lacking). Thus, for instance, in an essay from 1983 entitled “Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life?” Singer had stated: “If we compare a severely disabled human child with a nonhuman animal, for example a dog or a pig, we will frequently find that the animal demonstrates higher capacities with respect to comprehension, self-consciousness, communication and many other things.”31 And in *Practical Ethics* Singer had argued that even if someone belonged to the human species, he or she was “not a person,” if “rationality, autonomy and self-awareness” were absent. Or, connecting the dots more explicitly: “Some members of other species are persons: some members of our own species are not. No objective assessment can give greater value to the lives of members of our species who are not persons than to the lives of members of other species who are. On the contrary, as we have seen there are strong arguments for placing the lives of persons above the lives of nonpersons. So it seems that killing, say, a chimpanzee is worse than the killing of a gravely defective human who is not a person.”32

These were the kinds of comments that made his critics apoplectic. Klee, in his brilliant rejoinder to Singer, homed right in on what he called the “bizarre nexus of animal rights and euthanasia” in Singer’s work, and regaled his readers with examples of Nazis who had linked their enthusiastic embrace of animal rights both with antisemitism and lethal antidisability sentiment.
Figure 2. “Eine Kulturtat,” Kladderadatsch, September 3, 1933. The somewhat sarcastic title could be translated as “A Great Achievement” or “A Great Deed of Civilization.” This cartoon from the (since the early 1920s increasingly rightwing) satire magazine Kladderadatsch gently spoofs Hermann Göring for passing the first anti-vivisection law in the world (in Prussia, on August 16, 1933) as the now-spared rabbits, frogs, mice, and dogs gratefully salute him. Göring had announced that “an absolute and permanent ban on vivisection is not only a necessary law to protect animals and to show sympathy with their pain, but it is also a law for humanity itself” and threatened with imprisonment in a concentration camp all who “still think they can continue to treat animals as inanimate property.” Animal rights were indeed a major obsession for Hitler and his followers, and in November 1933 a further law was passed which announced that “It is forbidden to unnecessarily torment or roughly mishandle an animal” (breathtaking as a legal priority not least in view of Nazi treatment of humans). Caricature by Arthur Johnson. Kladderadatsch, September 1933. Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg.
As Klee reminded his readers, according to avid Nazis, Hitler was the “savior” of animals from “Jewish-materialistic” “animal torture” like vivisection. At the same time, the disabled had been openly and pitilessly denigrated. The SS-journal *Das schwarze Korps*, for example, had declared with regard to “mercy killing”: “A child born as an idiot has no value as a person ... He is less aware of his existence than an animal.”

Franz Christoph, one of the cofounders of the radical “ cripple-movement” (*Krüppelbewegung*) launched in the 1970s, in his own extended rebuttal to Singer in the pages of the newsmagazine *Der Spiegel*, also made the comparison to Nazism. Christoph, a polio survivor, had already made a name for himself in 1981, when he had the audacity to strike the federal president, Karl Carstens (a former Nazi), with a crutch at the occasion of paternalistic government festivities in Düsseldorf organized in keeping with the UN declaration that 1981 should be the “Year of the Disabled.”

Invoking Singer’s opinion that “The killing of a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to the killing of a person. Very often it is no injustice at all.” Christoph observed curtly: “In connection with any other group of people Singer’s thesis would be in danger of being rejected as fascistic thinking — without any scholarly dialogue.”

For Christoph, the most urgent task was to respond to Singer’s pronouncement to the effect that “We cannot condemn euthanasia just because the Nazis did it, any more than we can condemn the building of new roads for this reason.” Christoph was intent on putting forward a different interpretation of how the Nazi past mattered — not, as Singer’s proponents claimed, because it caused German conversations to be out of step with international trends regarding assisted suicide and related matters, but rather to articulate why talk could be so offensive. It was, Christoph said, “precisely these kinds of scholarly discussions and discourses that were precursors of what came to be, beginning fifty years ago, the extermination of ‘life unworthy of life.’” The trouble was the way that a question was being established as even legitimately posable, the very act of asking “‘Euthanasia for severely disabled newborns?’ that then could be answered with a Yes as well as with a No.” Christoph’s conclusion was thus that it was “specifically because of the historical experience, although social service bureaucrats apparently cannot relate to this” that “for those who are affected, any and all discourse about

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33 Quoted in Klee, “Von Menschen und Tieren.”

the reintroduction of the concept of ‘life unworthy of life’ seems like a menace to their right to live.” *Der Spiegel* took the cue, and accompanied Christoph’s piece not only with a photograph of a sit-in to disrupt a rehab experts’ conference on the topic of assisted suicide in Karlsruhe the year before (where Christoph and others had worn blue garbage bags — replete, in Christoph’s case, with a sign around his neck declaring “I am unworthy of life”), but also with a photograph of the distinctive gray buses that had brought the disabled to their deaths in the Nazis’ T4 program, and with a copy of Hitler’s order, backdated to the start of the war on Poland in September 1939, that permitted the beginning of the calculated murder of 5000 disabled children.35 (Singer later took particular umbrage at the magazine’s decision to use these supplemental images.)36 The tide of mainstream consensus was suddenly but manifestly turning — after an excruciatingly long delay of four postwar decades — in favor of radical disability activists’ views on the proper lessons to be drawn from the Nazi past.

### III. Abortion vs. infanticide

Although the broader potential implications of what had initially seemed like a side note in Singer would not become apparent until several years later, Singer had used as a springboard for his own causes something that had actually been an achievement of feminist and sex rights activism just a few years before his book was published. This was the fact that across the Western world, abortion had — due to vigorous women’s rights advocacy — been at least partially decriminalized and had come to be seen as morally acceptable by broad popular majorities that Singer used as his entry-point for theorizing the acceptability also of active infanticide (again, with frequent interpositions making comparisons with animals). Over and over, he had made a case for seeing the similarity, rather than the difference, between “killing the late fetus” and “killing the newborn infant.” Thus for instance — speaking about all newborns, not just disabled ones — Singer expressly built his argument on the basis of the only just recently established greater moral acceptability of abortion: “If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a

35 Christoph, “(K)ein Diskurs.”
person, it appears that the newborn baby does not either," he began one sentence, going on from there to assert once more that “and the life of a newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a chimpanzee.” But the difference between newborns had to do with parents’ desires for them, and Singer assumed that parents desired the disabled less. Moreover, then, in Singer’s view, since not all disabilities were evident prenatally — some indeed might be caused in the birth process — in cases of disability (and he was ambiguous about what counted as severe) sometimes active infanticide should be permitted, perhaps up to “a month” after birth. While Singer would, in the ensuing controversies in Germany keep insisting that he had never argued for the killing of already-living disabled individuals older than infants, readers could be forgiven for thinking that he actually had: “For simplicity,” he had written in Practical Ethics, “I shall concentrate on infants, although everything I say about them would apply to older children or adults whose mental age remains that of an infant.”37

This insistence on not drawing the line either at birth or at viability but instead actively blurring the boundary between abortion and infanticide was to have tremendous consequences — not just for the reception of Singer in that summer of 1989, but for the reconfiguration of women’s access to abortion that was, after the collapse of communism just a few months later, shortly to ensue. In the complex back-and-forth between constituencies that followed, feminists would lose the ability to retain the — morally crucial — distinction between an abortion on grounds of anticipated disability and an infanticide. As repelled as most activists on behalf of disability rights as well as women’s rights were by Singer, many appear to have accepted his terms of debate.

The antiabortion movement in West Germany had been trying, since at least the early 1980s, to involve disability rights groups in their assault on the 1976 version of article 218 of the German Penal Code, which had carved out four exemptions under which abortions, which remained generally illegal, could be legally performed: the so-called “medical” indication (threats to the life or health of the mother), the “criminological” indication (pregnancy as the result of sexual violence), the “eugenic” or embryopathic indication (expectation that the child would be disabled), and the “social” indication (cases in which the pregnancy would impose undue hardship, placing the mother in a “soziale Notlage”).

37 Singer, Practical Ethics (1979), 126, 131.
Floating once more the time-honored maxim (used as early as 1946) that abortions were somehow comparable to Auschwitz, West German antiabortion groups also tried to make the link between abortions and the murder of the disabled — focusing specifically on the “eugenic indication” for abortion as a reason for disability–rights activists to join them. They also spoke of the “thousandfold killing of unborn disabled babies” and of how “the so-called amniocentesis provides the ammunition for the fatal shot.” Among other things, a group calling itself “Movement for Life” had managed to organize individuals with disabilities in an affiliate called the “Helen Keller Circle.” And at least one young disabled man had written an open letter to the President of the Federal Republic criticizing the way “amniocentesis differentiates between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ life” and comparing the “eugenic indication” for abortion to Hitler’s 1939 directive to begin the euthanasia killings.

Initially, radical disability groups spurned these overtures. In 1981, when prompted by a Heidelberg-based Catholic antiabortion student association calling itself “Working-Group for Life” and condemning abortion under the slogan “Thou shalt not kill!,” the “Action Group against the UN Year of the Disabled” (“against” because the group was disgusted by what it took to be self-congratulatory but condescending and repressive charity efforts sponsored in that “UN Year”) responded: “On the basis of our experiences as cripples and as nondisabled but concerned individuals in our society, we do not presume to condemn women who decide against a disabled child.” In 1983, and again in 1985, when the antiabortion group “Action for Life” reached out to the Federal Association of Disabled and Crippled Initiatives “with an alliance-proposition,” the “Cripple Group Bremen” reacted negatively. Although the Bremen activists concurred that abortion on grounds of fetal disability was a problem for them (“we are ... opposed to ... the eugenic indication”), they rejected the campaign to criminalize all abortions. “To get rid of Paragraph 218 [i.e. to get rid of the penal code’s exemptions allowing for legal abortion in some cases] ... would change nothing in the life-reality of cripples in our society. We would continue to be disenfranchised and separated out .... Thus we see our immediate task in improving the life-conditions of those already living and we would welcome it greatly if organizations like yours would also engage themselves in this direction.” Moreover: “We have no desire to let ourselves be instrumentalized for your battle against §218 [i.e. the provisions al-


40 The Catholic antiabortion flyer and the response of the Action Group are reprinted in Franz Christoph, Krüppelschläge: Gegen die Gewalt der Menschlichkeit (Reinbek, 1983), 34.
We find the comparison drawn ... between §218 and Auschwitz conspicuously tasteless.”

In 1985, when feminist members of the “cripple-movement” compiled a book of essays on the particular difficulties confronting women with disabilities, the book, *Geschlecht: Behindert, besonderes Merkmal: Frau* (Gender: Disabled, Special Characteristic: Woman) had included an illustration indicating how women in wheelchairs were working to abolish Paragraph 218 in order to legalize all abortions.

As late as 1986, when the antiabortion group “Action for Life” had not only decided to hold its annual demonstration at Hadamar — one of two out of the former six Nazi killing centers that were on West German soil — but also to invite disability activists to join them, the radical cripple activist Gisel Hermes published an incensed response in *Die Randschau*. Hermes explained to its readers the right-wing, gender-conservative, and anti-foreigner racist values animating the hard core of the antiabortion movement and denounced the way “we so apparently are being used as show-pieces for an action that trivializes the fascist crimes against the disabled.” Also the Federal Association of Disabled and Crippled Initiatives announced: “We cripples will not let ourselves be used as propaganda objects!”

41 And in addition: “Aside from the fact that ‘euthanasia’ did not take place in Auschwitz, we find this comparison to make a mockery of the victims and survivors of the concentration camps.” Krüppelgruppe Bremen, September 20, 1985, responding to a letter from Michael Drayss of the Bewegung für das Leben, reprinted in *Die Randschau* 1, no. 3 (August-September 1986): 14.


43 Incredibly — and while 300 counter-demonstrators, including Hermes herself along with many other individuals with disabilities and representatives of feminist groups, had shown up at Hadamar the day of the demonstration in order to offer a different interpretation of the lessons of that place at which, during the Third Reich, 15,000 individuals had been murdered by gas and by poison — an agitated antiabortion activist woman had screamed at Hermes (who was there in a wheelchair): “Why don’t you kill yourself, you are not worthy of living. Under Hitler something like this would not have happened!” Gisel Hermes, “Mensch achte...” *Die Randschau* 1, no. 3 (August-September 1986): 11–12.

44 On the day of the demo and counter-demo, the group spoke out about how “the abortion opponents chose this spot in order to defame and to criminalize women who undergo an abortion, by putting the mass extermination of the disabled on the same level as abortion today.” They rejected “this shameless equation,” pointing out further how the same conservative politicians who were working to erode abortion rights were also cutting funding for the very social services the living disabled so badly needed. “Sind die Abtreibungsgegner noch zu retten?” *Die Randschau* 1, no. 3 (August-September 1986): 14-15.
Yet that same year, 1986, other feminists within the radical cripple movement were already reporting on their dismay and anger at what they saw as too many nondisabled feminists’ refusal to join in with a critique of the “eugenic indication.” “A wall goes up,” Swantje Köbsell and Monika Strahl explained. “They block off and refuse to engage with the actual problematic,” “they accuse us of being opponents of abortion … but we are not against abortion per se, only against the aborting, as a matter of course, of fetuses that have been declared as ‘defective’ and therefore undesired.”45 This was the compromise position that would come to define the feminist disability movement.46 Abortion on any grounds aside from anticipated disability would be adamantly defended; abortion because of anticipated disability would be rigorously, righteously rejected. Activists called on women to boycott prenatal screenings as though to do so was in itself a moral imperative. In contrapuntal tandem with the antiabortion movement they otherwise despised, then, disability activists would come to develop — and would do so even more emphatically in the aftermath of the tumult over Singer — a historically wholly new singling-out for special condemnation of abortion on grounds of fetal abnormality, extending their repulsion at the proposal for active infanticide backwards into the pregnancy.

Already before Singer hit the news, in a roundtable published in the New Left journal *Konkret* in April 1989, the well-known feminist journalist and cofounder of a family planning clinic in Hamburg, Susanne von Paczensky, discussed the newly perceived impasse between disability rights and women’s rights with Christoph and with three other women: Green feminist Adrienne Goehler, feminist author Katja Lehrer, and Hannelore Witkofski, a member of the Disability Forum. Von Paczensky saw through the emergent conundrums. Indeed, she was convinced that the existence of the “eugenic indication” was in fact a sign of how “extremely hostile to the disabled” German law and culture were. But she also thought the animus against women who sought prenatal diagnostics — and then in “1-2 percent” of cases went on to choose abortion — was inappropriate and overwrought. She held fast to her conviction that whether a woman had an abortion because she did not like children, or did not want one at a particular moment in her life, or whether it was because she did not want a disabled child, “that is okay … We are not authorized to judge on what grounds women abort.” Witkofski, by contrast, openly charged that “cripples are


being selected away before birth,” that this represented an attack “on my own life,” and — when challenged — said explicitly that, “Yes,” she was in favor of a “compulsory birthing of cripples.” Goehler, in reaction, noted that she found it “unbelievably brutal” for someone like Witkofski to say that a woman who was deciding against carrying a pregnancy with a disabled fetus to term was somehow thereby implying that she was “trying to get rid of all cripples in the world” — as “though people also wanted, after the fact, to abort you.” And: “We cannot solve the problem of a cripple-hostile society on the backs of individual women.” Witkofski, however, was adamant. Women who aborted what she in furious sarcasm referred to as “that cripple-stuff” were, in her view, “perpetrators.” Only von Paczensky, who was half-Jewish and had survived the Third Reich not least because her non-Jewish mother had refused to divorce her Jewish father and she had thus counted as a “mixed” individual, a *Mischling*, and thereby avoided deportation, pointed out that only the Nazis had murdered disabled people — and simultaneously they had punished abortion severely. Moreover, she noted, “in countries in which abortion has been liberalized, the disabled and the elderly and marginalized groups are generally treated with respect.” Her bottom line: “There is no indication that abortion has or ever had anything to do with the killing of human beings.”

But this would prove to be a losing position. In general, nondisabled feminists were ill equipped to respond to the conservative attacks on abortion once the flap over Singer had exacerbated the situation. Increasingly, the New Left (or what was left of it in the “alternative scene,” as well as the Green party, its partial offshoot) was on the defensive for having displayed a hugely disability-sensitive preoccupation with “healthiness” — since already before, but especially in the wake of the nuclear reactor explosion at Chernobyl in 1986, New Left and feminist periodicals had published some extraordinarily offensive images which lampooned disability as a likely outcome of technology run amok. Meanwhile, although they had occasionally argued with disability rights activists over abortion rights, a majority of feminists of the era shared with disability rights activists a reflexive distrust of reproductive technologies — these


48 The one major feminist venue which ran an essay defending Singer and also defending abortion on grounds of fetal disability — the magazine *Emma* — would find its offices the object of a rampage when women in monkey-face masks destroyed 100,000 DM worth of office equipment and spray-painted the walls with “Emma engages in selection!,” “Enough with the racism!” and “Euthanasia is violence.” See “Islamismus: Der Überfall,” *Emma* (July/August 1994). *Emma*’s counter-charge of “Islamism” was an (obviously racially inflected) barb directed at the intruders to convey what *Emma* saw as their fundamentalism and intolerance. The original offending article was Filter, “Das Affentheater.”

49 The New Left journal *Konkret* was the most offensive (although the Berlin-based daily *tageszeitung* was not far behind, and also a well-known feminist cartoonist contributed to the derogatory representations of disability). See Udo Sierck, *Das Risiko nichtbehinderte Eltern zu bekommen: Kritik aus der Sicht eines Behinderten* (Munich, 1989), 72, 77; Köbsell and Strahl, “Recht.”
(as they were called) “newest inventions of the technopatriarchy.”50 Already by the fall/winter of 1988, when Green party feminists held hearings about abortion in the Bundestag — urgently trying to collect arguments against the accusation that abortion was murder — they had also invited the disability activist Swantje Köbsell to address them and, moreover, concurred, as though it was self-evident, that reproductive technologies were profoundly immoral.51 By January 1990, dozens of feminist anti-reproductive technology groups, antifascist collectives, and prominent post-New Left journalists — including the editor of Konkret — had signed a declaration published in the leftist Berlin daily, die taz, against Singer’s right to speak.52

IV. Conclusion: changing the law

But how did lawmakers come to adopt the compromise formation first formulated by feminists in the cripple-movement? In the wake of the decision to unify in 1990, Western feminists had hoped that the accession of the former Eastern states, where first-trimester abortions had been decriminalized since 1972, would lead to the adoption of a more liberalized handling of abortion also in the West. But Western and Eastern feminist hopes were dashed. Although in 1992 the Bundestag promulgated a law which decriminalized an abortion when it could be shown “to prevent a danger to the life or physical or mental health of a pregnant woman,” this law was voided by the Constitutional Court the following year on the argument that abortion must officially remain criminalized because of the Basic Law’s guarantee of “protection of life,” and that indeed women, in almost all circumstances, had “an obligation to carry pregnancies to term” (Pfl icht zur Austragung).53 Yet the Court signaled that, not least in view of the unmistakable evidence

50 The quote is from Maria Mies, who — notably evincing a different kind of insensitivity — went on to argue that reproductive technologies represented a “‘new eugenics on a global scale’ that would make Hitler’s racial politics seem like mere ‘child’s play.’” Quoted and discussed in Kimba Allie Tichenor, Religious Crisis and Civic Transformation: How Conflicts over Gender and Sexuality Changed the West German Catholic Church (Lebanon, NH, 2016), 202. On some non-disabled Green feminists’ extraordinary commitment to sensitivity and solidarity with disabled feminists, see Verena Krieger, “Selbstbestimmung der Frau — eine grundsätzliche Debatte:” in DIE GRÜNEN, Bewährungspolitik, 9-13; Verena Krieger, “Die neue Abtreibungsdebatte in der Frauenbewegung,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 3 (1989), Sonderdruck nr. 365, 3-10. And as became clear at the latest in the protests against Singer, there were already in existence dozens of feminist organizations with such names as “Rhein-Main Rats Against Gender and Reprod-Nonsense,” “Women Against Genetic and Reproductive Technology” (from Darmstadt, Frankfurt, and Mainz) along with “Mixed[Gender] Group Against Genetic and Reproductive Technology,” and the “Cripple-Women Group Against Genetic and Reproductive Technologies and Eugenics West-Berlin.” See “Wider den tödlichen philosophischen Liberalismus.”


52 “Wider den tödlichen philosophischen Liberalismus.”

that women’s reliance on abortion apparently continued to be quite pervasive, it would permit the development of a law which, while maintaining the criminality of abortion, would simultaneously allow an abortion to go unpunished, if certain conditions were met.

The task now fell to the political parties, and then to the Bundestag as a whole, to propose new versions of the law. Revealingly, the new law proposed by the ruling CDU/CSU coalition still included, as though self-evidently necessary, references to the need for an embryopathic indication— a sign that the bone of contention for Christian Democrats had all along been the so-called “social indication” (the most widely used one, and the most contested because perceived by antiabortion forces to be inexcusably elastic), which was no longer mentioned in the proposed legislation at all. Ultimately, however — and whether we read this as a matter of complete contingency or of multifactor causation — in the final hashing-out by a cross-party committee of the various party proposals — a committee that included the Christian Democrat Hubert Hüppe, father of a disabled son and a staunch opponent of all abortions, the embryopathic indication disappeared entirely (to be absorbed, quietly, into the maternal-medical indication). In the small print of commentary on the finally published law, it was explained, tersely, that “for ethical reasons the embryopathic indication has been struck, in order to prevent any misunderstanding to the effect that an anticipated disability of a child could be a legitimating basis for a termination.”

And so it was that a hardcore antiabortion conservative ended up being the one to give the radical disability-rights movement the law that it wanted. Despite this manifest victory, moreover, Hüppe’s group continued to fret that, potentially, “in the expanded medical indication, terminations on grounds of the disability of an unborn child could be camouflaged” — and it served notice to the legislature and the executive, via a formal inquiry in 1996, that it continued to be concerned about how the implementation of abortion law was meeting the concern that disabled lives must be valued equally with the nondisabled. In 2009, these efforts bore fruit. The Bundestag, after prior attempts in 2001 and 2004 had been stalled, formally set yet further restrictions, including a three-day waiting period for “reflection” as well as heightened fines for any doctor discovered to be providing later-trimester abortions because of fetal disability without sufficient proof that bearing the child could definitively be construed as a threat
to the woman’s mental health. Christian Democrats had garnered the needed support of Social Democrats and Greens by specifically presenting these amendments to the law as once more an advance for disability rights. From 2009 to 2013 Hüppe served as Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Federal Commissioner for Disability Issues. And from this position, he has advocated against both stem cell research and preimplantation diagnostics in case of in vitro fertilization. The insight that “NS-Euthanasia” was “The Trial Run for the Holocaust” is part of his self-presentation. From 2012 on he lent his support to the Europe-wide “One of Us” movement — a transnational rightwing NGO that is the most formidable of the closely coordinating network of organizations working against not just abortion but also LGBT rights in the EU today.

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59 Hüppe has among other things argued that the (partial) legalization of pre-implantation diagnostics in Germany is in contradiction to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. See “Behindertenbeauftragter kritisiert PID-Regelung,” Stoppit PID website, http://www.stoppit-pid.de/beitraege/behinder­tenbeauftragter_kritisiert_pid-regelung.
THE OBJECT’S AFTERLIFE: NAZI-LOOTED PRECIOUS METAL OBJECTS, ART HISTORY, AND JEWISH HISTORY IN POSTWAR GERMANY

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“Your beautiful book, as well as your other works, contains rich material for my special research, so that I can do further studies.” With these words, written in 1978, historian, archivist, and rabbi Bernhard Brilling (1906–1987) praised a recently published book on goldsmiths in the Rhine and Neckar region by art historian Wolfgang Scheffler (1902–1992).1 Bernhard Brilling was one of very few experts on the history of the German Jews and Jewish archives in postwar West Germany, with a keen interest in regional micro-studies on the history of specific Jewish professions, such as printers and goldsmiths.2 For that reason Brilling had initially reached out to Wolfgang Scheffler, a well-known German expert on silver- and goldsmithery, in 1968. For more than a decade, Brilling and Scheffler exchanged information and sent each other new publications from time to time.3 Their professional relationship and mutual interest was polite and at the same time distanced in tone.

At first glance, this exchange of information between two academics from different disciplines does not seem very noteworthy. Although they had very different approaches, both shared an interest in gold- and silversmithery. What makes their relationship remarkable is their backgrounds. One was a Jewish historian who had been expelled from Nazi Germany in 1939 and re-migrated to West Germany already in the early 1950s, and the other was a non-Jewish German art historian who had benefited from the evaluation of Nazi looting of precious metal objects. Their relationship can therefore serve as a revealing example of a hitherto largely unexplored complex of themes: the Nazi looting of Jewish-owned precious metal objects, art-historical connoisseurship, and a neglected aspect of Jewish historiography in post-war Germany.

The first section of this article examines the biography and oeuvre of the art historian Wolfgang Scheffler, his development into a silver expert, and his involvement in the Nazi looting of Jewish-owned silver and gold objects. Although Scheffler’s art historical oeuvre remains well-known, his life and work has not yet been the subject of a scholarly article or monograph. The following section explores

3 The Scheffler/Brilling correspondence is located in the WSN at Hanau and the Jewish Museum Frankfurt (JMF) holds the Bernhard Brilling papers. I would like to thank Linda Wiesner for finding Scheffler’s letters and generously making them available to me.
Bernhard Brilling’s postwar cultural reconstruction of Jewish history in West Germany, focusing on his works on Jewish goldsmiths. Here too, his biography plays an important role, as no monograph has yet been dedicated to this almost forgotten Jewish historian either.

The connection that initiated the relationship between Brilling and Scheffler was research on goldsmithery, which is to a large extent based on objects. Consequently, this essay also focuses on material culture and the question to what extent objects — the knowledge of and about them, their ownership status and whereabouts — may have played a crucial role in the reconstruction of Jewish historiography in Germany after 1945 as well as for German so-called “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” (coming to terms with the past). Even though they played a negligible role in quantitative terms when compared to everyday objects, Jewish ceremonial objects made of precious metal will be my focus of attention because this specific type of object raises important questions about the connection of Nazi looting and anti-Jewish Scholarship during the Nazi era and because these objects played a distinct role both in postwar Jewish cultural reappropriation and in the later museumization of Jewish history in the context of German remembrance culture.

Provenance research has focused on the history of individual Nazi-looted cultural assets and collections since the “Washington Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art” were agreed on in 1998. This research, however, has been largely dedicated to the period before 1945 and mostly on works of fine art. By reconstructing the biographies of Scheffler and Brilling, their relationship, and analyzing the “afterlife” of Nazi looted objects, this essay broadens the object-oriented approach of provenance research and aims to offer new insights into the post-war history of Jews in Germany and Jewish-German relations.

I. Wolfgang Scheffler’s work with Nazi-looted objects: gathering knowledge and building networks

Born on January 2, 1902 in Braunschweig into an educated middle-class family, Wolfgang Scheffler studied art history in Göttingen, Berlin, and Munich and, in 1925, earned his doctorate with a dissertation on gothic sculpture. Subsequently he learned the practical side of museum work on-site, especially meticulous inventorizing as an academic intern (wissenschaftlicher Volontär) at the Hessisches Landesmuseum in Kassel. Scheffler worked in Kassel alongside research assistant Rudolf Hallo (1898–1933), an expert on Judaica, and it is not unlikely that he participated

4 My post-doc project at GHI with the working title “Remnants rescued from the fire.” A Transnational Cultural History of Jewish Ceremonial Objects after 1945,” seeks to close this research gap, among other things.


6 His task was in particular to reorganize several regional museums (“Heimatmuseen”) in Hersfeld, Rinteln and Wanfried.
in the preparations for a special exhibition that opened at the Landesmuseum in Kassel on April 10, 1927. This exhibition, called “Jüdische Kult- und Kunstdenkmäler,” presented a valuable collection of regional Jewish ceremonial objects and was thus an important step in the process of museumization of Jewish cultural assets and the professionalization of Jewish art history, which was still in its infancy at that time. The exhibition also had a political impact: to enlighten and fight against antisemitism. Scheffler definitely knew the exhibition and might also have learned from Hallo how to identify and inventory Jewish ceremonial objects.

Scheffler’s next professional position was at the municipal Thaulow Museum in Kiel, where he moved up the career ladder during the 1930s: from wissenschaftlicher Hilfsarbeiter to Provinzialkustode to wissenschaftlicher Assistent. Around this time, he also started a family: in 1931 he married Martha Lasogga, and two children followed in 1934 and 1937. During that time, he published many regional art-historical articles in local journals, and inventoried local art monuments in Schleswig-Holstein. In addition, he lectured and

7 As the museum Rinteln provided Jewish ceremonial objects for this exhibition in Kassel, it is likely that Scheffler acted as intermediary. See Rudolf Hallo, *Jüdische Kult- und Kunstdenkmäler im Hessischen Landesmuseum zu Kassel* (Darmstadt, 1928), 26.


gave guided tours. Scheffler did these in the context of the political education work of the National Socialists, as becomes clear in a letter of recommendation in his personnel file:

In spite of the high level of professional demands, Dr. Scheffler has unselfishly placed himself in the service of cultural-political education and further training of interested national comrades in accordance with the demands of National Socialism. Being inwardly attached to the Führer and his idea, he was a valuable and exemplary collaborator of the deutsches Volksbildungswerk in Kiel, thanks to his outstanding pedagogical and methodical gifts.10

Due to limited sources, it is difficult to precisely determine Scheffler’s attitude toward National Socialism. Despite his apparent commitment to the political education of National Socialism, he never became a party member of the NSDAP, unlike many others. However, Scheffler’s next professional assignment — a position as wissenschaftlicher Assistent at the Märkisches Museum (Berlin city museum), advertised in the Völkischer Beobachter — brought him to Berlin in 1939 and involved him in the National Socialist persecution and exploitation of Jews. “Among other things,” as a paper found in Scheffler’s personnel files describes it, “he was in charge of the access registers and cataloguing the new silver collection, a task to which he devoted himself with profound interest.”11

This “new” silver collection refers to almost 5000 silver objects which the Märkisches Museum purchased in 1939/1940 in the context of the so-called Leihhausaktion (“pawn shop action”).12 The Leihhausaktion followed the November Pogrom of 1938, during which precious metal objects — such as everyday silver and Jewish ceremonial objects — had been plundered from synagogues, Jewish homes and institutions in an uncoordinated manner. To give the looting a legal appearance, contain the chaos and stop individual enrichment, the Reich Financial Ministry issued the “Ordinance on the Use of Jewish Assets,” which forced Jews to deliver all privately-owned jewelry, gold, silver, and platinum objects to pawnbroking institutions (Leihhäuser) run by the municipalities starting in February 1939.13 Irrespective of the object’s artistic value, the Jewish owners were paid only a fraction of the material price, from which a further 10 percent administrative fee was deducted; it was essentially

10 Personalakte Wolfgang Scheffler, in Landesarchiv Berlin (LAB), A Rep. 001-06, Nr. 25545.
11 Note in “Personalakte Wolfgang Scheffler” by Head of Service on November 17, 1941, in LAB, A Rep. 001-06, Nr. 25545.
12 See Ralf Banken, Edelmetallmangel und Großraubwirtschaft. Die Entwicklung des deutschen Edelmetallsektors im “Dritten Reich” 1933-1945 (Berlin, 2009), 314-364. Actually, the term “pawnshop” is misleading since the objects from which museum curators could choose also included objects looted from synagogues, Jewish private households and institutions, as well as belongings confiscated from emigrants and those deported to concentration camps.
robbery. The whole action was intended to compensate for the Reich’s financial and precious metal shortages in preparation for the war.\textsuperscript{14} For resale, the pawnbroking institutions separated items of lesser value, which were to be melted down, from those of greater value, to be resold in their original form. Exceptions were made for objects of high artistic value, which could be preserved and sold at a low price to museums. This special regulation gave museum directors all over the Reich room for individual maneuver. They could signal the authorities their interest in selected items and assert claims for them as potential additions to their museum collections.\textsuperscript{15} Many museums benefited from this Nazi action by making substantial additions to their collection.\textsuperscript{16}

In case of the Märkisches Museum, museum director Walter Stengel (1882–1960) took advantage of this opportunity. Stengel was not only museum director but, since 1937, also Staatlicher Museumsprinzipal der Reichshauptstadt (Chief Curator of the Capital) and thus in a prominent position within Berlin to claim objects of high artistic value for his institution. He and his team selected looted silver objects stored at the pawnbroking institutions as well as at the Central Cultural Asset Purchasing Agency and probably also at the Reichsbank in Berlin.\textsuperscript{17} As Stengel’s assistant, Wolfgang

\textsuperscript{14} See Banken, 314–364.


\textsuperscript{17} Stengel’s team consisted of Scheffler, Paul Kothe (Stadtoberarchitekt), Georg Albrecht (Werkmeister), Otto Kohneart (supervisor), Leopold Lieske (supervisor) and Emil Schöder (supervisor).
Scheffler set up a separate inventory for this silver collection in two volumes, called the “S-inventory.” (See Figure 3.) With the utmost art-historical care, Scheffler inventoried each and every object with entries for title, dimensions, maker’s mark and/or hallmark, and sometimes a short description or photograph.18

In this way, countless silverware, sugar tongs, candlesticks, jewelry, and in some cases ceremonial objects that directly reflected the Jewish origins of their former owners, such as Kiddush cups with Hebrew inscriptions or Torah ornaments, passed through Scheffler’s hands. Due to his earlier work with Judaica expert Rudolf Hallo in Kassel, it is quite possible that Scheffler knew how to properly identify these Jewish ceremonial objects. In any event, he knew how to categorize the objects correctly, such as “Thoraschild” (Torah shield) or “Thoraweiser” (Torah pointer). The inventory process must have taken months and surely trained Scheffler’s expert eye. Looking back in the 1950s, Scheffler himself considered this phase of his career to have been decisive for his specialization: “I already specialized in silver during the last war as an assistant at the Märkisches Museum Berlin ...,” he recalled.19

To determine the concrete motives of the involved persons here, it is interesting to take a look at a 1941 report about new acquisitions of the Märkisches Museum, in which Scheffler’s supervisor Walter Stengel described these silver objects as “a unique rescue operation ... of the pieces saved from melting.”20 This statement is not only euphemistic but wrong. Provenance research has proven that this form of preserving objects through museum appropriation was by no means unique but a common practice throughout the whole Reich. The doubtful rescue narrative aside, Stengel stressed the objects’ scholarly value: the new silver collection, he wrote, could “present the silver culture of the last 150 years in unique series.” As Inka Bertz has highlighted, these museum acquisitions stand “for a special form of Nazi art theft: the motive was not the material or representative value of the looted objects, but the research possibilities that this material opened up.”21

18  Index cards including photographs of the objects and the information of Scheffler’s “S-inventory” were additional-ly created by Eva Maria Kraft from 1941 for the new silver collection. See Marlies Coburger, “Neues zum Silberschatz im Märkischen Museum:” in Jahrbuch Stiftung Stadtmuseum Berlin, 10 (2004/2005): 59–72.


21  Bertz, Silber, 192; Andreas Bernhard, Verschlungene Wege. Sammlungsobjekte und ihre Geschichte (Berlin, 2018), 44.
These new research opportunities also drew in experts from museums beyond Berlin. The director of the Altonaer Museum in Hamburg, Hubert Stierling (1882–1950), for instance, may have used the evaluation of “Jewish silver” — including Jewish ceremonial objects from the Altona Synagogue which he had “rescued” — for his regional research on maker’s marks from northern Germany. In a letter dated April 25, 1940, he asked his colleagues in Berlin, Walter Stengel and Wolfgang Scheffler, to inform him as soon as they found any objects that could fit his research interests. Later in Scheffler’s life this contact with Stierling would play an important role.


23 Stierling to Stengel/Scheffler, April 25, 1940 in Archiv Stadtuseum — MPM I. 1.2. 1940.
Stierling, Stengel, Scheffler, and other art historians who specialized in metal objects were interested not only in the history of stylistic developments, but also in collecting information about gold and silver marks. Most European silver and gold objects bear marks indicating the maker as well as the city and date of production. Knowing how to decipher those marks was and is very important for the determination and authentication of objects. Since the late nineteenth century huge compilations of silver and gold marks emerged, compiled by specialized art historians and published in the form of reference books.  

This fundamental art historical research on marks was part of the professionalization of the discipline. In Germany, the works of the art historian Marc Rosenberg (1851–1930) were groundbreaking and widely known all over Europe. In 1895, Friedrich Sarre (1865–1945) published the first comprehensive study dedicated to Berlin goldsmiths. While working with thousands of objects (and their marks) in 1939/1940, Scheffler became aware of limits, gaps or incorrect conclusions drawn in Rosenberg’s and Sarre’s manuals, which were the standard reference works of that time. His plan to collect information about marks in order to replace the existing standard works with a more complete study probably took shape during this time. Scheffler’s scholarly interest in silver and gold marks, which appears rather apolitical at first glance, was not only embedded in anti-Jewish persecution due to the looted objects he worked with. His research at the Märkisches Museum was also inspired and supported by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Goldschmiedekunst (DGfGK), a “clearly antisemitic” society. The DGfGK, founded in 1932, successfully reached out — in the person of its leading figure, Ferdinand R. Wilm (1880–1971) — to high-ranking Nazis (Hitler, Göring, Goebbels) to build a support network for its purposes soon after Hitler seized power. Art-loving Hermann Göring became the patron of the DGfGK. The Nazi commitment to German goldsmiths’ craft was extensive and ideologically justified as an expression of the German “völkische Wesensart” (national character). The antisemitic idea of purifying German goldsmithing art from the influences of the “Jewish spirit” may also have resonated here, as the assumption of a special, almost magical relationship between Jews, gold, and money was a long-established antisemitic trope. In the preface to “Goldschmiedekunst als Kulturpolitik,” a Festschrift on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the DGfGK in 1942, the...
ideological impetus is clearly evident: “The art of goldsmithing is one of the oldest crafts of the north, together with ironsmithing, pottery, and weaving. It seems to belong to the special talents of the Nordic race, to which Europe owes the best and highest. No craft was more highly honored among the Germanen [Germanic tribes] than that of the goldsmith.”31 Furthermore, the Nazi involvement in goldsmithing also pursued the destruction, through the policy of “Aryanization,” of the businesses of Jewish jewelers and goldsmiths.

In order to “make German goldsmithing a world leader again,” the DGfGK promoted research on the “history of German goldsmithing from its beginnings to the present” and supported publications, exhibitions, and competitions in the field.32 The “repatriation” of valuable German gold and silver artworks in “non-Aryan” collections was also of great interest.33 Furthermore, the DGfGK installed research centers for goldsmith’s craft at the art history seminars of the universities of Berlin, Bonn, Marburg, Halle, Rostock and Würzburg as well as at museums in Berlin, Dresden, Nuremberg, Hanau and Schwäbisch Gmünd.34

Especially against the background of the ideological orientation of the DGfGK the question arises as to why the museum professionals in Berlin also picked some objects that were clearly connected to Judaism, such as Torah ornaments, to be preserved. Did they choose these objects only because of the art historical research value of their marks or styles? Or did they want to rescue the objects, as was often claimed in denazification trials after the war? And if so, for whom did they preserve them and why? Were these genuinely Jewish objects preserved in order to perpetuate the image of the “essential Other” within the bipolar ideology of Nazism — for example, in future defamatory exhibitions?35 Due to a lack of historical sources, it is impossible to ascertain whether these objects can be seen as traces of a planned Nazi memory politics (Gedächtnispolitik).36 What is

32 Bermejo and Schneider-Braunberger, Das goldene Netzwerk, 79, 87.
33 For instance, until 1937 a valuable Renaissance wedding cup from Breslau was in the collection of Victor Rothschild. Its “repatriation” was lauded. Gündel, Breslau, 9.
34 Ibid., 139.
35 This might then be comparable to the establishment of the Jewish Central Museum in Prague in 1942, which is still a mystery to research today. See Dirk Rupnow, “Racializing Historiography: Anti-Jewish Scholarship in the Third Reich,” in Beyond the Racial State, ed. Devin O. Pendas, Mark Roseman, and Richard F. Wetzell (Cambridge, 2017), 288–316.
certain in the case of the Märkisches Museum is that almost the entire silver collection — including the looted silver objects — was lost in the turmoil of the war. Scheffler’s valuable data about the objects, however, was for the most part preserved. Therefore the “afterlife” of the objects was in this case of an immaterial nature.

II. Converting the knowledge of objects into connoisseurship after 1945

Scheffler’s time at the Märkisches Museum was formative but short. A new professional opportunity opened up for him as early as September 1941, when he was appointed museum director in Liegnitz (Lower Silesia). This assignment was also of short duration, followed by military service (1943) and captivity as a prisoner of war. After his release in 1947, Scheffler moved back to his hometown of Braunschweig, where at first he worked mainly as a freelancer at the Anton Ulrich Museum and at the city’s office of historic preservation (Denkmalpflegeamt).37

Only fifty kilometers from Braunschweig lies Celle Castle, which functioned as the Zonal Fine Arts Repository from 1945 until 1958 and offered interesting job opportunities for art historians.38 All works of art confiscated in the territory of the British Occupation Zone were collected there. For the most part, these objects were holdings of the Berlin museums that had been removed for security reasons during the war. Scheffler was able to obtain a professional position at the Celle repository, where his tasks were to identify objects that belonged to the former Berliner Staatliche Museen (Antiken-Abteilung, Schlossmuseum, Ägyptische-Abteilung), to curate exhibitions in Celle, and to prepare the relocation of the museum collections to West Berlin in his capacity as Beauftragter der Rückführungsaktion.39 During these formative postwar years, when the Zonal Fine Arts Repository and other Allied art “collecting points” were concerned with sorting and restitution, countless objects had to be identified. The determination of gold and silver marks was again essential. For, in addition to receipts and photographs, Jewish restitution claimants were required to indicate the marks of their precious metal pieces in order to identify them beyond doubt.40

While working at the Celle Zonal Fine Arts Repository, Scheffler returned to his former interest in gold and silver marks and reestablished contact with former networks. Scheffler may have reached out to Hubert Stierling (or his wife Dorothea) in Hamburg in the late 1940s; for after Stierling’s death in 1950, Scheffler edited Stierling’s book Goldschmiedezichen von Altona bis Tondern, which the deceased had left as a manuscript.41
With this publication Scheffler was following the latest art historical trend. Immediately after the war, there was a veritable wave of research on silver and goldsmithing. Countless publications, exhibitions and competitions emerged during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Remarkable are the many doctoral theses on the subject, which had been begun during the Nazi period but were published only after the war, and which may be interpreted as a long-term consequence of Nazi cultural policy. The re-established DGfGK in Hamburg also continued its tasks almost uninterruptedly after 1945 — but erased all former Nazi connections in its self-representation.

This wave of research on silver and goldsmithing may have motivated Scheffler to create a personal object index of gold and silver marks, which was arranged regionally and still exists in his papers in Hanau. Interestingly enough, Scheffler transferred all data concerning the looted Jewish silver which the Märkisches Museum had acquired in 1939/1940 into this personal index. In some cases, Scheffler’s personal index cards even contain supplemental information or sketches of the objects, drawn by Scheffler himself. (See Figure 5.)

Due to Scheffler’s much lauded work in Celle, he was predestined to be employed in the reconstruction of Berlin’s Staatliche Museen after the relocation of the objects. In fact, in 1957 Scheffler became the first staff member — research fellow and acting director — of the Kunstgewerbemuseum (Museum of Applied Arts) in West Berlin. The first years of the improvised museum, which lacked staff and space and whose collection was divided between East and West, were chaotic. Scheffler established order by — again — creating accurate museum index cards and inventories. It must have hit him hard when a young colleague was eventually appointed director of the Kunstgewerbemuseum in 1960 and Scheffler was fobbed off with a position as curator (Kustode). But this position offered him enough time to devote himself to his art historical research until he retired.

42 For example, the DGfGK in 1947 organized the competition “Das beste Buch über Goldschmiedekunst,” Bermejo and Schneider-Braunberger, Das goldene Netzwerk, 151. Two exhibitions on the subject were shown in Berlin in 1955: “400 Jahre Gold und Silberschmiede in Berlin” at the Rathaus Schöneberg. For a long list of publications on the topic, see Schiedlausky, Betrachtungen, 388 ff.

43 Schiedlausky states in his 2001 historical overview “that in the decades following the end of the war, research into the art of goldsmithing has made gratifying progress and has exceeded the usual level” without mentioning the catalytic effect of the Nazi period for the field. See Schiedlausky, Betrachtungen, 391.

44 Scheffler’s object index includes about 30,000 small-format index cards. Even if we don’t know the exact date, it is reasonable to assume that Scheffler systematically built up the index only after the war and until the end of his life. Scheffler also added Jewish ceremonial objects to his card index, including synagogue objects from Berlin and Gröbzig. These were — as far as we know today — not part of the new silver collection at the Märkisches Museum. See WSN.

45 See Mundt, Museumsalltag, 597–598.

46 See LAB B Rep. 014, Nr. 1698.

47 See Mundt, Museumsalltag, 581.

48 Ibid. 597.
in 1967; research that he continued for a long time thereafter. It was only during this time that the name Wolfgang Scheffler became known to the wider public as a silver and gold expert because of his numerous publications on goldsmithery in Lower Saxony (1965), Berlin (1968), Rhineland-Westphalia (1973), Hesse (1976), Main and Neckar (1977), Central and Northeast Germany (1980), East Allgaeu (1981), East Prussia (1983), and Upper Franconia (1989), just to mention a few.

It is interesting to note that there are traces in Scheffler’s personal papers documenting the art historian’s interest in a development since the early 1960s that linked his research field with the emerging memorialization of memory regarding the Shoah. Several exhibitions, but especially the “Synagoga” exhibition (1960/61) in Recklinghausen/Frankfurt (Main) and the “Monumenta Judaica” exhibition (1963) in Cologne, presented Jewish history and religion using authentic remnants of European Jewish material culture, such as antique Jewish ceremonial objects made of precious metal. The exhibited objects were on loan from private and museum collections, including some in Israel. Thus the organization of these exhibitions was a high-ranking cultural diplomatic act at a time when West Germany and Israel did not yet have diplomatic relations. Although the exhibitions were intended to be more than an art historical event and to enable a broad German public to (re-) encounter Jewish culture and promote reconciliation, their failure to address the Shoah and contemporary Jewish life resulted in a self-centered mourning for the loss of a part of German culture.49

Art experts like Scheffler may have approached the exhibition

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49 In addition to the Jewish ceremonial objects mentioned in Scheffler’s card index, a folder entitled “Jewish Cult Silver” in his papers contains articles and newspaper clippings concerning the exhibition Synagoge (1961) and an exhibition presenting the “Sofer Collection” of Jewish Ceremonial objects collected by Zvi Sofer at the Gropius Bau (1980). On the meaning of these exhibitions, see Inka Bertz, “Jewish Museums in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Visualizing and Exhibiting Jewish Space and History, ed. Richard I. Cohen (Oxford, 2012), 80-112.
first and foremost as a research opportunity, as it offered easy access to objects that had “emigrated” with their Jewish owners into exile or had been buried in German museum depots for a long time.

In 1968, Wolfgang Scheffler published his famous and oft-cited 700-page volume *Berliner Goldschmiede — Daten Werke Zeichen*. At the time of its publication the book was hailed as “the fundamental work on Berlin goldsmiths and their works,” and has remained the standard work until today.\(^50\) As a matter of course, Scheffler included all the information accumulated during the evaluation of the looted Jewish silver at the Märkisches Museum in 1939/1940. Today’s readers can easily identify the objects in question by their S-inventory number. Scheffler thus did not hide information, but he did not embed its background critically either. These were simply neutral facts for him, a scientific added value.

To be sure, Scheffler’s far more extensive scholarly work cannot be reduced to his work with the Nazi looted materials at the Märkisches Museum. Nevertheless, this work formed the starting point and cornerstone of his preoccupation with the subject, helped him to establish important networks, and ultimately had a catalytic effect on his research and career, which lasted far into postwar times. The critical and systematic examination of this somewhat inconspicuous part of art historical scholarship produced in museums during National Socialism is still in its infancy, even though there has been an increasing interest in the topic in recent years.\(^51\)

### III. Bernhard Brilling’s individual approach to reconstruction: “Jewish goldsmithery” as counter-narrative

It is not clear whether rabbi and historian Bernhard Brilling knew the backstory to Scheffler’s book *Berliner Goldschmiede* when he first reached out to him in the summer of 1968. As a scholar of Jewish history, Brilling’s interest was to write a cultural and commercial history of Jewish goldsmiths. During the 1960s and 1970s — and thus parallel to Scheffler — he published several pioneering articles on Jewish goldsmiths in Silesia (1967), Prague (1967), Moravia (1969), Berlin (1970) and East Prussia (1974) and continued to take an interest in the topic.\(^53\)

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\(^{50}\) SB3411, Nachlass Bernhard Brilling, JMF.


As Michael Brenner put it, Bernhard Brilling was one of the almost forgotten Jewish historians in postwar West Germany, “who never got a foothold in the academic establishment, or sometimes did not want to, but were nevertheless among the pioneers of research into the German-Jewish past.” Brilling’s career path was similar to that of many Jewish scholars whose lives were fundamentally disrupted by National Socialism. Bernhard Brilling was born in 1906 in Tremessen (Posen) and raised in Prenzlau; in 1924 he began to study history in Berlin and Breslau. At the same time, he attended the Jüdisch-Theologisches Seminar (Jewish Theological Seminary) in Breslau and started working as an intern (Volontär) at the Archiv der Synagogengemeinde Breslau (Archives of the Breslau Community of Synagogues). Simultaneously, he observed the local endeavors to collect, study and exhibit Jewish ceremonial objects, for instance the exhibition “Das Judentum in der Geschichte Schlesiens,” which took place at the Schlesisches Museum für Kunstgewerbe und Altertümer in 1929. Brilling became familiar not only with the Jewish archives and exhibitions in Breslau, but also catalogued the Hamburg Jewish community archives and evaluated archival sources in many other archives for genealogical and cultural historical studies.

Thus, in 1938, Brilling felt well-prepared for a career as historian and archivist. He was striving with some of his colleagues to establish a Jewish Central Archive for Moravia in Brno, where he saw himself employed in the future. But political developments in Germany came to upend his life. Following the November Pogrom of 1938, he was incarcerated at Buchenwald until January 1939. In March 1939, the Reichssippenamt confiscated the Archiv der Synagogengemeinde Breslau. Only after handing over to the authorities an exact list of the register of Jewish births, marriages, and deaths, which the Nazis intended to use for their antisemitic research on Jews (Judenforschung), was Brilling allowed to emigrate to Palestine.

In Palestine he, like many other Jewish historians, found himself “deprived by the Nazis of the fruits of [his] scientific research.” Although he found a job and lived a comparatively stable life in Tel Aviv, he did not take root in his new homeland. He oriented himself towards West Germany after the war, trying to rebuild his life and professional future there. In contrast to the Jewish majority, who considered Germany a “forbidden country” for Jews after the Shoah, Brilling expressed a different attitude towards Germany: “It is our world after all, even if it has changed a lot.” In fact, repression,
shame and rejection, shyness and unease characterized Germans’ interaction with Jews in the postwar period. However, Brilling wanted to return and to resume his archival work. The decisive motivation for him was to recover the Nazi-looted Jewish archives on which he had worked before the war. To accomplish this task, he was willing to take quite uncommon steps, as documented in a letter to a friend in 1951:

I’m looking for ... my successor, who took over “my” community archive in March 1939 and wanted to establish an Institutum Judaicum in Breslau. This was Dr. Fritz Arlt, head of the regional office of the Rassenpolitisches Amt Breslau, who, despite his title and his party affiliation, behaved very humanely to me. ... Dr. Fritz Arlt is therefore not being searched by me because I have accusations to make against him, but so that he can provide me with information about the fate of the archive, which will enable me to complete my work on the history of the archive of the synagogue community of Breslau.60

Brilling’s approach is interesting as it anticipates his later practice as a Jewish historian in the Federal Republic of Germany and may explain his openness towards German scholars such as Scheffler: Brilling vehemently advocated for cooperation with Germans in the interest of scholarly work. In 1956, for instance, he argued out of concern for the establishment of the “Germania Judaica” working group: “It is therefore necessary in this scholarly work to disregard all prejudices [handwritten correction: “concerns”] and to officially contact German historians and archivists for the purpose of founding a working group if one wants to take the matter seriously from a scholarly point of view and carry it out properly.”61

Besides looking for archival material, Brilling had a keen interest in locating Nazi-looted Jewish ceremonial objects from former synagogues and Jewish art collections. Thus he inquired about private Jewish collectors’ searches for their looted collections and visited an exhibition in Tel Aviv of “heirless” objects discovered by the Allied forces after the war that had subsequently been distributed by the Jewish Cultural Reconstruction (JCR) to Jewish communities and museums worldwide.62 As he was interested in the provenance of some JCR objects, he even reached out to South Africa to obtain an exhibition catalogue.63 As a scholar of Jewish history, he regarded ob-

60  Brilling to H. Pinkus, 18 January 1951. I would like to thank Judith Siepmann (Simon Dubnow Institut), who provided me with these letters. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

61  As cited in Jütte, Die Emigration der deutschsprachigen Wissenschaft des Judentums, 191.

62  On the JCR, see Elisabeth Gallas, A Mortuary of Books. The Rescue of Jewish Culture after the Holocaust (New York, 2019).

63  Brilling to Harry Abt, 25.5.1954, Bernhard Brilling Papers, Reel 5, USHMM.
“projects as important sources because “the inscriptions on the ceremonial objects, which give information about their age, also provide information about the donors and genealogical and cultural historical information.”64

However, it was the search for the remnants of Jewish archives, rather than objects, that brought Brilling back to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955.65 On his return journey by ship, he happened to meet Karl Heinrich Rengstorf (1903-1992), who offered him a professional future in Germany. Rengstorf was a Protestant theologian and head of the re-established Institutum Judaicum Delitzschianum (IJD) in Münster, which had been dedicated to research on the history of the Jews since 1948. The institute’s predecessor, which had existed until 1935 in Leipzig, had been associated with the problematic cause of Protestant “Judenmission,” as had been Rengstorf himself in his capacity as head of the Evangelisch-lutherischer Zentralverein für Mission unter Israel. Furthermore, Rengstorf had had close ties to theologians supporting Hitler, such as his teacher Gerhard Kittel, who had been involved in Nazi Judenforschung.66 In order to remove this stigma after 1945, Rengstorf was eager to cultivate social contact with Jewish intellectuals such as Martin Buber and Leo Baeck and recruit Jewish research fellows for his institute. Brilling, who wanted to finish his dissertation, accepted Rengstorf’s offer of a scholarship to finish his dissertation and subsequently a position as research fellow in various research projects. Brilling then stayed at the IJD in Münster until he retired.67

Figure 6. Undated photograph of Karl Heinrich Rengstorf with two Jewish employees of his Institute, Bernhard Brilling and Zvi Sofer. Zvi Sofer Papers, Private collection, Münster. Unknown photographer. Reproduced by permission.

64 Bernhard Brilling, “Neues Schriftum zur Geschichte der Juden in der Tschechoslowakei,” in Zeitschrift für Ostforschung Jg. 6 Hef 4 (1957): 572–582.


67 Brilling and Rengstorf shared an interest in plans for the establishment of an Institute for Jewish History in Hamburg. Hamburg seemed a fitting place for the future writing of Jewish history as a large number of Jewish archival documents had been preserved there. Rengstorf made a new institute, a director of this future institute and Brilling was supposed to be his research fellow. But finally, in 1964 these plans failed because of the resistance of some Jewish intellectuals in particular — most prominently Hans-Joachim Schoeps — who found Rengstorf to be the wrong choice for the position. Schoeps and others feared strong influence of Protestant teaching on the study of Jewish history, which seemed unthinkable especially after the ideologically tainted “Judenforschung” during the Nazi period. On the Hamburg case, see Miriam Rürup, “Whose Heritage? Early Postwar German-Jewish History as Remigrants’ History — The Case of Hamburg,” in Rebuilding Jewish Life in Germany, ed. Geller, 65–83; Lustig, Bernhard Brilling, 48–64; Honigmann 234; Björn Siegel, “Verworfene Wege: Die Gründungsphase des IGdJ,” in 50 Jahre — 50 Quellen. Festschrift zum Jubiläum des IGdJ (Hamburg, 2016), 26–55.
The earlier period of searching for the remnants of European Jewish material culture and struggling over their restitution during the 1950s was followed by a general shift towards its evaluation and presentation. This new phase found its clearest expression in the aforementioned exhibitions “Synagoga” in 1961 and “Monumenta Judaica” in 1964, which were co-initiated and supported by Brilling and Rengstorf. Brilling’s participation in working groups for these and later exhibitions was important for him in two ways. First, these exhibitions represented the first international cooperation between Jews and non-Jews after 1945 in Germany, which corresponded well with Brilling’s and the IJD’s Jewish-Christian dialogical approach. In Brilling’s words: “May the fruitful cooperation between Christians and Jews … the first far-reaching result of which is the exhibition Synagoga in Recklinghausen, not only be preserved, but deepened and produce many valuable scientific and human results in the future.”

It should be noted that this cooperation included scholars who had been involved in Nazi Judenforschung, such as Hermann Kellenbenz. Second, the “Synagoga” exhibition triggered the creation of a growing number of exhibitions on Jewish history and religion during the 1960s and 1970s. In this way precious metal Judaica staged as exhibits became elements of object-based memorialization, a process that apparently also affected Brilling’s selection of topics for his work as a historian. His commitment to the subject of Jewish goldsmiths — and thus the social and cultural-historical framework of a huge part of Jewish ceremonial objects — falls exactly and not coincidentally into this period. This choice may have been additionally motivated by one of Brilling’s colleagues in Münster, Zvi Sofer, who was an active collector of Jewish ceremonial objects and organized several important exhibitions in the Federal Republic during the 1970s.

In one of these essays Brilling discussed the Jewish goldsmiths of Silesia. This seemed natural, as he knew the region and its Jewish history well and was able to build on an earlier important work from 1906 by Erwin Hintze. Ironically, Breslau and Silesia had also been the subject of a highly ideological monograph commissioned by the DGfGK in 1942. This book was the first part of a series of monographs on the “Goldsmithing Art of German Cities,” which “received the undivided approval and interest of the Führer and caused … a contribution of RM 10,000.” In this study Jewish...
goldsmiths were not only neglected but maligned as the supposed “seed of the destruction of the handicraft tradition.” The decline of German goldsmithery was blamed on the implementation of economic freedom (Gewerbefreiheit) after the Napoleonic Wars — and therefore implicitly also on the admission of Jews to the craft. The book concluded that only the Handwerksgesetz (Handicraft Law) of 1935 — and thus the de facto exclusion of Jews — restored order in German goldsmithery.73

It is not yet known to what extent Brilling was aware of this baiting publication or Nazi ideological support for research on German goldsmithery. Be that as it may, his articles on the topic made the neglected history of Jewish goldsmiths visible again by creating a Jewish counter-narrative. However, besides reconnecting with Jewish research of the pre-Nazi era — including the work of historians Selma Stern, Jacob Jacobson and Ismar Freund — Brilling also drew on the work of antisemitic historians such as Heinrich Schnee and thus on a part of German historiography that “did not experience a ‘Stunde Null,’ but stood in the continuity of the past years in terms of personnel and perspective.”74 Brilling not only quoted Schnee’s work in a neutral tone but was apparently in contact with him, even though the Jewish religious scholar Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich, in a 1966 review, had unmistakably exposed Schnee’s arguments as borrowed from Nazi racial theory.75

It was the historic turning point of Jewish history within the history of goldsmithery — the admission of Jews to goldsmiths’ guilds — that was of great interest for Brilling’s research and, ironically, became the reason why he initially contacted Wolfgang Scheffler in 1968:

In connection with my research on the history of the German Jews, ... I am working on an article about Jewish goldsmiths in Berlin in the period from 1700 to 1900. However, I have not yet been able to determine when the Berlin goldsmiths’ guild changed its statutes to include Jews as members. I would therefore be very grateful if you could give me information about this — based on your investigations and research.76

At first, Scheffler reacted with extraordinary reluctance. He replied that Brilling should just be patient as his book was about to
be published in October of that year and would provide him with all answers. In November 1968, however, Scheffler had to admit in a letter to Brilling that the book’s publication was delayed. Despite being initially rejected, Brilling invested in the relationship. After he helped Scheffler obtain some information he was interested in, Scheffler’s tone became more collegial. This shows how much Brilling believed he was dependent on Scheffler’s information. Finally, after Scheffler’s book *Berliner Goldschmiede* was published, Brilling immediately went through it thoroughly in relation to his essay on Jewish goldsmiths. Disappointed, he wrote to his publisher: “As I found out, the book [Scheffler’s *Berliner Goldschmiede*] does not contain any historical descriptions at all and therefore does not deal with the question of the admission of the Jews into the goldsmiths’ guild.” Nevertheless, Brilling seemed to be impressed and added: “However, Scheffler’s book contains a very diligently and extensively compiled directory of Berlin goldsmiths up to 1850 ... As a result, I ... have to change the list of printed sources.” The inclusion of Scheffler in Brilling’s bibliography inaugurated the reception of this work in studies on Jewish history but even more visibly in studies on Jewish ceremonial objects. To this day, Scheffler’s reference book is consulted in academic studies and in Jewish museums worldwide.

By contrast, Brilling’s work on Jewish goldsmiths entered art historical scholarship only at the margins and found more of a reception in regional historical research. Since Jewish history was marginalized in postwar German historiography, all the more so if the research was produced in non-university contexts such as the IDJ, Brilling’s writings were hardly acknowledged.

**Conclusion**

The looting and destruction of the material culture of European Jewry was an integral part of the annihilation of Jewish life and culture by the National Socialists. Nazi-looted Jewish archives, libraries, and ceremonial objects were not only destroyed and exploited in a material sense but also opened up research opportunities — both within the framework of *Judenforschung* and, as is often overlooked, in the field of art historical research in museums. The theft of thousands of precious metal objects, in particular, suddenly enabled art historians to undertake studies of style and marks on an unprecedented scale. It is no coincidence

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77. Scheffler to Brilling, June 26, 1968, SB3411, JMF.
78. Brilling letter to Dr. Letkemann, April 16, 1969, SB3411, JMF.
79. Ibid.
80. On the marginalization if Jewish history see Bremmer, *Vergessene Historiker*, 223.
that German goldsmithery as a field of art historical research was promoted by the highest political authorities of the Nazi state. Here, the anti-modern idea of reviving German craftsmanship conjoined with the antisemitic trope of a connection between Jews, gold, and capitalism.

For Wolfgang Scheffler as a young museum professional during the 1930s, the Nazi-looted precious metal objects opened up a career perspective. Scheffler gained connoisseurship and networks through his work with the looted objects at the Märkisches Museum in Berlin. But more significantly, by transferring the information gained in 1939/40 into a groundbreaking book on “Berliner Goldschmiede,” Scheffler benefited from his Nazi-era work in the postwar era, during which he established himself as a well-known expert. Ironically, Scheffler’s art historical evaluation of the looted objects and their makers, the goldsmiths, was the only form in which the objects survived. Since almost all of the objects were lost by the end of the war, the “afterlife” of the objects took the form of immaterial knowledge.

Precisely this immaterial “afterlife” of the objects — not so much knowledge about each object but about Jewish goldsmiths — was of interest to Bernhard Brilling, especially from the 1960s onwards. Expelled from Nazi Germany, Brilling longed to rebuild his life and work as a Jewish historian after the war — in his own words, for his “Restitution in den früheren Stand” (restitution to [his] former status). To attain this end, he was not only willing to return to the land of the perpetrators but to work side-by-side with them in his field of research. As a result, the historian Brilling was marginalized in two ways. On the one hand, his contact with controversial figures such as Karl Heinrich Rengstorf and Heinrich Schnee may have put him on the sidelines with Jewish historians. On the other hand, Jewish history — especially the work of Jewish historians — was marginalized within the general field of history in postwar West Germany. It is therefore not surprising that Brilling is hardly known as a Jewish historian today. It was precisely the dialogue with non-Jewish German researchers — such as Scheffler or other historians and theologians who were active during the Nazi period and who were directly or indirectly involved in Nazi Judenforschung — that offered Brilling not only a personal professional perspective but also, at least occasionally, valuable information. Even though he made use of information acquired in dialogue with beneficiaries and perpetrators of the Nazi
regime, with his numerous writings on Jewish goldsmiths, Brilling did exemplary reconstruction work in the field of Jewish history in Germany after 1945.

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Although he had anticipated feeling happy in his homeland, Erdem was “shocked” to find himself the target of discrimination when he visited Turkey in 1991. A second-generation Turkish migrant born and raised in West Germany, the longhaired 21-year-old who played in a garage band called Apocalyptica stuck out from the local Turks. “You can’t imagine how crazy these people were,” he recalled. “They had an olfactory sense. They could smell that I was from Germany.” Twice, this prejudice turned to violence. Erdem was “lynched,” in his words, once at a discotheque and once while strolling along the seaside. In the latter encounter, a group of men encircled him, took out pocketknives, and attempted to cut his hair. When Erdem reported the incident, the police officers told him to “F*** off, you Almancı! This is Turkey, not Germany!” The insults never stopped. Only when he returned to Germany could he breathe a sigh of relief.¹

While certainly an extreme case, Erdem’s story captures the tensions between Turkish-German migrants and their home country. As Erdem vividly explained, the migrants’ time spent in Germany was marked on their bodies — in their fashion choices and hairstyles, in their behaviors, mannerisms, accents, and patterns of speech — making them the targets of scorn, derision, and ostracization. This sense of otherness is best captured in the police officers’ calling Erdem an Almancı. Translating literally to “German-er” — or, as I use it, “Germanized Turk” — this derogatory Turkish term evokes not only physical but also cultural estrangement: the perception that the migrants living in Germany (Almanya) have undergone a process of Germanization, rendering them no longer fully Turkish. Many migrants perceive Almancı as the flipside of the German word Ausländer (foreigner), which excludes them from the German national community even if they have lived there for decades and have obtained citizenship.² Indeed, whereas Germans have lambasted the migrants’ insufficient assimilation, the idea of the Almancı reveals that Turks in the homeland have often worried about precisely the opposite: excessive assimilation.

¹ Erdem S., interview by author, Şarköy, 2016.
² Almanya’da Yabancı, Türkiye de Almanlar, Türkiye ve Almanya ve İlişkileri (Ulm, 1995).
In this article, as well as the dissertation and book manuscript on which it is based, I tell the story of how the idea of the Almancı — of this dually estranged “Germanized Turk,” identified simultaneously with two homelands and with no homeland at all — came to be. I begin in 1961, when West Germany first began recruiting Turkish laborers as part of the 1955-1973 guest worker program (Gastarbeiterprogramm) and end in 1990, a year marked by several developments: the reunification of divided Germany, the liberalization of German citizenship law, and renewed discussions about Turkey’s compatibility with a post-Cold War conception of Europe. Taking a transnational perspective that intertwines the levels of policy, public discourse, and personal experience, I complicate a narrative that has long been portrayed as a German story — as a one-directional migration from Turkey to West Germany whose consequences have played out primarily within German geographic boundaries. To the contrary, I argue that Turkish migration to Germany was never a one-directional process; it was a back-and-forth process of reciprocal exchange, whose consequences played out not only within the two countries but also throughout Cold War Europe. The basic premise is the following: We cannot understand how migration impacted Germany without understanding how it impacted Turkey; we cannot understand German immigration policy without understanding Turkish policy and the ways in which the two were constituted mutually; and we cannot understand the migrants’ experiences integrating in Germany without understanding their experiences reintegrating in Turkey.

The burgeoning scholarship on postwar German migration history has converged upon a relatively consistent periodization. As the standard narrative goes, Turkish guest workers never intended — and were never intended — to stay long-term. Envisioning them as temporary “guests,” as the term Gastarbeiter implies, the West German government planned for them to stay for only two years, after which, according to the recruitment agreement’s “rotation principle” (Rotationsprinzip), they would be replaced. The workers, too, understood their migration as temporary. After a few years working in factories and mines, they planned to return home with fancy cars, build their own two-story homes, establish their own small businesses, and secure a prosperous future for their families. Nevertheless, guest workers did not go home as planned and, after the 1973 moratorium on labor recruitment, increasingly brought their families and children, leading them to become West Germany’s largest ethnic
minority. The realization that migrants had not returned ignited the earliest debates about integration and multiculturalism, as well as the rise of anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim xenophobia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since German reunification, these tensions erupted in the citizenship debates of the 1990s, resurfaced in controversies about the “failure” of multiculturalism in the 2010s, and have been transposed onto German attitudes toward new Muslim migrants amid the current-day refugee crisis.

While this periodization holds true, the overwhelming focus on developments within West German borders has had the inadvertent effect of downplaying migrants’ return to their home country as a mere “illusion” or an “unrealized dream.” Crucial to my argument, however, is the sheer dynamism and agency of migrants’ lives. Far from oppressed industrial cogs relegated to their workplaces and factory dormitories, guest workers and their families were highly mobile border crossers. They did not stay put in West Germany, but rather returned — both temporarily or permanently — to Turkey. They took advantage of affordable sightseeing opportunities throughout Western Europe, and they traveled each year, typically by car across Cold War Europe, on vacations to their home country, where they temporarily reunited with the friends and family they had left behind. Hundreds of thousands, moreover, packed their bags, relinquished their West German residence permits, and remigrated to Turkey permanently, making their long-deferred “final return” (in Turkish, kesin dönüş). Remigration was not only a personal decision, but also state-driven, with the West German and Turkish governments grappling with how to promote (for the former) and curtail (for the latter) the migrants’ return. Migrants’ mobility beyond West German borders, and specifically their return to their homeland, was thus central to everyday life, domestic and international policy, and identity formation.

Organized chronologically, the article traces the gradual development of the idea of the Almancı by highlighting three key themes in the migrants’ gradual estrangement from their home country. In the first section, I explore guest workers’ vacations to their home country, showing how the cars and consumer goods they brought from West Germany made non-migrant Turks perceive them as a nouveau-riche class of superfluous spenders who selfishly neglected to support their economically struggling homeland. In the second section, I explore how these concerns, amid heightened West German xenophobia toward Turks, erupted in heated domestic and international debates
about the West German government’s controversial 1983 Law for the Promotion of Voluntary Return (Rückkehrförderungsgesetz), which offered guest workers a “remigration premium” (Rückkehrprämie) of 10,500 Deutsche Mark (D-Mark) to go back to their home country. In the third section, I examine the consequences of the 1983 law, which brought about the largest remigration wave in modern European history, with 15% of the Turkish population (approximately 250,000 men, women, and children) returning to Turkey in 1984 alone. Here I focus particularly on the struggles of the second-generation “return children” (Rückkehrkinder), also derided as the “children of Almancı,” when they accompanied their parents back to Turkey. Turning the concept of “integration” on its head, I ultimately argue that, amid the longstanding discourses of Germanization and cultural estrangement, many return migrants were faced with an uncomfortable reality: reintegration in their own homeland was often just as difficult as integration abroad.

I. Vacations in the homeland

The moment at which guest workers initially departed their home country was one of great rupture. Each time guest workers boarded the trains at Istanbul’s Sirkeci train station, crowds of men, women, and children huddled together behind wooden gates with tangled barbed wire, their emotions varying from joyous singing to woeful sobs. While guest workers from Istanbul were able to have their families see them off at their departure, others had already said their goodbyes in their faraway home villages, spread throughout the vast Anatolian countryside. For the guest workers themselves, the moment was bittersweet. While they were excited about their new adventures and the wealth they could amass, they had already begun to mourn the separation from their loved ones even before they departed. They knew that maintaining contact would not be easy. Electricity and telephone lines had yet to come to many villages, and letters traveling through the international post could take weeks or months to arrive, if at all.

As soon as they settled in to their factory dormitories in West Germany, guest workers developed strategies for quelling their homesickness. Early on, they created surrogate families — typically along gendered lines — which served as crucial support systems. Often, they commiserated together. “It was terrible being alone in this foreign country,” recalled Nuriye M., whose husband had stayed behind in Turkey. “At the beginning, we sat together every evening,
Figure 1. Cartoon on the cover of a 1995 anthology of migrant writings, titled Foreigner in Germany, Almanç in Turkey, depicting a dismayed guest worker reluctantly returning from Germany to Turkey. The image captures the idea of the “Almançi,” or “Germanized Turks,” who feel dually estranged from both countries they consider home. Reproduced by permission.
listened to Turkish music, and cried." Discussions, whether somber or lively, often centered on their lives at home. “We had no other topic,” insisted Necan, who worked at the Siemens factory in Berlin. “What else could we have talked about? Economics or politics? The entire topic was our homeland.” Alongside the profound sadness, however, were moments of levity and excitement. They drank beer together, played cards, and watched television, and they often went out on the town to restaurants, bars, and shops. On the weekends, men in particular often congregated at local train stations—which one guest worker affectionately called the “gate to the homeland” (Tor zur Heimat) — to catch up on the latest political news from Turkey and to share stories about acquaintances in neighboring cities.5

While guest workers regularly wrote letters to their loved ones, eagerly awaiting each reply, they also developed another communication strategy: sending audio recordings of their voices by repurposing battery-operated cassette players, a new technology that they frequently purchased in West Germany to listen to Turkish music on tape. The process was complex. After recording their voice messages on a blank tape, the senders would locate a fellow guest worker who was planning to travel home by car and who would be willing to transport the cassette player, along with some extra blank tapes, directly to its recipient in the village. Once the intermediary delivered the cassette player, the family members would listen to the voice message and record a response on the blank tapes. They would then send the cassette player back to the original guest worker in Germany through either the same liaison or another guest worker. Although not always easy, finding this traveling intermediary was facilitated by the social networks guest workers had developed in their local communities. The weekend meetings at the train stations, for example, were spaces in which cassette players exchanged hands.6

By far the most important means of communication, however, was physically traveling to Turkey on their Heimaturlaube, or vacations in the home country. Because guest workers enjoyed the same right to vacation as German workers, they spent between four to six weeks in Turkey every year, usually during the summer but sometimes during Christmas break. By the rise of family migration of the 1970s, the spouses and children of guest workers took the vacations as well. Heimaturlaube were such an important component of guest workers’ experiences that they show up in even the most unexpected Turkish and West German archival sources: government agencies coordinated


6 Fatma U., interview by author, Cologne, 2017. See the many cassette players held in the DOMiD-Archiv.
travel logistics, companies fired guest workers on the basis of a tardy return, newspapers reported on vacations with great frequency, novelists and filmmakers incorporated vacations as plot points, and guest workers and their children recounted their vacation stories in personal memoirs, poems, and oral histories.

Although buses, trains, and airplanes were common options, the vast majority of guest workers opted to travel by car, which permitted flexible departure times. The journey, however, was no easy feat. The only possible roadway from West Germany to Turkey was an international highway, the Europastraße 5, which stretched 3,000 kilometers across the Iron Curtain at the height of the Cold War. Driving through neutral Austria, socialist Yugoslavia, and communist Bulgaria to get to Istanbul took a minimum of two days and two nights, and even longer if the driver was heading to a remote village in eastern Anatolia. Not only long, but also dangerous, the road trip captivated the interest of the West German and Turkish media. In 1975, the West German newsmagazine Der Spiegel sensationalized the treacherous road conditions in a ten-page feature article, headlined “The Road of Death” (“Die Todesstrecke”). Citing dubious statistics, the article reported that bumper-to-bumper traffic, exhausted drivers, and 2000-kilometer long unventilated tunnels made guest workers succumb to “near murder” and “certain suicide”: the 330-kilometer curvy stretch through the Austrian Alps caused over five thousand accidents each year, and one passenger allegedly died in Yugoslavia every two hours.7

To make matters worse, travelers had to deal with aggressive border guards and locals, whom one child of a guest worker called “sadistic.”8 The situation was especially difficult on the Balkan portion of the road. Living under socialism and communism at the height of the Cold War, Yugoslav and Bulgarian border guards thirsted for material goods from “the West” and took advantage of guest workers, whose West German license plates exposed them as potential suppliers. Regularly, they forced travelers to unpack their entire cars, searching meticulously for contraband and items they could surreptitiously sneak into their pockets, causing undue stress and delay. Yet the manipulation was a two-way street. Guest workers were well aware of border guards’ soft spot for bribes and, accordingly, even packed extra “western” items, such as Marlboro cigarettes and Coca Cola bottles, solely for that purpose.9 Locals, too, sought to exploit the travelers. Cavit S., for example, was once accosted by a group of Bulgarian

8   “Karambolage,” DOMiD-Archiv, DV 0089.
9   Ibid.
children, who knocked on his car window demanding chocolate and cassette tapes. As he drove away, leaving them empty-handed, they shouted at him: “I hope your mother and father die!”

The situation did not entirely improve when guest workers finally arrived in their home country, crossing the Bulgarian-Turkish border at Kapıkule. The lines were long, and Turkish border guards — like those in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria — were not immune to the lust for bribes. In his 1979 novel about the Europastraße 5, the Turkish novelist Güney Dal painted a chaotic picture of the scene: “German marks, Turkish lira; papers that have to be filled out and signed ... exhaust fumes, dirt, loud yelling, police officers' whistling, chaos, motor noises ... pushing and shoving.” Overall, however, guest workers tended to recall the Kapıkule border fondly, as it marked the first time they set foot on Turkish ground in months or years. For one child of a guest worker, Kapıkule was a “gate of paradise,” where her family excitedly called out “Geldik!” (We’ve arrived!). Despite the joyful homecoming, however, many continued to view the road trip as a whole with disgust. In a 2016 interview, looking back decades later, one former guest worker insisted that he would never take the journey again — “even if someone offered me 10,000 Euros!”

Vacations to the home country were significant not only for the collective experience of traveling along the Europastraße 5, but also for their critical role in shaping the way the migrants were viewed by those in their home country. Indeed, the perception that guest workers had become Germanized Almancı had much to do with the cars and consumer goods that they brought on the E-5. These material goods, which helped guest workers manipulate bribe-thirsty Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and Turkish border guards, also imbued the guest workers with social cachet in their homeland. The relatively closed economy of 1960s and 1970s Turkey made foreign products hard to come by, and those in the homeland often marveled at the perceived quality of goods “Made in Germany” compared to the allegedly “inferior” products available in Turkey. The excitement at German goods was even more palpable in Turkish villages, many of which would not receive electricity and running water until the 1980s, making products like telephones, cameras, refrigerators, and dishwashers especially curious commodities.

By far the most significant consumer goods were the very same cars that guest workers drove across the Europastraße 5. During
the 1960s and 1970s, car ownership in Turkey was a privilege of the wealthy elite, and many villagers had never seen cars with their own eyes until a guest worker arrived on his vacation. When a guest worker rolled up in a German-made car, they became the target of awe, bewilderment, wonder, and envy. In the early 1960s, 20-year-old Necla even based her decision to marry her husband, Ünsal, on his light gray Mercedes-Benz. “That car had come to me like a fairy tale,” she remembered fondly decades later. “All I knew was that he was a wealthy man and that he was working in Germany. I just had to marry him.”¹⁷ As the frenzy about cars circulated in the Turkish media, films, and novels, those in the home country began to associate guest workers nearly synonymously with West German brands like Mercedes, BMW, Volkswagen, Audi, and Opel.

Cars were also important because they allowed guest workers to bring other consumer goods to Turkey, as items to place in the houses that they were building in anticipation of their eventual remigration or, most commonly, as souvenirs to give to their friends, neighbors, and family at home. Indeed, worried about being perceived as stingy, guest workers felt pressured to undertake extensive shopping sprees before their vacations — which they often could not afford — in order to make sure that every friend, neighbor, and relative received a gift from Germany.¹⁸ These items ranged from clothing, bed linens, toys, and electronics to larger items, such as furniture and household appliances. By the 1970s, the association of guest workers with loaded-up cars was so pervasive that West German firms sought to profit off it. The home improvement store OBI, for example, created a Turkish-language advertisement for a sale on rooftop luggage racks, depicting a woman in a headscarf yelling, “Run, run! Don’t miss the deals at OBI!”

Guest workers’ displays of wealth, however, also had negative consequences, driving a rift between the migrants and their homeland and serving as a catalyst for the development of the term Almancı. At the root of these tensions were fundamental disputes about how guest workers should be spending their D-Mark, whether for themselves or

¹⁷ Necla and Ünsal Ö., interviews by author, Şarköy, 2014 and 2016.
Figure 3. Turkish-language ethno-marketing flyer from the West German home improvement store OBI, advertising auto parts and rooftop luggage racks to vacationing guest workers. The woman, wearing a headscarf, shouts: “Run, run, don’t miss the deals at OBI!” DOMiD-Archiv, Köln, E 0634.0000. Used by permission.
for the good of the Turkish homeland. The Turkish government’s goal in sending workers abroad had always been economic. State planners hoped not only to stave off domestic unemployment by “exporting surplus labor,”¹⁹ but also that the workers would develop a new set of technical know-how that they would use to promote their country’s productive industries upon their return.²⁰ Even more crucial, however, were the guest workers’ remittances payments, one-time cash transfers of D-Mark to Turkey, which the government hoped to direct away from guest workers’ personal coffers and toward investment in productive sectors. In reality, however, those goals did not always materialize. “Most of the workers come back without money,” complained the local governor of Cappadocia, a rural province in Central Anatolia, in a 1971 letter to the West German Foreign Office: rather than bringing tools and equipment to promote “income-generating activity,” vacationing guest workers “just spend it on frivolous things, such as cars, television sets, etc., or even items that do not correspond to their current standard of living.”²¹

The governor’s concerns were not unfounded. A 1975 sociological study found that only 1.5% of returning guest workers in the Central Anatolian district of Boğazlıyan had brought back tools and equipment. By contrast, a remarkable 65% percent of had brought clothing, 62% cassette players, 28% furniture, 10% televisions, 10% cars or other vehicles, and 5% household appliances.²² In one of the study’s most egregious cases, which the researchers called “gaudy” and superfluous, a returning guest worker had spent his D-Mark on building a five-bedroom house, by far the biggest in his impoverished home village, and had filled it with “modern urban business furniture,” five or six clocks, a grand showcase displaying German-made cups and mugs, and, curiously, a single Christmas ornament hanging from the ceiling. Although electricity had yet to come to the village, he had also brought a number of larger appliances, such as a laundry machine, a tanning bed (intended to alleviate the symptoms of rheumatism), and a refrigerator. As he waited for electricity to arrive in the village, he apparently placed the refrigerator in his bedroom and used it as a storage cabinet for clothing.²³

This is not to say, however, that guest workers did not take pride in contributing to their homeland. Beginning in the 1960s, they banded together to create Turkish Workers Collectives (Türkische Arbeitnehmergesellschaften; İşçi Şirketleri; TANGs), grassroots joint-stock companies that invested in the creation of factories in their primarily


²³ Ibid., 388.
agrarian home regions. For the Turkish government, TANGs were a welcome boon. By 1980, the number of vested workers had skyrocketed to 236,171; TANGs were responsible for approximately 10% of investments in Turkey and were estimated to have created 10,000 new jobs, with an additional 20,000 jobs indirectly. Not only did TANGs help direct remittances toward productive sectors, but they also attracted money from the West German government, which financed TANGs as part of its broader strategy of giving “development aid” (Entwicklungshilfe) to struggling “Third World” economies during the Cold War. Despite guest workers’ efforts to invest in their homeland, however, the population at home continued to perceive them as selfish; while they saw all the cars and consumer goods, the investment money was less tangible.

Concerns about how guest workers spent their D-Mark heightened in the late 1970s, when the Turkish economy collapsed in the midst of the so-called “Third World debt crisis.” Although Turkey desperately needed guest workers’ remittances, they had decreased substantially in the previous several years, from $1.4 billion U.S. Dollars in 1974 to just $980 million from 1976 through 1978. In one of many news reports on the issue, a Milliyet columnist lambasted guest workers for their selfish refusal to contribute to the national economy in its time of need. The column provoked the ire of guest workers living abroad, who defended their spending habits. The Turkish government had spent their remittances “irresponsibly,” one insisted, while another blamed the untrustworthiness of Turkish banks, which “think of nothing other than grabbing the marks from the hands of the workers.” Most revealingly, one guest worker defended his “right” to do whatever he wanted with his D-Mark, regardless of Turkish priorities. “The workers here are slowly beginning to live like Germans,” he contended. “They do not want to live in old houses. Everyone wants to live in a civilized manner, not to work like a machine. Like people. As a result, our spending has increased. Isn’t that our right?”

Indeed, the assertion that he and his fellow guest workers had begun “to live like Germans” was precisely the heart of the tensions, as the idea of the Almancı had already crystallized. The guest workers’ initial departure from their home villages led only to more separation anxieties, which — despite their best efforts — could not be quelled from afar, through letters and postcards alone. Ironically, guest workers’ vacations, although intended to be the best mechanism for bridging the separation anxieties, actually ended up deepening...
the rift between migrants and their loved ones at home. The long and treacherous road trip on the Europastraße 5 not only imbued the otherwise pleasant thought of vacationing to the homeland with exorbitant time, effort, danger, and expense, but also forged a collective migrant experience of unsavory encounters in the Balkans to which Turks in the homeland could not relate. Once in their home country, vacationing guest workers became the targets of awe and envy, but not always with the most beneficial outcomes. The cars and consumer goods they transported on the Europastraße 5 changed the way they were viewed in the eyes of their countrymen at home: as nouveau-riche superfluous spenders who had adopted the allegedly German habit of conspicuous consumption and, in the process, had stabbed their homeland’s economic needs in the back.

II. Kicked out of two countries

Vacations were not the only way that guest workers maintained physical contact to their homeland. Many remigrated permanently, packing their bags, relinquishing their West German residence permits, and reintegrating into life in their homeland. By the 1973 recruitment moratorium, an estimated 500,000 of the 867,000 Turkish guest workers had returned to their home country as expected.  

Paradoxically, however, the recruitment moratorium had the unintended consequence of reducing guest workers’ willingness to remigrate and precipitating a vast increase in West Germany’s Turkish population. Fearing heightened restrictions on visas, Turkish workers in particular took advantage of West Germany’s lax policy of family reunification and arranged for the legal immigration of their spouses and children. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, as families established stable lives in West Germany and the struggling Turkish economy portended dismal job prospects in their home country, the remigration rate plummeted. Between 1975 and 1981, the number of Turkish remigrants nearly halved from 1975 to 1981, from around 148,000 to 70,000 people. As a 1982 West German government report concluded, the number of Turks who expressed a “latent” desire to return far exceeded the number of those who “actually” returned (tatsächlich Zurückkehrende).

As Turkish guest worker families increasingly became the targets of xenophobia — or “anti-foreigner sentiment” (Ausländerfeindlichkeit), as it was more euphemistically labeled — West German policymakers realized they needed to take action. In an October 1982 meeting, just

several weeks after taking office, Chancellor Helmut Kohl secretly confessed in British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher about his desire to “reduce the number of Turks in Germany by 50%.” While extreme, Kohl’s ambitions were generally in line with his party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which had been fighting with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) about curtailing immigration and promoting remigration for the past several years. Far from an easy task, Kohl and other West German policymakers grappled with a political and ethical dilemma: How, after perpetrating the Holocaust forty years prior, could they rid themselves of an unwanted minority population without enduring domestic and international scorn for contradicting their post-fascist values of liberalism, democracy, and human rights?

The solution, they determined, was to pay Turks to leave. On November 28, 1983, the West German government passed the controversial Law for the Promotion of Voluntary Return (Rückkehrförderungsgesetz), which offered money directly to unemployed former guest workers in the form of a so-called “return premium” (Rückkehrprämie), often more magnanimously termed “return assistance” (Rückkehrhilfe): a one-time cash transfer of 10,500 D-Mark, plus an additional 1,500 D-Mark per child. To receive the money, the worker’s entire family, including spouse and children, would need to exit West German borders by a strict deadline of September 30, 1984 — just ten months later. Once a guest worker had taken the money, he or she could return to the country only as a tourist. Even children who had been born in West Germany or had spent the majority of their lives there would require tourist visas to re-enter the country, which were increasingly hard to acquire given the harsh immigration restrictions at the time. Upon their departure, a border official at either a roadway crossing or an airport would stamp all the family members’ residence permits “invalid,” marking their official severance from a country that they had, in some cases for nearly two decades, called home.

Anticipating criticism, proponents of the Rückkehrförderungsgesetz portrayed it in a way that sought to reconcile the morally controversial policy with their post-Holocaust commitment to upholding the rights of minority populations. Although policymakers’ primary interest lay in reducing the Turkish population, they knew that they would endure both domestic and international scorn — certainly from the Turkish government — if the law singled out only Turkish citizens. In an October 1982 internal memorandum shortly after

Kohl’s election, tellingly entitled “Turkey Policy,” one bureaucrat acknowledged that targeting Turkish citizens exclusively would generate a public relations disaster. “It is strictly advisable not to present the foreigner policy and its basic components (immigration restriction, remigration promotion, and integration) as exclusively oriented toward the Turkish workers,” he wrote, “although we are internally conceptualizing this policy with regard to this group and its country of origin.”35 To combat the appearance of discriminating against Turks, the law thus offered the remigration premium to former guest workers from all non-European Economic Community countries. To further save face, officials repeatedly made it clear in the press that the law did not constitute a forced deportation. During parliamentary debates in 1983, for example, Federal Labor Minister Norbert Blüm assured critics that the key word in the law’s title was “voluntary” (freiwillig).36

Despite attempts to frame the law as magnanimous, it drew intense scorn from West German leftists, trade unions, and migrant advocacy organizations. Siegfried Bleicher, a board member of the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB), called it a “false,” “illusionary,” and socially irresponsible “political miscarriage.”37 One journalist referred to it as an “elegant kicking out,”38 while the metal-workers union IG Metall condemned it as a “continuation of the federal government’s kicking out policy.”39 In the words of Die Tageszeitung, under the guise of generosity, the West German government was offering unemployed foreigners little more than “pocket money for an uncertain future.”40

Many critics contended that the West German government actually stood to make money off the deal and was not paying the guest worker families sufficiently in comparison to the returns expected to flood into federal coffers. The notion of the government benefitting monetarily was captured in a 1983 Der Spiegel article entitled “Take Your Premium and Get Out,” which featured a photograph of a Turkish family loading their belongings into their van with the caption “Splendid deal for the Germans.”41 In the words of one guest worker, the law was “singularly and solely about saving the German state the social services to which these foreigners are legally entitled.”42 Such critiques were on point. Policymakers were well aware of the long-term savings that would result from the reduction of the Turkish population. As one bureaucrat put it optimistically, the remigration

premiums would be “cost-neutral in the mid-term (3-4 years) and then — because of the decline in entitlements — even yield saving effects.”

Criticism of West Germany’s rising anti-Turkish sentiment reverberated transnationally to the homeland. Keen to sensationalize, Turkish newspapers added another layer, drawing parallels between the treatment of Turks to that of Jews before the Holocaust. Günaydın printed a photograph of “Turks out!” (Türken raus!) graffiti next to the iconic image of a Nazi Stormtrooper holding the sign, “Germans, protect yourselves! Do not buy from Jews!”

The accompanying article threatened: “Those who want to relive the spirit of Nazism should know that we live in another time. We won’t remain passive.” The most egregious comparisons, however,
were between West German chancellors and Adolf Hitler, from which neither Kohl, nor his Social Democratic predecessor Helmut Schmidt, were spared. Headlined “From Hitler to Schmidt,” a 1981 article on the front page of Milliyet asserted that the debates in Bonn “do not surprise us,” given the Nazis’ “desire that all non-German races be crushed.” 46 The following year, the tabloid Bulvar printed a cartoon depicting Kohl with swastikas on his glasses. 47

News of guest worker families’ mistreatment alarmed the Turkish population at home. Several expressed their discontent by sending hate mail to the West German Ambassador to Turkey, Dirk Oncken, who had recently dismissed reports of xenophobia as “isolated cases” and downplayed West German culpability by asking rhetorically, “But in which countries do [such sentiments] not exist?” 48 The writers of the hate mail were not convinced. “We have begun to hate you,” one man wrote to Oncken. 49 It was “a shame,” another lamented, “that our longstanding friendship has come to an end, and that you have lost a real friend ... The Germans today are only foreign and even enemies for us.” 50 Another claimed that he had collected enough experiences from his friends and family members abroad to “write a novel.” 51 Drawing upon a Sonderweg argument, he insisted that xenophobia was embedded within “German culture” itself: “Because of his psychological master race (Herrenrasse) complex, every German between seven and seventy years old is a xenophobe (Ausländerfeind),” and not to be trusted. 52

The Turkish government, too, vehemently opposed the law. In a 1982 speech, General Kenan Evren, who had assumed control of the Turkish government after the 1980 military coup, invoked the language of human rights to condemn West Germany, portraying himself and his regime as the true custodian of Turks living abroad: “We are following with horror and dismay how the very same countries that previously called for cheap laborers in order to drive their own economic progress are now attempting to expel the country’s same workers in defiance of their human rights. Our government opposes this injustice with full force.” 53 The following year, Turkish Minister President Bülent Ulusu held a press conference in which he called the remigration law “unjust and to the disadvantage of our workers” and urged the West German government not to “resort to measures not supported by the Turkish government.” 54

Considering this evidence, one might assume that the Turkish government’s main reason for opposing the Rückkehrförderungsgesetz

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50 İlhan Düzgit to Dirk Oncken, Jul. 30, 1982, PAAA, B 85/1612.
52 Ibid.
was a humanitarian concern for the migrants’ well-being. This was largely true. Despite long-term criticism of the Almancı abroad, they remained Turkish citizens and countrymen, and it was understandable that the home country would rush to their defense. The Turkish government, however, also had a more important, and more sinister, motive for opposing the 1983 Rückkehrförderungsgesetz: for primarily economic reasons, they had absolutely no interest in the migrants’ return and, in fact, actively sought to prevent their remigration. While often overlooked in discussions of Turkish-German migration history, this was no secret. A 1983 Der Spiegel article, for example, articulated the argument clearly: “At first glance, the position of the Turkish government appears to stem from a humane concern for the fate of their countrymen in the FRG. However, tangible economic interests play a role, if not even the main role … A mass remigration from the FRG would plague the country.”

While Turkish policymakers did not necessarily view returning guest worker families as harshly as a “plague,” they did view them as an economic liability. As early as 1974, Turkish Ambassador Vahit Halefoglu had expressed “fears of a mass remigration” because the unemployment rate was expected to double by 1987, compounded by a simultaneous population growth from 37.5 to 55 million. By the 1980s, these fears had become more realistic. In a January 1983 meeting, Turkish state planners told West German Foreign Office officials that “there is very little need for non-self-employed qualified remigrants in the Turkish labor market.” Returning guest workers, they continued, “expect too high of a salary” and “return to such provinces where no need for their labor exists.” Overall, “There is a general fear here that the dam against remigration could break if one makes exceptions.”

Reflecting the ongoing tensions about how guest workers spent their D-Mark, a mass remigration also threatened to cut off the remittance payments that the Turkish government so desperately needed. This fear was made patent clear during a tense January 1983 meeting in the northwestern Turkish city of Bolu, where West German and Turkish officials met to discuss how guest workers’ savings could be used to finance the development of the Turkish economy. The Turkish newspaper Hürriyet reported a “duel of words,” culminating in Turkish Finance Minister Adnan Başer Kafaoğlu snapping, “Turkey needs the workers’ remittances for many years to come, and she will not pull back her workers.” Guest workers were well aware of these
concerns. A 1983 study revealed that a startling 90% believed that the Turkish government viewed them only as sources of remittances (*Devisenquellen*).60 “If you ask me,” opined one guest worker in a 1983 interview with *Milliyet*, “the first priority of politicians is to abandon our workers in Germany like a burdensome, barren herd. They view us as remittance machines.”61

Ultimately, the Turkish government’s vehement opposition to guest worker families’ remigration reflects the development of a new set of relations between the Turkish state and the migrants that I call “financial citizenship”: a conception of national belonging in which the Turkish state valued those living abroad not for their physical presence on Turkish soil, but rather for the economic advantages reaped precisely from their absence. As much as the Turkish government sought to portray itself as the champion its workers abroad, it was far more interested in their money than their return. Viewed in transnational perspective, the multifaceted debates over the 1983 Rückkehrförderungsgesetz left the migrants dually estranged, as both *Ausländer* and *Almancı*. As *Der Spiegel* put it succinctly in 1983: “The bitter truth is: the 1.6 million Turks in the Federal Republic of Germany are also unwanted in their homeland.”62

### III. Return and Reintegration

Although Kohl’s party touted the remigration law as a “full success,” his goal of reducing the Turkish population by half remained far from fulfilled.63 By late February 1984, only 4,200 out of 300,000 eligible guest workers had applied.64 Desperate to boost these low numbers, the federal government sweetened the deal in March, adding the opportunity to cash in on employee social security contributions as soon as they provided proof of remigration.65 Another factor was the ability to receive additional money from their employers, who jumped on the opportunity to get rid of Turkish workers by offering hefty severance packages in addition to the government premium.66 These added perks proved effective, and the overall result was a mass exodus. By the September 30, 1984 deadline, within just ten months, 15% of the Turkish immigrant population — 250,000 men, women, and children — packed their bags, left their jobs and schools, and moved back to Turkey, with their residence permits stamped invalid at the West German border. While some flew on airplanes, the vast majority crammed all their belongings into their cars and drove back to their homeland.

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63  For many examples of the CDU praising the “full success” of the remigration premium, see the party’s 1986 publication: *CDU-Dokumentation 32/1986*, 29, at http://www.kas.de/wu/doc/kas_26763-544-1-30.pdf?110826092553 (accessed Jan. 15, 2020): “The SPD had been talking about Rückkehrhilfen for years — we acted. The Law for the Promotion of Voluntary Return was a full success.”
drove — as they had done so many times before on their vacations — on the Europastraße 5 across Cold War Europe; for many, it would be the very last time.

Both somber and chaotic, the scene of departure was regularly portrayed in the West German media. Reports focused on Duisburg’s district of Hüttenheim, derogatorily called “Türkenheim” because every eleventh resident was Turkish.\textsuperscript{67} The leftwing magazine Stern, for example, published a ten-page article titled “The Expellees” (\textit{Die Heimatvertriebenen}), in a reference to the mass migration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe after the Second World War. Aiming to attract sympathy, the article featured melancholy photographs of goodbyes, captioned “Hugs, kisses, tears. Compassion for the old and young who are leaving Germany forever — and for those who are staying in the Turk-Ghetto (Türken-Ghetto). Will they also have to go soon?\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Die Zeit}, on the other hand, described a mad dash to leave with as many West German consumer goods as possible: “Almost daily the Duisburg department stores are delivering goods that will be taken to the homeland: washing machines, television sets, video recorders, and entire living room furniture sets.”\textsuperscript{69}

Figure 5. A guest worker family packs their car, preparing to permanently leave West Germany in accordance with the 1983 \textit{Rückkehrförderungsgesetz}. Overall, the controversial law prompted the mass remigration of 15\% of the Turkish immigrant population—250,000 men, women, and children—within just ten months. DOMiD-Archiv Köln, E 1053,0547. Used by permission.

Although the guest workers had hoped to return with great wealth, for many remigrants, the stereotype of the wealthy Almancı failed to materialize. Reports on remigrants’ financial difficulties abounded following the 1983 remigration law. One article, tellingly titled “The

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Almancıs,” relayed the situation of 42-year-old Muzaffer Kılıç, who had returned to Istanbul with his wife and daughter after spending eleven years working at a manufacturing company in Bremen. When he arrived in 1984 with the remigration premium, he opened a small shop selling natural gas for cooking and heating, which, on the surface, appeared profitable. Nonetheless, given Turkey’s high inflation rate, his Turkish lira were “worthless” — mere pfennigs in comparison to the D-Mark that he had been making in Germany. Within months, Kılıç was broke. “It would have been better if I had not given up my well-paid job in Germany,” he said. “Here I am a foreigner and on top of that still a poor man. I had not expected that.”

Some returning guest workers, moreover, failed to receive the Rückkerprämie to which they were entitled. A collection of 105 handwritten letters from returning guest workers to the local Labor Office in Braunschweig reveals widespread confusion and desperation. “I regret coming back,” one man admitted. Although he had rushed to the West German Consulate in Izmir to submit the required border crossing form affirming his departure, four months later he had received neither the 10,500 D-Mark remigration premium nor his social security contributions and was struggling to make ends meet. Another man checked all of his bank accounts but found no money in his name: “I went to Fakat Bank and even telephoned the bank in Ankara and the Merkez Bank in Istanbul. I called them one by one … Which bank was it sent to?” For another, the situation was more dire: “There are five of us here (my children and I), and we have run out of money.”73

While the letters to the Braunschweig Labor Office provide only a localized set of cases, the problem was more systemic. West German newspapers regularly reported about shady credit sharks who preyed on desperate remigrants, charging interest rates of up to 50%.74

By far the biggest difficulties reintegrating, however, were encountered by the second-generation children of guest workers, whom the West German government, press, and sociologists lumped together as archetypical “return children” (Rückkehrkinder). Since the rise in family migration of the 1970s, concerns about guest workers’ children — who were stereotyped as poorly parented and “illiterate in two languages” (Analphabeten in zwei Sprachen) — had stood at the center of integration debates and were a major factor motivating West Germany’s decision to send Turks home. Nevertheless, West German anxieties about the second generation’s insufficient integration belie that many children had, in fact, integrated enough

71 H. S. to Ergün Yelkenkaya, Nov. 1, 1984, DOMiD-Archiv, E 0987,36.
as to consider themselves caught between two cultures and even to self-identify as German. As one boy wrote in a 1980 poem, “I stand between two cultures / the Turkish and the German / I swing back and forth / and thus live in two worlds.”75 Another explained how the external definition of his identity led to his internal confusion. “Some say: ‘You are a German.’ Others say: ‘You are a German Turk.’ ... My Turkish friends call me a German! ... But what am I really?”76

Not only did children at least partially self-identify as German, but — even more so than their first-generation parents — they were also perceived as Germanized by those in the home country, frequently being called “Almancı children” (Almancı çocuklar) as early as the 1970s. In 1975, Turkish journalist Nevzat Üstün observed that although guest worker children appeared to live in better conditions than Anatolian children “from a distance,” their situation was actually more pitiable. “The only thing I know is that these children cannot learn their mother tongue, that they do not integrate into the society in which they are living, and that they are alienated and corrupted (yabancılaştıkları ve yozlaştıklarıdır) in every direction.”77 Invoking a similar language of estrangement, a 1976 Cumhuriyet article reporting general “News from Germany” warned the Turkish public of the “crisis” to come. “In Germany, Belgium, Holland, France, and Switzerland, we have abandoned hundreds of thousands of our young people,” who are “adrift and alone” (başıboş, kimsesiz).78 As the mass remigration loomed in the early 1980s, both the quantity and the foreboding tone of such reports intensified. In 1982, one article derided guest worker children as “a social time bomb,” and another described them as “cocky, rowdy, and un-Turkish.”79

The Turkish government, too, was deeply concerned about the mass return of Germanized children. In the summer of 1984, when the majority of guest worker families who had remigrated following the Rückkehrförderungsgesetz were scheduled to arrive in Turkey, the Turkish Education Ministry scrambled to implement “adaptation courses” (uyum kursları), intensive six-week summer programs that aimed to prepare remigrant children for Turkish public schools. The specialized textbook began with the lyrics of the Turkish independence march and featured nationalistic poetry, the speeches of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and centuries of Ottoman history. Cultural norms, too, were a focus. As Murad, who had taken an adaptation course, recalled, “They were teaching us not only the history of Turkey and rules in Turkey but also how you have to appear in Turkey.

75 Förderzentrum Jugend Schreibt, Täglich eine Reise von der Türkei nach Deutschland. Texte der zweiten türkischen Generation in der Bundesrepublik (Fischerhude, 1980), 18-19, 37, 53.
76 Ibid.
how you have to behave in Turkey, and that that is different than how you have to act in Germany,” he explained. Most vividly, he recalled being taught to “stand up and kiss the hand of elders” when entering their presence.80

While the adaptation courses themselves were short-lived and poorly attended, they received widespread media coverage, setting remigrant students up for difficult transitions into the 1984/1985 school year and beyond.81 Turkish newspapers fixated on the notion of “adaptation,” a parallel to German concerns about “integration.” In August 1984, a front-page, above-the-fold Cumhuriyet article featured the headline “They Grew Up in Another Society, Made their ‘Final’ Return, and Now... They Will Adapt to Us.”82 The same newspaper published a similar article the following week, announcing “Germany did not adapt to their parents. Or their parents did not adapt to the Germans ... Now they are to be adapted to us ... For now, ‘They’re not adapting at all.’”83 The latter article quoted young children about what had confused them about life in Turkey: why people honked their car horns so frequently, why the toys were so “bad” and broke so easily, why civil servants treated people so unkindly, why the television was so awful, why the Bay of Izmir was so polluted, why no one did their job properly, and why everyone gave commands without saying “please.” After each student’s quotation, the newspaper printed the word “I am confused” (şasırdım). The message was clear: the Germanized children were simply unfamiliar with life in Turkey and would be difficult to “reintegrate.”

Underlying the concepts of “adaptation” or “reintegration” was the notion that remigrant children could be re-educated into becoming “real Turks.” Equating having been raised abroad with a disease that only a proper Turkish education could cure, one school principal announced at a school assembly: “You are from a foreign land. I will make you healthy again.”84 Remigrant children had been well prepared for these ideas, as their parents had often cited their drifting away from Turkishness as a reason for their return. “In Germany, we were always warned: Be careful, when you’re in Turkey, they will make real Turks out of you,” one returning teenager explained, while another noted, “We came here to escape Germanization and to become real Turks.”85 These motivations are corroborated in studies of the time. In a 1985 survey of eighteen returning families in Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya, 62% of parents cited “problems of the children” as a main motivation for their return.86 A study published three years

83 “Gurbetçi Çocuklar Zor ‘Uyacaklar’ Çünkü... Şaşırdılar,” Cumhuriyet, Aug. 21, 1984, 1.
later attributed many families’ decisions to return to the “fear that children could too strongly Germanize.”

Another key theme in students’ recollections, as well as in both Turkish and West German media coverage of their experiences in Turkish public schools, was a “liberal” versus “authoritarian” binary. To understand this binary, one must recall that Turkey was still undergoing a fraught transition from military dictatorship to democracy following the 1980 coup. Emphasizing the perceived authoritarianism within Turkish schools fit squarely into existing Europe-wide criticisms of Turkey’s slow return to democracy. West German observers harped on the idea that those returning to Turkey, especially migrant youths, were feared by both civil servants and the military as “potential agitators” (potentielle Unruhestifter), who might influence other Turkish students by asking critical questions of the government. As one Turkish school principal explained, he held concerns that remigrant children would “shake up schools’ sacred framework of drilling and subordination” because West Germany’s “freer” education system had socialized them to express “criticism and dissent.”

Teachers whom the West German government had sent to Turkey to work in special schools for returning students likewise invoked the liberal/authoritarian binary. Before his departure for Turkey, one explained his preconceived notions of Turkish schools:

In Turkey, the teacher is an absolute authority and is always right. Teacher-centered teaching is almost exclusively practiced. The children have to stand up when they are called upon to respond. This is certainly an entirely different atmosphere than in German classrooms. I do not want to change my teaching style, but I also do not want to cause conflicts. I want to do everything to avoid provoking the Turkish side.

Another explained, “Even I became authoritarian at this school... It would have been impossible to accomplish anything without disciplinary measures ... This school system would never function if all were authoritarian and only one was liberal.”

Remigrant students used similar language to describe the differences between the two school systems. A teenage boy interviewed...
for a Turkish newspaper praised the more “democratic” environment that he had experienced in West Germany, where he was allowed to “contradict” the teachers. “Discussion is the foundation of democracy,” he insisted. “One cannot educate through orders. One must persuade.”  

Another boy called his experience at Turkish schools “a type of slavery” and complained that the Turkish education system was “not modern.” “If I want to have a modern education,” he quipped, “I have to go to Germany.” An 18-year-old at the private Ortadoğu Lisesi described his school days as psychological torment that was “brainwash[ing]” him into obedience: “All nerves are under pressure ... [T]o be able to survive here, one must not speak, not see anything, and of course not hear anything.”

Turkish teachers’ verbal and even physical abuse drew the most media attention and consternation. Halit, a 10-year-old boy whose family came from Fethiye on the Aegean coast, complained: “The teachers don’t know how to treat people...If you don’t pay attention to something, if you just fool around during the lesson, you’ll just get slapped a couple times.” In Germany, on the other hand, “the teachers would just glare at us and then we were all silent as fish.” Aye, a girl in the tenth class at Maltepe Lisesi, revealed that she was “still very afraid of the teachers,” who had often hit her. In another article, a Turkish teacher exposed the abuse of her own colleagues. A fellow teacher had publicly shamed a remigrant student as a “beast” for chewing gum during class. When the student responded by calling him a pig (Schwein) in German, which required translation by another remigrant, the teacher hit him and kicked him out of the classroom. Despite the teacher’s role in escalating the incident, the disciplinary committee allegedly blamed only the student.

Outside school, the children faced similar difficulties that, for West German observers, further reinforced stereotypes about Turkish culture as authoritarian and patriarchal. A 1985 Die Tageszeitung article reported that Turkish newspapers’ frequent criticism of the girls’ alleged sexual promiscuity had impacted their daily interactions with men in their home country. Men of all ages, the article stated, “hit on the remigrant girls in order to go to bed with them.” Migrant girls’ styles of dress also raised eyebrows within the local communities. In one of Turkish novelist Gülten Dayoğlu’s stories about remigrants, a girl from Germany becomes the target of local gossip. “Why are her pants so short and tight around her bottom? People would even be
embarrassed to wear that as underwear!” the neighbors complain. The gossip takes an emotional toll on her. “I am like a prisoner in the village,” the girl explains. “When I go outside, everyone looks at me. There is nowhere to go, no friends. I am going crazy trapped at home.”

By the late 1980s, the widespread media coverage of the archetypically alienated, depressed, and abused Rückkehrkinder had made a powerful impact. Sympathetic to the children’s plight, West German policymakers gradually began to reconsider their decision to send Turkish children home and, in 1990, implemented a radical policy change: permitting them to come back. In the late 1980s, a hotly debated “return option” (Wiederkehroption), supported by the SPD and the Green Party, gained traction at the state level in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Berlin. NRW Interior Minister Helmut Schnoor (SPD) attributed his decision to allow children over age fifteen to return to West Germany to “progressive” concerns grounded in “a Christian conception of humanity.” Remigrant children, he insisted, had “tragic fates” and they should be allowed to return if “Germany had become their actual homeland” (eigentliches Heimatland). The Kölnische Rundschau concurred: “The Federal Republic has a human responsibility toward these young people.”

Public opinion also began to shift in autumn 1988 with the realization that several politicians within the federal government’s CDU/FDP coalition had changed their stance. The most significant was Liselotte Funcke (FDP), the Federal Commissioner for the Integration of Foreign Workers and their Families. Despite having earned the nicknames “Mother Liselotte” and “Angel of the Turks” for the “tolerance and understanding” with which she treated guest worker families, Funcke had long towed the coalition line on the issue of a return option. In October 1988, however, she altered her stance, asserting that the state-level reforms should apply to the entire country, so that the opportunity to return would no longer depend on the state in which the child had grown up. To mitigate critics’ concerns, Funcke insisted that a federal return option would not lead to a “flood” (Überschwemmung) of foreign children into West German borders. As evidence, she cited a study concluding that, of the seventeen thousand eligible Turkish children, only four thousand would want to make use of such an offer.
After nine months of extensive attention to the issue at the state and federal levels, Kohl’s conservative government softened its stance. In late December 1988, the Federal Interior Ministry publicized its plans to implement the return option for remigrant youths who had spent the majority of their lives in West Germany. The new policy was codified in the July 1990 revision of the Foreigner Law (Ausländergesetz). In a section entitled “Right to Return” (Recht auf Wiederkehr), the revised law allowed young “foreigners” to receive residence permits if they had legally lived in West Germany for eight years prior to their departure and had attended a West German school for at least six of those years; if they could secure their livelihoods either through their own employment or through a third party who would assume responsibility for their livelihood for five years; and if they had applied for the residence permit between their sixteenth and twenty-second birthdays, or within five years of their departure.106

The 1990 revision to the Foreigner Law went much further, however. The inescapable realization that foreign children who grew up on West German soil were, in fact, members of the national community prompted a reevaluation of the country’s citizenship law altogether. In a section entitled “Facilitated Naturalization” (Erleichterte Einbürgerung), the law enacted two milestone changes. First, it permitted “young foreigners” between the ages of sixteen and twenty-three to naturalize under similar conditions as in the “right to return” provision: if they had continually lived in West Germany for the past eight years; and if they had attended school there for six years, four of which at a public school. Second, it granted all foreigners the right to naturalize, as long as they had lived in West Germany regularly for the past fifteen years, could prove that they could provide for themselves and their families without requiring social welfare, and applied for citizenship before December 31, 1995. In both cases, the applicant could not have been sentenced for a crime and had to relinquish their previous citizenship. Though the “right to return” and the “facilitated citizenship” clauses pertained to all foreigners, the primary targets were guest worker families.107

The long-fought battle for the “right to return” reflected years of West German political, scholarly, and media attention to the plight of allegedly Germanized children who had endured great hard-

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ships after returning to a homeland that was not their own. The struggles of the second generation thus lay precisely in their at least partially successful assimilation into German society—in their “Germanization,” as concerned Turkish parents and observers put it. Therein lies the paradox of West German attitudes toward children caught between two cultures. Within the boundaries of West Germany, migrant children seemed to be anything but German. In their home country, however, their ostracization as Almancı underscored precisely the opposite: they had integrated, even excessively so, and were no longer “real Turks.”

Conclusion

Implemented within just three months of the reunification of Germany, and carrying through to the new Federal Republic, the July 1990 revision to West Germany’s Foreigner Law marked a sea change in conceptions of German national belonging. Within just ten years, a total of 410,000 migrants of Turkish descent — approximately 20% of the population — applied for German citizenship, and they did so at much higher rates than other immigrant groups, constituting 44% of all naturalized immigrants in the year 2000.108 The 1990 reform also paved the way for the more radical overhaul of the German Nationality Act in 2000, whereby individuals born in Germany could acquire German citizenship regardless of heritage. In bringing about this vast transformation, the experiences and discourses of return migration following the 1983 Rückkehrförderungsgesetz had played a crucial role: guest worker families’ status as Almancı made Germans rethink whether, after decades of living in Germany, they could still really be considered Ausländer after all.

In charting this process of gradual estrangement, I hope to offer several contributions to German, Turkish, and European history.

First, my work illuminates the understudied dynamics of Turkish guest worker families’ relationship to their home country. In the 1960s, guest workers were viewed as Turkish citizens who were temporarily moving abroad to develop skills and participate in their country’s economic uplift. By the late 1970s, declining remittance payments — coupled with the realization that guest workers were spending their money on superfluous consumer goods rather than tools and equipment — made many believe that guest workers were not fulfilling their duties to the homeland and motivated the Turkish government to oppose their remigration. The final act of transgression — most evident following the mass remigration in the 1980s — was the decision to raise a “lost generation” of “Almancı children” in Germany, who dressed and acted like Western Europeans and could barely speak the Turkish language. Whether conceived in financial or cultural terms, being a Turk abroad meant being loyal to the Turkish nation, and the migrants had slowly drifted away.

Second, my article revises our understanding of German identity. Because guest worker families existed in a liminal, transnational, and transcultural space, various stakeholders were able to develop multiple, fluid understandings of who they were, where and to whom they belonged, who was responsible for them, and what kinds of threats they posed. From this fluidity emerged an opportunity for Germany identity to be defined not only by “native” Germans and not only by the migrants themselves, but also by Turks in the home country, who lived two thousand miles away, had never even set foot in Germany, and in many cases were poor villagers. The Turkish conception of German identity, moreover, was highly radical. The term Almancı itself, which defined Germanness as a matter of cultural adaptation, contradicted the very foundation of German identity, which from the nineteenth century onward had been defined rigidly and homogenously, by German blood and German ethnicity—so much so that, only several decades prior, it had become the driving ideology behind Nazi genocide.

Third, my research questions West Germany’s political identity. By examining the controversies surrounding the 1983 Rückkehrförderungsgesetz, I show that West German policymakers’ best efforts to avoid domestic and international criticism for attempting to kick out the Turks failed miserably. Just as they determined the boundaries of German identity from afar, it was the Turkish government, population, and press who were the most vocal in exposing the hypocrisy
of West Germany’s postwar project of liberalism, democracy, and human rights: despite de-Nazification, discrimination and racism persisted well after 1945. Although often hyperbolic, Turkish accusations of direct parallels to Nazi Germany hit West Germany where it hurt. Paradoxically, these accusations were coming not only from Turkish citizens but also from the Turkish government, which had not yet transitioned to democracy following a military coup and which itself was under intense European scrutiny for violating human rights at home.

Finally, my work calls for us to challenge the categories we use when writing German history. The idea that a migrant might become German through cultural adaptation forces us to consider whom we count as German in a migratory postwar period. If we reformulate our impression of migrants as German actors—or at least historical subjects with a valid claim to having their stories told in the context of modern German history—then we must also broaden the lens of our investigations to include geographic spaces that they deem integral to their experiences and processes of identity formation. The story I have told follows the migrants along a journey that takes us from Turkey, to West Germany, across Cold War Europe, and back. Considering immigrants as German actors encourages us to adopt a more expansive philosophy of German history as a whole—one that is deeply rooted in the nation-state and domestic developments but acknowledges its limitations and strives to move beyond it, to consider Germany more broadly, in its regional, international, and transnational contexts.

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FREE CHINESE MIGRANTS IN THE AMERICAS IN THE MODERN AGE: DYNAMICS OF EXCLUSION AND XENOPHOBIA

Albert Manke
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Introduction

The current spread of the coronavirus epidemic serves as a reminder that xenophobia and racism continue to be relevant and worrying phenomena in many parts of our globalizing world. This often manifests itself in hostility toward “undesirable” immigrants, which occurs at the intersection of class, ethnicity, gender, age, and other markers and ascriptions. The public discourse of populists and “concerned citizens” (besorgte Bürger, as sympathizers of right-wing populism and even extremism are now calling themselves in Germany) tends to justify this aversion by claiming that the migrants themselves are to be held responsible for this aversion and not those who are aggressive toward and reject them. Prejudices based on supposed differences or cultural, ethnic or religious inferiority serve as a breeding ground for dynamics of discrimination and exclusion that not only infringe upon the human rights of immigrants, they are also harmful for the receiving societies and their economies. Repressive policies of “zero tolerance” or a “heavy hand” toward immigrants inevitably result in the criminalization of immigrants that foments the increase of xenophobia and racism.

During the Cold War, developed countries saw a decrease in racist and xenophobic policies and practices, both within the societies as well as in the design of migration regimes. However, since the 1990s there has been a new rise in racist and xenophobic attitudes that are now coupled with populist policies of the right and far-right. These tendencies have a direct impact on the formulation of exclusionary migration policies and the revival and deepening of the pre-existing structures of xenophobic discrimination.

The recent rise of xenophobia, racism, and populism causes much concern, yet the cycle of discrimination against migrants is intertwined with the social question and the decline of living conditions in their countries of origin caused by economic hardship, violence, and climate change in a globalized world.¹ A number of ideas have

emerged to counteract this disturbing situation and stop the cycle of xenophobic hatred, such as a global network to establish an operative framework that helps formulate policies against xenophobia in the development of migration policies.\(^2\)

While there are intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations today that have the power to raise awareness about these problems (with a special focus on refugees) and exert a certain amount of pressure on governments that do not uphold their promises in this regard, no such mechanisms existed in the nineteenth century. The maltreatment of immigrants posed more of a bilateral problem between nation states and only received attention when incidents greatly affected international relations and commercial interests. However, as Adam McKeown has shown for this time period, the implementation of policies that regulated populations and thereby excluded migrants had implications on a global scale, particularly with regard to the development of border regimes. In his conclusion he emphasizes the continuities of the discourse surrounding immigration, inclusion, and exclusion from the nineteenth century to today: “A sense of crisis pervades public discussions of migration, both now and for the past two centuries. [...] From the perspective of two hundred years, however, the arguments about migration are numbingly familiar.”\(^3\) The openly racist migration policies of the current governments of the USA, Brazil, and various European countries confirm these tendencies. One can draw a diachronic comparison between discrimination against immigrants today and nearly 200 years ago. It is therefore pertinent that this article revisit the earliest efforts to control voluntary migration to the Americas and identify the dynamics of immigrant exclusion.

Since they were the first group affected, this article will discuss migration policies directed towards the Chinese to reveal the cycles of exclusion and xenophobia in the Americas and subsequently explain some of their coping strategies. More specifically, I will describe several acts of resistance and empowerment that formed the structures of resilience these groups had to develop in the face of exclusion. This provides a link to current studies on migration, racism, and exclusion in the Americas and elsewhere. The first section of this article will provide an overview of free migration to the United States against the background of free and forced migration of Asians to the Americas. By analyzing the initial decades of Chinese migration to the United States, it will become clearer that discrimination and exclusion


against them began well before the start of the “official” era of exclusion in 1882. Anti-Chinese policies on a local and state level, which would eventually become federal policies after the Reconstruction Era, ultimately shaped this pre-exclusion phase. The second section will take a deeper look at processes of entanglement and transregional policy dissemination in the United States and Latin America. In showing that both local action and transnational networks have played a role in the dynamics of resistance, the second section of this article adopts a truly inter-American focus on processes of exclusion and, to a lesser extent, of resistance by highlighting the challenges that the Chinese communities have faced in the Americas. The era of exclusion ended in the Americas around World War II. In the United States, this period officially lasted until 1943, but the standards of controlling immigrants against the background of a racist paradigm remained an official policy until the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.

I. Chinese migration to the Americas in the modern age

Both forced and free migration of Asians to the Americas significantly increased in the mid-nineteenth century. While the Age of Revolution heralded the end of European colonialism in the Americas, this did not signify the end of imperialism. Indeed, a wave of European imperialism that was in many ways more intense would leave its mark on the world between the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.4

Forced migration to the Americas was marked by the continuation of the transatlantic African slave trade during the “Second Slavery”5 as well as by the semi-forced migration of Asian indentured laborers in Latin America and the Caribbean, the so-called “coolie trade.” While the coolie trade has been interpreted as an intermediate step toward voluntary labor by some, I consider it a form of exploitation resembling slavery.6 The coolie trade was a multi-national business that moved people from India and China to meet the demand for cheap and regulated labor in the Americas, Southeast Asia, Australia, and South Africa. In the case of the Chinese, competition between European countries for control over access to labor that could be dominated by forced exploitation resulted in the coolie trade.7

Through the Opium Wars against China, the British reached a privileged position in this rivalry by gaining control over Hong Kong, which they occupied in 1841 and forced China to cede in 1843 in the

6 Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks: Chinese Indentured Laborers and African Slaves in Cuba (Philadelphia, 2008), 1-5. Yun critically discusses the concept of “transition” from indentured work (slave labor) to free labor in various dimensions and warns that the application of this concept reduces the Asian workers to intermediate objects instead of subjects; Manuela Boatcă, “Coloniality of Labor in the Global Periphery: Latin America and Eastern Europe in the World-System,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 36, nos. 3–4 (2013): 287. Boatcă even goes as far as to say that we are “asking the wrong question” if the discussion remains limited to binary interpretations.
7 Yun, The Coolie Speaks, 13.
Treaty of Nanking. The first Opium War ushered in the opening of a new and powerful transoceanic transportation route (initially between China, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic) across the Pacific. This development would shape both forced and free migration of Asians to the Americas for the remainder of the century. During the years of the “Yellow Trade” (1847–1874), approximately one and a half million people (almost exclusively men) were recruited as coolie laborers in the Southern Chinese province of Guangdong, often through trickery or debt. The coolie trade formed a part of the changing extractivist system in the nineteenth century in which the relevance of the distinction between “free” and “forced” workers became blurred.

1. Asian immigration as part of the free migration to the Americas

Studies on global migrations today are in agreement with McKeown’s suggestion that between the 1840s and 1940s, migrations reached an especially high level: an estimated total of 149 to 161 million people migrated during this period, and of these, between 55 and 58 million arrived in the Americas coming from Europe. If the period of the Second Slavery is added to these calculations, between 1826 and 1940, around two million African slaves and around 2.5 million people from Asia arrived in the Americas. Of the 2.5 million Asians that migrated across the Pacific and via the Indian and Atlantic oceans, around 1.5 million Chinese arrived mainly in the United States, Cuba, Peru, Mexico, Canada, Hawaii, and Chile; some 600,000 Japanese arrived in Brazil, Hawaii, the United States, Canada, and Peru; and between 400,000 and 500,000 people from India and China arrived in the British, Dutch, and French colonies in the Caribbean. There was a smaller number of Koreans, Filipinos, and other Asian and Pacific Islander groups who immigrated especially to Hawaii and the United States. Some 30% of all Asian migrants during this period arrived as semi-slaved workers or coolies, so we can assume that approximately 1.75 million Asians migrated freely (or with contracts that were less abusive in relative terms) to the Americas.

Although these numbers represent an approximation, we can safely say that the large free migratory movement to the Americas in the Modern Age before World War II was primarily the movement of free “white” Europeans, not the one of “non-white” people. The free immigration of Africans was almost entirely prohibited, and free migration of Asians (which was less than three percent) was quickly restricted by mechanisms of control and exclusion that (even in view of the quota system introduced in 1924) did not apply to Europeans. It is commonly recognized that the Industrial Revolution brought about the technological innovations that facilitated the rise in long-distance transport to which Lucassen and Lucassen attribute the great increase in the number of migrants after 1850.13 However, it can be deduced from the numbers mentioned here that with regard to migration to the Americas, this increase primarily favored the mass transport of free European migrants. By analyzing the example of the United States, the following chapter will show that as soon as non-Europeans and especially “non-whites” sought to immigrate to the Americas voluntarily in larger numbers, they faced rejection, discrimination, and ultimately exclusion.

2. Free migration of Chinese to the United States

In 1848 the war between the United States and Mexico ended, and Mexico lost more than half of its territory to its Northern neighbor. Just days before the armistice, gold was discovered in Northern California, but this fact only became public after the annexation, triggering the famous California Gold Rush, which attracted thousands of prospectors from all over the globe, including China.14 Between 1848 and 1852, the non-indigenous population of California grew more than 16-fold, bringing the population count in the 1852 state census to more than 250,000 people.15 Trade between Hong Kong and San Francisco connected the transpacific with the global trade for the first time since the decline of the Manila Galleon in 1815. Therefore, the California Gold Rush can be interpreted as the beginning of the second Pacific century, including a spike in immigration that was, again, triggered by a precious metal, as historian Elizabeth Sinn states: “[…] the first Pacific century was the century of Spanish supremacy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries based on American silver, and the second Pacific century was brought on by California gold.”16 Cantonese migrants, incentivized by American and British agents and consuls, left China with hopes of a better life, possibly through

14 Sinn, Pacific Crossing, 1.
16 Sinn, Pacific Crossing, 321.
seeking their fortune in the “Gold Mountain.” They were part of a whole diaspora of Chinese laborers (both coolies and free migrants) that Look Lai describes as the “global movement of Chinese unskilled manual labor (huagong) in this period,” distinguishing it from “the centuries-old movement of traders (huashang), artisans, and skilled workers who migrated mainly to Southeast Asia.” Nevertheless, an important difference existed between those who migrated within the semi-slave system of coolie trade and free migrants, the latter using the credit-ticket system. In China, the name for Chinese who emigrated was huaqiao in Mandarin (Chinese citizen living abroad), or haiwai huaqiao (Overseas Chinese).

Kuhn explains that in Mandarin the concept of migrant itself does not indicate the direction of migration or its permanence, so it does not specifically refer to emigrants, immigrants, or remigrants. He argues that this may be an indication that up until that time, the majority of Chinese migrants did not intend to settle permanently outside of their country, but rather to temporarily move abroad for work and later return to their communities. Kuhn bases this argument on the numbers provided by Sugihara Kaoru, who, for the ports of Xiamen, Shantou, and Hong Kong, calculated some 14.7 million emigrants from China between 1869 and 1939, and some 11.6 million people who returned in nearly the same time period (1873–1939). The characteristics of the mobility schemes of Chinese abroad did not seem to be permanence and separation, but the multiplicity of the forms and frequency of migration and the connection between communities. Even for those who permanently settled elsewhere, the transnational connections remained a factor of fundamental importance. This perspective is especially useful in the analysis of the interconnectedness of the Chinese diaspora in the Americas since it focuses on the networks, connections, and new hybrid identities that result from migration and the processes of transculturation — quite different from the rather inappropriate term “integration,” which in turn is based on the outdated concept of “assimilation.”

Between 1852 and 1876, some 214,000 Chinese arrived in San Francisco while some 90,000 returned to Hong Kong during the same period. This leaves a balance of some 124,000 who appear to have stayed in the United States until that year. Robert S. Chang speaks of some 300,000 who arrived between 1852 and 1882, and of some 200,000 who returned to China. These numbers approximately correspond with the number of 105,465 people of...
Chinese origin (100,686 men and 4,779 women) who, according to the 1880 census, lived in the United States that year. Among a population of around a total of 50.3 million people, the Chinese population constituted about .2% of it. However, the fact that they only represented a very small demographic group among the total number of immigrants in the United States did not protect them from racist attacks.

3. The first phase of discrimination against Chinese immigrants (1848–c. 1865)

Even before the era of formal exclusion began in 1882, there were already many different forms of discrimination against the Chinese. Since the late 1840s, Chinese immigrants had settled in various parts along the Pacific Coast and in the Western United States. Until 1882, migration to the United States was not restricted on a federal level, but according to the Naturalization Law of 1790, access to citizenship was limited to immigrants who were free “white” people of good character. This reflected the parameters with which the majority of Americans of European descent excluded the indigenous population and those of African descent.

With the annexation of California by the United States, the “multi-racial population” that had lived there throughout colonial rule also suffered the consequences of the application of the 1790 law and other laws that racialized the American society. The annexation of Mexican California and subsequent massive immigration delivered a fatal blow not only to Native Americans but also to the African Americans living there. This “Americanization” was the result of large-scale immigration of “whites” from other parts of the United States and from Central and Northern Europe. While in 1850 Mexicans still made up the largest group of immigrants, in the following years European immigrants quickly caught up, followed by Chinese immigrants. Of the 146,528 immigrants who lived in California in 1860, 45.75% were Irish, German, and British, compared to 23.8% (34,935) Chinese and 6.24% Mexican. The indigenous peoples living in California in 1850 were quickly outnumbered and marginalized by the population boom of non-indigenous settlers. It is estimated that while in 1850 some 100,000 Native Americans lived in California, only about a fifth of the population was left in 1870. With the annexation of California, its “rapid transformation [...] into a white masculinist preserve for European-American men found popular
support in racializing ideologies," which were also widespread in Europe and among the elites in Latin America.\textsuperscript{34}

Initially, these racial classifications still did not formally apply to Chinese immigrants on a federal level. It was not until 1870, after the passage of the Naturalization Act, that “Chinese difference” was formally reclassified "as a 'race'."\textsuperscript{35} Towards the end of the 1870s, discrimination against the Chinese came to a head, and in 1882 the federal government passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, defining Chinese as “aliens ineligible for citizenship.”\textsuperscript{36} Even before the coordinated campaigns against the Chinese, there were incidents of discrimination and violence against them, particularly in California. It is commonly understood that during this period of U.S.-American history, one of the “darkest aspects [...] is the way that certain ethnic groups were treated by the predominately white majority.”\textsuperscript{37} Before the Civil War, economic development was largely dependent on the exploitation of enslaved Africans and the expulsion and extermination of the indigenous population in the name of developing the vast territory that had been acquired through continental expansion. According to Kanazawa, Chinese immigrants represented “a third example of how ethnic minorities were mistreated during this period,”\textsuperscript{38} although they had immigrated voluntarily.\textsuperscript{39}

Gold extraction provides us with a clear example of what this meant at the intersection of mobility and “race.” Gold prospectors competed fiercely for access to the best claims, and Mexicans and Chinese immigrants were the ones most affected by threats from other miners.\textsuperscript{40} Incidents of armed miners driving out foreign miners — individually or in groups — occurred frequently, starting in 1849.\textsuperscript{41} From the 1850s onwards, the state of California introduced legislative action that mostly affected Chinese Californians.\textsuperscript{42} Taxation frequently became an instrument to target Chinese immigrants, like the 1854 amendment to the tax law, which stipulated that the tax was exclusively applicable to Chinese miners.\textsuperscript{43}

In 1852, Governor John Bigler, with his “white” miner constituency in mind, lobbied for the exclusion of Chinese in California, and the Democratic Party officially approved the first anti-Chinese resolution during its convention in Benicia.\textsuperscript{44} The Chinese immigrants who protested this and other measures were represented by the associations of Cantonese merchants in San Francisco.\textsuperscript{45} One of these defenses was led by Norman Asing, also known as Sang Yuen. Born in the Pearl River Delta, he had traveled from Macau to Europe and eventually to

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 32.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Kanazawa, “Immigration, Exclusion, and Taxation,” 779.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Kanazawa, “Immigration, Exclusion, and Taxation,” 782.
\textsuperscript{41} Hsiang-shui Chen, Chinatown No More: Taiwan Immigrants in Contemporary New York (Ithaca, 1992), 4; Him Mark Lai, Becoming Chinese American: A History of Communities and Institutions (Walnut Creek, 2004), 88.
\textsuperscript{42} Kanazawa, “Immigration, Exclusion, and Taxation,” 784-786.
\textsuperscript{44} Chen, Chinatown No More, 4.
\textsuperscript{45} Him Mark Lai, Becoming Chinese American, 88.
New York. Traveling through other parts of the United States at the beginning of the 1820s, he had settled in San Francisco, where he opened a restaurant. He was one of the founders of the Yeong district association and a known representative of the Chinese community. On April 25, 1852, the popular newspaper *Daily Alta California* published Asing’s response to Bigler’s policies. Argumentatively eloquent and clear, Asing refuted each of the governor’s arguments:

You are deeply convinced, you say, ‘that to enhance the prosperity and preserve the tranquility of this State, Asiatic immigration must be checked.’ This, your Excellency, is but one step towards a retrograde movement of the government [...].  

Referring to the essence of the foundation of the United States — immigration — he reminded Bigler of his own immigrant background: “[...] immigration made you what you are — and your nation what it is. [...] I am sure your Excellency cannot, if you would, prevent your being called the descendant of an immigrant [...].” Asing even argued that, obvious physiognomic differences aside, one cannot establish a hierarchy or inequality between the human “races.”

The protests by Asing and other members of the Chinese community were temporarily successful, especially due to the state’s dire economic situation. The taxes paid by the Chinese community were vital to the operation and development of California in those early years while the state government’s expenses for public services offered to them, such as education and health care, were negligible. Even so, both local and state level legislation continued to exclude the Chinese. In 1854, the Chinese community experienced a major setback with the Supreme Court of California’s decision that no Chinese person could serve as witness in a trial against a “white” person (*People v. Hall*). While Chinese had previously not been formally excluded from American society, the Supreme Court of California now assigned them the same status as the indigenous population and African Americans.  


47 Asing, “To His Excellency Governor Bigler,” 10.  

48 Ibid., 11.  


51 Amanda Carlin, “The Courtroom as White Space: Racial Performance as Noncredibility,” *UCLA Law Review* 63, no. 2 (2016): 449–484. Carlin argues that *People v. Hall* in 1854 started the tradition of devaluing the testimonies of “non-white” people in all or almost all “white” tribunals and still persists today, just as the creation of “whiteness,” which manifests itself in this case: “Through cases like Hall, whiteness was characterized as an exclusive category” (457). Carlin uses this case to illustrate the sad long tradition of racist exclusion that contributed to the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the 2013 Trayvon Martin murder case. She attributes his acquittal to the devaluation of the testimony of the key witness, Rachel Jeantel, who is of Haitian and Dominican descent.
In 1855, the state of California officially started to limit Chinese immigration by passing the “Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons who cannot become Citizens thereof.” Both at the state and local level, many European Americans in California sought to significantly reduce Chinese immigration and even displace and exclude Chinese immigrants. In many cases, Chinese people were assaulted, swindled, and killed while the perpetrators often went unpunished. The federal Law of Naturalization of 1790, which reserved the privilege of citizenship for “free white men,” was interpreted in a manner that did not include Chinese people, thereby creating a legal framework to reflect the supposed superiority of the “white race.” Fifteen years before the federal law categorized them as “non-white,” the Chinese community had thus already been designated as an outsider “race” and denied access to citizenship in the state of California.

4. Building the Transcontinental Railroad and a time of hope during the Reconstruction Era

We have seen that until the Civil War, there were powerful and variable dynamics of exclusion of the Chinese that were mostly limited to California and the surrounding regions as well as more or less successful processes of negotiating belonging of Chinese immigrants in American society as a whole. During this initial period of exclusion, attempts to exclude the Chinese were limited to the local and state level, while in the second period (the “official” era of exclusion), these measures extended to a national level for various reasons. Meanwhile there was a period of hope that approximately coincided with the Reconstruction Era (1865–1877).

The demand for Chinese labor during the heyday of the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad ushered in a new, unexpected change in attitude among even the most racist and stubborn politicians in California. In the West, the owners of the Central Pacific Railroad (the Big Four: Leland Stanford, Charles Crocker, Collis Potter Huntington, and Mark Hopkins) expected to reap enormous profits from a project of great importance for the Union and the country’s overall development. Construction began in 1864, but its progress left much to be desired, especially in the dangerous and inhospitable region of the Sierra Nevada in California. Crocker tried to convince Stanford of the value of Chinese workers, arguing that “[...] the race that built the Great Wall of China could certainly be useful in building a railroad [...]”. The scarcity of controllable manpower after the end of the Civil War, which
was also the result of the liberation of African slaves, finally convinced those who had previously maintained an openly racist and exclusionary attitude toward the Chinese.

Only months after President Lincoln declared the abolition of slavery in 1865, Stanford, who had railed against Chinese migration on the basis of a supposed “racial inferiority” during his term as governor (1862–1863), completely changed his tune. In a report to Lincoln’s successor, President Andrew Johnson, Stanford now praised those whom he had called the “dregs” in his inaugural address as governor only three years earlier. Many European American workers were unwilling to perform such hard labor for comparatively little pay. Meanwhile, the more than 15,000 Chinese laborers not only built the most difficult and dangerous section of the train tracks, but they did so in record time, maximizing the productivity and speed of the work on the last stretch. In just one day, April 28, 1869, Chinese laborers built a total of ten miles of railroad tracks and beat the record set by their Irish (and other European American) contemporaries in the eastern part of the country for the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Yet when Stanford drove the last spike (made of pure gold) into the railroad tracks at the Promontory Summit ceremony in Utah on May 10, 1869, not even one of the Chinese workers present at the occasion appeared in the official photograph of the “Golden Spike” ceremony.

The picture, which does not include African Americans, Native Americans or women either, sends the message that the Union and the country’s progress were the achievements of “free white labor” by “free white men.” The omission of Chinese laborers could be interpreted as a harbinger of what was to come once they had

56 Kraus, “Chinese Laborers,” 45.
57 Ibid., 47.
successfully completed the arduous job of contributing so significantly to a project that connected the Pacific Coast region to the rest of the country.

Racist attitudes or discourse never completely disappeared. People continued to propagate apocalyptic visions of the future of the “white race” at the hands of Chinese and Irish immigration, as exemplified in this caricature published around the same time in San Francisco.

The image depicts an Irish and a Chinese man, representatives of the respective immigrant groups, devouring Uncle Sam. They stand on top of a South-centered map of the United States that stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, while details such as railroad tracks symbolize the progress of the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad. This xenophobic image typifies and reinforces the negative prejudices the “white” California public held towards “non-white” people. Finally, the Chinese immigrant is shown devouring the Irish immigrant, illustrating the fear of extinction of all “white” Americans if the country kept its doors open to Asian immigration.

Despite these persistent racist attitudes, the second half of the 1860s represented an exceptional phase of temporarily relaxed tensions during which coexistence between people of Asian and European descent seemed possible. The extraordinary rapprochement between the United States government and that of the Empire of China encouraged these sentiments. The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 was the result of the first diplomatic visit by the Qing government to the United States. Substantially modifying the Treaty of Tianjin of 1858, it became the first treaty to respect the rights of both parties as equals since the series of humiliating treaties between China and European powers which resulted from the Opium Wars.\footnote{John Schrecker “For the Equality of Men — For the Equality of Nations: Anson Burlingame and China’s First Embassy to the United States, 1868,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 17, no. 1 (2010): 9.} This was a big step in the direction of mutual respect between both countries, including the immigrants and permanent residents of each nation residing in the other. Although the treaty did not explicitly regulate naturalization within the country of destination, article 5 maintains the right to free
and voluntary migration between both nations while banning forced migration, clearly alluding to the coolie trade that was still practiced to supply the British and Spanish colonies and countries such as Peru with a semi-enslaved work force.\footnote{“Burlingame Treaty 1868,” concluded in Washington, July 28, 1868, Library of Congress, Rare Book and Special Collections Division, Printed Ephemera Collection, Portfolio 236, Folder 24. https://www.loc.gov/item/rbpe.23602400} It permitted people to move between both countries for almost any reason, “[…] for the purpose of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents.”\footnote{“Burlingame Treaty 1868,” concluded in Washington, July 28, 1868, Library of Congress, Rare Book and Special Collections Division, Printed Ephemera Collection, Portfolio 236, Folder 24. https://www.loc.gov/item/rbpe.23602400} Furthermore, article 6 granted both Chinese travelers and residents in the United States the same protection that Americans had in China.

5. The 1870s: a time of change

As there simply were not enough laborers available in California to build the Transcontinental Railroad, thousands of workers had been directly recruited in China. When construction was completed in 1869, some were able to work on new railroad projects, for which they were transferred to states to the east of the Mississippi River\footnote{Mak Lau-Fong and Him Mark Lai, “Occupational Structures of Chinese Immigrants in Early Malaya and North America,” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 20, no. 1 (1992), 46.} and to the South, where the labor force was dwindling due to the emancipation of formerly enslaved Africans. But the vast majority of the Chinese remained unemployed. Along with the recession in those years, which left many European Americans without work, racist and xenophobic resentment against Asians began to grow once again.

In California, the Chinese population was mostly concentrated in San Francisco, and the 12,000 Chinese who lived there in 1870 represented approximately a quarter of the entire Chinese population in California. This was due to the decline in employment opportunities in the railroad and mining sectors and to the rapid growth of the city as a commercial and manufacturing hub.\footnote{McClain, In Search of Equality, 43.} The anti-Chinese movement contributed significantly to hindering Chinese people’s access to the labor market.\footnote{L. Eve Armentrout Ma, “Chinatown Organizations and the Anti-Chinese Movement, 1882–1914,” in Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882–1943, ed. Sucheng Chan, (Philadelphia, 1991), 155.} This resulted in growing tensions within the Chinese community that sparked internal conflicts referred to as “tong wars.” Moreover, the increased presence of young, unemployed Chinese workers contributed to the growing scarcity of living space and to a decline in sanitary conditions, while illegal gambling, opium consumption, and prostitution increased. The authorities, far from being willing to grant them more access to public health, education, or the labor market, watched as the situation in Chinatown deteriorated. A report following the inspection of Chinatown that was ordered by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in 1885 described the state of the quarter as “filthy in the extreme,” and ascribed responsibility for this situation to “the Mongolian race.”\footnote{“Report of Special Committee on the Condition of the Chinese Quarter, and the Chinese in San Francisco” 1885, 165.}
In June of 1870, the same arguments that were to prompt this type of inspection by the Board of Supervisors had validated the anti-Chinese movement, whose adherents were trying to find a way to banish the Chinese to areas outside the city limits by means of a petition submitted by Thomas Mooney and Hugh Murray, the president and vice president of the Anti-Coolie Association. Open hate speech was followed by calls to pass legislation to halt Chinese immigration at both the local and federal level. Many laborers were actively demanding the exclusion of Chinese from the country, and one of the main forces behind their constant harassment and persecution was the Workingmen’s Party of California, founded by the Irish immigrant Dennis Kearney in 1877. With the slogan “The Chinese Must Go!” they loudly advocated for the exclusion of Chinese from California, particularly the workers. In November of 1878, one-third of the assemblymen who participated in the state’s constitutional assembly in Sacramento were delegates of this radical party. They came to play an important role in the design and subsequent adoption of new articles in the revised state constitution that replaced the 1849 version. Approved in 1879 and taking effect in 1880, it was the most discriminatory constitution against Chinese in the entire nation. Article XIX of this constitution would serve as the basis to halt Chinese immigration to the state starting in 1880. Furthermore, that same year, the Treaty of Burlingame was annulled, which can be interpreted as a prelude to the coming era of exclusion.

II. Inter-American entanglements: spreading xenophobia?

A comparison of the policies that affected the Chinese communities in the United States, in several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean during the era of exclusion will aid in identifying the dynamics and degrees of exclusion and inclusion these groups experienced. The purpose of a comparative approach is to gain a better perspective on the transnational entanglements that characterized these dynamics and the actors involved. A key question is to which extent these processes can be interpreted as the spreading of xenophobia or if it might be more accurate to perceive them as local, independent processes.

1. Transregional exclusion: The United States and Latin America

In her work on the exclusion of Chinese immigrants in the United States, historian Erika Lee found that “[i]mmigration law [...] emerges

65 McClain, In Search of Equality, 44.
66 Ibid.
68 McClain, In Search of Equality, 80-83.
as a dynamic site where ideas about race, immigration, citizenship, and nation were recast. Chinese exclusion, in particular, reflected, produced, and reproduced struggles over the makeup and character of the nation itself." I agree with her argument in the sense that the dynamics of transpacific and transatlantic migration created a space of transcultural Euro-Afro-Asian-indigenous entanglements in which the dominant group, immigrants from Northern and Central Europe, forcefully imposed themselves on indigenous groups as well as on “non-white” immigrant groups. Therefore, this space included conflict and ruptures and was defined not only by the idea of “white” supremacy, but also by the actions of the immigrants of European descent who perpetuated this idea. They thus created new imaginaries of co-existence and otherness, establishing the foundation of parameters of distinction and preference that have dominated U.S.-American idiosyncrasies up until the present.

Lee conceptualizes the exclusion of the Chinese as “an institution that produced and reinforced a system of racial hierarchy in immigration law, a process that both immigrants and immigration officials shaped, and a site of unequal power relations and resistance.” Here, she is mainly referring to the era of exclusion in the United States, which formally began in 1882 and ended in 1943. Lee’s book suggests that exclusion extended beyond institutional regulation and reproduction of unequal and racialized relations between immigrants and the authorities. Free Chinese immigration also opened up a new space to reformulate the concepts of citizenship, nation, belonging, and exclusion that, until the nineteenth century, had been defined according to the free mobility of Europeans and the forced mobility especially of Africans. Chinese immigration, both free and forced, can be included in a broader discussion that defined the development of nation states in the Americas. Therefore, I believe that the issue reflected in the unequal negotiations of belonging represented in the entanglements of the Chinese and other American inhabitants not only pertains to the entire United States, but in fact to all nations and societies of the Americas.

In order to validate this point, it is helpful to consider the following two observations about Chinese immigration in the American hemisphere. One has already been mentioned in the introduction and was made by Adam McKeown: The development of immigration policies in the Americas was influenced by the practices and ideas developed by the United States and Canada in order to regulate...
Chinese immigration at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. These marked the beginning of the development of a system that regulates borders with respect to migration at the global level. Despite the great problems created by the institutionalization of a system to regulate national borders, at the end of the nineteenth century,

the enormous legal, political, and administrative effort put into enforcing these laws would gradually shift the momentum in favor of borders, thus establishing the basic principles and practices of border control as an integral part of modern, liberal polities.72

Thus liberalism met its limits with regard to the individual right to freedom of movement, which certain groups were denied, mostly for racist and xenophobic reasons, yet framed as a concern for maintaining “the social harmony necessary in a self-governed society,” a fear that Thomas Jefferson had already harbored in 1782 with respect to the possibility of promoting the immigration of foreign workers.73

The other argument, which ties in with the first, stems from a meticulous study by Fitzgerald and Cook-Martín on migratory policies in the Americas from the end of the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. From an inter-American perspective, they argue that the processes of building nation states and representative democracies brought with them the implementation of racist principles that shaped migration law, favoring the immigration of (ideally Protestant) “whites” and discriminating against the rest, thus contradicting the central ideas of Western liberalism.74 Their study shows that there existed a nexus between migration, liberalism, and ethnicity that allowed for the identification of discriminatory policies regulating migration and citizenship. Within this framework, it is particularly interesting that they emphasize “racist ideology” as a means to legitimate “the differential distribution of resources and treatment by racial group.”75 This is in tune with Critical Race Theory: “[...] while race is a historical construct rather than biological fact, it permeates social life.”76 Although migration regulations were not the same in every country in the Americas, ethnic ascriptions have influenced, and continue to influence, societies and their migratory policies, the development of which are often based on racist prejudices. The following will compare the politics and practices in question in the United States, Cuba, and Mexico towards

72 McKeown, Melancholy Order, 122-123.
73 Ibid., 124.
76 Ibid.
the end of the nineteenth century. According to McKeown, restrictive regulations against the immigration and settlement of Chinese was present in the entire Pacific Rim: “Beginning in the 1850s, white settlers around the Pacific worked to keep Chinese at the margins of their communities, if not entirely excluded.”

In the United States, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 formalized a legal discriminatory framework at the national level that in practice had already been applied at the local level and in various states for more than thirty years. Now it took on a different quality though: It was the first migratory law in the Americas in the late modern period that was directed at an ethnic group. While the Chinese who had already immigrated before the government started implementing diverse measures to make it impossible for them to carry on with their lives, there was now an effort to hinder the access of new Chinese immigrants. This law marked a turning point where the United States began transforming from a country of free immigration to a country that started selecting new immigrants on the basis of racist prejudices. According to Lee, this was to influence the guidelines for the entire development of immigration regulation in the United States:

Beginning in 1882, the United States stopped being a nation of immigrants that welcomed foreigners without restrictions, borders, or gates. Instead, it became a new type of nation, a gatekeeping nation. For the first time in its history, the United States began to exert federal control over immigrants at its gates and within its borders, thereby setting standards, by race, class, and gender, for who was to be welcomed into the country.

As has been shown in numerous studies, in the United States the law of 1882, its extensions and later modifications initiated a true

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77 McKeown, Melancholy Order, 121.
78 Lee, At America’s Gates, 6.
era of exclusion that would formally continue until its abrogation in 1943, but it actually lasted until the adoption of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments in 1965. During the period of formal exclusion, U.S. law did not formally exclude educated or wealthy Chinese immigrants, among them primarily students and merchants, but it did make it extremely difficult to move legally between China and the United States, including for Chinese residing in the United States who wanted to visit China and were denied entry upon their return. The exclusion laws were often interpreted as a carte blanche to exercise unbridled violence. This was the case in the brutal massacre of Chinese miners who were killed by European and American miners in Rock Springs, Wyoming in 1885. It ostensibly happened because the Chinese did not join their labor protests, but would not have been possible without the permanence of anti-Chinese prejudice. At the same time, some observers on the East Coast saw the exclusion of Chinese laborers in a different way. Days before the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper in New York seemed to criticize that the United States federal government would now exclude Chinese immigrants while still welcoming Communists and immigrants of other inclinations labeled as undesirable.

2. Transpacific cooperation between Asia and Latin America and resistance in the late nineteenth century

During this period, Chinese emigrants enjoyed little legal protection by the Qing imperial government because “the Qing government did not officially recognize the right to emigrate and was itself besieged by foreign and domestic enemies.” In fact, it was not until 1893 that the government revoked the ban on emigration, which, however, did not change emigrants’ status as stateless with no guaranteed rights. Nevertheless, there was an initiative in China to protect the workers who had gone to Latin America and the Caribbean as coolies, where their working conditions were similar to those of African slaves. In Cuba, the inhumane coolie trade was abolished in 1874 after a visit and exhaustive investigation by the Chinese Commission to Cuba, which included Chinese and foreign experts who highlighted the exploitation and maltreatment of the Chinese coolies in the Spanish colony. That same year, the coolie trade was also abolished in Peru when representatives of the country signed the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in Tianjin (China). This established commercial and diplomatic relations between the two countries and
opened Peru to free Chinese immigration, which was later strictly limited in 1909.85

The last quarter of the nineteenth century was marked by a process that differentiated between the English-speaking region of North America and parts of Latin America: While the United States and Canada were adopting increasingly strict laws against Chinese immigration, the logic of which would later be applied to other immigrant groups as well, in colonial Cuba and other countries this process did not set in until the twentieth century, despite persisting ideas and practices of whitening that had been firmly established among the “white” elite in Cuba, Argentina, and other countries. In Mexico, however, an openly favorable policy regarding Chinese immigration existed during the Porfiriat before it would turn into the exact opposite during the Mexican Revolution.

In Cuba and Peru, the coolie trade had been abolished, but the poor treatment of plantation workers persisted. Ultimately, their discontent led Chinese migrants to rise up and participate in the Cuban Wars of Independence to fight against Spanish colonial control between 1868 and 1898.86 Thus they became part of the founding myth of the Cuban nation, which would be consolidated until the 1930s: “In Cuba, Chinese became ‘model minorities’ avant la lettre because of their participation in the late nineteenth-century independence wars.”87 In Peru, Diego Chou explained the reason that almost 2,000 Chinese coolies went over to the Chilean enemy’s side during the Pacific War in 1879: “The treatment of the coolies by the Peruvian masters was so bad and prolonged that it was natural for these unhappy people to go against them in this type of situation.”88 Nevertheless, in Cuba as well as in Peru, Panama, Jamaica, and other territories where coolie work existed, free Chinese communities were being established that were similar to the ones in California and British Columbia. Mostly in the cities, forms of coexistence that were largely based on mutual aid associations developed, although they were stratified under the control of Chinese chambers of commerce and their leaders.89

In Mexico, where there had been no coolie trade, Chinese immigration was driven by the country’s program for economic modernization during Porfirio Díaz’s military dictatorship, which began in 1877 and ended with the Mexican Revolution in 1911.90 After a plan to attract European workers had failed, Mexico turned to China and Japan.91 Despite multiple attempts, Mexico was not able to enter into a treaty with the imperial Qing government until the signing of the 1899

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86 Juan Pérez de la Riva, Los culíes chinos en Cuba 1847-1874: Contribución al estudio de la inmigración contratada en el Caribe (Havana, 2000), 265-274.
87 Young, Alien Nation, 281.
89 Andrew R. Wilson, The Chinese in the Caribbean (Princeton, 2004), xi.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, however. One year earlier, a treaty of the same kind had been signed with Japan, which, in contrast to the treaty with China, stipulated a bilateral relationship that ensured the same rights for both countries.

3. Circular migration and transnational networks

“Free and voluntary” migration between China and Mexico was established in both directions with the treaty of 1899. But even prior to that, the development of Chinese immigration to Mexico was closely interwoven with its neighbor to the North. Catalina Velázquez Morales noted that the region bordering Mexico, particularly Baja California, “became a pole of attraction for Chinese who were trying to evade deportation [to China].” Many of these Chinese intended to return to the United States. This type of remigration would become part of a circular, irregular migration scheme between the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Cuba that aimed at circumventing Chinese exclusion.

The most established intermediaries for the facilitation of immigrant labor were Chinese merchants living in San Francisco. They had already provided the workers for the Transcontinental Railway in the United States and sent temporary Chinese workers to the states of Louisiana, Texas, and Alabama. The Mexican government turned to these merchants to organize the recruitment of Chinese workers in Hong Kong and Shanghai as well as their voyage to the Mexican ports. Other Chinese were smuggled in from San Francisco and San Diego. According to Chao Romero, this cooperation between economic interests of Mexican and Californian Chinese businessmen was organized similarly to Chinese immigration to California just decades before and played an important role in the interwoven history of the Americas.

The development of these structures and informal networks, which relied on human trafficking and the falsification of papers, occurred at the same time as the establishment of an increasingly strict American regime of migration regulation. Apart from putting pressure on Mexico and Canada to support their system of exclusion based on ethnic discrimination, the United States used their imperialistic expansion, starting with the Spanish–American War of 1898, to spread their ideology of exclusion: In 1902, after the military occupation of Cuba and the Philippines, the United States decreed the application of the laws of exclusion of Chinese workers in these territories.
4. Hegemonic power and the proliferation of policies of exclusion in the Americas

After Hawaii was annexed in 1898, the United States prohibited Chinese immigration to these islands as well as the migration of the Chinese who already lived there to the continental United States. The definition of those who were considered “white,” which excluded Asians, underwent several changes during this period. Irish, Spanish, Italian, and European Jews were now being more easily classified as “white,” because “white was understood to be ‘European’ rather than exclusively Anglo-Saxon,”¹⁰⁰ as Benjamin Franklin had still defined it in the mid-eighteenth century.

In 1902, the United States congress extended the exclusion of Chinese indefinitely. Since the 1880s, both the measures the United States government took and the abolition of the coolie trade had had an impact on the entire American hemisphere.¹⁰¹ Of the twenty-two countries in the Americas that Cook-Martin and FitzGerald included in their study, eighteen adopted laws against Chinese immigration in the 1930s.¹⁰² Regulation of immigration to the United Stated had an impact on other countries due to the sheer size of the country, its increasing power in the hemisphere, and its advanced position in transoceanic immigration. When the United States began excluding Chinese immigrants, the majority of the other countries in the Americas reacted immediately, imposing “ethnic discrimination because they feared that U.S. bans on Chinese labor migration in the nineteenth century and restrictions of southern Europeans in the 1920s would redirect those groups to other ports.”¹⁰³ This was also the case with the Gentleman’s Agreement between the United States and Japan starting in 1907, which limited Japanese immigration, although disparately: While Canada “almost immediately imposed restrictions modeled on the Gentleman’s Agreement,”¹⁰⁴ Brazil and Japan agreed to facilitate Japanese immigration in order to support the development of Brazilian agriculture.¹⁰⁵

The immigration station on Angel Island in California’s San Francisco Bay was established in 1910 in order to regulate the detention and processing of immigrants from China and other countries. Previously, almost all immigrants to the United States entering from the Pacific had passed through the port of San Francisco. The Angel Island immigration station was constructed similarly to the one that had already been established on Ellis Island in 1892. Whereas Ellis Island was predominantly a place of immigrants’ hopes and dreams, ¹⁰⁰ Cook-Martin and FitzGerald 2019, 88.
¹⁰¹ Ibid., 55.
¹⁰² Ibid., 52.
¹⁰³ Ibid., 58.
¹⁰⁴ Ibid.
¹⁰⁵ Jeffrey Lesser, Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil (Durham, 1999), 85-91. From the perspective of the Japanese government, Brazil had not been a preferable destination for emigrants up until that point, but this changed due to the restrictive policies of the United States. Between 1908 and 1941, more than 188,000 Japanese immigrated to Brazil, making the Japanese community in Brazil the largest outside of Japan.
Although also of rejection and deportation, on Angel Island, which operated until 1940, the primary objective was to stop transpacific immigration, not to facilitate it. Both islands were ports of entry for immigrants who sought a life of liberty and prosperity; however, as Lee and Yung point out, Angel Island became a prison for many Chinese, for it was there that the enforcement of anti-Chinese laws became most visible.  

While the United States was able to establish its policies in the territories it occupied or controlled through its hegemonic dominance (such as Cuba and Hawaii), this was not the case in other countries. As already mentioned, some countries, such as Mexico, at that time sought to attract Chinese immigrants despite U.S. policies, which was to change with the new rise of nationalism during and after the Mexican Revolution. Others still looked to the United States when formulating their policies, but without pressure from the U.S. government. This was the case with Colombia, where in 1887 the conservative government of President Rafael Núñez ordered the prohibition of “the importation of Chinese for any kind of work on Colombian territory.”  

Starting in the 1920s, an increase in the inter-American entanglements can be observed, and migration policies in the region were becoming increasingly similar. Countries began adopting standards of ethnoracist distinction that informed the development of these policies. This was facilitated and lead by the “advances” and cooperation in the area of science, where transregional standards of ethnic classification were being established based on racist premises. During the First Pan American Conference on Eugenics and Homiculture in Havana in 1927, the experts “agreed that biologically selective immigration policy was a means to better national populations.”  

In his study on the selection of the “apt” immigrant in Colombia, Olaya noted the prominent role of Domingo Ramos, then Secretary General of the conference and also the leading representative of the Cuban experts on eugenics. His ideas were largely inspired by Charles Davenport and the Johnson-Reed Act, which he “wanted to introduce in Cuba and in the rest of Latin America, trying to convince his contemporaries to recommend the implementation of this system of quotas to their respective governments.” His ideas reflected those of many contemporary politicians who believed in eugenics, advocating a “betterment of the national genetic patrimony.” However, the majority of the representatives from other Latin American countries did not agree to follow the guidelines of the United States. Although

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106 Erika Lee and Judy Yung, Angel Island: Immigrant Gateway to America (New York, 2010), 69-70.
109 Olaya, “La selección.”
they were not “against racial selection of immigrants according to
their place of origin,” they wanted to formulate their own migration
laws. These laws were often shaped by the factors relevant to each
nation, such as migration caused by epidemics or armed conflicts.

In Mexico attitudes towards the Chinese were marked by the Mexican
Revolution, which radically changed the social makeup of the country
and redefined the meaning of national identity. As various studies
have analyzed, there were two periods during which the Chinese in
Mexico were aggressively persecuted. In 1911, the Chinese commu-
nity that had flourished in the city of Torreón (in the state of Coahuila)
was destroyed when President Francisco Madero’s troops killed more
than 300 Chinese and five Japanese residents. During the 1920s,
Chinese immigration to Mexico recovered and even grew, but so did
hostility against it. Anti-Chinese organizations were formed all
over the country, with particular strongholds in the northern states
of Sonora and Sinaloa, and Sinophobe attitudes went hand in hand
with anti-Semitism. Catalina Velázquez Morales explains that the
campaigns in Sonora and Baja California were organized by racist
groups and individuals, “making use of a xenophobic, nationalist
discourse [with which] they aimed to unite the population against
groups of foreigners, in this case the Chinese, who maintained their
hegemony with respect to trade.”

Marked by the effects of the Great Depression of 1929 and the emer-
gence of populist movements, the 1930s were a period which saw
nationalist tendencies reinforced in various Latin American countries,
often accompanied by resentment toward foreigners. In Cuba, for ex-
ample, the economic crisis particularly affected the Chinese who were
self-employed or had small businesses, and many of them returned
to China. Those who stayed in Cuba were affected by the nationalist
movements that, in 1934, resulted in the Law of the Nationalization of
Work. Laws like this went hand in hand with migration laws that ex-
cluded Asians, Jews, and other immigrant groups who were not granted
the same opportunities of participation and belonging as descendants
of European immigrants enjoyed, particularly in the retail trade.

Conclusion
This article has examined the exclusion and discrimination of
free Chinese immigrants in the Americas from a comparative per-
spective and through their transregional entanglements. The first
section analyzed free Chinese immigration to the United States

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110 Pablo Yankelevich, “Extranjeros indeseables en México (1911–1940): Una aproximación cuan-
titativa a la aplicación del artículo 33 constitucio-

111 Fredy González, Paisanos Chinos: Transpacific Politics among Chinese Immigrants in Mexico,
(Oakland, 2017), 19.


113 Chang, Anti-Chinese Racism in Mexico, 45.

114 Velázquez Morales, “Xenofobia y racismo,” 43.

between 1848 and 1882, while taking into account the coolie trade as a form of forced migration of Asians to Latin America and the Caribbean. It becomes clear that transpacific migration during that period was shaped by overlapping empires across the Pacific Rim. Once dominated by the Spanish colonial galleon trade between Manila and Acapulco that moved mainly goods and silver, in the nineteenth century the transpacific route gained new significance through Asian migration. While Asian coolies where transported to British and Spanish colonies in the Caribbean and to several Latin American countries, mostly to Peru, the British occupation of Hong Kong paved the way for free Chinese migration to California and British Columbia. Encounters between free migrants in California were shaped by racialized ascriptions made by people of European descent that clearly discriminated against Asians and others who the “white” majority considered to be ethnically inferior. This led to a proliferation of exclusionary practices and policies from the local to the federal level, culminating in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. It had both the effect that the access of Chinese immigrants to the United States was limited and that those Chinese immigrants already residing there and their families became, even more than before, targets of violence, discrimination, and unequal treatment. This would significantly shape their ways of becoming Americans for generations to come. Furthermore, the practices of controlling people’s mobility that had been developed with regard to Chinese immigration would serve as a model for implementing immigration and residency control systems. This also marked the beginning of the creation of a whole immigration and deportation bureaucracy that is still in place today. Its racist roots almost seemed to be forgotten during the Cold War, but are resurfacing since the 1990s, this time affecting mostly Mexican and Central American migrants. Again, bigotry serves as a basis for an ever more intense buildup of an inhuman control system aimed at persecuting and excluding immigrants whom the government considers racially, socially, or religiously inferior and a threat to the “white” majority.

To what extent did American hemispheric hegemony shape the configuration of inter-American cooperation regarding migratory issues? More specifically, were the discriminatory politics and practices around Chinese immigration enforced through U.S. pressure on other countries in the Americas? We have seen that there is no easy answer to these questions. Whereas American hegemony was evident in countries that were directly affected by U.S. imperialist and
economic interests (such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and various Central American countries), it was not as unilinear in the case of other countries. Although the influence of the U.S.-American model is apparent, this was clearly not the only model of immigration regulation that existed, as is clearly reflected in the politics of “whitening” in Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, and other countries. Although there was a confluence of exclusionary and racist policies at the inter-American level, especially as a result of closer Pan-American cooperation following the First World War, the United States was not the only country propagating them. Nor were these policies and practices simply applied through the adoption of an established inter-American model in the entire region; instead, they were influenced by the national, regional, and local development of and within each country.

Transpacific negotiations of bilateral and transregional agreements that also regulated migration between Asia and various other countries in the Americas are in turn related to inter-American relations. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, agreements and treaties between China and/or Japan, on the one hand, and Cuba, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, and the United States (to name the most central actors) on the other, tried to lessen the disastrous impact of the exploitation and exclusion of Asian migrants and residents or incentivize (as in the cases of Brazil and Mexico) Asian immigration. Another important element that went hand in hand with these efforts to protect the immigrants was the agency of the actors in the Chinese communities in the Americas. They created their own networks in order to bypass exclusionary policies and were able to establish alternative routes and patterns of inter-American cooperation that were different from those of the national authorities. The mechanisms of mutual aid that originated from local community practices in China contributed to fostering resilient communities and were necessary for the survival and development of these communities in order to confront discrimination. This has often been compared to the Jewish diaspora.\(^{116}\) As Evelyn Hu-DeHart has noted, “[i]n both cases, the resentment has something to do with the target group’s ethnic distinctiveness, clannishness, foreignness and, simultaneously troubling and intriguing, their perceived excessive success in limited but distinct occupations, especially in shopkeeping or local commerce.”\(^{117}\)

Finally, combining a comparative approach with intersecting histories offers a promising approach to the inter-American and transpacific

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116 For further comparisons between the Jewish and the Chinese diaspora, see Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid, eds., *Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe* (Seattle, 1997).

117 Hu-DeHart, “Indispensable Enemy or Convenient Scapegoat? A Critical Examination of Sinophobia in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1870s to 1930s,” in Look Lai and Tan, 65.
interconnections from a diachronic perspective. The fusion of the concept of *histoire croisée* introduced by Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann with the new trends of comparative history paves the way for putting aside nationalist limitations, allowing notions of connectivity and flows that are adapted to cultural studies and the study of diasporas, as I tried to show in this short history of exclusion and discrimination of the Chinese in the Americas.

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GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE, GLOBAL LEGITIMACY?
TRANSATLANTIC BIOMEDICINE SINCE 1970

Conference at the German Historical Institute Washington, September 6–7, 2019. Co-sponsored by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Conveners: Axel Jansen and Claudia Roesch (GHI Washington). Participants: Anna-Carolin Augustin (GHI), George Aumôthe (Princeton University), Jamie Cohen-Cole (George Washington University), Mario Daniels (Georgetown University), Donna Drucker (Technical University of Darmstadt), Elisabeth Engel (GHI), Ricardo Gomes Moreira (University of Lisbon), Markus Hedrich (University of Hamburg), Stephen Mawdsley (University of Bristol), Raúl Necochea López (University of North Carolina), Todd Olszewski (Providence College), Atiba Pertilla (GHI), Jeffrey S. Reznick (National Library of Medicine), Sarah Rodríguez (Northwestern University), Mathias Schütz (University of Munich), Susan L. Speaker (National Library of Medicine), Gaëtan Thomas (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales), Richard F. Wetzel (GHI). Guests: Teresa Huhle (University of Bremen), Chelsea Schields (UC Irvine & GHI).

All aspects of the biomedical enterprise, including laboratory and clinical research, drug and device development, and public health applications, have become global in scope during the past fifty years. In the process, global research practices have prompted support and resistance informed by varied beliefs and worldviews, some with transnational scope and with an impact on national laws as well as on the regulation of research and therapy. Cultural, moral, or religious considerations have affected the ways in which scientific insights or technologies were enabled, received, or restricted. Concerns about the availability of therapies has sparked public debates and led to national and global responses by advocacy groups, foundations, political parties, and governments. Biomedicine is, in fact, an area where many social, political, and economic developments since 1970 come together, and this conference was organized to explore how the history of medical science and biotechnology might function as a gateway to understanding the broader history of the era.

In their welcome address, Axel Jansen and Claudia Roesch noted the many ways that the bioscience enterprise has shifted since the 1970s, including the role of science in society at the national and global levels, and the changes in regulation, research, and social movements. They also observed that national frames for biomedicine
are increasingly those of “identity issues” or individual rights rather than “national mission.” They asked the conference participants to consider what narratives we might draw from the past 50 years; what this era says about current patterns and issues; how we relate advances in biomedical research to the ways we legitimize it, how definitions of “expert” have changed, and how the legitimacy of knowledge is negotiated; and how social movements have framed criticisms of science, and the ways that both critics and advocates have organized at transnational levels.

The first panel, moderated by Mario Daniels, dealt with international public health. Gaëtan Thomas’s paper re-examined the French controversy over hepatitis B vaccine use during the 1990s. The broad campaign to immunize against hepatitis B was shut down (apparently) due to alleged side effects, especially multiple sclerosis. But Thomas showed that the controversy also reflected concerns about the close relationship between France’s public health establishment and the World Health Organization (WHO), especially the latter’s growing acquiescence to aggressive pharmaceutical industry pricing of the vaccine. Raúl Necochea López’s study described how the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) reinvented its cervical cancer control strategy in response to the United Nations “Decade for Women” initiative from 1976 to 1985. PAHO’s original cancer screening effort (begun in the 1960s) was limited to Pap smears and targeted mainly middle-class women in their reproductive years. The new program was much broader, encompassing prevention, patient education, and research on the biological, cultural, social, economic, and political determinants of women’s health. Equally important, it sought to educate a “critical mass of health professionals” in the gender contexts of health.

Elisabeth Engel chaired the second panel, which focused on international regulation and business interests in biomedical debates. Claudia Roesch looked at the controversies surrounding the market introduction of the abortion pill RU 486 (Mifepristone) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, showing how social and political movements shaped drug development and marketing. While anti-abortion protests initially delayed its introduction in France, the French state soon nationalized the patent and made RU 486 available. Yet the manufacturer, Roussel Uclaf, only distributed to France and Britain, and was reluctant to expand into the U.S. and Germany. Anti-abortion activists drew on the Nazi-era history of the parent company (Hoechst...
AG) to protest the drug and threatened to boycott Hoechst’s other products. At the same time, transnational networks of pro-choice women’s health activists used conferences and petitions to demand access to RU 486, focusing on economic benefits and other possible uses of the drug, rather than moral implications. Stephen Mawdsley’s paper explored an unusual occupational disease, aerotoxic syndrome, reported by airline crews in the 1980s. The likely cause was TOCP (triorthocresylphosphate), a known neurotoxin used in lubricants and plasticizing agents. Air crews could be exposed when aerosolized chemicals (including TOCP) from jet engines were passed through the cabins during the pressurization process. Flight crews’ efforts to have aerotoxic syndrome recognized as a legitimate (and compensation-worthy) illness were resisted by the airline industry and regulators, who pointed to lack of clear evidence for the syndrome. Victims and their advocates gathered their own data, from personal accounts to toxicological screening, and searched the medical and scientific literature for documentation of TOCP’s effects. While they eventually succeeded in changing some practices and airplane design, the story highlights a debate over “evidence” reminiscent of those regarding tobacco- or asbestos-caused diseases.

Atiba Pertilla moderated the third panel, titled “Laypeople in HIV Research and Medicine.” George Aumoithe’s paper examined the development of the AIDS movement’s lay expertise in the National Institutes of Health (NIH) AIDS Clinical Trial groups, highlighting the roles that race, racism, sexism, and gender played in that process between 1987 and 2003. The study followed negotiations between professional and lay groups, and the ways their interactions shaped AIDS control and therapeutic agendas, challenged the apolitical stance of bench scientists, and changed the character of the groups themselves.

Sarah Rodriguez’s paper looked at the ethical debate that developed around international clinical trials of AZT (azidothymidine) to treat HIV-positive pregnant women, in 1997. The clinical trials aimed to assess the effects of AZT on “vertical” transmission of HIV from mother to fetus and compared full-course treatment to placebo, rather than to short-course treatment. Critics focused on the research ethics. But, Rodriguez said, there are other stories that might be told, e.g., the dangers of the women subjects knowing their HIV status (a requirement for participation) in the regions where studies were done, and the social, economic, and political structures that defined
HIV-infected women as valuable subjects only in relation to their fetuses/babies.

The papers presented in the final Friday panel, chaired by Richard Wetzell, highlighted the ways in which biomedical research projects, particularly “inclusive” genomic studies examining a wide range of populations, are negotiating (or not) shifting notions of race and diversity, and the possible social, political, and scientific outcomes of new definitions. Markus Hedrich discussed the persistence of colonial-era racial assumptions in the African Genome Variation Project, which studies disease resistance, genetic diversity, and ancestry in sub-Saharan populations. In highlighting differences via genomic variation, he argued, the project relies on an old paradigm, in effect applying a molecular-level “colonial gaze.” Hedrich called for a de-colonizing of big-data biomedicine and noted that current efforts to connect “ethnicity” and “infectious disease” could backfire. Ricardo Moreira looked broadly at how genetics has helped redefine “difference,” and at the recent turn toward “ancestry” rather than “race” in population studies (ancestry, unlike race, is always a mixture, and study must begin with individual genomes). This changing scientific view of diversity originated not just with “inclusion and difference” research policies, but with quantum leaps in data technologies, statistical methods, and biobanking. Scientific networks that have developed around genomics are generating new frameworks for dealing with “race,” much as the post-World War II “Atoms for Peace” initiative redefined “atomic power.”

The conference resumed on Saturday; the first session, chaired by Anna-Carolin Augustin, focused on medical research and human reproduction. Donna Drucker’s presentation looked at the strange career of the cervical cap contraceptive device from 1976 to 1993. Though not a new technology in the 1960s, the caps were unavailable in the U.S., and the primary manufacturer in Britain, Lamberts Dalston, hoped to phase out production. American women’s health advocates wanted to import the devices as alternatives to birth control pills and IUDs but the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) required clinical trials to reclassify caps as class II devices. When Lamberts Dalston, wary of lawsuits, wouldn’t organize the trials, the non-professional citizen-activist National Women’s Health Network took on the task, setting up trials at 11 women’s health centers. The FDA eventually approved one type of cap, but Lamberts Dalston chose only one U.S. distributor (unconnected with the activists), which
regulated the product so tightly that U.S. marketing wasn’t sustained. The story illustrated the difficulty of establishing national regulatory frameworks that support international cooperation for the research, testing, and approval of biomedical technologies.

The last conference panel, chaired by Jeffrey Reznick, focused on trans-national medical ethics. Todd Olszewski’s paper examined how the National Institutes of Health struggled to redef ine its mission starting in the 1970s, following two decades of explosive growth and expanding influence. Was it a research agency or a “health” agency? With growing health care costs and public distrust of both government and medicine in that era, the NIH increasingly caught criticism for the lag between research discoveries and clinical application. Olszewski’s study showed how NIH leadership tried to formulate mission statements (and 5-year funding plans) that reflected commitment to multiple constituencies: scientists, patients, consumers, and the biotech industry. It also demonstrated that tension between the various stakeholders remains. Mathias Schütz’s presentation asked why biomedical ethics standards formulated in the U.S. and widely adopted elsewhere after the 1960s were taken up only slowly in the Federal Republic of Germany. Although the new bioethics were actively introduced and well-received in Germany, the German biomedical professions were reluctant to cede the legitimacy of their own local “medical ethics” to the more “global” definitions.

In a lively final discussion session led by Axel Jansen, participants identified themes that emerged from the presentations and returned to the initial question, i.e., how could we use these recent histories in global biomedicine to inform historical accounts of the decades since 1970, perhaps as an alternative to, or complementary to, historical narratives demarcated by wars and other political events. Globalization of science and biopolitics, expansion of international agency missions, and shifting demands and expectations regarding health issues characterize this period. One recurring theme was that of increasing lay participation in the biomedical enterprise, whether through consumption of health products, advocating for or against particular disease research, or grassroots activism focused on broader social change, and the dynamism of that participation. While individual rights are a common focus of these decades, conservatism and resistance to change also run through these histories. Negotiations (and conflicts) regarding knowledge and the locus of expertise formed another theme. One prominent thread in the papers and
discussions was the risks of what Steven Epstein calls the “inclusion and difference paradigm,” the current research and policy focus on including diverse groups as participants in medical studies and measuring the differences across those groups. Epstein notes that while this approach has expanded knowledge about formerly neglected populations, focusing on categorical identity (e.g., ethnicity, gender, age) can obscure other ways in which health risks are distributed in society. And by emphasizing the biology of difference, such studies encourage the belief that qualities such as race and gender are essentially biological, and that social inequalities are best remedied by attending to biological particularities. Current studies of difference are also still haunted, even threatened, by a long history of gender and ethnicity research done mainly to confirm social notions of superiority or inferiority. Participants enthusiastically agreed that the papers could be the basis of an edited volume and discussed ways to organize such a work.

Susan L. Speaker (U. S. National Library of Medicine)
SIXTH JUNIOR SCHOLARS CONFERENCE IN JEWISH HISTORY: RADICALISM AND RESISTANCE IN MODERN JEWISH HISTORY

Sixth conference in the “Junior Scholars Conference in Jewish History” series, organized by the Institute for the History of the German Jews, Hamburg (IGdJ), the Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft of the Leo Baeck Institute in Germany, and the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI), held September 24–25, 2019 at the IGdJ in Hamburg. Conveners: Miriam Rürup (IGdJ, Hamburg), Anna-Carolin Augustin (GHI), Mirjam Zadoff (NS-Dokumentationszentrum München), Anne Schenderlein (GHI). Participants: Anna-Carolin Augustin (GHI), Lukas Böckmann (Institute for Jewish History and Culture — Simon Dubnow, Leipzig), Andreas Brämer (IGdJ), Noëmie Duhaut (Leibniz Institute of European History, Mainz), Eszter Susan Guerrero (New York University), Zoë Grumberg (Science Po, Paris), Sarah Johnson (UCLA), Vera Kallenberg (University of California Santa Cruz), Tom Navon (University of Haifa), Meghan Riley (Indiana University), Miriam Rürup (IGdJ), Jan Rybak (European University Institute, Florence), Björn Siegel (IGdJ), Sari J. Siegel (Cedar’s-Sinai Medical Center), Ynon Wygoda (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), Mirjam Zadoff (NS-Dokumentationszentrum).

This biannual workshop brings together recent PhDs as well as those in the final stages of their dissertations. The aim of each workshop is to bring together a small transatlantic group of junior scholars to explore new research and questions in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Jewish history, contextualized with research on people from other backgrounds. Over the course of two days the participants give short presentations of their individual research projects and engage in discussions on sources, methodology, and theory in order to assess current and future trends in the modern history of Jews around the world.

The Sixth Junior Scholars Conference in Jewish History focused on resistance and radicalism in Modern Jewish history. The conference highlighted how certain aspects of the socio-economic, educational, cultural and religious backgrounds coming from individuals who employed different forms of resistance were perceived throughout Jewish communities. All papers and discussions addressed the questions when and why Jews decided to turn to radical attitudes towards
politics, society, religion, and culture. They asked how some became activists for different political and social positions and in which contexts their opposition turned into various forms of resistance. Key questions of the conference were: What circumstances and events have triggered radicalism and stirred up various forms of resistance among Jews? What measures have people employed to resist and when did they become radical or perceived as such?

The first panel of the conference, titled “Religion, Community, and Radicalism,” was chaired by Miriam Rürup. In her contribution “An Oral History of the Jews in the Alternative Public Sphere in Hungary,” Eszter Susan Guerrero described her research on Hungarian Jews’ relationships to the socialist regime, focusing on those who criticized the Communist Party’s policies and acted upon this conviction. Working with oral history interviews, Guerrero drew attention to the experiences of secular Hungarian Jews during the socialist era. In particular, her research focused on those who were on the fringes or outside of the Jewish organizational networks and expressed resistance in an “alternative public sphere.”

Jan Rybak pointed out in his paper “‘The Red Flag on Mount Moriah’: Revolution, Anti-Jewish Violence, and Socialist-Zionism in East-Central Europe, 1918–1920” that different local conditions in which socialist-Zionist Poale Zion activists found themselves after the First World War were decisive for the later conflict and split of the World Union of Poale Zion in 1920. While the Zionist perspective put an emphasis on the role of Jews as victims in need of a national movement, the Poale Zionists wanted to make a strong case for the power of individual agency within a human rights oriented-movement rather than a merely Jewish and Zionist agenda.

The question of agency and Jewish diplomacy was again addressed in Noëmie Duhaut’s paper “19th-century French Jewish International Advocacy and its Links to European Radical Movements” during the second panel on “Revolution and Radicalism.” Duhaut presented a case study on the Alliance Israelite Universelle’s political fight for civic and political equality on behalf of Balkan Jews. According to Duhaut, the Alliance’s advocacy was shaped by the radical ideas of the 1848 revolution and built upon partnerships with radicals. Zoë Grumberg’s presentation, “Between political Radicalism and Resistance: Yiddish-speaking Jewish communists in France, 1930–1950s,” dealt with biographies of young Jews from Eastern Europe in the interwar period, their becoming communists and being part of the
resistance in France, and the overarching debate about the meaning of the Jewish communists’ identity as Jews. References to the relationship between communism and “Jewishness” came up again in several subsequent papers.

The third panel, chaired by Anna-Carolin Augustin and titled “Resistance and Radical Historiography,” put Vera Kallenberg’s paper “Becoming a radical pioneer of women’s history: The intertwining of Jewish experience, feminist historiography, art, and leftist activism in the life and work of Gerda Lerner (1920–2013),” in conversation with Tom Navon’s paper titled “Radical Historiography as a Form of Jewish Resistance during the 1930s: The Case of Otto Heller”. Kallenberg presented her approach to the biography of Gerda Lerner. Lerner was an anti-fascist Jewish refugee from Vienna who emigrated to the U.S. and became a radical leftist activist, feminist author, American-Jewish historian, public intellectual, and pioneer of women’s history who included an intersectional approach in her work. Tom Navon focused in his paper on another almost forgotten radical Jewish historian — Otto Heller — and a largely overlooked part of Jewish history: Marxist Jewish history. Both biographical cases discussed the relationship between leftist activism, socialism, communism and “Jewishness.”

Jewish resistance during the Holocaust and the Second World War was the focus of the fourth panel, titled “Resistance & Humanitarianism under Nazi Rule” and chaired by Andreas Brämer. In her paper, “Humanitarianism as Resistance and Resistance as Humanitarianism: The JOINT and HIAS in the French Internment Camp System During the Holocaust,” Meghan Riley undertook a study on how the work of Jewish American aid organizations (JOINT/HIAS) can be discussed as acts of resistance, such as if the JOINT ignored Vichy laws as part of its humanitarian mandate. Sari Siegel’s paper “Jewish Prisoner-Physicians and the Coercion-Resistance Spectrum Approach” addressed power imbalances and the possible conduct of resistance, analyzing the critical role of these Jewish prisoner-physicians in Nazi camps.

During the fifth panel, “Resistance, Pseudo-Resistance, and Defense,” chaired by Björn Siegel, Sarah Johnson presented her paper “Defending Jewish Germans: The Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens and its fight against Zionism in the Weimar Republic.” Johnson focused on the CV’s shift from an Abwehrverein (defense organization) to that of a Gesinnungverein (an
association based on shared ideological convictions). She emphasized that the CV’s fight against both antisemitism and Zionism was part of a larger attempt to adapt changing political and social structures in Germany and safeguard German-Jewish assimilation in a period defined by frequent instability and widespread antisemitism. Ynon Wygoda devoted his contribution, “‘Our time does not seem to lack a dictionary:’ On Resistance and Pseudo-Resistance within the ‘Republic of Silence’ (1940–1944),” to a discussion within the French literary and philosophical world during and after World War II, which questioned the definition of resistance and activism in times of war. Based on the analysis of Vercors’ The Silence of the Sea published in 1942 and Jean Paul Sartre’s The Republic of Silence that was published in the final issue of the underground journal Les lettres françaises two weeks after the liberation, Wygoda drew attention to the debate about and reception of the idea of defining silence as an active and engaged gesture rather than a cowardly regress or an equivocal non-action.

Anna-Carolin Augustin (GHI) and Miriam Rürup (IGdJ)
ELEVENTH MEDIEVAL HISTORY SEMINAR

Seminar organized by the German Historical Institute London and the German Historical Institute Washington, and held at the GHI London, October 10–12, 2019. Conveners: Stephan Bruhn (GHI London), Paul Freedman (Yale University), Bernhard Jussen (University of Frankfurt am Main), Ruth Mazo Karras (Trinity College Dublin), Cornelia Linde (GHI London), Simon MacLean (University of St Andrews), Len Scales (Durham University), and Dorothea Weltecke (University of Frankfurt am Main). Participants: Christina Broker (University of Regensburg); Julia Bühner (University of Münster); Robert Friedrich (University of Leipzig/DHI Paris); Oliver Glaser (University of Wuppertal); Daniel Gneckow (University of Kassel); Dallas Grubbs (Catholic University); Michelle Hufschmid (Oxford University); Dana Katz (Hebrew University of Jerusalem/University of Texas); Amelia Kennedy (Yale University); Mireille Pardon (Yale University); Alexander Peplow (Oxford University); Friederike Pfister (University of Bochum); Lenneke van Raaij (University of Exeter); Sandra Schieweck (University of Heidelberg); Daniel Schumacher (University of Freiburg); Paul Schweitzer-Martin (University of Heidelberg); Michel Summer (Trinity College Dublin); Rike Szill (University of Kiel); Aaron Vanides (Yale University/Graz University);

The 11th Medieval History Seminar, like earlier seminars, brought together a group of twenty Ph.D. students from both sides of the Atlantic. Organized jointly by the GHI Washington and GHI London, it brought together not only Ph.D. students, but also professors from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany, who chaired the nine panels along with Cornelia Linde and her new colleague, Stephan Bruhn, from the GHIL. The biennial Medieval History Seminar invited Ph.D. students to discuss their current or recently completed research. Topics covered a range of periods from late antiquity to the early modern era, with a strong concentration on central Europe, and some papers on the Mediterranean sphere.

True to the seminar’s well-established format, the papers were the centre of discussion. These were circulated prior to the conference and were not presented. Instead, short commentaries, prepared by fellow participants, on the key arguments of the individual papers and overarching aspects concerning the whole panel, kicked off each session. This allowed for more and in-depth discussion. The peer group and the conveners shared questions, criticism, suggestions,
and advice. A wide range of topics was represented at this year’s seminar. Interestingly, gender and the non-European Middle Ages were barely touched upon specifically, even though aspects of gender were repeatedly discussed throughout the seminar. Overall, the papers and discussions were open to a variety of methods and fields of research.

The seminar opened with a panel discussing Aaron Vanides’s paper on speech and empire under Sigismund of Luxemburg, who is often seen as emblematic of the ambiguous nature of authority in the later Middle Ages. Based on speeches and other rhetorical sources from the fifteenth century, this paper argued that we should conceive of Sigismund and the idea of the emperor in this period not as an author or authority, but as an audience. The second paper, by Rike Szill, discussed accounts of the fall of Constantinople in light of trauma studies. Based on Dukas’s historiographical account, she asked to what degree the “catastrophe” of Constantinople’s fall was sayable, or is even described in the sources. The paper also investigated strategies of attributing meaningfulness to the events, which were common knowledge and therefore could not be omitted from the narrative. Both papers used new approaches, drawing on rhetoric and trauma studies, which were thoroughly discussed.

Moving on from the late to the high Middle Ages, the second panel discussed Sicilian and Iberian history. Dana Katz’s paper examined the parklands and palaces of Norman Sicily. The construction of the royal palace of La Favara and its monumental lake marked a key moment in the secular self-fashioning of the twelfth-century kings of Sicily and their courts. Taking elite Islamic extramural estates as their models, the Norman rulers created a landscape of power recognizable both to their Muslim subjects at home and their contemporaries in the Mediterranean. Sandra Schieweck examined the frontier and borders of Castile in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The paper highlighted questions about how borders were described in the sources. Were Christian-Muslim and Christian-Christian borders perceived and organized in different ways? How important were natural demarcations such as water and mountains? While Katz drew not only on textual sources, but also on archaeology, emphasizing the role of water and technological transfer, Sandra Schieweck’s research relied on new perspectives provided by the spatial turn.

A panel on two aspects of kingship opened the second day. Michelle Hufschmid’s paper argued that Pope Innocent IV used a crusade against the Staufer (1246–51) as a tool to facilitate regime change in
the Holy Roman Empire. Without framing the military campaign as a crusade, Henry Raspe’s and William of Holland’s attempts to become the new king of the Romans would have immediately collapsed. Christina Broker looked at the description of the king’s psyche in Matthew Paris’s *Chronica Majora*. Her aim was to better understand the function of the emotions described, as the interpretation of emotions as rituals of political communication does not seem adequate for the episodes narrated in the sources.

The fourth panel introduced new perspectives on medieval society. First, Dallas Grubbs’s paper analysed the *Vita Dagoberti Regis Francorum*. It explored how the author of the *Vita* used his sources creatively, selectively, and with significant alterations to present a nuanced portrait of seventh-century society to address contemporary political realities and concerns. Friederike Pfister’s paper went down a different route, exploring how late medieval texts viewed different kinds of knowledge and potentially classified them as “foreign.” Roger Bacon’s and Dante Alighieri’s narratives of the origin story of astrology functioned as case studies.

Legal traditions of the late Middle Ages were illuminated in the fifth panel. Mireille Pardon introduced a greater complexity into the traditional narrative of legal history that a centralizing judicial bureaucracy contributed to the decline of communal reconciliation procedures and the rise of corporal punishment. She argued that a change in the perception of homicide encouraged execution over reconciliation. Increased emphasis on the “common good” curtailed the idea of excusable masculine violence and encouraged the development of early modern judicial systems in the Low Countries. Julia Bühner’s paper likewise questioned a traditional narrative in legal history by re-dating the formation and conventionalization of international law. Her paper showed how aspects of international law arose during the conquest of the Canary Islands. Treaties between indigenous people and the Spanish conquerors are one example. The paper showed the influence of non-European entities on the formation and idea of international law. Her work could result in the history of international law having to be rewritten.

The last panel of the day discussed three papers on late medieval religious orders and theology. Robert Friedrich’s paper analysed mendicants functioning as envoys for the kings of Mallorca and Aragon in the first half of the fourteenth century. His key questions concerned the role that the mendicants played in the bigger picture
of medieval diplomacy, their selection, and what implications their
association with a religious order had. While the source base for
Mallorca proved to be too small to allow conclusions to be drawn,
examples from Aragon show that the selection of envoys was delib-
erate and influenced by the intended recipient. Alexander Peplow’s
paper considered Alvarus Pelagius in the context of both the Apos-
tolic Poverty controversy of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries, and the clash between Emperor Ludwig IV and Pope John
XXII. Alvarus argued for absolute obedience to the Pope, believing
that this obedience should be used to reform the Church along Fran-
ciscan lines. Amelia Kennedy’s paper, finally, examined Cistercian
attitudes towards abbatial retirement, particularly the opposition
to retirement evident in twelfth-century sources. She argued that
these attitudes reflected the importance of productivity, service, and
labour in later life, and that the thirteenth-century trend in favour of
abbatial retirement stemmed from increasing bureaucracy and new
understandings of what constituted the “common good” for a mo-
nastic community. The discussion showed that age and perception
of age are important categories of analysis for historical research.

The third day began with a three-paper panel dealing with the com-
plementation of manuscripts and materiality of incunabula. Oliver Glaser
presented the compilation, variation, and discourse of changing
marriage rules in manuscripts between 750 and 1050. He highlighted
that Isidor of Seville’s definition of how many degrees and genera-
tions kinship comprises was often omitted in excerpts concerning
the topic in order to avoid contradictions within the text collections.
Lenneke van Raaij showed that the growing authority of the arch-
bishops within the city did not visibly influence the composition of
local masses for the saintly patrons of Trier in the late tenth century.
Separate institutions produced their own liturgy with specific themes
and structures, following the examples of creativity and preferences
for older sources known in Echternach. Paul Schweitzer-Martin’s pa-
per analysed what information textual sources provide on the supply
chains of paper for print workshops in Speyer. These findings were
compared with results of watermark analyses in the incunabula from
Speyer. Both approaches showed that the paper supplies came from
multiple mills in different regions. The analysis also showed that the
average thickness of the paper declined over time.

The eighth panel comprised only the paper by Daniel Schumacher.
His paper on Conrad I questioned three key arguments that interpreted
Conrad as the last of the Carolingians. It reassessed his election, conflicts with nobles, and strategies of legitimization. The reassessment of the historiography and sources showed that the analysis of single events has barely influenced the long-standing narratives of Conrad I. The panel’s second paper, “The Good Place of Arles in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages” by Sukanya Rai-Sharma (Oxford University), was not reviewed as she unfortunately could not attend the discussion.

Two different types of networks linked the papers of the last panel. On the one hand, Michel Summer’s paper considered the significance of the cartulary of the Liber Aureus Epternacensis for the analysis of Willibrord’s political network. By examining the context of the cartulary’s compilation and discussing the problems associated with its modern edition, the paper argued that Willibrord’s network was not restricted to the family of Pippin II, but characterized by its wide political and geographical range. Daniel Gneckow, on the other hand, studied the Swabian League of Cities (1376–89) with network analysis. He explored how different powers, such as kings, lords, and other cities, interacted with the members of the Swabian League, as well as how the League’s cities themselves dealt with each other. The concept of securitization was used to study the cities’ strategies for coping with conflicts and their struggle for autonomy and peace. Both papers broadened the existing research by including new perspectives on the role of women and the nobility, in addition to those of kings and dukes.

In addition to the nine panels, Simon MacLean, one of the conveners, delivered a public lecture on “The Carolingian Origins of the Medieval Castle.” MacLean presented a close reading of Charles the Bald’s Edict of Pitres (864). The critical edition marks six added clauses that probably have to be understood as parts of the King’s speech when the edict was issued. Based on this finding, MacLean concluded that the edict is not applicable to the general situation in the ninth century but has to be read in a very specific context, namely, that Charles the Bald was concerned about resources being diverted from a bridge-building project at that moment.

The seminar concluded with a final discussion chaired by Ruth Mazo Karras, whose term as convener ended with this 11th Medieval History Seminar. The discussion ranged from traditions in historiography to academic structures on both sides of the Atlantic. A key question was how to deal with well-known older scholarship without
ignoring it, but also adapting it to take account of the methods and questions of the twenty-first century. At the same time, strategies to find adequate terms and descriptions for historical phenomena were deliberated. Interestingly, many participants highlighted that the bilingual debate helped them rethink the meaning and accuracy of the terms they used. On the one hand, almost all papers tended towards presenting detailed case studies, which added new aspects and complexity to the established narratives, and some even deconstructed long-standing scholarship. On the other hand, the question remained about how to implement new, more complex findings into textbook-compatible knowledge. Overall, the Medieval History Seminar was a great opportunity to engage in current research going well beyond the interests of our own institutions and regions, and to meet other early career researchers from near and far.

Paul Schweitzer-Martin (University of Heidelberg)
DIGITAL HERMENEUTICS: FROM RESEARCH TO DISSEMINATION

International Conference and Workshop at the GHI Washington, October 10-12, 2019, co-sponsored by the GHI, the Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History (C²DH), and the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media (RRCHNM). Made possible by grants from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Friends of the GHI. Conveners: Andreas Fickers (C²DH), Sean Takats (C²DH), Gerben Zaagsma (C²DH), Daniel Burckhardt (GHI), Simone Lässig (GHI), Jens Pohlmann (GHI), Mills Kelly (RRCHNM). Participants: Edward L. Ayers (University of Richmond), Rosalind J. Beiler (University of Central Florida), Simon Donig (University of Passau), Katherine Faull (Bucknell University), Pascal Föhr (State Archive of Suhlthin), Sean Fraga (Princeton University), Frederick W. Gibbs (University of New Mexico), Jane Greenberg (Drexel University), Katharina Hering (GHI), Anne Heyer (Leiden University), Torsten Hiltmann (University of Münster), Tim Hitchcock (University of Sussex), Rachel Huber (University of Lucerne), Diane Jakacki (Bucknell University), Micki Kaufman (The Graduate Center, CUNY), Christian Keitel (Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg / Potsdam University of Applied Sciences), Daphné Kerremans (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), Amy Larner Giroux (University of Central Florida), Ursula Lehmkuhl (University of Trier), Alan Liu (University of California, Santa Barbara), Peter Logan (Temple University), Maret Niélander (Georg-Eckert-Institute — Leibniz Institute for International Textbook Research), Sarah Oberbichler (University of Innsbruck), Jessica Otis (RRCHNM), Atiba Pertilla (GHI), Lodewijk Petram (Huygens Institute for the History of the Netherlands), Andrew R. Ruis (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Achim Saupe (Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History Potsdam), Stefania Scagliola (C²DH), Silke Schwandt (University of Bielefeld), Jennifer Serventi (National Endowment for the Humanities), Juliane Tatarinov (C²DH), William G. Thomas III (University of Nebraska-Lincoln), Tim van der Heijden (C²DH), Thomas Werneke (Humboldt University, Berlin).

The conference began with four hands-on workshops. The first workshop addressed the theme of “Digital Hermeneutics in Education.” It included presentations, demonstrations and hands-on exercises organized by Stefania Scagliola on how to integrate elements of the Ranke 2.0 teaching platform for digital source criticism in humanities curriculum, and by Frederick W. Gibbs who reflected on strategies for enabling students to create and contribute to digital community-based
history projects. Both speakers discussed the practical challenges such projects inevitably bring, but also emphasized the possibilities of digital platforms and tools to promote active learning and engagement with history. For instance, by means of an interactive quiz or through the co-creation of GitHub-based webpages for disseminating local history.

The second workshop was organized by Maret Nieländer and Thomas Werneke. While Nieländer explored the use of the text mining tool DiaCollo for performing collocation analysis of historical text corpora, Werneke discussed various ways of doing text mining and distant reading with regard to the field of historical semantics. Katharina Hering showed in the third workshop on “Digital Resource Criticism” how to develop and read a multidisciplinary Zotero Group Bibliography. The problems following the division of infrastructure between academia and archives were discussed and conditions on both sides of the Atlantic were compared during the workshop. Finally, in the fourth workshop, Andrew R. Ruis demonstrated how to use the nCoder as a new tool for merging close reading methods with computational text analysis.

In the late afternoon, the program continued with a round-table discussion by Rosalind Beiler, Amy Larner Giroux, Katherine Faull, Diane Jakacki, Ursula Lehmkuhl and Atiba Pertilla on the theme of “Mobile Lives — Digital Approaches to a World in Motion.” The round-table discussed how digital tools for text mining and network visualization allow for identifying patterns and changes over time in large textual collections such as historical family letters from transatlantic, mainly religiously motivated movements. On the basis of their research projects, the panelists highlighted how this allows for aggregating stories of everyday life that connect the “micro” to the “macro” levels (and vice versa) and for visualizing mobile lives’ trends beyond the illustrative and exemplary. Something that would not have been possible with traditional methods of text analysis, interpretation and presentation, as they argued.

In the evening, the new open access Journal for Digital History was officially launched, a collaboration between the C²DH in Luxembourg and De Gruyter Publishers. The journal will be equipped with three full positions and aims to become an innovative platform for publishing digital history research. The journal will introduce new levels of dissemination formats that will provide different angles on a single research topic, ranging from a traditional paper to visualizations of interactive data sets. The first issue is forthcoming in 2021/2022.
The conference’s second day started with a panel on “Digital Source Criticism.” Tim van der Heijden and Juliane Tatarinov shared their experiences on the Doctoral Training Unit (DTU) “Digital History and Hermeneutics,” a four-year interdisciplinary research and training project funded by the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR). By conceptualizing the DTU as a “trading zone” in digital history, they reflected on the project’s first year, its training program and the project’s website as an interactive platform for doing digital hermeneutics in an interdisciplinary setting. Pascal Föhr and Christian Keitel followed with presentations respectively on historical source criticism in the digital age, and the opportunities and constraints on the use of digital-born sources from an archivist’s perspective. Their presentations also underscored the need for professional historians to engage more with the experience of digital archivists and librarians who are at the forefront of the digital turn in heritage work. The discussion at the end of the panel touched on a wide variety of issues. For instance, how does the digital turn affect the relationship between historians and archivists? Are private institutions a valid alternative? What does it mean when historians are becoming producers of their own digital archives? How to validate the integrity of a digital source or object? To what degree is digital history becoming a new discipline in its own right, or should we consider the digital to be an extension to the traditional historical discipline?

The question what the Digital (“the D”) does — and subsequently the question of what “the H” (history/humanities) does — was a recurring topic throughout the conference. One preliminary observation was that “the D” brings the humanities back in contact with each other and also invites the social sciences and sciences to join the dialogue. After a short panel on digital history funding on both sides of the Atlantic, this topic became especially significant in the panel on digital and transmedia storytelling, which included presentations by digital history pioneers Edward L. Ayers and William G. Thomas III. Ayers and Thomas reflected on their collaborative work in the digital public history project “Beyond the Valley of the Shadow,” and discussed the possibilities of digital storytelling for historical narration in relation to some of their current research projects: Mapping Inequality (by the Digital Scholarship Lab) and a reconstruction of an early nineteenth-century enslaved woman, named Anna Williams (http://annwilliamsfilm.com/). The panel furthermore included an impressive presentation by Rachel Huber on the question of how digital history can make the narratives of suppressed minorities
visible (in this case female activists of the Red Power movement). Huber provided a powerful example of how retrodigitized “traditional” sources can be combined with born-digital sources, such as various social media, to bring indigenous perspectives into focus and excavate the previously untold. Finally, Sean Fraga presented his views on how to narrate a non-narrative source with digital humanities tools.

The third and final panel of the day, entitled “Modeling the Analogue,” touched upon the epistemological implications of the shift from analogue to digital research methodologies. How can we produce new historical knowledge when modelling or transforming analogue sources and collections into digital datasets for computational analysis and visualization? Torsten Hiltmann presented some reflections on the consequences of data modeling for digital hermeneutics. Comparing analogue to digital methods for knowledge production, he argued that the “analogue” hermeneutic cycle is fundamentally different to the digital research process. While in the analogue realm one can always go back to the sources and re-read or re-interpret them, in the digital process you can often only go back to the data, and the data models we use determine the information from the sources we have at our disposal and thus the questions we can ask. Hiltmann consequently advocated for a digital hermeneutics, which makes transparent and explicit the conceptual work done in data modeling.

Lodewijk Petram and Sebastiaan Derks made a similar argument based on a case study on different usages of a specific “fuzzy and complex” historical data collection containing information about careers of sailors of the Dutch East India Company. The complexity of historical datasets — and the data curation effort which is required to make them usable for analysis — is often overlooked by digital historians and seldomly explicated in their publications, which is problematic. Peter Logan and Jane Greenberg presented how they worked with historical controlled vocabularies (HIVE) for mapping the history of knowledge in their Nineteenth-Century Knowledge Project. Finally, Simon Donig reflected in his presentation on the use of artificial intelligence for the historical disciplines and the epistemological challenges of machine learning he faced in his Neoclassica research project.

Two more panels were held on the third and final conference day. The first of these, entitled “The Challenge of the Collection,” started with a presentation by Sarah Oberbichler, who discussed the ways in which she and her colleague Barbara Klaus used digitized historical
newspapers to study return migration to Europe (1850–1950) in their NewsEye project, and the interface challenges they ran into and how these shaped the research. Among others, she emphasized the importance of metadata and full transparency about OCR quality of digitized text corpora for working with such interfaces. Anne Heyer presented her research within the framework of the EU Horizon 2020-funded TRANSPOP project (Juan March Institute, Universidad Carlos III Madrid) on the changing meaning of “the masses” in nineteenth-century Europe from a transnational perspective, also using digitized newspaper corpora. Achim Saupe reflected on the possibilities and limitations of DiaCollo as a digital tool for “blended reading” (combining distant and close reading) and analyzing semantic changes in the GDR press.

The conference’s final panel discussed the topic of visual hermeneutics: how to use digital tools for the visualization of historical accounts and (audio-visual) presentation of historical analyses? Micki Kaufman presented her PhD research project “Quantifying Kissinger,” which deploys the possibilities of virtual reality tools for the analysis, visualization and historical interpretation of the Digital National Security Archive’s Henry A. Kissinger correspondence. Kaufman argued that VR allows for new forms of engaging with the archive and navigating historical sources in more direct, spatial and playful ways. Silke Schwandt, who reflected in her presentation on the question how productive digital tools are for historians, likewise emphasized the potential of visualization for historical analysis, interpretation and dissemination. Coming back to the question of what “the D” does in historical research practice, she argued that digital technologies allow for new ways of interacting with the source material, new forms of storytelling and accessibility, and as such can provide new perspectives on the historical subject (i.e. zooming in and out, navigating through time and space). This potential was also illustrated in the final presentation by Rosalind Beiler and Amy Giroux, who focused on the affordances of Gephi for the interactive and dynamic visualization of complex early modern communication networks. The concluding discussion — a dialogue between Alan Liu, Tim Hitchcock and Jessica Otis, moderated by Simone Lässig — took Liu’s recent book Friend the Past: The Sense of History in the Digital Age, as its point of departure in a wide-ranging debate. The ensuing discussion highlighted that the digital, besides offering new possibilities for historical research, also comes with new challenges, or something Schwandt called “productive irritation.” Andreas Fickers
subsequently argued that it is exactly this productive irritation or “creative uncertainty” we should take as point of departure for our investigation as digital historians. Instead of reproducing certainties, digital tools and methods should help us to explore, visualize, interpret and sense the past in new ways.

The concluding discussion returned to several crucial points that define the digital turn in historical research. Digital methods can, for instance, accommodate the complex structure of time that cannot be depicted as simply linear or neatly layered. On the other hand, they pose challenges with regard to the transition from “traditional” sources that are heterogeneous, incomplete, complex and imperfect to “cleaned up data” with different scales and materialities. New digital and visual literacies amongst scholars might also bring challenges in the relationship between senior and junior scholars, as Simone Lässig reminded us. Moreover, as Fredd Gibbs pointed out in one of the final remarks of the conference, the added value of the “digital” should not only be investigated within the field. Digital public history projects create new links with industry or cultural heritage partners and create new visibilities for old historical questions. By creating new narrative forms, history as a discipline is being opened up to new audiences and might acquire a new reputation in the public sphere.

Tim van der Heijden, Juliane Tatarinov, Gerben Zaagsma (C2DH)
THIRD ANNUAL BUCERIUS YOUNG SCHOLARS FORUM
HISTORIES OF MIGRATION: TRANSATLANTIC
AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Workshop held on October 21-23, 2019 at the Pacific Regional Office of the German Historical Institute Washington (GHI PRO) at the University of California, Berkeley. Made possible by a grant from the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius. Conveners: Levke Harders (GHI / Bielefeld University), Andrea Westermann (GHI PRO). Participants: Cristian Cercel (University of Bochum); Sheer Ganor (GHI PRO); Vera Kallenberg (UC Santa Cruz); Armin Langer (Humboldt University Berlin), Darshana Sreedhar Mini (USC, Los Angeles); Brianna Nofi (Columbia University); Thiago Pinto Barbosa (Free University Berlin); Christoph Rass (University of Osnabrück); Katherine Reed (University of Manchester); Isabel Richter (UC Berkeley); Chelsea Schields (UC Irvine); Alexander Schwanebeck (University of Cologne); Bill Sharman (Duke University).

How do we deal with the unpredictability of the past in fictional and historical writing? Author Katja Petrowskaja raised this question during the Third Annual Bucerius Lecture at the GHI Pacific Regional Office at the University of California Berkeley. She explored the topic in her conversation with literary scholar Sven Spieker (UC Santa Barbara) about her book *Maybe Esther*, whose English translation was published last year. The ideas and topics discussed that evening gained momentum as participants of the Young Scholars Forum carried them over into the two-day workshop on “Histories of Migration.” The forum brought together scholars from Germany, the United States, and other countries. It assembled a broad range of interdisciplinary migration research. The papers engaged with all forms of migration flows, from deportation and expulsion to labor migration, circular migration, or illegal border crossings in the twentieth century.

The workshop started with a panel on “Migrant Knowledge: Race as Category.” Chelsea Schields analyzed the Dutch state’s growing preoccupation with Caribbean families at the nexus of two historical developments: decolonization and the retrenchment of the European welfare state. She argued that knowledge production centering on race, sexuality, and kinship intensified after the end of empire and shaped key social policies in the 1970s-90s, thus even increasing racial inequality in the structures of the decolonizing state. Thiago
Pinto Barbosa asked how the transnational movements of social scientist Irawati Karve shaped her production of anthropological knowledge about human difference. Her translocational positionality — an Indian elite woman educated in Germany — cannot be separated from her knowledge outputs. Barbosa showed that the “peripheral” can be especially insightful for the articulation of critical knowledge. The comments by William Sherman and Vera Kallenberg pointed out that both cases deal with the production of scientific racialized knowledge, while at the same time “race” was replaced with cultural arguments since the 1960s.

The next session was dedicated to “Transnational Lives and Knowledge.” Darshana Sreedhar Mini explored the emergence of ethical and empathetic modes of transnationality in the specific context of low-budget films showing migrations from the South Indian state of Kerala to the Gulf region, mapping transnational journeys. Through a combined analysis of these short films, literature, search for missing migrants, bureaucratic policies and ethnographic vignettes, she explored the figure of the migrant laborer as both a social force and a media object around which ideas of justice and empathy cohere. Vera Kallenberg is working on a biography of women’s historian Gerda Lerner (1920–2013). In her paper, she focused on Lerner’s screenplay “Black Like Me” (1964). The film reflected her own persecution in Nazi Europe, political repression under McCarthyism, socialization in the Old Left, and commitment to the civil rights movement and the tradition of European literature and radicalism. Kallenberg conceptualized Lerner’s women’s historiography as intersectional avant la lettre. The comments by Alexander Schwanebeck and Thiago Pinto Barbosa centered on language issues: how did the migrants studied deal with the new language/s they had to learn? And how do we as researchers handle the range of languages in the source material? The discussion also posed questions about ethics and empathy: why is the latter so present when researching migration and minorities?

“Borders, borderlands, and other boundaries” was the title of the last panel of the first day. Brianna Nofil examined how the U.S. immigration service relied on northern New York jails to incarcerate new categories of excludable and deportable migrants crossing the U.S.-Canada border in the 1910s and 1920s. She analyzed that the frustrations of border communities whose jails were overcrowded by “immigration prisoners” was a key catalyst in the development of the first federal jails, and the 1930 creation of the Bureau of Prisons.
Alexander Schwanebeck analyzed contemporary U.S. history museums representing Black Seminoles’ perspectives on U.S.-Mexican border regions from the mid-nineteenth century to the early 1900s. Schwanebeck showed how they can display borderlands and make marginalized voices heard in a postcolonial perspective. Commentators Katherine Reed and Cristian Cercel focused on the importance of counter-narratives in migration research, as did the discussion.

The workshop’s second day began with a session on “Transatlantic Emigrations.” Katherine Reed examined detained migrants’ graffiti from Ellis Island immigration station in New York c. 1900-1924, combining social history with an archaeology of the present approach. A counterpoint to official mark-making and bureaucracy, this fragmentary source material provides an insight into the perceptions and emotions of people held in the limbo of immigration detention. She argued that writing and drawing functioned as coping strategies in this precarious and disorienting environment. Cristian Cercel discussed the Danube Swabian postwar migrations to La Roque-sur-Pernes (France) and Entre Rios (Brazil). He paid attention to the different ways of “Europeanization” both settlements constructed and asked whether the idea to focus on “Germans abroad” is/was underpinned by ideological pan-Germanism. Comments by Brianna Nofil and Armin Langer dealt, on the one hand, with Ellis Island as a liminal space and the wide-ranging histories the graffiti convey. How do we deal with these archaeologically preserved but spotty inscriptions of migrant knowledge that only represent a small fraction of all the experiences that where shaped in this immigration station? Participants then went on to debate citizenship and nationality more broadly: how can we define Germanness or Frenchness?

The last panel, on “Knowing Germany,” included Armin Langer’s project on Berlin’s 2005 neutrality law, which prohibits religious symbols in public office buildings. Langer highlighted that a notion of religion separating belief from symbols and rituals was a historically Protestant concept and that the law must be seen in the tradition of Enlightenment philosophers’ criticism of Jewish rituals. William Sharman’s paper examined the social and intellectual worlds of “Third-World” refugees in 1970s and 80s West Germany. It argued that many refugees created the means to migrate through political, family, and religious networks. Once in West Germany, asylum seekers used poetry, activism, feminism, and documentary filmmaking to upend popular stereotypes, state knowledge, and humanitarian
conceptions about who they were. Both the discussion and the comments by Chelsea Schields and Darshana Sreedhar Mini stressed that a re-negotiation of German culture was necessary. Moreover, the question whether “predicament” be used as a concept in migration history was raised.

The lively, highly stimulating discussion fed by brilliant ideas and generous comments over two days made clear that migration studies has developed into a burgeoning field, and that “migration” is increasingly conceptualized as a cross-sectional research category. Collectively, the participants explored what historiography would look like if the categories of migrant or migration would be part and parcel of its fundamental vocabulary. While the papers focused either on migrants as actors or on the state and institutions, they never lost sight of the other dimension, thus revealing the multilayered history of knowledge production on migration. These distinctive perspectives (let us call them biographical or structural) require different source material. Some researchers need to build their own archives using film and (social) media, oral history, etc. Others read the existing archives against the grain. From a history of knowledge perspective, the group discussed the epistemological dimensions underlying and guiding, maybe unconsciously so, actors’ efforts in understanding their world and acting on it. The ethics and politics of research were a recurrent topic of debate as was the relevance of decentering archives and knowledge production.

Levke Harders (GHI / Bielefeld University) and Andrea Westermann (GHI PRO)
ARCHIVES OF MIGRATION:
ANNUAL ACADEMIC AND POLICY SYMPOSIUM
“INNOVATION THROUGH MIGRATION”

Workshop held at the Pacific Regional Office of the German Historical Institute Washington in Berkeley (GHI PRO), December 9–10, 2019, in cooperation with the Goethe-Institut San Francisco. Made possible by a grant from the Brüderstiftung. Conveners: Fatima El-Tayeb (University of California, San Diego) and Andrea Westermann (GHI PRO). Participants: Joanna Brooks (San Diego State University); Yasemin Yildiz (UC Los Angeles); Khatharya Um (UC Berkeley); Daniel Necas (University of Minnesota Libraries); Sandra Vacca (Dokumentationszentrum und Museum über die Migration in Deutschland, Köln); Robert Irwin (UC Davis); Paul Burnett (Oral History Center, UC Berkeley Library); Deniz Göktürk (UC Berkeley); S. Deborah Kang (California State University San Marcos); Dan Thy Nguyen (European Migration Knowledge Archive, Hamburg); Mervete Bobaj (Filmmaker and Activist, Berlin); Leslie Quintanilla (San Francisco State University), Katharina Hering (GHI Washington).

This symposium discussed the connection of migration, knowledge, and archives in historical perspective and brought the invited professionals into (hopefully lasting) contact. Structured around the larger theme of archives of migration, the symposium explored the role of knowledge transmission at the intersections of art, activism, education, media production, policy development, and academia. While the focus of migration studies and polices often is on knowledge production, here, participants highlighted how knowledge, once collected, is preserved and made accessible (or not). We explored the relationship between dominant and marginalized forms of knowledge, the role of material and cultural resources in creating and maintaining archives, and the tension between national and transnational narratives of migration. We were also interested in processes of interpretation and re-interpretation. As with other archives, the materials assembled in archives of migration lend themselves to ever new projects of (historical) sense-making and world-making.

The focus on archives of migration seems relevant in light of recent developments that urgently require innovative approaches, yet tend to replicate failed models. The European refugee crisis for example, provoked a cycle of reactions in Germany, from Willkommenskultur to the rapid success of anti-immigrant movements and parties; cycles
that played out in strikingly similar patterns as compared to the early 1990s, shortly after the German unification and the end of the Cold War. Also, the acknowledgement that marginalized knowledges need to be included in policy decisions, education models, and outreach efforts seems to be arrived at laboriously and then forgotten again in predictable generational cycles. In response to this observation, the symposium did not only explore the innovations gained through migration, but also inquired into how these insights can be presented and preserved in a manner that allows them to have lasting, if changing impact.

The introductory round set the tone. Linking personal engagement and intellectual work has become an experience that most academic participants had not sought from the outset but that had imposed itself as one way to respond to and make sense of the political present. It became obvious that many participants have recently felt compelled to wear two hats simultaneously that are often difficult to keep neatly separated: the hat of academic teacher, scholar, and artist and the hat of engaged citizen actively involved in the everyday politics of U.S. and European migration policies. The format of the workshop, which did not include formal academic papers but rather encouraged intellectual interventions based on collective experiences and individual trajectories through academic and political lives, proved to be invigorating. New strategies to make oneself heard in the closely-knit circles of policy advisors were but one recurrent topic.

The first panel, called “Bodies/Archives of Migrant Knowledge,” started out from the well-established idea that archives are not only repositories of collective knowledge but also sites of knowledge production. It explored what this means for the contested field of migration. Joanna Brooks described the background of “Allies to End Detention,” a local grassroots organization created by San Diego residents who came together to take action against the inhumane treatment of migrants and human rights violations at the U.S.-Mexican border, specifically the San Diego and Tijuana border less than twenty miles from San Diego. The group managed to overcome its impression that you cannot do anything about the border situation by corresponding with the people detained there, who come from around the world (the key was in obtaining people’s names). Letter-writing turned out to be a rather low-threshold, energizing strategy. The Otay Mesa Detention Center, operated by Core Civic, a private prison company, is near the border. The group was encouraged by the
response from migrants incarcerated there. In the letters, people tell about their lives, injustices and poor conditions at the facility. Such practices of “small batch humanity” are particularly important since much of the support for migrants at the U.S. Mexican border is carried out by small, local groups. Big international organizations — like the UN — are largely absent. Joanna discussed the close collaboration with the university archives and their staff, who preserve the letters and make them accessible to the public through SDSU institutional repository (https://library.sdsu.edu/detainee-letters-donate). In collaboration with lawyers, they have developed a solid review and redaction process to ensure that the publicized information does not include personally identifiable information and to mitigate risks in the asylum process. They have also developed protocols of dealing with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), if the original materials (sealed for 100 years) should be subpoenaed. The U.S. Postal Service proved to be a reliable venue to establish and maintain contact. The discussion addressed issues such as balancing advocacy with faculty responsibility and the importance of community and institutional support.

Yasemin Yildiz discussed her book in progress (with Michael Rothberg), “Citizens of Memory: Migrant Archives of Holocaust Remembrance,” which explores how memory regimes and migration regimes interact. Yasemin is interested in memory work by Germany-based immigrant writers, artists, and activists relating to National Socialism, the Holocaust, and World War II. She is assembling a new archive of materials, or, to put it slightly differently, is making existing sources newly visible. She discussed the significance of personal encounters in the creation of migrant archives, and the mobile, procedural nature of archives. Yasemin, like the artists among the group, in particular, highlighted the ways in which literature can act as a form of archive (condensation through poetization, clear-sighted, accurate depiction of social reality through fiction, etc). She also highlighted the fundamental difference between archival projects firmly tied to today’s emergency moments of migration and detention as opposed to the more slowly, inconspicuously accruing archives of guest workers. Historical contingency and contextualization make any attempt at generalization of what “archives of migrations” are difficult.

Katharya Um, one of the founders of the Critical Refugee Studies Collective (https://criticalrefugeestudies.com), discussed the importance of material culture in transmitting memories of the Cambodian
genocide, and the displacement in the diaspora. We have to expand the notion of “archive,” she argued, if we want to capture the traumatic memories of the survivors and document Cambodian displacement. In the Cambodian case of oral knowledge traditions, the killing of a whole generation means extinction of knowledge and memory. Traditional embroidery techniques go hand in hand with the retrieval of design content (motives) as media and elements of story-telling. This non-textual and non-photographic form may be the reason why the Cambodian genocide (one fourth of the population was murdered and perished) received comparatively little publicity and why it took the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum USHMM so long to show an exhibition focusing on Cambodia. Yet another puzzling question is: Why is there so little emphasis on the violence committed during the resettlement, including in the United States? How can the large Cambodian diaspora in the U.S. and around the world be empowered to tell their stories? What are the advantages and disadvantages of technology for the Cambodian diaspora?

In the second panel, titled “Archives of Migration Initiatives,” the participants were presented with three different types of archives, as moderator Paul Burnett emphasized: an established, university-based institution (IHRC), a grassroots initiative that is the process of becoming institutionalized (DOMiD), and an independent community based transregional initiative along the U.S. Mexican border (humanizing deportation). Daniel Necas discussed his and his colleagues’ work at the Immigration History Research Center (IHRC) Archives at University of Minnesota Libraries (https://www.lib.umn.edu/ihrca), which include large collections of materials documenting immigration to the United States from around the world. The IHRC documents both earlier migration to Minnesota (traditionally from Scandinavia and Central and Eastern Europe), but also more recent migration to Minnesota and the Twin Cities, home to the largest Somali diaspora in the U.S., as well one of the largest Hmong communities in the world. The IHRC records include many different types of records, including autobiographical records, records from resettlement agencies, and oral histories. Daniel also works on the Digitizing Immigrant Letters project, which translates and transcribes letters from migrants from many countries from IHRC’s own collections, and from partner institutions from Eastern and Central Europe, and makes these letters available online. Daniel’s own research interests are the implications of working with archived refugee records. Thanks to a staff research grant from his home institution, he was able to
research at the UNHCR archives in Geneva last year, focusing on the documentation of more recent humanitarian crises by the UNHCR. The agency has to deal with widely scattered, non-standardized, very diverse types of records, and protecting people’s privacy is among the biggest challenges. How can refugees and migrants be protected from the “weaponization of information” (Anne Gilliland) and what is the role of the archivist?

Sandra Vacca agreed that she, too, feels torn between a scholarly interest in documenting and making public the voices of vulnerable migrants on the one hand, and the need to protect these individuals on the other in her capacity as a member of the Documentation Center and Museum of Migration in Germany (DOMiD). Operating under this name since 2007, the initiative was established in 1990 by a group of immigrants from Turkey, who set out to address the noticeable gap in documenting the history of migration in Germany by established institutions. With a small and dedicated staff, the organization grew, expanded its collection scope to documenting all immigrant communities in Germany, moved to Cologne, and advocated for the establishment of a central museum of migration in Germany. Recently, in 2019, the German parliament approved 22 Million Euro to build a Museum of Migration in Cologne. The museum will include some virtual reality components, and Sandra showed us a preview of a Virtual Reality modelling of labor conditions in a factory.

Robert Irwin discussed the Humanizando la Deportacion project (http://humanizandoadeportacion.ucdavis.edu/es/), a community-based digital storytelling project that documents the human consequences of mass deportation. Launched in 2017 in Tijuana, which has been the epicenter of deportation visibility in North America, through a collaboration between researchers at UC Davis and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Humanizando la Deportation expanded in 2018 to the metropolitan areas of Mexico City, Guadalajara, Ciudad Juárez and Monterrey through new collaborations with several Mexican universities. Fieldwork teams in several locations, including Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez and Tapachula, have offered the bilingual platform to migrants in transit to share personal experiences of deportation. The storytellers’ agency is at the center of the project, and Robert says that he and they are just beginning to think about issues of digital curation of their archive. The discussion revolved around issues of privacy and the challenge of confronting sensationalist reporting about the migrant caravan with people’s stories.
The next morning started with panel three, titled “State Policies and Migrant Knowledge.” While standard accounts deal with the bureaucratic making of migrants and knowledge about migrations, this panel, in turn, discussed whether and how migrant knowledge “from below” has found or might find its way into national or international political decision-making. What were or are the conditions for any productive way of cooperation and exchange? Can archives be used to add historical context to presentist policy debates? From a history of film perspective, Deniz Göktürk discussed the framing of the debates, for instance, the persistence of a national framework. She asked how to respond to a field that is “saturated with images”: Migrants are portrayed as threats on the one hand and as suffering victims on the other. How does this tension affect viewers? She reminded us of several examples, for instance Ai Weiwei’s Human Flow (2017) or the famous 1964 picture of Armando Rodrigues de Sá, the millionth guest worker coming to West Germany, who was presented with a motor cycle.

S. Deborah Kang presented her new life as a “fast researcher,” that is, as a co-author of policy briefs and working papers at the U.S. Immigration Policy Center at UC San Diego. Fast research is understood as opposed to the “slow” research of scholars’ work. She underscored the need for scholars to provide historical expertise to policymakers, which means not only to adjust intellectual priorities based on political realities, possibly slowing down tenure-related work, but also to build durable pipelines to policy makers and ensure a diversity of experts. Kang has been preparing working papers and briefs (with Tom Wong and other colleagues) on the recent immigration enforcement policies issued by the Trump administration for the U.S. Immigration Policy Center (https://usipc.ucsd.edu/publications/index.html). On the plus side, she has had the experience that “the public at large wants to hear from us.” In the discussion, it was highlighted that historians do not necessarily bring enlightenment. Historical knowledge is not always an antidote to racism because historians, too, harbor political ideas and ideologies. But again, the question was raised whether there are ways to overcome scholarly silos, the separation of academy and activists, practitioners and scholars? What kinds of spaces can we create together, collectively? How can we leverage the network brought together in this workshop, for instance?

The last panel, “Self-Organization and Migrant Knowledge,” inquired into migrant activists’ intellectual, educational and cultural
approaches to migration. Which audiences do they address? Which media do they choose? Which notions of participation, empowerment, or politicization do they embrace or reject? Leslie Quintanilla discussed transnational border activism, art and activism. She, too, pointed out how difficult yet imperative it is to take precautions against involuntarily damaging individual refugees by recounting their stories. This is true not only on the individual level, but also for refugee groups assembling at the Mexican side of the border. By way of example, Leslie addressed ongoing micro-organizational dissent and emerging hierarchical structures within collectives of refugees and the ethical and practical challenges this produces for the organizations supporting the refugees.

Mervete Bobaj gave a preview of the evening’s film presentation at the Goethe-Institut San Francisco and discussed the background and work of MPower e.V., an NGO empowering young migrant women through documentary filmmaking in collaboration with the Berlin Hochschule der Künste and other film experts. Author and theater director Dan Thy Nguyen presented us with his idea to interview migrants in a stage-like environment, emphasizing a culture of portraits and self-portraits. The European Migration Knowledge Archive (EUMKA) is an ongoing project (https://eumka.org). Originally developed to collect biographies of a pluralistic European society, it became a tool for online education and archiving perspectives and life experiences, which are not fully represented and perceived in a general mainstream. Both Bobaj and Nguyen shared some of their work at the concluding evening program at the Goethe-Institute San Francisco, short films by girls taking part in the MPower program in Bobaj’s case and dramatic readings from two of his plays for Nguyen. The event was open to the public and led to a lively discussion.

In the concluding discussion, Daniel Necas summarized issues that came up at the colloquium, highlighting different types of archives with very different types of records (international organizations, national government, social service agencies, community groups, personal records, etc.) He saw much value in cooperating more closely with artists and practitioners. He believes that great benefit comes from artists and practitioners in residence programs. Katja Hering highlighted the importance for scholars to closely cooperate with archives and archivists (like the cooperation of the Allies with the archives at San Diego State University). Migration scholars and historians can especially benefit from archival initiatives and collabo-
rations in the post-custodial tradition (meaning that custody remains in the creator communities and is not transferred to a repository), and archival scholarship about documenting migration and refugee experiences, and experience with ethics based digital curation. The symposium made clear that blurring the lines and building connections between scholars, archivists, activists, artists, and practitioners can be mind-opening, and should happen much more often.

Fatima El-Tayeb (UC San Diego), Katharina Hering (GHI Washington), Andrea Westermann (GHI PRO)
**2019 FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE**

The 2019 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, which is awarded annually by the Friends of the German Historical Institute for the best dissertation in German history completed at a North American university, was awarded to Michelle Lynn Kahn (University of Richmond). The award ceremony took place at the 28th Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute on November 1, 2019. The selection committee was composed of: Brendan Karch (chair, Louisiana State University), Tanya Kevorkian (Millersville University), and Andrew Zimmerman (George Washington University). The prize winner has contributed an article presenting her dissertation research to this issue of the Bulletin (see “Features”).

The committee’s prize citation for Michelle Kahn’s dissertation “Foreign at Home: Turkish-German Migrants and the Boundaries of Europe, 1961–1990” (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 2018, advised by Edith Sheffer) reads:

Michelle Kahn’s elegant and highly original dissertation examines Turkish labor migrants to Germany who later returned to Turkey, some with German-born children. These understudied migrants comprised a large portion of West Germany’s Turkish guest workers, yet they were often caught between two worlds. Kahn traces these migrants’ dual estrangement from the moment of departure to Germany, through temporary trips home, to German policies urging return, the challenges of reintegration, and continued transnational mobility. Her work unearths xenophobic sentiment underlying West German policies, especially the incentive money given in 1983 to encourage remigration. Turkish media and popular culture pejoratively labeled many of these returning guest workers and their families ‘Almanci’ to underscore their Germanization. Moreover, the Turkish government resisted migrants’ return, prioritizing instead their remittances from Europe — a neoliberal calculation that Kahn labels ‘financial citizenship.’ Many migrants thus felt unwelcome in both Turkey and Germany.

Kahn draws on a rich source base in both German and Turkish including archival records, oral interviews, travel guides, cartoons, poems, and popular culture. These sources are interwoven, with clear and elegant prose, into a rich tapestry of diverse voices. Divides within the Turkish migrant population — between those from urban and rural backgrounds, between children born in Turkey or in Germany, or between families who stayed in Germany or who departed — are analyzed with great subtlety. A truly transnational project, her work puts at its center a group of migrants who challenge us to rethink German and Turkish national cultures, Cold War politics, European migrant flows, and the alleged divisions between
a democratic Europe and authoritarian others. We are proud to honor Michelle Kahn with the 2019 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize.

NEW STAFF PUBLICATIONS

Monographs


Edited Volumes and Special Issues


Chapters and Articles


Ananieva, Anna. “Intelligence, Diplomacy, Entertainment: Catherine II’s Son Tours Europe Incognito.” Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography 12 (2019), 149-168. DOI:10.1163/22102388-01201005


**Other Publications (Book Reviews, Conference Reports, Working Papers, Blog Articles, Encyclopedia Entries)**

Earnshaw, Sarah. “International Political Sociology.” In The Palgrave Encyclopaedia of Global Security Studies, ed. Thapa and Romaniuk (Online, August 2019)


Tetzlaff, Stefan. ‘The name of the game was globalization of goods, services and finance’ and India was increasingly part of it (Interview with Michael Gadbaw).” TRAFO: Blog for Transregional Research, 12.11.2019. https://trafo.hypotheses.org/19868


STAFF CHANGES

Jana Adkins, Assistant to the Director since November 2017, left the GHI in November 2019 to take up a position as office manager with a private company in New York.

Daniel Burckhardt, Technical Developer for our GHDI website, left Washington at the end of April to return to Germany, where he continues to work for the GHI remotely.

Jonathan Casey, IT staff member since April 2018, left the institute in September 2019 to continue his career in the private sector.

Brita Hanafy joined the GHI as Assistant to the Director in September 2019. She previously worked in several project management positions in the marketing sector. She will be leaving the GHI in July 2020 and returning to Germany.
Nora Hilgert, who joined the GHI in May 2019 as Research and Press Coordinator to cover for Sarah Beringer during her maternity leave, returned to Germany at the end of April.

Albert Manke joined the GHI’s Pacific Regional Office in Berkeley in September 2019. He is a research fellow and coordinator of the GHI’s working group in the project “Interaction and Knowledge in the Pacific Region: Entanglements and Disentanglements,” which is part of the Max Weber Foundation’s collaborative research project “Knowledge Unbound.” Before joining the GHI, he worked at the Center for Inter-American Studies at Bielefeld University and at the Global South Studies Center of the University of Cologne.

Ralph Miller joined the GHI as IT System Administrator in October 2019. He has more than 25 years of experience as a systems engineer and IT manager. Ralph holds a M.A. of Science in Management Information Systems from the University of Maryland/Bowie State University and a B.A. of Science in Computer Science, with German as a minor, from Pennsylvania State University.

Stefan Sachser, Administrative Associate since May 2018, left the GHI in June 2019 to return to his post at the Technisches Hilfswerk in Germany.

Atanas Vasilev, IT Manager since May 2017, left the institute at the end of April to return to Germany and continue his career in the IT sector.

GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to European and North American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars to pursue research projects that draw upon primary sources located in the United States. We are particularly interested in research projects that fit into the following fields: German and European history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the USA in international relations, and American history (European doctoral and postdoctoral scholars only). The proposed research projects should make use of historical methods and engage with the relevant historiography. We especially invite applications from doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars who currently have no funding from their home institutions. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to five months.
The GHI also offers a number of other long-term doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles to strengthen key research interests at the institute, including: the history of knowledge, the history of race and ethnicity, the history of religion and religiosity, the history of family and kinship, the history of migration, and North American history. In addition to these opportunities, several new fellowships programs have been introduced: The Binational Tandem Research Program for “The History of Knowledge” and “Global and Trans-regional History,” and the Gerda Henkel Postdoctoral Fellowship for Digital History.

For further information about these programs and current application deadlines, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

**GHI Internships**

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

**GHI FELLOWSHIP RECIPIENTS FOR 2019/20**

**Short-term Doctoral Fellowships**

**Pia Beumer**, Universität Erfurt

*Spaces of Fear: White Male Violence as Self-Defense in 1980s Urban America*

**Lia Börsch**, Universität Heidelberg

“One good photo worth ten pages of words”: Eine Visual History der Bildproduktion internationaler Menschenrechtsorganisationen ab 1960

**Stella Maria Frei**, Universität Gießen

*Ein “psychologischer Marshallplan” für Europa: Zur psychosozialen Rehabilitationsarbeit mit Displaced Persons in Nachkriegseuropa 1945–1951*
Roman Hutter, Universität Wien / University of Amsterdam
Travelling Poets, Travelling Ideas: Oskar Pastior und das Vermitteln im Kalten Krieg

Darja Jesse, Technische Universität Berlin
Gutes Kulturerbe — böses Kulturerbe? Zur Genese, Funktion und Rezeption der German War Art Collection

Christopher Kirchberg, Ruhr Universität Bochum

Robert Pursche, Universität Basel
Umkämpftes Nachleben: Walter Benjamins Archive 1940-1990

Short-term Postdoctoral Fellowships

Tanja Hammel, Universität Basel
Global Health History and the Rise and Fall of the Antimalarial Agent Mefloquine

Robert Hutchinson, United States Naval War College
After Nuremberg: American Clemency for Nazi War Criminals, 1949-1958

Christoffer Leber, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Wissenschaft unter Beobachtung: Die Entwicklung der Science Studies in Großbritannien und den USA (1960er-1990er)

Verena Lehmbrock, Universität Erfurt
Industrielle Sozialpsychologie in der DDR: Versuch einer transnationalen Genealogie.

Peter Ridder, Berliner Kolleg Kalter Krieg am Institut für Zeitgeschichte München - Berlin
GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR AND COLLOQUIUM, FALL 2019

September 18  The Science of Children
Jamie Cohen-Cole (George Washington University/GHI Washington)

September 19  Öl statt Kohle: Internationale Geschichte der westdeutschen Energietransition nach 1945
Clemens Huemerlehner (Universität Freiburg)

Samuel Huntington und die intellectual history des American Century
Cora Schmidt-Ott (Universität Tübingen)

October 3  Das große Köpfemessen: Die Vergleichende Anatomie und die Konstruktion von “Menschenrassen”
Sonja Malin Wilckens (Universität Bielefeld)

November 6  Midlife Crisis: The Feminist Origins of a Chauvinist Cliché
Susanne Schmidt (Freie Universität Berlin/GHI Washington)

November 14  “Priesterschaft des heiligen Merkur”: Schlesische Leinwandkaufleute und der atlantische Leinwandhandel in der frühen Neuzeit
Anka Steffen (Europa-Universität Viadrina)

Educating for Capitalism: Shaping Market Societies through Economic Education in the 20th Century
Thomas Ruoss (University of Leuven)

November 20  Persistence and Dynamic of Courtly Mobility: The European Social Elite and the Case of the Russian Prince Paul, 1754–1801
Anna Ananieva (Universität Tübingen/GHI Washington)

December 11  Russia in the European Counterrevolution, 1789–1815
Gregory Afinogenov (Georgetown University/GHI Washington)

December 12  Einsatzgruppe C in the District of Galicia: Ideology, Situational Violence, and Mass Murder
Benjamin Nestor (Marquette University)
GHI SPRING LECTURE SERIES 2020

“The spirits that I called”: Artificial Life from the Enlightenment to the Present

Organized by Anna-Carolin Augustin and Claudia Roesch

Will technological advancements enrich our lives or ultimately destroy us? Current debates about the consequences of artificial creations — robots, artificial intelligence, designer babies — raise both hopes and deep concerns. Promises of a better future or eternal life stand in contrast to fears of being overpowered by more intelligent, more resilient artificially created beings.

“The spirits that I called,” lamented the sorcerer’s apprentice in Goethe’s famous ballad, after bringing a broom to life with magic and losing control of it. For centuries, the idea of creating artificial life has fascinated and frightened human beings. It touches upon fundamental questions of human existence, the relationship between humans and nature, and the beginning of life. Fictional characters and stories such as the Golem, and Frankenstein’s monster reflect the long history of engagement with the idea of artificial life. So, too, do attempts over the past three centuries to build androids and robots, to mimic human thought in computer software, and to engineer ever more sophisticated reproductive technologies. The question today, as in the past, is whether artificially created beings and new technologies will ultimately turn against their creator.

The spring lecture series 2020 “The spirits that I called”: Artificial Life from the Enlightenment to the Present combines approaches from the history of science and technology studies with religion, gender and film studies to discuss the history of the idea of artificial life/creation, and how it has framed both hopes and concerns associated with new developments and technologies.

February 27  Human-Machine Boundaries in the Enlightenment and Beyond
Adveldt Voskuhl (University of Pennsylvania)

April 16*  The Golem: The Artificial Anthropoid from Enlightenment Monster to AI
Cathy Gelbin (University of Manchester)

May 7*  Transmission of Intelligence and Information. A History of Artificial Intelligence
Rudolf Seising (Deutsches Museum)

*Postponed to Spring 2021 due to the Covid-19 Pandemic.
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2020

February 18  Revisiting the Economics of German Overseas Imperialism, 1884–1918
Lecture at GHI PRO, Berkeley
Speaker: Steven Press, Stanford University

February 20-21  Recreating Separate Spheres Across Not-So-Separate Worlds: Gender and Reeducation in Japan, Germany, and the USA after World War II
Workshop at GHI PRO, Berkeley
Conveners: Claudia Roesch (GHI Washington), Jana Aresin and Heike Paul (FAU)

February 27  Human-Machine Boundaries in the Enlightenment and Beyond
Lecture at GHI Washington
Speaker: Adelheid Voskuhl (University of Pennsylvania)

February 27  ‘It hurts us that our people must work for global capital’: The Symbolic Politics of Out-Migration in Socialist Yugoslavia
Lecture at GHI PRO
Speaker: Ulf Brunnbauer (Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies & University of Regensburg)

May 25-29  26th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
*** Postponed, Date TBA ***
Seminar at Villa Vigoni, Laveno Menaggio, Italy
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University), Christiane Liermann Traniello (Villa Vigoni), Corinna Unger (European University Institute, Florence), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington)

June 1-2  Mobilities, Exclusion, and Migrants’ Agency in the Pacific Realm in a Transregional and Diachronic Perspective
*** Postponed, Date TBA ***
Conference at the University of California, Berkeley
Conveners: Albert Manke (GHI PRO Berkeley) and Sören Urbansky (GHI Washington)
September 21-22  **Change in Motion: Environment, Migration, and Mobilities**
Workshop at GHI PRO, Berkeley
Conveners: Sarah Earnshaw (GHI PRO, Berkeley) and Samantha Fox (Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility, The New School, New York)

October 1-4  **Sexuality and the Law in German-Speaking Europe**
Seminar at the Forty-Fourth Annual Conference of the German Studies Association
Conveners: Martin Lücke (Freie Universität Berlin), Veronika Springmann (Freie Universität Berlin), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington)

October 12-14  **Histories of Migration: Transatlantic and Global Perspectives**
Bucerius Young Scholars Forum at GHI PRO, Berkeley
Conveners: Christiane Reinecke (Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies, Osnabrück) and Andrea Westermann (GHI PRO, Berkeley)

November 16-17  **Contested Meanings of Migration Facilitation: Emigration Agents, Coyotes, Rescuers, and Human Traffickers**
Annual Academic and Policy Symposium: Innovation through Migration at GHI PRO, Berkeley
Conveners: Ulf Brunnbauer (Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies & Regensburg University) and Andrea Westermann (GHI PRO)
GHI Library

The GHI library concentrates on German history and transatlantic relations, with emphasis on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In addition to providing essential literature for scholarly research, the library fulfills an important cultural mission: no other library in the United States offers a similarly condensed inventory of modern German history.

The library offers access to about 50,000 books, DVDs, CD-ROMs, microfiches, and 220 print journals. In addition, we offer access to about 500 e-books and 100 online journals.

The collection includes books on American history written by German authors as well as historical literature of the institute’s past research foci: global history, religious studies, exile and migration studies, environmental history, and economic history. The collection includes only print materials, mostly secondary literature; there are no archival holdings.

The GHI library offers free access to scholars as well as the general public; appointments or reader cards are not necessary. The library does not lend materials but visitors may consult material from the entire collection in our beautiful reading room, which also offers access to a variety of databases for journal articles, historical newspapers, genealogical research, and bibliographical research.

For the library catalog or a list of our databases, please visit www.ghi-dc.org/library. Or send an email to library@ghi-dc.org for any further questions.

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