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This Bulletin begins with a thought-provoking article by Martin Geyer on “Speculation, Corruption, and the State of Emergency during the Great Depression.” Based on the Gerald Feldman Memorial Lecture that Geyer delivered at the GHI earlier this year, his article approaches the dissolution of the Weimar Republic and the Great Depression from a new angle, by examining the nexus between the emerging discourse about speculation and the future of capitalism, on the one hand, and new forms of state intervention under “state of emergency” powers and debates about the proper role of the state, on the other hand. By probing the example of the Reichsfluchtsteuer in some detail, Geyer is also able to illuminate the role of anti-Semitism as well as continuities between late Weimar and Nazi policies.

The next section of the Bulletin is a special forum on “The Challenge of Biography,” edited by GHI Research Associate Atiba Pertilla and GHI Deputy Director Uwe Spiekermann, which resulted from a panel at the 38th Annual Meeting of the Social Science History Association in Chicago that was organized and sponsored by the GHI’s Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project. The six articles in this section seek to provide an overview of current state of biographical research since its rejuvenation by the “biographical turn” of the late 1990s. In doing so, the forum also seeks to assess the GHI’s Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project’s contribution to biographical research, to several sub-disciplines, and to public history. Volker Depkat’s article offers a nuanced overview of the current state of biographical research in Germany and the United States. Next, Levke Harders makes a strong argument for using biographies as a tool to examine “marginalized lives” and broaden ethnocentric historical perspectives. While these two articles focus on the genre of biography, the following two articles offer case studies of biographical research beyond the analysis of an individual life and the epistemological problems related to this traditional form of biography. Clifton Hood uses biographical data to examine both the coherence and the transformation of the New York upper class in the 1940s. Susie Pak, drawing on her innovative book “Gentlemen Bankers,” analyzes the cultural and social milieu of the New York Banking House of J.P. Morgan and its interactions with German-Jewish bankers, especially Kuhn, Loeb & Co. Reflecting on these different forms of biographical research, Atiba Pertilla and Uwe Spiekermann discuss the specific biographical approach of the
GHI Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project. Finally, shifting perspective from research to classroom, Isabelle Schmitz assesses the benefits and challenges of using biographies in teaching history at the high school and college level.

The “GHI Research” section features an article by GHI Postdoctoral Fellow Emily Swafford, who examines the “internationalism” of the American Girl Scouts organization from the 1920s onward, with a special focus on the expansion of American Girl Scout troops overseas in the context of the stationing of U.S. troops in postwar Germany and Japan. The conference reports once again reflect a broad spectrum of topics, ranging from the history of obesity and health to the history of humanitarianism, from the history of the do-it-yourself movement to the history of Los Angeles as a site of German-American crossing, and from the history of childhood in wartime to the history of migration.

The GHI has lined up a diverse and interesting program of lectures and conferences for this fall and next spring. Please consult the calendar of upcoming events in this issue’s “News” section and on our website. We very much hope to see you at one of these events in the coming year.

Hartmut Berghoff (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)
WHAT CRISIS? SPECULATION, CORRUPTION, AND THE STATE OF EMERGENCY DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION

FIFTH GERALD D. FELDMAN MEMORIAL LECTURE, DELIVERED AT THE GHI WASHINGTON, MAY 29, 2014

Martin H. Geyer
LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT, MUNICH

I.
The historiography on the Great Depression of the 1930s has languished in the last two decades, at least in Germany. There are several reasons for this. First of all, the debate on Heinrich Brüning’s austerity policy and its possible alternatives, which flared up in the context of the debates on the crisis of Keynesianism in the late 1970s and 1980s, has for the most part been exhausted.\(^1\) Second, in Germany a landscape of commissioned company studies has blossomed. Even though the Great Depression usually represents an important episode in the history of the firms being studied, this history usually pales in comparison with the period of Nazi regime, given the evidence of a company’s entanglement with National Socialism.\(^3\) Third, unlike economic historians and economists who have used the depression as an exercise in reflecting on economic theories — much more so in the United States than in Europe\(^4\) — cultural historians have not seen this period as a stimulating challenge, quite unlike the preceding turbulent periods of the revolution, inflation, and the “golden years” of the Weimar Republic. A fourth reason for this relative neglect is that the Great Depression no longer holds a place of its own in what has become the common historical periodization. On the one side, two decades divide the Great Depression from what is by now referred to — somewhat exaltingly — as the “golden age” of “social democratic consensus” (Eric Hobsbawn/Tony Judt) or the postwar period of “consensus liberalism” (Anselm Doering-Manteuffel), which plays such an important role, at least in German debates. On the other side, two decades separate the Great Depression from the end of the “long nineteenth century” and the heyday of what Detlev Peukert has called “classical modernity.” Although Peukert and other historians placed great emphasis on the transformative years of the early 1930s, this rather short period has become somewhat of a side story.\(^5\) The reason for this is quite clear: Grave as the political and economic crisis of the 1930s was, its impact can only be understood in the context of a

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1 I am indebted to Dona Geyer and Richard Wetzel for improving drafts of this published English version.
5 Detlev Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik: Krisenjahrhunde der klassischen Moderne (Frankfurt, 1987).
longue durée not only of mentalities and ideologies but also of social and political practices that precede the Great Depression.

We will see whether the more recent worldwide financial crisis will bring new impulses to historiography. What has become quite evident so far is a flourishing interest in the history of “capitalism” — which has always been, to a considerable extent, the history of its crises. Yet the question of which analogies or comparisons should and can be made remains controversial. Two years ago, in his Feldman Lecture, Jürgen Kocka emphasized the differences between the current financial crisis and that of the 1930s. He referred to the fundamentally dissimilar political constellations, but he also meant the roles of finance capitalism then and now. “This finance-market-related part of capitalism [today - MHG] is much larger, more apart from the rest, more global, more dynamic, and more powerful than in the 1920s and 1930s, and it is less regulated than it was twenty years ago.” This may be true, but contemporaries eighty years ago had good reason to see their crisis as the worst so far; and “finance capitalism” was as much a sore issue then as it had been during the economic crisis of the 1870s or is today.

However, recent events have greatly increased the interest in Manias, Panics and Crashes (Kindleberger) and also in the shadier sides of capitalism, including corruption. Unlike some textbook versions, capitalism is not characterized by a state of equilibrium. Cycles of expansive and “speculative” waves involve people who at times act with what Keynes called “animal spirits.” More often than not, bankers, entrepreneurs, and financiers operate close to the edge of what is legal and moral, themes that have traditionally inspired many novelists.

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Economic risk-taking is a form of speculation on the future under precarious conditions. Yesterday’s heroes are today’s failures, and the line that separates the serious businessmen from what I call Grenzgänger of capitalism is sometimes thin indeed. Grenzgänger are those involved in extremely risky businesses, and there are many types of these blatant “rule benders,” including crooks and swindlers. In times of crisis, they tend to be the first to run into trouble and therefore inadvertently attract attention to themselves, usually to everybody’s surprise. Despite the moral outrage which they provoke, they are part of any economic system. This might be disturbing and distressing: of critical importance is the moment when the impression becomes prevalent in the public at large that the economic system is dominated by such Grenzgänger. “If the big banks can’t be relied on any more, it’s
best to trust one’s money to the casino”, spoofed one caricature in the German satirical weekly Simplicissimus in the wake of the 1931 banking crisis while depicting bourgeois banker-like types at the roulette tables (see figure 1).

The polemical talk about “casino capitalism” predates the crash of 1929. It signifies a crisis of legitimacy affecting not only supposedly risk-averse institutions such as banks, but even more so the people who run them. From here it is ideologically not a big leap to attack bankers as a group of white-collar gangsters; in fact, it appears that the leader of the Belgian radical right, Leon Degrelle, can claim to have invented the neologism “bankster” in the 1930s.

Political scandals and criminal investigations fueled the fires that discredited business and businessmen during the Great Depression. Germany hotly debated the briberies of the Berlin magistrate by the Jewish Sklarek brothers and various forms of fraud and failings affecting many big companies. One was the case of the Schultheiss-Patzenkofer brewery, in which top-level directors at the Deutsche Bank were involved. In 1933, the U.S. Senate held public hearings into fraudulent business practices of bankers and investigated, among other issues, whether bankers made loans to public officials. In 1934, France experienced the notorious right-wing Stavisky riots, which were directed against the personal connections of French politicians.

Figure 1. “If the big banks can’t be relied on any more, it’s best to trust one’s money to the casino.” Simplicissimus 36 (1931), no. 18 (3 August 1931), p. 208. Reprinted with permission.

10 Urs Stäheli, Spectacular Speculation: Thrill, the Economy, and the Popular Discourse (Stanford, CA, 2013).
to the Ukrainian-born swindler Alexandre Stavisky. In the mid-1930s Belgium witnessed an odd replay of a political drama that had shaken Germany in 1925 involving a certain Julius Barmat, a Ukrainian-born stateless Jew and a resident of the Netherlands, a Grenzgänger of capitalism whom polemical writers stylized as the epitome of the corruption plaguing democratic and liberal political systems.12

Blaming Jews was a common practice and spread like wildfire in the 1930s, at a time when the radical right was on the rise, not only in Germany. However, this anti-Semitism should not obscure the fact that the problems ran deeper. For every political scandal there were legions of similar cases about dubious business practices, wrongdoings, and speculative moves on the stock market involving countless private “investors,” among them even some famous economists such as John Maynard Keynes in England and Irving Fisher in the United States (and a great many others who preferred to remain silent for obvious reasons). People discussed the “future of capitalism,” and this involved not only institutions but also real people. Moreover, the phenomenon of speculation raised the question of the moral order of society, specifically, the failings of individuals and institutions, paths wrongly taken, and the contested relationship between state and economy, which needed to be mended by new forms of Ordnungspolitik.13

My investigation will begin by pinpointing the saliency and urgency of the amorphous and ambiguous phenomenon known as “speculation,” which at the time was discussed in widely differing contexts ranging from the economic prosperity induced mostly by foreign credits to the crisis of capitalism — in other words, in terms of boom and bust. I am particularly interested in how the debates over the causes of bust prompted notions of an economic emergency (Ausnahmezustand) and how they influenced policy-making.14 My narrative of the Great Depression differs from those focusing on the issue of unemployment or on the “sick economy” (Knut Borchardt) caused by high wages and the welfare state. What were the German peculiarities in these debates about speculation? For the sake of illustration, I will draw on the case of a man by the name of Jakob Michael, a well-known, albeit now mostly forgotten German financier at the time. For many contemporaries Michael embodied not only speculative capitalism but also the “spectacular speculations” (Urs Stäheli) of the post-World War I period. Thus this essay asks how popular resentment against speculation and speculators became entangled...
II.

Economic speculation is probably best defined as the practice of dealing in fluctuating values — in other words, financial transactions that imply a bet on the future with respect to market fluctuations not just of stocks, bonds, and currencies but also of all tradable goods from gold to houses. More often than not, such a definition implies that these activities are particularly risky, yet this is notoriously murky (if not tautological), considering how historically constructed the idea of risk is. Thus, it is a matter of — endless — debate as to what separates economically “functional” and “beneficial” speculation, on the one hand, from “dysfunctional” and disruptive speculation, on the other. The line is thin indeed and leaves much room for interpretation, with a heavy preponderance (not just among professional historians) of backward-looking prophets. This has much to do with the fact that in everyday language, the term “speculation” is mostly used in a pejorative way dominated by the assumption of socially and morally deficient behavior on the part of individuals: After all, dealing with “fluctuating values” implies the possibility that “all that is solid melts into air,” to quote the book title of Marshall Berman in which he deals with the “experience of modernity.”

When the proverbial “bubble” bursts — in other words, when expectations with respect to the future turn out to be wrong — the phenomenon of speculation becomes most apparent. The stock market crash of October 1929 and its long aftermath illustrate this well.\(^{15}\) The crash marked the end of the speculative boom years and what some German contemporaries disparagingly called — mostly ex post facto — the *Prosperitätstaumel* or *Scheinblüte* that had been made possible by the infl ow of American credit in the mid-1920s. During this period the buoyant economic optimism and the new opportunities for speculative activity, even for small investors, had been contagious. More than anywhere else, the United States was the country of “Speculation,” writ large literally and figuratively, as one contemporary British author, R. H. Mottram, dared to do in a book on the subject matter.\(^{16}\) Next to the boom in real estate, there were new — and supposedly secure — innovative financial products and practices, like buying on margin, which became available to larger sectors of the population. Fortunes could be made on

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booming stock markets all over the world, featuring the stocks and bonds of highly dynamic and often international companies like the Ford Motor Company or that of the Swede Ivar Kreuger, who was active in North America and Europe and was certainly one of the most charismatic businessmen of his time. In some countries like Belgium, savings banks and cooperative banks ventured into hitherto unknown territory by transforming their business strategies, adding investment branches, and luring their savers with high returns. Everywhere businessmen could be found who promised castles in the air: an airport or housing project here and a new banking scheme there wetted the appetite of those who were afraid to miss lucrative opportunities.

This spirit of speculation invaded people’s private lives and became common parlance in places where one would not expect it. It was a well-known fact already at the time that many bank employees participated actively in the stock market. But who would expect the honorable mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, to almost “gamble away” a great portion of his family’s wealth? Like many men of similar bourgeois stature, Adenauer, with his many contacts to bankers and industrialists, was affected by the exuberance of the American stock market boom and, enticed by the possible profits, switched from conservative to more risky investments in American stocks — stocks that kept heading in only one direction even before but especially after the crash of 1929, namely down the drain. Burdened with a debt of at least 1.4 million Marks, also as a result of previous bank loans, Adenauer ended up being bailed out by the Deutsche Bank by way of a complicated transaction, which raised what we would call today serious ethical questions. Contemporaries from the right talked about corruption, for two reasons: Adenauer was a member of the supervisory board of Deutsche Bank, and Cologne was deeply indebted and in dire need of credit even before the depression. Incidentally, Adenauer invested in the stock of German Glanzstoff, a German branch of an American company that (over)invested in facilities to produce rayon, that is, artificial silk, the material of which the dreams of Irmgards Keun’s novel Kunstseidene Mädchen (1932) were made. Unlike the protagonist of this very popular (and much underestimated) novel of the Weimar Republic who came to Berlin with grand illusions, Adenauer blamed almost everybody, including bankers and the boastful general director of German Glanzstoffe, except himself for the difficulties he had gotten into.

It is easily forgotten that the depression also offered opportunities for speculation. For many Americans (and no doubt their speculating brethren in Europe), the question was when to get back “into the market” and how to raise the money to do so. But the opportunities were particularly there for “big money.” The economic difficulties of individual countries and even more so the disintegration of the international Gold Standard led to a wave of speculative moves primarily by institutional investors, who could reap very high profits indeed. Attacks on currencies by international capitaux migratoires or “hot money” caused a great deal of public concern and prompted much talk about possible drastic legal action. Well-known are the words used by of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his first inaugural speech of March 1933 in which he criticized the “moneychangers” who had mislead the American people and needed to be driven out of the temple. This was amid an acute banking crisis in the United States that featured strong speculative attacks against the dollar. For Roosevelt and many other politicians in similar situations during the 1930s, this crisis posed an acute state of emergency that called for unprecedented measures by the executive.

III.

Almost everywhere banks were hit hardest by the crisis. When national income fell within a very few years by a fifth, a third, or — as happened in Germany — by about 40 percent, each of the countless bank failures and company bankruptcies could be considered as examples of bad speculation. Due to the drastic fall of the price of stocks and bonds every form of credit turned out to be problematic; such securities were an important part of the collateral for the loans that had been issued. Thus Bankers became the Prügelknaben (scapegoats) for nearly everything that had gone wrong. Contemporary observers registered the fall from economic stardom of businessmen and particularly bankers, who lost trust and credibility.

This process was also nurtured by the discovery that there were more than just a few black sheep operating in the economy, something that should not astonished us. Thus the crash ruined the reputations of seemingly upright men like Paul Dumcke, the director general of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs AG (Favag), an insurance corporation whose financial failure in 1929 heralded the bankruptcy wave in Germany, or that of the Lahusen family, owners of the Norddeutsche Wollkämmerei- und Kammgarnspinnerei AG, the so-called

Nordwolle, who ranked among the best names in Germany, associated closely for generations with high church positions, the Imperial Court of Justice, and the world of business. The Favag bankruptcy caused financial difficulties for many other companies and helped trigger the first wave of foreign loan terminations. The failure of the Nordwolle, in conjunction with similar events in Austria involving the Austrian Credit-Anstalt, not only brought about serious problems for the largest and most dynamically growing bank, the so-called Danat-Bank under its owner Jakob Goldschmidt, but also caused the near collapse of all German finance in the summer of 1931. Suspicions of grave irregularities and fraud turned out to be well founded, not just in the cases of Favag and Nordwolle; the banking crisis of the summer of 1931 revealed many dubious business deals and practices, which prompted public prosecutors to conduct drawn out investigations, some of which actually ended up in court.

One of the most spectacular trials involved the general director of the large Berlin Schultheiss-Patzenkofer brewing company, Ludwig Katzenellenbogen, a successful venture capitalist married to the glamorous actress Tilla Durieux; his business deals with Deutsche Bank, among others, turned out to be a great embarrassment for the bank. Like the banker Goldschmidt, Katzenellenbogen had shared the optimism that the crisis of the economy was only a fleeting phenomenon that would soon come to an end and that the “psychosis of pessimism” (Pessimismus-Psychose) had to be dispelled.

All these cases revealed a series of grave misdeeds, some of which went well back into the 1920s. The most prominent of these were, first, the use of false or manipulated opening Goldmark balances following the inflation; second, the intermingling of personal and economic interests — meaning business corruption — particularly in awarding loans (as had happened in the Schultheiss-Patzenkofer case); third, a lack of business supervision, particularly within banks, which raised the question of cognizance; fourth, more or less blatant ways of manipulating balance sheets, in which companies registered in the nearby tax paradises of the Netherlands and Belgium appeared with some regularity (as in the case of Nordwolle, which had manipulated its balance sheets by way of its branch in the Netherlands); fifth, the manipulation of the stock-market by banks through the practice of buying their own stocks; and not to be forgotten, sixth, the more or less sensational forms of risky speculation on the stock market with the help of and by bank officials themselves by way of credits.


they had received from their own banks. By 1931/32, it was quite clear that these charges did not just pertain to big banks and industries in the industrial centers but that the agricultural credit institutions, particularly in Prussia, were also seriously involved. In fact, the latter demonstrated some of the worst forms of mismanagement, personal failure, and even serious corruption. This had to do also with the co-operative, that is, the semi-public form in which many of these regional agrarian credit institutions were organized.

Promises of prosperity had been closely linked to the “new heroes” in business, the heralds of a new age. It was foreseeable that trouble would first arrive at the doorstep of those companies and corporations that were considered to be extremely dynamic and expansive — which was another way of saying that they operated on a very “speculative” basis; in fact, many had laid the foundation of their fortune during the inflation. In addition to many names long-forgotten, this group included men like Friedrich Flick, Otto Wolff, Ludwig Katzenellenbogen, and Jakob Goldschmidt (to name just a few).27

The Frankfurt businessman Jakob Michael belonged to this group of new self-made men. He was one of the boldest and most important financiers and entrepreneurs of the Weimar Republic (although he is nearly unknown in the literature, even in Jewish history). Like many other entrepreneurs in the war economy, he built a corporation during the First World War when he started to mine the scarce metal Wolfram from previously excavated material, an enterprise which expanded in many directions during the inflation years. Moreover, in 1924/25, he bet correctly and cleverly on the stabilization of the currency, quite unlike many others, including Hugo Stinnes, who went bust. Instead of being stuck with tangibles that had been so precious during the inflation, Michael liquidated a great deal of his assets at the very end of the inflation. This extremely risky strategy allowed him to make use of the extreme shortage of capital after the currency was stabilized — leading to charges of Wucher (usury) — and to redirect his business by acquiring, amongst other assets, share holdings in big German insurance companies that were in dire straits. At the time, his was a well-known story: Michael was thought of as the archetype of the “Großspekulant” (Heinrich Brüning), the big-time speculator, who had profiteered from war, inflation, and stabilization.28 In the mid-1920s, Jakob Michael ranked among the richest people in Germany, and in 1925 he even made it into Time Magazine, which heralded him as “Stinnes the Second.” Yet unlike the sturdy

27 Felix Pinner, Deutsche Wirtschaftsführer (Charlottenburg, 1925).
old man Stinnes, Michael was a “suave, handsome, crafty” Jew and an American type of self-made man who seemed to fit the new times.  

He built an extremely complex corporation — it was estimated that by the 1930 he and his wife Erna controlled 116 interlocked companies under various organizational umbrellas — that operated not only in Europe but also in North and South America. The new cornerstone of his empire consisted of department stores that introduced new forms of American-type consumer loans, real estate, and strategically selected shareholdings in big German companies. The latter earned him a lot of enemies in the banking and insurance industries where he was known for the ruthless pursuit of his own financial interests by using the leverage provided by his shares. 

To make a long story short: After some ingenious moves that got him through the year 1929 — such as selling his Favag and Induna Insurance shares (the latter to the American company Paine Webber) on time — Michael’s fortune changed during the Great Depression. With the huge drop in the value of real estate and stocks, he was unable to liquidate not only his share holdings but also his highly mortgaged real estate holdings, with which he had financed his expansion. Despite huge assets, many of his highly indebted German ventures became insolvent, which led by the end of 1932 to formal declarations of bankruptcy. This included also his house bank, the Industrie- und Privatbank, which got caught up in the turmoil of the banking crash in 1931. In 1932 Michael and his wife also declared personal bankruptcy. 

Although the career of Jakob Michael and his sprawling enterprise was quite exceptional, he was just one of many other “war and inflation profiteers,” who had risked much and gained much. They had all built fast-growing enterprises during the inflation and thus earned reputations as “speculators.” They had survived the stabilization crisis at the end of the inflation and continued their path of expansion in close cooperation with the big banks, which funneled huge amounts of foreign credit, borrowed on a short-time basis, into these ventures. It is debatable whether these men should be subsumed under the rubric of “speculators”; they were certainly betting on an American type of prosperity, the gains of which were alluring to many (including Konrad Adenauer). At any rate, the post-1929 years demonstrated how risky these economic activities had been. 

The onset of the depression became a time of reckoning. The gewiegteste Inflationstechniker (the most cunning technicians of inflation) lose in time of deflation — if not in 1923/24, then since 1929. 

The sudden eruption of talk about the “future of capitalism,” starting in 1929/30,
should not blind us to the fact that the problem actually boiled down to the question: what kind of capitalism in what kind of state? And the abstract formulation (already of contemporaries) should not blind us to the fact that what was really up for debate was the question: which “capitalists”?

IV.
The swift and dramatic rescue of the German banking system by the Reich in the wake of the banking crisis of 1931 has often been described. The partial if not complete takeover of the big German banks by the Reich was as stunning as the sums that were involved. The rescue was accompanied by an acrimonious row, between banking representatives and the Brüning government, over the question whether the banking industry could have managed the crisis on its own from the start. When the Danat Bank failed, it appeared to Brüning that its biggest competitors, the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank, were not unhappy to be rid of their rival, although the Danat Bank disaster made it necessary for the Reich to save the two other banks as well. This was the context in which Ernst Trendelenenburg, an undersecretary at the Ministry of Economics, argued, as many others did, that the private economic system could only be maintained “if it is protected from the capitalists who seek profits only and want the state to shoulder the losses.”

For Reich Finance Minister Hermann Dietrich, the prerequisite for a return to a “healthy” state of affairs was to purge capitalism of its “speculative elements” and to re-introduce the “service functions” that banks were supposed to perform for the economy. “The struggle for and against high finance has ended with the influence of the Reich on the big banks,” maintained Dietrich in his defense of the take-over of parts of Friedrich Flick’s corporation by the Reich. He stressed that the aim was to use new personnel “to liquidate the Babylonian tower-building, which had become unhealthy and unsustainable within establishments, in a way that would least harm the Reich and the German economy.” According to Dietrich, the alternative, namely not intervening, would have meant a “gigantic crash” of the economy that would have cost hundreds of thousands of people their jobs.

It is important to keep in mind that the Reich did not just intervene in the business of the big banks, banks that, as we would say today, were of “systemic” importance to the economic system. Taking over the banks was tantamount to making fast decisions about


who should be saved and who should not. The author of the 1933 book *Konzernkrach* mentioned an “eminent banker” and adviser to the Brüning government of whom it was said that before falling asleep each night his last thought was about which debtor should receive the order to clear his debit balance the next morning”.35 In his memoirs, Brüning vividly describes, with a trace of anger, the appeals for help by former business heroes such as Friedrich Flick and Otto Wolff, but also the doggedness of the representatives of farmers, both churches, and the center-right political parties. Despite striking cases of mismanagement and, as it turned out, sometimes outright fraud, people ceaselessly approached the Reich Chancellery in pursuit of bail-out loans. Among them was the Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland (People’s Association for Catholic Germany), an important organization associated with Brüning’s own Catholic Center Party. The association had overextended its finances by vastly expanding not only its printing plant in Mönchen-Gladbach but its entire media business (with the involvement a banker by the name of Brüning, an unrelated namesake of the chancellor, whose activities became an embarrassment for the politician because his name kept being mentioned in the context of criminal prosecutions). The otherwise staunch defender of market liberalism, the Wirtschaftspartei, asked for help for the Berliner Handelsbank, to which the party was closely connected. The financial troubles of the large home-loan bank Devaheim, a bank associated with the Protestant Church, endangered funds that had been donated to support the church’s missions and ended in a well-publicized trial, which revealed serious fraud. No doubt the demands that were most vexing for Brüning were those made by the agricultural interests close to the Conservatives and to his own Center Party, with their incessant call for public monies to bail out their indebted landed properties and their ailing agricultural credit institutions, some of which were in scandalous shape.36

These public efforts to rescue companies were problematic not only for economic and fiscal reasons, but also because they raised serious concerns with respect to the morality of political behavior. Who was to be bailed out with taxpayers’ money directly by the Reich or indirectly, by way of the newly state-controlled banks? For that matter: who was to make that decision? It is striking how willing Brüning was to incriminate himself and his government after the war; for he must have known that his own description of the disbursement of public funds to certain groups and individuals left him and the Republic vulnerable to accusations of political corruption. No doubt Brüning


wanted to hold a mirror up to those who had accused the Republic of corruption: His revelations were aimed not only at agrarian groups but even at the Reich President Hindenburg’s entourage, whom he connected to dubious financial transactions. This included rumors about the head of the Commerz- und Privatbank, Curt Sobernheim, who had lost a fortune in the stock market crash and had allegedly “taken down” with him the wives of men connected to Hindenburg, as a result of highly speculative deals. According to Brüning, there was pressure on the bank to absorb the losses incurred by the speculation accounts of these individuals out of consideration for the upcoming presidential election. This was problematic — just as it had been in the case of Adenauer when he was bailed out by the Deutsche Bank — because the Commerzbank had also been partially been taken over by the Reich. Similarly problematic was a secret campaign fund for the 1932 presidential election to support the republican parties (but also the NSDAP), financed in great part by Friedrich Flick. Flick, whom the historian Georg Hallgarten called a “daredevil speculator,” had been bailed out by the Reich when it bought his financially troubled iron and steel conglomerate, the Charlottenhütte, for what everybody considered an exorbitantly high price.37 In the end, one might read Brüning’s account not only as a story about the selfishness and political and economic opportunism of the times, but more importantly, as a story illustrating how the speculative spirit bred political corruption and eventually threatened to engulf even those, like Brüning, who otherwise had nothing to do with political corruption.

V.

As early as 1927, the U.S. Federal Reserve talked about taking the wind out of the sails of “speculative excesses” that had led to a misallocation of financial resources, heated up the stock market and undoubtedly caused real “excesses.” For a long time, it has been argued that the Federal Reserve was greatly responsible not only for the crash in 1929 but also the Great Depression. There has also been much debate on the question of whether the American happy-go-lucky stock market boom actually had a solid foundation, as some American economists would argue today. Most contemporaries would have disagreed, and this is certainly true of most politicians. President Hoover’s Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon alluded to past excesses when he said: “I will purge the rottenness of the system.”38 His German counterpart, Reich Finance Minister Hermann Dietrich,


and many in the Brüning administration would have agreed, although for different reasons. In Germany the stock market boom had already burst in 1927, although there was a upsurge in 1929 that misled many.39 As Brüning wrote in his memoirs, in 1931 his ministers and the state bureaucracy were confronted with “an abyss of corruption and imprudence in business that not only surpassed all imagination but [evoked] a measure of change in the temperament and eagerness to work among all of the cabinet members.” With bitterness he recalled the “cold-bloodedness” with which he, members of his government, and high-ranking civil servants were frequently “lied” to. According to Brüning, during one of the many meetings after the bank crash of 1931 the president of the Reichsbank, Hans Luther, got enraged and claimed that “all the people sitting across from us here are crooks. They were all broke back in 1926. I said the very same thing to them already in 1926.”40 Here Luther was referring to the situation after the hyperinflation when the books had not been properly adjusted. “The healing process within the German economy is not yet completed,” wrote one business journalist in his book Konzernkrach (The Company Crash), published in early 1933. In the period following World War I, particularly after the stabilization of the currency in 1923/24, he argued, both well-known “Inflationsgrößen” (“great men of the inflation,” an ironic circumscription of ruthless profiteers and speculators) — the author mentioned Jakob Michael and Hugo Stinnes, among others — and “old-school businessmen,” who ran firms like Nordwolle, Favag, Karstadt and the Burbach ironworks, “did not have the right feeling for numbers after the stabilization of the currency. The lack of a proper sense of proportion in a stable currency did not always lead to the demise of a company. But it put most businesses in very dangerous situations and it always ended with the final financial ruin and ultimate downfall of their power-hungry and short-sighted directors general.”41

The subtext of such contemporary commentaries is that something had been going wrong since the stabilization of the currency in 1923/24; they also convey the notion of a “sick economy.” Since the important work of Knut Borchardt, we associate this notion with “high” wages, taxes, and social welfare costs, an “overstaffed” banking apparatus, and the wrong uses of foreign credit, such as their use by German cities to build parks and swimming pools. No doubt, this perspective was shared by Brüning and many others, especially economists and businessmen. However, for the Brüning government the problem ran deeper and came to the fore during the recession: the

40 Heinrich Brüning, Memoiren, 309, 449, 522.
41 Abraham, Konzernkrach, 15ff. (quote), 192.
monetary stabilization had not put the economy on a sound footing; although the earlier “excesses of the inflation” might have vanished from sight, they were not altogether purged. Underlying this was a strong feeling of disillusionment because for a while things had looked different: in 1927/28, it looked like the courts had dealt with the big cases of real or alleged mismanagement, speculation, and political corruption during the inflation. There had been a widespread feeling at that time that the past craze had caused practices that were characteristic of the inflation period and that these were now being abandoned. It was believed that the return to economic normalcy would quite naturally weed out the relicts of former excesses, which also had such a disastrous impact on the moral order of society. The vexing issue was that the depression brought to the surface all sorts of Luftgeschäfte\textsuperscript{42} that had been associated with the speculative fervor of the inflation period: devastating forms of speculation by seemingly reasonable individuals; forms of cheating; and, not to be forgotten, the corruption of business ethics that had become associated with the Grenzgänger of capitalism.

The politics of deflation, pursued by both the Brüning government and the Hoover administration, served many purposes, both economically and politically. But there can be no doubt that deflation was, among other things, a strategy designed to rid the system of past speculation and its ill effects. Some economists studying this period, such as Barry Eichengreen, have stressed the “golden fetters” of the gold standard, which led the defenders of the gold standard to argue for the crushing regiment of deflation. It is more just than a side note to mention the derogatory remarks of R. H. Mottram, the proponent of “Speculation” mentioned earlier. At the height of the speculation frenzy he argued that, thanks to new forms of credit, the gold standard was now not much more than an outmoded “curiosity,” which “perpetuat[ed] the peasant mentality that is never really sure of itself unless it can handle tangible metal.” The idea that “the million individual bargains upon which all Speculation, as well as ordinary trade, is founded, could be liquidated in gold, may seem to the modern mind a trifle cumbrous.”\textsuperscript{43} Such utterances illustrate that the “rules” of the gold standard, namely deflationary policies, made it possible to liquidate speculative ventures — and with it the phantasms of speculation of the likes of Mottram. In our own day, Timothy Geithner, the former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, has characterized the current German position as a “moral-hazard fundamentalism,” that is, the conviction that those responsible for

\textsuperscript{42} On the semantics of this topic, see Nicolas Berg, \textit{Luftmenschen: Zur Geschichte einer Metapher} (Göttingen, 2008).

\textsuperscript{43} Mottram, \textit{History}, 305ff.
the crisis should not get away without repercussions. At least with respect to what happened in the early 1930s, Geithner’s words definitely capture a widespread “Old Testament sort of revenge” directed against banks, bankers, and businessmen that had allowed things to develop as they did.44

VI.

It should not come as a surprise that Germany’s economic crisis inaugurated an intense debate about the future of capitalism and the role of the state. Although the debate was polyphonic, most voices agreed that the state was to play a new role in the economy. In Germany, a jurist like Carl Schmitt set the agenda. In 1931, Schmitt diagnosed a “Wendung zum totalen Staat” (a turn toward the total state) that had been going on since the war. He was convinced that this was not a positive sign because what was happening was that since the war “society was organizing itself as the state.” In other words, social interests were taking over the state, a development that Schmitt saw reflected in the newly prevalent ideas of a Wirtschaftsstaat, Sozialstaat and Kulturstaat. This development posed a threat because it made “all social and economic problems immediately become problems of the state.” For Schmitt, who liked paradoxical formulations, this state was “total because of [its] weakness and inability to resist, because of its inability to withstand the onslaught of political parties and organized interests.” Schmitt’s alternative total state would be different; for it would not be “undermined by any catchwords like liberalism, constitutional state, or however one wants to call it.” The strong Italian fascist state offered such options. In 1931/32, Schmitt, who later welcomed Hitler, still argued for other options: Reich President, bureaucracy and army were to function as “custodians of the constitution” (Hüter der Verfassung). At a time when many experts argued that the Reich’s fiscal policies already amounted to a “military dictatorship” or that the worsening of the economic crisis necessitated declaring a “state of siege” (Belagerungszustand), Schmitt argued that the emergency powers under Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, which included possible economic intervention, were to play an important part in restoring the authority of the state.45

Restoring “order” was the slogan of the day and became one of the key concepts that pervaded a wide variety of public and academic debates. Unlike most modern economists, contemporary economists had still been trained in history, government, and public policy, and

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Schmitt’s odd but sharp thinking raised many questions that had been asked in other academic fields. Restoring the authority of the state was not just a matter of theory. It pertained foremost to the constitutional reorganization of the institutional arrangements for nearly everything: the constitutional relationship between Reich and Länder; social, economic and fiscal policies; or the future of parliamentarianism, for that matter. Equally important were the efforts to prevent future economic crisis and to safeguard for fiscal solidity. The execution of this task was delegated to the state bureaucracies, which were empowered legally and, equally important, “idealistically” by official emergency decrees and constant public appeals to a state of economic and political emergency. Given the malfunctioning of the parliamentary system, this emergency was broadly discussed as a general Staatsnotstand. It implied a constant appeal to idealized forms of state and bureaucratic rule, which, so it was argued, had been subverted by the parliament and special private interests. With respect to a revitalized state, this ideology shaped the mentalities of all actors, trickled down into bureaucratic practices, and shaped new institutional set-ups. The flight into the executive state was tantamount to opening a Pandora’s box, at least in Germany. In no other country did revisions of the economic order become so entangled with ideas and initiatives for what turned out to be open-ended revisions of the political order. Yet in all European countries, the efforts to fight the effects of the Great Depression changed the rules of the political and economic game. For the sake of brevity, the remainder of this article will focus on several regulatory solutions that were implemented at the time and eventually led to the new economic order of National Socialism in different, yet curiously interconnected ways.

There is no scarcity of studies that detail the series of far-reaching state interventions, mostly by ad hoc emergency decrees, right after the banking crisis in the summer of 1931. These interventions created the basis of an altogether new regulatory framework for banking, which eventually became codified in the Reich Banking Act of 5 December 1934 (and which continued to be applied in West Germany after the war). It regulated not only the government supervision of banks but also lending, minimum capital provisions, cash reserves, bank licensing, and rules about making loans to members of the bank (which had been one source of speculation before the war). It was within this new legal framework that the re-privatization of the banks took place in the mid-1930s in Germany. Economic historians generally characterize it as an “overdue modernization” of the
banking system. Analogous laws and regulatory frameworks can be found in many other countries, such as in the United States under President Roosevelt. These laws aimed at fencing in and reorganizing the banking system — which despite many regulatory efforts was still firmly rooted in the age of economic liberalism — in order to rid it of the ills that had come to the fore in the previous years and to create a new framework.

As studies of German banks by Harold James, Dieter Ziegler, Johannes Bähr, and others have demonstrated in detail, the government also exerted great pressure on the banks with regard to personnel decisions. Identifying those who were to blame for past failure was most important, so it is not astonishing that it was a common sport to pass on the blame to others. By emergency decree it was possible to radically reduce the number of supervisory board members in companies, a step that went hand in hand with strong pressure from the government to get rid of executive board members and other men in leading positions in the newly state-controlled banks and to appoint fiduciaries, especially to key positions. The directives issued by the Brüning government were quite specific: the new credo was clearly to “eliminate speculators in the banks.” Brüning stated that “[u]nder no circumstances are individuals allowed in top management who are in debt to their own bank by way of “speculation accounts.” He made the same point even more pressingly elsewhere: “The people who are burdened with the odium of mistakes should be eliminated as far as consideration for continuity of general technical operations allows.”

Despite the many studies on bank history, we know very little about the “golden age” of speculative dealing among bank employees and board members. From the perspective of those involved, the line between what was and what was not considered “speculative” with regard to business financing was by no means obvious. The way the failure of Deutsche Bank was handled in the Katzenellenbogen case, for example, makes it clear that those responsible were usually able to maneuver their way out of taking responsibility.

Still, the outside pressure exerted by the new men at the big banks who had the backing of the Reich, by the pending judicial investigations, and, last but not least, by public opinion should not be underestimated, any more than the new pressure exerted within organizations. Georg Solmsen, the spokesman for the managing board of Deutsche Bank is a good example. On the one hand, he defended the autonomy of banks and criticized those who did not want


to acknowledge the political origins of the present economic crisis. On the other hand, he adopted the criticism of banks made by men like Brüning and Dittrich by blaming the “speculators” within the ranks of business: “For periods at a time, the German economy kneeled before people whose knowledge and talent amounted to nothing more than speculation with stocks.” Like many others, he also argued that, in order to stay autonomous from governmental interventions in the future, the private sector of the economy (Privatwirtschaft) had to cleanse itself of “Schädlinge” (parasites or vermin). He combined his call for a renewed code of honor with his own endorsement of a “clean capitalism,” which would include the rule that members of banks could not mingle private and bank business.51 This said, it is worth noting that Reichsbank President Hans Luther, who had more than one confrontation with Solmssen after the banking crisis of 1931, included a joke circulating about Solmssen in his otherwise sober and factual autobiography: A fairy offers to grant Solmssen one wish. And what does the man who was happily living a life of luxury on Berlin’s island of Schwanenwerder wish for? To know at least once the stock market quotes of the day after tomorrow.52

Combating Schädlinge was of paramount importance in government policy. This implied making decisions about which enterprises were to survive. Albert Hackelsberger, one of Brüning’s economic advisors, argued that this meant implementing not only “reforms of a tangible nature,” like the above-mentioned Reich Banking Act, but also “a reform of attitude, of business ethics” that was particularly necessary “if the moral principles in our economies are to gain ground, if we truly want to experience a healthy economy once again.” The rhetoric included catchwords like the “dienende Funktion der Banken” (the service function of banks), and especially after 1933, slogans like “Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz” (public interest before self-interest). At first sight, such utterances might appear to be empty and meaningless rhetorical formulas. But they implied important strategies of “othering,” of making speculation and speculative behavior something outside acceptable “normal” — bourgeois or decent business — behavior. Unfortunately we know next to nothing about changing forms of business ethic and habitus (in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu) in the banking community. What was decent and ethical business behavior is difficult to decide to begin with; this is even more the case after the political regime change in 1933 when the rules of the game changed fundamentally. As Harold James had argued, the “internal dynamics of bank bureaucracy,” namely the prevailing opportunism


52 Hans Luther, Vor dem Abgrund 1930–1933: Reichsbankpräsident in Krisenzeiten (Berlin, 1964), 51ff.
to conform to the new regime also for the sake of newly available jobs, helped “to permeate National Socialist ideology through the bank.”53 As Georg Solmssen wrote in a moving letter in April 1933, there existed a pervasive atmosphere of a “manifest lack of any feeling of solidarity” on the part of those who had formerly worked “side by side with Jewish colleagues.” There was not only an “ever-clearer readiness to take personal advantage of the fact that jobs are now falling vacant”; but “the dead silence that greets the ignominy and shame irremediably inflicted on those who, albeit innocent, find the foundations of their honor and livelihood undermined from one day to the next” was conspicuous.54 By 1933, speculative activity could easily be subsumed under the rubric of “Jewish behavior.” How these resentments against “Jewish speculators” came to influence decision making even before 1933 is hard to say. Recruiting patterns might be one clue: the men Brüning trusted for economic advice and the majority of the new fiduciaries appointed by the Reich were not Jewish.55

Even before 1933, more often than not the plea for rejuvenation called for draconian measures to punish those guilty of misdeeds. The above-mentioned Hackelsberger called for martial courts (Standgerichte), which was quite typical of this line of state-of-emergency thinking and in tune with popular, and populist, pleas across party lines not to treat profiteers and ruthless speculators with the proverbial “velvet gloves” (see figure 2). Mocking the lengthy indictments and court verdicts of up to a thousand pages, he argued that martial courts offered a chance to “try such cases in the fastest way possible in a type of pretrial and at least bring the individuals concerned behind bars.”56 It is not without bitter irony that Hackelsberger, who was to collaborate very closely with the Nazis, ended up dying in pretrial detention on charges of allegedly violating the foreign-currency regulations.

VII.

Nowhere is this peculiar mixture of resentment against speculation, anti-Semitism, state-of-emergency exigencies, prevailing technocratic ideas for solving “acute problems,” and the logic of punishment more apparent than in the new regime of capital controls designed to control transnational capital movements. Given the lack of trust in the German Mark, the flight of not only foreign, especially American, capital but also of German capital to nearby safe havens like the Netherlands and Switzerland was a real issue.57 Ever since
One of the more drastic, although originally quite peripheral measures in this new effort to control the flight of capital was the so-called *Reichsfluchtsteuer* (tax on those who flee the country), which was introduced along with a large number of other fiscal, economic, and political measures by emergency decree on 8 December 1931.59 German citizens who gave up their domestic residency and settled abroad were charged a one-time tax amounting to 25 percent of their taxable assets and income. Not only was the rate of this tax exorbitant, the sanctions were drastic. Wanted posters (*Steuersteckbriefe*)

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58 Oddly enough, it was the Oscar Wassermann from Deutsche Bank who communicated this point to the Jewish Secretary of Finance Hans Schäffer and combined this with the idea of including the Nazis in the government coalition, IZ, ED 93/9 Tagebücher Hans Schäffer 14.10.1930, 253.

were issued for delinquent taxpayers and posted publicly alongside those of common criminals. Moreover, they were required to pay an additional five-percent penalty fee for each commenced half-month that they had failed to pay the original tax. Mathematically, this meant that a person’s entire property could be confiscated within a short period. The official justification of this particular section of the emergency decree read that “wealthy Germans who resettle abroad not in order to leave the country permanently but to avoid the high tax burden” had committed “treason against the German people.” The aim of this provision of the emergency degree was to have the “tax refugees” resettle in Germany. No doubt, this decree was motivated not only by fiscal reasons. After all, cracking down on tax-evaders, especially those who “fled” the country, was popular among all political parties, left and right. And the underlying sentiments of retribution are more than apparent, as can be seen in some very odd paragraphs of the first drafts of the Reichsfluchtsteuer decree, which were deleted from the final version: upon returning to Germany, persons were to be imprisoned; one had even thought about a clause that would have allowed every citizen to detain individuals under suspicion.60

The history of the Reichsfluchtsteuer brings me back to Jakob und Erna Michael, who were among the first to be targeted. In 1931, Jakob Michael settled in the Netherlands, to be followed the next year by his wife. In the summer of 1932, Berlin tax authorities issued the Michaels their first tax bill, as stipulated by this new legislation, of more than 8 million RM which by itself was ruinous to the credit-worthiness of Michael’s enterprises. In January and July 1933, assets valued in the millions were confiscated in advance of criminal proceedings. The confiscations in early January alone were enough to plunge the company into dire financial straits because the debt, consisting of tax obligations and preliminary fines, was growing constantly. At the beginning of 1935, tax authorities calculated that the Michaels currently owed 14 million RM, of which 12 million RM were for the Reichsfluchtsteuer (which at that point was still not legally binding because Michael was contesting it). When we consider that in 1931/32 and 1932/33 totals of 1.9 million and 1 million RM, respectively, were collected through the Reichsfluchtsteuer, it becomes clear that the Michaels were not the proverbial “little fish” to be caught in the tax net, but the really big ones.61 In fact, it seems quite likely that the business enterprises of the Michaels actually prompted the introduction of the Reichsfluchtsteuer to begin with. But there is no tangible proof of this, although Finance Minister Hermann Dietrich,
who had notorious resentments against Jews, argued in November 1931 that “Der Handelsjuden, der uns so hohe Zinsen abgenommen hat, kann jetzt auch einmal ordentlich etwas hergeben.” (The Jewish trader who charged us such high interest should now fork over a substantial sum.) Michael’s name did surface in the context of important revisions to this tax law in 1934, after the highest German tax court had in fact decided in Michael’s favor because he still maintained a residence in Germany. The revisions of the law that were made in response to the court’s verdict were very important insofar as they granted tax authorities an arbitrary right to access the assets of all those citizens who dared not return to Germany after the Nazi seizure of power on 30 January 1933 and who would — sooner or later — be driven from Germany or would flee to avoid persecution.

The German tax and customs authorities suspected that the Michaels systematically transferred capital and firm stock out of Germany; and Brüning’s reference in his memoirs to a supposed “Mantelkorporation,” that is, a holding company, in Connecticut shows that Michael’s was a notorious and widely discussed case at the time. The authorities also suspected that he had broken foreign currency and capital control regulations, justifying other penalties of several million Reichsmark. No doubt, these radical efforts must also be seen in the context of past frustrations. The extreme complexity of Michael’s corporate organization was a vexing issue for tax officials (although we do not know if it was any more vexing than, for instance, the setup of the mega-rich Thyssen family); in 1925/26 the financier had been on the radar of state prosecutors, whose clutches he escaped by leaving the country for a while. “Speculation” was not an explicit argument for prosecution, but this charge lurked in the background. A good illustration for this is a letter from March 1932 written by the president of the Landesfinanzamt Kassel. He pleaded strongly in favor of the criminal prosecution of the Michael Corporation. It was generally known, he argued, that the corporation had exhibited “behavior damaging to the German economy”; some of the business consisted of “purely theatrical accounting maneuvers” and the “focus of business operations does not lie in commodity transactions but in speculation. The head of the firm pursues only one aim, to transfer every bit of profit possible abroad.” The company management, he argued, acted “according to principles that fortunately are foreign to German business life in this manner . . . I consider it absolutely necessary to carry out the proceedings. Such elements have to be excluded from German business. To tolerate them in order to cover

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62 His Staatssekretär, Schäffer, noted this utterance, which was not further debated. The article in “Der Handelsjuden” is unspecific although it should be noted that Jakob Michael had been blamed for “usury” in 1924; IfZ ED 93/15, Tagebücher Hans Schäffer, 17.11.1931, 1028; 4.12.1931, 1131.

63 Referat Zülow, 17.1.1934, letter with the enclosed draft, p. 2. Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 2/57129; Friedenberger, Fiskalische Ausplünderung, 78.
the misjudgments of the credit banks and other creditors [who ran the risk of losing their money if Michael’s property was confiscated for the Reich — MHG] may be very dangerous.”

After 1933, any scruples about making such remarks had disappeared, especially among National Socialists. In connection with the debates that started in 1933/34 about the expatriation of the Michaels, the mayor of Berlin intervened and emphasized that, in reference to the non-collectible tax debt, there existed “great interest in the expedited implementation of the initiated expatriation proceedings and especially in the confiscation of all domestic property.” The “thoroughly labyrinthine and unproductive Michael Corporation,” with its multitude of companies, had to be “made to disappear from the tax lists.” The city referred to reports from the Netherlands, where Michael was said to surround himself “exclusively with Jews” who had fled or emigrated from Germany and whom he also supported.

The way in which the language of exclusion became radicalized and was adapted to new conventions is clearly illustrated by the case of a young public prosecutor in Berlin. In 1933, this prosecutor had investigated charges of “currency profiteering” (Devisenschiebungen) and initially came to the conclusion that the charges levelled by the Frankfurt customs authorities in connection with the tax bill of over 4 million Marks could not be upheld. Only later did he apparently realize that his assessment of the case was not at all opportune. He not only back-tracked, attempted to erase his earlier derogatory marginalia on the statement submitted by the customs authorities, and charged the corporation with violating the foreign currency law; in an article in the journal Juristische Wochenschrift he tried to demonstrate that his personal convictions were on the right side: “Since the beginning of the currency controls, but primarily since the National Socialist revolution, it can be seen increasingly that Jews living or having emigrated abroad and other economic parasites — that is, primarily those circles who nearly trip over themselves in the most boundless denigration of the German people and its new national leadership — band together for commercial currency graft. Entire bands of such profit-seekers without homeland and conscience appear on the scene in Germany and help each other in the prohibited currency and Sperrmark business with the aim not only of carrying off the wealth of our people and endangering the German currency, but also of raking in the sometimes very high profit linked to it at our expense.”

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In practice, the case of Michael’s expropriation and expatriation (deprivation of citizenship) dragged out until the end of the 1930s. It was utterly Kafkaesque, first because of endless infighting between German tax and custom agencies, and hence between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economics, over whose claims were to take priority and which regulations applied at which time. In addition, there were independent efforts, especially by the NSDAP, to deprive the Michaels of German citizenship on the basis of new legislation, which, incidentally, was also the easiest way to confiscate their property. Stuck somewhere in between were Michael’s private German creditors, who feared that they would go empty-handed if the Reich fiscal authorities got their way. The case of the Michaels was also Kafkaesque — and probably singular — for the simple reason that Michael outsmarted the German bureaucrats. After 1933 he sold the Köster AG, which ran highly successful department stores, and whose stock he had transferred to the Netherlands and later from there onto an account in England and thus placed out of the reach of German claims, to a sham owner from New York. This owner not only operated and even expanded this successful business in an alliance of convenience with leading Nazi and SS functionaries. He even repurchased company property, including the real estate of the Michaelschen Hackeschen Hof GmbH, which had previously been sold off at a foreclosure auction. As if all of this was not strange enough, in 1940 the Auswärtige Amt, which handled revocation of German citizenship, had to rescind Michael’s expatriation of 1938 because of new information it had received, from unclear sources. It became known that, already in 1931, the Michaels had acquired Lichtenstein citizenship.

Clearly, the “speculator” Michael, who had been a continuous object of attack and slander, had apparently already bet in 1931 on Germany’s declining future and his own and his family’s survival outside of Germany. With respect to the Köster AG, he also might have speculated in the 1930s on a German future without the Nazis. In the 1950s he sold his department stores to Horten, who ran department-stores and with whom he had cooperated earlier. However, his valuable properties in the Soviet Zone, especially in Berlin-Mitte, were confiscated as assets belonging to “war criminals and Nazi activists,” which made this an important and complicated case of restitution in the 1990s.

VIII.

The case of the Michaels demonstrates that the popular call to rid Germany of speculation must be seen with some ambivalence, all

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the more so if one wants to frame this history in terms of success or failure. The emergency legislation of the late Weimar Republic brought about a new institutional framework that helped to contain certain excesses that were blamed for the crisis. At the same time, this initiative went astray, as the case of Reichsfluchtsteuer illustrates. The prevalent mentality, a form of state-of-emergency thinking with Schmittian subtones, no doubt facilitated this.69 After the Nazi seizure of power this thinking rapidly became radicalized and associated Jews with speculation, which was a convenient way of “othering” speculation and speculators. Like many Germans, the majority of the Nazis did not like banks, and they liked Jewish bankers — known in their jargon as Jewish Börsenfürsten (stock market princes) — even less.70 At the time, almost everybody considered the rhetoric of expropriating and expatriating these Börsenfürsten lunatic and absurd; but by the late 1930s the Nazi agenda had, by and large, translated it into reality.

Equally interesting and a matter for future research is another question, namely what implications all of this had for ideas about and actual practices of speculation among those Germans who were deemed worthy of being Volksgenossen. First of all, one should keep in mind that the “cleansing campaign” of the spring of 1933 was also directed against many people who had been charged with speculation, corruption, and illicit behavior. Despite a few show trials (such as the ones of the Volksverein and the leadership of the Center party) and a good number of individual convictions, not much came out of this except that it left a considerable number of people frightened for their lives and property. There is evidence that the new Reich Economics Minister, Hermann Göring, held his protective hands over some of these “black sheep” — only to extort money for whitewashing them.71 Unfortunately, we know little about the long-term implications of these developments for general attitudes toward speculation, specifically how they might have affected individual participation in the stock market or how they helped to shape a new alliance between banks and industry, based on a new consensus on a “producing” and “productive” economy. After 1945, there were strong voices within the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank that distanced themselves from the “system of [Jakob] Goldschmidt.” The “Hasadeur,” that is the “player”, and the “Bankrotteur,” who “should never have been allowed to become Großbankdirektor,” had become the scapegoat responsible for everything that had gone wrong.72

69 Geyer, Grenzüberschreitungen, 372-375.
70 I will pursue this topic in some other context.
Did the aversion to speculation lay the foundation for the “tamed capitalism” of the postwar period? In the United States, Wall Street and brokerage firms had become “dull places” to work by the 1930s.73 Anyone interested in the issue of speculation in the postwar period looked back at the late 1920s; the speculation and the big players of the time appeared to be nothing but curious phenomena of a long-gone era. The lessons of speculation seemed to have been learned. However, as John Kenneth Galbraith has reminded us, “financial memory” lasts no longer than twenty years.74

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Forum: The Challenge of Biography

Edited by Atiba Pertilla and Uwe Spiekermann
I. The Complexity of Biography

Biography as a perspective on the world, a method of historical research, a form of literature and a phenomenon of popular culture is currently enjoying another boom on both sides of the Atlantic. Biography continues to be one of the most popular genres of non-fiction writing, offering a broad spectrum of variants that range from literary to scholarly biography, not to mention numerous non-prose forms like biopics, comics, and even operas. While the general reading public has never lost its taste for life stories, biography now is also back within academia’s ambit. After a longer period of marginalization and theoretical neglect under the onslaught of social history, the cultural turn in the humanities has triggered a revival of biography among scholars. This new fashion has not only produced an intense and diverse theoretical debate in a hitherto largely undertheorized field but also a lot of experimentation with new forms of biographical research and narrative.¹

Still, despite all these exciting new developments in the field of an emerging “new biography,” biographical approaches continue to trigger considerable fundamental criticism. Pierre Bourdieu thus spoke of the “biographical illusion,” insisting that the suggested coherence and directedness of a biography is a “socially irreproachable artifact.” As such it was largely the result of an individual applying the socially accepted practices, models and narratives of social identity to his own life.² Other critics, describing biography as a “quixotic enterprise,” highlight the elusiveness of a historical actor’s personality and character.³ Others have stressed the impossibility of reconstructing the life of a person as it actually was from the records, usually written, handed down to us, as extensive as this biographical evidence may be.⁴ Finally, many historians reject biography because it doesn’t seem to add substantially to our understanding of the past. Thus, in September 1999, Stanley Fish attacked modern biography as “Minutiae without Meaning” that produced “little more than a collection of random incidents, and the only truth being told is the truth of contingency, of events succeeding one another in a universe of accident and chance.”⁵


This criticism has to be confronted, of course, and the answers cannot be simple because biography itself is anything but simple. Rather, it is a highly complex phenomenon, and whatever we do with it, we have to start with the complexity that results from biography being situated between scholarship, literature and popular culture. The term “biography” itself has multiple meanings; it oscillates between the life itself and its narrative representation. To make matters even more complicated, “biography” also refers to an epistemological principle of organizing a perspective on the past centered on persons and individual agency. As such, biography rests on the premise that historical individuals are clearly identifiable psycho-physical entities which can be analyzed as historical facts in terms of change over time and of cause and effect.

Alongside the very ambivalence of the term, the hybridity of the literary genre “biography” defines the complexity of the phenomenon that we are talking about here. Biography moves between fact and fiction, curricula vitae and literary narratives, the fact-based historical reconstruction and the imaginative construction of lived lives. A biography turns a curriculum vita into a story, it reconstructs past worlds through narration, and it produces narrated worlds of the past. Following narrative patterns in the service of a “good story,” it has its own literary conventions and its own pressures of dramaturgy, climax, cohesion and closure. As a narrative, a biography turns the life of a historical person into a meaningful and fully intelligible whole that is constructed by the biographer through his or her selection and composition of individual motifs and elements. It is the biographer who decides on beginnings and endings, about periodization and turning-points, about linear or non-linear patterns of narrative, about what he tells and what he chooses not to tell. In transforming lives into stories, biographies are carried by the tension between lived and narrated lives. Situated somewhere between scholarship and literary art, biography shares many features with the novel.

This, however, is still not the whole story. Biography is also a hybrid because of its complex relationship to autobiography. The historicist tradition drew a clear distinction between both forms of life writing, with autobiography defined as the self-description of a person while biography was the source-based reconstruction of a subject’s life by a third person. Thus, the supposed “subjectivity” of autobiography was sharply distinguished from the supposed “objectivity” of biography. This once clear-cut distinction has increasingly eroded over the last
two decades or so. Today’s scholars point instead to the multiple and complex entanglements between autobiography and biography. It is very hard for the biographer to step out of the shadow of his subject’s autobiographical self-descriptions so that the voice and self-concept of a biographical subject are acknowledged and analyzed by the biographer’s narrative.

Then there are the biographers themselves, who are hardly ever detached observers but have a personal, if not emotional relationship to their subjects. Anybody who writes a biography has his own lived life as a criterion of comparison and judgment. Thus, one always has to assess the autobiographical element when an author commits an “act of biography.”

A last factor of complexity needs to be addressed: the readers and the communicative pragmatics of biography. It is true that biography is one of the last bastions of referential writing. They want to be read as referential texts, and the reader reads them with the expectation of learning something about the life of a real historical person. At the same time, the author of a biography promises to do just that. Taking Philippe Lejeune’s idea of an “autobiographical pact” to the field of biography, we could say that the writers and readers of biography enter into a “biographical pact” that validates the biography as a referential text. In sum, the complexity of biography as a hybrid literary genre results from the multilayered and complex relationships between the biographical subject, the biographer, the narration and the reader.

The very complexity of the phenomenon biography calls for interdisciplinarity, and biographical research is very interdisciplinary, indeed. A recent handbook on the methods, traditions and theories of biography edited by Christian Klein thus contains chapters on biographical studies in history, literary criticism, art history, musicology, sociology, political science, theology and religious studies, pedagogy, medicine and psychology, gender studies, postcolonial studies and Jewish Studies. Against this backdrop of a mindboggling diversity of the field, the focus of the following remarks will be on the development, major problems and opportunities of biographical research in the field of history.

II. The Ups and Downs of Biography in Historiography

Generally speaking, the development of biography in academic historiography was closely tied to the major paradigm shifts in the


profession. In the beginning, of course, there was historicism, and historicism was three things in one, a weltanschauung, a concept of history, and a method for investigating the past. As a weltanschauung looking upon all things historically, historicism offered a very powerful concept of history centering in ideas, individuals and states. The relationship between these three prime historical forces was inherently dynamic: ideas were thought to be historical actors in their own right striving for “realization.” Historical individuals were both carriers of certain ideas and actors in the historical process, literally “making” history by transforming ideas into reality. For a historiography indebted to this person- and agency-centered concept of history, biography was somehow the ideal method of research and form of narrative.

As a method, historicism centered in the epistemological concept of “verstehen,” which is only imperfectly translated as “understanding.” Rather, it means “participant observation,” “immersion,” and “empathy” with the subject of study. Focused on the “individuality,” “uniqueness,” and “contingency” of historical phenomena, historicism was driven by a quest for the specific and contingent. In this context, the term “verstehen” described the intellectual operation which, in cyclical movements, embedded concrete phenomena into the larger whole of the time specific contexts to reconstruct the specific “meaning” and “function” of a historical phenomenon.

The social history turn of the 1960s–1970s replaced the focus on the individual and agency with anonymous structures and processes, and it moved away from “verstehen” to embrace “erklären,” i.e., the explanation and analysis of historical phenomena in terms of general patterns, external factors and structural formations. Social historians analyzed societies as a whole and their major groups were interested in patterns of inequality, the mechanisms of social cohesion and the sources of social conflict. This form of historical inquiry privileged the collective over the individual and was only interested in individual biographies and experiences as manifestations of collective entities. Stressing that all individuality was socially conditioned, social historians tended to be more interested in social types, collective profiles and recurring patterns in individual lives. Therefore, social groups and shared social identities classified along the lines of class, occupation, gender, ethnicity, race and religion became the new objects of study. In the eyes of many social historians, for example the late Gerald D. Feldman, social historians and biographers were living on different planets.

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Under the auspices of the cultural turn, which, to some extent, evolved as the critique of a social history exclusively privileging anonymous structures and processes, the subjective dimension of history experienced a powerful comeback. As different as they are, cultural approaches to the past are eventually all interested in the question of how social groups made sense out of the world they were living in, how they interpreted it as “meaningful,” and how this shaped, structured, defined and motivated their individual and collective actions in their world. This suggests, to quote Jo Burr Margadant, that if historians want “to understand how people assume the identity that situates and motivates them in relation to others, it is necessary to grasp the symbolic world from which they construct meaning in their lives.” This new focus on meaning-making and agency has produced a new interest in biography.

The “new biography,” however, is not just a simple return to the epistemology of historicism. Rather, the new biography incorporates approaches from the fields of poststructuralist criticism, narratology, discourse analysis as well as media and communication studies to re-conceptualize biography and autobiography as acts of meaning making in those processes of social communication through which social groups negotiate their notions of reality, their perspective on their environment, and their place in the world. Furthermore, in questioning the very premises, paradigms, and traditions of biography that were developed from the lives and deeds of white, male, western, “great men,” feminist criticism, ethnic studies and postcolonial theory have fundamentally changed our understanding of “biography-worthy” historical actors and thus dramatically enlarged the spectrum of possible biographical subjects.

Together with this went a new interest in the narrativity and textuality of biography as acts of meaning-making through narration. Already in 1985, Ira Bruce Nadel argued that biographies were first and foremost “verbal artefacts of narrative discourse” through which the biographer as narrator created the historical subject, using certain narrative techniques, stylistic devices, thematic tropes, etc. The overall development of biography in the context of repeated paradigm shifts that I have sketched out so far is a general one that applies to academic historiography in America and Europe alike. Still, there are some remarkable differences relating to the debate about biography in the academic cultures of Germany and the U.S. that strike me as particularly noteworthy for this transatlantic panel here today.


In the specific context of Germany’s academic culture, the crisis of biography was the manifestation of a much larger crisis of historicism that was an integral part of the intellectual founding of the Federal Republic of Germany. The historicist tradition continued to dominate West German historiography well into the 1960s. Then, under the lead of historians like Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Thomas Nipperdey, Jürgen Kocka and others, the profession took its “social history turn,” which unfolded as a fundamental critique of historicism in all its aspects: as weltanschauung, as concept of history and as method.18 The founders of German social history aimed at establishing a historiography “jenseits des Historismus,” and their critique of historicism was all-encompassing.19 It aimed at both the epistemology and the politics of historicism.

Not only was the method of “verstehen,” focusing on individuality and the historically specific, thoroughly discredited, but the whole conceptual and theoretical cathedral of historicism was knocked down because — in the wake of National Socialism and the Holocaust — historicism was held to be an essentially authoritarian and anti-democratic tradition focusing on monarchs, statesmen and an abstract raison d’état, which, for the leading social historians, helped explain the rise and success of the Third Reich in Germany. The German social history project, therefore, unfolded as a radical critique of Germany’s national history, and this was seen to be the necessary precondition for a thorough democratization of Germany. But ironically enough, the criticism of historicism from the spirit of liberalism and democracy led to an outright hostility to biography as the kind of historiography that was to be overcome by the new social history.

In the U.S., there was never a similar war against historicism like that in Germany.20 Rather, the historicist tradition remained relatively


unbroken even under the onslaught of social history. A majority of U.S. historians continued to want to jump beneath historical actors’ skins, to read sources with the aim of “understanding” them and to reconstruct the past “as it actually was.” After 1945, therefore, the best Rankeans lived and worked in the U.S., largely due to the fact that American historians had applied historicism as a weltanschauung and a concept of history to the study of a democracy from the start. That is why biography, too, although it has also suffered from marginalization over the last four decades or so in the United States, was never as discredited as it was in Germany.

In addition, one should point out that over the last fifty years the world of academic historiography in the U.S. has been so much larger and so much more diverse and pluralistic than the German one that it was close to impossible for any single approach or school to dominate the whole profession. It was very different in Germany, where due to size and the pressures for homogeneity, a single approach was able to dominate the scene to a degree that scholars in the United States can scarcely imagine. Therefore, while writing a biography was a career-killer in Germany well into the 1980s, in the U.S. there continued to be a large and highly differentiated market for the biographical genre. The genre was prominently featured in the mass media, while in academia the study of biography was firmly institutionalized with institutes, academic journals and associations dedicated to biographical studies. A culture based on individualism and the celebration of individual agency is obviously particularly prone to embrace the biographical genre.

The continued popularity and presence of biography in the American context, however, stood in stark contrast to the theoretical endeavors in the field. Not much was happening on the theoretical front prior to the late 1970s. This was largely due to the fact that historical biography in American academia stood — and in many respects continues to stand — in the long shadow of Leon Edel, who in Writing Lives had theorized the model of “secret-self biography.” First developed in the 1950s, and drawing heavily on Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, Edel saw the biographer’s task as excavating the private, arguing that the hidden self of a biographical subject, including personality, character and “inner mental core,” provided all the answers desired to questions about why a historical subject acted the way he did. Biographers following Edel’s model therefore wanted to discover the “figure under the carpet,” the hidden myth of a life. This methodological

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approach was defined by conscientious work with the sources, thick
description and participant observation that walked a very fine line
between empathy and scholarly detachment, with the overall aim
being to enable a “truly human figure” to emerge from the pages of
a biography.24

Against this long and lasting tradition of the “secret-self biography,”
the project of a “new biography” began to unfold in the 1980s–1990s,
which, as Leonard Cassuto argues, has expanded the “range of
American biographical practice in general.”25 The formation of this
new biography in the U.S. was driven by several factors, two of which
were most important. The first one emerged from the pluralization
of agents, actors and voices in American history in the wake of the
Civil Rights Revolution of the 1960s–1970s. The resulting willingness
to “weave the stories of new groups into our national fabric” has led
to a significant broadening of the biographical spectrum under the
auspices of race, ethnicity, gender, and class.26

The second major factor behind the formation of a “new biography”
was the impact of poststructuralism on the humanities, which oc-
curred much earlier and was much more powerful in the U.S. than
in Germany or in Europe in general. The poststructuralist epistemo-
logical revolution has invalidated some of the central assumptions
traditional biography in the historicist tradition rested on. The new
biography no longer treats individuals as “historical facts.” It has
abandoned ideas of coherent and stable selves, and it is no longer
looking for an underlying pattern or motif that serves as an organizing
principle for a person’s life. Rather, accepting the elusive openness of
individual selves and allowing for fluidity and multiple identities, it is
much more interested in the narrativity, practices, uses, performances
and functions of biography as processes of meaning-making and so-
cial self-description. The “new biography,” therefore, is keenly aware
of the socially contested nature of identity constructions, so that it
treats biography as acts of identity politics in the social struggles of
a time.27 This is the point where the experience of pluralization and
multi-culturalism and the poststructuralist epistemology meet.

III. The Challenges of Biography

So, where do we go from here? It should have become clear that the
problem of biography is not biography per se but the premises we
base it on, the conceptual frameworks we use to approach it, and the

24 Shirley A. Leckie, “Biography
Matters: Why Historians Need
Well-Crafted Biographies
More Than Ever,” in Writing
Biography, ed. Ambrosius,
1–26, here 4.

25 Cassuto, “The Silhouette and
the Secret Self,” 1260.

26 Leckie, “Biography Matters,”
20.

27 Margadant, The New Biogra-
phy, 9; Bourdieu, “The Bio-
ographical Illusion,” 300.
questions we raise. In this context, I want to suggest three things for our biographical endeavors.28

First, it seems promising to position our life-writing endeavors in a triangle of curriculum vita, biography and autobiography, i.e. the facts of a lived life, its narrative interpretation by a participant observer, and its narrative interpretation by the person who has lived this life. These three dimensions of the biographical are separate and yet related, and as historians we somehow have to come to grips with this complex interrelationship in a way that transcends the binary oppositions of fact and fiction.

Second, we should strive to systematically reflect the multiple functions and uses of biography, keeping in mind that biography is “not the same” over time, that it “does not perform the same tasks, at different times and in different places,” and that there are different national and regional traditions of biography.29 In this context, one could analyze their functionality in memory and identity politics. One could also reflect their didactic purposes. Some biographies are written to either celebrate exemplary lives as models of a “good life” fit to be imitated, while others are to warn the audience by giving examples of a “bad life.” We should also not underestimate the simple pleasure and entertainment that can be drawn from reading or researching biographies. In many cases, biographical subjects offer examples of very interesting or fascinating lives, and the question might well be what exactly makes a certain life fascinating in a particular historical context. There are many more functions and uses of biography that come to mind the more one thinks about it.

What it all boils down to — and this is my third and final point — is to systematically analyze the communicative pragmatics of biography in a given historical context. This means reflecting on biography as an act of social communication through which social groups reach an understanding about who they are and who they want to be. Approaching biography from this communicative angle would also offer the chance of relating these groups’ textuality and narrativity to the social contexts in which they functioned.

This would help us to think of biography — and here I am referring to Thomas Etzemüller — as both an instrument for observing the world and an act of social self-description through which knowledge is constructed.30 As such, biography is both a universal cultural phenomenon and a phenomenon particular to certain cultures, certain regions and certain times.

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30 Etzemüller, Biographien, 21–22.
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LEGITIMIZING BIOGRAPHY: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO BIOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH

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In the summer of 2008, I received several photographs from Great Britain from Renate Easton, a great-niece of Helene and Max Herrmann. Helene Herrmann, née Schlesinger, born in Berlin in 1877, received her university degree by auditing courses in German studies, philosophy and art history at Berlin’s Friedrich Wilhelm University. She began her studies in 1898, ten years before women were allowed to matriculate at Prussian universities. In the same year, she married theater scholar Max Herrmann. After finishing her doctorate, Helene Herrmann worked as a teacher and freelance as a literary critic, while her husband taught at the university, today Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. After National Socialist policies forced Max Herrmann into retirement in 1933, the couple, like all Jewish Germans, experienced increasing discrimination but rejected the idea of going into exile. In early September 1942, their assets were seized by the state and they were deported to Theresienstadt, where Max Herrmann died in November. Two years later, Helene Herrmann and her sister were deported from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz, where they were murdered.

There are various biographical perspectives from which we might tell Helene Herrmann’s life story. The focus could be on gender as a category of social difference, or on the history of German studies, on Nazi persecution or collective biography. Fourteen years ago, Professor of literature David Ellis was still able to claim that the genre of biography offered only “lives without theory.” Such a definitive (if exaggerated) claim can no longer be made. Many works well worth reading have been published in both German and English in recent years that now provide us with a literary and historical overview of the genre of biography and its development. In this article, I will summarize the debates in progress in German and English-language biographical research. After a short look at the current state of research, I would like to explore three aspects of the discussion that are changing the genre for the better: inclusions and exclusions, gender and genre, and de/legitimizing biography.


I. The State of the Field

“Can biography offer historical research a distinctive contribution that is truly up to date in subject, method, and theory? What would a biography informed by the approaches and categories of modern historiography look like?” Simone Lässig asked ten years ago in the Bulletin of the German Historical Institute. There have been many discussions on theory and method, especially in the social sciences (including life course research) as well as in literature studies (for example, narratology) and increasingly also in history (oral history, history of science, etc.) as Susie Pak’s network analysis and Clifton Hood’s statistical study in this volume show. At the same time, feminist, post-modern and post-colonial critiques of the genre have led to more pluralistic approaches and broadened the spectrum of methods. Biography is no longer understood solely as a linear narrative of one person’s life from birth to death. Often the biographical approach itself is reflected upon within the biography. The role of the biographer is now sometimes discussed within the text, or a radically subjective approach is chosen. Collective biographies have also been written, such as Natalie Zemon Davis’s study on Glikl Hamel, Marie de l’Incarnation and Maria Sibylla Merian.

Certainly the splintering of the unified subject contributed to this shift in the genre of biography. If the individual can no longer be seen as the “doer behind the deed” (Friedrich Nietzsche) and biography must be seen as a complete construction, then the classical retelling of a life history no longer works. This tendency has been strengthened by the establishment of race, class and gender as analytical categories, which has changed the way biographers work and think over the past two decades. The biographical genre has become more critical and more self-reflective and, particularly as a result of German academic discussions, more scientific, as Volker Depkat points out in this volume.

It was feminist research, in the United States and Great Britain in particular, which first noted that biography is always subjective and has an autobiographical element; the observer is always also part of what she observes. Any discussion of biography is therefore always also a discussion about autobiography. My own interest in biographical research, and on the development of its theory and methods, began with a research project on the history of German studies. I planned to use the biography of a female scholar to discuss topics, structures, and epistemologies of this academic field only to find that until the
1960s there had been very few female scholars of German studies, and there was hardly any data to be found on those few. For example Helene Herrmann, as a woman and a Jew, was unable to begin an academic career although her publications received critical acclaim. Furthermore, aside from a few files in the university archives and some letters, no other writings by Helene Herrmann remain.

I then did my research on a group of female German studies scholars. This empirical approach eventually awakened my interest in the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of biographical research. Biography — in this case as a historical tool — comprises many elements that mirror my research interests. For one, biographical research is always interdisciplinary and can easily be linked to far-reaching theoretical and methodological questions. Second, the genre is well-suited to doing gender research. Finally, as a historian, biography makes it easy to explain and recount history.

Like the German historian Thomas Etzemüller, I understand biography as a reconstruction of an act of construction. This means that as a biographer, I am examining the process of an individual becoming a subject. Etzemüller suggests linking Foucault’s concept of discourse with Bourdieu’s analysis of structural rules and the influence of habitus. As a biographer I ask — and explain — which behaviors can be ascribed to individual idiosyncrasies, which to dispositions and which to the influences of society and the reigning discourse. Similarly, in Handbuch Biographie, published in 2009, most authors concur that newer biographies underscore the constructed nature of biographical identity and almost no one assumes a coherent life course. In his 1920 lectures on “The Art of Biography” William Roscoe Thayer made the same stress: “Remember that one-half — I might almost say four-fifths — of a biography depends on the biographer.”

As historians who write biographies, broadly defined, we should therefore know how to structure biographical accounts so that the “identity” constructed by the subject can be perceived. This can incorporate acknowledgment of both the subjectivity that underlies every life story as well as the narrative forms and structures that mark biographies as such. The elements of these narratives are connected to our social, academic and literary traditions. Only when these substructures are kept in mind do biographies "work."

In the case of Helene Herrmann, there were only a few biographical sketches available that strictly followed and emphasized a “victim”


11 William Roscoe Thayer, The Art of Biography (Folcroft, 1977), 139. Thayer made this comment on George Palmer’s biography of his wife Alice.
story in both narrative form and style (which is surely also a result of their place of publication, the GDR). And since they were almost all written by acquaintances or students, these accounts are marked by gaps, myth-making and the repetition of certain episodes. As the author of a biography of Helene Herrmann, I therefore had to read the existing literature and the family stories against the grain, as it were. I had to question them and then decide which focus to take and how I would tell the story of her life, while also making visible my act of reconstruction from the very incomplete details of her life that I could find.

II. Inclusions and Exclusions

For as long as biography has existed as a genre, biographers have discussed their choice of subjects, usually framing this discussion as a question of ethical merit: who is “worthy,” in other words, of having their biography written? Helene Herrmann obviously did not merit a place among the biographies of well-known German studies scholars. One fairly recent collection of portraits of twenty-eight German studies scholars includes women only twice: one is a portrait of Käte Hamburger and the other is in the final contribution “Outsiders,” in which women are treated as “the rest” and gives, moreover, only a “sketch.”

In the United States, critical feminist biographers and post-structuralist, post-colonial and queer theory have given rise to biographical methods which take the subject’s “outsider” status as their vantage point. These accounts of marginalized lives are meant to broaden the dominant Euro- and ethnocentric historical perspectives. In these understandings, biography can be a way of discussing the problem of representation on a thematic and theoretical level. Instead of portraying Western, white male subjects, the presentation of “new” subjects or a post-modern plural approach that does not valorize a single life can, as Mary Rhiel and David Suchoff argue, call into question the hegemonic culture. This should not be understood as recreating a dichotomy between marginal and hegemonical which only reproduces marginalization. Rather the aim is decentering history, as Natalie Zemon Davis has explained: “Decentering involves the stance and the subject matter of the historian. The decentering historian does not tell the story of the past only from the vantage point of a single part of the world or of powerful elites, but rather widens his or her scope, socially and geographically, and introduces...
plural voices into the account.” This pluralization — a quest for both new (and more) knowledge and content — has led to a change in the genre of biography, as I shall discuss in more depth.

Collective biography lends itself well to the study or representation of non-hegemonic subjects or groups, both because the dearth of sources makes an individual biography impossible and because group biographies promise to deliver more insights. This form of biography looks at both what is typical of and what is specific to a group of people. In contrast to both individual biography and purely prosopographical studies, collective biography can deliver a broader view of the history of mentalities, encompassing, for example, political views, influences of a certain milieu, of historical events, or career patterns. Collective biographies can also be linked to other approaches with encouraging results. It can be combined with methods of discourse analysis, intellectual history, historical and empirical social research, analyses of generations and cohorts, histories of migration, and network analysis.

Since subaltern subjects usually do not leave many written traces behind, their biographers tend to make greater use of photographs, oral histories and other materials. The American historian Nell Irvin Painter calls for using images and photographs in marginalized biographies and working more in an interdisciplinary context. Using Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglass and Duke Ellington as examples, Painter shows that many photographs contain racist stereotypes and “controlling images” while others illustrate the subjects’ conception of themselves and strategies for distancing themselves from clichés. Portrait photography was one method open to African-Americans for controlling their public image.

In the case of Helene Herrmann, the photographs I received from her great-niece posed new questions. One photo was a sepia image of a woman with grey hair whose friendly gaze is focused on something far away. The only photo that had previously been made public, and that had been used in every publication to date, was not only of inferior quality, it also showed Helene Herrmann dressed in dark clothing with a white collar, looking straight into the camera with a sad expression on her face. Both portraits were probably taken in the 1930s; one found its way into a public archive, the other remained in the family. The black and white photo was the perfect illustration of the “victim” narrative; the “happier” picture called this narrative into question.

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III. Gender and Genre

Most certainly in German-speaking countries, but also in the United States, the celebrated historical biographies of recent years have all continued to be about “great men of history,” as a glance at the subjects of the 2011 to 2013 Pulitzer Prizes in the biography or autobiography category shows. When a biography of a woman does meet with critical acclaim, it is often, as with the 2014 Pulitzer Prize–winning biography of Margaret Fuller, about a woman who lived in proximity to “great” men or about a “great” woman with an established status in a nation’s memory.

Linked to these inclusions and exclusions are the structure and norms of these representations, the reproduction of the mechanisms of the genre and its conventions. This is true of the choice of biographical subject. But this also influences the thematic focus or research question. Biographies in Germany, for example, are often linked to political history which means, among other things, that a gender-specific separation of private and public is reproduced, so that women do not appear as historical actors, and gender relations are not discussed. It is only recently that biographers have begun to analyze the construction of masculinity or the meaning of the body and its (gendered, racialized) embodiment. As far as I am aware, intersectionality has not yet entered the theory and practice of biographical research.

Another factor contributing to the tenacity of the genre is the availability of sources and their analysis, since historians have just begun to consider how to incorporate previously ignored categories of data (such as photographs, mentioned earlier). What is more, the problem of gaps in the sources is rarely discussed. However, as a biographer I should not make those gaps disappear, but instead talk about them and find ways to integrate them into the biographical narrative (by counterfactual methods, for example).

Last but not least, questions of representation are closely related to inclusions and exclusions. Usually, the chronological unfolding of a life history (Entwicklungsgeschichte) is offered. Despite continuous debates about biographical narratives, in this area little seems to have changed since Samuel Johnson and Johann Gustav Droysen. The genre of biography still basically always means the biography of an individual, thus constructing and stabilizing identity. Other forms, such as transnational and collective biography, by their nature weaken this dominant pattern. The same is true for transnational life stories since they allow “for national borders to be transgressed” and contest the “tenacious concept of the nation state.”


20 Megan Marshall, Margaret Fuller: A New American Life (Boston, 2013).

On the narrative level, collective authorship projects — taking a single individual or group and inviting multiple contributors to contribute their analytical perspectives — are one example of how multiple voices can contribute to the aforementioned act of decentering.22

I would like to therefore plead for a broader conceptualization of the genre that includes “marginalized” subjects and transnational approaches, as well as new narrative forms. As a biographer, the choice of narrative composition is mine. I can try, for example, to create multiple perspectives, a polyphonic narrative. Furthermore, historians especially should take opportunities to integrate photographs, audio recordings, film and music into our body of sources and into our presentations. Alongside the classical book, exhibitions, audio plays, graphic novels and online formats make other forms of biography possible, which of course must be produced and told differently, and which are also read or rather received differently.23

IV. De/Legitimizing Biography

Gender and genre, inclusions and exclusions are closely connected to at least three different legitimizing and delegitimizing processes concerning biography. Presenting a particular knowledge as valid and unchallengeable is to legitimize it; language in itself has a legitimizing function.24 First, then, production and reception of biography affect legitimation. Ruth Dawson has recently asked: “Who is authorized to write about particular persons? Which persons are legitimized as subjects of biography?”25 The biographer, her subject and the published work exist within specific discursive fields that include legitimizing and delegitimizing processes which can be described as authorization. The rules of academia, of contemporary discourse and of the publishing market can make biographies possible or difficult. On the one hand there are, as Foucault has said, the unthinkable, the unspeakable and the unsayable: that is, questions about who is “allowed” to write about whom. These norms explain why biographical research has to date barely examined certain questions. For example, German biographers tend to write about famous Germans because there is no strong tradition of writing biographies of individuals who lived in other countries.26 Inclusions and exclusions of the author and/or the subject of a biography are therefore connected to questions of the power of definition and of discourses in a specific academic discipline.
The relationship between the author and her biographical subject is, secondly, linked to questions of legitimacy, inasmuch as the symbolic capital of the person whose biography has been researched can be transferred to the author and vice versa. As Falko Schnicke shows, the German historian Johann Gustav Droysen gained immensely from his three-volume biography of the Prussian field marshal Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg. After its publication in 1851–52, Droysen attained a full professorship in Berlin as well as being appointed official historian of the House of Brandenburg. Conversely, the nineteenth-century teacher Herculine Barbin would hardly be so well-known had not Michel Foucault published the memoirs of this transgender person and discussed how and why societies construct ideas of “true,” immutable gender identities.

A third aspect of legitimizing and delegitimizing processes is maybe specific to biography: Compared to other genres in history or literature studies, biography is even more expected to present a complete picture. But, as I argued, biography can not and will never be fully comprehensive. As biographers, we should not see incompleteness as a curse but as a blessing, and welcome it as a means to create plurality and multiple perspectives instead of claiming that we are conveying ultimate biographical truth.

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COUNTING WHO COUNTS: METHOD AND FINDINGS
OF A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC ELITES
IN THE NEW YORK REGION, 1947

Clifton Hood
HOBART AND WILLIAM SMITH COLLEGES

For over a decade I have been researching and writing a cultural history of New York City’s upper class from the 1750s to the present. The book takes an essay-like approach, exploring a series of related topics and ideas analytically rather than providing encyclopedic coverage or a narrative storyline. Its method is to investigate particular decades as slices or layers of the overall history of New York City. Seven decades are scrutinized: the 1750s/1760s, the 1780s/1790s, the 1820s, the 1860s, the 1890s, the 1940s, and the 1970s.

These seven decades were selected to receive in-depth examination because important changes in the urban political economy happened then that in various ways challenged the upper class. In responding to these challenges, upper-class individuals made choices that reveal their priorities and that reset their compass directions. I begin with the 1750s/1760s because that is when New York City first became internationally important, as a British military headquarters during the Seven Years’ War. Four other periods (the 1780s/1790s, the 1860s, and the 1940s) also coincided with wars (the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War II, respectively) that transformed political and economic affairs and altered how elites organized their lives. The Gilded Age was at its height during the 1890s. Two other decades (the 1820s and the 1970s) marked fundamental shifts in the urban economic base that had far-reaching effects on the upper class, with the 1820s representing the beginning of the city’s takeoff as a national metropolis after the construction of the Erie Canal and the 1970s encompassing New York City’s near-bankruptcy during the fiscal crisis along with its transition to a finance- and service-centered economy.

My basic conclusion is that upper-class New Yorkers tried hard to create a separate and exclusive world for themselves, but they kept being assailed by the forces of economic growth and democracy. Their pursuit of privilege is what makes them different, but they were never able to completely control their environments in economically dynamic New York City. An initial colonial upper class that modeled
itself on European norms ran headlong into American capitalism and democracy by the 1790s and then spent the next two centuries trying to figure out how to deal with that whipsaw. In the process the elite became more complex and more plastic, while at the same time working feverishly to preserve its exclusivity, especially from the middle class that began to gain in numbers and prestige from the time it formed in the mid-nineteenth century. The tension between urban economic dynamism and democratic culture, on the one hand, and the enticements of exclusivity and superiority, on the other, is my focal point.

If high-status populations were convinced of anything, it was of their own importance. Fortunately for me, they filled libraries and archives with an abundance of materials documenting themselves — genealogies that are best described as creative; detailed household records; diaries, manuscripts, and letters; memoirs and books; the files of their churches, militia companies, private schools, and other institutions, and more. Along the way, however, I realized that I needed a better empirical knowledge of the people who constituted New York’s economic elites. Although I use quantitative evidence throughout the book, much of it comes from the records of institutions like private men’s clubs and elite militias and involves the piecing together of networks. I decided that I required something less impressionistic than my qualitative evidence and more comprehensive and systematic than the rest of my quantitative evidence — a census, in effect. That need was especially acute for my chapter on the 1940s.

The main reason for this felt need involves what I will call “the problem of the Gilded Age.” The preponderance of scholarship on the American (and New York City) upper class concentrates on the so-called Gilded Age of the late nineteenth century. Think of the work of Sven Beckert, Thomas Kessner, Eric Homberger, and David C. Hammack, not to mention the many biographies that have been written about robber barons like John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and J.P. Morgan. And of course there’s Susie Pak’s

1 I use two main categories of high status populations: “upper class” and “economic elites.” The upper class is defined as a group of individuals who are tied together by family, friendship, and business bonds, are self-conscious in their possession of goods deemed to be prestigious, and lead a distinctive way of life. Economic elites comprise people who make key economic decisions, those who provide support for the decision-makers, and those who serve as their retainers. Although the binary schema applied here derives from the theoretical work of sociologist E. Digby Baltzell, it modifies his typology in two respects. First, economic elites are not viewed as atomized individuals. Like the upper class, economic elites could establish communities and had their own values, practices, and aspirations. Second, economic elites and the upper class interacted in a variety of ways: sometimes they overlapped, cooperated, and shared, while at other times they separated and clashed. Both modifications take into consideration the intricacies of relationships among the high status New Yorkers. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class (1958; New Brunswick, N.J., 1992), 6–8; E. Digby Baltzell, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America (New York, 1964), vii–xx; E. Digby Baltzell, Puritan Boston and Quaker Philadelphia (1979; New Brunswick, N.J., 1996), 19–30.

new and methodologically innovative Gentlemen Bankers. Historians are drawn to the Gilded Age because that is when the upper class was at the summit of its wealth and power and was unequivocal about flexing its muscle, with some of its members even conceiving of themselves as a European-style aristocracy.

Most of these individual works are of high quality, but the problem with the myopic concentration of this overall body of scholarship on a single era is that it misses the historical profession’s reason for being, the study of change over time. The late nineteenth century was indeed significant. Yet a tight shot of the Gilded Age leaves out critically important events and issues that happened in other times. That creates a fundamental problem for an analysis of the twentieth-century elites. If you want to widen the angle of the camera lens to look at other time periods, how can you avoid being so influenced by what happened and what has been written about the Gilded Age that you can see later periods clearly and figure out what was happening then? Things get even more complicated when one factors in the economic dynamism of twentieth-century metropolitan New York and the sheer size of its high status population.

Hence my desire to create a statistical study of elites for my chapter on the 1940s. I elected to use a publication entitled Who’s Who in New York (City and State). Published in thirteen volumes between 1904 and 1960, Who’s Who in New York contains biographical profiles of leading New Yorkers. As sociologists, historians, and other scholars well know, such profiles have a wealth of information that can provide the basis for a detailed and comprehensive statistical portrait of social groups. The eleventh edition, published in 1947, fit the bill. As the full title indicates, Who’s Who in New York (City and State) contains entries for people from across New York State as well as from metropolitan New York. My first step, then, involved pinpointing individuals who resided in the 31-county New York metropolitan region and discarding the rest. The next step was to demarcate those metropolitan residents who qualified as “elite” and set them aside for further study. That determination necessarily centered on job descriptions, since, like most biographical dictionaries, Who’s Who in New York was intended as a reference for business and professional networking and thus supplied particularly detailed information about employment.

Accordingly, the study population consisted chiefly of economic elites — in the definition utilized in my book project, people who

5 A corollary advantage of the biographical dictionary’s emphasis on work was its inclusion of people who worked in New York City but who resided in New Jersey and Connecticut. Virtually everyone in the survey population worked in New York City. Of the cohort, 2,333 individuals (94.9% of the entire database and 98.5% of those providing workplace information) reported their office location as being New York City. HHEP. It thus possible to use this volume as a tool for studying the entire tri-state metropolis.
made key economic decisions, those who provided support for the decision-makers, and those who served as their retainers. The result of this filtering was a cohort of 2,458 men and women. The full population included well-known figures such as Bruce Barton, Bernard Baruch, Prescott Bush, Nicholas Murray Butler, Bennett Cerf, Allen Dulles, John Foster Dulles, Thomas W. Lamont, Robert Moses, Walter O’Malley, J.C. Penney, Joseph Proskauer, Eddie Rickenbacker, David Rockefeller, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., John D. Rockefeller III, Raymond Rubicam, David Sarnoff, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, Charles Lewis Tiffany, Oswald Garrison Villard, and Thomas J. Watson. But although the group included some very big names, there were many more “everyday” elites who may not have been known outside of their companies or industries, but who nevertheless exercised considerable clout. They were company presidents or vice-presidents, or corporate lawyers, or publishers and editors.

I then used faculty grants to hire research assistants to code the entries and input data into a SPSS-based computer program. With the help of a more statistically-blessed colleague from our economics department, I created a survey form that explored 74 questions. These involved sociological factors such as personal background, education, occupation, place of residence, business affiliations, social associations, and recreational activities. The results of this statistical analysis are not advanced with the view, once commonplace in historical scholarship, that quantification is an infallible method free of the selection bias of qualitative evidence; rather, my belief is that all historical evidence has its uses and its strengths and weaknesses and should be scrutinized and used in tandem with other evidentiary sources.

The findings demonstrated that this was indeed a privileged group. Four-fifths were college graduates. About a third had gone to Yale, Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia. Other leading colleges were Cornell, New York University, City College, Williams, Amherst, and the University of Pennsylvania. Just under one-third identified themselves as lawyers, roughly one-tenth as business executives and another tenth as bankers. The top economic sector was business services, which comprised one-fifth of the total, followed by banking/brokerage, contracting/engineering, health/medicine, manufacturing, and commerce. The people in the survey worked for more than 780 different corporations or firms that did business with corporations. The six leading employers were Milbank, Tweed; Cadwalader,
Wickersham, & Taft; Chase National Bank; Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Chadbourne & Parke; and Standard Oil. Four of these top six entities were corporate law firms. The findings of an interrogation of this data are consistent with other forms of evidence and confirm that this was indeed a privileged group.

This statistical portrait coincided fairly closely with what I already knew about the metropolitan region’s economic elites in this period. While the results reassured me that the survey population could provide a reasonable basis for my chapter, there was nothing new here. So far I hadn’t learned anything that shed light on the social structure and cultural values of the region’s high-status population at mid-twentieth century. Some of the findings were obvious. As it turned out, country clubs became a prime focus of my 1940s chapter, but the data that almost half the people in the study population who had hobbies said that that golf was their favorite pastime didn’t take me very far. It was hardly breaking news that at the time golf was the primary recreational activity of upper-middle- and upper-class American men.

But it can be hit or miss with qualitative sources, too, and not every archival visit yields jewels. It turned out that three of my seventy-four questions were invaluable and got me thinking along the lines that eventually enabled me to make sense of this time period and what happened to New York City’s metropolitan elite after the Gilded Age. These three questions dealt with residential location. Virtually everyone in the 1947 study group continued to work in New York City, and the Upper East Side was the principal place of residence. But almost half of the people in the survey had their primary residence within the metropolitan region but beyond the city’s borders. They were overwhelmingly suburban dwellers. Their most salient characteristic — what truly stood out — was their geographical dispersal. The leading suburbs were, in rank order, Scarsdale, Bronxville, Montclair, N.J., Greenwich, Conn., New Rochelle, Garden City, and Rye (all locations in New York state unless otherwise noted). This meant that elites were living in three different corners of the metropolitan region — to the north in Westchester County and in Connecticut’s Fairfield County, to the west in New Jersey, and to the east on Long Island. This was a large and dispersed area. While Scarsdale was the elite’s favorite suburb, less than four percent of the people in the project lived there. Taken as a whole, the top ten suburbs comprised just 15 percent of the entire survey population. In total, people resided

\[11\] N = 783 corporations and firms. The figures were Milbank Tweed (15 individuals), Cadwalader (15), Chase (14), Cravath (13), Chadbourne (11), and Standard Oil (10). HHEP.

\[12\] N = 1,348 people (54.8%) indicated that they did not have a hobby and 1,045 (42.5%) indicated that they did. Of those who did report having a hobby, N = 496 (48.7%) said that golf was their favorite one; 236 (9.6%) fall into the “other” category; 83 (9.2%) reported tennis; 69 (6.7%), yachting/sailing; and 59 (5.8%), fishing. Hiking/camping/walking, hunting, stamp collecting, skiing, and squash/racquetball elicited fewer responses. HHEP. On the emergence and growth of golf as a pastime, see “Popularity of Golf: The Old Scottish Game,” Current Literature, Sep. 1894, 238, and George B. Kirsch, Golf in America (Urbana, Ill., 2009), 6.

\[13\] N = 2,333 (94.9%) of the entire database and 98.5% of those providing information relevant to this question) people reported their office location as being New York City. N = 1,209 (49.2%) identified their primary residential location as being outside New York City and 1,156 (47.2%) as inside New York City. N = 1,123 (45.7%) residents of the metropolitan region beyond New York City. N = 939 (38.2%) residents of Manhattan. HHEP.
in more than 65 different suburbs. The reason why the number 65 stood out to me is that in the Gilded Age the upper class had tightly concentrated in a single Manhattan neighborhood, Murray Hill, the predecessor of today’s Upper East Side. Something much different seemed to be happening in the first half of the twentieth century.

A second attribute was that there was a conspicuous regional pattern to this geographical dispersal. While elites diffused to the three corners of the metropolitan region — again, Westchester County and Fairfield County in the north; New Jersey in the west; and Long Island in the east — they showed a marked preference for the northern and the close-in Jersey suburbs. Garden City was the only Long Island community in the top ten, and there were only three Long Island suburbs among the top 25 suburbs.14 The reason for this regional pattern appears to be that in the 1940s upper-class estates still occupied many sections of Nassau County that were most suitable for suburbanization, while relatively more land became available for development north and west of New York City than east of it. In this period, Long Island was weighted toward old money and blue blood rather than toward corporate elites. Of the fifteen communities in Nassau and Suffolk counties that the study population favored, nine were “old-money suburbs” like Lawrence, Oyster Bay, and Locust Valley.15 There were definitely old-money

### Table: Residential Locations of the New York Metropolitan Elite, 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of Elite Residents (N = 2458)</th>
<th>Pct. of Elite Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other boroughs</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside New York City / within Metropolitan Region</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarsdale, N.Y.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronxville, N.Y.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montclair, N.J.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich, Conn.</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Rochelle, N.Y.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden City, N.Y.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rye, N.Y.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larchmont, N.Y.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Canaan, Conn.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit, N.J.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other metropolitan communities</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside metropolitan area / unindicated</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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14 N = 87 residents of Scarsdale (3.5%), 60 of Bronxville (2.4%), 55 of Montclair, N.J. (2.2%), 47 of Greenwich, Conn. (1.9%), 30 of New Rochelle (1.2%), 25 of Garden City, N.J. (1.0%), 24 of Rye (1.0%), 23 of Larchmont (0.9%), 23 of New Canaan, Conn. (0.9%), and 20 of Summit, N.J. (0.8%). EP336.

15 The top 15 were, in order, Great Neck, Manhasset, Huntington, Lawrence, Oyster Bay, Locust Valley, Syosset, Hewlett, Port Washington, Old Westbury, Sands Point, Cedarhurst, Glen Head, and Eatons Neck. The nine that I have identified as “old money suburbs” are Lawrence, Oyster Bay, Locust Valley, Syosset, Hewlett, Port Washington, Old Westbury, Sands Point, and Eatons Neck. HHEP.
suburbs elsewhere in the region, such as Morristown in New Jersey and Greenwich and New Canaan in Connecticut, but they existed in tandem with numerous upper-middle- and middle-class suburbs. I later decided that this pattern of diffusion was significant for enlarging the separation between corporate and social elites — the main development that I saw happening in this period.

To see what was going on, I decided to examine the residential locations of people who were listed in the 1947 Social Register. The Social Register, of course, contains social elites, a very different group than the economic elites in my study population. An analysis of the 1949 Social Register shows that the people listed there had a different residential geography than the economic elites in the study group. The preferred area of primary residence for the Social Register crowd was overwhelmingly the Upper East Side of Manhattan, accounting for one-third of all residential addresses. By contrast, only 13 percent of the corporate elite group lived on the Upper East Side. In dispersing to the suburbs, corporate elites literally distanced themselves from social elites.

Elsewhere in my 1940s chapter, I investigated the composition of the boards of directors of nine major New York City non-profit groups in 1948: the American Museum of Natural History, Columbia University, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Metropolitan Opera, the Museum of Modern Art, the New York Botanical Garden, the New York Philharmonic, the New York Public Library, and New York University. I wanted to see if and to what extent members of the corporate elite were a presence on these boards. It is not possible to draw a hard-and-fast line between board members who owed their rank to their socially prominent families and inherited wealth and those who owed it to their corporate positions, since some board members from socially prominent families were capable business leaders (like Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, a founder of Pan American Airways and a Canadian mining concern, banker Robert Lehman, and publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger). Nonetheless, it is possible to identify individuals who would have been termed “income men” in a previous generation — those who owed their wealth and prominence entirely to their success in climbing the corporate ladder. These were the members of the corporate elite. Their representation on these boards ranged from a low of twenty-one percent for the New York Public Library to highs of fifty-nine percent for Columbia University and sixty-six percent for New York University.
University. Among the corporate elites serving on these boards were bigwigs like magazine publisher Henry Luce, CBS chairman William S. Paley, RCA president David Sarnoff, IBM’s Thomas H. Watson, Sr., and AT&T’s Walter S. Gifford.  

And where did these top corporate elites prefer to reside? Of the 99 corporate leaders who could be identified as having primary home addresses somewhere in the metropolitan region, 62 percent were situated in New York City, overwhelmingly on the Upper East Side. The same was true of corporate leaders who formed what has been called the New York foreign policy elite: James V. Forrestal, John Foster Dulles, his brother Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy, among many others, lived on the Upper East Side. Social elites and the top corporate leaders clearly preferred Manhattan — but many other economic elites had diffused to the suburbs.

It is noteworthy that the emergence of upper-class suburbs like Scarsdale, Greenwich, and Garden City in the early twentieth century coincided with the growth of Upper East Side, which by the 1920s had become the city’s premier upper-class neighborhood. The Upper East Side flourished all through the interwar and the postwar periods, as it does to this day, and the suburbs’ emergence obviously did not come at its expense. Indeed, the geographical scope and the growth of wealth in the metropolitan region was nothing short of extraordinary. The Upper East Side was not only the single largest and richest upper-class urban neighborhood in the United States, but multiple upper-class suburbs had appeared in different corners of the metropolitan region. This was singular. In Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Chicago, Buffalo, New Orleans, and Milwaukee, downtown upper-class residential districts survived until at least the mid-twentieth century, even as elite suburbs sprouted on their outskirts. But New York City was the only place in this period where a new upper-class neighborhood emerged and prospered in the central city at the same time that elite suburbs were developing on the outskirts.

19 In addition to annual reports and official publications of these institutions published between 1947 and 1949, other sources for this information included Who’s Who in America, 1944–1949; obituaries, reports of promotions, and wedding announcements in New York Times articles from 1932 through 2001, and articles in The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography.

20 N = 61. HHEP.


An upper class that at the turn of the century had emphasized its cohesiveness and its inter-connections had by the 1940s dispersed geographically. Since the mid-nineteenth century there had been divergent social and cultural ways of being a part of the city’s upper class, and to this was now added greater physical and social distance. What was going on here? Country clubs help us answer that question. By the 1940s, there were forty to fifty first-tier country clubs in the metropolitan region and perhaps an equal number that ranked just below them. The social geography of the top-end country clubs was defined by their multiplicity and localization. Unlike the rarified world of the late-nineteenth-century New York City elite men’s clubs, where there had been a well-accepted status hierarchy and a relatively small number of prestigious clubs, country clubs’ decentralized physical geography created a fuzzier pecking order. While the Union Club, the Union League Club, and the Metropolitan Club had occupied the same Manhattan neighborhood, country clubs were widely dispersed, with, for instance, Shinnecock Hills in Southampton, Long Island, more than 100 miles distant from Baltusrol in New Jersey and 60 miles from Winged Foot and Apawamis in Westchester County. Country clubs did compete with one another, especially those that were near one another and that recruited members from the same demographic pool, but these rivalries were diffused. This social geography — like that of the elite suburbs themselves — indicates that elites had segmented into a series of localized social environments where they could forge their own small and intimate communities.24

Many of the people I study in this chapter were beneficiaries of the elaboration of the corporate headquarters complex that had taken root in Manhattan in the late nineteenth century. They were well-to-do and professionally prominent, but the centrality of commuting and career to their lives stamped them and their families as middle class. Few belonged to the Social Register.25 They had emerged from the business world and cared less about social pedigrees and rituals than about providing good management to these massive new organizations. They saw themselves as professionals more than as entrepreneurs. They were proud of their educational accomplishments and many of them had professional degrees, including the M.B.A.

Tangible social gradations existed within this New York corporate elite. There was a bottom zone that consisted of businessmen and


professionals who made a decent living as middle managers but who so clearly belonged to the middle class rather than the upper class that there was no ambiguity about their social standing. Nor was there any uncertainty about the status of those in the top zone: individuals in this bracket (like magazine publisher Henry Luce, CBS chairman William S. Paley, RCA president David Sarnoff, and IBM’s Thomas H. Watson, Sr.) were eminent business leaders who made huge salaries, amassed considerable wealth, and commanded great power. They had reached the pinnacle of corporate America and were definitely elite.

Yet there was also an intermediary group that straddled the line between the upper and middle classes. Its members are my primary focus because the mode of life they constructed and the ideology they and their successors would later formulate became the basis of a new upper class that would later challenge the prerogatives and meanings of the vestiges of the Gilded Age upper class. People in this intermediate zone had good jobs as corporate presidents, vice presidents, lawyers, bankers, and the like. They made a lot of money and lived well. They were not part of the Social Register set and most did not want to be. They cared more about managing New York’s gigantic and important corporations, organizations, and professional services firms than about social pedigree, and they took pride in their educational and career successes. Their attention to career and their work ethic gave them a middle-class orientation, yet they also wanted to separate themselves from those in the broader middle class who had not reached their level.26

They were hybrids who combined some characteristics of the Gilded Age upper class and some of the twentieth-century middle class. With economic and social forces acting to blur class lines, the problem for individuals in this zone was how to distinguish themselves from that broad middle class, while simultaneously avoiding being mistaken for the nouveau riches and arrivistes whose showiness and posturing betrayed their lack of belonging. To achieve this separation, they used social markers like the suburbs where they lived, the country clubs that they joined, and the private schools where they sent their children. Wealthy suburbs like Rye and Scarsdale in New York and Summit in New Jersey that developed in the early twentieth century became crucial landscapes for them. Corporate elites who moved to the suburbs retained strong ties with the city: they socialized, attended cultural events, and shopped in Manhattan, and

through the 1940s almost all of their workplaces were still located there. Now, though, they could choose to be part of the city and its upper-class world when they wanted to and yet withdraw from it at other times. This allowed them to congregate with people like themselves and pursue distinction on their own terms. In mounting the corporate ladder, moving to the suburbs, and joining country clubs, economic elites did not directly contest the values, practices, or prestige of the blue bloods who had achieved ascendancy in the Gilded Age, but what they did was to create communities and a way of life that were entirely their own. Moving to the suburbs let corporate elites create their own social spaces and their own lives. This was important because it shifted the social structure of the upper class from a vertical ladder where the Manhattan social elite was in the ascendancy to a more horizontal arrangement of separate and only loosely interconnected elite groups, including social and corporate elites. It also muddied the boundaries between the upper class and the middle class.27

From the early nineteenth century, rapid economic growth has continually enlarged and enriched the upper class in New York City, bringing in newcomers, introducing new sources of wealth, generating new communities, and putting great weight on the pursuit of business success and the accumulation of wealth. In this competitive environment, the upper class in New York City has been highly plastic. Taking a biographical approach to the study of the upper class in the early twentieth century demonstrates that this plasticity and competitiveness characterized corporate elites as well. By the choices they made about their work, places of residence, and leisure activities, we can see that these corporate elites used the suburbs, country clubs, and the business world to make their own worlds. They had their own ideas about work, education, and social hierarchy that were at odds with those of social elites. By the 1940s, their understandings had not yet crystallized into a coherent ideology. That began to happen in the 1970s, and is the focus of my last chapter, which scrutinizes the emergence of an anti-elite elite that actively and self-consciously opposed the sensibilities of the Gilded Age upper class and used its opposition to assert its own legitimacy and prerogatives.

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WRITING BIOGRAPHY AS A HISTORY OF NETWORKS: WHY THE STORY OF J.P. MORGAN NEEDS JACOB H. SCHIFF

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This paper on writing biography as a history of networks is based on a longer book project called *Gentlemen Bankers: The World of J.P. Morgan*, a study of the social and economic networks of J.P. Morgan, the American financier.¹ The Morgan in the title refers to both John Pierpont Morgan Sr., known to his intimates as Pierpont, and his son, J.P. Morgan, Jr., or Jack, who were the senior partners of the House of Morgan, an international merchant bank, between 1894 and 1934. The book focuses on the New York branch of the bank, J.P. Morgan & Co., and traces its transition from a private, unlimited-liability private partnership to a public, limited-liability corporation during the Progressive and interwar periods. As the title suggests, *Gentlemen Bankers* is not a traditional biography because it looks at the Morgans as part of a larger network of people and places and institutions, and it writes their history from the perspective of those relationships as they changed over time.

Studying a business like private banking from the perspective of networks makes sense for investment bankers given the nature of their business; they rarely worked alone. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, private bankers like the Morgans were organized as unlimited-liability private partnerships, a form derived from their early history as merchant bankers whose business was dealing in international trade. Unlimited liability meant that the firm’s partners were personally liable for the profits and losses of their firm on every deal, as opposed to limited-liability corporations in which an individual’s losses are limited to the amount of the original investment. Underwriting large capital projects like American railroads thus involved great personal and individual risk, which bankers managed by sharing that risk with others through the organization of syndicates that typically involved many participants. Syndicates were monitored by a community and not by a state legal structure, which either did not exist or did not function efficiently to enforce contracts between parties. Fundamentally, they were based on trust. The monetary amount of a participation and the frequency of that participation indicated the strength of the relationship between the managing bank and the syndicate participant. To a certain extent,

they were also reflective of one’s standing in the larger financial community. For the Morgans, who were international bankers, this community was global in scope.

I first discovered the Morgans when I was researching the International Banking Consortium to China (IBC), a multinational group of bankers who acted as private representatives of their respective governments and whose ostensible purpose was to lend money to China for the development of its national railways. In addition to the Morgans, there was one other private American bank in the original IBC agreement, the German Jewish private bank, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. whose senior partner, Jacob Schiff, was the son-in-law of the firm’s founder, Solomon Loeb.² Kuhn, Loeb’s position on the IBC reflected its status as Japan’s foreign bankers, which it earned by underwriting the Japanese war effort to defeat Russia during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5. Morgan and Schiff were known to be strong competitors, but because they were united in their support of expanding American and Japanese interests in China, I had originally assumed that their common commitment to empire overcame any differences they had. Over time, it became clear that this was only part of the story.

In a business like private banking, which was and is defined by close, personal interaction, Morgan’s relationship with Jacob Schiff stood out because they had strong working ties but they were socially very separate because of the way in which their world was divided along ethno-religious lines. All of Schiff’s partners were Jewish and of German background and all of Morgan’s partners at this time were native-born American Protestants. They did not live close to each other; they did not socialize outside of work; they were not associated with the same cultural or social organizations; their partners and sons apprenticed at different firms; and their children did not attend the same educational institutions. In theory, these differences did not have to mean that they could not work together, but the reasons for their separation were rooted in the prevailing anti-Semitic sentiment.

of the day, which would have undermined the personal trust necessary for cooperation. If social relations were central to how private bankers like the Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb partners created inter-firm cohesion and developed relationships with associates in other firms and institutions, how, then, did the two firms’ members work together in the context of anti-Semitism?

Schiff’s presence, and that of Kuhn, Loeb, in the Morgans’ economic network make it necessary to question several basic assumptions about private bankers, which would not be as obvious if we were to write the story of either banker or firm independently. One of the assumptions that the book contradicts is the idea that bankers were both homogeneous and collusive, a view that was held, for example, by progressive reformers and the prosecutors of the Congressional “Money Trust” investigation of 1912–13. When we put their differences into relative context with other bankers with whom the Morgans had strong working ties (and with whom they did share social and affective ties), the fact that Morgan and Schiff worked together seems remarkable, given the assumption that elite bankers cooperated on the basis of shared social and ethnic ties. If we assume that social differences just did not disappear or cease to be important, and if we take into account the hostility created by the anti-Semitism of the day, how were Anglo-American and German Jewish American bankers able to trust each other and work together?

Historically, this contradiction has been explained by the idea that their relationship was based on money and economic self-interest. In the book I argue that given other qualitative evidence, including the fact that the bankers themselves said that money was not the primary basis of trust in their community, money could not explain how they were able to work together. It may have been an important incentive, but money alone could not serve as the basis for trust. The idea that money was the primary bond between Morgan and Schiff assumed that they could and did somehow separate the world of business from the broader society around them. But what conditions made this possible? And why or how did these conditions become invisible or taken for granted?

The book argues that the answer lies in the structure of the Morgans’ network and in the way in which the world of business was situated or embedded in the society at large. When studied together and put

3 Summarized in Report of the Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429 and 504 to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit (Washington, 1913), esp. 55–106.

into context, economic relationships and social ties often contradict the expectations of how relationships are generally assumed to work. That is because the choices individual historical actors make involve and affect the multiple networks of which they are members even if they themselves treat and see those networks as separate. Focusing on the times and spaces when the partners of the different firms were together, such as in the world downtown in Wall Street where they worked, and when they were not together, such as in the world uptown where they lived, I asked, “Who was there and who was not there?” In the process, one begins to notice other groups, who were already there but who were considered to be far removed from the financial world. In other words, when Anglo-American and German Jewish bankers were not together and when they were together, one group in particular was either present or absent; that group was elite Anglo-American and Jewish women. The book explores in greater detail how the separation between the social and economic spheres of bankers, as represented by the presence or absence of women, made it possible for them to work together.

Gentlemen Bankers is an example of how writing biography from the perspective of networks advances our understanding of history because it forces us to recognize that which we might take for granted. In other words, it reveals other people and events that appear in geographically distant and culturally separate spaces but whose presence and absence are relevant to the structure of a network as a whole. The distinction between these spaces is evident not so much in a qualitative change in the individuals themselves — in this case bank partners — but in the nature of the network as seen in the presence or absence of other groups at different times and in different places. One of the points I try to make in the book is that studying history as connections and relationships reminds us that what is not there can often be as important as what is there, and that the way in which evidence is linked together and interpreted is not predetermined.

Studying financial institutions within a larger social and historical context illuminates the important role that culture played in the world of finance even when it does not seem to play a role because of the way in which society and business are kept separate. Writing biography from a network perspective asks us to find the connections between different groups of peoples, who not only saw themselves as entirely separate from each other, but also went to great lengths to make that separation a reality, and therefore, did not leave evidence
of those ties. In practical terms, mapping biographical networks is a challenge precisely for these reasons. We must still find a way to demonstrate the connections empirically even when direct evidence is not there. The book goes into much greater detail about the many different historical sources and datasets that I used to study their networks, but in conclusion, I will briefly illustrate how I translated two archival sources into a network map: the Morgan syndicate books and geographic addresses from the New York City Social Register.

Between 1894 and 1934, J.P. Morgan & Co. created twelve syndicate books, which are very large ledgers with handwritten entries on business deals with additional pages of documents (usually typewritten) bound into each book. In order to translate the books into quantitative information, every deal was put into an Excel file and coded according to the type of client for the deal (e.g., a railroad, a utility company, a manufacturer, etc.), the total amount of money the syndicate was put together to finance, the profit and loss if noted, and the year, among other details. Every single syndicate participant was noted and given a separate Excel file with the name of the deal, the year, and the amount. The Morgan firm’s participation in syndicates initiated by other firms was also recorded. All of this information was then aggregated by five-year intervals.

By mapping these deals over time, one could see that the greater the amount allotted to a particular firm, the more frequently it joined the Morgans’ syndicates, and the more diverse its participations (e.g. by variety of clients), the more important that firm was to the Morgan bank. Thus, the coding process identified the nature of a participant’s position in the network relative to all the other participants and made it possible to answer the following questions: Did a participant only do business with the Morgans for one client? Did the amount of business drop off after a certain time? Did firms that joined syndicates managed by the Morgans reciprocate by inviting them to participate in their own deals? My analysis of the Morgan syndicates found that the Morgans did not cooperate with all the participants equally in terms of frequency or amount. It confirmed that Kuhn, Loeb was an important syndicate participant. But it also revealed that within this world, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. was an important partner with certain limitations: it was important because it was a competitor and not in spite of the fact that it was a competitor. What the Morgan syndicate data shows, therefore, is that the bank did not ignore social separation but accommodated for it.
As discussed in the book, the key to understanding the Morgan bank’s relationship and cooperation with Schiff and Kuhn, Loeb lays in recognizing that they were tied to Kuhn, Loeb & Co. by a larger network of financial actors. The fact that this larger network was set in the context of a time and place is apparent in the location of the partners’ homes, another dataset I generated in order to study their relationships. Using geographic data was taken from the Social Register, New York (for the Morgans) and from Census data, passport applications, newspaper articles, and private papers for Kuhn, Loeb partners, I gathered data and created maps for the Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb partners for every five-year period between 1895 and 1940. The addresses were compared to map data from Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Using information provided by Environmental Data Resources (EDR), which owns the copyright to the Sanborn map data, a latitude/longitude list was created for every address. Then, using a map file provided by the New York City planning department, the locations were uploaded into ArcGIS, a geographic information system program, and visualized on a map of Manhattan.

Though dozens of maps were made, only several made it into the book. These maps offer a relatively accurate picture of where the partners lived in relation to one another in early twentieth-century New York (see Map). Generally speaking, the Morgan firm’s partners tended to live near each other in the neighborhood known as Murray Hill, just south of Grand Central Station. Kuhn, Loeb partners, on the other hand, lived further north, in homes and mansions spaced out along Fifth Avenue and the eastern side of Central Park. Other syndicate participants, such as the First National Bank of New York and National City Bank, were managed by directors who tended to be Anglo-American Protestants and to live closer to the Morgan firm.
partners. Mapping the location of these bankers when they were away from Wall Street underscores the extent to which Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb partners lived separate social lives which, again, had to be understood in the context of the fact that they did work together as the syndicate books demonstrated. It goes without saying that a critical piece is not just to create the picture of the two networks but to analyze them together. Without both, we would only have part of the story, and most importantly, we would risk depriving historical structures of their sense of the processes that made them possible.

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LIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM? THE CHALLENGE OF WRITING BIOGRAPHIES OF GERMAN-AMERICAN IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS

Atiba Pertilla and Uwe Spiekermann

GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE

Introduction: The GHI Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project

Since 2010, the collaborative research project “Immigrant Entrepreneurship: German-American Business Biographies, 1720 to the Present,” has explored the entrepreneurial, economic, social, and cultural capacity of immigrants by investigating the German-American example in the United States. Biographies of businesspeople offer a new integrative perspective not only to trace the lives, careers, and business ventures of significant immigrants but to answer core questions of American, business, and migration history in a new way. Our main presupposition was that biographies would enable us to question notions of American exceptionalism in order to situate U.S. history in a transnational framework and understand the formation and ongoing changes of an immigrant nation over a period of nearly 300 years. The Immigrant Entrepreneurship project aims to explore hundreds of biographies; the sheer amount of this material has made clear that biographies can be used not only to analyze individual lives but also to address general questions in the history of capitalism and modernity. The accumulation of biographical details should enable us to more clearly discern and analyze the general patterns of American history as a history of immigration and acculturation. Consequently, the project’s website includes a growing number of thematic essays and teaching tools intended to link the individual cases to the large number of historiographical sub-disciplines, and enable teachers and the general public to situate the individual cases in the larger American historical experience.

The biographies of the Immigrant Entrepreneurship project are freely available to the public via the project’s website http://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org. As of October 2014, more than 130 biographies had been posted, more than 50 additional manuscripts are in the editorial process, and eventually more than 200 individual contributions will provide detailed and nuanced information about German-American immigrant entrepreneurship during the last three centuries. The website offers not only biographical articles but also

1 For details, see http://www.immigrantentrepreneurship.org.

2 An overview setting out the project’s goals was provided by Hartmut Berghoff and Uwe Spiekermann, “Immigrant Entrepreneurship: The German-American Business Biography, 1720 to the Present: A Research Project,” Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 47 (2010): 69-82. This piece, however, did not specifically address the genre of biography and its methodology as the present article and the companion pieces in this issue attempt to do.
fresh insights into migration, business, and social history by including more than 1,400 images and nearly 700 documents that shed light on business, family life, and social experiences. The research project covers the well-documented period of individual capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century but also presents more than twenty biographies each for the periods before 1840 and after World War II, providing a vivid picture of the dramatic changes in immigration, entrepreneurship, and the economic, social, political, and cultural framework of pre- and postindustrial American history.

Biographical research creates its own dynamics: with each new biography received from our contributors, we have had to learn how to deal with typical narratives of the genre, how to become more specific in our comments and review questions, and how to deal with the variations found among these reconstructed lives. Although the methodological and theoretical challenges of biographies were considered extensively in developing the project’s research design, the practical experience of the last four years has pushed us towards constant re-reflection on the project’s conceptualization and our editorial practice.

I. General Problems of Biographies

Although sociologists announced a “biographical turn” more than a decade ago, scholars have often had to defend biographical research against basic epistemological criticism. One well-known and broadly discussed example was French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s attack on the “biographical illusion.” For Bourdieu, biography was an expression of bourgeois ideology, with the identity and personality of the bourgeois emerging from a non-reflective approach that begins with the writer taking the subject’s life for granted as a continuum of events that can — and should — be shaped into a linear narrative. Bourdieu argued that the individual is not given but produced, with attributes of identity and personality dependent on his or her social world, and that without an analysis of social and historical space there cannot be any understanding of a biography. Consequently, he proposed, biographical research should not start with an analysis of a proposed subjectivity but with the object structures of the social world.

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coherent identity by using a consistent narrative of the self and the social world. British sociologist Anthony Giddens’ discussion of the “ontological security” of modern individuals seems to be a better starting point for biographical research. People use their individual experience to give meaning and coherence to their lives even while acknowledging they have only an incomplete understanding and that there are a myriad of challenges and alternatives in the private and social worlds.6

Closely related to Bourdieu’s criticism is the accusation that biographies tend to reproduce class structures.7 The biographical genre was, for a long period, a self-expression of the bourgeois subject and a solipsistic project of historians to enhance their own status through their reflections on the lives of “great men.” In recent decades, however, this has changed with the rise of the history of everyday life and growing interest in the lives of individuals of atypical prominence from minority groups and of “ordinary” people, broadly speaking.8 Biographical research has not only benefited from such new areas of attention but has become an important methodological and analytical tool for introducing the challenges of the “cultural turn” into historiography.9 Mentalities and meanings, practices and performance, emotions and feelings — all of these fields of modern research need a biographical backing. The genre of biography is no longer a backward and conservative method but an experimental field for the historiography of the twenty-first century.10 It allows a theoretically and methodologically advanced history without a meta-narrative.11

This does not mean that biographies are a tool to examine the lost subjectivity and individuality of modern history. Bourdieu’s warning that we cannot write biographies without a clear-cut understanding of historical context and a detailed empirical examination of the social world must be taken seriously. Although the growing importance of the genre can also be seen as one sign of the “age of fracture” and the attractiveness of a neoliberal, reflexive modernity, it is the interaction


between public and private, the general and the individual, which allows a thorough description of a person’s life and empirically solid results, which shed light far beyond the individual. Modern biographies are an indispensable tool of historiography but they offer no silver bullet for significantly better results.

Biographies are surely a challenge for historians: thinking about subjectivity pertains not only to this particular genre but has a bearing on the social role of all scholars doing historical research. Biographical research helps us to reflect — individually and as a profession — on how we organize knowledge and why. This process, ideally, can force us to think more honestly and self-critically about the uses and functions of history and historical knowledge in modern societies. The paradox is that not only do we attribute agency to others, but as experts, we are constantly fighting against the subjective knowledge of the majority. We no longer see our work — individually and as a profession — as an exact reconstruction of the past. Instead, we are more likely to reflect on how inherited narratives should be reconstructed and challenged — and why.

II. The Rise and Fall of Entrepreneurial Biography

Entrepreneurs, broadly stated, formed the core of the bourgeois middle and upper classes that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and have remained the most prominent and lauded figures in American society. Consider, for example, the celebration of small business as “the backbone of our economy” by President Barack Obama and the lionization of business leaders such as Steve Jobs, whose biography was a #1 bestseller. Although nineteenth and early-twentieth century biographies predominantly focused on “great” men (and a few women) — namely politicians, writers, civic activists, and religious leaders — entrepreneurs were also prominently covered in the public media of the time.

These biographies were interested in the secrets of success and in the example that prosperous and innovative businesspeople presented. Biographers claimed to be offering keen insights into the intellectual
and moral worlds of industrialists. Austin Adams, for example, declared in his profile of John D. Spreckels that "I have long and keenly watched this big man... I have watched him in moments of exaltation or of hilarity, and in moments of wordless grief and crushing sorrow; I have watched the working of his mind and spirit in no end of subjects. I know the man — his soul — his secret — and it is in the light of my discovery of this inward and spiritual side that I have told the story of his outward and visible life." Adams' idol was one of California's leading investors, second generation German-American immigrant entrepreneur John D. Spreckels, and Adams' biography offers a myopic portrait of Spreckels' life. Throughout the nineteenth century entrepreneurs were presented as representative men who served as examples to their communities and were publicly celebrated in biographical compendia on local and regional elites. The dominant narrative was that of a self-made man who lived the American dream by advancing through hard work to economic and social success.

During the Gilded Age, entrepreneurs were integral members of the class of "pioneers... merchants, orators, and divines," who "made" the country and its counties and were perceived as apostles of growth, civilization and wealth. Biographical sketches of the local and regional elites aimed to create a common idea of public spirit and civic duty and to define an "all-American" ideal of citizenship. At the same time, however, the immigrant communities were creating their own compilations of representative biographies, celebrating, for example, "the German element" in works published throughout the United States. Biographies remained an ambivalent element in forming melting-pot America.

16 H. Austin Adams, The Man: John D. Spreckels (San Diego, 1924), 8-9
17 Originally, "Representative Men" was a series of biographical sketches by essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson (Ralph W. Emerson, Representative Men: Seven Lectures (Boston, 1850)). The collection is a fine example of the historicist idea that "great men" made history and their biography offers a tool to understand the past and to predict the future. The transition to entrepreneurs can be studied in books like George F. Bacon, Portland: Its Representative Business Men and Its Points of Interest (Newark, 1891); Reading: Its Representative Business Men, and Its Points of Interest (New York, 1891).
18 See for example Charles C.B. Seymour, Self-Made Men (New York, 1858). The development of this idea is discussed in a number of studies, including Tom Pendergast, Creating the Modern Man: American Magazines and Consumer Culture (Columbia, Mo., 2000).
19 Typical titles include Oscar T. Shuck, The Representative and Leading Men of the Pacific: Being Original Sketches of the Lives and Characters of the Principal Men and of the Pacific States and Territories—Pioneers, Politicians, Lawyers, Doctors, Merchants, Orators and Divines... (San Francisco, 1870).
21 Cf., for example, James Bernard Cullen, ed., The Story of the Irish in Boston (Boston, 1893), and William J. Simmons, Men of Mark: Eminent, Progressive and Rising (Cleveland, 1887), a compilation of profiles of African-Americans.
This ambivalence was of particular importance in business: Many of the leading entrepreneurs were persons whose success often resulted from rude and shrewd business deals and practices. The notorious “robber barons” undermined the Jacksonian ideal of local and mid-sized business communities, while sharp scrutiny of their private lives and habits was used to discuss the rise of big business and monopolies and the danger to civil society. During the Progressive Era, biographies of businessmen had an important critical function in public debate and helped lend legitimacy to anti-monopoly legislation and other reform efforts throughout the early twentieth century, none more, perhaps, than Ida Tarbell’s biography of the business of John D. Rockefeller, *The History of the Standard Oil Company*. But it was not only this negative heroism that made business biographies a more challenging field than other sub-disciplines of the genre. Histories of firms, corporations, products, and organizational principles often became more important than biographies of individuals. Entrepreneurs were perceived as torchbearers of progress and innovation, of creative destruction and re-organization of society. Firms, corporations, products, and organizational principles helped to institutionalize the ideas of the industrial age, and often accounts of individual careers were focused only on this legacy. Thus, in order to offer a simple story of progress, the activities of entrepreneurs in multiple ventures tended to be ignored or deemphasized to limit the scope and the focus of the biography. The Uihlein brothers, for example, are directly connected to the rise of the Schlitz Brewing Company, America’s largest brewery in 1900, but from the 1890s onward, they invested much more time in becoming, at least for a short while, the largest real estate owners in the United States. As “captains of industry” were more and more replaced by “biographies” of firms and products, the result was a business history that was no longer interested in individuals.

These developments in the historiography of business were pushed by microeconomic functionalism, which put business history on a new intellectual level and enabled better explanations for business development and long-term changes of the firm. Mostly linked to the name of Alfred Chandler — although based largely on publications from the interwar period — these modern approaches were interested in decision-making and functions, in generalizations and in de-individualizing research, seeing people as “puppets or . . . unconscious agents, who obey various hidden determinations that frame
Entrepreneurs were no longer important; instead intense discussions of the concept of entrepreneurship shaped the profession of business history. The rise of modern business, which is no less than the rise of the modern world, was written without individuals: groups like merchants and entrepreneurs were integrated into these narratives only as representatives of general ideas and trends. Biographies were still referenced, but they were used to explain more general questions and to enable an understanding of theoretical approaches and complex configurations in history. In other words, economic functionalism and historical tradition merged into an often deterministic interpretation of (business) history.

This has changed in the last two decades. Business history has faced the challenges of the “cultural turn” and broadened its perspectives. Philip Scranton and Patrick Fridenson, suggesting a new agenda for business history, recently argued that historians need to pay attention to how entrepreneurs express their values and beliefs in the business, how managers’ personal motivations affect the fate of the firm, and how “minor” actors can damage or reshape a company’s performance. Further, they argued, actors can mobilize additional resources from outside the firm, and therefore networks and the social world cannot be ignored in business history.

These changes in business history were relevant factors in our decision to use a biographical approach for the Immigrant Entrepreneurship project. Today, even biographies written by family members or descendants are often no longer hagiographic and punctilious but try to combine individual biography with an analysis of the historical background. Most scholars do not concentrate on an individual career but try to broaden the analytical perspective. More common are group biographies, like Leon Harris’ well-known history of the merchant princes. Company histories are more and more linked


30 Good examples of this include Toni Pierenkemper, *Unternehmensgeschichte: Eine Einführung in ihre Methoden und Ergebnisse* (Stuttgart, 2000) and Hartmut Berghoff, *Moderne Unternehmensgeschichte: Eine themen- und theorieorientierte Einführung* (Paderborn et al., 2004).


33 Although such endeavors can result in highly interesting books, for instance William Edmundson, *The Nitrate King: A Biography of ”Colonel” John Thomas North* (New York, 2010).

to detailed information on the proprietors and leading managers. While for a long time big corporations remained the focus of academic analysis, family businesses have become a new topic of interest. Prozopography is a well-established field, namely in German business history, where economic and social history are still closely connected. Network analysis has been another inspiring approach and has not only been used for business history but also for a better understanding of the political economy of the Nazi period and the early history of West Germany.

III. Operationalization: The Guidelines of the Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project

The Immigrant Entrepreneurship project was conceptualized as a way to integrate the insights of social and cultural history into histories of business development that have either emphasized lone geniuses or attributed changes in production, distribution, and consumption to the rationalization efforts of anonymous agents or the result of large-scale, inescapable trends. In addition, the project has adopted a transnational approach and considers new insights from the field of migration history.

Authors of biographical articles (which generally range between 6,000 and 8,000 words) use a structural frame with three components. First, authors are asked to describe the subject’s family

Outline of Article Structure for the Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project.

1. Introduction
2. Family Background
3. Business Development
4. Social Status
5. Conclusion

Role of Ethnicity and the Immigrant Experience

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background, including his/her community or region of origin, and to provide information about the subject’s parents, class and occupational background, religion, and educational achievements. The author describes the circumstances under which the subject (or his or her parents) emigrated from Germany, and the extent to which the candidate established a German ethnic identity after arriving in the United States (or, for second-generation German-Americans, the extent to which the family maintained a German identity). The second component includes a description of the entrepreneur’s business career, including experiences of success and failure, the role of political events and government policy, access to capital and use of technology, and how the entrepreneur’s business strategies innovated markets or reflected broader trends in a specific industry. Finally, in the third component, the biography addresses the entrepreneur’s social status, family, political engagement, philanthropic and other non-economic activities, and the role of cultural heritage and social networks. Throughout the biography, authors consider the role of migration, German ethnic communities and traditions, and entrepreneurial opportunities in shaping the subject’s life.

This predefined structure enables a comparative perspective across all biographies. It emphasizes the project’s core interests in the individual, family and community, business development, and the immigrant experience. It offers freedom to add specific topics related to an individual life and a unique career. The guidelines give room for the typical chronology of a biography, but also elicit additional entry points for reflection. With this approach authors are encouraged to disrupt standard narratives of “success” because they are asked to concentrate on multiple topics that will have different relevant chronologies in a given subject’s life.

IV. Examples from the Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project

The Immigrant Entrepreneurship project, with more than 120 authors to date writing on as many biographical subjects, inevitably has produced a wide range of approaches to the topic within the structural framework. Some biographies lend themselves to a highly individualistic treatment because this most closely reflects the entrepreneur’s career. Contributor Leslie Goddard’s biography of candy manufacturer E.J. Brach, for example, traces his career from opening “Brach’s Palace of Sweets” in Chicago in 1904, a small
shop where candies made by hand in a back room were retailed to customers at the front counter. Brach then became a supplier for the city’s largest department stores, took over a factory, and established himself as a wholesale candy manufacturer, continually adopting new methods to eliminate manual labor, increase the variety of products offered, and add production capacity. By 1918, E.J. Brach & Sons had three factories producing two million pounds of candy a week.

The Brach company was promoted as an extension of the founder’s personality: advertisements emphasized his dedication to product quality and purity; the company’s 1946 annual report included a comic-book-style retelling of Emil J. Brach’s life and career; and internal employee publications referred to the founder as “Father Brach.” The project’s emphasis on ethnic identity, however, focuses attention on the ways in which “entrepreneurial myths” often smooth away potential friction points with dominant cultural values. For example, the comic-book retelling of Brach’s life, published shortly after the end of World War II, elided the fact that he grew up in Germany until age seven and began the story with his later childhood in Iowa.

Another approach has been to show the importance of family networks in fostering entrepreneurship. For many nineteenth-century businesses, particularly commercial and mercantile firms, having multiple family members to manage far-flung operations was an important contributor to entrepreneurial success. The five Sanger brothers, for example, operated a string of dry-goods stores in nineteenth-century Texas, as elaborated by author Kay Goldman in her biographical article. The employment of multiple family members who could be dispersed to different locations and shifted from place to place depending on a particular town’s fortunes allowed the family enterprise, as a whole, to diversify its risks and acquire information in multiple locations in order to make good business decisions.


The origins of the company Bausch & Lomb were also based on family relationships. Emigrant John Bausch opened a small optician’s shop in the 1850s, relying on his brother, who remained in Germany, for his supplies. Another emigrant, Henry Lomb, invested in the shop when Bausch was in need of funds; as the United States became more prosperous in the years after the Civil War, Bausch began manufacturing eyewear and lenses while embarking on a strategy of expanding both its domestic and foreign markets. Other relatives of Bausch and Lomb became affiliated with the company in both the United States and in Germany. The firm continually took advantage of information flows from Germany’s camera-manufacturing sector and scientific research in optics, and integrated “backward” into the production of industrial materials for its lenses as well as “forward” into the production of camera shutters. Members of the Bausch and Lomb families, as well as men from other German-American families in their social network, assumed positions in the company’s hierarchy and remained in control of the company through the 1930s. Berti Kolbow, author of the biographical profile of Bausch, notes that the persistence of this interrelated network of company executives and owners challenges the Chandlerian model of business history that argues that innovative diversification and vertical integration were processes that only occurred once ownership and management of the corporation were separated.41

Another variation on the theme of entrepreneurship focuses on subjects whose success lay in their ability to adapt large corporations to new challenges, using skills in information management and interpersonal negotiation rather than a talent for invention or technical expertise to enable a business to expand. Gerard Swope, for example, trained as an electrical engineer and joined the Western Electric Company in 1895. He ascended the corporate ladder by becoming a talented sales executive. After Western Electric was taken over by General Electric in 1909, he was charged with examining the company’s foreign operations, and spent much of the next decade developing new business overseas in Europe and Asia. In 1922, he became president of General Electric, where he focused on both developing new products for the homes of the burgeoning middle class and also on creating harmonious relations with labor that enabled the company to expand its manufacturing capacity. The Immigrant Entrepreneurship project’s approach examines the migration not only by...
of individuals but also of goods and ideas. In Swope’s case, author Thomas Irmer notes that Swope’s proposals for a robust system of employee benefits were probably shaped by his knowledge of similar proposals in the German electrical equipment industry. 

One of the primary difficulties in using a biographical approach to study the history of immigrant entrepreneurship is that of scale. On the one hand, it is usually difficult to catch sight of the business careers of any individual entrepreneur except for those who achieved some measure of renown at the local or national level. On the other hand, this means that the experiences of innumerable entrepreneurs who played roles in building and sustaining ethnic communities are difficult to retrieve. The problem of scale leads, in turn, to other problems, above all the question of how to represent the experiences of female entrepreneurs. This is particularly true of women who operated boarding houses, kept small shops, and operated laundries or other small-scale businesses. The biography of Fredericka Mandelbaum, by Rona Holub, represents one woman who took advantage of one of the limited number of business positions open to her in the mid-nineteenth century, initially operating a peddling business and then becoming a “fence,” offering a discounted price to criminals who wished to unload stolen goods and then offering them for sale to the general public. In Mandelbaum’s case, ethnic ties in Manhattan’s Kleindeutschland neighborhood led to alliances of convenience with craftsmen such as engravers who used their skills to erase distinguishing marks from stolen jewelry. While several scholars have examined forms of both legitimate and illicit small enterprise, the question of how ethnic identity shaped options for female entrepreneurship has only begun to be addressed.

In the decades after World War II, the character of German-American entrepreneurship changed in notable ways. The German Jews who fled the violence of the early Nazi period and those who arrived in the United States after surviving the war and the death camps constitute a special experience of forced emigration, distinct both from earlier Christian and Jewish emigrants and from later postwar migrants by choice. Whether they had been wealthy managers of important regional or national firms or the proprietors of small businesses, German Jewish entrepreneurs who were expelled from Germany or fled often arrived in the United States with little more than a week or a month’s living expenses to their names. Many sought to reestablish themselves as entrepreneurs in the United States, using their preexisting


skills, but the ability to attain this goal often depended on whether or not they had business contacts in the United States who could assist in this process. Brewing executive Hermann Schülein was one of the few who were able to leverage business contacts to attain a position of comparable stature to what they had enjoyed in Germany. Others, such as the Joel family, went from managing large, complex businesses to making a living from small-scale manufacturing.45

Those who emigrated voluntarily since the 1950s present important contrasts with the emigrants of earlier decades, who brought with them a wide variety of craft and managerial skills and sometimes no skills at all. The desire for political and economic opportunity that motivated earlier generations of emigrants lessened as West Germany enjoyed the benefits of postwar prosperity while East Germans were largely barred from emigrating. More recent German emigrants have tended to be either university graduates in business or scientific fields or individuals who have completed a formal apprenticeship program; in both cases, these emigrants tend to arrive in the United States to pursue a specific job or educational opportunity. German-Americans in recent decades offer fewer examples of an important stream of modern-day immigrant entrepreneur, namely individuals who started their own businesses as a form of “self-employment” and have parlayed such work into important local or regional enterprises.46 Yet another important form of entrepreneurship has been the arrival of executives to direct the subsidiaries of German corporations in the United States. In many cases, these companies and entrepreneurs have benefited from a government infrastructure that had not existed earlier, in particular networks of consulates and German-American chambers of commerce and other business associations, which have produced a different sociopolitical context for entrepreneurship.

**Conclusion**

The Immigrant Entrepreneurship project’s goals of seeing business history in a transnational context and migration history in the context of entrepreneurship over the long term are intended to offer a context for future research even as both of these topics continue to evolve.47 Technological developments will play unanticipated roles in the future of both migration and entrepreneurship. Among other services, one might point to cellular telephones and Internet access that enable near-instantaneous communication across national borders, as well

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as the rise of mobile payments and other forms of non-traditional exchange. Government policy will likely play an increasingly important part in shaping the terms on which migration can and cannot take place, with effects that will vary between small and large enterprises as well as between companies operating in local and multinational environments. The contributions of the Immigrant Entrepreneurship project, it is hoped, will offer a framework for considering the ranges of possibility that have been open to or withheld from new residents at various points in the American past and in its present. Biographies are one of the most useful methods for examining these possibilities, of the desire for liberty and success, to make a difference, or to fight against failure and hostility in an unfamiliar country. Abstract dreams like these became concrete in the private lives of these individuals who crossed from one country into another. That is the productive challenge of biographies.

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During the last decade, a change has come about in American history teaching that has shaken up classroom routines in secondary and higher education. Education experts and teachers increasingly question the predominant factual orientation in instructional practice and insist on the necessity of teaching students historical thinking skills. Instead of reading in the textbook and memorizing the “facts” of the national story, students are now expected to engage in contextualizing, corroborating and close reading of primary and secondary sources. At first glance, biographies do not seem to contribute much to these goals. Haven’t teachers bored students for decades with the lengthy life stories of long-dead people from which a moral lesson was to be deduced? This essay will argue that biographies are indeed a valuable resource for teaching historical thinking skills, and that they lend themselves well to varied and engaging activities in both secondary and post-secondary instruction.

If a historian works on a biography, he conducts a case study; if a certain biography is used in class to teach more complex ideas and structures, the underlying didactic principle is called exemplary learning. Education experts have reflected extensively on this principle for structuring history lessons. However, few connections have been made between the unique properties of the biographical genre and the development of historical thinking skills, so that this essay must be seen as a tentative venture into a specific domain of educational practice.
research. The following discussion will focus on the didactic principle of exemplary learning, the history of biography in Germany and the U.S., and on how the analysis of biographies can contribute to improving students’ understanding of history. Last but not least, the teaching value of the German Historical Institute’s Immigrant Entrepreneurship project, an online collection of over one hundred business biographies, will be considered and a sample lesson will be discussed.

I. Case Studies and Exemplary Learning

Epistemologically speaking, the concept of case studies counts among the micro-historical methods of analysis. A specific historical case or “example” is investigated, which, compared to longitudinal approaches, implies a focus on a unique, locally and temporally bound event. If students are supposed to grasp more complex ideas and structures by the means of working on a specific, “exemplary” event or person, one speaks of exemplary learning. Introduced by the physicist and teacher Martin Wagenschein for science education and further developed by the pedagogical reformer Wolfgang Klafki, this approach has been discussed in German education and history didactics since the late 1950s.

Especially in history education, due to the notorious overcrowding of curricula, experts have tried to agree on which topics were to be taught by using cases or examples, and how this “didactic reduction” was to be accomplished.

For a long time, experts on history teaching and learning in Germany discussed if and how the exemplar principle might be conducive to successful history learning. The consensus was reached that examples are useful for teaching historical thinking skills and fundamental categorical structures of the discipline; for orientation in history and the understanding of superordinate causalities, they generally are seen as less useful. This matches the general classification of the exemplary in didactics, which subdivides it into (a) elementary, (b) fundamental, (c) typical, (d) categorical and (e) representative. Exemplary learning becomes problematic, however, if students feel that historical content is random and replaceable by any other topic. Rohlfes even suggests that in students’ perception, history might be replaced by a chain of disconnected events and people, forming a “meta-history.” Thus, it is indispensable to connect the study of exemplary events or persons with the “bigger picture.” As has been explained, exemplary learning in history education has decided advantages but also pitfalls. With a view to these problems, the biographical genre

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8 Ibid., 280–281.
and its value for teaching historical thinking skills shall be explored in the following section.

**II. Biography in American and German History Teaching**

Biography as a genre has experienced varying degrees of appreciation. The decline of historicism and the rise of structural history during the 1960s led to a devaluation of the genre in Germany, whereas in the U.S., it was never as discredited and continued to stand strong as a valid approach. These trends and shifts in scholarship have of course influenced classroom practice, with different generations of teachers trained with different epistemological beliefs. Since the historicist approach to biography has been practiced widely and endured in the United States, biographies have seemingly been used in class with less reserve and greater confidence there than in Germany. The social history turn of the 1970s and later the cultural turn of the 1980s–1990s may simply have had less of an influence on teaching than they had in Europe.

Before the 1970s, biographies were usually strongly integrated into German history education. It was fairly common for teachers to give lectures on the lives of illustrious individuals. Teacher narratives were supposed to be structured in a way that gripped the students’ attention, made them immerse themselves in the story, and ideally brought them to empathize with and perhaps even admire the subject. From the late 1960s onwards, instruction in schools became less personality-focused and also less teacher-centered. The lecture format was strongly criticized for being overpowering and for the fact that students were expected to passively and uncritically accept their instructor’s interpretation of history. In accordance with the paradigm shift in academia, educators focused more on social and economic issues as well as structural questions, and the “great men” moved to the background. Changes in textbooks, which were particularly encouraged by Georg Eckert and the Institute for International Textbook Research, accompanied and reinforced this development. Today, biographies have returned to history classrooms as the relevance of the individual is balanced against structural conditions and contextual influences. Women, minorities and marginalized groups have become

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10 Depkat, “The Challenges of Biography.”


13 Joachim Rohlfes, Geschichte und ihre Didaktik (Göttingen, 2005), 264–265.

14 Depkat, “The Challenges of Biography.” Note that there was a similar but only tentative development immediately after World War II. Didactic materials were then published which stressed the history of the “little man” as opposed to that of the “great men” in more traditional textbooks Hans Ebeling, Methodik des Geschichtsunterrichts (Hannover, 1953).

increasingly present as subjects of instruction, a development to which microhistory and cultural history have both contributed.

After browsing through teaching resources on American websites, one cannot help but notice that biographies are embraced enthusiastically by many educators throughout the United States. Teachers can find an abundance of tasks, lesson plans and practical tips for using biographies in the history classroom, pointing to general confidence in the genre’s teaching value. Secondary history teaching in the U.S. has always comprised elements of civic education, meaning that “key biographies” in the “national story” are discussed and passed along. As Sam Wineburg, professor of education at Stanford University and a renowned expert on history education argues, “Myths inhabit the national consciousness the way gas molecules fill a vacuum. In a country as diverse as ours, we instinctively search for symbols — in children’s biographies, coloring contests, Disney movies — that allow us to rally round common themes and common stories, whether true, embellished or made out of whole cloth.” In the United States, the knowledge of these “key biographies” (including figures such as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King Jr.) is much more a part of the cultural canon than in Germany. The general public often consumes history in the shape of life stories, either at school or in public, and a strong focus on the individual in popular entertainment reinforces this tendency.

However, looking more closely at the concrete learning materials on study websites, biographies most often are used in a merely illustrative fashion, contributing “facts” for students to absorb. Generally, a task that does not require critical engagement has little value for fostering historical thinking skills. This usage may be attributed to the fact that in the United States, due to standardized state assessments, the acquisition of skills in historical analysis are oft en neglected in order to cover as much content as possible.


19 One could argue that for Germany the Third Reich period is an exception, with the lives of many Nazi officials, and particularly Adolf Hitler, inspiring curiosity among historians and the public alike.

20 A glance at the programming of the History Channel suggests how much popular history is narrated using the framework of biographies. For a comprehensive reader on celebrity culture and individualism in the U.S., see Celebrity Culture in the United States, ed. Terence J. Fitzgerald (New York, 2008).


focus on imparting factual information as it is easier to test students on their acquisition of this knowledge using multiple-choice questions. If a biography is merely used as a vehicle to transport “facts,” then this is indeed an old-fashioned way of teaching, as Ken Wolf argues. Teachers are increasingly reluctant to make their lessons “parades of great men and women,” but still it often seems that students are not encouraged to systematically analyze biographies as constructed narratives.23

III. The Benefits of Biography in the History Classroom

This lack of systematic analysis is unfortunate, since the educational value of biographies certainly is not limited to providing or illustrating historical content knowledge. Well-researched biographies are ideal material for implementing the acquisition of historical thinking skills, a focus in American history education that has recently been strongly emphasized by the incipient Common Core State Standards.24

First, reading biographies in the classroom can have very positive effects on learners’ abilities to deconstruct narratives and to reassemble facts into coherent stories.25 On the one hand, critical and analytical engagement with the author’s narrative, with the conventions of a genre, or with primary sources, such as autobiographies, diaries or interviews, develops historic literacy.26 It can be encouraged in all grades and on all ability levels. Considering that historic reading skills include being able to engage with many different source types, biographies can add to the diversity of genres used in the secondary and post-secondary classroom. They provide one more kind of textual information that can foster well-rounded analytical abilities. Reconstructive writing skills, on the other hand, may be promoted by having students compose their own biographies. The reconstruction of a historical narrative is very beneficial on many cognitive levels, as it requires a profound engagement with questions of continuity.


26 For the concept of historic literacy, see Sam Wineburg, Daisy Martin and Chauncey Monte-Sano, Reading Like a Historian: Teaching Literacy in Middle and High School History Classrooms (New York, 2013), x–xii.
and change as well as cause and consequence. Students can gain insights into the creation of a plot and the handling of source material and narrative conventions. In high school, it would be most effective if the educator provided a selection of primary and secondary sources that learners could use as a basis for shorter writing assignments. Having learners take notes and categorize information by using graphic organizers are good pre-writing activities. In college, whole independent research projects are thinkable, especially on historical actors who have not as yet come into the focus of scholarly research.

The content of biographies can make history more accessible to students, a crucial condition for sustaining motivation. Nowadays, it is understood that personality-centered lessons and case studies must be combined with other structural frameworks, including chronological presentations, longitudinal approaches, and comparisons. Still, biography enlivens and humanizes history, showing how political structures, intellectual movements and social/economic developments are the work of actual people, not of anonymous forces. Students often struggle with this “bigger picture,” so that for many, the biographical perspective is very appealing. The result can be higher motivation, deeper intellectual engagement and more positive attitudes towards the chosen topic.

Biography and autobiography are very much a part of each student’s personal experience. Reflecting on one’s own life and thinking about the lives of others, whether family and friends or politicians and celebrities, is a natural and frequent habit for many people, whether conscious or subconscious. Stories about us and others are an essential and constitutive part of humanity. There is a very close relationship between life, self, story and learning, so that it can be assumed that biography appeals to students on this very fundamental level.

Having decided to implement the use of biography in history instruction, the instructor should then select suitable biographies that are conducive to fruitful learning. In practical terms, they should not be too long, too expensive or difficult to acquire, and ideally ability-appropriate. They should also have a high academic standard, with footnotes referencing sources and accounts of secondary literature. Biographies are situated between scholarship, literature and popular culture, but in classroom settings, teachers should lean towards selecting scholarly works in order to familiarize students with academic research and to teach them the value of thoroughly researched presentations.

29 Biographies of minority group members come to mind, but also of regional leaders. Klaus Bergmann calls this approach Personifizierung, i.e. focusing on the “anonymous” and speechless, instead of teaching only the lives of prominent and influential people, which he calls Personalisierung. See Klaus Bergmann, “Personalisierung, Personifizierung,” in Handbuch der Geschichtsdidaktik, ed. Bergmann et al., 298–300.
32 Ibid.
34 Depkat, “The Challenges of Biography.”
In terms of content, the life of the chosen historical person should be interesting and compelling, but also representative of broader issues.\textsuperscript{35} There have been reproaches that biographies offer “minutiae without meaning” or “lives without theory,” and teachers should make sure that students gain insights into general historical issues rather than studying a highly idiosyncratic experience.\textsuperscript{36} In that sense, accounts of marginalized lives can be used to broaden the dominant Eurocentric perspective in historical research. Post-structuralist, post-colonial, feminist and queer theory have led to the emergence of a broader array of biographical subjects, which can prove valuable in fostering intercultural competence and broadening students’ horizons.\textsuperscript{37} They are also an excellent resource for teaching multiperspectivity, as the increasing diversity of society can be shown through them.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{IV. Challenges and Pitfalls}

Naturally, the genre of biography not only offers advantages but also poses difficulties to instructors and students. Some are inherent to the genre, while others are more practical. First and perhaps most important, students must be made aware that biographies are not factual accounts, but literary works with a narrative structure devised by the biographer. Authors construct causality and climaxes for the sake of plot, which is of course an interpretation of the sources, not an “objective” rendering of them.\textsuperscript{39} Students may be prone to at first accept a biographer’s interpretation as fact without questioning the narrative conventions underlying it. This goes hand in hand with the observation that the general public and students often view history as facts waiting to be discovered in an archive, believing that once historians find and publish them the secrets of the past will be divulged.\textsuperscript{40} Many people have little understanding that history is the result of interpretation and constant re-interpretation. Teaching students the differences between story, narrative, plot and source material is definitely a crucial, but not an easy task. Providing students with contextual information on the author, on academic debates of the time, and other background can help mitigate the power of these assumptions.\textsuperscript{41}

Accordingly, students should be motivated to work directly with the biographer’s sources. Many biographical subjects incorporate elaborate personal myths into their life stories, and in some cases these are incorporated into a biography uncritically, regardless of their


\textsuperscript{38} Leckie, “Why Biographies Matter”; see also Klaus Bergmann, Multiperspektivität: Geschichte selber denken (Schwalbach/Ts., 2000).


\textsuperscript{41} Leckie, “Why Biographies Matter.”
It is important that students consider how selective human memory can be and that they take into account what autobiographical documents survive and the potential motives for leaving certain particular records behind. It is also a good opportunity to remind students that this problem exists with all historical sources. Often, students have personal and inaccurate epistemological beliefs about the reliability of biographies, and this can be a useful opportunity to address these beliefs in this context.

Students are also generally quick to decide whether or not they “like” a subject of a biography, feelings which can influence the success of a teaching unit quite considerably. Reflection on the standpoint of the reader and the impact of his or her personal preconceptions can be helpful in this situation. No biography can be objective, as the biographer always has a certain “relationship” to his subject. This relationship in turn influences the attitude students develop towards the historical figure. If students reflect on their own feelings about the biography systematically, they can become aware of the fact that their attitude is generated and influenced by the biographer’s perspective and his or her way of writing.

Then, as is the case in any history lesson, students need to understand the relevance of the particular person they are studying. Their impact in the past, their meaning for the students’ present lives and their relevance for the future should be discussed, even if all these factors are not immediately obvious. Knowledge of a task’s relevance fosters intrinsic motivation in students, which is stronger, more effective and far more enduring than extrinsic motivation. It is also indispensable to discuss the question of perspective. After all, the biographical subject might have had a very different self-conception and idea of their own personal relevance than researchers and the public have today.

Further challenges connected to the genre are of a more practical kind. Biographies often come as heavy tomes of several hundred pages, a fact that rules out many of them for high school use. In college, one might ask learners to engage with a lengthy biography for a whole term with the goal of completing an independent research project. In secondary instruction, teachers should instead resort to shorter texts (approximately one hundred pages) that students can read easily either during the summer break or after school, or to biographical articles that do not exceed thirty pages. With younger students, it might be useful to structure the reading process by

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42 Ibid.
43 Cf. Goodson et al., *Narrative Learning*, 10–11. It is wise to concentrate on the central and most informative sources, as students may quickly be overwhelmed by a multitude of random documents.
46 Depkat, “The Challenges of Biography.”
49 Scholastic has a wide selection of shorter biographies for grades 9 through 12, such as Albert Marrin, *Commander in Chief: Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War* (New York, 1997). Among other examples, the publisher Addison-Wesley issued various biographies of notable women under the imprint of the Radcliffe Biogra-phy Series.
establishing tasks to complete before, during, and after reading in order not to overwhelm them with the sheer amount of text.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{V. Immigrant Entrepreneurship in the Classroom}

As has been mentioned above, in the framework of a high school class or a college seminar, it is often convenient for educators and students to work with shorter biographical articles rather than with whole monographs. They can form the basis for units that are not too long and can easily be integrated into the curriculum. Also, for students the incentive is higher to complete the whole reading assignment. For these reasons, the biographical articles of the GHI’s online Immigrant Entrepreneurship project, which tend to be within the range of 8,000 to 10,000 words, are an excellent and accessible resource for using biographies.\textsuperscript{51}

First, educators can use the detailed biographies to ask more general questions about modern American history, business history, and migration. The Immigrant Entrepreneurship project offers a starting point for addressing a wealth of critical topics such as the immigrant experience, transnational history, globalization, and capitalism, all of which have shaped and defined the United States.\textsuperscript{52} Each of the website’s five volumes offers entries that can be aligned without difficulty to state-level content standards, and all biographies lend themselves to practice domain-specific reading and writing skills in accordance with the Common Core standards.

In connection with these goals, the website’s business biographies provide ample opportunities to address aspects of entrepreneurship in relation to ethnicity, gender, or space. One can discover and analyze ethnic loyalties, ethnic enclaves and business strategies based on ethnicity. The biographies of female entrepreneurs illustrate the changing role of women in business as well as their strategies to succeed in a male-dominated sphere, and the spatial categorization of all entries makes it possible to explore and compare different regions of the United States. Additionally, students can increase their genre knowledge by exploring the concept of biography, by discussing its challenges and pitfalls, or even by writing their own business biographies.\textsuperscript{53} They can sharpen their analytical skills by working with the primary sources provided, for example business records, photographs, advertisements, personal letters, audio files, or video clips. Due to this wealth of entries and materials, many modes of instruction are possible.

\textsuperscript{50} Stephanie Macceca, \textit{Reading Strategies for Social Studies} (Huntington Beach, Calif., 2007).


\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
VI. An Immigrant Entrepreneurship Teaching Unit: Henrich Miller (1702-1782)

As has been shown, the project’s business biographies lend themselves well to classroom practice. In the following, a sample teaching unit centering on the German publisher Henrich Miller (1702–1782) will be presented to exemplify how Immigrant Entrepreneurship project biographies can be integrated into the history classroom.54

The teaching tool’s level of challenge is suitable for advanced high school (AP) courses, both in U.S. and World History, and for lower-level college seminars. It is equally aligned to Common Core, NCHS and AP standards.55

The mini-unit of four lessons centers on Henrich Miller, a German-born printer and publisher in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania.56 It addresses the value of a free press, the role of the media in the political and civic culture of an emerging nation, and the importance of group-specific media for immigrant settlements. The strong influence of religion and faith on business decisions as well as the complexities of immigration are other topics that can be raised by educators. The unit’s deep structure moves along the lines of historical thinking. It starts with collecting context information, moves on to source analysis and ends in a genre evaluation exercise. A jigsaw exercise trains the students’ understanding of chronology and also of cause and effect.

First, students assemble historical context information by studying Miller’s biography in a jigsaw exercise.57 This trains reading skills and, due to the nature of the jigsaw method, encourages reflection about chronological and causal patterns. In a second step, learners are asked to offer research ideas, which allow them to generate their own historical questions.58 The core of the teaching unit is then the analysis of specified segments of the biographical article, during which students either focus on the topic of media or of religion. Here, secondary source analysis with a special focus on the biographical genre is trained. Analytical writing skills are fostered through the recommended assignments. Finally, in a group discussion, students evaluate biography as a genre with regard to its informational value.


and are asked to pass critical judgment based on their engagement with the Miller text. During all four lessons, differentiating instruction is made possible by the fact that students work at their own pace, depend on each other to succeed, can bring in their individual strengths and help others with difficulties.  

After the mini-unit, students should either be able to outline the central role media played in immigrant settlements or be able to offer insights on the connection between a person’s religion and their business decisions. Also, students are expected to explain the advantages and shortcomings of biographies as suitable sources for historical research. With a view to products, students should present two concise and well-written answers to the research questions.

Conclusion
As has been mentioned, the call for content and skills training in history education has become increasingly dominant over the last years. Since recent academic trends in Germany and the United States have led to a re-appreciation of biographies among scholars, it seems natural to increase their use in the history classroom as well. Biographies can foster historical thinking, add to the rich diet of source materials that students can enjoy, and offer manifold opportunities for training in domain-specific literacy. The Immigrant Entrepreneurship project’s relatively short, well-researched and accessible business biographies can serve all these purposes. They enable teachers and students to delve into the lives of interesting businessmen and -women, and can contribute much to promote students’ historical understanding in both secondary and post-secondary learning environments.

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60 Cf. Wineburg, Martin, and Monte-Sano, Reading Like a Historian, xii.
THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF GIRL SCOUT INTERNATIONALISM: FROM PROGRESSIVE-ERA ROOTS TO COLD WAR FRUIT

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"Put your finger on the map. Wherever it rests in the free world, it is not too far from a Girl Scout troop. From Iceland to the jungle and back across the deserts to tiny mining camps and missionary settlements, there are Girl Scouts on foreign soil."

"TOFS: Girl Scouts, USA on Foreign Soil," 1963

By 1963, there were 35,000 American girls and women participating in U.S. Girl Scout activities overseas. Troops on Foreign Soil (TOFS), the overseas branch of the Girl Scouts of the USA (GSUSA), sponsored programs for American girls all over the world from the desert to the jungle, from mining camps to missionary settlements, and — as this article will make clear — on U.S. military bases. The internationalism espoused by the GSUSA by 1963, which touted a global American presence, would seem at first to represent an egregiously imperial assertion of American Cold War power, yet the GSUSA meant to promote a more thoughtful engagement with the world. In the same TOFS bulletin, the National President of the GSUSA was quoted as insisting, “Those in TOFS know that being a Girl Scout in a foreign land is a link with home and a bridge to making friends with sister Scouts in a new country.” How did Girl Scout internationalism come to reflect such seemingly oppositional impulses?

I argue that the version of Girl Scout internationalism that motivated the formation of and programming within TOFS in the early Cold War, particularly the North Atlantic Girl Scouts (NAGS), was the product of several intersecting threads and reflected the best efforts of the GSUSA to formulate a reciprocal internationalism within the rapid realignment of geopolitical resources in the early twentieth century. The GSUSA’s robust overseas program for girls was partly the result of growth in the world organization, in which the GSUSA was a driving factor, and partly the result of the way programming presented to girls in the field of international friendship emphasized cultural and consumer ties, as well as an imagined relationship with

2 “Girl Scout Registered Membership-USA Troops on Foreign Soil.” 31 Dec 1963. Membership-TOFS-USA Girl Scouts Overseas: General, Box 2. NHPC.
the world. Tracing the development of Girl Scout internationalism asks us to re-examine our view of U.S. military power during the Cold War and to historicize the American view of the world during the Cold War within a broader history of world engagement. The history of Girl Scout internationalism thereby contributes to the growing scholarship on social and cultural aspects of U.S. foreign relations and the relationship of American youth with the world.3

From the beginning of the Girl Scout movement in the early twentieth century, it was one of the Girl Scout laws to “be a friend to all and a sister to every Scout.” The idea that the shared experience of scouting could form an entryway into an understanding of common humanity was one of the founding impulses of the global movement and formed the basis of Girl Scout internationalism. This belief in the possibility of a world sisterhood drew on tropes of universalized visions of childhood, in particular, that the innocence of childhood could bypass national biases and thus lay the ground for world friendship based on reciprocity. The idea of Girl Scout internationalism was also born in a moment when beliefs about women as naturally peaceful and peace-loving held sway, and these gendered ideas continued to influence notions that girls were interested in and naturally knew how to cultivate international friendships. As these ideas were translated into programming under the rubric of international or world friendship, however, the version of Girl Scout internationalism presented to girls emphasized the cultural and consumer ties present in girls’ communities and relied on an experience of world friendship that asked girls to imagine the world beyond U.S. borders.

In the period leading up to World War II, two prongs to GSUSA internationalism developed partially in relation to one another. First, there was the formal, organizational internationalism cultivated by the GSUSA membership in the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts (WAGGGS), and following close on its heels came the internationalism cultivated in programming and literature directed at girls that encouraged them to imagine the world beyond U.S. borders. Throughout its early years, the GSUSA experienced steady growth in membership, and though World War II disrupted organizational ties, Girl Scout internationalist programming only increased, albeit with a rising emphasis on friendship as the charitable exchange of goods and a growing donor relationship with the rest of the world. After World War II, girls in the United States had expanded opportunities to engage with their “sister scouts” abroad, and the GSUSA

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underwent a profound shift as well, due to a suddenly expanded presence overseas and the sudden growth of its TOFS programs. During the early Cold War, these programs were concentrated in West Germany under the North Atlantic Girl Scouts (NAGS). The GSUSA seized upon the opportunity presented by the new presence of girls overseas to try and put into practice their ideal of world friendship that very few girls had been able to experience previously, but their efforts to create international ties between girls based on the shared experience of scouting more often than not revealed the limitations of a Girl Scout internationalism founded on an idealized version of childhood and friendship.

Born in a hopeful moment with an emphasis on tolerance and sympathy for those outside the United States, distilled through a world depression and war that translated expressions of world friendship into a language of goods, Girl Scout internationalism in the postwar period bore complicated fruit. The insistence on human commonality and universalism was often interpreted as an understanding that “the world is just like us,” so that girls in NAGS were unprepared to make sense of the national differences they encountered overseas. It is hard to imagine how any organization, not just the GSUSA, might have been able to cultivate a sense of internationalism that made ready room for difference. Yet, Girl Scout internationalism is useful for historicizing the development of American engagement with the world in the Cold War. An organization for girls run primarily by women, with robust world ties and a dedication to international friendship, the GSUSA is absent from most Cold War narratives. Yet the history of the organization shows that it was an important source of information for girls about the world beyond the United States and an organization that thought deeply about internationalism, even when it was unpopular. Tracing the evolution of Girl Scout internationalism from the early twentieth century to the beginning of the Cold War begins to tell this untold story.

I. Organizational Ties: The Girl Scouts of the USA and the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts

The Girl Scouts of the USA were founded in 1912 by Juliette Gordon Low, who was inspired by the Girl Guides in the UK, which in turn had been formed a few years earlier by Lord Robert Baden-Powell as an offshoot of the Boy Scouts. Scouting for girls and boys grew worldwide during the next few decades, often coinciding with native youth
movements, such as the German Jugendbewegung. In these early days of the GSUSA, its international contacts were primarily informal, arising from an international, predominantly transatlantic, network of social reformers and those interested in the future of youth. Baden-Powell, seen as the father of all scouting for boys and girls, described the movement in universal terms, united by their “one interest ‘the girl’...the essential spirit that should inspire us.” In the early 1920s, an International Committee was formed to further international cooperation between national movements, and adult representatives of national organizations held conferences and encampments in the U.K. and the U.S. throughout the decade. This increasing collaboration culminated in a conference held in Budapest, Hungary, in 1928, where the delegates officially voted to form the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts (WAGGGS).

The GSUSA took advantage of the propitious occasion in Budapest to announce the creation of the Juliette Low Memorial Fund. “Daisy,” as the much beloved founder had been known, had died the year before. She had always been keenly interested in the international aspects of Girl Scouting, and the fund in her memory was intended “for the promotion of Girl Scouting and Girl Guiding throughout the world, as a contribution toward world peace and good will.” A Memorial Committee was charged with collecting donations from individuals and scout troops in the United States and then allocating them for appropriate expenditures. The committee hoped the fund might be used for “[h]elping the poorer countries to send delegates to international meetings or camps; helping countries get captains by sending a representative . . . to speak before their women’s colleges or other groups; financing the exchange of visiting trainers from one country to another, and any other projects which might help the spread and effectiveness of Girl Scouting and Girl Guiding throughout the world.”

Throughout the 1930s, the Low Memorial Fund was used to foster relationships with Girl Guides around the world, even as war broke out in Europe and Asia. One of the first uses of the fund was paying for transportation and a two-week stay at Our Chalet, the international home of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts in Adelboden, Switzerland. In 1934-1935, for example, the fund gave out 22 awards to girls from France, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Denmark, and Estonia, in addition to the United States and Canada. A trip to Our Chalet could be a transformative experience for adolescent girls, who formed their own

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informal alumnae organization and memories that lasted. As three American girls wrote in a 1935 issue of American Girl, the GSUSA monthly magazine: “The thrill of hearing taps and grace in many languages, of being able to talk to girls from fourteen countries, and of the thought that we now have friends around the world, make us realize the wonderful opportunity and experiences we have had.”

The Low Memorial Fund also paid to help foreign girls visit the United States. In 1937, the GSUSA hosted a Silver Jubilee in honor of the organization’s twenty-fifth anniversary, held at Camp Andrée on the grounds of Camp Edith Macy, a donated home and estate outside of New York City that had been the site of one of the early international encampments. The Low Memorial Fund helped to bring 26 girls from around the world to camp with 74 American girls, where they spent time sharing songs and games, held a pageant of national costumes, and, generally, in the words of one of the organizers, “acquired something precious in the way of friendship which time and space are insufficient to destroy.”

But as war deepened in the rest of the world, the line between “the promotion of Girl Scouting and Girl Guiding” and actions of charity toward foreign children seemed to disappear. In late 1938, the chairman of the American Red Cross cabled the GSUSA national convention in Kansas City, Missouri. “There is tremendous need for assistance to thousands of suffering Chinese children who through no fault of their own have been driven from their homes and are in actual want for the common necessities of life,” he wrote, and added, “We would be delighted to transit any funds raised by Girl Scouts in this country to Girl Scout Headquarters in China.” The Juliette Low Memorial Committee voted to allocate $500 “to be used for the relief of sufferers in the Far East,” and an additional $300 was raised from individual contributions. The American Red Cross called the donation a “fine humanitarian action” and declared it to be “evidence of the international good will and fellowship so often expressed by the Girl Scouts in their activities,” and transferred the total of $800 through the American Red Cross Committee in Shanghai to the Girl Scouts of China.

Similarly, in 1940 and 1941, money and goods were sent to Girl Guides in the U.K., including $1,500 to the Girl Guide Emergency Relief Fund, which was used to aid Girl Guides whose homes had been bombed, and thousands of dollars worth of material goods, including clothes for girls and boys, an ambulance, and bedding for air raid shelters (though this last was destroyed by bombers as it sat in the docks).
In these early instances, the transfers of goods and money remained ostensibly between Girl Scouts, but the line between the promotion of scouting and participation in broader humanitarian efforts became more blurred as the war effort intensified. Renamed the Juliette Low World Friendship Fund in 1942, its coffers were increasingly used for relief work. The preference remained to give money and goods to Guide and Scout organizations when possible, but it was not an unbreakable rule. For example, in 1943, $7,000 was given to a Chinese orphanage on the advice of Madame Chiang Kai-Shek. In the same year, $3,000 was used to purchase powdered milk for children in Russia, where there were no Girl Scouts or Guides. Printed on each can of milk was a message: “This milk is a gift from the Girl Scouts of America and expresses their friendship and best wishes to the young people of the Soviet Union.”

These humanitarian efforts increased at the end of the war, as the GSUSA worked with WAGGGS to reestablish scouting as part of efforts to rebuild and re-democratize Europe. Through UNRAA and similar aid organizations, they served huge populations of displaced persons, and through cooperation with the U.S. military government, they worked to reform German girl scouting, which had been coopted into the Bund Deutcher Mädel. As early as 1944, the Girl Scouts began cooperating with UNRRA and the Guide International Service (a wartime relief organization started by Girl Guides in Britain and Australia) to train groups of professional scouts to go overseas in order to aid with rebuilding. The first groups were sent to Greece and the Balkans, and in 1946, UNRRA approved the travel of the first Girl Scout group to Germany to assist in displaced persons camps. Like other volunteers, the volunteer scouts (all adults) worked to provide normalcy, as much as they were able, for children in displaced camps and war-torn communities. Scouts and guides participated in general relief work as well as setting up scout troops. American scouts primarily worked through UNRRA, but they considered themselves somewhat autonomous. For example, Gertrude Bruns, working in a camp for people from Poland and the Baltic region resisted organizing a “repatriation parade” for those in her care, considering it too political and outside the scope of her mission.

The GSUSA also worked to rebuild the scouting movement in Allied countries. In September of 1944, even before the war in Europe had ended, the Chairman of the International Committee of GSUSA wrote to the Director of the World Bureau in London, informing her that some $56,000 had been raised by Girl Scouts in a “Victory


12 Letter from Gertrude Bruns, 10 October 1946. Defense Box 3. NHPC. See Proctor, Scouting for Girls for more information on the GIS.
which they had voted to use “to help re-establish Guiding and Scouting in the countries which have suffered so from the war,” and asked for help in ascertaining where this money might best be used. In addition, the International Committee of the GSUSA had also allocated thousands of dollars for use in France, North Africa, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and the U.K.\textsuperscript{13}

Though the GSUSA still perceived itself as working towards its goal of world friendship, its relationship to WAGGGS had changed from the younger sister who looked toward the UK and Baden-Powell and his wife for guidance to the generous, older sister who funded a significant portion of “world friendship” activities. This required a delicate balancing act. As a senior leader of the GSUSA warned scouts back home after traveling to Europe: “Obviously our resources are the greatest but do not always need to be identified” and “all . . . must be arranged tactfully in order to prevent the USA’s taking the position of donor and the other countries that of beneficiary.”\textsuperscript{14}

II. Imagining World Friendship: Literature and Programming Aimed at Girl Scouts in the Domestic United States

At the same time that the GSUSA was developing organizational ties with WAGGGS, it also worked to develop an International Friendship field of activities for Girl Scouts in the United States. The literature and programming for Girl Scouts was intended to cultivate a reciprocal relationship based on seemingly universal values. It took as its starting point that “the interest of girls of Girl Scout age in the people and customs of other countries is a natural one, beginning with folk and fairy tales, and pictures of children dressed in picturesque costumes.” Due to changes in the world the girls lived in, however, this cursory interest was no longer enough. In announcing the expansion of the field in the magazine for Girl Scout troop leaders, the GSUSA explained:

Formerly the differences between ourselves and these other children tended, in this country, to be exaggerated and the “funny” customs of one nation were made as humorous as the “queer” way in which the people of another country dressed . . . . Now that the wonders of invention have made the world a very small unit, compared with twenty years ago, [we] are striving to substitute a more sympathetic point of view — one that is based on a respect for human personality and achievement.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Mrs. E. Swift Newton to Mrs. Arethusa Leigh-White, 28 September 1944. Defense collection, Box 2, Folder Defense-General Postwar, 1946-1952. NHPC.

\textsuperscript{14} Memo from Ruth Henderson, Director of International Division to International Committee, July 12, 1949 re Trip to Europe — April-May, 1949. Defense Box 2. NHPC.

The GSUSA faced a difficulty in this field of programming, however, since the opportunities for direct engagement were limited. Our Chalet offered the opportunity of international friendship to a limited number of American girls, and the Low Fund offered a similarly limited number of girls the opportunity to interact with foreign Scouts and Guides in the United States. In addition WAGGGS operated an International Post Box division that matched Girl Scouts and Girl Guides with pen pals in foreign lands, but this service was in chronic over-demand. Because of this, Girl Scout literature and programming in International Friendship was designed to help girls in the domestic United States to imagine the world beyond their borders and to find traces of the outside world in their local communities and homes. In this way, the GSUSA sought to translate the idea of “world friendship” into gendered and age-specific programming for girls that sought to live up to the belief, as expressed in the 1940 Girl Scout Handbook, that “Internationalism, [was]...an ideal that must be experienced and lived.”16 As the world war raged in Europe and Asia, domestic Girl Scouts also began to engage with the world outside their borders through a proxy of goods, a relationship that was continued into the Cold War and mirrored the changes in the GSUSA’s relationship with WAGGGS.

Though the Girl Scout law had always included the tenet that girls be “a sister to every scout,” programming aimed at cultivating “International Friendship” in Girl Scouts became formalized and codified as the GSUSA’s organizational ties with WAGGGS strengthened during the 1920s and 1930s. “Thinking Day,” February 22, which commemorated the birthday of Lord and Lady Baden-Powell, was established in 1926, (before the official formation of WAGGGS), though Girl Scouts dubbed it “International Day” initially, and continued to celebrate “International Month” in March rather than February until 1934. By the mid-1930s, American girls could earn the World Knowledge Badge and World Interpreter Badge, and at the 1938 World Conference in Switzerland, the GSUSA also introduced tentative versions of three new International Friendship badges, which were well-received by the other international representatives at the World Conference. In addition, while WAGGGS members emphasized international programming primarily for older girls (generally older than 12), the GSUSA pioneered programming for younger girls, which their fellow members of WAGGGS responded to with interest.

By the late 1930s, the version of Girl Scout internationalism presented to girls through programming literature focused primarily on cultural differences and foreign lands, allowing them to imagine and explore the world beyond their own communities.女孩们通过编程文学获得了关注国际友谊的机会，帮助她们想象并找到世界之外的痕迹。在这种方式下，GSUSA寻求将“国际主义”的理念转化为适合女孩的、年龄和性别的具体编程，以实现认为，如1940年《女孩指导手册》中所述，“国际主义，[是]...一种必须被体验和生活”的理念。随着世界战争在欧洲和亚洲爆发，国内的女孩们也开始通过货物的代理来与世界外的边界接触，这种关系一直持续到冷战，并反映了GSUSA与WAGGGS关系的改变。

尽管女孩指导法律中一直包含着“每个女童都是每个女童的姐妹”的原则，旨在培养“国际友谊”的女孩指导编程在20世纪20年代和30年代期间被正式化和规范化，随着GSUSA与WAGGGS的组织性联系加强。‘思考日’，2月22日，纪念罗德和夫人巴登-鲍威尔的生日，于1926年设立（在WAGGGS正式成立之前），尽管女孩们起初称其为‘国际日’，并继续在2月以外庆祝‘国际月’直到1934年。到了20世纪30年代中期，美国女孩可以赚取世界知识徽章和世界解释者徽章，并在1938年世界会议在瑞士，GSUSA也推出了三款国际友谊徽章的初步版本，这些徽章得到了其他国际代表的欢迎。此外，虽然WAGGGS成员更强调为较年长的女孩（通常超过12岁）的国际编程，但GSUSA为较年轻的女孩开发了编程，他们的同辈成员对WAGGGS的回应感到兴趣。

到了20世纪30年代末，女孩指导国际主义通过编程文学向女孩们展示的重点主要集中在文化差异和外国土地，允许她们想象并探索世界之外的领域。
exchange and the ways the world was bound together by trade. The 1940 Handbook instructed girls, “If you listen to enough music from a certain country. . .you begin to understand something about the people who live there,” and pointed to the fact that technological advances in transportation and communication meant that girls now went “shopping” all over the world. An accompanying illustration showed a table set with the items from around the world: olive oil from Italy, tea from China, and china from England, as well as glass from Sweden, coffee from South America, and cheese from France. Activities under International Friendship that could lead to a badge achievement included corresponding with a foreign girl in her own language (World Interpreter Badge), asking a “foreign-born woman to demonstrate the making of a dish popular in her homeland” (World Gifts Badge), or making a “troop bulletin board” with clippings on current events in a chosen country, as well as learning a little bit about its “past and present history,” including “its chief writers, painters, musicians, sculptors, inventors, or other citizens whose work is of importance to the world” (World Knowledge Badge). Learning the political systems of other countries was not a requirement for any badges under International Friendship, although the Wide World Badge did suggest: “find out what you can about organizations such as . . . the League of Nations” and other international quasi-governmental bodies.17

In developing programs for younger girls, the 1939 Leader’s Guide for the Brownie Program stated that the ages between seven and ten offered “a real opportunity during a three-year period to create desirable attitudes and concepts in the Brownie’s mind toward far distant parts of the world.” It made clear that the program ought to emphasize both a Brownie’s attitude toward the outside world and a real engagement and understanding with the way things were in other lands. By cultivating an appreciation for lifestyles different from hers, “[the Brownie] begins to learn that no one can grow up surrounded only by friends who do, think, act just as she does. In small ways she is being prepared to be a tolerant and sympathetic citizen of the world.” The Guide suggested visiting local immigrant communities, where a Brownie might “[begin] to understand about people beyond the sea by becoming acquainted with representatives of each land living right in her own community. [Such a visit] is an exciting and concrete experience and makes realistic the facts that children in all countries play, read fairy tales, and sing; and that in Holland they tend tulips, watch the geese in Poland, and pasture goats in the Tirol.”18

17 Girl Scout Handbook (1940), 338-69.
With the establishment of the Low Fund, Girl Scouts were also given the opportunity to support the national organization’s efforts. Local Girl Scout troops sometimes hosted fundraising events organized by the girls, but troop donations were often derived from individual contributions by the girls who wanted to give “pennies to Daisy.” By the early 1940s, the Juliette Low contributions were annual events, usually accomplished with some fanfare. Girls might bring pennies to a troop birthday party (perhaps held on Low’s birthday, October 31), and drop a penny for each year of her age into a large cake, or perhaps they might hold an “International Night,” where girls dropped their pennies into a large globe. There were even “Self-Denial Parties,” where “each girl [brought] the pennies she saved by denying herself some simple pleasure — a package of chewing gum...a candy bar, soft drink, or moving picture.” Girls were also encouraged to earn pennies through performing chores for family or neighbors if they could not save pennies from an allowance. Presentation of the collections could sometimes be elaborate “Ceremonies of Pennies” and take the form of spelling out “Juliette Low” with pennies, sewing pennies into the skirts of dolls dressed in international costumes, or making penny banks in the shape of Our Chalet or “logs to add to the fire of friendship between America and other lands.”

Participation by U.S girls in the Low Fund was also given precedence over individual contributions to the World Fund. In 1932, WAGGGS proposed an annual collection of donations from Girl Guides and Girl Scouts as part of the worldwide celebration of Thinking Day, but the GSUSA demurred. While acknowledging that February 22 was a day when U.S. Girl Scouts would “think of their sister Guides and Scouts in other lands and feel that messages of hope and friendship are coming back to them,” the GSUSA insisted that “International Day, or Thinking Day, has always seemed to the Girl Scout organization to be a day on which the spiritual side of the movement should be emphasized, and it would seem a pity to associate in the minds of the girls the collection of money with that day.”

The GSUSA commitment to international friendship programming continued even as World War II deepened throughout the rest of the world. This was possible, in part, because of the type of internationalism that Girl Scouting cultivated. The 1940 Girl Scout Handbook, released when most of Europe and Asia was at war, sought to remind girls that “political boundaries change swiftly, but peoples do not,” and suggested instead “that the activities in this field be undertaken...
with peoples — not countries — in mind, reaffirming our belief as a member of a World Association in the possibility of peace and friendship among members of the world’s families.”

After the end of the war, the GSUSA enlisted girls’ help in the rebuilding of Girl Guide troops throughout Europe. American Girl Scouts were active in helping to reactivate guide troops, many of which had gone underground. Postwar scouting literature described these wartime guides in melodramatic language:

The Guide Associations of Europe, repressed but not destroyed during the dark years of war, never gave up hope. Although their book and uniforms were confiscated or burned and their meetings and camping expeditions strictly forbidden, still the Girl Guides carried on. They met secretly and banded together informally for relief of the needy, for encouragement and general helpfulness. They whispered their songs and wore their Guide pins under their lapels. They longed for the moment when they could meet openly and wear their uniforms.

To support the rejuvenation of European guides, the GSUSA organized the sending of “Friendship Bags”: These consisted of a “handmade drawstring bag filled with little articles that are commonplace to us but precious to girls who have not had them for years,” which included soap, combs, toothbrushes, pencils, etc. Troops would assemble the bags and then ship them to international organizations, which would bundle them together with other donations and ship them overseas. The intended recipients were Girl Scouts and Girl Guides in Europe, who could either make use of the items themselves or distribute them “to girls in greater need.” Friendship Bags were not sent to Germany, because in 1945 there were no German scout troops, but bags were organized to be sent “to Russian girls, who suffered so much more than Americans in our common cause,” even though there were no scouts or guides there either. Adult Girl Scouts, who worked in DP camps across Europe under the auspices of UNRAA and similar bodies also distributed them.

This shift toward conducting relationships with girls in other countries through a proxy of goods continued into the 1950s, when the GSUSA launched “Schoolmates Overseas,” a program intended to anchor the “international friendship activity” of troops throughout the world.
the United States. Similar to the “Friendship Bags,” the program asked Girl Scouts in the U.S. to make and fill bags with school supplies, as well as “some small surprise, perhaps a pair of mittens or a gay hair ribbon, a trinket, toy or game.” The bags and their contents were meant to “express the Girl Scout’s friendly interest in the welfare and happiness of children in other lands,” as well as the scouts’ belief “that by making education a little easier for the youth of all nations, they can help to safeguard the future of democracy in the world.”

The project succeeded in shipping tons of supplies overseas. Like earlier scouting literature, the Friendship Bag and Schoolmates Overseas programs delineated an understanding of internationalism that was most fully expressed through consumer goods and cultural ties. But in contrast to the ideal that Girl Scout internationalism would cultivate an understanding of difference and tolerance, the postwar literature distributed to American Girl Scouts also subtly encouraged the idea that, although all scouts and guides could be friends, not all scouts and guides could be equal. The cartoon illustration from the leaflet distributed to Girl Scout troops in the U.S. shows this clearly. The tableau is divided in two — on the left, presumably the U.S. side of the Atlantic, girls in neat Girl Scout uniforms cheerfully tie up boxes and gleefully show one another the dresses that are included. Though the stated purpose of the program was to “[make] education a little easier,” only one box on the left, labeled “pencils,” is directly connected with education. On the right side of the illustration, presumably Europe, girls are shown unpacking the boxes. In contrast to the American girls, whose clothes and hair were neat and modern, the European girls have clothes that are patched, many with kerchiefs on their heads, and there is even one (likely supposed to represent the Dutch) wearing an oddly nineteenth-century-style bonnet and wooden shoes. As on the U.S. side of the Atlantic, the girls are gleeful and there is no representation of educational materials — only clothes: dresses, socks, and mittens. The imagined relationship, then, is one where U.S. Girl Scouts are donors and European scouts the recipients of charity. This is underscored by the accompanying text, aimed at U.S. Girl Scouts: “We, in this country, have all these things in comparative abundance. Wouldn’t you like to share what we have with the young people of other lands?”

Even though Girl Scout internationalism championed an international sisterhood of scouts, activities such as Schoolmates Overseas undermined such a rosy worldview. The Girl Scout leadership saw age and


25 “Schoolmates Overseas.” Defense Box 3. NHPC.
gender as universal categories that would foster a sense of commonality, yet these commonalities broke down over national disparities of wealth and power, and this reflected an ongoing contradiction within the Girl Scouts at home. Though the GSUSA had a strong national organization, with a clearly defined agenda and programming, the nature of the organization meant that these had to be enacted locally, so that troops in the South, for example, were often segregated, immigrants were invited into troops in order to “Americanize” them, and poorer girls might not have the opportunity to participate in scouting at all.

III. The North Atlantic Girl Scouts and the Expansion of Troops on Foreign Soil

At the same time that girls in the domestic United States developed new ways of interacting with girls overseas, albeit through a proxy of goods, the postwar period also brought a broader shift in the GSUSA’s internationalist programs and organization. Though cooperation with WAGGGS and overseas giving by the Girl Scouts increased after World War II, by far the biggest shift in the GSUSA came in its new overseas presence. The postwar occupation of Germany and Japan brought an unprecedented number of American military families overseas, and their numbers only grew in Europe as the army of occupation shifted to become part of a NATO-backed presence of indeterminable duration. As might be expected, the GSUSA saw this new international presence as an opportunity to embody the internationalist ideals of Girl Scouting in new ways. But like the domestic programs, the postwar expansion of TOFS demonstrated that a Girl Scout internationalism born of progressive reform and nurtured during world depression and war might run into problems in the new postwar order. Organizationally, the GSUSA had to contend with the expanding and changing U.S. military, which valued international interaction between the members of military families and the surrounding Europeans, but which also sought to subsume the GSUSA organization into its sphere of military activities. In terms of programming, the rapid postwar expansion of TOFS, in particular, the establishment of the North Atlantic Girl Scouts (NAGS), offered the GSUSA opportunities to fully embrace and embody Girl Scout internationalism, but interaction between girls under the rubric of internationalism did not always lead to the common understanding that the GSUSA hoped for.

The original Troops on Foreign Soil (TOFS) had been created in 1927 to serve the children of ARAMCO personnel in Saudi Arabia. Until

1947, TOFS had fewer than 200 members (frequently fewer than a hundred) and had existed only in five to six countries. TOFS grew in size exponentially after World War II, fueled almost entirely by overseas military personnel. By 1962, approximately two-thirds of TOFS members were daughters of military personnel, and the remaining third were overseas with personnel from the State Department, business firms, or other government missions. Although TOFS had been specifically set up as isolated, essentially temporary troops, the increase in the number of American girls accompanying the U.S. military overseas, especially in Europe, made it clear by the early 1950s that something more robust and long-term was needed.

Though TOFS troops were established nearly everywhere that the U.S. military had an overseas military presence, the greatest number were in West Germany, where the concentration of U.S. military communities was also the largest. The establishment of Girl Scout troops in Germany happened almost as soon as military families arrived and grew as the numbers of U.S. troops stationed overseas increased. As early as 1946, the first year families arrived in occupied Germany, GSUSA counted two troops with 35 girls, and by December 1961, after the construction of the Berlin Wall, there were more than 12,000 Americans, girls and adult volunteers, involved in American Girl Scouting in West Germany. The Girl Scout presence in occupied Germany and later West Germany overshadowed the Girl Scout presence in other countries where U.S. forces were stationed. In 1955, the number of American Girl Scouts in West Germany (5,517) was a good four times the number in second-ranking France (1,040 girls), and nearly nine times the number of Girl Scouts in the UK (643), the birthplace of Boy Scouting and Girl Guiding. Additionally, the scouting presence in West Germany, where the U.S. military had occupied only one quarter of the country, outstripped the scouting presence in Japan, where the U.S. was the sole Allied occupier. In 1953, there were 3,446 Girl Scouts in Germany and 2,225 Girl Scouts in Japan, and by the end of 1961, when there were more than 12,000 Girl Scout volunteers in West Germany, there were just under 6,000 girls and adult volunteers involved in U.S. Girl Scouting in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, and Taiwan.

Early activities of the American Girl Scouts in Europe placed a special emphasis on international scouting, their activities mirroring the work done by professional scouts and American women’s clubs in Germany. By 1952, the international activities of the Girl Scouts
encompassed girls of all ages and Girl Guides of several countries. For example, in Karlsruhe, a troop of Girl Scouts and a troop of Pfadfinderinnen “planned and carried out an out-of-doors meeting together”; in Heidelberg, German scouts were the guests at a rally in honor of the visiting president of GSUSA; Brownies at Bad Godesburg were invited by British Brownies as guests during Girl Scout Week, and Salzburg Intermediate scouts joined Austrian scouts in a harvest festival, “learning each other’s customs, dances and games.”

These activities were both initiated and received by American Girl Scouts and were perceived as a special opportunity for American scouts, since only a few girls normally had the ability or opportunity to travel internationally and mingle with international scouts. Thinking Day was an especially important opportunity for international involvement, and the activities on these days often included scouts “of the hostess countries” and in displaced persons camps. “Our Chalet,” designated “the international home of Girl Scouts and Girl Guides throughout the world,” provided a special opportunity for American girls in West Germany: they were given special permission to visit at the age of 11, instead of the usual 15.

But while Girl Scouts on military bases in West Germany may have had new opportunities for international engagement, these came through increased cooperation with the U.S. military. In 1950, the U.S. Army made a request for an organization of American Girl Scouts for American children located in the European Command (EUCOM). This request was primarily concerned with the American girls living in Germany, where U.S. military forces were concentrated. The military requested the help of a “professional Girl Scout Director or Executive” to aid with the formation of “a Scouting Advisory Council” in the command. There were also parallel efforts at organizing Boy Scouts for boys in the overseas command. These efforts at organization received official sanction that entailed eligibility for “logistical support” by the military.

The GSUSA responded to the military government’s request for assistance by sending a professional representative to Germany, who was paid by the military but maintained ties with the GSUSA. Along with a representative from Boy Scouts USA and military staff, the GSUSA representative joined the newly formed EUCOM Scouting Advisory Council (ESAC). The Girl Scout Council initially took the name EUCOM Girl Scouts but eventually settled on the moniker...
North Atlantic Girl Scouts (NAGS) to better represent the geographic dispersal of troops — at various times they stretched from Iceland to Morocco, though the core of their members were always centered in West Germany. The council was quickly formed (it was official as of November 1950), yet negotiation over details of control continued for the next several years and were finally settled in the mid-1950s, though the military and the Girl Scouts revisited the agreements every few years. The accommodations were sparse at first: the first representative recalled that the Girl Scout office in Heidelberg at one point resided in the “ladies cloak room in the Stadthalle, overlooking the Neckar River.”35 But over time the scouts worked out a place for themselves within American military communities in West Germany and maintained their headquarters on the Heidelberg post, close to the location of headquarters for the United States Army in Europe (USAREUR, a slightly reorganized EUCOM).

The increased interaction with U.S. Girl Scouts in Europe intersected with a larger military policy, wherein the U.S. military sought to improve its community relations at home and abroad by cooperating more overtly with scouting.36 A 1952 directive produced by the Adjutant General of the Army and distributed to commanders of continental commands pointed out the Army’s “recognition that the training the American girl receives through the Girl Scout program better prepares her for a future role of constructive citizenship” and that the Army was committed to furthering good relations with the communities around bases through its support of Scouting, at home and abroad. It was also hoped that this cooperation might also alert young women to careers in the Women’s Army Corps and the Army Nurse Corps.37

The U.S. military wanted to court the good will of American communities and American families, but it also saw youth programs more generally as a way to promote a “democratic” way of life to the West Germans. This began as part of the four “d’s” of the occupation — denazification, demilitarization, decartelization, and democratization — and was transformed into an ideological mission during the Cold War against the communist USSR. From the beginning of the occupation, the U.S. military had sponsored the GYA — German Youth Activities — and beginning in the mid-1950s, it sponsored “Operation Helping Hand” or Helfende Hand, which brought children out of German cities, primarily Berlin, to live with service families on American bases during the summer.38 As in the

35 Ibid.
36 See Public Information and Community Relations Reports. RG 319, Box 10. NARA.
37 MG E. Bergin (The Adjutant General) to Commanding Generals, Continental Armies, and MDW re Army Cooperation with Girl Scouts, 18 December 1952. Defense Box 2. NHPC.
38 See also Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven, 2003).
1959 “Kitchen Debate” between Nixon and Khrushchev, the example of service families was in part supposed to expose visiting Berliners to the material abundance of the American lifestyle, which would in turn persuade them of the superiority of an American, democratic way of life. To the U.S. military, therefore, the international activities of the Girl Scouts held particular significance. When the Girl Scouts sent a copy of the 1955 report “Ambassadors in Pigtails” to the U.S. command, General McAuliffe, Commander-in-Chief of USAREUR, replied, “I had not previously appreciated the fine work they are doing in promoting friendly relations with the young ladies of the other nations of Europe. Thank you for sending it to me.”

From the point of view of the GSUSA, however, cooperation with the U.S. military came at a cost. The military provided key logistical support to U.S. scouting overseas. In Europe, the U.S. military arranged to have scouting uniforms and equipment available for sale through European Exchange System (EES), in PXs across the command. In addition, the military paid the salary of the GSUSA representative and provided an operating budget out of the military’s established Morale, Recreation and Welfare Fund (MWR). These were not appropriated funds, that is, they were not funds from the federal government; instead MWR monies came from profits from the PX and Class VI (alcohol) sales, an established method of funding community activities. Such funds were also used to pay for dependent schools, as well as recreation areas for the troops and their families, among other uses. But because scouting accepted MWR slush fund monies, the military wanted to absorb it into existing dependent activities and to bring it under military control. Some of this was necessary for the scouting organization in EUCOM to receive salary and benefits from the military. The Personnel and Administration Division at USAREUR Headquarters performed a “classification study” on Girl Scout advisers to establish their salaries and civil service grade, fitting them into the military rank structure. But the Girl Scout leaders also worried that such close cooperation would materially change the scouting experience. Campsites were shared with existing German Youth Association and American Youth Association (GYA and AYA) sites and were more militarized than in the States. As the Girl Scout Community Adviser wrote to GSUSA HQ in New York in 1952: “It’s a little difficult for me to visualize the camp operation itself with the require[d] military guards and other military personnel in addition to the regular camp staff — but I’m learning fast about these things.”


40 Eleanor Moniger to Frances Faeth, 11 April 1952. Membership TOFS-NAGS, Box 4. NHPC.
As much as the GSUSA staff worried about the effect of the U.S. military on their programming, the presence of U.S. Girl Scouts in West Germany did create new opportunities for U.S. Girl Scouts to put internationalist ideals into practice. After all, a key pillar of scouting internationalism was that the shared experience of scouting could lead to international exchange and help to build an international sisterhood. But the way Girl Scout internationalism idealized interactions between girls — an idealism that emerged from early twentieth-century ideals about the universalism of childhood and womanhood and gained traction in the early Cold War through humanitarian aid based on protecting the innocence of youth — was not always up to the task. Unlike Our Chalet, where select individuals were sent to camp with girls from many nations, the participation of European guides in American camps and attendance by Americans at international encampments did not lead to “something precious in the way of friendship which time and space are insufficient to destroy.”

In 1957 NAGS opened Camp Lachenwald, the first camp dedicated to GSUSA use in Europe. Crucially, camp organizers saw it as a way to foster relations with their “sister scouts,” since scouting’s international sisterhood hinged on the shared experience of scouting. During the inaugural summer of Camp Lachenwald, however, it became clear that American girls had been ill-prepared for the realities of a Girl Scout camp and often expected nothing but “resting and being entertained while at camp.” This inexperience dampened interactions with German “Pfadis” and French “Eclaireuses,” who had been invited to the American camp for the first time. Fewer than ten foreign girls had been able to come, but they were “extremely skilled in camping and very experienced in Scouting.” By comparison, the American girls seemed lacking, and coupled with a language barrier, the Girl Scout report on Camp Lachenwald concluded that “the conditions for developing mutual respect and understanding did not exist.”

These sorts of lopsided interactions with non-American girl guides continued for TOFS troops in Europe through the early 1960s. A Girl Scout staffer, reflecting on feedback received from all the American Girl Scouts in Europe who attended international camps in the summer of 1960, reported: “Almost all reportedly returned home with ideas that they appreciated their own country and customs even more, felt that USA Scouting was very good, vowed to make it better.” In the words of one camper, “After this experience, I began to think more about my own Scout Organization. I stand up for it and for my country. I seem to have a greater respect for both.”

41 Eleanor Moniger to Frances Faeth, 18 July 1957. Membership-TOFS-NAGS, Box 1. NHPC.

42 “NAGS: International Opportunities, 1960.” Membership-TOFS-USA GS Overseas, Box 1. NHPC.
Conclusion

Cooperation with the U.S. military overseas challenged the organization of Girl Scout internationalism, since they were no longer always able to autonomously coordinate interactions between girls. But the commitment of the GSUSA to a reciprocal internationalism remained steadfast, even in the face of strong pressure from the U.S military to fit the organization into its own ideological mission. The U.S. military, reflecting the standard Cold War binary between democracy and communism, saw international interaction as the opportunity for one-way, outward sharing of American democracy and the American way of life. This is captured in the words of one GSUSA staffer who complained in 1961 that the U.S. military only approved of international activities if “we teach them the American way rather than learning their way.” On the other side of the coin, the U.S. Girl Scouts believed strongly in promoting an American democratic way of life, but they also embraced the possibility of openness in international interactions. Their pursuit of “world friendship” drew criticism from the growing conservative movement in the United States. Throughout the early 1950s, there were isolated pockets of concern from local troops about being accused of promoting communist or un-American speakers and ideas.43 These stirrings culminated in 1954 when a gadfly broadcaster from Florida attacked recent edits in The Girl Scout Handbook and asserted that activities such as asking girls to learn about the United Nations as part of merit badges cultivated a “one-world,” un-American mentality in America’s youth. The bulk of the attack left the Girl Scouts behind in favor of a broad-handed attack on the UN Declaration of Human Rights, but the accusations meshed so neatly with the paranoid politics of the day that the Girl Scouts were officially censured by the Illinois department of the American Legion, which resulted in a national controversy that provoked comments in Congress and elicited a defense from Eleanor Roosevelt.44

By 1963, when TOFS asserted, “look anywhere on the map, there are troops on foreign soil,” it represented a complex evolution in Girl Scout internationalist organization and programming. The epigraph that started this article was drawn from a bulletin about TOFS programs, which was distributed with a letter from the GSUSA Commissioner for TOFS to leaders of international organizations, such as the Red Cross and the Rotary, as well as to the wives of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. In both sets of letters, Katzenberg wrote, “We are all grateful to the Armed Services for the support and encouragement they give to Girl Scouting overseas,” and in the letters to the wives

43 American Legion Controversy. Box: General 1933-1946. NHPC.
of the Joint Chiefs, she added, “We owe a special debt to the service wives.” Though Girl Scout internationalism, both organizationally and in programming, had changed dramatically since the birth of scouting in the early twentieth century, the TOFS bulletin reflected the GSUSA belief that U.S. girls participating in scouting overseas represented the fullest expression of a Girl Scout internationalism that sat at the heart of the movement. At the end of the bulletin, they quoted “our own Juliette Low,” saying she “would be pleased by the wealth of friendship and affection earned by U.S.A. Girl Scouts on Foreign Soil” in pursuit of her dream that scouting would be “the magic thread that will link the children of the world together.” Girl Scout internationalism was undoubtedly a thread linking girls together, but it was one of many intersecting threads of American power and engagement with the world.

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OBESITY, HEALTH, AND THE LIBERAL SELF: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE LATE NINETEENTH AND LATE TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Conference at the GHI Washington, September 26-28, 2013. Co-sponsored by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. Conveners: Nina Mackert, Jürgen Martschukat (both University of Erfurt), Susan Strasser (University of Delaware), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI Washington). Participants: Nora Binder (GHI Washington and University of Konstanz), Bart Elmore (University of Alabama), Michael Gard (Southern Cross University), Deborah Lea Frommelt (University of Ulm), Jan Logemann (GHI Washington), Rachel Louise Moran (Penn State University), Ava Purkiss (University of Texas, Austin), Kathleen Robinson (University of Wisconsin, Madison), Ulrike Thoms (Charité — Free University Berlin), Katharina Vester (American University), Alice Weinreb (Loyola University Chicago), Psyche Williams-Forson (University of Maryland).

Obesity has been identified as a crucial social and health problem in the Western world and beyond. While doctors describe obesity as a modern epidemic and a major threat to individual health and well-being, obesity is analyzed in the humanities as a social marker, an element of defining and redefining social order. In public, obesity is often linked to the responsibility of the individual and the ability to remain a fit, productive member of business and society. The conference “Obesity, Health, and the Liberal Self: Transatlantic Perspectives on the Late Nineteenth and the Late Twentieth Centuries” sought to historicize these observations. The GHI invited sixteen historians, sociologists, cultural anthropologists, and specialists in American Studies to discuss this pressing contemporary topic and to compare the different cultures of obesity and obesity perception in Europe and the U.S. over these time periods.

Two brief introductions by Jürgen Martschukat and Uwe Spiekermann outlined an agenda for the presentations and discussions: For Martschukat, obesity is a key to understanding how society is organized and how the individual is integrated into power relations. But there is more than repression: Discussing obesity is always linked to the bigger topic of freedom and its consequences. In modern, liberal societies, a rational and efficient use of the body is preferred. Size is therefore a signifier: it marks winners and losers. Analyzing obesity can help to define moments of crisis and give a better idea
of the Westernization of the world and the fierce debates on the consequences of globalization. From a more historical perspective, Uwe Spiekermann saw obesity as a concept useful for questioning common ideas of historical linearity. Obesity is more than a narrative about the loss of our natural foundations or an inherent decline of mankind since industrialization. It shows history in action and sharpens our awareness of differences and choices. In contrast to doctors with their clear-cut distinction between healthy and unhealthy, the history of obesity allows us to realize complexity and contingency. Defining obesity is always about creating a hierarchy of different rationalities — that is, different knowledge regimes. The objective knowledge of experts and the subjective knowledge of people are in constant struggle, and public advice and guidance is always contested. Finally, obesity as a concept makes it possible to analyze human beings not only as cultural but also as natural beings.

The first panel “Obesity and Normativity,” chaired by Susan Strasser, focused on such differences between ideals and reality in exploring public health politics and the epistemology of natural sciences. Michael Gard, in his talk on “Schools, Public Health and the Responsible Self,” gave a taste of a book project exploring the crucial and long-lasting debate on liberality versus education in twentieth-century school systems in the U.S. Public health topics were introduced into schools from the 1930s to enable pupils to make their own responsible choices and to demonstrate the state’s determination to improve individual health. Although never uncontested, schools continue to hold this position today. Underfinancing, a lack of reliable teacher training, and pressure from companies led to an educational system driven by campaigns and based on corporate sponsorship. Gard gave many examples of the commercialization and commodification of today’s schools and stressed that public health education today is based on “illiberal” politics rather than a culture of knowledge-based decision-making by strong individuals. While Gard focused on teaching, Deborah Lea Frommeld discussed a basic and often unquestioned concept in medicine today. “Lipolitics: The Body-Mass-Index (BMI) as an Instrument of Power” started with the current significance of the BMI as a tool for categorizing people by weight and health. The index is closely linked to ideas of normality and abnormality that its creator, Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874), developed within the bourgeois mentality of the nineteenth century. Frommeld stressed the unintended consequences such hidden morality had in
the implementation and execution of several World Health Organization campaigns since 1997.

People have always questioned the normativity of companies and doctors, however. Panel 2, “Concepts of Obesity,” chaired by Jan Logemann, presented rather different ways to understand and deal with obesity. Nina Mackert, one of two colleagues whose travel expenses and accommodation were paid by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, presented a case study on the Connecticut fat men’s club, whose members had to be wealthy men with a weight of at least two hundred pounds. Her paper, “I want to be a fat man / and with the fat man stand”: Fat Men’s Clubs and the Meaning of Body Fat in the United States around 1900,” showed that being fat could be regarded as a positive value and celebrated in opulent public banquets. Fat men, within the understanding of the clubs, embodied the promise of material success; the members perceived themselves as a climax of evolution. In contrast to the dominant discourse criticizing the appetite of these fat people as a threat to society, these happy ignoramuses understood fat as an expression of upward mobility in the new world. Obviously, fat has ambivalent interpretations. Fat, however, is not only a social marker distinguishing wealthy white men from the rest. As Kathleen Robinson demonstrated in her presentation “Militant Fats: Contesting Obesity as Illness: NAAFA, and Its Heirs, 1969-2004,” the small National Organization to Advance Fat Acceptance has tried to change the public perception of predominantly female bodies since its foundation in 1969. Members have primarily been fat white women. who met regularly, published pamphlets, brochures, and books to promote “fat power,” and attempted to convince the public that fat is not unhealthy (although it can become so). Robinson discussed the often hidden background of the organization, which was supported by many men who loved fleshy women, but she made clear that the positive effect on society more than outweighed this: By questioning diet products and cosmetic surgery, they had some effect on regulating these new body-related markets.

This example already foreshadowed some aspects discussed in more detail in the third panel, “Obesity, Gender and Race,” chaired by Uwe Spiekermann. First, Katharina Vester examined the writings of French gastronome Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin (1755–1826) and English publisher William Banting (1797–1878) to understand how the idea that educated people could control themselves was developed. In her talk “Diets and Gender in Late Nineteenth-Century America,” she
showed how Brillat-Savarin presented dieting as a question of knowledge and rationality and thinness as a difference between males and females that had to be produced. Banting’s low-carb diet dismissed the idea of weight as a hereditary and developed individualized treatment for overweight people. Within this framework, obesity became an expression of laziness and lack of self-discipline. The U.S. market was flooded with self-help guides that celebrated the disciplined and thin self-made man. Dieting was to become a good habit of the educated classes. Thinness among women came to be perceived as a sign of strength, while being overweight came to be associated with greed. Restraint became an expression of white superiority, while overeating and overabundant body forms became loaded with racial connotations. The obvious racism of body discourses changed at the end of the nineteenth century, when modern physiology offered new explanations for moderate eating. Rachel Louise Moran referred in her lecture “‘The Good Wife and Mother does not Understand’: Federal Expertise and Authority in American Nutrition Science, 1880-1935” to the modern (German) scientific approach of Wilbur O. Atwater (1884-1907). He publicly propagated a family economy in which women were to develop a rational plan for purchasing food and learn to cook in a male-oriented way. This approach was propagated and promoted by the U.S. Bureau of Home Economics after Louise Stanley (1883-1954) took on leadership of the institution in 1923. The agency established a balanced approach to promoting a slim body combined with common concern about motherhood. Advice literature highlighted the prestige and practicability of rational food choices without using quantification; rather, it tried to appeal to the public’s common sense. The rational consumer, it was assumed, needed to make purchases according to the findings of modern physiology, but she should also have some freedom in composing a proper and tasty diet. White women were the main addressees of such approaches, but there was a broad discourse on fatness in the African-American community at that time as well. Fat shaming, as Ava Purkiss pointed out in her talk on “‘Beauty Secrets: Fight Fat’: Black Women’s Physical Culture, Health, and the Beautiful Body in the Early Twentieth Century,” was well established among black women before World War I. But while white women were supported in their efforts to remain or to become slim, female African Americans had to deal with a long list of obstacles, concentrated in the image of African American nannies and a lack of respect for thin bodies, which were often associated by the (white) police with prostitution and intellectuality. The “white” ideal of thinness, however, shaped the lives of many black women
during the entire twentieth century — now perhaps embodied in
the iconic body model of Michelle Obama. Psyche Williams-Forson
focused on the current discussions on food in political, social, and
popular debates in the U.S. In “‘What’s this in my Salad?’ Black
Women, Food, and the Quandary of Self-Identity,” she presented
food as an expression of basic rights. Eating right should not adapt
to predominantly “objective” ideals of healthy and rational diets but
on values of good diet and good eating. This would lead to eating
and body patterns shaped by rather diverse cultures, values, and
ideologies. William-Forson told some stories about young African-
American girls in vicious cycles of excessive eating and exercising.
She urged communities to incorporate healthier cooking techniques
and ingredients into foods already rich in cultural meaning. Discuss-
ing food and the body is essential in questioning the artificial borders
between healthy and unhealthy foods and eating patterns.

Most of the contributions during the first day focused on public
discourses and the discussions between experts and the public,
often excluding economic interests. This was different in panel 4,
“Obesity as a Market,” chaired by Nina Mackert. Uwe Spiekermann’s
lecture “Options for the ‘Slaves of Culture’: Light Products, Diets and
Laxatives Diets in Imperial Germany” showed that the new scientific
knowledge system, based on new ideas of nutrients and metabolism,
opened the horizon to new generations of food products: Processed
food could balance “natural” processes and keep the body in balance.
Modern balneology established not only a market for advice and cures
but offered nuanced mineral waters and salt essences to balance
out-of-balance bodies. From the 1890s, stimulants were detoxified:
Coffee without caffeine, cigars with less nicotine, and beer with very
low alcohol content were the harbingers of a product world of both
enjoyment and responsibility. Effective diet products, however, were
rare. But from the 1890s, hormone preparations offered an effective
(yet risky) way to reduce body weight. More prominent and widely
used by bourgeois women were laxatives. Even before World War I,
the food industry offered the first “light” products with either reduced
or enriched nutrient content. This opened a knowledge-driven path
to growing profits for entrepreneurs and experts — and new options
for consumers, who did not want to eat differently but to eat some-
thing different. The overlapping field of food and health marketing
was also examined by Ulrike Thoms in her contribution “Obesity
and Diabetes: A Complicated Connection, and Its Role for the
of diabetes began in the 1880s when the disease was already linked to undisciplined lifestyle and eating choices. Before the invention of insulin therapy in the 1920s, the treatment of the disease was based on dietary restrictions to prevent this deadly threat and to help those affected. Thoms showed how diabetes was linked to obesity, how biochemical research distinguished between diabetes type I and II, and how experts and specialized companies developed diets helpful for living a “normal” life even after contracting the disease. Diabetics had to take responsibility for themselves by preventing obesity and living a balanced and moderate life. While the first two papers of the panel focused on specialized markets, Bart Elmore concentrated on one company. In “Coca-Cola and the Battle of the Bulge: Defining the Solution to Obesity, 1990–Today,” he explained the soft drink producer’s successful strategy to fight regulation. Coca-Cola is a company that chooses not to own most of the value chain except the syrup and to share the profits with a large number of local and regional stakeholders. This engenders an ever-changing coalition that is able to fight any regulation of soft drinks, the consumption of which is surely linked to widespread and growing obesity. The coalition partners’ strong financial stakes establish networks to fight any “threats,” even without the Coca-Cola Company’s direct involvement. Philanthropy, engagement in communities, developing “healthier” products (mineral water, Diet Coke), and advertising a healthy lifestyle were additional strategies the company developed to reduce its appearance of responsibility for the growing obesity problem.

Coca-Cola is a surely a model for global capitalism in the twenty-first century. The spread of knowledge and practices and the question of national differences were discussed in more depth in panel 5 “Transatlantic Differences, Transnational Entanglements,” chaired by Jürgen Martschukat. Nora Binder presented the successful career of an immigrant in her talk “The Obese within the Group: Kurt Lewin’s Method of Changing Food Habits and its Limits (1940s–1950s).” German-American psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), who had to leave Germany in 1933, became one of the most influential social scientists of his time. His ideas on group psychology and chain management aimed to close the gap between knowledge and activity and to trigger social change. As a member of the U.S. Committee on Food Habits, established in 1941, Lewin developed new and “democratic” methods of group decision-making processes to rationalize food choice among housewives and to reduce poor eating
habits resulting in obesity. His research, later continued and specified by members of his group at MIT, analyzed subjects’ resistance to eating recommendations. Three consequences were drawn from Lewin’s research: Obesity treatment must be long term, it must be recognized as an individual problem, and it should be embedded in a group environment. This led to new public health approaches, most notably self-help groups and group therapy. While Levin transferred the core elements of his social psychology from Berlin to the U.S., the effects of specific political systems for defining the causes of and treating obesity were a broader and more complex phenomenon, discussed by Alice Weinreb in the final presentation “Fat in the Cold War: East and West German Struggles with Obesity.” For her, fat has to be recognized as a problem of modernity, which has been politicized wherever it has been debated. In West Germany, fatness was perceived as the result of a prosperous postwar economy contrasting with the hunger years between 1944 and 1947. Similarly, in East Germany, growing body sizes were understood as the result of the success of establishing the socialized planned economy in East Germany. Both Germanys, however, had to deal with the obesity epidemic starting in the early 1950s. In the West, the manager’s disease became a symbol for the threats of too much: Bourgeois males were affected and their spouses were trained to improve their families’ diets to keep their husbands healthy and fit. This changed in the following decade when obesity became a less exclusive and “ugly” problem for most people. In contrast, in the East obesity was perceived as a problem of labor productivity, especially a problem among working women. Collective responses, like healthy canteen meals and improved convenience foods were intended to reduce the problem and the body sizes.

The final discussion emphasized not only confusion on a higher level but also discussed strategies of using topics like obesity to conceptualize history in a different way. The concept of the “liberal self” and “liberal” societies were questioned: Sick people often do not have freedom of choice and often end up in hospitals, public service institutions, and retirement homes. The vanishing point of responsibility — the liberal self, the group, or larger communities — remained unclear. The economy mattered, but how did it interact with culture, how did values and prices interfere? How did different elites, either in politics, science, business, or the media, interact? What were the interests of individuals, and did they correspond to common perspectives?
Obesity appeared to be a multi-faceted, often puzzling creation, not a clear-cut concept. It varied from time period to time period, across regions, knowledge bases, classes, races, genders, ages and life situations. Obesity therefore gives us a tool for rethinking our yardsticks for comparison and our research categories. It opens a new perspective on the narrative and the reality of modernity: Freedom as a problem, the organization of society under constant threat, individuals and groups in an ongoing search for responsibility, business as a solution and a problem, knowledge as a burden and mode of dominance. And how can we combine this with more compelling ideals of perfection and efficiency, of beauty and a good life, of community and fellowship around the table? The GHI obesity conference opened up a wide field for further research.

Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
LOS ANGELES AS A SITE OF GERMAN-AMERICAN CROSSINGS

Conference at the Max Kade Institute for Austrian-German-Swiss Studies at the University of Southern California and the Villa Aurora, Los Angeles, February 7-8, 2014. Co-sponsored by GHI Washington, Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, and Max Kade Foundation. Conveners: Jeff Fear (University of Glasgow) and Paul Lerner (University of Southern California). Participants: Ehrhard (Ted) Bahr (University of California, Los Angeles), Doris Berger (Skirball Cultural Center), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Washington), Stefan Biedermann (German Consul General), Bill Deverell (University of Southern California), Kathleen Feeley (University of Redlands), Margrit Fröhlich (University of California, San Diego), Judith Goodstein (California Institute of Technology), Giles Hoyt (University of Indiana), Marion Kant (Cambridge University), Tom Kemper (University of Southern California), Cristina Stanca Mustea (UNESCO, Paris), Nicole Neuman (University of Minnesota), Anne Schenderlein (University of California, San Diego), Joachim Schlör (University of Southampton), Cornelius Schnauber (University of Southern California), Marje Schütze-Coburn (University of Southern California), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI Washington), Jonathan Steinberg (University of Pennsylvania), Michaela Ullmann (University of Southern California), Thomas Wheatland (Assumption College, Worcester), Karen Wilson (University of California, Los Angeles).

Where is Heimat? Can Germans find a new one even in the American West? These were the core questions of a conference in Los Angeles, organized by the Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project’s volume editor Jeff Fear and Paul Lerner, director of the Max Kade Institute for Austrian-German-Swiss Studies (USC), that offered an exciting opportunity to compare the well-known German exiles and immigrants of the interwar period with many German-American immigrant entrepreneurs, most notably in the movie and entertainment industries.

The participants and many guests were welcomed at the Max Kade Institute by the organizers, Bill Deverell and German Deputy Consul General Stefan Biedermann. The latter had clarified that the large German(-American) community in Los Angeles, at least one-half million people, is quite disperse. He named four groups: The Holocaust survivors and exiles, the emigrants who arrived after World War II, the young urban professionals in the entertainment businesses, and the pioneer generation of German-Americans, who had come
to California already in the 19th century. Although all from German heritage, these groups did not commonly interact with one another.

The first session, chaired by Marje Schütze-Coburn, dealt with *Intellectuals, Writers, Artists*. Ted Bahr presented “Weimar on the Pacific Revisited.” He not only discussed the general history of German exiled intellectuals in Los Angeles but reflected on the meaning of the term “Weimar” for those who had to leave their *Heimat*. Thomas Wheatland added a very nuanced analysis of “Critical Theory. The Los Angeles Years.” He emphasized the differences between the New York and the Los Angeles time of the Frankfurt School and gave new light to the often complicated relation of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno on the one side, and Franz L. Neumann on the other side. Michaela Ullmann spoke on “A lasting legacy: Lion and Marta Feuchtwanger’s impact on preserving the memory of German-Speaking exiles in Southern California.” She gave an overview both on the large number of German writers in the Los Angeles region and on the activities of the Feuchtwanger Memorial Library. The following vivid discuss circulated around the relevance of space and place for the immigrant’s experience and work.

After a culinary break, delivered by the Currywurst Truck of Los Angeles, session 2 dealt with *Exhibiting the Émigrés*. Chaired by Bill Deverell, Karen Wilson gave powerful insights into the exhibition “Jews in the Los Angeles Mosaic,” presented by the Autry National Center from May 2013 to January 2014. Banker Isaias Hellman and the large number of Jewish movie producers were used as examples to discuss the specific flavor of Southern California. Wilson’s thesis, “Jews made Hollywood, and Hollywood made LA,” however, was discussed only as a tapering, not as a valid empirical, statement. Doris Berger, presented the structure of the forthcoming exhibition “Light & Noir: Exiles and Émigrés in Hollywood 1933–1950.” Again, the Jewish-German relations were debated vigorously.

The third session focused on a quite different and much broader group, namely *Immigrant Entrepreneurs in California*. Chaired by Jeff Fear, the presenters focused predominantly on those German-Americans, who contributed to the rapid rise of Los Angeles as the leading metropolis in the U.S. West. General editor Hartmut Berghoff started with a detailed overview on “The German-American Immigrant Entrepreneur Project.” He also highlighted some of the most interesting biographies, namely Henry J. Kaiser, Harry Cohn, Jacob Beringer, and Emanuel Bronner. General editor Uwe Spiekermann
continued with a case study on “The Spreckels Family in Southern California.” The urban development of Los Angeles’s main competitor, the “one man town” San Diego, is closely linked to the investments of John D. Spreckels into urban infrastructure and both the beautifying and industrializing of the metropolis, now ranked eighth in the U.S. metropolitan regions. Kathleen Feeley drew the attention back to Los Angeles, speaking on “American, then German: Irving Thalberg and the Second Generation in Hollywood.” The “wonder boy” of first Universal Pictures and then MGM was able to combine European and American traditions and to anticipate the desires of audiences in motion. Again, the discussion was intense and challenging: Core questions of the Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project were discussed, namely the differences between German and German-Jewish businesspeople, the meaning of being German for doing business abroad, and the sources of the case studies. Jürgen Kocka (UCLA), one of the guests, requested the other side of the success stories and wanted to hear more on losses and failures. Finally, the relevance of philanthropy for businesspeople and immigrants was discussed in detail.

These and more questions continued to be debated during dinner at the USC University Club. The main dish, however, was served by Cornelius Schnauber, who shared his memories on Fritz Lang, Fred Zinnemann, Billy Wilder and many others in his talk “Speak German You Are in Hollywood: Episodes and Experiences with German-Speaking Exiles and Émigrés.”

The second day, February 8, 2014, was held at a different location: The conference met at the Villa Aurora in Pacific Palisades. This mansion, bought in 1943 by Lion and Marta Feuchtwanger, was once a center of German emigrant’s intellectual life. After restoration, the villa today hosts the 20,000-volume Feuchtwanger Memorial Library and is an open place for literature, fine art, film, and music. Villa Aurora director Margit Kleinman welcomed the group and gave some details on the history of this German-American landmark.

Session 4 widened the perspective to Exile, Science and the State. At the beginning, chair Jonathan Steinberg expressed the gratitude of all participants to the German State, who financed the restoration of the Villa Aurora and opened its doors for the conference. Afterwards, Judith Goodstein returned to history, presenting “Caltech’s German Connection.” From the early 1920s, physicist Robert A. Milikan hired first-class experts in Germany to develop American science and to teach American students. Paul Epstein, Theodore von Karman, and
Benno Gutenberg were the most pronounced examples; while German-trained Linus Pauling, already a prominent pioneer for the politics of U.S. self-recruiting, practiced at Caltech until the early 1960s. Anne Schenderlein added archival based research on “Making German History in Los Angeles: German-Jewish Refugees and the West German Foreign Office.” Focusing on Jewish refugees in Los Angeles, she analyzed how they found a new Heimat in California and how this group interacted with the diplomatic representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany. Trust-building and the reciprocal use of the German diplomats and the Jewish community for their different goals of reconciliation and restitution were analyzed. Although fraught with tension, post-Holocaust German-Jewish relations were not only resulting from negotiations between Bonn, Jerusalem, and New York but were also influenced from the periphery — at least in the U.S. The session was completed by Giles Hoyt’s presentation on “Max Kade: Pertussin and Philanthropy.” The German-American immigrant entrepreneur invested most of his fortune, earned in the pharmaceutical industry, for the improvement of German-American relations after World War II. Although very prominent, Kade’s biography still offers many research opportunities because he was a quite private and modest person.

Los Angeles gives dreams to the world, and consequently the fifth session tackled Film Worlds. Those who only had Hollywood in their mind were surprised by Nicole Neuman’s contribution on “Home Sweet Heimat: Finding Germanness in LA’s Moviegoing Culture.” She analyzed the history of the La Tosca Filmbühne, a Los Angeles cinema, which presented German-language movies, mostly Heimatfilme, to a German and Austrian immigrant audience from the late 1940s to the early 1980s. The movie theater offered the idea of an ideal Germany far beyond National-Socialism and the controversies in democratic West Germany — a dream world of the fatherland still existing for many of those who came to the U.S. after World War II. Margrit Frölich, in contrast, presented in her paper “Liberties and Constrictions: Émigré Producers in Hollywood Motion Pictures” Los Angeles as a typical American place — in some opposition to more international New York. Joe Pasternack, Eric Pommer, and Sam Spiegel were biographical examples for her analysis of the movie industry predominantly during the 1940s. Finally, Tom Kemper contributed another gatekeeper business in talking about “Sue Mengers and the Rise of the Hollywood Agents.” While producers lost importance in the post-war era, Hamburg-born Sue Mengers represented leading actors of the new cinema from the late 1960s on and became a power in
Hollywood until her retirement from International Creative Management in 1986. The discussion not only added biographical examples but also focused on the ongoing challenge for Los Angeles/Hollywood to remain the dominant place for the global film business.

The concluding session, entitled *Weimar on the Pacific Revisited: Exiles between Two Worlds* and chaired by Paul Lerner, again broadened the scale and scope of German immigrants. Marion Kant, in her presentation “For the Time Being a Row of Palm Trees Is Nothing but a Nice Façade,” offered a challenging and paradoxical analysis of theatre and dance in emigration and exile in the U.S. Collective undertakings, like the German theatrical culture, suffered intensely and the German concept of theatre had no real chance in an entertainment culture. In dance, however, the modernism supported by the Nazis (for instance Mary Wigman and Hanya Holm) was integrated in the U.S. Cristina Stanca Mustea led — in her lecture “No More Crossings: Carl Laemmle’s Last Visit to Germany” — the focus on the Universal Studio founder’s interaction with Germany. In 1918 and 1919, he produced anti-German *Hetzfilme*, re-established Universal on the German market from the early 1920s on, and suffered under the ban on his anti-war movie “All Quiet on the Western Front” in 1929. As a consequence, he began to bring his relatives and many other Jews from Germany to the safe haven of the U.S. The final paper was given by Joachim Schlör, who addressed “Werner Richard Heymann in Hollywood: A Case Study in German-Jewish Emigration after 1933 as a Transnational Experience.” In spite of all the musical exchange between Europe and the U.S., even a leading composer like Heymann could not continue his work in exile but had to deal with the necessities of the film music market in Hollywood. The market triumphed over the individuality of an artist; and the composer, although really successful, suffered abroad, missing the opportunities of early 1930s Germany.

The conference put the immigrant entrepreneurship experience in a broad and challenging perspective. Many of the pioneering German-Americans had already made their fortunes by the time this wave of exiles and emigrants arrived in Los Angeles. In spite of their common national background, there was not much interaction between those already established and the Jewish, social democratic, and communist newcomers. Although the movie industry offered many opportunities for the emigrants, even those who succeeded did not really find a new *Heimat* in the West.

Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
HISTORIES OF HUMANITARIANISM: RELIGIOUS, PHILANTHROPIC, AND POLITICAL PRACTICES IN THE MODERNIZING WORLD

Conference at the GHI Washington and University of Maryland, College Park, March 7-8, 2014. Conveners: Sonya Michel (University of Maryland), and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI). Participants: Emily Baughan (Columbia University), Jacqueline deVries (Augsburg College), Heide Fehrenbach (Northern Illinois University), Poppy Fry (University of Puget Sound) Rebecca Gill (University of Huddersfield) Christine Hartig (University of Flensburg), Julia Irwin (University of South Florida), Seth Koven (Rutgers University) Isa Leff (American University), Susan Levine (University of Illinois) Yannan Li (Indiana University), Giulia Marotta (Sorbonne-Paris IV), Amanda Moniz (National History Center), Marian Moser Jones (UMD), Brian Phillips (Co-Editor Journal of Human Rights Practice), Francesca Piana (Columbia University), Richard Price (UMD), Alexandra Przyrembel (Free University Berlin), Robin Seelan (Loyola College).

Starting in the nineteenth century, societies on both sides of the Atlantic initiated a series of strategies and institutions designed to provide emergency assistance and humanitarian interventions across the globe. Such practices were rooted in earlier colonial and religious missions, in pre-modern government claims of responsibility for co-religionists even beyond national borders, and in the activities of domestic relief organizations. As NGOs largely independent of national governments, they became agents of globalization processes that reached an initial highpoint at the end of the nineteenth century.

Developments in the early twentieth century challenged earlier humanitarian practices as the formation of the League of Nations — the world’s first official intergovernmental entity — shifted the context for international relief work, while the scale of the crisis produced by the war demanded a new level of humanitarian response. At the same time, organizations themselves were becoming increasing bureaucratized and professionalized, displacing individuals who had previously been able to participate on a voluntary basis and questioning their motivation.

In the wake of World War II, the context for international assistance shifted once again with escalation in the scale of humanitarian disaster, the founding of the UN and its affiliated agencies, the wave
of decolonization, and the spread of the Cold War. Yet religious arguments for humanitarian practices persisted, with robust religious and secular NGOs existing alongside, sometimes cooperating, sometimes in tension with expanding international organizations. As humanitarianism became ever more a global enterprise on the part of the world’s wealthy nations and a tool of their foreign policy, recipient populations began to mobilize and assert agency in claiming aid and shaping it according to their own perceptions of need.

The workshop examined the roots of international humanitarian organizations, motivations for providing assistance, the rhetoric and visual iconography of aid, and the impact of race and gender. Papers considered individual motivation and the effects of professionalization and bureaucratization, and compared religious and secular humanitarianism. They also looked at the relationship between states and NGOs, and between NGOs and IOs.

The workshop began with opening remarks from the conveners, who asked, what is humanitarianism? This question recurred over the next two days. They also noted that humanitarianism may be studied and analyzed from multiple perspectives and in multiple disciplines.

The first panel, on Historiographical and Theoretical Perspectives, began with a paper by Amanda Moniz, “The American Revolution and the Politics of Early Humanitarianism.” Moniz argued that one of the conventional explanations for humanitarianism, which emphasizes economic motivations, should be extended to take politics into account. During and after the Revolution, philanthropists on both sides of the Atlantic used transnational humanitarianism as a tool for rebuilding the Atlantic world. This history, she noted, also pushes back the origins of humanitarianism to the late eighteenth century. Next, in a paper entitled “Global Moments and the Armenian Genocide: World Public, Violence and Religious Humanitarianism in the Early Twentieth Century,” Alexandra Przyrembel analyzed the Armenian Genocide as a “global moment” characterized by worldwide appeals for help. These were directed toward a “global public” whose consciousness had been growing since the late nineteenth century as new media, such as the press, news services like Reuters, and the telegraph, rapidly spread eyewitness accounts of the genocide. Although humanitarian aid was unable to keep pace, the “aid market” became professionalized, and a new public emerged. Giulia Marotta’s paper, “Human Rights and Humanitarianism: Religious and Secular Views of a Modern Dilemma,” compared two models
of establishing a right to humanitarian assistance, one based on political liberalism, the other invoking the principle of a natural right dependent upon divine will. Although the gap between them seemed to grow over the course of the twentieth century, the project of an organization like Amnesty International, which appears to be based wholly on the UN Declaration of Human Rights, actually “exceeds” the principle of secularism, suggesting that traces of the religious basis for humanitarianism may still be found.

The second panel, Religion and Humanitarianism, picked up on Marotta’s theme. In “Jewish Solidarity in Nineteenth-Century France: The Evolution of a Concept,” Lisa Leff focused on the moment in post-revolutionary France when the language of secular republicanism replaced that of Catholic absolutism as the dominant syntax of French national politics. Faced with a changing religious identity as French citizens, France’s Jews sought to extend support to co-religionists everywhere under the rubric of “Jewish solidarity.” This language resonated with French secular republicans, allowing them to demonstrate universal concerns for others without evoking explicitly Christian concepts. The next paper examined a case in which religion proved to be divisive rather than inclusive. In “Christian Religious Humanitarianism in Tamilnadu, India: A Historical and Philosophical View of the Protestant and Catholic Approaches,” Robin Seelan detailed the long history of Christian missionary activity in Tamil Nadu State of Southern India, with particular focus on the Christian critique of the Indian caste system. Through their schools, hospitals, and educational and relief services, he showed that the missionaries allowed lower-caste individuals and families to find new opportunities within the Christian community. Finally, Brian Phillips’ “The Supremacy of Divinely Ordered Human Relations: Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Quaker Humanitarians Ethos” explored Quakers’ work after the first and second world wars. Tracing the origins of humanitarianism to early Quaker thinkers, Phillips noted that the “radical realignment” of Quaker spirituality urged individuals to go beyond concerns with their internal states to “remake the world” and transform social ills. As both a scholar and practitioner, Philips viewed recent trends toward professionalization as a betrayal of the humility and call to service that marked the Quaker humanitarian ethic.

The third panel turned toward a familiar theme in humanitarianism, “Putting Children First.” First, Francesca Piana returned to the Armenian question, this time focusing on the League of Nations and its
work on behalf of Armenian refugees, primarily women and children stranded in Syria and in Constantinople. Its efforts were hampered by the Armenians’ statelessness. Other organizations and individuals, particularly Americans and British, also undertook humanitarian operations, but their lack of coordination with the League led to the “emergence of the refugee regime of the inter-war period.” The next paper, Rebecca Gill’s “The Politics of Play: The Educational Development Work of the Save the Children Fund (UK), 1919-1939,” showed how social work shaped humanitarian methods of dealing with children both at home and abroad. As the war got under way, SCF transplanted methods first devised in nurseries for poor British children during the depression to projects for poor and refugee children in crisis sites around the world. Drawing on the latest theories of child development, including the principle of “play with a purpose,” the organization sought to burnish its own professional credentials while providing essential services to children. Concluding this panel, Emily Baughan explained how the “Save the Children Federation” gained financial support for its work by encouraging individuals to enter a quasi-adoptive relationship with the children they “sponsored.” In “A Child to Keep for a Dime a Week”: International Child Sponsorship Schemes and the Humanitarian Movement, 1915-1940,” she noted that while SCF emphasized individual connections between donors and recipients, it also framed support for child welfare as an “investment in a peaceful future,” with sponsors becoming “national ambassadors.”

These themes continued in the fourth panel, “Professionalizing Relief,” which Jacqueline deVries opened with her paper, “Doctoring Across Borders: Mary Scharlieb and the Creation of Modern Gynecology.” Scharlieb, an Anglo-Catholic physician and midwife trained in both Madras and London, served as a medical missionary in India in the late nineteenth century. Her experience not only aided Indian women but enhanced her status in the field of women’s medicine in England. DeVries argued that “Indian women played no small part in determining the conditions under which they received treatment” and gained medical knowledge as well. The final paper on this panel, Christine Hartig’s “Rescuing and Professional Standards: The Case of Immigration of Unaccompanied Jewish Children into the U.S. during the Second World War,” analysed German-Jewish social workers’ efforts to save Jewish children by placing them with American families. Hartig showed how the felt need to maintain professional standards shaped their practice. With their reputations riding
on “successful” placements, they carefully selected children and matched them with “suitable” foster parents, a process that could exclude children who appeared to be “less adaptable.”

In her keynote address, “The Humanitarian Eye,” Heide Fehrenbach invoked Thomas Laqueur’s definition of humanitarian discourses as those that keep “distant others within ethical range.” Noting that anthropology, humanitarianism and photography were co-emergent, Fehrenbach pointed out overlaps between ethnographic and humanitarian imagery. While photography has been used for fundraising purposes, she said, it also raises political and ethical concerns about humanitarian crises, giving form and meaning to human suffering and making it “actionable.” Images of children have been central, their presumed innocence helping to create a “self-conscious globalism.” Presenting dozens of photographs from 1860 to 1944, Fehrenbach covered crises ranging from war to poverty to hunger and famine. The humanitarian eye was, she concluded, often gendered female. Many of the makers and purveyors of humanitarian photography have been women, and their images often depict women and children, suggesting the inadequacy of patriarchal protection in times of crisis.

The concluding roundtable focused on “The Politics and Practices of Humanitarianism.” Poppy Fry began by looking at “‘Enlarged Views of Philanthropy’: Competing Humanitarianisms in the Early Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony.” Cape humanitarians divided into two camps, a deeply conservative, community-oriented strain promoted by English missionaries, and the more pragmatic, liberal, capitalist approach of the colonial governor, Benjamin D’Urban, and some of the settlers. Driven by the contemporary international politics of abolition, these differences came to a head in 1835 over the issue of civil rights for non-whites, as the governor promoted a policy of tolerance that the missionaries feared would prove disruptive. Next, Yannan Li analyzed the establishment of “The Red Cross Society in Imperial China, 1904-1912.” While the corrupt and authoritarian Qing dynasty viewed such organizations as incursions into imperial power, the rulers were facing momentous humanitarian crises they could not resolve. Yet the idea of allowing the creation of a Red Cross chapter appeared galling since it came from the Japanese, who had invaded China in 1894. Under pressure from a modernizing, philanthropic-minded gentry, the weakening Qing Empire finally agreed to create a chapter, even using the Japanese society’s constitution as a model for its own. Julia Irwin then discussed “The Emergence of Disaster
Relief as an Element of U.S. Foreign Affairs,” showing how, over the course of the twentieth century, disaster relief became a way for the U.S. to extend its interests abroad. At the same time, it has brought non-state actors — NGOs like the Red Cross — into American foreign relations. As such, disaster relief forms part of a broader story of international humanitarianism and international civil society, with the U.S. and the global community influencing one other. Susan Levine was also concerned with how and when humanitarianism became a part of U.S. foreign policy. In the final paper of the workshop, “Cold War Humanitarianism: The Public/Private Nexus of American Food Aid,” she explained how CARE’s food relief program became part of American geopolitical strategy. America’s postwar abundance, along with its victors’ mentality, led to the belief that the U.S. had a responsibility to help out both sides — victors and victims — in rebuilding their lives and eliminating hunger.

The concluding discussion returned to some of the broad themes that had arisen throughout the conference, such as the relationship between humanitarianism and liberalism, and differences among humanitarianism, charity and philanthropy. Most agreed that involvement in humanitarian work, wherever and in whatever form, is nearly always bound up with governments. This can take different forms: foreign policy, the ratification of international treaties, or the choice of which humanitarian effort to promote.

Sonya Michel (University of Maryland, College Park) and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)
MIGRATION DURING ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS: FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE GREAT RECESSION

Workshop at the GHI, April 4-5, 2014. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Migration Policy Institute. Conveners: Elisa Minoff (GHI) and Marc Rosenblum (Migration Policy Institute). Participants: Brian Gratton (Arizona State University), Christoph Rass (University of Osnabrück), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Almuth Ebke (University of Mannheim), Jimmy Patiño (University of Minnesota), Perla Guerrero (University of Maryland), Demetrios Papademetriou (Migration Policy Institute), Cybelle Fox (University of California, Berkeley), Hidetaka Hirota (Columbia University), Thomas K. Wong (University of California, San Diego), Hiroshi Motomura (University of California, Los Angeles), Muzaffar Chishti (Migration Policy Institute), Jim Hollifield (Southern Methodist University), David T. Hsu (University of Pennsylvania), Madeleine Sumption (Migration Policy Institute), Alejandra Tijerina García (University of Hamburg), Jessica Sperling (Graduate Center-City University of New York), Jobb Dixon Arnold (Queens University).

During the Great Recession immigration has been hotly contested on both sides of the Atlantic. Politicians, advocacy groups, and members of the public have debated new immigration reforms and controls. The workshop placed the current debates over immigration in historical perspective. The papers, presented by an interdisciplinary group of historians, political scientists, legal scholars, and policy analysts, shed light on how migrants have fared during economic downturns, how discourse has shifted, and how policy has actually changed. The majority of the papers focused on the United States, but several offered a helpful comparative perspective on the experience, discourse, and policy in Europe. Together, the papers complicated the traditional narrative about the fate of immigrants and immigration policy during global recessions. The papers confirmed that recessions often strengthened anti-migrant sentiment, but they also showed how migrants themselves found innovative ways to persevere in their host societies. Immigration restrictionists, meanwhile, often had difficulty enacting their preferred policies; and when they were able, the new regulations were not always enforced as they had envisioned.

The first panel considered migration during the Great Depression. Brian Gratton, presenting a paper he co-authored with Emily Merchant at the University of Michigan, considered what census
data can tell us about the immigration patterns of Mexicans between the 1920s and 1940s. As Gratton explained, by the time the United States entered the Depression, Mexicans had a well-established pattern of circular migration. He and Merchant suggest that this pattern continued through the 1930s. By far the majority of the repatriation through the 1930s was voluntary, they argue. The Mexican government contributed significant funds to facilitate the repatriation, but the role of the U.S. government was limited. The first bilateral agreements between the United States and Mexico in 1942 creating a temporary agricultural workers program continued this pattern of a strong Mexican state and a weak U.S. state captured by agricultural interests. Christoph Rass picked up this discussion of bilateral agreements, charting the forgotten history of bilateral agreements in the interwar period. As Rass showed, the first bilateral agreements creating temporary workers programs were established at the turn of the twentieth century, and the bilateral agreements of the years immediately following World War I became a model for what came later. The agreement between France and Poland in 1919 established the goal of balancing supply and demand and the principle of equal treatment of temporary alien and native workers that later agreements would follow. Americans like Henry Pratt Fairchild looked to these European agreements when contemplating a bilateral agreement with Mexico in the early years of World War II.

The second panel considered discursive shifts during economic downturns. Almuth Ebke presented the case of the Brixton riots of 1981. As Ebke demonstrated, the most widespread image following the riots of West Indian migrants in the West London neighborhood was that of a bloodied policeman. Though liberals tended to argue that economic conditions were the underlying cause of the riots, conservatives and the Thatcher government argued forcefully against this thesis, asserting that unemployment could not justify rioting. The discourse helped build support for the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1981. Jimmy Patiño showed how Mexican-American activists in 1971 began to argue for a new definition of Chicano that transcended citizenship and could include the many undocumented workers residing in the United States. These activists fought against established Mexican American politicians and their allies in labor unions who believed it was in their interest to crack down on undocumented immigration. These “Chicano Democrats” supported the country’s first law sanctioning employers of undocumented workers. The law, which California Governor Ronald Reagan signed in November 1971, made
it illegal to knowingly hire an undocumented immigrant in California if it would have an adverse effect on resident workers.

The keynote address, delivered by Demetrios Papademetriou, considered Migration and the Great Recession. Papademetriou emphasized that the Great Recession is not over. Unemployment remains high, and Papademetriou argued that this high unemployment is structural. Firms have invested in mechanization and not hired new workers even as their earnings have picked up. The long-term unemployed are the worst off, since many are not only having difficulty finding work, but they are having difficulty keeping the jobs they are offered because their skills have atrophied. Papademetriou argued that we need to find new ways to invest in people. The government needs to partner with business to create training programs that will actually prepare workers for the jobs of the future. Immigration needs to be part of the solution.

The third panel examined deportation policy and practices during downturns. Cybelle Fox discussed the increased collaboration between health and welfare and immigration officials in the 1970s. During the Nixon administration, the first legal status restrictions were inserted into federal public assistance law and Congress amended the Social Security Act to permit the disclosure of information on public assistance recipients to immigration officials. These legal changes opened the door for federal, state, and local welfare officials to cooperate with immigration authorities. In Texas, California, and New York, officials did cooperate, and many immigrants were forcibly repatriated as a result. Marc Rosenblum discussed the most recent surge in deportations in the years since the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. As he showed, the law streamlined removal practices and increased funding for enforcement. As a result, the number of removals in the United States has steadily climbed over the last two decades. Under the Obama administration, deportations have continued to increase. In fact, the workshop coincided with public protests over the administration’s removal policies. But as Rosenblum documented, removals over the last few years have been more targeted, focusing in particular on criminal aliens.

The fourth panel considered state-level immigration regulation in the United States. Hidetaka Hirota described the long history of state-level immigration regulation, focusing in particular on the crackdowns on immigration in Massachusetts and New York during
the Irish potato famine in the 1840s and the financial panic of 1873. At these moments, Hirota argued, working Americans supported the exclusion of “pauper labor” and state governments responded, excluding and even deporting poor migrants. Such state-level policies became the foundation of federal immigration law when the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1882, prohibiting the landing of paupers as well as people with mental illness and criminals. Following Hirota’s paper we jumped forward to the present, as Tom Wong discussed the current Congressional politics of interior immigration enforcement. Wong modeled recent votes in the House of Representatives on legislation that supported state-level immigration enforcement, and showed that party membership was a strong predictor of whether a Congressperson supported such legislation. But Wong also found that the demographics of a Congressperson’s district had some effect. If there was a very high percentage of Latinos in a district, support for the most drastic state-level policies fell among Republican legislators. Finally, Hiroshi Motomura presented some thoughts on the significance of state-level migration policies. He observed that state level policies tended to be “indirect” regulation, affecting a migrants’ rights to benefits and services, while federal regulation was most often “direct,” controlling who has a right to enter and reside in the country. He further noted that state level policies sometimes, but did not always, influence federal immigration law. So why do we care about state-level policies? Motomura argued that they tell us something about whether we view immigrants as “Americans in waiting” and how we think about illegality.

The luncheon speaker, Jim Hollifield, provided a broad overview of the evolution of American and German citizenship law in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He argued that although many in Germany once considered the nation “kein Einwanderungsland,” there has since been a convergence between German and American citizenship policy and practice. The distinction between countries of “jus soli” and “jus sanguinis” no longer holds, Hollifield argued.

The fifth panel considered how countries have actually changed their migration policies since the onset of the Great Recession. Madeleine Sumption observed that public opinion didn’t react as some expected to the crisis, and in fact immigration as an issue decreased in salience in many countries as concern about the economy rose. Perhaps as a result, there has not been as much restriction as many people predicted. In the UK, tough rhetoric about immigration was followed
by relatively limited policy changes. In Spain, where the recession was (and is) particularly severe, the government suspended its temporary work program, cut quotas, and even launched a paid return program. But many countries did not enact restrictive policies. As an idiosyncratic response to the recession, a number of countries actually attempted to attract “investor immigration” by reserving visas for people who start companies that will hire more people or even buy vacant housing. David Hsu specifically considered the trend toward liberalizing skill-based migration policies. Using a model based on an original dataset of policy changes in 25 countries, Hsu argued that the political strength of multi-national firms requiring skilled workers helped predict whether a country lifted skill-based barriers to migration during the crisis.

The sixth and final panel considered the experience of migrants during the Great Recession. Alejandra Tijerina García presented the early findings of an ethnographic study of the experiences of Spanish migrants living in Berlin Neukölln. She found that some of the migrants left for Germany because they were unemployed in Spain, while others left jobs in Spain because they feared future unemployment. Many of the Spanish migrants were highly educated, and those who were the most successfully integrated worked in tech and other sectors where they could speak English while taking classes to learn German. Jessica Sperling examined the experience of 1.5 and 2nd generation young adult Columbian and Dominican migrants to New York City and Madrid. She found that the migrants to the two cities held very different ideas about the value of education and their future prospects. Migrants in New York believed that a university education was even more crucial after the recession and saw their future in the city. Migrants to Madrid, meanwhile, believed that the recession decreased the value of a university education and held a bleak view of their future prospects; some saw hope in further migration to Germany or the UK. Jobb Dixon Arnold considered the experience of migrants to Fort McMurry, the oil boom-town in Alberta, Canada. Focusing on migrants from Ireland and from Canada’s eastern province of Newfoundland, Arnold found that these migrants, living as they were in a multicultural and “petro-cultural” city, often bound together in mutual support, aiding each other in search of jobs, congregating at Irish and Newfoundlander pubs, and attending sports matches together. But they also tended to occupy one of the lowest socio-economic rungs in the city, working as laborers and earning $20 an hour when the modal annual income in the city was over $250,000.
The workshop was only the beginning of a conversation about the insight history provides into contemporary immigration debates. Workshop participants hoped that historians and historically-minded social scientists will begin to play a much more active role in these debates in the years to come.

Elisa Minoff (GHI)
A HANDS-ON APPROACH: THE DO-IT-YOURSELF CULTURE AND ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Workshop at the GHI Washington, April 25–26, 2014. Convener: Reinhild Kreis (GHI). Participants: Hanno Balz (Johns Hopkins), Christopher Chenier (University of Delaware), Gary Cross (Penn State), Andre Dechert (University of Münster), David Farber (Temple University), Rachel Gross (University of Wisconsin), John Hoenig (Penn State), Mischa Honeck (GHI), David Lazar (GHI), Benjamin Lisle (Colby College), Lisa Z. Sigel (DePaul University), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Zinaida Vasilyeva (University of Neuchâtel), Jonathan Voges (University of Hannover), Sonja Windmüller (University of Hamburg).

In a mass consumer society, do-it-yourself (DIY) is a very peculiar way of obtaining goods. Why do people choose to make things themselves when they can simply buy most goods or services? As consumer choices and leisure practices, DIY expresses preferences in the use of time, money, and material resources. Engaging in DIY activities therefore usually presupposes a decision on what and how to consume. The workshop took DIY as an approach to link the spheres of work, leisure, and consumption in the twentieth century, all three of which are important for defining individual as well as group identities, as indicated by labels that have been used to characterize modern societies such as “consumer society,” “work society,” or “leisure society.” In order to explore the often neglected phenomenon of DIY in the twentieth century, the workshop brought together scholars from different disciplines such as history, anthropology, and the social sciences.

In her introductory remarks, Reinhild Kreis highlighted three characteristics of DIY in (mass) consumer societies. First, the consumption of ready-made items and DIY practices were not mutually exclusive but correlated with one another in many cases. Second, DIY in the twentieth century was different from making things oneself in pre-industrial times. It was based on industrialization, and is part of an industrialized world. Third, she stressed DIY as an alternative with a built-in comparative perspective and suggested asking what the alternatives to DIY were in a certain context and what DIY was an alternative to. She was followed by Gary Cross who put “Doing it Yourself in an Age of Shopping” in the broader context of twentieth-century America. He pointed out how DIY helped shape identities...
across gender, ethnic, and generational lines in an age of rapidly shifting identities, at least in part caused by changing work patterns, and housing developments. Throughout the “age of shopping,” Cross claimed, a strong desire to produce something independently prevailed, putting DIY somewhere between opposition and participation in the consumer society as well as the refusal and reinforcement of traditional values.

The second session considered DIY at the intersection of production and consumption from different angles. Rachel Gross elaborated on the remarkable but brief success of sewing kits for outdoor equipment such as tents or hiking gear in the 1960s and 1970s that seemed to provide a way to escape consumerist structures as many outdoorsmen and outdoorswomen desired. By the late 1970s, however, gear companies provided equipment that was not only cheaper but also superior to what even advanced sewers could produce, not to mention the enormous amount of time one needed to sew one’s own gear. Consumers stopped buying kits, which had promised to lend a sense of individuality, ecological sensibility, and adventure to outdoor gear, and turned to factory-made high-tech products such as Gore-Tex. Do-it-yourself stores and home gardening, as discussed by Jonathan Voges and John Hoenig, in contrast, proved to be successful undertakings. Voges presented the rise of home improvement stores in West Germany as heavily inspired by the American model and as a highly profitable and therefore competitive market. By the mid-1970s, home improvement had established itself as an industry and as a market to which not only retailers, but also producers, had to adapt. John Hoenig focused on the tomato to outline how and why disparate groups of American society engaged in home gardening in the second half of the twentieth century, making it both a profitable business and a way to escape dependence on the market for economic as well as for health or lifestyle reasons.

The third session focused on knowledge and skills as preconditions for engaging in DIY activities. Christopher Chenier presented twentieth-century amateur photographers as a highly differentiated group. While most amateur photographers appreciated the opportunity to disregard the technical side of photography, a smaller and rather elitist group aspired to develop technical and creative skills on an almost professional level. Drawing on magazines, self-help literature, and other sources, Chenier explained how the needs of these prosumer photographers led to the emergence of a diverse
market for highly advanced amateurs. Zinaida Vasilyeva contrasted the hitherto Western-centered perspective with a presentation on DIY as an everyday phenomenon in the Soviet Union. Challenging notions of DIY as a mere economic necessity in Soviet society, she related these practices to a culture that ranked production more highly than consumption and valued the exploitation of the full potential of material resources as well as workers.

The fourth session explored the relationships between DIY, privacy, and publicity. Based on artefacts from the Kinsey Institute of Sex, Gender and Reproduction, Lisa Z. Sigel explored handmade and homemade pornography in the United States. Arguing that mass-produced pornographic items did not necessarily reflect consumer wishes, she emphasized how people articulated their individual sexuality, not least in places like prisons. Here, handmade pornography can be seen as a form of resistance to state attempts to control and organize sexuality. Sonja Windmüller’s presentation focused on another “hidden treasure”: waste. From an anthropological perspective, she analyzed waste as a resource of DIY as well as techniques of repairing and recycling, relating such practices to ideas of revaluation and reintegration. Furthermore, Windmüller claimed, by repairing an item people made it part of one’s own history and served as a carrier and generator of memories.

The fifth and last panel dealt with questions of identity as expressed through DIY. David Farber analyzed DIY-practices of the American counterculture as part of an ethos of self-creation and self-invention. Using the examples of home building and customized trucks, he stressed the desire for a self-sufficient, egalitarian, community-based life that valued technical mastery and shared knowledge. The approaches practiced in counterculture settings had a lasting impact on American society but were, as Farber pointed out, also vulnerable to being commercialized. A striving for independence and self-expression beyond consumerism also drove the DIY homebuilding movement that started in Maine in the 1970s. Benjamin D. Lisle explored how economic instability, growing ecological awareness, and critique of the consumer society all led to the establishment of the Shelter Institute, where people could learn how to build their own homes. Despite this anti-modern and anti-consumerist stance, the homebuilders of Maine maintained a lifestyle based on the traditional family home and, unlike the counterculture, did not seek communal solutions. Andre Dechert, finally, analyzed the role of the media in
mediating role models as related to DIY. Taking the U.S. sitcom “Home Improvement” as an example, he asked whether working with tools still served as a signifier of masculinity in the 1990s, when the show was aired, as it had during the 1950s. He concluded that in the 1990s working with tools was seen as an indicator for male insecurity. Nevertheless, the DIY principle continued to play an important role in American society since “Home Improvement” served both as a DIY guide for work around the house and for keeping up a happy family life. Here, as in the presentations throughout the workshop, DIY was depicted as a field that is highly sensitive to questions of gender, race, class, and generation.

The final discussion focused on general questions about the characteristics of DIY and its meaning in consumer societies. It was generally agreed that, both on a social and an individual level, DIY as a practice, a movement, and a market, offers deep insights into the social, cultural, and economic transformations of the twentieth century.

Reinhild Kreis (GHI)
TWENTIETH TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR
NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMAN HISTORY

Seminar at the GHI Washington, May 7-10, 2014, co-sponsored by the GHI and the BMW Center for European Studies at Georgetown University. Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Faculty Mentors: Celia Applegate (Vanderbilt University), David Barclay (Kalamazoo College), Johannes Paulmann (Leibniz-Institut für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz), Ute Planert (University of Wuppertal). Doctoral participants: Norman Aselmeyer (Free University of Berlin), Joshua Bennett (University of Oxford), Scott Berg (Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge), Adam Blackler (University of Minnesota), Skye Doney (University of Wisconsin, Madison), Marc Hanisch (University of Duisburg-Essen), Tina Hannapel (Max-Planck-Institut für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte, Frankfurt/M), Carla Heelan (Harvard University), Christoph Kienemann (University of Oldenburg), Daniel Ristau (University of Leipzig), Katharina Steiner (University of Zürich), Matthew Unangst (Temple University), Marshall Yokell (Texas A&M University), Matthew Yokell (Texas A&M University).

The first panel, which included comments by Skye Doney and Katharina Steiner, explored processes of identity formation in nineteenth century Germany. Adam Blackler focused on how colonial encounters in German Southwest Africa influenced German conceptions of citizenship and Heimat, culminating in the prevalence of “racial thinking” by the early twentieth century. Prior to this point, however, settlers’ ideas of colonial identity and nationality had been much more fluid and far less exclusionary. As Blacker showed, mixed marriages between settlers and indigenous women were relatively common. Once race emerged as the central category of national belonging, bringing more white women to the colony became a key aim of the Imperial German government. Daniel Ristau’s paper honed in on “Jewishness” — which the author explicitly understands as a constructed and contingent category — as a resource of identity formation. Ristau’s dissertation project, which takes its cues from newer, transnationally-orientated cultural historical approaches and seeks to overcome the binary readings of “Germanness” and “Jewishness” that informed an older literature on nineteenth century Germany, is a micro history of the far-reaching familial network of the Bondi family (1790-1870). Both papers emphasized the fluidity of German identity.
formation in a period when race-based definitions of inclusion and exclusion had not yet taken center stage.

The second panel, whose papers were introduced by Norman Aselmeyer and Christoph Kienemann, focused on the role of religion in nineteenth-century Europe. Scott Berg shared his thoughts on the Catholic revival in the Habsburg Empire of the 1830s and 1840s. He sought to understand why the Habsburg state, which had been loyal to Catholicism prior to the reforms of Joseph II, eschewed the use of confessional politics and did not participate in the Catholic resurgence before 1848, which put it in a somewhat unique position in Europe — particularly in contrast to Prussia, which actively embraced its identity as a Protestant state in the same period. Joshua Bennett’s contribution was an intellectual history of how nineteenth century British religious historians engaged with different strands of German historical criticism. He showed that the creative adaptation of German historical philosophy was crucial to how distinctive liberal religious discourses were articulated in Britain. Their reliance on German debates helped British intellectuals to overcome the religious typologies of the evangelical revival and to answer materialist conceptions of human experience. Both papers touched on the legacies of the Enlightenment for religious actors — what Bennett termed “the most modern of phenomena: anti-modern religious reaction.” This opened up larger questions about the secularization of European states in the nineteenth century and the extent to which it was fruitful — as much of the recent literature on this controversial paradigm suggests — to distinguish more clearly between organized religion and popular forms of religiosity.

The papers of the third panel, introduced by Marshall Yokell and Carla Heelan, both took space as their central category of analysis. Marc Hanisch offered a long-term overview of how German spatial conceptions of the “Orient” (or “Nahost”) evolved and changed within the Auswärtiges Amt from the late nineteenth century onwards. One emphasis of the paper was to tease out the continuities in terms of personnel within the German Foreign Service. Without tracing a direct path from “Windhoek to Auschwitz,” Hanisch showed that some of the same “Orient experts” shaped Germany’s policy in the broader region from the Imperial period into the Bonn Republic. Matthew Unangst analyzed how ideas about space and race entered colonial practice in German East Africa. Taking the “twin crises” of the Bushiri War and the deteriorating position of Emin Pasha in
the late 1880s as his starting point, Unangst argued that German colonial fantasies increasingly began to clash with the reality on the ground. At this point, African actors challenged German control for the first time, leading to increasing efforts to strengthen German rule from the top down, which would ultimately transform the German colonial project. The wide-ranging discussion touched on the place of imperialism within German history on the one hand and the place of Germany within newer histories of imperialism on the other.

The first panel on Friday, introduced by Daniel Ristau and Matthew Yokell, shed light on the varied forms responses to modernity took in nineteenth-century Germany. Norman Aselmeyer explored the “ills” of modernity through representations of health and disease from 1850 onwards. Based on a close reading of a range of workers’ autobiographies, he examined the intricacies of German medical culture in the period up to 1918. Aselmeyer detected a shift toward individual and collective understandings of illness as closely tied to the working conditions under industrial capitalism. Carla Heelan looked at the spread and transformation of “medievalism” in Germany between 1806 and 1914. Nineteenth-century German intellectuals developed a keen interest in the Middle Ages, and “medievalism” could serve competing interests. Heelan honed in on the Rhenish Catholic architectural philosopher August Reichensperger to show that his identitarian politics relied upon an idealized medieval society whose holism he believed to be articulated in medieval Gothic architecture. Reichensperger was not just nostalgic about the past, however, but modeled a program for modern social and religious renewal upon medieval aesthetics. The discussion of these ambitious and wide-ranging papers centered on questions of manageability and the selection of sources.

Friday’s second panel, with comments from Joshua Bennett and Adam Blackler, teased out the importance of increasingly globalized social networks in nineteenth century German history. Tina Hannappel examined transnational criminal justice regimes in Europe between 1871 and 1914. Assassinations and assassination attempts that often targeted European monarchs were on the rise in the last decades of the nineteenth century, forcing Europeans to deal with the phenomenon of anarchism across national borders. At the 1898 anti-anarchist conference in Rome, however, anarchism was deliberately not defined as a political crime to avoid related claims to asylum by the perpetrators. Marshall Yokell turned to German policy in Latin
America in the same period, specifically to the German military mission in Chile and its effect on the German arms industry. Yokell demonstrated that the Chilean army was successively “Prussianized”; weaponry, uniforms, and rituals were exported to the country. The primary purpose of this “Prussianization” seems to have been establishing a sustainable export market for German manufacturers in Latin America. The discussion focused on the tensions between different German actors abroad, the role of the state in transnational networks, and definitions of “globalization” vs. “informal Empire.”

Saturday’s first panel, on which Marc Hanisch and Scott Berg served as commentators, touched on a number of different themes, including travel and pilgrimage, materiality, and representations of modernity in the nineteenth century. Skye Doney’s paper focused on the 1840s Trier Controversy, which dealt with the role of superstition and fanaticism in German Catholicism. Based on a close investigation of the writings of the Silesian priest Johannes Ronge and their impact, Doney demonstrated that the clergy and laity followed diverging trajectories from the 1840s onward. While there was a huge rise in the number of pilgrims who came to Trier to venerate the Holy Coat of Jesus, which they continued to regard as a vessel of divine presence, Catholic clergy increasingly turned to scientific methods to provide evidence of the relics’ authenticity. Katharina Steiner’s paper took the audience to the Naples of the early 1890s where Wilhelm Giesbrecht, a zoologist and amateur photographer, took thousands of photographs of the city that diverged from the well-known visual canon of the period. Eschewing pictures of the city’s architectural attractions, Giesbrecht turned the eye of his camera on his day-to-day surroundings. Steiner’s study seeks to combine approaches from the recent “visual turn” in German historiography and the history of science, which increasingly looks at the media of scientific documentation.

The papers of the seminar’s final panel, introduced by Tina Hannappel and Matthew Unangst, returned to colonial history. Christoph Kienemann explored the connections between German colonial policy in Africa and German perceptions and imaginations of Eastern Europe between 1871 and 1914. Based on scientific works on Eastern Europe from the field of geography and related disciplines, Kienemann sought to show that these relied heavily on colonial tropes. Matthew Yokell took the seminar further eastward, to the German colony of Tsingtau. He traced how the vision for a “German Hong Kong” evolved from 1880 to 1918. Building on Paul Kennedy’s recent work,
Yokell paid close attention to the “middle people.” He examined conflicts between naval and merchant interests, debates over schooling and the creation of a Chinese colonial elite. The discussion raised questions regarding the definition of relationships as “colonial” and returned to earlier debates about the place of the colonies in Germany’s nineteenth century.

During the concluding discussion, participants reflected on how they had come to their topics and what their choices said about the state of research on nineteenth-century German history. Central themes of this year’s seminar were Empire, religion, and spatial history. By contrast, many of the classic turning points of the century (notably 1848) and key figures (Bismarck) were by and large absent. This reflected a certain “presentism” of historical research — the role of Empire and globalization as well as religious conflict being important present-day concerns.

Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University)
WAR AND CHILDHOOD IN THE AGE OF THE WORLD WARS:
LOCAL AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Conference at the German Historical Institute, June 5-7, 2014. Co-sponsored by the German Historical Institutes in Washington, London, and Paris. Conveners: Mischa Honeck (GHI Washington), James Marten (Marquette University), Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Arndt Weinrich (GHI Paris). Participants: Valentina Boretti (University of London), Sabine Frühstück (University of California, Santa Barbara), Julie K. deGraffenried (Baylor University), Antje Harms (University of Freiburg), Robert Jacobs (Hiroshima Peace Institute), Kate James (University of Oxford), Martin Kalb (Northern Arizona University), Esbjörn Larsson (University of Uppsala), Emma Lautman (University of Nottingham), Nazan Maksudyan (Kemerburgaz University, Istanbul), Susan A. Miller (Rutgers University), Sharon Park (University of Minnesota), L. Halliday Piel (University of Manchester), Manon Pignot (University of Picardie Jules-Verne), Karl Qualls (Dickinson College), Kara Ritzheimer (Oregon State University), Birgitte Soland (Ohio State University), Thomas Christopher Stevens (University of Oxford), Suzanne Swartz (Stony Brook University, NY).

This conference explored the intersecting histories of modern war and childhood in the early twentieth century. Its goal was to come to grips with a fundamental paradox: How was it possible for modern societies to reimagine childhood as a space of sheltered existence and yet mobilize children for war? Rather than merely investigate adult representations of youth and childhood in war, it uncovered the processes by which young people acquired agency as historical subjects. The participants paid attention to the voices and actions of children in the different locales of modern war — from the home to the home-front; the bomb shelter to the battlefield; the press to the pulpit; the school to the street. In addition, they examined how adult institutions (governments, civic organizations, social movements) utilized images of children for wartime propaganda. These images could be deployed for various purposes: to mobilize patriotism and popular support for the war effort; to discredit and dehumanize the enemy; but also to subvert the logic of escalating military and political violence.

The first panel looked at different discursive and material modes of infantilizing war in the first half of the twentieth century. Using examples from Japanese propaganda, Sabine Frühstück showed how the Japanese were emotionally sensitized and mobilized by iconography that
co-configured soldiers and children. Portraying soldiers as caring fathers and linking war with infancy made war appear natural and inevitable. Valentina Boretti illustrated the importance of toys for militarizing Chinese children under the republican and communist regimes. War toys were disseminated to foster a martial spirit among youths perceived as frail and unmasculine. Julie K. deGraffenried compared American and Soviet alphabet books published in World War II. While the war and military life were more prominent in the Soviet case, the American example tended to highlight traditional gender roles and a normative whiteness.

The second panel explored forms of different forms of youth mobilization. Antje Harms argued that ideological constructions of “youth” in the German youth movement during World War I stressed attitude over age. The concept, according to Harms, was broad and fluid enough to encompass both militarists who volunteered for a “new Germany” and pacifists who refused to fight. Esbjörn Larsson analyzed the Swedish government’s implementation of defense training in national schools. He underscored the importance of traditional gender roles, financial feasibility, medical education, and ethics in Swedish debates over children’s roles in civil defense. Mischa Honeck challenged the idealized image of the Boy Scouts of America during World War II, which papered over generational and racial conflicts. While adults envisioned the organization as a tool of social control and wartime conformity, young Scouts conceived it as an opportunity for self-mobilization and self-actualization.

The third panel focused on issues of agency and victimization. Kate James examined boy soldiers in the Royal Navy and British Army in the early 20th century from an intergenerational perspective. Working-class boys enlisted in search of adventure and social advancement. British military leaders, on the other hand, sought to heighten youth’s physical fitness while restricting their involvement in combat. L. Halliday Piel talked about the Manchu-Mongol Pioneer Youth Loyal and Brave Army, which was composed of Japanese boy soldier-settlers in the 1930s and 1940s. Lured into Manchuria with the promise of education and land, the boys from rural Japan who joined the Army wanted to rise socially but ultimately faced poverty and death. Suzanne Swartz’s paper about Jewish child smugglers in the Warsaw Ghetto demonstrated how generational roles could be inverted in times of crises. While adults faced increasing restrictions,
children formed their own networks and became breadwinners for their families.

The fourth panel centered on juvenile delinquency on the home front. Kara Ritzenheimer talked about *Kriegsschundliteratur* in World War I Germany, a popular genre in youth literature that featured sensationalized wartime heroics. Discredited as inferior literature that would lead young people astray, the genre was suppressed by governmental authorities as part of Germany’s wartime censorship regime. Emma Lautmann analyzed widespread claims of juvenile delinquency in Britain during World War II. She linked these claims to children’s public visibility after many schools had been closed but also highlighted the fact that the young contested adult definitions of good citizenship. Martin Kalb dissected constructions of the “delinquent boy” and the “sexually deviant girl” in Munich during the 1940s. These stereotypes emerged in war-ravaged spaces and are due to a mismatch of the sexes, with women outnumbering men in postwar Munich. Young German women who socialized with U.S. soldiers were accused of tarnishing the nation’s future, even more so if those soldiers were black.

The fifth panel shed light on the role of children as witnesses of war. Manon Pignot analyzed World War I drawings from French, Russian, and German children. Enemies were illustrated with animal features, and depictions of battles often merged modern and medieval symbols of war. Reflecting traditional gender divisions, boys overwhelmingly depicted battle scenes, while the drawings of girls contained references to the home front. Susan Miller’s presentation revolved around the art made by German children in response to the American Quaker feeding program after World War I. Arguing that children’s art should be regarded as a genuine reflection of their feelings, Miller identified two conflicting emotional reactions: gratitude for the relief, but also ambivalence about needing it. Thomas Christopher Stevens drew on autobiographic writings to investigate the perception and (re)interpretation of childhood in revolutionary Russia. He regarded the writings as deliberate efforts to construct childhoods that were consistent with the ruling ideology and as personal expressions of individual interactions with a violently changing social environment.

The sixth panel dealt with wartime relocation and child relief. Nazan Maksudyan focused on Ottoman orphan boys brought to Germany as apprentices in the final years of World War I. The few sources
available show the diverging expectations of the parties involved: German authorities sought to bolster their dwindling domestic workforce, while Turkish authorities wanted to get rid of delinquent boys. Karl Qualls talked about Spanish refugee children, mostly boys, who migrated to Russia to escape the violence of the Spanish Civil War. Struggling to overcome homesickness and adjust to a foreign culture, these children were idealized by Soviet propaganda and held up as examples of a heroic childhood that young Russians should imitate. Sharon Parks gauged the scope and impact that U.S. postwar aid programs had on European refugee children. The figure of the destitute child was used to attract funding and symbolize the boundless generosity of a victor nation, although personal accounts reveal discrepancies between official representations and the programs’ actual impact.

The seventh panel explored how children remembered war, and how wartime children were remembered in postwar societies. Arndt Weinrich argued that generational conflict structured the collective memory of World War I in Weimar and Nazi Germany. Although youth groups across party lines seized on the cult of the fallen warrior, National Socialists exploited this myth best by eventually turning it against the older generation. Drawing on 200 oral interviews, Birgitte Soland told the story of American orphans who had become subjects of medical experimentation conducted to boost U.S. combat efficiency in World War II. She suggested that most of the survivors of these experiments took pride in having contributed to the war effort, even if that contribution had left physical and psychological scars. Robert Jacobs talked about the nuclear attack on Hiroshima in August 1945 and its impact on children. Examining the absence and reemergence of children in Western stories about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Jacobs highlighted changing representations that range from military personnel secretly assessing the destructive impact of atomic bombs on school populations to sentimentalized depictions of child victims used to promote global peace.

The conference concluded with a roundtable that pulled together the major methodological and historiographical strands. A focus on children, the participants agreed, calls into question and productively disrupts common boundaries of modern war. On an emotional level, it shows the importance of children for the morale of the soldiers and their symbolic value as embodiments of suffering and national survival. On the level of agency, it shows that while childhoods were
ideological constructions and children semiautonomous actors at best, their modes of self-determination also proved empowering. For the young, war was both a devastating trial and a locus of socialization, where issues of age, gender, sexuality, and citizenship were negotiated, adapted, and redefined. As adults were grappling to regain control over their children in times of war, children constantly reinvented the meaning of childhood for themselves.

Mischa Honeck (GHI), Susanne Quitmann (GHI), and Stina Barrenscheen (GHI)
INFORMAL AND EVERYDAY MARKETS: HISTORIES OF BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Conference at the University of Göttingen, 18–20 June 2014. Co-organized by the GHI Washington, the Centre for Modern Indian Studies (CeMIS), Göttingen, and the Institute for Economic and Social History of the University of Göttingen. Additional funding provided by the Forum Transregionale Studien, Berlin, the Inhülsen Foundation, and the Volkswagen Foundation. Conveners: Ingo Köhler (Göttingen University), Christina Lubinski (GHI Washington / Copenhagen Business School), Sebastian Schwecke (Göttingen University), Douglas E. Haynes (Dartmouth College).

The history of business in modern South Asia has traditionally focused on large-scale Indian firms and corporations in an attempt to study the contribution of big capital to the historical development of the sub-continent. At the same time, social history has tended to narrate the worlds of small-scale actors on South Asian markets from the perspective of labor or regimes of production, especially when concerning artisanal populations. The international workshop “Informal and Everyday Markets: Histories of Business and Entrepreneurship in India since the Nineteenth Century” attempted to supplement this focus of the historiographical discourse by debating a business history of the informal and the local as well as the everyday worlds of small-scale entrepreneurs: a social history of South Asian markets.

The interdisciplinary workshop identified inter-personal, often ‘below the radar’ practices of small-scale entrepreneurs as constitutive of actual markets — as opposed to the market — in modern South Asia and proceeded to discuss regimes of market governance outside of or parallel to statutory regulations of economic behavior in various spatial and historical settings. After an introductory note by Ingo Köhler (Göttingen) that outlined the intention of the workshop and situated the discussion within larger debates on the evolution of capitalism in the Global South, the first panel discussed the relationship of informality, trust and risk in South Asian financial markets. Ritu Birla (Toronto) set the tone for the ensuing discussion with her paper on the futures contract, showcasing the embedment of speculation in both colonial and post-colonial Indian governmentalities and local conceptions of licit and illicit market behavior. Sadan Jha and...
Nishpriha Thakur (Surat) followed with an ethnographic analysis of Chauta Bazaar in Surat which identified the history of small-scale businesses as a quasi-commodity used (among others) in generating trust between entrepreneurs and customers and therefore as a legitimizing entity shaping social and economic dynamics of a market. Sebastian Schwecke (Göttingen) concluded the first panel with a discussion of the changing characteristics of informal financial transactions in late colonial and contemporary Banaras, defined by the disappearance of a statutory framework for these financial practices and a corresponding emergence of distinct economies governed primarily by conceptions of reputation. Following the first panel, Claude Markovits (Paris) discussed the constitutive character of informal business relations and entrepreneurial networks in market relations in his special lecture. Here Markovits referred to debates on the embedment of markets in social institutions, arguing with Geertz that informal markets could not be understood as unregulated markets, but their regulatory mechanisms were not of a legal nature and illustrated this argument with two case studies on entrepreneurial networks involving the management of inheritance affairs outside British India by Shikarpuri traders and their role in intelligence gathering.

The second panel discussed the efforts and impacts of state regulation on informal aspects of market governance. Ritajyoti Bandyopadhyay (Calcutta) discussed the adaptation of street vendors and hawkers to state attempts to regulate their operation on public space and traced the ways in which street vendors were navigating a world changing due to the impacts of legal discourses while, in turn, affecting the direction of legal discourses through their collective action and everyday practices. Sujeet George (Calcutta) followed Bandyopadhyay’s paper with a discussion on the regulation of the salt trade in colonial western India, especially focusing on the ways in which the everyday practices of local business life uneasily entered the colonial logic of order and governance, while pointing out how the everyday practices of the salt trade themselves affected the negotiations of the shifting sign posts of profitability under changing rationalities of market governance. Concluding the second panel, Koyel Lahiri (Calcutta) returned to the subject of street vending in Calcutta, contrasting colonial legislative discourses on the identification of hawkers with contemporary socio-political activism by hawkers’ unions and ongoing legal discourses and analysing the hawkers’ management of a complex terrain defined simultaneously by legal and social practices.
Following the debate on regulations of the informal, the third panel concentrated on the histories of markets as distinct spatial entities. Saumyashree Ghosh (Calcutta) opened the discussion with a paper on the history of railway trading marts in colonial Bengal, deciphering the morphology of a new business landscape introduced by the arrival of the railway in eastern India and the shaping of these new markets by the interaction of two different forms of capital — big capital in the form of the railway and local, commercial capital. Anwesha Ghosh (Toronto) followed with a study of the establishment of the New Market in Calcutta as a model marketplace catering to the consumption patterns of Europeans in the colonial metropolis, though remaining embedded in a web of illicit entanglements characteristic of ‘traditional’ business practices that shaped markets as social institutions for the exchange of goods. Lucy Norris (Berlin) concluded the panel with a study of the working of second-hand clothing markets operating below the radar in liminal quasi-regulatory spaces that simultaneously function at different scales — the formal, informal, and black economies — and illustrating the fuzzy character of dualistic distinctions between these categories.

The fourth panel carried on the focus on local economies, but centered on the observation of local forms and varieties of capitalism. Suresh Bhagavatula (Bangalore) opened the discussion with a paper on the handloom industry in Andhra Pradesh, emphasizing the entrepreneurial tenacity of artisans and artisanal small-scale capitalists (master weavers) to subsist as an underlying reason for the survival of the industry in contrast to depictions that trace this survival to interventionist efforts by the state. Yugank Goyal (Rotterdam) followed up the discussion with a study on institutions of trade credit in the footwear industry of Agra, delineating how market relations and social hierarchies kept alive informal financial arrangements embedded in social relations and institutions that extract surplus but also enhance trust and regulate economic behavior. Stefan Tetzlaff (Göttingen) concluded the discussion with a paper on the worlds of small-scale entrepreneurs in road transport, focusing on the navigation of economic vagaries and opportunities for entrepreneurs in an emerging branch of small-scale business. Following the fourth panel, Douglas E. Haynes (Dartmouth) in his keynote lecture outlined the potential of the overlap between economic and social history as a social history of markets and market governance with a study of market relations in the informal sector.
of small-scale textile manufacturers in western India from the perspectives of both business and labor history.

In the sixth panel the focus of the debate shifted from the embedment of markets and economic actors in society to the social embedment of goods and commodities through constructions of consumer identity. V. Kalyan Shankar (Pune) opened the discussion with a reconstruction of the social history of the television market in Pune, contrasting the efforts to create brands by licensed companies with the evolution of the generic image of television sets and the role of the secondary and informal industry of television maintenance and retail. Jason Petrulis (Colgate) followed up the discussion on the embedment of commodities with his paper on the hair market in modern India, depicting how markets produce sites of liminality where objects can take on multiple identities. Following Panel 6, Barbara Harriss-White (Oxford) in her special lecture outlined the explanatory value of the concept of local capitalism to our understanding of development and clusters of development through an analysis of the local food-grains economies in post-colonial northern Tamil Nadu, depicting local capitalism as a building block in which the state and state-led regulation constitute vital elements but informal activities, in turn, penetrate corporations and the state itself.

Concluding the workshop, the seventh panel introduced the study of transnational actors and their management of the social embedment of South Asian markets into the discussion. Christina Lubinski (Copenhagen) analyzed the management of notions of (German and common European) racial superiority in a context defined by competitive advantages due to non-British foreign origins of economic actors in her study on the recruiting practices of German multinationals in colonial India, illustrating how perceptions of Otherness in both the country of origin and the local target markets defined changing business practices. Concluding the panel, Raman Mahadevan (Chennai) argued for an introduction of social history perspectives into the study of foreign trade, typically dominated by quantitative analyses, in his depiction of the IG Farben subsidiary Havero in the dye market of British India.

Together the papers showed the potential of a business history of the informal. All papers paid special attention to the informality of economic transactions and to the inter-personal characteristics of markets instead of their abstract nature. They thus shed light on
markets in practice and offered conceptual ideas of how to integrate markets’ cultural and social embeddedness, informal exchanges, everyday interactions and illegitimate or illegal market activities.

Christina Lubinski (GHI/ Copenhagen Business School)
Sebastian Schwecke, (Center for Modern Indian Studies, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)
NEW GHI PUBLICATIONS

Publications of the German Historical Institute
(Cambridge University Press)

Studies in German History (Berghahn Books)
Frank Usbeck, “Fellow Tribesmen”: The German Image of Indians, the Emergence of National Identity, and Nazi Ideology in German Periodicals (2014)

Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)
Anja Schäfers, Mehr als Rock’n’Roll: Der Radiosender AFN bis Mitte der sechziger Jahre (2014)

Worlds of Consumption (Palgrave Macmillan)
Hartmut Berghoff and Thomas Kühne, eds., Globalizing Beauty: Consumerism and Body Aesthetics in the Twentieth Century (2013)
EDITORIAL NOTICE

We would like to communicate the following notice from Jasper Trautsch, author of the article “The Invention of the ‘West’,” published in issue 53 (Fall 2013) of this Bulletin, to our readers:


Jasper Trautsch

STAFF CHANGES

GHI Research Fellow Jan Logemann left the GHI at the end of March 2014 in order to take up a new position as wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte of the University of Göttingen. There he is continuing his research on the transatlantic history of consumption and is offering classes on modern economic history.

GHI Research Fellow Christina Lubinski left the Institute at the end of March 2014 to take up the post of Associate Professor at the Centre for Business History of the Copenhagen Business School, where she is teaching International Business und Entrepreneurship Studies and continuing her research on European companies in India.

Jan C. Jansen joined the GHI as a Research Fellow in May 2014. His main research interests concern the comparative history of the European colonial empires and decolonization, with a particular focus on North Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic World. Prior to working at the GHI, he was fellow and lecturer at the University of Konstanz as well as visiting researcher at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London and at the Institut de Recherche sur le Maghreb Contemporain in Tunis. He is the author of Erobern und Erinnern: Symbolpolitik, öffentlicher Raum und französischer Kolonialismus in Algerien 1830–1950 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013) and coauthor, with Jürgen Osterhammel, of Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2012) and Dekolonisation: Das Ende der Imperien (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2013). He is currently engaged in a research project on the expansion of freemasonry in the Atlantic World during the age of revolutions (circa 1770s–1820s).
GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Fellowship in North American History

Anne Clara Schenderlein, University of California, San Diego
American Jewish Boycott and Consumption of German Products

Fellowship in the History of Consumption

Juliane Czierpka, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung professioneller Sportclubs seit der Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts
Fellowship in Economic and Social History

Gisela Hürlimann, Forschungsstelle für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Universität Zürich

Doctoral Fellow in African American History

Cecilia Márquez, University of Virginia

Doctoral Fellow in International Business History

Nathan Delaney, Case Western Reserve University
Modes of Extraction and Distribution: The Development of the Global Non-Ferrous Metal Market, 1870-1919

Fellowships at the Horner Library

James Boyd, Cardiff University
Connecting Colony and Republic: German-American Migration Across the Revolutionary Divide

Sabine Mecking, Fachhochschule für öffentliche Verwaltung NRW, Duisburg
Zwischen den Welten. Deutsche Gesangskultur in England, Deutsch-Südwestafrika und den USA, 1848-1918

Postdoctoral Fellows

Kristen Brill, Aberystwyth University
The Revolution from within: German Women on the Confederate Home Front, 1861-65

Jens Gründler, Institut für Geschichte der Medizin der Robert Bosch Stiftung
Gesundheit und Krankheit in Selbstzeugnissen deutscher Auswandererinnen und Auswanderer, 1830-1930

Sandra Kraft, Universität Münster
The Female Face of American Conservatism: From the Daughters of the American Revolution to the Reagan Revolution

Willeke Sandler, Oglethorpe University
Imagining the World in the Reich: Perceptions of America and Britain in Nazi Public Culture
**Doctoral Fellows**

**Christoph Ellßel**, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München  
*Das amerikanisch-australische Wissenschaftsnetz 1945-1965*

**Gregg French**, University of Western Ontario  
*An 'Instinctive Mutual Attraction': American Perceptions of Spain and the Spanish Empire in the Long Nineteenth Century, 1776-1914*

**Patrick Gaul**, Universität Frankfurt  
*“Der folgenschwerste Principienkampf des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts”: Rezeption und Folgen des amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs in Deutschland, 1861-1871*

**Martin Gruner**, Universität Augsburg  
*Alliierte Strafverfolgung von NS-Verbrechen: Die britischen und US-amerikanischen Prozesse gegen ehemalige KZ-Kommandanten*

**Julia Heunemann**, Universität Weimar  
*Untiefen mariner Zeitlichkeit. Formationen des Wissens über das Meer, ca. 1770-1870*

**Sina Keesser**, Technische Universität Darmstadt  
*Raum im Bild: Darstellungstechniken der Planungspraxis*

**Kilian Spiethoff**, Universität Bamberg  
*Von Hambach in die Neue Welt: Die soziale und politische Integration demokratischer deutscher Auswanderer in der Region St. Louis (1830-1849)*

**Robert Terrell**, University of California, San Diego  
*Things Bavarian: Food, Reconstruction, and Recovery in Bavaria, 1940s-1970s*

**Franziskus von Boeselager**, Ruhr-Universität Bochum  
*Die Bedeutung der Regelung der deutschen Auslandsschulden für die Finanzierung von Unternehmen in Westdeutschland (1948-60)*

**GHI Conference Travel Grants for GSA Participants**

**Oscar Ax**, University of Virginia  
*Trouble in Paradise: The East and West German ‘Marriage Crisis’ of the 1950s*

**Irit Bloch**, City University of New York, Graduate Center  
*“Bending the Law”: Weimar Judiciary and The Political Bias Paradox of the Legal System*

**Colleen Anderson**, Harvard University  
*The GDR and the Cosmos: East German Technology and the Soviet Space Program*
Indravati Felicite, Die Hanse in der Diplomatie der Frühen Neuzeit: deutsche Städte im Spannungsfeld von Handel und Politik

Janine Murphy, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Contesting ‘Surveillance’: The German Gymnastics Movement and the National Security State, 1850-1864

Rainer Orth, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
The “Official Residence of the Opposition”? Politics and Subversion in the Reich Vice-Chancellorship from 1933 to 1934

Kathleen Rahn, University of Leipzig
Discipline, Punish, Improve? Imprisonment and Penal Law as Instruments of Colonial Rule in German South-West Africa (1884-1914)

GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR, SPRING 2014

January 29
Corinna Ludwig (GHI)
Trading with the Enemy

Andreas Joch (GHI)
In a Democracy Planning is a Slow Process

February 12
Maike Lehmann (Universität Bremen)
Dissidents and the West. Intellectual and Everyday Encounters during the Age of Fracture

February 19
Arndt Engelhardt (Simon Dubnow Institute, Universität Leipzig)
Jewish Publishing Cultures in Nineteenth Century Germany

March 5
Christina Lubinski (GHI)
HR Management and Politics: German Multinationals in British India, 1922-46

March 26
Mario Daniels (GHI)
The enemy is reading. The U.S. government and the control of unclassified technical information in the 1950s

April 2
Steve Silvia (American University)
Holding the Shop Together: German Industrial Relations in the Postwar Era

April 16
Benjamin Schwantes (GHI)
Selling MCI Mail to America: The Commercialization and Commodification of Electronic Mail
April 30  Julio Decker (Universität Darmstadt)
Colonial Railways of the German Empire and the United States

Jana Weiss (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster)
Beer and German Immigrants in the United States: A “Reinvention of Tradition and Consumption”

May 28  Carl-Henry Geschwind (Independent Scholar, Washington, DC)
The Petrol Tax and the Politics of Austerity, 1947-1957

Emily Swafford (GHI)
Practicing Democracy: U.S. Girl Scouts in the Cold War at Home and Abroad

June 11  James Boyd (Cardiff University)
Migration patterns from the German southwest to colonial Pennsylvania and the early American Republic: connections, continuities and change

June 25  Rachel Moran (Pennsylvania State University)
“The Poor Cannot Be Trusted”: Nutrition and Pregnancy in the American Welfare State

GHI DOCTORAL SEMINAR, SPRING 2014

February 27  Daniel Kuppel (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin)
Praxis der „Weltanschaulichen Schulung“ von SS- und Polizeiangehörigen in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus

Jana Hoffmann (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster)
Familienvorstellungen im amerikanischen Mainline-Protestantismus, 1950-1980

Ella Müller (Universität Freiburg)
“Anti-Environmentalism”: Widerstände gegen Umweltschutzpolitik in den USA von 1969 bis in die frühen 1990er Jahre

March 13  Sophia Dafinger (Universität Augsburg)
“Lessons learned”? Wissenschaftliche Expertise für den Luftkrieg nach 1944 in den USA

David Möller (Universität Erfurt)
April 17

Claas Kirchhelle (University of Oxford)
Pyrrhic Progress: Consumer Attitudes towards Agricultural Antibiotics (1951-2012)

Jake Newsome (State University of New York at Buffalo)

May 22

Caitlin Verboon (Yale University)
Urban Encounters: Struggle over Freedom in Southern Cities, 1865-1877

Kristina Poznan (College of William & Mary)
Becoming Immigrant Nation-Builders: The Advancement of Austria-Hungary’s National Projects in the United States, 1880s-1920s
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2014/15

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org

September 1-12 Bosch Foundation Archival Summer School for Young Historians 2014: American History in Transatlantic Perspective
Seminar in Chicago, Madison, Boston, Washington, DC
Convener: Mischa Honeck

Sept. 4 – Dec. 4 The Early Days: Hip-Hop Culture in the German Democratic Republic
Photo Exhibition at the GHI
Curated by Leonard Schmieding (Georgetown University/GHI)

September 11-13 Gender, War and Culture: From the Age of the World Wars (1910s-1940s) to the Cold War, Anti-Colonial Struggle to the Wars of Globalization (1940s-Present)
Workshop at Duke University
Convener: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Dirk Bönker (Duke University), Karen Hagemann (UNC Chapel Hill), and Mischa Honeck (GHI)

September 12 Congressional Briefing on “Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Historical Perspective”
Congressional Briefing in the Dirksen Senate Office Building

September 15 World War I: Causes, Events, and Legacy
Lecture and Panel Discussion at the German Embassy
Speakers: Christopher Clark (Cambridge University) and Roger Chickering (Georgetown University)

September 18-20 Shady Business: White Collar Crime in History
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Edward Balleisen (History Department / Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke University), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), and Christopher McKenna (Said Business School, University of Oxford)

October 3 German Unification Symposium — The Memory of Dictatorship and the Future of Democracy: The East German Past Today
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Richard Schröder
October 30-31  Green Capitalism? Exploring the Crossroads of Environmental and Business History
Conference at the Hagley Museum and Library in Wilmington, Delaware
Conveners: Adam Rome (University of Delaware), Yda Schreuder (University of Delaware), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Erik Rau (Hagley Museum and Library), and Roger Horowitz (Hagley Museum and Library)

November 9-11  Dispossession: Plundering German Jewry, 1933-1945 and Beyond
Conference at Boston University, Boston

November 13  28th Annual Lecture: Toward a New Europe? Knowledge as a Transformational Resource since the 1970s
Speaker: Andreas Wirsching (Institut für Zeitgeschichte, München)
Comment: Jeffrey J. Anderson (BMW Center, Georgetown University)

November 14  23rd Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute
Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize at the GHI

November 17  The Rosenberg Files: The West German Ministry of Justice after 1949 and the Nazi Past
Lecture and Panel Discussion at the GHI
Speakers: Heiko Maas (Federal Minister of Justice), Manfred Goettemaker (University of Potsdam), Christoph Safferling (University of Marburg), and Eli Rosenbaum (U.S. Department of Justice)

December 5-6  Taxation for Redistribution since 1945: North America and Western Europe in Comparison
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Gisela Hürlimann (University of Zurich/GHI), W. Elliot Brownlee (University of California Santa Barbara)

2015

March 5-7  Germans in the Pacific World from the Late 17th to 20th Century
Conference at the University of California in San Diego
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Frank Biess (UCSD), Uliike Strasser (UCSD)
March 26-28  “Consumer Engineering”: Mid-Century Mass Consumption between Planning Euphoria and the Limits of Growth, 1930s-1970s
Conference at the University of Göttingen
Conveners: Gary Cross (Pennsylvania State University), Ingo Köhler (University of Göttingen), and Jan Logemann (GHI)

May 7-9  Jewish Consumer Cultures in 19th and 20th-Century Europe and America
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Paul Lerner (University of Southern California / Max Kade Institute for Austrian-German-Swiss Studies), Anne C. Schenderlein (GHI), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

May 21-22  A Great Divide? America between Exceptionalism and Transnationalism
International Conference at the Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich
Conveners: Michael Kimmage (Catholic University of America), Uwe Lübken (LMU), Andrew Preston, (University of Cambridge), Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)

May 27-30  21st Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: Twentieth-Century German History
Seminar at Humboldt-University, Berlin
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI), Michael Wildt (Humboldt University)

May 28-29  The Practices of Structural Policy in Western Market Economies since the 1960s
Conference at the Center for Contemporary History (ZZF) Potsdam
Conveners: Ralf Ahrens (ZZF Potsdam), Astrid M. Eckert (Emory University), Stefan Hördler (GHI)

May 29-30  Nature Protection, Environmental Policy and Social Movements in Communist and Capitalist Countries during the Cold War
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Astrid Mignon Kirchhof (Georgetown/GHI) and John McNeill (Georgetown)
June 12-13  Financialization: A New Chapter in the History of Capitalism?
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Kenneth Lipartito (Florida International University), Laura Rischbieter (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin)

October 15-17  Medieval History Seminar 2015
Seminar at the GHI Washington

October 21-23  Nineteenth-Century Anti-Semitism in International Perspective
Conference at the GHI Paris
Organized by the German Historical Institutes in Paris, London, Rome, Moscow, Warsaw and Washington, the German Centre for the History of Art in Paris, the Orient Institute Istanbul, and the Centre for Research on Anti-Semitism at the Technische Universität Berlin
German Historical Institute Washington DC
Fellows and Staff

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff, Director
  Modern social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption
PD Dr. Uwe Speikermann, Deputy Director
  Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge
Prof. Dr. Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, Deputy Director
  African American Studies, transatlantic relations, gender history, American religious history
Andreas Fischer, Administrative Director

Dr. Clelia Caruso, Research Fellow
  Modern European history; history of migration; history of technology
Dr. Mischa Honeck, Research Fellow
  19th and 20th-century American history; transnational history; history of ethnicity and race relations; gender history; history of youth and youth movements
Dr. Stefan Hördler, Research Fellow
  20th-century German history, Holocaust Studies, Jewish Studies, business history
Dr. Jan Jansen, Research Fellow
  Modern European, North African, and Atlantic History; colonialism and decolonization; memory studies; migration studies; global history of freemasonry
Dr. Ines Prodoehl, Research Fellow
  Global history, cultural and economic history, civil society
Dr. Richard F. Wetzel, Research Fellow and Editor
  Modern European and German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
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