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This issue of the *Bulletin* features the 26th Annual Lecture of the GHI, which was delivered by Johannes Paulmann last November on the topic “The Straits of Europe: History at the Margins of a Continent.” Paulmann approaches European history in the period 1850-1914 by “circumscribing the continent” and focusing on what he calls the “straits of Europe,” ranging from the Kara Strait in the Arctic to the Straits of Gibraltar and the Bosphorus in the South. Paulmann’s approach decenters European history: the perspective from the periphery reveals the “fluid and permeable” character of Europe’s borders and highlights the continent’s global, imperial, and international connections. From this perspective, he argues, the nineteenth century appears not so much as an age of nationalism, but of internationalism and globalization. Helmut Walser Smith’s wide-ranging comment examines the venerable historical pedigree of approaching Europe from the margins, but also notes that the accelerated interaction of contact zones such as the straits was not typical of all of nineteenth-century Europe.

The following two articles present the research of the two winners of the 2012 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, awarded annually by the Friends of the GHI. Adam Rosenbaum’s “Timeless, Modern and German? The Remapping of Bavaria through the Marketing of Tourism, 1800-1939” examines the self-representation of Bavaria through the marketing of two tourist attractions, the mountainous area of “Franconian Switzerland” and the city of Nuremberg, two case studies drawn from his dissertation. The Bavarian tourism industry, Rosenbaum argues, promoted an image of what he calls “grounded modernity,” a romanticized version of the modern present that “reconciled tradition with progress and nature with technology.” Sarah Thomsen Vierra’s article “At Home in Almanya? Turkish-German Spaces of Belonging in West Germany, 1961-1990” examines how Turkish immigrants and their children made themselves “at home” in German society by constructing “spaces of belonging” within German society. Focusing on the Sprengelkiez neighborhood in Berlin-Wedding, Vierra’s dissertation examines the practice of “space-making” in the workplace, home, school, and places of worship. In her article, Vierra argues that the school was a site of significant conflict but was also perceived as a space of opportunity and provided a forum for cross-cultural socialization.
Our final feature article presents the 2012 Hertie lecture, delivered by the German writer Ingo Schulze at the GHI’s German Unification Symposium. Schulze begins by noting that the key event of the East German revolution of 1989 was not November 9, when the Berlin wall fell, but October 9, the date of the decisive Leipzig “Monday demonstration” that opened the floodgates of revolution. The main point of his lecture is to highlight a paradox: after the East German revolution resulted in German unification, East Germans found themselves in a very un-revolutionary “world without alternatives”. “Democracy, freedom, social justice, and prosperity seemed only to be possible in a market economy where the means of production were privately owned.” In his lecture, Schulze seeks to challenge the “self-evident truths” (Selbstverständlichkeiten) that govern present-day politics.

In this issue’s “GHI Research” section, two Research Fellows present their current research projects. In “An Empire of Youth: American Boy Scouts in the World, 1910-1960,” Mischa Honeck examines the nexus of “youth, hegemonic manhood, and American Empire” by exploring how transnational forces shaped the identities of American Boy Scouts and how these identities enabled them to endorse or challenge America’s role in twentieth-century world politics. In “European Imports? European Immigrants and the Transformation of American Consumer Culture from the 1920s to the 1960s,” Jan Logemann argues that European immigrants of the interwar period — many of them émigrés fleeing Hitler’s Germany — played a key role in the development of consumer psychology, market research, and product design in the United States, all of which were crucial in turning this country into a mass consumer culture after the war.

The remainder of this Bulletin presents conference reports of recent GHI conferences, whose topics once again ranged widely: from the American Civil War to the trial of Adolf Eichmann, and from American music in the Cold War to an interdisciplinary conference on the role of immigrants as entrepreneurs. The “News” section presents recent prizes, fellowships, and staff publications and includes a calendar of events that informs you of upcoming GHI events and conferences, at which we hope to welcome you.

Hartmut Berghoff (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)
THE STRAITS OF EUROPE:
HISTORY AT THE MARGINS OF A CONTINENT
26TH ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE GHI, WASHINGTON DC, NOVEMBER 8, 2012

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Writing a history of Europe requires placing a story in time and space. The time chosen here is the nineteenth century and more specifically its second half, the period between the European revolutions of 1848 and the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. While there are interesting debates about the character of this period and its position in what has been called the long nineteenth century, this article will focus on the other dimension of history; it will seek to describe Europe in terms of space.¹

For historians, it is always appropriate to begin by asking what contemporaries thought about the issue at hand. In this case, however, the sources from the past are not very helpful. The experts of the time, the geographers, who were just establishing their discipline at universities, were divided on the question of where and what exactly Europe was, geographically speaking.² Coming from different scholarly backgrounds, geographers defined Europe in a variety of ways: in terms of its geology and physical or biological features; in terms of its ethnic, cultural, or economic geography; and in terms of combinations of determining factors. Moreover, contemporary experts could not agree whether Europe was a continent in its own right or a mere appendix of Asia. The exact borders of Europe always remained an issue, particularly its borders in the east. Some even adhered to an expansive notion by speaking of a “Greater Europe” that included white settler colonies and by pointing toward Europe’s part in integrating world trade.³ What they all could agree on was that Europe’s geography was something special and the foundation of its superior global position.

This geographical distinctiveness was often attributed to the character of Europe’s coastlines and its special relationship with the sea. In the early twentieth century, Emil Deckert of the University of Frankfurt am Main pointed to the “many seas at the boundaries as well as the continental waters and bays cutting into the mass of [Europe’s] body” and to “the large number of peninsulas and coastal islands.”⁴ He concluded that the Atlantic Ocean provided “such a

¹ The paper is based on a chapter from my forthcoming book Globale Vorherrschaft und Fortschrittsglaube: Europa 1850-1914 (Munich: C. H. Beck). References have been kept to a minimum.
² See Hans-Dietrich Schultz, Europa als geographisches Konstrukt (Jena, 1999).
spectacular range of nautical difficulties that it was no surprise that the world’s most enterprising and proficient sea-faring race grew at the extended European coasts” and that culture and trade developed. Here we recognize the deterministic view of the relationship between environment and culture or politics, which many nineteenth and twentieth century geographers took for granted. This view resulted in the construction of long-term continuities apparently founded on spatial peculiarities.

As this all-too-brief summary of late-nineteenth-century geographical debates demonstrates, a history of Europe can rest only approximately on the geography of the continent. Historians need to abstract from it and, at the same time, specify the environmental factors locally. Population, economy, culture, and politics should be considered in relation to physical setting. Taking a cue from Deckert but discarding his determinism, I will describe European history in the second half of the nineteenth and the opening decades of the twentieth centuries by circumscribing the continent or, to put it differently, by traveling around Europe. I will focus on the margins of the continent and look closely at the straits of Europe. The tour begins at the Kara Strait in the Arctic Sea, continuing with the Öresund (the Sound) and the English Channel, and then moves to the Strait of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles and Bosporus in order to finally reach the Suez Canal. This verbal circumnavigation serves not to delimit the borders of Europe but to explain, first, their fluid nature and the changing relation between history and geography and, second, to identify some fundamental nineteenth-century processes that may be detected most clearly at the margins.

I. The Kara Strait

The Kara Strait is situated at the extreme northeast of Europe, leading from the Barents Sea into the Kara Sea, a marginal sea of the Arctic Ocean. On its southern coast the Ural Mountains start to rise. Today the area is best known for the discarded Soviet nuclear submarines dumped in the Kara Sea. The strait itself is 56 kilometers wide and separates the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya and the coastal Vaygach Island.

The strait began to receive increasing attention in the 1850s as Siberian merchants and goldmine owners searched for a direct link between European harbors and the Ob and Yenisei Rivers in Siberia, hoping
to replace the long and expensive route overland.5 During the reform era that followed the Crimean War, large numbers of settlers, many of them newly emancipated serfs, began farming in Siberia and hoped to send their cereal crops to markets in the west. Norwegian whalers, too, were interested in the arctic strait as they had overfished the Barents Sea and were now advancing into the Kara Sea in search of seals, walruses, and whales.

However, the Kara Strait and Sea were unknown waters and first needed to be surveyed and mapped. Wind and weather had to be observed to plan for safe, regular journeys. The gold merchants found little support for this venture from the Imperial Geographical Society in St. Petersburg or the Royal Geographical Society in London. In the end, it was the Swedish-Finnish geologist and arctic explorer Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld (1832-1901) who was persuaded to take on this challenge. Financed by the Gothenburg magnate Oscar Dickson, who later also sponsored Fridtjof Nansen, and by Alexander Sibiryakov, the wealthy owner of Siberian goldmines, Nordenskiöld started his journey in July 1878.6 He was the first to succeed in sailing through the Northeast Passage along the Siberian coast into the Pacific. His two-year journey took him from Gothenburg around Norway and through the Kara Strait towards Cape Chelyuskin, the northernmost tip of Eurasia. His ship, the Vega, had been built in Bremerhaven as a whaler for arctic waters. She got stuck in the ice just before the Bering Sea, forcing the crew to winter there. It was only in July 1879 that the journey could be resumed toward Japan and then through the Strait of Malacca near Singapore, the Suez Canal, Gibraltar, the Channel, and the Öresund.
into the Baltic Sea. In April 1880 the Vega was welcomed home by splendid illuminations in Stockholm.

A year after his return, Nordenskiöld published a full report: *The Voyage of the Vega Round Asia and Europe*. The two volumes were quickly translated into several languages.\(^7\) His journey through the Northeast Passage was one of the numerous arctic exploration expeditions in the later nineteenth century; its scholarly report set the standard for others to follow. Nordenskiöld also published further scholarly and popular works to disseminate the newly acquired knowledge of geography and the natural world. The publications defined what was regarded as European at the northeastern margin of the continent. In contrast to the icy environment of the Arctic and to underdeveloped Siberia, “Europe” meant civilization. “European,” in turn, described people who heroically overcame adverse conditions and conquered the world as they collected knowledge about the seas and continents across the globe. The exploration of the Arctic Sea was an enterprise driven by economic interests and scholarly curiosity. The men on the Vega came from several countries in Europe; the crew was Swedish-Norwegian, the officers Swedish, Finnish, Danish, and Italian.

The Kara Strait was thus in many ways a European strait that intersected with Asia and with wilderness. Economically, it remained marginal despite the Russian colonization of Siberia. Its waters were too icy for regular merchant marine services. Only during the interwar period did Soviet icebreakers manage to get through the Northeast Passage without being interrupted by winter. The regular service installed after the Second World War was excessively costly and could not be kept going after 1991. Maybe global warming will in the future make the route through the Kara Strait into the Pacific as attractive as it was in the mid-nineteenth century.

**II. The Sound and the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal**

In contrast to the Kara Strait, the Öresund or Sound was economically highly profitable for a long period — benefiting the Danish state. The Öresund connects the North Sea and the Baltic. Numerous small and larger islands dot the shallow waters between Denmark and Sweden. There are three main passages; on the western side, the Little Belt and the Great Belt — their many shallows make navigation difficult and unsafe; on the eastern side between the large Danish island of Zealand and the southern Swedish province of Scania; the

third thoroughfare, the Öresund, is a 67-kilometer-long strait that is usually navigable throughout the winter. It is narrowest — only four kilometers wide — in the stretch between Helsingør und Helsingborg, which was long dominated by the Danish fortress of Kronborg. The cities of Copenhagen and Malmö lie across from one another at the southern end of the Öresund.

The Danish Crown began levying a toll on foreign ships and goods in 1429. The Sound Dues allowed the monarch a considerable amount of independence from the Estates and limited their participation in governing. Well into the nineteenth century, the toll provided a sizeable portion of the Danish state’s income. In 1853 almost 25,000 ships passing Helsingør paid some 2.5 Million Danish rigsdaler in tolls. The goods being transported came from Russia and other countries of the Baltic Sea, and included leather, canvas, coal tar, hemp, rope for ships’ rigging, and tree trunks for masts. In the opposite direction, luxury imports passed through such as wine, fruits, high-quality textiles, and colonial goods ranging from spices, coffee, cane sugar, and tobacco to rice and cotton — the latter products mainly from the United States of America.

The Sound Dues rested on bilateral treaties between Denmark and other maritime powers. When in 1856 the treaty with the United States was up for renewal, the American government insisted on the abolition of the tolls arguing that they were a trade obstacle and that they constituted an unlawful restriction of the freedom of the seas. U.S. diplomats threatened to take retaliatory measures against the Danish West Indies if the


Öresund and Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, ca. 1900
tolls were not abolished. The Danes preferred to hold on to their colonial possessions among the Lesser Antilles; the Virgin Islands were eventually sold to the United States in 1917. In 1857, Denmark therefore gave in to international pressure and signed the Copenhagen Convention. For a one-time compensation of 30.5 million rigsdaler, Denmark relinquished the dues levied for more than 400 years, and the straits connecting the North and Baltic Seas were internationalized. The compensation came from those states whose shipping companies and trading houses stood to benefit most from free passage; Britain and Russia each paid a third, the United States contributed substantially, and lesser sums were paid by the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg and Lübeck.

The abolition of the Sound Dues signaled clearly that Denmark was no longer a Nordic power and had joined the ranks of Europe’s smaller states, a decline that was confirmed by the wars against Austria and Prussia in 1864 and 1866. At the same time, the end of the toll is an example of the international liberalization of trade during the nineteenth century. Finally, the Sound proves to be one of the nodes in the colonial entanglements of even minor European powers.

The Danish straits were not separating but connecting waterways. The bridging function across the Sound and the Belts was strengthened when in 1892 the first railway ferry started to transport railway carriages from Denmark to Sweden; two contemporary engines of progress, the steamship and the railway, now seamlessly came together in this European zone. More than a hundred years later, a combined road-and-railway bridge was opened in 1999-2000.

By contrast, an artificial strait that proved to be highly divisive was the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, known today as the Kiel Canal or Nord-Ostsee-Kanal. It was built between 1887 and 1895 by the German Reich mainly for strategic reasons. During the construction some 9,000 workers from Germany, Denmark, Poland, Russia, Austria, and Italy were employed at the site. The new canal was almost 100 kilometers long; electric lights enabled operation by night. A mere decade after its opening, the canal needed to be widened and deepened to accommodate a new class of battleships, the Dreadnoughts of the German Navy.

Unlike the natural straits between the North and Baltic Seas, the canal’s construction was not related to the freedom of the seas but to the competition between the European imperial powers Britain and Germany. Their rivalry was the reason for the deep cut through the

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landscape and transformation of geography by engineers. Ultimately, however, the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal proved to be almost worthless strategically. During the First World War, the British blockade of Kiel and other German ports rendered the idea of allowing the German fleet easy passage between the North Sea and the Baltic moot. The canal also had financial implications. The fees for merchant ships did not cover the construction and running costs. Therefore the Reich introduced a new tax in 1902, the so-called *Schaumweinsteuer*, a tax on champagne. The artificial strait thus tied geography to domestic politics and the intricate relations between the German states and the Reich. In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles internationalized the canal.

III. The English Channel / La Manche

Whereas the technical and financial power of the new German Reich materially changed the geography at one of the straits, the northwestern strait of Europe remained basically unchanged despite the engineering capability to transform it. The English Channel / la Manche is roughly 350 kilometers long. At its eastern end, the gap between Dover and the Cape Griz-Nez, the so-called Pas de Calais or the Dover Strait, is only 34 kilometers wide. This has long been one of busiest waterways in the world connecting the North Sea, and therefore also the entry to the Öresund, with the Atlantic Ocean. It channels the traffic from northwestern Europe via the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean Sea and, since 1869, further on through the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Coastal geography produces irregular tides in the eastern parts of the Channel and even a double tide in places. The climate results in foggy weather throughout the year. The biggest freshwater river to feed into the Channel is the Seine. Among the important ports are Le Havre (the largest European harbor for coffee imports before 1914), Portsmouth (the naval port of the Royal Navy), and Southampton (where in 1912 the Titanic began its first and fatal journey in the direction of New York). The international denomination “English” Channel for the strait signified who dominated it in the nineteenth century. It was at Portsmouth that the *Dreadnought*, which lent its name to the new class of battleships, was launched in 1906, triggering busy digging at the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.

The Channel was thus a central sea bridge connecting different parts of Europe and the world; it had seaports tied to global trade; and it was the naval base of an empire and, at the same time, the highly
protected national security zone of England. The nineteenth century saw several plans for strengthening the ties between the British Isles and the Continent through large-scale engineering projects. Beginning in the 1850s, proposals were regularly put forward to build a bridge, dig a tunnel, or establish a railway ferry. In 1881-82 the first test drillings for a tunnel took place at the Shakespeare Cliffs near Dover and at Sangatte in the vicinity of Calais, advancing for a mile on both sides. Before voting on a bill on the proposed tunnel, both houses of Britain’s Parliament called in experts; engineers, merchants and industrialists, railway representatives, naval and army officers gave exhaustive evidence. Yet the Joint Select Committee could not come to agreement. In the end, supporters of the tunnel were only narrowly outnumbered by their opponents.

The main argument against the project came from the British Ministry of War. Although most contemporaries thought this unrealistic, the army leadership feared that the subterranean tube could be used by a foreign power — and this meant France for most of the period — to occupy the British Isles. It became a shibboleth to link Britain’s national strength to its being an island despite arguments to the contrary which emphasized the existing close links with the continental Europe. Britain’s island status was considered an essential factor for the building and preservation of the Empire as well as for the country’s national character.

Although the majority of official Britain regarded the Channel as something that closed the country off, several nineteenth-century developments actually brought Britain closer and closer to the Continent. Many French proponents of a Channel tunnel supported the project for commercial reasons — because a tunnel would allow perishable goods

such as milk products, fruits, and luxury items to be transported faster and without reloading. Likewise, salesmen would be able to travel more easily to, and therefore increase their business with, England. Above all, the supporters in both countries argued, a tunnel under la Manche would benefit tourism. The interests behind the project at the beginning of the twentieth century had not changed much from the mid-nineteenth century — and would not be very different by the end of the twentieth when the channel tunnel was finally opened in 1994: all along, these were railway companies and their bankers, free traders, and export industries. At the opening of the twentieth century, however, they could not yet overcome the opposition from within the government in Britain. Still, despite prevailing doubts, traffic across the Channel became easier and increased from mid-century through regular steamship services jointly run by French and British companies. Then, in 1909, the French aviation engineer Louis Blériot (1872-1936) flew from Calais to Dover in just 37 minutes; the sea gap had begun to narrow substantially even if security and strategic measures against air attacks were implemented after the Great War.

The story of the tunnel projects demonstrates the central role of this northwestern strait of Europe. Besides the Channel’s political function in the European power game and the manifold threads from all over the world entangled at this junction, the tunnel plans were also a manifestation of the pride and self-assurance of the period’s engineers. They had the will to change the landscape, and they did transform European geography. In other places they constructed masterworks such as the twenty-kilometer Simplon Railway Tunnel through the Swiss and Italian Alps, which opened in 1906. This enterprise was financed by, among others, Emile Baron d’Erlanger (1832-1911), a Paris banker who was born in Frankfurt am Main. Baron d’Erlanger was also the chairman of the Channel Tunnel Company and of the Chemin de Fer du Nord. His bank invested not only in European railways but also in colonial Africa, in North and South America, as well as in the transatlantic cable, together with Julius Reuter. The channel tunnel was just one of the era’s many landscape-transforming engineering projects that created the infrastructure for European and global interactions.

IV. The Strait of Gibraltar

The Strait of Gibraltar was a strategic place in Europe. It joined the Mediterranean Sea with the Atlantic Ocean, and Europe with North


13 See Gabriele Mendelssohn and Kristin Schwarz, Die Familie Erlanger: Bankiers, Mäzene, Künstler (Ingelheim am Rhein, 2005).
Africa. During the period under review, it acted as a bridge rather than a dividing line. The western entry between Cape Trafalgar in the South East of Cadiz and Cape Spartel at the northern tip of Africa near Tangier is 44 kilometers wide. Navigation is tricky because of a strong surface current from the Atlantic. Strong winds add to the difficulties, while on the inside along the Rif Mountains regular calms could keep sailing ships idle for long stretches. The bays of Algeciras and Gibraltar on the northern side made for two of the safest ports in the world.

Gibraltar has been in British hands since 1704. On the Rock, which is connected by a sandy piece of land to the Iberian Peninsula, there was a British fortress and town. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Gibraltar was not the enclave it has been since the days of Franco. Its borders were permeable; dividing rules were internal rather than external. Seen from London, Gibraltar was a military base: a safe harbor and docks for the Navy; an impressive fortress at an important strait, which became even more valuable with the opening of the Suez Canal at the other end of the Mediterranean; a pivotal point for steamships in a worldwide system of coaling stations. The garrison held up to 5,000 soldiers. The civilian population numbered around 5,000 in 1800, but grew to more than 20,000 by 1901. Only some of them were British subjects; the rest were aliens. The origins of the British were rather mixed. Only a small portion came from the British Isles, the majority had Spanish, Portuguese, and Genovese, Maltese or North African roots. There were more Catholics than Protestants, and a Jewish community was present on the Rock as well.
Many merchants profited from the free port. Fortress and town had to rely on food and water from the mainland. These and other services were provided by workers who went back and forth between Gibraltar and the mainland on a daily basis. The workers and other aliens received permits to work and live in Gibraltar under a permit system, which underwent several reforms during the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{14} The impetus for reform first came from epidemics that were attributed to overpopulation and often blamed on the many resident aliens. Yellow fever killed several thousand in 1804, 1813–14, and 1828. Cholera took its toll in 1860 and 1864. Besides sanitary reforms, the governor and the police introduced measures to limit population growth. First, permits were limited and the time periods shortened. Second, new laws and regulations made naturalization more difficult. Since whoever was born on the Rock was automatically granted British citizenship, from the 1830s pregnant women who were not British or were married to an alien had to leave Gibraltar three months before the baby was due. Likewise, the new British naturalization law of 1844, which obliged women to take their husbands’ citizenship, was suspended for Gibraltar and other Crown colonies because the authorities did not want alien women to acquire British citizenship by marrying British subjects. They had primarily prostitutes in mind, who they thought were likely to seduce British men who were staying on the Rock or passing through. Marriage regulations, the eviction of pregnant women, and the permit system were periodically tightened in the following decades.

The necessity of involving the population in the concomitant sanitary measures led in the long term to political participation by the male dignitaries in the government of the colony.\textsuperscript{15} In 1865 a Sanitary Commission was appointed by the governor; this body was partially transformed into an elected town council in 1921. Civil society first started to organize around the local merchants’ Exchange Committee formed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1817, a library was founded, later a Chamber of Commerce. Catholic associations, the Jewish community, Boy Scouts and, in the 1920s, trade unions were established. The civilian population developed strong loyalties to the Crown. During occasional royal visits and the 1887 and 1897 jubilees, its members demonstrated their allegiance thereby confirming their demand for participation, both together with the Governor of Gibraltar and over his head.

Until 1937 Spanish representatives were always present during official festivities. In the nineteenth century, border lines were drawn


inside societies rather than between nation states. Situated at the geographical margin of Europe, Gibraltar experienced problems similar to those of other European societies and tried similar solutions. Citizenship, population, and sanitary policies in the Crown colony are merely examples of the internal lines drawn in Europe on the basis of gender and social status, and elsewhere of ethnicity. The dialectics of inclusion and exclusion formed identities, in the case at hand the new notion of “Gibraltarians.” Economic and security interests were often intertwined with moral judgments and social concerns. A closer look at the Rock would also reveal that state control was incomplete and that people still had sufficient resources to avoid the tightening grip.

At mid-century the southern side of the strait featured several Spanish military posts in the large bay formed by the Rif Mountains. The bases from Ceuta in the west to Melilla in the east had been established during the Reconquista. The most recently acquired position, captured in 1848, were the Islas Chafarinas. As a consequence of the European occupation, Moroccan trade had shifted away from the Mediterranean Sea towards the Atlantic coast. The Sultan exercised no real control over the Rif’s coast, which was one of the poorest stretches of the Mediterranean. By the nineteenth century local conditions allowed only for scant agriculture, fishery — and piracy. European colonialism worsened conditions. The Spanish posts in North Africa, from the 1830s, disturbed Moroccan trade with Algeria because they regarded it as smuggling or suspected the traders of being pirates. Indirectly, the Spanish thus made piracy more attractive or even necessary for some tribes to make a living.16 Although by the beginning of the nineteenth century the European sea powers had mostly suppressed Muslim and Christian pirates, they never succeeded in controlling the small groups operating from the Rif Mountains. These local pirates captured and robbed sailing vessels caught in the Gibraltar calms. The rugged coastal landscape with its many hiding places and scattered settlements, which could not be placed under fire by naval artillery as a city could be, made suppression from the sea impossible.

From 1855 on, the British government put effective pressure on the Sultan to regain control over the Rif’s Mediterranean coast. Mulau Abd ar-Rahman sent several military expeditions to discipline the inhabitants of this area so that piracy stopped for some decades. When Morocco’s government experienced internal conflicts and increasingly fell victim to European imperial rivalries towards the

century’s end, piracy flared up again. In 1893-94, Spain led a war on some Berber tribes, and in 1909 entered a military conflict with the Sultan over the Spanish fortress and settlement of Melilla. European imperial competition triggered two diplomatic crises over Morocco in 1905-6 and 1911. Finally in 1912, the Treaty of Fez established a protectorate, with France taking over most of southern Morocco and Spain controlling the northern Mediterranean coast plus a small strip on the Atlantic side of the strait. The city of Tangier became an international zone (officially in 1923). Spanish Morocco again gained historical prominence in the 1930s. It was from here that General Franco, who had fought as second-in-command of the Spanish foreign legion in yet another war against the Berber people from 1921 to 1926, launched his revolt against the Republic in 1936 with the support of the colonial army.

The Strait of Gibraltar was a fuzzy border between Europe and Africa. On both sides, particular localities developed from regional and transnational sources during the nineteenth century. British Gibraltar, international Tangier, Spanish Ceuta, and other such localities were all somehow at the “frontiers of the state,” whose control over the population at Gibraltar or over the Rif’s inhabitants, for example, though it increased, was by no means complete. Identities and internal divisions formed along different lines at the strait; European-Oriental was just one of them; others of equal importance could be religious, ethnic, social, or gender markings. An ever-increasing power over the strait was exerted by European colonialism and imperial competition, particularly on the southern side where states were failing to gain effective control. In some respects, this “deficiency” still manifests itself in the present. Today, the Rif Mountains are the world’s largest cannabis growing fields, producing half of the global output. The Strait of Gibraltar was an intersection of power, a contact zone, and a sphere for exchanges among Europeans and between Europeans and others. The opening of the Suez Canal made it into a global strait.

V. The Dardanelles and the Bosporus

At the other end of the Mediterranean, the so-called Turkish Straits, made up of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, were a pivotal spot of European diplomacy and warfare. Here, the European state system manifested itself throughout the nineteenth century. At the same time, the straits formed the intersection of the Ottoman Empire and its European and Near Eastern territories.
Geographically, the straits connect the Mediterranean with the Black Sea. The Dardanelles are 65 kilometers long and 2 to 6 kilometers wide. They lead into the Sea of Marmara, which is followed by the Bosporus, whose waters narrow down to 700 meters and stretch over 31 kilometers before they flow into the Black Sea. On both sides of the Bosporus, Constantinople/Istanbul spreads out. The city had more than a million inhabitants in 1897, a figure it regained only in 1950 after a slump in the interwar years. According to the census of 1885, some 15 percent of its inhabitants were not subjects of the Sultan. Among the Sultan’s subjects only a minority (44 percent) were Muslims; the rest adhered to the Greek Orthodox Church (17 percent), the Armenian Church (17 percent), Judaism (5 percent), or the smaller communities of Catholics, Bulgarian-Orthodox, and Protestants. Constantinople accommodated a conglomerate of religious, ethnic, and national groups who spoke a myriad of languages and followed widely varying customs. The 1911 edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* characterized it as “not of one nation but of many, and hardly more of one than of another.” Although the city deserves in-depth treatment, our focus here will be on the straits as an object of European and, indeed, world politics.

The straits became the object of international conventions on several occasions. In principle, the Ottoman emperor exercised control over them. From the eighteenth century on, however, Russia sought favorable regulations for itself but encountered resistance not only from the Ottomans but also from the other European powers. The Russian demand for free passage of its merchant fleet through the straits had already been granted in the peace of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. Well into the nineteenth century, the Russian cargo consisted mainly of cereals from Ukraine bound for export. Later the coal and iron industries of the

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Don accessed the world market through the straits. Controversy arose from the strategic interests Russia pursued in the wake of its expansion south towards the Black Sea and the Caucasus. The Tsarist Navy wanted ice-free access to the seas, and the Russian government tried various means to reach this aim: threats against the Ottoman Empire, alliance with the Sultan, and finally war against the other European powers.

All to no avail; throughout the nineteenth century, the Turkish straits remained closed for all warships but the Ottoman fleet, unless the Ottoman government determined otherwise. The European powers guaranteed this state of affairs in the multilateral Conventions of London in 1840 and 1841. This was yet another example of the (partial) internationalization of important European waterways, in peace time at least. The issue of the passage of warships arose several times during the following decades, such as in the Crimean War in 1854-56 and in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. In 1895, the British cabinet considered sending its Mediterranean fleet through the Dardanelles for a humanitarian intervention in response to the murder of large numbers of Christian Armenians who had protested Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s connivance in pogroms against their brethren in Anatolia. The Russian government discussed similar plans and wanted to reach Constantinople before the Royal Navy. Despite humanitarian campaigns in Europe and the United States, the powers distrusted and blocked each other. No ships sailed forth. The German Protestant missionary Johannes Lepsius began his publicity and aid campaigns for the Armenians on this occasion.

In 1905 the international conventions prevented the Russian Black Sea fleet from sailing through the straits and the Suez Canal to reinforce Russia’s Pacific fleet against the Japanese. The politics surrounding the Dardanelles and the Bosporus began to take on a global dimension, particularly in the context of Anglo-Russian rivalry. The two empires came into direct contact with each other in Afghanistan just northeast of India, the jewel in the Imperial Crown. Since the British sea route to South Asia went through Gibraltar via Malta and Cyprus to the Suez Canal, the London government did everything to prevent the free movement of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, keeping the Turkish Straits closed to warships was a central British strategic aim. But the domestic and internal weakness of the Ottoman Empire made it increasingly difficult to uphold the “European principle” from 1841 on.

18 For the background, see Winfried Baumgart, Europäisches Konzert und nationale Bewegung: Internationale Beziehungen 1830-1878 (Paderborn, 1999), 287-301.
19 See D.W. Spring, “Russian Foreign Policy, Economic Interests, and the Straits Question, 1905-1914,” in New Perspectives in Modern Russian History, ed. Robert B. McKean (Basingstoke, 1992); Ronald P. Bobroff, Roads to Glory: Late Imperial Russia and the Turkish Straits (London, 2006).
During the First World War, one of the bloodiest campaigns took place at the European entry to the Dardanelles. This peninsular area carried the name Gallipoli. British and French troops tried to land there in order to reach Constantinople and open the straits for transport to the Eastern front in Russia from the south via the Crimea. This seemed a solution to the blockade of the Baltic Sea in the north by the German fleet at the Öresund. The British Army at Gallipoli encompassed the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), a Gurkha regiment, and other colonial troops. The French army corps included several battalions from Senegal. On the other, Ottoman side, a certain Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938) served as commander of a division. The Gallipoli campaign, or the battle of Çanakkale as it is called in Turkey, was a transformative moment for British Dominion and colonial troops, as well as for their Turkish counterparts. For the former, the Gallipoli campaign was decisive in shifting identity away from the European metropoles. More than 200,000 soldiers died in the futile attempt to gain control of the straits. Only with the armistice in 1918 did these come under Allied control. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne established an international strait commission, but in 1936 the execution of the regulations fell back into Turkish hands. In sum, there is ample justification for calling the straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea a “focal point of world history.”

**VI. The Suez Canal**

My circumnavigation of Europe concludes with a strait that did not even exist before the second half of the nineteenth century. It was also a focal point of world history and particularly of European imperialism. The reference is, of course, to the Suez Canal, built between 1859 and 1869. Its construction was one of the largest engineering projects of the period. Without any locks, the canal slopes gently from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. It links two different sea worlds. For a while, the Great and the Small Bitter Lakes, two saltwater lakes between the northern and southern sections of the canal, prevented the migration of flora and fauna. But by the late 1920s the continuous flow of waters diminished their salt content, and maritime flora and fauna began migrating from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. Biologists have called this “Lessepsian migration,” after Ferdinand de Lesseps, the organizer of the canal’s construction. The migratory movement was furthered by the construction of the Aswan Dam in the 1960s, which changed the sea environment at the Nile Delta. As a result, today Red Sea fish are no

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20  Zechlin, “Die türkischen Meerengen.”

longer regarded as exotic aliens in the eastern Mediterranean and continue to spread. Some of the unintended biological consequences of the canal were unwanted. Contemporary European experts, for example, feared the spreading of pathogenic germs from Asia. International conventions regulated quarantine rules to keep cholera and the plague at bay.22

The human history of the canal’s construction was full of irony.23 Initiated by French diplomats and engineers and financed largely with French capital, the waterway was initially built by Egyptian forced labor until the British protested; then modern machinery was introduced, and the construction triggered further technical improvements. The British government had been suspicious of plans for the canal and tried to block it as best as it could. But as it turned out, Britain quickly proved to be the greatest beneficiary of its construction. The project had been meant to strengthen the Egyptian Viceroy against the Sultan in Constantinople, but the financial costs eventually led the Egyptian state to bankruptcy. This, in turn, set in motion the establishment of the British protectorate over Egypt in 1882.

The canal introduced a direct route to the Indian Ocean, eliminating the need to sail around southern Africa. Its length was 164 kilometers with a bottom width of 22 meters and an original depth of 8 meters. Traveling via Suez shortened the route from Britain to Bombay by more than 40 percent, to Calcutta by a third, and to Hong Kong still by 25 percent. On account of the unreliable desert winds and high towing costs, sailing ships hardly used the canal. The canal thus boosted the British steamship industry and hastened the end of the sailing

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era. The tonnage going to East Africa and Asia quickly exceeded expectations. Taken together, the shortening of the sea routes, the increased production of steamships, and the growth in tonnage all benefitted British financial interests, the shipbuilding industry, and the merchant fleet. Suez became a tool of empire.

The other parties involved were the Egyptian Viceroy and the French backers of the project. Ever since Napoleon had surveyed Suez in 1798, plans to cut through the isthmus had been proposed to the Khedive. A successor to Muhammad Ali, the Albanian founder of the self-proclaimed dynasty of Egyptian viceroys, finally granted a concession to the former French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps (1805-1894). De Lesseps founded the Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Suez. The logistics of the undertaking and the physical task of digging through the ground necessitated enormous efforts; financial and political obstacles also had to be removed. Two-thirds of the shares were bought by Frenchmen; the rest had to be acquired by the Egyptian government because analysts did not expect the company to make a profit. British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, who later became prime minister, rejected the plans at first. Although he realized the proposed canal’s strategic importance for British India, he feared the negative consequences of a canal under French control. Later, when the canal had opened, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli bought 44 percent of the shares from the indebted Viceroy Ismail (1830-1895), who in 1879 had to leave office under joint pressure from Britain and France and spent the rest of his life in a palace on the Bosporus.

The canal was open to all nations, like other waterways internationalized in the nineteenth century, for example, the Rhine (treaties of 1831 and 1868) and the Danube (1838 and 1856). In fact, the British protectorate over Egypt and the presence of the army ensured control by London from 1882 on — until some 90 years after the opening of the canal, the Suez Crisis of 1956 signaled the end of the British Empire.

The establishment of the British protectorate over Egypt is regarded as one of the key events in the history of European imperialism.24 The motives and causes have been the subject of debate among historians. The occupation of Egypt was not the catalyst of the “new imperialism” in the late nineteenth century but an important step in Europe’s involvement in ruling over lands and peoples beyond the geographical borders of the continent. Imperial geographies crystallized at the Suez Canal.25 However, we should keep in mind that


European imperialism was not all about rule and profits. Culture was also an essential dimension. In this respect, the Suez Canal marked a frontier, or, more precisely, a liminal space. Valeska Huber has pointed out that the canal became a new emotional border for Europe. European merchants, soldiers, colonial servicemen with their families, missionaries, workers, and tourists all passed through the canal. Upon reaching Port Said, they bought suitable clothing for the tropics and put it on. On the return journey, this was the place to change back into the usual European outfit and thus drop one’s colonial role and status. In letters, postcards, and diaries, many travelers noted this symbolic border crossing. Novelists and poets often referred to Suez. Rudyard Kipling, for example, who was born in India in 1865, described Suez as a frontier between very unlike worlds with different rules and customs. In his poem *Mandalay* (1890), he expressed his desire to return to the East in the following lines:

> Ship me somewhere east of Suez, where the best is like the worst,  
> Where there aren’t no Ten Commandments an’ a man can raise a thirst;  
> For the temple-bells are callin’, an’ it’s there that I would be —  
> By the old Moulmein Pagoda, looking lazy at the sea.26

In Kipling’s view, powers other than Christian ones seemed to rule beyond the Canal.

Although geographically not part of the Continent, Suez clearly marked a European frontier. In many respects — political, economic, and technological as well as ecological — the canal was one of the essentially European straits in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In cultural terms it may best be described, though, as a liminal zone of an imperial character.

**Conclusion**

Let me summarize and draw some conclusions. Europe’s many straits allow us to understand its uncertain borders during the nineteenth century. Ecologically, economically, politically, socially, and culturally, its straits were points of intersection and contact. They were interfaces where diverse interests, ideas, peoples, goods, flora and fauna from Europe and other parts of the world encountered one another. Straits linked the peoples of Europe to one another and to non-European societies. To be sure, they also separated peoples. Nonetheless, the multiplication and intensification of contacts...

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outweighed the divisions. Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century was characterized by a high level of mobility. Depending on circumstances and region, this mobility resulted in cooperation, competition, or resistance. Europeans attempted to shape geographically different conditions — think of the Kara Strait in the Arctic Ocean and the Suez Canal — by means of scientific reconnaissance and the use of advanced technology. These efforts rested on the mobilization of economic resources and the exercise of political and military power, as well as the development of complex systems of knowledge and organization.

In the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, political power shifted. Think of Denmark’s loss of control over the Öresund or the weakening of the Ottomans’ hold over the Bosporus. The Suez Canal illustrates two things: first, the successful efforts of the Egyptian viceroyalty to achieve greater autonomy vis-à-vis the Ottoman sultan by means of reforms and progressive projects; second, the failure of Egypt’s European-oriented modernization policy to resist European business and financial interests. It was, above all, British predominance that was evident from the Channel to Gibraltar across to the Bosporus and the Suez Canal. The intense competition between the European powers was manifested in the control of the Turkish Straits as well as in the construction of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. In the strategic consciousness of European governments, the different straits were
linked to one another. Internationalizing straits provided a way to avert conflict or to bring hostilities to an end.

Straits became imperial intersections during the nineteenth century. Siberia, North Africa, the Black Sea region, East Africa, South Asia, and the Far East were now more easily accessible to European traders, missionaries, scientists, soldiers, and bureaucrats. In many respects, Europe’s straits became more globally enmeshed than before. But the example of Europe’s inability to impose order in the region of the Strait of Gibraltar shows how precarious Europe’s predominance was at its colonial margins. Here, the frontiers and limits of the state were felt.

The example of Gibraltar also illustrates how state action and societal need led to identity formation within societies during the nineteenth century. This process is perhaps more clearly evident in certain regions at Europe’s margins than elsewhere. Europe’s straits were crystallization points for the construction of various types of collective consciousness: social, religious, ethnic, national, and gender-specific. The self-understanding manifested here was marked as “European.” It was also rooted in the experiences of individuals who crossed the icy Kara See in the 1860s, who passed Port Said and Suez after 1869, or who fought at the Dardanelles in 1915.

Finally, some general remarks on the historiographical intentions of writing history from the margins of a continent. This approach does not merely serve the purpose of illustrating significant nineteenth-century processes, which may also be detected elsewhere. It is not simply a European “world-in-a-nutshell” principle but has further implications. First, this approach decenters European history. This allows us to recognize that central places of the nineteenth century were actually situated at the so-called periphery. The perspective from the periphery reveals global, imperial, and international connections between the straits. The fluid and permeable character of borders stands out instead of their separating and delimiting qualities. Second, history from the margins emphasizes the transnational and relational character of the period over the national element by showing the political, economic, and social pertinence of the manifold European interaction “within” and in relation to the world beyond the Continent. Studying the straits of Europe is therefore not an arbitrary but an appropriate choice of localities. From this perspective, it is difficult to regard nineteenth-century Europe solely as an age of nationalism: it was as much an age of internationalism and globalization.27

Third, the journey around the margins of Europe shows the potential of translocality as a heuristic concept. It allows us to distinguish the various layers of relations that entangle localities with other places in an often hierarchical and asymmetrical manner. Questions of power and domination arise in all places concerned as well as in the linking channels between them. Translocality appears not as a condition but as the result of movements and interactions. There are tensions at work between the fluidity and changeability of geographical space and the forces of solidification and condensation, institutional or otherwise. In general, the future historiographical challenge may be to approach what are regarded as the centers of European history in the same manner, that is, to analyze the liminal zones within Europe by researching the spatial dimensions of how Europe negotiated differences, otherness, and inequalities, and how these were established, overcome, or sustained. Such an approach will challenge standard histories of Europe as a system of nation-states.

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EUROPE FROM THE OUTSIDE IN: A COMMENT
COMMENT ON JOHANNES PAULMANN’S LECTURE, WASHINGTON DC, NOVEMBER 8, 2012

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Most educated Americans received their introductions to European history in courses on Western Civilization, and these, at least in the United States, had as their central purpose to teach Americans about their common European past. During the 1930s and 1940s, when such courses were first taught, this European past was, as concerned the modern era, defined principally as England, France, and to some extent Germany — with Italy largely out of the picture since the Renaissance, except for a brief moment during unification in the 1860s; with Russia only in with Peter the Great, perhaps Catherine as well, and then again with the Russian Revolution; and Spain out of the picture since Charles V, except to offer brief resistance to Napoleon and a last stand against the United States in Cuba in 1898. Holland, despite its importance for the Atlantic world and as a motor of early globalization, fell out except in art history because it fit ill into a scheme defined by powerful nation-states; so, too, did the Austrian and then Austro-Hungarian Empire, except for 1914 and 1918. Finally, what to do about Istanbul remained a mystery.¹

Against the background of this tradition we may measure the departure proposed by Johannes Paulmann, an early and important pioneer in transnational history. He is in the process of writing a methodologically exciting work on Europe from 1848 to 1914 in which imperialism, relations of center and periphery, and asymmetries of power play a crucial role. He defines Europe not by nation-states but by its contested margins, and focuses not on landmasses but on strategic waters, arguing that these waters, a series of straits, are not margins at all but crossroads that define Europe’s encounters and make up its character. He takes the reader to these waters: the Kara Stait allowing unfrozen passage northeast along the coasts of Siberia; the Øresund, separating the Danish island Zealand from the Swedish province of Scania; the English Channel, or La Manche, as it is called in the Francophone world; the Suez Canal, completed in 1869; the Strait of Gibraltar; and the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. In Paulmann’s telling, they are not natural givens — as waters had sometimes been for late nineteenth-century, geography-as-destiny thinkers. Rather, he sees them as worked on and transformed by

human knowledge and technology; as sites of labor and labor history; as places of prodigious transnational and intercontinental mixing; as objects of military strategy and intervention; and as places of encounter, usually with stark asymmetries of power: man against man, man dominating nature. Paulmann’s is a history that foregrounds space instead of time, connections over development, routes rather than roots — not to the exclusion of the second elements in these dyads, but so that the first elements become more visible, central, located less on the margin, placed more in the middle.

But space, as we know from Karl Schlögel’s wonderful book, is also a place to read time. Paulmann tells us of a Europe at the zenith of its power: financial, technological, military. From this space, the story of the straits is one of dominance; they are in the first order roads to imperial rule. Suez is the clearest case: allowing for faster, easier British suzerainty over India, and serving as the starting point, in competition with the French, for the transition from informal to formal empire, or, to put it more plainly, from commercial to political and military control of Africa. The story has the ring of truth when we consider the yawning divergences between Europe and Asia in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) as well as in agricultural and industrial productivity, and the fact that a large part of the globe was by century’s end under Europe’s direct or indirect control. Europe, in the time Paulmann writes about, is imbued with self-confidence — shading into hubris.

It was not always so. The earliest post-classical articulations of Europe tended to the reverse: a sense of smallness, enclosure, and powerlessness. Throughout the Middle Ages, one did not even refer to Europe but instead to “Christian territories,” or, as Albert Magnus put it in the thirteenth century, to “our quarter of the inhabitable world.” Europe, as a geographical concept, came into wider use with the rediscovery, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, of the second-century coordinates of Ptolemy, which charted out the earth with far greater precision than anything conceived of in the Christian world. Not coincidentally, the manuscript of the Geography was discovered in Constantinople, crossroads of a sputtering Christian civilization with a more advanced Islamic one. When mapped, Ptolemy’s coordinates equalized space and fixed areas, allowing one to “represent the several localities of the entire earth in a picture.” The picture showed Europe as barely more than a sliver of a peninsula of Asia, and plotted European proportions vis-à-vis large-area Africa more accurately in terms of area than most Mercator-influenced maps.
that students still see in Western Civilization textbooks. But what really spurred Europe-thinking was Christian defeat at the hands of the Ottoman Turks in 1453. “We are wounded and thrown down in Europe,” wrote Enea Silvio Piccolomini, the Italian humanist, soon to become Pope Pius II, in response to the calamity on the Bosporus, “in our fatherland, in our own home, and our residence.”

The first to employ “European” as an adjective, and the first to compose a *History of Europe* whose purpose was to describe the continent and its people, Piccolomini also advanced a plea for unity in the face of division and downfall — with a not-so-secret agenda that the European cities and princes should send money for Christian armies.

Paulmann’s approach to Europe starting with the straits has, therefore, a venerable pedigree, and it is not unimportant that the tradition is both at the very beginning of Europe-thinking and that it marks Europe at its self-conceived weakness vis-à-vis the world. Straits can be about European weakness as well as its strength. There is in any case nothing gimmicky about starting this way. In his description of Europe, Piccolomini did not start with England, France, and Germany, as many of our textbooks do, but with Hungary, Transylvania, Thrace, Turkey, Macedonia, Peloponnesia, and Albania — cradles, Piccolomini thought, of ancient civilizations and contact zones between Christian and Islamic worlds.

It was, in fact, the contact zones that Europeans had understood, long before they accurately conceived or mapped Europe’s heartland. As early as the thirteenth century, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese charts evinced a remarkably precise sense of the shape of the continent, and oriented their understanding towards points of departure: as we can see with the famous, evocative Portolan charts (“related to ports of harbors”).

What Europeans knew less well was the distances and geometric patterns between the continent’s interior cities. They also understood little about the height of the mountains (most of which were not named), the curvature of the rivers (the Rhine, for example, was mapped exceedingly straight into the sixteenth century), and the extent of the great forests (though in central and western Europe they were already disappearing). Even if we concede that Shakespeare likely engaged in conscious fantasy when in *The Winter’s Tale* he cast a shipwreck on the Bohemian coast, it remains that in the first three centuries of European self-awareness, circa 1450-1750, knowledge and interest in the land lagged behind the passion for the sea. Mental maps, the informal cartographical understanding that people carry with them, hardly pierced the countryside; indeed, it was not until

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deep into the eighteenth century that European travelers even reported on rural areas, except to complain about inns, people’s boorish manners, and muddy pot-holed roads, with occasional ethnographic remarks about the dress, food, customs, and religious behavior of rustics. Montaigne, from whom we might have expected better, tells us about the valleys of the Austrian Alps only when they are well cultivated and adorned with noble houses; for the raw countryside, he had only disdain. Nearly two centuries later, in the 1760s and 1770s, our best guide to Europe would have been James Boswell, the biographer of Samuel Johnson; but he, too, lost few words on those vast stretches where most people lived, except to complain about the table strewn with straw where he was forced to sleep in a village somewhere along the Westphalian Hellweg connecting the Rhine with the Elbe. Finally, Europeans understood little about their vast, thinly populated, to some extent still pagan, expanses. *Extra Ptolomaeum* is how at the end of the fifteenth century one still described poorly mapped Scandinavia and especially virtually unknown Finland. The expansive Russian lands were similarly unknown. Not until Boris Godunov commissioned a survey at the end of the sixteenth century was there a well-documented Russian-made map of the whole of the Czar’s territories.\(^7\)

One wonders if, as in the sixteenth century, and much of the early modern period, understanding of the waters, the focus on the dynamic periphery, does not render more difficult an appreciation for the land, and for those who participated less in the multiethnic contact zones that Paulmann begins with. It would be wrong to imagine the countryside as defined by stasis. But it is equally important to recall how long and how late many things on the continent retained their basic morphology. Consider, for example, the percentage of people living in rural communities (communities below 2,000 inhabitants). Between 1500 and 1750, these percentages change significantly in England, the Netherlands, and the country we now associate with Belgium; but in these 250 years they remained virtually the same in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, France, Spain, and Italy — with only the last three below a ninety percent rural population rate (France still at 87%, Italy at 78%, and Spain at 79%).\(^9\) Even when we take in the next hundred years — to the beginning of Paulmann’s work, the continued predominance of the rural over the urban populations remains daunting. Circa 1850, Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands were the only European countries that had crossed the threshold at which agriculture employed less than fifty percent of the workforce.\(^10\)

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Moreover, except for that immensely productive and dynamic triangle between Manchester, Amsterdam, and Paris, Europe witnessed little endogenous change in fundamental life-quality indicators, including average caloric intake, amount of diet drawn from inferior caloric sources, stature (as far as this can be ascertained from recruitment lists and skeletal remains), infant mortality, life expectancy, and throughout much of Europe, literacy. The nineteenth century certainly brought change, though in the short and medium term not always for the better. Germany’s high rate of infant mortality, to take one example, actually worsened in the middle years of the nineteenth century, especially in cities; while real wages likely declined before they dramatically improved in the last third of the century. There was, it is true, a tremendous amount of human movement away from the countryside and into the city, so that already be mid-century cities, their protective walls torn down and railroad stations in their place, had become ruralized in the same measure as rural landscapes felt the pull of the urban. Yet there is some truth in Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl’s sense that the rural hinterlands represented forces of perseverance, beharrende Kräfte, the pull of custom affirmed against the jerk of rapid change. Perhaps one does not want to follow Riehl, whose sense of the countryside of Germany (which he never ventured outside of) was powerfully shaped by his dismay at the radical turn of the Revolution of 1848. But one can also glean the force of perseverance in Pierre-Jakez Hélias’s evocation of the melancholy of change in a Breton village in his serene The Horse of Pride, or in in “the bottomless sadness of the desolate countryside” painted by Carlo Levi in ChristStopped at Eboli, or Milovan Djilas’s controlled descriptions in Montenegro of harsh village life in the craggy mountains of the sparse homeland of his youth. My intention here is not to substitute poetic evocation for scholarly studies, or to suggest there was little or no change in the countryside. On the contrary, urbanization, the rail and the bicycle, mass emigration and re-migration, and the tilting of even rural markets towards global trade, meant that the horizons of rural Europeans were wider than ever before. Perhaps the church tower and the fields to be tilled never circumscribed rural horizons — in the latter half of the nineteenth century, they certainly did not. My point is only that the accelerated pace of interaction that we associate with contact zones and cities (places, as Richard Sennett puts it, “where strangers meet”) cannot be taken as a norm. Finally, it also bears recalling that at the end of the nineteenth century, urbanization and industrialization notwithstanding, more people lived in the European


12 A central theme in the best of his major works. See Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, Land und Leute 8th ed. (Stuttgart, 1883).


14 For one illuminating example, see Hartmut Berghoff, Zwischen Kleinstadt und Weltmarkt: Hohner und die Harmonika, 1857-1961 (Paderborn, 1997).

countryside than in any time in its history. It was true in England, the most industrialized place in Europe, and it was true for Germany, where there were as many people working in the agricultural sector in 1913 as across the economy in 1800.16

If persistence is one issue, movement, paradoxically, is another. At one level, Paulmann’s evocation tells of the starting places for interaction with other continents. But from a European standpoint, the great intercontinental movement of peoples involved not the straits, or proximate points of contact, but the mass migrations across the Atlantic. Between 1860 and 1914 roughly 52 million migrants left European shores for the Americas — as if one major country, say Germany in 1900, got up and left (with some returning).17 Paulmann obviously knows this, and will integrate the great transatlantic migrations into his larger historical synthesis. But there remains a question about how a Europe defined by geographical borders, however watery, take this fundamental fact of European life in the late nineteenth century into account. It also seems to me that the emigrants did not leave as Europeans, but as Westphalians, Sicilians, and Ruthenian Jews — even if, as Robert Wiebe powerfully argues, in the process they became, perhaps for the first time, Germans, Italians, and Jews.18 What they did not become, as far as I can tell, was European — except in one powerful sense.

Perhaps I can illustrate what I mean with a story. When I was four years old, my mother took me from one small town in southern Germany to another in the United States, where we then lived and I grew up. In many ways, the two towns were similar — small, not very exciting, each near a body of water, one Lake Constance, the other the Atlantic Ocean. There was, however, one salient difference. The American town was religiously and ethnically diverse: in place of two churches, a large Catholic and a small Protestant, there were at least eleven, spanning the religious field from Congregationalist to Russian Orthodox, and in place of Germans and virtually no one else, the American town was full of Greeks, Poles, French, Irish, Italians, and, so it seemed to me, one German. As a boy I remember lots of fights in the schoolyard: Polish against Greek kids, Irish against French. But I never remember anyone saying we’re all European. The only context in which that could occur was racial, and even then its vocabulary was not about continents but about skin complexion. So I wonder about the effect of race on the sense of being European. At the end of the nineteenth century, racial ideologies infused with Social Darwinism were in full strength; and colonial rule often segregationist, brutal,

17 This estimate is taken from Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, 2003), 147.
and murderous. How did these forms of interaction impact the emotional resonance of being European, especially a European among others?19 Perhaps the straits help us see this in more complex ways. One is drawn to the European-African dynamic that unfolded just to the west of Suez, where the “colonized colonizer,” as Eve M. Troutt Powell describes Egyptian nationalists in the 1880s, appropriated, changed, and extended the logic of European racism and British understandings of rule to justify Egyptian dominion, personal and territorial, over Sudan.20 Or one may follow Russian anthropologists through the Kara Straits to discover, however obliquely, mirrors of European Russia in the circumpolar hunters and gatherers strewn throughout the tundra and taiga of Asian Siberia.21

Certain is only that in his circumnavigation Paulmann allows us to be travelers to those places that set off Europe from Africa and Asia and serve as conveyers of exchange between Europe and the rest of the world. Although even the most conventional of historians cite travel reports, Paulmann highlights travel as a way to know place in time, and as a source of insight into how countrysides, cityscapes, and borders have been understood. There is now a burgeoning literature on these questions. In Nicht West, Nicht Ost, Bernard Struck has, for example, shown how it was not until the 1840s that Germans travelling across the border into France or into the Polish lands used the occasion to reflect on leaving home.22 One wonders about this with respect to Europe. When did one know that one was entering Europe? Was it when one entered the bustle of Europe’s busy harbors, humming with the sounds of peoples, steam, and machines? Was it about a different literary and cultural landscape? Was entry into Europe even mentioned? Or did one enter nation-states? Or cities? And was this different according to the origin of the traveler, whether from Africa, Asia, or the Americas? Was there a gender or racial component to it? Did it change over time? And when did travelers perceive they were leaving?

By defining Europe from the outside in, as it once was, Johannes Paulmann has helped us to ask these questions in new ways.

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TIMELESS, MODERN, AND GERMAN?
THE RE-MAPPING OF BAVARIA THROUGH THE MARKETING OF TOURISM, 1800-1939

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The state of Bavaria is made up of three elements. First, the ancient land of the Franks, then, the more earthy Bajuwaria, and finally, the old cultural region of Swabia ... But the land of Bavaria is not at all a museum of historical memories. Munich and Nuremberg are industrial cities, just like the remote but beautiful Amberg, and the golden Augsburg ... Those who seek pleasurable travel, travel to beautiful Bavaria. Friends of art find incomparable treasures, the sick and weary healing power and strength, and hikers and sports enthusiasts quiet valleys, beautiful lakes, and glacial blue-green rivers, rustling mountain forests and sleepy, peaceful villages.¹

_Dresdner Anzeiger_, June 18, 1938

When this advertisement appeared in the summer of 1938, there was little doubt that Bavaria had secured its status as a multi-faceted tourist region. This brief excerpt points to the diversity of attractions in Bavaria, as well as the careful balancing of nature, tradition, and modernity that defined its marketing. The fact that this advertisement appeared in a Saxon newspaper suggests that these tropes had become common currency throughout Nazi Germany. By 1938, Bavaria embodied the entire German nation, and its timeless landscapes and historical legacy served as the foundations of its modern appeal. Then again, nationalized renderings of Bavarian tourist attractions were common as early as the First World War, just as the deliberate balancing of past and present, tradition and progress, nature and technology, had defined regional tourist propaganda for longer still.

Today, Bavaria is an internationally-renowned vacation destination, and in the eyes of many visitors, the region seems to epitomize Germany itself. The consequences of this development are noticeable internationally, and much to the chagrin of modern Rhinelanders and Berliners, Lederhosen, Oktoberfest, and Neuschwanstein have

¹ _Dresdner Anzeiger_, June 18, 1938.
become the prevailing symbols of German culture around the world, even being profitably reproduced in American amusement parks and theme towns.2 Still, Bavaria was not always so popular and was once overshadowed by the Rhineland and the Black Forest, conveniently situated along the meandering route of the aristocratic Grand Tour. The rise of the regional tourism industry during the nineteenth century and the subsequent marketing of Bavaria as a bona fide travel destination created a space for collective self-reflection on a number of topics, including nature, history, and collective identity. In his now classic The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class, sociologist Dean MacCannell writes: “Entire cities and regions, decades and cultures have become aware of themselves as tourist attractions.”3 Tourism led to a massive re-mapping of Bavaria, raising the profile of some locations while making others invisible, but did it make Bavarians self-aware? Did tourism facilitate the creation of a distinctly Bavarian form of “Germanness”?

To address these questions, my research focuses on the self-representation of Bavaria through the marketing of several representative tourist attractions. Although I had initially hoped that travel would provide insight into the construction of a Bavarian, regional identity, I discovered much more. My research uncovers the complex relationship between the promises of tourism and the turbulent experience of modernity during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when, in a matter of decades, Germany evolved from a grouping of predominantly agrarian states into an industrial and military superpower. In the midst of unprecedented changes, how did a growing tourism industry respond to widespread feelings of displacement and alienation? How did Germans decide to represent the new nation to visitors from home and abroad? How did their picture of their locality as a tourist attraction reflect changing conceptions of nature, history, and modernity?

On one hand, tourism was a modern phenomenon, pioneered by the nineteenth-century middle classes who dedicated their limited free time to rewarding leisure activities. On the other hand, extended hikes and trips into the countryside were often sold as temporary flights from modern civilization. Still, this was never simple escapism.4 Tourism provided distance from the contemporary world, but it also provided perspective. In fact, I contend that tourism became an important feature of modern life itself; it was a coping mechanism that allowed men and women to experiment with alternative possibilities. In a post-traditional world rendered unrecognizable

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4 For more on tourism as escapism, see Ursula A.J. Bechet, Geschichte des modernen Lebenstils: Essen-Wohnen-Freizeit-Reisen (Munich, 1990), 197-198, 204-205.
by industrialization, urbanization, and the rise of the nation-state, tourism promised to reconcile civilization and its discontents, anchoring contemporary urban society in the natural environment and a common past.

The Bavarian tourism industry consistently promoted an image of what I refer to as grounded modernity, a romanticized version of the present that reconciled tradition with progress, continuity with change, and nature with technology and science. This alternative vision provided the traveler with a taste of stability and a glimpse of authenticity, and it was part of a larger process of grounding modernity. The tourism industry worked to make the experience of modernity more tangible by linking impersonal and abstract ideas, like national identity, with familiar experiences and concrete sights. Excursions into nature and vacations in health resorts provided visitors with an antidote to their hectic, dirty, and stressful urban existence. Trips to cities allowed Germans to reacquaint themselves with the historical roots of the fatherland, while also offering a new perspective on the modern nation-state, defined by industrial progress and political triumph. In other words, tourism was always in the shadow of the present, even when it was seemingly fixated on the natural environment and the past. The region of Bavaria provides insight into this process, giving us numerous case-studies that showcase how both visitors and the visited coped with modern life and thus paved the way for the future.

Still, my research does more than reflect on modernity. By focusing on Bavaria, it contributes to a body of scholarship that focuses on the region as a category of historical analysis. In the past twenty years, scholars like Caroline Ford, Celia Applegate, and Alon Confino have called our attention to regions in Germany and France, demonstrating that regional identities are not always reactionary and antimodern, just as regionalism and nationalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive. These scholars have shown that the paths of regionalism and the Heimat movement in particular “do not always lead away from modernity, but rather to its very core,” to borrow a phrase from Thomas Kühne. My work engages with this literature, but I do not concentrate on a uniform Bavarian identity as a “mediator” or “metaphor” for national identity. Instead, I deconstruct the notion of Bavarian regionalism, recasting the former kingdom and Freistaat as a region of localities. I do not focus on a single, Bavarian identity because that is rarely what the tourism industry chose to sell. Often


enough, the only thing “Bavarian” about these tourist destinations was their location.

My research also contributes to a growing literature on German tourism, which has generally overlooked Bavaria. One of the exceptions is a 1992 article by Helen Waddy Lepovitz that focuses on the origins of the regional tourism industry in Upper Bavaria.7 In a more recent work, Joshua Hagen addresses the growth of tourism in Rothenburg ob der Tauber, a Franconian town that became “a symbol of rootedness, community, and continuity with a bygone era.”8 My research provides a more extensive overview of Bavarian tourism as well as a careful reading of the language used to market its diversity of attractions. My case studies are not exclusively from Altbayern, but also from Swabia and Franconia, historical regions that were first incorporated into Bavaria at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, my time period spans from the time of the French Revolution to the Second World War, allowing me to address the evolution of tourism over the course of at least four distinct eras in modern German history.

Throughout this period, local tourism industries in Bavaria responded to the malaise of modernity by inviting contemporary society to become reacquainted with nature, tradition, and history. At the end of the nineteenth century, the tourism industry of “Franconian Switzerland” promised a romantic respite defined by scenic hikes and elevated vistas. While achieving distance from modern society, guests could paradoxically enjoy modern accommodations and conveniences at local inns and restaurants. Similarly, a trip to the spa town of Bad Reichenhall allowed tourists to reconnect with the natural environment in a cosmopolitan environment with modern facilities and cutting-edge medical technology. Bavaria therefore remained timeless and yet decidedly of this time, or modern. The region was quaint and rustic, but also sophisticated and cosmopolitan, additional indications of modernity. After 1914, the demands of total war undermined this carefully cultivated image of Bad Reichenhall, as nationalism helped to transform the international spa into an inexpensive sick bay for German soldiers.

During the interwar period, the word “German” became much more prominent within the marketing of numerous Bavarian attractions. In Augsburg, guidebooks and brochures defined local sights in explicitly nationalist terms, highlighting the importance of the Swabian

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8 Joshua Hagen, Preservation, Tourism and Nationalism: The Jewel of the German Past (Burlington, 2006), 1.
city within the narrative of the German nation. Augsburg’s image, however, was not based on its historical record alone but on its contemporary relevance as an industrial center and modern metropolis. Similarly, Munich and Nuremberg triumphed as tourist attractions after 1933 because of their symbolic role within the Third Reich. The sights associated with Hitler and the National Socialist movement, such as the Temples of Honor and the Reich Party Rally Grounds, became the defining features of each city’s tourist profile. This modernity was grounded in selective history and invented traditions, as the Bavarian tourism industry put its own stamp on the idea of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, a people’s community united by history, culture, and, less obviously, race. Munich and Nuremberg provided insight into the German past and present, as well as hints of future greatness.

The remainder of this article will briefly consider two case studies from my larger research project, one from the beginning and one from the end. In the interest of casting doubt upon the notion of Bavarian regionalism, I have chosen two destinations in the “ancient land of the Franks,” or Franconia, a region that dominates northern Bavaria but retains a separate identity. The first is the mountainous area of “Franconian Switzerland,” which emerged as a popular travel destination at the end of the eighteenth century. The second is the medieval city of Nuremberg, an established tourist attraction that acquired a new significance after the Nazis rose to power. In their own ways, both destinations became sites of grounded modernity. In the case of the former, the natural environment grounded the middle-class tourist in need of something authentic during uncertain times. In the case of the latter, it was German history that grounded both the individual tourist and the Third Reich.

I. Romantic Distance in Franconian Switzerland

With its highest mountain measuring a mere 627 meters, the tourist destination known as “Franconian Switzerland” looks more Appalachian than Alpine, and its landscape is defined by rolling green hills instead of glacier-covered granite peaks. In the nineteenth century, the Swiss label implied more than mountains, promising visitors a space where time seemed to stand still, a sanctuary where they were safe from the noise, traffic, and stress of urban life. As the definitive travel destination of the early nineteenth century, the real Switzerland was synonymous with tourism itself. The Alpine nation was the original Romantic getaway, a site of spiritual transcendence celebrated by the likes of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Lord Byron. It
became continental Europe’s foremost travel destination as middle-class tourists began to join the young noblemen, intellectuals, and wandering plebeians who previously monopolized travel. Meanwhile, throughout German-speaking central Europe, promoters of tourism adopted “die Schweiz” as a profitable label for mountainous regions, regardless of altitude. The first was “Saxon Switzerland” outside of Dresden, a landscape of rocky peaks, valleys, and caves that attracted painters like Caspar David Friedrich and Ludwig Richter. The discovery of Saxon Switzerland in the 1770s was followed by the discoveries of “Kroppach Switzerland” in the Taunus Mountains, “Holstein Switzerland” between Kiel and Lübeck, and “Hersbruck Switzerland” in northern Bavaria.

One of the most popular “Switzerlands” was located in Upper Franconia, between the cities of Erlangen, Bamberg, and Bayreuth. Commonly referred to as “the land in the mountains,” or “the Muggendorfer Mountains,” the region first became a popular destination during the late eighteenth century, when natural scientists flocked to its many subterranean caves in search of unique rock formations and prehistoric fossils. During the summer of 1793, the Romantic authors Ludwig Tieck and Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder spent several days touring the mountainous region. While Wackenroder displayed some enthusiasm for the treasures underneath the mountains, both men were even more enamored of the landscape itself, with Tieck proclaiming in a letter: “Oh, nature is truly inexhaustible in its beauty! Here is genuine pleasure, for a picturesque terrain purifies men.” The travel reports of Tieck and Wackenroder sparked the imagination of their literary contemporaries, with men like Ernst Moritz Arndt and Jean Paul following in their footsteps around the turn of the century.

In 1812, geographer Johannes Christian Fick became the first to use the label “Franconian Switzerland” in reference to the Muggendorfer Mountains, and later travel writers would incorporate die Schweiz into the titles of their works. In 1820, local poet Jakob Reiselsberger independently published a booklet entitled Little Switzerland, or Invitation to Travel in Streitberg, Muggendorf, Weischenfeld, and their Environ. In the book’s preface, Reiselsberger justified his use of the Swiss label by insisting that the natural environment of the Franconian mountains also featured “many sublimely beautiful and admirable curiosities” but in a “reduced degree.” In 1829, Bamberg historian and travel writer Joseph Heller published the first “tourist handbook” on Franconian Switzerland. Entitled Muggendorf and its Environ, or
Franconian Switzerland, this work targeted middle-class hikers, supplying them with a map, an overview of travel routes, an alphabetical inventory of sights, and two illustrations. Like Reiselsberger, Heller insisted that Franconian Switzerland boasted all that the real Switzerland possessed in abundance, but here it was available “on a condensed scale, and therefore more pleasant to behold, as it was possible to look across it and grasp it as a single image.”

If the Swiss Alps were the quintessential “sublime” landscape, possessing a sort of terrifying beauty, then the rolling mountains of Franconian Switzerland were more of a “pastoral” landscape, idyllic and peaceful, and therefore less intimidating to potential visitors. This was tourism for beginners and it sold well. Franconian Switzerland became one of the early stars of the Bavarian tourism industry, long before the railway or the package tour debuted. The timeless landscape, the prehistoric caves, and the medieval ruins were the defining attractions of the region, drawing German tourists as well as international visitors. In 1861, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine published a piece on Franconian Switzerland by the American travel writer Bayard Taylor. Taylor’s accounts of hikes through the region mirrored the romantic endorsements found in German publications. For example, he described his walk between Streitberg and Muggendorf as follows:

The dew lay thick on the meadows, and the peasants were everywhere at work shaking out the hay, so that air was sweet with grass-odors. Above me on either side, the immense gray horns and towers of rock rose out of the steep fir-woods, clearly, yet not too sharply defined against the warm blue sky. The Wiesent, swift and beryl-green, winding in many curves through the hay-fields, made a cheerful music in his bed.

In this postcard view of Franconian Switzerland, the pastoral landscape dwarfs the village of Streitberg. From the author’s collection.

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15 Joseph Heller, Muggendorf und seine Umgebungen oder die fränkische Schweiz: Ein Handbuch (Bamberg, 1829), V.

16 This piece was later reprinted as “A Walk through the Franconian Switzerland.” See Bayard Taylor, At Home and Abroad: A Sketchbook of Life, Scenery, and Men (New York, 1862), 286-318.

Drawing upon both sublime and pastoral conceptions of nature, Taylor described a premodern wonderland without dwelling on the origins of medieval sites like the Neideck ruins or the castle of Gößweinstein. Like many future visitors and guidebook authors, Taylor was interested in sentiment, not historical specifics.

After German unification, economic growth, increased wages, and legislation guaranteeing paid vacations for civil servants all contributed to an increase in middle-class tourism. In Franconian Switzerland, locally published guidebooks proliferated and continued to define the region in terms of natural beauty, pastoral simplicity, and medieval mystery. These publications typically avoided the jingoism of the better-known Baedeker and Grieben’s guidebooks, rarely endorsing any sort of regional or national identity. They defined the destination only as “romantic,” appealing to modern society’s growing desire to find solace in natural settings. When these guidebooks used the term “romantic,” they suggested an understanding of the word that lacked the ideological sophistication of turn-of-the-century intellectuals. The travel writers used the term to characterize the landscape, villages, and medieval architecture of the region as idyllic, secluded, and evocative of a bygone era that became more attractive in the shadow of industrialization and urbanization. This was a simplified romanticism, colored by vague notions of Bildung and spiritual redemption but ultimately focused on achieving distance from the modern city. As the majority of nineteenth-century tourists were city-dwellers, this motivation is not surprising.

Among the many features of Franconian Switzerland identified as “romantic,” it was the natural landscape that received the most attention and praise from late nineteenth-century guidebooks. Here was a landscape that was not only beautiful, but also peaceful and pure, even more remarkable when juxtaposed with the filth and noise of the modern city. An 1890 Leo Woerl guidebook identified “simplicity and idyllic charm” as the defining characteristics of the entire landscape. The same year, in *Romanticism of Franconian Switzerland*, Adam Koch-Neuses described the region as “a little piece of earthly paradise” that managed to remain sheltered from the “rational and practical achievements” of modern civilization. An 1889 guidebook published by Andreas Deichert painted an even more striking picture:

> Whenever long shadows stretch out from the wooded slopes of the mountains in the east, whenever the stunning rock formations stand before the splendor of the sunset,
whenever we see the pure water of the river winding between beautiful meadows and the diligently-cultivated fields of the peasant, then the region gives us a vision of peace and rural tranquility, and we begin to enjoy the pleasant feeling of distance from the consuming life of crowded cities.\textsuperscript{22}

Although numerous authors cast Franconian Switzerland as an idyllic retreat and a refuge from urban life, it was not exactly a “wilderness.” The region’s mountains and forests were dotted with medieval ruins and rustic mills, which served as reminders of a romanticized past and a simpler way of life. All of these elements were understood as part of nature, or of what Celia Applegate has described as “an alternative milieu that did not fundamentally challenge the necessity of cities.”\textsuperscript{23} This environment existed in a careful balance with the modern world, providing a reprieve from urban life but not a complete escape from civilization itself.

Just as the guidebooks incorporated the medieval ruins and rustic mills into the broader landscape, they also reduced the region’s inhabitants to mere decoration. Although earlier guidebook writers like Joseph Heller called attention to the customs of the “simple and hard-working” natives, the guidebook writers of the late nineteenth century generally overlooked the local population. The 1889 Deichert guidebook called the tourist’s attention to “diligently-cultivated fields” while failing to identify the peasants responsible for this work.\textsuperscript{24} Another guidebook mentioned Charlemagne and the medieval artist Veit Stoss in a brief paragraph on the town of Forchheim, but avoided reference to human beings throughout the rest of the text.\textsuperscript{25} These guidebooks were preoccupied with the natural wonders of the tourist region, a common phenomenon in late nineteenth-century tourist propaganda. When the local inhabitants did appear, they were cast as hospitable hosts or as idyllic representations of rural life, similar to those featured in Ludwig Richter’s well-known engravings of the region. Woerl’s 1890 guidebook portrayed the region’s inhabitants as “friendly and obliging, and not to mention hospitable,” listing them alongside an agreeable climate and fresh air as the destination’s greatest amenities. The same guidebook also featured a full-page picture of the landscape around Gößweinstein, with a number of peasant children playing in the foreground.\textsuperscript{26} In this case, the human inhabitants of the region became part of the natural landscape itself, another detail in the holistic representation
of Franconian Switzerland. These were not real people but symbols of an alternative way of life.

For late nineteenth-century tourists, the most popular method of enjoying the landscape of Franconian Switzerland was hiking, which was still a relatively recent phenomenon. Recreational walking only became an established practice during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, after Rousseau and his disciples rehabilitated the natural environment. Over the course of the nineteenth century, this practice became a celebrated vehicle of “empirical edification and self-cultivation,” distinguishing the middle classes from the aristocracy, who preferred to travel by coach. Movement aside, hiking in the Franconian Switzerland was ultimately a means of arriving at the best vantage point. The merit of a particular trek had little to do with physical activity but rested on the quality of the views encountered along the way. For example, an 1889 guidebook described the route from Muggendorf to Gößweinstein as a series of “picturesque views,” during which one could “joyfully survey … the lovely charms of nature.” The same guidebook advised travelers to slow their pace between Gößweinstein and Pottenstein so that they would not fail to enjoy the panoramas of this “romantic landscape.” Friedrich Ende’s 1894 guidebook likewise praised the “wild and romantic” scenery around the village of Pottenstein, which did not possess any specific tourist attractions other than “an impressive view” of the “grotesque rock formations” that surrounded the community.

This obsession with the natural environment was a distinctly modern phenomenon linked to urbanization. Nature only became a marketable commodity when it was removed from the realm of the ordinary. Geographer Steven Bourassa explains: “[A]s the intimate tie between land and its users was severed with the development of capitalism, the idea of the landscape arose. In other words, it became possible to distance oneself from the land so that it could be viewed as landscape.” Distance allowed for the nineteenth-century idealization of natural landscapes but distance was also the definitive feature of most of the views endorsed in guidebooks on Franconian Switzerland. Practically, this meant being far enough away to get a good view of something. In discussing the best views of the region’s medieval ruins, one English tourist concluded: “All these castles require to be seen from a distance, as it is only thus one can realize the height of the rocks on which they stand.” In other cases, it was not just distance from the landscape that was important but distance from civilization. The fortress of
Gößweinstein, for instance, was supposedly most striking when it suddenly appeared on the horizon after the tourist rounded a bend following the Wiesent River from Muggendorf. Upon arriving in the village of Gößweinstein itself, the visitor was typically not invited to tour the fortress or even the historical pilgrimage church, but instead compelled to climb the nearby Wagnershöhe and enjoy the “magnificent view” of the Wiesent, Püttlach, and Eschbach river valleys, as well as a “gorgeous panorama” of the Upper Pfalz, the Fichtel Mountains, and the cities of Bayreuth and Kulmbach in the distance. Such distance allowed the tourist to consume several sights simultaneously, conserving time and mastering the larger landscape.

While tourism in Franconian Switzerland promised distance from modern civilization, it was also a distinctly modern activity. Eager to vacation in a region that evoked a bygone era, the middle classes also enjoyed modern standards of cleanliness, comfort, and convenience at local accommodations. In his now classic article, Hans Magnus Enzensberger identifies this as one of the central paradoxes of tourism: “The destination has to be both: accessible and inaccessible, distant from civilization and yet comfortable.” Guidebooks on Franconian Switzerland catered to this predisposition, including advertisements from inns and restaurants promising gemütlich and bürgerlich accommodations as well as many of the modern conveniences of the city. Local inns like the Gasthof zur Terrasse in Pinzberg pointed to a list of inviting features, including: “Beautiful, shaded garden. Lovely view into the Regnitz and Wiesent valleys. Recognized quality kitchen with an extensive selection for every time of the day. Guest rooms with good beds.” Johann Distler’s Gasthof in Pottenstein similarly advertised a large veranda with views and “numerous and friendly guest rooms” as well as “Munich beer (in bottles),” reaching out to residents of the Bavarian capital. Other inns promised beer from Munich, Nuremberg, and Bamberg. Some inns tried to appeal to wealthier patrons by cultivating a more refined character. Pottenstein’s Gasthaus zum Goldenen Anker, for example, marketed itself not only with “lovely views and good beds” but also a “bürgerliche kitchen” and “real service,” indirectly ensuring the satisfaction of its middle-class clientele. In some cases, visitors could even receive mail and telegraph messages within the inns themselves, as was the case at Behringersmühle’s Gasthof zur Post, and other locations in Streitberg and Muggendorf. Middle-class visitors may have sought a romantic respite but they were not willing to leave their modern life behind.

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32 Ende, Praktischer Führer durch die Fränkische Schweiz, 16-17.
34 Anton Schuster, Kleiner Führer durch die Fränkische Schweiz (Bamberg, 1891).
35 Ende, Praktischer Führer, 25.
36 Kleiner Führer durch die Fränkische Schweiz, sowie Wegweiser durch das Schwabachtal von Erlangen nach Gräfenberg und die sogenannte Herbrucker Schweiz (Erlangen, 1893); the advertisements at the end of this guidebook are unpaginated.
37 Friedrich Ende, Vollständiger Führer durch die ganze Fränkische Schweiz und Teile der Oberpfalz (Nuremberg, 1895), 8, 63.
The tourist destination of Franconian Switzerland provided a break from modern civilization but it was also a catalyst of modernization. In the end, tourists helped to corrupt the very nature that they came to venerate. In spite of such unintended consequences, leisure travel in Franconian Switzerland helped to ground the experience of modernity in late nineteenth-century Germany. Excursions into a relatively natural environment offered a balance to a hectic, dirty, and stressful urban existence, a cure that enabled the individual to return to everyday life rested and reinvigorated. In this regard, the tourist culture of Franconian Switzerland did not just provide an escape from modernity; it provided a more acceptable version of it.

II. Historical Proximity in Third-Reich Nuremberg

If a visit to Franconian Switzerland promised romantic distance, then a visit to the Franconian city of Nuremberg promised historical proximity. The city’s history was especially rich. Established in the eleventh century, it became one of the most important cities of the Holy Roman Empire, especially after the Golden Bull of 1356 decreed that every Holy Roman Emperor must hold his first Imperial Diet in the free city of Nuremberg. As the “unofficial capital of the Reich,” the city enjoyed three hundred years of political significance and economic affluence and also served as the center of the German Renaissance. By the time of the Napoleonic Wars, a weaker Nuremberg had become part of the new kingdom of Bavaria just as its star began to rise among German romantics. Like Franconian Switzerland, Nuremberg seemed to represent a “simpler world” free of modern worries. The so-called “Pearl of Medieval Cities” played a prominent role in Ludwig Tieck’s and Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder’s 1798 novel, Franz Sternbald’s Wanderings, in addition to serving as the backdrop for E.T.A. Hoffmann’s 1816 short story, “The Nutcracker and the Mouse-King.”

History was central to Nuremberg’s identity, but it was a vague sort of history. In the early twentieth century, the city’s primary tourist attraction was its general medieval look, epitomized by the buildings of the Altstadt, including the Imperial Fortress, the gothic churches of St. Sebald and St. Lorenz, and the Hangman’s Tower and Bridge along the Pegnitz River. A 1907 guidebook published by a regional tourism association praised Nuremberg’s historical architecture, especially the medieval fortifications that were such a novelty in twentieth-century Germany. The guidebook also described Nuremberg as the “German Reich’s Treasure Chest,” home to Renaissance master Albrecht Dürer and the legendary poet Hans Sachs, immortalized in Richard Wagner’s opera, *The Mastersingers of Nuremberg*. This identity as the “Pearl of Medieval Cities” and the “German Reich’s Treasure Chest” began to be transformed after the First World War, when the regional tourism industry placed greater emphasis on “the Nuremberg of the present.” Thus one 1929 publication offered details on the city’s local factories before even mentioning Albrecht Dürer.

Nuremberg’s identity became more complicated after the Nazis rose to power. Not only was the city at the heart of Franconia, a hotbed of German nationalism and anti-Semitism, it was also home to Julius Streicher, member of the Nazi “Old Guard” and the editor of the anti-Semitic newspaper *Der Stürmer*. Nuremberg proved fertile ground for the National Socialist movement, especially after the failed putsch in 1923 and the subsequent ban on the party in Upper Bavaria. The city hosted the Nazi Party Rally in both 1927 and 1929, until violence between brown-shirts and leftist opponents compelled the Nuremberg city council to forbid the Nazis from returning. After his appointment as chancellor, Hitler returned in late August 1933, proclaiming a “Victory of Faith,” and bringing with him over 300,000 followers; from then on the Nuremberg party rally became an annual event. No longer just a “celebration of the party,” it was now a “celebration of the nation,” as well as an opportunity for the people to see the *Führer*. Visiting Nuremberg in 1938, Scottish writer A.P. Laurie recounted the reaction of an Austrian woman upon seeing Hitler in person: “[S]he was silent, her eyes filled with tears. She turned to me and said in English, ‘I have never seen the Führer before — I think my heart is breaking.’” Even if spectators just caught a glimpse of Hitler or heard his voice projected through a loudspeaker, they experienced history first-hand by sharing a common space with Germany’s messiah.

42 Richard Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich* (New York, 2004), 188.
44 Hebung des Fremdenverkehrs, sowie Fremdenverkehr überhaupt, 1936-1939, III. Band, Stadtsarchiv Nürnberg [hierafter StadtAN], Hauptregistrar, 1292.
47 Ian Kershaw has described the Reich Party Rally as “above all a vehicle for the transmission of the Führer cult... now he towered over the Party.” Ian Kershaw, *The Hitler Myth*: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (New York, 1987), 69.
The Reich Party Rally drew both pilgrims and tourists, typically over half a million each year.48 The spectacle began with the “Day of Greeting,” when Hitler arrived by plane, and rode into the heart of the Altstadt. The opening sequence of Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will captures this procession well: narrating Hitler’s drive through historic Nuremberg, the camera repeatedly cuts from his smiling face to the jubilant crowd and to various monuments of the city’s illustrious past, from the Imperial Castle to the “Beautiful Fountain.”49 The climax of the Reich Party Rally was the elaborate ceremony at the “Hall of Honor” in the Luitpold Meadow. This monument, originally dedicated to the casualties of the First World War, now served as a shrine for the sixteen martyrs of the Beer Hall Putsch. Each year, the party honored these men with a pseudoreligious ritual, with new recruits watching as the Blutfahne, the blood-stained relic of the 1923 putsch, was rededicated with new Nazi standards.50 Before a monument honoring fallen soldiers, in a structure commissioned by Luitpold, former Prince Regent of Bavaria, the Nazis commemorated their past and framed it with myths of heroism and rebirth. Watched in a movie theatre in Dresden, Viktor Klemperer noted in his diary: “Contemporary history on film! This time the Nuremberg rally of the Nazi Party. What stage direction of the crowds and what hysteria!”51 Even opponents of the regime could not deny the spectacle’s power. Such rituals allowed the regime to gather the disparate threads of the German past and weave them into a single, comprehensible narrative leading to the Third Reich.52

As the number of visitors grew each year, it became obvious that the grounds around the Luitpold Meadow were inadequate, both logistically and symbolically. As a result, Hitler and his associates developed plans for a complex of buildings and parade grounds that would rival the forum of ancient Rome. By 1939, Nuremberg was the largest building site in the world.53 Although it was ostensibly built for the party, the Nazi architecture was equally popular among tourists, who visited year-round.54 As early as 1935, the Nuremberg Tourism Association reported that visitors were requesting tours of the rally grounds in the southern part of the city. Shortly thereafter, the organization began offering official tours, conducted along prearranged routes with carefully chosen local guides.55 Meanwhile, both local and national tourism associations incorporated the Reich Party Rally Grounds into the sightseeing itinerary. As early as 1934, the Nuremberg Tourism Association printed 100,000 copies of a brochure detailing the plans for the Reich Party Rally Grounds, while the official

50 Dietzfelbinger and Liedtke, Nürnberg — Ort der Massen, 30, 45-46.
53 Dieter Wuttke, Nuremberg: Focal Point of German Culture and History (Bamberg, 1988), 12.
54 Kristin Semmens, Seeing Hitler’s Germany: Tourism in the Third Reich (New York, 2005), 46.
55 Führungen im Reichsparteitagsgelände — Fremdenrundführten, 1935-1943, StadtAN, Zweckverband Reichsparteitag, 337.
guidebook of the city began featuring a description of the grounds in its list of tourist attractions. In 1937, an English-language brochure produced by the official Bavarian Travel Bureau acknowledged Nuremberg’s medieval charm and industrial might before moving on to the rally grounds: “Having seen and enjoyed all the sights of the great past of Nuremberg one ought to pay a visit also to the sites of our modern times ... No visitor should fail to see the gigantic Parade Ground.” Gigantic, great, tremendous — these words defined the marketing of the Reich Party Rally Grounds. Since Hitler understood architecture primarily as a “statement[s] of power,” the buildings of the Reich Party Rally grounds were supposed to make Nazi strength seem tangible. Structures like the Zeppelin Field and Congress Hall would reflect the weight of recent German history and showcase the magnitude of the Third Reich to future generations. At the same time, the sheer size of these buildings indirectly produced a sense of community by dwarfing the individual.

In Nuremberg, a city that did not exhibit the particularism that defined places like Munich, both German and international tourists could watch history being made. In his account of Nuremberg as modern Germany’s “imaginary capital,” Stephen Brockmann argues that the city “had always seen its fate as intimately connected to the fate of the German whole. Nuremberg was indeed a synecdoche for Germany itself.” This tendency was even more pronounced during the Third Reich, when Nuremberg joined Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, and Linz as one of the “Führer Cities” that represented all of Germany. The city’s marketing now celebrated the power of the Third Reich but grounded it in the vague and malleable past of the Franconian city. Locally produced publications confirmed that contemporary history was taking place at the Reich Party Rally Grounds, just as the buildings themselves represented a long tradition of German culture that extended into the medieval city of Dürrer and Sachs.

Tourist publications endorsed Nuremberg’s new status as the “City of the Reich Party Rallies” by listing it among the city’s various titles. An advertisement in an August 1934 issue of the *Neue Leipziger Zeitung* insisted that every German must become acquainted with Nuremberg, the “German Reich’s Treasure Chest, the City of the Mastersingers, and the Reich Party Rallies.” These claims did not contradict each other; they coexisted and complemented one another. Other publications employed similar combinations. The twelfth edition of the *Nuremberg Official Guidebook*, for example, featured...
the new slogan: “City of the Mastersingers and Reich Party Rallies.”

A 1938 brochure issued by the State Tourism Association of Nuremberg and Northern Bavaria used the same tagline, praising the coexistence of the “immortal Nuremberg of the German Romantics and German history” and the new Nuremberg of the “Reich Party Rallies.” Past and present remained balanced in the marketing of Nuremberg, but now the Reich Party Rally Grounds replaced factories as the dominant symbol of the city’s modernity. Conversely, the “Nuremberg of the German Romantics and German history” was never clearly defined.

Whether they visited during the rally itself or during another time of year, tourists to Nuremberg found a place where the past and present connected and seemed to point toward a glorious future for Germany. A 1938 guide published by the Nuremberg Tourism Association distinguished the city as the “living embodiment of German history,” where every year at the Reich Party Rally “new currents of national energy and enthusiasm” originated and subsequently spread across the German fatherland. A 1937, English-language brochure proclaimed:

In no other city in Germany are tradition and old German culture as harmonically blended with the new life and struggles of the present times as here in Nuremberg. He who visits Nuremberg for the first time, even though it be only for a short stay, will undoubtedly as soon as he enters the town be impressed by the imposing developments of the present, amidst the many signs that bear witness to a great and glorious past.

Whether directed at domestic or international visitors, tourist propaganda consistently balanced historical significance and contemporary relevance in its endorsements of Nuremberg.

This new version of grounded modernity helped to make the abstract concept of Germany real by providing tangible evidence of the past and present achievements of the Volksgemeinschaft. For Germans in particular, this fleeting engagement with history helped to overcome the sense of discontinuity and rupture that characterized the interwar period. An exhibit at the Germanic National Museum that coincided with the 1937 party rally sought to accomplish this quite overtly. Entitled “Nuremberg, the German City: From the City of the Imperial Diets to the City of the Reich Party Rallies,”
and organized by Alfred Rosenberg’s Fighting League for German Culture, the exhibit highlighted the historical continuities between the early modern assemblies and the modern-day rallies in order to substantiate the Third Reich’s claim that it was the ideological heir to the First Reich. What is more, the official guidebook of the exhibit explicitly linked the fate of Nuremberg to the fate of the German nation, arguing that when the Reich was strong, Nuremberg was strong, and when the Reich was divided, Nuremberg was divided.70 After immersing themselves in the nation’s rich history at the museum, visitors could witness history firsthand at the nearby rally grounds.71

The “City of the Reich Party Rallies” symbolized the creative spirit of the German people, as well as the power of the National Socialist Party, a violent, anti-Semitic organization. These were not exactly selling points to international tourists. However, a 1935 report by the Nuremberg Tourism Association denied rumors that the city’s anti-Semitic reputation had damaged the local tourism industry. In spite of an alleged boycott of Nuremberg organized by the international Jewish community, statistics confirmed that tourism had improved since 1933.72 While representatives of the tourism industry neither rejected nor downplayed Nuremberg’s anti-Semitic reputation in internal memos, they rarely stressed it in tourist propaganda, presumably for fear of alienating international tourists. One exception can be found in a brochure issued by the Nuremberg Tourism Association in 1939, that is, after the violence of Reichskristallnacht. The brochure boldly stated: “The healthy national and racial instincts that reside in the Franks ensured Nuremberg’s transformation into a stronghold of National Socialism, even before other cities had heard Adolf Hitler’s call.”73 By emphasizing the proper “national and racial instincts” of the Franks, the local tourism association implied that some people simply were not welcome.

For those who were welcome, the Franconian city of Nuremberg provided proximity to German history, both contemporary and medieval. Touring the city facilitated a reconceptualization of time and space that confirmed the special place of the Third Reich within the larger narrative of the German nation. This balancing of tradition and progress, past significance and contemporary relevance, had been the modus operandi of the Bavarian tourism industry for decades. It worked especially well during the Nazi period, when the malleable past of Nuremberg grounded the individual tourist and the Third Reich.

70 Brockmann, Nuremberg, 176, 179.
71 Semmens, Seeing Hitler’s Germany, 67.
73 “Nürnberg Kurzführer,” 1939, BayHStA, Sammlung Varia, 268.
Conclusion

As a modernist endeavor in its own right, tourism led to a remapping of Bavaria in several regards. This new Bavaria was characterized by a sense of perpetuity. Destinations like Franconian Switzerland were defined by their natural landscapes, which seemed to exist outside of time. These locations appealed to the allegedly primordial bond between the German people and the untamed wilderness but they became especially appealing in the wake of nineteenth-century urbanization. Assertions of timelessness were also recognizable in the Bavarian tourism industry’s treatment of history. Guidebooks and brochures often focused on ahistorical forces, like the “creative spirit of the German people,” that transcended particular eras and established a sense of continuity between past and present. Still, even though the Bavarian tourism industry relied on natural and historical destinations, these sites also contained evidence of modernization. Tourist propaganda did not obscure this fact; it celebrated it, and in this manner, helped to remap Bavaria as a modern place. Premodern nostalgia was not necessarily incompatible with a positive experience of modernity, just as a Bavarian location was not incompatible with German nationalism, as demonstrated by the case of Nuremberg. By the 1930s, tourist propaganda had also remapped Bavaria as a German place.

The people who visited Bavaria between the French Revolution and the Second World War lived in a period of rapid social, economic, and political change. Whether departing from New York or London, Mainz or Munich, these people travelled in the shadow of the present, carrying modern baggage that influenced their expectations and determined their desires. My research not only showcases where people traveled and what they chose to see, but illuminates why they traveled and what their chosen destinations represented. The cultural landscapes and historical cityscapes of Bavaria provided temporary access to the foundations of the modern world. By pointing visitors to the past, tourism illuminated the present and cleared the way to the future.

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AT HOME IN ALMANYA?
TURKISH-GERMAN SPACES OF BELONGING IN WEST GERMANY, 1961-1990

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Born in West Berlin to Turkish Gastarbeiter parents, Filiz Güler spent her childhood in the Berlin neighborhood of Wedding, playing in its parks, attending its public schools, and wandering its streets with friends. She excelled at her studies, graduated from the Gymnasium, and ultimately earned a university degree. Now an adult with a family of her own, Güler lives and works in Wedding as an elementary school teacher, specializing in English language instruction. Güler speaks flawless German, considers religion a private matter, sees Germany as her home, and has a successful career that required advanced education. By most measures, she is the poster child for a well-integrated Turkish German.

At one point in her life, though, Güler wanted to leave Germany. While discussing some of the difficulties she encountered growing up with a different language and culture, Güler admitted: “Beginning at twenty, I really wanted to live in Turkey, I wanted to study there. I had this drive, this desire. It was pretty bad.” With time, that desire diminished, and at present she cannot imagine relocating to Turkey or what her life would have been like had she made the move back then.1 However, the fact that — despite embodying in so many ways the traditional markers of successful integration — she did not feel at home in the place where she had been born and raised calls into question the ways in which the relationship between immigrant communities and host societies is understood and measured.

My dissertation examines this relationship through the experiences of Turkish immigrants and their children in the Federal Republic of Germany from the beginning of Turkey’s participation in the guest-worker program in 1961 to the early years of reunified Germany. More specifically, I focus on integration as a process through which members of the Turkish-German community made themselves “at home” in German society by constructing spaces of belonging within and alongside it. By combining a spatial approach with Alltagsgeschichte, the dissertation shows Turkish integration to be a fundamentally local

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1 Filiz Güler (pseudonym), interview by author, 27 May 2009, transcription by Perrin Saylan, Berlin, Germany, 2.
experience, influenced as much by personal relationships and community dynamics as by the larger structural factors such as immigration policy and economic conditions. The field of postwar immigration and multiculturalism in Germany contains a wealth of insightful studies. My dissertation engages most directly with scholarship that investigates the convergence of transnational and local influences on ethnic identity and belonging, such as Rauf Ceylan’s study of Turkish cafes and mosques in Cologne and Patricia Ehrkamp’s research on the Turkish community in Duisburg-Marxloh. My study focuses primarily on the neighborhood of Sprengelkiez in Berlin-Wedding, and relates its history to developments in Germany more broadly. Doing so brings the history of the Turkish-German community into the narratives of postwar Germany and reveals the dynamics of its formation.

Using the framework of space and place to examine integration reveals the reciprocal nature of immigrant settlement and integration. In using this methodological approach, a clearer picture emerges of how, as members of a community on the margins, Turkish immigrants and their children were able to work around established power structures and recreate spaces to address their own wants and needs. In the course of their daily negotiations, members of the Turkish-German community constructed “spaces of belonging” for themselves within their everyday landscapes and the social spaces embedded therein. In my dissertation, I focus specifically on space-making in the workplace, the home and neighborhood, the school, and places of worship as sites of common, daily activity. Often, members of the community used pre-existing spaces, such as the workplace, in ways unintended by the Germans who created and managed those sites. In other cases, they constructed wholly new spaces of interaction. Yet all of these spaces also exerted influence on their inhabitants. While immigrants and their children constructed these spaces to increase their own sense of belonging, they did not result in a linear process of integration. Each space was affected by numerous factors, including its participants, setting, and the reactions of those “outside”; and immigrants and their children engaged in multiple spaces in the course of their daily lives. Consequently, at different times and places members of the Turkish-German community felt varying levels of connection and belonging to German society, as illustrated in the opening story of Filiz Güler.

The results of the convergence of space-making, everyday routines, and immigrant belonging are particularly clear in the context of
educational institutions. Primary and secondary schools have been sites charged with expectations, symbolic importance, and practical challenges in connection with the growth and belonging of the Turkish community in German society. When Turkish families reunited with their relatives working in the Federal Republic and settled into residential neighborhoods, Turkish children and youth began attending German elementary and secondary schools. This development presented both political and pedagogical issues for West German governmental and educational authorities as they grappled with the question of whether to prepare these children for a life in West Germany or a return to their Heimatland. While the answers to this question ranged across the spectrum according to the political make-up of the individual Länder, the federal government, the media, and the public largely agreed that the school constituted the most important site for promoting the successful integration of foreign children into German society.

In the early 1970s, sociologists, political scientists, and other scholars interested in migration began examining the contemporary situation of Gastarbeiterkinder, focusing on the influence of the politics of the guestworker program on educational policy as well as the practical challenges of and for the second generation in German schools. While some early studies presented a relatively positive tone about the potential of the school as a site of integration for Gastarbeiterkinder, by the end of the 1970s most social scientists saw the persistent adherence to the idea of the rotation principle (if not the actual practice) as detrimental to the quality of the education of foreign students and their ability to integrate into German society. The studies that followed in the 1980s and 1990s continued to highlight challenges to the education of the second generation as a key element of continued social isolation and examined the consequences of decreased funding and the designation of foreign children as “special problems” for the school system. Whether focusing on health, social conditions, and family socialization or the structural factors of the German school system and labor market, more recent scholarship has generally concluded that students with migrant backgrounds underperform in comparison to their German peers. Their relatively poor performance in school, researchers have argued, whatever its cause, has put immigrants’ integration into German society at risk.

Even as the discourse around school and education brought to the fore real challenges to the German educational system and its

8 See, for example, Herbert R. Koch, Gastarbeiterkinder in deutschen Schulen (Koningswinter am Rhein, 1970). Koch drew on his experiences and the data he had collected as a school inspector in Düsseldorf.

9 The rotation principle refers to the stipulation in the Gastarbeiterprogramm that migrant laborers serve in the Federal Republic for a limited time and then return to their country of origin, to be replaced by new Gastarbeiter.


11 Joyce Marie Mushaben, "A Crisis of Culture: Isolation and Integration among Turkish Guestworkers in the German Federal Republic," in Turkish Workers in Europe: An Interdisciplinary Study, ed. İlhan Başgöz and Norman Furniss (Bloomington, 1985), 125-150.


students, it obscured the complex interactions between teachers, students, administrators, and parents. While numerous examples exist of low achievement in classrooms with high percentages of non-German students, stories of students with migrant backgrounds achieving some degree of academic success also abounded. My research, which is one of the first historical studies of the subject, explores the reciprocal influences between the second generation and their schools from the 1970s to the early 1990s, revealing how the school served simultaneously as a site of inclusion and exclusion, furthering the second generation’s sense of conflicted belonging.

I. The School as a Site of Struggle and Conflict

The debate over the role and responsibilities of school in the lives of children with migrant backgrounds began years before Turkish students started filling the seats in German classrooms. In the early to mid-1960s, the rapid growth in the numbers of Gastarbeiterkinder in schools across the country, combined with debates about the developing European Community and reform movements regarding the German educational system, prompted politicians at the federal level to take an active interest in educational policy. Initially, the majority of politicians, as well as the Standing Conference of the Ministers for Education and Cultural Affairs, held to the idea of the rotation principle and concluded that if Gastarbeiterkinder were to be educated in German schools, they should be prepared to reintegrate into their country of origin. This perspective shifted in the late 1960s and early 1970s as people began to recognize that many Gastarbeiter were extending their stay and bringing their families to live with them in West Germany. Under the SPD/FDP coalition, the federal government adopted a dual strategy of encouraging the return of migrant workers to their countries of origin while promoting the integration of Gastarbeiterkinder into German society through education in the German school system. Despite the Anwerbestopp of 1973, which terminated the recruitment of new guestworkers, politicians began to recognize the significant growth and diversification of the immigrant population. This led them to increase their reliance on the German school system as the site of Gastarbeiterkinder integration and a tool to combat ghettoization of ethnic minorities and improve their position in the labor market. The economic downturn and increasing conservatism, however, shifted the discussion from the integration of Gastarbeiterkinder to questioning immigrants’ ability and desire to integrate into German society.

15 The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (Kultusministerkonferenz) is a federal body that issues policies to the Länder regarding education but does not have the power to enforce its suggestions.
sentiments were especially popular within the CDU/CSU, which came to power in the Bundestag in 1982. While the government continued to view schools as important weapons for combatting ghettoization and the growing unemployment levels of “foreigners,” the tenor of the debate — at least at the federal level — had grown more critical.16

During this time, the Länder were designing and implementing their own educational policies, resulting in a variety of approaches to the education of Gastarbeiterkinder. West Berlin’s strategy regarding “foreign” student education soon began to follow the premise that the second generation needed to be equipped to lead successful lives in Germany. School officials based their program on the goal of the quickest possible integration of migrant children into the German school system. Migrant students were placed in classes with German students and had additional German language instruction in smaller, separate classes. The program in West Berlin also adhered (or attempted to adhere) to a 20 percent cap of “foreign” students in each German classroom, and until the 1980s, left teaching of the children’s native languages to the consulates and embassies of the sending countries, while supplying those classes with facilities and maintenance.17 Despite their good intentions, Berlin school officials thus failed to incorporate their students’ languages and cultures into the education process, breaking the connection between home and school. In addition, the practical implementation of the 20 percent cap meant that those “foreign” students who exceeded the quota were educated in separate classes, entirely composed of other foreign students. Finally, Berlin schools experienced high dropout rates among their students with migrant backgrounds. In 1976, the chief administrative official of education estimated that 60 percent of “foreign” students left school before finishing their studies.18

The personal narratives of Turkish-Germans reveal how these and other challenges made schools a site of conflict and struggle. One of the first struggles the second generation faced was overcoming the language barrier. While some had the opportunity to learn German as children on the playground or from childcare providers, many others entered school with little or no knowledge of the language, as their parents spoke their native language with them at home. Moreover, those who had attended school in Turkey had to adjust to a different educational system. Not being able to fully participate in class negatively affected their ability to learn their lessons and often worked to isolate them from their fellow classmates.

16 For an in-depth study of the influence of political developments on the development of educational policy regarding Gastarbeiterkinder, see Brittany Lehman, “Education and Immigration: Federal Debates and Policies in West Germany, 1960s-1980s” (Master’s Thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010).

17 Rist, Guestworkers 226-228.

18 Rist, Guestworkers, 226-232.
Being in one of the many *Ausländerklassen* mitigated the social isolation these second generation students felt from their peers but also hindered their ability to learn German, despite the additional German language classes given there. “At the time, we were guestworker kids,” Sprengelkiez resident Bilge Yılmaz reflected, comparing her generation with her children’s, “we didn’t have very good German, because all of us Turks were in one class.”20 Although some officials, including Berlin’s *Schulsenatorin* Hanna-Renate Laurien (CDU), claimed that “reine Ausländerklassen” (pure foreigner classes) did not lead to isolation from German society, few of those interviewed mentioned having close friendships with Germans in their schools.21 Filiz Güler counted it as an advantage that, though she was in a “reine Ausländerklasse,” her best friend was Albanian, which forced them to speak German with each other. If caught speaking Turkish during class, Güler and her classmates had to put a penny in a jar as a symbolic punishment.22

Even after second-generation students knew German well enough to participate more fully in classroom activities, German as a subject often proved a persistent challenge. An examination of the *Abgangszeugnisse* from a Wedding secondary school in the mid- to late-1980s reveals a Turkish-German student body with diverse academic strengths and weaknesses. A significant minority — averaging about one-third over the course of six years — earned a “4” (the equivalent of an American “D”) or worse in their German courses.23 Lale, who attended another *Oberschule* in Wedding, lamented her ongoing struggle with German grammar, which started in primary school and continued to plague her in eighth grade. She liked geography and history, she told her German interviewer, but she hated German.24 This struggle with language could also affect otherwise high-achieving students in the more advanced levels of the German school system. Filiz Güler, armed with ambition and a stack of report cards littered with 1’s (the equivalent of American A’s), proceeded to a *Gymnasium* with the official recommendation of her primary school. Once there, however, the academic challenge set her back on her heels. The subject matter was harder, the expectations higher, and Güler felt that language made the *Gymnasium* a greater challenge to her than to her German classmates:

But in the *Gymnasium* I noticed that it was just difficult, because of language barriers I’d say … somehow something was missing from the vocabulary, I noticed that in German. I would think, oh I want so much more, I want to express
myself between, and the essays, why aren’t they coming together? Why do I always get a 4? Then I looked at one of my German friends and thought, hmm … she gets 1s and 2s. And so I thought, yeah, maybe they have it a little bit easier.24

While Güler felt motivated to do well in school and had parents that supported her education, this was not the case for all young women. For some, the struggle they experienced at school was partly the result of conflicting expectations, lack of interest, or lack of support. Families, and sometimes also the young women themselves, considered school unnecessary or a distraction from their duties to the family or from their futures as housewives and mothers. Güler remembered that some of her classmates in the Grundschule did not care about their progress in school: “They wanted to get married as soon as possible,” she explained.25 Lack of motivation could lead to young women leaving school before they received the training necessary to prepare them for the German job market. Deniz, for example, left school at age fourteen after the ninth grade without doing an Ausbildung to run away and marry her boyfriend.26 While some young women voluntarily left school early, others, like Azra Demir’s eldest daughter, were kept home by their parents to take care of the household. Demir expressed regret over the decision, but explained that it was a common practice in the neighborhood and no one had told them school attendance was mandatory.27

Difficulties with language or parental expectations were not the only sources of conflict at school, however. Güler’s transition from Grundschule to Gymnasium reveals another challenge encountered by the second generation at school: conflict with their teachers and fellow classmates. Sometimes this conflict was spurred by teachers’ different (and discriminatory) expectations of their “foreign” students compared to their German ones. Though Güler had received the official recommendation of her school to proceed to the Gymnasium, a few teachers cautioned her against it, saying that it might be too difficult for her. “[I have] also heard that from others, that it’s said to so-called children with a migration background, ‘hmmm, careful, I wouldn’t recommend the Gymnasium to you.’”28 Lale told her interviewer about a French teacher at her school — also a foreigner, the young woman pointed out — who “looks at me like she’s never seen a Turk before, as if I’m her enemy.”29

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24 Güler interview, 9.
25 Ibid., 8.
26 Deniz (pseudonym), interview by Ursula Trüper, 12 December 1992, transcription, DLSA, MMA, Berlin, Germany, 1.
27 Azra Demir (pseudonym), interview and transcription by Hatice Renc, 9 March 1993, DLSA, MMA, 10. The local Grundschule did, however, send a letter to their home, saying they must send their second daughter to school.
28 Güler interview, 2.
29 Lale interview, 8.
Though none of the second-generation interviewees felt that Ausländerfeindlichkeit (xenophobia) was a daily event during the school day, many found that their fellow students could be quite blatant in their displays of hostility and xenophobia. Deniz described an incident in sixth grade when some of the German students in the class next to hers told the Turkish students that they all needed to “go away.” “Actually, I like Germans,” Deniz added, “but when they say something like that, I don’t know [laughing] what they have against Turks.” Being laughed at for mistakes made in class and called names like “Scheiss-Ausländer” and “Scheiss-Türke” were other ways the second generation experienced hostility at school. When Emre and a group of friends stirred up trouble at their Oberschule, it was the sole German participant — the young man was careful to point out — who turned them in, resulting in Emre being expelled from school. Such events, even when not clearly motivated by xenophobia, led many Turkish-German students to feel cut off from their teachers and classmates more generally; they set the groundwork for further misunderstandings, conflict, and distrust.

Turkish-German youth also struggled with exclusion and discrimination at the Berufsschule, both on an individual and an institutional level. Many who completed their studies at Haupt-, Real-, or Gesamtschulen and wanted to continue with an apprenticeship found positions difficult, if not impossible, to come by. For some, the problem was a legal one. In 1974, the federal government passed a law barring foreign youth who immigrated from that year on from receiving work permits. Immigrant youths would have to wait five years before they could apply for the permit, which was required not only for employment but also for apprenticeship positions. Thus, despite legal immigration, part of the migrant population was barred from obtaining legal job training and employment. In a 1981 report, the Federal Ministry of Education and Science concluded that only one quarter of all foreign youth at the ages of compulsory vocational training (between fifteen and eighteen years of age) were continuing their education or had obtained an apprenticeship. For those who immigrated to West Germany as teenagers, this statistic rose to 50 percent. Politicians, social scientists, and the media increasingly began to link the difficulties foreign youths had in securing apprenticeships to failed integration and a perceived growth in youth violence. Though a 1990 report from the Federal Ministry of Education and Science emphasized the positive trend of increasing numbers of “foreign” youth enrolled in vocational training, the press continued

30 Deniz interview, 1.
32 Lale interview, 7-9.
33 Emre and Erkan (pseudonyms), interview by Ursula Trüper, 7 December 1993, audiocassette, DLSA, MMA.
35 Der Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Arbeiterkinder im Bildungssystem (Bad Honnef: 1981), 41, 46.
37 Der Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Grundlagen, Perspektiven, Bildung: Wissenschaft, Berufsbildungbericht 1990 (Bad Honnef: 1990), 120-124.
to stress the relationship between lack of opportunity for foreign youths and their participation in organized violence.38 Discrimination and conflict in the school system, which the lack of opportunity for apprenticeships illustrated, the media concluded, led ausländische Jugendliche into a life of crime.

While second-generation students were often on the receiving end of hostility in school, this was not always the case. Turkish-German students, like their fellow classmates, also instigated conflict. Teachers documented these classroom conflicts in students’ files, report cards, and letters to parents. Most cases were relatively minor, for example, students being distracted during lessons or not turning in their homework.39 Some students received reprimands and letters home for getting caught breaking school rules, such as smoking on school grounds.40 Still others, however, were more actively disobedient and challenged authority. Despite receiving positive evaluations throughout the Grundschule, one young woman’s behavior took a different turn once she reached the seventh grade. At first her rebellion was relatively small and passive; she stopped paying attention in class and turning in her homework. By eighth grade, however, her challenges to teachers’ authority became more aggressive, including throwing erasers during class and insulting the teacher.41 Thus, like their German peers, second-generation students sometimes contributed to the space of conflict and hostility within the school even when they did not create it.

Students and teachers were not the only participants in this space of conflict. Parents, too, found the school to be a site of struggle and even hostility. In some cases, these struggles stemmed from Turkish parents’ own limited schooling or lack of understanding of the German school system. Prior to 1972, the Turkish educational system consisted of primary, middle, and secondary schools, with only five years of primary school education being compulsory. A diploma was awarded upon the successful completion of each level. The German system not only required longer attendance but also had a more complicated series of tracks and diplomas. One Realschule principal explained such conflicts with the following example: a Turkish-German student’s parents were upset with the school, because they wanted their son to be a doctor and, apparently, did not realize that the type of Oberschule their son attended did not allow for that possibility.42

In other cases, parents entered into an ongoing conflict between their children and the school’s teachers or administrators. When Elif’s teacher sent her to the principal’s office for refusing to stop eating

an apple during class — two German girls were eating bread at the same time, the young woman told her interviewer, and the teacher did not tell them to stop — the principal sent her home for three weeks. When she returned, the principal informed Elif that she would be fined for missing so much school. She protested, saying that the only reason she had been gone was because the principal had made her leave. You can’t prove that, the principal apparently replied. When Elif’s stepmother heard this story, she marched directly back to the school with her stepdaughter, demanding that Elif be transferred. At first the principal refused but changed his mind after the stepmother threatened to submit a formal accusation against him to the education supervisory council. Elif transferred to a new school and received her Hauptschulabschluss within a year.43

Parents also countered school officials’ expectations and decisions in order to advocate for their children’s improved educational opportunities. One of the first tasks Gülen Yeğenoğlu took up when she moved to Frankfurt was to seek out a school she felt would best equip her son for their new life in Germany. Once she found such a school, she met with its director and counselor as well as the teacher whose class her son would attend to argue the case for her son’s admittance. In addition, Yeğenoğlu maintained contact with them as her son progressed through his education.44 When his son’s teacher wanted to move him from the Gymnasium to a Hauptschule, Behçet Algan went to school to discuss the proposed change with the teacher and refused, politely, to have his son moved. “My son stayed in the Gymnasium and finished with a 2.4,” Algan recounted. “Now he studies law. Unfortunately, I have to say that many foreign families were affected by such problems. … Whoever fought, won. Whoever did not fight, those children were sent to the Hauptschule.”45

II. The School as a Place of Opportunity

One reason the school could be so full of conflict was precisely that the participants involved realized the potential advantages this site could offer the growing number of children with a migrant background. The earlier examples of Yeğenoğlu’s and Algan’s advocacy, even as they reveal the difficulties “foreign” children faced in school, illustrate parents’ perception of the school as a highly significant place for the well-being of their children. Although most parents originally intended to spend a limited amount of time in Germany, many lengthened their stay out of consideration for their children’s

43 Elif (pseudonym), interview by Ursula Trüper, 11 December 1992, transcription, DLSA, MMA, 3.


futures. According to a 1973 survey in the Ruhr region, 31 percent of parents considered their children’s education a motivating factor in their decision to extend their stay, while 55 percent said their children’s occupational interests influenced their decision. 61 percent wanted their children to continue schooling, while 24 percent preferred for their children to be involved in an apprenticeship. In 1974, a more extensive survey in Cologne found that 32 percent of parents regarded the Abitur (university-entrance qualification) as their children’s educational goal, 31 percent wanted their children to complete an apprenticeship or certification from vocational schools, while 12 percent would have been satisfied with the Hauptschulabschluss (granted at the end of tenth grade). A similar survey a year later among the Turkish community also indicated that a significant number of parents were staying longer than intended out of concern for their children’s education; women in particular gave great weight to vocational and professional training for their children.

The statistical evidence that their children’s education was a major motivating factor in parents’ decisions to lengthen their stays in Germany is borne out by the narratives of first-generation parents. Thus, Hadiye Akin, recalling her husband’s plan to leave Germany after three years, remarked: “But then the children came. And ... if the children are in school, you can forget about going back.” Such a statement is common in the first-generation’s stories. Nermin Özdil exhibited pride in her children’s scholastic achievements, which included a university education for each of them. She explained her own supportive role as going to every parents’ meeting and inviting her children’s teachers to her home for tea. Through their participation in school life, first-generation Turkish immigrant parents opened up new opportunities for themselves as well. Especially at the Grundschule level, teachers invited students’ parents into the classroom to contribute to and join in special festivities, which allowed Turkish parents to become more familiar with the school itself and brought them into contact with other parents.

For members of the second generation, the spaces of opportunity they encountered and created within the context of their primary and secondary schools enabled them to form and maintain friendships and other social relationships similar to those they experienced in their neighborhoods. Some made friends quickly, easing the transition into this new site and setting a positive tone for the rest of their career at school. For others, the transition was decidedly rockier.

48 For examples, see Kudat, “Personal, Familial and Societal Impacts of Turkish Women’s Migration to Europe,” 299; and Czarina Wilpert, “Children of Foreign Workers in the Federal Republic of Germany,” 481-482.
51 Ute Schmidt (pseudonym), interview by author, 29 June 2009, transcription by Perrin Saylan, Berlin, Germany.
52 Yılmaz interview, 2.
but ultimately successful. Students also cited examples of teachers and administrators who helped them to feel at home and succeed in school. When asked about Ausländerfeindlichkeit, ten-year-old Timur talked about a teacher who was “so nice” and “ashamed of Nazis” and people like them.\textsuperscript{53} The context of the boy’s statements shows the connection he made between the positive relationship he had had with his teacher and his sense of belonging at school in general. Similarly, Emre’s respect for his principal helped him to feel more comfortable at his new Oberschule, despite the circumstances of his transfer.\textsuperscript{54} This type of space proved especially important for young women, for whom the home could be a stifling or even abusive place.

Positive relationships with teachers and fellow students often had more tangible benefits than an abstract sense of belonging. Friendships with fellow classmates meant assistance with schoolwork, protection from bullies, and help learning German. When Lale started taking swimming lessons as part of her fourth-grade curriculum, she was so inept that she nearly drowned. A school friend helped her learn to swim, and by the end of the year Lale was the second-best swimmer in her class.\textsuperscript{55} Teachers, too, provided tangible support and assistance. One of Elif’s teachers, upon learning that her student wrote poetry, put her into contact with a Frauenladen where Elif gave a reading that led to an invitation to share her poetry on a television show.\textsuperscript{56} When Filiz Güler struggled with particularly difficult schoolwork at the Gymnasium, she would call a former teacher of hers from primary school who was always ready to help.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, some of the connections the children of immigrants forged at school offered them skills and support that helped them develop personally and enabled them to operate more successfully in that space.

\textsuperscript{53} Timur (pseudonym), interview by Ursula Trüper, 22 June 1993, audiocassette, DLSA, MMA.

\textsuperscript{54} Emre and Erkan interview. Emre was expelled from his previous Oberschule for disciplinary reasons.

\textsuperscript{55} Lale interview, 18.

\textsuperscript{56} Elif interview, 5. Elif ultimately declined the invitation as some of her poetry concerned her relationship with her father, and she did not want those sentiments to get back to him.

\textsuperscript{57} Güler interview, 9.
The school also offered more formal avenues for these children to consider and prepare for their lives once they finished their required schooling. For students who attended a Haupt-, Gesamt- or Real-

schule, a Betriebspraktikum (internship at a company) formed a part of their formal instruction. Students were given a variety of professions to choose from, some of the more popular being in the fields of healthcare, customer service, industry, and manufacturing. Such internships exposed student participants to possible future occupations, taught them some of the skills they would need to succeed in those positions, and sometimes also helped them to make contacts in that particular industry. Other students participated in a Lehre (apprenticeship) and Ausbildung (job training) that served a similar function. Those involved in apprenticeships also had to attend courses at a Berufsschule, where they would learn skills that were not part of on-the-job training. Bülent Kaplan began his Lehre at age fifteen, one of two Turks among the forty apprentices. Between his responsibilities at the company and the Berufsschule, he did not have much free time but still enjoyed going to a bar with his Turkish and German colleagues and sometimes playing soccer.

Large businesses, like Siemens and AEG-Telefunken, coordinated with Berufsschulen in order to bring “foreign students” into their apprenticeship programs, often highlighting this fact in their company newspapers. In a 1982 Siemens Mitteilungen article, two of the young Turkish-German Azubis (Auszubildende; trainees) interviewed described the types of jobs they were training for and what positions they hoped to hold in the future. In the early 1980s, Siemens also instituted a Benachteiligten-Programm (program for the disadvantaged) at its Frankfurt branch that focused on bringing young Germans without a Hauptschulabschluss and “foreigners” (which included both those born in Germany and those who had moved there recently) with language difficulties into an apprenticeship program. Through this training program, apprentices learned either telecommunications or electrical-systems installation. Turkish-German students knew that such formal training was essential for success on the job market. Güler explained what she saw as the attitude of her generation, saying, “one thought, I must find a place in German society and that only happens through education.”

In the second generation, young women who did not want to live and work like their parents, especially, took advantage of the educational opportunities. After Aylin completed her Realschulabschluss, she

59 Bülent Kaplan (pseudonym), interview by Ursula Trüper, 14 June 1993, audio cassette, DLSA, MMA.
60 “Anpassen, ohne die Identität zu verlieren: Gespräche mit ausländischen Mitarbeitern,” Siemens Mitteilungen, December 1982, p. 6, Siemens Corporate Archives (SCA), Munich, Germany.
61 “Trotzdem sind wir Fremde hier,” Siemens Mitteilungen, December 1986, 3-page article, unpaginated, SCA.
62 Güler interview, 7-8.
continued with an apprenticeship as a foreign-language secretary. It would be a good career, she thought, that would allow her to be independent of her family and the need for a husband.63 Sanem, who was sixteen years old and dating a man seven years her senior at the time of her interview, was adamant about finishing her education and training and starting a career before getting married. Her reasons for wanting a career were both practical and personal: What if her husband got sick? Then they would need her income. But more important was her desire to put her training into action and have an interesting life. “The main thing is,” Sanem explained, “if someone asks me, ‘what are you,’ I say ‘yeah, I’m a trained retail saleswoman,’ I’ve got something [to fall back on]. And I don’t say, ‘yeah, I finished 10th grade, and now I sit at home.’ Then why did I go to school for ten years? For nothing. For nothing at all!” Many Turkish-German women thus seized the opportunity education afforded them to attain financial security and independence.

III. The School as a Space of (Cross-)Cultural Education and Socialization

One of the opportunities that schools presented for both students and teachers was to create a space of cross-cultural education. The student body and, in later years, the teaching staff constituted an increasingly ethnically diverse population that rubbed shoulders on a daily basis and spent a significant part of their waking hours together. This close proximity, along with the school’s mandate to equip its foreign students for a successful transition into German society, provided the conditions for the development of spaces within the school in which students and teachers, whether purposefully or by accident, could learn about each other’s languages, customs, and traditions. Sometimes these interactions led only to shallow exchanges or the perpetuation of stereotypes. Interviews with some German administrators and teachers, for example, revealed highly generalized knowledge based on perceived religious differences: “Turks” celebrate Ramadan, do not eat pork, and women sometimes wear headscarves.65 Other encounters between second-generation students, their classmates, and their teachers through formal instruction and informal social activities did result in spaces of cross-cultural education, however limited they may have been.

Most of the intentional, structured cross-cultural education occurred within the context of the classroom, as educators worked to fulfill
their role as teachers of German language and culture to their foreign students. The classroom exposed these students to a new educational system with different lessons, expectations, and ways of interacting than in Turkish schools. Since most Turkish-German students grappled with the challenge of learning a new language, language-learning became one of their first spaces of cultural education. In many cases, Gastarbeiterkinder received special German-language instruction. At a primary school in Sprengelkiez, these additional classes consisted of four to five students who would be taken out of their regular class for a few hours each week for German lessons. Early language instruction was fairly piecemeal, stitched together by teachers in response to an immediate need rather than as a result of training and preparation. By the mid-1980s, however, teachers and some school administrators had begun to address the situation more systematically, developing more efficient and effective strategies for teaching their foreign students German language and culture.

Particularly in the 1970s and stretching into the 1980s, however, German schools also concerned themselves with equipping Gastarbeiterkinder for their family’s return to their country of origin, even though that prospect was becoming increasingly unlikely. For the children of Turkish immigrants, this task was to be accomplished by teachers from Turkey who held special classes in German schools. Selected by the Turkish government, these teachers were generally strong supporters of Kemalism and thus secular nationalists. Their classes, conducted solely in Turkish, consisted of Turkish-language instruction, geography, history, and other subjects, opening up another space of cultural education. Since few students had received formal education in the Turkish language, or Turkish history, politics, and culture, these Turkish classes constituted a space of cross-cultural education for the growing numbers of Turkish-German children for whom Turkey was their Heimatland but not their home.

German teachers also found themselves affected by these new cross-cultural spaces. Some teachers even learned Turkish in their efforts to successfully communicate with and teach their foreign students. For some, this occurred primarily in the context of their own classrooms during the course of their lessons. Ute Schmidt, a preschool teacher, described her shock at the number of “foreigners” in her class when she first started at a primary school in Sprengelkiez. “But it was exciting and interesting,” she said, recounting her experiences. She began by learning how to pronounce all of her students’

66 Maja Herbert (pseudonym), interview by Ursula Trüper, 16 June 1993, audiocassette, DLSA, MMA.
67 Ruth Mandel, “A Place of Their Own: Contesting Spaces and Defining Places in Berlin’s Migrant Community,” in Barbara Daly Metcalf, ed., Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe (Berkeley, 1996), 155. “Kemalism” refers to the political ideology championed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and adopted by the Republic of Turkey, which, among other platforms, advocates a distinct separation of religion and the state.
68 Güler interview, 13-14.
names correctly and soon she was learning Turkish words. “I have to say ... I can’t say a whole sentence correctly,” she confessed, “but I can understand a lot of words. I had to, because I, when I tested the kids, whether they named colors or numbers or their body parts, I had to learn all of that.”

Schmidt grew close to many of her students, enjoyed warm support from their parents, and remained in touch with a number of them even after her retirement.

Other teachers enrolled directly in Turkish-language classes to equip themselves for the challenge of a multicultural classroom. When Sabine Müller started teaching in West Berlin in the mid-1970s, a quarter of the students in her first class were the children of immigrants. Some, she recounted, spoke German very well, while others struggled. “That meant I was confronted with this from the beginning. And at first, I didn’t know how to deal with it.” Since most of her foreign students were Turkish, Müller decided soon thereafter to take a Turkish course and learn the differences between the German and Turkish languages. She also drew on her Turkish colleagues, first those employed by the Turkish government and later independent teachers, for help with the new language and in communicating with her students. Müller regarded understanding her students’ language as part of being a good teacher, and her efforts contributed to a space of cross-cultural education that would gradually extend beyond her own language-learning to incorporate all of her students and the classroom itself.

Particularly in the earlier years of immigrant settlement and until the mid-1980s, however, few teachers received any formal education or training specific to the instruction of Ausländerkinder. While many in West Berlin and throughout West Germany struggled to effectively
teach increasingly diverse student populations, some took it upon themselves to develop strategies and programs to meet these new challenges. In West Berlin, a movement to incorporate both German and Turkish languages into classroom instruction began in the early 1980s with two teachers at a primary school in the district of Kreuzberg. Teachers in other districts with high foreigner populations, such as Wedding and Tiergarten, looked upon their efforts with interest. Especially in the beginning, the bilingual education approach was very much a grassroots effort as interested teachers met with each other, discussed the pedagogy, and developed their own instructional materials. Soon, however, teachers took the idea in a different direction; instead of using *zweisprachige Erziehung* (bilingual education) in foreigner-only classes, they integrated the concept into mixed classrooms of German and migrant students. By the mid- to late-1980s, similar programs were popping up all over the city, aided by funding from the sympathetic SPD-Grüne coalition government in the Berlin Senate. At its highpoint, approximately sixty schools throughout the city offered bilingual classes.

Bilingual education came to Wedding primary schools in the late 1980s and early 1990s, due in part to the efforts of Sabine Müller. Eager to be an effective teacher and willing to try new things, Müller began incorporating the approach into her own classroom and soon became a passionate advocate and developer of the program. “I observed how wonderful it is for the children and also for the parents,” she explained. As part of the program, the classroom furniture and tools were labeled with tags bearing both their German and Turkish names. The students and parents came into the classroom, “and discover[ed]: Aha! There’s something Turkish, there’s something Turkish, there’s something Turkish. My language is accepted, and I’ll be accepted, too.” For Murat Güngör, another primary school teacher who has worked in Tiergarten and Wedding, one of the strongest pedagogical features of the bilingual approach is its utilization of what the children have already learned before they enter school. Instead of starting from zero, Güngör related, the approach builds on students’ previous knowledge, making them feel more confident in the classroom, which in turn encourages their learning process.

The implementation and practice of the *zweisprachige Erziehung* approach opened up an obvious and deliberate cross-cultural educational space in primary schools throughout the city in which teachers and students, German and “foreign,” participated actively. As

71 Müller interview, 4.
72 Ibid., 2.
74 Müller interview, 4.
75 Kayman interview.
reflected in the observations of both Müller and Güngör, the verbal and visual inclusion of German and Turkish created a space that allowed for all participants to be involved in daily classroom activities on a relatively even level. At the same time, teachers incorporated other exchanges, such as celebrating holidays from different cultures in the classroom, and often emphasized commonalities in particular religious or cultural traditions. Müller illustrated this aspect of the program with the example of Abraham, a central figure in the Muslim Festival of the Opferfest (Sacrifice) as well as in the Christian Bible.76

Turkish-German students further learned about and experienced German holidays and traditions in classrooms and school-wide celebrations throughout the year, which also provided parents with the opportunity to experience and contribute to the classroom as a cross-cultural space. When Schmidt’s preschool class celebrated St. Martin’s Day, parents brought homemade baked goods and joined in the class party, part of which took place in a nearby Catholic church. “They thought it was fantastic,” Schmidt remembered, that they could take part in the festivities and the singing. Schmidt credited parental participation in this and other class celebrations with helping parents to feel more comfortable in the classroom and with the school in general.77

Conclusion
Primary and secondary schools played multiple and at times conflicting roles in the lives of second-generation students, their parents, and their teachers. The school brought Turkish-German students into direct contact with Germans, institutions, and expectations that alternately served to embed them in the host society even as they continued to define them as “foreign.” Teachers and fellow students, both intentionally and unknowingly, created spaces of exclusion that informed these students of their foreignness and reinforced the mindset that this was not their “home.” Yet, Turkish-German students also found and created within the school spaces of opportunity that enabled them to pursue their own interests and goals. To facilitate the education of these new students, school administrators and teachers adapted, even transforming the physical classrooms themselves. Often, change started with the teachers in grassroots, trial-and-error type programs that over time became a regular and regulated facet of the curriculum.78 The effects of the spaces within the school were

76 Müller interview, 4.
77 Schmidt interview, 4.
78 Unfortunately, administrative support and funding for zweisprachige Erziehung programs began to wane in the mid-1990s as well-to-do German families moved out of the central districts of the city and into more suburban areas. By 2009, only five of the original sixty schools still offered bilingual classes.
ambivalent but overall led to a bounded, at times almost defensive, sense of belonging.

More broadly, this look at the experiences of Turkish-German children in their local schools illustrates the centrality of space in understanding the relationship between immigrants and their host society. By examining the space-making practices of Turkish immigrants and their children in their everyday landscapes, the active and interactive nature of integration becomes more apparent and reveals the places in which German society, not only immigrants, experienced a measure of hybridization. Ultimately, a spatial approach helps to explain the multi-faceted and at times conflicting nature of immigrant belonging — a complicated social, cultural, economic, and emotional connection rooted in the deceptively simple activities of one’s daily life.

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1989: HOW WE LOST POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES

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BERLIN

“Where were you on November 9, 1989, when the Wall fell?” Outside of Germany, I have been asked no other question more often than this one in the last ten years. If I were to divide all the events in which I have participated on the basis of this question, there would be only a few at which it did not come up.

This question is a phenomenon. What is most striking about this phenomenon is that it is no longer surprising. For no other question seems to suggest itself more naturally concerning East Germans over the age of forty than this one. In an unpretentious way, this question links world events to personal life, and perhaps it might even generate a story. The question assumes that those asked remember what they were doing and thinking on that evening, that night, the next morning, as well as where they were and who they were with. And it is also a question that allows inquirers to demonstrate a certain basic knowledge and, at the same time, to demonstrate kindness: after all, it offers Germans the rare opportunity to speak light-heartedly — indeed, joyfully and proudly — about their own history.

I would argue, however, that the question also reflects a particular historical understanding of the Fall of the Berlin Wall. And this understanding seems to be a paradox. On the one hand, there is hardly anyone who does not think of this date as a rupture. In the consciousness of Europeans and probably almost all nations, the Fall of the Wall marked the end of the Cold War. November 9, 1989, spelled the end of an era that had been defined by the end of the Second World War. On the other hand, the Fall of the Wall is degraded to an episode, to a pleasant experience that affected Eastern Europe and brought the countries behind the Iron Curtain back into the civilized world — a good story that has nothing, or very little, to do with the Here and Now.

To put it another way: It is best to illustrate a presentation on the fall of 1989 and its consequences with Trabi cars, debris from the Wall, German flags, or bananas rather than with Lehmann Brothers, African refugees or the Occupy Movement. I speak of the fall of 1989 because
October 3, 1990, the date of German unification, does not stir much in me — and possibly not just in me. And this is not only because no one ever asked me where I was on October 3, 1990. I remember that we stayed up until midnight. There was a sort of New Year’s Eve atmosphere, just more subdued. And when the clock struck midnight, I knew even less than on New Year’s Eve how I was supposed to feel. The category of the “national” had not played a role in my life up to that point. No, that’s not true, it had played a dubious role. I found it strange and suspicious. Moreover, in the fall of 1989, I had wanted, had longed for something other than the old Federal Republic.

There is only one reason why October 3, 1990, was selected as the day of the German Democratic Republic’s accession to the Federal Republic: it was the last Saturday before the October 7, the national holiday of the GDR on which the country that was surrendering its sovereignty would have become 41 years old. And this birthday needed to be avoided. If the decision-makers had had the courage to wait another six days until the following Friday, they could have declared October 9 the Day of German Unity. And that would have been splendid — a sign of a new Germany.

In answer to the question of what I did on November 9, 1989, I usually say, “Please ask me what I did on the October 9, 1989.” This often provokes puzzlement, even in Germany. And when I say, “October 9 was more important than November 9,” the audience starts to grow restless. November 9, 1989, was one of the very few days on which I managed to go to bed early — and when I got up the next day, the Wall was gone. I could add that, when I saw the long line of people in front of the police station who were there to get the necessary stamp to leave the country, I was worried that everyone was going to the West and that no one would come to the demonstrations anymore. Now you will be thinking: “Aha! He has no story to tell. He slept through the most important historical moment in his lifetime. He’s ashamed but won’t admit it and would rather talk about another day.”

October 9, 1989, was a Monday. At that time, there had been demonstrations in Leipzig for several weeks that later went down in history as the “Monday Demonstrations.” From the beginning of the 1980s, people — mostly youth — had gathered in the Nicolai Church in Leipzig to share their experiences concerning their conscientious objection to serving in the military. They called their meetings “peace prayers.” These gatherings were a thorn in the side of the state, but also of some church people. Nonetheless, they managed to continue
their “peace prayers.” In some years, hardly even ten or twenty people came together. At the end of the 1980s, mostly during the Leipzig trade fair, these meetings evolved into the first demonstrations. The majority of demonstrators hoped to speed up their departure for the West by participating. Around the middle of September 1989, after Hungary had opened its border to the West and some GDR citizens had founded the “New Forum” movement, the idea behind the demonstrations ceased to be “We want out!” and became instead “We’re staying here!” If the representatives of the state thought the chant “We want out!” had been blasphemy, they had to perceive “We’re staying here!” as a declaration of war.

I lived not far from Leipzig in the small town of Altenburg and took part in a Leipzig Monday demonstration for the first time on October 2, 1989. On that day, the demonstration still ended at the police line at the ring road around the downtown area. On that day, the slogan “We are the people!” was born because when the Volkspolizei (the GDR’s “People’s Police”) demanded through a megaphone that everyone clear the street, someone called back: “We are the people and you are only our police; we are the people!” The demonstration ended with the Volkspolizei starting to club the people. The demonstrations five days later ended much worse when the GDR tried to celebrate its 40th anniversary on October 7. In Dresden and Berlin, but also in Leipzig and other cities, the police treated the demonstrators with great brutality. There were mass arrests, and the treatment of many of those arrested can only be described as torture.

Two days later, that is, on Monday, October 9, was the day of decision. The official state guests had departed; after the violence, there was great fear; the Leipzig Volkszeitung published open threats against the demonstrators. The memory of the massacre in Tiananmen Square in Beijing just four months earlier was still present in everyone’s mind; the East German government’s approbation of the Chinese comrades still rang in our ears. Then, the miracle happened. Suddenly, seventy thousand people gathered in downtown Leipzig and advanced toward the so-called Leipzig Ring. They demanded that the “New Forum” be allowed to register; they taunted the state security personnel; they called for Gorbachev and sang the left-wing anthem, the “Internationale.” The most common chants were “No violence!” and “We are the people!” The demonstration was about freedom and democracy, about free elections and self-determination. Although we had all had to learn the “Internationale” in school, the song typically
died down after the refrain. None of the demonstrators had thought it possible that we would ever voluntarily sing the “Internationale.” On this 9th of October, the demonstrators walked all the way around the downtown ring road of Leipzig. There was not a policeman to be seen. One must respect those who were in charge in Leipzig. They were intelligent and conscientious enough to dispense with the use of violence. Had it been otherwise, there would most certainly have been a catastrophe.

This 9th of October opened the floodgates. From then on, it really turned into a peaceful revolution. The whole country breathed a sigh of relief. And suddenly everything seemed possible, like a logical sequence of events, even the Fall of the Wall. Already on October 2, a poster had popped up with the demand: “Visafrei bis Shanghai!” (Visa-free to Shanghai)! The Wall was torn down almost as an afterthought; this was about the whole world and, not least, about solidarity with the Chinese demonstrators. Now it seemed as though a “socialism with a human face” — along the lines envisioned by the Czechoslovakian reformers such as Alexander Dubček during the Prague Spring — could actually be realized. Indeed, it seemed inexorable. Civil rights activists like Bärbel Bohley or ostracized writers like Stefan Heym spoke at the beginning of November in front of a million people on the Alexanderplatz in Berlin, and their speeches were broadcast live on GDR television. In companies, universities, and publishing houses, people began to elect new bosses. I even bought myself an additional radio so that I would not miss the latest news when I went to the bathroom. And then the Wall came down. And everyone could see that the government was no longer in charge of what was happening in the country.

The way in which the real-existing GDR came to an end is rare in history. That such a highly armed apparatus, seemingly prepared for all eventualities, in the end allowed itself to be pushed aside, without going on a shooting spree, is a stroke of luck. However, by dropping the state like a hot potato, the GDR authorities, even in departing, did a disservice to democracy and self-determination. Helmut Kohl’s coup was embracing the GDR’s CDU, one of several Blockparteien, who had slavishly followed the lead of the SED. This fraternization with known opportunists should have been unthinkable. If the East German CDU played any role in the fall of 1989, it was an unpleasant one. The GDR’s CDU was a sycophantic servant of the system, stabbing various attempts at resistance in the back, for example, at the Kirchentage (annual conventions of the Protestant Church). Since
Kohl had no scruples to make the two CDU’s agreement in the name amount to agreement in substance, there was suddenly, from one day to the next, a trace of syrupy sweetness from East to West. The message was: “If you elect them, you’re electing me.” Thus, in just a few days, Kohl determined the outcome of the first free election in the GDR on March 18, 1990. The promise of “prosperity for all,” made overnight, could not be opposed. And this strategy paid off. The freely elected East German representatives handed over their newly obtained power to the officials in Bonn. These officials, in turn, made loans dependent on East Germany relinquishing its sovereignty. Even if the names of government bureaucrats who implement the plans of politicians are typically irrelevant, let them be named in this case: The state secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance tasked by Finance Minister Theo Waigel with preparing a monetary union already at the beginning of January 1990 was Horst Köhler. And the department head who led a working group from the end of January to “put the offer of a monetary union in concrete terms as fast as possible” was Thilo Sarrazin. “Actually, the federal government offered the D-Mark to the GDR before people on the street in East German expressly demanded it.” “We are paying for everything, so we’ll decide everything” — this is how Sarrazin described Bonn’s attitude, a quote that can be found in his contribution to Theo Waigel and Manfred Schnell’s volume Tage, die Deutschland und die Welt veränderten. The era of a democracy in which money and property had hardly played a role and in which it had been possible in companies, schools, universities, and theaters to elect the people whom one wished to have as one’s bosses (even though not easily, and even though this was often blocked) was over.

The introduction of the West German Deutsch-Mark in East Germany on July 1, 1990, spelled the end of East German industry. In July, companies were supposed to pay the same wages in D-Mark that they had paid in East German marks in June. The economic collapse was pre-programmed. Almost all factories were on the brink of ruin — and this at the very moment when the entire East German economy was being offered for sale on the market. But it is too euphemistic to speak of the market. The most lucrative parts of the East German economy were sold off underhandedly; undesirable competition was not allowed into the country; and attempts to proceed independently in the East were hamstrung by administrative measures. It is worthwhile to take a closer look at the history of Treuhand. German model enterprises such as the Deutsche Bank, Allianz or Lufthansa — the list of names is long and considerable — made billions at the expense

1 Dirk Laabs, Der deutsche Goldrausch: Die wahre Geschichte der Treuhand (Munich: Pantheon, 2012), 21, 27.
2 Theo Waigel and Manfred Schell, Tage, die Deutschland und die Welt veränderten. Vom Mauerfall zum Kaukasus. Die deutsche Währungsunion (Munich: Bruckmann, 1994).
of East Germans — and, in the end, at the expense of all German taxpayers. East Germans did not receive a cent of their national assets. What was left behind was a region that was 70-80 percent deindustrialized. We are still paying the price for this today.

Instead of a unification of the two German states, the East joined the West. That meant: Forget everything that was; learn everything that is. Nonetheless, the hope for a better world was great and justified. The end of the confrontation of East and West, the end of the Cold War and of the arms race, it was hoped, would free up money and energy for the real problems of this world: for clean water and for combating hunger, disease, and the destruction of the environment. There would be no more proxy wars. Gradually, prosperity and education would spread across the world. What would stand in the way of this now? And wasn’t this more than a hope? Wasn’t it downright necessary? Or was I deluding myself?

Those who saw the televised images of the Fall of the Wall or the scenes of GDR citizens climbing over the fence of the West German embassy in Prague, those who heard the outcry of the refugees waiting there in the yard, did not even think of asking which system was better. That was self-evident; it was an obvious truth. The results of GDR citizens voting with their feet were clear.

What happened in Eastern Europe, and especially in East Germany, functioned as a beacon for the whole world. The German experience served and still serves as the quintessential example of the end of the Cold War. For even among the competing events in Eastern Europe, the images of the Fall of the Wall trump everything else, be it Gorbachev, the Polish Round Table, the Hungarian reforms, or the dark images of the early Monday Demonstrations. The political implosion of the Eastern Bloc changed the power relations of the world. No country was unaffected by it. Privatization and free enterprise displaced socialist models and non-private ownership structures around the world. Thus, countries like South Africa or Namibia would, most likely, have forged different constitutions were it not for the collapse of the Eastern Bloc— and their property relations would, likewise, have turned out differently. Even China and India changed course.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the titles of two books reflected a widespread sentiment that also found official favor: One of these was Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, which breathed new life into the phrase “the end of history”
and declared that it had arrived in the present. Whereas Hegel had regarded the end of history as arriving with the triumph of the ideas of the French Revolution in the Battle of Jena, Fukuyama interpreted the Hegelian idea (with Kojève and Marcuse) as a sort of final synthesis in which, after the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the liberal, Christian bourgeoisie — the West — became the determining force. In this worldview, “real-existing socialism” as well as the idea of communism — to which Fukuyama’s idea, ironically, is structurally related in its expectation of a linear path to salvation — becomes an accident whose effects have been remedied, a sickness that has finally run its course. Humanity, in a sort of higher natural state, can find peace; paradise is within its grasp. In The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) Samuel Huntington seemed to argue the opposite. After the end of the Cold War, it was not Western hegemony that had arrived, in his opinion, but an era in which the West, by necessity, would come into conflict with Islamic countries and China. Both books, however, have one thing in common: They view the West as a single unified entity. The West is the West. Its opponents have disappeared or been removed.

As someone from East Germany, I actually felt as though I was “back from the future.” Now the present was all that remained. In the GDR, the future was, of necessity, officially cast in a positive light. But even I, like most others, had expectations of the future that were linked to hopes for a better society. In 1990, we lost this concept of the future. Now, we could only think of the future as a gradually improved today; we could no longer think of it as something else. We had just arrived in the best of all possible worlds. The battle had been decided; the “victors of history” had been determined. What the West had done was right; what the East had done was wrong. From now on, people would do only what was right.

The trends already on the rise under Reagan and Thatcher — the privatization and commodification of practically all areas of life, but also a foreign policy that no longer had qualms about the use of military force — had always met with opposition and resistance and run up against limits. With the Fall of the Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, these limits disappeared and opposition — let alone resistance — in Western countries dried up in an almost eerie way. From now on, all political decisions were to be directed towards the aim of economic growth. As soon as a suggestion — or a mere thought — was suspected of curbing growth, it was finished, not only

Politics existed for the purpose of spurring growth. The best way to generate growth was supposed to be the privatization of just about everything. Less state, more market. The more freedom, the more prosperity. Hardly anyone asked: Freedom for whom? Freedom from what? Prosperity for whom? Words like capitalism, class struggle, profit maximization and even exploitation were dismissed as outdated and avoided. Asking who earned money from what, who benefited from this or that, or who was disadvantaged by this or that was considered impolite and an expression of vulgar thinking. Thus, a whole group of words and questions disappeared at the very moment when they became more necessary than ever for describing the old new reality. One can discern these changes most easily in language. What is more natural to us than our mother tongue?

The old new ideology consists of giving facts the appearance of being about something given, something found in the laws of nature that we simply have to accept. This use of language draws us away from the political, social, economic, and historical contexts and questions and leads us into a realm where the status quo cannot be called into question, where all constraints are factual constraints, and conflicting interests only exist on the surface — a language that turns history into nature, a nature that we are powerless to change, that we have to come to terms with, that we have to get used to. The new rules of the game were supposed to be the only ones worth striving for and were made absolute; those who fail to accept them exclude themselves from the conversation. The people allowed to participate in the conversation call profit “shareholder value,” those who sell their labor Arbeitnehmer (employees; literally: “work takers”) and those who buy labor Arbeitgeber (employers; literally: “work givers”). Tax cuts for enterprises and entrepreneurs are called “relief for investors”; the reduction in social security benefits becomes “benefit reduction for those unwilling to work,” burdening the poor is known as taking “personal responsibility,” cuts in unemployment benefits amount to “stimulating growth,” lowering the minimum wage is characterized as “global competitiveness” or “employment practices in line with market conditions,” unions that advocate for collective wage agreements become “wage cartels” and a “drag” on the economy, and so forth.4

Recently, I heard someone say in a radio interview: “We need to finally clean out our social system!” Unfortunately, the interviewer failed to ask what cleaning out the social system would entail.

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4 See Ivan Nagel, Falschwörterbuch (Berlin, 2004).
“One tends to understand Schiller’s distich on a ‘cultivated language which writes and thinks for you’ in purely aesthetic and, as it were, harmless terms,” Victor Klemperer wrote in his famous book on the language of the Third Reich.5 “But language does not simply write and think for me, it also increasingly dictates my feelings and governs my entire spiritual being the more unquestioningly and unconsciously I abandon myself to it.”

The words that I use in the language that I speak and write already begin to shape the way I feel, think, and act. The image I have of myself and the world depends on the words I choose, on which meanings I give these words as an individual and which meanings society as a whole gives them. But today there are once again words that — to borrow Günter Gaus’s lovely simile — are used like the Gessler hat in the story of William Tell, that is, for the purpose of forcing people to conform to a certain way of thinking. Woe to whoever fails to greet the hat; woe to whoever fails to say the word. Unrechtsstaat — literally “unjust state,” the opposite of the Rechtsstaat (state under the rule of law) — has become such a word. Woe to the person who refuses to call the GDR an Unrechtsstaat. In 1990, this word passed my lips with ease. Although I had never had anything to do with the GDR justice system, I nonetheless knew that, as soon as something was even remotely related to politics, arbitrariness reigned. The actions that qualified as criminal offenses — from Republikflucht (“fleeing the Republic”) to foreign-currency offenses — only served to show that it was the state that was perpetrating injustice.

Today, though, I would be cautious with this phrase. Not because I have changed my mind about what I just said, on the contrary. But in the current political context and twenty-two years after the end of the GDR, Unrechtsstaat is too undifferentiated a description. Today, the term means above all: “We don’t even need to talk about an Unrechtsstaat — that has been dealt with!” Characterizing the GDR as an Unrechtsstaat discredits and dismisses everything that was ever done or tried there. Although the lifetime achievements of the East German “sisters and brothers” are acknowledged, it is strongly implied that their work was really a wasted labor of love and that their dream of a better world was just overblown ideology.

Yet some things were actually better and more reasonable than they are today — ranging from a uniform labor code and the right to work to a more modern family law and free healthcare, with

5 Victor Klemperer, LTI: Notizbuch eines Philologen (first ed. 1947; 24th, revised edition with commentary, Stuttgart, 2010), chap. 1, 25-26; translated into English as Language of the Third Reich (London, 2006). LTI was Klemperer’s private code for Lingua Tertii Imperii, i.e. the language of the Third Reich.
exemplary cancer statistics, to childcare and youth welfare. The administrative costs of the single-payer social insurance system amounted to 0.35 percent; today they amount to 7 percent. Mentioning these things also means asking: Why do doctors have to think like businessmen? Is it not immoral; does it not endanger the medical ethos? And is it not also uneconomical for society? Can a private insurance company that is per se obligated to make a profit even be in the interest of the insured at all? Such questions cause one to bump up against the limits of our system. Such questions are not discussed.

What today’s prevailing opinion cannot forgive the East is its different property relations. These gave the individual the experience of living in a society where money was not everything. To say this without promptly relativizing and qualifying it immediately gives me a bad conscience because now I ought to list all the GDR’s injustices as though I had never done that before. But in the very attempt to pull myself out of my submissive stance, I notice how much I have internalized the bad conscience. This bad conscience reveals itself in things that seem to be trivial: For example, I am relieved that the book about the Treuhand that I cited earlier was not written by an East German but by an author who was born in Hamburg in 1974. When I relate critical remarks made by others, I like to add (as do several of my colleagues) that the person in question is certainly not suspected of being a communist or a leftist. Once when I quoted a colleague, I added, without being asked to do so, that she moved to the West in 1988 and therefore cannot be considered a supporter of the GDR. As if by magic, the word “ehemalig” (former) slips into the conversation when one is talking about the GDR, as if this addition were necessary to banish it to the past. No one would dream of talking about the former Third Reich or the former Weimar Republic.

But let’s go back to the beginning of the 1990s. In its official self-understanding, the West no longer knows any political or social alternative; we had arrived in a world without alternatives. Democracy, freedom, social justice, and prosperity seemed only to be possible in a market economy where the means of production were privately owned. Even today, Joachim Gauck can write in a speech on the subject “Freedom”: “And there is therefore no reason to make the old-new attempt to bring a new version of anti-capitalism into the debate.”

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6 Joachim Gauck, Freiheit: Ein Plädoyer (Munich, 2012), 58; the book is based on a January 2011 lecture.
Yet one ought to have been allowed to wonder why the implosion of the East banished every alternative to the existing system from social consciousness. For the ossified shape of real-existing socialism was never understood as an alternative — at least not by the majority of those who had to live in it. It was a custodial state, not a democracy; and freedom and democracy were precisely the demands of the fall of 1989. There was no poster, no slogan, no chanting for privatization, no demand to abolish the right to work. Why shouldn’t it be possible to have freedom and democracy alongside public ownership of the means of production? This was an obvious question to ask. Because precisely in those cases where things were not privatized come hell or high water, larger companies, such as Zeiss-Jena, did manage to survive. But back then, only a few people asked this question. Nobody in the free and democratic mainstream media paid it any attention. There is no article in the Basic Law that mentions the private ownership of the means of production. In 1947, even the newly founded CDU perceived large-scale industry and enterprises as a threat to freedom and democracy. In the party program that was agreed on in Ahlen in 1947, the CDU stated:

The capitalist economic system has not served the state and social interests of the German people. The horrible political, economic, and social collapse brought on by a criminal kind of power politics must lead to a fundamentally new social order. The content and aim of this social and economic new order can no longer be the capitalist striving for profit and power but the well-being of our people.

The observation that profits are being privatized and losses are being socialized could be the headline for the past twenty years. Never before has private wealth been so great; never before has public debt been so high. Today, according to the German Taxpayers’ Association, Germany’s national debt amounts to about 2 trillion Euros, that is about €24,700 per capita. The Taxpayers’ Association has tried to make this debt easier to comprehend with an example:

If, from today, no more debt was taken on, and if the public purse was legally obligated to pay off one billion Euro of its debt each month in addition to all its expenditures on personnel, investments, social benefits, interest, and so forth, this process would have to continue for 169 years in order to completely pay off the mountain of debt.
Every eighth Euro that comes in goes solely to paying interest on the national debt.

Again and again, the spending habits of the states are regarded as the cause of the crisis because, so the argument goes, countries with solid state finances would not even give speculators a chance to corner them. This is a strange way of thinking. Oddly, people seem always to focus their criticism on state expenditures that either directly or indirectly benefit society as a whole — unless we need a couple billions to save the banks. It is strange that our system is set up in such a way that after we, the polity, have saved the banks, we allow them to dictate the interest rates at which we borrow the money needed for the bank bailout. Everyone who overdraws his account has to pay overdraft fees and interest that average 12 to 13 percent. Wouldn’t it be fair for the polity to charge the banks similar interest for their overdrawn accounts?

Why don’t we ask whether it is insufficient state revenues, rather than excessive expenditures, that are increasing the public debt and causing the current crisis? The German state has been and continues to be systematically run into the ground because its democratically elected representatives have been robbing it of its revenues. The Schröder administration lowered the top tax rate in Germany from 53 to 42 percent; tax rates for companies (commercial tax and corporate tax) dropped by almost half between 1997 and 2009, from 57.5 to 29.4 percent. The capital gains tax dropped to 25 percent. Even estate taxes were reduced in some respects.

If the public coffers are empty, so the mantra goes, more state property has to be privatized at favorable terms for the buyer; public-sector positions need to be cut and public services privatized; sponsors have to be found; swimming pools and libraries have to be shut down; the fees for the music school have to raised, and so on. Such measures affect especially those who have to watch how they spend every Euro.

Another way of weakening the polity — almost identical to the invectives against its spending — is the call for a leaner government. Leaner is better! Who would not want a de-bureaucratized state, that is, a state that is as lean as it is elegant? The neoliberal propaganda outfits like the Bertelsmann Foundation or the Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (New Social Market Economy Initiative) were able to successfully sell this beauty ideal of the lean state to the public because, like any half-truth, it contains some legitimate criticisms. Bureaucracy, too, can make democracy impossible. But
what is not mentioned is that the weakening of the state leads to a loss of competence. The public administration can hardly afford qualified experts anymore; there is not enough money. Amazingly, though, help is already waiting impatiently at the door. In Germany’s federal ministries alone, there are more than one hundred so-called Leihbeamte (“borrowed officials”). They are the employees of private companies and trade associations, and are paid by them, but work in the ministries in the capacity of government officials. They participate in the formulation of laws and regulations that are supposed to regulate their own companies. Do an internet search for “lobbyists in ministries” or read the book Der gekaufte Staat (The Bought State), and you can find out which firms have placed their people in which ministries. If a lobbying organization paid a government official to influence laws and ordinances in its favor, this would be considered corruption and would be punished. But when a lobbyist is seconded to a ministry and granted civil servant status, at least temporarily, this is part of an official initiative called Seitenwechsel (Changing Sides), which is one element of the Red/Green government program “Modern state — modern administration.” Despite its name, the program cannot be described as an exchange. Whereas “more than a hundred representatives of companies have spent sometimes years at desks in federal ministries, no more than twelve civil servants have taken educational excursions into the private economy.”

Hardly any sphere is protected from privatization and thus from profit-seeking. This is especially bitter in healthcare and education. The new “self-evident truths” (Selbstverständlichkeiten) that began to dominate discourse at the beginning of the 1990s continue to prevail unchanged today. Not even the financial crisis prompted the rules to change or us to become aware of these false truths and to alter them. It is therefore not surprising that a world without alternatives has resulted in a kind of politics that propagates the logical nonsense of “no-choice

7 Sascha Adamek and Kim Otto, Der gekaufte Staat: Wie Konzernvertreter in deutschen Ministerien sich ihre Gesetze selbst schreiben (Cologne, 2008)

8 Adamek and Otto, Der gekaufte Staat, 15.


10 Adamek and Otto, Der gekaufte Staat, 21-40.
decisions.” How is it that we accept as self-evident that governments have to “calm the markets” or “win back the markets’ trust”? In such phrases, the term “markets” refers to the stock exchanges and financial markets, in other words to actors who speculate, either on their own account or as agents for others, in order to maximize profits. Aren’t these the people who deprived the public coffers of billions? Our highest representatives are supposed to vie to win their trust?

We should be grateful that Angela Merkel let slip the phrase “markt-konforme Demokratie,” that is, a democracy that operates in line with the markets. Because by saying this she got to the heart of the current form of our democracy. Had the big media been paying better attention, they might have asked the chancellor to explain this phrase. But nobody demanded an explanation. Marktkonforme Demokratie is the loveliest of our new self-evident truths, which, to my knowledge, no one has yet publicly criticized. It is regarded as natural that democracy is being turned on its head. Should not the actors on the stock markets be trying to win back the public trust? Instead of marktkonforme Demokratie we should be calling for demokratiekonforme Märkte, that is, markets that conform to democracy! Such markets would be ones in which not everything that generates money would be allowed, from dubious financial products to speculating in foodstuffs. Conforming to democracy would mean demanding that the economy meet social, moral, and ecological standards. But for this to become possible we would need a politics that does not subordinate all decisions to economic growth. Yet calling for such democracy-oriented markets is a matter of life and death. For our daily life is shaped by a murderous duplicity, a duplicity that hides the consequences of our decisions and our economic activities. The actions that lead to poverty, lack of freedom, disease, discrimination, and marginalization here at home cost lives elsewhere, by the millions.

After the government leaders of the Euro-zone states made 1.7 trillion Euros available to breathe new life into the banks’ lending activities in October 2008, these same countries made massive cuts in their aid to humanitarian organizations and loans to the poorest countries. The UN’s Feed the World Program, entrusted with helping in cases of famine, had had a budget of $6 billion, but in 2011, this had been reduced to only $3 billion. Among other things, this meant that school meals for one million undernourished children in Bangladesh had to be cut. The 300,000 Somalian refugees now get a daily ration of 1500 calories instead of the subsistence minimum of 2200 calories.
Before the real estate crisis, about $13 to $18 billion was invested in so-called renewable raw materials, but in 2011 it was $600 billion. For years now, the speculation in foodstuffs — in which all the big German banks, including the savings and loans, participate — has been causing food prices to rise drastically. For some items, prices have doubled within one year. One of the main causes of hunger in Africa are the agricultural subsidies of the industrialized nations. In 2008, EU agricultural subsidies amounted to €55 billion, leading vegetables and meat from Europe to be 25 to 33 percent cheaper than the products of local African producers. This precipitated the ruin of local agriculture and its known consequences.

While one hand donates money and helps developing nations, the other hand shamelessly seeks a profit. Despite all assurances to the contrary, there is a double standard — a sort of schizophrenia — and it has a long tradition. Among the authors of the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America of July 4, 1776, in which general human rights were laid out for the first time, were Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin. When Jefferson died in 1826, in addition to large estates in Virginia, he also left his heirs full ownership rights to more than 200 slaves. The Declaration of Independence embarks on its explanation of “the causes which impel” the separation from Britain with the famous sentence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

Jean Ziegler, the Swiss sociologist and social critic, who was the UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food for several years, refers to the so-called Millennium Development Goals that UN member nations drew up in the year 2000: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, to achieve universal primary education, to promote gender equality and empower women, to reduce child mortality rates, to improve maternal health, to combat HIV/AIDS, to ensure environmental sustainability, and to develop a global partnership for development between the West and the South. The record of what has been achieved is pitiful. The number of seriously malnourished people has increased, according to UN statistics, from 785 million in 2000 to 854 million in 2008. Subsequently both the financial crisis and the speculation in foodstuffs exacerbated the situation, so that we may assume that the number of the malnourished rose to about one billion in 2009. Just a few more statistics: in 2008, 500,000 women in sub-Saharan
Africa died in childbirth. Because Africa cannot afford effective AIDS medications, 12 million children were orphans in 2003; in 2010, there were 18 million orphans. I could continue with Ziegler’s examples, but I will just add one more: It is highly probable that the computer that I am using to write these lines and the cell phone that I carry in my pocket are made with tantalum, a rare metallic element mined under the most atrocious conditions in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Extraction in the Congo is so cheap that it beats all competition. It is also pretty certain that these devices were assembled by workers who can only dream of a 60-hour week.

Jean Ziegler asks: “Why this blindness? Why this unmoved arrogance while hundreds of millions of people indignantly condemn this duplicity and deny the West the right to moral hegemony?” Ziegler answers cautiously, as though he himself recoils at the insight: “I will formulate a hypothesis,” he writes,

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the discrediting of the communist idea, have created a black hole. The (naturally necessary) Fall of the Berlin Wall buried all prospects for emancipation and even banished any thought of protest ... Since the Fall of the Wall, the idea of a different world order, a different memory, a different will, has fallen into disrepute.11

Some might want to call this insight paradoxical; others might want to call it logical or a truism. The self-liberation of the East, the adoption of capitalist modes of production, and the resulting globalization of the economy unleashed a pursuit of profit that, thus far, has remained without a commensurate political counterweight. Commensurate would have to mean: at least as internationalized as the corporations and at least as powerful, self-confident and decisive as they are.

Of course, the Fall of the Wall is a conditio sine qua non and a day of celebration. But the 9th of November did not mark the dawning of a new age in the world. We need to see it as a day on which, for the time being, the alternatives to the Western status quo fell into oblivion. We need to expand this day to include the tradition of the 9th of October. Those who do not wish to accept a marktkonforme Demokratie and instead demand demokratiekonforme Märkte, markets in line with democracy, stand in the tradition of that peaceful revolution.

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11 Jean Ziegler, Der Hass auf den Westen: Wie sich die armen Völker gegen den wirtschaftlichen Weltkrieg wehren (Munich, 2011), 15f.
of the Fall of 1989. We must not allow the chant “We are the people!” to become a museum relic.

Translated by Patricia Casey Sutcliffe

Ingo Schulze was born in 1962 and raised in Dresden. After performing his military service (Grundwehrdienst), he studied Classical Greek and Latin at the University of Jena from 1983-1988 and then worked as a dramaturg at the Landestheater in Altenburg. In early 1990, he cofounded a weekly newspaper in Altenburg and in 1993 spent six months in St. Petersburg, Russia, as the managing editor of a newspaper. Since 1993, he lives in Berlin. His books have been translated into thirty languages and include 33 Augenblicke des Glücks (1995; translated as 33 Moments of Happiness) and Neue Leben (2005; translated as New Lives). He has received many honors, including the 2013 Bertolt Brecht Prize and the Manhæ Prize (South Korea). He is a member of the Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung and of the Akademie der Künste in Berlin, where he presides over the literary section. Further information is available at www.ingoschulze.com.
AN EMPIRE OF YOUTH:
AMERICAN BOY SCOUTS IN THE WORLD, 1910-1960

Mischa Honeck
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A boy’s dream came true in June 1928 when Dick Douglas, David Martin Jr., and Douglas Oliver boarded a steamer in New York bound for Mombasa, Kenya. After extensive mental and physical examinations, the three Boy Scouts had been chosen out of a large field of applicants to join the explorers Martin and Osa Johnson for a two-month safari through central Africa. The adventures of Dick, Doug, and Dave made national headlines. They camped under starlit skies, filmed African wildlife, gave native boys Scouting lessons, and each shot a lion.1 In 1929, Doug and Dave again traveled overseas. But now they were on a different mission. Together with 1,500 American boy ambassadors hailing from places as far apart as Berlin and Beijing, they participated in the biggest interwar youth gathering: the Third World Scout Jamboree in Birkenhead, England. “Barriers of language were pushed aside as well as religion and color,” Doug observed as he was touring the campground. “Everyone greeted everyone else with a firm Scout grip and joyful smile.” Pitching their tents alongside boys from five continents, U.S. Scouts staged historical pageants, traded souvenirs with their foreign peers, huddled around the campfires of global youth, and sang songs of international brotherhood.2

My research about Boy Scouting on America’s global peripheries builds on stories such as this one. Chronologically, the project stretches from the Progressive Era to the early Cold War. Geographically, it covers a wide range of different people and places that came into the orbit of American boys and men wearing the Scout uniform. My research project traces physical and imaginary border crossings across several generations. It weaves together colonial Scouting in the Philippines, Boy Scout expeditions to Africa and the South Pole, U.S. participation in international Scout festivals, the transnational networking of adult Scoutmasters, Boy Scouts corresponding with distant pen pals, and Scouting on U.S. military bases in Japan and West Germany after 1945.

Founded in 1910 as part of a larger transatlantic movement, the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) grew into one of the largest and most enduring

American youth ventures of the twentieth century. The Scouts’ emphasis on patriotism, faith in God, and training boys in outdoor skills and responsible citizenship made the organization extremely popular. National elites — Congress, churches, big business, the military — backed the BSA from the start. Since its incorporation more than a century ago, over 110 million Americans have donned the uniform of the Boy Scouts of America. At the same time, membership restrictions around the issues of gender, sexuality, and religion, as well as accusations of militarism and cases of child abuse, have mired the Boy Scouts in controversy to this day.3

Why study the Boy Scouts? Why go beyond the nation? The flowering of the organization in the early twentieth century can tell us a lot about several big questions in U.S. history that are often examined separately. Youth, gender, nation, international relations, and empire all converge in the Boy Scouts. Scouting was started by men in England and the United States who sensed that white middle-class masculinity was in decline. They feared that industrialization, urban vice, ethnic diversity, juvenile delinquency, and women in education made young men soft and racially degenerate and thus incapable of protecting the nation. Attempts to arrest this development through the promotion of physical exercise and outdoor vigor bred new normative assumptions about what constitutes the modern man. Youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts, located in the sphere between the family and the state, were established to advance the ideals of impeccable manhood and keep adolescents out of street gangs and away from crime.4

Like other scholars, I understand gender and youth to be fluid and contested but nonetheless powerful cultural constructs; yet my investigation of these constructs transcends political and geographical boundaries. The problem with much of the historical research on the BSA is that it takes places in a small national sandbox.5 This perspective is not only limited, it is wrong. It is wrong because it implies that the BSA turned into a domestic institution with purely domestic interests, that it looked inward rather than outward, that members negotiated the meaning of boyhood and manhood amongst themselves, and not in conversation with the outside world. By refusing to pursue the history of the Boy Scouts of America beyond the water’s edge, scholars have missed significant ways in which global developments have influenced American


attempts to define youth, gender, and nation. My project covers this neglected terrain.

A second problem is that historians have paid insufficient attention to the intergenerational dynamics of Scouting. Much has been said about the adult organizers, but little about the role of young people in the organization. The history of children tends to escape close scrutiny, maybe because writing it is a grueling task. Boys and girls are rarely autonomous historical actors and they produce fewer sources than adults. Yet similar to the ways in which young people have made their presence in history felt as students, workers, consumers, and activists, Boy Scouts were never the passive agents that the organizers so often assumed they were. Networks that sought to take political advantage of youth came to realize that young people frequently strayed from the scripts that adults had prepared for them. Rather than simply look at representations of youth, this project understands youthful subjects as complex players with their own interests and desires, who pushed national and transnational politics to new and unexpected places.

My research project heeds calls made by historians such as David Thelen and Thomas Bender to internationalize the study of U.S. history. Scouting serves this purpose because it was a movement that was neither purely national nor global, but both. The BSA, by forging new kinds of cross-border ties along the lines of age and gender, connected American boys and their leaders to a wider world of political and cultural affairs. It offered exciting opportunities for young American males interested in engaging with faraway people and places. I am interested in exploring how transnational forces and experiences molded the bodies and identities of young Scouts, and how these identities enabled them to accept, support, and critique America’s global presence in the twentieth century. I want to examine the nexus of masculinity and the projection of American power through the lens of the nation’s foremost youth organization. This power was reciprocal on many levels, affecting people of all ages and genders, as well as domestic and global politics. In short, I am interested in the correlation of youth, hegemonic manhood, and American empire.

A word about terminology. While some scholars suggest that the terms “transnational” and “imperial” are somehow analytically incompatible, assuming that the former denotes reciprocal interactions

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beyond nation states and the latter signifies the sprawling nature of metropolitan power, my usage postulates a symbiotic relationship between the two. Following Paul A. Kramer, I contend that writing a history of the BSA that proceeds outward into “the world” means writing a history of “power and connection,” a history that is simultaneously national, imperial, and transnational. The advantage of this approach is that it can capture and combine several trajectories of expansion and exchange pertaining to the Boy Scouts — from the internationalist forums of global Scouting to nation-specific colonial or quasi-colonial projects — without neglecting the multiplicity of actors, asymmetries, and uneven transformations these trajectories illuminate.

This essay focuses on the interwar period to elucidate the central argument of my research project: the BSA has always relied on wider spaces — geographical and historical — to construct the ideal twentieth-century man. In Boy Scout culture, Americanism was a masculine nation-making enterprise unconfined by national boundaries. As gender uncertainties caused by the disruptive forces of modernization made proving manhood increasingly difficult, the international arena came into view as one of the last sanctuaries of male authority, one well suited to raising American men for an American century. By sending boys and men abroad, the BSA aimed at reviving the equation of masculinity with national strength, while at the same time adapting it to the needs of a nascent world power drawn into closer political, economic, and cultural relations with other nations. The role of youth was crucial in all of this. The story of the BSA’s global frontiers, therefore, needs to be told as a story of two intersecting spaces: one in which adults sought to reform young people, and one in which young people carved out their own realms of experience.

I. Young Bodies and the Body Politic

Embedded in Dick’s, Doug’s, and Dave’s rise to becoming American boy celebrities are references to two dominant and interconnected discourses that thrived in the early twentieth century: youth and physical culture. These two discourses merged most conspicuously in the figure of the body. In the wake of the cultural turn in historiography, the body has emerged as a serious topic of historical inquiry. Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu have been in the vanguard of a group of social philosophers highlighting the significance of bodies for explaining broader historical developments. Although their

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arguments differ, historians are increasingly drawing on their theories to map the connections between bodily practices, collective identities, and the exercise of power. One of their most important contributions was to demonstrate that bodies are not simply biological “facts” but culturally produced. As a result, scholars have stressed the body’s ability to function as a site of domination and contestation as well as a vehicle of social interaction and community formation.¹⁰

Few turn-of-the-century scientists fused contemporary ideas about physical education, race, eugenics, civilization, empire, and youth more effectively than the American psychologist Granville Stanley Hall. His 1904 study *Adolescence* revolutionized understandings of youth.¹¹ Hall described adolescence as an intermediate period bridging childhood and adulthood, an unstable life phase marked by extreme vitality and insecurity. He maintained that organized play, not formalized school curricula, built young men with strong muscles and superior morality. While Hall shaped scientific discourse, mass movements such as the Boy Scouts popularized his themes. Building on Hall’s research, white middle-class educators on both sides of the Atlantic regarded fitness as the key to elevating youth and reinvigorating manhood.¹² Exholling the physical aspects of manliness sustained the belief in the fundamental dissimilarity of the sexes at a time when more women were questioning this distinction. Clean, healthy, and upright male bodies indicated discipline, decency, and productivity. Constructing an ideal of citizenship that was both moral and muscular, BSA leaders introduced the Scout Oath in 1910, which made young Scouts promise that they would keep themselves “physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight.”¹³ The first BSA handbook, published one year later, laid special emphasis on personal hygiene, proper eating, outdoor exercise, and sexual restraint. “To be strong,” physical educator George J. Fisher advised the young reader, “one must be pure in thought and clean in habit.”¹⁴

Early Scout leaders turned Hall’s recapitulation theory — the idea that children grew up repeating the stages of human evolution — into a powerful narrative documenting the parallel processes of maturational American boyhood and nationhood. The BSA’s founding texts derived the manly code of Scouting from a heroic national past. Celebratory accounts of nineteenth-century continental empire-building encouraged twentieth-century boys to see themselves as future citizens of a world-class nation. Obscuring white guilt, the 1911 *Handbook for Boys* cast the history of U.S. annexations as a moral crusade. In 1848, Americans defeated “the barbaric and military despotism

¹⁰ Instructive examples of how to utilize bodies for the writing of U.S. history are Olaf Stieglitz, *100 Percent American Boys: Disziplinierungsdiskurse und Ideologie im Civilian Conservation Corps* (Stuttgart, 1999); Jürgen Martschukat, *Die Geschichte der Todesstrafe in Nordamerika: Von der Kolonialzeit bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 2002); and James A. Tyner, *Oriental Bodies: Discourse and Discipline in U.S. Immigration Policy, 1875-1942* (Lanham, MD, 2006).


¹⁴ Ibid., 233.
of the Mexican government.” Following the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States liberated Cuba from the “inhuman treatment practised by the Spanish soldiery.” Even as Americans acquired an oceanic empire, the handbook told its young readers that “there is no country less warlike than ours.” In this sanitized history, America’s colonial ventures were presented not as bloody conquests but as an exercise in modern knighthood.

Although references to chivalry became less frequent over time, BSA members continued to make creative use of one of the oldest literary forms, the quest, to generate allegiance to empire. The quest functioned as a sort of proxy narrative, a way of discursively making sense of empire without having to acknowledge its existence. Like the classic Arthurian quest, the journey to manhood in Scouting was paved with ordeals. The imagined reward was citizenship, which boys could attain by proving their merit and advancing upward in rank. Youth was presented as a teleological process geared towards immaculate manhood. Quests also involved travel. Just as the romanticized medieval knight pursued glory in faraway places, Scouts were to seek adventure outside the feminized spheres of home and school. Boys allegedly built sturdy bodies and male character in natural surroundings under adult supervision. While most Scouts attended regional summer camps, the highest recognition was reserved for those who traveled to distant lands, thereby imitating the central myth of American history: the story of virtuous pioneers, inspired by manifest destiny, who forged new communities on foreign territory. Adolescence was thus transformed from a scientific drama into a juvenile romance that utilized quest narratives for the entwined projects of man, nation, and empire-making.

To stoke the boys’ enthusiasm, BSA leaders stressed the element of play in these rites of passage. Youth reformers in the United States subscribed to the idea that citizenship training was a game full of adventure that boys should enjoy playing — an idea developed by the British founder of Scouting, Robert Baden-Powell.16 Survival training,
campfire rituals, and choreographed pageants promised worthwhile entertainment. The Seventh and Eighth Scout Laws — which state that a Scout is “obedient” and “cheerful,” respectively — were supposed to bolster parental authority by teaching boys to happily follow the orders of their elders but also blurred the lines between work and play, leisure and politics. Travel accounts as well as fiction about Boy Scouts carrying a mobile American civilization to the outer rims of U.S. state power, such as the Philippines or the Panama Canal, whetted young people’s appetite for overseas adventure.\(^\text{17}\) 

Playful encounters with the world helped adolescents outline the shifting horizons of masculine citizenship and American empire before global currents shaped their lives as adults.

II. A Vast Army of Peace Boys

If the Boy Scouts grew out of an Anglo-American project aimed at shoring up the validity of strong masculine and national identities, the geopolitical and cultural transformations of the early twentieth century brought to the fore progressive femininities and alternative masculinities that challenged the gender order that Scouting upheld. Pacifism, church decline, economic professionalization, and the horrors of World War I curbed the muscular Christianity of previous decades. Modern mass leisure and consumerism allowed a more assertive youth to dwell in social and cultural spaces of their own making. Movie theaters, dance clubs, gambling halls, sports teams, summer camps, and other recreational institutions offered new opportunities for adolescent bonding and self-expression. The fact that young people were beginning to craft their own gender and sexual identities through peer practices such as flirting and dating filled conservative educators with alarm.\(^\text{18}\) Another cause of concern was leftist youth movements that forged transnational ties of their own while filling their ranks with working-class children in defiance of traditional racial and gender sensibilities.\(^\text{19}\) The specter of gender upheaval was further raised by the enfranchisement of women and their advance into male-dominated spheres. Girl organizations such as the Girl Scouts or Camp Fire Girls foregrounded the civic potential of young women.\(^\text{20}\)

Unsettled by these developments, Boy Scout organizers sought ways to reaffirm their status as the guardians of the one true organization that raised able-bodied men and citizens who could master the global risks and uncertainties of their time.

Transnationalism offered a solution, even as others in the movement viewed it as part of the problem. After the machine guns fell silent
in 1918, the webs of commerce, migration, and cultural exchange that had pulled Americans onto the world stage once again started to multiply. The interwar years were a period full of nationalist resentment and economic volatility but also replete with aspirations for world peace and democratic globalization.21 Despite the U.S. government’s refusal to join the League of Nations, world fairs and exhibitions, international conferences and sporting events, as well as media changes demonstrated America’s interdependence with other countries. New technologies accelerated the pace of global communication and transportation. U.S. citizens traveled abroad more often but they also lived in foreign countries as businessmen, artists, diplomats, and missionaries. Young people, too, aided by innovations such as the youth hostel, journeyed across nations and continents as never before, getting acquainted with new people, places, and cultures.

The Boy Scouts navigated the same currents. In less than a decade, their body culture had become a global phenomenon. The organization’s mantra of fun, fitness, and fellowship appealed to boys from various societies. As branches of the movement began cropping up in Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and throughout the British Empire, the BSA, too, established an offshore presence. Overseas councils were founded in Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and other territories under U.S. colonial rule. In addition, BSA officials entered the newly formed transnational bodies of global Scouting, the International Scout Conference and the World Scout Bureau, where they worked with European Scout leaders to develop worldwide standards for citizenship training consistent with their Western middle-class expectations. Most prominently, the organization sent delegations to the World Scout Jamborees, large rallies of Boy Scouts of various

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nationalities that have been held almost every four years since 1920. The selection criteria favored highly decorated boys who were healthy, athletic, and able to cover their own travel expenses. The interwar jamborees and their performances of gender, nation, and generation reshaped Scouting’s image, adding new layers to the meaning of boyhood and manhood. They reimagined youth as the architect of a new world built on peace and universal brotherhood.22

However, while adult organizers set the stage for these global youth encounters, it was actual youth who made these networks flourish by making their time, capital, energy, and bodies available to them. American Boy Scouts eager to bond with their distant peers subscribed to Scout magazines with international news, wrote letters, and engaged in foreign aid.23 Young people’s enthusiasm proved contagious, as the example of Daniel Carter Beard illustrates. One of the founders of Scouting in the United States, Beard initially railed against “alien influences,” echoing the virulent nationalism and nativism of postwar American society. But the international fan mail he received, including letters from boys who were looking to find penpals in other countries, as well as popular reports of young Scout explorers hoisting the American flag on distant shores softened his stance.24 In 1929, the almost eighty-year-old Beard crossed the Atlantic to participate in the Third World Scout Jamboree in England. “Uncle Dan, you should be the happiest man in the world to be able to look around you and see all your dreams realized,” BSA Foreign Commissioner and banker Mortimer Schiff told Beard as they were watching the “vast army of peace boys” that had assembled at Arrowe Park march by in their national Scout uniforms.25

Beard was not the only eyewitness who was impressed by the exuberance with which young participants enacted the jamboree themes of world friendship and brotherhood. Carried away with how youths extended the fraternal ties of nationhood to an imagined global community of youth, British journalist Sir Philipp Gibbs had this to say about Boy Scouts from different corners of the earth marching in unison and laughing and singing together: “It seemed to me, as I stood there watching ... that here was the beginning of a new chapter in history. We older men who remember the past had no place here. It was youth’s rendezvous, with new hopes, a new vision of life, a great promise ahead.”26 In a sense, Gibbs was merely amplifying the generational distinctions made by young Scouts themselves, who used their moment in the public spotlight to articulate forceful


24 Daniel Carter Beard to Mortimer Schiff, April 22, 1920, in Daniel Carter Beard Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. This collection also contains numerous letters of children asking Beard for information on how to get in touch with foreign Scouts.


critiques of adult international relations. Citing his young age as an asset rather than an impediment, Gibson Sherrard from San Antonio, Texas, wrote home from England: “It is remarkable how we get along over here ... we seem to understand [each other] for we seem to all have the same impulses and ideas — anyway, we are just boys ... If the older people would have just such a meeting of all nations in a spirit of friendship,” Gibson augured, “I don’t believe there would be any wars.”

Eagle Scout Owen Matthews made a similar point when recounting his experiences at the 1933 jamboree in Hungary. “Even though their creed or color might be different,” Owen formed amicable bonds with Scouts from England to Estonia, from Syria to South Africa, and learned to “love these brother Scouts as much as those in America.” Owen then called upon his government to turn more young Americans into campfire diplomats, since “peace gatherings and encampments of youth from all countries [would] do more to further future world peace than adult conferences held in some castle or other building.”

In all these cases, U.S. boys tapped into the notion that youth were unburdened by the prejudices and follies of their elders, and thus uniquely qualified to envision different national and global futures.

This faith in the transformative power of youth motivated some Boy Scouts to foster a universal language that would reduce the distance between nations and cultures. Again U.S. boys were in the vanguard. They helped turn the “International Left Handshake” into a ritual that bound Scouts together the world over. Plans to establish Esperanto as the lingua franca of the movement thrived in the early 1920s but found little support outside a small circle of connoisseurs. Much more popular were initiatives to introduce Indian sign language as a mode of transnational communication. Training courses that American boys offered at international Scout festivals based on Scoutmaster William Tomkins’s manual *Universal American Indian Sign Language* captured the interest of Boy Scouts from different countries. Although their success was limited, such schemes testified to the young Scouts’ optimism that their playful interactions would spawn a less cynical and more authentic form of international relations.

It would be easy to dismiss these efforts as youthful naivety, but postwar associations of boyhood with purity, flexibility, and inclusiveness also served adult interests. Creating the image of the Boy Scouts as global crusaders for peace was not just another recruitment tool in a time of slow membership growth. It helped turn attention away...
from instances of youth bullying and child abuse that the BSA had been trying to keep from the public eye to protect Scouting’s good name. More importantly, it deflected charges that the organization was militaristic to the core. Boy Scouts selling war bonds and waving the Stars and Stripes had become iconic scenes for Americans during World War I. In the climate of demobilization after 1918, Boy Scout leaders sought to turn war bodies into peace bodies by shedding some of the movement’s martial components. U.S. officials, in keeping with international standards, added knee socks, shorts, and neckerchiefs to the Scout uniform to soften its military features. Socialist groups warned that the BSA was a junior branch of the U.S. army that indoctrinated kids for war. They could point to the fact that the BSA had garnered endorsements from high-ranking officers and veteran organizations such as the American Legion. Many parents were reluctant to let their sons join a youth program that emphasized marching and soldier-like drill. The uniform drove a wedge into immigrant families, in particular. The boys the BSA viewed as agents of Americanization had to contend with their fathers, for whom the uniform served as a bitter reminder of military conscription in their homelands. To combat such misgivings, Scout leaders insisted that all they cared about was “character-building” and instilling fraternal feelings in boys, until the rise of totalitarian youth in the 1930s rendered equations of Scouting with militarism much less effective.

Although adult organizers underscored the political productivity of Scouting’s body culture in an era of global-ideological reorientation, they simultaneously worked hard to rein in the transnational impulses of young Scouts. Demonstrations like one pacifist procession in Chicago in 1922 in which Boy Scouts carried a banner reading “Humanity Above Nationalism” gave BSA leaders serious headaches. What if international understanding weakened the bond between manhood and national service instead of preserving it? What if young people jumped to wrong conclusions about their role as peacemakers? Chief Scout of the World Robert Baden-Powell argued passionately against returning to the “narrow patriotism” of prewar times, but the former warrior wondered how boys could be trained for peace without “emasculating [the] nation.” Echoing Baden-Powell’s concerns, U.S. Scout officials avoided describing their overseas activities with any term that might have branded them unmanly and unpatriotic. One such term was pacifism, which many equated with weakness or outright treason, but American organizers also found internationalism to

32 The BSA national archives in Irvine, Texas, hold a file on Scoutmasters accused of homosexual and pedophilic conduct that goes back to 1919. A ruling of the Oregon Supreme Court in June 2012 required the BSA to make public records dating from 1965 to 1985.

33 See MacLeod, Building Character in the American Boy, 178. The International Scout Conference in Paris in 1922 recommended these changes to the Scout uniform.

34 On the BSA’s cooperation with the American Legion, see BSA, Annual Report of the Boy Scouts of America (New York, 1920), 39–42.

35 For some of these intergenerational disputes between parents wary of militarism and children who wanted to join the Boy Scouts, see the letters that boys wrote to Daniel Carter Beard, Daniel Carter Beard Papers, Boxes 213-215. See also “From Doughboy Duds to Oscar de la Renta,” Scouting (October 2002), 12-13.


37 Robert Baden-Powell, “Education in Love in Place of Fear,” Jamboree (January 1923), 326.
be a dirty word because of its proximity to revolutionary social-
ism. “We are not pacifists or internationalists,” assured Mortimer
Schiff. For men like Schiff, whose success in international business
made them new American role models, there was no better foun-
dation for a peaceful and prosperous future than in raising men
“with clean, strong minds and bodies.”38 The common language
spoken by Boy Scouts around the globe, Schiff insisted, had little
to do with bookish theories but everything to do with giving literal
flesh to the idea of brotherhood through camaraderie and shared
manly experience.

Few examples are more illustrative of the BSA’s anti-intellectual-
ism in international affairs than its handling of the major su-
pranational player of the time, the League of Nations. Starting in
the early 1920s, League representatives reached out to organized
youth as part of a larger campaign to propagate their ideals. While
U.S. Scout officials welcomed the League’s assistance in lobby-
ing foreign governments to grant Scouts travel facilitations, they
blocked any motion to introduce a League-backed merit badge for
world citizenship.39 Much of the fear that participating in a sys-
tem of binding global governance would sap national virility was
expressed in gender-specific and generational vocabulary. “While
diplomats blunder and men debate — here is youth … pledged to
a high code of living,” stated George J. Fisher at the first multi-
national Scout gathering on American soil in 1937.40 Against the dual
menace of an unmasculine foreign policy and a hyper-masculine
fascist youth, the BSA pitted a concept of international relations
grounded in strong national bodies and brotherly recognition.
Portraying professional diplomacy as inept and ineffective, Scout
leaders suggested that world peace hinged neither on a rootless
pacifism nor on opaque supranational regimes but on voluntary
ties of companionship forged by tough, disciplined, and patriotic
boy-men. Here and elsewhere, adult organizers rode the wave of
youth to present their ways as the way of the future.

III. Brotherhood, Race, and the Rejuvenation of Empire
Adolescent performances of border-crossing friendship drove adult
organizers to reconsider the relationship of manhood, national
loyalty, and transnational responsibilities. But the spectacle of
white U.S. Scouts holding hands with boys of different color abroad
also produced potentially powerful critiques of social and racial

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38 Mortimer Schiff, “Scouting Among the Nations,” Jamb-
eree (October 1930), 1138.

39 League of Nations, “Resolu-
tions on Youth Rights and
Responsibilities 1922-23,” in
The International Law of Youth
Rights: Source Documents and
Commentary, ed. William D.
Angel (Dordrecht, 1995)
60. On the failed motion to
introduce a League of Na-
tions merit badge, see Rob-
ert Baden-Powell to Dame
Rachel, November 22, 1922;
and Christobal Rodrigues to
W. Lewis Bailey, August 8,
1924, in Boy Scouts File,
Dossier Nos. 22650 and 41815,
International Committee on
Intellectual Cooperation,
League of Nations Archive,
Geneva.

40 Fisher is quoted in
Boy Scouts of America, The
1937 National and World
Jamborees in Pictures: The
First National Jamboree of the
Boy Scouts of America and the
Fifth World Jamboree of Scou-
ting (New York, 1937), 130.
inequalities at home. The idea of raising male youth in the spirit of cooperation based on characterizations of boyhood as classless, transreligious, and transethnic called established hierarchies of race and empire into question. In fact, the BSA’s interwar policies towards Native Americans, African Americans, and colonial youth were directly related to the transnational forces that renegotiated the boundaries between nations and generations.41 Again, the behavior of young people shaped these policies in decisive ways.

Conservative youth workers had always exhibited a strong interest in non-white masculinities. Many believed that the naturalism and primitivism of the supposedly “uncivilized races” could be utilized to shield young white men from the feminizing effects of modern civilization. This explains why Native American lore played a central role in Boy Scout mythology. Wild West shows and Indian war dances that U.S. boys performed at the interwar jamborees turned the figures of the rugged pioneer and the red warrior into global symbols of American masculinity. However, the popularity of these symbols sometimes led to unexpected results. U.S. Scouts who had traveled to Hungary in 1933 were caught by surprise when Hungarian children interrupted one of their pageants with improvised Indian yells. Four years earlier, British Boy Scouts were disappointed when their American companions did not appear fully dressed in Indian garb for the 1929 Jamboree. Instead, they scoffed at the U.S. delegation for taking “feminine precautions,” seeing in their modern tents and generous food rations a sign of “American plutocracy.”42 Ironically, the globalization of playing Indian had been so successful that foreign Scouts felt confident enough to criticize American boys as unrepresentative of their country’s reputation for hardiness.

One way to counter this perception was to bring in individuals from racial groups whose masculine traits BSA leaders sought to instill in the nation’s youth. Native American lore experts were hired to


lend authenticity to large-scale Indian performances abroad. The International Scout Conference laid the groundwork for non-white participation in global Scouting in 1924, declaring that Boy Scout membership should not be denied for “any reason of race.” Such stipulations provided a boost to those in the BSA leadership who held that invocations of brotherhood on the international stage also required expanding the realm of brotherhood at home. In 1926, the Inter-Racial Service (IRS) was established to increase African American participation and encourage reluctant white southerners to allow segregated black troops. Another group the IRS targeted was Native American boys. Starting in the late 1920s, BSA officials partnered with the Bureau of Indian Affairs to launch troops at federal boarding schools for Native Americans. The IRS’s endeavors were only modestly successful. By the mid-1930s, black membership had passed the 30,000 mark. Small inroads into the Asian and Native American community had also been made.

Parallel attempts to enlist non-white youth in the cause of building an expansive and inclusive American nation were undertaken in the colonies. U.S. Scoutmasters started organizing troops of local boys in Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines as early as 1912 to pacify and “civilize” indigenous youth. Discounting geographical, cultural, and political differences, the BSA national office bundled Scouting in these overseas possessions into a separate “Region 13” in addition to its twelve geographical regions on the mainland. BSA officials believed that Scout training would strengthen the bonds of empire and turn colonial boys into future native elites loyal to the American nation-state. Backed by state officials, missionaries, businessmen, and military personnel, U.S. Scout authorities emphasized that their work with indigenous youth was a project conducted in the spirit of mutuality and fellow feeling rather than domination. This vision found full expression at the Hungarian World Jamboree in 1933 when a delegation of Filipino Scouts arrived on the campground and pitched their tents next to boys from New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Few occasions were more apt to sell to the world a successful example of cross-racial brotherhood and benevolent empire. Here, organizers thought, were the future pillars of a healthy, robust, and friendly world-class American Commonwealth. Like their pioneer forbears, the boys had proven their manhood by crossing new frontiers: the frontiers of international politics. Chief Scout Executive James E. West drew this analogy in his description of the gateway to the American camp:

43 On playing Indian at the 1929 World Jamboree, see “At the Indian Sign,” Boys’ Life (June 1929), 24; and “Boy Scouts at World Jamboree to Learn Indian Sign Language,” Weekly Bulletin of Boy Scout Activities (July 13, 1929).

44 “The Third International Conference,” Boys’ Life (December 1924), 57.

45 “Annual Report of the Boy Scouts of America 1935,” Scouting (April 1936). See also 1929 BSA Annual Report, 104-105, 229; and 1932 BSA Annual Report, 141, 188-89. According to the 1930 U.S. Census, 9.7 percent of the total population was black and 0.27 percent was Native American. See also Jordan, “A Modest Manliness,” 170-220, and MacLeod, Building Character, 212-30.

Our blockhouses were not built for defense against hostile Indian tribes. They were a promise to the Scouts of the World that, in entering, they would find the same spirit, in Scouting, of resourcefulness, perseverance and friendliness that marked the early pioneers ... Weren’t we settlers, too, in a strange land? Hadn’t we come to help in the building of an empire — an empire of youth and brotherhood?  

But even as the multiracial character of the jamborees reflected poorly on domestic race politics, masculine and racial hierarchies were anything but absent from Scouting’s “empire of youth”. In fact, the “Little Americas” that Boy Scouts constructed on the country’s twentieth-century global frontiers were less a socially accurate representation of a multicultural nation than a projection of white fantasies. The playful and often superficial interactions of white boys with the few Native American, black, and colonial Scouts that had been invited as token representatives of the “other” America tended to gloss over differences instead of engaging with them. Non-whites, fully aware that the BSA’s model of manhood privileged white middle-class youth, gave mixed responses at best. While some Native and African Americans detected in Scouting a corridor leading to social recognition, others saw in the separate and segregated treatment of minority boys evidence that involvement would lead to the perpetuation of their second-class masculine and civic status. Many voiced their disapproval by simply staying out of the organization. Colonial boys may have taken offense that white Scoutmasters were advised to lower the standards when it came to admitting non-white youth, but their reluctance to flock to the Boy Scouts in high numbers had just as much to do with the organization’s colonial policies of military drill and strict Americanization. The publication of a local supplement to the BSA handbook in 1932 that contained a section on Filipino patriotism was vetoed by national authorities. It was only after the islands embarked on the path to full independence in the late 1930s that membership in the newly founded Boy Scouts of the Philippines soared.

Despite the formal inclusion of non-white youth into the BSA’s orbit of brotherhood, the belief that global Scout friendship entailed fraternizing with the racial “other” remained heavily contested. More than once the boys had to grapple with the ambiguities of equality. Not unlike adults, some responded with apathy and outright hostility, others with courageous support. Many white Scouts in the South emulated the discriminatory practices of their elders and refused to

48 On similar colonial dynamics in British Scouting, see Timothy H. Parsons, Race Resistance and the Boy Scout Movement in British Colonial Africa (Athens, OH, 2004).
49 Governor General Leonard Wood to James E. West, June 4, 1924; "Memorandum for General Parker," December 6, 1932. Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, Record Group 350, Box 26981, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
admit blacks into their troops. A group of Los Angeles Boy Scouts, on the other hand, voted in favor of welcoming a Japanese-American boy in their midst, despite racially motivated objections from white parents. Most white adults supported Scouting because they saw it as a tool to reconstruct, not replace, national and imperial identities. But the Fourth Scout Law that a Boy Scout “is a friend to all and a brother to every other Scout” sounded so appealing and, yet, was so undefined that youth in different localities could come up with answers of their own. These answers on occasion departed from or even defied the intentions of their superiors. For young Scouts, whether they embraced Owen Matthew’s interracial idealism or sided with the Jim Crowism of white southern boys, it was the interaction with new transnational forces that set them apart from preceding generations and suggested to them that the destiny of their nation and its relationship to the world ultimately rested in their hands.

Conclusion

What, then, are the lessons that historians can draw from the young Americans in Scout uniform who navigated the turbulent national and international waters of the Interwar Years? How do their itineraries fit into the chronologies of manhood and American empire in the early twentieth century? The interwar jamborees conveyed a palpable sense of excitement. The boys approached each other with a joyful curiosity and faith in their ability to usher in a new era in global relations. But even as Boy Scouts claimed a special role for youth in transcending class, racial, religious, and national antagonisms, nascent feelings of difference dented their self-proclaimed fraternity. The Boy Scout narrative of postwar reconciliation had a clear Western bias, downplaying the wartime experiences of former enemies or current ideological opponents — in particular, Soviet Russia. Moreover, by actively exploring international relations, U.S. boys returned not only with a better appreciation of global commonalities, but also with a clearer understanding of what made them unique as Americans. Nation-building, not cosmopolitan unity, was more often the principal outcome of these youth gatherings. Pageants, flags, camp folklore, and uniformed bodies representing different countries made many Scouts aware that national distinctions mattered and that the nation was the primary locus of belonging. Although rivalry was discouraged in global Scouting, British Scouts “glowed with national pride” when they saw their “Chief” Baden-Powell enter the arena, hailing him as a Christ-like saint who “had brought the world of youth together in


a common fellowship.” Likewise, American boys boasted that their camping methods were the envy of the civilized world and stated that hearing “the national anthem in a foreign land made quivers race up and down [their] spines.”

Transnationalism worked in tandem with nationalism to offer the initiation rites for a new manhood that cast the United States as a young and benign power in world affairs. And yet, the nostalgic drift of Boy Scout rhetoric is obvious, and their rituals advanced a markedly preadolescent and asexual style of masculinity. Scouting’s boyish cult of friendship hardly captured the complexities of the twentieth-century’s political, economic, and cultural interdependencies — it trivialized them. At the same time, however, it bridged the realms of play and politics in decisive ways, linking abstract notions of national identity and global responsibility to concrete sites and experiences. Whistling the tune of youthful brotherhood made hegemonic manhood all the more effective since it obscured the fact that adopting the latter meant the subordination of women and denigrating the masculinities of other men (socialists, atheists, homosexuals) who deviated from accepted standards of manly achievement. Meanwhile, adults basked in the ambiance of youth and the positive imagery it evoked. Posing as youthful leaders allowed them to whitewash their personal histories and refashion themselves as dynamic and forward-looking men. Boy Scouting’s creation of “minor utopias” through juvenile bonding exonerated the same elites whose policies had made imperial conquest and war possible in the first place. This was the organization’s answer to the problem of how to inculcate in boys a sense of masculine citizenship in an era that witnessed the erosion of traditional gender roles as well as alternative attempts to breed the “new man” under the banner of Soviet communism, Italian fascism, and National Socialism. Such ideological distinctions resurfaced during the BSA’s golden years in the “long” 1950s when the confluence of Cold War politics and the arrival of the baby boomers led to record growth rates resulting in more than five million active members.

My research project joins a new generation of scholars who have begun to write the history of “global America.” The BSA’s imperial and transnational encounters reveal how young American males left their imprint upon changing conceptions of their nation’s place in the world, in an era when U.S. attitudes toward international involvement were very much in flux. These encounters were conditioned by region, race, ethnicity, class, and age — power structures that

52 “The Jamboree of Smiling Faces,” The Scouter (September 1933), 2.
55 The BSA published current membership figures in its annual reports to Congress.
shaped the ways in which American boys gained access to identity-forming global experiences. To be sure, only a small elite of mostly white and well-off U.S. Scouts enjoyed the privileges of overseas travel. But in following their tracks we can learn more about changes and continuities in the larger patterns of social status, gender, and empire. Overall, the BSA crafted an understanding of masculine citizenship that transcended the domestic-foreign binary and constituted a significant auxiliary of U.S. expansion. But since there is always a tension between cultural norms and individual practices, this project is committed to recording the agency of youthful subjects as they struck their own paths to manhood within and beyond the ideological constraints of Scouting. A history that examines how Boy Scouts came to terms with the entangled notions of gender, nation, and empire needs to cut across geographical and generational lines.

There is much to be gained from embedding the history of the Boy Scouts of America in larger global contexts. It illustrates the centrality of young people in the widening of America’s “external footprint,” to borrow a phrase from Ian Tyrrell, and shows how youth became a potent symbol of its imagined national and international future. It reveals how twentieth-century U.S. global expansion was tied to articulations of new ideals of boyhood and manhood. It sheds important light on the dialectics of military culture and peace. And it invites reflection on the extent to which narratives of fun and fellowship, rather than military or economic might, spurred the evolution of American empire.

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EUROPEAN IMPORTS? EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CONSUMER CULTURE FROM THE 1920S TO THE 1960S

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When considering the relationship between European émigrés and American mass consumption, it is perhaps the cultural critique of the Frankfurt School scholars that most readily comes to mind. “The culture industry,” Theodor Adorno declared, “fuses the old and familiar into a new quality. In all its branches, products which are tailored for consumption by masses, and which to a great extent determine the nature of that consumption, are more or less manufactured according to plan. ... This is made possible by contemporary technical capabilities as well as by economic and administrative concentration. The culture industry intentionally integrates consumers from above.”

While Adorno also gave more nuanced assessments of the consumer society he had experienced in American exile, it is his indictment of the passive consumption engineered by modern consumer capitalism for which he is most remembered and which publications of like-minded émigrés such as Herbert Marcuse elaborated further. Adorno, Marcuse, and his colleagues present us with an image of the European émigré at odds with mid-century consumerism and its manipulative capabilities in the United States.

This, however, is an incomplete picture. Other émigrés, as intellectual historian Daniel Horowitz has pointed out with regard to consumer researchers Ernest Dichter and George Katona, were among the most prominent cheerleaders of a new, and supposedly democratic, world of mass consumption. Furthermore, beyond the intellectual debates reverberating on both sides of the postwar Atlantic, a large number of European immigrants and émigrés contributed to the very rise of “consumer engineering” that the Frankfurt School critics attacked. They came to the United States with innovations in consumer psychology, in market research and marketing, as well as in industrial and product design, and they applied and furthered these innovations commercially and academically within the context of emerging professions and American corporations.

My current research project investigates the careers of European migrants who had come to the United States in the interwar period as

immigrants or as émigrés fleeing from National Socialism and who, in one way or another, played influential roles in postwar America’s “Golden Age” of mass consumption. Rather than providing a collective biography, their careers serve as a lens on the development of mass consumption — particularly consumer psychology, market research and product design, highlighting transatlantic differences as well as transfers and entanglements in the emergence of mid-twentieth-century mass consumer culture.

I. European Émigrés, Transnational Careers, and American “Consumer Engineering”

A diverse group of “consumer engineers” found their way across the Atlantic beginning in the interwar period and contributed in a variety of ways to the transformation and expansion of American consumer culture. This group includes leading representatives of American consumption research such as economic psychologist George Katona and the sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld. The work of émigré psychologists such as Ernest Dichter became central to approaching consumer behavior in advertising and marketing. Designers such as Lucian Bernhard, Herbert Bayer and, most prominently, Raymond Loewy contributed to new trends in graphic and industrial design during the 1930s and 1940s. Their innovations and designs helped promote the ubiquity of the American consumption model in the postwar decades.

To study such European impulses for “consumer engineering” is not to deny the genuine “Americanness” of American consumer culture. It was after all the social, cultural, and economic context of the United States that allowed many of these émigrés and their ideas to succeed. It does, however, call for a more transnational understanding of modern mass consumer culture. For the purpose of my study, I use “consumer culture” in reference to an array of meanings with which commercially produced goods became invested. Cars, for example, became associated with “brand images” during the 1950s which spoke to the way this product became enmeshed in and signaled the preferences, tastes, and attitudes of their owners. While the meaning of goods, as much recent scholarship in consumption studies reminds us, is always negotiated between various actors, including producers and consumers, my work investigates primarily the producers, those that create, market, and advertise the goods. The rise of professional marketing meant that corporate production processes were increasingly geared towards understanding, anticipating, and
influencing the consumer. Imbuing goods with psychological meaning and understanding, the psychology of buying gained in importance to producers by the middle of the century.

The Depression had spawned a slew of efforts which Roy Sheldon and Egmont Arens termed “consumer engineering” in their influential 1932 publication by the same title. Consumer engineering, they explained “in its widest sense ... includes any plan which stimulates the consumption of goods.” More specifically, consumer engineering came to mean creating consumer demand through the appearance of innovation, such as modernist design forms, new color variations, the creation of new applications and the discovery of other ways of “making goods desirable.” In some ways their concept found its continuation after the war in what historian Thomas Hine has termed “populuxe design,” an eclectic design style marked by exaggerated expressions of affluence such as the notorious tail-fins for automobiles. Populuxe consciously sought to avoid market saturation and to engineer replacement demand.

Consumer engineering further rested on the assumption that companies could create demand through “humaneering,” that is, by understanding the psychology and demographics of consumers. In their book, Sheldon and Arens repeatedly looked to European design and intellectual trends for inspiration.

Commercial design, marketing, and market research, as well as consumer psychology were areas in which European migrants came to play prominent roles. I argue that some concepts which came out of interwar Europe were especially amenable to efforts to create sustained demand for goods by changing design styles, to appeal to the “hidden motivations” of consumers, and to employ various means of “persuasion” in marketing. The success of “segmented marketing” in postwar America — the targeting of specific groups instead of a broad middle-market — rested in part on the groundwork of European immigrants, who could draw on their experience in analyzing and designing for milieu-specific consumer groups in interwar Europe.

In postwar Europe, finally, many of these migrants were then instrumental in introducing, translating, and adapting what was now seen as American-style marketing and design. Rarely, however, did such exchanges amount to straight imports or one-to-one copies of the original from one society to another.

Instead, recent scholarship in transnational history has aimed to transcend “national” boxes and to question labels such as “American” or “European.” By focusing on the professional networks of actors and


5 Thomas Hine, Populuxe (New York, 1986).


exchanges beyond the level of the nation state and its governments, transnational history has not only attempted to challenge the national paradigm, but — more importantly — has heightened our sensibility for the global interconnectedness of historical developments. Few processes were as truly transnational as the spread of commercial consumer cultures. Studies focused on transfers, furthermore, have increasingly emphasized that such transnational exchanges are not a simple one-way street. Transfers of ideas and goods are as dependent on the context of the originating society as they are on that of the receiving one. In the transatlantic case, such an understanding of exchange not only challenges simplistic notions of “Americanization,” but also informs this study’s perspective on European “exports” to the United States: on both ends of the transatlantic exchange, processes of “adaptation” were central to the success of new ideas and approaches.

Migrants are a central group of agents in such transfer processes. The history of European migration to the United States has, in recent years, been informed by similar notions of reciprocity and hybridity. Newer studies tend to emphasize migration as a multi-faceted process which includes the context of the societies of origin, the frequently complex path of migration, communication with those who stay behind as well as periodic, temporary or permanent returns home. All these elements affect the experience of migration and are part of migration-based exchange processes. Millions of Europeans had migrated to the United States prior to the mid-twentieth century and many of them — as entrepreneurs, workers, retailers or consumers — played a role in the emergence of America’s mass consumer society. The time period between the 1920s and 1960s, however, is of special significance because of the high number of refugee professionals that found their way across the Atlantic. At a time when overall immigration was declining, these émigrés formed a highly educated, well-connected, and frequently quite successful group of new arrivals, which is estimated to have numbered at least 130,000 from German-speaking Europe alone. Numerous studies have looked at the experience of Jewish refugees and of artists, scientists, intellectuals and political exiles. Specialized studies have focused on the impact of émigrés in fields such as psychology, arts, architecture or economics. This literature provides evidence for the influence exerted by émigrés on American society. In contrast to the long prevailing notion of a “brain drain” from Europe to the United States, newer studies emphasize the complexity of transfer and adaptation.
processes. The professional success of émigrés and the reception of their ideas, for example, frequently depended on a number of factors, including their willingness to respond to the circumstances and needs of American society.

Beyond the significant number of émigré professionals, the mid-twentieth century was particularly fruitful for transatlantic exchanges in consumption-related disciplines for two further reasons. First, many of these refugees could draw upon insights and innovations from the vibrant commercial, artistic, and academic life of such interwar metropolitan centers as Vienna, Berlin, and Paris. While interwar European corporations had been slower to incorporate consumer research and design into their marketing efforts, the continent had still seen a great deal of development in this area. A growing number of market research firms began to pay attention to consumer markets, often in close cooperation with economists and social scientists at universities. Secondly, as a consequence of the Great Depression, American corporations and marketing professionals increasingly saw a need to stimulate and create demand, to understand the composition of markets and the motivations of consumers. At the same time, the expanding American state similarly set its sights on “the consumer,” who would become a central figure in demand-driven economic growth policies as well as wartime mobilization efforts. American consumer culture, as a result, changed during the 1930s and 1940s and this transformation provided an opening for European influences.

II. Consumer Research and Psychology: The Example of Paul Lazarsfeld and the “Vienna School”

European migrants contributed significantly to transformations in American marketing and consumer research following the 1930s. The professionalization of marketing and market research has received increased interest from business historians as well as those working on the history of the social sciences in both Europe and the United States. This interest is due in part to the construction of “the consumer” as an increasingly central figure in twentieth century societies and economies. Hungarian-born George


16 On changing role of consumption, see Cohen, Consumer’s Republic; Kathleen Donohue, Freedom from Want: American Liberalism and the Idea of the Consumer (Baltimore, 2003); Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, 2005); Charles McGovern, Sold American.


Katona, for example, is tied closely to the rise of “behavioral economics” and the centrality of the consumer in the context of an emerging Keynesian growth strategy. Katona’s work built on interwar European experiences with inflation and depression as well as on social psychology research he did in Berlin. He became one of the premier consumer researchers of postwar America, and the consumer confidence measurements he pioneered in Michigan were reflective of the growing importance attached to understanding “the consumer” by social scientists and government administrators. Advertisers and corporations increasingly drew on scientific research to refine their market surveys, demographic analyses, and studies of psychological motivations of shopping. Such cross-overs between commercial and academic work were increasingly characteristic of the mid-twentieth century development of the marketing profession; it provided an opening for the transatlantic careers of several Europeans coming to the United States.

Few individuals impacted this trend as prominently as Austrian émigré Paul Lazarsfeld. Lazarsfeld and several of his fellow


émigrés from Vienna helped to shape the world of mid-twentieth-century market research. In 1977, the *Journal of Advertising Research* included threeémigrés in its list of the seven “founding fathers” of ad research, and several of the non-émigrés were also intimately tied to Lazarsfeld and his group. The so-called “Vienna School” of market research emerged from the *Wirtschaftspychologische Forschungsstelle*, a social research institute associated with the University of Vienna, and, next to Lazarsfeld, it prominently included the sociologist Hans Zeisel and the motivation researchers Herta Herzog and Ernest Dichter. Some recent research has begun to acknowledge their transatlantic careers, but much of it has overemphasized the role of the colorful Ernest Dichter while the full breadth of the influence exerted by the Viennese group remains underappreciated.

The *Wirtschaftspychologische Forschungsstelle* was affiliated with the University of Vienna’s Institute of Psychology and had been conceived in 1931 as an “Austrian institution for motivational research” to study markets and improve economic life. Lazarsfeld, who had come to psychology by way of a degree in mathematics, was the driving force behind the institute and its research. His interest in psychological motivations was coupled with a strong desire to innovate and improve nascent empirical survey methodology. The institute, which continued to exist until 1936 when it was shut down by the Austrian government for political reasons, engaged in a broad array of social scientific inquiry. Its most famous study was a comprehensive community study on the effects of unemployment on the workers of Marienthal. Funding, however, was always scarce, and it was a host of commercial market research studies that paid the bills of the Forschungsstelle.

The market studies were more than a source of revenue, though, as Lazarsfeld and his colleagues used them as practical fieldwork to

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25 See “Verein Österreichische Wirtschaftspychologische Forschungsstelle,” in PFLA, Box “Lazarsfeld Vienna Marktforschungsstelle.”

develop theories about “true” consumer motivations, “consumer biographies,” and the impact of advertising on decision making, as well as interview methodologies to uncover subconscious factors in decision making.27 Still, the reports produced by the Forschungsstelle were careful to give clear advice about potential commercial uses, suggesting advertising strategies and slogans. During the early 1930s, the Vienna institute established a European network with branches in Berlin, Budapest, Stuttgart, and Zurich. It conducted market surveys for companies ranging from “Bally” shoes and “Naermil” malt products to producers of electronic goods. The surveys paid close attention to differences in social class among consumers, and many open-ended questions aimed at the psychological factors involved in buying. One such report, for example, suggested the slogan “mein Kaffee” to advertise ready-made coffee to petite-bourgeois women who took pride and psychological ownership in preparing their own coffee.28 The institute thus very consciously wedded commercial and academic work, an approach that Lazarsfeld would apply several times over after he left for the United States.

Paul Lazarsfeld came to the United States in 1933 on a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. He had applied for the grant with the expressed purpose of studying American market research and survey techniques.29 Aside from academic curiosity, his trip was also motivated by an effort to interest American firms in retaining the services of the Wirtschaftspychologische Forschungsstelle to conduct market surveys for their products in Europe.30 As much as Lazarsfeld felt that he stood to gain from a trip to the United States, he was also soon convinced that he had much to share with Americans. He published articles based largely on his Austrian research in academic journals such as the Harvard Business Review and Market Research and prepared a book manuscript on psychology in marketing.31 Lazarsfeld’s work and appearance on the American scene was portrayed in a 1934 article in the trade publication Tide — The Newsmagazine for Advertising and Marketing.32 While he acknowledged that American corporations had been more open to psychological work, he later recalled this to have been “on a terribly unsophisticated level. So that … if a European really specialized in the work, he’d just run rings around them.”33

In his first years in the United States, Lazarsfeld succeeded in making numerous connections among academic and commercial consumer researchers. He met with General Electric marketing officials and was
in touch with General Foods about a large-scale food consumption study.34 In Pittsburgh, he worked with David Craig and his Research Bureau for Retail Training on a survey concerning rayon hosiery. In early 1935, Lazarsfeld proposed in a letter to establish this bureau to act as a “clearing house for methods of market analysis” in the U.S., much as the Wirtschaftspychologische Forschungsstelle had for its European network.35 His continuing connection to Europe bolstered his American career as he used his European expertise with corporate contacts. His most successful early affiliation was with the Psychological Corporation, a New York based private market research company. In 1935 its managing director Paul Achilles wrote to Gallup and other corporate clients, recommending Lazarsfeld as the man to contact while he travelled Europe that summer: “His Bureau for Psychological Field Work will represent us on the continent.”36

Ultimately, academia and not commercial research would remain Lazarsfeld’s primary field of activity, and he established his position by building up survey research institutes following the Vienna model.37 The first such institute was established at Newark University in 1936 as a center for empirical and psychological social research that also received much of its funding from commercial market studies.38 Even more successful was a second project that grew out of an interest among commercial American broadcasters in the audience research work of the Vienna institute.39 In 1937 Lazarsfeld teamed up with Hadley Cantril (Princeton) and Frank Stanton (CBS) to start the famous Radio Research Project, one of the first systematic efforts in audience surveys.40 Over the course of the late 1930s, Lazarsfeld managed to bring several key members of the Vienna institute to the United States. He used his connections to introduce Herta Herzog to American academia as a specialist on audience research. Her later work for the Radio Project included collaboration on an analysis of the “Invasion from Mars” panic following the 1938 radio broadcast of H.G. Wells’ War of the Worlds.41 Hans Zeisel similarly joined the new American research project, and Ernest Dichter, who had been a student of Lazarsfeld’s in Vienna and worked for the Forschungsstelle after he had left, also received his first introduction into the world of American market research through Lazarsfeld. In addition to his former Viennese colleagues, other émigrés also became involved with the Radio Project. The most well-known case is that of Theodor Adorno, who wrote on radio and music for the project until his theoretical style increasingly clashed with Lazarsfeld’s more empirical...

34   Letter John Jenkins (General Electric) to Lazarsfeld, Sept. 10, 1934, PFLA Box “Biography 1933–46.”
35   Letter Lazarsfeld to Craig (U Pitt), Jan. 18, 1935, PFLA box “Biography 1933-46.”
36   Letter (Draft) Paul Achilles (Psychological Corporation) to “Chalkley, Gallup etc.,” c. 1935, in PFLA Box “Biography I.”
40   On the radio project, see Fleck, Transatlantische Bereicherungen, ch. 5, and Thomas Wheatland, The Frankfurt School in Exile (Minneapolis: 2009).
41   Hadley Cantril, The Invasion from Mars: A Study in the Psychology of Panic (Princeton, 1940), published with assistance from Hazel Gaudet and Herta Herzog.
While both continued to share an interest in modern mass consumption and communication, their relationship remained somewhat distant, though largely friendly. Though Adorno and his Frankfurt colleagues never quite felt at home personally or academically in the United States, Lazarsfeld and his Viennese group transitioned across the Atlantic with much greater ease.

The radio project helped shape the beginnings of Lazarsfeld’s most lasting institutional achievement, the Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR) at Columbia University. By the early 1940s, BASR became an institutional home for many of the Austrian émigrés. While the Bureau was set up as a center for sociological survey research, commercial contracts made up much of its work and revenue during the early years. Both émigrés and their American colleagues produced numerous studies for BASR: Ernst Dichter studied psychological programming, Herta Herzog surveyed daytime serial listeners and studied the effect of Kolynos Tooth powder commercials, while Lazarsfeld wrote on soap operas and produced studies for CBS. Marie Jahoda, who came to the United States from her earlier exile in Britain in 1946, and Hans Zeisel also produced BASR studies. Still building in part on the work done in Vienna over a decade earlier, the BASR prided itself in establishing and refining the methodology for panel studies and focused interviews, the type of psychologically informed qualitative market research which would be influential for decades to come.

By the late 1940s, the BASR and Lazarsfeld himself shifted their attention increasingly away from commercial market research. Instead, the more direct impact of the Vienna School on postwar mass-marketing came arguably through Ernest Dichter and Herta Herzog. Dichter left academia and established himself as a marketing guru after the war. After immigrating to the United States in 1937, he had initially conducted research for corporations such as Proctor & Gamble. In 1947, he established the independent Institute for Motivational Research. Dichter’s fame rests in part on the utilization of Freudian concepts as well as sexual allusions and desires in advertising. Along with Pierre Martineau, he is considered to be one of the pioneers of motivation research in the U.S., which became popular with advertisers during the 1950s. Rather than relying on empirical market research and polling, Dichter used in-depth interviews with smaller panels to uncover the hidden motivations of consumers — clearly building on some of the work he had done with the Forschungsstelle.
His work was central to establishing the notion of “brand image” in marketing and he helped inspire advertising campaigns like Exxon’s “Put a tiger in your tank” that aimed to associate that animal’s renown for strength and virility with the company’s fuel. His success and visibility made him a target for critics of postwar consumer culture. Thus Vance Packard attacked him in his 1957 exposé as one of the “hidden persuaders” manipulating consumers.48

Herta Herzog, while less publicly prominent than Dichter, also contributed to the 1950s rise of motivation research and played an influential role in bringing qualitative market research to Madison Avenue advertising firms.49 Herzog had been a prominent academic voice at the Forschungsstelle and upon arrival in America in 1935 she not only conducted audience research for the Radio Project and BASR but also built a career as a media and advertising expert. Herzog helped pioneer qualitative research methods such as panel studies and focus groups in marketing campaigns. She was keenly interested in the psychological attachments consumers developed to goods and the meanings they invested in them. During the 1950s and 1960s she held influential positions at McCann-Erickson, an advertising firm whose marketing department she and Hans Zeisel had joined in 1943. By the mid-1960s, Herzog had joined Jack Tinker Partners, a marketing think tank affiliated with McCann.

Hans Zeisel’s postwar career as a forensic sociologist at the University of Chicago took him furthest from marketing research. Nonetheless he stayed in close contact with Lazarsfeld and other members of the group, spoke at marketing conventions, and still in 1967 was a board member of the market research firm Marplan.50 Zeisel, in some ways, became the historiographer of the group, writing about the legacy of the Vienna research center. In doing so, he (and by consultation Lazarsfeld) was writing a counter-narrative to Dichter who — to position himself as an innovator — in interviews and his own publications reliably de-emphasized the role which psychology and the quest for hidden motivations had played in the work of the Wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle.51

Within the group of the “Vienna School” and within the market-research profession more generally, tensions prevailed at times between an academic self-understanding and the demands of commercial consulting work. Especially for the European émigrés with their backgrounds in European university training and, frequently, the social reform movements of the interwar era, pure commercial work...
often carried the stigma of a less reputable occupation. Dichter’s work received only limited recognition from his more academically-minded colleagues. Indeed, the more empirically inclined Zeisel and Lazarsfeld scoffed at Dichter’s liberal use of Freudian interpretations. Few attacked Dichter and his methodology more vigorously than Alfred Politz, another influential independent market researcher of the 1950s and 1960s.\textsuperscript{52} Politz, who had come out of interwar Berlin, was primarily concerned with improving empirical survey methodology. He determinedly fought for stringent academic standards in the commercial work of the emerging market research profession. Still, as discussed above, qualitative research and psychologically informed questions about consumer motivations had both always been prominent in the work of the Vienna group at large. Indeed, the very combination of empirical survey methods and psychological motivation research had been central to the \textit{Forschungsstelle} and to its “successor” institutions from Newark to the BASR in the United States.

Across the board, the immigrants and émigrés discussed drew on various schools of psychology for their work, which represented a major European influence on the American marketing field and contributed to what marketing scholar Harold Kassarjian has called the postwar “cognitive revolution” in marketing studies.\textsuperscript{53} While behaviorism and stimulus-response models had long dominated American advertising psychology, the influx of European migrants helped popularize other approaches. Freudian psychoanalysis was most prominent in the work of Ernest Dichter and others working in motivation research. Social psychologists such as émigré Kurt Lewin gained in recognition. His work on field theory and group dynamics of persuasion influenced both Lazarsfeld and George Katona and foreshadowed direct-marketing approaches of the postwar years.\textsuperscript{54} Another important group was the Gestalt psychologists, including Max Wertheimer and Kurt Koffka. After their emigration to the United States, their work was increasingly received by Americans and began to appear in studies on marketing and consumer psychology.\textsuperscript{55} Much of the work of the “hidden persuaders” of the 1950s and the interest in “humaneering” proposed by consumer engineering advocates thus employed methodologies developed in a transatlantic context.

### III. Product and Graphic Design: The Example of the “American Bauhaus”

Much like psychological market research, commercial design became an integral element of “consumer engineering.” The emergence


of industrial design as a profession during the 1930s has been portrayed as a peculiarly American phenomenon that gave rise to the colorful postwar world of modern consumer products.\textsuperscript{56} Yet European-born designers played a significant role in the professionalization process. French Art Deco, Bauhaus functionalism, and other stylistic developments had received considerable attention in the U.S. as early as the 1920s. Next to “streamlining” pioneer Otto Kuhler, influential design professional Peter Muller-Munk, and other immigrant designers, the stellar career of French-born industrial designer Raymond Loewy perhaps most readily illustrates the transatlantic connections that shaped the “golden age” of American commercial design.\textsuperscript{57}

By contrast, the influence of the more radical European design traditions, including Bauhaus functionalism, on American commercial design has often been considered more marginal, and Bauhaus artists have been portrayed as aloof from the pragmatic demands of corporate America, ideologically incompatible or too theoretically minded.\textsuperscript{58} Both historians of American design and contemporary design professionals have described the foray of Bauhaus design philosophy into the hard-nosed world of

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\item On the emergence of industrial design in America, see Meikle, Twentieth-Century Limited.
\end{itemize}
American business as a venture doomed from the start. In his 1940 *Industrial Design: A Practical Guide*, Harold Doren wrote in reference to Walter Gropius, Joseph Albers, and other Bauhaus émigrés: “The Bauhaus approach is a philosophy of life as well as a method of design. It lacks, however, the realistic qualities that we Americans, rightly or wrongly, demand. Much of the writing of the group is vague to the point of complete unintelligibility ... It will be difficult, I believe, to acclimatize the esoteric ideas of the Bauhaus in the factual atmosphere of American industry.” But were Bauhaus ideas and American business culture really so incompatible?

In 1937, Hungarian-born László Moholy-Nagy was asked by a group of Chicago business leaders to head a new design school in the Bauhaus tradition. The Chicago Association for Arts and Industries that extended the invitation represented a group of philanthropists and city businessmen and saw itself as a “liaison” between the manufacturer and design education, intent on promoting “good design in industry” in the Midwest. In the wake of the depression, American businesses had increasingly turned to product and graphic design to market their goods, and as design programs emerged all over the United States during the 1930s, Chicago did not want to lag behind. Since Chicago was home to the corporate offices of major corporations, several advertising agencies, and big department stores, the city’s business community hoped for tangible benefits from opening a cutting-edge design school in Chicago.

For this, they turned to Moholy-Nagy with his Bauhaus credentials. The design philosophy of the Bauhaus emphasized a new and holistic approach to art education that was indeed radical in the totality of its vision. Moholy-Nagy had been one of the leading theorists of that approach as author or co-author of many Bauhaus books that appeared during the interwar years. The Bauhaus stood for a comprehensive artistic and social vision, which did not mesh easily with business demands for quick sales and profitability. For all their radicalism, however, the Bauhaus designers were not as aloof from the commercial world as is often thought. Indeed, much of their work was geared towards designs suitable for commercial mass production. Students at the Bauhaus received schooling in consumer psychology and the psychological ramifications of design. They were similarly offered courses on the basic principles of business and marketing. Among other things, Moholy-Nagy did commercial design and advertising work in the European market during the early 1930s, for instance for Schott...
glassworks. After arriving in the United States, he quickly set out to draft a comprehensive program for the school and to recruit faculty from the United States and among former Bauhaus affiliates. In letters, his wife Sibyl encouraged him to specifically target middle-class Americans as students and to focus on design for commercial purposes.

One can easily tell two very different tales of this “New Bauhaus” and its successor organizations. One conforms to the view of the Bauhaus vision as incompatible with American business culture. The schools remained small, financially precarious, and continuously on the verge of closure. A second story, however, reveals an educational enterprise that, for all its problems, garnered a great deal of attention and support in the art and design world and had a perhaps surprising degree of successful interaction with corporate America.

Let me briefly tell the first story. After their initial honeymoon phase, relations between Moholy and the Association quickly soured. In part, this was due to a realization by the sponsors that the much desired Bauhaus education, with its emphasis on basic and abstract training, did not immediately yield concrete and practical results. At the same time, the Association ran into fundraising troubles. Many of its initial donors could not be tapped again, and new sponsors did not rush in to make up for this, especially under the economically depressed conditions of 1937/38. By the summer of 1938 the Association decided that the school would not remain open for a second year. Parting ways with the Association for Arts and Industries, Moholy-Nagy began a new venture in 1939, the School of Design, which in 1942 became the Institute of Design. While the Bauhaus name was officially dropped to signal a new beginning, the continuities in staff, program, and vision were substantial, and the phrase “American Bauhaus” remained in use. The school, however, continued to struggle financially until it finally merged with the Illinois Institute for Technology in 1949.

A second, more optimistic story can also be found in the records, which demonstrate successful interaction between the European

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64 Letter Laszlo Moholy-Nagy (=LMN) to Alvar Aalto, Feb 9, 1932, IIT Archives (=IITA), Acc. 2007.15, Alain Findeli, Box 4.
émigrés and corporate America. Key to this story was Walter Paepcke, president of the Container Corporation of America (CCA). Paepcke, a second-generation immigrant entrepreneur, had a longstanding interest in modern art, and his company built up a decidedly modernist design department in the 1930s. Bauhaus graphic designer Herbert Bayer would come to play a prominent role in corporate and advertising design for the company during the 1940s. As Moholy’s school was struggling, Paepcke helped to keep it afloat through several generous donations and vigorous fundraising efforts among his business connections. In May of 1940, for example, Paepcke sent out scores of invitations for a luncheon at the Chicago Raquet club, to consider how the School of Design can “best meet the industrial and business needs of Chicago.” The school, he explained to fellow industrialists, was unique in its methods and offered promising potential at a time when “Chicago is seeking new industries and new work for existing industries, [and] product design is of primary importance.” The event helped lay the groundwork for a network of support from companies such as Kraft Cheese, Rand McNally, Sears & Roebuck, and others who would regularly contribute to the school.

The school itself did its part to offer the Chicago community what it was expecting, tackling the problem of good design for mass production. The curriculum built on the Bauhaus model of basic and specialized workshops in product design, textiles, painting, sculpture, light, and display. Of most direct interest to its corporate sponsors were the night classes for working professionals. In his inaugural address, Moholy enthusiastically embraced the “splendid” “American” concept of the night class as a new way of combining leisure and professional advancement. By the early 1940s the school offered evening courses in display, in product design, and in advertising arts. The night classes were a success with employees of corporations such as Bell Telephone, Corning Glass, and Marshall Fields, who sponsored part of the tuition to help their employees gain additional expertise. The courses received positive reviews: the head of display at Marshall Fields, for example, lauded the program and the “European Workshop Method” to which it exposed his employees.

By early 1945, Moholy reported with optimism about the school’s outreach in the commercial and artistic world. He had just given a talk at the J.W. Thompson advertising agency in New York and was preparing an exhibition display for the U.S. Gypsum Company. A special public-relations report detailed plans for a scholarship program

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67 Letter Walter Paepcke to Mr. J. Finlay, May 23, 1940, Institute of Design Collection, Box 2, Folder 36, UIC Daley Library (=IDC).
68 See class schedules in IIT Archives, Institute of Design Records, Box 1a.
69 S. Moholy-Nagy, moholy-nagy, p. 149.
70 See “Institute of Design — New Registrations (1945),” IDC Box 1, Folder 14.
71 Letter John Moss to W. Street, August 22, 1944, IDC Box 1, Folder 23.
72 On the subsequent discussion, see “Report on Public Relations Activities: Institute of Design”, Feb 6, 1945, IDC Box 1, Folder 19.
for Chicago high-school students funded by local corporations to enter the Institute of Design. At the same time, the school furthered its connections with other émigré designers by hosting talks by Gropius, Herbert Bayer, Siegfrid Giedion, as well as French graphic artist and ad designer Jean Carlu. On November 30, 1944, finally, the institute was featured on the local television station Balaban & Katz and the report surmised hopefully: “The future will produce other occasions of a similar nature, for the institute is ideal for televising.”

Press coverage highlighted the Bauhaus’ devotion to research in new designs for machine-produced goods, and the Chicago Sun informed its readers that “[t]oday the very fountain pen in your pocket can trace part of its design back through American studios like Norman Bel Geddes’ to abstract painters in pre-war Europe.” Indeed, between 1944 and 1946 Moholy worked regularly as a consultant to the Parker Pen Company, influencing the styling of its products and designing desk-sets. The St. Louis Star-Tribune went so far as to as to see in the Institute of Design a “blueprint for the postwar world,” quoting Moholy-Nagy as saying that “We must ‘streamline’ not only our automobiles, offices, factories, and homes, but ourselves as well.” Moholy and the American Bauhaus were certainly contributing voices to the 1940s discussion on modern commercial design and consumer engineering in the United States.

Despite their various and continued interactions, some in the Chicago business community remained skeptical vis-à-vis the institute. A 1944 letter from the Chicago Association of Commerce, for example, listed “typical questions” they received about the school, including “is it ... the personal hobby of Mr. Paepcke?,” or does it represent “a particular sect of art?” Tensions existed between the school and commercial art directors as well. A 1946 letter from a General Outdoor Advertising Co. executive related to Paepcke the impressions of their national art director: Moholy, whom he called “the promoter,” had barely survived with his school by hustling companies for donations while his methods were “questionable.” None of the students, he alleged, had become “outstanding,” he himself had quit a course — “a complete flop!” — in “disgust,” and, finally, all professional art schools in Chicago, he intimated, were “against this promoter.”

The tension between commerce and art was by no means one-sided, however. Moholy and his staff retained an idealistic commitment to the Bauhaus vision of education and could at times be highly
disdainful of commercial work. In a 1945 letter to Herbert Bayer, Sibyl Moholy-Nagy vented her frustration with well-meaning advice from émigré friends such as Bayer and Giedion: “Not a single friend of the European Bauhaus group ... has found it worth his while to give up the flesh-pots of commercial New York for the hard work and financial risks of an experimental school.” Moholy and his faculty always remained slightly at odds with the commercial mainstream of the new industrial design profession.

Such tensions, however, were often fruitful for the professionalization of the field. In November of 1946, shortly before his death, Moholy-Nagy participated in a Museum of Modern Art conference, “Industrial Design: A New Profession.” The conference gathered leading figures of industrial design in America including Raymond Loewy, Egmont Arens, Walter Baermann, George Nelson, and Walter Teague. Discussions ranged from professional standards and ethics to principles of good design and the role of market surveys. Against too strong a market orientation and the overburdening streamlining trend, Moholy emphasized the creative role of the designer and the need for an artistic vision in order to move beyond the status quo. He and other émigrés like Bernard Rudofsky introduced a “European” perspective on “American” “artificial obsolescence” and advertised “novelty.” While some present vehemently disagreed with Moholy’s stance, he did provide a prominent voice in the American discussion about industrial design.

Especially with regard to design education, members of the emerging profession deferred to Moholy-Nagy, who was introduced by Joseph Hudnut, Dean of Harvard’s School of Design, as “the most able and vigorous and successful pioneer in educational discipline ... We imitate him at Harvard and he is imitated over the world.” Moholy’s emphasis on the practical teaching of fundamentals and the abstract concepts of space, color, and material resonated with many of the assembled members of the profession. In 1955, his long-time colleague George Keck boasted about the educational achievements of the Institute of Design, whose alumni were “responsible for significant advances in industrial design” and whose “philosophy has penetrated the art education world to such an extent that there is today scarcely any art school of any stature in this country which has not adopted many of its principles.” Its champions certainly believed in the Bauhaus’s impact on American design. Gropius, in a 1950 speech, called the institution “the decisive link between the designer and industry in this country.”


81 Ibid, p. 59-60.


Historians of business and design such as Regina Blasczyk have justly cautioned against overestimating the mass market influence of prominent designers while overlooking the legions of “fashion intermediaries,” the vast number of unknown design professionals in companies and ad agencies who were much more intimately tied to the production process and more responsive to consumer inputs. They, she and others would argue, were ultimately responsible for shaping postwar America’s world of consumer goods. Still, the Bauhaus émigrés, I contend, were an important part of the story of mid-century American consumer design in several ways. They helped shape the professional discourse during a formative period for American industrial design. As teachers in Chicago and elsewhere, they passed on their concepts and methodologies, adapted to an American context, to a new generation of American industrial designers. Their own commercial and experimental design work, finally, set standards that were received through exhibitions and trade-journals and reflected, if often in modified form, in the work of other professionals.

The oscillation between art and commerce exemplified by the American Bauhaus was generally characteristic of the broader group of immigrants and émigrés coming out of European traditions. In the field of graphic and advertising design, for example, Herbert Bayer played an important role through his work for advertising companies such as Dorland or the CCA. In his writings, Bayer consciously reflected on the new role of the artist in an age of mass consumption. Centered around the Black Mountain College, another group of experimental émigré artists including Josef Albers, Xanti Schawinsky and — by extension — Gyorgy Kepes gave new impulses for visual design. French artists such A.M. Cassandre helped bring elements of the European poster-art tradition into American advertising, while Lucian Bernhard’s work popularized modernist fonts for commercial copy. European immigrants frequently filled the position of art directors

85 On the history of graphic design, see Steven Heller and Georgette balance, eds., Graphic Design History (New York, 2001). For Germany, see Jeremy Aynsley, Graphic Design in Germany, 1890–1945 (Berkeley, 2000).
in American advertising agencies and companies; thus Leonard Lionni worked at N.W. Ayers and Bauhaus émigré Walter Allner at Fortune magazine. Immigrant entrepreneurs such as Hans Knoll and Walter Landor helped set new standards in American corporate design aesthetics. The Museum of Modern Art in New York, finally, played a vital role in connecting the artistic and commercial aspects of design, promoting the work of European modernists, and fostering a discussion about the future of the profession and “good design” between art and business.

IV. Towards a Transatlantic Consumer Culture: Postwar Translations

The careers of European immigrants and émigrés in mid-century America are only one side of a truly transatlantic story. Many of them returned to Europe in varying capacities after World War II and became active participants in a process that contemporaries and some later historians have discussed as the “Americanization” of postwar European consumer culture. Consumer history’s combination of economic and cultural aspects have made it a central area for scholarship on “Americanization,” understood as the transfer of American goods, consumption practices and patterns, and their local adaptation. Few studies have been as encompassing as Victoria de Grazia’s Irresistible Empire, but numerous studies have traced the cultural “Americanization” of Europe through film, music or advertising as well as the economic “Americanization” of the continent through policy transfers or the adaptation of new management or marketing strategies.

Highlighting the impact of émigré “consumer engineers” in the postwar transformation of European consumer society complicates this picture and poses the question of how unidirectional transatlantic flows truly were during the heyday of the American Century. With their considerable knowledge of both American and European markets, émigrés could frequently function as translators, adapting innovations now perceived as “American” to European settings. In some cases, the American government drew on their expertise in postwar reconstruction efforts. George Katona, for example, surveyed German opinion and consumer research for the American occupation administration. In other cases, marketing experts such as Ernest Dichter helped American corporations interested in gaining access to European markets. European professional institutions sought out


91 Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, 2005).
the émigrés as they transformed themselves, and universities called on them as teachers and guest lecturers. In various functions, they thus played central roles as transatlantic intermediaries. Especially in the field of consumer design, the work of the émigrés featured prominently in Cold War efforts to promote American consumer culture in Europe. Exhibitions of consumer design sponsored by the Museum of Modern Art, the Ford Foundation, and the American government included many European-born designers such as Eva Zeisel, wife of above-mentioned market researcher Hans Zeisel. Such efforts consciously drew a direct line between European design traditions of the interwar years and postwar consumer goods to appeal to European audiences. The work of the émigrés in the United States was invoked to legitimize transformations in Europe. 92

Yet, throughout the postwar era, European and American consumer culture continued to be discussed as counterparts. Critiques of American consumer culture as manipulative in its appeals and wasteful in its design often drew on the theoretical work of those European émigrés that engaged American commercial culture more critically. Frankfurt School critics such as Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse often attacked the very elements of “consumer engineering,” such as psychological marketing appeals, that their fellow émigrés had helped to introduce. With regard to design, the writings of Bernard Rudofsky and Siegfried Giedion are particularly critical of modern mass design trends. Both as celebrants of modern consumption and as critics, then, European immigrants and émigrés were crucial for the transatlantic debate at the time. 93 Their work and their writings contributed to the emergence of a truly transnational consumer culture that ultimately transcended the national or regional labels of “American” and “European.”

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20TH ARCHIVAL SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY


From June 18 to June 29, 2012, the GHI Archival Summer Seminar took place for the twentieth time. A group of ten American Ph.D. students visited archives and research institutions and met with archivists and scholars in four German cities: Speyer, Cologne, Koblenz, and Munich. The seminar seeks to give American doctoral students in the field of German and European history the opportunity to familiarize themselves with a wide range of research institutions in Germany. The two-week program started in Speyer, where the participants, under the guidance of Walter Rummel, learned how to read documents in old German handwriting. An irreplaceable partner of the GHI Archival Summer Seminar since its beginning. Walter Rummel, head of the Landesarchiv Speyer, offered a well-conceived and motivating introductory course in paleography. The group practiced their newly acquired paleographical skills with documents from the seventeenth to the twentieth century over an entire week. Moreover, they learned a great deal about the procedures of Quellenkritik as Rummel carefully contextualized the sources and taught the basics of Quellenkunde. During a tour through the Landesarchiv, the participants got to see some of the “crown jewels” from the stacks as well as the conservationist facility for old documents. Two afternoons in
Speyer were spent discussing the participants’ dissertation projects. The students’ presentations in a semi-formal atmosphere produced lively discussions and paved the way for intensive scholarly exchange throughout the two weeks.

The second part of the Seminar consisted of visits to federal, state, local, and private archives and libraries. First, the group visited the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz. Archivist Thekla Kleindienst explained the organization of the German archive system and introduced the participants to the vast holdings of the branches of the Bundesarchiv. Most of the time was spent on an introduction to the digital research tools of the Bundesarchiv’s electronic finding aids combined with a practical exercise in archival research: The participants were assigned a fictitious research project and sent on a mission to find relevant sources in the Bundesarchiv’s holdings.

Next, the group visited the municipal archive of Cologne. A long-standing partner of the GHI, Cologne’s municipal archive has gained a sad notoriety: In 2009 the archive collapsed. This accident was most probably closely related to the construction of a new subway line of the Cologne Stadtbahn system. Nearly the entire collection was damaged, and the archive has been under reconstruction ever since. The deputy director of the archive, Ulrich Fischer, gave a presentation on the collapse of the archive and led a tour of the restoration facilities, which allowed the participants to gauge the amount of work and the technological expertise and equipment needed to restore archival documents. In addition to familiarizing participants with the technological aspects of this process, this tour strengthened their awareness of the fragility of historical documents and of the selection processes historical documents undergo in the process of archival storage.

The seminar’s third destination was the Staatsbibliothek München. Here Patrick Frauenrath provided an introduction to the history of the library and its current function, as well as a general tour of the facilities and an introduction to the online catalog. The afternoon was dedicated to a meeting with two German graduate students who shared their knowledge about methods and practices of archival research and about Internet and database research in particular. Drawing on his own research experience, Michael Hohlfeld shared valuable tips on how to prepare archival visits and on the computer-based management, compilation and analysis of archival documents. Christiane Sibille (University of Basel), a specialist in the history of the League of Nations, introduced the group to German online research
tools and networks for researchers, providing an excellent overview of journal databases, digitization projects, archival websites, and communication platforms for historians.

On the following day, archivist Monika von Walter welcomed the group to the Bayerisches Hauptsstaatsarchiv. She explained how numerous administrative changes on the regional and state levels affected the organization of archive holdings in Germany and thus elucidated the practical consequences of the principle of provenance. Following this theoretical introduction, the students had the opportunity to work on records related to their research topics. The last station of the seminar was the Deutsches Museum München, a museum and archival complex dedicated to the history of technology. After an inspired guided tour of the highlights of the Museum with Bruno Graf, head archivist Wilhelm Füßl gave an overview of the history of the museum and introduced participants to its archival holdings. He also explained how this archive differed from the governmental archives that the group had visited up to that point: Whereas the holdings in governmental archives are composed mostly of regular transfers from the public administration, the collections of the Deutsches Museum were mostly acquired by gift and bequest.

The GHI organizers would like to extend their heartfelt thanks to all the individuals and organizations that made the 2012 Archival Summer Seminar in Germany a success. An announcement of the 2013 seminar can be found on the GHI website.

Clelia Caruso (GHI)
BRIGHT MODERNITY: COLOR, COMMERCE, AND CONSUMPTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Conference at the GHI, June 21–23. Conveners: Regina Lee Blaszczyk (GHI) and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI). Participants: Joyce Bedi (National Museum of American History, Washington), Isabella Campagnol (Rubelli Historical Collections and Archives), Augustine Cerveaux (Chemical Heritage Foundation, Philadelphia), Alexander Engel (Harvard University/University of Göttingen), Eva Eis (Kremer Pigments), Nicholas Gaskill (University of Chicago), Mary Lisa Gavenas (New York), Ingrid Giertz-Martenson (Centre for Business History, Stockholm), Dominique Grisard (University of Basel/New School for Social Research, New York), Jessica Jenkins (Royal College of Art, London), Carolyn Kane (City University of New York), Laura Anne Kalba (Smith College), Prakash Kumar (Colorado State University), Charlotte Crosby Nicklas (University of Brighton), Melissa Renn (Harvard Art Museums), Michael Paul Rossi (École Normale Supérieure de Cachane, Paris), Alex J. Taylor (University of Oxford), Lesley Whitworth (University of Brighton Design Archives).

Color is one of the most striking and yet under-researched topics of the modern history of consumption. Preindustrial societies featured an astonishing variety of natural dye stuffs, and color was used as a marker of social stratification and prestige. From the middle of the nineteenth century, however, color production changed fundamentally. New colors emerged, while synthetic dyes replaced — at least in the long run — most of the natural substances. The number of dyes grew from less than 50 in 1870 to around 1,300 by 1913. Western science, namely organic chemistry, became a decisive force for refiguring the color branch, first on a regional level, then in the Western world, and finally on a global scale.

These changes were described and discussed in the conference first panel “Working for a Colored World: Scientific Innovation and Industrial Perspectives, 1850–1914.” Alexander Engel’s presentation offered a concise overview of the transformation of the international dye business, using artificial indigo as an example. In contrast to heroic narratives of inventor-entrepreneurs, like William Henry Perkin, it has to be realized that artificial dyes had no noticeable price advantage over natural ones and that early producers aimed at specific high-end markets. Instead, the success of the new colors was based on an elaborate system of marketing. Specifically, the German
producers were able to offer a broad variety of coal-tar dyes, established systems of developing new products, and could use economies of scale. In addition, however, their salespersons were in close contact both with the customers and the chemists. The latter were praised in histories of innovation, but the merchants were crucial for economic success. Engel concluded his presentation with a detailed analysis of the introduction of new artificial blue by BASF in the late 1890s. The dye industry is a good example of the rise of large-scale business. The color market, however, was also served by smaller firms. Eva Eis presented the history of the Farbenfabrik Heinrich Wiesel, a pigment producer from Thuringia, Germany. Although focusing on the niche market of painting, Wiesel did intense research and developed many varieties well recognized not only in Germany and by its neighbors but also by many customers in Canada and the U.S. Similar to Engel, Eis stressed the importance of marketing with sales agents and direct producer-customer relations for the success of the Wiesel family business.

While German firms were setting the standards of the new artificial dye business, it is also necessary to think about the (re)actions of the producers of natural dyes, often located in colonial dependence. Prakash Kumar gave intriguing insights into the countermeasures of Bengal indigo producers and British textile firms. The conflict concerned not primarily on prices but knowledge regimes. The Indians questioned the validity of “scientific” tests, condemning this as reductionist. Chemists, they argued, could realize the “real value” of natural dyes, the variety of non-standardized shades and nuances. However, most of the large textile producers disagreed. Natural indigo could defend its position only in the field of wool dyeing, where skills, practical experience, and artistry were still important. The Indian producers had a second chance during the First World War, but even then they were not able to change their critical attitude toward chemically standardized products and failed to improve their distribution networks.

Discussing the relevance of knowledge enriches not only business history but can also offer links between individual scientists and the general change of the color branches. Laura A. Kalba presented the work of the French chemist Michel-Eugène Chevreul, who was a celebrity in his lifetime. A physiologist by training, he thought about the effects of the intensely visual nature of modernity and tried to establish a new order of color. Chevreul’s color wheel contained
14,400 colors — a number smaller than the mixtures already available in mid-nineteenth-century France. It functioned, however, as an important taste-maker arguing for harmony and balance. The system caused lots of tension between fashion experts and the public, a typical struggle for modern consumer and knowledge societies.

The second panel, “Developing a New World of Goods: Color and Consumption, 1850-1930,” focused on the market and the (female) consumer. It is still an open question whether the fashion industry was one of the pioneers of consumer-oriented marketing, or whether this was introduced mainly by department stores. Based on colorists’ notebooks, dye manuals and middle-class women’s magazines, Charlotte Crosby Nicklas analyzed the British fashion market as a new “world laid by art and science” at the feet of the consumers. Triggered by new synthetic dyes, change and novelty became crucial to the discourse of fashion and women’s clothing. From the late 1850s, mauve, magenta, shades of blue and purple were among the most fashionable colors and, combined with white and black, established growing fashion markets and new standards of bourgeois respectability. But again, intermediates were decisive actors in this transformation, based on a growing number of standardized dye brands and fashion experts. Manufacturers still played a role here, especially if they produced for a high-quality market. Isabella Compagnol presented the example of the Venetian textile company Rubelli. In the late nineteenth century, its fabrics offered traditional regional colors, like crimson and savoy blue. Changes occurred, but the artisanal tradition did not allow radical changes to the range of colors, despite the strong influence of the Modernist movement on twentieth-century design. A break with the traditional Venetian textile spectrum came about not before the late Fascist era, when Rubelli included even a newly invented shocking pink in a selection of fabrics presented at the Milan Triennale in 1940. This Italian example showed that the textile markets of artisanal and historical traditions led to a broad variety of colors, styles, and fabrics in a dynamic market, where a glorified and imagined past opened new opportunities for high-value products.

Augustin Cerveaux’s analysis of the U.S. paint and varnish industry confirmed this trend toward a growing variety of colors and colored products. Paints had been selected predominantly for their usefulness. Yet after the Civil War, new ready-mixed paints transcended the old emphasis on durability and protection and allowed a more individualistic and aesthetic use of paints first by painters, and later by
consumers. However, this shift did not last very long. Master painters, now organized in powerful interest groups, advocated “pure” colors and favored consumer education. Utilitarian arguments became more important even before World War I and dominated during the 1920s—at least in Du Pont’s Duco advertisements: Scientific progress and the painter as color expert were promoted as the dominant forces in the market. This reminds us to broaden our definition of consumers (away from the individual end user) and the use of colors (not only in fashion but also in housing and construction).

Knowledge seems to be a crucial analytical category for understanding color, commerce, and consumption within a global perspective. Consequently, the third panel focused on the “Knowledge Base for Endless Novelties: The American Example.” Changing production patterns, consumer markets, and aesthetics derived from the ways colors were perceived and defined by experts and consumers. Nicholas Gaskill used the case of the entrepreneur and educator Milton Bradley (1836-1911) to explore the role of childhood education in the formation of color markets. His manuals on color pedagogy, published in the 1890s, formulated a model of color perception based on a simple and logical nomenclature and the solar spectrum; they also provided the equipment for teaching his ideas. Learning such elementary skills was expected to allow the pupil to resist the lure of modern color advertisements and designed products—and it made Bradley one of the most successful U.S. toy producers. However, he was only one of many U.S. academics who developed new systems to fight the “color anarchy” of the late nineteenth century and to establish more nuanced terms and theories for dealing with bright modernity. Michel Rossi discussed the contributions of U.S. psychologist Christine Ladd-Franklin (a theory of color vision based on evolution), ornithologist Robert Ridgway (an “objective” nomenclature of colors), and painter Albert Henry Munsell (a numerical description of colors, which served as a model for many international color schemes). Rossi emphasized the fundamental linguistic problems of defining colors and producers’ and distributors’ need for a standardized nomenclature. At the same time, the contrasts of different systems made it clear that any color system, although derived from similar anthropological expressions in most human languages, results from cultural evolution and therefore expresses power relations and interests.

“Color” not only tells us more about the construction of modern consumer societies but can be a very helpful tool for analyzing “Desires
and Determination: The Gendered World of Color and Consumption,” the title of the fourth panel. Margaret Maile Petty gave instructive insight into leading U.S. firms’ use of gender roles in marketing light bulbs from the 1920s to the 1950s. Colored lampshades were presented as giving the home a feminine identity related to the personality of the housewife and her understanding of the “right” look. Homes were often decorated like retail window displays; standardization and variety went hand in hand. Such marketing strategies were not only pushed by the use of light effects in the visual media and the variations of wall colors but also by the invention of colored incandescent bulbs by General Electric in 1955. “Bulb-snatching” was a rather typical part of the lifestyle choice in the postwar period. The housewives’ choices of seasonal colors and color-tailored interior lit up the male breadwinners’ homes.

The attribution of colors to gender roles, however, changed drastically over time. While babies today often live in the gendered spheres of blue or pink, pink was a fairly common male baby color decades ago. The characteristics of today’s cult of pink were analyzed by Dominique Grisard. She discussed current explanations of the “pinkification” of Girl Culture and its relation to modern consumer culture. In modern feminist discourses, the gendering of colors and color preferences is often perceived as a conservative backlash reproducing gender and class inequality. Grisard, however, stressed, in addition, that “pinkification” can also be interpreted as a search for authenticity, resting upon the belief that inner feelings and outer appearance need to correlate. Whatever the answer might be, the process created new markets and added economic value.

Most of the conference contributions focused on national examples. Color, however, was always discussed in a transnational framework, as the fifth panel “Managing Color: The Establishment of National and Transnational Networks” made clear. Fashion, industrial design, and interior design professions established discussion circles, networks, and institutions to manage color mainly in the western world. With this, trade and industry associations played an important role in making a bright modernity, too often understood as the result of the work of some fashion celebrities or individual firms. Lesley Whitworth presented the work of the British Colour Council and the UK Council of Industrial Design from the 1930s to the 1970s. Their goal was to establish color standards for government and industry, which were used mainly by the textile and interior decorations
industry. This was not a *l’art pour l’art* activity but part of a larger European effort to rival the American Munsell system. In addition, these institutions promoted a more harmonious (that is, more successful) balance of color and design. Their success was limited and their financing always precarious; but they were at least part of the broader movement to strengthen British competitiveness during the second wave of globalization.

More successful was MODEUROP, an international fashion network for shoe and leather accessories. Ingrid Giertz-Martenson, who once served in this group as a Swedish representative, gave instructive insights into the origins and objectives of this group, founded in 1960. Based on national initiatives, namely, the Swedish Shoe Fashion Council and the Nordic Fashion Council (founded in 1949), the main task of the fashion experts was to forecast the trends of color and leather materials, to inform local producers, and to enable international cooperation among producers. MODEUROP was located in Switzerland and started by thirteen western European countries. Later, six eastern European countries and India were included as well. Although international in its membership, the network triggered many negotiations on the “right” (national) color proposition, broadly suitable names, and the hierarchies in international shoe business.

Similar topics of fashion and national identity/pride were discussed by Mary Lisa Gavenas, who examined the history of one of the most successful textile and color exhibition and forecasting groups, *Première Vision*. Founded in 1973, it first served as a competitor of the leading Frankfurt/Main-based textile fair Interstoff, which set trends for international mass markets from 1959. Driven by traditional French pride in glamour and fashion, *Première Vision* offered an alternative for a more producer-oriented and trendy fair. Located first in Lyon and then in Paris, it quickly became a center of international color and textile fashion forecasting. As a consequence of the new Frankfurt/Main venture, Texworld, and globalization, additional fairs were established in New York and Shanghai. As a venture of fashion producers for fashion producers, the annual color card results from detailed negotiations among the leading fashion houses and the largest distributors. With this, color experts set dominant trends on a global scale.

Fashion is the dominant field of research for color studies, but it is perhaps not the most important one. Therefore, the sixth and final panel, “Changing the Everyday Life: Architecture and Visual Culture,”
tried to broaden the discussion on the underexamined fields of color printing and architecture. Melissa Renn examined the role of new printing techniques and the reproduction of colored artwork for the success of *Life* magazine. Although often praised for its photojournalism, *Life* reported regularly on historic and contemporary art. Using the Donelly rotary press, invented in 1934, the magazine was able to produce high-quality color reproductions, reaching a peak of 13.5 million copies in the 1940s. The magazine cooperated with leading museums and popularized and defined icons of art. In this capacity, it positioned the U.S. as the center of the art world, democratized high art, and paved the way for the poster business. The extensive use of color, however, was not only restricted to the western world. Jessica Jenkins analyzed the discussion on color, architecture, and urban planning in East Germany during the first Cold War. Based on the discussions of Weimar architects and urban planners on the “colorful city,” the reconstruction of the GDR was supposed to offer the new socialist society a new approach. In the 1960s, architects like Siegfried Tschiersky, Bruno Flier, and Hans Schmidt advocated a new expressiveness and the use of colored walls and facades in prefabricated building. At the same time, they discussed the limits of *Buntheit*, of overly bright and vivid colors, already used in the production of cars. In addition, they faced the economic constraints and material limitations of the East German construction business. These restrictions became dominant in the 1970s when gray and ochre *plattenbau* facades dominated the appearance of East German towns.

All of the contributions were the subject of lively and productive discussion. Regina Lee Blaszczyk concluded that the conference had provided important answers to the main questions: What is color, how should color be studied, what are the dominant and most worthwhile research topics, and how should color be embedded in a comparative or even a transnational perspective. A conference volume is in preparation and will be published in the GHI’s “Worlds of Consumption” series with Palgrave Macmillan.

Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
THE COLD WAR AND AMERICAN MUSIC, 1945-2000

Conference at the Center for Advanced Studies, Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU) Munich, June 22-23, 2012. Conveners: Michael Kimmage (Catholic University of America), Ernest Suarez (CUA), Berndt Ostendorf (LMU), Christof Mauch (LMU), Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI). Co-sponsored by the German Historical Institute Washington; Center for Advanced Studies, LMU Munich; Catholic University of America; Lasky Center for Transatlantic Studies. Participants: Amy Beal (University of California, Santa Cruz), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), George Blaustein (University of Amsterdam), Michelle Engert (University of Munich), Penny von Eschen (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Petra Goedde (Temple University), Martin Lücke (University for Media and Communication, Munich), David Monod (University of Ontario, Canada), Celeste Day Moore (University of Chicago), Uta Poiger (Northeastern University), Helle Porsdam (University of Copenhagen), Wolfgang Rathert (University of Munich), Rüdiger Ritter (University of Bremen), Christian Schmidt-Rost (Free University of Berlin), Matthias Tischer (University of New Brandenburg), Dean Vuletic (European University Institute, Florence), Günter Wagnleitner (Salzburg), Reinhold Wagnleitner (University of Salzburg).

The Cold War and its impact on American music, at home and abroad, were the organizing motifs of this conference, which focused on three separate, though inter-related, questions. The first was narrative: How should one write the history of this period and which continuities, turning points, and contradictions deserve the greatest attention? The second question concerned place and genre. How should one understand the proliferating genres and their respective fusions within American music — from jazz to R&B, to rock-and-roll, to folk and classical music — across a geographic and historical continuum? What is the relationship between regionalism and urbanism, on the one hand, and genre hierarchies, on the other? And, given that music was a pivotal aspect of American Cold War diplomacy, in what way was American music produced, received, and assimilated in Europe generally, including the Soviet Union, and in Germany in particular? The third question dealt with the political and cultural dimension: How did Cold War politics shape, or fail to shape, the music history of the postwar era? To what extent did official attempts to promote American culture and foreign policy, though music, succeed beyond American borders? And to what extent is the history of politics and music, in the Cold War, a history of unintended consequences and cultural-political ironies?
By bringing together an international group of scholars from a variety of disciplines, whose expertise encompasses the history of multiple nation states, this conference created a unique opportunity for an interdisciplinary discussion and exchange of ideas. Music was debated as a vehicle for political agitation, satire and cultural critique, and a special emphasis was given to questions of race, ethnicity and authenticity. After a brief introduction by the conveners, Hartmut Berghoff, the director of the German Historical Institute Washington, highlighted the importance of transatlantic intellectual exchange. Cultural and social historian Berndt Ostendorf set the tone for the conference with his opening paper on Willis Conover’s Jazz Hour at the Voice of America: Using jazz musician Thelonious Monk’s assumption that jazz and freedom are intertwined, as a point of departure, Ostendorf went on to explore the soft power of jazz in the Cold War context. In sync with historian Rüdiger Ritter, who analyzed the broadcasting of jazz into the Eastern Bloc, Ostendorf raised questions about the symbolic and political capital of jazz: Did jazz have the potential to serve as a sonic weapon and was it effective as political propaganda or was the jazz craze just a side effect of modernization? Both Ostendorf and Ritter reached the conclusion that much less than a political weapon, jazz was a means of peaceful exchange that enabled cultural communication, even across language barriers. The strong focus on jazz throughout the conference suggests that most participants shared Ostendorf’s assumption, that this musical genre was a dominant force in shaping American intellectual culture and therefore political culture in the 20th century.

Historian Uta Poiger expanded on this idea by analyzing American jazz and its ramifications in Eastern and Western Germany. Poiger illustrated the complicated role race played in criticisms of jazz in the GDR by using the example of Reginald Rudorf, an outspoken promoter of jazz music in Eastern Germany and SED-member. Hailing blacks as both the greatest traitors of and the greatest hope for jazz, Rudorf assigned them an ambiguous role within the process of cultural production: He heavily criticized bebop artists while he celebrated musicians who played spirituals and blues. However, as Poiger pointed out, by categorizing certain forms of jazz as “degenerate”, Rudorf made use of terminology that evoked a racial logic and ultimately reasserted racial hierarchies between black Americans who allegedly lacked responsibility and white Germans. Similarly, Poiger deconstructed the myth that jazz was successfully employed by German officials in East and West as a means to overcome Germany’s
racist past. She asserted that jazz promoters often used strategies of “de-racializing” and “whitening” jazz in order for it to be acceptable.

Historian Dean Vuletic further examined the role of jazz in Cold War politics by discussing the changing attitudes of Yugoslavia’s Communist Party and their correspondence with developments in international relations. After initial hesitation, the party soon came to appropriate jazz as a means to demonstrate openness towards the West, establish distinctiveness from Eastern Europe and show solidarity with African states. Yugoslavia’s cultural diplomacy with regard to jazz shows that communist states also appropriated jazz as a soft power and that it was a floating signifier defined more by the nationality of its artists than by the genre’s American origins. Vuletic hence invited the participants to re-conceptualize the relationship between Americanization and jazz in postwar Europe by paying special attention to the fact that Yugoslavia functioned as an agent of musical Americanization in Eastern Europe.

Michael Kimmage assumed that the Cold War can be narrated in at least three genres: the epic, the tragedy, and the comedy. Kimmage chose comedy and, more precisely, the songs of Jewish entertainer and intellectual Tom Lehrer as his vantage point. Lehrer’s “comedy of inversion” with its unsettling character becomes the appropriate means of transporting and playing with a Cold War mindset in Kimmage’s tale. Comedy and satire help us to understand Cold-War complexities. The assumed dichotomy of good and evil, black and white, the United States and the Soviet Union is dissolved in popular culture, which raises awareness of the fact that nothing is as palpable as it seems. American Studies scholar George Blaustein shared Kimmage’s suppositions in his analysis of the novel “Slumberland” written by African-American poet and anthologist Paul Beatty. Even though published in 2008, the bildungsroman is set in a Cold-War world, more precisely Cold-War Berlin. Blaustein investigated the novel’s dealings with historical questions about jazz and the text’s use of satire in the process. He reached the conclusion that “Slumberland” deals with the uncertainties of a complex reality by using farce as a stylistic device. Both Kimmage and Blaustein saw humorous forms of expression as highly suitable for discussing and understanding the Cold War, either in its own time or in retrospect.

In her paper historian Penny Von Eschen elaborated on the means of circulating music during the Cold War. Von Eschen highlighted the importance of technologies, such as the cassette and the portable
radio recorder. While the talks by Ostendorf, Ritter and historian Celeste Day Moore reflected on the role broadcasters and radio personalities played in the circulation of jazz. In her account, von Eschen emphasized that mix tapes and the boom box were sensible tools for distributing and sharing musical materials. The transgression of national boundaries, not just via airwaves, was her focus. Von Eschen’s narrative spanned the globe: from the adaptation of popular American songs in India to the struggle for recognition of Jamaican-born musician Linton Kwesi Johnson in the UK. She ended on the note that music and poetry do not necessarily have the power to change the ways of the world, however, they can serve as a common denominator within society and therefore facilitate reform.

Musicologist Martin Lücke chose a rather traditional set-up for his talk on the Cold War’s representation in music during the 1980s. He started out with a brief description of the world’s political climate and perceived threats before venturing into his examination on the role of Cold War topics within the realm of popular music. By analyzing songs as The Clash’s “London Calling” (1979), Ultravox’s “Dancing with Tears in My Eyes” (1984) and Frankie Goes to Hollywood’s “Two Tribes” (1984) with regard to the lyrics as well as to their visual representation in the form of music videos, Lücke illustrated how Cold-War Befindlichkeiten were absorbed in and criticized by popular music. He demonstrated how songs which were simple and appealing and therefore part of a “global mainstream” emitted opinions, protest and cultural critique. However, Lücke did not overestimate the power of popular songs; on the contrary, he voiced the concern that music may have a mass appeal, but that its (mass) audience often lacks the ability to extract meaning.

Over the course of the conference, the participants ventured into extensive discussions on the ramifications of race, class, gender and space in their explorations of the complex issues at the intersection of politics and (popular) culture. Even though they disagreed on a number of points — all discussants subscribed to author Ralph Ellison’s famous suggestion: American culture is “jazz-shaped” and hence has a global appeal. The liberating potential of popular music — in heavy opposition to restrictive ideologies inherent in high culture — provides an opportunity for an improved global cultural understanding, as Ostendorf asserted: “It is the promise of individual liberation from the straitjacket of fundamentalist world views and education programs on either side of the Iron Curtain”.

Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI), Bärbel Harju and Angelika Möller (LMU)
Archival seminar in Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington DC, September 2-14, 2012. Co-organized by the German Historical Institute Washington, the University of Chicago’s Department of History, and the Heidelberg Center for American Studies, with the generous support of the Robert Bosch Foundation. Convener: Mischa Honeck (GHI). Participants: Amanda Brickell Bellows (University of North Carolina), Mahshid Mayar (University of Bielefeld), Kritika Agarwal (University of New York, Buffalo), Robert Fischer (University of Erfurt), Michelle D. Tiedje (University of Nebraska), Markus Huber (University of Munich), Scott Krause (University of North Carolina), Stefanie Eisenhuth (Humboldt University, Berlin), Ava Purkiss (University of Texas, Austin), Philipp Reick (Free University, Berlin), Peter Theiner (Robert Bosch Foundation).

The Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar convened for the third consecutive time in September 2012. Once again the tour spanned four cities (Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington DC), and the ten seminar participants from Germany and the United States were introduced to the holdings and policies of a broad spectrum of American archives and research libraries. As in previous years, the goal of the seminar was to prepare doctoral students from both countries working in diverse fields of American history for their prospective research trips; to teach them how to contact archives, use finding aids, and identify important reference tools; and to help them gain a greater appreciation of the various kinds of archives and special collections located in the United States.

The seminar kicked off with the traditional historical walking tour of downtown Chicago on Labor Day, September 3. The following day was set aside for the opening thesis workshop at the University of Chicago hosted by Kathleen Neils Conzen, Jane Dailey, and other members of the history department. The seminar participants, who had been grouped into five transatlantic tandems consisting each of one German and one American student, commented on the work of their respective partners, exposed their projects to academic scrutiny, and received valuable feedback from their peers and present faculty members. On Wednesday, September 5, the Seminar met Daniel Greene, Director of the William M. Scholl Center of American History
and Culture at the Newberry Library, for a daylong introduction to the institute’s collections as well as for a general overview of American archival policies and practices. Among the topics discussed were the purchase of rare books, techniques for browsing manuscript collections, the expedience of maps for historical research, and the opportunities and pitfalls of digitalization. On Thursday morning, before the group departed for Madison, Wisconsin, the seminar visited the Cook County Court Archives. In his lively and instructive presentation, court archivist Phil Costello demonstrated how historians could make creative use of legal records and court cases.

Our first destination in Madison was the Wisconsin State Historical Society. Chief archivists Michael Edmonds and Harry Miller welcomed the seminar participants in the morning hours of September 7. They spoke about the history and holdings of their institution within the broader context of American state historical societies and impressed the students with the Wisconsin State Historical Society’s dedication to accessibility and public education. After that, time was set aside for individual research before the group reassembled at the local University of Wisconsin history department for a roundtable discussion that focused on comparative, transnational, and global approaches in American history. Under the guidance of faculty members Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, John Tortorice, and independent scholar and award-winning bibliographer James Danky, the participants engaged in a spirited dialogue about the methodological potentials and challenges of posing historical questions that transcend national boundaries. While the participants agreed that not every topic lends itself to global analysis, there was little doubt that transnational history provided the tools not only for connecting the United States to the rest of the world, but also to facilitate the exchange of ideas between American and European historians of the U.S.

On Saturday evening, September 8, the group landed in Boston, the third stop on our itinerary. The following morning gave the seminar participants a chance to witness public history in action with a guided tour of the Freedom Trail. After that, the group spent the rest of the day engaged in individual explorations. On Monday, September 10, the seminar resumed at Harvard University. The first of three research libraries on our schedule was Houghton Library, where Peter Accardo walked the group through some of the library’s most precious Early Americana collections and gave valuable advice on how to use them for various research agendas. The seminar then
moved on to Schlesinger Library, one of the leading U.S. research facilities for women’s history. Ellen Shea showed and explained letters, pamphlets, books, and visual material related to topics ranging from domesticity and black women to the female suffrage movement. The day concluded with a visit to the Baker Library Archives at the Harvard Business School. Katherine Fox, Associate Director of Public Services, acquainted the students with the impressive scope of the Baker Library’s holdings, which touch upon almost every issue pertaining to the country’s economic development from an agricultural society to an industrial and postindustrial superpower. Our sojourn in Boston drew to a close the next morning when we drove to Columbia Point to see the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Enjoying a two-and-a-half hour tour of the museum and library archives under the supervision of Stephen Plotkin, the group benefited from staff presentations on audiovisuals, declassification, and the library’s manuscript collections and oral history program.

After reaching Washington DC in the late afternoon of Tuesday, September 11, the seminar continued the following day at the Library of Congress. Peter Theiner from the Robert Bosch Foundation joined the group for the last three days of the Seminar. A guided tour of the Jefferson building was followed by a presentation from archivist Daun van Ee, who spoke to the participants about the breadth of manuscript collections available through the Library of Congress Manuscript Division. The group then advanced to the Prints and Photographs Division, where Sara Duke and her coworkers had worked hard to muster illustration samples related to the participants’ individual projects, thereby underscoring the significance of visual material for historical research. In the afternoon, the group was welcomed by Matthew Wasniewski from the Office of the Historian of the House, who gave the seminar participants a detailed tour of Congress and explained the work of his office, which provides information on the history of Congress, as well as congressional documents and legislation, and chronicles its composition and individual members.

On Thursday, September 13, the group visited the Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington DC. Historian Richard McCulley welcomed the group and introduced them to David Langbart, who is the top archivist responsible for State Department records. In his orientation, Langbart explained the structure of the National Archives and ways to access source material pertaining to the history of U.S. foreign policy. Next,
Executive Director James Grossman and Interim Special Projects Coordinator Julia Brookins welcomed the group to the American Historical Association (AHA) for a brown-bag lunch. They drew the students into a vibrant debate over the ethical stakes involved in the study and teaching of history, touching on issues of plagiarism, civility, access to sources, trust, and truth-claims. Following this fruitful discussion, the group met with two curators at the National Museum of American History, William Yeingst and Bonnie Campbell Lilienfeld. The students appreciated this session because it pointed them to another potential career path for young historians. Learning a lot about decisions that are made in putting together an exhibition, the objects chosen, and how to translate research into information the public can readily grasp, the students recognized the highly political and contested nature that history assumes when it leaves the purely academic sphere.

On Friday, September 14, the seminar put in a final stop at the Moorland-Spingarn Research Center at Howard University, where Ida Jones introduced the participants to the Center’s remarkable array of collections on African American history and culture. In the afternoon, the group met for a wrap-up discussion at the German Historical Institute. They were greeted by Deputy Director Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, whose presentation focused on the institute’s work, research projects, as well as the many fellowship and networking opportunities. The farewell dinner that evening concluded a very successful seminar, whose participants were extremely grateful for the useful information, contacts, and prospects for future collaboration that it opened up for them.

Mischa Honeck (GHI)
THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Conference at the University of Toronto, September 8-10, 2012. Co-sponsored by the Centre for Jewish Studies of the University of Toronto and the GHI Washington. Conveners: Doris Bergen (University of Toronto), Michael Marrus (University of Toronto), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Made possible by additional grants from the Sarah and Chaim Neuberger Holocaust Education Facility of the UJA of Greater Toronto; the Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority of Yad Vashem; the Ray and Rose Wolfe Chair in Holocaust Studies; the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Chair in Israel Studies; the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies; the Faculty of Law; the Toronto Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany; and the Toronto Consulate General of Israel.

Participants: Bryce Adamson (Toronto), Deborah Barton (Toronto), Ronald Beiner (Toronto), Liat Benhabib (Yad Vashem), Laura Berger (Toronto), Michael Berkowitz (University College London), Leora Bilsky (Tel Aviv University), Ruth Bettina Birn (The Hague, formerly Dept. of Justice Canada), Boaz Cohen (Western Galilee College Akko), Lawrence Douglas (Amherst College), Mira Goldfarb (Sarah and Chaim Neuberger Holocaust Education Foundation), Valerie Hébert (Lakehead University at Orillia), Alex Hinton (Rutgers University), Sara Horowitz (York University), Neha Jain (George-town University Law Center), Tomaz Jardin (Ryerson University), Jennifer L. Jenkins (Toronto), Laura Jockusch (Hebrew University/ Ben-Gurion University of Negev), Michael Kasprzak (Toronto), Thomas Pegelow Kaplan (Davidson College), Jeffrey Kopstein (Toronto), Deborah Lipstadt (Emory University), Nimrod Lin (Toronto), Audrey Macklin (Toronto), Lindsay Macumber (Toronto), Michael Marrus (Toronto), Mayo Morgan (Toronto), Devin Pendas (Boston College), Johannes Platz (Archive of Social Democracy, Bonn), Derek Penslar (Toronto/University of Oxford), William Schabas (Middlesex University, London), Roni Staubert (Tel Aviv University), Irmgard Steinisch (York University), Fabien Théofilakis (University of Paris Ouest Nanterre), Dominique Trimbur (French Research Institute, Jerusalem), James Waller (Keane State College), Esther Webman (Tel Aviv University), Annette Weiske (Friedrich Schiller University, Jena), Rebecca Wittmann (Toronto), Hanna Yablonka (Ben-Gurion University of Negev), Ran Zwigenberg (City University of New York).

Although more than fifty years have passed since the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, the trial and its legacies continue to resonate...
worldwide. This multi-disciplinary conference examined the trial retro-
respectively, exploring its impact on law and international relations
in the early sixties; as well as prospectively, exploring how it has, or
has not, been a precedent in international law, in historical under-
standing of Eichmann and the Holocaust, and in the social sciences.

The conference was opened by a screening of David Perlov’s Memo-
ries of the Eichmann Trial. This film, produced by Israel’s IBA Chanel
in 1979, features interviews with survivors, their children, and young
Israelis who offer their perspectives on the impact of the trial on
their personal lives and on Israeli society. The film was introduced
by Mira Goldfarb and Michael Marrus (in lieu of Liat Benhabib, who
could not attend), who spoke about the history of the film as well
as its recent restoration and re-release in 2011 by the Yad Vashem
Visual Center.

The first panel, chaired by Jeffrey Kopstein, focused on “The Eich-
mann Trial: As it Happened.” Laura Jockusch examined the rela-
tionship between the Eichmann trial and the Nuremberg trials. The
Eichmann trial, she argued, realized the longstanding demand of
Jewish organizations that the crimes against the Jews be tried as
a separate category and rearranged the hierarchy of testimony es-
tablished at Nuremberg by focusing on the testimonies of survivors
who were presented as reliable witnesses. Liat Benhabib’s paper,
presented by Mike Kasprzak, discussed the filming and distribution
of the trial, first recorded on two-inch tapes, then broadcast in the
United States on City Network, and now fully available on a You-
Tube channel. Benhabib explained that during the trial the prime
concern in Israel was that it would receive too much coverage, and
only very limited footage from the trial was shown at Israeli cinemas
in newsreels. Deborah Lipstadt asked the question: what was and
what was not accomplished by the trial? She argued that the trial
did not break some sort of “silence” on the issue of the Holocaust
in Israel, where the story of the Holocaust had already been told by
survivors for decades. The trial’s focus on survivor witnesses did,
however, redefine the survivors’ role in Israeli society and led to their
experiences being “heard” in a new and different way. Commentator
Tomaz Jardin reflected on the legacy of the trial beyond its verdict
and questioned the role of the law and the courtroom in establishing
historical memory.

The next panel, chaired by Ronald Beiner, examined Eichmann as a
person and Hannah Arendt’s famous analysis. Michael Berkowitz’s
paper discussed the afterlife and reception of Hannah Arendt’s claim that Eichmann was a “convinced Zionist.” Challenging Slavoj Zizek in particular, Berkowitz argued that Eichmann cannot be described as a Zionist and did not work with Zionists on the basis of shared interests. Fabien Théofilakis, drawing on the notes Eichmann took during his trial, contended that Eichmann played a central role in shaping his own defense. Far from image of the banal bureaucrat portrayed by Arendt, his notes reveal Eichmann as an engaged and thoughtful person who carefully constructed and manipulated his image and defense during the trial. James Waller’s paper examined the tremendous influence that Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann has had on the social sciences. Powerfully reinforced by the experiments of Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo, Arendt’s “theory” thoroughly transformed the way that we think about perpetrator behavior. In her comment, Rebecca Wittmann questioned whether historical evidence proving Eichmann’s antisemitic commitment necessarily invalidates Arendt’s theory of the “banality of evil.”

The third panel, chaired by Audrey Macklin, examined the legal aspects of the Eichmann trial and its impact on international law. Devin Pendas argued that the trial did not set an important legal precedent and had little impact on the development of international law. Therefore, the reason why the trial has had such “staying power” is not related to its legal but its political significance: By casting Nazi criminality not in terms of international aggression (as the Nuremberg IMT trial had done) but as a crime against the Jewish people, the Eichmann trial “disconnected Nazi criminality from the issue of world order,” an approach that had considerable political appeal during the Cold War. By contrast, William Schabas contended that the trial did contribute greatly to international law because it was the first trial to apply the genocide convention, to distinguish between genocide and crimes against humanity, and to prosecute genocide retroactively. In addition, the trial demonstrated that Eichmann’s kidnapping was not an impediment to the jurisdiction of the court. Leora Bilsky challenged the view that survivor testimony played no significant role in the Eichmann verdict (as opposed to the trial) by arguing that Judge Landau sought an “integrated history” that included not only historical documents but also the personal experiences of victims. In the panel’s final paper, Neha Jain examined the juridical problem of how to hold individuals responsible for collective crimes. She argued that the Eichmann trial contributed to the development of one of the most sophisticated legal doctrines of perpetrator responsibility,
that of Organisationsherrschaft, but also noted the underlying legal challenge remains unresolved and relevant for us today. In his comment, Michael Marrus examined the didactic role of the Eichmann trial, concluding that trials are not the best places to tell balanced or durable historical stories.

The second day of the conference was dedicated to exploring the impact of the trial around the world. The fourth panel, chaired by Sara Horowitz, examined the trial’s impact in Israel. Boaz Cohen demonstrated that the Holocaust already permeated all aspects of Israeli life and society before the Eichmann trial. Although the trial represented a new phase in Holocaust awareness, that integration was founded on a communal permeation and commemoration that existed before the trial. Hanna Yablonka advanced the thesis that, although the memory of the Shoah was already present in Israeli society, the central place that the Eichmann trial accorded to survivor testimony led to a processing of this information into a new kind of “knowing” and thus caused a merging of the Holocaust experience and the identity of the State of Israel. Dominique Trimbur examined German-Israeli relations, arguing that the Eichmann trial did not register any change in the “quiet but tense” relations between the two countries. The delegation sent by the FRG to report on the trial improved de facto relations but de jure relations remained the same, as the permanent presence of the delegation in Israel was blocked. In the panel’s final paper, Roni Stauber argued that in order to win West Germany’s support for Israel Ben-Gurion was willing to draw a sharp distinction between Nazi Germany and contemporary West Germany, promoting a notion of the “other Germany” that provoked controversy in Israel but won him the gratitude and support of the West German government during the period of the Eichmann trial. Commentator Derek Penslar questioned the morality of Ben-Gurion’s intentions in the relations between Israel and Germany, since these would not have been possible without a “psychological shift” in the identification of “the villain” in Israeli discourse from the Germans to Arabs.

The fifth panel, chaired by Jennifer L. Jenkins, examined the impact of the trial in the two Germanies. Annette Weinke argued that the impact of the trial in West Germany was minimal and consisted mainly of reports that were critical of the trial. The reception of Hannah Arendt’s report did not establish a new way of thinking about perpetrator behavior but strengthened trends that were already dominant.
in West German historiography and public discourse. Ruth Bettina Birn contended that the Israeli prosecution failed to construct its case against Eichmann on the basis of accurate and comprehensive historical documentation, instead presenting many witnesses whose testimony was unrelated to Eichmann’s crimes. Thus both the legal and the educational aspects of the trial were deeply flawed. Johannes Platz examined public opinion polls conducted by the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research that measured the West German population’s reactions to the trial: their findings emphasized the continuing prominence of the “authoritarian personality” in Germany and did not indicate any decrease in antisemitic commitment. Thomas Pegelow Kaplan argued that Arendt’s interpretation of Eichmann appealed to West German and U.S. student protestors because it subjected the Nazi perpetrator to a profound universalization, which allowed Eichmann to emerge as the archetypal perpetrator of twentieth-century mass crimes. The student activists’ remaking of representations of Eichmann in the aftermath of the trial had a profound impact on collective memories in West Germany and the United States. In her comment, Irmgard Steinisch reflected on the fact that none of the papers addressed the political context or the continuing presence of former Nazis in politics, in both West and East Germany.

The final panel, chaired by Mayo Morgan, examined the Eichmann trial’s worldwide impacts. Esther Webman examined the impact of the Eichmann trial on Arab Holocaust discourse. As the Holocaust became increasingly central to Israeli identity, Arab writers became increasingly alienated from it. This was expressed in Holocaust denial, accusations of collaboration between Zionism and Nazism, and charges of complicity of its victims, whose suffering was equated with that of the Palestinians. Valerie Hébert considered the effects of the post-atrocity paradigm generated by the trial, which centralizes survivor testimony, in Rwanda. She argued that, although these trials may be the only way to legally confront atrocity, the intense trauma experienced by survivors in testifying demonstrates that their involvement in the trials does not necessarily lead to reconciliation for the victims. Exploring the impact of the Eichmann trial on the Duch trial at the Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia, Alex Hinton focused on what he called “redaction” in trials, the reduction involved in explaining perpetrator behavior, and on how this shapes and limits both victim and perpetrator testimony. He argued that the impacts of the Eichmann trial do not necessarily translate to cross-cultural
justice, particularly when applied in Cambodia. In his paper, Lawrence Douglas advanced the thesis that the Eichmann trial anticipated and paved the way for the shift from the “aggressive war paradigm” to the “atrocity paradigm” that now characterizes international law. The Eichmann trial thus exemplified a shift away from crimes against peace to the crime of genocide, and from documentary evidence towards survivor testimony. In her comment, Doris Bergen reflected on the legacies and effects of the Eichmann trial in other contexts, noting that these have not always been positive, either for the victims or for the pursuit of justice in general.

The conference concluded with a roundtable, chaired by Richard Wetzell, in which six graduate students commented on the six conference panels. Commenting on the first panel (on the trial itself), Laura Berger drew connections from the Eichmann trial to related contemporary issues in Canadian law. In her comment on the second panel (on Eichmann), Lindsay Macumber argued that the influence of Arendt’s concept of the “banality of evil” was demonstrated in many of the papers of the conference, even when it was explicitly negated. Commenting on the third panel (on the trial’s legal aspects), Bryce Adamson raised the question whether the precedent created by the Eichmann trial was “consistent with modern values in a human rights era.” In her response to the fourth panel (on the trial’s impact in the German states), Deborah Barton highlighted the ways in which the papers dealt with the representation, appropriation, and reception of the trial in the light of political objectives. Commenting on the fifth panel (on the trial’s impact in Israel), Nimrod Lin argued that the trial initiated a shift in Holocaust discourse that might be described in terms of Foucault’s notion of a “discursive explosion.” In his response to the final panel (on the trial’s worldwide impact), Ran Zwigenberg suggested that the trial exemplified a larger shift in the privileging of experience over reason, that is, over documentary evidence, in law and history.

Lindsay Macumber (University of Toronto)
IMMIGRATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE

Conference at the GHI Washington and the University of Maryland, College Park, September 13-14, 2012. Co-sponsored by the GHI, the Center for the History of the New America, the Maryland Technology Enterprise Institute, the A. James Clark School of Engineering, the Dingman Center for Entrepreneurship, and the Office of Undergraduate Studies (all University of Maryland). Conveners: David B. Sicilia (University of Maryland, College Park), David F. Barbe (University of Maryland, College Park), and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI). Participants: Rajshree Agarwal (University of Maryland), Katherine Benton-Cohen (Georgetown University), Tobias Brinkmann (Pennsylvania State University), W. Bernard Carlson (University of Virginia), Susan B. Carter (University of California-Riverside), Simone Cinotto (University of Gastronomic Sciences, Colorno [Parma], Italy), Elizabeth Clifford (Towson University), Yesenia Ruiz Cortes (CUNY Graduate Center), James Deutsch (Smithsonian Institution), Pawan H. Dhingra (Tufts University), Hasia Diner (New York University), Shweta Gaonkar (University of Maryland), Andrew Godley (University of Reading), Brent Goldfarb (University of Maryland), Marilyn Halter (Boston University), Will Hausman (College of William and Mary), Eric S. Hintz (Smithsonian Institution), Marcia Hohn (Immigrant Learning Center), Alvaro Huerta (University of California-Berkeley), Violet M. Showers Johnson (Texas A&M University), David Kirsch (University of Maryland), Alan Kraut (American University), Lucia Lo (York University), Martin Lutz (University of Heidelberg), C. D. Mote (University of Maryland), Julie Park (University of Maryland), Alejandro Portes (Princeton University), Alex Severinsky (Fuelcor LLC and University of Maryland), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Zulema Valdez (Texas A&M University), Dan Wadhwani (University of the Pacific), Ruth Wasem (Library of Congress), Michele Waslin (Immigration Policy Center), Elizabeth Zanoni (Old Dominion University), Xiaojian Zhao (University of California-Santa Barbara), Min Zhou (University of California-Los Angeles).

The United States has long been an immigrant society as well as an entrepreneurial society. This is no coincidence: immigrants launch new enterprises and invent new technologies at rates much higher than native-born Americans. The conference, an interdisciplinary endeavor, looked at how newcomers have shaped and in turn been shaped by American economic life. Scholars from a wide range of disciplines — history, sociology, anthropology, economics, engineering, Asian American studies, gastronomic sciences, geography, management
studies, and others — engaged in lively discussions of topics such as patterns and geographies of ethnic entrepreneurship, barriers to immigrant entrepreneurial success, and policy implications of historical and contemporary research on immigrant entrepreneurship.

There are striking parallels between immigrant entrepreneurship in the nineteenth century and today. Then, as now, immigrants brought considerable education, ambition, and capital, yet often were marginalized or excluded from mainstream opportunities by law, custom, and prejudice. Particular immigrant groups ultimately dominated particular industries and services. Immigrant entrepreneurs built and circulated through trans-Atlantic, trans-Pacific, and at times global networks of people, capital, and know-how. However, the two eras of heavy migration also differ in significant ways. Recently, newcomers from East and South Asia and Latin America have supplanted European immigrants who dominated in the nineteenth century. And whereas many recent immigrants, like their predecessors a century ago, work in low-skilled occupations, in construction, or have created small businesses, a significant portion who have come since the 1965 revision of U.S. immigration policy have arrived with advanced degrees and launched businesses in the most advanced sectors of the economy.

The conference began with a well-attended keynote lecture at the GHI by Alejandro Portes, a leading international scholar in immigration studies. The address “Entrepreneurship, Transnationalism, and Development” (co-authored by Jessica Yiu) provided a comprehensive overview of the current sociological research on immigrant entrepreneurship in the United States and the empirical significance of these groups for the economic performance both in the U.S. and in their countries of origin. Portes presented self-employment as a strategy of social mobility that must be analyzed in a transnational framework. Immigrant entrepreneurs are the new argonauts, using family and ethnic networks and their bounded solidarity to build close ties between the United States and their countries of origin. From this perspective, the often-lamented “brain drain” is actually a kind of brain circulation, pushing not only the U.S. economy but benefitting the countries of origin as well. Portes recommended encouraging immigrant self-employment but made clear that the work of these groups must be embedded in broader political strategies of development. Without at least a minimum level of economic and social development, collective benefits would be deployed only from the more advanced country — and
then there is the danger that poorer nations would subsidize the richer ones.

Throughout the second day of the conference, scholars presented papers to students, faculty, and visitors at the University of Maryland, College Park. Three papers delivered as part of the panel “Education as Critical Social Capital” examined the basic question: How does education shape entrepreneurship and vice versa? The first contribution focused on West African immigrants who came to the United States in search of educational opportunities but who went on to found businesses — usually within particular niches. The second paper looked at Chinese and Korean businesses in Los Angeles and discussed how those businesses encouraged educational attainment within their ethnic communities. The third paper focused on an individual, Nikola Tesla, and explored how Tesla’s education and religion, along with his immigrant experience, contributed to his willingness to embrace “disruptive technologies.” To some extent, all three papers were concerned with the theme of effectuation and explored how immigrant entrepreneurs actively create opportunities for themselves and within their communities.

The second of the concurrent opening panels focused on immigrants’ transition “From Workers to Proprietor Entrepreneurs.” In his paper on Mexican immigrant gardeners in Los Angeles, Alvaro Huerta explored how a group of migrants stereotypically thought to have little human and financial capital (and therefore lacking important prerequisites for entrepreneurship) has taken advantage of their migrant networks to acquire equipment, routes, and experience to become self-employed petty entrepreneurs in the informal market. Hasia Diner explored peddling as an entry point to self-employment for Jews in the New World. While Jews have a long history of peddling in Europe, in this new environment peddling was often the first step toward founding more established businesses. In the third paper, Yesenia Ruiz Cortes focused on the emerging transnational Mexican migrant elites in the United States. Forming perhaps a new class, these newly minted elites exert influence equally in their adopted country as in Mexico. The papers elicited a lively discussion that focused in particular on measuring the success of these migrants.

The panel on “Enclaves, Regions, and Other Geographies” offered perspectives on how entrepreneurs from immigrant communities engage with the wider world. Susan Carter’s paper used Census
data to demonstrate that urban discrimination and shifts in labor demand produced a wide dispersal of Chinese immigrants and their descendants into small towns and rural communities, notwithstanding the symbolic prominence of “Chinatowns,” well before the 1920s. Elizabeth Zanoni’s presentation on New York’s Italian newspaper *Il Progresso* in the World War I era showed that producers in Italy and customers in the United States participated in a transnational debate over how foodways, clothing, and other patterns of consumption enabled the formation of political identity. The paper by Martin Lutz on Mennonite, Hutterite, and Amish communities argued that (notwithstanding their reputation for insularity) they are engaged in a continual process of adapting to the market economy in ways consistent with their belief systems. Zulema Valdez’s presentation on Mexican-origin entrepreneurs used interviews and quantitative research to conclude that men benefitted more than women from encouragement to develop business skills and access to family and outside capital.

Three case studies from different time periods with different methodological approaches were the focus of the panel on “Immigrant Dominance of Consumer Sectors.” Andrew Godley looked at Jewish immigrant entrepreneurs and the U.S. garment industry. Their economic success in this sector cannot, in his opinion, be explained by their level of education, their advanced abilities of social organization, or skills already developed in their home countries. He argued that instead, external changes in the demand for women’s wear were decisive. Pawan Dhingra presented his research on Indian immigrants in the hospitality industry. He questioned the somewhat artificial separation of lower and higher status immigrant entrepreneurs, gave detailed insights into the family networks and value systems of the new motel owners, and showed how they took advantage of opportunities and developed the resources for buying and developing motels. Simone Cinotto presented three company histories to discuss Italian wine entrepreneurs in California. The Italian-Swiss Colony, the Italian Vineyard Company, and the Gallo Brothers all established large-scale winemaking and preferred Italian labor. They popularized wine consumption in the U.S. and used the myth of California as an “Italy on the Pacific” to gain a competitive edge. In his comment, David Kirsch emphasized the challenge of the well-known disadvantage theory by all these papers. Immigrants were predominantly opportunity-seekers in their new environment, which explanations of their success stories need to take into account. To Kirsch, the triad of
opportunities, resources, and motivation offers a good starting point for more systematic research.

The lunch keynote was given by Alex J. Severinsky, who was introduced by former UMD president C. D. Mote. An engineer/scientist who immigrated to the United States in 1978, Severinsky described how the education he had received in the Soviet Union and several business opportunities in the U.S. enabled him to successfully pursue the development of a system for powering gas-electric hybrid automobiles — the one used by Toyota, patented in 1994. In his animated talk, Severinsky emphasized the importance of persistence as well as of luck when it comes to business ventures and inventions.

Chaired by Elizabeth Clifford, the afternoon panel on “Human Capital” addressed different ways that immigrants utilized ethnic networks, charitable activities, and other means to advance their economic and social standing in the United States. Ziaojian Zhao discussed how three ethnic Chinese groups achieved economic success in the latter half of the nineteenth century and during the modern era by growing businesses from scratch or utilizing ethnic finance networks. Tobias Brinkmann focused on Jewish immigrants from Central Europe and presented theories about why this group achieved significant economic success in the U.S. during the nineteenth century. Eric Hintz examined the charitable activities of immigrants Leo Baekeland and Charles Eisler and compared how they employed charitable donations as a strategy for acquiring social status. Commentator Will Hausman noted that all three papers addressed self-employment as a category of entrepreneurship and speculated that this complicated traditional economic interpretations of entrepreneurship.

The broader institutional environment was the subject of the panel on “Removing Barriers to Immigrant Entrepreneurial Success.” Ruth Wasem discussed important principles of U.S. immigration law and criticized the mixed-message approach of the United States’ simultaneous “Help Wanted” and “Keep Out” policies. She advocated an immigration policy based on the human capital needs of the broader economy rather than on the desires of individual employers. Lucia Lo presented her and her co-author Wei Li’s research on the financing of immigrant businesses. They conducted interviews in San Francisco and Vancouver and found that financial institutions both in the U.S. and in Canada have a long way to go in addressing immigrant entrepreneurs’ needs. Shweta Gaonkar and Rajshree Agarwal asked how
immigration status impacts the wage of a high-skilled immigrant and found that on a temporary work visa, high-skilled immigrants will earn significantly less per year than native-born Americans. Michele Waslin and Marcia Hohn looked at immigrant entrepreneurs in three categories (neighborhood storefronts, growth businesses, and STEM entrepreneurs) and discussed some problems of U.S. immigration law such as excessive paperwork, long backlogs, and a very narrow definition of “entrepreneur.” In her comment, Katherine Benton-Cohen emphasized the importance of an institutional framework such as worker safety laws, maximum work hours, and health insurance.

The closing discussion of the conference, led by David Sicilia, focused on some the cross-cutting themes of the conference, such as transnationalism, gender, family, social/human/economic capital, ethnic clusters, and immigration policy. All themes proved relevant in view of the planned publication of an edited volume based on revised conference papers as well as possible future ventures.

Clelia Caruso, Jessica Csoma, Bryan Hart, Kelly McCullough, Atiba Pertilla, Benjamin Schwantes, Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
THE TRANSNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A GLOBAL HISTORY

Conference at the German Historical Institute, September 20-22, 2012. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the University of Jena, with the support of the Thyssen Foundation. Conveners: Don Doyle (University of South Carolina), Marcus Gräser (University of Linz/GHI), Jörg Nagler (University of Jena). Participants: Sven Beckert (Harvard University), Tiziano Bonazzi (University of Bologna), Alison Efford (Marquette University), Andre Fleche (Castleton State College), Chris Hill (Columbia University), Martha Hodes (New York University), Mischa Honeck (GHI), Howard Jones (University of Alabama), Matthew Karp (American Academy of Arts and Sciences), Hartmut Keil (University of Leipzig), Bruce Levine (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Michael Mann (Humboldt University, Berlin), Stephanie McCurry (University of Pennsylvania), Jay Sexton (Oxford University), Mark Stoneman (GHI), David Thomson (University of Georgia), Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI), Andrew Zimmerman (George Washington University).

A year after the first “Transnational Significance of the American Civil War” conference in Jena, this meeting brought together some of the original participants and a fresh group of historians, who gathered in Washington DC to reevaluate the promise of transnational approaches to the history of the American Civil War. After Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson welcomed the participants to the German Historical Institute, Jörg Nagler opened the proceedings by remarking that the conference program reflected many of the scholarly desiderata that emerged in Jena, including an emphasis on the war’s global impact, both in the mid-nineteenth century and over the longue durée, and the relationship between the war, the British Empire, and the world beyond Europe. In his opening remarks, Don Doyle noted that the organizers intended to collect a book of essays that drew on insights shared at both the Jena and Washington conferences. Doyle observed that in contrast to the domestic and social history preoccupations of Civil War scholarship in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, historians in the twenty-first century have turned back toward an international approach. Finally, Marcus Gräser drew attention to the meeting as a collaboration of both U.S.- and European-based scholars of the Civil War, and considered what different perspectives non-American scholars might bring to the subject.
To begin the first panel, on revolution and nation-building in a comparative perspective, Tiziano Bonazzi addressed a larger historical parallel between the Civil War era United States and Italy during the time of the Risorgimento. Bonazzi noted that despite their obvious differences in economic development, after 1861 the political leadership in both Italy and the United States embarked on a process of liberal nation-building. The new Italian state’s war on the obstreperous and violent southern banditti, Bonazzi argued, shared a “structural affinity” with the process of Reconstruction in the United States — as did the eventual political settlement in both nations, which built a stronger central government at the cost of excluding large swathes of the population from political participation. Chris Hill was unfortunately unable to attend the conference, but Jay Sexton briefly related Hill’s view of a similar problem confronted by both American and Japanese nation builders in the late nineteenth century — how to deal with the losers of a recent internal conflict, many of whom (like Japanese samurai) retained close connections to the new nation’s history, culture, and identity.

Bruce Levine’s keynote address took up the question of the American Civil War’s place in the “age of revolutions.” Levine began by stressing the indisputably revolutionary experience of the Civil War, and especially its destruction of slavery and the southern Slave Power. The relationship between this second American Revolution, Levine noted, and European upheavals in 1789, 1848, and 1871, was something which contemporary commentators from Abraham Lincoln to Karl Marx had not failed to perceive. Like their counterparts in the European revolutions, the Civil War’s eventual revolutionaries began with a strictly limited set of ends and means. But Lincoln’s disinclination to turn the war into “an instrument of social revolution” gradually dissolved under the pressure of military conflict and slaveholding intransigence. Unlike its European counterparts, Levine observed, the escalation of the Civil War’s social revolution — formalized in Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation — did not feature a radical transformation in political leadership. Yet the political power base of the Republican Party did shift toward abolitionists, Radicals, and even the slaves themselves after 1863. Although blacks were never at the heart of the Republicans’ constituency, and the Civil War contained its own Thermidor, in the conservative retreats and failures of Reconstruction, Levine concluded, the war’s revolutionary impact was not entirely effaced: as in the case of the European revolutions, the Old Regime never again returned in full.
Friday morning’s proceedings began with Hartmut Keil and Alison Efford presenting papers that considered the political odyssey of German-American immigrants during the Civil War era. Keil argued that the experience of the Civil War transformed German-American liberal and radical attitudes, reorienting the immigrants away from political concerns in their homeland and toward their own role in American politics. Efford’s paper assessed the place of African-Americans in the pluralistic democracy that German-American immigrants sought to build in the Civil War era U.S. At first, Efford demonstrated, German-American enthusiasm for multi-ethnic democracy provided a boost for black rights in the late 1860s. Ultimately, however, the Germans’ conception of pluralism was vulnerable to racial distinctions, and may have helped weaken both the Fifteenth Amendment and the white North’s commitment to blacks during Reconstruction.

The second panel on Friday morning took up the question of the American Civil War’s larger relationship with global slavery. Michael Mann urged U.S. Civil War historians to avoid the temptation to see the global nineteenth century as an “Age of Emancipation,” or a simple triumph of modern free wage labor. In fact the most important development between 1840 and 1880, Mann argued, was the “rearrangement of labor on a global scale,” resulting in a multiple labor market which combined different work regimes across the world, each one tailored to suit the evolving demands of industrial capitalism. From the perspective of the Indian Ocean, especially, the perpetuation of slavery in East Africa, the spread of bound Indian “coolie” labor throughout the British Empire, and the increasing importance of convict transport reaffirmed the diversity and complexity of this evolving global picture. Matthew Karp’s paper also considered the relationship between American slavery and other forms bound labor in the nineteenth century world. Southern slaveholders may have sharply criticized imperial coolie and apprentice labor in specific instances, but from a larger perspective, they saw these systems as part of a wider European recognition that coerced labor and racial hierarchy were unavoidable features of the nineteenth century world economy. Ultimately, Karp concluded, the rise of the multiple labor market in the 1850s only fortified Southern elites’ confidence in the future of their own slave system.

A third Friday panel sought to further relate Civil War era politics of race, slavery, and emancipation to contemporaneous global developments. Andrew Zimmerman argued that transatlantic plebian radicalism
represented a critical and overlooked component in the politics of the U.S. Civil War. The political economy of autonomy and the idea of the common, Zimmerman noted, animated radical resistance movements in the U.S. South, West Africa, and Europe. Although the power of bourgeois elites ultimately enclosed these new commons, any transnational understanding of the Civil War era must account for the significant ideological connections between anti-slavery, anti-racist, and plebian radical actors on both sides of the Atlantic. Andre Fleche, meanwhile, returned the discussion to the global confidence of conservative slaveholding elites in 1861. The political leadership of the Confederacy, Fleche observed, embraced and anticipated the racial logic of late nineteenth century European imperialism. Tracing Southern enthusiasm for Napoleon III’s imperial invasion of Mexico, Fleche stressed the irreducible white supremacy at the heart of Confederate nationalism, which surpassed any competing commitments to liberalism, republicanism, or even the Monroe Doctrine.

After lunch, the conference reconvened with a panel that examined the direct reverberations of Civil War events and actors in the wider world. Martha Hodes reviewed international responses to Abraham Lincoln’s assassination and suggested that the emphasis on “unity” and “universal grief” for Lincoln previewed the white North’s later turn toward sectional reconciliation at the expense of black freedom. Charles Francis Adams and Benjamin Moran, the leading American diplomats in London, stretched the truth to include even Lincoln’s bitter opponents among those in mourning for the President. Did these emotional responses, Hodes asked, “form the raw beginnings” of the political movement that led to white reunion and the betrayal of black equality? Jay Sexton examined former Secretary of State William Seward’s remarkable twenty-month global tour, from 1869 to 1871. Seward’s journeys, which largely bypassed Europe and ranged from Japan to Turkey to Mexico, produced an array of useful sources, including his own exhaustive memoirs and manuscripts, international press clippings, and British and American consular correspondence. The Secretary of State’s materialist conception of “civilization” in the nineteenth century, Sexton argued, captured his nationalist view of globalization, but also reflected the ways that post-war American expansion was conditioned by British imperial power.

The final panel on Friday afternoon addressed religion and gender in the Civil War from a transnational perspective. David Thomson’s exploration of ministerial influence on Union diplomacy traced the
ways that the North’s religious envoys abroad turned sharply from the rhetoric of “holy fraternity” and embraced the language of “righteous violence.” Both the Catholic John Hughes in Paris and the Episcopalian Charles Pettit McIlvaine in London argued before foreign audiences that the Union represented the “cause of God,” while the Confederacy was “the work of the devil.” Stephanie McCurry’s paper investigated the larger relationship between waging war and building a nation in the nineteenth century. The inescapable military component to nineteenth century nationalism required newly-built states to expand the body politic in order to access male bodies for military service — but what were the gender consequences of this fraternal nationalism? Examining the evolution of Francis Lieber’s code of war, McCurry noted that the Union’s political and intellectual leadership was forced to revise its 1861 assumption that women were necessarily outside the domain of war. The case of the American Civil War, McCurry suggested, raises fundamental but often-ignored questions about the relationship between war, gender, and the consolidation of masculine citizenship in nineteenth century states the world over.

After a lively conference dinner on Friday evening, participants reunited on Saturday morning for a final panel, which assessed the transnational meaning of the Emancipation Proclamation. Don Doyle’s paper began by noting Great Britain’s skeptical reaction to the announcement of Emancipation in the fall of 1862. As William Seward had feared, British leaders including William Gladstone and Lord John Russell saw the policy as a desperate ploy by the Union, and an active debate on British recognition of the Confederacy continued within Lord Palmerston’s cabinet. Doyle then shifted the scene to Italy, where the independent initiative of a U.S. consul enlisted the formidable rhetorical support and international moral prestige of Giuseppe Garibaldi to the cause of emancipation and the Union. Popular demonstrations in London, on behalf of the imprisoned Garibaldi, discouraged British conservatives from sympathizing with the slaveholding Confederacy, and demonstrated the transatlantic connections between democratic politics in the 1860s. Howard Jones, meanwhile, addressed the basic power politics that shaped the diplomacy of emancipation on both sides of the Atlantic. While the Confederates remained victims of their own global naïveté — in finance, diplomacy, and elsewhere — Jones stressed Lincoln’s hard-headed determination “to destroy the South.” Emancipation was above all a military decision made for political reasons, and one that ultimately strengthened the cause of the Union both at home and abroad.
The proceedings concluded with a roundtable discussion featuring five panelists. Jörg Nagler stressed the necessity of “de-provincializing” the Civil War and identifying new connections in an entangled world. Marcus Gräser observed that the Civil War was in fact an ideal test case of the possibilities of a transnational approach, given how firmly it is rooted in the master narrative of American national history. Martha Hodes identified five aspects of a transnational history of the Civil War that required further contemplation: time, and the chronological boundaries of the Civil War era; space, and whether the war was a truly global or a merely Atlantic event; visions, and how contemporary actors themselves understood the war’s transnational implications; voices, and whose histories are selected and omitted by a global perspective; and readers, or whether an American readership is really willing to swallow a global view on the Civil War. Mischa Honeck noted the instability of political labels during the tumultuous Civil War era, and proposed that further investigation into the material culture of the era — e.g., the dissemination of Garibaldi shirts from South America to South Carolina — might yield a transnational history that includes the experiences and activities of ordinary people. Sven Beckert stressed the necessity of understanding the Civil War not merely as a cause or result of overseas events, but a critical instance of the larger transformations of the global nineteenth century. The two most fundamental of these, he argued, were the consolidation of the nation-state and the spread of capitalist social relations throughout the world, in both industrial centers and the countryside. Michael Mann wondered if “global history” was really necessary to understand the old Atlantic story of Euro-American state formation. The original promise of transnational history was that it reached beyond the nation-state — to make good on that promise, he argued, historians must break out of their comfortable confines of expertise, and shift perspective to a wider, unfamiliar global view.

A concluding conversation, which involved all conference participants, identified a number of critical questions that students of a transnational American Civil War must continue to engage. These included the idea of the war as a global trial of democracy; the relationship between the war and the worldwide evolution of capitalism and labor freedom; the need to incorporate Asian and African perspectives to determine if the war was truly “global”; the relationship between the Civil War and the other major military conflicts of the 1860s, including the wars of German and Italian unification, the Taiping Rebellion, and the Paraguayan War; the transnational
careers of military professionals in the era, many of whom fought in more than one of these wars; the problem of how to think about gender and women’s history in a world defined by war; and a larger reassessment of the methodological benchmarks, research strategies, and standards of evidence made necessary by a truly transnational approach to the mid-nineteenth century.

Matthew Karp (American Academy of Arts and Sciences)
TRANSLATING POTENTIAL INTO PROFITS: FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS IN EMERGING MARKETS SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Conference at the GHI, November 2-3, 2012. Conveners: Matthias Kipping (Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto), Christina Lubinski (GHI). Participants: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Bram Bouwens (Utrecht University), Marcelo Bucheli (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Paula de la Cruz-Fernandez (Florida International University), Jessica Csoma (GHI), Stephanie Decker (Aston Business School), Nadia Fernandez de Pinedo (UAM Madrid), Sierk Horn (University of Leeds), Geoffrey Jones (Harvard Business School), Pao Kao (Uppsala University), Elisabeth Köll (Harvard Business School), Takafumi Kurosawa (Kyoto University), Jan Logemann (GHI), Andrea Lluch (CONICET and CEHDE-UdeSA, Argentina), Corinna Ludwig (GHI), Terutomu Ozawa (Colorado State University/Columbia Business School), Atiba Pertilla (GHI), David Pretel (EUI Florence), Erica Salvaj (Universidad del Desarrollo, Chile), Benjamin Schwantes (GHI), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Espen Storli (NTNU Trondheim), Graham Taylor (Trent University), Adrian E. Tschoegl (Wharton School).

Multinational enterprises have long identified markets as “emerging” and have tried to take advantage of their growth potential. Emerging markets are important sites for conducting business often due to low costs and growing consumer spending, but also present a number of obstacles to foreign investors that must be overcome to achieve profits. As emerging economies are hardly a contemporary phenomenon, this conference aimed at providing historical perspectives on the activities of multinational companies in these markets. The conference participants included scholars from various disciplines, among them history, economics, and sociology; and the papers dealt with a broad range of countries, companies, and national contexts utilizing a variety of methodologies to examine how multinational companies have operated in emerging markets, how they have addressed different market conditions, and finally what impact they have had on host and home countries.

After introductory remarks by the conveners, Christina Lubinski and Matthias Kipping, the first session set out to deal with conceptual frameworks and periodization schemes. In his talk, “Multinational Strategies and Developing Countries in Historical Perspective,” Geoffrey Jones stressed that corporate strategies in developing economies
were shaped by trade-offs between opportunity and risk. This was determined by three broad environmental factors: first, the political economy and the legal framework; second, the market and the resources of the host economy; and third, the competition from local firms. Based on these three factors, Jones delineated three different eras: the “First Global Economy” (1850-1929), the era of “De-globalization” (1929-1978), and finally the “Second Global Economy” since the late 1970s. In the second paper, “The Changing Nature of Multinationals’ Operations in the Emerging World and Their Impacts on Host and Home Countries: The “Leading Sector” Stages Model à la Schumpeter,” Terutomo Ozawa focused on technological, financial, and institutional innovations that led to rapid changes in the world economy. He argued that these processes initially evolved under British and later American hegemony and that, over time, markets became less industry- and more consumption-oriented. In the discussion of Jones’ and Ozawa’ periodization schemes participants raised the issue of Euro- or Western-centrism as well as the question whether the period after 1929 can be characterized as “De-globalization”, since multinationals continued their activities despite the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War. The question of how to define an emerging market was also discussed. The contemporary concept of “emerging markets” is certainly not a new phenomenon. It generally refers to a market that is underdeveloped but expected to grow quickly. These markets share a potential for growth but also many problems, such as weak institutions and infrastructures. The following were identified as fruitful topics for further research: political dependency and political risk, consumption patterns of the host economy, and the localization of multinational corporations.

The second session was dedicated to organizational choices and foreign direct investments. Sierk Horn’s paper (co-authored with Peter Buckley and Adam Cross), “Japanese Production Networks in India: Spatial Distribution, Agglomeration, and Industry Effects,” dealt with the often neglected Japanese multinationals in emerging markets, namely India, and analyzed different factors on which they based their investment decisions. Japanese companies adapted quickly to changing market conditions in India and investment followed agglomeration logic, prior investments attracting further investments. Therefore the paper stressed the importance of business networks in promoting foreign investment, which was a recurring topic at the conference. The question of corruption led to a debate on how
to integrate this topic into historical research and which sources to use. Andrea Lluch’s paper, “Foreign Multinationals in Emerging Markets: the Argentinian Case (c. 1913-1960),” (with Norma Lanciotti) addressed corporate strategies pursued by foreign multinationals in Argentina and related them to domestic political change. Based on a database of foreign multinational companies in Argentina, Lluch showed how Argentina provided inducements to foreign investors, leading to high foreign direct investment even during nationalist governments after 1945. Finally, Bram Bouwens’ joint paper with Keetie Sluyterman, “From Colonial Empires to Developing Countries and on to Emerging Economies: The International Expansion of the Dutch Brewery Heineken, 1930-2010,” contributed to the discussion of what constitutes an emerging economy by showing that Heineken saw these markets first as “colonial”, than as “developing,” and finally as “emerging” without significantly changing its strategy. As a consumer-goods producer Heineken had to deal with the establishment of local brands, taste, and differences in beer consumption. These points were further developed in the discussion. Moreover, ethical questions were raised regarding the introduction of foreign products as harmful as opium, alcohol, and cigarettes.

In the third session, panelists examined how multinationals have operated in the context of changing and weak institutions. Marcelo Bucheli and Erica Silvaj presented their paper on “Multinational Corporations, Public Utilities, and Globalization: A Comparison of the Operations of US and Spanish Multinationals in the Chilean Telecommunications Sector, 1958-2005.” Looking at the companies’ boards of directors, the authors developed a network analysis that showed that interlocks, i.e. directors serving on multiple boards at the same time, depended on ownership. During times of state ownership, public utilities do not need many linkages with other sectors of the economy. During democratic regimes they build more networks with the rest of the economy than during military regimes. In the hand of foreign multinationals, public utility companies build links with domestic corporations, which are useful for coordination purposes, and with the domestic government, which are useful for coordination or legitimization purposes. Adaptation to local circumstances was also the topic of Pao Kao’s contribution. With his co-authors Martin Johanson and William Redekop, he raised the question of “How do Market-Leading Foreign Subsidiaries in China Overcome Changes in Laws and Regulations and Sustain Their Success? Cases of Swedish Manufacturing Firms.” The paper showed how
the three companies Högnäs, Elekta, and LeDaval have dealt with the ever-changing regulatory institutions in China. It argued that three strategic responses arose as these firms encountered market transition and turbulence: learning, responding, and integrating. The authors analyzed these three strategic responses to shed light on how multinational corporations sustain their competitiveness in China. Finally, in his paper, “The Canadians in the Tropics: Imperial Oil in Latin America 1914–1948,” Graham D. Taylor examined how Standard Oil of New Jersey used Imperial Oil of Canada to cloak its efforts to obtain oil for its North American refineries from Latin and South America. Imperial Oil operations in Peru and Colombia were poorly capitalized, as profits from the venture went to Standard Oil instead of Imperial Oil. Ultimately, Imperial Oil exited both markets and refocused its operations within Canada.

On the second day of the conference, the fourth session examined the challenge of nationalism for multinationals in emerging markets. In a paper co-authored with Pierre-Yves Donzé, Takafumi Kurosawa discussed the case of “Nestlé Coping with Japanese Nationalism: Political Risk and the Strategy of a Foreign Multinational Enterprise in Japan, 1913–1945.” Nestlé not only faced nationalism in Japan, but also had difficulties establishing its main product, condensed milk, on the Asian market due to consumption habits. Kurosawa showed the long-term strategy Nestlé pursued and the sophisticated organizational strategies the firm developed to counter political risks. Christina Lubinski’s paper, “The Global Business with Local Music: Western Gramophone Companies in India before World War I,” illustrated that India has been perceived as an emerging market for more than a century. She showed how Western gramophone and record companies adapted rather successfully to local consumer preferences by sending out agents to record local music. They were, however, challenged by the nationalist anticolonial Swadeshi movement in India, which led to a boycott of British firms since 1905 but opened the door to other Western as well as domestic competitors in this market. The companies’ experience of heavily localizing their product in foreign markets later shaped segmentation strategies in the respective home markets.

The fifth panel discussed the challenges of decolonization. Adrian E. Tschoegl presented his study on “Belgolaise: The life-cycle of a colonial bank,” which told the story of a Belgian bank that was active in the Congo for almost 100 years before it ceased to operate in 2004.
Although the relatively small bank ultimately failed, it weathered remarkable political and economic changes for more than a century, including Congolese independence, and reinvented itself to serve a postcolonial banking market. In the next presentation, “Doing Business in a Wave of Nationalizations: Philipp Brothers and the Bolivian Tin Experience,” Espen Storli raised the question of how the Bolivian expropriation and nationalization of foreign companies beginning in the 1950s influenced global value chains. He focused on the commodity trading firm Philipp Brothers and how it coped with radical domestic political transitions in Bolivia. The experience traders acquired in this emerging market later helped the company manage political risks in other markets. Another example of how to manage political risk in times of decolonization was examined by Stephanie Decker in her paper, “British Multinationals in West Africa: Re-gaining Organizational Legitimacy after the End of Empire.” Decker looked at the aspect of sense-making and public perceptions of British companies in West Africa in the second half of the twentieth century and explored questions of corporate communication and reputation. To legitimize their ongoing business activities in the former colonies, British companies pursued recurring narratives that were connected to concepts of corporate citizenship and corporate social responsibility.

Concluding the conference, the sixth session dealt with technology transfers in international business. In her paper, “Selling Industrialization and Technological Progress: Foreign Multinationals in China’s post-1895 Emerging Market,” Elisabeth Köll discussed the role that foreign companies played in developing China’s transportation infrastructure, railroads in particular. Foreign investors competed for prominence until the early 1910s when Chinese authorities began implementing standardization to centralize the railroad system. However, the presence of private foreign investors in China continued to shape the construction of industrial infrastructure and led to transfers of knowledge and the founding of engineering schools. An interesting side aspect of these competing “spheres of knowledge” was the conflict over which language should become the universal technical standard for industry. German engineers vied with British and French engineers, but English ultimately prevailed as the international engineering language. Next, Nadia Fernández de Pinedo and David Pretel presented their paper, “Trading Innovation in Nineteenth-Century Cuba: Patent Rights, Foreign Firms and Technology Transfer,” in which they discussed the importance of the sugar
industry in promoting vigorous patenting activity in Cuba while the country was part of the Spanish Empire. The authors noted, however, that patenting activity did not directly correlate to industrialization.

The final discussion concluded that markets have been perceived as “emerging” ever since companies have been active on a global scale. In some cases, it may be justified to see particular regions or nation states as “emerging,” in others expectations may be based on the experience of a single industry. Several contributors argued that emerging markets are characterized by rapid growth or the expectation thereof and often by a higher political risk for foreign investments. Despite this risk, the potential of high profits attracted, and still attracts, multinational corporations to emerging markets. The papers presented at this conference showed how multinationals — successfully and unsuccessfully — aimed at managing political risks, interacted in networks, developed global strategies, and at times localized strategies. Many of the historical studies showed “path dependency” over time. Moreover, the experiences in emerging markets triggered learning processes that shaped future foreign investments but also influenced strategies in the home market. Although global conditions seem to have changed in the most recent era, there are numerous similarities between the historical case studies and current debates on multinationals in emerging markets. The conference thus contributed to the ongoing discussion by adding historical depth and perspective to a current topic.

Corinna Ludwig (GHI) and Paula de la Cruz-Fernandez (Florida International University)
2012 FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZES

The 2012 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prizes, which honor the two best doctoral dissertations on German history written at North American universities, were awarded to Adam Rosenbaum (Colorado Mesa University) and Sarah Thomsen Vierra (New England College). The award ceremony took place on November 9, 2013, at the twenty-first Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI, chaired by David Blackbourn (Vanderbilt University), President of the Friends. The prize selection committee was composed of Ann Goldberg (University of California, Riverside), Maria D. Mitchell (Franklin & Marshall College), and Ulrike Strasser (University of California, Irvine). Both prize winners have contributed articles presenting their dissertation research to this issue of the bulletin.

Adam Rosenbaum (Colorado Mesa University) was honored for his dissertation, “Timeless, Modern, and German? The Re-Mapping of Bavaria through the Marketing of Tourism, 1800–1939,” completed at Emory University in 2011. The committee’s prize citation read:“Timeless, Modern is at once an expert case study of the Bavarian tourism industry and a highly accomplished exploration of the larger question of German modernity in the 19th and 20th centuries. Using an array of contemporary sources — tourist guidebooks, brochures, maps, and postcards, as well as the records of tourism associations, contemporary newspapers, and travel reports — this rich dissertation probes the language and imagery of the Bavarian tourism industry and the making of tourist sites, from the 19th-century spa to the cities of Augsburg and Nuremberg under the Third Reich. Rosenbaum argues persuasively that the tourist industry marketed images of Bavaria and Germany that merged both tradition and progress; the escape from and embrace of modernity; Romantic celebrations of nature and the premodern past, on the one hand, and technology, city planning, and mass culture, on the other. Rosenbaum introduces the term “grounded modernity” to characterize this synthesis of old and new. Written with elegance and clarity, his dissertation demonstrates the shifting contours of “grounded modernity” over three regimes, weaving together with sophistication the strands of both continuity and change in German culture and society. The notion of “grounded modernity” offers as well an important contribution to understandings of German modernity, one that transcends and complicates older historiographical binaries of modernity versus antimodernism. Likewise, Rosenbaum’s innovative work casts new light on the history of German nationalism, showing the ways in which cosmopolitanism, nation, and regionalism coexisted and were transformed over time.”

Sarah Thomsen Vierra (New England College) was honored for her dissertation, “At Home in Almanya? Turkish-German Spaces of Belonging in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 1961-1990,” completed at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2011. The committee’s prize citation read: “This beautifully written and thoughtfully conceptualized dissertation explores the place of Turkish immigrants and their children in West German history. Deploying a variety of methodological and theoretical approaches, Vierra weaves together transnational, national, and local histories of Turkish-Germans since the arrival of the first West German Gastarbeit to create a rich tapestry of the experiences of Turkish-Germans and their host society. The author’s conceptual focus rests on “spaces of belonging” — from the workplace to the classroom, neighborhood, school, and mosque. This spatial approach allows Vierra to highlight the contradictions and ambiguities of the everyday lived experiences of marginalized communities, while her reliance on a rich array of archival and oral sources in German and Turkish enables her to recount how those spaces were constructed and contested in West Germany over time. Turkish-Germans have charted paths far more complex than many contemporary models of West German immigrant integration and assimilation suggest. In its compelling portrayal of a community defined by its diversity, this innovative work challenges commonplace notions of Turkish-German identity while informing us about majority-minority relations, national identities, and immigrant communities in contemporary Germany and Europe more broadly.”

2012 FRANZ STEINER PRIZE

On October 17, 2012, the 2012 Franz Steiner Prize, offered biennially for the best German- or English-language manuscript in transatlantic and North American studies, was awarded to Anja Schäfers, Bonn, for her outstanding dissertation, “Mehr als Rock ‘n’ Roll: Der Radiosender AFN bis Mitte der sechziger Jahre” (“More than Rock ‘n’ Roll: the radio station AFN up to the mid-1960s”). The prize is awarded by the German Historical Institute Washington and the Franz Steiner Verlag in Stuttgart, which publishes the GHI’s book series Transatlantische Historische Studien (Transatlantic Historical Studies; THS). The prize carries an honorarium and includes publication of the award-winning manuscript in the THS series. This year’s award was presented by Thomas Schaber, editor-in-chief of the Franz Steiner Verlag, and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, Deputy Director of the GHI, in a ceremony that took place as part of the German-American Day celebration at the Neues Schloss in Stuttgart. After Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson briefly introduced the GHI and the THS series to the audience, the laudatio for Ms. Schäfer was delivered by Thomas Schaber:
“[AFN’s] main purpose was at first to broadcast news and to motivate the troops, to bring a piece of home to the forces abroad. Extremely important for that were music programs, particularly request shows as well as the broadcasting of sport events. Soon, AFN was also popular with a German audience. The music that was played came to represent the end of a terrible war and hope for a better future, a future with new political as well as cultural freedom. Actually, one can indeed say that AFN brought a new spirit and attitude to life. ... One of the common clichés was, of course, that AFN solely played music and that its listeners were mainly German teenagers. Ms. Schäfer’s analysis shows a more precise picture, so we can see an assumed history of everyday life in post-war Germany in a new light. She expands our knowledge of this part of transatlantic relations; her work will be a standard reference for future research in this field. She is a worthy winner of our award! To sum it up, allow me to quote from her epilogue: ‘Despite all changes in the assignments and the everyday lives of the troops, a lot is still the same when you are overseas: be it the stress, the boredom, the loneliness or the homesickness: it’s good to have the radio on, and AFN still is much more than Rock ’n’ Roll.’”

NEW STAFF PUBLICATIONS

Books and Edited Volumes


**Articles and Chapters**


**STAFF CHANGES**

Stefan Hördler joined the Institute as a Research Fellow in October 2012. Previously he was a Research Associate in the Department of Contemporary History at the University of Vienna, Austria. Hördler earned his doctorate at the Humboldt University in Berlin in 2011/12 with a dissertation soon to be published as Ordnung und Inferno: Das KZ-System im letzten Kriegsjahr (Göttingen: Wallstein, forthcoming 2013). In 2009 he held a Ben and Zelda Cohen Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. He has published on twentieth-century German history, Holocaust and genocide studies, as well as social and economic history and is the editor of several books, including SA-Terror als Herrschaftssicherung: “Köpenicker Blutwoche” und öffentliche Gewalt im Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Metropol, forthcoming 2013). His current research project deals with the steel industries in divided Germany and the United States since the 1970s.
GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Postdoctoral Fellows

Melanie Arndt, Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society
The Natures of Radioactive Landscapes: East, West, and the Fading Boundary Between Them

Anne Kornhauser, City College of New York, City University of New York (CUNY)
Debating the State: Liberal Anxieties and the New American Leviathan, 1930–1970
Rene Schlott, Universität Gießen
“I have never begun by asking the big questions”. Eine Biographie zu Leben, Werk und Wirkung von Raul Hilberg (1926-2007)

Jacob Zollmann, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
Zwischenstaatliche Tribunale. Formen völkerrechtlicher Konfliktlösung (1800 – 1930)

Doctoral Fellows

Kritika Agarwal, State University of New York, Buffalo
Uncertain Citizenship: Denaturalization and Expatriation in Twentieth-Century America, 1906-1967

Brian Goodman, Harvard University
Amerika and the Other Europe: Literature and Culture Beyond the Curtain, 1946-1989

Felicitas Jaima, New York University
The African Diaspora in Germany: The Experiences of African American Servicewomen and Military Wives in Germany, 1945-1970

Kristina Kütt, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

Elisabeth Maurer, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
“This Astonishing Chaos of a Modern World”: Franco-American Cultural Relations, 1871-1919

Brendan Murphy, University of Sheffield
Killing in the German Army: Organizing and Surviving Combat in the Great War

Thilo Niedhöfer, Johannes Kepler Universität Linz
Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson und das “balinesische Ethos”: Amerikanische Anthropologie zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat ca. 1930-1950

Elisabeth Piller, Universität Heidelberg
German Cultural Diplomacy and the United States, 1919 – 1932

Dorothea Schöne, Universität Hamburg
Free Artists in Free Berlin — Deutsch-Amerikanische Kunst- und Kulturförderung in Berlin von der Republikgründung bis zum Mauerbau
Elise Vallier, University of Paris-Est Marne La Vallée
African American Women in the Years Between the Civil War and the Plessy vs Ferguson Supreme Court Decision in 1896

Isaiah Wilner, Yale University
The Boasian Circle: German-American Networks, Intellectual Friendships, and the Idea of Diversity

Matthew Yokell, Texas A&M University
Qingdao and the German Experience in China, 1880-1918

Transatlantic Perspectives Fellows

Christiane Bauer, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Deutschlandbilder der Nachfahren von deutschen Immigranten in den USA: Eine erinnerungsgeschichtliche Auseinandersetzung mit Migration und Identität

Nora Binder, Universität Konstanz
Experimentelles Subjekt und demokratische Gruppe: Zur Sozialpsychologie der Lewin-Schule

Martin Nekola, Charles University Prague
For the Freedom of Captive European Nations: Eastern European Exiles in Postwar America
GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR, FALL 2012

September 10  Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)
From Civil Rights to Children’s Rights: Marian Wright Edelman, the Children’s Defense Fund, and the Institutionalization of the CRM

Gisela Parak (Staatliche Akademie der Künste, Stuttgart)
Seeing Like a State: FSA Photography and the New Deal

Benjamin Schwantes (GHI)
Networks in Conflict: Business, Politics, and Railroad Telegraphy in Gilded-Age America

September 11  Jasper Trautsch (Freie Universität Berlin/GHI)
Die Konstruktion kultureller Räume in Europa und Nordamerika nach 1945

Julia Gunn (University of Pennsylvania/GHI)
A Good Place to Make Money: Civil Rights, Labor, and the Politics of Economic Development in the American Sunbelt South

Adrian Hänni (Universität Zürich)
The Terror Network: Images of Terrorism during the Reagan Years

Ines Prodöhl (GHI)
The Soybean in Global Perspective: Werkstattbericht

October 17  Jan Logemann (GHI)
In the Employ of the Field Marshall? Laszlo Moholy-Nagy and the New Bauhaus in Chicago

November 14  Atiba Pertilla (GHI)
Panic! at the Discount Window: Emotion and Regulation in New York City during the Financial Crisis of 1907

November 28  Mischa Honeck (GHI)

December 12 Corinna Ludwig (GHI)
Bayer’s Transatlantic Cross(ing). The Struggles of a Foreign Multinational Company in the United States

Andreas Joch (GHI)
Zukunftslabor amerikanische Stadt? Stadtplanung und Architektur im Kontext transatlantischer Elitenwanderung in der Zwischenkriegszeit
GHI DOCTORAL SEMINAR, FALL 2012

September 6

Michael Geheran (Clark University)
Betrayed Comradeship: German-Jewish WWI Veterans under Hitler

Nina Lorkowski (Technische Universität München)
Die sanitaire Ausstattung des Privathaushalts in den USA und in Deutschland: Vergleichende Aspekte einer Konsum- und Technikgeschichte des Badezimmers, 1918-1980

Anna Barbara Sum (Freie Universität Berlin)
Albert O. Hirschman und die Expertenkultur in der Entwicklungsökonomik (ca. 1940-1985)

Eva Balz (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
Die frühe Rückerstattung in West-Berlin (1949-1957)

October 11

Katharina Gärtner (Freie Universität Berlin)
White Picket Finance: Government Interventions in the U.S. Mortgage Market

Sebastian Teupe (Universität Bielefeld)
Varieties of Competition? Der deutsche und amerikanische Markt für Fernsehgeräte zwischen den 1950er und 1980er Jahren

October 25

Rebecca Odom (Saint Louis University)
Negotiating Hyphenated Identities: German-Americans during World War I

Timothy Sayle (Temple University)
NATO’s Survival: The Atlantic Alliance in Crisis, 1955-1968

November 29

Holger Drössler (Harvard University)
Race for the Pacific: Samoa in the Age of Empire

Emily Löffler (Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen)
Kulturgüterschutz und Kulturpolitik im besetzten Deutschland - amerikanische und französische Kunstschutzeinheiten im Vergleich
GHI LECTURE SERIES, SPRING 2013

PUBLIC DEBT IN HISTORY

The escalation of public debts is a central topic of our time, both in Europe and in the United States. The looming bankruptcies of entire nations are a pending danger, and so far only concerted bailout actions have prevented this scenario. Looking back at the history of public finance, we see that state bankruptcies are not uncommon and that the burdens of public debt can destabilize political systems. This lecture series proposes that the recent European sovereign debt crisis can be better understood as part of the history of economic integration from the 18th century onwards. To what extent and under which circumstances did economies show the same responses to high sovereign debt? When and how did financial crises make it difficult or impossible for countries to repay or refinance their debt without the assistance of third parties? Last but not least, why are bailouts common solutions, and what are some possible solutions for the future?

May 23  Sovereign Debt as a Problem of Modern Societies
Hans-Peter Ullmann (University of Cologne)

June 6  States vs. Banks: Debt and Crises in the Twentieth Century
Moritz Schularick (University of Bonn)

June 13  “The lost decade”: The Debt Crisis of the 1980s and the Reaction of the International Community
Laura Rischbieter (GHI)

June 27  A Common Solution: Bailouts in History
Robert E. Wright (Augustana College)
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2013

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org

January 24  Fateful Communities: Jewish Ghettos in German-Occupied Eastern Europe, 1940-1945
Panel Discussion at the GHI
Panelists: Omer Bartov (Brown University), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Martin Dean (USHMM), Geoffrey Megargee (USHMM), Paul Shapiro (USHMM), and Sybille Steinbacher (University of Vienna)

March 8-9  In Search of Better Lives: The Circulation of Ideas for Social Improvement between Europe and the US in the 19th and 20th Century
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Christina Lubinski (GHI), Christina May (University of Göttingen), and Warren Rosenblum (Webster University, St. Louis)

April 3-4  Germans and Americans in Israel — Israelis in Germany and the United States
Third Junior Scholars Conference in German-Jewish History Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Michael Brenner (LMU München), Stefan Hördler (GHI), Miriam Ruerup (Institute for the History of the German Jews, Hamburg)

April 18-20  Inventing the ‘Silent Majority’: Conservative Mobilization in Western Europe and the United States in the 1960s and 1970s
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI) and Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University)

May 10-11  New Technologies and Cultures of Communication in the 19th and 20th Centuries
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Clelia Caruso (GHI), Peter Jelavich (Johns Hopkins University), Richard R. John (Columbia University), Benjamin Schwantes (GHI)

May 29 - June 1 19th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: Twentieth-Century German History
Seminar at the Historisches Kolleg, Munich
Conveners: Richard F. Wetzell (GHI), Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University), and Margit Szöllösi-Janze (University of Munich)
June 6-8  Colonialism and Climate History  
Conference at Georgetown University  
Conveners: Franz Mauelshagen (KWI Essen), John R. McNeill (Georgetown University), Jean-François Mouhot (Georgetown University), Eleonora Rohland (KWI Essen)

September 19-21  The Dream and Its Untold Stories: The March on Washington and its Legacy  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Marcia Chatelain (Georgetown), Sharon Monteith (Nottingham), Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)

September 19-21  Kriminalität und Strafjustiz in der Moderne, 18.-20. Jh.: Tagung zur Historischen Kriminalitätsforschung 2013  
Conference in Munich  
Conveners: Sylvia Kesper-Biermann (LMU München), Désirée Schauz (Münchner Zentrum für Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

September 26-28  Obesity, Health, and the Liberal Self: Transatlantic Perspectives on the Late Nineteenth and the Late Twentieth Centuries  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Nina Mackert/Jürgen Martschukat (University of Erfurt), Susan Strasser (University of Delaware), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

October 10-13  Medieval History Seminar 2013  
Seminar at the GHI London  
Conveners: Stefan Hördler (GHI), Cornelia Linde (GHI London)

October 18-19  Silent Seller: The Cultural Meaning of Commodities that Thrive in Obscurity  
Workshop at the GHI  
Conveners: Carla Meyer (University of Heidelberg), Ines Prodöhl (GHI), and Amy Slaton (Drexel University)

October 24-26  Migrants as “Translators”: Mediating External Influences on Post-World War II Western Europe, 1945-1973  
Workshop at the Institut für die Geschichte der deutschen Juden, Hamburg  
Conveners: Jan Logemann (GHI) and Miriam Rürup (Institut für die Geschichte der deutschen Juden)
The Consumer on the Home Front:
World War II Civilian Consumption in
Comparative Perspective
Conference at the GHI London
Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Felix Römer (GHI London), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), and Jan Logemann (GHI)
German Historical Institute Washington DC
Fellows and Staff

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff, Director
Modern social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption

PD Dr. Uwe Spiekermann, Deputy Director
Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge

PD Dr. Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, Deputy Director
African American Studies, transatlantic relations, gender history, American religious history

Andreas Fischer, Administrative Director

Dr. Clelia Caruso, Research Fellow
Modern European history; history of migration; history of technology

Dr. Mischa Honeck, Research Fellow
19th and 20th-century American history; transnational history; history of ethnicity and race relations; gender history; history of youth and youth movements

Dr. Stefan Hördler, Research Fellow
20th-century German history, Holocaust Studies, Jewish Studies, business history

Dr. Jan Logemann, Research Fellow
Comparative and transatlantic history; history of consumption; history of urban development; history of emigration; modern Germany and the United States since the 1920s

Dr. Christina Lubinski, Research Fellow
Modern economic and social history; business history

Dr. Ines Prodohl, Research Fellow
Global history, cultural and economic history, civil society

Dr. Richard F. Wetzel, Research Fellow and Editor
Modern European and German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow

Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow

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