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03 Preface

FEATURES

09 Germany and the Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1820
   David Blackbourn

23 “Get out the Vote!” Elections without Democracy in Imperial Germany
   James Retallack

39 Disappointed Hopes for Spontaneous Mass Conversions: German Responses to Allied Atrocity Film Screenings, 1945-46
   Ulrike Weckel

55 The Second Generation: Historians of Modern Germany in Postwar America
   Catherine Epstein

GHI RESEARCH

67 The Global Business with Local Music: Western Gramophone Companies in India before World War I
   Christina Lubinski

CONFERENCE REPORTS

89 Living on the Margins: “Illegality,” Statelessness, and the Politics of Removal in Twentieth-Century Europe and the United States
   Miriam Rürup

95 The Globalization of African American Business and Consumer Culture
   Joshua Davis
101 Adolescent Ambassadors: Twentieth-Century Youth Organizations and International Relations
Mischa Honeck

106 18th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History, 1770-1914
Richard F. Wetzell

112 Democratic Cultures Past and Present: Perspectives from Washington DC
Meike Zwingenberger and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson

116 The Second Generation: German Émigré Historians in the Transatlantic World, 1945 to the Present
Andreas Daum

Lauren Shaw

131 GHI NEWS

25th Anniversary of the German Historical Institute
New Publications
Staff Changes
GHI Fellowships and Internships
Recipients of GHI Fellowships
GHI Research Seminar, Spring 2012
GHI Doctoral Seminar, Spring 2012
GHI Lecture Series, Fall 2012
GHI Calendar of Events 2012/13
This past spring the German Historical Institute in Washington celebrated its 25th anniversary. The highlight of the Festakt on May 17, 2012, which was attended by more than 150 guests and colleagues, was David Blackbourn’s lecture on “Germany and the Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1820.” In the lecture, which is published in this issue of the Bulletin, Blackbourn challenges the stereotype that whereas the British in this era had an industrial revolution and the French a political revolution, the Germans merely had a “reading revolution” — that Germans “only thought while others acted.” Although the Germans had no empire overseas, Blackbourn demonstrates that they had a global presence in international trade and created remarkable transatlantic networks and that German ideas and practices — from mining and scientific forestry to music and education — had a far-reaching impact across the globe, especially in Great Britain and America.

Addressing the question of German history’s “dark side” in his conclusion, Blackbourn argues that the key continuities linking Nazism to the nineteenth century belong almost entirely to the late nineteenth century, that is, to the German Kaiserreich. This point is taken up in James Retallack’s article on “elections without democracy” in Imperial Germany, which originated in a public lecture delivered in the GHI’s spring 2012 lecture series on the history of elections. Retallack challenges recent interpretations which have contended that Imperial Germany’s universal manhood suffrage, combined with strict adherence to electoral procedure, gave the monarchy’s political opponents a foothold and thus led to a significant democratization of the Kaiserreich. By contrast, in his case study of the 1893 Reichstag elections, Retallack argues that modern mass elections had highly ambivalent consequences because the enemies of democracy learned to use the new rabble-rousing style of mass politics for their own purposes. Not just radical fringe parties but conservatives targeted German Jews with belligerent anti-Semitic rhetoric. Although this mainstreaming of anti-Semitism in mass elections foreshadows the rise of Nazism, Retallack concludes by suggesting that the latter cannot be understood without the impact of the First World War.

The aftermath of Nazism is addressed in Ulrike Weckel’s article on German responses to Allied screenings of films documenting Nazi atrocities. This article summarizes the argument of her book
Beschämende Bilder, which was published in the GHI book series *Transatlantische Historische Studien* earlier this year and won the GHI’s Franz Steiner Prize as well as the 2012 Carl-Erdmann-Preis für herausragende Habilitationen of the German Historiker-Verband (Historical Association). Moving beyond the prevailing interpretation that Allied attempts to reeducate Germans through the visual documentation of liberated camps were a failure, Weckel redirects our attention from German guilt to German shame by focusing on the fact that the atrocity films presented “shameful images” designed to shame Germans. Nearly all German viewers of atrocity films, she concludes, were susceptible to being shamed. With shame, however, not much was achieved in terms of reeducation since shaming people did not increase their readiness to come to terms with the source of the shame but was more likely to lead to resentment against those doing the shaming.

A very different impact of Nazism is examined in Catherine Epstein’s article, which is based on her presentation at the GHI conference “The Second Generation: German Émigré Historians in the Transatlantic World, 1945 to the Present,” organized on the occasion of the Institute’s 25th anniversary this past May (see the “Conference Reports” section). Pursuing a long-standing GHI interest that originated with the Institute’s very first conference (1988), which examined the work of the first generation of German-speaking refugee historians (those who had received their training as historians in Germany before emigrating), this year’s anniversary conference examined the work and influence of the “second generation” of German émigré historians, that is, those who fled Nazi Germany as minors and received their university training as historians in the United States — a group of scholars that played a key role in promoting the internationalization of the American university, helped a younger generation of German scholars create a democratic academic culture, and shaped German-American relations in the second half of the twentieth century. Epstein’s article provides a survey of their training at American universities dominated by the Western civilization paradigm, their careers in the context of the rapid expansion of the field of European history in the United States, their political outlook, and their interactions with the first generation of refugee historians and with non-refugee colleagues in their own cohort. Epstein also shows that although many of them later trained the current generation of Holocaust scholars, most second-generation émigré historians focused on explaining the Nazi seizure of power 1933 — rather than studying the Holocaust.
Christina Lubinski’s article in the “GHI Research” section demonstrates that the GHI is committed not only to German history but also to transnational and global history. Lubinski examines the late-nineteenth-century expansion of Western gramophone companies into India as an example of Western companies’ international ambitions during the era of an increasingly integrated world economy prior to 1914. Among the challenges these companies faced were the diversity of local customs, languages, and musical tastes as well as rising Indian nationalism. Lubinski argues that several of the strategies these companies developed in India, such as the adaptation of the music portfolio to local tastes and the cooperation with local entrepreneurs, helped them achieve success in multiple markets during the interwar period.

The conference reports in this issue once again reflect the diversity of historical research supported by the GHI. The topics examined range from the history of statelessness to the globalization of African-American consumer culture, and from the role of transatlantic contacts in the history of post-1945 social reform to the history of youth organizations. The calendar of events in our “News” section informs you of upcoming GHI events and conferences. We hope to have kindled your interest and look forward to welcoming you at a GHI event in the near future.

Hartmut Berghoff (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)
Features
GERMANY AND THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN WORLD, 1780-1820

LECTURE DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION OF THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, MAY 17, 2012

David Blackbourn
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

My subject was suggested by the larger project I am working on, about Germany and the world since 1500. As Thomas Bender wrote in his recent transnational history of America, “the nation cannot be its own historical context”.¹ Now, “transnational” has become a buzzword and we historians should not be creatures of fashion. The transnational approach does not invalidate comparative history or microhistory, and can in fact be combined with each. Yet transnational history has particular attractions. The idea of the nation as “container” misses the movement of people, things, and ideas. It overlooks the porosity of borders, underplays zones of contact and exchange, favors the homogeneous over the hybrid. It also makes it harder to see commonalities — the history a nation shared with other nations. I hope today’s lecture will show the virtues of a transnational approach.

I have chosen to talk about the period 1780-1820 partly because of what it is not: it is not the twentieth century. Let me add immediately that I have nothing against the twentieth century. Some of my best friends work on the twentieth century. I’ve written on it myself. Nor, emphatically, am I suggesting that we turn our backs on the darkest episode of twentieth-century German history. My concern is about proportion. Quite suddenly, German history in this country has become almost synonymous with the history of the last hundred years. The share of twentieth-century articles and books reviewed in the journal Central European History has grown to 75 percent and more of the total. The same is true of history panels at meetings of the German Studies Association. At a time when there are fewer jobs in our field in North America, it is no surprise that graduate students, seeing positions listed as “Twentieth-Century Germany” or “Post-1945 Germany”, and facing advice on all sides that this is the shape of the future, take the hint and opt for “marketable” topics. One of many undesirable effects of this trend is that, if pre-1914 history withers in North America, it threatens to create asymmetry in the transatlantic exchange (unless, of course, younger German scholars

also opt overwhelmingly to neglect everything but the last hundred years, in which case we’re all in trouble). This is not the time to dig deeper into the reasons, but I do think this quite dramatic shift should be registered.

Not that any apology is necessary for talking about the decades on either side of 1800. This was truly a seed-time of the modern world. It is fifty years since Eric Hobsbawm wrote about the “dual revolution” — the political revolution in France, the Industrial Revolution in Britain. More recent scholarship has only added to our sense of this period as a hinge of history. A warfare-generated period of upheaval shook all the major empires, bringing revolution not only to Europe but to the North American colonies, the Caribbean, and Latin America. On a larger scale still, Christopher Bayly has labeled this an era of “proto-globalization”. The “Industrial Revolution”, meanwhile, has been cut down to size and post-dated; but in its place we have a commercial revolution in agriculture and what one historian has nicely called an “industrious revolution”. This was also a time of demographic transformation, of rising populations that broke the Malthusian cycle, and a time when measures were increasingly undertaken to “conquer” nature, as the phrase went. There is good reason to refer, with Fernand Braudel, to “the end of the biological old regime” in Europe. Nor is that all. Admirers of the late Reinhart Koselleck — and who is not? — would point to his identification of this as a “Sattelzeit”, a period when ideas about history, about the nature of time itself, changed.

Changes of this range and scale might, you would think, be interesting enough even to attract a few historians of Germany out of the twentieth century. But where exactly did Germans fit into this picture of transformation? There is one familiar answer. It was during these years that Germaine de Stael dubbed Germany the land of Dichter und Denker, writers and thinkers. She was not alone. For Friedrich Hölderlin, Germans were “rich in thoughts but weak in deeds.” A little later Heinrich Heine added his voice to the choir: Germans had merely thought what others had done. The historian Rolf Engelsing summed this up a generation ago when he suggested that while the British had an industrial revolution and the French a political revolution, Germany had a reading revolution. This is intuitively plausible and has cast a long shadow. I want to challenge the stereotype in two ways. First, it seems to me dubious to take so cavalier an attitude to the written word and to ideas at the very moment when a modern world was being forged in which education, culture, and disciplinary

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8 Rolf Engelsing, Der Bürger als Leser (Stuttgart, 1974), 256-67.
knowledge would enjoy such huge authority — and I would add that the dismissive view often shown towards the connected idea of a distinctive German “inwardness” also sits awkwardly with efforts to understand what one scholar (writing about Britain) has called the “invention of the modern self” in these years.9 I will return to these issues later in my lecture. But I also want to challenge the idea that Germans only thought while others acted, and it is to that I turn now.

I.

The world became a smaller place in the late eighteenth century. Of course, the world is always becoming a smaller place: the modern state is always rising, and the world is always getting smaller. This was not yet our world, the world whose unprecedented globalization we celebrate (and exaggerate). It was not yet even the world of the mid-nineteenth century, joined together by steamship and telegraph. But networks of communication were becoming much more tightly meshed through travel and exchange, the movement of commodities, people, and ideas. When Wilhelm von Humboldt, the more sedentary of two famous brothers, sat at his desk writing about world languages, he was connected with hundreds of correspondents on five continents: scholars and diplomats, merchants and missionaries. Germans themselves were everywhere. Merchants from the Baltic and North Sea coasts were central to the carrying trade of northern Europe. They were resident in the great mercantile hubs of London, Antwerp, and Amsterdam. And they had a global presence. Because there was no German empire overseas, the role of Germans along the arteries of world trade can easily be overlooked, from West Africa to the Dutch East Indies, from the eastern seaboard of North America to the Spanish empire. They were merchants, settlers, printers, and booksellers. They served on Dutch merchantmen and Scandinavian whaling ships, and they served on land as soldiers under many flags. The famous Schlegel brothers had an older sibling, Karl August, who was a soldier for the English East India Company and died in Madras in 1789, while the world’s attention was elsewhere — a death, some have argued, that shaped his brothers’ fascination with India.10 In Dutch Surinam, the imprint of German merchants, craftsmen and farmers was such that visitors thought this Caribbean colony more German than Dutch.11

The German place within the Atlantic world is starting to be recognized. The German lands were integrated into the Atlantic economy.

10 Suzanne L. Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire (New York, 2009), 60.
11 Percy Ernst Schramm, Neun Generationen (Göttingen, 1963), 174.
which carried the products of the slave plantations — sugar, coffee — back to Germany, where their consumption sparked debates in the journals and coffee houses, as they did in other countries, about fashion and gender roles, and occasionally even about slavery. The German role in the peopling of the Americas also created some remarkable transatlantic networks, religious in their origins but wider in their effects. One was formed by the Moravians, the Herrnhuter of Saxony. By the late eighteenth century they circled the Atlantic world with their missions in London, Ireland, Greenland, West Africa, the Caribbean and North America, where they spread out from Pennsylvania to establish congregations and Indian missions from Maine to the Carolinas. All this required money, and in 1758 the Moravian merchants had created the Commercial Society, which was intended, as one of them put it, “to start a commerce that the Lord could sanctify and bless”. Lutheran Pietists created an even more impressive network radiating out from Halle. Their missionaries could be found from Siberia to Malabar. Pietist agents shipped ironware and glassware up the Elbe to Hamburg, traded in Russian grain, brought sugar and coffee back for resale in Venice and Amsterdam. They carried news through their courier system, and brought pharmaceuticals as well as Bibles to the new world. The late eighteenth century saw an intensified exchange of books, copper plates, as well as botanical and agricultural specimens across the Atlantic.

It is hard to make a clean separation between the intellectual and the material in exchanges of this kind. The same is true of another activity that took Germans around the world — as mining engineers. Decades before Germany became famous as the “fatherland of forestry”, providing foresters to the British Raj and establishing the first Forestry Schools in the United States, German mining engineers were sought after from Russia to the Andes. Now, the mine (like the forest) is a ubiquitous motif in Romantic literature, a place of darkness and mystery, and a remarkable number of contemporary writers had been trained as mining engineers — Novalis, Eichendorff, Brentano, Körner. But, I want to suggest, sometimes a mining engineer was just a mining engineer. One such, emblematic of what I have been talking about, was Fürchtegott Leberecht von Nordenflicht, a Saxon-trained mining engineer who worked in Poland, then accepted a commission from the Spanish crown in the 1780s to inspect and reform the silver mines of Peru. He and his fifteen fellow engineers created a mineralogical laboratory which became the Peruvian Mining School before Nordenflicht, after twenty-five years in the new world, retired to Madrid with his Creole wife.


13 Renate Wilson, Pious Traders in Medicine: A German Pharmaceutical Network in Eighteenth-Century North America (University Park, PA, 2000), 207.

14 Theodore Ziolkowski, German Romanticism and Its Institutions (Princeton, 1990), 18-63.
In Lima Nordenflycht met Alexander von Humboldt — another mining engineer by training, although very much more than that. In his famous five-year *Journey to the Equinoctial Regions* with Aimee Bonpland, Humboldt established the connection between the Orinoco and Amazon river basins. He scaled volcanoes, descended mines, collected rock samples, and handled electric eels; he studied the flora and fauna and sent specimens back to Europe. He examined everything from the properties of guano to the prospects for sugar plantations, and everywhere he went he measured things — heights, distances, temperature.\(^{15}\) He returned in 1804 a celebrity — “our conqueror of the world”, in Goethe’s words. The decades on either side of 1800 have been called a “second age of discovery.” Herder captured the spirit of the age when he wrote in 1784: “Man, while he continues man, will not cease from wandering over his planet, till it is completely known to him; from this, neither storms nor shipwrecks, nor those vast mountains of ice, nor all the perils of either pole, will deter him.”\(^{16}\) The poles would have to wait another hundred years. But this was a time when human knowledge of the earth advanced rapidly, and Germans had a major part in it, forging new connections as they did so. Thirteen years before Humboldt’s journey Joseph II dispatched a group of Austrian botanists to Caracas. They returned after three years with samples — and with new-found Creole friends, to whom they sent musical instruments and musical scores of Haydn and Mozart. Humboldt’s friend Georg Forster had travelled around the world with Captain Cook and published a bestseller about it in English and German. Carsten Niebuhr travelled to Arabia and on to India as part of a Danish expedition that he alone survived, a journey that made him hardly less of a European scholarly celebrity than Forster or Humboldt. The list could be easily extended to include Peter Simon Pallas’s travels in Siberia or Friedrich Hornemann’s in Africa.

II.

Travel, thickening networks of communication, and “the animation of universal commerce” (as Fichte called it) all made the world more interconnected.\(^{17}\) They also shaped the German impact of the upheavals that came out of France and the Americas and remade the world politically. That impact was uneven in several respects. The revolt of the American colonies opened up American ports to direct trade by Hanseatic merchants; Napoleon’s Continental system and the English blockade then closed it down again — and with it, the flow of information. The flood of French political writing that appeared

\(^{15}\) Alexander von Humboldt, *Personal Narrative of a Journey to the Equinoctial Regions of the New Continent*, originally published in French. The *Personal Narrative* made up the final three volumes of the 30-volume account Humboldt completed in 1834.


in German translation (more of it in the 1790s than in the previous ninety years combined) was offset by the slowing down of information from the Americas. The German lands that felt the shock waves were also far from uniform. They contained numerous petty territories and Mack Walker’s “home towns” gathered within the stifling, airless Holy Roman Empire. But they also included states that had already taken major steps down the road of princely enlightened reform “from above”, and within those lands there were — as we have seen — individuals and groups that had many contacts with a wider world. Alexander von Humboldt, admittedly exceptional, knew both Thomas Jefferson and Simon Bolivar, the South American “liberator.”

A cautious admirer of the French Revolution (more cautious than his friend Forster), he spent the first quarter of the nineteenth century living in Paris and corresponding with an even wider range of people than his brother.

In turning to the impact of the revolutionary era in Germany, I want to start with France. For it was the French Revolution that recast German politics, whether by imitation, appropriation or rejection. Events in France had an immediate effect, prompting popular disturbances and a wave of enthusiasm among German writers, both established and young. Some went to Paris as “pilgrims of revolution.” But the disturbances were suppressed, and the Terror led to disillusionment. “They have betrayed our ideals and dragged them in the mud,” lamented Caroline Schlegel. Klopstock stopped writing odes to liberty, and instead displayed a bust of Charlotte Corday, Marat’s assassin, in his study. The radical course of the French revolution reinforced pride in German “moderation.” War and occupation then led both to preemptive reforms and to a spasm of Francophobia among some German intellectuals in the early nineteenth century.

The French Revolution was transformative. Most obviously, it redrew the map of central Europe, destroyed the Holy Roman Empire, and turned Germany into a constitutional laboratory. That process began in 1806, with the Napoleonic puppet states and the new constitutions granted in Baden and elsewhere. It continued, however unevenly, through the eras of reform and reaction, and through the renewed political unrest of the years after 1815 in Greece, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Germany itself. Most German rulers found themselves with new subjects after the Napoleonic years and the 1815 settlement. They also had to operate on new political terrain. They were forced to learn — some were slower learners than others — how to manufacture consent through state-building, invented traditions, and

timely concessions. By 1847 only four of the 39 member states of the German Confederation had no constitution. This might be seen as carrying through the program described by the Baron von Struensee in 1799, when he told the French charge d’affaires that the revolution that the French had made “from below” would be completed “gradually, from above” in Prussia — very gradually, it must be said, for Prussia was one of those four states that still lacked a constitution until after 1848.20

That is the view from the top down. But the French Revolution also bequeathed a new political vocabulary of nation, rights, liberty, and a new set of political symbols — the tricolor flag, the liberty tree.21 The use of this language and these symbols during German popular disturbances after 1815 was part of the French legacy, especially in the Rhineland. So was the cult of Napoleon, which persisted across the German lands in the form of broadsheets, vivats to the former Emperor in taverns, and songs like “Napoleon wo bist du denn?” But the French Revolution was also responsible for creating a modern conservatism that had its own reference points, the “historical” and “organic,” and its own vocabulary — hierarchy, order, faith. The lessons learned from France often floated free of their original source. One of those fire-eating Francophobes I mentioned, Ernst Moritz Arndt, nonetheless credited the French Revolution as inspiration. It had, he said, “ignited a great sea of fire in the mind.”22 German nationalists appropriated and reworked the new French political vocabulary, sometimes with an anti-French twist — although more so after the Rhine crisis of 1840 than before, and never universally. One French lesson had a long after-life. That was the lesson of the Terror. Even in the 1790s, Germans who welcomed the revolution had been drawn more to the Girondins than the Jacobins (Mirabeau was a great favorite). This was consistent with a widespread view, shared by some German rulers, that through their revolution the French were simply catching up with German enlightened reforms. The subsequent “excess” and supposed “self-interest” of the revolution undermined its appeal as a vehicle of reason and virtue. For German liberals, although not for radical democrats, the French Revolution provided the tools with which they forged a reformist but anti-revolutionary message: reform was necessary, because reform denied led to revolution.

The lessons Germans drew from events across the Atlantic often served as a foil to their reception of the French Revolution. The American Revolution was less bloody and more practical than the French — less “metaphysical”, said one admiring writer.23 (Let us

23 Volker Depkat, Amerikabilder in politischen Diskursen (Stuttgart, 1998), 268.
pause for a moment to enjoy this German criticism of the “metaphysical” French.) That was a recurring theme after 1815, when the volume of writing about the United States grew — including articles in new journals dedicated to the new world like Columbus and Atlantis. It remained true after 1830, when there was even more writing about America, for reasons partly connected with the onset of mass emigration. The United States interested German liberals because of the emphasis placed on constitutionalism, individual rights, religious toleration, and the rule of law. In other words, for the same reasons that Britain served as a model, with the added interest that the United States was a federal system. Perhaps the Bundestag could be reformed into something resembling Congress? The United States also offered the example of a new state being built from scratch, as the post-1815 German states were in fact being built. Robert Mohl wrote in 1824 that the United States was the state “which has taken up and represented in purest form the ideas that have so violently turned our time upside down.” Yet the signature aspect of the American revolution — “we, the people”, popular sovereignty — was largely bracketed out of German liberal, although not radical, discussions.

More than that: Despite their sympathy for the American experiment, liberals largely agreed with conservatives that US institutions could not simply be “injected” or “transplanted” into Germany. What was suitable for a rudely vigorous people in a wide-open land without history was not necessarily right for an old society. German liberals drew the same conclusion from the Latin American struggle for independence. A writer in the journal Hermes referred in 1821 to the “death struggles and birth pains” of the previous fifty years in the Americas, which had seen “the end of the old and the emergence of a new order of things” — a Totalrevolution in politics, religion and economics. And yet this revolution too, he and others argued, could not be transferred from the “free soil” of the Americas to Europe.

Radicals disagreed. These “world-historical events” — the term was much bandied about before Hegel took it up — represented “the seeds of a better future.” (I quote from an article in the Politisches Journal of 1815). The great revolt in South America would “perhaps sooner than some would like to think pull the European motherland into its powerful vortex.” Some wanted to speed these world-historical events along. South America became a site of German radicalism. Hundreds of Germans fought in Bolivar’s legions, others fought in the Uruguayan war of independence and

25 Depkat, Amerikabilder, 330.
26 See Günter Kahle, Simon Bolivar und die Deutschen (Berlin, 1980), 12.
in the two republican uprisings in southern Brazil. In the second of these, in 1835, the Germans who fought alongside Garibaldi in the Guerra dos Farragos (the war of the ragamuffins) flew the red-black-gold flag of German radical nationalism. This was, of course, a displaced radicalism — a physical-force variant of the verbal radicalism practiced by a new German political emigration that stretched from Paris, Brussels, and London to the Americas. But sometimes the émigrés returned, like Samuel Gottfried Kerst, a veteran of radical campaigns in Uruguay and Brazil who was elected in 1848 to the Frankfurt parliament and became a leading advocate of a German navy.27

III.

Goethe, meanwhile, pinned an admiring note about Bolivar to the door of his bedchamber and proposed a design for the new Venezuelan national flag based on his theory of primary colors. (The proposal was adopted.) And with that I return in the final part of this lecture to the poets and thinkers. For how can we talk about Germany and the birth of the modern world without considering the impact of that extraordinary flowering of German literature and philosophy in the decades on either side of 1800? Consider for a moment just the talent gathered together in the Jena Circle of 1799 — Schiller, Fichte, the Schlegels, Schelling, Novalis, Schleiermacher, Tieck. Apart from the slightly older Schiller and Fichte, all were born within a decade of each other, between the late 1760s and the late 1770s, the same ten years that saw the birth of Hegel, the Humboldt brothers, Hölderlin, Kleist, and Beethoven.

I will not try to summarize the richness of thought we associate with these figures — the writers of the *Sturm und Drang*, the Romantics, Kant, and the idealist philosophers who took up his challenge. To do so would bring me quickly into the territory of Monty Python’s “Summarizing Proust” competition. But I do want to question whether we can be satisfied with the formulation I noted earlier in this lecture that Germans merely thought what others did. Did ideas themselves not change the world? German contemporaries certainly thought so. When Fichte wrote in 1793 about the French Revolution, which he supported, he nonetheless called the Kantian revolution “incomparably more important.” The young Joseph Görres made similar claims: “In the last ten years”, he wrote in 1797, “there has occurred in Germany the revolution by which this country has in the realm of theory contributed almost as much

to humanity as has France in the realm of practice, I mean our immortal Kant.”

In these decades German writers changed the way we think about ethics, the theory of knowledge, religion, law, language, music, art and aesthetics, work and vocation, humans and the natural world, and — not least — history. And what they wrote had a far-reaching impact. German ideas and German culture went around the globe. English literary notables from Coleridge and Carlyle to George Eliot and Matthew Arnold looked to Germany. So did their American counterparts. We can trace in individual cases how this happened. Coleridge, for example, travelled to Germany with Wordsworth and stayed there to study. He met Ludwig Tieck, his contemporary, with whom he shared a passion for folk diction and Shakespeare, and he translated Schiller’s *Wallenstein*. Most importantly, he introduced German philosophical and literary thought into England, often without attribution. His introduction of Schelling’s term “the unconscious” into English is one example of many.

In the American case, one could do worse than follow the reception of German thought at the institution where I once taught, Harvard University. Consider, for example, the student radical Karl Follen, who became a political émigré first in Switzerland, then in Massachusetts, where he changed his name to Charles, married a Cabot, and became Harvard’s first professor of Germanic literature, where he had a powerful influence on undergraduates. But Follen was working with the grain. It would be hard to overstate the spell that German thought cast on Harvard students in the early nineteenth century. The classicist and future Harvard president Edward Everett went off to do his Ph.D. in Göttingen after graduation. So did two of America’s most prominent nineteenth-century historians, George Bancroft and John Lothrop Motley. German ideas were formative for those graduates of the College and Divinity School we know as the New England Transcendentalists. For Ralph Waldo Emerson, David Thoreau, and Theodore Parker, as for many lesser lights, German philosophy, scholarship, and literature were a source of huge intellectual excitement. Acquiring German was, Thoreau exuberantly told his friend Orestes Brownson, “the morning of a new Lebenstag.”

When I refer to ideas changing the world, sometimes they were just that — particular ideas such as the categorical imperative, the Gothic, or the influential thesis propounded by one soon-to-be-famous German political émigré, Karl Marx, to the effect that previous philosophers

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29 Edmund Spevack, *Charles Follen’s Search for Nationality and Freedom in Germany and America, 1795-1840* (Baltimore, 1993).

had only interpreted the world; the point was to change it. But this German contribution to the making of the modern world may be best understood by thinking about bodies of thought, or practices. I mentioned two of these earlier: mining engineering and scientific forestry. A third, also concerned with human mastery of the natural world, was the advent of a self-consciously scientific agriculture associated with the work of Albrecht Daniel Thaer. But when we think of German practices that had a truly global impact in shaping the modern world, then there are two that deserve special mention: music and education.

Music was not always the German art form. In the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth the cultural transfer ran in the opposite direction. German musical taste was influenced, first by Netherlandish, then by Italian models. It was the decades on either side of 1800 that established the tight fit between music and the Germans. That was, of course, partly a matter of the canon — the extraordinary cluster of German composers who created a repertoire that became truly global in the dawning age of the concert hall. But we are also talking about the centrality of German music journalism and music criticism, as well as the primacy of German musicianship. The German music tutor was prized beyond Germany. So was the German conductor or first violin. Think, for example, of the role that Germans would play in the formative years of the great American symphony orchestras. The German conservatory, meanwhile, was a magnet for ambitious composers and musicians everywhere.

Let me single out two educational institutions and their associated practices. One is Friedrich Fröbel’s Kindergarten. The product of a remarkable Swiss-German axis of pedagogical reform in the late eighteenth century, it had its origins in Thuringia in the years 1816-1820 and achieved a global impact in the century that followed. The other is the German research university. The early nineteenth century was once again the seed-time. These years saw the founding of a new university in Berlin and the re-establishment of others, including Heidelberg and Munich. The university, given up for dead by many educational reformers of the late eighteenth century, instead became the primary setting for the explosion of knowledge in the nineteenth century and beyond. The structure that emerged then, of scholarly disciplines, the scientific laboratory, and the research seminar, turned out to have more staying-power than the spinning jenny or factory chimney. And the German university, like the conservatory, became a magnet — George Bancroft and John Motley were just two of the

10,000 Americans who earned Ph.D.s in nineteenth-century Germany — just as it became a global model to be imitated or selectively appropriated elsewhere.

The Kindergarten and the new university, both products of a reform era, sat awkwardly with the new age of state-building — and with the imperatives of commerce, come to that. The Kindergarten was denounced for its atheistic tendencies; universities, at least before 1848, were centers of political opposition. One idea they had in common was the value they placed on the interior self — the development of the child in one case, adult self-cultivation, or Bildung, in the other. I think it is worth emphasizing how German writers in these years helped to give us a vocabulary with which to think about selfhood and subjectivity, starting with Kant and continuing through the younger generation who took up the gauntlet he threw down. Kant was suspicious of efforts to “eavesdrop on ourselves,” as he called it. He warned against “occupying ourselves with spying out the involuntary course of our thoughts and feelings.” Fichte, for whom the first person singular was never far away, dissented. So, above all, did the Romantics, who turned eavesdropping on themselves into a way of life. We can call this the cultivation of “inwardness.” We can also see it, for better or worse, as a foundational moment in modern notions of personhood and authenticity.

IV.

As I move to a close, some of you may be asking: Was there no dark side to what I’ve been talking about? And, of course, there was. Germans played a larger role in a burgeoning world economy than you would guess from reading Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which barely mentions them. That meant Germans were also deeply implicated in the system of slavery — contrary to later claims of innocence and possession of a special affinity for native peoples. And far from being just dreamy poets, Germans played a large part in forging the instrumental view of nature so typical of these years — a view to which Romanticism was in part a response. There are other, more familiar respects in which the legacy of these years had a darker potential. German, especially Prussian educational accomplishments were mediated through a bureaucratic state that had been strengthened by the challenge of revolutionary upheaval. German music sometimes came in the form of the military band. The flowering of interest in German cultural folkways had an anti-French affect that found bitter expression in the years after 1806 and would burst out again in the
future. All of the mighty cultural achievements of these decades had the potential to feed German hubris, something that became increasingly apparent after 1871.

After 1871: that’s the point. I believe strongly in lines of continuity that link the German catastrophe of the twentieth century to the nineteenth. But the key elements of continuity seem to me to belong almost entirely to the late nineteenth century, the period that saw the rise of an aggressive new nationalism, the advent of pseudoscientific racism and eugenics, state surveillance on a new scale, the modern cult of the “strong” political leader, and the spread of a recklessly populist politics. A shadow falls somewhere between the years I have been talking about today and the more sinister ideas and practices of the decades before 1914.

Germany between 1780 and 1820 was not some innocent heile Welt. This was a time of movement and change, as contemporaries very well knew. When the Jena Circle broke up in 1800, its members scattered across Germany, Italy, France, and Hungary. That was the context of a letter written by Jean Paul in 1805 and addressed to “Ludwig Tieck in space and time.” It is hard to imagine that being written even a few decades earlier. Christopher Bayly has called this an “axial age” in world history. It was a foundational moment for much of what we recognize as modern, for better and worse. I have tried to place Germans squarely within a new world in the making, to insert them into a historiography that has been rewritten in recent years largely without reference to Germany. Germans were not inert bystanders when it came to the upheavals of the era. The world became smaller in these years and Germans helped to make it so. Through their ideas and practices, through travel, material exchange and networks of communication, they contributed to the making of a new world.

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“GET OUT THE VOTE!” ELECTIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY IN IMPERIAL GERMANY *  

James Retallack  
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You can certainly tell small children that a ringing bell means the ice-cream truck is out of ice cream. But that’s about it, I think.  
— Jeffrey Goldberg, advice columnist

I.  
George Eliot’s novel Felix Holt was published in 1866 — when Prussia’s victory in the German Civil War excluded Austria from the future Germany. Eighteen-sixty-six was also the year when Bismarck decided to use the “revolutionary” idea of universal manhood suffrage for a new, national parliament. He deployed it as a weapon against Austria and against Prussian liberals. Liberals saw universal suffrage in exactly these terms. As one of their newspapers put it in 1867, “Even the vote is a rifle, and ballots are also bullets.” (Abraham Lincoln made a similar remark a decade earlier.) George Eliot viewed the act of voting more cynically. In Felix Holt she wrote, “An election is coming. Universal peace is declared, and the foxes have a sincere interest in prolonging the lives of the poultry.”

Eliot’s bon mot prompts reflection on three open questions that characterize past scholarship on German elections. First, if barnyards and the familiar rhythms of country life had begun to disappear by the last third of the nineteenth century under the impact of modern industrial capitalism, how do we calibrate the speed and direction of socio-economic change, on the one hand, against the speed and direction of political change, on the other? Did social dislocation transform the German electorate more than any single

* This piece originated as a public lecture at the GHI Washington on 12 April 2012 as part of the series “Get Out the Vote! Mobilization, Media, and Money.” I have tried to preserve the tone of that original oral presentation. For the invitation I am indebted to the series organizers David Lazar and Jan Lomberg. A Research Fellowship (2012) from the Jackman Humanities Institute and a Research Grant from the SSRC of Canada provided me time to add the necessary references. For her longstanding support and friendship I dedicate this article to Margaret Lavinia Anderson, whose willingness to trade intentionally provocative reflections, privately and in print, continues to inspire my effort to understand Imperial Germany’s electoral culture.

1 The Atlantic 310, no. 1 (July/August 2012), 148.
3 Volks-Zeitung (Berlin), 30 August 1867.
4 “The ballot is stronger than the bullet.” Abraham Lincoln, speech of 19 May 1856.
event or decision? Assuming for a moment that it did, how best do we gauge the political manifestations of divisions, cleavages, conflicts, and exclusionary practices in rapidly changing societies? To what extent were people’s socioeconomic status and their everyday lives reflected in the choices they made at the polling place? And how do the X-factors of locality and region complicate things? More than three decades ago, when the history of everyday life (Alltagsgeschichte) was just beginning to be taken seriously, the political scientist Peter Steinbach offered a convincing argument about why students of German elections and democratic institutions need to address these questions head-on. “Whereas previously, histories of parties, associations, and elections would jump all too quickly from the social structure of a district to the articulation of politics, research on the history of everyday life offers the opportunity to ... describe more precisely the social structures that are considered primarily as statistical categories ... Even though the much-cited ‘linkage problem’ between social structure and political articulation can be resolved at the empirical level only in the rarest cases, this does not eliminate the [historian’s] duty to recognize that it is a new task of historical-sociological regional history to find a solution.”

Second, if the great questions of modern German history revolve around the Third Reich, Hitler, and the Holocaust, when voting was inconsequential to politics and democracy was on the mat, why should we care about “elections without democracy” in an earlier period? One fragile consensus holds that there are three institutional attributes of democracy: universal male suffrage, an autonomous legislature, and civil liberties. Did these attributes actually characterize Imperial Germany? Even if they did, such a view ignores important elements of Imperial Germany’s political culture, for example the role played by the state and political leaders in defining the choices among which voters had to choose. Historians have done a good job of charting the increasing levels of competition among German political parties during what has been called Europe’s “participation revolution” of the nineteenth century. But they have tended to over-emphasize the role of “populist” outsiders — rascals and others who wanted to get inside the party-political tent — in determining who profited from changes to the system. We need to know more about how anti-democratic leaders and representatives of the authoritarian state worked together at all three tiers of government (national, state, and municipal) to change the rules of the electoral game to their own


advantage. Was the “motor of change” in Germany’s electoral culture driven mainly by mendacious elites operating from above? Or was the “terror of the street” more important, for example when thousands of German citizens called for suffrage reform in mass demonstrations?9 The easy answer is that both kinds of pressure combined to favor change. But the easy answer does not get us very far.

Third: Did either the “red specter” or the “Jewish threat” determine how Germany’s electoral culture was transformed by the processes of democratization? Interrogating the fate of socialists and Jews together forces us to consider the longue durée stretching from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) won more votes in Reichstag elections than any other party from 1890 onwards. By 1912 the SPD fielded the largest caucus in the Reichstag: 110 of 397 seats. It had clearly expanded its base of support beyond Germany’s working classes alone. Even though the party became more reformist and less revolutionary over this period, the SPD was poised to push Germany over the threshold to democracy on the eve of the First World War. Or was it?

Socialists were not the only ones in Germany who suffered persecution, defamation, and political isolation. Other alleged Reichsfeinde did not fit into the national community defined by Bismarck, Hitler, and other anti-democrats. Why consider socialists, Jews, and their enemies together when talking about democracy and efforts to mobilize a changing electorate? Because democracy and voting laws are fundamentally about inclusion and exclusion. In the late 1920s Hitler became the impresario of attacks on Marxists and the Jews that ascribed pariah status — and much worse — to both groups.

I am not suggesting here that Imperial Germany was Nazi Germany in embryonic form.10 Even though the Kaiser chose his own government ministers and had exclusive power to declare war and peace, the Second Reich was not a fascist state or a dictatorship ruled by terror. It was not a state where you could line your enemies up against a wall and mow them down. It was a semi-parliamentary constitutional monarchy, where the rule of law still prevailed (with notable interruptions and exceptions). The Reichstag had the power of the purse and grew more important over time as a sounding board of public opinion. It became a forum for airing demands for participation and grievances against the authoritarian state — something that chancellors and the Kaiser ignored at their peril.


Nevertheless, Hitler was conspicuously unoriginal in targeting Marxists and Jews and profiting at the polls by doing so. The dystopia of a future Germany overrun by “Sozis” and “Semites” — as conservatives put it in the 1880s and as depicted in Max Bewer’s semi-pornographic *Politische Bilderbogen* in the 1890s — was a spectre made frighteningly real not *despite* universal manhood suffrage but because of it. That spectre was not born in 1933 or 1919. It had already become a German nightmare by 1900. This continuity from the nineteenth century to the twentieth is not unique to German history: the concept of Germany’s “special path” to modernity — its *Sonderweg* — cannot explain it. Democrats everywhere pay a terrible price when their enemies become responsive to the masses without wishing to be responsible to the people. However, historians have yet to explain the interconnectedness of three dimensions of German electoral culture before 1918: exclusionary strategies targeting socialists and Jews, efforts to hold back the tide of democracy, and mendacious campaign tactics that successfully turned the weapon of universal manhood suffrage against revolutionaries and reformers. We do not need to invoke the *Sonderweg* to sense that Imperial German elections hold important clues to what went so terribly wrong in the 1920s and 1930s.

II.

What partial answers have scholars provided to pry open these questions of social change, democratic institutions, and continuity? Good history is like a Swiss Army knife: it offers different tools for different situations, rather than only the sharp edge of a blade. Students of German elections have learned a great deal from political scientists and political sociologists in particular: one thinks of Stein Rokkan, M. Rainer Lepsius, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Karl Rohe. Rokkan wrote about the cleavages dividing societies on the cusp of modernity. These included conflicts between center and periphery, between agriculture and industry, between state and church, and between employers and employees. Lepsius asked why the main social-moral milieu that formed in Germany in the 1860s — at the moment that universal manhood suffrage (but not democracy) was introduced — persisted more or less in the same form until the Nazis broke the mold after 1930. Dahrendorf’s “German Question” is almost too familiar to bear repeating: “Why,” he asked, “is it that so few in Germany embraced the principle of liberal democracy?” And Rohe has developed the idea

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cische Bilderbogen 1892-1901* (Norderstedt, 2005); idem, “Zwischen katholischem und völkischem Antisemitismus. Die Bücher, Be


13 M. Rainer Lepsius, *Demokratie in Deutschland. Sozialisch-historische Konstellationsanaly
sen* (Göttingen, 1993).

14 Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (Garden City, NJ, 1967); further reflections on Dahrendorf in James Retallack, “Democra
tization and German Society: Why the Fluchtpunkt of 1933 Still Matters,” unpublished paper read at the Annual Meeting of the German Stud
of political camps (Lager), taking over Lepsius’s thesis about a socialist camp and a Catholic camp but lumping the other milieus into a “nationalist” camp.15

I cite Rohe’s camps as a “partial answer” because the nationalist camp is actually very difficult to find in the historical record. Nonetheless, political historians have always tried to incorporate factors like socioeconomic dislocation and cultural anxiety into their analyses. For example, the émigré historian Hans Rosenberg argued in the 1940s that the “Great Depression” from 1873 to 1896 drove up the anxiety level of the German lower-middle class (petit bourgeoisie or Mittelstand).16 Rosenberg’s thesis was not dissimilar to Richard Hofstadter’s thesis dating from the mid-1960s, about the Paranoid Style in American Politics.17 This lower-middle-class grouping was fractured, in flux, cut loose from its traditional political moorings and susceptible to the siren call of antisemitism. After 1930 its members flocked to the Nazis, who appealed to their real and imagined fears. But it is still not clear whether the idea of Panik im Mittelstand really helps explain Rohe’s nationalist camp or the first wave of racial antisemitism.

A second partial answer highlights the importance of democratization as a social process but remains ambivalent about democracy as a political institution. German and non-German scholars have focused mainly on the latter, as Daniel Ziblatt made clear when he asked, “How did Europe Democratize?”18 A notable ambivalence about these twin aspects of democratization is evident in the best work on Imperial German elections: The Kaiser’s Voters by Jonathan Sperber; Democracy in the Undemocratic State by Brett Fairbairn; and Practicing Democracy by Margaret Lavinia Anderson.19 Sperber is not speaking of citizen-voters, but subject-voters. Fairbairn’s paradoxical title acknowledges the power of social democratization but the persistence of undemocratic state institutions. And Anderson argues that Germans, by practicing democracy with such fervor and dedication before 1918, were actually more ready to make the Weimar Republic a political success than we previously believed.20 Each of these works

16 Hans Rosenberg, “Political and Social

20 See also Stanley Suval, Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (Chapel Hill, NC, 1985).
provides a piece of the interpretive puzzle of Germany’s democratization. Yet that puzzle, even when it is assembled, remains slightly out of focus — rather like a 3-D movie viewed without the right glasses.

These studies have built on a mountain of previous research that tells us how unusual Imperial Germany was in having universal manhood suffrage without a liberal democracy based on the parliamentary system. The broad suffrage provided German Social Democrats the opportunity to develop a modern, mass-based party apparatus at a time when the Reichstag’s prerogatives and ambitions were still uncertain. And the gradual transition from a “politics of notables” (Honoratiorenpolitik) to a “political mass market” frightened those who wanted to protect (as they put it) the established social and political order. Germany in 1914 still did not possess a legislature that determined the make-up of the government or could rein in a powerful military and bureaucracy.

To be sure, one kind of democratization, the Fundamentalpolitisierung of German society, was far advanced. Civil liberties also protected a free vote — usually. But Germany was not a democracy just because the ballot was exercised and the secret ballot was defended. As Tom Stoppard once wrote, “It’s not the voting that’s democracy; it’s the counting.” I don’t mean that corruption precluded a “fair count” in the narrow sense. Instead I mean that the Reichstag, if it was an autonomous legislature, was too autonomous: it didn’t “count” for as much as optimistic historians of the Empire like to think.

Including herself among such optimists, Margaret Lavinia Anderson has argued that in 1866, when Bismarck tossed universal manhood suffrage into his “national omelet” — the one he didn’t want liberals or foreign powers poking their fingers into — only two other countries in Europe had a broader suffrage (Greece after 1844, France after 1852). Almost all other countries had to wait until after 1900 for an equitable franchise. The United States was encumbered by any number of racial and other barriers to fairness, based on states’ rights. And Britain could not boast of democracy after the First, Second, or Third Reform Acts of 1832, 1867, or 1884; it arrived only with the “Fourth” Reform Act of 1918. These assertions are not contentious. I’m much less sure, however, that we should sign on to Anderson’s more provocative claim. Implicitly alluding to Wilhelm Liebknecht’s famous pronunciation that the Reichstag was merely

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the “fig-leaf of absolutism.” Anderson writes that Germany in 1914 was not just “a monarchy with democratic adornments”; rather, it was a “‘democratic' monarchy” — full stop. The inverted commas around “democratic” preserve the modesty of her claim, though only just.

Anderson is the world’s leading scholar on Imperial German elections. She has studied the myriad rules, regulations, and election protests that protected the secret ballot. In the process she has exploded the myth that German voters were frog-marched to the polls by their agrarian landlords, urban employers, and Catholic priests. Anderson’s broader thesis is that those rules and regulations prepared Germans well for democracy after 1918. They ensured that Imperial Germany’s oppositional parties could mobilize their voters and get them to the polls, with little chicanery to prevent them from doing so. Those rules also ensured that every word spoken in the Reichstag could be published in any party’s newspaper the next day: hence even opposition deputies could declare their disdain for the monarchy — even their “hatred for the person of the Kaiser,” as the SPD leader August Bebel did in January 1903. During election campaigns, typically lasting eight weeks or so, there were (still according to Anderson) no restrictions on the media of modern elections: pamphlets, flyers, posters, placards, even the distribution of printed ballots before voting day. All parties had access to new technologies in their campaigning, from the rotary printing press to the slide show to mechanized transportation for party Schlepper who helped bring supporters to the polls. And German civil servants, the police, and the parties’ own scrutineers ensured that graft, bribery, and other forms of what the English call “treating” had no meaningful impact on German elections.

With this evidence Anderson concludes that strict adherence to elaborate rules of electoral procedure provided “the early handholds, the rough crevices in the smooth system of authority, which allowed some groups of voters as early as the 1870s to gain a purchase on the wall of authority.” Both the metaphor and Anderson’s analysis are illuminating. What both fail to convey is that the enemies of democracy did their utmost to fill in those handholds, smooth those crevices, and loosen the grasp of democrats trying to conquer the bastions of authority. They were aided in this task by the harsh political climate of authoritarianism. The many successes scored by democracy’s enemies cast doubt on Anderson’s central conclusion, namely, that

advocates of democracy had successfully turned the weapons of the old order upon itself before 1918. Substantial intimidation and other barriers to a free vote persisted, for Social Democrats above all.

What about other successes scored by the enemies of democracy? Limits of space allow me to cite only one example: the rolling-back of “democratic” voting laws in countless municipal and regional parliaments after 1890. As I have argued elsewhere, in municipal councils and state Landtage across Germany, either unequal suffrage laws were retained or new ones were introduced in order to privilege income, property, education, military service, and age (this list is not exhaustive). Both retrenchment and experimentation with new suffrages were advertised — and accepted by German burghers — as a means to keep socialists out of these parliaments.30 Like a storm lashing our climber from all sides, such anti-democratic practices and strategies increased the slipperiness of the face of the authoritarian state. They weakened the resolve of all but the most resilient adventurers to continue the upward struggle. That this ascent continued at all is of profound historical significance. Without question it deserves our attention. But for precisely that reason, historians should not diminish the durability of obstacles that remained in the path of those for whom we — as small-“D” democrats ourselves — would like to reserve our most enthusiastic cheers.

III.

In this section I would like to offer a case study based on the Reichstag elections of June 1893 in order to make three points. First, democracy’s enemies in Germany hated the style of democratic politics at least as much as they hated its content. Yet, they could not entirely resist new pressures to get “up close and personal” with voters. Second, despite their distrust of “rabble-rousing” campaign tactics, many conservative insiders were just as willing to play the “Jewish card” in 1893 as were their more radical opponents, the independent antisemitic parties. Third, I hope to provide a hint of the look and feel of a contemporary election campaign.

By 1893, three years after Bismarck’s dismissal, the German party system was in upheaval. The right-wing parties Bismarck had successfully manipulated for two decades were in disarray, and “enemies of the Reich” were on the cusp of their remarkable period of growth in the 1890s. The successes of Social Democrats and radical antisemites showed that the older, informal style of politics was in

its death throes; a new, more “in-your-face” style of mass politics seemed to have arrived. “Rabble-rousing” election campaigns and their successes demonstrated how badly Bismarck had miscalculated in 1866 when he gambled that the German masses, peasants and workers, were pliable monarchists and likely to defer to their betters for decades to come. By the 1893 election, the Conservative Party leader Otto von Helldorff-Bedra expressed his disdain for the new, vulgar, racist antisemitism that was penetrating even his own party. Helldorff referred to “the frightful brutalization of public opinion” that was the hallmark of modern campaigning.31

Now, Conservative prejudice against unsavory mass politics and against the Jews was neither new nor exclusively German: Conservatives had long preferred to run in “Riviera constituencies,” where one might issue a short statement in the first week of the campaign and spend the rest of the “contest” relaxing on the south coast of France. Moreover, curmudgeons elsewhere have expressed disdain for the “unwashed” or “uneducated” masses who clamored for attention. One thinks here of the crusty American journalist H.L. Mencken, who liked to refer to the American middle classes as the “booboisie.” Mencken once observed that “Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.”32

To look ahead for a moment to the outcome of the 1893 Reichstag elections, it seemed to be a case of grand larceny. At least that’s how it was seen by Conservative Junkers in the rural, backwoods provinces of Prussia. When the independent antisemites made off with a record high of sixteen Reichstag seats in that election (won with over 250,000 votes or 3.4 percent of the national total), the Junkers cried “foul!” These interlopers had stolen their safe seats. Yet when the Junkers claimed that the independent antisemites promised everything to everybody, the independent antisemites also cried “foul!”

A primer on *How to Win an Election* — actually a letter from Quintus Tullius Cicero to his famous brother Marcus, written in the summer of 64 BC when the latter was vying to become a Roman consul — tells us that the rules of the game had not changed much in two millennia. Quintus gave Marcus the following nuggets of advice: Don’t leave town; call in all favors; build a wide base of support; “promise everything to everybody”; know the weaknesses of your opponents — and exploit them; give people hope; and “flatter voters shamelessly.”33 In 1893, radical antisemites found a lot of traction with voters using the

same methods. They also won a hearing for themselves when they
claimed that the “little man” in Germany was the victim of Jews and
Junkers alike. Conversely, Junkers and other conservatives charged
that the scatter-shot attacks of the antisemites were doing the dirty
work of Social Democrats. “The frightful brutalization of public
opinion,” they argued, was “plowing the furrows” in which socialists
planted the seed of revolution.

One observer (Helmut von Gerlach) who had a foot in both the antise-
mite and Conservative movements, described the rural campaigning
that proved successful around this time for one of the loosest can-
nons in the antisemitic camp, Hermann Ahlwardt. Ahlwardt offered
prospective voters in backwoods Pomerania electoral bait in the form
of lies, flattery, and innuendo: “Along with his secretary, [Ahlwardt]
systematically called on farms, asking each farmer how many acres
of land and how much livestock he owned. Then he turned to the
secretary, who flashed a gigantic notebook, and dictated to him: ‘Take
this down! [Farmer] Gussow owns 30 acres, 5 cows, 4 pigs; he ought
to own: 60 acres, 12 cows, and 10 pigs.’”

With their close ties to the state, the civil service, and the army, main-
stream Conservatives objected to such dishonesty on the hustings.
They liked the tenor — the noise and rough language — of antisemitic
rallies even less. Consider what one high-born Conservative, Baron
Heinrich von Friesen-Rötha, defined as “rowdyism” shortly after he
and other Conservatives lost seats to the independent antisemitic
parties in 1893. In Friesen’s pamphlet entitled Honor the Truth!, it was
virtually impossible to distinguish between the “rabble-rousing” tac-
tics used by Social Democrats and those used by radical antisemites.
Even the beer-bench politics of Pan-Germans, student corps, and
veterans’ associations loomed in his dystopia, which reflected all of
Friesen’s class pretensions and political prejudices:

Rowdyism [der “Radau”] is a singular sport of the unedu-
cated masses ... One shouts, one stamps one’s feet, and
in this way one achieves a certain gymnastic exercise ...
Rowdyism in meetings sets the mob into [a] kind of
drunkenness ...

Whether one has announced that the meeting will exhibit
a calf with six feet or the inevitable “Jew” is completely
irrelevant ...

34 Helmut von Gerlach, Von
rechts nach links (Zurich,
1937), 113f. (emphasis
added).
It is mandatory to greet the speaker with rowdy applause, and even here there is an opportunity to set lungs, hands, feet, and the lids of beer steins into the desired state of motion. A hired group of applauders has to make sure that this movement does not cease. The ... alcoholic atmosphere increase[es] the need to call out and rave. If the word “Jew” is mentioned, then the jubilation has no end ...

Rowdyism is infectious. Soon one demands these kinds of rabble-rousing meetings in every village ... Always new meetings ... The leaders [of the antisemitic movement] soon feel themselves to be the people’s representatives, from whom the governments, in sheer amazement, declare themselves obligated to seek counsel.

One could proclaim this “rowdyism,” in and of itself, to be benign. However, it is a big lie, it relies on deception and breeds deception, and therein resides a danger that cannot be underestimated.35

I have cited these attempts to define what Hitler (after Friesen) called the “big lie” to bring Conservatives and antisemites into the same picture. As David Blackbourn explained long ago, their competition for votes was not merely a challenge-and-response development.36 Rather, it was a spiral of escalating radicalism that continued from the 1890s right up to Hitler’s seizure of power. I cannot chart the longer path that transformed the “traditional” Right into the “radical” Right and then the fascist Right in Germany. But I hope I can illuminate the timing and the trajectory of that path with a few final remarks. I’ll do so with one last example of “demagogic” politics. I want to argue that antisemites did not steal the Conservative vote in 1893 at all. Rather, that election proved there’s no honor among thieves.

Another Conservative big-wig, Dr. Paul Mehnert, delivered a programmatic speech to the Dresden Conservative Association in February 1880 — that is, more than a decade before the Reichstag election I have been describing.37 This address was delivered at the height of the first wave of antisemitic excitement in Germany, after the nationalist historian Heinrich von Treitschke had famously proclaimed “The Jews are our misfortune.”38 Mehnert made the following points: The French Revolution had helped German Jews begin their rise to influence and power. Sweden and Norway severely limited the rights of Jews, whereas Germany had allowed “Semitism” to become a “moneyed

35 Anon. [Heinrich Freiherr von Friesen-Rötha], *Der Wahrheit die Ehre!* (Leipzig, n.d. [1893]), 17-19 (emphasis added), Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Leipzig, Rittergut Rötha mit Trachenau, Nr. 1576, Mappe: Aufzeichnungen und Notizen.
37 Sächsischer Volksfreund, 21 Feb. 1880.
power” in its own right. It was wrong to speak of Jew-baiting any more: “one could better speak of Christian-baiting.” Next Mehnert drew his audience’s attention to an American group called the “Society for the Eradication of the Jews.” After claiming that this “society” sought to relocate all American Jews to Jerusalem, Mehnert cited a resolution it has passed, demanding “the complete extermination of the Jews.” Some gentle jabs at a local antisemitic club in Dresden followed, but Mehnert claimed that its policies merely repeated what the Conservatives had been demanding for years: a stock-exchange tax (meant to hit Jews hard), the demand for cash payments from Jews in business dealings, and other measures to address the “dysfunctional economy” that Bismarck and his liberal supporters — also identified as Jews — had put in place during the 1870s.

During the Reichstag election campaign of 1893, Conservatives in the Kingdom of Saxony offered only variations on this speech Mehnert had delivered thirteen years earlier.39 They acknowledged the “good kernel” in German antisemitism; they reworked age-old myths to sharpen the Conservative message; they coquettied with the specter of physical violence; they blamed the Jews for their “dominance” of the press and public opinion; and they reaffirmed the Conservative Party’s claim to have defended the “rights of Christians” longer and more diligently than any other party, old or new. Conservatives never conceded that their own party was insincere — mendacious. They never conceded that they were insufficiently engaged — unable to mobilize their troops — in the struggle against the Jews. Fresh recruits were needed in the Conservative army. Certainly, “genuine” antisemites were welcome. But “new regiments” were not. So: grand larceny? Stealing the vote? Not quite. From the beginning, the fix was in.

In later elections, German Conservatives drew to their side antisemites who grew disaffected with the rancor and confusion in the independent antisemitic parties. But Conservatives did not moderate their views on the “Jewish question” or scale back their rhetoric on the hustings. Quite the reverse: as Yeats would say, their innocence had been drowned: “The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity.”40 In the Reichstag election campaign of 1893, the independent antisemites won 93,364 votes in Saxony (15.8 percent) compared to just 4,788 votes in 1890. Six antisemites were elected in Saxony, compared to none in 1890. Over the same two elections the Saxon Conservatives saw their own Reichstag


contingent decline from twelve to six. The exact congruency between these gains and losses was more apparent than real. Yet only slight differences of strategy separated the two groups. For “radical” antisemites, the “Jewish question” was one of beguiling simplicity. There was no harm in fighting elections as single-issue parties. For “moderate” Conservatives, the “Jewish question” was fraught with dangerous complexities. But there was no harm in playing the “Jewish card” either.

This example and countless other ones like it show that Conservatives preferred defiance over decorum in targeting German Jews at election time. Their rhetoric was belligerent and clangorous — certainly not aloof and measured, as Baron von Friesen-Rötha would have preferred. It really doesn’t matter when and where Conservatives learned this language. Recent scholarship suggests it was earlier than historians have believed, namely in the years 1855 to 1873. At that time another Conservative antisemite, Hermann Wagener, taught his party comrades to “get out the vote” — also to recruit new members and to sell newspapers — by making scapegoats of Jews, even though German liberalism was on the rise. Regional particularities determined the success of such strategies at the subnational level, as I have argued elsewhere. The more important point is that both groups, “radical” antisemites and “moderate” Conservatives, identified feckless liberalism and dysfunctional “democracy” as their chief enemies in the 1890s as in the 1860s. Jew-baiting provided the bridge that brought these two groups together — so closely together that they became virtually indistinguishable.

IV.

In conclusion, what is the benefit of posing open questions, reviewing tentative answers, and applying the case-study approach to elections in Imperial Germany? First, I have tried to suggest that as a transatlantic and a global phenomenon, democracy was not a single river that kept adding new tributaries through history as it flowed to the blue sea we call “modernity.” At the dawn of the twentieth century, democracy’s tributaries were still distinct. Some of them trickled into nothing or went over a cliff. But almost all of them were contentious — attacked or defended by statesmen, party leaders, functionaries, and ordinary voters who all had different views on the ultimate purpose of voting (and counting votes). Nevertheless, by
1914 most Europeans had accomplished a significant expansion of their national electorate. That expansion in turn was based on the premise that elections served a worthwhile transmissive function, funnelling pressures upwards from society and downwards from the state. Those pressures were always ultimately about power, and as in military conflicts, power usually rested with those who had the biggest armies. If “ballots are also bullets,” democracy could not be resisted on a world-historical scale.

Second, I have argued that the secret ballot and a free vote did not necessarily mean a fair or equal vote. The principle of “one man, one vote” had a powerful appeal to contemporaries, as it has to historians. But that principle was always fraught with complexities, many of which favored democracy’s enemies. Contemporaries were aware of this. In 1900, the left-liberal politician Friedrich Naumann referred to the Conservatives as “authoritarian types with democratic gloves.”

Conservatives and other opponents of democracy were not always imbued with a meanness of spirit or a willingness to pander to the lowest common denominator. However, often they were — particularly when they declared that socialists and Jews presented a clear and present danger to the homogenous, Christian, national community of their ideal.

Third, in Germany, as elsewhere, bumpy and potentially reversible transitions to democracy unfolded in the context of local, regional, national, and transnational conversations about inclusion, exclusion, and political fairness. Who belonged to the political nation? Which “cautionary measures” were compatible with what Thomas Jefferson called “the decent opinion of mankind”? What bulwarks against democracy could ensure that “enemies of the Reich” would not overturn the political status quo or overthrow the authoritarian state? (Tellingly, contemporary references to “revolution” often used the term Umsturz.) If the rules of the game could be changed, what oversight could be exerted, from below and from above, to make sure that neither side could game the system with unpredictable ramifications and irreversible consequences?

In this context — where a political culture was slowly abandoning ingrained traditions but accommodating new conflicts fitfully or reluctantly — Elmer Eric Schattschneider’s observations about a “semi-sovereign people” are germane. “Political conflict,” he wrote in 1960, “is not like a football game, played on a measured field by a fixed number of players in the presence of an audience scrupulously

44 Friedrich Naumann, Demokratie und Kaisertum (Berlin, 1900), 92ff.
excluded from the playing field. Politics is much more like the original primitive game of football in which everybody was free to join, a game in which the whole population of one town play the entire population of another town moving freely back and forth across the countryside.”

Politics is rough business, especially when players and the crowd come into such close proximity. The analogy is not water-tight, but Schattschneider’s idea of opposing teams (and their supporters) roaming freely back and forth across the political landscape calls to mind groups of people studied by historians of another era in German history. Electoral politics, too, has its victims, bystanders, and perpetrators. In the high-stakes contests that unfolded with mounting ferocity after 1890, mobilizing electoral support at whatever cost meant that fewer and fewer unsavory tactics were declared out of bounds.

In the decades before 1914, the advocates of reform and the advocates of retrenchment were not equally matched, but neither side was willing to cede the field to the other. We cannot say what would have lain in Germany’s future if the First World War had not intervened: a liberal democracy was only one of many possible outcomes. Germans before 1914 had many opportunities to undertake significant constitutional reform. In most cases they side-stepped them. In 1908 they refused to censor the impetuous Kaiser in any meaningful way, even after he called the British “mad, mad, mad as March hares.” In 1910 they refused to abolish the notorious three-class suffrage in Prussia. And they never significantly reformed the upper houses of parliament at the national and most state levels, even after the British showed the way by clipping the tail-feathers of the House of Lords.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that conservative enemies of democracy could have inaugurated anything resembling the Third Reich absent the horror of the First World War. More plausibly they would have

46 Elmer Eric Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America (New York, 1960), 18. He also draws a distinction between “the idea that the people are involved in politics by the contagion of conflict” and the “classical definition of democracy as ‘government by the people’” (129).


embraced a kind of pragmatic, reformist conservatism — because no other option was available. G.K. Chesterton suggested as much in his work *Orthodoxy* (1908). His words underscore the ambiguities inherent in German transitions to democracy. They also suggest why the traditional Right’s prospects at the polls were growing dimmer in a democratizing age. In a chapter titled “The Eternal Revolution,” Chesterton wrote: “All conservatism is based upon the idea that if you leave things alone you leave them as they are. But you do not. If you leave a thing alone you leave it to a torrent of change.”

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DISAPPOINTED HOPES FOR SPONTANEOUS MASS CONVERSIONS: GERMAN RESPONSES TO ALLIED ATROCITY FILM SCREENINGS, 1945-46

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Several hundred thousand Germans viewed an Allied atrocity film in the year after the Second World War had come to an end. By “atrocity film,” I mean one of the documentaries the Americans, Soviets, British, and French compiled from the footage that their army cameramen had shot during, or shortly after, the liberation of German death, concentration, and forced labor camps between July 1944 and May 1945. According to the results of my study, ten different such documentaries were shown to German audiences: four were American, three Soviet, two British, and one was a French film. At first, the Allies had planned to gather filmic documentation of German atrocities as evidence for Nazi war crime trials. And, in fact, the two most comprehensive documentaries at the time were those that the American and Soviet prosecution teams put together for the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (iMT) at Nuremberg. But when, during their advance through Germany in the spring of 1945, the Allied forces came across an unexpectedly large number of camps and subcamps, at which fleeing SS personnel had left behind countless unburied corpses and survivors in the most wretched condition, the military staffs decided without much discussion that not only German war criminals, but the world in general and the German population in particular should be confronted with the shocking visual evidence of German atrocities. Most people in the Allied countries had not taken the reports and rumors of systematic mass murder in German-occupied Europe seriously enough. Now it turned out that the news they had either heard or read had not been exaggerated, as many had preferred to believe: on the contrary, the crimes far exceeded human imagination. Photographs and film footage from the scenes of the crimes were to dispel, for everybody and for all time, any remaining doubts and elicit empathy for the victims that words had failed to evoke. Even more was at stake with German audiences: many Germans had lived in close proximity to camps or subcamps and had not been too concerned, it seemed, about the wrongs that were happening more or less in their midst. That they now claimed “not to have known” most Allied occupiers found hard to believe. The Allies therefore used their atrocity films

1 This article provides a summary of my recent book Beschämende Bilder: Deutsche Reaktionen auf alliierte Dokumentarfilme über befreite Konzentrationslager (Stuttgart, 2012).
not only to enlighten Germans but, and this is my central thesis, also to shame them.

Seldom before or afterwards have film viewers been as intensely observed, listened on, questioned, surveyed, and evaluated as were the Germans to whom the Allies showed their atrocity films. The 21 defendants of the IMT trial at Nuremberg saw the American and Soviet prosecutors’ films under the attentive gaze of the international representatives of the press gathered in the courtroom; in many American and British POW camps, German prisoners of war were asked to give verbal or written comments after being forced to watch an atrocity film; and, in their zone of occupation, the American military government made the film Die Todesmühlen an essential part of their re-education program and employed social scientists to collect and interpret viewers’ reactions. The resulting set of unusually rich and varied primary sources on audience reception forms the basis of my analysis. Contrary to recent studies on collective memory, which have searched for common denominators in postwar Germans’ thought and silence about Nazi crimes, I am interested in the diversity of historical utterances on this subject. In particular, I seek to reconstruct the concrete conditions of film reception at the various screenings; I closely inspect the wide spectrum of extant responses; I interpret their wording; and I pay particular attention to the types of reports in which each of these responses has come down to us. The last point may sound like a matter of course. It is surprising, however, to what degree the rules of historical Quellenkritik have sometimes been neglected when it comes to morally sensitive questions like what Germans knew about Nazi mass murder and how they grappled with their disturbing past after the war.

Both contemporaries and historians of postwar Germany have treated German reactions to Allied atrocity films in the first postwar months as a kind of litmus test for Germans’ willingness to confront their Nazi past and even as indicators of the success or failure of so-called German Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Already at the time, some commentators were pessimistic, but especially in the academic literature one regularly finds the thesis that re-education via visual documentation of the liberated camps failed. The reason why scholars have adopted this thesis of Brewster Chamberlin’s, who first voiced it in regard to the effects of Todesmühlen — rather than examining the primary sources — seems to be that the failure thesis fits neatly into the familiar picture of postwar Germans repressing their past, keeping silent about what they

had done, indignantly rejecting the slightest hint of “collective guilt,” and showing no interest in the victims of German policies. Before I summarize what I found in the sources and how I interpreted it, let me advance my own hypothesis, which I cannot prove but find most plausible. I submit that the widespread readiness to find the effects of atrocity film screenings in postwar Germany disappointing is the result of exceedingly high hopes. After so much shameful indifference in the previous years, one wanted to see spontaneous conversions of viewers en masse. Confrontation with an atrocity film was to be a “road to Damascus” that converted as many Sauls as possible into Pauls, even if such radical turnarounds were more the stuff of legends than everyday life or, at least, needed a much longer process of reorientation.

I.

In his feature film *Verboten!* of 1959, the American director Samuel Fuller created a telling picture of just such an on-the-spot conversion, which can raise our awareness of what in reality did not happen or, at least, could not be detected. As a member of the 1st Infantry Division, Fuller participated in the liberation of a satellite camp of the concentration camp Flossenbürg. His commander forced twenty of the town’s leading citizens to clothe all of the naked corpses found in the camp in shirts and pants commandeered from the townspeople and then to wrap them in white bedsheets and bury them. Fuller’s footage of this can be viewed in the documentary *Falkenau, vision de l’impossible* of 1988.3 In hindsight, Fuller was certain that the Germans at Falkenau had learned their lesson. In a dramatic sequence of his 1980 autobiographical war movie, *The Big Red One*, Fuller reenacted his own feelings and those of his comrades during the camp’s liberation. However, his earlier film *Verboten!* tells an entirely fictitious story. During the capture, with heavy American losses, of a provincial Bavarian town faithful to Nazism to the very end, a young GI, David Brent, falls in love with former “Blitzmädel” Helga Schiller, who dresses his wounds, and soon afterwards marries her despite the fraternization ban. The audience knows more than naive, good-natured David does, namely, that Helga deceived the denazification office about her Bund Deutscher Mädel (BDM) career and marries David solely out of materialistic calculation. Nevertheless, Helga appears to turn away from Nazism as her affection for David grows. In any case, she is appalled to find out that her younger brother Franz belongs to a Werewolf gang, whose cynical leader Bruno sends its members out to steal and orders them to lynch

alleged traitors. Franz defends the gang as working “for Hitler” and refuses to believe his sister when she tells him that Germans were the first to be thrown into concentration camps. Franz aggressively protests that she is lying: only Jews, Poles, and “all the other enemies who started the war” were locked up in camps. So, Helga makes a pact with Franz: if she fails to prove to him that the Hitler regime was criminal, she will join him in his fight against the American occupiers. To present him with irrefutable evidence, she takes Franz to the Nuremberg trial. We see the siblings pass a guard and sit down in benches that — appropriate for the conversion that is supposed to occur — resemble pews.

By including historical courtroom footage of the Nuremberg trial as well as excerpts from various films that were actually shown there, the director has Franz catch sight of Göring and the other defendants, listen to U.S. Chief Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson’s opening statement including his announcement that the Nazis’ “own films” will be shown, and then watch Hitler, marching SA and Hitler Youth, scenes of persecution, miserable camp inmates, a gas chamber, and piles of corpses on the screen. The combination of Jackson’s announcement with this montage of footage of different origins clearly gives Franz — and the viewers of Verboten! — the impression that these pictures of the camps were taken not by the liberating Allies, which actually was the case, but by the Nazis, who had shamelessly documented even their worst crimes on film.4 In line with Helga’s argument, the narrator of the atrocity film within the film first stresses the German victims of Nazi rule: anti-Nazis, the mentally ill, the handicapped, Protestants, and Catholics. We then watch defiant, unbelieving Franz getting nervous and starting to sweat as his facial expressions become more and more desperate. When the prosecutors’ film quotes Nazi leaders, Franz sees, in his mind’s eye, Bruno making the same brutal statements about enemies that must die and proclaiming hate as the new religion for Werewolf gang members. The narrator of the film within the film continues that probably the greatest crime against humanity is what the Nazis did to the Jews.5 As children tattooed with numbers, fake shower heads, and heaps of gold teeth appear on the screen, Franz breaks down and turns his face away in despair. Helga grabs his head and admonishes him to look, together with her, at what “the whole world should see.” Franz is crying now. He can barely speak. “I did not know,” he stammers repeatedly. But Franz does not stop at this claim, which was heard so frequently in the immediate postwar period that Margaret Bourke-White sarcastically called it “a kind of national chant for Germany.”6

4 This was not the case. Photographing and filming in the death and concentration camps was strictly prohibited and the camp personnel seems to have complied. The only film footage from the time of the camps’ operation was shot in Theresienstadt and Westerbork for propaganda films that were to deceive their audiences about the camps purpose and conditions. See Weckel, Beschämende Bilder, 62-65.

5 In this regard, the atrocity film in Verboten? “corrected” the actual ones, which mentioned the murder of the European Jews more in passing. See my discussion of the possible reasons in Beschämende Bilder, 181-186.

running that very evening to betray the Werewolf gang to David who, as a member of the military government, immediately breaks it up.

This textbook conversion was unrealistic in many respects. First, very few ordinary Germans were granted access as spectators to the Nuremberg proceedings, and there was never a courtroom session that combined Jackson’s opening statement with such a mixture of films, which were actually shown over the course of several weeks. Second, when Germans felt obliged or forced to watch atrocity films, the pressure was not exercised by a trusted loved one but by the Allies, whom many still perceived as the enemy. Third, what went on in viewers’ minds hardly ever showed so unambiguously on their faces nor could it be spotted so clearly by observers as in the close-ups of Franz’s face. And, finally, on top of everything else, Franz gets the opportunity to prove his conversion by giving up his fight against the occupation forces and handing his fanatical former comrades over to the new authorities.

In real life, denazification hardly ever came about so straightforwardly. As a rule, the screenings of atrocity films did not trigger unequivocal signs of inner change. At best, one could inquire whether viewers believed that what they saw in a film was true. The fact that a broad majority regularly answered in the affirmative confirms that Germans had either known of or at least suspected the crimes or, in any case, considered the Nazi regime capable of them. However, the films’ other effects were difficult to assess. If the images were supposed to shame German viewers, then what showed that a viewer did, or did not, feel shame? Shame is a feeling of embarrassment that uncontrollably arises in human beings when they are caught in the — sometimes unintentional — act of violating a norm which they generally (even if not in that moment) share. An individual feels shame bodily, but whether he or she also evinces the visible reactions indicative of shame — blushing, lowering of the head, avoiding looking others in the eye — is less certain and mostly a matter of observers’ interpretations. On the other hand, even an explicit public avowal that one is feeling shame does not necessarily make for more credibility. I would like to demonstrate the problem by introducing the three case studies I undertook in my book.

II.

When the American prosecution at the IMT trial presented their film Nordic Concentration Camps on the eighth day of the proceedings,
commentators focused their attention more on the defendants’ reactions than on the film. There are some hints that suggest that the prosecutors had indeed intended to offer the international journalists crowding the press gallery something that they could turn into good stories. Chief Prosecutor Jackson had successfully established his strategy of basing the prosecution first and foremost on the Nazis’ own documents and relying less on witness accounts, which would have appealed to the public much more. The long-winded readings from dry treaties, laws, and memos had already resulted in the first mocking articles. While hardly anyone doubted that the 21 indicted major war criminals bore significant guilt, all of the defendants had pleaded “not guilty” at the opening of the trial without the slightest indication of an awareness of wrongdoing. To be sure, nobody expected that the screening of an atrocity film would lead any of them to cave in and confess. Rather, most of the correspondents present sought to catch a glimpse of someone in the dock feeling shame at least at the moment when the disgraceful consequences of their deeds were revealed for all the world to see.

In order to allow, theoretically, for such a glimpse during the screening when the lights would be switched off, neon tubes were fixed to the dock’s balustrade the night before. Practically, however, the set-up did not work out. Reading through the reports on the film screening in the international press and the diaries and memoirs of participants in the trial, one finds similar descriptions of defendants’ reactions, but the reactions are ascribed to different individuals. Several commentators claimed to have detected hidden tears — some “detected” them in Walther Funk’s eyes, others in Hans Frank’s, and still others in the eyes of somebody else. Various explanations were offered for why this or that defendant had used his handkerchief. Lowered and raised heads were commented upon; some wanted to know whose hands had trembled and who had clenched his fists or grit his teeth. Only one reaction, an ostentatious gesture, was widely reported and interpreted by most in the same way: ex-Reichsbankpresident Hjalmar Schacht had turned his back to the screen throughout the hour-long film in order to express that shaming him, whom Hitler had arrested after July 20, 1944 and interned in a concentration camp, was inappropriate.

A detailed analysis of the reports about the effects of the film Nazi Concentration Camps on the defendants thus reveals how wide the room for observers’ interpretation was, the degree to which observers

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7 Rebecca West would later coin the famous bon mot of Nuremberg as “a citadel of boredom.” in A Train of Powder (New York, 1955), 3. The film about camps liberated by the Western Allies did not fit into the Americans’ presentation of proofs of a “conspiracy” to commit crimes against the peace. The prosecutors interrupted their documentation of the German chain of breaches of international treaties between the annexation of Austria and the destruction of Czechoslovakia.

8 This term from the London Charter went back to the 1943 Moscow Declaration that had announced the intention of the Allied leaders to punish all those Germans whose criminal offenses had no particular geographical localization by joint decision of the Allies, while all other German war criminals would be sent back to the countries where they had committed their crimes so that they could be judged by the people they had outraged.
were influenced by what they hoped for and what they knew about each defendant, and the ways in which authors turned what they observed or guessed into stories with a punchline. In Nuremberg, many apparently hoped that the defendants would be shamed, and most commentators came to the conclusion that the American film had indeed succeeded in this, while a small minority of commentators inferred that the defendants had proven themselves even more unscrupulous and brazen than expected. Presumably, the wish to shame the indicted major war criminals was so widespread because it was thought that no punishment would be severe enough to fit the crimes in question. A telling variation of this theme can be found in the trial’s press coverage when, two and a half months later, the Soviet prosecutors screened their *Film Documents of the Atrocities by the German Fascist Aggressors in the USSR* in the courtroom. This time, the film fit the presentation of evidence, and commentators focused more on its content than on its effects on the defendants. One East German correspondent, however, who was certain of the defendants’ guilt and shamelessness, claimed to have noticed that they had shown signs of acute fear during the film screening — fear, he speculated, of their certain death sentences. Juridical sentencing alone apparently did not provide enough satisfaction.

III.

The only target group of the Allied atrocity films about whose reactions we have a large number of first-hand records is German prisoners of war. In the summer of 1945, all POWs held in British or American captivity outside of the European continent were forced to view the twenty-minute film *KZ*. Immediately afterwards, many expressed their feelings in writing while others were questioned by their German camp leaders, who then sent summaries to the Allied commandants. This means that we can almost listen to POWs coming to terms with the overwhelming pictures before others started to interpret viewers’ reactions. German POWs are an especially informative group for other reasons as well. On the one hand, they were heterogeneous in regard to their personal war experiences, the dates of their capture, their knowledge of the further course of the war, and their political views. On the other hand, they all found themselves together in the hands of the (former) enemy, who now ordered them to attend a film screening and guarded, monitored, and questioned them about their responses.
The resulting primary sources have allowed me to reconstruct a surprisingly broad spectrum of responses — surprising, that is, only if one assumes there could be only one reaction to such gruesome images or, rather, two — one right and one wrong — without acknowledging the variation among individuals’ dispositions. When I classify the documented responses and arrange them along a scale, this scale reaches from approval and justification of the crimes through dismissals of the film as “propaganda” and relativizing references to Allied war crimes to articulations of dismay and fury with the Nazis, the SS, Himmler, or Hitler, avowals of shame, discarding Nazi emblems, and, finally, collective burnings of uniforms and commemoration ceremonies for the victims. Responses at the two extremes were rare. Very few POWs seem to have defended the Nazi crimes, and when they did, they appear to have wanted primarily to provoke their captors. Equally, demonstrations of support and empathy for the victims were exceptional, but when they occurred they were usually carried out by groups who sometimes mobilized other groups. The dramatic enactment of one’s break with the Nazi regime by burning one’s uniform is also only infrequently reported; however, this may count as the one unmistakable indicator of radical change.

Since responses are often ambiguous, not much insight is gained by merely classifying them. Take, for example, the frequently articulated reservation that an atrocity film was Allied propaganda, which could be based on quite varied considerations. By “propaganda” a critic could mean that the film was faked altogether, that the dead shown in the film had not died in concentration camps but had been killed in Allied air raids on German cities. A small number of POWs did indeed voice this charge while others wanted at least to cast doubt on the origins of the corpses. Much more frequently, however, those who used the word “propaganda” did not question the atrocity film in principle but reckoned that the filmakers had exaggerated. (Laughs were reported, in particular, at the film narrator’s claim that there had been 300 Nazi camps and at the mention of lampshades made of human skin.9) Some who made the “propaganda” charge argued that the film showed only the chaos of the last weeks of the war; others complained about onesidedness and the film’s silence in regard to Allied war crimes; yet others meant to suggest nothing more than the undeniable fact that the Allies pursued a policy in showing them the atrocity film, namely, to impress and reeducate the film’s German viewers. It was, of course, true that the Allied footage, inevitably, showed conditions in the very last stage of the camps, most of which

9 This rumor played a crucial role in the trials against Ilse Koch, the Buchenwald commandant’s wife, whom camp inmates had accused of having owned such a lamp and even having ordered tattooed prisoners whose skin she was interested in killed. Such a lampshade made of human skin, however, was in fact never found.
had not been death camps but had become dumping grounds for the thousands of sick and starving evacuees from camps further east. My impression is that it was exactly this ambiguity of the qualification “propaganda” that made this reservation so attractive for Germans. It helped to keep the nightmarish images at bay without needing to articulate what it was precisely that one doubted.

Expressions of harsh criticism of the Nazis are also open to interpretation. With such criticism, a film viewer could express an anti-fascist conviction, articulate his disillusionment, distance himself from the regime, find an outlet for his distress, or follow a strategy of exonerating himself. In order to assess such expressions correctly and to evaluate to what extent they were triggered by the atrocity film, one would have to know what a POW thought about National Socialism before the film screening. Explicit anti-fascist statements, for example, were probably not effects of the film but the result of long-harbored political sentiments. Especially when POWs used political catchwords or slogans from the socialist or communist parties, we can assume that they had already despised the Nazis before the screening and only took the film to confirm the worst of their expectations. Expressions or signs of personal grief, on the other hand, are much less open to interpretation if they occurred in convinced supporters of Nazism, who had illusions to lose through the film viewing, so that such expressions can be more confidently taken as evidence of the film’s effectiveness. This is something the guards don’t seem to have realized when they voiced their surprise at noticing tears mostly in the cages for those POWs who were labeled “black” meaning “fanatical Nazi.” (“Grey” was the label for apolitical men and “white” was for Nazi opponents.)

POW sources are also especially informative because POWs usually stayed together as a group in the weeks after the screening, which meant that they talked about the film more, and for a longer duration, than all of the films’ other German viewers. A few primary sources offer some insights into these group dynamics. According to such sources, vociferous opinion leaders who talked about the film’s alleged lies and exaggerations could get uncertain comrades on their side during and immediately after a screening. But this does not seem to have lasted very long. As newspapers and radio programs revealed more Nazi crimes in the following weeks, and as some POWs started to speak about their personal experiences with such crimes, be it as perpetrators, bystanders, or former concentration
camp inmates, it became more and more difficult for the die-hards to resist the truth. Therefore, it seems that in many POW camps the atrocity film screenings significantly contributed to a process in which the long predominant Nazis and staunch nationalists lost followers and influence, while antifascists and democrats, many of whom had kept a low profile out of fear of peer punishment (Feme), gained increasing authority.

IV.

After indicted German war criminals and POWs, the third target group of Allied atrocity films was the civilian population in occupied Germany. All four military governments organized screenings in their zones of occupation, but the Americans made by far the greatest efforts to reach large audiences, and they were the only ones who systematically studied audience reception. In this summary of the results of my extended study, I am going to concentrate on the screenings of Die Todesmühlen, probably the best-known atrocity film, in the American zone between January and March 1946. These are the screenings on which the prevalent thesis, mentioned earlier, of the failure of Allied reeducation through atrocity films is usually based. Before I suggest a different reading of the film’s effects, however, another legend needs to be dispelled. Although in later recollections many Germans claimed that the occupiers had compelled them to watch a film on concentration camps, mandatory attendance was actually a rare exception. If atrocity films were shown in their proximity at all (and they were shown in very few places in the other three zones), people could usually decide for themselves whether to see them or not. The widely “recalled” measure of food ration cards being stamped at the box offices had, indeed, been considered by the British and the Americans, but the British never finished their atrocity film, and the Americans, after brief discussion, decided against enforcement measures. Interestingly, however, the thought of Allied compulsion seems to have suggested itself to many Germans in 1946. A small number of local authorities in the American zone announced on their own that attendance would be mandatory in their jurisdictions, but OMGUS immediately canceled such unauthorized directives once they came to its attention. Nevertheless some movie-goers, especially former members of the Nazi Party, brought their ration cards to theaters and insisted on having them stamped as they were convinced that, even if attendance was not mandatory at present, it would be later. Also, many Germans actually demanded that former Nazi party members
be forced to attend a screening (but this never happened). Since very few civilians in postwar Germany actually ever had to watch an atrocity film,\(^{10}\) it is telling that so many added the imagined enforcement to their memories. This widespread false recollection shows how common the preference for representing oneself as a victim of the occupiers rather than as an open-minded, repentant movie-goer was; but it also shows that the degree to which postwar Germans took their attendance to be voluntary rested on subjective interpretation.

Although the Americans deliberately abstained from any policy of compulsory attendance they still intended the viewing of Todesmühlen to appear as the proper thing to do. They therefore produced the unusually high number of 114 prints of the film and organized the screenings in such a way that all of the reopened movie-theaters in each of the zone’s three military districts showed the atrocity film in the same week so that movie-goers of that district had no alternatives that week. (Only in Berlin’s American sector was the situation different as movie-goers could cross the sector’s border to visit other theaters.) In addition, theater owners were obliged to screen Todesmühlen only in combination with the British-American newsreel Welt im Film and a serious documentary but under no circumstances with a feature film. In comparison with the feature film programs, which by then had again become usual (and even included German feature films from the Nazi era that had been declared politically harmless), the atrocity film screenings in early 1946 clearly stood out as a reeducation measure. One can well imagine that such an obvious attempt at reeducating residents evoked the idea that attendance was a moral obligation. Several journalists of the licensed German press pointed out that this moral obligation was all the greater precisely because the military government did not order Germans to see the film. Because viewing was voluntary, the turnout at theaters could be interpreted as an indicator of the locals’ readiness to confront their Nazi past. Thus, German journalists pushing for attendance promised, in addition to a personal catharsis, a gain in national reputation if sizable numbers of movie-goers showed up. Also teachers, employers, and other authority figures might well have exerted pressure to attend so that in retrospect many movie-goers would not recall their attendance as voluntary.

As mentioned earlier, the primary sources on audiences’ reception of Todesmühlen hardly ever convey viewers’ responses in their own words. Rather, we have documents from social scientists, journalists, and

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\(^{10}\) In the American zone, these were the residents of those places, where the unauthorized enforcement of attendance could not be called off in time. This is known of Bad Kissingen but might have been the case in one or two other places as well.
other observers who reported, interpreted, and evaluated what they found. Their reports depended, of course, on the specific screenings they attended, the sample of interviewees they polled, their prior expectations of viewers, and the intended audience for their reports. Accounts describing the atmosphere in the movie theater, for example, regularly came to more positive conclusions when American intelligence officers were reporting to their superiors than when German journalists were writing for their fellow countrymen. The American intelligence officers had evidently feared protests and walk-outs and were therefore relieved when neither occurred. Moreover, when some of them, posing as German movie-goers, heckled the film as Allied propaganda, audience members shushed them up or lectured them that the film showed the truth. In light of their experiences in the movie theaters, most intelligence experts therefore interpreted silence at the moment when the film ended as a sign of shame and dismay. German journalists, by contrast, having promised catharsis and looking to witness spontaneous conversions, tended to be disappointed as their disillusioned reporting shows. We can assume, however, that German journalists also intended their supposed quotations of banal or inappropriate comments by Germans leaving the theater as admonishments to their readers to behave differently. Finally, another reason for German journalists’ more negative coverage may have been that they wanted to recommend themselves as demanding reeducators to the military government.

Military intelligence’s main device for opinion research was the anonymous multiple-choice questionnaire, which was handed out at random to viewers at some screenings. Three different surveys of this kind can be found in the archives — not the completed questionnaires themselves but only their analyses. The historical literature has focused on the fact that two of these surveys included a question about whether or not the viewer felt, in the one case collectively, and in the other personally, guilty for the crimes documented in the film. That a significant majority answered the question in the negative in both cases is the basis for most authors’ thesis that Die Todesmühlen failed as an attempt at reeducation. And here the carelessness in the analysis of sources becomes striking. Regardless of how probable it is, psychologically, that immediately after exposure to disturbing images someone would confess guilt for the underlying crimes, I want to argue that the readiness to confess guilt is a badly chosen criterion for assessing the pedagogical success or failure of atrocity films. This point is confirmed by the two surveys in question, which differ in almost every way except for the relatively high percentage of
respondants who denied feelings of guilt. In Eichstätt an American captain found the turnout during *Todesmühlen*’s seven-day run too small and therefore scheduled extra screenings and demanded that all public employees attend one if they had not yet seen the film. At 14%, the return of completed questionnaires in Eichstätt was very low, and among those who did respond, the number who gave snotty answers or deliberately misunderstood awkwardly phrased questions was high. In Berlin, by contrast, where nobody was officially pressured to attend a screening, participation in the survey was much higher, and 90% of respondants answered that *Todesmühlen* should be shown to all Germans. In other words, although in both Eichstätt and Berlin large majorities denied feeling personally or collectively guilty for Nazi crimes, those two majorities gave widely divergent responses to all of the other questions. This finding fits the picture of other sources which show that Germans in 1945-46 rejected any suggestion of “collective guilt” even if nobody explicitly reproached them for it. In Eichstätt, where the questionnaire asked about feelings of *personal* guilt, several respondants noted that there was no such thing as *collective* guilt. The word “guilt” seems to have triggered a kind of reflex or hypersensitivity — hearing and rejecting an accusation even where none was lodged, and, more specifically, hearing it in its least convincing form, namely as a collective charge, in order to reject it the more soundly. But this means that interviewees’ denial of guilt feelings in post-screening surveys can be explained in terms of social psychology, so that such responses do not have much to do with the film and hence cannot be used to judge its effectiveness.

Concentrating exclusively on responses to sensitive questions about guilt obscures the diversity in political attitudes that responses to other questions reveal. This diversity led to the same wide spectrum of reactions to the atrocity films in the civilian population as it did with the POWs. The only difference is that the POWs’ collective responses, like burning Nazi insignia or collecting money for the victims of Nazi crimes, did not occur among civilians. This might well be due to the fact that the civilian population gathered more anonymously in the cinemas and could therefore more easily avoid subsequent communication about what they had seen than the POWs confined in their camps.

V.

It is telling that the data from which I was able to reconstruct the variety of responses consists primarily of the reports of social scientists

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who were used to dealing with diversity and thus prepared to discover it — and who therefore did not measure success or failure with a single indicator. Those observers and commentators, on the other hand, who essentially pursued moral or political goals with their reports on viewers’ responses tended to polarize matters, focusing solely on what they portrayed as morally right and wrong reactions and quantifying them. Following suit, most historians have paid attention only to the single detail that a majority of surveyed viewers denied feelings of guilt. The failure thesis drawn from this fits so well into the well-known picture of a deficient German Vergangenheitsbewältigung that nobody inquired into the other responses that were collected in 1945-46. But it is only if we look at the whole range of reactions and correlate them with the different conditions of film viewing that we can analyze under which conditions certain reactions became more likely than others. This type of analysis will not answer the question whether the screenings of the atrocity films succeeded or failed, but this question may be wrongly posed in the first place.

In my book, I have recommended leaving aside the heated and somewhat muddled debate on Germans’ guilt and examining the responses to atrocity films in light of the fact that the pictures were shameful and that the Allies used their films to shame Germans. As I have explained earlier, there are no unambiguous indicators of shame. There is, however, a clear indicator of someone’s immunity to shaming: A person who proudly justified the crimes that the films documented was not ashamed of them or at least wanted to demonstrate that he or she could not be shamed. But this hardly ever happened. None of the Nuremberg defendants, not even Göring, boasted about the mass murder in the camps; rather, they denied knowing about it. However unconvincing, such denials suggest that the person considered not only the Nazi crimes shameful but also knowledge of them at the time they occurred. If we look at it this way, we find that nearly all German film viewers in 1945-46 were to some degree receptive to feelings of shame and being shamed. In this respect, the screenings were very effective. Yet, my study also shows that with shame, as necessary and appropriate as this feeling may appear, not much was achieved. People who feel shame usually prefer not to talk about its source or about the process of coming to terms with it. Therefore, the atrocity films were no miracle weapon of instant reeducation. Many more initiatives and discussions had to follow. And, finally, actively and publicly shaming viewers did not increase the films’ effectiveness. On the contrary, shaming offered
viewers the loophole of shifting attention away from their own moral failure to the question of whether the people who tried to shame them had the right to do so. This loophole was used by many Germans. Their reservation that the atrocity films were Allied propaganda because they did not address Allied war crimes served the purpose of undermining the Allies’ moral authority. Whether this strategy was effective at keeping the disturbing pictures at bay remains a private matter on which the historian can shed little light.

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The second generation: what a heterogeneous crowd! Some became historians of modern Germany, some did not. Some hated Germany, some did not. Some identified as Jews, some did not. Some were on the left, some were not. Some spent the war years in the United States, some did not. Some began their careers as historians of Germany, some did not. Some wrote directly on the Holocaust, some did not. Can we say anything meaningful about these historians as a group? Let me try. My remarks, though, are limited to historians of modern Germany, broadly conceived.

What characterizes the second generation? A second generation refugee historian was born in Germany or what became Nazi-occupied Europe; he or she left due to Nazi persecution or opposition to the Third Reich; and he or she had his or her college and graduate education in the United States. These criteria are significant: they mean that these individuals came to the United States as children, adolescents, or young adults. Emigration and subsequent Americanization occurred at a life-stage in which these individuals were striving to forge their own identities.

As a rule, these historians came to think of themselves as Americans. They were also perceived as such by their refugee parents. In correspondence, for example, my grandfather (and first-generation refugee historian) Fritz Epstein wrote my father (and second-generation émigré historian) Klaus Epstein, using phrases such as “young Americans like you ...”' Unlike their parents, the second generation experienced a profound rupture in their identities. They had been Germans, but now they were Americans. Meanwhile, many of their parents remained pronounced “Bei-unskis”.

As a further Americanizing experience, many second-generation émigré historians served in the United States military, usually in Europe. Because of their native-language skills, many underwent training in intelligence operations at Camp Ritchie in Maryland. Tom Angress is featured in the documentary film *Ritchie Boys*, about 1 Fritz Epstein to Klaus Epstein, 18 October 1947, Epstein Family Papers, Box 5/1.
German-Jewish refugees who fought the Nazis as American soldiers. Some future historians also belonged to United States occupation forces in Germany. They now occupied the very country from which they had barely escaped just a few years earlier. This, however, only underscored the sense that they were no longer Germans, but rather Americans.

All of the second-generation historians, by my criteria at least, received their Ph.D.s after World War II. Most received their graduate educations at just three institutions, Harvard, Columbia, and the University of Chicago. A few each earned their degrees at Yale, Stanford, and Berkeley. Three had a Doktorvater who was a first-generation refugee historian: Walter Simon and Arno Mayer both studied with Hajo Holborn at Yale, and Gerhard Weinberg studied with Hans Rothfels at Chicago.

Why didn’t more beginning refugee historians choose to study with their older counterparts? Besides Holborn, only Hans Rothfels, who spent a decade at Chicago between 1946 and 1956, taught in a top graduate program. Hans Rosenberg didn’t get to Berkeley until 1959, when younger refugee historians had usually already launched their careers.

Second-generation émigré historians also studied history as it was then studied in the United States. Americans studied European history, not the national histories of the major European nation-states. Modern German history barely existed. Moreover, some second-generation refugee historians did not initially study German history at all. George Mosse first made his reputation as a historian of early modern British constitutional history. As he later wrote of his early books: “These were certainly respectable, indeed core subjects at the time … That they were also far removed from my own origins may have played an unconscious role as I tried to dive into my new Anglo-Saxon environment.” Mosse chose a historical field that would allow him to “fit in” to his American environment.

Younger refugee historians may also have been reluctant to study with their older counterparts because that might have seemed to compromise their ability to write “objective” history. Worse still, by focusing on German history, they might be accused of navel-gazing. Klaus Epstein was allegedly told that as a refugee he would never get a job if he focused on German history. He wrote his dissertation on modern British constitutional history. Fritz Stern wrote his Ph.D.
thesis on a German topic, but he published *The Varieties of History* — an edited volume on great historians — before *The Politics of Cultural Despair*. In his memoirs, Stern questions the motives behind doing *The Varieties of History*: “Was I unconsciously taking a break from the Nazi past, returning to my old love of Europe itself?” I wonder whether Stern’s decision might also have been an unconscious attempt to first establish credentials in a field other than German history — in a field in which his motives and achievements would be less open to question.

Most of those who became historians of modern Germany did write their dissertations on German history topics. Many had a burning interest to understand what happened in their native country. But they did not study with historians of Germany *per se* — which was well-nigh impossible, given how few historians specialized in German history at the time. In the 1940s, for example, Hans Gatzke and Klemens von Klemperer wrote their theses at Harvard under the nominal supervision of William Langer.

Still, second-generation émigré historians had connections to their older counterparts. Hajo Holborn was key in this regard. While teaching at Yale, Holborn taught at least one seminar at Harvard and participated in others at Columbia. Von Klemperer recalls how Holborn was “helping us youngsters move into the profession ... We had to come to terms as scholars with our own experiences, and Hajo Holborn helped us in a masterful way to bring together history and political commitment.” Stern, too, developed a close relationship with Holborn, and eventually co-edited the *Festschrift* in his honor. Gatzke became Holborn’s colleague at Yale in 1964.

In the 1940s, several younger émigré historians came to know Fritz Epstein, then a librarian at Widener Library. Epstein was known for supplying graduate students with obscure bibliographical references. In the early 1950s, he was in charge of the War Documentation Project, the filming of captured German war documents. Gerhard Weinberg fondly recalls working under his direction. A number of younger historians such as Klaus Epstein and Georg Iggers also came to know Dietrich Gerhard, a first-generation refugee historian at Washington University in St. Louis. In 1960, Gerhard even extended a job offer to Klaus Epstein to become an associate professor at Washington University.

3 Fritz Stern, *Five Germanys I Have Known* (New York, 2006), 221.
6 Informal conversations with author.
7 Dietrich Gerhard to Klaus Epstein, 7 November 1960, Epstein Family Papers, Box 1.
And then there were the not-so-good experiences. In his memoirs, Raul Hilberg recalled an encounter with Hans Rosenberg in an undergraduate class at Brooklyn College: “[Rosenberg] remarked, in parentheses, that Napoleonic atrocities in Spain had not been equaled since. At this point I raised my hand and asked, ‘What do you call six million dead Jews?’ Ah, said Rosenberg, that was an interesting problem, but one which was very complicated, and he was constrained by time and the outline of the course to forgo a discussion of my question.” Hilberg was deeply agitated by Rosenberg’s response — one perhaps typical of the older generation of refugee historians who didn’t quite know what to make of the Holocaust. Still, Hilberg remarked, “Although I perceived in Rosenberg’s remark about Napoleon a plain denial of Adolf Hitler’s Germany, I used everything he taught.”

Rosenberg may well have sparked Hilberg’s interest in the bureaucratic organization of the Holocaust.

By contrast, Hilberg was scathing about Fritz Epstein. Hilberg also worked on the War Documentation Project. In his memoirs, he complained of Epstein’s “limited analytical abilities,” quoted a Jewish refugee co-worker who hissed that Epstein “looks like a Jewish cattle dealer from Hesse,” and complained that Epstein fired him because he wanted to hire “men who would be totally beholden to him.” I suspect that Hilberg’s vituperation stemmed from his frustration that Epstein did not place the murder of Europe’s Jews front and center at the War Documentation Project.

Hilberg was not the only second-generation historian to have difficult interactions with older refugee historians. At Chicago, Iggers later wrote, “I found two small seminars by Hans Rothfels very useful … For the first time I was forced to study documents carefully, which I had not been required to do in my previous training. However, I had a very unpleasant exchange with him … Rothfels made no secret of his rightwing and nationalistic Prusso-German views and I challenged him … He called me in his office and told me, although he had given me As in both seminars, that with my views I had no understanding of history and should not pursue a doctorate.” Rothfels, dismayed that someone with Iggers’ views might write the history of his native country in the United States, hoped to cut short his career.

Refugee historians, of course, were not the only émigré academics that the younger historians encountered. Indeed, other refugee academics had an arguably much greater influence on them. This was particularly true at Columbia, where many future historians of
Germany studied with the political scientist Franz Neumann, author of *Behemoth*. Similarly, at Chicago, Iggers studied with Arnold Bergstraesser, a refugee political scientist employed in the German Department. Younger émigré historians also came into contact with Erich Auerbach, Felix Gilbert, Erwin Panofsky, and a host of other notable refugees. In their memoirs, they repeatedly praise these scholars’ erudition and engagement.

The second generation of émigré historians had an American education. In the 1940s and 1950s, this meant that they received their graduate education in an educational environment in which the Western Civilization narrative dominated. For some, Western Civilization remained a lifelong passion. Karl Weintraub, for example, was a legendary lecturer in the core course on Western Civilization at the University of Chicago. Students spent nights in line waiting to register for his course. Even in later decades, when Western Civ had become a dinosaur, Weintraub tried to save the course. And he justified this with his biography. Recalling his time as a hidden child and adolescent in Nazi-occupied Holland, he told several people, “I had enough of life without civilization.”

As budding historians, the second generation wanted to fit into their American milieu. In keeping with prevailing trends in European history, they generally focused on intellectual history or the history of ideas. Their work solidified the *Sonderweg* paradigm — why Germany departed from the supposed norms of Western Civilization. While Hajo Holborn made the most dramatic statement about the importance of the *Sonderweg* thesis in a 1952 article — “The split between Germany and the West will of necessity always be an important theme for historians” — it became something of an article of faith among younger émigré historians. Fritz Stern, for example, later wrote about how this article inspired his own research.

What of their careers? Émigré historians came of age just when European history took off in the United States. Indeed, they were the first generation of American Europeanists who specialized in national subfields such as German history. As Stern describes in his memoirs, when he first taught German history, there were virtually no books available. “What a remarkable opportunity for my generation!” he exclaims. Émigré historians ran with the times, and wrote path-breaking books that defined the field of modern German history. In addition, they pioneered subfields of German and European history. Peter Loewenberg applied psychoanalytical methods to history.


Renate Bridenthal was among the first to write women’s history. Michael A. Meyer wrote landmark studies in modern German-Jewish history.

But second-generation émigré historians did not have a monopoly on German history. While they shaped the field of modern German history, they did so in conjunction with non-refugee colleagues such as Gordon Craig, Leonard Krieger, Otto Pflanze, and Carl Schorske. I recently interviewed Tom Skidmore, eventually a leading historian of Latin America. Skidmore wrote a dissertation in German history, but jumped at the opportunity to retrain as a Latin Americanist. As he describes it now, he felt that it would be difficult to break into the German history crowd — to an outsider, refugees dominated the German history scene. But was there really a refugee historian cabal? I doubt it. True, the émigré historians had a network of sorts, but it spanned their American-born and other colleagues, too. In 1964, for example, when a group of twelve American historians wrote a letter to Die Zeit protesting the German Foreign Ministry’s cancellation of a lecture tour by Fritz Fischer, the group included quite a mix. Klaus Epstein, Hans Gatzke, Hans Kohn, Hans Rosenberg, and Fritz Stern were émigré historians; Leonard Krieger, William Langer, Otto Pflanze, Carl Schorske, and John Snell were American-born. In addition, Gordon Craig was born in Glasgow and Theodore Hamerow in Warsaw; both came to the United States before 1933.

But still, something differentiated the émigré historians from their American-born counterparts. For one, they were tireless mediators between the German and American historical professions. In the Fischer Controversy, it was Klaus Epstein and Fritz Stern who spearheaded the American campaign on behalf of Fischer. Epstein drafted the letter to Die Zeit, while Stern secured funding for Fischer’s subsequent lecture tour in the United States. In addition, some émigré historians felt themselves to be somehow “outsiders.” They were not quite part of mainstream American life. Tom Angress titled his memoirs Immer etwas abseits (Always Somewhat on the Margins). Peter Gay famously analyzed “The Outsider as Insider” in his study of Weimar Culture. Did a sense of “outsiderdom” shape these historians’ work? In his memoirs, Mosse repeatedly refers to the two qualities that made him an outsider: his homosexuality and his German-Jewish origins. For Mosse, “outsiderdom” perhaps influenced his pursuit of innovative topics and/or methodologies. The opposite, however, may have been true of someone like Gatzke. Perhaps because he was gay and German-born, Gatzke wrote very traditional diplomatic

15 Interview with Thomas Skidmore, 12 January 2012.
17 Mosse, Confronting History, 118.
history; he was eager to prove himself according to the accepted standards of his profession.

The childhood and adolescent experience of persecution in Germany also shaped these historians’ politics. Since political events had such a tangible impact on their early lives, many became avid followers of contemporary affairs at a very young age. Most were liberals to the core. They staunchly believed in the importance of civic engagement. Georg Iggers has suggested that his experiences in Nazi Germany inspired his work for racial equality in the United States. In the 1950s, when he taught at several historically black colleges, he worked hard to end segregation in Little Rock and New Orleans. Fritz Stern has written that “at decisive moments in cold-war America, the memory of German civic passivity sliding into complicity prodded me into action.” In the 1960s, he was deeply involved in the antiwar movement and student protest politics at Columbia. On a more leftist note, Bridenthal has written, “The direct personal experience of flight from fascism colors all my political vision, so much so that I must factor it out sometimes. When I read that the FBI has been surveilling groups to which I give regular contributions ... then I hear the midnight knock on the door.” These historians, then, combined their passion for history with civic engagement: a reflection, perhaps, of both their personal experiences and their professional interests.

Finally, a few words on émigré historians and the Holocaust. In the past two decades, there has been a sea-change in German history. Earlier, historians of Germany were primarily preoccupied with 1933 (Hitler’s rise to power), but now they are preoccupied with 1941-42 (the Holocaust). The Sonderweg thesis, however, was focused on 1933 — and this is where second-generation historians made their biggest contribution. Given their life histories, this should not be surprising. Most second-generation émigré historians came to the United States between 1933 and 1941. Their lives were indelibly marked by Hitler’s rise to power. This was the seminal event that fundamentally changed their lives. In their later historical work, they thus wanted to know why National Socialism took root in Germany. Contrary to what others have argued, these historians were first and foremost preoccupied with the failure of liberalism, and only secondarily (and much later in their careers) with the Holocaust. In his memoirs, for example, Mosse lists his major historical concerns. First on his list is the demise of liberalism, last is the Holocaust.

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19 Stern, Five Germans, 198.


21 Mosse, Confronting History, 175-185.
Steven Aschheim and Jeffrey Herf have both argued that Stern and Mosse, along with Gay and Walter Laqueur, played a crucial role in shifting historians’ attention from 1933 to 1941. Aschheim insists that their early focus on German nationalism, racism, and anti-Semitism, showed that for them “the scandal in need of accounting, was 1941-42.” Perhaps. But while these émigré historians’ works were key for the analysis of the German cultural antecedents to the Holocaust, it is striking that none of them researched the details of the Holocaust per se. This was true even though captured German documents related to the nuts-and-bolts operations of the Holocaust were readily available in the National Archives. The liberal ethos for which these refugee historians are justly admired, along with their research topics, suggests that for much of their professional lives their primary historical concern was Germany’s inability to adhere to a liberal political order.

This is not intended as an indictment, only an attempt to document historians’ changing interests, in step with their times. Most second-generation refugee historians made their careers before anyone was much concerned with the Holocaust. There were, however, a few refugee historians who did make the Holocaust central to their professional concerns. They are just not usually mentioned in the same breath as Peter Gay, George Mosse, or Fritz Stern. Take Henry Friedlander. Unlike most refugee historians, Friedlander came to the United States only after harrowing experiences in ghettos and camps. He has always been much more focused on the Holocaust than most of those historians who came to the United States in the 1930s. Henry Huttenbach, who spent the war years in England but received his higher education in the United States, was a pioneer in placing the Holocaust in the broader framework of genocide studies. He is seldom grouped among historians of modern Germany — even though he wrote on the Jewish community in Worms. And although Raul Hilberg came to the United States in the 1930s, his preoccupation with the Holocaust made him a total outsider to the historical profession (and indeed, he was trained and taught as a political scientist).

There is no question, though, that the second-generation émigré historians trained many of the current scholars of the Holocaust. Gerhard Weinberg’s list of students reads as a veritable “Who’s Who of Holocaust Studies.” Students of Mosse and Stern have also made extraordinary contributions to the study of the Holocaust. But here, I wonder: was it the students who pushed the cart forwards? Many

students of Mosse and Stern did graduate work in the 1960s and 1970s, just when widespread interest in the Shoah began to percolate. Is it possible that they taught their teachers in this regard?

To conclude: Second-generation émigré historians were American historians of Germany. They brought the intellectual concerns of their host country to bear on their native country’s past. Their careers, however, coincided with the extraordinary take-off and resulting specialization in European history that occurred in the quarter century following World War II. Together with American-born and other colleagues, they were able to define the field of German history for the postwar era. They did so, however, with a passion, commitment, insight and understanding that was born of their experience of persecution in, and emigration from, Nazi Germany.

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THE GLOBAL BUSINESS WITH LOCAL MUSIC: WESTERN GRAMOPHONE COMPANIES IN INDIA BEFORE WORLD WAR I

Christina Lubinski
GHI WASHINGTON

The period from Western industrialization to World War I has aptly been described as that of the “first global economy” because international trade expanded rapidly during that time. While there is a lot of uncertainty about the amount and composition of foreign investments, scholars agree that the share of trade in world output rose steadily until 1913. According to an estimate by John Dunning, about one-third of total world foreign investment took the form of direct foreign investments in 1913, because multinational companies not only exported to foreign countries but also owned assets and exerted management control there. Setting this number in relation to world output suggests a level of economic integration that was not reached again until the 1990s.

Different factors added to this development. Newly available technologies in transport and communication, such as railroads, steamships and the telegraph, facilitated international travel, communication, and commerce, while the gold standard laid the basis for cross-border capital flows. The adoption of free trade and the expansion of Western imperialism led to more exchanges between imperialist countries and their colonies, which were opened up, often forcefully, to international trade. As a consequence, the share of British foreign investments going to Europe and the United States fell from 52 to 26 percent between 1870 and 1914, while the share going to the British Dominions and Latin America rose from 23 to 55 percent.

The gramophone industry was a part of this highly integrated world economy right from its inception. Although most of the existing literature about this industry focuses on the United States and Western Europe, some scholars have started exploring the early relationships with India.

Western gramophone companies entertained with Asia. In this article, I will describe the pre-World War I business of Western gramophone firms in India. India held a particular fascination for these companies because it was one of the first Asian countries to be penetrated by the industry and one of the biggest markets in terms of the number of consumers. Moreover, the implementation of Anglo-Saxon property law in the British colony ensured a more or less open field for Western businesses that sought to import manufactured goods into the country. The commercial relations with Britain also made the country more accessible for other foreign companies, as they often turned to British agents for support and profited from their experiences.

Despite this advantageous context, selling gramophones and records to Indian consumers was by no means an easy task. The gramophone and music business faced a series of challenges from transport and infrastructure to climate, communication, and the control of local agents. While those problems were typical for early multinationals in many industries, the “creative” music industry faced some additional challenges. Creative industries are broadly defined as those producing goods and services associated with “cultural, artistic, or simply entertainment value.” The gramophone industry simultaneously sold gramophones and music on records. As I will show, these two product lines were complementary and heavily dependent on one another. Music, as a creative product, has subjective qualities, and its consumption is taste-driven and culturally contingent. This article will trace how Western manufacturers learned to be successful in India by adapting to the taste and preferences of their consumers on the ground. Exploring the commercial opportunities in a musical scene that they often did not understand or appreciate, Western gramophone companies found themselves forced to delve into Indian musical traditions. Moreover, the political developments at the turn of the twentieth century further reinforced this trend to give business a local orientation. The emerging nationalism in British India, particularly in the region of Bengal and its capital city Calcutta, led to a boycott of foreign products beginning in 1905, which affected the gramophone companies’ business firsthand. To respond to this challenge, Western manufacturers explored different strategies, to be discussed in this article, ultimately aiming at making their products and production processes more local.

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11 For examples and characteristics of creative industries, see the articles in the special issue of *Business History Review* 85, no. 2 (2011).
In the global economy before World War I, the gramophone companies experienced the typical tension between global ambitions and local markets. While accessing markets such as India opened up new opportunities, it was a challenge to understand local tastes and customs, in particular, in a creative industry like music. Local events, such as the rising popularity of the nationalist movement, changed musical tastes and consumers’ choices about whom to buy from. The challenge to sell products internationally while still responding to local demands is one that still very much occupies today’s creative industries: understanding how firms dealt with it during the first global economy may help to better contextualize and understand this challenge. The gramophone industry identified the global-local tension early on and applied different strategies to deal with it. While its managers worked assiduously to exploit ownership advantages and reach an ever-wider range of consumers, they also made their products more local and learned to adapt to the demands of the Indian market by trial and error.

I. The Birth of the Gramophone Industry and Its International Business

“[N]othing that can be conceived would be more likely to create the profoundest of sensations, to arouse the liveliest of human emotions, than once more to hear the familiar voices of the dead. Yet science now announces that this is possible, and can be done,”12 reported Scientific American in November 1877. The device that made it possible to listen to dead people’s voices was the “talking machine,” invented by the American inventor Thomas Edison. Born on February 11, 1847, in Milan, Ohio, Edison had experimented with the telegraph and the telephone during the 1870s and had invented a machine that would transcribe telegraphic messages through indentations on paper tape. After discussing different names and related utilizations for the machine — such as antiphone or back talker, chronophone or speaking clock, didaskophone or portable teacher, and glottophone or language speaker — Edison named the machine “phonograph.”13 He filed for a patent on December 24, 1877, which was issued two months later on February 19, 1878.14

The American public took great interest in the new technology. The invention was reported in several newspapers during the years 1877 and 1878. “The telephone ... is destined to be entirely eclipsed by the new invention of the phonograph. The former transmitted sound.

13 The Thomas Edison Papers, Rutgers University, Document File Series — 1877: (D-77-02) Edison, T.A. — General [D7702EO; TAEM 14:242]
The latter bottles it up for future use,” reported the New York Times on November 7, 1877. At the beginning of 1878, Edison sold the manufacturing and sales rights to a syndicate in return for $10,000 in cash and a 20 percent royalty on any sales. However, the invention initially appeared to be of little practical use. The machine was a laboratory curiosity but seemed unlikely to create a constant stream of income. Operating the early phonographs was complicated, and the recordings made on tin foil were usually ruined after a few uses. The newly founded Edison Speaking Phonograph Company, incorporated on April 24, 1878, sold no more than 2,000 phonographs over the following two years and ceased to exist in 1880. Edison turned his attention to other inventions, most importantly electric light, and set the phonograph aside.

It was not until a decade later that a German-born immigrant, Emile Berliner, first demonstrated his improved version of the talking machine, which etched the sound onto a flat metal disc rather than onto a cylinder. Emile Berliner had immigrated to the United States in 1870 to pursue a job opportunity at a store in Washington DC. While working as a clerk and traveling salesman, Berliner had become interested in the newly developed telephone and experimented with an improved transmitter, which he eventually patented in the United States. The American Bell Telephone Company bought the rights to this invention and hired Berliner as a research assistant. He stayed with the company in New York and Boston until 1884, working on a number of problems associated with the telephone. Berliner became an American citizen in 1881 and that same year married Cora Adler, who was also of German descent. In 1884 he gave up his job and moved to Washington DC to become a private researcher and inventor. From 1886 on, he devoted most of his work to the talking machine, inventing a machine with a turntable to play discs, which he called a “gramophone,” an inversion of Edison’s original name “phonograph.” Despite Berliner’s improvement of the technology, the machine remained a curiosity. Because it was operated by hand, the user had to keep the turntable at a constant speed. This problem was eventually overcome when Eldridge R. Johnson, an engineer from New Jersey, developed a cheap spring motor that assured a constant speed of rotation.

In 1887, Berliner patented his invention in Germany and England. Starting in 1889, he cooperated with the German toy manufacturer Kaemmer & Reinhardt in Wolfershausen, Thuringia, which started selling small discs and small hand-turned machines...
as children’s toys for a few years.¹⁹

In 1894, Berliner founded the United States Gramophone Company in Washington DC and in 1896 licensed his product to a group of businessmen who formed the Berliner Gramophone Company of Philadelphia. The consortium hired a manager, Frank Seaman, to organize the National Gramophone Company in New York as the sales agent for both the discs and the machines.

In 1897, the National Gramophone Company sent a sales manager, William Barry Owen, to London to sell the company’s machines and exploit the British and European rights of Berliner’s patents. Owen convinced a British lawyer, Trevor Williams, to invest in the gramophone. In April 1898, Williams and Owen formed the Gramophone Company (which after the merger with a typewriter manufacturer in 1900 was renamed Gramophone Typewriter Ltd., hereafter GTL) as a trading syndicate. In the same year, Emile Berliner and his brother Joseph set up a manufacturing plant for records in Hanover, Germany, to supply the European demand.²⁰

Since the 1880s, Berliner’s business had expanded internationally. Besides the patents in Germany and England, Berliner obtained others in Italy, France, Belgium, and Austria. Berliner’s sons, Herbert and Edgar, opened a branch in Montreal, Canada, in 1899. But a series of copyright infringements and lawsuits led to the end of the Berliner business in the United States. In June 1900, a court injunction shut down the Berliner Gramophone Company of Philadelphia. For several years attempts were made to overturn the injunction but to no avail. Berliner passed his patent rights to Eldridge Johnson, who sold some of his patents to GTL and also supplied it with parts and components. In 1899, GTL (still called Gramophone Company until

²⁰ Martland, Since Records Began.
1900) bought the European and British Empire rights for the manufacture of sound recordings from Johnson, and in 1901 both agreed to a wide-ranging partnership in marketing, finance, and research. They also divided the world market between them: GTL was to sell in Europe, the British Empire, Russia, and Japan, while Johnson’s Victor Talking Machine Company (founded in 1901 in Camden, New Jersey) would sell everywhere else.21

Going global, however, proved to be more demanding than the gramophone companies initially expected. While the machines could be sold to other markets, it soon became obvious that a “one-size-fits-all” strategy would not be successful with regard to the recorded music. To broaden the portfolio and provide customers in foreign markets with suitable products, the gramophone companies started sending recording engineers to different parts of the world to record music. These young engineers, also known as “the experts” or, because of their young age, “the boys,” were regarded as an elite group and traveled around the world to spot new talent and expand the repertoire of the company.22 In the late 1890s, American-born William Sinkler Darby, who had worked as an assistant in Emile Berliner’s laboratory in Washington, went on a trip to Russia on behalf of Berliner’s German company. In 1898, Fred Gaisberg, who had also previously worked for Berliner in Washington, became GTL’s first official recording engineer. He moved from the United States to London, where he was responsible for the first recording studio and several recording tours first in Europe and later worldwide.23

II. Into the Unknown: Western Gramophone Companies in India

GTL and other gramophone companies showed a great interest in India as a market for their machines early on. Seen through the eyes of Western companies, the vast country with a population of 287 million in 190124 was highly attractive, not only for the gramophone industry. The German electrical company Siemens, for example, sought to attract investors in its telegraph line from London to Calcutta by arguing in 1867 that India “with its enormous population and growing production” was not only one of the largest markets in the world but also a “gate for Europeans to the important markets of China, Japan, and Australia.”25 Likewise, an American consular report of 1915 said that India, despite being under British control, was “one of the few large countries of the world where there is an ‘open door’ for the trade of all countries.”26

22 Martland, Since Records Began, 44.
Already before the turn of the century, English and Indian musical instrument dealers sold talking machines and music to the native and foreign populations in India. In Calcutta, English firms, such as T. E. Bevan and Co., Harold and Co., and the Western Trading Co., and Indian firms, such as M. L. Shaw and Dwarkin & Son, advertised gramophones and recordings already before 1900.27 Blank cylinders were particularly popular with the native population. Unlike discs that could only play back prerecorded voices, cylinders could be used for home recordings. They thus allowed for the recording of local music, whereas the gramophone firms sold almost exclusively Western recordings. At first, the gramophone was a novelty and several events were held to celebrate its arrival, including the “Phonograph Concert” at the Dalhousie Institute in Calcutta on November 16, 1899. The Statesman, an Indian English-language broadsheet daily newspaper, announced that on this occasion “Edison’s Grand Concert Phonograph” would be played and that the event was open to the public for an admission fee.28

In July 1901, an agent of the Anglo-American GTL, John Watson Hawd, came to Calcutta to investigate business opportunities in India. He had been instructed by the London headquarters to take with him 500 talking machines and 30,000 records and to “prove the possibility of making a business there.”29 Previously, GTL had worked with a British agent, the Mutoscope and Biograph Co. Ltd., a company that had been active in India since 1898, but GTL had ended this partnership in early 1901.30 In September of the same year, after traveling widely in India, Hawd recommended that a branch office be opened in Calcutta, which GTL did in November 1901. Hawd commented: “I think we shall do a fair business here if we only have the goods, but until we get native records we shall only be able to sell to Europeans and they are only 1 per 100 natives.”31 Surprisingly, there was little debate about the prices for gramophones and records, which may suggest that customers, at least in the beginning, came from the highest social classes, which could afford these products. Even a small percentage of the overall population of India made for an interesting market for the Western firms, and the enormous size of the Indian market was frequently stressed. Hawd also repeatedly urged his supervisors to offer a more locally oriented product: “There will be a big business here ... and it is best to own the territory, then we know it is well worked.”32 He also commented on the challenges to be expected: “the country is so large that it will take a long time to cover it and as yet we have no dealers to speak of.”33 The most urgent

27 Kinnear, Indian Recordings, 9.
29 EMI Music Archives (hereafter EMI), letter London to Hawd, January 13, 1900.
31 EMI, letter Hawd to London, November 21, 1901.
33 EMI, letter Hawd, Calcutta to London, April 13, 1902.
task for Hawd was the recording of native artists. “You must however
send one man to make records,” he insisted again in October 1901.34

Consequently, GTL prepared for its first recording expedition to
the Far East, planning to record in Calcutta but also Singapore,
Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tokyo, Bangkok, and Rangoon. The team
of recording experts consisted of recording engineer Fred Gaisberg,
his 19-year-old assistant George Dillnutt, and the businessman
Thomas Dowe Addis, who was accompanied by his wife. Accord-
ing to Gaisberg, the aim of this trip was “to open up new markets,
establish agencies, and acquire a catalogue of native records. … [A]s
we steamed down the channel into the unknown I felt like Marco
Polo starting out on his journeys.”35 The terminology is revealing.
Gaisberg’s likening himself to Marco Polo and the description of the
trip as an “expedition” show that, although commercial concerns
triggered the trip, Gaisberg and his colleagues saw themselves as
brave explorers of an unknown world.36 Gaisberg and his fellow
travelers reached Calcutta in October 1902.37 While unpacking, they
were observed by the native population. “It was the fi rst time the
talking machine had come into their lives and they regarded it with
awe and wonderment.”38 Like other Western technologies exported
to India, the gramophone gave the visitors power because they had
the knowledge and means to control the machine.

John Hawd awaited the crew in Calcutta. He arranged for a loca-
tion for the recording sessions and got in touch with Amarendra
Nath Dutt of the Classic Theatre and Jamshedji Framji Madan of the
Corinthian Theatre, who established contacts to local artists. Dutt
was known to be interested in the technology of sound recordings
and had earlier purchased an Edison phonograph, which he used
to record dialogues and songs of the plays being performed. Madan
also took interest in the newly emerging sound and motion-picture
technologies and owned a motion picture projector. The theaters
were the main sources of entertainment for the general public at
the time.39

According to Gaisberg’s diary, the fi rst recordings made on No-
ember 8, 1902, were of two nautch girls “with miserable voices.”40
Generally speaking, Gaisberg and the local agents of GTL found it
difficult to develop an understanding of the native music. As Gaisberg
observed, “We entered a new world of musical and artistic values. …
[The] very foundations of my musical training were undermined.”41
However, according to Gaisberg, the British staff of GTL’s local office

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34 EMI, letter Hawd to
London October 3, 1901.

35 Frederick William
Gaisberg, Music on Record
(London, 1946), 52.

36 See also Farrell, Indian
Music, 114.

37 Gaisberg, Music on Record. Gais-
berg’s autobiography was fi rst
published in the US in 1942
with the title The Music Goes
Round (reprinted in 1977). This
and following quotations
are from the 1946 UK version,
which is an identical repro-
duction of the US predeces-
sor but includes more graphic
materials.

38 Ibid.

39 Kinnear, Indian
Recordings, 15-16.

40 Farrell, Indian Music, 117;
Jerrold Northrop Moore, A
Voice in Time: The Gramophone
of Fred Gaisberg, 1873-1951

41 Gaisberg, Music on
Record, 54.
had even less understanding for the music: “I soon discovered that the English, whom we contacted and who were acting as our agents and factors, might be living on another planet for all the interest they took in Indian music.”

During the following days, Gaisberg recorded the renowned female singer Gauhar Jan, who at the time was a local celebrity in Calcutta. Gaisberg met her during a visit to a wealthy babu, an Indian clerk: “We elbowed our way through an unsavory alley jostled by fakirs and unwholesome sacred cows, to a pretentious entrance ... no native women were present excepting the Nautch girls, who had lost caste.” Public performance by women was considered a low-status and often disreputable profession. The nautch girls performed music and dance in front of their audience accompanied by male musicians, who also acted as their teachers. When Fred Gaisberg first encountered the Indian nautch girls, he noted that all female singers were “from the caste of the public women, and in those days it was practically impossible to record the voice of a respectable woman.” However, the translation “dancing girl,” which was often used in contemporary sources, does not correctly convey the role of these female artists in Indian society. Nautch girls traditionally performed at the courts of nawabs and maharajas and often belonged to a long family tradition in music. As this patronage declined in the twentieth century, music was more often performed in urban centers where dance and music were closely intertwined. While Gauhar Jan came from the tradition of nautch girls, she also represented a group of professional urban musicians who became more common after the turn of the century. She was a well-known exponent of classical and light classical music, trained in khyal and thumri as well as other classical vocal forms.

Gauhar Jan acted as a cultural translator between the Western companies and the city’s music. She was born to Eurasian parents, William Robert Yeoward and Allen Victoria Hemming, and was not intimidated by the Western visitors or the technology. She was brought up in Benares by her mother, who converted to Islam after the break-up of her marriage. She was multilingual and sang in Hindustani, English, Arabic, Kutchi, Turkish, Sanskrit, Bengali, and Pashtu. Gaisberg noted that she was proud and savvy in business matters. “She knew her own market value as we found to our costs when we negotiated with her.” While she was said to earn 300 rupees for an evening soiree, she charged 1,000 rupees for her recording session.

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 55.
44 Ibid., 56-57.
45 Daniel M. Neuman, The Life of Music in North India: The Organization of an Artistic Tradition (Chicago, 1990), 100.
46 Vikram Sampath, My Name is Gauhar Jan! The Life and Times of a Musician (New Delhi, 2010).
47 Gaisberg, Music on Record.
Other companies were also becoming interested in the music of the nautch girls. A report in the Zeitschrift für Instrumentenbau, reprinted in the American journal Talking Machine World, strongly recommended recording the Indian “dancing girls,” who were musically talented and commercially successful.48

During their six-week stay in Calcutta, Gaisberg and his crew made over 500 recordings, which were sent to the factory in Hanover, Germany.49 Only about half of those recordings were used to make pressings to be sold to the Indian public, while the other half was presumably rejected because of their poor technical or musical quality. The records were shipped to India in April 1903. The vast majority of records were of singers and musicians associated with the Classic or Corinthian Theater, which had been the main access points to the local music scene for the Western engineers.

The newly available recordings of local music increased the popularity of the gramophone in India. The gramophone machines and the records were heavily advertised in the press.50 GTL’s new agent in Calcutta, Thomas Addis, who took over from Hawd, observed the growing market closely. On several occasions, he informed his supervisors that providing music in different languages and dialects was crucial for success in the Indian market.51 In response, GTL instructed him to extend the catalogue by 2,500 records in order to cover the twelve languages that were considered most popular.52 While Western businesspeople’s understanding of the different genres of Indian music remained rudimentary, the decision to provide music in different languages was a first step toward diversifying the portfolio.

49 Kinnear, Indian Recordings, 12.
50 Ray Choudhury, Early Calcutta Advertisements, 1-16.
51 EMI, letter Addis, Calcutta to London Headquarters, December 23, 1903.
52 EMI, letter London Headquarters to Addis, Calcutta, December 6, 1904.
GTI was not the only company that realized the opportunities related to the growing business in India. In October 1902, the American company Columbia Records sent Charles J. Hopkins to India, where he was surprised to find the “talking machines” as popular as they were in Europe and the United States.53 In 1904, the firm Nicole Frere, originally founded in 1815 as a manufacturer of musical boxes in Geneva, Switzerland, sent its first recording engineer to Calcutta.54 The industry had an increasingly international outlook. The trade journal Talking Machine World observed: “The phonograph and its various modifications have been spread all over the world, penetrating into some of its dark and remote corners.”55

Against the background of the growing competition, GTI started a second recording expedition shortly after the first one. It was led by William Sinkler Darby and assisted by Max Hampe, both previously based at the Berlin office in Germany. The second expedition built on the experience of the first by focusing on musical styles that had proved to be commercially successful. The engineers recorded more pieces by some of the most successful artists. Moreover, GTI ventured out of the city of Calcutta and into different parts of the country.56 Darby and Hampe recorded in a variety of languages, including Gujarati, Marathi, Sanskrit, Tamil, Telegu, Malayalam, Goanese, Gurmuuki (Sikh), Canarese, Pashto, and others. They also made recordings of several instruments unknown in the West, such as the sarod, sitar, esraj, and sanai. The recording tour concluded in Madras during late March 1905.

Both the American Talking Machine Company and the German BEKA followed in GTI’s footsteps and went on expeditions to India in 1905. The American Talking Machine Company was founded by Joseph Jones and Albert T. Armstrong in 1898. The German BEKA Record GmbH was initially established in 1904 as Bumb & Koenig GmbH in Berlin.57 Owner Heinrich Bumb himself, accompanied by Wilhelm Hadert and Willy Bielefeld, departed Germany on October 5, 1905, and traveled via Budapest to Constantinople, then took a ship to Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said, and eventually arrived in Bombay on November 18, 1905.58 BEKA cooperated with the local firm Valabhdas Lakhmidas and Co. (previously Valabhdas Runchordas and Co.), which arranged for artists to be recorded. After their stay in Bombay, Bumb and Hadert traveled to Calcutta, where more recordings were made. They continued on their journey to Rangoon.
Burma, the Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements, China, and Japan before returning to Berlin on July 17, 1906. Their recordings quickly became successful:

The BEKA Indian Records were made under our [Valabhdas Lakhmidas’] supervision late in 1905, and in such a short time their popularity is second to none in our territory. ... [W]e have taken about 150 Indian records up to now in our city, and shortly we will be traveling over the whole of India and making about 800 to 1,000 records in all the principal dialects of our country.59

Valabhdas Lakhmidas and Co. became the sole agent of the BEKA Record GmbH for India, Burma, and Ceylon. BEKA granted its partner favorable conditions: BEKA sent large quantities of goods on consignment, allowed the Indian agent to pay for them only when they were sold, and did not expect a minimum quantity of sales in a fixed time period. Moreover, BEKA guaranteed Valabhdas the sole and exclusive rights to sell BEKA products throughout the Indian Empire.60 GTL considered the new competition inferior: “The ‘BEKA’ Records (Native) are now on the market and they are poor stuff. No class whatever, and not to be compared with our Records.”61 Nevertheless, GTL took some countermeasures to guarantee its position as market leader. In November 1906, the London headquarters debated the option of reissuing records that had been withdrawn from the catalogue at a cheaper price “as a measure for the destruction of the BEKA Agency.” This was meant as a temporary action. “[W]e should issue a limited number of these records in such a form as would most effectively compete with the BEKA Record.”62 As more competitors entered the market, price became a decisive factor. This development favored BEKA because the German manufacturer produced lower quality, cheaper products.

GTL initiated a third recording expedition in 1906-07, which was led by Fred Gaisberg’s younger brother William Conrad Gaisberg. He was assisted by George Dillnutt, who had also gone on the first expedition. Some 1,350 recordings were added to GTL’s Indian repertoire. In his travelogue, the younger Gaisberg explained the new focus on local music when he said that they “went to India to furnish records for the natives and not for Europeans.”63 The trade journal Talking Machine World confirmed his view when it reported in 1907 that sales to the European population in India were much more limited than sales to indigenous people.64

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60 EMI, letter Rodkinson, Calcutta to London Headquarter, December 18, 1906.
In 1907, a second German competitor, the Talking Machine GmbH of Berlin, entered the Indian market. The company was best known for its Odeon record label with the logo of a classical dome. Shortly after the expedition, Odeon released a South Indian catalogue and became a big importer of both machines and discs. BEKA, too, dispatched another expedition to India and recorded 400 records, which met with great success. BEKA focused successfully on genres that had not been previously recorded, especially in languages other than Hindustani. By 1908, BEKA had approximately 1,000 titles to offer Indian consumers. As more and more companies pressured their way into the market, competition increased. GTL struggled with its agents to assure the exclusive sale of their products. GTL’s agent Messrs Mullick Bros was caught selling BEKA Records in two of their retail shops in 1907. Questioned about it, the agent claimed to keep only a few BEKA records in store that were not available from GTL’s list and was very reluctant to give up this business.

While most recording expeditions eventually turned out to be successful, they encountered a number of difficulties, such as logistics, climate, and illnesses. Many Indian artists declined to be recorded, as Mr. Saific, the manager of one of GTL’s agencies, explained in 1907: “There is no dearth of good Indian artists but our great difficulty lies in getting them to record. Old Indian superstition may partly account for it.” While some artists feared that the gramophone would capture their voice for good, others were irritated by the recording situation. Vocalist Rahimat Haddu Khan (1860-1922) was said to have been very disturbed by the recording atmosphere, with two large horns being placed in front of him. When the sample was played back to him, he was infuriated by the unfamiliar voice singing back at him.

III. Indian Business for Indian People: The Swadeshi Movement

While the Western gramophone companies had a head start in India due to their superior access to technology, Indian competitors quickly caught up and found their own niche in the competitive market. As early as 1900, the Indian entrepreneur Hemendra Mohan Bose started recording local talents. Bose was born in 1864, in Eastern Bengal, and studied at the Calcutta Medical College. He started experimenting with the manufacture of perfume and opened his fragrance business in 1894 in Calcutta. Over time he added other toiletries and, in 1903,
bicycles to his line of products and also established a printing and publishing house. In 1900, he acquired an Edison phonograph as well as cylinder blanks and started to make home recordings. From 1903 on, he cooperated with the French company Pathé Frères in Paris and used his bicycle store to sell its records. The success encouraged him to open his own record store in the commercial center of Calcutta. He made recordings of local artists and sent his master cylinders to France for manufacturing. In association with Pathé Frères and the Nicole Record Co. Ltd., Bose engaged many talents in 1904 and 1905, sometimes even on an exclusive basis. By 1906, Bose had blank cylinders manufactured in Calcutta, which were in high demand in India. He reproduced his recordings of local artists, many of whom belonged to his circle of friends, and marketed them as “H. Bose’s Records.”

Other Indian firms also acted as agents for Western companies. M. L. Shaw (Manick Lal Saha), a manufacturer of harmonicas, became an agent for the company Nicole Records. In Bombay, the English firm S. Rose and Co. offered Columbia machines and cylinders. Valabhdas Lakhmidas and Co., founded by Valabhdas Runchordas and Lakhmidas Raojee Tairsee, acted as an agent for Edison, Columbia, and Pathé before becoming sole representative of the BEKA Record GmbH. The relationships with Western firms were not always harmonious. As early as 1905, some competitors engaged in trademark piracy, leading GTL to initiate lawsuits protecting the term “gramophone” as well as the famous image of the dog listening to a gramophone (“His Master’s Voice”).

The competitive situation between Western and local gramophone companies was further inflamed by a political event. In 1905, the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, started the process of partitioning the province of Bengal, which he considered too large for effective governance. His aim was to divide it into East and West Bengal with capitals in Dacca and Calcutta. Lord Curzon’s plans were met with resentment by the Bengali population because after the partition Bengali Hindus would form a minority in West Bengal. This led to a surge of Indian nationalism, during which activists called for a boycott of foreign goods. The so-called “swadeshi” movement — swadeshi meaning “from one’s own country” — was an economic strategy aimed at weakening British trade influence and improving economic conditions in the country. Swadeshi supporters boycotted British, and in some cases Western, products.
and lobbied for indigenously manufactured alternatives. Political and economic goals intersected in the swadeshi movement. Indian manufacturers of different industries saw that the swadeshi agitation increased the demand for their goods. Most affected was the cotton textile industry, whose production capacity heavily increased.\textsuperscript{75} The impact of swadeshi was greatest in the province of Bengal and triggered the founding of a number of Bengali enterprises.\textsuperscript{76}

In this context, Hemendra Mohan Bose launched his swadeshi records. While he had previously imported blanks from Pathé Frères, by 1907 Bose manufactured his own blank cylinders in Calcutta. As a Bengali businessman, Bose advertised his line of records as “H. Bose’s Swadeshi Records” and highlighted that he was “the first to manufacture records here in Calcutta” and that he offered “the only real swadeshi records.”\textsuperscript{77} He also specialized in nationalist music and speeches, which sold increasingly well. Stirring swadeshi sentiments among his customers, Bose declared: “The manufacture of these records marks an important epoch in the industrial enterprise of India. It points out most clearly that the Indians if they care to turn their attention, not only compete fairly with other nations, but in some cases beat them.” Famous Bengali artists, such as Rabindranath Tagore and Dwijendra Lal Roy, supported Bose’s business, while declining to work with GTL. The cooperation with Pathé Frères, however, became important again when disc machines increasingly overtook the popularity of cylinder machines. Starting in 1908, Bose thus made his recordings available on disc by cooperating with Pathé and re-releasing earlier recordings as “Pathé/H. Bose’s Records” discs.\textsuperscript{78} Although Bose again became partly dependent on the technology of a Western manufacturer, he managed to sustain his image as a native swadeshi businessman.

The impact of the swadeshi movement on GTL and other Western gramophone firms is hard to quantify because turnover and profit data is largely unavailable. Qualitative sources suggest that Indian nationalism, at least temporarily, presented a big obstacle to GTL. In 1906, the company stated “Bengali Trade (i.e. in Bengali Records) is practically at a standstill. The Bengalis are boycotting us as much as possible,”\textsuperscript{79} and in a different letter dated the same day, “We are boycotted practically, and our trade is entirely done by Mohommedans [sic] and a few Europeans.”\textsuperscript{80} As a response to the swadeshi
\textsuperscript{75} Dwijendra Tripathi, The Oxford History of Indian Business (New Delhi, Oxford, New York, 2004), 154-59.
\textsuperscript{76} Amit Bhattacharyya, Swadeshi Enterprise in Bengal (Calcutta, 1986), chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{77} Kinnear, Indian Recordings, 43.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
challenge some Western companies, such as Pathé and BEKA, started cooperating with the local elite. Others, such as GTL, invested in manufacturing facilities in India. Roughly from the end of 1906, GTL began developing plans to build a record pressing facility in Calcutta. This allowed GTL to cut transport costs and time and to manufacture at lower cost. The site for the factory was found by the end of 1906, about one mile east of the commercial center of Calcutta at 139 Beliaghatta Road, Sealdah. The first Indian discs were pressed there in June 1908. GTL also established permanent recording studios in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. Shortly after manufacturing in India started, GTL newspapers ads included the statement that: “Our Indian, Burmese and Ceylonese records are now made at our Calcutta factory — using Indian materials — by Indian workmen,” thus presenting themselves as a swadeshi-conscious business. By December 1908, the factory was pressing 1,000 discs per day. In the record storerooms, the company had stocks of over 150,000 discs, of which some 100,000 were recordings in the vernacular languages of India.

Talking machines and music on records continued to be popular in India over the following years. In 1912, the Bombay ambassador to the United States, Consul Edwin S. Cunningham, observed that “natives here are very fond of phonographs and the machines can be heard in the native part of the town practically at all hours of the day and night.” Cunningham expressed his surprise to find that the gramophone trade was largely with the native population, not the Westerners living in India. This, he noted, gave an edge to the German manufacturers, who sold their machines at prices as low as $2.90 and “control the market for inexpensive articles.” In comparison, a GTL catalogue from 1909 offered its cheapest available gramophone for 30 rupees, equaling approximately $9.74. The German firms offered not only low prices but also liberal credit terms and a fairly attractive design, while “American and French sales were limited.” The American and French manufacturers were too expensive and failed to offer records with native music, which were crucial for winning local customers. Indeed, witnesses before and after World War I confirmed that Indian music lovers had little use for Western music. The famous filmmaker Satyajit Ray was one of the few Bengalis interested in Western classical music. Later, Alex Aronson, a German-Jewish refugee in Calcutta, observed that the Bengalis “found most Western music a chaotic and intolerable noise.”

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82 Quoted in Kinnear, Indian Recordings, 30.
83 Ibid.
84 Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Special Consular Reports - No. 55: Foreign Trade in Musical Instruments (Washington, DC, 1912).
85 Ibid., 82.
86 EMI, The Gramophone Co. Ltd, Catalogue of Gramophone Instruments - February 1909 (Calcutta, 1909). From 1898, the Rupee was pegged to the British Pound with 15 Rupees equaling 1 Pound.
87 Department of Commerce and Labor, Special Consular Reports, 83.
88 Ibid., 87.
90 Quoted in ibid., 49. On Alex Aronson, see also Anil Bhatti and Johannes H. Voight, eds., Jewish Exile in India, 1933-1945 (New Delhi, 1999).
With the outbreak of World War I, the market for gramophones and records fell into turmoil. The German gramophone companies completely lost their position in the Indian market. All of their assets were expropriated as “enemy property” by the British. For the most part, American and Japanese competitors managed to take over the German market shares, but the war also created a favorable environment for native goods because it interrupted imports into the country. GTL, freed of some of its biggest competitors, remained the clear market leader in India. In 1912-14, India was GTL's fourth largest foreign market after Britain, Russia, and Germany, and the company realized 9 percent of its total turnover in India.\(^\text{91}\) Central to the ongoing success was the growing selection of local music in different languages and dialects, which Indian consumers kept in high demand. Although expanding the selection generated enormous costs, it was the only path GTL could take toward satisfying consumers and competing with the many local and international competitors.

**Conclusion**

From the 1890s and 1900s, shortly after the invention of the gramophone, the talking machine industry was active in a global market. Its major players were international firms that often cooperated with each other to better pursue their international business. Invented in the United States, the gramophone started as a novelty item. However, it was crucial for the survival of the manufacturers to create a constant demand beyond consumers' initial curiosity. This was achieved, first, by expanding internationally and taking the initial business plan beyond the home market. The talking machine industry is thus a perfect example of companies' international outlook and ambitions during the highly integrated world economy before World War I. Second, the selling of talking machines depended to a large extent on the availability and quality of records. Records and talking machines were complementary products with one depending on the other for success. Particularly during the period when two different technological systems, the cylinder and the disc system, were competing with each other, providing the right selection of music to customers was vital for influencing their decision in favor of one system or the other.

In the gramophone business, only minor changes to the machines were necessary to take the product international. By contrast, the

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recorded-music business differed greatly from one country to another and even from one region to another. The first Western manufacturers faced highly localized musical traditions, which they did not fully understand, in most parts of the world, and were forced to build a market for records from scratch. By traveling, by cooperating with local agents and multipliers, and by relying on more or less knowledgeable recording experts, the companies gave a local orientation to their musical repertoire and, by consequence, to their business strategy in foreign markets such as India.

In India, they faced a series of challenges. First, they had to cope with the logistical and communication problems typical of early multinationals. Second, they were challenged by the diversity of local customs and languages, which required a large portfolio of musical recordings. Third, they were confronted with rising Indian nationalism leading to an at least partial consumer boycott of so-called foreign products. Native competitors, who had initially found themselves at a disadvantage for lack of access to technology, human resources, and capital (“ownership advantages”), now explored the market more successfully by relying on their local knowledge and contacts (“location advantages”). Moreover, they were able to play the national card. Being local, they marketed their products as “native”, stirring up nationalistic sentiment to their advantage. Since both ownership and location advantages are necessary for a successful business, different forms of cooperation between both groups were tested.

The strategies of music companies during the first global economy were shaped by global ambitions and an international outlook. The gramophone companies explored India as a different cultural context and dealt with the tension between the global and the local. During the internationalization of the industry, the gramophone firms realized that “localizing” their product portfolio and engaging with indigenous music were crucial prerequisites for selling music to foreign consumers. In a trial-and-error process, the companies learned that distinctive local music cultures existed and needed to be served separately. This understanding would continue to shape corporate strategies for years to come, not only internationally but also in large national markets, most markedly in the United States, where niche music markets would achieve great success during the interwar period. The experience gained in India increased manufacturers’ know-how in defining and serving
subsections of a national market. This became a highly useful set of business skills.

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LIVING ON THE MARGINS: “ILLEGALITY,” STATELESSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF REMOVAL IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

Conference at the GHI, February 9-11, 2012. Conveners: Kathleen Canning (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Jana Häberlein (University of Basel), Barbara Lüthi (University of Basel), Miriam Rürup (GHI). Participants: Mae Ngai (Columbia University), Mira Siegelberg (Harvard), Annemarie Sammartino (Oberlin), Tobias Brinkmann (Penn State), Atina Grossmann (Cooper Union), Kathrin Kollmeier (ZZF Potsdam), Linda Kerber (University of Iowa), Daniela L. Caglioti (University of Naples), Ilse Reiter-Zatloukal (University of Vienna), Marianne Pieper (University of Hamburg), Aysen Ustubici (University of Istanbul), Christoph Rass (University of Osnabrück), Friederike Kind-Kovacs (University of Regensburg), Serhat Karakayali (University of Halle), Insa Breyer (Humboldt University, Berlin), Jens Röschlein (University of Münster).

In contemporary history, both stateless people and “illegal aliens” have been referred to as the “citizen’s others” (Linda Kerber), whose lack of citizenship rights prevents them from participating in social and political life. Throughout the twentieth century, illegality, statelessness, and forced removals have represented political processes with roots in historical forms of inclusion and exclusion, definitions of citizenship and belonging, and different forms of deportation and expulsion. These phenomena are linked in several ways. First, the affected people are often presented as lacking subjectivity. Second, these people are physically removed from the social landscapes they inhabit and thus rendered nearly invisible. Third, these states of being are frequently “coerced” phenomena that involve violence, while they also generate resistance in non-state actors such as migrants or illegals, human rights organizations, and others.

In her keynote lecture, Mae Ngai traced the origins of the US-specific topos of the “Nation of Immigrants.” She pointed out the range of actors who influenced this concept of immigration, which moved from being normatively open to normatively closed, including scholars, politicians, and migrants themselves, shifting their self-definition over time from “emigrants” to “immigrants.” Another important shift occurred in the classification of immigrants — in the early 1900s, it was racial but eventually moved to legal vs. illegal — so that “illegality today does the work of race” in defining inclusion and exclusion.
The first panel concentrated on the emergence of statelessness. Mira Siegelberg discussed the first mass of stateless people whom the international community helped by issuing an internationally accepted travel document called the “Nansen Passport.” She contextualized the debate concerning stateless refugees in the interwar years with reference to the International Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1929, which conceived of statelessness as mankind’s most salient problem. By linking these two discourses, Siegelberg highlighted the view of statelessness not as a humanitarianism but as a rights issue, which Russian émigré lawyers especially advocated. Annemarie Sammartino then discussed three primary groups of vulnerable legal status in Weimar Germany whom the Nansen Passport helped: the Russians, Jews from Eastern Europe, and groups like the Baltendeutsche, whose citizen status was uncertain despite their ethnic Germanness. She noted the aspect of an imaginary element of citizenship: The Nansen-Passport, she argued, could only succeed because it implied a promise to nation-states that its holders did not want to become citizens. Tobias Brinkmann discussed the stateless territory of the port city of Danzig in the 1920s. Danzig admitted people without asking for passports or visas, thus developing into both a seemingly safe haven for (Jewish) refugees and a territory into which Poland could “dump” unwanted people. For Jews, Danzig proved to be a battleground of differing approaches to helping each other: Again, the dichotomy of the humanitarian approach (Western Jewish relief organizations) vs. the fight for Jewish rights (Eastern and Zionist support groups) came into play here.

The second panel addressed efforts to solve the problem of statelessness. Atina Grossmann remapped the landscape of survival and rescue of Jews during and after World War II by tracing refugee routes from Poland to Siberia and, after war’s end back, to Poland and into the Displaced Persons (DP) camps. She analyzed how aid groups such as the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), transnationally active in such seemingly remote theaters as Iran and India, suggested different solutions for Jewish refugees. Palestine proved to be more imaginary than real as a place of rescue. This was a controversial issue with the Jewish Agency, which promoted immigration to Palestine only. Here again, a fundamental difference emerged between humanitarian rescue and political solutions. Kathrin Kollmeier looked at France as a place of rescue, examining how France turned from an international to a national protection regime in the 1950s. The OFPRA (French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless
Persons) was established after a long debate that led France to insist on the right of national sovereignty concerning statelessness in French territory. OFPRA then helped shape a new bureaucracy ("Knowledge Agency") and also gave new agency to the stateless people who registered with it.

The decade after World War II saw new supranational attempts to overcome statelessness. The 1954 UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Refugees was a first major achievement in the postwar world of newly shaped international politics. Linda Kerber showed how one of the major players at this convention, Louis Henkin, represented a nation that never ratified any of the postwar UN conventions on refugees: the United States. As Henkin was present at all the debates, the US left its “fingerprints” all over the convention. While statelessness was generated by nation-states, it clearly could only be solved supranationally. Yet national sovereignty proved to be key in preventing the international community from really solving the problem of statelessness.

The third panel dealt with the ongoing struggle over defining inclusion in citizenship. Statelessness first emerged primarily because of denaturalization and denationalization policies, which many nation-states considered their national sovereign right. Daniela L. Caglioti showed how denaturalizing citizens in World War I was a radical yet ubiquitous means that states used to push unwanted people to the margins and remove them more easily. Consequently, World War I generated a new system of population management that reshaped the notion of citizenship by differentiating between aliens and citizens. Ilse Reiter-Zatloukal retraced how denationalization in the twentieth century became an instrument authoritarian and totalitarian regimes mainly used to punish “illoyal” citizens. Prime privileges of nation-states, the granting and revocation of citizenship, were finally reluctantly banned by the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness in 1961 – in cases where denationalization would lead to statelessness. Miriam Rürup then looked back at the first apparent course of action the UN took to solve the problem of statelessness: paving the way for the new state of Israel in 1948. Exploring the specific framing of Israeli citizenship as a possible reaction to the Jewish experience of statelessness, she argued that the Israeli Law of Return changed the concept of Jewish belonging. While having been defined in non-territorial terms in the Diaspora, after 1948 the previously utopian notion of “Zion” transformed into a transterritorial
idea of Israeli citizenship. Although based on an idea of supranational identity, this notion of citizenship was territorially grounded in the ethnically defined nation-state in the Land of Israel.

For the last three panels, the conference’s focus shifted to people who are actively and decisively left out of citizenship: illegalized migrants and state actions of removal. Marianne Pieper spoke about migrants’ ability and strategies to actually “do borders” by permanently questioning them, for example by violating border restrictions and being transnationally mobile. Her analysis of a variety of interviews with transnational migrants showed how border spaces were “contested terrains” with the migrants as active agents in this process and not merely victims of the ever changing means of controls in the European border regime. Aysen Ustubici then focused on two case studies of border migration in Turkey and Morocco. Her paper supported the idea of migrant agency, that is, their claim to being agents in the migration process. She highlighted how they change the character of the “receiving” countries, for example, by affecting legal discourse on defining the status and rights of citizens.

The fifth panel turned to expulsion and removals, beginning with Christoph Rass’s paper on the removal of unwanted foreigners from Germany. He compared various policies of removal in Imperial Germany and in postwar West Germany, demonstrating that social arguments and policy have persistently been entangled in German citizenship policy. In Imperial Germany, the people who were removed were those who might fall into the social safety net as dependents. From the 1950s onwards, the pattern of deportations in West Germany remained strikingly detached from shifts in migration policies, yet it seems likely that removals followed a sort of symbolic policy to appease public anger about changes in the social welfare state. Friederike Kind-Kovacs analyzed another case of refugees of uncertain status becoming pawns in the game of national politics. She focused on ethnic Hungarians who had fled from Transylvania to Budapest and become a symbol for the social decline of the middle class. They were regarded as the embodiment of the national disaster and loss of territory that had befallen the Hungarian Empire. The Hungarian refugees were in a state of legal limbo until the Treaty of Trianon provided them with a legal framework that included opting for the nationality of their state of residence. In Hungary, however, they were not instantly integrated but continued to live in broken-down railway coaches at railway stations. Thus, while unable to
integrate these displaced families called “Vagonlakok,” the Hungarian regime nonetheless instrumentalized them in an effort to revise its territorial loss.

The final panel turned to “Illegalizing Migrants.” Serhat Karakayali began by stressing the problematic nature of categorizations such as legal/illegal. He argued that different shades of legalization are important, just as differentiations between the interests of state, municipal, and individual actors are. In the guestworker recruitment regime in postwar Germany, he argued, the term “illegal” served as an argument in labor recruitment and policies of migration—sometimes even causing conflicts between companies that were becoming non-governmental transit stations for immigration and government agencies that were trying to control migration. The question of who the sovereign is in defining legal and illegal and determining citizenship again proved to be in flux if not contingent. Insa Breyer compared different attitudes towards undocumented migrants in Germany and France, including the terminology. While the term “Sans Papiers” is not necessarily judgmental in France, it implies a criminalization in Germany. This corresponds to different legal approaches: in Germany illegalized migrants are perpetually in danger of being expelled, while in France they are constantly on the verge of becoming legalized. This sheds light on the nations’ different understandings of society and belonging, as well as pathways to joining it. Focusing on “gypsies” in postwar West Germany, Jens Röschlein turned to a group that could not be physically removed from German territory, since they had settled in Germany long ago and had obtained citizenship, but nevertheless remained “unwanted.” German authorities in the 1950s and 1960s sometimes ignored Sintis’ legal citizenship and refused to extend their German passports, provided them with alien passports, or even forced them into lengthy naturalization processes.

The final discussion pointed to contingency as a recurrent theme of the conference. The changing standards of passport control as well as of passports themselves, for example, were, of course, unwelcome to state authorities, but highly welcome to migrants because they gave them agency to travel, say, with forged passports. The ambiguity of terms was another key issue. While terminological ambiguity contributes to the ambiguity of a person’s status, it also offers options for migrants who might choose to be categorized as “stateless” or of “uncertain nationality” (and thus protected from deportation) rather than as a “refugee” (and thus often subject to involuntary
“repatriation”). It seems that non-state actors embraced contingency and liminality, especially in the early instances of statelessness and illegality, as these qualities invited them to actively create their stories and have a say in the overall power of the system of border regimes of the sovereign nation-state.

Miriam Rürup (GHI)
THE GLOBALIZATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN BUSINESS AND CONSUMER CULTURE

Workshop at the GHI Washington, February 24-25, 2012. Convener: Joshua Clark Davis (GHI). Participants: Davarian Baldwin (Trinity College), Enrico Beltramini (Notre Dame de Namur University), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Nemata Blyden (George Washington University), Douglas Bristol (University of Southern Mississippi), Ansgar Buschmann (University of Münster), Nathan Connolly (Johns Hopkins University), Tiffany Gill (University of Texas), Brenna Wynn Greer (Wellesley College), Oluwafemi Alexander Ladope (University of Ibadan, Nigeria), Kip Lornell (George Washington University), Seth Markle (Trinity College), Celeste Day Moore (University of Chicago), Donna Murch (Rutgers), J. Griffith Rollefson (University of California, Berkeley), Fritz Schenker (University of Wisconsin), Suzanne Smith (George Mason University), David Suisman (University of Delaware), Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI), Juliet E.K. Walker (University of Texas).

To a large degree, historians have examined the globalization of U.S. business and consumer culture as the campaign of white American businesspeople to shape the world’s economies and market cultures into their own image. This workshop, however, moved beyond that narrow perspective and investigated the global dimension of African-American businesses and consumer cultures. This workshop was framed around the following questions. How have African Americans exported their products, goods and culture beyond U.S. borders? How have African-American businesses and consumer cultures, when exported abroad, shaped global perceptions both of black Americans, and of the United States more generally? Can exported African-American consumer cultures undermine, challenge and alter dominant conceptions of the American marketplace as the exclusive province of white elites? How did the civil rights and black power movements shape global markets for African American businesses and products? Just as important, what impacts have non-American businesses and products had on African-American consumer culture? In what ways have international businesses reinterpreted black consumer cultures for their own purposes, sometimes even importing those adaptations back into the United States?

Joshua Clark Davis introduced the workshop by tracing the history of businesses on 7th Street and Georgia Avenues in the District’s
Northwest quadrant, explaining how African American consumer culture has long been deeply global. Over the years African Americans along 7th Street and Georgia Avenue have conducted business with a wide variety of immigrants from eastern and central Europe, the Caribbean, east and west Africa, and Asia. Indeed, the very idea of what constitutes “black business” has changed over time, as black merchants on 7th Street and Georgia Avenue increasingly hail not only from America but also from such countries as Ethiopia, Senegal, Jamaica, and Trinidad. In addition, quite a few prominent black businesspeople with extensive global connections — including H. Naylor Fitzhugh, Sean “Puffy” Combs, and Ben Ali of Ben’s Chili Bowl — have attended Howard University, whose western border runs along Georgia Avenue.

In the first paper of the “African American Businesses and Africa” panel, “Black Business, Africa, and Global Capitalism: The African American Entrepreneurial One Percent,” Juliet E.K. Walker reflected on the historical profession’s changing approach to the topic of black business. Since she began her graduate studies in the early 1970s, when many historians challenged the very idea of African American businesses meriting scholarly consideration, Walker has been heartened to witness a marked increase of scholarly interest in African American enterprise. In her paper, Walker discussed how many leading black American entrepreneurs, from the nineteenth-century shipping magnate Paul Cuffee, to the first African American billionaire Reginald Lewis, to the Nigerian-born oil importer Kase Lawal, owe a tremendous share of their wealth to international business deals. The next paper, presented by Oluwafemi Alexander Ladapo, addressed the conundrum of Nigerian trade relations with African American firms. On the one hand, Nigerian youth have long embraced African American music, film, and television, as seen most clearly in the tremendous market for pirated media made in the U.S. Major white-owned companies, particularly in the oil business, also maintain a strong presence in the Nigerian economy. On the other hand, however, very few African American companies have yet to deeply penetrate Nigeria, the largest economy on the African continent. If African American entertainment firms, Ladapo argues, committed themselves to distributing their products in Nigeria, the country’s market for unlicensed media products would shrink significantly.

minister with a nationally-syndicated radio show on CBS, Michaux was both a religious leader and an intrepid global businessperson, distinguishing himself with economic goodwill trips to Haiti and even an aerial Bible drop over the Soviet Union. In “Africa Must be Seen to be Believed: The Henderson Travel Agency and the Making of Black Global Citizens,” Tiffany Gill explored the fashion-designer-turned-travel-agent Freddye Henderson, who began organizing tours of black Americans visiting African countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Amid the civil rights struggles of the period, trips to newly decolonized African nations like Ghana and Nigeria offered African American tourists inspiring encounters with both their own ancestral heritage and with nascent projects in black national political independence. Donna Murch concluded the panel with her paper “Toward a Social History of Crack: Drugs, Informal Economy, and Youth Culture in an Era of Neoliberalism.” Murch examined the crack-cocaine economy of the 1980s and 1990s as an outgrowth of not only the massive deindustrialization and global outsourcing of factory jobs in urban American, but also the U.S.’s covert and over participation in the bloody civil wars and internal conflicts of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia.

The “Global Jazz Business at Mid-Century” panel opened with “Spinning Race: The Production and Promotion of African American Music in France, 1947-59,” Celeste Day Moore’s investigation of two postwar French record labels that specialized in jazz, Disques Vogue and Disques Barclay. The owners of these labels functioned as vital intermediaries between American musicians and French consumers, wielding enormous power in determining what was perceived as authentic jazz and genuine expressions of African American culture in France. Fritz Schenker followed with his paper “Music, Race, Consumption, and Empire: African American Musicians in Asia’s Jazz Age,” in which he traced the sizable market for jazz throughout the British, American, Japanese and Dutch Pacific empires of the 1920s and 1930s. Traveling African American musicians doubled as entrepreneurs, as they organized and booked their own performing tours throughout colonial Asia, yet local racial hierarchies still limited and restricted their economic and musical autonomy throughout the region.

Saturday began with the panel “The Transnational Hip Hop Economy,” and Seth Markle’s paper, “Youth Subversive Consumption: Preliminary Thoughts on the Politics of Travel, Appropriation, and
In this paper, Markle analyzes the global commodification of hip hop not as a simple story of hegemonic Americanization, but rather one of cross-pollination within the African diaspora. Access to hip hop in Tanzania depended largely on one’s access to transnational trade networks, while numerous American hip hop artists of the late 1980s and early 1990s drew heavily on African, particularly Egyptian and Kiswahili, imagery and vocabulary. Ansgar Buschmann followed with “When Hip-Hop Blew Up Tommy Hilfiger: Globalization with the Help of African American Consumer Culture as Illustrated by the Case of the Tommy Hilfiger Corporation.” In this paper, Buschmann examines the curious trajectory of the white-owned apparel company Tommy Hilfigers. Considered the quintessential clothing line for African American hip-hop fans and artists in the late 1990s, after 2001 Tommy Hilfiger plummeted in popularity in the U.S. In the last decade, however, international demand, particularly in Europe, has kept the company afloat. J. Griffith Rollefson concluded the panel with “Le Cauchemar de la France: Blackara’s Postcolonial Hip Hop Critique in the City of Light,” in which he traces the complex interplay of attitudes towards capitalism, economic justice, and entrepreneurship in the music of French rap duo Blackara. The group prides themselves on their conquests in the multiple arenas of the marché noir, both the “black market” of illicit drug sales, as well as the business of selling “black” cultural commodities such as hip hop recordings. In celebrating these activities as the foundation for their economic advancement within French society, Blackara furthers a distinctly free-market logic, while also excoriating the neo-liberal policies of former president Nikolas Sarkozy.

With his paper “Exported Racism”: African American Consumerism, Black Sailors and the Cold War in Greece, 1972-74,” Douglas Bristol commenced the panel on “African American Consumers and Empire.” Bristol explained how Greek media coverage of racial violence between white and black U.S. naval members serving in Europe in the 1970s, combined with press coverage of the American Black Power Movement, motivated many Greek merchants to discriminate against black service personnel who tried to patronize their businesses. Thus, American economic racism was exported to the Mediterranean via the U.S. military and international media. Davarian Baldwin continued with “How Ya Gonna Keep ’Em Down on the Farm, After They’ve Seen Paree?”: Thoughts on Black Consumer Culture and the Transnational Turn.” Baldwin argued that even in the early twentieth century, African
American entrepreneurs were using consumer capitalism outside the United States for the purposes of advancing Black political and intellectual interests. From the boxer Jack Johnson’s international celebrity to James Reese Europe’s massive success as a touring artist in—where else—Europe, the global marketplace beckoned black entrepreneurs seeking economic and cultural opportunities. Joshua Clark Davis concluded the panel with “The Musical Economy of African American Soldiers in Cold-War West Germany,” a discussion of the pivotal role black American servicemen played in transmitting funk music and hip hop culture into Cold War West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Through record stores, American military stores and night clubs, as well as German discos, American soldiers of color forged bonds with each other and with curious West Germans, in turn laying the ground work for the widespread popularization of hip hop in post-unification Germany.

In the last panel of the workshop, “The Politics of Black Global Business,” Enrico Beltramini delivered the paper “The Globalization of Black Business: The Case of Jesse Jackson.” Beltramini examined the civil rights leader’s vital role as a broker and intermediary between African American business interests and foreign governments. As the most prominent proponent of “black capitalism” to emerge out of the civil rights movement, Jackson advocated a highly influential vision of African American economic progress in the U.S. and abroad through his leadership in projects like Operation Breadbasket and Operation PUSH. In the final paper of the workshop, “Selling Liberia: Moss H. Kendrix, the Liberian Centennial Commission, and the Post-World War II Trade in Black Progress,” Brenna Wynn Greer investigated the career of Moss Kendrix, an African American public relations man who planned a centennial celebration of Liberia that would promote the country to U.S. business interests. Although the planned exposition was ultimately cancelled, by the early 1950s Kendrix was hired by the Coca-Cola Company as their first consultant for the African American consumer market.

In conclusion, workshop participants agreed that much work remains to be done on this relatively new area of interest for historians. While topics like imperialism and the entertainment business were discussed at length, participants contended that the discussion could include a closer analysis of the relationship between black religion and global business, a consideration of the role of gender in African American entrepreneurship, and further exploration of global African
American consumer culture in the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition, much of the discussion at the workshop focused on African American businesses’ global dealings; but non-American companies’ dealings with African American consumers merit further consideration. Participants expressed satisfaction with the course the workshop had taken and looked forward to the project progressing, hopefully through the publication of an edited collection of essays.

Joshua Davis (GHI)
ADOLESCENT AMBASSADORS: TWENTIETH-CENTURY YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Workshop at the GHI Washington, March 23-24, 2012. Conveners: Mischa Honeck (GHI) and Gabriel Rosenberg (Duke University). Participants: Benjamin Jordan (Christian Brothers University), Marcia Chatelain (Georgetown University), Leslie Paris (University of British Columbia), Alessio Ponzio (Wellesley College), Kristin Mulready-Stone (Kansas State University), Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University), Sara Fieldston (Yale University), Sean Guillory (University of Pittsburgh), Akira Iriye (Harvard University), Christina Norvig (University of Göttingen), Tamara Myers (University of British Columbia), Paula Fass (University of Berkeley), Matthew Shannon (Temple University), Mark Malisa (College of Saint Rose), Deborah Durham (Sweet Briar College).

Youth has been crashing the international headlines. The Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, and other border-crossing moments of public activism are challenging the global status quo. Often it is young people who march in the forward ranks of these present-day transnational movements. However, this is not the first youth cohort that mobilized to shape the planet’s destiny. One of the goals of the workshop “Adolescent Ambassadors” was to demonstrate that youth history offers a rich and unexplored field for rethinking the transnational entanglements of the twentieth century.

The papers presented highlighted and connected some of the imprints young people left in the international arena from World War I to the end of the Cold War, both individually and as part of adult-led organizations. In their opening remarks, Mischa Honeck and Gabriel Rosenberg outlined the potential benefits that initiating a dialogue between scholars of inter- and transnational history and historians of youth and childhood could yield. Given that the voices of children and teenagers are often hard to glean from traditional sources, Honeck and Rosenberg also spoke about the methodological challenges that lay ahead. Where do we find the cultural and political footprints of youth in a globalized world? Do young people have identities beyond the nation? What is specific about their transnational actions and experiences? How are they endowed with, and how do they claim “ambassadorship” of states, social movements, and cultural formations? Finally, how does our
understanding of the past change when we apply the analytical lenses of age and generation?

The first panel probed some of these questions in the context of Scouting, arguably the most successful archetype of global youth organizing in the twentieth century. Benjamin Jordan focused on a peculiar form of cultural diplomacy that U.S. Boy Scouts practiced with Native Americans in the 1920s. Jordan contended that white Scouts’ fascination with “primitive” cultures led to a reappreciation of Native Americans, which the latter actively used to demand rights and recognition. Simultaneously, white U.S. boys “played Indian” at international Scout festivals to promote a typically American way of Scouting abroad. Marcia Chatelain discussed the internationalism of the Girl Scouts of America after World War II. Using the example of Nuestra Cabana, an international Girl Scouts center in Mexico, Chatelain recounted episodes of U.S. girls traveling south as ambassadors of goodwill. Despite intercultural and intergenerational tensions, Chatelain stressed that engaging with foreign others sensitized many girls for struggles against discrimination at home. In her commentary, Leslie Paris reiterated the significance of Scouting as a twentieth-century manifestation of youth transnationalism. Rather than elaborating on the adult dimensions of the movement as prior works have done, Paris called on researchers to pay more attention to how boys and girls in Scout uniform developed their own gender and civic identities.

The second panel charted the international ties of fascist youth in the 1930s and 1940s. Alessio Ponzio investigated the exchanges between the German Hitler Youth and the Italian Opera Nazionale Balilla. Both organizations learned from the other’s attempts to breed racially pure youthful bodies as the heralds of a future fascist Europe. But as Ponzio pointed out, these conversations became increasingly uneven as Nazi Germany acquired greater military and imperial clout. Kristin Mulready-Stone’s treatment of young Chinese collaborators with Imperial Japan revealed a similar dynamic of cross-cultural adaptation. Eager to pacify and rebuild their nation after years of war, Chinese adolescents bonded together in new groups such as the Chinese Youth Corps, which borrowed elements from internationally successful models of youth organizing at the time. Anna von der Goltz raised a couple of methodological issues in her response. Although Ponzio’s and Mulready-Stone’s accounts chimed away at parochial histories of fascist youth, more empirical work was needed
to gauge the broader implications of transnational youth cooperation for hypernationalist regimes.

The third panel spotlighted two fascinating cases of youth diplomacy in the early Cold War. Introducing three U.S. foster parenting organizations that expanded their overseas activities after 1945, Sara Fieldston delved into the realm of international child sponsorship. Aiding children from the era’s global hotspots such as China and Korea served the image of the United States as a benevolent leader of the free world. However, Fieldston emphasized that non-Western youths were not merely on the receiving end but tried to influence their American foster parents on a range of economic, cultural, and political issues. Sean Guillory talked about the student exchange programs that the Soviet Union launched to attract talented African youth. Below the official rhetoric of international class solidarity, Guillory identified cultural misunderstandings and contentions. Whereas the Soviets tended to racialize their black guests, African students, many of whom were privileged and well-traveled, often compared Soviet life unfavorably with Western standards of living. Akira Iriye’s comments put the panel in a wider historical context. Iriye observed that Fieldston and Guillory reflected on youth histories in a Cold War world but also showed how these histories transcended Cold War binaries.

Akira Iriye concluded the first day with his keynote lecture “Youth Makes History.” Iriye revisited the historiographical turns of the last decades that have integrated youth more fully into the study of the past. He insisted that young people had made essential contributions in culture and society. They have stood at the vanguard of innovations in communication and transportation that have made the world a smaller one. Even as their transnationalism comes into conflict with local loyalties of nation, race, and religion, Iriye noted with undaunted optimism that today’s young people share a greater sense of “planetarity” that may encourage them to join hands across borders for the preservation of the planet.

The second day began with a panel that addressed the efforts of post-war youth to develop notions of transnational citizenship. Christina Norwig’s examination of the European Youth Campaign of the 1950s detailed how young activists drew on the perception of youth as a unifying, regenerative social force to promote a common European identity based on liberal values. At the same time, these adolescents
struggled to find a language conducive to that aim as the “myth of youth” was still fraught with prewar military and nationalist tropes. Tamara Myers moved the discussion to Canadian schoolchildren, who played a central role in turning Miles for Millions, a walkathon created in the 1960s to ease third world hunger, into a mass phenomenon. For Myers, the Miles for Millions events exemplified that the youngest members of society were quite capable of expressing sentiments of long-distance solidarity and global responsibility that impressed their elders. Paula Fass commented on the forms of youth activism that Norwig and Myers presented. Applauding both for dissecting historically specific moments of youth mobilization with the help of rich visual material, Fass urged researchers to also interrogate the cultural and interpersonal aspects of transnational youth politics.

The fifth panel explored the impact of youth from non-Western countries on global discourses on human rights. Matthew Shannon’s discussion of Iranian student lobbying abroad illuminated an effective case of transnational youth organizing in the 1970s. Forming alliances with countercultural movements in Europe and North America, educated young Iranians pushed the different U.S. administrations to reconsider their relations with the Western-supported regime of Shah Reza Palavi. Mark Malisa weighed in on the role that indigenous African youth protest played in bringing about the downfall of South African apartheid. Images of brutalized children, Malisa demonstrated, turned out to be powerful tools for mobilizing global public opinion against the country’s racist leadership and human rights abuses. Deborah Durham, in her response, reminded transnational scholars to take non-Western constructions of youth seriously and not universalize Western conceptions. On another level, Durham, an anthropologist, stressed the flexibility of such constructions in cultures where local rites, rather than codified law, determined the boundaries between young and old.

The concluding plenary discussion returned to general questions about the cultural, social, and political locations of young people in twentieth-century history. The participants agreed that developing a precise analytical vocabulary was a prerequisite for further study. Youth can be quite tricky conceptually, and scholars need to be aware that they are dealing with a contingent and multivalent term. Historically, youth has encompassed people who are young in a biological sense, adults who invest in young people or embody youthfulness, and a cultural trope that connotes forward-looking designs of regeneration.
and renewal. Modern characterizations of organized youth as the embodiment of the future, as the best of what societies could offer, proved empowering to young people, heightening their visibility in spaces beyond the conventional domains of home and school. As most papers suggested, “youth-making” in the twentieth century was first and foremost an intergenerational process, one that was not confined by national boundaries. Since young people were never passive objects of socialization, historians may be well advised to view them not simply as recipients but as catalysts of transformation, nationally as well as internationally.

Mischa Honeck (GHI)
The 18th Transatlantic Seminar brought together sixteen doctoral students working on dissertations in nineteenth-century German history at universities in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. The seminar discussed pre-circulated papers in eight panels that featured two comments on the papers from fellow students.

The first panel examined the subject of censorship and press policy. Matthew Bunn’s paper “Censorship is Official Critique: Contesting the Boundaries of Scholarship in the Censorship of the *Hallische Jahrbücher*” analyzed the censorship of the *Hallische Jahrbücher* in the late 1830s and early 1840s, focusing on the relationship between their editor, Arnold Ruge, and their censor, Wilhelm Wachsmuth. Bunn argued that the relationship between editor and censor was collaborative as well as confrontational and that the *Jahrbücher*‘s later prohibition reflected higher authorities’ concerns over the censor’s ambiguous association with the journal. Arno Becker’s paper “Das pressepolitische System Otto von Bismarcks 1871–1890” argued that Bismarck did not command a perfect machinery of press manipulation, as older research has sometimes suggested. By analyzing press policy on three levels — Bismarck’s initiatives, the ministerial bureaucracy, and newspaper editors — Becker provided
a nuanced understanding of how the Chancellor managed to influence newspaper coverage. The panel’s discussion focused on the differences between pre-publication censorship during the Vormärz and the state’s increasingly indirect means of influencing the press after 1848 — through defamation lawsuits, economic pressure, and press manipulation.

The second panel was dedicated to the history of museums and popular history. Alice Goff’s paper “In the Place of the Statue: German Encounters with Art in the Napoleonic Kunstraub (1796–1815)” explored the physical encounters between Germans and art objects in the revolutionary period, especially during the requisitioning of German art collections under the Napoleonic occupations in 1806–1807. Goff argued that even as the Enlightenment and the French Revolution stressed the symbolic meaning of art, the experience of Napoleon’s looting of art drew attention to the fragile material status of art and sensitized contemporaries to the dangers that people and art posed to each other. Nina Reusch’s paper “Zwischen Unterhaltung und Wissenschaft: Geschichtsschreibung in illustrierten Familienzeitschriften, 1890–1913” examined articles on historical topics in five German family journals. Revising the notion that print culture was closely linked to nationalism and nation-building, Reusch argued that most historical articles in these journals did not construct a German national history but located history in a variety of spaces, ranging from local and regional history to European and even global history. The discussion turned on the papers’ historiographical implications: Goff’s shift from examining aesthetic discourses about art to focusing on the materiality of art objects and Reusch’s focus on the tension between region and nation in nineteenth-century historical culture.

The third panel dealt with urban politics in the postrevolutionary 1850s. Anna Ross’s paper “Transnational Networks and Exchanges in Municipal Government after 1848” explored the networks established among municipal administrators in the German states, Europe, and the United States after the 1848/49 revolutions. Focusing on Berlin Police Chief Karl von Hinkeldey, Ross argued not only that post-1848 urban planning and administration were closely linked to such transnational exchanges but that municipal authorities consciously used the transnational exchange of information to pressure their own state governments for increased investment in managing urban environments. Janine Murphy’s paper “The Transformation of Urban Politics: Cultural Liberalism in Germany, 1850–1864” presented a
regional case study of the Rhine-Ruhr industrial region that examined how the German Bürgertum used the public sphere to redefine liberalism. Focusing on the development of bourgeois voluntary associations, Murphy argued that in the 1850s the Bürgertum developed a “cultural liberalism” designed to foster the formation of rational, independent, and democratically capable citizens. The panel’s discussion centered on the extent to which both papers challenged the traditional portrayal of the 1850s as a decade of political reaction by showing that both conservatives and liberals adopted new political strategies after 1848.

The fourth panel explored the political, social, and cultural functions of collecting and exhibiting art in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Johannes Gramlich’s paper “Entstehung, Entwicklung und Funktionieren des Kunstmarktes,” which derived from his dissertation project on the art collecting of the Thyssen family, drew on sociological theories to analyze the development of an international art market in the nineteenth century. By examining the manifold meanings and uses of art that motivated collectors and the process by which works of art acquired a specific monetary value, Gramlich showed how art collecting gradually became a major trend in bourgeois culture. Megan McCarthy’s paper “Modern Design for Newark from the Rhine: German Applied Arts and Progressive Museum Practice in America” explored the origins of a landmark exhibition entitled “German Applied Arts,” which opened at the Newark Museum and traveled throughout the United States in 1912–1913. While the show resulted from a distinctly German impulse, McCarthy contended, it transformed the nature of modern American arts institutions by dissolving the boundaries between art, trade, and industry. The discussion centered on the role of transnational art exhibits as a kind of cultural diplomacy as well as the complicated mix of motivations on the part of art collectors — for whom art represented an aesthetic experience, an economic investment as well symbolic capital.

The fifth panel investigated migration and social welfare in late nineteenth-century cities. Felizitas Schaub’s paper “Topographien der Bewegung im urbanen Raum: Berlin um 1900” examined the remarkable fluctuation and mobility of Berlin’s population around 1900 by looking at the city’s taverns and restaurants. The high fluctuation of the wait staff, the practices of job agencies, and the changing composition of the customers all illustrated the functions of taverns and restaurants as spaces that both reflected and influenced intra-urban,
regional, and transnational processes of migration. Barry Haneberg’s paper “Protestant Welfare for Maidservants and Migrant Women: Marthashof and Maidservant Homes” explored the emergence and development of maidservant homes in mid-nineteenth-century Germany. Focusing on Theodor Fliedner’s Marthashof in Berlin as a case study, Haneberg argued that maidservant homes must be understood not only as preventive measures protecting migrant women and unemployed domestics from moral danger, but also as a prophylactic effort seeking to buttress an aging social and moral order. The discussion noted the contrast between the well-known “cosmopolitanism” of turn-of-the-century Berlin and the “silent migration” of waitresses and domestic servants within the city and the region, which was little noted at the time and has also been neglected by historians.

The sixth panel addressed two different inter-cultural encounters and the role of religion in the nineteenth century. Inka Le-Huu’s paper “Jüdisch-christliche Begegnung als kultureller Code: Die Debatte um einen Dienstmädchenverein 1842 in Hamburg” used an 1842 debate over the membership of Jews in a Hamburg civic association as an example to develop her thesis that mid-nineteenth-century Jewish-Christian interactions functioned as a “cultural code.” Those who advocated Jewish participation in associational life identified themselves as part of a secular camp characterized by liberalism and democratic leanings, while those who rejected Jewish membership demonstrated that they belonged to a conservative camp that rejected democracy and assigned the Christian church a central position in state and society. Albert Wu’s paper “Ernst Faber and the Consequences of Failure: A Study in Changes in 19th-century German Missionary Culture” examined the career of a German missionary to China in order to illuminate the central conflicts within German missionary circles and the complicated nature of a cosmopolitan identity in the nineteenth century. In Faber’s case, Wu argued, it was his experience of missionary failure that shaped his unremittingly critical, even hostile but life-long engagement with China and Confucianism. The discussion addressed the transformation of Western attitudes toward Confucianism and the tension between Shulamit Volkov’s concept of a “cultural code” and the more dynamic concept of a “bürgerlicher Wertehimmel” (Hettling/Hoffmann).

The seventh panel was dedicated to the history of gender and sexuality. Katherine Hubler’s paper “‘The Woman Question is also a Men’s Question’: The Promise and Problem of Male Allies of Wilhelmine
Feminism” investigated the support of Wilhelmine feminism by a significant number of men who were drawn to feminists’ veneration of femininity and maternity and the promise of a restorative deployment of these virtues in the public sphere. Hubler argued that the maternalist ideology that attracted men to feminist efforts had contradictory consequences: although feminist maternalism could justify distinctively hyper-manly activities, it was also predicated upon a condemnation of dominant masculinity and male power. April Trask’s paper “Transforming the Sexual Body: Medicine, Glands, and Gonads” explored the relationship between German sexual science and the emerging fields of embryology, endocrinology, and constitutional medicine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Trask argued that these new fields of research offered sexologists a new language for negotiating their position in modern medicine and for exploring the therapeutic possibilities of transforming the sexual body. Among the questions raised during the discussion was whether the feminists were launching a cultural movement in response to a failure of politics and whether the sexologists were trying to solve a social question.

The eighth and final panel examined the history of colonialism. Jonas Kreienbaum’s paper “Koloniale Konzentrationslager um 1900: Wissenstransfers, gemeinsame koloniale Kultur und geteilte strukturelle Probleme” addressed the question of why Britain and Germany set up concentration camps in South Africa and South West Africa. Kreienbaum argued that the existing historiography, which has centered on structural factors and knowledge transfers between colonial powers as explanatory factors, does not do justice to the complexity of the historical reality. Although German colonial officials, for instance, adopted the idea of the concentration camp from the British, their implementation was shaped by local traditions, a different structural context as well as their own conceptions of “colonial culture.” Jeremy Best’s paper “Founding a Heavenly Empire: Raising Missionsgeist and Mission Funds in the Heimat” examined the 1913 Nationalspende, a national fundraising drive led by secular colonialists for German mission, which was a key event in the nationalization of the German Protestant mission movement. Whereas before 1913 most German Protestant missionaries had opposed nationalism and favored an international spiritualism, Best argued, the financial success of the Nationalspende strengthened the position of nationalist missionaries just before the First World War. Much of the discussion focused on the challenges that the papers posed to the recent historiography of
German colonialism, the question of what (if anything) was specifically German about these two case studies, and the effect of colonialism on the metropoles.

The final discussion began with reflections on the historical topics that were represented at the seminar, as well as those that were not. There was general agreement that many papers presented highly differentiated analyses of German society, especially civil associations; many examined the social question, but with a focus on the middle-class (rather than working-class) perspective; and a whole cluster of papers focused on the 1850s as a vitally important decade. By contrast, there was not much classic political history, economic history, or Habsburg history. As the entire Sonderweg debate has receded into the background, there were few references to any kind of national narrative; instead, most papers embedded German history in larger transnational contexts, networks, and narratives. Drawing on a remarkably diverse array of primary sources, most projects used cultural history approaches and were primarily concerned with meaning and representation rather than causation. Many worked with a broad definition of politics and used cultural history to illuminate questions of political and social history from new angles. The seminar was characterized by a perfect combination of intellectual rigor and collegiality. The completion of the doctoral dissertations that were presented is eagerly awaited.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
DEMOCRATIC CULTURES PAST AND PRESENT:
PERSPECTIVES FROM WASHINGTON DC

Seminar at the GHI and American University, May 4-13, 2012, organized by the Bavarian American Academy. Conveners: Heike Paul (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI), Barrett Watten (Wayne State University), Meike Zwingenberger (Bavarian American Academy). Keynote Lectures at the GHI by Heike Paul, Maria Höhn (Vassar College) and Werner Sollors (Harvard University). Participants: Alisa Allkins (Wayne State University), Sarah Lisa Beringer (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Sarah Nike Bernhard (University of Passau), Edmund Brown (Wayne State University), Sebastian Dregger (University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt), Cedric Akpeje Essi (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Annabella Fick (University of Würzburg), Katharina Gerund (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Alexandra Herzog (University of Regensburg), Sabrina Hüttnner (University of Würzburg), Dorian B. Kantor (Free University Berlin), Mahshid Mayar (University of Bielefeld), Marcus Merritt (Wayne State University), Michael Oswald (University of Passau), Jonathan Plumb (Wayne State University), Monika Sauter (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Stefanie Schäfer (University of Jena), Michael Schmidt (Wayne State University).

For two inspiring days during the week-long summer academy we were delighted to be able to enjoy the hospitality of the GHI. Our group of doctoral candidates affiliated with German and U.S. universities felt a warm welcome when Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, deputy director at GHI, opened the first session on Monday morning. With the overall topic “Democratic Cultures Past and Present: Perspectives from Washington DC,” the GHI was just the place to be. Individual doctoral projects and three keynote lectures by Heike Paul, Werner Sollors and Maria Höhn were presented.

In her introductory keynote lecture Heike Paul dealt with myth as a foundational moment in democratic cultures in her talk on “Memory Wars, Founders Chic and the Consumption of American Democracy.” Paul indicated the continuities and changes in the canonical readings of specific texts by the Founding Fathers and elaborated on the “founders chic” by using Lauren Berlant’s concept of the “intimate public sphere” (2004). Paul alluded to the fact that many authors of recent biographies of the founders, like David McCullough in his John Adams biography or Newt Gingrich in his historical novels, revisited
the founders and presented them as founding gardeners, founding architects and cooks. Being in the kitchen with the Founding Fathers clearly indicates the consumption of the myth in a “sentimentalist country” again a term derived from Lauren Berlant (2009). Paul asked: “Who would argue about old recipes?” and stressed that the “founders chic” was part of the marketing of a nostalgic past.

The first round of work-in-progress presentations by the doctoral candidates focused on contemporary politics: Sarah Nike Bernhard in her talk on “The Functionalization of Cultural Narration and Memory in Political Staging (Barack Obama’s Presidential Campaign in 2008)” used the tropes of the American Adam and the family man to demonstrate the constructedness of male blackness in Obama’s first campaign. Michael Oswald analyzed interest group politics in his project “The Tea Party: A Social Movement or rather a Means of Post Democracy”, referring to Colin Crouch’s “Post-Democracy” (2004). In the afternoon the second round of work-in-progress presentations covered a wider time span from Edmund Brown’s “The Unification of a Nation: How F.D.R. and Hitler Used Technology during Their Reign” to Stefanie Schäfer’s “Yankee Democracy? Canon Formation and the Struggle for Cultural Independence”, and Sabrina Hüttner’s “Politics of Dissent: The Theater of Naomi Wallace, Christopher Shinn and Tony Kushner.” All three projects were very well developed and indicated how and by whom a multiplicity of voices might be reduced by canon formation with the help of technical devices (the radio, but also, in a broader sense, the literary market) to transmit representative, but also biased interpretations of the state of democracy to the audience.

The evening keynote lecture by Werner Sollors, “Hard on the Eyes: A Photographer and His Subject,” unravelled an intimate relationship. Sollors began by showing the audience a photograph supposedly of a German child after the liberation of death camp Bergen-Belsen, shot by British photojournalist George Rodger, who later became a founder member of Magnum photos, published in LIFE magazine exactly 67 years before the lecture on May 7, 1945. The boy really was Sieg Maandag, a Dutch Jewish child survivor of Bergen-Belsen. Sollors argued that the false caption “Young German boy walking down dirt road lined with corpses of hundreds of prisoners who died of starvation near Bergen-Belsen extermination camp” further strengthened the powerful rhetoric of the visual. Only after finding the real story behind the photograph, the life-long traumatization of the subject and the photographer became the focus of Sollors’ captivating lecture.
On Tuesday morning the period after World War II, democratization processes in Germany, occupation and re-education were once more at the center of Maria Höhn’s talk titled “‘We Will Never Go back to the Old Ways Again.’ African American GIs, Germany and the Struggle for Civil Rights.” The time African American GIs spent in Germany — most of them from the segregated Deep South of the U.S. — had been a life-transforming experience according to Höhn. The military in the occupied spaces was what the U.S. were not at the time: integrated. Contact zones in Germany provided experiences many of the Black soldiers had not made in the U.S. These first-hand experiences of integration became a very powerful narrative in the African American community back home.

In the third round of work-in-progress presentations Cedric Essi took up the questions of race and social change in his talk “Washington’s Interracial Genealogies: From Thomas Jefferson to Barack Obama.” Essi included the newest readings of Sally Hemmings in his analysis of the multiracial individual and family, mixed-race movements and the concept of a post-racial era in the dominant popular discourse. Jonathan Plumb provided another transatlantic perspective in his dissertation project on “How the Artists Peter Weiss and Anselm Kiefer criticize Nazi Ideology.” With Freud’s “Melancholia and Mourning” (1915) Plumb examined how the ego can work through loss and traumatization and indicated the relevance of Anselm Kiefer’s works for aesthetic pedagogy and political education.

The final three work-in-progress presentations started out with a descriptive perspective on contemporary political cultures and attempted to determine the outcomes with a more theoretical approach on the institutional level. Sebastian Dregger’s talk focused on “The U.S. Supreme Court between Originalism and Living Constitution (Rehnquist and Roberts Courts 1986-2012)”; Dorian Kantor presented a project titled “Politics as Law: Juridified Executive Unilateralism and Conservative Legal Movement”; and Sarah Lisa Beringer analysed “The Flow of Trade between Nations.”

During the following days the group was introduced to the work of the National Endowment of the Humanities and the research facilities of the Library of Congress by the staff of the John W. Kluge Center. Further keynotes by Max Friedman (American University), Barrett Watten (Wayne State University), and Donald Pease (Dartmouth College) plus the additional work-in-progress presentations made this summer academy a unique and rewarding scholarly experience.
The inspiring lectures, enthusiastic discussions, and social networking strengthened academic collaboration between German and U.S. researchers and the institutional ties of the GHI, American University, Wayne State University, the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg and the Bavarian American Academy.

Meike Zwingenberger (Bavarian American Academy)
and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)
THE SECOND GENERATION: GERMAN ÉMIGRÉ HISTORIANS IN THE TRANSATLANTIC WORLD, 1945 TO THE PRESENT

Conference at the GHI Washington, May 18 – 19, 2012. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington, the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, and the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius. Conveners: Andreas W. Daum (State University of New York at Buffalo), James J. Sheehan (Stanford University), Hartmut Lehmann (University of Kiel), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI). Participants: Peter Alter (University of Duisburg-Essen), Steven E. Aschheim (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), Doris L. Bergen (University of Toronto), Volker R. Berghahn (Columbia University), Uta-Renate Blumenthal (Catholic University of America), Clelia Caruso (GHI), Carola Dietze (Kulturwissenschaftliches Kolleg, Konstanz), Catherine A. Epstein (Amherst College), Hanna Holsborn Gray (University of Chicago), Atina Grossmann (The Cooper Union, New York), Jeffrey Herf (University of Maryland), Georg G. Iggers (State University of New York at Buffalo), Konrad H. Jarausch (University of North Carolina and Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam), Marion A. Kaplan (New York University), Jürgen Kocka (Humboldt University, Berlin), Tilmann Lahme (Göttingen), Marjorie Lamberti (Middlebury College), Merel Leeman (University of Amsterdam), Silke Lehmann (Kiel), Jürgen Matthäus (Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, Washington, DC), Frank Mecklenburg (Leo Baeck Institute, New York), Jerry Z. Muller (Catholic University of America), Peter Paret (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton), Gerhard A. Ritter (Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich), Philipp Stelzel (Boston College), Fritz Stern (Columbia University), Shulamit Volkov (Tel Aviv University), Gerhard L. Weinberg (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).

This conference brought together historians from various countries and generations to discuss a chapter in the transatlantic history of historiography that, so far, has not been studied systematically. The participants dealt with the lives and oeuvres of those men and women who became historians in the United States, England and Israel after having escaped Nazi Germany as children and teenagers. Since this conference coincided with the anniversary celebration of the GHI, a large number of additional guests from both sides of the Atlantic filled the seminar room.

Names such as Hans Baron, Felix Gilbert, Hajo Holborn, Ernst Kantorowicz, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and Hans Rosenberg represent the first generation of emigrants who left Nazi Germany to continue
their careers, many for good, in the United States. All of them had concluded their academic training by the time the Nazis seized power in Germany. In contrast, those who left Europe at a much younger age constituted a cohort whose academic training was still to come, only to see their careers unfold in the United States, but also in England and Israel. These scholars of the “second generation,” many of whom were of Jewish background, stood in the center of the conference. Some of them — Renate Bridenthal, Hanna Holborn Gray, Georg Iggers, Peter Paret, Fritz Stern, and Gerhard Weinberg — were able to attend the conference and greatly enriched the discussions. Others featured prominently in the conference’s discussions, among them Werner Angress, Klaus Epstein, Henry Friedlander, Saul Friedländer, Peter Gay, Klemens von Klemperer, Walter Laqueur, Michael A. Meyer, George Mosse, Gerda Lerner, Arno Mayer, Hans Rogger, Ismar Schorsch, and Hans L. Trefousse.

As Andreas Daum emphasized in his introduction, the “second generation” was anything but a homogeneous group. Personal experiences varied as dramatically as choices of topics and methodologies. These scholars would embark on multiple themes that often cut across national boundaries. German history and the Holocaust stood at the center of the works of some but not of all of them. To what extent, then, did the “second generation’s” origin in and intellectual familiarity with German-speaking Europe matter — for them personally, for their research, and for their audiences? Which parts of this heritage mattered, and in which context? What impact did these scholars have, and on whom? Furthermore, the forms of disassociation from Germany but also the desire to reconnect with that country varied significantly among these historians, who were also influenced by the political developments of the Cold War era and the massive expansion of higher education.

The first panel of the conference, chaired by Hartmut Berghoff, provided a survey of the “second generation” and two case studies. Catherine Epstein introduced the audience to the role that the younger émigré historians played in American academia at large. She emphasized the great variety of personalities, themes, and experiences. The “second generation” émigrés, so Epstein, saw themselves primarily as American historians. Their works often, but by no means exclusively, dealt with German history; very few addressed the Holocaust directly. In her paper, Marjorie Lamberti, too, argued against drawing easy conclusions from the fact that young
émigrés brought with them a distinct cultural baggage, such as an appreciation of German-style Bildung. Lamberti concentrated on the careers of Gerda Lerner and Hanna Holborn Gray. Lerner played a key role in establishing women’s history in the United States, and her political stance was heavily influenced by the illiberality of the McCarthy years. Only late in her life did she begin to reflect explicitly on her Jewish and German background. In contrast, Gray’s work as a historian of the Renaissance was directly influenced by émigrés of the “first generation.” She overcame boundaries in different ways, as the first female provost of Yale University and the first female president of the University of Chicago. In her comment, Uta-Renate Blumental emphasized the importance for the “second generation” of European intellectual traditions and forms of academic training that were not at all in conflict with efforts to modernize American higher education, as in Gray’s case. The second commentator, Atina Grossmann, suggested taking seriously the particular, if only partial, “otherness” of émigrés. The latter distinguished themselves from others through forms of habitus and style. In the case of Lerner and Gray, however, gender politics might have mattered more than a “refugee effect” in adapting to but also in changing academic environments.

The second panel, chaired by Jürgen Matthäus, concentrated on the role that anti-Semitism and the Holocaust played in the “second generation.” Jeffrey Herf argued that émigrés brought both issues from the margins into the mainstream of historical scholarship, though in each case with distinct interests. Herf highlighted the works of Walter Laqueur, George Mosse, Fritz Stern, and Peter Gay in the United States, Peter Pulzer in England, and Saul Friedländer, who worked for many years in France, Switzerland and Israel. He also drew attention to the intellectual stimuli from researchers in the field of political science. Doris Bergen focused on three émigré historians and the ways in which they contributed to constituting the field of Holocaust Studies: Raul Hilberg with his emphasis on researching the step-by-step bureaucratic process culminating in the Holocaust; Gerhard Weinberg, with his insistence on a source-based inquiry that captures both the global and the ideological origins of the Holocaust; and Henry Friedlander, who stressed the diversity of groups in European society that fell victim to the Nazis’ genocidal policies. In her comment, Marion Kaplan emphasized how the scholars addressed in these two papers encouraged the following generation of students, especially women students, to venture into then still under-researched areas, specifically the situation and perceptions...
of Jewish victims. Delivering the second comment, Steven Aschheim pointed out that German-Jewish émigrés gave historical questions a different texture. As exemplified by the works of Saul Friedländer, they wrote agency into the story of why and how the Holocaust happened. Aschheim also encouraged the audience to reflect more vigorously on the meaning of what constitutes an “outside” perspective in historiography.

The conference’s third panel, chaired by Jerry Muller, provided a close reading of the oeuvres of three historians. Merel Leeman examined Peter Gay and George Mosse as cultural mediators between Germany and the United States. She argued that both saw the United States as the true intellectual successor of the best of Weimar culture and were particularly inspired by Ernst Cassirer’s study of symbols. Tilman Lahme portrayed Golo Mann as an emigrant-remigrant. For Mann, the American exile was enriching but left him as unfulfilled as his brief return to Germany before he eventually settled in Switzerland. The public success of Mann’s works stood in stark contrast to his defeats in the realm of academic politics. The two commentators raised additional questions about what the experience of emigration and exile means for historical scholarship. Carola Dietze advocated an expansion of comparative perspectives, acknowledging the difficulties that the “second generation” faced in its acculturation to American culture. Georg Iggers compared this second cohort of émigrés to the first cohort and suggested putting more emphasis on critics of German imperialism like Georg Hallgarten.

The first day of this conference culminated in a round-table discussion. Moderator James Sheehan invited three “second generation” scholars — Hanna Holborn Gray, Peter Paret, and Fritz Stern — to share personal recollections with the audience and to comment on their sense of belonging (or not) to a particular cohort as well as on their relationship to Germany. Gray pointed out that there was, indeed, a social and intellectual network of émigrés, which she and her family were part of. These émigrés shared, however, a deep appreciation of American culture and the American model of the university. Peter Paret recalled his early life as a young emigrant, a US soldier in the South Pacific, a post-war visitor to Germany, and ultimately a doctoral student in England. Reviewing his own, diverse interests, Paret articulated his appreciation of a kind of historical writing, exemplified by Felix Gilbert, that allows room for a wide variety of topics. Fritz Stern emphasized that he never thought of himself as being in
exile but as having made a permanent move to the United States, especially since the American academic milieu was welcoming and enticing. Still, the transnational experience remained with him as he felt encouraged to enter the field of German history, which was only beginning to take shape in the 1950s.

On the second day of the conference, Gerhard A. Ritter introduced the conference’s fourth panel, which was devoted to comparative perspectives. Shulamit Volkov examined German émigré historians in Israel. Her portrayals of Richard Koebner at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem as well as of Walther Grab, Shlomo Na’aman, Charles Bloch, Yehuda Wallach, and Yaakov Touri at Tel Aviv University provided important insights into the ruptures and difficulties in the careers of these scholars and highlighted their transnational identities. Peter Alter brought in the British perspective. Those who came to Britain as trained scholars faced profound difficulties, as did slightly younger ones like Werner E. Mosse. Ultimately, those who were able to stay, according to Alter, make a difference in fueling an interest in Central European history among British students. Commentator Konrad Jarausch suggested examining what kind of cultural capital the emigrants brought with them, how they acculturated to American society, and to what extent they contributed to the professionalization of the study of central European history. In his comment, Frank Mecklenburg emphasized the role of networks and the institutional infrastructure used by the “second generation” outside universities, such as the Wiener Library and the Leo Baeck Institutes.

The last panel situated the “second generation” among various types of transatlantic conversations. Philipp Stelzel traced this generation’s ambivalent impact on historiography in Germany. In spite of the “non-reception” of Gay’s and Stern’s early works and persistent biases against emigrants among parts of the West German scholarly establishment, the émigrés were ultimately embraced for a variety of reasons — to buttress the agenda of the “critical” historical studies and to be cited as supposedly impartial arbiters. Volker Berghahn concluded the sequence of papers with some far-reaching suggestions about how to conceptualize the distinct experiences of both the first and the second generation of émigré historians. He suggested utilizing insights from the social sciences and anthropology and stressed the overlapping tasks of identifying communalities among the emigrants, understanding their socialization in the United States,
and realizing the limits to their assimilation. In her comment, Renate Bridenthal confirmed that, in her case, the feeling of being “somehow outside” never truly disappeared. She also encouraged the audience to pay more attention to the specific role women scholars played in articulating not only emigrant experiences but also larger questions of social identity that helped to renew history as a discipline. Gerhard Weinberg pointed to three additional dimensions of the conference’s theme: the necessity of gaining access to German sources after the end of World War II; the role that the German Studies Association played in fostering dialogue among historians of all generations; and the importance of having American works translated into German.

Hartmut Lehmann opened the final discussion by reading a statement prepared for this conference by Klemens von Klemperer. Klemperer recalled his personal process of acculturation in the United States and the relationship to older émigrés who often served as mentors. He underlined the keen interest he and his contemporaries took in facilitating a new transatlantic dialogue. The ensuing, lively discussion addressed, among other things, the relationship between social and cultural history and the political contexts that influenced the “second generation.” Many discussants articulated questions about the hybrid identities of many émigré historians and the influence (and limits thereof) of the émigrés’ works among succeeding generations of students. It therefore emerged that this conference marks a welcome beginning in the process of historicizing and contextualizing the oeuvres and experiences of the “second generation” of émigré scholars in all their diversity.

Andreas W. Daum (State University of New York at Buffalo)

Workshop at the GHI, June 7–9, 2012. Conveners: Jan Logemann (GHI), Mary Nolan (NYU), Daniel Rodgers (Princeton). Participants: Tal Arbel (Harvard University), Daniel Bessner (Duke University), Alessandra Bitumi (University of Bologna), Jens Elberfeld (Bielefeld University), Udi Greenberg (Dartmouth College), Christian Gütgemann (University of Konstanz), Carola Hein (Bryn Mawr College), Andreas Joch (GHI/University of Giessen), Christopher Klemek (George Washington University), Merel Leeman (University of Amsterdam), Matthieu Leimgruber (University of Geneva), Corinna Ludwig (GHI/University of Göttingen), Andrea Mariuzzo (Cornell University/Luigi Einaudi Foundation), Stephen Milder (University of North Carolina), Ines Prodöhl (GHI), Barbara Reiterer (GHI/University of Minnesota), Elizabeth Tandy Shermer (University of Cambridge), Frank Schipper (GHI/University of Leiden), Quinn Slobodian (Wellesley College), Phillip Wagner (Humboldt University Berlin), Kenneth Weisbrode (Bilkent University), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI), Thomas Wheatland (Assumption College), Anne Zetsche (Northumbria University).

Nearly fifteen years after Daniel Rodgers’ Atlantic Crossings explored transnational and transatlantic influences on progressive era American society, this workshop set out to inquire about the extent to which reciprocal transatlantic exchanges extended into the post-World War II decades. To what degree was the much discussed “Americanization” of postwar Western Europe tempered by a continued influence of European ideas and voices on transatlantic relations in a variety of fields?

To assess transatlantic countercurrents and the impact of European voices that offered competing visions of modernity, the workshop brought historians from a number of historical subfields into dialogue. In an attempt to complicate existing narratives of postwar transatlantic interaction, this group of scholars examined the interaction of various overlapping elite and professional networks. Diplomatic historians working on transatlantic relations and those studying transnational institutions and networks encountered the work of intellectual historians working on European émigrés and the transfer of ideas. Urban and business historians offered their perspectives on changing transatlantic dynamics, as did historians of
the social sciences. The interplay of institutions and individual actors provided a recurring thread throughout the panels. While a unifying narrative across all dimensions of societal exchange remained elusive, it became clear that the traditional understanding of a coherent postwar Atlantic community dominated by American hard and soft power and of an American model of modernity that pervaded social, scientific, and economic discourses is in need of revision. Despite the shift in transatlantic power relations following World War II, European voices continued to play a vibrant role in constructing the concept of the transatlantic West and in the increasingly mobile professional and expert networks that dominated postwar era discussions of social modernization.

The first panel focused on the role of European voices in transatlantic elite networks and in shaping various aspects of a Cold War Atlantic community. Challenging narratives of the postwar global economic order, Quinn Slobodian analyzed the Swiss-German economist Wilhelm Röpke’s position as a linking figure between American conservatives dissatisfied with the New Deal economic order and German ordoliberalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Other European voices, by contrast, bolstered a Cold War consensus. Focusing on German émigré and political scientist Carl Joachim Friedrich, Udi Greenberg traced the evolution of the term “Judeo-Christianity” from its origins among Weimar-era intellectuals in Europe to its popularization in the United States during World War II and the Cold War. Weimar intellectual traditions also influenced U.S. security policy as Daniel Bessner showed, presenting the German exile Hans Speier as representative of the transatlantic influences that helped shape the American security state in the 1950s. Kenneth Weisbrode, finally, framed the Atlantic transfers and networks discussed in this panel within a broader look at the mid-twentieth century redefinition of the Atlantic Community as the core of the West, as well as this concept’s roots in the Wilsonian tradition of international and transatlantic relations. By looking at the European voices present in Cold War America and, more broadly, in the Atlantic Community, the papers of this panel opened a discussion about the need to qualify perceived American hegemony and U.S. efforts to build a cultural consensus in the postwar Atlantic world.

Cultural diplomacy and efforts by institutions and individuals to keep Western Europe on the agenda for American elites formed the core of the second panel. Anne Zetsche began by presenting a close
look at the Ford Foundation’s role in facilitating networking between German and American elites, its interactions with the Atlantik-Brücke and the American Council on Germany, and its contributions to the creation of an Atlantic Community that was more than just a security network. Andrea Mariuzzo examined Italian-American political scientist Mario Einaudi’s position as a cultural translator, “explaining Europe to Americans and America to Europeans,” and emphasized the importance of biographic studies for the further development of intellectual historiography. Alessandra Bitumi analyzed the European Union Visitors Program’s efforts in the field of transatlantic public diplomacy through fellowships awarded to rising American leaders from different professions and the complexities of the Atlantic alliance in the era of European integration. Overall, the panel revealed the limitations and weaknesses of concerted European efforts in cultural diplomacy, especially when compared, for example, to successful U.S. programs such as Fulbright. Methodologically, the concept of “networks” was central to this panel and, as the discussion following the presentations showed, it is a phenomenon about which historians need to think more critically — to reexamine the many functions of international networks and to separate intention from outcome.

The third panel showcased urban planning as a field with continued, strong European influences on the United States, if primarily as a rhetorical tool with the European city serving as a foil for comparison in the American planning discourse. Phillip Wagner shared his research on American planning experts’ engagement with their European counterparts within the framework of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning, as well as a look at European urban renewal as perceived by these American planners. Carola Hein traced the international careers of three individual planners — Maurice Rotival, Edmund Bacon, and James Marshall Miller — which prompted a discussion of the ways in which European ideas and planning debates played out or were transformed in American cities. Andreas Joch then provided a broad look at the role of Europe in the postwar American discussion about urban development and the importance of migration and travel in the circulation of planning knowledge. Continuing the discussion about periodization that ran throughout the workshop, these three papers presented urban planning as a field whose transatlantic exchanges were not interrupted significantly during the mid-twentieth century, as was the case in other fields. Instead, the 1970s with the end of New Deal liberalism and the decline of high modernist planning presented the more significant
break in this field. Overall, that decade was repeatedly acknowledged to be a turning point in transatlantic relations, if analyzed differently within different fields.

The panel that followed examined transnational critiques of the Cold War order and highlighted the impact of critical European voices in the United States and the Atlantic Community. Christian Gütgemann traced the early history of the Club of Rome and its efforts to organize an international forum where systems analysis and long-term planning could be used to tackle the present and future problems facing humanity. Stephen Milder presented a study of Petra Kelly’s global approach to activism and politics, and a look at the way her position as a Green Party member of the West German Bundestag allowed her to address the American people, to connect anti-nuclear activists on both sides of the Atlantic, and to challenge the U.S.-West German Cold War relationship. By looking at an epistemic community and an individual activist that both sought to address universal issues, these papers served as a reminder that transatlantic history cannot be written in isolation and must be considered within a global context. A departure from a bloc view of Europe and “the Atlantic West,” many participants agreed, would foster a much more nuanced evaluation of the heterogeneous voices that shaped the postwar era.

European émigré scholars were among the most influential European voices in postwar America, and their role in American intellectual life formed the focus of the fifth panel. Émigré historians, for example, were instrumental in constructing Cold War notions of the “West.” Merel Leeman shared a look at the German-American historians George Mosse and Peter Gay, reflecting on their cultural approach to historical analysis as a result of their transatlantic migration experiences. In their work, European émigrés at times played the role of transatlantic mediators. In that vein, Thomas Wheatland’s paper argued that Franz Neumann was instrumental in attempts to negotiate between Critical Theory as espoused by the Institute for Social Research and the American brand of empirically-based social science that the Frankfurt School encountered in exile. Both this panel and the previous one raised the idea that generational differences within organizations and groups of migrants can effectively create a natural periodization; while émigré intellectuals often remained rooted in interwar traditions and concepts, many younger scientists and activists began to reach across the iron curtain and worked with “mental maps” of the world that afforded them a more global problem-solving agenda.
The next three papers questioned the hegemonic role of American social science models in the postwar period and explored the negotiations between American and European scientific cultures and traditions. Tal Arbel’s presentation analyzed the knowledge migration of German classical social theory and postwar American empirical social research to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The two met and clashed as part of a historical episode in which an area on the periphery became the venue for a transatlantic debate, serving as a reminder that the reception of transatlantic exchanges often depended greatly on localized political and cultural dynamics. Barbara Reiterer then shifted the focus to the applied social sciences by discussing the biography of Gisela Konopka, a professor of social work at the University of Minnesota. Reiterer traced Konopka’s career from her initially reluctant entrance into the field of social work as a recently arrived German refugee in the United States to her introduction of social group work to postwar West Germany and her efforts to foster intercultural understanding on both sides of the Atlantic. Jens Elberfeld, finally, examined the development of family therapy in the United States and in West Germany, arguing that it was not a clean-cut case of Americanization and unilateral transfer, but rather one of multiple and multidirectional exchanges that had their roots in turn-of-the-century European psychology and psychoanalysis. The panel suggested that within the complexity of transatlantic exchange, a look at the individual setbacks, challenges, and failed transfers is often equally important for the narrative of exchange.

The final panel considered the role of European corporations and corporate models in the United States, qualifying narratives of postwar economic Americanization. Elizabeth Tandy Shermer began by presenting a study of European postwar investment in the American South, connecting it to a longer history of transatlantic economic exchange in the region, and emphasizing the proactive role of Southern businessmen like North Carolinian Luther Hodges in seeking to attract foreign investment. Matthieu Leimgruber analyzed the evolution of cross-border benefits plans for traveling managers and executive expatriates among the growing number of American multinationals operating in Western Europe. Corinna Ludwig, finally, shared a case study of the German chemical company Bayer’s return to the U.S. market in the wake of the Second World War, its marketing strategies and corporate communication practices, and the challenges that European, and particularly German companies faced in postwar America. All three papers complicated the paradigm of American
hegemony in an area where the idea of Americanization has been most widely accepted. Looking at the multiplicity of ways in which European and U.S. businesses acted and interacted transatlantically, the panel revealed many vibrant European voices in the postwar boom of transatlantic economic exchange.

The concluding discussion underscored the great variety of ways in which European influences and models played a role in the United States during a period typically characterized by exchanges crossing the Atlantic in the other direction. The Americanization paradigm, most participants agreed, was no longer tenable, and transnational approaches to transatlantic history have by now become the accepted norm. Similarly, postwar labels such as modernization, the Cold War dichotomy, and the unified West were called into question and, while none of them were completely dismissed, their reexamination suggested a more complex view of postwar transatlantic exchanges. As much as participants embraced the application of new, transnational geographies, several participants emphasized that nation states also remained a powerful unit of analysis that should not be forgotten. Research that “thinks small” and looks at individual European migrants, transatlantic institutions, and transnational businesses is beginning to reveal a more nuanced and multidimensional view of transatlantic exchange in the rapidly globalizing second half of the twentieth century. At the same time, several common threads emerged over the course of the workshop that allowed connections to be made across disciplines and between different groups of émigré professionals. The labeling of individuals or ideas as “European” could either help or hinder their acceptance in the United States — a distinction that often rested on a number of variables, including what aspect of their Europeanness was being stressed and whether it reflected commonalities or differences with the element of American society to which it was being compared. Many participants called for the reevaluation of conceptual geographies as discussions turned to the inclusion of Japan in a trilateral view of “the West,” postcolonial and peripheral areas as forums for exchange, and the need to explore the voices of Southern and Eastern Europe — or conspicuous lack thereof — in the narrative of postwar transatlantic exchange. While several suggestions were made for alternative periodizations of the “American Century” based on the rise or fall of institutions and ideologies, the emergence and decline of intersecting networks, or on subtle differences in generations of Atlanticists and migrants, no unifying timeline emerged. Rather, it was suggested that a number of
overlapping periodizations might more aptly describe the entangled nature of the twentieth century.

The workshop was part of the GHI’s Transatlantic Perspectives project, and the project’s new website (www.transatlanticperspectives.org) was introduced during the workshop. We are grateful for the hard work of everyone who helped to organize this event and for the support from the German Historical Institute and the German Federal Ministry of Research and Education which made this workshop possible.

Lauren Shaw (GHI)
25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE

The 25th anniversary of the German Historical Institute in Washington DC was celebrated by more than 170 guests on May 17, 2012. After words of welcome from GHI Director Hartmut Berghoff, a number of distinguished speakers offered their congratulations and best wishes to the Institute on the occasion of its anniversary. German Ambassador Peter Ammon noted the importance of the GHI in German-American relations; Heinz Duchhardt, head of the Max Weber Foundation, stressed the contribution of German emigres to German-American scholarly exchange and offered the Foundation’s thanks to the four directors who have led the GHI since its founding; James Grossman, executive director of the American Historical Association, lauded the GHI as a model for the mutual responsibilities of scholars to one another; Simone Lässig, Executive Board Member of the Verband der Historiker und Historikerinnen Deutschlands, highlighted the GHI’s role as a forum for scholarly exchange and cooperation between German and American historians; David Barclay, executive director of the German Studies Association, described the GHI as one of the most exciting ventures in transnational academic cooperation and commended Germany for its commitment to humanities scholarship as a public good; James V.H. Melton, President of the Central European History Society, highlighted the GHI’s role in socializing its research fellows to navigate the different academic cultures of Germany and the United States; Marion Deshmukh, Senior Vice President of the Friends of the German Historical Institute, conveyed the Friends’ congratulations in poetic form; and Alexander Nützenadel, deputy chair of the GHI’s Academic Advisory Board, explained the Advisory Board’s role in connecting the Institute to the larger academic world. The evening’s main feature was a lecture by Professor David Blackbourn (Harvard University) on “Germany and the Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1820,” which is published in this issue of the Bulletin.

Over the next two days (May 18-19, 2012), as part of its anniversary celebration, the Institute hosted a conference on the “second generation” of German emigre historians, who fled Nazi Germany as minors and subsequently became historians teaching European history in the United States (as well as Great Britain and Israel) — a group of scholars that played a key role in promoting the internationalization of the American university, helping a younger generation of German scholars create a democratic academic culture, and shaping German-American relations in the second half of the twentieth century. Catherine Epstein’s conference paper “The Second Generation: Historians of Modern Germany in Post-War America” is published in the “Features” section of this Bulletin. For a full report on the conference, please consult the report in this issue’s “Conference Reports” section.
NEW PUBLICATIONS

   Yair Mintzker, *The Defortification of the German City, 1689–1866* (2012)
   Hartmut Berghoff, Jürgen Kocka, and Dieter Ziegler, eds., *Business in the Age of Extremes: Essays in Modern German and Austrian Economic History* (2012)

2. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)

3. World of Consumption (Palgrave Macmillan)

4. Other GHI Publications
   Hartmut Berghoff and David Lazar, eds., *The German Historical Institute at 25, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Suppliment 8* (2012)
   This publication is available free of charge upon request. Readers who wish to obtain a copy should send an email to hester@ghi-dc.org

5. Publications Supported by the GHI
STAFF CHANGES

Nicole Kruz, Assistant to the Director since 2008, left her position in September 2012 to pursue graduate studies in Berlin.

Insa Kummer, Project Associate since 2007, left her position in May 2012 to pursue other professional interests.

Miriam Rürup, Research Fellow since 2010, left the GHI in June 2012 to assume the directorship of the Institut für die Geschichte der deutschen Juden in Hamburg.

Bärbel Thomas, Foreign Language Assistant since 1996, retired from her position at the end of August 2012. Thomas was involved in organizing almost every conference during her more than 15 years at the GHI and will be greatly missed by her colleagues.

GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay
is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Fellowship in African American History

Julia Gunn, University of Pennsylvania
“A Good Place to Make Money”: Civil Rights, Labor, and the Politics of Economic Development in the Sunbelt South

Fellowship in Economic and Social History

Julia Rischbieter, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Januskopf des Kapitalismus: Multilaterale Kreditvergabe als Institution der Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Strukturprobleme der globalen Ökonomie (1957–1990)

Fellowship in the History of Consumption

Simone Selva, University of Bologna
The West European Mass Market between International Interdependence and National Economic Policies under Bretton Woods: Private Consumption and Public Policies in Transatlantic Perspective

Fellowship in North American History

Simone Müller-Pohl, Freie Universität Berlin

Jasper Trautsch, Freie Universität Berlin
Die Konstruktion kultureller Räume in Europa und Nordamerika, 1945 bis 2011

Postdoctoral Fellowships

Konrad Linke, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Engineers and Entrepreneurs between Tradition and Innovation: The Story of the John A. Roeblings Sons Company, 1849–1953

Klaus Nathaus, Universität Bielefeld
Producing Pop for Germany: A Transnational History of Popular Music in the 20th Century
Julia Nitz, Universität Halle-Wittenberg
The Quest for "Citizenship": Southern Women’s (Personal) Narratives of the American Civil War, 1861-1920

Anja Werner, Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science
Educating the Deaf: An Exemplary Case Study in German-American Relations in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Doctoral Fellowships

Eva Balz, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Die frühe Rückerstattung in West-Berlin (1949-1957)

Mikkel Dack, University of Calgary
The Categorization of Guilt: The Fragebogen, Denazification and the American Occupation of Germany, 1944-1949

Sven Deppisch, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Die Ausbildung deutscher Polizeioffiziere von den 1920er bis in die 1950er Jahre

Robert Fischer, Universität Erfurt
Grenzleben — eine translokale Geschichte von Ciudad Juárez und El Paso, 1880-1940

Katharina Gärtner, Freie Universität Berlin
White Picket Loans — Government Interventions in the U.S. Mortgage Market

Jan Hüsgen, Leibniz Universität Hannover
Sklaverei und Sklavenemanzipation in der Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine — Dänisch und Britisch Westindien

Emily Löffler, Universität Tübingen
Kulturgüterschutz und Kulturpolitik im besetzten Deutschland — amerikanische und französische Kunstschutzeinheiten im Vergleich

Doron Oberhand, Freie Universität Berlin
Die osteuropäisch-jüdische Migrationsbewegung im Spiegel der jüdischen Presse, 1881-1939

Timothy Sayle, Temple University
NATO’s Survival: The Atlantic Alliance in Crisis, 1955-1968

Emily Swafford, University of Chicago
Democracy’s Proving Ground: U.S. Military Families in Germany between World War II and Vietnam

Matthias Voigt, Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main
Re-inventing the Warrior — Native American Activists between Indigenous Traditions and the Modern Nation State during the Red Power Era
Fellowships at the Horner Library

Juliane Graf, Freie Universität Berlin
Crossing Boundaries: German Immigrants to the U.S. between Transcultural Challenges and the Realities of the Everyday, 1850–1880

Christian Horn, Universität Mainz
German Travelers in Nineteenth-Century America

Meredith Soeder, Carnegie Mellon University
American Émigrés in Germany in the Interwar Period

Christian Wilbers, College of William and Mary
German America between 1919 and 1942

GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR, SPRING 2012

January 18
Ulrike Thoms (Charité Berlin)
Zwischen Wissenschaft und Markt. Pharmareferenten in Deutschland im 20. Jahrhundert

Margrit Schulte-Beerbühl (Universität Hannover)
Im Schatten der Blockaden: Verdeckte Handelsnetze deutsch-britischer Kaufleute im Zeitalter der Napoleonischen Kriege

February 1
Clelia Caruso (GHI)
Modernity Calling: Employing and Interpreting the Telephone in the United States and Germany (1890–1980)

February 15
Christina Lubinski (GHI)
Musikalische Entdecker: Westliche Grammophon-Unternehmen in British India, 1902–1947

February 29
Andrew Demshuk (University of Alabama)
The Lost German East: Silesian Expellees in West Germany and the Idea of Heimkehr, 1945–1970

March 7
Atina Grossmann (Cooper Union for the Advance-ment of Science and Art/USHMM)
Remapping European Jewish Flight, Displacement, and Survival: Soviet Central Asia, Iran, and India as Sites of Relief and Refuge

March 21
Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University)
Turning Right in the Wake of 1968? Conservative Mobilization at West German Universities
May 2  Winson Chu (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee/USHMM)
Germans without Borders? Locating “National Indifference” in Twentieth Century Poland

May 9  Espen Storli (Harvard Business School)
Metal Trading in the Post WWII-World

May 23  Miriam Rürup (GHI)
Staatenlose als Herausforderung der internationalen Politik, 1919-1961

June 13  Anja Laukötter (Max Planck Institut für Bildungsforschung, Berlin)
Disease and Emotions: Health Educational Films in Germany and the US in the First Half of the 20th Century

July 17  Silke Hackenesch (Freie Universität Berlin)
“Toxi kehrt heim”: Der Diskurs um die sogenannten brown babies in den USA nach 1945

Isabella Löhr (University of Heidelberg)
“A Defence of Free Learning”: Akademische Fluchthilfeorganisationen in Großbritannien und den USA nach 1933

GHI DOCTORAL SEMINAR, SPRING 2012

February 2  Ulrich Kreutzer (Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg)
Das USA-Geschäft von Siemens: Von den Anfängen bis 2001

James Seaver (Indiana University, Bloomington)
Fighting for Souvenirs: Americans and the Material Culture of World War II

March 15  Elizabeth Lambert (University of Indiana, Bloomington)
Contested Memory: Divided Representations of KZ Buchenwald and Weimarer Klassik

Matthias Schmelzer (Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder)
“A temple of growth for industrialized countries”: Die OECD und das Wachstumsparadigma in der Nachkriegszeit
Social Justice in Times of Crisis
A Transatlantic Comparison

Limiting the social costs of market capitalism and its potentially destabilizing effects has become a central concern of governments in modern societies. Especially in times of crisis, when the risk of social disintegration was high, politicians often advocated the “just” distribution of economic benefits and burdens in order to secure social stability. Exactly how this can be achieved has been the subject of substantial debate. Social justice as a concept has thus inspired and justified very different policies. Welfare is often viewed as the “European” approach to social justice, while the focus on equality of opportunities is commonly seen as its “American” counterpart. Recent scholarship, however, has called into question whether the history of social justice and social policy in the late 19th and 20th centuries is characterized by national or regional exceptionalism. This lecture series explores the idea that this history might be better understood as a history of transnational transfers and mutual influence. To what extent and under which circumstances did Europeans and Americans show the same responses to social crises? When and how did they transfer ideas of social justice or social policy instruments? Can we still identify a distinctly American approach to social justice?

September 6  The Idea of Social Justice: Genuine or Spurious?
Wilfried Hinsch (Universität zu Köln)

October 11  Markets, States, and Social Justice in the Era of High Industrial Capitalism: Contrasts and Connections across the Atlantic
Daniel Rodgers (Princeton University)

October 25  Parallels, Networks, and Convergences: Women and Social Justice in Transnational Perspective
Sonya Michel (University of Maryland, College Park)

December 6  The End of the Social Democratic Era? Crisis in the Conceptualization of Social Justice in the 1970s and 1980s
Martin Geyer (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org

2012

September 5-15 Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar for Young Historians 2012: American History in Transatlantic Perspective
Convener: Mischa Honeck (GHI)

September 9-11 The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Retrospect and Prospect
Conference at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto
Convener: Doris Bergen (University of Toronto), Michael Marrus (University of Toronto), and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)

September 13-14 Immigration and Entrepreneurship: An Interdisciplinary Conference
Conference at University of Maryland, College Park
Convener: David B. Sicilia (University of Maryland, College Park), David F. Barbe (University of Maryland, College Park), and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)

September 20-22 The Transnational Significance of the American Civil War: A Global History
Conference at the GHI
Convener: Marcus Gräser (University of Linz), Jörg Nagler (University of Jena), and Don Doyle (University of South Carolina)

Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Ingo Schulze

November 2-3 Translating Potential into Profits: Foreign Multinationals in Emerging Markets since the 19th Century
Workshop at the GHI
Convener: Matthias Kipping (Schulich School of Business, Toronto) and Christina Lubinski (GHI)

November 8 Twenty-Sixth Annual Lecture of the GHI The Straits of Europe: History at the Margins of a Continent
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Johannes Paulmann (University of Mainz)
November 9  Twenty-First Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute
Symposium at the GHI

December 6-8  Kriminalität und Strafjustiz in der Moderne
(18.-20. Jh.): Tagung zur Historischen Kriminalitätsforschung der Neuzeit
Conference at the Bildungsstätte Liborianum Paderborn
Conveners: Sylvia Kesper-Biermann (University of Gießen) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)

2013

March 8-9  In Search of Better Lives: The Circulation of Ideas for Social Improvement between Europe and the US in the 19th and 20th Century
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Christina Lubinski (GHI), Christina May (University of Göttingen), and Warren Rosenblum (Webster University, St. Louis)

April 18-20  Inventing the “Silent Majority”: Conservative Mobilization in Western Europe and the United States in the 1960s and 1970s
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI) and Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University)

May 29 - June 1  19th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: Twentieth-Century German History
Seminar at the Historisches Kolleg, Munich
Conveners: Richard F. Wetzel (GHI), Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University), and Margit Szöllösi-Janze (University of Munich)

September 19-21  The March on Washington and its Legacy
Conference at the GHI
Convener: Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson (GHI)

September 26-28  Eating, the Body, and the Liberal Self in Transatlantic Perspective
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Jürgen Martschukat (Univ. of Erfurt) Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Susan Strasser (Univ. of Delaware)
October
18-19

Silent Seller: The Cultural Meaning of Commodities that Thrive in Obscurity
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Carla Meyer (University of Heidelberg), Ines Prodöhl (GHI), and Amy Slaton (Drexel University)

October
24-26

Migrants as “Translators”: Mediating External Influences on Post World War II Western Europe, 1945-1973
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Jan Logemann (GHI) and Miriam Rürup (Institut für die Geschichte der deutschen Juden)

December
5-7

The Consumer on the Home Front: World War II Civilian Consumption in Comparative Perspective
Conference at the GHI London
Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Felix Roemer (GHI London), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Washington), and Jan Logemann (GHI Washington)
German Historical Institute Washington DC
Fellows and Staff

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff, Director
Modern social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption

PD Dr. Uwe Speikermann, Deputy Director
Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge

PD Dr. Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, Deputy Director
African American Studies, transatlantic relations, gender history, American religious history

Andreas Fischer, Administrative Director

Dr. Clelia Caruso, Research Fellow
Modern European history; history of migration; history of technology

Dr. Mischa Honeck, Research Fellow
19th and 20th-century American history; transnational history; history of ethnicity and race relations; gender history; history of youth and youth movements

Dr. Jan Logemann, Research Fellow
Comparative and transatlantic history; history of consumption; history of urban development; history of emigration; modern Germany and the United States since the 1920s

Dr. Christina Lubinski, Research Fellow
Modern economic and social history; business history

Dr. Ines Prodhöhl, Research Fellow
Global history, cultural and economic history, civil society

Dr. Richard F. Wetzel, Research Fellow and Editor
Modern European and German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow

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