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This issue of the Bulletin presents the 25th Annual Lecture of the German Historical Institute, delivered by Mark Mazower this past November. Speaking on “National Socialism and the Search for International Order,” Mazower examined the Nazis’ conception of a new international order against the backdrop of interwar international relations, especially the minority-rights regime administered by the League of Nations. Since minorities had been such a source of international conflict in the interwar years, hardline Nazi thinkers argued that the Third Reich could pacify Europe by eradicating minorities and imposing hegemonic regional rule. Europe was to be stabilized by making each state ethnically homogeneous by expelling or exterminating minority populations. Even though the Nazi vision of a new order was, of course, rejected by the Allies, Mazower argues that its challenge to many of the assumptions of interwar internationalism had an impact on the postwar international order, which dropped minority rights protection, reestablished great power hierarchy, and sidelined international law. Lutz Klinkhammer’s comment raises the question to what extent Nazi ideas about a new international order were translated into political action. The Nazi domination of Europe, he argues, created an institutionalized state of conflict that prevented the implementation of any rational project of a “new order.” Running the gamut between the two poles of collaboration and extermination, Nazi occupation policies were fluid and divergent but ultimately simply destructive.

The next two articles present the research of the most recent winners of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize awarded annually by the Friends of the German Historical Institute. Picking up the theme of minority policies, Brendan Karch’s article “Nationalism on the Margins: Silesians between Germany and Poland, 1848-1945” explores how Upper Silesians resisted being assimilated into either the German or Polish nation. Far from being indifferent to nation-building, Upper Silesians nurtured a political culture that embraced ethnic ambiguity and refused to adopt nationhood as the primary axis of identity. The long-term resilience of this political culture allowed Upper Silesians to avoid the ethnic cleansing that took place in other parts of Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe. Eric C. Steinhart’s “Creating Killers: The Nazification of the Black Sea Germans and the Holocaust in Southern Ukraine, 1941-1944” sheds light on the motivations of Holocaust perpetrators by examining how residents of Transnistria, a multietnic region on the border between Romania and the Ukraine, were enticed to participate in the Holocaust. Since
the local populations did not carry out any autonomous anti-Semitic pogroms, pre-existing anti-Semitism was not a major factor. Instead, joining the militia and participating in the mass killings of Jews constituted a key way in which local male residents could demonstrate their “Germanness” to the SS, thus positioning themselves to reap the material rewards being offered to those qualifying as *Volksdeutsche*.

Charles Maier’s article “Lessons from History? German Economic Experiences and the Crisis of the Euro” is based on the lecture he delivered on the occasion of receiving the 2011 Helmut Schmidt Prize in German-American Economic History. In this lecture, Maier elucidated the current crisis by reexamining three sets of episodes from twentieth-century German history: the post-World War I inflation and the deflation of the early 1930s; the protracted conflict over German reparations; and the post-1945 Marshall Plan. Addressing the current crisis, Maier suggests that the Europeans will have to uncouple the short term from the long term by combining a short-term moratorium on debt payments with a long-term resolution of the debt problem. Germany’s role will require generosity and imagination.

In the section on GHI research, Research Fellow Clelia Caruso presents her research project on the role of the telephone in interpersonal communication in Germany and the United States from 1880 to 1990. While research on the telephone often assumes that the device by itself brought about major changes in social relations, Caruso argues that the technological characteristics of the telephone did not predetermine its usage or its interpretation. Instead, over the course of the century after 1880, numerous alternative usages of the telephone were imagined or implemented. The project therefore explores the shifting usage and interpretations of the telephone in order to assess how this new tool of communication both reflected and shaped modern society.

This issue’s conference reports once again reflect the great diversity of the topics examined at the Institute’s conferences and workshops, ranging from medieval history to the history of the Cold War; from the history of migration to the representation of the Holocaust in museums; and from the American Civil War to transatlantic tourism. This spring the German Historical Institute celebrates its 25th anniversary. Please take a look at the special anniversary supplement that is being issued simultaneously with this *Bulletin* and please join us for some of the public events that will mark this anniversary year. As always, please consult our homepage at www.ghi-dc.org for our calendar of upcoming events.

Hartmut Berghoff (Director) and Richard F. Wetzell (Editor)
Foreign policy has always lain very close to the heart of historians’ concerns with the Third Reich. The argument that began at Nuremberg over responsibility for the origins of the Second World War necessitated a consideration of Nazi foreign policy goals. And it was perhaps the peculiarities of the trial’s charge sheet, in particular the charge of a conspiracy to wage aggressive war which dictated that historians would subsequently devote enormous attention to trying to elucidate how far the Reich had been driven by the Führer’s own personal ideological concerns and how far by wider and perhaps more traditional concerns and worldviews. Three conjoined issues were involved: first, how far Hitler set the foreign policy agenda; second, how far geographically this agenda went: Eastern Europe; Europe; the world?; and third, how far back in time it was established: whether purely opportunistically; in the late 1930s; in the early 1920s; or perhaps even, if Fritz Fischer was to be believed, back in the First World War.

The entire debate was really about two things above all: how German Hitler really was in his aspirations; and how far the Third Reich had been playing by, or departing from, the European rules of the game in international affairs. Both were matters of abiding concern to anyone anxious for the stability of post-1945 Western Europe, and West Germany’s place within it. If the entire debate has lost much of its urgency today, it is because we no longer share those anxieties. But we now have other anxieties and other concerns, and these prompt me to revisit the issue of Nazism and its vision of international affairs and to situate it somewhat differently. For we can now see, more clearly I think than was evident during the Cold War, that during the entire debate German foreign policy in the Third Reich era was being judged against an implicit yardstick of how a “normal” major European power could be expected to behave. For A.J.P. Taylor, committed to an avowedly realist model of international relations, that yardstick was a traditionalist diplomatic vision of the pursuit of the national interest in the context of the struggle for mastery in Europe. For his opponents, it involved a more newfangled respect for international
law, for the rights of small nations, and for the balance of power. What both positions shared, in my view, was a fundamental ahistoricism, a reluctance in particular to admit the novelty of the post-1918 European rules of the game, and a fundamental Eurocentrism, an inability to see what was happening in Europe as part of a larger story of competing visions of global governance. Today, as Carl Schmitt put it in 1939, “we have to think planetarily.” And we need to think more conceptually about the vocabulary of international affairs that was deployed at the time and that we now have at our analytic disposal.

Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 2001, historians have returned to the study of international institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Their work reveals that these bodies were produced by ideas and ideologies and emerged as the products of a long period of Anglo-American world dominance; in both cases, too, the catalyst for their emergence was world war. From this perspective, the period of the Nazi “New Order” in Europe takes on a new relevance, not so much for the light it sheds on German war aims, but for the visions of the management of international affairs it elicited both in Berlin and in Allied capitals.

One way to think about this would be to ask how far Nazis and their opponents participated in a common set of arguments about the threat to world peace and the means to confront them. I shall sketch out some of the areas where we can see this happening. Another approach, a little more familiar perhaps, is to look at Nazism as a critique of liberal internationalism. For although it is always tempting to write off Nazi ideology as the irrational expression of madmen, in fact, in the context of the larger twentieth-century story of international governance, one can find no more sustained critique of the dominant assumptions common to both the League of Nations and the UN. It was not just that National Socialism disagreed with the terms of the 1919 peace settlement. Revisionism is too weak a term for the nature of the Nazis’ objections: they believed that their guiding philosophy represented an entirely different view of the world, one which exposed the League’s internationalism for the sham it really was. Thus after 1933, the regime made a set of challenges unmatched before or since to the principles of nineteenth-century internationalism embodied in the League of Nations. And just as the League formed the foil to the Nazi conception of world order, so in turn the UN emerged out of anguished and intense discussions in Washington, Paris, London, and elsewhere about the meaning of the war and the nature of the Nazi challenge. The rise and fall of a
Nazi-dominated Europe thus forms a kind of alternate universe that cannot be left out of any reckoning with the struggle to establish workable international institutions after 1945.

I.

Let us start with the question of ethnic homogeneity in Europe. The Nazis’ original sin, to state the obvious, was scarcely their nationalism. The League of Nations itself had been premised on the idea, common among Mazzinian radicals back in the 1830s, that the spread of what was known as the nationality principle would actually smooth the internationalist task. In 1919, Europe was to become a continent of nation-states. Woodrow Wilson was determined to promote democratic nations and make them the constitutive elements of the new world organization. Unfortunately, Wilson’s conception of national self-determination was really all about the right of communities to self-government and the iniquities of autocracy: it took no account of ethnic complexity at all. Only very late in the day — too late — did he wake up to the fact that “this principle which was good in itself would lead to the complete independence of various small nationalities now forming part of various empires,” in short, to extreme instability.1

This, too, was scarcely news. Since the Congress of Vienna there had been plenty of dissenting voices from the prevailing liberal embrace of nationality politics. Lord Acton, the distinguished English Catholic historian, had famously warned in 1861 of the dangers of a tyranny of the majority for an ethnically mixed democracy. John Stuart Mill tried to sidestep this fear by distinguishing between good and bad nationalism, but the distinction sounded like special pleading and, by the end of the century, bad nationalism in the guise of Prussian militarism or Balkan irredentism seemed to be growing faster than good nationalism. Many British liberals saw this as a problem of national character, basically of psychology, that education would eventually remedy. But the real issue was not psychology at all but attitudes towards the value and prestige embodied in the possession of land and the military threat posed by supposed aliens. As Acton understood, what the principle of national self-determination inexorably did was to turn minorities, however defined, into a political problem.

Faced with this unwelcome revelation of the darker side of nationality politics, the League of Nations responded in two ways. One was to involve itself from very early on in the burgeoning refugee problem. Indeed, one might argue that this formed the substantive core of the

League’s earliest activities. The other was to enunciate a doctrine and a policy of minority rights. Both represented facets of the League’s effort to reconcile the stability of Europe with the vision of a continent of nation-states at peace with one another. But by the mid-1930s, if no earlier, it was evident that in both respects the League had failed.

Far from disappearing, over time the interwar refugee problem, already grave by 1919, grew worse. The international slump, gathering pace after 1929, made it harder for refugees to seek work and dried up charitable support. In addition, there was political pressure within the League of Nations to wind down its refugee work, evident especially after the USSR became a member in 1934 and started trying to curb relief to White Russians, several hundred thousand of whom remained in penury more than a decade after they had fled the Bolsheviks. And with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, refugees from the fighting, and from the triumphant Franco regime, constituted the largest single number of refugees in Europe, outnumbering Russians, Armenians, and Jews.

Most significant of all was the emergence of Nazism in Germany. The Third Reich was an extreme example of the refugee-producing nation-state that materialized in Europe after 1918. Even though many countries, from France to Poland, had deliberately forced out thousands of people after the end of the war on the grounds that they were of the wrong ethnicity, none of these were one-party states ruled by groups explicitly committed to the political exclusion of certain racially defined groups. From 1933 onwards, large numbers of political opponents and Jews were either forced out of the Reich or chose to flee whilst they still could. Making matters worse, Germany’s turn right had a demonstration effect, and other eastern European states started to see in the Reich an alternative pole of attraction to Geneva and a model to emulate. The drift to a far more extreme policy towards Jews and other minorities began to be perceptible in Poland, Hungary, and Romania as well.

The German annexation of Austria resulted in an escalation of Nazi expulsion policy as Vienna became a kind of laboratory under Adolf Eichmann for accelerating Jewish emigration. Eichmann’s Office for Jewish Emigration was, in Nazi terms, a success, and in March 1939 the “Vienna model” was transferred to Prague and then to Germany itself: the numbers of refugees from the Reich soared. And far worse was in the offing. There were far more Jews in Poland than in either Germany or former Austria, and the emboldened Polish government now began
talking about planning its own — voluntary — mass emigration of Jews. It held discreet talks with the revisionist Zionists, who saw this as a way to build up the Jewish presence in Palestine, and also with the French and American governments. Since the British refusal to allow unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine — policy was tightened up after the 1936 revolt — forced a search for alternative destinations, one option that they canvassed was to settle large numbers of Polish Jews in Madagascar.

The Madagascar option provides one illustration of what I alluded to earlier: the extent to which the Third Reich in its geopolitical imaginary was in fact engaged in a larger global conversation that did not end with the outbreak of war in 1939 but, on the contrary, continued through and beyond it. The German foreign ministry’s brief interest in planning for en masse compulsory Jewish emigration to Madagascar is well known. Holocaust historians such as Christopher Browning and others have illuminated the role of diplomat Franz Rademacher and the Ministry’s experts on Jewish affairs in advancing this idea in the summer of 1940. Rademacher’s memorandum of July 3, 1940, written a week after the Franco-German armistice and in anticipation of a forthcoming peace treaty, bears close reading. It was, of course, radical in its assumption that the European peace would require “all Jews out of Europe.” But it was strikingly traditional in its reference to the need to “determine the position under international law of the new Jewish overseas settlements.” And even more strikingly, I think, it talked about having Madagascar “transferred to Germany as a mandate.” Rademacher seems to have liked this idea primarily because it allowed the Jews to be kept in a state of suspended sovereignty, subject to Germany but not citizens of it. Nevertheless, his use of the term “mandate” as much as his adoption of the scheme itself indicates that in some ways German thinking about international affairs found it harder to break with the presuppositions of the League of Nations era than we might have imagined.2

And, of course, the global conversation about refugees was happening in a broader sense, too. All sides in the war regarded refugees as a source of instability and saw transcontinental demographic engineering, in particular creating new colonies outside Europe for Europe’s troublesome population surplus, as essential to future peace. For President Roosevelt, an even larger global challenge loomed over the contemporary Jewish problem. If, as he and many demographers believed, large flows of unwanted masses were destabilizing Europe

and smoothing the path to war, and if Europe itself was too crowded and unable to find homes for them all, then global peace ultimately required American leadership to lead an internationally coordinated policy of refugee resettlement.

Roosevelt was not deterred by the fact that his own favorite social scientist, geographer Isaiah Bowman, was skeptical about the rest of the world’s capacity to take in large numbers of surplus Europeans. In effect, what Roosevelt imagined was a scientific reenactment of America’s own historical experience: a global civilizing process through planned colonial settlement by Europeans. The outbreak of the European war in the autumn of 1939 seemed to him to demonstrate the urgency of the problem and the validity of his proposed solution, and a special team of social scientists was put together which spent the early years of the war scouring atlases to identify possible sites of colonization. This was Roosevelt’s secret so-called M-Project. Its ultimate goal was an even more ambitious internationalist venture: the pursuit of world peace through demography, specifically via the creation, once Nazism had been defeated, of a global scientifically based resettlement program to be organized under the auspices of a new International Settlement Agency.

The International Settlement Agency never came into existence. But even as the war was under way, policy-makers accepted that more international involvement at the state level would be needed to solve Europe’s refugee question. Private agencies had reached the limits of their ability to act. Wartime estimates of the scale of the human dislocation caused by Nazi policies and the war itself were that there would be at least ten million displaced persons upon liberation. Even if the majority were to be able to return home, that would still leave large numbers to be resettled elsewhere — the head of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration estimated at least half a million — to add to the half a million White Russians, Armenians, and Spanish Republicans who remained in temporary shelter decades after they had been uprooted.

Thus in the realm of refugee policy, the League of Nations experience, halting though it was, prompted demands for more organized planning at the international level. Alongside the detailed wartime planning that went on for Europe’s food provision (through the Food and Agriculture Organization) and the financing of housing and reconstruction (through the new International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later the World Bank), refugees and displaced

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persons were cared for, first, by military agencies, then by the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). But in 1946 there were still millions in need of help around the world, and violence in South Asia, Palestine, and China over the next three years pushed the numbers higher still. The UN created a new International Refugee Organization, hoping that this, too, could be wound up once Europe’s displaced had been cared for. But the largest single postwar group — the Germans expelled from eastern Europe after 1945 — were not under its purview and were left to the occupation authorities in Germany to help. The international community’s reluctance to look refugee issues in the face continued.

II.
Refugees were a sign of national and international failure, a marker of the manifold internecine ethnic and ideological struggles taking place across interwar Europe and of the growing reluctance by others to take in those in need. But there was an internationalist alternative and that was to protect minorities by giving them rights through international law so that they could stay where they were. This approach was still embryonic before 1918, and the League of Nations minorities’ policy represented a quantum leap forward, indeed the most ambitious extension of international law for minorities ever seen.

The Great Powers were well aware that the newly independent states they recognized in Europe in the course of the nineteenth century were often no more ethnically homogeneous than the empires they had succeeded. Belgium, Romania, and Greece all contained substantial minorities. However, such protection as the latter got before 1914 was through constitutional clauses guaranteeing freedom of belief and faith. Rights were still conceived of in individual terms.

The initial assumption among the peacemakers in Paris was that the old safeguards would still suffice. In January 1919, President Wilson had clarified that American policy remained that new states should guarantee “under responsibility to the whole body of nations” equality of treatment and status to all “racial and national authorities within their jurisdictions.” This was to extend the nineteenth-century conception of protecting religious groups to ethnic and national ones but it was certainly not yet a doctrine of national or minority rights.4

However, reports of anti-Jewish violence perpetrated by Polish nationalists in the disputed Tsarist borderlands were reaching the Paris

Peace Conference, and by February 1919 the issue of minority rights had already been raised by British diplomats in connection with the terms on which new states in Eastern Europe would receive international recognition. Foreign Office expert James Headlam-Morley, who was to sit on the so-called New States Committee, read over draft proposals to incorporate western sections of Bohemia into the new Czechoslovak state. He asked what they meant by guaranteeing the “cultural, linguistic and political rights” of minorities: “I assume it implies definite clauses to be entered in the treaties, by which the new states are to be recognized, and that if the substance of these clauses is not observed, there will be a right of appeal to the League of Nations by whom the treaty will be guaranteed. Would it not be a good thing to ask the Legal section to draft clauses so that we might know more precisely to what we are committing ourselves? As I have before pointed out, the whole subject is one which might become extremely dangerous.”

Why dangerous? Because the proposed rights involved the new international organization checking the behavior of sovereign states within what had generally been regarded as their own jurisdiction, and this was bound to be deeply unpopular. It was dangerous in particular to the Great Powers, who might otherwise welcome the idea, if it should be turned back on them. In fact, despite the protests — which only grew with time — that no minority-rights regime was equitable unless it was universal, there was never the slightest chance that the Great Powers would allow themselves to be subjected to such a thing. To British and French delegates it was obvious that the maturity of their political institutions and the wisdom of their governing elites obviated the need for any such measures. Equally obviously, the new states of central and eastern Europe lacked the maturity to bring together their own fractured and divided societies without this kind of external supervision and help. Did the news from Poland not demonstrate this? Hence, the New States Committee was established to deal with the issue separately and to ensure it was hived off from the peace treaty discussions.

As Headlam-Morley suggested, there were at least two aspects to this potentially most explosive of legal innovations. The first was substantive: rights for whom and which ones? Just in the case of Czechoslovakia, he observed, one might distinguish Germans in western Bohemia who had “always” lived there from Czechs who had chosen to move relatively recently to, say, Vienna. “Surely,” he

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observed, “when people of one nationality, for private reasons of this kind, choose to take up their residence in a foreign city, there is no claim of any kind to receive exceptional treatment.” So not all members of an ethnic minority ought to count as equally worthy recipients of rights, especially when the rights in question were not merely the traditional freedom to worship, but cultural and national rights: to use one’s language in public as well as private, perhaps to ensure that it was taught in schools and allowed to be used in the press, and, by extension, to have a range of cultural activities safeguarded.

The second issue was procedural: what status should such rights have, who could grant them and provide the guarantee that they would be respected, without which they would likely be meaningless? What happened at the Paris Peace Conference was that separate treaties were drawn up and eventually signed between the Great Powers and the states of eastern Europe that confirmed international recognition and in return guaranteed their inhabitants not only equality before the law and freedom of worship but the right to use their own language, and to private and public education. The first such treaty, signed with Poland, incorporated a right of appeal to the Council of the League of Nations; and others, signed with another seven states, followed suit. In vain, diplomats from these small nations protested that the guarantees would make internal government harder and create states within states.

The minority-rights regime represented an enormous advance over any previous international effort to tell states what they should do in their internal affairs. The trouble was that it was set up in a way almost guaranteed to alienate all sides. Nations accused of misconduct were aggrieved at being singled out for international attention and resented the humiliation when other states were not arraigned in this way. In fact, Poland, for instance, deliberately tried to force German farmers out through a variety of discriminatory measures, and the plight of other minorities in eastern Europe was little happier. Only the Estonians made a serious effort to incorporate minorities into their national life. At the same time, the League did little for those who complained. It refused to admit individual complainants and scrutinized all accusations so carefully that scarcely any were admitted for consideration by the Council. Frustration therefore built up among representatives of the minorities and their supporters. Germans and Jews mobilized together in a new lobby group, the European Congress of Nationalities, but this did not have much success.
The fundamental problem was that the minorities question had become inextricably linked with the demands of revisionist powers to adjust the borders set down at Versailles. Because the two major revisionist powers — Germany and Hungary — also made support for their co-nationals a key part of their interwar diplomacy, protection of minorities became bound up with a larger set of complaints about the justice of the Versailles settlement. And this in turn made countries like Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia dig in their heels. Because the British and the French needed strong supporters in eastern Europe against the twin threats of Germany and Soviet Bolshevism, they were unenthusiastic about making sure that their allies were observing the minorities provisions they had signed up to. Indeed, as time went on and the threat from Germany grew, their pressure on the “New States” evaporated. Even before Hitler took power in 1933, most people in Europe had ceased to place much hope in the League of Nations as a defender of minorities. Afterwards, as power shifted from Geneva to Berlin, a very different approach to minorities emerged and the League system collapsed.

III.

The largest single minority in interwar Europe were ethnic Germans. Stranded by Germany and Austria-Hungary’s defeat on the wrong side of the new borders, millions of them found themselves citizens of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Assimilation was far slower than the diplomats at Paris had envisaged, and many of them faced pressure to leave their homes for a new life in the Weimar Republic, or else to abandon their cultural traditions and the German language. The minorities issue became one of the motors of irredentist nationalism inside Weimar and, for the Nazis and the other parties on the right, one of their main grievances against the League of Nations.

For a time in the mid-1920s, Weimar governments tried to exploit the Geneva minorities system; under Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, German diplomats gave support to other ethnic minorities — especially Ukrainian and Jewish groups — and financed the European Congress of Nationalities, a lobby-group for minority rights that held conferences and published denunciations of minority rights abuses. But by 1929, Stresemann himself had become disillusioned with the League’s weak handling of the minority issue and its reluctance to confront the Poles and other governments that continued to pressure their ethnic Germans. The German public was even more dismayed,
and the Nazis’ uncompromising rejection of the League started to win more support.6

After 1933, with the minorities system close to disintegration, National Socialism began to advance a very different conception of the place of nations and minorities in Europe. Good Wilsonians, the Nazis in their party program of 1920 had started out with a demand for the unification of all Germans in a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination. But the really critical article was article 4: “Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can only be one who is of German blood without consideration of creed. Consequently, no Jew can be a member of the race.” Non-Germans were to live in Germany only as guests, and those who had arrived since 1914 had to leave immediately. And there was another relevant clause: “We demand substitution of a German common law in place of the Roman law serving a materialistic world-order.” All the elements were therefore in place, long before the actual seizure of power, for a sweeping ideological assault on the League of Nations and its approach: no assimilation, racial not universal law, and therefore exclusion and expulsion, not protection.

For National Socialism, there were several things fundamentally wrong with the League of Nations. One was its mystification and idealization of international law, as if international law existed in an abstract realm independent of the power relations it reflected. In reality, what the League had done, some Germans argued, was to freeze a moment in which liberalism, in the shape of Britain, France and the United States, was temporarily dominant, and then rewrite the rules in its image. But behind all the talk of a new organization in which all states were equal, some remained more equal than others. The major powers had permanent seats on the Council, for instance, and they did not have to worry about being bound by things like minority-rights treaties. Real power lay, as Carl Schmitt put it, in the power to set the norms and to decide when they applied and to whom. The League was just another alliance in the scales of power, therefore, and as other states with different philosophies gathered strength, states like Fascist Italy and the Third Reich, the waning of the League’s power would be reflected in the fact that people ceased to take any notice of its rules and to look elsewhere for guidance.

Moreover, this was entirely to be expected since Nazi lawyers insisted that law itself should not be fetishized. Few went so far as to say there was no such thing as international law, and indeed in some areas of

life — notably the treatment of West European prisoners of war once the war broke out — important institutions like the German army found it imperative to continue to observe at least some of Germany’s legal obligations. But international law was to become much less central in the conduct of inter-state relations. The League had led to a “juridification” of international life because it had attempted to craft perennial rules for state behavior and to freeze the territorial status quo established at Versailles. In the Nazis’ organicist vision of world politics as a constant struggle for life this was implausible; instead, any legal order needed to respond to the changing needs of the moment, to be dynamic rather than static. States could not be expected to do what lawyers said — the ideal of the arbitration movement and the new Permanent Court of Justice — especially since there was no “common measure of justice”; rather law should be expected, as in the Third Reich, to flow from the will of the people as expressed in the policies of their rulers. Nor could they be expected to refrain from seizing opportunities to expand through conquest any more than a plant could stop growing. The British might claim that they had done this in 1919 but they had not, as witnessed by their desire to remain outside the legal order of minority rights, and their invocation of legal universalism only when it suited them. Law was for the powerful to adjudicate, not to be adjudicated by.

The Nazis took from an older German school of thought the view that instead of trying to subordinate national states to international control, it was individual states whose will and autonomy was sacrosanct; at extreme moments, this led German lawyers to deny the very possibility of international law. This denial gathered force with the rise from the mid-1930s of a racist reading of law. If politics was a struggle between races, each unified in its own state, then there could in reality be nothing they shared. (Sometimes the Nazis talked about Europe as a “community of peoples” but how this could be reconciled with the fundamental assumption of racial struggle as a motor of history was never made clear.) On this reading, each state would develop its own conception of law and it would not necessarily have anything in common with others. It followed that treaties were only to be observed insofar as it suited the signatories to observe them: they were “scraps of paper” as one German lawyer admitted in print, which could not be allowed to hold the well-being of the race hostage. Or, in the words of another: “Generally recognized international legal principles and international customs are recognized by Germany only when they coincide with the legal concepts of the German Volk.”

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The implications were particularly important for policy towards minorities. If blood was the basis of political belonging, then boundaries counted for little, and ethnic Germans in Poland or Czechoslovakia owed a primary allegiance not to those states but to the Reich. Nazi lawyers worked hard to peddle this view both because it allowed them leverage over the political organizations representing the ethnic Germans across eastern Europe and because they hoped to use it to pressure neighboring governments to cede rights over these minorities and thus allow the Reich to start interfering in their domestic affairs. These governments had on the whole been happy to follow the Reich’s lead in repudiating the League’s minority treaty provisions. But they were a lot less happy about allowing Hitler to pose as the legitimate master of their German minorities. In the late 1930s, as German power seemed boundless, they found it hard to resist; but during the war, and especially as German demands on them increased from 1942 onwards, a real struggle broke out between the Reich and nominal allies like Hungary over issues of sovereignty: Were the Hungarians, for instance, sovereign over all Hungarian citizens in the traditional sense? Or had ethnic Germans in Hungary suddenly ceased to be subject to Hungarian laws? Paradoxically, the experience of being allied to the Third Reich turned many right-wing Europeans into staunch defenders of older conceptions of national sovereignty.

What then did the Nazis propose in place of the League of Nations? Carl Schmitt, the most prominent and interesting legal mind on the German Right, who had long been a vehement critic of the League, explained this at the moment, in April 1939, when the German occupation of Prague demonstrated, for the first time, that Hitler aimed to do more than merely unify all ethnic Germans in a single state. What was the German intention for central Europe? In a word: domination. Schmitt singled out the League’s purported universalism for criticism. Airy claims to universal laws were at best hypocrisy, at worst recipes for instability. Instead, he said, stable legal regimes were those based on power over a clearly delineated territory. He gave the example of the United States: a Great Power which, according to him, ruled the Western Hemisphere on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, prohibiting any other major power from interfering in its zone of influence.

The Monroe Doctrine was much discussed at this time, on both sides of the Atlantic, invoked in Berlin as a model for Europe, expanded by Washington as geopolitical rationalization for tighter hemispheric
cooperation. Both before and after the fall of France, Hitler himself stated that world peace could be secured by an understanding among major powers that each would run their own particular “Great Space.” “America for the Americans, Europe for the Europeans,” was how he was quoted in June 1940. The following month Roosevelt’s press spokesman awkwardly seemed to confirm the idea when he remarked that the US government believed in the application of a “Monroe Doctrine for each continent.” Two days later, he was emphatically overruled by Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, who clarified that the Monroe Doctrine “contains within it not the slightest vestige of any implication [...] of hegemony on the part of the United States.” A year later, shortly after the Atlantic Charter (August 1941) had spelled out the Anglo-American commitment to universalism, self-determination, and the reconstruction of a new liberal order, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden still felt it necessary to spell out that the Roosevelt-Churchill proclamation “excludes all idea of hegemony or zone leadership in the east or the west.”

The Americans and British might have shuddered at a term which forty years later their own political scientists would regard very positively, but hegemony was the central idea around which the Germans initially developed their distinctive conception of world rule. A heavyweight analysis, Die Hegemonie by Heinrich Triepel, a respected retired professor of international law, had been published in Berlin in 1938, and together with Schmitt’s work, it provided the underpinnings for Germany’s vision of Europe in the heady months after the fall of France. Triepel saw leadership by one or more states as the sole contemporary path to reestablishing unity in Europe. This task would fall to the Reich, in partnership with Fascist Italy, allying itself with other smaller powers, establishing protectorates elsewhere. Hegemony thus reflected the newly inegalitarian constitutional structure of the Nazi New Order. Nazi politicians were less polite or mealy-mouthed than Triepel. There would be no question in future, according to propaganda chief Josef Goebbels, of some “crummy little state” acting independently or forgetting its place in the New Order.

In September 1940, the full diplomatic implications of the new doctrine were articulated in the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan. As France’s Marshal Petain put it, the Pact was the expression of “those who tomorrow will preside over the reorganization of the world.” According to its preamble, a condition of any lasting peace was that “all nations of the world be given each its own proper

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place.” That this rather vague formulation implied a system of hierarchy rather than equality among states was clarified in the first two articles in which the leadership of each signatory in a specific region — Italy and Germany for Europe; Japan for “greater East Asia” — was acknowledged by the others. That it was regarded as breaking with the past was conveyed by the repetitious use of the term “new order.”

Within two years, Berlin had moved from talking about a Monroe Doctrine which basically concerned central and eastern Europe (as in Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag of October 6, 1939) to the “pacification of the world.” In his conversations with Molotov in November 1940, the Führer spelled out the implications of this. He told Molotov that his recent conversations with Petain, Franco, and Mussolini had aimed to set up “in the whole of Europe some kind of Monroe Doctrine and to adopt a new joint colonial policy by which each of the powers concerned would claim for itself only as much colonial territory as it could really utilize.” The aim was a “great coalition of powers” which “would assert itself against the rest of the world.”

This conception of an Italo-German New Order in Europe, paralleled by a Japanese one in East Asia — and, Hitler hoped, a Soviet presence southwards through Iran to the Indian Ocean — perfectly encapsulated the notion of hegemony at a continental level. In its regionalism it differed sharply from the universalistic goals of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by United Nations of January 1942, and in place of national self-determination and the equality of nations it posited hierarchy and continued colonialism. But what the idea of hegemony as such did not clarify, and what remained opaque in the highly formal language of the Tripartite Pact, was the nature of the rules to be laid down by a hegemon such as the Third Reich within its zone of influence.

At the theoretical level, neither Schmitt nor Triepel had said much about that, perhaps because neither was a dedicated disciple of National Socialist racialism. After the war broke out, and especially with the invasion of the USSR in 1941, which hardened the racial dimension of Hitler’s own vision of the future, this exposed Schmitt in particular to criticism from more radical National Socialist political scientists. The group of intellectuals clustered around Heinrich Himmler in the SD — Wilhelm Stuckart, Reinhard Höhn, Werner Best, and others — who spent a considerable amount of time worrying about these issues, provide our chief guidance into hardline Nazi thinking about how race could be turned into a principle of international
governance. Their basic conception was that of stabilizing Europe by turning each state into an ethnically homogeneous whole. In some cases this was to happen through population exchanges and expulsions. But because they ruled out the possibility of assimilation — race-mixing was by their definition harmful — they were also prepared to contemplate more violent solutions. Indeed, on more than one occasion they went into print, admittedly at the most abstract level, to recognize the possibility of extermination as a means of national and continental purification.11 They seem to have believed that, since minorities had been such a source of international friction between the wars, the eradication of minorities and the imposition of hegemonic regional rule by the Third Reich would suffice to bring peace to inter-state relations in Europe. Creating a continent of “race-satiated states” would induce harmony, a kind of racialized Mazzinianism. And since having numerous tiny statelets under the Reich’s sway was easier than controlling larger states as junior partners, they favored fragmenting states like Poland; indeed they were willing to do the same for France, and had they conquered the United Kingdom, they would also have recommended autonomy for Wales and Scotland as a means of eroding British power.

Ironically, we now know that even as Nazi theorists were mounting an attack on the very idea of minorities, Nazi policy-makers were having to grapple with some of the same issues in eastern Europe that the League had been dealing with and coming up with surprisingly similar solutions. In the Protectorate, as Tara Zahra has shown, Nazi nationalities policy did not represent much of a break with the past, at least not where Germanization was concerned.12 Even more interesting is the case of Hungary and Romania. Because they were both allies of the Reich, Germany could not allow them, as seemed possible in 1940, to go to war with one another over their rival claims to Transylvania. Instead, Germany and Italy found that the best way of preserving their regional status as leaders was securing new minority rights regimes for those Hungarians and Romanians on the wrong side of the borders between the two states. Astonishingly, to our eyes, an Italo-German commission supervised both the Hungarian and the Romanian treatment of their minorities and ended up behaving rather similarly to how the League’s minorities secretariat had done a decade previously.13

At the same time, what struck most contemporary observers of Nazi rule in occupied Europe were not the contradictions and the

11 See Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York, 2009), 237.
similarities with the past, but the new light it shed on old assumptions. One important consequence of the Nazi assault on the League and its values was that it led commentators in Britain and America to wonder out loud what the future held for international law. “What’s wrong with International Law?” asked one émigré law professor in 1941. It was not that the Nazis were thought to be right in their arguments but that their rise to power had thrown into question many of the most cherished beliefs of proponents of interwar internationalism. Quincy Wright, a leading American supporter of the League, noted with dismay that “totalitarianism has unmasked the inadequacy of [the philosophical and political foundations of international law].” Law without the means of enforcement was discredited. Law as an unquestioned fount of impartial authority lay in tatters. For some, the lesson was to establish an international authority stronger than the League had been with the power to make and enforce its laws. But others wondered whether there existed the necessary shared values among states to make this possible, or whether the very divergent social conditions and ideologies would preclude it. The old shared confidence in the nineteenth-century standard of civilization had surely been mortally wounded by the rise of Nazism itself.14

To make matters worse for the lawyers who wished to see international law become an effective supranational force, the war saw a revival of support for the old idea of a Europe of nation-states. Although Nazism had been at heart a doctrine of state sovereignty, it had trampled heedlessly over the sovereignty of other nations. Early in the war there had been a momentary impulse to see the nation-state in Europe as the problem and to argue for federalism as the solution. But this did not last, and by 1942 at the latest, the early enthusiasm for recasting the map of Europe and creating a continent of large federations had vanished. Émigré politicians took the lead in demanding the restoration of their independence and pointed to the Atlantic Charter in support of the restoration of self-determination.

It also led to a flourishing of power politics. In Britain, E.H. Carr published his indictment of interwar idealism, setting the terms for the rise of postwar realism as the dominant paradigm in international relations. In the United States, émigré lawyer Hans Morgenthau became the best-known proponent of this view. At the same time, strategists like Nicholas Spykman affirmed the importance of geography in world affairs and urged a new global conception of U.S. national security based on premises that resembled in many of

their essentials the mainstream geopolitics of interwar continental Europe. As for the Monroe Doctrine, we should not forget that its last incarnation, after the mutations of 1940, was the “new Monroe Doctrine” enunciated by President Harry Truman in March 1947, which was almost immediately dubbed the Truman Doctrine. Both critics and supporters understood Truman’s decisive innovation to have consisted in globalizing the premises of the older Monroe doctrine and in that sense articulating a philosophy for a new global role for the United States.

It was thus in the war against Nazism that a more hardnosed approach to international engagement emerged in the United States, one which would underpin the turn to globalism in the Cold War. Nazism itself was decisively defeated and the chief body of interwar liberal internationalism, the League of Nations, was resurrected in the shape of the new United Nations. But although the latter embodied essential continuities from the League of Nations, it was also markedly different in some respects. Minority rights protection was dropped; Great Power hierarchy was re-established; and international law, the idea of arbitration, and obligatory disarmament all remained mere shadows of what they had stood for earlier. The imperfect interwar hegemony of the British was replaced by the far more powerful global hegemony of the United States, whose liberal internationalism was tempered by the experience of the war against Hitler and influenced by much of the geopolitical thinking that had emerged at that time. Riven with contradictions and uncertainty, the Nazi vision of international order was no sooner glimpsed — between 1938 and 1940 — than it vanished amid the rubble of defeat. But its influence and impact lasted for much longer; indeed in some respects, it remains to this day.

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NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER
COMMENT ON MARK MAZOWER’S LECTURE, WASHINGTON DC, NOVEMBER 10, 2011

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With a notable increase in research during the 1990s, the prevailing understanding of Nazi rule in Europe during the Second World War has been focused on the regime’s ruthless extermination policies. The overall conduct of the German armed forces — not only of SS men — has been analyzed and the myth of the so-called “code of honor” allegedly maintained by the Wehrmacht, at least in Western Europe, has been dismantled, revealing the savagery of war and the slaughtering not only of Russian soldiers and European partisans but of civilians in all occupied countries. The role of the Wehrmacht in the genocide has been thoroughly documented, but there is still intense scrutiny of the extent to which individual soldiers participated in the slaughter of civilians. Only thorough studies of small territories can help us to better understand the dynamics of Wehrmacht violence. Carlo Gentile’s recent study of the Italian theater of war, for example, considers a series of contingencies, but also reintroduces a distinction between ordinary German soldiers and Nazified elite troops.

The historiography’s attention to the sins of commission has been reinforced by the media and the courts. One could notice the return of the faces of Nazi perpetrators in a series of recent war crimes trials, mostly against SS criminals but — as in the case of Italy — also against soldiers of the Waffen-SS and non-SS army soldiers. These trials have marked a shift in public sensibility in Europe. In the West German public debate the centrality of the Holocaust has been accepted since the Auschwitz Trial of the early sixties, but it was accepted precisely because the number of active perpetrators was seen to be limited to a relatively small group of several thousand people. We know that this view was strongly attacked by Daniel Goldhagen as well as by the first version of the German exhibition on the crimes of the Wehrmacht. Contemporaries were indirectly requested to take account of their sins of commission and not to minimize them as sins of omission. Both interpretations constituted a challenge to established interpretations of Nazi institutions and anonymous structures. Historiography — in dealing with Nazi intellectuals and with Nazi violence — has been shifting from institutional responsibility
to individual guilt, looking much more at the perpetrators and the collaborators, the spies and the informers, rather than the structures of the apparatus of repression.

Historians’ interest in the participation and shared individual responsibility of German soldiers and parts of the occupation apparatus for the Nazi extermination program has brought back to the forefront the material executors of the repression, deportation, and extermination, and has overcome the overly tidy separation between bureaucrats and criminals, those who ordered the crimes and those who carried them out. In particular, studies like those of Christopher Browning and Omer Bartov have shown how large the number of direct participants in the extermination of the Jews and of those who assisted the direct participants was. The barbarization of the Wehrmacht had an analogue in the barbarization of the non-military personnel, and in the barbarization of their intellectual planning, involvement in Nazi occupation policies and in the Holocaust.

Mark Mazower’s interpretation has a different focus: not the savagery of killing, not Nazi bloodlust, but “the Nazi vision of international order,” which swept away the League of Nations’ attempts to establish a stable and peaceful international order, and the kind of thinking that underlay Nazi violence and made possible a destructiveness of unthinkable dimensions. Mazower examines “Nazism as a critique of liberal internationalism” and as a challenge “to the principles of nineteenth-century internationalism embodied in the League of Nations.” Indeed, in the context of international governance, he argues, “one can find no more sustained critique of the dominant assumptions common to both the League and the United Nations.”

Mazower’s investigation of the Nazi search for a new international order, Nazi foreign policy, and geopolitics is meant to explain how the “rise and fall of a Nazi-dominated Europe” influenced the development of a new international order, replacing the “imperfect interwar hegemony of the British” with the “far more powerful global hegemony of the United States.” Mazower does not want to deal with the older debate on Nazi political aims or the question of a German national Sonderweg (special path), both of which have been on the historians’ agenda since the Nuremberg trial, or to discuss the German war aims. He is testing another hypothesis, focusing on the question of how Nazi ideas on shaping a New Order in Europe influenced the “visions of the management of international affairs.” In such a perspective, the “period of the Nazi New Order in Europe”
had great relevance for the development of international institutions, especially the United Nations: for “the catalyst for their emergence was world war,” as before in the case of the League of Nations. The “vocabularies of international affairs ... deployed at the time” and the new visions of the management of international affairs that arose in Berlin and in the Allied capitals are Mazower’s main concern in exploring some of the issues that the Nazis and their opponents considered central to creating a stable world order: the refugee problem created by the war and by the allegedly more “homogeneous” new nation states, the international law about nationalities and minority rights, the question (raised by the Nazis) of ethnicity and the racial state, of hegemony and spheres of influences, and the force of international law. The question is if, when, and how these ideas (proposed by lawyers, politicians, and diplomats) were translated into political action or whether some of these debates derived from a new political situation. This might be the case for “hegemony,” which reflected, according to Mazower, “the newly inegalitarian constitutional structure of the Nazi New Order.”

Mazower’s emphasis on the catalytic impact of World War II and on the question of the “Nazi New Order” is clearly related to his previous works, in particular to Hitler’s Empire (2008). In this masterpiece, which provides a comprehensive analysis of Nazi rule in Europe during the war, including the parallel occupations and violent actions of the major German allies, the two most important concepts are “Empire” and “New Order,” which are analyzed in relation to contemporary conceptions of Europe and the character of fascist violence. Quite convincingly, Mazower chose to present a global view of Nazi rule over Europe and to deal with Hitler’s allies and their parallel occupations of smaller parts of Europe as well, thus creating a measure of comparison and challenging the collective amnesia with regard to collaborationism that developed during the Cold War. What Mazower’s analysis of Nazi rule highlights is not so much the “catalytic impact of the war itself,” but the Nazi belief that “it had fallen to them to establish an empire that would elevate them to the status of a world power. ... Hitler as empire-builder: it may not be how we commonly think of the Führer.” In this, Mazower is completely right. For a long time, Nazi rule was seen much more under the aspects of destruction, denationalization, murder, and genocide than under those of self-interpretations, speeches, and strategy papers on how to shape the newly dominated areas of Europe for the sake of a Greater German Reich. Therefore Mazower’s focus on the “Nazi
New Order,” which is at the heart of his Annual Lecture as well, is most welcome and deserves further consideration.

The so-called “New European Order” was an expression that came into widespread use primarily in the Latin and Anglo-Saxon linguistic areas during the Second World War; unlike “living space”, “race” or “national character” (*Volkstum*), it was not one of the key concepts of National Socialism. Rather, it was a formulation created by Nazi Germany’s allies in order to place their collaboration with the Axis Powers into context, a catch phrase that later entered the terminology of historical research on the Nazi policy of continental occupation through the political sphere. Although the term “New Order” was used in the Tripartite Pact (autumn 1940), it was not common Nazi terminology. Hitler himself does not appear to have used it. During a *Ministerkonferenz* on 16 September 1942, Goebbels strongly opposed its use. It was the Nazis’ European fascist and pro-fascist allies who adopted this term as part of their strategy for obtaining concrete concessions about their political future under Nazi hegemony. In this they failed, as Petain had to learn when he talked to Göring at the end of 1941 desiring to know more about German plans for “how France would fit into the New Order of Europe.” As Mazower underlines, Hitler was completely reluctant to define anything that would bind him. In order to prepare the renewal of the anti-Comintern pact in November 1941, the dictator allowed Ribbentrop to prepare the draft of a European manifesto, but when “victory was in sight, he forgot about diplomacy.”

It seems to me that, at least to some extent, the idea of a Nazi New Order as presented in Mazower’s *Hitler’s Empire* constitutes a return to a more Hitler-centric point of view, now combined with a global approach that includes the strategies of German allies and of collaborationist forces. Mazower gives centrality to Hitler’s speeches and other utterances on his strategies of domination and to the discussion or application of some of these arguments by major Nazi leaders. In addition, other sources on Hitler’s plans are often taken from German or foreign diplomatic papers. What Mazower’s analysis fails to address is the question of whether Hitler was able to turn his ideas into strategies and the connection of Hitler’s ideas to the internal structures of Nazi power that provided the basis for the horrible dynamics of the Nazi state, leading to aggressive expansion, radicalization, terror, and mass murder. It was precisely its “cumulative radicalization” (Hans Mommsen) that made the Nazi system so
efficient in its initial phase and much more effective than its Italian counterpart, which could not withstand the war and broke down in 1943. The fact that this cumulative radicalization led to a selection of the negative elements of Nazi ideology (as Martin Broszat put it) was not only destructive to others, but in the last analysis also self-destructive for the regime. Among other things, it rendered the Nazi system unable to reach pragmatic solutions and decisions about political priorities. After Stalingrad, for instance, not only Ribbentrop, but Goebbels and Hans Frank desired a political declaration in favor of Polish collaborationist forces in order to make the Poles work harder for German victory. But Hitler opposed any such declaration, whether in favor of the Polish collaboration or the other occidental collaborationist groups and states.

One can question whether there was any central planning from above for the “New Order.” What Hitler deliberately created was, I would suggest, not a new order, but a new disorder — based on the destruction of the state system that came out of Versailles. Saturated with feelings of revenge and violent anti-Semitism, his political program was based on expansionist war, the conquest of new space to the east, and the extermination of the peoples of Eastern Europe as a form of politics. Immediately upon the military subjugation of these states, the National Socialist concept of conquering new “living space” in the East and its cruel Germanization were translated into action, with all its racist and social-Darwinist implications. In order to do so, the Nazis employed a series of plans that involved the forced transfer of entire populations and the systematic massacre of millions of human beings in Eastern Europe. By contrast, no such analogous general plan existed for Western Europe.

Apart from a few rare above-mentioned constants in Hitlerian ideology, National Socialist policy often proceeded in a contradictory manner and was shaped by the contingencies of the war. The catalytic impact of war thus has to be stressed. A rational project of European domination was never systematically translated into reality. One therefore has to examine the contradictions of Nazi policy in every single occupied state. The Nazi occupation in Europe moved, with very different gradations, between the two poles of a policy of collaboration and one of extermination. Although the policy of collaboration was more forcefully promoted in Vichy France and the Italian “Social Republic,” even in France and Italy there were zones of more intense Nazi domination such as Alsace-Lorraine, the Alto
Adige, and Venezia Giulia, which were de facto removed from their respective local governments and made subject to special Nazi administrations and governed by Gauleiter of the neighboring regions of the Greater German Reich. After the Wehrmacht’s victories in the Blitzkrieg, the Nazi leadership decided spontaneously — according to a somewhat colonial logic — what form of domination should be established in the different conquered countries.

Apart from the contextual differences between different cases, it is generally possible to distinguish three phases in the dynamics of German occupation: a formative phase, a phase of consolidation, and a phase of radicalization. Characteristic of the formative phase of Nazi domination in Europe was the geographic dismemberment — that derived at least in part from a racist notion of national character — of the structures of the occupied nation-state. The case of France is typical: while the northern départements were joined together, along with Belgium, under a military administration, Alsace and Lorraine were given civil administrations directed by Gauleiter, high functionaries of the Nazi Party even more than German state administrators. Furthermore, in the remaining part of the northern half of France, a militarily occupied zone was created under the control of a German military administration, while the southern half of the country — which was less important militarily and less attractive economically — was entrusted to the French state of Vichy. In subsequent years, the controlling German authorities engaged in a lively competitive struggle among themselves to obtain collaboration — so much so that what resulted was an entirely new model of occupation that no longer bore any resemblance to Werner Best’s model. Even occupied Yugoslavia was divided into a zone of annexation (Slovenia), a zone under military administration (Serbia), and a zone entrusted to a collaborationist government (the Croatia of the Ustaše). An analogous model was that of Italy, occupied by the Germans after 8 September 1943. This destructive reorganization of occupied countries evidently had little to do with any kind of master plan.

During the consolidation phase of Nazi domination, the continuous struggles for power in almost all the occupied territories between political officials, police agencies, and the military authorities of the occupation regime produced an institutionalized state of conflict that prevented the implementation of any coherent set of political plans for western, southern, and northern Europe. With the installation of Heinrich Himmler’s regional office-holders — the higher officers of
the SS and police — the political weight of the SS increased continuously beginning in 1942, resulting in a radicalization of occupation policy that permitted the capture, detention, and deportation of the European Jews, carried out in the West by the SS, which was given wide autonomy, including on the matter of the involvement of local collaborationist police. It is here, above all, in the system of control and of ransacking the resources of the occupied countries, that the real constant of Nazi occupation policy can be recognized. Nonetheless, the inner circle of SS radicals around Himmler never succeeded completely in setting the guiding principles of governance in occupied countries. In what is recognizable, beginning in 1943, as the third phase of German domination in Europe, the intensified exploitation of the occupied territories and the acceleration of the program of extermination brought about an ever stronger radicalization of conflicts: the growth of resistance movements and a general discussion of the policy of collaboration in all the states of western Europe.

The idea of Europe conceived and proposed by Hitler and his inner circle of decision-makers cannot be separated from the concrete occupation policies that the Nazi regime developed during the Second World War. The role that the different European nations were to play within the new European order depended not only on the ideas disseminated by the Nazi leadership, but also from the attitude of the Third Reich’s greatest ally — Fascist Italy — and on other fascist and collaborationist groups within the occupied countries. Starting in 1942, and with more force after the catastrophe of Stalingrad, the idea that something should be offered to foreign collaborationist groups, even if only for propagandistic purposes, began to spread among the highest levels of the National Socialist leadership. Thus Ribbentrop proposed to Hitler the project of a league or federation of European states (Europäischer Staatenbund) composed of the occupied countries and German satellites; this meant the exclusion of the eastern occupied states, where an extermination policy would be applied in order to gain “living space.” In 1943, both Giuseppe Bastianini of the Italian Foreign Ministry and Pierre Laval, head of the Vichy government, (vainly) put repeated pressure on Ribbentrop to convince him of the advantages for the Nazis if they made any sort of Europeanist declaration. Although they aimed at increasing the willingness to collaborate with Germany in their respective countries, they only succeeded in demonstrating the weakness of these allies in comparison with Germany’s hegemonic power. Hitler’s earlier idea of separate zones of influence for Germany and Italy vanished during the war.
Because of the strong differences between the Eastern and Western paradigms of occupation, the pressures on Nazi Germany to define a new European Order came from governments and intellectuals in western and southern Europe. In western Europe, the Germans instituted occupation regimes whose *raison d’être* did not consist in carrying out a racial war of extermination, even if later racially motivated persecutions did, in fact, take place there. The Germans wished to offer western states a subordinate place in a National Socialist Europe, an arrangement that presumed at least partial ideological adaptation to the model of Nazi domination. In many cases, this adaptation occurred in the form of collaboration on the state level (the passage of anti-Semitic laws, for example), collaboration in the war (with the creation of the Waffen-SS), and economic collaboration (in the production of armaments). In a certain sense, the administrative segregation of the Jews represented an indirect test of the collaborative capacity of local ruling groups in the occupied territories. This collaborationist paradigm was then linked to propaganda that expressed an unspecific idea of the “West.” Thus in the West an occupation policy began to take root that was different from that used in the East, where Hitler had already announced in 1939 that he wanted to move forward massacring like Genghis Khan.

In Hitler’s mind, “Europe” and “the East” were different concepts that excluded one another. In May 1943, he told his young future soldiers that there ought to be a European living space under German leadership, for otherwise Europe would disappear leaving the place to something evident to those who knew the East. In another speech, delivered on 22 August 1939, he told his army commanders to eliminate the Polish population — men, women and children — so that the citizens of Western Europe would tremble in fear. In this way, Hitler created an “Eastern paradigm” in Nazi-ruled Europe. When SS-general Odilo Globočnik turned to Trieste after his bloody work connected to Operation Reinhard, he followed such a distinction between East and West. He organized the deportation of the Jewish population of the Trieste region to Auschwitz but did not build an extermination camp with gas chambers in Trieste. Instead he “limited” himself to the shooting and torturing mostly of communist partisans.

What about the “New Order” and the spheres of influence established in the Tripartite Treaty in September 1940? When one examines the development of Nazi policies in the areas of Europe under German domination, the “New Order” reveals itself as a fluid and divergent
but always destructive realization of various Nazi political aims, which changed during the years of war. In my view, the expression “eine neue Ordnung der Dinge” in the official German version of the treaty (“Ziel ist, eine neue Ordnung der Dinge [in den europäischen Gebieten] zu schaffen und aufrechtzuerhalten”; “die Führung Deutschlands und Italiens bei der Schaffung einer neuen Ordnung in Europa”) should be understood simply as a synonym for oppressive hegemony in the newly defined continental areas: “Europe” on one hand and “Greater East Asia” on the other. The Nazi leadership used a distorted interpretation of the original Monroe Doctrine in order to reinforce its concept of hegemony as unbounded domination over a huge geographical area of the world. Carl Schmitt’s use of the Monroe Doctrine (“den gesunden Kern eines völkerrechtlichen Großraumprinzips der Nichtintervention”) as a vehicle to propagate his concept of concurring continental zones of influence was a method of eroding international law and — according to Catherina Zakravsky — to disguise his propaganda as a forecast. As Lothar Gruchmann demonstrated years ago, Carl Schmitt and Nazi officials misinterpreted the original Monroe Doctrine by referencing the Olney Corollary or the Roosevelt Corollary, which constituted imperialistic distortions of the 1823 declaration. But even during the period of American “big stick” foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine never served as a pretext for territorial annexations through armed intervention. In his declaration of July 1940, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull made clear the fundamental difference between the American and the Nazi interpretation when he underlined that the Monroe Doctrine “never has resembled ... policies which appear to be arising in other geographical areas of the world, which are alleged to be similar to the Monroe Doctrine, but which ... would in reality seem to be only the pretext for the carrying out of conquest by the sword, of military occupation, and of complete economic and political domination by certain powers of other free and independent peoples.” Indeed, the latter was the essence of Nazi domination over Europe including, at the end, the geographical area of Germany’s most important ally in Europe, Fascist Italy.

The case of Italy demonstrates that the Tripartite Treaty was only a stage on the road to fully unleashed German hegemony in Europe. The proclamation of the “axis” between Rome and Berlin (1936), the signing of the German-Italian Cultural Agreement (1938), and ultimately of the Pact of Steel (1939) had been stages on the way to an ever stronger political and ideological rapprochement, which by no means occurred only at the top level of party bosses and members of
government, but also happened among the masses. The exchanges organized by Kraft durch Freude and Dopolavoro groups, the multitude of German travel groups which set out for Italy, half a million Italian workers who came to Germany between 1938 and 1943 and were mostly involved in the arms industry — all of these were signs of an intensive cultural exchange that was by no means free of conflict but was a historical experience of great significance. This mass movement was preceded by a progressive rapprochement at both political and military levels, which led to the parallel Italian wars in Africa and the Mediterranean, the conquest of Ethiopia and Albania, Italy’s entry into the War in 1940 and the immediate attack on France, the surprise attack on Greece, the attack on Slovenia and Croatia, dividing up the occupied territories in Yugoslavia and Greece between the two allies, and Italian support for the German attack on the Soviet Union. All of these point to an extensive agreement to accept each other’s politics of aggression that aimed to destroy the international status quo. The politics of aggression was not, however, confined to foreign affairs. A parallel development was becoming evident in the pressure that Fascism was exerting internally: the Italian race laws of 1938, the forced Aryanization of Jewish companies, the exclusion of Italian Jews from the professions, the dismissal of Jewish soldiers and officers from the army, the setting up of Italian prison camps from 1940, in which foreign Jews and those Italians seen as politically dangerous were interned; and the deportation of thousands of Slovenians and Croats as political prisoners, supposed saboteurs and partisans. This independent development of Italian policies of aggression, both internally and externally, ended with the German occupation in September 1943. The Tripartite definition of a common “leadership of Germany and Italy in creating a new order in Europe” was now completely swept away.

The most fatal development in the German Sonderweg that led to a Nazi war of extermination that was quite different from the Mediterranean blueprint of fascism derived from a radical racist understanding of mankind and of citizenship, as the Nazi Party program of 1920 already defined it. As Mark Mazower says, the consequences were: “no assimilation, racial not universal law, and therefore exclusion and expulsion not protection.” The interwar refugee problem and the expulsion and nationalization politics, unresolved on the international scene, inspired Nazi leaders to search for ever more radical “solutions” for dealing with “undesired” minorities, whereas Fascist Italy became at least temporarily a refuge for Jewish emigrants. Although
the undermining of the binding force of international law encouraged by Nazi lawyers had its effects, it could not completely undo the tradition of the Geneva Conventions. The German Wehrmacht partially abandoned the set of principles established for the treatment of prisoners of war, introducing a strong differentiation according to its own East–West paradigm. Nonetheless, during the war, as Mark Mazower puts it, “the cult of force and the racial geopolitics that the Nazis took so seriously turned into a program of extermination on a scale which had no precedent.” Instead of a “Nazi unification of Europe,” in the end a geographic fragmentation of nation-states took place. Instead of hegemony, the outcome was destruction without precedent.

NATIONALISM ON THE MARGINS: SILESIANS BETWEEN GERMANY AND POLAND, 1848-1945

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At first glance, Upper Silesia belongs in the dustbin of German, Polish, and European history. Once its own district and even for a brief time its own quasi-state, Upper Silesia is now split between two Polish provinces — województwo opolskie and śląskie. Once a region along the German-Russian and then German-Polish borders, its lands now lie much closer to the Czech Republic than to Germany. Upper Silesia and its sibling to the west, Lower Silesia, belong to those fated lands east of the Oder-Neisse line. As historical symbols of German superiority over Poles, and then as launching pads for murderous Nazi expansionism, they were eliminated — and their millions of German inhabitants expelled — with Poland’s westward shift in 1945. Yet, dig just slightly below the surface, and it is easy to unearth Upper Silesia’s historical roots even today. The Polish 2002 census reveals that, in an ethnically homogeneous Poland where 96 percent are Poles, the largest self-declared national minority belongs to a nation that has arguably never existed: Upper Silesia. These more than 173,000 Upper Silesians, along with nearly 153,000 others who declared themselves Germans, are the living artifacts of a region long presumed dead.¹

Before 1945, Upper Silesia had existed for over a century within Prussian Central Europe as a distinct political unit and a powerful ordering force for regional identity. Its mixed-language, and often bilingual, Catholic population largely avoided violent ethnic cleansings in the twentieth century by crafting its national mutability. The fact that over 750,000 Upper Silesians remained in their homes after World War II, with up to 90 percent in some rural areas spared expulsion, forms both the chronological endpoint and the thematic departure point for my dissertation.² While my work addresses the development of Upper Silesian regional identity, its focus is on the attendant historical process that made this regionalism possible: the failure of German and Polish nationalists to divide Upper Silesians into stable and discrete national groups in the century after 1848. German and Polish activists escalated national strife in the region, ultimately using mass violence to advance their utopian goals of

² Statistics on the proportion of Upper Silesian autochthons (as of 1950) in Michał Lis, Ludność rodzima na Śląsku Opolskim po II wojnie światowej, 1945-1993 (Opole: Państwowy Instytut Naukowy, 1993), 32.
ethnic homogeneity. Yet, throughout this strife, the majority of Upper Silesians proved resistant to activists who tried to nationalize them. Upper Silesians’ self-fashioned national ambiguity was robust enough so that the Nazis could declare them loyal Germans, while a few years later Poland could declare them loyal Poles. My dissertation, “Nationalism on the Margins,” is thus simultaneously a story of nationalism on the contested territorial margin of two states and a story of the marginality of national loyalties to the identity of most Upper Silesians.

These two stories, as I found in my research, are linked in a causal chain. National radicalism and indifference in Upper Silesia reinforced each other, particularly in the early to mid-twentieth century. Even as Polish nationalism made political inroads around 1900, many who spoke Polish avoided long-term commitment to the movement. The heavily Catholic population was also largely skeptical of often openly anti-Catholic German policies. Upper Silesians’ wavering prompted frustrated activists to adopt increasingly harsh measures and rhetoric after World War I to convince locals of their supposedly innate national identity. With each turn toward more extreme nationalism from the 1920s to the 1940s, German and Polish loyalties became less attractive to Upper Silesians, who began hedging their bets against regime change by holding on to their bilingual, Catholic communal ties. This apathy toward the national cause only further convinced activists of the need for forcible racial separation. An ultimately disastrous feedback loop developed in which national activists, frustrated by popular apathy, advocated increasingly illiberal measures to achieve their visions. These measures only further distanced locals from national loyalties, prompting greater frustration and radicalism from activists. As I conclude, national indifference was thus not only an effect of radical nationalism, but also, simultaneously, a cause.

The setting for this study is the mid-sized city of Oppeln/Opole and the surrounding county that shared its name in western Upper Silesia. This geographic micro-scale allows for an intimate portrait of activists’ efforts to divide a real, bilingual community into two “imagined” national ones. As a growing civil servant city, Oppeln/Opole’s urban core increasingly became a local fortress of German language and culture, and municipal politics played out with almost no inkling of national diversity. But the surrounding suburbs and villages were heavily Polish speaking and served as the primary
recruiting grounds for Polish nationalists. As this local dynamic suggests, ethno-linguistic divides in Oppeln/Opole often mirrored socioeconomic ones. This social hierarchy of German over Polish would make the two nationalist projects in the area highly asymmetrical. While German nationalists could rely on both the mechanisms of state power and the promise of social uplift to make loyal Germans, Polish nationalists were fighting against these tides and relied largely on transforming social grievances, and what one scholar has called a national “inferiority complex,” into support for the Polish cause.3

My dissertation seeks to analyze the relationship between these localized national projects and their intended targets of nationalization. In arguing that Upper Silesians were defined largely by an absence of durable national loyalties, the inevitable question of evidence arises. How does one prove a lack of something? In answering this, my research has relied heavily on the records of nationalists themselves. Rather than take their claims at face value, I seek a careful reading of nationalist activity against the grain, locating failures, contradictions, or disjunctions in their projects. Thankfully for the historian, Polish nationalists in particular complained nearly continuously about the failure of Upper Silesians to live up to their supposedly innate national loyalties. I also juxtapose the claims of nationalists with the few nationally ambiguous or non-national voices that emerge strongly in the historical record, such as those of priests. While the Polish nation-building project in Oppeln/Opole was subject to strict surveillance and countless worried reports from Prussian officials, these bureaucrats saw no need to track German nationalists with equal vigor. Thus local Polish activists receive the bulk of attention, although their project is arguably more relevant given the demographic preponderance of Polish speakers.

Evidence is also drawn from potential alternative allegiances. While indifference is fundamentally a reaction to nationalism that tells us what someone was “not,” the alternative regional, local, familial, religious, ideological, or class loyalties that could usurp nationalism’s role can tell us what someone “was.” If local citizens in Upper Silesia were neither Germans nor Poles, then what did they feel themselves to be? One compelling answer is “Catholic.” The imagined community of Upper Silesian Catholicism has been explored in detail as an alternate marker of loyalty in the region and a buffer against nationalization, from the 1890s through at least the 1930s. Yet another possibility lies in the powerful draw of regionalism: that

is to say, locals were simply “Upper Silesians” rather than Germans or Poles. Still other answers may be found, among diverse Upper Silesians, in labels such as communist, socialist, Prussian, peasant, or simply *tutejczy*, that is, local. My dissertation, however, avoids offering any one answer to the question of identity. Rather, it examines the outlets for local social and political organization at specific junctures in Upper Silesian history, of which ethnic nationalism proved one option in a vibrant and shifting field of other potential loyalties to community, parish, class, state, or abstract humanism. Widen ing suffrage and democratization substantially augmented both the political activity of Upper Silesians and the diversity of options for channeling their loyalties. It became increasingly possible for one person to be a Polish-speaking son, a German-speaking father, a Catholic union worker, a Socialist voter, a proud Prussian veteran, and a Polish nationalist sympathizer all at the same time. Yet most theories of modern ethnic nationalism actually posit the opposite result, whereby heterogeneous social practices and multiple loyalties became ironed out by national division. This dissertation seeks to complicate that narrative by contrasting the diverse loyalties of local communities with the efforts of nationalist activists to stamp out these practices.

I. From Catholic Regionalism to National Partition

Before roughly 1890, modernization in Upper Silesia led not to national division but rather to the opposite: Polish and German speakers united across presumed ethnic boundaries in the name of regional, Catholic solidarity. In this prenational era, a set of religious and socio-economic battle lines were drawn between poor Catholic Upper Silesians and a richer Protestant German core outside the region. In the decades before 1890, Catholic ties expanded beyond the communal level amid a fervent, clerically-led religious revival. Upper Silesia had not always been so pious. In 1819, the Upper Silesian district president reported: “The appearance of godliness is there, but unfortunately only the appearance,” adding that drunkenness was ubiquitous and pilgrimages often served as an “inducement to debauchery.”4 A wildly successful temperance movement led by the priest Jan Fiecek in the 1840s began to turn the tide. With the 1848 revolutions, Upper Silesian Catholics began organizing their own comprehensive civil society. The Silesian Catholic Association, a political-social umbrella organization founded by the Breslau Diocese in spring 1848, signed up 20,000 members across 140 subgroups within its

first year. Affiliated groups sprang up to cover nearly every demographic, including women, children, workers, children, and even the dead. Most groups only increased in popularity in the decades after 1848. Just as importantly, the regional scope of such social-religious groups also produced new connections. The faithful across the province shared in common causes that helped produce a regional Catholic solidarity. Upper Silesia formed a Catholic island in otherwise heavily Protestant eastern Prussia. Regional solidarity was thus born of isolation from other mainly Catholic regions of German-speaking Europe. Nowhere was this clearer than in pilgrimages, which were typically regional in scope. In March 1852 over 20,000 Catholics from across Silesia flooded Oppeln/Opole, which at the time had fewer than 10,000 residents. The pilgrimage, like many others, was really two in one: a German-language version and a Polish one. Language was but a natural form of difference; priests ensured in most cases that masses held in German and Polish were identical in content. Through new lay associations and pilgrimages, Upper Silesia was increasingly imagined as a singular but bilingual religious unit.

Internal unity came also through the crystallization of an external enemy in the form of secularizing Liberals. The Catholic press and clergy preached a *Kulturkampf* to their newly devout flock for at least a decade before the German anti-Church measures of the 1870s. The kleindeutsch nationalism and anti-Church policies associated with Liberals were deplored by the Church. In Manichean terms, the regional Catholic press organ declared in 1860: “As soon as one leaves the solid and sure foundation of rights (*Recht*), one comes to the system of nationalities, of natural borders, or in other words: despotism.”

The Seven Weeks’ War of 1866 sealed Upper Silesia’s fate as a Catholic borderland. Prussian defeat might have meant the return
of Oppeln/Opole to the Catholic Habsburg crown; instead, Prussia’s unexpected victory turned Upper Silesia into an eastern outpost in a Prussian-dominated, majority Protestant Kleindeutschland. The subsequent Kulturkampf in the 1870s backfired in Upper Silesia, as regional Catholic leaders used new universal male suffrage to take political hold of the region. The Catholic Center Party’s dominance lasted for an entire generation: from 1884 until 1903 Upper Silesia was represented continuously by eleven Center Party members in the Reichstag, along with just one Conservative. Crucially, the Catholic defense of religious rights before and during the Kulturkampf was carried out with hardly an echo of German-Polish strife. On the contrary, bilingual religious solidarity stood in contrast to the enemy of German Protestant nationalism. At an 1877 regional meeting of Catholic leaders in Oppeln/Opole, Father Franciszek Przyniczyński, editor of a Polish-language Center-Party paper, claimed: “Upper Silesia’s virtuous people must defend not only their religion, but also their language, so that they can pray to God in the language they think in and understand.” Policies in defense of bilingual schooling and catechism instruction reinforced these ideas.

Added to the religious solidarity was a regional unity born of economic hardship. With the creation of Kleindeutschland, Upper Silesia became hemmed in on three sides by foreign states. Distant from the political and industrial centers of Germany, its economy stagnated relative to the rest of Germany, despite abundant coal and mineral riches. Already by the 1850s, Upper Silesia was known as the “poor house of Prussia,” and would decline into a German economic backwater in the next century. While Upper Silesia faced enormous geographic and geopolitical hurdles to becoming economically successful, its deficiencies were only exacerbated by the decisions of politically powerful classes within the province to protect their own interests and by rising tariff wars between Germany and Russia.

Religious conflict and economic impoverishment thus set the terms of social conflict in Upper Silesia before the arrival of national strife. Nationalist activists would subsequently be forced to confront this regional and religious unity as they hoped to divide the population into loyal Germans and Poles. The first such Polish effort came with the arrival of the 26-year-old newspaper man Bronisław Koraszewski in Oppeln/Opole in 1890. He wore his nationalism on his sleeve, declaring in the first issue of his new Gazeta Opolska: “I greet you, dear fellow combatants.” Policies in defense of bilingual schooling and catechism instruction reinforced these ideas.
into the centerpiece of a fledging community of Polish activists. Mediating their message of Polish self-awareness through Catholic belief, these activists were able to convert a growing body of Polish speakers to their political cause. Yet, even amid the successful organizing of the 1890s, Koraszewski devoted much of his energy to combatting national indifference; he derided the “many irrational people who regard a Pole and a German as hardly different from each other.”

His friend and fellow newspaper publisher Adam Napieralski warned him: “You are deluding yourself if you think that our people have matured to their own fundamental national sensibility. You judge everything based on those few people that surround us.” This was the dilemma that would plague Koraszewski and his successors for decades: they assumed that the wider population should imitate the small circle of committed nationalist activists in their passion and in the ordering of their social lives around national divisions.

By 1900 Koraszewski had reached a broad readership and pursued his nationalism through Polish-Catholic clubs. But the following decade saw two seemingly contradictory trends: electoral triumph and simultaneous organizational decline. In the 1903 and 1907 Reichstag elections Upper Silesian politics was remade. A Polish-speaking electorate suddenly voted on national and linguistic interests, prompting German nationalists to likewise solidify an alliance of nationally minded voters. Yet even as a Polish voting bloc coalesced, continued efforts to forge a vibrant national associational life floundered. Local citizens, concerned with the day-to-day struggles of economic Zinto clerically-led Workers Associations. In between the drama of elections, many Upper Silesians continued to exist in a social world where national divisions made little sense and where bilingualism and the enticement of upward mobility through learning German continued to be accepted norms. Much of the Polish electoral success proved temporary, coming on the heels of a spectacular downfall for the regional Catholic Center Party. But by 1912 a resurgent Center Party, along with newfound success for the Social Democrats, made Polish electoral success appear fleeting.

Had World War I not interrupted this arc of history and radicalized the terms of national belonging, Koraszewski’s national ideal would have likely continued to fade in Upper Silesia. As Polish nationalists’ electoral fortunes declined, their frustration showed. A breakaway group of Polish nationalist activists in Oppeln/Opole formed a rival

8 Gazeta Opolska, 2 October 1891, from German translation in Archiwum Państwowe w Opolu (National Archive in Opole hereafter: APO), Rejencja Opolska (Opole District Administration; hereafter: RO), Syg. 163.

9 Quoted in Maria Wanatowicz, Społeczeństwo polskie wobec Celnego Śląska, 1795–1914 (Katowice: Uniwersytet Śląski, 1992), 77.
paper, declaring themselves — unlike Koraszewski — authentic locals of peasant background. “We are children of one mother, children of the same Polish people, among which you — dear brother and sister — also count yourselves,” they wrote. Yet rather than reassess the appeal of nationalism, the group also blamed apathetic, indifferent locals for failing to awaken to the national cause. In the very first issue of their Nowiny newspaper, they complained “that our people read so little, which is the cause of their lack of education and sense of honor.” This group of activists had been nurtured by Koraszewski and other Polish nationalists, including Roman Dmowski. Growing up in a world of nationalist allegiances, they placed the same expectations on their readership to prove their primary loyalty to the Polish nation. The founding of the breakaway Nowiny marked a first step in the feedback loop between isolated nationalist activists and a broader population wary of national loyalties.

World War I offered a new political education, but not always one that heightened national division among Upper Silesians. For many convinced Polish nationalists, the experience of World War I retrospectively stood out as a climax of Prussian-German national chauvinism and authoritarianism. The German-Austrian war against a broad alliance of Slavic-speaking peoples, including Poles under Russian rule, led to an almost immediate outbreak of German official repression of Polish nationalists. Koraszewski had the unfortunate distinction of being the first Polish German citizen arrested in Prussia. The imprisonment radicalized Koraszewski and destroyed any remaining faith he held in the Prussian rule of law. A Polish-speaking soldier, Bernard Augustyn, wrote retrospectively of his experiences: “There, having finally gained solid life experience and a wise outlook on the world and social issues, I recognized precisely the German spirit of militarism and rapacity, this German mentality which is alien to the Polish nation.”

Yet, the vast majority of Polish-speaking Upper Silesians served loyally in the Prussian army. In the industrial area in particular, about 25 percent of coal miners had been drafted by 1915, compared to just five to six percent from the Ruhr mining areas. Memoirs point to vast numbers of young men, Polish- and German-speaking, who were drawn from the villages and cities around Oppeln/Opole. Nor did efforts of the Entente powers to lure prisoners of war into supporting Polish nationalism find success. French efforts to recruit a Polish legion among Germany’s POWs had yielded only 31 Polish speakers by December 1915. Loyal service was expected and in all but a few cases delivered.

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10 Nowiny Codzienne, 21 June 1911, official German translation in APO, Rejencja Opolska Biuro Prezydialne (Opole District Governor’s Office; hereafter: ROBP), Syg. 123.
11 Ibid., 21 June 1911, official German translation in APO, ROBP, Syg. 123.
Polish nationalism benefitted above all from the combination of German defeat and new Polish statehood in 1918, yet the unleashing of post-war regional radicalism subsequently quashed any hope for a durable Polish national awakening. In a scenario to be repeated a generation later, the aftermath of war proved more traumatic for Upper Silesia than the war itself. The Allies initially agreed to cede Upper Silesia to Poland in spring 1919, but amid German protest, reversed the decision in favor of a regional plebiscite. The non-binding plebiscite, intended to mark the preference of Upper Silesians for a future in Poland or Germany, achieved exactly the opposite of its intent: instead of clarifying national loyalties, it blew the lid off long-simmering forces of national ambiguity.

The experience of the plebiscite years was one of overwhelming trauma, material deprivation, and loss of trust in government and fellow citizens, but these events did not always follow pre-scripted national dividing lines. The November Revolution, German defeat, new Polish statehood, and continued postwar material deprivation all combined to create a great overlap in the aims and methods of radical socialists and Polish activists. Arkadiusz Bożek, who would later become a regional leader in the Polish nationalist movement, described himself in his memoirs as “a conglomerate of a socialist, a Spartacist, and a conservative” during the Revolution. The Polish cause benefited from widespread discontent with the continuities in governing between old and new Prussia. The police-state atmosphere of censorship and arrests did much to alienate the population from the party at the helm of the revolution, the Social Democrats. Yet

This German propaganda poster from the plebiscite combines anti-Polish sentiment with appeals to the regional indivisibility of Silesia. The girl, dressed in a skirt of the official colors of the German Empire, guards the industrial province of Silesia in her basket from the Polish wolf. The German girl promises to keep Silesia whole in the face of the rapacious wolf seeking to tear it apart. The caption reads: “You have in mind my basket? / My dear Silesia is inside! / It will always remain indivisible with me / For it would look desolate and wild with you.” Source: Bundesarchiv Bildarchiv. Reproduced by permission.
many on the ground were unclear at the time whether these radical activists were Polish nationalists, Spartacists, or both.14

Further national confusion came with the pervasive violence during the plebiscite campaign. The Allied Powers exerted control over Upper Silesia from 1920-1921 through a French-led occupation force. Blatantly pro-Polish policies by the French, combined with poor planning and a lack of adequate policing, allowed violence to increasingly consume the plebiscite zone. This bloodshed was undeniably the direct result of national strife over the plebiscite, with roving bands of Polish and German partisans terrorizing villages in order to scare locals into one national camp or another. Yet at the local level, this violence was experienced most directly as a breakdown of community, aided by a flood of weapons and bandits, by material privation, and by radicalized young workers and decommissioned soldiers. Nationally-motivated attacks often grew into communal violence motivated by pure criminality or personal score-settling. As German officials complained to French commissioners, “[h]ardly a day passes without reports of a serious crime, a robbery or a murder.”15 An estimated seven to eight violent deaths occurred each day during the 13-month occupation leading up to the plebiscite, and this figure excludes deaths during the second Polish uprising in August 1920.16 While this violence hardened some Upper Silesians’ national loyalties, for many caught in the crossfire this breakdown of communal order arguably did more to disillusion them with nationalist politics than any other event in the region’s history.

Amid radical demands for revolution or partition and pervasive violence conditioned by Polish uprisings and German reprisals, one group of related movements stood out for its relative moderation: autonomists operating under the slogan “Upper Silesia for the Upper Silesians.” Mainly affiliated with less nationalist elements of the Catholic Center Party, these autonomy activists hoped to corral the forces of the German Revolution in a more conservative Catholic direction, and used the threat of regional secession to gain promises of cultural tolerance and political independence. Most favored remaining a part of Germany, either as an autonomous province within Prussia or as a free-standing German state outside Prussia. But the audience for the autonomy message extended beyond convinced Germans into the mass of nationally indifferent Upper Silesians. Many of the hundreds of thousands who read the main autonomist newspapers would have identified the arguments and tone as very

14 See article “Polnisch-Spartakistischer Putsch in Oberschlesien,” Oberschlesische Grenzzeitung, 18 August 1919.
15 Letter from Hatzfeld to Inter-Allied Commission, November 1920, APO, ROBP, Syg. 304.
16 Sigmund Karski, Albert (Wojciech) Korfanty: Eine Biographie (Dülmen: Laumann-Verlag, 1990), 308.
similar to prewar Polish nationalist protests against Prussian anti-Polish policies. Regional autonomy movements were able to open up a new space for political discontent which had been foreclosed with the postwar transformation of Polish nationalism. Before World War I, Polish nationalism was stateless, and as such could lodge its claims in the broadest and most malleable terms. But the resurrection of the Polish state in 1918 and the vociferous demands of Polish nationalists to cede Upper Silesia to the new nation-state vastly increased the stakes of Polish loyalty.

The popularity of Upper Silesian regionalism and non-national loyalties was reflected in the types of plebiscite propaganda deployed by both sides ahead of the vote. Negative stereotyping of the enemy was pervasive, but positive messages contained little in the way of direct appeals to national belonging. Economic arguments formed the plurality of appeals in posters, placards, and pamphlets. Polish nationalists quoted the calculation that German war reparations translated into a debt of over 60,000 marks for every person in Germany. The German “body” was often represented as a corpse: a dying economy and nation destined to a future of penury. German propaganda countered with appeals to the benefits of a robust welfare state buttressed by new socialist promises for worker equality. Regional appeals were also common, as both sides claimed the mantle of representing Upper Silesians. One pro-German pamphlet read, “Upper Silesia is not Polish, but rather Silesian land.”

For the German side in particular, the appeal to the concept of Heimat worked as an established idiom through which to temper nationalist claims by appealing to the locality or region as under national attack. Polish appeals to the ojczyzna (fatherland), while common, lacked a similar connotation of Upper Silesian autonomy and unity distinct from national identity. Yet Polish nationalists could counter by claiming that the Upper Silesians’ Catholic faith tied locals more closely to Poland. “The German faith is not your faith,” one Polish prayer book read.

Propaganda materials were often bilingual, an obvious admission that national loyalties could cross linguistic lines.

The Upper Silesian plebiscite reflects the contradictions and tensions in this great moment of Wilsonian national self-determination. The forces unleashed by defeat, socialist revolutions, and the breakdown of communal peace greatly complicate a narrative focused on binary national choice in Upper Silesia. If concepts of national belonging had previously implied a mandatory group identity that activists tied

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17 Quoted in Waldemar Grosch, Deutsche und polnische Propaganda während der Volksabstimmung in Oberschlesien, 1919-1921 (Dortmund: Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa, 2002), 182. Emphasis in original.

18 Quoted in ibid., 231.
to supposed natural duties to the nation, this rhetoric was no longer sufficient. Now, instead of asking what you can do for the nation, the plebiscite forced the question: What can the state do for you? This inversion of agency in nationalist thinking showed that, the closer one approached the actual practice of democratic self-determination, as in the plebiscite, the less clear the national principle underlying it became. The results of the plebiscite, meanwhile, with 60 percent voting for Germany, and 40 percent for Poland, did little to clarify national boundaries. While larger cities tended to vote heavily in favor of Germany, in the countryside voting patterns varied wildly from village to village, making a fair partition all but impossible. The final partition line — determined in late 1921 by a neutral League of Nations committee — pleased almost no one. Poland received the vast majority of eastern Upper Silesia’s mineral deposits and industrial capacity, but was left with a partition where 44 percent of residents had voted for Germany. Meanwhile, 23 percent of those on the German side of the partition had voted for Poland. In the following decades both countries promoted their revisionist desire to rule over all of Upper Silesia, delving into radical nationalist tyranny, repression, or mass expulsions to achieve their aims. The plebiscite served as the catalyst for the following decades of radical nationalism, but also for growing skepticism among Upper Silesians about the dangers of national loyalty.

II. A Feedback Loop between Nationalism and Indifference

In the Oppeln/Opole area, which fell on the German side of the regional partition, most communities sought a return to stability after the poisonous plebiscite years. Meanwhile, Polish activists became more insulated from the population they claimed to represent. Many of the leading figures, including Koraszewski, departed for Poland, leaving behind a small, tight-knit group of a few hundred activists. These remaining Polish nationalists had been radicalized by the plebiscite, and were more convinced than ever that the ethno-linguistic roots of Upper Silesians should predetermine their national loyalty. Yet, Weimar-era democracy and internationally guaranteed rights that gave Polish activists more freedoms in the Weimar period served ironically to weaken their movement. The new autonomy granted Upper Silesia as an independent province allowed for the dominance of the Catholic Center Party, which blended populist economics with a defense of Catholic, bilingual rights. The stability offered by the democratically elected Catholic regional government satisfied
many Upper Silesians who had previously flocked to the Polish party to protest prewar Prussian policies. In this democratic field, the regional Polish nationalist party faced increasing failures at the ballot box. The share of votes in the Oppeln/Opole area for the Polish party steadily declined from 25 percent in 1924 to a low of 4.6 percent in the November 1932 elections.

These failures came despite greater leeway and more robust protections for Polish activists, thanks to a German-Polish minority protections treaty enforced by the League of Nations. The 1922 Geneva Accord for Upper Silesia promised individual rights of legal equality and nondiscrimination as well as group rights to Polish-language schooling and access to Polish-speaking administration. Yet, aside from a brief flowering of youth sport and theater groups in 1927-1929, Polish efforts to reconstitute a robust associational life largely floundered. Polish minority schools proved a particular failure. Although they could be established with merely a few dozen signatures by local parents, the schools saw steady declines in enrollment. The minority school in the village of Königlich Neudorf / Nowa Wieś Królewska, for example, which was built after 96 signatures were gathered, opened to only 16 students in 1925, and was closed in 1929 with only six enrollees. Throughout German Upper Silesia, Polish minority school enrollments dropped from 1,227 students in 1923-24 to just 347 in 1930-31. While Polish nationalists at first blamed poorly trained teachers, they later directed their blame more squarely at indifferent parents. The Polish School Association scolded them in 1927: “Parents! You are Poles, your mother tongue is the Polish language, therefore your children also belong, according to legal decisions and from the standpoint of nature, in the Polish schools. Today there is still time, you can still make good on what has been neglected.” Yet parents (and children) seemed to prefer Polish language instruction, particularly for religion, within German schools. Throughout the 1920s, around four times the number of students signed up for Polish religious instruction as for a Polish minority school in German Upper Silesia.

By the early 1930s, Polish activists sensed overall failure and, with their movement in disarray, directed much of the blame towards the nationally apathetic. In a 1932 article, the Nowiny Codzienne in Oppeln/Opole bemoaned the “mass of cultural half-breeds” among indifferent Upper Silesians. Their solution was a strict separation of the races “in the interest of the purity of both cultures.” It was
this trend towards separation that they sensed taking root in Germany with the rise of Nazism. “Luckily, one sees ever more clearly that the German people will no longer tolerate the preponderance of these cultural hybrids,” the article concluded.20 For the previous decade, Polish nationalists felt they had been fighting a battle in some ways similar to that of the Nazis, against racial mixing and for the acknowledgment of the distinct, innate qualities of the Polish national body. The Nazis, meanwhile, made inroads into Upper Silesia by largely avoiding attacks on Polish speakers. “Asians, Chinese, and Negroes as well as Galician Jews must be excluded from having German rights or public offices,” a Nazi deputy told locals at a 1929 rally; no mention of Poles was made.21 Election patterns make clear that large numbers of Poles voted for Hitler in 1932, far more than for the Polish nationalists. The town of Malino/Malina, for example, which was over 95 percent Polish or bilingual speaking according to the 1925 census, recorded 47 percent of villagers voting for the Nazis in the July 1932 elections, compared to 15 percent for the Polish party. In this divergence of fortunes between Nazis and Polish nationalists, one can see a feedback loop between national ambiguity, with Polish speakers voting for Nazis, and national radicalism, with Polish activists embracing Nazi ideals of forced racial separation.

When the Nazis assumed power, local Polish activists believed they had reason for cautious optimism. A German regime embracing racial separation seemed initially superior to the Weimar-era promotion of integration and assimilation. “The present-day government cannot behave any worse than the previous government with respect to the Polish movement,” the Polish regional leader Arkadiusz Bożek told an Oppeln/Opole county official in 1933.22 Bożek’s prediction proved mostly untrue. After 1933, the Nazis were far from friendly to Polish nationalists. They harassed, expelled, and eventually — during World War II — forced dozens of local leaders into the Buchenwald concentration camp. Yet, the broad mass of nationally indifferent Polish and bilingual speakers met a much more ambiguous fate. Until 1937, thanks to the Geneva Accord, Poles remained a protected group in Nazi Upper Silesia. As Gleichschaltung eroded Catholic and civil associations, Upper Silesians fled to protected Polish groups to reconstitute networks destroyed by the Nazis. One Nazi official bemoaned the ability of Polish groups to “pull all the fluctuating or indifferent among the population who were formerly members of earlier German Catholic

20 Nowiny Codzienne, 22 June 1932, no. 141.
22 Report of Matuschka to Prussian Interior Ministry, 17 March 1933, APO, NO, Syg. 75.
competitor organizations into their group."\textsuperscript{23} The radical national revolution of the early Nazi regime only promoted heightened national ambiguity and opportunism among Upper Silesians. Committed Polish nationalists joined the Nazi Party or SA, and Polish was spoken among the Hitler Youth. Meanwhile, Polish associations served as a shield behind which German speakers with little loyalty to the Polish cause could organize themselves, including priests, and (at least according to paranoid Nazi reports) even communists. Still others joined Polish groups in hopes of avoiding service to the Nazi racial state, such as the \textit{Landjahr}.

The Nazi solution to this \textit{Zwischenschicht} (intermediate stratum), as administrators called them, was greater repression, but only up to a point. After the 1937 expiration of the League of Nations protections, Nazis terrorized Polish nationalist leaders and suppressed the Polish language in its last public forum, Catholic church services. After one Polish nationalist was expelled in May 1939, a local magistrate reported: "The effect is absolutely tremendous... one hears in Eisenau and its surroundings not a single word of Polish spoken anymore." As the magistrate predicted, "[o]nly a few Poles will need to be expelled, and then not a single person will go to Polish-language religious services."\textsuperscript{24} Yet, the Nazis could not change linguistic patterns of hundreds of thousands overnight. By the time Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, the Nazi government in Upper Silesia had achieved only the \textit{appearance} of Germanization. During the war, Germany settled for this false victory. Needing Upper Silesians to provide coal, grain, and soldiers for the war effort, Berlin lived with the myth that the Oppeln/Opole area was full of loyal Germans. Upper Silesians from the interwar German partition, in turn, survived relatively free of the brutal repression which Nazis were unleashing against Poles in other areas. Unlike in Posen or even eastern Upper Silesia, around Oppeln/Opole no resettlement programs were initiated and no \textit{Volksliste} established. After expansion during World War II, Upper Silesia included Auschwitz, and yet — in its western zones — it was arguably one of the safest places in Europe for Polish speakers.

Moreover, much of the apparent progress of Germanization in Upper Silesia actually unraveled during the war. An influx of Polish wartime laborers sparked Nazi fears of increased Polish usage and "racial mixing" in Upper Silesia. Polish laborers would break protocol to eat at the dinner table with Upper Silesians, sleep in their


\textsuperscript{24} Birkental town official to Oppeln Landrat, 23 May 1939, quoted ibid., 923.
homes, and — in some cases — enter romantic relationships. After years under Hitler’s rule, Upper Silesians were arguably speaking as much Polish as at any time in the previous generation. Yet the Landrat, Friedrich Seifarth, advocated essentially Weimar-era solutions to these problems. “The lawful and therefore proper handling of the minority in all fundamental questions of life has an assimilationist effect that should not be underestimated,” Seifarth insisted in 1940, when Poles were being ethnically cleansed and Jews forced into ghettos in other parts of Germany. Meanwhile, officials in Berlin still deemed the Oppeln area purely German. In fact, they even forcibly resettled Poles from other areas into Oppeln with the unrealistic hope of Germanizing them. By 1944, Seifarth warned Himmler that his corner of the Reich was a “nationally-politically endangered” zone.

The distance that many Upper Silesians placed between themselves and the Nazi regime by cultivating their own national indifference and mutability helped them survive the Polish takeover of 1945 and escape the subsequent expulsion of millions of Germans. The very ambivalence toward nationalism of these Upper Silesians was in fact conditioned by the national radicalism that had grown around them. A negative feedback loop developed in which nationalist activists, frustrated by the failure of their appeals, increasingly embraced illiberal and racialist measures to divide the population. These measures only further politicized national identification, driving Upper Silesians away from nationalist loyalties. It is a story that in fact continues well into the postwar period, when Polish efforts to repress the German language prompted some frustrated Upper Silesians to flee to East or West Germany under the guise of “family reunification” and declare German nationality. If the Nazis failed to make them into Germans, communist Poland in some cases succeeded. Although the number of German speakers have been greatly reduced, the Opole/Oppeln area remains today, as it was 150 years ago, dotted with linguistically diverse villages and populations. It remains that way primarily because Upper Silesians did not willingly participate in repeated efforts by Polish and German nationalists to draw national borders through local communities. At the same time, this indifference must be seen as a key catalyst for the radicalization of nationalist activists who, frustrated with the unwillingness of Upper Silesians to adhere to a logic of national division, used increasingly radical, illiberal measures to enforce this division.
the case of Upper Silesia, these activists’ efforts to forge nationalized societies ultimately failed over the long term, in the process revealing the instability of the categories “German” and “Pole” as markers of loyalty in this German-Polish borderland.

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CREATING KILLERS: THE NAZIFICATION OF THE BLACK SEA GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST IN SOUTHERN UKRAINE, 1941-1944

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During the Second World War, German authorities and their local helpers killed some two million Jews in the occupied Soviet Union. The large swath of Soviet territory that Germany and its allies occupied from the Baltic to the Black Sea was not simply the crucible of the Holocaust, it was also a region of singular importance to Nazi ambitions. Guided by the belief that territorial expansion in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was the only way to provide the agricultural base needed to secure the Third Reich’s global dominance, the Nazi regime attempted to remove supposedly racially undesirable Jews and Slavs and to gain permanent control of the region by settling it with Germans. Wartime German authorities regarded Soviet Jewry as the most inferior of the region’s numerous allegedly inferior peoples and as the Soviet state’s puppeteers. They were therefore the first group that the Nazis targeted. Future German designs, however, were far more expansive. After winning the war against the Soviet Union, Nazi planners envisioned settling their new empire’s breadbasket with Germans, whose militarized, agricultural settlements would dot the countryside and cement lasting economic autarky. In this brave new National Socialist world, local Slavs would remain as laborers until German industry could supplant them with agricultural machinery. Then, they too would share the grim fate of their Jewish neighbors. For the Nazis, the destruction of Soviet Jewry was the opening gambit in a broader planned genocidal demographic revolution in conquered Soviet territory.

Over the course of the Second World War, the Nazi leadership had to content itself with a more modest pilot program of population engineering. Absent the excess population in the Reich or the resources to begin settling Germans in the conquered Soviet Union — particularly after the conflict expanded into a global war against the United States in December 1941 — the Nazis sought to develop a German demographic bulwark in the area to secure lasting claims to Soviet territory. In lieu of more grandiose plans, the Third Reich would marshal indigenous ethnic Germans or Volksdeutsche as the 1 All views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
2 This figure reflects the number of victims in the pre-1939 borders of the Soviet Union and territories that it annexed between 1939 and 1941. Yitzhak Rabin, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Lincoln, 2009), 525.
basis for permanent control of the region. The largest population of Soviet ethnic Germans to come under the control of the Third Reich was the so-called Black Sea Germans (Schwarzmeerdeutsche), 130,000 Volksdeutsche in southern Ukraine’s Odessa oblast’ (region). Between the arrival of German forces in the fall of 1941 and the German evacuation of all Volksdeutsche from the region in early 1944, this group became the focus of Nazi efforts to organize Volksdeutsche as a demographic toehold on conquered Soviet territory. Although limited by scarce resources and operating in Romanian-occupied territory, local German administrators targeted area Volksdeutsche for an intense and brutal Nazification program. When unanticipated situational factors moved area German authorities to enlist the help of local Volksdeutsche in the mass shooting of Jews, the region’s ethnic Germans responded by fielding some of the most heavily implicated Holocaust perpetrators. My dissertation explores Nazi Volksdeutsche policy in southern Ukraine and analyzes why the area’s large ethnic German population embraced the Nazi project and especially the Holocaust.

I.

During the past twenty years, research on the Holocaust “in the East” has bloomed, thanks to access to previously closed Soviet archival holdings and an increased scholarly sensitivity to the importance of the Holocaust within the history of the Second World War. Owing in part to the scale of the Holocaust in the Ukraine and its ongoing significance in the formation of Ukraine’s post-Soviet national identity, many historians have focused on the topic. Research by scholars including Andrej Angrick, Omer Bartov, Karel Berkhoff, Kate Brown, Martin Dean, John-Paul Himka, Wendy Lower, Dieter Pohl, and Thomas Sandkühler, has yielded a rich understanding of an array of topics related to Nazi rule and the Holocaust in Ukraine, including the history of everyday life, the policies and practices of German administrators, and the mass murder of Jews, to name but a few. Despite this prodigious scholarly output, historians have largely overlooked Nazi policy toward the Black Sea Germans and the group’s key role in the Holocaust in southern Ukraine.

There are a number of reasons why scholars have not focused on this episode of the war and the Holocaust. First, specialized studies on southern Ukraine during the conflict have concentrated on Romanian authorities, who administered most of the area during the war and played a central role in orchestrating the
Holocaust. German and Volksdeutsche activities, insofar as scholars have probed them, appeared peripheral to Romanian involvement. Second, although historians have devoted substantial attention to Ukraine’s German occupiers, only relatively recently have they begun to examine the role of the area’s indigenous helpers, who propelled the Holocaust at the grassroots level. Concentrating on the important work of recovering the history of local collaboration, scholars have only partially dissected the motivations of these essential participants in the occupation regime and the Holocaust. In contrast to the monumental work of recovering the history of local collaboration, scholars have only recently begun to examine the role of the area’s indigenous helpers, who propelled the Holocaust at the grassroots level. Concentrating on the important work of recovering the history of local collaboration, scholars have only partially dissected the motivations of these essential participants in the occupation regime and the Holocaust. In contrast to the monumental work of recovering the history of local collaboration, scholars have only recently begun to examine the role of the area’s indigenous helpers, who propelled the Holocaust at the grassroots level.8 Focusing on the complicity of the predominantly Slavic local police in Belarus and Ukraine, for example, Berhard Chiari, Martin Dean, and Dieter Pohl have examined the crucial contribution of non-German Holocaust perpetrators in the Soviet Union. Chiari, Alltag hinter der Front. Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust. Dieter Pohl, “Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden,” in Die Täter der Shoah: fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?, ed. Gerhard Paul (Göttingen, 2002), 205-24. In examining Eastern European Holocaust perpetrators, historians have sketched two preliminary explanations for the involvement of Eastern Europeans. First, as Karol Berkhoff and Amir Weiner note, the region’s indigenous anti-Semitism was a crucial engine for driving the Holocaust at the grassroots level. See Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair; Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, 2001). Similarly, in his case study of the Holocaust in Jedwabne, Poland, Jan Gross points to the primary importance of local anti-Semitism in the decisions of Poles to murder their Jewish neighbors. See Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland (Princeton, 2001). Second, as historians, such as Chiarina, Dean, Diekmann, and Ioanid argue, Eastern Europeans perpetrated Holocaust crimes as a result of self-interest, either by simply robbing their victims, or by attempting to curry favor with German occupation officials. See Chiarina, Alltag hinter der Front; Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust; Christoph Diekmann et al., eds., Kooperation und Verbrechen: Formen der “Kollaboration” im östlichen Europa 1939-1945 (Göttingen, 2003), 9-21. Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania. 205-24.

A final, albeit key reason why the Nazi Volksdeutsche project and the Holocaust in southern Ukraine remain under-studied is that most sources available to probe the subject have become accessible to scholars only very recently. Intentional and unintentional document
destruction during the war’s final months erased most wartime German records related to the Third Reich’s activities in southern Ukraine and local Volksdeutsche participation in the Holocaust. Within the past decade, however, wartime and postwar record collections that permit a comprehensive study of the subject have become available. Two newly accessible sources provide valuable caches of relevant wartime materials. The recently declassified records of the British Radio Code and Cypher School contain decrypted wartime German police radio traffic that British signals intelligence gathered during the Second World War. These intercepts include the text of more than 1,000 messages that area German officials sent or received during the conflict. Records from the Odessa oblast archive also house substantial, albeit fragmentary, wartime German and Romanian correspondence, which complements previously available German archival sources.

Most importantly, the recently released records of postwar Soviet and German inquiries into Nazi population policy and the Holocaust in southern Ukraine permit a detailed reconstruction of this often ignored episode of the war. Beginning just after the Red Army wrested control of southern Ukraine from Romanian and German forces in 1944, the Soviet secret police began investigating the crimes of local German speakers and their Nazi overlords and recorded testimonies taken from area residents and from captured suspected German and Volksdeutsche perpetrators. Starting in the early 1960s, West German investigators at the newly founded Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen) in Ludwigsburg launched a parallel investigation into the same events, interviewing hundreds of former German officials who served in Odessa oblast’ during the war as well as former local ethnic Germans who had relocated to Germany after 1945. By the time that German investigators concluded their inquiry in 1999, these dueling and occasionally cooperating inquiries yielded nearly a thousand testimonies related to the Third Reich’s Volksdeutsche policy and the Holocaust in southern Ukraine.

Although these newly available testimonies provide detailed information about wartime events, using them to recover the occupation’s local dynamics and the Holocaust is methodologically challenging. Historians continue to wrestle with how to glean useful historical information from statements that erstwhile participants

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14 With the exception of places, such as Odessa, which have common English spellings, all place names are given using the names that local German speakers and later the SS assigned to them. This is done to recreate and convey the historical landscape as it existed at that time. For the reader’s convenience and geographical precision, if possible the contemporary Ukrainian-language place name is given in the first instance.
in the Holocaust provided years after the fact in circumstances that undoubtedly shaped their accounts. This problem is particularly acute for police statements. Fearing criminal liability, interviewees often adapted their testimony to deflect suspicion. That the Soviet security apparatus recorded many of these statements raises further methodological issues. The Soviet secret police’s lack of due process, probable coercion of witnesses, and history of staging politically motivated show trials during the 1930s raises valid concerns about the veracity of information contained in postwar Soviet testimony about the war.

While this body of evidence presents significant methodological challenges, the scale and diversity of sources available to reconstruct Nazi Volksdeutsche policy and the Holocaust in southern Ukraine provides an exceptional opportunity to assess the quality of historical information in Soviet testimony. Not only is there a large, if fragmentary, body of wartime records that can be used to corroborate postwar statements, but the West German investigation produced an exceptional parallel set of testimonies. In few if any other instances did German investigators possess the language skills or unfettered access to former area residents to conduct a detailed investigation into the Holocaust in the occupied Soviet Union at the local level. Postwar investigations into this subject constitute a rare instance in which two very different states probed the same microhistorical events and one in which historians can compare the content of each record group to distinguish between consistent, historically useful and inconsistent, likely implausible information. That interview transcripts recorded decades and thousands of kilometers apart provide remarkably uniform historical information speaks to the empirical weight of these testimonies.

II.

The precise contours of German occupation policy in southern Ukraine were a product of Germany and Romania’s cooperation in the invasion of the Soviet Union and, at least initially, in the Holocaust. To cement Romania’s assistance in Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union and to compensate the country for the reallocation of Transylvania to Hungary, Adolf Hitler promised Romania’s dictator, Ion Antonescu, Soviet territory outside of Romania’s historical borders between the Dniester and Bug Rivers, dubbing the region Transnistria. While this move enticed Romania to support Operation Barbarossa, it

15 Although a number of historians have used postwar testimony to reconstruct wartime events related to the Holocaust, perhaps no scholar has employed them as systematically in historical research on this period as Christopher R. Browning. See Christopher R. Browning, Remembering Survival: Inside a Nazi Slave-Labor Camp (New York, 2010).
also placed the Black Sea Germans under foreign control. For Heinrich Himmler, who, as the Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germanhood (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volksstums), was responsible for the Third Reich’s relationship with Germanophone minorities abroad, this situation proved intolerable. Fearing that what he regarded as the valuable biological building blocks of Nazi rule in the Soviet Union would languish under Romanian authority, Himmler ordered the SS-run Ethnic German Liaison Office (Volksdeutsche Mitteilstelle) or VoMi to deploy to Romanian-controlled Transnistria. The SS devoted substantial elements of Sonderkommando R, the VoMi unit charged with implementing the Nazi regime’s Volksdeutsche policy in the occupied Soviet Union, to the area. Transnistria’s new Romanian rulers grudgingly granted the unit extraterritorial authority over local ethnic Germans.16 Under the leadership of Horst Hoffmeier, the architect of the VoMi’s ethnic German “resettlement” operations in the Baltic and southeastern Europe, Sonderkommando R’s forces in Transnistria were not subject to the VoMi’s chain of command and reported directly to Himmler — making it his personal ethnic German affairs unit in the occupied Soviet Union.17

When Sonderkommando R’s forces arrived in Transnistria in early September 1941, they encountered local ethnic German communities embattled by decades of Soviet rule and traumatized by the war’s opening months. The Black Sea Germans descended from German-speaking settlers who had relocated to the area at the invitation of the tsarist regime at the beginning of the nineteenth century and inhabited some two hundred multi-ethnic villages and hamlets that dotted the Ukrainian countryside outside of Odessa. As the beneficiaries of legal privileges, including reduced taxation, under the ancien régime, the Black Sea Germans supported the tsarist autocracy until the First World War, when it took repressive measures against German and Yiddish-speaking residents along the empire’s western borderlands.18 During the Kaiserreich’s brief occupation of southern Ukraine during the First World War, area Germanophone residents anticipated lasting German dominance in the region and supported the German military until its hasty retreat. Siding with White forces during the Russian Civil War as the only viable alternative to the Bolsheviks, local German speakers suffered mightily during the first years of Soviet power as vanquished political opponents.19 During the late 1920s

16 Copie de pe adresa Nr. 67148 a Ministerului Afacerilor Străine Dir politică către M.St.M., September 11, 1941, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives [hereafter USHMM], RG-31.004M, Reel 2, Fond 2242, Opis 1, Ed Hr 1081, 13.
17 VoMi chief SS-Obergruppenführer Werner Lorenz claimed that Himmler removed Hoffmeier from his chain of command and subordinated Sonderkommando R to the Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer (Higher SS and Police Leader). Vernehmung von Werner Lorenz, April 16, 1973, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen Abteilung Westfalen, Münster [hereafter Staatsarchiv Münster], Nr. 2787, 102. As such a position did not exist for Transnistria, Hoffmeier reported directly to Himmler. While perhaps technically true, wartime British radio decryptions of German police radio traffic demonstrate that Hoffmeier remained at least partially under Lorenz’s command. During the evacuation of Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche, for example, Lorenz called Hoffmeier on the carpet for failing to report in and admonished him that “it is to be avoided that other Reich offices are better informed than me.” German Police Decodes No. 1 Traffic: 18.4.44, BNA, HW 16, Piece 40, 3.
18 Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen im Zarenreich: Zwei Jahrhunderte deutsch-russische Kulturgemeinschaft (Stuttgart, 1988), 479, 502; Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I (Bloomington, 1999), 23; Eric Lehr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign Against Enemy Aliens during World War I (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 100, 104-108.
19 Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen im Zarenreich, 587-589.
and early 1930s, local Soviet officials disproportionately identified southern Ukraine’s German speakers as “kulaks,” or wealthy peasants, and targeted them for arrest, expropriation, and deportation. Soviet authorities also shuttered ethnic German churches and with them a key way in which the region’s predominantly Catholic and Protestant Volksdeutsche differentiated themselves from their non-German neighbors. The degree of linguistic autonomy that the Soviet regime had granted local German speakers ended abruptly during the late 1930s, as Soviet authorities pursued increasingly repressive measures against ethnic minorities on the country’s periphery. The Red Army’s brutal retreat from southern Ukraine ahead of advancing German and Romanian forces during the late summer of 1941 exacerbated the Black Sea Germans’ generation and a half of cultural, religious, and socio-economic decline. Withdrawing Red Army units attempted to deport ethnic German men — who were already in short supply owing to prewar arrests — to the Soviet interior. While advancing Wehrmacht forces overran many of these deportation transports, the experience signaled to remaining Volksdeutsche that a return of Soviet rule would likely precipitate their wholesale expulsion and the destruction of their communities.

Although local German speakers welcomed the Germans as an alternative to the Soviets, they remained initially ambivalent about the Nazi agenda. In contrast to local residents of western Ukraine, area ethnic Germans did not carry out autonomous anti-Semitic violence during the interregnum between Soviet and German power. After Einsatzgruppe D swept through the communities on the Wehrmacht’s heels in August 1941, the unit’s personnel reported that area Volksdeutsche regarded local Jews as “harmless and innocuous.” This was something of an exaggeration. Local residents gleefully denounced alleged Volksdeutsche “communists” and the “bad Jews,” whom area Volksdeutsche deemed complicit in the evils of the Soviet regime, to Einsatzgruppe D for murder. Yet, initially unbeknownst to the Germans, Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche communities conspired to hide a substantial number of indigenous Jews who had intermarried with local ethnic Germans. Despite their suffering under the Soviets, Transnistria’s ethnic Germans were initially ambivalent toward National Socialism’s genocidal plans.


During the late summer and fall of 1941, Sonderkommando R’s personnel trickled into Romanian-occupied Transnistria overland via Rowno (Rivne) and Kiev. After establishing the unit’s regional headquarters in Landau (Shyrokolanivka), one of the region’s sizable ethnic German communities, the unit’s personnel divided into eighteen Bereichkommandos or Regional Commands and set up station in Odessa and major ethnic German settlements in the Transnistrian countryside. Sonderkommando R’s Bereichkommandos varied in size and composition, but typically included an SS-Hauptsturmführer (roughly equivalent to Captain) as commander, an SS non-commissioned officer as his subordinate, and a member of the National Socialist Motor Corps, seconded to the VoMi for wartime service, to maintain and operate the unit’s vehicles. Eventually, the German Red Cross and the NS-Frauenwerk, the Nazi women’s organization, contributed a substantial number of nurses, teachers, and National Socialist organizers to these rural VoMi outposts. By 1942, Sonderkommando R’s hodgepodge composition and gender diversity made it one of the most eclectic German formations of the war.

With only skeletal instructions from their VoMi superiors, Sonderkommando R’s personnel began marshaling Transnistria’s ethnic Germans as a bulwark of Germanism in conquered Ukraine. The unit’s first measure was to expand local Volksdeutsche militia or Selbstschutz forces that Einsatzgruppe D had created. Reminiscent of homegrown self-defense forces that local German speakers had
fi elded during the Russian Civil War, these militias were ostensibly an anti-partisan force.30 As Sonderkommando R quickly discovered, with the notable exception of Odessa’s catacombs, southern Ukraine’s countryside was inhospitable to partisans. It therefore redirected these untrained, poorly equipped, and abysmally armed militias against a more immediate threat: the Romanians.31 Although Romania’s leaders had acquiesced to German pressure and permitted the VoMi to operate in Transnistria, local Romanian military and civilian leaders understood quite correctly that Sonderkommando R’s Volksdeutsche project permitted the SS to unfurl its tentacles into Romanian-occupied territory. Area Romanian authorities therefore countered Sonderkommando R’s presence in a running conflict that escalated to kidnappings, carjackings, and shootouts between the Romanian military and local ethnic German militiamen.32 Although Sonderkommando R eventually deployed its ethnic German militia forces as a manpower pool for mass murder, the VoMi initially used these units to contest Romanian control of the Transnistrian countryside.

To secure Germany’s demographic claim to conquered Soviet territory, Sonderkommando R bolstered local German speakers through a twin policy of ethnic cleansing and material enrichment. While most of the region’s ethnic Germans lived in predominantly German-speaking enclaves, these communities were far from homogeneous. For decades, local Ukrainians and Jews had lived among and forged close bonds with their ethnic German neighbors. Sonderkommando R undid this rich multiethnic heritage by creating exclusively Germanophone settlements, where none had existed previously. Sonderkommando R murdered the handful of easily identifiable local Jews within weeks of establishing command posts in rural Transnistria. Unaware that many ethnic German communities continued to hide some thoroughly integrated local Jews and believing Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche settlements to be j udenrein, Sonderkommando R turned its attention to local Slavs. In towns and hamlets that the VoMi designated as ethnically German, Sonderkommando R’s staff evicted local Ukrainians and Russians, redistributing their homes to area Volksdeutsche.33 In communities where so few German speakers lived that even the SS could not delude itself into identifying these settlements as ethnically German, the SS pressured local German speakers to relocate to Germanophone strongholds.34 The VoMi’s brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing in rural Transnistria presaged, at least in embryo, the type of militarized, German-speaking settlements with which Nazi planners aimed to remake conquered Soviet territory after the war.

30 Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen im Zarenreich, 375.


34 Aussage von P. B., October 20, 1964, BAL, B162/2303, 57.
Sonderkommando R also sought to establish lasting ethnic German dominance in the area by creating a superior material position for local residents who remained in communities that Sonderkommando R deemed to be ethnically German. The SS forged structural economic advantages for local Volksdeutsche by granting them privileged access to Transnistria’s scarce economic resources. In a bid to bolster Transnistria’s ethnic Germans and to expand the SS’s Lilliputian empire in the area, much to the annoyance of local Romanian officials, Sonderkommando R declared rural enterprises, including wineries and mills, to be “ethnically German” and thus within its purview. More importantly, Sonderkommando R dismantled collective agriculture in Transnistria’s ethnic German settlements — an exceptional move in the occupied Soviet Union. The unit reallocated rural Ukraine’s primary agricultural resources, including farmland, tractors, and livestock, which the Soviet state had previously owned and made available to all local residents, exclusively to denizens of Sonderkommando R’s Volksdeutsche settlements.

Despite Sonderkommando R’s ambitious plans to marshal local ethnic Germans as a demographic claim to conquered Soviet territory, the unit’s staff had surprisingly little idea which area inhabitants belonged in the Nazi racial community. The core of Hofmann’s staff in Transnistria had participated in the VoMi’s earlier ethnic German “resettlement” operations. A substantial number of Sonderkommando R’s officers were themselves ethnic Germans who had relocated from the Baltic or Southeastern Europe to occupied Poland with the VoMi’s assistance and received SS commissions. The unit’s leaders rapidly concluded that local residents, particularly in rural Transnistria, bore little resemblance to ethnic Germans with whom the VoMi had interacted before the invasion of the Soviet Union. Not only had the Black Sea Germans maintained more circumscribed cultural and economic connections to Germany than other groups of German speakers that the VoMi had encountered, but, more importantly, decades of Soviet rule had prevented Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche from engaging in the prewar National Socialist agitation that denoted real “Germanness” for the SS. Unwilling to apply the classification criteria that the SS had used elsewhere in East Central and Eastern Europe, Sonderkommando R decided against assigning formal ethnic classifications during the fall of 1941. Rather, the unit permitted local men to self-identify...
as ethnic Germans by joining the SS’s militias, and thereby to secure Volksdeutsche status for their families.\footnote{Protokol doprosa / Ionusa Aleksandra, April 6, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8454.}

Granting Transnistria’s denizens the power to classify themselves provisionally as Volksdeutsche was predictably corrosive to the category’s poorly defined boundaries. Local residents had powerful incentives to identify themselves as ethnic Germans regardless of whether or not they or others would have done so before the war. Einsatzgruppe D and Sonderkommando R’s violent campaign to murder local Jews and to expel area Slavs from rural Transnistrian communities illustrated to area residents the possible dangers that awaited non-Germans under Nazi rule. Schooled in the brutal politics of Stalinist agricultural production, which had precipitated a famine less than a generation earlier, local denizens also grasped the dire long-term consequences of exclusion from the land, livestock, and equipment necessary to farm.\footnote{On the distribution of livestock to militia members, for example, see Protokol, April 26, 1967, USHMM, RG-31.018M, Reel 17, 8902.}

As area residents understood, non-Germans would starve to fatten area ethnic Germans.

To secure their material position and to enrich themselves through the largesse that the Third Reich offered to Volksdeutsche, area men — ethnic Germans and non-Germans alike — flooded to militia service that the SS required of all male Volksdeutsche.\footnote{Stabbefehl Nr. 102, April 18, 1943, BB, R 59/67, 18. Stabbefehl Nr. 109, June 22, 1943, BB, R 59/67, 59.} Just as ethnic German settlements had conspired to hide a selective number of highly integrated Jews from Nazi violence, so too did these communities field ostensibly “ethnically German” militia forces that included many non-Germans. As residents of highly incestuous enclaves, Transnistria’s inhabitants identified most of their neighbors as fellow area ethnic Germans.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image}
\caption{Horst Hoffmeyer (right) examines an ethnic German child, undated. Source: Staatsanwaltschaft Dortmund, Zentralstelle für NS-Verbrechen, Nr. 2795, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Westfalen. Reproduced by permission.}
\end{figure}
members of extended clans. Rather than exclude their non-German neighbors and relatives from the material bounty that the Third Reich offered, area German speakers charged with militia recruitment included relatives, whom even they identified as non-Germans, in this auxiliary force.\(^{43}\) Local sabotage of the SS’s fly-by-night efforts to separate ethnic Germans from non-Germans in rural Transnistria would have profound consequences as the Holocaust intensified in southern Ukraine during the winter of 1941-1942.

III.

A region that might otherwise have remained a focus of brutal Nazi demographic experimentation became an epicenter of the Holocaust during December 1941 because of a collision between Romanian and German anti-Jewish policies. While the Antonescu regime murdered hundreds of thousands of Jews during the Second World War, Romania remained concerned primarily with removing Jews from its border regions and recently acquired territory. It therefore frequently sought to deport Jews to German-occupied areas, where they were to be murdered by the Germans. Germany, which sought to eradicate Jews across Europe and eventually the globe, by contrast, pressured Romanian authorities to kill Jews within territory that they administered. Although initially united in their struggle against the Soviet Union and partners in the Holocaust, Romania and Germany differed on where and by whom Europe’s Jews were to be killed.\(^{44}\)

During winter 1941, the tension between these conflicting policies became acute when Romanian occupation officials began deporting tens of thousands of Jews from territories that they had acquired during the invasion of the Soviet Union to a series of camps and ghettos near Odessa and along the Bug River’s right bank.\(^{45}\) When occupation officials in German-occupied Ukraine refused to permit their Romanian counterparts to deport Jews across the Bug River and into German-controlled territory, the Romanian government resolved to send its Jewish prisoners to villages at the heart of Sonderkommando R’s Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle project in rural Transnistria.\(^{46}\) This development in Romanian anti-Jewish policy surprised Sonderkommando R’s personnel.\(^{47}\) While the unit had murdered a selective group of easily identifiable local Jews and suspected communists, Sonderkommando R was neither designed nor prepared to initiate a mass killing operation. The SS had assigned much of the unit’s German staff to Transnistria because its members were unfit for frontline service.\(^{48}\)


\(^{44}\) For another example of the tension between Germany and Romania’s anti-Jewish policies, see Andrej Angrick, “The Escalation of German-Romanian Anti-Jewish Policy after the Attack on the Soviet Union,” Yad Vashem Studies 26 (1998): 231-232.

\(^{45}\) Ancel, Transnistria, 1941-42, 63.

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 56.


\(^{48}\) A surprising proportion of Sonderkommando R’s German staff was physically unfit for frontline service. See, for example, Betr.: Ermittlungen der Angehörigen des Rußland-Kommandos des Hauptamtes Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle zu Fachführern der Waffen-SS in SS Offizier Akte Fritz Dankert, NARA, RG 242, A3343, SSO-135, 1018. SS Offizier Akte Erich Meinert Claassen, NARA, RG 242, A3343, SSO-129, 11-13. Aussage von E. M. C., August 6, 1962, BAL, B162/2293, 171.
Moreover, the only personnel at Sonderkommando R’s disposal capable of mass killing were local militias of dubious ethnic origin and certain martial incompetence.

Although acutely aware of these limitations, the VoMi leadership in Transnistria also feared that the appalling sanitary conditions in which Romanian authorities housed their Jewish captives threatened to precipitate a typhus epidemic that could spread to local Volksdeutsche communities. While Hoffmeier consulted with Berlin and Bucharest and unsuccessfully explored the possibility of receiving assistance from other German forces, energetic local commanders began deploying their Selbstschutz units against the Jewish deportees. With little warning, Sonderkommando R mustered militia units and ordered them to gun down men, women, and children in the countryside surrounding established ethnic German settlements and at shooting sites that Romanian authorities designated. There is neither evidence that Sonderkommando R permitted any of its militiamen to stand aside, nor is there indication that any Selbstschutz members refused to shoot.

Sonderkommando R’s militiamen were initially amateurish mass murderers. Under the close, albeit oft en incompetent, tutelage of Sonderkommando R’s German staff, local men used captured Soviet small arms that the SS had scrounged together to shoot their victims at close range. Poor marksmen, the killers merely wounded some Jews, whom the perpetrators then chased down and murdered. While the unit predicated its involvement in the Holocaust as a disease prevention measure, its officers permitted local residents to steal their victims’ clothing, facilitating the spread of typhus to area killers and their families — the precise consequence that the SS had hoped to avoid.

Despite the Selbstschutz’s inept inauguration into genocide, their performance convinced local commanders to improve and expand the training, armament, and scope of the militiamen’s murderous responsibilities. With surprising rapidity, Sonderkommando R’s militiamen developed into highly skilled genocidaires, who, in anticipation of techniques that the SS would develop at the extermination camps only just opening in occupied Poland, destroyed their victims’ corpses through cremation and tapped Jewish slave labor to assist in body disposal. By the time German diplomatic pressure and an increasing scarcity of potential victims ended Sonderkommando

49 On Sonderkommando R’s fear of typhus see Rundanweisung Nr.
31. April 7, 1942, BB, R 59/66, 103. German Police Decodes Nr 2

50 German Police Activities in the Soviet Union, Summary Covering the Period of 16th December - 15th January 1942, February 14, 1942, BNA, HW 15, Piece 6, 3.


R’s consistent involvement in mass killing operations during the spring of 1942, local SS-controlled militias were no longer waiting for Romanian authorities to deport Jews to their hometowns, but were traveling away from their settlements in search of targets.\textsuperscript{56} A year later, these militias, complete with a string of VoMi-run training academies through rural Transnistria, had become sufficiently potent that the Waffen-SS began inducting their younger members into its ranks for frontline service.\textsuperscript{57} Initially clumsy groups of perpetrators, southern Ukraine’s VoMi militias evolved into elite killing units.

IV.

Why did many residents of Transnistria’s SS-administered ethnic German settlements succumb to the Nazi project’s seductions and participate in the Holocaust? The answer is particularly bedeviling because many of the explanations that scholars have developed to understand perpetrator behavior fail to explain the actions of VoMi militiamen in Transnistria. Preexisting indigenous anti-Semitism, although undoubtedly present in Transnistria’s VoMi-administered communities, for example, appears not to have been a major factor. In contrast to other residents of rural Ukraine, there is no evidence of autonomous Volksdeutsche violence against Jews in Transnistria during the summer and early fall of 1941. While area residents denounced some Jews, whom they regarded as outsiders, to Einsatzgruppe D and Sonderkommando R for murder, many area communities hid a selective group of thoroughly integrated local Jews from the SS, even in the midst of murdering Jewish deportees. Had historic anti-Semitism been the central reason why local residents participated in the Holocaust during the winter of 1941-1942, then surely it would have manifested itself before the SS asked local residents to kill in a hastily organized mass shooting operation.

More so than indigenous anti-Semitism, local residents responded positively to Nazi genocidal policies because of situational factors, many though not all of which VoMi policy in Transnistria created. To understand why individuals choose to take part in mass murder, scholars have developed myriad universally applicable social psychological explanations, many of which shaped the decisions of Transnistria’s militiamen to participate in the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{58} Local dynamics ensured that two such factors, the propensity to obey authority and to conform to group behavior, acted particularly powerfully on area residents. Decades of Soviet rule had conditioned...
area residents to comply with state authority. Analysis of wartime biographical information about known militiamen indicates that Soviet authorities had targeted virtually all of them or one of their immediate family members for expropriation, arrest, and deportation. The Nazi regime’s brutal campaign to root out local Jews and suspected ethnic German “communists” during the summer and early fall of 1941 underscored to local residents that the area’s new German rulers were no less brutal. By the winter of 1941, little in the collective experiences of Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche militiamen inclined them to resist state authority, particularly in a crisis, such as the one that Sonderkommando R’s leaders saw in the unanticipated influx of Jewish deportees.

The way in which the VoMi organized local militias also created a particular impetus for militiamen to conform to group behavior. Scholars have long pointed to pressure to conform to explain why genocidal killers participate in mass murder. Most of the Holocaust perpetrators whom scholars have examined operated as military, police, or auxiliary units — groups that served together for the war’s duration. Transnistria’s Selbstschutz units, by contrast, had longer lasting and deeper affiliations. Organized by villages, in which most residents were related by blood or marriage, Selbstschutz members perpetrated the Holocaust within the context of extended families. Militiamen not only had deep prewar relationships with their comrades but undoubtedly anticipated having to navigate postwar ties with them as well. If German perpetrators, with much weaker existing interpersonal relationships, felt substantial pressure to conform to group behavior, then it stands to reason that this tendency would have been accentuated within these family groups.

While local circumstances intensified some universal social psychological motivations for Transnistria’s militiamen to participate in mass murder, Sonderkommando R’s policies created strong — and perhaps uniquely potent — material incentives for local residents to take part in the Holocaust. Most immediately, Sonderkommando R permitted local residents to rob their victims of the often few remaining items that Romanian forces and their local collaborators had not already taken. Contrary to the articulated aspirations of senior Nazi leaders, including Himmler, Sonderkommando R’s forces stole in virtually every recorded mass killing operation. The distribution of purloined Jewish property duplicated the Nazi racial hierarchy in

59 Without surviving personnel files for Selbstschutz members, recovering biographical information about the suspected militiamen constitutes a challenge. Nevertheless, immigration records that the SS-run Einwandererezentrals (EWZ) generated in occupied Poland during 1944 for ethnic Germans who had fled Transnistria with Sonderkommando R can be used to identify militiamen implicated in postwar statements. These naturalization records are included in the Berlin Document Center collection at the United States National Archives and Records Administration.

60 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, 2nd ed. (New York, 1998), 185.
miniature. Sonderkommando R’s officers amassed small fortunes in stolen jewelry, coins, and dental gold, much of which they shipped to relatives in Germany.\(^61\) The unit’s militiamen received the most desirable clothing and whatever personal items from their victims that Sonderkommando R’s German personnel had not snapped up.\(^62\) Area Ukrainians, who often assisted the unit in body disposal, claimed any remaining property.\(^63\)

Beyond improving the often dire material circumstances of area Volksdeutsche, for Transnistria’s ethnic German killers the theft of Jewish property was doubly significant. On the one hand, it remedied what local ethnic Germans perceived to be a generation and a half of socio-economic decline. Receiving purloined Jewish property in the course of SS-led killing operations enabled local ethnic Germans to reacquire a privileged material position vis-à-vis their neighbors and thus to turn back the clock to an imagined Golden Age before 1914. On the other hand, it fed the Third Reich’s propaganda narrative about the allegedly pernicious “Judeo-Bolshevik” enemy.\(^64\) When German military and police forces had swept through Transnistria in August 1941, many Volksdeutsche communities were unwilling to accept the purported Nazi connection between Jews and Soviet power and conspired to hide thoroughly integrated local Jews from the Nazi security apparatus.\(^65\) The VoMi’s concerted efforts to link Jews with the Soviet regime’s evils remained largely ineffective until the beginning of Sonderkommando R’s mass shooting operations. In the course of these killing deployments, local ethnic Germans came into contact with Jewish victims who fit a key Nazi stereotype: they were substantially wealthier than their Volksdeutsche killers. A primarily urban population, this group of victims was richer than their rural killers, even after Romanian military and police authorities and their local Ukrainian auxiliaries had robbed them en route to Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche settlements. To many local residents, the wealth that they perceived their Jewish victims to possess provided a compelling explanation for what had happened to the property that the Soviet state had confiscated from area ethnic Germans during the preceding two and a half decades. Encountering Jews who, in Volksdeutsche eyes, typified the greedy architects of Soviet power that Nazi propagandists depicted, suggested to many local German speakers that Jews were indeed the Soviet regime’s prime movers. That, in early 1942, area Volksdeutsche began divulging the identities of their Jewish neighbors and even relatives to German authorities speaks, at least in part, to their acceptance

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\(^{61}\) Postwar statements that former residents of Transnistria gave to West German authorities are replete with references to the cupidity of Sonderkommando R’s German personnel. See, for example, Aussage von E. A., August 18, 1964, Staatsarchiv Münster, Nr. 2684, 32. Aussage von J. F., September 20, 1963, BAL, B162/2302, 300.


\(^{65}\) On Einsatzgruppe D’s activities in Transnistria’s Volksdeutsche settlements, see Angrick, Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord, 254-294.
of Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda.\footnote{Testimony that both Soviet and West German investigators collected captures the denunciation of local, previously hidden Jews in the ethnic German settlement of Selz during April 1942. See, for example, Akt No. 40, October 17, 1944, RG-22.002M, Reel 6, Fond 7021, Opis 69, Delo 75, 62, Aussage von D. P., April 26, 1967, BAL, B162/2307, 524.} Robbing their Jewish victims became, for Transnistria’s ethnic German killers, not simply an important source of personal enrichment, but a way to exact retribution against the “Judeo-Bolshevik” enemies whom the area’s new Nazi overlords identified as the perpetrators of past Soviet violence.

Beyond acquiring stolen Jewish property, participating in the Holocaust permitted local residents to clarify their uncertain ethnic identity in the VoMi’s eyes and to gain access to the material rewards that membership in the Volksgemeinschaft afforded. Sonderkommando R’s militiamen were acutely aware that the VoMi remained suspicious of the “Germanness” of area residents and had, in an act of desperation, relied on supposedly reliable local Volksdeutsche to identify area ethnic Germans by including them on the militia’s roster. Having packed the militia with their non-German relatives, they also knew that Sonderkommando R’s anxieties were well-founded. When mustered to murder Jewish deportees, area denizens correctly recognized that killing constituted a key way in which they could demonstrate their Nazi credentials and thus “Germanness” to the SS. Any militiaman who stood aside could not hope to receive SS recognition as an ethnic German after the conclusion of the mass murder campaign and would be excluded from the Third Reich’s material largesse. Moreover, individual recalcitrance risked closer SS scrutiny of the unit’s commitment to the Nazi agenda and, from the SS’s perspective, its “Germanness.” Keenly aware of the comparatively impressive material incentives that the Third Reich proffered to members of the Nazi racial community, most if not all would-be ethnic Germans that the SS deployed participated in the Holocaust. The structural rewards that the SS offered to cooperative area denizens who had underscored their “Germanness” by taking part in the Holocaust thus constituted a potent situational pressure that encouraged Transnistria’s ethnically German residents to carry out mass murder.

Recovering the SS’s Volksdeutsche enterprise and local collaboration in the Holocaust in Transnistria has three broader implications. First, and most basically, it reconstructs a previously under-studied episode of the Nazi genocidal project in conquered Soviet territory and adds an important chapter to the history of the Second World War and the Holocaust. Second, probing the role and particularly motivations of local collaborators provides new information about the Holocaust at the grassroots level in the occupied Soviet Union. It
brings into sharp relief the Third Reich’s struggle to layer its policies over a multiplicity of preexisting interethnic relationships in a region scarred by decades of conflict.67 It also highlights the ways in which local residents navigated and often exploited opportunities that the new Nazi system created. And last, but perhaps most importantly, it contributes to the mature, yet ongoing conversation about the motivations of Holocaust perpetrators. By tying the comparatively tremendous material inducements that the Third Reich offered to members of the Nazi racial community to participating in the Holocaust, the SS was able to gain exceptional and perhaps unique leverage over Transnistria’s ethnic Germans to encourage them to take part in genocide. This finding suggests that in examining why perpetrators took part in the Holocaust, scholars would be well served to explore the Nazi regime’s capacity to generate circumstances in which some individuals chose to become killers.


67 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York, 2010).
It has been a great, and unexpected, honor to be awarded the Helmut Schmidt Prize in German-American economic history. While I have been concerned with German economic performance at many points in my scholarship — whether the economics of the hyper-inflation and reparations of the 1920s, or of the Marshall Plan and Germany, or the economic difficulties of the German Democratic Republic — I have dedicated no single book to the German economy as such. In effect, German economic history — in truth, the history of Germany’s political economy more than of its enterprises — has been a recurrent theme that I have been unable to escape. So much of German public life has followed from economic alternatives and contestation that I have simply found it hard not to study these issues. In any case, I am immensely thankful to the committee that believed my forays were worthy of this prize, proud to be honored with an award named after one of postwar Germany’s most intelligent leaders, and grateful, too, for the generous laudatio prepared by Volker Berghahn, an earlier winner and a longtime colleague.

I.

The receipt of the Helmut Schmidt award comes with the assignment and the opportunity of preparing a suitable address. It would have seemed perverse, I believe, not to use the occasion to reflect on what economic and financial history can teach us about the crisis that has simmered before us over the past few months — most notably that of Europe’s great experiment in common currency, the Euro. At the time I delivered the lecture that follows (December 8, 2011), events seemed at a decisive juncture: Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy — this new duo dubbed Merkozy — had agreed on a common policy for averting Greek sovereign debt default and requiring a renewed European Union commitment to debt-reduction guidelines and enforcement. Since then, British objections to a common policy led to a new fiscal compact in early March 2012 that required more stringent budgetary policies by signatories, but established a larger “firewall” provision. The new governor of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi,
has extended very large loans at very low interest to European private banks in the hope that they would re-subscribe to the sovereign debt rollover that the ECB itself was not allowed to purchase. So far so good, but he cannot compel the banks to act as a conduit for ECB liquidity. And clearly some of his German board members, especially Jens Weidman, have sharply criticized his policy. Most recently the Greek parliament has passed stricter austerity measures and got bondholder representatives to agree to a debt exchange that entailed over a 50 percent write-off of nominal value in their bond holdings. Whether, as of this writing, the Greek drama (or others in the Eurozone) is over, remains far from certain.

We have all followed, before and after my own comment, this serial drama reminiscent of the “Perils of Pauline” in the early cinema, and only a foolhardy prophet would say the crisis has run its course. Unless the European economies resume significant GDP growth, the new fiscal compact will become simply unenforceable. Spain has already said it cannot comply at this point. Countries can perhaps control the numerator of the debt-to-GDP ratio assuming they can stop their ears from cries of real hardship among those of their citizens who bear the costs of a crisis for which they had little responsibility. (Among all the concerns for moral hazard, one might think about immoral hazard or financial “collateral damage” as well.) But few nations can control the denominator of this ratio. Whatever supposedly automatic sanctions the new fiscal compact decrees they can be imposed only if European economic growth can be stabilized. A recession or depression will quickly transform the new so-called Golden Rule into what Barry Eichengreen termed, in his great account of interwar difficulties, Golden Fetters.

I am not an economist and not a policy maker, neither am I a resident of the European Union or the Eurozone. But to a significant degree we are all hostage to Europe’s fortunes: the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China), the emerging economies, and ultimately, if not yet, the United States. Focused on the day-to-day, it is easy to forget that the crisis of the Euro is part of the more general economic and financial difficulty that has gripped the United States and Europe since 2008. It may be part of a more general crisis of capitalism. It is certainly part of the longer-term passage of global economic ascendancy from Europe and North America, ultimately to the benefit of other continents. The United States has played a relatively passive role in the Eurocrisis but clearly was a major actor in helping unleash the policies of
reckless lending, and of the proliferation of flimsy financial wagers that proved so contagious. A decade and half ago, I tried to describe what was apparently the terminal crisis of state socialism in the German Democratic Republic. I would rather not have to write a similar autopsy for the system of markets and private decision making that then seemed to triumph so strongly. But I retain enough of a dialectic sensibility to believe that the very sources of vigor and strength in one period can become vulnerabilities in the next.

The great sociological and political as well as purely economic question that arises from the last decade — and I would argue ever since the 1980s — is whether we can turn over the enormous power to expand credit to private actors (not just to elected politicians) without fictitious and disastrous inflation of financial assets. The question has been repeatedly asked, by Charles Kindleberger and Hyman Minsky, and most recently perhaps in Carmine Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff’s book _This Time is Different_. Faced with the persistent inflation of the 1970s, earlier critics had similarly feared that the “moral basis of capitalism” — that is, its once Weberian or Smithian instincts for saving and parsimony — had eroded. But they looked mostly at the wage and welfare sector and they feared class entitlements and consumerism and the spinelessness of democratic politicians in promising what once was called “jam today and jam tomorrow.” Certainly there are many political candidates and leaders who raise the same charges today; they claim we cannot afford to generalize health care and pensions. But I believe that responsibility must be attributed not just to elected representatives, or to greedy unions, or to supposedly irresponsible borrowers, but to those supposedly in charge of society’s savings — private wealth managers as well as public officials — for having behaved recklessly and shortsightedly.

We have lived through an orgy of credit creation, not by public agencies alone, but by banks as well. This took place under governments of the left as well as the right.

In any case, economic historians of the future will have much anguish to sift through, and given the division between left and right that is eternal in human political society they will come up with different diagnoses. For the nature of economic and financial history is such that it can never reach positions of greater non-partisan certainty than economic policy itself. This does not mean that divergent historical analyses are equally correct or that the truth must always lie in between. Neither do contested narratives mean that there are no lessons
from history. Rather history alerts us to the range of choices and of solutions that we can contemplate. If studied correctly, it teaches not a false simplicity but the true complexity of events. It suggests how policy options can produce perverse and unanticipated effects; it provides that mood music of a complex past which should alert us to how devilishly complicated the present is.

II.

It is in that spirit, not of resolving choices, but revealing some implications they present, that I want to re-examine very briefly some twentieth-century experiences that were important for Germany and which cast light, I believe, on current choices for that country and the rest of us as well. I will turn first to the great German inflation after World War I and the deflation of the early 1930s; second, to the protracted and bitter conflict over German reparations that fell between these economic catastrophes; and third, to the post-World War II era of economic privation and recovery during the Marshall Plan. In different ways each of these wrenching episodes elucidates the crisis of the Euro today and Germany’s choices in that crisis.

What can the catastrophic German inflation that followed World War I teach us? Inflation is the rise in general price levels that occurs when societies realize that they have created claims on present and future output that exceed what they can actually produce. In another form we call these claims debt. Let’s be clear about the cliché of living beyond one’s means. It’s not possible for a society to live beyond its means unless it gets subsidies from abroad. No closed society of economic actors can really consume more than it is willing or able to produce or has already produced — the goods and perhaps labor, in that case, are simply not there to be had. It is, rather, the intention to spend more — expressed, say, in greater purchases of goods in the private sector, including houses, or in the approval of consistently deficitary budgets, or alternatively in the intention to devote less lifetime labor to the acquisition of a given standard of living — that results in inflation. Debt — private and public — expresses the willingness to call on those within a society who have accumulated savings or to tap foreign sources to pay for current consumption, including pensions and medical care, or to pay for durable goods, including housing, industrial plant, and infrastructure, or for military goods and labor. What is too easily forgotten, however, is that debt accumulated to augment the stock of productive resources will
usually generate the future income to pay itself off; debt incurred for consumption or leisure cannot do so — although it is not always unambiguous which expenditures are tantamount to capital formation and which are not. Health and education and even housing can be construed as social capital and not just current expenditure.

Debt becomes a very easy recourse when a society suddenly adds military expenses to its normal civilian ones without cutting back equivalently on the latter, as was the case most spectacularly in the First World War. Like every one of the major combatants in the First World War, Germany mobilized most of its resources (including labor resources that it expanded and made subject to compulsion) by claiming that far less would have to be surrendered in terms of the society’s purchasing power, present and future, than was the case. The state, with the collusion of the Central Bank, printed the money it needed to commandeer perhaps up to 40 percent or more of GDP. The society thus devoted roughly half its labor and production efforts to goods and services useful only for fighting its adversaries. By refusing to drastically shift apparent (and I underline apparent) purchasing power from its citizens and businesses, it temporarily disguised the levies. Other societies did the same; the latest research suggests that Germany was not really much more improvident than even Britain and certainly France or Italy. But defeat made it impossible to disguise further, and the Germans spent the next four years trying to figure out who among them should really bear the silent confiscations that had taken place.

If debt is mobilized from within a society, repayment can be avoided by making the real cost of goods and services higher, that is rationing through inflation, even as the real value of monetary assets — money, bonds, insurance payments — are all reduced. The postwar German political system was sufficiently paralyzed between left and right so that it essentially acquiesced in the write-off of all domestic monetary assets as well as letting the prices of consumer goods rise astronomically. And while Germans could not borrow as much from abroad as could the Allies during the war, they were assigned the postwar debts known as reparations. Ironically enough, Allied reparation demands made it easier to avoid facing up to the great redistributive issues inside the country after 1918; they served as an alibi, for it seemed as if the foreign exactions were the underlying problem. But the problem originated with the war, and not merely that it had been lost, but that it had been fought.
The result was a social and political stalemate. By 1922, German Social Democrats wanted to requisition not paper savings but the returns on tangible capital assets, which in the postwar era could actually be expanded (the so-called “Erfassung der Sachwerte”), but they had no majority for such a policy by 1922. On the other hand, German workers as a group were able to enforce frequent wage adjustments and probably lost relatively less than middle-class savers and salaried employers. (It is appropriate to recall here the great work of the late Gerald Feldman, friend of so many of us, and of this German Historical Institute, who so exhaustively documented this process.) Redistribution rewarded those who understood domestic paper assets were doomed and only real estate or perhaps factories or foreign currencies and assets might save them.

The conflict over distributing the losses, of course, deeply poisoned Weimar politics, and not just during the inflation, but during the “good” years of 1924-29, when the battles to allocate the losses racked up between 1914 and 1918 were still being fought. Now, inflation in the narrow sense did not bring Hitler to power — mass unemployment and the perceived inability of democratic political leaders to overcome it contributed more directly. Neither can we be certain that this remote episode continues to determine German policy choices, as many commentators always affirm. Repeating a cliché does not necessarily make it true. The current one-sided mandate of the European Central Bank to preserve price stability arose from an interpretation of the stagflation of the 1970s, not the 1920s, nor even of the currency collapse of 1945 to 1948.

No, the real lesson of the inflation that is relevant for today is that liabilities can be disguised, sometimes even as assets (as is the case in the great bubble that led up to 2008) but ultimately will be discovered and must be allocated. That process is perhaps the most painful and indeed paralyzing exercise a democratic society can carry out in peacetime; but it becomes unavoidable as long as social actors can express their preferences, whether through the paralysis of legislation — as in Weimar and perhaps the current United States — or resistance in the street, as has been attempted recently in Greece and Spain and Italy, although with less success than one might have anticipated.

Fast forward six or seven years to the onset of the Great Depression. Just as German leaders were paralyzed by political division from 1921 to 1923, so they were in dealing with mass unemployment. It used to be easy to critique the deflationary stubbornness of Chancellor
Heinrich Brüning in persisting in policies that worsened unemployment. Statesmanship was insufficient before November 1923 and in the deflationary sequence of 1931. Knut Borchardt argued with verve over a decade ago that, given international obligations under the Young Plan and a residual fear of quantitative easing from 1923, Brüning had no choice but to wager on the revival of capital inflows. Indeed, that wonderful economic historian hammered those of us who squirmed at the consequences into the ground with his inexorable logic. And indeed had Brüning tried to inflate, his policies might well have backfired. Today, the partisans of the ECB status quo can rightly argue that treaties and statutes prohibit the bank from serving as a lender of last resort to European national central banks and governments. Listening to Axel Weber or Jens Weidman, his successor at the Bundesbank and on the ECB board, I hear analogous arguments. But the historian knows the consequences of such fatalism, and I still believe that the policymaker must ask what will be the possible fateful consequences of persisting in decisions that seem so inscribed by law or even logic. Remember Bethmann Hollweg in 1914 and Brüning in 1932 — history punishes those who come too late, as Gorbachev famously told Honecker, but it also punishes those who insist on their own powerlessness.

III.

Let me turn to reparations and what we can learn from that episode. The issue was not what reparations Germany actually paid; indeed Germany paid obligations only when it could borrow from abroad so that it might defray an ongoing minimum and not sacrifice its domestic consumption. It seemed unjust that a Germany unscathed at home should escape from the economic consequences of its occupation of Belgium and France, but sometimes the effort to extract justice is economically harmful and there are painful choices between what is deemed equitable and what is feasible. (We face the same difficulties today with respect to dilemmas of moral hazard.)

The reason reparation was so difficult was not that Germany was deprived of Silesian and Pomeranian territory as well as of Alsace-Lorraine. The Federal Republic became far richer on a far narrower territorial base. The real difficulty of the reparation problem was four-fold. First, from the beginning Germans across the political spectrum felt that the demands were illegitimate and extracted by simple force. Even the proponents of fulfillment such as Walther Rathenau believed that Germany’s effort to make the initial cash
payments demanded in 1921 would convince the Allies that they must seriously reduce the amounts they were demanding. The initial global sum brandished in 1921 amounted to about 132 billion marks ($33 billion) of constant 1914 value, so-called gold marks, or perhaps about 180 percent of the GNP of the later 1920s — somewhat higher than the recent pre-haircut Greek debt, and all owed externally. In fact, because the debt was to be mobilized only gradually, the burden would have been far less, as even Keynes recognized, perhaps about 80 or 90 percent of GNP.

The second problem was the so-called transfer problem — the fact that in an era when currencies were still floating (as those between the Euro zone and other currencies do), the value of the mark would continually fall. Germany might scrape together a billion marks in budget surplus, but it would take greater and greater tax effort at home to purchase the pounds, dollars, or gold for the transfer to its creditors abroad.

The third problem — debated at the time — was that even after the transfer obligation was eased under the Dawes Plan in 1924, the need to tax and raise real resources would depress economic activity and make the burden become higher in real terms each year. This is also the dilemma that Euro country members face today. Extracting the surplus needed to pay back the debt could shrink the basis from which the surplus had to be raised. The Dawes Plan minimized real payments for four years, but as that term came to an end, it was already clear — even before the Great Depression — that Germany would be unable to meet the payments that were supposed to follow.

Underlying all these difficulties was the fourth, the political dilemma. Even when a majority of German parliamentarians could agree to pay something, the Weimar political system was divided between the Social Democratic partisans of a nascent welfare state and the partisans of business, who did not want to burden industry with taxes for increasing social burdens, not to speak of the diffuse middle classes who had hoped to see their savings partially reconstituted after 1923-24 and not simply confiscated. Ultimately, these divisions could not be solved in a democratic framework. The reparation problem could only be the now proverbial can kicked down the road by private capital loans from abroad — which served as its own sort of time bomb.

The reparations dilemma has much to make us reflective. The usual lessons, I believe, are too simple and are excessively moralized —
namely that spiteful leaders at Versailles imposed an unworkable and vengeful system. Stephen Schuker and others have made vigorous cases to the contrary. My own views have varied over the decades. Some of the Allied demands and expectations were certainly justified; why should a devastated France not expect some restitution from an unscathed Germany that seemed more responsible for the costly war? There was also much to deplore in the German debate. The German Right, augmented by the rising voice of the Nazis, threatened treason trials against those who consented to the Young Plan that further attenuated the reparation burden, but kept it in existence. Still, watching last year’s American discussion of raising the debt limit makes one aware of how inflamed debt discussions can become. Reckless voices in the United States talk about jail for policymakers. Irresponsibility and catastrophe can begin at home.

Nonetheless, the effort to extract foreign payments that are seen as punitive, that cost the jobs of those who did not originate the irresponsible behavior, can also prove disastrous. Not only Greeks will see Germany as the collector of reparations if the new tightened enforcement mechanisms fail to yield economic recovery. What is important to learn is not that reparation debts were evil, but that they were politically so explosive. Reparations, conceived as a string of debt payments, seemed unfair in their premise, unworkable in their mechanism. Enforcement can have consequences that are far more adverse than surrendering or transforming them.

I am not claiming that today’s debt problem is the same as the reparations problem — we have no legacy of a terrible war and embittered national aspirations. In the 1920s, moreover, the powers who were reparation creditors of Germany were simultaneously debtors to the United States. They pleaded, and with justice, that if the United States would forgive them their debts, then but only then might they forgive their German debtors. America negotiated many of the debts downward; it accepted what in today’s language is called a haircut, perhaps of about 50 percent in real terms. But the U.S. refusal to accept any formal linkage between reparations and war debts inhibited the efforts among the Europeans to reach a solution. Ultimately at the depth of the Depression, President Hoover proposed a year’s moratorium on all international debt and interest payments. But the concession came too late to prevent the political situation inside Germany from degenerating; it also side-swiped the French who were trying to derail the proposal for an Austro-German customs union that threatened to be a prelude to Anschluss.
Greece is hardly the actor that Germany was, and Americans are no longer creditors of last resort. It is unclear whether in a depression we could be consumers of last resort; so much depends upon Asian economies these days. Still, the fact that international debt obligations are so hard to enforce, that the spill-over effects can be so powerful, and that even a rightful debt can appear to a national public as an outrageous demand is a sobering lesson.

IV.

Let us turn the situation around and examine the economic distress after World War II. Faced with the threat of Communist advances in Eastern, Central, and perhaps even Western Europe, the United States no longer insisted on its rights as a creditor nation. Neither did it, nor could it have relied on its own private sector to provide the loans needed for Europe to purchase the American goods required to sustain reconstruction. The Marshall Plan did not replace European capital formation. But the one to two percent of United States GDP that Americans provided annually for four years helped Western European countries overcome the crucial current-account bottlenecks that threatened to plunge societies, which (as Alan Milward emphasized) had started to recover, back into the same austerity measures that had led Europe downward in 1931-32. Without the Marshall Plan, each European government would have had to impose a drastic austerity program, putting ceilings on wages and rationing imports. The political consequences — so American statesmen understood, as did Europeans of the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic center — might well have radicalized politics, either to the left or to the right.

The Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program), moreover, was extended to the collective unit of the recipient countries, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) convoked in 1947, as well as to each national recipient by bilateral agreement. That meant that the OEEC scrutinized each country’s medium-term plans, and over the years from 1948 to 1958 worked toward the restoration of multilateral currency clearance agreements, with American credits provided as an incentive. The collective responsibility that the European Recovery Program imposed was not that of a supreme legislative agency but a genuinely collaborative agency. Insofar as the United States nudged the Europeans as a group, it did so through incentivization, not Diktat nor automatic rules. Today, of course, Europe has entered the current crisis not merely with convertibility...
but a common currency and a number of collaborative agencies — the organizational structure on which to build is hugely developed. Still, it is important to recall that at a time when postwar organization was far more rudimentary, the major economic power had an interest in the stability and growth of the Western community as a whole and found it a worthwhile bargain to subsidize that trajectory.

Robert Camdessus, the former director of the International Monetary Fund, once told me, in connection with the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the Marshall Plan, that he found the American initiative so admirable because it imposed early on the idea of “conditionality,” which International Monetary Fund loans also required. But Camdessus, I believe with all due respect, was wrong. In fact, the Marshall Plan worked because at decisive moments the American funders suspended conditionality. Washington had compelled the British to adopt convertibility of the pound and thus monetary rigor in 1947 with disastrous consequences. Over the next few years, in effect, Washington authorities (who had not shackled themselves to parliamentary or congressional approval except for yearly appropriations) accepted that the French might postpone balancing their budget and that the British would not be compelled to renounce their residual imperial position and liquidate the special privileges that the sterling zone provided them.

The Marshall Plan was political both in its premises and its consequences. It helped nurture not formal “great coalitions” but de facto centrist politics that broad swathes of the European working class as well as entrepreneurs could support. And in the United States it rested on a bipartisan coalition, with the internationalist wing of the Republican Party cooperating with the Democratic administration. Sadly, that prerequisite seems far from being available in today’s Washington, but it must not fail in Europe. Indeed in Germany such agreement lies at hand: Chancellor Merkel’s real allies are the two leaders of the SPD, Peer Steinbrück and Frank Steinmeier; and her potential foot-draggers are her FDP and CSU coalition partners.

V.

Germany did not like reparations but did appreciate the Marshall Plan; and both with good reasons, which should offer reflection today. In effect, American insistence on the sanctity of debts coupled with Chancellor Brüning’s nationalistic deflationary zeal had helped plunge Europe into the depths of depression and political radicalization. American suspension of conditionality and its funding the debts
of Europe after World War II let the West escape a renewed spiral into incalculable poverty and turmoil. The big bazooka was not accompanied by a big stick, but by joint resolve.

Do these episodes have a lesson for today? Of course, there are great differences. The Euro crisis arises within a framework that does not allow single countries to devalue, any more than the hard-pressed state of California can devalue. But California’s weaknesses do not immediately have an impact on the refunding of the federal debt; federal taxes are collected at the same level in California as in Texas or New York; its social security system functions as mandated by Washington; and California still has Hollywood and Silicon Valley. Conversely, as Martin Wolff has argued, within the Eurozone cross-border current-account flows still play a large role; there are exporters and importers, and as he has insisted, not every country can have a positive current account balance. Let’s face it, like it or not, the Eurozone is a transfer union, just as Germany is an immigrant country. But the transfers are not just at Germany’s cost and to the Mediterranean country’s benefit, for the transfers are the counterparts of the fantastic export performance that Germany has enjoyed.

German spokesmen for the Bundesbank have stressed the sanctity of the treaties that created the Euro and have pushed through what they envisage as an even more sacrosanct treaty. Others might draw different conclusions, but if this historian can venture some indirect policy advice, it would be to start by decoupling the short term from the long term, the way the 1924 Dawes Plan did, and the way U.S. policies worked after World War II. Sometimes there is no better immediate alternative than kicking the can down the road.

We know that in the long run the public debt of Greece, Italy, Spain, and the United States must be restored to sustainable levels if Western economic life is to rely on private sources of capital and not a backdoor approach to state socialism. But such reduction of debt can follow only as economic growth resumes. Remember that the stabilization programs in East Asia and Latin America during past debt crises caused massive misery and hardship — but the misery took place often in agricultural milieus and among groups whose normal penury we in the West were accustomed to taking for granted. The same pain inflicted in the cities of Europe will have unacceptable political consequences. Whether Greece remains in the Eurozone or not — I wager that it will — Germany will not be able to stand by as misery and hardship accumulate at its doorstep.
The tone of continuing negotiations is as crucial perhaps as the provisions themselves. Perched on the possible edge of recession — faced as we have been with repeated downward revisions of European growth estimates during the last three years — single-minded insistence on debt repayment and redemption will lead to catastrophic results. Deploying the rhetoric of the Fass ohne Boden is understandable, but unhelpful. In the really important areas of life, such as family needs, we realize that solidarity cannot be gainsaid. Should the Euro project enjoy that status? I would hope so, less perhaps for its own sake (computers after all can instantly calculate exchange rates) than its role in the advance of European union as a whole. The European project, I believe, redeemed much of European history in the second half of the twentieth century. To object that there is no European demos is merely to assert one form of sentimentality over another: demoi take shape around institutions, especially institutions that summon citizens to decide among meaningful electoral alternatives.

This suggests that Europeans must approach their institutions with a more encompassing perspective. Most immediately in institutional terms it means, I think, that the ECB must find a way to reconcile its long-term mission with short-term funding of national debt. Eurobonds are another ligament, although they must wait at least until after national elections. Ultimately, this particular observer would like to see the European parliament given budgetary control over a far larger share of Europe’s GDP than is currently the case — perhaps “entitlement” expenditures, which arouse so much passion, could be “federalized” at the Brussels/Strasbourg level. In the long run, Keynes quipped, we are all dead. In fact, in the long term we can survive — it is the short term that seems so menacing. The leaders of Europe — Germany its economic locomotive, France and Benelux and Italy still the indispensable partners for moral consensus — perhaps need a de facto moratorium on enforcement and a long-term sliding scale of debt-reduction targets keyed less to national income than to the trends of economic growth, positive as well as negative; and perhaps a calculation of debt burdens that separates what is owed for current consumption from what is owed for social capital and infrastructure. The irony is that the more vigorous the growth, the more easily debt can be accommodated. My personal plea would be to bring the bazooka into play and not abolish the big stick, but make its timing more conditional on recovery. If the institutions show the way, the markets will follow.
Winston Churchill once said, trust America to do the right thing after it has tried all the alternatives. I feel somewhat the same about Angela Merkel: trust her to do the right thing, but, to cite Günter Grass’s title, Im Krebsgang. In this crisis all eyes are on Germany. It saddens me that the United States is hardly in control of its own public finances — not because it spends too much, but because its political leaders have been unwilling or unable to make the case as they once did that a great nation rests on public goods and that the well-off of our society have the most at stake. In Germany Helmut Schmidt, whose name honors this award, would have made that case; and I believe that Chancellor Merkel in her matter-of-fact way understands it as well, as Konrad Adenauer and Willi Brandt, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder did earlier. Not all commanded soaring oratory, but they each raised their country to a recognition of its highest interests, often against the temptations, as the Polish foreign minister said last fall, not of hegemony, but parochialism. In the over six decades since 1948, West Germany, then the Federal Republic has combined a generous welfare state with the capacity, first, to integrate perhaps ten million refugees; then, to provide reparations to Israel and the Jewish communities as well as to other nations, to absorb millions of migrant worker immigrants and political asylum seekers; to provide development aid in what we once called the Third World; to cushion the gradual retirement of the EU’s agricultural workers, then its own industrial laborers without catastrophic political protest movements; and to spend perhaps a trillion Euro on reequipping the new Bundesländer. A decade ago it made its labor market more flexible and its welfare state less of an open-ended claim on national resources. It is clearly the economic leader of Europe. For Europe today, Germany is the indispensable nation, and it is fervently to be hoped that it will understand that this role requires generosity and imagination.

Bibliographic Note

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MODERNITY CALLING: INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND THE TELEPHONE IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1990

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I. Introducing the Telephone: Communicative Innovation and the Established Communication Order

“The young man had been trying to tell her how madly he loved her for over an hour but couldn’t pluck up the courage. ‘Excuse me for a moment, Mr. Featherly,’ she said, ‘I think I hear a ring at the phone.’ And, in her queenly way, she swept into an adjoining room. Presently she returned and his mad passion found a voice. ‘I am sorry, Mr. Featherly,’ she said, ‘to cause you pain, but I am already engaged. Mr. Sampson, learning that you are here, has urged his suit through the telephone.’”1

The 1888 newspaper story beautifully illustrates the representation of the telephone during the first few decades after its invention. Even though the number of telephones in private households increased slowly in most modern societies until World War II, the impact of the telephone on private life became a prominent topic of discussion soon after the device became available to consumers in 1877. The newspaper anecdote of the telephone suitor shows how the telephone was thought to affect specific areas of society long before it became a customary means of communication.2

The main goal of the woman in the story is to get married. It seems to be of no great importance to whom. In this respect, the account does not go beyond a well-known cliché about middle-class women at the time. However, this traditional cliché is then confronted with a technological innovation, the telephone. More generally, in the story about the distant suitor the telephone is pictured as being integrated into the existing social and cultural order. It is represented as a new resource in the context of an established communicative practice. At the same time, however, in the newspaper story, the telephone is pictured as deeply affecting communicational practices. In its dramatization of the impact that telephone communication would have on courtship the episode displays a satirical quality. One technological device alone seemed sufficient to bring about a significant


2 Claude S. Fischer, America Calling: A Social History of the Telephone to 1940 (Berkeley, 1992), 24-28, 72-85; see also: Marvin, Old Technologies, 59-89.
change in social practice. Representations of what contemporary sources call the “telephone suitor” probably entered the cultural consciousness of several western societies. Henceforth suitors relying on the telephone threatened — or promised — to change the rules of courtship.³

The story of the telephone suitor thus suggests that the communicative situation in which marriage proposals took place, even the whole communicative setting of marriage initiation was about to change profoundly because of the telephone. The telephone did not simply make the physical co-presence of the two potential future fiancées unnecessary — the letter and other forms of mediated communication had already achieved this. Because the telephone rendered possible instantaneous space-transcending communication, it seemed to dramatically reduce all the constraints that spatial distance imposed on vocal social interaction. In fact, whatever the key to a successful face-to-face marriage proposal may have been before, the telephone — allowing for the space-transcending even if only vocal imitation of the face-to-face encounter — made timing the decisive factor. In the view of contemporaries, this affected the basic social and cultural rules applying to this particular communicative situation. Therefore the episode about the telephone suitor really is about the impact that increased speed as a general modern condition was about to have on communicative cultures in general.⁴

The idea of the telephone causing changes in established communication routines or creating new routines is demonstrated by many of the representations of the device in the first decades after its invention. Although a wide range of technical experts and social analysts and commentators described its presumed effects on public service and the business world, it seems that most observations dealt with its impact on private life. In the field of “love and the telephone” alone several narrative patterns evolved. There is, for instance, the man falling for the telephone operator, the young girl being lured into an inappropriate relationship by a telephone suitor or the marriage swindler having his victims believe in the legality of a marriage concluded over the phone. All these narrative patterns built on the idea of the new telecommunication prompting the kinds of interpersonal relations that had previously developed exclusively from face-to-face interactions. Although the narratives oscillated between elation over the prospect for new class-transcending interactions and fear of the telephone promoting “irregular” courtship or fraudulent practices, all

³ Marvin, Old Technologies, 73–74.

of them resulted from the firm conviction that the telephone changed many of the communication routines that interpersonal relations were based on.5

II. Representations of the Telephone and Representations of Telephoning

Representations of the telephone did not necessarily mirror common contemporaneous practices of telephoning. In the United States telephoning was not established as a way of maintaining preexisting intimate personal relations until the 1930s. In Germany and other European countries this occurred even later.6 Contrary to contemporaneous representations, the telephone was even less effective as an instrument for creating new relationships. Contemporaries also erred in their belief that all kinds of important emotional and relationship decisions would soon habitually be made over the phone.7 Contrary to what the episode about the telephone suitor would have us believe, asking for somebody’s hand in marriage over the telephone never became a sanctioned practice in most modern western societies. That representations of the telephone did not necessarily mirror customary contemporaneous usages of the device, however, by no means diminishes their empirical value.

My research project draws on the idea that representations of the telephone from the 1880s to the 1980s reflect perceptions of changes in the communicative culture of modern societies. Yet the very nature of representations of the telephone changed over time. In the decades immediately following its launch, representations of the telephone primarily addressed the desired or feared effects that the telephone’s spread would have on modern societies. Mostly technological and social experts commented on the observed and expected effects of the implementation of the telephone, which grew to symbolize the changes both desirable and dreaded that societies underwent on their path to modernity.8 However, because in this early period the telephone was still subject to debate, its use as a symbol of modernity was still rather arbitrary and its cultural association with isolated and varying aspects of modernity unstable and inconsistent.

During the second quarter of the twentieth century two notable changes in the representation of the telephone occurred. First, the debates over the blessings and curses that the telephone had already brought or could be expected to bring in the future greatly diminished. To be sure, the telephone continued to figure prominently

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7 Fischer, America Calling, 175-192.
8 Marvin, Old Technologies, 59-89.
in texts and images created not only by experts of technology and society, but also by journalists, writers, painters, and filmmakers; but it almost ceased to be an object of debate. Instead, representations of the telephone now showed that the device had become culturally accepted as a daily means of communication — the small number of actual users notwithstanding. Second, the cultural meanings of the telephone became relatively standardized and generalized: the telephone started to function as a symbol of modernity per se. The simple act of displaying a person on the phone alone indicated that the individual embraced technological and social progress. The telephone had already begun to symbolize certain aspects of modernity after the beginning of its implementation in offices and private households in the 1880s. Only about fifty years after its invention, however, it finally came to symbolize what could be classified as a modern life style and modern values. The high degree of abstraction that the symbolic representation of the telephone had reached by the 1930s showed itself when the representation of the device became detached from actual telephone practices. Hollywood and UFA stars’ posing with a telephone on autograph photos, for instance, made them seem approachable — no matter how unlikely a call from a fan was to actually reach them.

This development notwithstanding, representations of the telephone and telephone practices remained interconnected in several regards. Not only the symbolic content but the usage of the telephone changed over time. From the beginning, telephone technology and the telephone network shaped telecommunications by creating a unique communicative situation with specific possibilities and limits. While conventional telephones permitted vocal interaction between persons located out of earshot of each other, for example, they failed to transfer visual conversational signals. Technological preconditions and the technical features of the device thus played a role in establishing the common usages of the telephone. That they allowed for certain communicative practices while inhibiting others, however, did not mean that they determined how the telephone would be used. How contemporaries actually perceived the technological properties and potential of the telephone proved much more influential in shaping the usages of the device.

The telephone represents a technology-induced innovation in the sense that no demand for telephone service had been articulated before its launch. As a result, the usage of the telephone did not conform to

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9 Fischer, America Calling, 175-183.
10 Universum Film AG.
any pre–imagined practice and remained undefined for several decades. Many of the different usages that the telephone as a technical device permitted were explored and applied over the course of its history. Revealing its potential as a medium of point-to-point communication, the telephone was at first used to transfer written messages. After the first telephone connections had been set up, they served to compensate for the gaps in the telegraph network between cities in several countries. The telephone was also used as a mass or one-to-many medium for several decades. Concerts, for instance, as well as the weather forecast or crop prices were transmitted over the phone.13 Eventually, the telephone “yielded” these functions to competing mass media such as the radio.14 By the late 1930s, a single basic form of use for the telephone had prevailed. Its prevalent function was to enable instantaneous communication between two spatially separated individuals. Since then, the telephone has mainly been used to provide interactive, synchronic, one-to-one and point-to-point space-transcending communication. As one basic type of use was established, the social debate about the telephone wound down. Simultaneously, representations of telephoning seemed to shift from the imagination of potential telephone practices to the observation and reproduction of established ones.

By the late 1920s, the implementation of the telephone was beyond social debate. Now representations of the telephone and telephoning were no longer about its social impact or about imagining completely new modes of use or about what by then appeared as unlikely ways of using the telephone. Nevertheless, representations of telephoning were by no means limited to reflecting only well-implemented telephone practices. Although one basic type of usage of the telephone had prevailed, much about this usage still needed to be specified. Cultural negotiations, especially representations of telephoning, now played a central role in the shaping of telephone practices, in shaping rules pertaining to telephone conversations, and in the cultural meanings attached to telephoning. In this sense, representations of telephoning anticipated changes in telephone routines and reflected continuous changes in communicative routines. Moreover, representations of telephoning disclose contemporaneous perceptions of change not only in telephone routines but in the communicative culture of modern societies as a whole throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

III. The Culture of Telephone Communication
Communication constitutes a central form of social agency. It relates individuals, groups, and organizations to one another and to society

13 Fischer, America Calling, 97-101, and Werner Faulstich, Medienwandel im Industrie- und Massenzeitalter, 1830 - 1900 (Göttingen, 2004), 186-189.
14 Other functions of the telephone not relying, however, on the transmission of sound persisted: The usage of the telephone for sound transmission aside, as the examples of the telefax, and, later on, the interactive videotext prove, the telephone can also transfer digital data.
as a whole, allowing for their social interaction. The culture of communication therefore is an important part of any cultural order and consists of procedures and routines of communication, the rules guiding them, and the representations providing them with meanings. Routines and representations of communication are key, both in legitimizing established patterns of interpersonal communication and in initiating their transformation or replacement. Modern societies rely heavily on mediated communication, which produces its own set of procedures and routines of communication for which rules have to be established. As telephoning became widely customary in several distinct social contexts, telephone practices became routines and telephone procedures were established. More precisely, certain conversational genres and contents were deemed appropriate for the telephone situation. While giving condolences over the phone, for instance, became frowned upon, calling a crisis helpline and opening up to a complete stranger became an established practice. Moreover, rules were framed regarding under which circumstances and at what time one ought to call. Finally, appropriate greetings and farewells were established, the adequate length of time for a call was set, and the jargon befitting a telephone conversation identified. And it was established that all of these depended not only on the purpose of the call but on the relationship between the callers.

Representations of telephoning further validated routines and procedures of telephoning. They drew on a widely shared ensemble of collective cultural representations of communication and added to it. Because the telephone provided a completely new form of long-distance communication by permitting instantaneous vocal communication with absent others, it probably had a direct impact on communication practices and, more importantly, was widely perceived as having this kind of impact. At first, the act of telephoning probably mainly symbolized changes in the established communicative order brought about by the adoption of a new technology of communication. Very soon, however, it seems to have come to epitomize the change of communication patterns resulting not from one technology but from modernization in general. Contemporaries probably processed major changes in the established communicative culture when they observed and imagined practices of telephoning. It thus stands to reason that representations of telephoning, even if they did not provoke modifications of the established communicative culture, reveal contemporary perceptions of changes in the communicative cultures of modern societies to the historian. Therefore, I will analyze
observed and imagined telephone practices in order to trace the social and cultural impact that telephoning was perceived to have on shaping the communicative culture of modern societies.

IV. The Historiography of the Telephone

Drawing on current notions of the telephone, the historiography of the telephone has reconstructed the establishment of the now dominant mode of telephone use: instantaneous dialoguing with personally related, but absent others. More precisely, scholars have traced how the telephone as a technical device gained general acceptance and telephoning became a customary communication practice. Historians of technology have delineated the technological innovations prompting the invention of the telephone and the further development of the entire technical apparatus of phones and cabling. Scholars have examined the establishment and operation of telephone companies and public telecommunication networks. They have plotted the gradual geographical extension of telephone networks, the slow but steady increase in the number of subscribers over the course of a century, and the growing number of private calls since 1945. Scholars approaching the history of the telephone from a social constructivist perspective have contributed narratives of how the telephone was incorporated into the social and cultural order. They have argued that its usage and interpretation, rather than its technological characteristics, account for the success of the telephone. Hence their focus on the political, economic, social, and cultural structures that allowed the successful embedding of the telephone in the everyday life of most modern populations.

These historical studies rely heavily on well-known historiographical narratives of modernity. They relate the routinization of telephoning to modernity in two different ways. They view it both as an explanans, that is, a factor that helps to explain the rise of modernity, and an explanandum, that is, a phenomenon that is explained by the conditions of the modern world. Seeing the telephone as an explanandum attributes its spread and its incorporation into the socio-cultural order of modern societies to processes that are part of modernity. In other words, scholars identify patterns in the telephone’s spread and incorporation that fit the features distinguishing modern from traditional societies. The state regulation of telephone networks, for instance, seems to have matched the modern trend towards more regulation, and the telephone’s evolution from an elitist status

20 Fischer, America Calling; John, Network Nation; Michèle Martin, Hello, Central? Gender, Technology, and Culture in the Formation of Telephone Systems (Montreal; Buffalo, 1991); Frank Thomas, Telefonieren in Deutschland: Organisatorische, technische und räumliche Entwicklung eines großtechnischen Systems (Frankfurt/Main, 1995); Jan-Otmar Hesse, Im Netz Der Kommunikation: Die Reichs-Post- und Telegrafenverwaltung 1876-1914, (München, 2002), 351-420.
symbol to a product of mass consumption appears to epitomize the formation of the consumer society.21 At the same time, regarding the telephone as an *explanans* for historical developments has led historians and social scientists to point to the effect that the spread of the telephone had on modern societies. In this view, the telephone does not merely reflect some of the most significant changes that modern societies experienced but, at least partly, accounts for them as well. The telephone thus appears to have promoted the processes that constitute what we have come to call “modernity.” Rather than merely satisfying existing needs specific to modern societies, such as the need for long-distance (vocal) communication, the telephone nourished such needs by supplying technological possibilities. It mostly reflects, yet to a certain extent also promotes the shaping of a modern social order.22

By relating the rise of the telephone to the shaping of modern societies scholars have followed the contemporary notion of the telephone as a symbol of modernity and have adopted narratives that modern societies have developed to describe themselves.23 The expansiveness of telephone networks, for example, has been traced back to the conviction that spatially extensive communication networks are essential, which is a creed that itself can be retraced to the territorialization of the nation-state. Scholars have shown how long-distance calls played an important role in the imaginary of the telephone, yet accounted only for a small percentage of the total calls placed in the United States until American Bell Telephone Company dedicated more of its advertisements to the notion of connecting people all over the nation via telephone cables.24 Bell, and later AT&T, adopted the paradigm of expansion and promoted the nation-wide growth of the telephone network without anticipating immediate profits. Serving yet another narrative of modern self-description, historians have portrayed the telephone as one of the first communication technologies to transcend space in virtually no time. This idea embodies the more general belief that the acceleration of modern life renders spatial distances insignificant.25

While most studies on the telephone convincingly demonstrate the connection between the telephone and basic social processes and self-descriptive narratives of modern societies, they fail to add to our knowledge of modern cultures of communication. To be sure, scholars have analyzed the impact that the rise of the telephone had on social relations or the social order, sometimes taking into consideration
But their research usually relates the telephone to processes and narratives that are not genuinely communicative. Routines and procedures of telephoning, let alone the representations they created, have not in and by themselves been systematically analyzed. How representations of telephoning impacted modern cultures of communication and how they reflected their development has thus remained unexplored.

V. The Telephone as an Element of Communication History: A Research Gap

Not only histories of the telephone but also general histories of communication fail to relate the telephone as a means of interpersonal communication to more comprehensive changes in modern cultures of communication. The historiography of modern and contemporary communication traditionally focuses on mass communication because the latter is generally considered to be responsible for the advent of the so-called “information age.” Mass communication has been defined as working over long distances, relying on one-to-many media, and not necessarily involving interaction. Interpersonal communication, by contrast, is the interactive communication between at least two people — either face-to-face or space-transcending and involving one-to-one media. The historiography of communication has neglected this form of communication, and until recently its historical change has implicitly been denied.

The currently intensifying historical research on interpersonal communication has generally adopted social science concepts and has mostly targeted face-to-face communication (or interaction). Early modern historians were the first to investigate rumors or conflicts over issues of honor. Scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries broadened the area of study to include communication genres such as debates, arguments or jokes, and places such as taverns or hotels, which they conceptualize as spaces of specific types of communication. The genres and spaces of interpersonal communication have generally been explained in different societies. Rammert, “Telefon und Kommunikationskultur.”

26 Fischer, America Calling; Marvin, Old Technologies and Martin, Hello Central?

27 I have found one notable exception so far: Werner

28 See, for instance, Ute Daniel and Axel Schildt, eds, Massenmedien im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts (Köln; Weimar; Wien, 2010); Habbo Knoch and Daniel Morat, Kommunikation als Beobachtung: Medienwandel und Gesellschaftsideen 1880-1960 (München, 2003); Asa Briggs and Peter Burke, A Social History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet (Cambridge, 2002); Anthony Fellow, American Media History, 2nd ed. (Boston, 2010).


tion have, in fact, received more attention than its media. The small amount of historical research done on the media of interpersonal communication has focused on written communication. According to this research, interpersonal exchange in the past appears to have been mostly structured by written communication, as exemplified by the cultural significance of epistolary routines or the impact of telegraphy on diplomacy. 

Media of interpersonal communication that are not based on writing have remained the almost exclusive domain of sociology and media studies. Scholars in these fields have analyzed the effect that interpersonal telecommunication had on general communication culture. Unsurprisingly, however, their focus has been on present-day media such as the mobile telephone or the computer.

Scholars of communication history in general and interpersonal communication in particular have largely overlooked the telephone because it does not seem to fit these categories. It is modern but not part of the mass media; it is interpersonal but not face-to-face; it is long-distance but not based on writing. The telephone allows for synchronic vocal interaction with absent others, creating a sense of social presence despite the physical distance. It provides mediated communication only but imitates face-to-face communication. Thus, the distinction between face-to-face and long distance communication does not fully apply to the telephone.

Despite extensive scholarship on past communication the telephone as a medium still remains undefined to a certain extent. This is all the more surprising since the spread of the telephone accounts for a change in the communication with absent others that was (arguably) at least as dramatic as the transformation provoked by the rise of mass communication. Hence, instead of resorting to master narratives of modernity to explain how the telephone was established and how phone calls became a daily routine, my research aims at introducing a new narrative. This narrative will not focus on mass or face-to-face communication but contribute to the history of modern communication from a perspective that uncovers the impact that the emergence of the telephone had on modern communication cultures.

VI. Approach, Organization, and Primary Sources of the Study

My study will explore the perceptions, interpretations, and classifications of telephone practices, which are all part of the self-descriptive narratives of modern societies. As previously detailed, since its launch the telephone was seen as one of the central achievements of

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32 See, for example, James B. Murray, Wireless Nation: The Frenzied Launch of the Cellular Revolution in America (Cambridge, Mass, 2001).

33 Höfl ich, “Telefonsituation.”
modernity. I will therefore use a definition of modernity that factors in the self-descriptive narratives of modern societies. According to this definition, the beginning of modernity can be dated back to the 1890s, when the use of narratives that labeled western societies as “modern” increased sharply. Representations of the telephone are modern self-descriptions in this sense without, however, necessarily evolving in a linear fashion towards current notions of the telephone.

Even if it seems to epitomize modern communication, the instantaneous communication between spatially separate but socially close individuals only became the dominant mode of using the telephone during the last third of the twentieth century. Other, previous ways of using the telephone have commonly been regarded by scholars as straying from the path that led to presently dominant mode of usage. Historians of the telephone have rated them “dead ends.” Two kinds of practices fall into this category. First, there were short-lived practices that evolved aside from the alleged linear development that led towards the currently predominant usage. Second, there were imagined practices of telephoning that never became actual practices. Sometimes an exact classification proves difficult as the episode about the “telephone suitor” shows. On the one hand, the idea of the suitor proposing over the phone found its way into so many publications, mostly magazine articles, in the late nineteenth century that it appears to reflect a popular practice of the time. On the other hand, it sometimes seems as if only these publications and no other kind of empirical evidence document the prominence of this practice, which makes the telephone suitor appear as a product of the contemporaries’ imagination.

Whether imagined, discontinued, or anything in between such practices have drawn hardly any scholarly attention. As stated earlier, neither historians of the telephone nor scholars from neighboring disciplines have examined representations of telephoning as indicators of perceived changes in modern cultures of communication. Short-lived practices of telephoning have hardly been analyzed at all and imagined practices have been dismissed almost entirely. I would suggest that the quality that led to these practices’ dismissal in the history of the telephone is exactly the quality that makes them so valuable for a history of modern cultures of communication. Discontinued and imagined practices did not directly relate to established practices and they did not simply shape and reflect the evolution of telephone practices. Instead, they picked up and assimilated broader
contemporary perceptions of change in patterns of communication. For this reason they will be examined in this study alongside representations of permanently realized telephoning practices. Assuming that the analytical value of all observed and imagined practices of telephoning lies precisely in their ability to disclose contemporary perceptions of change in cultures of communication, the dead ends in the history of telephoning seem especially significant for assessing the perception of changes in the patterns of interpersonal communication and the culture of communication as a whole.

The representations of the telephone were partly detached from the evolution of actual telephone use because they centered on specific social settings. First, contemporary observers were preoccupied with how the spread of the telephone would impact kinship relations, friendship-based relationships, and, as the story of the telephone suitor illustrates, romantic relationships. Second, they pictured the influence of the telephone on business-client relations and business connections. Finally, they considered the impact of the telephone on citizen-state relations as well as personal connections inside the political power structure. Therefore, the contemporary perception of a changing culture of communication focused on distinct areas of private communication, business communication, and communication in public service and politics. My study will be organized according to the emphasis that contemporary observers of telephoning placed on specific social settings.

In order to grasp the variety of observed and imagined practices of telephoning, my research will be based on a large and diverse body of sources. For the early years, I have identified contemporary and retrospective newspaper and magazine articles capturing the experts’ debates on the telephone. Many of these rather dry and prosaic sources cover technical details but also include at least some remarks about the social relevance and expected impact of the new technology. A more comprehensive debate in the print media begins around 1900 but declines during the 1930s.

The cultural negotiations over the forms of telephone use are reflected in the letters that customers addressed to telephone companies and the postal services throughout the hundred-year period under scrutiny. They are especially useful when it comes to tracing the continuously intensive social engagement with the telephone and its permanently changing usages. Their authors not only filed complaints but also suggested new ways of using the device. The strategies of...
telephone companies and state authorities as well as their interactions reveal the constraints that followed from the telephone’s establishment as a part of daily life.

The same is true for legal proceedings, which addressed, for example, whether the recording of a telephone call ought to be admitted as evidence in court. These documents also discuss the overall social relevance of the telephone. In the 1920s, German authorities inquired whether the telephone company could be sued for intolerable cruelty if the customer is forced to wait for a connection.35 Such telling sources are unlikely to be found for the postwar decades. By contrast, advertisements for the telephone and documents on marketing can be found throughout the century. Interestingly, the first ads that used the telephone as a symbol to advertise another product materialized during the interwar period. The performing arts, the visual arts, and literature also used the telephone in a symbolic fashion.36 Franz Kafka’s use of the telephone, for instance, transcended the portrayal of actual practices and pointed to contemporaneous perceptions of the consequences of new communication technologies and routines for the culture of communication.37

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Conference Reports
THE COLD WAR: HISTORY, MEMORY, AND REPRESENTATION

Conference at the European Academy Berlin, July 14–17, 2011. Co-sponsored by the Berlin city government; the European Academy Berlin; the German Historical Institutes in Moscow, London, and Washington; the Center for Contemporary History in Potsdam; the Military History Research Institute in Potsdam; the Allied Museum in Berlin; the German-Russian Museum Berlin-Karlshorst; the Berlin Wall Foundation; the Airlift Gratitude Foundation (Stiftung Luftbrückendank) in Berlin; the Cold War International History Project in Washington; and the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies of the Free University Berlin. Conveners: Konrad Jarausch (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Andrea Despot (European Academy Berlin), Christian Ostermann (Cold War International History Project, Washington), and Andreas Etges (John F. Kennedy Institute, Free University Berlin). Participants: Csaba Békés (Cold War History Research Center, Budapest), James D. Bindenagel (Former Ambassador of the United States), Wayne Cocroft (English Heritage), György Dalos (Publicist), Sybille Frank (Technical University Darmstadt), Mary Fulbrook (University College London), Andreas Gestrich (German Historical Institute, London), Andrei Grachev (Advisor and last official spokesman of former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev), Hope Harrison (George Washington University), Winfried Heinemann (Military History Research Institute Potsdam), Wolfgang Ischinger (Chairman of the Munich Security Conference), Axel Klausmeier (Berlin Wall Foundation), Martin Klimke (German Historical Institute, Washington), Sergej Kudryashov (German Historical Institute, Moscow), Heonik Kwon (London School of Economics and Political Sciences), Thomas Lindenberger (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for European History and Public Spheres, Vienna), Markus Meckel (Former GDR Foreign Minister), Walter Momper (Former Lord Mayor of Berlin), Christopher Moran (University of Warwick), Falk Pingel (Georg Eckert Institute for International Research on Schoolbooks, Braunschweig), Vladimir Pechatnov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations), Marie-Pierre Rey (University Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris), David Reynolds (Cambridge University), Tony Shaw (University of Herfordshire), Anders Stephanson (Columbia University), Eckart D. Stratenschulte (European Academy Berlin), Matthias Uhl (German Historical Institute, Moscow), Odd Arne Westad (London School of Economics and Political Science), Jay Winter (Yale University).

“The past is never dead.” William Faulkner famously wrote in 1951 in *Requiem for a Nun*, “It’s not even past.” This is definitely also true
of the Cold War. Its traces are still visible in many places all around the world. It is the subject of exhibitions and new museums, of memorial days and historic sites, of documentaries and movies, of arts and culture. There are historical and political controversies, both national and international, about how the history of the Cold War should be told and taught, how it should be represented and remembered. While much has been written about the political history of the Cold War, the analysis of its remembrance and representation is just beginning. Bringing together a wide range of international scholars, the conference held at the European Academy Berlin focused on the public history of the Cold War from an international perspective, covering topics such as master narratives of the Cold War, places of memory, public and private memorialization, popular culture, and schoolbooks. One impetus for the conference was the proposal to establish a new Museum of the Cold War at Checkpoint Charlie.

The first session, entitled “The Cold War: Master Narratives in East and West,” was opened by Odd Arne Westad, who emphasized the internationalization of Cold War historiography which has long been dominated by a Western and especially American perspective. He described how international scholars have begun to shape the field and are helping to incorporate the global impact of the Cold War into scholarship. Referring to Berlin as a place of remembering the Cold War, Westad stressed the need to understand it as a lived experience and an underlying event that European nations experienced. It was therefore crucial, he suggested, for the development of the world we live in today.

Anders Stephanson critically discussed how the term “Cold War” has been used in both public and academic discourse. In his view, it should be regarded as a US concept and project with a primarily American historiography. In terms of periodization, Stephanson argued that after 1963 the term “Cold Peace” is more suitable for describing relations between the two superpowers. For Stephanson, Berlin was an anomaly during the Cold War.

Next, David Reynolds presented his comparison of Cold War narratives in Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. None of these entirely accepted the superpower polarity as the necessary master narrative, instead emphasizing national, European, or colonial aspects of Cold War history. During the Cold War, Britain and France were struggling with their loss of imperial power, while West Germany focused on the issues of German unity and German guilt. Vladimir Pechatnov discussed three narratives of the Cold War in
the post-Soviet period. The standard Soviet version describes the Cold War as having been imposed on the Soviet Union by the United States. In this narrative, the Soviets saw themselves as victims of Western policies. A revisionist narrative which includes a massive rejection of the Soviet past emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A third, more recent, post-revisionist narrative is less ideological and stresses realpolitik, such as Russia’s security interests.

In his keynote lecture, Jay Winter discussed the Cold War at the intersection of history and memory. He described memory as the intersection between family and world history, stressing that remembrance is an act of people, not of states. States can only provide an active symbolic exchange — at best, they manage to glorify those who died without honoring war itself. Winter described a booming memory industry that is driven not by the state but by society. He stated that the commemoration of war has changed over time. There is a popular disenchantment with war especially in Berlin, which is characterized by a lively but overwhelming memory landscape.

Winter’s keynote lecture was followed by a panel on official versus biographical memorialization. Marie-Pierre Rey compared the attitudes of the French and Russian states toward the Cold War. She outlined the Cold War’s intense impact on social life, since everybody had to act within a binary scheme. This also manifested itself in popular culture, in novels, music, and art. For Russia, the Cold War and its end constitute a painful memory and a collective trauma, while in France loyalty to the West and the French role (for example, in détente policy) are emphasized. Sergej Kudryashov underlined that the experiences of the Cold War are an ongoing and serious issue in Russia. He drew attention to a uniquely Russian aspect, namely, the flourishing of amateur historiography. The work of non-professionals partially fills a gap in the country’s collective memory of the Cold War. These amateurs to a large extent fulfill a popular demand for conspiracy and espionage histories. Serious historians find it difficult to react to these popular approaches. Matthias Uhl focused on spies as heroes of the Cold War. He presented parts of his research on double agent Oleg Penkovsky. Uhl stressed the importance of technology and espionage as the subject of a future Cold War exhibition in Berlin.

Contrasting the ways in which the superpowers remember the Cold War, Thomas Lindenberger concentrated on border communities in Eastern Europe. He presented his oral history microstudies of everyday life, politics, and the heterogeneity of remembering the Cold War in
East and West. Nation-building and communist policies played a much larger part than Cold War issues in the border communities he examined. For Lindenberger, this justified and implied a critical perspective in mapping European memory of the Cold War, which has been seen as a Western term. The conference’s first day ended with the screening of the PBS documentary *After the Wall: A World United* (2011). Former Ambassador James D. Bindenagel, who was involved in the production, took questions from the audience.

The session on popular culture and schoolbooks was opened by Tony Shaw, who gave a presentation on Cold War films in East and West. He argued that for ordinary people films gave real meaning to the Cold War and pointed out that they still have an impact on its memorialization, even among those born after the end of the conflict. Shaw identified five categories of Cold War films: films that justify the Cold War; films of extremely positive or negative propaganda, depicting the home country as heaven and the other as hell; films about the nuclear threat; films on espionage; and films that give alternative images and provide a critique of the Cold War.

Next, Christopher Moran focused on Ian Fleming’s James Bond novels. He stated that they filled a public vacuum at a time when the secret services had an even greater passion for secrecy than today. The Bond novels were in a privileged position since there were hardly any competing spy novels at the time. Moran also analyzed the direct correspondence between Fleming and the CIA and how it affected his stories. Falk Pingel compared the depiction of the Cold War in social studies textbooks in the old Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Britain. Until the 1970s, he said, the term “Cold War” was not used. Instead, “East–West Conflict” was the preferred term, loaded with a great deal of meaning. National emphases differed. While French textbooks regarded the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam as crucial, German textbooks focused on Soviet policy.

The final session discussed sites of Cold War memory. Wayne Cocroft, senior archaeological investigator at English Heritage, talked about protecting, preserving, and presenting Cold War heritage. He discussed examples from more than thirty Cold War sites that have become nationally protected historic places in the United Kingdom. Csaba Békés depicted the memory landscape in East Central Europe, with a special focus on Hungary. Like others before him, he emphasized that “Cold War” is not a term generally used in that region, where the communist experience and the memory of the communist past are crucial.
The anthropologist Heonik Kwon then looked at violent manifestations of the Cold War in the postcolonial world with its many millions of victims and contrasted it with the exceptionally long peace in postwar Europe, where the Cold War was more of an “imaginary war.” He also emphasized the importance of family memory, and not just in East Asia.

Concentrating on Berlin as a place of history, memory, and representation of the Cold War, Hope Harrison and Sybille Frank both outlined the Berlin state government’s memorial plan. While Harrison focused on the recurring complications Germany faces as a result of the continuing process of unification, Frank looked at the state of memorialization at Checkpoint Charlie. Both speakers pointed out that multiple and sometimes competing actors are part of Berlin’s public history landscape. Harrison stressed the need to concentrate not only on the Wall and the division of Germany but also to provide a broader and multi-perspectival Cold War context. Frank compared Checkpoint Charlie with Plymouth Plantation Heritage Center and detected a special German anxiety about the “Disneyfication” of memorial sites when private institutions step in to fill a vacuum left by the state.

Finally, Konrad Jarausch discussed the project for a Cold War museum at Checkpoint Charlie. Referring to some of the findings of the conference, he described the project as a major opportunity for the city of Berlin. The global nature of the conflict, including postcolonial struggles, and especially the dramatic role of individuals, he suggested, should be highlighted in a future exhibition. The aim of the Berlin conference is “to create an intellectual frame of reference and to initiate a public debate about open questions regarding the project,” he explained. In this respect, it proved highly successful.

The conference ended with a reading by the Hungarian author György Dalos, a leading Eastern European intellectual, who presented his recently published biography of Mikhail Gorbachev, Gorbatschow, Macht und Mensch: Eine Biografie (2011).

The conference showed how diverse and contested the memory and representation of the Cold War is in different parts of the world. Even the term “Cold War” is not universally used. A future Cold War Museum in Berlin should not present a master narrative of the Cold War but should challenge German and international visitors by incorporating different and sometimes competing interpretations.

Jula Danylow, Jasmin Heermann, Claudia Schumacher, Andreas Etges (John F. Kennedy Institute, Free University Berlin)
SUMMER SEMINAR: EUROPE – MIGRATION – IDENTITY

Seminar at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, August 24-27, 2011. Co-organized by the GHI Washington and the University of Minnesota. Conveners: Donna Gabaccia (University of Minnesota), Sally Gregory Kohlstedt (University of Minnesota), Jan Logemann (GHI). Participants: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Daniel Bessner (Duke University), Tobias Brinkmann (Penn State University), Clelia Caruso (GHI), Gary Cohen (University of Minnesota), Mimi Cowan (Boston College), Andreas Heil (Institute for European History, Mainz), Poul Houe (University of Minnesota), Andreas Joch (GHI / University of Giessen), Corinna Ludwig (GHI / University of Göttingen), Shira Klein (New York University), Saara Koikkalainen (University of Lapland), Laura Miller (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), Leslie Page Moch (Michigan State University), Christine von Oertzen (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin), Kiran Klaus Patel (European University Institute, Florence), Riv-Ellen Prell (University of Minnesota), Barbara Reiterer (GHI / University of Minnesota), Amanda Ricci (McGill University), Aviel Roshwald (Georgetown University), Jessica Sperling (City University of New York), Jens Wegener (European University Institute), Thomas Wolfe (University of Minnesota), Elizabeth Zanoni (University of Minnesota / Old Dominion), Marynel Ryan Van Zee (University of Minnesota, Morris).

This seminar set out to build bridges between migration studies and research in the history of Europeanization and European-ness which has generated much interest in recent years. Beyond histories of European political integration and the intellectual and elite movements that have supported this process, scholars increasingly pay attention to the constructedness of European-ness and European identities, and to the multiplicity of ways in which this construction happens. On the everyday level, concepts of Europe and European-ness have been constructed through sports and music, travel, and also migration. Migrants can be a particularly useful lens on Europeanization processes as they provide a perspective from the periphery in two ways: by providing a view from the outside, as in the case of those who left the continent, or by providing a view from the margins of the European societies in which they live. The field of migration studies has long shifted away from straight-forward questions of assimilation and integration towards an interest in more fluid and complex processes. We now see an emphasis on multiple, shifting, and hybrid identities, on transmigrants who oscillate between countries and between national, ethnic, and cosmopolitan affiliations, and on...
the transnational networks and institutions they build and sustain. Considering European-ness with its supranational, but also regional, cultural, religious, ethnic and racial connotations can provide an additional fruitful dimension to such inquiries. The seminar thus asked what Europe meant to migrants abroad and within the continent. Can we trace the emergence of European identities among different groups of migrants and, if so, what form did they take (e.g. as European-Americans)? To what degree are such identities comparable to the crystallization of national identities within migrant communities in, say, nineteenth century North America?

Two keynote lectures provided the thematic frame for the seminar. Leslie Page Moch approached the topic from the perspective of migration history. Europeanization, she argued, would be an anachronism if applied to most migrants in European history. Unlike the mobile elite of “Euro-Stars” that moves within the EU and European capitals of today, the majority of inner-European migrants over the past centuries remained attached to regions and states or perhaps considered themselves “internationals,” but rarely primarily Europeans. While European history was full of transnational migration movements, cross-cultural integration was frequently only localized and temporary, depending on political and economic circumstances as much as on the type of migration at hand. Coming from the field of Europeanization research, Kiran Klaus Patel stressed the social-constructedness of European-ness and the importance of not essentializing this concept or conflating Europe with the European Union. Explicit European identities, he agreed, were a rare and recent phenomenon. Especially since the nineteenth century, however, being European was often defined vis-à-vis the “other” by Europeans migrating abroad or in discourses over non-European in-migrants. The ethnic “melting pot” of the United States, Patel noted, was envisioned by some as a place to create a “new” American yet quintessentially “European man.” While the term “European-American” has not enjoyed the success of its hyphenated national counterparts (Italian-American etc.) and has remained both vague and secondary in the American discourse, Patel suggested that it still may be fruitful to look for the spaces and places where concepts of European-ness did pop up among migrants to the U.S., as for example with those who took refuge from political persecution during the 1930s and ‘40s.

The first panel of graduate student presentations focused very much on this latter group as well as more broadly on the role of transatlantic
elites in networking the United States and Europe during the middle of the twentieth century. Jens Wegener traced the migration careers of three European scholars — Moritz Julius Bonn, Hajo Holborn, and Carlo Sforza — who were part of the Carnegie Endowment’s inter-war campaign to foster an “international mind” in war-torn Europe and were later forced to emigrate to the United States. Andreas Joch analyzed the group of European architects and urban planners who came to the United States during the middle of the twentieth century and as part of a transnational elite helped shape contemporary understandings of the “American” and the “European” or often simply of the “modern” city. Daniel Bessner, finally, presented a close reading of émigré-sociologist Hans Speier’s work while at the New School for Social Research in New York, in which Speier engaged fellow émigrés in a debate over the opportunities and obligations of exile as well as on the need to overcome the dogmatism of interwar Europe and to embrace life in American society. All papers inquired into the intellectual and institutional underpinnings of transnational exchanges. Still, they also suggested that even among this often quite cosmopolitan group of émigrés who actively reflected on Europe’s past and future, national communities and networks frequently remained vital.

Career migrants who — at least temporarily — left their native country in the employ of a company or institution stood at the center of the second panel. Andreas Heil studies European missionaries in colonial Africa and showed that — prompted by exchanges with the non-European “other” — European-ness, inflected through several recurring topoi from “Christianity” to “Education,” became a central category of reflection in their writings. Corinna Ludwig focused on “business migrants,” managers and employees of German companies who were sent to the United States to establish American branches and helped negotiate company image, corporate identity and marketing strategies for European products abroad. By stretching traditional conceptions of “the migrant,” this panel opened a discussion about different categories of migrants and forms of mobility and their impact on subjective identifications.

The following two panels shifted the view towards the more “traditional” communities of European immigrants to the United States. Shira Klein examined the lives of Italian-Jewish émigrés to the United States and their identity struggles between Jewish and Italian immigrant communities as well as American society in general; their look back to Europe frequently oscillated between nostalgic memories
and the painful rejection of the racist and fascist currents at the time. Elizabeth Zanoni presented a comparative look at Italian immigrants in Argentina and the United States and the transnational commodity exchanges between Europe and the Americas they sustained by exporting and (re)producing “Italian” products as entrepreneurs, traders, and consumers.

Consumer identities as a way to negotiate transnational belonging were similarly central to Laura Miller’s paper on ethnic resorts in the Catskills. Miller complicated the notion of a postwar emergence of a white or European-American identity by demonstrating the longevity of ethnic resorts for New York’s immigrant communities, yet noting some degree of growing fluidity and exchange between various immigrant groups. Cross-ethnic solidarity was also an important facet of Mimi Cowan’s presentation on nineteenth-century transnational Irish nationalism in Chicago, where Fenians rallied other immigrant groups by appealing to the brotherhood of nationalist republicanism, but also provoked the image of radical, “un-American” Europeans among nativist American critics. All papers in these two panels transcended traditional histories of immigrant communities by emphasizing transnational entanglements and cross-ethnic interaction, or by offering comparative perspectives. Despite the many connections back to Europe and a high degree of exchange among European immigrant communities, however, attachment to Europe or notions of a shared European-American-ness appear to have been even less prominent among the majority of labor migrants to the United States than among elite migrants.

Such Europeanization has been more meaningful to migrants within contemporary Europe, as two sociological papers in the following panel suggested. Jessica Sperling shared parts of her research on Latin-American immigrant adolescents in Spain among whom she found a subset who identified as “Latin-Europeans,” finding it in some ways easier to identify with the supra-national than the national level. Saara Koikkalainen examined more highly educated Finnish labor migrants who worked in several European countries. While the majority of her subjects continued to identify primarily as Finnish, a sizeable percentage also self-identified explicitly as Europeans. In both these cases, however, identifications with Europe often had to be prompted by the survey questions, suggesting that outside of a small group of highly educated “Euro-Stars” (who often see themselves even more broadly as “global citizens”), European identities are frequently secondary to other forms of collective identification.
The genderedness of migration experiences was the topic of the last panel. Barbara Reiterer, taking the example of female émigré sociologists and social workers from German-speaking central Europe, emphasized the positive opportunities afforded by exile to some women on both a personal and professional level, thus qualifying existing research that has long focused on the disadvantages and hardships experienced by female exiles. Amanda Ricci presented on the entangled history of Quebecoise second-wave feminism in which Jewish, Italian and other immigrant voices complicated and fostered a gradual transformation in Quebecoise self-understanding from a post-colonial discourse about francophone Canadians as the “white negroes of America” to a more recent self-image as European-Canadian or “Euro-American.”

The concluding discussion underlined that the interplay of migration experiences and identifications with Europe cannot be packaged into a single, neat story. To what degree (if at all) migrants identified with Europe very much depended on time and circumstances as well as type of migration. Much like the “Euro-Stars” of today, educated elites of exiles and cosmopolitans were most likely to understand themselves in terms of European-ness while for many others national identifications remained primary. For Europeanization research, the look from the outside still holds promise and especially the juxtaposition with post-colonial studies may provide a fruitful avenue for further study to come to a more global understanding of what Europe and European-ness have meant and can mean. While many conference participants agreed that both the concepts of Europeanization and identity remain at times only vaguely defined and not unproblematic for migration research, the papers certainly put empirical meat on the theoretical bones of transnational history, which itself had also long been a lofty concept that is now gradually being filled with more concrete meaning.

Perhaps more important than such theoretical and methodological considerations, the seminar succeeded in fostering transatlantic exchanges among graduate student presenters and more senior commentators across academic cultures and disciplinary divides. In group discussions and individual exchanges, students received extensive feedback on their dissertation projects. The University of Minnesota provided an ideal setting for this, and the seminar included tours of Minneapolis’ culturally rich immigrant neighborhoods as well as the extensive archival collections held by the university’s Immigration
History Research Center. We are grateful for the support we received from various university sources, the German Historical Institute as well as the German Federal Ministry of Research and Education which made this seminar possible.

Jan Logemann (GHI)
BOSCH ARCHIVAL SEMINAR FOR YOUNG HISTORIANS, 2011

AMERICAN HISTORY IN TRANSatlANTIC PERSPECTIVE

Archival seminar in Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington DC, September 4-16, 2011. Co-organized by the GHI Washington, the University of Chicago’s Department of History, and the Heidelberg Center for American Studies, with the generous support of the Robert Bosch Foundation. Conveners: Mischa Honeck (Heidelberg Center for American Studies/GHI) and Martin Klimke (GHI). Participants: Anja-Maria Bassimir (University of Münster), Jasmine Noelle Yarish (University of California, Santa Barbara), Martin Deuerlein (University of Tübingen), Clayton Cleveland (University of Oregon), Agnes Kneitz (University of Munich), Lisa Maurer (University of Nebraska), Clemens Immanuel Schmidt (University of Leipzig), Christopher Parcels (University of Massachusetts), Florian Plum (Free University of Berlin), Kevin Kosanovich (College of William and Mary).

After premiering successfully in 2010, the Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar for Young Historians convened for the second time in September 2011. Once again the tour spanned four cities (Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington DC), and the ten seminar participants from Germany and the United States were introduced to the holdings and policies of a broad spectrum of American archives and research libraries. The goal of the seminar was to prepare doctoral students from both countries working in diverse fields of American history for their prospective research trips; to teach them how to contact archives, use finding aids, and identify important reference tools; and to help them gain a greater appreciation of the various kinds of archives and special collections located in the United States.

The Bosch Archival Seminar 2011 kicked off with a historical walking tour of downtown Chicago on Labor Day, September 5. The following day was set aside for the opening thesis workshop at the University of Chicago hosted by Kathleen Neils Conzen and attended by members of the history department and graduate student body. The seminar participants, who had been grouped into five transatlantic tandems consisting each of one German and one American student, commented on the work of their respective partners, exposed their projects to academic scrutiny, and received valuable feedback from their peers and present faculty members. On Wednesday, September 7,
the Seminar met Daniel Greene, Director of the William M. Scholl Center of American History and Culture at the Newberry Library, for a day-long introduction to the Institute’s collections as well as for a general overview of American archival policies and practices. Among the topics discussed were the purchase of rare books, techniques for browsing manuscript collections, the use of maps for historical research, and the opportunities and pitfalls of digitization. On Thursday morning, before the group departed for Madison, Wisconsin, the seminar visited the Cook County Court Archives. In his presentation, which was both instructive and entertaining, court archivist Phil Costello demonstrated how historians could make creative use of legal records and court cases.

The seminar’s first destination in Madison was the Wisconsin State Historical Society. Chief archivists Michael Edmonds and Harry Miller welcomed the seminar participants in the morning hours of September 9. They spoke about the history and holdings of their institution within the broader context of American state historical societies and impressed the students with the Wisconsin State Historical Society’s dedication to accessibility and public education. After that, time was set aside for individual research before the group reassembled at the University of Wisconsin history department for a roundtable on the relationship between historical research and political intervention. Under the guidance of faculty members William Reese and Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen as well as independent scholar and bibliographer James Danky, the participants engaged in a spirited dialogue about whether historians not only have a right to address issues of contemporary relevance but should feel obliged to use their expert knowledge to shape and elevate public debate. While some identified with a more traditional ideal of the scholar as a disinterested and unbiased observer of the human past, most agreed that historians should engage in wider debates about politics and society to promote various causes or simply challenge the simplistic truth claims of others.

On Saturday evening, September 10, the group arrived in Boston, the third stop on the itinerary. The following morning gave the seminar participants a chance to witness public history in action with a guided tour of the Freedom Trail. After that, the group spent the rest of the day engaged in individual explorations. On Monday, September 12, the seminar resumed at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library at Columbia Point. Enjoying a two-and-a-half-hour tour of the museum and library archives, including the Ernest Hemingway
Collection, under the supervision of Jane Lindsay, the group benefited from staff presentations on audiovisuals, declassification, and the library’s manuscript collections and oral history program. The day concluded with a visit to the Baker Library Archives at the Harvard Business School. Katherine Fox, Associate Director of Public Services, acquainted the students with the wealth of the Baker Library’s holdings, which touch upon almost every issue pertaining to the country’s economic development from an agricultural society to an industrial and postindustrial superpower. The seminar returned to Harvard University the next morning. The first stop was Schlesinger Library, one of the leading U.S. research facilities for women’s history. Head librarian Ellen Shea showed and explained letters, pamphlets, books, and visual material related to topics ranging from domesticity and black women to the women’s suffrage movement. The final destination on our Boston schedule was Houghton Library, where Peter Accardo talked the group through some of the library’s most precious Early Americana collections and gave valuable advice on how to use them for various research agendas.

After reaching Washington DC late on Tuesday, September 13, the Bosch Seminar continued the following day at the Library of Congress. A guided tour of the Jefferson building was followed by a presentation from archivist Daun van Ee, who spoke to the participants about the breadth of manuscript collections available through the Library of Congress Manuscript Division. The group then advanced to the Prints and Photographs Division, where Sara Duke and her coworkers had worked hard to muster illustration samples related to the participants’ individual projects, thereby underscoring the significance of visual material for historical research. In the afternoon, the group was welcomed by Matthew Wasniewski from the Office of the Historian of the House, who gave the seminar participants a detailed tour of Congress and explained the work of his office, which provides information on the history of Congress, as well as congressional documents and legislation, and chronicles its composition and individual members.

On Thursday, September 15, the group visited the Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archives and Records Administration. Historian Richard McCulley introduced the participants to the different types of legislative records of Congress, e.g. committee or investigative records. Drawing on the Investigation into Stock Exchange Practices (Pecora Investigation) by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency set up in March 1932 to explore the Wall Street crash of 1929 as a case study, McCulley presented a variety of research strategies for specific aspects and source material. After that, the group moved to the Treasure Vault to see a plethora of historically significant documents, such as a copy of Washington’s First Inaugural Address, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s reading copy of his message asking Congress to declare war against Japan (“Day of Infamy” Address), as well as the enlarged copy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Next, the group was welcomed, over lunch, at the American Historical Association (AHA) by Executive Director James Grossman and Interim Special Projects Coordinator Julia Brookins. They explained the job situation for historians in the U.S., elaborated on the various efforts of the AHA to reach out to graduate students and young scholars, and engaged the participants in a stimulating debate about their own experiences, plans, and perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic. Following this fruitful discussion, Associate Curator and Archivist Craig Orr received the seminar at the National Museum of American History. Orr presented a detailed picture of the museum collections that have a strong emphasis on the history of technology, advertising, marketing, entrepreneurship, as well as American music, among other fields. He successfully demonstrated how many of the participants would find suitable source material for their topics in the museum’s extensive holdings and offered specific advice and contacts for them to follow up.

Due to the damage incurred by a recent earthquake, the visit to the Moorland-Spingarn Research Center planned for Friday, September 16, had to be canceled. In the afternoon, the group met for a wrap-up discussion of the seminar at the German Historical Institute and was greeted by Deputy Director Uwe Spiekermann, who introduced them to the institute’s work, research projects, as well as the many fellowship and networking opportunities. The farewell dinner that evening concluded a very successful seminar, whose participants were extremely grateful for the useful information, contacts, and prospects for future collaboration that it opened up for them.

Mischa Honeck (GHI) and Martin Klimke (GHI)
THE TRANSNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A GLOBAL HISTORY

Conference at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena, September 15-18, 2011. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington, the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, the Ernst Abbe-Foundation, the American Embassy in Berlin, and the Faculty of Philosophy of the Friedrich Schiller University Jena. Conveners: Jörg Nagler (University of Jena), Marcus Gräser (GHI). Participants: Sven Beckert (Harvard University), Richard Blackett (Vanderbilt University), Robert Bonner (Dartmouth College), Amanda Brickell-Bellows (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Leslie Butler (Dartmouth College), Richard Carwardine (Oxford University), Enrico Dal Lago (National University of Ireland, Galway), Don Doyle (University of South Carolina), Paul Finkelman (Albany Law School), Stig Förster (University of Bern), Susan-Mary Grant (Newcastle University), Nicholas Guyatt (University of York), Mischa Honeck (University of Heidelberg/GHI), Axel Jansen (University of Frankfurt), Hartmut Keil (University of Leipzig), Axel Körner (University College London), Nicola Miller (University College London), Paul Quigley (University of Edinburgh), Evan C. Rothera (Pennsylvania State University), Brian Schoen (Ohio University), Zachary Sell (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign), Jay Sexton (Oxford University), Aaron Sheehan-Dean (University of North Florida), Nimrod Tal (Oxford University), Andrew Zimmerman (George Washington University).

Since this conference took place in Jena, Friedrich Schiller’s famous lecture “What Is, and To What End Do We Study Universal History” generated the conference’s main question: why, and to what end, do we study the global history of the American Civil War? Participants of the conference thus did not shy away from offering new perspectives on seeing the Civil War in a global context and from responding to the tendency of some historians to “deprovincialize” the war and its implications. The papers posed questions regarding nation-building and its relationship to the transformation of the character of labor, as well as the economic, political, social, and cultural impact of the war around the world. At the same time, they paid heightened attention to networks of people and ideas that came to shape the outcome and perception of the American Civil War.

The first panel of the conference, chaired by Jörg Nagler, was dedicated to the dialectical relationship between nationalism and universalism. Richard Carwardine’s paper revealed that Lincoln came to be
perceived as both a nationalist and internationalist by advocating a romantic nationalism fused with “a conviction that the hope of all humankind lay in his country’s republican principles and practices.” Axel Jansen then discussed the 1863 founding of the National Academy of Sciences and claimed that the law implementing a national academy should not only be interpreted as a symbol of the nation’s acceptance of the logic of science, but also as a tool for helping Americans consolidate their emerging nation and national state.

Stig Förster then held the public keynote address on “Global Warfare and the American Civil War.” Förster argued that the American Civil War was not a global war, but, as its very name implies, merely a civil war between the Union and Confederacy. Although it was an isolated affair, however, the conflict exhibited tendencies of a total war and can be interpreted as a return to the “people’s war,” similar to the Napoleonic wars but under the changed condition of industrialization. A reception followed in Schiller’s summer house in the evening, allowing for historical debates in a historical atmosphere and giving participants the opportunity to visit the house of one of universal history’s early advocates and world famous poets.

On Friday, the conference continued with the second panel, chaired by Nicola Miller, addressing the issue of nation-building, war, and the question of inclusion in the era of the American Civil War. First, Aaron Sheehan-Dean showed how a “rough typology of non-combatant treatment” emerged during the conflict without any explicit policy being developed for it. Furthermore, he revealed that the military options of both North and South were severely limited by their functioning as autonomous nations that were eager to impress fellow nations with their modern state-like behavior. In her paper “Civil War Cybernetics,” Susan-Mary Grant then repositioned the “wounded soldier” as central to the nationalist forces that emerged in the nineteenth century. She urged historians not to downplay the corporeal costs of the war and portrayed the nineteenth century as the age of the emergence of a “war machine” with both technological as well as human elements. Paul Quigley continued the panel with a re-evaluation of the question of citizenship in the United States in a transatlantic context, demonstrating how wartime needs caused governments to make new demands upon the governed, while material hardships increased people’s expectations of their leaders. Enrico Dal Lago concluded the panel by comparing processes of nation-building, civil war, and social revolution in the American South and
the Italian South (*Mezzogiorno*) from 1860 to 1865. He showed how both regions played important roles in the respective processes of national consolidation during this time.

The afternoon then began with panel three, chaired by Jay Sexton, which discussed the impact of the American Civil War on the global economy and looked at the Civil War era through the prism of cotton in different ways. The first panelist, Brian Schoen, offered new insights into a familiar theme: that cotton’s central place in the modern nineteenth-century global economy critically informed a Deep South sectional identity and contributed to secession. Sven Beckert then looked at the American Civil War as one of the most important events in the history of global capitalism. He argued that one of the principle outcomes of the Civil War was the rearrangement of the nation’s political economy, which, in turn, had a dramatic impact on America’s place in the world and thus on global capitalism more broadly.

Chaired by Susan-Mary Grant, the fourth panel addressed the impact of the American Civil War on the international state system. While most historians agree that the Confederacy’s slaveholding status in itself was no barrier to international recognition, Robert Bonner elaborated the ways that the Confederacy’s perceived “piratical tendencies” undermined its reputation as a responsible potential sovereign. Jay Sexton then talked about the Civil War’s impact on international finance, arguing that the Civil War constituted a key moment in the international history of nineteenth-century finance by fundamentally disrupting and altering existing financial relationships, institutions, and the flow of capital. He underlined his argument by showing that the decision of (most) British financiers not to invest in war bonds of either war party fueled financial innovation in the United States. Afterward, Richard Blackett analyzed African American efforts to win British public opinion for the Union. He was able to demonstrate that these efforts definitely had a profound impact on British public opinion and helped keep the causes of the war alive within it, even though the extent to which they influenced British policy remains unclear.

Panels five and six were both titled “The American Civil War and Transnational Ideological Currents.” The fifth panel, chaired by Leslie Butler, began with Don Doyle’s examination of the efforts of Union agents in charge of propaganda operations in Europe, such
as John Bigelow. This analysis illustrated how the transatlantic exchange and its impact on the popular imagination engendered the interpretation of the Civil War as an “epic battle” with international significance for the “entire democratic experiment.” Mischa Honeck’s paper then emphasized the bonds of companionship, mutual interests, and converging print cultures that drew abolitionists of differing backgrounds together. By appreciating abolitionists’ dual role as “selfless humanitarians and self-interested nation-builders,” Honeck argued, one is able to understand the intertwined nature of their devotion to emancipation and their search for belonging. Paul Finkelman followed with a discussion of how the American Civil War effectively changed the nature of world slavery. Had it not been for the Civil War, he argued, the Brussels Act of 1890, which formally condemned slavery for the entire Atlantic community for the first time, would not have been adopted.

The sixth panel, moderated by Don Doyle, began with Leslie Butler’s paper "Assuming 'A Democracy Can Think',' which elaborated the transatlantic contexts of Civil War liberalism by illuminating how liberals on both sides of the Atlantic perceived the American Civil War as an "educative moment of sorts." Hartmut Keil followed with an examination of one person actively engaged in the cause of abolition and national unity: the German-born political philosopher Francis Lieber. If one is familiar with his background, however (he had been living in the South for more than twenty-one years prior to the Civil War), one wonders why he actually entertained such strong liberal and nationalist ideas. Keil identified two sources of Lieber’s activities during the war, namely, his German background, which accounted for his nationalist views, and his experience in the slaveholding South. The last panelist Axel Körner looked at the influence of works of literature and music on the Italian image of America. Negative portrayals of slavery that were widely received in Italy, such as those in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* or Verdi’s *Un Ballo in Maschera*, helped shape Italian public opinion such that Italians did not regard American federalism as a proper model for the country’s own unification.

Hartmut Keil chaired the seventh panel, which was concerned with contemporary (self-) perceptions and analyses of the American Civil War. Amanda Brickell-Bellows compared post-emancipation literary portrayals of peasants in the American South with those of freedmen in Russia. She demonstrated that Russian and Southern elites responded to the abolition of serfdom and slavery by producing
divergent post-emancipation cultural myths. While Russian nobles idealized the peasants in an effort to define and understand what it meant “to be a Russian,” white Southerners promoted the illusion of harmonious ante-bellum race relations in order to secure political order after Reconstruction. The second panelist, Nimrod Tal, analyzed the memorialization of the Civil War in the twentieth century, particularly within British and Irish projections of the Civil War from 1870 to 1922. From 1870 onward, Tal maintained, the Civil War became an “ideological acid test” for both the Irish and the British with which they examined Ireland’s place within the British union. Nicola Miller then discussed the impact of the Civil War on Latin America. Looking at the roots of transmission and the lessons of nation-building that Latin Americans drew from the conflict, she sees the Civil War as an oscillation in the history of intra-American relations.

Panel eight, chaired by Marcus Gräser, addressed the issues of slavery, emancipation, and racism that are vital to our understanding of the transnational impact of the American Civil War. Andrew Zimmerman launched the panel by revealing how the American Civil War was part of a unique mid-nineteenth-century Atlantic history and an important theater in the “(second) age of revolution.” Considering the relationship between slavery and slave rebellion (“the Black Atlantic”) and the workers’ uprisings in Europe and the United States (“the Red Atlantic”), Zimmerman found that abolitionism and communism were indeed deeply intertwined and that the fight against slavery served as an important impetus for formulating critiques of capitalism. Nicholas Guyatt then considered the impact of the American Civil War on the Caribbean by testing the prophecies that Tocqueville had made about these islands in the 1830s. Tocqueville had predicted that, if slaves were to be emancipated, a race war would break out both on the mainland and in the Caribbean. Guyatt showed that this vision resonated in the Civil War period and influenced the debate about whether to expand emancipation to encompass the former colonies of the Caribbean. Zachary Sell’s paper, “From Ormond to Regalia,” used the example of the white South Louisiana sugar planter Samuel McCutchon, who relocated to British Honduras in the aftermath of the Civil War, to illustrate how the structure of slavery and settler colonialism designed by Southern white supremacists was integral to nineteenth-century capitalist production — even after the Civil War. In the final talk of the conference, Evan C. Rothera proposed an interesting new angle for studying the Civil War and its aftermath by analyzing “comparative
reconstructions” and by exploring the presence of competing national mythologies.

The third day of the conference ended with a trip to Weimar on which Jane Obst pointed out well known and lesser-known attractions of the city. A joint dinner followed, and the evening proved Schiller’s words that the “study of world history” is “an attractive as well as useful occupation.”

The conference concluded on Sunday with a roundtable discussion. Moderator Jörg Nagler first made some general observations on the advantages and disadvantages of doing a global history of the Civil War and suggested new avenues for future research. Nagler observed that more scholarly work is still needed on a variety of topics to illuminate the global implications of the Civil War even more effectively, including the multinational Union regiments, the war’s influence on the perception of international migration and migration to the United States, the impact of the economic transition following the Civil War on countries such as Egypt and India, and the rarely discussed significance of the British Empire in relation to the event. Furthermore, Nagler proposed that historians need to be more precise in defining “liberalism” in a global world and to think about the specific connotations of the term. Don Doyle then launched the discussion by challenging the validity of the term “age of nationalism” that many historians have employed as a label for the mid-nineteenth century. Doyle pointed out that national identity in this era was much more fluid and in some ways more voluntary than the term implies. Richard Blackett advocated that historians analyze what “ordinary people” did and the connections they tried to make across issues of race and class. Jay Sexton highlighted the importance of political languages and vocabularies, suggesting that the “old language of republicanism” was giving way to a “new language of civilization” over the course of the civil war. Then, the discussion turned to the question of how global the Civil War actually was. The participants agreed with Aaron Sheehan-Dean’s suggestion that global analysis is not always relevant to our understanding of history and that one needs to exercise caution when putting events in a transnational framework. Marcus Gräser asked whether the transnational approach should be regarded as a means of explaining the war per se or rather as a tool for illuminating it, and Richard Carwardine and Jay Sexton observed that more attention should be paid to the role of religion in the Civil War. Finally, it was observed that since the conference had considered the

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transnational significance of the Civil War, it would also be fruitful to reflect on the world significance for the Civil War and examine how global developments help to explain how the war even came about.

Katharina Wagner (University of Jena)
SHIFTING VISIONS OF DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS, AND THE RISE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 1945-1990

Conference at Jacobs University Bremen, September 29-30, 2011. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington, the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS), and the Research Group TEAMs at Jacobs University Bremen. Conveners: Marc Frey, Sönke Kunkel, Corinna R. Unger (all Jacobs University Bremen). Participants: Antoine Acker (European University Institute Florence), Eileen Boris (University of California, Santa Barbara), Jürgen Dinkel (University of Giessen), Jost Dülffer (University of Cologne), Leonie Holthaus (Technical University Darmstadt), Ruth Jachertz (Humboldt University Berlin), Vincent Lagendijk (University of Leiden), David Lazar (GHI), Francine McKenzie (University of Western Ontario), Samuel Misteli (University of Lucerne), Jana Otto (University of Hamburg), Corinne Pernet (University of St. Gallen), Claudia Prinz (Humboldt University Berlin), Bob Reinalda (Radboud University Nijmegen), Klaus Schlichte (University of Bremen), Matthias Schmelzer (European University Viadrina Frankfurt/Oder), Daniel Speich (University of Lucerne), Jens Steffek (Technical University Darmstadt), Rainer Tetzlaff (Jacobs University Bremen), Welf Werner (Jacobs University Bremen), Heike Wieters (Humboldt University Berlin), Thomas Zimmer (University of Freiburg).

Over the last sixty years, international organizations and their non-governmental counterparts have played an even more important role in international politics. They have acted as promoters of globalization, as global transmitters of ideas and knowledge, and as influential stakeholders in a wide range of fields, such as human rights, health, agriculture, labor, demography, and ecology. The growing importance of international institutions has gone along with a similar rise to prominence of the concept of “development,” which — although often lacking a precise definition — has worked as a major catalyst for expanding activities in the international realm.

Historians’ growing interest in international and global phenomena in recent years has brought a rediscovery of the long-neglected history of international organizations. A considerable amount of this research has focused on the concept of development, its meanings, and its use by international stakeholders. However, despite efforts by historians, political scientists, and anthropologists alike, there is much territory left to cover in the quest to explain shifting visions of...
development and the role of international organizations in shaping the contemporary world. The conference therefore intended to take a systematic look at the state of research and to assess the tasks that still lie ahead in the field.

In the conference’s first panel, Jens Steffek and Leonie Holthaus tracked the rise of international organizations by shedding light on the thinking of two early theorists of international administration. In the interwar years, James Arthur Salter and David Mitrany developed notions of rational public administration and planning that proved to be influential both for political science and for international organizations. Salter, a British diplomat and League of Nations official, and Mitrany, the founding father of the functional theory of International Relations, both endorsed rational planning and transnational administration as means of overcoming political struggles and the danger of political and economic anarchy. Both Salter and Mitrany expected de-politicized governance by functional international organizations to bring about effective political solutions that would spur economic development, among other things. To this end, planning was best left to experts.

The rule of experts was also at the core of Daniel Speich’s paper, which connected the proliferation of international organizations after the Second World War to the concurrent rise of macroeconomics as a scientific discipline. In the 1940s, Speich argued, macroeconomic expertise was established as a generalized medium of communication in international relations, insofar as it provided a shared analytical framework that reduced the complexities of world politics. Thus, economics became a lingua franca in diplomatic negotiations that allowed participants to articulate differing interests and to connect diverse backgrounds. Focusing on European-African relations from the 1940s to the 1960s, Speich showed that economic concepts like the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) helped establish new modes of communication in the context of declining empires.

Matthias Schmelzer linked the power of macroeconomics to the conference topic of shifting visions of development by tracking changes in the understandings of the concept of economic growth and by connecting these shifts to parallel changes in development thinking. Schmelzer claimed that the concept of economic growth lies at the heart of modern societies’ discussions about progress and well-being, and that its shifting understandings and meanings closely parallel changing paradigms of the desired path for the development of the
Global South. The debates within the OECD during the late 1960s and early 1970s are an exemplary case of this: The OECD discussions about the need for qualitative and sustainable growth had their counterpart in a critique of dominant notions of industrialization and modernization of the Global South, as well as the subsequent introduction of a new focus on “basic needs” in development thinking.

Economic considerations not only matter in shaping international discourse; they are also important for the “survival techniques” of international organizations, as Heike Wieters showed by looking into the “mindset” of the humanitarian organization CARE. Since its founding in 1945, the New York-based NGO has managed to grow into a significant international player thanks to an entrepreneurial culture that guaranteed CARE’s competitiveness in a challenging environment. The rise of the Western humanitarian community, Wieters demonstrated, was in no small part rendered possible by the fact that nonprofit organizations’ business techniques were not really that different from the ones employed by their for-profit counterparts.

Several papers dealt with the notion of “failure” for international organizations. Francine McKenzie highlighted the emergence of a development agenda in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). “Development” did not figure in GATT’s agenda when it was founded in 1947, but in the 1950s and 1960s, GATT faced increasing criticism from developing countries that sought to change the rules of world trade. Vilified as a “rich man’s organization,” GATT tried to incorporate development concerns into its agenda within its secretariat, but largely failed. The 1964 founding of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development directly challenged GATT’s hesitance to seriously enhance its goals beyond trade liberalization.

Like GATT, the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), one of the oldest of the specialized UN agencies, missed the opportunity to be a leader in promoting development. Ruth Jachertz delivered a bleak picture of FAO’s efforts to fulfill its mandate to combat world hunger and better the lives of rural populations. Far from being able to establish itself as an organization with wide-ranging policy-making functions, FAO became an arena for the North-South conflict in the 1960s. Tensions between G77 countries, which held the voting majority, and OECD countries, which held the power of the purse, led to the lasting paralysis of FAO. The failure of the FAO
secretariat to act as an efficient governing body further contributed to FAO’s decline to an organization that increasingly saw its mandate reduced to publishing reports and statistics.

Vincent Lagendijk’s and Antoine Acker’s papers dealt with ruptures in development thinking by examining the rise in criticism of formerly uncontroversial development visions. Lagendijk looked at growing opposition to dam-building, and Acker analyzed a farming development project run by the Volkswagen company in the Brazilian Amazon region. Dam-building went from being a consensual project and an integral part of the development paradigm to being a contested undertaking from the 1980s onward, when ever more vociferous and better organized opponents started highlighting the potentially damaging consequences of dam-building projects. Similarly, the development of the Amazonian area ceased to be a widely unquestioned vision of progress when, during the 1980s, it became clear that the promise of universal welfare failed to consider the environment and various previously voiceless actors.

A separate panel was dedicated to looking into the way international food and health organizations approached the development concept: Corinne Pernet explored how the Central American Institute of Nutrition (INCAP) acted as a place for the creation and transfer of development knowledge. In the process, she advocated a “de-centered” understanding of development: Governments and international organizations in the Global North should not be seen as sole “senders” of development ideas; instead, the complexity of exchanges and transfers between actors in the “center” and the “periphery” should be seriously considered.

The call for the “de-centering of development” was taken up by Claudia Prinz and Thomas Zimmer. Prinz stressed the importance of multi-directional knowledge transfers in global efforts to control diarrheal diseases during the 1970s and 1980s. The policies of the global Diarrheal Diseases Control Program (CDD) were shaped significantly by the medical knowledge produced by the International Centre for Diarrheal Disease Research in Bangladesh (ICDDR, B), which had been established under the slogan “take the science where the diarrhea is” in 1978. Prinz also showed the benefit of looking into global programs instead of focusing on particular organizations, claiming that the former approach can be rewarding for disentangling interactions and connections in global knowledge production. Thomas Zimmer, for his part, delivered further evidence against the
notion of the Global South being simply an object of project ideas conceived in the West. He illustrated the crucial part Indian actors played in the installation of the Indian branch of the WHO’s global Malaria Eradication Program (MEP) in the 1950s and ‘60s. While the Indian MEP was shaped to fit the Indian government’s agenda, the global program was closely linked to international development discourse: Combating malaria and fighting human suffering was not seen as an end in itself, but as a means to promote economic development through the conservation of a healthy and therefore productive workforce.

The conference’s final panel broadened the view once more, this time to include gender perspectives. Eileen Boris’s paper dealt with the category of “women in developing countries.” In the 1970s, rural women in the Global South became central to development discourse as they were no longer perceived in development thinking as unproductive parts of developing societies but rather as a significant workforce due to a reconsideration of reproductive labor. Third World women became chief targets for the ILO in an effort to end poverty through world employment. Boris sketched the discursive construction of this doubly secluded target group. She also made a general methodological statement by advocating a history of international organizations that is sensitive to how gender makes a difference.

The final discussion stressed the continuing importance of international organizations as facilitators and agenda-setting actors in an interconnected world. At the same time, participants agreed that any analysis of IOs needs to take the larger context into account, such as relations with nation-states, civil society or with knowledge-producing actors. As Bob Reinalda emphasized, one should not forget the role of a beneficial hegemon (the United States) during the founding period of the UN system. In addition, while affirming the lasting significance of international organizations, conference discussions had also exhibited limits to IO agency. Thus, taking up the notion of failure that had surfaced repeatedly during the conference, Sönke Kunkel highlighted the potential for frustration inherent in the transformative promise of international organizations.

Participants agreed further that the concept of “development” and its shifting meanings are as hard to grasp as the forces shaping the role of international organizations in the contemporary world. However, participants identified the scientification of global development as an obvious trend — since various papers had dealt with this phenomenon.
Looking closely into this process may indeed be a rewarding perspective for future research. Klaus Schlichte outlined another possible research path by suggesting that one track the shifting power structures behind perceived changes in development thinking.

In sum, it became clear that two days of fruitful discussions had not been enough to entirely disentangle the highly complex discourses of development thinking and global policy-making. However, all the conference contributions together presented a comprehensive kaleidoscope of a dynamic research field, and exchange among different professions uncovered potentially promising pathways for future research.

Samuel Misteli (University of Lucerne)
MEDIEVAL HISTORY SEMINAR 2011

Seminar at the GHI Washington, October 13-16, 2011. Organized by Miriam Rürup (GHI Washington) and Jochen Schenk (GHI London), with the help of Jan-Hendryk de Boer (University of Göttingen). Conveners: Stuart Airlie (University of Glasgow), Michael Borgolte (Humboldt University Berlin), Frank Rexroth (University of Göttingen), Patrick J. Geary (University of California, Los Angeles), Barbara H. Rosenwein (Loyola University Chicago), Miri Rubin (Queen Mary University of London). Participants: Jason Berg (University of Leeds), Johanna Dale (University of East Anglia, Norwich), Christopher Fletcher (University of Chicago), Thomas Greene (Loyola University Chicago), Angela Ling Huang (University of Copenhagen), Eleanor Janega (University College London), Christopher Kurpiewski (Princeton University), Tillmann Lohse (Humboldt University Berlin), Benjamin Pope (Durham University), Ulla Reiss (University of Frankfurt am Main), Ingo Trüter (University of Göttingen), Maximilian Schuh (University of Münster), Kristin Skottki (University of Rostock), Michèle Steiner (University of Fribourg), John Young (Flagler College), and Miriam Weiss (University of Trier).

The seventh meeting of the Medieval History Seminar, which was again jointly organized by the GHI Washington and the GHI London, took place in Washington DC on October 13-16, 2011. Sixteen young medievalists — six from Germany, four from the United Kingdom, four from the United States, one from Switzerland, and one from Denmark — were invited to join the conveners and organizers to discuss their research in the broadly defined field of Medieval History. In her opening lecture, Barbara Rosenwein outlined the emerging field of a history of emotions of the Middle Ages, which explores and illuminates historical variations in the way emotions are expressed and dealt with. During the middle ages, different emotional communities evolved, ranging from those that left hardly any room for the rhetoric of emotions to those that were characterized by highly emotional and affective ways of acting and talking.

Over the next three days, the participants’ papers, which had been distributed in advance, were discussed two at a time in eight panels. The procedure of each panel was as follows: first, two fellow participants introduced the two papers acting as commentators; then the authors replied briefly; and finally there was a general question and answer session. As in prior years, this procedure ensured that the discussions were intense and thorough.
The opening panel started with a presentation of Ingo Trüter’s paper on the social and cultural capital that men of learning living around 1500 could acquire with a doctoral degree. As an example, he introduced a jurist from Tübingen whose degree served as a prerequisite for social advancement. From this perspective, earning a doctoral degree was regarded as a costly investment that could pay off in the future. The second paper dealt with Christopher Kurpiewski’s dissertation, which analyzed the relationship between the German mystic Christina von Stommeln (1242–1312) and her Dominican confessor as a representation of the Dominicans’ acceptance of the cura monalium. Kurpiewski’s attentive examination of the confessor’s letters and treatises revealed these texts as stylized documents of a spiritual friendship and as an apology for cura, which he portrayed as integral to the Dominican mission.

The second panel opened with Ulla Reiss’s paper on the evolution of technical language in English account books during the twelfth century. She demonstrated that scribes of the royal English exchequer tentatively employed different notations and signs, which over time developed into something like an “expertise.” By adopting useful solutions and dismissing other efforts, these scribes unintentionally participated in creating a specialized accounting language. While it is often argued that organizations provide the framework within which technical languages can develop, Reiss argues that the situation was reversed in the case of the English exchequer: that is, an organization emerged from the successive development of a technical language in the Pipe Rolls. The second paper by Miriam Weiss presented the results of her close reading of the Chronica maiora by Matthew Paris. Comparing the different redactions of the text helps to bring into light Matthew Paris’s multifaceted strategy of “intentional oblivion” as a means of adapting his Chronica to changing audiences and circumstances.

The third panel began with Angela Ling Huang’s econo-historical study of the international dimension of cloth production in Hanseatic towns in the fifteenth century. Using material from London custom accounts, she demonstrated how local government agencies and officials enforced high quality standards on imported goods, thus becoming important players in Hanseatic cloth production and trade. Benjamin Pope’s paper then followed the suggestions of German Landesgeschichte to re-examine the relationships between townspeople and rural nobility in late medieval Erfurt and Nuremberg.
He argued that the lack of an overall narrative and the varieties on the phenomenal level should be interpreted as results of the sources’ social function as documents of the interaction between urban and rural elites: One group used the other as a means to determine its own identity.

The fourth panel started with Johanna Dale’s comparative study of saints’ feasts and royal coronation dates in England, France, and Germany in the High Middle Ages. Her detailed comparison of the coronation dates showed that they were well chosen to mark the significance of the events and to place them in a liturgical framework. This strategy served to load political events with biblical and historical symbolism. This was followed by a lively discussion of Tillmann Lohse’s finished doctoral dissertation on “the continuity of the foundation” of a collegiate church in Goslar. Lohse argued that the continuity of the foundation from the Middle Ages to present times was disclosed as retrospective abstracting from the many continuities of the foundation on different social, liturgical, and economic levels.

Michèle Steiner launched the fifth panel with her intercultural perspective on the life of Muslim subjects in the Norman kingdom of Sicily. Studying everyday interactions between Muslims and Christians, Steiner noted that Normans were willing to adopt principles of Islamic law in their legal contracts with Muslims. This she regarded as further proof of the Normans’ well-known strategy of stabilizing their power by assimilating to local traditions. John Young’s paper likewise considered everyday contacts between different religious groups: Jews and monks were frequent if unlikely economic partners in the High Middle Ages. But by comparing a vast array of documents from the German empire, Young argued that Jews and monks interacted regularly in negotiations and discussions with each other. Shifting the focus from extraordinary interactions such as religious debates to fairly unremarkable everyday interactions, he was able to present contacts between the two communities as usually normal and peaceful.

Thomas Greene opened the sixth panel with his paper on Haimo of Auxerre’s emotional eschatology, which followed the path opened by Barbara Rosenwein in her opening lecture. In order to reconstruct the standards in the emotional community that the monks of Auxerre had formed, Greene examined Haimo’s emotional eschatology in his comments on the emotions experienced by souls after
death. Christopher Fletcher followed with a presentation on another famous medieval religious author, Hildegard of Bingen, arguing that her letters became the hallmark of a subjective theology. Letters were Hildegard’s foremost means to put her theological convictions into practice to direct and save souls. Writing letters to abbots and abbesses played a crucial role in implementing her reform theology.

The unforeseen cancellation of Jason Berg’s anticipated paper on monsters and monstrous language in the Cosmographia of Aethicus Ister left plenty of time to discuss Kristin Skottki’s finished dissertation in the seventh panel. Using an intercultural perspective, she studied Latin First Crusade chronicles as historic sources and literary products. These chronicles, she maintained, should no longer be read as truthful mirrors of reality, but instead as multilayered representations of possible world views and as drafts of the role of the self and the other that seek the readers’ seal of approval.

On the last day of the conference, Maximilian Schuh opened the eighth panel with an overview of the results of his recently finished dissertation on fifteenth century humanism at the University of Ingolstadt. Turning from well-known humanists like Konrad Celtis to the more mundane ways in which the new learning evolved in the faculty of arts, Schuh was able to show how the professors and their students felt their way in order to merge new methods and insights with older traditions. Then, in the final paper, Eleanor Janega highlighted the spatial dimensions of Jan Milic’s sermons, arguing that the preacher’s calls for reform grew out of the changing urban culture in Prague during the reign of Charles IV.

The conveners used the final discussion to pass on some practical and theoretical advice on writing comprehensive and thorough dissertations. However, it was not easy to harmonize idealistic and pragmatic claims. Whereas Michael Borgolte encouraged the young medievalists to open their gaze to non-Latin cultures, Patrick J. Geary reflected on the different cultural importance of the Middle Ages to European and American scholars: Identities of modern-day Europeans have remained anchored in Europe’s medieval heritage in one way or another; Americans, on the other hand, perceive the Middle Ages as a foreign culture, comparable to that of ancient China or ancient India. There was general agreement among the participants that events like the Medieval History Seminar and institutions like the German Historical Institutes, with their ability to assemble young and senior medievalists from different countries and backgrounds,
offer researchers important and much needed opportunities to compare their methods and approaches with colleagues from different scientific communities — and thereby to acquire the competence to identify shortcomings in their own scholarly traditions.

Jan-Hendryk de Boer (University of Göttingen)
UNCERTAIN KNOWLEDGE: DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF (NON-)AFFIRMATION IN NINETEENTH- AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN HISTORY

Workshop at the GHI Washington, October 20-22, 2011. Conveners: Bruce Dorsey (Swarthmore College), Sebastian Jobs (GHI/University of Rostock), Olaf Stieglitz (University of Erfurt). Participants: Gary Alan Fine (Northwestern University), Jennifer Fronc (University of Massachusetts, Amherst), Rachel Hall (Louisiana State University), Mischa Honeck (GHI), Cynthia Kierner (George Mason University), Robert Kramm-Masaoka (University of Tübingen), Jan Logemann (GHI), Tim Lockley (University of Warwick), Christina Lubinski (GHI), Jennifer Manion (Connecticut College), Silvan Niedermeier (University of Erfurt), Jason Phillips (Mississippi State University), Woody Register (Sewanee: The University of the South), Sharon Ullman (Bryn Mawr College), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI).

This workshop brought together scholars from Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom researching topics of rumors, gossip, and scandals in American history. In his introduction, Sebastian Jobs described the theoretical concept of “uncertain knowledge” as an umbrella term for various practices of knowledge production such as rumors, libel, slander or denunciation. Contrary to many scholars who consider these phenomena mere disturbing interferences in communication, Jobs proposed to use the lens of “uncertain knowledge” to go beyond the dichotomy of historical “true” and “false” and to take these irritations and crises of knowledge seriously in order to analyze the dynamics of knowledge production. Thus, rumors and gossip could be a means to understand networks of communication and to bring into focus the fluidity and dynamic changes of categories with which Americans organized their lives and assigned meaning to their experiences. Furthermore, Jobs introduced the general outline and highlighted the three basic areas of inquiry on which the workshop discussions would touch, namely, actors, media, and practices within the field of “uncertain knowledge.”

The first panel focused on the uncertainties of physical intimacy and desire. In his paper on same-sex relations in New England in the early nineteenth century, Bruce Dorsey dismissed monocausal historical interpretations of homosexuality. Describing the case of a Christian minister who was said to have sexually harassed a fellow parishioner, he emphasized instead the fluidity of categories
employed to understand and describe sexual encounters. Thus, he offered a variety of perspectives contemporaries could have used to understand the behavior he was alleged to have committed: as a homosexual advance, as an educational measure, as an act of Christian brotherhood. Moreover, his contribution questioned the adequacy of today’s analytical concepts for grasping same-sex relations in the early American republic. In the same panel, Jennifer Manion gave a thought-provoking presentation about violence among women in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Pennsylvania. Interpreting trial records of assault and battery cases, she explored ways to decode these violent encounters as instances of physical intimacy and desire. In doing so, Manion addressed the uncertain knowledge toward same-sex relations and emotions as produced in official reports and as stored in archives. Thus, her paper posed a challenge to historians’ work with source materials insofar as it stressed the categories of archiving and the selectivity it imposes on the perspectives found in their sources. Moreover, she proposed interpreting the violent encounters of individual bodies as signs of a struggle within the American body politic over changing gender roles in the early republic.

The second panel focused on the emergence of “uncertain knowledge” in the American South. Sebastian Jobs offered a close reading of a slave insurrection panic in Murfreesboro, North Carolina, in 1857. In his paper, he explored how rumors about these uprisings reflected fears and stereotypes of the white population. At the same time, Jobs explained that these anxieties and panics created an “echo chamber” in which the utterances of African Americans resonated powerfully — thus creating power and agency for slaves. The panel’s second contribution analyzed the role of rumors in the American South during the Civil War. Jason Phillips argued that rumors were political and social visions that had an impact within the Confederate States. When, for instance, troops repeatedly reported the death of Union General Ulysses S. Grant, this not only presented an expression of wishful thinking, but also a way to explore alternative realities of war that went beyond mere battle reports. Phillips strongly advocated taking rumors and gossip seriously as they have had real effects within a certain group or society. Consequently, they can point to how people in the past understood and organized their experiences and their environment.

Gary Alan Fine’s keynote address on “The Promiscuity of Facts: Barack Obama and Uncertain Knowledge” concluded the workshop’s
first day. In his talk, Fine elaborated four specific rumors about President Obama: first, reports that he is not a natural-born American citizen; second, the assumption that he is a Muslim; third, stories that he was allegedly involved in a same-sex affair and drug abuse; and finally, the claim that he is an ideological socialist. Fine made a convincing case for the relevance of rumors in current American politics, and our need to engage with them as scholars.

The second day began with a panel about “uncertain knowledge” and social reform. Jennifer Fronc’s paper about “Private Surveillance and the Construction of Social Knowledge in Early-Twentieth-Century New York City” examined the work of voluntary undercover agents during World War I. In two case studies, Fronc explored how they assisted professional police detectives in investigating the emergence of political anarchism and prostitution. As these agents continuously grappled with the challenge of making valid claims about who was an anarchist or a prostitute, her paper explored how standards of plausibility emerged from their work. Robert Kramm-Masaoka continued with the topic of prostitution in his paper, demonstrating how administrative practices helped to overcome social uncertainty in post-World War II Japan. The rumor that American occupying soldiers would rape Japanese women, he argued, reflected the Japanese fear that this mutilation of the individual body would also affect the integrity of the Japanese social body as a whole. In order to prevent this kind of violation, Japanese administrators assumed a certain American need for sexual and erotic entertainment and erected a so-called “female floodwall”: prostitutes who served the mass of American soldiers and, thus, protected Japanese women.

The workshop’s last panel focused on the connection between visual representations and the uncertainty of knowledge of and about the human body. Taking on a topic from current affairs, Rachel Hall interpreted the unavailability of public visual proof that Osama bin Laden had been killed after the U.S. Special Forces operation in Pakistan in May 2011. Hall interpreted the lack of pictures as a shift in both official politics and public discourse on terror. The Obama administration’s refusal to present pictures of bin Laden’s corpse marked a distinct change from earlier political rhetoric that had employed figures of a Wild West manhunt. In that vein, Hall saw this return to civility in official statements as a chance to let go of the melancholia and paranoia that had haunted the American public in regard to the topic of terrorism. In his paper, Silvan Niedermeier joined the debate
about pictures as a means of overcoming uncertainty. His contribution dwelled upon the use of photographs during FBI investigations of police brutality toward African Americans in the 1930s and 1940s. On the one hand, photos of illegal and hidden acts of torture could stabilize claims African Americans made in court and, thus, amplify their voices within the legal system. On the other hand, even the plausibility of these depictions was insufficient to overcome white prejudices and stereotypes in Southern courts. Black testimony was still regarded as inferior and was often dismissed.

In his concluding statement, co-convener Olaf Stieglitz stressed the analytical value of “uncertain knowledge.” The workshop’s papers raised the question of the stability of knowledge over and over again. Thus, one of his conclusions was that “Every form of knowledge is potentially uncertain.” Therefore, Stieglitz called for a close historical analysis of actors and institutions of affirmation and doubt. Yet, he also stressed the concrete methodological ramifications the topic has for historians themselves. In their archival work, they constantly have to deal with the lingering question of what the uncertainty of knowledge that past actors experienced means for our own interpretations. As a result, the conditions of archiving and preserving historical materials have to be part of historical analysis as well.

Sebastian Jobs (GHI / University of Rostock)
In the twentieth century, tourism has become a major economic sector worldwide. The workshop “Transatlantic Tourism” brought together historians of tourism, technology, and mobility to better understand the first significant cross-continental flows of tourists from the United States to Europe, which grew to mass proportions, particularly in the last third of the nineteenth century. Christopher Endy opened the workshop with the lecture “The Accidental Nationbuilder: Tourism and the Myth of the Weak State.” Endy addressed three issues: First, he asked how tourism can help us understand the relationship between globalization and the fate of nation-states, while acknowledging that states still matter and have always played a large role in tourism through subsidies, creating tourist spaces, and border management. Second, he argued that the impact of globalization was stronger in the economic realm than in its cultural counterpart, where nation-states and territoriality retained more leverage. Third, Endy discussed how these two elements changed depending on time and place. He made a general call for scholars to engage in creative comparisons, for example, between dictatorships selling themselves as attractive travel destinations to boost their international standing, say in Franco’s Spain (1960s), Tunisia (1980s), and Cuba (early twenty-first century).

The first panel of the workshop discussed civil aviation. Chandra Bhimull kicked it off with the paper “Shaping the Colonial Encounter: Verticality, Dimensionality, and Airline Travel,” focusing on the first generation of long-distance airplane travelers from Britain. Her paper revolved around their itineraries in relation to imperial contexts at a time when airplane travel was, above all, an experience, not merely a means of getting from point a to point b. By combining anthropological and historical approaches, Bhimull tracked three airline passengers up close on their way to India, Iraq, and South
Africa, respectively. By studying their travel accounts in the *Imperial Airways Gazette*, the monthly magazine of British Airways’ predecessor, she found that their first-hand experience of moving through the air shaped their understanding of both themselves and others. The panoramic overview they acquired from the air occasioned a feeling of superiority in them — in a literal as well as a figurative sense. Whereas aviation reduced distance in the sense of shrinking the travel time necessary to reach the colonies, it also enlarged the distance between colonial subjects on the ground and the passengers in the sky.

Eda Kranakis’s paper “‘Come Fly with Me’: Transatlantic Flying from Social Club Glamour to Cattle Car Blues” provocatively sketched the shrill contrast between the golden age of air travel in the 1950s and 1960s, and today’s “cattle car flying bus.” In the golden age, prices were regulated, and airlines competed to provide the best service and comfort. Air travel was an upper-middle-class phenomenon; flight attendants, all university educated, had relatively few customers to take care of. As a result, the transatlantic passage was a first-class experience, unlike the present-day bifurcated system of expensive private aviation for the happy few who retain the previous comforts, on the one hand, and “efficient” commercial aviation stripped of most pleasanties, on the other. The private system can only exist thanks to large subsidies from general tax revenues and taxes collected from passengers in the commercial system. The contrast is further reinforced by the securitization of commercial aviation versus the relaxed security infrastructure in private aviation. The paper concluded by noting that this change was not unintentional but the outcome of a deliberate choice in the aviation industry to deprioritize passengers’ travel comfort over efficiency and price.

Ruth Oldenziel started the second day of the workshop with the paper “Europe from the Bicycle Saddle and the Grand Tour, 1881-1939,” co-authored by Martin Emanuel (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm). The paper zoomed in on a neglected mode of mobility that its users often associate with individual freedom, a trait that most people connect with the automobile. American tourists cycling through Europe depended on auxiliary technologies like trains and ships to gain access to rural destinations close to nature and authentic everyday life that they imagined had remained unspoiled. Special cameras enabled cyclists to sharpen their observation skills en route. In order to facilitate the mobility of their members, bicycle clubs collaborated across national borders in improving roads, building
tourist infrastructures including appropriate accommodation and safety measures for first aid and bike repair, and agreeing internationally on measures that eased border formalities for cyclists, such as custom regulations. Both American and Swedish cyclists, in their travelogues, depicted “Europe” as a tourist destination that acquired specific content in their itineraries.

The theme of “Europe” as a tourist product given meaning by American travelers resonated in the paper “Transatlantic Tourism” by Frank Schipper. It discussed three themes relating to Americans visiting Europe in the interwar years. The first explored whether the ocean passage by steamer was represented as an inherently European part of the trip, and additionally touched on the transport of uncrated automobiles aboard the ship for travelers to use in touring around Europe. The second snapshot portrayed the American Institute of Educational Travel, an elusive part of the British travel giant Thomas Cook. Collaborating with academic institutions, the Institute offered two- to three-month trips designed to edify American students. The final snapshot sketched the four conventions Rotary International organized in Europe between 1921 and 1937. Aside from providing a forum for discussing the general business of the organization, these events formed an outstanding opportunity for Rotarians to make post-convention tours. Selected steam liner companies and travel agents coordinated with the organization’s headquarters in Chicago to ensure that the tours would not simply consist of pleasurable sight-seeing, but would also serve Rotary’s expansion in Europe and fortify the friendly bonds among Rotarians, for example, by incorporating visits to local Rotary clubs.

Delphine Lauwers’s paper “Battlefields as Tourist Attractions: Britons Traveling to the Ypres Salient since 1919” introduced cross-Channel British travel to the battlefields in Ypres as a case comparable to transatlantic tourism. British travel to Ypres started as soon as the war had ended. With not a single building left standing, locals turned to tourism in the aftermath of the war just to survive. Lauwers identified the time periods 1919-1922, 1928-1932 (the tenth anniversary and thereafter), and the late 1930s as booms in the cycle of British travel to Ypres. The heyday of this type of tourism, however, is today. Starting in the 1960s with the fiftieth anniversary of the battles, the site has become a near obligatory passage point for all Britons. Lauwers highlighted two main changes over time: The initial military focus of battlefield tourism gave way to more attention to civilian interests,
and the bottom-up private initiative that was important in kick-starting this type of tourism was replaced by the growing involvement of (local) authorities in what has quite simply become big business.

Adri Albert de la Bruhèze closed the workshop with “The Politics of Translation: The Dutch Appropriation of Modern American Tourist Accommodation, 1945-1955.” His paper tracked the appropriation of the US fordist tourism regime with regard to the design and construction of new hotel facilities during the Marshall Plan years. American car-based mobility patterns differed from Dutch ones based on bicycles, motorcycles, trains and buses, which resulted in substantially different accommodation needs. Together with an American coalition of business actors and government, Dutch steam liner and airline companies with an interest in promoting American travel to Europe emphasized the need for new, modern, and large hotel facilities. The Dutch Hotel Union, however, branded such proposals as “un-Dutch” and pleaded for the preservation of small-scale “typically Dutch” hotel facilities instead. The outcome consisted of a mixed bag of hotel modernization that fit local contexts and respected prevailing traditions, while simultaneously attending to American standards with regard to hygiene, management, and service. Such selective appropriation is broadly representative of the results of negotiation processes elsewhere in Europe as well.

The manageable size of the workshop added to the liveliness of its debates. Two main observations can be made about the workshop in general. First, the contributions put users and travelers and their experiences in the center. This more bottom-up approach corresponds well to current trends in the history of technology. Second, the papers displayed substantial sensitivity to the mobility involved in tourism and how it impacts the experience, a trait that accords with fresh developments in new mobility studies and mobility history. Overall, the workshop contributed to the growing scholarship that takes tourism seriously as an important, if neglected, part of twentieth-century history.

Frank Schipper (GHI)
“TRUST BUT VERIFY”: CONFIDENCE AND DISTRUST FROM DÉTENTE TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Conference at the GHI Washington and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 7-9, 2011. Conveners: Martin Klimke (GHI), Reinhold Kreis (University of Augsburg), Sonya Michel (United States Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center), Christian Ostermann (Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center). Participants: Noël Bonhomme (Sorbonne University), Jens Boysen (GHI Warsaw), Laura Considine (Aberystwyth University), Andreas Daum (University of Buffalo), Ute Frevert (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin), Jens Gieseke (Center for Contemporary History, Potsdam), Joseph P. Harahan (U.S. Department of Defense), Rinna Elina Kullaa (University of Jyvaskyla), Deborah Welch Larson (University of California, Los Angeles), Jan Logemann (GHI), Arvo Makko (University of Oxford), Michael Cotey Morgan (University of Toronto), Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol (University of Glasgow), Effie G. H. Pedaliu (University of West England, Bristol), J. Simon Rofe (University of Leicester), Bernd Schäfer (Woodrow Wilson Center), Arvid Schors (University of Freiburg), Sarah Snyder (University College London), Patrick Vaughan (Jagiellonian University, Cracow), Nicholas Wheeler (Aberystwyth University).

This conference sought to shed new light on the years following détente by investigating the role trust and distrust played in foreign as well as domestic politics during a time when the guiding principle of foreign policy was to avoid the worst case scenario — a “hot war” with the possibility of nuclear annihilation between the superpowers. It drew on the role of trust both as an object of historical analysis and as an independent analytical category based on the wide application of notions of trust in the fields of sociology, economics, media studies, and political science. Interpreting trust as a form of political and social capital, the conference explored the dynamics of trust or distrust as an interplay of factors such as risk assessment, strategic self-interest, shared values and goodwill, highlighting the significance of historically grown trust regimes, symbolic actions, the effective staging of trust, and trustworthiness. Participants thus set out to reevaluate the final decades of the Cold War by investigating the strategies of trust and confidence-building employed to enforce certain political aims, the communication and representation of trust, the crucial role of the media, as well as the complex interaction of trust, fear, risk of betrayal, and verification mechanisms.
In their introduction, Reinhild Kreis and Martin Klimke stressed that the issue of trust and confidence in international affairs during the final years of the Cold War might yield new ideas about the evolution of international relations during the Cold War both between and within the blocs. Kreis and Klimke maintained that the idea of the conference was not only to trace the importance of active trust and confidence-building between the superpowers from NATO’s 1967 Harmel Report until the end of the Cold War, but also to show how trust and distrust impacted international relations, and to highlight the dynamic entanglement between foreign and domestic affairs. Investigating the role that individuals played in trust-building processes, the first panel focused on the connection between trust on a personal level and the control or verification mechanisms that were part of these processes. Patrick Vaughan analyzed the role of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security advisor, in mediating between the United States, Poland, and the newly formed Polish labor union Solidarity. In his paper, Vaughan demonstrated how the Polish-American Brzezinski used his unique connection to Poland to lobby for the importance of a peaceful negotiation among all parties involved. Vaughan emphasized the importance of both sides’ trust in Brzezinski, which had a substantial impact on the success of his strategy of “peaceful engagement.” J. Simon Rofe then examined the significance of trust and trustworthiness in the George H. W. Bush administration, emphasizing that trust was an integral element of the Bush presidency, including interactions with advisors, allies, and the Soviet Union. Rofe underscored that personal trust and the paradigm of “order over justice” were the guiding principles Bush followed throughout his career and particularly drew on in the final phase of the Cold War.

In her keynote lecture “Emotions in History,” Ute Frevert provided a comprehensive introduction to recent research on the history of emotions. For Frevert, emotions play an active role in history not only by influencing moral judgment and collective behavior. They should also be seen as deeply historical, meaning that their perception, interpretation, and handling are subject to historical change. Frevert argued that trust is a distinctively modern concept linked to notions of profound uncertainty, and she particularly highlighted the personal character of bonds of trust in modern societies. In her view, the concept of trust cannot easily be applied to international relations since these are primarily driven by national interests and thus lack the high personal investment characteristic of trust. Instead, she favored the concepts of confidence and reliance to describe these relationships.
Deborah Welch Larson began the second day’s proceedings with a keynote lecture on “Trust and Mistrust during the Cold War.” Larson defined trust broadly as the “belief that the other has benevolent intentions towards us,” which also implies vulnerability. For her, trust exists in a continuum; that is, a lack of trust does not mean distrust. In the context of the Cold War, she argued, trust was an integral part of communication and international cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Michael Cotey Morgan, in his paper “The Closed Society and Its Enemies: Confidence and Distrust at the CSCE, 1969-1975,” contended that trust and distrust played a central role at the CSCE conference, functioning both as a tool and an objective. At the same time, however, the proclamations of “trust” were partially “lip service” as both sides had entered the negotiations mainly to achieve domestic political gains, and not chiefly to develop a relationship of mutual trust. Sarah Snyder’s paper “No Crowing: Reagan, Trust, and Human Rights” focused on the role of trust in Reagan’s promotion of human rights, particularly religious freedoms. Snyder examined Reagan’s efforts to secure exit visas for two Pentecostal Soviet families who sought refuge in the US embassy in Moscow in 1982. Reagan, Snyder claimed, was able to personally empathize with the individuals in question and, moreover, his “quiet diplomacy” and assurances toward Gorbachev not “to crow” over any steps taken by the Soviets on this issue helped establish a greater degree of trust in Soviet-American relations.

The following two panels explored the mechanism of trust inside the ideological blocs. Drawing on opinion polls and on intelligence reports, Jens Gieseke outlined East Germans’ attitudes toward their own government and that of the Federal Republic during the 1970/80s. Gieseke identified ideological, official, and bottom-up trust regimes in the GDR and showed how the intelligence apparatus became increasingly worried about the positive attitude and rising trustworthiness West German parties and politicians such as Willy Brandt began to enjoy among East Germans. However, in light of the NATO Double-Track Treaty, Gieseke argued, these attitudes partially shifted, with East Germans experiencing increased fear of war, alienation from Western policies, and the feeling of helplessness in the renewed superpower confrontation. Jens Boysen then further complicated the notion of a homogeneous ideological bloc among the Warsaw Pact countries by looking at a series of changes in the relationship between East Germany and Poland that showcased the fissures between these official allies. Boysen noted that mutual
dependency and trust was a litmus test for East German leaders to determine how far allies would subordinate their national interests to the common cause. He highlighted how both countries’ officials interpreted their respective turns to West Germany for economic support differently, and yet they similarly viewed the Federal Republic as an external anchor. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol asked whether G7 and European Council summit meetings could be seen as efforts to institutionalize trust. He explained how they served to show the public unity of the member states to specific national audiences and how the informality of these meetings was supposed to help foster trust among the Western leaders. Noël Bonhomme, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of codes and rule-making for the G7 meetings and interpreted the meetings’ function as a means of “socializing” Western leaders that had recently come into office. Bonhomme posed the question of whether, as the G7 summits became institutionalized, trust helped or hindered them.

The final panel of the day turned its attention to the role of small and neutral states in the Cold War. Effie G. H. Pedaliu elaborated on “‘Footnotes’ as an Expression of Distrust? The U.S. and the NATO ‘Flanks’ in the Last Two Decades of the Cold War,” focusing on several NATO episodes in which Denmark and Greece dissented against the organization’s policies. Pedaliu argued that it was not short-term domestic political advantages that spurred both countries to dissent but rather a growing sense of insecurity and a decline of trust within NATO. In Pedaliu’s view, their behavior was an expression of a new type of confidence, in which member countries felt able to oppose their allies without fear of serious consequences. Aryo Makko then explored the nature of Swedish neutrality in the final decades of the Cold War. Exploring accusations of Sweden having been the “seventeenth member of NATO,” Makko looked at the mechanism of trust between Sweden and the international community as well as how trust (particularly the lack thereof and the levels of secrecy among a small political elite) operated between the Swedish government and its population, leading the latter to feel profoundly betrayed after the end of the Cold War. Rinna Elina Kullaa examined the role of Finland during the 1970/80s, challenging the notion that Finland was merely a convenient location for international talks. Instead, Kullaa emphasized that Finland’s neutralism should not be confused with neutrality. Finland did not want to be in the “Third Bloc” of the Cold War, although its position was similar to that of Yugoslavia and Egypt, and it chose to keep quiet on a number of key
issues, thus arriving at official neutralism from a point of self-interest and from the government’s view of trust as political capital.

The conference’s third and final day began with a panel entitled “Implementation and Verification.” Arvid Schors provided another perspective on the complexity of trust by focusing on the reduction of strategic arms leading up to the SALT I treaty. Schors emphasized that the US did not necessarily initiate the SALT I talks out of a desire to foster trust, but that trust did eventually emerge over the course of the negotiations. Schors also underscored the significance the rhetoric of distrusting the Soviet Union had for U.S. domestic politics, specifically when selling these negotiations to the public by pointing out to the essential element of verification. Following up on this, Laura Considine and Nicholas Wheeler explored the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as a case study for the relationship between trust and verification, arguing that accepting verification — in particular in the form of on-site inspections — is already an act of trust. The INF Treaty, Considine and Wheeler posited, shows that trust and verification are inexorably linked on a conceptual level. Practical actions that stimulated mutual trustworthiness between Reagan and Gorbachev were thus an important element of ending the Cold War. Joseph P. Harahan then focused on the technical implementation of the INF Treaty, namely, on the perspective of US and Soviet/Russian weapons inspectors. Harahan argued that the trust between Reagan and Gorbachev was not sufficient to explain the success of the treaty but that the military and technical personnel executing the treaty provisions also have to be taken into account. Trust was achieved through personal relations between the military on both sides that eventually yielded a method for implementation. Advanced technology such as satellite-based techniques, Harahan asserted, always served as a fallback option in these negotiations.

The concluding discussion chaired by Martin Klimke brought together a multitude of methodological issues related to the introduction of the notion of trust in the history of the Cold War. It explored, for example, the fine analytical line between confidence and trust, its domestic, transnational, and international dimensions, as well as its performative, rhetorical, and ritualistic nature. Both Klimke and Kreis stressed the need for a differentiated perspective within the ideological blocs of the Cold War, taking into account the significance of historical relationships, tensions, and asymmetries with regard to political and military power. On a domestic level, they pled for a
greater contextualization of trust and its cultural representations by looking at the political decision-making process as a whole, including the role of various branches of government, political advisors, and expert cultures. Along those lines, they also underscored the importance of broadening the source base to transcend a focus on personal testimony and to incorporate gender perspectives when investigating trust in international relations. Concluding remarks also pointed out the linguistic bias when it comes to trust that rendered the discussion potentially very Anglo-specific. In French and German, for example, the concepts of “trust” and “confidence” can be expressed with a single word, making finer differentiation difficult. It was also suggested that scholars pay closer attention to the mechanisms that create trust, such as transparency, promise-keeping, and small-step agreements.

Nadja Klopprogge (GHI) and Emily Malkin (Woodrow Wilson Center)
Exhibitions about the Holocaust and other aspects of the violent history of the “Third Reich” have enjoyed tremendous public interest and success in the past several years. In Germany, the exhibitions “Hitler and the Germans” (German Historical Museum, Berlin) or “Forced Labor: The Germans, the Forced Laborers, and the War” (Jewish Museum, Berlin) not only attracted large numbers of viewers, but also sparked academic debates. On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) continues to be one of the most successful museums in the country. In connection with the opening of the traveling exhibition “Forced Labor for the ‘Final Victory’: Mittelbau-Dora Concentration Camp, 1943-1945” at the GHI on November 17, 2011, the conveners of this one-day conference invited scholars and museum practitioners to discuss the creation and functioning of museum representations of Nazi crimes at a time of change: the generation of survivors, instrumental in creating the first memorials and museums, is passing away, while historians and museum designers are taking over the (re-)design of such places of memory. In an increasingly interconnected world, questions of museum content and reception are also becoming issues of ever greater international and transnational significance.

In her opening remarks, Miriam Rürup explained that the aim of holding this conference in connection with the traveling exhibition
on Mittelbau-Dora at the GHI was to provide a transatlantic forum for discussing the current state of the art for exhibiting the Nazi past. Focusing on exhibition concepts, contents, and intended messages, Rürup emphasized the challenges of tailoring an exhibition’s message to its respective audience. For example, different viewing habits would clearly separate a German audience from audiences in other national and cultural contexts. She also pointed to the tension between efforts to “document the Nazi past” and to “stage” this past that sometimes distinguishes German from American exhibitions.

Harold Marcuse opened the first panel, introducing a “creation-reception model.” Based on his extensive research on the development of the Dachau Concentration Camp Memorial, Marcuse explained that a certain sequence of initiators and audiences was responsible for the development of concentration camp memorials: immediately after the war, the occupying armies (“bystanders”) used the camps to educate German citizens (“perpetrators”) about Nazi crimes, followed by survivors (“victims”), who wanted to make German citizens aware of their history of victimization. Thereafter, these sites were re-appropriated by the generation of the perpetrators, who, according to Marcuse, wanted to show foreign audiences and younger Germans that “it wasn’t so bad.” At the present — the fourth stage in this process — museum professionals have taken over the sites to convey the threefold message of genocide prevention: “intervene, desist, and resist.”

Following Marcuse, K. Hannah Holtschneider chose the permanent exhibition of the Jewish Museum in Berlin and the former permanent exhibition of the Jewish Museum in Vienna as case studies to demonstrate how differently museums have addressed the “Holocaust as Jewish History.” Both exhibitions shared the challenge of representing the history of a minority group as well as telling the history of the Holocaust as part of Jewish history, with markedly different results: The Berlin museum integrated Jewish history into German history and chose a celebratory approach to the achievements of Jewish individuals. The former exhibition in Vienna, in turn, showed that Jewish life in Austria had been destroyed and could not be reconstructed in its former form. It denied its visitors “the assurance of a completed narrative.”

Taking a transnational perspective, Steffi de Jong explored the recent phenomenon of introducing video testimonies in World War II and Holocaust museums. Analyzing the relationship between
video testimony, artifacts, and photographs in the Museo Diffuso della Resistenza, Deportazione, Guerra, Diritti e della Libertà in Turin and the Imperial War Museum in London, de Jong showed the increasing importance of video testimony for authenticating and individualizing objects by supplementing the experiences of a “real person.” De Jong’s paper spurred an intriguing discussion about “appropriate” witness testimony: were a person’s experiences or rather his qualities as a “talking head” decisive in selecting testimonies? Would fictional “testimonies” ever appear in Holocaust museums? This — at times controversial — discussion clearly demonstrated the productive working atmosphere in this group of about a dozen scholars and museum professionals.

The second panel brought together representatives of two very different institutions: the director of the Mittelbau-Dora Concentration Camp Memorial, Jens-Christian Wagner, and Michael J. Neufeld, a historian and museum curator in the Division of Space History at the National Air and Space Museum. Wagner gave an engaging account of the challenges he faced in curating the traveling exhibition “Forced Labor: The Germans, the Forced Laborers and the War,” which was inaugurated in Berlin and was afterwards on display in the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Moscow. Extensive research in a vast number of archives resulted in an exhibition that portrays Nazi Germany as a society constructed by “exclusion vs. inclusion.” The exhibition ends with the sobering conclusion that justice has not been done to many former forced laborers.

Focusing on the “career” of the V-2 rocket as a museum artifact in the United States and Germany, Neufeld pointed to a crucial connection between the history of technological innovation and Nazi forced labor. Through the significant contribution of its inventor Wernher von Braun to the American success story of the “space race”, the V-2 used to be considered a milestone in this process. Yet with the growth of Holocaust consciousness in the United States, this narrative had to integrate the history of the slave laborers exploited at Mittelbau-Dora in producing V-2s, and of civilians killed by that rocket. The National Air and Space Museum did so in 1990. For the same reasons, attempts in Peenemünde — where rockets were developed — to create a positive narrative of technological innovation about the V-2 were doomed to fail. In the ensuing discussion, Wagner illuminated the circumstances of putting the traveling exhibition on display in Moscow: the narrative thrust of the exhibition had to be adjusted...
to suit the expectations of Russian authorities, who disapproved of the number of references to Jewish and Polish forced laborers. This example forcefully illustrated how much the definition — and hence representation — of Nazi crimes depended on national and cultural contexts.

The next panel focused on two sites of Nazi crimes and their subsequent history as memorials. Jörg Skriebeleit, the director of the Flossenbürg Concentration Camp Memorial, presented the history of the creation of the first permanent exhibition at this site, which only opened in 2007. This exhibition is based on thorough historical research into the history of the camp as well as a comprehensive reinvestigation of the camp’s grounds. Using modern technology, they aimed to present the biographies of these almost forgotten victims of National Socialism to visitors of the memorial with “a clear moral narrative, but never a moralizing one.” Shifting to a project in the making, Christel Trouvé provided a fascinating account of the challenges she and her colleagues faced in turning a massive bunker near Bremen into a “Denkort” for forced laborers. Bunker “Valentin” was built for the construction of submarines, yet not a single submarine was ever produced here. Having been used as a depot by the German army until 2010, the site is currently being redesigned by a group of scholars as a memorial and information center. Once it is completed, visitors will be able to acquaint themselves with the site and its history on an interactive walking tour. The ensuing discussion focused on the need to integrate the history of the “total war” — armaments projects such as the V-2 and the Bremen bunker — into the topography of memorials for Nazi terror.

The next panel turned away from Europe and toward the United States, bringing together two scholars working on the USHMM, albeit with rather different approaches. Alison Landsberg stressed the challenge of telling the history of the Holocaust in a place “where nothing happened” in creating the USHMM. This museum is thus an attempt to “create memory.” Furthermore, she argued that visitors experience what she calls “prosthetic memory,” a memory that is not the result of lived experience. Having been exposed to various representations of the Holocaust in mass culture, the visitor engages “affectively” and “cognitively” with the history of the Holocaust in the USHMM, experiencing a “profound absence,” thus empathizing with the victims of the Holocaust.
Jacob S. Eder examined West German reactions to the planning process of the USHMM. Accordingly, German officials, representatives of the Kohl government in particular, perceived the USHMM as an “anti-German museum” and attempted, from the early 1980s onward, to alter its narrative by including references to postwar German history and the history of anti-Nazi resistance. Such attempts to “claim” the power of interpretation over the Holocaust and its aftermath failed, but the actual impact of the museum has not been as harmful to the Federal Republic’s reputation as officials had feared. The discussion following these two papers returned to the question of telling the history of the Holocaust in a museum setting. Harold Marcuse pointed to the highly intriguing finding that the Los Angeles-based Museum of Tolerance, which scholars tend to view very critically and which contains virtually no artifacts from the Holocaust, has an impact on the visitor almost identical to that of the USHMM. This is certainly an issue that will have a major effect on the design of future museums and memorials.

The final panel focused on museums that do not explicitly aim to tell the history of the Holocaust. William Niven compared the representation of Nazi crimes and the history of flight and expulsion of Germans in the Upper Silesian Regional Museum (Ratingen) and the Silesian Museum (Görlitz). Niven pointed to the significant impact of the Silesian Landsmannschaften, who failed in their efforts to prevent the representation of Nazi crimes in the museums. However, these exhibitions, in addition to illustrating German suffering, directly juxtapose anti-Semitism and anti-Nazi resistance and provide the biographies of resistance fighters, but do not call the perpetrators by their names. Thus, they create a dichotomy that simultaneously confronts the visitor with Nazi crimes while allowing for empathy with the German experience of flight and expulsion.

Paul Williams focused on the integration of the history of the Holocaust in the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, which is due to open in Winnipeg in 2013. After briefly explaining the concept of the entire project with specific emphasis on the Holocaust segment, he spoke of the tensions between Canada’s Jewish community and other ethnic-diasporic minorities. Canadian Ukrainians, for example, are calling for more attention to Stalinist crimes in the museum. Furthermore, Williams pointed to a major difference between this institution and the concentration camp memorials discussed earlier. Rather than teaching the history of an event, the Canadian museum will
use history “to teach ethics.” Williams asked in conclusion if efforts to present the Holocaust so that future generations can make sense of it will eventually outweigh historical accuracy.

The conference provided an excellent forum for a productive encounter between scholars working on memorials/museums and representatives of such institutions. Discussions of the processes of the musealization and memorialization of Nazi crimes in a transatlantic and an interdisciplinary framework proved to be highly productive as well as instructive. At times, a slight imbalance in analytical depth became obvious, which could have been avoided if the presentations of exhibition projects had been paired with a scholarly perspective from the outside. Then again, as most exhibition projects — the ones still in the making aside — were completed fairly recently, it may be too soon for them to be historicized. Nevertheless, the conference raised many important questions that deserve more thorough examination and debate in the future. The relevance of questions about “authenticity” versus “impact,” for example, will certainly increase, especially as the generation of survivors and other witnesses continues to pass away. We can only assume what future Holocaust museums — especially in non-European locations — will look like. However, if the Holocaust continues to be reduced to a tool for “teaching ethics” — a shock therapy, as it were — and learning about the actual history of this event and of the sites of Nazi crimes becomes less and less relevant, will this result in the creation of ever more shocking, yet artificial Holocaust “theme parks”?

Jacob S. Eder (University of Pennsylvania)
2011 FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZES

The 2011 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prizes, which honor the two best doctoral dissertations on German history written at North American universities each year, were awarded to Eric Steinhart (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum) and Brendan Karch (Harvard University). The award ceremony took place at the Twentieth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute on November 11, 2011, chaired by David Blackbourn (Harvard University) as president of the Friends. The selection committee was composed of Ian F. McNeely, chair (University of Oregon), Maria Mitchell (Franklin & Marshall College), and Benjamin Marschke (Humboldt State University). Both prizewinners have contributed articles presenting their dissertation research to this issue of the Bulletin.

Karch was honored for his dissertation “Nationalism on the Margins: Silesians between Germany and Poland, 1848-1945,” completed at Harvard University. The committee’s prize citation read: “This elegantly conceptualized and meticulously researched dissertation explores how Upper Silesians resisted being assimilated into either the German or Polish ‘nations,’ sometimes overtly, often more subtly. Focusing on the local and regional history of Oppeln/Opole, it rests on thorough and detailed use of archival and printed sources in both German and Polish. Moreover, it engages the entire period from 1848 through the late 1940s, seamlessly integrating several widely divergent historiographies covering an eventful century that saw the creation of German and Polish nation-states and two world wars. Finally, it mounts a comprehensive microhistory, treating associational life, the media, and the public sphere; social class and the economy; education and language policy; elections, political parties, and plebiscites; government administration; and religion. Karch’s fine-grained and nuanced approach enables him to reconstruct the tensions between nationalistic elites and the wider Upper Silesian populace who resisted becoming either Germanized or Polonized. Far from merely documenting Upper Silesians’ apathy and indifference toward projects of nation-building, this work shows how their political culture hinged on the toleration and embrace of ethnic ambiguity and a refusal to adopt nationhood as the primary axis of identity. Karch’s finding that Upper Silesians partly avoided the violence and ethnic cleansing of the 1940s highlights the long-term resiliency of the region’s political culture even and especially for the period of Nazi totalitarianism.”

Steinhart was honored for his dissertation “Creating Killers: The Nazi-fication of the Black Sea Germans and the Holocaust in Southern Ukraine, 1941-1944,” completed at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The committee’s prize citation read: “This tremendously accomplished dissertation is an example of Holocaust research at its best, showing how ‘ordinary’ people were pressured and enticed to murder their neighbors in Transnistria, a multiethnic region on the border between Romania and the Ukraine. This work advances our knowledge in numerous ways, offering a painstaking reconstruction of a complex story of horror resting at the intersection of Romanian, Nazi, and Soviet policy; Jewish suffering and death; and Black Sea German victimization and crime. Steinhart’s focus on Black Sea Germans, the largest group of Soviet ethnic Germans under Nazi occupation, sheds light not only on Nazi policy vis-à-vis the Volksdeutsche, but, more broadly, on Nazi plans for the Soviet lands Germany occupied. Furthermore, by focusing on the role of Black Sea Germans in executing Jews, the author contributes to our understanding of Holocaust perpetrators, in particular perpetrators from outside the Reich. Unfailingly attentive to class, religion, and gender, this dissertation thoughtfully engages methodological issues and historiographical debates throughout the text, all in the course of treating a vast expanse of sources from Germany, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Given contemporaries’ failure to keep complete records, and the intentional destruction of other materials, Steinhart’s careful and creative use of problematic and politicized sources, many of them produced decades after the events described, is especially innovative.”

2011 HELMUT SCHMIDT PRIZE FOR GERMAN-AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY

On December 8, 2011, the 2011 Helmut Schmidt Prize for German-American Economic History was awarded to Charles Maier, Leverett Saltonstall Professor of History at Harvard University and a renowned expert on the history of twentieth-century Europe and the United States. Maier was honored for his wide-ranging oeuvre, which includes Recasting Bourgeois Europe (1975), The Marshall Plan and Germany (1991), Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (1997), and Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors (2006). The Helmut Schmidt Prize pays tribute to the former German chancellor for his part in transforming the framework of transatlantic economic cooperation. The prize is awarded every other year. Since 2007, it has been generously sponsored by the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius.

Following introductory remarks by Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Volker Berghahn (Columbia University) delivered the laudatio. After accepting the prize, Professor Maier delivered a lecture on the topic “Lessons from
History? German Economic Experiences and the Crisis of the Euro," which is published in the “Features” section of this Bulletin. An excerpt from Volker Berghahn’s laudatio follows:

“There is a thread running through many of [Charles Maier’s] books that explains why he is receiving the Helmut Schmidt Prize this year: He has never been an economic historian of the orthodox kind who would undertake a meticulous analysis of economic statistics, of the quantifiable economic performance of a particular country, of certain branches of industry, or of international trade flows. Rather he has been, throughout his academic life, a political economist. ... Professor Maier’s very first book, which I still consider a truly great study, was his Recasting Bourgeois Europe, a 600-page tome on the socioeconomic and political stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy after World War I. This study looked at how the bourgeois elites of Europe succeeded in re-stabilizing a situation that had undergone an enormous upheaval between 1914 and 1923 by recasting its class structures in what he called a corporatist mode. To quote him: ‘This study examines a critical period in the disciplining of change, in the survival and adaptation of political and economic elites, and in the twentieth-century capitalist order they dominated.’ ... You can find a further expansion of his thoughts on the transformations of capitalist societies in his 2006 book entitled Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors, which contains two illuminating chapters, one concerned with the “empire of production” and another with the “empire of consumption.” Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to say that here Professor Maier provides a subtle criticism of more orthodox approaches to economic history that have been concerned with the productionist side of modern industrial systems. What they overlooked for all too long was the advent of mass consumption and consumerism, the other side of the Fordist vision of modern societies. ... I hope I have given you the reasons why [the prize] is being given to a great historian of modern Germany and Europe and is certainly more than fully deserved because of his many scholarly accomplishments and also his mentorship of many budding historians whom he has trained in the past three decades at Duke University and then at Harvard.”
NEW PUBLICATIONS BY GHI STAFF

Monographs and Edited Volumes


Mischa Honeck. We Are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants and American Abolitionists after 1848. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 2011.


Articles and Chapters


LIBRARY REPORT

The GHI maintains a research library of about 48,500 volumes and subscribes to more than 219 journals and newspapers. Since 2010, we have provided online access to 76 of these periodicals through the EZB (Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek, Electronic Journals Library). Other databases we have recently acquired access to are the Proquest “Dissertations & Theses” database and the EBSCO database “America: History and Life.” Over the last two years (2010 and 2011), the library increased its holdings by 3,107 volumes.

One major library project over the last two years was the conversion of the library catalog to a new system. In late 2010, after looking at various library management systems, the GHI signed a contract with Innovative Interfaces Inc. for its “Millennium” integrated library system. After several months of transferring data files, debugging the program, and training GHI
library staff, the new catalog went online in September 2011, much to the
delight of all at the GHI. It is available at https://ghi.iii.com. One decisive
factor in the selection of the Millennium system was that it enabled the
GHI to acquire a powerful new research tool, Research Pro. This program
allows researchers to search multiple databases through a single search
engine, with direct access to full-text entries and/or articles. The licensing
of the databases limits their use to the GHI’s IP address, so they can only
be accessed in-house.

Acquisitions deserving special mention from the last two years include
about a hundred titles in modern German and Austrian history from the
personal library of the late George O. Kent, formerly Professor of History
at the University of Maryland. Included in this acquisition are the 42 vol-
umes of Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal, Nuremberg, 4 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Nuremberg, 1947).
Another acquisition of note from 2011 was a valuable collection of texts
on architectural history and social criticism purchased from the family of
Roland V. Wiedenhoef. Of particular interest are texts by Bruno Taut and
Walter Gropius as well as various journals of architectural-historical value.
For example, we now have the Zeitschrift für Baukunst (1899-1919), Die
Baugilde (1925-1934), and Die Volkswohnung (1919-1923).

We would like to express our gratitude to the following individuals who
donated books to the GHI library: Richard Meier of Chicago for several
volumes on contemporary German history; Joanna Sturm of Washington
for a number of volumes on the German military; as well as Robert Thomas
Hennemeyer, Tom M. Schaumburg, and Don Velsey, all of Washington DC.
The library gladly accepts any recommendations for acquisitions. Simply
send an e-mail to the librarian with your comments and suggestions.

Other recent library news includes the internship of a student of library
science at the GHI. Gerlind Ladisch from the Hochschule der Medien in
Stuttgart spent a portion of her internship semester (November 2011–
February 2012) with us learning how a small specialized library functions.
**STAFF CHANGES**

**Christa Brown** retired from the GHI at the end of August 2011. She was a fixture of the GHI from its earliest days, hired within a month of the Institute’s opening, in May 1987. “I started my career at the GHI with a leased typewriter and worked at a folding table,” she recently recalled. Her job title was “Foreign Language Assistant,” but she really functioned as the GHI’s office manager and was in charge of organizing conferences and events, always tending to multiple projects simultaneously. She is fondly remembered by all who worked at the GHI during its first quarter century and sorely missed by the colleagues she left behind.

**Susanne Fabricius** joined the GHI in January 2012 as Assistant to the Director. Prior to this position, Fabricius worked for such organizations as the Smithsonian Institute and the World Bank in Washington DC, as well as the German Military in Reston, Virginia.

**Andreas Fischer** joined the Institute as Administrative Director in July 2011. He studied public administration and finance and previously worked in the German Archeological Institute’s central office in Berlin as chief of the Finance & Budget Department. Over the past twenty years, he served as Administrative Director at different institutes of the German Archeological Institute abroad, including in Cairo, Athens, and Rome.

**Mischa Honeck** joined the Institute as a Research Fellow in September 2011. He previously held a position as Research Associate at the Heidelberg Center for American Studies, University of Heidelberg. He studied medieval and modern history, English, and philosophy at the University of Heidelberg and Portland State University, Oregon, and earned his Ph.D. from the University of Heidelberg in 2008. He specializes in teaching and researching U.S. history through a transnational lens, taking a strong interest in the history of ethnic and race relations, gender history, and twentieth-century youth movements. Honeck’s first book, *We Are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants and American Abolitionists after 1848* (University of Georgia Press, 2011), is a Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2011. He is co-editor of *Germany and the Black Diaspora: Points of Contact, 1250–1945* (Berghahn Books, forthcoming). He is currently writing a global history of the Boy Scouts of America from the Progressive Era to the early Cold War.

**Martin Klimke** left the GHI in December 2011 to become Associate Professor at New York University Abu Dhabi. He had joined the GHI as a Postdoctoral Fellow for North American History in August 2007 and had been a GHI Research Fellow since August 2009.
Julie Martin joined the GHI in January 2012 as an Administrative Assistant, working part-time with Andreas Fischer and Jörg Schröder in the areas of payroll, benefits, and accounts payable. Martin has a BA in Business Administration from the University of Maryland, University College, and also completed a Diploma in German Business from the Goethe Institute in Chicago. She previously worked as a business manager for the Corporation of Catholic Archbishops in Seattle.

Atiba Pertilla joined the Institute as a Research Associate in March 2012 to work on the project “Immigrant Entrepreneurship: German-American Business Biographies, 1720 to the Present.” He is a doctoral candidate in U.S. history at New York University. His dissertation, “Investing in Manhood: Gender, Finance Capitalism, and the Professionalization of Wall Street, 1893-1914,” is a study of New York City’s financial community in the era of J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, and other famous and infamous bankers and industrialists. He graduated from Stanford University with a degree in history and a minor in international relations. After college and before entering graduate school, he worked at the Project for Excellence in Journalism, also in Washington, conducting studies on television news and political coverage. In addition to business history, his research interests include gender history and urban history.

GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a
scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Postdoctoral Fellows

Hannah Ahlheim, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen

Christian Bailey, The Open University
_A Living Dialogue: Love between Jews and other Germans 1875–1968_

Claudia Haake, La Trobe University
_Struggling for Land: Native Americans in the Age of Removal_

Isabella Löhr, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

Doctoral Fellows

Catherine Davies, Freie Universität Berlin
_1873: Globalgeschichte einer Börsenpanik_

Holger Droessler, Harvard University
_Race for the Pacific: Samoa in the Age of Empire_

Stefanie Eisenhuth, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
_West-Berlin und der Umbruch in der DDR. Grenzübergreifende Wahrnehmungen und Verhandlungen 1989_

Michael Geheran, Clark University
_Betrayed Comradeship: German-Jewish WWI Veterans under Hitler_

Andreas Griefer, Freie Universität Berlin / Rachel Carson Center
Felicitas Jaima, New York University
The African Diaspora in Germany: The Experiences of African American Servicewomen and Military Wives in Germany, 1945-1970

Ulrich Kreutzer, Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Das USA-Geschäft von Siemens – Von den Anfängen bis 2001

Jennifer McComas, Indiana University, Bloomington
The Politics of Display: German Expressionist Exhibitions in America, 1930-1960

Rebecca Odom, Saint Louis University
Negotiating Hyphenated Identities: German-Americans during World War I

Sarah Panter, Universität Freiburg
Zwischen jüdischer Solidarität und staatsbürgerlicher Loyalität – Jüdische Kriegserfahrungen während des Ersten Weltkriegs in vergleichender und transnationaler Perspektive (Deutschland, Österreich, Großbritannien, USA)

Edward Richardson-Little, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
The Exploitation of Man by Man Has Been Abolished: Dictatorship, Dissent, and Human Rights in East Germany, 1945-1990

Matthias Schmelzer, Europa-Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)
‘A temple of growth for industrialised countries’. Die OECD und das Wachstumsparadigma in der Nachkriegszeit

Anna Barbara Sum, Freie Universität Berlin
Albert O. Hirschman und die Expertenkultur in der Entwicklungsökonomik (ca. 1940-1985)

Sebastian Teupe, Universität Bielefeld

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GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR, FALL 2011

Sept 30 - Oct 1

Mischa Honeck (Universität Heidelberg)
International History of the Boy Scouts of America

Joshua Clark Davis (Universität Hamburg)
Brothers Moving Germany and the Conundrum of (Trans)National Hip Hop

Jens Nissel (Universität Mannheim)
Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschland und den USA
Frank Schipper (University of Leiden)
Transatlantic Tourism: American Visitors to Europe in the Long Twentieth Century

Sophie Lorenz (Universität Heidelberg)
Die DDR und Angela Davis, 1965–1989

Martin Klimke (GHI Washington)
Petra Kelly

October 26
Jane Dailey (University of Chicago)
The Civil Rights Movement and the Question of Miscegenation Laws

November 16
Warren Belasco (University of Maryland, Baltimore County)
Terror in DC? Inventing Food Traditions for the Nation’s Capital, 1800–2011

December 14
Jonathan Wiesen (Southern Illinois University)
Buying and Selling Racism: New Approaches to Consumption in the Third Reich

GHI DOCTORAL SEMINAR, FALL 2011

October 6
Jan Hansen (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

Tilman Pietz (Universität zu Köln)

December 15
Sarah Barksdale (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Black Soldiers and Double Consciousness, 1940–1954

Henriette Müller (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
The European Commission President in Crisis: Political Leadership in the European Union

Philip Wagner (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
Ein transnationales Laboratorium der Stadtplaner? Die IFHTP zwischen 1910 und 1950
GHI LECTURE SERIES, SPRING 2012

GET OUT THE VOTE! MOBILIZATION, MEDIA, AND MONEY

March 22  Mobilizing the Nineteenth-Century American Electorate: The Elections of 1828 and 1840  
Michael Holt (University of Virginia)

April 12  Voters without Democracy: Elections in Imperial Germany  
James Retallack (University of Toronto)

May 3  Americanizing the Electoral Process? Elections in the Federal Republic of Germany  
Frank Bösch (Zentrum für Zeitgeschichtliche Forschung, Potsdam)

May 31  American Campaign Mobilization in the Age of New Media  
Kate Kenski (University of Arizona)

Lectures begin at 6:30 pm and are preceded by a reception (6:00 – 6:30 pm)

GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2012

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org

February 9-11  Living the Margins: Illegality, Politics of Removal and Statelessness  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Kathleen Canning und (University of Michigan), Barbara Lüthi, Jana Häberlein (Universität Basel), and Miriam Rürup (GHI)

February 24-25  African American Consumer Culture  
Workshop at the GHI  
Convener: Joshua Davis (GHI)

March 23-24  Adolescent Ambassadors: 20th-Century Youth Organizations and International Relations  
Workshop at the GHI  
Convener: Mischa Honeck (GHI) and Gabriel Rosenberg (Duke University)
March 23-24 Models of Mobility: Systemic Differences, Path Dependencies, Economic, Social, and Environmental Impact (1900 to Tomorrow)
Workshop at York University
Conveners: Matthias Kipping (Schulich), Christina Kraenzle (CCGES), and Christina Lubinski (GHI)

April 26 Gerald D. Feldman Memorial Lecture
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Gerhard A. Ritter (University of Munich)

May 2-5 18th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History, 1770-1914
Seminar at the GHI
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

May 18-19 The Second Generation: German Emigré Historians in the Transatlantic World, 1945 to the Present
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Andreas Daum (State University of New York, Buffalo), Hartmut Lehmann (MPI Göttingen), James J. Sheehan (Stanford University), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)

Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Jan Logemann (GHI), Mary Nolan (New York University), and Daniel Rodgers (Princeton University)

June 18-30 Archival Summer Seminar in Germany
Seminar in Germany
Convener: Clelia Caruso (GHI)

June 21-23 Color, Commerce, and Consumption in Global Perspective
Conference at the GHI
Convener: Regina Lee Blaszczyk (GHI)

September 5-15 Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar for Young Historians 2012: American History in Transatlantic Perspective
Convener: Mischa Honeck (GHI)

September 9-11 The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Retrospect and Prospect
Conference at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto
Conveners: Doris Bergen (University of Toronto), Michael Marrus (University of Toronto), Derek Penslar (University of Toronto), Rebecca Wittmann (University of Toronto), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

**September 13-14**
*Immigration and Entrepreneurship: An Interdisciplinary Conference*
Conference at the University of Maryland, College Park
Conveners: David B. Sicilia (University of Maryland, College Park), David F. Barbe (University of Maryland, College Park), and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)

**September 20-29**
*The Civil War in Transatlantic Perspective*
Conference at the Universität Jena
Conveners: Marcus Gräser (GHI) and Jörg Nagler (Universität Jena)

**November 8**
*26th Annual Lecture of the German Historical Institute*
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Johannes Paulmann (University of Mainz)

**November 9**
*21st Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI: Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize*
Symposium at the GHI
German Historical Institute Washington DC
Fellows and Staff

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff, Director
Modern social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption

PD Dr. Uwe Spiekermann, Deputy Director
Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge

PD Dr. Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, Deputy Director
African American Studies, transatlantic relations, gender history, American religious history

Andreas Fischer, Administrative Director

Dr. Clelia Caruso, Research Fellow
Modern European history; history of migration; history of technology

Dr. Mischa Honeck, Research Fellow
19th and 20th-century American history; transnational history; history of ethnicity and race relations; gender history; history of youth and youth movements

Dr. Jan Logemann, Research Fellow
Comparative and transatlantic history; history of consumption; history of urban development; history of emigration; modern Germany and the United States since the 1920s

Dr. Christina Lubinski, Research Fellow
Modern economic and social history; business history

Dr. Ines Prodöhl, Research Fellow
Global history, cultural and economic history, civil society

Dr. Miriam Rürup, Research Fellow
Modern German history; Jewish history; history of education; transnational history

Dr. Richard F. Wetzel, Research Fellow and Editor
Modern European and German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow

Jessica Csoma, Research Associate
Bryan Hart, Research Associate
Insa Kummer, Project Associate
David B. Lazar, Senior Editor
Dr. Kelly McCullough, Project Manager
Atiba Pertilla, Project Associate
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Dr. Patricia Sutcliffe, Editor
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