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PREFACE

This Bulletin begins with the Second Gerald D. Feldman Memorial Lecture, delivered by Margaret Lavinia Anderson on Imperial Germany’s reactions to the Armenian genocide. Taking Hitler’s reported August 1939 remark “Who still talks nowadays about the extermination of the Armenians?” as her point of departure, Anderson examines the kinds of “talk” that the Turks’ treatment of the Armenians had, in fact, provoked in Germany at the time. Despite the Ottoman-German alliance, by July 1915 the German ambassador to Turkey reported to the German Chancellor that the Turks aimed to “destroy the Armenian race.” Even though censorship prevented any such statement in the German press, Anderson demonstrates that German elites—professors, businessmen, politicians—were well informed about the genocide. Prior to the Holocaust, she concludes, “events in Anatolia in 1915 set the international standard for horror.” While Hitler regarded the genocide as a warning of the doom awaiting weaker peoples, other Germans expressed shame for Germany’s share in this wrong.

The second feature article presents the work of Jan Surmann, the latest winner of Franz Steiner Prize, which the German Historical Institute and the Franz Steiner Verlag award biennially for the best German-language manuscript in transatlantic and North American studies. Surmann’s examination of the international negotiations over the restitution of Holocaust-era assets that took place in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, argues that these restitution debates, conducted under the leadership of the United States, led to a transformation of Holocaust memory.

This issue also features a special forum on “The German Foreign Office and the Nazi Past.” In the fall of 2010, the independent commission of historians appointed to investigate the history of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) during the Nazi era and the postwar period published its report. Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik [The Foreign Office and the Past: German Diplomats in the Third Reich and the Federal Republic], by Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and Moshe Zimmermann, became a bestseller and triggered a vigorous public debate in Germany. In March 2011, the GHI Washington hosted a panel discussion about the book. To
introduce Bulletin readers to the book and the debate it prompted, this issue features an overview of the book by Norbert Frei and Peter Hayes along with four assessments, by historians from the United States, Germany, and Great Britain: Christopher Browning, Johannes Hürter, Holger Nehring, and Volker Ullrich. Controversial debate is a fundamental feature of academic life, and we are glad to present our readers with a range of different perspectives.

The two articles in the “GHI Research” section are also related to the history of National Socialism. Stefan Link, the GHI’s Doctoral Fellow in International Business History this past academic year, examines the multifaceted relationships of Henry Ford, the Ford Motor Company, and Fordism to National Socialism, arguing that Ford provided an “illiberal, productivist alternative” to liberal capitalism that the Nazis found appealing. Miriam Rürup, GHI Research Fellow, provides an overview of her research project on statelessness after the First and Second World Wars. Examining the lived experience of statelessness, its treatment on the national and supranational level, as well as its cultural representations, Rürup demonstrates that studying statelessness illuminates key aspects of political belonging, citizenship, and statehood in the twentieth century.

The conference reports in the remainder of this issue reflect the diversity of topics examined at our conferences, ranging from early modern history to the history of the 1970s, from business history to the history of criminal justice, from the history of religion to the global history of cash crops, from the history of regulation to German-Jewish history. In addition to the calendar included at the end of this issue, please consult our online calendar of events at www.ghi-dc.org to check for upcoming events. This coming spring, the German Historical Institute in Washington will celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary. We hope to welcome you at some of the events that we are lining up for the anniversary year.

Hartmut Berghoff, Director
WHO STILL TALKED ABOUT THE EXTERMINATION OF THE ARMENIANS? IMPERIAL GERMANY AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
SECOND GERALD D. FELDMAN MEMORIAL LECTURE
DELIVERED AT THE GHI WASHINGTON, APRIL 7, 2011

Margaret Lavinia Anderson
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

When I told my husband that my next project was going to be on the Armenian genocide, his eyes opened wide. “Don’t think it’s going to be like studying the Holocaust,” he warned. “There’s a big difference between the German-led genocide of the Jews and the Turkish genocide of the Armenians.” “Oh yeah?” said I, “and what’s that?” (I was expecting to get a History 101 lecture on “The Uniqueness of Each Historical Event.”) His answer brought me up short: “The Turks won their war.”

Think about it. Imagine, he said, that Germany had prevailed in World War II, or at least (and this is actually closer to the Turkish case) had fought the Allies to a stalemate. What would the study of the Holocaust look like now? Imagine that those (literally) tons of Nazi documents had not been captured and microfilmed for libraries around the world. Imagine that access to Germany’s archives was controlled by second- and third-generation successors of the Nazi state; that German schoolchildren were taught that Germany’s Jews had fought for Russia and that “deporting” them was an act of self-defense. Imagine that it was a crime in Germany to say in print that their leaders had been genocidaires, and that as recently as 2007 someone who did say it had been assassinated by nationalist fanatics.

And I did think about it. I remembered a conversation with my Berkeley colleague, Gerald Feldman, shortly after he returned, in 1997, from a colloquium he had given at Istanbul’s Koc University, on the Deutsche Bank and the Baghdad Railway. He had mentioned the “nightmare” the Armenian genocide had posed for Bank officials during the war. After the talk, one of his hosts – dean? department chair? he wasn’t sure – came up to him with a warning: “Do not speak of the killing of Armenians if you ever wish to lecture here again.” Norma Feldman still remembers the chill that comment cast over the subsequent Festessen.

Academic freedom has made considerable progress in Turkey since 1997. True, in 2005 a conference of Istanbul historians on “Armenians
in the Late Ottoman Empire” had to be canceled after the Justice Minister denounced its organizers on the floor of parliament for “stabbing Turkey in the back” and police told university officials that they could not guarantee the participants’ safety. But the conference did eventually take place – four months later. Turkish translations of work published abroad on the genocide have appeared. And at least one historian teaching at a Turkish university has published an article that uses the g-word to describe what happened to Armenians in 1915 – admittedly, in an American journal.

Still, the defenders of Turkey’s official narrative have not ceased to police the boundaries of their political correctness, repeatedly impugning data that are non-controversial among most historians outside the country. Take Hitler’s jeering query, flung out at the meeting of his commanders at Obersalzberg, on the eve of the German invasion of Poland: “Who still talks nowadays about the extermination of the Armenians?” Princeton’s Atatürk Professor of Ottoman and Modern Turkish Studies, Heath Lowry, has challenged the authenticity of this remark, arguing that the text of Hitler’s August 22, 1939, peroration, in which the line appears, was unknown before 1942, when it was quoted in a book written by a mere “newspaperman,” the A.P.’s Berlin Bureau Chief, Louis Lochner. Claiming to be the first to disclose Lochner’s role as conduit, Lowry also asserts that the document’s “ provenance … has never been disclosed, investigated … much less established.” In fact, Winfried Baumgart’s painstaking detective work, published almost two decades before Lowry’s attack, established the document’s congruence with the notes scribbled on the spot by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris – of all the sources for Hitler’s August 22 remarks, the most trustworthy and superior to those (privileged by Lowry) written that evening from memory by Admiral Hermann Boehm and General Franz Halder. The Lochner text had been entrusted to him by an emissary from what would come to be known as resistance circles. He immediately turned it over to the British embassy, and within three days of the Obersalzberg conclave it had been translated and sent to Whitehall.
This lecture will not go into the evidence for whether or not it was Hitler who included the famous query about the Armenians in his Obersalzberg monologue, for both attack and defense of the text obscure a greater reality. Suppose it could be proven that the text had been enhanced by Hitler’s opponents, as Lowry suggests, “for propaganda purposes,” to make the Führer appear “in an extremely negative light” to allies and others. Such an enhancement would only underscore the iconic status of the Armenian genocide as the apex of horrors conceivable in 1939.

My lecture aims at supplying the empirical basis for what is implicit in that sarcastic query, regardless of who posed it: that the Armenians and their extermination had once excited considerable “talk.” Secondarily, I shall raise the question, without resolving it, of whether talk has consequences. The question implies an audience that thought so; otherwise, why the sneer about talk’s transience, aimed at reassuring those about to embark, perhaps reluctantly, upon exterminations of their own? Finally, a demonstration of the ubiquity of talk about the extermination is evidence, prima facie, that an extermination occurred.

Talk about the extermination of Ottoman Armenians began in the mid-1890s, when Abdul Hamid II’s massacres, with an estimated 100,000 victims, provoked an international outcry. In England, the House of Commons demanded that the Royal Navy force the Dardanelles and remove the sultan. The normally so fractious French united — from Dreyfusards to the monarchist Right — in pro-Armenian activism. In Russia, intellectuals from Chekhov to the philosopher Solov’ev raised nearly 30,000 rubles for Armenian relief, while little Switzerland collected a million francs (that’s more than 10 million in today’s purchasing power) and more signatures on an Armenophil petition than any petition in Swiss history. Americans held “Armenian Sundays,” when participants fasted to send the money saved to “starving Armenians.” By 1925, forty-nine countries were sharing these rituals of symbolic sacrifice.

Germany was slow to start, but by late 1896 young Johannes Lepsius had spearheaded a movement supporting Armenians, making him briefly (in the words of a supporter) “the most famous man in Germany.” Lepsius came from a family of distinguished academics and intellectuals. His father was the founder of German Egyptology; his grandfather, a friend of Goethe and the Grimms; his great-grandfather, the Enlightenment publisher Nicolai. (His nephew, by
the way, is the Bundesrepublik’s most famous living sociologist.) But Lepsius himself was a rural pastor – soon made unemployed by Church authorities who disapproved of his activism. (I’ll come back to him.) With the new century, massacres became fewer, closer to pogroms, until 1909, when 20,000 more Armenians were slain in Adana province, reviving anew talk about the extermination of Armenians.\(^6\)

We must distinguish, of course, between noise in the public square and the intense but discreet exchanges in the corridors of power. To merge these two conversations was vital for Armenophils; to keep them apart, the goal of statesmen of all countries. For sooner or later “talk” meant pressure, and the last thing policy-makers wanted was the kind of moralizing speech that might limit their own freedom of action. Any restraints on Ottoman sovereignty, they feared, would compromise the Ottoman Empire’s survival – and risk unleashing a war of all against all, in Anatolia, certainly, and perhaps in Europe. Thus, in the poker game of Great Power politics, as the historian Marion Kent has noted, “The Ottoman Empire held one trump card. This was the general desire of the European Powers for it to survive as a political entity.”\(^7\) The Ottomans could play that card just as easily against Western humanitarianism as against Western imperialism. Thus the louder the outcry over the Armenians’ plight, the more Europe’s foreign offices cooperated in their studied efforts at silence.

Yet behind closed doors, talk continued, as stacks of diplomatic files make clear. Discussions grew more heated with the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, when the Ottoman Empire lost more than 20 percent of its population and almost all of its European territory. Europe’s “sick man” appeared to be breathing his last. The collapse of Ottoman authority in the Balkans was expected to spread to Asia Minor, where whole new crops of separatists were emerging, from Beirut to the Persian frontier.

Would Armenian nationalists join the fray? Or would the returning Ottoman army, bitter over its Balkan losses, take out their anger on Armenian villagers? At the prospect of ethnic conflict that might spill across the Caucasus, Russia began threatening to occupy Eastern Anatolia if credible protections for Armenians were not implemented immediately. Suddenly, preventing a massacre of Armenians became the task of every statesman committed to peace. For violence in Asia Minor, if it triggered Russian intervention, would surely be met by Austrian counteraction in the Balkans – with the risk of a general

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\(^6\) Sources for these two paragraphs are in my article “‘Down in Turkey, Far Away’ Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany,” *Journal of Modern History* 79.1 (March 2007): 80-113.

war. As Russia pressed and Turkey dithered, Germany deployed, with British approval, four cruisers to Turkish waters. And talk got louder. Led by demonstrations in London, Paris, Sofia, and Cairo, Armenians and their supporters petitioned the president of France; sent appeals to the Hague Court and to Britain from India, Burma, Japan, and Southeast Asia; and sent pleas to Germany, from Constantinople, Yokohama, Manchester, Frankfurt, and Potsdam.

At least one German diplomat recognized a crisis when he saw one. Ambassador Baron Hans von Wangenheim urged Berlin to instruct its representatives in Turkey to intervene to stop the abuses of Armenians and even, in emergencies, to act as their “really effective protectors.” It was time, he thought, to grasp the nettle of Armenian Reforms. Wangenheim’s proposal required scuttling a sacred diplomatic convention: to hear no evil, see no evil, and speak no evil of a friendly state’s domestic “arrangements” – the very convention that had kept the Kaiser’s government on a non-interventionist path during the massacres of the 1890s.

Wangenheim’s bosses in Berlin disagreed. With the outcome of the Balkan wars still so uncertain, “rolling out the Armenian question,” the new foreign secretary, Gottlieb von Jagow, sighed, was the last thing he wanted. But talk about imperiled Armenians could no longer be hushed. The London Times ran 88 items on them over the course of 1913. In Paris, Pro Arménia, a journal defunct since 1908, resumed publication. Speeches and queries in the British, Italian, and German parliaments reflected and contributed to the disquiet. Jagow was forced to concede that the situation in the Orient had become “the most pressing of all political questions.” Whether he and his counterparts liked it or not, they had to talk about the Armenians.

The consequence? The workload of Europe’s exhausted diplomats, already crushing thanks to the ongoing Balkan crisis, increased dramatically. In June 1913 alone, over 75 missives on the Armenian matter crossed the transoms of the Wilhelmstrasse. In Therapia, Baron Wangenheim was chained to his desk, his longed-for family holiday repeatedly postponed. Uncertain whether the future lay with the Armenians or the Turks, German diplomats began to work both sides of the street at what today is termed, euphemistically, the “peace process.” With London’s cooperation, Germany labored to square the circle: to secure protections for the Armenian minority that would not undermine Ottoman sovereignty – and thus obviate Russian intervention and all that might follow.


9 Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg (hereafter BH), Feb. 24, 1913, Nr. 38; on the rejection of Wangenheim’s proposal, see A. Zimmermann, minute of Mar. 5, and G. Jagow to Wangenheim, Apr. 22, Nr. 369, GP, vol. 38: 10–15, 30–31 and 30n.

At the same time, through former pastor Lepsius, Jagow opened relations with Armenian leaders to win them for a compromise—and to insure their goodwill should compromise fail. Although not the dramatic course correction that Baron Wangenheim had wanted, Jagow’s expenditure of diplomatic capital on behalf of an Ottoman-Russian-Armenian accord demonstrated how acute the danger in Eastern Anatolia was felt to be: to its populations, to the Turkish Empire’s survival, to European peace.

On February 8, 1914, Germany succeeded in brokering such an accord. Turkey ceded some of its sovereignty in Eastern Anatolia (to a Dutchman and a Norwegian, commissioners representing the “international community”), and Russia stopped threatening to occupy it. Would these “Armenian Reforms” stabilize Ottoman rule? Or would they, as some hoped and many feared, deliver it the coup de grâce? Whatever the answer, the reforms did not quiet talk about the Armenians. And nowhere, perhaps, was that talk louder than in Germany.

In June 1914, a German-Armenian Society, aimed at fostering warmer relations between the two peoples, held its inaugural gala in Berlin. The very existence of such an organization betrayed the Foreign Office’s tilt. Only the sun of official favor could explain how an outfit with a board composed of Lepsius, another pastor, a journalist, and six unknowns from the tiny Armenian colony in Berlin, had managed to collect the dazzling names, ninety-six in all, that graced the German-Armenian Society’s appeal for members: four generals; the leaders of the Reichstag’s two liberal parties; the Conservative president of Prussian Chamber of Deputies; and important representatives of business, church (for example, the court preacher, Ernst Dryander), and academia—including the historians Hans Delbrück and Rudolf Oncken.

Yet the desire to be in the government’s good graces cannot explain the support of such glitterati as Germany’s most celebrated painter, Max Liebermann; the social theorist Georg Simmel; the winner of the 1908 Nobel Prize for Literature, Rudolf Eucken; and the young novelist Thomas Mann, who would capture the same honor in 1929. These men must already have been talking about the Armenians. And the editors of three of Germany’s most influential dailies on the list of sponsors seemed to promise that from now on, talk on behalf of the Armenians would reach an ever widening public.


It was not to be. Within weeks, Europe was at war. On August 2, Germany signed a secret alliance with the Ottoman Empire. The German-Armenian Society suddenly became a political embarrassment. Its rival, the German-Turkish Union, now had a mission. The latter’s managing director, Ernst Jäckh, was put on the government payroll, running a one-man development office for the new alliance. Behind the scenes, “Jäckh-the-Turk,” as he was called, spied on prominent Armenophils. Openly, his job was public education; its real aim: to sell Turkey to his countrymen.

It was not a difficult task. By the time the Ottoman Empire actually entered the war – on October 31, 1914 – the German public was reeling from three months of the deadliest combat of the entire conflict. With losses of 265,000 men – killed, wounded, and missing in action – in the first month alone, Germans hardly needed incentives to embrace the Turks as saviors.

The alliance proved a Full Employment Act for anyone with a colorable claim to expertise on the Ottoman Empire. German orientalists, long marginal in the academic pecking-order, rejoiced in their newfound prestige. Overnight the anemic enrollments in C. H. Becker’s course on Turkey soared. Even language classes boomed. “Everyone,” Professor Becker crowed, “wants to learn Turkish now!” His Göttingen counterpart, Enno Littmann, was amazed by the Turcomania. “Everything possible is appearing about the Orient and Islam,” he marveled. Among the things now “possible” was a publication entitled “The Evolution of Turkey into a Rechtsstaat” – this, in 1915.13

Even as Ernst Jäckh and company were marketing the Ottoman Empire as the land of tolerance, Turkey’s ruling cadre, a hard-line subset of the Young Turks’ Committee of Union and Progress (CUP; henceforth, Unionist), were driving Armenians to their deaths. By late April 1915, Germans in Turkey had begun to witness expulsions of Armenians from their villages. In May, deportations, accompanied by pillage, rape, and mass murder, snowballed. In July, the Italian consul in Trapezunt suffered a nervous breakdown under the weight of these sights.14

But those who wanted the world to know what was going down in Eastern Anatolia faced formidable obstacles. In May 1915, not just Armenians but all Western teachers, doctors, and missionaries were barred from using the mails. Then their telephones and telegraphs were confiscated.15 Envoy of neutral powers were forbidden to en-

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14 Heinrich Bergfeld, Consul at Trapezunt, to BH, July 9, 1915, PAA Türkei 183 vol. 37. The Auswärtiges Amt’s vast archive on the genocide is now being published online, along with English translations, thanks to the long work of Wolfgang and Sigrid Gust, to whom all of us are enormously indebted. The Gusts list documents according to date, followed by the suffix DE and then a number for each document posted on the same date. In the above case, it is 1915-07-09-DE-002. Hereafter, whenever a document has been posted on their web site, I shall cite that (www.armenocide.net) in preference to a PAA citation.

15 Dr. Ruth Parmelee, Harpoot, diary entry, June 8, 1915, Parmelee Papers, Box 1, Hoover Archives.
crypt their telegrams, and their letters were opened. Only the German embassy’s diplomatic pouch remained a secure conduit for candid information on these gruesome events. Would it be willing to forward such explosive information? When, that April, a German consul tried to forward to Germany an account of a pogrom from a teacher at a German orphanage by including it in his bag, Ambassador Wangenheim refused to accept it until he had extracted a promise that the material would be released “neither through the press nor any other way.” Even then, it took two months, and repeated requests, before the teacher’s superiors in Frankfurt were allowed to receive the report, and then only in an oral, sanitized redaction.\footnote{Wangenheim to BH, May 27, 1915, encl. 1 W. Rössler, Aleppo, to BH; encl. 2 K. Blank, Marash, to Fr. Schuchardt of the German Aid Federation for Christian Charity in the Orient in Frankfurt, Apr. 14, 1915, www.armenicide.net, 1915-05-27-DE-001; K. von Neurath to S, June 29, 1915, ibid. 1915-06-29-DE-001. Schuchardt, Frankfurt, to AA, Aug. 20, 1915, encl. 1, K. Blank, Marash, to S, Apr. 6, 1915; also encl. 3, B. von Dobbeler, Adana, to Schuchardt, July 12, 1915: ibid. 1915-08-20-DE-001.}

Turkey’s leaders usually denied their purpose – to rid Anatolia of its Armenians – even when they conceded that massacres were taking place. Thus it was that Baron Wangenheim, who had protested sporadic brutalities against Armenians in the winter of 1914, at first accepted the Turkish story the following spring that the deportations were a military necessity, aimed at removing actual and potential fifth columns from the path of Russian invaders. As for the massacres that befell the deportees as they trudged away? They were regrettable failures of military discipline, which could happen in any wartime situation.

But the deception could not last long. Wangenheim has had a very bad press, thanks to the American ambassador, Henry Morgenthau. Writing after the United States entered the war against Germany in a book that has become standard reading for those interested in the Armenian genocide, Morgenthau villainized Germany’s ambassador as an arrogant Teuton, satisfied to see Armenians go to their ruin so long as it furthered “pan-German” goals.\footnote{Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Garden City, NY, 1918), passim.} But, in fact, much as he wanted to believe the Young Turk story, the German ambassador never sacrificed his critical judgment on the altar of the alliance. In this respect, Wangenheim compares favorably to his British counterpart in St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan. In answer to London’s anxious queries about reports of the Russian army’s mass expulsions of the tsar’s Jewish subjects along its border, Buchanan answered that he had not “the slightest doubt” that Jewish treason necessitated such harsh measures, assurances echoed uncritically by other Brits on the spot – soldiers, journalists, and even scholars.\footnote{Mark Levene, War, Jews, and the New Europe: The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–1919 (Oxford, 1992), 51, 54.} Unlike Buchanan, Wangenheim, although already a dying man, could still summon the energy to catch the Turkish government in fictions.

And by mid-June, he had concluded “that the banishment of the Armenians is not motivated by military considerations alone is clear
as day.” Indeed, shortly before that, the Minister of the Interior, Talât Bey, had stated frankly to an embassy official “that the Porte wanted to use the war to thoroughly clean out its domestic enemies – the native Christians – without being disturbed by diplomatic intervention from abroad ...” On July 7, Wangenheim informed Germany’s chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, that the extension of the deportations to provinces not threatened with invasion, as well as the manner in which they were carried out, convinced him that their ally was “in fact pursuing the aim of destroying the Armenian race in the Turkish empire.”

The ambassador based his conclusion not only on Talât’s comments, but also on an array of German witnesses: teachers, medical personnel, church people, civil engineers, soldiers – and reports from his own consular staff, which were detailed and compelling. Germany’s consul in Aleppo would eventually earn a mild reprimand for his passionate protests against the treatment of the Armenians. Germany’s man in Mosul was so moved by the famished creatures straggling by that he fed them himself. If the Foreign Office was unwilling to foot the bill for the £300, well then, he declared, he’d pay it back to them out of his own salary, in monthly installments.

Then there was Lieutenant Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, who had been seconded to Eastern Anatolia to organize Muslim guerrillas behind Russian lines. Arriving in Erzerum, the heart of historic Armenia, Scheubner found himself pressed into service to run the vice-consulate there. Soon he was privy to the same grisly sights. Unionist hardliners bluntly informed him that their goal was the “complete extermination” of the Armenians. “After the war, we will ‘have no more Armenians in Turkey,’ is the verbatim pronouncement of an authoritative personage,” the young soldier reported. In August 1915, Scheubner informed Wangenheim’s stand-in that this grim goal had been attained – throughout the entire territory of his consulate.

Scheubner did not deny that there had been Armenian insurgents here and there. What could be more “natural” for a people so badly treated? But, in his view “any proof whatsoever” of a “general, intentional, and premeditated uprising by the Armenians is lacking.” The very extent of the extermination proved the absurdity of Turkish claims: “... that tens of thousands of Armenians let themselves be butchered, without resisting, by a handful of Kurds and irregulars as happened here is surely proof of how very little taste this people has for fighting and revolution.”

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Were people inside Germany also talking about the extermination of the Armenians? War means censorship – and the censor’s strictures on what might be written about the Ottoman Empire exceeded in length even such awkward topics as “Belgium” and “U-Boat Warfare.” The principle was simple: “All remarks that could in any way diminish the reputation of our Turkish allies or be wounding to them must be avoided.” Any mention of the Armenians had to be submitted to pre-censorship. In fact, the Zensurbuch made plain, it wanted no mention of the Armenian question at all.22

The press got the message. Although the Frankfurter Zeitung, Germany’s most prestigious daily, had a veteran correspondent in Constantinople, he devoted his insider status to securing interviews with Unionist leaders and to disseminating their tale of Armenian treachery. Others did the same. During the genocide year of 1915, Armenians were mentioned in the Berliner Tageblatt just five times: two were reprints of rebuttals of Entente atrocity “propaganda” issued by the Ottoman press agency. The other three? Casual asides in interviews held by the Grand Vizier, by Talât Bey, and by the War Minister Enver Pasha. And with more than 3 million of their own sons at the front, with pundits like Friedrich Naumann telling them that “everything turns on the Dardanelles,” can anyone wonder that ordinary Germans let their ally’s story of Armenian fifth columns go unchallenged?23

And yet: numbers alone – on censorship guidelines, news items, German soldiers mobilized – cannot close the question of what Germans knew and said about the extermination of the Armenians. Unlike in the Third Reich, where the disclosure of genocide was a capital offense, penalties in Imperial Germany for circumventing censorship were light. Moreover, in Berlin, and probably in other large cities, Dutch, French, English, and even Russian newspapers remained on sale. Those unskilled in foreign languages could learn the news from the Swiss press.24 An information barrier so omnipresent yet so porous meant that Turkey’s boosters faced the task of rebutting Entente atrocity reports that they could never be sure anyone had actually read.

The result was a mass of contradictions. Germans were told by their press that Armenians were being subjected to a just and necessary response to their treasonous aid to the Russian army. But they could also read that the Armenian Reforms of February 1914 had “proven themselves absolutely,” that a “friendly relationship”


existed between Armenians and their government, based on “firm, constitutional granite”; that the Armenian elite and German-Turkish circles were “very close.” Contradictions multiplied when on the very same page another author blamed the terrible Armenian massacres (here assumed to be common knowledge) on unruly Kurds, whom the Turkish government, burdened with a bureaucracy from the previous regime, could not control.25 (So much for the effectiveness of those Armenian Reforms...) Competing apologias fueled suspicion of mayhem and murder.

So, who knew? If we look not at the hard-pressed German-in-the-street, but at the elites, the close-knit world of movers, shakers, and opinion-makers, then the answer is clear: everyone. And if we ask, what did they know? The answer, with equal certitude, is: enough.

Orientalists learned about it early on from colleagues in neutral countries and from students serving as interpreters in Turkey. Some, like Professor Littmann, were inclined to dismiss an American document on the Armenian fate. The future translator of Arabian Nights knew a good tale when he saw one; and anyway, Russia’s expulsion of Poles and Lithuanians was no less harsh and its persecution of its Jews, as well as London’s anti-German mobs, were worse. But details from former students became so copious that eventually, as his colleague, C. H. Becker, assured him, “the madness...” was “not to be doubted.” By October 1915, reports of massacres, Becker noted in an essay whose publication was quashed, “now fill the entire world.”26

Another source was Armin Wegner. Returning to Berlin after serving as a medic in Turkey, the aspiring writer used readings of his new work to notify dovish intellectuals, like the art collector Count Harry Kessler and the journalist Hellmut von Gerlach. Gerlach took the news to the Federation for a New Fatherland (Bund Neues Vaterland), whose eclectic clientele stretched from Albert Einstein and the novelist Stefan Zweig, through the usual liberal, socialist, and feminist suspects (Eduard Bernstein, Clara Zetkin, Ernst Reuter), all the way up to liberal members of the government. But in his more influential capacity as the political editor of Die Welt am Montag (circulation 150,000), Gerlach kept faith with his government’s precept: what happens in Anatolia stays in Anatolia.

Nor was Maximilian Harden, publisher of the fashionable Zukunft, any profile in courage. Inform the Empress! he advised Wegner. Emphasize the religious angle, since the Armenians are a Christian


people! He himself, he was sorry to say, could do nothing. “The censor closed our mouths,” Gerlach later explained. But how do we assess the censor’s power, when self-censors were so obliging?

Talk about the “extermination of the Armenians” was not confined to professors and lefties, as we know from Gerald Feldman’s magisterial study of the mighty Deutsche Bank in World War I. The bank owned controlling shares of the Anatolian Railway, and its Constantinople office was full of what Feldman described as “hair-raising accounts” of the Turkish government’s determination (as the deputy director reported to his chief in Berlin, Arthur von Gwinner) “to eradicate” the Armenians – “the entire line: root and branch.” A quarter of the population of roughly 2 million, he estimated, had already perished. Eastern Anatolia was “armenierrein.” “The Jewish pogroms in Russia, which I know,” he stressed, “are comparative child’s play.”

What did the Deutsche Bank do with this knowledge? Gwinner’s man protested to the Turks and reported in detail to his own Foreign Office. The Railway saved as many Armenians as it could, hiring even the unqualified for construction and office work. Its “lifeboat” bears comparison to Oskar Schindler’s, and on a much larger scale. Gwinner himself designated £1,000 for immediate Armenian relief – secretly. But he did nothing publicly, nor did he resign as chairman of Jäckh-the-Turk’s German-Turkish Union, whose goals he continued to legitimate with his name.

Other key figures in business – Walther Rathenau, Hugo Stinnes, August Thyssen – must also have known. Wartime Constantinople was never off-limits to men with influence (“Every train from the Balkans brings Germans who want to monkey around with the Turks,” a later German ambassador complained). Stinnes and Thyssen arrived in the winter of 1916 and talked with Germans who talked about the extermination of the Armenians. Among the “flood” of Germans on fact-finding missions was Gustav Stresemann, a rising star of the National Liberals, who met with newsmen, soldiers, expats, diplomats – and Enver Pasha. Stresemann’s diary leaves no doubt that he learned exactly what was happening. On day 4 he wrote: “Armenian reduction 1-1 ½ million.”

Back in Germany, the future chancellor of the Weimar Republic made his influence felt. To the public, Stresemann’s speeches reflected the sunny face of the alliance, eulogizing the “tagferen Türken” to receptive audiences. To insiders, however, his picture was grim: on the


Ottoman economy, on relations between German and Turkish officers, on growing xenophobia there. On the Armenian question, however, Stresemann reversed targets, aiming his guns not at Germany’s Ottoman ally but at Wangenheim’s replacement, Count Paul von Wolff-Metternich, for antagonizing the Turks by repeatedly lecturing them on the Armenian question. Was “Herr von Metternich ambassador of the German empire,” Enver Pasha had sneered, “or ambassador of the Armenians?” The future Nobel peace laureate endorsed Enver’s demand that Germany recall its outspoken ambassador.31

Stresemann’s traveling companion, Matthias Erzberger, the leader of the Catholic Left and by 1916 the most powerful man in the Reichstag, was already well-informed. As director of war propaganda for neutral countries, Erzberger was kept supplied by the Foreign Office with the extenuations with which it armed its diplomatic personnel to rebut challenges about atrocity allegations. But Erzberger also had independent sources on what he called “this newest burning question”; most credibly, Catholic clergy on the spot. From “two absolutely reliable” men, Erzberger learned that murdered Christians numbered 1.5 million – the same figure as Stresemann’s. “The Armenian nation,” one of them confided, “is supposed to be pretty much exterminated.”32

Erzberger had several fish to fry when he arrived in the Ottoman capital in early 1916. Not least, he wanted to persuade the Turkish government to turn over any Christian sites in Jerusalem that had been “vacated” by the Armenian Apostolic Church to his own, Roman Catholic, church. Still, in interviews with Enver and Talât, Erzberger did speak up for the Armenians, and back in Berlin he wrote to the Cardinal Archbishop of Cologne about their plight. He also sought out the Turkish ambassador and went to the Foreign Office to defend Ambassador Metternich against his critics.33 Alarmed by all this negative talk about Turkey, Jäckh, at a board meeting of his German-Turkish Union, denounced the “rumors” spread by Erzberger and Stresemann as completely baseless – which testifies to their impact.34 In public, however, the normally so voluble Erzberger did not break the silence.

And, as a member of parliament, he might have. The arm of the censor stopped at the Reichstag door. Only the noise of his fellows (or the president’s call to order) could silence a member. But noise and calls to order were precisely what occurred in January 1916, when Karl


Liebknecht, a radical Social Democrat, demanded to know whether the government was aware that its allies had annihilated “100s of thousands” of Armenians, and that “Professor [sic] Lepsius” was calling it “flat-out extermination”? Two days later Liebknecht was expelled from his party.

But murder will out. By 1918, when a Center backbencher returned from Turkey with news of fresh massacres, Germany’s last ambassador there threw up his hands. “So much has been spoken and written about the Armenian atrocities that it seems idle to express oneself on these questions.”

His exasperation is revealing. It seems that Germans could not stop talking about the extermination of the Armenians.

The Protestant clergy, recipients of constant streams of information from their own and international networks, talked most. They forwarded eyewitness accounts to the government, protested the press’s complicity in Turkey’s alibis, and badgered the Foreign Office “to put a stop immediately to the murders by our...allies.” In July 1915, the monthly publication of a prominent Protestant charity for the Near East (circulation 25,000) was among the first, in Germany or anywhere, to publish details of the genocide – which soon spread internationally. Reports like these were terrible for allied relations. But, groaned the chargé d’affaires in Constantinople, Konstantin von Neurath, an outright “repression of Germany’s pro-Armenian associations” was “naturally out of the question.”

Nevertheless, the constant government pressure against negative publicity took its toll. Yes, the genocide remained on people’s lips; otherwise that same German Charity could not have collected so much money for Armenian relief during the war. But in the public square where talk might have mattered, the Church’s speech remained muffled. Belief requires not only hearing talk from a credible source. It requires subjecting that talk to public debate. Precisely such a debate was forbidden.

In recent years, a number of historians have reiterated the Entente’s charge that Germany was co-responsible for the Armenian genocide – a charge Armenians themselves have long believed. Others have countered that in the deadly game of Ottoman minority policy, Germany held few cards. As our once-skeptical Professor Littman put it: “In any case, would Turkey let us have a voice in a domestic matter?” He knew the answer: not if it could help it.
The Entente’s implicit demand that Germany ditch its allies was a cheap shot – certainly during their Gallipoli invasion, which overlapped almost precisely with the first genocidal push, and even later, when Turks were tying down a million Entente troops. But there is something that all of us can demand of a society, even during a desperately fought war: that it not lie to itself.

“Living in the truth”: Václav Havel’s famous line identifies truth itself as a kind of power, available to men and women who have nothing else. Once someone steps out of the lie, Havel found, “he has shattered the world of appearances, the fundamental pillar of the system ... He has enabled everyone to peer behind the curtain. Living within the lie can constitute the system only if it is universal.” An alternative threatens its very existence. Truth then becomes “the power of the powerless.”

That power was grasped by Johannes Lepsius. The veteran champion of the Armenians had already stepped out of the lie on October 5, 1915, when he invited the German Press Association, which met weekly in the Reichstag building for government briefings, to hear what Enver Pasha and Talât Bey had told him about their Armenian policy.

It was an offer journalists could not refuse. News of Lepsius’s chilling conversations in August 1915 with Constantinople’s strongmen had already spread by word-of-mouth. Those who remembered how Lepsius’s 1896 reports from the killing fields were soon published in translations abroad also knew that this was a man who knew how to get the world’s attention. Articles circulating in the Swiss press on the extermination of more than a million Armenians suggested that Lepsius had already begun.

The next day Under Secretary of State Arthur Zimmermann summoned together the same reporters. While offering lip service to the Turks’ claim that it was the Armenians who were massacring the Turks, Zimmermann’s main point was that, since nothing could be done for them anyway, Armenians were not worth the loss of an important ally.

Lepsius kept pushing. He spoke to the Wednesday Society, a group of intellectuals around Hans Delbrück and Adolf von Harnack. And he organized an array of Protestant Church leaders (men with reliable sources of their own), proposing they circulate a mass petition

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to the chancellor that explicitly reproved the government’s disinformation policy: “It oppresses our conscience that the German press praises the nobility and tolerance of our Mohammedan allies, while Mohammedans are shedding rivers of innocent Christian blood.” The petition predicted a “crippling impact on the morale of German Christians when they have to look on while their allies destroy an entire Christian people ... without our side doing whatever is possible to save them.”

Yet precisely such visions of crippled morale raised anxieties within the petitioners’ own ranks. Alarmed by their own courage, they wilted under pressure from Church authorities to scrap a mass signature drive. Their petition would remain confidential, its signers limited to men in leadership roles. Even so, within a few days, 49 of the most distinguished figures in German Protestantism had been persuaded to sign – an unprecedented step in a Church known for its expansive interpretation of “Render unto Caesar.” At Lepsius’s urging, Erzberger got a committee of the Catholic Lay Congress (Katholikentag) to issue a similar, although more anodyne, statement. Nothing remotely like this effort – a movement opposing the policies of a wartime ally, for example, in Britain to protect Russia’s Jews – occurred in any of the other belligerent powers. Chancellor Bethmann took notice. Referring to “mounting ... commotion in Germany,” he instructed his ambassador to inform Turkey’s leaders of the two petitions “at every opportunity, and emphatically.”

But Germany’s “mounting commotion” remained private. By December 1915, the Foreign Office had managed to convince most Church leaders that public talk would be counterproductive for Armenians (and for Germans). Thus, debate within the Establishment was aborted before wider circles could learn of it. Outside the columns of a few religious publications (which usually employed Aesopian language), there was no public “talk” about the extermination of the Armenians.

Yet Germany’s Daniel Ellsberg (or Julian Assange?) kept on. The pandemonium that broke out in the Reichstag in January 1916 when Liebknecht referred to Lepsius’s findings was a telling sign that Lepsius’s very name had become a synecdoche for the embarrassing genocide. Now Lepsius worked feverishly to put a comprehensive picture of the genocide into the hands of “every Protestant pastor” in Germany. The board of his own German Orient Mission, unnerved by rumors that Lepsius intended to finger Turkey’s government as

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responsible for the horrors, stepped back. Couldn’t Lepsius leave that part out? (He could not.) Misgivings grew: What if there were reprisals against the mission’s schools, orphanages, and clinics? After initially agreeing to foot the bill for Lepsius’s “comprehensive picture,” the board decided to withdraw its support.

But let’s be real: How would living in the truth in Germany halt a Turkish killing machine? The lack of a convincing answer helps explain, I think, why Lepsius found himself working so alone.

In July 1916, Lepsius finished his Report on the Situation of the Armenian People in Turkey [Bericht über die Lage des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei], printing 20,000 copies for “every” Protestant parsonage, plus an additional 500 to send to public figures, the press, and members of parliament. Lest so many identical parcels mailed in one place attract attention, his eleven children were conscripted to fan out over Potsdam, distributing them among corner mailboxes.

How successful were Lepsius’s efforts? It’s hard to tell. In August, the authorities impounded 191 copies meant for Germany’s elected representatives. A month later, the Turkish ambassador got wind of the Report and protested to the military authorities, who ordered the seizure of any remaining copies. But some of these Reports surely reached their destinations because by late September, Lepsius had received an astonishing 24,000 Marks for Armenian relief in response to the appeal inserted in each copy. We can also see Lepsius’s efforts reflected in the sharp criticism of the government’s handling of the Armenian issue in the Reichstag’s budget committee that September, as well as in the complaints of a hypernationalist, speaking that month before a crowd of thousands in Munich, about propaganda in Germany on behalf of the Armenians.

Lepsius’s Report offers some puzzles worth pondering. Given exploding paper costs, where did an unbeneﬁted parson with eleven children get the money to publish and mail more than 20,000 copies of a 300-page book? Stamps alone would have cost 4,000 marks. Lepsius merely cites “friends of the good cause.” Given rationing, where did he obtain the paper? Another mystery is Lepsius’s continued freedom of movement. While Entente powers were quick to incarcerate their critics, Lepsius was threatened only with three days of jail and a 30 Mark ﬁne – and then only in 1917.

Such forbearance suggests ambivalence. Even the policeman charged with executing the seizure order in September 1916 proceeded with a

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minimum of force and fanfare – and, it appears, commitment. Finding no one in Lepsius’s office, he simply left a penciled slip on the desk, announcing the impoundment. 44 Apparently, German confiscations, like German censorship, were expected to be self-enforcing.

The grapevine that informed Germans of the genocide reminds us of that old riddle: What’s the definition of a secret? Answer: something told to only one person at a time. With the peace, however, official secrets of all kinds burst into the open as authors scurried to “update” their rosy accounts of wartime Turkey.

Openness begat controversy. What had befallen the Armenians continued to be entwined with politics, most obviously, the politics of peace-making, as a defeated Germany found itself in the dock, accused not only of starting the war, but of atrocities in waging it: in Belgium; on the high seas; in Anatolia against the Armenians. Yet even at that point not everyone at the Wilhelmstrasse was alive to how deeply the Ottoman alliance had compromised their country. Thus, Germany’s delegation to Paris initially included not only their heroic vice-consul of Mosul, who had succored Armenians, but also their embassy’s naval attaché, Hans Humann, a pal of Enver’s who had worked throughout the war as Enver’s mouthpiece. Word that Ambassador Morgenthau’s memoirs had connected Humann to the genocide led to the captain’s hasty removal, as an embarrassed Foreign Office, scrambling for damage control, responded with a Flucht nach vorn: it commissioned the troublemaker Lepsius (!) to publish its files on the genocide.

Widely reviewed, Lepsius’s Deutschland und Armenien, 1914–1918: Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke told anyone still in the dark that a genocide had taken place – with the knowledge of Germany’s own leaders. (Lepsius also re-published his 1916 Report. Now entitled The Death March of the Armenian People [Der Todesgang des Armenischen Volkes], its fourth printing reached 28,000 copies.)

Inevitably, the genocide also became part of Weimar politics. Those convinced their leaders had lied to them throughout the war squared off against those convinced their undefeated army had been stabbed in the back – a legend guaranteed to produce natural supporters for the Young Turks’ own alibi of Armenian betrayal. A chain of Armenian revenge assassinations in Berlin kept the issue alive, most famously in 1921, when Soghomon Tehlirian gunned Talât down in broad daylight on the Hardenbergstrasse. Eulogies by prominent Germans at Talât’s

44 Lepsius, Der Todesgang, xxiii–vi; Steinhauer, Kriminalpolizei Potsdam, Apr. 1, 1917, GS PK I Rep. 191 Nr. 3664.
graveside praised him as the “Turkish Bismarck.” Lepsius, on the other hand, testified on behalf of Talât’s assassin, whom a Berlin jury acquitted – to international approval, but to vilification in Hugo Stinnes’s Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, whose editor, the former naval attaché Hans Humann, continued the war against the Armenians by other means. In attacking and defending Armenians and Turks, Germans were attacking and defending each other.

The Armenian catastrophe thus meant different things to different Germans. For some, it meant mourning, and shame. There was standing room only at St. Hedwig’s Cathedral, in the heart of Berlin, for a memorial service for the Armenian people. The invitation, from the German-Armenian Society, acknowledged that the genocide had always been an open secret. “As is well known,” it said, “during the World War more than a million Armenians, on orders of the Turkish government, were massacred or deported to the desert ...” Although they knew that their compatriots did not feel directly responsible, the sponsors stated flatly that, because of its Turkish alliance, Germany’s share in this wrong was greater than that of any other people.

Most Germans, however, weighed down by their own sorrows, assimilated the genocide into a developing master narrative of German battles nobly fought, if nobly lost – as we can see in a 1938 biography of Lt. Scheubner-Richter, consul of Erzerum in 1915, written by his adoring adjutant. In a work published five years after Hitler’s seizure of power, we might expect a testosterone-poisoned paean to the healthy ruthlessness of the Young Turks. Instead, the author lingered over his hero’s vigorous efforts to save Armenians. His preface proudly recalled his young commander in 1919 presenting him with Lepsius’s newly-minted Deutschland und Armenien, Scheubner inscribing it to the “memory of common struggles for the honor of Germany’s escutcheon....”

Other Germans drew different lessons. To Hitler, the genocide served as a warning of the doom that awaited weaker peoples. In 1922, he cited the fate of the Armenians as what lay in store for Germans – if no rational solution were found to the Jewish problem. Eight years later, Hitler was complaining of the German press portraying “over and over, far and wide, the ‘Armenian atrocities.’”


What is the significance of our story of Germany and the Armenian genocide? It’s important, I think, because it highlights for us the enduring tensions between national interests, felt to be vital, and our obligations to humanity. (As our own Secretary of State Henry Kissinger opined in 1973, recorded on the Nixon tapes: “...if they put Jews into gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a humanitarian concern.”50 And it reminds us of the moral complexities we face in judging what Kant called “the crooked timber of humanity.”

Let me close with two examples: The 40-year-old career diplomat Count Friedrich-Werner von Schulenburg became consul at Erzerum in 1916, arriving after the region had been cleansed of its Armenians. He had heard that there had been massacres, but he wasn’t having any of it. Such stories, he was sure, were “99/100 % lies, the result of the colossal cowardice of these people and of the Orientals’ addiction to exaggeration. Naturally,” he then conceded, “quite a lot have been beaten to death and even more died on the way.”51 But it was clear that the new consul thought this was nothing for Germans to get upset about. The man Schulenburg had replaced as consul was 31-year-old Lt. Scheubner-Richter, who had protested, intervened, and aided every Armenian he could, and was finally removed because the Turks refused to have any more dealings with him.

Both men met violent ends. The hard-hearted Schulenburg died a hero’s death at Plötzensee in November 1944 for his role in the plot to assassinate Hitler. Scheubner-Richter met his death eleven years earlier, in Munich, shot down at Hitler’s side in the unsuccessful Beer Hall Putsch of November 9, 1923. He was the Führer’s right-hand man.

Even as the war generation aged, the memory of the genocide remained green. In December 1932, Franz Werfel traveled across Germany giving readings from *Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, his epic novel of Armenian resistance, to capacity audiences. Professor Becker clipped a review of Werfel’s chapter depicting Lepsius’s verbal “duel” with Enver Pasha in Constantinople in August 1915.52 Both antagonists were now dead; the empires for which each had fought, also gone. Yet before other victims claimed the world’s attention, the events in Anatolia in 1915 set the international standard for horror. Germans were still talking about the extermination of the Armenians.


51 armenocide.net 1916-04-16-

DE-001.


Jan Surmann
2010 FRANZ STEINER PRIZE WINNER

The collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989/90 led to a new round of efforts to come to terms with the consequences of the Nazi past that resulted in a major shift in the paradigms of restitution and compensation. The newly revived debate over restitution and compensation that took shape after 1989 focused on compensating individuals rather than nation states, as had been the case in the immediate postwar period. As a result, the postwar restitution regime experienced a crisis of legitimacy, as Jewish organizations, in particular, called attention to its many deficits. In addition, the restitution debate challenged traditional historical narratives and meta-narratives of the postwar period. For decades, the strategic alliances of the Cold War had ignored the material demands of individuals. The renewed debate raised questions that most of the affected countries had regarded as resolved for fifty years. Challenging many countries’ national postwar myths, it publicized aspects of war looting and economic collaboration with Nazi Germany that societies had repressed in the postwar era. Within the framework of concrete demands for restitution, the United States developed an action-oriented politics of history that played a central role in the process and greatly determined its course. The debate about the so-called Holocaust-era assets was not only important in relation to clarifying open questions of compensation and restitution. It also formed a context wherein the U.S. politics of history helped to decontextualize and universalize Holocaust remembrance on both the transnational and state levels. Thus, the U.S. politics of history in the 1990s is not only important as a central aspect of restitution and compensation history but also for the associated transformation in the politics of remembrance.

In the following, I will sketch the background and the first approaches of the U.S. politics of history in Eastern Europe. Then I will demonstrate how and why the U.S. politics of history aimed its lens at Western Europe, and, particularly, Switzerland. Finally, an analysis of the three major conferences on restitution policy will explain the consequences that the U.S. approach had and how the debate

1 The use of the term “Holocaust-era assets” makes it clear that the inadequacies of restitution and remembrance policies during the Cold War were regarded as highly significant in the recent debate. However, the injured parties do not necessarily have to be Jews. Rather, the term manifests the fact that the murder of European Jews had become a fixed point from which the entire era was to be regarded.
increasingly turned from purely material questions to those related to the politics of remembrance.

**Restitution after the End of the Bipolar World Order**

The fall of the Berlin Wall not only represented a break in the Cold War; it was also the precondition for renewed discussion of the restitution question, which originated in the 1990s in the dispute about Jewish assets that had been stolen and then nationalized in Eastern Europe. Only in the second half of the decade, when the dispute spilled over into Western Europe, did it become a global issue. The World Jewish Restitution Organization, which was founded in 1992 as an umbrella organization for various Jewish groups with a special focus on Eastern Europe, had a mandate to pursue restitution for Jewish assets that had been nationalized after 1945.² With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, the question about the so-called uninherited or unclaimed assets and the lack of resolution since 1945 became relevant agenda items. This issue was especially important in Eastern Europe on account of the tremendous extent to which the Nazis carried out their extermination policies there. Yet, by the later 1990s, it would also profoundly affect Switzerland as an international center of finance.

Especially in the United States, there was soon broad political support for these restitution efforts, which extended well beyond the Clinton administration and the State Department.³ Already in the early 1990s, relevant political circles in the U.S. acknowledged the legitimacy of the restitution demands and consistently advocated that they be fulfilled in the context of general re-privatization. But the question of restoring Jewish assets was only one facet of a much broader process, representing only one part of what the U.S. was demanding. The strong focus on restitution, particularly of Jewish assets, was characteristic of this paradigm shift. This unprecedented support for Jewish restitution demands meant that the United States now recognized that it represented an historical injustice for these asset issues to have remained unresolved for half a century. At the same time, the attention the topic now received heightened American society’s awareness of the extent to which the Jewish population had been robbed,⁴ as well as the close connection between plunder and extermination. The Clinton administration integrated the process of restoring stolen or nationalized Jewish assets into a discourse characterized by respect for private property as well as adherence to human rights—in this case, particularly those of minorities. The

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administration underscored that Eastern European governments needed to acknowledge and return stolen or nationalized property before they could successfully transform their societies. This U.S. government approach was fundamentally different from that of many Western European states, which insisted on introducing private property in Eastern Europe but had not allowed the economic plunder of the Jewish population and the resulting demand for restitution to become a central topos of the economic transformation processes of the 1990s.\(^5\)

The United States conducted the debate about restitution in Eastern Europe under the paradigm that this was a specifically Eastern European issue deriving from the legacy of both Nazi and Communist rule. Thus, there was talk of “double victims.” However, it seemed no one had yet perceived that this issue was a fundamental problem of all postwar societies extending beyond the question of the type of government or its economic policies. Only the State Department’s willingness to generally address unresolved asset issues made it possible for the restitution debate to spill over into Western countries.

The Dispute Extends to Western Europe

In the later 1990s, the restitution issue burst out of the confining framework of Eastern Europe and became a global issue. The limited goal of resolving restitution issues for the Eastern European states expanded into addressing the omissions and denials that occurred after 1945. This larger framework brought Western European countries under critical fire, as well. The issues of plundered gold and so-called unclaimed bank accounts, in particular, became central to the debates about the Nazi era, Switzerland becoming the first Western country to be scrutinized. The unclaimed accounts held by Swiss banks that had not been paid out showed that the insufficient resolution of demands for victims of National Socialism in the postwar era was not limited to Eastern Europe but constituted a general problem of postwar societies. Just as the restoration of private property in Eastern Europe had heightened awareness of assets and therefore reanimated the restitution question, the expansion of the issue to Western Europe transformed the question of how the demands of victims of National Socialism had been dealt with in the postwar period to a general issue of the 1990s that pulled in ever more states.

The extension of the restitution issue to Switzerland substantially altered the nature of the debate. For one thing, the number of U.S.

\(^5\) See also “Jewish Restitution – WJRO Brussels Conference Looks to Germany, Switzerland and Western Europe,” September 1995, National Archives / Maryland (NARA), RG 59, Entry ZZ-104, Box # 20, Folder HF 1 of 2, HF 02.
actors increased tremendously. Now, alongside Jewish organizations and the U.S. administration, senators, states, Democratic and Republican members of Congress, and private attorneys stepped onto the stage of restitution politics. Although they were united in their aim, there were profound differences concerning how restitution should be made. As a result, there was a great deal of friction among these various camps. The other actors in the restitution movement were particularly suspicious of the private attorneys, whose motivation they distrusted. The tone of the debate grew less diplomatic, especially concerning the conflict of the assets Switzerland. Instead, media campaigns took on great significance. Whereas the Clinton administration always took its bilateral relations with Switzerland into account alongside its aims for restitution policy, other actors, such as the World Jewish Congress and the private attorneys, were interested in waging a media battle designed to bring the accusations to a head. The individual American states, likewise, cared little about possible international repercussions. Instead, they challenged Washington’s foreign policy monopoly, just as they had during the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the 1980s. The threat that individual American states might impose sanctions put more pressure not only on Switzerland but also on the U.S. administration, with the threat often more effective than the sanctions themselves in spurring crucial advances in negotiations. In general, this led to a new configuration totally unlike the quiet backdoor diplomacy of the restitution debates of the postwar years. In the controversy of the 1990s, the idea of government as a central and solitary actor had lost its validity, resulting in a less controlled debate with less predictable consequences. A variety of actors had to ratify any agreement that was made in order to become viable, and this heterogeneity made the conflict explosive and intense. Yet, in spite of all the U.S. administration’s complaints, this intensity undoubtedly made the U.S. actors more effective and put more pressure on Switzerland. For a long time, Switzerland counted on the supposed status quo of the Cold War era being maintained and imagined, falsely, that the country was safe with regard to restitution policy. This not only cost Switzerland its moral legitimacy but also dramatically raised the price of an agreement with U.S. actors.

The U.S. Politics of History in the 1990s

The expansion of the restitution debate to include Western Europe led to a drastic change in U.S. policy: Whereas the U.S. support for Jewish restitution demands in Eastern Europe aimed to generally transform economic policy, once the issue spread to Switzerland,
U.S. involvement turned from pure restitution politics to a more comprehensive politics of history. It no longer aimed just to have stolen property restored to its owners but also to critically revise the historical narratives of the postwar period. This shift would profoundly influence the self-image of the affected states, as well as how they would choose to remember the murder of millions of Jews and integrate the Holocaust into their national historical narratives.

In 1995, President Bill Clinton appointed Stuart E. Eizenstat as special envoy for property claims in Central and Eastern Europe and later made him special envoy for Holocaust issues. This step made clarifying the unfinished business of World War II restitution claims a central component of the Clinton administration’s political agenda. In May 1996, Clinton promised the president of the World Jewish Congress, Edgar Bronfman, in a letter that he would provide the full support of the U.S. government for restitution demands in Western Europe, arguing that it was a question of justice and an issue of great moral consequence. In October 1996, Clinton then announced the launch of an investigative report on the restitution policies of the U.S. and its Allies in relation to the transfer of wealth within German-controlled territory, as well as on Switzerland’s role as a financial hub. With the Eizenstat Report, which was published in 1997, the behavior of the United States and its Allies also came under fire. This not only broadened the conflict over the “shadow of the Second World War” but also qualitatively transformed it, particularly in relation to Holocaust remembrance. This was because Eizenstat’s programmatic orientation for the report went beyond criticizing restitution policies during the war and the postwar period and demanding financial resolution of the open asset issues. Eizenstat aimed to conduct a “Crusade for Justice” that would not only resolve these issues but also problematize the national historical images of the war and postwar period. Thus, he entered into the contested field of historical-political narratives. Eizenstat’s declaration that “We must not enter a new century without completing the unfinished business of this century” became a leitmotif of U.S. policy.

The Eizenstat Report and the Crisis of National Postwar Myths

There were two reasons the Clinton administration opted not only to work to restore material assets but also to address historical omissions. First of all, the societal amnesia of the postwar period concerning Nazi looting practices had actually resulted in inadequate

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6 It is important to always point out that this was a long process within the Clinton administration as well. For example, the U.S. ambassador to Switzerland, Larry Lawrence, assured U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher of his trust in Swiss banking practices as late as summer 1995 and advised against diplomatic intervention because he regarded the accusations against the Swiss banks as unfounded. See “Cable Embassy Bern to Secretary of State, Subject: Swiss Bank Accounts of Holocaust Victims: Possible Visit To Switzerland,” July 1995, Library of Congress, Eizenstat Papers, Folder CEE (property) / Miscellaneous, Paxton Box 23.


8 Stuart E. Eizenstat, U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II. Preliminary Study (Washington, 1997).

information about the looting and the deficits in restitution policy for that time. The rush to the National Archives in Washington in the mid-1990s revealed how rudimentary the state of historical knowledge actually was. The conflict within the Tripartite Gold Commission concerning the commingling of stolen gold with gold from Holocaust victims exemplifies this issue. Consequently, it was necessary to reconstruct and work through these matters in order to clarify the open restitution questions, as the Clinton administration demanded, by the end of the twentieth century. In the context of addressing these historical issues, the United States pushed to get international sources opened to research and national historical commissions established.

The second reason for the Clinton administration’s approach to the politics of history was the programmatic orientation of the “Crusade for Justice.” Establishing justice was seen as only partly a financial matter; it also included the moral and political task of working through one’s history and responsibilities. Within this orientation, the aim of the restitution debate was to draw the nations into a process of reconciliation. The national investigative commissions would have a great responsibility to raise awareness for their nations’ histories and omissions. Thus, the Clinton administration regarded the “unfinished business” as an encumbrance on international relations. Each nation’s working through its postwar history and establishing foundations was to foster a reconciliation that also had an important foreign policy component. On a general, strategic level, this approach could be observed in the development of a New Transatlantic Agenda in 1995. The Western world was supposed to step into the twenty-first century after the catastrophes of the twentieth without the burden of the unfinished business of the postwar period. Of central importance for the U.S. administration was the affected countries’ willingness to acknowledge their historical mistakes and shortcomings, although the present governments were not to be blamed for these. The process of clarification was also supposed to lead to a new cohesion of Western states to replace the dissolving glue of the Cold War confrontation. In other words, the United States was also finding ways to continue with the project of the American century and to remain an “indispensable nation” (Madeleine Albright) in the new geostrategic configuration.

“Building a Framework for American Leadership in the 21st Century” was the practical political task that the United States had set itself in


the 1990s, and not only in its foreign policy objectives. As Madeleine Albright put it in 1997, “The great divide in the world today is not between East and West or North and South; it is between those who are prisoners of history and those determined to shape history ... That is the same choice America faced 50 years ago in the aftermath of World War II.” In this context, the gradually developing awareness of the murder of the European Jewish population took on special significance—not only within the historically specific framework of particular victims, perpetrators and crimes but, more importantly, as a moral-ideological guideline that forged a link among nations in the system of Western values after the end of the Cold War. This orientation shows that the aim of drawing conclusions from the crimes of the Second World War also impacted the course of U.S. foreign policy, making Holocaust remembrance a component of the discourse of legitimation during the Clinton era. However, this was not a linear process but involved a highly contested field upon which various groups tried to occupy Holocaust remembrance for themselves.

Both the historical reconstruction of Nazi looting policies and the collaboration it involved, as well as concern about new Western cohesion after the end of the Cold War, motivated the United States to work through the shortcomings of restitution policies from the postwar period from the perspective of a new politics of history. Significantly, this approach strengthened and accelerated the gradual process, begun in the 1980s, of challenging Europe’s national postwar myths. The U.S. insistence on challenging these myths deeply influenced the self-image of the affected states; U.S. criticism brought about a paradigm shift that delegitimized the great narratives of restitution policy and made a new perspective on these myths possible. This gave more weight to interpretations primarily of a younger generation of historians that criticized national meta-narratives and pointed to blind spots in the writing of history. The Cold War image that divided nations into perpetrator countries, victim countries, neutral observers and, in the case of the United States, rescuer countries began to break apart. The dichotomies of the Cold War period dissolved. In their place, a debate about the various types of collaboration and different countries’ share of the guilt led to a new perception of the Holocaust as a phenomenon that affected the entire Western world. This, then, was the debate the U.S. pushed on the European states, powerfully propelling the process of internationalizing remembrance and decontextualizing the Shoah and radically changing the self-perception of the Western countries in relation to Nazi crimes.


16 Ibid., 3.

17 It should be noted that the U.S. administration did not instigate the crisis about national postwar myths but merely gave it greater weight and made it more politically relevant. In postwar Western societies, a critical rewriting of history that criticized self-legitimating historical national images was already underway before the 1990s. However, such perspectives were marginalized both in the sociopolitical realm and academia.
The U.S. politics of history transformed and expanded Holocaust remembrance in three crucial ways. First, the perception of Shoah victims changed—not least because of the internal dynamics of this U.S. politics of history—after all, it was the shortcomings in restitution and compensation policies toward individual victims that comprised the core of the so-called unfinished business. If it appeared at first glance as though the United States would, in the 1990s, take a restitution approach similar to that of the immediate postwar period, a closer examination revealed a fundamental difference. It was no longer national interests in restitution that stood in the center but rather the fate of individual victims and the way they had been ignored during the Cold War. The previous practice of forcing Western integration to the detriment of the interests of individual victims became obsolete when the Eastern Bloc imploded. Thus, the U.S. shift in restitution policy corresponds to a changed view of the victims of National Socialism that puts them in the center after a long period of relative marginalization. Only when the Cold War ended did societies become aware of the inadequacy with which questions concerning assets of individual victims had been addressed.

Second, in the course of overcoming what Avi Beker called the “conspiracy of silence,” a new perspective on the Second World War and the annihilation of European Jews emerged. This perspective viewed the Holocaust not only as the largest systematic and planned murder of human beings but also placed it in the context of one of the largest looting and expropriation campaigns in history. Eizenstat’s statement, “The Holocaust was not only the worst genocide in history but also perhaps history’s greatest theft,” describes this shift toward integrating the systematic plunder into remembrance of the Shoah. This achieved in Shoah reception and in the sociopolitical conflict about restitution and compensation what Raul Hilberg had already worked out in his three-volume standard work on The Destruction of the European Jews in 1961: the interweaving of plunder and extermination. This demonstrates, too, that the restitution policy debates of the 1990s did not really have to do with new knowledge but with the reappropriation and dissemination of what had long been ignored. This perception reflects the dynamics of the 1990s debate: after all, it was primarily concerned with the material consequences of National Socialist looting policy, which now came to be understood as an integral part of the Nazi policy of genocide.

Third, this reception of the Holocaust, which sought to rectify the lack of individual restitution and stressed the role of looting as an

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18 Stuart Eizenstat, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Holocaust Issues, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, April 5, 2000, at http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/2000/000405_eizenstat_holocau.html. Interview Gerald Feldman.

19 Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1990).
integral aspect of the extermination of European Jews, led to a new perception of the relative weight and relationship of the Holocaust and the Second World War. The Independent Commission of Experts in Switzerland commented on changes in Second World War historiography in its concluding report: “A historical presentation that integrates the Holocaust leads to different interpretations than one that is limited to the challenges of the war.”20 This corrected the dominant perspective of the postwar period in which historical questions focused on the war, and restitution policy concentrated on the nation-states. This new view was especially important to Western European countries in the context of European rapprochement.

Memory and Restitution: On Historical Memory and the Material Conflict about Holocaust-Era Assets

The reanimation of the restitution question in Eastern Europe after the end of the bipolar world order and its extension to Western European countries lead not only to a large number of material funding decisions and new foundations. Whereas the first restitution debate in the immediate postwar period put material issues front and center, a key characteristic of the 1990s debate was its close connection to the politics of historical memory. How to remember these crimes, what to emphasize, and, above all, what consequences they had for the present and future—all became crucial to the discussion. The development of this link between restitution and historical memory, that is, the movement “from money to memory,” can be clearly discerned in the three principal conferences of the restitution debate in London in 1997, in Washington in 1998, and in Stockholm in 2000.

The 1997 London Conference on Nazi Gold

The main task of the London Conference on Nazi Gold was to discuss the extent of Nazi looting of gold as well as its international distribution during the Second World War. Tied to this was the question of what restitution steps had previously been taken and how one should henceforth proceed with restitution efforts. Thus, the conference built upon the Eizenstat Report and the studies of the British Foreign Ministry on Nazi gold.21 The idea of holding an international conference on this issue derived, at least partly, from the unanswered questions about the composition of the Tripartite Gold Commission’s gold, especially the extent to which it included Holocaust victims’ gold.22 Thus, the conference was not supposed to generate a conversation

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on who owed what to whom but rather to compile empirical and historical information on the whereabouts of the Nazi gold. In addition, this gathering was expected to imbue the issue with momentum.23 Strictly speaking, it was not intended to be a restitution conference; no concrete political steps were planned. Rather, the conference aimed to prompt research on Holocaust-era assets and to anchor the topic in a broader international discussion. For this to happen, each affected state had to be ready to critically assess its role in the Second World War as well as its postwar restitution efforts.24

At first, the British government was not enthusiastic about an international conference. Although British Foreign Minister Rifkind declared that he was not principally opposed to such a meeting on stolen assets, he doubted that it would be productive.25 Whereas Great Britain wanted to limit the conference to Nazi gold, the U.S. government sought to include other Holocaust-era assets, including insurance policies and looted art, in the discussions.26 Great Britain, in return, expressed concern that a host of countries would be extremely sensitive about expanding the discussion, which would endanger the conference’s chances of success.27 Britain’s reservations clearly showed how great international worries about further restitution demands were and how cautiously diplomatic circles approached the issue. Therefore, in the run-up to the conference, the British government asked the U.S. government not to associate the upcoming conference with any demands for restitution.28

The public was largely excluded from the proceedings, which attested to the great explosive political power the issue continued to have. The transparency British Foreign Minister Robin Cook spoke of—“We must be open”29—was just lip service. As Gerard Aalders, a Senior Researcher at the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) in Amsterdam, noted, a “wall of silence surrounded the discussions about what was probably the greatest gold robbery in the history of humanity.”30 In his opening statement, Stuart Eizenstat demanded that the London Conference make a moral gesture as well as a material contribution to justice for victims and survivors.31
The conference consisted primarily of reports by the various countries on the status of investigations into Nazi gold. These reports revealed a wide range of perspectives on the issue but yielded little new knowledge. Switzerland’s Bergier commission’s report was an exception, presenting new figures for the amount of Nazi gold transferred to Switzerland. These figures were of great political importance, especially to the Clinton administration, because they supported the basic statements of the first Eizenstat Report from May 1997. As a result, the United States singled out Switzerland for praise at the Nazi gold conference, noting that the Bergier commission and its investigation of the Swiss past attested to Switzerland’s willingness to address the unresolved questions of its history. By praising Switzerland as pioneering, Eizenstat demonstrated one of the characteristics of the 1990s restitution debate: The Clinton administration’s “Crusade for Justice” was not about assigning blame. Rather, it aimed to initiate a process of clarification that, as explained in the preface to the Eizenstat report, would not burden the present and the future of the affected countries but relieve them of a historical burden. The majority of European countries did not understand this approach; instead, they regarded the entire process and its implicit exposure of guilt and responsibility as a threat to be avoided.

One step the United States demanded from the beginning was the opening of archives. This was part of its political directive to examine war and postwar history particularly from the perspective of failures and omissions and thus to take care of any unfinished business. However, the U.S. had difficulty getting this demand fulfilled because the topic was still so explosive that many countries were reluctant to cooperate. France and Great Britain, for example, opposed the release of the Tripartite Gold Commission’s files, thus violating the principle of openness they themselves had advocated.

A key issue at the conference was what to do with the remaining gold of the Tripartite Gold Commission now that Albania, the last claimant, had received its share in October 1996. The Clinton administration favored a solution that would benefit individual victims; this would involve creating a fund comprised of the Commission’s remaining gold stocks. Eizenstat and British Foreign Minister Robin Cook officially presented this solution at the London conference, and Eizenstat declared that the United States would deposit $25 million into the fund. The country delegations present responded very positively to this idea, with pledges for payments far exceeding U.S. expectations. Eizenstat closed the conference with a reminder...

that set the tone of his entire involvement in the restitution question: “We must not enter a new century without completing the unfinished business of this century. We have a collective responsibility to leave this century having spared no effort to establish the truth, and to do justice.”

As Aalders put it, however, “the results of the conference were rather sparse.” The London Conference did not yield binding agreements. To be sure, it had shown how the issue of Nazi gold had attracted increasing attention internationally and could no longer be ignored. Restitution of Nazi gold, it had become clear, was an international problem that was not yet resolved. This heightened awareness constituted a success for those who had advocated clarifying these open questions. Yet most delegates took a wait-and-see approach and were reluctant to take action. The British delegation came under pressure because it had kept a completed report on Great Britain secret in order to avoid negative headlines in the press. Delegates were similarly hesitant to take up the U.S. suggestion to coordinate international research efforts and open archives.

Nonetheless, the U.S. government was quite satisfied with the achievements of the conference. “The London Conference on Nazi Gold greatly strengthened international momentum for further measures to compensate victims of Nazi persecution,” the State Department declared in its first internal assessment. The conference had actually made the expansion of the debate about unresolved asset questions a broad international issue that ever fewer countries could evade. Under the slogan “Completing Work This Century,” Eizenstat announced a follow-up conference in Washington in 1998 at the end of the proceedings. This conference was supposed to broaden the spectrum of Holocaust-era assets to be discussed beyond gold.

This planned follow-up ensured that the London conference would not remain a mere episode. Thus, the conference increased pressure on the various states to critically examine their history and question national myths about collaboration and restitution. In terms of its concrete results, the London Conference on Nazi Gold was not as Eizenstat claimed in his closing speech, a “landmark event,” but it did become a central component in U.S. government efforts...
to address postwar myths and restitution issues by the end of the twentieth century.

The 1998 Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets

The conference on Holocaust-era assets that took place in Washington DC from November 30 to December 3, 1998, was conceived as a follow-up to the London conference. Fifty-seven delegations from forty-four countries and thirteen non-governmental organizations took part. The subject of Nazi gold was only addressed marginally; instead, previously neglected Holocaust-era assets such as insurance policies and stolen art stood at the center of the conference.45 This expansion of the issue had caused the date of the conference to be postponed several times. Although the conference was originally planned for early 1998, the State Department and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum ended up holding a series of smaller preparatory conferences to discuss details of various assets over the course of the year. The Art Loss Registry, especially, was supposed to help galleries and museums ensure they did not acquire stolen artworks.46 These preparatory meetings attest to the meticulousness with which the Washington conference was planned. The meetings not only provided substantive preparation on the issues but also drew the various states into an intensive preliminary exchange and discussion that mooted strategic policy options for the restitution of stolen assets ahead of the conference.

Like the London Conference, the Washington conference was not intended to be a forum for individual governments to make decisions but rather a gathering of various governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Concrete material and monetary demands for restitution of stolen assets were not supposed to figure as part of the conference.47 Instead, according to Eizenstat, the conference was supposed to contribute to creating a non-binding international consensus on principles and procedures for dealing with restitution demands concerning these types of assets and thus to give restitution policy new momentum at the century’s end. The exploration of unresolved Holocaust-era assets was intended, as in London, to function as a catalyst that would draw ever more countries into the debate.48

As James D. Bindenagel, the U.S. Official Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues from 1999 to 2001, explained, the social and political significance of the conference extended far beyond the concrete question of restitution of Holocaust-era assets. Rather, an open and consensual resolution of these long repressed questions constituted

45 Interview John Becker.
a key condition for Europe’s successful transition from the historical Europe of the twentieth century to the transatlantic community of the twenty-first—a project that was supposed to give the Western world a new geopolitical structure after the collapse of the bipolar world order. That leading representatives of the Clinton administration contextualized the Washington conference in this way reveals the extent to which the administration’s “Crusade for Justice” was also part of a programmatic foreign policy reorientation after the end of the Cold War. The U.S.-led debate thus had the function of creating a new coherence for the Western world now that the geostrategic binding agent of the postwar era had been lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this context, the preservation and restoration of property titles assumed central importance. In her keynote address to the Washington conference, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared that reestablishing justice was one of the key aims of the U.S. government, but that the participating states’ commitment to resolving resolution issues had a two-fold purpose: First, the unresolved material questions pertaining to Holocaust-era assets were to be openly aired and resolved. Second, the memory of the Holocaust, research on the Holocaust, and the dissemination of knowledge about it must be advanced. The first process, though painful, would have a cathartic effect on the affected countries, but the second aim constituted a continuing task that each generation would have to take up anew. With these words, Albright pointed to a central feature of the conference: Although the conflict about material questions still stood at its center, the U.S. government also wished to anchor the issue of Holocaust memory in the international debate. Consequently, the Washington conference can be interpreted as the turning point at which the agenda began to shift from restitution policy to the politics of historical memory.

Since the issue of Nazi gold was regarded as largely settled after the 1998 global agreement with Switzerland, the Washington conference changed the focus from Nazi gold to other looted assets. It did not deal with reparations for forced laborers, even though this subject played a central role in public debates at that time. This exclusion reveals the diplomatic strategy behind the conference: The Washington conference was not to interfere with negotiations then underway with Germany on this issue. Whereas the London conference had mainly focused on material issues, the Washington conference addressed questions concerning the politics of historical memory. As a result, the Washington conference marked the transition in
the politics of history from “money to memory.” The conference thus initiated a shift toward questions of education and the politics of history, accompanied by attention to Holocaust education, remembrance, and research. The backdrop to this development was the founding, in 1998, of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research. The Task Force was officially presented to a broader public at the Washington conference in December 1998. Already in the opening speeches of the conference, speakers mentioned the Task Force and called for increased efforts in the areas of Holocaust education, remembrance, and research. Although the Washington conference was clearly focused on restitution policy, the issue of Holocaust memory and education thus had a strong presence. In his concluding statement, Eizenstat asked participating states to accept the Swedish government’s invitation to attend a conference on precisely these historical-political issues in Stockholm in 2000. Consequently, with the close of the Washington conference, the subject of restitution moved from direct political debate to the realm of culture.

The Holocaust as a Cultural Code: The 2000 Stockholm Holocaust Conference

The Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in 2000 saw the emergence of a new kind of cultural memory in which the Holocaust became an emblematic memory for the twentieth century. This first major conference of the new century consisted of a discussion of values among Western states that was centered on the Holocaust as a negative historical example.

The various restitution funds and foundations that were set up under substantial pressure from the U.S. in the 1990s had brought conclusion to the material and legal aspects of the restitution debates. The Clinton administration now strove to shift the perspective from material questions to questions of memory for the new century. As Eizenstat stated, “[a]s we proceed with addressing Holocaust-related issues, it is important to move from money to memory. The last word on the Holocaust should be the memory of its victims and the teaching of its enduring

53 See Interview Bennett Freeman; Interview James Bindenagel.
lessons.”59 This implied a transformation in Holocaust remembrance that would involve a considerable amount of conflict over the use and representation of the past. Made ever more universal, Holocaust remembrance came to be closely associated with human rights policy—a sort of template applied to present conflicts, as Eizenstat illustrated in this remark: “The horrors of the Holocaust provided a lesson applicable to contemporary events ... The focus on human rights violations from Chechnya to China resonates with Holocaust-related issues.”60 Whereas the period 1945 to 1989 was characterized by disagreements over facts, now the debate shifted to the use of the Holocaust and its memory for the present. As the Holocaust was interpreted as the diametrical opposite of a society based on human rights, Western democratic societies began to appear as embodying the lessons of the destructive tendencies of the twentieth century. The Holocaust remembrance that established itself at the Stockholm Holocaust conference thus seemed to resemble the historical-political function of the Americanization of the Holocaust.

In the context of this conference, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider note that avoidance of a new Holocaust became a fundamental principle underlying an official European Holocaust memory. The pattern of legitimation for this official memory would then apply to both military and non-military interventions in the future. On the pragmatic consequences that this decontextualized Holocaust remembrance would have on politics, Levy and Sznaider write: “The way a state treats its citizens is now of concern to all of humanity, and the conflict between international law, which guarantees state sovereignty, and human rights, which challenge this sovereignty, is reflected in the latest developments in world politics. The key question in this conflict of memories is to whom the Holocaust ‘belongs’ in the final analysis.”61 The Stockholm conference witnessed the emergence of a Holocaust memory that placed the Holocaust and its lessons in the context of human rights policy and the notion of limited state immunity, which implied the possibility of military intervention when human rights are not upheld. This perspective gave the Nazi practice of looting and extermination new importance as a negative historical example that had been overcome. However, similar to the development of Holocaust remembrance in the United States since the late 1970s, the Stockholm conference exhibited some ambiguity in Holocaust interpretation: Whereas Jewish NGOs, in particular, pushed for more intensive engagement with and teaching of the Shoah, the official state approach was to implement a transnational,
Western Holocaust narrative that did not primarily present the Shoah as a historical event but used it to legitimate certain political options and policies.

The Stockholm Holocaust conference illustrated how the U.S. politics of history of the 1990s transformed the Shoah into a central point of reference for the destructive tendencies of the twentieth century while also granting Nazi victims a central position. Yet this transformation—which was necessary and long overdue for raising awareness of historical shortcomings in restitution and reparation policy—at the same time also led to the Shoah becoming decontextualized and abstracted, particularly in relation to how the victims are perceived. This is because it was marked by a turn away from the perpetrators because this new narrative of remembrance focused on the victims rather than the perpetrators. Michael Jeismann describes this shift as follows: “Remembrance thus loses its specificity because it is not the perpetrators but the victims who are being remembered ... In other words: Although it [Holocaust remembrance] is still about a specific, German past, this past serves primarily as an example of genocidal tendencies that can break out anywhere in the world.”62 In this new narrative of remembrance, the individual fates of the victims represent a generalized, universal victim. Any persecuted group can take the position of the victim within it. Levy and Sznaider therefore speak of the Holocaust as a universal “container” that can serve the remembrance of a variety of victims.63 This shift in the politics of memory, which the Stockholm conference exemplified, made it possible to generalize the lessons of the Holocaust and apply them to current cases in the political realm.

In the 1990s, in the course of the crisis of national postwar myths, a culture of admitting guilt developed in which addressing the failures and shortcomings of the postwar period became a badge of moral rectitude.64 This process was furthered by the Clinton administration’s political approach, which judged countries not on past deeds but on their present willingness to address these historical issues. Even as the historical-political debates of the 1990s showed how Western postwar societies’ view of the Second World War had been distorted by myths, the debates about politics of memory surrounding the Stockholm Holocaust conference laid the groundwork for a new founding myth. The central reference to the Holocaust in Western discourse that took shape in Stockholm did not reflect a sustained engagement with the extermination of European Jews but the emergence of what Ronit Lentin has called the “Auschwitz

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62 Michael Jeismann, Auf Wiedersehen Gestern (Munich, 2001), 56.
63 Levy and Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter, 223.
the real, historical event grew blurry, was trivialized and dehistoricized. Collective memory was forced into public rituals and ceremonies. In this new narrative, the break in civilization known as “Auschwitz” no longer represented a stain on Western modernity and a basic philosophical dilemma that cast serious doubt on the progress-oriented optimism so deeply ingrained in Western Enlightenment culture. Instead, official remembrance of the Holocaust became a part of a “Western progressive narrative” that was proactively oriented toward the future. Linked with a discourse on human rights, this narrative constituted a negative point of reference for the Western canon of values, representing the antithesis of democracy and human rights within a new, post-Cold War transatlantic order.

At the Stockholm conference, heads of state warned of societies sliding back into barbarism, and the prevention of genocidal crimes was declared a moral imperative. The concrete historical event was no longer the point of departure for historical memory, but the Holocaust became merely a discursive negative point of reference—at least until the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Similar to the Americanization of the Holocaust, this development—which prompted an analogous Europeanization as Europe sought to catch up—gave the Holocaust mainly a legitimizing function. The Holocaust served as a global lesson. The Shoah in its reception was now no longer a German and Jewish question but became, through the internationalization of its remembrance, a universal point of orientation, though it had a variety of different functions. Thus Gerd Wiegel has argued that the Holocaust is serving as a new master narrative for the Western world. The Holocaust narrative was torn from the various national narratives and transformed into a universal moral imperative.

The break in civilization “Auschwitz” became a cautionary tale of evil. As Ronit Lentin has argued, “[n]o society can ‘remember’ the extermination outside the discourses used to narrate, or ‘memorize’ it. The Shoah has been ‘remembered’, ‘forgotten’, ‘re-interpreted’, and ‘historicized’ in different historical periods and different social and political climates.” The U.S. politics of history, therefore, can be understood as instigating a process that transformed the postwar Holocaust narrative and embedded it in a new, transnational meta-narrative wherein the lessons of Auschwitz lead to universal moral responsibility for human rights. This reference to the Holocaust had the pragmatic political function of legitimating actions—including military ones—directed against circumstances that could be discursively associated with Auschwitz.

68 Lentin, “Postmemory,” 5.
In conclusion, the dehistoricization and decontextualization of the Shoah has allowed it to serve as a point of orientation in central social and political debates, especially on issues of human rights, with important foreign-policy implications. This transformation in Shoah remembrance occurred at the very moment when the number of historical witnesses who could testify and thus influence the nature of this remembrance rapidly declined. The U.S. politics of history of the 1990s is relevant not only because it influenced the restitution debates of the 1990s but also because it provided the discursive foundation for a new era in the politics of history and remembrance. The dehistoricized and decontextualized Shoah became the focal point of a new narrative of remembrance that influenced the entire Western world.

Translated by Patricia C. Sutcliffe and Richard F. Wetzel

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Forum: The German Foreign Office and the Nazi Past
FORUM:
THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE
AND THE NAZI PAST

In 2005, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer announced the appointment of an independent commission of historians to investigate the history of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) during the Nazi era and the early postwar period. The commission published its findings in October 2010 in the book *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* [The Foreign Office and the Past: German Diplomats in the Third Reich and the Federal Republic], by Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and Moshe Zimmermann (Munich: Blessing, 2010). The book quickly attracted attention, became a bestseller, and triggered a wide-ranging public debate in Germany. In March 2011, the German Historical Institute in Washington hosted a panel discussion about the book, in which two members of the commission, Norbert Frei (University of Jena) and Peter Hayes (Northwestern University), were joined by two other scholars, Christopher Browning (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) and Miriam Rürup (GHI), and the German Ambassador to the United States, Klaus Scharioth. To introduce readers to the book and the debate it prompted, this issue of the *Bulletin* presents an overview by Norbert Frei and Peter Hayes along with assessments of the book by Christopher Browning, Johannes Hürter (Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich), Holger Nehring (University of Sheffield), and Volker Ullrich (Hamburg).
THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE PAST

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Das Amt und die Vergangenheit, the report of the Independent Historians Commission that Joschka Fischer appointed in 2005 to examine the history of the German Foreign Office and Nazism both before and after 1945, has aroused widespread popular interest and considerable scholarly controversy in Germany since the book appeared in October 2010. The critical reactions have included constructive and well-taken elements, but several also have shown a troubling tendency to mischaracterize the work’s contents, source base, and process of composition. Fortunately, academic discourse operates on the principle that the best answer to heat is light. As a result, Hans Mommsen’s reckless claim that Das Amt had made no use of the published documentary collection Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik dissipated in the face of the reality that the book cited this compendium tens of times. One hopes that Richard Evans’ recent spurious charge that we were ignorant of such English-language publications as Donald McKale’s two books on Curt Prüfer also will evaporate once readers notice that both titles appear in the bibliography to Das Amt, contrary to Evans’ explicit assertion. Similarly, the canard spread by Johannes Hürter (and in softer form by Evans) that the members of the Historians’ Commission merely edited the book should disappear as people discern what we thought we had made clear in the appendix entitled “Nachwort und Dank,” namely that each chapter emerged through a process of repeated give and take among the drafters named there and the member of the Commission primarily responsible for the relevant time period or topic and then at successive sessions of the Commission.

In view of the extent of misinformation about Das Amt that is currently in circulation, we especially welcome this opportunity to present the main findings of our work in English.

1 Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and Moshe Zimmermann, Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010); hereafter simply: Das Amt.
2 Hans Mommsen, “‘Das ist schon ein ziemlicher Makel,’ Hans Mommsen im Gespräch mit Christoph Schmitz,” Deutschlandfunk, 30 November 2010.
3 Compare Richard J. Evans, “The German Foreign Office and the Nazi Past,” Neue Politische Literatur 56 (2011), 173, to Das Amt, 845. Why Evans insists that Prüfer should have figured prominently in our text is puzzling. Though he doctored his wartime diaries after 1945, neither the original nor the false version was published until 1988, and neither played a part in postwar myth-making about the Foreign Office. Had we made much of Prüfer’s machinations, critics would have pointed out rightly that they were as irrelevant as he was, since he did not return to the German diplomatic service. This is not the only example of Evans’ carelessness: his reference to “Werner” Blankenhorn stands out (180, the man’s first name was Herbert), as does his puzzling reproach that we “failed to deal with the preparation of an illegal and criminal war of aggression” (174). This is not just descriptively untrue, but the assertion that this aspect of the Foreign Office’s history should have bulked larger in our account also overlooks the fact that, among all ten senior diplomats tried after the war, only the two Foreign Ministers, Ribbentrop and Neurath, ultimately were convicted of this charge.
4 Johannes Hürter, “Das Auswärtige Amt, die NS-Diktatur und der Holocaust,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 59 (2011): 167, footnote 3; Evans, NPL, 169; Conze et al., Das Amt, 720. Both Hürter and Evans could and should have known better, since one of the Commission members and one of the drafters described the composition process quite clearly in “Die Debatte um ‘Das Amt’: Ein Interview mit Eckart Conze und Annette Weinke,” which appeared shortly after the interview took place on 21 February 2011; see http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.desite/40209039/Default.asp; last accessed on 13 April 2011.
I.

After Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on 30 January 1933, most German diplomats behaved just as they had been trained to do, as part of the machinery of their state. A few—the Ambassador in Washington and the Vice Consul in New York, notably—quickly realized that the Third Reich was not the state to which they had sworn allegiance and resigned. But, almost no one else in the German diplomatic corps followed suit. Instead, both individually and collectively the German Foreign Office adjusted rapidly to the new political priorities, most strikingly by reviving in March the recently dissolved Deutschland-Referat or German Desk to handle issues involving the interrelationship of domestic and foreign policy and by appointing Emil Schumburg, a career diplomat since 1926, to lead the Desk’s external defense of the nation’s new policies of discrimination and persecution. The process by which the Foreign Office came to act as a constituent part of an increasingly barbaric and criminal state began so spontaneously and automatically in the early days of the Nazi regime that one may speak justifiably of a Selbstgleichschaltung, a self-coordination with the so-called National Awakening.

As with other German elites, such as big business leaders and military commanders, cooperation with the New Order in Germany stemmed in the prewar years from a “partial identity of goals.” Virtually all of Germany’s diplomats shared with Hitler and the Nazis a desire to restore the nation’s power, throw off the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, and reacquire the lands lost in 1918. Drawn overwhelmingly from Germany’s upper classes, indeed from the aristocracy, the upper echelon of the Foreign Office also shared the prevailing antisemitism, which led many leading diplomats, including Ernst von Weizsäcker, to justify Nazi anti-Jewish policies from their inception as an understandable reaction to a supposed “inundation” of German society and culture by Jews (“Judenüberschwemmung”) during the 1920s. After war began in 1939, Germany’s enemies multiplied, and the Foreign Office’s representations and traditional tasks abroad declined correspondingly. A new incentive to cooperate with the Nazi leadership thus arose, namely the need to preserve the institution and the careers and influence of its members by demonstrating indispensability to the regime in other capacities and ways. As a result, a continuous blurring of the lines between Party organizations and the Foreign Office took place throughout the Nazi era. The trend gathered force less because of the insertion of numerous National Socialists into leading bureaucratic positions than because of the

massive flow of senior civil servants into the NSDAP and the SS and the Nazification of the training and the promotion standards for the next generation of officials. Until 1943, Hitler blocked Ribbentrop’s attempts to purge the diplomatic personnel that the Nazi regime had inherited from the Weimar, in fact, largely from the Wilhelmine era. But in 1937-38, with the lifting of the ban on new party memberships imposed in mid-1933, and again in 1940, these diplomats and their would-be successors joined the Nazi Party in waves, and by then the preparatory courses for future diplomats had come to include tours of the concentration camp at Dachau and a reception hosted by the Führer at Berchtesgaden.\footnote{Das Amt, 63-68, 96-100, 112-23, 128-32, 140-43, 155, and 159.}

Both before and after 1939, dissent over the tactical wisdom of government policy occasionally arose within the Foreign Office. Thus, Foreign Office personnel sometimes delayed the denaturalization of prominent Germans who had gone into exile lest the move harm the Reich’s image. Similarly, State Secretary Weizsäcker and several associates tried in 1938-39 to impede the regime’s march toward war for fear that Germany could not win. And in 1941-43, many diplomats pointed out the politically counterproductive nature of German harshness toward the populace in the occupied East, maltreatment of the Eastern Workers brought to Germany, and round ups of laborers in Western Europe.

Regarding the persecution of the Jews, however, Weizsäcker and nearly all of his colleagues were implacable or indifferent, which amounted to the same thing. In 1938-39, Weizsäcker rejected any amelioration of antisemitic policy because that would make Germany appear weak and susceptible to outside pressure, and he blocked several proposals to increase the flow of Jewish emigrants. He took this hard line even though he already had told the Swiss envoy in Paris that Jews had to leave Germany “otherwise they are going surely sooner or later toward their complete annihilation” (“sonst gingen sie eben über kurz oder lang ihrer vollständigen Vernichtung entgegen”).\footnote{Das Amt, 173 (Source: Oscar Gauye, Gabriel Imboden, and Daniel Bourgeois, eds., Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz, v. 12: 1937-1938 (Bern: Benteli, 1994), Doc. 449, 15 November 1938, 1031.} In the months leading up to Hitler’s infamous address to the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, veteran diplomats attended and reported with satisfaction on the international conference at Evian that revealed how trapped Europe’s Jews were and then downplayed the prospect of international objections at the meeting following the November Pogrom that intensified the despoliation of Germany’s Jews. The implicitly murderous Madagascar Plan, though not the invention of the German Foreign Office, found its most vigorous proponent in Franz Rademacher, who took over the Desk for Jewish Affairs in the
German Section at the end of March 1940. Sent to Serbia in October 1941 in response to the efforts of Felix Benzler, the long-time diplomat who was serving as Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office to the Commander in Chief there, to rid himself of 8,000 Jews, Rademacher felt no inhibition upon his return to Berlin about entering the reason for his trip on his expense report as “Liquidation of Jews in Belgrade” (“Liquidation von Juden in Belgrad”).

Rademacher’s candor attests to the widespread awareness within the Foreign Office that the Vernichtung Weizsäcker had predicted was unfolding. Diplomats assigned as Liaison Men to the High Commands of each Army fighting on the eastern front filed periodic, sometimes graphic reports; in addition, the reports of the Einsatzgruppen, complete with tabulations of the killed, circulated among the Deputy Ministers and the Department Heads (Abteilungsleiter). When the deportation trains started to roll out of Germany, the Foreign Office merely asked the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) to consult it in advance so it would have time to prepare misleading responses to inquiries from “malevolent foreign countries” (“des böswilligen Auslands”). When similar transports began to depart from the occupied countries, diplomats occasionally warned about adverse effects on local public opinion, but the tepid and feeble nature of most of these interventions is exemplified by Weizsäcker’s decision merely to alter the wording of a memo on transports from France to say that the Foreign Office had “no objection” (“kein Einspruch”) rather than “no reservations” (“keine Bedenken”).

Long before many of the personnel of the News and Press Department, the Cultural Policy Department, and the Radio Policy Department convened at Krummhübel in April 1944 with representatives of the German missions to twelve European countries and heard detailed numerical summaries of the “executive measures” for “the physical removal of East European Jewry” (“Exekutiv-Maßnahmen” zur “physische[n] Beseitigung des Ostjudentums”), the leading personnel of the Foreign Office and its missions in Europe not only were fully informed about the Holocaust, but also had assumed central responsibility for “anti-Jewish propaganda abroad,” that is, in effect, for spreading justifications for mass murder.

In short, the Foreign Office during the Third Reich was the Foreign Office of the Third Reich. “Working toward the Führer” was as typical here as it was in most institutions in Nazi Germany. Das Amt intentionally avoids echoing the tendency in earlier scholarship to write of the “role” of the Foreign Office between 1933 and 1945 because

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9 Das Amt, 254.
10 Das Amt, 186-88, 208-14.
11 Das Amt, 181.
12 Das Amt, 229, 397 (Source: Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, Series E, v. II, Nr. 56, AA (Rademacher) an Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 20.3.1942). See also Werner von Bargen’s stance regarding deportations from Belgium; Das Amt, 242-43.
13 Das Amt, 197-99 (on the meeting), 199 for the quotation (Source: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Nachlass Schleier, NL.965/24 II, Amtliche Niederschrift der Zeugenaussage, 11 June 1946, 32, 36. On the propaganda, see Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
that phrasing implies that the Nazi regime and its Foreign Office were distinct in some way and opens the way to apologia. Of course, German diplomats did not all regard the Nazi regime with the same degree of enthusiasm and act identically. However, collaboration with and integration into the regime were the norm in the Foreign Office of this period, reluctance to cooperate exceptional, and resistance extremely rare.

II.

Such real resistance to the Nazi regime as is usually associated with the Foreign Office—resistance defined as action to bring down the Nazi state or sabotage its policies—actually came primarily from diplomats who were no longer active, including Albrecht von Bernstorff, Eduard Brücklmeier, Ulrich von Hassell, Otto Kiep, Richard Kuenzer, Herbert Mumm von Schwarzenstein, and Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenberg, and from individuals who were not really diplomats at all, having been recruited to carry out special assignments in the central offices, as were Hans Litter and Adam von Trott zu Solz, or abroad, as was Georg Duckwitz with the German Mission in Copenhagen. Heroic and rare exceptions among the professional diplomats were Hans Bernd von Haeften, the second man in the Cultural Policy Section, who participated in Helmuth James von Moltke’s Kreisau Circle, knew in advance of the plan to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944, and paid for that with his life later that year; Rudolf von Schelina of the Press Section, who passed information on the Holocaust to Carl Burchhardt in Switzerland and was caught up in the capture of the so-called “Red Orchestra” espionage organization and executed in December 1942; and Gerhart Feine of the German Mission in Hungary, who worked with the Swiss Vice-Consul in Budapest in the Fall of 1944 to place 50,000 Jews in the city under Swiss diplomatic protection.¹⁴

Among the 6,500 employees of the Foreign Office in 1943, one can count the total number of genuine resisters on one’s hands. That Adam von Trott claimed otherwise to his Gestapo interrogators and that Joseph Goebbels did so to the German people via the diaries he intended to publish hardly proves the contrary. Trott’s assertion was, first, an evasion—an attempt to avoid naming his few fellow conspirators by claiming that everyone around him was in on the plot—and, second, a justification—an assertion that he was not a lone traitor but the expression of general opinion. The regime’s pronouncements, including the relevant passages in the Goebbels diaries, had a different

¹⁴ On these figures, see the relevant entries in Historischer Dienst des Auswärtigen Amtes (ed.), Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes 1871-1945, 3 volumes (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2000, 2005, 2008), and Wolfgang Benz and Walter H. Pehle, eds., Lexikon des deutschen Widerstandes (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1994).
political valence but also were self-serving exaggerations. They were part of the Propaganda Minister’s desperate and fierce efforts in Nazism’s waning days to generate a new “stab in the back legend” and to shift the blame for what was befalling Germany.15

Given all of this, the limited extent of even oppositional sentiment, let alone action, in the Foreign Office that was reported in the only credible surviving contemporaneous document about political attitudes there prior to 1945 should come as no surprise. Its author, Fritz Kolbe, did not belong to either the Higher Service in the Foreign Office or the Nazi Party, but from the end of 1940 on, he managed the office of Ambassador Karl Ritter, the Foreign Office’s liaison with the German Army and an advisor to Ribbentrop on issues of war economy. In this capacity, Kolbe came in contact with a great many high-ranking members of the diplomatic corps and saw a host of secret documents. Beginning in August 1943, he began using his authorized trips to Bern in Switzerland to pass some of these documents to Allen Dulles, the station chief of the OSS, the American intelligence organization. In April 1945 Kolbe delivered a remarkable document of his own creation, a list of 241 employees of the Foreign Office still resident in Berlin at the end of March 1945, along with their titles, office locations, and Kolbe’s political evaluation of each.16 Of the 104 non-clerical personnel listed, Kolbe classified as “anti-Nazi and suitable for further employment” exactly 9 people, in other words, fewer than one in ten, and as “provisionally employable after a warning” another 28. As “unsuitable” and deserving of immediate dismissal and in most cases arrest, he listed the remaining 67 individuals, almost two-thirds of those he surveyed. To be sure, many of the diplomats who later claimed varying degrees of knowledge of wartime conspiracies against Hitler, such as Wilhelm Melchers and Herbert Blankenhorn, were no longer in Berlin in March 1945 and thus not evaluated by Kolbe, but even if one credits their autobiographical accounts, his ratios are telling. We have no reason to think that they did not apply to the entire German Foreign Service, including personnel posted abroad or in offices that had been evacuated from the capital.

The irony here, of course, is that Kolbe’s evaluations both discredit the myth of the Foreign Office as a bastion of opposition to the Third Reich and lend credence to those Germans who told the Allies in the early 1950s that finding qualified and experienced diplomats who did not have at least outwardly pro-Nazi pasts was almost impossible. Indeed, the task grew more difficult in the first years after the war,

16 Das Amt, 319-20 (Source: United States National Archives and Records Administration, RG 226, E190C, Box 07, Personal des Auswärtigen Amtes nach dem Stand Ende März 1945, 17 April 1945, enclosed in letter from 110 to Climax and Philip Horton, 19 April 1945).
since 7 of the 37 diplomats Kolbe labeled “provisionally employable” or “anti-Nazi” died then, 6 of them in Soviet captivity.

Yet, the former and future German diplomats who later emphasized this difficulty were the same people who built the postwar legend of the Foreign Office as an oppositional bastion. Chief among them was Wilhelm Melchers, and that fact, too, has an ironic side. For Melchers appears to have engaged in retrospective projection of his own wily earlier behavior and motives onto many of his colleagues. Having been careful to keep his fingerprints off anything highly incriminating, even as Consul in Haifa in 1938-39 and thereafter in Berlin as head of the Orient Desk, which encompassed the Near East and entailed close relations with the Mufti of Jerusalem, Melchers, whose Party membership dates from the day Germany invaded Poland, even had an act that saved lives to his credit, albeit one that resulted from purely pragmatic considerations. In hopes of keeping Turkey neutral in the war, he had obstructed the SS’s desire to round up Turkish Jews residing in Europe until Turkey decided to permit the repatriation of at least some of them.17

The story of how the image of the Foreign Office and Nazism came to diverge profoundly from the reality described here did not begin with Melchers, although he was the author of decisive contributions to the process. Herbert Blankenhorn, who spoke good English thanks to his service at the German Embassy in Washington in 1936-39, laid the foundation for a romanticized postwar image in a report written for his American captors in early June 1945 entitled “The German Foreign Office under the Nazi Regime.” Following up on his earlier disarming admission that “we were all guilty for submitting to such a regime,” the report depicted Ernst von Weizsäcker as the leader of a long and losing rear guard action on the part of professional diplomats in the Foreign Office against the relentless ascent of amateurish and ignorant National Socialist appointees. The document also listed 30 “professional officials” in the central sections of the Office, including Blankenhorn himself, who had entered the diplomatic service before 1933, become merely nominal Nazis whom the Party distrusted, and been “outspoken opponents of the regime.”18 Blankenhorn thus expanded the number of alleged anti-Nazis in the Ministry well beyond Kolbe’s 9 and their presence well beyond the Cultural Policy Section where Haeften and Trott had worked. Needless to say, Blankenhorn did not specify to whom and how these people had been “outspoken,” and the diaries of Marie Vassiltchikov, a translator in the Foreign Office who was close to several of the conspirators of July 1944, indicate

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18 Das Amt, 337-38 for the admission (Source: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, RG 65, Entry 136 AB, Box 154, FBI File on Blankenhorn, Interrogation of Mr. Blankenhorn, 14 April 1945, 6-8). For the report and the accompanying correspondence identifying its author, see RG 59, Central Decimal File 1945-49, 840.414/6-745, Box 5702; the quoted words and the list appear on pages 8-10.
that he, in fact, was anything but.19 Three months later, in September 1945, Emil von Rintelen, the former director of the Political Section, reinforced Blankenhorn’s claims by providing an American general with political evaluations of 72 senior personnel in the central sections, rating 28 of them as “reserved” or “critical” toward Nazism.20 And, in October in Shanghai, Erich Kordt, who had been attached to the German embassies in faraway Japan and then China since February 1941, gave American intelligence a list of 40 diplomats posted both at home and abroad “whose anti-National Socialist attitude was unquestionable.”21

Intended to persuade the American occupiers of the breadth of anti-Nazi sentiment in the Foreign Office, these three documents give a rather different impression when laid side by side. Not only do they provide no evidence of actual oppositional actions on the part of the people listed, aside from Kordt’s efforts in London in 1939 to get Britain to stand firm in the Danzig crisis; the discrepancies among them suggest remarkably amorphous and inconsistent standards of inclusion. Altogether, the Blankenhorn, Kordt, and von Rintelen lists contain 83 different names, yet 70 of these appear on only one list, 10 on two, and just 3 on all. Moreover, only 1 of Kolbe’s 9 “anti-Nazis” appears on even one of the other lists, and only 12 of his 28 “provisionally employable” people do. Clearly, such accounts might ingratiate their authors with Allied intelligence agencies, but they were unlikely to stand up to cross-examination in court if the U.S. followed through on its declared intention to place former professional diplomats on trial for complicity in Nazi crimes.

This is where Wilhelm Melchers came in, both literally because he was galvanized by the prospect of such a trial, and figuratively because he now proffered a kind of evidence that might be more difficult to undercut, namely that of two authoritative voices from the grave. In February 1946 as part of his denazification proceedings, Melchers had written a long memo regarding the conspiracy of 20 July 1944 that rested entirely on his uncorroborated memory and that furnished two central pillars of postwar apologetics surrounding the Foreign Office. First, he presented Weizsäcker as an inspiration for and central figure in the plot; and second, Melchers claimed that two days before the failed coup, he discussed the current personnel of the Foreign Office with the martyred von Trott, who affirmed that it was still “healthy” at its core.22 By June 1947, as the American trial plans began to coalesce, Melchers had allied with Erich Kordt and other of Weizsäcker’s former associates to defend him as the


20 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, RG 226, XL Intelligence Reports, Box 292, Entry 19, Report XI, 20140, The Organization of the German Foreign Office during the Last Year of the War, 18 September 1945; signed by General P.E. Peabody; the political evaluations appear on pages 6-13.

21 Ibid., RG 84, Entry 2531B, Box 85, E. A. Bayne to Walter Rudlin, 13 October 1945, enclosing Supporting Memorandum to the Personal History Statement made by Dr. Erich Kordt; the list is Section III of the document.

22 Das Amt, 306 and 402 (Source: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Nachlass Häft en, v. 1: Aufzeichnung von Dr. Wilhelm Melchers, 28 February 1946, 14 and 32; also in Nachlass Becker, Bd. 9/2).
embodiment of the self-sacrificing and principled civil servants who had labored constantly from within to check the worst Nazi excesses. Melchers now also claimed to have learned from Helmut Bergmann that Weizsäcker had tried continuously to plant or retain anti-Nazi diplomats in key positions within the Foreign Office.23 The former deputy head of the Personnel and Administrative Section, Bergmann was one of the only two men whose name appeared on all four of the lists of putatively anti- or non-Nazi diplomats to which we have referred, and he had disappeared into Soviet custody in April 1945, never to be seen or heard from again.

Melchers’ modus operandi of telling non-disprovable inside stories was only one of many devices by which former diplomats typically sought to exonerate themselves after the war and, more specifically, avoid the potential penalties mandated by the Allied denazification process, which included loss of property and voting rights, and could prohibit return to the civil service for up to ten years. A process of mutual whitewashing sprang up in which diplomats exchanged attestations to each other’s reservations about this or that action by the regime or evasion of this or that Nazi command. The most trivial indicators of hesitation about or deviation from the Party line became signs that one had “remained decent” (“anständig geblieben”), while in many cases the most damning indicators to the contrary, including membership in the SS, were concealed or obfuscated. Abetted by the declining willingness of German denazification courts even to question the autobiographies that former diplomats provided, many of them swiftly found posts after the war in the occupation administration or the fledgling institutions of German self-government. Although under Allied regulations all senior professional diplomats were to be brought before denazification courts categorized as “main perpetrator” or “perpetrator,” almost none emerged from them as such; the process degenerated into an exoneration factory (Entlastungsfabrik).24

Case 11, the so-called Ministries Case that began before an American Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in November 1947, threatened this trend of events and more. Among those accused of culpability in Nazi crimes—from conspiracy to wage aggressive war to participation in the murders of Jews and Allied servicemen—were eight former senior officials of the Foreign Office, including Ernst von Weizsäcker, who had served as the Foreign Office’s top official (Staatssekretär) from 1938 to 1943. In contrast to its response to the indictments and conviction of Foreign Ministers Joachim von Ribbentrop and Constantin

23 Das Amt, 409-10 (Source: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Nachlass Becker, Bd. 9, Melchers to Becker, 9 January 1948).
24 Das Amt, 342-52.
von Neurath by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945–46, the entire German diplomatic caste now reacted as if under direct attack. In fact, it was, for the indictment of Weizsäcker and his colleagues represented a rejection of distinctions between “real” and “nominal” Nazis and an assertion that what senior governmental figures had done and/or allowed was more important than their putative levels of National Socialist fervor. All the members of Germany’s elites whose defense since 1945 had been that they had acted as loyal state servants, apolitical and neutral specialists animated by duty and patriotism, and thus had not been discredited by the deeds of Nazi Germany, stood implicitly in the dock, as did their aspiration to return to prominent positions in the nation’s life. This is why not only Wilhelm Melchers rose to Weizsäcker’s defense, but also a united front of the nation’s old elites, including church functionaries, politicians, academics, and journalists. Convinced that they were refuting outrageous charges of “collective guilt,” Weizsäcker’s defenders had no trouble rationalizing extensive, behind-the-scenes manipulation of evidence. Hellmut Becker, Weizsäcker’s young lawyer, staged his defense in the style of a public relations campaign, the ugliest dimension of which became attempts to smear the chief prosecutor, a Jewish German and former Prussian civil servant named Robert Kempner, that descended into naked antisemitism.25

That the judgment of the tribunal in Case 11 derided Weizsäcker’s conduct as “unresisting resistance” and convicted him and 6 of the other 7 indicted diplomats on one or more of the various charges suggests that the arguments of Melchers and Becker failed, but their actual impact is apparent in the wide gap between the harsh wording of the court’s verdict and the mildness of its sentences.26 More importantly, the defense strategy struck a chord with German public opinion. By 1949, when the judgments came down, Germans were increasingly disposed to accept the conveniently self-exculpating view that Nazi bosses and SS fanatics had been the perpetrators, not the society and institutions that had served and strengthened Hitler’s regime. And, focusing on Weizsäcker’s predicament, stylized as inability to turn on his beloved country because it had repugnant leaders, suited postwar Germans’ egocentric fixation on their own suffering, not on what they had done to others. Moreover, after 1949, in the environment expressed and fostered by the Amnesty Law, the end of denazification, and legislation pursuant to Article 131 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic that restored jobs and pension rights to almost all civil servants who been removed from

26 For the quotation from the verdict, see U.S. Department of the Army, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, v. 14, 91.
office by the Allies, holding the Foreign Office to a higher standard of erstwhile political purity seemed unreasonable to many Germans. It also seemed increasingly unrealistic to the Western Allies, who long since had accepted that a democratic and pro-Western Federal Republic could not be built without the help of many people with compromised pasts.

III.

These circumstances explain not only the swift commutation of the sentences meted out in Case 11, but also the fact that the Foreign Office founded by the new Federal Republic of Germany in March 1951 took on both the name of the old entity in Berlin’s Wilhelmstraße and a great many former occupants of the building. Thanks to the influence of Blankenhorn and Melchers on the recruitment of new consular officials, West Germany already had reneged on its public and private promises to the Western Allies that it would not enlist diplomats who had been members of the NSDAP. The practice had gone so far by late 1951 that a multi-party Parliamentary Investigating Committee undertook a review of 22 senior appointees and in June 1952 ruled that their pasts made 3 unsuitable for appointment altogether, 3 others, including Melchers, unsuitable for assignment to the Personnel Section, and 3 more unsuitable for posting abroad. The Committee also surveyed 237 of the 397 people who had been recruited to the new Higher Service and established that almost half of them had belonged to the NSDAP; among 129 re-employed veterans of the old Foreign Office, the share was 69%. Conversely, people who had been persecuted by the Nazi regime, i.e., real opponents of it, came to only 9% and 12% of the two groups, respectively.27 But, if discomfort with this pattern was sufficient to provoke the investigation, it was not enough to make most of the recommendations stick or to shock either the German public or the Western Allies, who still possessed and never once exercised their right to veto appointments to the Foreign Office. Instead, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a man with a seismographic feel for both German public opinion and his room for maneuver with the Allies, brought the whole matter to a close by calling, in the Bundestag, for an end to “sniffing around for Nazis” (“Naziriecherei”), and the floodgates opened.28

From 1950 to 1954, the number of members of the Higher Service who had belonged to the NSDAP rose from 58 to 325, which raised the percentage of Nazis to a higher level than had prevailed in 1937. Interestingly, given the argument that the Foreign Office needed

28 Das Amt, 487 (Source: Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografische Berichte, WP 1, 22 October 1952, 433).
The experience of these people, more than half of the former Party members in the Higher Service as of 1952 had not served previously as diplomats. The Personnel Section initially decided to distinguish between “Party members and Nazis” by excluding people who had joined the Nazi Party before 1933, recruits to the General SS, and so-called “activists,” but made exceptions almost immediately, most notoriously perhaps in the cases of SS-Untersturmführer Franz Krapf; Herbert Müller, who as part of the German Section had been sufficiently involved in deportations to have to give up his post as Ambassador to Portugal when he was exposed in the late 1960s; and Otto Bräutigam, who had been a senior official in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories during most of the period 1941-44 and whose diary, later published by the East Germans, recorded his approval of the shootings of Jews. Later, especially after the Federal Republic acquired sovereignty in 1955, the Foreign Office relaxed even these rather porous standards, and the number of former members of the SS increased noticeably.

The consequences for Germany’s postwar diplomacy were serious, particularly with regard to personnel and public relations. By the mid-1960s, the allocation of ambassadorships became an increasingly delicate task of matching pasts and posts: senior diplomats with “unburdened” histories went to formerly occupied or enemy countries, those with “burdened” political records stayed in Bonn or went to Arab, Asian, Latin American or formerly neutral states. Even their presence there sometimes led to embarrassment. Werner Junker, a former NSDAP member and participant in deportations from the Balkans, became Ambassador in Argentina in the last half of the 1950s. While there he made no attempt to find Adolf Eichmann after his indictment by a court in Cologne, even though two of Eichmann’s sons appeared before the consular division of the Embassy in Buenos Aires and obtained passports in their own names. Junker also shielded Karl Klingenhoff, a former official of the German Section in the Foreign Office, from his own government’s extradition request. Less outwardly visible was the creation of an inhospitable atmosphere in the Foreign Office for “re-emigrants,” people who had left voluntarily or compulsorily during the Nazi years and who now wanted to return to service. Werner Peisser found himself kicked from post to post by ambassadors who invented reasons for not accepting a reinstated Jew. Other such individuals learned they had to prove their loyalty by returning to Germany for a year before reinstatement.

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29 Das Amt, 493-94.
30 Das Amt, 495, 589-95, 672-78.
31 Das Amt, 603-08. See, most recently, Deborah Lipstadt, The Eichmann Trial (New York: Schocken, 2011), 12.
agreeing that they would not serve in the country that had harbored them, persuading their spouses to accept German citizenship and renounce all others, and demonstrating that the previous resignation had stemmed from “pure” and unselfish motives.33 Perhaps the ugliest case of the last-named sort concerned Wolfgang Gans Edler Herr zu Putlitz, who had defected from his post in Holland to Britain in October 1939. Wilhelm Melchers blocked his reinstatement by citing at second hand the supposed testimony of another of the corpses Melchers found so handy, Putlitz’ former superior at The Hague who had died in Russian captivity. This superior had allegedly indicated that Putlitz had been blackmailed as a homosexual into changing sides and thus, said Melchers, he was a traitor, not a resister.34 Fritz Kolbe found his way to appointment in the Foreign Office barred, not just by understandable fears that he might act again as an American agent, but also by unsubstantiated rumors that he had helped drive the last wartime German Ambassador to Switzerland to suicide.35 Such readiness to believe the worst of people who had acted on their hatred of the Nazi state extended even to the matter of honoring their memory. For almost fifty years after the founding of the Federal German Foreign Office, it refused to recognize the resistance activities of Rudolf von Schelihon on the basis of the findings of the Gestapo investigation of 1942—ultimately disproved by historical research—that he had worked for and been paid by the Soviet Union.36

Still another adverse consequence of the personnel policy of the 1950s was to drag the Foreign Office into elaborate efforts to cover up or otherwise protect employees implicated in war crimes. After Franz Nüßlein was rehired following his deportation from Czechoslovakia as a “non-amnestied war criminal” in 1955, the Foreign Office hid his personnel file in a wall safe and pressured the German publishers of the translation of Gerald Reitlinger’s The Final Solution to insert supposedly exonerating information in the author’s accounts of the wartime roles of Werner von Bargen and Otto Bräutigam in the killing of Jews.37 Indeed, the practice of protecting putative war criminals was extended beyond the ranks of the Foreign Office: Until 1969, the Foreign Office’s Central Legal Defense Agency (Zentrale Rechtsschutzstelle) considered a legitimate part of its responsibilities to be compiling lists of Germans under investigation or indictment elsewhere and disseminating these via the German Red Cross, so as to make sure that those affected did not blunder into arrest. Among the early beneficiaries of the work of this agency were Klaus Barbie and Kurt Lischka, both former SS officers and Gestapo chiefs. As late as 1968,

33 Das Amt, 534-38, 542-45.
34 Das Amt, 548-50.
35 Das Amt, 551-58.
36 Das Amt, 558-69.
37 Das Amt, 585-89.
one of the principal officials in the Legal Defense Agency declared its work justified because “the worst crimes against humanity were the so-called war criminal judgments of individual or multiple enemy states because these in effect abolished prisoner-of-war status.”

Despite periodic flaps in the German and international press about incidents such as these and recurrent exposures of the wartime conduct of people who had entered the Foreign Office in the 1950s, by 1970, when Herbert Blankenhorn completed his term as Ambassador in London, or 1971, when Wilhelm Melchers died, either man could look back with considerable satisfaction on his efforts to mold the image of the German Foreign Office during the Nazi era and to shape its personnel during the initial phase of the Federal Republic. They had established in the public mind, not only in Germany, two not quite compatible perceptions. First, by making sure that people like them in background, training, and behavior dominated the postwar Foreign Office and that people of different and dissonant experiences were kept either down or out, they imparted an important historical-political message, namely that the way they claimed to have survived the Third Reich—at their posts and doing their duty, but in dissent—had been the right one, and that those who had done anything else were suspect. Second, through constant repetition and mutual reinforcement, these men and their allies in their age cohort had propagated the legend of the Foreign Office as an island of decency in the Nazi swamp. That the myth of the Office’s opposition and resistance had become official doctrine is demonstrated by the publication in 1979 of its pamphlet “Foreign Policy today” (Auswärtige Politik heute). It attested that “[t]he Foreign Office offered tenacious and time-winning resistance to the plans of the Nazi power holders without being able to prevent the worst. The Office long remained non-political and was regarded by the National Socialists as a site of opposition.”

Of course, the durability of these legends owed much to their convenience. Both at home and abroad, they legitimated the process of hiring people who had joined the NSDAP and served the Nazi state. They were so politically useful, in fact, that they outlasted the other simplistic fictions of the early 1950s concerning the forced complicity of German industrialists, the German churches, and the German Army, at least in the public mind. Even today, former diplomats who obtained new leases on professional life in the Federal Republic, along with their protégés, insist that postwar service justifies erasing earlier deeds from public memory. Professional historians and even some members of the diplomatic service may have come to think more realistically about
the Foreign Office after 1979, thanks to the publications of Christopher Browning and Hans-Jürgen Döscher, but the fact that Germans bought tens of thousands of copies of Das Amt und die Vergangenheit in the last two months of 2010 suggests that the general public had not.\textsuperscript{41}

The largely positive public reception of Das Amt und die Vergangenheit also suggests something else: that Germans are no longer preoccupied with the inner struggles and subjective feelings of their countrymen in the period 1933-45, no longer absorbed by the desperate search for reassuring or escapist answers to the question “how could this have happened?” but instead now willing to focus on what those countrymen, diplomats included, actually did and did not do. In this climate, a generation’s timeworn evasions and excuses no longer command more attention than the shrieks of Nazi Germany’s millions of victims. Some may lament this development; we do not.\textsuperscript{42}

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\textsuperscript{41} Christopher Browning’s path-breaking The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1973) did not appear in German until more than three decades later as Die Endlösung und das Auswärtige Amt (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2010). Hans-Jürgen Döscher’s important contributions were, in order of publication, Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich. Diplomatie im Schatten der Endlösung (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1987), Verschworene Gesellschaft: Das Auswärtige Amt unter Adenauer zwischen Neubeginn und Kontinuität (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), and Seilschaften. Die verdrängte Vergangenheit des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin: Propyläen, 2005).

\textsuperscript{42} For an appalling expression of such regret, see Bernhard Schlink, “Die Kultur des Denunziatorischen,” Merkur 745 (June 2011), 473-86.
THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE REVISITED

REVIEW OF DAS AMT UND DIE VERGANGENHEIT: DEUTSCHE DIPLOMATEN IM DRITTEN REICH UND IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK, BY ECKART CONZE, NORBERT FREI, PETER HAYES, AND MOSHE ZIMMERMANN (MUNICH: BLESSING, 2010).

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For historians interested in the relationship between the German Foreign Office and the Judenpolitik of the Third Reich, three books (in three different languages) have long been available: Eliahu Ben Elissar’s La Diplomatie du IIIe Reich et les Juifs 1933-1939 (1969), my The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office (1978), and Hans-Jürgen Döscher’s Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich: Diplomatie im Schatten der ‘Endlösung’ (1987). Taken together, these books established a number of key points. First, the Foreign Office quickly transformed itself into an ardent defender of Nazi Jewish policy in the 1930s, largely out of a reflexive defense of Germany’s image abroad combined with a general aversion toward German Jews so typical of the national conservative mentality that dominated the diplomatic ranks. Second, the Nazification of Foreign Office personnel proceeded rapidly, especially after 1937, not only through the “infiltration” and recruitment of NSDAP and SS members into the Foreign Office but also through prior personnel obtaining Party and SS membership, whatever the mixed motivation of ideological conviction, career opportunism, and fatalistic resignation. Third, the Foreign Office was deeply implicated in the Final Solution, first promoting the Madagascar Plan for the total “ethnic cleansing” of Jews from Europe (that in practice would have been extremely lethal), and then expanding the number of Jews killed by pressuring Germany’s allies and satellites to impose Nazi-style anti-Jewish measures and ultimately to surrender their Jews to deportation. And finally, two additional books by Döscher have studied the controversial return of a considerable number of Foreign Office personnel—the so-called Ehemaligen—to the Adenauer Foreign Office in the early 1950s.¹

As the author of one of these earlier books, whose scholarship was necessarily going to be put to the test by the Commission as it once again examined the archival record and wrote Das Amt, I am quite gratified that all of these basic earlier findings have been fully confirmed. Moreover, in doing so, Das Amt has brought these findings to a far wider public. Much as it needed the Wehrmacht Ausstellung

in the 1990s to dispose of the myth of the clean Wehrmacht, though numerous scholarly studies had for decades documented Wehrmacht complicity, it has taken this highly publicized Commission report to dismantle the myth of the Foreign Office as untainted by the crimes of the Third Reich and a center of anti-Nazi opposition—a myth that has persisted into the twenty-first century, largely through its own self-representation, despite long-standing scholarship to the contrary. One of the shrewdest decisions of the Commission was to include a chapter on the real resistance within the Foreign Office, which honors the remarkable courage and moral acuity of the few men clustered around Adam von Trott zu Solz and Hans Bernd von Haeften, as well as the isolated Rudolf von Schellila and Fritz Kolbe, but in so doing also makes clear what a tiny, marginal group it was. By no reasonable sense of proportion can the Foreign Office be deemed to have been a center of opposition to rather than an instrument of the Third Reich. If such useful myth demolition were all that the book accomplished, we should be grateful for its appearance.

For the prewar period, Das Amt effectively documents how quickly in the spring of 1933, under the guidance of State Secretary Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow, the Foreign Office became the ardent defender of Nazi Jewish policy abroad. But Bülow was also torn by a “crisis of conscience” that one does not cease to serve one’s country just because it has a bad government.² Clearly Bülow did not consider the de-emancipation and persecution of Germany’s Jews to be at the root of his “crisis of conscience.” Das Amt documents similar paradoxical behavior on the part of Bülow’s eventual successor, Ernst von Weizsäcker, who on the one hand clearly sought to keep Germany out of war, and on the other supported the denaturalization of Thomas Mann. In the key case of Weizsäcker, however, a stronger indictment could have been made. In the summer of 1938, Weizsäcker tried to block any negotiations with the representative of the Evian Conference, George Rublee, on how to facilitate German Jewish emigration. He treated the Rublee mission as a bald attempt to shift blame to Germany for the failure of other countries to take its Jews, noting acridly that “many countries produced Jews but not a single one wants to consume them.”³ However, Hitler and Göring overrode Foreign Office objections and sanctioned the ensuing Schacht-Rublee talks. Subsequently, the notorious memorandum of the Foreign Office Jewish Referent, Emil Schumburg, on “The Jewish Question as a Factor in German Foreign Policy in the Year 1938” offered support for a different way to achieve a judenrein Germany

³ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereafter PA), Inland II A/B 45/1, Weizsäcker Memorandum, August 2, 1938.
through Jewish emigration, namely through intensified persecution and economic ruination that would overcome the absence of any negotiated agreement. Schumburg’s memorandum, endorsing a position identical to that of Heydrich’s SD “Jewish experts,” was then circulated to all German missions abroad—a dissemination that could scarcely have occurred without the approval of the State Secretary.

The pattern of Weizsäcker’s paradoxical behavior continued during the war. After the war he wrote, “I still believe today that I went to the border of the possible in direct, visible resistance.”4 For that there is little in the way of compelling evidence, but there certainly is clear evidence that Weizsäcker was well informed. As early as September 5, 1941, he received personal correspondence “that we don’t treat the Jews with kid gloves and that in the east already many a Jew no longer lives.”5 Subsequent access to the Einsatzgruppen reports only solidified this early awareness. There are hints that Weizsäcker struggled with what course to take, as evidenced by his minor amendments to various documents drafted in the Judenreferat, in one case correcting that the Foreign Office “raised” no objections rather than “had” no objections to the deportation of Jews from France and in another that Slovakia’s cessation of deportations “would cause surprise” rather than “would leave a bad impression in Germany.” Only late in his tenure as State Secretary did he suggest the policy that the Foreign Office ought to limit itself “to the general remark that in each case the more lenient solution is the preferable one from the foreign policy point of view.”6 If only he had come to this formulation earlier and stuck to it tenaciously, his fate before the Nuremberg court and in the judgment of historians might have been much better. But it is still worth noting that in his response to Nazi Judenpolitik, at least after the fateful turn from racial persecution to mass murder, he was troubled rather than enthusiastic or indifferent.

For me, the sections of Das Amt that covered the postwar period were most interesting, perhaps because I was much less familiar with this material. One of the most fascinating themes that the Commission chose to examine was the succession of trials involving Foreign Office personnel and how the Foreign Office and Ehemaligen responded. I had studied the testimony and documents of these trials as sources of evidence for my own book, but it was a revelation to learn about the behind-the-scenes maneuvering that, needless to say, was not part of the official trial record. Far more important than the conviction of

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5 PA, Politische Abteilung IX 93, Hübner to Weizsäcker, September 5, 1941.
6 Christopher R. Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office (New York, 1978), 143.
Ribbentrop and Neurath before the International Military Tribunal for the postwar image of the Foreign Office and future re-employment of the *Ehemaligen* was Case XI before the American Military Tribunal in 1948—the so-called Wilhelmstrasse or Ministries trial—in which State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker (alongside seven other diplomats) was the most prominent defendant.

The defense of Weizsäcker became the cause around which the diplomats closed ranks and, under the guidance of an inner circle of Wilhelm Melchers, Theo and Erich Kordt, Hans Schröder, Ernst Achenbach, and others, articulated both a legal defense and rewriting of history. In this version, the professional diplomats were apolitical servants of the state who held themselves aloof from the crimes of the regime and whose subsequent party and SS memberships were nominal and meaningless. Insofar as *Judenpolitik* was implemented in concert with the Foreign Office, this was the work of a truly separate and newly created branch of the Foreign Office filled with Ribbentrop’s creatures (Martin Luther and Franz Rademacher in Abteilung Deutschland; Horst Wagner and Eberhard von Thadden in Inland II).

The attempted resistance of the professional diplomats within the Foreign Office was first betrayed by British appeasement in 1938 and then rendered hopeless by the Casablanca formula of unconditional surrender. Insofar as professional diplomats had signed documents that now appeared incriminating, these in fact had had no effect on decisions made and policies carried out (about which, of course, the diplomats had no knowledge), and were the necessary price to be paid for heroically staying at one’s post to prevent worse. The goal of the Case XI trial, therefore, was not individual justice but the destruction of Germany’s elites, and the moving demonic spirit behind this act of victors’ vengeance was the returned Jewish émigré, Robert Kempner.

Because the defendants of Case XI had been restricted to officials of higher rank, those mid-level officials of the Foreign Office *Judenreferat* upon whom the Weizsäcker circle placed all the blame beyond the now-deceased Martin Luther—Franz Rademacher, Horst Wagner, and Eberhard von Thadden—were not in the dock. But the trial of Franz Rademacher that opened in 1952 before the Landgericht Nürnberg-Fürth did not elicit eagerness on the part of the *Ehemaligen* to help bring to justice the culprit who, by their earlier testimony, had brought such disrepute on them. On the contrary, feeling themselves under attack from the investigative journalism of the *Frankfurter*
Rundschau and subjected to uncomfortable questioning by a parliamentary committee, they did everything they could both to avoid appearing as witnesses and to discredit the trial once again as an act of vengeance. Rademacher’s attorney even intimated that he was led to believe that his client’s infamous expense form, listing the purpose of his October 1941 trip to Belgrad as “the liquidation of Jews,” might be withheld as evidence if he were cooperative in shielding others from the ramifications of the trial.

The Rademacher trial was dependent upon the documents selected for the Nuremberg trials, but after 1958 the entire captured files of the Foreign Office were returned to the Politisches Archiv in Bonn, making available to future prosecutors far more extensive incriminating evidence. Moreover, one of Rademacher’s assistants, Fritz-Gebhardt von Hahn, who had falsely characterized his own involvement during denazification, supported the Weizsäcker defense in 1948, and re-entered government service in 1951, was apparently so confident about immunity from prosecution that in the 1960s he openly and frankly admitted his earlier knowledge of the extermination of the Jews. This act of hubris led to a thorough investigation of the archival evidence now available, and subsequently to von Hahn’s indictment, trial, and conviction in Frankfurt in 1968. It also put investigators on the trail of another assistant in the Judenreferat, Herbert Müller. He had re-entered the Foreign Office in 1951 without revealing his prior assignment under Rademacher and changed his name to Müller-Roschach in 1953. His career prospered, and by the late 1960s he was ambassador to Portugal. He had initialed summaries of Einsatzgruppen reports circulated to his superiors, and when the German Red Cross approached the Foreign Office to pass on an inquiry about the possibility of sending food relief to Jews in the Lodz ghetto, the matter ended up on Müller’s desk. He informed the Legal Division: “The planned Final Solution for the European Jewish question, known to you, does not permit food shipments to be made from abroad to Jews in Germany and in the General Government.” Thus, he advised the German Red Cross not to reply to the inquiry. After considerable hesitation, the Foreign Office first put Müller on vacation and then retired him from his ambassadorship. The investigation dragged on and was finally halted in 1972 without coming to trial, since none of Müller’s actions in the Judenreferat when his awareness of the Final Solution could be proven could also be shown to have resulted in loss of life. Even if Müller’s denial of his own past was hardly commendable, in both his person and activity in the Judenreferat, he was

7 Ibid., 85.
nonetheless quite different from the ambitious and proud Nazi von Hahn, and the difference in judicial outcomes was not unjustified. The two other deeply implicated Foreign Office officials, Eberhard von Thadden and Horst Wagner, who unlike von Hahn and Müller were not brought back into government service, were never tried. The former died in an auto accident in 1964, and the latter successfully employed an array of delaying actions—change of attorney and certificates of ill health—until his death.

Alongside demonstrating the reentry of the Ehemaligen and the numerous awkward ways in which the past hung over the Foreign Office in the postwar period, Das Amt also notes important contexts in which to put this postwar story into perspective. The presence of the Ehemaligen, however embarrassing, did not hinder either Adenauer’s path to the West, Brandt’s Ostpolitik, or Germany’s increasing participation as a model citizen of the international community, which was crucial for international acquiescence to reunification in 1990. Just as many of them had been opportunistic or compliant servants of the Third Reich, they similarly adapted to the postwar era as well. Moreover, new generations of recruits, trained and professionalized in a very different diplomatic environment, ably filled the new roles that professional diplomats now had to play. In general, the Foreign Office was part of the success story of German democratization at home and living in peace with its neighbors—the two crucial developments that had proved so elusive in the past. Nonetheless, a handful of retired Ehemaligen fought a rearguard action to preserve their version of the history of the Foreign Office during the Nazi era, and the last chapter of Das Amt is a fascinating tale of the final unraveling of this “coverup.”

Given a book of more than 700 pages, it is perhaps churlish to suggest where yet more should have been included. But I do think that greater differentiation among the Third Reich diplomats and the ways in which they either participated in or responded to Nazi Judenpolitik would have added greater depth and subtlety to the study. To establish a spectrum of behavior, the book does open with a brief sketch about three diplomats with different career trajectories: Franz Krapf, who joined the NSDAP in 1936, served in the Tokyo embassy during the war years and re-entered the Foreign Office in the postwar period; Fritz Kolbe, who refused to join the NSDAP, was shocked by Nazi terror and criminality, provided information to the American secret service during the war and to the Nuremberg prosecution after the war,
and was stigmatized as a traitor and refused postwar reemployment in the Foreign Office; and Franz Nüsslein, a Nazi Party member and lawyer who served in the occupation of the Protectorate during the war and in the Foreign Office after the war. Unfortunately, concerning Krapf, it is conceded that little is known about his activities in Tokyo, yet it is nonetheless asserted that “Selbst im fernen Ostasien waren deutsche Diplomaten mit der ‘Endlösung’ der Judenfrage befasst”—a generalization that is both indiscriminate and unsubstantiated. Das Amt is very effective in contrasting the real resisters with those who were culpable in various ways, but it could have been more explicit in differentiating between active complicity (the “crimes of commission” by the likes of Rademacher and von Hahn) and passive complicity (the “crimes of omission” for which Weizsäcker is the prime example).

Perhaps the greatest opportunity that Das Amt missed to explore the full complexities of human behavior in both the war and postwar periods is the case of Wilhelm Melchers. In Das Amt, he is identified as the originator of the myth about the Foreign Office as a center of opposition, when he wrote a memorandum invoking an alleged “dispensation” from Adam von Trott zu Solz shortly before the latter’s arrest and execution declaring that the bulk of its officials had resisted Nazification and remained “healthy.” Melchers then worked with the Ehemaligen both to defend Weizsäcker and to facilitate their subsequent reentry into the Foreign Office. What Das Amt does not explore is the irony that on certain occasions during the war Melchers behaved quite differently from the bulk of the Ehemaligen with whom he subsequently made common cause. Contrary to the counterfeit claims of so many others, by staying at his post he had actually prevented worse and “threw sand” in the machinery of destruction.

It was routine for the Judenreferat to circulate RSHA proposals for anti-Jewish actions through the Political Division, where the relevant desks were to check that they had been informed and raised no objections concerning possible foreign policy complications. Melchers used his position as head of the Near East desk first to save Palestinian Jews in German hands by raising the specter of reprisals against German colonists in Palestine. Then, when the Foreign Office informed Turkey that it had to repatriate its 2,400 Turkish Jews in Nazi-occupied France if they were not to be deported and the Turkish government showed no interest, Melchers nevertheless intervened to save the Turkish Jews abandoned by their own government. He cogently argued that the Turkish Jews posed no security risk
commensurate with the damage that would be incurred if their deportation were subsequently exploited by enemy propaganda to incite the Turkish press and damage relations with neutral Turkey. For seven months he held steadfastly to these arguments in the face of pressure from both the RSHA and von Thadden, until the Turkish government reversed itself and permitted the repatriation of Jews holding Turkish citizenship.  

Adding to the complexity of the Melchers case, however, is that on other occasions during the war he endangered rather than helped Jews. He urged that German deference to Italy in the Mediterranean not stand in the way of promising the Arabs a solution to the Jewish question acceptable to them in order to weaken the British position in the Near East. A longtime supporter of anti-Semitic propaganda to the Arab world, he urged continued financial support for Amin el-Husseini and other Arab exiles in Berlin even in the last months of the war in order not to provide a victory for “Jewish propaganda in Palestine.” Paradoxically, while Melchers protected Turkish Jews against being killed by the Germans in Poland, he supported the continuation of propaganda exhorting Arabs to kill Jews in the Near East. It was the success of the British 8th Army in preventing German forces from reaching Palestine that ultimately left Melchers as a net rescuer rather than taker of Jewish lives.

A more differentiated and nuanced treatment of the German diplomats who stayed at their posts and, while not engaged in opposition or resistance to the regime itself, nonetheless displayed a variety of responses to the regime’s murderous Judenpolitik would have enhanced the contribution of Das Amt. Even so, the basic arguments of the book are valid. As an institution, the Foreign Office contributed to the persecution of the Jews and the Final Solution. All too many of its personnel became both Nazified and complicitous, and of these, many were re-employed in the Foreign Office after the war. And though the Foreign Office supported the new German democracy and its foreign policy, it continued for decades to maintain a distorted version of its own history, a debilitating, embarrassing, and unnecessary burden from which hopefully, by virtue of this book, it has now been liberated.

This article is a revised version of a book review originally published in Yad Vashem Studies 39: 1 (2011) and is republished here with the gracious permission of the editors.
Not since the publication of Daniel J. Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* in 1996 has a book on the history of National Socialism had as great a public resonance in Germany as the report of the independent commission of historians appointed in July 2005 by then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. The commission’s task was to address the “history of the Auswärtiges Amt [German Foreign Office] in the National Socialist era, the treatment of this past after the reestablishment of the Auswärtiges Amt in 1951, and the question of continuity/discontinuity in personnel after 1945” (12). The book, edited by four university professors from Germany, the United States, and Israel and written by twelve collaborators, is divided into two largely unconnected parts. The first part, approximately 300 pages long, deals with the Auswärtiges Amt in the Third Reich, primarily with its personnel structure and the role it played in the Holocaust. The second part, about 400 pages long, shows how the Auswärtiges Amt, the political community, and the West German public dealt with the Amt’s Nazi-era past after 1945.

My observations focus on the first part of *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit*, which has been the focus of the debate about the book thus far. How do the findings presented in the commission’s report fit within the current state of research? What advances in knowledge does it offer? Why has the book created such controversy? And what does that controversy tell us about our historical and memory culture, the expertise of specialists and the state of research on contemporary history?

I. The Auswärtiges Amt and Its Personnel

Historians agree today that the Auswärtiges Amt was not a “foreign body” (*Fremdkörper*) within the Nazi system of rule. Rather, like other governmental institutions and traditional elites, it contributed to the establishment of a totalitarian regime and to the realization of its policies of racist disenfranchisement, conquest, annihilation, and genocide. Already the Nuremberg Trials, where the onetime Foreign Ministers Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath and Joachim von Ribbentrop
were convicted along with State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker and several other diplomats, determined that the Auswärtiges Amt was complicit in violent and criminal acts.

That finding was long obscured in the Federal Republic by an exculpatory myth that was propagated not only by foreign service personnel. There was little that scholarly work on Nazi foreign policy or the fact that many compromising documents had been published early on in the series Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 (ADAP) could do against this manipulation of the past. Since the late 1970s, starting with the pioneering studies by Christopher R. Browning and Hans-Jürgen Döscher, basic research on the participation of the Auswärtiges Amt in Nazi crimes appeared and refuted many aspects of early postwar versions of the past.

The commission of historians could thus rely upon a solid basis of well-documented specialist literature. The first section of its report is essentially a synthesis of what was known. Given the previous lack of an overview of the research on the subject, it is a considerable accomplishment to have provided a compact, accessible survey for the general public. This achievement in synthesis is marred, however, by a simplification and over-interpretation of the results of previous scholarly research.

While one can certainly agree with the unsurprising conclusion that the Nazi dictatorship’s diplomatic elite did not fundamentally differ from other old elites in their professional and moral deformation, one would expect a scholarly analysis to make careful differentiations. The career civil servants of the Auswärtiges Amt can be compared in many respects to the military elite. The generals and general staff were also characterized by social, professional, and political-ideological homogeneity: with their revanchist goals, nationalism, and political and racial animosities, they too could make common cause with the Nazis on a number of points. Just like older diplomats, older officers allowed themselves, despite reservations, to become part of the Nazis’ ever more radical policy of violence. They too integrated themselves within the system of totalitarian rule through numerous acts of accommodation and individual Gleichschaltung (synchronization). Resistance was the exception. That applies to the foreign service as well, as the commission rightly emphasizes – even though the myth of the Auswärtiges Amt as a “hotbed of resistance” (Hort des Widerstands) had been dispelled long ago.
Although Hitler and his confidants distrusted the old elites in the civil service, diplomatic corps, and military, and repeatedly announced plans to replace them with “genuine National Socialists,” the Nazi regime remained dependent on their competence and professionalism for many years. In this regard, however, there were important differences between the diplomatic and military elite. The Nazi regime, up to its final days, had to entrust the conduct of war and military administration—core aspects of its policy of violence—to officers who had been trained and socialized in Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic. The old officer corps could not be replaced and continued to serve until literally the last shot was fired.

The situation was different with the diplomatic corps. The process of transformation took place earlier and with more lasting effects. The personnel structure of the Auswärtiges Amt during the Nazi era is one of the focal points of the commission’s report. New and nuanced findings might have been expected on this issue, since the authors could draw upon personnel files and the hitherto published volumes of a detailed biographical encyclopedia. That expectation went unmet, however. The report’s one-sided conception and apodictic tone stand in the way of a balanced account and are repeatedly contradicted by facts about personnel policy that find mention in the report. That leads to obscurities and inconsistencies.

Which part of the personnel does the report examine? It focuses on the senior service (höherer Dienst), which ranged from legation secretaries to the State Secretary (Staatssekretär), and on academic experts employed during the war. Which areas and individuals are important for the commission’s interpretation? The authors distinguish between “classic” diplomacy and the new tasks imposed by criminal racial and occupation policies as well as between “old” and “new” diplomats. The report concentrates on the Amt’s participation in the Nazis’ rule by force in Germany and Europe and consequently gives particular weight to the departments, divisions, and foreign outposts involved: until May 1940 above all the department D/Deutschland, thereafter the newly established “Abteilung Deutschland” (renamed the Referatsgruppe Inland II in April 1943) and its “Jewish department” (Judenreferat; D III, later In II A), and the diplomatic missions in the countries and regions under German control, whose key positions were staffed by “new” diplomats.

For the commission’s line of argument, “classical diplomacy” is only of marginal relevance. It is surprising then that the authors...
refer to that sphere of activity to demonstrate the homogeneity and continuity of the diplomatic elite. In their analysis, the replacement of the diplomat Konstantin von Neurath in the foreign minister’s office by the party man Joachim von Ribbentrop in February 1938 did not have any significance for personnel policy. Contradicting that point, however, the report shows that important positions in the areas of primary interest to the commission were increasingly filled with outsiders from Nazi Party organizations and young diplomats “with party backgrounds.” This form of Nazification began during Neurath’s final years as foreign minister but intensified after Ribbentrop’s appointment. The beneficiaries were above all the staff members of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, a Nazi Party foreign policy office under Ribbentrop’s direction, 28 of whom were transferred to the Auswärtiges Amt after Ribbentrop’s appointment as Foreign Minister and subsequently held “key functions in the policy of annihilation” (128).

The commission’s overarching interpretation is also contradicted by its findings regarding the ministry’s wartime personnel structure, which state that Ribbentrop’s personnel policy aimed “to integrate representatives of important party organizations within his ministry and to limit career diplomats to a narrowly curtailed group of tasks” (154). The domestic and Jewish departments and most of the foreign postings in German-ruled Europe were dominated by Party activists and Nazified civil servants. The commission’s report wavers between acknowledging this fact and trying to replace the “master narrative” (295) juxtaposing “old” and “new” diplomats with an equally questionable narrative of a negatively homogeneous government agency—a narrative that disregards most of the distinctions noted in the report.

There are sufficient examples among the diplomatic elite to show that civil servants who had joined the foreign service before 1933 participated in the disenfranchisement of groups targeted by the regime, its preparations for war, exploitation, and annihilation when that was asked of them. But in contrast to the military, the Auswärtiges Amt was characterized by a certain division of labor between career civil servants and the party-loyalist newcomers. Whereas career civil servants continued to dominate in the classic diplomatic functions and thereby advanced the Nazis’ aggressive foreign policy, positions in the new areas of policy (racial policy, occupation, economic exploitation, and the Holocaust) were primarily assigned to party loyalists who had newly joined the foreign office.
The commission’s suggestion, in the book’s introduction, that drawing a distinction between traditional diplomats and Nazi careerists must be regarded as a diversionary tactic (12) does as little to advance scholarship as does its general line of argument attributing almost all actions on the part of the foreign service to the Auswärtiges Amt and the diplomats—that is, to the ministry as a whole and to all of its personnel. By wartime at the latest the foreign service was no longer so homogeneous. Of course, there were not two foreign ministries, a good “old” one and a bad “new” one; and, of course, there were many points of connection between different areas of responsibility. Nonetheless, ignoring the evident differences in personnel structure and in the division of responsibilities within the Auswärtiges Amt stands in the way of a nuanced, hermeneutic, and inductive general analysis.

II. The Auswärtiges Amt and the Holocaust

The diplomatic elite’s participation in the disenfranchisement, persecution, and murder of Europe’s Jews is the second central subject of the commission’s investigation. Scholarly research has demonstrated that the Auswärtiges Amt actively participated in the exclusion of Jews from the National Socialist “national community” (Volksgemeinschaft) in the early years of the dictatorship. The acceptance and, at times, eager implementation of the regime’s “Jewish policy” was facilitated by the conservative elite’s anti-Semitic consensus that the “disproportionate influence” of Jews in German public life had to be brought to an end. Leading representatives of traditional diplomacy like Neurath and State Secretary Bernhard von Bülow share responsibility for the first phases of anti-Semitic discrimination and persecution. Only a few diplomats refused to go along with anti-Semitic policies or decided to resign. Members of the foreign service were confronted with a question of conscience well before 1938 or the outbreak of the war. The response of the overwhelming majority was shameful.

The commission’s report describes the involvement of the Auswärtiges Amt in racial policy in the years up to 1939 on the basis of existing scholarship, but suggests a linear development and uses the concept of the “final solution” (Endlösung), which long had a multiplicity of meanings, in a potentially misleading way. A fundamental problem of the commission’s interpretation is that it clearly rests on the premise that the disenfranchisement of the Jews led inevitably to their murder and that this course must have been clear to the members...
of the diplomatic elite even before the start of the war. This premise contradicts scholarly findings on the unfolding of developments that culminated in the Holocaust. Despite all the ominous signs, which those involved interpreted differently, the decision to carry out the mass deportation and mass murder of Jews was not taken until the war was underway—and even then, the decision was the result of a complex series of developments that culminated in genocide in the late summer-early fall of 1941.

The first phases in the regime’s anti-Jewish policy—the marginalization, disenfranchisement, and plundering of the German Jews and the application of pressure on them to emigrate—were generally accepted, supported, and in some cases actively carried out by the old-line ministerial civil service, including the personnel of the Auswärtiges Amt, isolated reservations and protests notwithstanding. When it came to the next, more radical steps of deportation and murder, the Nazi leadership believed that it could no longer trust old elites and officials. From 1938 on, it therefore transferred these tasks increasingly to new institutions and actors. The Reich bureaucracy’s self-adaptation to Nazi rule was now increasingly supplemented by the growing power of new central agencies and the Nazi Party’s infiltration of older agencies. The party and, above all, the SS and the police took over the leading role in translating the eliminationist radical anti-Semitism of the state’s leaders into action. The Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) established in September 1939 became the control center of the “final solution.” By contrast, the regime’s targeted manipulation of the old elites and institutions varied in pace and results. The upper ranks of the military, for example, remained highly homogenous and became radicalized on their own without the influence of Nazi newcomers, whereas the Auswärtiges Amt, as noted above, experienced a quantitative and qualitative change in its personnel structure.

The report’s account of the war years does not do justice to the complex and multifaceted process of the radicalization of an institution and its personnel. Too often, the report intersperses accepted facts with controversial findings or incorrect information. The Auswärtiges Amt was undoubtedly “extraordinarily well informed” about Nazi crimes, and German diplomats were without question “facilitators of occupation, informed parties, and—repeatedly—accomplices” (167). Nonetheless, the formulation that “the German diplomats enabled the leadership of the Third Reich to carry out an inhumane program until the end of the war” [emphasis added] is too broad to accept.
And what is meant by the following assertion: “Although the entire civil service was indispensable for anti-Jewish measures, in the end the Auswärtiges Amt was the only ministry authorized to participate directly in the implementation of this policy beyond the Reich’s borders” (169). Since German occupation policy was characterized by a plethora of special agencies and attempts at self-empowerment by every possible Reich agency, it is absurd to attribute an exceptional status to the Auswärtiges Amt. This claim, which is not further elaborated, is also misleading because it suggests that the Auswärtiges Amt was not only indispensable but decisive in carrying out the Holocaust, equal in influence to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. In the commission’s view, it was with the transition from emigration to a “territorial final solution,” namely the plans in 1940–41 for a “relocation” of the Jews (to Madagascar, for instance) that the Auswärtiges Amt began to play a “leading role in Jewish policy” (183). Elsewhere in the report, it is claimed that the Auswärtiges Amt and the Reichssicherheitshauptamt closely cooperated on “Jewish measures”—which is true—and that “sometimes the one, sometimes the other” took the lead (287). The diplomatic corps and the SS alternating in spearheading racial policy and genocide: that interpretation is not only surprising but absurd.8

No less surprising is the unsubstantiated claim that the Auswärtiges Amt seized “the initiative for a solution to the ‘Jewish question’ on the European level” after the German invasion of the Soviet Union and “directly participated” in the decision on the “final solution.” “The fate of the German Jews was sealed on September 17, 1941: on that day, a meeting between Hitler and Ribbentrop took place” (185). In this formulation, this thesis stands in opposition to nearly all research on the genesis of the decision in favor of genocide. It is contradicted by the fact that Ribbentrop’s influence within the Nazi hierarchy rapidly decreased during the war and that, by 1941, he was informed about fundamental policy decisions but rarely participated in making them. Accordingly, his ministry had virtually no say about the Ostraum (eastern theater) from the outset.

At other points in the commission’s report, connections between knowledge of criminal acts and complicity in them are drawn too quickly. The report includes broad speculation on what German diplomats could have known and must have known about the Nazi leadership’s intentions regarding the Jews. Already in 1938, “the signs were multiplying that Hitler had decided to pursue the most radical of

8 Recent general histories of the Holocaust do not assign nearly so large a role to the Auswärtiges Amt. See: Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung. Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung (Munich, 1998); Saul Friedländer, Das Dritte Reich und die Juden. Verfolgung und Vernichtung 1933–1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).
all 'solutions’” (172). And, according to the report, “the” Auswärtiges Amt had already spoken out in early 1939 in favor of “striving toward a ‘comprehensive solution’ [Gesamtlösung] in the form of a ‘Jewish reservation’ [Judenreservat] or through physical annihilation” (174).

Moving the “resolutions” (Entschlüsse) for a genocidal “final solution” as well as the ministerial bureaucracy’s knowledge of those resolutions back in time to 1938/39 is, to put it mildly, audacious. By contrast, it has long been known that the diplomatic elite were well informed about the first mass murder of Jews in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union and about the radicalization of policy toward the Jews through reports from the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. The commission’s conclusion that the Auswärtiges Amt “not only took note [of the RSHA reports] but also used them as the foundation for its own ministerial actions” (186) is, however, as speculative as its equation of awareness with “sympathy” (Verständnis) (188).

Alongside numerous pointed theses presented without adequate evidence stand solid passages in which the scholarly literature is well summarized and enriched by archival discoveries. The report deals with the war years by region, which makes for a certain amount of repetition but has the advantage of offering a clearly structured overview. It claims to deal with the Auswärtiges Amt’s part in German rule over half of Europe, but in fact the “comprehensive account” (Gesamtdarstellung) (11) concentrates overwhelmingly on the persecution and murder of the Jewish population. The report finds that the Amt was “fighting a losing battle” in occupied Soviet territory and was only an “uninvited spectator” (201). In the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia it had “no influence to speak of” (222); and it had only “limited” opportunities in the Generalgouvernement (225). Since the occupied Polish and Soviet territories were the central arena of the Holocaust, these findings significantly qualify the report’s core thesis that the Auswärtiges Amt played a leading role in the regime’s crimes. The ministry’s influence in Norway was limited, too, and somewhat greater but still not important in Belgium. In Denmark, the diplomat responsible for maritime affairs, Georg Duckwitz, contributed to the rescue of the majority of Danish Jews.

The situation in France was very different. The German embassy in Paris was able to establish itself as a key authority alongside the military occupation administration and the SS and police agencies. It assumed a correspondingly large share of responsibility for anti-Semitic measures. Diplomatic influence in the Netherlands was much
more limited, but there too representatives of the Auswärtiges Amt participated in the violent policies directed at the local population. The involvement of the ministry and its personnel in the “final solution” in Serbia, Greece, and Hungary was considerable. Particularly shocking was its active assistance in the deportation, in the spring and summer of 1944, of 437,000 Jews from Hungary to Auschwitz, where 320,000 of them were murdered on arrival. Here the figure given in the commission’s report (180,000) is clearly too low. The Amt’s participation in the murder of Jews and its cooperation with the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Southeastern Europe is beyond dispute, even if there, too, one cannot really speak of it having had a “leading role.” In the states allied with the Reich, the representatives of the Auswärtiges Amt also frequently played a pernicious role in “Jewish policy.” Its complicity was especially significant in Slovakia, Croatia, and Bulgaria.

Who were the main actors in the Auswärtiges Amt’s assistance in the Holocaust? A sober analysis must include the observation that the decisive officials in the department responsible, the Abteilung Deutschland (later the departmental division Inland II), and its “Jewish department,” which worked closely with the Reichssicherheitshauptamt—Martin Luther, Franz Rademacher, Eberhard von Thadden, and Horst Wagner—were “new” diplomats who had joined the foreign service in the late 1930s and were closely associated with Nazi Party organizations. Other important confidants of Ribbentrop’s and the Nazis in the Auswärtiges Amt included State Secretary Gustav Adolf Baron Steengracht von Moyland, State Secretary Wilhelm Kepller and the department heads Hermann Kriebel (personnel), Walter Wüster (information), and Franz Alfred Six (cultural policy). The majority of the foreign service members seriously implicated in Nazi crimes in occupied Europe were newcomers who had been transferred from the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, the Nazi Party’s overseas organization, the party itself, or the SS or SA: Otto Abetz (France), Otto Bene (the Netherlands), Manfred Freiherr von Killinger (Slovakia, Romania), Hanns Ludin (Slovakia), Eduard Veesenmayer (Serbia, Hungary), Siegfried Kasche (Croatia) und Adolf-Heinz Beckerle (Bulgaria), to name only the most important. In addition, there were also the police attachés and consultants on “Jewish affairs” on loan from the police agencies and the SS.

The commission’s report attributes the actions of these perpetrators generally to the Auswärtiges Amt and the diplomatic corps as
a whole. By contrast, the commission treats the opposition figure Adam von Trott zu Solz, who first joined the Auswärtiges Amt in June 1940, as if he did not really belong to the foreign service. Trott, they write, did not feel “particularly tied personally or institutionally” to the Auswärtiges Amt and was “increasingly stylized as a member of Wilhelmstrasse” only after 1945 (302). Such differences in assigning “bad” and “good” newcomers to the foreign service are rather inconsistent.

To be sure, the responsibility of numerous career civil servants is beyond dispute. The perpetrators also included “old” diplomats such as Felix Benzler, the Auswärtiges Amt’s representative in Belgrade, and Fritz Schönberg, the consul general in Salonika, and numerous lower-ranking officials serving abroad. Moreover, one should not underestimate the assistance that theAmt’s traditional departments provided to its “Jewish department.” Senior Auswärtiges Amt officials serving under the Nazi true believer Ribbentrop—including the career diplomats who held the top positions in the ministry until 1943—were not only informed about the path to the “final solution” in general (Under State Secretary Luther represented the ministry at the Wannsee Conference) but also about the collaboration of departments in their own ministry. The conduct of a conservative senior official such as State Secretary von Weizsäcker could be described as having swung between approval and a resigned, formal acceptance of responsibility. It is beyond dispute that the participation of often anti-Semitic “old” diplomats in formulating “Jewish policy” undoubtedly helped remove obstacles on the way to the Holocaust.

The core thesis of the commission’s report—that the Auswärtiges Amt and its staff played a central, at times even leading role in the Nazi regime’s anti-Jewish measures and were significantly involved in the decision to launch the Holocaust—is, however, untenable. The diplomatic elite certainly participated in the Nazi regime’s crimes, including the disenfranchisement, persecution, and murder of Jews. Nevertheless, it is important not to overlook qualitative distinctions between individuals and departments within the ministry or the complicated and contradictory nature of the process of radicalization. The commission’s sweeping and undifferentiated interpretations represent a step backwards from scholarly efforts to achieve a nuanced picture of the multilayered responsibility for the Holocaust. Current scholarship sees a complex interaction of the entire apparatus of the state in which the Auswärtiges Amt was only
one of many components. The course, tempo, and scope of the policy of murder was determined above all by Hitler and the SS. Anyone who attributes excessive importance in this process to an institution that was not unimportant but nonetheless subordinate such as the Auswärtiges Amt runs the risk of underrating the initiative, responsibility, and actions of the main perpetrators.

III. The Foreign Ministry without Foreign Policy

The commission’s simplification of the question of responsibility for the Holocaust consists not only in its insufficient effort at setting the Amt’s assistance in anti-Jewish measures within its political, military, and bureaucratic as well as structural, intentional, and functional contexts. The report’s narrow perspective on the Holocaust and its prehistory is also inadequate. As a result of this self-limitation, the Nazis’ other crimes are neglected and the genocide of the Jews is detached from an essential context. Nazi rule involved numerous other complexes of crimes touching millions of victims beyond the Holocaust, particularly in Eastern Europe, where the exploitation, abuse, and murder of POWs and non-Jewish civilians were part of everyday life under German occupation. If this aspect of the Nazi rule receives only passing mention in the commission’s report, the traditional task of the foreign service is almost entirely neglected: “classic” foreign policy.

How is an assessment of the Auswärtiges Amt in the Nazi dictatorship possible without examining the intentions and conduct within its core area of professional concern? The commission’s report makes only superficial mention of the motives and hopes most diplomats had in welcoming the change of regime in 1933, quickly coming to terms with the new rulers, and helping establish the dictatorship. Nor does the report consider the diplomatic corps’ response to the new regime in light of the development of the diplomatic elite from the late years of the Empire. The path that led from revanchist thinking before 1933 to support for Hitler’s radical foreign policy should be part of a scholarly analysis of the diplomatic elite because otherwise their conduct during the Third Reich appears to have been almost without preconditions. On this topic, however, the commission’s report offers only inadequate and contradictory hints. For the 1930s, the report briefly mentions that “Hitler increasingly sought to set the course, method, and tempo of foreign policy and to leave merely routine day-to-day business to the professional elite in the Auswärtiges
A few lines later, it says that Hitler could not and did not want to dispense with most of the diplomats in the “implementation of revisionist policy”—which does not sound like being shunted aside and left with routine work. With regard to foreign policy in the years from 1939 to 1945, the report makes do with the brief comments that “classic diplomacy” and the “old diplomats” lost influence under the conditions of the war (138, 152).

The commission thus makes things easy for itself. German foreign policy during the “years of peace” (Friedensjahre) up to 1939 has been well researched. That knowledge is hardly used in the report. For the war years, however, there are no general surveys of German diplomacy, and bilateral relations with numerous countries and many aspects of foreign policy have not yet been studied. The commission had the opportunity to make a real contribution here and to determine whether the diplomatic corps did, in fact, exercise little influence in its core areas of competence after 1939. To what extent, for instance, was it the doing of the diplomatic elite that the unstable coalition with states like Italy, Japan, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania held together as long as it did and thus prolonged Germany’s reign of terror over large parts of Europe? Did the Foreign Office give serious thought to how the German Reich could prepare for peace or at least avoid a catastrophic dictated peace settlement? Dealing with such questions regarding the influence of the Auswärtiges Amt on foreign policy during the war could have helped to demonstrate this elite’s professional and moral deformation: its failure and its involvement in wrongdoing—which was not limited to its ancillary roles in the rule of occupied Europe and in the Holocaust.

The same omission applies to the prewar period. The report’s brief remarks on foreign policy before 1939 do not provide a picture of how the foreign service allowed itself to be harnessed for an ever more radical revisionist and expansionist foreign policy, thereby contributing to the preparations for a war of aggression. On this issue, too, the commission passed up the opportunity to set the Auswärtiges Amt’s past into the broader political history of the Nazi dictatorship. Narrowing the examination to a few aspects of foreign policy, even if central ones such as “Jewish policy,” reinforces the lack of contextualization. In the end, the report does not explain how the Amt’s participation in Nazi crimes fit in with its “classic” foreign policy activities, how “new” and “old” diplomacy influenced one another and became intermingled, or to what extent the ministry’s conduct of diplomacy


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aidered a criminal foreign policy. The part that the Auswärtiges Amt played in the criminal policies of the Nazi state would have been clearer if the commission had taken its core diplomatic activities into consideration. The commission only partially fulfilled its mandate to investigate the “history of the foreign service in the era of National Socialism”: a comprehensive assessment of the Auswärtiges Amt is not possible without inclusion of foreign policy. Thus, even after the publication of the commission’s report, the deficit in the scholarly literature that Marie-Luise Recker noted twenty years ago remains: “A thorough, archive-based account of the structure and policies of the Auswärtiges Amt in the Third Reich is still missing.”

IV. Public Perception and Contemporary History

Das Amt und die Vergangenheit immediately attracted public notice unusual for a scholarly work. The official presentation of the report in the Auswärtiges Amt on October 28, 2010, was accompanied and even preceded by reviews of the book and interviews with the editors in the major German newspapers as well as on radio and television. The tenor of the reviews and media coverage was overwhelmingly positive, even enthusiastic. The commission’s report quickly made it onto the bestseller list and remained there for many weeks. A contributing factor to that success was the spectacular formulation used by the commission’s spokesperson, Eckart Conze, in summarizing the report: “The Auswärtiges Amt was a criminal organization (verbrecherische Organisation).” That pronouncement went beyond the conclusions of the report itself and caused unease among the other editors. Nonetheless, Conze’s general verdict was frequently cited and bolstered interest in the book. That Conze called an institution involved in numerous crimes of the Nazi state an organization was not coincidental. He was alluding to the concept of organized crime, which was transferred from American anti-mafia law to the prosecution of German war crimes and Nazi crimes via Allied Control Council Law No. 10 of December 20, 1945 (Article 2). Under that law, mere membership in a “criminal organization”—rather than individual responsibility for a crime—constituted a criminal offense. The verdict in the Nuremberg war crimes trial found the Nazi Party’s political leadership, the Gestapo, the SD, and the SS to be criminal organizations—but not the Reich government or the Wehrmacht, nor even the SA, on the grounds that its members were not “in general” involved in crimes. There was no discussion at Nuremberg of classifying the Auswärtiges Amt as a criminal

10  Recker, Aussenpolitik, 67.
12  See the interview with Nobert Frei: Die Zeit, Oct. 28, 2010, 22: “That is a concept from the prosecution at Nuremberg that does not appear in our book….The ministry shares responsibility for the regime’s crimes, but the concept is not analytically helpful.”
organization; consequently, Conze’s accusation was, in effect, a belated pronouncement of guilt.

That Conze’s sweeping judgment met with widespread public resonance and has since been closely linked to the report’s reception shows the public’s need for unambiguous pronouncements about Nazi-era perpetrators and victims cast as large groups. The success of the commission’s report is also due to the public’s need for information. Public interest in National Socialism today centers on the Holocaust, which, after long having been marginalized, has increasingly shaped German memory and memorialization culture since the 1980s. That development is to be welcomed, but carries with it the risk that the “felt” identification with the victims and the associated pathos of Betroffenheit (empathic consternation) will be exhausted in rituals that ultimately stand in the way of genuine engagement with the history of National Socialism and can provoke counterreactions that hamper the open discussion of the past in civil society.

Not only positive identification with the victims but also negative identification with the perpetrators plays an important role. According to common opinion, nearly all Germans aside from the victims of persecution were perpetrators. Along with “felt victimhood,” we now have felt guilt. Memory becomes self-purification and is morally charged. The commission’s report thus hits a nerve when it portrays the complicity of an old elite in terms of collective guilt and denounces its postwar “cover-up” of its past. The Manichaean division between good and evil in memory culture facilitates both positive and negative identification. The result is a simplified image of the past that does not acknowledge different levels of complicity or complicated processes, and in which the history of National Socialism consists almost solely of the Holocaust. This perspective is potentially relativizing. If almost everyone who wasn’t a victim was a perpetrator, doesn’t any one individual bear only a small share of guilt? If German guilt is defined almost solely by the Holocaust, can other aspects of Nazi violence be neglected? The task of contemporary history is to counter such simplifications by advancing the historicization, contextualization, and differentiation of knowledge about the Nazi dictatorship. Das Amt und die Vergangenheit, however, does more to serve the expectations of the prevailing memory culture than to advance scholarly understanding.

The overwhelmingly positive initial response to Das Amt und die Vergangenheit was gradually supplemented by critiques from scholarly

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13 Ulrike Jureit and Christian Schneider, Gefühlte Opfer. Illusionen der Vergangenheitsbewältigung (Stuttgart, 2010).
experts. Their criticisms focused on errors of fact, but primarily also on the sweeping interpretations. Some critics, advancing political rather than scholarly arguments, went too far: How the commission came into being is no argument against its findings. It is legitimate for a governmental institution to have a team of expert scholars investigate its National Socialist past and its postwar engagement with that past. Some voices in the mass media responded sharply to the criticisms of the book put forward by individual historians. The critics were accused of querulousness, of trying to raise their own profile, and of jealousy as well as of professional incompetence and right-wing political leanings. Unfortunately, the four editors of the commission’s report, too, have joined in the deplorable practice of accusing their academic critics of incompetence and revisionist tendencies. On the many substantive points of criticism, however, the editors have had little to say.

Historians of twentieth-century Germany should reflect on whether, despite all the important detailed studies of the Nazi regime that have appeared in the past two decades, they have been neglecting the big questions about Nazi rule. Up into the 1990s, research on National Socialism was shaped by discussions of fundamental issues: how the National Socialist state functioned, what the relationship between ideology and expert knowledge was, how the Third Reich was able to extend its rule over Europe, and how Nazism was to fit into German history and the history of Europe as a whole. Since then, however, research on National Socialism has narrowed. The dominance of new methodological paradigms (“cultural turn”) and the constraints on researchers’ time have made it difficult to address the big picture. While theory is becoming more important, the scope of research is shrinking and the larger picture is too often ignored. It is therefore striking that it was a leading expert on Nazism of the older generation, the 80-year-old Hans Mommsen, who pointed out that the commission’s report oversimplifies matters by reducing the “ministry’s past” largely to its role in the Holocaust. With this narrowing of scope, the report is perhaps a symptom of the current state of research on National Socialism. If the debate on Das Amt und die Vergangenheit leads to self-reflection on this point among historians of twentieth-century Germany, the book and the controversy it raised will have had a positive effect.

Translated by David B. Lazar, this article is a shortened version of “Das Auswärtige Amt, die NS-Diktatur und der Holocaust. Kritische Bemerkungen zu einem Kommissionsbericht,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 59 (2011): 167–92.
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In May 2003, a retired interpreter, formerly employed by the German Foreign Office, complained to Foreign Secretary Joschka Fischer that a former diplomat with Nazi connections had received an honorable obituary in the ministry’s newsletter. Fischer stopped that practice immediately and asked an independent commission of historians to investigate the Foreign Office’s Nazi past and the official treatment of that past after 1945. The inquiry’s result is not a dry commission report, but the breathtaking story of the German Foreign Office’s history as an organization from the rise of the National Socialists to power to the present-day Federal Republic. The book, written by an international team of twelve German and American historians around the four lead investigators, Eckart Conze (University of Marburg), Norbert Frei (Jena University), Peter Hayes (Northwestern University,) and Moshe Zimmermann (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), offers a gripping story of the continuities in twentieth-century German history.

When Das Amt und die Vergangenheit was first presented to the public in October 2010, Fischer, by then former German Foreign Secretary, commented that this was “the obituary they deserved.” “They” were the Foreign Office’s old guard, mostly (but not exclusively) members of the German aristocracy, with strong links to West Germany’s political and cultural elites. These networks had created and perpetuated the notion that the Foreign Office was the shining white knight among German institutions in the Federal Republic and had had a key role in the German resistance against Hitler. This book investigates the intellectual baggage and social background that German diplomats took with them from the Nazi era into the Federal Republic, and thus fundamentally questions that benign self-interpretation. In doing so, it goes well beyond an organizational history. It embeds the history of the Foreign Office’s bureaucracy in the personal, political, and media networks that reached deep into the hallowed circles of the West German liberal media, such as the weekly Die Zeit and the magazine Der Spiegel.
In this book, we encounter diplomats such as Franz Rademacher, who was in charge of Jewish affairs in the German Foreign Office. In his application for leave in October 1941, he gave “liquidation of Jews” as the reason for his business trip to Belgrade. Every secretary and registrar in the Foreign Office was therefore in a position to know about the Foreign Office’s involvement in the Holocaust. We also learn of the attempts by the Ministry to strip the writer Thomas Mann, living in exile near Zurich, of his German citizenship in order to punish him for his anti-National Socialist stance.

Insiders have known about the Foreign Office’s Nazi past for a long time. The Nuremberg Wilhelmstraße Trial (1948/9) singled out the Foreign Office as a key object of investigation. The historians Eliahu Ben Elissar, Christopher Browning and Hans-Jürgen Döscher have written about the Foreign Office’s involvement in the Holocaust and in Nazi politics more generally. Hence, although significant and breathtaking in their detail and contextualization, the stories of the personal involvements of many German diplomats in the Holocaust are not even the most important contribution made by this study. More significant is the connection it establishes between the ministry’s Nazi history and its more recent past. The authors force us to reconsider continuities in German history beyond individual biographies and beyond remnants of reactionary ideologies. They develop an entirely new angle to address this fundamental question by zooming in on the state, its structure, its bureaucracy—and their relationship to German society from the early 1930s to the present.

This is history at its very best, one of the most original empirical contributions to an assessment of the role of National Socialism in twentieth-century Germany and possibly one of the most important books on contemporary German history in the last decade. The book demonstrates in breathtaking detail how, despite individual acts of refusal (and, very rarely, resistance), the Foreign Office adapted to the new regime almost immediately after the National Socialists had come to power. And it shows how these networks of power and influence reached deep into the social and political fabric of the Federal Republic. For example, the “Central Department for Legal Protection” in the Foreign Office, set up by the former National Socialist prosecutor and judge Hans Gawlik, played an active role in procuring legal protection for German war criminals living abroad well into the early 1970s. With the help of the Red Cross, Gawlik developed a system that warned those war criminals about countries in which
search warrants had been issued; and the Foreign Office’s diplomatic networks played an active role in trying to thwart attempts at prosecution. The authors report in the book that they had problems gaining access to some of the files in the Foreign Office archives, which is all the more striking as some of them had already been published as part of edited document collections. Today, the old guard is only tiny, but all the more vocal: former diplomats have been engaged to discredit the book in a letter writing campaign to Germany’s main national center-right newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine. The newspaper’s book review editor Rainer Blasius has put himself at the forefront of a campaign by conservative German historians such as Horst Möller and Gregor Schöllgen to discredit the book’s findings by pointing out minor infelicities in the citation of primary sources. Interestingly, they concentrate on the Nazi period and have little to say about the central question of continuities.

The illusion of the apolitical civil servant was able to survive the war, not least because it satisfied the needs of many for some form of historical reorientation in the period after Nazi Germany’s unconditional surrender, and its subsequent loss of national sovereignty and even national territory. A key episode in this transition was the campaign around the trial of Ernst von Weizsäcker, secretary of state in the Foreign Office between 1938 and 1943, ambassador to the Holy See, 1943–5 and father of the West German president Richard von Weizsäcker, at the Wilhelmstraße Tribunal. The Tribunal was one of the principal organizations for the re-founding of the West German state after 1945. With the trial against von Weizsäcker, nothing less than the survival of the diplomatic caste appeared to be at stake, a caste whose members regarded themselves as the incarnation of German statehood. The public relations campaign around the trial succeeded in making von Weizsäcker the tragic hero of the failed opposition against the Nazi regime. This allowed the civil servants to redeem their self-image of belonging to an unpolitical and ultimately fair-minded bureaucracy for the post-1945 period.

This interpretation of Germany’s transition from National Socialism to democracy in the West after 1945 transcends both the interpretation of a “zero hour” in 1945 and the idea of a “restoration” of conservative values, propagated by many critics and left-wing intellectuals since the early 1960s. But it also asks us to question more recent arguments about the “liberalization” of West German political culture after 1945. Like all good obituaries, therefore, this study
carries an important message for the living. Fundamentally, it demonstrates that, in the words of Karl Marx’s critique of Hegel’s doctrine of the State, bureaucracy “is a network of practical illusions, or the ‘illusions of the State.’” These illusions suggest that bureaucracy is distinct from society and can act as a bridge between society and the State. No other bureaucratic organization had practiced, cherished and believed in those illusions as much as Germany’s Foreign Office, engaged, as it was, in representing the German state both at home and internationally.

This book thus highlights the uncanny traces of what Eckart Conze has called a “criminal organization” (a term commonly used to describe the death squads of the SS) in the personnel, procedures and general operation of the Ministry after its re-creation in 1951. Not only German readers should be unsettled by the book’s general message: seemingly apolitical bureaucratic neutrality often contains within it the seeds and traces of intolerance, racism and violence. Bureaucracies and bureaucrats, despite the veneer of the rationality of bureaucratic procedures, might well be capable of complicity in the most irrational and heinous crimes, if they encounter the appropriate environment. In Nazi Germany, civil servants’ belief in apolitical bureaucratic procedures was lethally mixed with National Socialist ideology aimed at creating an ethnically pure Nazi empire. The modern liberal belief in the reliability of bureaucratic procedures conceals these uncomfortable continuities. This book suggests powerfully that it is civility and decency that are the exception and deserving of analysis. Das Amt und die Vergangenheit does not merely advance our understanding of twentieth-century German history. It also highlights meticulously the paradoxes of modern government and society in general.

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HITLER’S BROWN DIPLOMATS

REVIEW OF DAS Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, BY Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, AND Moshe Zimmermann (Munich: Blessing, 2010).

Volker Ullrich

DIE ZEIT, HAMBURG

In early February 2005 something unprecedented in the history of the German Foreign Office occurred: 128 retired diplomats rebelled against Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. They published a large-sized death notice for their late colleague Franz Krapf, a former member of both the NSDAP and the SS, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. In the Federal Republic Krapf had risen to the posts of German Ambassador in Tokyo and Head of Germany’s Permanent NATO Delegation. The paid notice in the FAZ was their protest against an order issued by Fischer according to which former members of the Foreign Service who had been members of the Nazi party were no longer to be “honorably remembered” in an internal publication of the Foreign Office.

The ex-diplomats’ sensational move triggered an entirely unintentional reaction. For the Foreign Minister then decided to go on the offensive in order finally to tackle a task all of his predecessors had neglected: to have the history of the Foreign Office during the Nazi regime and its repercussions in the Federal Republic examined by an independent commission of historians. Four years after it began its work, the commission has now presented its final report in the shape of an almost 900-page long publication.

What these four historians—Eckart Conze (Marburg) and Norbert Frei (Jena) from Germany, Peter Hayes from the United States, and Moshe Zimmermann from Israel—and their team of twelve staff members have achieved is astonishing. Not only did they study the files in the Foreign Office’s Political Archive, including the personnel records that had been kept classified for decades, they also extended their research to numerous national and international archives. Maintaining a high academic standard, they meticulously interpreted the vast amount of material. The Foreign Office’s role during the Third Reich is analyzed in an unemotional and differentiated manner. The Foreign Office’s carefully maintained image, according to which the Office had, with only a few exceptions, bravely withstood the onslaught of National Socialism, is dismantled almost entirely. The
German Foreign Office was not a hotbed of stalling resistance or an island of decency amidst Nazi barbarism, but an important supporting pillar of the National Socialist regime right from the beginning.

These findings are not entirely surprising. In 1978 the American historian Christopher Browning had published a pioneering study on the infamous Judenreferat [Jewish Affairs Department] of the Foreign Office, officially known as Department D III in the “Germany” Section, titled The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office. (It has only just been translated into German, 32 years after its publication.) In 1987 Hans-Jürgen Döscher published his dissertation Das Auswärtige Amt im Dritten Reich: Diplomatie im Schatten der “Endlösung” [The Foreign Office During the Third Reich: Diplomacy in the Shadow of the “Final Solution”], and, eight years later, another study, Verschworene Gesellschaft: Das Auswärtige Amt unter Adenauer zwischen Neubeginn und Kontinuität [Conspiratorial Circle: A History of the Foreign Office under Adenauer Between a New Beginning and Continuity]. Browning’s and Döscher’s studies, however, not only met with skepticism and rejection among diplomats; they didn’t manage to influence public opinion either. The fact that political science professor Theodor Eschenburg of Tübingen, assisted by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, was allowed to slam Döscher’s book as unsound in an article in Die Zeit in 1987 was symptomatic; the old network was still active, even four decades after the Wilhelmstraße Trial, in which Ribbentrop’s State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker was the main defendant. After Eschenburg’s death he turned out to have briefly been a member of an SS-affiliated organization.

This publication by the commission of historians has several advantages over the works of Browning and Döscher: its approach is broader, it does not examine just the Foreign Office’s Nazi past but also, in the more extensive second part, the way the Foreign Office dealt with that past. In addition, it is written very clearly and precisely so that it has the potential to appeal to an audience beyond scholars. What had been missing up until now—a comprehensive, readable, source-based synthesis and overview—finally has been provided.

It becomes evident right in the first chapter (“The Foreign Office and the Establishment of the Dictatorship”) that no pressure was required in order to get the Wilhelmstraße officials in line with Nazi policy after the National Socialist rise to power. In fact, they willingly served their new master from day one. “As of January 30, 1933 the Foreign Office was the Foreign Office of the Third Reich and it operated as
such until 1945,” reads the analysis. High-ranking diplomats eagerly devoted themselves to the task of trivializing and justifying to their foreign counterparts the deprivation of rights and persecution of Jews that began immediately after Hitler’s seizure of power. “Foreign countries have great difficulty understanding the anti-Jewish program since they have not experienced our inundation by Jews themselves,” Ernst von Weizsäcker, then minister at the embassy in Oslo, commented on the boycott of Jewish businesses of April 1, 1933. The only high-ranking Foreign Office official to quit the service in the spring of 1933 because he did not want to be part of the new regime was the ambassador in Washington, Friedrich von Prittwitz und Gaffron.

Even before the Second World War, an active exchange of information developed between the Foreign Office headquarters in the Wilhelmstraße and the nearby Gestapo headquarters. Germany’s foreign missions eagerly participated in the surveillance of German emigrants. Expatriations, too, were often initiated by the Foreign Office, as in the case of Thomas Mann in May of 1936. The revocation of Mann’s citizenship was preceded, among other things, by a written opinion advocating it from Ernst von Weizsäcker, by then minister at the German embassy in Bern, who accused the writer of having “rewarded the patience that the German authorities have shown toward him with ridicule” and thus engaged in “hostile propaganda against the Reich from abroad.”

The authors give two explanations for the unopposed integration of the Foreign Office into the regime’s mechanism of repression and violence: first, a mentality dating back to the Kaiserreich that combined a pronounced *esprit de corps* with a high measure of conformity and antidemocratic as well as anti-Semitic sentiment; second, the identity of the Office’s and the regime’s goals in foreign policy. Top diplomats, just like the military elite, agreed with Hitler that the Treaty of Versailles had to be done away with as quickly as possible and that Germany had once again to rise to the level of a great, even a world power. The Foreign Office’s support of Hitler’s revisionist policies was indispensable since it helped to assuage the Western powers and to mislead them about his further expansionist plans.

The authors decidedly contradict the claim that the Foreign Office was usurped by Nazi careerists early on. After 1933 the homogeneity of the veteran diplomatic elite remained essentially intact. The study also demonstrates that the replacement of the compliant Foreign
Minister Constantin von Neurath by the Hitler acolyte Joachim von Ribbentrop in February 1938 did not constitute a decisive break in this continuity. Career diplomats continued to occupy the key positions. Career diplomat Ernst von Weizsäcker assumed the second highest position of State Secretary.

There has been much speculation about Weizsäcker’s role under Ribbentrop. In his memoirs (published in 1950, a year before his death) he claimed not to have aspired to his new position. In the end, he had taken up this “cross” in order to prevent greater evil. Joining the NSDAP and simultaneously accepting the SS rank of Oberführer had been the “sacrifices” he had to make in order to serve the greater good of “maintaining peace”.

The commission’s report does not doubt Weizsäcker’s motivation, but corrects his account in two respects: first, the report notes that diplomats could avoid joining the SS if they wanted to. Second, it points out that Weizsäcker’s basic intention was not maintaining peace but avoiding a major war which would have endangered the existence of the Reich itself, a subtle yet important difference. In the process, State Secretary Weizsäcker overestimated his capacity to influence foreign policy through Ribbentrop. For the authors, Weizsäcker personifies the dilemma of a top diplomat who believed he had to collaborate in order to influence policy and who became increasingly entangled in the regime’s brutal politics in the process.

In the summer of 1939, when all of Weizsäcker’s attempts to avoid military conflict had failed due to Hitler’s absolute determination to wage war, he did not draw the logical conclusions but remained in his position. He defended himself in September 1945 by saying that resigning “would have equaled the crew of a ship in distress hiding below deck once it realizes the captain is a madman!” The report calls this an “absurd conception of service”—for Germany was by no means “in distress” in the summer of 1939, in fact it was preparing to subject Europe to its regime.

The authors rightly emphasize that the war was a racist campaign of conquest and annihilation beginning with the attack on Poland in September 1939 and not just with the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. The question if and how the Foreign Office was involved in the monstrous crimes committed during the war is a main focus of the study. The verdict could not be any clearer: The Foreign Office was informed thoroughly about Germany’s barbaric methods of
warfare and the criminal character of its occupation policy right from
the beginning. It was aware of both the mass death of Soviet POWs
and the annihilation of European Jews.

The reports on the activities of the Operations Units [Einsatzgrup-
pen] of both the Security Police [Sicherheitspolizei] and the Security
Service [Sicherheitsdienst] in the Soviet Union, which left no doubt
about the systematic character of the mass killings, were received by
the Foreign Office, where they were summarized and signed by State
Secretary Weizsäcker and Undersecretary Ernst Woermann. At the
Wannsee Conference of January 20, 1942, which was supposed to
coordinate the various authorities’ efforts to carry out the Holocaust,
Undersecretary Martin Luther represented the Foreign Office. The
only copy of the conference protocol ever to be found after the war
was discovered in the Office’s files.

Members of the Foreign Service did not just know about these crimes,
however; they acted as accessories. As the report states, “[t]he more
the number of territories falling under the Third Reich’s sphere of
control grew, and the more radical the policy towards Jews became,
the more the Foreign Office was involved in the planning and politics
of the ‘final solution.’” German diplomats proved to be compliant
aides to the Reich Main Security Office [Reichssicherheitshauptamt].
They were involved in deportations of Jews in many places and some-
times initiated them as well. The propaganda that the Office spread
abroad assured that rumors circulating about mass killings could be
dismissed as “horror stories.”

The study shows that Weizsäcker became an accessory even though
he tried to conceal it. For example, he made a characteristic change
to the draft of a reply by Franz Rademacher, head of the “Department
of Jewish Affairs” [Judenreferat], to SS-Obersturmbannführer
Adolf Eichmann of March 1942, in which the Foreign Office agreed
to the deportation of 6000 French Jews to Auschwitz: while the draft
originally read there were “no concerns” about the plan, the edited
version states that the Foreign Office raised “no objection” to it.
Furthermore, when SA-Obergruppenführer Hanns Elard Ludin, who
held the office of envoy in Bratislava, reported in June 1942 that the
deporation of Slovakian Jews essentially had come to a standstill,
Weizsäcker first instructed him to inform Slovakian President Jozef
Tiso that this had made “a very bad impression” in Germany, but
later softened the message: the cessation of deportations would cause
“surprise” in Germany.
Yet the authors are careful to avoid generalizations. The actions and reactions of Foreign Office representatives are studied separately and in detail for each European country occupied by Nazi Germany or allied with it. The results shed light on a broad spectrum of behavior—from anticipatory obedience and routinely bureaucratic handling to naked connivance. Attempts to save Jews as made by a member of the embassy in Hungary, diplomat Gerhart Feine, in 1944, remained exceptional.

According to the commission, one cannot speak of significant opposition in the Berlin head office of the Foreign Service. Weizsäcker’s inner circle essentially disbanded in 1940/41; at his own request, he was transferred to the Vatican as Ambassador in 1943. It was only on the periphery of the Foreign Office, namely in the Information Office, that a small circle of Hitler’s opponents gathered around Adam von Trott zu Solz and Bernd von Haeften. Both were members of the Kreisau Circle around Helmuth James von Moltke and Peter Yorck von Wartenburg, and thus the main focus of their resistance lay outside the Foreign Office. Both were involved in the planning of July 20, 1944 and were executed after the failure of the coup d’état.

How did the diplomats deal with their past after 1945? The report attributes a key role to the Wilhelmstraße Trial of 1948/49. In this follow up to the Nuremberg trial eight former members of the Foreign Service found themselves in the dock, with Ernst von Weizsäcker the highest-ranking among them. Weizsäcker was defended by the young attorney Hellmut Becker, son of former Prussian Minister for Culture Heinrich Becker, who had died in 1933. (It turned out after Hellmut Becker’s death in 1993 that he had joined the NSDAP in 1937.) Assisting him was Weizsäcker’s younger son Richard, who interrupted his studies at law school in Göttingen for this purpose.

For the first time, we read a description of how the defense managed to get the large circle of former Foreign Office staff to come to the aid of the accused and exonerate him of all charges by means of notarized affidavits. At the same time a smear campaign was launched against the American prosecutor Robert M.W. Kempner, which is without doubt one of the most shameful chapters of German postwar history. Kempner, a former official in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior who had been dismissed in 1933 due to his Jewish background and who had managed to escape into exile in the US, was defamed as
“Dr. Sixtus Beckmesser”, “Kempner-Freisler”, and “Talmi-American”; not even anti-Semitic stereotypes were off limits.

The “standard-bearer in the fight against Kempner,” as Richard von Weizsäcker correctly noted in November 1949, was Hamburg weekly Die Zeit. As late as September 1951 its editor-in-chief Richard Tüngel ran an article against the former prosecutor titled “This Vermin Must Be Stopped” and demanded that American High Commissioner John McCloy expel him from Germany.

In his memoirs published in 1983 Kempner was still outraged that “the distinguished gentlemen of the Foreign Office in their blood-sprinkled white vests [i.e. clean records]” got off so lightly. Weizsäcker was sentenced to seven years in prison, which were reduced to five years in December 1949. He got an early discharge in October 1950. Like many other convicts, he profited from the change in the global political situation. The Cold War prompted the Allies to quickly close the “denazification” chapter in order to win over the new West German state and its old elites as allies in the confrontation with the Soviet Union. To quote the report: “Nuremberg had become passé.”

The chapter titled “Constructing the Myth” gives insight into how former members of the Foreign Service concocted their apologetic self-perception. A note of February 1946 written by former Legation Counselor Wilhelm Melchers is a key document in the internal myth-making process, which began quite early. In it he not only elevated Weizsäcker’s circle to a breeding ground of the conspiracy of July 20; he also attested that the Foreign Office in general had remained “healthy” at its core, quoting the word of executed dissident von Trott zu Solz. The joint line of defense was built upon this basis: according to it, remaining in office was not condamnable at all but rather a stance dictated by politics as well as morals in order to fight the Nazi system from the inside. One’s own involvement in the criminal policies was quickly reinterpreted as the heroism of perseverance. The claim that there really had been two Foreign Offices during the “Third Reich”—one which had remained “uncorrupted” and consisted of the old elite and another, “corrupt” one made up of National Socialist upstarts—fitted in very nicely with this myth. Clearly this legend served the purpose of creating an acceptable tradition that facilitated re-entry into the service.

It still is surprising to read how easily the Wilhelmstraße diplomats managed to re-establish themselves in the reorganized...
Foreign Office. After all, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had insisted that the new Foreign Office should have “as little as possible to do with the old guard.” Yet under the leadership of his confidant Herbert Blankenhorn professional qualification was given priority over questions about the former officials’ political past. Adenauer let this happen and soon even demanded an end to the “sniffing around for Nazis,” not least because of the political past of his State Secretary in the Chancellery, Hans Globke, who had been deeply involved in the Nazi regime. Thanks to the old networks high-ranking positions in particular were again staffed with members of the “old guard.”

The shadows of its past have always accompanied the history of the Federal Republic’s Foreign Office. Up until the 1970s the public was repeatedly roused by scandals about the Nazi past of high-ranking West German diplomats. These were fueled in part by GDR publications that, although mostly accurate, actually worked in the accused’s favor in the climate of the Cold War since they could be dismissed as communist propaganda.

Yet the commission’s report not only considers the continuities but also the innovations that have changed the face of the Foreign Service over the course of the past decades. The junior diplomats who slowly began to fill the ranks did not usually come from the circles of nobility and the wealthy bourgeoisie from which the old diplomatic corps had been recruited. Many of them had gotten to know and value the advantages of a democratic-liberal order during stays in the United States. Among the “old guard,” too, the willingness to revise old thinking with regard to foreign policy grew as a result of the successful Western integration of the Federal Republic. The doctrine of the primacy of the nation-state was replaced by a commitment to European integration and international cooperation. This shift came with a new, demure diplomatic style that played a major part in the Federal Republic’s return to the community of states as an equal and acknowledged member.

What did not change in all these years was the self-image of the Foreign Office regarding its role during National Socialism. The work of the commission of historians has demolished the basis for this self-image once and for all, and this achievement cannot be praised enough. The book should be required reading for all future diplomats. It would be good if other Federal Ministries also found the strength to have their past examined in a similarly unsparing manner.
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“The passport is the most noble part of the human being. It also does not come into existence in such a simple fashion as a human being does. A human being can come into the world anywhere, in the most careless way and for no good reason, but a passport never can. When it is good, the passport is also recognized for this quality, whereas a human being, no matter how good, can go unrecognized.” Thus wrote Bertolt Brecht in his *Refugee Conversations* in 1940, still deeply affected by his own experience of exile. His view illustrates the vital importance that a seemingly simple administrative act—the issuance of personal identification papers—could acquire. The possession of correct papers legitimated a person’s right to be accepted as a human being and as part of the collectivity defined by the nation-state. The passport, which has been the most important document for regulating the interstate movement of people since the First World War, quickly became the most obvious symbol of this belonging, offering proof and recognition of one’s status.

The reverse was also true: The lack of valid papers expressed one’s lost link to human society. Brecht’s dark observation, therefore, highlighted the logical conclusion of a historical process that Gerard Noiriel has termed an “identificatory revolution.” The stateless person emerged as a sort of inevitable byproduct of the nationalization process that began in the nineteenth century with the rise of European national movements which defined the state as a nationally homogeneous entity. Within these newly conceived states, belonging became synonymous with possessing the correct nationality, verifiable through the proper documentation, which was necessary to open paths to social participation and interaction with the state’s citizenry.

Consequently, those who were displaced by flight, deportation or other means during the two world wars and thereby lost their formal

3. Definitions of citizenship are culturally determined and change over time. In pre-modern times, citizenship referred to membership in a municipality, but a few new concepts emerged after the French Revolution wherein nationality came to constitute an institutionalized link between citizen and state.>>
state affiliation constitute an unintended result of the nation-state system. Indeed, these stateless people seem to be the mirror image and negative counterpart of citizens. Yet, although the history of citizenship and nationality has been well researched, these stateless groups have largely been left out of it. In fact, they only came into view after the historiographical gaze recently shifted toward the transnational, revealing groups that transcended national boundaries and were, in some cases, stuck outside them. Responsibility for such persons fell to supranational organizations. Statelessness is basically a state of legal limbo, of mostly temporary non-status, of not belonging to any of the modern national frameworks. Whether a product of free will or force, statelessness always expresses a form of marginalized existence in the middle of society. Hannah Arendt describes the exclusion of a stateless person from a community of citizens as a violent act that denies him even the “right to have rights,” whereas citizens can at least fight for their rights.

My research project traces how statelessness arose and how people and institutions came to grips with this challenge in Europe after each of the world wars. In particular, it focuses on how these developments shaped international relations and on the framework within which they were addressed, which from 1948 was supposed to apply norms such as those formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The very diverse and heterogeneous group of stateless people constituted the counterpart to passport holders. From the First World War on, passports provided proof of identity and nationality. While the passport first appeared as part of the democratization process during the French Revolution and mainly served as a travel document, it became the modern symbol par excellence for defining inclusion and exclusion in the nation-state system in place by the twentieth

4 See the concise study by Andreas Fahrmeir, Citizenship: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept (New Haven, 2007). Thoughtfully drawing attention to the lack of research on statelessness, Fahrmeir claims that such research is vital to understanding the historical development of the concept of “citizenship.”

5 Arendt herself had escaped Berlin in August 1933 and finally immigrated to the US. She lived as a political refugee and stateless person for nearly a decade until gaining US citizenship in December 1951, shortly after finishing The Origins of Totalitarianism. For broader insight into Arendt’s life, see Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: Leben, Werk und Zeit (Frankfurt am Main, 2004). Arendt first processed the experiences of flight, detention and statelessness in her essay “Wir Flüchtlinge” of 1943. (See the collection of her political essays, Hannah Arendt, Zur Zeit. Politische Essays, ed. Marie-Luise Knott (Berlin, 1986), 7–21. It was first published as “We Refugees,” Menorah Journal (1943). Her interpretations of the experience here and in later works are linked to her own biography and at the same time rooted in the broader historical context.


7 Mark B. Salter, Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations (Boulder, 2003), 4. See this also on the “Visa System”, following suit upon the establishment of the Passport Regime.

The experience of statelessness as a life in legal limbo thus corresponds to the ever-growing importance of the passport system in the twentieth century. After the “long nineteenth century,” an era of national movements and the attendant emergence of new nation-states, the twentieth century was an era not only of world wars but also of nation-states in flux, newly forming, collapsing, and being reconfigured. Numerous violent, but also internationally sanctioned revisions of territories and borders accompanied these developments, eventually resulting in a growing number of stateless people with no legal protections.9

In my overall project, I focus on the historically and culturally specific practices of actors who experienced or dealt with statelessness. The geographic starting point is Switzerland, insofar as it was the center of all international efforts to address statelessness—the first country to provide a setting for international discussions in each of the two postwar periods that saw the European state system in tatters. International organizations such as the League of Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the first institutions to react to the problem of statelessness on a large scale, had their headquarters in Geneva. However, the supranational decisions made there then had to be applied within the different nation-states, so my project concentrates on Germany (in the post-1945 era, on West Germany) and the United States to examine how this worked in these two Western nation-states.

This geographic emphasis corresponds to a three-step approach in researching the subject of statelessness. First, I focus on the supranational level, that is, the discussions of the League of Nations and later the United Nations on the issue of statelessness that eventually led to broad changes in international relations and international law. Next, I analyze the positions and approaches of the nation-states in direct interaction with the supranational institutions. Finally, I turn to the implementation of international agreements on the nation-state level, examining the everyday practices and experiences of the actors and groups involved: the stateless themselves, individuals and support groups who worked with them, and national as well as supranational organizations.

In this introduction to my project, I begin with a brief sketch of the fundamental causes of statelessness as well as the national and international responses that typified or reshaped the problem. In the second section, I build on this framework by examining three brief

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9 Enzo Traverso, for example, sees the stateless person as the epitome of the twentieth century, which he describes as a period of “European Crisis”; see Enzo Traverso, Im Bann der Gewalt: Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1914–1945 (Munich, 2008), esp. 38 and 51. Eric Hobsbawm makes a similar point in his The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York, 1994), esp. 50-51.
but consequential periods that made statelessness a characteristic problem of the twentieth century. In the third section, I present the main perspectives that inform my research, using concrete examples to address the following questions: How was statelessness dealt with on a supranational level? What did it mean for those who experienced statelessness? How did cultural imaginations process the historical experience of statelessness? Finally, to what alternative, that is, post-national, concepts of belonging did the experience of statelessness lead in some cases?

Writing a history of statelessness in Europe requires both legal and cultural approaches. Jurisdictions’ methods for addressing the problem of statelessness always stood at the beginning of discourses concerning the issue because the first definitions were legal. Contemporaries utilized a variety of terms to categorize and grasp stateless persons as such, describing them as persons of “abnormal status,” “homeless,” a “new class of international people,” “undesirables,” and so on.10 The leitmotif of all these discussions was clearly first to define, then solve. Only after legal delineation did “stateless” and related terms such as “homeless” and apatride (French for “stateless”) enter broader societal discourses about people who, for various reasons, had lost their citizenship. However, we cannot describe and study statelessness in legal terms alone but must analyze the legal approaches themselves since they were culturally constructed and subject to historical change. If, instead of focusing too narrowly on legislation and state bureaucracy, we observe interpretations of statelessness and the ways such ideas were mirrored in discourses at a broader societal level, we can find many reflections of statelessness in literature and film. Moreover, these cultural responses influenced the legal discourses that had initially spawned them.11

To flesh out the three-step approach, this project therefore goes beyond the mere reconstruction of the legal history of statelessness to investigate the experience of statelessness on legal, cultural, and everyday levels after 1918 and 1945. Besides laying out the causes of widespread statelessness after both world wars, the project focuses on solutions that newly emerging supranational organizations such as the League of Nations came up with and how the discussions they engaged in changed the arena of international politics. Next, it seeks to shed light on how the nation-states applied the internationally agreed-upon solutions in international conventions and other such accords. Then, to get as close as possible to the experience of statelessness, it turns towards those most affected by statelessness—that is, the stateless themselves.

10 For one of numerous examples, see Bericht über die Sitzung des Expertenkomitees Terminologie am 15. August 1956 in Vaduz, Archives of the Comité International du Croix Rouge, Geneva, BAG 234.

and those who sought to help them. One way to do this is to analyze lawsuits filed to combat discrimination against the stateless—such as disputes over property, social welfare, pensions, and so on. With this multistep approach, it is possible to see how a seemingly marginal phenomenon such as statelessness lay at the heart of much broader issues including the question: Who, in times of crisis, defined state affiliation and how? More importantly, considering the growing power and relevance of international politics after the two world wars, how vital was national belonging in the modern and crisis-ridden system of nation-states? What relevance did collective belonging in a presumably modern civil society resulting from the experience of World War II still possess in the postwar years? What does research on statelessness reveal about the historically changing conceptions of what a modern state collective—and the individual’s role within it—could and should be?

In recent years, a number of scholars have done research on citizenship, nationality, and documenting identity. Some works compare different national approaches to citizenship laws, while others concentrate on the entanglements of national belonging, ethnicity, and participatory citizenship rights. The development of the passport system has also been the subject of important research. The most recent scholarly approaches to the relationship of citizenship rights and international politics, however, are primarily inspired by a new interest in the development of international and supranational organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well as the notion of human rights in international politics. Some scholars have also done some exploratory research on particular aspects or legal issues of statelessness, such as the role of the United

12 See especially Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1992); and with a quite different position Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürger- und Ausschließ: Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen, 2001); see also Andreas Fahrmeir, Citizens and Aliens: Foreigners and the Law in Britain and the German States, 1789–1870 (New York, 2000). For more general reflections on the history of citizenship, see Rogers Brubaker, Ethnizität ohne Gruppen (Hamburg, 2007); Charles Tilly, Citizenship, Identity and Social History (Cambridge, 1996); Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany (Stanford, 2008); and Andreas Fahrmeir, Citizenship: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept (New Haven, 2007), as well as the essay collection edited by Christoph Conrad and Jürgen Kocka, Staatsbürgerschaft in Europa: Historische Erfahrungen und aktuelle Debatten (Hamburg, 2001).


14 For a great synthesis of passport research, see John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge, 2000); though it covers a different historical era, Valentin Goebrers, Der Schein der Person. Steckbrief, Ausweis und Kontrolle im Europa des Mittelalters (Munich, 2004), is also of interest.

15 See Madeleine Herren, Internationale Organisationen seit 1865: Eine Globalgeschichte der internationalen Ordnung (Darmstadt, 2009).

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Following the heels of these studies, this project emphasizes groups who were no longer part of any nation-state, but whose mere existence helped to shape a new system of international politics after the end of the nineteenth-century Vienna System of international power relations.

By looking at the margins of postwar societies, we can find out more about different modes and models of belonging. For periods of crisis, a perspective on the margins of society can help us learn more about how membership in a particular human society was defined. Furthermore, it helps us untangle how individuals and nonstate organizations reconceptualized ideas of belonging on the basis of humanitarian principles. This approach brings conceptions of social belonging into a picture that eventually moves beyond nation-state affiliation to encompass such ideas as world citizenship and the growing importance of universalist ideals based on human rights.

I. Causes and Responses

An integral part of modern national self-understanding throughout most of the twentieth century was that adopting a different—for- eign—nationality meant giving up one’s former nationality. This crucial aspect of nearly all nationality laws caused nationality changers to fall into a sort of stateless legal limbo as they waited to obtain their new nationality after giving up their old one. But what if their request failed? Or what if the grounds for granting someone a new nationality changed over time? As nation-states increasingly faced stateless people in their midst, they quickly began to seek solutions.

In the two postwar periods, there were five general causes, both historical and personal, of statelessness. The first cause was the actions of states against their own citizens. Nearly all European nationality laws permitted state institutions to expatriate citizens, revoke their citizenship, or both for maintaining permanent residence abroad, accepting a foreign nationality, taking an official post in a different state, or serving in a foreign military, among other reasons. Some countries could expatriate citizens to punish them for criminal offenses or even political opposition. After the First World War and the revolutions that followed, many European countries began to pass laws that allowed them to denaturalize or denationalize their citizens. Such laws and the resulting mass phenomenon of statelessness marked a turning point in the history of the modern nation-state, which...
erased any naive notion of the inviolability of one’s membership in the national community. State-generated statelessness continued to grow in the interwar period with more European states issuing laws enabling the expatriation of unwanted citizens. Expatriation became legal in several countries long before National Socialist laws broke any remaining inhibitions on such actions in Germany.

A second cause of statelessness was contradictory nationality laws that allowed some people to fall through the cracks following the dissolution of empires and the creation of new nation-states. The territorial changes in Europe after World War I were dramatic: Old empires like Austria-Hungary collapsed; new nation-states such as Czechoslovakia appeared; and border regions, including Alsace-Lorraine, were transferred to other nation-states. In Eastern Europe, moderate and integrative nationality policies inspired by the Paris Treaties of 1919 as well as the Treaties for the Protection of National Minorities were supposed to prevail. Some contradictory regulations in the treaties, however, rendered people stateless without them ever leaving their homes. These international treaties, though informed by good intentions, lacked sufficient appreciation of local circumstances and therefore produced new problems in many cases. Questions of citizenship and nationality therefore became a major issue in the new transnational order.

A third major cause of statelessness was specific to women. Until far into the twentieth century—in international law until 1957—a woman’s nationality was based on the principle of “derivative citizenship.” That is, her citizenship depended on who she “belonged to,” be it her father in her country of origin or her husband of a different nationality. This could be positive if it offered a woman a change in citizenship she desired, such as becoming a U.S. citizen by marrying one. The other side of this principle, though, was that many countries automatically revoked the citizenship of women who married foreign nationals, rendering them dependent on their husbands’ nationality. This often then led to statelessness, for example, if a husband’s land of origin did not grant his wife citizenship in her own right and the marriage later ended in divorce, or if the wife had not yet fulfilled the naturalization


22 See Martha Gardner, The Qualities of a Citizen: Women, Immigration, and Citizenship, 1870–1965 (Princeton, 2005), 14. Furthermore, the restrictions in regulations such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 stated that this rule only applied when the woman could theoretically also be naturalized without marriage—that is, if she met the racial criteria necessary for naturalization. On this issue in France, see Patrick Weil, “The History of French Nationality: A Lesson for Europe,” in Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU, ed. Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2001), 52–68, 59.
requirements of her spouse’s country. As long as that state of “legal limbo” was not resolved, she remained stateless.\(^3\)

A fourth cause of statelessness was inconsistent laws concerning the nationality of children born to foreign or naturalized citizens. Nationality laws that protected women did not always ensure that nationality was automatically passed on from parents—men or women—to their children, even if one or both had been naturalized.\(^2\) Consequently, if parents did not possess valid papers, had lost their nationalities, or had come from different countries with conflicting laws on the nationality of their offspring, children could be born into statelessness.\(^5\) As early as in the interwar period, various organizations, and especially religious ones, took up efforts to save “innocent” children from statelessness, yet laws to protect children from becoming trapped in a legal void in the first place were, for the most part, not taken up until after the Second World War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the European Council tried for years to draft a convention on these issues. The question of stateless children always swung between two poles. On the one hand, from early on there was the topos of “innocent” children who should not suffer the consequences of what was implied to have been the parents’ fault. On the other hand, easing the citizenship requirements of children sparked fears that such laws might provide countless parents with leverage to acquire citizenship themselves against the intentions of the lawmakers.

The fifth and final reason for statelessness was—and to a certain extent still is—what has legally been called “de facto statelessness.” People in this category might have been able to produce documents proving their formal affiliation with the state they had left but for some reason refused to affirm this citizenship. Elucidating this cause of statelessness expands the perspective from one primarily of victimization and state-directed actions to one that reveals the potential for agency among the stateless themselves; many of them accepted the possibility of expatriation without acquiring a new nationality when they emigrated to escape authoritarian regimes. Prominent examples, such as Thomas Mann and Hannah Arendt, can be found from the early years of National Socialism. Similarly, quite a number of less prominent Alsatians tried to escape mandatory National Socialist labor service by fleeing to Switzerland and France and obscuring their nationality, more or less knowingly risking statelessness.\(^2\) Another group of people who played a more active role in becoming or remaining stateless were the so-called Displaced Persons after the Second
World War who preferred statelessness to forced repatriation to a country they feared or despised and so tried to rid themselves of any national classification.27 International treaties today prohibit states from expelling people in cases that might render them stateless. Refugees, in turn, can instrumentalize such policies combined with the principle of *non-refoulement*—that is, the doctrine of not deporting people from their current country of residence into potentially dangerous places. By obscuring their country of origin and declaring themselves stateless, they seek to avoid unwanted and feared deportation.28 One may conclude that refugees in the two postwar periods under discussion used the experience of statelessness and the different solutions sought in international law to stay where they were. In other words, the legal responses to statelessness clearly also affected the practices of refugees.

Since the modern problem of statelessness emerged, the question of whether universal legal instruments such as internationally binding conventions should also support those who “voluntarily” give up their citizenship has remained unresolved and controversial.29 This is not surprising as it concerns the question of who gets to define belonging and state sovereignty. During the postwar periods under discussion, most actors, except the de facto stateless themselves, relegated this power to the nation-state. Yet the debate over statelessness discursively challenged and reshaped international relations in postwar societies. The international legal definition of a “stateless person” finally delineated in the United Nations Convention in 1954—“a person who is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its law”—only encompassed the de jure stateless, and thus reflected the challenge the debate posed. The de facto stateless, those supposedly stateless by choice, were not included and therefore not protected. This project, however, by focusing on both the de jure and the de facto stateless, can provide further insight into what the claims of human rights and universal principles really meant to the societies and states that constituted what was called the “international community.”

**II. Three Moments**

Three historical moments clarify how statelessness emerged and evolved from its first mass appearance in 1918 over the course of the century. The first of these moments occurred in the aftermath of World War I, when the European map was redrawn following revolutions and the dissolution of empires. The second moment began in


28 For more on *refoulement*, see Mathias Hong, *Asylgrundrecht und Refoulementverbot* (Baden-Baden, 2008).

29 See, for example, SdN, C558(b)M200b1927, Discussions at the 3. Conference on Communications and Transit in the year of 1927.
the 1930s, when the National Socialist regime in Germany enacted discriminatory citizenship laws against Jews and other presumed “enemies of the Reich,” which rendered many people stateless. The third moment accompanied the dramatic changes in the international political system that followed Germany’s defeat in 1945. All three of these moments highlight statelessness as an intractable characteristic of this “age of extremes,” to borrow Eric Hobsbawm’s felicitous label, that could only be resolved by supranational institutions.

The end of the First World War and the collapse of Romanov, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern rule led to a fundamental restructuring of Europe. New nation-states such as Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia emerged. Since Europe’s ethnic and linguistic boundaries were not as neatly drawn as the new state boundaries, these changes caused many people to lose their nationality with all its attendant rights and privileges. Indeed, some ten million refugees left their countries of origin and, unable to settle permanently anywhere else, found themselves perpetually “on the move.” Jews comprised a high percentage of these refugees because they were the most likely to be rendered stateless by the new states’ exclusionary categories of national belonging. The strong presence in Europe of both Jews and national minorities called into question the imagined unity of nation, state, and territory that informed nationalism and the modern European state system, creating what Annemarie Sammartino terms a “European crisis of sovereignty.”

In this extraordinary situation, new institutions emerged that sought ways out of the crisis and eventually shaped the framework and condition of international politics. Supranational organizations such as the newly founded League of Nations and various committees of the International Red Cross assumed responsibility for problems associated with statelessness on both a diplomatic and a humanitarian level. One early achievement was the introduction of an identity document for all the refugees who had been rendered stateless by a Soviet order of 1921 that revoked their citizenship for having left the country following the October Revolution. Called the Nansen passport after Fridtjof Nansen, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, it was instituted in 1922 and issued by the government in which the stateless individual resided. Although it did not guarantee or grant any citizenship rights, it at least provided stateless people with a legal identity for the first time. This highly symbolic document mainly proved that a person did not belong to any state entity and


33 For more information about Fridtjof Nansen, see, among other biographies, Roland Huntford, Nansen: The Explorer as Hero (London, 1997).
declared that its holder should be accepted in any state in which he or she produced the document for authorities to examine. Its primary goal was not to document national belonging but to protect its holder from deportation.34

This remarkable step represented a shift in international politics because, for the first time, statelessness was recognized as a problem that went beyond the power of nation-states and could only be solved by international politics.36 As the Nansen passport demonstrated, dealing with statelessness often entailed supranational interventions in fields of utmost national sovereignty. Simultaneously, the introduction of the Nansen passport contributed to the establishment of an international passport regime that functions to this day, regulating border crossings and reenforcing the security needs of nation-states.35 The first years after World War I thus made it clear that the international community could only resolve the problem of statelessness by interfering with national sovereignty. In other words, international politics were needed to overcome the issue of not being a national of any nation-state, whereas being a national of a nation-state had to be defined on the nation-state level.

The second historical moment, during the rise of National Socialism in Germany and the run-up to the Second World War, was probably the most prominent and tragic example of state-generated statelessness. As Hannah Arendt showed in her work on totalitarianism, statelessness is fundamental to the origin of all nation-states and results from them, but especially from those founded on authoritarian, nationally inspired theories. Six months after seizing power in January 1933, the Nazis enacted a law enabling the expatriation of all “disloyal” and exiled Germans and began to take the first legislative steps to revoke the citizenship of Jews by July. The German government could now denationalize citizens against their will if it considered them undesirable. Then, early in the summer of 1935, it abolished the legal option of applying for naturalization. Yet another instrument for mass expatriations, which primarily targeted Jews, came later that year with the Nuremberg Laws; these introduced new language to distinguish between “imperial citizens” (Reichsbürger) and supposedly racially inferior “German nationals” (deutsche Staatsangehörige), that is, people who belonged in Germany but not to Germany, and deprived the latter of all the usual rights, privileges, or protections associated with citizenship.37 A further amendment to Germany’s citizenship law in 1941 aggravated the situation dramatically by depriving all Jews who had taken residence abroad—several

35 Salter, Rights of Passage, 77. On the term “passport regime” in the source material, see, for example, Journal Officiel, Société des Nations (August 1926).
hundred thousand—of their citizenship, regardless of whether they had been forced out of the country by deportation or had “voluntarily” chosen to emigrate.

The problem of statelessness after World War II was even more severe than it had been after World War I. First of all, surviving German Jews were still deprived of their citizenship. At the same time, the official national affiliation of the so-called expellees (Vertriebenen)—the ethnic Germans who were driven out of Eastern Europe—was uncertain. These very different groups of temporarily stateless people resulting from the cataclysms of the Second World War prompted the international community to seek a solution, although its main goal in the first postwar years was the repatriation of displaced persons (DPs). This task proved to be quite difficult considering the numbers of cases of undefined or undetermined nationality; in 1948, 3 percent, or some 10,000 out of 280,000 displaced persons living in Germany, were stateless. Until a law concerning the legal status as homeless foreigners was passed in April 1951, these DPs were defined as homeless, stateless foreigners under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees.38

The National Socialist case demonstrates that the expatriation of German Jews, their forced statelessness and loss of legal belonging, was just the beginning of a process of dehumanizing them that ended in their widespread extermination. Nonetheless, the problems persisted after the war with the question of how the national affiliation and belonging of the displaced persons should and could be categorized. This historical experience made it clear that the states had to address the nationally produced problem as an international community. The newly established United Nations urged the nation-states to search for solutions that would prevent the emergence of new statelessness forever, resulting in an international law that obliged states never again to expatriate people who, not being citizens of another country, would be rendered stateless by such an action.39 The law was also intended to protect the existing stateless against the hardships of statelessness and to issue travel documents for their everyday use.

III. Four Perspectives

By presenting a history of statelessness after the two world wars and focusing on the moments and forces that challenged rather than strengthened the nation-state system, this project brings seemingly marginal phenomena to the fore. Although the stateless

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39 Nevertheless, some states continued to use expatriation as a form of punishment after the Second World War; for example, “collaborators” in Poland were punished this way. See Krysztof Stryjewski, “Nachkriegsfolgen der ‘Deutschen Volksliste’ in Großpolen und das Schicksal der verbliebenen Deutschen,” in Deutschsein als Grenzerfahrung, ed. Beer et al., 261–278, here 274. For a comparison of such laws, see Rainer Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship: Membership and Right in International Migration (Cheltenham, 1994), 134–35.
never constituted the majority of all refugees, their experiences reflected worldwide developments and bore implications for any individual in the modern international state system. With the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, individual rights were no longer supposed to depend on one’s status as a citizen in a specific nation-state but on one’s inherent humanity. However, since only nation-states could guarantee any human rights in practice, people continued to fall through the cracks. While these stateless people were a minority, they can be seen as paradigmatic of the increasingly international world, with all its pros and cons. This view, just beyond the edges of national belonging, helps us understand the concepts of national identity and the ideal citizen that were in play.

To investigate how statelessness is produced and perceived as a problem in political, legal, humanitarian, and other debates, this project looks at the phenomenon from a variety of perspectives. It examines both international law and diplomatic discourse, including debates about the definition of statelessness, as well as humanitarian assistance for the stateless. It seeks to understand the issue from the multiple perspectives of the sovereign nation-state, the individuals who became stateless, and those who deliberately made themselves so in an attempt to overcome nation-state belonging (like the so-called world citizens). I argue that the discussions about the problem of statelessness can uncover key aspects of European identity discourse as well as issues of membership embedded in notions of “post-national belonging” or the “international citizen,” for example. Therefore, the project does not focus on the narrative of the nation-state but on its limits and margins.

To analyze stateless persons as both active agents in history and objects affected by history, we must keep the following four perspectives in mind: first, the social practices of dealing with statelessness on the supranational level; second, statelessness as a sphere of lived experience, including the impact of supranational decisions and national and local actions on it; third, cultural conceptualizations of statelessness; and, closely linked to this imaginary sphere, fourth, utopian notions of world citizenship that go beyond conceiving of statelessness as merely a history of victimization. I will provide an example utilizing each of these perspectives below.
1. Supranational Agreements on Statelessness: The example of the UN Convention of 1954

The history of dealing with statelessness on the supranational level essentially began with the aforementioned agreement about the Nansen passport. However, its local implementation, which never really met the high expectations of the international actors, was rather varied, as case studies for Marseille and Lyon demonstrate, revealing that the status of the passholders remained quite insecure.40 The relevant local administration often simply ignored the protected status of so-called Nansen refugees and even continued to deport them.41 The history of the Nansen passport thus shows that analysis of the international discourse and policies concerning statelessness always has to be linked to everyday practices on the ground. While the Nansen passport is a symbol of supranational sovereignty, national responses to it provide insight into whether national sovereignty took precedence over the dictum of such supranational treaties. The global approach of modern international politics based in universalist ideas such as human rights thus always has to be held up against the realpolitik on the local level.

One of the leading questions I investigate in my project is the extent to which international developments in the interwar period questioned the sovereignty of the nation-state, or whether the very establishment of supranational supervisory bodies actually strengthened this sovereignty. Take the following supranational discussions about passports: At the first international conference of the League of Nations on passports, customs, and border traffic in 1920, the League’s first proposal was to abolish passports altogether, though it met, not surprisingly, with opposition from the nation-states. The United Nations adopted a similar approach in 1947 when a meeting of experts proposed a model for an international passport, but they failed to even call another conference on the topic—despite some interest.42 Did these discussions ultimately reinforce the authority of the nation-states?

Although statelessness was a problem produced by nation-states, it was nevertheless of utmost international importance and could only be resolved by means of international politics, and specifically, international negotiations and treaties. In the worst case, such international treaties could even generate new forms of statelessness.43 Which human rights treaty or international law to apply in an individual case was a question that local bureaucrats had to address in their daily
practice. This confirms the importance of investigating the local level and the local practices in assessing supranational agreements. Time and again in this study, I go back and forth between the two levels to determine how they are intertwined.

After the Second World War, the United Nations, as the successor of the League of Nations, took over joint responsibility with the International Refugee Organization (IRO) for solving the problem of statelessness. In 1948, the UN called for a study of the situation of stateless persons and formed an Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, and in 1951, the UN General Assembly adopted and signed the widely known Refugee Convention. Although this convention did not include a formal protocol for the protection of stateless people, the UN recommended further action on this issue, and thus the UN Secretary-General invited all nation-states to deliver statements on the question of statelessness. This culminated in the 1954 UN Conference of the Plenipotentiaries convened in New York, which issued a convention of its own, the “Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.” Coming into force in June 1960, the convention aimed to eliminate the “legal void” of the stateless, but, as with the Nansen passport, did not oblige the signatory states to help the stateless but merely to issue travel documents unless the stateless were asylum seekers. The convention aimed to secure the legal status of the stateless and guarantee them fundamental social and economic rights. Various articles regulated particular rights concerning marriage, property, inheritance, travel documents, and the “non-refoulement” policy, that is, protection from expulsion. One of the practitioners involved in the discussions pointed out the guiding principle of this international effort: “The problem of the refugees that are difficult to resettle can be solved if it is shared.” Yet, as the very small number of ratifications of the conventions indicates, little was ultimately shared. The primacy of national sovereignty thus seems to have persisted over the rule of the human rights regime that was established by supranational bodies such as the UN.

In my project, inspired by the idea of making the global local, I begin by conducting a case study of this UN convention to analyze the supranational discussion; then I compare the different approaches of the United States and (West) Germany as nation-states reacting to the convention, as well as the domestic repercussions these demands of the newly formed international community placed on each of these countries. I follow this with further case studies on the implementation of the conventions across countries.

of the different regulations of this particular UN convention on the local level.

2. Experiencing Statelessness: The Example of Albert Einstein

A study focusing on international politics and the shaping and reshaping of international law (increasingly based on human rights principles) easily risks leaving out the very people who were most affected by these supranational decisions. As mentioned above, a study of statelessness must also look at the experience on the individual level, both from the point of view of those rendered stateless by others and those who voluntarily chose this status. The first group—those who experienced statelessness as victims—were mainly migrants who found themselves in between the protection of their state of origin and that of their new country of residence. They did not have a right to work; they were not entitled to social welfare or health care benefits of any kind; they had no right to send their children to school; and even getting married posed huge problems—not to mention traveling or taking on an active part in society and politics. If they wanted to overcome their “betwixt and between” status, they first had to be able to prove their status with documentation. Thus, they had to enter the treadmill of endless definitions. But this again was part of the problem itself. After all, as Carol Batchelor put it, “[p]roving statelessness is like establishing a negative. The individual must demonstrate something that is not there.”

One way of tracking the experience of statelessness in this project is to conduct different case studies of the various non-governmental organizations that dealt with the problem of statelessness, such as the Congres juif mondial, the Ligue internationale des droits de l’homme, and others. Parallel to the supranational organizations in the interwar period, “grassroots” organizations like the Association of Stateless Persons (Verband der Staatenlosen) were also established. Yet an individual perspective is also needed to understand statelessness for both forced and voluntarily stateless persons. For both groups, I look at specific biographies to determine how people dealt with their specific situations and processed their experience of statelessness. For some, statelessness was a necessary step in overcoming a legally unbearable situation by seeking a new nationality with citizenship rights in their country of residence; for others, the experience accompanied an attitude that aimed to move beyond the idea of nation-state belonging altogether and fashion concepts of world citizenship.

One of the more prominent individual examples of statelessness is the case of Albert Einstein (1879-1955). The conflicts over his expatriation from German citizenship illustrates the ways in which the sovereignty claims of a nation-state, an individual’s understanding of belonging to a state out of choice, and the notion of world citizenship can become entangled. After relinquishing his German citizenship in 1896, Einstein was stateless until 1901, when he received his Swiss citizenship. In 1914, he became a German citizen again when the Prussian Academy of the Sciences (Akademie der Wissenschaften) invited him to join; members had to be Prussian and thus German citizens. Thus, it is not so much that Einstein wanted to become a German citizen again but that he had to do so to receive scientific honors. When the Nazis seized power, Einstein, who was in the United States on a trip, asked to be released from his German citizenship. This request ended up on the desk of Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick in Berlin, who delayed granting Einstein’s request until further clarification could be obtained, not by any means to keep Einstein as a German citizen but rather to demonstrate that he, as a representative of the state, had the power to strip Einstein of his German citizenship and that it was not a matter of individual choice. Frick wanted to be able to apply the above-mentioned law of July 1933, which enabled him to expatriate illoyal citizens as a punishment, on his own terms, but he could hardly punish Einstein by stripping him of his citizenship when this is what Einstein had requested. The Foreign Office, in turn, did not object to Einstein’s request as the diplomats there feared that causing trouble for such a prominent citizen would damage Germany’s reputation abroad. Moreover, they worried that an act of expatriation might lead to unwanted international attention. To be sure, inconspicuously approving his request could have the same outcome, albeit without reputational damage. This power-wrangling went on for about a year until Einstein was finally expatriated in March 1934. Six years later, he was granted U.S. citizenship.

Einstein’s expatriation case exemplifies how “the state” can use the granting or denying of citizenship rights as a symbolic instrument to demonstrate its power and sovereignty though it was far more than merely symbolic for those affected. The state’s efforts to gain and maintain control over questions of belonging to the national entity are striking here; the state would not brook arbitrary individual actions in this realm. It is the goal of my project to analyze such citizenship practices and their correlation to national belonging, and to write

49 On this case, see Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and Moshe Zimmermann, Das Amt und die Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik (Munich, 2010), 82-84.
the history of statelessness as a history of individual experiences of law. Consequently, I always combine supranational discourse with individual and local experiences.

3. Imagined Statelessness: Laurel and Hardy in 1951

With so many individuals like Einstein struggling with the issue of statelessness, it is not surprising that the cultural realm took up the theme with enthusiasm. Numerous novels and films throughout the twentieth century, from B. Traven’s novel Totenschiff (Death Ship, 1926) to Steven Spielberg’s film The Terminal (2004), explored this experience. We must also explore this “imagined” side of statelessness to fully understand its history. Whereas the settings for the stateless encounters have changed over time from ships, sea ports and islands to airports and terminals, the fundamental issue such stories address is still statelessness.

One example is the James Bond story Casino Royale, in which the bad guy—the very personification of evil—is a stateless person. Claiming to have lost his memory in the Second World War, he seems not to know his nationality and thus calls himself “Le Chiffre” (the Cipher). Although the various film versions of the story give only marginal importance to the villain’s statelessness, it is a bigger issue in Ian Fleming’s original novel of 1953. The novel clarifies that Le Chiffre is a Displaced Person, one of the huge group of stateless people after the Second World War, who calls himself Le Chiffre since he is, as he claims himself, “only a number on a passport.”

Common to all cultural representations of statelessness is the depiction of its extremely difficult and untenable nature. In 1951, during the heyday of international discussions on how to deal with the refugees and stateless persons left in a shattered Europe after the Second World War, Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy thematized statelessness in their last slapstick comedy, Atoll K. The stage in this case is not an airport, as in The Terminal, but a ship and a lonely island. Following the very real experience of many stateless people in the mid-century, the film’s plot also reflects upon a utopian society that is to be established on the island and thus considers the hope and utopian vision of world citizens as well. Like Fleming’s James Bond novel, Atoll K originated in an era when questions of national and transnational belonging seemed unsettled and open to re-thinking. Likewise, the lessons to be drawn from the experience of exile and flight in the Second World War were not yet clear. Nor had the

50 See Alfred Mehran, Der Terminal-Mann. 15 Jahre als Staatenloser auf dem Pariser Flughafen (Berlin, 2004).

51 The passport in this case is a Stateless Passport; see Ian Fleming, Casino Royale (New York, 2002 [1953]), here 13.

52 For a more in-depth analysis, see Rürup, “Staatenlosigkeit als Utopie?” 69–86.
Western community of states, experiencing the beginning Cold War, set the tone and direction for future concerted action. The film reflects in miniature the large-scale difficulties concerning citizenship and statelessness that the international community faced and had to address in its supranational discussions.

The Cold War, statelessness, and the question of how a peaceful society should be shaped—these are the three existential themes of the international community after 1945 that Ian Fleming’s novel alluded to and Laurel and Hardy’s final film erected a monument to. The two main motifs of these cultural productions are the person whose lack of papers deprives him of all rights, even the “right to have rights,” as Hannah Arendt famously put it, and the positive, lawless utopia in which everyone is free to pursue his needs. Consequently, these works ostensibly place two types of sovereignty—of the state body and of the subject—in opposition, making way for another, positive interpretation of statelessness: the ideas of world citizenship, wherein the individual sense of belonging can overcome national bonds and boundaries to be part of something far greater.

4. Transcending National Belonging? The Option of World Citizenship

World citizenship, like that depicted by Laurel and Hardy’s Atoll K, has sometimes been presented as the historical counterpart to statelessness. Yet utopias of a “borderless world” or “world citizenship” are found not only in the movies. New movements that visualized a world free of nation-states, comprised only of “world” rather than “national” citizens, emerged as early as during World War I, and then again after World War II, and at the beginning of the atomic age. While the term statelessness usually evokes images of refugees and expatriated people, many of them Jews, it can also apply to so-called world citizens and cosmopolitans: groups and individuals who see the dissolution of national citizenship as a welcome opportunity to escape narrow confines of belonging. Cosmopolitan citizens, globalization, and internationalism are neither new nor exhausted topics. Post-national thinkers of world citizenship, world unity, and universal peace draw upon a variety of notions developed by philosophers such as Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, and Albert Einstein.

The fundamental ideas driving world citizenship movements have shifted over time. During and shortly after World War I, world citizenship supporters such as Arnold Toynbee and H. G. Wells mainly
aimed to secure peace and to prevent future wars. In the interwar period, thinkers like Bertrand Russell advocated the development of an international system that could move beyond the powerlessness of the League of Nations. After World War II, with fear of nuclear weapons inspiring supra- and transnational organizations, those who sought alternatives to the failure-prone nation-state system primarily focused on issues such as world peace and disarmament.

The post-World War II movement spurred some people to relinquish their nationality and declare themselves world citizens. One of the first people to do so was peace activist Garry Davis: In June 1948 in Paris, he publicly renounced his US citizenship and declared himself “World Citizen No. 1” on the grounds that this path was essential to peace: “I must extend the little sovereignty I possess, as a member of the world community, to the whole community, and to the international vacuum of its government—a vacuum into which the rest of the world must be drawn if it is to survive, for therein lies the only alternative to this final war. I should like to consider myself a citizen of the world.” In 1949, he then founded the Registry of World Citizens, which issued a world citizen identity card to those who signed up. Within five months, roughly a quarter million people from seventy different countries had registered, with 800,000 signing up by the end of the year.

Yet even these ideas of world citizenship remained embedded in the nation-state system as an organizing structure. The World Movement for World Federal Government (WMWFG), which was an umbrella organization for thirty-seven groups around the world, shows the extent to which this was the case. The movement held its first international congress in 1947 in Montreux—making Switzerland the stage of international efforts once again—where it set forth its goals in the Declaration of Montreux: universal membership and a world passport, limited national sovereignty, world courts, a supranational army, as well as supranational control and possession of nuclear and technological developments. These elaborations also make clear, however, that world citizens in postwar Europe actually re-enacted national citizenship and belonging. Just like other initiatives, such as the Comité permanent mondialiste, this organization receded remarkably in the 1970s when the oil crisis shattered the international, Western postwar order.

Such reenactments of national citizenship point to one of the internal contradictions of world citizenship based on the universal idea of

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54 See, for example, some pieces that Albert Einstein published with an introduction by Bertrand Russell in Otto Nathan, Heinz Norden, eds., *Einstein on Peace* (New York, 1960).

55 Garry Davis, “Statement of Renunciation,” June 25, 1948; see http://www.garrydavis.org/archive.html. See also Barry James, “‘World Citizen No. 1’ and His Quixotic Quest: Garry Davis Champions Life Without Borders,” *International Herald Tribune*, December 5, 2001. He also draws the connection to the issue of statelessness after World War II.


human rights: The nation-state, with its particular means of state power, possesses the sole instruments for protecting universal human rights in society, yet, at the same time, the state itself also poses the greatest threat to human rights. Consequently, advocates of world citizenship were unable to give up on the nation-state altogether in attempting to overcome state-generated statelessness. This double-bind, however, is one reason statelessness should not be regarded exclusively as a negative result of a presumably declining nation-state system. Rather, attention should also be drawn to developments at the margins of the nation-states after the wars, specifically, the ideas of world citizenship and overcoming national belonging that grew out of the historical experience of statelessness.

IV. Conclusion

Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948 aimed to put an end to the phenomenon of statelessness, which, though it had only emerged three decades before, had already troubled hundreds of thousands of people worldwide. It declared: “Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality, nor denied the right to change his nationality.” This declaration was supposed to eliminate the stateless individual as a counterpart to the “national.” The link it makes between citizenship and human rights proves the rising influence of supranational institutions and discourses on national citizenship.59

On the one hand, as John Torpey has shown, it was in the particular interest of the nation-state to increasingly monopolize and standardize the “legitimate means of movement.”60 Yet this tendency had created the problems of identification and statelessness in the first place. The lives in limbo, in turn, fundamentally threatened the nation-state and generated a feeling of vulnerability among citizens. On the other hand, very much like in a counter movement, it was explicitly the presence of stateless and other people—such as illegals and undocumented citizens—who questioned the social contract between state and citizen that then again led to increased law enforcement and border restrictions, strengthening the nation-state.

Though statelessness may have been a marginal phenomenon, the experiences of the stateless nonetheless reflect the implications that worldwide developments had for individuals. Moreover, it is precisely at the margins of the nation-state that we can delve further into the meaning and importance of state belonging and thus also into the

59  Bauböck, Transnational Citizenship, 240.
60  Torpey, Invention, 250.
concepts and confines of the state. As two sides of a similar development, stateless persons and world citizens need to be linked analytically. The underlying basic question is how belonging and identity were defined in different historical settings. In the above-mentioned movie of 1951, Laurel gets at the heart of the matter when Hardy tells him that Antoine is “what is known as a stateless man, in other words, a misplaced person.” Beaming in his understanding, Laurel replies: “See—he’s lost and he can’t find himself!” How the experience of losing this sense of belonging changes one’s understanding of it is one of the questions of this research project.

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RETHINKING THE FORD-NAZI CONNECTION

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The peculiar admiration that National Socialists had for Henry Ford and the supposed sympathies that the Detroit industrialist harbored for Nazism keep attracting the curious, both academic historians and Internet dilettantes. There is something irresistible about the connection between the man taken to symbolize American industrial modernity and the quintessential villains of the twentieth century. Intriguing anecdotes abound. To name a few: The New York Times reported that a portrait of Henry Ford graced Hitler’s Munich office in 1922.1 Hitler acknowledged Ford in Mein Kampf and Baldur von Schirach testified in court in Nuremberg that “the decisive anti-Semitic book” he had read was Ford’s International Jew.2 According to Prince Louis Ferdinand, Hitler told him over lunch in 1933 that he was “a great admirer of Ford’s” and would do his “best to put his theories into practice in Germany.”3 German diplomats awarded Ford a prestigious decoration in 1938. Robert Ley, head of the Nazi labor organization German Labor Front, wrote a letter to Henry Ford from his Nuremberg prison cell, days before his suicide.4

We also know that Nazi engineers and industrial managers adapted technological and functional aspects of Fordism. Flow production (assembly lines and vertical integration) had considerable appeal after 1936, when the Four-Year Plan sparked renewed interest in industrial rationalization. The Volkswagen plant invoked Ford’s Rouge factory as a model, and the German Labor Front hired Ford engineers to staff it. Finally, the Nazi-appointed manager of the airplane builder Junkers, Heinrich Koppenberg, was a vocal disciple of Ford production techniques.5

Historians have proposed different understandings of the Ford-Nazi connection. Some have offered muckraking indictments of the American industrialist as a Nazi sympathizer and war profiteer.6 For others, the connection exhibited Nazi “reactionary modernism,” that paradoxical fusion of technological zeal and anti-modern romanticism supposedly characteristic of Nazism.7 Others again have suggested

3 Prinz Louis Ferdinand von Preussen, Als Kaiserenthel durch die Welt (Berlin, 1952), 261.
4 The original penciled letter is in the National Archives and Records Administration College Park (NARA), RG 238, Entry 51, Box 3.
5 See the essays by Manfred Grieger and Lutz Budrass in Zukunft aus Amerika. Fordismus in der Zwischenkriegszeit, ed. Stiftung Bauhaus Dessau and RWTH Aachen (Dessau, 1995).
a structural nexus between Fordism and fascism. In this vein, Fordism is essentially understood as a device of capitalist control over the industrial workforce. In Germany, it is asserted, Fordism only became dominant under Nazism.8

But despite these interpretations, the Ford-Nazi connection still leaves us with considerable uneasiness. It fits only awkwardly into the master narratives of a historiography still dominated by national conceptual frameworks. In the American case, the status of Henry Ford as a herald of the roaring 1920s makes it difficult to integrate his anti-Semitism and indelicate political leanings into a unified appreciation of his historical role, which, in turn, creates the cliché of the man as an “enigma.” Meanwhile, in German historiography, the juxtaposition of “Ford” and “Nazis” is still more likely to elicit ruminations about the relationship between National Socialism and modernity rather than empirical investigation.

The quality of speculation and insinuation that pervades much of the writing on Ford and the Nazis, I believe, is owed to the weak development of transnational interpretive frameworks for the 1920s and 1930s. To be sure, there are ambitious attempts to embed the specific Nazi reception of Ford and Fordism within the longitudinal context of the German “Fordist century.”9 Yet the Ford-Nazi connection looks different once we withdraw this national lens and observe the remarkable global career that Ford’s ideas and practices enjoyed during the 1920s and 1930s. Nazis were hardly the only ones excited about Henry Ford during the interwar years—Ford had fans among illiberal modernizers across the globe. This was partly due to his notoriety as a major organ of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. But it also stemmed from the fact that Ford’s industrial philosophy seemed to offer a productivist strategy for transcending liberal capitalism from the Right.

The purpose of this essay, then, is to provide some contextualizing evidence for the familiar stories of the Ford-Nazi connection and to embed them in contemporaneous, transnational contexts. To do so, it is first necessary to clear up some misunderstandings of Henry Ford’s place within the American corporate arena in the interwar years. Far from typifying American capitalist modernity, Ford and his company represented a producerist critique of liberal American capitalism. Next, I want to situate the Weimar Nazi reception of Ford’s antisemitism within a broader global reshaping of the anti-Semitic discourse after World War I. I then offer some context for the 1938

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episode of Hitler awarding Ford a medal. After briefly touching on the Nazi Volkswagen project, the essay ends by pointing out that the affinity between “fascism and Fordism” does not look quite as compelling once we acknowledge the simultaneous Soviet adaptation of Fordism. In sum, these transnational contexts suggest that we may understand the Ford-Nazi connection as having sprung from a shared background ideology characteristic of the global interwar years: the search for illiberal alternatives to liberal capitalism.

**Ford Myths**

To understand the appeal that Ford exerted on the global Right in the interwar years—Nazis included—we must first dispel a few prevalent myths about Henry Ford and his company. Following Antonio Gramsci’s classic equation of “Americanism and Fordism,”10 historians too often have taken Ford as the archetype of American industrial capitalism for this period. But, in truth, Ford Motor Company serves poorly as an emblem of the “New Era” of the 1920s and was entirely sidelined during the New Deal. Between 1919 and 1921, Ford Motor Company (FMC) underwent a major restructuring. After this, the company occupied a unique position in the American corporate arena, which it retained until 1941, when Edsel Ford agreed to war contracts against the wishes of his father Henry. It was only during this period that FMC became the autarchic production giant so admired by thousands of visitors from across the globe. During the same period, however, the American corporate mainstream moved in a rather different direction.

The 1920s completed the penetration of corporations into the stock market, increasing access to capital and boosting the growth of “New Era” capitalism. Meanwhile, Henry Ford had bought up all minority shares of FMC over the course of 1919, after which it remained the only American company of comparable size whose shares were not traded on the New York Stock Exchange. (In fact, FMC only went public in 1957.) While its competitor General Motors pioneered a model of corporate governance that relied entirely on professional managers, FMC fortified the charismatic leadership of its founder. Hence, the separation of ownership and management, which increasingly dominated American corporations in the 1920s, did not affect FMC until after WWII. FMC’s River Rouge complex, which took up full production in 1920, vertically integrated the supply of raw materials to an unprecedented degree, producing steel, glass, and lumber in its own branch factories. But as the market for first cars dried up, a

strategy of relying on suppliers for parts and raw materials, as followed by GM, proved more flexible and helped competitors avoid the massive losses FMC incurred during the Depression.\(^{11}\)

Ford’s famous implementation of the assembly line and his groundbreaking introduction of the 5-dollar day in 1914 have created the misleading impression that FMC pioneered the social rationalization and disciplinary innovations workers faced under mass production conditions. To be sure, a so-called Sociological Department was created in 1914 to supervise workers’ homes and habits to ensure that they lived in stable households, were married, and did not drink or smoke.\(^{12}\) But few recognize that the Sociological Department remained a mere episode in FMC’s history—it was scrapped in 1921 as too expensive and replaced with an agnostic labor policy that did not concern itself with workers’ lives outside the factory. Throughout the interwar years, Ford consistently paid above-average wages, but these rewarded work performed, not the workers performing them. Workers had no contracts and no seniority. In fact, as welfare capitalism became the norm in the USA during the 1920s, it was practiced everywhere but Ford Motor Company.\(^{13}\)

Even the association of Ford’s name with the coming of 1920s consumer culture is questionable. Much more than Ford’s high wages, it was consumer credit schemes, again pioneered by General Motors, that expanded the American consumer goods markets in the 1920s.\(^{14}\) Unlike its competitors, Ford’s company made use of consumer credit only reluctantly and inconsistently.

FMC was most distinct from its competitors, and from all other corporations of comparable size, in the extent to which the company reinvested profits in manufacturing. As a private company, FMC had no stockholders to satisfy and no dividends to pay. Thus, Ford was uniquely able put substance behind the claim that his company put “production over profit.” According to a contemporary assessment, the ratio of reinvested profits to total capital at FMC was 99.99 percent in 1927 (compared to GM’s ratio of 51.63 percent).\(^{15}\)

In short, Gramsci was wrong. Fordism was not Americanism. On the contrary, FMC was in many ways uniquely unrepresentative of the dynamics of American capitalism in the 1920s. But what is more, Ford’s alternative path was not simply the result of managerial failures, as Alfred Chandler has suggested.\(^{16}\) Ford did not conform to the dynamics of the 1920s because his company explicitly followed an alternative strategy.

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14 Louis Hyman, Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink (Princeton, 2011), 10-44.
15 Lawrence H. Seltzer, A Financial History of the American Automobile Industry (Boston and New York, 1928), 266.
This strategy was most clearly expressed in the three books that Samuel Crowther wrote for Ford. *My Life and Work*, published in 1922, was followed by *Today and Tomorrow* (1926) and *Moving Forward* (1930). These books presented ideas quite remarkable for an American captain of industry. In them Ford criticized the practice of running corporations for shareholder value, disparaged the profit motive as a driving force of industry, and put the idea of public service over individual profit. “It is the function of business to produce for consumption and not for money and speculation,” Ford informed his readers. Similarly, he declared it “utterly foolish for Capital and Labor to think of themselves as groups. They are partners.”

Historians have been too quick to dismiss these ideas as inconsequential, often on the assumption that Ford’s books were simply part of a self-serving PR strategy.

Not quite so. Ford did not hire Crowther. The editor Russell Doubleday did, and when *My Life and Work* appeared, FMC refused to aid its distribution, citing the principle that the company “handle[d] Ford products only.” Initially, the only thing that distinguished Crowther’s book from the steady stream of *Fordiana* that began populating the bookshelves in the 1920s was a simple but highly effective technique. Crowther secured Ford’s consent to use the industrialist’s name on the cover as author and obtained permission to write in the first-person voice. This technique has tricked readers of *My Life and Work* to this day into believing that Ford was speaking to them. But, in fact, it was Samuel Crowther, putting into quotable prose the heterodox principles of FMC. In doing so, Crowther expressed his own convictions as much as Ford’s. Crowther conceived of the cooperation with Ford as a political project designed to deliver “not so much the story of a life as the development of a social theory.”

What Crowther’s books preached (and FMC practiced) was, in fact, a producerist critique of liberal capitalism. *My Life and Work* cast the idea of an industrial moral economy, in which a community of producers struggled against stockholders, financiers, and idle profiteers. This illiberal modernism was not only compatible with the anti-Semitism propagated simultaneously in Ford’s paper *Dearborn Independent*. It also struck a note worldwide among radicals who thought that the time was ripe for an economic system that would supersede liberal capitalism. Too often we forget that, in the 1920s, these radicals were not only to be found on the Left. And it was right-wing modernists who admired Ford’s ideas—National Socialists among them.

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17 Henry Ford and Samuel Crowther, *My Life and Work* (Garden City, 1922), 12, 117.
18 BFRC, Acc. 285, Box 91, Liebold to Doubleday, 13 Sep. 1922.
19 Benson Ford Research Center (BFRC), Acc. 572, Box 4, Crowther to Liebold, 3 Jan. 1923.
20 Laying to rest the claim that modernism was a prerogative of the Left is Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler* (London, 2007).
Fordism: A Global Infatuation

When *My Life and Work* appeared in German translation in early 1923, Weimar Germany became “infatuated” with Fordism, as the historian Mary Nolan put it. Ford seemed to offer something for everyone—employers looked to Fordist rationalization, unions to Ford’s high wages, and conservatives to the Fordist promise of social harmony. But Fordism was hardly a uniquely German predilection. Ford’s contemporaries across the globe showered Crowther’s Ford book with praise. Each nation found its Ford booster, and letters from admirers requesting the right to translate *My Life and Work* survive in scores in the Ford archive.

For example, Brazilian journalist and literary modernist José Bento Monteiro Lobato, translator of *My Life and Work* and *Today and Tomorrow* into Portuguese, praised Ford in terms that bordered on worship. Ford, wrote Lobato, was “the most lucid and penetrating intellect of modern times,” whose visionary methods anticipated “a future state of things more efficient and just than the present,” providing “the only correct solution” to the social and economic problems of the present. “No conscientious man reading *My Life and Work*,” Lobato gushed, “can fail to discern in it the Messianic Gospel of the Future. It penetrates into the heart of things as a steel drill penetrates granite.”

In another example from 1926, across the Pacific, T. Nakamura, head of the Economic Research Department of the Bank of Taiwan in Tokyo, wrote a glowing letter to Henry Ford. “I have just gone through your most valuable book *Today and Tomorrow* with profound interest and admiration,” wrote Nakamura. “Your wage motive and principle of service to the public, if realized everywhere, must remake the world and contribute greatly to the common cause of humanity.” Then, like Lobato, Nakamura went into genuflection, concluding, “Your book is the Bible of the modern age.”

It is of little help for historians to dismiss the Crowther-Ford books as “boring.” To contemporaries—Nazis included—these books were thrillers, and we must understand why this was so.

Ford and Weimar Nazis: Anti-Semitic Critiques of the Liberal Order

Weimar Nazis first took note of Henry Ford as the leader of what they imagined to be an American movement of fellow anti-Semites.
Through the veteran völkisch publication Hammer, Ford became a household name in German right-wing radical circles. In January 1921, Hammer reported on the anti-Semitic campaign then conducted in the pages of the Ford-owned Dearborn Independent in Detroit. After the Independent’s articles had been compiled into a volume under Ford’s name and with the title The International Jew, it was Hammer that translated the book into German.

The first volume of Der Internationale Jude appeared in the summer of 1921. By August 1925, Hammer was advertising the twenty-third edition of the two-volume work by “the eminent American industrialist and social politician” Ford. In April 1927, when Ford withdrew the publishing rights, Hammer reported a circulation of 90,000 copies of Der Internationale Jude.25

In the early 1920s, Hammer served as a clearinghouse for the ideas and conceits of the völkisch Right. Through Hammer, Ford’s anti-Semitic credentials were noted by the members of the budding National Socialist Party, who took The International Jew as indication that “America is about to assume leadership in the international solution to the Jewish question.”26 Ford became a model to emulate. When Gottfried Feder, the Nazi economic theoretician, admonished Hitler to exercise better leadership, he recommended Ford as an example: “Have you not read the article on Henry Ford in Hammer?”27 The Nazi attention to Ford thus began as part of the keen interest that German anti-Semites had in anti-Semitic movements elsewhere. Indeed, when it came to anti-Semitism, the völkisch nationalists were internationalists. As Hammer wrote, “the Jewish question cannot be solved by any single

26 Der Nationalsozialist, 10 July 1921.
nation,” and “the defense against this scourge of humanity must be a common one,” the success of which could only be achieved by “an international effort of all nations.”

The rise of what could be termed an anti-Semitic international movement followed in the wake of the World War I, which had spawned the myth that Jewish financiers had caused and perpetuated it. *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which began circulating worldwide in 1919, gave those inclined to nurture apocalyptic interpretations of unsettling world events a key to understanding both the crisis of the liberal West and the Bolshevik takeover. The war and the *Protocols* profoundly changed anti-Semitism, altering the arguments of anti-Semites and the quality and ferocity of anti-Semitic discourse. This transformation remains underappreciated in two respects: the degree to which the new conspiracy theory superseded older religious and biologistic anti-Semitism, and the degree to which the new anti-Semitism was international in nature. Based on the specious *Protocols*, the new anti-Semitic code interpreted both financial capitalism and communism as two strategies in one and the same Jewish plot, an idea that was by no means a Nazi invention.

White Russian émigrés played a key role in this reformulation by exporting the *Protocols* to the West. Not only did Nazism have a few “Russian roots”—Ford’s anti-Semitism did, too. Ernst Liebold, Ford’s general secretary and chief executive of the *Dearborn Independent*, met with Russian émigrés and eagerly received both the *Protocols* and other indictments of the Bolshevik Revolution from them. The *Dearborn Independent*, in turn, was largely responsible for the career of the *Protocols* in the USA, and greatly magnified their impact elsewhere. The *Protocols* and *International Jew* were made of the same stuff, and both texts reflect an important global shift in the anti-Semitic discourse after World War I. The Nazi appropriation of Ford’s anti-Semitism is part and parcel of this shift. In short, the presence of Ford’s *International Jew* in Hitler’s personal library is no more surprising than the presence of a copy of the *Protocols*.

The new anti-Semitic discourse, however, was inseparable from right-wing critiques of capitalism of the time. To the budding Nazi Party of the early 1920s, Ford was more than an ally in the anti-Semitic cause. He epitomized the distinction between productive and speculative capital so dear to early Nazi economic theorizing. In April 1923, just before the German edition of Henry Ford’s *My Life and Work* hit the

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28 Hammer, no. 562, (November 1925)
bookshelves, the special five-hundredth edition of *Hammer* ran an article under the headline “Ford and the Industrial Future.” The author was Paul Lehmann, who had translated Ford’s *International Jew*. Lehmann’s article was based on an extended paraphrase of a recent American portrait of Ford in which the industrialist defended high wages and his anti-Semitic campaign, attacked stockholders, and advocated decentralizing industry to the countryside. The centerpiece of the *Hammer* article was the story of how FMC, facing a downturn in the recession of 1921, staved off a Wall Street takeover by house-cleaning and cost-cutting. Lehmann noted: “It is surprising how much Ford’s convictions connect with what *Hammer* has been writing for 15 or 20 years.” In Ford’s works “we find the living antithesis of that purely parasitical entrepreneurship, which—lacking fruitful thought and creative strength—through the abuse of financial power coerces people into servitude.” Ford is depicted as a prophet and a visionary: “Over and over, his thoughts pierce into the future. A strange appearance, this Ford, in times of deepest capitalist savagery: smiling, strong of will, he marches through these times and points to a future, the coming of which for him is as certain as tomorrow follows today.” *Hammer* subsequently published the article as an independent brochure for the price of 10 Pfennig apiece.

In 1923, Gottfried Feder was working on a tract titled *The German State on National and Social Foundations*, which summarized early Nazi positions on social and economic policy. In it, Feder established the core principle that “the task of the national economy is to meet demand and not the profitability of private capital.” From this, it followed that the entrepreneur “will organize production so that demand can be met with the lowest cost for the consumer, that simultaneously the enterprise will grow and thrive, and that the production costs will keep decreasing without lowering wages.” This, of course, was the gist of *My Life and Work*. In Feder’s later exegesis of the Nazi Party platform, he enumerated some entrepreneurs who had supposedly followed this path. He then stated: “The finest and most universally known example of this kind of manufacturer is Henry Ford.” In the late 1920s, Feder edited the fifty-odd volumes of the “National Socialist Library,” which offered a panorama of Nazi social and economic ideas. Both *The International Jew* and *My Life and Work* were frequent entries in the otherwise slim bibliographies of these books. Many authors of the “Nazi Library” channeled Ford, and at least one did so explicitly.

35 *Hammer*, no. 505 (July 1923): 273.
37 Gottfried Feder, *Das Programm der NSDAP und seine weltanschaulichen Grundgedanken* (Munich, 1927), 34.
“Hitler’s Medal”

On July 30, 1938, on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday, German diplomats awarded Henry Ford the “Grand Cross of the German Eagle” at Ford Motor Company in Dearborn. Pictures of Ford shaking hands with German consular staff filled the press the next day. The Völkischer Beobachter ran a broadside page with the story. The episode caused an outcry in the American liberal press. “Hitler’s medal,” as the award became known, marked the end of the already deteriorating love affair that the American public had entertained with Ford. But what kind of award was Hitler’s medal actually?

The Nazi leadership had created the “Grand Cross of the German Eagle” in May 1937 to honor its allies abroad. Mussolini was the first recipient of the Cross; it had been pledged in June 1937 and was awarded on the occasion of Il Duce’s visit to Berlin in September of that year. The award came in six ranks—from “Grand Cross” and “Cross with Star” to a simple medal—and was later differentiated into military and civilian versions (“with swords” and “without swords”). The German Foreign Office awarded the lesser ranks of the decoration liberally: from its inception through the end of 1939, there were 4,177 civilian and 5,718 military recipients. The Grand Cross was more restrictive, though hardly exclusive. It was awarded 256 times between 1937 and 1940. The large majority of recipients were Italians; the remainder Japanese, Spanish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian. In 1939, the award was amended to include a “Golden Grand Cross,” the recipients of which were limited to sixteen. They included Italian Foreign Minister Ciano, General Franco, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin Oshima, and the German wartime allies Horthy, Antonescu, King Boris, Ryti, and Tiso.

The decoration presented both a diplomatic tool in forging the Anti-Comintern coalition and a needle to weave the web of an anti-liberal
international movement. Thus, when General Franco was decorated in March 1940, the dedication specified that both Spain and Germany were fighting “the same foe, who, deceiving the world with false slogans of liberalism and democracy, obscures and pursues egotistical aims.” Both countries were building a “new Europe” from the struggle between “a new, healthy worldview and the aging ideas of a decayed world.”

But the Cross of the German Eagle also played a role in courting American economic partners of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Only weeks after the award was created, Hjalmar Schacht pinned its second class (“cross with star”) version on the chest of Thomas Watson, the chief executive of IBM, on the occasion of his visit to Berlin in June 1937. James D. Mooney, head of overseas operations at General Motors, received the award in August 1938. All in all, twenty-two American citizens received the award between 1937 and 1940. Among them were Ford’s general secretary Liebold and his friend, the German consul in Detroit Fritz Hailer, who was an American citizen of German heritage. Of all American recipients, only Ford was granted the highest rank, the “Grand Cross.”

Nazi admiration for Ford is thus amply documented. But did Ford reciprocate the feeling? Rumors, according to which Ford financially supported Hitler’s party in the 1920s, have never been verified by evidence—and their accuracy seems unlikely, given Ford’s general aversion to credit and his consistent refusal to honor monetary solicitations from all quarters. While IBM’s Thomas Watson publicly conveyed to Hitler his “pride in and deep gratitude for” the award, Ford remained silent, but did refuse calls to return the award both after the pogrom of November 1938 and even after the German declaration of war in December 1941. Though the American media were quick to label Ford a fascist, his political leanings were less developed. Without doubt, the late Henry Ford was consistently in thrall to the anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that arose and flourished in the United States after World War I. These conspiracy theories had considerable overlaps and, as we have seen, some common sources with Nazi anti-Semitism. But Ford’s horizon hardly extended to the political and economic realities of Nazi Germany. His refusal to repudiate Nazi Germany was, most of all, a tool to provoke the heralds of the New Deal order, which he detested. For Roosevelt’s opponents on the radical Right, invoking Nazi Germany was always primarily a way to take a stand in an American debate.
However, the evidence demonstrates that Ford’s general secretary Ernst Liebold, a German American and close confidant of Ford’s since the early 1910s, was sympathetic to the Nazi cause and flattered himself about his numerous contacts in Germany. Liebold was on good terms with German consular staff. He developed a particularly close relationship with the German consul of Detroit, Fritz Hailer (a fellow German American and US citizen). Through Hailer, Liebold kept abreast of developments in Germany. Hailer arranged Liebold’s subscription to the *Völkischer Beobachter* and forwarded him Nazi propaganda material. A typical piece of correspondence between Hailer and Liebold is this letter from April 7, 1938:

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Dear Mr. Liebold,

Acknowledging your check in the sum of $10.00 for the German “Winter Relief Fund” and thank you very much for your contribution. Your name was inserted on the contribution list. ...

Will be glad to hear from you concerning the reservation of tickets for April 12th at the Greenfield Village Theater.

I am sending to you, under separate cover, a copy of the speech delivered by the “Führer” in the Reichstag February 20, 1938, which I am sure will interest you.43
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On January 31 1938, Liebold wrote to Otto Meissner, the chief of staff at Hitler’s chancellery: “It is five years ago today that the present German Führer became German Chancellor and the past five years have seen a definite advance in German progress. It is for this reason that I am writing to express my congratulations with the hope that the progress you are making may continue.”44 In October 1940, the German consul in New York alerted Liebold to an interview by the German Minister of Transportation Dörmüller to be broadcast “over all German shortwave stations.” The following day, Liebold wrote to Müller to “convey [his] congratulations to Dörmüller,” stating that he was “quite frankly impressed with ... the progress which ha[d] been made insofar as new construction work in Poland [was] concerned.”45

**Ford and the Volkswagen Project**

Ford Motor Company made a hitherto overlooked cameo appearance in the tragicomedy that was the Nazi Volkswagen project, the regime’s botched attempt to mass-produce an affordable “people’s
car.” The reluctance of the German auto industry to involve itself in the construction of the Volkswagen soon led Wilhelm Keppler, at the time chief economic adviser to Hitler, to request the assistance of the American-owned car builders in Germany. Keppler carried out negotiations with the American management of Opel/General Motors as well as with FMC. An unlikely figure usurped the role of agent between the Ford headquarters in Detroit and Berlin in these negotiations: Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia, the deposed Kaiser’s grandson. Louis Ferdinand, at the time of the negotiations in his late twenties, had worked in Ford factories in Michigan and Argentina as an adolescent, became one of Ford’s protégés, and helped establish a close relationship between Henry Ford and the Kaiser’s family exiled in Doorn. Louis Ferdinand was fascinated by Ford’s illiberal modernism and expressed the opinion that a project like the Volkswagen rightfully belonged to Ford. A delegation from Hamburg, where Keppler suggested the Ford-Volkswagen plant could be built, even traveled to Dearborn and was granted a meeting with Henry Ford and his chief production manager Sorensen. However, the Volkswagen plans did not persuade Sorensen, and Ferdinand’s maneuverings annoyed the management of FMC’s branch in Cologne. The plan came to naught, and Louis Ferdinand distanced himself from Henry Ford and the company.

The role model for the Nazi Volkswagen Project was Ford’s Dearborn factory and his Model-T. The Volkswagen plant was modeled on Ford’s River Rouge. The layout was sketched by Fritz Kuntze, the chief engineer of the power plant at the Rouge, a German American

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46 The Ford film department produced a series of moving pictures for the personal use of the Kaiser’s family. Copies are at the Ford Film Collection (NARA 200FC) at the National Archives, College Park.

47 BFRC, Acc. 572, Box 26, Louis Ferdinand to Sorensen, 26 June 1934.
who had left Germany for the USA in the 1920s and returned in 1937 to join Volkswagen.\(^{48}\) Along with Kuntze, the German Labor Front recruited a stream of German-American skilled workers and engineers across the American Midwest to come to Germany.\(^{49}\) While the recruitment campaign was motivated by the acute shortage of skilled labor in Germany, it also delivered personnel familiar with American production techniques. But even in this, the Nazi auto enthusiasts were hardly alone. The Soviet Union had beaten the Nazis to their own “River Rouge” by almost ten years: the technical assistance program between the Chief Economic Council of the Soviet Union and FMC of May 1929 provided the cornerstone for the auto factory of Gor’kii, 400 kilometers east of Moscow. In the Soviet rhetoric about the goals of the first Five-Year Plan, cars played a key role as a signifier of the advanced and industrialized power the Soviet Union aspired to be.\(^{50}\) When Hitler habitually used Ford and the high level of American motorization as a reference point in his speeches at the yearly International Automobile Expositions of the 1930s, he was therefore not simply indulging a pet preference of his. Rather, he was exploiting a common symbol of illiberal modernization.

“Fordism and Fascism”

The idea that there is a structural link between Fordism and fascism was first articulated by Antonio Gramsci. The Italian heterodox Marxist saw in Fordism a new global phase of capitalist self-renewal radiating from the United States around the world. Europe, which historically trailed the US, sought to catch up by introducing Fordism without the necessary underlying social structure, so it had to rely on force. “For this reason,” Gramsci wrote, “the introduction of Fordism [in Europe] takes place in particularly brutal and insidious forms, and by means of the most extreme coercion,”\(^{51}\) which was “objectively” necessary to impose the discipline on the working classes that capital in an age of mass production required.

Gramsci, writing in 1930, was, of course, referring to Italian Fascism. But his diagnosis had ramifications for a whole host of interpretations from Dimitroff’s thesis to the Frankfurt School, which both saw in National Socialism the unleashed coercive potentials of a capitalist society in deep economic crisis. To this day, the Nazi flirtation with Fordism is sometimes taken as a sure sign of the structural affinity between Nazi coercion and rationalized capitalism. Hence, Fordism in the Third Reich is analyzed as a “technique of domination” (Herrschaftstechnik).\(^{52}\) Nazism, in other words, is said to have crucially


\(^{49}\) FBI report “Labor Recruiting Campaign Conducted in the US by German Volkswagen Werke,” NARA, RG 319, Entry 47, Box 464.

\(^{50}\) Lewis Siegelbaum, Cars For Comrades: The Life of the Soviet Automobile (Ithaca, 2008).


\(^{52}\) See, with further references, von Saldern and Hachtmann, “Das fordistische Jahrhundert.”
implemented necessary structural changes in work processes and worker discipline, both in and outside the factory, on which post-1945 Fordism was able to build.

These arguments seem plausible. Surely, capitalism needed disciplined and productive workers, and so did National Socialism, especially after Nazi war production turned unemployment into a labor shortage in less than four years. But it is problematic to understand Fordism in Gramscian terms: as a strategy of capitalist domination, the coercive potential of which only materialized under “fascism.” Yet again, a transnational perspective reveals why. Nazis were not the only ones to rediscover Fordism in the face of a skilled labor shortage. So did Soviet planners. The Soviet obsession with Fordism was second to none during the interwar years. The Russian translation of My Life and Work went through at least eight editions, while Today and Tomorrow circulated in three competing editions. Soviet planners celebrated the “decisive repudiation of craft-based principles” found in Fordism, a system that abolished “subjectivism, traditions and routines” in favor of “scientific research and rational work methods.” The automobile factory that the Chief Economic Council erected in Gor’kii with FMC’s technical assistance was designed around flow production layouts. The assembly lines were crucial when the factory became a forge for tanks after 1941.

Clearly, the Gramscian paradigm cannot explain the Soviet adaptation of Fordism. A chronic labor shortage since 1928 made Fordism an attractive option in the Soviet attempt to overcome capitalism by productivist means. Here, too, Fordism was perhaps a technique of domination and worker repression—but it can hardly be explained as a capitalist production regime transmogrified into Soviet Communism. The empirical link between Fordism and Communism makes the stipulation of a structural nexus between Fordism and Nazism look dubious, indeed. Fordism and fascism were compatible, but for different reasons than hitherto appreciated. Far from demonstrating the coercive potential of advanced capitalism, the link between interwar Fordism and fascism lay in a shared productivist critique of liberal capitalism that was all the rage transnationally during the interwar years.

**Conclusion**

Baldur von Schirach’s reference to Ford during his testimony in Nuremberg was quite likely meant to provoke his American...
prosecutors. On this occasion, the former Nazi youth leader claimed that young right-wing radicals in the 1920s admired not only Ford, but also “the great benefactor” Herbert Hoover (Schirach was referring to Hoover’s role in the postwar European relief effort). And yet, Schirach’s testimony is credible and quite revealing about the nature of the Ford-Nazi connection. Here is the full quote:

The decisive anti-Semitic book which I read at that time, and the book which influenced my comrades ..., was Henry Ford’s book, The International Jew. I read it and became an anti-Semite. In those days this book made a great impression on my friends and myself because we saw in Henry Ford the representative of success, and also the representative of a progressive social policy.57

Productive “success,” and anti-Semitism as “progressive social policy”—that, in a nutshell, describes the appeal that Henry Ford exerted on a whole stratum of illiberal modernizers across the globe. After 1945, liberalism became the unchallenged telos of modernizing projects. But the 1920s and 1930s were a period in which liberalism was on the ropes, capitalism—especially after 1929—appeared to have failed, and the future seemed to many to belong to illiberal, productivist alternatives. Ford seemed to offer such an alternative.

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57 Quoted in Wallace, American Axis, 42.
GOING GLOBAL: INTERNATIONALIZATION PATHWAYS
FOR FAMILY FIRMS DURING THE NINETEENTH
AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Conference at the GHI, February 18-19, 2011. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington and Gerda Henkel Foundation Düsseldorf. Conveners: Christina Lubinski (Harvard Business School/GHI), Paloma Fernández Pérez (University of Barcelona), Jeffrey Fear (University of Redlands). Participants: Stefano Agnoletto (Kingston University London), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Jessica Csoma (GHI), Susanna Fellman (University of Helsinki), Giuseppe Gentile (University of Salerno), Vipin Gupta (California State University San Bernardino), Miquel Gutiérrez-Poch (University of Barcelona), Susanne Hilger (University of Düsseldorf), Harold James (Princeton University), Matthias Kipping (York University Toronto), Berti Kolbow (University of Göttingen), Jan Logemann (GHI), Liza Lombardi (University of Geneva), Miguel López-Morell (University of Murcia), Raffaella Montera (University of Salerno), Anne Overbeck (University of Münster), Nuria Puig (Complutense University of Madrid), Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (University of Düsseldorf), Luciano Segreto (University of Florence).

For decades, the international expansion of corporations and their contribution to the globalization process has attracted scholarly attention. However, their motivations and courses of action are still not fully understood. This conference aimed to reappraise the role of a subset of these, specifically family firms, as international actors. While the global impact of giant managerial enterprises is universally accepted, the role of family firms has been broadly considered of minimal importance. As Christina Lubinski stated in her introduction, earlier research regarded the conflict family firms experienced between their wish for independence and the capital requirements of cross-border expansion to be an insurmountable dilemma. Yet, nonetheless, numerous family firms of various sizes have enjoyed long-term international success—how did they manage this? Business historians have begun increasingly to investigate this question while challenging the dichotomy between large managerial and small- or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with family involvement.

This conference was the first to present substantial results to four key questions this research trend pursues: What competitive advantages did family businesses have in their international ventures? Which structures and strategies did they choose for going global? How did
they react to the capital needs of internationalization? What role did local learning processes as well as regional and national communities play?

The first panel, “Concepts of Family Business and Internationalization,” already shook up the current perspectives with its discussion of theory and methodology. In his paper, “A Case Study in Italian Family Business History: The Small ‘Born Global’ Firm Gerli of Milan, 1867-2010,” Stefano Agnoletto suggested that we need to rethink the sequential stage model wherein cross-border expansion is viewed as an intermediate stage in a firm’s life cycle. His research on a metal products distributor that operated internationally from the outset illustrates that growth within national borders is not a necessary prerequisite for going global. He therefore recommended applying “born global” firms—a concept that has mainly been used in other contexts—to family business history, too. Vipin Gupta contributed by widening the scope to business networks. He traced the findings of a low degree of internationalization in family firms back to limited research designs ignoring ventures that are not coordinated by equity stake. Blending economic and migration history, Gupta’s paper “Are Family Firms ‘Reluctant Internationalizers’?” on Indian overseas family businesses revealed ample international trade activity within ethnic networks. The fusion of knowledge of overseas migrants and India-based network-extenders gave them a competitive advantage. Raffella Montera and Guiseppe Gentile’s paper, “Internationalization Pathways for Long-Lasting Family Business: Between Familism and Determinants of the Expansion Abroad,” raised awareness of another research bias. Challenging the underlying assumption that kin and ownership play a fundamental role in family firms, they looked at a sample of Italian companies that displayed varying degrees of internationalization but no remarkable difference in family involvement as measured by the F-PEC scale (power, experience, culture). This points to familism having no exclusive impact on internationalization pathways. Commitment and the openness to outside resources and skills are equally important.

The second panel, “Reaching Out into the World: Internationalization Pathways in Historical Perspective,” focused on family firms crossing the border for the first time. Harold James’s paper, “Globalization and Business History: Krupp as an Exemplary Story,” emphasized the significance of pioneer marketing in foreign environments during Continental European industrialization. He highlighted global branding
tied to family ownership and national origin as part of the steel producer’s internationalization strategy starting in mid-nineteenth century. According to James, a major competitive advantage was Alfred Krupp’s ability to turn the family name into a German icon (“hard as Krupp steel”). The branding strategy heavily determined the international expansion as export to the leading economic and military powers was expected to prove Krupp’s industrial superiority. While Krupp is an example of a first mover in an infant industry, Paloma Fernández Pérez’s presentation (which María Fernández Moya and Hui Li wrote with her but were unable to attend), “Is the Future Going Back? Family-Owned Multinationals in China,” concentrated on the challenges market newcomers face when entering into the highly globalized economy. Taking up China’s contemporary economic backwardness, she emphasized the bright side of coming into the market late. Benefiting from knowledge transfer through joint ventures with and the acquisition of Western businesses, some large family groups were able to avoid mistakes these Western predecessors had made. In addition, they were able to instantly reach notable world market positions. Li Ka-shing, owner of Hutchison Whampoa, is a prominent example. However, the impact of Chinese family entrepreneurs blends together with that of further stakeholders: the state and collective business angles. Hartmut Berghoff then provided insight into how small-cap family entrepreneurs can stay involved and expand their firms despite delegating responsibility in light of the postwar globalization wave. In his paper, “Becoming Global, Staying Local: The Internationalization of Bertelsmann, 1962-2010,” he identified a permeable corporate culture as an umbrella under which Reinhard Mohn turned a German provincial publisher into a multinational media company. For his first cross-border venture, Mohn chose the Spanish developing market where a minor greenfield investment sufficed. To establish distribution in line with country-specific parameters, he acquiesced to hiring non-family executives who were familiar with local conditions. Since, for different reasons, neither relatives nor long-serving employees were available to set up foreign establishments, Mohn promoted ambitious and talented individuals. Go-betweens ensured communication between subsidiaries and world headquarters. As Bertelsmann leapfrogged the export stage, this study once more demonstrated the limitations of evolutionary internationalization models. Moreover, family entrepreneurship neither inhibited nor fueled the company’s going global.
Different settings not only require different modes of entry but also different adaptive strategies. Panel three, “Managing Internationalization: Strategies for Global Markets,” showed how family businesses changed their pathways over time to adapt to current conditions. Liza Lombardi’s paper, “When DuPont Entered Mexico, 1902–1928,” delivered details on the chemical giant’s decision-making and risk management practices. Examining DuPont’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico, she identified its connections to influential non-family bankers as an informational edge. Additionally, comparing interwar and postwar FDI, Lombardi discovered a shifting readiness to assume risk. In the 1920s, the three Du Pont brothers then in charge relied on the market intelligence of only a small circle of middlemen—running the risk of limiting them to bounded rationality. During the European expansion after 1945, the company’s management, which had ever fewer family members, based the information flow on numerous local experts to avoid such concentrated risk. Miguel López-Morell’s talk, “From Pioneers to Last Mohicans: The Rothschild Family at the Forefront of International Investment Banking,” revealed that a dissimilar strategy can accomplish similar sustainability. The family of merchant bankers refrained from hiring outsiders until the 1960s, thus avoiding the principal-agent problem. They gained a second competitive edge with their pro-cyclical momentum strategy. The Rothschilds flexibly sought out profitable business areas and dropped declining segments—no matter what industry or region they were in. Next, Susanne Hilger showed with her paper, “Shoes for the World: Internationalization Strategies of European Family Firms in the Shoe Industry Before World War II (with Particular Reference to the Czech Bat’a Company),” that Geoffrey Jones’s concept of “the disintegration of the first global economy” is in need of an adjustment. While Jones’s idea conceptualizes the decrease of internationalization after 1930, Hilger’s paper gave a counter example—an account of Bat’a’s enormous anti-cyclical FDI in the 1930s. The company set up manufacturing facilities, company towns, and sales subsidiaries worldwide. With high productivity in a small domestic market, Bat’a’s growth was inevitably tied to internationalization—providing evidence that there is no constitutive contradiction between family entrepreneurship and industrial expansion.

The fourth panel, “Global Expertise: Knowledge, Training, and Education,” looked at how intermediaries helped family entrepreneurs gain knowledge for building and managing international organizations.
Nuria Puig’s study, “Learning to Go Global: Business Education and the Internationalization of Spanish Family Firms,” linked the cross-border expansion of the companies Salvat, Puig, and Lladró to the rise of the IESE Business School, which taught the family entrepreneurs how to implement standardized growth strategies from the 1960s onwards. In contrast, Susanna Fellman argued that, although Finland likewise saw a growing interest in special management training, their contribution to the rise of big business is overstated. In her talk, “Preparing for Internationalization: Transforming Education and Recruitment Patterns in Finnish Family Firms, 1970-2005,” she pointed out that large-cap entrepreneurs had already received excellent academic training from early industrialization and that the breakthrough of additional MBA programs in the 1970s did not significantly raise their educational level. Rather, what has changed is the amount of foreign work experience the postwar generation has amassed; the interwar generation, by contrast, was more domestically oriented.

The fifth panel, “The F-Factor: Family Dynamics and Family Ruptures in International Business,” drew particular attention to the role of familism as a safeguard against all odds. Margrit Schulte Beerbühl underlined how trust within entrepreneurial families was more important than arms in “The Commercial War against Napoleon: The Spread of International Trading Networks during the Early Years of the Blockades.” To revive the flow of capital and goods within Europe and overseas territories in spite of the naval blockades, several merchant clans sent family members to leading entrepôts worldwide. From there, they built intelligence and trade communities of trustworthy, influential business partners who were able to successfully undermine the restrictions. Instead of causing a logjam in commerce, the Napoleonic wars hence marked a new step towards a global economy in which family businesses actively participated, Schulte Beerbühl argued. Anne Overbeck illuminated how cultural cohesion fostered the establishment of an ice cream parlor oligopoly and the creation of “Italian ice cream” as a generic term. Her talk, “Two Countries, One Home, One Occupation: The Success of Italian Ice Cream Makers as a Family Business in Germany, 1900-2011,” disclosed that most such parlors in this host country are run by inhabitants of two valleys in Northern Italy. Many of them only spend the summer in Germany and the remainder of the year in their Italian home villages, where they also raise their children. This lack of connection to the “country of work” strengthens the emotional bonds to their culture of origin and to their own kin against all outsiders.
When family cohesion is lacking, by contrast, the coevolution of a family and its joint business is often disrupted. Luciano Segreto’s paper, “Creating a Fortune with the Timber Trade: Business, Family Strategy, and Family Unity: The Feltrinelli Case, 1854–1942,” depicted the rise and fall of an entrepreneurial family whose solidarity could withstand multiple personal tragedies but not the offspring’s need to find other forms of self-fulfillment. Nonetheless, Segreto proved the proverbial “Buddenbrooks syndrome” wrong by showing that individual third-generation family members may resume commercial success. For instance, Giangiacome Feltrinelli, who was too young to save the firm in the 1940s, became a prosperous entrepreneur when he founded a publishing house years later.

Finding the right path was likewise the subject of the last panel. “Big Fish in Small Ponds: Family Businesses in International Market Niches” concentrated on the “hidden champions” concept, which refers to provincially headquartered firms that reach dominant positions by focusing on small market subsets without the public noticing their role. This is clearly supported by the findings of Miquel Gutiérrez-Poch’s aggregative study on SMEs that supply the global demand of paper for special purposes. In his talk, “Looking for a Place in the International Market: Success and Failure in European Papermaking Family Firms, 1800–2010,” he pinpointed flexibility and customer proximity to be among the competitive advantages these firms utilize as small-scale production enables them to respond to individual requests. By contrast, in examining a set of Central European tool and security components manufacturers, Jeffrey Fear questioned the “hidden champions” idea altogether. In his paper, “Globalization from a ‘22mm Diameter Cylinder Perspective’: How Mittelstand (medium-sized firms) became ‘Pocket Multinationals’,” he dismantled the general perception of these firms as regionally rooted, socially responsible, traditional family firms. Fear demonstrated that many of these companies, having relocated manufacturing to foreign countries to be closer to target markets and to exploit cost advantages, and with decreasing familism, have become in many regards akin to “ordinary” managerial multinationals.

Bridging public reception, older research concepts, and fresh findings, the closing round table with Matthias Kipping as commentator summarized four fundamental results of the conference. First, there is no single archetype but a diversity of strategies, advantages, sizes, and organizational models in the internationalization pathways of family
firms. Secondly, though many SMEs may not be that visible, they have still been drivers of globalization. Cautious management of resources did not at all inhibit the companies presented here from taking the risk and shouldering the cost of going global; yet it goes without saying that, historically, there must have been divestments, too. Third, it is clear that, regarding the expansion motives, some trading and banking businesses exhibited defensive behavior in reaction to external impulses. On the other hand, multiple family manufacturing businesses pursued the same aggressive growth strategies as managerial multinationals do. In fact, these case studies showed that difference between the secondary and tertiary sector is bigger than between family and managerial firms. Fourth, participants agreed that there are different means of risk management. Trust and social control within families appear to be equivalent to the institutional dependability of managerial firms whereas large conglomerates seem to have a combination of these. Thus, Kipping recommended creating a model that includes similarities between family and other types of firms, as well as the particular qualities of family firms, to provide a more precise research framework. Future studies on family firms will achieve better results when they do not “exceptionalize” but link arms with international business history.

Berti Kolbow (University of Göttingen)
Conference at the GHI Washington, March 10-12, 2011. Co-organized by the GHI Washington and the GHI London. Conveners: Kerstin Brückweh (GHI London) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington). Participants: Robert Andersson (Linnaeus University, Växjö), Sarah Badcock (University of Nottingham), James M. Donovan (Pennsylvania State University, Mont Alto), Greg Eghigian (Pennsylvania State University), Sace Elder (Eastern Illinois University), Eric J. Engstrom (Humboldt University, Berlin), Andreas Fleiter (University of Bochum), Sabine Freitag (University of Frankfurt/Main), Paul Garfinkel (Simon Fraser University, Vancouver), Urs Germann (Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, Bern), Mary Gibson (John Jay College, City University of New York), Marcus Gräser (GHI Washington), Dominique Grisard (University of Basel), Rebekka Habermas (University of Göttingen), Sylvia Kesper-Biermann (University of Paderborn), Paul Knepper (University of Sheffield), Tiago Pires Marques (Université Paris - Descartes), Roddy Nilsson (Linnaeus University, Växjö), Ines Prodöhl (GHI Washington), Warren Rosenblum (Webster University), Judith Rowbotham (Nottingham Trent University), Miriam Rürup (GHI Washington), Désiré Schauz (Technical University Munich), Pieter Spierenburg (Erasmus University, Rotterdam), Stephen A. Toth (Arizona State University), Bert Vanhulle (Catholic University of Louvain), John Carter Wood (Institute of European History, Mainz).

This conference brought together historians working in Belgian, British, French, German, Italian, Russian, Swedish, and Swiss history in order to develop comparative and transnational perspectives on the history of criminal justice in modern Europe since 1870. The first panel sought to provide a transnational perspective on late-nineteenth-century criminal justice with papers on international crime, criminal justice in the colonial world, as well as transnational prison and penal reform. In his paper on the internationalization of crime in Britain and America between 1881 and 1939, Paul Knepper argued that international crime was both more and less than a myth invented by the police. Although the police exaggerated the threat of international crime, they did not invent it; crime became an international issue as a result of “world-shrinking” technologies of transportation and communication. At the same time, the police were not the only ones promoting crime as an international problem; many other groups did so as well, including the press, politicians,
transnational voluntary associations, the League of Nations, and various anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists. Judith Rowbotham’s paper examined the process of exporting European legal cultures and practices to the colonies. Criticizing the claim that the British Empire created a dualist system that left many indigenous legal structures intact, Rowbotham argued that the British made a concerted effort to crack down on domestic violence in the colonies through the imposition of Western legal norms. The failure of this effort must be explained by a crucial difference between metropole and colonies: Whereas in Britain the prosecution of domestic violence was part of a wider cultural education, in the colonies the cultural element was lacking.

Andreas Fleiter’s paper used the concept of legal culture to compare the introduction of probation in the United States and Germany. Whereas the 1878 Massachusetts Probation Act gave the power to suspend sentences on probation to the trial court, the equivalent Prussian ordinance of 1895 gave this power to the Ministry of Justice, which exercised it in the form of a “conditional pardon” legitimized by the monarch’s prerogative of mercy. Instead of explaining this divergence by a difference in political cultures, Fleiter attributed it primarily to a difference in legal cultures: Whereas American criminal procedure distinguished between verdict and sentencing as two distinct phases of the judicial process, in Germany the pronunciation of guilt and punishment were inextricably linked. In the panel’s final paper, Tiago Pires Marques used the problem of the “habitual criminal” as a case study to examine the impact of transnational reform organizations on national penal reforms in the period 1880–1940. Stressing the role of the International Penal and Penitentiary Congress (IPPC), Marques argued that the introduction of indeterminate sentencing in continental Europe owed much to the encounter of continental jurists with penal experts from common-law countries (especially Great Britain and the United States), which had pioneered indeterminate sentencing. In her comment, Sylvia Kesper-Biermann encouraged further reflection on how the internationalization of the penal reform movement related to legal reforms within each nation-state. She also called for examining transnational contacts beyond Europe and the United States, including possible effects of the colonial experience on the judicial systems of the metropolitan countries.

The second panel compared the history of penal reform in Britain, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Sweden. In a comparative paper,
Desiree Schauz and Sabine Freitag argued that British and German discourses on crime and criminal justice in the period 1870–1930 were quite different: While in Britain these discourses were dominated by prison commissioners and voluntary societies, in Germany they were controlled by academic (legal and psychiatric) experts. Whereas the British favored environmental causes of crime, the Germans focused on biological factors. Finally, only British discussions of crime were embedded in a larger discussions of political participation, whereas the German discourse was shaped by a belief in scientific progress. Pursuing the history of German penal reform beyond 1933, Greg Eghigian’s paper on the categorization of offenders criticized the conventional view that the history of modern penal policy “played out as a choice between punitive retribution and correctional rehabilitation.” Insisting that the two were not mutually exclusive, Eghigian argued that penal policies in Nazi Germany, East Germany, and West Germany were characterized by significant continuities. Although National Socialism became more punitive, it never abandoned its rehabilitative hopes for criminals. After starting out with a class-struggle theory of crime, East German penology came to prioritize the rehabilitation of offenders during the 1960s, while West Germany, too, pursued rehabilitative policies, as evidenced by the introduction of social-therapeutic facilities (sozialtherapeutische Anstalten) for sex offenders and abnormal repeat offenders in 1969.

Paul Garfinkel’s paper on penal reform in liberal and fascist Italy challenged the historiography’s thesis that Italian penal reform in the period 1880–1930 was marked by sharp conflict between the classical and positivist schools of criminal law. Instead, Garfinkel argued that Italian legal culture in this period was unified by broad support for moderate social-defense principles, whose roots he traced back to early-nineteenth-century Italian criminal law. The Rocco Code of 1930 was therefore not a compromise between the classical and positivist schools but a “systematic reworking of moderate penal reform ideas,” which was also fully in line with the transnational penal reform movement. Urs Germann’s paper on penal reform in Switzerland in the period 1890–1950 argued that the Swiss Criminal Code of 1937 brought about a diversification of sanctions that connected criminal justice to existing regimes of discipline, such as correctional education. Clearly inspired by the international penal reform movement, the code was also shaped by Swiss domestic politics. Robert Andersson’s paper examined the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal embodied in Sweden’s 1965 penal code in the two following decades. Although
academic critiques played a key role in discrediting the rehabilitative ideal, Sweden’s turn toward a criminal justice system based on “the general sense of justice” disconnected penal policy from any scientific legitimation, thus transforming penal policy from a “social engineering practice” into a “moral engineering practice.” In his comment on the panel, Warren Rosenblum encouraged the authors to take into account the role of nonideological social factors (such as economic depression or full employment) in penal policy. He also underscored the commonalities in the development of penal policy in the countries examined, most of which underwent processes of de-carceration and decriminalization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

The third panel examined the criminal trial from a variety of perspectives including the role of juries, forensic expert witnesses, and the press. James Donovan’s paper used a 1955 debate on the jury system between two prominent jurists as a lens to examine the tension between inquisitorial and accusatory elements in French criminal procedure from the French Revolution to the Fifth Republic. The 1955 debate centered on the question whether France should retain échevinage (the association of judges and jurors deliberating and voting together on verdict and punishment), introduced by the Vichy regime in 1941, or return to the trial by jury instituted in 1791. The Code of Criminal Procedure adopted with the advent of the Fifth Republic three years later consolidated the victory of the inquisitorial system over the accusatory principle; échevinage was kept, and the presiding judge remained the dominant figure in French criminal trials. Eric Engstrom’s paper turned from the role of jurors to that of forensic psychiatrists. Challenging the thesis that the increasing role played by forensic psychiatrists resulted in a medicalization of criminal justice in Imperial Germany, Engstrom examined an array of jurisdictional conflicts between psychiatry and jurisprudence, including conflicts over forensic expertise in court, the placement of mentally ill criminals, and forensic psychiatric training, in order to present a more complex picture of the relationship between psychiatry and criminal justice. John Carter Wood’s paper used a British murder trial of 1928 as a case study to examine the role of the media in criminal trials. In their reporting, Wood argued, the press placed increasing emphasis on expert witnesses such as detectives and pathologists, but also expanded its reporting beyond the courtroom to cover crime scenes and pretrial investigations; newspaper crime reporting also contributed to celebrity culture and provided opportunities for the discussion of broader social and cultural issues.
Continuing the third panel, Sace Elder’s paper examined Wilhelmine Germany’s renegotiation of the limits of acceptable adult violence against children. Starting with a 1907 case of child abuse that became a nation-wide scandal, Elder analyzed the public, legal, and parliamentary debates that weighed parental rights against the rights of children and resulted in the passage of Germany’s first anti-cruelty law in 1912. The panel’s final paper, by Dominique Grisard, examined the 1973 trial of a male left-wing terrorist in a Swiss court in order to tease out the gendering of judicial narratives. The court’s judgment, she argued, alternated between a “narrative of rationality,” which was necessary to create a threat scenario as the basis for conviction, and a “narrative of dilettantism,” which denied the defendant the attributes of hegemonic masculinity by depoliticizing the crime and pathologizing the defendant. In her comment on this panel, Rebekka Habermas noted that all the papers shared a conception of legal culture as part of the broader culture, but nevertheless encouraged the authors to pay more attention to the interactive dynamics between criminal trials and various external factors. To what extent, for instance, were trials both shaped by and an influence on penal reform? To what extent did the press create events?

The conference’s fourth and final panel was devoted to the history of prisons and other penal institutions. Mary Gibson’s paper on prisons in nineteenth-century Italy revised the conventional narrative of Italian prison history, which stresses the modernization and secularization of prisons after the unification of Italy, by revealing stark differences between the treatment of male and female prisoners in post-unification Italy. Whereas men’s prisons were increasingly constructed and administered according to modern penological principles, women’s prisons were managed by religious orders, who submitted female prisoners to a regime that stressed moral and religious reform. Since this private monastic model was clearly at odds with the principles of the liberal Italian state, it also demonstrates that women were not perceived as citizens. Turning from Italy to Belgium, Bert Vanhulle and Margo DeKoster’s paper challenged the conventional division of the history of Belgian prisons into two distinct periods: the era of the “moral prison” (circa 1850-1880), during which Belgium implemented the “cellular system” to facilitate the moral improvement of inmates, and the subsequent transformation of Belgian prisons into science-based institutions committed to a medicalized approach to crime and criminals. Although Vanhulle and DeKoster acknowledged that there was a discursive shift from a
moral to a medical discourse from the 1880s onwards, they argued that this shift was not neatly reflected in penal practice, which revealed a great deal of continuity and a fusion of different approaches throughout the period 1850-1940. Just as prison practices prior to 1880 were already undergoing a process of medicalization, so the supposedly scientific practices after 1880 still reflected many of the old moral categories. Moving further into the twentieth century, Roddy Nilsson’s paper on the transformation of the Swedish prison system from the 1930s to the 1960s also identified a significant gap between discourse and practice. Although Swedish prison reformers in this period talked about constructing a prison system built on the principles of individual prevention, treatment, and humanism, much of this remained just talk. The prison system never received sufficient material resources to implement the reforms; it lacked professionally educated personnel; and the enormous energy expended on creating diagnostic tools to assess prisoners stood in sharp contrast to the very limited interest in developing in treatment programs.

The panel’s last two papers explored penal institutions other than the prison. Stephen A. Toth examined the “Contard Affair” of 1909, in which the suicide of a male youth interned in the Maison Paternelle, a private establishment for recalcitrant bourgeois youths, resulted in a trial of the Maison’s director for wrongful imprisonment. The trial, he argued, led to a far-reaching reassessment of private power, state control, and paternal authority in fin-de-siècle France. Although the director was acquitted, the trial sealed the fate of the Maison Paternelle and other private institutions of this kind, as the French state asserted its preeminent role in dealing with troubled youths. Three years later, France established a separate juvenile court system, which mandated psychiatric examinations. Sarah Badcock’s paper explored the lived experiences of convicts who were exiled to Eastern Siberia in late Imperial Russia. Badcock found that the state only played a minimal role in determining conditions in exile, where convicts were supposed to make a living off the land. Because of the lack of state involvement, conditions for criminal exiles were often worsen than conditions in Russian prisons. Since the mostly male convicts were often accompanied by their families, the line between punishment and the suffering of innocents was often blurred, giving rise to a sense of arbitrariness. In his comment on the panel, Pieter Spierenburg insisted on the need to distinguish between medical metaphors and the application of medical techniques in nineteenth-century penology. He also encouraged the authors to think about the implications
of Norbert Elias’s theory of the long-term diminution of power differences (between men and women, parents and children, prisoners and guards, for instance) for the history of criminal justice.

The conference was characterized by lively exchange and discussion. The final discussion identified a number of common themes: First, many of the papers challenged narratives of rupture and stressed long-term continuities. Second, many authors called into question accounts that focused on conflicts between different juridical schools, arguing instead that reforms were made possible by a widespread consensus among criminal jurists. Third, taken together, the examinations of national criminal justice histories revealed a remarkable transnational consensus on penal reform, especially around the turn of the century. Fourth, while everyone has long been critical of whiggish narratives of progress in the history of criminal justice, most of the authors were equally critical of teleological narratives of scientization, medicalization, and social control. In the final discussion, there was also a near-consensus that it was important to examine both ideas and practices without establishing a hierarchy between the two. While much remains to be done – suggestions for topics to be studied ranged from the history of risk management to the history of emotions – there was a strong sense that the national histories of criminal justice have reached a stage at which the comparative and transnational perspectives that were central to this conference are extremely fruitful for advancing the field.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
SECULARIZATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY AFTER 1945

Conference at the GHI Washington, March 17-19, 2011. Conveners: Uta Andrea Balbier (GHI Washington / King’s College London), Wilhelm Damberg (Ruhr University), Lucian Hoelscher (Ruhr University), Mark Ruff (St. Louis University). Participants: Steward Anderson (Binghamton University); Amandine Barb (Sciences Po, Paris); John D. Boy (CUNY, New York); Daniel Gerster (European University Institute, Florence); Sven-Daniel Gettys (Ruhr University); Nicolai Hannig (LMU Munich); Claudia Haupt (George Washington University); Andreas Henkelmann (Ruhr University); Janet Jakobsen (Barnard College); Amy Koehlinger (University of Florida, Tallahassee); Felix Kraemer (Münster University); Isabel Richter (Ruhr University); Annette Lippold (University at Albany); Thomas Mittmann (Ruhr University); John Torpey (CUNY, New York); Peter van Dam (University of Amsterdam); Joseph Williams (Rutgers University)

This international, interdisciplinary conference set out to bridge the Atlantic divide in the field of religious history. Instead of focusing on the differences between the two religious landscapes on either side of the Atlantic, the conference intended to highlight similar transformation processes in the religious history of both states that relate to broader social changes such as democratization and the rise of the media after 1945. The leading question was whether assumptions about how secularization proceeds have obstructed our view of deeper transformation processes in the field of religion and spirituality, as well as in the relationship between religion and politics.

In her opening lecture entitled “Sex and the Secular,” Janet Jakobsen set out to sensitize the participants not just to the theoretical issues involved when one deals with the concepts of secularization, secularisms, or the secular, but even more to the topic’s political implications. Building on her research on the use of religious rhetoric by secular institutions to define social and sexual norms, she showed how such practices have constantly challenged and blurred the boundaries between religion and politics in the United States and between the religious and the secular realms. Jakobsen did not treat the sacred and the secular as opposing poles, but highlighted the interplay between the two as the central focus of study.
The first panel sought to explain the defining characteristics of our understanding of secularization and looked at attempts to separate the religious and the secular. Employing a legal historical perspective, Claudia Haupt analyzed the different constitutional definitions of the relationship between state and religion in Germany and the United States. The following papers by John Torpey and Sven-Daniel Gettys explored the different meanings of secularization on either side of the Atlantic. While Torpey introduced the history of the sociological secularization theory, Gettys examined the use of the term in theological discourse in Germany and the United States with a special focus on semantics. An additional paper by Amandine Barb focused on “non-believers” as important actors in the religious landscape of the United States and highlighted the reasons behind their growth, as well as the relationship between their history and the process of secularization. The panel profited from its broad interdisciplinary scope and underlined the important social dynamics generated by ongoing debates about secularization in both countries.

The second panel delved into particular facets of the interplay of religion and the media in Germany and the United States. Nicolai Hannig analyzed the role of religion in the public in Germany after 1945. He not only showed that churches felt increasingly under pressure to communicate with the public, but that, conversely, journalists turned into leading authorities for interpreting and communicating religion after 1945. Steward Anderson made a similar point in his work on religion and television fiction in 1950s and 1960s Germany. He observed a reinvention of religious morality in the German Fernsehspiele that were full of religious symbols and rhetoric. Both papers emphasized the transformations in the relationship between religion and the secular media—and particularly the persistence of religion in the latter—in the second half of the twentieth century, which challenge traditional assumptions about the state of secularization in Germany. Felix Krämer’s paper added the American perspective by investigating the media’s role in shaping and creating the political figure of moral leadership that Ronald Reagan perfectly embodied. Like the other two papers, Krämer’s highlighted the close interplay among religious rhetoric, politics, and the media.

The third panel introduced three different religious actors and delineated their role in the process of secularization and the transformation of religion. In the first paper, Daniel Gerster characterized the transformation of Catholic peace protests in both countries during
the Cold War as an example of the gradual re-codification of Catholic identity. He showed how closely intertwined religion and politics were when it came to questions of war, peace, and protest. The theoretical analysis of the interaction of religion and politics continued in a paper by Amy Koehlinger. She used her study of the involvement of Catholic sisters in the war on poverty to highlight the fluidity of definitions such as the secular and the religious. Isabel Richter’s paper on the self-narratives of young German and American travelers to India in the 1960s then broke the dominant focus on Protestantism and Catholicism. She advocated including the search for new spiritual experiences, as well as the belief in the supernatural and in magic, in religious historiographical narratives. All these papers illuminated the important ways that a perspective on religious actors can help researchers challenge and overcome theoretical assumptions about the meaning of the sacred and the secular and, in particular, about the relationship between religion and politics.

The fourth panel focused on transformations of religious social engagement or religious cultural practices. Andreas Henkelmann analyzed transformations in the social engagement of the German branch of Caritas, a leading Catholic charity, in the 1960s and 1970s, linking these to broader changes in German Catholicism related to the Second Vatican Council and the fragmentation of the Catholic milieu. In her paper, Annette Lippold interpreted Christian Marriage Counseling in Germany and the United States after 1945 as yet another form of religious social engagement. She once again emphasized that defining moral and explicitly sexual norms involves a multi-faceted interaction of religious, secular, and political impulses. Moving from engagement to religious practices, Joseph Williams highlighted the persistence of religious forms of healing in the United States in the context of secularization and modernization trends. Using the concept of the “off-modern,” he argued that holistic healing is not attractive because of its traditionalism, but because it is in itself a modern reinvention of tradition. All the papers of this panel maintained that transformations in religious engagement and practices result from their interaction with secularization and modernization processes.

The fifth panel concentrated on the religious dynamics released in these processes of transformation. John D. Boy investigated the “Church Planters” in the German urban public to pursue broader questions about the spatial practices of deterritorialized religion. He began by observing that the declining church memberships in
Germany are somewhat offset by increasing membership in Free and especially Pentecostal churches. In his paper, Peter van Dam challenged the traditional view that religious structures in Germany and the Netherlands after 1945 were weakening, proposing instead that new, “lighter” religious communities based on modern assumptions of individuality and the functioning of civil societies had formed. Finally, Thomas Mittmann offered a narrative of the “self-modernization” of churches “to describe the transformative processes that occurred in German Protestant and Catholic Churches in the 1960s.” He held that the overall democratization of society influenced the founding of religious academies and the organization of broad lay meetings. These three papers foiled one-dimensional, traditional linear narratives with observations of new dynamics in the process of secularization in Europe.

The conference successfully highlighted the dynamics that processes of modernization such as individualization or democratization set in motion in the religious landscapes on both sides of the Atlantic. Changing meanings of community and of civil society interactions forced religion to adapt. The conference especially illuminated the complex interplay of the sacred and the secular, of politics and religion, and of modernity and secularization. Although it bridged the gap in terms of German and American religious scholars coming together, the differences in the religious developments on either side of the Atlantic prevailed. Transformation processes in both religious landscapes may have been triggered by similar social changes, but the strong differences in media structure or community formation in Germany and the United States led to clearly different outcomes. The comparative perspective, however, will surely stimulate further research on the question of secularization and the modernization of religion after 1945 in the United States and Germany.

Uta Andrea Balbier (King’s College London)
ECONOMIC CRIME AND THE STATE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A GERMAN-AMERICAN COMPARISON

Workshop at the GHI Washington, April 14-16, 2011. Convener: Mario Daniels (GHI). Participants: David O. Friedrichs (University of Scranton), Karl Christian Führer (University of Hanover), Michael Levi (Cardiff University), Paul Maddrell (Aberystwyth University), Eurídice Márquez Sánchez (International Organization for Migration in Austria, Vienna), Atiba Pertilla (New York University), Cornelia Rauh (University of Hanover), Stefanie Werner (University of Hohenheim), Sarah Wilson (University of York).

In view of the widely reported cases of corruption and fraud in companies such as Volkswagen, Siemens, and Enron, as well as the public outrage that erupted in the wake of these scandals, it is surprising that economic crime has attracted so little scholarly interest among historians. Neighboring disciplines such as criminology, law, economics, political science, and sociology offer excellent approaches to the phenomenon of economic crime; however, they do not reflect much on the changing definitions and conceptions of illegal and immoral behavior in the business world since the late nineteenth century. This lacuna is even more conspicuous in so far as the relatively well-established field of corruption research has demonstrated that historicizing the terminology and thoroughly describing transformations in economic practices can produce far-reaching insights into historical societal forms, their structures, conflicts, and developmental processes.

The aim of the workshop “Economic Crime and the State in the Twentieth Century” was to fill this gap in knowledge. To this end, it brought together historians, law historians, criminologists, and economists who applied methods developed in their respective disciplines to a broad spectrum of individual phenomena subsumed under the rather diffuse term of “economic crime”; the term covers such diverse crimes as embezzlement, tax evasion, certain forms of corruption, investment and subsidy fraud, human trafficking, and industrial espionage. The workshop showed that analyzing states’ endeavors to prosecute these crimes and the political and ethical discussions surrounding these processes is a fruitful approach that yields a deeper understanding of economic and political practices in modern societies. Yet the fact that “economic crime” describes such a variety of offenses also underlined the need for the terms and
concepts employed to be differentiated and made more concrete. In this, the workshop proved the merits of interdisciplinary dialogue once again.

Transnationally oriented with an accent on German-American comparison, the workshop focused on the following issues: (1) Which actors and institutions in industrialized countries have developed an awareness of economic crime as a new problem? Since when? What are the moral, political, societal, and economic values governmental and social actors draw upon? How and why have concepts of what is considered morally and legally correct changed in the economic sphere? (2) What role have the media played in defining economic crime? Public scandals that both illuminate and transform the semantics of morality and the law were a central issue of analysis. (3) What means have political institutions as well as private and state businesses employed in response to economic crimes and the discourses surrounding them?

Sarah Wilson addressed all these questions in her presentation on economic crime in the British banking sector in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to Wilson, cases of fraud and embezzlement were so ubiquitous then that the financial system had a “criminogenic architecture”—a term borrowed from David O. Friedrichs’s study on the most recent financial crisis on Wall Street. Friedrichs defines “criminogenic conditions” as “conditions that tend to promote criminal activities and actions,” a definition which extends the notion of crime “beyond the strictly legalistic notion of violation of the criminal law.” Wilson presented examples of criminality within the British financial system that were not only made possible but actually fostered by the laws and rules and the obvious gaps and loopholes they provided. Because of the close personal and political connections between the political and the economic elites, it proved very difficult for the authorities to regulate the financial system effectively and lastingly.

Following Wilson, who empirically demonstrated the complexities and difficulties of analyzing economic crime in modern societies, Mike Levi undertook to define different criminological concepts. His differentiation of the terms “white collar crime,” “economic crime,” and “corporate crime”; his reflections on the impact of scandals and the development of national and international awareness regarding economic crime; and his presentation of basic criminological models like the “crime triangle” provided useful tools for further discussions.
Levi’s presentation highlighted that the immense diversity of terms and concepts impedes productive research on economic crime in criminology, let alone in other disciplines.

Atiba Pertilla’s paper on the case of the U.S. Shipbuilding Corporation and subsequent legal proceedings in the first decades of the twentieth century followed. It showed the enormous value of an approach that combines in-depth analysis of economic and financial practices with a sophisticated application of cultural studies methods. Pertilla described the intricacies of big mergers and the resulting manifold opportunities for criminal activities, on the one hand, and for regulation, on the other, during this period. He also showed how much concepts of competitiveness and notions of masculinity shaped the discourse on economic crime. Pertilla illustrated the broad range of sources that can be used for historical analysis by including contemporary caricatures to reconstruct gender models.

In his case study on Günter Kaußen, Karl Christian Führer discussed the thin line between socially and morally questionable practices and criminal behavior according to the law. Kaußen made a large fortune by buying substandard apartment buildings and renting them out to immigrants at excessive prices. Kaußen capitalized on his tenants’ fear of filing a suit against a strong adversary although the law would have offered safeguards against such dubious practices. Even though Kaußen, who caused a string of scandals, was publicly disgraced as a “Miethai” (rent shark) and “slumlord” in West Germany and in the U.S., he was never convicted of any economic crime.

Eurídice Márquez Sánchez’s presentation also dealt with the prosecution of economic crimes, in her case illegal human trafficking. She offered an illuminating survey of the history of the international discussions on the phenomenon of trafficking in human beings, especially in the twentieth century. She also described the structures of this specific field of organized economic crime today and discussed the international and national efforts, particularly of NGOs, to fight it.

While Sánchez focused on the weak—particularly women forced into prostitution—as victims of economic crime, Paul Maddrell called for greater emphasis on the “crimes of the strong against the strong.” His presentation discussed states’ efforts to illegally gain economic, technological, political, and strategic advantages in a world of global competition. Maddrell presented abundant evidence to illustrate the
massive effort of Western intelligence services to collect information about the GDR’s economy between 1949 and 1961. The Cold War was not only an all-embracing competition between two ideological global systems; it was also, as Madrell illustrated, increasingly an economic conflict. Information about the adversary on the other side of the Iron Curtain was collected to strengthen one’s own economic system—on both sides. Eastern European spying on the West caused alarm particularly in the U.S. government.

In his talk, Mario Daniels then argued that the Reagan administration saw industrial espionage, usually referred to as “illegal technology transfer,” as a major threat to the economic and military position of the U.S. in the global competition for market shares and political influence. Consequently, the government launched a large campaign that aimed to control the global trade and exchange of information; it was also intended to prevent U.S. citizens from divulging trade secrets to foreign states and hinder intelligence services from acquiring economic and technological information. However, critics in business, science, and the press regarded the policy as a threat to the basic rules and values of liberal capitalism. Although industrial espionage was certainly an economic crime, efforts to thwart it threatened the interests it sought to protect. This case made plain that the perception and prosecution of crimes always depends on the legal interests of a society.

This was also the tenor of David O. Friedrichs’s paper on the “criminalogenic architecture of Wall Street,” in which he showed how difficult it is to legally regulate economic practices that have a manifest negative effect on societies on a global scale. The meltdown of the financial market in 2008, Friedrichs argued, has highlighted the need for an intense and open discussion of specific economic practices and the lack of regulations. Friedrichs also called for the social costs of the crisis to be more justly dispersed, as well as for widely shared moral concepts and legal formalities to be more closely aligned.

Stefanie Werner, who concluded the workshop, addressed two questions in her presentation: why good people do bad things, and how widespread economic crime—or “business crime,” as she prefers to call it—has been in (West) Germany since World War II. In response to the first question, Werner presented findings from her application of the Rational Choice Theory, which weighs the expected gains from a crime against the possible negative consequences. The second question is more difficult to answer as no official statistics on
economic crime exist in Germany. Werner bypassed this problem by evaluating the German periodicals *Die Zeit* and *Der Spiegel* to gather her own statistics and thereby illustrate the potential of this method for quantitative analysis.

In sum, the workshop demonstrated the benefits of a multidisciplinary approach to the historical analysis of economic crime. As historical research in this field is still quite sparse, historians can gain a great deal from interacting with their colleagues in criminology, economy, and law to learn how the phenomenon of economic crime can be defined, described, and categorized. The workshop also underlined the enormous potential the historiography of economic crime holds for understanding the political, economic, and social challenges of our time.

Mario Daniels (GHI)
REGULATION BETWEEN LEGAL NORMS AND ECONOMIC REALITY: THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES

Conference at the GHI Washington, April 28–30, 2011. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the interdisciplinary research project “Designing Freedom: The Implications of Historic Legacy and Standardization on the Regulation of the Economy” funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), William J. Hausman (College of William and Mary), Günther Schulz (University of Bonn). Participants: James W. Ely Jr. (Vanderbilt University), Jeffrey Fear (University of Redlands), Katja Fuder (University of Bonn), Klaus F. Gärditz (University of Bonn), Boris Gehlen (University of Bonn), Niels Krieghoff (University of Bonn/London School of Economics), Cathrin Kronenberg (University of Bonn), Alexandra von Künsberg-Langenstadt (University of Mannheim), Marc Levinson (independent scholar), Kenneth Lipartito (in absentia), Florida International University), Christian Maurer (University of Göttingen), Roman Michalczyk (University of Bonn), Alfred C. Mierzejewski (University of North Texas), John L. Neufeld (University of North Carolina at Greensboro), Bill Novak (University of Michigan), Markus Patt (University of Bonn), Mark Rose (Florida Atlantic University), Johannes Rüberg (University of Bonn), Yair Sagy (Haifa University), David B. Sicilia (University of Maryland), Mathias Schmoeckel (University of Bonn), Frank Schorkopf (University of Göttingen), Andreas Thier (University of Zürich), Markus Wagner (University of Miami), Holger C. Wolf (Georgetown University), Thomas Züll (University of Göttingen).

Currently, the terms regulation and deregulation are on everyone’s lips; however, those who use them frequently forget that regulation, in its strict sense, is a mechanism to either restrain competition or to induce it where there is none or too little. Natural monopolies are the most prominent targets for regulation because, in such cases, efficient competition will not emerge by itself. Situated at the intersection of legal and economic history, this conference focused on the regulation of natural monopolies in network industries such as railways, energy, or telecommunications. It brought together both established and younger scholars from the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Israel to analyze constitutional and legal frameworks, as well as to investigate the development of markets and the political influence of market participants.

The event kicked off with Mathias Schmoeckel’s keynote lecture on “Legal Tradition and Economic Success” comparing the American

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and the German regulatory systems. Both countries have generally had successful economies over more than the last hundred years, but their approaches to legally addressing the so-called natural monopolies have been quite different, Schmoeckel argued. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court defended a strong liberal tradition, including the freedom of contract as a constitutional principle. Before 1949, Germany had no comparable institution for maintaining continuity in regulatory questions; there was, however, a strong tradition of public administration. As a result, in the U.S., independent regulatory agencies that generally favored market freedom were established, while in Germany the state itself acted as a market participant providing state operated networks instead of controlling private business. In the U.S., the Sherman Act prohibited cartels, while in Germany they were regarded as a useful economic instrument. Thus, both regulatory systems grew out of the economic understanding of freedom, equality, and justice deeply grounded in each nation’s traditions and mentalities. This explains why legal transplant concerning regulation is hardly possible and why, as Schmoeckel noted, “there is no abstract general legal system for the economy.”

Günther Schulz started the second day with introductory remarks that once again summarized the general aim of the conference and explained the cooperation between the German Historical Institute and the research project “Designing Freedom – The Implications of Historic Legacy and Standardization on the Regulation of the Economy” funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research. (Please visit the project webpage www.regulatoryhistory.com for detailed information.) Starting with a quotation by the general secretary of the Deutsche Handelstag [German Association of Chambers of Commerce] from 1875, who said “that it seems that the more one deals with these [regulatory] questions, the more one struggles to find an answer,” Schulz stressed both the complexity and relevance of regulating natural monopolies. He pointed out that, aside from the historic and the modern dimensions of this issue, a variety of other perspectives make the topic well-suited to generating an inspiring and fruitful discussion.

William J. Hausman chaired the first session, which was designed to give a general overview of some core regulatory problems. Serving as a translator between German and American regulatory researchers, Jeffrey Fear laid the groundwork for the discussions to follow. In his
presentation, “Funny Words – Important Concepts,” he explained governance in Germany since the late nineteenth century, introducing special German terms to the audience such as Selbstverwaltung, best translated as self-regulation. If one understands the entire semantic meaning behind the plain translation – and such culturally constructed terms are never easy to translate – it becomes a lot easier to answer the focal question of whether there has ever been a German idea of regulation. As Fear explained, Germany has no continuous history of regulation like the United States have nor any coherent concept of it across time. But there are mechanisms of self-regulation that German industry has enacted for its own benefit. Furthermore, Germany has traditionally been skeptical of free markets, deeming them disorderly and in need of management. And last but not least, Germany views markets as embedded in a broader (national) social system, making social distributional goals integral to the regulatory system. Next, Markus Wagner presented a paper on “Legal Perspectives and Regulatory Philosophies on Natural Monopolies in the United States and Germany.” He explained and subsequently compared the nations’ different regulatory philosophies and how they have diverged considerably from one another since the early twentieth century. The United States has a laissez-faire approach with an emphasis on private autonomy and enforcement, whereas German regulatory philosophy exhibits distinct elements of public control and framework setting. Referring to the electricity industry, Wagner showed that the leitmotif in the Federal Republic has changed since the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkung (Act against Restraints of Competition) went into effect “from one which allowed polyopolistic structures to one which now emphasizes the functioning of competition.” Although there are more similarities in regulatory strategy than ever before as the emphasis in both countries now lies in the idea of the free market, Wagner affirmed that important differences remain.

Günther Schulz moderated the second session, which turned to “Legal Norms and the Establishment of Path Dependencies, ca. 1870/80 to 1930/35.” Frank Schorkopf began the session by taking the audience on a journey through the constitutional principles that have addressed regulatory questions since the foundation of the German Reich in 1871. As the European Union now governs most regulatory questions while the nation state serves more as a secondary guarantor, Schorkopf concluded that the national constitution builds a framework for economic governance made in Brussels, for the
constitution is unable to reflect the dynamics of the economy. That said, he argued that the much more important parameter in the national constitution is the decision to support fundamental economic rights such as freedom of business, freedom of trade and freedom of association or property. Bill Novak then presented a paper called “Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism, 1877–1932,” which is part of his ongoing research on the role of law in the creation of the modern American regulatory state during this formative period. He described the decline of a world of local, common-law self-government and the rise of a considerable modern administrative state regulatory apparatus in the United States. Novak located the roots of this new legal-political regime in three interlinked developments: the centralization of public power, the individualization of private rights, and the constitutionalization of the rule of law. James W. Ely Jr.’s paper followed with an investigation of U.S. railroad regulation in the nineteenth century. America’s first big business railroads were subject to extensive regulation very early on. But even though there were a lot of statutes and legal cases concerning railroad regulation during this period, the U.S. never designed a comprehensive policy for regulating the railroads. Ely concluded that the record of railway regulation was mixed. On the one hand, the state was reasonably successful at imposing measures to protect rail safety, but, on the other hand, rate regulation by the Congress failed because effective rate controls were constantly undermined by several actors especially the public, which was torn between the desire of cheap costs and greater transportation facilities.

The session continued with Yaïr Sagy’s presentation, “A Tale of Two Revolutions: On the Rise of Railroad Regulation and Evolution in the Late-Nineteenth-Century United States.” Sagy concentrated on the previously unnoticed fact that public regulation of the U.S. railroad industry arose during a period when theories of evolution were very popular in American academic discourse. Focusing on the ideas of Charles Francis Adams Jr., one of the leading theoreticians of regulation in America at that time, Sagy demonstrated that evolutionary thinking had a profound influence on the mid-nineteenth century debate on state regulation. Boris Gehlen concluded the session with a talk on the influence of interest groups on railway, telecommunications, and electric industry legislation between 1871 and 1935, which ranged between the poles of regulation and nationalization. Gehlen’s analysis of the driving forces behind regulatory legislation in these three natural monopolies was influenced by George J. Stigler’s general thoughts.
and assumptions about the regulation of natural monopolies—in Stigler’s view, such regulation results from political negotiations that are largely influenced by interest groups. Gehlen showed that no specific German regulatory pattern has ever existed although some general observations – for example, that there is a strong correlation between regulatory policies and the state budget – can be made.

The third session, chaired by Hartmut Berghoff, dealt with regulatory discourses after World War II. Niels Krieghoff started it off with a talk about the reorganization of banking regulation in Germany after World War II, which was characterized by the American influence and the legacy of the Third Reich. As Krieghoff showed, the United States attempted to restructure the West German banking system by forcing far-reaching structural changes in the German regulatory regime, the central bank, and the universal banks, in an effort to create a decentralized banking system similar to that of the United States. However, these changes were rolled back after initial successes. Marc Levinson then investigated “An Unnatural Monopoly: Evasion as a Driving Force in U.S. Transport Deregulation.” His paper reflected upon the ways in which market forces created pressure for the regulation of transport in the United States. As his research focuses on the twentieth century, Levinson’s understanding of transport goes beyond railroad traffic, also including water, air and road transportation. These alternatives to rail transport created intermodal competition that significantly weakened the railroads financially. When Congress first attempted to heal this state of affairs, it became apparent that any change in the regulatory structure inevitably favored one form of transportation over another, so no significant changes were made. Thus, the origin of rail deregulation, according to Levinson, lies in the fact that partial reform of the regulatory structure proved impossible: “evasion as a driving force.”

The fourth and last session, moderated by Jeffrey Fear, turned once again to the regulation of natural monopolies, this time since World War II. Alfred C. Mierzejewski compared the historical development of railways in the United States and Germany, which is like “Comparing Apples and Oranges” according to the title of his paper. Although there are big differences in the geographical circumstances between the countries, one can also find remarkable similarities. Mierzejewski argued that the performance of the privately owned railroads of the United States was strikingly similar to that of the state owned and state operated German railways up to 1980. He presumed that the reason for this lay in the common basic technological trends,
consumer preferences, and the operation of fundamental laws of economics. The differences that the two systems exhibit derive from differences in government policy, primarily the lack of regulation before 1890 and deregulation beginning in 1976 in the United States. Kenneth Lipartito followed this with a contribution on “The Public Network in Eclipse: National Experiences in Telecommunications, 1945–1990” (read by David B. Sicilia). Looking at the United States and several countries in Europe first, Lipartito’s paper argued that no country had a stable regulatory structure or policy concerning telecommunications at the time they were invented—a state of affairs usually explained by means of a structure-conduct-performance model. Contrary to this explanation, Lipartito maintained that experience, learning, and history have shaped developments and the fundamental specifics in telecommunications in each nation and have led to differences in structures, innovation, technology, pricing, and investment. Klaus F. Gärditz’s presentation then portrayed “The Law of Telecommunications: From State Monopoly to Regulated Competition in Markets” for the German case. The German telecommunications market, he asserted, doubtlessly exemplifies the most successful conversion of a former state monopoly into a competitive market. However, in his opinion, regulation has created a completely new type of administration that could threaten the system of public administrative law, because regulatory agencies in Germany and the rest of the European Union have broad authority to design the future market structure without direct democratic legitimation.

In the next presentation, William J. Hausman and John L. Neufeld investigated “Regulation and Restructuring of the U.S. Electric Utility Industry in the Twentieth Century.” They presented several attempts to organize electricity regulation in the United States beginning with the decision Munn vs. Illinois in 1877 and ending with the California crisis in the early twenty-first century. Every system that had been employed, they concluded, had its pros and cons; there is no universally best solution for regulating the energy industry in a way that perfectly reconciles both private and public interests, which demonstrates that regulation consists primarily of a search process. Alexandra von Künsberg-Langenstadt concluded the session with a paper on “The Powers behind the Throne? Reasons for the Persistence of the Regulated Electricity Industry in Germany, 1950–1980.” Like most European network industries, the German electric industry was strictly regulated during the twentieth century. The Utilities Law passed in 1935 was not reorganized until 1998—and then only under
constant pressure from the European Union. This points to great powers of persistence which von Künsberg-Langenstadt explained by the structure of the German electric industry, its actors, and their information and communication channels. Moreover, she showed that the regulation of the electric industry was often instrumentalized to achieve other goals that were not necessarily related to the supply of energy itself, like the political desire to use coal for energy production.

The comments sparked vivid discussions by challenging and re-evaluating the arguments presented in the papers. They also drew attention to the different approaches used in both countries. The role of regulatory agencies and the question whether there is a lack of democratic legitimation was the subject of controversial discussions. The concluding discussion clearly showed that most of the differences between Germany and the United States can be ascribed to different national development paths, even though astonishing parallels could be found in the specific markets that were examined. In sum, the conference demonstrated that the different reactions to market failure in the United States and Germany can better be explained historically than conceptually.

Cathrin Gehlen, née Kronenberg (University of Bonn)
17TH TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR: EARLY MODERN GERMANY HISTORY

Seminar at the GHI, May 18-21, 2011. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington and the BMW Center for German and European Studies, George-town University. Convener: Roger Chickering (Georgetown) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI). Faculty Mentors: David Luebke (University of Oregon), Harriet Rudolph (University of Innsbruck), Ulrike Strasser (University of California, Irvine), Anne-Charlott Trepp (University of Bochum). Participants: Emily Bruce (University of Minnesota), Fabrizio Dal Vera (Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main), Sven Düwel (Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main), Amanda Eismann (University of Illinois), Nikolas Funke (University of Sussex), John Jordan (University of Oxford), Kornelia Kaschke-Kisaarslan (Free University Berlin), Laura Kounine (University of Cambridge), Erin Lambert (University of Wisconsin, Madison), Stephen Lazer (University of Miami), Hans Leaman (Yale University), Margaret Lewis (University of Virginia), Hannah Murphy (University of California, Berkeley), Avraham Siluk (University of Marburg), Jason Strandquist (Penn State University), Marco Tomaszewski (University of Freiburg).

The 17th Transatlantic Seminar brought together sixteen doctoral students working on dissertations in early modern German history at universities in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. The students submitted papers on their dissertation projects ahead of time so that the seminar could be fully devoted to comments and discussion. Each panel began with two comments from fellow students.

The first panel was dedicated to the history of childhood and the history of reading. Margaret Lewis’s paper “Beware the Kinderfresser: Infanticide in Swabia, 1580-1630” examined infanticide in Swabian cities at the turn of the sixteenth to the seventeenth century. Her analysis focused on the relationship between the dramatic rise in prosecutions of infanticide in this period and the simultaneous flourishing of popular literature focusing on the theme of violence toward children. Even though this literature usually depicted other types of violence directed at children (rather than infanticide), Lewis argued that both phenomena reflected a period of intense political, social, and economic pressure in Swabian cities. Emily Bruce’s paper “The Geographic Education of German Children: Schoolbooks and Reading Practices in the Late Enlightenment” sought to reconstruct
the ways in which geography and world history textbooks were used by German children around 1800. Bruce argued that new pedagogical approaches to geography developed in synergy with children’s increasingly interactive reading practices. Children themselves contributed to the making of geographic education, which must be seen as a constitutive component of reimagining modern childhood. The comments and the discussion focused on the themes of children’s agency, the history of reading and literacy, the methodological problem of recovering the experience of readers as well as contemporary mentalities, and the place of infanticide in a larger reconfiguration of sexuality, paternity, and state regulation.

The second panel featured two papers on political communication in the Holy Roman Empire during the sixteenth century. Fabrizio Dal Vera’s paper “Public Order and Political Crimes: Sedition in the Legal and Political Discourses of the Sixteenth Century” examined sixteenth-century legal and political discourses on revolts in order to analyze the historical development of the concepts that were generated in reaction to political struggles. Dal Vera argued that sixteenth-century jurists interpreted and modified the concept of sedition (seditio) in order to respond to particular political problems. By reconstructing the history of this concept in the context of the legal tradition and political theory, he sought to shed light on the development of the legal remedies and political strategies that were deployed to repress and prevent revolts. Avraham Siluk’s paper “Wahrnehmung des Politischen, Politische Strategien und Politische Organisationsformen der Juden im Alten Reich zu Beginn der Frühen Neuzeit, 1509-1555” explored a very different aspect of political communication in the Holy Roman Empire, namely, the relationship of the Jews to the Empire. The Jews, Siluk contended, were in many respects well-integrated subjects of the Reich who knew its structure and political culture exceptionally well. Presenting a case study of the Frankfurt Jewish community’s response to Johannes Pfefferkorn’s call for the confiscation of Jewish books, Siluk argued that the community’s knowledge of the empire allowed it to mount quite an effective defense of its rights by appealing to Reich institutions. Recurring topics in the comments and the discussion included different approaches to understanding exactly how Herrschaft functioned, the close relationship between rebellion and litigation in the Holy Roman Empire, as well as the gradual juridification of the empire’s social and political conflicts.
The third panel dealt with two different aspects of war and violence in the Holy Roman Empire. In his paper “in puncto declarationis belli nomine Imperii de annis 1756 et 1757: Die Instrumentalisierung des Reichstags durch Preußen und Österreich – Das normierte Reichsrecht stößt an seine Grenzen,” Sven Düwel presented a chapter from his dissertation about the Holy Roman Empire’s Reichskriegserklärungen in the period 1675-1757, in which he analyzes the interaction of the Reichshofrat, the Reichstag, and its delegates in the shaping of these declarations of war. At the end of this period, he argued, Brandenburg-Prussia and Austria pursued power politics in ways that undermined the regular procedures of the Reichstag, thus effectively abolishing the longstanding norms of Reichsrecht. Nikolas Funke’s paper “Military Religious Violence, Confessional Identity, and the Individual in Early Modern Germany” examined incidents of military religious violence in the period 1500-1650 to assess soldiers’ confessional identity and the role of confessional differences. While this approach yielded valuable insights into soldiers’ spirituality, Funke found that the patterns of religious violence challenged the usefulness of confessional explanations. Funke’s conclusion therefore pointed towards the centrality of the individual, rather than confessional differences, for the occurrence of religious violence and the form such violence took. Comments and discussion set the papers in the wider contexts of military history as well as the confessionalization thesis and its critics.

The fourth panel featured two papers that used gender as their primary category of historical analysis. Amanda Eisemann’s paper “Equine Trade Identities and Curative Masculinities in Daily Life, 1580-1735” examined the masculinization of horse-related smithing and medicine which occurred both through the gradual exclusion of women from these guilds and through a variety of visual representations—in guild signs, for instance—that associated equine trades such as veterinary smiths with masculine virtues. Laura Kounine’s paper “The Gendering of Witchcraft in Early Modern Germany” presented a case study using the Listening Guide method of psychological enquiry to analyze an extract of a witch-trial concerning a man and woman in a case of “stolen manhood.” Setting the case study in a broader historiographical context, Kounine argued that early modern historians ought to move beyond the binary categories of “man” and “woman” and recognize the fluidity of masculinity and femininity in the gendering of witchcraft. Differences within the genders, she concluded, are as important a category of analysis as differences between
the genders. Comments and discussion placed the equine trades in the larger context of the gradual exclusion of women from most guilds in the transition from the late medieval to the early modern era, situated Kounine’s study within the historiographical debates on witchcraft, and touched on the use of psychological methods of analysis in history.

The fifth panel was devoted to two local studies of legal and medical institutions in sixteenth-century cities. John Jordan’s paper’s “Urfehde and the Evolution of Court Procedure in Sixteenth-Century Freiberg, Saxony” probed the development and culture of the Freiberg (Saxony) Stadtgericht. Adopting a legal-anthropological rather than sociological approach to study the culture of the local courts, Jordan argued that by using the civil device of the Urfehde to handle what would normally be considered criminal offenses (such as theft, assault, and Unzucht) the Freiberg Stadtgericht demonstrated a preference for using civil remedies to resolve conflicts. Hannah Murphy’s paper “Limits of Medical Orthodoxy: Galenicism and Paracelsianism among the Municipal Physicians in Nuremberg, 1553–1598” focused on two of Nuremberg’s municipal physicians to investigate the relationship between Paracelsian and Galenic medicine among practicing doctors. Although Paracelsian pharmacology played a major role in Georg Palma and Heinrich Wolff’s medical practices, both doctors contributed to the city’s medical ordinances, which prohibited the practice of Paracelsian medicine. By examining how these doctors balanced their private Paracelsian leanings and their public Galenic medical practice, Murphy sought to revise our understanding of the boundaries of orthodox medicine in the sixteenth century. In the comments and discussion, it was noted that both papers analyzed a professionalization process; Jordan’s project was discussed in the context of the historiography of early modern legal history and its critiques of the paradigms of Normdurchsetzung and Sozialdisziplinierung; and Murphy’s project was related to eighteenth-century medical reforms, raising the question of whether sixteenth-century Nuremberg anticipated later reforms in some ways.

The sixth panel was devoted to the theme of early modern knowledge production. In her paper “Wenn du gehört hast, ich hätte viele seltsame Dinge und einige ungewöhnliche Tiere mitgebracht, so ist das alles nicht der Rede wert: Die Verdienste Ogier Ghiselin de Busbeeus um die Vermittlung von Wissen über das Osmanische Reich,” Kornelia Kaschke-Kisaarslan studied the knowledge transfer performed by
Ogier Ghiselin de Busbeqc following his stay in sixteenth-century Constantinople. Based on an analysis of Busbeqc’s descriptions of Ottoman plants and of Islam and its rituals, Kaschke-Kisaarslan argued that sixteenth-century travel literature on the Ottoman Empire did not just convey Türkenzuricht (fear of the Turks), but represented plural systems of knowledge that integrated the Ottomans into the world of European knowledge. Turning from knowledge transfer between cultures to the writing of local history in one early modern city, Marco Tomaszewski’s paper “Historiographische Kommunikation in Basel, 1525-1550” examined the close connection between the writing of family history and urban history. Based on an analysis of a sixteenth-century manuscript chronicling family history, Tomaszewski argued that such histories, though motivated by the family’s desire to secure social status, became alternative forms of social memory and city history after the reformation eliminated religious forms of memoria. The comments and discussion raised the questions of whether reports on the plurality of religions in the Ottoman Empire affected debates about religious toleration in Central Europe and how the patrilineal family history affected the practice of urban history.

The seventh panel dealt with religion in the sixteenth century. Erin Lambert’s paper “Resurrection, Devotion, and Illustrated Hymns in Reformation Nuremberg” used song pamphlets depicting bodily resurrection as an avenue into Lutheran devotional culture and its role in the construction of religious identities in sixteenth-century Nuremberg. In the context of pastoral writings on resurrection, Lambert argued, the pamphlets reveal devotional practice as fundamental to identity construction: worship materially altered the Christian’s body, both in earthly life and after death. Hans Leaman’s paper “Exile in the Development of Gnsio-Lutheran Identity and Ecclesiology” examined Gnsio-Lutherans’ efforts to call evangelicals out of Catholic territories where they faced pressure to participate in Catholic forms of worship. In public letters (Trotschriften) addressed to persecuted evangelicals, they related contemporary exile to biblical accounts of exodus and sojourning. Through those analogies, Leaman argued, Gnsio-Lutherans developed a distinct identity and ecclesiology that embraced transience and marginality as marks of Christian fortitude. During the comments and discussion, it was noted that both papers challenged the confessionalization thesis; instead, both papers were related to the historiographical thesis that the Reformation was not only about religious beliefs and practices, but also about a new regime of emotions.
The eighth and final panel examined practices of *Herrschaft* (rule) in seventeenth-century Lübeck and eighteenth-century Alsace. Jason Strandquist’s paper “The Rod and Bloody Sword: Pastors and Magistrates in Wartime Lübeck, 1618–1650” examined how the relations between Lübeck’s religious and civic authorities changed during the Thirty Years’ War. Whereas Lübeck’s clerics and magistrates had frequently clashed over what it meant to be a “Lutheran” city before 1618, the physical threats and heterodox challenges of the Thirty Years’ War pushed them toward a confessional rapprochement in order to secure the city’s survival. This new cooperation between the secular and spiritual estates, Strandquist concluded, provided the model for Lübeck’s recovery from a severe internal crisis after the Peace of Westphalia. Stephen Lazer’s paper “All the King’s Men? French State Building and Seigneurial Administrations in Early Modern Alsace, 1680-1789” analyzed the process of state-building in Pfalz-Zweibrückenfeld’s Alsatian territories of Guttenberg and Lützelstein from 1680-1789. Lazer argued that France extended its sovereignty through a series of mechanisms that included not only stringent administrative regulations but also the preservation and cooptation of seigneurial systems and their officials. The comments and the discussion asked to what extent Strandquist’s project challenged *Landesgeschichte* historiography and whether Lazer’s findings support the main thesis of Peter Sahlins’s book *Boundaries* (1989) that national identities were shaped in the borderlands.

The final discussion provided an occasion to place the seminar’s papers in the context of current research trends. Here it was noted that the seminar featured relatively few papers on the history of cultural transfer, the history of violence (including *Gewalterfahrung*), and media history (*Mediengeschichte*), three prominent areas of research in contemporary German historiography. By contrast, participants remarked that the history of religion was more strongly represented at the seminar than in current German research. Much of this research engaged the confessionalization thesis, which was a frequent topic during the panel discussions. While everyone agreed that the confessionalization thesis has been the subject of trenchant criticisms for some time, most participants conceded that it was difficult to avoid engaging with it in some way because it has not been replaced by a new master narrative. Nevertheless, some called on the dissertation writers to emancipate themselves from the confessionalization thesis. Another theme in the papers as well as the exchanges was the issue of “identity,” which was the subject of extensive debate during the final
discussion. While some argued that the search for religious and other identities formed a legitimate and important part of historical inquiry, others argued that, since historians can never uncover a historical actor’s “core self,” they ought to abandon the search for identities and restrict themselves to reconstructing and analyzing people’s behaviors, practices, actions, or communication. As the debate on identity demonstrates, the sustained and lively discussion of methodological issues was one of the strengths and pleasures of a seminar that was characterized by a remarkable combination of academic rigor, intellectual generosity, and a congenial atmosphere.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
FEEDING AND CLOTHING THE WORLD: CASH CROPS AND GLOBAL HISTORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Conference at the GHI Washington, June 2–4, 2011. Convener: Shane Hamilton (University of Georgia), Ines Prodöhl (GHI). Participants: Warren Belasco (University of Maryland), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Patricia Clavin (University of Oxford), Sterling Evans (University of Oklahoma), Fritz Georg von Graevenitz (European University Institute, Florence), David Hamilton (University of Kentucky), Shane Hamilton (University of Georgia), Elizabeth Heath (University of Chicago), Jan Logemann (GHI), Rudolph Ng (University of Heidelberg), Tore Olsson (University of Georgia), Adina Popescu Berk (Columbia University), Ines Prodöhl (GHI), Jenny Smith (Georgia Institute of Technology), John Soluri (Carnegie Mellon University), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Amrys Williams (University of Wisconsin–Madison), Rebecca Woods (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Andrew Zimmermann (George Washington University).

This conference brought together primarily U.S. and European historians researching agricultural topics related to cultural, social, and economic aspects of a global history of cash crops. The wide range of presentations assured that the discussion would not be limited to mere histories of agriculture but would provide a panopticon of the theme. Ines Prodöhl opened the conference by sketching the broad topical framework that would serve as a guideline for the final discussion. She posed questions about the economic and cultural consequences of the increasing production of cash crops. Global trade relations had a strong impact on different life patterns. Likewise, the processes and outputs of exchange as well as the practices of transcultural interaction strongly influenced the perception of this global interconnectedness, she argued.

In her keynote address, “Cash, Crops, War, and Peace,” Patricia Clavin highlighted the opportunities and geographic diversity of studying this subject that, seemingly more than any other, is so interwoven with concerns about prospects for peace and welfare. First, she emphasized the unique opportunity studying cash crops provides for exploring the relationship among globalization, nationalism, and imperialism, whether in terms of national political reactions to globalization or new imperial appetites for colony-grown cash crops. The resulting welfare gap between North and South is a historically underdeveloped research area. Secondly, cash crops are well suited
to researching internationalism and international institutions, especially the League of Nations and its affiliated organizations. Although the International Labor Organization promoted global peace through global justice, the League’s approach to peace followed a traditional path toward global security. Historically and thus historiographically, it seems that the League’s peace movement neglected economic and social concerns and separated political from social and economic issues. Agriculture, especially, played a central role in international relations. Economic internationalism could have contributed greatly to the political integration of the world by “de-nationalizing” international policy. Finally, Clavin noted that the Eurocentrism of both the League and current historiography has failed to fully represent the geographic range and globalization of cash crop production. Asia and Africa have to be taken as part of that globalization. Visions of common social and political rights emerged from a troubling unevenness of global welfare. Agriculture was at the core of philanthropic visions of how to feed the world. With these issues in mind, Clavin argued, one can detect a central continuity and lesson from dealing with global cash crops that has been the central linkage of global agriculture and security, of cash, crops, war, and peace.

The first panel, “Transnational Institutions,” opened with a talk by Sterling Evans on “Fiber and Food: How Mexican Agaves Enabled U.S. and Canadian Wheat Production in the Early Twentieth Century.” Evans pointed to the interconnectedness of production of binder twine made of agaves from Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula and the production of grain in the U.S. and Canada: the twine was needed for the binders used in harvesting the corn. This suggested both a production chain in the international agricultural sector and illuminated part of the history of the industrialization of agriculture. Mexican twine production was halted completely when North America introduced the combine harvester-thresher.

Tore C. Olsson’s paper on “Corn versus Cotton: Monoculture, Subsistence, and Market Integration in Two Green Revolutions” followed. He showed that the “Green Revolution,” as it is commonly understood—that is, as a series of developmental transfer projects designed to increase agricultural yield—did not emerge as a monolithic project of North-South domination, nor should it be seen as an idealization of technology in the twentieth century. Instead, this development policy has to be seen as a set of specific choices made for a certain environment. However, the larger political and economic
structures into which the development projects had to fit eroded their intentional specific character.

David Hamilton underlined the historiographical importance of international commodity agreements in his talk, “Global Markets in the Age of Global Crisis: The Great Depression, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and International Commodity Agreements.” He connected the New Deal’s Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and the search for an international commodity agreement on the wheat sector to a wider project of the New Deal makers to return to a more liberal free trade economy through intervention, which created a new relation between national and international markets. Thus, the AAA has to be seen as a part of a wider global market idea and also as a tool of international cooperation.

Amrys Williams concluded the panel with her paper, “America’s Grassroots Ambassadors,” elucidating the internationalization and extension of the 4-H Club in the postwar era. This was one of the most popular and successful programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Extension Service for modernizing rural life in Asia and Africa. International activities of rural youth were seen as the natural setting for introducing new techniques and practices to rural populations worldwide and, therefore, for development policy. But, at the same time, the program also served as an ideological instrument in Harry S. Truman’s policy of containment as it promoted global economic development along capitalist, industrial, commodity-production lines.

The second panel, “Colonial Transitions,” started with Rudolph Ng’s presentation, “Colonos Asiáticos: The Foundations of the International Sugar Trade in the Late Nineteenth Century,” which investigated the role of Chinese coolies in Cuba. Characterizing the global Chinese coolie trade not so much as a part of international “migration” but rather as a late form of slavery, Ng demonstrated how Chinese coolies fulfilled an economic and social function in Cuba. This contrasts with the usual understanding of Chinese coolies being connected with a political function there as freedom fighters during the Cuban War of Independence against Spanish rule. Economically, their main legacy was to enable the planters to buy enough time to make a smooth transition from a labor-based to a mechanized production system. Socially, the Chinese coolies were a critical force in transforming the entrenched Cuban white-versus-black social paradigm into a more pluralist perspective.
Andrew Zimmermann’s paper, “Sugarbeets, Cotton, Palm Oil: Cash Crops and the Freedom of Labor in the Atlantic World between the Civil War and the First World War,” aimed to understand commodities in terms of markets and labor. Zimmermann discussed the development of standardized agricultural commodities and the racial identities that accompanied them. This connection makes it plain that capitalism has to be understood as a particular form of labor control. Finally, Zimmermann also presented some reciprocal transnational influences in his three commodity case studies. For example, cotton production in the American New South was repeatedly held up as an example that colonial authorities used to introduce large-scale cotton monoculture into colonial Africa.

Elizabeth Heath concluded the panel with a presentation on the historical development of the French colonial sugar industry in Guadeloupe in the late nineteenth century, entitled “Beet vs. Cane: Writing a Global History of a Sugar Island’s Decline.” Although the Guadeloupean sugar industry faced a structural crisis, France kept supporting it. The reason for this has to be seen in Guadeloupean sugar producers’ success in positioning their interests in terms of French national interest. This positioning raised the question of citizenship in the metropolitan and colonial contexts, wherein the ancienres colonies were located in the French nation. This led to a new pacte colonial, which impacted the social class and racial structure of Guadeloupe. While the sugar producers became “French” in their consumption habits and tastes, the working class maintained its own culture.

The third panel, on “Regulation and Speculation,” started with Adina Popescu Berk’s presentation, “Market Disruptions: Famine and Speculation on International Grain Markets, 1888–1909,” which focused on the perception and contemporary conceptions of markets and market disturbances. It built on the view that market disturbances were seen as “artificial” when they were caused by speculation and as “natural” when caused by unfavorable climatic circumstances. Popescu Berk showed how the quest to analyze market forces in this period indicates that there was a sense of helplessness in the face of a market that was difficult to comprehend and seemingly impossible to control.

Fritz Georg von Graevenitz’s paper, “From Disposal to Provision: Facets of World Wheat Planning in the Depression Years (1927–1939),” looked at two early and significant instances of international grain
market intervention. First, Graevenitz explained how international market planning marked a kind of Europeanization of the markets. Promoted by a transnational European interest group within the League of Nations, international commodity agreements became a tool for intergovernmental regulation of international markets. This kind of internationalism would later fit European protectionism and replace the League’s quest for global free trade. Over the course of the 1930s, however, international commodity agreements became an instrument of provision rather than a tool to manage global overproduction. It proved to be the conceptual origins of a world food board.

Jenny Smith rounded out the panel with her paper, “The Great Grain Robbery and the History of Futures during the Late Cold War,” which sought to elucidate the lasting effects of this event on the Soviet Union. The “robbery” occurred in 1971, when the Soviet Union purchased almost 30 percent of the U.S. wheat crop at low prices using U.S. government export subsidies. Smith showed that the roots of the Soviet Union’s economic decline are to be found in a set of agricultural reforms which forced the Soviet Union to buy grain internationally rather than in sclerotic bureaucracy or military folly. She explained, furthermore, how the Cold War affected the nature of cash crops at the generic level, the environmental level, and at the level of circulation and consumption.

The fourth and final panel, “Globalizing Animal Products,” began with John Soluri’s presentation, “International Wool Markets and Sheep Ranching in Southern Patagonia, 1890-1960.” He illustrated how the fortunes of sheep ranching in southern Patagonia were initially tightly linked to global transnational networks of production, distribution, and consumption in the absence of regional centers of consumption. In the mid-twentieth century, this circumstance gave rise to an “import substitution industrialization” in Patagonia designed to expand national markets for wool and meat. Soluri looked at sheep breeds in Patagonia to examine the interplay of economic and ecological forces as well as effects on local ecologies and labor processes.

Rebecca Wood’s paper, “Breed, Culture and Economy: The Australasian Frozen Meat Trade, 1880-1920,” explored the cultural dimensions of the global imperial trade in frozen mutton meat. Woods did not focus on the odds of establishing this trade between Great Britain and its colonies but rather underscored perceived cultural affinities
between colony and metropole together with economic necessities as the rationale for empire trade in wool and meat. Meat became a focal point for the construction of a colonial identity that combined British heritage with the colonial locus.

The final discussion, which began with the observation that the conference had featured a wide range of analytical perspectives on the question of cash crops in a global historical context, was shaped by three main points. First, in researching the history of cash crops, one should think generally about the notion of commodification. The history of cash crops demonstrates not only a general process of commercialization but also how the commercialization of human labor proved to be a socially disintegrating force. Second, finding a common periodization for cash crops in the twentieth century turned out to be difficult. While World War I and II were certainly important in shaping global cash crops’ flows and methods of production, they nonetheless fail to provide period-defining caesurae for historians in this context. “Interwar,” for instance, might not be a useful term here. The global history of cash crops might contribute to a depiction of a crisis of capitalism and its periodization. Third, many of the papers examined the local and regional cultural implications of global market structures. This reveals the specificity of agriculture as a topic of global history. Since agriculture lacks clear profit margins and is deeply rooted in a particular society, methods of production are not chosen exclusively on the basis of rationality but also on the basis of cultural and social practices.

Fritz Georg von Graevenitz (European University Institute, Florence)
SECOND JUNIOR SCHOLARS CONFERENCE
IN GERMAN-JEWISH HISTORY

Conference at the GHI Washington, June 14-15, 2011. Co-organized and co-sponsored by the Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft des Leo Baeck Instituts in Deutschland, the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the GHI. Conveners: Michael Brenner (University of Munich), Jürgen Matthäus (Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies), Miriam Rürup (GHI). Participants: Hannah Ahlheim (University of Göttingen), Caspar Battegay (University of Basel), Adi Gordon (University of Cincinnati), Udi Greenberg (Dartmouth College), Anne-Christin Saß (Free University Berlin), Björn Siegel (Hamburger Institut für die Geschichte der Deutschen Juden), Russell Spinney (University of Maryland, Baltimore), Noah Strote (University of California, Berkeley), Sarah Wobick-Segev (Syracuse University), Leah Wolfson (USHMM Washington), Noam Zadoff (University of Munich).

After a successful conference in 2009, this year’s workshop again brought together a small transatlantic group of recent Ph.D.’s and faculty members in the field of German-Jewish history from North America and Germany to foster a new generation of scholars. Thus, even though the workshop focused on participants’ current projects, the discussions also centered on the future developments to be expected in German-Jewish history in terms of methodology, theories, approaches, research questions, sources, and so on, as well as the research paths to pursue. In other words, the workshop aimed to assess the “state of the art” of German-Jewish history, considering that every new generation of researchers addresses new questions while sometimes taking up “old” topics, material and methods. The participants came primarily from three different academic traditions: those of Israel, Germany, and the United States. But even more importantly, they came from different disciplinary approaches. As all are teaching at either German or North American universities, participants were interested in questions concerning the teaching of German-Jewish history for the future, as well. In this respect, the workshop tied in perfectly with the Silberman Seminar, a two-week intensive course on how to teach Holocaust history in college today that was taking place simultaneously at the USHMM. In order to make an exchange with seminar participants possible, the Junior Scholars Workshop convened the first day at the Center of Advanced Holocaust studies and the second day at the German Historical Institute.
The workshop capitalized on this opportunity to include the Silberman Seminar participants with a special lunch event on the first day, “Intersections and Differences between Jewish Studies and Holocaust Studies in the United States and in Germany”—a round of discussions about the meaning of teaching Jewish history as well as Holocaust history at universities and about where the Holocaust fits into everyone’s research narratives and teaching agendas. After some introductory remarks by the conveners of the Silberman Seminar Doris Bergen and Barry Trachtenberg, Michael Brenner and Jürgen Matthäus addressed changing trends in teaching and researching the Holocaust and how they have shaped the field of Holocaust studies. They observed, and participants in the discussion concurred, that Holocaust Studies and Jewish Studies are surprisingly separate fields that only rarely intertwine.

The five regular panels of the Jewish History Seminar were devoted to twentieth-century German-Jewish history, with a high proportion of biographical approaches, and a preponderance of papers on Weimar or Post-1945 Germany. The first session, “Weimar Economy and the Jews,” discussed two different approaches to the topic. In her talk on “Self-Perceptions and ‘Fremdbilder’: Writing the History of the ‘Jewish Economy’ in Weimar Germany,” Hannah Ahlheim posed the question of how one could define a specifically “Jewish” position within the economy. She not only sketched out the economic stereotypes of Jews in specific terms (for instance, “the materialistic Jewish mind”), but challenged the very idea of writing a separate history of the “Jewish economy” in Weimar Germany: she asked whether one can be written at all without setting “the Jews” apart again. After all, she argued, statistical counting in itself is no more “objective” than other ways of describing groups. She demonstrated this by presenting results different Jewish and non-Jewish actors with completely different motives obtained from manipulating the same numbers to prove both the merits of Jews and to establish their overrepresentation in certain fields. Russell Spinney took a rather different perspective on Weimar German-Jewish society in his paper, “The Fear of Exclusion: Emotional Economies, Emotives and the Response to Anti-Semitism in the Weimar Republic.” Focusing on Weimar Jews’ emotional responses to the ever-present stereotypes and everyday threats of anti-Semitism, he asked whether the rather new field of the history of emotions can contribute to understanding individual and group agency in that era. Although everyday Jewish life was shaped by anti-Semitism and fear, Jews also had to find a way to balance out their social interactions in a kind of economy of emotions.
The second session, “Central European Biographies,” had two papers dealing with the challenges and opportunities that writing German-Jewish biographies generate. Caspar Battegay presented his biographical work on Nathan Birnbaum (1864–1937), an important advocate of many central European Jewish ideas, some of which even conflicted with one another. Looking specifically at the many “Turning Points of Modernity” in Birnbaum’s life, Battegay asked how these made him a modernist figure who, in being modern, could even tell his own life story through them instead of in a linear manner. Adi Gordon’s biographical paper also focused on a person whose life was marked by many permutations. In writing “The Intellectual Biography of Hans Kohn (1891–1971): Extending Central European Jewish History into Cold War America,” Gordon sought to explore not only in the turning points in Kohn’s biography but also the changing approaches to intellectual history that extend the interest in European Jewish history to include contemporary history in general, in this specific case, the history of the Cold War. This theme would be taken up again the next day in the panel, “Jewish Intellectuals and the Rebuilding of Germany.”

The third and final panel of the first day, “Jewish Societies in Movement,” turned to the vital factor of migration in Jewish history. Anne-Christin Saß addressed “‘Der historisher moment’: Familiar Challenges and New Developments in the Encounters between Eastern European and German Jews in Weimar Berlin.” As her title already suggested, her interest lay not so much in the well-researched differences between the archetypical “Eastern” and “Western” Jew, but more in the unusual encounters and cooperative endeavors between those groups to overcome their traditional juxtaposition. Björn Siegel also focused on a location of transit, as Berlin was in Saß’s case, picking “Ships, Shipping Companies and the Jewish Emigration to Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s” as his site of analysis. Shipping companies and societal situations on the ships themselves shed new light on Jewish emigration and maybe even provide insight into preliminary Zionist state-building because people stuck on a long voyage together would fuse into a rudimentary society while still on board. The ship is thus far more than a metaphor for the transitional situation of Jews, Siegel maintained, as it also comprises an economic, ideological, and political place imbued with the emigrants’ hopes and fears.

The second day began at the German Historical Institute with a panel on “Belonging and Distancing,” which highlighted emotions
as an important factor in German-Jewish history. Sarah Wobick’s talk, “German-Jewish Belonging: Community, Space and Faith from 1850–1950,” focused on how, in both the secular and religious realms of this period, gathering places that enhanced feelings of Jewishness and ties between Jews shaped a Jewish communal sense of belonging more than geopolitical conceptions of space. She discussed how scholarship of Jewish life generally overemphasizes the secular characteristics of German Jews at the expense of religious ones. Noam Zadoff continued this panel with a biography that asked more general questions about German-Jewish historiography. In his paper, “Towards a History of Emotions: Gershom Scholem and Post-Holocaust Germany,” he especially concentrated on the notion of “turning points” again, as Caspar Battegay had discussed the day before, by illuminating the difficulties Jewish emigrants faced when they returned to Germany after the Holocaust. Key issues included the emigrants’ emotional bonds to Germany and German intellectuals, as well as the emotional burden of returning to the land of the perpetrators. Seemingly “extraterritorial spaces,” such as Monte Verità, eased the transition from being an emigré to being a German intellectual, he noted.

The final panel, “Jewish Intellectuals and the Rebuilding of Germany,” returned to the question of Jews in postwar/Cold War Germany and beyond. In his paper, “Christians, Jews, and the Intellectual Foundations of the Federal Republic,” Noah Strote highlighted individuals who had achieved intellectual leadership in the Weimar Republic, fled National Socialism, and returned to Germany after 1945 in order to help rebuild a democratic society. He drew especially upon the political metaphor of the “Judaic spirit,” chronicling its development from an anti-Semitic reflex to a component of “philo-Semitism” and even “Judeo-Christianity” in the new postwar vocabulary. Udi Greenberg’s paper, “German Jews and the Cold War: The Case of Ernst Fraenkel and the ‘Global New Deal,’” then examined the Jewish roots of the transformation of the Social Democratic Party in the postwar decades. Whereas it had been a class-based party in the 1950s, it then became a pluralist party integrated into the anti-Marxism of the West with some intellectual origins in Socialist discussions of the Weimar era involving famous Jewish intellectuals such as Ernst Fraenkel, Greenberg maintained. These experiences not only made German-Jewish emigrants advocates of U.S. Cold War policies but also now reveal them to have been key actors in shaping U.S. diplomacy.
In the concluding joint discussion on major changes in the field of German-Jewish history, it was obvious from both the research presented during the workshop and from the discussions that non-territorial spaces such as Scholem’s Monte Verità meeting and the emigrants’ ship are recurring motifs in the writing of Jewish history. Secondly, it was clear that biographies have gained new importance in writing the history of Jewish life. Strikingly enough, these biographical approaches do not present linear success stories but rather use biographies as vehicles for showing the many turning points of Jewish history and its transnational character while still focusing on continuities rather than breaks. This leads to the third major observation: the era of National Socialism is not necessarily and not automatically seen as a fundamental break that prompts historians to either write “pre-1933” or “post-1945” Jewish history; rather, the trend now is to focus on Jewish history in the longue durée. A last remark, though, has to follow up on this reasonable and comprehensible approach: the history of National Socialism still stands surprisingly apart from Jewish history, and the history of the Holocaust even more so. Jewish Studies and Holocaust Studies thus are not only separate fields in academic teaching—as was discussed during the lunch roundtable with the Silberman-Seminar—but remain separate in research and scholarship, as well.

Miriam Rürup (GHI)
WRITING POST-1970 HISTORY: CONCEPTUALIZING THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Workshop at the Center for Advanced Studies (CAS) of the Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU) Munich, June 23-25, 2011. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington and the CAS. Conveners: Ariane Leendertz (LMU Munich), Daniel T. Rodgers (Princeton University). Participants: Howard Brick (University of Michigan), David Engerman (Brandeis University), Martin Geyer (LMU Munich), Sarah Igo (Vanderbilt University), Wencke Meteling (University of Marburg), Bethany Moreton (University of Georgia), Christopher Neumaier (University of Mainz), Alice O’Connor (University of California Santa Barbara), Uwe Schimank (University of Bremen), Andreas Wirsching (Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich).

The times when the 1970s were believed to be a decade when “nothing happened” are definitely over. Quite the contrary, the 1970s and the subsequent decades have evolved into a major field of research for historians and social scientists alike during the last few years. Yet the question of how to conceptualize and to “label” this period still remains open and highly debated and is further complicated by the international scene. Comparing the current historiographies of the United States and Germany, Ariane Leendertz and Daniel T. Rodgers detected two different discourses—two histories, as it were—accompanied by two different sets of vocabulary. These differences were the starting point for this workshop, which aimed to establish a dialogue on how to write post-1970 historiography by bringing together German and American historians and social scientists as specialists on their countries and providing a setting for fruitful exchanges.

The first panel dealt with the “Impact of the Global on Post-1970s Society and History.” In the first presentation, “The Parochialism of Global Power: American Historians and American Globalism from Bemis to Bender,” David Engerman argued that American diplomatic historians were not in fact affected by the “shock of the global” (Niall Ferguson et. al.) but remained focused on American policies and governmental sources without participating in the intellectual transformations of the 1970s and 1980s. Only recently has this “parochialism of global power” yielded to new topics and new approaches. Social scientists of the 1970s, by contrast, very much took global developments into account when assessing contemporary changes.
In her presentation, “Discovering Social ‘Complexity’ in the 1970s and 1980s,” Ariane Leendertz drew attention to “complexity” as a key concept. Its rise during the 1970s indicated uncertainty about the future and a loss of confidence in the face of social transformations and a changing international environment. Although both politicians and social scientists maintained that politics would have to adjust to a more complex and more interdependent world, neither group had resolved the question of how this was to be realized. The 1970s also marked the eclipse of modernization theory, as Howard Brick pointed out in his talk, “From Modernization to World/Global Analysis.” In the late 1960s (and thus long before the concept of globalization came up), modernization theory began to be superseded by a “world turn.” Theories such as Immanuel Wallerstein’s “world-systems analysis” challenged prevalent notions of “core” and “periphery” and hinted at the limits of modernization theories by rejecting teleology and linearity. While these new theories emerged from discourses on colonialism and imperialism during the 1960s, economic transformations contributed to the rise of “globalization” as yet another concept.

The second panel addressed the topic of “Values in Transition.” In a truly German-American comparison, Uwe Schimank analyzed different views of individualism in Germany and the United States from the 1970s onwards. Proposing a scheme of four modes of individualism—liberated, excessive, embedded, and endangered individualism—he explained how sociologists of both countries held very different views on which mode of individualism was desirable and which one was seen as a threat to society. Depending on the origin of sociologists, talking about individualization therefore had very different implications. The session continued with Sarah Igo’s presentation on “postmodern privacy,” in which she identified the late 1960s and early 1970s as a period of profound change in this area. Technological and bureaucratic developments but also political events such as the Watergate scandal transformed the way Americans thought about privacy. The emergence of databanks, in particular, led to a new consciousness about information privacy for both citizens and courts. Yet this period also saw the rise of a “confessional culture” of public self-exposure. Both developments, Igo suggested, can be seen as part of a greater shift in individuals’ encounters with the public sphere. In the panel’s third presentation, Christopher Neumaier took contemporary statements of value changes in Western societies as a starting point to set up a “triangle of value change” consisting of institutional settings, codes of practices, and values. He adapted
this model to family values and discourses on divorces, stating that changes in social practices such as a rising divorce rate can lead to changes in institutional settings as was the case in the reform of the West German divorce law in 1976.

The “Values in Transition” panel continued after lunch with a presentation by Bethany Moreton, who focused on the interrelationship of family and market values, thus connecting shifts in religion and in sexual morality to shifts in the economic order. The newly emerging New Christian Right and the rising post-Fordist economic order shared a common view of the key categories of reproduction and service. In this logic, women were to provide social services without pay, while the state presented itself as a good place for investment with low costs for social provisions. Andreas Wirsching continued the session’s focus on gender and work by looking at life courses as indicators of change. During the last third of the twentieth century, the Fordist life course regime eroded in Western societies. Contesting prevalent assumptions, Wirsching interpreted the Fordist life course regime as part of a bourgeois model dating back to the late eighteenth century which was characterized by a standardization of family structures and gender roles and the emergence of male industrial work. From the late 1960s onwards this life course regimen changed: female labor force participation rose while male labor force participation decreased, and family ties lessened. Whereas these changes clearly indicate economic and social changes, it remains to be seen what the new standard life course will look like.

In the third panel the workshop turned to “Economies and Crises.” Wencke Meteling started with an investigation of “The Debate about the German Economy” of the 1980s and 1990s, which revolved around the key concept of Standort. This debate on Germany’s ability to assert itself as an important economic nation in times of change, she argued, was part of an overall narrative of decline. With Germany facing strong international competition, many feared that factors hitherto seen as assets would become disadvantages. Alice O’Connor then turned to the United States, economic crisis, and the politics of the late twentieth century as a period of growing inequality. Emphasizing the significant role of narratives for shaping policies, O’Connor explained how right-wing politicians and economists hijacked economic debates in the United States from the 1970s onwards. As an example, she highlighted how conservatives regarded the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 as a major factor in the Great Recession of
2008—despite all evidence to the contrary. Yet even during and after
the crisis of 2008, American progressives failed to establish counter-
narratives. Narratives remained important during the last paper given
by Martin Geyer. He focused on “Security, Risks, and Narratives of
Modernity since the 1970s.” In this period, Geyer stated, optimism
faded and expectations of the future changed, so the impetus for
reform policies shifted as well. The future was reinvented as a set of
risks, with risk-management viewed as a way to manage the future. In
consequence, modernization theory had to adapt to ideas of security
and risk, and it became a defensive concept with different and rivaling
concepts of modernity emerging.

The papers and discussions of this workshop confirmed Rodgers’s
and Leendertz’s initial notion that there are two different historiogra-
phies of the post-1970s period in the United States and in Germany.
Whereas historians in both countries quite often focus on similar
topics, their perspectives and interpretations differ from each other.
The workshop engendered intense debates on differing approaches
and concepts such as “value change” (Germany) and “cultural wars”
(United States) as ways of interpreting the 1970s, but these proved to
be extremely fruitful. The question of how to write post-1970 history
will probably continue to be much debated for some time, along with
the question of just how important a turning point the 1970s really
were—another topic that participants vigorously discussed. But the
German-American meeting at the CAS presented many promising
methods for investigating this time period, whether it is viewed as a
starting point for new developments or as an end to processes that
shaped previous decades.

Reinhild Kreis (University of Augsburg)
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE ECONOMY: HISTORICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

Conference at Villa Vigoni, Lago di Como, Italy, June 19–22, 2011. Co-sponsored and co-organized by the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne (MPIfSS) and the GHI Washington. Conveners: Jens Beckert (MPIfSS) and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI). Participants: Bruce Carruthers (Northwestern University), Andrea Colli (Bocconi University), Alexander Engel (University of Göttingen/Harvard University), Neil Fligstein (University of California, Berkeley), Jane Guyer (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore), Mark Häberlein (University of Bamberg), Chris Hann (Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle), Jan-Ottmar Hesse (University of Bielefeld), Christof Jeggle (University of Bamberg), Peter Katzenstein (Cornell University), Jürgen Kocka (Social Sciences Research Center Berlin), Pierre-Michel Menger (EHEESS Paris), Stephen Nelson (Northwestern University), Federico Varese (Oxford University), Frank Wehinger (MPIfSS), Thomas Welskopp (University of Bielefeld), Clemens Wischermann (University of Constance); Sylvia Yanagisako (Stanford University).

This conference sought to bring together leading experts from sociology, anthropology, political science and history who share an interest in the investigation of economic phenomena. The challenge was that these disciplines often speak different languages, use different methodological tool sets, and subscribe to different premises. The conference tried to overcome these differences and to reap the synergies of cross-disciplinary cooperation. On the basis of pre-circulated papers, the program allowed ample time for discussion. Its interdisciplinary character was underlined by the fact that each paper was commented on by a scholar from a different discipline. The commentators included Hartmut Berghoff, Jürgen Kocka, Frank Wehinger, Jane Guyer, Neil Fligstein, Clemens Wischermann, Christof Jeggle, Bruce Carruthers, Pierre-Michel Menger, and Jan-Ottmar Hesse.

In their introduction, conveners Jens Beckert and Hartmut Berghoff highlighted that the theme, “Risk and Uncertainty in the Economy,” was ideal for this interdisciplinary conference because risk and uncertainty are universal features of economic activity. Whether analyzing the behavior of medieval traders whose merchandise had to be secured against burglars or that of financial traders on Wall Street who have to close deals in highly volatile markets, one is sure to find risk and uncertainty playing a role. Beckert and Berghoff went on to
delineate the four categories of uncertainty: (1) strategic uncertainty, which arises when one is dependent on the actions of others who follow their own interest; (2) uncertainty originating from contingent assessments of the value of goods; (3) uncertainty concerning product quality, which emerges from incomplete or asymmetrically distributed information; and (4) uncertainty stemming from the unknowability of the future.

The question of how economic actors deal with these sources of risk and uncertainty is relevant for all economic systems and throughout economic history. Capitalistic economies, however, are characterized by a specific tension between institutions that reduce uncertainty and institutions that create uncertainty, especially markets. Uncertainty can provide crucial opportunities to make profits but can also create problems for the coordination of economic activity and make people insecure. The position economic actors take with regard to reducing or expanding uncertainties in the economy hence depends on their class situation (Max Weber).

Bruce Carruthers opened the first panel, on “Financial Markets,” with a paper on “Turning Uncertainty into Risk: The Case of Credit Ratings,” which focused on the history of credit-rating agencies. As Carruthers pointed out, with decision-making on credit fraught with uncertainties, credit-rating was invented in the nineteenth-century in the U.S. to help make those uncertainties more tractable. Credit-rating methods spread widely, even before their accuracy or efficacy had been demonstrated. The origins of credit rating reveal problems and limitations that re-emerged during the financial crisis of 2008 when rating agencies performed very poorly.

Alexander Engel continued the panel with his paper, “Interpreting Futures Trading as Risk Management,” which challenged the current self-understanding of futures exchanges. It is textbook knowledge that futures markets exist to help those who want to dispose of price risks (hedgers) by bringing them together with those who want to take on the risks (investors/speculators). Moreover, these institutions depict themselves as suppliers of risk management services. But futures exchanges were not established with this aim. The notion of risk, which takes center stage in current interpretations, did not enter the debate until later. In addition, Engel argues that the introduction of futures markets actually increased the total individual exposure to price risk, while at the same time allowing people to choose the exact form and structure of that exposure more deliberately. In sum,
futures markets have made it possible for economic actors to take a more active approach towards risk and facilitated the emergence of a “risk economy” in which risk itself has become a key commodity.

Stephen Nelson and Peter Katzenstein’s paper on “Risk, Uncertainty, and the Financial Crisis of 2008” then used the lens of uncertainty to analyze the methods of modern financial markets. They focused especially on securitization and reliance on simplified and erroneous mathematical models of risk management, as well as on the decision-making process within the Federal Reserve. They argued that the emphasis on insecurity forces one to include social and political spheres in analyzing economic activity and to reject purely macroeconomic approaches, which lead, in the words of Lawrence Summers, to a “stochastic pseudo-world.”

Thomas Welskopp began the second panel, “The Underground Economy,” with a paper on “Organized Crime and the Stability of Illegal Markets,” which dealt with theoretical concepts he used in his analysis of the illegal alcohol business in the United States in the 1920s. Welskopp characterized this case of organized crime as the classic example of opportunistic behavior. The gangs of the Prohibition era were organization-building networks that relied on personal ties and trust relationships. Welskopp likened these networks in many ways to tribal groups, which build up complex systems of face-to-face relationships with informal hierarchies dominated by indispensable individuals without whom the whole organization is liable to collapse. The alcohol-running gangs were also integrated by conflict and violence, and yet these characteristics were at odds with organizational stability. The foundation of these organizations was therefore also, paradoxically, their Achilles’s heel.

Federico Varese then spoke on “The Structure of Criminal Connections: The Russian-Italian Mafia Network.” Basing his paper on a unique source, transcripts of a multitude of taped telephone conversations, Varese analyzed the extent to which this expat Mafia group developed a fluid network or a more hierarchical structure. Varese used network analysis and actor-oriented models to study the communications between various members of the cell. The findings show that, although hierarchies emerged, there were also network effects with three subgroups rather than a clearly centralized structure.

Andrea Colli launched the third panel, “Families and Economic Risk,” with a paper on “Kinship and Trust: Perspectives from Family
Business Studies,” which summarized the spate of recent research on the history of family firms. He examined family ownership and values both as internal features of firms and in the way they interfaced with the external environment. In both cases, he found that, on the positive side, family firms can reduce risk and uncertainty within the firm, but, on the negative side, the family element can also increase a firm’s level of turbulence and uncertainty inside the organization and in its relationships with other firms, the market, and the local community. Thus, the impact of a firm being comprised of a family may be positive or negative, overall, with relevant effects on the performance and ultimately the survival of the family firm.

Sylvia Yanagisako followed with a paper titled “Sentiments of Risk: Cultural Logics of Family Business,” which treated Italian family firms as one type of kinship enterprise rather than as a type of business enterprise to analyze the uncertainties and risks that their members face. This approach, she claimed, does not presuppose that kinship goals and strategies play a larger role in structuring family firms than business goals or that these firms are essentially kinship organizations. Rather, the approach is essential to deepening our understanding of the dynamic interplay of trust, betrayal, uncertainty, and risk in family firms. It also challenges the concept of the “economic,” moving beyond the idea that economic activity is embedded in cultural, social, and political configurations to recognize that it is all of these at once. Among family firms in Como, the goals people pursue are not limited to the maximization of profit or even the survival of the firm but include, more importantly, achieving independence and winning the distinction of being the head of a family and a firm, as well as the enduring loyalty of children and the esteem of the community.

Chris Hann concluded this panel with a paper based on the observation of “Uyghur Peasant Families” and their communities in western China. Discussing the characteristics of Uyghur farmers’ unique social networks, Hann pointed out that Uyghur culture emphasizes personal contact in the family and the community to establish, develop, and maintain good relationships between kin and non-kin. Uyghur value, which is deeply rooted in Islam and its ethnic identity, is the guiding principle in family and social events. While socialism—which Hann defines as an attempt to eradicate all uncertainty from peoples’ lives—greatly obstructed this way of life, it never completely destroyed it. This reveals why the Uyghur farmers highly mistrusted the grassroots mechanisms of establishing secure relations.
The fourth panel, on “Institutions and Uncertainty in the Economy,” began with Mark Häberlein’s paper on “Competition, Cooperation and Trust in Early Modern Merchant Networks.” Long-distance trade in the early modern period was marked by various types of uncertainty. While merchants were able to cover specific risks by resorting to innovations such as marine insurance and the dissemination of commercial information, Häberlein shows that they mainly relied on social strategies and cultural practices. First of all, kinship ties formed the basis of most mercantile firms because in premodern societies these ties entailed social obligations and generated social capital within unstable environments. In addition, wider networks developed that were both professional and friendly. Secondly, early modern merchants from specific locations or regions routinely collaborated with one another because common origins, religious affiliations, and commercial specializations fostered cooperation to reduce transaction and information costs. Thirdly, cooperation between merchant companies across cultural boundaries took place because iterative business activity generated trust. Finally, early modern patterns of commercial education and language learning as well as the adoption of common business practices promoted the cultural formation of international merchant communities.

Jane Guyer then talked about “Domains of Exchange and Value,” re-examining the anthropological and historical accounts of monetary transactions in Atlantic Africa. One key problem is the exchange among multiple currencies, especially along the hard and soft currency divide. Money changers have to possess a variety of occupational skills, including monitoring, protecting, promoting; training in how to count and convert currencies, how to distinguish real from counterfeit money, how to hide and to transport it, and distinguishing between when to write up documents of trust and when to simply trust in others. Money changers enable people on the margins of society to make a living and to purchase even the basic necessities of life. The “realities” and “representations” of monetary value are mediated by a vast army of local experts.

Neil Fligstein presented the final conference paper on “The Role of Government in the American Mortgage Market, 1966–2010,” which demonstrated that the 2007–2009 financial crisis was centered on the nonconventional mortgage industry. In essence, financial institutions drove the housing bubble in their desire to vertically integrate and mass-produce MBS and CDO in order to reap profits at all phases of
the securitization process. From the early 1990s, they evolved in a way that enabled them to innovate and engage in more and more profit-making activity. The “industrial” model—fueled by the low interest rates of the early 2000s—was enormously profitable as long as housing prices were rising and the size of the market was growing. The main source for mortgages from 2001 until 2004 was the conventional mortgage market, but beginning in 2004, in order to keep their industrial model going, the industry’s main players shifted their attention to subprime mortgages where even higher profits could be had. After elucidating four different theoretical approaches—“financialization,” “actor-network / performativity”, “perverse incentives,” and “markets as politics”—Fligstein concluded that the “markets as politics” approach accounted for the social structuring of the market from 1990-2008. Moreover, an “industrial conception” of control, wherein financial firms integrated vertically in order to capture profits at all points along the value chain, had come to dominate the industry.

Jens Beckert (MPIfSS) and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)
19TH ARCHIVAL SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY


One of the longest-standing programs of the GHI, the Archival Summer Seminar, took place for the nineteenth time this year. From June 26 to July 8, 2011, a group of ten American Ph.D. students visited archives and research institutions and met with archivists and scholars in five German cities: Speyer, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Koblenz, and Leipzig. The aim of the seminar is to give doctoral students from the United States working on topics in the field of German and European history the opportunity to familiarize themselves with a wide range of research institutions in Germany that will help them in their dissertation research. In the first part of the two-week program, the participants learned to read documents in old German handwriting. The second part consisted of visits to federal, state, and local archives and libraries. The group also met with two scholars to discuss methods and practices of archival research and to learn more about Internet and database research. A crucial part of the seminar was the discussion of the participants’ dissertation projects in four afternoon sessions. The students’ presentations in a semi-formal atmosphere produced lively discussions and paved the way for intense scholarly exchange throughout the two weeks.
Since the very beginning, Walter Rummel, head of the Landesarchiv Speyer, has been an irreplaceable partner of the GHI Archival Summer Seminar. As always, the seminar started off with a well-conceived and motivating introductory course in paleography. The group learned how to read documents from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. Rummel’s instructions were not limited to deciphering texts. The group learned a great deal about the procedures of Quellenkritik as Rummel carefully contextualized the sources and taught the basics of Quellenkunde. Rummel was supported by his colleague Franz Maier, who gave a more detailed introduction to nineteenth- and twentieth-century sources. Another part of the program in Speyer was a tour through the Landesarchiv, which gave participants the opportunity to see some of the “crown jewels” from the stacks as well as the repair shop for old documents.

On one of the afternoons in Speyer, the participants met with Isabella Löhr (University of Heidelberg) to discuss practical aspects of archival research. Sharing her own experience in writing her Ph.D. thesis on international cooperation and the globalization of intellectual property rights in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Löhr gave valuable tips on how to prepare archival visits, on time management, and on using excerpts and databases to process sources.

Following the paleography course, the group visited the Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Rheinland, in Düsseldorf. Archivists Uwe Zuber and Kathrin Pilger, also partners of the Archival Seminar for years, explained the organization of the German archive system and gave an overview of their own holdings followed by a tour through the archive. In the afternoon, archivist Verena Kinde introduced the group to the photography collection, and then Zuber led them in some practical exercises working with archival documents.

The third destination was the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz. As in 2010, archivist Thekla Kleindienst introduced the group to the vast holdings of the branches of the Bundesarchiv across Germany followed by a tour of the building in Koblenz. In the afternoon, the participants received an introduction to the digital research tools of the Bundesarchiv’s electronic finding aids and visited the photo archive, where they had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the digital photo database. It offers access to a continuously growing collection of more than 11 million photographs, posters, and aerial photographs. Kleindienst rounded off the program with a practical exercise in archival research. The participants were given a fictitious
research project and sent on a mission to find sources in the Bundesarchiv’s holdings.

On the seminar’s last day in the Rhineland, Joachim Oepen, another established partner of the GHI, welcomed the group at the Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln. In an inspiring presentation, he explained the practical consequences of the *Provenienzprinzip*, which is a crucial principle of organization for many archives in Europe and the United States. For the participants working on early modern history and German history in the nineteenth century, especially, it was most useful to learn how the many administrative changes on the regional and state levels affected the organization of the archive holdings in Germany. For example, in the early nineteenth century, secularization resulted in Church archives’ holdings being broken up and transferred to state and local repositories, thus creating a complicated network of archives. Similar outcomes ensued from the political changes after 1945. Following this theoretical introduction, the students conducted hands-on exercises, working with finding aids to locate files for a specific research question—in this case, the confiscation of a seminary building by the National Socialists.

The last station of the seminar was Leipzig, where the group first visited the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Starting with an introduction by Cornelia Ranft to the library’s history, statutory tasks, and everyday activities, the group was given a tour through the library including the Deutsche Musikarchiv and the brand new building of the Deutsches Buch- und Schriftmuseum. Afterwards, Uta Spaet and Jörg Räuber acquainted the group with the library’s comprehensive activities collecting books in German and about Germany from all over the world, as well as with the challenges of book handling, storage, and restoration. In the afternoon, Birgit Honeit introduced the library’s electronic research tools, providing the participants with a very good starting point for their own work. After leaving the Nationalbibliothek, the group visited the nearby *Völkerschlachtdenkmal*.

The last archive on the seminar’s route was the Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig e.V. This privately organized archive offers a collection of documents on the history of the “Peaceful Revolution” in the German Democratic Republic. Archivists Monika Keller and Rainer Müller, members of the Verein and activists in the GDR civil rights movement, told the group about the archive’s extraordinary history and goals and gave an introduction to the collection. Having seen only governmental archives up to that point, participants appreciated
the visit to the Archiv Bürgerbewegung, which illustrated the diversity in the German archive system; this important addition to the tour also presented them with a stimulating encounter with recent German history.

In the afternoon, the seminar group met Christiane Sibille (University of Basel), a specialist in the history of the League of Nations. Sibille introduced the group to German online research tools and networks for researchers, providing an excellent overview of journal databases, digitization projects, archival web sites, and communication platforms for historians.

The GHI organizers would like to extend their heartfelt thanks to all the individuals and organizations that made the 2011 Archival Summer Seminar in Germany a success. An announcement of the program for the 2012 seminar can be found on the GHI web site at http://www.ghi-dc.org/seminars.

Mario Daniels (GHI)
TWELFTH GERD BUCERIUS LECTURE

On May 10, 2011, Gerhard Schröder, Former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1998-2005), delivered the Twelfth Gerd Bucerius Lecture in the ballroom of the Willard Intercontinental Hotel in Washington DC before an audience of more than 450. The annual Gerd Bucerius Lectures, which feature public figures from Germany and Europe, are organized by the German Historical Institute in Washington in cooperation with the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius. Past speakers have included Timothy Garton Ash, Ralf Dahrendorf, Joschka Fischer, Jutta Limbach, Kurt Masur, and Helmut Schmidt.

Speaking on the topic “Opportunities and Challenges in the 21st Century: The Future of Europe and the Transatlantic Partnership,” Schröder noted that with the accession of the states of Eastern Europe, the European Union has “become a full partner” rather than a “junior partner” in transatlantic relations. He therefore welcomed President Obama’s “paradigm change in American foreign policy: a turn toward multilateral cooperation.” He gave a very optimistic assessment of the future of the United States: “Even if the global financial and economic crisis had its origins in the United States and even if the American economy in particular was affected by it,” he argued, “the United States is and will remain a superpower” and “will rebound politically and economically.”

Schröder’s assessment of Europe’s future was much more critical. Even though “the European Union has the potential to become a third pole in international politics alongside the United States and Asia,” he argued, “political weakness, above all the disunity of the European Union, makes it difficult for the United States to take advantage of the transatlantic partnership’s potential.” To remedy this weakness, the former chancellor called for a strengthening of European institutions in order to make the European Union “more capable of taking action” and of “speaking with a single voice.” He also emphatically argued for the accession of Turkey to the European Union, noting that a “democratic Turkey, committed to European values, is clear proof that there is no contradiction between Islamic faith and a modern society.”

Regarding the war in Afghanistan, Schröder insisted that “Germany must hold to its responsibilities. We intervened together with the United States, and we must also end this mission together.” Finally, Schröder made a strong plea for closer cooperation with Russia, noting that “the strategy of containing and encircling Russia has failed.” Instead, he argued, “it is in our interest to bind Russia as closely as possible to the European structures.”

During the extended question-and-answer session, Schröder displayed a
winning sense of humor as he fielded a wide variety of questions, ranging from the problems of the Euro zone to climate change, energy policy, and relations with Russia. Regarding the troubles of the Euro zone, he argued that the currency union must lead to closer political cooperation with the European Union, in the direction of federalism.

NEW GHI PUBLICATIONS

1. Publications of the German Historical Institute
(Cambridge University Press)


2. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)


3. World of Consumption (Palgrave Macmillan)

Hartmut Berghoff and Uwe Spiekermann, eds., *Decoding Modern Consumer Societies* (2012)

4. Studies in German History (Berghahn Books)

Marion Deshmukh, Françoise Forster-Hahn, and Barbara Gaehtgens, eds., *Max Liebermann and International Modernism: An Artist’s Career from Empire to Third Reich* (2011)

5. Other GHI Publications

Uta A. Balbier, Cristina Cuevas-Wolf, and Joes Segal, eds., *East German Material Culture and the Power of Memory, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* Supplement 7 (2011)
STAFF CHANGES

**Uta Balbier**, Research Fellow, left the GHI in April 2011 to take up a position as Lecturer in the Institute of North American Studies at King’s College London.

**Clelia Caruso** joined the Institute as a Research Fellow in May 2011. She studied history, political science, and Italian literature at the University of Trier, where she earned her doctorate in history. She is particularly interested in the social and cultural history of migration and of technology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, approaching both subjects from perspectives that transcend national boundaries. Her dissertation, *Eigene Welt? Der transnationale Sozialraum italienischer Arbeitsmigranten in Seraing (1946-1990)*, focuses on transnational social spaces resulting from intra-European Italian migration and is currently under revision for publication in the *Industrielle Welt* (Böhlau) series. In her current research project on the culture of the telephone, Caruso examines how the telephone became a technical object of everyday life. From the perspective of entangled history, this project will analyze the changes in the usage and interpretations of the telephone in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany and the United States in view of an emerging mindset of modernity.

**Marcus Gräser**, who joined the GHI as Deputy Director in 2010, left the Institute in September 2011 to take up a position as Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the Johannes Kepler Universität in Linz.

**Christine Le Jeune** joined the Institute as a Project Associate in the “Immigrant Entrepreneurship” project in August 2011. Prior to joining the GHI, Christine worked at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and as a national security analyst at the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare. From 2008 to 2009, she was a visiting fellow at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s Moscow office. Christine holds an M.A. from Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, as well as an M.A. in International Relations from the Free University Berlin. She earned her B.A. in International Relations and German from Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts.

**Christina Lubinski** joined the GHI as a Research Fellow in July 2011. She studied history at the Universities of Göttingen, Brussels, and Geneva and received her doctorate in 2009 at the University of Göttingen. During
the academic year 2010/11, she was the Newcomen Fellow at the Harvard Business School and worked on a comparison of German and U.S. family businesses in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Her book Familienunternehmen in Westdeutschland: Corporate Governance und Gesellschaftskultur seit den 1960er Jahren [Family Business in West Germany: Corporate Governance and Shareholder Relations since the 1960s] was published by C.H.Beck in Munich in 2010 and was awarded the Prize for Business History by the German Society for Business History. Her article “Crossroads of Family Business Research and Firm Demography: A Critical Assessment of Family Business Survival Rates” (with Isabell Stamm) just appeared in the Journal of Family Business Strategy. Her next project will look at multinational corporations and their early ventures in British India since the mid-nineteenth century.

Benjamin Schwantes joined the Institute as a Project Associate in the “Immigrant Entrepreneurship” project in August 2011. Schwantes earned a Bachelor of Philosophy University Honors Degree in history from the University of Pittsburgh in 2001 and an M.A. in history from the University of Delaware in 2004. He received his Ph.D. in American history from the University of Delaware in 2009. He studied in the Hagley History of Industrialization Program at Delaware and his doctoral research focused on American business management, transportation, and telecommunications in the nineteenth century. More recently, he has conducted research on immigrant entrepreneurship in the Mid-Atlantic states during the antebellum period.

Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson joined the GHI as Deputy Director in October 2011. She studied at the University of California at Davis and at the Universities of Münster and Munich, where she earned her doctorate. She has taught American history at the University of Munich from 1994 to 2011 and has been a visiting scholar and guest lecturer at numerous European and American universities. Her main research interests are African American Studies, Transatlantic Relations, Gender and American Religious History. Among her publications are From Protest to Politics: Schwarze Frauen in der Bürgerrechtsbewegung und im Kongress der Vereinigten Staaten (1998), Europe and America: Cultures in Translation (2006), Gegenspieler: Martin Luther King & Malcolm X (2000, 6th ed. 2010); Christian Science im Lande Luthers: Eine amerikanische Religionsgemeinschaft in Deutschland, 1894-2009 (2009), and Dreams and Nightmares: Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X and the Struggle for Black Equality in America (2011). She is a member of the advisory board of the German Association of American Studies.
GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Postdoc-Stipendium für Nordamerikanische Geschichte

Mischa Honeck, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg

Fellowship in Economic and Social History

Frank Schipper, University of Leiden
*Transatlantic Tourism: American Visitors to Europe in the Long Twentieth Century*
Fellowship in the History of Consumption

Joshua Clark Davis, Universität Hamburg

African-American Music Businesses as Agents of Empowerment and Globalization in the Cold War United States and Germany

Horner Fellows

Wolfgang Flügel, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg
Identitätsbildungsprozesse der deutschen Lutheraner in Pennsylvania 1742–1825

Ralf-Peter Fuchs, Universität Duisburg-Essen
The Art of Peacemaking in Early Modern Pennsylvania

Felicity Jensz, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
Shaping the Natives: Education, Missions, and Assimilation in the British Colonial World

Patricia Simpson, Montana State University
Epistemologies of the Playroom

Postdoctoral Fellowships

Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf
Im Schatten der Blockaden: Verdeckte Handelsnetze deutsch-britischer Kaufleute im Zeitalter der Napoleonischen Kriege

Silke Hackenesch, John F. Kennedy-Institut, Freie Universität Berlin
“Und wenn er bringt Schokolade herbei, dann ist die Hautfarbe nebenbei!”—Der Diskurs um die brown babies in den USA und die afro-deutschen “Besatzungskinder” in Deutschland

Anja Laukötter, Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung
Emotionen und Wissen im medizinischen Film, 1910–1990

Gisela Parak, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
The Photographic Agenda: Three Case Studies on How U.S. Governmental Institutions Studied the Environment from the 1860s to 1970s

Ulrike Thoms, Medizinhistorisches Institut der Charité
“Mother’s little helpers” in Amerika und Deutschland. Zur Konsumgeschichte der Schlaftabletten 1900–1950

Doctoral Fellows in the History of African Americans and Germans/Germany

Sarah Barksdale, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Black Soldiers and Double Consciousness, 1940–1954
Sophie Lorenz, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg
*Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik und Angela Davis, 1965-1989*

**Doctoral Fellow in International Business History**

Jens Nissel, Universität Mannheim
*Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschland und den USA*

**Doctoral Fellowships**

Elizabeth Lambert, Indiana University, Bloomington
*Contested Memory: Divided Representations of KZ Buchenwald and Weimarer Klassik*

Nina Lorkowski, Technische Universität München
*Die sanitäre Ausstattung des Privathaushalts in den USA und in Deutschland: Vergleichende Aspekte einer Konsum- und Technikgeschichte des Badezimmers, 1918-1980*

Julia Metger, Freie Universität Berlin
*Auslandskorrespondenten im Ost-West-Konflikt, Moskau 1965-1985*

Henriette Müller, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
*Historische Dimension des EU-Integrationsprozesses und Leadership-Forschung aus amerikanischer Perspektive*

Tilman-Ulrich Pietz, Universität zu Köln

Claudia Prinz, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
*Von der Cholerakontrolle zum “Diarrhoeal Diseases Control Programme”: Die Produktion und Organisation von Wissen für ein globales Gesundheitsprogramm*

James Seaver, Indiana University, Bloomington
*Fighting for Souvenirs: Americans and the Material Culture of World War II*

Philip Wagner, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
*Die Internationale der Stadtplaner, 1910–1950*
GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR, SPRING-SUMMER 2011

January 12  Marcus Gräser (GHI Washington)
Ethnizität, Regionalismus und Ökonomie: Die USA im transatlantischen Vergleich, 1820-1940

January 26  Mario Daniels (Leibniz Universität Hannover)
Industriespionage in Deutschland und den USA im 20. Jahrhundert

February 9  David Kuchenbuch (Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg)
Arno Peters, die Peterskarte und die Synchronoptische Weltgeschichte: Mediale Repräsentationen der “einen Welt” zwischen Entwicklungshilfe und Wissenschaft in den 1950er bis 1990er Jahren

February 23  Stefan Link (Harvard University)
A Fordist International: Illiberal Modernism and the Politics of Production in the USA, Germany, and the Soviet Union between the World Wars

March 2  Miriam Rürup (GHI Washington)
Das Irreguläre regulieren? Politik mit der Staatenlosigkeit in der UN-Konvention von 1954

March 16  Roberto Sala (Universität Erfurt)
Wissenschaftliche Paradigmen und berufliche Praxis in den deutschen und amerikanischen Sozialwissenschaften nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1918-1933)

Claudia Kemper (Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte Hamburg)
Ärzte in der anti-atomaren Friedensbewegung der 1980er Jahre—die deutsche Sektion der IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War)

April 6  Cathie Jo Martin (Boston University)
Gonna Party Like It’s 1899: Party Systems and the Origins of Varieties of Coordination

April 13  Jan Logemann (GHI Washington)
European Imports? Emigrés and the Transformation of American Consumer Culture from the 1920s to the 1960s
May 4  Martin Lutz (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg)
Mennoniten, Amische und Hutterer in den USA während der Hochindustrialisierung

May 25  Michael North (Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald/University of California, Santa Barbara)
Towards a Global Material Culture: Domestic Interiors in the Eighteenth Century

June 8  Carl-Henry Geschwind (Washington, DC)
Cheap Gasoline, Teures Benzin: Towards a Comparative History of Motor Fuels Taxation

June 29  Susan Richter (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg)

Regina Blaszczyk (University of Pennsylvania)
Ernest Dichter and American Consumer Culture

July 6  Thomas Pegelow Kaplan (Davidson College)
"Wir müssen Völkermord Völkermord nennen." Linkspolitische Protestbewegungen, Genozid und die Transformation von Erinnerungskultur in Westdeutschland und den USA

GHI DOCTORAL SEMINAR, SPRING-SUMMER 2011

January 20  Lisa Seibert (Carnegie Mellon University)
Saints, Sisters, and the State: Women and Religion in East and West Germany, 1945-1975

Jennifer Rodgers (University of Pennsylvania)
"From the Archive of Horrors" to "the Shop Window of Democracy": The International Tracing Service and the Transatlantic Politics of the Past in the Cold War Era

March 24  Jürgen Dinkel (Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen)
Geschichte der internationalen Blockfreienpolitik (1946–1992)

Christian Johann (Freie Universität Berlin)
Wohlfahrtsstaat und Mittelschichten in den USA, 1945–1975
April 21  Andreas Hübner (Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen)
Migration, Sklaverei und Kreolisierung im Zeichen globaler Krisen: Der historische Raum des unteren Mississippideltas als Bruchzone der Globalisierung, 1720–1820

Jens Wegener (European University Institute Florence)
Engaging Europe: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and International Relations during the Interwar Period

William Kurtz (University of Virginia, Charlottesville)
German-American Catholics in the Era of the American Civil War

May 5  Johannes Steffens (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg)
The Racial Integration of the American Workplace: How US and Foreign Companies Ended Racial Discrimination in Employment

Christoph Wehner (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
Nach den Katastrophen? “Sicherheit” und Sicherheitsproduktion seit 1945 im Spannungsfeld von Atomgefahr und Katastrophenversicherung

June 16  Andreas Riffel (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg)
Gewalt und Rassismus während des mexikanisch-amerikanischen Kriegs

Eva von Wyl (Universität Zürich)
Ready to Eat! Amerikas Einfluss auf die Schweizer Essgewohnheiten in der Nachkriegszeit

July 14  Johannes Dafinger (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
Deutsch-Sowjetische Kulturbefindungs in den 1930er Jahren

Ulrich Eisele (Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg)
Die DDR in den Vereinten Nationen 1973–1990

Michael McConnell (University of Tennessee-Knoxville)
The Situation Is Once Again Quiet: Gestapo Crimes in the Rhineland, Fall 1944
GHI LECTURE SERIES, FALL-WINTER 2011/12

GERMAN COLONIALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY

October 20  Modern Colonialisms and Agrarian Anxieties: How Did Industrialization Matter?
Kenneth Pomeranz (University of California, Irvine)

October 27  Tensions of Empire and the Production of Silence: Colonial Scandals in the German Empire at 1900
Rebekka Habermas (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)

November 3  Rethinking German Colonialism in a Global Age
Sebastian Conrad (Freie Universität Berlin)

December 1  Love and War. Or: How to Make Use of Transnational History for German Colonialism?
Birthe Kundrus (Universität Hamburg)

January 19, 2012  Germany and Genocide in Africa and Anatolia: Creating the Color Line and the National Line
Eric Weitz (University of Minnesota)

January 26  Does the German Colonial Empire Strike Back? The Afterlives of German Colonialism
Lecture and Panel Discussion
Andreas Eckert (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)
Panelists: Hartmut Berghoff (Chair, GHI), Martin Andjaba (Ambassador of Namibia, Washington DC), Cyprien Fisiy (World Bank), Steve McDonald (Woodrow Wilson Center), Armin Owzar (University of California, San Diego)

All lectures are held at the German Historical Institute from 6 to 8 pm.

In cooperation with the University of California, San Diego, and the University of California, Irvine, as well as the Fritz Thyssen Foundation.
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org

2011

August 25-27  Europe - Migration - Identity: Summer Seminar
Seminar at the University of Minnesota
Conveners: Donna Gabaccia (University of Minnesota), Sally Gregory Kohlstedt (University of Minnesota), and Jan Logemann (GHI)

September 4-16  Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar for Young Historians: American History in Transatlantic Perspective
Convener: Mischa Honeck

September 15-Nov. 15  An American in Deutschland: Photographs by Leonard Freed
Photo Exhibition at the GHI
Curated by Paul M. Farber and Martin Klimke

Conference at Jacobs University Bremen
Conveners: Marc Frey (Jacobs University), Sönke Kunkel (Jacobs University), Corinna R. Unger (Jacobs University)

October 3  Germany Has Come of Age: Lessons from the Past and Worldwide Responsibilities
German Unification Symposium / Hertie Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Günter Nooke

October 6-7  Unternehmer und Migration
34. Wissenschaftliches Symposium der Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte in Frankfurt/Main
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI, Universität Göttingen), Andreas Fahrmeir (Universität Frankfurt/Main)

October 13-16  Medieval History Seminar 2011
Seminar at the GHI
Conveners: Miriam Rürup (GHI) and Jochen Schenk (GHI London)
October 21-22  Uncertain Knowledge—Practices, Media, and Agents of (Non)-Affirmation in 19th- and 20th-Century American History  
Workshop at the GHI  
Convener: Sebastian Jobs (Universität Rostock)

October 28-29  Transatlantic Tourism  
Workshop at the GHI  
Convener: Frank Schipper (GHI)

November 7-9  “Trust, but Verify”: Confidence and Distrust from Détente to the End of the Cold War  
Conference at the GHI and Wilson Center  
Conveners: Martin Klimke (GHI), Reinhild Kreis (University of Augsburg), Sonya Michel (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), Christian Ostermann (Woodrow Wilson Center)

November 10  25th Annual Lecture of the German Historical Institute  
Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Mark Mazower (Columbia University)

November 11  20th Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI: Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize  
Symposium at the GHI

November 17-Dec. 31  Forced Labor for the “Final Victory”: Mittelbau-Dora Concentration Camp, 1943-1945  
Exhibition at the GHI  
Organized by Miriam Rürup (GHI)

December 8  Helmut Schmidt Prize Lecture  
Award Presentation and Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Charles Maier (Harvard University)

2012

February 9-11  Living the Margins: Illegality, Politics of Removal and Statelessness  
Conveners: Kathleen Canning (University of Michigan), Barbara Lüthi, Jana Häberlein (Universität Basel), and Miriam Rürup (GHI)

February 24-25  The Globalization of African American Business and Consumer Culture  
Workshop at the GHI  
Convener: Joshua Davis (GHI)

March 23-24  Adolescent Ambassadors: Twentieth-Century Youth Organizations and International Relations  
Workshop at the GHI  
Conveners: Mischa Honeck (GHI) and Gabriel Rosenberg (Duke University)
March 23-24  Models of Mobility: Systemic Differences, Path Dependencies, Economic, Social, and Environmental Impact (1900 to Tomorrow)
Workshop at York University
Conveners: Matthias Kipping (Schulich), Christina Kraenzle (CCGES), and Christina Lubinski (GHI)

April 26  Gerald D. Feldman Memorial Lecture
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Gerhard A. Ritter

May 2-5  18th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History, 1770-1914
Seminar at the GHI
Conveners: Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

May 17  25th Anniversary of the GHI
Event at the GHI
Lecture by David Blackbourn (Harvard University)

May 18-19  The Second Generation: German Emigré Historians in the Transatlantic World, 1945 to the Present
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Andreas Daum (State University of New York, Buffalo), Hartmut Lehmann (MPI Göttingen), James J. Sheehan (Stanford University), Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)

Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Jan Logemann (GHI), Mary Nolan (New York University), and Daniel Rodgers (Princeton University)

September 9-11  The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: Retrospect and Prospect
Conference at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto
Conveners: Doris Bergen (University of Toronto), Michael Marrus (University of Toronto), Derek Penslar (University of Toronto), Rebecca Wittmann (University of Toronto), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

September 20-29  The Civil War in Transatlantic Perspective
Conference at the Universität Jena
Conveners: Marcus Gräser (GHI) and Jörg Nagler (Universität Jena)
September 13-14

Immigration and Entrepreneurship: An Interdisciplinary Conference
Conference at the University of Maryland, College Park
Conveners: David B. Sicilia (University of Maryland, College Park), David F. Barbe (University of Maryland, College Park), and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)

November 8

26th Annual Lecture of the German Historical Institute
Lecture at the GHI

November 9

21th Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI: Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
Symposium at the GHI
German Historical Institute Washington DC
Fellows and Staff

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff, Director
  Modern social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption
PD Dr. Uwe Spiekermann, Deputy Director
  Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge
PD Dr. Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson, Deputy Director
  African American Studies, transatlantic relations, gender history, American religious history
Andreas Fischer, Administrative Director

Dr. Clelia Caruso, Research Fellow
  Modern European history; history of migration; history of technology
Dr. Martin Klimke, Research Fellow
  19th and 20th-century European and American history; U.S. foreign affairs; protest movements; transnational history; cultural history; oral history; political communication
Dr. Jan Logemann, Research Fellow
  Comparative and transatlantic history; history of consumption; history of urban development; history of emigration; modern Germany and the United States since the 1920s
Dr. Christina Lubinski, Research Fellow
  Modern economic and social history; business history
Dr. Ines Prodöhl, Research Fellow
  Global History, cultural and economic History, civil society
Dr. Miriam Rürup, Research Fellow
  Modern German history; Jewish history; history of education; transnational history
Dr. Richard F. Wetzel, Research Fellow and Editor
  Modern European and German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow

Jessica Csoma, Research Associate
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