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
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
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## PREFACE

The German Historical Institute's work focuses on modern history, especially the twentieth century. This does not mean, however, that the Institute neglects earlier periods. This issue of the *Bulletin* reflects the Institute's abiding interest in the early modern era. The first article presents Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger's 2010 Annual Lecture on the role of rituals in politics. Conceptualizing ritual as an act of "social magic" that at once transforms reality and reinforces its basic social principles, Stollberg-Rilinger elucidates the functioning of rituals in the early modern era by examining the feudal investiture of imperial princes in the Holy Roman Empire. She augments this analysis with comparative reflections on the role of political rituals in the early modern era and today. Since the founding norms of modern states are preserved in a written document, it is no longer as imperative to ritually stage the constitutional order as it was in the premodern period, when the order's validity could be upheld only through a complex nexus of rituals. Nevertheless, as the example of President Barack Obama's inauguration - which included the famous slip-up in the wording of the oath of office - demonstrates, we should not underestimate the significance of rituals in the present. David Luebke's insightful comment inquires to what extent political rituals at all levels of society were instrumentalized by the parties involved; calls attention to the profound shift, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries that transformed the homage ritual from an act of negotiation into an instrument of acclamation; and draws out the implications of Stollberg-Rilinger's analysis for larger historiographical debates on the history and decline of the Holy Roman Empire.

As we do every spring, this *Bulletin* issue presents the work of the two winners of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, awarded annually by the Friends of the German Historical Institute for the two best dissertations in German history written at North American universities. Extending this issue's focus on early modern history, Yair Mintzker discusses his research on the defortification of German cities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The demolition of city walls, he argues, was a significant historical moment that signaled a transformation of the urban environment on three interrelated levels: the city's ability to defend itself from external intervention; public security within the city; and the symbolic level, that is, the way

burghers and foreigners imagined the urban community. Only after appreciating both the functions and the symbolic meaning of early modern city walls, he contends, can we begin to understand why they were demolished in such great numbers and why defortification was perceived as a dramatic event by the urban community.

The second Stern Prize Winner, Alice Weinreb, offers an overview of her dissertation on “The Politics of Food in Divided Germany, 1945-1971,” exploring the ways in which food concerns, nutritional policies, and hunger fantasies shaped the development of the two postwar German states. In order to understand the category of hunger in postwar Germany, she reaches back to the deprivations of the First World War and the specific “hunger rhetoric” that was central to Hitler’s popularity. Her analysis of the postwar period focuses on comparative studies of school lunch programs, factory canteens, and home cooking in the two German states. Concerns over food, hunger, and nutrition, she concludes, connected schools, factories and private homes and were central for postwar refashionings of the worker, child and housewife as well as for the postwar definitions of communism, capitalism, and democracy.


In the “GHI Research” section, we present the GHI’s latest collaborative research project “Transatlantic Perspectives: Europe in the Eyes of European Immigrants to the United States, 1940-1980,” a four-year project funded through a grant from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung). This project seeks to trace transcultural perspectives on Europe and the emergence of hybrid European identities among European immigrants and émigrés in the United States between the 1940s and 1970s. The main research questions investigated by the project include: How did immigrants who left the continent under a variety of circumstances look back at Europe? How did their views inform broader American perceptions of Europe? Did they manage to bring European perspectives into a postwar transatlantic world dominated by the United States? To what degree were they able to impact European debates regarding European identity, which drew so heavily on the contrast with the United States in the twentieth century?

This issue’s conference reports reflect the great diversity of research topics pursued at the German Historical Institute, ranging from the history of beauty to the Nuclear Crisis of the 1980s to the concept of the “generation” as a historical category of analysis. Our “News” section begins with a sad item, an obituary for former GHI Research Fellow

Elisabeth Glaser, whose death the Institute mourns. Most of the rest of the section reports on a variety of prizes, both those awarded by the Institute and the Friends of the GHI – such as the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize and the Franz Steiner Prize – and those won by the Institute, including the Washington Humanities Council’s Partner Award and the James Harvey Robinson Prize of the American Historical Association (awarded to the GHI’s “German History in Documents and Images” Project) as well as – last but not least – the three book awards won by GHI publications this past year. Please check the event calendar at the end of this issue as well as our website [www.ghi-dc.org](http://www.ghi-dc.org) for the rich array of upcoming events and conferences. We look forward to welcoming you at one of our events soon.

Hartmut Berghoff, Director





# Features



## MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? RITUALS OF POLITICS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE AND TODAY

24TH ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE GHI, WASHINGTON DC, NOVEMBER 11, 2010

**Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger**

UNIVERSITY OF MÜNSTER

### I. Much Ado About Nothing? A Ritual Mistake

Many people will remember Barack Obama's being sworn into office as the 44th President of the United States on January 20, 2009, by placing his right hand upon Lincoln's bible and repeating the words spoken to him by Chief Justice John Roberts:

I, Barack Hussein Obama, do solemnly swear that I will execute the office of President of the United States faithfully and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. - So help me God.

And with this, the 44th President of the United States was called into existence (see Fig. 1). Or was he? As Americans, of course, know much better than I - although the German press also followed this carefully - Chief Justice Roberts jumbled the words. The oath's actual line in the Constitution reads, "I do solemnly swear that I will *faithfully* execute the office of President of the United States."

One might imagine that this was not a truly serious problem, for Obama did in any case promise to execute his office "faithfully," whether the adverb was placed before or after the verb. But in the blogosphere, a debate arose immediately about whether Obama was now, in fact, actually president. And even if many would like to see these doubts as "paranoid," the administration wanted to be on the safe side and to preclude the possibility that anyone might use the mistake as an opportunity to challenge the act's legitimacy. As is well known, Justice Roberts had Obama repeat the oath in the White House the following day, this time without any great publicity and without any mistakes in the word order. Only now was Obama unequivocally president.

In Europe - and presumably here as well - the episode caused much shaking of heads. Something like this is generally more familiar from the early Middle Ages: Then, too, it could be quite dangerous



**Figure 1. Barack Obama, joined by his wife Michelle and daughters Sasha and Malia, takes the oath of office from Chief Justice John Roberts to become the 44th president of the United States at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, January 20, 2009. Source: AP Photo/ Elise Amendola. Reprinted by permission.**

1 For the recent debate on the theory of ritual, see Jens Kreinath, Jan Snoek and Michael Stausberg, eds., *Theorizing Rituals: Issues, Topics, Approaches, Concepts* (Leiden/Boston, 2006); Catherine Bell, *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice* (New York/Oxford, 1992); Roy Rappaport, *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity* (Cambridge, 1999). There are countless studies on historical rituals; Here I name but a few important ones: Sean Wilentz and William O'Neill, eds., *Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics Since the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia, 1985); David Cannadine and Simon Price, eds., *Rituals of Royalty: Power and Ceremony in Traditional Societies* (Cambridge, 1987); Edward Muir, *Ritual in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1997); Philippe Buc, *The Dangers of Ritual: Between Early Medieval Texts and Social Scientific Theory* (Princeton, 2001); Sergio Bertelli, *The*

effect of the entire ritual. Legal historians refer to this as archaic-magical formalism - and it seems astonishing and disconcerting that it could still play a role in the present day. The general reaction is to see this as “Much Ado About Nothing.”

The episode is certainly a borderline case. Even if he had *not* repeated the oath, Obama would surely have been recognized as president by 99.9 percent of all U.S. citizens. But the story is nonetheless revealing and is eminently suited to a discussion of questions about what rituals are, how they function, and how rituals today differ from those of premodern eras. The episode not only teaches us that rituals must be carefully practiced, but gives us important insight into rituals in general, which can be understood as a kind of “social magic.”

I will develop my argument in three steps: First, I will discuss what a ritual is and in which sense I will use the word. Second, I will illustrate the functioning of a political ritual with an example from the early modern era, namely, the ritual of enfeoffment or investiture of an Imperial prince in the Holy Roman Empire. Third and finally, I will compare this to political rituals today and will ask if there are significant similarities and differences.

## II. What Is a Ritual?

There are at least as many different definitions of the term “ritual” as there are scholarly disciplines that study ritual phenomena.<sup>1</sup> Though

to make a mistake in a ritual. A judgment was invalid if the judge did not cross his legs properly during the trial. And the missal sacrifice was invalid if the priest did not correctly utter the words of consecration. Clearing one’s throat, coughing, or stumbling could nullify the

*King’s Body: Sacred Rituals of Power in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Pennsylvania, 2001); Gerd

Althoff, *Die Macht der Rituale: Symbolik und Herrschaft im Mittelalter* (Darmstadt, 2003); Lawrence M. Bryant,

*Ritual: Ceremony and the Changing Monarchy in France, 1350-1789* (Farnham, 2010).

they can be debated at length, definitions are not actually truths, but merely tools used to distinguish and arrange phenomena. My suggestion for a definition would be as follows:

A ritual is a specific kind of act or sequence of acts with several actors and several defining characteristics: First of all, it is repetitive and standardized in its outward form. This means that there are specific conventions concerning the formal “correctness” of the gestures, words, actors, and context. This is the essence of what constitutes a ritual: it is repetitive and, therefore, recognizable. Every kind of ritualization releases its participants from having to choose from an infinity of possible acts, thus creating a certain reliability of expectations. The way in which the forms are normalized can vary; it can be a matter of unspoken expectation or of written codification. But, when examined closely, formalization does *not* mean rigidity and immutability. While the forms inherently require a certain constancy – ultimately this is the whole point of rituals – they can also be changed in their details at the actors’ disposal. Rituals are shaped quite consciously, even if this is generally disguised, and they appear as if they were immovable.

Second: Rituals do not merely *say* something; they *do* something. They are efficacious in the sense that they bring about a change of – social, political, spiritual, etc. – state or condition. They create a break between two situations that would otherwise merge seamlessly into one another. Rituals have a performative character. They bring about what they represent. (For example, the mere act of saying “yes” effects marriage in certain, specific circumstances, with all the social, legal and psychological consequences that entails.) This is precisely what Pierre Bourdieu means when he applies the term “social magic” to rituals.<sup>2</sup> By effecting change and marking breaks, rituals generate the distinctions that are important to a society (for example, the distinctions between war and peace, youth and adulthood, baptized and unbaptized persons or authorities and subjects), and they oblige all participants to adhere to these distinctions in the future.

Third: Rituals are staged or enacted demonstratively. Indeed, they must be to effectively mark and bring about change. The English word “to enact” is very significant here because it not only means to stage but also to sanction. Rituals are elevated above the course of everyday acts and symbolically denoted as such, for example, by the actors’ clothing and attributes, by marking the place, by signs for the beginning and end, music, and verbal formulas. It is not possible to

2 Pierre Bourdieu, “Les rites d’institution”, in *Ce que parler veut dire, l’économie des échanges linguistiques* (Paris, 1982), 121-34.

perform a ritual accidentally. Rituals follow an explicit intention and are executed consciously, publicly, demonstratively, and solemnly; they are performed on a stage, in a certain frame (in the literal or figurative sense).

These three essential features of rituals are given expression by the old term *solemnis*, solemnity (“I solemnly swear”): In the ancient Roman Empire, *actus solemnes* were originally acts that were publicly celebrated in the same way once a year (*solus annus*) with a strict formality and a binding character. The same is true of rituals: They are characterized by strict adherence to forms, repetition, and obligation.

Fourth: Rituals are symbolic in that they point to something beyond themselves and evoke a greater context of order, which they symbolize and simultaneously reinforce (this distinguishes them from mere individual routines). The central requisites are symbolically charged, such as Lincoln’s bible at the U.S. presidential inauguration, for example. This is an important point: Rituals do not function without preconditions. The conventions of a ritual derive their validity only from a larger context of order. Among other things this context authorizes the persons as able to correctly perform the ritual. Because they are performed in specific, repeatable, solemn forms, they place the individual act – and the individual actors – within a larger context and connect act and actors to the past or to a mythical or historical origin. And, as a rule, they also connect this world to the next, and thus have a sacral and transcendental character in the stricter sense.

Rituals thus create structure and continuity – and do so in a way that transcends the change of individual actors. When someone is solemnly installed in office by being publicly clothed in special garments before witnesses, given the traditional insignia, made to swear a formalized oath (as in our opening example), and seated upon a specific chair, this changes the status of this person and also commits him to specific behavior in the future. But at the same time, and even more importantly, the order *into which* the person is installed remains the same, and its fundamental values, categories of order, and distinctions are reinforced. Rituals thus create a certain reliability of expectation. They bridge precisely the sensitive “neuralgic” points in the life of an individual or a society as a whole and consolidate institutional orders. And, paradoxically, this remains true even when rituals do not actually remain the same but merely seem so to the actors. What is essential is that rituals point beyond themselves,

symbolically transcend the present moment and place it in a larger – possibly a cosmic – context. In the case of Obama’s inauguration, it is not only the change of the person in office that is carried out; much more importantly, the constitutional order itself – its past, its highest entities with the Chief Justice at the head, its leading values, and ultimately its protection under God – is evoked and staged in a symbolically condensed manner in this ritual.

Rituals not only make continuity and change – structure in general – symbolically visible, but they also tend to generate the associated feelings, such as feelings of belonging, obligation, dignity, and even shame. One might say that rituals function like a kind of collective contagion. Of course, this is not necessarily so. But even when rituals do not truly produce the appropriate feelings and the inward attitude in all participants, this is by no means crucial. The salient point with rituals is precisely that what matters for the ritual to be valid is the outward visibility, the correct external performance. This is exactly what the story of the slip-up in Obama’s oath formula illustrates: The essential thing is what is shown correctly in an outwardly visible way. It is this to which one commits oneself in the ritual, in front of the others present as witnesses. Whether one later breaks this commitment is a different matter. Of course, the ritual itself cannot force the participants to comply with the commitments it enacts. But it does cause all participants to expect compliance, an expectation that becomes the premise for future action. To stay with our example, whether President Obama will in fact execute his office “faithfully” and “to the best of his ability” is certainly not dependent upon whether he placed the adverb properly in his oath. But the correct execution of the ritual ensures that he is accepted as the president by all, and that no one can really dispute this without being considered crazy.

This is what I mean by social magic: A ritual brings about what it represents; it transforms reality in the sense that it reciprocally changes the expectations of the participants. This is particularly true of political rituals. Political power always requires visibility. Although objective means of power are necessary, they are not sufficient. For political power is not a possession or a quality but a relation between people. Someone has power only if the others know this, attribute it to him, expect and believe it. Even the reputation of power *is* power, as Thomas Hobbes perceptively noted in *Leviathan*.<sup>3</sup> Public political rituals normally generate a collective belief that power exists, that institutional roles determine who possesses it and, above all, that

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan. The English Works*, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London, 1839–1845), 3:74.

these persons possess it legitimately. As a historian more familiar with early modern European history than modern American history, I would like to elucidate this using an historical example.

### III. Rituals in the Premodern Age: The Example of Feudal Investiture in the Holy Roman Empire

Premodern European history is filled with rituals of rulership; in monarchies as well as in republics, there were royal coronations or changes of republican councils, investitures and homages, court days and assemblies of the estates of the realm. The swearing of oaths was almost always at the center of these acts and took place on all levels of the hierarchical order, holding the entire society together by justifying and limiting rule.<sup>4</sup> The royal coronation oath at the head of the hierarchy formed only “the heart of an interwoven system of rulership contracts.”<sup>5</sup>

I will single out one of these rituals of installation as an example, namely the solemn investiture or enfeoffment by the Emperor, through which the princes in the Holy Roman Empire from about the fourteenth century received the transfer of their fief and thus their right to rule over their hereditary territories.<sup>6</sup> I will introduce this ritual in its ideal-typical form in order to then briefly sketch how it changed over time.

From the late Middle Ages,<sup>7</sup> the investiture of Imperial princes took place as a great solemn spectacle whenever Emperor and Imperial princes met together publicly in ceremonial form, that is, on the occasion of solemn court and Imperial diets. In the open air, on a central square in an Imperial city, a scaffold was built expressly for this purpose, adorned with a canopy and magnificently decorated with the Imperial eagle (see Fig. 2).

There, the Emperor appeared “in his majesty,” that is, in Imperial vestments and accompanied by the prince-electors (or at least their representatives), who positioned themselves around him “in their

4 For an example, see David Luebke's comments in this volume.

5 Paolo Prodi, *Il Sacramento del potere: Il giuramento politico nella storia costituzionale dell'Occidente* (Bologna, 1992).

6 For the Holy Roman Empire in general, see Beat Kümin, “Political Culture in the Holy Roman Empire [Review Essay],” *German History* 27 (2009): 131–44; Jason Philip Coy, Benjamin Marschke and David Luebke, eds., *The Holy Roman Empire Reconsidered* (Washington, 2010); Robert Evans and Peter Wilson, eds., *The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806* (Oxford, 2011).

7 For the feudal rituals since the Middle Ages, see Karl-Heinz Spieß, *Das Lehnswesen in Deutschland im hohen und späten Mittelalter*, 2nd edition (Stuttgart, 2009); Gerd Althoff and Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, “Rituale der Macht in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit,” in *Die neue Kraft*

*der Rituale*, ed. Axel Michaels (Heidelberg, 2007), 141–77; Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, “Die Investitur mit den Reichslehen in der Frühen Neuzeit” (URL: <http://miami.unimuenster.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=5217,01.01.2011>); idem, *Des*

*Kaisers alte Kleider: Verfassungsgeschichte und Symbolsprache des Alten Reiches* (Munich, 2008); Matthias Schnettger, ed., *Kaiserliches und päpstliches Lehnswesen in der Frühen Neuzeit. Zeitenblicke* 6.1 (2007) (URL: [http://www.zeitenblicke.de/2007/1/editorial/index\\_html,01.01.2011](http://www.zeitenblicke.de/2007/1/editorial/index_html,01.01.2011)).

right order” and held the Imperial insignia at the ready. They did this in accordance with the ceremonial script of the Golden Bull, the most fundamental ordinance of the Empire. Contemporary sources always refer to the presence of a giant crowd of spectators. The recipient of the investiture appeared with high-ranking relatives as advocates and had hundreds of horsemen in his retinue, all with banners and clothing in the colors of their lord. The greater the jostling in the streets of the city, the more admiringly the sources always describe the thoroughly harmonious order of the “mighty host” whose followers arranged themselves in formation according to a strictly hierarchical choreography. The ritual began with the retinue riding in a gallop around the Imperial throne three times (the so-called *ritus circumequitandi*, first mentioned in 1417). To contemporary spectators it was clear that this enacted the vassal’s military might – as in a tournament: hundreds of horsemen, all well-practiced noble soldiers with their pennants, rallied around the one red banner as was usually done on the battlefield. Finally, as intercessors, the vassal’s closest friends and relatives, kneeling three times, presented the formal request of investiture to the Emperor (first documented in 1486 at the election and coronation of Maximilian). The latter then conducted a short ritual dialogue with the electors to show that he ruled according to their consent. Only then did the vassal himself enter the picture, kneel in turn three times before the Imperial throne and present the Emperor with his feudal banners – one for each of his territories, each bearing the appropriate coat of arms, as well as the red “blood banner” symbolizing high justice as the essence of all the rights and privileges of lordship. Still on his knees, the vassal swore the oath of fealty during which he laid his finger upon the open book of the Gospels in the Emperor’s lap (documented from 1530 onwards). Finally, the Emperor invested him with the banners, one by one, thus symbolically granting him rule over the individual territories.

Another characteristic part of the ritual (documented from 1473 onwards) was that the surrounding spectators sought to seize the



**Figure 2. The Emperor among the Prince-Electors solemnly investing an Imperial Prince. Woodcut, *Buoch der lehenrecht* (Nuremberg, 1493).**

banners for themselves – an act of spoiling, as was also common at other rituals of power: the crowd took possession of the ritually charged objects by force and tore them to pieces. And finally, the Emperor offered the vassal the Imperial sword whose pommel he was required to kiss. Still kneeling, he gave a speech of thanks before he was allowed to stand up and retire to his lodgings with his retinue.

It was less the power of the Emperor and more the power of the Empire itself that the ritual's form made visible. Whoever received his fief in this way presented himself before the public as a member of the Empire. This ritual rendered the Imperial majesty and its hierarchically ordered and consensus-based system perceptible and in a certain sense truly real. Contemporaries had already given a name to these performative acts, which theologians call real presence, namely, the *repraesentatio identitatis*. According to this late medieval concept, the Emperor within the circle of the prince-electors “represented” the Empire in two senses of the word (see Fig. 3): by bringing the majesty of the Empire into view to be experienced through the senses in solemn rituals, but also by producing it in a technical, legal sense;

that is to say, what was performed by those present in specific forms was bindingly valid as having been performed by the entire Empire as a political body. The fact that the vassal subordinated himself on his knees to the Imperial majesty and received the presentation of his status as a member of the Empire from this body reinforced the entire structure of the Empire *pars pro toto*.

The symbolic surplus of the ritual was thus a reciprocal one. Both sides profited from the splendor of the staging that made the centuries-old sacral authority of the Holy Roman Empire visible. By recognizing the majesty of Emperor and Empire as the source of his own power, the vassal himself participated in its traditional sacral legitimacy. In addition, the act gave vassals the opportunity to mobilize their social capital in the form of

their intercessors, and to display their military power in the form of their mounted retinue. In other words, the investiture ritual revealed the reciprocal character of power in that the great vassals attributed



**Figure 3. King Maximilian among the Prince-Electors.** Woodcut from a diary of the Diet of Worms 1495.



died, and thus to renew the relationship as one of personal loyalty. With each change of rule, the vassal had to request an investiture and submit to the ritual, by envoy if not personally. No one ever seriously questioned this.<sup>8</sup>

It was not until the eighteenth century that the ritual encountered a serious *crisis* from which it did not recover. There were several reasons for this, and the crisis mirrored that of the Imperial constitution in general. I can only touch upon this briefly here.

The great Imperial princes – some of them kings of countries outside the Empire – found it difficult to reconcile kneeling before the Emperor during the enfeoffment with their sovereign status under international law. The ritual repeatedly reinforced to the world that they were still subject to the Empire for a part of their lands. After Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, refused to take his fief from the Emperor in 1740, a dynamic of refusal broke out among the other electors and princes that could not be stopped. The investiture ritual almost completely died out despite decades of intensive diplomatic efforts on the part of the Imperial court. When Emperor Joseph II simply dropped all attempts to demand the performance of the investitures in 1788, a contemporary writer remarked that “the bond essentially securing the Imperial constitution and connecting the head and members” was finally dissolved.<sup>9</sup>

I have described this history in detail because it is highly significant for the function of rituals in premodern times in general. The validity of the oldest, most elementary, and universal rules for political order was primarily, and at times exclusively, based on rituals. There was no positive legal, abstract, written basis of the Imperial order as a whole or of its most fundamental categories. There was no authoritative and legally binding, written definition of what constituted princely, royal or imperial majesty – only what the Emperor could *not* do was always more precisely fixed. There was no exact legal definition of the Empire. As jurists attempted to comprehend this in abstract and theoretical terms, they found themselves in a dilemma: a consensus about it could not be obtained in a discursive way. Only rituals allowed everyone to experience the unity and order of the Empire. The ambivalent and vague nature of rituals, the fact that they were always open to various interpretations, made it possible to represent a consensus that could never have been brought about by discourse.

On the other hand, in the late Empire there was no adequate, legitimate way to amend ritual forms and adapt them to new conditions.

8 For the development of the investiture ritual in the Holy Roman Empire, see Jean-François Noël, “Zur Geschichte der Reichsbelehungen im 18. Jahrhundert,” *Mitteilungen aus den österreichischen Staatsarchiven* 21 (1968): 106-22; Stollberg-Rilinger, “Die Investitur mit den Reichslehen.”

9 *Teutsche Staatskanzlei*, ed. Johann August Reuss (Ulm, 1788-89), 22:321; see also Johann Jakob Moser, *Von der Teutschen Lehens-Verfassung [...]* (Frankfurt/Main, Leipzig, 1774), 307.

The political dynamic, however, could not be immobilized by rigidified old forms. This situation produced an impasse from which there was no way out and created parallel worlds of a sort. As long as the old rituals were still performed, they continued to demonstrate a consensus about the fundamental political order, even though many powerful members no longer identified with them and regarded them as ridiculous anachronistic relics. Yet the old rituals still continued to function as usual. In a certain way, one can say that rituals bring about what they represent, whether or not they reflect the inner convictions of all participants. This is why we often call them “empty rituals” nowadays.<sup>10</sup> Nonetheless, they sustain the political order as an institutional fiction. This is precisely their function.

#### IV. Political Rituals Then and Now

Let us return to the politics of the present day. What is the situation in the modern age? Is there a universal grammar of rituals? And what has changed structurally? Have political rituals lost their binding power?

At first glance, the similarities are apparent on the level of outward forms (see Figures 5-10). There seems to be a symbolic vocabulary with a whole series of more or less universally comprehensible basic elements, even if they do arise in countless variations. These include specific ritual gestures. Think only of the touching of sacred objects, kissing or hugging as gestures of friendship, brotherhood, and reconciliation. Or think of the act of kneeling as a gesture of voluntary self-abasement, penitence, or subservience.

The arrangement of persons in space is also quite universally effective (see Fig. 5-6). It is not by chance that interpersonal social relationships are generally expressed in metaphors of space, of spatial relations:



**Figure 5.** The inauguration of President Barack Obama on January 20, 2009, at the United States Capitol in Washington DC. Source: Corbis / Scott Andreas. Reprinted by permission.

<sup>10</sup> See David Luebke's comment in this issue.



**Figure 6. Solemn investiture of Prince-Elector August of Saxony, Augsburg 1566. Woodcut from a diary of the Diet of Augsburg by Hans Tirol.**

above/below, in front/behind, proximity/distance, center/periphery. One need only think of terms such as “your Highness,” or words like “subordinate,” “upper class/lower class,” and so on. This can be explained by recalling that power is essentially experienced in face-to-face situations. The fact that spatial arrangements symbolize power and elicit respect can be easily illustrated through the example of a procession or parade (see Fig. 7-8). A great many horses and wagons or cars and people, orderly intervals, disciplined, measured movements: all these characteristics connect a present-day police motorcade with a baroque procession of princes in the seventeenth century. Time also plays a central role in the ritual staging of power: the time that the procession takes, for instance, or the time that one must wait in order to personally see the powerful figure or to speak with him. It would be possible to invoke many further examples of continuities in the ritual grammar of the premodern

and the modern. Even today, a public ritual generally begins with a procession to the place of the event and ends with a shared meal or celebration.

Yet despite these continuities, doesn't it seem that today's rituals are somewhat pale in comparison to those of the premodern era? Why should this be? Germans would surely answer these questions differently from Americans, for the two political cultures vary conspicuously in their political rituals. And yet, haven't rituals everywhere tended to forfeit their binding force in the modern era?

At first glance, it is clear that the Atlantic revolutions precipitated a break not only in the entire sociopolitical order, but also in ritual culture. The ideal of democratic transparency and the equality of citizens replaced late baroque absolutism, the ceremonial of lordship, and the hierarchy of the estates. Modern political culture is founded on the idea that political power and social order should not rest on images, symbols, and rituals that emotionally overpower people, but solely on words, good reasons, and rational procedures. This was the message of the Enlightenment and the democratic revolutions. These still

remain our ideals. Today it is disparaging to say that a political act is “purely symbolic” or an “empty ritual” in contrast to “real” political action.

The modern critique of ritualism is by no means new. Since the transition from the Middle Ages to the Early Modern period, strong anti-ritualistic movements have arisen repeatedly: from the Reformation, the Enlightenment, Classical Modernism following the First World War, to the protests of 1968.<sup>11</sup>

The goal of all these movements was not only to disempower the old rituals and, along with them, the old order itself – the Roman Catholic Church, the Ancien Régime, the political establishments. More fundamentally, they always claimed to be categorically setting living *spirit*, true inner sincerity and authenticity against rigid, dead, empty, and false *forms*. Yet none of these movements could avoid the creation of new rituals, “rituals of anti-ritualism.”<sup>12</sup> And, taken as a whole, their effect was anything but a reduction in the number of rituals; quite the contrary, they led to a pluralization of rituals. Take the French Revolution, which was itself a gigantic spectacle full of perfect acts of staging. To a particularly excessive degree, the revolutionaries relied upon festivals, rituals, and suggestive mass events. They could not avoid drawing upon the ritual tradition, even though they were staging equality instead of hierarchy. To this end, they combined all imaginable old and new, sacred and secular set-pieces from the repertory of ancient, Christian, monarchical, and republican symbols. There is no doubt that this patchwork way of dealing with rituals had a promising future.<sup>13</sup>

So have we changed anything fundamental in how we deal with political rituals? I will content myself here with a few concluding theses.

Take these two very different representations of installation into office: Figure 9 shows the United States in 2009, while Figure 10 shows the “Oath of the Councilmen of the City of Iglau”




**Figure 7. President Barack Obama's inaugural parade makes its way down Washington's Pennsylvania Avenue with the United States Capitol Building in the background. Source: Corbis / David Bergman. Reprinted by permission.**

11 See Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology* (London, 1970).

12 A term shaped by Hans-Georg Soeffner, *Die Ordnung der Rituale: Die Auslegung des Alltags II*, 2<sup>nd</sup> rev. ext. ed. (Frankfurt/Main, 1992), 102-30.

13 See the classic studies by Mona Ozouf, *Festival and the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 1988); Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, CA, 1984).



**Figure 8. Solemn entry of a Prince-Elector to the Imperial election, 1658.**

from around 1400. The core of the two ritual events – the three fingers of the right hand raised in oath, the oath as ritual self-commitment – remains the same, as does their effectiveness, apparently, their “social magic”: upon their conclusion, the senator has become president and the citizens have become councilmen.

Yet there are also striking differences. First, in contrast to premodern rituals, modern ones exhibit a certain material austerity (even though German ones are considerably plainer than those in the United States). There are good reasons for this. Political rituals of the Medieval and Early Modern periods always also served as a demonstration of the material and cultural wealth of all participants, indeed, of the entire society’s hierarchy of social rank. Today, the latter demonstration takes place on a completely different stage. The constitutional and legal system and the system of social inequality are largely separate; or at least they are supposed to be. For this reason, a president today no longer needs to glitter like a king in gold and gemstones but can restrict himself to a black suit.

Second: In Figure 10, the overarching crucifix dominates the group of those taking the oath. This would be a problem in a modern liberal and pluralistic democracy since Western societies at least aspire to keep the political and religious orders constitutionally separated. This does not mean, however, that political rituals cannot be elevated and sacralized, in turn, into a kind of civil religion. As a rule, however, installations into office no longer take place within the framework of a church service, and the oath of office is valid even if not sworn upon the Holy Scripture.<sup>14</sup> For us, signs and symbols are no longer the elements of a universe of divine symbols but are chosen arbitrarily, created by persons, and available at will. The old stock of symbols is dealt with very freely: all of them, even symbols that were once most sacred, can be the objects of parody, mockery, caricature, and,

14 Long before Obama’s inauguration, internet bloggers speculated about whether he would say “So help me God.” Article II, Section 1, of the United States Constitution does not provide this phrase, nor does it stipulate the use of a Bible.

more than anything, commercial exploitation. The use of symbols has become pluralized and arbitrary; with a few exceptions, anyone can usurp any symbol and use it to his own ends.

Third, and most crucially: Our political order, like that of any modern organization, is available as a text, as a written founding document. We have a “constitution” in the strict sense, to which


we assign clear precedence over all other law. The constitution preserves the founding norms of the state in general, abstract, and systematic form. Their validity is based upon their being fixed in writing, which they owe either to a one-time act of foundation or to a legally designated process, but not to regularly renewed oath-taking by each individual citizen. Since it is possible to consult the constitutional order anytime, it is no longer necessary to symbolically and ritually stage it as it was in the premodern period, when the validity of the entire order could be upheld in no other way than through a complex nexus of rituals.

This is related to a fourth point: The way we take part in rituals today has certainly changed. It makes a crucial difference whether the vast majority of citizens follow the ritual on a screen as an anonymous mass public – if at all – or whether all those with the right to political participation are personally present. The efficacy of rituals is essentially based on the personal presence of all participants, who through their participation in the ritual reciprocally commit themselves to what they perform there. This does not mean that the depiction of rituals – in words and images – might not have stimulated their elaboration.<sup>15</sup> Yet the more complex society became and the more governmental rule was intensified, the less rituals could continue to be organized face-to-face by means of personal commitments, and the more they were converted into impersonal, abstract binding procedures based



**Figure 9.** Barack Obama, left, takes the oath of office from Chief Justice John Roberts, not seen, as his wife Michelle holds the Lincoln Bible and daughters Sasha and Malia watch at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, January 20, 2009. Source: AP Photo/Chuck Kennedy. Reprinted by permission.

<sup>15</sup> See David Luebke’s comment in this issue.



**Figure 10.** Oath of the councilmen of the city of Iglau, Silesia, 1400.

on writing. The modern state is no longer a community that can be integrated through face-to-face interaction. In the course of the modern state-building process, the public, personal presence of the ruler became less sufficient for the exercise of rule, but also less and less necessary. The citizens of a modern state are bound by its constitutional norms even if they have never sworn an oath to that effect. Thus, it no longer matters whether they are present during the swearing-in of a new head of state, merely watch it on television, or ignore it altogether.

Communication by the media and the general pluralization of society are two factors that foster a more distanced relationship to political rituals. Rituals are subject to unrestrained commercialization, museification, folklorization,

spontaneous quotation, strategic reinvention, parody, and ironic refraction. In brief, the modern way of dealing with political rituals seems to me fundamentally broken. But perhaps this is a very German point of view. In Germany, most people have a distanced, if not ironic, relationship to large and solemn political rituals – for which there are obvious historical reasons. As mentioned above, we moderns do not wish to be overwhelmed emotionally, but persuaded by good reasons. But I wonder whether we are deceiving ourselves and underestimating the significance and efficacy of rituals. Who among us can claim to be immune to the emotional effects of such rituals, even when viewing them on television? And even someone who does not believe in the efficacy of rituals must assume that others do. For this reason, it was surely wise to have Barack Obama repeat the oath of office.

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## TOO LITTLE ADO ABOUT PLENTY

COMMENT ON BARBARA STOLLBERG-RILINGER'S LECTURE, WASHINGTON DC,  
NOVEMBER 11, 2011

### David M. Luebke

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In 1587, a medium-sized town called Warendorf sued its immediate ecclesiastical overlord, the archdeacon Georg Nagel, over what it perceived to be a breach of spiritual jurisdiction. The town was subject to the ecclesiastical authority of the prince-bishop of Münster, of which Archdeacon Nagel was the local executor, but it also claimed a broad array of judicial prerogatives ordinarily associated with spiritual authority, including the right to adjudicate marriages and to prosecute sexual misconduct. When it lost the first judicial round, the town appealed its case to the Imperial Chamber Court, one of the two supreme courts in the Holy Roman Empire. In the legalese of its brief against the archdeacon, the town asserted 55 “facts,” which included the following:

[2] Fact: that the princes and lord bishops of [...] Münster at the time of their inauguration, when they are led into the towns and receive the customary homage [...], pledge to preserve the aforementioned towns undiminished in their privileges, freedoms, rights, as well as all ancient customs and to detract nothing, but rather to enhance them.<sup>1</sup>

Anyone who studies early modern political ritual will recognize this kind of language, which makes legitimate authority conditional on a reciprocal exchange of oaths between a lord and the subjects.

I begin with this anecdote because it shows how widely and deeply the phenomena that Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger describes pervaded political culture in the early modern Empire. Political ritual was by no means “empty”; on the contrary, political ritual animated relationships that were empty without it. “Fact 2” of the town’s lawsuit, quoted above, gets at what the plaintiffs thought political ritual actually accomplished. To be sure, there are few eyewitness accounts of the homage ceremonies to which this lawsuit refers. But we do know that a delegation consisting of the two mayors and the town council was to receive the prince-bishop and his retinue outside the city gates; we also know that the bishop was to be led in procession

1 Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Abteilung Westfalen (LANRW-AW), Reichskammergerichtsakten W 281/940, vol. 1, 19r-39v, *Libellus nullitatis et iniquitatis articulatus*, 17 June 1591.

to the central market square in town, where the oaths would be exchanged under the open sky;<sup>2</sup> that at an homage ceremony held in Warendorf in 1614, the town's delegation was accompanied by one hundred marksmen, twenty-five from each quarter; that the town presented the prince-bishop with the gift of a large silver goblet to mark the occasion (along with an obligatory payment of seventy-six gold ducats); and that the citizens were instructed to keep themselves sober for the duration of the prince-bishop's visit.<sup>3</sup>

The crucial point is that, as far as the citizenry was concerned, the ceremony itself instantiated a relationship that was legally binding on all parties, a contract sealed not merely by signatures but by scripted gestures and choreographed movements into and through urban space.<sup>4</sup> And it was *actionable*: any violation of the bond that homage generated could be litigated, and so it was. Archdeacon Nagel's offense had been to violate a contract, enacted through the homage ritual, between the town, the prince-bishop, and a long sequence of prelates before him. The official record of this particular lawsuit ran into many thousands of pages and filled seven fat tomes.

This transaction also raises a set of questions—questions about the immediate significations of political ritual, about transformations in their legal or constitutional function, and about the relationship between publicity, presence and audience in the Holy Roman Empire.

2 Kreisarchiv Warendorf (KAW), Stadt Warendorf A 13, "Kurtzer extract berichts auß alten annotationibus, wie es in vorzeiten bei der inauguration eines neuen landtfürsten gehalten" [1614].

3 KAW Stadt Warendorf A 107, 31r-32r, *Protocollum senatus civitatis Warendorpensis de anno 1614 et 1615*, entries for 13 June and 16 June 1614; and KAW Stadt Beckum A 66, 49v-50r, Beckum Town Council Protocols, entry for 15 June 1614.

4 On the structure and function of enthronement ceremonies in Münster, see Elisabeth Anne Harding, "Das Zeremoniell der fürstbischöflichen Inthronisation," M.A. thesis, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 2003. I am grateful to Dr. Harding for making her master's thesis available to me.

## I.

The first is a question from the "devil's advocate": *How can we know what rituals were really about?* To take the example just given, the underlying conflict that had prompted the lawsuit was nowhere articulated overtly in those seven fat volumes; nor was it addressed directly in any of the homage ceremonies to which it referred. It involved the right of towns to tolerate Protestant minorities, even to allow certain forms of Protestant religious observance in the nominally Catholic parish churches that were subject to the town's patronage. In 1587, Protestants constituted a large segment of the population, perhaps even a majority, and the town magistracy was already coming under their domination. These magistrates believed that the town's "privileges, freedoms, rights, as well as all ancient customs" included the right to tolerate Protestants; they also believed that in the act of taking homage, the prince-bishop was effectively validating the town's constitutional claims. This is also why the town council emphasized the necessity of conducting homage ceremonies

*in person, in the town square, in the physical presence of the citizenry.* The ritual, in other words, was about advancing a set of concrete legal demands that are nowhere to be seen in the ritual itself or in the protocols of its litigation.

All this prompts me to ask about the exposure of political ritual at all levels of society to instrumentalization by the parties involved. In what ways, if any, were the solemnities of high politics appropriated in this manner? If so, how did their function change over the early modern centuries? To what extent were the scripted movements and gestures of imperial ceremony susceptible to appropriation by the participants in order to make a point or to drive home an argument?

## II.

One of most valuable attributes of Professor Stollberg-Rilinger's approach to political ritual is that it undermines the age-old habit of dismissing political ritual and ceremony as empty *by virtue of* its repetitive quality, its recognizability, and its ability through these qualities to impart a sense of constancy and durability. At the root of this habit is a tendency to distinguish sharply between decision-making and the "external and symbolic demonstrations" of ceremony, as Denis Diderot put it in his contribution on the subject to the *Encyclopédie*.<sup>5</sup> As Stollberg-Rilinger points out, this tendency has deep historical roots and was expressed in the hostility toward images during the first wave of the Reformation. During the French Revolution, too, the polarity between political essence and ritual affect would be mobilized to demolish the system of political representation by metaphorical embodiment—in which the mystical body politic was incarnated through the solemn convening of its constituent members—and to replace it with a system of general, liberal delegation.

This leads to the second question: *Can there be such a thing as an empty ritual?* One historian of homage rituals argues that a profound shift took place between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries—more quickly in some places than others, but everywhere with the same ultimate result. In the sixteenth century, as in the late Middle Ages, these ceremonies had been the occasion for negotiation and deal-making, often heated, between the representatives of a lord and his subjects. The product of these deliberations was a written agreement, but it was the ceremony itself, not the piece of paper to which

5 "Cérémonies," in *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1752), 838-39.

it referred, that generated a relationship of subordination. For these reasons, lord-subject relations were understood to be reciprocal, contractual, and—at least in theory—*revocable*.<sup>6</sup>

By the late eighteenth century, however, homage no longer had either quality: first, and more concretely, it was no longer *constitutive* in the older sense because homage was no longer the occasion for bargaining over the terms of legitimate rule. Second, the interregal suspension of authority implicit in the earlier regime had been replaced by a new and different set of significations, in which homage was understood simply to ratify a set of subordinations that were already in place and could not be altered. The homage ritual itself had been transformed into an instrument of unconditional subordination—if indeed it was performed at all, and most indications are that its frequency declined as its constitutive function deteriorated.

The same shift is evident in the Westphalian example cited earlier. From the late sixteenth century on, prince-bishops strove to reduce the burden of homage to a ceremonial minimum. New monarchs, as before, had to receive homage in the capital city. But they were increasingly reluctant to go on an homage tour in order to pledge protection and to receive oaths of loyalty in every single privileged town in the prince-bishopric. It was expensive, time-consuming, exposed the monarch unnecessarily to physical harm, and so on. Nevertheless, the monarchs' advisors continued to insist, long into the seventeenth century, that they go on homage tour in person.<sup>7</sup> By the eighteenth century, however, prince-bishops had dispensed with homage tours; homage ceremonies were still performed, of course, but only once in the capital city. The main act was greatly simplified, too.

Here it is worth stressing that the outward forms of homage had changed little over the centuries. It also remained a ritual that continued to exhibit all the qualities that Professor Stollberg-Rilinger ascribes to political ritual—its form was standardized, it effectuated a change of condition, it was performative, it referred symbolically to relationships outside itself. *But* by the mid-eighteenth century at the latest, it no longer *instantiated* the contractual relationship it once had; instead, it had become a ritual of acclamation. In that sense, homage had been drained of its meaning—it had become “empty” and, as such, reflected quite accurately the opinion of enlightened observers who dismissed homage as an anachronistic relic.

6 André Holenstein, *Die Huldigung der Untertanen: Rechtskultur und Herrschaftsordnung (800-1800)* (Stuttgart, 1991).

7 LANRW-AW, Fürstbistum Münster, Landesarchiv 1/12, vol. 2, 87r-v, Johannes Hobbelinck to Engelbert von Brabecken and Johann von Westerholt, 6 June 1614.

### III.

The third and final question has to do with the relationship between “presence” and audience. Professor Stollberg-Rilinger draws a contrast between early modern political rituals, which were efficacious because they depended on the physical presence of all participants, including onlookers, and contemporary political ritual, which does not depend on physical presence to the same degree. In early modern political ritual, the participation of onlookers was integral, so much so that to speak of onlookers as an “audience” is to distinguish them misleadingly from actors on the main stage. Thus, a successful investiture was one attended by a *joyous* crowd at the *ritus circumequitandi*, and the ritual was not complete unless and until the crowd seized the banners and tore them up. One could amplify the examples with many more—one thinks of the grand displays of Imperial largesse that attended every Imperial coronation in Frankfurt, such as the roasting of the Imperial ox on the Römerplatz or the scattering of coins to the crowd watching the imperial cavalcade as it rolled into town. In all of these cases, the audience was general—anyone lucky enough to live in Frankfurt, even a little boy named Johann Wolfgang Goethe, could watch the coronation of Emperor Joseph II in 1764. And these rites were efficacious, symbolically and emotionally, because they engaged the participation of a physically present audience. In this respect, the difference between Imperial coronations and local homage rituals was only a matter of scale.

That said, the initial dates of these imperial rites are striking. The despoiling of the banners is first mentioned in 1473. Similarly, the custom whereby Imperial princes knelt three times before the emperor prior to their investiture was first mentioned in 1486. All but the *ritus circumequitandi*, in fact, are first mentioned during or after the print revolution of the late fifteenth century. This, in turn, raises a chicken-and-egg question about the relationship between high political ritual and its media audience. The late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were characterized by an unprecedented outpouring of printed imagery that depicted high political rituals of all kinds—*entrées*, coronations, diplomatic encounters, assemblies of the Imperial Diet, and so on. Do we know about this crescendo of ritual elaboration because of descriptions in printed word and image, or was it the other way around? Did high imperial ritual become more elaborate and complex *because* the printing technology had supplied a new and unexpectedly efficient tool for conveying majesty and authority to an audience vastly larger than could be reached *in*

person, by theatrical means alone? If so, then one might argue that the new media reinforced the participatory aspects of high political ritual by making its constitutive effects visible to an audience that was *not* physically present, but could now be reached through the previously unavailable vehicles of the printed word and the etched image. Whether print or ritual elaboration came first, the specific theatricality of high political ritual in the early modern empire implied an audience far larger than the physically present mass of onlookers.

It is also possible that the elaboration of these rituals and their representation were bound up with another fundamental transformation of political culture. The late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were also a period of intense reform, codification, and institutionalization, in which most of the deliberative bodies and judicial tribunals that constituted the early modern empire—including the Imperial Diet and the Imperial Chamber Court—were founded or acquired durable form. One effect of these reforms was a highly complex, multi-tiered system for the mediation of disputes, which German historians refer to as the “juridification” (*Verrechtlichung*) of social conflict, which enabled subject populations to litigate grievances against their authorities. So pervasive was juridification that the rituals of political life themselves became the objects of judicial arbitration—as they were in the case of *Warendorf v. Nagel*. The high political rituals that Professor Stollberg-Rilinger describes, in other words, were related integrally to an entire system of communication and adjudication that differed as sharply from its medieval antecedents as it was distinct from more recent configurations of ritual and decision-making.

#### IV.

Several implications follow from Professor Stollberg-Rilinger’s account. One, arguably, is that the Reformation’s impact on *political* ritual was negligible compared to the political and cultural agendas we associate with the “Enlightenment.” There has been an outpouring of scholarship in recent years on the transformations brought on by what Susan Karant-Nunn has called “the Reformation of ritual.”<sup>8</sup> Revolutionary though it surely was, the Reformation’s impact appears to have been confined to the religious sphere and—judging by the largely successful efforts of sixteenth-century princes and emperors to diffuse the effects of religious controversy on imperial ritual—sharpened its separation from ritual performances in the secular domain. The tandem processes of ritual elaboration and institutional consolidation begun in the fifteenth century thus continued unabated

8 Susan Karant-Nunn, *The Reformation of Ritual: An Interpretation of Early Modern Germany* (London, 1997).

through the sixteenth. Such was their durability that the Reformation's assault on religious images appears to have affected political ritual little or not at all.

Stollberg-Rilinger's account also bucks a trend in recent scholarship on the last phase of the Empire, particularly its judicial institutions. For the past twenty years or so, historians of the empire's judicial institutions have tended to emphasize the ongoing vitality of these tribunals, right down to the Empire's *de facto* dissolution in 1803. As a framework for the mediation of conflict, the empire, so the argument goes, did not crumble from within, but continued to function normally until it was shattered from without. Stollberg-Rilinger's emphasis on the constitutive functions of political ritual leads to a different narrative, which dates the empire's dissolution to the mid-eighteenth century, when the princes of the empire withdrew from rituals of investiture and, in so doing, laid symbolic claim to sovereign authority for themselves. This chronology coincides roughly with an older narrative, which holds that the empire was effectively done in by its constituent states, especially (though not exclusively) Prussia and Austria. The watershed moment, if there was one, came with the treaty that concluded the Seven Years' War in 1763, which effectively gave its stamp of approval to Austro-Prussian dualism. Thus, Stollberg-Rilinger's culturalist account augments and extends the narrative of power politics: When the princes withdrew from investiture ceremonies, the bond between princes and the empire was broken, and because the empire had no constitutional text to fall back on, the damage was more profound than it might have been elsewhere. Within twenty years of Joseph II's decision to drop investiture rituals altogether, the empire was dead. The implication is clear: Political ritual held the empire together, and in its absence the rest could not hold long.

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## WHAT IS DEFORTIFICATION? MILITARY FUNCTIONS, POLICE ROLES, AND SYMBOLISM IN THE DEMOLITION OF GERMAN CITY WALLS IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

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Throughout its long history, the German city was always a dynamic organism.<sup>1</sup> It continuously changed in size and appearance, and its economic and political relationships with the outer world were often in flux. The defortification of the German city in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a significant moment in the city's history. It signaled a fundamental transformation of the urban environment on three interrelated levels: the level of the city's defense against military intervention from the outside; the level of public security and police within the city; and the symbolic level of the way burghers and foreigners imagined the urban community.

Contemporaries wrote a great deal about the transformation of cities from closed to open places. Whether supporting or opposing this transformation, they wrote with much passion; all felt that something very important was at stake. Some burghers argued that even the smallest change in the old walls was absolutely unacceptable. The city representatives in Jena, for instance, sent a delegation to their Grand Duke one day around 1800 with the urgent request that His Highness put an immediate stop to the demolition of a small part of Jena's walls. The burghers evoked "their old, honorable city walls" (*ihre alten ehrwürdigen Stadtmauern*) and claimed not to understand how anyone would think about demolishing even a small section of them (the adjective "honorable" was frequently associated with the walls—before, during, and after their destruction).<sup>2</sup> Others would hail the prospects of similar action in other cities as "the liberation of the city from its old 'pressing belts'"<sup>3</sup> or write poems and even compose music for the occasion.

In many cases, contemporaries viewed the defortification of a city as nothing short of magic. "Many years had passed since I last saw this friendly city with its high standing castle," wrote, for instance, one traveler to Gotha in 1810,

And how speechless I was, when—coming from Erfurt and traveling along the street before the Siebleber Gate—I saw

1 This is an expanded version of an article that was originally published in the online journal *WEIMARPOLIS: Multi-disciplinary Journal of Urban Theory and Practice* 1.1 (2009): 31-48. <http://www.weimarpolis.net>

2 J. W. von Goethe, *Gespräche*, ed. Woldemar Freiherr von Biedermann, 10 vols., vol. 8, *Anhang an Goethes Werke* (Leipzig, 1890), 260-61. Another excellent example of the use of the terms *ehrwürdig* (honorable) and *Zauber* (magic) to describe the walls can be found, among many other contemporary texts, in Amalie Muenster-Meinhövel, *Amaliens poetische Versuche* (Leipzig, 1796), 128.

3 Napoleon Weinhagen, *Studien zur Entfestigung Kölns* (Cologne, 1869), 3.

the great and pleasant transformation that had taken place in that area. In years past, a traveler had seen here the city's walls and deep moats and had been forced to go through the dark, long passage of the gate into the city. But now everything had changed as if by a magic spell into a wonderful park with large grass lawns, little grottos, groves, and small waterfalls.<sup>4</sup>

A few years earlier Catharina Elisabeth Goethe (1731-1808) echoed this sentiment in a letter to her illustrious son. For many of her fellow burghers in Frankfurt am Main, the demolition of the old walls was a moment of great melancholy. For Catharina Elisabeth, however, it was a joyful occasion. "It is all really like magic [*Feerei*]," she wrote about the defortification of the city in which she served on the city council. "Our 'old wigs' would surely have waited until the Second Coming before daring to do such a thing of their own volition."<sup>5</sup>

The reactions in Frankfurt to the demolition of the city walls contain three of the most important leitmotifs of defortification stories in general: contests over the fundamental transformation of the city (the "old wigs," who would have never dared to defortify the city of their own volition, were nonetheless forced to do so); a sense of wonder when it finally arrived ("it is all really like magic"); and accompanying nostalgia for the world just lost (sadness about the demolition of some beautiful gates and towers). Such sentiments, though conflicting, were almost always related. Together, they signaled that the destruction of the old barriers between city and countryside meant much more to contemporaries than the demolition of a physical object. Contemporaries had strongly contradictory views about defortification because they viewed it as a metamorphosis of the urban environment as such: a fundamental transformation of what the city actually was. This transformation was the source of burghers' nostalgia and the reason for their sense of wonder after the walls fell; the sense that through defortification the old city had suddenly turned into a totally different place, as if by a magic spell.

Indeed, many contemporaries had a hard time calling an open city "a city" at all. Some felt the expression was inadequate; others viewed it as an actual contradiction in terms. French military theoreticians around the turn of the eighteenth century, for instance, used the expression "to raze [*razer*] a city to the ground" as a synonym for the destruction of the city's fortifications and not the destruction

4 "Bemerkungen über die neuen Anlagen und Kunst-Sammlungen in Gotha," *Journal des Luxus und der Moden* 25 (1810): 756.

5 Letter from 1 July 1808. Catharina Elisabetha Goethe, *Briefe an ihren Sohn Johann Wolfgang, an Christiane und August von Goethe* (Stuttgart, 1999), 287.

of the city's footprint. To raze a city was equal to demolishing its defenses, since by doing so one turned it "back" into a village.<sup>6</sup> In German, on the other hand, the verb "to raze" (*schleifen*) was reserved in the early modern period to what one did to the walls, not to the city. Thus, the walls were razed to the ground (*geschleift*); the city, however, was either physically destroyed (*zerstört, geäschert, der Erde gleich gemacht*) or merely defortified (*entfestigt*).<sup>7</sup> But on the whole, men of letters in eighteenth-century Germany held a similar view to that of their French counterparts. An unfortified place was simply not a city, argued the important German jurist Johann Gotthold von Justi (1717-1771). Echoing the old German proverb that what distinguishes the burgher from the peasant are the city walls (*Bürger und Bauer scheidet nichts als die Mauer*), Justi claimed that a place could be big, beautiful, or densely populated, but if it was not physically surrounded by a wall it lacked the most important sign (*Wahrzeichen*) of a city and should therefore not be called by that name.<sup>8</sup> Even in the early nineteenth century, one sometimes encounters examples of similar sentiments. Goethe himself shared this sentiment when writing about newly defortified cities. They were nothing more than big villages, he argued.<sup>9</sup> The fact that the market, the streets, the churches, and all other buildings were left intact did not matter. With the destruction of their walls, these places ceased to be towns and turned back into rural communities (*große Flecken*).

What was behind such arguments? In what sense were the walls "honorable"? And why did one refrain from calling a large though wall-less settlement "a city"? What, in other words, was at stake in the contests over the defortification of the German city, and why, when it finally happened, did it make one feel that something "magical" had just taken place? These questions take us back to the late seventeenth century: First, to the issue of the overall spread and geopolitical characteristics of urban fortification in Germany; and second, to the daily routines of the city and the symbolic meaning of its walls.

## I. The Fortifications of German Cities by the Late Seventeenth Century

Down to the late seventeenth century, German cities had a long tradition of political independence that was manifested by strong fortifications. Comparing his day with that of the ancients, Sir Roger Williams wrote in 1590 that "Alexander, Caesar, Scipio, and Hannibal ... would

6 Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1863), 4:160.

7 The etymology of one of the names for a city in Latin, *oppidum*, signifies a similar idea. It comes from "ob-pedum," that is, "an enclosed area." The English term "town" comes from the German "Zaun" (a fence) for the same reason, as does an old Hebrew word for a city, *kiryā*, which comes from *kir* ("wall").

8 Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, *Staatswirtschaft*, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1758), 491. A similar idea can be found in Diderot's *Encyclopédie*: "[une Ville est un] assemblage de plusieurs maisons disposées par rues, & fermées d'une clôture commune, qui est ordinairement de murs & de fossés. Mais pour définir une ville plus exactement, c'est une enceinte fermée de murailles, qui renferme plusieurs quartiers, des rues, des places publiques, & d'autres édifices." Louis de Jaucourt, "Ville," in *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond D'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Projet (Winter 2008 Edition), Robert Morrissey, ed., <http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/>, 17:277.

9 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens, Münchner Ausgabe*, ed. Karl Richter (Munich, 1985), 9:459.

never have conquered countries so easily had they been fortified as [present-day] Germany, France, and the Low Countries.”<sup>10</sup> “The cities of Germany,” wrote Niccolò Machiavelli a few decades earlier,

are completely free, they have little surrounding territory, they obey the emperor when they wish, and they fear neither him nor any other nearby power, as they are fortified in such a manner that everyone thinks their capture would be a tedious and difficult affair. For they all have sufficient moats and walls; they have adequate artillery; they always store in their public warehouses enough to drink and to eat and to burn for a whole year; and besides all this, in order to be able to keep the lower classes fed without exhausting public funds, they always have in reserve a year’s supply of raw materials sufficient to give these people work at those trades which are the nerves and the lifeblood of that city and of the industries from which the people earn their living. Moreover, they hold the military arts in high regard, and they have many regulations for maintaining them.<sup>11</sup>

Much would change in central Europe from Machiavelli’s time to the late seventeenth century, when German cities began to be permanently defortified. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were a time of great upheaval in the Holy Roman Empire. The Reformation and the Wars of Religion during the sixteenth century and the Thirty Years’ War in the seventeenth brought the Holy Roman Empire to the brink of collapse without, however, revealing an undisputed winner in the conflict. The military impasse after three decades of war and the peace treaties of Westphalia (1648) established a delicate political equilibrium in the Empire, which would last—at least in some parts of Germany—until the Napoleonic Wars and the Empire’s final demise in 1806. This delicate balance was one of the two factors that shaped the physical appearance of Germany’s numerous fortified cities in the century and a half after 1648.

Based on the status quo painfully achieved by the end of the Thirty Years’ War, the peace treaties of Westphalia strove to prevent conflicts within the Empire from turning into another general war of all against all. They created a political mechanism that historian Mack Walker called the “perpetual frustration of disruptive energy and aggressive power.”<sup>12</sup> The treaty did not abolish the Empire (Reich), and the Imperial Diet (Reichstag) could still declare a general war

10 Quoted in Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (New York, 1996), 6.

11 Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford; New York, 1984), 37-38.

12 Mack Walker, *German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1871* (Ithaca, 1998), 11.

against the Reich's external foes and raise an Imperial army for that purpose. But the treaties also gave the German states the right to form and break alliances independently in defense of their liberties (*Landeshoheit*), and they designated the Great Powers of Europe as guarantors of the peace. The result of these arrangements was that no one, not even the Emperor himself, could garner enough power to dramatically change the status quo of 1648. In theory, at least, the Empire was meant to be sufficiently strong to protect itself as a whole but never strong enough to deprive its members of their liberties.

The impact of the political arrangements of Westphalia on the physical form of German cities was unmistakable. Unlike the situation in other European countries such as France, England, or parts of eastern Europe, the idea of a wall-less, defenseless city remained for a long time a contradiction in terms in the German lands. In France, the king demolished many an urban wall in the seventeenth century, and in England, in the words of an Italian traveler, "the sea served as the wall and moat" of a united, even if not completely pacified, country.<sup>13</sup> But since every member of the Holy Roman Empire had the constitutional right to defend itself and since external threats did not disappear but had to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, it was almost unthinkable for a city to demolish its defense systems.<sup>14</sup> The Peace of Westphalia was not only, as Catherine the Great once put it, "the very basis and bulwark of the constitution of the Empire."<sup>15</sup> It was also the reason so many physical bulwarks existed in the Empire at all.

The second factor determining the outer appearance of contemporary German cities was continuous innovation in military technology. By the late seventeenth century, German cities, which Machiavelli had hailed as "fortified in such a manner that everyone thinks their capture would be a tedious and difficult affair,"<sup>16</sup> were no longer well defended by contemporary standards. The introduction of gunpowder to European warfare in the late Middle Ages contributed to a slow "military revolution," which by the mid-sixteenth century had fundamentally changed the nature of the defense of cities.<sup>17</sup> It was the result of a vicious cycle in military technology. In order to counter the rise in the besieger's firepower, the city's fortifications became stronger; the stronger the city walls, however, the greater the need for further development in firepower, and so on.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it became clear that the simple stone walls of preceding centuries were no longer sufficient,

13 This is Girolamo Lando, as quoted in Colin Platt, *The English Medieval Town* (London, 1976), 43.

14 See, for instance, article VIII (2) in the Instrumentum Pacis Osnaburgensis in *Die Westfälischen Friedensverträge vom 24. Oktober 1648. Texte und Übersetzungen* (Acta Pacis Westphalicae. Supplementa electronica, 1), <http://pax-westphalica.de/>.

15 As quoted in Johann Stephan Pütter, *An Historical Development of the Present Political Constitution of the German Empire*, trans. Josiah Dornford (London, 1790), 3:203.

16 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 37.

17 See Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution*.

but that strengthening the old walls would not be enough. One also had to reevaluate the layout and functions of fortified places more generally. Some of early modern Europe's greatest minds contributed to this reevaluation: not only famous military engineers such as the Marquis de Vauban (1633-1707) and Menno van Cohoorn (1641-1704), but also such figures as Albrecht Dürer, Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo Galilei, and even Immanuel Kant.<sup>18</sup> The size and complex structure of the new fortification systems made war on the continent much more sophisticated and more expensive for the defender. For the besieger, too, war had become more costly. One had to keep a much larger field army and supply it with ever more expensive equipment in order to have a chance of taking a city fortified according to the new style. Not every member of the Holy Roman Empire was strong enough or wealthy enough to do so.

Together, the political compromise of Westphalia and the change in the nature of the science of fortification and the art of siege explain the particular character of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century fortifications of German cities: practically all German cities were fortified, but only a few were fortified well. The Reich, it was agreed, should not have a standing army or any fortress towns directly under its control.<sup>19</sup> In case the Imperial Diet declared a general war, the Emperor was allowed to raise an Imperial army and use existing fortified cities in the Empire to support his campaigns. But it had been the general consensus at least since 1635 (Peace of Prague) that the Emperor and the Reichstag should have no say in the construction of new fortifications in the cities and no right to interfere with the decisions of particular territorial states to fortify or defortify cities and towns.<sup>20</sup> Such provisions were recognized as part of the constitutional liberties of the Reich's members, which were now even entitled to raise money for the overall defense of their territories without the need of their estates' consent.<sup>21</sup> Since the essence of the treaties of Westphalia was defensive in nature, offensive operations were made deliberately difficult, while defensive measures on the part of the Reich's members were unrestricted. The construction of modern fortifications in post-Westphalia Germany was never, and could never have become, a general matter for the Empire as a whole.

With the Reich playing little or no part in the financing of city defenses, the construction of new fortifications could be funded only by a territorial state or a wealthy city. Several cities belonging to territorial states such as Prussia, Bavaria, or the Habsburg lands were

18 Albrecht Dürer, *Etliche underricht / zu befestigung der Stett / Schloßz / und flecken* (Nuremberg, 1527), Galileo Galilei, *Breve Istruzione all'Architettura Militare* (1592). About Leonardo, see Pietro C. Marani, *L'architettura fortificata negli studi di Leonardo da Vinci* (Florence, 1984). Not much is known about Kant's lectures on the science of fortification. See Allen W. Wood, *Kant* (Walden, MA, 2005), 6.

19 For the question of the military constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, see Helmut Neuhaus, "Das Problem der militärischen Exekutive in der Spätphase des Alten Reiches," in *Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung in der europäischen Geschichte der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. Johann Kunisch (Berlin, 1986).


20 The history of these agreements was often discussed in the 1790s. See, most importantly, Dietrich, *Gedanken über die Frage: Wann und wie sind die Reichsstände verpflichtet, in die in ihren Landen befindlichen Festungen... Reichstruppen zur Besatzung einzunehmen?* (Frankfurt am Main, 1794).

21 This was true, most importantly, in the *Jüngster Reichsabschied* of 1654, §180. Karl Zeumer, ed., *Quellen-sammlung zur Geschichte der Deutschen Reichsverfassung in Mittelalter und Neuzeit* (Tübingen, 1913), 2:460.

indeed fortified by the state in the new, modern style. But such cities were relatively few in number, since states fortified in the modern style only those cities that they deemed strategically important, such as the capitals (*Residenzstädte* such as Berlin, Vienna, or Munich), or cities along their borders. Several wealthy, independent cities such as Hamburg and Bremen were also able to finance—single-handedly—the construction of modern fortifications. But the vast majority of German cities lacked the independent financial means to strengthen their fortifications and could not rely on the support of any territorial state to do so. They therefore refrained from strengthening the fortifications altogether, had to compromise the quality of the fortifications because of the huge sums of money involved (as in Frankfurt am Main, for instance),<sup>22</sup> or, after spending a fortune on their construction, neglected the maintenance of their walls. One traveler to Cologne in the 1790s had this to say about its fortifications: “[T]his pompous enclosure, . . . with its hundred turrets and twenty-four principal gates, is in such a state of dilapidation that I am apprehensive it would tremble and fall at the very report of the besieging cannon, as effectually as the walls of Jericho yielded to the sounds of ram horns.”<sup>23</sup>

- 22 Johann Georg Battonn, *Oertliche Beschreibung der Stadt Frankfurt am Main* (Frankfurt a.M., 1861), 144-46.
- 23 Thomas Cogan, *The Rhine: Or a Journey from Utrecht to Francfort* (London, 1794), 1:244.

A general map of fortified cities in Germany during the first half of the eighteenth century demonstrates the resulting spread of urban fortifications (see Figure 1). The map shows the differences between three areas in central Europe: the north, the center, and the south. The north and the south were what historical geographer Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl (1823-1897) called Germany’s “centralized country”: the two areas traditionally under the control of the strong territorial states of Prussia (north) and



**Figure 1. Distribution of fortified cities with populations over 1,000 inhabitants in early eighteenth-century central Europe.**

Bavaria and Austria (south).<sup>24</sup> The “centralized country” contained many fortified cities, though it had significantly fewer cities than Germany’s central areas. It was in the north and south, too, that one could find the greatest number of well-fortified cities, since the strong, centralized states had the means to finance the building of modern fortifications.

The majority of German cities lay outside the centralized country, in a belt running through the middle of the country, roughly from Saxony through Thuringia, Franconia, and Swabia, to the southwest. Here, in the lands Riehl termed “the individualized country” because of the variety of small and medium states they contained, lay most of Germany’s mid-sized cities and home towns. As opposed to the north and south, the “individualized country” contained very few modern fortifications. There was simply no one who could finance the strengthening of the old city walls in these areas. Lying outside the sphere of influence of the great territorial states, middle Germany’s cities and towns could not apply for money for new defenses from the Imperial Diet, and they lacked the financial means to embark on such an expensive project independently.

But even in small German cities and towns, where by the second half of the eighteenth century city walls possessed little or no military significance, there were heated debates over whether to defortify cities or keep their walls intact. As we saw in the cases of Jena and Gotha, one spoke about the walls as possessing “honor” and about demolition as a kind of “magic.” Such debates, as well as the type of language deployed in them, stemmed from the fact that city walls were important not only militarily; they were also crucial to public security and to the community’s symbolic self-definition. To understand the contests over defortifications, it is therefore not enough to describe the walls’ military functions. One also needs to picture a typical early modern German city in its daily routines and its physical, as well as symbolic, form.

## II. The City at Night

The police role of the walls was especially evident after dark. Indeed, approaching a city like Gotha, Jena, Frankfurt, or Munich in the early modern period was something a traveler would dare to do only during the day.<sup>25</sup> At night, the city gates were bolted, the drawbridges raised, and the city’s surroundings engulfed in pitch black. By the late seventeenth century, German cities no longer hung heavy chains

24 Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, *Land und Leute*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: 1855), 132-35, 139-41, 159-217; Walker, *German Home Towns*, 1ff.

25 For a general treatment of nocturnal life in the early modern city, see A. Roger Ekirch, *At Day’s Close: Night in Times Past* (New York, 2005) and especially Norbert Schindler, “Nocturnal Disturbances: On the Social History of the Night in the Early Modern Period,” in *Rebellion, Community, and Custom in Early Modern Germany*, trans. Pamela E. Selwyn, ed. Norbert Schindler (Cambridge, 2002), 193-235. The police measures typical of contemporary cities in Germany are detailed, for instance, in the case of Munich: “Curfürsl. Special Mandat die Tor-Sperre betr. 20 März 1747” and “Stadttoresperre und -öffnung,” *Stadtarchiv München, Polizeidirektion*, Nr. 20, 21.

(*Strassensperren*) across their streets after dark,<sup>26</sup> but even so, nocturnal city streets were quiet and human movement rare. Only a couple of German cities had public streetlights before 1750, and even then more to prevent garrison troops from deserting than anything else. In some towns, a gibbet just outside one of the city gates would provide a solemn warning to soldiers who might entertain the idea of fleeing their posts. Still, many managed to escape into the night, never to return.<sup>27</sup>

In one or more of the city's towers, a night watchman kept an eye on the city, calling the hours throughout the night. His main role, as the motto on the Holsten city gate in Lübeck solemnly proclaimed, was to guarantee both *concordia domi* (domestic harmony) and *pax foris* (peace without). The night watchman's highest task in assuring "domestic harmony" was to ring the alarm bells in case a fire broke out somewhere in the city. Fire was by far the gravest danger to the burgher's life and property. "The burning city" was so much on everybody's mind at the time that it even existed as a separate genre of painting in early modern northern Europe.<sup>28</sup> The watchman's task of assuring "peace without," on the other hand, involved alerting the population in case of an approaching enemy or horde of robbers from the surrounding, often unsafe, countryside. The gravity of these dangers to the community prompted cities to draw strict rules for their night watchmen. Most importantly, the rules forbade them from compromising their responsibilities by falling asleep during their watch or bringing alcoholic beverages and women to sweeten their long, solitary hours up in the tower. Needless to say, over time quite a few watchmen had to be dismissed.<sup>29</sup>

Travelers and even locals who missed the gates' lock-out time (or had the strange notion of trying to enter the city during a *missa solemnis* on a major holiday, when the gates were also closed), were forced to seek accommodation at one of the inns in the suburbs or in a nearby tavern. As late as 1827, a Scottish traveler described such a place just outside Vienna:

At ten o'clock the outer gate [of the inn] must be shut, whatever revelry may be going on within. It is a police regulation, and the police is watchful. Besides a body of men corresponding to our watchmen, the [city] streets are patrolled, all night long, by gens d'armes, both mounted and on foot. Street noise, street quarrels, and street robberies are unknown. It is only outside of the walls, in the more

26 Hans Dumrese, "Die mittelalterlichen Straßensperren in Lüneburg," *Lüneburger Blätter* 9 (1958): 9-20; Rolf Rosenbohm, "Die Straßensperren in den niederdeutschen Städten," *Lüneburger Blätter* 9 (1958): 21-38.

27 See, for instance, Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (Oxford, 1955), 3ff. Breslau's case is especially rich in terms of archival materials. See, e.g., "Erbauung eines neuen Soldaten Galgens in Oder Thore beym Ravelin, Anfertigung des Esels b.d. Hauptwache und die... Executionsgebühren," StA Breslau, Akten der Stadt Breslau, (1680) 12.219; and "Einrichtung der Laternen Wesens u. den Steuer Geld Einnahmen," Staatsarchiv Breslau, Akten der Stadt Breslau, (991) 11.530.

28 This can be seen in the painting by Frans Francken the Younger, *Gastmahl im Hause des Bürgermeisters Rockox*, ca. 1630/5, Alte Pinakothek, Munich.

29 For Breslau, see "Nacht Wacht Dienst," StA Breslau, Akten der Stadt Breslau, (985) 11.524. For a collection of instructions in Hamburg, see *Instruction für die Wächter an Thoren und Bäumen*, Staatsarchiv Hamburg (no Signatur).

lonely parts of the glaxis . . . that nocturnal deprivations are sometimes committed; and, in such cases, robbery is not infrequently accompanied with murder.<sup>30</sup>

The suburbs—for those cities that had them—were unruly places. They belonged legally to the countryside (*das platte Land*), not to the legal sphere of the city, and were consequently an unsafe and unstable social environment. In the suburbs of big cities such as Vienna and Berlin, the situation steadily deteriorated from the second half of the eighteenth century onward, and the local gendarmerie began raiding them frequently in search of “troublemakers.” In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such raids (*Vagabunden-Visitationen*) occurred so often in Berlin’s suburbs that the authorities felt compelled to print out large numbers of blank report forms about raids’ possible outcomes in order to save the gendarmes’ precious time. Raids were held at ten o’clock in the evening, when “vagabonds” were usually busy playing and drinking in the local tavern, or at six o’clock in the morning, when they were still in deep slumber. The aim was to arrest not only the “troublemakers” themselves but also their accomplices and helpers, of whom there was evidently not a small number. As one regulation put it:

All local establishments as well as all houses and persons with any possible relation to, or communication with, these lawless persons should be thoroughly searched. The search should therefore not be limited to the taverns themselves. Stables, rooms, cellars, barns, gardens, courtyards, churches, and in general all other conceivable places where one might seek haven, should be thoroughly combed out.<sup>31</sup>

30 John Russell, *A Tour in Germany and Some of the Southern Provinces of the Austrian Empire*, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh, 1827), 2:221-22.

31 The quote is taken from “Die General-Vagabunden-Visitation, 1818-50,” Landesarchiv Berlin, A Rep 038-01 Nr. 48. Similar materials about earlier periods can be found in the same record group.

32 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Confessions*, trans. Angela Scholar (Oxford, 2000), 40-41.

Travelers had quite a few reasons, therefore, to refrain from roaming the city’s surroundings at night and had to be careful not to miss the gates’ lock-out hour in the evening. This could force even the city’s own sons and daughters, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously found out in Geneva, to spend the night in an open field or to look for a bed for the night in some suburban tavern or at the closest travelers’ inn.<sup>32</sup> From there, together with the colorful dangers of such places, they could make out the nightly silhouette of the city’s fortifications. From there, too, they could faintly hear, though not actually see, the watchman calling the hours from the church tower.

### III. The City as an Organism

At daybreak the city awakened.<sup>33</sup> For many early modern Germans, such a statement was more than a mere metaphor. The powerful legal philosophy of corporation theory (*juristische Korporationstheorie*), ubiquitous in central Europe throughout the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, perceived the city as an actual organism: it was both an independent, breathing individual and a limb or an organ of a larger being.<sup>34</sup> As the first of the two it was called a corporation (*Stadtkorporation*, from the Latin noun *corpus*, “body”) and possessed its own limbs or organs (the guilds, the city councils, the city officers, etc.). As a corporation, the city also had the status of a legal person. It could sue and be sued in a court of law and had its own interests, views, and voice in many legal matters. As the second, it was a member or “a limb” (*Mitglied*) of a yet larger corporation or “body” such as a province (*Land*) or the Empire as a whole. Such larger bodies possessed not only individual members (such as cities), but also “a head” (*Haupt*). In the Reich, for instance, the head was the Emperor (see Figure 2).<sup>35</sup>

In its role as a member or an organ, the city was of vital importance to the existence and overall health or constitution (*Verfassung*) of the body politic. This was Justi’s opinion in the eighteenth century as it was the opinion of John of Salisbury in the twelfth century, Lucian’s in the second, and Aristotle in the fourth century BCE (In *The Republic*, Plato famously made the opposite analogy: The city is not like a body, but rather the human body is like a polis).<sup>36</sup> Thus, for instance, did Justi explain the role or place of the city in a state:

If one were to compare the moral body of a republic to a human body, then trade and the circulation of money would represent the blood circulation or the force of life itself; [furthermore,] one would have to consider the cities as the main or largest blood veins, which represent the actual engine that makes possible the entire movement.<sup>37</sup>

33 This is an old biblical theme, of course (e.g., Isaiah 52:1). Compare also contemporary music like J. S. Bach’s cantata BWV 140, *Wachet auf, ruft uns die Stimme*.

34 See, most recently, Albrecht Koschorke et al., eds., *Der fiktive Staat: Konstruktion des politischen Körpers in der Geschichte Europas* (Frankfurt am Main, 2007), esp.

78-88. Ideas about the metaphor of the body in other European countries during the early modern period are treated in Paul Archambault, “The Analogy of the Body in >>

>> Renaissance Political Thought,” *Bibliothèque d’humanisme et renaissance* 29.1 (1967): 21-53, and Leonard Barkan, *Nature’s Work of Art: The Human Body as Image of the World* (New Haven, 1975), esp. chapter 3.

35 For the idea of the city as an organism see, most importantly, Richard Sennett, *Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization* (New York, 1994). For the Holy Roman Empire as a living body, see Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, *Das Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation: Vom Ende des Mittelalters bis 1806* (Munich, 2006). And for its ceremonial practices, see Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, “Zeremoniell als politisches Verfahren. Rangordnung und Rangstreit als Strukturmerkmale des frühneuzeitlichen Reichstags,” in *Neue Studien zur frühneuzeitlichen Reichsgeschichte*, ed. Johannes Kunisch, *ZHF, Beiheft 19* (Berlin, 1997), 91-132. A classic study about the inner workings of small urban communities can be found in Walker, *German Home Towns*, 34-72.

36 John of Salisbury, *The Statesman’s Book*, trans. John Dickinson (New York, 1927), 258-63; Lucian, “Anacharsis,” in *Lucians von Samosata sämtliche Werke* (Vienna, 1798), 4:338; Aristotle, *Politics*, Book I.

37 Justi, *Staatswirtschaft*, 491.



**Figure 2. The Holy Roman Empire with Head and Members, known as Quaternionenadler, woodcut of ca. 1510 by Jost de Negker instructed by Hans Burgkmair the Elder (1473-1531), master painter in Augsburg.**

diet (*Landtag*) only, in which case it would have the status of a provincial city or town (*Landesstadt*). Or it could have an even lower legal standing and exist as an independent legal person only in a smaller legal corporation such as a small princely state or a county (*Bezirk*). In order to assert its legal status, distinct privileges, and even its “honor,” the city resorted to legal and political measures as well as to particular ceremonial practices. As we shall see, the walls played an important role in all these respects.

Like all members and persons in the hierarchical world of the Holy Roman Empire, the city had a political rank. The city could have a voice or vote (*Stimme*) in the Imperial college of cities (*Reichsstädtekollegium*), one of the three colleges in the Imperial Diet, in which case it would have the rank of an Imperial or free city. It could have a voice in a provincial

38 See Werner Lahne, *Magdeburgs Zerstörung in der zeitgenössischen Publizistik* (Magdeburg, 1931), e.g., 85–87.

39 For a description of courtly ceremonies in early modern France, see Norbert Elias, *The Court Society*, rev ed. (Dublin, 2006). For the importance of ceremonies in the world of the Holy Roman Empire, see Stollberg-Rilinger, “Zeremoniell als politisches Verfahren.” And for the idea of the city as a person with ceremonial practices similar to those of nobles, see André Krischer, *Reichsstädte in der Fürstengesellschaft: Zum politischen Zeichengebrauch in der frühen Neuzeit* (Darmstadt, 2006).

For a German living in the early modern period, the city was therefore a living, breathing organism. It was often even described in sexual terms—that is, imagined as a woman or a maiden (a virgin)—so she could also be raped if she were dishonored by having her walls “penetrated.” This was an ancient metaphor, of course, but one that was still prevalent in early modern Germany—in many depictions of the destruction of Magdeburg during the Thirty Years’ War, for instance.<sup>38</sup> And like all creatures, the city passed through natural cycles. It was sometimes healthy and sometimes ill; at times it grew up and, like a plant, flourished, while at others it grew old and declined. It was constantly changing and yet always the same. Little wonder, then, that the city also “awakened” every morning and “fell asleep” every night. Little wonder, too, that much like any other honorable person in Germany of the time, the city also engaged in ceremonial practices when the time arrived to start the day.<sup>39</sup>

The larger the city, the more elaborate were its morning rites. In smaller towns, where the city walls consisted merely of wooden fences, a series of hedges, or an enclosure of palisades, there was little sense in employing the same level of control and observation used in heavily fortified cities. But even in a typical German home town where burghers knew each other well and where, consequently, it was difficult for them to pretend to be somebody else, one used the city gates and walls as important means of control and observation. “[Our] city walls are not meant to defend the city from an approaching army,” explained one Coburg citizen in the mid-1780s: “[but] a lawless rogue is often much more dangerous than such an army.”<sup>40</sup>

In large, heavily fortified cities, morning rites were much more intricate than in the home towns. In Breslau, for instance, the gatekeepers (*Thorschlüssler* or *Zirckler*) woke up shortly before dawn and came down to the gate. Except for their commander (*Schlüsselmajor*), all gatekeepers had the key to a single gate and could only assume their posts after an older gatekeeper passed away. The keeper swore an oath to fulfill his job dutifully, to abstain from mingling with night watchers, and to let no one, no “women, children, relatives, acquaintances, or even superiors,” distract him from his duties. His was the key to the city, and this key had to be safe.<sup>41</sup>

Other office holders soon followed.<sup>42</sup> According to several general instructions published by the Prussian government during the second half of the eighteenth century, such officers included soldiers in garrison towns and gate watchers elsewhere (*Torwächter*, *Torstehrer*; to be distinguished from the night watchers), scribes (*Torschreiber*, often Jews), and different types of customs officers (*Zöllner*). The last group was especially heterogeneous, as officers specialized in different types of customs (such as wine, beer, wood, foodstuffs). The gate officers, distinguishable from one another by different uniforms, would then occupy separate posts at the gate. The customs officer, dressed in green, would stand at the front together with the gate watchers, and the scribe occupied a small office nearby. When all was ready, the gatekeeper would open the gate himself and immediately depart. The key’s importance to the security of the city was so great that no burgher other than the gatekeeper (or his commander) would be entrusted with it, day or night. At last, with the drawbridge rolled down, the gate unlocked and unbolted, and with all the gate officers in place, the city was open. The day could finally begin.<sup>43</sup>

40 “Berichtigung eines Aufsatzes im Kiel. Mag. II B. 2St. S. 186 die Thorpolicey in Coburg betreffend,” *Journal von und für Deutschland* 10 (1785): 380-82.

41 “Acta generalia von der Combination der Expedition der Brel. Thor und Wasser Zöllner mit den Juden Thorschreibern und Thorstehern. Vol. I,” StA Breslau, Akten der Stadt Breslau, (476) 11.016.

42 For the specific rules for Breslau, see “Acta specialia von den breslauschen Thorschlüsslern oder sogenannten Zircklern, derselben Bestellung, Besoldung, Vereidung u. Conduite. T. 2.,” Staatsarchiv Breslau, Akten der Stadt Breslau, (1703) 12.242, “Koenigl. Preussische Accise Reglement,” StA Breslau, Akten der Stadt Breslau, (1747) 12.286. On uniforms in Prussia in general, see Peter Kall, Harald Moritzen, and Lambert Frank, *Zolldienstkleidung einst und heute* (Bonn, 1972).

43 An interesting comparison with the case of late eighteenth-century Paris can be found in Louis-Sébastien Mercier, *Panorama of Paris: Selections from the Tableau de Paris*, ed. Jeremy D. Popkin (University Park, 1999), 47-49.

#### IV. The City and Its Boundaries

It was a part of the natural cycles of the city as an organ in a larger, pulsating body that the city tended, to use Justi's metaphor, to "pump out" people and commodities in the morning, and take them back in at sunset. It was a simple question of numbers. At dawn travelers and locals would leave to start the day outside the walls or to travel farther to a different city, town, market, or fair; at sunset they crowded back into the safety of the city before the gates were closed. The bigger the city, the more marked this cycle was and the more mayhem ensued at the gate. Contemporaries would especially notice this movement shortly before lock-out in the evening. Since the city consumed more commodities and people than it sent into the bloodstream of the country, the traffic in a large city was more into the city than out of it.

Travelers in the Holy Roman Empire would most likely leave early from the city or inn where they had spent the night and start the day's journey to their next destination.<sup>44</sup> In the German lands, such a journey was a notoriously cumbersome affair. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there were over one thousand more or less independent political entities in the Empire, including, among many others, great territorial states, free and Imperial cities, ecclesiastical territories and monasteries, smaller princely states, and even some Imperial free villages. Some of these entities were so small, claimed one eighteenth-century German writer half-jokingly, that they seemed to be made up completely of borders.<sup>45</sup> To a contemporary traveler, however, boundaries were no joking matter. Border controls were practically everywhere: on turnpikes, local roads, and on bridges, at the entrance to canals, in mountain passes, in the middle of Germany's great rivers, and of course in and around towns and cities. "In the small district between Mainz and Coblenz, which, with the winding of the river [Rhine], hardly makes twenty seven miles," wrote one contemporary, "you don't pay less than nine tolls. Between Holland and Coblenz there are at least sixteen."<sup>46</sup>

The first border one would usually encounter upon approaching a major German city was its legal limits (*Weichbild*).<sup>47</sup> These limits could be quite far from the walls in the case of prosperous independent cities such as Nuremberg or Frankfurt am Main, which, over the centuries, had managed to subordinate a large territory to their control. The territory of the city of Nuremberg, for instance, included six smaller towns as well as dozens of market villages and other rural communities.<sup>48</sup> A city like Munich, on the other hand, was not

44 A general discussion of traveling to a fortified city as well as of this genre of travel literature can be found in Klaus Martin Hofmann, "Festungsstädte im Rahmen regional- und stadtegeschichtlicher Konzeptionen," in *Festung, Garnison, Bevölkerung: Historische Aspekte der Festungsforschung: Die Vorträge des 2. Internationalen Kolloquiums zur Festungsforschung Minden (29. bis 31. Oktober 1982)*, ed. Volker Schmidchen (Wesel, 1982), 31-44..

45 Quoted in James J. Sheehan, *German History, 1770-1866* (Oxford, 1989), 30.

46 Johann Kaspar Riesbeck, *Travels through Germany, in a Series of Letters* (London, 1787), 3:284.

47 A general treatment of the history, as well as prehistory, of the concept of *Weichbild* can be found in Ernst Kaeber, "Das Weichbild der Stadt Berlin seit der Steinschen Städteordnung," in *Ernst Kaeber: Beiträge zur Berliner Geschichte*, ed. Ernst Vogel (Berlin, 1964).

48 Richard van Dülmen, *Kultur und Alltag in der frühen Neuzeit*, 3 vols., vol. 2: *Dorf und Stadt im 16.-18. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1990), 63.

a free city, and both sides of its legal boundary—though marking two separate legal spheres, city and countryside—were nonetheless under the overall sovereignty (*Landeshoheit*) of the Bavarian Elector. In such a case, the city’s legal boundaries enclosed a sphere known as the “peace of the castle” (*Burgfriede*).<sup>49</sup>

In big or politically powerful cities, where the walls and legal boundaries did not converge, the latter were marked by one of two physical signs: milestones or dikes (*Landwehr*). Historically, the older of the two was the *Landwehr*: a long dike or ditch, flanked by an earthen wall and planted with trees or hedges. Some dikes dated back to the early Middle Ages when they served as signs of a territory’s legal status as well as impediments to the movement of wild beasts and even an approaching army. In some cases, the *Landwehr* were exceptionally long, cutting the countryside for several dozens of miles.<sup>50</sup> By the eighteenth century, however, these dikes did not usually correspond to the city’s legal boundaries and had been replaced by milestones.<sup>51</sup>

When one approached a well-fortified city from afar, three parts were immediately conspicuous: the suburbs, the glacis, and the fortifications.<sup>52</sup> The suburbs were often surrounded by a simple wall. They were sometimes as old as the city and, like exoparasites, fed on the city’s fortified body. The suburbs existed within the economic sphere of the city, but they belonged legally to the countryside (*das platte Land*). Consequently, the city had little or no legal obligations vis-à-vis its suburbs in such crucial matters as fire insurance (*Feuersozietät*), poor relief (*Armenverpflegung*, *Armenwesen*), or even defense. Had cities possessed legal obligations to such communities, they would have had to defend them and therefore include them within their walls, in which case the suburbs, strictly speaking, would cease to be suburbs.<sup>53</sup> Thus, while the suburbs of German cities began to expand rapidly in the second half of the eighteenth century, the cities themselves often remained the same size. Unlike North American cities, for instance, German cities did not simply expand into the surrounding countryside; rather, the surrounding countryside increasingly “crowded” around them.

The second conspicuous feature of a major seventeenth or eighteenth-century German city was its glacis. The glacis was a slow, downward slope stretching from the city’s fortifications towards the fields or suburbs around it whose aim was to provide a field of fire for the city’s gunners in case of attack or siege. Thus, it was either

- 49 One eighteenth-century milestone marking this boundary still exists today in Munich’s English Garden.
- 50 The Sächsische Landwehr in southern Thuringia, whose remains are still visible today, stretched for almost forty miles.
- 51 For the origins and history of medieval fortifications in Germany, including the *Landwehr*, see the collection of articles in Gabriele Isenberg and Barbara Scholkmann, *Die Befestigung der mittelalterlichen Stadt* (Cologne, 1997).
- 52 A good comparison between descriptions of German fortified towns in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is Hofmann, “Festungsstädte,” 31–44.
- 53 Guido Helmig, “Die Befestigung der Basler Vorstädte und ihre Integration in den äusseren Mauerring,” in *Die Befestigung der mittelalterlichen Stadt.*, ed. Gabriele Isenberg and Barbara Scholkmann, 167–78.

completely devoid of tall vegetation and man-made structures (as mandated by legal measures known as *Rayon-Gesetze*), or it contained only objects that could be quickly demolished if necessary (*Wallservitut*).<sup>54</sup> The word “glacis” was originally reserved for the artificial downward slope close to the fortifications themselves, but with time it came to describe the entire round, exposed belt or “no man’s land” surrounding a fortified place and separating it from the suburbs.

Within the rings of the suburbs and the glacis stood the fortifications themselves, often under repair (it was customary for the city to employ the poor to execute such works).<sup>55</sup> Modern star-shaped fortifications (*Stadtbefestigung*) could be extremely intricate, including ravelins, moats, dikes and ditches, drawbridges, bulwarks, ramparts, bastions, several lines of walls, gates, towers, magazines, and more. An eighteenth-century field officer would have to know many dozens of different terms in order even to speak about the fortifications, let alone effectively command them. Beyond the modern fortification works stood the old medieval city walls (*Stadtmauern*). They were much simpler than the modern fortifications, containing only moats, gates, towers, and curtains (*Courtinen*: wall sections connecting every two towers).

Some sections of the medieval walls were inhabited or formed the outer walls of buildings so that the walls comprised a part of the city’s living tissue. The towers, for instance, contained some of the city’s most important institutions. Some housed the city’s prison (*Hexen- and Diebtürme*—witches and thieves towers), or stored the wheat, barley, or gunpowder needed for the city’s garrison. Others were inhabited or formed the outer walls of private houses. In the Imperial town of Schwäbisch Hall, for instance, one of the city towers was inhabited by the local executioner (*Scharfrichterturm*); in Berlin parts of the walls belonged to the Charité, the city’s largest hospital; and in Frankfurt am Main the medieval wall formed one side of the Jewish ghetto’s enclosure.

In German cities where Jews were allowed to live, they often settled right next to a part of the walls’ inner side, a location that manifested the Jews’ equivocal position vis-à-vis the community: they were simultaneously insiders and outsiders. Sometimes Jews worked as clerks at the gate (as in Breslau or Berlin), and in some places they could enter the city only through a single entrance (e.g., the Rosenthaler Gate in Berlin).

54 For the case of Frankfurt am Main, see Albert Westerburg, *Ueber die rechtliche Natur der Frankfurter sogenannten Wallservitut, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Baurechts* (Frankfurt am Main, 1887).

55 German cities spent huge fortunes on the constant repair of their walls in the eighteenth century. The repairs in Berlin are well documented: “Die Reparatur und Unterhaltung der Landwehre bei den hiesigen Residenzen ingl. den neuen Graben in der Friedrichstrasse, darüber anzufertigende Brücke und neu zu erbauende Corps de Garde auch die zur Fortifikation gehörige Brücke,” Br. LHA Potsdam, Rep. 2 B 71; “Reparierung der Pallisaden bey denen hiesigen Landwehren,” Br. LHA Potsdam, Rep. 2 Berlin Nr. 2840; “Reparatur und Abbruch der Stadtmauer und der Tore sowie die Verbesserung des nicht im Zuge der Chaussee gelegenen Straßenpflasters in Angermünde,” Br. LHA Potsdam, Rep. 2 A IHb Nr. 1163, Bd. 1. For a vivid description of how such maintenance works looked in Hamburg, see Geoffrey Parker and Simon Adams, *The Thirty Years’ War* (London; New York, 1997), 12.

It was anything but pleasant to live just inside the city wall. This part of the city was the most distant from the marketplace, and often housed not only Jews, but also the poorer segments of the population, as well as the city's brothels (where these were allowed). As the walls cast long shadows and often retained moisture, it was dark, wet, and slippery there.<sup>56</sup> With poor air circulation and no modern sewage system, this part of the city literally stank. If that was not enough, persons living right next to the walls also sometimes had a gunpowder storage tower looming right above their heads. This was a cause for great concern as such structures were prone to sudden explosions because of a force of nature or the carelessness of a single soldier.<sup>57</sup> When lightning struck the gunpowder tower in Breslau one day in 1749, the explosion not only broke the glass windows of churches hundreds of yards away; it also killed many dozens of Jews living in its vicinity.<sup>58</sup> Living near the wall was at its worst when the city was bombarded during a siege, as the fate of the Jewish ghetto in Frankfurt am Main demonstrates all too well. The ghetto burnt down during several sieges in the eighteenth century, the last one in 1794. Since Frankfurt was defortified shortly thereafter, the ghetto walls were never rebuilt. In this case, as in others, the demolition of the city's outer boundaries implied an internal restructuring as well.

Approaching the city by day, an eighteenth-century traveler would cross the suburbs and the glacis and advance toward the city gates through over- and underpasses in the fortification works (see Figure 3). The gates were one of the city's busiest locations; they were spatially peripheral but economically and socially central, since all travel to and from the city had to pass through one of them. Some city entrances were elaborate structures, containing not one, but two or even three consecutive gates. The gate officers would charge entry fees and indirect taxes. Here the guard would also examine travel documents and luggage—sometimes searching the travelers' bodies as well—admitting them or sending them away, sometimes quite brutally. When one Christina Bobingerin, a nineteen-year-old peasant from the area around Augsburg, tried to sneak into that city without permission, she was put in jail, whipped, and finally deported by the guards.<sup>59</sup> In the second half of the eighteenth century the gate watcher in Berlin was instructed to “pay special attention to the Jews approaching the gates, to let the locals in, and send back the foreign Jews.”<sup>60</sup> Both Moses Mendelssohn and Salomon Maimon, the great Jewish philosophers, experienced the effects of these regulations personally when they tried to enter Berlin at the time.


56 Goethe, *Gespräche*, 232.

57 For arguments for and against keeping such a tower in Breslau, see “Der Bau der Koenigl. Pulver Magazine ausserhalb der Stadt,” StA Breslau, Akten der Stadt Breslau (1682) 12.221.

58 “Acta wegen des durch einen Wetterstrahl d. 21 Juni zerprengten Pulver Thurms verursachten Schadens. T. 1,” StA Breslau, Akten der Stadt Breslau (1136) 11.675.

59 Christopher Friedrichs, *The Early Modern City* (New York, 1995), 214.

60 Heinz Knobloch, *Herr Moses in Berlin: Auf den Spuren eines Menschenfreundes* (Berlin, 1979), 35.



**Figure 3. Walls around seventeenth-century Goslar. Source: Matthäus Merian and Martin Zeiller, *Topographia Saxoniae Inferioris. Topographia Germaniae*, volume 14, p. T13. Frankfurt am Mayn: Frankfurter Kunstverein, 1853.**

On its external side, the gate was not unlike a combination of a modern checkpoint and a train station. It was often the location of a small market, where different types of people—peasants, playing children, and gate officers, but also beggars, thieves, and self-appointed preachers and prophets—would seek the money or at least the attention of passersby.<sup>61</sup> One gets a glimpse into common scenes at the gate by reading what cities forbade the gate officers to do. The city of Hamburg, for instance, declared that its gate officers and garrison should refuse bribes; abstain from stealing from, insulting, or spitting on passersby; avoid fights, duels, drinking, and gambling during their shift; and refrain from threatening anyone, including their comrades and even their officers, with their weapons (and yes, one instruction added, a dagger is also considered a weapon in this respect).<sup>62</sup> That such activities needed to be forbidden implies that they occurred often enough to draw the attention of the city government.

### V. The Invisible City

Beyond its military, economic, social, and police roles, the gate also had an enormous symbolic function. It was the physical incarnation of the borders between the city and its adjacent countryside. Much as a piece of paper cannot have only one side, so too must a gate always have two faces. For a traveler entering the city, the gate denoted the physical boundaries of the city corporation (“city-side”); for a traveler

61 Eighteenth-century travel accounts were often constructed along fairly rigid lines. See Wolfgang Griep and Hans-Wolf Jäger, *Reisen im 18. Jahrhundert* (Heidelberg, 1986). In order to overcome these often rigid narrative structures, I used customs and gate watchers' instructions (e.g., “Koenigl. Preussische Accise Reglement,” and *Instruction für die Wächter an Thoren und Bäumen*, StA Hamburg, ca. 1812), letters of complaint regarding events at the gates (e.g., “Berichtigung eines Aufsatzes im Kiel. Mag. II B. 2St. S. 186 die Thorpolicey in Coburg betreffend,” *Journal für und von Deutschland* 10 (1785): 380–82), as well as other

police documents (such as “Die Unterhaltung der Stadtmauer, Belegung von Pforten in derselben, Abbruch

der Thore in Beeskow,” Br. LHA Potsdam, Rep 2 A, Nor. 1165, for evidence of children playing near the walls).

62 “Revidire Kriegs-Artikel für die Garnison der Stadt Hamburg,” StA Hamburg, A 480, 307.

leaving it, the entrance to the adjacent territory (“countryside”). In its quality as a boundary, the gate (and the walls in general) belonged to more than one entity: the city, on the one hand; its surrounding area, on the other. At this convergence of boundaries, it was most appropriate to present the city’s symbols, motto, or coat-of-arms. By means of its “coat” or “dress,” external symbols, and human officers, the city would “speak” to the persons approaching its walls, expressing the city’s existence as a living being. Walking through the gate was, in the most literal sense of the phrase, a rite of passage.

Entering the city was much like entering a cathedral. A traveler walking through one of the city gates not only entered a place; he or she also performed a symbolic act. A cathedral’s overall architecture represents the crucifix’s structure through the narthex, nave, transept, and chancel. Walking underneath the arch of triumph in a cathedral’s transept, chapels, altar, and ambulatory, a pilgrim reinstates Christ’s body by the very act of *visiting* a basilica. The general architecture of a city gate served a similar purpose. It made both visitors and locals perform symbolic acts vis-à-vis the city—acts that indicated and constituted the city’s imperceptible presence as a living organism. Much as in religious ceremonies, the gate’s rites not only *described* or *indicated* the city’s symbolic form; they breathed life into it.

When a prince, bishop, or ambassador approached the city, the gate provided the stage for the urban community’s welcome ceremonies. The first delegation would meet the visitor earlier, near the city’s legal boundaries. It was at the gate, however, that the entire city assembled to welcome its guest: the priests in their long robes (and, in Catholic towns, also carrying the local church’s reliquaries), the garrison troops fully armed and in uniform, the gate watchers with the city’s keys, and representatives of other members of the city, all performing their roles according to a strict protocol.<sup>63</sup> On an especially festive occasion such as an imperial procession, heralds also sounded the trumpets, flags were planted on the walls and banners hung from windowsills, and the burghers, crowding along the procession route, even cared enough (in the words of one contemporary description) to “wear clean clothes.”<sup>64</sup> Even without such extraordinary ceremonies—when, for instance, a native of the city came back after a long absence—the gate served its function as a “rite of passage.” Goethe’s *Werther* felt this way when he approached his old town after a long absence. “I approached the city,” *Werther* says, “and on my way greeted all the old, familiar garden houses . . . . I walked in through the city gate, and felt, immediately

63 Winfried Dotzauer, “Die Ankunft des Herrschers: Der fürstliche ‘Einzug’ in die Stadt (bis zum Ende des Alten Reiches),” *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 55.2 (1973): 245–88.

64 *Kurtze Relation und Entwurff der Röm. Kayserl. Mayest. Leopoldi, Zu Nürnberg gehaltenen Einzugs den 6. (16.) Augusti 1658* (Nuremberg, 1658).

and completely, like my old self again [*Ich trat zum Thore hinein, und fand mich doch gleich und ganz wieder*].”<sup>65</sup>

The symbolic functions of the walls explain why even in small cities and towns the walls remained crucial for the city’s self-definition long after they had stopped serving their original economic, defensive, and police functions. They were a basic element in the way every urban community constructed and asserted its presence: a manifestation of the idea of who or what the city was, its “honor.” Thus, even in the small Saxon town of Königsbrück, which had never possessed actual gates, walls, or moats, one still called the two entrances to the city the Kamenzer and Schmorkauer Gates.<sup>66</sup> The gates and the walls were elements of a physical city. But they were also, to use Italo Calvino’s poetic formulation, monuments of a *città invisibile*, an invisible city: the tangible form of every city’s abstract idea of itself.<sup>67</sup>

A community, wrote Emile Durkheim, “is not constituted simply by the mass of individuals who compose it, the ground which they occupy, the things they use, and the movement they make, but above all by the idea it has of itself.”<sup>68</sup> It is only too understandable, then, that historians have tended to look with suspicion on the old definition of the city as a fortified place. To reduce a city to one of its architectural elements seems like a basic misunderstanding of how the urban community functions and how it is perceived and experienced. It would be like equating a vineyard with its surrounding fence or collapsing the entire realm of human religious sentiment into a church’s outer walls.<sup>69</sup> The city was always much more than its physical features; it was, and it still is, a complex group of ideas.

Nevertheless, the city walls—as seen in the case of Königsbrück—were as much ideal or abstract structures as they were physical ones. They belonged to *the idea of the city* as much as to its visible side.<sup>70</sup> Three main ideological components of the German city seem to have contributed to the symbolic (rather than physical) construction of the walls: the world of religion, the workings of human memory, and the symbolic cosmos of the Holy Roman Empire as a whole.

The city walls were part of the symbolic form of the city because of their biblical connotations. City walls were an inseparable element in the religious imagination of the time and appeared in countless stories, works of art, and even reenactments of the Godly Word in the world.<sup>71</sup> They appeared in the description of the gates of Paradise with their eternally revolving sword in the story of the Original Sin;

65 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers*, ed. Matthias Luserke (Stuttgart, 1999), 154-55.

66 Erich Keyser, ed., *Deutsches Städtebuch* (Stuttgart, 1939-), 2:115.

67 Italo Calvino, *Invisible Cities* (New York, 1974).

68 Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York, 1995), 425.

69 The metaphor is Robert Browne’s, in Robert Browne, *An answer to Master Cartwright: his letter for ioyning with the English Churches: whereunto the true copie of his sayde letter is annexed*. (London, 1585). I am thankful to Noah Millstone for drawing my attention to it.

70 It is interesting to note that Mack Walker, though he rejects the old definition of the German city as a walled settlement, nonetheless continuously uses the metaphor of “walls” in his history of German home towns. See, most importantly, his fourth chapter, entitled “Walls, Webs, and Citizens,” in Walker, *German Home Towns*, 108-43.

71 In early modern northern Europe, it was customary to fix routes in cities and town, modeled on Jerusalem’s *via dolorosa*, to be used by locals in ceremonial processions on Good Friday. See Brad S. Gregory, *Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe* (Harvard, 1999), 56. Most important here were Corpus Christi and Palm Sunday.

in Joshua's conquest of Jericho and the Land of Canaan; in Jesus's entrance into Jerusalem (a model for Palm Sunday processions and even royal entry ceremonies in some German cities), in his passion and crucifixion, and in his legacy to the apostles in the form of the double key handed over to Peter.<sup>72</sup> Within such a symbolic world, the city was

much more than a physical entity or even a political body (*corpus politicum*); it was also a heavenly place, a model for social organization in general (St. Augustine), a *corpus mysticum*. No wonder that Martin Luther, for instance, often used the metaphor of walls in his writings. In *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* (1520), he compared the papacy to a city surrounded by three rings of walls, and in his most famous chorale, *Ein' feste Burg*, he followed

the psalmist and compared God himself to a mighty, walled castle. Indeed, the very crown of the Holy Roman Emperor (*Reichskrone*) represented the heavenly city (and therefore the Empire itself) by its octagonal shape, the "gates" in which its four plates were placed, and the setting of its gemstones, all alluding to the Book of Revelation and *de civitate dei* (see Figure 4).<sup>73</sup>



**Figure 4. Crown of the Holy Roman Emperor (*Reichskrone*); second half of the tenth century, modified early eleventh century. By its octagonal shape, the "gates" in which the four plates are placed, and the setting of the gemstones, the *Reichskrone* represents the gates and walls of the heavenly Jerusalem. Photo: Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna. Reproduced by permission.**

72 Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, *Des Kaisers alte Kleider: Verfassungsgeschichte und Symbolsprache des Alten*

*Reiches* (Munich, 2008), 106.

73 Reinhart Staats, *Theologie der Reichskrone:*

*Ottonische "Renovatio Imperii" im Spiegel einer Insignie* (Stuttgart, 1976), 24-32.

The invisible operation of the walls did not vanish with the destruction of the city's physical fortifications. On the contrary, it became all the more conspicuous. It was as if the symbolic form of the city came out of the shadows of the physical stones once the walls themselves had been destroyed. Such was the case, for instance, with the religious connotations of the walls. In Bonn, where in the early eighteenth century the peasants from the surrounding countryside helped demolish the city's walls, one poet commented that "[w]hat through trumpet blows in Jericho had happened / By that miracle, is all the world amazed // A different thing is what in Bonn has just transpired / When by sounds of peasants' horns the walls had just been razed."<sup>74</sup> Even a century later, one still finds a similar deployment of biblical imagery. When one Hamburg writer opposed the charging of fees at his city's gates, he too composed a poem for the occasion. He claimed that charging fees at the gates was against the Bible itself. Hamburg might charge entrance fees at its gates, he wrote, "[b]ut when we climb to Heaven's door / From the earthly valley's floor / There Peter stands, no slave is he / He'd let one in and charge no fee."<sup>75</sup>

74 "Was durch Posaunenschall vor Jericho geschehen / Das ist ein Wunderwerk, bei aller Welt geacht' // Ein anders ist, was man bei Bonn jetzt hat gesehen / Daß eines Kühorns Ton die Mauern fallen macht." My translation is not literal here. Quoted in Edith Ennen, "Die kurkölnische Residenz Bonn und ihr Umland in einem Jahrhundert der Kriege," in *Bonn als kurkölnische Haupt- und Residenzstadt, 1597-1794* (Geschichte der Stadt Bonn 3), ed. Dietrich Höroldt (Bonn, 1989), 194.

75 "Doch fliegen einst zum Himmelstor / Wir aus dem Erdenthal empor // Wird Petrus ja kein Pecus sein / Er läßt uns ohne Sperrgeld ein." My translation, from Wilhelm Hocker, *Opfer der Thorsperre: Local Lustspiel mit Gesang* (Hamburg, 1840), 59.

76 For the concept of *lieux de mémoire*, see Pierre Nora, "Entre Mémoire et Histoire," in *Les Lieux de Mémoire*, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris, 1984), xv-xlii.

The city's walls were also inseparable from the invisible presence of the city's past. They were *lieux de mémoire*: places of memory.<sup>76</sup> After all, German cities had always been fortified. During the Middle Ages, walls—together with the city's market and legal privileges (*Stadtrecht*)—were the three prerequisites that turned a settlement into a city. Strictly speaking, therefore, Munich, Freiburg, or Nuremberg, *as cities*, had always possessed walls. Furthermore, the city gates, towers, and walls were old, familiar faces for the burghers; they were part of the city's *genius locii*. They stood around the city at one's birth and throughout one's life. And they stood when crucial events in the city's history took place. The Ulrepforte in Cologne reminded one of an important battle (the memorial plaque still exists there today); and the Jerusalem Gate in Büdingen bore witness to residents' safe return from a historical pilgrimage. The gates and the walls were in that respect often the only "witnesses" to the city's history. At any rate, they were always witnesses to one's friends and childhood games, to one's family, to one's culture, and to one's home or *Heimat*. To demolish the gates and walls would consequently be tantamount to *dis*-membering the city, in the sense of both physically cutting or disjoining one of the city's limbs or members from its body and in the sense of annihilating their functions as places where the city's past was *re*-membered, where the present city was symbolically connected with its traditions and its history.

Indeed, the city gates and towers had their own personalities. They had individual names, sometimes so ancient no one could remember where they had come from. In Hamburg the ravelins were named after Jesus's disciples. In Dresden, parts of the star-shaped fortifications were named after the planets. The walls in those cities were literally a part of the cosmology or "metaphysics" of the city. To demolish them was almost unthinkable; it meant (in the case of Dresden quite literally) to destroy a world. This is why, as Catharina Elisabeth Goethe so beautifully put it, the "old wigs" would have waited until the Second Coming before demolishing Frankfurt's city walls. Time itself had to stop before such an event could take place.

The third and perhaps most important reason the walls belonged to the "invisible city" was that the city itself, as an organ in a larger body, also belonged to an invisible world: the Reich or any of its organs. Such a state of affairs was most evident in the case of a free or Imperial city. The functioning of the Reich's whole body was visible—in the form of the Reichstag—only to a select few. According to early modern German political philosophers, it was only in the Imperial Diet, when all the members or organs of the Reich were physically present, that the Reich as a coherent body, "with head and limbs" (Emperor and Imperial estates), became visible.<sup>77</sup> The Reichstag was then the Empire *in corpore*: "embodied" or physically "incarnated." "The sovereign princes and the estates constitute the Imperial body," wrote, for instance, the important jurist Tobias Paurmeister in the early seventeenth century. "This body's head is the Emperor, and only when all members are present together in a *compendium representativum* can one say that the Empire [itself] has been assembled."<sup>78</sup>

Contemporary political philosophers further stated that individual members of the great pulsating body of the Empire were not distinguishable from their membership. A duke, for instance, was not only the individual who carried this title at a specific point in time. A duke was also all his ancestors and future descendants—much in the same way that kings, as human beings, always died, yet *the king* never passed away.<sup>79</sup> In such a world, external symbols of the intangible ideas of membership and rank were by no means superficial. They were of the essence, because they were more durable than the specific person who carried them at a given point of time; they were how the invisible bodies of a king (invisible because it was always greater than the body of the crowned person), a bishop, or even the Empire as a whole made their presence known. "*Honor*," concluded one early modern legal theoretician, "*consistit in signis exterioribus*."<sup>80</sup>

77 See, for instance, Johann Carl König, *Gründliche Abhandlung von denen Teutschen Reichs-Tägen überhaupt und dem noch fürwährenden zu Regensburg insbesondere* (Nuremberg, 1738), vol. 1, 31.

78 Tobias Paurmeister, *De iurisdictione imperii Romani* (Hanover, 1608), Vol. 2, 1.

79 Louis XIV once wrote in this vein to his son, the Dauphin: "I give you an opportunity to demonstrate your personal superiority. Show it to the whole of Europe, so that no one would notice, when I am gone, that the King has died." Quoted in Jean-Christian Petitfils, *Louis XIV* (Paris, 1997), 494. The most important treatment of the relationship between the king's two bodies is Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton, 1957).

80 The quotation is from Bartholomaeus Cassanaeus, a sixteenth-century scholar whose work appeared in new editions well into the seventeenth century. Stollberg-Riliinger, "Zeremoniell als politisches Verfahren," 95, n13. My analysis of the importance and meaning of signs in the world of the Holy Roman Empire is influenced by St. Augustine's definition of signs in St. Augustine, *De Magistro*, 1.

Likewise, the walls often stood more strongly as symbols than as physical barriers. Just like the Imperial crown (which, as we saw, was modeled after Jerusalem's city walls), a city's walls were external signs of an abstract idea or honor (the city). We remember how the burghers of Jena pleaded with their Grand Duke to leave their old *honorable* monument unharmed.<sup>81</sup> And like a monarch's crown, the walls were also always greater than their physical incarnation. They could change physically (compare: a monarch) without ever changing substantially (compare: *the* monarch, or monarchy). They could even be physically absent (Königsbrück), and yet still be very present. This is the reason why one sometimes spoke about the demolition of relatively new, modernized walls as if they had been built during the Middle Ages. The physical stones were indeed new, but they bore the memory of the original walls and the rite of initiation that those walls once meant to a nascent city.<sup>82</sup> The city, consequently, was its actuality (its streets, houses, physical walls, and gates), but also an abstract idea. The gates and the walls were among the places where these two aspects of the city converged, places where stones had meanings and the meaning of living in a city was incarnated in stone. In that respect, the city walls constituted one of the city's pineal glands: a point where the city's soul came into contact with its physical body.<sup>83</sup>

In times of peace, as we have seen, the gates and the walls were places where travelers and locals felt, recognized, and instituted the city. In times of war or political turmoil, the city's fortifications stood for the idea (and by the mid-eighteenth century, it was often little more than *an idea*) that a city could independently defend itself. Contemporary Germans called this idea *die Stadt in Waffen*, "the city in arms." Urban fortifications possessed important military functions well into the second half of the nineteenth century. But the military revolution of the early modern period and the resulting changes in the art of siege and the science of fortification made it increasingly clear that city walls were not sufficient by themselves for the defense of a city and that the community had to find additional ways to protect itself in times of war. Such practical considerations notwithstanding, the idea that a city *ought* to be able to defend itself independently was still very much alive in the second half of the eighteenth century. It is all too easy to ridicule the citizens of Frankfurt am Main, for instance, who well into the 1790s thought they could single-handedly defend their city from the French revolutionary armies.<sup>84</sup> More important, however, is not to ridicule but to understand. It was not only the

81 See n2 above.

82 This theme recurs very often, for instance, in "Der Abbruch der Stadtmauer sowie die Regulierung, Pflasterung und Unterhaltung der hierdurch frei werdenden Straßen, 1859-1882," LA Berlin, A Rep 000-02-01 Nr. 1579.

83 Another urban monument that served the same purpose was the Rathaus.

84 "Verteidigungsmaßnahmen der Stadt," ISG Frankfurt am Main, Kriegszeugamt Nr. 5.

actual military functions of the walls that were important to the citizens of the early modern city. It was also the abstract idea behind the military fortifications: the idea that in a time of need the city ought to be able to raise its arms and defend itself like any honorable person in the Reich.

Within the mental universe of the Reich, the demolition of city walls was consequently much more than the destruction of purely military defenses. It was equivalent to a king's wrecking his scepter and crown or a bishop trashing his pastoral insignia. Such acts would be considered either signs of madness or crimes against "honor"—that of the organ or member as well as that of the body politic as a whole.

## VI. Defortification and Its Resulting Problems

The walls were related both to the physical nature of the city and to the city as an idea. They were important for the city's defense and public security. But even more significantly, they were a part of one's religious imagination; they related to the community's past, present, and future; and they belonged to the larger symbolic cosmos of the Holy Roman Empire. Walls were in all these respects an inseparable part of the life and honor of the city, an abstract idea that took a physical shape. To demolish the external signs of its personality, to destroy the stone-made borders of its community, was of course to deface the visible, physical city. At the same time, defortification also dealt a crushing blow to the invisible, intangible city: a painful blow to the city's symbolic, rather than physical, form. It was to dismantle (literally: to divest of a mantle or a cloak; to strip off a piece of clothing, covering, protection) the idea of the city. All of this explains why walls were still so fundamental to the city's definition of itself in the eighteenth century, why contemporaries had a sense of magic when they looked at their transformed, defortified cities, and why the word "honor" appeared in so many contemporary descriptions of urban fortifications.

Defortification introduced, therefore, two interrelated sets of problems: the one practical, the other symbolic. On the one hand, the demolition raised a series of questions about the ability of the city to defend itself, finance itself, and control its population. It further raised questions about property, both in terms of the walls as a whole and of the fortifications' inhabited parts. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German burghers had to determine to whom the walls actually belonged, who was entitled to make decisions about

their demolition, how defortification should be performed and by whom, and who should be allowed to profit from it. They also had to decide what would happen to the persons and institutions that had been related to the walls for so many centuries: where to relocate the magazines, what to do about the prisons, how to find new employment for all the different gate officers, and what to do with the exposed area around the city (including the glacis) now that the walls were gone.

Beyond these practical issues, however, the community had to confront the assault on the walls' symbolic aspect, the assault on the invisible city. Not only the beauty of the city was at stake here, but also, and perhaps above all, its identity. Since the walls were *lieux de mémoire*, their demolition raised questions about the community's collective memory and the city's relation to its history. Since they served as external signs of the city's honor and membership in the Empire, the walls' demolition raised questions about the old mental universe of the Reich as a whole. And since the walls constituted symbolic borders between city and countryside, their demise raised questions about the city's abstract boundaries: questions such as where the city began and where it ended, who belonged to the city and who did not, and what differentiated the city from a big village now that it was no longer a closed, protected place. In other words, in what respect could it still be called "a city" at all.

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## MATTERS OF TASTE: THE POLITICS OF FOOD IN DIVIDED GERMANY, 1945-1971

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### I. Origins of the Project

My initial interest in studying the politics of food in Germany arose during the four years that I lived in Berlin after graduating from college. Moving to Berlin ten years after unification as someone who knew almost nothing about the Cold War history of the country, I was surprised by the ways in which daily life, and especially specific foods and ways of eating, were explicitly connected to either the former East Germany (GDR) or West Germany (FRG). This was not an academic but a personal observation: comments from friends and roommates, the *Berliner Zeitung*, TV and radio shows, all shared an apparently self-evident post-Cold War culinary vocabulary that to me was incomprehensible. When I eventually moved back to the United States to enroll in a doctoral program at the University of Michigan, I thought that here was finally a chance to try to understand this “oddity” of contemporary Germany. As a result, I returned to Germany in 2006 to begin my official dissertation research on a topic that I at the time called *Ernährungspolitik* (the politics of nutrition/food). At that time, I could not even have conceptualized many of the themes that were to shape the final project: medical disagreements over the definitions of hunger and obesity, collective feeding programs in schools and factories, domestic kitchen design, collective memories and fantasies attached to specific foods and ways of cooking.

Before I actually entered the archives, my idea was to do a comparative project on the postwar politics of food through the lens of *Konsumkultur* (consumer culture) and *Alltagsgeschichte* (everyday history). Both of these strategies of writing history have been particularly productive in recent innovative work on East Germany; for a historian of food, both were particularly attractive because they take material objects – in my case actual food itself – seriously. Following in the tradition of some of the most exciting recent work on consumer culture in German history, I anticipated writing a lot about shopping – about the well-known struggle to get good, or even adequate, groceries in the GDR.<sup>1</sup> I also expected to document the tensions surrounding

<sup>1</sup> Franziska Becker, Ina Merkel, and Simone Tippach-Schneider, eds., *Das Kollektiv bin ich: Utopie und Alltag in der DDR* (Weimar, 2000); Ina Merkel, *Utopie und Bedürfnis: Die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR*. (Cologne, 1999); Kathy Pence, “Schaufenster des sozialistischen Konsums: Texte der ostdeutschen ‘consumer culture,’” in *Akten. Eingaben. Schaufenster. Die DDR und ihre Texte*, ed. Alf Lütke and Peter Becker (Berlin, 1997).

the foods that post-unification Germany had immortalized as icons of East German food culture: most of all, absent and deeply desired bananas, but also *Spreewaldgurken*, *Tempo-Linsen*, and the omnipresent cabbage, sausages, and potatoes.<sup>2</sup> West Germany, in my expected narrative, was going to serve as a normative foil against which East German development could be highlighted. To tell the truth, I was not really interested in exploring the FRG's oft-repeated trajectory from *Hungerjahre* to *Wirtschaftswunder*<sup>3</sup> and had accordingly allotted an embarrassingly short amount of time for the obligatory trip to Koblenz, where the Federal Republic's archival holdings were kept.

Based in Berlin, I began my research year in the East German archives. My first major research site was the archive of the former Central Institute of Nutrition of the Academy of Science of the German Democratic Republic, an institute that, unusually, survived the *Wende* and has since been remade and renamed, now the German Institute for Nutritional Research (*Deutsches Institut für Ernährungsforschung*, or DIfE). I began my research by introducing myself to the institute's librarian, Dagmar Kollhof, who had worked at the DIfE since the early 1980s and proved to be a wealth of information about food sciences, as well as everyday life in the GDR. Most importantly, she was an enthusiastic supporter of my vaguely described project on *Ernährungspolitik*.

One day early on in my research, I was sitting in the library thumbing through institutional records from the 1950s when an elderly man walked up to me. "Are you Frau Weinreb," he asked, "the woman who is interested in *Ernährungspolitik* in the GDR?" He introduced himself as Dr. Martin Zobel, one of the most important nutritionists of East Germany, and a man who had worked with the Institute since its formation during the Soviet occupation. With great conviction, Dr. Zobel explained to me that he had "exactly what you need" to complete this project. I was, of course, incredibly excited; at the time, I myself had little idea what I was looking for. Rather mysteriously, he handed me a piece of paper with the handwritten citations of ten articles: "Here it is," he said again, "exactly what you need." With bated breath, I thanked him profusely and immediately tracked down and xeroxed the articles, located in nutritional and economic journals spanning the four decades of the GDR. When I had gathered them all, I finally sat down to read them – only to realize, painfully, that they were all about the implementation and development of East Germany's school meal program. I was both frustrated and bored and after going through

2 Patrice Poutrus, "... mit Politik kann ich keine Hühner aufziehen.' Das Kombinat Industrielle Mast und die Lebenserinnerungen der Frau Knut," in *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur*, ed. Thomas Lindenberger (Cologne, 1999); Charlotte Brinkmann, "Bananen mit Ketchup. Esskultur: Beobachtungen in einer markt- und einer planwirtschaftlich orientierten Gesellschaft," in *Blick-Wechsel Ost-West: Beobachtungen zur Alltagskultur in Ost- und Westdeutschland*, ed. Wolfgang Kaschuba and Ute Mohrmann (Tübingen, 1992); Burghard Ciesla, "Eine sich selbst versorgende Konsumgesellschaft? Industrieller Fischfang, Fischverarbeitung und Fischwarenkonsum in der DDR," in *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur*, ed. Thomas Lindenberger (Cologne, 1999).

3 The titles of many books on the Federal Republic reflect this narrative. See Johannes Volker Wagner, *Vom Trümmerfeld ins Wirtschaftswunderland. Bochum 1945-1955: Eine Dokumentation* (Bochum, 1989); Klaus-Dieter Kraus, *Vom Kaugummi und der Schulspeisung bis hin zum Brausepulver* (Bochum, 2001).

them several times to make sure I had not missed any references to banana crises, or to popular anger over poorly stocked grocery stores, I put away the articles and returned to combing through the archives looking for the stories of high conflict that I envisioned when I conceptualized *Ernährungspolitik*.

A few months later, with a vast amount of fascinating material from the DfE but no clearer idea of what the “politics of food” really meant, I traveled to my first West German archive. I began my research at the wonderful city archive in Cologne. Happily for me, the remarkably friendly and knowledgeable archivist here also “knew” exactly what I needed for this project. “Ah,” he said, “*Ernährungspolitik*. You need the files from the occupation years – the ‘hunger years.’ *That* was the time when food was political.” As with school lunches, at the time I was not particularly interested in the hunger years, a time in German history that seemed to have been exhaustively studied and whose symbolic and material meaning for postwar Germany seemed clear. Indeed, the hunger years were the single aspect of the “food history” of postwar West Germany to have already received a remarkable amount of scholarly and popular attention. However, being polite, I smiled and nodded – and accepted the material that he had prepared for me: a slim folder titled simply *Hungertod*. To be honest, I was a little disappointed with the content. Instead of lurid details of mass starvation and suffering, the file contained two brief cases – a doctor’s narrative of the death of a woman named Henriette Michel, and an autopsy report. Nonetheless, I dutifully transcribed them both.

Neither of these incidents – the articles on the East German school meal program, or the Cologne *Hungertod* folder – seemed particularly interesting to me at the time, nor did they immediately provoke any reflection about what my project was about. Instead, I set aside the convictions of my East and West German informants in my quest to find materials to tell the story that I wanted to tell. It was not until I had completed my research year, and finally began to process my materials, that I remembered what those two researchers – and many others I had casually talked to over the course of my research – had told me. Perhaps Dr. Zobel was on to something, I thought, as I realized that much as I had tried to avoid it, the materials that I had gathered on the GDR were dominated by the issue of collective feeding programs, in particular in schools and factories. And despite my initial intention to begin the dissertation with the year 1949, my

holdings from the Federal Republic included a disconcerting amount of material on the immediate postwar years.

As a result, I began to think more carefully and historically about the category of hunger in German history, which led to a new understanding of my project as reaching back not only to the Third Reich but to the deprivations of World War I and the experiences and memories of the infamous British Hunger Blockade. When my postwar sources evoked hunger, it was not simply a physical sensation but a personal memory, a historical legacy or cultural symbol. The further back in time I explored, the more I came to understand, as James Vernon recently reminded us, that hunger always has a history.<sup>4</sup> Never was German hunger something that existed in a vacuum, as an exclusively German concern. Indeed, much of what gave German hunger in particular, its power as a category was the fact that it was recognized as significant by non-German powers, especially British and American politicians and economists. Unexpectedly, military leaders and politicians ranging from Herbert Hoover to Winston Churchill to Henry Morgenthau became key figures for thinking about the ways in which the German past informed memories, fantasies, and expectations of hunger and satiety after the Second World War.

After the First World War, most of the world believed that the primary cause of Germany's defeat had been Britain's infamous Hunger Blockade. Through most of the war and after its end, Great Britain had used its naval power to block overseas imports of food into the enemy country. The resulting domestic food shortages devastated the German civilian population, ultimately eroding popular support for the war.<sup>5</sup> This mass hunger, experienced as an unjust weapon of war and the cause of military defeat, definitively shaped the interwar years.<sup>6</sup> Hunger became inextricably linked with German experiences of war and of defeat. As the Berlin Medical Association painfully explained in a 1919 convention documenting the harm the blockade had done to German bodies: "[W]e have already spent of our bodies as much as is possible; no other nation has ever quietly and patiently stood such privations."<sup>7</sup> Long after the blockade had been replaced by the more general deprivations of the global depression of the interwar years, Germans continued to evoke the Hunger Blockade as an explanation for both the loss of the war and the general chaos of the Weimar years.

During the hungry thirties, the Nazi Party actively promoted the view that the First World War had been lost not by military defeat but due

4 James Vernon, *Hunger: A Modern History* (Cambridge, 2007).

5 For a discussion of the importance of food concerns for popular German attitudes toward the state see Belinda Davis, *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (Chapel Hill, 2000).

6 Alf Lüdtke, "Hunger in der grossen Depression. Hungererfahrungen und Hungerpolitik am Ende der Weimarer Republik," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 27 (1987): 145-76, 170.

7 Berliner Medizinische Gesellschaft, *The Starving of Germany: Papers Read at Extraordinary Meeting of United Medical Societies Held at Headquarters of Berlin Medical Society, Berlin, December 18th, 1918* (Berlin, 1919), 7.

to a hunger-based collapse of the home front: “In the [First] World War, our weapons remained unvanquished; it was hunger that made the *Volk* cave in.”<sup>8</sup> During the war, Hitler promised the populace that they would never suffer from hunger again, identifying himself as a safeguard against that most nefarious of threats. As a 1944 Nazi pamphlet put it: “[A]s paralyzed as the Germans were in the face of the threat of hunger before 1933, just as thorough were the defensive measures that Adolf Hitler established when he came to power. Today the front stands firm against hunger.”<sup>9</sup> That same year, a moment when civilian rations had dropped dramatically and the food distribution system was in complete disarray, an optimistic nutritionist reported that “simple statistics do not adequately convey the degree to which the current food situation is better than that of the First World War.”<sup>10</sup> Parallel to such reassurances, Hitler’s propaganda apparatus warned the public that German defeat would result in mass starvation. Not only had the blockade confirmed Germany’s nutritional vulnerability; it had also established the Allies as wielders of the devastating “hunger-weapon,” and the Axis powers—and especially Germans—as their favorite targets.<sup>11</sup> As I explored these themes, I realized that I had to grapple with hunger as a crucial category of experience and self-identification that cast a long shadow over the postwar era.

I also increasingly came to think that any narrative about food and nutrition in the GDR needed to address collective feeding programs. Indeed, I originally conceptualized this theme as paradigmatically “communist.” In other words, collective feeding programs were important for understanding East German history because the country was communist. This belief echoed West German discourse; nutritionists from the FRG explicitly linked family meals with liberal democracy and collective eating with both Nazism and Communism.<sup>12</sup> My early discovery that West Germany had canceled its school lunch program in 1950 at first seemed to support these linkages. However, when I examined the evolution of collective feeding policy, I discovered not only that the Nazi Party had discouraged school meals during the Third Reich, instead steadfastly promoting maternal meal preparation for German children,<sup>13</sup> but also that capitalist countries had embraced school lunches after 1945 even more consistently than communist ones. On June 4th, 1946, United States President Truman famously signed the National School Lunch Act, claiming that “[C]ongress has acted with great wisdom in providing the basis for strengthening the nation through better nutrition for our school children ... In the long view, no nation is any healthier than

8 Cited in Hans-Erich Volkmann, “Landwirtschaft und Ernährung in Hitlers Europa, 1939-45,” *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen* 35, no. 1 (1984): 9-74, 9.

9 See Eberhard von der Decken, “Die Front gegen den Hunger: Ernährungskrieg 1939/43,” *Gemeinschaftsverpflegung mit Volksernährung*, no. 15 (August 1944).

10 “Kriegsernährung einst und heute,” *Gemeinschaftsverpflegung mit Volksernährung*, no. 13 (July 1944).

11 Von der Decken, “Die Front gegen den Hunger: Ernährungskrieg 1939/43.”

12 “Schulspeisung gefährdet Eßkultur” BArch B 142 / 447.

13 “Wie meistere ich die Familiennahrung trotz Berufsarbeit?” *Zeitschrift für Volksernährung* 6 (March 1943); Reichsausschuß für Volkswirtschaftliche Aufklärung, *Ernährungspolitik und Schule* (Berlin, 1938).

its children or more prosperous than its farmers; and in the National School Lunch Act, the congress has contributed immensely both to the welfare of our farmers and the health of our children.”<sup>14</sup> Early Cold War America in fact claimed that school meals would “dispel the gloom of Nazism and Communism from the face of the earth,” as “dictator nations exist upon hungry bodies and befuddled minds.”<sup>15</sup> In this postwar embrace of the school meal, it comes as little surprise that a 1951 UNESCO study of childhood health found that school meal programs were being expanded in every country examined, including India, Czechoslovakia, and France, with the exception of the Federal Republic.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, rather than designating the Federal Republic as democratic or Western, the absence of school meals should be seen as a specifically West German cultural form of self-identification. In the words of the young nation’s leading nutritionists, “German parents want to have their children at home for their meals for educational reasons and to strengthen family life.”<sup>17</sup> As a result, it was claimed that school meals could never be part of West Germany’s nutritional policy. The East German state, by contrast, embraced school meals as a positive marker of modernity, while also casting them as a socialist virtue. Here school meals were an expression of “the humanistic character of the socialist social structure, in which children are cared for and treated as a precious resource. Concern and care for the young generation is an essential part of the socialist state, and another site that reveals its superiority over capitalist society.”<sup>18</sup> As I traced these narratives, I realized that neither specific ways of eating nor the presence or absence of hunger mapped neatly onto Cold War or German/non-German divisions. Instead, categories of hunger, satiety, and overabundance intersected in unpredictable places and in fascinating ways both over time and across the East-West divide.

The dissertation that emerged from my research, titled *Matters of Taste: The Politics of Food in Divided Germany 1945-1971*, traces the political and cultural economy of food in East and West Germany from the years of occupation through the first decades of the Cold War. By using food as its primary lens of analysis, my research attempts to develop a new analytical and methodological approach to modern European and global history. It does so by exploring the ways in which food concerns, nutritional policies, and hunger fantasies shaped the development of the two postwar German states. My work reveals the interconnectedness of the GDR and the FRG and challenges many of

14 Cited in Kelly D. Brownell and Katherine Battle Horgen, *Food Fight: The Inside Story of the Food Industry, America's Obesity Crisis, and What We Can Do about It* (Chicago, 2004), 163.

15 Cited in Susan Levine, *School Lunch Politics: The Surprising History of America's Favorite Welfare Program* (Princeton, 2008), 82.

16 International Bureau of Education, *School Meals and Clothing* (Paris, 1951), 57-58.

17 Heinrich Kraut and Willy Wirths, *Mehr Wissen um Ernährung. Berichte über Studienreisen im Rahmen der Auslandshilfe der USA* (Frankfurt am Main, 1955), 104.

18 Cited in Rainer Gries, *Die Rationen-Gesellschaft: Versorgungskampf und Vergleichsmentalität: Leipzig, München und Köln nach dem Kriege* (Münster, 1991), 113.

the chronological and geographic divisions that have defined both German and Cold War historiography. It also highlights the ways in which ideas of gender, nation, and race, particularly the categories of Slavs and of Jews, were implicated in the everyday food practices of the populations of the two German states. In other words, theories and practices of cooking, shopping, eating, and feeding others were central to postwar definitions of communism, capitalism, and democracy. *Matters of Taste* offers new insights not only into the history of the FRG and the GDR, but into the global networks that shaped and were shaped by World War II and the Cold War. My wide chronological scope, reaching from the Nazi years through to unification in 1989/90, allows me to trace longer-term institutional developments as well as cultural discourse. The scope thus allows continuities and ruptures to emerge over both space and time, connections which are contextualized by both World War II and the Cold War.

## II. Hunger and Germany

The outbreak of the Second World War meant that concerns over mass hunger suddenly shifted from the Third World to Europe, where food and nutrition were understood as central to the war itself, and in turn to the postwar world. The war, with its origins in global depression and its resolution characterized by promised prosperity and the division of the world into socialist and capitalist halves, has long been mythologized as the decisive turning point of the twentieth century. This was a war whose scale and impact were measured in terms of food lost and people starved. It was a time when the recognition of the global ramifications of hunger meant that postwar reconstruction centered on nutrition and food distribution, ensuring that nutritional science was “critical to an internationalist vision for the reconstruction of postwar Europe.”<sup>19</sup> The postwar era revealed a commitment to the “vast enterprise of providing food for health for all people,” an undertaking “beset with difficulties” and “requiring international collaboration” in order to succeed.<sup>20</sup> Both the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) were responses to the hunger generated by the war, underscoring the fact that “the construction of a postwar international order began with food.”<sup>21</sup> Indeed, the postwar period was a time when hunger seemed the greatest enemy of civilization at the same time that global food production was skyrocketing. Although the official “global food crisis” was considered over by the beginning of

19 Vernon, *Hunger*, 151.

20 D. John Shaw, *World Food Security: A History since 1945* (Basingstoke, 2007), 21.

21 Nick Cullather, “The Foreign Policy of the Calorie,” *American Historical Review* 112, no. 2 (April 2007): 337–64 esp. 362.

the 1950s, it ensured that the postwar era was shadowed by concerns over food shortages.

Rather than being a clear medical or biological state of being, hunger was and is a highly mutable concept. In the case of defeated and divided Germany, moreover, hunger was uniquely contested, consequential, and public. In the aftermath of the Third Reich and the Holocaust, ruled by the conflicting powers of the Americans, Soviets, British and French, dependent upon foreign food aid while convinced of their own imminent starvation, the people of Germany were unsurprisingly obsessed with their hunger. Critically engaging with and historicizing this obsession challenges widely held assumptions that hunger is a category worthy of historical analysis only when it is obviously present. Both the Cold War and the postwar relied upon the intertwined categories of hunger and satiety in order to define the years between 1945 and 1989, shaping them in reference to a time of hunger (the past of the war and the Depression) and a space of hunger (the Socialist East, the exploitative West, and the Third World).

Not only the reality and fear of famine, but also the production, distribution, and consumption of food shaped the emergent Cold War. Struggles over food production and consumption across divided Germany shaped not only specific policies but also emerging redefinitions of the place of the factory, school, and home in the new postwar order. The hunger suffered by Germans after the war was connected causally and symbolically to the (non-German) hunger caused by Germans during the war, most infamously in the context of the Holocaust. Both the rhetorical evocation and deliberate manipulation of hunger were central to Nazi social and economic policy, and in quite different ways for the capitalist and socialist societies that emerged out of defeat and occupation. At the same time, though, divided Germany was not simply the most obvious stage for “watching” the larger Cold War unfold; instead, the populations and states of both East and West Germany actively shaped postwar developments. Out of a hungry past, the two German states attempted to construct new, ideologically opposed postwar identities. In West Germany, debates over cooking and eating were central in the project of redefining the ideal worker, child and housewife – three central figures for the transition of the FRG from a Nazified society and pariah-state to one of the most successful modern democracies and capitalist economies in the postwar world. In different but related ways, the GDR struggled to create communist and German versions of these paradigmatic

modern bodies – ones that were equally central to their productivist, rather than consumerist, ideology. My dissertation argues that this vocabulary of food and hunger was as connected to the past “hot” war as they were to the current “cold” one.

During the years of his rule, Hitler displayed a remarkably sophisticated grasp of the political power of food and hunger.<sup>22</sup> The Nazi Party came to power during the hungry thirties, when much of the world was suffering from food shortages and economic depression. Nonetheless, Nazi Germany was alone in extracting such meaning and power from the physiological experience of hunger; nowhere else did hunger become a necessary category of belonging; and nowhere else did hunger seem both the most feared enemy and the most intimate friend of the state. Propagating a narrative of the German past in which military defeat and civilian suffering were both the cause and result of mass hunger, the Nazis measured military success and economic development through control over food. In other words, German national survival was cast as a battle against hunger.

Over the course of the Third Reich, hunger was continually redefined in the attempt to convince the population that it was well fed, and, simultaneously, that the Nazis were its only defense against a global plot for German starvation. Drawing upon Christian imagery of self-abnegation and the purifying force of hunger, Nazi rhetoric used hunger-based fantasies to define the *Volksgemeinschaft* and the Aryan race. According to the Nazis, military *victory* guaranteed access to vast food supplies; defeat, however, was linked to starvation. Nazi media regularly reported on mass famines in India, Asia, and Africa, blaming them on deliberate “hunger-policies” of the “British, Americans and Bolsheviks”; it assured the population that the Allies actively hoped for the “extermination of the German people through hunger.”<sup>23</sup> Such warnings proved remarkably successful at maintaining civilian allegiance to the Third Reich. The Nazi Party used hunger and food discourse to construct the *Volksgemeinschaft* by identifying a specifically Germanic sort of hunger that was intrinsically different from the hungers suffered by other races, especially Slavs and Jews.

At the same time that the Nazis were developing their own unique “hunger discourse,” the Allies were also evoking similar fears of widespread famine. As the war dragged on, and casualties grew to previously unimaginable numbers, all sides agreed that control over food supplies would determine victory and defeat. The Allies, and indeed most of the world, saw Germany as the primary source of the

22 For more on the importance of the Hunger Blockade for the Nazi Party, see Ludolf Herbst, *Der totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft: Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda, 1939-1945* (Stuttgart, 1982).

23 “Hinter glänzender Fassade: Hunger!” *Gemeinschaftspflege mit Volksernährung*, no. 4 (February 1944); “Deutschland gab Europa mehr zu essen. UNRRA bedeutet Hungersnot,” *Gemeinschaftspflege mit Volksernährung*, no. 20 (1944).

widespread hunger that existed in Europe for the entire war period, albeit in different places and at different times. The Western Allies linked starvation to the Third Reich not so much because of what we now think of as the Holocaust, with images of starving concentration camp inmates, but out of fear of the devastating impact of Nazi food seizures and the destruction of food production capabilities across Europe. In particular, the famines of Western Europe, especially in Belgium and the Netherlands, preoccupied the American and British forces during the war. Jews and communists from Europe and the

United States also cast the Third Reich as a “Hunger Reich,” but they focused their critique on the Nazi treatment of the occupied lands of Eastern Europe, often specifically focusing on inequitable and racially based rationing programs (see Figure 1). Thus, all participants in the war – Axis and Allied forces, soldiers and civilians, Nazis, communists and Jews – imagined, experienced, and strategized the war with a vocabulary of food and hunger. As a result, the forces that were to occupy defeated Germany shared with the local population a language of fears and aspirations based on calories and nutritional status.

After the end of the war, the mass emergence of hunger on German soil seemed almost inevitable, especially to the men and women living in the four zones of occupation. In the aftermath of the war and the Holocaust, the German past had been officially gutted of all positive force, leaving a population without a center, and with empty bellies. At the same time, this emptiness offered Germans a remarkable opportunity. The end of Europe’s Second World War was a moment and a place primed to recognize, fear, and empathize with starvation. The use of hunger as a weapon by both Axis and Allied forces during the war, the unprecedented scale of wartime hunger and civilian famine, drops in agricultural productivity and a shift away from colonial and toward globalized trade relations, along with global food shortages, all meant that the Allied forces had been predicting postwar hunger since the early days of the war. At the same time, a widespread belief that hunger caused political unrest and revolution,




Figure 1. Starvation over Europe. Table “Racial Feeding II.” From: Boris Shub, Zorah Warhaftig, and Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Starvation over Europe (made in Germany). A Documented Record, 1943* (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish Congress and World Jewish Congress, 1943), 48.

and that it had led to the rise of Nazism, meant that German hunger received particular attention in international postwar discourse.

I argue that the hunger experienced by Germans after World War II served multiple purposes, connecting the current moment with the Nazi past while simultaneously engaging with new concerns over the threat of global hunger and the politics of food aid. Negotiations over this hunger were contested, unstable, and had tremendous consequences not only for the development of Germany but for the establishment of international languages of humanitarianism and for food aid policy at large. I became interested in exploring the multiple meanings attached to hunger during the years of occupation, and particularly in the multiple, and often mutually exclusive, categories of identification and community-formation that aligned with the diagnosis of “being hungry.” There are three primary framings for hunger that dominate the archival records. The first category is that of German-ness; immediately after the end of the war, hunger became the single most meaningful marker of a German identity at the same time that it proved profoundly unknowable. By concentrating on medical discourse, the rich body of articles and medical reports by German and Allied doctors diagnosing and analyzing the state of the German civilian population after the collapse of the Third Reich, my research explores the fluid and ultimately indefinable nature of “hunger” as a quantifiable medical category.

The centrality of hunger for the postwar era meant that almost as soon as the war was over, Germans began describing this time as the “Hunger Years.” Men and women in all four zones experienced their collective and individual hunger as inseparable from military defeat, occupation and, gradually, reconstruction. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Third Reich, the first months and years of occupation witnessed the emergence of a collective narrative of German hunger that was rooted in the various traumas of the twentieth century, and that made German-ness itself synonymous with the constant threat of hunger. The German *Volk* was remade as a people joined not by links of blood and soil, or a shared experience of war and defeat, but rather by the common experience of hunger: “[T]he hunger disease today has attacked our entire *Volk* and knows no social distinctions.”<sup>24</sup> The voices of German civilians, politicians, doctors, and public figures all agreed that “we hunger all together.”<sup>25</sup> By asserting this politicized and internationally relevant form of suffering, these German voices documented the degeneration of their bodies in painful detail in order

24 Ferdinand Bertram, “Über Ernährungsschäden vom Standpunkt der zentralen Regulationen Teil II,” *Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift*, no. 5/8 (February 1948.)

25 Quoted in Günter J. Trittel, *Hunger und Politik: die Ernährungskrise in der Bizone (1945-1949)* (Frankfurt, 1990), 110.

to display their innocence and powerlessness, just as these performances of suffering forged new bonds of shared victimization.

In the specific context of occupied Germany, hunger also acquired the ability to explicitly transform its sufferer into a victim of Nazism. I explore the ways in which hunger became a specifically postwar category of suffering, one that was granted an apolitical universality in accordance with international political and economic pressures to establish new networks of humanitarian aid alongside international networks of trade and exchange. The liberation of Nazi concentration camps created a new scale for measuring hunger, which came to be associated with the most grotesque crimes of the Third Reich, particularly the mass starvation of Jews and Soviet prisoners of war. The Holocaust's new vocabulary and images of hunger shaped the development of the postwar food economy and global food aid programs. As a result, German doctors and civilians knowingly exploited the vocabulary and imagery that had been produced by Nazi starvation policies in order to align themselves with the victims of the Third Reich. Not only did their hunger mark them as innocent victims of dictatorship; it also allowed Germans to display a particularly modern self-identification. In their own scrawny bodies, defeated Germans saw an expression of their own suffering, as their connection to Nazism and the horrors of the war melted away with their excess flesh.

At the same time, the new Cold War categories of "communist" and "capitalist" were translated and performed as both gustatory and political. It is not a coincidence that the first great clash of the Cold War, the Berlin Airlift, revolved around the feeding or starving of the German civilian population. Indeed, I argue that a central purpose of the airlift was to validate some hungers and invalidate others. On the one hand, the airlift defined non-Jewish, anti-communist civilian Germans as the ultimate postwar victims of hunger. It also, equally importantly, established the central food-based categories of the Cold War that shaped German division: the communist Soviets as deprivers of food, and the capitalist Americans as providers (see Figure 2). The occupation and division of Germany not only provided a central stage for watching the developing Cold War take shape. The conflicts and compromises between the Allied powers, and between individual occupation powers and the German civilian population, went on to become crucial for the nature and scope of the global Cold War itself.

### III. Eating and Feeding in the Cold War

Because the end of the war brought with it the complete breakdown of the German economy, ushering in a time of grim shortages and widespread hunger, the immediate postwar era focused an inordinate amount of attention on the regulation of consumption and the increase of productivity. Thus, after the war both the FRG and the GDR came to see domestic food production—wives' and mothers' "home cooking"—as necessary for the successful (re)construction of the German family and state. Yet, despite radically different rhetorics over the gendered nature of labor, both East and West Germany expressed great discomfort with the meaning and nature of female domestic labor, especially cooking. It is against this backdrop that the private home, and above all the dinner table, became one of the most important places for postwar Germans to negotiate the relationship between everyday life and modernity. Both East and West Germans claimed the family meal as central to negotiating individual and collective relationships to the past and the future, and for the shaping of labor and leisure during the postwar decades.

#### *The Home-Cooked Meal*

In the aftermath of a devastating war and even more devastating defeat, women were seen as the primary placeholders of a "German-ness" that had been rendered largely untenable in the eyes of the world. Through her tireless struggles during the hunger years, the German woman had come to embody the values that had traditionally defined German culture: a strong work ethic, sense of self-sacrifice, dedication, and absolute commitment to a higher good: her family. In particular, women's work at feeding their families during these years of shortages signaled Germany's transition from Nazism toward a new socialist or capitalist modernity.<sup>26</sup> The family meal, a model of food production and consumption that had only become widespread in the early twentieth century, symbolized all that postwar Germans imagined they had lost due to the war and occupation, and all they hoped to regain: familial integrity, physical and spiritual health,



**Figure 2. Cartoon of Berlin Airlift on the cover of *Operation Vittles Cook Book* (Compiled by the American Women in Blockaded Berlin; Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1949). The Berlin Airlift was dubbed "Operation Vittles" by the U.S. Military.**

<sup>26</sup> Elizabeth Heinemann, "The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and West German National Identity," in *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968*, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton, 2001), 21-56.

economic stability, and material well-being.<sup>27</sup> In the two German states, the family meal was central to negotiations over the definition of labor, exchanges between genders and generations, and the relationship between the individual and the collective. In both the socialist GDR and the capitalist FRG, remaking the family meal was both symbolic of and a necessary prerequisite to creating a healthy postwar German society.

The Federal Republic constructed the home-cooked meal as the symbolic heart of the West German economic miracle, the literal and metaphoric sustenance of a healthy and “occidental” German family. Postwar West Germans assigned a remarkable array of tasks and responsibilities to the home-cooked meal. It was supposed to maintain and improve the health of all eaters; it was to buoy up the economy and strengthen the consumer marketplace; it was a German housewife’s main outlet for creativity, pleasure, and self-expression; it should provide a needed counterpart to the German man’s stressful and rushed work environment by offering a vital opportunity to relax and slow down; it was a primary site of socialization and familial interaction; it was one of the last remaining ways to preserve German culture; and it was a site of childhood education. In the words of a 1953 consumer guide for housewives, purchasing and preparing food was “the core basis of all female activities, perhaps even the single most important one because it is the most natural expression of the highest task of the woman: motherhood and caring for the family.”<sup>28</sup> Because women’s cooking was thought to shape the family that consumed it, changing the kitchen seemed the easiest and most effective way of remaking that family, incorporating it into a new capitalist and consumer-based society while preserving, through the continued insistence on female cooking, traditional gender and familial relations. Indeed, through her kitchen, the housewife was located at the heart of West Germany’s economic miracle. As the primary shopper of the family, she became the icon of consumerism, and food was one of her most important commodities. Yet at the same time, her consumption of food transformed her into a producer of food for her children, thus making her not simply the “model consumer” but a complex figure who regulated familial consumption, production, and reproduction. (See Figure 3.)

27 Prof. Dr. med. J. Kühnau, “Die Frau als Hüterin der Ernährung,” in *Die Frau und ihre Ernährung*, ed. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ernährung (Frankfurt am Main, 1959), 8.

28 Liane Haskarl and Wolfgang Clauss, *Die Macht der Hausfrau. Eine ernährungswirtschaftliche Fibel für die Verbraucher* (Kiel, 1952), 34.

In dramatic contrast, the GDR was not caught up in an all-consuming search for the “harmonious unity” of a “traditionally” prepared and consumed home-cooked meal. Here, modernity was

officially embraced and celebrated; the establishment of a socialist state demanded a radical remaking of the traditional German diet and eating culture. Early on, socialist nutritionists declared an official battle with tradition. In 1950, less than a year after the country's founding, nutritionist Richard Schielicke announced that

“the movement away from the old traditions, which are found in abundance in our cuisine, is an absolute necessity.”<sup>29</sup> In the East, modernity's impact on family life was defined by an increase in female employment – but this was seen as positive both for the women themselves and, crucially, for their families. Heinrich Gräfe, leading dietician and public relations figure at the Institute of Nutritional Research, explained that the “incorporation of women into the public world” meant that “we must realize that their thousand-year-old duty to be responsible for the shaping of daily food intake can no longer be maintained.”<sup>30</sup> East German cookbooks condemned “the humiliation and exploitation associated with kitchen work,”<sup>31</sup> which was structurally linked to unappreciated labor, marital inequality, and improperly nourished children; all these were culinarily based problems to which socialism offered an alternative: the public canteen.

Thus, in the GDR, the primary freedom that the state offered women was not the freedom to shop but to work. As in the West, both consumption and reproduction remained associated with women, but they were explicitly subordinated to the “right” to perform paid labor. As a result, food and diet were shifted from the sphere of consumption to that of production. Household work, and especially cooking, was often denigrated or cast as an unpleasant chore – but its nature as work was never denied. Domestic labor was an obstacle to be overcome in the process of engaging women in the workforce.<sup>32</sup>



**Figure 3. Book cover of: Lilo Aureden, *Was Männern so gut schmeckt: Eine kulinarische Weltreise in 500 Rezepten* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1953).**

29 “An Fachbuchverlag,” Archive of the Deutsches Institut für Ernährungsforschung, folder 252, page 341.

30 Heinrich-Karl Gräfe, *Richtige Ernährung, gesunde Menschen*. (Leipzig, 1967), 120.

31 Kurt Drummer and Käthe Muskewitz, *Kochkunst aus dem Fernsehstudio: Rezepte, praktische Winke, literarische Anmerkungen* (Leipzig, 1968).

32 Irene Dölling, “Gesplantes Bewusstsein: Frauen- und Männerbilder in der DDR,” in *Frauen in Deutschland, 1945-1992*, ed. Gisela Helwig and Hildegard Maria Nickel (Bonn, 1993), 438.

The solution was communal meals, which were intended to reduce home cooking to a simple evening meal and the more elaborate Sunday lunch. Canteen cooking took on the primary responsibility for maintaining the biological and cultural health of the population. Despite this shift, family cooking retained tremendous significance in the GDR; it continued to consume the largest percentage of female household labor, it played an important role in socialization practices and defining familial structure, and it was located at the troubled heart of the GDR's complex and conflicted attempt to remake categories of production and consumption.

### ***School Meal Programs***

While the importance of domesticity and the ideological construction of the home for the Cold War have long been acknowledged, less attention has been paid to two other major sites of postwar economic and social development: the school and the factory. My dissertation begins to address this gap through careful studies of these places of postwar modernity and Cold War competition, with a chapter each on debates surrounding the factory canteen and the school meal program.

In the aftermath of war and occupation, the school acquired particular importance in connection with debates over children's health, the role that children were to play in the reconstruction of postwar Germany, and the appropriate relationship between the family and the state. These tensions were especially explosive when it came to the issue of the school lunch. One of the first major policy decisions of the FRG was its controversial decision to cancel the school lunch program in 1950. This made West Germany virtually the world's only industrialized nation without school lunches. In contrast, the GDR selected the school lunch program as one of its flagship programs, developing a system of school meal distribution with one of the world's highest participation rates. Indeed, throughout the duration of the Cold War, and despite growing pressure to remake and liberalize West Germany's educational structure, the country's mainstream medical establishment remained firmly convinced of an inherent tension between childhood health and school meals. Dr. Werner Droese, Director of the Institute for Child Nutrition in Dortmund, wrote in 1970 of the feeding dilemmas faced by the full-day school. Warning that "it is almost impossible for a school's collective feeding program to appropriately acknowledge the different appetites and individual

tastes of the schoolchild,” Droese feared the negative impact of such meals on the fragile body and more fragile ego of the growing child.<sup>33</sup> The West German schoolroom was imagined as a place to nourish democracy alongside individualism – both of which seemed gravely threatened by any sort of collective feeding program.

Unsurprisingly, the story was dramatically different in the Eastern part of the divided country. Here the end of occupation and the founding of the GDR did not lead to the end of school meals, but rather to their increased political, economic, and cultural value, as they were deliberately integrated into the formation of a new socialist state. While the East German government and its medical and educational authorities assumed that this new prioritization of *Schulspeisung* would be rapidly embraced by the population, in fact it took over a decade for the general population and, most of all, for mothers, to accept school meals as part of their children’s daily diet. Indeed, the social and economic goals of school meals as well as their cultural meaning changed over the course of the early postwar years due to pressures from mothers and children as well as changing economic realities. By exploring institutional changes and policy reform alongside letters of complaint from parents, teachers, and occasionally even children, I trace the highly differentiated evolution of school meals in the GDR, from one of the most contested state policies to its flagship nutritional program. Although the two German states shared basic nutritional standards and expectations for individual diets, they taught their children about diet in quite different ways. In the FRG, nutrition proved a way of teaching about the lost German lands that had been ceded to Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR after the war, whereas in the GDR, it was a way to encourage a locally focused “healthful” integration into the international socialist family/community.

### ***The Workplace Canteen***

In contrast to these radically divergent approaches to feeding children in East and West Germany, the workplace canteen was constructed as a site for negotiating the meaning and value of labor in *both* East and West Germany. In both German states, there was great concern over the impact of modern work on “worker health,” a category that implied a strong and effective masculinity, a racially delineated body, and an economically profitable model of productivity. Despite a consensus that canteens were an unavoidable aspect of a “modern”

33 Werner Droese and Helga Stolley, “Die Ernährung des Schulkindes,” *Ernährungs-Umschau* (1970): 519.

economy, East and West German nutritionists and economists saw their ideal function as dramatically different. In the GDR, the factory was claimed as the new center of a German socialist identity. In a land that identified itself through its workers, the factory was seen as the ultimate, even only, site of authentic labor. Canteen meals were literally intended to create a new collective, one opposed to the Nazi *Volksgemeinschaft*. In the West, the factory canteen was the only form of collective eating supported by the state, but this support was contingent on a highly classed and gendered definition of what the West German worker was. Here, canteens paradoxically became a way to reaffirm traditional class hierarchies and familial eating models.

During the early decades of the division, the feeding of workers was a crucial economic concern in both East and West Germany; the *Wirtschaftswunder* of the FRG demanded well-nourished laborers as much as the socialist system idealized collective feeding. Nutritionists in East and West Germany, and indeed throughout much of the world, argued that collective meals and eating outside of the home were definitional to industrial modernity, and they promoted workplace canteens as both necessary and advantageous for a strong national economy. In the GDR, nutritionists, economists, and social theorists crafted a model of the factory canteen as the symbolic crux of the country's development. Indeed, the canteen had an ideological significance in the GDR unmatched by any other aspect of the food economy:

[O]f all the policies which were created to realize our goal [of socialism] since the new construction of our entire society after the collapse of 1945, particularly significant is the enabling of our workers to partake in the communal feeding program, which distributes a warm meal during their time of work in the factory, and not simply any meal, but a meal that in always improving quality, preparation and healthfulness matches the requirements of the newest nutritional sciences.<sup>34</sup>

34 "So sollte eine Werkküche geplant und eingerichtet werden," *Die neuzeitliche Gaststätte*, no. 6 (1956).

35 Mark Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge, 2005).

East German canteen meals are particularly interesting because they complicate the traditional critique made of the Soviet zone of occupation and East Germany, namely that the Soviet authorities and then the East German government focused their energies on production at the expense of consumer culture and consumption.<sup>35</sup> There was one

sort of consumption which even the most radical communist could not put aside until the reconstruction of the German economy was complete: the feeding of workers. The factory canteen was seen as the crux of adult socialist society, a place where all East German men and women came together to eat and to learn about nutrition. The canteen did little to change traditional culinary gender hierarchies, as women continued to be the primary domestic food producers. However, both men and women, as workers, were also seen for the first time as productive consumers of food.

In contrast to the GDR, West Germany lacked a unified opinion as to the shape and aims of workplace canteens, places that proved difficult to integrate into the Federal Republic's self-understanding as a consumer-based and family-centered society. Unlike the situation in socialist countries as well as in most of Western Europe, where canteens were conceptualized as primarily blue-collar institutions, here the canteen was integrated into the middle-class ideal of the *Wohlstandsgesellschaft* or "Prosperity Society." West Germans linked full bellies with the successful overcoming of the Nazi past and their integration into the anti-communist, Christian West. As a result, these full bellies were ideologically over-determined—and they were not associated with the workplace collective but with the private family table. West Germans assumed an innately human, and especially German "internal revulsion toward mass feeding, toward the *Abfütterung* [feeding of animals] or however else the workers tend to disparagingly name the canteen meal."<sup>36</sup> Canteens were thought to threaten Germans' hard-won democratic individualism. Rather than liberating women and strengthening community, West German nutritionists saw canteens as both cause and effect of a marked degeneration in the family.

Consequently, the West German canteen was remade as both capitalist and Christian, complete with frequent references to the communal eating traditions of the New Testament, as well as pseudo-ethnographic invocations of a Germanic heritage of shared meals. As canteens removed workers' diets from housewives' control, they become alternate sites of leisure, pleasure, and consumption. Thus, the FRG's canteens were reshaped to confirm and strengthen firmly held notions of the interdependence but separateness of the public and private spheres, and of production and consumption. Rather than emphasizing the nutritional makeup of the food, West German canteen advisors focused on the pleasure of the consumer; tasty

36 "Für und Wider den grossen Topf," *Das Großküchen-Magazin* 1, no. 3 (1949).

rather than healthy meals promised to increase an employee's sense of indebtedness to his employer.

#### **IV. Culinary Memories and Hunger Fantasies in Unified Germany**

My dissertation's three thematic chapters on the home-cooked meal, school meal programs, and workplace canteens trace the changing nutritional debates, economic policies, and cultural expectations that surrounded the figures of the housewife, school-child, and worker through the Cold War. Of course, these three categories were disturbingly fluid, and in fact they often overlapped and flowed into one another. Men cooked, women worked, and children both cooked and worked. Nonetheless, my dissertation argues that specific ways of eating were central to the delineation of these three categories as key societal tropes. These three bodies all needed, in different ways, to be resuscitated and reclaimed after the horrors and hungers of the war and occupation. Food provided the means to realize this vast project of creating "new Germans" for two new German states. At the same time, although this project was a specifically German one, it was also inextricably intertwined with larger, international Cold War projects to define a new post-war modernity that was split between communism and capitalism. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the end of the Cold War itself was also a gustatory experience.

On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. In the days and weeks that followed, throngs of East Germans rushed across the newly permeable border. Giddy men, women, and children filled the small towns and cities that had lined the western side of the Wall. West Berlin, in particular, was overwhelmed; roads were impassable, shops sold out of most of their products, and normal life briefly ground to a halt. That same month, the Federal Republic's satiric magazine *Titanic* published an issue dedicated to this historic moment. The November 1989 cover image depicted a smiling "Zonen-Gaby," or "Gaby from the [Eastern] zone." (See Figure 4.) In her left hand, she clutches an enormous cucumber, carefully peeled so that strips of green skin fall down the cucumber's flesh like a banana peel. The headline is Gaby's proud declaration: "My first banana." The *Titanic* picture was only the most famous in a veritable flood of cartoons and images memorializing the fall of the Wall, an overwhelming number of which focused on bananas.

Bananas, indeed, seemed well-nigh ubiquitous during the drama of unification. In Berlin, groups of West German retirees gathered at the Brandenburg Gate to greet East German newcomers with free bananas. Photos of frantic grocers trying to protect mounds of bananas from the appetites of long-deprived Easterners projected a mixture of humor and very real fear. Bananas had long been an obsession for both East and West Germans, who recognized them as one of the most important symbols of postwar prosperity. In the early 1950s and over the angry protests of France and most of Western Europe, West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer had successfully negotiated the Federal Republic of Germany's exclusive right to import bananas tax-free, making them one of West Germany's cheapest fruits and ensuring that West Germans would become Europe's leading banana consumers. West Germany's incredibly cheap banana supply was enabled by the country's reliance on the American-controlled banana trade, the United States' infamous access to its neighboring "banana republics."<sup>37</sup> It was after World War II, in the wake of decolonization and the emergence of the Cold War, that the international banana market exploded. American control over the market was solidified through the consolidation of the banana industry in Central and South America. (In contrast, former European colonial powers like France and England were contractually bound to import bananas from their former colonies—Guadalupe, Martinique, Grenada, St. Lucia—at far higher prices.)

Adenauer's economic policy was intended to elevate bananas to a position of particular significance within divided Germany – it was a fruit deliberately transformed into one of the most important symbols of postwar prosperity and luxury as well as Western consumption. Bananas were steadily integrated into daily eating habits, as housewives were taught to broil, fry, and mash them, serving them with sweet desserts as well as savory roasts, in drinks and as confections. In 1961, the country produced its first cookbook dedicated exclusively to banana recipes.<sup>38</sup> In 1989, the year of unification, West German banana consumption reached a new peak, importing 800,000 tons



**Figure 4. “Zonen-Gaby” on the cover of *Titanic* (November 1989)**

37 Kabinettsprotokoll der Bundesregierung, 66. Sitzung am 12. März 1957, Tagesordnungspunkt A.: Deutsch-französische Verhandlungen über den Bananenzoll im gemeinsamen Außenzolltarif des Gemeinsamen Marktes, [http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/x/x1956e/kap1\\_2/kap2\\_29/para3\\_6.html](http://www.bundesarchiv.de/cocoon/barch/0000/x/x1956e/kap1_2/kap2_29/para3_6.html)

38 Hans Karl Adam, *Bananen-Schlemmereien: ein mannigfaltiges Rezeptbuch* (Munich, 1961).

of bananas, with the average West German eating 14 kilos a year.<sup>39</sup> In contrast, the government of East Germany had little access to bananas, though even the geeky Gaby was unlikely to have never enjoyed the mystical pleasures of the fruit. The small socialist country's primary source of tropical fruits, Cuba, was not a banana producer, and supplies from North Africa and Asia were unreliable, of inferior quality, and often prohibitively expensive. Even during the peak of the GDR's consumer prosperity, bananas, like most tropical fruits, were available only during holidays and special events, and then in limited quantities.

The ubiquity of bananas in German unification discourse cannot be explained by the fruit's excessive consumption in the West and its scarcity in the East. Figures like Gaby derived their power and resonance not from the real absence of the fruit in the GDR, but from West German assumptions of a specific and insatiable East German hunger. This particular fantasy had endured from the hunger years through the decades of division and ensured that, when the Wall fell, West Germans were convinced that it was an appetite for bananas which had finally motivated the people of East Germany to "tear down that wall."

Although the skyrocketing levels of banana consumption in the immediate aftermath of unification quickly stabilized, there is no doubt that unification radically increased former East Germans' banana eating habits. East Germans, however, were not the only ones whose banana consumption was changed by the events of November 1989. With German unification, the European Union finally called a halt to the country's decidedly special treatment. In 1991, German newspapers began to warn with horror that "Brussels is determined to raise the banana price drastically" – indeed, prices rapidly rose, becoming equivalent to those of the rest of Western Europe for the first time since the end of the war.<sup>40</sup> Although East German appetites could not really be held responsible for bananas' rising price and resulting decreased availability, the coinciding of reunification with the establishment of a standardized EU banana import tax certainly did not go unnoticed. When I first moved to Berlin in the late 1990s, I was completely perplexed by the frequency of headlines in the papers grimly tracing the rising cost of bananas. No longer were bananas cheaper than homegrown produce, cheap enough to be given away with impunity to poor friends and hungry relatives. Small wonder that a 1991 cartoon depicted a West German man slipping on a banana peel and screaming as he fell: "Damned reunification!"<sup>41</sup>

39 Ursula Brunner and Rudi Pfeifer, *Zum Beispiel Bananen* (Göttingen, 1993), 73.

40 Georg Seefßen, "Die Banane. Ein mythopolitischer Bericht," in *Mauer-show: das Ende der DDR, die deutsche Einheit und die Medien*, ed. Rainer Bohn, Knut Hieckthier and Eggo Müller (Berlin: 1992), 55-69, 55.

41 *Eulenspiegel* (May 1991).

In today's unified Germany, the former German Democratic Republic is popularly remembered in terms of specific flavors, smells and "tastes," a phenomenon described with the term *Ostalgie*, or nostalgia for the East. The phenomenon of *Ostalgie* frequently focuses on food products and recipes "native" to the former GDR. Movies like the international hit *Goodbye, Lenin* highlight processed foods, especially sausages and Spreewald pickles, as evocative symbols of the vanished country. Exhibits on the former East Germany inevitably display an array of canned, pickled, and packaged foods alongside kitchen utensils and cooking equipment. An entire genre of cookbooks dedicated to the recipes of the GDR has emerged, popular among citizens from both former German states. Some are primarily intended as entertainment and include anecdotes, songs, and advertisements from the GDR in an effort to recreate lived experience from a dietary perspective.<sup>42</sup> Taken for granted in all of these representations of the former GDR, however, is the fact that such culinary information preserves a meaningful and revealing aspect of the vanished country.

My research argues that hunger and food were crucial for how both East and West Germans understood themselves and each other for the entire duration of the Cold War. By exploring the ways in which food concerns, nutritional policies, and hunger fantasies shaped the development of the two postwar German states, my dissertation explores the interconnectedness of the GDR and the FRG while embedding both states within the global networks that were produced by World War II and the Cold War. Concerns over food, hunger, and nutrition connected schools, factories and private homes in East and West Germany and were pivotal for specifically postwar refashionings of the worker, child and housewife. Unsurprisingly, the particular nexus of food, politics, and popular practice that emerged during the Cold War has had a long legacy. In present-day unified Germany, concerns over high numbers of immigrants, poor educational testing results, and economic stagnation have led to reconsiderations of school lunch policies and other collective feeding programs, eliciting strong reactions from state officials, parents, factory employees, business owners, and political activists.<sup>43</sup> Thus, while I show that evolving practices of cooking, shopping, eating and feeding others were central to specifically postwar definitions of communism, capitalism, and democracy, my research also opens up larger questions of the relationship between production, consumption, and cultural identity that resonate in other contemporary contexts. The specific weight and meaning of the German past, the war, and the Holocaust, shaped

42 Thomas Heubner, *So schmeckte es in der DDR: Ein Lach- und Sachbuch vom Essen und Trinken* (Berlin, 2004), 191.

43 A recent *New York Times* article, for example, explored how an ongoing switch to all-day school schedules—and consequently expanded school lunch programs—brought to light stark divides over questions of economic policy, family life, eating practices, and proper gender roles; Katrin Bennhold, "In Germany, a Tradition Falls, and Women Rise," *New York Times*, January 17, 2010.

the food worlds of the Cold War Germanies. Memories and expectations of hunger and satiety framed individual and collective visions of the German past and future. Claiming and rejecting specific sorts of hunger, rationales for developing strategies of feeding Germans and non-Germans, as well as the encouragement of appetites both for specific foods and ways of eating, all were tied to the contested process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. My dissertation argues that precisely these domestic, bodily, and gustatory concerns made up some of the most significant and meaningful ways for Germans to negotiate the links and breakages between their past, present and future.

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**GHI Research**



## **TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES: EUROPE IN THE EYES OF EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1930-1980**

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Ashley Narayan, and Barbara Reiterer**

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Can one become “European” by migrating to the United States? What did “Europe” look like and what did it mean to those who crossed the Atlantic? What role did European migrants play in shaping transatlantic networks of exchange between the United States and Europe during the middle of the twentieth century? These questions form the basis of the new GHI research project “Transatlantic Perspectives.” The project aims to trace transcultural perspectives on Europe, the emergence of hybrid European identities among European migrants – including long- and short-term immigrants as well as émigrés – in the United States, and the role these migrants played in transnational transfers between the 1930s and 1980s.

The project, which is funded by a research grant from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, examines identifications with and perceptions of Europe among European immigrants in the United States. Our research is guided by the following assumptions:

- European migrants played an important role in shaping American perceptions of Europe in the postwar era of the Cold War, the economic boom, and European integration.
- As part of larger transatlantic networks, professional migrants also had an impact on European developments as they reached back to their native countries and Europe in various ways.
- The transatlantic vantage point – and in the case of émigrés often also the forced nature of their migration – helped European migrants in postwar America to transcend parochial and national perspectives and to regard Europe as a more encompassing social, cultural, and political entity.

As “wanderers between the worlds,” migrants participated in a transatlantic construction of Europeanness in which the contrast with the United States and American society was of central importance. Based on the previous assumptions, the project pursues a set of overarching questions:

- Can we trace a connection between migration experiences and the emergence of a European sense of belonging among migrants?
- What patterns of perception predominate among migrants with regard to specific aspects of European society, such as the European city, the European economy, or European consumption?
- Did the transatlantic perspective lead migrants to weigh a widely perceived lack of modernization of Europe vis-à-vis the United States — as in predominant narratives of “Americanization” during the postwar years — against more positive images of Europe or elements of it such as the European city, business culture, or consumer culture?
- What role, finally, did European immigrants and émigrés play in transnational processes of transfer and exchange in the postwar Atlantic world?

By emphasizing the role of migrants as actors in reciprocal processes of exchange and perception, the project ultimately seeks to probe notions of unidirectional Americanization during the postwar decades. Investigating migrant biographies can potentially show that transatlantic history during the American century was, in fact, characterized by a complicated entanglement of social, cultural, and economic developments in Europe and the United States.

## Research Contexts

The project draws on and aims to pull together several areas of historical research. We are interested in fostering a dialogue between the historiography of transatlantic migration and an emerging literature on European identities and Europeanization in the twentieth century. We also strive to integrate both of these fields into the research on transatlantic relations and Americanization in the postwar decades.

Historical research on perceptions and images of Europe as well as on European identities has enjoyed increasing popularity in recent decades, particularly in the wake of the European integration process.<sup>1</sup> The call for a European history that transcends national boundaries has informed a growing number of studies that provide narrative syntheses of European history or engage in intra-European comparisons.<sup>2</sup> A number of these works delineate the long-term structures as well as the peculiarities of European history, in some cases reaching as far back as the societies of Western antiquity. But researchers

1 See Hartmut Kaelble and Martin Kirsch, eds., *Selbstverständnis und Gesellschaft der Europäer. Aspekte der sozialen und kulturellen Europäisierung im späten 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2008). Several research projects have recently promoted research in Europeanization. See “Imagined Europeans: Die wissenschaftliche Konstruktion des Homo Europaeus” directed by Kiran Klaus Patel at Humboldt Universität zu Berlin ([www.imagined-europeans.org](http://www.imagined-europeans.org)), and the cooperative project “Europeanization History Network” ([www.europeanization.org](http://www.europeanization.org)) directed by Kiran Klaus Patel and Martin Conway.

2 See Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford, 1996); Edgar Morin, *Europa denken* (Frankfurt, 1991); and Harold James, *Europe Reborn: A History, 1914-2000* (England, 2003). See also Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, “Die Geschichte Europas als vergleichende Geschichtsschreibung,” *Comparativ* 14 (2004): 83-97.

have also focused on the history of the European integration process during the twentieth century. Beyond the institutional and political history of this process, several intellectual histories have traced the “idea of Europe” since the interwar era.<sup>3</sup> Here, the immediate post-war years of the 1940s and 1950s emerge as a period of widespread enthusiasm for Europe. Social historians have simultaneously emphasized the growing structural convergence of Western European societies after World War II.<sup>4</sup> Both perspectives share an implicit interest in the emergence of a shared European sense of belonging and its relationship to long-dominant national identities.

Yet, the concept of a European identity remains contested. As ubiquitous as the term identity has become in historical and social science writing, it can be opaque and problematic when applied to groups.<sup>5</sup> More specifically, historians such as Konrad Jarausch have warned against the temptation to historically construct a homogenous or narrow concept of European identity. This would run the danger of recalling nineteenth-century efforts by historians engaged in the construction of national identities. Complex and contradictory cultures of memory in Eastern, Western, and Central Europe demonstrate why it is impossible to forge a single narrative of European history.<sup>6</sup> Most recent scholarship thus assumes European identity to be a patchwork of diverse and overlapping identities.<sup>7</sup> In contrast to traditional notions of national identity, some historians employ the term “European consciousness,” which can coexist with national identifications.<sup>8</sup> This hybrid European self-understanding provides a useful link to current research in historical migration studies that emphasizes the emergence of hybrid identities as a consequence of transnational migration.<sup>9</sup>

At the same time, there are recurrent calls to put the history of migrants, a marginalized group in various national historiographies, at the center of a new post-national approach to European history.<sup>10</sup> Some studies have suggested that a European self-understanding can be

3 See Wolfgang Schmale, *Geschichte Europas* (Vienna, 2000); Frank Niess, *Die europäische Idee – Aus dem Geist des Widerstands* (Frankfurt, 2001); and Ute Frevert, *Eurovisionen: Ansichten guter Europäer im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2003).

4 Hartmut Kaelble, *The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth*

*and Twentieth Centuries* (New York, 2004); Hartmut Kaelble, *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft: eine Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas: 1880 – 1980* (Munich, 1987); and Gerold Ambrosius and William Hubbard, *Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Europas im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1986).

5 Lutz Niethammer, *Kollektive Identität: heimliche Quellen*

*einer unheimlichen Konjunktur* (Reinbek, 2000). See also Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, “Gibt es eine ‘europäische Identität’? Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zum Zusammenhang transnationaler Erfahrungsräume, kollektiver Identitäten und öffentlicher Diskurse in Westeuropa seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in *Diskurse und Entwicklungspfade. Gesellschaftsvergleiche* >>

>> in *Geschichte und Sozialwissenschaften*, ed. Hartmut Kaelble and Jürgen Schriever (Frankfurt, 1999), 163-216.

6 Jarausch calls this the “Treitschke Trap.” Konrad Jarausch, Thomas Lindenberger, and Annelie Ramsbrock, eds., *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories* (New York, 2007).

7 See, e.g., the introduction to Hartmut Kaelble et al., eds., *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2002).

8 Hartmut Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa: die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt, 2001).

9 On transnational and hybrid identities, see Hartmut Kaelble et al., eds., *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten*, especially the contributions by Martin Kohli, “Die Entstehung einer europäischen Identität: Konflikte und Potentiale”, 111-34, and Martin Kirsch, “Wissenschaftler im Ausland zwischen 1930 und 1960 – Transferbedingungen und Identitätswandel einer erzwungenen Migration, 179-205.

10 Rainer Ohliger, Karen Schönwälder, Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, *European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies since 1945* (Aldershot, 2003).

linked to migration experiences. Hartmut Kaelble's work on European self-descriptions in the nineteenth and twentieth century, for example, draws prominently on the travel writing of European intellectuals abroad.<sup>11</sup> Travel outside of Europe (and in this case especially to the United States) often heightened a sense of shared European attributes and problems. While exiled in America, Austrian sociologist Louise von Simson, for example, wrote that "it is astounding how in America one completely forgets those national differences which appear as such important lines of demarcation in Europe .... [This] made the unity of Europe apparent and made us feel as though we were Europeans."<sup>12</sup> Research on identity transformation as a result of labor migration and tourism within Europe suggests that this was not a phenomenon confined to intellectual debates. To what degree this amounted to "Europeanization from below" remains to be seen, however, and preliminary findings are disparate and ambivalent.<sup>13</sup> As Karen Schönwälder has noted, there is a need to systematically probe the relationship between European identities and migration experiences.<sup>14</sup> Our project intends to address this gap in the current historiography.

The contrast with the non-European Other, which predominantly included the United States during the middle of the twentieth century, has influenced modern European self-understanding. Recent transnational studies, particularly on the colonial era, have sharpened our understanding of the global contextualization of European history.<sup>15</sup> Prior to World War I, the colonial gaze focused on a supposed European civilizational and racial superiority. In contrast, European self-understanding endured a crisis beginning in the interwar years. Following World War I, internal differences and shortcomings became a central feature of the debate. Still, the juxtaposition to the non-European Other remained important. Postcolonial migration to Europe became an increasingly important source of reflections about Europeanness and accompanied the process of European integration.<sup>16</sup> More crucial for the context of our project, the rise of the

11 See Hartmut Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa*, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, *Amerika erfahren – Europa entdecken. Zum Vergleich der Gesellschaften in europäischen Reiseberichten des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1999). For Imperial Germany, see also Alexander Schmidt, *Reisen in die Moderne: der Amerika-Diskurs des deutschen Bürgertums vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg im europäischen Vergleich* (Berlin, 1997).

12 Kaelble, *Europäer über Europa*, 214 (translation J. L.).

13 Thomas Mergel, "Transnationale Mobilität, Integration und Herkunftsbewusstsein: Migration und Europäisches Selbstverständnis im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert," in *Selbstverständnis und Gesellschaft der Europäer*, ed. Kaelble and Kirsch, 251-97. See also Thomas Mergel, "Europe as Leisure Time Communication: Tourism and Transnational Interaction since 1945," in *Conflicted Memories*, ed. Jarausch et al., 133-52.

14 Karen Schönwälder, "Immigration from Below? Migration and European Contemporary History," in *Conflicted Memories*, ed. Jarausch et al., 154-63. Schönwälder writes: "Unfortunately, to my knowledge, wide-ranging empirical studies of connections between migratory experiences and attitudes to Europe, as well as other Europeans, do not exist" (156).

15 See, e.g., Jürgen Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats: Studien zur Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen, 2001); as well as Frevert, *Eurovisionen*. On the rise of transnational history, see especially Ian Tyrrell,

"Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History: Theory and Practice," *Journal of Global History* 3 (2009): 453-74; and Kiran Klaus Patel, "Transatlantische Perspektiven transnationaler Geschichte," *Geschichte & Gesellschaft* 29 (2003): 625-47.

16 Karen Schönwälder, "Integration from Below?"; and Bo Strath, "Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other," in *Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder. Repräsentationen sozialer Ordnungen im Wandel*, ed. Jörg Baberowski et al. (Frankfurt, 2008), 191-202.

United States made America a central foil of comparison for European self-reflection.<sup>17</sup> The U.S. served both as a model and a dystopian vision against which Europeans could define themselves. European immigrants, émigrés, and exiles in the United States played a central role in this debate.

Here, we can draw on a long tradition of research on European migration to the United States.<sup>18</sup> While the primary interest of scholars of historical migration used to focus on processes of assimilation, integration, or acculturation within American society, recent scholarship has begun to understand migration as a transnational process. Scholars are paying increasing attention to migrants' ties to their homelands and communication with those left behind, to temporary or permanent returns, and to the complex path of migration itself.<sup>19</sup> These facets of the migration process foster the emergence of multiple and hybrid identities among those "transmigrants" who are continuously engaged in border crossings as well as within American immigrant communities more generally.<sup>20</sup>

The position of European-Americans in American society changed during the postwar period. The ethnic communities of European migrants that were so prominent during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were now less important. The restrictive turn in U.S. immigration law during the 1920s largely cut off the influx of new arrivals, while the offspring of first generation immigrants increasingly left ethnic neighborhoods for suburbia. In his longitudinal study of European immigrant communities after 1945, the sociologist Richard Alba found a weakening of ethnic identifications relating to particular nationalities (such as Polish or Italian-Americans). Instead he saw a new group of "European Americans" emerge whose ethnic identity was, as Herbert Gans has argued, of a symbolic nature.<sup>21</sup> In contrast to first half of the twentieth century, there is only limited research on post-World War II European migration to the United States despite the fact that a substantial number of Europeans moved across the Atlantic during the 1950s.<sup>22</sup> Changes in transport and

>> *Erinnerung: Reflexionen über Wanderungserfahrungen in Europa und Nordamerika* (Göttingen, 2006); Bruce Elliott et al., *Letters Across Borders: The Epistolary Practices of International Migrants* (New York, 2006); and Andreas Gestrich and Marita Krauss, eds., *Zurückbleiben: der vernachlässigte Teil der Migrationsgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 2006).

20 See Alejandro Portes, "Globalization from Below: The Rise of Transnational Communities," in *The Ends of Globalization*, ed. Don Kalb et al. (Oxford, 2000), 253-70.

21 Richard Alba, *Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America* (New Haven, 1990); and Herbert Gans, "Symbolic Identity: The Future of Ethnic Groups in America," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (1979): 1-20.

22 Transatlantic migration increased again after the war; about 2.7 million Europeans left the continent during the 1950s. See Klaus Bade, *Europa in Bewegung: Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 2000), 301; and idem, "From Emigration to Immigration: The German Experience in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in *Migration Past, Migration Future*, ed. Bade and Weiner, 9.

17 Hartmut Kaelble, "Eine europäische Geschichte der Repräsentationen des Eigenen und des Anderen," in *Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder*, ed. Barberowski et al., 67-81.

18 For an overview, see Klaus Bade and Myron Weiner,

*Migration Past, Migration Future: Germany and the United States: Migration and Refugees* (Providence, 1997); and Dirk Hoerder and Leslie Moch, eds., *European Migrants: Global and Local Perspectives* (Boston, 1996). More recently, see Christiane

Harzig, Dirk Hoerder, and Donna R. Gabaccia, *What Is Migration History?* (Cambridge, 2009); and Jochen Oltmer, *Migration im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2010).

19 See, e.g., Christiane Harzig, *Migration und >>*

communication made their migration experience a substantially different one. There was an increase in temporary migration in the form of extended family visits, student exchange programs, short-term labor migration or longer stays by business migrants and other career migrants. The impact of these changes on the experience of European migrants in the United States, their ethnic identification, and their perception of Europe has not received much attention from historians.

More is known about those migrants who fled to America during the 1930s and 1940s as émigrés and exiles due to political or racial persecution by the Nazi regime. This group of migrants stands apart not only because of the forced nature of their migration experience, but also because of their ethnic and social composition. At least 130,000 of these migrants are estimated to have come from German-speaking Europe.<sup>23</sup> Many of the émigrés were Jewish and many belonged to Europe's professional, political, or intellectual elite. Numerous studies now exist on prominent refugee artists, writers, academics, and professionals, as well as labor activists and political leaders.<sup>24</sup> The literature has traced personal emigration experiences which, despite the diverse spectrum of individual biographies and differences across gender lines, included many structural similarities. For example, many migrants shared problems of professional dislocation or similar perceptions of the American host society.<sup>25</sup> Émigrés often prominently reflected on their conflicted and hybrid identities.<sup>26</sup> There is anecdotal evidence here for an emerging self-understanding as Europeans among this group, as in the case of Thomas Mann, who refashioned himself as a European rather than a German in American exile.<sup>27</sup>

Beyond this, scholarship on the émigrés offers concrete examples of their cultural and political influence on the United States and later — through transatlantic networks — on Europe. In contrast to the older conception of a brain drain from Europe to the United States, the newer literature offers an increasingly refined notion of complex processes of transatlantic transfer and adaptation.<sup>28</sup> The success of migrants and their reception depended on a number of factors, including their willingness to adapt European traditions to the conditions and demands of American society. Theoretical work in the history of transfers, which considers the transnational and multi-polar flow of both ideas and people, has underlined the importance of the receiving society for such

23 Claus-Dieter Krohn, "Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika," in Krohn et al., eds., *Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration* (Darmstadt, 1988). On life in exile, see Corinna Unger, *Reise ohne Wiederkehr? Leben im Exil 1933 bis 1945* (Darmstadt, 2009).

24 See, e.g., Laura Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration from Europe 1930-1960* (Chicago, 1968); and Lewis Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America: Their Impact and Their Experiences* (New Haven, 1984).

25 See especially Coser, *Refugee Scholars*. On the gendered nature of the émigré experience, see Sybille Quack, ed., *Between Sorrow and Strength: Women Refugees of the Nazi Period* (New York, 1995).

26 Claus-Dieter Krohn, ed., *Exil, Entwurzelung, Hybridität: Jahrbuch Exilforschung 27* (Munich, 2009).

27 On Mann, see Helmut Koopmann, "'German Culture Is Where I Am': Thomas Mann in Exile," *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 7 (1982): 5-20; and Eveline Pochadt, "Zwischen den Stühlen - Thomas Mann nach 1945," *Blätter der Thomas-Mann-Gesellschaft Zürich* 25 (1993): 5-31.

28 Mitchell Ash and Alfons Söllner, eds., *Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Émigré German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933* (Washington, DC, 1996). On the changing emphasis from "brain drain" to "brain circulation," see more generally Dittmar Dahlmann and Reinhold Reith, eds., *Elitenwanderung und Wissenstransfer im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert* (Essen, 2008).

processes.<sup>29</sup> Émigré economists, for example, were successful in the United States in part because they could integrate their research into the context of growing state intervention during the New Deal and later into the ideological competition of the Cold War.<sup>30</sup> As Joachim Radkau has shown, during and immediately after World War II, the influence of émigrés on American perceptions of and policy towards Europe through institutions such as the Office of Strategic Services was quite tangible.<sup>31</sup> As temporary or permanent “returnees” this group also influenced the course of events in Western Europe during the postwar decades. Research has shown the importance of returning émigrés in “Westernizing” politics, business, and academia in the Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>32</sup> To what degree this influence also contained elements of Europeanization remains an unanswered question.<sup>33</sup>

While the experience of émigrés and the broader European migration to America are frequently treated as distinct fields within historical literature, our “Transatlantic Perspectives” project aims to connect the two and to ground them within the wider scholarship on European-American relations throughout the twentieth century. The history of postwar transatlantic relations has been studied from a variety of angles.<sup>34</sup> Beyond traditional diplomatic history approaches, much attention has been devoted to relations and exchange processes in the areas of business, culture, and civil society.<sup>35</sup> The role of migrants in transnational networks, however, has rarely been at the center of such investigations despite their prominent role in organizations such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Even during the 1950s and 1960s, transatlantic exchanges were less unidirectional than the popular label Americanization suggests.<sup>36</sup> Instead, the postwar decades appear as a continuation (though certainly under unequal power relations) of

>> und Wissenstransfer: Transatlantische Gastprofessoren nach 1945, in *Elitenwanderung und Wissenstransfer*, ed. Dahlmann and Reith, 35-53.

33 Klaus Körner, “Emigranten im kulturellen Wiederaufbau. Die Europäische Verlagsanstalt, in *Rückkehr und Aufbau nach 1945*, ed. Krohn and Mühlen, 139-56.

34 Detlef Junker et al., eds., *Die USA und Deutschland im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges, 1945-1990: ein Handbuch*, (Stuttgart, 2001). A recent overview of the literature on transatlantic exchanges in the triangle Germany – France –USA is offered by Reiner Marcowitz, “Im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Europäisierung, Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung. Die Zäsur der 1960er und 1970er Jahre für die transatlantische Europadebatte,” in *Deutschland – Frankreich – Nordamerika: Transfers, Imaginationen, Beziehungen*, ed. Chantal Metzger and Hartmut Kaelble (Stuttgart, 2006), 98-123.

35 See, e.g., Frank Trommler, *The German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800 – 2000* (New York, 2001); Alexander Stephan, *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanization after 1945* (New York, 2006); and Martin Klimke et al., eds., *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s* (New York, 2010).

36 See Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York, 1997).

29 See Matthias Middell, “Kulturtransfer und Historische Komparatistik – Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis, *Comparativ* 10 (2000): 7-41.

30 Claus-Dieter Krohn, *Wissenschaft im Exil. Deutsche Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften in den USA und die New School of Social Research* (Frankfurt, 1988).

31 Joachim Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den*

*USA. Ihr Einfluss auf die amerikanische Europapolitik 1933-1945* (Düsseldorf, 1971).

32 On the question of “remigration, see Claus-Dieter Krohn and Patrick Mühlen, eds., *Rückkehr und Aufbau nach 1945: Deutsche Remigranten im öffentlichen Leben Nachkriegsdeutschlands* (Marburg, 1997); Axel Schildt, “Reise zurück in die Zukunft. Beiträge von intellektuellen USA-

Remigranten zur atlantischen Allianz, zum westdeutschen Amerikabild und zur ‘Amerikanisierung’ in den 50er Jahren, “*Exilforschung* 9 (1991): 25-45; and Claus-Dieter Krohn and Axel Schildt, eds., *Zwischen den Stühlen? Remigranten und Remigration in der deutschen Medienöffentlichkeit der Nachkriegszeit* (Hamburg, 2002). Guest professorships are discussed in Marita Krauss, “Exilerfahrung >>

a vibrant transatlantic dialogue dating back to the Progressive Era.<sup>37</sup> The role that migrants, with their unique perspective on Europe, played in the process will be a focal point of our project.

Recent efforts in transnational and global history have sought to transcend national distinctions and question labels such as “American” or “European.” Both in American and European history, transnational studies have begun to unearth political, economic, and cultural connections and processes that were not bounded by national frameworks. Additionally, our focus on the contextualized biographies of migrants is grounded in a renewed interest in biographical approaches to historical analysis.<sup>38</sup> By investigating networks of actors and exchanges beyond the level of the nation state and its governments, “Transatlantic Perspectives” joins in an effort to challenge the primacy of national perspectives within historical writing and to heighten our sensibility for the global and transnational dimension of historical developments.

Four individual research projects explore interconnected aspects of the broader project in the fields of history of science, history of consumption, urban history, and business history.

### **Europeanization from Afar**

As discussed above, scholarship on Europeanization has produced some anecdotal evidence of an increased sensibility for European rather than national identifications among immigrants and émigrés. Can we trace links between transnational migration experiences and hybrid European identities? When and in what ways did Europeans look back at Europe in a way that transcended their individual countries of origin?

Barbara Reiterer’s dissertation project studies German-speaking Central European women émigré social scientists who migrated to the United States between 1930 and 1945. The project investigates their lives and subsequent careers up to 1980 and reveals their professional networks as they related to the social, professional, and academic culture of the United States at a time when the social sciences expanded and gained significant public authority. While prominent male intellectual émigrés have been studied by other historians, this dissertation focuses on women who brought with them considerable expertise and experience and helped establish a research framework that combined their European roots with

37 See Daniel Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, 1996).

38 See Volker Berghahn and Simone Lässig, eds., *Biography between Structure and Agency: Central European Lives in International Historiography* (New York, 2008).

American traditions in social research and gendered practices of social inquiry.<sup>39</sup> They created atypical professional cultures as well as distinctive theories and methodologies that influenced both the development of disciplines and their particular topics.<sup>40</sup> Working as academic researchers, college and university professors, and in professions outside the universities (for example, in social administration and market research), the most successful émigrés, such as Gisela Konopka (see Figure 1) and Marie Jahoda, combined a unique set of characteristics. Their European and American training, their experiences of exile, their cultural and cognitive traditions, their encounters with social norms and role expectations in different places, as well as their language and connections made it possible for them to maintain dynamic international collaborations.



**Figure 1. Gisela Konopka was born in Berlin and studied psychology, pedagogy, and history in Hamburg. After emigrating she became a professor of social work at the University of Minnesota and played a crucial role in re-fashioning postwar social work in Germany. Photograph courtesy of University Archives, University of Minnesota Twin Cities.**

The quite different personal and professional contexts many of these émigré women found themselves in forced many of them to reflect on their identities. Their theoretical and methodological training in the social sciences equipped them to engage with this issue of identity and communicate these efforts. Thus, this specific constellation renders them a useful group to study migrant self-identification as Europeans, as European Americans, or as Americans. In this process of identity formation, they also participated in forging a fresh perception of Europe as they established themselves in and adapted to the United States. These processes left a lasting mark on the social science disciplines and the émigrés' perspectives on American and European societies, as well as on their personal and professional identities in ways that this dissertation sets out to examine.

### Perspectives on the European Economy

The shape of the European economy was of particular relevance in the era of Cold War economic competition and the economic

39 Much of the literature on intellectual migration focuses on male émigrés, e.g., Donald

Bailyn and Bernard Fleming, eds., *The Intellectual Migration: Europe And America,*

*1930-1960* (Cambridge, 1969); Coser, *Refugee Scholars*; Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants.*

40 For an example of these processes in psychology, see Mitchell Ash, "Émigré Psychologists after 1933: The Cultural Coding of Scientific and Professional Practices," in *Forced Migration and Scientific Change*, ed. Ash and Söllner, 117-38.

41 See, e.g., Krohn, *Wissenschaft im Exil*, and Coser, *Refugee Scholars*, 137-85, as well as Claus-Dieter Krohn, "Dismissal and Emigration of German-Speaking Economists after 1933," in *Forced Migration and Scientific Change*, ed. Ash and Söllner, 175-97. Jan-Otmar Hesse, "'Ein Wunder der Wirtschaftstheorie': Die 'Amerikanisierung' der Volkswirtschaftslehre in der frühen Bundesrepublik," *Jahrbuch des Historischen Kollegs* (2007): 79-113, notes the need for further exploration regarding the impact of émigré economists on postwar European economic thinking.

42 On union leaders, see Julia Angster, "Wertewandel in den Gewerkschaften. Zur Rolle der gewerkschaftlichen Remigranten in der Bundesrepublik der 1950er Jahre, in *Rückkehr und Aufbau nach 1945*, ed. Krohn and Mühlen, 111-38. On immigrant entrepreneurs, see Hartmut Berghoff and Uwe Spiekermann, "Immigrant Entrepreneurship: The German-American Business Biography 1720 - Present," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute* 47 (2010): 69-82; and Charles Haller, *German-American Business Biographies: High Finance and Big Business* (Asheville, 2001).

43 On the influence of American business models within the Federal Republic of Germany, see Christian Kleinschmidt. *Der produktive Blick: Wahrnehmung amerikanischer und japanischer Management- und Produktionsmethoden durch deutsche Unternehmer 1950-1985* (Berlin, 2002).

44 On how German companies utilized public relation methods to promote public trust in West Germany, see S. Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955* (Chapel Hill, 2001).

integration of Western Europe. The work of émigré economists in the United States such as those of the Austrian School has already received some scholarly attention.<sup>41</sup> Beyond economists, however, exiled union leaders, immigrant entrepreneurs, and European managers who came to the United States as career migrants also played significant roles in postwar transatlantic networks that demand further historical attention.<sup>42</sup>

Corinna Ludwig's dissertation project examines the business strategies of German companies in the American market from the end of the Second World War to the 1980s. In the postwar period, the influence of American economic power grew stronger than ever before. More and more U.S. companies expanded their business to Europe. Entering the American market, in contrast, was a challenge for European companies. From a business historical perspective, the project analyzes what opportunities existed in the U.S. market, what conditions German companies faced, and what kind of strategies they pursued to establish themselves in the United States. The project seeks to enrich the debate over the so-called Americanization of West German companies by a change of perspective and by tracing transfers and interactions between German and U.S. companies in the American market rather than in Germany.<sup>43</sup>

With a focus on marketing strategies, and especially public relations, Ludwig's dissertation examines how such structural processes were translated into forms of communication. The public relations aspect was especially relevant for German companies, who had to repair reputations that had been severely tainted by the recent Nazi past. Furthermore, their trade relations with the United States had been placed on hold during the war. How did German firms tie back into prior existing business networks after the war, and, more generally, how did they promote public trust in the United States?<sup>44</sup> What kind of commercial campaigns did they initiate? Who developed these, and which image did they try to convey with these?

Integrated into the analysis of corporate policy decisions, this dissertation will pay especially close attention to business migrants – the carriers and individual agents of these transatlantic transfer and adaptation process – such as managers and businesspeople sent to the United States by their parent company as well as experts in the field of public relations. Thus, the project will enhance the microeconomic perspective with cultural aspects, that is, individual travel experiences. Did their experiences and perceptions

of American business and consumer culture influence these businessmen in creating and shaping certain corporate identities of the company branches in the United States? Finally, how successful were their strategies and what were possible reasons for their strategies to fail?

### Perspectives on the European City

The continued reciprocity of postwar transatlantic relationships becomes particularly visible in the realm of urban development. Dating back to Max Weber's comparative work, the "European city" has long been regarded by many as a peculiar characteristic of European history and civilization. In transnational debates over social change in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, urban problems frequently occupied a central role.<sup>45</sup> Especially in the context of rapid urban change in the decades after World War II, the American metropolis was increasingly regarded, approvingly as well as critically, as a "modern" counterpart of European urban forms.<sup>46</sup>



**Figure 2. Victor Gruen, an immigrant architect from Vienna who is known as the "father of the mall," became an important voice in postwar transatlantic debates about urban planning and consumer landscapes. Photo: Victor Gruen Collection, Box 61, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming. Reproduced by permission.**

Within this context, Andreas Joch's dissertation project looks at the role European migrants played in this genuinely transatlantic discourse. His study focuses on transnational connections within the field of planned urban development between 1930 and 1970. Furthermore, it links this aspect to a discussion of perceptions of urbanity and urban life in the Atlantic world.

Urban planning is a discipline with decidedly transnational roots. Some of the planning history classics have shown that knowledge about new theoretical concepts and ideas as well as about the most innovative planning projects circulated freely among a large group of

45 Christian Meier, "Die okzidentale Stadt nach Max Weber," supplement, *Historische Zeitschrift* 517 (1994). On current research on and a critique of the concept of the European,

see Friedrich Lenger and Klaus Tenfelde, eds., *Die europäische Stadt im 20. Jahrhundert: Wahrnehmung - Entwicklung - Erosion* (Cologne, 2006). See also Kaelble, *The European Way*.

46 Jeffrey Diefendorf, "American Influences on Urban Developments in West Germany," in *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War*, ed. Junker, 587-93.

experts from various nations, especially during the formative years of the discipline before 1930.<sup>47</sup> The intensity and direction of the information flows varied over the twentieth century, but discussions about urban matters maintained a strong tendency to utilize this transnational frame of reference. International conferences, journal articles, and personal contacts functioned as efficient mediators of exchange.<sup>48</sup> Parallel to this intense exchange, however, the (perceived) “American city” has frequently been portrayed as a counter concept to the development of urban Europe. Elements like the modes of transportation and the intensity of suburban sprawl are seen by many as elements setting the “European” and the “American” city apart.<sup>49</sup> Such comparisons, however, are accompanied by the conception of a general trend towards convergence of modern lifestyles, to which urban planning, as Axel Schildt argues, contributed significantly by bringing cities in Western Europe and in the United States ever closer together, especially in the decades following World War II.<sup>50</sup>

Against this backdrop, Joch’s dissertation project seeks to further our understanding of the transnational aspects of planned urban development and the distinctions between European and American urbanity by looking at the American city through two distinct lenses. The first lens is provided by European city planners who migrated to North America during the research period and who are the main focus of the study. Despite considerable progress, especially with regard to the lives and work of émigré architects, many open questions remain about the modes, mechanisms, and long-term trends of planning exchange on the micro-level.<sup>51</sup> Here the study seeks to deepen our understanding of the functionality of professional transatlantic networks. Were migrants able to take up a central position in the border crossing exchange on urban planning? What links did they maintain to their countries of origin? This professional perspective is supplemented by a second view, through the eyes of “ordinary migrants” coming to America during the same time period and settling in its cities but not confronting them on a professional level. Just like the professionals, these migrants were bound to experience differences in the built environment and city life when comparing dwellings, the structure of the neighborhood, or traffic at home and in the United States. By combining the views of these groups, the study offers a new perspective on the actual and perceived similarities and differences between American and European cities and clarifies the historical background of an ongoing debate about distinct forms of urbanity.

47 See Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York, 2002); and Anthony Sutcliffe, *Towards the Planned City* (New York, 1981).

48 Ward provides a recent synthesis: Stephen V. Ward, *Planning the Twentieth Century City: The Advanced Capitalist World* (London, 2002).

49 For an overview of the related discussions, see Friedrich Lenger, “Einleitung,” in *Die europäische Stadt im 20. Jahrhundert: Wahrnehmung - Entwicklung - Erosion*, ed. Friedrich Lenger and Klaus Tenfelde (Cologne, 2006), 1-21, esp. 5-10.

50 See Axel Schildt, “Amerikanische Einflüsse auf den Wiederaufbau westeuropäischer Städte nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” *Informationen zur Modernen Stadtgeschichte 1* (2007): 48-62, 62.

51 See, e.g., the essays in Matthias Boeckl, ed., *Visionäre & Vertriebene: Österreichische Spuren in der modernen Amerikanischen Architektur* (Berlin, 1995); and Bernd Nicolai, ed., *Architektur und Exil: Kulturtransfer und Architektonische Emigration 1930 bis 1950* (Trier, 2003).

## Perspectives on European Consumption

In areas as varied as marketing and market research, advertising psychology, product design, commercial architecture, and the study of consumption patterns, European immigrants played pioneering roles during the middle of the twentieth century. Their work helped translate European aesthetics, research approaches, and even marketing innovations into an American context. Contrary to the widespread emphasis on Americanization in the history of consumption, the roots of mid-twentieth century consumer modernity were genuinely transatlantic.

Jan Logemann's *Habilitation* project looks at the contributions of European innovators in these areas in order to highlight the reciprocity of transfers in the emergence of mass-consumer modernity. The historiography of mass consumption has traditionally emphasized the American influences on Europe since the interwar period. The decades after the end of World War II appear to have been an era of Americanization of European consumption during which the United States' "irresistible empire" of goods changed European societies and economies.<sup>52</sup> Retailing, product design, as well as marketing and management in Europe seem to have been revolutionized and modernized by American innovations. This narrative not only downplays the continuity of indigenous developments but also overlooks the fact that many key figures in the development of American consumer culture since the 1930s were European immigrants and émigrés. They successfully integrated their European experiences into the culture of consumption in the United States, which was undergoing tremendous transformations in the aftermath of the Great Depression.

The focus of Jan Logemann's study will be a diverse group of consumption specialists who crossed the Atlantic after World War I and contributed to the transformation and expansion of American consumer culture. The group includes leading representatives of American consumption research such as George Katona and Paul Lazarsfeld. The work of émigré marketing psychologists such as Ernest Dichter was central to approaching consumer behavior in fields like advertising. Graphic and industrial designers such as Lucian Bernhard, Herbert Bayer, and, most prominently, Raymond Loewy contributed to new trends in advertising and industrial design during the 1930s and 1940s, when the role of design in consumer engineering gained importance. Postwar American criticism of consumption also received important theoretical impulses from émigrés

52 See especially Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, 2005).

such as Theodor Adorno or Erich Fromm, whose impact on the works of David Riesman provides one example among many.

For most of these migrants, European consumption provided a comparative foil against which American consumption practices could be critically analyzed. It also provided a number of artistic, entrepreneurial, and social science impulses for innovation which came to full fruition on the American side of the Atlantic. A number of the ideas and innovations exported to Europe after 1945 as American consumerism can thus also be interpreted as re-imports in which European migrants to the United States played a central role as conduits and cultural translators.

### **Planned Seminar, Workshop, and Website**

The individual projects pursue specific aspects of the broader project questions and are ultimately grounded within the research agendas of their respective subdisciplines. At the same time, “Transatlantic Perspectives” seeks to transcend conventional disciplinary divides by creating a multidisciplinary dialogue through conferences and a web platform that integrate the overarching research agenda.

In August 2011, we will hold a summer seminar titled “Europe – Migration – Identity” in cooperation with the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota. This seminar will bring together graduate students and scholars from both sides of the Atlantic to promote an exchange between researchers engaged in the field of migration and emigration research and those interested in processes of Europeanization in the modern era. A central question will be what Europe meant to migrants abroad on several levels – ranging from the personal and the professional to the political.

A projected 2012 workshop at the German Historical Institute in Washington DC will then look at the questions raised by Daniel Rodgers’s seminal *Atlantic Crossings*<sup>53</sup> in the context of social developments during the second half of the twentieth century. To what degree, this workshop will ask, can we still trace reciprocal “Atlantic Crossings” in policy-making, economic thinking, social development, cultural production, and other fields during the postwar decades? In what ways did Europeans and European social or cultural models continue to shape transatlantic debates despite the seemingly overwhelming role played by the United States? In many areas, European models failed to gain traction and cases of outright imports were few and far

53 Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*. See note 37.

between, especially if compared to earlier historical eras. Still, the exchanges that did exist, for example, in urban planning or popular culture, should be considered vital elements of the entangled history of the postwar Atlantic world, complementing our increasingly refined understanding of European reflections about and adaptations of American models at the same time.

The website [www.transatlanticperspectives.org](http://www.transatlanticperspectives.org) is managed by Ashley Narayan and will provide the capstone for the overall research project. The platform contains resources for researchers, educators, and students, as well as the general public. The website's primary content consists of biographical and thematic essays, but it also holds source documents including photographs, images, and maps. Practical resources include guides to archives, bibliographies, and teaching tools. More than a simple repository of documents and information, the web site is ultimately intended to dynamically connect "Transatlantic Perspectives" to the wider academic community and to promote further research at the intersection of Europeanization and transatlantic migration. Therefore, we actively solicit the contribution of content from scholars in various disciplines working in this field.

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The authors are members of the GHI research project "Transatlantic Perspectives: Europe in the Eyes of European Immigrants to the United States, 1930-1980," directed by **Jan Logemann**. He received his Ph.D. from Penn State University in 2007 and is currently a Research Fellow at the GHI working in the history of modern mass consumption. **Andreas Joch** is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Giessen working in urban history, **Corinna Ludwig** is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Göttingen working in business history, and **Barbara Reiterer** is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota working in the history of science. All three are currently Doctoral Fellows in Residence at the GHI. **Ashley Narayan** is a M.A. candidate in International Affairs at George Washington University and serves as research assistant and website coordinator for the "Transatlantic Perspectives" project.





# Conference Reports



## **BOSCH FOUNDATION ARCHIVAL SEMINAR FOR YOUNG HISTORIANS 2010: AMERICAN HISTORY IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE**

Archival seminar in Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington DC, September 5-17, 2010. Co-organized by the German Historical Institute Washington, the University of Chicago's Department of History, and the Heidelberg Center for American Studies, with the generous support of the Robert Bosch Foundation. Conveners: Mischa Honeck (Heidelberg Center for American Studies) and Martin Klimke (GHI). Participants: Nate Probasco (University of Nebraska), Felix Schürmann (University of Frankfurt), Brian Bredehoeft (University of Florida, Gainesville), Jan Hüsgen (University of Hannover), Rebecca Preis Odom (St. Louis University), Claudia Buchwald (University of Munich), William Chou (Ohio State University), Juliane Frinken (Free University Berlin), Cynthia Greenlee-Donnell (Duke University), Sophie Lorenz (University of Heidelberg)

The Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar for Young Historians convened in September 2010. On a tour spanning four cities (Chicago, Madison, Boston, and Washington DC), the ten seminar participants from Germany and the United States were introduced to the holdings and policies of a broad spectrum of American archives and research libraries. The goals of the seminar were to prepare doctoral students from both countries working in diverse fields of American history for their prospective research trips; to teach them how to contact archives, use finding aids, and identify important reference tools; and to help them gain a greater appreciation of the various kinds of archives and special collections located in the United States.

After a historical walking tour of Chicago on Labor Day, September 6, the Bosch Archival Seminar 2010 commenced the following day with a thesis workshop at the University of Chicago hosted by Prof. Kathleen Neils Conzen and attended by members of the history department and graduate student body. The seminar participants, who had been grouped into five transatlantic tandems consisting each of one German and one American student, commented on the work of their respective partners, exposed their projects to academic scrutiny, and received valuable feedback from their peers and present faculty members. On Wednesday, September 8, the seminar met Daniel Greene, director of the William M. Scholl Center of American History and Culture at the Newberry Library, for a daylong introduction to the

institute's collections as well as for a general overview of American archival policies and practices. Among the topics discussed were the purchase of rare books, how to browse manuscript collections, the expedience of maps for historical research, and the digitization of archival resources. Thursday morning, before the group departed for Madison, Wisconsin, was reserved for a brief visit at the Cook County Court Archives where Phil Costello demonstrated how historians could make creative use of legal records and court cases.

Our first destination in Madison was the Wisconsin State Historical Society, which welcomed the Bosch Seminar in the morning hours of September 10. Nancy Green and Harry Miller spoke about the history and holdings of their institution within the broader context of American state historical societies and impressed the students with the Wisconsin State Historical Society's dedication to accessibility and public education. After that, time was set aside for individual research before the group reassembled at the local University of Wisconsin history department for a roundtable talk on career opportunities in the historical profession. Under the guidance of Jeremi Suri, William Reese, Adam Nelson, and James Danky, the participants engaged in a spirited dialogue about the hazards facing young historians aspiring to an academic career in an ever more mobile yet highly competitive environment on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite the news about a tightening job market, however, the discussants agreed that graduate education offered a range of skills badly needed in and outside academia, and that historians cooperating across national borders were exceptionally well suited to meet the demands of today's globalized world.

On Saturday evening, September 11, the group arrived in Boston, the third stop on our itinerary. The following morning gave the seminar participants a chance to witness public history in action with a guided tour of the Freedom Trail, after which they could enjoy some time for individual explorations. On Monday, September 13, the Bosch Archival Seminar 2010 resumed at Harvard University. The first of three research libraries on our schedule was Houghton Library, where Peter Accardo walked the group through some of the library's most precious Early Americana collections and gave valuable advice on how to use them for various research agendas. The seminar then moved on to Schlesinger Library, one of the leading U.S. research facilities for women's history. Ellen Shea showed and explained letters, pamphlets, books, and visual material related to

topics ranging from domesticity and black women to the female suffrage movement. The day concluded with a visit to the Baker Library Archives at the Harvard Business School. Katherine Fox, Associate Director of Public Services, acquainted the students with the richness of the Baker Library's holdings, which touch upon almost every issue pertaining to the country's economic development from an agricultural society to an industrial and postindustrial superpower. Our sojourn in Boston drew to a close the next morning when we drove to Columbia Point to see the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. Enjoying a two-and-a-half-hour tour of the museum and library archives under the supervision of Stephen Slotkin, the group benefited from staff presentations on audiovisuals, declassification, and the library's manuscript collections and oral history program.

After reaching Washington DC in the late afternoon of Tuesday, September 14, the Bosch Seminar continued the next day at the Smithsonian National Museum of American History. Craig Orr, Associate Curator of the museum's archives, talked to the students about the archive's holdings on American technological, scientific, and consumer history, raising their awareness of connections among the three and of important overlaps with the broader fields of social and cultural history. The second half of the day was spent across the street at the National Archives. Richard McCulley guided the students through the Legislative Records including statutes and the official correspondence of congressional delegates, while Eugene Washington provided an instructive survey of the Freedmen's Bureau Records, which contain significant data on African American life during and after Reconstruction. On September 16, we visited the Library of Congress. After a tour of the Jefferson Building, historian Daun van Ee spoke to the participants about the breadth of manuscript collections available through the Library of Congress Manuscript Division. The group then advanced to the Prints and Photographs Division, where Sara Duke and her coworkers had worked hard to muster illustration samples conducive to the participants' individual projects, thereby underscoring the significance of visual material for historical research. Finally, the group made the acquaintance of the Deputy Historian of the House of Representatives, Fred Beuttler, to talk with him about his work as a congressional historian. The ensuing tour of the Capitol marked a true highlight of this year's Archival Seminar and will be fondly remembered by those who partook in it.

On Friday, September 17, the Bosch Archival Seminar came to a cheerful conclusion at the German Historical Institute. William Burr, Senior Analyst of the National Security Archives, joined the group to give a presentation on the archive's origins, holdings, and mission. He was followed by Ida Jones from Howard University's Moorland Garland Research Center, which holds a remarkable array of collections on African American history and culture. Participants and organizers then took stock of the results of the Bosch Archival Seminar 2010 in a wrap-up discussion. All concurred that the three basic objectives of the seminar—building archival knowledge, expanding scholarly networks, and fostering international cooperation—had been fully achieved. The idea to form German-American tandems along the lines of similar research interests received special praise, and it is to be expected that further cooperation will grow out of these transatlantic partnerships, be it through continued academic exchange, joint conference appearances, or an online presence for the network on facebook.

Mischa Honeck (Heidelberg Center for American Studies)

## GLOBALIZING BEAUTY: BODY AESTHETICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Conference at the GHI, October 14–16, 2010. Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI) and Thomas Kühne (Clark University, Worcester). Participants: Ingrid Banks (University of California, Santa Barbara), Christina Burr (University of Windsor), Paula Diehl (Humboldt University, Berlin), Jennifer Evans (Carleton University, Ottawa), Mila Ganeva (Miami University, Oxford), Erik Jensen (Miami University, Oxford), Geoffrey Jones (Harvard Business School), Karin Klenke *in absentia* (University of Göttingen), Sara Lenehan (Oxford University), Jan Logemann (GHI), Michael Müller *in absentia* (Technical University Dortmund), Henry Navarro (University of Cincinnati), Uta Poiger (University of Washington, Seattle), Véronique Pouillard (Free University of Brussels), Christiane Reichart-Burikuiye (University of Bayreuth), Miriam Rürup (GHI), Anne Sonnenmoser (University of Duisburg-Essen), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Mark Stoneman (GHI), Althea Tait (Old Dominion University, Norfolk), Ulrike Thoms (Charité Clinic, Berlin), Paula-Irene Villa (Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich), Kerry Wallach (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI).

Beauty matters. Starting with this assumption, Hartmut Berghoff and Thomas Kühne convened an interdisciplinary and international conference at the GHI that looked at the global development of conceptions of beauty, the rise of the beauty industry, processes of achieving and performing beauty, as well as the contestation of hegemonic beauty ideals. Beauty has mattered in the context of modern consumer societies, in which the pliable body—shaped by fashion, cosmetics, or surgery—has become a major object of consumption and spending. Consumers, the media, and an increasingly globalized beauty industry all interact to shape and negotiate beauty standards. Beauty has mattered politically, as well. Ethnically or racially charged beauty ideals and fashion practices have worked either to uphold and reinforce or to challenge and subvert power structures from the local to the global level. Soliciting the perspectives of business and cultural historians, anthropologists and sociologists, as well as scholars of gender studies, cultural studies, and fashion, the conference engaged a series of questions. In what ways have beauty ideals functioned as instruments of social oppression, on the one hand, or for the empowerment of individuals, on the other? To what degree can we observe a globalization and standardization of beauty ideals and practices? To what extent does local diversity persist? What roles have commercial

actors played in shaping discourses on beauty? What agency have consumers been able to exert in adapting or challenging mediated notions of beauty?

In his keynote lecture, Thomas Kühne opened the conference by tracing the development of beauty as a historical category in the modern era. Suggesting a functional rather than normative understanding of beauty, he suggested viewing “beauty” as “whatever human beings do to, in their own subjective perspective, improve their physical appearance.” Beauty has long served as symbolic capital in a sociological sense, but Kühne detects an increased emphasis in the Western World over the past century on beauty as cultural capital that can be individually achieved. No longer just a product of nature, so to speak, beauty has become increasingly interwoven with the democratic aspirations of emerging consumer societies, in which everyone can supposedly be beautiful. This democratic vision of beauty, however, has always been bounded by gender norms and racial prejudices. Furthermore, heavily mediated beauty ideals have exerted pressures to conform that at times have negated their democratic promise. The contestation of such hegemonic ideals by groups from youth cultures to ethnic minorities is, therefore, another important field in the global history of modern beauty.

The first panel surveyed possible avenues for “explaining beauty,” inquiring into the theoretical groundwork for understanding how perceptions of beauty are socially and culturally constructed. Anne Sonnenmoser offered a sociological view of shifts in modern body aesthetics, which she developed with Michael Müller. Their research emphasizes the increasingly mediated nature of beauty ideals in the twentieth century. Early cinema cosmetics, for example, popularized a stylized language of pictorial aesthetics that helped to promote the standardization of body images. The proliferation of photography and video not only made body images ubiquitous in the media, but challenged consumers to engage in continuous “self-reflexivity,” comparing their own self-images with these mediated ideals seen on television or in print advertising. The differences between mediated ideals and physical reality were often most palpable for minority populations, as Althea Tait emphasized. Focusing on African-American writing in the twentieth century, and Toni Morrison’s, in particular, Tait traced biases in the perception of beauty and efforts to develop “cultural tutorials” for black children to resist and overcome them. Since beauty has always been a learned behavior, its seeming subjectivity

is influenced by wider social discourses. Tait urged participants to uncover biases in constructing beauty and to ask, “Who trained the eye of the beholder?”

The inherent tension between mediated images and physical reality has been evident in politically promoted body ideals as well. Constructing a visual Aryan ideal type, Paula Diehl suggested, was central to the Nazi regime’s broader racial agenda. In particular, the Nazis envisioned the SS as the embodiment of a certain Nordic beauty ideal for men; it ultimately became the regime’s testing ground for bridging image and reality through the selection of members and the implementation of eugenics measures. The potency of mediated images fueled by a combination of political ideology and commercial interests was also apparent in anthropologist Karin Klenke’s otherwise very different study of changing beauty ideals in rural Sumatra in the second half of the twentieth century. The Indonesian government hoped to cast women aspiring to an ideal of “the beautiful modern housewife” as domestic agents of national development. The women Klenke studied, however, were no mere passive objects but rather agents in their own right. They employed new beauty ideals to achieve social mobility, if not always successfully. In the process, they challenged traditional gender roles. The extent to which beauty norms can oscillate between oppressive and empowering qualities was the subject of Paula-Irene Villa’s talk on Western feminist beauty debates, which concluded the panel. Second-wave feminists vehemently rejected hegemonic commercial beauty norms as sexist and repressive. In place of these, they emphasized an idea of natural beauty, claiming that “all women are beautiful.” This discourse of a plurality of natural manifestations of beauty, Villa suggests, and the claims for choice and control over one’s body have now been co-opted by the beauty industry, which promises people that they can achieve “natural” beauty, even if by artificial means. Plastic surgery and make-over “reality” shows present beauty as the work of self-improvement in which social recognition is awarded, if not for the outcome itself, then at least for the effort invested.

A recurring theme of the second panel, which focused on “consuming beauty,” was the relative power and agency of various actors from industry and media to the consumer. The papers explored a variety of settings and arenas in which beauty has been prominently displayed or performed. Bridging business history and design history, Veronique Pouillard explored the phenomenon of trendsetting

and taste formation in the interwar fashion industry. Taking two influential American fashion forecasters and their published trend reports as examples, Pouillard showed how fashion trends emerged out of a complex interplay of transatlantic transfers and a negotiation between expert knowledge and consumer responses. Beauty pageants became a central arena for performing beauty during the 1920s, as Mila Ganeva showed for Germany. The pageants promoted a transnational ideal of the modern age, the empowered “New Woman,” yet simultaneously reinforced conservative notions of gender roles. Like few other institutions, pageants thrived because of the democratic aspirations they elicited as well as their interconnections with a movie industry in search of new talent, advertisers’ appetite for testimonial ads, and the media’s desire for appealing stories.

The interwar years appeared in several papers as a significant turning point, as the performance and consumption of beauty became more public and more important throughout the Western world. Next to cinema and advertising, sport was another arena in which beautiful bodies were increasingly displayed. As Erik Jensen suggested, however, interwar participants in beauty discourses increasingly employed a distinction between a more classical ideal of beauty as perfection and a notion of what Jensen termed “sexiness.” Male athletes such as popular boxers appeared erotically appealing, less for their perfection than for their imperfections—such as a bashed-in nose—and a more visceral appeal that spoke directly to the viewers’ “animal selves.” Social class, Jensen emphasized, heavily informed such perceptions of beauty and sexiness. That class boundaries in beauty ideals and perceptions may have diminished somewhat in recent decades was suggested by the final paper in the panel, which examined the seemingly unlikely boom of rhinoplasty in contemporary Teheran. While predominantly a middle-class phenomenon, anthropologist Sara Lenehan explained, it is not exclusively so, and “back-alley nose-jobs” can be had for little money. The practice spans a surprisingly wide range of ages and is common among men as well as women. Moreover, both secular and religiously conservative Iranians have come to use this form of surgery. While the ideal they aspire to resembles the straight “Western” nose beamed into Iranian living rooms via satellite TV and the first surgeons were trained in Europe and the United States, Lenehan cautioned against a simple narrative of Westernization. Iranians, she argued, see the practice not as foreign but very much as locally grounded.

The tension between global strategies of standardization and persistent local diversity was also the central theme of the third panel on “selling beauty” and the business of cosmetic and hygiene products. Geoffrey Jones opened the panel with a broad overview of the development of the modern cosmetics industry since the early nineteenth century. What began with local entrepreneurs such as Elizabeth Arden and Max Factor soon crossed national borders and cosmetics companies became driving forces behind the global homogenization of beauty ideals with Western assumptions and routines as the benchmark. Especially following World War I, multinational companies began to dominate the beauty industry. Still, Jones stressed, distinctive local consumer preferences persisted and, with the partial exception of high-end luxury brands, companies continued to adapt their products to local markets. Taking advertising campaigns for Lux Soap as a case study, Christina Burr also underlined the inherent tension between the local and the global. Lux campaigns pursued a transnational strategy that relied heavily on the appeal of the “Modern Girl Look” and the cosmopolitan flair of movie star testimonials. However, ad agency JWT tailored its messages to national markets by using local celebrities and paying attention to ethnic differences and plurality in their advertising imagery.

This dichotomy between advertisers’ attempts to homogenize markets by appealing to a notion of “One-Worldism”—asserting basic similarities among peoples—and countervailing efforts to emphasize or construct local and national differences played out particularly prominently in Nazi Germany, as Uta Poiger showed. While Nazi propaganda ardently attacked cosmetic products at times, labeling them “French,” “Jewish,” or “Negro” vices, the German beauty industry continued to advertise its products and market them successfully to consumers well into the war years. Ulrike Thom’s paper on the growing importance of drugstores in postwar German cosmetics sales not only brought in retailers as an important branch of the beauty business but also told a peculiarly local story. Barred from selling prescription drugs, West German drugstores found a survival strategy in selling beauty and hygiene products. Weight-loss and hypoallergenic products, especially, appealed to notions of both beauty and physical health, transforming the druggist in boom-era Germany into one of the leading local experts on beauty and physical care.

The final panel on “contested beauty” aimed to complicate narratives of hegemonic commercial and political constructions of beauty by

looking at challenges to the mainstream, as well as subversive adaptations. Ingrid Banks shared results from her fieldwork in African-American hair salons in Baltimore and other cities, where she found white teens adopting racially coded hairstyles such as cornrows and dreadlocks. Such unmistakably African-American hairdos have a long and politically charged history within black communities, signifying resistance to mainstream beauty ideals. The white suburbanites who wore these styles regarded their adoption of them as evidence that society was becoming “post-racial” or colorblind, an interpretation Banks hesitated to embrace. Henry Navarro similarly focused on the politics of race in American fashion. From the New Negro and the zoot-suit look to the Motown style and disco, Navarro showed how African-American fashion trends visibly challenged mainstream practices even as they were successively co-opted by the fashion industry and American commercial culture. Subversive beauty ideals that aimed to enhance a minority group’s visibility and ultimately their acceptance were also the subject of Jennifer Evans’s talk on “queer beauty.” Tracing the development of homoerotic photography in art, fashion advertising, and pornography since the late nineteenth century, Evans identified several stages in which the changing beauty norms of a subculture intersected with and eventually entered the commercial mainstream by the 1980s.

The central importance of achieving visibility for contesting dominant conceptions of beauty was reinforced by Kerry Wallach’s presentation on debates over “Jewish beauty” in the interwar and immediate postwar eras. Taking the example of beauty pageant winners who were Jewish, Wallach examined attempts by the Jewish media to create a sense of community and pride vis-à-vis Jewish body aesthetics. Challenging traditional efforts to “pass” as members of the majority group—also a recurring theme in the papers on African-American beauty standards—Zionist organizations in central Europe and later Palestine, for example, promoted dark hair and olive complexions as the perfect embodiment of the “Jewish racial type.” Such efforts, Wallach remarked, resembled colonization in that they imposed aesthetic norms on women—in this case beauty queens—and made them objects of commodification and ethnic marketing. The negotiation of beauty ideals in colonial contexts was indeed a highly complex and contested process, as the final paper by Christiane Reichart-Burikukuiye showed. Breaking down the dichotomy that posited “European” looks as modern and “African” body ideals as traditional and static, Reichart demonstrated the dynamic nature of body images

within indigenous African communities. Christian missionaries—themselves hesitant to fully embrace Western styles—tried to mold African styles, while African elders resisted what they perceived as a loss of “Africinity.” Beauty ideals on the continent remained subject to highly selective adaptation processes throughout the twentieth century, interweaving the global and local.

In the end, conference participants were hesitant to agree on the value of a single, shared definition of what “beauty” was and is. There was much common ground, however, in understanding beauty as a social, cultural, and economic construction as well as in emphasizing the process of achieving beauty as a means of social distinction rather than just for the aesthetic reasons. Cast in such terms, beauty opens up a wide and fruitful arena for future interdisciplinary and transnational scholarship, as this conference demonstrated.

Jan Logemann (GHI)

## **ACCIDENTAL ARMAGEDDONS: THE NUCLEAR CRISIS AND THE CULTURE OF THE SECOND COLD WAR, 1975-1989**

Conference at the GHI, November 4-6, 2010. Co-sponsored by the GHI, the New School for Social Research / Eugene Lang College, Heinrich Böll Foundation, and National Security Archive, Washington DC. Conveners: Eckart Conze (University of Marburg), Martin Klimke (GHI), Jeremy Varon (New School for Social Research). Participants: Dolores Augustine (St. John's University), Philipp Baur (University of Augsburg), Frida Berrigan (New America Foundation), William Burr (National Security Archive, Washington), Michael Foley (University of Sheffield), Philipp Gassert (University of Augsburg), Tim Geiger (Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Berlin), Thomas Goldstein (Clemson University), Jan Hansen (Humboldt University Berlin), Kyle Harvey (Macquarie University Sydney), William Knoblauch (Ohio University), Reinhild Kreis (University of Augsburg), David Lazar (GHI), Wilfried Mausbach (Heidelberg Center for American Studies), Stephen Milder (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Katrin Ruecker (University of Geneva), Jonathan Schell (New Haven, CT), Susanne Schregel (Technical University Darmstadt), Tony Shaw (University of Hertfordshire), Laura Stapane (Heidelberg Center for American Studies/GHI), Tim Warneke (University of Heidelberg), Lawrence Wittner (State University of New York at Albany), Natasha Zaretsky (Southern Illinois University Carbondale), Marianne Zepp (Heinrich Böll Foundation, Berlin).

After having been lost for almost thirty years, Alan Sonneman's photo-realist piece "The Last Washington Painting" (1981) was recently rediscovered. The painting is a classic of nuclear doom. It shows a mushroom cloud exploding over the American capital city as cars speed across Fourteenth Street Bridge straight into disaster. "It was painted in the days of mutually assured destruction, the daily business of parents of people I knew in D.C.," Sonneman recalled in a recent interview with the *Washington City Paper* (July 16, 2010): "This is the business of Washington. My girlfriend's father arranged the distribution of nuclear warheads for NATO." The painting very nicely reflects the cultural mood of the early 1980s, when the resurgence of Cold War tensions, the rearmament decisions of NATO, and the election of Ronald Reagan to the American presidency fed into a new bout of nuclear angst.

The story of the loss and the recent rediscovery of Sonneman's painting, which can now be seen at American University ([www.wpadc.org/catalyst](http://www.wpadc.org/catalyst)), is almost metaphorical for the returning interest in the

controversies of the 1980s about an impending “nuclear Holocaust”—as the atomic doomsday scenario was commonly referred to at the time. By historical accident, this resurging interest is now accompanied by a new anti-nuclear movement in Germany. This conference at the German Historical Institute in Washington studied the historical context in which artworks like Sonneman’s painting clearly resonated in Western cultures. As the conveners explained in their introduction, the “Accidental Armageddons” conference sought to explore the political and cultural discourse on nuclear weapons and atomic energy in the 1970s and 1980s—the Second Cold War—by analyzing diplomatic and strategic debates as well as the “anti-establishment” perspective of protest movements, and by linking political debates with cultural representations of nuclear death in music, literature, and film.

The first panel on “Doomsday Ideologies,” chaired by Martin Klimke, started with a comparative discussion by Michael S. Foley of the environmental protests of the Clamshell Alliance against the Seabrook (NH) and Diablo Canyon (CA) nuclear power plants, on the one hand, and the grassroots campaign of Love Canal (NY) residents, on the other, who had discovered that their houses had been built on a toxic waste site. As Foley argued, Love Canal activists were more successful than their anti-nuclear peers because they could see concrete “visible evidence” of pollution from their “front porches.” This “front porch politics” succeeded in mobilizing the critical support of representatives in Congress, whereas the dangers of nuclear power remained more abstract even after the Three Mile Island (TMI) disaster in March 1979. Wilfried Mausbach then analyzed the “Nuclear Winter” scenario, which burst onto the scene in the fall of 1983 and which he characterized as “the one and only new concept that separates the struggle against nuclear weapons in the 1980s from its antecedents in the 1950s.” Although the science behind it was not particularly new, the idea of “nuclear winter” resonated because it was an outgrowth of a new environmental awareness that had not existed two to three decades earlier. It also tapped into the general sense of doom and crisis that became characteristic of the 1970s. Eckart Conze examined the “instrumentalization of Auschwitz” during the early 1980s debates about nuclear rearmament in West Germany. He highlighted the mobilizing effect of the term “nuclear Holocaust,” which was meant to provoke anxiety and fear of death. It stipulated a “special German responsibility.” German as well as American politicians were linked to Nazi crimes, which provoked conservative politicians, such as CDU

General Secretary Heiner Geissler, to fortify their political positions by also using historical analogies to the 1930s. Geissler famously claimed in the West German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) that the pacifism of the 1920s and 1930s had “paved the way to Auschwitz.”

Nuclear death in film and popular culture was the theme of the second panel, chaired by Jeremy Varon. Tony Shaw used the 1979 movie *The China Syndrome*, which dealt with a near disastrous turn of a fictional safety cover up at a California nuclear power plant, to look at the cultural dimensions of the Cold War. He asked how Hollywood’s skepticism of nuclear energy connected with a critique of corporate power and the media. Originally conceived of as a small-scale docudrama, the film became a major blockbuster thanks to the input of activist actors like Jane Fonda and Michael Douglas and its auspicious timing, since it was released shortly before the near meltdown at TMI. In fact, the movie seems to have framed the reaction to TMI of journalists who had had little knowledge of nuclear energy up to that point. William Knoblauch then examined British anti-nuclear pop music of the 1980s. Geography, memories of World War II, and British civil defense propaganda made Britain a unique case. MTV enabled activist musicians to convey their political messages and even export them to the United States. Overall, however, Knoblauch concluded that nuclear pop was more popular in Great Britain than in the United States, which seemed to be less exposed to nuclear threats. Furthermore, anti-nuclear pop came to a sudden end in 1987, when Cold War tensions eased and groups shifted their focus to other political issues.

Panel three, chaired by Eckart Conze, continued to explore nuclear themes in music as well as in the arts more generally. Laura Stapane spoke about the “Artists for Peace” (Künstler für den Frieden) movement, which in the early 1980s served West German musicians, artists (e.g., Joseph Beuys), actors, and intellectuals as a platform for utilizing artistic expression as a means of political protest. Politically triggered by NATO’s double-track decision, the movement aimed to disseminate the idea of a nuclear-free world in a series of cultural events. Thanks to a wide variety of genres and artists—a plethora of different types of music such as rock, pop, classical, folk, and the so-called German Schlager was offered—these art festivals were highly successful both financially and in terms of participation. The organizers were also able to mobilize groups not normally interested in political issues. Martin Klimke then linked anti-nuclear expressions in West German popular music at the beginning of the 1980s (such as

Nena's "99 Luftballons") to the "Green Caterpillar" bus tour that was organized by the newly founded West German Green Party as part of its 1983 electoral campaign. A fusion of cultural and political event, the tour not only forced the Social Democratic Party to reconsider its ties to critical artists but also strengthened the Greens' appeal as an "anti-party party." In addition, the tour's emphasis on regional input helped pull the party together. Finally, it also helped to broaden the draw of Green politics beyond the alternative milieu.

The fourth panel, chaired by David Lazar, turned its attention to literature. Philipp Baur argued that one of the Second Cold War's characteristics was "the intentional use of fiction to warn and educate the public." By looking at Gudrun Pausewang's *Die Letzten Kinder von Schewenborn* (The Last Children of Schewenborn) and Anton-Andreas Guha's *Ende. Tagebuch aus dem 3. Weltkrieg* (End: Diary of World War III), he came to the conclusion that regionalism and the localization of Armageddon were peculiar features of the artistic anti-nuclear engagement during the 1980s. These scenarios also fed on scientific visions of a post-apocalyptic world (like those presented in the concept of nuclear winter). Thomas Goldstein examined how the official East German Writers' Union (Schriftstellerverband) served the regime's propagandistic purposes with mixed results. Whereas the government had some success in co-opting even critical writers to its "peace agenda," the narrow focus on NATO missiles that it fostered became increasingly untenable as Gorbachev's reforms and a growing environmental consciousness in the GDR triggered increasing criticism of the dictatorship. Dolores Augustine's examination of the representations of the peace and anti-nuclear movement in the West German print media focused on the weekly *Der Stern*. The Second Cold War saw a confluence of the debate about peaceful and military use of nuclear power. In contrast to debates of the 1950s, those during the Second Cold War utilized visual strategies to convey the horrors of nuclear destruction; protests were generally portrayed in a sympathetic light, and the synergy between anti-nuclear power and anti-nuclear weapons issues made media coverage during this period a "force" to be reckoned with.

Establishment reactions were the focus of the fifth panel, chaired by William Burr. Jan Hansen summarized his findings on the political and cultural discourse on nuclear weapons within the West German Social Democratic Party. NATO's double-track decision shattered party unity over central foreign policy questions. Driven by cultural anxiety and deep-seated fears regarding modernity, the Social Democratic split over

nuclear weapons led to a renegotiation of the possibilities and nature of legitimate political action within the political mainstream. In his presentation, Tim Geiger asked: “Did Protest Matter?” According to Geiger, the peace movement did not have to push the government very hard for détente, because the SPD-FDP government coalition aimed to reduce nuclear arsenals anyway. Furthermore, the peace movement helped the federal government to present itself as a proponent of a moderate approach and to bolster its international position. It was forced, however, to step up its propaganda efforts. Reinhild Kreis then analyzed the discourse about a “successor generation” as a master trope that structured the debate about an alleged “transatlantic crisis” among diplomats, politicians, and experts. Fears of estrangement, which were couched in generational terms, need to be read in the context of the contemporary discussions about “value change.” Leaders therefore focused on bringing the “next generation” on board for German-American friendship, which they feared anti-nuclear sentiments and widespread anti-Americanism had sundered.

The sixth panel, chaired by Philipp Gassert, on “Security Cultures” focused on the emergence of particular national discourses structured around nuclear issues. Natasha Zaretsky discussed how, following incidents such as Watergate or the oil crisis, the TMI accident led to a further erosion of public trust in governmental policies and official insurance. TMI now placed the human body—and, more specifically, the pregnant, the young child’s, or fetal body—in the center of a question of trust. TMI emerged as a fully-fledged cultural crisis because the “grammar of human life” enabled female members of a largely white, conservative, rural Pennsylvanian community, especially, to remain good Christians and patriots while opposing nuclear energy at the same time. Tim Warneke’s presentation explored the discourse about “madness” in the United States and West Germany. Taking his clues from *Dr. Strangelove*, Warneke argued that the consensus of “what was reasonable and what was insane” broke down in the context of shifting values, resulting in an almost complete rupture of communication between the two warring camps. Finally, Katrin Ruecker explained why France did not experience a prolonged period of nuclear anxiety. The small, and mostly communist, French peace movement operated in a “discouraging context” (Wittner), with all major parties strongly in favor of the *force de frappe* (the French nuclear program) and NATO’s rearmament decision. Also, public opinion was either strongly in favor of nuclear power and nuclear weapons or indifferent. Finally, French international aspirations and,

thus France's national identity were closely linked to having access to nuclear weapons. The nonaligned French peace movement therefore had only limited access.

The final panel, chaired by Marianne Zepp, explored grassroots initiatives at the local level. Stephan Milder discussed the protests against the planned Wyhl nuclear power plant in South Baden, Germany. Local grassroots opposition, which included conservative farmers and middle-class citizens from the neighboring university town of Freiburg, served as the model on which many subsequent anti-nuclear protests were built. The media portrayed them mostly in a positive light, and their opposition to what they perceived as non-responsive government officials proved to be contagious. In "Radical Feminism and the Anti-Nuclear Movement" Kyle Harvey looked at the emerging "eco-feminism" of the 1970s and 1980s. Exposing deep rifts within feminism, the movement was characterized by clashes that were as much about womanhood as they were about politics. Using the example of the tensions over the Seneca Falls Women's Encampment in upstate New York, Harvey demonstrated that feminist radicalism turned off many potential supporters. Finally, Susanne Schregel analyzed Nuclear Free Zones as part of the transnational oppositional movement to nuclear war, which was both global and local at once. Within this movement, the local was seen as the place where global transformations would emerge. This special, localized nature of protest seems to have been one further characteristic of the 1980s peace movement that distinguished it from its predecessors in the 1950s, as some of the other papers demonstrated as well.

An evening keynote lecture and a public panel discussion rounded out the conference. In his keynote on "The Rise of the Hawks and the Revolt of the Doves: Writing the History of the Second Cold War," Lawrence S. Wittner raised the question of the impact of the peace movements. Whereas some politicians like former U.S. President George H. W. Bush retrospectively claimed that pursuing "peace through strength" had worked, Wittner came to a different conclusion: in fact, governments listened to anti-nuclear activists. From Jimmy Carter's inaugural address to Ronald Reagan's stunning course reversal in the mid-1980s, the idea of nuclear abolition proved to be irresistible. A "remarkable popular uprising" against "nuclear madness," along with the "rise of world citizenship," led to a considerable reduction in the nuclear danger. With nuclear arsenals now significantly diminished (there are now about 20,000 nuclear

warheads worldwide, down from a peak of more than 60,000 in 1990), Wittner stressed that real progress had been made.

A panel discussion on the second night of the conference provided a contrast to Wittner's upbeat message. It featured the author and anti-nuclear activist Jonathan Schell, whose book *The Fate of the Earth* (1982) remains one of the key texts of the nuclear apocalyptic genre. Sharing the panel with Frida Berrigan and Philipp Gassert, Schell highlighted some of the failures of earlier anti-nuclear movements, discussing how his 1980s prophecies had stood the test of time and what their contemporary relevance was. As Schell insisted, the dangers of "exterminism" are still with us, and with global warming, they seem to have taken on a dimension that would have been unimaginable in the 1980s.

Whereas Jonathan Schell, from the perspective of his own involvement, stressed continuities between then and now, the final discussion of the conference explored some of the discontinuities and specificities of 1970s and 1980s culture that particularly interest historians. Eckart Conze proposed that "a real and perceived crisis of modernity" is the common denominator of the various anti-nuclear movements and groups. Martin Klimke submitted the interaction of the transnational and the local levels as a 1980s peculiarity, including how human rights discourse unified or divided peace activists in Eastern and Western Europe. He asked what the impact of both popular movies and the 1986 meltdown in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union was. Jeremy Varon underscored the lessons and examples that the 1970s and 1980s still provide in how to cope with global problems. Wilfried Mausbach asked to what extent the Second Cold War had a specific culture different from the 1950s and what the parameters for distinguishing between a First and a Second Cold War should be. Reinhild Kreis emphasized the importance of different perceptions of time and timeliness in contemporary debates on nuclear and environmental issues. Philipp Gassert stressed that the "nuclear crisis" provides raw material for a history of the political culture of the 1980s, when people were trying to make sense of multiple crisis scenarios and got stuck in the most dramatic one. As the conference's discussion demonstrated, historical research into the 1980s, which has only just begun, is propelled by new questions and exciting source materials, some outstanding examples of which this conference brought to the fore.

Philipp Gassert (University of Augsburg)

## **HISTORY BY GENERATIONS: GENERATIONAL DYNAMICS IN MODERN HISTORY**

Conference at the GHI Washington, December 9–11, 2010. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the graduate program “Generations in Modern History,” University of Göttingen. Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Bernd Weisbrod (Göttingen), Uffa Jensen (Max-Planck-Institut für Bildungsforschung, Berlin), Christina Lubinski (GHI/Harvard). Participants: Astrid Baerwolf (Göttingen), Volker Benkert (Arizona State), Olof Brunninge (Jönköping International Business School), Elwood Carlson (Florida State), Sarah E. Chinn (Hunter College, CUNY), Karl H. Füssl (Technical University of Berlin), Gary Cross (Pennsylvania State), Kirsten Gerland (Göttingen), Hope M. Harrison (George Washington University), Jochen Hung (Institute of Germanic & Romance Studies, London), Jan Logemann (GHI), Ondrej Matejka (Institute of Contemporary History, Prague), Daniel Morat (Free University of Berlin), Maria Fernández Moya (University of Barcelona), Lutz Niethammer (University of Jena), Miriam Rürup (GHI), Dirk Schumann (Göttingen), Judith Szapor (McGill University), Anna von der Goltz (Cambridge), and several other members of the Göttingen graduate program “Generations in Modern History.” Johanna Brumberg (Göttingen), Uffa Jensen, and Georg Kamphausen (Bayreuth) submitted papers but were unable to attend.

The concept of generations has featured prominently on both sides of the Atlantic in recent years, be it in popular culture or academic studies. Indeed, it is on course to become a firmly established category of social analysis alongside those of class, gender, and ethnicity. Given the frequent political ruptures in twentieth-century German history, historians of modern Germany, perhaps more than others, have focused on specific events—such as 1945 or 1968—as centers of gravity around which the experiences of particular generational groupings coalesced. Age-related affinities and life chances have fascinated U.S. scholars just as much, albeit in subtly different ways. Twentieth-century U.S. history witnessed the rise of the baby boomers and the labeling of a somewhat intangible Generation X. The conference brought together established and younger scholars from the United States, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Spain, and Sweden to explore the challenges of writing “History by Generations” from a transatlantic and interdisciplinary perspective.

The event commenced with Elwood Carlson’s keynote lecture on “Generations as Demographic Category.” While the Göttingen

School—one of the event’s sponsors—has paid particular attention to self-conscious generational discourse and generation-building, Carlson’s wide-ranging lecture stressed the power of sheer numbers. Some groups were more “generational than others,” he argued, and one of the crucial challenges scholars faced remained explaining the conditions that lead subgroups of people to define themselves in generational terms. While he concurred that there was “more to destiny than demography,” he highlighted the impact of the “generation in itself,” whose underlying “mechanical solidarity” (Durkheim) created significant and lasting differences in the life experiences of its members. Carlson illustrated his arguments by drawing on seven distinct generations in twentieth-century U.S. history and paid particular attention to a group he termed the “Lucky Few.” Born between 1929 and 1945, their life chances and experiences were shaped profoundly by the fact that their generation was smaller than those that preceded and followed them. While the Lucky Few have not self-consciously identified themselves as a generation, Carlson portrayed them as a coherent social group with similar long-term experiences.

The conference’s first panel, “Generations and Intellectuals” departed from Carlson’s demographic focus. Daniel Morat’s paper investigated the role of intellectuals as “generationalists” (Robert Wohl) in Germany and France between 1900 and 1930. Morat historicized the concept of generation by showing that it served intellectuals as a category of social analysis, self-description, and mobilization. His analysis focused on Henri Massis’s and Alfred de Tarde’s *Les jeunes gens d’aujourd’hui* (1913) and Franz Matzke’s *Jugend bekennt sich: So sind wir!* (1930) as literary acts of generation-building. The authors of both texts, he argued, were part of a particular type of manifesto generation that helped to position specific male, middle-class, intellectual groups within the literary and political realm in France and Germany. Based on recent approaches to the history of emotions, Uffa Jensen’s paper (read by Miriam Rürup) on the interwar German youth movement re-interpreted Karl Mannheim’s influential theory of generations. Arguing that the emotional content of Mannheim’s work had been ignored, Jensen stressed that emotions are the glue that binds generations together, producing specific emotional styles and communities. Different sections of the interwar youth movement did not just differ in their political views, but also in their emotional styles. There was a “conduct code of heat” that rivaled the “conduct code of cool” (H. Lethen), he suggested. Bernd Weisbrod’s commentary

built on Jensen's interpretation of generations as emotional communities by stressing the performative element in producing and sustaining generational ties. Weisbrod favored the idea of generational belonging over notions of stable generational identities and argued that the continued performance of generational belonging was central to making a generation and to ensuring its binding force over time.

The second panel, moderated by Jan Logemann, tackled the relationship of "Generations and Migration." Karl H. Füssl investigated the role that generational models played in shaping the recommendations that social scientists put forward in the early 1940s for a U.S. cultural policy towards Germany. Scholars such as Margaret Mead, Talcott Parsons, and Erik Erikson, who were all closely involved in the U.S. Council for Intercultural Relations, contended that the supposed deficiencies of the German "character structure" were not inherited but the product of a flawed socialization process that promoted submissive behavior and authoritarian tendencies. These arguments, Füssl contended, did much to bring about the adoption of a re-education policy towards Germany. Next, Sarah E. Chinn questioned the common assumption that a "generation gap" first surfaced in the United States in the 1960s. The concept may have been invented to describe the alienation of the baby boomers from their parents, but the phenomenon had first emerged at the turn of the century. At this point, however, the gap was widest among working-class immigrants and their children. Conflicts erupted between "Americanized" children and their "greenhorn" parents—a phenomenon that was also gendered. The conflicts were often most marked between mothers and daughters, because female employment created a gap between the homosocial world of the mothers and that of their daughters, who separated work and leisure time.

The third panel, chaired by Christina Lubinski, turned to business history to explore "Generations and the Family Firm." Maria Fernández Moya compared intergenerational transmission practices in the Spanish publishing family firms Salvat and Seix Barral between 1900 and 2008. Her paper examined the strategies that enabled these firms to create intergenerational continuity by confirming, and at times contesting, their business and family histories and analyzed the factors that influenced their capacity to adapt to the rapidly changing economic and political environment of twentieth-century Spain. While the Salvat family was always careful to stay out of politics,

Carlos Barral's involvement in left-wing politics meant that he eventually left to set up his own company in 1970. The following paper, by Olof Brunninge, introduced the audience to the case of the Swedish pulp and paper firm MoDo between 1872 and 1990. Drawing on the concepts of "familiness" and "family business identity," which are slowly gaining ground in business studies, Brunninge argued that MoDo gained a sustainable competitive advantage by being a family firm. While the drawbacks of being a family firm dominated the scholarly literature for a long time, more recent studies have focused on the positive assets that a generational heritage creates. Family firm identity creates a bridge between past, present, and future generations of owners.

The final panel of the day turned to "Generations and Consumption." Gary Cross argued that generational identities may be shaped by political, military, or economic events, but in the twentieth century were also increasingly influenced by consumption. U.S. consumer identities were established earlier than in other countries and political identities declined with consumerism. At a time when old community ties were disappearing, consumer products offered age-based peer groups ways of identifying themselves. The resulting communities of consumption, Cross contended, hold on to their identities deep into the aging process. Reminiscing about formative consumer experiences creates emotional associations and is a vital element of generation-building. Similar themes appeared in the next paper: Dirk Schumann provided an alternative reading of four German political generations by looking at them in cultural rather than political terms. Building on Habbo Knoch's idea of images as "emotional containers," Schumann argued that the so-called war youth generation was affected not only by wartime violence but also by the new visual experience of going to the cinema and being otherwise surrounded by image-based advertisements and war propaganda. The lively discussion that followed, which Hartmut Berghoff moderated, centered on the question of how visualization and a deep-seated attachment to particular products played out in terms of creating generations. To what extent were products just things that people bought rather than markers of generational identity? Was the "1965 Ford guy" a useful category for understanding a particular U.S. generation? While the discussion produced no final answers and revealed palpable differences between German and U.S. scholarship, the call to move beyond focusing on those who proclaim their generational identity most loudly was generally welcomed.

The following morning saw a return to interwar Germany. Understanding generation-building as a communicative process, Jochen Hung analyzed the generational public sphere of the Weimar Republic. The newspaper *Tempo*—his case study—was published by the left-liberal Ullstein publishing house between 1928 and 1933 to attract urban white-collar workers around the age of thirty who wanted to help create a new democratic Germany. While the notion of generation in Weimar is traditionally associated with the anti-republican struggle of the nationalist right, Hung suggested that the Weimar Republic was characterized by a polyphony of competing generational public spheres. The discussion, chaired by Bernd Weisbrod, highlighted the challenges of studying newspaper reception. Did *Tempo*'s positioning in the market allow for conclusions to be drawn about its readers' consciousness?

The next panel, moderated by Anna von der Goltz, turned to what is arguably the most famous generation of all. "The 68ers as a Generational Construct" examined how ideas of generation emerged during the period so closely associated with notions of generational conflict. Both papers questioned this perception in interesting ways. Johanna Brumberg (who could not attend, but whose paper was read) charted the development of the baby boomers from a purely demographic category used by U.S. social scientists to describe those born between the 1940s and 1960s to a self-referential label employed by commentators and former left-wing activists to describe members of the "sixties generation." Brumberg argued that it was a somewhat elusive term that was limited to the white middle class, which explained much of its success. Ondrej Matejka's *osmašedesátník* denoted an older age group of Czech intellectuals who had fallen in love with communism during the German occupation. He followed the development of this tight-knit group born between 1920 and 1930 from their coming-of-age in the Second World War to their role in present-day Czech politics. Rather than seeing the Prague Spring as a phenomenon akin to the Western youth revolt, Matejka portrayed the Czechoslovakian 1968 as a broader political project of socialist reform. Nevertheless, the notion of generation was central to how the protagonists and their opponents made sense of 1968 and played a crucial role in subsequent Czech memory wars. Both papers reminded everyone that much remains to be discovered about the national processes of generation-building that emerged out of 1968.

The final two panels, chaired by Hope Harrison and Lutz Niethammer, respectively, homed in further on East-Central Europe, focusing on


“Generation and the Transformation Process” of 1989 and “Post-Communist Generations in Comparative Perspective.” While the shared socialization in East Germany and the joint experience of the country’s demise suggest a generational disposition among those born between 1967 and 1973, Volker Benkert argued that there was no such thing as a “Generation Exit.” Instead, he argued, young people responded to the collapse of the GDR in manifold ways. On the basis of oral history interviews, Benkert identified seven different types of transformation experience, ranging from the “victim” to the “*Wendehals*” or turncoat. Astrid Baerwolf then turned to an in-depth analysis of East German models of motherhood. As social institutions and cultural inventions, childhood and parenthood are subject to constant changes, she explained. East German women, in particular, have had to contend with new social risks associated with having children, including the reprivatization of childcare as well as changing cultural norms since 1989. As a consequence, Baerwolf found that the more practical and strict working mother of the GDR was replaced by the role model of a sensitive, highly involved mother who employs sophisticated psychological and managerial skills to give her children a good childhood. This “professionalization of motherhood” was a key symbol for the transition process in East Germany. Kirsten Gerland compared the generational dynamics in the revolutions of 1989 in the GDR and Poland. In both countries oppositional groups defined themselves in generational terms and developed generation-specific visions of the future in the 1980s. Contrary to the GDR, where no memory generation of 1989 was created afterwards, in Poland numerous biographical narrations illustrate the continued traction of generational self-perceptions. They often portray the establishment of the Third Republic as a generational project and use generational arguments to distinguish themselves from the founders of Solidarity. In the final paper, Judith Szapor examined Hungary’s National Association of People’s Colleges (NÉKOSZ), which was charged with opening universities to previously underrepresented social strata after 1945. At its peak, this exceptional case of social mobility represented close to 10,000 students, sometimes referred to as the “Generation of Bright Winds,” after their college anthem. In a more general sense, the term encompasses the young men and women from working-class or poor-peasant backgrounds who entered universities in the immediate postwar period to become members of the new communist elite. Although the People’s Colleges were politically contested, Szapor argued, as a pedagogical experiment designed to create a new, merit-based and politically engaged generation of socialist leaders,

they were a unique case in the postwar transformation of Soviet-controlled East Central Europe.

In the final roundtable discussion, Bernd Weisbrod, Lutz Niethammer, Gary Cross, and Elwood Carlson offered some concluding thoughts on how to bring the diverse findings of the papers together. While the conference had initially focused on manifesto generations, it concluded with several cases that ought to have functioned as generations in Mannheim's sense, but that never defined themselves in such terms. Hence, the formative experience of a close-knit peer group was not enough to create a generation "for itself." Generation consciousness was clearly on the rise, and there was something magical about this "last community" (Lutz Niethammer), but there was still no clear-cut link between experience and playing the generation card. Generation should thus be considered an *optional* resource of mobilization that historical actors—particularly in the political realm—have employed as an argument at particular moments for particular purposes. Rather than invoking Mannheim once more, the panel turned to Marx to conclude: "We make our own generations, but not under the conditions of our own choosing."

Anna von der Goltz (University of Cambridge)





# **GHI News**



## IN MEMORIAM ELISABETH GLASER

The German Historical Institute mourns the death of Elisabeth Glaser, who served as a Research Fellow at the Institute from 1991 until 1996. Dr. Glaser died on September 23, 2010, after a long struggle with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Born in Cologne in 1954, she received a doctorate from the University of Cologne in 1984 and served as assistant professor of history in the Anglo-American Department there from 1984 until 1990. While she was a Fellow at the GHI, she also taught German history at Georgetown University. Her first book, *Die Philippinen den Filipinos! Die amerikanische Debatte über die Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungspolitik auf den Philippinen, 1898-1906* (Frankfurt/New York: Peter Lang, 1986), examined the United States conquest and administration of the Philippines. At the GHI she convened numerous international conferences and co-edited four important essay collections that grew out of some of these conferences: *Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: German Emigrés and American Political Thought after World War II*, co-edited with Peter Graf Kielmansegg and Horst Mewes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America after 1776*, co-edited with David Barclay (New York: Cambridge UP, 1997); *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years*, co-edited with Manfred Boemeke and Gerald D. Feldman (New York: Cambridge UP, 1998); and *Transatlantic History and American Exceptionalism*, co-edited with Hermann Wellenreuther (New York: Cambridge UP, 2000). The *Treaty of Versailles* volume, in particular, for which she brought together the leading world experts on the end of World War I, remains the definitive work in the field. While continuing her research on emigration from Nazi Central Europe, Glaser embarked on a second career as a psychotherapist in 1997 after settling permanently in Charlottesville. She graduated from the psychoanalytic psychotherapy training program at the Washington Psychoanalytic Foundation and maintained a private practice in both Charlottesville and Richmond. Juggling two careers with aplomb, she also taught graduate courses on European history with her husband, Stephen Schuker, professor of history at the University of Virginia. Elisabeth Glaser bore her affliction with ALS with characteristic dignity and courage. She continued seeing patients and writing until weeks before her death.

## 2010 FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZES

The 2010 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prizes, which honor the two best doctoral dissertations on German history written at North American universities each year, were awarded to Yair Mintzker (Princeton University) and Alice Weinreb (Northwestern University). The award ceremony took place at the 19th Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute on November 12, 2010, chaired by David Blackbourn as president of the Friends. The selection committee was composed of: Mary Lindemann, chair (University of Miami), Donna Harsch (Carnegie Mellon University), and Ian McNeely (University of Oregon). Both prize winners have contributed articles presenting their dissertation research to this issue of the *Bulletin*.

Mintzker was honored for his dissertation “The Defortification of the German City” (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 2009). The committee’s prize citation read: “Yair Mintzker’s dissertation studies one of those rare and wonderful topics that seem so obvious but only after someone, like Mintzker, has done it. His work demonstrates how the gradual disappearance of the old city walls was neither an obvious nor an inevitable process. Not only does Mintzker cross established chronological boundaries, moving easily and sure-footedly from the mid-seventeenth century through the railway age, he also breaks down other accepted distinctions between large cities and small towns and between the putatively pronounced distinctions characterizing German-speaking areas and their neighbors. Mintzker combines sensitivity to differences and individual idiosyncrasies with a strong line of argument and an original conceptualization. He shows how city walls did not merely come tumbling down; their demolitions required negotiations among, and between, those in the city and those outside. Moreover, he demolishes simplistic interpretations of why the walls had to go. He rejects as facile and inadequate explanations based on the need for room to expand and on the sheer inevitability of industrialization and economic growth in favor of a more subtle understanding of how politics worked within the cities, between cities and their surroundings, and within the larger German and European worlds. Especially impressive is Mintzker’s ability to draw theory out of his rich empirical materials. Deeply researched, elegantly presented, and robustly theorized, it is a tour de force of historical writing and analysis.”

Weinreb was honored for her dissertation “Matters of Taste: The Politics of Food in Divided Germany, 1945-1971” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 2009). The committee’s prize citation read: “Alice Weinreb’s dissertation is a highly sophisticated investigation of postwar experiences in the two Germanies. Several previous studies have considered

food and hunger but none has systematically made them the focus of a German-German comparison. Her work deftly explores the multiple discourses about food, hunger, the body, and national identity and uses these discourses to illuminate a host of historical questions centered on the transition from the Nazi regime to postwar Germany and, subsequently, the divided country's history during the 1950s. Professor Weinreb focuses closely on food, its production, consumption, and value as a contested political terrain, contextualizing and historicizing these topics in several key ways. First, she places postwar food and hunger in the broader context of German history. Second, she anchors German hunger in both a comparative European context and within particular postwar political cultures. The dissertation combines in a wonderful and impressive scholarly manner a series of consequential historical topics, memory and identity, barbarism and victimhood with what would seem the most prosaic ones, such as workplace canteens and the provision of school lunches. Its empirical richness combined with its strong conceptual framework make this work an excellent vehicle for interrogating our categories of prosperity and want, wartime and peacetime, capitalist and socialist, German and other."

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## 2010 FRANZ STEINER PRIZE

The 2010 Franz Steiner Prize, offered biennially for the best German-language manuscript in transatlantic and North American studies, was awarded to Jan Surmann, Hamburg, for his dissertation on "Shoah Remembrance and Restitution: The U.S. Politics of History at the End of the Twentieth Century" on October 13, 2010. The prize, awarded by the German Historical Institute Washington and the Franz Steiner Verlag in Stuttgart, which publishes the GHI's book series *Transatlantische Historische Studien*, was presented by Thomas Schaber, editor-in-chief of the Franz Steiner Verlag, and Marcus Gräser, Deputy Director of the GHI. The ceremony took place as part of a German-American Day celebration at the Neues Schloss in Stuttgart.

In excerpts, the prize citation, delivered by Thomas Schaber, read: "At the end of the cold war era and the breakdown of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, a highly controversial debate began on unresolved claims resulting from National Socialist plunder and extermination policies. Particularly in the United States, the focus was on moral and economic questions. Compensation for National Socialist crimes was 'unfinished business.' At first, there were material issues—to what extent were the demands of the Holocaust victims met? However, the debate quickly centered on

our conception of history and the way we deal with the Holocaust. One of the major achievements of Surmann's work is outlining and examining the nature of this restitution discussion. The key protagonist in that discussion—which Surmann places at the center of his work—was the Clinton administration. By consistently supporting the claims of Jewish organizations for restitution, the subject was turned into an important political reality. Clinton urged an economic, but more importantly a moral solution of the open issues of restitution. The debate turned not only on payments, but on interpretations and perceptions of history. The next century was meant to start with a new moral coherence in the Western world. Surmann's work demonstrates that our experience and understanding of the past have substantial impacts on present political decisions.”

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### **GHDI PROJECT WINS JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON PRIZE**

The German Historical Institute is pleased to announce that the GHI's online documents project German History in Documents and Images (GHDI) was awarded the American Historical Association's James Harvey Robinson Prize at the AHA's Annual Meeting in Boston on January 7, 2011. The prize was established by the AHA in 1978 and is awarded biennially to the teaching aid that has made the most outstanding contribution to the teaching and learning of history in any field. The prize was accepted by the project's coordinator, Kelly McCullough, on behalf of the GHI at the award ceremony in Boston.

GHDI is a comprehensive collection of primary source materials documenting Germany's political, social, and cultural history from 1500 to the present. It aims to give students and teachers of German history free access to a wide range of historical documents, both in the original German and in English translation. The site also includes a large selection of visual imagery, maps, and secondary-source texts. The materials are presented in ten chronological volumes, each of which has been edited by a leading scholar or team of experts. GHDI was undertaken in cooperation with the Friends of the German Historical Institute and enjoys the generous support of the Max Kade Foundation and the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius. For access to GHDI, go to [www.ghi-dc.org/ghdi](http://www.ghi-dc.org/ghdi)

## GHI RECEIVES 2010 PARTNER AWARD OF THE HUMANITIES COUNCIL

The German Historical Institute received the “Partner Award” of the Humanities Council, Washington DC. GHI Director Hartmut Berghoff and Research Fellow Martin Klimke accepted a silver trophy on behalf of the Institute at the Humanities Council’s 30th Anniversary Grantee Showcase on September 21, 2010. The annual award is given to individuals and organizations in recognition of their contributions to scholarship, public life, and culture in Washington DC. It honors a partner organization that has enhanced the Humanities Council’s programming by participating in its initiatives and projects. The GHI is a long-standing cooperation partner of the Humanities Council. Both organizations collaborated on the Council’s “Soul of the City” program in 2009 and co-hosted a variety of lectures, conferences and events on Dr. Martin Luther King, the civil rights struggle, African American GIs, and Germany. In the spring of 2011, they co-organized the GHI Spring Lecture Series on “Crossing the Color Line: A Global History of the Civil Rights Struggle.”

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## BOOK PRIZES FOR GHI PUBLICATIONS

### ***Know Your Enemy* Wins Myrna Bernath Book Award**

*Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945* by Michaela Hoenicke Moore (University of Iowa) was awarded the Myrna Bernath Book Award of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). *Know Your Enemy*, which appeared in the *Publications of the German Historical Institute* series in 2010, traces American assessments of the Nazi regime and the impact of Nazi rule on German society, beginning with the first press accounts of Hitler’s seizure of power and following through to wartime depictions of the German enemy. The Myrna Bernath Book Award is awarded biennially to the best book in the field of international history written by a woman. The award was announced at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians in Washington DC, on April 10, 2010. *Know Your Enemy* is “a massively and meticulously researched study of a topic central to our understanding of twentieth-century United States international history,” the selection committee for the Myrna Bernath Book Award wrote in its citation.

### ***Death in Berlin* Awarded Fraenkel Prize in Contemporary History**

Monica Black (University of Tennessee) was awarded the 2010 Fraenkel Prize in Contemporary History (Category B) for her study *Death in Berlin: From Weimar Germany to Divided Germany*. *Death in Berlin*, based upon a doctoral dissertation that won the Friends of the German Historical Institute's 2007 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, was published earlier this year in the GHI's book series with Cambridge University Press. The Fraenkel Prize in Contemporary History is awarded by the Wiener Library, a leading center for research on the Nazi era and the Holocaust, for "outstanding work" in twentieth-century history. The library awards two Fraenkel Prizes annually: Category B honors first book projects. The 2010 Fraenkel Prize committee also commended Michael Meng for his study *Shattered Spaces: Encountering Jewish Spaces in Postwar Germany and Poland*. Dr. Meng was a recipient of the 2009 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize.

### ***German Orientalism* Awarded AHA's George L. Mosse Prize**

The American Historical Association awarded its 2010 George L. Mosse Prize to Suzanne L. Marchand (Louisiana State University) for her book *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship*, which was published in the *Publications of the German Historical Institute* series. The Mosse Prize is awarded annually to "an outstanding major work of extraordinary scholarly distinction, creativity, and originality in the intellectual and cultural history of Europe since the Renaissance." It was presented to Marchand on January 7, 2011, during the AHA's annual meeting.

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## **NEW PUBLICATIONS BY GHI STAFF**

### **Books and Edited Volumes**

Hartmut Berghoff, Jürgen Kocka, Dieter Ziegler, eds. *Wirtschaft im Zeitalter der Extreme. Beiträge zur Unternehmensgeschichte Österreichs und Deutschlands. Im Gedenken an Gerald D. Feldman*. München: Beck, 2010.

Martin Klimke and Maria Höhn. *A Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany*. New York/London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Martin Klimke. *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Martin Klimke, Belinda Davis, Carla MacDougall, and Wilfried Mausbach, eds. *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Intercultural Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010.

Christina Lubinski. *Familienunternehmen in Westdeutschland. Corporate Governance und Gesellschafterkultur seit den 1960er Jahren*. München: Beck, 2010.

Ines Prodöhl. *Die Politik des Wissens. Allgemeine deutsche Enzyklopädien zwischen 1928 und 1956*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010.

Ines Prodöhl and Arndt Engelhardt, eds. *Kaleidoscopic Knowledge: On Jewish and Other Encyclopedias*. Special issue, *Jahrbuch des Simon Dubnow Instituts Leipzig* 9 (2010).

Corinna R. Unger and John R. McNeill, eds. *Environmental Histories of the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Corinna R. Unger and Heinrich Hartmann, eds. *Bevölkerungswissenschaften im 20. Jahrhundert – Diskurse und Praktiken in transnationaler Perspektive*. Special issue, *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte* 33.3 (2010).

Corinna R. Unger, Andreas Eckert, and Stephan Malinowski, eds. *Modernizing Missions: Approaches to “Developing” the Non-Western World after 1945*. Special issue, *Journal of Modern European History* 8.1 (2010).

### Journal Articles

Uta Balbier. “Billy Graham in West Germany: German Protestantism between Americanization and Rechristianization, 1954–70” *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, Online-Ausgabe* 7.3 (2010).

Hartmut Berghoff and Berti Kolbow. “Konsumgütermarketing im Rüstungsboom. Wachstumsstrategien der IG-Farben-Sparte Agfa, 1933–1945.” *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte* 55.2 (2010): 129–60.

Jan Logemann and Uwe Spiekermann. “The Myth of a Bygone Cash Economy: Consumer Lending in Germany from the Nineteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century.” *Entreprises et Histoire*, 59.2 (2010): 12–27.

Christina Lubinski. “Zwischen Familienerbe und globalem Markt. Eigentum und Management von großen westdeutschen Familienunternehmen im Wandel (1960 bis 2008).” *Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte* 55.2 (2010): 204–229.

- Anke Ortlepp. "Poverty Studies in the United States and Germany: A Review of Historical Literature." *Neue Politische Literatur* 54.1 (2009): 423-438.
- Ines Prodöhl and Arndt Engelhardt. "Kaleidoscopic Knowledge: On Jewish and Other Encyclopedias, Introduction." *Jahrbuch des Simon Dubnow Instituts Leipzig* 9 (2010): 3-13.
- Miriam Rürup. "Comments on Current and Future Directions in German-Jewish Studies." *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 54 (2009): 22-28.
- Uwe Spiekermann. "Claus Spreckels: A Biographical Case Study of Nineteenth-Century American Immigrant Entrepreneurship." *Business and Economic History Online* 8 (2010).
- Corinna R. Unger. "Histories of Development and Modernization: Findings, Reflections, Future Research." *H-Soz-u-Kult*, December 9, 2010.
- Heinrich Hartmann and Corinna R. Unger. "Einleitung: Zur transnationalen Wissensgeschichte der Demografie." *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte* 33.3 (2010): 235-245.
- Corinna R. Unger. "Industrialization or Agrarian Reform? West German Modernization Policies in India in the 1950s and 1960s." *Journal of Modern European History* 8.1 (2010): 47-65.

### **Chapters in Edited Collections**

- Hartmut Berghoff. "Vom Gütersloher Kleinverlag zum globalen Medien- und Dienstleistungskonzern. Grundzüge der Unternehmensgeschichte des Hauses Bertelsmann, 1835 bis 2010." In *175 Jahre Bertelsmann: Eine Zukunftsgeschichte 2010*, edited by Bertelsmann AG, 8-83. München: C. Bertelsmann, 2010.
- Hartmut Berghoff. "From Small Publisher to Global Media and Service Company: Outline of the History of Bertelsmann, 1835 to 2010." In *175 Years of Bertelsmann: The Legacy for our Future*, edited by Bertelsmann AG, 8-83. München: C. Bertelsmann, 2010.
- Mario Daniels and Susanne Michl. "Strukturwandel unter ideologischen Vorzeichen. Wissenschafts- und Personalpolitik an der Universität Tübingen 1933-1945." In *Die Universität Tübingen im Nationalsozialismus*, edited by Urban Wiesing, Klaus-Rainer Brintzinger, Bernd Grün, Horst Junginger, and Susanne Michl, 13-73. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010.
- Mario Daniels. "Auslandkunde an der Universität Tübingen 1918-1945." In *Die Universität Tübingen im Nationalsozialismus*, edited by Urban Wiesing,

Klaus-Rainer Brintzinger, Bernd Grün, Horst Junginger, and Susanne Michl, 351-384. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010.

Martin Klimke. "A 'Serious Concern of U.S. Foreign Policy': The West German Student Movement and the Western Alliance." In *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Intercultural Identities in West Germany and the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s*, edited by Belinda Davis, Martin Klimke, Carla MacDougall, and Wilfried Mausbach, 105-131. New York: Berghahn Books, 2010.

Martin Klimke. "Revisiting the Revolution: The Sixties in Transnational Cultural Memory." In *Memories of 1968: International Perspectives*, edited by Ingo Cornils and Sarah Waters, 25-47. Bern: Peter Lang, 2010.

Martin Klimke. "1968 als transnationales Ereignis." In *Das Jahr 1968 - Ereignis, Symbol, Chiffre*, edited by Oliver Rathkolb and Fritz Stadler, 19-28. Göttingen: Vienna University Press, 2010.

Uwe Spiekermann. "Aussenseiter und Wegbereiter: Die Rezeption Bircher-Benners im Deutschen Reich in den 1930er Jahren." In *Lebendige Kraft. Max Bircher-Benner und sein Sanatorium im historischen Kontext*, edited by Eberhard Wolff, 134-150. Baden: hier + jetzt, 2010.

Corinna R. Unger. "Tradierungen und Transformationen: Die Erforschung des europäischen Ostens und die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1945-1975." In *Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 1920 bis 1970: Forschungsförderung im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft und Politik*, edited by Karin Orth and Willi Oberkrome, 407-424. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010.

Corinna R. Unger and John R. McNeill. "Introduction: The Big Picture." In *Environmental Histories of the Cold War*, edited by John R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, 1-18. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Richard F. Wetzell. "Bio-Wissenschaften und Kriminalität: Eine historische Perspektive." In *Gefährliche Menschenbilder: Biowissenschaften, Gesellschaft und Kriminalität*, edited by Lorenz Böllinger, et al., 315-328. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010.

Richard F. Wetzell. "Gustav Aschaffenburg: German Criminology." In *Encyclopedia of Criminological Theory*, edited by Francis T. Cullen and Pamela Wilcox, 58-62. Los Angeles: Sage, 2010.

## RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

### Fellowship in the History of Consumption

**Regina Blaszczyk** (University of Pennsylvania)

*Ernest Dichter and American Consumer Society: A Life and Legacy in Transnational Perspective*

### Postdoctoral Fellowships

**Thomas Kaplan** (Davidson College)

*Naming in the '60s and '70s: Political Activism and Representations of Genocide in West Germany and the United States*

**Martin Lutz** (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg)

*Deutschstämmige Täufer in den USA und ihre Religion im „rationalen“ Zeitalter: Eine institutionentheoretische Wirtschaftsgeschichte von Mennoniten, Amischen und Hutterern während der Hochindustrialisierung 1865-1914/1917*

**Hedwig Richter** (Universität Bielefeld)

*Anthropologie der Gleichheit. Gleichheitsnormen und Wahlpraxis im 19. Jahrhundert in Deutschland und den USA*

**Susan Richter** (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg)

*Modelldenken und Konstruktionen von Vorbildern in der europäischen Aufklärung am Beispiel außereuropäischer Staatlichkeit*

**Elisabeth Röhrlich** (Demokratiezentrum Wien)

*Ostwärts nach Europa. Deutsche, österreichische und amerikanische Experten in der frühen türkischen Republik (1923-1952)*

**Eli Rubin** (Western Michigan University)

*The Arc of Destruction: Materiality and Loss in Germany, 1937-1945*

**Tim Schanetzky** (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena)

*Struktur und Semantik unternehmerischen Erfolgs in den Staatskonjunkturen der 1930er Jahre: Friedrich Flick und Henry J. Kaiser.*

### Doctoral Fellowships

**Rebekka Denz** (Freie Universität Berlin)

*Frauen im "Central-Verein Deutscher Staatsbürger Jüdischen Glaubens" (C. V.) und im "Allgemeinen Jüdischen Arbeiterbund" (Bund) in der Zwischenkriegszeit*

**Jürgen Dinkel** (Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen)

*Geschichte der internationalen Blockfreienpolitik (1946-1992)*

**Ulrich Eisele** (Institut für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin)

*Die DDR in den Vereinten Nationen 1973-1990*

**Sebastian Haak** (Universität Erfurt)

*In Between the Wars: Die USA, the Good War und die filmische Interpretation von Erfahrungen des Zweiten Weltkrieges. 1945 bis 1962*

**Jan Hansen** (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)

*Nachrüsteten? Eine Kulturgeschichte der Debatten um den NATO-Doppelbeschluss in der SPD (1977-1987)*

**Andreas Hübner** (Justus- Liebig-Universität Gießen)

*Migration, Sklaverei und Kreolisierung im Zeichen globaler Krisen: Der historische Raum des unteren Mississippideltas als „Bruchzone“ der Globalisierung, 1720-1820*

**Christian Johann** (Freie Universität Berlin)

*Wohlfahrtsstaat und Mittelschichten in den USA, 1945—1975*

**William Kurtz** (University of Virginia, Charlottesville)

*German-American Catholics in the Era of the American Civil War*

**Michael McConnell** (University of Tennessee-Knoxville)

*The Situation is Once Again Quiet: Gestapo Crimes in the Rhineland, Fall 1944*

**Andreas Riffel** (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg)

*Gewalt und Rassismus während des mexikanisch-amerikanischen Kriegs*

**Devlin Scofield** (Michigan State University)

*Veterans, War Widows, and National Belonging in Alsace, 1871-1955*

**Johannes Steffens** (Heidelberg Center for American Studies, Universität Heidelberg)

*The Racial Integration of the American Workplace: How U.S. and Foreign Companies Ended Racial Discrimination in Employment*

**Jens Wegener** (European University Institute, Florence, Italy)

*Engaging Europe: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and International Relations during the Interwar Period*

**Christoph Wehner** (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)

*Nach den Katastrophen? „Sicherheit“ und Sicherheitsproduktion seit 1945 im Spannungsfeld von Atomgefahr und Katastrophenversicherung*

## GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR, FALL 2010

- September 8**     **Maria Fritsche (Norges Teknisk-Naturvitenskapelige Universitet, Trondheim)**  
*Visualizing Europe: The Marshall Plan Information Films 1948-1954*
- Tobias Hof (Institut für Zeitgeschichte München)**  
*Galeazzo Ciano (1903-1944): Eine biographische Studie über den Faschismus und die Außenpolitik Italiens*
- September 15**   **Frank Bajohr (Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte, Hamburg)**  
*Fremde Blicke auf das "Dritte Reich": Konsulatsberichte aus der Zeit nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft 1933-1945. Eine Bilanz*
- October 13**     **Uta Balbier (GHI Washington)**  
*Billy Graham's Cold War Crusades: Mass Evangelism, Consumerism, and the Free World in Europe and the United States*
- October 20**     **Martin Klimke (GHI Washington)**  
*Breath of Freedom: The Civil Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany*
- November 3**    **Sebastian Jobs (Universität Rostock)**  
*"Uncertain Knowledge": The History of Rumors and Gossip in the American South, 1783 - 1861*
- Rüdiger Ritter (Freie Universität Berlin)**  
*Jazz und sozialistisches Massenlied im Radio 1945-1970*
- December 1**     **Lutz Budrass (Ruhr Universität Bochum)**  
*Die Entdeckung der Schläfrigkeit. Heinrich Kraut und die (Unter-) Ernährungsforschung im Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Arbeitsphysiologie bis 1945*
- December 15**   **Mark Roseman (University of Indiana / U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum)**  
*The Realization of the Utopian? The Bund: League of Socialist Life - Resistance, Rescue, ... and Silence*

## DOCTORAL SEMINAR, FALL 2010

- September 9**     **Jeremy Best (University of Maryland, College Park)**  
*Missionary Nationalism: Politics in the Literature of German Missionswissenschaft, 1874-1919*
- Felix Krämer (Westfälische Wilhelms Universität Münster)**  
*Assassination Attempt: Medien, Macht und Moralische Führung in den USA 1981*
- November 18**     **Lucie-Patrizia Arndt (Ruhr Universität Bochum)**  
*Die „German Community“ von Washington DC, 1840-1880*
- Ewald Blocher (Rachel Carson Center, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)**  
*Konstruktion des modernen Ägypten: Experten, Staudämme und die Transformation des Nils von 1882-1970*
- December 9**     **Frauke Scheffler (Universität zu Köln)**  
*American Indian Policy, United States Imperialism in the Philippines and the Formation of Race, 1890 - 1914*
- Hubert Seliger (Universität Augsburg)**  
*Die andere Seite: Die Nürnberger Strafverteidiger und ihr Wirken in der Bundesrepublik bis zum Ende der sechziger Jahre*
- Eva Neumann (Philipps-Universität Marburg)**  
*Die Zusammenarbeit der Geheimdienste und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsch-amerikanischen Sicherheitsbeziehungen, 1950-1965*
- Juliane Frinken (Freie Universität Berlin)**  
*From the Frontline of the Cold War: Die amerikanischen Botschafter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955-1990*

## OTHER GHI-SPONSORED EVENTS, FALL 2010

Reports of the following events can be accessed online at: [www.ghi-dc.org/eventhistory](http://www.ghi-dc.org/eventhistory). This list does not include conferences reported on in the "Conference Reports" section, lectures published in the *Bulletin*, the Spring and Fall Lecture Series, or the Research and Doctoral Seminars (all listed separately).

- September 7**     **The Berlin Edition: Willy Brandt - Berliner Ausgabe**  
Book launch at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Co-sponsored by the GHI, the Woodrow Wilson Center, Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt Foundation, and Friedrich Ebert Foundation
- October 4**        **German Unification Symposium / Hertie Lecture 2010**  
"1990 - 2010: The Unfinished Business of Unifying Europe"  
Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Wolfgang Ischinger
- November 5**      ***The Fate of the Earth Revisited: Nuclear Dangers Then and Now***  
Lecture and Panel Discussion at the GHI  
Speakers: Jonathan Schell (Yale University), Frida Berrigan (New America Foundation, New York), and Philipp Gassert (University of Augsburg)
- November 12**    **19th Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute**  
Presentation of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize Symposium at the GHI

## **GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS**

### **GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships**

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at [www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships](http://www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships).

### **GHI Internships**

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns' interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at [www.ghi-dc.org/internships](http://www.ghi-dc.org/internships).

## **GHI LECTURE SERIES, SPRING 2011**

### **CROSSING THE COLOR LINE: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN FREEDOM STRUGGLE**

African American civil rights activists early on conceived of their struggle for racial equality as part of a larger struggle against colonialism in Africa, Asia, and South America. This lecture series brings together scholars from both sides of the Atlantic to reflect on this booming field of African American history and to shed light on how both African Americans' quest for equality and the responses to it transcended the borders of the United States. Focusing on new actors and geographic regions, the series offers a more comprehensive perspective on the civil rights movement.

- |                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| <b>March 24</b> | <b>Bourgeois Radicals: The NAACP and the Struggle for Colonial Liberation, 1941-1960</b><br>Carol Anderson (Emory University)                             |
| <b>April 21</b> | <b>Global Perspectives on the Black Freedom Struggle</b><br>Manfred Berg (Universität Heidelberg)   |
| <b>May 26</b>   | <b>Black Expatriates and Civil Rights Activism in 1950/60s Ghana</b><br>Kevin Gaines (University of Michigan)   |
| <b>June 9</b>   | <b>The Night Malcolm X Spoke at the Oxford Union, England: Race Protest in the Subversive Special Relationship</b><br>Stephen Tuck (University of Oxford) |

## GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2011

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our website at [www.ghi-dc.org](http://www.ghi-dc.org)

- February 18-19** **Going Global: Internationalization Pathways for Family Firms During the 19th and 20th Century**  
Workshop at the GHI  
Conveners: Christina Lubinski (Harvard Business School, GHI) and Paloma Fernández Pérez (Dept. d'Història i Institucions Econòmiques, Universitat de Barcelona)
- March 3** **The German Foreign Service and Its Nazi Past**  
Panel Discussion at the GHI  
Speakers: Christopher Browning (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Norbert Frei (University of Jena/New School for Social Research), Peter Hayes (Northwestern University), Miriam Rürup (GHI), and Klaus Scharioth (Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany)
- March 8** **Radical Liaisons and Race: Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties**  
Panel Discussion at the New School for Social Research, New York  
Speakers: Maria Höhn (Vassar College), Martin Klimke (GHI), Jeremy Varon (New School for Social Research), and Norbert Frei (University of Jena)
- March 10-12** **Crime and Punishment: Criminal Justice in Modern Europe, 1870 - 1990**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington) and Kerstin Brückweh (GHI London)
- March 17-19** **Secularization and the Transformation of Religion in the U.S. and Germany after 1945**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Uta A. Balbier (GHI), Wilhelm Damberg (Bochum University), Lucian Hoelscher (Bochum University) and Mark Ruff (Saint Louis University)
- April 7** **Gerald D. Feldman Lecture**  
Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Margaret Anderson (University of California Berkeley)

- April 14-16**      **Economic Crime and the State in the Twentieth Century, a German-American Comparison**  
Workshop at the GHI  
Convener: Mario Daniels (GHI)
- April 28-30**      **Regulation between Legal Norms and Economic Reality**  
Symposium at the GHI  
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), William J. Hausman (College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA) and Günther Schulz (University of Bonn)
- May 10**            **Twelfth Gerd Bucerius Lecture**  
Lecture at the Willard InterContinental Hotel  
Speaker: Gerhard Schröder
- May 18-21**      **17th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: Early Modern German History**  
Seminar at the GHI  
Conveners: Richard F. Wetzell (GHI) and Roger Chickering (Georgetown University)
- June 2-4**         **Feeding and Clothing the World: Cash Crops and Global History**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Shane Hamilton (University of Georgia) and Ines Prodöhl (GHI)
- June 14-15**      **Junior Scholars Seminar in Jewish History**  
Workshop at the GHI  
Conveners: Michael Brenner (LMU Munich) and Miriam Rürup (GHI)
- June 14-16**      **Kalter Krieg: Geschichte, Erinnerungen, Repräsentation**  
Conference at the Europäische Akademie Berlin  
Convener: Andreas Etges (FU Berlin)
- June 16-18**      **Making Modern Consumers: Rationalization, Mechanization, and Digitization in the Twentieth Century**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Gary Cross (Penn State University), Angelika Epple (University of Bielefeld), and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
- June 19-22**      **The Embeddedness of the Economy - Historical, Sociological and Anthropological Perspectives**  
Conference at Villa Vigoni, Italy  
Conveners: Jens Beckert (Max-Planck-Institut, Cologne) and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)

- June/July**      **Archival Summer Seminar in Germany 2011**  
Seminar in Germany
- August 25-27**      **Europe - Migration - Identity: Summer Seminar**  
Seminar at the University of Minnesota  
Conveners: Donna Gabaccia (University of Minnesota),  
Sally Gregory Kohlstedt (University of Minnesota), and  
Jan Logemann (GHI)
- September 4-16**      **Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar for Young  
Historians 2011: American History in Transatlan-  
tic Perspective**  
Convener: Mischa Hoeneck
- September  
29-30**      **Shifting Visions of Development: International  
Organizations, Non-Governmental Actors, and  
the Rise of Global Governance, 1945-1990**  
Conference at Jacobs University Bremen  
Conveners: Marc Frey (Jacobs University), Sönke Kunkel  
(Jacobs University) and Corinna R. Unger (Jacobs  
University)
- Fall**      **An American in Deutschland: Photographs  
by Leonard Freed**  
Photo Exhibition at the GHI  
Curated by Paul M. Farber and Martin Klimke
- October**      **Uncertain Knowledge - Practices, Media, and  
Agents of (Non-) Affirmation in 19th and 20th-  
Century American History**  
Workshop at the GHI  
Convener: Sebastian Jobs (University of Rostock)
- October 3**      **German Unification Symposium and Hertie  
Lecture**
- October 6-7**      **Unternehmer und Migration**  
34. Wissenschaftliches Symposium der Gesellschaft  
für Unternehmensgeschichte  
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI, University of  
Göttingen) and Andreas Fahrmeir (University of  
Frankfurt/M.)
- October 13-16**      **Medieval History Seminar 2011**  
Seminar at the GHI  
Conveners: Miriam Rürup (GHI Washington) and  
Jochen Schenk (GHI London)

- November 7-9**    **“Trust, but Verify” - Confidence and Distrust from Détente to the End of the Cold War**  
Conference at the GHI and Wilson Center  
Conveners: Martin Klimke (GHI); Reinhild Kreis (University of Augsburg); Sonya Michel (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) and Christian Ostermann (Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center)
- November 10**    **Twenty-Fifth Annual Lecture of the GHI**
- November 11**    **Twentieth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI**





## **German Historical Institute Washington DC Fellows and Staff**

For further information, please consult our web site: [www.ghi-dc.org](http://www.ghi-dc.org)

**Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff**, Director

Modern German social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption

**PD Dr. Marcus Gräser**, Deputy Director

Modern American, German, Austrian history; history of the welfare state; urban history;  
history of historiography; comparative and transnational history

**PD Dr. Uwe Spiekermann**, Deputy Director

Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge

**Sabine Fix**, Administrative Director

**Dr. Martin Klimke**, Research Fellow

19th and 20th-century European and American history; U.S. foreign affairs; protest movements;  
transnational history; cultural history; oral history; political communication

**Dr. Jan Logemann**, Research Fellow

Comparative and transatlantic history; history of consumption; history of urban development;  
history of emigration; modern Germany and the United States since the 1920s

**Dr. Ines Prodöhl**, Research Fellow

Global History, cultural and economic History, civil society

**Dr. Miriam Rürup**, Research Fellow

Modern German history; Jewish history; history of education; transnational history

**Dr. Richard F. Wetzell**, Research Fellow and Editor

Modern German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and  
medicine; history of sexuality

**Dr. Thomas L. Hughes**, Senior Visiting Research Fellow

**Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston**, Senior Visiting Research Fellow

**Dr. Mario Daniels**, Fellow in Social and Economic History

**Jessica Csoma**, Research Associate

**Bryan Hart**, Research Associate

**Insa Kummer**, Project Associate

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**Dr. Patricia Sutcliffe**, Editor

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**Elisabeth Mait**, Library Associate

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