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please contact Ms. Bärbel Thomas at b.thomas@ghi-dc.org.

For editorial comments or inquiries, please contact
the editor at wetzel@ghi-dc.org or at the address below.

For further information about the GHI, please visit our

For general inquiries, please send an email to info@ghi-dc.org.

German Historical Institute
1607 New Hampshire Ave NW
Washington DC 20009-2562
USA

Phone: (202) 387-3355
Fax: (202) 483-3430

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This year’s fall issue reflects the German Historical Institute’s new research focus on economic and social history as well as the continuing diversity of its research and programs. This issue’s first article is devoted to a key topic in modern economic history: the history of capitalism. Although the term “capitalism” has fallen out of usage among economists and economic historians for some time, Jürgen Kocka’s article demonstrates that capitalism remains a powerful category of historical analysis. His magisterial reflections on the history of the concept, practice, and crises of capitalism shed new light not only on the past two centuries of social and economic history but also on the current economic crisis. His article was first delivered as the inaugural Gerald D. Feldman Memorial Lecture this past spring. The Feldman Lectures, which are to take place annually, commemorate Berkeley historian Gerald D. Feldman, who was a major contributor to the field of economic history and a stalwart supporter of the GHI. To ensure the continuation of the lecture series, the Friends of the GHI are raising funds for a Gerald D. Feldman Memorial Lecture Endowment. We thank everyone who has already contributed for their generous support, and encourage potential donors to visit our homepage www.ghi-dc.org for further information.

The Institute’s research concentration in a broadly-conceived economic history that includes cultural and social perspectives is also reflected in this issue’s “GHI Research” section. It introduces readers to the GHI’s new collaborative research project “Immigrant Entrepreneurship.” By researching the biographies of about 250 German-American entrepreneurs from 1720 to the present, this project seeks to open up new connections between economic history and the history of migration that should provide new insights in American, German, and transnational history.

The remainder of the articles in this issue reflect the continuing diversity of the Institute’s scholarly interests and public outreach. Pamela Smith’s article “Why Write a Book?” explores the connection between lived experience and the written word in early modern European books. What makes her article so engrossing is that she brilliantly connects the history of the book to early modern European intellectual history, the history of science, and economic and social history. Smith’s essay reflects the GHI’s continued commitment to the
history of early modern Europe; next year’s Transatlantic Seminar will also be devoted to the early modern era. Both Pamela Smith’s and Wolfgang Huber’s articles also illustrate the diversity of the cooperative ventures that the GHI is engaged in: Smith’s lecture was delivered at the Grolier Club in New York City at the opening of an exhibit of rare books and manuscripts from the Leipzig University Library, titled “In Pursuit of Knowledge,” which was part of the celebrations of the 600-year anniversary of the founding of the University of Leipzig. Huber’s article makes available the GHI’s Eleventh Gerd Bucerius Lecture, which he delivered this past June. The Bucerius Lectures, generously sponsored by the ZEIT Foundation Gerd and Ebelin Bucerius, are part of the GHI’s effort to foster transatlantic dialogue by inviting prominent public figures from Germany to Washington for public lectures and discussions. Huber, the former chair of the governing body of the Protestant Church in Germany, who has taken a leading role in inter-faith dialogue, spoke on the timely topic “Religion and Violence in a Globalized World.” The theme of globalization is also taken up in the reflections on the role that the humanities should play in the globalization process that Annette Schavan has contributed from her pivotal vantage point as Germany’s Federal Minister of Education and Research. Her remarks were presented during her visit to the German Historical Institute this past spring.

We hope that readers will also enjoy this issue’s conference reports and GHI news, which document the GHI’s commitment to supporting outstanding research on a great variety of historical topics. Please also check our website www.ghi-dc.org for a remarkable lineup of events and conferences during the coming year. If you live in the Washington metropolitan area, we hope to see you at one of our public events.

Hartmut Berghoff, Director
WRITING THE HISTORY OF CAPITALISM
FIRST GERALD D. FELDMAN MEMORIAL LECTURE
DELIVERED AT THE GHI WASHINGTON, APRIL 29, 2010

Jürgen Kocka
FREE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

I.
Gerald D. Feldman, whom we remember and honor with this lecture, did pathbreaking research on German businessmen, their motives, strategies, and achievements. Take his outstanding biography of Hugo Stinnes, for example. He analyzed the changing structures and strategies of firms, particularly of large-scale managerial corporations. Take his impressive monograph on the Allianz and the German insurance business during the Nazi period as a case in point. Gerald Feldman analyzed the communication, competition, and cooperation between market actors, he dealt with prices and markets, their expansion and their organization. He wrote about capital accumulation, innovation, and market success as well as about market failures, market crises, and government interventions which tried to regulate and even to replace the market, for instance in World War I. Consider his seminal Army, Industry and Labor. Gerald Feldman knew a lot about social, cultural, legal, and political conditions of markets and firms. He also dealt with noneconomic consequences of economic processes, that is, with class relations or with the political impact of economic disturbances. Consider his comprehensive analysis of the German inflation and its devastating impact on German society between 1914 and 1923.¹

The relations between business and the state, but also between economic calculation and morality, were central to his work as a historian and his concerns as a person. In his penetrating study on German and Austrian banks and insurance companies during the Third Reich, he analyzed the differences and tensions between businessmen and Nazi rulers, as well as the convergence and cooperation between them. He made clear that there were many different characters, motives, and preferences involved. The degree of cooperation between businessmen and political rulers varied. Individual cases differed and latitudes existed, though within politically defined constraints. But Feldman also made very clear, in his concrete, detailed, sober, and sometimes sarcastic way, that business and Nazi rule were

basically compatible and structurally complicit. In his last lecture, at the University of Glasgow in January 2007, he quoted the German banker Hermann Josef Abs, who wrote in 1942: “... we will always do that which is politically determined and economically wise.” Feldman showed in detail how even the most immoral purposes could be pursued and enacted in a cool, correct, “rational” business way. He concluded his lecture with the words: “For the banks and bankers what was front and center was not the forced or slave labor that one could see, let alone the mass murder that one could smell, but rather the opportunities offered by Auschwitz and its expansion. In the end, one could write off the failure of such investments, the Third Reich itself, and the unpleasant and unspoken memories of complicity.”

Entrepreneurs, managers, capitalists, their motives, actions and achievements, markets, prices and competition, firms, their structures and strategies, noneconomic conditions and consequences of business behavior and economic processes, the intricate relationship between business and state as well as between economic rationality and morality—Gerald Feldman dealt with all of these things—that is, he dealt with central dimensions of capitalism in twentieth-century history. But, as far as I know, he did not use the word “capitalism,” or at least not in any more than a marginal or casual way.

II.

With this conceptual decision he was in very good company. During the last decades—in the West—the large majority of (non-Marxist) economic and social historians and the overwhelming majority of (non-Marxist) economists have either not used the concept at all or only in passing. To the extent that reasons were given for this decision against the concept, we mainly find two arguments. On the one hand, scholars regarded the term “capitalism” as too broad and vague, in contrast to “industrialization,” for instance. On the other hand, people rejected it as too ideological, partisan, and not sufficiently scientific. “Let’s face it, capitalism does have a negative connotation,” said a member of the Texas Board of Education recently. “You know: capitalist pig!” When revising the social studies curriculum, the board replaced the word “capitalism” with “free-enterprise system” throughout. The concept was not always rejected in this way, nor is it ubiquitously avoided today. On the contrary, the concept of “capitalism” has a remarkable history and is experiencing something like a comeback.
The term “capital” is very old; the term “capitalist” has existed at least since the late seventeenth century. But, at least in French, German, and English, “capitalism” is, semantically, a product of the nineteenth century. It emerged largely as a critical, sometimes polemical concept used in critical treatments of the market economy and bourgeois society, particularly by more or less socialist authors, in the second third of the nineteenth century. Karl Marx did not use the noun “capitalism” more than in passing, but he wrote much about the “capitalist era” and the “capitalist mode of production.” His analysis, his critique, and his predictions have influenced the use of the concept ever since the 1870s. When the German economist Richard Passow surveyed the literature in 1918, he observed, allegedly, 111 slightly different meanings of “capitalism,” and he interpreted this broad spectrum of definitions as an indication of the vagueness of the concept, which he did not like.

There were indeed differences of definition. While Marx had stressed the surplus value of contractual labor, relentless capital accumulation, and the dynamic class antagonism between workers and the bourgeoisie as major criteria of “capitalism,” Max Weber together with Werner Sombart emphasized the “rational” organization of business and work in the enterprise (separate from household and politics) as major features of modern capitalism. Joseph A. Schumpeter defined capitalism as “that form of private property economy in which innovations are carried out by means of borrowed money, which in general ... implies credit creation.” There were many other positions and nuances.4

But if one looks closely at these definitions, one will see that they were not that far apart from one another. At least structurally, they had much in common: Usually, authors used the concept to identify basic experiences of their time, perceived as modern, new, and different from more traditional socioeconomic relations, which had been less prone to growth and fast change and which had been based on non-market principles, that is, on feudal, corporate, or household principles. Using this present-related categorization, historians like Henri Pirenne and social scientists like Lujo von Brentano and Richard Tawney applied the concept to older historical periods, in which they found beginnings, less mature variations, and preceding stages (Vorstufen) of modern capitalism. Or, the concept “capitalism” was used to contrast the existing system with the idea of, and then, the beginnings of socialism. In other words, “capitalism” was a concept

of difference. It gained its vigor from contrasting the present with the past and an imagined future. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the concept was not only used as a political catchword or as a key concept of social criticism, but also as an analytical concept, within socialist and radical parlance as well as in the texts of authors who were anything but anticapitalist intellectuals or activists.5

But the critical, polemical, pejorative connotations of “capitalism” did not disappear, especially in German. They became even more pronounced under National Socialism, whose ideologues liked to present themselves as anti- or postcapitalist. The Cold War was a war about concepts, too. In the sphere of Soviet dominance, “capitalism” became not only a central concept of social analysis, but also a semantic instrument for attacking the West and legitimizing the communist order. In Western countries, as well, intellectuals on the Left and Leftist movements could build on a long tradition of anticapitalism. Sometimes, “capitalism” became the explanation for everything bad in the world; the concept was extended, inflated, and overcharged. Its analytical power sometimes disappeared behind its polemical use in political-ideological battles. Those who did not share this type of anticapitalist, antibourgeois, sometimes anti-Western attitude often reacted either by avoiding the word or by treating it with suspicion or outright hostility.6 There was also another reason for the decline of “capitalism” as an analytical tool. The more economics became a specialized, analytical science with strictly defined parameters and sharply defined theories, the less its practitioners felt the need for a broad concept like “capitalism,” which, after all, aims at bringing economic and social analysis together, frequently within a historical perspective.7

There were always authors in different disciplines who continued to use the concept of “capitalism” in a nondogmatic way—think of Fernand Braudel and Eric Hobsbawm or Albert Hirschman and Immanuel Wallerstein and outsiders like Karl Polanyi. The concept remained less instrumentalized and politicized in English than in German.8 But the space for a productive use of the concept was narrower; other concepts like “industrialization,” “modernization,” and “market economy” fared much better.

In the last two decades, however, the intellectual climate has changed. The Cold War is over. The anticapitalist mood of many intellectuals, so vividly analyzed by Schumpeter and Hayek, has not disappeared but has lost much of its vigor and self-confidence. Nowadays, the

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6 For a review of literature about capitalism by Marxist and non-Marxist authors up to the late 1960s, see Maurice Herbert Dobb, “Kapitalismus,” in *Sowjetsystem und Demokratische Gesellschaft: Eine vergleichende Enzyklopädie*, vol. 3, ed. C. D. Kernig (Freiburg, 1969), 538-63.


The concept of “capitalism” is clearly not reserved for positions on the Left; it is much less a flag or a political signal than it used to be for decades. It is possible now to use “capitalism” with positive connotations, as the Deutsche Bank Research did, for instance, in a 2007 report entitled “Die glückliche Variante des Kapitalismus” (The happy version of capitalism), a comparative analysis of attitudes towards capitalism in different countries. Economists who are clearly not on the Left do not necessarily avoid the concept. Take recent books by Barry Eichengreen and Werner Sinn, for example. The concept can be used in neutral ways, with a comparative interest in observable “varieties of capitalism,” or with a sense of deep ambivalences inherent in capitalism, as in in Joyce Appleby’s recent historical synthesis. An article by Hartmut Berghoff deals with the “Mittelstand and German Capitalism”; Jerry Z. Muller just published on “Capitalism and the Jews.” Historians interested in global history develop viewpoints and questions that invite the rediscovery of comprehensive concepts. It is difficult to discuss globalization without mentioning capitalism. The recent financial and economic crisis has not only reinforced critical assessments of capitalism, it has also renewed interest in the analysis of market crises, and as a consequence, “capitalism and its history” have become more frequent topics of discussion and deliberation even among economists. The crisis has raised interesting questions which historians might want to address. Those who, like this author, deplore the increasing distance between economic historians and other historians have reason to hope that the concept of “capitalism” might serve as a bridge that invites economic historians to incorporate social, cultural, and legal dimensions, while encouraging social, cultural, and other historians to take the economy more seriously than they have done ever since the “cultural turn” that has influenced the discipline since the 1980s.


III.

If we want to use the concept of “capitalism,” we have to define it in order to liberate it from a long tradition of vagueness and political instrumentalization. Based on the discussions I have sketched here and on a selective reading of pertinent literature,” I propose to define capitalism as an economic system, or a type of economy, distinguished by three sets of criteria.

First, capitalism is based on individualized property rights and decisions. These decisions lead to results—both gains and losses—that are ascribed to individuals, that is, to individual persons, groups, associations, or firms.

Second, in capitalism, the coordination of the different economic actors takes place primarily by means of markets and prices, competition and cooperation, demand and supply, and the exchange of commodities. The commodification of resources and products is central, including the commodification of labor, largely in the form of contractural (“free”) labor for wages and salaries.

Third, capital is central to this type of economy. This entails the investment of savings or returns in the present with the perspective of higher gains in the future, the importance of profit as a major yardstick of success, and accumulation with the perspective of change and growth. Accepting uncertainty and risk is implied, as are the notions of profitability and its systematic control over time. In this regard—capital, investment, profitability over time—it makes sense to see borrowing and credit, including speculation and limited liability, as central to capitalism, as Schumpeter did and some modern economists do. It is in exactly this respect, too, that one can see double-entry bookkeeping as an important feature of capitalism, as Werner Sombart did. This thesis continues to be discussed on empirical grounds.” From this same perspective, it also makes sense to see the systematic (“rational”) organization of business and labor within the modern firm as the central characteristic of modern capitalism, as Max Weber and many others in this tradition did. Marx and Weber, convincingly, regarded the distinction between the employer, who holds decision-making power based on individualized property rights, and the employees, who are without ownership rights or decision-making power, but “free” on a contractual basis, as central elements of this “rational” systematic organization. The class difference was built into the essence of capitalism.
This working definition of capitalism is an ideal type, a model that can be used even though one knows that historical reality is never fully identical with it but corresponds to it in different ways and to various degrees. This definition sees capitalism as an economic system with certain institutions and rules, with some autonomy, some logic of its own. To be sure, capitalism has always been dependent on noneconomic conditions: law, culture, social relations, family, even religion. And, of course, capitalism influences social relations, culture and politics. But in order to grasp this complex and changing relationship it is necessary to define capitalism as an economic system with noneconomic conditions and consequences, that is, neither as a social or cultural system nor as a historical epoch.

Historians differ a lot from one another, but most of them have a few things in common. They prefer findings that are space-specific and time-specific. They are interested in change over time. They take context seriously. I will therefore deal with capitalism in space and time. First, I will discuss some spatial dimensions of capitalism in a long-term perspective. Second, I will investigate crisis and change in capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I will compare the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008 in order to discuss some very recent changes in capitalism and place our present experience in a historical perspective. Finally, I will address changing contexts, including the changing nature of Kapitalismuskritik.

IV.

It is true that authors have long differed on how to date the beginnings of capitalism. There are those who argue for continuity from the ancient world to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g., Lujo von Brentano), those who see the beginning of capitalism in the medieval world (e.g., Joseph Schumpeter), and those who stress the rise of capitalism as a modern phenomenon following the Renaissance and Reformation (e.g., Max Weber). We find similar confusion with respect to other complex phenomena and concepts such as “industrialization.” This confusion is caused by uneven and changing states of research, and, more importantly, by differing criteria of definition. It is also true that most authors are well aware of the transregional, increasingly global relations contributing to the rise of capitalism—from the Crusades and the long-distance trade of medieval merchants through European colonial expansion and especially the transatlantic economy of the early modern period to

12 Conceiving of capitalism as an economic system presupposes a certain degree of internal societal differentiation. In societies without it—in tribal societies and under feudalism, e.g.—one cannot expect to find capitalism in a developed form, although one may perhaps find elements, islands, or beginnings of capitalism.

imperialism, international trade, and globalization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Despite the aforementioned differences, the bulk of the literature has basically supported the view that capitalism was originally a European and then a Western phenomenon before it started to extend into other parts of the world and become global in the twentieth century—a process that is still under way.

Historians continue to debate the particularities of capitalism in the Roman Empire. Its heavy reliance on slave labor, its continuous dependence on military means for providing income, resources, and growth, as well as low levels of market integration and enterprise continuity, mark a clear distance between Roman reality and the ideal type of capitalism presented above.

For the late medieval and early modern periods, we are accustomed to looking at the merchants and bankers of North Italian city states like Venice and Florence, the commercial families of South German cities like Augsburg, and the networks of cities around the Baltic Sea. These were forms of commercial capitalism based on long-distance trade and on a symbiosis with local or regional political powers. Although these places were islands of early capitalism in a basically noncapitalist environment, they developed sophisticated methods of capital transfer and accounting as well as the idea and practice of property shares with limited liability.

Next, overviews usually deal with the early modern global economy of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, mainly promoted and structured by West European overseas expansion: first dominated by southwest Europeans, later by the Dutch, and finally by the British. These were systems with strong capitalist elements, but again with a close symbiosis between capitalists and the holders of political power. We observe a dynamic mixture between noncapitalist forms of exploitation (coercion, enslavement, pillaging, violent destruction) and capitalist commerce, capital accumulation and speculation, increasingly through trade on the stock exchange since about 1600. This was a process full of gains and losses, bubbles and bursts, excitement and cruelty, that was barbarous and civilizing at once. The benefits and costs were unevenly distributed, under the hegemony of European adventurers, entrepreneurs, and rulers. In this period, capitalist principles slowly started to move beyond trade and to penetrate industrial production (mostly still in decentralized forms) and agricultural production, for instance, in the plantation economies of the Caribbean, in North American farming, and through the commercial
erosion of feudalism in some rural areas of Europe where lords were transformed into agricultural capitalists and entrepreneurs. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, England became the world’s most capitalist country.¹⁴

But the real breakthrough of capitalism came with industrialization, that is, with accelerated technological progress, the rise of the factory system, and a new organization of work since the late eighteenth century, and with the removal of feudal, corporate, and bureaucratic restrictions around 1800 in Western Europe, and later on further east. It was only with industrialization that the recruitment and allocation of work was thoroughly organized according to capitalist principles: labor markets emerged, contractual work for wages and salaries became widespread, and work became a commodity. Wage work became a mass phenomenon and, soon, a basis of social protest and labor movements. Only with industrialization did the centralized firm with fixed capital and a systematic organization of business become more frequent. Only with industrialization did capitalism become the dominant structure in the economies of a quickly growing number of regions and countries—soon to impregnate social relations, cultures, and the distribution of power. With the partial exception of eighteenth-century England, this had not happened before. Because of all of this, some historians see the history of capitalism as beginning only in the eighteenth century. They do not care to differentiate clearly between capitalism and industrialization, which, however, is essential.

In the nineteenth and during most of the twentieth century, the history of capitalism and the history of industrialization went hand in hand, so that we speak of industrial capitalism. This is frequently still true today, for instance, in Eastern Asia. But by the second half of the twentieth century, in some highly developed countries of the West, service industries had become so dominant that one is inclined to speak of postindustrial capitalism, usually with a great deal of emphasis on financial markets.

What happened in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is usually described as a process of gradual, unequal, and partial expansion, starting from the “first industrial nation” (Britain) and Western Europe, moving into North America as well as to Central and Eastern Europe, reaching Japan in the late nineteenth century, and penetrating many other regions of the world in the twentieth. This is a story of relentless expansion and growth, of innovation and liberation,


Much of this is known, but many questions remain open, and the balance-sheet still needs to be drawn up. For writing a future history of capitalism, two sets of questions seem particularly important. First, which insights will the progress of global history bring? Did capitalism really originate exclusively in Europe? Recent research seems to show that it is not always easy to distinguish between a capitalist Europe and a noncapitalist China or India in previous centuries. Were there equivalents to the European early beginnings of capitalism in China, India, or Tokugawa Japan before Western influences deeply affected those regions? How will the overall picture change once present-day capitalism under authoritarian or dictatorial conditions in Singapore, China, and Vietnam is fully incorporated? Second, to what extent do we have to focus on specific territories in order to explain the rise and dynamics of capitalism? Should we perhaps try to explain these developments in terms of relations—trade, migration, transfer of capital and knowledge, learning—between regions, countries, and even continents? Did something like the territorialization of capitalism take place during the nineteenth and early-twentieth-century industrialization and the rise of the nation-state, in contrast to the transnational commercial capitalism of earlier centuries, and in contrast to the present de-territorialization of finance capitalism? Research in the spatial dimensions of capitalism promises to produce new insights. Thorough comparison (stressing similarities and differences and explaining them) and the analysis of transnational relations, dependencies, and connections need to be combined.

V.

Change is normal in capitalism and is part of its essence. It is change of a special kind, finding and creating something new while discarding and destroying something old. Josef Schumpeter’s description from 1943 is famous: “The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalism engine in motion comes from the new consumers, goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates ... [This process] incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.”17

Under capitalist conditions, economic growth comes in cycles. Boom and bust phases alternate. These ups and downs are also largely produced from within. They are explained in different ways by different economic theories. But they certainly have something to do with innovations, with rising and falling rates of returns, differentiated by branches, with expectations that fail, with over-investment and under-consumption, with limited knowledge and basic uncertainty, with the fact that in this system strategic decisions are decentralized and spontaneous, not centrally planned.18

But there are, now and then, particular peaks and extraordinary declines, euphorias and crashes, bubbles which burst and lead to depressions. While there are competing theoretical explanations for such deep crises of capitalism (by Marx, Keynes, Schumpeter, Friedman, and others), there is also well-developed scholarly literature describing and analyzing such crises historically and systematically, including works by Hyman Minsky, Charles Kindleberger, Niall Ferguson, and, more recently, works by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff as well as Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm.19

Kindleberger began his survey of Manias, Panics, and Crashes with the highly speculative South Sea Bubble of 1720, in which Isaac Newton lost a gigantic fortune. Newton commented that he could calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people. For the period between 1810 and 1987, Kindleberger listed twenty such crises, thirteen of which began either in the United Kingdom or in the United States. All of these were basically crises that originated as crises of share prices, stock markets or banks, usually with deep repercussions on the “real economy,” that is, on production, employment,
and growth. There is a regular pattern: The crisis starts with the emergence of new and profitable opportunities in certain branches like railroads, IT, or housing; a euphoria follows, carried by the expectation of rising profits and leading to rising share prices; then comes a mania or bubble during which masses of investors are attracted by rising expectations of easy capital gains (including some swindlers); over-trading occurs until some, usually insiders, begin to discover that the expected profits cannot possibly justify the now exorbitant prices of shares and begin to take out profits by selling; share prices begin to fall, many others stampede for the exits, and this causes the bubble to burst—with serious to devastating consequences for those who lose property, for banks which default, credits which freeze, reduced trading, declining business, unemployment, and widespread distrust.

The occurrence of this mechanism is made more likely by the availability of easy money (from various sources), certain financial practices, reduced regulation, and perhaps government encouragement (as in the case of the U.S. housing market in recent decades). There are different institutional and psychological explanations which, to my mind, carry the following message: One can do a great deal to make such crises less likely, less numerous, and less severe, particularly through wise legislation and careful regulation; one can also learn from previous crises and hope for a changing culture in the financial part of the economy. But one cannot prevent such crises altogether, as long as one does not want to jeopardize the important positive functions the financial sector performs for the whole economy. This body of knowledge was all but forgotten before the last crisis hit. At least it was largely absent from the theories, recommendations, and predictions of mainstream economists as well as from the expectations and considerations of most economic and political actors.20

Looking at three of these crises—those of 1873, 1929, and 2008—I would like to add a historical perspective to the ongoing discussion with two observations, in particular: one concerning the possibly productive consequences of such crises, and another concerning what might be new in the present crisis.

The international crisis of 1873 was particularly severe in Germany, where it followed a tremendous boom that had been created by inflowing funds, reparations paid by defeated France to the newly established German Empire. This led to a stock market crash, bank failures, deflation, and reduced business activities for several years. It provoked a wave of Kapitalismuskritik—public outrage over

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20 There are numerous attempts to account for this surprising blindness. Usually mainstream economists are severely criticized for having neglected history. This is certainly correct, although the study of history would have informed economists not only about long-term experiences with crises according to relatively constant patterns (this is stressed by Reinhart and Rogoff, *This Time Is Different*), but also about what has changed and is new (largely neglected by Reinhart and Rogoff). An interesting and self-critical account of what went wrong (and why) in mainstream economics and among those who gave economic advice to government and corporate actors is Barry Eichengreen, “The Last Temptation of Risk,” *The National Interest Online* (May/June 2009 issue). On Isaac Newton in 1720, see John Carswell, *The South Sea Bubble* (Stanford, 1993), 108, quoted in Hartmut Berghoff, “Von Herdentrieben und anderen ‘animal spirits’. Zum Verhältnis von Rationalität und Irrationalität auf Finanzmärkten,” Paper delivered in Berlin, November 7, 2009.
capitalism—usually with an antiliberal, frequently anti-Semitic thrust. A reshuffling of the domestic political scene took place—towards the Right. But after some years it also helped productive reactions to emerge. New forms of cooperation were invented, both among large industrial enterprises and between such enterprises and large banks; associations were organized, and there were other attempts towards market organization, supported by increasing government regulations and the beginnings of the rise of a welfare state in the 1880s. Later Rudolf Hilferding, the socialist theoretician, spoke of “organized capitalism.”

The world depression that started in 1929 was much deeper, more extended, and more comprehensive than all other economic crises in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its effects were, as is well known, to a considerable extent quite dreadful: unemployment, poverty, deprivation, loss of status, social and political disorientation. Hitler’s move into power in Germany in 1933 had many reasons, but without this depression it probably would not have happened, and world history would have taken a different course.

But there were also productive reactions. Think of Roosevelt’s New Deal bringing elements of the welfare state to bear on the federal level, institutionalizing government regulations of different sorts, and reforming capitalism, in a way. Think, for instance, of the granting of new union rights, Social Security legislation, and the Glass-Steagall Act regulating banks (enacted in 1933 and repealed in 1999). Consider John Maynard Keynes, who completed his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1935. It was against the background of the Great Depression that Keynes developed his far-reaching policy recommendations, which became one basis of economic policy in the West during the third quarter of the twentieth century and again in the present. In my view, this can be seen as a positive structural change, although it was not without unintended consequences that manifested themselves in the 1970s and 1980s. One might add that the basic ideas of “Soziale Marktwirtschaft,” the highly coordinated “Rhenish Capitalism” of the Federal Republic of Germany, also originated in the years of the Great Depression among authors like Alfred Müller-Armack. These were productive responses to the crisis, which, in this sense, served as a dynamic factor for reforming capitalism and generating structural change.

Can we expect anything like this from the present crisis, which is now frequently referred to as the “Great Recession”? How does it compare...
to the previous crises? The parallels between the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession have been widely remarked upon, both with regard to basic underlying mechanisms and with regard to the depth, speed, and global scope of the crises. No doubt the decline of the world’s equity markets, of international trade, and of the volume of industrial production, worldwide and in leading countries, in 2008/09 was such that it could only be compared with the crisis of 1929/30. Nevertheless, the differences between both crises are striking as well. Let me mention several of them.

First, there are differences in the initial economic conditions, among them the gold standard then as opposed to flexible rates of exchange now and nationalist protectionism then versus low trade barriers now. Social legislation providing for some protection is much more developed now than it was in 1929/30.

Second, a core section of capitalism has changed. There is the rise of what can be called “finance market capitalism.” Over the last decades, we have observed the continuous growth of liquid funds worldwide, very unequally distributed, incessantly floating around across borders, largely for speculative purposes. Over the last decades, we have also observed the continuous rise of a specific type of capitalist specializing in financial services and decisions: managers of funds, analysts, rating experts, brokers, private equity managers, investment bankers. Nowadays the large majority of shares, at the New York Stock Exchange for instance, are held by institutional investors, such as retirement or investment funds and banks. The managers of these institutions are usually professionals, globally oriented, with high expectations regarding returns, very competitive and mobile. They make crucial decisions regarding resources that are not owned by them but by shareholders and lenders. They accept high risks, but their personal liability is very limited (“moral hazard”). They have very indirect, mediated relations to the property they dispose of. They are managers, but they speak for the owners/investors and their profitability interests, which distinguishes them from the managers of industrial, commercial, and service firms. One does not speak any more of the regime—or the revolution—of the managers, but of investor capitalism, particularly of the power of institutional
investors, that is, investment funds. This is the sector where “short termism” and speculation have reached dimensions that could not have been imagined in the 1920s and 1930s. Before the recent crisis, the turnover rate of shares at the New York stock market was more than 100 percent, that is, investors kept their shares less than one year on average, whereas fifty years earlier the corresponding figure was around 10 percent. This finance-market-related part of capitalism is much larger, more apart from the rest, more global, more dynamic, and more powerful than in the 1920s and 1930s, and it is less regulated than it was twenty years ago. It is particularly strong in the United States and Great Britain. It is an open question whether adequate forms of regulation can be found and implemented (against resistance). They would have to be of transnational, global scope. Many of the present political debates and fights concentrate on this problem.

Third, the reactions to the crises are different. In the Great Depression of the 1930s, capitalism still faced the challenge of forceful and hostile alternatives, communism and fascism. These alternatives, now discredited, have become history. In the present crisis, no clear alternative to capitalism has emerged or been seriously advocated. In contrast to the Great Depression, governments are now forcefully reacting with huge bailouts, stabilization programs, and countercyclical stimulus packages. They have tried to avoid what are seen as the fateful government mistakes of the 1930s. They have learned from the Great Depression. They use public resources in order to rescue private firms that perform public functions and are regarded as too important to fail. Ben Bernanke, the chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, personifies this learning process as an author and actor.27

On the one hand, as a consequence of this, the present crisis appears to have been much shorter than that of the 1930s (although the future is not clear). The decline of most indicators was stopped and turned around to the positive after roughly ten months, whereas it took more than three years before such a turnaround of economic indicators was achieved in the 1930s, and then rearmament was a major stimulus with the next war imminent. So far, the social and political consequences, including unemployment, have been much less severe than in the 1930s. And the crisis has not triggered major political changes comparable to the shock waves that hit the political systems in the early 1930s, endangering and partly destroying democracy.28

On the other hand, in contrast to the 1930s, the accumulated public debt jumped from 65 percent of GNP to 78 percent in the United States


28 For the indicators, see Eichengreen/O’Rourke as quoted in fn. 23 above.
in 2008-09, and from 66 percent to 73 percent in Germany. The United Kingdom is expected to reach a deficit of 12–13 percent and a gross debt of 73 percent of GDP in 2010. Even without including Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland in the calculation, in 2009 the Euro area had a fiscal deficit of 5.2 percent and an outstanding gross debt of 81.5 percent of GDP. In a way, the governments have absorbed, taken over, and shouldered the crisis of the markets. It is not at all clear whether they will find ways of dealing with this burden in the future. One also wonders how frequently such a rescue strategy could be repeated. Related to this is a final, perhaps most important, difference between the Great Depression of 1929 and the present crisis: a difference in the dominant attitudes vis-à-vis saving and spending.

Take the public debt—gross debt—of Germany, for instance. In the last year before the Great Depression, in 1928/29, it amounted to about 9 percent of GNP. In the last year before the present crisis, in 2007, this figure amounted to 62 percent (a tremendous increase, even before the crisis began). Or take the United States: This country was the world’s largest capital exporter in 1928/29, whereas it is the world’s largest capital importer today. The savings rate of Americans (private households) was nearly 5 percent in 1930, the rate reached more than 10 percent in the early 1980s, but declined to zero in 2005/07. Since some Americans are saving money, others are spending more than they have. The financial strategies of the large banks fit into this pattern, both in the United States and in Europe. Average bank capital is now equivalent to less than 10 percent, frequently less than 2 percent, of assets, compared to around 25 percent at the beginning of the twentieth century. In other words, average leverage (the proportion of borrowed funds) soared. It is known that tremendously high rates of leverage are one of the aggravating factors in the present crisis. The high leverages resulted from the fact that huge returns were not reinvested but distributed to shareholders.

Taken together, the huge public debts, the soaring leverages, and the declining saving rates of households are indicative of a basic change that Ralf Dahrendorf, in one of his last essays, described as the problematic change from Sparkapitalismus to Pumpkapitalismus—a move from savings capitalism to the capitalism of easy credit. The reasons for this change are manifold. They include the rise of consumer capitalism, which, in other respects, has strengthened the legitimacy and acceptance of capitalism, provided a great deal to the people (not just to the elites), and helped to defeat communism...
in the second half of the twentieth century. The tension between the need to save—that is, to defer gratification to the future—and the need to spend for consumption in the present in order to thrive was already analyzed in Daniel Bell’s *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976). In the meantime, this tension has intensified. It may, indeed, be a problem not only of capitalism, but of our culture at large in the wealthy countries of the West.31

John Maynard Keynes was fundamentally critical of too much saving. He wrote a great deal about how to spend more than one earns, at least in bad years. And in the long run, he said, we all are dead, anyway.32 If he were writing today, he would probably write more about what to do in order to counter the trend and to sometimes spend less than one earns. And he might be more concerned about the future.

VI.

In other words, historical analysis suggests that a simple return to Keynesianism will be neither possible nor sufficient. Will there be productive answers to the recent crisis and basic reforms of the capitalist system like those that occurred after the crises of 1873 and 1929? Instead of attempting to give a speculative answer, I would like to conclude by drawing attention to the importance of noneconomic contexts. A closer analysis would show that in both cases (1873 and 1929) it was not the capitalist economy per se, but the interplay between the capitalist crisis, strong waves of *Kapitalismuskritik*, and political actions based on social mobilization that generated partial solutions to basic problems and led to structural reforms. The central topics of *Kapitalismuskritik* in Western countries changed over time: In the late nineteenth century, the central issues were opposition to capitalist exploitation at the workplace and the underprivileged status of labor; in the crisis of the 1930s, protest against unemployment and destitution took center stage; and during the decades of the Cold War, the confrontation with the challenge of communism repeatedly exposed the dark sides of capitalism and increased the influence of those who advocated reform. The history of *Kapitalismuskritik* is as old and as important as the history of capitalism itself;33 and it has to be fully taken into account if one wants to understand the social and cultural meanings of capitalism and the mechanisms through which crises and reforms of capitalism were interconnected, usually in interdependent processes of intellectual criticism, the formation of public opinion, social mobilization, and political conflict. In this


sense, the history of capitalism is never just a matter of economic history, but of social, cultural, and political history as well.34 At the present time, after the collapse of socialist-communist alternatives in the late twentieth century, fundamental criticism of capitalism is relatively weak. Nowadays Kapitalismuskritik no longer focuses on the threat of pauperization (Verelendung), alienation at the work place, the destitution of labor, or the allegedly antidemocratic or even “fascist” potentials of capitalism. Instead, it focuses on increasing inequality, permanent insecurity, and the relentless pressure for change that is produced and required by capitalism. Capitalism is also challenged with regard to its compulsive reliance on permanent growth and expansion, which tend to erode and destroy the natural resources (environment, climate) and the cultural conditions (solidarity, meaning) that civilizations, including their economies, need for their long-term survival.35 Whether these types of discontent with capitalism will be strong enough and whether the political system—on a global level—will be responsive enough to generate another round of basic reforms of capitalism in response to the recent, threatening crises remains to be seen.

Noneconomic contexts are of utmost importance if one wants to understand the history of capitalism as an economic system. On the one hand, it is clearly necessary to examine social relations, culture, mentalities, religion, and political power in order to comprehend why and how capitalism emerged in certain areas and periods (and not in others).36 On the other hand, it is equally indispensable to investigate the political, social, and cultural “embeddedness” of advanced forms of capitalism37 in order to understand why and how capitalist economies survive or fail. Finally, we need to explore the changing relations between capitalist economies, democratic or authoritarian polities, moral values, social community, and citizenship, as well as war and peace, in order to elucidate what Max Weber called the Kulturbedeutung of capitalism—its place and meaning in history.38

Jürgen Kocka taught modern history at the University of Bielefeld and the Free University of Berlin from 1973 to 2009. He is Senior Advisor to the International Research Center “Work and Human Life Cycle in Global History” at the Humboldt University Berlin and Senior Fellow of the Center for Research on Contemporary History Potsdam. As a Visiting Professor he teaches regularly at the University of California Los Angeles. His recent publications include: Civil Society and Dictatorship in Modern German History (Hanover/London, 2010); Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives (edited with Heinz Gerhard Haupt; New York/London, 2009).
WHY WRITE A BOOK?
FROM LIVED EXPERIENCE TO THE WRITTEN WORD
IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

Pamela H. Smith
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

For who could be taught the knowledge of experience from paper? since paper has the property to produce lazy and sleepy people, who are haughty and learn to persuade themselves and to fly without wings .... Therefore the most fundamental thing is to hasten to experience.¹

—Theophrastus von Hohenheim, called Paracelsus (1493–1541)

I.
A book can be many things: it can be a collection of medical recipes on papyrus, like a Papyrus Ebers from 1600 BCE, or it can be a computing device, like the Theorice novella from the 1400s, used to calculate planetary position (see Figure 1), or it can be a platform for taking notes, like a 1492 edition of Aristotle’s De Caelo et Mundo, filled with a university master’s notes, or it can be a laboratory where experiments are carried out in the precise replication of nature, such as in an early sixteenth-century book of nature prints by an unknown artist (see Figure 2), or it can be a repository of memory, as the eighth-century Bedouin poet Dhu’l Rumma’s words indicate: “Write down my poems, because I favour the book over memory. ... [T]he book does not forget and does not exchange any word for another.”² His view of the book as a valuable aid to memory and knowledge was not universal. In Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus, Socrates condemns the discovery of writing by the god Theuth:

And so it is that you, by reason of your tender regard for the writing that is your offspring, have declared the very opposite of its true effect. If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. What you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder. And it is no true


² Quoted in the exhibition catalog, Ulrich Johannes Schneider, ed., In Pursuit of Knowledge: 600 Years of Leipzig University (Leipzig, 2009), 124.
wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its semblance, for by telling them of many things without teaching them you will make them seem to know much, while for the most part they know nothing, and as men filled, not with wisdom, but with the conceit of wisdom.3

A recent exhibition of books from the library of the University of Leipzig held at the Grolier Club in New York City demonstrated that books can function in a multiplicity of ways; they might even incorporate objects within themselves, such as the wood samples included in Johann Bartholomäus Bellerman’s 1788 work on different types of woods (Abbildungen zum Kabinet der vorzüglichsten in- und ausländischen Holzarten nebst deren Beschreibung). This exhibition emphasized the material nature of the book like that of a 1307 Mongol Qur’an, a holy object as well as a sacred text, which “none toucheth save the purified.”4

The exhibition was exemplary in demonstrating how diverse the purposes, formats, and sheer materiality of books could be, and its point that books are much more than the sum of their textual contents is worthy of reinforcing. In the following essay, I consider a moment in European history at which writing began to be employed in fields and by individuals who did not usually record their activities in texts. This is a moment at which movement occurred from lived experience to the written word, from the orality and the tacit knowledge of artisans to the written word of books. The years around 1400 represent a pivotal “practical moment” at which, with remarkable suddenness,
a wave—a virtual tsunami—of writing overtook many European craftsmen and practitioners. These individuals, who previously had been happy to live out their lives without recording their experiences and knowledge, and creating and producing in relative obscurity, suddenly began to write. It is a moment I shall call the “Sophists’ Revenge.”

Such a provocative rubric deserves explanation. As we all know, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle dismissed many of their contemporaries and teachers of rhetoric as “mere sophists.” According to Plato, the sophists’ bad qualities included a wandering life not tied to a single polis or even to Greece, a focus on practice rather than theory, that is, on the “technique” of “rhetoric” rather than the “knowledge” of “philosophy,” thereby teaching an appearance of wisdom rather than “real” wisdom. Sophists taught “how to do” rather than “how to think,” and, worst of all, they were paid for this teaching—a practice akin to prostitution for Xenophon. Although many ancient philosophers called each other by the name of sophist, Plato was the first to give the sophists a persona, and he did so not because sophists actually existed as an identifiable school, but because they were a convenient foil against which to establish a genealogy of his own “true philosophy.” Plato made the sophists the counterfeit background to the emergence of true wisdom in the teachings of Socrates. As historians of philosophy have shown, Plato’s project was not uncontested in the ancient world, but because Plato wrote (and his writings so remarkably survived), his genealogy has become our dominant narrative of the development of human thought.

Historians of ancient philosophy, most recently Hakan Tell, have attempted to piece together a clearer picture of this ancient sophia tradition from the scattered and meager documents that have come...
down to us. Ancient *sophia* seems above all to have been oriented toward the *practice* of wisdom and to have included expertise of a practical kind—the performance of religious ritual, architecture, city planning, water catchment, medicine, poetry—which was often oriented to community life in the *polis* and an active life in politics. Movement from place to place was central to this ancient knowledge; indeed, some fragmentary ancient histories of philosophy located the origins of philosophy in India and Egypt, rather than giving primacy to the Greek city states, thus representing a more pluralistic ideal of knowledge. Sometimes this ancient tradition was referred to as a kind of cunning wisdom, a *metis*, celebrated, for example, in the fables of Aesop, sometimes as wise counsel, akin to prudence, but most often oriented to doing and practice.

This ancient wisdom tradition was overshadowed, if not completely suppressed, by the success of Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon’s founding figure of Socrates and his philosophical tradition, which emphasized one kind of knowledge—that is, the universalized and disembodied *episteme* (or *scientia*)—at the expense of another—*technē*—and which placed practical pursuits lower on the epistemic hierarchy than true philosophy. As a result, “doing” came to be seen as separate from “knowing.” Doing was knowledge of “how to” rather than of “why” and was seen as goal-oriented “know-how” involving specific and particular practices, while “knowing” was regarded as generalizable, abstract knowledge expressed in propositions, general theories, and proofs. Plato and Aristotle regarded “knowing” as a more powerful type of understanding. It was obvious to them that “doing” could be employed in important ways for survival, but because animals exhibit this kind of knowledge (birds build nests and bees make hives), it was not an activity which could distinguish humans from brutes. “Doing” was thus a way of being in the world which was not worth theorizing about and did not need much written attention. Moreover, Aristotle was scathing about the unsuitability of the manual worker for citizenship in the republic, and this prejudice would be carried forward with the rest of the Aristotelian corpus and reinforced as the medieval university system in Europe grew.

This essay suggests that the *scientia* tradition of philosophy in Europe came under siege with the explosion of practical and technical writing in the 1400s. We can see the advance party of this siege in the expressions of self-consciousness, expressed not in words,
but, to take just a few examples, in the 1392 self-portrait in stone of Peter Parler, proudly placed on the Prague Cathedral where he acted as master mason, and in the sculpture of Adam Kraft, who carved himself in 1485 life-sized and dressed in his mason’s working garb, holding his stoneworking tools at the base of his astonishing sacrament house, which reaches into the vaults of the St. Lorenz Church in Nuremberg. Lorenzo Ghiberti cast his own portrait in bronze on the doors adorning the Florentine baptistery in the first quarter of the quattrocento, and Jan van Eyck referred to himself prominently and powerfully in his 1434 oil portrait of Giovanni Arnolfi ni and His Wife, where he placed his maker’s signature, “Johannes de Eyck fuit hic,” in the very center of the painting. These artisan-artists all seem to be saying, “Here I am; here is my proof; here is what I can do.” These men all expressed ambitions to record themselves in some medium, sometimes in writing as well as in representation.

This sudden appearance of self-consciousness and self-assertion took place in the context of increasingly powerful territorial rulers and their need of artisans for war technologies and for the representation of power. At the same time, society in Europe had become increasingly urbanized, with concentrations of artisans experimenting with different media and engaging in an intense exchange of skills and ideas with their fellow craftsmen and other social groups. The wave of technical writing that followed on this beginning around 1400 rippled out still further with the invention of printing in the 1460s: recipe collections and technical treatises (still titled, as they had been since the Middle Ages, “books of secrets”) were some of the earliest works off the presses and some of the biggest best-sellers, growing larger and larger with each reprinting as material was added and the pseudonyms of the authors changed. Early works in the vernacular appeared in astounding numbers and include Distillir-Bücher in the 1490s, Kunstbüchlein in the 1500s, and assaying and metalworking treatises (known as Probir-Büchlein) in the 1530s. Then Alessio Piemontese’s Book of Secrets burst onto the scene in the mid-sixteenth century, first in Italian and then quickly translated into Latin and many other European languages, going through ninety editions by the seventeenth century. This boom in “how-to” books continued throughout the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, and these two centuries saw the publication of many more books on every conceivable subject, from fencing to composting, and from embroidery to cannon casting.6

6 For further examples of such artisanal self-consciousness, see Pamela H. Smith, The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago, 2004).

Vivid evidence of this siege on the *scientia* tradition can be found in a coat of arms a Venetian galley oarsman gave to himself in the 1400s (see Figure 3). It certainly seems to portray a kind of revenge, a world turned upside down, in which a giant mouse holds a bloodied cat in its paws, blood dripping from the cat’s already stiffening sides. This striking image is flanked by oversized turnips, known as peasant food, in place of the usual noble fleur-de-lis. This is clearly a work of some self-consciousness and no little irony on the part of its low-born vernacular creator, Michalli da Rhuodo (Michael of Rhodes). Michael joined the Venetian navy as a lowly galley oarsman in 1401, taking part in over forty voyages in as many years across the Mediterranean and to Flanders, rising to a high position. He documented his life in a remarkable manuscript begun in the 1430s, only published in its entirety for the first time in 2009, which records his voyages and provides a remarkable glimpse into his life.\(^8\) It reveals his interest in mathematical and algebraic calculation for commerce, calendar computation, navigation, and apparently just for

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the sheer delight of working with numbers, as well as his deep piety (see Figure 4), his concern with astrology (see Figure 5), and his interest in the technical details of ship-building, for which he provided many striking illustrations, filled with precise measurements (see Figures 6 and 7). All these components of his book convey a vivid but enigmatic glimpse into the concerns and ambitions of a low-born, informally educated handworker who was part of neither an intellectual nor a social elite.

In Michael’s book, a working man who has been engaged in “doing” all his life suddenly comes to light through his foray into the written word, and he looks like we hoped he would: no doubt embedded in his religious and cultural context which included deep piety and astrology, but also self-conscious and mathematically clever, and, from the look of his remarkable coat of arms, apparently dreaming of overturning the social order.

It would thus appear that Michael’s book must be a treasure trove for understanding this moment of “sophists’ revenge” and the practical sophia tradition lost in antiquity. What do we find in Michael’s book? How does he express his vernacular “knowledge”? As text-centered scholars ourselves, concerned with our own authorship, we must admit to disappointment.
in Michael’s book—it is a bit of a jumble, the math is mostly problem solving, rather than setting out rules or axioms; the problems are a compilation from abacus school textbooks; the portolans (descriptions of sailing routes) are so inaccurate that anyone using them would have shipwrecked themselves; the images are not all original; the recipes often seem dry lists; the magical incantations brief; and the shipbuilding instructions not actually useful to shipbuilders. What do we make of this? So much practical writing is like this—compiled from other texts with little conceivable order: bare-bones recipes, magic tricks, undigested, out-of-date, and inaccurate information that could not possibly be employed by the readers. What is such useless information doing in a how-to book? So many of the ways in which we think today about knowledge as powerful—innovative, oriented to formulating general rules, precise, accurate, and useful—seem to be absent from many of these books. Perhaps Michael’s book really gives little insight into this working person’s life, or, even more regrettable, perhaps it is the work of a second-rate mind, simply imitating rather than innovating, not something upon which we might hopefully found an alternative intellectual genealogy of knowledge-making. Can we thus conclude, after all, that Michael

Figure 5. Zodiac man, indicating the astrological influences over various parts of the body. The Book of Michael of Rhodes, vol. 1, fol. 103b.

9 For these assessments, see the scholarly essays in vol. 3 of The Book of Michael of Rhodes.
was just a striver, trying to imitate an intellectual elite tradition of *scientia* in his book without really understanding it? Is the movement from lived experience to the written word around 1400 not revenge but merely a moment of imitation, a case of practical people emulating the higher status activity of writing books, and printers capitalizing on their desire? Perhaps these how-to books appealed to readers because they appeared to promise a means to obtaining the social status of an artisan without actually having to make oneself subservient in the way that an apprentice is subject to a master; thus they might be a manifestation of the social mobility of this period, which is also evidenced by the popularity of conduct manuals at the same time.

II.

To answer these questions, let us return to Michael’s book to consider what writing could do for him. Michael earned his livelihood by being signed on every year in some capacity to the Venetian navy or to the trading fleet. From 1401 to 1422, he worked his way up from oarsman to *armirai*o, the highest position he could attain as a non-noble. In order to be hired at the rank of non-noble officer, Michael had to compete with dozens of other mariners. Such officer positions not only put one into a position of command, but also paid better and gave more space to the individual to ship his own commodities for private sale. Due to changes in the rules of the competitions in 1418, the applicants for non-noble officer positions were judged by Venetian patricians who had negligible maritime experience themselves. As Alan Stahl’s careful reconstruction of Michael’s service in the Venetian fleets has shown, the competitions from 1433 to 1436—the years during which Michael substantially completed his book—were particularly fraught by conflict between the noble patrons of the ships of the fleet and the non-noble officers, as well as by various charges of influence and corruption. In these difficult years when Michael composed his text, it appears a book could assist in the competitions. There is no getting around the social and intellectual status of a book, especially one that had the “look” of expertise, including a list of his voyages, portolans (inaccuracy was not at issue since no one actually used them for navigating), lots of numbers, and many impressive images of ships. Michael’s book from this vantage point was a “proof” of his expertise, although it was a much less powerful proof than his actually navigating a ship safely across the Mediterranean, or his being able to garner a profit by his ability to calculate—to take an example from
Michael’s book—the correct price of a load of silk worth 11-3/11 soldi per pound being exchanged for cloth worth 60 soldi in cash and 66 soldi by barter, in which one third of the silk must be paid for in cash. But his book did constitute a proof that conformed to the textual world and expectations of the competition’s judges, many of whom had never been to sea. It appears that Michael’s book may have worked, for he was elected as armiraiolo of the Flanders galley in 1436.11

But what about the pictures devoted to shipbuilding? On the strength of its images (see Figures 6 and 7) and its precise measurements for ships, Michael’s text has until recently been viewed as a how-to work for shipbuilders. But it mysteriously begins with sail-making, not ship construction. This is especially mysterious because Michael did not work on sailing ships, only on galleys with banks of oars. It seems that Michael intended this portion of his book not for instruction in building ships but for “completing them for the sea,” that is, arranging the masts, fitting them out with rigging, hanging the rudders, and providing the stores and equipment, all of which also required precise measurements. The audience for Michael’s pictures (with verbal explanation to be provided

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11 Alan M. Stahl, “Michael of Rhodes: Mariner in Service to”
by Michael) was probably made up of patrician youths whose merchant families sent them to sea at their own expense to learn the trade, boys who then went on to serve not on galleys, but on merchant sailing ships. It appears, indeed, that almost all how-to manuscripts on shipbuilding written at this time by practitioners were not intended to furnish instructions for other craftsmen, but instead were employed by practical men explaining the tools and expertise of their trade to the social group above them, administrators or patrons, who needed the illustrations and the book both to understand the spoken presentation and to take it seriously as “knowledge.” Thus, Michael’s pictures were probably employed for the instruction of non-experts.12

Pictures are especially effective in organizing technical knowledge into an abbreviated form, because the processes being described are extremely tedious and confusing to follow in writing, especially for the uninitiated. His pictures, supplemented with verbal elaboration, were undoubtedly even better than the pictures alone at transmitting complicated procedures. Michael’s book thus tells us about one of the aims of a how-to book—for use with patrons and officials as

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talking points. Yet, for actually doing and producing things, embodied non-textual knowledge was still best, as demonstrated when the Venetian Council of Forty specified in 1403 that on every ship construction over a certain size an elderly carpenter be hired “for the benefit and improvement of the craft of ship carpenters,” in order that he could “give to the others the means to learn this craft.” Administrators well into the eighteenth century would continue to call upon such knowledge embodied in craftspeople whenever they aimed to have things actually produced.

Michael’s foray into making a book shows us something else that writing made possible. One of the largest sections of the book is taken up with calculations, most of them eminently practical problems familiar from abacus school textbooks for calculating partnership shares, bartering, freightage, as well as the rule of three, a very ancient commercial technique already employed before the common era in Egypt and Mesopotamia, but first written down in Sanskrit in the seventh century. We might lament Michael’s lack of originality, but the historian Raffaella Franci has shown that the long sections on mathematics actually are a kind of experimentation with the problems—for Michael solves each of them in three ways: first by using the rule of three, then the rule of double false position (another ancient technique first written down in India), and, finally, by means of algebra (what Michael called the “rules of the unknown”). Writing makes the ordering of information in a variety of ways possible and allows for its comparison, thus leading to a kind of experimentation. Putting something into writing might have the effect of formalizing a dynamic oral tradition, but it can also allow for experimentation in a way that oral presentation cannot. Indeed the recipe-like nature of many how-to books—listing various different methods and combinations as “another way” and yet “another way”—positively encourages the comparison of techniques.

Perhaps, as Jack Goody has claimed, writing develops abstract thought and may even bring forth changes in cognition by fostering an internal monologue. This seems plausible, but what can we see it doing for Michael? In 1431, after a battle against the Genoese, a violent storm arose and the ships in the Venetian fleet were separated. Then again, in 1437 and 1439, Michael voyaged in one of the four ships of a convoy escorting the Byzantine emperor and his party of 700 from Constantinople to Venice and back, and, as violent storms separated the ships of the convoy, all on board
feared shipwreck.\textsuperscript{18} How could they determine where they were? And how could they reach the other ships of the fleet? Michael used a technique to mentally calculate how far a vessel had been blown off course, using a table of numbers (“raxon del marteloio”) and a computational practice called dead reckoning by English mariners and “mental navigation” (“navichar a mente”) by Michael.\textsuperscript{19} By these means, internalized through his endless practice in computation, Michael could master the storms and contingencies of sea travel. He also devoted much computational practice to calculating the lunar and solar years and the date of Easter, and this clearly represented to him a means, as Faith Wallis has put it, to control “the flow of time, as one might master the flow of money, or the flow of the ocean currents, to secure human safety and advantage. Mathematics was the key to that mastery.”\textsuperscript{20} Mastery of this technique, like others, was attained by constant practice, by doing all the problems in three different ways.

The fact that the mathematics in Michael’s book—as was the case in most other practical mathematics texts—was organized around problems rather than theorems or proofs could be taken as a sure sign that we are dealing with “how-to” practical knowledge rather than the “why” of science. But we can see in Michael’s case that such problems were a way to gain practice in thinking through the forces of nature and the value of materials until the practice was internalized. This practiced “thinking and working through” allowed a higher-order, intuitive response to tides and winds or the fluctuations in commodity prices. The carefully computed problems, done three ways and then copied into his book, are thus a demonstration of how to learn to improvise and intuit. Much of Michael’s how-to book, then, is a demonstration of the training of intuition and improvisation, an extremely powerful combination of practice and thought that I think we might consider an embodied equivalent to the functioning of generalization in logical induction. Michael was not only “doing,” he was also thinking about cognition. In the late sixteenth century, scholars would indeed turn to algebra, to use their phrase, as an “art of thinking about thinking.”\textsuperscript{21} As Michael put it: “These are the points of the stars, by which are made the fortunes of the sea and the wind and the rain, and in the same way of great calm and great heat, and in addition you must always watch out not for the appropriate things but for the contrary things that can arise, so that if you want to navigate, always be prepared for every contrary thing.”\textsuperscript{22} It was the hours of practice that made Michael able to respond to the unknown—the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{19} Franci, “Mathematics,” 140–142.  
\textsuperscript{20} Wallis, “Michael of Rhodes and Time Reckoning,” 318.  
\end{footnotesize}
contrary things—and this ability to respond at a more general level constitutes a form of generalizing or universalizing analogous to Aristotle’s conception of *scientia* or *theoria*.

A similar statement by a master mason in a compilation of design rules repeatedly emphasized that his written rules were not to be relied upon exclusively, but that a mason must be able to exercise judgment based on his accumulated experience: “Give to this writing careful attention, just as I have written it for you. However, it is not written in such a way that you should follow it in all things. For [in] whatever seems to you that it can be better, then it is better, according to your own good thinking.”23 Because how-to books were often written as lists of design rules and specific problems, they have been seen as prescriptive for particular cases rather than describing general methods. If we see these books of practice as intended to replicate the ways in which general methods were taught in apprenticeship, however, they come to have new significance. Take, for example, *Das Büchlein von der Fialen Gerechtigkeit* of 1486 by master mason Matthäus Roriczer, which appears to set out instructions on how to draw a pinnacle for a spire. In actuality, this piece of technical writing provides an exercise in deriving the elevation of a pinnacle from a ground plan, the most important “secret” of masons’ lodges throughout Europe.24 Such exercises, taught by example and imitation in apprenticeship, led to an ability to apply specific instances more generally and can therefore be understood as instances of higher-order knowledge.

In 1444, Michael wrote a second book, an abbreviation and compilation of his 1434 book with some new material. At his death in 1445, both books passed into the possession of another mariner, who apparently carried the books with him on his voyages. This man carefully erased Michael’s name on the second book, substituting his own.25 A work of plagiarism and thievery, perhaps? Not really. Rather, Michael’s book had, in fact, become the book of its inheritor. It was never a book by Michael of Rhodes in our sense; it was, as Michael called it, the book *of* Michael of Rhodes.26 It contained a collectively gained, shared resource of maritime knowledge, shaped to Michael’s own needs and laid out according to Michael’s best efforts at demonstrating his techniques as well as the knowledge that resulted from them. A book was, of course, not an optimal means of transmitting embodied knowledge. That was done better by the collective working conditions of the workshop and the course of “doing” of apprenticeship and imitation.

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Let us then question the idea of individual authorship (with which we scholars are all so self-absorbedly enamored) and not just for such how-to books. Even Shakespeare, whose authorship and personality are so important to our own self-understanding and identity, was a master compiler—he hardly invented a plot. I would argue that all writing was viewed as wholly or partially an act of compilation and incorporation for some centuries after 1400. Roger Chartier and other historians of the book have shown how the idea of the author as the most important component in the production of a book emerged very gradually in the eighteenth century out of a system that viewed the author as one of several cogs in a mechanism that included the work’s dedicatee, copyist, printer, and seller. Long after 1400, authoring a text could mean a variety of things, of which compilation continued to be central. Consequently, we should expect from a how-to book neither a proof, for the proof lay elsewhere—in the practitioner’s humble body and the objects produced—nor insight into an individual author, for how-to books did not emerge from single authors, but from knowledge made, held, and shared collectively.

III.

Michael’s precise contemporary, Cennino d’Andrea Cennini, a painter not far away in Padua, also wrote down his knowledge—in *Il Libro della Arte* at the very end of the fourteenth century. Cennino’s book set out a complete course of an apprenticeship for a painter, from picking up the chicken bones under the table and charring them for charcoal through pigment-making, panel painting, gilding, frescoing, and casting. His book records painters’ techniques current in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. At first glance, Cennino’s book appears, as Michael’s did at first evaluation, as an attempt to attain a higher intellectual and social position. Cennino sought, as he tells us, to establish that the art of painting requires both “scienza” (science) and “operazione del mano” (work of the hand). Cennino nowhere defines *scienza* very clearly, but for him it has two important characteristics: first, it is a superior form of activity and it lends this superior status to whomever articulates it and, second, it involves the work of imagination and intellect.

Cennino and Michael were both making claims for their expertise within a hierarchy of knowledge that placed the written word and *scientia* higher than practice and embodied knowledge. Their movement...
from practicing to writing, like that of other how-to compiler-authors, was partly about asserting their identity, their modes of cognition, their skills, and their own particular kinds of knowledge. As with the artists who began to include self-portraits in the body of their works, these individuals began to take the measure of themselves and sought to make their practical knowledge known, respectable, or, in other words, recognizable as “knowledge” within their culture. Yet just as Michael’s book can be read as an epistemological tool of experimentation and a text that both teaches and demonstrates how to learn to improvise and intuit, Cennino’s book is also more than simply an attempt to move up the intellectual and social hierarchy.

Cennino’s lived experience comes across vividly in the opening lines of his book, in which he declares his work one of religious piety and common good. Cennino begins and ends his book with a prayer to “God All-Highest, Our Lady, Saint John, Saint Luke, the Evangelist and painter, Saint Eustace, Saint Francis, and Saint Anthony of Padua,” that the students of his book will “study well and ... retain ... well, so that by their labors they may live in peace and keep their families in this world, through grace, and at the end, on high, through glory, per infi nita secula seculorum.” Cennino’s piety pervades the manuscript, lauding those who become painters out of enthusiasm and desire to praise God, stressing the costume of “Enthusiasm, Reverence, Obedience, and Constancy” that the painter must don when he begins his apprenticeship. Cennino advocates the use of fine gold and good colors, because they will make the painter’s reputation, but even if he is not paid well, “God and Our Lady will reward you for it, body and soul.” On beginning every panel, a painter should invoke “the name of the Most Holy Trinity ... and that of the Glorious Virgin Mary.” And when the painter begins the extremely delicate task of drawing with a sharp-pointed needle on gilded glass, being careful not to make a single mistake, he must begin “with the name of God.” It is worth noting that Michael also quite literally framed his text with his piety, heading each page with the sign of Christ. Michael carried an image of St. Christopher on his travels (see Figure 4), and similarly to Cennino’s, and to numerous other artisanal activities and texts, Michael’s book also began with an invocation of the name of God.

Cennino’s book progresses from the prayer to an abbreviated recounting of Genesis, moving immediately to the Fall. As he says, “Inasmuch as you have disobeyed the command which God gave you; by your struggles and exertions you shall carry on your
lives....”36 The Fall of Humankind imposed a necessity of laboring for salvation, and Cennino’s painting and his text should be understood as works of redemption through labor. This expresses more than formulaic piety: Cennino’s work functions as an act of religious devotion and redemption, as did an altarpiece in Wurzach, on which Hans Multscher signed the work: “Intercede with God for Hans Multscher von Reichenofen, citizen of Ulm, who made this work in the year numbered 1437.”37 Numerous works of art reveal that the artist viewed the bodily labor of producing as an act of devotion and a work of individual salvation, as well as working to redeem humanity through the act of redeeming matter.38

This spiritual understanding of his craft is also expressed in Cennino’s straightforward technical instructions. For example, he describes precisely how one is to lay in the flesh tones of living individuals and specifies that this flesh tone should never be used in representing faces of the dead. He called this color incarnazione and clearly regarded its use as akin to the incarnation of life in a body.39 This giving life to (or “incarnating”) an image for Cennino constituted a perfectly mundane artisanal technique by which the abstract principle and profound miracle of the incarnation of God and the Word in human flesh could be imitated. Cennino thus proclaimed, through a nuts-and-bolts recipe, the transformative power of art and artisan. His simultaneously material and spiritual understanding of the production of pigments, expressed in this recipe, illustrates the “theory” that underlay artisanal practices, although it was a lived and practiced “theory,” rather than a written and abstracted one. Cennino and Michael’s piety was a commonplace component of their culture, but we may also understand it as one piece of an underlying set of principles that gave meaning and order to the world; it was knowledge that explained “why,” yet it was contained in a “how-to” book largely made up of recipes.

It turns out that another explanatory theory of sorts underlies additional straightforwardly didactic recipes in Cennino’s book. In “How to Paint Wounds,” Cennino instructs a painter, “take straight vermilion; get it laid in wherever you want to do blood.”40 The pigment vermilion was an artificially manufactured substitute for naturally occurring cinnabar (mercury sulphide), which painters had employed as a deep red pigment in Europe and Asia from ancient times. To manufacture vermilion, mercury and sulfur were heated together until they became a black paste. On constant heating and
stirring, this paste turned dark blue on the outside and silver on the inside, and eventually formed a vapor that condensed as a bright red cake on the walls of the crucible. This powder was then scraped off to be used as a painting pigment.\(^{41}\) The red of vermilion was associated naturally with blood and in particular with the blood of Christ. Evidence for this can be found in the practice of scribes and illuminators, who marked the places where vermilion was to be used in their manuscripts with a cross.\(^{42}\) Perhaps their use of the cross even referred to the making of vermilion in the crucible; the root of “crucible” in Latin is, of course, “crucis” (cross), and it was in the crucible that sulfur and mercury underwent their own passion and transformation to produce the blood red pigment.

In vernacular practices and high theology, blood brimmed with overlapping and contradictory meanings. It signified vitality, fertility, the material of conception, and the spirit of life, but at the same time, blood poured out could signify death, and, of course, that shed by Jesus signified death, life, and redemption all at the same time.\(^{43}\) Blood was regarded as an extremely powerful agent: it was often listed in recipes as the only means to soften or cut hard gemstones such as diamonds.\(^{44}\) In medieval and early modern Europe, red substances were viewed as possessing the powerful properties of blood. Red coral, for example, had a variety of valuable qualities:

And it has been found by experience that it is good against any sort of bleeding. It is even said that, worn around the neck, it is good against epilepsy and the problems of menstruation, and against storms, lightning, and hail. And if it is powdered and sprinkled with water on herbs and trees, it is reported to multiply their fruits. They also say that it speeds the beginning and end of any business.\(^{45}\)

Michael of Rhodes includes a recipe “To staunch the flow of blood,” which intones, “Blood is in you as Christ was in himself. Blood is fixed as Christ was crucified. Blood is strong in your vein as Christ was in his pain. And break one stone and immediately put it on your nose and take the breath of the stone deeply into yourself.”\(^{46}\)

Blood was the carrier of life heat, and gold was viewed as possessing analogous properties, heating up the body and stimulating rejuvenation when prepared as the medicinal “potable gold” or even when worn on the body as jewelry.\(^{47}\) Red components, such as the


\(^{43}\) See Caroline Walker Bynum, Wonderful Blood: Theology and Practice in Late Medieval Northern Germany and Beyond (Philadelphia, 2007), esp. chs. 7 and 8.

\(^{44}\) For example, Theophilus, The Various Arts: De Diversis Artibus, ed. and trans. C. R. Dodwell (Oxford, 1986), 189–90. The recipe for softening hard stones goes back millennia more or less unchanged at least to Pliny, Natural History, Book 37 (The Natural History of Precious Stones), ch. 15 (Adamas).


\(^{46}\) The Book of Michael of Rhodes, 2:521 (fol. 184b).

pigment vermilion, were often ingredients in recipes to produce gold pigment, even when they could have no practical effect on the actual chemical reaction. Red seems to have been considered an essential ingredient in processes that sought to generate and transform, especially related to the noble metal gold. The materials of vermilion (i.e., sulfur and mercury) also often appear in recipes for gold pigments, such as for mosaic gold (tin or stannic sulfide, SnS₂), a sparkling golden pigment that imitated pure gold. Cennino lists one such recipe, which calls for “sal ammoniac [ammonium chloride], tin, sulfur, quicksilver, in equal parts; except less of the quicksilver.” Art conservators have determined that the mercury (quicksilver) in this recipe is not necessary to produce the gold pigment, and instead appears to refer back to the homologies between red and gold. But through their ability to produce red color, sulfur and mercury seem to have been viewed by artisans as necessary to bring forth gold or, in other words, regenerate, transform, and ennoble materials.

Cennino’s recipes are thus deceptively simple. They both provide a set of instructions to be followed by an aspiring painter, and, at the same time, they reveal the explanatory framework in which this practice took place. They reveal what we might call a “vernacular science” of matter and transformation, a relational web of interlinked homologies among red, blood, and gold that underlay artisanal practices and techniques and that generated meaning in their world. This knowledge system was not formulated as a set of propositions, but rather as a set of particular instances or instructions. Yet it was intended as a generalizing statement. Moreover, it was not always expressed in writing, but was instead sometimes just practiced and lived. It related practices of making to knowing nature, and it gave access to the powers of nature, transformation, and generation. Productive practices in early modern Europe did not just involve the handling and transformation of inert materials, but rather allowed the artisan to investigate and engage in life forces and in the relationship of matter to spirit, and even to imitate the most profound mysteries such as the Incarnation. On the one hand, their practices were mundane and oriented to the production

48 Just one example comes from H. G., “Goldsmith’s Storehouse,” c. 1604, Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington DC, ms. Va 179, f. 55r.


53 I say more about this vernacular science of nature in Pamela H. Smith, “Vermilion, Mercury, Blood, and Lizards: Matter and Meaning in Metalworking,” in Materials and Expertise >>
of goods, but, on the other, artisanal techniques gave access to the greater powers of the universe.

Pigment-making and metalworking texts also often included another unusual component related to this red-gold-vermilion complex: lizards. In instructions perhaps for making mosaic gold, which appear in a 1531 collection of recipes for pigment-making and metalworking, a process of producing gold by catching, feeding, and burning lizards is described in naturalistic detail. The recipe opens with precise instructions on how to catch the lizards, then directs the reader to force-feed the lizards on goat’s milk and brass, preventing them from suffocating, however, by making holes in the vessel in which they are buried in the earth. The recipe instructs the reader to burn and mash the lizards to eventually produce a powdered gold.54 In this and other lizard recipes in this compiled volume, lizards are associated repeatedly with generation and transformation, in part apparently through their connection with mercury and sulfur, the generators of gold and blood-like vermilion. More evidence for the association of lizards and transformation comes from a book of secrets ascribed to Albertus Magnus (but probably a compilation of material from various sources written no later than the fourteenth century) which contains many “secrets” for lighting a house. One of these calls for cutting off the tail of a lizard and collecting the liquid that bleeds from it, “for it is like Quicksilver [i.e., mercury],” and, when it is put on a wick in a new lamp, “the house shall seem bright and white, or gilded with silver.”55

Lizards were associated with processes of putrefaction and generation more generally, as can be observed in the natural world: lizards appear seemingly spontaneously from putrefying matter, lending support to the commonsense principle that generation involved a process of decay. Furthermore, lizards emerge fully grown from their places of hibernation after freezing winters, and they can regenerate their tails when severed. In other words, lizards, too, were bound up with the mysterious processes of putrefaction, generation, and regeneration.56 An ambivalent attitude to lizards as impure and associated with putrefaction, yet as crucial in processes of transformation and generation, seems to have been very long-lived, appearing relatively recently, for example, in the birth amulets—adorned with naturalistic lizards and salamanders—of Jewish silversmiths in early twentieth-century Morocco.57

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Such recipes to transform lizards probably were not intended to provide straightforward instructions, but rather they reveal another node, along with blood, red and gold, in the theoretical framework by which metalworkers explained processes of generation and transformation. It should be emphasized, however, that these two different functions of a how-to book might be combined comfortably, as Cennino did in his book of recipes which could be followed by an apprentice, while simultaneously making clear the explanatory or “theoretical” framework of his practice.

The naturalistic details of these lizard recipes, such as approaching the lizards carefully and keeping them from suffocating by perforating their vessels, remain puzzling, however. Why the precise instructions for an action probably not meant to actually occur? Perhaps these should be understood as inculcating certain habits necessary to craft practice. For example, the concentration of the lizard hunt proclaims “stay alert!” One of the most important components of successful handwork is the training of attention, and many recipes make reference to this important habit of being wide awake to the changes in the state of the material and the task at hand. Michael of Rhodes repeatedly admonishes his reader to “watch out.” 58 The injunction not to suffocate the lizards seems to tell the practitioner to put himself in the position of the material, and enjoins the artisan to know the materials with the whole body, to come to “feel,” to “sense,” and to “know” matter. Such injunctions resemble Cennino’s deceptively homely discussion of materials when he speaks about the wooden panel on which he is going to paint as being hungry, and having to give it an appetizer of size (a thin gesso mixture) before laying on the following coats which constituted its meal. Matter was like a living being one had to come to know through intimate and bodily acquaintance. The artisan had to sound out his materials, be attuned to them, taste them through the bodily senses, or “overhear” matter, as the medical and intellectual reformer Paracelsus, quoted in the epigraph to this essay, expressed it in trying to capture this element of artisanal practice. 59 Artisanal manuals are full of directives about this type of discernment by listening, tasting, and smelling, which is very hard to describe in words, but instead is known in the body. 60

Jack Goody defines a recipe as “a written formula for mixing ingredients for culinary, medical or magical purposes; it lists the items required for making preparations.” 61 While this is certainly a good
definition of one function of some recipes, how-to texts and recipe collections can also form a meditation on the material; they develop a habit of regarding matter and its manipulation. By their very repetition, often listing different variations of ingredients or different methods of doing something, they can encourage trial-and-error testing. The need for repeated trial is emphasized by the Venetian metalworker, Vannoccchio Biringuccio in his 1540 book on metalworking, the *Pirotechnia*: “those things that have such inner powers [implanted by God], like herbs, fruits, roots, animals, precious stones, metals, or other stones, can be understood only through oft-repeated experience.”

Such trial-and-error procedures teach that matter is something to work through, something in which to explore resistances, in which to seek out the characteristics of a material in different situations. Such grounding in the behavior of matter led, like Michael’s computational practice, to an ability to intuit, improvise, and innovate. The judgment required by such intuition could only come through practice, not through the words or texts of simple instructions.

Hours of practice enabled the practitioner to respond to the unknown. Indeed, cognitive psychologists now believe that expertise in a craft comes after 10,000 hours of practice. This was the training that made intuition possible, and it involved a repetition of particular instances and experiences until they became generalized as “second nature,” like Michael’s calculations. Improvisation based on thorough knowledge was the stock-in-trade of the practitioner. In the smoke and heat of the workshop, with dangerous and molten materials all around him, the metal caster must make the split-second determination at which exact moment the metal is ready to pour. Technical writing and how-to books sought to convey the necessity of educating the attention, of overhearing or thinking with matter, and of repetitive “doing” in order to respond to the contingencies of the workshop. As a modern Japanese silversmith trained in traditional methods put it:

> Remember, our work is not done by measuring and talking. The hammering, the forging, all the processes are performed by intuition. It’s the split-second intuitive decision to remove the iron from the fire, when and how to bring up the flame, to immerse the blade in the water now—it is these acts of intuition that produce.

And, as the assay master of the 1604 manuscript, “The Goldsmith’s Storehouse,” phrased it: “a pfit Assay Master, whose perfection

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[is] grounded upon Artificiall Exercise, for these things doe rather consiste in doing then in referringe, for they are not easelye reduced to matter of Argument ... the trade asketh a good Judgment, gotten rather by years & experience, then by speculation & dispute.” The assay master must possess “grounded experience in this Science or mysterie, should have a perfect Eye to vewe, & a stedye hand to waye for other mens senses cannot serve him.”

IV.
The foregoing survey of the books of Michael and Cennino indicates that, contrary to first impressions, their desire to move from lived experience to the written word was not merely a striving towards the higher intellectual and social status of authorship. Rather, they sought to convey and to teach the foundations of their techniques, the system of knowledge that underpinned their practices, and the attitudes and actions that fostered them: “watch out,” “pay attention,” “practice over and over again.” But this was not all: the ultimate goal of these books was to instruct in the ability to improvise, that is, to respond to new situations intuitively. We can see intuition as the certain scientia—the science or theory—of this practical writing, while improvisation is the generalizing action, and proof was the success in producing the right result or making things work. As such, these practical how-to books included thinking about doing and how to train for it, but they also included thinking about thinking, if that encompasses such elements of cognition as attentive action and intuition. The title of “Sophists’ revenge” consequently seems more fitting for the avalanche of how-to texts during the practical moment around 1400 than viewing it simply as mass imitation of higher-status intellectual practices.

We seem to be entering another such practical moment ourselves. In clear contrast to previous scholarship on guilds, economic historians have recently come to see the embodied knowledge of the crafts and the guild structure of early modern Europe as providing an effective means of transmitting knowledge and fostering innovation. Economists are studying cooperation in place of competition, while law theorists are emphasizing practice and norms over principles of law, and cognitive philosophers and psychologists are studying skill and collaborative knowledge-making—none of which even touches on the phenomenon of Wikipedia and open source software as examples of collective knowledge-making. Of course, this interest in practice is not entirely new to the last ten years: phenomenology and

65 “The Goldsmith’s Storehouse,” fols. 5v–6v.
66 See, for example, S. R. Epstein and Maarten Prak, Guilds, Innovation, and the European Economy, 1400–1800 (Cambridge, UK, 2008).
pragmatism also argued for the importance of embodiment and collective intelligence. These contemporary concerns with practice and skill no doubt possess important ramifications for policy-makers and educators in technology, industry, and science, but let us conclude on a scholarly note by going back to the issues of knowledge-making.

This essay has assumed a linear movement in the work of Michael of Rhodes and Cennino Cennini from experience to writing. Perhaps this itself is too simplistic. Let us attempt an inverted view—appropriate to the inverted world of Michael’s frontispiece—by considering three examples. First, in 1530, maize was already growing in Avila, Spain. Historians have argued that it took about a century for the New World to be assimilated into the world picture of the Old. They have relied upon texts to make this argument. That maize was already growing in Spain within forty years of first contact indicates that exchange and assimilation of information, materials, and practices were already much livelier at an early stage than the texts would lead us to believe. Practices, practitioners, and experience moved ahead of the written word. This indicates the importance of attending to practices and to lived experience as well as books.

In recent work on the construction of the Canal du Midi in the seventeenth century, which ran 150 miles north of the Pyrenees from Toulouse to the Mediterranean, Chandra Mukerji documents the use of hydraulic mortar on the canal, that is, mortar capable of being used underwater. At the time of the canal’s building, waterproof mortar was a rural French masons’ practice (perhaps dating from Roman times), unknown to the scholarly tradition. In fact, hydraulic mortar had been discussed by the Roman architect Vitruvius, but the textual knowledge of the technique had fallen out of historical memory, while the practice itself survived. In the eighteenth century, the technique was rediscovered in Vitruvius, which then came to be regarded as the source of the use of waterproof mortar in the building of the canal. In fact, what had happened was that a practice had moved in and out of written tradition. As a practice it had survived, but it was lost and then found again in the written tradition. This example indicates the complexity of the relationship between practice and text and alerts us to the pitfalls of thinking about them in a hierarchical or binary way.

It turns out that the deeply associative red pigment vermilion constitutes a similar caution: the practice of manufacturing vermilion spread westward, probably from China to the Islamic world and thence to Europe in the early Middle Ages. The first written recipe

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67 The classic statement of this is J. H. Elliott’s The Old World and the New (Cambridge, UK, 1970).


for vermilion-making appeared in Europe in the eighth century. Vermilion production interested medieval European scholars, such as Albertus Magnus, because it was made by the combination of what he believed to be the two principles of all metals, sulfur and mercury, a theory he had discovered in the texts of the Arabic (al)chemical scholars whose works were translated from Arabic into Latin in the twelfth century. The philosopher’s stone, the substance that alchemists believed to be capable of instantly transforming a mass of base metal into shining gold through a dramatic series of color changes, was often described as a red powder, like vermilion. Thus, pigment-making and alchemical theory seem to have been intimately related; not only were the two principles of metals in (al)chemical theory—sulfur and mercury—also the ingredients of actual vermilion production, but they both involved spectacular transformations that bore a strong resemblance. When alchemical theory arrived in Europe in the twelfth century in textual form, craftspeople had already been combining mercury and sulfur to produce a red powder for at least four centuries. Indeed, the practice of vermilion production always seems to have predated the articulation in texts of a theory of metals. It appears likely that the sulfur-mercury theory of metals actually emerged from the practice of making vermilion, in other words, from the work of craftspeople and their techniques. Thus, one of the most pervasive and enduring metallurgical theories of matter and its transformation—the sulfur-mercury theory—probably emerged from the making of a valuable trade good that resulted from the worldwide circulation of craft techniques and texts.

As I laid out above, vermilion was one of the nodes—along with blood, gold, and lizards—of a “vernacular science” of matter and the transformation of natural materials. Oddly enough, in the early twentieth century, anthropologists working on the oral culture of illiterate South Asian villagers recorded recipes using reptiles to produce light similar to the lizard-tail recipe from the medieval book of secrets. In China, too, lizards were deeply implicated in transformation, indicated even by the characters which made them up. The Bo wu zhi (Comprehensive Record of Things) by Zhang Hua (232–300 CE), illustrates this, while also drawing a direct connection between lizards and red pigment, when it instructs the reader to keep lizards in a vessel and feed them cinnabar. When the lizards turned red, they were to be pounded into a pulp and then applied to a woman’s body, where the red color would glow brightly as long as she remained chaste.

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71 Edgar Thurston, Omens and Superstitions of Southern India (New York, 1915). My thanks to Robert Goulding for this reference and for allowing me to read his lecture, “Snakes in a Flame,” in manuscript.
72 “Xi yi are also called yan yan 噴煙. If you keep it in a vessel and feed it cinnabar (zhu sha), its body will turn all red. After it has ingested seven jin of cinnabar, pound it into a pulp by ten thousand smashes with a pestle. Dot it on a woman’s limbs and body and it will glow without extinguishing. If she has sexual intercourse, then it would extinguish. Therefore, it is called shou gong (guard chamber).” According to the third-century dictionary Shiming (Explanation of Names), xi yi is so-called because its tail could detach (xi 剃) from the body and its color could change (yi 改). Yi is the word for change or transformation, as in the Yijing/ I Ching. The word yi that made up the compound lizard is made up by adding the “insect” radical 虫 to 魚. The former radical indicates that it is in the insect family and the latter gives it its sound, yi. Lizard is thus related to yi-transformation. My deep thanks to Professor Dorothy Ko, Barnard College, for this communication.
The potent combination of lizards, vermilion, metals, and generation that formed a cornerstone of Arabic alchemical theory and European metalworkers’ vernacular beliefs apparently journeyed far across the globe, conveyed by craftspeople, commodities, books, and technologies (with practices, as was the case with maize, apparently traveling in advance of the texts), and taken up both by learned scholars and manual workers. The resulting amalgam of written and tacit knowledge and of theories and practices that formed the knowledge of vermilion can be viewed as characteristic of the relationship between lived experience and the written word of books: that is, experience and the written word, theory and practice, were never really opposed, but existed in a more complex and dynamic relationship. Indeed, “doing” and embodied knowledge were always a part of “knowing.” Even Plato, as he attempted to explain the final step toward the highest stage of intellectual knowledge—apprehending the Forms—could do so only by employing an analogy to sexual intercourse and reproduction.73

Pamela H. Smith is a professor of history at Columbia University and the author of The Business of Alchemy: Science and Culture in the Holy Roman Empire (Princeton, 1994) and The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago, 2004). She co-edited Merchants and Marvels: Commerce, Science, and Art in Early Modern Europe (with Paula Findlen; London, 2002) and Making Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: Practices, Objects, and Texts, 1400–1800 (with Benjamin Schmidt; Chicago, 2008). In her present research, she attempts to reconstruct the vernacular knowledge of early modern European metalworkers from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, including hands-on reconstruction of historical metalworking techniques.

It is a great honor for me to deliver this year’s Gerd Bucerius Lecture. This lecture is named after a great German publisher, politician, and philanthropist. Gerd Bucerius was among those who were exposed not only in their youth, but also as adults to the horrors of the Nazi regime in Germany and to the cruelties of World War II. This generation was devoted to the task of forming a new, democratic Germany embedded in the political culture of the West, a peaceful Germany far removed from the militaristic spirit of former times. Independent and free—these two words best characterize Gerd Bucerius, whose memory we honor with this lecture.1

Nothing is more dangerous for such a spirit of freedom and independence than an atmosphere of hatred and violence. Our time is characterized by an open conflict between two tendencies. On the one hand, freedom and human rights, peace and justice are highly esteemed in our time. But, on the other hand, we observe not only a resurgence of the spirit of hatred and violence, but, even worse, its justification and promotion with seemingly religious reasons. That leads to a situation in which violent religious extremism is seen as one of the mega-problems of the twenty-first century.2 It figures together with global warming, population growth, water shortages, and pandemics as one of the big challenges facing our global societies. Therefore, in this lecture I will address the interaction between religion and violence in our present-day, globalized world.

To begin with, I will briefly describe some manifestations of a new linkage between religion and violence. In the subsequent parts of this lecture I will discuss three different concepts for explaining the relationship between religion and violence: a necessary connection between religion and violence, religious criticism of violence, and, finally, a contingent relationship between religion and violence. These are the three patterns of interpretation I want to discuss. That will lead us, finally, to some insights into the tasks that religious bodies should address in the future, but to describe these tasks in more detail would require an additional lecture.


Turning to the present debate on violence, I will, in a first section, address the problem of the definition of violence in general and the attitudes of religions towards it. In a second section, I will turn to the specific problems of military violence.

I.

There is a longstanding debate on the meaning of the term “violence.” The restriction of the term to only the physical violation of persons creates problems. On the one hand, such a restriction might give the mistaken impression that the destruction of things is pardonable compared to the use of violence against persons. On the other hand, it is obvious that human beings can be negatively affected by structural restrictions just as intensely as by physical violence; therefore, it was for good reason that the concept of structural violence was introduced. Structural violence in this sense is found in all structural conditions that prevent people from developing and using their capabilities. The segregation of ethnic groups in the United States of America before the success of the Civil Rights Movement or the system of Apartheid in South Africa were often used as examples of such structural violence. But even in the case of direct violence, not every violation of human beings takes the form of physical violence. We know psychological and other forms of non-physical but highly effective damage by which people are affected. Today bullying at the workplace is often described as a form of such psychological violence.

Most important in such a broader reflection on the understanding of violence is a shift in perspective. Recent research looks at violence not primarily from the perspective of the act and its perpetrator, but from the perspective of the victim. Empathy for the victim becomes the key to understanding violence. Therefore, not so much the means but the effects of violence and not so much the intentions of the actors but the consequences for the victim form our image of violence. However, there is also a need to define the limits of the term “violence.” Whoever tries to wrestle with the problems of terminology indicated above has to address the problem that the term “violence” becomes very vague. Violence in this broad sense seems to be an omnipresent reality; the hope of limiting, containing, and at least partly overcoming violence seems futile when the term is used in such a limitless sense. For the purpose of this lecture, therefore, I restrict myself
to the problem of direct, physical violence exerted by human beings against one another.

But even in this narrow sense violence is extremely manifold and disturbing. Indeed, you find a whole spectrum in which this problem has to be addressed. Different forms of physical violence committed by human beings against other human beings include: personal acts, especially rape and violence against children, in families and on the streets; other forms of criminal violence affecting individual lives as well as the social fabric; terrorist violence ranging from suicide bombing to organized warfare; civil wars in failed states or between states; foreign military interventions on humanitarian, economic, or other grounds; and, finally, a monopoly of the state on the legitimate use of physical force.

Ethical traditions are in principle clear in their judgment of physical violence. “Thou shalt not kill” is a basic command in religious as well as humanistic ethical traditions. However, there are many controversial issues related to this basic commandment. The use of coercion in education and family relations, especially against children and women, was once widely accepted, and it is still accepted in different cultures around the globe. This is an example of the slow changes of behavioral patterns in this respect. There is also a disturbing continuity in the use of violence against minorities in many societies. Scholarly research shows that religiosity does not necessarily lead to a decrease but, at least in certain circumstances, rather to an increase in latent or manifest violence.

This tendency is astonishing considering that at least three major monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—include the commandment to love one’s neighbor as one of their central ethical precepts.3 What can be the driving force negating the basic religious stricture not to kill but instead to respect the dignity of the other and love one’s neighbor? What can be the reason for the violation of the Golden Rule, to treat the other as we want to be treated by him? Some argue that aggression is so basic to human nature that it cannot be limited by ethical or even religious restraints. But that is obviously not true. People are able to limit their aggression; they listen to the voice of their conscience and invent the instruments of law to overcome or limit the tendency to hurt one another.

Why, then, does it happen that the sources of religion are not used in this direction but instead become instrumental in the intensification

of hatred and the readiness to use violence? To explain this linkage between religiosity and the use of violence, it is often argued that people tend to devalue others with a different faith when they are convinced of the superiority of their own belief system. But, again, this is not an inevitable consequence. Personal trust in the truth of a specific religion does not imply the need to disrespect people of other faiths. Historically, we know examples of the peaceful coexistence of religions as well as violent conflicts between them.

Other explanations do not relate to religious factors in the narrow sense of the word but to cultural factors. Some observe, for instance, that conservative Turkish families with a Muslim background cultivate an ideal of masculinity that legitimizes the use of violence by young men. It would evidently be a simplistic interpretation to assert that Islam as a religion implies the justification of violence exerted by young males. Yet there is no strict separation between religious commands and cultural traditions. Religious education always relates to social and cultural factors; it is therefore not easy to separate them from each other. However, such complex interactions should not be interpreted in a reductive and therefore simplistic manner. To summarize, none of these explanations leads to a necessary linkage between religion and violence, but they provoke the question of why the impulses of religions are not translated more consistently in the behavior of their adherents. Religion seems to be limited in its influence in anomic situations, in situations of extreme inequality, or in situations in which children are brought up in an atmosphere of mistrust and violence and so internalize this atmosphere from the beginnings of their lives. In such situations, it is not enough to remember the good values of religions or ethical systems. You have to work on the conditions in which children are brought up and must live. You have to change the anomic situation; you have to work for justice in society; you have to improve the educational conditions for children and youth—to name the most important aspects of the tasks to be addressed.

II.

As already indicated, the general ethical debate on violence deals mainly with the problem of collective physical violence. Until 1989, the European debate concentrated on the potentials of violence inherent in the antagonism between the two superpowers and their respective satellite systems. This antagonism came to an end

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without a transition from “cold war” to “hot war.” This historical miracle provoked hope for a “peace dividend” after 1989, hope for the containment of military violence that would, in the end, further the use of available funds for sustainable development and the promotion of global justice.

None of these expectations were fulfilled. The Millennium Development Goals proclaimed by the United Nations in the year 2000 with the intention of reducing global poverty by half by the year 2015 did not trigger a thrust towards sustainable development. The great confrontation between East and West has been followed by a multiplicity of military confrontations, many of whose protagonists are non-state actors. Indeed, the world public still has to learn that the use of violence by non-state actors can result in wars.

Terrorist violence has become a rather omnipresent phenomenon in the world of today. For the international conscience, September 11, 2001, continues to function as a historical watershed that gave a new character to international terrorism. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were directed at the economic, military, and political power centers of the United States of America, but they affected the whole globe. They had an explicitly religious motivation, as explained in the manual of “spiritual guidelines” that had been in the hands of the attackers.6 Other attacks in Europe followed—in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005—and there were some failed terrorist attempts in the following years. To a much greater extent, people in the Muslim world itself have fallen victim to religiously motivated terror attacks. The case of Afghanistan is before our eyes. To sum up, the interaction between religion and violence has belonged to the characteristic traits of our era of globalization since 2001.

It is a characteristic trait of globalization that people’s destinies become dependent on the uncertainties of the market and that traditional forms of solidarity are dissolved. These phenomena create new tasks for religions. Their ethic of “brotherhood” can step in to take the place of traditional solidarities. But often this ethic of brotherhood is combined with a fundamentalist worldview that can end up in a violent confrontation with those who do not belong to the same group, who are not adherents of the same religion and do not envisage the same political goals. A new idea of martyrdom has developed that promises immediate access to paradise for those who sacrifice their lives in a “holy war.”

This is one of the ways in which violence is understood as worship in our times. Such examples can be useful in countering the notion that the linkage between religion and violence is limited to one religious community. In fact, however, 9/11 and also the suicide attacks that are part of the conflict in the Middle East direct our attention towards the renewal of the Islamic jihad doctrine in particular. Today, this doctrine is often given a meaning in which “holy wars” of the individual against his or her inner person, against the evil around him or her, and, finally, against unbelievers are intertwined. In such a framework, the transition from toleration of unbelievers to violence against them plays a decisive role. Of crucial relevance in this respect is the so-called Verse of the Sword in the Qur’an: “Once the Sacred Months are past, (and they refuse to make peace) you may kill the idol worshipers when you encounter them, punish them, and resist every move they make. If they repent and observe the Contact Prayers (Salat) and give the obligatory charity (Zakat), you shall let them go. GOD is Forgiver, Most Merciful.”

As Islamic studies have shown, this verse documents the changed attitude of the Prophet Mohammed towards unbelievers after his move from Mecca to Medina. It is thought likely that this verse replaced an older revelation with differing content. Whereas here violence against the unbelievers is seen as obligatory, in his Mecca period Mohammed coexisted rather peacefully with the unbelievers. This inner tension in the Qur’an has repeatedly provoked controversial interpretations. But there is no doubt that the tendencies towards a new kind of religious violence that have been observed in Islam since the 1970s are based on the aspect of jihad directed against unbelievers.

But, again, the new linkage between religion and violence is not restricted to Islam alone. It also exists in Christianity. The Iraq War of 2003 was an example of the use of religious arguments to propagate war. In this highly debated case, some understood the war against Iraq as the execution of a death penalty against Saddam Hussein—accepting the danger that many other Iraqis were far more likely to lose their lives than the well-protected dictator himself. Insofar as one could argue that violence does not equal violence, the religious justification for terrorist violence has to be judged differently than the religious interpretation of the use of violence within the framework of a state monopoly on violence. But even respect for the state’s task of securing peace and justice by all necessary means—under certain conditions even violent means—turns into a highly

7 See Hans G. Kippenberg, Gewalt als Gottesdienst: Religionskriege im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Munich, 2008); on 9/11, see pp. 161–84.
8 Sura 9:5.
9 Kippenberg, Gewalt als Gottesdienst, 177–78.
problematic proposition when it becomes a bellicose concept that gives preference to military violence over other means—political, economic, or legal—in whichever context, religious or nonreligious, such a preference might occur. The application of a religious justification for the death penalty to international relations leads with inner necessity to a kind of bellicosity which, in dubious cases, privileges war over other possible solutions.

The linkage between religion and violence occurs today in different religions. This circumstance nurtures a kind of public debate that is not prepared for differentiations. Moreover these developments—as complex as they may be—result in a rather simplistic public perception: the justification of violence is seen as a crucial element of religion in general. From such a perspective, the political role of religion is understood as preparing for and justifying the use of violence. In our times, the critique of religion very often has its center in this critique of the interaction of religion and violence. The critical point is simple: Religion leads to violence.

This critique responds to a situation in which violence seems to be present everywhere. The ubiquity of violence is a part of the globalization process. Violence is globalized. This is true in the sense that violence is omnipresent in the media. Everyone has easy access to all kinds of violence through TV or the Internet. Everyone has access to reports about how successful new academic elites are as actors in the field of violence. Violence is an important economic good in a global economy. The arms trade is an important part of the global economy.

When one starts to analyze the relationship between religion and violence critically, one can see different patterns of interpretation. First, some posit a necessary connection between religion and violence; second, others point to religious criticism of violence; and, third, still others note a contingent relationship between religion and violence. We will now turn to these patterns of interpretation.

**III. First proposition: Religion leads to violence.**

On an academic and intellectual level, this widespread assumption is currently discussed in a version proposed by the well-known German Egyptologist, Jan Assmann, in his recent statements on monotheism. Briefly, Assmann says that the biblical connection between Moses and Egypt leads us back to the reform of Pharaoh Echnaton in
the fourteenth century B.C., who tried to replace the old Egyptian deities with Re or Aton, the God of the Sun. This reform was not successful, but became part of cultural memory in Egypt, including among the enslaved people of Israel, who lived there. It was Moses who adopted this idea and created an exclusive monotheism for the people of Israel that denied the right of existence to all other Gods. Assmann distinguishes this kind of monotheism from other forms of henotheism in which the cosmic order gives a place to all deities but veneration is concentrated on one God. Distinguishing this religious attitude from monotheism, Assmann calls it cosmotheism. For him, the so-called monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—are exclusive by nature and therefore in their tendency violent, whereas cosmotheism is by nature peaceful. The violent character of monotheism that he asserts is not a question of historical data on the ways in which monotheism gained superiority as such but rather a “semantic paradigm” that explains how such processes were remembered.¹⁰

For instance, it is historically probable that in Judaism violence was used against internal dissenters rather than against adherents of other religions. Already the Hebrew Bible included more examples of the suffering of the people of Israel under the polytheism of its neighboring powers than of the perpetration of violence in the name of the one God of Israel. That was even more, and terribly, the case in later historical times. But there has also been no consistent line of justification for violence in Christianity or Islam. So the semantic paradigm of monotheism does not mean that the use of violence is justified or practiced in every single case. It is not sufficient to go back to the “Mosaic distinction” in order to explain the problem of religiously justified violence. And it is rather superficial to proclaim, as the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk has, a “renaissance in the sign of Egypt” in order to “destroy the poison that declares all other cults to be enemies.”¹¹ Finally, it seems misleading when the German sociologist Ulrich Beck argues that all truth claims in religions have to be invalidated (by whom?) as a condition for respecting the “religious otherness of the other.”¹²

It is not the religious truth claim as such; it is its exclusivist misconception that makes it a motive for violence and warfare. This exclusivity occurs today in fundamentalist movements of religious renewal. They are reacting to the processes of globalization, for they respond to the dissolution of traditional forms of solidarity and to

¹⁰ Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); Assmann, Die Mosaische Unterscheidung oder der Preis des Monotheismus (Munich, 2003).
¹¹ Peter Sloterdijk, Gottes Eifer: Vom Kampf der drei Monotheismen (Frankfurt am Main, 2007), 211.
¹² Ulrich Beck, Der eigene Gott: Von der Friedensfähigkeit und dem Gewaltpotential der Religionen (Frankfurt am Main, 2008), 220.
the experience of cultural fluidity by reverting to simple religious truths. It is not monotheism as such but this protest against modernization, of which these movements are at the same time a part, that makes fundamentalism a threat to peaceful coexistence.

There are also other points that shed critical light on the more recent debate over monotheism. The horrible outbreaks of violence during the twentieth century, for instance, cannot be attributed to a connection between monotheism and violence. This is most evident in the case of the murderous violence perpetrated by Nazi Germany after 1933. On the contrary, Nazi ideology clearly used elements taken from ancient German polytheism. Moreover, the ideology of blood and soil or of a specific German “Volksnomos” was evidently and directly opposed to the recognition of the one God.

To go a step further, we have to recognize that the idea of a single monotheism binding together Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is intrinsically problematic. In Judaism, adherence to the one God developed in stages over a long period of time; it is an ahistorical construction to call Moses a monotheist in the generally accepted sense of the word today. In Christianity, monotheism unfolded as the faith in one God in three persons. In Islam, this Christian understanding is explicitly seen as “polytheism” and therefore as an apostasy from true monotheism. It is exactly this Christian stance that is sharply criticized in the already quoted “Verse of the Sword.” This fits in with such observations that the concept of “monotheism” and its undifferentiated application to all three religions is rather new. The history of the word “monotheism” begins only in the seventeenth century, and only in the nineteenth century was it used as a general concept comprising the three religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It was in that period and with the memory of the confessional wars of early modernity that the general statement was formulated that monotheism necessarily implied an intolerant and violent attitude towards the adherents of other religions or confessions. Since then, the critical perspective has been formulated that monotheism, as the idea of the superiority of one’s own religion, and violence depend on one another. This kind of critique of religion was found already in the nineteenth century, for instance, in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

Since then, different theories have tried to explain in which sense monotheism produces a certain kind of “political theology.” In the early 1930s, the German legal philosopher Carl Schmitt traced

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13 See Rolf Schieder, Sind Religionen gefährlich? (Berlin, 2008); Arnold Angenendt, Toleranz und Gewalt: Das Christentum zwischen Bibel und Schwert (Münster, 2008).

the central political terms back to a seemingly “final, systematic structure.” For him, the concept of legitimate, necessarily person-
ally identifiable political rule led back to the reign of the one God,
whereas rule based on liberty, which inevitably ended up in anarchy,
was based on the “ideal of humanity in the process of [attaining] self-consciousness.”  
But this interpretation, as the theologian Erik Peterson already explained in the discussion at the time, stems from
an inadequate understanding of the Christian concept of God and
therefore also of Christian monotheism. Such a “political theology”
cannot be based on the Christian understanding of God, as it had
already unfolded in the Trinitarian doctrines of early Christianity.  
In brief, the monotheism reflected in this position does not take
into account the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the crucified and
risen Son of God.

Today, discussions on the political role of monotheistic religions
normally do not touch on these explicitly theological dimensions.
Instead, the current debate addresses empirical questions. Are we
really observing a clash of—religious—civilizations as predicted
by Samuel Huntington in the mid-nineties?  
In fact, today’s military conflicts rather rarely have their original cause in differences
of religion or confession. Many military conflicts are civil wars in
which adherents of the same religion fight on both sides. Rwanda,
Iraq, and Iran are examples of this. In other conflicts—for instance,
Kosovo or Sudan—the fighting ethnic groups are divided by reli-
gion, too. But the role of religion can only be understood within a
broader spectrum of causes behind these conflicts. To the extent
to which religion has been taken more seriously over the last ten
years, it is often seen as a driving force behind these conflicts,
even if—and this is normally the case—the political and economic
strengths or weaknesses of the respective countries or parties play
an important role.

But without any doubt, for a decade we have been observing a
tendency to regard religion as the one decisive factor sparking
and feeding conflicts. This interpretation has to do with how the
identity of ethnic, national, or social groups is predominantly seen
through the lens of religion much more than before. The identity of
groups as well as individuals always has many facets. It is therefore
misleading to reduce this identity to one single factor. In fact, the
reductive interpretation conflating identity with religion intensifies
conflicts, because it pits groups against each other, using only one
denominator for their identity. When one looks at all Iraqis or all

15 Carl Schmitt, Politische Theolo-
gie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von
der Souveränität, 2nd ed. (Mu-
nich and Leipzig, 1934), 49ff.
16 Erik Peterson, “Der Mono-
theismus als theologisches
Problem” (1935), in Peterson,
Theologische Traktate (Munich,
1951), 45–157. See also Al-
fred Schindler (ed.), Monothe-
ismus als politisches Problem?
Erik Peterson und die Kritik der
politischen Theologie (Guters-
sloh, 1978); Barbara Nicht-
weiß, Erik Peterson: Neue Sicht
auf Leben und Werk, 2nd ed.
(Freiburg im Breisgau, 1994).
17 Samuel Huntington, “The
Clash of Civilizations,” For-
eign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993):
22–49; Huntington, The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remak-
ing of World Order (New York,
1996).
North-Sudanese only from the perspective that they are Muslims, then this trait of their identity will necessarily be seen as the driving force behind actual conflicts. As Amartya Sen has shown in an admirable manner, this use of religion as identity-marker damages our understanding of identity as well as our understanding of religion, and it ends up advancing the deathly spiral of antagonism and violence.\(^\text{18}\)

To justify and to drive violence in conflict is not an inherent and unchangeable characteristic of religion, but an acquired or even ascribed quality of religion. But there are situations or contexts in which this kind of acquisition or ascription tends to be enforced. This seems to be the case today. The necessary answer to this dangerous constellation includes good historical research on the manifold reasons for conflicts and the forces behind them, and a self-critical reflection within religious communities on their role in conflict and their possible functions in peace-building processes.

**IV. Second proposition: Religion leads to nonviolence.**

All religions include an impulse to overcome violence. The critique of violence in Old Testament prophecy, Jesus’s blessing for the peace-makers and the meek, and the Qur’an’s opposition to force in the name of religion (“there is no compulsion in religion”)\(^\text{19}\) show in different ways a distance of those three religions to violence. The same can be demonstrated in the cases of Buddhism and Hinduism.

There is a common advocacy of religions for the sanctity of life, for the integrity of every human being, and for the nonviolent character of religious truth. The Golden Rule that appears in one form or another in many different traditions of our world—treat the other in the same manner in which you want to be treated—demands a mutual recognition that would be violated by any kind of violence. The first expectation of every religion would be that it advocates nonviolence and not violence. This tendency is most explicit in Christianity, but there is no reason to link it exclusively to the Christian faith.

On the contrary, no religion, including Christianity, can claim consistency in its advocacy of nonviolence. All religions, in one way or another, take part in the ambiguity of dealing with a reality that includes violence on an individual as well as a social and international level. In our era, this ambiguity is very clearly encountered


\(^{19}\) Sura 2:256.
Wars tend to become “world wars”; and the commitment to nonviolence becomes a global, ecumenical, and even interreligious commitment.

The twentieth century was a century of extreme violence and exemplary nonviolence at the same time. Both tendencies appeared across continents, cultures, and religions. The introduction of nonviolence as a political strategy was due to a Hindu lawyer who was also well versed in the Christian religion, namely Mahatma Gandhi. Some Christians, such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King, Jr., who devoted their lives to the task of overcoming violence, became, as martyrs, shining examples for the adherents of different religions. In the United States, the nonviolent struggle for civil rights, the opposition to the Vietnam War, and the Sanctuary Movement showed the potential strength of religiously motivated nonviolence. Likewise, the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa became an outstanding example of the possibilities of nonviolent transformation; Nelson Mandela very often underlined the great influence of Mahatma Gandhi on the South African struggle to overcome Apartheid. The paradigm shift in the ethical debate from “just war” to “just peace” was prepared and promoted by those who, for their part, renounced all types of violence.

Many of them—across religions—used the example of Jesus and referred again and again to the Sermon on the Mount. The message of Jesus is characterized by a renunciation of violence, love for one’s enemy, and blessings for those who champion peace without the use of violence. Jesus himself suffered from violence. Regarding his death on the cross, it is said that it happened “once forever.” A repetition of this sacrifice is therefore excluded; there is no compulsion to sacrifice. Therefore, it can be said that Christianity turned away from violence in a specifically radical manner. However, it could not resist the seduction of violence and its apparent unavoidability. The conviction that one cannot avoid answering violence with violence became a crucial point in Christian doctrine already in the Constantine era. Since those times, violence has even occurred in the service of the church itself. Being a part of the world, the church not only had to take the reality of violence into account. It went a step further and used violence for its own purposes. Every critical observer will be astonished again and again by the fact that the religion of love adapted so well to a climate of violence and even developed a theory about its inevitability. The idea of

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20 Hebrews 10,10.
certain punishment for human sinfulness was not used in order to understand human dependence on God as Savior. Instead, it was used in order to integrate human beings into a system of threat and punishment. The idea of nonviolence was often restricted to the private sphere, in which individuals could abstain from the coercion without which life in society as a whole was seen as impossible. On the one hand, this ambiguity was a sign of a religion that took ambivalent realities seriously; on the other hand, this happened at the expense of the clarity of Christian witness.

Therefore, reform groups, peace churches, and pacifists promoted self-critical reflection within Christianity and in dialogue with other religions. Their intention was to renew the clarity of Christian witness as a witness for justice, peace, and nonviolence as well as for the poor. In our globalized world we can also see this phenomenon as a globalized movement. At a certain point, it was even explicitly encouraged by Pope John Paul II, who invited representatives of the different world religions to a peace prayer held in 1986 at Assisi, the place of Saint Francis, an early precursor of modern pacifists. Self-critical reflection was also encouraged worldwide by the Protestant and Orthodox Churches who cooperate in the World Council of Churches. When they proclaimed a ten-year program to overcome violence in 1999, that proclamation was a response to a globalization process that included new forms of violent conflict. Different movements motivate religions to contribute to a global ethos based on the Golden Rule, including the rejection of violence. But in all these processes we learn that all religions that really address these kinds of problems are “risky religions.” They have to liberate their basic motives again and again from the internal contradictions in which they become entangled. Mercy and power, love and violence, charity and profit, sustainability and self-interest—these are some of the basic tensions in which religions become involved in our globalized world. The effort to stand clearly for the preferential option of nonviolence without blindness to the existing threats of violence is a test of the identity of religions in our time.

V. Third proposition: Religion and violence are linked in a contingent manner.

The linkage between religion and violence is not at all automatic. There is no inevitable and necessary relationship between monotheism and the justification of violence. Instead, such justification responds to concrete historical circumstances and challenges.
The linkage between monotheism and violence, wherever it occurs, is contingent; it is neither necessary nor impossible. Therefore, whether or not the critique of violence in religious traditions prevails in the behavior of the faithful is also related to contingent factors.

Religion in general and monotheism in particular neither guarantee pacifist attitudes nor make them impossible. When pacifism not only relates to an individual conviction but also includes the responsibility to protect the freedom of others from coercion and violence, the crucial question is always whether a nonviolent practice is apt to overcome the use of violence from the other side or give it free reign. But whenever theories of just war or just peace regard the use of violence as an ultimate resort to end violence already being exerted, the question has to be asked whether the violence that is designed to maintain or restore the rule of law will effectively limit the use of violence or increase it.

This fundamental ambiguity in the phenomenon of violence itself explains why religions have an ambivalent attitude toward it. At least for Christianity, however, it has to be said that this faith is consistent with its original impulse only if, even in ambivalent situations, it defends the priority of nonviolence over and against violence and therefore rejects a religious justification of violence even in those cases in which the situation makes the use of violence seem inevitable. Measured by this criterion of clearly rejecting any religious justification for the use of violence, the Christian churches have often failed.

There is no critique of violence, no matter how radically formulated, that could save anybody from being sucked in by violence and counter-violence. The reason for this conundrum is that religions have to deal with reality as a whole. That this reality bears violent traits cannot be denied. Reality as a whole includes not only personal lives from beginning to end, individual destinies with their joy and suffering, human freedom with its successes and failures, whether caused by fate or guilt, but also human communities and their inherent tensions between hate and love, conflict and reconciliation, as well as violence and peace.

René Girard, a French philosopher of culture, went one step further. In his view, dealing with violence—taming and overcoming it—represents the most important social function of religion. Religion channels violence and averts it. This is the reason behind rites
of sacrifice in old religions. It therefore becomes self-contradictory when religions limit the use of violence in a ritual form but justify it at the same moment politically.

Today, too, religions may be aware of the potentials for violence in human life, but name and address them without justifying them. They may take into account the human tendency towards violence, but simultaneously oppose its glorification. They may avoid illusions about the susceptibility of human beings to violence, but not abandon the field to it.

VI. Conclusion

Let me summarize some results of these reflections in five proposals for further discussion.

1. The linkage between religion and violence is one of the great challenges for the twenty-first century. It reveals the difficult aspects of globalization in concentrated form: the erosion of culture, the increase in religious fundamentalism, the increasing domination of politics by economics, and the ubiquity of violence.

2. The process of globalization presents new tasks for religious communities. New forms of public religion help people to find their place in a world full of uncertainties. But this role depends on whether religious communities understand themselves as a part of civil society or as enemies of existing society who endorse violent struggle against it. This question is both an essential issue for inter-religious dialogue and a central task in defending the rule of law.

3. It is of primary importance to maintain the distinction between religion and politics as a necessary precondition for peaceful coexistence in a religiously and culturally diverse world. This does not mean that religion and politics do not interact, but they have to deal with different aspects of human life. It is the secular character of the political order that makes religious freedom possible.

4. Religions can cooperate in order to promote peaceful coexistence and proscribe the use of violence as much as possible. This effort necessitates a self-critical evaluation of violent traits in the histories of the different religions, the elaboration of religion’s specific contributions to the future tasks of humankind, and working toward a consensus on basic ethical questions.
5. All religions have a great educational responsibility. They have opportunities to transform the Golden Rule into daily practice. They can strengthen the moral identity of their adherents so that these people develop respect for the dignity and integrity of their neighbors. In order to put an end to the spread of violence in societies, they have to plead for a politics that overcomes anomic situations and promotes justice.

Wolfgang Huber has been a leading representative of the German Protestant Church for the last two decades. Following a twenty-year academic career that included professorships in Marburg and Heidelberg, he served as Bishop of the Evangelical Church of Berlin-Brandenburg-Silesian Upper Lausitz from 1994 to 2009. From 2003 to 2009, he was chairman of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD), the governing body for the Protestant Church in Germany. His most recent publications include: Wenn ihr umkehrt, wird euch geholfen. Oder: Anmerkungen zur globalen Finanzmarkt- und Wirtschaftskrise (Frankfurt/Main, 2010); Das Netz ist zerrissen und wir sind frei: Reden (Frankfurt/Main, 2010); Gottes Wort halten, Liebe üben und demütig sein: Predigten (Frankfurt/Main, 2010).
Immigration and entrepreneurship are two central themes in the history of the United States. The topics are closely interrelated, since the U.S. developed a strong culture of entrepreneurship as it became the quintessential immigration country in the nineteenth century. While entrepreneurship is still a key component of American culture and its value is essentially undisputed, the way in which immigration is viewed has changed considerably. In the course of the twentieth century, especially during the interwar period, immigration policies became more restrictive. However, the nexus between immigration and economic growth created by immigrant businesspeople is still strong. Immigration has long been recognized as a rich source of entrepreneurship. Empirical studies confirm that self-employment exerts a strong appeal for immigrants, as other avenues of social integration and advancement are often barred or more difficult to access. While the experience of navigating between cultures can be uncomfortable and challenging, it can also be “an asset that sparks creativity and inspiration” and creates “new possibilities for entrepreneurship.”

Since the late nineteenth century, immigration has often been seen as a burden on the receiving country and a threat to its social stability. In-depth historical analysis of immigrant entrepreneurship and its relation to elite formation might correct this gloomy picture and raise awareness that immigration can become a source of economic strength that helps create additional wealth—not only by supplying cheap labor to the lower end of the market but also by providing fresh talent for strategic business leadership. Immigrant businesspeople commonly bring with them a diverse array of skills and a prodigious work ethic. In the language of economics, they can be seen as imported
human capital that is crucial for innovation and economic development. Immigrants themselves can profit from the characteristics of ethnic networks such as trust, mutual assistance and credit, and continued relations with their home country that might involve particular commercial opportunities such as trade or the transfer of knowledge and other resources.

Immigrant entrepreneurship was one of the decisive factors in the United States’ rise as an economic superpower since the late nineteenth century. While protectionism played a key role in U.S. foreign trade policy, the country’s relative openness to the influx of immigrants attracted talent from around the world, including minorities who fled discrimination elsewhere. The lack of petrified social divisions, caste-like systems, and feudal structures, as well as the high regard for businesspeople and a superior opportunity structure must be added to the comparative advantages of the United States that set off a self-reinforcing, beneficial circle of wealth creation and immigration: “No other country refreshes itself in quite the same way by continuous waves of immigration.”

I. The Current State of Research

Entrepreneurship is a sine qua non of economic development. Economists have long neglected the study of entrepreneurship “exactly because of the bias to the assumption that profitable activities automatically take place.” By suggesting that the market mechanism simply prompts rational economic actors to react to opportunities, neo-liberal economics has trivialized entrepreneurship. Yet it is clear that there is no automatic supply of entrepreneurs and that it takes more than opportunity structures to motivate people to set up businesses. Since the 1980s, entrepreneurship has attracted growing interest in management studies and economic sociology. However, the question of which cultural and social factors nurture entrepreneurship remains open, and a detailed study of successful immigrant entrepreneurs in the United States will add significantly to the debate.

Immigrants’ contributions to building the U.S. economy are rarely fully acknowledged because they are seen only as Americans, at least if they are successful. In that case every one of these “heroes” is claimed as part of the triumphant ascent of American capitalism and lauded as the epitome of “genuine American genius.” The common assumption is that American business elites were and are native born.
For example, studies on the composition of the American business elite stress that it was “disproportionally derived from Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, native-born, well-to-do families.” This thesis of a relatively homogeneous, socially exclusive group is misleading and must be revised. Clearly, excluding immigrants from the overall picture by equating “native-born” with “non-immigrant” is an erroneous, circular argument. The overestimation of the Anglo-Saxon contribution is another outdated viewpoint that needs to be replaced by an investigation that lives up to the diversity of the American experience.

The “Immigrant Entrepreneurship” project will contribute to the ongoing effort to globalize American history or, more precisely, to situate the American past in a transnational framework. By analyzing the role of immigrant entrepreneurs in the formation—and continual reformation—of the American business elite from the early eighteenth century to the present day, the project will shed light on how a nation whose people claim a multitude of national and ethnic backgrounds grew together. In contrast to many immigration studies, which often confine themselves to the first generation of foreign-born citizens, this project deliberately includes the second generation, because in many cases social mobility and economic success only take place once the initial difficulties of settling in have been overcome.

The native-born children of foreign-born immigrants find themselves in a unique position. They have much higher chances of integrating themselves into the culture of the new country and making use of the economic opportunities it offers. At the same time, the cultural heritage of the country of origin is not yet lost. In a way, some of them might have “the best of two worlds.” There are, however, less optimistic interpretations with regard to Asian and Latin-American immigration in recent decades that stress the perils of lasting exploitation in the lower segments of the labor market. These studies show how important it is to include immigrants of the second generation, who often have no realistic option of returning to their parents’ country of origin.

Most current studies on immigrant entrepreneurs focus on very small businesses that rely on self-employment and (often unpaid) family labor. This kind of firm is typical in statistical terms because, as far as we know, it represents the majority of first-generation immigrant businesses especially. But it is only one part of the story and excludes the children of immigrants who leave behind the ugly world of sweatshops, subcontracting, and other precarious ventures. By contrast,
this project will deal mainly with successful businesspeople in order to explore the chances of upward mobility and the full economic benefits of immigrant entrepreneurship. To be sure, for every success story, there are many less happy stories and cases of “downward assimilation” into the lower strata of society. Although small, stagnant, or failing businesses are part of history, and in statistical terms even dominate it, these endeavors leave few traces. It is a long-standing, intractable problem of business history that it is therefore often limited to dealing with successful companies. This study will not differ in this regard, but the difficulties, problems, and failures of immigrant business ventures will not be ignored. Wherever material becomes available, it will be included in the analysis even though the main focus will have to be on successful entrepreneurship.

There is a wealth of literature on recent Asian and Latin-American immigrant entrepreneurship in the United States. Although these studies have focused on recent decades and non-European ethnic groups, who have made up the great majority of immigrants to the United States since the second half of the twentieth century, comparison across different centuries and ethnic groups can be an important asset for understanding the relationship between immigration and entrepreneurship. Moreover, this literature has developed general concepts of immigrant entrepreneurship that can be useful for the GHI project. In sharp contrast to sociological and ethnological studies, neither immigration history nor business history has dedicated much systematic research to immigrant entrepreneurship until now. There is, however, considerable research on diaspora networks in business history. Although immigrant and diaspora businesspeople share many common characteristics, the former group tends to stay in the destination country permanently, in many cases to integrate itself into the new society and assimilate over the course of two to three generations. Diaspora businesspeople fill economic gaps as permanent outsiders and remain distinct groups trying to preserve their distinct identity. By contrast, successful, increasingly wealthy immigrants try to integrate and move into the established bourgeoisie of their new countries. There can, of course, be overlap between diaspora and immigrant business families, and boundaries might be blurred in individual cases. Alejandro Portes has discovered “transnational entrepreneurs” among Colombians and Dominicans in the United States whose success derives from close ties to their home countries. These businesspeople constantly move back and forth and live in various places virtually simultaneously.

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14 Stéphane Dufoix, *Diasporas* (Berkeley, 2007).

One important immigrant group in the past came from German-speaking lands; however, research on the German-American business community is practically non-existent. There are a number of short biographical sketches in the collections by Charles Haller and Gerard Wilk. The lives of a handful of prominent entrepreneurs like the Warburg family have met with scholarly attention. There is also a body of commemorative literature produced by families and companies themselves or by German-American organizations. Finally, several journalistic articles examine individuals. However, most of these accounts are only anecdotal and of limited scholarly value.

II. The Relevance of German-American Business Biography

The “Immigrant Entrepreneurship” project will focus on German immigrants as one significant and often overlooked group. The year 1720 was chosen as the starting point because immigration reached a new dimension around that time. Germans in particular were beginning to arrive in hitherto unprecedented numbers, even though these numbers were still modest compared with the nineteenth century. The project will begin in the eighteenth century and cover all of the nineteenth century, during which immigration to the United States reached peak levels, as well as the twentieth century, which saw several fundamental changes in immigration patterns and business careers. It will bring the story of German-American immigrant entrepreneurship right up to the present and address current debates on immigration. The German-American case is particularly suited to this kind of study as it exemplifies the history of immigrant entrepreneurship in America in an especially rich way. There are four main reasons for the project’s focus on the German-American case:

1. Germans were one of the main sources of immigration to the United States. Today, some forty-three million U.S. citizens claim German heritage, which is about fifteen percent of the total population. For much of the nineteenth century, Germans were the largest group of immigrants.

2. German immigration to America never dried up, even if it declined markedly in both absolute and relative terms over the course of the twentieth century. Economic crises, political upheavals, and the persecution of minorities and political dissenters during the Nazi period were strong push factors. The continuing attractiveness of “the American dream,” the multitude of economic opportunities


for immigrants, the country’s high level of wealth, and its appreciation of the entrepreneurial spirit all acted as powerful pull factors—and they still do, since Germans still form the largest immigration group from the European Union.

3. German immigrants and their descendants played a disproportionately large role in building the American business community. This impact reached its pinnacle in the late nineteenth century and remained significant thereafter. In 1870, for instance, when New York was the financial hub of American industrialization, almost half of its wealthiest inhabitants were foreign-born. Among the 1,571 richest New Yorkers, only 56 percent were natives, while 44 percent were foreign-born. Among the latter group, Germans predominated. They represented almost one-quarter (23 percent) of the city’s wealthiest citizens.\(^{18}\) The fact that German Americans made ample use of the myriad opportunities in the United States and brought many crucial assets with them from Europe can also be assessed by looking at individual company histories. The common origin of well-known large companies like Heinz, Levi Strauss, Anheuser-Busch, Miller, Pabst, Pfizer, Warburg, Steinway, and Merck, to name but a few, is easy to recognize. In many other cases, the German origin was disguised through the anglicization of firm and family names. For instance, Blumental became Bloomingdale. Moreover, the names of German entrepreneurs were not necessary reflected in brand or company names. Thus, J.P. Morgan originated as Drexel, Morgan & Co. To take another example, the German immigrant Wilhelm Böing founded a lumber mill and eventually became a timber magnate. His son, William Edward Boeing, founded the Pacific Aero Products Company, which became the Boeing Airplane Company and today is the world’s leading aerospace company. Moving from hard to soft power, everyone knows the global influence of the American culture industry, especially the dream factories of Hollywood. But it is little known that Universal Studios was founded by Carl Laemmle,
who was born in the village of Laupheim in southwestern Germany. More recently, German immigrants have come to the United States to take advantage of educational opportunities and unique economic clusters like Silicon Valley. A good example is Andy Bechtolsheim, a co-founder of Sun Microsystems and early investor in Google, who came to the United States to study at Carnegie Mellon and Stanford and went on to play an important role in the development of Silicon Valley.

4. In the rich literature on German immigration to the United States, entrepreneurs are often missing completely or only mentioned in passing. They seem to be the “forgotten siblings” of all the farmers, craftsmen, and eminent scholars. For some reason, they seem not to have been deemed worthy of historical attention even though they did much to turn the United States into the world’s strongest economy. German businesspeople entered the country, and a considerable number of immigrants became businesspeople after doing so. The emerging industrial economy offered many opportunities and the country developed an almost infectious infatuation with entrepreneurship so that immigrants were literally drawn into the world of business. Andrew Godley compared Jewish immigrants in London and New York between 1880 and 1914 and found that Jewish immigrants with similar backgrounds displayed a much higher propensity to become businesspeople in New York. Not only was the demand for new entrepreneurs larger in New York than in London, but American society’s value system also encouraged entrepreneurship more than Europe’s did. The Horatio Alger myth of rags-to-riches had enormous appeal, which also reached German immigrants as they tried to adopt the cultural values of their host nation. In the present discourse on immigration, there is little awareness of this very successful group. The Germans are “among the least visible of American ethnic groups,” which is a sign of successful integration and assimilation but also mirrors the legacy of the two World Wars, which accelerated the dissociation of German Americans from their country of origin.

III. General Objectives and Research Questions

“Immigrant Entrepreneurship” is a biographical project that will make a contribution to various academic disciplines including business history, immigration history, economic history, and management
studies. It will trace the lives, careers, and business ventures of emi-
inent German-American businesspeople of the last three centuries.

The first objective of “Immigrant Entrepreneurship” is to collect
and secure biographical data and information on company histories
that is scattered or all but forgotten. A wide range of published and
unpublished material will be consulted: obituaries, local histories,
memos, newspapers, trade journals, histories of individual compa-
nies and branches, specialized biographical dictionaries, biographies,
commemorative publications of German-American organizations,
business and wealth rankings, databases, websites and U.S. census
material published by the North Atlantic Population Project, trade
directories, and local directories. The contributors will also use com-
pany records, family records, autobiographical material, records of
German-American organizations, tax registers, census entries, credit
reports, and interviews.

The project’s second objective is to make this material accessible
to researchers and the wider public free of charge. Therefore, the
biographical articles will not only be published in a printed volume,
but the GHI project team will use their experience with online
platforms for historical research to create a website that will make
all articles and primary sources freely accessible to scholars and
the public. The third objective is to lay the groundwork for future
scholarship in a variety of relevant disciplines. The pool of informa-
tion will be a convenient starting point for future dissertations and
research initiatives in the field. The fourth objective is to reintegrate
the history of immigration and the history of German-Americans
into the larger narrative of U.S. history. Finally, there are a number
of specific research questions that will structure all biografi-
cal entries as well as the general essays at the beginning of each
planned volume:

Reasons for migration: What motivated future entrepreneurs to mi-
grate to the United States? Were their reasons different from the gen-
eral push or pull factors in operation for other groups of immigrants
from Germany? Was there a certain predisposition for entrepre neur-
ship as a result of selective immigration? Did these businesspeople
plan permanent immigration or did they start as sojourners hoping
to return after some years?

Social origins: What were the social backgrounds of these business-
people? At what point in their careers did they become self-employed
and when did they rise to the upper ranks of the middle class? Were they self-made, and, if so, were they self-made in Germany or in the United States? Was upward social mobility easier outside the older commercial centers along the East Coast and in new industries, as Jocelyn Ghent and Frederic Jaher have suggested? Or did established structures provide the best breeding ground for immigrant entrepreneurship?

Entrepreneurial sources: What were the personal sources of entrepreneurship? What were the starting positions? How and when did German-American entrepreneurs discover business opportunities? What was the impact of counteracting forces like nativism, anti-German sentiments, boycotts, and anti-Semitism in the United States?

Regional identities: How important were ties to certain regions in the home country or in the destination country? Did regions of origin matter in the sense that Bavarians and Silesians had their own distinct networks? Did American regions of dense German settlement provide a new identity that helped business development? Or was the minority status in other parts of the country more of a stimulus to entrepreneurial energies? What part did the various internal divides within the United States (East Coast versus West Coast, North versus South, coastal versus inland areas) play?

Religion: What was the significance of certain confessions, such as Protestant versus Catholic or Jewish denominations? Did businesspeople display a preference for a particular American church such as the Presbyterian, for example? Did they adhere to German communities like the Lutherans or did they integrate into the American mainstream?

Comparative advantages: Did the immigrants’ German background generate comparative advantages in terms of craftsmanship, technical education, or cultural predisposition? What kind of transfer of skills, capital, or knowledge took place from Germany to the United States? What were the mechanisms, vehicles, and consequences of this transfer? Did immigrants concentrate on particular areas of entrepreneurship in which the German economy was strong, such as craft-related or science-based industries? Were there sector-specific biases in the nature of their entrepreneurial activities? Did immigrants play a significant role in the international transfer of knowledge and skills, such as the adoption of foreign technologies? Or did they simply seize the opportunities they found in the United States and acquire the skills they needed there? Was there a subgroup of “transnational entrepreneurs” whose success

hinged on maintaining close connections to Germany?

**Ethnic networks:** Did ethnic solidarity in the form of loans, cooperation, advice, information, extended families, and other networks contribute to success in the United States? How active were businesspeople in German clubs, associations, and cultural institutions? What was the role of immigrant communities and families for pooling resources? Did they affect hiring policies and labor relations? Was the German ethnic enclave a kind of business incubator? In other words, was ethnicity a business asset? What was the density of these networks? What were their internal mechanisms? If “social embeddedness” and ethnic solidarity played a large role, was it pre-existing or reactive solidarity? Finally, did these potential sources of comparative advantage exist prior to immigration? Or did they only develop in response to the challenges of the immigration situation?

**Americanization:** Were the ties to Germany maintained or severed? Did German-American business elites develop multiple identities? When did noticeable changes occur? How did immigrants perceive themselves? Did they continue to speak German and adhere to

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German customs and habits? What part of their culture did they preserve, and did this play any role in their success in the market? How did the process of Americanization interact with general changes in the U.S. economy, politics, and society? Did the end of German mass immigration in 1893 reduce the viability and flexibility of the German-American community and accelerate the Americanization process well before World War I? How did German-American entrepreneurs position themselves in political terms? What role did they play in political parties, parliaments, councils, and lobbying organizations? Did their activities in the political sphere foster or hinder integration? How did the dynamic interaction between German and American cultures shape the role and self-definition of immigrant entrepreneurs?

Business strategies: What strategies did German Americans pursue? Did they concentrate on serving their communities in the United States or those in their home countries? Or did they adopt a broader strategy from the beginning? Did these firms use their own ethnic background for brand formation and advertising, or did they hide it and present themselves as Americans? Did these firms reap comparative advantages through niche strategies? When did the firms leave the ethnic market that primarily served co-ethnics?

Typologies of entrepreneurs: The project will, among other methodologies, use the taxonomy of Christian Bruyat and Pierre-André Julien, who proposed a sliding scale with four categories, namely reproduction (no innovation), imitation (little innovation), valorization (significant innovation), and entrepreneurial ventures (radical innovation, “creative destruction” in the Schumpeterian sense, as in the creation of completely new industries).

Change over time: Most of these questions require different answers in different epochs. It will be one of the project’s main concerns to trace the changes in the patterns and backgrounds of immigrant entrepreneurship over the course of almost 300 years of American
history as well as their relation to changes in the political, economic, and social parameters of immigration. More specifically, it remains to be seen whether there were significant differences between immigrant generations. First generation entrepreneurs may have been strongly influenced by their first-hand experiences with the German education system, culture, and work experience. This might have determined the nature of their entrepreneurship. The second generation, however, had a different, American starting point. Analysis must consider how such contextual differences gave rise to different patterns of acculturation and identity formation, ambition and achievement, experiences of discrimination, and inner-familial conflicts. In other words, how did entrepreneurial recruitment and activity change across the generational divide?

IV. Structure of the Project

The core of the project will consist of about 250 biographical essays, which will be assembled into five chronological volumes. The preliminary sequence of the volumes will follow major turning points in U.S. history in general and German-American immigration history in particular:

1. From the Colonial Economy to Early Industrialization, 1720–1840
2. The Emergence of an Industrial Nation, 1840–1893
3. From the End of the Gilded Age to the Progressive Era, 1893–1918
4. The Age of the World Wars, 1918–1945
5. From the Postwar Boom to Global Capitalism, 1945–Today

Each of these volumes will feature roughly fifty biographical essays on German-American immigrant entrepreneurs whose careers fell primarily in the given period. Additionally, each volume will include introductory and contextual essays that analyze the wider business and immigration themes of the period. Where applicable, these broader essays will delve into the specific sectors or industries, geographic clusters, small businesses, religions, or major events of American history that affected German Americans and their businesses, such as Prohibition and the Temperance Movement. The introductory essays will set the stage for the biographies. In turn, the biographies will recount the rise—and sometimes fall—of the migrants in addition to their specific business achievements and the broader contributions that they made to their respective commercial sectors.

A selection of materials will be assembled and published electronically on an extensive online platform. In addition to the essays, it will
include statistics and raw data on businesses and immigration, visual and media materials such as archival photos, video clips and audio recordings, interviews with contemporary entrepreneurs and business documents. This electronic resource will be a unique tool for teaching and research, and will make readily available—in a convenient, user-friendly and easily searchable format—invaluable materials that would otherwise effectively be lost. A multivolume print publication with abridged versions and/or extracts of the essays is also planned upon the project’s completion.

Each volume will be edited by a senior historian of the era in question, who will exercise editorial supervision over the biographical articles written by specialists in the field. The editors will coordinate the volumes and the overall project with the support of staff at the GHI. They will be in regular contact with the authors of the biographical and other research articles, provide advice and feedback, ensure quality, and write introductory essays. The volume editors are Mari-anne Wokeck (Indiana University, Purdue University Indianapolis), William J. Hausman (College of William & Mary), Giles R. Hoyt (Max Kade German-American Research and Resource Center, Indiana University, Purdue University Indianapolis), Jeffrey Fear (University of Redlands), and R. Daniel Wadhwani (University of the Pacific).

An Academic Advisory Board composed of leading American and European business and immigration historians has been established to advise the GHI project team, editors, and researchers. It will help refine the project as it develops and will be involved in determining the criteria for the composition of the biographical sample of entrepreneurs. The members of the board are Sven Beckert (Harvard University), Kathleen N. Conzen (University of Chicago), Richard Sylla (New York University), Joseph P. Ferrie (Northwestern University), Walter Friedman (Harvard Business School), Andrew Godley (University of Reading), Leslie Hannah (London School of Economics), Roger Horowitz (Hagley Library and Museum), Walter D. Kamphoefner (Texas A&M University), Tom Nicholas (Harvard Business School), Werner Plumpe (University of Frankfurt/Main), Frank Trommler (University of Pennsylvania), and Thomas Welskopp (University of Bielefeld).

At the German Historical Institute, Hartmut Berghoff and Uwe Spiekermann will direct the project and act as the general editors of the volumes and the online platform. A project team will manage the general flow of information between the editors and researchers,
ensure that deadlines are kept, coordinate workshops, organize panels and conferences, edit incoming contributions, and perform additional research as necessary. The project team is composed of Jessica Csoma, Kelly McCullough, Bryan Hart, and Insa Kummer.

The “Immigrant Entrepreneurship” project is supported by the Transatlantic Program of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany through funds of the European Recovery Program (ERP) of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. The internet platform is scheduled to go online in 2011 with the first contributions, which have already been commissioned. More details about the project can be found online at http://www.ghi-dc.org/entrepreneurship. For further questions, please contact the project coordinator, Jessica Csoma (csoma@ghi-dc.org).

**Hartmut Berghoff** has been Director of the German Historical Institute in Washington since April 2008. He is on leave from his position as director of the Institute of Economic and Social History at the University of Göttingen. His major publications include: *Englische Unternehmer 1870–1914: Eine Kollektivbiographie führender Wirtschaftsbürger in Birmingham, Bristol und Manchester* (Göttingen, 1991); *Zwischen Kleinstadt und Weltmarkt. Hohner und die Harmonika 1857 bis 1961: Unternehmensgeschichte als Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (Paderborn, 1997); *Fritz K. Ein deutsches Leben im 20. Jahrhundert* (co-authored with Cornelia Rauh-Kühne; Stuttgart, 2000) and *Moderne Unternehmensgeschichte: Eine themen- und theorieorientierte Einführung* (Paderborn, 2004). He is currently working on the history of consumption in Nazi Germany.

**Uwe Spiekermann** is Deputy Director of the German Historical Institute and Privatdozent at the University of Göttingen. His publications include: *Basis der Konsumgesellschaft: Entstehung und Entwicklung des modernen Kleinhandels in Deutschland, 1850–1914* (Munich, 1999), *Künstliche Kost: Die Genese der modernen Ernährung in der Wissens- und Konsumgesellschaft Deutschlands, 1880–2000* (forthcoming) as well as numerous articles on 19th- and 20th-century economic and social history, the history of consumption, retailing and nutrition, and the history of science.
HOW DO THE HUMANITIES HELP US MASTER
THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESS?
SPEECH AT THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 18, 2010

Annette Schavan
MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND RESEARCH, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The American President and his administration are as convinced as the German Federal Government that national and international policy in the next decade will have to deal much more than ever before with the role of science and research, and with the findings and knowledge that they generate, in order to be able to make responsible decisions. Whether we are dealing with climate change, the future supply of energy, the fight against poverty and disease, or security questions, there will be no answers or solutions to any of these problems without genuine cooperation among different scientific and scholarly realms and cultures—and without including the humanities.

When we reflect on the internationalization of science and research policy in Germany and develop strategies in this field, these are not just strategies for cooperation with respect to technological developments in the natural and life sciences. It is also an exceedingly rewarding task for us in the twenty-first century to forge particular connections with the humanities.

That is why I am grateful for the existence of the German humanities institutes abroad. You can be assured that the self-understanding of today’s German research policy includes a commitment to continue this great tradition in the twenty-first century. The German Historical Institutes in particular are outstanding sites of international cooperation. The German Historical Institute here in Washington is the largest historical research institute not affiliated with a university in the United States, an exceptional venue for transatlantic cooperation, and one of the most important organizations connecting Germany and the United States.

In June, a group of young scholars will start work here on a research project that will examine the image of Europe held by European immigrants in the United States. The views of European emigrants as they look back across the Atlantic will provide a special external perspective on Europe. This was especially significant in the context of the transatlantic relationships of the postwar era. As wanderers...
between worlds, these European emigrants decisively shaped the American perception of Europe. This is only one example among many showing that the people conducting research at this institute today are also wanderers between worlds. They cultivate stable, reliable bridges of understanding and dialog between the United States and Germany. And thus they do precisely what has always numbered among the distinctive tasks of the humanities: they enlighten and provoke enlightenment.

Enlightenment is not an automatic process; enlightenment is a lasting responsibility; enlightenment must always prevail over inertia and prevent relapses into old ways. The humanities have always played a special role in this process. Only recently, a historian convincingly discredited common assumptions about the supposed differences between the United States and Europe. If one looks at the diversity of European and American cultures, he argued, then the supposed chasm that separates us is nowhere near as deep as is often claimed. America and Europe are not worlds apart. Europe and the United States are parts of a common culture.

I am convinced that our common anthropological convictions will play a central role in the international context in the future. These commonalities concern not only the development processes of societies, the way research sees itself, and the relationship of science and scholarship to government policies, but also the complex and manifold globalization processes that are leading to the dissolution of familiar boundaries and a departure from the well-known framework of nation-states.

A global economy subverts the basic principles of the national economy; climate problems do not end at national borders. The familiar unity of cultural identity, space, and the state is in flux. Not only spatial, but also temporal boundaries are changing. Industrial, newly industrialized, and developing countries have increasingly different paces of development. Their reaction times to developments in the global financial and economic markets are becoming a precondition for prosperity and progress. Sometimes it is a question of bare survival.

The French author Erik Orsenna therefore rightly emphasizes that “globalization is not only a matter of space; it has also unleashed a war of the clocks.” The explosion of data traffic, the worldwide exchange of goods across borders, and the blending of cultural
systems of knowledge take on new meanings in different cultural contexts—as do the public and the private sphere, justice and injustice, as well as private property and public welfare.

The humanities can no longer rely on established parameters of space and time, but are generating new approaches to dealing with these two factors. Their development of new standards in this area is one of the reasons why the humanities are in such demand. They are becoming an increasingly important part of the productive work of a functionally differentiated modern society, which is eager to make use of their findings. By way of example, I will just mention the increasingly valued philosophy of corporate social responsibility and the concept of creative cities. The humanities and cultural studies create transparency under complex conditions. They supply knowledge that offers guidance.

Clearly, these qualities are of great appeal to those who are thinking about what subject to study. The number of students in the humanities is steadily increasing. Psychologists are in demand, as are political scientists who understand concepts of global governance. Philosophers who understand something about business ethics, social scientists who work on intercultural communication, and theologians working in human resources departments—all of them are in demand.

And then, of course, there is the constant debate about whether or not the humanities are being neglected or disadvantaged. This discussion has been going on for a long time in Germany. I think that scholars in the humanities should adopt a bold approach to this question. The times when universities could believe that cutbacks in the humanities would improve their academic profile are coming to an end.

But it is up to the humanities themselves to make clear what their purpose is. The humanities point out time and again that one should not question their usefulness too strongly. I believe, however, that we must nevertheless answer the question of the specific contribution which the humanities make to dealing with the diverse processes of globalization.

Recognition of other forms and patterns of knowledge is playing a growing role in many development projects. The significance of regional studies, so-called area studies, has consequently increased both in Europe and the United States. The goal is to achieve an
intensified exchange between fields such as sociology, political science, or history and ethnology, religious studies, and regional subjects such as Middle East Studies or India Studies. As a result, the humanities, social sciences, and cultural studies will make an increasingly important contribution towards understanding—and therefore also towards shaping—globalization. We need economists with regional competence, social scientists with intercultural knowledge, and cultural studies scholars with a political antenna.

The humanities protect us from cultural prejudices, ideological blindness, and dangerous stereotypes. The transfer processes between regions and cultures are complex; researching them at the same time secures peace and promotes development and action. The humanities and cultural studies bear significant responsibility for fostering understanding in a globalized world. The humanities must move beyond the role of reactive reflection.

The examples of many technological developments—let me just mention the current discussion about body scanners—make clear that the humanities and social sciences should not merely be invited to provide their ideas and assessment after the fact. They must participate in technological developments from the beginning. They should set the essential standards for technological developments. The humanities create something like dialogic attention, especially concerning the expectations of the public and political leaders when deciding about employing specific technologies.

Globalization processes are removing previous boundaries and expanding the spaces in which we move. At the same time, people’s yearning for spirituality, values, and roots is growing. Literature, art, and music speak of precisely this yearning. Humanities scholars research such paths of yearning throughout human history. They preserve texts as witnesses to our history; they trace the boundaries of cultural patterns and constant boundary-crossings in literature. Thus, they point out our own limits. They help identify culturally formative and identity-creating phenomena in the globalization process. Modern ethnology, sociology, media theory, philosophy, history, and psychoanalysis help us to better understand the complex process of globalization. They can help us understand how developments become autonomous and dissociated from the interests and wishes of the people. They can help us see how old euphorias and utopias of progress and modernity have shattered with uncontrollable consequences. The humanities can help us to think the world anew.
The causes of societal problems have changed radically. The Cold War era and the competition between the systems are over. At issue today are conflicts over space and resources, conflicts which will shape our society fundamentally in the future. Just take the worldwide resource conflict over water, which is mentioned in every research policy debate, or the future supply of energy.

The humanities and cultural studies will have to define the scope of their research more broadly. They will have to utilize the findings of the natural sciences—in brain research, for instance—in order to be able to describe and understand societies better. Globalization processes do not just pose new challenges for the humanities; they also call for a new self-confidence. The humanities must dare to become a thorn in the side of society—to call problems by their name, to speak out against injustice, to pursue unconventional ideas, and to call attention to the consequences of our actions.

The philosopher Hans Jonas wrote about these matters more than thirty years ago, in 1979, in his book, The Imperative of Responsibility (Prinzip Verantwortung). The starting point for his argument is the completely different way in which people are now using technology, which has rendered our former ethical standards inadequate. It was out of this situation that Jonas developed his imperative of responsibility. One might say that it was the forerunner of the imperative of sustainability.

The humanities make the world more complicated in a positive way. They do not diminish the complexity and contingency of our world; they try to read the world, decode it, understand it, make it comprehensible. With more self-confidence, the humanities will again play an important role in the universities and public life. The humanities must show what they are capable of. For that they need inspiring settings. The German Historical Institute here in Washington is precisely that.

Translated by Mark R. Stoneman

Annette Schavan is a member of the German Bundestag and Federal Minister of Education and Research, a position she has held since 2005. She studied educational sciences, philosophy, and Catholic theology in Bonn and Düsseldorf, earning a doctoral degree in theology in 1980. After a professional career at the Cusanuswerk, a Catholic educational foundation, which she headed as Director from 1991 to 1995, Schavan served as Minister of Education, Youth, and Sport in the German Land of Baden-Württemberg from 1995 to 2005. Among her recent publications: Keine Wissenschaft für sich: Essays zur gesellschaftlichen Relevanz von Forschung (Hamburg, 2008); Bildung und Erziehung: Perspektiven auf die Lebenswelten von Kindern und Jugendlichen (Frankfurt/Main, 2004).
UNDERSTANDING MARKETS: INFORMATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND HISTORY

Conference at the Hagley Museum and Library in Wilmington, Delaware, October 30–31, 2009. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington and the Hagley Museum and Library. Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Washington), Roger Horowitz (Hagley Museum and Library), Philip Scranton (Rutgers University), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI Washington). Participants: Regina Lee Blaszczyk (University of Pennsylvania), Alan Brody (TECHmarketing), Kerstin Brückweh (GHI London), Lynn Catanese (Hagley Museum and Library), Roy Church (University of East Anglia), Gregory A. Donofrio (University of Minnesota), Alexander Engel (University of Göttingen), Ferdinando Fasce (University of Genova), Gerulf Hirt (University of Göttingen), Ingo Kühler (University of Göttingen), Josh Lauer (University of New Hampshire), Kenneth Lipartito (Florida International University), Jan Logemann (GHI Washington), Séverine Antigone Marin (University of Strasbourg), Sean Nixon (University of Essex), Patrick Hyder Patterson (University of California, San Diego), Jamie Pietruska (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Daniel Raff (University of Pennsylvania), Daniel J. Robinson (University of Western Ontario), Stefan Schwarzkopf (University of London, Queen Mary College), Terry Snyder (Hagley Museum and Library), Alexia Yates (University of Chicago), and twenty-eight guests.

The opening of the Ernest Dichter files at the Hagley Museum and Library was not only an occasion to recognize the contributions of this Austrian-American immigrant and leading market analyst of the postwar era, but also provided an excellent opportunity to discuss and broaden crucial economic and cultural topics that benefited from Dichter’s innovative contributions. The aim of the conference was to analyze the practices and institutions through which markets have been understood in Europe and North America since the late nineteenth century. Markets are not transparent to those engaged in them; they change over time, and understanding them is a complex process that involves a wide range of heterogeneous and conflicting individuals, institutions, and forms of knowledge. A call for papers attracted nearly forty scholars, and the conveners divided the most promising systematic overviews and case studies into five sessions, which provided both theoretical and comparative perspectives of Europe and the United States. A volume with a smaller selection of revised papers will be published in the GHI’s new series, Worlds of Consumption.
The conference was opened with words of welcome by Terry Snyder, who thanked Carol Lockman and the Hagley staff for their outstanding organizational work and the guest of honor, Mrs. Hedy Dichter, for generously donating her husband’s papers to the Hagley Museum and Library in 2008. (See http://hagleylibrary.blogspot.com/2009/02/ernest-dichter-papers-at-hagley-library.html.) Hartmut Berghoff started the academic program with his introductory talk, “From Practical Know-How to Science-Based Management Tool: The Emergence of Modern Marketing in the 20th Century.” In his overview, he tackled the changing role of marketing in business since the Gilded Age, dating the beginnings of modern marketing practices to the late nineteenth century and seeing the emergence of scientific approaches to marketing in the 1910s and 1920s. Berghoff questioned the received notion of a one-way Americanization of European and German marketing practices and provided evidence of a more complex, intertwined transatlantic history, in which European social sciences and American marketing practices were formative. In contrast to other branches of business, however, marketing remained a subject in which experts—so-called marketing gurus—still played an important role. Dichter was an outstanding example, but he was only one of many experts searching for ways to understand markets and analyze consumers.

The first session dealt with “Generations and Paradigms.” Kenneth Lipartito began his paper, “The Politics of Market Knowledge in Post-World-War II America,” by discussing the intense public debate over the so-called hidden persuaders; this discourse was typical of Cold War hysteria. In contrast to such hyperbole, Lipartito integrated this debate into the long-term changes in sociological research promoted by the Austrian-American immigrant Paul Lazarsfeld in the 1940s. The aim of these social scientists and marketing experts was not to persuade the consumers, as Vance Packard’s highly influential best seller suggested. They tried to analyze and understand the needs of postwar consumers and were convinced that manipulation was not possible in the long run. “Tell me how you buy and I will tell you who you are” was their slogan, for in their minds they worked not only for good salaries but also for the public good, helping people to discover their innate desires and find a distinct place in America’s heterogeneous society. Most experts therefore rejected attempts at subliminal advertising as unserious and damaging to the branch’s reputation. Crossing the ocean, Sean Nixon talked about “Understanding the Ordinary Housewife: Advertising and Consumer Research in Britain
His analysis of the London subsidiary office of J. Walter Thompson enabled reflections on how market research helped produce understandings of the “typical” housewife. American firms pushed new forms of market research in Britain. British experts learned from their American colleagues but also found their own ways of conducting market research, adapting it to class-oriented British consumption patterns.

Moving from Britain to Germany, Gerulf Hirt’s paper “Caught Between Goebbels and Dichter: German Ad Experts from National Socialism to the Early Bonn Republic” argued that the leading German advertising “masters” of the Nazi period still shaped the way marketing was done during the postwar era. Understanding the consumer’s mind and soul was perceived as a kind of art, not a serious profession or science. Therefore, Hirt rejected the thesis of a broad Americanization of German marketing in the 1950s and, instead, advocated a nuanced analysis of the practical and theoretical ideas of these “creative masters.” The panel’s final presentation, “Psyched over Synthetics: Ernest Dichter, the DuPont Company and the Boomer Consumer,” was delivered by Regina Lee Blaszczyk. She provided an overview of the quickly changing clothing market, which was profoundly impacted by new synthetic fibers like nylon and Orlon. Many consumers did not accept these new materials, and responses to this problem comprised combinations of synthetic fibers, “natural fabrics,” and intensified market research. Ernest Dichter started his work for DuPont in 1957, interpreting the “deeper meaning” of clothes and clothing. New advertisements focused on informality and individuality, the relevance of local and personal interaction, the rise of a new middle class, and the increasing relevance of male customers. In his comment at the end of this session, Daniel Raff made an engaged plea for a business history that analyzes not only firms and industries but also the decision-making processes of entrepreneurs and managers. Their knowledge has always been crucial in strategic decision-making, and the role of marketing experts and their conceptions should be embedded into this broader context.

The academic discussion was enriched by Alan Brody’s keynote address, “Who Let the Id Out? How Ernest Dichter and Market Research Changed American Marketing: Its Cultural DNA and Digital/Post-Industrial Legacy.” As a practitioner, Brody confessed to being deeply influenced by Ernest Dichter’s work and legacy. He presented some of Dichter’s most significant campaigns and characterized the
Dichter papers at Hagley as an archive of what Americans thought about during the postwar years.

As Dichter himself had done, the conference’s second session explored the problem of “Marketing Products.” In his paper, “Is the Doctor In? The Changing Role of Salesmen in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry in the Twentieth Century,” Roy Church presented not only another industry but also other actors. The British firm Burroughs Wellcome & Co. hired up to fifty salesmen to sell its products to doctors and obtain detailed market information from these customers. Church’s case study questioned widely accepted periodizations of marketing history. He advocated more archival work on small-business structures and credence goods, which required persuasion by salesmen to be sold, during the interwar period and earlier. The situation of the pharmaceutical industry was similar to that of the automobile industry, although the latter’s products were advertised in audiovisual media. In his presentation, “Recognizing Car Market Realities: Marketing, PR and Market Research of the German Automobile Industry in the 1970s,” Ingo Köhler concentrated on a period of crisis that required even leading companies, such as Volkswagen, to fundamentally change their products. Automobile firms underwent major organizational changes in order to identify and integrate the needs and desires of customers into a cycle of product development that supported continuous product innovation. A broader variety of cars led to profound changes in production and the social hierarchy of German employees. The economic and energy crises of the 1970s led to profound changes in retailing and services as well. Gregory A. Donofrio analyzed a fascinating facet of this shift in his paper, “Self-service: How Gas Stations Were Marketed to Women.” The transition from a full-service to a self-service marketing strategy forced reluctant oil executives to confront their practice of associating station designs and sales strategies with masculinity, because nearly half of all American drivers were women. Dichter and others stressed the “specialized needs” of female customers, pushing the industry to make gas stations aesthetically pleasing, safe, and easy to use. A once masculine space was transformed into a kind of gender-neutral territory. The session’s commentator, Ferdinando Fasce, lauded the innovative character of all three case studies, which offered a broader perspective on different kinds of products, actors, services, and forms of knowledge. He also advocated more comparative work. Research should encompass not only a larger bundle of products and industries but also international and transnational comparisons.
The conference’s third session was dedicated to “Dealing with Uncertainty,” that is, managing limited knowledge about both an existing situation and future outcomes. Dealing with uncertainty means establishing forms and standards of market-related knowledge to make markets more calculable and increase the probability of business success. Interestingly, industrialization was no real watershed in such efforts. In his paper “Into the Blue: Trying to Sell Indian Indigo in Traditional and Modern European Markets, 1780-1910,” Alexander Engel described the early indigo market as it developed from the interaction between producers and experts. On the one hand, the knowledge of production techniques, the variety of nuances in color, and the product itself made it possible for the industry to establish quality grades. On the other hand, differing tastes and purchasing power, both defined by merchant-producers, permitted the successful segmentation of regional and national markets. The introduction of synthetic indigo changed the market rapidly and led to severe uncertainty among the producers of so-called natural indigo. But the increasing variety of dyes and changes in their production did not transform the structure of the market, which continued to be shaped by the superior knowledge of (now chemical) experts and producers.

In the panel’s next presentation, “Cotton Guessers: Crop Forecasters and Rationalization of Uncertainty in the American Cotton Market, 1894-1905,” Jamie Pietruska convincingly questioned this rationality of expert systems. Pietruska demonstrated that private market forecasters were able to influence prices and markets by exploiting the industry’s dependence on many “natural” factors, especially incalculable weather conditions, because agents and large-scale customers believed in such information. Even more interesting was her analysis of the struggle between different knowledge producers, mainly private actors and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Although the price of cotton remained highly volatile and market uncertainty remained high, the use of statistical methods allowed more calculable risk behavior in the long run.

Other industrial branches functioned in a very different way. In her talk “Why Is There No MLS [Multiple Listing Service] in France? Information and Intermediaries in the Parisian Housing Market in the 19th and 20th Centuries,” Alexis Yates concentrated on a service market characterized by efforts to centralize and standardize information on houses and apartments. Nevertheless, private expertise remained
decisive, and real estate agents acted as the crucial “decoders of Paris’s complex urban space.” Their expertise was socially embedded; they knew their quarters and the tricks for obtaining a domicile. At the same time, their associations tried, albeit not very successfully, to establish moral codes and business rules to foster trust among their customers. Despite such efforts, however, the reign of experts led to uncertainty, but mainly among customers. In his comment, Uwe Spiekermann observed, first, that profound cultural, legal, and economic differences existed between regions, countries, and states, which led to different knowledge regimes and institutional settings. Second, the cases studies in this session significantly relativize the notion of a free market. Third, the knowledge of experts and consumers alike constitutes a key element in understanding markets. Consequently, additional information is needed on both groups, including wholesalers and retailers as experts at the point of sale.

Personal experience was only one element of “Gathering Knowledge,” the topic of the fourth session. Daniel J. Robinson began his presentation, “Letter Writing, Market Research, and Patent Medicines, 1880–1930,” by discussing a wide range of methods used before World War I to contact consumers in the print media, on the street, and through the mail. His case study focused on the rich records of the Lydia E. Pinkham Company, established in 1875. He examined the interplay of testimonial letters, company correspondence, direct mail marketing, and additional market research. Again, an analysis of particular branches showed intense, firm-based information-seeking, resulting in new types of employment, knowledge power, technology, and communication with customers. Josh Lauer discussed new forms of “objective” knowledge production on firms and consumers in his presentation, “Making the Ledgers Talk: Credit Management and the Origins of Retail Data Mining, 1920–1940.” While credit departments had emerged during the 1890s as an integral part of department stores and installment houses, credit managers were not urged to scan their ledgers to analyze the buying habits of customers until the 1920s. Starting as a kind of consumer control, credit management was increasingly used for targeting promotion. Detailed quantitative information replaced the personal knowledge of the shop owner and permitted the use of formerly “unproductive” credit information as a tool for identifying, classifying, and contacting consumers.

Such marketing measures were normally based on statistical, social, and psychological research. In her paper, “‘Beware, You Could Be a
 Target: A History of Consumer Classification in Britain,” Kerstin Brückweh investigated continuity and change in statistical categorization. Consumers were understood via quantitative models of social stratification and regional income distribution. In spite of many adjustments and changes since the interwar period, the normative character of science-based models remained evident. Philip Scranton, in his comment, critically examined the different perspectives of the three contributions. The reduction of people to buyers was similar in all cases, but firms were focused on very different aspects of consumer identity. This circumstance raised questions about the actors and their decision-making or, more particularly, the differences between the marketing experts and consumers, that is, the supposedly vital few and the trivial many. Scranton also stressed a basic problem of information societies: they lack adequate information and understanding, but mostly demand more, not different, data. Additionally, Scranton noted, the parameters of reliability were a crucial topic in understanding markets and marketing.

The fifth and final session, “States and Markets,” discussed the role and function of the state in influencing and understanding markets. One nineteenth-century example of export promotion by states was the commercial museum. Séverine Antigone Marin’s talk, “Introducing Small Firms to International Markets: The Debates Over the Commercial Museums in France and Germany, 1880-ca. 1910,” described the changes that this institution underwent. First used to present information on technological innovations, the museums were transformed into sites that offered advice and education on how to market goods. Comparisons between foreign and domestic products were supposed to enable producers to learn more about standards in foreign markets and improve their own marketing efforts. Commercial museums helped to encourage exports and intensified relationships among producers, merchants, and the state. Such connections became even closer during the interwar period.

Stefan Schwarzkopf’s paper, “How Do States Understand Markets and Consumers? The Uses of Market Research in British Government Departments, 1920-1940,” examined the establishment of a state-driven market-research industry. Governmental and quasi-governmental institutions—such as the BBC, the Milk Marketing Board, the Empire Marketing Board, and the Stationary Office—developed methods to observe, measure, and interpret consumer behavior. Pushed by the political Left, such institutions were intended not only to promote
domestic goods and create more efficient markets, but also to help solve problems of information asymmetry in modern consumer markets.

Quite different was the role of the state in the postwar socialist countries examined by Patrick Hyder Patterson in his paper, “The Bad Science and the Black Arts: The Reception of Marketing in Socialist Eastern Europe.” Although the market was widely understood by the socialist elite as an instrument of oppression, it was also recognized as essential to the development of domestic economies. This pragmatic approach stimulated marketing efforts, even though such efforts were often denounced as “capitalistic.” Patterson compared developments in the more prosperous states of East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Although he found stark differences among them, according to each state’s relative wealth and affluence, all of these states wanted consumption to function properly, and they all sought to act in the so-called real interests of consumers. Market research, often regarded with suspicion, was used as a tool to learn more about people’s desires, while consumer policies, including marketing, were supposed to educate consumers on rational consumption and needs. These efforts can be seen as a distinctive form of “socialist marketing,” even if their methodology and advertising forms resembled those used in Western countries.

Jan Logemann began his comment by noting the surprising gap between economic theory and governmental practice. The former emphasizes the information problems of the state and its inability to understand markets, but all three presentations in this section revealed rather successful state activism. The problem of rationalizing information and legitimizing politics via consumer policies was similar in all three cases, but the answers and results were quite different. Although the commercial museums were not successful in the long run, capitalist societies offered more sustainable answers than the communist ones, which provided no effective response to consumer needs due to their ideological priorities. Logemann encouraged researchers to examine different kinds of states, as well as public and marketing-related institutions, to obtain a more nuanced understanding of the broad field of state-market relations.

The conference concluded with closing remarks by Philip Scranton, who focused on information, institutions, and markets. Information is always ambiguous and never neutral. It creates markets and defines consumers. At the same time, the differences between “data,”
“information,” and “knowledge” require closer and more theoretical examination. Similarly, the term “institution” covers a wide range of diverse organizations and practices. They vary in time and space, and there is no linear or direct causal relationship between institutions and consumption. Markets are relevant not because they are rational—this is a myth—but because they focus on demand and exchange. Historians should not neglect the production and supply chains, however. This more economic perspective is necessary to put market analysis into perspective. Scranton also mentioned four other themes frequently discussed during the conference: conventions, competition, credit, and constraints. A basic question emerging from such different perspectives is what makes a market a market. In spite of focusing on one particular theme, Scranton called for clusters of concepts for further research. Cultural and economic history should recognize and analyze the complexity of markets and all the attempts to understand them. While experts in marketing typically reduce this complexity, the choices they make in apprehending and constructing markets require scholarly attention and theoretical conceptualization.

Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
CULTURES OF CREDIT: CONSUMER LENDING AND BORROWING IN MODERN ECONOMIES

Workshop at the GHI, February 5–6, 2010. Convener: Jan Logemann (GHI). Participants: Rebecca Belvederesi-Kochs (RWTH Aachen), Lawrence Bowdish (Ohio State University), Lendol Calder (Augustana College), Michael Easterly (University of California Los Angeles), Sabine Efosse (University of Tours), Larry Frohman (SUNY Stony Brook), Isabelle Gaillard (University of Grenoble), Sheldon Garon (Princeton University), Andrew Gordon (Harvard University), Martina Grünewald (University of Applied Arts Vienna), Charles Yuji Horioka (Osaka University), Louis Hyman (McKinsey & Co.), Christina Lubinski (GHI), Silke Meyer (University of Münster), Sean O’Connell (Queens University Belfast), Martha Poon (University of California San Diego), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Gunnar Trumbull (Harvard Business School).

The recent economic crisis has underscored the centrality of consumer credit for modern economies. This workshop aimed to give the issue of consumer borrowing and indebtedness a historical dimension by engaging a series of questions. How did the American experience with consumer credit—frequently seen as globally formative—compare to that in other parts of the world? What did changes in lending practices—from easy access to credit cards to increasingly refined credit scoring—mean for consumers as economic and social actors? What breaks and continuities characterized the broad shift from face-to-face credit relations to institutionalized lending? How significant was the line frequently drawn between consumer loans made under conditions of affluence and household debt incurred because of poverty and destitution? The composition of the workshop—which brought together historians, economists, anthropologists, and other social scientists from Europe, Asia, and North America—strongly encouraged comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives on the development of consumer credit.

The first panel focused on lenders and changes in lending practices across various countries during the latter half of the twentieth century. Who were the innovators and what were the driving forces behind innovation? How did the relationship between retailers, producers, and financial institutions evolve in the consumer credit business? To what degree can we trace transnational transfers of knowledge and practices? Here, Louis Hyman’s recent work serves as an important reminder that the American credit model—frequently
regarded as influential for both Europe and Asia—was by no means static, but underwent dramatic changes during the postwar decades. Hyman posits a transition from an installment-credit economy of the “Fordist” era to a revolving credit economy of the “Post-Fordist” era, in which profits derived from credit financing became an end in themselves for retailers and manufacturers alike. For this conference, Hyman submitted a paper that focused specifically on postwar inequalities in U.S. credit markets. He described a “two-tier credit system” in which highly inefficient and costly retailing credit prevailed in urban “ghettos,” and he recounted attempts to overcome this divided market during the 1960s and ’70s.

In Europe, the revolving credit regime Hyman discusses as increasingly central to postwar America did not gain the importance it held in the United States. Instead, the growth of installment credit dominated the postwar decades. Isabelle Gaillard discussed the important role of the electronics and especially the television industry for the development of credit in postwar France. Specialized lenders such as CETELEM engaged a frequently skeptical French public and greatly expanded the consumer credit market in an effort to grow the overall sales of electronic appliances. Rebecca Belvederisi-Kochs looked at the changes in marketing and business ethics involved in bringing a peculiar German institution, the public savings banks or Sparkassen, into the consumer loans market. The Sparkassen had long emphasized the importance of savings and “German thrift,” and they retained this stance well into the 1960s. However, they also emerged as reluctant pioneers in the consumer loans business at a time when most commercial banks in Germany did not consider ordinary consumers to be “credit-worthy.” Andrew Gordon’s paper on the Japanese case emphasized the combination of American influences (for example, through the Singer Company) and indigenous developments in retail credit for the growth of consumer lending in Japan. While Japanese consumers “caught up with” Americans in some measures of credit use, the structure of their credit remained significantly different. As in Europe, revolving credit lines were much less common here. Sheldon Garon, who presented the paper, further noted the relative absence of home equity loans and similar forms of credit in Japan and many markets outside the United States, and he emphasized the long history of negative public views towards indebtedness in the country. In Japan and elsewhere, transfers and “modernization” rarely meant convergence towards a uniform business model.
The second panel shifted the focus towards the borrowers and questions of credit access, privacy concerns, as well as the changing social contextualization of credit. Sean O’Connell opened with a look at the long tradition of working-class credit in the United Kingdom. In a class-segmented market, working-class consumers since the nineteenth century had been supplied with access to credit by tallymen and check-trading companies such as Providential. Their agents were deeply embedded in the fabric of local communities and continued to collect money on the doorstep well into the second half of the twentieth century. Like poorer consumers, women also faced frequent challenges in the consumer credit market. Lawrence Bowdish chronicled the push for credit rights for women in the United States that ultimately led to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974. Drawing on a large repository of letters, he showed how middle-class women, in particular, rallied around the cause of credit access as a way to gain economic independence and “economic citizenship.” Consumer self-determination also stood at the center of debates regarding credit reporting and concerns over privacy rights during the 1970s in West Germany, which Larry Frohman discussed. He sketched the rise of the Schufa agency, which in some ways functions as an equivalent to American credit bureaus but does not, for example, employ credit scores.

In the last paper of this session, Martina Grünewald explored the declining world of public and private pawn shops in Vienna. Unlike in the United States, where pawn shops are part of a burgeoning fringe banking sector, Austrian pawn shops have been limited by a requirement to auction off all unredeemed pawns. However, this model had long sustained a close community of credit and second-hand buying (especially for immigrants) around pawnshops that shared some of the face-to-face qualities of Britain’s working-class credit economy. Overall, the panel uncovered similar trends concerning expanded access to credit for various social groups as well as an increase in contractual and institutionalized lending forms that relied on the scientific mapping of consumers rather than social ties. Still, national distinctions in credit practice also remained palpable throughout the twentieth century.

State regulation and credit policy stood at the center of a third panel, which specifically explored reasons for differences in the macro-economic importance of consumer credit in France and the United States. Gunnar Trumbull presented a comparative perspective on the two countries after World War II, in which he focused on the impact of regulatory policy and lender incentives. Trumbull explained
comparatively high American rates of indebtedness by emphasizing, first, the importance of an American financial and retail system that benefited from deregulation and championed revolving debt and, second, a long-standing and evolving policy coalition of interests on the political left and right that favored credit access throughout the twentieth century. By contrast, Sabine Efossé showed that French governmental attitudes towards expanded consumer credit were long reserved at best. After the war, industrial development and fighting inflation outweighed interest in expanding credit in France (as they did elsewhere in Europe). While the government adopted more liberal regulations modeled on American examples during the mid-1950s, the overall significance of credit-financed consumption still paled in comparison to the United States, even towards the end of the trente glorieuses. Jan Logemann’s paper returned to the theme of a peculiar American policy coalition favoring credit growth. He argued that credit expansion in the United States was not simply tied to market-liberal deregulation, but also to long-standing attempts at expanding credit access as a form of social policy. Making credit—from mortgages and student loans to credit cards and installment loans—affordable and widely available was of peculiar importance in twentieth-century America, which lacked European-style welfare systems and tied social mobility heavily to consumption possibilities.

The final panel turned to the question of cultural differences in explaining credit patterns. While presenters in previous panels pointed to market patterns, social structures, and policy incentives to explain credit development, Silke Meyer’s paper suggested a cultural change in attitudes towards credit in recent decades. Spurred on by advertising and aggressive marketing, the debtors who are the subject of Meyer’s anthropological field research in Germany have come to view credit-financed consumption and instant gratification of personal desires as integral to notions of social inclusion and self-realization. The social ties of traditional lending are gone, she argues, and debts have become mere consumer options without a social dimension. Economist Charles Horioka approached the question from a very different angle. Comparing cross-national OECD data on household liabilities and assets, he probed the traditional notion of the “frugal” Japanese. Surprisingly, household liabilities have been relatively high in Japan in recent decades—at times even surpassing those in the United States. These liabilities, however, were more than offset by high household assets. While this seemed to vindicate traditional assumptions about Japanese household budgeting, Horioka cautioned
against purely cultural explanations by pointing to the significant rise in debt over the postwar decades, which runs counter to assumptions about ingrained cultural patterns. Looking at American debt cultures, historian Lendol Calder rejected simplistic narratives of a decline of thrift or a Victorian “golden age” of responsible budgeting. While traditional notions of thrift enjoy less currency today, even “respectable” nineteenth-century Americans were no strangers to financial irresponsibility. Thrift was never the only game in town, Calder argued; furthermore, modern forms of debt often had a disciplining character that merits consideration as its own form of thriftiness. Thus, while cultural patterns clearly influence credit use, arguments about “national cultures” of thrift or credit-fueled hedonism are rarely borne out by the historical record.

Discussions throughout the workshop emphasized the importance of several factors—from cultural development to public policy and market incentives—for understanding credit development that defy easy characterization and stereotypical answers. While the influence that American developments had on other nations is undeniable, for example, the twentieth century was not characterized by “Americanization” or global homogenization in consumer lending. Transfers went in multiple directions and participants (economists, historians, and social scientists alike) repeatedly noted that the American model of consumer credit remained unique and peculiar in important ways. Comparing the experiences from numerous countries, furthermore, suggested that fundamental problems of the twentieth century such as providing “democratic” access to credit under safe and affordable conditions while avoiding irresponsible lending and over-indebtedness will likely remain with us for some time to come. Nor should the recent credit crisis be seen as an inevitable culmination of previous developments or even an end point to consumer credit growth. Credit scores—the innovation that drove many of the American (and global) financial developments in recent decades—were, as Martha Poon reminded us, still rooted in traditional notions of predicting and avoiding defaults. Future scores, she predicted, may well transcend this concern and focus solely on lending profitability. While such a development would perhaps represent the ultimate depersonalization and commodification of lending relations, the workshop suggested that face-to-face lending and the neighborhood loan shark are not likely to vanish entirely any time soon either.

Jan Logemann (GHI)
LIVES BEYOND BORDERS: TOWARD A SOCIAL HISTORY OF COSMOPOLITANS AND GLOBALIZATION, 1880–1960

Conference at the University of Heidelberg, Cluster of Excellence “Asia and Europe,” February 12–13, 2010. Sponsored by the GHI and the University of Heidelberg, Cluster of Excellence “Asia and Europe.” Conveners: Madeleine Herren (Cluster of Excellence “Asia and Europe,” University of Heidelberg) and Ines Prodöhl (GHI). Participants: Gopalan Balachandran (Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva), Nicolas Berg (Simon Dubnow Institute, Leipzig), Tibor Frank (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest), Michael Geyer (University of Chicago), Frank Grüner (University of Heidelberg), Jing Yuen Tsu (Yale University), Cornelia Knab (University of Heidelberg), Erez Manela (Harvard University), Rudolph Ng (University of Heidelberg), Miriam Rürup (University of Göttingen), Amy Sayward (Middle Tennessee State University), Christiane Sibille (Universities of Heidelberg and Basel), Rudolf Stichweh (University of Lucerne), Tomoko Akami (Australian National University, Canberra), Raphael Utz (University of Jena), Rudolf Wagner (University of Heidelberg), and Yoshiya Makita (Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo).

Recently, transnational and global historians have focused on several aspects of the history of international networks and organizations, but they have failed to address the role of the individuals who work in and define these networks. The conference “Lives Beyond Borders” was held to develop a methodological approach to this question in the field of biographical research. In her opening lecture, Madeleine Herren illustrated the need for new methods of biographical research with regard to international individuals, using the example of the recent opening of the personnel files in Geneva’s League of Nations Archives. These files do not support the common image of diplomats, but rather reveal the underlying bureaucratic methods of administrative organizations. Herren presented methodological questions and a preliminary theoretical conceptualization aimed at defining transboundary biographies. She suggested approaching these biographies on three levels: first, transcultural entanglement, representing aspects of boundary-crossing communication and community; second, territoriality, which incorporates the bureaucratic and political organization of the newly invented type of international civil servant; and, third, performativity as an ongoing process of creating and transforming boundary-crossing identities. Based on this analytical approach, Herren proposed a typology of boundary-crossing lives. Although limited to the League
of Nations’ source material, she divided transboundary lives into four sub-categories: elite cosmopolitans, experts creating global topics, cumulative internationalists, and global illusionists.

The first panel, “Border-Crossing Elites,” concentrated on journalists, scientists, and aristocrats. Using the example of Michael Polanyi’s biography, Tibor Frank pointed out that, as a consequence of Hungarian anti-Semitism, which excluded Jews from higher education, young Hungarian Jews were usually sent abroad to study. The effect was a weakening of Hungarian national science, a theory supported by the list of Hungarian Nobel Prize winners, most of whom received the prize well after they had left Hungary. The biography of Polanyi, a chemist, seems to have been paradigmatic of Jewish Hungarian scientists, who often did not find a home in a specific language, or a certain country, but through their internationally desired expertise in science.

Journalists such as William T. Stead constituted a second category of internationalist. Although Stead was neither a displaced intellectual like Polanyi, nor a member of the cosmopolitan elite, he was still an actor on the internationalist scene. Motivated by his belief in the “superiority of the English race,” and, as a consequence, an “English civilizing duty,” he remained strongly connected to his country. He was, as Cornelia Knab argued in her contribution, “an international imperialist.” As a journalist, Stead created a public sphere of influence around international events such as the Hague Conferences (1899; 1907). Knab pointed out that, because of the publicity surrounding him and his controversial character, biographical research on Stead as a “global player” must critically differentiate between his personal statements and the perception of and commentaries about him by his contemporaries.

The women on whom Raphael Utz focused in his lecture about ruling families as a social group enjoyed a similar degree of public notoriety. Utz presented the biographies of three very different royals, not all of whom were successful in realizing their aspirations. The comprehensive collections of letters from these royals, especially in the case of Grand Duchesse Maria Pavlovna, reveal an extensive and influential political network. In her commitment to the women’s rights movement, Princess Alice of Battenberg also demonstrated a strong affinity for transcending social boundaries. Utz pointed out that such aristocrats—as a social group of ruling dynasties in a global context—have been an understudied subject
until recently. He suggested that the study of royal biographies could provide a window onto transnational family networks, and could be extended to the study of the community of ruling families that crossed social and ideological boundaries.

The second panel, on “Fugitives and Patterns of Mobility,” shifted the focus from the social heights of global elites to the field of bureaucratic questions about citizenship and the self-definition of internationalists as so-called Weltbürger, or cosmopolitans. Frank Grüner reflected on the different connotations of cosmopolitanism. The idealized cosmopolitan has been linked to the international, liberal-minded, and widely travelled individual, whereas more negative connotations were employed by the Nazis and Soviets as part of their anti-Semitic propaganda campaigns.

During the conference, various attributes of real cosmopolitans were also presented. These ranged from travelling the world with a comforting sense of nationality and a persistent connection to a home country, to being banished from one’s home country and thus becoming a “world citizen” by necessity. The latter fate was often strongly connected to the idea of “statelessness.” Examining the history of statelessness in the twentieth century, there are manifold aspects and agents that need to be considered. Miriam Rürup defined fundamental terms such as passport, citizenship, and statelessness, before providing an overview of landmark incidents in the history of statelessness, ranging from the aftermath of World War I to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. In her lecture, she addressed the question of how organizations, diplomats, national institutions, and stateless refugees dealt with statelessness. Rürup pointed out that it is not only important to examine the biographies and activities of internationalists, but also to look at the circumstances and legal relationships that they were embedded in or excluded from. Referring to Bertolt Brecht’s “Flüchtlingsgespräche” (Refugee Conversations), Rürup stressed the importance of a passport to any border-crossing individual.

In contrast to humans, bacteria and viruses do not respect national borders, and while epidemics easily overcome geographic boundaries, the fight against epidemics has often been obstructed by them. The struggle to control epidemics has yielded a strong, cooperative international effort. The third panel, “Experts Creating Global Topics,” allowed a closer examination of the careers of medical and scientific experts in international settings. Yoshiya Makita
presented surgeon Anita Newcomb McGee’s battle for the recognition of nursing as a profession, rather than as a natural role for women. During the Spanish-American War, McGee was successful in establishing a permanent corps of trained female nurses within the U.S. Army. The idea of a qualified female nursing service was further strengthened when many American soldiers based in Cuba contracted yellow fever during an epidemic, leading to an urgent need for nursing staff in military camps and hospitals.

Another example of disease promoting an international career was presented by Erez Manela, who offered insight into the biography of Nicole Grasset, a microbiologist-epidemiologist and the senior smallpox advisor of the World Health Organization. The aim of Manela’s research is to learn more about the motivations of international activists, who often left high-status careers, families, and personal lives behind to pursue careers in international health organizations. Through the example of Grasset’s life, it becomes clear that technological change and scientific progress must be weighed alongside the personal motivations of internationalists in order to understand the history of transnational campaigns for disease control and eradication.

Tomoko Akami examined two global health experts, each driven by very different motivations. On the one hand, Akami presented the example of Polish Jew Ludwig Rajchman, whose commitment to the subject of global health as the medical director of the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) from 1921 to 1939 was driven by a sense of humanity and social justice. On the other hand, Neville M. Goodman, British representative to several international organizations, acted explicitly to promote national interests, such as protecting his fellow countrymen from outside health threats. Tomoko’s talk underscored that the professional agendas of health experts could be strongly influenced by the political structures of their times. But while experts’ motivations differed, they were united in their goals.

The fourth panel, “The Invisibles: No Place in History,” sought to offer further answers to the question of what a cosmopolitan is. Some general observations about cosmopolitans were offered by Rudolf Wagner. According to him, most cosmopolitan lives are characterized by certain attributes, such as a high standing in society and government protection, made visible through Western clothing and manners, accompanied by a certain ignorance vis-à-vis
foreign cultures. Instead of concentrating on Western cosmopolitans, Wagner chose to present the biography of Zhang Pengchun, who, while fully integrated into American society, remained strongly connected to his home country of China. He is a prime example of a cosmopolitan who was still rooted in traditions and ideologies of his origins, but used a Western “disguise” to operate more successfully in a foreign culture. Li Shizeng (1881–1973) represented a somewhat similar type of cosmopolitan. His biography was presented by Rudolph Ng, Christiane Sibille, and Ines Prodöhl. Shizeng was one of those international individuals who attempted to use international organizations as platforms for his own agenda. Like Zhang Pengchun, Li Shizeng has been overlooked by historians thus far, and his international operations only become visible by tracing his paths around the globe. Li’s activities are too numerous to be listed here, but the unconventional nature of his biography is typical for an internationalist, and highlights the need for equally unconventional approaches to research methodology.

In contrast to the previous focus on elites, Gopalan Balachandran spotlighted international subaltern groups such as seafarers and displaced persons in global spaces. To illustrate this phenomenon, he described international harbors and the worlds that surround them as places where a global community of subalterns—seamen, prostitutes, dock workers, etc.—had been generated. Balachandran also pointed out that subaltern global spaces are rarely visible without sources by middle-class observers.

The recurring theme of cosmopolitanism can be found in the Jewish Diaspora as well, whether one is looking at Michael Polanyi, Ludwig Rajman, or other Jews drifting, fleeing, and moving through the sometimes dangerously anti-Semitic European countries, often unwillingly becoming part of a cosmopolitan community. Nicolas Berg questioned the old definition of the Luftmensch as a general Jewish way of life. All kinds of negative attributes deriving from an international lifestyle—particularly the attitude of seeing the globe as one’s homeland—were often associated with Jews. And while most cosmopolitans were always connected to their home country and, as Michael Wagner indicated, could continue to be identified as British, Chinese, and so on, Jews were seen as dangerously rootless. Nicolas Berg presented insight into the literary reverberation of Weltbürgerum (cosmopolitanism), in which the Luftmensch is characterized as someone who is not rooted to his
homeland. This last panel concluded that the necessity of either broadening the definition of cosmopolitanism or finding a way to categorize and name the very individual and diverse biographies, all of which share the characteristic element of a border-crossing life, remains controversial.

During the conference’s discussion about the socio-historical methodology of cosmopolitanism, it became clear that biographical research must take the ethnicity, gender, and class of individuals or groups into account. Eventually, discomfort about terms such as internationalism, globalization, and cosmopolitanism arose, because they implied a Western-centric definition of the professional class of boundary-crossing individuals. The three variants of methodological approaches to transboundary lives—transcultural entanglement, territoriality, and performativity—as presented by Madeleine Herren in her opening lecture, can be applied to most of the biographies presented at this conference. These lenses could become important avenues for the thorough examination of the history of international organizations and networks by enabling new investigations into the biographies of the women and men behind them.

Milena Guthörl (University of Heidelberg)
THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE SECOND COLD WAR: EUROPEAN AND TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES

Workshop for Young Scholars, March 24—26, 2010, Berlin/Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis. Cosponsored by: Referat Zeitgeschichte und Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis (Heinrich Böll Foundation), German Historical Institute Washington DC (GHI), University of Augsburg, Geschichte des europäisch-transatlantischen Kulturraums (GETK). Conveners: Christoph Becker-Schaum and Marianne Zepp (Heinrich Böll Foundation), Philipp Gassert (GETK), Martin Klimke (GHI). Participants: Hanno Balz (Lüneburg); Philipp Baur, Reinhold Kreis (GETK); Enrico Böhm, Eckart Conze, Sebastian Kalden, Jan Ole Wiechmann (University of Marburg); Robert Camp (Archivist of the AGG); Gunter Dehnert (University of Erlangen); Tim Geiger, Anja Hanisch (IFZ Munich-Berlin); Jan Hansen (HU Berlin); Paul Hockenos (Internationale Politik, Berlin); Claudia Kemper (University of Hamburg); Alexander Leistner (University of Leipzig), Silke Mende (University of Tübingen), Birgit Metzger (University of Freiburg), Eva Quistorp (Green Party, et al.), Ines Reich-Hilweg (Berghof-Stiftung, Starnberg), Saskia Richter (FU Berlin), Simon Teune (WZB Berlin), Tim Warneke (University of Heidelberg).

The peace movement of the 1970s and 1980s has now become “old enough” for many previously unpublished and unreleased sources to be made available to researchers. Yet it is also recent enough that many eyewitnesses can still be found. Consequently, it is a hot topic in historical research, drawing many young scholars to study it. This workshop, organized in cooperation with the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the international research project “Nuclear Crisis — Transatlantic Peace Politics, Rearmament, and the Second Cold War” (www.nuclearcrisis.org), brought several of these aspiring historians together.

In his opening remarks, Philipp Gassert pointed out a central question in research on this era: What prompted so much protest? Regarding the NATO Double-Track Decision in particular, he noted that we live today “in the shadow of the atom bomb” without mass protests, so the strong reaction was not just a matter of course.

were to the movement. Galvanized by the Double-Track decision in 1979, the Christian peace movement rejected the “spirit, logic, and practice of deterrence” and called for the “democratization of security policy.” It expanded the concept of security to include economic, energy, and ecological questions, representing a fundamental paradigm shift in the FRG’s sense of security in the 1970s and 1980s.

Alexander Leistner then turned to the Christian peace movement in East Germany (GDR). In “Religious Peace Groups in the GDR under the Influence of the Nato Double-Track Decision: Formation of the Movement and Activists’ Identity,” he advocated analyzing individual and group biographies to ascertain people’s motives. According to Leistner, some protesters sought to position themselves in relation to the GDR, spurred by conflict with state institutions. The youth culture of the 1980s and the emigration movement equally manifested people’s desire to distance themselves from or even opt out of the regime.

A public roundtable moderated by Paul Hockenos, co-editor of the magazine *International Politics*, concluded the first day. It featured two eyewitnesses of the peace movement: Eva Quistorp, a long-time member of the National Executive Board of the Green Party, as well as of the European Parliament, of the Coordinating Committee of the peace movement, and an activist in the women’s movement and for European Nuclear Disarmament (END); and Ines Reich-Hilweg, a peace researcher and a research fellow at the Berghof-Stiftung and a former employee of the State Parliamentary Group Bündnis 90/Die Grünen Rheinland-Pfalz. Quistorp emphasized the importance of “Frauen für Frieden” [Women for Peace] and END in the heterogeneous peace movement. Ines Reich-Hilweg related some of her experiences with grassroots initiatives to build trust and reduce military dominance. She cited the practice of German municipalities declaring themselves to be “nuclear-free” zones as an especially effective form of protest. Both agreed that the peace movement raised a class of anti-experts and helped create a critical, democratic public. They also agreed that a mood of hope and change — rather than fear of annihilation — drove the movement, as it tried to recapture the optimism of the 1960s. Only this positive outlook could explain its profound impact.

Jan Hansen explained the shift in SPD opinion — from support for the Double-Track Decision to rejection of missile sites in 1983 — as a crisis in the party marked by the dissolution of its consensus on security policy. Simultaneously, a new perception of the superpowers emerged. Young people and alternatively socialized Social Democrats, especially, began to question the West as a normative model for free, democratic societies, and viewed the East more positively. Silke Mende then illuminated the founding of West Germany’s Green Party in the 1970s and 1980s in “Ökopax [Eco-Peace Group] — the Founding Greens, the Cold War, and the Peace Movement.” Two issues of survival — the environment and peace — merged in the Greens’ crisis discourse. “Ökopax” signaled the integration of the two concepts into a green-alternative political approach that advocated an ecological and nonviolent society. “Peace” thus gave the new party a distinctive agenda, helping it to distance itself from the foreign and security policy consensus of the postwar years.

The third panel, moderated by Hanno Balz, turned to the public debate and popular culture of the Second Cold War. In “The Public Debate about the NATO Double-Track Decision in the Federal Republic, 1979–1984,” Tim Warneke articulated the visions of danger and salvation in the peace movement. He focused on radical positions that sought to “achieve insight through fear.” Allusions to the Second World War (Hiroshima) and the Holocaust predominated among historical analogies, as examples from both the German and American discourse revealed. Philipp Baur then explored “Nuclear Apocalypse Scenarios in 1970s and 1980s Pop Culture,” arguing that these should be viewed as both a mouthpiece and a mirror of the rearmament debate. Such representations tended to be rendered with alarming authenticity and to employ the rhetoric of agitation. Arguing for critical analysis of works like Anton-Andreas Guha’s Ende — Tagebuch aus dem Dritten Weltkrieg [The End — Diary from the Third World War], Baur explored whether such works heightened fear of nuclear strikes.

The fourth panel, moderated by Marianne Zepp, presented two sub-projects from the research project “The KSZE Process: Multilateral Conference Diplomacy and Its Consequences” (Institut für Zeitgeschichte Munich-Berlin and Lehrstuhl für Osteuropäische Geschichte, Erlangen). Using Poland as an example, Gunter Dehnert discussed the “Self-organization of Society — Solidarność, Citizens’ Committees, and the Long Path to Democracy.” Poland
was remarkable because its most important opposition movements, the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) and Solidarność, did not stem directly from the Helsinki Accords as in other Warsaw Pact countries. Nonetheless, the accords generated a document ratified by Poland that helped propagate the idea of general human and civil rights across broad levels of Polish society. Anja Hanisch, in her presentation on “Criticism, Dissidence, and Opposition through the Lens of State Perceptions and Reactions,” elucidated the consequences of the CSCE process for the GDR. On the one hand, the SED presented itself as an equal participant in such conferences and an internationally recognized sovereign state. However, the emigration movement undermined the legitimacy the SED hoped to achieve domestically by explicitly demanding the GDR adhere to the CSCE Accords.

Panel 5, moderated by Simon Teune, dealt with selected peace movement actors. Hanno Balz discussed “The Bundeswehr Riots of 1980 in Bremen — A New Social, Youth, and Peace Movement between Pacifism and Militancy.” Analyzing the protests against the central pledge for recruits in Bremen’s Weser Stadium, he demonstrated the differences between the autonomous anti-war and “civil” peace movements. The Double-Track Decision and the escalation of the East-West opposition drove the “civil” movement, whereas the left-radical “War against War” Movement focused on a North-South opposition and regarded U.S. policies toward the revolution in Iran as an imperialist “war for oil.” Next, Claudia Kemper addressed the role of physicians in the anti-nuclear peace movement of the 1980s in the German section of the IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War). As the doctors feared that expansion of the civil defense system would militarize health care, they made protest against the civil defense plans developed in the context of the Double-Track Decision central to their work. With its campaigns and expertise, the IPPNW formed an interface between the field of medicine and the public, although it could not maintain its non-partisan self-conception. Saskia Richter then traced the “Rise and Fall of a Green Icon” in the person of Petra Kelly (1947–1992). Kelly took was a public leader in founding the Green Party up to 1983. But when the party joined parliament and grew less unified, Kelly was bound to fail. Her charisma in protesting the Double-Track Decision was famous, led frightened FRG citizens to project their hopes and fears upon her, and became an integral part in the struggle against powerlessness in the so-called “Age of Apocalypses.”
Eckart Conze concluded the second day with a public lecture entitled “Striving for Security and Skepticism towards Modernity.” Conze argued that the debate about the Double-Track Decision and rearmament was not only a fierce controversy about the security policy of the federal government and the Western alliance, but also about the concept of security. The peace movement criticized a traditional understanding of security, articulating, too, a profound discomfort with technological-industrial modernity and the idea of progress that lay at its core. Having developed in the late nineteenth century, this sort of thinking had become widely accepted, especially after 1945. In the mid-1970s, the security discourse changed: the peace movement believed that securing peace through mutual nuclear deterrence fundamentally contradicted its own understanding of nuclear-free peace.

After a tour through the Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis [Green Memory Archive], the sixth panel, moderated by Christoph Becker-Schaum, concerned transnational aspects of the peace movement. Enrico Böhm discussed the G7 World Economic Summit as a new format for international cooperation. The “Security Summit” openly and intimately addressed questions of energy supply and the economy, including the relationship between industrial and developing countries. As governments treated these increasingly as “security” issues, the understanding of international security politics expanded beyond pure defense and alliance matters. The G7 debates on defense policy had to address arguments against rearmament, even though the summit itself was intended as a partial answer to protesters’ demands. Then Sebastian Kalden outlined the transnationalization of the Christian peace movement in Western Europe (1979–1985) in “Protests of Unlimited Disarmament.” Christian peace groups in the Netherlands, Germany, and Great Britain worked together across national borders, making mass demonstrations such as the one in the Hofgarten in Bonn on October 10, 1981, possible. They transferred ideas of peace not only by exchanging forms of protest (i.e., devotions, peace festivals, human chains), but also through the symbols they used.

The final panel, moderated by Martin Klimke, concerned 1980s protest. Birgit Metzger presented catastrophe discourses and counter-strategies in the West German debate about Waldsterben, or forest death (1978–1986). The increasing damage to the forests, then traced to acid rain, touched a nerve in the German public,
prompting debate that utilized pertinent motifs relating to the glorification of the forest in German Romanticism, concepts of disease (AIDS, cancer), and the Second World War. Nonetheless, the protest against the alleged forest death turned out to be smaller than the anti-nuclear movement. Invoking the slogan “One world — one fight — one enemy” as her title, Reinhild Kreis then took up the anti-American protests in the Federal Republic of the early 1980s. Almost a decade after the demonstrations opposing the Vietnam War, the West German protest movement once again focused on American policies in the rearmament debate: the peace movement criticized American (and West German) armament policy, and other groups accused the U.S. of imperialism. Kreis highlighted the movement’s global dimensions and action-orientation. National Socialism, the Second World War, and the Vietnam War, especially, stood out as consistent targets for its criticism.

In their concluding remarks, Philipp Gassert and Martin Klimke observed that the peace movements were not “just about peace.” Rather, they ought to be regarded as part of a larger shift in the self-conception of society associated with the radical breaks, crises, and transformations of the 1960s–1980s. The peace movements of the 1970s and 1980s typically met with broad societal support (in contrast to “1968”), but they were also characterized by “professionalization and scientification of criticism.” Gassert and Klimke registered several gaps in research on these movements, including gender specific and transnational perspectives, the social composition of protest groups, cultural representations, and consideration of the Eastern European viewpoint.

In the concluding discussion, participants noted open questions, such as the language and symbolism of the protest movement (compared to the student movement of the 1960s), the role of the media in the debates, the relationship between the peace movement and the emerging culture of memory of the 1980s, and the significance of the conservative political camp. The atmosphere of the workshop was excellent, with constructive and fair discussion among participants, due in no small measure to the hospitality of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. In short, the workshop highlighted that its themes have now become one of the most dynamic fields of research in current contemporary history.

Philipp Baur (University of Augsburg)
THE STASI AND ITS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Workshop in Washington DC, April 28 and 30, 2010. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington and the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project. Conveners: Robert Gerald Livingston (GHI Washington), Mircea Munteanu (Woodrow Wilson Center), Christian Ostermann (Woodrow Wilson Center), and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI Washington). Participants: Jefferson Adams (Sarah Lawrence College), David Bathrick (University of Bremen), Gary Bruce (Waterloo University), Dirk Dörrenberg (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, retired), Benjamin Fischer (CIA History Staff, Washington DC, retired), Jens Gieseke (Zentrum für Zeitgeschichtliche Forschung Potsdam), Georg Herbstritt (Stasi Records Authority, Berlin), Konrad Jarausch (University of North Carolina), Oleg Kalugin (KGB, retired), Kristie Macrakis (Georgia Institute of Technology), Paul Maddrell (Aberystwyth University), Bernd Schäfer (Woodrow Wilson Center), Douglas Selvage (Stasi Records Authority, Berlin), Walter Süß (Stasi Records Authority, Berlin), and more than twenty additional audience members.

The German Historical Institute in Washington DC commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) with a variety of events. In 2009, a lecture series “GDR—What remains? East German Legacies in German History” and three conferences were organized: one on the East German economy during the twentieth century, a second—in cooperation with the Wende Museum in Los Angeles—on material culture and daily life in the GDR, and a third conference on the strategic and political implications of the collapse of the communist regime. Gerry Livingston, senior research fellow at the GHI Washington, suggested an additional event on the history of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA), the foreign intelligence service of the GDR, arguing that East Germany’s history could not be understood without an analysis of its repression and surveillance institutions, including the Ministry of State Security (commonly known as the Stasi) and its foreign intelligence service. Concerned that focusing exclusively on the Stasi and its legacy might lead to a one-dimensional idea of GDR history, we decided to integrate Stasi history into the context of GDR history more broadly. In organizing this workshop, the GHI found a strong and experienced partner in the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson Center. The four conveners, in cooperation with Benjamin Fischer, planned a program of four panels and a keynote lecture. Each
session combined American and European scholars who gave short presentations that generated intense discussions of different approaches and perspectives. Additionally, the event was open to an expert audience, including some active members of the Western intelligence services.

The workshop began with a public event held at the Goethe-Institut Washington. More than one hundred people came to watch “The Lives of Others,” German writer and director Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck’s Academy Award-winning movie from 2006. In his introduction, GHI Deputy Director Uwe Spiekermann lauded the actors’ performances and the film’s efforts to create an authentic atmosphere. From the perspective of historical research, however, he noted, the movie presented several questionable narratives, above all, the ahistorical figure of Stasi captain Gerd Wiesler and the misleading social lives of the Stasi representatives. In contrast, the distinguished film historian David Bathrick focused on the film’s authentic aura and its appeal to a broad audience, which has prompted many to learn more about GDR history and memory. Historical “errors,” he argued, must be evaluated in reference to the complex narrative structure of a movie—which is fundamentally different from historical analysis. Bathrick’s comment was followed by a long and intense discussion about the GDR’s and Stasi’s legacies. Nearly seventy people spent more than four hours at this event discussing such crucial topics of contemporary German history.

All the other workshop panels took place at the Woodrow Wilson Center. The first panel, “The Stasi and East German Society,” followed words of welcome by Uwe Spiekermann and Christian Ostermann. Jens Gieseke, tracing the arguments of his path-breaking volume *Staatssicherheit und Gesellschaft: Studien zum Herrschaftsalltag in der DDR (2007)*, presented a subtle analysis of the interactions of the Stasi, the SED state, and society. Criticizing the myth of an omnipresent Stasi, he provided detailed insights into East German everyday life and ordinary people’s images and perceptions of the organization. Ordinary citizens, he argued, knew both the limits of the dictatorship and their own powerlessness. Awareness of the Stasi shaped a specific form of social life that was tied to a long tradition of submission and should not be glorified as relative freedom in a “niche society.” Gary Bruce supported this line of argument with results from his case studies on
the two Brandenburg districts of Gransee and Perleberg. There, the Stasi worked effectively only with the support of broader parts of the local population. Denunciation was a form of participation in the dictatorship, especially during the early, formative phase of the GDR. Like Gieseke, Bruce emphasized the historical tradition of close interaction between society and intelligence services. In spite of extreme differences, both the Stasi and the Gestapo worked in an active and reactive way to gather information and win limited trust from society. In his comment, David Bathrick, who personally experienced Stasi observation, endorsed both presentations as part of a necessary historization of the Stasi. A comparative long-term perspective, he argued, not only sharpens our understanding of the Nazi and the GDR dictatorships but also identifies structural changes in the relationship between state institutions and society. As the number of people who were under surveillance grew in the 1970s, more subtle forms of repression were employed. The lively discussion focused on questions of periodization, the limits of comparisons, the unity of GDR society, and the changing nature of interactions between the Stasi and society.

The second panel, “The Stasi, the SED, and the GDR State,” was introduced by Walter Süß, who provided a precise overview of the Stasi’s history. The intelligence service was defined as the sword and shield of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the GDR’s communist party. It was to be a ruling force for the country, loyal to its political leadership. Trained in the tradition of the Soviet intelligence service, the Stasi had a dual loyalty to both the GDR and the Soviet Union, which caused many problems during its formative period. In addition to problems of professional standards, such conflicts led to the dismissal of early Stasi ministers Wilhelm Zaisser (1953) and Ernst Wollweber (1957). Under the leadership of Ernst Mielke, the Stasi was dominated by the SED, even though the scope for development was widened during the Honecker era. While Süß concentrated on long-term changes in Stasi-SED relations, Jefferson Adams analyzed the self-image of the East German intelligence service. Ninety percent of Stasi personnel were members of the SED and defined themselves as cadres of the communist state. They established advanced forms of Traditionspflege, or the cultivation of traditions, honoring both the achievements of the Soviet Cheka tradition and the successes in establishing a socialist German state. The collapse of the GDR was a deep disappointment for most Stasi officers, who were outraged, first of all, by the SED.
The plenary sessions of the morning were enriched by Konrad Jarausch’s keynote lecture, “The Stasi Legacy in Germany’s History.” Jarausch criticized the notion that GDR society was completely dominated by the Stasi and called for demythologizing the Stasi. According to Jarausch, the Stasi mystique was a crucial element of power in the GDR, allowing for rule by fear rooted in both knowledge and the lack thereof. By generating insecurity and uncertainty, the Stasi stabilized SED rule and ensured that the majority of the population would be obedient. After the end of the SED regime, “de-stasification” was a crucial issue in the East German citizens’ movement, and the preservation of most Stasi files was one of its greatest successes. Although the files allow nuanced analysis of the organization’s role in establishing and protecting the communist regime, it is clear that it had not infiltrated every realm of everyday life, as has often been maintained since 1989. In his lecture, Jarausch advanced a different view. The poisoned legacy of the Stasi had enormous private costs: many broken friendships, widespread knowledge of betrayal, and general distrust. The GDR was not a gigantic prison, but a place where the relationship between state and society was negotiated day by day, with serious social and cultural consequences. Such interaction and its consequences should be a key question on the research agenda, which should also include the historicization of the Stasi, the transformation of the Stasi Records Authority into a “normal” archive open to all scholars, and comparative studies of East and West, as well as of Germany’s democratic, communist, and National Socialist regimes.

The second half of the workshop was dedicated to the role of the Stasi in international relations. Paul Maddrell opened the third panel, “The HVA, the KGB, and the East,” with a paper analyzing the changing relations between the East German and Soviet intelligence services. Both were deployed as weapons in the Cold War. They used infiltration and subversion, and they exploited the large amount of migration to Western countries. At least until the erection of the Berlin Wall, the relationship between the two organizations was hierarchical or even colonial, causing a crisis of identity on the German side. Later, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA, the Stasi’s foreign intelligence branch) became ever more emancipated from the Soviets and grew quite successful at collecting information on political, economic, and military issues. Mainly interested in military information, the KGB used the HVA as a tactical tool in the Cold War. It utilized HVA information to instigate several
political scandals in Western countries, but it could not bring about major political change in West Germany. Structural problems in the planning system limited the use of economic information, however, because some things could not be voiced. Both the KGB and HVA grew rapidly, which changed their identities in the 1970s and 1980s. Intensified activities resulted in big successes in developing countries, but these successes did not contribute to the structural changes necessary for the survival of these communist regimes.

Douglas Selvage offered a detailed empirical analysis of the cooperation between the HVA and the other Eastern-bloc intelligence services during the Helsinki process from 1972 to 1989. Based on the Stasi’s Sira database, he was able to show which GDR institutions received what kind of information, how the HVA’s information exchange with other Eastern-bloc intelligence services worked, and what the results of the HVA’s special relations with the KGB were. Ben Fischer characterized the HVA as a first-class intelligence service marked by “Slavic ruthlessness and Teutonic efficiency.” He gave precise information on the size, targets, methods, and techniques of East Germany’s foreign intelligence services, which comprised no less than 80 percent of all the intelligence forces of the Warsaw Pact, excluding the Soviet Union. He also analyzed Western countermeasures. In his comment, former KGB general Oleg Kalugin stressed the immense size of the KGB (nearly 500,000 employees) and the Stasi (more than 100,000). He described top Stasi officials Erich Mielke and Markus Wolf as “pragmatic idealists” who wanted to create a new German society and lived in a “world of dreams.”

Such assessments were subject to considerable debate in the last panel on “The HVA and the West.” Dirk Dörrenberg, former director of counterespionage and protective security at the West German Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, claimed that West German intelligence was well informed about the structures and targets of Eastern espionage and was, therefore, with few exceptions, quite successful in protecting crucial information, especially military and economic secrets; there was “no effect at all,” no destabilization of the FRG, and no harm to West German industry. Dörrenberg also stressed the differences between the HVA and the West German intelligence services, mainly the lack of legal control of the former. Georg Herbstritt, by contrast, characterized the HVA as one of the most successful intelligence services of the twentieth century. He
called for a detailed analysis of the different time periods. Although the HVA’s work was not affected by the erection of the Berlin Wall, the deep social and cultural changes in both German societies that accompanied this event made placing spies in the West more and more complicated. In the late 1970s, HVA chief Markus Wolf himself judged the HVA’s activities as too slow and inflexible. Although 1982 was celebrated internally as the most effective year of the HVA’s work, stagnation and even decline marked the 1980s. Therefore, Stasi frustration and disillusion were part of the peaceful revolution of 1989. In the panel’s final paper, Kristie Macrakis presented the results of her research on scientific and economic espionage. She advocated a nuanced view of the HVA’s work: numerous small successes could be listed, but in the long run this did not help the East. The power of scientific secrets was overestimated because scientific progress was increasingly the product of large-scale research and development focused on small improvements rather than big scientific breakthroughs. Commonly used definitions of “success,” she argued, must therefore be called into question.

In sum, the workshop discussed a highly-charged political topic in a serious and analytical manner. Nearly all participants agreed on the need to historicize and demystify the Stasi. To this end, historians must integrate the role of the intelligence service into a broader perspective. One thing that is needed is a social history of the Stasi that focuses on the interaction of the Stasi, the state, and society in a “participatory dictatorship.” More generally, it is necessary to transform the history of intelligence from the niche topic of a handful of specialists into an integral part of the history of international and transnational relations.

Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
16TH TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR:
GERMAN HISTORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Seminar at the Jena Center for 20th-Century History of the University of Jena, May 12–15, 2010. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington and the BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Norbert Frei (Jena Center), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Faculty Mentors: Greg Eghigian (Pennsylvania State University), Atina Grossmann (Cooper Union), Margit Szöllösi-Janze (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), Michael Wildt (Humboldt Universität Berlin). Participants: Anja Bertsch (Universität Konstanz), Matthew B. Conn (University of Iowa), Peter Engelke (Georgetown University), Georg von Graevenitz (European University Institute, Florence), Stephen Gross (University of California, Berkeley), Erin Hochman (University of Toronto), Anke Hoffstadt (Heinrich-Heine-Universität, Düsseldorf), Elizabeth Harrington Lambert (Indiana University), Marcel vom Lehn (Freie Universität Berlin), Katrin Schreiter (University of Pennsylvania), Daniel Stahl (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena), Maren Tribukait (Universität Bielefeld), Sarah Thomsen Vierra (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Larissa Wegner (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg), Frank Werner (Universität Bielefeld), Ryan Zroka (University of California, San Diego).

The 16th Transatlantic Seminar brought together sixteen doctoral students from North America and Germany who are working on dissertations in twentieth-century German history. The students submitted papers on their dissertation projects ahead of time so that the seminar could be fully devoted to discussion. Each panel began with two comments from fellow students.

The seminar’s first panel was devoted to the First World War and featured two papers that presented what one commentator called “revisions of revisionist history.” Larissa Wegner’s paper, “Auf Freiwilligkeit kann nicht gerechnet werden: Zwangsarbeit und Deportationen im besetzten Nordfrankreich, 1914–18,” sought to normalize a war that historians have recently de-normalized by challenging the “total war” thesis. Her close examination of forced labor and deportation during the German occupation of Northern France aimed to demonstrate that these policies did not reflect a process of totalization but significant internal tensions and ruptures. Ryan Zroka’s paper, “The Bitter End: A Social History of the German Army in Defeat, 1918,” was conceived as a contribution to
the debate over the defeat of the German army in 1918. By arguing that the German army remained intact until the end of the war, Zroka challenged a long line of historical interpretations that refuted the stab-in-the-back-legend by demonstrating that the German army had fallen apart. Zroka’s explanation for the army’s cohesion emphasized internal social processes. As social bonds among soldiers broke down, he argued, individual opposition to the war was prevented from turning into collective resistance.

The second panel examined the intersection of economic history and international relations in the interwar period. While most of the historiography on the interwar period has stressed national competition and the breakdown of international cooperation, both papers challenged this picture by arguing for the importance of transnational cooperation. Stephen Gross’s paper, “The Culture of Trade: The Weimar Republic’s Cultural Diplomacy and Area Studies in Southeastern Europe,” argued that, starting in the late 1920s, commercial elites in Berlin and Saxony changed the nature of German cultural diplomacy by using it to promote exports in Central and Southeastern Europe. In 1929, these elites founded the Mitteleuropa-Institut in Dresden, one of a number of private organizations that sought to reorient German trade to Central and Southeastern Europe. Georg von Graevenitz’s paper, “Fluchtpunkt Europa: Die Commission Internationale d’Agriculture und die Planung des globalen Agrarmarktes, 1889–1933,” examined the founding and development of a transnational agrarian organization whose membership consisted exclusively of European agrarian associations. By lobbying the League of Nations for a policy of international market intervention, this organization succeeded in dissolving the League’s dogma of free trade and realigning its policies with European agrarian interests. As a Europeanized international system of market intervention established itself, internationalism and economic nationalism ceased to be conceptual opposites.

The third panel featured two papers on the political meanings of soldiers’ experiences at the front. Anke Hoffstadt’s paper, “Frontgemeinschaft—Gemeinschaft der Front?” analyzed the relationship between the Stahlhelm and the National Socialists, arguing that the growing gap between the two organizations’ respective levels of popularity resulted from a difference in their use of the war experience. Despite great similarities in political ideas and habitus, the Stahlhelm lost out to the rising Nazi party, because the Stahlhelm’s promotion of
an exclusive *Frontgemeinschaft* of World War I veterans prevented the successful integration of a younger generation. Frank Werner’s paper, “Noch härter, noch kälter, noch mitleidloser: Soldatische Männlichkeit im Vernichtungskrieg, 1941–1944,” examined military notions of masculinity and their effect on German soldiers’ behavior. On the basis of soldiers’ letters, Werner investigated how masculinity functioned as a motive for taking part in the war and mass crimes. The category of gender, he argued, served not only as a concept of identity, order, and distinction, but also as a conveyor of political meanings that normalized and naturalized the ideologies of war.

The fourth panel was dedicated to sex and crime in the Weimar Republic. Both papers focused on the construction of cultural norms and the contested boundaries between private and public. Matthew Conn’s paper “Sex on Trial: Epistemologies of Justice and Rethinking Sexuality in 1920s Courtrooms” argued that, in the early 1920s, German courtrooms witnessed a crucial shift as presiding judges began to consider a greater number of sexual acts illegal under article 175, which targeted homosexual acts. By focusing on the rhetorical strategies employed by attorneys, judges, expert witnesses, and defendants, Conn investigated the often complimentary functions of expert and tacit knowledge in court. Maren Tribukait’s paper “Die Visualisierung von Verbrechen in den Massenmedien der Weimarer Republik,” which forms part of a comparative project on visual representations of crime in Germany and the United States, examined how Weimar’s boulevard newspapers and illustrated magazines visualized crime and what kinds of reactions these images provoked. The highly critical reception of crime-related press photographs, she argued, reveals a fear that such images held a nefarious fascination for the masses, an attitude that reflected a more general discomfort with the medium of photography.

The fifth and sixth panels were devoted to *Vergangenheitspolitik*, that is, the relationship among nation, memory, and history. Erin Hochman’s paper, “Staging the Nation: The Grossdeutsch Idea in the Weimar and First Austrian Republics,” examined how commemorations for Beethoven, Schubert, and Goethe in the late 1920s and early 1930s became key sites for discussing a *grossdeutsch* vision of the German nation and demanding *Anschluss*. Socialists, liberals, and conservatives alike participated in these celebrations, demonstrating that trans-border German nationalism and the project of a Greater Germany were not simply right-wing phenomena in the Weimar era.
Marcel vom Lehn’s paper, “Gelehrte oder Intellektuelle? Deutsche und italienische Historiker zwischen wissenschaftlicher und öffentlicher Praxis, 1943/45–1960,” compared the historical analyses of Nazism and Fascism that West German and Italian historians offered the general public and the resulting tensions between public activities and academic research. Although historians in both countries contributed to a normative distancing from dictatorship in both postwar societies, their desire to shape public opinion affected their choices of research topics and interpretations. Daniel Stahl’s paper, “‘Nazijagd’ in Südamerika: Transatlantische Vergangenheitspolitik und die geflohnen NS-Täter,” examined the efforts undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s to bring to justice Nazi perpetrators who had fled to South America. The modest success of these efforts, Stahl argued, resulted from the convergence of two developments: the democratization of several Latin American states and the internationalization of Holocaust commemoration. Finally, Elizabeth Harrington Lambert’s paper, “Zwischen Goethe und Gedenkstätte: ‘The Best and Worst Place in German History’ as European Culture Capital, Weimar 1999,” explored the construction of German national identity and cultural heritage in the city of Weimar. Through the lens of Weimar’s preparations to assume the mantle of “European City of Culture” in 1999, Lambert traced the transformation of representations of German Classicism and the Nazi past against the backdrop of German unification and European integration, illustrating how national identity and cultural heritage have been politicized, used, and abused in the postwar and post-1989 eras.

The seventh panel was devoted to the economic and social history of the two postwar Germanies. Sarah Thomsen Vierra’s paper, “Settling In: Turkish Guest Workers, West German Businesses, and the Workplace,” examined the role that Turkish guest workers’ workplace experiences played in their settlement in West Germany. The presence of Turkish Gastarbeiter and the resulting negotiations and circumventions, she argued, created spaces within West German businesses that mediated their permanent settlement, even as the companies’ treatment of guest workers also helped set the stage for their status as permanently foreign. Changing the focus from worker to industrial product, Katrin Schreiter’s paper, “Limiting National Aesthetics: The Triangle of Design, Politics, and Production in Cold War East and West Germany,” explored the economic and political structures that constrained the implementation of official design aesthetics in the two German states. Both states
maneuvered within triangles of design, politics, and production that increasingly overlapped, especially under the influence of European market forces. Despite the rhetoric of cultural superiority over the “other” Germany, in which both states engaged, Schreiter argued, the result of this process was a convergence of aesthetics that ultimately forfeited a distinct national design.

The eighth and final panel explored different forms of “alternative” travel in West Germany. Peter Engelke’s paper, “The City, the Car, and the Bicycle in West Germany, 1960–1990,” examined the history of bicycling in West Germany. After long being marginalized by the automobile, during the 1970s urban cycling experienced a resurgence due to the combined effects of the environmental movement, high oil prices, changing cultural norms, and the activism of cycling advocates. Moving from urban cycling to long-distance travel, Anja Bertsch’s paper, “Gegen-Bewegung: Distinktions-Erfahrung und transnationale Vergemeinschaftung im Alternativreisen westdeutscher Jugendlicher, 1960er bis 1980er Jahre,” investigated the history of “alternative” travel among West German youth. Alternative travel, Bertsch argued, allowed travelers not only to develop left-alternative identities but to experience foreign countercultures firsthand and thus contributed to the counterculture’s self-image as a transnational phenomenon.

The final discussion noted that a preponderance of the papers examined the interwar period and West Germany, while relatively few dealt with the Nazi period and East Germany; and that a remarkable proportion of the projects were comparative or transnational. It was also observed that very few papers sought to explain the rise of Nazism. Instead, Nazism figured as one factor among others in papers that were focused on other questions. Clearly, twentieth-century German history is no longer being written as the prehistory and aftermath of Nazism. While this turn away from the established master narrative can be disorienting, most participants seemed to agree that the papers made a strong case for the contingency of German history and demonstrated that this approach can be extremely productive for understanding twentieth-century German history. The seminar’s discussions were characterized by an ideal combination of intellectual rigor and collegiality, which made the seminar an exceptionally rewarding experience.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
ARCHIVAL SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY, 2010


The GHI’s eighteenth archival summer seminar took place in Germany from June 14 to 25, 2010. This year, the group visited research institutions and met with archivists and scholars in Speyer, Düsseldorf, Koblenz, Cologne, and Weimar. The aim of the seminar, as always, was to introduce American doctoral students of German history to a wide range of research institutions in Germany and to support them in preparing for prospective dissertation research in German archives and libraries. In the first part of the seminar, participants learned to read documents in old German handwriting. The second part consisted of visits to local, state, and federal archives and libraries to allow participants to familiarize themselves with the German archival system and to learn the basics of what German archivists call Archivkunde. The group also met with two scholars to discuss research methods and receive advice about the practical side of archival work.

As in former years, the seminar started off at the Landesarchiv Rheinland-Pfalz with a one-week course in paleography led by
Walter Rummel and Franz Maier. Under their guidance, the group learned to read documents from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. Besides providing an introduction to the evolution of German handwriting and the technical aspects of paleography, the course also covered the basics of Quellenkunde, source criticism, as well as a tour of the Landesarchiv. In the afternoons, students had the chance to explore Speyer with its famous Romanic Dom and Judenhof, both dating from the eleventh century.

On one of the afternoons, the participants met with Isabella Löhr (University of Heidelberg) to discuss practical aspects of archival research. An expert on international cooperation and the globalization of intellectual property rights in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Löhr offered valuable advice on how to prepare for archival visits, make the most out of the time spent in the archives, and optimize note taking. She encouraged participants to use databases, both as digital resources and as tools for efficiently organizing their own findings.

Following the paleography course, the group spent a day at the Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW), Abteilung Rheinland, in Düsseldorf. Archivists Uwe Zuber and Kathrin Pilger explained the archive’s organization, provided an overview of its holdings, and offered helpful advice on a number of research questions. Of special value was a practical exercise in working with archival files. Since the Landesarchiv NRW is famous for its large holding of Gestapo files from Düsseldorf, the archivists used some of these documents to give the students a feel for the kinds of information archival material can either offer or lack.

At the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, President Hartmut Weber kindly welcomed the participants. During the morning session, archivist Thekla Kleindienst introduced them to Archivkunde, including the “secret language” of symbols and colors used to communicate between different departments, subdivisions, and staff members. This will undoubtedly prove valuable to the students when they work with government documents. In the afternoon, the group was given a tour of the archive. Oliver Sander acquainted them with the Bundesarchiv’s digital photo archive, which offers access to a continuously growing collection of more than 11 million photographs, posters, and aerial photographs. The digital archive cooperates with Wikipedia and can be accessed through www.bild.bundesarchiv.de.
That evening, in a spontaneous event, the group discussed the individual research projects of three participants who volunteered to present their dissertation topics. Sharing in this semi-formal atmosphere, these participants received thoughtful feedback and were exposed to diverse methodological perspectives. All agreed that the presentation of dissertation projects should become a regular part of the seminar in the future.

On the last day in the Rhineland, Joachim Oepen welcomed the group at the Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln. He explained the *Provenienzprinzip*, the principle of provenance, which is crucial to understanding the organization of many European archives. It is especially important concerning historical developments that led to administrative changes on the regional and state levels. For example, in the early nineteenth century, secularization resulted in the break-up of Church archives’ holdings. These were then transferred to state and local repositories, creating a complicated network of archives. Something similar happened in the postwar era, when new states and bishoprics were created. Following this theoretical lesson, the students did a hands-on exercise, working with finding aids to locate files of potential interest for a specific research question, in this case, the National Socialist confiscation of a particular Church property.

The third and last station of the seminar was Weimar. Here the group visited the Gedenkstätte Buchenwald, where Ronald Hirte led participants on an excellent tour of the grounds. Afterward, archivist Sabine Stein presented the site’s archival holdings. Since the SS destroyed most of the concentration camp’s documents at the end of the war, sources are scattered and incomplete, but the researchers at Buchenwald are cooperating with numerous national and international institutions to assemble as much information about Buchenwald and its many satellite camps as possible.

The last day of the seminar was devoted to the Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek (HAAB) in Weimar. In the morning, Roland Bärwinkel led the group through the rococo reading room and library, which, though destroyed by a fire in 2004, were restored and reopened in 2008. Focusing on the exquisite historic building and a modern addition across the street, the tour highlighted the outstanding working conditions offered by the HAAB. Afterward, the group met the library’s director, Michael Knoche, who kindly took the time to talk about the library’s work. Afterwards
Johannes Mangei gave a lecture on the salvaging and replacing of books damaged or lost in the fire. Hans Zimmermann then presented the journal *Simplicissimus*, which has now been digitalized and made available for online research by the library (www.simplicissimus.info). Finally, Annett Carius-Kiehne discussed the issue of *NS-Raubgut*—in this case, books stolen from libraries and individuals during the Nazi period—and the HAAB’s efforts to find and return these books to their rightful owners.

In the afternoon, the seminar group met with Christiane Sibille, a specialist on the history of the League of Nations who works at the University of Basel. Sibille introduced the group to online German research tools and networks for researchers, providing an overview of journal databases, digitization projects, archival web sites, and communication platforms for historians. She also enabled the participants to prepare for their research trips as much as possible beforehand.

The GHI organizers would like to extend their heartfelt thanks to all the individuals and organizations that contributed to the 2010 Archival Summer Seminar in Germany. An announcement of the program for the 2011 seminar can be found on the GHI web site at http://www.ghi-dc.org/seminars.

Ines Prodöhl (GHI)
NEW GHI PUBLICATIONS


Monica Black, *Death in Berlin: From Weimar to Divided Germany* (2010)

Christoph Mauch and Kiran Klaus Patel, eds., *The United States and Germany during the Twentieth Century: Competition and Convergence* (2010)

2. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)


3. Studies in German History (Berghahn Books)


4. GHI Reference Guides


Readers who would like to obtain a copy of this Reference Guide free of charge should send an email to hester@ghi-dc.org.
LIBRARY REPORT

We are happy to announce the GHI library’s subscription to the online database *International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences* (IBZ). This database is the leading international and interdisciplinary bibliographic reference documenting academic periodical literature in the humanities, social sciences, and related fields. It covers publications in more than forty languages; more than 3.2 million journal articles from 10,700 journals are listed. The database is updated monthly.

The library also added more than 150 new titles to its collection on business and consumer history and will continue to expand its holdings in these research fields. The library gladly accepts any suggestions or recommendations for acquisitions. Simply send an e-mail to the librarian with your comments and suggestions. The library also acquired many issues of *Die Abendschule*, a biweekly German-American newspaper published in St. Louis from the mid-nineteenth century until 1940. Our holdings span the years 1904 to 1940. It is a great primary source for anyone studying German Americans in the St. Louis area. More detailed information about *Die Abendschule* is provided in the article immediately following this Library Report.

Further acquisitions deserving special mention include *The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos 1933–1945*, edited by Geoffrey P. Megargee, vol. 1 in a series of seven volumes, which will provide the first comprehensive survey of all known Nazi camps and ghettos; *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States*, in three volumes, which offers a wide-ranging survey of the history of economic activity in the United States; *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, in three volumes, a comprehensive, international history of the conflict that dominated world politics in the twentieth century.

The library also received a major donation from Professor Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), who kindly donated his microfilm collection of newspapers published in Freiburg im Breisgau during the First World War. Readers can now consult, scan, and print articles from the *Breisgauer Zeitung* (1914–1918), *Freiburger Bote* (1914–1918), *Freiburger Tageblatt* (1914–1918), *Freiburger Tagespost* (1914–1918), *Freiburger Zeitung* (1913–1919), and *Volkswacht Freiburg* (1911–1918) on the microfilm reader in our Reading Room. Also, Professor Dirk Hoerder (Arizona State University) donated the journals *International Migration Review*, 1973 to 2009, and *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 1980 to 2008. We are most grateful to both individuals for donating these important additions to our library.
We would also like to express our gratitude to the following people and institutions who donated books to the GHI library: Hartmut Berghoff, Edwin Black, William P. Bradley, Dorothee Brantz, Bundesarchiv, Deutsche Botschaft Washington DC, Cambridge University Press, Timothy Duskin, Ernest F. Fisher, Dagmar Herzog, Martin Klimke, Stephan H. Lindner, Christof Mauch, Charles Meyer, Georg F. Müller, Minerva Institute for German History at the University of Tel Aviv, Anke Ortlepp, Ines Prodöhl, Anne Purkiss, Der Spiegel, Stadtbibliothek Duisburg, Corinna Unger, Volkswagen Stiftung, and Richard F. Wetzell.

**HOME VERSUS HEIMAT? ASPECTS OF IDENTITY IN THE LUTHERAN GERMAN-AMERICAN NEWSPAPER DIE ABENDSCHULE**

The GHI Library recently purchased a set of original copies of the biweekly German-American newspaper *Die Abendschule: Ein illustriertes Familienblatt*, covering the years from 1904 to 1940. This article examines some of the questions that *Die Abendschule* may answer as a historical source. How did German Americans learn to regard their “old home” or Heimat from both a temporal as well as a spatial distance? *Die Abendschule*, founded in 1854 in Buffalo and later transferred to St. Louis by its longtime publisher Louis Lange, aimed to serve the needs of a specific group of American citizens: German immigrants and Americans of German descent. Right from the start, *Die Abendschule* was designed as a family paper that provided information, entertainment, tips for everyday life, and moral guidance. The latter was of particular importance to the publishers and editors, who had their roots in Missouri’s Lutheran-German milieu. Seen from a favorable contemporary perspective, *Die Abendschule* was a “unique” publication that combined all these topics like no other paper “in the world.”¹ *Die Abendschule* is a valuable historical source that provides illuminating insights into the socio-political and cultural framework of the Lutheran German-American community, how it saw itself and its place in larger American society.

The newspaper was founded in 1854 and was soon bought by Louis Lange. This ambitious businessman² transformed the paper from something small and limited into a newspaper that was well known among Lutheran German-Americans in Missouri, with more than 59,000 copies sold in 1914.³ *Die Abendschule* played a key role in the German community. Throughout the paper’s existence the editors did not tire of emphasizing


² The publisher’s personal story as a self-made entrepreneur and the first 50 years have been told elsewhere and in far more detail. See Brent O. Peterson, *Popular Narratives and Ethnic Identity: Literature and Community in "Die Abendschule"* (Ithaca, 1991).

its moral agenda and normative guidelines for “true Christian”—meaning Lutheran—believers. This, of course, already points to one of the limits of Die Abendschule as a historical source on the German community. Although the editors stressed the journal’s German identity, its stance as an exclusively Lutheran publication clearly distanced it from other religious denominations, especially Catholicism. A good example of this attitude was the special edition published on Reformation Day in October 1914, which featured strong anti-Catholic rhetoric and was heavily influenced by the war in Europe, presenting reformer Martin Luther as a just warrior against corruption and manipulation within the Catholic Church.4

Die Abendschule was divided into different sections designed to appeal to the interests of different family members. While the first section, titled Aus der Zeit—Für die Zeit (“from the times—for the times”) covered mostly political and social news, there were also other genres such as serialized novels, adventures, and short stories. Another section, Frauenfließ (“women’s diligence”), targeted female readers. It contained useful tips on handicrafts, housekeeping, education, and cooking and thus represented a fairly traditional and paternalistic understanding of women’s roles. This understanding was also stressed by the pictorial language of the journal. The Frauenfließ section was occasionally headed by classical illustrations referring to women as housekeepers who guard the flame and thus secure the family’s well-being (see Figure 1).5 Likewise, since the products advertised in Die Abendschule were predominantly related to health and household, all advertisements were placed in the Frauenfließ section on the assumption that women were the decision makers for the domestic sphere.

The character of the advertisements changed over time. While issues from the first two decades of the twentieth century featured fancy color advertisements for beverages from Anheuser-Busch and Coca-Cola (both trying to stress the healthful qualities of their products, see Figure 2), starting in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the ads focused on products that aimed at senior citizens. Products like Fornis Alpenkräuter and Canadian thistle tea for bladder problems were among the most consistent advertisers. The most striking feature throughout the entire run of publication is the

5 “Frauenfließ,” Die Abendschule 55.16 (February 2, 1909): 205.
translation of advertisements into German. American companies obviously did not want to miss out on potential customers and thus translated their ad copy into German.

The articles in the news section “Aus der Zeit—Für die Zeit” and the short news entries in the section “Buntes Allerlei” reflected the political orientation of the journal and showed how the editors wanted Abendschule readers to regard their home country, the United States, as well as their place of descent, Germany. The journal displayed a strong sense of dual patriotism. The editors sympathized with most of the decisions made by the German political elite, especially the royal family, above all Emperor Wilhelm II, who became an idealized figure as the sole guarantor of the rise of the German nation-state. While the editors tended to idealize the German Empire, they took an extremely critical stance when it came to U.S. politics, which became especially clear during World War I. The paper’s supposed dedication to Lutheran religiosity notwithstanding, the first issue after the war’s outbreak was an exercise in heavy-handed pro-German propaganda. Until the United States entered the war in March 1917, the paper featured detailed reports on military mobilization, the progress of the war, and the reactions of the public, which, however, increasingly echoed a feeling of duty towards Germany rather than any sense of enthusiasm. The United States’ entry into the war on the side of the Entente caused a rupture in the reporting on the war. Torn between loyalties to the United States and Germany, Die Abendschule joined the American call to arms—but not without criticizing the American decision to enter the war and not without a display of deep regret. Ironically, the justification for supporting the American troops and war effort was based on the same ideal of “a German man’s loyalty” and patriotism—but the object of patriotism was now the United States. As German-Americans had to take sides amidst a mood of anti-German sentiments in the American public, the Abendschule came to stress loyalty to the United States, whose “government decisions have to be followed as good citizens.”

During the newspaper’s last years, the 1930s, a shift can be detected. Even after the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933, the paper remained generally well-disposed toward Germany, but it viewed Hitler’s chancellorship...
The tenor of the Abendschule’s German coverage after 1933 was certainly much less enthusiastic than the almost unconditional, pro-German stand taken during World War I. Whereas during that war Die Abendschule had supported Germany’s cause as defensive and just, in 1939 the paper withdrew from all reporting on war events, and the editors explicitly turned Die Abendschule into a place of retreat—or denial. While the paper did not contain any overt anti-Semitic propaganda, the Nazi regime’s anti-Semitism was not attacked either. By the time the newspaper ceased publication in June 1940, however, the editors had come to identify with the United States, turning their backs on the political and human disaster taking place in their Heimat.

Björn Blass

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**STAFF CHANGES**

**Barbara Amarasingham**, retired from her position as GHI receptionist at the end of April 2010 after twelve years of service.

**Carola Dietze**, who joined the GHI as a Research Fellow in November 2006, left the Institute in April 2010 to take up a position as Akademische Rätin (auf Zeit) at the Justus-Liebig University in Giessen.

**Marcus Gräser** joined the Institute as a Deputy Director in August 2010. From 1996 to 2009 he held positions as Research Fellow and Research Associate at the University of Frankfurt’s Center for North American Studies. In 2009-10 he was a visiting professor, substituting for the chair of American history at Heidelberg University. He received his Ph.D. in 1993 and completed his Habilitation in 2005. His main areas of research are American and European history, history of the welfare state, urban history, and the history of historiography. In 2008, Gräser was awarded the David Thelen Prize of the Organization of American Historians for the best article in American history published in a foreign language. He is presently preparing the volume on North America for the series “Neue Fischer Weltgeschichte.”

**Andreas Joch** joined the Institute in August 2010 as a Doctoral Fellow in Residence. He is working on the research project “Transatlantic Perspectives: Europe in the Eyes of European Immigrants to the United States, 1940–1980”. Joch studied modern and medieval history at the University of Giessen and University College Cork. His main areas of interest are modern urban and migration history. His current research focuses on processes of transatlantic exchange in the fields of architecture and urban planning.
Katharina Kloock, who joined the GHI as Head Librarian in June 2001, left the GHI in May 2009 to manage the library of Anglo-American history at the University of Cologne in Germany.

Corinna Ludwig joined the Institute as a Doctoral Fellow in Residence in August 2010. She is working on the research project “Transatlantic Perspectives: Europe in the Eyes of European Immigrants to the United States, 1940–1980.” She studied Economic and Social History, German Language and Literature as well as Medieval and Modern History at Göttingen University. Her research interests include transatlantic history as well as business history and migration history. Her Ph.D. project focuses on German entrepreneurs in the American market after the Second World War.

Luzie Nahr, who worked at the GHI as a Library Associate since November 1988, retired from her position at the end of April 2010.

Anke Ortlepp, Research Fellow since April 2005, left the GHI at the end of April 2010 to take up the professorship in American Cultural History at the Amerika-Institut of the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich.

Barbara Reiterer joined the Institute as a Doctoral Fellow in Residence in September 2010. She is working on the project “Transatlantic Perspectives: Europe in the Eyes of European Immigrants to the United States, 1940–1980.” She holds a Master’s degree in sociology from Vienna University, where she also worked as a researcher and project administrator on topics in the history of sociology as well as social gerontology. After spending the academic year 2006-07 as a research fellow at the Center for Austrian Studies at the University of Minnesota, she began her current Ph.D. studies in the Program in the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine at the University of Minnesota. Her teaching activities both in Austria and at the University of Minnesota have covered a broad range of topics including the history of empirical social research, the history of biology, science and American culture, and the history of technology. Reiterer’s primary research interests revolve around the intersection of the history of the social sciences, gender and science, and the history of migration, particularly in the twentieth century.

Miriam Rürup joined the Institute as a Research Fellow in September 2010. From 2007 to 2010, she worked as Assistent at the chair of Professor Bernd Weisbrod in the History Department of the University of Göttingen and previously at Göttingen’s DFG-Graduiertenkolleg Generationengeschichte. She studied history, sociology, and cultural anthropology at the Universities of Göttingen, Tel Aviv, and Berlin, and worked for the Foundation “Topography of Terror” in Berlin, the
Rosenzweig Center in Jerusalem, and the Simon Dubnow Institute in Leipzig. Her dissertation on the history of German-Jewish student fraternities in Imperial and Weimar Germany, supervised by Wolfgang Benz and Dan Diner and submitted at the Technical University of Berlin, was edited as *Ehrensache* (Göttingen: Wallstein) in 2008. She also recently edited a collection of essays on the use of the concept “diaspora” in modern and contemporary history (*Praktiken der Differenz: Diasporakulturen in der Zeitgeschichte* [Göttingen, 2009]). Her current research project is a history of statelessness in Europe after the First and Second World Wars. Through case studies, this project analyzes both the supranational level of discussion about the problem of statelessness as well as the national implementations of those decisions “on the spot.”

**Mark R. Stoneman** joined the Institute in February 2010 as an editor. His primary responsibility is the GHI’s new series, *Worlds of Consumption*. He earned his B.A. in history at Dartmouth College, his M.A. in history and political science at the University of Augsburg, and his Ph.D. in modern European history at Georgetown University. His dissertation is entitled “Wilhelm Groener, Officering, and the Schlieffen Plan” (2006), and he has published articles on the Imperial German officer corps as well as the interactions between Bavarian soldiers and French civilians in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71). Besides studying the Kaiserreich, he is interested in modern European history more generally, especially social history, cultural history, and historiography. He also teaches history part-time at George Mason University.

**Corinna Unger**, who joined the institute as a Research Fellow in November 2005, left the GHI in July 2010 to take up the professorship in European History at Jacobs University Bremen.

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**RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS**

**Postdoc-Stipendium für Nordamerikanische Geschichte**

**Sebastian Jobs**, Universität Rostock

“‘Uncertain Knowledge’: A History of Rumors and Gossip in the American South, 1783–1861”

**Fellowship in Economic and Social History**

**Mario Daniels**, Leibniz Universität Hannover

“Economic and Industrial Espionage in Germany, the U.S., and Great Britain, 1880–1990”
Fellowship in the History of Consumption

David Kuchenbuch, Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg

Horner Fellows

Liza Candidi, University of Udine
“Heimat-Transfer. Wurzeln, Sprache und Kultur in den deutsch-amerikanischen Kinder- und Jugendbüchern”

Randall Donaldson, Loyala University
“German Emigration into the Free State: The History of German-American Communities in Maryland”

Miron Mislin, Technische Universität Berlin
“Entwicklung der Industriearchitektur in Pennsylvania, 1890–1930”

Postdoctoral Fellowships

Tobias Hof, Institut für Zeitgeschichte München
“Galeazzo Ciano: Eine biographische Studie über Faschismus und italienische Außenpolitik, 1903–1944”

Claudia Kemper, Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte Hamburg
“Ärzte in der anti-atomaren Friedensbewegung der 1980er Jahre – die deutsche Sektion der IPPNW”

Rüdiger Ritter, Freie Universität Berlin
“Kalter Krieg in der Musik: Jazz und sozialistisches Massenlied im Radio, 1945–1970”

Doctoral Fellow in the History of African Americans and Germans/Germany

Paul Farber, University of Michigan
“Where is the Berlin Wall? Boundaries of Freedom in American Culture”

Doctoral Fellowship in International Business History

Stefan Link, Harvard University
“A Fordist International: Illiberal Modernism and the Politics of Production in the USA, Germany, and the Soviet Union between the World Wars”
Doctoral Fellowships

Ewald Blocher, Rachel Carson Center, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
“Konstruktion des modernen Ägypten: Experten, Staudämme und die Transformation des Nils von 1882 bis 1970”

Juliane Frinken, Freie Universität Berlin
“From the Frontline of the Cold War: Die amerikanischen Botschafter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955–1990”

Martin Holler, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
“Sowjetische Roma unter Stalin und Hitler”

Felix Krämer, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
“Geschlecht, Religion und soziokulturelle Ordnung in den USA, 1969–1989”

Eva Neumann, Philipps-Universität Marburg

Frauke Scheffler, Universität zu Köln
“American Indian Policy, United States Imperialism in the Philippines, and the Formation of Race, 1890–1914”

Lisa Seibert, Carnegie Mellon University
“Saints, Sisters and the State: Women and Religion in East and West Germany, 1945–1975”

Hubert Seliger, Universität Augsburg
“‘Die andere Seite’: Die Nürnberger Strafverteidiger und ihr Wirken in der Bundesrepublik bis zum Ende der sechziger Jahre”

Doctoral Fellows in Residence: Transatlantic Perspectives

Andreas Joch, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen

Corinna Ludwig, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
“Bridging the Atlantic Gap: German Entrepreneurs in the United States after the Second World War”

Barbara Reiterer, University of Minnesota
“Traveling between Worlds: Gender, Exile, and the Framing of Social Science Careers in Austria and the United States, 1940–1980”
GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR, SPRING-SUMMER 2010

January 13  William Clarence-Smith (University of London)
The ‘Battle for Rubber’ and the Second World War: The Impact of a Global Conflict on a Commodity Chain, 1931–1945

January 20  Stephan H. Lindner (Universität der Bundeswehr München)
Getting Inside IG Farben: Problematik und Chancen der Nutzung von Unternehmensarchiven und persönlichen Nachlässen
February 17  Jan Logemann (GHI)  
State, Society, and Space: Transatlantic Differences in Shaping Postwar Mass Consumption in West Germany and the United States

February 24  Natascha van der Zwaan (New School for Social Research)  

March 3  Peter Hoeres (Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen)  

March 31  Cornelia Wilhelm (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)  
Deutsche Rabbiner im amerikanischen Exil, 1933–1989

April 21  Ariane Leendertz (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)  
The Postindustrial Challenge: American-European Relations and American Views of Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s

April 28  Claudia Siebrecht (Trinity College Dublin)  
Colonial Concentration Camp Systems: Origins and Historical Trajectory

May 19  Michael David-Fox (University of Maryland, College Park)  
Comparisons versus Entanglements: Stalinism and Nazism in Light of Recent Historiography and Soviet Archival Research

May 26  Ines Prodöhl (GHI)  
The Soybean in Global Perspective, 1900–1950

June 2  Stephanie Leitch (Florida State University)  
Flattening Out the World: Planarity in Early Modern Visual Culture

June 9  Daniel Rodgers (Princeton University)  
Social Ideas in an Age of Fracture: Ideas and Arguments in the United States in the Last Quarter of the 20th Century

June 16  Christina Lubinski (GHI)  
Besitzen, Vererben und Sein: Ein Modell zum Vergleich von Familienunternehmen in Deutschland und den USA

June 23  Marc Levinson (Council on Foreign Relations, New York)  
GHI DOCTORAL SEMINAR, SPRING-SUMMER 2010

April 8
Jacob Eder (University of Pennsylvania)
Sanitizing the Nazi Past? West German Politics of the Past and the Americanization of the Holocaust

Natalia King (Boston College)

Christian Schmidt-Rost (Freie Universität Berlin)
Cold War and Hot Music: Jazz in der SBZ/DDR und Polen zwischen 1945 und 1971

Heike Wieters (European University Viadrina)
Vom CARE-Paket für Europa zu Hungerhilfen für die “Dritte Welt”: Internationale Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen im “Kampf gegen den Hunger”

June 10
Christian Pinnen (University of Southern Mississippi)
Slavery and Empire: The Development of Slavery in the Natchez District, 1720–1820

Eleonora Rohland (Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen)
Hurrikane in den USA 1900–2005: Anpassung durch Erinnerung?

Johanna Brumberg (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)
“Die Babyboomer”: Generationelles Argument und gesellschaftliches Ordnungsmuster

July 15
Daniel Bessner (Duke University)

Stefan Hübner (Jacobs University Bremen)
The “Asian Games” (1913–1978): Sport and Media Orchestration between Transnational Experience and Representations of the Nation

Brendan Matz (Yale University)
Agricultural Animal Breeding and the Study of Heredity in Germany and the United States, 1860–1929
August 26  Elisabeth Engel (Universität zu Köln)  
*Fighting the Color Line—Fighting Colonialism?*  
AfroamerikanerInnen als AkteurInnen der  
(De)kolonialisierung Afrikas  

Martin Holler (Humboldt Universität Berlin)  
*Sowjetische Roma unter Stalin und Hitler*

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**OTHER GHI-SPONSORED EVENTS, SPRING-SUMMER 2010**

Reports of the following events can be accessed online at: www.ghi-dc.org/eventhistory. This list does not include the Spring and Fall Lecture Series, the Research and Doctoral Seminars (all listed separately), lectures published in the *Bulletin*, or conferences reported on in the “Conference Reports” section.

**January 7–10**  
**Immigrant Entrepreneurship in History: Concepts and Case Studies**  
GHI-sponsored Panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association

**March 11**  
**Germany Discovers the World: Scholarly Engagement with Foreign Cultures in the Age of Empire**  
Panel Discussion at the GHI  
Speakers: Andreas Eckert (Humboldt University Berlin), Suzanne L. Marchand (Louisiana State University), and Anke Ortlepp (GHI)

**April 21**  
**The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties**  
A book discussion at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars  
Speaker: Martin Klimke (GHI); Commentators: Michael Kazin (Professor of History, Georgetown University), Jeremy Varon (Associate Professor of History, The New School for Social Research)

**May 13**  
**Thousands of Sites, Millions of Fates: New Insights into the Universe of Nazi Camps**  
Panel Discussion at the GHI, in collaboration with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM)  
Speaker: Geoffrey Megargee (USHMM) and Susanne Heim (Institut für Zeitgeschichte)

**March 11–June 30**  
**Publishing in Exile: German-Language Literature in the U.S. in the 1940s**  
Exhibition at the GHI
GHI LECTURE SERIES, FALL 2010

THE PROFITABLE BODY: THE BUSINESS OF BEAUTY

A glowing complexion, healthier hair, the perfect physique: beauty matters. The beauty industry stands ready to help the modern consumer attain physical attractiveness. Indeed, it has come to exercise tremendous influence on notions of beauty and individuals’ perceptions of their own bodies. The lecture series The Profitable Body: The Business of Beauty will explore the interplay of commerce and culture in the shaping of beauty standards over the past century. Focusing on the tension between individual choice and the market’s offerings, this series will offer a new perspective on the cultural, economic, and political dimensions of the concept of beauty.

September 23  Masculinity and its Commercialization
Jürgen Martschukat (Universität Erfurt)

October 14  Struggling for Beauty: Body Aesthetics and Social Conflicts in Modern History
Thomas Kühne (Clark University, Worcester)

October 28  Beauty Shop Politics: African American Entrepreneurs and Activism in the 20th Century
Tiffany M. Gill (University of Texas, Austin)

November 18  From the Nose Job to Face Transplants: A History of the Authentic Face
Sander L. Gilman (Emory University, Atlanta)
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2010/2011

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org.

September 5–17  Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar for Young Historians: American History in Transatlantic Perspectives
Convener: Mischa Honeck

September 7  The Berlin Edition: Willy Brandt—Berliner Ausgabe
Event at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

October 4  1990-2010: The Unfinished Business of Unifying Europe
German Unification Symposium/Hertie Lecture 2010
Speaker: Wolfgang Ischinger

October 15–16  Globalizing Beauty: Body Aesthetics in the 20th Century
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI) and Thomas Kühne (Clark University)

November 4–6  Accidental Armageddons: The Nuclear Crisis and the Culture of the Second Cold War, 1975–1989
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Eckart Conze (University of Marburg), Martin Klimke (GHI), Jeremy Varon (New School for Social Research, New York City)

November 11  Twenty-Fourth Annual Lecture of the GHI
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger

November 12  Nineteenth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI: Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
Symposium at the GHI

December 9–11  History by Generations: Generational Dynamics in Modern History
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Uffa Jensen (University of Göttingen), Christina Lubinski (Harvard Business School/ GHI), and Bernd Weisbrod (University of Göttingen)
2011

February 18–19  Going Global: Internationalization Pathways for Family Firms during the 19th and 20th Century
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Christina Lubinski (Harvard Business School/ GHI) and Paloma Fernández Pérez (Dept. d’Història i Institucions Econòmiques, Universitat de Barcelona)

Conference at Jacobs University Bremen
Conveners: Marc Frey (Jacobs University), Sönke Kunkel (Jacobs University), Corinna R. Unger (GHI/Jacobs University, Bremen)

March 10–12  Crime and Punishment in Modern Europe, 1870–1990
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Richard F. Wetzell (GHI) and Kerstin Brückweh (GHI London)

March 17–19  Secularization and the Transformation of Religion in the U.S. and Germany after 1945
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Uta A. Balbier (GHI), Wilhelm Damberg (Bochum University), Lucian Hoelscher (Bochum University), Mark Ruff (Saint Louis University)

April 7  Gerald D. Feldman Memorial Lecture
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Margaret Anderson (University of California, Berkeley)

April 14–16  Economic Crime and the State in the 20th Century: A German-American Comparison
Workshop at the GHI
Convener: Mario Daniels (GHI)

April 28–30  Regulation between Legal Norms and Economic Reality
Symposium at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), William J. Hausman (College of William & Mary), Günther Schulz (University of Bonn)

May 5–7  Feeding and Clothing the World: Cash Crops and Global History
Conference at the GHI
Convener: Shane Hamilton (University of Georgia), Ines Prodöhl (GHI)
May 18–21  17th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History  
Seminar at GHI Washington  
Convener: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

June  Anonymous Consumption: Rationalization, Mechanization, and Digitalization in the Twentieth Century  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Angelika Epple (Universität Bielefeld), Gary Cross (Pennsylvania State University), and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

June/July  Archival Summer Seminar in Germany 2011  
Convener: Ines Prodöhl (GHI)

October 6–7  Unternehmer und Migration  
34. Wissenschaftliches Symposium der Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte  
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Andreas Fahrmeir (Universität Frankfurt/M.)

October 13–16  Medieval History Seminar  
Seminar at the GHI  
Convener: Jochen Schenk (GHI London) and TBA (GHI Washington)
German Historical Institute Washington DC

Fellows and Staff

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff, Director
Modern German social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption

PD Dr. Marcus Grüser, Deputy Director
Modern American, German, Austrian history; history of the welfare state; urban history; history of historiography; comparative and transnational history

PD Dr. Uwe Spiekermann, Deputy Director
Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge

Sabine Fix, Administrative Director

Dr. Uta Balbier, Research Fellow
American and German history since 1945; history of religion; history of sports; transnational history

Dr. Martin Klimke, Research Fellow
19th and 20th-century European and American history; U.S. foreign affairs; protest movements; transnational history; cultural history; oral history; political communication

Dr. Jan Logemann, Research Fellow
Comparative and transatlantic history; history of consumption; history of urban development; history of emigration; modern Germany and the United States since the 1920s

Dr. Ines Prodhöhl, Research Fellow
Global History, cultural and economic History, civil society

Dr. Míriam Rüup, Research Fellow
Modern German history; Jewish history; history of education; transnational history

Dr. Richard F. Wetzell, Research Fellow and Editor
Modern German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. David Kuchenbuch, Fellow in the History of Consumption
Dr. Mario Daniels, Fellow in Social and Economic History

Jessica Csoma, Research Associate
Bryan Hart, Research Associate
Insa Kummer, Project Associate
David B. Lazar, Senior Editor
Dr. Kelly McCullough, Project Manager
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