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This past fall, the German Historical Institute marked the twentieth anniversary of the peaceful revolutions of 1989 with a series of events devoted to the history of the German Democratic Republic, its legacy, and the process of unification. The Institute’s Annual Lecture, delivered by Professor Donna Harsch this past November, was devoted to the place of East Germany in history. Taking issue with Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s characterization of the GDR as a “footnote in world history,” Harsch argued that the GDR played an important role in three major stories of the twentieth century: the history of Germany, the history of Communism, and the history of women, employment, the family, and social policy. In his comment on the Annual Lecture, Professor Thomas Lindenberger advanced the argument that the GDR earned a place in world history though the circumstances under which it ended: Germany’s first successful democratic revolution. The complicated process that led from this revolution to the unification of the two German states less than a year later formed the subject of the Hertie Lecture delivered by Ambassador Frank Elbe, who participated in the diplomatic negotiations over German unification as Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s chief of staff. Elbe’s first-hand account of the West German effort to gain the assent of the four Allied powers not only to German unification but to NATO membership for the united Germany provides fascinating insights into West Germany’s diplomatic strategy, the key role of American support, and, last but not least, the reasons for the Soviet leadership’s agreement to united Germany’s NATO membership.

The following two articles present the research of the latest winners of the most prestigious prize for North American dissertations in German history, the Fritz Stern Prize, which is awarded annually by the Friends of the German Historical Institute. Michael Meng provides an enlightening comparative analysis of how the treatment of Jewish sites in Poland and the two postwar German states was gradually transformed from one that was primarily engaged in destruction to one of historical preservation. Moving from comparative to transnational history, Alison Clark Efford elucidates the role of German immigrants in the reshaping of American citizenship after the Civil War and Emancipation, especially concerning the key issue of whether African-Americans would be granted the vote. While
the Fritz Stern Prize honors junior scholars at the beginning of their careers, the GHI’s Helmut Schmidt Prize, awarded every two years, honors senior scholars who have made exceptional contributions to the study of German-American economic history. This past year’s winner was Professor Richard H. Tilly, whose lecture at last December’s award ceremony, printed here, provided a historical and comparative analysis of banking crises in Germany, Britain and the United States from 1800 to 1933.

As always, the “GHI Research” section of this Bulletin shares the research of GHI Research Fellows with a larger public. The two contributions in this issue show how work in economic history can provide new perspectives on transnational and global history. GHI Deputy Director Uwe Spiekermann’s examination of German-American quarrels over meat imports in the period 1870–1900 sheds new light on the role of nutritional cultures, changing scientific and medical discourses, and the emergence of modern consumerism. Also taking a transnational approach, GHI Research Fellow Ines Prodöhl analyzes the early twentieth-century spread of the soybean from China to the West, both in the context of economic and nutritional change in the West and in the context of the transformation of Manchuria amidst the rising tensions between Russia and Japan.

The conference reports in this issue once again reflect the diversity of the Institute’s scholarly agenda. They range from medieval history to the history of the Cold War, from the history of early modern encyclopedias to the history of material objects in the postwar era, and from the history of the Nazi regime to the connections of the U.S. Civil Rights movement to Germany. We hope you enjoy this issue and invite you to keep abreast of upcoming GHI events and programs by checking the Institute’s website at www.ghi-dc.org.

Hartmut Berghoff, Director
Features
FOOTNOTE OR FOOTPRINT? THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN HISTORY

23RD ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE GHI, WASHINGTON DC, NOVEMBER 12, 2009

Donna Harsch
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

Twenty years ago the German Democratic Republic (GDR) collapsed from a fatal sickness and swiftly succumbed, unloved and unmourned. This, of course, we know. Yet one sometimes wonders if rumors of the GDR’s death have not been greatly exaggerated. Over the last twenty years, the GDR has periodically risen from the grave to haunt German public life. Early in 2009, this surprisingly frisky phantom emerged yet again, disturbed—as in a classic ghost story—by an attempt to bury the cadaver much deeper and thus be finally, truly, and absolutely done with it. I am referring to the controversy stirred up by Hans-Ulrich Wehler in the fifth volume of his Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Wehler set off a spirited debate in Germany with his assertion that “the short-lived GDR was only ‘a footnote in world history.’” As Wehler noted, he was quoting the East German writer Stefan Heym, who in March 1990 had said, “The GDR will be nothing more than a footnote in world history. The only thing that remains for us to consider is what comes next.”

When articulated in 1990 by an East German dissident, this opinion elicited little vocal opposition. The “footnote” phrase received a decidedly more hostile reception when proclaimed in 2008 by a famous historian in a major work of contemporary history. At real forums and in e-forums, in interviews and in publications, historians, politicians, and the lay public debated this characterization, and Wehler defended it.

My lecture joins this controversy. Before beginning, I would like to express my appreciation to the German Historical Institute for inviting me to speak on the question of the historical significance of the state and society whose death throes began with the dramatic opening of the Berlin Wall exactly twenty years ago. I would also like to acknowledge my deep respect for Hans-Ulrich Wehler. He is a great scholar whose work has profoundly influenced several generations of scholars in German history as well as other national histories. I will disagree with his view that the GDR was, or will become, a historical “footnote,” but I aim to present my standpoint provocatively, not polemically. To argue with Wehler is to provide

yet more evidence—as if that were needed—of his outstanding influence as a scholar and public intellectual.

Many participants in the debate about Wehler’s dismissal of the GDR agreed with him that its history will slide into footnote status over the long run, particularly from a world-historical perspective. Yet many of these same people objected to Wehler’s formulation of this point. They did so mainly for two related reasons. The footnote remark, they contended, was a ham-fisted, if understandable, reaction to the widening political appeal of the post-Communist Left Party in Germany today. Additionally, many noted the psychological insensitivity of pushing the GDR into the shredder of historical significance only two decades after its collapse. Like Wehler, various participants expressed impatience with the wave of Ostalgie that has swept up many former East Germans. They criticized him, however, for stepping so insistently on the feelings of the millions of Germans for whom life in the GDR constitutes a major part of their personal histories. It is natural, his critics asserted, for former East Germans (including even many dissidents) to remember the GDR, as one does any homeland, as a world of the good and the bad, the loved and the hated, the personal and the political.2

It was certainly politically and psychologically maladroit of Wehler to revive Stefan Heym’s words. Such a critique does not, however, present a historical challenge to the dismissal of the GDR in history. Here, I will offer an historical argument to explain why the GDR will
not slip into footnote status in scholarly or even popular histories.\(^3\) 

The GDR has, I contend, left a footprint in modern history, both in the everyday meaning of “footprint” as an imprint or dent in time or place and in the archeological sense of “footprint” as illustrative or representative evidence of major developments in an historical era. (Having no crystal ball, I will make no prediction on the much grander question of the GDR’s world-historical significance.)

Why did the GDR not pass the test of historical significance, according to Wehler? His book puts forward four explicit arguments. The GDR’s population was always small and shrank over time. The GDR was a failed state and society in every way: economically, politically, socially, and culturally. The GDR never had real autonomy as a state, but originated and ended as a “satrapy” or “sultanate” of the USSR. The GDR exists no more, and did not exist for a significant period of time. These points are connected to a fifth argument that is implicit in Wehler’s analysis of the GDR; its dictatorial nature undermined its historical significance. He does not suppose, of course, that a dictatorial regime per se has no historical significance. Rather, his discussion of the GDR and Stalinism suggests that the GDR’s supposed insignificance was conditioned by the coincidence of its dependent status and its nature as a Communist dictatorship. In addressing the pros and cons of “totalitarian theory,” Wehler recognizes central contrasts between National Socialism and Communism as mass ideological dictatorships. Both dictatorships were massively destructive, but, he emphasizes, in fundamentally different ways. While Nazism fomented and carried out ethnic slaughter and racial genocide, Communism systematically smashed independent societal structures and entire social classes. Stalinism created states based, therefore, on the mere vestiges of a society with no real social force, much less the independence to organize social interests.\(^4\)

For a political historian of dictatorship, the lack of societal autonomy in Communist states would not *ipso facto* imply historical insignificance and, indeed, this lack might enhance his or her interest in the peculiarities of Communist political history. Wehler, however, is a founder and practitioner of “societal history” (*Gesellschaftsgeschichte*)—he investigates social processes and changing social structures, including class relations, as they have developed in relation to economic and political power. He studies, in other words, the interactive history of state and society. In his view,

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\(^3\) I use the phrase “footnote status,” as Heym and Wehler do, in the derogatory sense in which it is used in the lay world. For me and most historians, however, “footnote status” does not necessarily imply low ranking. Historians, legal scholars, and, indeed, many academics generally hold the footnote in high regard and are not pleased to find our work tucked into this space.

such interaction does not occur in a Communist state, and thus, scholarship can study only the social consequences—or, better, the social-statistical artifacts—of party decisions and its controlling structures. The Soviet Union was historically significant despite its lacking societal history, because it had a huge impact on the world stage. The GDR, by contrast, did not make a big impression on international relations. In sum, I infer that, for Wehler, the GDR did not attain historical significance because of the conjunction of its lacking autonomy and its failure as a Communist state to develop a dynamic relationship between state and society.

Wehler is not alone in believing that these arguments build a definitive case against the significance of the GDR in history. He is, however, the most famous historian and most prominent public intellectual to make this argument, and, indeed, the one who has made it most forcefully. GDR history, he concludes, is significant only as a “contrast” case to its successful and ultimately victorious rival, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). East Germany is important only as the negative pole to the West German positive pole. Wehler is not uncritical of the FRG; while he has only praise for its political and economic development, he critiques its societal history sharply and insightfully.

Wehler’s explicit points about the GDR are factual and, as such, undeniable: the GDR was small and shrinking; it failed; it lacked autonomy; it disappeared. These facts, in my view, do not set the bar for historical significance. Historical significance is a mysterious quality, even when looking backward to find it, much less looking forward to predict it. I do not claim to have a well-developed definition, much less a theory. I would suggest, though, that historical significance arises from a connection between the historical content and context of the topic or theme of study, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the structural characteristics of its history. (Wehler’s structural elements include, for example, size, failure, and dependence.) An historical subject will gain “shelf space” and “shelf life” if its substance, context, and structure conjoin to capture the attention of (enough) historians and provide (enough) evidence to allow scholars to apply methods of historical analysis and interpretation. If their research constructs an interesting, well-supported story and a persuasive interpretation, then it will attract the wider attention of the discipline and might (a big caveat) grab the attention of a wider public, and could (an even bigger caveat) stand the test of
The GDR, I will argue, is of historical significance because it made a “dent” and an “archeological” footprint within several historical contexts that are of recognized significance to the history of the twentieth century: Germany, Communism, the mass entry of (married) women into the public sphere, and, in particular, wage labor. Before I address these substantive themes, I will lay out the structural elements that provide the foundation for historical interest in the GDR.

In tandem with West Germany, East Germany offers a virtually unique instance of a controlled experiment in historical development. One can encapsulate the terms of comparison in several ways: one nation, two states (to quote Christoph Klessmann); one culture, two systems; two “nows,” one “then” (most significantly, the National Socialist past). The appeal of the German-German comparison is evident in the number of recent scholarly works it has spawned. Let me cite several examples that give a sense of the varied, interesting, and significant social, cultural, and political themes these comparative studies have covered: Elizabeth Heineman’s book on marriage in the Third Reich and after 1945, Uta Poiger’s analysis of the discourse about Americanized youth cultures in the 1950s and ‘60s, Carola Sachse’s study of debates about women’s wage and household labor, Jeffrey Herf’s volume on the political memory of National Socialism and the Holocaust, Dagmar Herzog’s investigation of discourse about sexuality in post-fascist Germany, Rainer Geißler’s study of postwar social structures, and, last but not least, Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s “contrasting” societal history. The study of change and continuity within this unusual comparative framework contributes, I would argue, to a theoretical understanding of the interaction between culture and system in general, beyond the borders of Germany, on one hand, and before the twentieth century, on the other. From a scientific viewpoint, this controlled experiment is tainted because the control condition and the experimental condition “contaminated” each other’s political culture and policies. For the historian, however, the mutual antagonism and reciprocal influence between the two states make the comparison not only more complex, but also more intriguing.

The second structural element was the dynamism of the GDR’s historical development. Between 1949 and 1989, East Germany
experienced profound changes in its state, economy, society, and political culture. These changes are important in their own right, but also as case studies of the interrelationships between economic, social, and cultural change under a tyrannical party dictatorship. The GDR represents, in fact, a classic case of a “rise and fall” or a “reversal of fortune” story: the rise and fall of the power of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in all its manifestations. Not only did the SED state suffer a gradual reversal of fortune, but its rise and fall were punctuated by three events that are of proven historical interest. The workers’ uprising of June 1953 continues to draw the attention of historians and political scientists who study state socialism. The sudden construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 provokes the interest of both scholars and the lay-public due to its real and heartbreaking meaning for East Germans and its symbolic and moral meaning as a defining event of the Cold War. The opening of the Wall in 1989 captivates the whole world and is seen as the iconic event of the Cold War’s end. Popular fascination with these happenings is certainly less sophisticated and more emotional than the critical perspective of contemporary historians who try to resist the simple appeal of the master narrative. Still, one cannot deny that the historical eye, whether naive or trained, is drawn to a rise-and-fall story whose arc is interrupted by riveting events before ending in the sudden collapse of apparently total power.

The third structural element is that the GDR exists no more. For Wehler, its disappearance helps doom the GDR to insignificance. Yet, why should that be? A ghost state is interesting as a self-contained subject with, in the case of the GDR, a clear beginning and a definite end. Historians have traditionally preferred to study the distant past, in part because bygone times are, well, bygone and “closed.” The GDR’s demise presents a different kind of historical closure,
but one that provides similar analytical and interpretive advantages to the passage of time. We know when and how the story began and ended, although we still have to investigate what happened in between and why it ended as it did. Undoubtedly, a considerably longer period of time must pass before we can evaluate the “afterlife” of the GDR, that is, the ways in which its existence continues to influence society, politics, economics, and culture in unified Germany.

The excellent documentary record left by the GDR is another element in favor of its historical significance. This record includes a wide variety and large number of sources, including, above all, reams of archival documents, and also statistics, oral histories, memoirs, print literature, the built-environment, and cultural artifacts. The archival and statistical records were mainly generated by party and state officials and, as such, are uncritical of power relations in the GDR. They do not, however, necessarily “white-wash” daily relations as they unfolded in ministries, factories, schools, stores, divorce courts, or hospitals. Nor do they always cover up undesirable social trends, worrisome public health developments, falling productivity, or popular dissatisfaction with living and working conditions. The records are so plentiful and diverse that one can be overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of individual complaints, ministerial correspondence, factory reports, and studies of, for example, marital divorce, youth attitudes, or nude bathing in the GDR. Scholars have to read the documents within the context of specific sets of power relations as well as within the overall framework of repression and surveillance. Still, the GDR definitely provides the records that historians need in order to construct a story, document an interpretation, and produce many long and detailed footnotes.
The GDR draws historical attention, finally, because it had a real societal history. Like Wehler—indeed, partly because of his seminal work on Imperial Germany—I consider myself a societal historian, that is, a student of the relationship between society and the state. GDR history fascinates me—and many social and cultural historians—precisely because there was a relationship between state and society that was not completely one-sided, although the lines of power and decision-making all ran from the top down. The SED’s restructuring of society, radical and rapid as it was, had its limits. First, the SED never transformed a basic social structure: the nuclear family. Second, before 1960, the SED moved unevenly against some social groups such as physicians and private farmers. Third, and most significantly, the SED both falsely predicted, and could not control, many of the social, cultural, and economic consequences of the societal transformations that it set in motion. It also could not control the societal consequences of the GDR’s many and deep economic problems. GDR policy succeeded in crippling, but not pulverizing, East German society, a fact that would come back to bite the SED, provoking the state and party to revise many policies. These revisions led, in turn, to additional, unexpected social consequences that would often negatively impact the SED. An example would be the SED’s gradual and escalating concessions to accommodate people’s increasing desire for more and better private consumption.

These structural elements make the GDR a candidate for historical significance. I would not claim that they are necessary prerequisites for historical significance, much less that they are the only possible such characteristics. I think, though, that they provide a sufficiently sturdy foundation to sustain historical attention, research, and interpretation. They help to explain why the GDR has remained a subject of considerable and serious scholarship for two decades. They do not, however, assure its historical significance. One has also to consider the historical context in which the GDR existed and its role in that context. The GDR was of consequence, I contend, to three major stories of the modern era: Germany, Communism, and the mass entry of married women into wage labor.

The GDR and Modern German History

The German Democratic Republic was part and parcel of modern German history. Its history cannot be understood outside of German history, nor does Germany’s postwar or post-1989 history
make sense without incorporating the GDR. Although the GDR was dependent on the USSR, it was neither in its origins nor its existence a “satrapy” or “sultanate” of the Soviet Empire. It was a Communist state, and also a German one. It existed as one side of the dyad that was the mutually antagonistic and interactive relationship between East and West Germany. The GDR was not, despite the best efforts of the SED, sealed off from the West. West Germany was, despite the denials of many politicians and public commentators, influenced by the East. Given their paired and intertwined status within the Cold War constellation, I would argue that to consign East Germany to “footnote status” is to do the same to West Germany.

The GDR was a product of German history most obviously because it would not have existed but for German history. There would have been no Western or Soviet occupation of Germany and, thus, no East or West Germany without the war that Germany began, fought with incredible determination, massive violence, and unsurpassed murder, and, finally, lost. Peter Bender makes this point forcefully in his recent book Deutschlands Wiederkehr: Eine ungeteilte Nachkriegsgeschichte (Germany’s Return: An Undivided Postwar History). One finds an analogous argument in Postwar, Tony Judt’s survey of European history since 1945. “Postwar” and “Cold War” were coterminous, Judt contends. The Cold War defined postwar Europe and, above all, Germany. Yet the Cold War, he emphasizes, was a postwar phenomenon, a product of the Second World War. The war hung over East Germany as much as it hung over the West. Interestingly, until at least the late 1970s, it was the SED that most vigorously denied the hold of the past over the GDR. As a Communist party with close ties to the USSR, the SED claimed to represent, by definition, a decisive break with the German past and, especially, fascism. That claim was untrue. The SED certainly tried to abolish by fiat the material, social, and cultural structures it inherited from the German past, but it could not escape them. Like the FRG, the GDR also had to come to terms with National Socialism, although each state dealt with the Nazi past differently.

The GDR was also part of the history of German Communism, not just a creature of Soviet Communism. The German Communist party was born out of the First World War, German domestic politics and class relations, and the Russian Revolution. It was infused with

9 Peter Bender, Deutschlands Wiederkehr: Eine ungeteilte Nachkriegsgeschichte (Stuttgart, 2007), 4-14. See also Herf, Divided Memory; Christoph Klessmann, Hans Misselwitz, and Günter Wichert, eds., Deutsche Vergangenheiten—a gemeinsame Herausforderung: Der schwierige Umgang mit der doppelten Nachkriegsgeschichte (Berlin, 1999).
Bolshevik politics and ideology, but also with Social Democratic Arbeiterkultur (workers’ culture). In its twenty-five years of existence before 1945, the German Communist Party (KPD) was shaped by its cadre’s experiences in the Weimar Republic, Third Reich, and Second World War as much as by the party leaders’ exile in the USSR.  

The GDR remained a German state with a German history throughout its existence. Given its dependence on the Soviet Union, one could argue that the GDR was not a real national state. That argument is risky, however. As Bender emphasizes, West Germany was dependent on the Western allies, especially the United States, for approval of its military policies and its relationships with most other states, especially, the USSR. Although West Germany—unlike the GDR—enjoyed domestic autonomy, its external dependence would weigh heavily against significance on some historical scales. Traditional diplomatic and political historians, for example, count foreign-policy autonomy as a key criterion of a state’s legitimacy and independence. I reject the idea that West Germany’s external dependence undercuts its standing as a German state or an important one. I also object to the proposition that GDR dependence on the USSR excluded it from German history or significance.

No one would dispute that the GDR was strongly shaped by its rivalry with the FRG.SED fixation on the FRG as its economic standard of measurement reflected the orientation of the East German people, yet the popular orientation toward West Germany and SED sensitivity to popular attitudes arose because the GDR’s rulers and its people were German. It is more controversial to argue that the FRG was also affected by its relationship with its despised “brother” (to borrow the metaphor used by Bender). The Cold War was most intensely experienced in the two Germanys; that comes as no surprise. It is easy to forget, though, that for years the SED was absolutely convinced that its side would win the battle between capitalism and socialism. In triumphalist rhetoric, it trumpeted this confidence in the press and in speeches both at home and abroad. Its stance and language provoked anxiety and analogously passionate responses from the West German opinion-making apparatus. In the oratory of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, especially, one finds repeated references to “Asiatic” Communism and constant reminders that Communism was not German, not “Western,” and not Christian. Both the content and extremity of such claims surely influenced the


11 Bender, Nachkriegsgeschichte, 24–31. As William Gray shows, the FRG was quite autonomous in its relations with the GDR and worked hard to influence other states’ relations with East Germany. See William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007).
political culture of West Germany, making it different than it would have been without a German Communist rival.\textsuperscript{12}

As the devil in a red dress, the GDR was the anti-model that influenced not just rhetoric, but policy in West Germany. The FRG is known for a welfare state that is considerably more conservative than those of some other European countries, especially the Scandinavian countries and France. Indubitably, the Christian Democratic Union truly believed in the conservative family policy that characterized West Germany from the 1950s through the 1970s and even afterwards.\textsuperscript{13} My guess, though, is that there would have been greater political interest and popular support for progressive variations of the Scandinavian type if the GDR and its social policies had not existed as the “Schreck” next door. Why, one might ask, have West Germans worried more about the effects of daycare on young children and the “all-day school” on older children than have the populations of most other European countries or, indeed, the United States? Surely, it has something to do with forty years of defining family and child nurture in opposition to the social policies of a German socialist state, which, in the lurid accounts of many West German preachers, politicians, and sociologists, was allegedly destroying the family and “taking children from their mothers.”

The GDR also influenced West German economic history. The flood of some twelve to fifteen million German refugees and expellees into both Germanys is well documented. What was initially a huge burden became a demographic plus. Economic historians agree that this immense in-migration contributed to the economic boom in both Germanys in the 1950s. West Germany also took in around three million people who fled East Germany in the 1950s. Many of these, too, were refugees and expellees, but many others were native East Germans who were, on average, better educated and better trained than the East German or West German population as a whole. Their contribution to the West German economy was therefore proportionately greater than that of the original refugees.\textsuperscript{14} The SED absolutely did not intend that consequence when it implemented the draconian educational and economic policies that provoked the westward flight of doctors, engineers, skilled workers, farmers, and teachers. Intended or not, the social and economic effects were real, and were a consequence of GDR history, or, rather, of its integral intermeshing with the history of the Federal Republic.

\textsuperscript{12} Bender, Nachkriegsgeschichte, 44–47.

\textsuperscript{13} Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley, 1993).

\textsuperscript{14} Werner Abelshauser, Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945 (Munich, 2004), 315; Geißler, Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands, 69; Wehler, Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 5:35–6.
The GDR and Communism

Communism was an undeniably central force in twentieth-century history, and the GDR was a significant example of a European socialist state and society. In his contribution to the debate over the “footnote” remark, the historian Martin Sabrow argued, “[The GDR was] the endangered external border [of Communist Europe] and, therefore, [is] especially productive to investigate as an example of a world-historical alternative that substantially shaped the century of extremes.”

I will list only a few examples of how the study of the GDR can illuminate and contribute to the history of communism. Several points are formulated as questions, because historians (as opposed to social scientists) have conducted little comparative research on state socialism to date, and thus I speak speculatively on the theme of the GDR’s significance within European Communism after 1945.

I would first point to the GDR’s significance as a German Communist state. How did its German-ness shape its relations—and especially the relations of its people—not only to the Soviet Union and its people, but also to other Eastern European socialist states, especially Poland? The GDR’s “special” place within the Eastern bloc is as important to recognize as partnerships within the Western alliance—particularly the relationship between West Germany and the United Kingdom, and, above all, the relationship between the FRG and France. How did East Germany’s proximity to West Germany and their shared language contribute to the version of Communism that developed in the GDR as compared to the variations that unfolded in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia? Rather than merely point to the well-known fact that East Germans watched West German television, as though its impact is self-evident, we need serious comparative studies of cultural, political, and consumer attitudes in the various Eastern European countries in order to understand how Eastern Europeans variously did and did not come to terms with Communism.

The GDR’s status as a German Stalinist state is also relevant for the comparative study of modern mass dictatorships, particularly comparative studies of National Socialism and Stalinism. Again, the GDR case offers a controlled experiment because it was German and Communist. What can we learn from the comparison of these two mass dictatorships inside one cultural tradition? How might that
comparison challenge or confirm current interpretations of Stalinism as a dictatorial system? 

A striking difference between National Socialism and Communism was the different timing of the radicalization of each of these ideological dictatorships. National Socialism’s early years in power were relatively moderate; its racist practices became increasingly radical, reaching their highest intensity during the war. In Eastern Europe, Stalinist class-struggle began with fire and fury, but Communism grew less radical over time, becoming more willing to make adjustments to its original policies and, finally, stagnant and decadent. This evolution typified the history of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (and in China). What explains it? The East German case was characteristic of the general path and is, again, especially well-documented. It could be fruitfully examined in comparison to the rest of socialist Eastern Europe. An important line of investigation would be the comparative study of the secret police. How did the Stasi’s relationship with the East German population compare and contrast over time to that of the state police in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and, of course, the USSR? Comparative investigations of the evolution of postwar Communism should, in my view, look at societal change and social development as one source of the amelioration of the radicalism and repression of the early years. Comparative investigation of the rise of an educated social stratum in the Soviet bloc would illuminate, I believe, the origins of the invisible inner erosion of Communist commitment to the ideological goals of the early Stalinist era.

Also illuminating would be consideration of the ways in which East German Communism was socially and economically atypical. East Germany began as the most industrial economy ever to endure a Stalinist transformation, and it remained the most industrial until the end of European Communism. Did GDR Communism work differently, therefore, than its Eastern European and Soviet counterparts? How did its higher level of industrialization shape the relationship between the East German state and society relative to other Eastern European socialist states and the USSR? Especially enlightening would be comparative studies of the industrial working class, its cultural milieu, and its “silent social contract” with industrial managers and the state.

In the case of the GDR, a lot of this research is already taking place, promoted most notably by the Zentrum für Zeitgeschichtliche Forschung (ZZF) (Center for Contemporary History) in Potsdam. We have
studies of East German socialism as an “alternative modernity,” investigations of its (political-)cultural world, and, as noted earlier, a relative abundance of research on state/society relations in the GDR. 21 Hopefully, this GDR research will get “plugged” into studies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union so that a history of the Communist “alternative modernity” and its characteristic relationships between state and society can help us interpret the rise and fall of European Communism. Truly comparative primary research is difficult, of course, as it requires knowledge of several very different languages. I take my hat off, therefore, to the ZZF, which is nurturing comparative studies of many kinds.

The GDR and Women’s Employment

The history of the GDR is significant as part of a profound and continuing process of social change in Europe, the United States, and much of the world: the mass entry of wives and, particularly, married mothers into wage-dependent labor. East Germany was ahead of the curve in this process. In 1970, East Germany had the highest rate of female employment in the industrialized world. Especially notable were the high levels of participation in wage labor among married mothers with multiple young children. Let me make clear: I come here neither to praise this development nor to condemn it. The entry of East German women into wage labor did not equate to their emancipation, and, contrary to SED claims, it did not signal the party’s commitment to women’s emancipation. Female participation in the workforce was, above all, the result of economic necessity—although one should note that Communist ideology did theoretically support the hiring and, more importantly, training and education of married mothers. Rather than credit or criticize the SED on the “woman” question, I want to emphasize that the rise of women’s employment constituted a huge societal change that reverberated in many directions. Consider its ramifications for the private sphere: husband-wife relations; the rate of divorce; single parenthood; children’s nurture; the birth rate; attitudes toward female sexuality, contraception, and abortion; and demand for private consumption, including easy-care clothing, washing machines and other household appliances, modern kitchens, and indoor plumbing—anything and everything that would make it easier for women to get out of the house and into training and work, while also bearing at least two children. Consider its implications for the public sphere: male workers’ resentment and prejudice against women workers and
strong opposition to women supervisors; official discussions of women’s wages and work hours; gender job segmentation; women’s training and higher education; expansion of daycare and afterschool programs; adjustments to the economy to meet the demands of the private household; and modification of social and family welfare policies to encourage a higher birth rate. The consequences for women were both depressing and impressive. To provide just one contrast: East German women’s wages remained 30 to 40 percent lower than men’s in 1989, but female rates of secondary and university education gained parity with statistics for men by the 1970s, eventually surpassing them.22 We can focus on all this as an East German story—and it was an East German story, given that the state’s need for employed women and a rising birth rate were both exceptionally high. We can view it as a socialist story—and it was a socialist story, given that socialized industry and private consumption mixed like oil and water.

Yet it was not only an East German or socialist story. The mass entry of married women into wage labor and the accompanying rise in women’s education are huge social processes that straddle the German/German divide, the capitalist/Communist divide, and the Cold War/post-1989 divide. Here, too, the GDR serves as a test case, indeed, a virtual “Petri dish” of the social impact of women’s employment in a small, closed, and well-documented environment that allows us to study the interaction between women’s employment, family roles, economic exigencies, and state policies from many angles and in much depth. Bringing the East German case into comparative studies of women’s employment, education, and political participation will reveal both its anomalies and its typicality. Study of the GDR experience will also shed light on this world-historic process as a whole.

Conclusion

I have argued here that East Germany will claim historical significance in studies of the modern era due to its history’s structural elements: its almost unique comparability as a “controlled experiment,” the dynamism of its history, the “closed-ness” of its story, its rich documentary base, and its real societal history, which allows historians to compare state/society relations in the GDR to other Communist and even non-Communist societies. The GDR has left a footprint because of its substantive role in three undeniably major stories of the twentieth century: the history of Germany, the history of Communism, and the history of women, employment, the family, and social policy.

These arguments for the significance of GDR history have, of course, nothing to do with justifying its existence: The SED-state was a manipulative, controlling, and dictatorial mass-party state whose policies not only failed on every front but also greatly harmed East Germans. Precisely because the GDR was a repressive and failed state that deserved to collapse, we neither should nor can turn away from its history. Indeed, we should investigate that history from every angle in order to expose it for what it was. We should also present the GDR in all its complexity, rather than as a two-dimensional caricature. To demonstrate that the SED was unable to control, much less predict, every aspect of societal development does not weaken the condemnation of the GDR as a Communist dictatorship. On the contrary, shining a light on chinks in its armor exposes all the more decisively the hubris of the Communist claims that a socialist state knows all and a socialist economy can solve all.

Historical simplification always cuts both ways. Yes, absolute opponents of the despised object can mock and cut down a surly “straw figure,” but absolute supporters of the admired subject can rally around a smiling “poster child.” Studied from many angles as a three-dimensional entity, GDR history takes on significance, yes, but does not win friends or influence. As we know from the ongoing history of the study of National Socialism, serious historical research undermines nostalgia and amnesia. While I am not moved by political or psychological arguments for the significance or insignificance of GDR history, I believe that richly layered, well-documented, and analytical histories of the GDR alone, and in comparison with other states and societies, could have psychological
and political benefits. Such histories may or may not conform to the personal memories of East Germans, but they will confirm their suspicion that the GDR was a real and complicated homeland and, accordingly, contribute to the process of moving beyond—but not forgetting—a difficult past that is over, but not gone.

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WHAT’S IN THIS FOOTNOTE? WORLD HISTORY!
COMMENT ON DONNA HARSCH’S LECTURE, WASHINGTON DC, NOVEMBER 12, 2009

Thomas Lindenberger
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Since comments are meant to enhance a discussion rather than confirm unanimity, I have to confess that Professor Harsch’s excellent overview on some of the seminal issues of GDR history is not easy for me to comment on. I fundamentally agree with her views on the significance of the GDR for German, Communist, and Gender history, and its outstanding suitability as a test case for historical study of modern societies.

Nevertheless, when confronted with the task of countering as sweeping an argument as the one recently proposed by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, I see points of divergence. I fully share Donna Harsch’s sincere respect and veneration for this pioneer in the practice of history as a social science. I would not stand here if it were not for his books on the Kaiserreich, published 30 years ago, which were powerful both as path-breaking challenges to the dominance of positivist political history and as politically engaged statements provoking the criticism of younger generations of historians. In the concluding volume of his monumental Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Wehler’s insights and arguments are once again poignant, brilliant, but sometimes very one-sided, thus provoking criticism and partial rejection anew. I thank Hans-Ulrich Wehler for another refreshing intervention and for his well-known, almost athletic sense for the exchange of critical arguments.

But how should one criticize Wehler in this case? Like Professor Harsch, I too reject the footnote-of-world-history verdict on the GDR. I would like to do so, however, not only by claiming that the GDR is a rewarding object of social and cultural history research, but on slightly different grounds as well. Whether the GDR should be considered merely a footnote in world history is not just a matter to be debated by academic experts of German history. Wehler also speaks and writes as an engaged citizen; he is a political mind, and one should not fail to answer him on this ground as well.

But first allow me a little digression that I cannot suppress when it comes to Hans-Ulrich Wehler and the subject of footnotes, which are so dear to our craft as historians. Let’s examine what is meant
when qualifying something as “just a footnote.” Paradoxically, it is Wehler himself who by his own practice strongly undermines his claim. In the first chapter of his recent book about postwar Germany footnote number 13, for instance, which is printed as an endnote, begins at the end of page 451, then continues over two entire pages and ends in the upper third of page 454. Two and a half pages for one footnote—and this is by no means exceptional for Wehler. His footnotes are legendary; they replace whole bibliographies. They are often spiced with sarcastic, and sometimes quite unfair comments on other historians’ work. In fact, many people regard Wehler’s works as indispensable on their bookshelves just for the sake of these abundantly rich footnotes. Therefore a footnote in this Wehlerian sense is not “nothing.” It can be very substantial, and it certainly can be essential to the main text. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: In the conventional understanding, footnotes only support the main text, they are not part of it. According to Wehler, then, the GDR should not figure in the main text of world history; it is sufficient to refer to it in the margins, as a provider of supporting information and collateral polemics.

I consider this assessment to be incorrect. It reflects a specific position in recent history itself, about which Wehler is quite explicit. It is a deliberately Western, or, more precisely—and now am speaking as someone who grew up in the Western half of divided Berlin—a West German view. The telos of Wehler’s account of postwar history is the coming of age of the old Federal Republic. For him, neither unification nor the events leading up to it, including the GDR and its demise, were part of this process of maturation. In this narrative, there was and is no conception of the GDR and the Federal Republic as the two parts of a divided country. This unwillingness to integrate the openness of the German question into a retrospective narrative is by no means accidental.

Let us remember: For the old, pre-1989 Federal Republic, the existence and the nature of the East German state was always difficult to handle. For a long time, until the beginning of Ostpolitik and détente, the Federal Republic sought to deny the GDR statehood, trying to prevent its recognition by third-party states, according to the so-called Hallstein doctrine. In public communication, this denial of acknowledgment was signified symbolically by always putting the term “DDR” in quotation marks, or by avoiding the term altogether, replacing it with Ostzone, die Zone, or to speak of it as
something “over there” (drüben), a phenomenon, even a Gebilde. In West German eyes, the GDR was the epitome of Uneigentlichkeit, an unreal existence: it was not sovereign, it was obviously predicated on the presence and the warranties of the Soviet Union, it was not accepted by its citizens, and it was an artificial construct.

I think that in order to understand Wehler’s verdict, this excursion into the history the political culture of West Germany is necessary. Of course, with détente and the fundamental liberalization of the Federal Republic, it increasingly became a matter of political correctness not to refer to the DDR as Zone or to place the qualifier sogenannte (so-called) in front of it. But this shift did not indicate a recognition on the part of West Germans of the role the GDR played in co-determining the development of Federal Republic. On the contrary, for a large part of the West German population interest in the GDR decreased to the point of indifference and blatant ignorance. This indifference was reflected by the political elites who, in 1989/90 simply did not know what to do with the unexpected mass of new co-citizens in the East, even as others immediately perceived a new political “market” opening up. Interestingly, it was Social Democrats such as the Oskar Lafontaine, from the far West of the Republic and a key member of the critical intelligentsia, who grossly underestimated the emotional reserves that could still be mobilized by addressing feelings of national unity and togetherness.

It is this perception of an ephemeral, precarious existence of the GDR which does not really fit the teleology of what was expected for the further development of the Federal Republic, which, I think, invites and motivates a posthumous “footnoting” of the GDR. This freak of world history on the other side of the Zonengrenze is denied the critical importance and weight that would have been necessary to make a difference to the old Bundesrepublik and its development.

To counter this refusal of historical recognition by merely enumerating the merits of the GDR as a model case for historical inquiry is not enough. Legitimizing the place of the GDR in world history through its relevance for understanding modern history among academic historians may, on the contrary, even turn out to be a way to actually make it a footnote in the end. Someday, the GDR might be a subspecialty of specialists for German history, and nothing else.

In his critical review of the recently published anthology Erinnerungs-orste der DDR (Memory Sites of the GDR), Klaus-Dietmar Henke 2 See Franziska Augstein, “Die Zone”, in Erinnerungs-orste der DDR, ed. Martin Sabrow (Munich, 2009), 451-459.
raises the question of why the GDR should be remembered at all, and what aspects of it are particularly worthy of recollection. He is skeptical about the very sense of what he sees happening in this collection of short, sometimes very impressionistic essays initiated by the leading expert of East German memory culture, Martin Sabrow, from the Potsdam Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung. A canon of GDR memorabilia is created in which not only Bautzen, Die Mauer, and Die Partei, but also Die Kinderkripppe, and Die Puhdys, Das Sandmännchen, Der Trabant, and Die Platte are discussed as candidates for becoming lieux de memoire allegedly contributing to Germany’s sense of identity. (Ironically the essays of those authors who deny the suitability of their respective object for functioning as a future Erinnerungsort der DDR figure among the best of the collection.) All of these related GDR reminiscences, so Henke’s contention, will not serve as national memory sites:

I think this remark points the way. The most important thing to remember about the GDR, which should earn it a place in the main text of world history, is the circumstances under which it ended. While listening to Professor Harsch’s presentation, I asked myself why the term “revolution” did not appear a single time (except for a reference to the Russian Revolution of 1917, which, however, is now considered an ordinary coup d’état by the majority of experts of Soviet history)—and this in this very year, 2009, in which public debates are replete with references to the miraculous sequence of events that culminated in what have been called “revolutions” in several ways: a “peaceful” one in Germany, an even more peaceful one, namely the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia, and a tragically bloody one—costing more than one thousand lives—in Romania.

To make a case for a respectable place for the GDR in world history, we must go beyond Henke’s remark. Not only was this the first time Germans were able to carry a democratic revolution to a successful
end, reversing a century-old tradition of failed democratic revolu-
tions, but their actions simultaneously contributed to closing the
chapter of the history of modern dictatorships in Europe, hopefully
for the last time. Earlier German revolutions were marked by their
propensity to turn nationalist or imperialist; thus the Nazis’ rise to
power was the ultimate perversion of “revolution” in modernity. The
German revolution of 1989, by contrast, was part of a larger project
of revolutionary changes uniting, and not dividing the continent.
Starting as a mass revolt in Poland in the early 1980s, the revolution
was carried on as reform within the system in Hungary, and—while
being supported by glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union—
reached its definite point of no return with mass mobilization in
the GDR and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

To conclude, and to put this in a wider, world historical context, let me
quote the Oxford historian Timothy Garton Ash. He recently argued
that, “1989 was the best moment in European history.” But he also
added: “For it was probably the last time, at which Europe was at the
center of history. [...] The Weltgeist is elsewhere,” namely in Asia.4

One may conclude: Now that the continent is more unified then ever,
and the Cold War has been overcome, Europe will lose its weight
as the center stage for international power relations and for mass
mobilizations which once ended in mass murder and destruction,
but which also brought down whole empires. Of course, this will
not make Europe a footnote in world history; rather, it will become
a highly relevant province of global history, and East Germany and
its GDR legacy will remain right at its very center.5 We specialists
of German contemporary history should focus on inscribing the
making of the GDR, as well as its revolutionary unmaking, into
this most recent contemporary history of Europe—and not just of
Germany.6 Only then it will not be so easy to dismiss the GDR as a
footnote of world history.

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pean History and Public Spheres (Studienverlag/Transaction Publishers, 2009).-His publications include: Volkspolizei: Herrschaftspraxis und öffentliche Ordnung
im SED-Staat 1952-1968 (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 2003) and Conflicted
Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories (New York and Oxford 2007),
edited with Konrad H. Jarausch); as well as several articles on film in Cold War
and post-Cold War Germany.

4 Timothy Garton Ash during a debate at the Vienna Burghtheater, February 22,
2009, sponsored by the Institut für die Wissenschaft des Menschen (IWM), quoted
5 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and
Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ, 2000).
6 See Thomas Lindenberger and Martin Sabrow, “Das Findelkind der Zeitge-
schichte: Zwischen Verinselung und Europäisierung: Die Zukunft der DDR-
THE DIPLOMATIC PATH TO GERMAN UNITY
A TRIBUTE TO AMERICAN FRIENDS
HERTIE LECTURE, DELIVERED AT THE GHI’S GERMAN UNIFICATION SYMPOSIUM, WASHINGTON DC,
OCTOBER 2, 2009

Frank Elbe
FORMER AMBASSADOR, FOREIGN MINISTRY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

A West German foreign service officer since 1972, Frank Elbe served as Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s Director of Cabinet (Chief of Staff) from 1987 to 1992. In this capacity he participated in the “Two Plus Four” negotiations that resolved the international aspects of German unification. He later served as German Ambassador to India, Japan, Poland, and Switzerland, before retiring in 2005. His publications include Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Ecken: Der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit (Baden-Baden, 1993; co-authored with Richard Kiessler) which has been translated into English as A round table with sharp corners: The diplomatic course to German unity (Baden-Baden, 1994).

Nothing has symbolized the final end of the postwar order as much as the unification of Germany: Former allies relinquished their rights from the period of occupation, Germans regained full sovereignty over their internal and external affairs, the Soviet Union removed its troops from Germany and Poland, and the division of Europe was overcome. My lecture carries the subtitle “Tribute to American Friends.” It needs no lengthy explanation that President Bush and Secretary of State Baker were Germany’s most crucial allies in those decisive months. The United States, more than any other Western government, could assess the global dimension of Gorbachev’s foreign policies and their impact on the restructuring of postwar Europe.¹

The opening of the wall on November 9, 1989 came as an unforeseen, eruptive event that had to spark worries among Germany’s neighbors about the established European security architecture. Stability had always been a top issue in German politics. West Germany itself had, in fact, exercised a policy of self-restraint for decades. In the “Letter on German Unity” of August 1970, which the West German government delivered to the Soviets in the context of the signing of the Moscow Treaty, it was stated that it would be West Germany’s “political objective to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will recover its unity in free self-determination.” This meant that West Germany was giving first priority to the state of peace in Europe—you might call it our sacrifice for stability.

¹ I wish to mention the friendship, fairness, and assistance of all those Americans who shared our concerns and enthusiasm, who instilled the process with great ideas, and who worked hard without giving themselves a break during these few months of long days and short nights: Bob Blackwill, Bob Kimmitt, Condoleezza Rice, Denis Ross, Ray Seitz, Margaret Tutwiler, and the man who normally ranks at the end of the alphabetical list, but who surely was the greatest strategic thinker during this eventful time, namely Bob Zoellick, with whom I worked most closely, and in a spirit of trust that I would call unique in my diplomatic career.
Therefore, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Federal Republic considered it essential that unification should proceed within a stable European framework. President von Weizsäcker echoed Willy Brandt’s words: “Now what belongs together is growing together,” but he also added a warning against “mushrooming growth.” Chancellor Helmut Kohl has been criticized for presenting the idea of a Vertragsgemeinschaft, a confederation between the two German states. But could he really have gone any further at this juncture? Then, all of a sudden, the call for freedom in East Germany became a call for unity. The East German demonstrators, who had originally been shouting “We are the people,” began shouting “We are one people.” Now we feared that European stability might be jeopardized more by “going too slowly than by going too fast.”

The events of November 9, 1989 obviously gave rise to grave concerns in the Kremlin. Ironically, it had been perestroika and Gorbachev’s public warning in East Berlin—“Life punishes those who fall behind”—that had made the peaceful revolution in East Germany possible. However, the Soviet leadership’s sympathy for the upheavals in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had its limits. The safety of the over 300,000 Soviet soldiers and their families could not be compromised. Under these circumstances, the Soviet side made it very clear that it wished the GDR to continue to exist as an independent state within the sphere of influence of the Warsaw Pact. In hindsight, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze admitted that this initial Soviet attitude was far removed from Moscow’s eventual position during the last lap of the Two Plus Four process. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were ready to accept German unification only in a long-term perspective. The division of Germany ran contrary to the political ideals of perestroika, and there was a basic moral feeling that did not accept the division of a country and a people for political reasons. Shevardnadze asked: Which Germany better suits our interests—a divided one that stockpiles bitter and potentially explosive insults, one that harbors a dangerous inferiority complex and a feeling of humiliation, one that in no way lives up to its intellectual, economic, creative, and cultural potential, or a united, democratic Germany that takes its place amongst those sovereign over their own destiny?

From the very beginning it was clear that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze would not oppose German unification. Gorbachev recognized his dilemma: He would not be able to explain it to his people if he lost
the GDR. Yet he would not be able to keep the GDR afloat without West Germany’s assistance.

Bonn had been assured of political support from Washington at a very early stage. I refer to the speech of President Bush in Mainz in May 1989 and to his interview in *The New York Times* just fifteen days before the Berlin Wall came down, in which he said, “I don’t share the concern that some European countries have about a reunified Germany.” Already in the summer of 1989 we sensed a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy. Jim Baker arrived at the State Department in early 1989, at the time of bitter conflict within NATO over the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles. Initially, Baker was not happy with the German position, but he was open to listening, and he eventually helped to work out a compromise at the NATO summit in May that postponed modernization.

In his speech in Mainz, President Bush described the United States and Germany as “partners in leadership.” What seemed, at first, just a flattering remark was, in fact, an early, calculated recognition that Germany would play a key role in the further development of East-West relations, especially with regard to the Soviet Union. The offer of “partners in leadership” was made to ensure that the United States would maintain its option of influencing the future course of events, since developments in Europe could have an incalculable effect on the American role in Europe. Given the turbulence in Eastern Europe, the American government realized that its own role on the European continent might be at stake. In his speech to the NATO council in Brussels on December 4, 1989, President Bush made his position very clear: “Of course, we have all supported German reunification for four decades.” The American President was referring to nothing less than a legal obligation. In the Paris Agreements of October 1954, the three Western allies of the Federal Republic had pledged to bring about the reunification of Germany through peaceful means. And for decades its NATO partners had supported German unity with stock phrases in their communiqués. NATO’s program of détente, the Harmel Report of 1967, emphasized the functional aspect of a satisfactory solution to the German question for the peace process in Europe as a whole.

For all his enthusiasm, however, President Bush stipulated an important condition in his Brussels speech of early December 1989: A unified Germany must be a member of NATO. The United States
strongly supported unification, because it made it more likely that the German people would voluntarily stay within Western structures. The stipulation of united Germany’s membership in NATO also made unification more palatable for Great Britain and France since remaining American troops on the continent were viewed as a counterbalance to a stronger Germany. By supporting German unification, the United States could best safeguard its presence in Europe and influence the shaping of the East-West process. This was the attitude that the United States displayed at the Malta summit of December 2–3, 1989, where Bush left Gorbachev in no doubt about his interest in German unification.

By the end of 1989, the political landscape of Europe had changed. The Berlin Wall had come down, Poland had a freely elected government, Hungary had declared itself a republic, Václav Havel had been elected president of Czechoslovakia, and the Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceauşescu, had been shot. Two primary concerns determined German foreign policy at the end of the year. First, what type of format was suitable for negotiating German unification? Second, how could the question of united Germany’s membership in NATO, which matched West German security interests, be resolved so that the Soviet Union would not withhold approval? Under no circumstances did we wish to seek a peace treaty. This was an outdated concept, and the Treaty of Versailles had given the term a negative connotation. Considering Germany’s achievements in the forty-five years after the war, it was altogether inappropriate. The key issue was: How could we push through the membership of a united Germany in NATO?

In a speech at the Protestant Academy in Tutzing on January 31, 1990, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher took the initiative. He called for NATO membership for united Germany and rejected the notion of a neutral Germany. However, he added an essential reservation to the demand for NATO membership: “Notions that the part of Germany that today constitutes the GDR should be drawn into the military structures of NATO would block attempts at getting closer.” He continued: “It is NATO’s task to clarify unequivocally that whatever may happen to the Warsaw Pact, there will be no extension of NATO territory to the East, i.e. nearer the borders of the Soviet Union. This guarantee will be significant for the Soviet Union and its attitude.” He also spoke of the future role of both alliances. They would shift from confrontation to cooperation and should become elements of cooperative security structures in the whole of Europe.
Genscher’s Tutzing Formula constituted a sound approach that balanced the security interests of all concerned, but it also created misgivings in Germany. In all parties, there were doubts that Gorbachev, beleaguered as he was by the conservatives in his own party, could permit NATO membership for the GDR. To avoid any misinterpretations, the German Foreign Office had distributed advance copies of the Tutzing speech in English, French, and Russian to the foreign ministers’ offices in London, Paris, Moscow, and Washington. While Genscher was speaking in Tutzing, I flew to Washington for talks with Bob Zoellick and Denis Ross about the proposed NATO formula. They warmly welcomed the Tutzing speech; they even seemed quite relieved. As far as the format of the negotiations was concerned, they proposed a “mechanism of six”: Negotiations on German unification should be conducted between the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. This made sense, since the four victorious powers not only had rights, but also responsibilities with regard to Germany as a whole, and to Berlin. The following day, Genscher arrived in Washington for talks with Baker. He suggested that the proposed mechanism of six should be called “Two Plus Four.” It was important to erase all memories of the humiliating negotiations in Geneva in 1954. For this reason, neither “Four Plus Two” nor a “Council of Six” nor “Four Plus Zero” were acceptable. The Baker-Genscher meeting strengthened the personal bond between these two very different men, much to the advantage of the unification process.

Now that the West Germans had clearly expressed themselves in favor of unified Germany’s membership in NATO, the Americans actively promoted the process.

Baker immediately swung into action. He filled in British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd and French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and briefed journalists on his flight to Moscow on February 7. In Moscow, he sought to convince Gorbachev and Shevardnadze that both German states and the four victorious powers should sit down to negotiations at one table. Baker pointed out that it would be “unrealistic” to imagine that an economic power like Germany would remain neutral once it was united. In fact, he warned General Secretary Gorbachev of the danger that a united Germany might pose, if it were to make arrangements for its own security. Would the Soviets like to see a reunited Germany outside NATO without U.S. troops, and potentially in possession of its own nuclear weapons, or would they prefer a united Germany firmly integrated in NATO, with the
guarantee that NATO would not extend its territory eastwards by even a centimeter? Baker’s persistent lobbying carried the weight and authority of the leading Western power. In a way, he took on the position of a bailsmans or trustee vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, which was very important in this situation. Baker left a three-page letter drafted by his adviser, Denis Ross, with the German ambassador in Moscow to prepare Kohl for his talks with Gorbachev. In a personal letter that Bush sent to Kohl prior to Kohl’s meeting with Gorbachev, the American President also assured his West German counterpart that he could count on the support of his American allies in the German question. But at the same time, Bush urged Kohl to insist on united Germany remaining within NATO when he met with Mikhail Gorbachev. At a meeting in the Kremlin on February 10, 1990, Chancellor Kohl received Gorbachev’s consent to go ahead with unification. As the Soviet news agency TASS put it, “there was no difference of opinion that the Germans themselves must resolve the question of the unity of the German nation and that they themselves decide in what time frame, at what speed, and under what conditions they wish to bring about unity.”

On their return from Moscow, Genscher and his aides immediately flew on to Ottawa for the “Open Skies” conference, a meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers. At the traditional “Deutschland breakfast” that preceded NATO conferences, Foreign Ministers Genscher, Dumas, Baker, and Hurd agreed on the framework for future negotiations on Germany. Baker and Genscher then individually met with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. They faced a hesitant Soviet colleague, surprised by the speed of the Western initiative, and obviously without any directions from Moscow. Shevardnadze interrupted the talks with Baker and Genscher...
several times for cross-checks with Moscow on the phone. He informed us about the Polish request for a final recognition of the border between Poland and Germany. At 3:00 p.m. in the Canadian capital, all six foreign ministers met for a photo session and presented their agreement to begin the Two Plus Four talks on German unification.

The news spread like wildfire in the conference hall in Ottawa. It did not meet with approval in all quarters. The Italian Foreign Minister, de Michelis, and his Dutch colleague, van den Broek, were extremely upset and demanded that any negotiations on German unity must also involve them. Genscher had great difficulty in clarifying that the number of participants—besides both concerned German states—had necessarily to be restricted to those states that, as a result of the war and postwar period, had rights as well as responsibilities with regard to Germany as a whole. Undoubtedly, most NATO partners felt steamrolled by the events. The Canadian hosts complained that history had been made in their capital and they had not been informed in advance. The American diplomat Bob Blackwill quoted a Canadian who said: “We felt like a piano player on the ground floor of a whorehouse, who has some sort of idea of what is going on in the upper floors.”

Of course, we had no intention to offend anyone. We were under colossal pressure to keep up the momentum that we had gained in Moscow. Germany’s main negotiating goals were as follows: no peace treaty; termination of the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers; full sovereignty of united Germany; German membership in NATO; withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Germany within a foreseeable, fixed time period; finalization of the border issue between Poland and united Germany; and no “singularization” of
Germany. The non-singularization of Germany meant that Germany should not be different from any other state after unification. To refer to a well-known quote from Orwell, “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others,” it meant that Germany could not accept a variant of that saying, “All animals are equal, but one is unequal.”

The first meeting of the Two Plus Four process took place on March 14, 1990 in Bonn, only four days ahead of the first democratic elections in the GDR. It was a meeting at the level of the political directors of the foreign ministries: Dieter Kastrup (FRG), Ernst Krabatsch (GDR, later replaced by Gerold von Braunmühl), Bertrand Dufourcq (France), Juli Kvzinsky (USSR), John Weston (Britain), and Robert Zoellick (U.S.). The negotiators were all experienced diplomats supported by outstanding legal and security experts. From a technical point of view, there seemed to be no difficulty drafting a text that would resolve all issues. The delegations, in fact, started drafting texts, virtually ignoring unresolved political issues, and they got very far.

As Shevardnadze put it, the “mother of all questions” was the future military status of Germany. The Soviet leadership had to find solutions that were acceptable to the opponents of perestroika and palatable to the Soviet people. Hard-core Soviet conservatives were under the illusion that they could use the fact that Soviet troops were still stationed in the GDR to dictate the terms of reunification, insist on Germany leaving NATO, and create a confederation of the German states. No Soviet General Secretary could afford to disregard public opinion at home. The people had suffered a very high death toll in World War II. At first glance, the idea of a united Germany in NATO appeared as if the outcome of World War II were being reversed. How was the collapse of the postwar order of Yalta and Potsdam, for which the Soviet Union had fought, to be justified?

Because this critical mass of security aspects overburdened the original Two Plus Four negotiating forum, German unification was not only discussed at the Two Plus Four venues—namely Bonn, Berlin, Paris, and Moscow—but also followed up on in many parallel meetings and conferences, including Windhoek (Namibia), Geneva, Brest, Münster, Washington, Turnberry, Copenhagen, Dublin, Houston, London, and especially Archys. The frequent meetings between Genscher and Shevardnadze did not cause any irritation amongst the Western Allies; quite the contrary. The United States itself participated in “this
circus with many rings," as Zoellick described it. Indeed, in the Washington-Moscow-Bonn triangle a transparency and cooperation was achieved that would have been unthinkable before.

The Washington summit between Bush and Gorbachev at the end of May 1990 brought to life the question of alliance membership, on whose outcome everything hung. President Bush broached the alliance question directly: "Why don't we let the Germans decide?" Gorbachev's totally unexpected and astonishing answer was: "That is a good idea. Let the Germans decide!" Zoellick remembers that Gorbachev's entourage, Falin in particular, was horrified. Groundwork for this breakthrough had already been laid during Baker's February visit to Moscow. The night before Baker met Gorbachev, Zoellick had had an ingenious idea. He, Denis Ross, Ray Seitz, and Condoleezza Rice drafted nine points to be presented to Gorbachev by Baker. These nine points touched upon U.S.-Soviet ties, and summarized the conceptual work of the political directors. It was a condensation of arguments that Gorbachev would have never received through his own apparatus. But the job was far from being done. Would Gorbachev stick to his guns? Could he survive the Communist Party Congress having made such a commitment? Now each side had to make efforts to present the other with suitable arguments, with an eye to the impending 28th Communist Party Congress in mid-July. Tarassenko and Stepanov, Shevardnadze's closest aides, revealed to us the paradox of the strategic thinking in the Soviet Foreign Ministry: "If we go too fast there will be no unification, and if we go too slowly there will be no unification either!" What this meant was that one had to reduce the speed in view of the sensitivities among Russians, while at the same time stepping on the gas so that opponents would not have time to put up a concerted front against the unification treaty.
Meetings in Turnberry, Brest, Münster, and London aimed at supporting Gorbachev publicly; diplomacy turned into a public-relations exercise. NATO foreign ministers sent the “Message of Turnberry,” extending a “hand of friendship” to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. Genscher and Baker had been lobbying for this message among their colleagues. What Baker told his NATO colleagues contains a piece of wisdom that has gradually petered out in the two decades since unification:

Moving in this direction does not require a revolution in our thinking. It just requires that we adapt to new realities and build upon our proven collective defense structure a broader notion of security. This notion must recognize that NATO cannot only prevent war but can also build peace. And that the way to build the peace is to reassure the Central and Eastern Europeans and the Soviets that they will not be left out of the new Europe.

The “Hand of Friendship” thus sent an early signal, allowing the Soviet leadership to adjust to the new developments well before the 28th Communist Party Congress.

After a long day of consultations in Brest on June 11, Shevardnadze took Genscher to his brother’s grave. Akai Shevardnadze and 230 other soldiers had fallen while defending the garrison in Brest in the first days of Hitler’s aggression against Russia. The joint laying of flowers at the grave was broadcast nationwide by Soviet television several times that day, and it sent a thoughtful message to the Russian people. Genscher had selected Münster for their next venue, a city that in a special way represented peace and justice and the right to freely choose one’s alliance with others. In October 1648, the Westphalian Peace Treaty had been concluded here, ending the Thirty Years’ War in Europe.

When the 28th Communist Party Congress met from July 2 to 13, Gorbachev not only survived, but actually managed to consolidate his position. It is very clear that the declaration of the sixteen NATO heads of state and government at the London summit that took place on July 5–6 had strengthened Gorbachev’s hand. There can be no doubt that developments would have taken a completely different course if Gorbachev’s opponents had gotten their way at the party congress. Only a few days after his political victory, Gorbachev
gave the green light to proceed with unification during his talks with Kohl in Moscow and the Caucasus on July 15–16. The agreement covered all the points that had been developed during the Two Plus Four negotiations. The understanding about the status of the combined German armed forces and the future size of the Bundeswehr, however, were new elements.

The Soviet side now wished to step up the pace so that the treaty could be signed at the meeting of the foreign ministers scheduled to take place in Moscow on September 12, 1990. They came within a hair’s breadth of not signing the treaty at all. When London’s political director, John Weston, insisted that exercises of foreign troops must be allowed on the former territory of the GDR despite the fact that the relevant passage in the treaty had already been drafted—namely “that foreign troops can neither be ... stationed nor deployed in this part of Germany”—the Soviets called off the signing scheduled for the next day. Eventually, this problem was also resolved, and on September 12 the four Allied Powers and the two German states signed the Two Plus Four Treaty relinquishing all Allied occupation rights over the two Germanys and Berlin and thus paving the way for German unification.

On the fringes of a special meeting of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in New York on October 1, 1990, the foreign ministers of the Two Plus Four process signed a document suspending the operation of Quadripartite Rights and Responsibilities. Thus, de facto, Germany became a sovereign state. One day later the foreign ministers of the CSCE states took note of the Two Plus Four document. It was a meaningful event, because it implied that German unification had taken place with the approval of...
the signatory states to the Final Act of Helsinki. On October 3, 1990, the GDR acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany according to Article 23 of the Basic Law. The United States was the first of the Four Powers to ratify the Two Plus Four Treaty. Ratification in Moscow, however, was the subject of a bitter controversy, and it was by no means certain. Before Ambassador Terechov handed over the Soviet instrument of ratification on March 15, 1991, Erich Honecker, the former head of the East German communist party and government, was taken from the GDR to a hospital in Moscow by a Soviet military aircraft, an important concession to Gorbachev’s foes in the Duma. This was most probably the last act in the Soviet exercise of power as an occupation force, because with the deposit of the last instrument of ratification Germany had attained full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.
FROM DESTRUCTION TO PRESERVATION:
JEWISH SITES IN GERMANY AND POLAND
AFTER THE HOLOCAUST

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In late 2001, I happened upon a small book in the stacks of Potsdam’s public library. It was a reprint of a publication prepared for the unveiling of the city’s synagogue in 1903. A short chronology of the building’s history was added at the end. The last entry noted the building’s destruction in 1958. “That’s late,” I thought to myself. To be sure, I had been thinking about urban reconstruction for some time; otherwise I probably would have just put the book back on the shelf and moved on. The summer before I arrived in Potsdam—fresh out of undergraduate studies on a Fulbright—I was reading any book I could find on urban space, historic preservation, and memory, feeling liberated to explore a new topic after my senior thesis and keeping my mind awake during a sleepy summer job. So I checked out the book, walked downstairs, and started looking for where the synagogue once stood, which ended up being just a couple of dozen feet away. I came across a block apartment building, constructed in the late 1950s like many across the Soviet bloc in the wake of de-Stalinization. I suspected that this was the spot, but was not certain. I had the synagogue’s prewar address, but no prewar map. It did not take long, though, before a small plaque, erected I discovered later in 1979, was staring at me: “The synagogue of the Potsdam Jewish community stood at this location. It was plundered and destroyed by the fascists on the night of November 9–10, 1938.” No mention of the wrecking ball in 1958, I noted curiously.

Several months later, I traveled to Cracow. I had studied East European and German history as an undergraduate, but was more of a “Germanist” at the time; a few phrases were all the Polish that I knew. Like just about every American in Cracow, I was a tourist, but I walked through the city’s preserved “Jewish district” with interest as a budding urban historian. I was struck that, after so many decades of neglect, this area was now being refurbished in a city with almost no Jewish population. Although Cracow never became one of “my” cities, it pushed me to think comparatively. Indeed, when I arrived back in the United States, I had a topic in hand. I now just
had to learn Polish and figure out how to frame it. The Polish would come, and I knew that I wanted to think broadly across space and time: I wanted to connect my two Potsdam and Cracow discoveries, to think about the destruction and preservation of Jewish spaces across national, political, and local borders. My dissertation is the outcome of my efforts to do that. It studies the material traces of Jewish life in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and the Polish People’s Republic (PPR) in the five urban landscapes of Berlin, Warsaw, Potsdam, Essen, and Wrocław (I decided against Cracow because it is an exceptional case in Poland, and in Europe, for that matter).

When I returned to Europe in 2005 to conduct my dissertation research, I initially thought that I was going to analyze these cities through the prism of memory. It gradually occurred to me, though, that my project involved more than just memory. It also involved tourism, nostalgia, historic preservation, urban modernism, and cosmopolitanism. It meant thinking as much about block apartment buildings as about debates on the Holocaust. I also realized over time that I was not just writing “Polish,” “German,” and “Jewish” history. The postwar history of Jewish sites is, at its core, about non-Jewish Germans and Poles encountering the material traces of Jewish life in the wake of genocide and ethnic hatred. But as I went from archive to archive, I discovered that many other figures acted in this postwar story—that the history of Jewish sites was transnational and multivocal, with roles for tourists, Jewish leaders, politicians, journalists, intellectuals, and dissidents. Similarly, I first thought that my argument was going to be about national and political differences: that the handling of Jewish sites would fall distinctly along the lines of the Oder-Neisse border and the Iron Curtain. But the deeper I probed, the more I realized that national, political, and local differences shaped a similar history across a diverse region. My aim became to explain the parallels as much as the divergences.

I have attempted to do so by focusing on Germany and Poland. I have selected these two countries not just because I happen to be more familiar with their histories, not just because they were the two countries that caught my traveling eye, or because the Fulbright commission wisely placed me in Potsdam rather than my first choice of Berlin. I have chosen them because several empirical factors bring these two cases together into a sensible comparison around, as the
historian Marc Bloch put it, “differing and, at the same time, related realities.” Few societies have faced the burden of the Holocaust—encountering those empty synagogues, streets, and cemeteries—quite as intensely as Germans and Poles have. It was, after all, in Germany that the “Final Solution” originated, and in Poland that it unfolded with the greatest brutality in the midst of its occupation by the Nazis. Moreover, no other European countries have received the amount of international attention regarding the legacies of the Holocaust that Germany and Poland have; Germany because of Nazism and Poland because it was once home to the world’s largest Jewish diaspora community. Finally, Jewish sites have dominated postwar German and Polish history as in few other places. To be sure, the problem of shattered Jewish spaces emerged across the continent after the Holocaust, but it has proven to be particularly palpable in Germany and Poland over the past sixty years.

I.

Indeed, the history of Jewish sites has unfolded in rather distinctive ways in Poland and Germany. In the early postwar decades, urban planners, historic preservationists, and local officials in both countries completed the destruction of numerous damaged Jewish sites, or allowed them to ruin by neglect, despite numerous protests from local and international Jewish leaders. International organizations, such as the World Jewish Congress, the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization, and the American Joint Distribution Committee, worked with the Central Council of Jews in Germany, the State Association of Jews in the GDR, the Central Committee of Jews in Poland, and the Religious Association of the Mosaic Faith in Poland to urge local and national officials to preserve Jewish sites. Jewish leaders were successful at times, particularly in West Germany. In 1956, after years of negotiations, the West German federal government finally agreed to maintain Jewish cemeteries as part of Konrad Adenauer’s policy of restitution. In East Germany and Poland, both Communist parties pursued policies toward Jews that oscillated between benign neglect and outright hostility. Jewish leaders encountered many difficulties in both Communist countries, but occasionally succeeded in protecting some Jewish sites.

The different political contexts of the Cold War shaped, then, the handling of Jewish sites, although not always as one might predict. In fact, the protection of Jewish cemeteries in West Germany proved to be an exception. Numerous synagogues were destroyed across the

1 Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (New York, 1953), 42.
Federal Republic just as in East Germany and Poland. In all three countries, Jewish leaders had little power to stop this destruction from happening, not least because they did not legally own these properties. In West Germany, restitution laws returned Jewish communal property to newly created successor organizations, which sold most of it to local governments with the idea of distributing the profits to Holocaust survivors throughout the world. West Germany’s Jewish communities could only reclaim the property that they were currently using (a tiny amount given the small size of the postwar communities). In East Germany and Poland, the party-state rejected restitution and confiscated all Jewish property. But while the reasons differed, the effect across the Iron Curtain was the same. In the FRG, GDR, and PPR, municipal officials controlled Jewish communal property and were the ones who decided what to do with it.

Their decisions led to destruction across the region throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Urban modernism and Stalinist socialist realism dominated urban reconstruction at this time in divided Germany and Poland. Both approaches had little regard for preserving much of anything, but many non-Jewish historic sites were reconstructed. Germans and Poles made deliberate choices about what to preserve from the ruins of war. In selecting what was culturally valuable, they were also making choices about what was not. In the 1950s and 1960s, Poles and Germans rarely perceived Jewish sites to be part of the national or local heritage worth maintaining.

In Warsaw, for example, the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR) restored the old town, while using the former Jewish district to construct a massive socialist-realist housing complex. In an eclectic blend of old and new, urban planners combined modernism, socialist realism, and historical reconstruction into one single rebuilding project. Historic preservationists meticulously rebuilt Warsaw’s old town in one of the largest historical reconstruction projects of postwar Europe. The old town became lined with staged “historic” buildings, which displayed the cathartic, redemptive survival of the city after the Nazi occupation. The old town became a space to experience, photograph, and witness reconstructed markers of the nation. This restorative impulse denied the irreversibility of time by claiming that Warsaw’s past had never truly been lost.

Brushing against the perimeter of the old town, Warsaw’s main Jewish district, Muranów, was never slated for restoration. It was
instead turned into a housing complex. In the late 1940s, the project’s main architect, Bohdan Lachert, initially sought to articulate the trauma of the area, which the Nazis destroyed as they crushed the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. He decided to build his apartments directly on top of the ruins, dramatizing the idea of Warsaw coming back to life from destruction. Lachert connected Muranów to Warsaw’s resurrection not just materially, but also symbolically; the project would serve as a kind of oblique architectural encounter with the abject past of the Holocaust. He left the front of the buildings unstuccoed with a dark red, rusty brick that would capture the somberness of the ghetto space. As Lachert explained, “the history of the great victory of the nation paid for through a sea of human blood, poured out for the sake of social progress and national liberation, will be commemorated in the Muranów project.”

But his ideas were strongly criticized in the early 1950s, as socialist realism swept across the Soviet bloc. Socialist realism aimed to document the triumph of communism over capitalism. In the built environment, it aimed to transcend the “cosmopolitan,” “bourgeois” functionalism of urban modernism by constructing buildings socialist in content and national in form. What this meant in practice was the construction of large, monumental, and ornate buildings across Eastern Europe. The PZPR decided to stucco Lachert’s buildings, and painted small designs with decorative ornaments on the white surface. Muranów was now to be a cheerful, bright, and colorful place for the working class. “New, bright houses grow on the ruins of the ghetto,” the main party newspaper wrote. “These houses and the forest of scaffolding that are rising up throughout all of Warsaw are evidence to the constantly growing power of peace and socialism.”

Whereas Warsaw’s old town was perceived as a great national loss that must be restored, its rubble sorted through for even the minutest architectural piece, Muranów was seen as scattered debris that could be shoveled up for the construction of the socialist future.

In Berlin, a similarly grandiose rebuilding scheme never emerged, in large part because of the city’s division. The large-scale competing Cold War projects of the Hansaviertel and Stalinallee were exceptions, but for the most part, rows of plain housing complexes dominated the postwar urban landscape of both Berlins. Numerous damaged historic buildings were demolished, including Berlin’s many synagogues. Jewish leaders in divided Berlin—home to the largest Jewish communities of West and East Germany—contested

this demolition. When the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED) decided to tear down the sanctuary of the New Synagogue in 1958, the East Berlin Jewish community was able to save the building’s façade. In West Berlin, the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO) often had conflicts with district officials about Jewish sites.

The most striking example was the synagogue on Fasanenstrasse in the Charlottenburg district. The massive stone structure survived the war intact, but the Nazis heavily destroyed its interior and roof. After the war, district authorities showed no interest in providing basic forms of protection after repeated cases of vandalism. By the early 1950s, the synagogue had become so run-down that the police deemed it a public safety threat and demanded that the JRSO erect a fence around the building. The JRSO was hardly amused. In a lengthy reply, it stated that it was not responsible for providing security for a building that the Nazis had destroyed. “The fact that the building is currently in such a condition that it provides safe haven for asocial elements and prostitutes is not because of wartime destruction but because of Kristallnacht,” it wrote. “We assume that your letter to us was processed just routinely without taking into consideration the peculiarity of this case.”

In 1957, the synagogue was demolished. A parking lot was to be built in its place, but at the last moment the SPD-dominated government of Berlin intervened and decided to erect a Jewish community center instead.

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Similarly, in Essen, the city’s towering stone synagogue remained abandoned for years after the war and fell into deep disrepair. Essen’s small Jewish community had no interest in maintaining the building, and the city government did nothing to protect it. Finally, in 1956, city officials decided to do something with the synagogue. In an odd move, they turned it into the House of Industrial Design. The interior of the building was changed to exhibit the wonders of the German economic miracle. This transformation of Essen’s synagogue starkly uncovers the ambivalence of one local community to the absence of Jewish life after the Holocaust. In contrast to the GDR and Poland, the West German state developed an official policy of restitution and German-Jewish cooperation, but this shift on the federal level did not penetrate deeply into local society and politics during the 1950s. The few protests that emerged in Essen never broached the issue, which remained eerily absent as the synagogue remained in damaged form, trees and grass growing out from its charred cupola, pieces of stone falling off its façade onto the nearby street—why no one was around in the first place to take care of the building. The Essen synagogue marked the murderous expulsion of Jews from the city. It symbolized an anxious, abject past that reminded Esseners of their own involvement in a dictatorship of war and genocide. Turning the synagogue into an exhibition of consumer products was an attempt to control this anxiety by sanitizing the building of its past.

In Potsdam, the synagogue was not transformed but torn down. The building, erected in 1903, survived both Kristallnacht and allied bombs. With a mere two survivors after the war, a Jewish community did not reemerge in the city until decades later, after the collapse

of Communism, with the migration of Russian Jews to reunified Germany. The synagogue remained standing until 1958 when the city decided to tear it down to build an apartment complex. Few in Potsdam voiced much concern about the decision. The GDR’s Institute for Historic Preservation, which for years had been challenging the destruction of Potsdam’s historic buildings, made no effort to save the building; it did not perceive the synagogue to be a site worthy of preservation. In the early postwar years, most preservationists understood their task largely in terms of “age value,” and emphasized the protection of buildings predating the mid-nineteenth century. In Potsdam, the youngest structure on its list of historic monuments was a home built in 1838. But the synagogue’s young age was not the only reason for its exclusion. In the 1950s, East German preservationists adhered to a classical understanding of protecting “national” heritage. The canon of historic sites in the GDR often included traditional examples such as town halls, castles, and churches. The party used historic preservation to emphasize the distinctly “German” aspects of its regime. At the same time, the SED aimed to develop “a progressive, democratic culture” that stood in direct opposition to cultural developments in West Germany, calling for “a resolute and ruthless fight against all manifestations of neo-fascist, reactionary culture and decadence.” It involved, in a phrase, “resistance against all cosmopolitan tendencies.” After the SED’s campaign in 1951–52 against “cosmopolitanism,” Jews and their cultural heritage became suspiciously linked to the West. In short, city officials, party leaders, and historic preservationists ignored the synagogue partly because it was a Jewish site. The synagogue fell outside the culturally constructed boundaries of the historic; it never received the kind of attention that other historic structures in Potsdam did.

5 “Objekliste der künstlerischen Baudenkmale (Einzelobjekte),” 1956, Potsdam Stadtarchiv, file 388.
7 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA, 1997).
Prejudice against Jews was clearest, though, in Communist Poland. Wrocław, a city with a shifting history under Piast, Bohemian, Austrian, Prussian, and German rule, became part of Poland in 1945 with the westward shift of the country’s border. Portrayed after the war as having eternally “Polish” roots, Wrocław expunged its most recent status as Breslau and became “Polish,” complete with the expulsions of Germans and the forced resettlement of Poles. As the most important city on Poland’s new frontier, Wrocław was key to the regime’s integration of the “recovered territories” into the rest of Poland. As Gregor Thum has shown, the state carefully reconstructed the city’s old town and churches to make Wrocław “Polish.” None of the city’s Jewish sites fit into this national recovery. In 1954, the Socio-Cultural Association of Jews in Poland noted after a visit to the Jewish cemetery on Lotnicza Street that its grounds were “in a condition of complete neglect.” It also discovered disturbing signs of vandalism: “It was found that countless graves had been dug up with scattered human remains. The graves have been systematically dug up in search of gold teeth and valuables.” The city’s only surviving synagogue also fell into terrible condition after years of neglect. In 1966, local officials even closed the building down as a physical hazard, forcing Wrocław’s small Jewish community to vacate their own synagogue. In 1973, the state confiscated the building. Thereafter, the synagogue continued to suffer from vandalism and neglect, as the city did nothing with it for the next two decades.

II.

But the ravages of time and the bulldozer did not destroy every Jewish site in postwar Germany and Poland. Jewish sites were, in fact, some of the last ruins of the war located on otherwise reconstructed streets. By the early 1970s, a growing number of Germans, Poles, and Jews started to become interested in preserving them. Their efforts were small and local at first: East Berliners cleaning up tombstones at the Jewish cemetery in the district of Weißensee; Varsovians doing the same at their Jewish cemetery on Okopowa Street; Esseners demanding that the synagogue be returned to its

8 Gregor Thum, Die fremde Stadt: Breslau 1945 (Berlin, 2003).

9 TSKZ to Ministry of Culture and Art, July 15, 1954, Archiwum Akt Nowych, 22/43.

10 Ibid.
prewar interior. This interest in Jewish sites gradually expanded beyond the local level. By the mid-1980s, Jewish sites were attracting national and international attention. A number of restoration efforts soon followed: In Essen, city officials, local citizens, and historians restored the city’s synagogue to its original interior design; East Germany’s political leadership decided on the 85-million-mark restoration of the New Synagogue in East Berlin that had been left bombed-out for four decades; and the PZPR restored Warsaw’s only remaining synagogue and staged a massive international event at the former site of the ghetto, its rubble buried under apartment complexes and tree-lined avenues constructed in the 1950s and 1960s. In a region with almost no Jews, a veritable renaissance of Jewish culture started to take place in the built environment.

This transformation unfolded for a number of reasons. In the late 1960s and ’70s, longings for a “lost” past swept across parts of Europe and the world. Global protest, economic insecurity, and disillusionment challenged the modern, optimistic belief in progress. Modernity had not just failed to produce constant improvement, but had caused death, inequality, imperialism, and repression in both its democratic and communist guises. In the built environment, modernity’s destructive impulses were on clear display in the rows of plain, functional buildings that replaced the city’s historic, particular form. This critique of modernity was expressed in multiple ways, but one of the most common was an interest in the historic. In the built environment, people became concerned about the few ruins left around them.
The rediscovery of Jewish sites was part of this broader postmodern embrace of the historic, but it also emerged for specific reasons across national and political borders. In East Germany and Poland, Jewish sites became a politically contested issue, as ruling elites experienced growing pressure, both domestically and internationally, to rethink their earlier anti-Jewish policies. Just as the SED and PZPR were looking to improve their image abroad in the early 1980s, Jewish sites started attracting attention from tourists, Jewish leaders, and foreign journalists. International interest turned Jewish sites into a political issue that the SED and PZPR had to mitigate. Both parties selectively restored Jewish sites in their capital cities and held events commemorating the Holocaust. But in doing so, they only made the problem worse, as international attention grew stronger, and segments of society dismissed their sudden embrace of Jewish culture as insincere. Jewish sites became another issue that divided state and society as Communism weakened across Eastern Europe.

This conflict over Jewish sites was particularly strong in Poland because of its “anti-Zionist” campaign. In 1967–68, the PZPR targeted Jews in the largest anti-Jewish assault of post-Holocaust Europe. Some 13,000 Jews fled the country. Several factors contributed to the rise of this campaign: fractional divisions in the PZPR, resistance to Communist rule, the nationalization of Polish Communism, conflict in the Middle East, and the anti-Zionism that swept across the Soviet bloc in 1967–68. What is important here, though, is that it stimulated a substantial debate among intellectuals, writers, and dissidents about Polish-Jewish relations. The year 1968 reawakened the “Jewish problem” (problem żydowski) among segments of Poland’s intelligentsia and general population. The anti-Zionist campaign shattered the postwar notion that Jews

had vanished from Poland. Few Jews lived in the country anymore, but their absence increasingly provoked discussion and reflection. By the early 1980s, Poland was experiencing its most intense dialogue about its Jewish minority since 1945. Most of those involved in the discussions were associated with the opposition and/or the progressive Catholic intelligentsia. Some Poles became interested in discussing Polish-Jewish relations in part as they worked through what a more humane, post-Communist Poland might look like.

Such direct tension between state and society was less overt in West Germany. Jewish sites in the FRG never became a nationally or internationally contested problem that the federal state had to step in to resolve. West Germany had developed strong relations with the United States and Israel during the postwar years. Thus, Jewish sites remained largely a local issue. As the Holocaust became widely discussed in the 1980s, historians, religious leaders, politicians, and ordinary citizens, typically on the Left, challenged the early postwar handling of Jewish sites, and conflicts over neglected or transformed Jewish sites erupted across the country. Their sheer number is striking: the synagogue in Kippenheim was renovated and turned into a Jewish museum after serving as storage for agricultural products for over three decades; a citizens’ coalition fought to preserve the archaeological remnants of Frankfurt’s earlier Jewish community; a controversy erupted as a new mall was built on part of the Jewish cemetery in Hamburg; the synagogue in Rendsburg was turned into a Jewish museum after functioning as a fish smokehouse since 1939; local residents pushed city officials to place an exhibition on the Third Reich in Essen’s synagogue; a group of citizens in Berlin-Schöneberg researched the history of their district’s Jewish past and developed a memorial route to inscribe the absence of the Jewish community in the urban environment. The list could go on much longer.

In three different states, then, Jewish sites became of interest to a variety of social actors who contested dominant memories and politics. The 1980s proved to be pivotal years in West Germany, Poland, and East Germany. In the PPR and GDR, intellectuals, dissidents, and ordinary citizens got involved in efforts to restore Jewish sites in part to contest the regime, while in the FRG leftist politicians and activists acted in part to challenge the Christian Democratic demand for normalizing the Nazi past. At the same time, Jewish tourism and international attention about the Holocaust were increasing in the two Germanys and Poland. By the early 1980s,
tourists, international Jewish leaders, and foreign journalists began to pay attention to the material traces of Jewish life. This interest was strongest in Poland in the wake of 1968 as American and Israeli Jewish leaders became concerned about the state of Jewish life in the country. But divided Germany also received international attention, and the two states competed with each other over embracing “Jewishness” in the 1980s. West Berlin finally approved the construction of the Berlin Jewish Museum at the height of the GDR’s celebration of Kristallnacht, while Erich Honecker’s regime restored the Adass Yisroel Cemetery in East Berlin in response to West German newspaper coverage about its neglected condition.

Since the collapse of communism in 1989, this growing interest in Jewish sites has only increased. Tourists in the tens of thousands from the United States, Israel, Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere have been traveling to Poland and, increasingly, Germany in search of the “Jewish past,” while Germans and Poles have continued to be drawn to almost anything perceived to be “Jewish.” People both far and near have become attracted to Jewish spaces for a variety of reasons—heritage tourism, growing transnational discussions about the Holocaust, postmodern fascinations with the historic, nostalgia for a lost past, and longings for cosmopolitanism in a globalizing world. While the motivations are varied, the effects are clear. Jewish culture has now become something to be touched, photographed, preserved, and displayed. Jewish sites have become what they were not just a few decades earlier: pieces of “heritage” that must be saved, “historic monuments” marked for their historical importance and perceived authenticity.

Some have bemoaned this restorative impulse for creating virtual Jewish worlds on a continent with no real Jews. Tourism and preservation have produced kitschy Jewish Disneylands of Klezmer music, restaurants, museums, and anything else that can be marketed as “Jewish.” Of course, this involves constructions, productions, and reifications of Jewishness, but it does not produce a fake variant of Jewish culture. For what is “really” Jewish and what is not? Who makes these distinctions in a world of multiple meanings of, and identifications with, Jewishness? Indeed, the contemporary obsession with what one imagines to be Jewish cannot simply be reduced to kitsch. A deeper impulse for something seemingly real underlies it. Authenticity is not some stable, measurable quality; it is above all an affective desire for what one perceives to be real and unique.

12 Ruth Ellen Gruber, Virtually Jewish: Reinventing Jewish Culture in Europe (Berkeley, 2002).
Walter Benjamin once defined authenticity as the “aura,” or the perception of distance and authority, that we give to works of art.\(^\text{13}\) Although he believed that modern technological reproduction was freeing art from this culturally endowed uniqueness, the opposite has actually occurred in our globalizing, capitalist world. The desire for perceived temporal distance and uniqueness has only increased through “the fear of inauthenticity” that global technological reproduction and consumption have provoked.\(^\text{14}\)

### III.

This impulse to restore Jewish sites represents a rather peculiar twist in postwar European history. Two societies that violently expunged Jews forty years earlier started inviting them back into the built environment. What are we to make of this change? I see in it a number of tensions, especially in the appropriation of Jewishness for the celebration of cosmopolitanism and tolerance in a post-fascist and post-communist world. Jews have long been linked to cosmopolitanism, for better or worse, depending on who is doing the interpreting. In the late nineteenth century, Jews were often portrayed as city-dwellers with innumerable undesirable characteristics: the rootless cosmopolitan who has no ties to the nation; the city-dwelling banker who causes economic misfortune; the urban criminal who brings prostitution, pornography, and incest. In an industrializing world, Jews were scorned and scapegoated for the social, cultural, and economic anxieties of modernity that they allegedly symbolized—what Shulamit Volkov long ago termed “antisemitism as a cultural code.”\(^\text{15}\)

In contemporary Europe, the opposite is now more often the case: The presence of Jews, or more precisely Jewish “heritage,” has become code for what one desires rather than dislikes. Restored Jewish sites have turned into public representations of imagined Jewish-gentile symbiosis and cosmopolitan tolerance. They are transformed into spaces of what I call more precisely redemptive cosmopolitanism. The recovery of material traces atones for the Holocaust, and displays tolerance for local, national, and transnational consumption. Jews are brought back into contemporary Polish and German society—they become “Jewish co-citizens” and “co-stewards of this land” (\textit{Mitbürger}, \textit{współobywatele}, \textit{współgospodarze}). One speaks of their “enormous contribution” to a “joint history” of symbiotic, harmonious relations broken only by brief periods of catastrophic and ethnic nationalism. This redemptive cosmopolitanism has a

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cathartic appeal and effect. The recovery of Jewish culture promises to absolve Germans and Poles of past sins by recalling the past, and reconstructing a tolerant, democratic society in the present. Jewish sites become signifiers of successful rehabilitation and respectful mourning. Tolerance manages the anxiety of the traumatic, abject past; it controls discomfort and aversion by displaying the Holocaust in public space.\textsuperscript{16} Whereas in the early postwar decades, Poles and Germans controlled the abject past by expelling it, they now manage the Holocaust by publicly embracing it.

In two countries on a dark continent that has seen genocide, war, expulsions, and ethnic hatred, redemptive cosmopolitanism has appeal, all the more so in Germany, as the primary source of Europe’s violent half century, and the country where the leftist belief in redemption through “enlightened knowledge” has deep roots stretching back to the early years of the Social Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{17} Redemptive cosmopolitanism is perhaps not altogether that harmful, given its alternative. But, at a moment when Jewish life in both countries is growing, Jews remain a “problem” to be discussed, used, and examined. Just as Jews are embraced, they are held at a distance. Jews are not “citizens” but “co-citizens” who are tolerated and used for political rehabilitation. Redemptive cosmopolitanism reinforces ethnic difference, even as it strives to overcome ethnic nationalism. It is rooted solipsistically in a politics of national recovery, even as it aims to imagine beyond the national collective self.

Indeed, redemptive cosmopolitanism harnesses the Holocaust for a kind of European utopianism as Germany and Poland return to “Europe” precisely at a moment when the continent remains divided socially and politically. Jews are now part of Europe in a way that some other minorities are not.\textsuperscript{18} The social, cultural, and legal position of immigrants who have come to Europe through postcolonial, labor, and asylum migration remains precarious. As these conflicts unfold, the embrace of the “Jewish co-citizen,” the display of restored Jewish sites, and the building of Jewish museums provide brief reprieves of imagined cosmopolitanism, pluralism, and tolerance.

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\textsuperscript{18} John R. Bowen, \textit{Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space} (Princeton, 2007); Rita Chin et al., \textit{After the Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe} (Ann Arbor, 2009); Ruth Mandel, \textit{Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging} (Durham, 2008); Jeffrey M. Peck, \textit{Being Jewish in the New Germany} (New Brunswick, 2006); Joan Wallach Scott, \textit{The Politics of the Veil} (Princeton, 2007).
My dissertation, “New Citizens: German Immigrants, African Americans, and the Reconstruction of Citizenship, 1865–1877,” explores the influence of German immigrants on the reshaping of American citizenship following the Civil War and emancipation. This project was initially inspired by questions that have long occupied historians of the United States. First, how did African-American men achieve citizenship rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments? In 1867, the Fourteenth Amendment defined American citizens as all persons born or naturalized in the United States. Three years later, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited states from using racial qualifications to limit citizens’ right to vote. Having inaugurated these measures, however, the federal government retreated from implementing them. My second question therefore became: Why were African-American rights not enforced? American historians have explained Reconstruction’s arc of hope and disappointment in many ways, but they have not investigated the impact of German immigrants.

There are many reasons to suspect that these newcomers played a distinctive role in Reconstruction. They made important contributions to the ruling Republican Party, they remained sensitive to European events, and they were acutely conscious of their own status as new American citizens.¹


“New Citizens” recovers the debate over citizenship within the German-language public sphere in the border states of Missouri and Ohio and evaluates its national ramifications. Missouri and Ohio offer variations on the significant midwestern German-American experience. In Missouri, a loyal slave state that determined its own Reconstruction policy, German immigrants were overwhelmingly Republican. In Ohio, Germans were as politically divided as the state as a whole. During the Civil War era, Ohio earned a reputation as a political bellwether. German immigrants made up just 7 to 8 percent of the population in each state, but Anglo-American politicians recognized that they, along with their American-born children, had the potential to become a formidable voting bloc, especially in St. Louis and Cincinnati, which were each considered about a third “German.”

German Ohioans and Missourians engaged in Reconstruction politics from within a public sphere segmented by language. Jürgen Habermas has theorized the public sphere as a deliberative arena lying between the state and the individual. Informed by historians who have elaborated and critiqued Habermas’s formulation, I conceptualized a German-language public sphere in which immigrants who had little else in common debated American politics and what it meant to be German-American. Historian John L. Brooke suggests that the concept of the public sphere has the power to bridge the gap between the “the old political history of law and the new political history of language.” He conceives of the public sphere as a communicative space of both authority and dissent, involving both persuasion (the unequal exchange of cultural signals, particularly language, that “set boundaries on the possible”) and deliberation (“the structured and privileged assessment of alternatives among legal equals leading to a binding outcome”). I examine these themes of authority and dissent by reading the editorial sentiment in the German-language press against private correspondence, the political record, election results, and reports of public celebrations and protests. My analysis explicates the interplay between persuasion and deliberation during Reconstruction.

Focusing on the public sphere has allowed me to examine how attitudes took shape without assuming that there was a German-American consensus. The German-language press reflected the fault lines in the German community: German Americans were divided by political affiliation, religious faith, place of residence, and class. In
the 1870s, one German American quipped, “Wherever four Germans gather, you will find five different ideas.” In cities such as St. Louis and Cincinnati, immigrants could choose between daily newspapers presenting Republican and Democratic viewpoints. The debates between competing editors often took on the intimate intensity of a bitter family feud. Even religious publications such as Cincinnati’s episcopally sanctioned Roman Catholic weekly, the Wahrheits-Freund (Friend of Truth), were drawn into the fray. Working-class immigrants also founded newspapers to express their interests. Disenchanted with the mainstream press, socialists in St. Louis established the Volksstimme des Westens (People’s Voice of the West). The activities of German Americans in rural areas received some coverage in urban dailies and weeklies. After all, entrepreneurial editors hoped to sell them subscriptions through the mail. Yet even quite small centers supported newspapers. The Fremont Courier in northeastern Ohio, for example, served a county of fewer than 2,300 German-born residents. Such weeklies reprinted editorials from larger newspapers, appending their support or disapproval. The very structure of the German-language press lends itself to a study of how differences among German Americans textured Reconstruction’s citizenship debates.

Citizenship is an elusive concept. Nineteenth-century Americans agreed that citizenship was a status predicated on membership in a national community and that it conferred a certain set of rights, but the term had various overlapping meanings. I seek to distinguish between the language of citizenship and the law of citizenship. Citizenship was, in part, a language of belonging. Since the founding of the United States, a sense of shared racial, ethnic, and religious heritage had permeated the language of citizenship. As political scientist Rogers M. Smith has observed, it was widely maintained that “America was by rights a white nation, a Protestant nation, a nation in which true Americans were native-born men with Anglo-Saxon ancestors.” Yet German immigrants exploited the fact that

5. Der deutsche Pionier 11 (1879): 144.
the Constitution had defined a community based largely on a civic vision. They stressed that American citizens were supposedly knit together by allegiance to a set of shared political ideals. In claiming citizenship for themselves, new Americans influenced how membership in the American community was imagined, debated, and contested.

The language of citizenship colored binding political and legal decisions. At its core, Reconstruction was a transformation in the law of citizenship that sought primarily to define what rights of citizenship should be conferred on the freedpeople, the former slaves. During the mid-nineteenth century, “Suffrage,” as historian Mitchell Snay puts it, “embodied the fullest manifestation of citizenship.”

The laws pertaining to naturalized foreign-born men indicated the strong connection between American citizenship and the right to vote, but legally it was not that simple. In several states, resident aliens could vote, but native-born blacks and women—presumably citizens—could not. In legal fact, there were gradations of American citizenship as well as variations among the states. The framers of the Constitution had implied a national citizenship, mandating a federal naturalization policy and entitling citizens of each state to “all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states” in the Comity Clause. Yet, America’s fundamental law had left this key status undefined. Prior to Reconstruction, states had taken the lead in determining the rights citizens received.

“My dissertation follows an arc that climbs from 1848 to 1870 as Americans strengthened citizenship law before turning downward in the 1870s as their commitment to enforcing the Reconstruction amendments declined. Europe’s Revolutions of 1848 prepared German Americans to fuse nationalism with the era’s liberalism, which promised male citizens civil and political rights. German immigrants, especially those who supported the Republican Party, contributed to the development of a coherent view of American citizenship that included suffrage for men by 1870. That year, however, the immigrants turned their attention to the Franco-Prussian War. Captivated by a less liberal demonstration of national strength, German Americans shifted their political priorities. They emphasized reducing government involvement in the economy, reforming the

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8 Snay, Fenians, Freedmen, and Southern Whites, 163.

civil service, and reconciling Northern and Southern whites. When this transition precipitated a German exodus from the Republican Party during the 1870s, it would undermine African-American rights. After briefly tracing the contours of the argument that appears in my dissertation, this essay addresses my reconsiderations of gender as I revise “New Citizens” for publication.

**Fusing Liberalism and Nationalism, 1848–1870**

From 1848 to 1865, German immigrants helped open opportunities for African Americans by fusing nationalism and liberalism. The German men who became American citizens embodied the potential of individual rights and democratic representation—the civil and political cornerstones of the era’s liberalism. Their lives became emblematic of the twin promises of American nationalism: that American citizenship was predicated on shared political ideals, not background, and that in the United States hard-working individuals unrestrained by feudal institutions could achieve economic independence. The refugees of the Revolutions of 1848 who helped form the Republican Party saw opposition to slavery as the logical extension of the liberal nationalism they carried with them across the Atlantic. Many other German Americans reconciled themselves to the institution of slavery, but the Forty-Eighters came to dominate the German-language public sphere. Wartime nationalism only reinforced their influence. By the end of the Civil War, the German-Republican myth of the freedom-loving German who championed ethnic diversity and opposed slavery had taken hold. Democrats, who retained a slim majority of the German vote, resented the Forty-Eighters’ achievement. In expressing their resentment and accepting the end of slavery, however, German-Democratic editors conceded the power of their opponents.

Between 1865 and 1870, African Americans harnessed the potential of liberal nationalism in their fight for citizenship rights. At specific junctures, German Republicans supported them. I examine the role of the German community in the debate over the Missouri constitution in 1865. In a state where most German immigrants voted Republican, prominent German leaders arrayed themselves behind African-American suffrage. German-born radicals, including viticulturist Georg Husmann, rural sage Friedrich Münch, Karl Marx’s correspondent Joseph Weydemeyer, and the editors of the successful St. Louis *Westliche Post*, argued that the United States could make

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10 My argument follows a similar trajectory to that in a significant conceptual synthesis that examines American history in transnational context: Thomas Bender, *A Nation among Nations: America’s Place in World History* (New York, 2006). Given his conclusions, Bender’s omission of German Americans is remarkable.


12 See, for example, *Milwaukee Banner und Volksfreund*, Sept. 2, 1860; *Cincinnati Volksfreund*, Jan. 15, 1865.
citizens of African-American men in the same way it had transformed European immigrants. Meanwhile, Forty-Eighter Carl Schurz tried to connect immigrant and African-American rights on the national stage. During 1865, he made a much publicized tour of the South, and determined that African-American men must be granted the vote to protect themselves against the depredations of recalcitrant white Southerners. Schurz penned a series of open letters and a report for the Senate, becoming one of the most visible advocates of black suffrage. At the same time, Schurz appointed himself the spokesman of Germans around the country.

The efforts of German radicals were significant despite the fact that they could not persuade all German Republicans to vote to enfranchise black men in the state referenda held in Ohio in 1867, and Missouri in 1868. When President Andrew Johnson encouraged Southern whites to resist emancipation and Union victory, African-American suffrage became a practical means to cement national unity. Republicans in Congress resolved to support black Southerners, and the radical vision of racially inclusive citizenship gained ground in German-Republican circles. In 1868, German Republicans helped elect President Ulysses S. Grant, who supported the congressional program. Radicals such as Schurz accrued increasing power. Soon after he moved to St. Louis to edit the Westliche Post, Schurz was elected to represent Missouri in the United States Senate in 1869. Once more, Democrats revealed the appeal of the Republican message. After Ohio and Missouri Democrats failed to attract voters by pitting immigrants against African Americans, German-Democratic leaders reflected on their approach and subsequently abandoned it. Important German Democrats in the Midwest pioneered the “New Departure,” a strategy that advocated accepting African-American suffrage before the Fifteenth Amendment was even ratified. They claimed overt racism alienated their constituents.

15 See, for example, Milwaukee Seebote, March 10, 1869; Cincinnati Volksfreund, July 9, 1869. See also retrospective commentary in Cincinnati Volksfreund, June 7, 1871.
sphere. Most German-American observers allowed their enthusiasm for German unity to override their misgivings about Bismarck. The new nationalism that circulated in the German-language press was less liberal than the one that had been fostered by the Revolutions of 1848 and the Civil War. Newspapers sometimes described the German Volk’s triumph over the French in racial terms. They also praised the educational institutions and efficient bureaucracy of the emerging German Empire as “progressive,” while they ridiculed French attempts to institute a republican government.16

Between 1870 and 1872, a surprising number of German Americans hoped to express the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War in a new political movement, the Liberal Republican Party. Differences over free trade, civil service reform, and alcohol consumption contributed to the Republican schism, but the central plank of the Liberals’ platform became the reconciliation of Northern and Southern whites regardless of the implications for Southern blacks. Historians widely acknowledge that during the 1872 presidential campaign, Liberal Republicans helped turn the tide of Reconstruction, but with the exception of Jörg Nagler, they have left the German role in the movement relatively unexamined.17 Carl Schurz was the Liberals’ most active national leader, and he claimed to have built the third party on the support of German Democrats and Republicans, especially in midwestern states such as Missouri and Ohio. German Americans ensured that the Franco-Prussian War shaped the meaning of Liberal Republicanism. Newspapers and political stump speakers

16 On the dearth of serious studies of American responses to German unification, see Katz, From Appomattox to Montgomery, 86–89. Exceptions include John G. Dickey, American Opinion of German Unification, 1848–1871 (1926; reprint, New York, 1970); Hans L. Trefousse, “The German-American Immigrants and the Newly Founded Reich,” in America and >>

urged Germans in the United States to unite as their counterparts had in Europe.  

Schurz and other politicians also called on Americans to learn from German examples of administrative probity. Prussia’s bureaucratic traditions appeared more successful in creating fair and efficient state agencies than the American practice of distributing plum posts to the supporters of successful political candidates. The desire to eliminate political corruption was not inherently illiberal, but German immigrants who had believed extending the franchise would perfect the United States now hoped to mitigate the influence of voters they considered unfit. Germany also offered a model of compromise. Speaking in the Senate in January 1872, Schurz urged Northern whites to reconcile with Southern whites, just as former German revolutionaries were putting aside their grievances to support Bismarck’s emerging German Empire. Schurz hoped that the United States would learn from the “example of wisdom … set by other nations.”

In the end, the Liberal Republicans nominated Horace Greeley, a New York editor who advocated temperance and tariffs, to contest the presidency in 1872. Greeley was unpalatable to most German Americans. Thomas Nast, a loyal Republican, penned a cartoon for Harper’s Weekly that captured Schurz’s chagrin at the choice (see illustration). Nast was himself German-born, but he had come to the United States as a child and did not move in German-American circles. He depicted Schurz as “disgusted with American politics,” hunkered at a piano displaying sheet music for “Mein Herz ist am Rhein.” In Nast’s image, Uncle Sam leans over Schurz, informing him he is not compelled to remain in the country. Outside an open door, steamers advertise fares to Germany.


18 Congressional Globe, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., Dec. 15, 1870, p. 701.  


German Americans clearly lost control of the Liberal Republican Party, but they had shaped a movement which signaled that the liberal nationalist energy of the Civil War era was dissipating. Without quite grasping the nature of their compromises, German immigrants encouraged the notion that national reconciliation would come at the expense of constitutional rights and racial equality. Liberal Republicans suggested that North and South would only reunite when Northern Republicans stopped intervening on behalf of black Southerners. Despite their name, the Liberals pitted national unity against the protection of citizenship rights, nationalism against liberalism. The Fifteenth Amendment had written the principle of universal manhood suffrage into the Constitution, but after the 1872 election, the Republican Party gradually became less committed to enforcing it.

Other developments during the 1870s also signaled the eclipse of liberal nationalism. Religious tensions in Europe and the United States created dominant nationalisms that were less tolerant of Roman Catholics. The rise of the labor conflicts associated with intensified industrialization led many working-class radicals to question the importance of voting rights, which had not secured economic justice for workers. At the same time, men such as Schurz showed no reservations about using the power of the state to end strikes and subdue protests, encouraging President Rutherford B. Hayes to use federal troops to intervene in the Great Railroad Strike of 1877. The myth of their opposition to slavery no longer served to unify German Americans. They never totally abandoned it, but religious divisions and class conflict would become much more salient in the decades that followed.

Reconsidering Gender

Gender was an integral part of both the language and the law of citizenship, but my dissertation only began to grapple with its role in the German-language debate over Reconstruction. As I revise my work, I am devoting more thought to gender and how German-born women impacted American citizenship. My reading of German-language newspapers has already convinced me that female immigrants were not involved in the political controversies of the Civil War era to the same extent as their native-born sisters. Anglo-American women found opportunities in the English-language abolition movement. Based in the Protestant churches of

21 For one exploration, see Ward McAfee, Religion, Race, and Reconstruction: The Public School in the Politics of the 1870s (Albany, 1998).

the northeastern states, American abolitionism drew women into fund-raising, committee work, public speaking, and writing. Some of them, such as Lucretia Mott and Sarah and Angelina Grimke, lectured to large audiences. Abraham Lincoln even reportedly credited Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of the abolitionist novel *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, with starting the Civil War. Stowe’s work demonstrated the sentimental and feminine sensibility that pervaded English-speaking abolitionists’ attempts to elicit sympathy for humans held in bondage. Having achieved an important place in the movement to end slavery, some women began to critique the abrogation of their own rights. In this way, the American abolition movement fostered feminism. After women had been excluded from participating in a London antislavery meeting, Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton planned the famous convention at Seneca Falls New York in 1848. In the Seneca Falls *Declarations of Sentiments*, women demanded equal citizenship, including the right to vote. During Reconstruction, suffragists intensified their campaign for the franchise for black and white women as well as black men. The Fifteenth Amendment divided them: Stanton and her colleague Susan B. Anthony decided that they could not support an amendment that did not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, while other activists accepted the amendment and continued to identify with the Republican Party.

In contrast, German-American women took a relatively low profile in the sectional controversies of the 1850s and 1860s. As “New Citizens” explains, the antislavery movement in the German-American community developed within male-dominated secular organizations, not in the religious spaces that were increasingly feminized. Ohio and Missouri chapters of the Turnverein, for example, integrated antislavery into their staple offerings of masculine camaraderie, physical training, and German cultural nationalism. Ethnic identity was at the center of German-American antislavery. German-born opponents of the peculiar institution contrasted themselves to Anglo-American abolitionists, whom they considered “fanatics.” This dismissal did not hinge on their attitudes


toward the future of slavery, but rather on the cultural tone of each movement. Most Anglo-American abolitionists embraced the causes of temperance and Sabbatarianism and distrusted immigrants, especially Catholics. In turn, German Americans believed that the native-born abolitionists were narrow-minded. In their view, cultural intolerance was inconsistent with the liberalism that underpinned the antislavery movement. After the Civil War, a Cincinnati newspaper submitted that the women’s rights movement “originated with Puritans and temperance advocates and with females of every sort from Massachusetts and Maine who are angry that men cannot bear children.”

Even immigrants who were more judicious must have found it difficult to separate female activism from their objections to Anglo-American antislavery. Women’s citizenship thus appeared incompatible with the “freedom-loving” German that the Republican German-language press defined as a defender of immigrant citizenship sensitive to the demands of African Americans.

Noting the opposition of German-American men to female Anglo-Americans who supported temperance does not, however, tell us how immigrant women approached citizenship. Historians recognize that German women had been active in the Revolutions of 1848. Only a few participants, such as Louise Dittmer and Louise Aston, had demanded the right to vote for women, or spoken at mass meetings. Many more had joined street protests, accompanied their husbands into battle, or formed women’s organizations to support victims and refugees once the reaction set in. Women also wrote in support of the revolutionary cause. Louise Otto, for example, began publishing the Frauen Zeitung in Saxony in 1849. Otto distanced herself from the “emancipated women” who flaunted gender norms by speaking in public, shunning marriage, and wearing trousers, but she still challenged the limitations placed on women and asserted her right to disseminate her ideas in a society where the state limited expression and association. In Otto’s newspaper, women articulated a critique of some gender norms, demanded a public audience, and challenged state power.

27 Cincinnati Volksfreund, Feb. 20, 1869. See similar sentiments in Columbus Westbote, Feb. 25, 1869; St. Charles Demokrat, Feb. 11, 18, April 22, 1869; March 3, May 12, 1870; Westliche Post, Wochen-Blatt, Feb. 10, 17, Nov. 3, Dec. 1, 1869, May 4, June 13, 1870; Anzeiger des Westens, May 6, July 1, 1869.


Though not as radical as Mott, Anthony, and Stanton, the efforts of German women to advance liberal reforms and German nationalism in Europe had involved citizenship claims similar to the demands of the American women who were involved in the abolition movement. The question then becomes: What happened to this impulse in the United States?

One female Forty-Eighter who did achieve prominence in the United States suggests at least a partial answer. Journalist Mathilde Franziska Anneke had settled in Cologne just before the upheavals of the late 1840s. She became involved in democratic organizing, inviting like-minded intellectuals and political activists to salons at the home she shared with her second husband, Fritz. The couple edited the *Neue Kölnische Zeitung* together until Fritz was arrested for agitation among Prussian soldiers in 1848. While her husband was imprisoned, Mathilde Anneke continued to write, briefly publishing under the title *Frauen-Zeitung* after Prussian authorities banned their first paper. As revolutionary forces were weakening in 1849, she accompanied her husband to the last stand of the revolutions in Baden. The Annekes fled to Switzerland, and then to the United States, where Mathilde was drawn into the campaign against slavery and spoke publicly on women’s rights around the country. While living in Milwaukee during the 1850s, she published a handful of issues of a *Deutsche Frauen-Zeitung*. In the city dubbed the German Athens of North America, she also developed a close friendship with Mary Booth, a native-born abolitionist whose husband helped liberate a fugitive slave from a Wisconsin jail in 1854. Anneke and Booth spent the Civil War together in Switzerland, where the German-born writer turned her hand to antislavery fiction. On Anneke’s return to Milwaukee, she opened the Töchter-Institut, an academy that provided bilingual instruction to girls. Anneke became involved in the American suffrage movement during Reconstruction. She spoke at the first convention of the National Woman Suffrage Association in Philadelphia in 1869, aligning herself with the more radical organization formed by Stanton and Anthony and opposing—albeit reluctantly—the Fifteenth Amendment when it failed to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex.31

Anneke was exceptional. Her atypical experience, however, illuminates the context in which German-American women operated. Anneke’s career straddled the German-American and Anglo-American worlds. Her role as an exponent of German culture was in tension.

with her role as suffragist. She won some German support for her ideas of women’s citizenship: A group of Turner sponsored her to lecture on women’s rights, Milwaukee Freethinkers backed her demands, and she drew strength from socialists after 1870. On the whole, however, German-American men were hostile to her assertion of women’s right to the franchise. When she tried to establish her Deutsche Frauen-Zeitung, she remarked that “it nearly seems as though there was a conspiracy against this paper on the part of men.” She found German-American audiences resistant to the suffrage message when she spoke. A preliminary survey of Anneke’s activities and correspondence indicates that Anglo-American women provided the emotional support and organizational networks that made her work for gender equality possible. She did not, however, sever her links to the German community—these connections sustained her as well. She preferred not to speak or write in English, and she continued to speak at German-American venues. At women’s suffrage meetings, Anneke urged other women to disassociate their efforts to win the vote from Protestant morality and anti-immigrant sentiment. In 1869, she told her husband Fritz that she would “let loose on religion, the Bible, nativism, and temperance” at the upcoming convention of the National Woman Suffrage Association. Anneke mediated between German immigrants and Anglo-Americans.

Anneke apparently embodied German Bildung (learning and cultivation) to many German Americans. Interestingly, German-American newspapers commonly disparaged Anglo-Americans for relegating teaching to women. The feminization of teaching was a sign, they asserted, that Americans did not value education as much as Germans. Yet Anneke’s literary and journalistic accomplishments seem to have put her in another category. Heralded by Milwaukee’s German-language press, the Töchter-Institut earned an enviable reputation and attracted the daughters of the city’s elite. Anneke understood her commitment to female education as a feminist endeavor, but the German Americans who enrolled their daughters at her school insisted that they did not. After Anneke attended the Philadelphia suffrage conference in 1869, a group of parents wrote to Milwaukee’s Banner und Volksfreund to express their support for Anneke, citing her ability to keep her political opinions out of the classroom. Anneke’s temperament apparently endeared her to people who did not share her views, and her talent impressed even her detractors.

34 Mathilde Anneke to Fritz Anneke, May 4, 1869, microfilm: reel 3, frame 534, Mathilde and Fritz Anneke Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison.
35 See, for example, Westliche Post, Jan. 5, Feb. 10, 1865.
36 Wilhelm Hense-Jensen, Wisconsin’s Deutsch-Amerikaner bis zum Schluss des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, vol. 1 (Milwaukee, 1900), 133.
Despite the unpopularity of woman suffrage among German Americans, the immigrant community respected Anneke because she nurtured German culture. She promoted the cultural pluralism that was so vital to the German understanding of American citizenship. Anneke’s work identified her as a Kulturträgerin (bearer of the culture). Scholars have identified the middle-class woman’s part in child-rearing, music, and conviviality as a socially sanctioned contribution to nineteenth-century German nationalism. In the American context, German-born men and women considered it even more important to preserve the language, family traditions, and mixed-gender conviviality, for which they were renowned. Historian Anke Ortlepp’s study of German women’s organizations in Milwaukee reveals that these groups shared a commitment to cultural preservation. Female immigrants took on a special role in defending their community in a land where they were a minority.

While German nationalism had led some women to assert their citizenship and defy the state in Europe, it had a different effect in North America. German-born women entered American public life on the terms dictated by the Anglo-American temperance campaign. After the Civil War, women’s efforts to win the right to vote were increasingly tied to the crusade against alcohol. When Anglo-American temperance advocates set their sights on immigrant culture, German-American women joined men in defending it. One immigrant, who identified herself only as “M,” wrote to the Westliche Post in 1865 to speak out against laws to control alcohol consumption. She agreed with Anglo-American temperance activists that drunkenness was a problem, but she denied that it was a particularly German-American one. M wrote that the best remedy for alcohol abuse lay in the hands of women working in their “natural sphere,” the home. Political activism would only undermine the special strengths of women. Although further research is required to test the universality of this view, the transplanting of a German community to the United States seems to have channeled women’s activism into a defense of ethnic difference. Because the temperance movement clashed with the German penchant for social drinking, German-American women represented their community by eschewing female political activity.

Yet M was taking a public stand on behalf of German Americans, and immigrants accepted much of Anneke’s openly public persona. Historians know better than to take M’s notion of separate spheres
at face value. As I assess the gendered nature of citizenship, I intend to explore how women worked to define the German place in the United States from within their families and at informal gatherings, festivals, performances, and celebrations. All of these activities underpinned the assertion that German immigrants could be American citizens while they asserted their cultural peculiarity. Perpetuating and communicating German culture could be very public work. To evaluate women’s contributions, however, I must broaden my definition of the German-language public sphere. Few women wrote for German-American newspapers. Still, their letters and the various writings of men recorded women’s part in the reshaping of American citizenship during the Civil War era.

At least on initial inspection, it appears that migration, the very experience that led German immigrants to question the exclusion of racial minorities from American citizenship, actually strengthened the exclusion of women. Liberalism already predicated men’s citizenship on the subordination of women. Marriage defined women’s normative state, and the act of marriage made women dependent while conferring on husbands the necessary independence to participate in government.  

Having immigrated, men relied on women to provide cultural justification for their claim that being German only made them better American citizens. Since defending the German community required that women confront the Anglo-American suffrage movement, citizenship for German-American men demanded a distinctive subordination of women. The United States produced considerable homegrown resistance to woman suffrage, but German immigrants’ version of American citizenship triumphed with the Fifteenth Amendment. The paradoxical relationship between male equality and women’s subordination underscores that the liberal nationalism touted by German immigrants was a product of a specific historical context. Liberalism offered solutions to the most pressing problems of the 1860s, but its shortcomings were all too evident in the 1870s, when some women joined workers and Roman Catholics in their critique of an ascendant liberal nationalism that excluded them.

Some Tentative Conclusions

My research suggests a transnational reframing of Reconstruction. Acquiring American citizenship allowed immigrant men to link the arc of Reconstruction to the trajectory of nationalism in Europe.
Before 1870, German Americans demonstrated the power of liberal nationalism. The spirit of 1848 bolstered the citizenship claims of black men in North America. As German immigrants eroded the racial basis of citizenship, however, they also reinforced women’s status as second-class citizens. The liberal nationalism that made Reconstruction possible was clearly gendered. Attending to gender, then, forces me to recognize the limits and contingent nature of liberal nationalist ideas. Although the German-American prophets of liberal nationalism maintained that it was universal and transcendent, their ideology was undeniably rooted in the circumstances of their encounter with the United States during the 1850s and 1860s. This observation can be extended to the role that immigrants played in the decline of Reconstruction during the 1870s. If German Republicans’ support for African-American southerners was largely a byproduct of their work to define their own place in the United States, it only makes sense that the Franco-Prussian War and German unification would alter their political course. Transnational history is the domain of sweeping trends and grand theories, but in this case, it also illuminates the particular constructions of identity that determined how those trends and theories would play out in practice.

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BANKING CRISES IN THREE COUNTRIES, 1800–1933:
AN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE AWARD OF THE HELMUT SCHMIDT PRIZE IN GERMAN-AMERICAN
economic history, GHI, December 10, 2009

Richard Tilly
UNIVERSITY OF MÜNSTER

I. Introduction

The financial boom and bust of our most recent economic past has repeated a pattern that has marked capitalist economic development for over 200 years. Banking crises have been much less frequent than such cyclical ups and downs. The most severe busts, however, have always involved the banking system. This essay, therefore, attempts to identify conditions conducive to banking crises. As its title indicates, the essay builds on historical comparison, which in this case is limited to just three countries—the United States, Great Britain, and Germany—but for the period surveyed here, from the early nineteenth century to the early 1930s, they were important ones.

The main theme developed here is the relationship between banking crises and government regulation of banking, employing the working hypothesis that the frequency and severity of banking crises depended critically on government regulation. I focus on regulation for two reasons. First, it had powerful long-term effects on the structure of banking institutions. Regulatory rules—or direct regulation—determined how banks could operate; they could set capital and reserve requirements, dictate lending practices and branching options, and so on. Such rules affected the degree of competition in banking systems and shaped their structure—just as much perhaps as economic forces such as income or capital accumulation. That structure, in turn, strongly influenced the propensity of those systems for crisis.

Second, government regulation clearly also influenced the short-run collective responses to banking crises, and it was an important determinant of the severity of crises. This regulation was what I call indirect here. In any case, an institution was necessary that could provide an elastic currency to offset the surging demand that marked banking crises and limit monetary contraction. We usually think of a central bank that prints money in this role, though historically there were alternatives.

To supplement my working hypothesis, I draw on the concept of asymmetric information. It belongs here because it captures a...
structural disadvantage of bank creditors (depositors and other banks): they know much less about how banks use their money than the banks do. Their trust in particular banks will depend on the reputation of the latter as well as on their general knowledge of the economic situation. Should the economic situation deteriorate markedly, bank creditors may well assume that their banks as lenders will face adverse selection and be left with bad risks on their balance sheets, and, in response, bank creditors may withdraw their funds. With many banks linked together through correspondent and clearing relationships, it can be difficult for bank creditors to distinguish between sound and unsound banks, and such withdrawals can become general, in the extreme, leading to panic and runs. With this asymmetry in mind, I turn now to the crises themselves.

II. The Crises

I begin with a definition: if we were to define crises as panics and take panics to mean sudden runs on banks with widespread suspensions of convertibility and bank failures, then we would have Table 1 with a score of 13 to 3 to 1, with the U.S. having the most crises and Germany the fewest.

That is an important result, for panics, as mentioned earlier, reflected generalized asymmetric information and a particularly severe form of loss of trust in banks. Nevertheless, the table leaves out part of the story. By the definition used, a number of oft-cited crises in Great Britain and Germany are excluded. I thus opt here for a broader definition, viewing a crisis as a financial disturbance in which banks are significantly affected, or an event with important consequences for banking policy. This change in perspective gives Table 2 a less one-sided ranking of 13, 8, and 6 crises, respectively. Question marks indicate that a financial disturbance was registered, but without any unusual collective response or significant reforms documented.

We thus have the following: first, banking crises took place in all three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis Year</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1814</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847-48</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866-67</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882-84</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1901</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-33</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = banking crisis
? = uncertain evidence
countries in the years discussed here; second, they came more frequently and with greater severity in the United States. As has been noted elsewhere, this was one reason why cyclical downturns in America tended to be longer and deeper than in the other two countries in this period. The relevant crisis years are in Table 2. Especially severe were the crises of 1825–26 (in Britain), 1837, 1873, 1893, 1907 (United States), and, of course, 1930–33 (United States and Germany). More details on the crises are in three-country tables published elsewhere.

Third, if we connect the dates of crisis outbreaks with the business cycle, we see a rough correspondence between crises and the upper turning point, a result which mirrors the cyclical movement of key asset prices at these times, and which suggests a source of crisis potential that was particularly pronounced in the American case. Table 3 offers a summary view based on the older National Bureau approach.

Fourth, and finally, 15 of the 27 crises reflected, at least in part, the effects of international linkages, usually due to a financial disturbance in another country. This is an important point, for the economies of these three countries became highly interdependent in the course of the survey period. This was particularly true of Anglo-American finance, about which much has been written. The American crisis of 1837, for example, reflected the extent of British credit and capital moving into and out of the American financial system. The same thing can be said of the crises in the United States of 1857, 1873, and even 1907. Indirectly, British banks and capitalists were far-off creditors of American banks at such times. The German financial system was similarly affected by British creditors in 1847 and 1857, and to a lesser extent in 1866. A similar well-known linkage characterized the role of American creditors of German banks in the crisis of the 1930s. Nevertheless, the basic finding of this section is the relative instability of American banks. Since I believe this instability depended on different regulatory regimes, I now turn to a discussion of governmental regulation.
III. Historical Comparisons: Regulation in the Three Countries

United States

The United States is first on the list, since its dualistic regulation history was thick with complexity. It was dominated by its federal political beginnings. The country’s Founding Fathers endowed the states with considerable freedom to develop their local economies as they saw fit. In pursuit of their economic and fiscal aims, they chartered corporate banks, initially note-issuing banks, regulated directly by the terms of the charters. These charters usually, though not always, included restrictions on branching and created a growing political constituency favoring unit banking, that is, a banking system consisting of many small and independent banks. Regulation by the individual states and unit banking survived all four regulatory stages of the period covered here.

The first stage, from around 1800 to the early 1830s, was marked by dual regulation: the states regulated directly by means of the charters they had granted, and the federal government regulated indirectly through its central banks, the First and Second Banks of the United States. The latter is said to have influenced the state-chartered banks—by virtue of its great size, its branches, and its government ties—much like a modern central bank. This circumstance produced good financial and economic results, but it also brought about a populist political attack on the Second Bank led by President Andrew Jackson in the Bank War, which put an end to it, thereby leaving the United States de facto as early as 1833 without a central bank for the next 80 years. This was forced partial deregulation, and it opened stage two, a period marked by state regulation alone, and by the boom and bust and severe banking crises of the 1830s, for which Jacksonian intervention was at least partly responsible.  

The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 brought stage three and introduced direct federal control over banking in the United States. These were emergency Civil War measures, temporarily made possible by the absence of Southern representatives in Congress, but they proved long-lasting. Aimed at note-issuing banks, these

Table 3: Cyclical Position of Banking Crises in Three Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Close to Peak</th>
<th>Recession</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Asset Prices Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1**</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Wars **War’s end
measures resolved the country’s currency problem of heterogeneous bank notes, but these regulations also led many of the deposit banks founded in the following decades to prefer state charters. Figure 1 shows initial decline, then resurgence. Restrictions on branching insured the further growth of unit banking reflected in the figure.

The National Banking Act rules, coupled with market forces associated with correspondent banking (a kind of substitute for branching), led to a concentration of deposits in money centers like New York City. These nascent centers of wealth may be said to have underwritten the remarkable growth of the American capital market that characterized the late nineteenth century. These same rules, however, enhanced the system’s crisis potential by pyramiding reserves in money centers like New York City, for these were vulnerable to extreme swings in currency demand, which drew liquidity out of the money centers and created crisis conditions, as happened in 1873, 1890, 1893, and 1907. And there was no central bank to provide new currency to offset such swings.

The institution of the central bank came on the heels of the panic of 1907, which had strong shock effects. These effects yielded a reform movement, culminating in 1914 in a kind of central bank, the Federal Reserve System. Trust companies, a new type of lightly regulated bank, played an important role in this crisis. They were just as big as the larger New York banks, but remained outside the latter’s cooperative institution, the New York Clearing House. It was their illiquidity, however, which set off the panic, brought most New York banks into difficulties, and at last induced the New York banking elite to accept the need for a central bank. The ultimate result, however, reflected an irony of history, since the remarkable leadership role played by J.P. Morgan as rescuer of the New York banks in the crisis of 1907 probably stimulated fear of concentrated financial power and convinced many politicians and the unit bank lobby of the need for a central bank that would not be controlled by Wall Street and that would protect their interests. The cartoon in Figure 2 illustrates the

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6 The standard work is still John James, Money and Capital Markets in Postbellum America (Princeton, 1978).

7 On this see Eugene White, The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900–1929 (Princeton, 1983). See also James Neil Primm, A Foregone Conclusion: The Founding of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (St. Louis, 1989), ch. 2, which cites the famous “Pujo Committee’s” investigation of the “Money Trust” in 1912–13 (and J.P. Morgan’s financial power) as a factor affecting the Federal Reserve Act eventually passed in 1913.
way in which the unit bank lobby—and many Americans as well—envisioned J.P. Morgan at this time. This was perhaps the reason why the country got twelve regional central banks instead of just one.

With the Federal Reserve Act, stage four of the United States regulation story began. From 1914 to 1930, the Federal Reserve System, regulating directly and indirectly, fulfilled one expectation in making the American money supply more elastic. It failed, however, to eliminate the large number of small, unit banks with limited diversification of risk. This failure was a direct result of the unchanged restrictions on branching.

That was one reason for the severity of the crisis of 1930–33. In that crisis, however, as hundreds of banks failed, the Fed—its leaders divided—failed to act. It remained passive, raised interest rates, and did not offer the liquidity that might have stabilized the banks. Some historians believe that this was what turned a recession into a deep depression. What then came in response was the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, and along with it federal deposit insurance, later embodied in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a measure which made the unit banking system much less susceptible to runs.

**Great Britain**

The British story is somewhat simpler. It begins with the Bank of England, protected by the Bubble Act, which made it the only joint-stock bank. Its size and proximity to the government gave it considerable influence over the London money market, the country’s payments nerve center, through which it indirectly regulated the private banks in London as well as the country banks. On the edge of this system stood a small number of Scottish banks, joint-stock banks with unlimited liability and note-issuing rights, but subject to Scottish (and not English) law.

The severe crisis of 1825–26 was a catalyst of change. Two indices of its severity display the immediacy of the situation: the London
police had to be called out to disperse angry crowds; and by 1826 close to 10 percent of all English banks had failed. The British government was shocked into action. Their diagnosis of the crisis focused on the vulnerability of unit banking as embodied in the large number of small, note-issuing country banks. Step one was the implementation of a reform program that restricted growth of the country banks, strengthened the Bank of England through its establishment of branches outside London, and changed company law to encourage the development of the joint-stock deposit banks. These three points anticipated the next steps. Here we see England learning from Scotland, since the unregulated Scottish banks came through the crisis virtually unscathed.

Step two was Peel’s Act of 1844, which regulated the Bank of England. It embodied the triumph of the “monetarists,” that is, the Currency School and Lord Overstone. As such, it was, in effect, a vote of no confidence in the bank, for its statutory limit on note issue tied to gold reserves formally precluded its intervention as lender of last resort. Nevertheless, it was an important step. It signaled the end of private note-issuing banks, de facto the end of the country banks, and paved the way for the Bank of England to become the country’s central bank, “guardian of the nation’s gold reserves.” Step three was the further liberalization of English company law in the 1850s, which conferred limited liability and facilitated the growth of the deposit banks and their network of branches across Britain. In 1858, for example, limited liability was extended to joint-stock banks. There was no other direct regulation.

Though crises in 1847, 1857, and 1866 revealed the inadequacies of Peel’s Act, which later had to be suspended to permit lender of last resort action in these crises, British banking remained relatively stable from 1866 on. Nobody really knows, of course, how much the Bank of England contributed to that stability. There are alternative explanations, the most prominent of which was the stability of the diversified and integrated network of the large British deposit banks, which steadily replaced the unit banking of the country banks.

**Germany**

The German regulatory story is even simpler. In stage one we have a highly restrictive regulatory regime in Prussia, the dominant state in Germany. Its bureaucracy, fearful of corporations and especially of corporate banks, concentrated on strengthening its bank of issue,

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the Prussian Bank, which became a proto-central bank as early as the 1860s. Stage two came in 1870 with free incorporation, supplemented in 1875 with the founding of the German Central Bank, the Reichsbank. From then until the 1930s, there was no direct regulation of commercial banking, only indirect measures implemented by the Reichsbank. One might call this a phase of deregulation. As is well known, light regulation in this period encouraged concentration and the emergence of the “great banks”—or “universal banks”—with diversified nationwide networks of branches and very close links to the Reichsbank. In addition, specialized and carefully regulated institutions became well established: savings banks, credit cooperatives, and mortgage banks. The relative stability of German banking in this period reflected the joint effects of all these actors.

Nineteenth-century crises, especially those of 1847–48 and 1873, were important historically, but not primarily as banking crises. The crisis of 1873 felled many banks, but it was actually a stock market crisis. It was probably more important as a turning point in the ideology of economic policy. The crisis of 1907 involved the loss of gold and set off a debate concerning possible conflict between gold standard rules and domestic bank credit expansion. Other than the Bank Enquete of 1908 and a few minor regulatory changes, little came of it.

The crisis of 1931 was the watershed in German banking regulation, as it led to the creation of a public organization specifically concerned with the supervision of banks, the Supervisory Office for Credit Matters, in 1934. The crisis itself, to be sure, reflected more than banking problems. The “great banks” had become vulnerable, but the Reichsmark had also become a weak currency, both a result of World War I and the Great Inflation. In 1931 the Reichsbank had exhausted its gold reserves because of its assistance to the banks, and it proved powerless against the run on the Reichsmark by foreign creditors. The central bank could not support both weak banks and the weak currency. Runs, a bank holiday, exchange controls, government bailouts of big banks, and defaults were the well-known results.

IV. Historical Comparison: Differences

Let us begin by examining differences in the character and timing of economic development. Britain, the first industrial nation, led the way in economic and financial development, but the United States...
began catching up early in the nineteenth century. The American economy, moreover, soon took on continental dimensions, grew much faster, and became much larger than its British or German counterparts. That alone made the economic environment of American banking unique. British banks, meanwhile, supported a financial center increasingly shaped by global interests. That was also unique. Germany, in contrast, lagged far behind the other two countries until the last third of the century, and along with it lagged the “banking habit.” This may be one cause of its observed relative stability. Table 4 shows one rough measure of the ranking mentioned: Great Britain ahead, Germany behind, then convergence.

Data on financial structure also confirm the same ranking. In Table 5 we see Great Britain ahead and Germany way behind in 1850, up to 1913 convergence, then the effects of World War I and the Great Inflation on German financial wealth. Differences in the political structures of the three countries also deserve attention. The decentralized structure of the United States, though increasingly threatened by the growth of federal government powers since the 1870s, remained comparatively strong, especially in banking affairs. Perhaps it was supported by the continued importance of the rural, agricultural interest that helped shape state-level politics. This was a constellation favorable to support for unit banking. In Great Britain, government was comparably more centralized, run by a small, educated elite, whose interests, following the country’s financial system, became more and more absorbed by global and especially imperial concerns. These concerns did not include protection of unit banks from competition. Germany—less centralized than Great Britain, but much more so than the United States—did not even display a pedestrian political interest in defending unit banking, that is, the private banks, from competition over my period of examination.

What about central banking? Its absence from the United States and presence in the other two countries was surely one reason for the relative severity of the American crises during this period. The Americans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Index of Nominal GNP in Three Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Britain, 1850 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Financial Assets as Share of Total Assets in Three Countries, 1850–1929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1880 + 1927
developed creative alternatives: the state-level co-insurance funds, or Clearing House guarantees, could dampen panics and limit monetary contraction, but not as effectively as a central bank. The mere presence of central banks, to be sure, did not guarantee their effectiveness as stabilizers. Pro-cyclical behavior by central banks in Britain and Germany up to 1866, and especially by the United States Federal Reserve in the crisis of the 1930s, illustrated the point. Thus, it was not the existence of central banks, but their willingness to act as leaders in crisis that could restore confidence in the system and stabilize it effectively.

The gold standard was another hurdle for central banks. Even in its heyday, its “rules of the game” imposed restrictions on lenders of last resort, usually overcome by international capital movements. After World War I, that proved more difficult for both Great Britain and Germany. The fate of the German Reichsmark in 1931 has been mentioned already. The financial crisis in Europe in 1931 ultimately led to a severe depletion of American gold reserves that may have hindered the Federal Reserve System from offering American commercial banks more support.13

A more important ramification of government regulation, however, was its synthesis of the defining characteristics in the banking structures of the three countries. As pointed out earlier, dual regulation led to branching restrictions and the predominance of a unit banking system in the United States, while in Britain from the 1850s and in Germany from the 1870s, government regulation was restricted to the normal operations of the central banks, and competition was allowed to shape banking structure. A few indicators of this may suffice.

Figure 3 shows that the United States had far more commercial banks than the other countries, even in relation to population. Note that the smaller the column, the greater the number of banks per 1000 inhabitants.

As Figure 4 demonstrates, however, the American banks were mostly small ones, and accordingly they were highly dependent on their local economies. Branching in Great Britain and Germany produced larger banks, estimated for 1913 as roughly four or five times as large. Figure 4 shows the relatively high degree of branching attained by British banks.

Figure 5 shows the difference between Germany and the United States.

Thus, both the German and British commercial banks could develop extensive branch systems which permitted a degree of risk diversification missing in the unit banking system of the United States. This trend enhanced the stability of the commercial banks and made it easier to distinguish between sound and unsound banks than it was in the atomized American system. The German banking system, however, differed from those of the other two countries in two other important respects. First, the German “great banks” were “universal banks” that combined commercial with investment banking. It is likely that this state of affairs permitted better management of capital market risks than was typical of American commercial banks. Second, the networks of public savings banks and credit cooperatives, each of which had, by the end of the nineteenth century, their own monitoring institutions and arrangements for emergency assistance in troubled times, controlled a significant share of the total
market for financial services by 1913. These two types of institutions held about 30 percent of total financial assets as opposed to some 22 percent for the joint-stock banks.

Conclusion
Banking crises in the United States were more frequent and severe than in Germany or Great Britain over the period observed. This circumstance was a marked derivative of the vulnerability of a unit banking system at the mercy of periodic swings in the demand for currency. The absence of a central bank further contributed to this result.

Another way of stating the same result is to stress the effectiveness of the branching networks developed by the British and German commercial banks and to emphasize the role of these countries’ central banks. In the German case, the special status of the self-regulated public savings banks and credit cooperatives may have also contributed to the observed stability. It is interesting to note that the difficulties of the savings banks in the crisis of 1931 were a result of reforms since 1909 that permitted them to operate as commercial banks; but the crisis of 1931 was far more than a banking crisis, and, in any case, it hit the branch banks just as hard.

A number of puzzles remain unsolved. One concerns the role of politics as a determinant of how banks were regulated. Did a kind of asymmetry exist between the costs and benefits of political protection for local banks and those associated with advocacy of branch banking? That is not implausible. But why did it take so long for American politicians to reverse the Jacksonian decision on central banking when the banking system proved so crisis-prone? Central banking, after all, is wholly compatible with a unit banking system. Perhaps the answer lies in the ease with which the collective memory of crises could be blotted out by subsequent phases of growth and prosperity. These phases, after all, better characterize American economic history of the period than the crisis-dominated cycles do.

Another unresolved problem concerns the comparability of banking systems in different countries. Given the numerical preponderance of commercial banks in the United States, it seems likely that these served social strata much broader and more encompassing than their counterparts in Britain and especially Germany, where commercial bank clients represented a relatively small elite, and other specialized institutions catered to the banking needs of all
others. For this same reason, moreover, currency played a larger monetary role in Germany than in the other two countries. This was one reason behind the already noted one-sided distribution of bank panics marked by runs. The subject deserves more research attention.

A further conclusion of the paper is that regulation, where competing authorities set rules, necessarily hampers the coordination and cooperation badly needed in crises. As the interdependence of banks subject to different regulatory restrictions grew, the collective response to crises became more difficult to coordinate. The role of dual regulation and competing regulatory regimes in the United States has already been mentioned, and it became painfully evident in the crisis of 1907. The same applies to international interdependence. When the Bank of England raised its discount rate to arrest or reverse an outflow of gold, as it did in 1836 and at other times, it did not pay much attention to the consequences for banks in other countries. Such introspection became even more painfully apparent in the global crisis of the 1930s, when the gold standard collapsed and international cooperation stumbled. If that applies in lesser degree to the financial crisis of the past few years, perhaps that is due to policymakers taking “lessons from history” seriously.

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DANGEROUS MEAT? GERMAN-AMERICAN QUARRELS OVER PORK AND BEEF, 1870–1900

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In 1900, Consul General Frank H. Mason painted a grim picture of American-German trade relations, characterizing them as imbued with “hostility” and “distrust and aversion.” Growing out of “mere ignorance, a failure to comprehend the many customs and details in practice in respect to which the two” nations differed, they had become “strangers to each other.” This was written shortly after the German decision to close the country’s national market to American meat. During the three prior decades, meat quality was one of the most controversial issues in German-American trade relations. Since the early 1860s, emerging medical and bacteriological research detected and defined a growing number of zoonoses that had been unknown before. The spreading knowledge on food-related health risks led to growing concerns among experts, in the general public, and in politics. Hygienists and veterinary doctors began to establish structures to detect infected meat, but scientists, state officials, and parts of the public advocated additional and expensive preventive measures. Before the American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, such measures were predominantly local and regional, but the strong increase in trade volume as a result of large-scale slaughterhouses, progress in canning and cooling technologies, and falling freight rates in international steamship transport, elevated the question of meat quality to the national level. Since the late 1870s, quality and health standards had become a constant source of quarrels between the two rising economic and political powers.

To gain a better understanding of the changes in German-American relations before World War I, we therefore must integrate the scientific, economic, and public quarrels on meat safety and quality. Additionally, we must analyze how collective images of “German” and “American” meat, eating practices, and culture were formed and became stereotypes. The study of meat—that nineteenth-century super food—allows us to combine politics, economics, science, and public opinion. Reflecting on different concepts of “risk,” “quality,” and the relationships among experts, the state, and individuals will not only open a window on the different food identities of German and American citizens, but also on the substructures of so-called great politics.

The most prominent meat-related disease of the late nineteenth century was trichinosis. Trichinae are small roundworms, which complete all stages of development in one host within a two-week time span. They exist in a larval state in the muscles of omnivores and carnivores. Once someone has eaten infected meat, the parasites mate, and the newborn worms migrate from the intestines to the muscles, where they wait for the next host. The human body can endure a small number of these parasites without real harm, but if there are more, trichinosis will soon become dangerous or even deadly.

These worms were discovered during the 1820s, but their life cycle was not understood until about 1860. Within a few years, German anatomists and doctors analyzed the etiology of trichinosis,7 which until this time had been diagnosed
as rheumatism, typhoid fever, or “black death” (due to the peculiar discoloration of infected corpses). The knowledge these researchers gained helped to explain several epidemics in central Germany, each of which had caused dozens of deaths.

Before 1880, 8,500 cases of trichinosis were documented in Germany, resulting in 513 attributed deaths. Now doctors no longer wrote about “harmless worms.” On the contrary, “fear and horror” became common, ideas of accelerating infection spread, and Trichinenfurcht (fear of trichinae) became a well-known word in German. The public “terror over such a great food-borne danger” spawned detailed statistics and case studies, which helped to

> und öffentliche Prophylaxis: Eine Studie an der Hand der Kratz’schen Schrift über die Trichinenepidemie zu Hedersleben (Tübingen, 1867); [Andreas] [Christian] Gerlach, Die Trichinen: Eine wissen-
schaftliche Abhandlung nach eigenen, besonders in sanitäts-polizeilichen und staats-thierärztlichen Interesse angestellten Versu-
chen und Beobachtungen, 2nd ed. (Hanover, 1873).

9 Wardell Stiles and Albert Has-sall, Trichinosis in Germany (Washington, DC, 1901), 35.
10 Karl Houbner, Ueber die Trichinen mit besonde-
"rer Berücksichtigung der Schutzmittel gegen die Tri-
chinenkrankheit beim Men-
schen (Berlin, 1864), 5.
11 Ibid., 3.
12 J. Samter, “Erkrankun-
sen, “Die Trichinen in Be-
13 Rudolf Virchow, Darstel-
lung der Lehre von den Trichinen, mit Rücksicht auf die dadurch gebote-
nen Vorsichtsmaßregeln, für Laien und Aerzte, 2nd enlarged ed. (Berlin, 1864), 3.

Trichinae Cartoon from Fliegende Blätter, 1864. The German caption reads: “Yes, dear neighbor, busi-
ness is bad; three weeks ago we slaughtered our father-in-law, and he cer-
tainly was fat, and we still managed to sell nothing but a small ham—it’s all due to those newly invent-
inform doctors and the public about the symptoms and causes of trichinosis.  

In the mid-1860s, public and political attention shifted to questions of therapy and prevention. German fears led first of all to public education. Regional authorities advocated the proper cooking of meat and warned against eating raw and underdone pork, especially sausages and ham. Unfortunately, such dishes were an essential element in the diets of the middle and lower classes and of German food culture and identity. Experts and politicians knew that they could not change such habits in a short time: “The big and small trichinosis epidemics have shown how invincible the people’s penchant for eating raw pork is and how powerless the risk of trichinosis is against it.” Therefore, the most important German prevention measure was to examine meat microscopically.

Based on sound scientific evidence, the “naked eye” of the experts was armed with efficient visualization machines to differentiate between dangerous and wholesome meat. German science was both supposed and able to prevent an epidemic spread of trichinosis, even if the average person behaved irrationally. Pride in the achievements of modern science led to an immense professionalization—around 1880 some 25,000 inspectors worked to ensure the safety of the German pork consumer. But this expensive control system institutionalized bourgeois ideas about the interaction between the individual and the state in Germany. The Liberal politician and anatomist Rudolph Virchow proclaimed

> What the individual chooses to do is his own affair, but the general public has the task of keeping at bay, as much as possible, general dangers to which the individual may unknowingly fall prey through no fault of his own, and especially of standing by those people who may harm others without intending to, and, where necessary, of monitoring them so that they can truly conduct their activity for the benefit of their fellow citizens.

In Germany, state bureaucrats, including public health officials, had a civilizing mission, which included the protection of the individual even from irrational and unhealthy eating habits.

The situation in the United States was different. During the 1860s, trichinosis was recognized as a foreign, primarily German epidemic.
As one newspaper described it, “the victims are ‘eaten up alive by a legion of worms hardly so thick as a human hair, that have worked their way into the tissue of their flesh, their muscles and their nerves.’” Germany’s microscopic examination system was recognized as an expression of the nation’s efficiency and its first-class status in the field of medicine. But perceptions changed. As medical knowledge improved, more and more cases of trichinosis were detected in the U.S. Indeed, American pork was widely infected with trichinae. Well-founded rumors “of the existence of the disease” spread in several large East Coast and Midwestern cities during the late 1860s. Doctors warned people not to panic. They should not believe “in the sweeping stories told about the deadly character of pork.” American consumers got over the initial scare, although American newspapers continued reporting on cases of trichinosis and resultant deaths in sensational ways. This attitude did not result from official statements, which were quite similar to the German ones in proclaiming “that pork thoroughly salted and smoked, and well cooked, is as harmless as pork ever has been.” The fundamental difference lay in the countries’ respective eating and cooking practices: In the United States, it was uncommon to eat raw or underdone pork products.

The parasites seemed to be no real health problem, because most of them were destroyed by boiling or roasting. Even the large German immigrant colonies in the East and Midwest had changed their preparation techniques and eating habits remarkably. In the New World, German immigrants consumed even more sausages, ham, and other pork products—but a growing quantity was not...
fresh and, therefore, risky, but mass-produced and preserved. The relatively small number of deaths—less than five per year on average—did not justify an expensive examination system, because the responsibility for health was individualized: Being infected with trichinosis was caused by eating raw meat—and this was an easily avoidable private risk.

II. The German-American Pork War, 1880-1891

This background allows us to view the so-called German-American Pork War, which lasted from 1880 to 1891, from a broader perspective than has been offered by diplomatic and traditional economic history. American officials were fully aware of German health concerns about American pork. The German examination system revealed that 4 percent of American pork products contained trichinae; similar percentages were found for German hogs. The import figures were highest in 1873 and 1874, and then declined and finally stagnated long before German countermeasures became evident.

This decline was partly a result of the growing awareness of the risk associated with the consumption of cheap American meat, which was primarily consumed by urban workers in western and central Germany. During the mid-1870s, American veterinarians called attention to an “alarming spread of trichinosis.” They recommended changes in animal farming, including, first of all, that indoor breeding become more common to prevent pigs from eating rats, mice, and other vermin. At the same time, American diplomats recommended a “rigid and trustworthy examination” before shipping, but this seemed too expensive. Therefore, it was not surprising that trade restrictions were soon imposed, especially when Germany followed the Americans’ highly protective post-Civil War policy with the tariff of 1879. Germany protected its agriculture against the “American grain invasion,” although the large and


growing number of workers and middle-class consumers suffered from rising prices.

The imperial German decree of June 23, 1880, however, which prohibited the import of all types of American pork except ham and bacon, had different, primarily health-related reasons. The decree was part of a European-wide ban on American pork, which started in 1879 in Italy, Hungary, and Austria.\(^\text{28}\) The implicit message to Americans was that they should improve the hygienic quality of their products and establish an examination system similar to Germany’s. While many European nations lifted their import restrictions in the early 1880s, partly to avoid retaliation, Germany expanded its ban in 1883 to include all American pork.\(^\text{29}\) Despite intense diplomatic pressure and the threat of retaliation concerning German wine, the imperial government insisted that the U.S. reform its slaughterhouses and packaging methods and, most importantly, that it introduce a reliable system of microscopic examination for exported pork. After a decade of intense quarrels and the first, unsatisfying, American Meat Inspection Act of 1890, the new American Act of 1891 mandated compulsory inspection and labelling of exported meat. Health arguments had succeeded, although the withdrawal of the German prohibition in 1891 was prompted in part by increasing pressure on German sugar imports to the U.S.\(^\text{30}\)

Americans, though, were not easily convinced. For the U.S. government and meat packers, the German import prohibition was unfair and unjustified. From 1880, the trichinae question was highly politicized. By 1884, four official reports had analyzed the American pork business and the trichinae question.\(^\text{31}\) Unfortunately, the results called the official position—that its products were wholesome and of high quality—into question. Trichinae were as common in America as in Europe, and several American experts conceded even higher percentages—up to 8 percent.\(^\text{32}\) The reports recommended that a system of microscopic meat examination be established, at least for exported hogs. This recommendation, however, was not primarily about public health, but intended to support the export of meat. The consumers were proclaimed responsible for any outbreak of the disease. As *The New York Times* stated, “Legislation can do very little with trichinosis, except by aiding to diffuse information.”\(^\text{33}\)

While experts viewed American and German trichinae-related problems in a sophisticated fashion, many American newspapers argued in a more nationalist way: “The greatest war, since the time


\(^{30}\) See Keim, *Forty Years*, 73–78.


of Frederick, called ‘The Great,’ which Germany has undertaken, is Bismarck’s war against the American pig.” 

Newspapers saw “underhanded warfare against American products” that was grounded in concerns for the protection of East Prussian landholders, not health concerns. They asked Germany to provide evidence of illness and death caused by American pork—and they questioned the official German position, which referred to German medical authorities.

Most American newspapers emphasized retaliation, because they believed that this was the only language Germans would understand. The U.S. Senate gave the president options for such a policy, but he did not use them, partly because he felt this would be “equivalent to a declaration of war.” In the U.S. discourse on the subject, one could find claims that American products should undergo “proper inspection,” but, by and large, health-related problems involving meat consumption were disregarded.

American meats were characterized as “the best,” and the German ban was presented as “simply a sanitary pretext for protection,” not founded on public opinion, but introduced by an authoritarian regime that denied its urban consumers a choice and indoctrinated the public with “prejudicial judgment against the swine exports.” Not the government, but the Liberal opposition, was presented as the voice of the real Germany.


40 [No Title], New York Times, January 4, 1884, 4.

41 “Mr. Sargent and Mr. Frelinghuyzen,” Washington Post, April 5, 1884, 2.


Such one-sided political reporting was quite typical for the press in the US—and in Germany. However, drastic changes in the way trichinosis was presented in America ran parallel to this debate. From the early 1880s, trichinosis became German—that is, it was presented as a disease predominant among German immigrants. If trichinosis victims had any sort of German background, this fact was emphasized, whereas victims of other ethnic backgrounds—with the exception of African Americans—were merely listed by name: The “German family named Rosenberg” and “Carl Gall, German-boarding house keeper” were examples in a long list of names and cases intended to de-Americanize trichinosis. Moreover, German victims were often portrayed unfavorably. For instance, “they ate greedily without cooking.” Or: “Germans are singularly fond of eating ham without preparing it for the table, and apparently cannot be induced to exercise self-restraint in this respect, even by a knowledge of the risk they run.” Similarly, the eating of raw food became the most prominent marker of un-American eating habits. This exclusion from the American table was supported by the typical presentation of trichinosis cases as isolated family tragedies. German immigrants could change their diets and become members of the American nation. Those who remained outsiders, however, suffered diseases typical of Imperial Germany.

And what about Germany during the 1880s? Although critics of import restrictions within Germany were a political and academic minority and the idea of “dangerous” American meat was widely accepted, there were serious conflicts in Germany, too. First of all, Germany was a divided nation. The microscopic examination system was typical in Prussia and Saxony, while most southern states failed to establish similar structures. Germany had never really had a national diet. Regional differences and regional food identities were prevalent in Imperial Germany. Raw meat was uncommon in southern, western, and even larger parts of eastern Germany, where the trichinosis death toll was similar to that in the United States and where compulsory meat inspection was never introduced. Nonetheless, most states accepted the pork ban and were convinced that American pork was dangerous for German meat consumers.

Germany’s Liberal opposition was the first group to question this acquiescence. They asked, “where are the sick and dead who are...
suffering from trichinosis because of the character of American pork?” 49 They wanted to offer consumers the choice of foreign meat, because they felt that consumers should be able to make decisions about risk-taking behavior themselves. 50 Pure and healthy foodstuffs, they believed, seemed to be a fiction anyway. Therefore, individuals as free citizen-consumers should be able to take responsibility for their own actions. The Liberals offered a different idea of state-consumer relations that was common among large segments of the urban bourgeois middle and upper classes, but which had lost influence during the late nineteenth century.

Even harsher criticism came from German doctors and hygienists. 51 First, they questioned the reliability of the German microscopic inspection techniques, which were often conducted “with foolish eyes or with imperfect microscopes.” 52 While some of these experts and the vast majority of veterinarians argued for higher professional standards and improved microscopes, critics advocated that this expensive German peculiarity should be stopped, because it wasted a large amount of money in the name of propagating a delusional and fatal idea of safety. More than 30,000 trained German inspectors 53 were only able to reduce the number of fatalities from twenty per year during the 1880s to ten during the following decade. Meat quality improved in general, but the system failed to guarantee safe German meat. Second, although some doctors argued against the “barbarian habit of eating raw pork,” 54 many continued to exhort people to consume raw pork because the nutritional value of animal protein was judged more important than the health risks. 55 Few demanded a public ban on all raw meat products. Improving the German daily diet and overall health meant fighting bad habits and prejudices. This fight for a new rational, scientific German and—in some respects—international food identity would be complicated, they acknowledged, but it had to be undertaken to exterminate trichinosis. The German governments shared this long-term goal, and official public brochures favored such a change. 56

But the governments did not want to force people to eat in a different way: “The government cannot effect a change in the direction of taste by means of compulsion.” 57 Their ideal of freedom included the freedom to be foolish. It was based on the idea of a weak, greedy, and unreasonable consumer who was dominated by tradition and had to be guided by a wise German government and scientists.
Although the “Pork War” lasted more than a decade and the official positions of the German and American governments remained controversial and contradictory, a closer look at the internal quarrels reveals both convergence of opinion and new images of “Germans” and “Americans.” In the early 1890s, intensified cooperation was still an option. When in 1891 Americans established their meat examination system only for export, many U.S. experts, acknowledging German health concerns, claimed “that a similar system should be established for the examination of pork intended for home consumption.”58 And German experts were aware that even an army of inspectors was not strong enough to successfully fight eating habits and irrational ideas about tasty and “strong,” bloody food. These experts commented on the American legislation respectfully.59 But the quarrels continued during the 1890s, and, instead of cooperating, Germans and Americans became more and more estranged from one another.

### III. Growing Danger: Pleuro-Pneumonia, Trichinosis, and Bovine Tuberculosis

One reason for even more intense conflicts between the German and U.S. governments was the knowledge production of modern science. Breakthroughs in bacteriological research not only spawned new etiologies of killer diseases such as cholera, tuberculosis, and typhus, but widened and specified the range of relevant animal diseases. Since the early 1880s, the sanitary protection of national markets was expanded from exclusively human health issues to encompass livestock as well.60

Hog cholera in the U.S. drove the United Kingdom—the dominant free-trade nation of the world and by far the most important customer of American products—to ban pork imports. Even more severe was the highly infectious, so-called Texas fever or pleuro-pneumonia. Although these zoonoses did not harm human beings, it became necessary to quarantine and rigorously slaughter livestock to prevent the worldwide spread of such animal diseases.61 Consequently, early U.S. reports on trichinosis advocated additional legislation and increased government intervention.62 While newspapers criticized foreign governments for their unfair exclusion of U.S. meat, comprehensive measures were taken to exterminate pleuro-pneumonia.63

The stringent and expensive measures of both the U.S. and foreign governments were quite successful, and threats to quarantine the

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62 “Trichinosis Again” (1881), 495.
Chicago stockyards led to improved testing and livestock breeding. In 1891, Secretary of Agriculture Jeremiah Rusk announced that pleuro-pneumonia had been successfully exterminated from American soil and foreign nations should learn from America’s advanced veterinarian institutions. As a result, the U.S. government stopped the importation of cattle from all over the world.

But European states—including Germany—struck back. In 1893, hay was seized at European ports because it contained pleuro-pneumonia bacteria. In 1894, a case of Texas fever resulted in a ban on the import of U.S. cattle and fresh beef to Germany. Changes in the sugar trade provided the prime impetus for such measures, but they could also be justified with regard to problems with the American inspection system. While U.S. diplomats and newspapers criticized this ban as an “apparently needless and harsh measure,” the German public was not really interested in such technical questions, which they believed should be delegated to experts. Such debates again confirmed public concerns over “dangerous” American meat. And they were used by the agrarian lobby of northern and western German meat producers to question the import of foreign meat in general.

Another good example of the continuity of transatlantic quarrels was the ongoing debate on the quality of the American meat inspections. When Germany withdrew the pork ban in 1891 and accepted American certificates of inspection, American newspapers celebrated these steps as German acceptance of the wholesomeness of American pork. However, German local and regional authorities were allowed to re-inspect some American pork products. When this practice started in 1892, it generated American complaints of hidden trade restrictions and a lack of trust in transatlantic trade relations. On the other hand, German inspectors did manage to detect trichinae-infected American pork. Although any
inspection system would miss some cases—more than 30 percent of the German trichinosis cases resulted from meat inspected by German professionals—such results were presented and discussed over and over again.\(^\text{73}\) The American side correctly argued that these results only showed “the impossibility of discovering all trichinous meat in the first inspection,”\(^\text{74}\) but German officials annoyed importers by charging them for the additional costs of the second inspection. This battle over the reliability of scientific meat inspection was an abstract discussion on the quality of American meat and German skills. Several German veterinarians traveled to the U.S. to report on the sanitary conditions in the meat business there, spurring Americans accusations of “a sort of espionage over all the principal abattoirs of the United States.”\(^\text{75}\)

Several travel reports portrayed American producers as greedy capitalists who sold the most inferior quality possible and who did not care about the health concerns of the broad majority of consumers.\(^\text{76}\)

But Germany was not the only country inspecting its trade partner. In 1898–99, the U.S. Department of Agriculture sent a young scientist to Germany. He published an impressive analysis of the German


74 Sherman to White, November 20, 1897, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC, 1898) 190–91, here 191.


76 “American Canned Meats are Good: Secretary Morton Says German Criticisms Are without Foundation,” New York Times, August 6, 1895, 9.
meat inspection system whose inefficiencies he laid out precisely. The German system cost $3-3.5 million per year, 25 percent more than American expenses for the entire Department of Agriculture.\footnote{Stiles and Hassall, *Trichinosis in Germany*, 32; see James H. Cassidy, “Applied Microscopy and American Pork Diplomacy: Charles Wardell Stiles in Germany, 1898-1899,” *Isis* 62 (1971): 4-20. It should be noted that Stiles still praised the German inspection system as “the most elaborate system of public hygiene ever put into practice” in “Trichinosis and Trichina Inspection,” *Journal of the American Medical Association* 36 (1901): 1706.}

This fundamental attack on German pride was scientifically solid, but it merely served to deepen Americans’ and Germans’ contradictory perceptions of each others’ quality standards and health issues.

These debates garnered a lot of attention and cost a lot of money. But at the same time, both countries failed to make basic improvements to reduce the incidence of bovine tuberculosis, a zoonosis that was not identified before 1882. During the late 1880s and early 1890s, both Germany and the U.S. came to realize that at least a fifth of the cattle were infected and that humans could be contaminated with tuberculosis simply by consuming affected meat or milk.\footnote{See Barbara Orland, “Cow’s Milk and Human Disease: Bovine Tuberculosis and the Difficulties Involved in Combating Animal Diseases,” *Food & History* 1 (2003): 179-202.}

Although both nations instituted rigorous measures at the start of the crisis, including mandatory slaughtering, Germany and the U.S. decided in the early 1890s to stop such consistent health prevention, because it was simply too expensive to kill 20–25 percent of livestock.\footnote{See O. Malm, “Die jetzige Bekämpfung der Haustiertuberkulose,” *Zeitschrift für Tuberkulose und Heilstättenwesen* 6 (1904): 13-42.}

While experts and governments were fighting diseases that led to a relatively small number of deaths, tuberculosis was still the dominant cause of death in both countries—and bovine tuberculosis generated a yearly death toll of up to several thousand people, above all babies and toddlers.\footnote{See “Bovine Tuberculosis: Widely Discussed by the Veterinary Association,” *The Daily Picayune*, September 6, 1896, 4.}

Both governments failed to concentrate on more relevant sanitation measures to fight this “most subtle, insidious and baneful disease that the human race is heir to.”\footnote{“Bovine Tuberculosis: Its Relation to the Health of the General Public,” *Morning Oregonian*, December 21, 1894, col. B.}

The transatlantic meat quarrels were thus fought over territory that was initially relevant but which grew more and more self-perpetuating by the end of the nineteenth century.

Despite this self-perpetuating quality, one-sided perceptions, prejudices, and plain economic interest took on an incalculable dynamic. By 1899, German-American diplomats had finally found a compromise for the new meat arrangement, which was closely linked to the introduction of a compulsory meat examination in the German Empire.\footnote{“The Reichstag Reassembles: Prof. Stiles Says Germany Will Act with Fairness in the Question of Meat Inspection,” *New York Times*, January 11, 1899, 7; “As to American Emats [sic],” *Los Angeles Times*, May 10, 1899, 2.}

Meanwhile, however, meat had become such a crucial public topic that it could no longer be handled simply with old-fashioned diplomacy. The compromise came under fire, first, from the southern German states, which did not want to introduce expensive and—in some ways—ineffective inspection systems. Second, a center-right coalition fought against concessions to American
importers and in favor of domestic agriculture. It exploited sanitation problems and the public perception of supposedly “dangerous” American meat to increase the German hygienic standards to a prohibitive level."83

Some cases of fraud in the labeling of imported pork helped to sway the majority of representatives to pass the new Imperial Meat Inspection Law in the German parliament in 1900. This brought the ongoing transatlantic meat trade to an end, although Social Democrats and Liberals again fought to preserve the possibility of cheap imported meat and autonomous choices for urban consumers. After 1903, exorbitant and impractical inspection procedures closed the German market to American meat.

While Germans still expected that the day would come “when America will thank Germany for having been the cause of introducing meat inspection regulations,”84 the U.S. government decided to stop its own meat inspection system in 1906.85 Yet German officials were not alone in having to recognize that civil society and the political mass market achieved a different quality during the Progressive Era. Since the late 1890s, for example, the American Pure Food Movement was using many arguments that had been presented by German hygienists and chemists for more than three decades.86 Americans grew ever more aware of the sanitation problems of the Chicago meat packers, and they came to doubt the wholesomeness of American meat products.87 One argument in favor of stricter standardization and more intense regulation of the food sector after 1906 was the fact that up to 100 million pounds of trichina-infected meat was hitting the domestic market every year.88 When America’s Pure Food Law was passed in 1906, it marked a milestone in the federal government’s efforts to assume responsibility for the growing number of urban consumers who did not really know what they were eating. Despite such efforts, in the United States, meat inspections for trichinosis were not re-established or even used for the domestic market.89 As a consequence, the amount of trichinae in the U.S. remained high. Between 1901 and 1915, 240 American citizens died of trichinosis; probably 5 percent of the population suffered from this disease at some in their lives, and trichinae were “of common occurrence” in the U.S.90 As a consequence of the lack of meat inspections, the health situation worsened during the following decades. In the late 1930s, it became evident that the U.S. had “the greatest problem in trichinosis of any country in the


84 Jackson to Hay, November 17, 1898, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC, 1902) 485.


A National Institutes of Health report from the early 1940s found that one-sixth of the U.S. population was infected. Improvement in swine production and feeding as well as the wide-scale use of home freezers and commercial lockers led to a notable reduction of trichinosis during the 1950s and 1960s, while public health policy remained weak.

### Conclusion

Our analysis of the German-American meat quarrels of the late nineteenth century facilitates a deeper understanding of the changes in German-American relations before World War I because it integrates many aspects that have previously been neglected.

First, the German-American meat quarrels can sensitize us to the importance of images and prejudices in politics in the late nineteenth century. From the 1860s onwards, modern science generated new knowledge that not only clarified the causes of diseases, but also advised people to eat and prepare food in ways that often clashed with their traditions and culture. Other actors—politicians, journalists, and consumers—often did not accept such advice. Instead, they combined new scientific knowledge with the particular framework of class, nation, or region. Transatlantic debates precipitated an intense flow of arguments and expertise; however, in the end, traditional values and differing food identities were more important than so-called rational, scientific arguments.

Second, our case study reflects the new identity of the modern consumer. As Frank Trentman has pointed out, the “emergence of the consumer is the political product of a particular constellation of modernity, resulting in the final analysis from belief about policy and society not from material change or interests as such.”


of the consumer, or rather the idea of “economic citizenship,” was needed because markets malfunctioned. The consumer constituted a conceptual placeholder for political, economic, and scientific interests, wherein either protection or individual freedom were championed. Reflecting on such use of the consumer concept is crucial for any understanding of public debates in modern consumer societies and their ways of handling uncertainty and risk.

Third, the hidden structure of these debates stresses the importance of social Darwinist ideas and notions of decadence during the fin de siècle. Scientific advances made it appear that livestock was increasingly contaminated with bacteria and worms. Not only were these parasites contagious and harmful to people, but they also weakened the whole population. The conflict over meat, the most important food of this time, symbolized and materialized typical fears about racial decline and perpetual struggles in which even countries with a common heritage engaged.

Fourth, this story is one of hubris and national overconfidence. Whereas internal debates were sophisticated, external debates and foreign policy—spurred in the imperialist age by national prestige—argued in stereotyped glorifications of the home perspective and negative prejudices about the Other. On the Western side of the Atlantic, Americans were “prone to consider [their] methods the most practical and best, and to think that in whatever degree those of other nations differ from [American ones] the latter are wrong.”

On the other side, German perceptions of America changed from a kind of ideal state with free and just institutions to an oligarchy that had become an enemy of European culture dominated by “a handful of ambitious, ruthless and German hostile parvenus.” The meat quarrels offer empirical evidence that attests to the development and spread of such one-sided perceptions.

Fifth and finally, our case study also allows for a different narrative—one of convergence rather than opposition. Instead of growing hostility, distrust and aversion, we find rather similar arguments in both countries that offered good options for cooperation and a fair partnership. If this was true for the pre-World-War I era of imperialism and nationalism, then it is likely that we can find post-national identities that will be decisive in a globalized world confronted with more severe problems than transatlantic meat quarrels.


97 Zimmermann (1901), 216.
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“A MIRACLE BEAN”: HOW SOY CONQUERED THE WEST, 1909-1950

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In 1925, Japanese-American journalist Kinnosuké Adachi extolled the virtues of the soybean, describing it as a “miracle bean,” and its relatively short history in the West as a “wonder tale.” This insight was motivated in a utilitarian sense by the myriad uses of soy, but also by the astonishingly favorable reception the crop had received in the West during the first part of the twentieth century. In only a short period of time, the soybean would fundamentally transform agriculture and industry in both Asia and the West—a transformative process that this essay will seek to elucidate. I will argue that increasing demand for soy effected an economic and cultural transformation, the consequences of which were simultaneously global and asymmetrical. Indeed, the increasingly important role of soy in a global economic context—varying in use from East to West—led to the perception of soy as an irreplaceable all-purpose plant, fostering and influencing the creation of conceptions, imaginations, and images. It is the goal of this essay to investigate and expose these asymmetries between economic meaning and cultural perception.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Europeans and North Americans knew of the soybean only within the context of botanical gardens and agricultural experimentation; soy was far from being a cultivated crop with wide-reaching economic potential. The demand for soy first established itself with the shortage of vegetable fats and oils in 1908/09. For precisely the same reason, soybean demand would increase exponentially during the First World War, ushering in a comparatively late recognition of the crop’s agricultural and industrial value in the West. In the globalized world of the early twentieth century, crops such as cotton, vanilla, coffee, hemp, sugar, cocoa, and rubber had long been cultivated on a tremendous scale in colonial regions of the globe to satisfy Western hunger for raw materials. Soy did finally gain entry into the frame of Western consumption because of its versatile oil. Soy oil began to be used in the manufacture of soap, margarine, dyes, waterproof materials, candles, and other industrial products. Indeed, it was a byproduct of the oil-harvesting process—the production of so-called bean

cake—that brought the soybean to the center of attention. This protein-rich cake proved ideal as animal feed, admitting soy onto Western menus, albeit in a secondary sense.

This contrasted—and continues to contrast—with the uses of soy in Asia, where the crop has been cultivated primarily as a foodstuff for over a thousand years. Prized among Asians for its high protein content, soy is processed into tofu, soy sauce, soymilk, and miso paste, and is enjoyed in some regions as a preferred candy. Until the turn of the century, China proper was the primary growing-bed for soy, exporting its harvest within Asia. Nevertheless, intensified imperialistic aggression from both Russia and Japan led to economic and political change particularly in northeastern China. In so-called Manchuria, imperialism and globalization went hand in hand, and with increased Western demand soy rapidly became the cash crop of this previously unsettled region. The resource of soy now connected markets and people across the East-West divide, but in spite of its various uses, soy did not generate great enthusiasm in the West. This did not even change in the United States when New Deal policy encouraged extensive cultivation of soybeans. Indeed, at the end of the Second World War, American farmers were producing more soy than their Chinese competitors in Manchuria, and soy had surpassed other harvests to become the most important cash crop in the United States. Yet despite this economic significance, the soybean hardly played a role in the realm of collective Western imagination or self-representation.

The present article begins by examining this paradox of global economic power and Western cultural resistance. I will analyze soy as an issue of Western history and historiography. The article’s second part investigates the roots of the Western demand for soy. Finally, in the third section, the work of the Bureau of Plant Industry, a division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, will be described in the context of advanced soybean cultivation in the United States.

Soybeans: History and Historiography

For approximately the last fifteen years, historical studies have placed greater emphasis on global interdependencies. Driven by the term “transnational,” historians have concentrated less on the development of a stringent method and instead have undertaken the intellectual adventure of challenging the idea of the nation as a productive category of comparative analysis. A recent essay

3 For the use of soy as a foodstuff in Asia, see Christine M. Du Bois, Chee-Beng Tan, and Sidney W. Mintz, eds., The World of Soy (Urbana, 2008).

4 The three northeastern Chinese provinces Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning are popularly known as Manchuria in the West. Although the term is problematic from a historical perspective, I use it here for the sake of simplicity.

by historian Ian Tyrrell demonstrated this using the example of American history. As Tyrrell stressed, however, the transnational question is not intended to either affirm or deconstruct the idea of the nation, but rather to recontextualize global relations beyond the idea of “national” parameters. These methodological considerations are of central importance to the history of the cultivation and use of soy, as they illustrate the interdependence between the United States and the rest of the world. This is particularly noteworthy in times of global crisis, when oils and fats are often in short supply. America’s encounters with the world can be elucidated by studying the case of soy. As part of New Deal policy, the U.S. Department of Agriculture subsidized the cultivation of soy, bolstering prices, offering advantageous credits to farmers, and buying directly from the farms. This course of action had both local and global motivations. The European demand for soy increased steadily, enabling soy to fill the void created by the receding cotton industry, and subsequently, to reinstate a critical piece of the American export economy.

The increase of soy cultivation also served to stimulate industrial research into the potential uses of soy derivatives. Henry Ford was just one of the famous individuals to investigate the industrial applications of soy. In the interwar period, Ford developed his own agricultural trials and laboratories in order to find out if it was possible to convert botanical oils into plastic and rubber for applications in the automobile industry. The most conspicuous outcome of his experiments was the presentation of a soy car in 1942, the body of which was comprised entirely of plant-based derivatives. These visionary plans were purely speculative, though, as their further development was cut short by American entry into the Second World War. The war served to reinvigorate the U.S. government’s interest...
in soy, prompting 100 million dollars in subsidies to be issued. Concurrently, the government moved to regulate the use of soy oil, restricting particular industrial uses of soybeans, to preserve oil for margarine and shortening production. Ford’s fantastic soy car was also a casualty of restrictive practices, as the governmental regulation of vegetable oils and fats as foodstuffs was prohibitive to the industrial designs on soy oil. In fact, in 1941, approximately 500 million pounds of soy oil were consumed by industrial projects—only a year later, this amount would be cut in half. The ensuing surplus created by governmental subsidies and decreasing demand in the postwar era was far from being earmarked for industrial use; rather, the American government remained focused on developing soy and soy oil as human food sources. The efforts of the Office of Strategic Services in the postwar period primarily addressed the problem of widespread hunger throughout Europe. Identifying soy as a potential cure for the ailment of hunger, the U.S. government began producing specialized cookbooks aimed at making soy appeal to the European tastes of housewives.

This overview of the intervention of the United States government into the production and uses of soy highlights the inadequacy of modern territorial boundaries as analytic categories of history. More prominently, soy enables an inquiry into the territorial representation of the nation as a realm of understanding, reflecting the narratives of progress and modernity. The historiographical challenge is to effectively trace the development of soy’s economic, cultural, and political impact. So far economic history has always greatly emphasized the process of global integration. However, historians who have adapted a more modern, transnational approach generally regard

10 For more theoretical reflections, see Prasenjit Duara, “Transnationalism and the Challenge to National Histories,” in Rethinking American History in a Global Age, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 2002), 25–46.
economic phenomena as part of an exchange process, allowing investigative forays into the fields of social influence and cultural change.11 Thus, in the case of soy, the question becomes one of understanding an economic history that functions transculturally by asking the question of what connotations are associated with soy. What role does soy play in the construction of identity.12 In the United States, apparently, none. After the Second World War, soy became the most important cash crop in the nation, with local American farmers serving consumers throughout the world. And yet, soy never attained a stature of perception or identification in American society similar to that of cotton, despite the fact that in 1950, the United States produced comparable amounts of both.13 An online search of the Library of Congress’s “American Memory” database provides an objective basis for confirming this relationship: the keyword “cotton” yields over 50,000 hits; “soy” or “soybean” barely 20.14

American society’s lack of interest in soy is not exceptional when compared to other Western nations. It is even possible to trace this lack of interest back to the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Western discovery of soy’s economic potential was still a novelty. Wide-ranging social identification was not an accompanying byproduct of the successful emergence of soy in Western markets in the 1910s. It is striking that, while soy fulfilled a variety of roles as an all-purpose crop in both America and Europe, it was never regarded as much more than the sum of its parts. For soy oil alone, contemporary texts contain references to potential uses ranging from margarine, salad oil, industrial lubrication, lamp oil, and soap, to glycerin, fatty acids, dyes, varnish, linoleum, and rubber.15

The search for products that advertised soy content nevertheless remains difficult. Residents of the English town of Port Sunlight, the Lever Brothers were, in 1909, among the first companies to employ soy oil in the manufacture of soap.16 With the name “sunlight soap,” the Levers successfully highlighted the locality of their product, but simultaneously downplayed its soy content in its advertising. This had the consequence of suppressing any negative connotations that a mention of “soy” might conjure up. Evidently, soy was not oriented to common marketing strategies in the same way as other plants. Only a few years before, the American Johnson Soap Company had bestowed a name upon a product that overtly referenced the origin of the oil used to produce it. Their new soap, “Palmolive,” established a brand that remains recognizable today.

15 Norman Shaw, The Soya Bean of Manchuria (Shanghai, 1911), mentioned mainly soap and margarine; the other products came later, see Agricultural Office, South Manchuria Railway Company, ed., Manchurian Beans (Dairen, 1929); David Legros and Jacques Kaltenbach, Le soja dans le monde (Rome, 1936); Roy H. Akagi, Bean Oil Industry in Manchuria, ed. English Section, South Manchuria Railway Company (April 1937).
16 Shaw, The Soya Bean of Manchuria, 20.
Such referential marketing strategies for soy or soy derivates are extremely difficult to find. Hardly any products containing soy seemed eager to advertise their multifaceted content. For as often as soy was processed or employed as feed, it remained colorless, invisible, and unknown.

Even today, the production and use of soy remains invisible to Western cultural consciousness, announcing its presence solely in the concrete moment of reality; namely, in the growing fields of tremendous scale where soy is currently cultivated. The societal indifference towards soy is also reflected in its historiographical fortunes. Neither in cultivation nor in consumption has the soybean or its derivative products been regarded as an integral component of Western economic or cultural narratives. In the context of economic analysis, the historical role of the soybean and its correlating use-value are generally marginalized. 17 With the increased emphasis placed on economic history during the 1970s, some attention was finally dedicated to the significant economic stature soy had attained in China and the United States. These studies, however, tended to limit the scope of their analysis to focus on either the Sino-Japanese or American cases independently. 18 Seldom was soy discussed in the framework of imperial conflict for raw materials. 19 The historical, political, and economic contexts, along with the significance of the countless changes initiated, have thus far been neglected by economic history at large. This observation allows us to speculate that soy was responsible for an economic and cultural transformation whose consequences would be felt—and continue to be felt—asymmetically across the globe. The most visible changes precipitated by demand for soy relate to the physical area devoted to its cultivation, originally in Chinese Manchuria, and later in the United States, and also to potential side effects of this cultivation, such as labor migration or the expansion of infrastructure. And yet the cultural consequences—the developments that both consolidated and perpetuated this “soy revolution”—remain hidden from view.

**Manchurian Soy in Europe**

When we analyze the history of soy—its cultivation, uses, and economic strength—in the United States, a lot of connections to other parts of the globe become visible. I argue that governmental support in the cultivation of soy was a reaction to both national and international conditions, which constantly influenced one another. To trace this history is to ask when and why soy acquired

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an economic prominence in Europe, and what the consequences of
the suddenly incipient demand on Manchuria were.

In 1915, Gottfried Haberlandt lamented the fact that his father’s
“Schützling”\(^{20}\) (pet project) was still not being cultivated in central
Europe. His father, agricultural scientist Friedrich Haberlandt,
had spent the 1870s campaigning passionately for an increase in
soy cultivation. Success, however, eluded the elder Haberlandt; it
was not until the First World War that “this noteworthy legume”\(^{21}\)
gained a measure of recognition outside of agricultural circles. Neu-
thertheless, his son Gottfried Haberlandt stood ready and willing to
further the budding popularity of the soybean. In an effort to boost
the nascent interest in soy, he consented to write the introduction
to a short, informative book extolling its virtues, although, in his
eyes, the booklet was unable to “assert or advance any intrinsically
novel considerations or facts.”\(^{22}\) This episode shows that adequate
knowledge of methods of cultivation and nutritional properties of
soy was not at all lacking in nineteenth-century Europe. Rather, it
was an agro-cultural apathy that impeded the cultivation of this
plant. Considering the extensive European knowledge of soy and
the bean’s popularity in other parts of the world, how was it that soy
had managed to lead only a shadow of an existence in Europe up
to this point? And how was it that this narrative suddenly changed,
allowing demand for soy subsequently to explode?

The older Haberlandt did not gain his knowledge of soy through ex-
tensive field research in Asia, but through countless agro-scientific
experiments conducted in Europe. In 1873, at the World’s Fair in
Vienna, Haberlandt acquired a selection of approximately twenty
varieties of seeds, with which he proposed to conduct his agricul-
tural experiments. In the years that followed, Haberlandt organized
the cultivation of his seed stock throughout various regions in Europe
from his base at the University of Natural Resources and Applied
Life Sciences in Vienna. In this fashion, he sought to spread his
enthusiasm for the soybean within the wider circles of agricultural
scientists, though he remained unable to install soy as a widely
cultivated crop in Europe. The primary hindrancer was the fact that
Haberlandt and other European agricultural and nutritional experts
sought to sell inexpensive soy protein as an alternative to more
expensive animal protein. Further, Haberlandt’s attempts to cultivate
the soybean were not particularly successful, owing largely to the
fact that soy is ill-suited to cultivation in a European climate. After
Haberlandt’s death, interest in the experiments faded, and, despite

\(^{20}\) Maurice Fürstenberg, Die
Einführung der Soja. Eine
Umwälzung der Volks-
nährung (Berlin, 1916),
preface by Gottfried Ha-
berlandt.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
previous efforts, so too did the hopes of widespread expansion of soy.

Also of relatively modest success was another project, initiated at approximately the same time: Nutritionists and medical scientists sought to establish soy as a food for diabetics. Soy contains no starch, but high percentages of protein and oil, making it exceptionally sustaining. Due to these benefits, soy had long been used in Asia as a diabetic food, though the plant was still unable to gain acceptance in Europe. France and the Netherlands were the sole European exceptions, having provided enriched bread baked with soy flour as a diabetic-specific alternative since the late 1880s. That a type of bread which so easily could have alleviated nutritional problems of diabetics struggled to gain viability in Europe was indicative of a serious flaw: “It may be (and we will even charitably suppose so) that this lamentable fact is only due to ignorance,” complained Sinologist Gustave Schlegel in 1894.23 Schlegel, however, focused so exclusively on the potential use of soy as a diabetic remedy that he failed to perceive soy as a source of more general human food.

With these two examples, the parameters of the European “soy-based” knowledge and use in the late nineteenth century have been defined. Soy was a plant that had entered into the realm of agro-scientific research, and whose uses were tirelessly vaunted by nutritional experts, and yet the soybean remained largely unknown. In portions of the population, soy was received with minimal interest, evincing closed-mindedness and slow-changing attitudes towards patterns in dietary consumption.24 Asian culinary preparations remained extremely foreign to the European palate, and European culinary experiments with soy, consequently, met only with moderate success. Europeans were more accustomed to seeing beans used as vegetables and attempted to prepare them as such, an approach that proved frustrating considering the long cooking time required to tenderize soy to the point of becoming edible. The association between soy and its homeland—China—also failed to inspire associations with the exotic, instead conjuring up images of the faltering Qing Dynasty. European consumers, therefore, had limited enthusiasm for soy, despite the ardent support some members of the scientific community demonstrated for it.

This situation began to change at the beginning of the twentieth century, when industrial interest in soy as an oil resource began to

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24 Nützenadel and Trentmann: “Mapping Food and Globalization.”
grow. Low yields of American cotton and flaxseed, crops generally used for the production of margarine and soap, created a persistent demand throughout 1908–09 for alternative forms of vegetable oils in Europe. In a long-globalized market with fast communication pathways and streamlined supply chains, European industry managed to immediately meet this demand by importing soy from Manchuria. This was made possible in part by a surplus of soy that the north Chinese region yielded during the course of the Russo-Japanese War, which Japanese and Russian traders subsequently tried to offload to emerging soy markets in Europe and North America. The Japanese company Mitsui & Co., founded by the Mitsui family of business moguls, established itself as one of the first successful firms in the East-West soy trade. In November 1908, Mitsui sent an experimental load to England, and a few months later in March 1909, the first of countless following freight loads arrived in the English port of Hull. It would prove to be beneficial to the success of soy oil in the West that European oil mills designed to harvest cottonseed oil could also press soybeans without any technical reconfigurations. This development was coupled with the discovery by a growing number of farmers that a byproduct of the oil-harvesting process, the so-called bean cake, was an ideally suited form of animal feed. This was also true of cottonseed byproducts, but due to its high percentage of protein, the (soy)bean cake was more nutritious, not to mention cheaper. The impact of feeding bean cakes to animals was the subject of countless agro-scientific experiments, each quantifying the results of a soy-based diet on the quality of meat, butter, or milk. These studies produced astoundingly positive results, which would boost the budding demand for soy higher still.

Though not intended as a source of protein for human consumption, soy nevertheless prevailed, taking on an intrinsic significance in the global economy, and, in a somewhat biocyclical sense, in the human diet. The need for alternative vegetable oils and fats created a new commercial market for soy in Europe. In the years after 1909, soy continued to establish itself further, garnering a reputation as a viable source of both oil and animal feed throughout Europe. This augmented functionality of the soybean, which was similar to the multiple uses of cottonseed, made the plant all the more attractive in an agro-industrial sense. Since the low oil

25 The sudden and wide-ranging interest in soy was reflected in a series of articles published in the Economist as soon as the first soybeans landed in Europe, during the fall and winter of 1909-10.


27 As described in Charles V. Piper and William J. Morse, The Soybean (New York, 1923), 129-143.
yield of the soybean was similar to that of cottonseed, utilization of soy as a source of vegetable oil alone would hardly constitute a commercial breakthrough in the European market. Contemporary varieties of soybean yielded between 14 and 21 percent oil, which compared competitively to cottonseed (ca. 17 percent) and flaxseed (16–30 percent), but were still not in the same class as other traditional sources of vegetable oil: Copra, the dried flesh of the coconut, contains 60–75 percent oil; poppy seeds and peanuts are approximately 50 percent oil; and the oil content of sunflower seeds and rapeseed also compare favorably to soybeans. Aside from the two-fold usefulness of the bean in oil and cake form, price also had to be accounted for—a factor that made the soybean considerably more attractive to European purchasers. Japanese suppliers offered Manchurian soy for a lower price than American cottonseed. Cottonseed prices were inflated because of low harvest yields, though even if cottonseed prices had been “normal,” soy would still have been a competitive product.

Soy tied Manchuria to the process of global transformation, and in doing so, suddenly pushed the underdeveloped region into the international spotlight. As early as 1911, the soybean industry had grown to challenge the Chinese tea trade in terms of global economic significance, and it was projected that soy would soon rival even the silk trade. The unexpected arrival of the soybean on the world economic scene altered not only European agriculture and industry; increasing Western demand necessitated an essential realignment of economic, political, and cultural structures where soy had been born, so to speak, in China. In Manchuria, which was characterized by quasi-colonial dependency structures, soy had become the identifying cash crop, meaning that it was cultivated mainly in monoculture and for export. In the Manchurian case, the territory was established as a global satellite dedicated exclusively to the cultivation of soy.

The worldwide economic situation from the late nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century was characterized by asymmetries between industrialized states and colonized regions. The northeastern region of China, Manchuria, was a casualty of informal imperial hegemony, as evidenced by the unfair representation of Chinese interests in international treaties and through economic discrimination. However, at the end of the nineteenth century, global changes were afoot. China, which up until this time had been

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29 Shaw, The Soya Bean of Manchuria, 1.
30 A comprehensive English-language survey of the history of northeast China is still lacking, but there are excellent monographs, including Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham, 2003); and Mariko A. Tamanai, ed., Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire (Honolulu, 2005).
unimpressed by Western cultural and economic advances, finally began to crack under the pressure exerted by Japanese expansionism. Japan’s growing desire to expand its territory to gain a foothold on the Asian continent finally culminated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. Manchuria smoldered at the center of an international flashpoint of competing Russian, Chinese, and Japanese imperialist interests. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905—in the course of which soy came to the attention of the European market—marked the highpoint of tensions in this “scramble for Manchuria.”

Migration, infrastructure development, and an expansion of trade are typical signifiers of a region with a history of informal colonial dependencies.31 Manchuria is a prime example of the interdependencies of such processes. Between 1890 and 1942, approximately 8 million Chinese, primarily from northern provinces, immigrated to Manchuria, comprising one of the largest human migrations of the early twentieth century.32 This immigration was accompanied by the steady establishment of infrastructure and trade. These developments, however, were not controlled by the Chinese, but by the Russians and Japanese. Railroad systems in colonial regions existed primarily to expedite the transfer of resources from their domestic origin to seaports, from where they could be easily distributed throughout the world. Manchuria’s link to the centers of the industrialized world came in the forms of the Russian Chinese Eastern Railway and the Japanese South Manchurian Railway.33 The infrastructural benefits provided to the colonies by railway connectivity were, however, limited. The construction of the railroad did not usually stimulate the colony’s industry, as its components were almost universally manufactured in the imperialist homeland. Railcars, engines, tracks, and bridge-building materials often came from the colonizing country. The Manchurian railroads owed their existence largely to the economic interests of its imperialist “suitors.” Both the Russians and Japanese viewed their Manchurian railroads as investments oriented towards attaining capital interests. Until 1931, no single nation managed to establish complete hegemonic control over the Manchurian case; nevertheless, the soy trade was thoroughly regulated by the Russians and Japanese. These rail lines traveled over outlying extraterritorial regions belonging to either Russia or Japan, and the soybeans produced by Chinese farmers in Manchuria were subsequently shipped to Europe and the United States via either the Russian port of Vladivostok or the Japanese-controlled city of Dairen. The primary trade destination in Europe

31 For an outline of such processes, see Wendt, Vom Kolonialismus zur Globalisierung, and Christopher A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Malden, MA, 2004).


33 David Wolff, To the Harbin Station: The Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898–1914 (Stanford, 1999).
was London, where soybeans were transported to the European continent through either Amsterdam or Hamburg.

European purchasers preferred to import whole soybeans as opposed to pre-processed alternatives like pressed oil or pre-formed bean cake. One reason was that they wished to avoid unrefined or diluted oil, but this preference also reflects a general trend toward importing raw materials that was typical of industrialized economies in the late nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. In an effort to protect their own economies, industrialized nations would often impose high duties on the import of manufactured goods, creating a preference for raw materials that could instead be processed domestically and then exported.34

Following this formula, Germany became the largest importer of soybeans and the leading European exporter of soy oil and bean cake during the period between the two world wars.35 The Germans first became interested in Manchurian soy during the general increase in demand for vegetable fats and oils during the First World War. Whereas other European powers turned to their colonies for oil alternatives—cottonseed, coconuts, or sesame seeds—Germany sought to establish trade relations outside of the pre-established imperial network. China remained outside of direct European influence, accordingly presenting the Germans with the opportunity to mitigate their need for oil and simultaneously meet growing demand for bean cake. Alternatively, China belonged to one of the most critical production regions for the oil industry during the interwar period; only British India and West Africa produced more raw resources for the harvest of vegetable oil.36 All this places historical-political relations in an economic context: At the end of the 1920s, Germany had a substantial interest in the prosperity of the Manchurian soy industry, which increased trade relations between Japan and Germany.

Support and Stimulation in the United States: The Bureau of Plant Industry

The emergence of soy in the world economic market in 1909 created competition for American cottonseed, which was in short supply following a year of widespread crop failure. Up to this point, European consumers had relied heavily on cottonseed, importing it both for its high oil content and for its potential use as animal fodder. As European consumers discovered, soybeans from Manchuria could

34 Wendt, Vom Kolonialismus zur Globalisierung, describes this process in general. As for soybeans and soy oil, it has been contemporarily observed by Erich Stietz, Die Soja in der Weltwirtschaft. Ein Beitrag zur Ernährungs- u. Rohstoffwirtschaft der Erde (Gießen, 1931), 28-34.


and did replace cottonseed in both of these functions, creating a sort of “double competitor” for cottonseed. The appearance of soy in the European marketplace thus precipitated apprehension among American cottonseed producers and traders, who sensed a threat to their prime consumer market. With the receipt of the first soy shipments in Great Britain in 1909, the U.S. Bureau of Manufactures issued a request for detailed information to consulates stationed in key Asian and European harbors and trade epicenters. These consulates were charged with providing an assessment of the potential competition that the emerging Chinese soy industry posed to the American cottonseed industry, with instructions to focus explicitly on a comparative evaluation of the respective oil yields of each crop. Although there was as yet little tangible evidence of competition—a fact supported by the consular reports—the approach of the Bureau of Manufactures reflects the alarmed American response and its preparedness to elicit the particulars of the economic situation. The U.S. consulate in England, the place of the soybean’s first permeation of the European market, prophesied the incredible economic potential of the soybean:

A valuable oil, used largely in the making of soap, is extracted from the bean, and it is anticipated that the meal and cake manufactured therefrom may compete very seriously with American cotton-seed cake.... There is no doubt, however, that the soya-bean cake and meal will be used more and more in this country, provided a sufficiently low price is maintained.

This high appraisal is notable because, up to this point, import quantities remained low enough that special shipments were unwarranted. In light of the consular reports, a steady increase in American soy imports can be observed, though reliable figures on the amount of soy imported in both Europe and the United States would not emerge until some years later. It was not until 1911 that the United States imported a quantity of soy oil valued at about $2.5 million and an amount of bean cake valued at approximately $60,000. The amount of soy being exported from Manchuria during this time fluctuated. This is largely attributable to the diplomatic tensions existing between China, Russia, and Japan in Manchuria at this time.

The key questions are how and why the United States became the leading producer of soy in under thirty years. What implicit
economic and political machinations lie concealed in what appears to be a solely agricultural transition from cotton to soy? What interest did the United States have in the cultivation of a plant whose economic impact in the West prior to the First World War was relatively unheralded? And what role did this transformation play in a larger, globalized context?

Similar to the European case, the history of soy in the United States before 1900 was limited primarily to the realm of agricultural experimentation, though, in contrast to Europe, American agriculturalists discovered relatively early on that several American regions were ideally suited to the prodigious cultivation of soy. Belonging to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Bureau of Plant Industry initiated experiments across the United States even before the First World War. In both Europe and America, most scientific investigations were academic or governmental. In Europe, botanical gardens and exotic plants were prestigious objects of princes, and scientific expeditions, like those of the nineteenth century, were unthinkable without sovereign subsidies. But the botanical interest of the American government far exceeded the European standard of collection, classification, and research, orienting itself more towards the utilitarian feasibility of domestic cultivation. With the founding of the USDA in 1839, this goal of domestic cultivation manifested itself at the federal level, with the newly formed agency calling for systematic evaluation and study of foreign plants and breeds.

To assist in these efforts, the Office (as of 1901, Bureau) of Plant Industry was founded in 1900. This division aggregated several federal agencies previously scattered throughout the USDA whose work was concerned with questions of feasibility and the establishment of foreign plants domestically on a variety of scopes. This included the divisions responsible for vegetable pathological and physiological investigations, botanical experiments, grass and forage plant investigations, pomological investigations, experimental gardens and grounds, foreign seed and plant introductions, and congressional seed distribution. In the years leading up to the First World War, the primary assignment of the Bureau of Plant Industry remained to research the sustainability of certain crops and determine their economic, agricultural, and industrial potential. Following the war, the goal shifted towards expanding existing research and implementing the results with farmers.


The Bureau of Plant Industry was not only the central institution responsible for the cultivation of soy in the United States in the 1910s, but also for initiating the agricultural transformation that would bring soy to prominence in the 1930s. Charles Piper, head of the USDA’s Office of Forage Crops, and William J. Morse, Agronomist in Forage Crop Investigations within the Bureau of Plant Industry, can be counted among the prime advocates for the soybean in the United States. They had published the results of their research as early as the 1910s and 1920s, which had been conducted at the Arlington Experimental Farm in Virginia, the current site of the Pentagon. The specialists expounded the superlative qualities of soy, citing its ability to boost nitrogen levels in soil, thus enriching the earth naturally through its cultivation. This ability constituted the sole appeal and rationale for American farmers to begin growing soy. Factors inducing American adoption of soy were, therefore, fundamentally different from European motivations. The American agricultural scene was concerned with maintaining the best possible soil quality for the production of cotton and corn. At first, neither the nutritional properties of soy nor its oil content were of much interest; rather, these more concrete uses of harvested soy were decidedly secondary. Indeed, considering that the United States satisfied its demand for vegetable-based oil almost entirely with imported coconuts, the harvested crop of soybeans possessed little industrial value, and was earmarked almost entirely for inclusion in hay.

Morse and Piper were nevertheless enthusiastic about the potentially diverse uses of soy as a sort of all-purpose plant. With the increased demand for vegetable oils during the First World War, the potential use of soy was not lost on Morse and Piper. Witnessing the increasing amounts of soy being exported from Manchuria to Europe—and also to the United States—strengthened their conviction that soy needed to be more widely cultivated in America: “The large annual importations of soy beans, oil, and cake into the United States during the last few years indicate a ready market for products obtained from America-grown beans.” Morse and Piper sought to ensure that the botanical expeditions undertaken by the Bureau of Plant Industry kept soy firmly in the center of their endeavors. During the 1920s, a total of three expeditions to Asia were conducted, two with the explicit goal of comparing growing conditions and cultivation methods of various types of soybeans. The USDA authorized these expeditions because the cultivation

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42 Piper and Morse, *The Soybean* (1923), was the most comprehensive and best known of their many publications.


44 Piper and Morse, *The Soy Bean, with Special Reference to its Utilization for Oil, Cake, and Other Products* (1916), 18.
of cotton and corn was becoming economically difficult: the American cotton industry was being ravaged by the boll weevil, which devastated the cotton crop year after year, and the famed Corn Belt was similarly impacted by the corn borer.

Rattled by crop failure, monoculture, and mismanagement, the American agricultural industry badly needed to modernize. Soy appeared to be a crop with promise for the future, filling the void caused by the receding demand for cotton, and yielding both agricultural and industrial applications in the process. Thus, in February 1929, shortly before the beginning of the Great Depression, agricultural experts P. Howard Dorsett and William J. Morse set off with their families on a research expedition to Asia. Dorsett worked as a horticulturalist in the Office of Foreign Plant Introduction, an agency of the Bureau of Plant Industry, and had previously led a research expedition to Asia (1924–27) with the support of the USDA. This newest venture, the “Oriental Agricultural Exploration Expedition,” was purposefully conducted with the aim of gathering information that could be put to use in American agriculture to further the cultivation of soy. Field research would focus particularly on the collection of new varieties of soybeans, as well as on the search for “methods of utilization of the soybean for food and all byproducts, especially those industrial.”

Significant hopes were pinned on the excursion, which was claimed to be as a window for the expansion of soy in the United States:

Although grown primarily for forage in the United States, many sections are looking forward to the production of the soybean as a cash grain crop for oil and oil meal, and for human food, and industrial uses. It is quite generally predicted that the soybean will become one of our major crops, particularly in the South of the boll weevil.
sections and in the Corn Belt states through the menace of the corn borer.46

Dorsett and Morse remained abroad for nearly two years, placing particular emphasis on Japanese networks of knowledge and trade. They stationed themselves along the Japanese South Manchurian Railway and its experimental fields in Manchuria. Dorsett and Morse returned to the United States with a total of 9,000 distinct specimens, constituting ca. 4,500 different types of soybean. The remaining samples were those deemed to be of particular potential value for American agriculture.

Concurrent with their field studies, Dorsett and Morse traveled to the epicenters of the soy trade, such as Harbin, where they met with other scientists, including the German soy expert Lene Müller and Russian botanist Boris V. Scvorcov. Such encounters fostered the formation of an international scientific community in 1920s Manchuria, which drove the distribution of the soybean worldwide.

In Manchuria, however, the researchers were limited solely to investigating the cultivation of the crop, not its industrial processing. As in most regions with colonial or near-colonial dependencies, the subsequent industrial processing of the resultant harvest was still conducted nearly exclusively outside of Manchuria. Thus, Dorsett and Morse documented the production of tofu, soymilk, soy sauce, miso paste, candy, the use of bean cakes as fertilizer, the production of soy oil for various industrial applications, and the export of soy to Europe and America, predominantly either from the city of Dairen, or from Japan, or Korea.

The work of Dorsett and Morse became the cornerstone upon which the American soy industry was built. Their research encouraged

P. Howard Dorsett and William Morse took many pictures to document the cultivation of soybeans in China and Japan. This one shows Chinese workers planting soybeans near Chinchou, China, in May 1930. Photo: United States Department of Agriculture.
the propagation of the crop throughout the United States, enabling America to attain the title of the world’s largest producer of soy shortly after the Second World War. While soy was being grown solely in North Carolina—if at all—prior to First World War, the interwar period saw a boom in soy cultivation compared to previous cash crops, in the cotton and corn belts. Between 1924 and 1945, soy proliferated prodigiously, as evidenced by the dramatic increase in growing area dedicated to the crop. The cumulative area devoted to soy production grew eightfold over this time, from ca. 1.8 million acres to 14.2 million acres. Such incredible growth would not have been possible without significant federal support, and would also have been inconceivable without the Great Depression, which boosted production. In the aftermath of the First World War, the USDA encouraged cultivation of soy by producing countless brochures dedicated to spreading the word about America’s next agricultural frontier. To a certain extent, this soy-centric advertising campaign mitigated the impact of the reeling American cotton industry, though it was not enough to establish a sustained American commitment to soy. Despite the exhaustive efforts of the Bureau of Plant Industry, cultivation of soy spread haltingly throughout the 1920s, with farmers maintaining a skeptical distance between themselves and the alien crop. The first notable increase of farmland devoted to soy occurred in 1933 and was the result of a USDA initiative stemming from President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policy of the 1930s. This measure was supported through credit incentives and the imposition of higher import taxes on soybeans. Increased cultivation was particularly successful throughout the Corn Belt, including the states of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Iowa, and Missouri, where existing farm machinery formerly used to cultivate corn could continue to be used to grow and harvest the soy crop. In the 1950s, American farmers surpassed the Chinese in the production of soybeans. Soy would become the United States’ most important cash crop, and was, ironically, primarily exported back to Asia.

**Conclusion**

The breakthrough of soy in the West at the beginning of the twentieth century can be attributed to two fundamental causes, which are mutually dependent. The first cause lay in the imperial tensions between Russia and Japan, which had been building since the late nineteenth century. In the course of this conflict, Manchuria was unlocked: It became a destination of massive human migration; railroads were constructed; and soy became the dominant cash crop...

47 Munn, “Production and Utilization of the Soybean in the United States.”

48 For details, see Fornari, “The Big Change: Cotton to Soybeans.” Besides the New Deal, the U.S. support of soy also resulted from the 1930s oil and fat crises. See Ayodeji Oluokoju, “The United Kingdom and the Political Economy of the Global Oils and Fats Business during the 1930s.” *Journal of Global History* 4 (2009): 105-125.

of the region. A second cause for soy’s Western proliferation must be ascribed to strongly increasing Western demand for alternative forms of vegetable oils and fats. At the turn of the twentieth century, the soybean was well known in the refined circles of botanical enthusiasts and agricultural scientists, but its economic potential was largely ignored. Demand for soy became prominent with the global shortage of conventional vegetable fats and oils between 1908–09, and the outbreak of the First World War only exacerbated this deficit. Though soy was needed for the manufacture of many products, demand for it as a substitute oil source continued to grow exponentially. A byproduct of the oil-harvesting process, the so-called bean cake, would soon evolve into the center of interest in soy. This protein-rich cake proved to be of superlative value as animal feed, providing a secondary entrance for the soybean into Western agriculture.

The booming demand for soy exercised a balanced global impact that affected not only Western agricultural and industrial enterprises, but also had further international consequences. As a raw material, soy unified people and economies in the East and West. Initially coming to prominence as the prime Manchurian cash crop to meet rising global demand, the crop attained notable prominence in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s through the support of the American government. Despite its budding economic significance in the West, however, the plant failed to permeate preexistent cultural institutions. Up to this point, soy attained no unique place in the sociocultural narrative of the West, but was relegated to a minor status. This discrepancy between soy’s economic significance and its cultural perception was governed by a quintessential asymmetry, whose complex implications for local consumerism, regional conceptions, and global economic implications remain open to debate. One firm conclusion, however, is that the soybean would not have become the most important cash crop of the United States without the subsidies and support programs of the USDA.

Translated by Richard Lambert III

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Conference Reports
KALEIDOSCOPIC KNOWLEDGE: ON JEWISH AND OTHER ENCYCLOPEDIAS IN MODERNITY

Conveners: Arndt Engelhardt (Simon Dubnow Institute, Leipzig) and Ines Prodöhl (GHI). Participants: Yaakov Ariel (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Kirsten Belgum (University of Texas at Austin), Richard I. Cohen (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), Dan Diner (Simon Dubnow Institute/Hebrew University, Jerusalem), Arndt Engelhardt (Simon Dubnow Institute), Ottfried Fraisse (Simon Dubnow Institute), Dagmar Glaß (University of Bonn), Gershon D. Hundert (McGill University), Thomas Keiderling (University of Leipzig), Markus Kirchhoff (Simon Dubnow Institute), Ulrike Kramme (Simon Dubnow Institute), Ines Prodöhl (GHI), Bettina Rüdiger (German National Library, Leipzig), Martin Rüsch (University of Zurich), Dirk Sadowski (Simon Dubnow Institute), Barry Trachtenberg (University of Albany), Jeffrey Veidlinger (Indiana University, Bloomington), Philipp von Wussow (Academy Project at the Simon Dubnow Institute), Hansjakob Ziemer (MPI für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Berlin).

Since the onset of modernity at the latest, the encyclopedia has been a medium through which communities have sought to reassure themselves of their own selfhood. Encyclopedias became an important locus of negotiation for the debate over what communities regarded as “worth knowing.” “Jewish” encyclopedias came into being in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as a reaction to so-called general or universal encyclopedias, which were, in fact, anything but universal because they were largely oriented toward national cultures. The general encyclopedia’s claim to universality served as a kind of foil for emphasizing distinctive national features and particularities, specifically with respect to the process of modernization. This international workshop on “Jewish and Other Encyclopedias” at the Simon Dubnow Institute in Leipzig aimed to analyze encyclopedias as constructs of particular processes of identity formation. Nevertheless, the workshop organizers proposed that the body of “Jewish” knowledge is more closely related to other “worlds” of knowledge than has commonly been assumed, owing to a particular feature of encyclopedic texts: the continual resumption of modes thought and knowledge that have periodically been considered passé and outdated. In contrast to other media, encyclopedic texts have a certain degree of persistence. This persistence is evinced, for example, by editions reissued over several decades.
without significant changes, and portions of text taken from other encyclopedias. The workshop asked, therefore, if the encyclopedia might be a kind of textual kaleidoscope. Do encyclopedic texts merely reorder the same contents of knowledge into new patterns? To what extent is the observation of recurrent textual building blocks diametrically opposed to the ambition of the encyclopedia to generate a collective sense of belonging? To what extent does the formation of identical or similar knowledge influence the negotiation of concepts of value that are valid beyond borders, or without borders? And in what way does the encyclopedia help us to negotiate our conceptions of the global order and “modernity”?

In the introduction, Dan Diner presented the concepts underlying various projects on the history of knowledge at the research institute in Leipzig. He argued that modern encyclopedias, especially in their alphabetical form, marked a transition from traditional forms of knowledge to a new canon.

The first panel addressed ideas of identity and modernity in regard to encyclopedias from different societies. Dagmar Glaß focused on encyclopedias from Egypt in the context of the Arab Renaissance of the nineteenth century, taking Butrus al-Bustani’s incomplete Dai‘rat al-‘ma‘arif (1876–1900) as an example. Glaß analyzed how the Western concept of modernity manifested itself in the Arab encyclopedias of the time by tracing the substantial influence and pressure exerted by the West on Arabic encyclopedic production. Next, Yaakov Ariel discussed the English-language Jewish Encyclopedia (1901–06), the first modern Jewish encyclopedia, which would transform American Judaism into a global center of Jewish learning. He argued that the encyclopedia was crucial for putting Judaism on an equal footing with Christian groups in America. The third presenter, Jeffrey Veidlinger, also underscored the connectedness of modernity and self-understanding. He investigated the Russian-language Evreiskaia entsiklopedia (1908–13) within the context of the Jewish public culture movement after the 1905 Revolution. He argued that this encyclopedia marked a key moment in the creation of a distinct Judeo-Russian identity.

The second panel concentrated on how canons of knowledge have been shaped. How do canons arise, and who compiles them? Arndt Engelhardt showed that the Encyclopaedia Judaica (1928–34), published in Berlin in the interwar period, preserved a canon of common knowledge for European Jewish communities in transformation,
integrating secular elements into a tradition primarily characterized by sacred scripture. Addressing the question of how a scholarly canon is developed, Ottfried Fraisse concentrated not on a single encyclopedia, but on a certain author and his influence on the production of particular knowledge. Ignác Goldziher, a prominent Jewish Orientalist from Hungary, and a widely respected scholar at the turn of the twentieth century, wrote several entries on Islam for various German- and English-language encyclopedias, spreading a specific picture of Islam in Western society. Barry Trachtenberg spoke on *Di algemeyne entsiklopedye* (1932–66), which was supposed to be the first comprehensive encyclopedia in the Yiddish language. Its intended purpose—helping to craft a modern Jewish citizenry—gave way with the Nazi rise to power to a more particular goal: memorializing destroyed Jewish communities and promoting the resettlement of Jews in new centers.

The third panel analyzed the transformation and adaptation of encyclopedic knowledge, particularly in encyclopedias based on those published by the German publisher F. A. Brockhaus in Leipzig. Kirsten Belgum focused on the Jewish terminology in the 7th edition of Brockhaus’s *Conversations-Lexicon* and its English-language adaptation, the *Encyclopedia Americana* (1829–32). Both encyclopedias purveyed a socially distinguished form of cultural expression and served as repositories of information. Belgum highlighted this presentation of specifically Jewish cultural and religious knowledge to a predominantly non-Jewish readership across the Atlantic as part of the larger process of transatlantic cultural translation. Ulrike Kramme discussed Hungarian adaptations of the Brockhaus encyclopedia from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, focusing especially on the Jewish themes in these works. In the last lecture of this panel, Ines Prodöhl discussed the numerous foreign language adaptations of the “Brockhaus,” which enabled the transnational proliferation of the work throughout the nineteenth century. Taking these adaptations and the global flow of encyclopedic texts as an example, Prodöhl explored the analytical possibilities for understanding processes of cultural homogenization and heterogenization in Europe and North America.

In an evening lecture, “New History—Refined Memory,” Gershon D. Hundert provided insight into the making of the *YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe*. He presented this encyclopedia as an up-to-date account of the history of the Jewish experience in Eastern Europe, presenting scholarship based on research in recently opened archives,
featuring diverse contributors, and attending to previously overlooked aspects of the field. The subsequent discussion centered on decision-making strategies for such a complex work, and specifically the question of what is included in, or excluded from, the encyclopedia.

The workshop’s final panel addressed the question of how editors of encyclopedias have negotiated knowledge. Bettina Rüdiger discussed the production of the unfinished *Allgemeine Enzyklopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste* (1818–89), initiated by Johann Samuel Ersch and Johann Gottfried Gruber. She argued that the editors aimed to produce a work that would encompass knowledge on values and identity, rather than provide practical information. Martin Rüesch then analyzed Pierre Bayle’s *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, relating the work to the author’s views on Jews and Jewish history. Rüesch engaged the difficult question of whether Bayle, who was famous for propagating tolerance, was sincere, or whether his tolerant stance was merely a beautiful façade. Finally, Dirk Sadowski presented the case of the early modern *Ma’ase Tuvia*, a Hebrew compendium of knowledge first published in 1708. This encyclopedia sought to provide Jews in the time of Haskala with contemporary knowledge on the natural sciences. According to Sadowski, such “modern” knowledge was intended to enable the encyclopedia’s readers to intelligently participate in scholarly discussions with Christian interlocutors.

In his closing remarks, Richard I. Cohen compared encyclopedias to museums, focusing especially on forms of visibility. He argued that both Jewish museums and encyclopedias aspired to raise Jewish pride and foster a sense of belonging, while asserting the desire to present Jewish culture and history to the non-Jewish world in the classical spirit of the founders of the “Wissenschaft des Judentums” (the science of Judaism). Cohen highlighted the nature of Jewish visibility and the character of Jewish knowledge during the twentieth century.

Participants left the workshop with a better understanding of encyclopedias as products of their time, reflecting an occasionally distorted Zeitgeist. Encyclopedias continue to serve as a unique cultural space for developing concepts of values and norms. They also spread the standards of modernity to the world, thus multiplying them. Encyclopedias have always contained an invitation for readers to identify with their own society, and they proffer a catalog of suggestions on how to demarcate one’s own self and society from other societies.

Ines Prodöhl (GHI)
FALLING BEHIND OR CATCHING UP? THE EAST GERMAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Conference at the GHI, September 24–26, 2009. Co-sponsored by the Stiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur. Conveners: Uta A. Balbier (GHI) and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI). Participants: Uwe Müller (University of Saarbrücken), Rainer Karlsch (Berlin), Jaap Sleifer (Amsterdam), Burghard Ciesla (Berlin), Jackson Janes (American Institute for Contemporary German Studies), Jeffrey Kopstein (University of Toronto), Jörg Rösler (Berlin), Silke Fengler (University of Vienna), Andrew Port (Wayne State University, Detroit), André Steiner (ZZF, Potsdam), Dolores L. Augustin (St. John’s University, Jamaica, NY), Ray Stokes (University of Glasgow), Ralf Ahrens (ZZF, Potsdam), Sibylle Gauing (Tübingen), Gerhard A. Ritter (University of Munich), Holger Wolf (Georgetown University), Michael Burda (Humboldt University, Berlin).

Did the East German economy suffer from the long-term effects of difficult starting conditions or did it perform poorly for other reasons? This conference, held at the German Historical Institute in Washington DC and co-sponsored by the Stiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur, sought to locate the economic history of the GDR within the broader framework of twentieth-century German history. Historians and economists from both sides of the Atlantic traced the past, present, and future of the East German economy, considering not only the decline, but also the relative success and longevity of the GDR’s economic system. The conference set out to challenge the historical narrative that regards the East German economy primarily as a failure, and as a preeminent example of the deficiencies of central planning, especially when contrasted with the outstanding economic success of the Federal Republic. The conference explored the factors behind both the strengths and weaknesses of the East German economy within its broader political, cultural, and social context.

The conference opened with a public panel discussion presented in cooperation with the American Institute of Contemporary German Studies. Hartmut Berghoff and Jackson Janes discussed the GDR’s culture of decline with leading German and American experts on the history and economy of the GDR as well as the new Länder (German states) after 1990, addressing the GDR’s legacy in Germany up to the present.
While this opening focused on the state of eastern Germany today, the first conference panel turned to the past—as far back as the nineteenth century—to uncover the roots of the GDR’s economic heritage. Analyzing the history of the eastern German economic realm before 1945, this panel focused on the starting conditions for the GDR economy. Uwe Müller opened the panel with a presentation on the political debates over the “backwardness” of the East, which was treated as a grave political and social problem before the First World War. He outlined the different modes of intervention undertaken by the state to improve economic productivity in the East. Rainer Karlsch then showed how the autarky projects of the Nazi regime shaped the eastern German economic landscape through the establishment, for example, of the “chemical triangle.” He demonstrated that these projects were heavily subsidized, just as the GDR’s autarky projects of the 1950s were. Jaap Sleifer presented the starting conditions for the regime, concluding that the GDR economy suffered from bad political decision-making rather than a bad start. East Germany had inherited a modern industrial sector that would have made economic growth possible. However, the exclusion from international free trade and ideological decisions taken in the Soviet Union in the late 1940s made the GDR’s economic decline foreseeable. Taken together, these papers revealed the ongoing state intervention in the East German economy in the first half of the twentieth century under different regimes, and considered this tradition in analyzing the GDR’s economic system.

The second panel traced the ideological framework behind the creation of the centrally planned economy in the Soviet Occupation Zone, as well as the political and economic realities of the early years of the GDR. First, Burghard Ciesla addressed Soviet economic policy, displaying how the dismantling of industrial equipment, occupational pragmatism, and disarmament brought the East German economy close to collapse in the late 1940s. He underlined the influence that Cold War developments had on Soviet economic policies. Jeffrey Kopstein’s paper explored the ideological and cultural parameters that influenced the creation of the GDR’s socialist society and economic system. In accordance with the work of the political economist Andrew Janos, he labeled the GDR’s economic system a “militarized economy.” He also compared it to the economy of the Third Reich, working towards a general model to explain German “militarized economies” in the twentieth century. Whereas Ciesla and Kopstein unveiled the chaotic, exploitative, and destructive
nature of Soviet economic policy in East Germany, Margrit Grabas turned to the economic policies that the SED—the GDR’s ruling party—planted on that soil. She interpreted the crisis of June 17, 1953, as an instructive shock to the system, which led to the formation and consolidation of a GDR-specific regulatory capacity in socialist industrialization. The panel made clear how important ideological, political, and social influences were in shaping the centrally-planned East German economy.

The third panel focused on the economic developments and reforms of the 1960s. Inquiring into the regime’s attempt to implement market mechanisms within the centrally planned economy, Jörg Rösler argued that the reforms produced a rise in consumption standards and could have succeeded, had arguments within the SED and with the Soviet Union not brought the process to an end. Next, Silke Fengler outlined the business history of the VEB Filmfabrik Wolfen, adding a micro-historical perspective to the panel. She demonstrated how the cooperative and competitive relations within the Comecon affected the innovative capability and productive capacity of the company. In particular, the demands and goals of Soviet Union limited the development of the East German photochemical industry, which restricted Wolfen’s potential for technological development. This effect was exacerbated by the corporation’s isolation from the West. Finally, Andrew Port presented a socio-historical dimension to the economic decline of the GDR by exposing the dark side of Eigensinn. He showed how attempts to create artificial competition among workers to stimulate productivity had a contrary effect: socialist workers began to sabotage the work of their colleagues in the struggle for benefits and honors. In sum, this panel analyzed the different dynamics within the GDR’s economic system and that of the socialist bloc, arguing that the East German economic system was weakened not only by the structures of the centrally-planned economy but by dynamics that developed within it.

The fourth panel pursued the GDR’s economic path to stagnation and decline. André Steiner provided an overview of the economic situation for the period after 1971, when Erich Honecker replaced Walter Ulbricht as the General Secretary of the SED Central Committee. In the 1980s, especially, exports decreased, growth rates diminished, and the supply of consumer goods declined. These developments could hardly be stopped—not by two major loans...
from West Germany, nor by investment in microelectronics. With her analysis of the life and impact of Werner Hartmann, Dolores Augustin added a biographical dimension to GDR economic history. Focusing on Hartmann’s career as the father of the GDR’s microelectronics industry, she outlined the shifts in the GDR’s culture of technological innovation that undermined the regime’s economic viability as early as the 1960s. The GDR’s competitive potential in the technological sector reached its lowest point in the 1980s, when the influence of the state and the Stasi grew. The panel again emphasized the GDR’s heavy reliance on economic development within the communist bloc. It also revealed the GDR’s inability to keep up with international technological research.

The fifth panel explored the global dimensions of the GDR economy, highlighting external influences on, and challenges to, its closed, centrally-planned economy. First, Ray Stokes analyzed the impact of the 1970s oil crisis on the GDR. He showed, on the one hand, how the Soviet Union supported the GDR during the crisis, which affected the GDR less profoundly than the Federal Republic. On the other hand, he characterized the GDR’s response to this challenge as leading to a long-term economic pattern: the regime invested money in short-term solutions such as increasing brown coal mining, which risked further exploitation of the environment, instead of considering long-term solutions for the provision of energy resources. In the next paper, Ralf Ahrens outlined the dynamics of East German foreign trade in the Honecker years. He described the so-called “import hunger,” which derived from the GDR’s desire to fill gaps in consumer goods and hide the state’s lack of technological innovation. Ahrens emphasized Soviet support of the GDR, for instance, through its purchase of products that were produced in the GDR and could not be sold in the West. In the third paper, Sibylle Gausing investigated the political dimension of the GDR’s “de facto membership” within the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s. She sketched German-German trade relations, revealing how these interactions opened the EEC to the GDR. The West German government supported these trade relations for political reasons, even though some West German firms opposed them because of their negative impact on economic competitiveness. While other European member states were also suspicious, the Soviet Union tolerated the GDR’s special position within the EEC, as it strengthened the East German economy. The panel clearly highlighted the importance of viewing the GDR’s economic history
within the context of the global economic system. Such an outlook makes the decisive influence of global players like the EEC or the Soviet Union on the development of the regime readily apparent.

The sixth panel broadened the conference’s perspective by examining the transformation of the eastern German economy after reunification and discussing its future prospects. Michael Burda gave an overview of the economic development of the former GDR regions since reunification, pointing out the improved standard of living in the East over the last two decades, and the convergence of consumption patterns in East and West. He also underscored that the wage differential between the West and the new Länder has led to the relocation of international companies in the East. Burda’s positive take on German economic unification contrasted with Gerhard A. Ritter’s analysis, which emphasized the negative consequences of imposing the Federal Republic’s social system on the new Länder. He demonstrated how the transfer of the West German system—with its pensions, benefits, and trade unions—to the economically weaker East produced higher wages and exploded the cost of unification. In addition, Western options for early retirement and short-term labor became important parts of the labor market policy affecting the East. Thus a vicious circle developed in which high social expenses led to increasing unemployment. Holger Wolf compared the course of German economic unification with the postwar economic policies of the 1940s. In both periods, an initial reform package comprising monetary reform and price liberalization aimed to reinvigorate an economy stifled by wage and price controls, heavy state debt, and extensive state influence on allocation. Due to the different international economic situation, however, the new Länder never experienced an economic boost comparable to that of the West German state in the 1950s. The panel nevertheless acknowledged the impressive ability of the new Länder to catch up with West Germany in terms of consumer goods and infrastructure.

The conference broadened the perspective on GDR economic history both temporally and geographically. It demonstrated that the GDR was by no means isolated from the general course of German history. The GDR’s development was based on its economic heritage from the first half of the twentieth century and was strongly influenced by Soviet exploitation after the war. However, the Soviet Union also constantly supported its German socialist stepchild in
trade and the supply of raw materials. At the same time, the GDR economic system was shaped by its trade with and credits from the Federal Republic; it was influenced by international economic systems like the Comecon and the EEC, as well as by global challenges like the oil crisis.

The combination of approaches, ranging from economic and social history to economics, helped to shed new light on the GDR’s economic development. The conference promoted an exploration of the history behind the constant decline of a centrally-planned economic system, by revealing the system’s various dynamics and traps. The conference will add to the German Historical Institute’s growing interest in GDR history, correlating with an international upswing of interest in the field.

Uta Andrea Balbier (GHI)
AFRICAN-AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS AND GERMANY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Conference at Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY, October 1-4, 2009. Co-sponsored by the GHI and Vassar College. Conveners: Maria Höhn (Vassar College) and Martin Klimke (GHI). Made possible by the generous support of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and Vassar College’s President’s Office, Dean of Faculty, Development Office, and the Departments of History, German Studies, American Culture, Africana Studies, International Studies, Art, and Political Science. Participants: Kenneth Barkin (University of California, Riverside), Leon Bass (Philadelphia), Manfred Berg (University of Heidelberg), Angela Davis (University of California, Santa Cruz, emerita), Eve Dunbar (Vassar College), Moritz Ege (Humboldt University, Berlin), Karl-Heinz Füssl (Technical University, Berlin), Katharina Gerund (University of Düsseldorf), Matt Herron (Taking Stock, San Rafael, CA), Hansjürgen Hilgert (Hilgert & Witsch KG, Krautscheid), Gerald Horne (Houston University), Andrew Hurley (University of Melbourne), S. Marina Jones (UNC-Chapel Hill/GHI), Helma Kaldewey (Tulane University), Wilfried Kaute (Cologne), Christine Knauer (University of Tübingen), Peter H. Koepf (The Atlantic Times, Berlin), Daniel Lee (University of California, Berkeley), Brian Mann (Vassar College), Mia Mask (Vassar College), Joe McPhee (Poughkeepsie), Frank Mehring (Free University of Berlin), Quincy Mills (Vassar College), Maggi Morehouse (University of South Carolina, Aiken), Eli Nathans (University of Western Ontario), Christina Oppel (University of Münster), Anke Ortlepp (GHI), Rosemarie Peña (Black German Cultural Society), Peggy Piesche (Vassar College), Dan Puckett (Troy University), Matthias Reiss (University of Exeter), Robert Sackett (University of Colorado), Christian Schmidt-Rost (Free University of Berlin), Alcyone Scott (Midland Lutheran College, Nebraska), Tyrone Simpson (Vassar College), Laura Stapanese (Oldenburg/GHI), Roland Stolte (Marienkirche, Berlin), Debra Tanner Abell (Pittsburgh), Harriet Washington (Rochester), Judith Weisenfeld (Princeton University), Karl-Dietrich Wolff (Frankfurt).

The conference brought together scholars of history, literature, and cultural studies from Germany, the U.S., and Australia, as well as eyewitnesses, to explore the links between the African-American Civil Rights Movement and Germany throughout the twentieth century. The pre-conference program began on Wednesday afternoon with a screening of the film The Negro Soldier from 1944, directed by Stuart Heisler (U.S. War Department), and introduced...
by Mia Mask. Subsequently, Leon Bass, a World War II veteran, gave a lecture, “Fighting in the Jim Crow Army: A Black Sergeant Remembers Buchenwald.” As a nineteen-year-old, Bass served in the 183rd Engineer Combat Battalion, a segregated unit of the U.S. Army, and was among the soldiers who liberated the Buchenwald concentration camp in 1945. Born and raised in Philadelphia, Bass gave a moving recollection of his own struggles with racism in the U.S. military during his training in the South, reflecting on the idea of putting his life on the line for a country that did not deem him “good enough.” He recounted how seeing the atrocities committed at Buchenwald would lead him to become an agent for social change upon his return to the U.S.

The first conference day began with a panel discussion, “Tracing an Untold History: Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s Visit to Cold War Berlin in 1964,” chaired by conveners Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke. Höhn and Klimke introduced King’s largely forgotten visit to the divided city of September 1964, during the course of which he visited the Berlin Wall, opened the city’s cultural festival, delivered a sermon to more than 20,000 West Berliners at an outdoor arena, and was awarded an honorary degree by the Theological School of the Protestant Church. Höhn and Klimke also played audio excerpts of a previously unreleased speech that King gave in East Berlin’s St. Mary’s Church in Alexander Square during the same visit. Roland Stolte further explored King’s visit by discussing how Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt and Provost Heinrich Grüber facilitated it. Grüber, the former pastor at East Berlin’s St. Mary’s Church, had been an active opponent of the Nazi regime, and had gained international attention when he testified during the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961.

The panel continued with a vivid eyewitness account by Alcyone Scott, one of King’s interpreters during his visit, who detailed King’s border crossing at Checkpoint Charlie without a passport and described the impact of King’s message of nonviolent resistance and hope during his sermon at the overcrowded St. Mary’s Church. Discussing the primary and secondary sources related to King’s visit, Laura Stapane introduced the digital archive of “The Civil Rights Struggle, African-American GIs, and Germany” (http://www.aacvr-germany.org). The project, a collaboration of the GHI Washington, the Heidelberg Center for American Studies at Heidelberg University, and Vassar College, serves as a platform for making
On the second conference day, Kenneth Barkin examined W. E. B. DuBois’s time at Harvard University and in Germany (1892–94) as part of a panel on “Transatlantic Journeys.” Barkin investigated DuBois’s perceptions of Germany, arguing that DuBois’s everyday experiences in German society—and not his academic studies—exercised the strongest influence on his position on racism in the U.S., and made Prussia seem like a “racial paradise.” Karl-Heinz Füssl’s paper focused on Black Mountain College, NC, which was established in 1933 and became home to a number of prominent German and European refugees, such as Josef and Anni Albers. Füssl described how, from its inception, debates on whether to allow black students and faculty preoccupied people at the college, creating a rift within the faculty and similarly dividing the European refugees. Füssl argued that the campus integration project eventually failed in part, at least, because of the pervasive segregation surrounding the college community. Next, Harriet Washington explored the origins of prejudices against and stereotypes associated with black people from antiquity through modern slavery, demonstrating how these images and perceptions shaped the medical field and the research of German scientists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The second panel, “Black Soldiers, Germans, and World War II,” began with Matthias Reiss’s presentation on the experiences of German prisoners of war in the United States. Reiss complicated traditional narratives by highlighting the ways in which the presence of these POWs in American society “helped to undermine the legitimacy of racial segregation.” According to Reiss, the ambiguous status of the POWs was characterized by the fact that their direct relationships with African Americans, although temporary, were generally friendly. At the same time, Reiss noted, the white POWs...
enjoyed privileges relative to black GIs, allowing the latter a lens through which they could compare Nazi racial discrimination to their own domestic discrimination in the U.S. In the next paper, Maggi Morehouse emphasized the importance of Truman’s 1948 Executive Order desegregating the U.S. military. Morehouse made a case for reframing the meta-narrative of the civil rights movement by focusing on this landmark policy decision instead of the 1954 Supreme Court decision “Brown v. Board of Education” as the starting point.

The third panel, “Debating Civil Rights on Both Sides of the Atlantic,” was opened by Christina Oppel’s analysis of the role that Nazi Germany played in African-American discourse in the 1930s and 1940s. In Oppel’s view, African-American intellectuals used the analogy between U.S. racism and German fascism not only to charge the U.S. with hypocrisy, but also to situate their struggle within the larger framework of human rights in the context of the Atlantic Charter and the formation of the United Nations. Christine Knauer addressed German and African-American interactions and media representations of interracial rape in postwar Germany. Pointing to the crucial role of race in each case, Knauer particularly examined how these sexual assaults were characterized in official reports, political discourse, and public debate. In the section’s last paper, Robert Sackett explored West German media coverage of U.S. race relations from 1949–67. Sackett noted how the discourse on both racial discrimination and black militancy, especially from 1960 on, used Nazi Germany as a comparative reference to contextualize the situation on the other side of the Atlantic.

The second day of the conference concluded with a keynote lecture by Angela Davis on the topic “Between Critical Theory and Civil Rights: A Sixties’ Journey from Boston to Frankfurt to San Diego.” Before an audience of over four hundred, Davis reflected on meeting her academic mentor Herbert Marcuse at Brandeis University, studying with Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer at the University of Frankfurt, and her visits to East Berlin in the 1960s and early 1970s. Davis underscored the importance of Critical Theory and her experiences abroad, citing their contributions to her political coming-of-age as an African-American activist. She also recounted the personal significance of the international outpouring of support she experienced during her trial and incarceration in the U.S.
The next conference day began with a panel on “Bringing the Cold War Home,” which opened with Helma Kaldewey’s examination of Louis Armstrong’s Eastern European tour in 1965. Kaldewey focused on Armstrong’s time in East Germany, his close relationship with jazz specialist and radio host Karl-Heinz Drechsel, and East Berlin’s attempt to use jazz to its own political advantage in the propaganda battles of the Cold War. Next, Daniel Lee investigated the debates and policies concerning relationships and marriages between African-American GIs and white German women, both in West Germany and the United States. Lee revealed a spectrum of attitudes on interracial marriage, including the staunch opposition of white segregationists, the conflicting opinions among African Americans, the myriad media representations, and the varying treatment of interracial couples by U.S. military and local German officials. Lee showed how the presence of these couples influenced discussions about racial equality and civil rights in the U.S. leading up to the landmark 1967 Supreme Court decision “Loving v. Virginia.”

In the fifth panel, “Framing Civil Rights,” Eli Nathans examined the radio and television commentaries of conservative West German journalist Peter von Zahn in the 1950s and early 1960s, which focused largely on the United States. As Nathans revealed, the first two years of Zahn’s broadcasts were funded by the United States Information Agency (USIA). Nathans contended that Zahn’s sympathetic but critical broadcasts contributed to the liberalization of West German society, fundamentally shaping the ways in which the racial situation in the U.S. was perceived in Germany. Frank Mehring investigated how the Marshall Plan’s re-education films aimed to propagate democracy, free trade, international cooperation, and a vision of multiracial tolerance in Europe. Using the example of Georg Tressler’s “Wie die Jungen sungen” (1954), directly referencing the civil rights struggle in the U.S., Mehring demonstrated how the racial encounters of ethnically European and African children in an international school in Vienna fostered colorblindness and integration while mirroring the creation of a new, collective European identity.

The panel “Jazz and Civil Rights in a Divided Germany” began with Christian Schmidt-Rost’s analysis of the discourse on jazz in East Germany. Examining jazz magazines and concert series, Schmidt-Rost traced the changing political interpretations of jazz
in East Germany from the postwar period to the mid-1960s, relating these interpretations to their intersection with the civil rights struggle. Andrew Hurley scrutinized the jazz discourse in West Germany from the 1950s to the 1970s, focusing on the example of Joachim-Ernst Berendt. Hurley demonstrated that Berendt, initially fascinated with the musical qualities of jazz, came to view it as a tool for liberalizing West German postwar society. Berendt commented on the alliance between jazz and the civil rights movements of the 1950/60s, openly criticizing the ideology of Black Power and Black Nationalism at the beginning of the 1970s, which he regarded as fascist. This presentation illustrated another instance in which the German past overshadowed perceptions of the civil rights struggle.

A roundtable on “Expanding the African-American Diaspora” concluded the conference day, focusing on lacunae in scholarship. Judith Weisenfeld proposed several areas that require closer examination: the religious dimension, for instance, links between Germany and Black Caribbean Moravians, some African-American artists’ appropriation of European culture as African-American culture, or the history of the Women’s Auxiliary Corps in Germany. Matt Heron described his life as a photographer during the U.S. civil rights movement, his support of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and his project, “National Archive for Civil Rights Movement Photography,” which underscores the crucial role of visual representations for both the domestic dynamic and transnational attraction of the civil rights struggle. Sara Lennox called for more interdisciplinary and transnational work, emphasizing the need to apply the ideas of “race” and “whiteness” to the German case. Gerald Horne applauded the call for a stronger concentration on interdisciplinary studies, suggesting closer cooperation between African-American studies and German departments, and outlining potential topics of research in this area. The subsequent discussion encouraged researchers to further address gender, especially concerning dependents of U.S. military personnel in Germany.

The last session of the day started with the panel entitled “The Commodification of Civil Rights.” Katharina Gerund examined Angela Davis’s impact on the “West German imagination.” Gerund argued that, as a black female student, Davis defied the traditional discursive categories of “Black Panther” or “black GI,” and emerged as one of the leading representatives of the “other” America. Moritz Ege
analyzed representations of African Americans in advertisements, books, and magazines, and the “Afroamericanophilia” expressed in West German visual culture in the late 1960s. Ege contended that members of the German student movement attempted to emulate African Americans in language and style and pursued interracial relationships as a means of demonstrating anti-racism.

The conference concluded with a panel on “History and Memory across the Atlantic,” in which several participants shared their transatlantic experiences related to the civil rights struggle. As a composer, improviser, and instrumentalist employed by the U.S. army, Joe McPhee was stationed in Germany from 1964–65 and often returned to participate in jazz concerts. Debra Tanner Abell, born in Germany and raised in the U.S. as the daughter of a white German mother from Lower Bavaria and an African-American GI from Philadelphia, talked about her childhood in the U.S. and about returning to Germany as a seventeen-year-old to trace her parents’ love story and visit her place of birth. Participating via videoconferencing, Karl-Dietrich Wolff, former president of the German Socialist Student League (SDS), shared his perceptions of the African-American civil rights struggle when he visited the U.S. and spoke about his role in establishing the Black Panther Solidarity Committee in West Germany.

The conference sparked lively discussions about the transnational connection between the U.S. civil rights movement and Germany, as well as aspects of the theory and methodology of writing this history. It underlined the crucial need for scholars to further examine the global impact of the U.S. civil rights movement, and to investigate how the experiences of African Americans abroad affected it.

S. Marina Jones (GHI) and Martin Klimke (GHI)
GERMANS’ THINGS: MATERIAL CULTURE AND DAILY LIFE IN EAST AND WEST, 1949–2009

Conference at the Wende Museum and the University of California at Los Angeles, October 1-3, 2009. Co-sponsored by the GHI, UCLA, and the Wende Museum. Conveners: Uta Balbier (GHI), Philipp Gassert (University of Augsburg), Justinian Jampol (Wende Museum), Robert G. Moeller (University of California, Irvine). Participants: John Ahouse (Wende Museum), Paul Betts (University of Sussex), Paul Freedman (Yale University), Lindsay Hansen (California State University, Northridge), Karen Lang (University of Southern California), Alf Lüdtke (University of Erfurt), John Maciuika (Baruch College, CUNY), Josie McLellan (Bristol University), Jane Pavitt (Victoria & Albert Museum), Kathy Pence (Baruch College, CUNY), Uta Poiger (University of Washington, Seattle), Martin Roth (Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden), Eli Rubin (Western Michigan University), Lutz Sauerteig (Durham University), Leonard Schmieding (University of Leipzig), Jana Scholze (Victoria & Albert Museum), Jeff Schutts (Douglas College), Joes Segal (Utrecht University), Edith Sheffer (Stanford University), Detlef Siegfried (University of Copenhagen).

From October 1–3, 2009, an international group of historians and museum specialists convened in the UCLA Library and Villa Aurora under the auspices of the Wende Museum and Archive of the Cold War and the German Historical Institute. In six panels and a plenary discussion, they scrutinized the role of “things”—that is, objects of material culture—and their importance for the writing of German history. Some of the presenters focused on tangible objects, such as photographs or menus; others looked at the practices associated with objects, from teaching sex education to collecting designer pieces of furniture. Exploring the political, social, and cultural history of the two postwar German states in the Cold War era from the perspective of material culture, conference participants emphasized three areas of research: first, the function of things in the everyday life of East and West Germans; second, the history of cultural transfers of material culture, including different, often contesting, interpretations and appropriations of objects and their associated uses; and third, present-day museum practices as indicators of the politics of “doing history.”

Throughout the conference, a number of themes informed the presentations and subsequent discussions. Speaking about Germans’ things in Los Angeles triggered many responses about proximity,
distance, and perspective. Los Angeles was particularly attractive as the conference location because it gave participants the opportunity to go on a guided tour of the remarkable collection of the Wende Museum, which includes many objects de-accessioned by other museums and thus lends itself to exploring alternative ways of writing histories of the Cold War. While at first glance, Los Angeles seems very far away from Germany—or at least East Germany—in fact, the city has strong ties to German culture, as demonstrated by the exile of intellectuals such as Thomas Mann, Bertolt Brecht, and Lion Feuchtwanger to L.A. Talking about “things” German on the Pacific coast, then, seemed not only appropriate, but it allowed us to probe into their “German-ness” from a safe and liberating distance, free from the German political discourse of “doing history,” and inviting new perspectives on historiographical approaches. This setting sparked discussions about the agency of things, as well as their opacity and their respective aura. By suggesting a need to unsettle things, to shake loose their layers of meaning, and to attend to signifying practices, the conference group opened up new arenas for further research agendas. Closely connected with scrutinizing this “thingness” of things were concerns about their relation to texts, the written and spoken word, and images, and correspondingly, the discourse and practice of using and staging “things” in museum contexts. In the space of three days, about 25 scholars of German history came together, but not to further their own agendas; rather, to discuss their projects within the framework of a truly collaborative investigation. There were disagreements, but no arguments; new ideas, but no grand-standing; answers, but none of them wrong. As this conference demonstrated, more of these opportunities for cooperative work are needed. The subject matter is not important. True, we came to this conference to talk about things. But we left with new questions about the practice of history—a step towards (inter-)disciplinary growth that is perhaps the harbinger of a new era of doing history.

Benita Blessing (Ohio University) and Leonard Schmieding (University of Leipzig)
MEDIEVAL HISTORY SEMINAR 2009

Seminar at the GHI London, October 8-11, 2009. Co-sponsored by the GHI London and the GHI Washington. Conveners: Michael Borgolte (Humboldt University, Berlin), Frank Rexroth (University of Göttingen), Patrick J. Geary (University of California, Los Angeles), Dame Janet Nelson (King's College, University of London), Barbara H. Rosenwein (Loyola University, Chicago), Miri Rubin (Queen Mary, University of London), Carola Dietze (GHI Washington), and Jochen Schenk (GHI London). Participants: Jan-Hendryk de Boer (University of Göttingen), Joshua Burson (Yale University), Alison Creber (King's College, University of London), Daniel Föller (University of Frankfurt on Main), Leanne Good (University of California, Los Angeles), S. Adam Hindin (Harvard University), Astrid Lembke (University of Frankfurt on Main), Jamie McCandless (University of Western Michigan), Katharina Mersch (University of Göttingen), Sandra Müller-Wiesner (University of Zürich), Levi Roach (Cambridge University), Steven Robbie (University of St. Andrews), Tanja Skambraks (University of Mannheim), Gustavs Strenga (Queen Mary, University of London), Immo Warntjes (University of Greifswald).

The sixth meeting of the Medieval History Seminar, organized jointly by the German Historical Institutes in London and Washington, took place in London from October 8 to 11, 2009. Frank Rexroth gave the opening lecture, comparing “Three Doctoral Students”—John of Salisbury, Hermann Heimpel, and Kerstin Seidel—and the way their work was influenced by the discipline of their time. Papers were given by seven German, one Swiss, four American, one Latvian, and three British Ph.D. candidates and recent Ph.D. recipients, and then discussed with mentors Michael Borgolte, Patrick J. Geary, Dame Janet Nelson, Frank Rexroth, Barbara H. Rosenwein, and Miri Rubin. The seminar considered proposals from all areas of medieval studies, and the selected projects covered a broad range of thematic perspectives, methodological approaches, and periods of medieval history. Papers were distributed ahead of time, allowing the eight panels to be fully devoted to discussion. Each panel featured two papers introduced by fellow students acting as commentators rather than by the authors themselves. The intriguing papers opened a window to current research in medieval history in Germany, Great Britain, and North America, and the resulting discussion was constructive and lively.
The opening panel started with a presentation of Immo Wartnjes’s dissertation, “The Munich Computus: Text and Translation: Irish Alternatives to Bede’s Computistics.” Wartnjes stresses the importance of the study of computistical texts not only for historians of science, but also, and especially, for linguists and cultural historians. Using hitherto unknown source material, he argues that the Bede’s scientific work can only be understood as a culminating point on a line of Irish tradition, deconstructing the myth of the Bede as the only outstanding scientist of his age. Daniel Föllner’s dissertation “Verflochtenes Denken: Kognitive Strategien in der Runenschriftlichkeit der Wikingerzeit” focuses on the way information was conveyed on rune stones in order to analyze the intellectual basis of Scandinavians’ acculturation to other European cultures in the ninth to eleventh centuries. He stresses that an entire network of semantic significations indicated by different media (content, form of the text, presentation, ornamentation, pictures, topography) and methods of presentation (making it mysterious, strengthening the main idea, or completing it) must be simultaneously considered by the reader in order to understand them correctly. He maintains that the complexity and dynamics of such mental processes allow us to draw conclusions about the cognitive flexibility expressed within them. This flexibility has to be regarded as the basis for the Vikings’ skill at acculturation.

The second panel began with a discussion of Gustavs Strenga’s dissertation, which focuses on the role of elites in memoria of two non-elite guilds—beer carters and carters—in late-medieval Riga. He analyzes the impact that elites had on the remembrance of the two guilds and puts forth the hypothesis that the elite members joined these guilds because they perceived them as guilds of the “poor” that would take good care of the elite’s commemoration. Next, S. Adam Hindin presented his work on the Bethlehem Chapel in Prague (founded in 1391), which has been considered unique in Central European Gothic architecture. He proposes that its atypical appearance is best understood as willful participation in an ongoing architectural and social dialogue about ethnic identity and minority status between the Czech and German populations of Prague, rather than as a conscious effort at church reform.

In the third panel, Jan-Hendryk de Boer presented his work on doctrinal condemnation at universities in the High Middle Ages. He analyzes them not as an “occupational accident,” but as a constructive
part of scholastic scholarship that established the banned texts as speech acts on the edge of the system of scholasticism. By banning books, the scholastic system of thought determined the difference between an author and his work, between right and wrong, and between belief and knowledge. Joshua Burson’s dissertation deals with one of the more “disreputable” topics in the history of Constance—drunken brawls in brothels—and uses them as a key to understanding the relationship between the city and the surrounding countryside.

In the fourth panel, Jamie McCandless analyzed how different groups competed—and justified their competition—for the control of ecclesiastical property in late-medieval Germany. Dominican reformers often relied on secular authorities (the territorial lord or the free city) to complete reform projects, yet those authorities often used reforms as a means of enhancing their own authority against each other. Reforms, therefore, brought many houses under the control of the same secular authorities. McCandless suggests that the mendicant order supported lay and prayer confraternities to offset the loss of power and prestige to the secular authorities, upon whom they had to rely to ensure the success of their reforms.

In the fifth panel, Tanja Skambraks presented her studies on the Kinderbischofsfest exemplified by the English cathedral town Exeter. Using liturgical, pragmatic, and regulatory sources from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, she analyzes the ritual and secular character of the festival, and church authorities’ attempts to regulate violations against the rules. She shows that the Kinderbischofsfest was important in reducing tensions caused by age and hierarchy, and that it can, moreover, be interpreted as a substitute ritual sustained by performative magic. Finally, it had an important function in building community. Katharina Mersch unlocked the value of late-medieval pictorial sources for the religious and social history of women’s convents. Against the grain of common assumptions in the field of gender studies and art history, she shows that Eucharistic piety in women’s convents was specific neither to gender nor certain orders. Instead, it resulted from exchange processes between the women’s convents and diverse outside influences.

In the sixth panel, Jan Hildebrandt analyzed the reception of ancient myths in the early middle ages. He stresses the diversity of approaches towards these pagan narratives, ranging from scholarly explanation and euhemeristic interpretation to allegorical explication
and a method of observation that demonized them. Moreover, he points out that the assessment of ancient myths in medieval commentaries ranged from strong skepticism to integration into the Christian worldview. Astrid Lembke studied the ways in which the protagonist of the Jewish narrative *Ma’aseh Yerushalmi* needed to prove himself in the world with its divine and paternal system of rules. The narrative focused on mastering the law.

In the seventh panel, Alison Creber’s study of imperial models for the seals of Beatrice of Tuscany and Matilda of Tuscany was discussed. The seals’ depictions of Beatrice of Tuscany (c. 1020—76) and Matilda of Tuscany (1046—1115) have been interpreted in terms of typically “feminine” priorities. This gendered approach obscured the seals’ role as *Herrschaftszeichen*, or signs of rule. Against this, Creber argued that Beatrice and Matilda were princely women whose seals expressed their political ambitions. Therefore, their seals made use of different imperial models to claim and secure political legitimacy against the Salian emperors. Next, the panel discussed Sandra Müller-Wiesner’s dissertation, interpreting the common side of the Genevan altar of Konrad Wirz, constructed in 1444. It depicted the “Wonderful Catch” and the “Liberation of St. Peter” as an expression of the struggle for city rule fought between the Bishop of Geneva and the Savoyan (anti-) Pope Felix V.

In the eighth panel, Steven Robbie presented his work on the evolution of the duchies of Burgundy and Alemannia over the period 887 to 940. Early tenth-century aristocrats are routinely characterized as players in a contest to claim the dukedom of Alemannia, even though no such office existed. His paper questions this conventional framing device and suggests that senses of Alemannian identity played no significant role in the actual politics of the region, which were driven by magnates competing for resources and access to royal patronage. Leanne Good investigated the terms used in the Freising charters to describe land during the time of the Carolingian takeover in Bavaria. Although the property descriptions in the charters became increasingly more detailed, they did not represent a developed system of ecclesiastical land administration. Rather, she finds a variety of competing “vocabularies” of land possession, of which the episcopal thrust to establish canonical jurisdiction over proprietary churches stood foremost. Levi Roach discussed hitherto unexplored possibilities for using theories developed by German historians of the Ottonian Empire to understand the performative
aspects of tenth-century English diplomas. He argues that there were notable similarities between the rituals of charter-granting in both kingdoms, but that we must also be careful not to lose sight of the important differences.

The final discussion focused on differences and similarities in medieval study and scholarship in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. Moreover, the institutional possibilities and limits of the different university systems were compared.

The seventh Medieval History Seminar for German, British, and American doctoral students and recent Ph.D. recipients will take place at the German Historical Institute in Washington in October 2011. Please check the GHI Washington’s website at www.ghi-dc.org for further information.

Carola Dietze (GHI Washington) and Jochen Schenk (GHI London)
THE DECLINE OF THE WEST?
The Fate of the Atlantic Community After the Cold War

Conference at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, October 15-17, 2009. Co-sponsored by the GHI, the University of Pennsylvania's Department of History and Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures, the DAAD, the American Council on Germany, and the Heidelberg Center for American Studies. Conveners: Philipp Gassert (University of Augsburg), Ronald Granieri (University of Pennsylvania), Eric Jarosinski (University of Pennsylvania), and Frank Trommler (University of Pennsylvania). Made possible by a grant from the University of Pennsylvania's University Research Foundation as well as the University of Pennsylvania's Mellon Cultural Diversity Grant. Participants: Riccardo Bavaj (University of St. Andrews, Scotland), Elizabeth Borgwardt (Washington University), Uta Balbier (GHI), Thomas Banchoff (Georgetown University), Volker Berghahn (Columbia University), Stephen Brockmann (Carnegie Mellon University), Lily Gardner Feldman (Johns Hopkins University, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies), Dorothea Fischer-Hornung (University of Heidelberg), Sandeep Gopalan (University of Reading School of Law), William Glenn Gray (Purdue University), Ellen Kennedy (University of Pennsylvania), Martin Klimke (GHI), Ariane Leendertz (University of Munich), Thomas W. Maulucci (American International College), Wilfried Mausbach (Heidelberg Center for American Studies), John A. McCarthy (Vanderbilt University), Adam Michnik (Editor in Chief, Gazetta Wyborcza), Samuel Moyn (Columbia University), Ben Nathans (University of Pennsylvania), Simon Richter (University of Pennsylvania), Mary Elise Sarotte (University of Southern California), Bryan van Sweringen (US Army Europe, Pentagon, Washington DC), Henry Teune (University of Pennsylvania), Martin Thunert (Heidelberg Center for American Studies), and John C. Torpey (CUNY Graduate Center).

Adam Michnik opened the conference with a keynote speech, “The Decline of the West Seen from Poland,” in which he drew on his own experiences in the Polish opposition to communism to link the concept of the West to democracy and tolerance. Although noting the problems and doubts facing the contemporary West and the United States in particular, Michnik saw no alternative to the Western model, and concluded that critiques drawing on the West’s own intellectual and moral traditions are proof both of its cultural significance, and the need to defend its basic principles. “A sinful
democracy,” he declared, “is better than an innocent dictatorship.” His perspective, at once knowledgable, ironic, critical, and hopeful, set the stage for the discussions to follow.

The first full day of the conference consisted of three panels and a roundtable discussion, all of which sought to analyze theoretical and cultural foundations of the West. The opening panel addressed the concept of the West and the perception among intellectuals of a post-1968 crisis in Western civilization. Riccardo Bavaj’s paper “A Cultural Crisis of the West? Liberal Intellectuals and the Challenges to ‘Western Civilization’ in the 1970s” explored how the student movements of the late 1960s sparked the Left-leaning intellectuals Richard Löwenthal, David Bell, and Raymond Aron to revisit earlier hypotheses about the decline of Western civilization. Western culture was closely intertwined with ideals of liberty, progress, and stability, and as an intellectual space for negotiating the tensions accompanying modernization and industrialization. Bavaj proposed that the notion of “Western decline” originated in the existential crises of rapidly transforming societies. In her contribution to the panel, “Complex Problems in a Complex World: America, Europe and the Postindustrial Challenge of ‘the West’ in the 1970s,” Ariane Leendertz agreed with Bavaj’s assessment. She asserted that the perceived decline of the West and emphasis on conflicts reflected a process of sociocultural transformation since the late 1960s. Leendertz noted that the cultural differences between the United States and Europe were eventually translocated into the political arena. Having successfully ushered Europe into the modern industrial era, Leendertz contended, the Americans lost interest in Europe. She therefore saw the crisis of the West partially as a crisis of the United States. In response to Bavaj and Leendertz, Thomas Maulucci inquired whether or not the political move to the right, especially in the United States, Britain, and West Germany in the 1980s was conceived as a means to stabilize the cultural crisis, or the perception thereof.

The second panel examined the West at the international level. Sandeep Gopalan’s paper “The Two ‘Wests’: International Law in the U.S. and Europe,” built on an overarching theme of the conference: the existence of multiple conceptions of “West.” Like Leendertz, Gopalan saw a clear demarcation of two different “Wests,” separating the United States and Europe, particularly in the application of international law. He noted that the two “Wests” instrumentalize
international law and its applications for their respective needs, perhaps owing to domestic constitutional cultures. Mary Sarotte employed an architectural framework to examine changes in the post-1989 international order in a paper entitled, “1989 and the Architecture of Order: The Competition to Lead the Post-Cold War World.” She asserted that, while there were various models for post-Cold War order in the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, the speed of the transition favored pre-existing structures that ultimately prolonged the life of Cold War institutions such as NATO and the European Community. Noting the stark difference between Gopalan’s and Sarotte’s arguments, commentator William Glenn Gray posed the question of how the continuation of Cold War institutions impairs the West, and if a combination of the Americans and European perspectives would create a more cooperative model.

The third panel considered how human rights discourse impacted American and Soviet societies during and after the Cold War. Elizabeth Borgwardt examined the genesis of the UN-adopted Nuremberg Principles, which held individual and state actors to international legal statutes, and which the conservative American opposition attempted to block with the Bricker Amendment. Her paper, “Politics, Culture, and the Limits of Law in Generating Human Rights Norms,” suggested that Cold War fears fed concerns about international meddling in American domestic affairs. Although the amendment ultimately failed because President Eisenhower saw it as curtailing American foreign policy, Borgwardt nonetheless illustrated the primacy of domestic politics in determining the acceptance of international legislation. Benjamin Nathans’s paper “Soviet Rights Talk” traced human rights discourse and practice in the Soviet Union to the “strange” emergence of Russia in the European human rights system. He used the “all people’s discussion” that accompanied each successive version of the Soviet constitution in the post-Stalinist era as a lens through which to view shifting notions of rights among the Soviet public and the government. Extending his analysis to contemporary international legal precedents, Nathans concluded that Russia, in contrast to the United States, consistently embraces international human rights and legal decisions, at least rhetorically if not in practice.

The day ended with a roundtable discussion on approaches for studying the evolving definition of the West. Lily Gardner Feldman discussed how German foreign relations repaired Western Realpolitik
in its pursuit of reconciliation for the Nazi past and the Holocaust. She outlined Germany’s quadripartite model for redefining the West’s international relations as exemplified in its rehabilitative foreign policy towards France, Israel, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Philipp Gassert, reflecting earlier papers by Leendertz and Bavaj, examined the West as an intellectual framework—a construct that is defined by scholars, American Studies programs, and institutions such as the Ford Foundation. He noted that the “transnational project” of American Studies is a clear indicator of American political sentiment. Thus, the influx of American capital to Eastern Europe after 1989 marked a shift to a more multinational model. John McCarthy continued the discussion about post-1989 implications on perceptions of the West. He noted that the once bipolar world has become multi-polar. McCarthy called for the incorporation of “European Studies” into academic programs, and further noted that the reconceptualization of national “selfhood” as European has challenged views of the United States.

The third and final day of the conference examined cultural bonds that bridge the Atlantic divide. The first panel approached the West as experience: Stephen Brockmann’s paper “The Cultural Paradox of Atlanticism” investigated popular culture as the binding element of the West that transcends even German-American political and economic disagreement. Referencing the German critique of American popular culture in 1968, Brockmann suggested an approach that considered this criticism as proof of successful German democratization. Continued enthusiasm for American values such as democracy and human rights, he concluded, could prevent a decline of the cultural West. In her talk “(Re) Making the East and West in Film” on American Cold War movies and their less successful sequels after the end of the Cold War, Dorothea Fischer-Hornung argued that Hollywood utilized American anxieties about loss of individuality, domestic communism (The Manchurian Candidate, 1963, 2004), and internal subversion (The Invasion of the Body Snatchers, 1956, 1993, 2007) as vehicles to complicate East-West binaries. The sequels paid tribute to the persistent fear of subversion, but shifted their focus to North-South dichotomies: corporatism has replaced communism, and American economic interests are linked to global issues. In his comments, Frank Trommler underscored that American popular culture, rather than European high culture, provided a common point of reference for Euro-American civilization: consumption. Though the discussion was marked by differing views on
Americanization, anti-Americanism, and Hollywood’s overbearing tendency to conflate the United States and the West, participants agreed that American cultural exports formulated a language of performance in imagery and plot that has indeed become global.

In the second panel, John C. Torpey and Uta A. Balbier agreed that the religious divergence between North America and Europe tends to be overstated; both continents are foundationally Christian, which provides common ground, even if differences have recently become more apparent. Torpey presented a sociological analysis of statistical data on European and American secularism in his paper “The Return of God and the Decline of the West.” Both continents experienced secularization during the Cold War, though to differing degrees and with different outcomes. The emerging Cold War culture of disbelief has triggered a backlash in the United States, however, which overemphasizes the role of religion in public affairs today. Balbier’s paper set a different tone with the case study “Crusading against Secularization—Billy Graham in Germany.” Balbier investigated the appeal evangelical missionary Billy Graham had to German audiences in the 1950s and 1960s. Public viewings of Graham’s services bridged the divide across the Atlantic by making Germans part of a growing global media society. Balbier argued that this sense of transnational belonging and a Wirtschaftswunder search for values beyond materialism attracted Germans to Graham’s religious spectacle.

Volker Berghahn’s public lecture on “The Fallacy of Triumphalism” that afternoon attracted a broad audience beyond the conference participants. Reflecting on the lessons American intellectuals learned from the collapse of the Soviet Union—leaving the United States the “victor” of the Cold War—Berghahn claimed that triumphalist attitudes among American elites hurt domestic and international policy making. These sentiments found expression in post-Cold-War unilateralism, which failed under the second Bush administration as the United States approached an economic and political state that is best described by Paul Kennedy’s concept of imperial overstretch. Berghahn criticized American elites for failing to learn the right lessons from the end of the Cold War, missing the opportunity to promote lower military spending and to invest in reforms of social institutions and the economic system. The current economic crisis is both the result of that failure and an indication of the problems to come. In his comment, Henry Teune...
responded with his own critique of American post-Cold War policy, emphasizing the short-term strengths and long-term weaknesses of many decisions. Ronald Granieri used his comment to argue that only an equal partnership with the European Union and a renewed sense of shared responsibility within the transatlantic community would save the United States from collapsing under the burden of an overstretched empire.

The concluding roundtable discussion featured two main presentations. Martin Thunert extracted three concepts of the West from Western and non-Western literature: the territorial West marked by NATO, EU, and EFTA; the material West, driven by interests rather than values; and the philosophical West based on the equality of men and anchored in modern science. Challenged by Afrocentrism, Asian values, and anti-modern radical Islam, which are all part of the “Rise of the Rest” in a post-American world, the West has lost its monopoly on interpreting the world. While today’s West is open to all, Thunert argued, it faces a paradox: How can a democratic minority sustain a predominantly undemocratic world while maintaining its support for democracy? Thunert’s presentation suggested that one fruitful way of thinking about “the West” is to look through the eyes of the “Other.” Bryan van Sweringen picked up Volker Berghahn’s discussion of American imperial overstretch. With the double-involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has made a precarious move. These operations have defined the limits of U.S. military power, as guerilla fighters and terrorists undermine U.S. strategic efforts. What should be essential to the West is to think more about allocation of resources and to consider ways to defend what it has already achieved. The spirited discussions after each panel and at the conclusion left participants with a productive uneasiness over a simplified concept of “the West.” The multiplicity of definitions, such as Western civilization, Western values, and the Cold War West, confirms a need for more research on the West and its possible decline. Despite grim outlooks predicting a “decline of the West,” Thunert suggested that we should rather see this process as a normalization of relations. The postwar 1940s and 1950s had posed an exceptional situation in Europe, a vacuum that Americans were ready to fill. What we see happening in transatlantic relations today, he concluded, is a rebirth of “the West.”

Jennifer Rodgers (University of Pennsylvania) and Katrin Schreiter (University of Pennsylvania)
BEYOND THE RACIAL STATE: RETHINKING NAZI GERMANY

Conference at Indiana University, Bloomington, October 23–25, 2009. Co-organized by the GHI Washington and the following institutions at Indiana University, Bloomington: the Borns Jewish Studies Program, the Center for Arts and Humanities, West European Studies, and the Office of the Vice President for International Affairs, with major assistance from the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). Conveners: Devin Pendas (Boston College), Mark Roseman (Indiana University), and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI). Participants: Monica Black (Furman University), Donald Bloxham (University of Edinburgh), Doris Bergen (University of Toronto), Richard Bessel (University of York), Michel Chaouli (Indiana University), Rita Chin (University of Michigan), Winson Chu (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee), Herwig Czech (Documentation Center of the Austrian Resistance, Vienna), Edward Ross Dickinson (University of California at Davis), Jim Diehl (Indiana University), Sara Friedman (Indiana University), Pascal Grosse (Klinik und Poliklinik für Neurologie Charité-Universitätsmedizin Berlin), Frieder Günther (Stiftung Bundespräsident-Theodor-Heuss-Haus, Stuttgart), Carl Ipsen (Indiana University), Marion Kaplan (New York University), Martina Kessel (University of Bielefeld), Claudia Koonz (Duke University), Eric Kurlander (Stetson University), Jürgen Matthäus (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington DC), Jason McGraw (Indiana University), Michael Meng (Davidson College), A. Dirk Moses (University of Sydney), Michelle Moyd (Indiana University), Regina Mühlhäuser (Hamburg Institute for Social Research), Roberta Pergher (University of Kansas), Julia Roos (Indiana University), Dirk Rupnow (Institut für Zeitgeschichte, University of Innsbruck), Richard Steigmann-Gall (Kent State University), Nicholas Stargardt (Magdalen College), Alexa Stiller (University of Bern), Ben Thorne (Indiana University), Annette Timm (University of Calgary), Jeff Veidlinger (Indiana University), Gerhard Wolf (University of Sussex), Jürgen Zimmerer (University of Sheffield).

Over the past fifteen or twenty years, scholarship on the Third Reich has increasingly recognized the centrality of racial thought to the formulation of policy in a wide array of fields. During the 1980s, scholars began to depict the Third Reich as, in Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann’s resonant phrase, a “racial state.” Moving away from an exclusive focus on anti-Semitism, this racial turn broadened the understanding of Nazi racial policy. It expanded awareness of the range of Nazi victims, incorporating, for instance,
the murder of the mentally and physically handicapped, and also the sterilization and incarceration of people considered “asocial,” into a comprehensive account of Nazi biopolitics. This approach also broached the question of how broad the support for Nazi racial policies was, interrogating the extent to which ordinary Germans cooperated in the projects of the racial state, for instance, as mothers of “Aryan” children or as supervisors of “racially inferior” forced laborers.

While the benefits of this approach have been significant, it has become increasingly clear in the last few years that the racial state paradigm has begun to obscure as much as it reveals about the reality of the Third Reich. First, this approach tends to reify race as an epistemological category, presenting it as more coherent and comprehensive than it in fact was. The Nazis themselves were aware of the internal tensions and contradictions that plagued any effort to articulate a coherent and comprehensive racial “science.” Second, the ongoing salience of alternative categories of identity in the Third Reich (ethnic, völkisch, religious, class-based) is difficult to explain within the racial state paradigm. Third, the racial turn blurs the tensions between, on the one hand, specifically racial ideas and policies and, on the other hand, broader traditions of domination and empire-building that acquired at most a superficial racial gloss during the Third Reich. Questions of military necessity or economic advantage coexisted with biopolitical projects.

The first conference panel, “Race, Empire, Ethnicity,” examined notions of race prior to the establishment of the Third Reich. Pascal Grosse’s paper argued that racial discourse since the eighteenth century should not be regarded as the intellectual incubator of Nazi racial policy, but as “a matrix composed of many different discursive elements” that “do not constitute a systematic unity.” Although the eugenic debates in pre-1914 German colonial politics resonated with Nazi racial policy in many respects, they were “fluid thought experiments” rather than a precursor of Nazi biopolitics. Jürgen Zimmerer’s paper offered a postcolonial reading of Nazi empire and located the Nazi project in Eastern Europe within the history of German and European colonialism. The Nazis’ imperialist aims in Eastern Europe mandated the obliteration of the culture of the colonized peoples, as had been the case nearly half a century earlier in German Southwest Africa. Such “cultural genocide” required an absolute Other that was created through ideas of racial difference.
Although one should not speak of a “causal nexus” between German colonial rule in Southwest Africa and the Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe, Zimmerer concluded that there is a “continuity” between the two sets of events. Winson Chu challenged the paradigm of a völkisch turn in Weimar Germany by arguing that right-wing groups were permeated by disagreement and conflict. In particular, he demonstrated the need to distinguish territorial revisionism and irredentism from völkisch activism.

The second conference panel, “Nazism and Race: The Big Picture,” challenged the concept of race as a category of analysis. A. Dirk Moses proposed that, although the language of race permeated the Third Reich, race was not the motivating impetus behind the Nazi imperialist project or the Holocaust. Instead, issues of security drove the agents of genocide. Not races, but rather people, populated the völkisch imagination, and enemy peoples posed a threat to the German Volk. In this worldview, Jews were “partisans,” bearers of bolshevism, and, along with Soviet civilians, “were targeted preemptively and often collectively to forestall future resistance.” Similarly, Mark Roseman’s paper argued that “biological thinking was not a prerequisite for genocide” and that a “more generalized sense of ethnicity” proliferated. Nazi racial thought was often more nationalistic than biological, and the unity of the Volksgemeinschaft, not the Aryan Rasse, was the subject of nationalist zeal. The danger that the Jews represented in the minds of the Nazis, Roseman contended, “was less that of substandard individuals threatening the health of the Volk than of an international conspiracy.” Jews came to be seen as an enemy state. Roberta Pergher concluded the panel by evaluating the concept of the racial state in Fascist Italy. Her paper criticized the traditional narrative that pressure from the Nazi racial state fueled the Italian race laws, arguing that notions of razza, while perhaps even more incoherent than in Germany, had currency within Italy. While noting that pressure to keep up with Nazi Germany was a concern for Mussolini, Pergher showed that racialized notions of belonging and cultural homogeneity spurred Fascist domestic projects, while racial policy went hand-in-hand with Fascist Italy’s imperialist quest.

The third panel was devoted to “Race and Nazi Racial Policy.” In contrast to analyses of racial concepts and ideology, Jürgen Matthäus examined the racial policies and practices of the early Third Reich. Matthäus’ paper highlighted the interaction between
Party activists and traditional bureaucrats. The “mutual give and take” in this interaction produced an escalation of racial policy, where “the bureaucracy became Nazified and more radical, while Nazi agencies became bureaucratized and more efficient.” Richard Steigmann-Gall’s paper scrutinized the mutability of Nazi racial categories and the paradox of immutable Jewishness. While race was dominant in the vocabulary of difference, Nazi efforts to find an adequate definition of Jewishness relied on extra-racial—especially religious—elements. Jewishness in the Third Reich thus became far more fluid than the rhetoric of Nazi anti-Semitism would suggest. Ben Thorne closed the panel by evaluating the failure of the racial state paradigm to explain the persecution of the Roma in Romania. Thorne’s paper showed that, despite serious racial and eugenic inquiries into the “Gypsy Problem,” economic or military concerns often trumped racial imperatives, and, where race was influential, crude racism—not the coherent ideology of the racial state—lay at the heart of Romanian policies toward the Roma.

The first day of the conference concluded with an evening address by Donald Bloxham that was co-sponsored by Indiana University’s Institute for Advanced Study. Bloxham’s lecture, “The Final Solution in European Perspective,” advocated a holistic account of the Holocaust within an “international relations of genocide,” eschewing the traditional Germanocentric chronicle for an approach that interweaves a multiplicity of national, genocidal narratives.

Conference participants reconvened on the second day for panel four on “Race in Science and Scholarship.” Herwig Czech’s paper drew attention to the limits of the racial state paradigm by examining Nazi medical crimes, most notably the T4 euthanasia program. He emphasized a lack of continuity between the racial-hygienic impetus of sterilization and the medical killings of the “euthanasia” program. Whereas sterilization addressed eugenic fears of biological inferiority spreading to future generations, the euthanasia killings were primarily motivated by economic concerns, targeting mental patients who were considered “unproductive.” Dirk Rupnow’s paper focused on Judenforschung (research on Jews and Jewish life) during the Third Reich, arguing that, for the most part, the Third Reich’s Judenforschung was not designed, as one might have thought, to provide a scholarly basis for Nazi anti-Semitism, but to historicize the Jewish question from an anti-Semitic perspective. In the panel’s final paper, Frieder Günther called for a reevaluation of the
periodization of twentieth-century German history, arguing that an overemphasis on 1945 and the “Zero Hour” obscures trends and transformations that extend beyond the temporal boundaries of the Third Reich. Günther’s analysis of right-wing intellectual debates during the period 1920–60 revealed that a number of intellectuals sought order and stability as their primary goal and only adopted Nazi racial discourse to achieve these ends, quickly abandoning the Nazi program after 1945.

“Race and German Society” was the theme of the fifth panel, which investigated how Germans could be harnessed to the Nazi state in a variety of ways. Eric Kurlander’s paper explored the activities of Gertrud Bäumer and her left-liberal colleagues during the Third Reich, positing that their cautious, selective investment in the National Socialist state constituted an attempt to “carve out a space for compassion” between free-market liberalism and socialism. Martina Kessel examined the ways that humor and joking continuously redefined the differences between the self and the Other. Humor did not always solidify racial boundaries, but often blurred them or highlighted differences outside the discourse of race. In the panel’s final paper, on the Lebensborn program, Annette Timm criticized the racial state paradigm for obfuscating interactions between race, gender, and class that should be seen as dynamic and fluid. In particular, she suggested that historians need to be more attentive to the emotional aspects of sexuality, which, she argued, provided some Germans with powerful incentives for accepting Nazi racial policy.

The conference’s sixth panel turned eastward to contemplate “Race, Citizenship and Empire in the East.” Michael Meng addressed a lacuna in German colonialism studies, namely a lack of focus on German imperial projects in Europe. Meng’s paper showed that Nazi conceptions of the East as imperial space built upon decades of German colonial fantasies, though the concept of the East remained, in actuality, “exceptionally amorphous.” In the panel’s second paper, Alexa Stiller examined how millions of people from annexed and occupied areas were pragmatically incorporated into the Volksgemeinschaft. Stiller’s paper revealed that the primary criterion for inclusion was a völkisch or ethnic idea of Germanness, often considered in terms of “good blood” and ancestry, which was supplemented by related, but secondary factors such as race or productivity. Gerhard Wolf’s paper focused on the selection criteria of
the Deutsche Volksliste and competing approaches to Germanization policy. His paper, too, emphasized the importance of inclusion and assimilation based on völkisch criteria rather than exclusion based on racial criteria in Nazi population policy.

The second day of the conference concluded with a panel on “Race in Wartime.” Nicholas Stargardt began the panel with a paper asking how Germans were “able to go on fighting a world war until they were utterly defeated?” Stargardt urged a rethinking of the “psychological periodization” of World War II, shifting focus from viewing the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943 as a turning point, to a broader, escalating middle period of 1941–44, during which time, “the worse the war went, the more effort had to be made simply in order to stave off defeat.” Regina Mühlhäuser’s paper examined how Nazi authorities dealt with sexual encounters and sexual violence between German soldiers and local inhabitants in the East. While the specific practices of the SS and Wehrmacht diverged, both favored regulating (and facilitating) soldiers’ heterosexual activity, even with women of supposedly inferior races, rather than trying to suppress it. Richard Bessel concluded the panel with a paper calling for more analysis of the final months of the war and the apparent disappearance of the racial state. His paper showed that the proliferation of “race” was a product of the regime, but not the source of its cohesion. The source, he contended, resided in Nazism’s extraordinary embrace of violence as a guiding principle and cultural norm.

The final day of the conference commenced with a panel on the “Aftermath” of the racial state in postwar Germany. Devin Pendas’ paper reconstructed the murder of Dr. Hans Hannemann, a Jewish Czech living in Berlin, in the final days of the war. He also analyzed the failed postwar efforts to bring the perpetrators to trial. Pendas’ paper revealed that the prosecution of the case was abandoned when it got caught in mounting Cold War tensions within Germany. In her paper, Rita Chin showed that, despite the (over)saturation of race in the historiography of Nazism, historians have only rarely considered the possibility that race may elucidate elements of the Federal Republic’s history. Finally, Monica Black examined reports from Danube Swabian expellees of “partisan sickness” among members of the Yugoslav population. Her paper argued that stories of partisan “blood-drinkers” reveal much about the experience of World War Two on consciousness; the stories constituted an
articulation of “a mental world in which very old ideas ran up against modern, ethnic warfare and racial ideology.”

The conference concluded with a roundtable discussion featuring presentations by Marion Kaplan, Claudia Koonz, Jürgen Matthäus, Nick Stargardt, and Richard Wetzell. Marion Kaplan began by harking back to the conference “Reevaluating the Third Reich,” which took place at the University of Pennsylvania in 1988, and which marked a shift from a Marxian class perspective on National Socialism, as represented by Tim Mason, to one focused on eugenics and racism, as represented at that conference by Detlev Peukert. There was general agreement that, over the past two decades since that conference, the racial state paradigm has made a signal contribution by showing that Nazi biopolitical racism reached beyond the persecution and murder of the Jews to target an array of other groups, including the forced sterilization of the supposedly “genetically defective,” the “euthanasia” murder of the handicapped and mentally ill, the murder of Sinti and Roma in the death camps, the internment in concentration camps of homosexuals and supposed “asocials,” many of whom perished there, and the brutal and often deadly treatment of forced laborers and Soviet prisoners of war. Despite that achievement, Kaplan argued, the pendulum has now swung too far in the direction of race, so that we now need to re-integrate class and economics into our historical analyses in order to achieve a “balancing act” between the Nazi regime’s racisms and economic aims. Claudia Koonz made the case that the “racial state” paradigm’s “lumping together” of diverse target groups under the rubric of “scientific racism” missed important differences, and therefore suggested that historians use terms such as Judeophobia, Gypsyphobia, homophobia, and Slavophobia to name and analyze the prejudice and persecution of specific groups. Jürgen Matthäus criticized the recent turn to Täterforschung (research on the perpetrators) for focusing on the question of motivation at the expense of the institutional and social contexts within which the perpetrators operated, and for concentrating on the murder of the Jews while almost entirely ignoring other victim groups. Nick Stargardt contended that the racial state narrative has neglected social and cultural history, and he made a plea for paying more attention to subjectivity and psychology. Richard Wetzell argued that the racial state paradigm’s monolithic image of the human sciences under the Nazi regime ignores important differences—between eugenics and euthanasia, for instance—as well as instances of dissent
and debate within the realm of Nazi biopolitics. He also suggested that the boundary between *Volksgemeinschaft* and “community aliens” was not as stable as is often assumed, because definitions of biological inferiority, such as “feeblemindedness,” were often quite malleable, making every German a potential target of Nazi biopolitics. Finally, he reiterated a point made repeatedly during the conference, namely that it might be time to counterbalance the racial state paradigm’s focus on a long-term “fatal racist dynamism” (Peukert) by paying closer attention to the rupture of 1933 and the nature of the Nazi state.

Patrick Gilner (Indiana University, Bloomington)
2009 FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZES PRESENTED AT THE 18TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE FRIENDS OF THE GHI

Every year the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize honors the two best dissertations in German history completed at a North American university. The 2009 Stern Prizes were awarded to Alison Clark Efford (Marquette University) and Michael Meng (Davidson College). The award ceremony took place at the 18th Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI on November 13, 2009, which was chaired by David Blackbourn (Harvard University), president of the Friends of the GHI. Efford received the prize for her dissertation “New Citizens: German Immigrants, African Americans, and the Reconstruction of Citizenship, 1865-1877” (Ohio State University, 2008). Meng was honored for his dissertation “Shattered Spaces: Encountering Jewish Ruins in Postwar Central Europe” (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008). The prize selection committee was composed of Mary Linde mann (University of Miami), Brian Vick (Emory University), and Jonathan Zatlin (committee chair; Boston University). Both Efford and Meng provide overviews of their dissertation research in their articles in the “Features” section of this Bulletin. For a more detailed event report and the committee’s prize citations, please check the GHI website at www.ghi-dc.org/eventhistory.

2009 HELMUT SCHMIDT PRIZE FOR GERMAN-AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY

The 2009 Helmut Schmidt Prize for German-American Economic History was awarded to Richard H. Tilly (Professor Emeritus, University of Münster) at a ceremony at the GHI on December 10, 2009. After introductory remarks by Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Director) and Matthias Sonn (Head, Economics and Science Dept., German Embassy), Volker Berghahn (Columbia University) delivered the laudatio. Tilly then delivered a lecture on “Banking Crises in Three Countries: An Historical and Comparative Perspective,” published in the “Features” section of this Bulletin. The Schmidt prize is awarded every two years by the GHI and the Zeit Foundation Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius. Previous laureates include Harold James (Princeton University) and Volker Berghahn (Columbia University). Excerpts from Volker Berghahn’s laudatio follow:

Born in Chicago in 1932, Richard Tilly went to the University of Wisconsin from which he graduated with a B.A. in History in 1955, before doing
his military service in West Germany. Having seen the country and also learned the language, he evidently liked it so much that by 1961 he was doing research there on a fellowship from the Social Science Research Council. He turned this research into a dissertation that he submitted for his Ph.D., again at Madison, Wisconsin, in the Department of Economics in 1964. Subsequently, he taught at the University of Michigan and at Yale University until he was called, in 1966, to a full professorship and chair in Economic and Social History at the University of Münster in Westphalia, where he taught until his retirement in 1998.

Early German postwar economic and social history and business history, exceptions always granted, had not yet made the connection with the kind of historiography that Richard Tilly had been trained in. However, when he settled in Münster in the mid-1960s, a new generation had emerged that was invested in the modernization of research and teaching in West Germany. Some of his colleagues, such as Wolfram Fischer, had been to the United States to study the practices and methods of economic history over there, of which Wisconsin and Michigan had become major centers. These shifts will have made it easier for Richard Tilly to connect with like-minded scholars such as Fischer and led him to expand the work he had done for his dissertation on “Financial Institutions and Industry in the Rhineland” in the nineteenth century into larger questions about both industrial growth and finance in the period of early industrialization in Central Europe at large.

Tilly wrote both in English and German, publishing an article in the prestigious _Journal of Economic History_ with the telling title “The Political Economy of Public Finance and the Industrialization of Prussia, 1815-1866.” His inaugural lecture at Münster was on “Problems of Nationalism in German Economic History” and broached the question of the efforts of Central European industry and business to emancipate itself from the hegemonic weight that Britain exerted in the nineteenth century. Time and again, Richard Tilly also returned to his work on finance and banking, editing, for example, such important books as _Bankkrise in Mitteleuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert_.

Another aspect of his wide-ranging oeuvre is that Richard Tilly did not stay put in the nineteenth century. Rather, his writings range from the beginnings of industrialization all the way to the present, as reflected in a volume published with Paul Welfens on _50 Years of EU Economic Dynamics_. Nor was he merely interested in the kind of history that informed second-generation West German, but also Anglo-American research into social and economic developments in the First Industrial
Revolution. He also became a constant mediator of approaches that had meanwhile been developed in the United States. There economic and business historians had taken up rigorous statistical and mathematical tools of analysis that economists were using for their more contemporary research. In an attempt to introduce these approaches to West Germany, Richard Tilly organized a major conference in the 1980s whose proceedings were subsequently published under the title *Contributions to a Quantitative Comparative Business History*. Finally, and always more broadly interested in the societal context of modernity, he co-authored with his brother Charles and his sister-in-law Louise Tilly the influential volume *Rebellious Century, 1830–1930*, which raised fundamental questions about the dynamics of politics, economics, and society in the age of momentous technological and democratic change.

**ENDOWMENT OF A GERALD D. FELDMAN MEMORIAL LECTURE**

The Friends of the GHI have begun a fund-raising campaign to establish an endowment for an annual lecture in memory of the late Gerald D. Feldman to commemorate his contributions to the study of modern German history and to the work of the German Historical Institute. The campaign is off to a promising start with significant contributions from friends and colleagues. Although the fund is still significantly short of its target, the first Gerald D. Feldman Memorial Lecture will be delivered on April 29, 2010, by Jürgen Kocka.

The Friends of the GHI would like to thank everyone who has contributed to the fund as of March 8, 2010.

Donations over $5,000: Peter Baldwin, Paul Foreman.

If you have not yet contributed, please consider doing so. Donations are tax-deductible under U.S. tax law. Checks should be made out to the Friends of the German Historical Institute (Memo: Donation Feldman Lecture) and sent to the Friends of the GHI, 1607 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington DC 20009–2562. Those who are taxed in Germany can make a bank transfer to: Deutsches Historisches Institut Washington, Verwendungszweck: Spende Friends GHI Washington Feldman Lecture, Konto-Nr.: 0233 363 600, Dresdner Bank AG, Bankleitzahl: 370 800 40. Contributors will receive a statement for the tax authorities.

David Blackbourn, President of the Friends of the GHI

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Books


Christina Lubinski. Mikropolitik und flexible Spezialisierung: Das Beispiel der mechanischen Werkstätten der Handelsgesellschaft


**Journal Articles**


Chapters in Edited Collections


Christina Lubinski. "Wo 'nachfolgende Generationen schaffende Arbeit verrichten': Generationenerzählungen in mehrgenerationellen deutschen Familienunternehmen von ca. 1950 bis 2005." In Generation als Erzählung: Neue Perspektiven auf ein kulturelles Deutungsmuster,


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RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

**Postdoc-Stipendium für Nordamerikanische Geschichte**

Ariane Leendertz, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München


**Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship**

Brian K. Feltman, Ohio State University

“The Culture of Captivity: German Prisoners, British Captors, and Manhood in the Great War, 1914–1920”

**Postdoctoral Fellowships**

Stephanie Leitch, Florida State University

“Flattening Out the World: Planarity in Early Modern Visual Culture”

Robert Sala, Universität Erfurt

“Wissenschaftliche Paradigmen und berufliche Praxis in den deutschen und amerikanischen Sozialwissenschaften nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1918-1933)”

**Doctoral Fellowships**

Lucie-Patrizia Arndt, Ruhr Universität Bochum

“Die ‘German Community’ von Washington, D.C., 1840-1880”
Daniel Bessner, Duke University

Jeremy Best, University of Maryland, College Park
“Ambiguous Agents of Empire: German Missionaries and Imperial Politics, 1860–1919”

Johanna Brumberg, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
“Die Babyboomer: Generationelles Argument und gesellschaftliches Ordnungsmuster”

Stefan Hübner, Universität Bremen
“The Asian Games (1913–1978): Sport and Media Orchestration between Transnational Experience and Representations of the Nation”

Christian Pinnen, University of Southern Mississippi
“Slavery and Empire: The Development of Slavery in the Natchez District, 1720–1820”

Jennifer Rodgers, University of Pennsylvania

Eleonora Rohland, Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen
“Hurrikane in den USA 1900–2005: Anpassung durch Erinnerung?”

Christian Schmidt-Rost, Freie Universität Berlin
“Jazz in der DDR und der VR Polen: Verflechtungen und Vergleich”

Patricia Wiegmann, Universität Erfurt
“People on the Move: Migration, Identifikation und Emanzipation im atlantischen Raum, 1906–1939”

GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships
The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the roles of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to...
six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships
The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications, but applicants interested in coming to Washington in 2011 are encouraged to submit their application by July 2010. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

GHI RESEARCH SEMINAR, FALL 2009

September 17  Dagmar Herzog (City University of New York)  
Sexual Politics and Cultures in Post-Reunification Germany

September 23  Volker Barth (Universität zu Köln)  
WeltNachrichtenordnung: Strukturen und Bedingungen internationaler Kommunikation, 1859–1934

October 26  Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Jessica Csoma (GHI), Insa Kummer (GHI)  
Immigrant Entrepreneurship: The German-American Business Biography, 1720 to the Present

November 4  Adam Seipp (Texas A&M University)  
In a Foreign Land: Refugees, Germans, and Americans, 1945-60
November 17  Berti Kolbow (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)
Transatlantische Marketingtransfers zwischen Kodak und Agfa von 1880 bis 1945

Marina Jones (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
‘Outsiders Within’: Afro-Germans in West Germany—Discourses and Experiences, 1949–1989

December 9  Tim Guinnane (Yale University)
Cooperative Law and Business Law, 1867-1892

GHI DOCTORAL SEMINAR, SUMMER/FALL 2009

August 6  Enrico Boehm (Philipps-Universität Marburg)
Gipfel der Kooperation? Die Entstehung der G7 als Instrument internationaler Sicherheitspolitik

Deborah Brown (University of California, Los Angeles)
Science and Politics of Category Creation and their Relation to Religious-Racial Identity in Germany, 1900–1933

Paul Benedikt Glatz (Freie Universität Berlin)
US-amerikanische Deserteure, oppositionelle GIs und internationale Protestbewegungen gegen den Vietnamkrieg

Felix Krämer (Universität Münster)
Geschlecht, Religion und soziokulturelle Ordnung in den USA, 1969–1989

September 9  Julio Decker (Leeds University)
The Immigration Restriction League and the Political Regulation of Immigration, 1894–1924

Bodo Mrozek (Technische Universität Berlin)
Jugendstile und Popkultur nach 1945 aus transnationaler Perspektive

Stephan Isernhagen (Freie Universität Berlin)
Fiedeln, während Rom brennt? Krieg und Protest—Susan Sontag interveniert in Hanoi und Sarajewo

December 3 Marie-Luise Tapfer (Freie Universität Berlin)
Bernhard A. Böhmer—a Dealer of “Degenerate Art” in the Third Reich: A Biography
Maria Dörnemann (Universität Tübingen)

OTHER GHI-SPONSORED EVENTS, SUMMER/FALL 2009

Reports on the following events can be accessed online at: www.ghi-dc.org/eventhistory. The list does not include the Spring and Fall Lecture Series, the Research and Doctoral Seminars (all listed separately), lectures published in the Bulletin, or conferences reported on in the “Conference Reports” section.

June 25–26
Immigrant Entrepreneurship: The German-American Business Biography, 1720 to the Present
Workshop at the GHI

September 16
Why Write a Book? From Lived Experience to the Written Word in Early Modern Europe
Lecture by Pamela H. Smith, Columbia University
Grolier Club, New York (NY)

September 23
Yes, We Can! Political Rhetoric in the U.S. and German Elections
Panel Discussion at the Goethe-Institut Washington

September 24
A Culture of Decline? Politics, Economy, and Social Life in East Germany
Panel Discussion at Johns Hopkins University SAIS, jointly organized by AICGS and GHI

October 29
Book presentation at the Thomas Jefferson Building, Library of Congress, co-sponsored by the GHI and the John W. Kluge Center of the Library of Congress

November 13
Eighteenth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the German Historical Institute: Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
Symposium at the GHI

December 2
The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter
Book Presentation at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, co-sponsored by the GHI
December 4  The Birth of the Risk Economy: A Cultural and Institutional History of Futures Trading, 1880s-1990s
Speaker: Alexander Engel (Georg-August University Göttingen) in cooperation with the Washington Area Economic History Seminar (WAEHS) at American University
GHI LECTURE SERIES, SPRING 2010
HISTORY OF GLOBALIZATION–GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORY

Today, everyone is convinced that globalization is influencing our lives, but it seems difficult to answer questions about when globalization began, how it happened, and how it has changed over time. At least as complex as the phenomenon of globalization itself are the analytical perspectives scholars have developed to explore it. One can observe globalization processes in the economy, in migration patterns, in cultural trends, and in historiography, to name just a few of them. The lecture series *History of Globalization–Globalization in History* aims to bring together some of these perspectives in an effort to improve our understanding of the underlying currents and the effects of globalization, and to help us grasp the historical meaning of different phases of globalization over time.

April 15  The World Historical in China’s Twentieth Century: Perspectives on Globalization and Globality  
Rebecca E. Karl (New York University)

May 6  Critical Junctures of Globalization: Conceptualization and Examples  
Matthias Middell (University of Leipzig)

May 20  Population, Food, and Health: Global Problems in the Twentieth Century  
Alison Bashford (University of Sydney/ Harvard University)

June 10  Multinationals and Globalization: Engines of Growth, or Drivers of Inequality?  
Geoffrey Jones (Harvard Business School)
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS 2010

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our website at www.ghi-dc.org.

January 7–10  Immigrant Entrepreneurship in History: Concepts and Case Studies
GHI-sponsored Panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association

February 5–6  Cultures of Credit: Consumer Lending and Borrowing in Modern Economies
Conference at the GHI
Convener: Jan Logemann

Conference at the University of Heidelberg
Conveners: Madeleine Herren (University of Heidelberg) and Ines Prodöhl (GHI)

March 11  Germany Discovers the World: Scholarly Engagement with Foreign Cultures in the Age of Empire
Panel Discussion at the GHI
Speakers: Andreas Eckert (Humboldt University Berlin), Suzanne L. Marchand (Louisiana State University), and Anke Ortlepp (German Historical Institute)

March 20  Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar
Seminar at the GHI
Convener: Peter Jelavich (Johns Hopkins University)

April 21  The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties
A book discussion at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Speaker: Martin Klimke (GHI). Commentators: Michael Kazin (Georgetown University), Jeremy Varon (New School for Social Research)

April 29  Gerald D. Feldman Lecture: Writing the History of Capitalism
Speaker: Jürgen Kocka (Free University, Berlin)

April 30  The Stasi and its Foreign Intelligence Service
Workshop at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
May 12–15  
**16th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: Twentieth-Century German History**  
Seminar at the University of Jena  
Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Norbert Frei (Universität Jena), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

May 13  
**Thousands of Sites, Millions of Fates: New Insights into the Universe of Nazi Camps**  
Panel Discussion at the GHI, in collaboration with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum  
Speakers: Geoffrey Megargee (USHMM) and Susanne Heim (Institut für Zeitgeschichte)

June 10–12  
**Anonymous Consumption: Rationalization, Mechanization, and Digitalization in the Twentieth Century**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Angelika Epple (Universität Bielefeld), Gary Cross (Penn State University), and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

June 15–24  
**Archival Summer Seminar in Germany 2010**  
Convener: Ines Prodöhl (GHI)

June 24  
**Eleventh Gerd Bucerius Lecture**  
Religion and Violence in a Globalized World  
Speaker: Wolfgang Huber

September 5–17  
**Bosch Foundation Archival Seminar for Young Historians: American History in Transatlantic Perspectives**  
Convener: Mischa Honeck

October 14–16  
**Feeding and Clothing the World: Cash Crops and Global History, 1900–1930**  
Conference at the GHI  
Convener: Ines Prodöhl (GHI Washington)

October 15–16  
**Globalizing Beauty: Body Aesthetics in the 20th Century**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Washington) and Thomas Kühne (Clark University)

November 4–6  
**Accidental Armageddons: The Nuclear Crisis and the Culture of the Second Cold War, 1975–1989**  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Eckart Conze (University of Marburg), Martin Klimke (GHI Washington), Jeremy Varon (New School for Social Research, New York City)
November 11  Twenty-Fourth Annual Lecture of the GHI
Lecture at the GHI

November 12  Nineteenth Annual Symposium of the Friends
of the German Historical Institute: Award of the
Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
Symposium of the GHI

December 9-11  History by Generations: Generational Dynamics
in Modern History
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Washington), Uffa
Jensen (University of Göttingen), Christina Lubinski
(GHI Washington), and Bernd Weisbrod (University of
Göttingen)