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The thematic diversity of the feature articles in the Bulletin’s last issue reflected the great diversity of historical research conducted by the German Historical Institute. The same is true of the conference reports in this issue, which range from the history of demographics to the history of poverty, from German-Jewish history to the black diaspora, and from the Nazi occupation of Europe to the history of Northeast China. By contrast, this issue’s feature articles have a thematic focus on economic and business history, which is one of the areas of research concentration during my directorship of the GHI. The first feature article presents my inaugural lecture at the GHI, which traces the beginnings and early history of credit rating in the United States and Germany – a topic that has been given remarkable contemporary relevance by the role that faulty credit and bond ratings have played in the current financial crisis.

The next two articles present a controversial debate in the economic history of the Nazi regime that has received considerable attention in recent years. The first presents Peter Hayes’s lecture in the GHI’s very successful Fall 2008 lecture series on “New Perspectives on the Economic History of National Socialism.” Examining the issue of “corporate freedom of action in Nazi Germany,” Hayes takes issue with the interpretation that has recently been advanced by Christoph Buchheim and Jonas Scherner. Whereas Buchheim and Scherner have contended that Nazi intervention in the economy left private firms considerable freedom of action, Hayes argues that the Nazi regime’s regulation, intimidation, and, when necessary, coercion of business severely circumscribed firms’ autonomy. As it happened, Jonas Scherner was the GHI Fellow in Economic and Social History during 2008-2009, and Christoph Buchheim delivered a lecture later in the same series. We therefore took the opportunity to invite Scherner and Buchheim to write a response to Peter Hayes’s critique, which we are publishing in this issue. All three authors have done a remarkable job of making the sometimes rather technical and arcane arguments of economic historians accessible to non-specialists and explaining the key issues of this debate, which has important implications for our understanding of the Nazi regime. We hope that readers will enjoy the direct argumentative style that such a debate forum affords.
This issue’s “GHI Research” article deals with the history of consumption, a second thematic focus of my directorship. Jan Logemann, currently History of Consumption Fellow at the GHI, presents his comparative research on the “geography of consumption” in postwar West Germany and the United States. Examining the divergent development of suburban shopping malls and downtown pedestrian areas in these two countries, Logemann also analyzes these developments’ social and economic ramifications, many of which are of contemporary relevance, as Americans have recently begun to think seriously about reducing energy consumption and improving mass transit in response to global warming and the current economic crisis. In this sense, then, we hope that this issue does what the German Historical Institute sees as one of its missions: making history relevant to contemporary debates.

Hartmut Berghoff, Director
Features
Capitalism is intrinsically tied to risk and recurrent cycles of boom and bust. Despite this obvious and almost trivial observation, many people were surprised when the current financial crisis broke out in 2007. Capitalism has never been stable. On the contrary, it stands for dynamic change, “creative destruction,” and a never-ending series of bull and bear markets. The all-important question is how to deal with this Janus-faced system. The enormous dynamism of modern capitalism poses a fundamental dilemma: How can stability be imposed on an economic system that, by its very nature, destroys equilibrium and order? A look at the beginning of modern industrial society can be very helpful in searching for answers to this question.

This article deals with insecurity and distrust in anonymous markets and with ways to overcome these obstacles to economic growth. More specifically, it concentrates on the early history of credit rating and demonstrates how useful this new service was during the industrialization and globalization of the nineteenth century, although it entailed problems and dangers right from the beginning. This historical overview will focus mainly on the United States but will also draw a brief comparison to the German Empire, where credit rating played a much smaller role. The reasons for this striking discrepancy will be discussed. At the end, I will briefly address the question of why the rating agencies failed so blatantly in identifying the risks that brought about the post-2007 financial crisis. At the outset, an account of the challenges facing industrializing countries like the United States in the nineteenth century is called for in order to understand the institutional response that credit rating represented.1

I. Causes and Effects of Industrialization and Globalization

Industrialization unleashed productivity gains that changed Western societies beyond recognition. Six major factors contributed to the turbulent change.
1. A revolution in logistics made for quantum leaps in connecting the nation and the world. Steam power substantially cut transport times. Railways reduced the cost of transporting heavy goods over land by some 95 percent and added greater speed and reliability. The once isolated regional markets for most products became parts of a huge unified system. A fast-growing national and international market emerged. This unprecedented integration brought forth the challenge of dealing with the increasing anonymity of exchange.

2. A revolution in communications took place. Historians long focused on the impact of the telegraph but have recently begun to place greater emphasis on the advances brought about by railroads and steamboats. In 1820, it took some 32 days for messages to cross the Atlantic from New York to London. By 1860, steam-powered ships had reduced that time to 13 days—before the telegraph succeeded in reducing it to two days and later to a few minutes. Compared to these drastic reductions, the changes effected by the Internet in relation to letters or faxes have been relatively modest.

3. An explosive growth in world trade occurred. Preindustrial trade tended to concentrate on luxury products with favorable weight-to-value ratios such as silk and spices. These constraints were shed after 1820 as ever larger ships carried grain, coal, minerals, textiles, and later machines and finished products that could be transported long distances at economically viable rates for the first time. Industrialization led both the supply and demand for tradable goods to grow. More people survived to an advanced age. In Germany, the average life expectancy for men rose from 27 to 45 years, and, despite mass migration, the population tripled. Meanwhile, people’s real income increased, particularly toward the end of the century. And on the supply side, the number of products grew continuously while prices sharply declined.

4. Capital markets became global. The large discrepancies in development between countries created lucrative investment opportunities for European surplus capital, particularly in the development of enormous tracts of hitherto uninhabited land. Because there were few restrictions, the international flow of capital swelled to previously unimaginable dimensions, increasing by 49 times from 1825 to 1913.

5. Labor markets became more international. Not only capital but also people were highly mobile. Relatively open borders made it easy
for millions to escape the poverty of their homelands. Migration reached inconceivable dimensions, with about 70 million people emigrating worldwide between 1850 and 1915. The lion’s share of this mass movement consisted in transatlantic migration from Europe to North and South America.

6. Deregulation of the economy. Generally speaking, industrialization and globalization went hand in hand with deregulation. Old rules were abandoned, or new technologies and market structures outgrew existing regulatory regimes. Liberalism emerged as the dominant ideology in Europe, which, likewise, spurred the removal of constraints on trade and production. People, capital, and goods were freely exchanged in this relatively open world, despite the reappearance of modest protectionism after 1880.

What were the consequences of this sea change? By and large, there was an increased division of labor and a growth in complexity. Both created a myriad of new uncertainties. The number of geographically distant people who had to cooperate with one another increased exponentially. For the most part, they lacked the shared values and regulatory systems that craftsmen in guilds or “honorable merchants” had relied on. Industrialization and globalization made business partners out of people who would never personally meet.

II. Trust as a Key Socioeconomic Category

For all these reasons, more and more businesspeople had neither good names to uphold nor any stake in the traditional rules and practices of preindustrial wholesale. What resulted was, essentially, a crisis of trust, as deceptions, breaches of contract, and failed shipments proliferated. Without trust a market economy cannot work. The word “credit” originates from Latin credere, which means to believe and to trust. Without it, economic activity simply grinds to a halt.

Sociologists have long understood the significance of trust. For Georg Simmel, it was a prerequisite of cooperation. Complex modern societies require a multitude of promises whose fulfillment is uncertain. In every exchange of goods, one party always makes itself vulnerable through advance action. The key question following every delivery is if and when the bill will be settled. The same goes for bank credits. Niklas Luhmann defined trust as a mechanism to reduce complexity

and to stabilize uncertain expectations. Trust makes the contingencies of modern society bearable and cooperation possible. The neglect of trust in mainstream economics results from the preponderance of neo-classical theory, which holds that the well-informed, rational *homo oeconomicus* does not need trust because he has perfect information at his disposal. This is theory at its worst: Real people in real economies always act with incomplete information.

As economists began to search for more realistic assumptions, trust received more attention. In his classic study *The Limits of Organization*, Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow referred to trust as a “lubricant of a social system”:

> It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word. Unfortunately this is not a commodity which can be bought very easily ... Trust and similar values ... are examples of what the economist would call ‘externalities.’ They ... have real, practical, economic value; they increase the efficiency of the system ..."4

The field of New Institutional Economics stresses the importance of trust even more strongly. It searches for institutional designs that help overcome distrust. According to the anthropological assumptions of this school of thought, human beings are prone to opportunism, i.e., to lying, malice, deceit, and the manipulation of information, as well as to free-riding. That is why Institutional Economics looks for efficient incentive structures that encourage desirable behavior without excessive transaction costs.5 Trust in individuals but also in complex systems might be the result.

Experimental economics also ascribes considerable significance to trust. In his multi-period games, Robert Axelrod asked “how cooperation among egoists can take place without a central mediating power.”6 The answer he came up with was tit for tat, or, in more technical terms, reciprocity. The individuals who performed best were those who responded constructively to offers of cooperation but broke off relationships when they encountered unfriendliness. The profits to be had through cooperation, however, were greater than any advantages that might accrue to the lone wolf in a world of general suspicion. In short, trust pays. Unjustified, blind trust, on the other hand, can cause substantial damage. Trust has to be justified. Otherwise, the consequences may be disastrous.

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The insights gained from these experiments were not unknown to the people who had to respond to the challenges of industrialization and globalization in the nineteenth century. I personally find it fascinating that it took many years of research for twentieth-century sociologists and economists to discover what practitioners more than 100 years ago already regarded as general knowledge. Take this undated meditation of a mercantile Hamlet:7

To sell or not to sell?
That is the question
Whether it is better to send the goods
And take the risk of doubtful payment,
Or to make sure of what is in possession
And, by declining, hold them.
To sell; to ship; perchance to lose—
Aye, there’s the rub!
For when the goods are gone,
what charm can win them back
From slippery debtors?
Will bills be paid when due?
Or, will the time stretch out till crack of doom?

Today a warning might read: Advance action like shipping goods to insolvent companies or depositing money with hedge funds can damage your wealth. With their world becoming more complex and riskier by the day, how could nineteenth-century businessmen know where to place their trust? How were they able to play Axelrod games or, in the words of the poem, “to send the goods/And take the risk of doubtful payment?”

III. National and International Regulation and the Power of Sociocultural Networks

There were very different responses to these challenges. According to Max Weber, the modern state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, as well as its administrative machinery, enabled public authorities to solve these problems. The rule of law curbed insecurity and created trust in general regulations. Legal codification and the consolidation of the judicial and executive branches of government contributed to the tremendous progress of the rule of law in the nineteenth century. At the international level, there were intensive and at least partly successful efforts to harmonize national laws.8 1883 saw the establishment of an International Union for the Protection of

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7 Undated poem quoted in Peter R. Earling, Whom to Trust: A Practical Treatise on Mercantile Credits (Chicago/New York, 1890), 200.

8 See Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850 (Cambridge, UK, 1994).
Industrial Property, which secured patents and trademarks. Efforts were also made to standardize the laws on bills of exchange, trade, and insurance. International Chamber of Commerce congresses and trade associations exchanged information and attempted to harmonize laws touching on commerce. Despite the rise of what we might call institutionally based trust on the national and international level, many gray zones and large areas outside the range of trust-creating measures remained. Especially in grappling with our mundane question of whether “to ship or not to ship,” merchants had to look elsewhere for confidence.

They found sources of trust in areas that many contemporary intellectuals perceived as doomed to disappear. In their theories, industrialization seemed to destroy premodern communal forms and replace them with a pure cash nexus. According to Marx and Engels, there was “no tie between humans other than ... cold-hearted cash payment.” For sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, the social relationships of modern Gesellschaft, in which “everyone is a merchant,” were structured along lines of self-interest, and individuals were isolated units in the market. But, in fact, traditional social relationships did survive and helped businesses safeguard their activities. Businessmen systematically placed family, ethnic, and religious loyalties in the service of their commercial interests, securing national and global transactions with non-market links. If such ties were lacking, they could be established through strategic marriages or social networks. Churches served as networks for the business transactions of their members. It was hoped that the faithful would adhere to the fundamental norms they espoused. Moreover, concern for one’s reputation played a crucial role, and the fear of hell might also have helped to assure honesty.

Immigrant networks created solidarity as well. The success of many “ethnic businesses” to this day is based on the interlocking dynamic of outside pressure and internal cohesion. Many transactions such as credit allocation can be settled with lower transaction costs between members of an ethnic community than between strangers. The phenomenal success of Jewish entrepreneurs and other minorities, above all in the financial sector, is due to this close culture of trust that grew from their marginality. Comparative advantages sprang from the outside world’s discrimination – discrimination that maintained minorities’ awareness of their identity. On account of their uniquely high degree of cohesion, diasporas were able to develop greater levels of trust than members of other

9 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, 16th ed. (Leipzig, 1985 [1848]), 34.
10 Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie (Berlin, 1920 [1887]), 43.
ethnicities. In the nineteenth century, Indians organized long-distance trade in the eastern and southern parts of Africa; Armenian merchants had very broad networks stretching from the Middle East to England; Greek merchants dominated the Black Sea region for a time; and European entrepreneurial families operated not just in Europe, but all over the world, especially in North and South America, cultivating networks that functioned very well. Such socially and culturally based networks were and are self-coordinating and “self-regulating.” They use specific sanctions and gratification mechanisms such as exclusion from their community or allotment of symbolic capital. Of course, these patterns, which had kept international trade going for centuries, also had clear limits. In the nineteenth century, not every business transaction could be secured by such sociocultural relationships.

IV. Commercial Risk Management: Credit Rating in the United States

The crisis of trust created by market expansion was eased by the market itself, by commercial risk management. The challenge of rapidly growing anonymous markets was met by the professional transformation of uncertainty into risk, in other words, by turning trust into a commodity. The economist Frank Knight famously argued that a distinction should be drawn between uncertainty, in the sense of pure contingency, and risk, which is calculable and therefore manageable. Uncertainty, according to Knight, can be transformed into risk in two ways: first, by evaluating relevant data, and second, by establishing expert systems. This idea was taken up by Anthony Giddens, who defined expert systems as “embedding mechanisms.”

In the nineteenth century, the number of such mechanisms grew in response to increasing uncertainty. Here we will focus on credit markets alone. These had to cope with the problems of adverse selection and information asymmetries. Lenders do not normally have all the information on potential borrowers that they need to adequately evaluate risk – considerable scope for deceit and misjudgment exists on both sides. To be sure, banks were specialists in transforming vague uncertainties into manageable risks, although the nineteenth century is littered with bank failures. As most of these failures have been well researched, concentrating on less-known institutions might be a more rewarding endeavor. What’s more, banks were not optimal institutions for all kinds of credit, especially not for small loans.


Therefore, I shall now turn to an expert system to which historians have paid little attention: credit-rating agencies.13 These “guardians of trust” emerged in the United States in the early nineteenth century. The pioneering role of the United States in the development of these agencies reflected the comparatively high demand for financial information that this land of immigrants generated. Businessmen with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds who did not know each other and had just arrived had to advance trust to one another, and existing legal and administrative structures were deficient in many ways. Around 1850, U.S. retailers sold up to three-quarters of their stock on credit and, thus, were dependent on credit from their suppliers. Accounts were settled once a year, usually after the harvest, when the cash registers were ringing. As long as markets remained local, problems associated with credit could easily be worked out. But as interregional markets expanded and business transactions became more anonymous, defaults on debts became rampant.

In 1890, a merchant looked back somewhat nostalgically on the more personal nature of business transactions in the past:

> Most of us can remember when it was the custom of merchants, from all parts of the country, to repair to the metropolis once a year, at least, for the two-fold purpose of settling up and buying new stock. This custom brought the New York merchant into personal contact with his customers, both old and new, and developed in him a faculty for determining character and judging men and human nature, that has been largely lost.14

In reaction to this loss of face-to-face contact, Lewis Tappan founded the Mercantile Agency in New York in 1841. He began to sell credit information at the very moment when the railroads were creating interregional, anonymous markets. Tappan had two motives: First, he had had some bad experiences himself; his creditors had almost driven him into bankruptcy. Second, he was a strict Congregationalist and thought that credit was basically evil. In 1843 he wrote: “How much wisdom there is in the advice of the apostle Paul – ‘Owe no man anything.’” Although he knew that credit was unavoidable, he wanted to “purify” it.15

His agency built up a nationwide network of correspondents and branch offices. In 1859, Robert Dun took it over, and by 1880 Dun...
was supervising 69 branch offices and 10,000 correspondents. By centralizing and enlarging the data pool, the agency was able to realize economies of scale. Thanks to the agency’s efforts, the market became more transparent, and the chances of default decreased. A good credit report from the agency could form the basis for lasting business relations. A bad one, however, could spell social death for small businessmen, as they were virtually ostracized.

What kind of data were collected? Going by today’s practices, we would expect balance sheets and tax returns, but this was far from true. Most businesses at that time had either no accounts at all or only dubious ones. Tappan and Dun’s agents dealt with this deficit in three ways. First, they asked local lawyers, bankers, aldermen, merchants, and other putative dignitaries what they thought of the potential borrower and his financial situation. Second, their idea of “credit rating” consisted more in “character rating” than our modern understanding of the term. That is, certain personal traits such as religious faith, moderation in consumption and sexuality, and the “right” ethnicity were used as indicators of creditworthiness. Third, the agencies documented the repayment of loans in the past and took these credit histories as the basis for evaluating the risk of extending credit in the future. This greatly reduced information asymmetries as debtors could no longer hope that defaults would remain unknown. Now anyone, theoretically, was able to buy this information and boycott unreliable debtors. Thus, an effective sanctioning device emerged and the problem of adverse selection was diminished. Solid debtors were now able to build up a good name and benefit from it commercially.

It therefore comes as no surprise that the early “credit reports” provided information not only about the financial situation of potential borrowers but also about their private lives. Leading a godly life was considered an infallible indicator of trustworthiness. On the other hand, a man who cultivated “fast living” or had an “extravagant wife” was someone to whom it was better not to lend money. One San Francisco businessman was a habitué of brothels in Chinatown – mostly accompanied by out-of-town clients. This
was bad for his credit rating but probably good for his existing business contacts. Another entrepreneur was said to “overindulge his appetite for women.” The message was clear: a “good family man” – as the expression usually went – with modest financial security was a better risk than a rich but immoral rake. The ratings were guided by the values of the WASP middle class, to which, not surprisingly, the correspondents belonged. The moralistic approach to early credit rating was very much in line with the religious convictions and social reform initiatives of Tappan, who was involved in the anti-slavery movement. He hoped to improve overall morals by disciplining people by means of credit reports. To a large degree, the ratings were an attempt to draw on the values of old-style networks in an era of impersonal exchange.

Ethnicity and religion at first played large roles in the rating system. On average, Jewish businessmen received lower ratings than Christians. One report said, “We should deem him safe but he is not a white man. He is a Jew,” subsequently recommending he be kept on a short repayment leash, for “delay is always dangerous with Jews.” In one case, the correspondent was obviously well versed in the bible and took a very long-term approach to credit history. He held an otherwise very solid merchant house responsible for what had happened during the Jewish exile in ancient Egypt. His report read: “Are doing an excellent business ... character and habits good. ... Considered good by all dealers, but they are Jews, and their ancestors took Jewels of the Egyptians when they left Egypt and never returned them.”

Negative credit reports could be devastating and exclude people from credit for good. If a report read “never trust him, will always be worthless” or took whole families into collective liabilities (“The whole lot of the Weatherbys are Bad Eggs”), relentless social execution took place. Judgments like “he has no energy & will never make a dollar” or “has never succeeded at anything & probably never will” make it clear that people were denied a second or even a first chance forever. The reports assigned dollar values to the assets and character traits of individuals. They graded people according to their creditworthiness almost like commodities and placed them in different classes. Others were permanently branded – many as failures and losers. To get out of the trash can, one had to turn to other sources of credit, if these were available, such as friends and families. The agencies institutionalized a comprehensive system of control,


almost in the sense of a Foucauldian disciplinary society. Total surveillance of commercial and private activities and severe punishment in the form of making this information available to anyone willing to pay for it were the main principles of this “panopticon without walls.”

Based on stereotypes, prejudices, and rumors, the early reports were frequently arbitrary and unreliable. In some cases, the agencies were even taken to court and convicted of libel charges. In order to establish themselves for the long term, the agencies had to improve the quality of their information, which they accomplished in three ways:

1. The collection and evaluation of the information required systematic data processing. Summary reports replaced detailed accounts. Taxonomies with letters and numbers like “O.B.” or “A1” shortened the message and signaled that the questioned firm possessed a certain capital and was considered good for a certain amount. Such “ratings” abstracted the specifics of the individual case, allowing information to be compared at a glance and extending the coverage of the rating system without the burden of too much detail. This was reduction of complexity in the extreme.

Beginning in 1859 – two years after the first worldwide economic crisis – a reference book with summary analyses appeared as an alternative to individual reports. The changing number of entries gives some indication of the broadening scope of information compiled. In 1859, there were 20,000 entries; by 1915 the number had reached 1.8 million.

2. The agencies developed elaborate and work-intensive routines for managing information. Thousands of huge volumes contained detailed registers. When the New York agency received an inquiry from a branch office, the reports were copied by hand. Several thousand inquiries were received every day. In 1875, the first mass-produced...
typewriters were introduced, which triggered a push for rationalization. These typewriters allowed several carbon copies of a report to be made, improving archiving. Instead of distributing entries in many volumes that eventually filled up, one could take individual pieces of paper and collate them according to firm. Furthermore, the speed and ease of reading increased, as the handwritten reports had sometimes been hard to decipher. All these advances simplified matters greatly. In addition, the telegraph was increasingly used. In short, the agencies availed themselves of the latest information technology of the day.

3. Professional “credit reporters” gradually replaced local amateur correspondents. It became standard procedure to use several sources and to make direct inquiries with banks and business partners as well as with the very firms being evaluated. Starting in 1875, increased numbers of firms allowed access to their books – an unmistakable process of objectification. Nevertheless, credit reporters still rendered character judgments, with prudent, conservative, hard-working businessmen as their ideal. All things considered, however, the working methods of the inspectors approached those of modern auditors.

Following the 1929 stock market crash and the onset of the Great Depression, Dun merged with Bradstreet in 1933. Today Dun & Bradstreet is the market leader in the commercial data business.

With success came self-confidence. The agencies described themselves as civilizing forces in an unsafe world. They alleged that, without their services, the whole system would fall victim to moral corruption and would eventually collapse. They hailed themselves as guardians of the market and of society at large for reconciling ethics.
and capitalism. This message was translated into figurative imagery. It is not absolutely certain when the bas-relief depicted on this page was created. There are, however, many indications that it was designed for the centenary in 1941, having been displayed since then outside the Dun & Bradstreet headquarters in New York. The sculptor was Georg Lober (1892-1961), who also created several famous statues in New York.

The monumental metal frieze depicts two allegorical men connecting the different parts of the country. A buckskin-clad frontiersman with a rifle and a shirtless proletarian with a large cogwheel hold hands and gaze into one another’s eyes. The center is embellished with symbols of productivity and wealth like fruits, a plough blade, a mallet, a wheel, and a sheaf of wheat. The message is clear: “Man’s Confidence in Man” is the ultimate productive force. Its wealth-creating power is greater than that of mines and factories. Trust is key, so to speak, and it helps society overcome social and geographical divisions. It bridges rural and urban life and connects the hunter and farmer with the worker, although these groups were the most unlikely customers of nine-

Allegorical frieze depicting “Man’s Confidence in Man.” Artist: Georg Lober (1892-1961).

The inscription reads: “Credit / Man’s Confidence in Man / Commercial credit is the creation of modern times and belongs in its highest perfection only to the most enlightened and best governed nations. Credit is the vital air of the system of modern commerce. It has done more - a thousand times more - to enrich nations than all the mines of the world. / Quoted from a speech by Senator and later Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Senate at Washington, D.C., March 18, 1834.”

teenth-century credit-rating agencies. The scope of the agency’s service is boundless and reaches from the wilderness to the cities of skyscrapers and factories. Despite the international nature of the rating business, the frieze and especially the inscription pay homage to the national self-image of the United States. The frontiersman and the skyline of Manhattan are American motifs representing the symbiosis of the country’s pioneering spirit and modernizing energy. This male-dominated imagery is connected to visions of abundance, national strength, and civilization. The “most enlightened and best governed nations” like the United States can overcome distrust, establishing stable credit across the land – an impressive cultural achievement. Parts of these images were used on letterheads or on forms and brochures of the company. The frieze is still displayed outside Dun & Bradstreet’s main office. A gold-plated replica adorns the entrance to Moody’s Corporation in New York.

As of April 2009, Dun & Bradstreet’s database covered some 143 million enterprises in over two hundred countries, and the firm received almost 100,000 inquiries and fed 1.5 million new data items into the system each day. Moody’s, Dun’s former subsidiary, started to rate bonds in 1909. It developed the standard categories we know today reaching from AAA to junk bonds. In this case, too, an extreme reduction in complexity has taken place. Instead of a detailed analysis of the individual circumstances, three letters suffice to give a risk assessment. Moody decides on the creditworthiness not only of companies but also of states, thus playing a significant political role.

V. Credit Rating in Germany and around the Globe

At first, the services of Dun & Bradstreet were designed exclusively for the American market. However, European firms soon began to tap into the American agency’s information pool. Matthias Hohner, a German harmonica maker, who resided in a remote village located in between the Black Forest and the Swabian Alp, was able to build up his business in America with the help of Dun and Bradstreet. He first established himself in the United States by using the older sociocultural trust mechanism of employing emigrants from his own little village. Once exports to the U.S. had gathered speed, Hohner needed a larger network and approached the agencies. He developed a substantial export business to the U.S. without ever crossing the Atlantic. He did not need to. He simply got the addresses and credit ratings of American merchants from the agencies. Bradstreet offered the following services: classified lists
of potential importers and wholesalers of musical instruments, letters of introduction for representatives, reports on every single North American firm, and the collection of debts. By the turn of the century, Hohner had clients in all the major American cities and was on his way to becoming the world’s leading manufacturer of musical instruments.  

For a long time, the international scope of the American agencies was one-sided. They sold reports on American firms to interested parties in all parts of the world but were unable to satisfy the desire of U.S. firms for similar information on foreign companies. To meet the large demand, starting in 1880 Dun built a global network of branch offices and began working in liaison with foreign agencies. In 1900, Dun had 137 offices, mostly in America; over the next sixteen years, 104 new ones were opened, 77 of them abroad. By 1914, the branch office network covered all of North America and Western Europe and had bridgeheads on every continent except Asia; it was now possible to receive detailed information on almost any company in the world within 48 hours.

This global network included Germany, although Germany remained at its fringe. Credit rating, however, did take place there. In 1872, one year after the unification of Germany, Wilhelm Schimmelpfeng had set up an eponymous company in Frankfurt along the lines of Dun & Bradstreet. By 1900, Schimmelpfeng had grown considerably and called itself the “largest European agency.” It had 133 branches and 1,157 staff.  

But why did Schimmelpfeng not outgrow the American pioneers, and why was it not founded until three decades after Dun?

Smaller challenges required smaller solutions, one might say. Compared to the United States, Germany was smaller in terms of geography, though not yet in population, and more stable. There was no mass immigration, and its industrialization did not coincide with the opening up of a whole continent. German businesses could rely on older economic and social structures to a much greater degree than their American counterparts. There were well-established trust-generating mechanisms. The chambers of commerce acted as important brokers of contact, information, and trust. When, for example, someone from Nuremburg received an offer from an unknown person from Frankfurt, he would write to the Frankfurt Chamber of Commerce and ask for a reference. He could also approach the mayor or other businessmen. Asking for references from local dignitaries, whose status...
often went back several generations, was a standard practice within the German business community. In other words, in many cases a non-market approach prevailed and curtailed the market for commercial rating agencies’ information.

In Germany, the big banks also used their branch networks to provide their customers with credit information on people from other cities. The U.S. banking system, by contrast, was weak and decentralized. Especially in the Southern states, “country merchants” acted as a kind of bank substitute. To perform this task, they needed to back up their lending activities using credit rating. The strength of the rating agencies in the United States, thus, also reflects the weakness of the U.S. banking system.

Moreover, in Germany non-commercial alternatives, like cooperatives, sprang up, which are still very important. Today Creditreform is the market leader for domestic German and small business credit reporting. This cooperative goes back to 1879, when 25 shopkeepers and craftsmen in Mainz founded the Verein Creditreform zum Schutze gegen schädliches Creditgeben (Society for the Protection against Harmful Lending). It aimed to ban credit customers who had overdue debts to a member of the Society. It also strove to collect debts and establish an information network. By 1883, there were already 15 local clubs – enough to indulge in the well-known German passion for founding associations, in this case the Verband der Vereine Creditreform (Association of Credit Reform Societies).

This collaborative mode of operation, which grew out of guild and civic traditions, is characteristic of the German variety of capitalism, which has been called “cooperative capitalism.” This method of disseminating credit information was no doubt very effective in
civilizing the German credit market, but it also narrowed the scope for the American form of credit rating, and for American-style, competitive, market-based capitalism.

Still, credit rating did get off the ground in the German empire, and it was no coincidence that it did so at the very moment when the unification of Germany enlarged the market and made trade between the various parts of the country much easier. Almost simultaneously, considerable deregulation took place, which greatly simplified the establishment of new corporations, especially joint-stock companies. The Joint-Stock Corporation Act of 1871 marked a watershed, although commercial law and its application had already been significantly liberalized in the 1860s. There was an increase in complaints that opening the world of commerce to inexperienced newcomers was depriving the *Kaufmannsehre* (merchant’s honor) of its former binding power and that the levels of education and decency among businessmen were declining sharply. Following the crash of the Berlin stock market in 1873, these complaints became louder and all too often took an anti-Semitic turn.

As in pioneering America, where the railroads created interregional anonymous markets, the unification of Germany and the deregulation of company law created a demand for credit information brokerage within Germany. Prior to the emergence of Schimmelpfeng, the 1860s had witnessed the founding of several German agencies. Some of these remained limited to a regional market, like Salomon (Stettin, 1860), and others failed, despite national strategies, to achieve the importance of Schimmelpfeng, like Lesser & Liman (Berlin, 1862) and Wys, Muller & Co (Holland, 1863).23

At the same time, it became increasingly indispensable for German exporters to tap into the global information networks of the

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U.S. market leaders when they wanted to approach new customers around the world. They needed the expertise of Dun and others to protect themselves, just as American companies needed reliable information on potential partners in Germany. For these services, they would not go to Creditreform or write a letter to the chamber of commerce but had to utilize the standardized, commercialized services of modern rating agencies. The German agencies cooperated very closely with the American firms so that an inquiry made to Schimmelpfeng in Frankfurt about an American company in the Midwest would, in effect, be answered by Dun.

In 1984, Dun & Bradstreet took over Schimmelpfeng. Since 2006, this German business has operated under the name of D&B Deutschland GmbH.

VI. Conclusion

Nineteenth-century businessmen reacted to the growing uncertainties of their expanding markets in two ways. First, they employed non-market mechanisms for securing loyalty, using the social capital of their families, churches, and ethnic communities. Second, they looked to the market, which transformed the uncertainties into manageable risks by means of commercial expert systems.

The rating agencies were one of these systems. They collected, evaluated, and centralized enormous amounts of data. They enabled their clients to practice active risk management, lessen the probability of defaults, and foster trust among strangers in an increasingly anonymous and insecure world. At the same time, the agencies acted as disciplining institutions with a considerable impact on individuals’ lives and an almost unchecked power to exclude people from access to credit.

Trust is essential to the operation of markets, enabling cooperation and minimizing frictional losses. The emergence of honest dealing in the industrialization and globalization processes has long been interpreted as a result of national and supranational regulation. This is true, but only to a limited extent. Historians and economists have neglected the strategies developed by the business community itself. The new market structures demanded offensive risk-oriented behavior, but that was neither conceivable nor practicable without safety strategies.
Commercial risk management has undoubtedly been fundamental to setting up and expanding markets. However, its history is not a trajectory of ever increasing stability. On the contrary, it would be completely misleading to assume that commercial risk management has always been able to eradicate uncertainty and dishonesty. At the present moment, global capitalism is caught in a deep crisis of trust, and markets are suffering under a severe credit crunch. In the build-up to the current crisis, the rating agencies blatantly failed to serve investors when they assigned investment grade to mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), whose underlying assets consisted of subprime mortgages. They classified these securities as AAA and put them in the same category as U.S. government bonds.

What happened? Obviously, the rating agencies either grossly underestimated the risks involved and could not imagine a downturn of the real estate market, or they were simply overtaxed by the quantity and complexity of the new investment vehicles. There also is reason to believe that a conflict of interest occurred. The agencies are typically paid by the issuers of these papers, and downgrading their products would have lowered the agencies’ revenue. All three factors seem to have added up. The consequences of this failure were grave, as everyone trusted the agencies. After all, they had acquired a reputation for trustworthiness over a period of 150 years. In this case, excessive trust turned out to be economically more damaging than distrust, with disastrous results – because no one considered it necessary to assess risk themselves. Instead, most investors trusted an expert system that had stopped being an efficient gatekeeper between issuers and investors.

This situation discloses two fundamental dilemmas that will likely prevent capitalism from ever becoming completely civilized. First, those who have earned trust are highly tempted to abuse it. Second, although risk management, like credit rating, brings some risks under control, it also encourages people to take new risks that no one would have previously taken. As Peter Bernstein laconically observed, “seatbelts encourage drivers to drive more aggressively,”24 and, as a result, the number of accidents rises. In the same way, capitalism continues to be plagued by uncertainty and instability.

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Recently, Christoph Buchheim and his former student Jonas Scherner have advanced a reinterpretation of business-state relations in the Third Reich that has attracted considerable notice. Articulated in a series of essays that appeared in 2006 in several prominent journals, in their respective contributions to a just-published collection of conference papers entitled *German Industry in the Nazi Period*, and in Dr. Scherner’s new book, their case incorporates many now established and uncontroversial findings of the existing literature, albeit too often without adequate acknowledgment of who first arrived at these or even an indication that someone has done so. In consequence, although Buchheim and Scherner present several fruitful insights, key parts of their argument merely knock down straw men or already opened doors, while other parts slice and dice the current state of knowledge in a simplistic and misleading fashion.

The central, load-bearing propositions of the Buchheim-Scherner interpretation are as follows:

1. The Nazi state regulated German business in order to achieve autarky and rearmament, but did so quite unsystematically and never established anything resembling a centrally planned economy.

2. Because the Nazi state generally respected private property rights and freedom of contract, the regime rarely forced corporations to serve its objectives, but rather offered an array of inducements, which firms could take or leave without adverse consequences, to get enterprises to meet the regime’s production goals.

3. Given this context, private enterprises in Nazi Germany retained much of their autonomy over their investment decisions and production strategies, which continued to reflect managers’ estimates of long-term commercial prospects.

The problem with all of these propositions is that they are half-truths. Point one uses the well-known improvisation and lack of central planning that characterized Nazi economics to divert attention from the fact that the interventionist spiral set in motion

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by Nazi trade policy in 1933–34 developed by 1938 into a full-blown, comprehensive, and state-mandated rationing and allocation system for every factor of production. That system then became more rigorous during the war and almost airtight from 1942 on. Point two is right that the Nazi regime preferred the carrot to the stick, for both ideological and practical reasons, but quite wrong to deny the intimidating effect of the most spectacular exceptions to this preference: the forced sale of Junkers aircraft in 1933, the conscription of private enterprises to underwrite the formation of the Braunkohle Benzin AG (Brabag) in 1934, and the virtual confiscation of the Salzgitter iron ore fields from German heavy industry in 1937 as part of the establishment of the Hermann-Göring-Werke, not to mention the impact on corporate decision-making of the numerous removals of chief executives during the war, including Paul Reusch of the Gutehoffnungshütte, Willy Messerschmitt and Ernst Heinkel in the aircraft industry, and Franz Josef Bopp at BMW. Point three is correct that many corporate leaders currently imagined—indeed, longed for—an economic future that would resemble the pre-Nazi, free market past and thus tried to sustain their traditional core operations. But Buchheim and Scherner both overstate the limited success that most large firms enjoyed in clinging to business as usual and understate the considerable extent to which many executives modified their evaluations of commercial prospects along party lines in the key interval of 1937–42.

In essence, Buchheim and Scherner have brought “the voluntarist turn” in historical writing about the Third Reich to the field of business-state relations in that era. This trend, ably described and critiqued by Neil Gregor, refers to the gathering interpretive tendency to stress the willing, freely chosen participation of Germans in the policies of the Nazi government. In stressing, on the one hand, the

2 An exhaustive case study of how this occurred is Ralf Banken, Edelmetallmangel und Grossraubwirtschaft (Berlin, 2009).
regime’s deference to private property and freedom of contract, and on the other hand, the corporate sector’s assessment of Nazi initiatives according to such conventionally capitalist decision-making criteria as concern for relative market shares and near- and long-term profitability. Buchheim and Scherner present a picture of a relatively normal capitalist economic setting in which negotiations between business and government proceeded on a fairly familiar and equal basis and corporations possessed only mildly circumscribed freedom of action. On the whole, then, Buchheim and Scherner maintain that businessmen’s decisions were unconstrained products of their own desires, calculations, and priorities. In so far as firms made common cause with the Nazi regime, they did so largely of their own volition.

This reinterpretation deviates sharply from the rather more nuanced consensus view that developed among scholars of business in the Nazi regime over the past thirty years. That view sees the Nazi economy as a hybrid of market mechanisms and state directives, a mix of incentives and instructions, rewards and reprisals, opportunities and obstructions. In this “carrot-and-stick” or “Skinner Box” economy, corporations’ micro-economic decisions were increasingly channeled in directions the regime desired by the interaction of government funding and state-guaranteed profit margins for producing certain goods, on the one hand, and steadily tightening official controls, stiff penalties for their violation, the possibility of government compulsion, and the danger that refusal to cooperate could open opportunities to competitors, on the other. In other words, the Third Reich both bridled and spurred the profit motive. A complex, somewhat jury-rigged repertoire of positive and negative reinforcements influenced the production and investment decisions of most enterprises, and these became increasingly conditioned by the regime’s macroeconomic priorities with each passing year. Buchheim and Scherner, in effect, seek to strip away one side of this story as superfluous. In their account, neither fear nor force played an appreciable part in limiting the freedom of businesses to determine their outputs under Nazism; indeed, macroeconomics seldom had much influence either.

This new depiction of corporate freedom of action in the Third Reich strikes me as an analytical step backwards. Whatever utility Buchheim and Scherner’s interpretation may have as an account of decision-making in relatively small-scale enterprises, it seriously misstates the thinking and situation of German big business under Nazism. Considerations of space prevent me from delineating all

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4 See the very able summary of the literature in Werner Plume, “Unternehmen im Nationalsozialismus. Eine Zwischenbilanz,” in Werner Abelshauser, Jan-Otmar Hesse, and Werner Plume (eds.), Wirtschaftsordnung, Staat und Unternehmen: Neue Forschungen zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus (Essen, 2003), 243-66; and the essays in Francis R. Nicosia and Jonathan Huener (eds.), Business and Industry in Nazi Germany (New York, 2004).
my objections and the evidence for them here, so I will concentrate my remarks on two telling absences from Buchheim and Scherner's story that weaken it decisively.

First, like the voluntarist turn in general, their account virtually ignores the political context in Nazi Germany, which was marked by constant and open threats to any person or entity that did not serve the national interest as the regime defined it, along with considerable room for arbitrary punishment. One should not forget, for example, that the resistance of heavy industry to the seizure of its ore fields in 1937 was broken by Göring’s blunt indication that he intended to use the laws against economic sabotage against corporate leaders who opposed him. Naturally, in a system that wished to harness business’s energy and expertise, the regime generally displayed flexibility in order to obtain them, usually by offering financing options that reduced the risk of producing what the regime desired, and resorted to the alternatives of seizure or founding state-owned competitors only in highly important instances when Plan A failed, e.g., the Hermann-Göring-Werke and Volkswagen AG. I know of no reputable scholar in the field who has ever put the matter differently. But those scholars also have taken care to note that these resorts to Plan B left an impression on the corporate world, all the more so as government spokesmen repeatedly referred to them as replicable precedents.

Second, Buchheim and Scherner’s generalizations rest on selective scrutiny of only one dimension of business-state relations, namely, corporate reactions to projects the Nazi government wanted carried out. An equally important indicator of the nature of business-state relations in the Third Reich, however, concerns projects companies wanted that the state blocked. When business sought to pursue lines of development justified by commercial calculations that were not also national ones, it usually found the authorities to be implacable and effective impediments. Buchheim and Scherner repeatedly imply that the large reserves corporations amassed during the 1930s were at

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their free disposal and, thus, that firms could pursue their own development strategies without serious interference. This is simply wrong, as a host of corporate studies have shown in recent years, because of official control over access to raw and building materials, machinery, and labor. Indeed, the very size of these accumulated reserves reflected the constraints to which corporate decisions were subjected. With dividends capped, tax rates on corporate profits rising by 5 percent annually from 20 percent in 1935 to 55 percent in 1942, and interest on capital held in reserves also fixed, understanding what firms were prepared to do at the state’s behest is impossible without paying attention to what they were not allowed to do instead.

My first objection essentially concerns the mentality or working assumptions of German corporate executives in the Third Reich. According to Buchheim, such people never took seriously sporadic Nazi threats to nationalize or socialize industry, since the costs to the regime of doing so were bound to outweigh the benefits. Scherner adds the observation that the regime wielded this sort of stick toward business very seldom after the onset of the Four Year Plan in 1936-37. As a result, both authors emphasize, most firms continued to design their production strategies around traditional commercial considerations, including the avoidance of overcapacity and the preservation of mainstay markets, so as to secure their long-term competitiveness. A major problem with this contention is that the rhetorical threat was not sporadic at all, but rather constant, although it rose to several crescendos, notably in 1937-38 and 1940-41. In my book on IG Farben, I cited numerous such examples, including Hitler’s public remark in September 1937 that “[i]f private enterprise does not carry through the Four Year Plan, the state will assume full control of business,” and State Secretary Brinkmann’s warning a conference of insurance and banking executives in October 1938 not to “underestimate the possibility of the state managing wherever business cannot produce to an adequate degree or perform creatively.” In my book on Degussa, I quoted Hermann Schlosser, the chairman of that firm’s managing board, admonishing his colleagues in July 1940, following the great German victories in the West, to bear in mind that in future:

If, rightly or wrongly, the initiative and tempo of expansion on a private economic basis become viewed as inadequate, then the danger of not only a planned but also a state-imposed system will be strengthened. ... The
tendency expressed by the Hermann-Göring-Werke will be reinforced yet again if business does not exploit its chances sufficiently.\textsuperscript{10}

In a similar vein, Gerald Feldman’s book on Allianz amply documents the unnerving effect on that firm’s executives of recurrent rounds of agitation in Nazi circles in favor of a public takeover of the insurance industry. Moreover, the first published volume by the research team working on the Commerzbank under the Nazi regime records a speech by Kurt Lange, the vice-president of the Reichsbank in January 1941 that cataloged the alleged insufficiencies of joint stock banks in carrying out government policy and pointedly reminded their managers that the best antidote to possible nationalization would be a “proper attitude ... to the National Socialist economic program.”\textsuperscript{11} Henry Turner’s book on Opel AG quotes its managers in mid-1936 reporting to General Motors, the U.S. parent company, that Opel faced “a veiled threat of confiscation,” and then shows that the U.S. managers withdrew from the firm’s board in the fall of 1939 and assented to producing components for German bombers only in order to stave off a government-authorized takeover by Junkers aircraft.\textsuperscript{12} None of these numerous remarks appears to have made an impression on Buchheim or Scherner. Neither scholar’s analysis so much as alludes to any of them or to the numerous documented comments by German industrialists, especially in the period 1937-42, that they had to prove what private enterprise could accomplish, lest the state resort to different devices.

In my book on IG Farben, I also excerpted another highly pertinent document that apparently also failed to arrest Buchheim’s or Scherner’s attention. The unsigned memorandum records a meeting that occurred on 20 October 1938, in the middle of a clash between the government and the principal producers of coal in the Ruhr over the volume and distribution of their output. Present were four high-ranking executives of Preussag, the Gutehoffnungshütte, and

\textsuperscript{10} Peter Hayes, From Co-operation to Complicity: Degussa in the Third Reich (New York, 2004), 195 [translated as Die Degussa im Dritten Reich (Munich, 2004), 211].


\textsuperscript{12} Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., General Motors and the Nazis (New Haven, 2005), 44, 90-99.
Otto Wolff’s Neuenkircher Eisenwerk, along with Ernst Poensgen, the chairman of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Albert Pietzsch, the president of the Reichswirtschaftskammer, and Wilhelm Zangen, the chairman of Mannesmann, who also headed the Reichsgruppe Industrie. The principal item on the agenda was a discussion of a recent meeting between Zangen and Hermann Göring at which the latter had demanded that German industry increase its export proceeds in the coming year by one billion Reichsmark so that the Reich would have sufficient foreign exchange to pay for materials vital to Germany’s preparation for war. Here is how Zangen summarized Göring’s viewpoint:

He assumes that German business has grasped the seriousness of the situation as well as he. If, nonetheless, his goal is not reached, then he will have no alternative to appointing a State Commissioner to direct the economy and equipping him with all powers, including to seize specific sectors of business that in his judgment cannot do what the state must demand of them.

The author of the memo, who appears to have been Poensgen, goes on to say at the end of the six-page document:

I, too, am of the opinion that we are in the highest state of excitation at present and that, if we give the state cause to call our performance unsatisfactory, an expropriation will not be avoidable ... I can certainly vividly imagine that in such a case the socialization of the mines would be ordered and conducted from on high ... Business, especially the mining industry, never has been in such danger as today.”

These are not the words of corporate executives who confidently discounted the regime’s determination to get its way.

Buchheim and Scherner’s contention that the regime’s rhetorical bullying of private enterprise had no impact on its leaders because it was never acted upon is demonstrably false. Paul Walter was appointed in 1939 as Reich Commissar for Coal, in which capacity he had authority to dictate output and distribution. His incompetence soon proved as powerful an inducement for industry leaders to work with the regime as the threat of socialization had, and he was elbowed aside two years later by the leader of the Hermann-

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13 Klöckner-Archiv, Bestand Peter Klöckner, Kleiner Kreis, Bd. 1, Aktennotiz über die am 20. Oktober 1938 um 11 1/2 Uhr im Büro des Herrn Dr. Ernst Poensgen unter dessen Vorsitz stattgefundenene Besprechung in einem kleinen Kreise, 20.x.38, no signature.
Göring-Werke, Paul Pleiger. But the point remains that the regime actuated its threat and in a fashion that industrialists had reason to dread seeing repeated. Besides, even without such a counter-example, the Buchheim/Scherner claim would not be credible. To say that industrialists could and did disregard recurrent Nazi threats to dispossess them because these ceased to be carried out after 1938 is like saying that the non-use of the nuclear option after the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki means that no one was or should have been concerned about the bomb during the Cold War. Well, maybe in retrospect.

Moreover, in so far as the Nazi state turned away from the blunt-instrument forms of coercion on which Buchheim and Scherner fixate, it did so because it no longer needed them as much after 1938. Examples had been made, fear inspired, and the lessons internalized, on both sides of the business-state divide. Consider the following progression: Until 1937, the prototypical worst case of what awaited companies that did not cooperate with the regime’s objectives was the compulsory formation of Brabag; after 1937, it was the establishment of the Hermann-Göring-Werke on the basis of ore fields that were, in effect, confiscated; and beginning in 1941, it was the creation of the Kontinentale Öl AG as a public-private partnership to exploit the oil resources of conquered Eastern Europe, but one in which state representatives held controlling positions on both the supervisory board and the administrative committee, and the government owned sufficient multi-vote shares to ensure its virtually perpetual dominance of policy. In the first case, industrial opposition was broken by decree, as Hjalmar Schacht used his power to compel recalcitrant enterprises to fund the new firm; in the second case, the simple expedient of threatening the leaders of resistant firms with legal charges was enough to dissolve resistance; and in the third, all the corporate parties just fell in line and paid in their allotted share of the operating capital in order to get a piece of the economic action in occupied territories.

Finally, in this connection, one has to emphasize that, when corporate executives factored the possibility of coercion by the Nazi
state into their decisions about whether or not to produce what it requested, their chief worry was not usually or primarily about nationalization or another form of state takeover. It was about the loss of market positions or specialized knowledge to more cooperative competitors or newly created state-supported enterprises. One adverse consequence of recalcitrance is illustrated by IG Farben’s experiences with synthetic fibers in the 1930s. Reluctance to expand output as rapidly as the regime wished was met by the formation of five quasi-publicly financed regional synthetic fiber firms to meet the production targets and compete with Farben.15 Worries about state-sanctioned competition were prominent among the arguments Farben executives made for joining in the Reich’s ambitious plans to expand aluminum output in Norway, as in this passage from a letter to the firm’s chairman of 23 October 1940:

We consider it quite possible that the Hermann-Göring-Werke will enter the field if Farben does not take the opportunity offered now. If that happens, ... we would once again experience the situation that existed after the World War ... [when] the Lautawerk, the largest foundry, fell to the state, and the combine [i.e., Farben] had to restrict itself to 20% of aluminum production. If another state-owned firm enters this field, our share would be still further reduced. This firm also would be sure to enter the field of magnesium.16

Similarly, concern that the state could create an Auffanggesellschaft to carry out the Aryanization of Jewish businesses in 1937–38 added to the zeal with which the established joint stock banks stepped up their financing of such transactions. Moreover, in this instance, as in many others involving the prospect of state interference, the animating fears were not just of income lost to another party. Rather, the bankers dreaded either success or failure on the part of such a new entity, since success would vindicate the principle of state enterprise, whereas failure, especially in the form of politically influenced distribution of properties, might wreak economic havoc with businesses that often were former bank customers.17

In short, fear of the consequences of the Nazi regime acting without them—whether that fear was of nationalization, the creation or promotion of competitors, the loss of patents and processes, or merely damage to a firm’s existing business as a result of governmental ham-handedness often played a demonstrably significant role in restricting corporations’ ability to lay down and pursue their

16 Hayes, Industry and Ideology, 292.
lines of development autonomously. To put the matter in the most dramatic possible terms, of course both Degussa and IG Farben agreed to work with the state in developing the production of carbon black and synthetic rubber (buna) because the firms expected these products to achieve long-term profitability. But there is not the slightest reason to believe that either enterprise would have done so at the tempo the state demanded or would have bowed to the state’s insistence on locating factories for these products at Gleiwitz and Auschwitz, respectively, if the relevant leaders of both firms had not concluded that a negative response would jeopardize monopolies they had acquired through research acumen and built up with the state’s assistance. In fact, there is an abundance of evidence to the contrary. Indeed, that evidence powerfully suggests that, with regard to large firms in the chemical industry at least, Buchheim and Scherner’s judgment that “the initiative for investment projects normally [came] … from the enterprises themselves and not from any state planning agency,” requires substantial qualification. 18

As indicated earlier, the second chief reason I think Buchheim and Scherner’s argument falls short concerns the one-sidedness of their approach to the phenomenon they analyze. Scholars who have looked at business-state relations through the filter of corporate strategies that the Nazi state stymied, rather than that of government goals that firms were persuaded to serve or not, present a far less normalized picture of microeconomic decision-making in the Third Reich. This angle of vision has led me to argue that large German firms could and in some cases did lose control over their own mix of outputs to the state and thus become quasi-public or quasi-state entities via a process of indirect socialization, a characterization to which Buchheim takes especially vigorous exception. 19 I will try here to substantiate my position in two ways, the first regarding a particular turning point in the interaction of

the Nazi regime with both Degussa and IG Farben that occurred in 1938–39, and the second concerning a series of products that Degussa considered essential to its future competitiveness and thus sought to expand production of, but could not do so because the regime withheld necessary materials.

The turning point of 1938–39 was a massive liquidity crisis that affected both Degussa and IG Farben because capital expenditures, mostly for new plant pursuant to the autarky and armaments drives, not only outstripped depreciation, but appeared likely to exhaust each enterprise’s reserves. The respective chairmen therefore announced belt-tightening strategies that promptly fell well short of achieving their objectives. Why? The answer lies in a far subtler form of state penetration of corporate decision-making than Buchheim and Scherner are willing to acknowledge. Neither Hermann Schmitz of IG Farben nor Ernst Busemann of Degussa could rein in their burgeoning outlays for new installations because several of their division heads had become more attached to expanding their operations with the aid of state support than to their chairman’s view of the overall enterprise’s financial health. The regime’s determined promotion of autarky and armament fragmented corporate interests and created new coalitions between subsets of executives and specific government or military agencies. These alliances could and did break down linear divisions over output strategies between firms and the state and replace them with battles fought out within the firms, battles in which the party, allied with the government’s purposes, often prevailed. Degussa’s inability from 1938 to 1945 to rein in the expenditures and indebtedness of its wholly owned subsidiary, the Auergesellschaft, because its managers enjoyed the backing of the Defense Ministry for which they produced, is another, longer lasting illustration of this phenomenon. Whether a private enterprise’s loss of control over its investment outlays in order to satisfy state-forced demand suffices to justify describing the firm as “quasi-public” or “indirectly socialized,” as I did, is for scholars to debate. But the occurrence of that situation, even if documented in only a few cases to date, certainly undercuts Buchheim and Scherner’s claim that the Nazi regime left firms “ample scope to devise their own production and investment profiles.”

As for Degussa’s frustrated expansions, they were, in fact, in the three lines of business development to which the firm assigned highest commercial priority in 1939. The first was a new plant to make metallic sodium, one of the firm’s traditional core products

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20 See Hayes, Industry and Ideology, 205-06; and Hayes, From Cooperation to Complicity, 134-36 [Degussa im Dritten Reich, 150-52].

21 Hayes, From Cooperation to Complicity, 128-32, 221-25 [Degussa im Dritten Reich, 143-46, 234-39].

used in the manufacture of metal hardeners, cyanides, detergents and bleaching agents, tetraethyl lead, synthetic fuel, and synthetic rubber. The second project was a new installation to fabricate another chemical for which Degussa at the time also was the nation’s leading producer, namely hydrogen peroxide, which was essential for synthetic fiber-making and textile processing, porous concrete, and several fledgling military applications. The third initiative was a giant new and integrated Central Works, which was intended to bring together many of Degussa’s scattered and outmoded factories on one modern site.

Johannes Eckell, a former employee of IG Farben who had become the official in Berlin responsible for the chemical industry, declined to issue building permits and construction material allocations for the first two projects when Degussa requested them in early 1939. He did not relent for three years, until March and September of 1942, respectively, by which dates too little time remained to complete either factory before the end of the war. Degussa concluded that, as a result, it had lost its pre-eminence in sodium production to IG Farben and its leading position in hydrogen peroxide output to the state-established installations and the politically better-positioned firms of Albert Pietzsch, all of which Eckell had favored in his allocations. As for Degussa’s planned Central Works, the Nazi regime did permit the firm to expend accumulated capital on the project, but otherwise withheld its support on the grounds that the installation was not vital to the war effort. Thus little happened between Degussa’s vote to undertake the project in November 1939 and the end of 1941, and the project was revived in 1942 only by altering the plans to include more output of formaldehyde for military purposes. Although that installation came on line in late 1943, no other part of the factory was finished by the time the Russian army arrived in March 1945.  

Of course, the delays in these cases were aggravated by the outbreak of World War II. Nonetheless, the important points are that a government official decided what Degussa could build and when, not the corporations’ own executives, and that he first exercised that decision in peacetime, on the basis of the authority over the German economy that the Nazi state already had acquired.

Although both Buchheim and Scherner relentlessly reject the use of the word “compulsion” (Zwang) in describing business-state relations under Nazism, the latter author concedes in one passage that firms did have to contend with “state-induced quandaries”
(staatlich induzierte Zwangslagen). Buchheim does not use such language, as far as I can tell, but he provides several examples of the phenomenon. Admissions of this sort go some of the way toward closing the interpretive gap between us. Even so, Buchheim and Scherner’s stance remains too literal and stilted. Consider their claim that after 1933 firms could continue producing as before by making sure that their traditional output was exported, since the regime valued the resulting earnings in foreign exchange. This is true enough, as far as their story goes. Unmentioned, however, is the circumstance that exporting was frequently an unattractive way of making a profit in the Third Reich, since the Reichsmark was so over-valued and the export subsidy system so cumbersome that German enterprises generally made more money per unit of output at home than abroad. In other words, yes, opting for export to sustain familiar lines of production sometimes was an available alternative, but it was often not an appealing one, which is one of the reasons that Göring felt he had to threaten heavy industry with a state commissioner in 1938 in order to make it sell more abroad. Moreover, even in this context, the larger point applies: Such freedom of action as remained for firms with regard to what they produced existed at the pleasure of the regime. The war years made this crystal clear, as demonstrated by Hartmut Berghoff’s superb book on the Hohner harmonica firm and Michael Schneider’s well-researched study of three Chemnitz office machine makers. In 1939-42, the firms they examine managed to keep producing even diminishing quantities of their traditional product lines only by also turning out rising volumes of military goods. In other words, Nazi economic policies structured opportunities and thus corporate executives’ choices. Did businessmen retain free will? Of course, they did. Was their autonomy intact? I think not.

In sum, I believe that Buchheim and Scherner wield Occam’s Razor as if it were Sweeney Todd’s and with, figuratively speaking, correspondingly extreme results. What remains after they have hacked away rather arbitrarily at the existing literature is a depiction of entrepreneurial maneuvering room in Nazi Germany that presents economics in virtual isolation from politics, corporate thinking on the basis of an incomplete analysis of its determinants, and the fluctuating relationship between business and the state as largely static. Revisionism in historical writing is often to the good, but this instance of the practice serves as a reminder that when historians set out to correct the historical record, they should take care not to overdo the job.

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The first point to note is that, Peter Hayes’s polemics notwithstanding, there is a considerable degree of agreement between him and us on the question of the relationship between the state and businesses during the Nazi era. Hayes does not dispute that the economic system of the Third Reich was not a typical planned economy. Firms in National Socialist Germany had more room for maneuver in decision-making than enterprises in the Soviet Union did. That room for maneuver was not unlimited, of course, as firms took the prevailing political and economic circumstances into consideration. That is the case in every economic system in which private enterprises exist. But it was precisely those circumstances that made the National Socialist economic order different from other capitalist systems. As a result, the decisions firms made were also sometimes very different.

Peter Hayes writes:

[D]ecisions were increasingly channeled in directions the regime desired by the interaction of government funding and state-guaranteed profit margins for producing certain goods, on the one hand, and steadily tightening official controls, stiff penalties for their violation, the possibility of government compulsion, and the danger that the refusal to cooperate opened opportunities to competitors, on the other. (Hayes, p. 31)

Later, he continues: “When business sought to pursue lines of development justified by commercial calculations that were not also national ones, it usually found the authorities to be implacable and effective impediments.” (Hayes, p. 32) We can agree by and large with this key passage from Hayes’s essay. As we have written elsewhere, “Industry adapted to the regime’s sometimes irrational wishes, often at little financial cost but by deferring development plans of its own. It is obvious therefore that there existed, in the
words of Hayes, opportunity costs to enterprises.” Where, then, does the difference of opinion between Hayes and us lie? It concerns two main points, we believe: the interpretation of the dynamics of state regulation and the extent to which the state threatened to use force and carried through on that threat.

I. The Dynamics of State Regulation

According to Hayes, there was a clear development, driven solely by the state, in the direction of steadily stronger and more comprehensive regulation of the economy from the very outset of the Nazi era. “…[T]he interventionist spiral set in motion by Nazi trade policy in 1933-34 developed by 1938 into a full-blown, comprehensive and state-mandated rationing and allocation system for every factor of production. That system then became more rigorous during the war and almost airtight from 1942 on.” (Hayes, p. 30) In our view, state regulation and the reasons behind it were far more complex. First of all, the regulations were usually formulated in such a way that the affected firms still had considerable room for maneuver in decision-making, so they were never “airtight.” We have repeatedly demonstrated that this was the case in a variety of industries dependent on rationed raw materials.

Rationing meant that firms did not have a free hand in determining how much of certain important raw materials they could consume; but they nonetheless had numerous options in deciding what products they would produce with the raw material allocated to them. Moreover, special quotas of raw materials were frequently available to firms producing goods for the Wehrmacht or for export. Such special quotas often made production for export very appealing, a point Hayes fails to recognize. Even if export revenues did not fully cover costs, production for export helped guarantee raw material supplies, especially as a raw materials bonus was sometimes available. Moreover, as a matter of principle, firms did not want to be forced out of profitable markets even if they were not making money in those markets in the short run. Further freedom in decision-making existed in the domestic market, as firms were generally free to choose between customers.

It can be shown, moreover, that, contrary to the claim by Hayes quoted above, at no point were all factors of production fully subject to rationing and state control. It is well known, for example, that labor was not strictly controlled and could not be fully mobilized even during the war. That is very clearly evident from the high number


2 Buchheim and Scherner, “Role of Private Property,” 395-97; Christoph Buchheim, “Unternehmen in Deutschland und NS-Regime 1933-1945. Versuch einer Synthese,” Histo-
rische Zeitschrift 282 (2006): 357-59; for the textile industry, see Gerd Hösch-
le, Die deutsche Textilindustrie zwischen 1933 und 1939. Staatsinterventionismus und ökonomische Rationalität (Stuttgart, 2004; = Diss. Mannheim, 2003), and idem, “Textile Industry as a Training Ground for State Interventi-
on,” in German Industry in the Nazi Period, ed. Christoph Buchheim, 39-52 (Stuttgart, 2008).

of women employed as housemaids throughout the war and the fact that numerous German women were able to avoid the obligation to work. Nor, despite tight state control of the capital market, can it be maintained that firms’ possibilities for financing were entirely dependent on the state’s good will. High levels of profit meant that firms almost always had the option of financing investments on their own as an alternative to the capital market.

If purely private investment—investment that was in no way supported by state guarantees or subsidies—was nevertheless extremely limited during the Nazi era, that was not only a result of the state hindering investments that did not serve its goals, as Hayes would have the reader believe (see Hayes, p. 32). It was also due to the fact that firms did not want to invest in industrial assets because they were afraid of being left with overcapacity when the state-driven economic boom came to its expected end. This point is confirmed not only by the comments of businessmen and contemporary observers of the economic scene but also by the actions of many firms—or, more to the point, their non-action. Consider the example of the cellulose-based synthetic fiber industry. Despite pressure from the state and offers of state subsidies (which, however, were considered inadequate), IG Farben, one of the major firms in this industrial branch, declined to invest in expanding its production of synthetic fiber beyond the level that it deemed profitable in the long run. The most prominent example, however, was the steel industry. Germany’s private steel companies were not prepared to expand capacity to meet the rapid increase in demand arising from the state’s rearmament program despite the high profits they were earning. It was this unwillingness that first induced the state to introduce iron and steel rationing. Steel companies preferred to hoard liquid assets rather than invest them even though expanding capacity would have been extremely profitable in the short run. The problem, in their eyes, was the prospects for profit in the mid and long term; they could not justify major investments on the basis of the narrow armaments-driven upswing in demand. These and other examples suggest that in some instances Hayes’s argument has to be turned on its head. This was a manifestation of the autonomy in decision-making that still existed for private firms, and the exercise of that autonomy was highly detrimental to the interests of the state.

4 Rolf Wagenführ, Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945, 2d ed. (Berlin, 1963), 139.
9 Ulrich Hensler, Die Stahlkontingentierung im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart, 2008); = Diss. Mannheim, 2006), 40-59; also see Hensler, “Iron and Steel Rationing during the Third Reich,” in Buchheim, German Industry, 54-57.
10 One example was Krupp; see Buchheim, Wirtschaftsentwicklung im Dritten Reich, 659, note 38.
The example of the iron and steel industry also illustrates, however, the opportunity costs specific to the National Socialist economic system that firms had to bear. Hoarding liquid assets, after all, is not usually a firm’s strategy of choice. Iron and steel producers were passing up opportunities for growth by doing so and also running the risk, given the signs of repressed inflation, of seeing a loss in the value of their monetary assets. It should be stressed, however, that the constraints on firms in the iron and steel industry—and, indeed, on firms in other branches as well—were partially self-imposed and that the associated opportunity costs had nothing to do with particular governmental prohibitions or controls. However, as Hayes rightly notes (see the passage cited above and page 36–37), company behavior that was potentially at odds with the state’s priorities was sometimes curbed by the fear of permanently losing government contracts to competitors who were more willing to expand capacity. At the same time, state institutions often competed with one another to have private firms give their orders priority, which gave firms considerable sway in their negotiations with their public sector customers. The relationship between the state and private firms in the market was thus much more nuanced than Hayes’s account would suggest.

The same holds for the relationship between governmental regulation and firms’ conduct. As with the imposition of the steel quota system, regulations were often a response to actions on the part of private firms that ran counter to government objectives. But that was not the end of the matter. As firms failed to respond as intended, the state’s methods of regulation were constantly changed or adjusted. A particularly striking example comes from the textile industry. Starting in 1936, producers of cotton and wool textiles for private domestic consumption were obliged to substitute a portion of natural fiber with cellulose-based synthetic fiber. Previously, textile manufacturers had, on their own accord, rarely mixed natural and synthetic fibers because of the poor reputation such products had among German consumers. That changed dramatically once they were compelled by state regulations to do so, and consumers were left without a choice. Indeed, manufacturers thereupon frequently used a much higher percentage of synthetic fiber than mandated in official regulations. That proved to be extremely inconvenient to the government as the quality of textile products declined markedly and thus the public’s acceptance of them was undermined even further. Consequently, new regulations setting maximum levels of synthetic fiber content were imposed, but, in response to pressure

11 This was also noted in Buchheim, “Unternehmen in Deutschland,” 361–65, 386–88.
12 This can be observed, for instance, in the development of the steel quota system, as Hensler (see note 9) has shown in detail.
from textile manufacturers, those levels were quickly increased.\textsuperscript{13} The “interventionist spiral,” in other words, was not kept in motion by the state alone; it was largely propelled by private firms’ decisions that the state saw as undesirable responses to regulatory initiatives. The sheer numbers of private firms meant, moreover, that compliance with regulations often could not be generally monitored. That, in turn, meant that there was little chance in practice that noncompliance might result in prosecution, which greatly reduced the deterrent effect of the threat of punishment.\textsuperscript{14}

All in all, it can be concluded that regulations were never “airtight,” as private firms always had multiple options for adapting their conduct to them. Consequently, the goals the state sought to achieve through regulation were achieved only in part; indeed, in some instances, firms’ actions made a mockery of the state’s regulatory efforts. In any event, the regime saw itself constantly confronted with the task of revising the methods of regulation, but it never succeeded in steering firms entirely in the direction it wanted.

A decisive change in regulatory methods occurred with the introduction of the system of industrial committees following Albert Speer’s appointment as minister of armaments in 1942. That change can, in effect, be seen as an official admission of the state’s failure to impose a comprehensive system of regulations unilaterally. To make the war economy more efficient, the state now consciously sought to mobilize industry’s capacity for self-regulation. The result of Speer’s changes in the state’s approach to regulation was that industrialists, in particular the chairmen of the hundreds of self-regulating industrial committees, officially had a large say in decisions such as the awarding of governmental contracts and the allocation of raw materials. In the process, needless to say, they did not neglect their own interests.\textsuperscript{15} For this reason, Hayes is wrong when he claims that, from the regime’s perspective, the official rationing system was all but perfect in the period from 1942 on.

II. The Threat and Use of Force

Hayes refers to some specific coercive measures carried out by the state: the nationalization of the Junkers firm, the founding of

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{13} Höschle, Textilindustrie, 114-28.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{14} On pricing practices in the textile industry, for instance, see Höschle, Textilindustrie, 162-69; on price control policy, see André Steiner, “Industry and Administrative Price Regulation 1933-1938/39,” in Buchheim, German Industry, 85-95; on the illegal hoarding of rolled steel, see Hensler, Stahlkontingentierung, 119-21.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}
Brabag, the seizure of the Salzgitter mines, and the dismissal of executives like Paul Reusch and Ernst Heinkel. These examples of coercion are cited time and again in the scholarly literature on the Third Reich, and, indeed, almost all of them are noted in our work.\textsuperscript{16} However, even democratic systems use similar sorts of coercive measures on occasion. The West German government, for instance, collected a compulsory loan from industrial firms within the framework of the 1952 Investment Aid Law [\textit{Investitionshilfegesetz}]. Rescue legislation enacted in 2009 allowed the German government to strip shareholders of the Hypo Real Estate Group of their property. The U.S. government’s breakup of AT&T’s monopoly in 1984 can likewise be viewed as a coercive action. Both the constitution of the Weimar Republic (Article 153 II) and the Federal Republic’s \textit{Grundgesetz} (Article 14 II) allow for the possibility of state expropriation of private property for the common good.\textsuperscript{17} Yet nobody claims that industrialists in democratic societies are intimidated by such state actions and constitutional principles or that they generally take account of such possibilities in their everyday planning and decision-making.

Hayes attempts to make the opposite case for the Third Reich. He points to the absence of the rule of law (see Hayes, p. 32) and offers a number of quotations from businessmen that seem to confirm his argument. The first point is one that we have made as well.\textsuperscript{18} As for Hayes’s second point, a critical examination of the source from which he drew at least one of his quotations would support an interpretation that is at odds with the one Hayes offers. Opel’s management raised the “veiled threat of confiscation” in 1936 not because of a threat from the regime but rather as a tactical maneuver in its negotiations with its corporate parent, General Motors, to secure dollars for financing rubber imports.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, Göring’s often drastic-sounding public pronouncements were frequently not taken seriously,\textsuperscript{20} not least because he sometimes also called for a reduction of the state’s engagement in the industrial sector and even took steps in that direction.\textsuperscript{21} Many government officials and important functionaries took similar steps—and often precisely in connection with projects of the Four Year Plan. From the regime’s perspective, we would argue, establishing the Hermann-Göring-Werke and Volkswagen were stopgap measures that the regime would have preferred to avoid. That the regime did not want to get involved in running businesses is also suggested by the fact that it not only sold off its majority holdings in two major

\textsuperscript{16} Buchheim and Scherner, “Role of Private Property,” 391, 401; Buchheim, “Unternehmen in Deutschland,” 360, 366-68.

\textsuperscript{17} In this context, it deserves to be noted that in 1952 the Bundesgerichtshof upheld the legality of the 1942 expropriation of the Salzgitter mines: “Ein Verstoß der Anordnung vom 13. November 1942 gegen Artikel 153 Abs. 2 [der Weimarer Verfassung] ist nicht ersichtlich. Die Anordnung diente dem Allgemeinwohl, denn sie sollte die planmäßige und rationelle Ausbeutung der Mineralvorkommen im Raume Salzgitter ermöglichen, um so dem wirtschaftlichen Bedürfnis entsprechend, die deutsche Erzgewinnung zu steigern. Sie beruhte auch auf gesetzlicher Grundlage … Die Enteignung ist auch gegen eine Entschädigung erfolgt, deren Angemessenheit nicht in substantieller Weise bestritten worden ist.” (BGH ruling of 8 February 1952, available at www.legios.de)

\textsuperscript{18} Buchheim and Scherner, “Role of Private Property,” 390.

\textsuperscript{19} Henry A. Turner, \textit{General Motors and the Nazis: The Struggle for Control of Opel, Europe’s Biggest Carmaker} (New Haven, 2005), 44.

\textsuperscript{20} Matthias Riedel, \textit{Eisen und Kohle für das Dritte Reich. Paul Pleigers Stellung in der NS-Wirtschaft} (Göttingen, 1973), 98.

\textsuperscript{21} Buchheim and Scherner, “Role of Private Property,” 407, 409.
banks and the Vereinigte Stahlwerke in the course of the 1930s but also tried to privatize as many state-owned armaments firms as possible.\(^{22}\)

There are additional reasons not to overestimate the Nazi regime’s threats to business. For one, Nazi ideology placed great value on private enterprise. Even Hitler frequently expressed his opposition in principle to bureaucratic management of the economy. By impeding the process of natural selection, state intervention in the economy would, he believed, “give a guarantee to the preservation of the weakest average [sic] and represent a burden to the higher ability, industriousness and value, at the expense of the general welfare.” Indeed, Hitler thought businessmen performed a function that others could not easily take over: “For the good of the economy, practical understanding of business is needed. Generally speaking, a National Socialist who has only a theoretical grasp of business is more dangerous than a businessman who is only a businessman and not a National Socialist.”\(^{23}\) Finally, there are many examples of large and small firms in all branches of industry that declined to make the capital investments the state wanted and did not experience any negative consequences.\(^{24}\) Those firms, at least, were not intimidated by the regime’s threats, which suggests noncompliance was possible. Why that should not have been the case with other firms as well, Hayes neglects to explain.

Hayes himself makes an observation that suggests the Nazi regime did not in general consider coercion a useful means to achieve its economic goals. “Naturally,” he writes, “in a system that wished to harness business’s energy and expertise, the regime generally displayed flexibility in order to obtain them, usually by offering financing options that reduced the risk of producing what the regime desired, and resorted to the alternatives of seizure or founding state-owned competitors only in highly important instances when Plan A failed.” (Hayes, p. 32) Hitler’s highest priority from the outset was to prepare for war as quickly as possible. It was thus opportune, from his point of view, to have existing capitalist enterprises take care of the economic side of those preparations – even if that meant having to accept that they would continue to pursue their own ambitions. Comprehensive use of coercive state power would have undermined the efficiency of private firms – “business’s energy and expertise,” as Hayes puts it – and would therefore have impeded the realization of the state’s own goals.\(^{25}\) The Nazi state thus acted accordingly – for

\(^{22}\) Ibid., 405-07.

\(^{23}\) The Hitler quotations are taken from Buchheim and Scherner, “Role of Private Property,” 409; Buchheim, “Das NS-Regime und die Überwindung der Weltwirtschaftskrise in Deutschland,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 56 (2008): 401; Ludolf Herbst, Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft (Stuttgart, 1982), 80.


\(^{25}\) This accords with the lessons of economic theory, of which Hayes is rather dismissive (Hayes in this issue, p. 41). See Andrei Schleifer, “State Versus Private Ownership,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (1998): 133-50. The Hermann-Göring-Werke were indeed a warning example of the inefficiency of state-run enterprises, especially in a thoroughly corrupt regime; see Buchheim and Scherner, “Role of Private Property,” 406f.
example, by entering into negotiations with firms about the investments it sought and offering incentives that took their calculations of long- and short-term profitability into account. And because that approach was seen by firms as normal behavior on the part of the state, it influenced their conduct in the same way—that is, they assumed that they would continue to enjoy freedom of contract in their dealings with the state. It thus seems unlikely that they would, in general, let their conduct be guided by the handful of instances when the state applied coercive measures.

Neither regulation nor threats deterred firms from gearing their actions to profitability calculations. The state was nonetheless able, by and large, to achieve its economic goals, but it had to take firms’ pursuit of profit into account and offer incentives accordingly. State intervention in the economy did indeed limit firms’ options, but almost never so narrowly that they were left entirely without alternatives. It is completely mistaken to call the economy of the Third Reich a “‘Skinner Box’ economy,” as Hayes does (Hayes, p. 31). For the state could not condition businessmen like rats. On the contrary, if its goals were to be successfully realized, the state had to make them compatible with businessmen’s interests as far as possible.

Translated by David B. Lazar

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26 See Jonas Scherner, Die Logik der Industriepolitik im Dritten Reich: Die Investitionen in der Autarkie- und Rüstungsindustrie und ihre staatliche Förderung (Stuttgart, 2008).
REJOINDER: A REPLY TO BUCHHEIM AND SCHERNER

Peter Hayes

The circularity of Prof. Buchheim and Dr. Scherner’s argument will be apparent to anyone who reads their footnotes: In them the authors buttress their points almost exclusively by citing their own publications or those resulting from dissertations Prof. Buchheim directed. Since their response to my critique, therefore, is merely to reiterate the views of the Mannheim School, I will leave it to readers to judge the weight of our respective cases.

Permit me, however, one correction and one observation. First, before charging me with quellenkritische carelessness [carelessness in source criticism], Buchheim and Scherner should have read Henry Turner’s footnotes more attentively. The remark about a “veiled threat of confiscation” was not made by Opel executives to their home office in an attempt to get dollars, as Buchheim and Scherner state, but was made by the head of General Motors’ European operations to the U.S. Ambassador in Berlin George Messersmith, who passed on the comment in a letter to Acting Secretary of State Moore (see p. 171, note 22, of Turner’s book, General Motors and the Nazis).

Second, the sheer artificiality, even naiveté, of the Buchheim/Scherner line of argumentation seems captured perfectly by their assertion that because business was not intimidated by the provisions of the Weimar and Bonn constitutions that permitted property confiscations for the good of the community, business under the Nazis was similarly unconcerned. I rather doubt that Buchheim and Scherner would blithely make the same sort of ahistorical claim if the subject were homosexuals, even though the legal basis for proceeding against them was exactly the same under all three regimes. Obviously, what made all the difference in each era was enforcement and knowledge of it. These made people subject to prosecution a great deal more circumspect during the Third Reich than under the governing systems that preceded or followed it. The point holds for corporations, too.
WHERE TO SHOP? THE GEOGRAPHY OF CONSUMPTION IN THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY ATLANTIC WORLD

Jan Logemann
GHI FELLOW IN THE HISTORY OF CONSUMPTION

In 1966, the German travel agency Hapag Lloyd offered a guided tour of American cities geared toward German city-planners and retailing experts. An ad for the trip in the trade publication Der Aufbau explained:

It is an obvious development that our expanding cities are growing increasingly and visibly sick in their centers. The reasons for this are manifold. Because of too much traffic, noise, and bad air, the consumer no longer has any incentive to make the cumbersome trip into the city. Thus, the consumer is about to leave downtown behind. The United States took too long to recognize such trends which devastated their city centers, and they are now forced to pursue radical solutions. We would do well to learn from the American experiences.¹

This short advertisement illuminates a central aspect of the development of twentieth-century mass consumer societies: their impact on changing metropolitan landscapes, the urban environment, and public spaces. My research deals with the changing spatial configuration of shopping and retailing in Germany and the United States from a comparative and transnational perspective by paying attention to both a vibrant transatlantic debate about the geography of consumption and the manifold local and national responses to it over the course of the past century. On a first level, this entails studying the visions and designs of retail spaces by urban planners, retail managers, and city officials. Consumer spaces, however, were not simply planned, but emerged from a complex process of negotiation that involved consumers as well. Shopping streets and similar places of consumption need to be understood as socially constructed spaces of everyday social and community interaction. My research will therefore also consider the appropriation of shopping spaces by consumers and the spatial practices, such as routine acts of everyday shopping, that (re)constructed and transformed retail space. As the geography of consumption changed, what significance did this have for the development of

¹ “USA Studienreise für Städtebau und Städteplanung,” Der Aufbau 20, no. 3 (December 1966): 39.
retailing, the social meaning of consumption, and metropolitan life more broadly?

My project aims to contribute to what might be called a “spatial turn” in the recent historiography of consumption. Both representations of space, the visions of retail and urban planners, and the everyday spatial practices that construct consumer spaces and their social meaning have increasingly been studied – on the level of the store, the shopping street, and in the context of the city as a whole. The spatial layout and design of stores have long interested historians of consumption, who have examined the traditional service counter as a barrier between the customer and the goods as well as the enticement and desire evoked by sumptuous department store interiors or the efficiency and convenience of modern supermarket aisles. \(^2\) More recently, the planning of shopping streets and of larger configurations of stores has received increased attention especially in the American case. As public markets gave way to street fronts of discrete stores and later shopping centers and strip malls over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the relationship between retailers and consumers, as well as the public nature of consumption spaces, were continuously renegotiated. \(^4\)

Some historians have expressed concern that the increasing individualization of shopping, as well as the commercialization of urban space especially in the later part of the last century, have begun to undermine traditionally important public and community functions of consumption spaces. \(^5\) To address such concerns, we not only need more research on the community function that spaces such as stores and shopping streets actually played in everyday life (without taking too nostalgic a view of Main Street or a bygone age of the corner grocer), but we also need to ask about historical alternatives to the American spatial pattern of consumption, in particular, to the shopping centers and big-box stores at the center of present-day Jeremiads. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to the transnational dimension of retail development, which despite numerous cross-border transfers and exchanges is not simply a story of increasing homogenization and uniformity. \(^6\)

In this short essay drawn from my larger research project, I will focus on developments in West Germany and the United States from the 1950s to the early 1970s that the advertisement cited above refers to. Contrary to notions of convergence and “Americanization” in the realm of consumption, these two countries took

\(^2\) For a recent discussion of the spatial dimension of consumption, see the introduction to Jon Stobart / Andrew Hann / Victoria Morgan, Spaces of Consumption (London, 2007).


\(^4\) See, e.g., Helen Tangires, Public Markets and Civic Culture in Nineteenth-Century America (Baltimore, 2003), Erika Rappaport, Shopping for Pleasure (Princeton, 2000), and especially Alison Isenberg, Downtown America (Chicago, 2004).

\(^5\) The notion of decline is particularly pronounced in Ann Satterthwaite, Going Shopping (New Haven, 2001). See also Elizabeth Cohen, “From Town Center to Shopping Center: The Reconfiguration of Community Market Places in Postwar America,” American Historical Review 101 (1996): 1050-81.

\(^6\) This is emphasized in Alexander Sedilmaier, “From Department Store to Shopping Mall: New Research on the Transnational History of Large-Scale Retail,” Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte (2005): 9-16.
distinctly different paths in the postwar era when it came to integrating mass consumption within the spatial layout of their cities.\footnote{On the notion of the “Americanization” of European consumer culture, see, above all, Victoria de Grazia, \textit{Irresistible Empire} (Cambridge, 2005).} After World War II, the United States became a predominantly suburban consumer society that was stereotypically centered on the two-car family, sprawling developments of ranch houses, and the suburban shopping centers and strip malls that supplied the multitude of goods with which to fill these houses. West Germany, by contrast, remained a much more urban consumer society. More densely settled, it was a nation of consumers who continued to live predominantly in apartments and who shopped by walking to neighborhood stores or by taking public transportation to downtown shops. To be sure, the reality of postwar shopping was more complex and varied on both sides of the Atlantic than this ideal-typical contrast between a suburban and an urban consumer society suggests. Still, despite important differences among regions and social and ethnic groups, a comparative look at aggregate national data on housing and retail development justifies the simplification for the present purposes. A number of factors, including public policy approaches (such as zoning regulation or tax incentives), differences in the structure of the retail industry as well as divergent consumer attitudes, contributed to this transatlantic divide in postwar consumption spaces. Differences in urban planning provide yet another important factor, and this essay will focus specifically on the planning of inner-city pedestrian streets or \textit{Fußgängerzonen}. They emerged between 1950 and 1970 as a conscious West German effort to avoid some of the negative aspects of suburban mass consumption noted, for example, by Hapag Lloyd’s American tour for planners.

The transatlantic comparison is particularly useful because it reveals a wide array of similar problems and debates with at least partially different results. The rise of pedestrian malls in postwar West Germany can thus serve as an exemplary case to raise broader questions about the spatial development of consumer societies and its economic and social ramifications. What did the urban/suburban contrast mean economically for the development of retailing structures and local business communities on either side of the Atlantic? What consequences did it have for metropolitan communities, and how did changes in commercial space affect the everyday experience of shared public space? Did European countries like West Germany provide a historical alternative to American-style geographies of mass consumption?
I. Alternatives to Suburban Retailing: The Example of Pedestrian Malls

In many ways, the inner-city pedestrian mall was a product of post-war mass consumption. In West Germany, the first pedestrian malls emerged during the 1950s in the context of postwar reconstruction. In 1953, the city of Kassel inaugurated the best-known early pedestrian street, the Treppenstrasse. Already five years earlier Kassel had devised a plan for its inner city, which had been devastated during the war. To accommodate anticipated modern traffic demands (usually done at the time with an eye to American developments), a new circular road pattern was set up to enclose the inner city. The Treppenstrasse was to provide pedestrian access from the train station to the main business street. The core of the city, planners envisioned, was to be the “realm of the pedestrian.”

The city council unanimously voted to create a fully pedestrianized shopping street, because “the increase in automobile traffic makes it necessary to reserve the urban core solely for the pedestrian.” This experiment – and its further expansion a few years later – received nationwide attention in the press. Kassel’s city center was celebrated in the 1950s German press as an “oasis for pedestrians.”

The introduction of pedestrian areas during the 1950s, however, was not simply an attempt to “modernize” German cities and make them suited to the demands of the automobile. Planners and commentators in the media also stressed the “calming” effects of traffic-free zones. Such language betrayed underlying concerns about the modern and commercial “mass city” of the twentieth century, which were especially prevalent among conservative and educated elites. This can be seen in attempts to discursively connect the newly created pedestrian streets to Western (or, as they were called, abendländische [occidental] traditions. Images of Venice, the public places of early modern cities, or even the Greek agora were invoked repeatedly.

From its inception, the development of pedestrian shopping streets at the core of West German postwar cities was thus also an attempt to embed modern mass consumption within a more traditional urban framework.

It was American city planners, however, who discovered the potential of pedestrian malls to revive struggling central business districts early on. During the 1950s, many American cities were already experiencing the negative side effects of an increasingly suburban consumer culture. As suburbs began to sprawl, retailers in central

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12 One prominent example is Adolf Abel, Regeneration der Städte (Zürich, 1950).

13 On the development of shopping centers in the United States, see, e.g., Richard Longstreth, City Center to Regional Mall (Cambridge, 1997), and Nancy Cohen, America’s Marketplace (Lyme, 2002).
business districts had to compete with outlying shopping centers that were mushrooming across the country. By the end of the decade, America’s downtowns and Main Streets saw a significant decline in retail traffic in central locations that had once been prime real estate and the heart of community life. American city planners soon found themselves looking at their European colleagues with envy. Traveling to Europe during the late 1950s, they not only marveled at modern public housing projects, but also at inner-city shopping districts bustling with life. Experiments with traffic-free areas in the centers of German and other European cities caught the eye of American observers: Pedestrian malls, they concluded, might hold the key to halting the decline of downtown centers.

One of the key figures in promoting pedestrian malls in the United States was architect Victor Gruen, an émigré from Vienna, who, ironically, had made a name for himself as a leading designer of suburban malls during the 1940s and early 1950s. Inner cities, Gruen argued, had to learn from the new suburban competition he had helped to shape. Their shopping districts had to be designed in such a fashion that consumers would like to stay and linger. In a 1957 talk before the American Planning and Civic Association, Gruen outlined his vision for the Main Street of the future: “The surface of the city center will belong exclusively to the pedestrian. ... Thus a new measure of compactness and cohesiveness for the urban center can be reached, similar in character to the one found in older European cities.” Gruen wanted to design urban commercial spaces that would simultaneously provide a...
center to the urban community and ensure the economic survival of traditional downtown retailers.

Kalamazoo, Michigan, was one of the first American cities to implement such plans. Hit by rapidly declining retail sales due to suburban competition in 1956 and 1957, the business community of Kalamazoo commissioned Gruen’s firm to design a plan for converting its main business street into a pedestrian walking mall. The mall, built in 1959, was a tremendous success for the city and its retailers and garnered national attention. Kalamazoo – now “Mall City USA” – became a model for similar projects in Fresno and other cities across the United States. 18 However, pedestrian malls would not become the widespread national phenomenon during the 1960s that its proponents had hoped for. Indeed, for a variety of reasons, many American cities quickly ended experiments with traffic-free zones. Frequently, the business community mounted opposition fearing an even greater decline in sales should their customers be prevented from driving directly to the store. As surveys among consumers in American pedestrian malls showed, this concern was not unfounded. The vast majority of shoppers reached downtown in their own cars. Especially middle-class consumers (by now already underrepresented in the city) were unwilling to switch to public transportation – and mass transit itself was rapidly declining in postwar American cities. Respondents to the survey instead repeatedly complained about limited parking space and, furthermore, voiced concerns about their safety, crime, and “the element of people” in downtown areas. This also hints at the importance of “race” in postwar American urban development. 19 Above all, once race riots had taken place in the downtown and neighborhood shopping streets of numerous cities during the 1960s, few white middle-class consumers were inclined to envision American urban centers as any sort of “oasis.” 20

As American pedestrian malls struggled, Victor Gruen and others took it upon themselves to warn European cities against repeating American mistakes. At a 1968 congress on commerce and urban planning in Brussels, Gruen emphasized the negative aspects of suburban shopping centers and touted his plans for pedestrian business districts as an alternative. 21 German observers were already attuned to the concerns Gruen presented; the “death of the American city” had become a common place in the German debate on urban planning. 22 German city planners as well as retailing experts traveled to the United States by the scores – the tour I
referred to at the outset of this essay being only one of many examples. Other study tours were organized by federal and local administrations as well as retailing and planning experts. By the mid-1960s, America had become the example of urban planning gone wrong.

Before the foil of the American problems, the survival of inner-city retailing emerged as a central concern in West Germany as well and became a driving force in the development of further Fußgängerzonen. As Germany’s first suburban shopping centers appeared “on the green meadow” (auf der grünen Wiese) outside of towns, many German towns stepped up their efforts to develop pedestrian areas. The city of Munich set the most path-breaking example for developing pedestrian areas during the 1960s. Planning with the 1972 Olympic Games in mind, the city aimed to develop an entire network of pedestrian streets in its center. Championed by Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel, a leading critic of American-style urban development, the Munich plan envisioned a system of pedestrian areas connected to public transportation. Its proponents hoped to recreate the urban center in its “old glory” for citizens and tourists alike. Centered on the Marienplatz, the largest contiguous pedestrian area in Europe was created between 1967 and 1972.

A survey conducted among Munich citizens in 1969 revealed vast differences in the role downtowns played for German and American consumers at the time. Over 80 percent of respondents in Munich indicated that they routinely shopped while visiting the city center. They not only visited department stores and specialty shops, but in surprising numbers still bought goods for everyday use as well. Many

23 See, for example, Erwin Thomas, Einzelhandel im Städtebau (Frankfurt a.M., 1964), a report of a trip organized by the Rationalisierungskuratorium der deutschen Wirtschaft in cooperation with the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium and the Hauptgemeinschaft des deutschen Einzelhandels.

24 First suburban shopping centers such as the Main-Taunus Center near Frankfurt were opened in the mid-1960s and garnered »
complained about crowded sidewalks or too few benches and other such amenities on downtown streets. A lack of parking space, on the other hand, was not considered as high a priority as with consumers on the other side of the Atlantic. Indeed, the majority of respondents used public transportation to reach downtown – at least 20 percent even came occasionally on foot.26 Under such circumstances, the development of pedestrian zones, which met with widespread public enthusiasm, held tremendous potential in keeping urban consumers within city centers.

By 1970, 96 Fußgängerzonen existed in Western Germany; by 1973, their number had more than doubled to 214.27 They presented an urban alternative to the suburban shopping malls whose number had skyrocketed across the United States during the same time period. Taken together, shopping centers accounted for only 4 percent of total retail sales in Germany as compared to over 40 percent in the United States at the time.28 At least in part, the relative success of traditional urban stores in West Germany was due to conscious urban planning that brought together city officials and retailers. But the way consumers used existing shopping spaces as well as their shopping habits and attitudes towards urban centers also figure into the equation. Ultimately, a broader metropolitan context of regulation and development further helped pedestrian malls to flourish in postwar West Germany. By contrast, American middle-class consumers’ move to the suburbs was encouraged by a lack of zoning regulations and policies that subsidized mortgages and road-building, but allowed for only minimal public expenditures on urban apartment housing, mass transit, or other public services. Although West Germany, too, saw an increase in single-family homes and automobiles during the “miracle” years, substantial spending on social housing programs and public support for trolleys and other forms of public goods kept average German consumers more closely connected to the traditional downtown retailing core and to urban neighborhood shopping.

II. The Implications of Consumer Geography

The urban/suburban divide in retailing that is exemplified by the pedestrian malls had far-reaching ramifications. My research aims to raise questions about both the economic and social implications of transformations in the spatial configuration of shopping and consumption. Differences in the geography of consumption had signifi-
cant economic implications for the structure and development of the retail industry as a whole. The suburbanization of American consumer culture contributed to a process of retail concentration, symbolized by large supermarkets and regional shopping centers, that was unmatched in West Germany well into the 1970s and 1980s. Most new suburban developments in the United States severely restricted shops and other commercial outlets, so that, to 1970s suburbanites, the corner grocer was indeed an institution of bygone days. The automobile and weekly rather than daily shopping had helped to speed up the rise of large chain supermarkets. Above all in many smaller and mid-sized cities across the United States, once lively Main Streets began to give way to boarded-up store fronts as downtown real estate values plummeted. Independent specialty retailers and small traditional stores, in particular, struggled in the suburbanized retail landscape of postwar America. In West Germany, by contrast, even large-scale new housing projects on the urban fringes, such as Bremen’s Neue Vahr, often carefully integrated small retailers from butchers to florists within walking distance and usually provided mass transit connections to downtown shopping districts.

Such new neighborhood centers as well as inner-city shopping streets allowed more traditional specialty retailers to survive in West Germany. The quantitative differences between German and American retailing during the postwar decades can easily be illustrated. While the U.S. population in 1965 was roughly three times that of Western Germany, the number of retail businesses was only about twice as high (1,350,000 in the U.S compared to 600,000 in West Germany). Moreover, in West Germany, unlike in the United States, the number of retailers in variety goods and groceries actually increased after the war (from 246,041 in 1939 to 304,683 in 1961).

29 For the numerical decline in different retail trades during the postwar decades, see U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Statistical History of the United States (New York, 1976), 843-45. See also “Status of Small Business in Retail Trade (1948-1958),” Staff Report to House Select Committee on Small Business, 16 December 1960 (CIS: NO: 86-2 HS033), 18-19.

retailing in postwar Germany did shift away from “full-service,” family-operated stores to independent self-service stores that were often organized in voluntary chains, the level of concentration did not compare to the suburban retailing landscape in the United States with its increasing shift to big-box retailers.

The pedestrian zones did their part in keeping German middle-class consumers in the city. Some urban historians have estimated that retail space in German inner cities doubled between 1960 and 1970. In the face of rising sales, Heinz Hermans, then manager of the Cologne chamber of commerce, proclaimed in 1972:

In Cologne one does not talk about pedestrian streets, one has them! ... Amazingly, furniture stores, which today often move out to “the green meadow” in Cologne, decide to settle in the pedestrian streets. ... Since automobile traffic was banned, retail sales there have grown by 30 to 40 percent. This revival of the inner city is not only to the benefit of owners of stores, restaurants and amusement facilities, but also to that of the urbanity and the prestige of the city as a whole.33

While retailing forms changed in postwar Germany as well and many pedestrian malls would eventually become home to the kind of chain retailers found in suburban American shopping malls, differences in the geography of consumption did contribute to a different West German path of retail modernization, which defies narratives of “Americanization.” One focus of my current research project is thus to investigate the interrelationship between changes in the geography of consumption and the development of retail structures across the twentieth-century Atlantic world.

Hermans’ somewhat exuberant observations on the “urbanity” of Cologne, cited above, point to a further implication of the spatial difference between American and West German mass consumer societies – their impact on community life and the urban public sphere. The debate regarding the “malling of America” frequently emphasizes the disappearance of public space. Private shopping malls contributed to a metropolitan environment, in which, as Liz Cohen has suggested, “people were no longer brought together in central market places and parks and public buildings that surrounded them but, rather, were separated by class, gender, and


33 Attachment to “Fußgängerbereiche in Köln” (1972), Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, Acc 1714.
race in differentiated commercial sub-centers." 34

Indeed, many suburban shopping centers attracted a fairly homogeneous, white middle-class customer clientele by the 1960s. 35 Did Fußgängerzonen in Germany present an alternative to this trend by keeping consumers within the realm of urban public space?

That was exactly what many of its contemporary proponents hoped. Inner cities, they argued, should once again become a focal point of urban living. The notion that local retailers can and should be central to a vibrant city, small town, or neighborhood community life became commonplace among urban planners and sociologists by the late 1960s and early 1970s, as they abandoned the long-dominant paradigm of functionally separated urban development and began following Jane Jacobs among others – to look for the social life of small, mixed-used urban spaces. 36 Next to retailing, studies found, the ideal pedestrian mall should also include a residential population, restaurants and cafés, public meeting places, and cultural highlights. 37 Pedestrian malls, many planners in Germany hoped, would ensure that inner cities remained part of the public sphere, a place for social interaction beyond mere commerce.

To be sure, Gruen and others had had the same hopes for early shopping centers. Commercially run suburban malls, however, hardly became another Piazza del Popolo as one Cologne city official described the pedestrian-only Schildergasse in a 1971 radio feature: “Here the stream of people can disperse. On the street, hippies display silver jewelry for sale. Jealously observed by shop owners, but democratically defended by letters to the editor in local dailies.” 38 With similar enthusiasm the city of Munich described its Fußgängerzone in 1972:

The city as a community has regained its center. Everybody looking to see something, in search of excitement, life, and discussion congregates here. You can observe the most beautiful girls, those wearing traditional costumes, backpackers, all sorts of original characters, people who bring their concerns – political or religious – to the public, discussion groups, long-haired youths, and many old people. 39

While this reads like the urban boosterism one would expect to find in a tourist brochure, it does speak to a prominent strand in postwar West German urban development that tried to contain modern mass

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35 See Tri-County Regional Planning Commission, “Shopping Center Effects.” Of the total respondents in 1964, 6.9 percent stated an annual family income under $3,000 (as opposed to 20 percent of families in the 1962 national average), 14 percent stated $3,000-$5,000 (9 percent nationally), 31.7 percent stated $5,000-$7,500 (versus 25 percent nationally), 28.9 percent stated $7,500-$10,000 (15 percent nationally). Income groups above $10,000 were represented only slightly above the national average. Cf. “1962 Family Incomes before Taxes,” Statistical Abstract of the United States (1964), 33B:39.


39 Baureferat München, München - Fußgängerbereiche.
consumption within an integrated metropolitan framework. Both statements interpret commercial pedestrian malls as democratic and diverse places of everyday social interaction. Critical voices, to be sure, were careful to point out the limitations of these public spaces – for example, when peddlers or street musicians interfered with the interests of local business owners. But while class distinctions remained prominent in West Germany, its cities by and large avoided the increasingly segregated and socially fragmented character of postwar American metropolitan development.

In assessing postwar geographies of retailing on both sides of the Atlantic from a historical perspective, however, one should be careful not to romanticize the “lost” traditional retail spaces in downtowns and neighborhoods. Here it will be particularly crucial to widen the timeframe beyond the postwar decades. As research into the cultural history of everyday life (Alltagsgeschichte) suggests, relationships between shop owners and customers were frequently marked by conflict, and stores and shopping streets also served as locations for social and political struggles and for practices of exclusion and persecution – most dramatically perhaps during the Nazi era in Germany or the era of Jim Crow segregation in the American South.

The development of shopping centers as well as pedestrian malls is part of a larger and more ambiguous narrative of twentieth-century retailing that defies simplistic interpretations of “decline” or “modernity.” Another central aspect of my current research, then, is an inquiry into the changing role that consumer spaces have played in everyday community life during the last century in both Germany and the United States.

III. Conclusion

A first point to emphasize in conclusion is that the postwar spread of mass consumption has produced not one “American-style” geography of consumption, but a variety of different spatial patterns. To be sure, one should not exaggerate these differences. Anyone familiar with German pedestrian malls, for example, knows that today they are often just as dominated by chain stores as their suburban counterparts. Nor are they always a haven for free speech and public exchanges. Still, the spatial difference between the American, suburban vision of a modern consumer society and its German, more urban alternative has had significant economic and
social ramifications. Beyond its impact on the development of the retail industry and the urban public sphere sketched above, one could easily list political and especially ecological consequences of spatial consumption models that should at least receive brief acknowledgment. To begin with, the spatial organization of mass consumption has impacted political support for a variety of urban public services such as mass transportation. Only when and where such public goods and services remained a significant part of the everyday experience of middle-class consumers, as they did in West Germany, did consumers as taxpayers willingly support them. America’s suburban landscape of consumption lay not only at the heart of conservative taxpayers revolts; it also contributed significantly to an extraordinarily energy-intensive model of consumer society. The environmental impact of car-dependent suburban consumption and the sprawl it entailed has become increasingly evident since the 1970s. The early movement for inner-city pedestrian malls was, not coincidentally, motivated by environmental considerations as well.

The geography of consumption was a vital aspect of life in the twentieth century that helped shape the world we live in today. The pedestrian malls and shopping centers of the postwar decades are but a small part of a larger transatlantic story of shopping and consumption spaces. My research project thus sets out to explore broad questions of retail development and social change in urban communities through the lens of transatlantic debates over retail space and the cultural history of everyday retail spaces. In doing so, I seek to put the appreciation of local space by historians of everyday life into fruitful dialogue with recent historiography’s growing attention to transnational exchanges. It is important to understand the historical alternatives, the paths taken and not taken, and their consequences for the everyday life of consumers. The pedestrian malls discussed here provide one example of a European counterpoint to what once was the suburban “American Dream” – and is today in danger of becoming an American nightmare among mortgage foreclosures and skyrocketing gas prices. Ultimately, I hope to shed light on a complex process of transfers, convergences, and divergences with regard to both metropolitan development and the shape of mass consumer culture on both sides of the Atlantic.43

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1968 IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES:
POLITICAL PROTEST AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Conference at the Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin (JDZB), March 4-6, 2009. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington, Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin, Heidelberg Center for American Studies (HCA), University of Heidelberg, and the International Center for Protest Research. Conveners: Wolfgang Brenn (JDZB), Martin Klimke (GHI), Yoshie Mitobe (Meiji University, Tokyo), Joachim Scharloth (University of Zurich / University of Freiburg), and Laura Elizabeth Wong (Harvard University / HCA). Participants: Meike Baader (University of Hildesheim), Friederike Bosse (JDZB), Timothy Brown (Northeastern University), Claudia Derichs (University of Hildesheim), Kathrin Fahlenbrach (University of Halle-Wittenberg), Philipp Gassert (GHI), Dorothea Hauser (Berlin), Himeoka Toshiko (University of Tsukuba), Ishii Kae (Shitennoji University, Osaka), Izeki Tadahisa (Chuo University, Tokyo), Ekkehart Krippendorff (Free University, Berlin), Rainer Langhans (Munich), Wilfried Mausbach (HCA), Simone Müller (University of Zurich), Murakami Kimiko (Waseda University, Tokyo), Nunokawa Yasuko (Kyoritsu Women's University, Tokyo), Jeremy Varon (Drew University).

Many historians consider the year 1968 as marking the first global revolution of the twentieth century and representing a central node in the period of protest spanning the 1960s and early 1970s. Worldwide, and particularly in the industrialized states, youth-led protest movements shared similar goals advocating the breakdown of the authoritarian structures of educational systems, the overthrow of capitalist economic systems, and the end of superpower intervention in the Third World. Whether viewed from transnational or particularist perspectives, the Japanese and West German postwar experiences inevitably invite comparison along numerous lines. Following defeat in the Second World War, both Germany and Japan experienced Allied occupation, rehabilitation (for the strategic pursuit of America’s global Cold War aims in Europe and Asia), and subsequent “miracles” in their revived economies. Not only were the domestic and international politics of the two defeated powers strongly influenced by the United States, but the dramatic social and cultural changes that accompanied the postwar years in both countries also bore a distinctly American stamp. Even after official occupation ended, the global influence of American popular and youth culture deeply affected the generations coming of age in the
late 1960s in West Germany and Japan. These experiences were explored in the interdisciplinary conference “1968 in Japan, Germany, and the USA: Political Protest and Cultural Change,” a three-day conference that marked the passing of forty-one years since the events of 1968 with eyewitness accounts from the period as well as fourteen presentations, two films, and lively discussions.

Following words of welcome from Friederike Bosse (JDZB), Philipp Gassert (GHI) and Wilfried Mausbach (HCA), Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth introduced the three prominent contemporary eyewitnesses that had been invited to relate how they experienced 1968. In a roundtable forum moderated by Klimke, Ekkehart Krippendorff, a self-proclaimed “65er,” described how his experience with the comparatively laid-back American university environment he encountered at Harvard (such as Professor Talcott Parsons welcoming him into his office with his feet up on his desk) equipped him to challenge the relatively authoritarian German university system to which he returned. He explained how his experience and practical knowledge of American protest methods (“picketing and sandwich boards”) contributed to the organization of the first student protests in Germany. Rainer Langhans, another active figure from Berlin in the sixties, particularly known for his role in Kommune I in Berlin, focused his comments on the spiritual and inwardly focused, but nevertheless public nature of his activities during this period. Langhans, who continues to lead a communal lifestyle in Munich, explained that a search for the self has always been his central focus. Trying to explain the feeling of living “as if half-dead with guilt,” Langhans recounted his ongoing horror at his generation’s legacy of mass murder in the name of National Socialism. Langhans said of 1968, “our actions weren’t political—they were much more.”

Regarding the conference’s transnational approach to 1968, he remarked that activists felt not so much as if they were participating in a transnational phenomenon, but as if they were a part of one big family. He then challenged historians and social scientists to come up with a means of more adequately describing the spirit of the times. Historian and feminist Toshiko Himeoka turned eighteen in 1968. Her memories of protest in Japan began with the “Anpo” protests against the ratification of a revised U.S.-Japan security treaty. The deaths of two student protesters—a twenty-year-old woman at the Anpo protests and another student in demonstrations against the Vietnam War in 1967—brought the very real dangers of this form of protest home to her. This feeling
became even more palpable when she faced riot police in a woman-led protest in Kansai in 1969. Having studied in Germany, Himeoka was able to compare the Japanese and German atmospheres in the early 1970s, observing that protest culture in Germany had a markedly more personal flavor, exemplified by the idea that “the problems of others are also mine.” Later, the women’s movement in Germany also seemed to place greater influence on lifestyle (as opposed to politics) than the Japanese women’s movement did.

The conference was placed in a transnational framework by the theoretical approaches outlined in talks by Tim Brown and Martin Klimke. Brown linked “the global” to “the transnational,” observing that the global features characterizing the events of 1968 (their simultaneity, the timing of revolutions in the Third World) led to the development of a sense of a “global imagined community.” Within this community, transnational lines of influence falling across different terrains should be identified and their influences studied. The year 1968 could be approached as having two separate parts—the “big” 1968 of global youth culture and a certain set of ideas, and the “small” 1968, focused on the particular forms those big ideas took in individual settings. Klimke carried this idea forward, concentrating on transnational symbols and collective identity, and documenting the ways in which ideas of the movement were diffused transnationally and understood differently in different places and then recontextualized or adapted to local values and situations.

As a number of papers traced the trajectory of protest in Japan through the 1960s and compared it to protest in West Germany, it became clear that the year 1968 bears less emblematic weight in Japan. Claudia Derichs suggested that by 1968, postwar protest in Japan was already further advanced than in Germany. Despite superficial parallels, the New Left and student movements had different origins and long-term trajectories in Japan than in West Germany. Derichs’ paper sparked commentary from Japanese conference participants who emphasized that in Japan (as opposed to Germany) being a veteran of 1968 was considered to be neither a symbolic generation marker nor a point of pride or status.

Moving away from German-Japanese comparisons to a more Euro-American focus, Philipp Gassert analyzed how the counterculture eventually penetrated consumer culture to alter mainstream culture, while also leading to a democratization of lifestyles, revolutionizing and repositioning sexuality in the context of everyday life, and
unleashing a new wave of critical thought. Kathrin Fahlenbrach took on the icons of revolution in 1968, delving into the synchronic and diachronic pathways by which these visual images were transformed into icons that became uniquely embedded in the collective memories of varied cultures.

Tadahisa Izeki, Joachim Scharloth, and Yoshie Mitobe analyzed the social and cultural consequences of 1968. Izeki explored the popular and revolutionary publications that influenced the postwar baby boomers who went on to lead the student movement. Scharloth followed with a tightly documented panorama of the ways in which 1968 led to the heightened presence of emotion and informality in daily practice, particularly in aspects of language and behavior. Mitobe approached the consequences of 1968 through a comparative analysis of abortion debates in Japan and West Germany, paying particular attention to differences in men’s and women’s participation, finding that men in Germany participated considerably less than in Japan.

Toshiko Himeoka compared the women’s movements in Japan and West Germany, elaborating on the theme of liberating women’s sexuality in Japan, as proclaimed by Mitsu Tanaka’s article “Liberation from the Toilet.” The Japanese women’s movement remained on the radical fringe, in contrast to the West German women’s movement, which had more success in altering social practices. Interestingly, however, the Japanese movement remained more open to mothers and children than its German counterpart. Chieko Yamagami’s and Noriko Seyama’s 2004 documentary film 30 Years of Sisterhood, which featured veterans of the women’s movement in Japan, was presented by Laura Wong, who argued that the movement must not be viewed as just an offshoot of left-wing protest, but as part of a separate and ongoing revolution in the construction of gender roles. Kae Ishii discussed the role and construction of gender in the Japanese and German film industries since the 1960s, as exemplified in the work of female directors like Sachi Hamano, who, excluded from the club of male directors, came up through the genre of low-budget, short production time “pink films.” Directors like Hamano appropriated the genre and used it to show female sexuality from a female perspective, eventually gaining a diverse and loyal audience of women film lovers. Moving from the revolution in the film industry to the revolution in education, Meike Sophia Baader discussed the formation of Kinderläden—parent-sponsored alternative childcare centers or kindergartens—which emerged in West Germany following the 1965 education
reforms. These proliferated under the influence of the 1968 generation, and later, the women’s movement. Although the first Kinderläden in Berlin and Frankfurt were known for their politicized anti-authoritarian stances, the character of Kinderläden developed and broadened as the model became more widespread in subsequent decades.

It is particularly noteworthy that Germany and Japan, which led brutal expansionist campaigns through World War II, saw particularly strong and violent left-wing terrorist groups emerge in the late 1960s, which, unlike their counterparts in the United States, took a large number of lives before their implosion and capture. Conference participants viewed Wakamatsu Kouji’s unsettling film United Red Army (2007), which dramatizes the Japanese Red Army’s mountain camps and eventual siege in the winter of 1971/72. Dorothea Hauser approached the culture of violence in Japan, Germany, and the United States from a comparative perspective in her talk on Red Army groups in Japan and West Germany; she identified parallel strains of anti-Americanism in the two terror organizations bred in former Axis powers. Jeremy Varon addressed the inadequacies of viewing the Red Army Faction in West Germany and the Weathermen in the United States from purely national perspectives, which provide only inadequate explanations of the “apocalyptic violence” of these groups. Varon argued that understanding these groups’ views of themselves as participants in a global movement is essential if one is to begin to comprehend how they came to view violence as a form of sacred action in the redemption of a falling/fallen world.

As the conference drew to a close, participants reflected on what a conference marking the fiftieth anniversary of 1968 in Japan, Germany and the United States in ten years’ time might entail. Aspects that should receive greater emphasis next time included those of translation, terminology, sociological impact, political institutions, and culture. Further analytical research of the Japanese experience was also called for. Overall, the challenge of bringing three distinct cultures and locations together to explore a period whose legacy is still unresolved proved a significant step in generating locally specific as well as transnationally meaningful portraits of 1968 in Japan, Germany, and the United States.

Laura Elizabeth Wong (Harvard University / Heidelberg Center for American Studies)
Alexander Holmig (Brandenburg an der Havel)
REPRESENTING POVERTY: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

Conference at the GHI, March 13-14, 2009. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the University of Paderborn. Conveners: Anke Ortlepp (GHI) and Christoph Ribbat (University of Paderborn). Participants: Vivyan C. Adair (Hamilton College, Clinton), Thomas Adams (Independent scholar, Washington DC), Beate Althammer (University of Trier), Ebony Coletu (Pace University, New York), Leon Dash (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), Keith Gandal (Northern Illinois University, DeKalb), Dorothea Löbbermann (Humboldt University, Berlin), Claudia Müller (University of Leipzig), Alice O’Connor (University of California, Santa Barbara), Suleiman Osman (George Washington University), Christiane Reinecke (Humboldt University, Berlin), Corinna Unger (GHI), Sabine Veits-Falk (Stadtarchiv Salzburg), Thomas Waitz (University of Cologne), Welf Werner (Jacobs University, Bremen).

This conference invited historians, journalists, and scholars in literary and cultural studies to consider representations of poverty in modern North America and Europe. Over two days of lively discussion, the group of scholars from Austria, Germany, and the United States explored a broad range of narratives and images that have informed the discursive and political responses to and constructions of poverty: photographs, paintings, journalism, fiction, statistics, television, and film. A number of recent studies have critically analyzed the narratives of the poor, exposing the problematic ideologies underlying mainstream representations of “the poor” or “the underclass” as well as the attendant questions raised by the rhetoric of authenticity. In light of recent scholarly work on inequality—by Walter Benn Michaels and Gavin Jones, for instance—this conference’s premise suggested a more pragmatic approach to poverty and its representation, asking questions such as: How effective are such narratives in triggering social reform or cultural change? What options and strategies exist for photographers and journalists to alert audiences to the issue of poverty? What can literary and cultural history contribute to the field? The conveners hoped to provide a forum for innovative approaches to these questions. In order to foster productive interactions between younger and more established scholars, the conference participants included prominent scholars (some of them authors of seminal studies in the field) as well as postdocs and doctoral students.
In the first panel, titled “Representing Poverty in the Long Nineteenth Century,” participants discussed new perspectives on poverty in the nineteenth century, a well-researched period that nonetheless still prompts a variety of questions regarding new sources and methodological approaches. Sabine Veits-Falk analyzed Austrian genre painting of the mid-nineteenth century, focusing specifically on transformations from quasi-medieval charity to more systematic, modern poor relief. Painting and graphics, Veits-Falk argued, both reflected and helped to shape these transformations. Examining cultural texts produced a few decades later, Beate Althammer analyzed narratives of the homeless around 1900. Althammer read the journalism of American author Josiah Flynt (published in 1899 as *Tramping with Tramps*) and the German early-twentieth-century writer Hans Ostwald as cultural texts explicitly catering to a curious middle-class audience. Althammer looked at the significance of role play and role switching in these texts and connected them to the work of contemporary German journalist Günter Wallraf, whose most recent project on German homeless people resembles Flynt’s and Oswald’s narratives in significant ways. Linkages between the late nineteenth century and the contemporary period were also prominent in Keith Gandal’s presentation, which reflected on his study *The Virtues of the Viscious* by discussing theoretical and methodological questions pertaining to the analysis of past representations of poverty. Gandal criticized totalizing, presentist, and discontinuous approaches to such historical texts as Jacob A. Riis’ *How the Other Half Lives*, arguing that readings that are interested only in the technology of surveillance ignored the actual contributions that Riis as a writer and social reformer made to urban improvement. Gandal’s contribution argued for a more respectful and historically more accurate reading of such early reformers.

The second conference panel explored the “media of poverty” in four contributions on literary fiction, journalism, and television. Dorothea Löbbermann assessed the representation of homelessness in contemporary American literature. As literary protagonists, Löbbermann argued, the homeless make urban problems visible and challenge concepts of urban space. In an age of gated communities, Löbbermann pointed out, the boundaries between inside and outside become ever more rigid in the American city. The homeless person functions as a striking reminder of the constructedness of these borders. Addressing the urban context of New York City, Ebony Coletu discussed the narratives of poverty in the “Neediest
Cases” series in the *New York Times*, exploring a century of poverty journalism and the relation between these case narratives and the tradition of American philanthropy. Coletu analyzed structural patterns in these texts, the use of images and captions, and central motifs of these mini-narratives. She probed such issues as dignity, the deserving poor, the republican ethos, and race, and concluded that the *Times* collection of “the most pitiful instances of want” in the twenty-first century seems to turn into a sort of “pay-per-view charity.” Claudia Müller and Thomas Weitz examined contemporary German representations of poverty. In her talk titled “The ‘Fat Poor’, the Work Ethic, and the Workout,” Claudia Müller investigated how a media discourse on the overweight poor imagines these individuals as a threat to society: embodiments of resistance to dominant ideas of the work ethic and physical fitness. Müller stressed how the traditional categorization of the poor as either deserving or undeserving heightens the significance of the stereotype. Thomas Waitz investigated a similar terrain in his discussion of “underclass television” (a term coined by the historian Paul Nolte). In German discussions of this media subgenre Waitz finds ritualized displays of traditional middle-class values, politics of taste and condescension, and, again, the dichotomy of the deserving and the undeserving poor.

The first day of the conference closed with a lecture and reading by one of the most prominent American journalists to publish on questions of urban poverty. Leon Dash, the Pulitzer-Prize-winning reporter for the *Washington Post*, discussed his book *Rosa Lee: A Mother and Her Family in Urban America* and the research methods and strategies that led to this project. Dash’s lecture offered a close look at a journalist’s approach to poverty as an extremely complex mixture of collective and individual factors.

On the second day of the conference, the focus shifted from media representations and to the discourse of poverty experts. Vivyan C. Adair opened the panel called “Experts” with her own life story. As a single mother living in poverty, Adair managed through education to forge a career in the academy. At the same time, she remains conscious of the highly problematic political implications of her “success story” in an expert culture dominated by ideas of individualism and lean government. Adair presented her project “The Missing Story of Ourselves: Poverty and the Promise of Higher Education,” a combination of photographic portraits and life stories, and reflected
on the project’s goals as well as its conceptual difficulties. In particular, Adair focused on her project as a counter-narrative to the prevailing narrative of poor women as “welfare queens.” Christiane Reinecke moved the discussion to the German context, exploring representations of social inequality in West German sociological studies between 1950 and 1989. Reinecke emphasized how empirical research on social inequality developed in close connection with political discourse. Graphs, lists, and statistics, she argued, have to be understood in the context of shifting political agendas.

In similar terms, Alice O’Connor argued for a multi-layered history of social science and poverty reform, taking the Pittsburgh Survey of 1907/08 as an example. In her analysis of the survey’s goals, O’Connor discovered a form of social investigation that questioned the ideology of capitalism and reframed what had seemed like individual problems as part of larger social questions. In the concluding presentation, the economist Welf Werner looked at the surveys that influence contemporary discussions, arguing for a broader global perspective on poverty policies. Werner explored such concepts as Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach and the development of a “one world” strategy of welfare policies. He also reflected, from his perspective as an economist, on the intricate connections between narratives of poverty and political decision-making processes.

In the concluding discussion, participants weighed options of future cooperation on further and deeper interpretations of the various cultural narratives of poverty. The group agreed on a central issue that had emerged in the course of the discussion: the crucial importance of pictorial, journalistic, even fictional narratives of poverty in a given society’s framing of poverty issues and the necessity to pragmatically explore both the inner workings of these narratives and the way in which they shape public opinion and policy. The group decided to take the results of this conference as the starting point for collaborative projects on cultural and political representations of poverty, both in the United States and Germany.

Christoph Ribbat (University of Paderborn)
BLACK DIASPORA AND GERMANY ACROSS THE CENTURIES

Conference at the GHI, March 19-21, 2009. Conveners: Martin Klimke (GHI), Anne Kuhlmann-Smirnov (University of Bremen), Mischa Honeck (Heidelberg Center for American Studies). Participants: Robbie Aitken (University of Liverpool), Manfred Berg (University of Heidelberg), Allison Blakely (Boston University), David Ciarlo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Maria Diedrich (University of Münster), Jens-Uwe Guettel (Pennsylvania State University), Maria Höhn (Vassar College), Dirk Hoerder (Arizona State University), Jeannette Eileen Jones (University of Nebraska), Paul Kaplan (Purchase College, SUNY), Christian Koller (Bangor University), Kate Lowe (University of London), Peter Martin (Hamburg), Frank Mehring (Free University, Berlin), Stefanie Michels (University of Frankfurt), Bradley Naranch (Stanford University), Anke Ortlepp (GHI), Heike Paul (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Rashid Pegah (Independent scholar), Eva Ulrike Pirker (University of Freiburg), Kendahl Radcliffe (California State University, Fullerton).

“Black Diaspora and Germany Across the Centuries” embarked on the ambitious task of retracing six centuries of mutual perception and contact between German-speaking Europe and blacks of diverse origins (from the Americas, the Caribbean, the Byzantine Empire, Asia, Africa, or Europe). Over the past several years, practitioners of transnational and global history have successfully challenged monolithic concepts of national identity by emphasizing the interconnectedness of various regional developments, no longer treating them as separate entities. One recent area of inquiry that has benefited immensely from this perspective has been research on the intersections of black and German history. While important strides have been made for the twentieth century, however, Afro-German interactions of earlier periods are still comparatively underexplored. To fill this gap, the conference brought together scholars from various disciplines—history, art history, cultural studies, and literature—to map continuities and ruptures in the long history of the African-German encounter from the late Middle Ages to the First World War.

The conference kicked off with a panel interrogating representations of black people in art and social discourse in the Renaissance and early modern periods. Using the Calenberg Altarpiece as his
point of departure, Paul Kaplan demonstrated how religious art used Africans to enunciate a Christian universalism that was less concerned with racial identities than with stressing the inherent unity of a divinely ordained Christian world. Patterns of racial differentiation emerged more forcefully from the eighteenth century onward. As Allison Blakely argued, Kant, Blumenbach, and other German Enlightenment intellectuals proved instrumental in cementing stereotypes of black inferiority by turning them into objects of scientific investigation. In the first of two keynote addresses, Kate Lowe then looked at different ways of imagining, performing, and experiencing blackness in Renaissance Germany. Parallel to the conspicuous presence of blacks as court moors and servants, the staging of blackness for satirical purposes in popular comedy and carnival reflected the identity struggles of a burgeoning German middle class. In his response to Lowe, Dirk Hoerder argued that the terms “moor” and “black” had no fixed meaning but carried various racial, social, and religious connotations which could change over time.

The second day started with Peter Martin addressing theoretical and methodological problems pertaining to early Afro-German history. His deliberations culminated in a call for a more nuanced terminology that would transcend the simplistic black/white dichotomy and capture a greater array of social spaces that blacks occupied in German society across the centuries. Next, Anne Kuhlmann-Smirnov analyzed migration routes as well as the social and geographical dispersion of blacks in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Germany. Presenting statistical evidence that as many black migrants came from the Caribbean and North America as from Africa, Kuhlmann-Smirnov moved away from an African essentialism to espouse a more global understanding of Germany’s place in the Black Diaspora. Rashid Pegah’s talk on real and imagined Africans in eighteenth-century court entertainments highlighted yet another facet of early modern Afro-German interaction: Just as blacks started to figure more prominently in the world of courtly entertainments, deteriorating images of Africa and Asia began to supplant older notions of exoticism and increasingly ascribed inferior status to dark-skinned people.

The next two panels moved forward in time, shifting the focus to literary and scientific representations of blackness in nineteenth-century Germany. Heike Paul focused on German receptions of
black writing, establishing that they rarely connoted an independent black agency. Eva Ulrike Pirker provided a close reading of Theodor Storm to show that the spaces where black figures were allowed to excel were circumscribed by prevalent racial stereotypes of the time. Jens-Uwe Guettel went on to investigate the racist ideas and pro-slavery attitude of the late eighteenth-century Göttingen professor Christof Meiners. Placing his writings in the context of transatlantic slavery, Guettel underscored that, even though blacks were a fringe phenomenon on German streets, Enlightenment scholars intervened vigorously in the transnational debate on the existence of different “races.” Jeannette Jones’s talk on the Heidelberg anatomist Friedrich Tiedemann delved further into the complexities of German Enlightenment culture and its impact on the evolution of anti-black racism. Contrary to Meiners, Tiedemann employed scientific methods to challenge, not bolster, dogmas of racial hierarchy, emerging as a spokesman of abolition in German academia and beyond. Linking German discourses of blackness to transatlantic and global developments, Bradley Naranch argued that competing mid-nineteenth-century images of the Black Diaspora, which stressed either philanthropy or savagery, can only be properly understood if situated in the evolving struggle for a German national identity. In the section’s concluding presentation, Frank Mehring offered a fresh appraisal of the German-American artist Winhold Reiss and his involvement in the Harlem Renaissance. Reiss’s portraits of iconic African Americans, Mehring showed, mirrored his complex transformation from a German immigrant used to seeing the world through a colonial lens to a cosmopolitan artist visualizing “the unfinished business of democracy.”

At the end of the conference’s second day, Maria Diedrich delivered the second keynote speech, on her new research project, which seeks to rescue the individual and collective life stories of the Black Hessians from oblivion. This community consisted of former slaves who had served in the ranks of pro-British German regiments during the Revolutionary War. Faced with a dearth of primary sources, Diedrich made a case for “critical fabulation” (Saidiya Hartman) as a way to reconstruct the circum-Atlantic worlds through which the *Kasseler Mohren* moved, from their African homelands via the slave fields of North America to the domain of Hesse’s Landgrave Wilhelm IX.

The third and last day of the conference featured two panels that addressed Germany’s place in the Black Atlantic during the long
nineteenth century, both of which put a strong emphasis on black agency. Mischa Honeck revisited the European sojourn of the African-American abolitionist and churchman James W. C. Pennington, contending that his idealized depiction of mid-nineteenth-century Germany grew out of his search for an egalitarian, non-racist society. Echoes of a black cosmopolitan mobility also resonated in Stefanie Michel’s talk, which probed the opportunities and limits of two privileged Afro-German families in transit, the Jimenez family from Cuba and the Bells from Cameroon. Kendahl Radcliffe unearthed the story of the Tuskegee Institute’s cotton-production scheme in German Togoland. This effort, while catching the attention of Germans bent on developing methods of scientific agriculture in their colonies, was above all intended to propagate the Tuskegee vision of uplifting the socio-economic status of blacks by means of education. Robbie Aitken then brought the discussion back to the heart of the Hohenzollern Empire when he charted the migration of young Cameroonianians to the German metropole. The migrants’ experience, argued Aitken, was shaped by their status as colonial subjects as well as by imperial policies that sought to restrict and control migrants’ exposure to German society. Imperial Germany’s fascination with colonial Africa was reflected in its burgeoning consumer culture. As David Ciarlo demonstrated, advertisements such as those featuring the Duala leader “King Bell” provided a powerful justification for colonial rule and fixed stereotypes of racial difference. Finally, Christian Koller shared his ideas on German perceptions of African colonial soldiers that enlisted in the French Army between 1859 and the First World War. While most statements had to be read in the context of Franco-German antagonism, Koller identified a common sentiment of whitecivilizational superiority that was prevalent on both sides.

In sum, the conference broke important new ground in the complex, contested, and highly volatile history of Afro-German interaction prior to the twentieth century. Rather than promulgate a linear narrative grounded in static notions of racial difference, it presented the story of Germany’s entanglement in the Black Diaspora as one of many competing strands of discourse and social practice vying for dominance across time and space. Germany’s place in the Black Atlantic might have been marginal in a geographical sense; intellectually and discursively, however, it proved significant for the formation of modern social and national identities. In addition to stimulating and productive exchanges, the conference sparked a
long-term multinational and multidisciplinary collaboration. Tangible fruits of this cooperative endeavor will soon be made available to a larger academic audience and the general public, including a forthcoming publication and a joint online site that will present diverse sources on the Black Diaspora with regard to Germany.

Mischa Honeck (Heidelberg Center for American Studies)
NUCLEAR ARMAMENT, PEACE MOVEMENTS, AND THE SECOND COLD WAR: THE 1979 NATO DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION IN GERMAN-GERMAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Conference at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, March 26-28, 2009. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ), München-Berlin. Conveners: Philipp Gassert (GHI Washington), Tim Geiger (IfZ, München-Berlin), Hermann Wentker (IfZ, München-Berlin). Participants: Helmut Altrichter (University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), Friedhelm Boll (University of Kassel), Coreline Boot (Campus The Hague/University of Leiden), Eckart Conze (University of Marburg), Jost Dülffer (University of Cologne), Beatrice de Graaf (University of Leiden), Ronald Granieri (University of Pennsylvania), Helga Haftendorn (Free University, Berlin), Anja Hanisch (IfZ München-Berlin), Jan Hansen (Humboldt University, Berlin), Helge Heidemeyer (BStU Berlin), Jeffrey Herf (University of Maryland, College Park), Beatrice Heuser (University of Reading), Detlef Junker (University of Heidelberg), Martin Klimke (GHI Washington), Ursula Lehmkuhl (Free University, Berlin), Wilfried Mausbach (University of Heidelberg), Horst Möller (IfZ München-Berlin), Beate Neuss (University of Chemnitz), Leopoldo Nuti (University of Rome), Michael Ploetz (IfZ München-Berlin), Detlef Pollack (University of Münster), Andreas Rödder (University of Mainz), Rolf-Dieter Schnelle (Hertie Foundation), Joachim Scholtyscek (University of Bonn), Klaus Schwabe (RWTH Aachen), Peter Schwarz (University of Bonn), Georges-Henri Soutou (Sorbonne), Kristan Stoddart (University of Southampton), Gerhard Wettig (Kommen).

In this year’s marathon of commemorations, an important milestone in the Cold War unjustly gets overlooked: the NATO Double-Track Decision of December 12, 1979. On that date, NATO decided that in case arms control negotiations with the USSR should fail, the intermediate nuclear forces of the West would be modernized to provide a counterweight to the new Soviet SS-20 missiles. This directly affected international relations as well as domestic developments in European and North American societies. Protests against nuclear armament manifested themselves on a scale hitherto unseen. Protesters organized human chains, sit-ins, and mass demonstrations that ran into the hundreds of thousands. But east of the “Iron Curtain,” as well, the idea of peace moved people.

This conference used the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Double-Track Decision to take a fresh look at the heated debates of
the 1970s and 1980s, which can now be explored with the methods of contemporary history. Based on newly available archival source material and in exchange with contemporary eyewitnesses, historians and political scientists from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States asked to what extent these late Cold War controversies marked a turning point in the history of the post-World War II period. Also, participants asked what the contribution of the controversies over nuclear armament to the overcoming of the East-West conflict had been. Finally, participants explored the not so trivial question what the extraordinary political mobilization of the late 1970s and early 1980s tells us about the concerned societies and cultures. As co-convener Philipp Gassert (GHI) stressed in his opening remarks, the fact that millions were taking to the streets in the early 1980s demands an explanation. Why could the nightmare scenario of a “nuclear Holocaust” grip the human imagination in the early 1980s whereas today barely anyone bothers?

The first panel, chaired by Detlef Junker, focused on the political decision-making processes on the super power level. Michael Ploetz placed the role of nuclear weapons in the long-term context of the Cold War’s ups and downs. According to Ploetz, the Soviet Union’s decision to modernize its intermediate nuclear arms force by stationing SS-20s aimed at revolutionizing diplomatic relations between the two antagonistic blocks. Ploetz also highlighted the fact that it was under Carter and not under Reagan that the United States started to swiftly move away from détente. Klaus Schwabe then carefully traced the Reagan administration’s paradoxical stance on the issues. Reagan, who came into office as a Cold War hawk and was a lukewarm supporter of the Geneva armament reduction talks, changed course during his second administration. He realized that the United States had a massive credibility problem and was losing ground with its NATO allies. According to Gerhard Wettig, the Soviet Union did not share the basic premises of the West that deterrence should prevent a nuclear war. Rather, its strategy aimed at placing the Soviet Union into a position, in which she could survive nuclear war. Wettig also stressed the Soviet world view, in which the West was necessarily aggressive.

A roundtable discussion, chaired and introduced by IfZ Director Horst Möller, then reflected these hotly debated questions through the eyes of contemporary decision makers. Its participants were Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the former Federal Foreign Minister;
Karsten Voigt, the current coordinator for German-American cooperation and a spokesperson on foreign affairs for the SPD faction in the Bundestag at that time; Rainer Eppelmann, a reverend “moved by peace” in East Berlin and the last minister of defense and for disarmament of the GDR; and Antje Vollmer, a former member of the West German peace movement, a member of the first group of Green Party Bundestag deputies, and a former vice president of the Bundestag. Whereas Genscher stressed the key role of West Germany for the Double-Track Decision and portrayed Helmut Schmidt as his “hero”, Voigt underscored the relative lack of importance of foreign policy issues within the SPD – even when in government. At the same time he gave an impression of the sophisticated foreign policy debates that were going on among the experts. Vollmer for her part explained the opposition of the peace movement by a sense of responsibility gleaned from history and Germany’s responsibility for the crimes of World War II. Rainer Eppelmann finally highlighted the relative isolation of the GDR peace movement, which very much reacted to domestic political concerns.

The first half of the following day was devoted to the domestic politics of the two German states. Tim Geiger’s presentation of the Schmidt-Genscher government placed Schmidt’s famous 1977 London address into the long-term context of continued German anxieties over German dependence on U.S. nuclear deterrents. He also stressed that during the armament controversy the Federal Republic fully developed its leadership role within the Western alliance. Andreas Roedder then discussed the politics of the Kohl-Genscher government, with Kohl placing West German loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance at the top of his agenda. As Roedder argued, domestic politics fell in line with international developments, yet the debate also showed that it would have been difficult to repeat that show of strength, when during the end of the decade the issue of short-term nuclear missiles came up. The paper by Friedhelm Boll, with the assistance of Jan Hansen, then explored the inner-party dynamics in the SPD. As Boll argued, the main motives of those within the SPD who dissented from Schmidt’s increasingly marginalized line were the inner cohesion of the party and efforts to re-integrate those who had been lost to the new social movements during the 1970s. Hermann Wentker presented a paper that looked at the role of the GDR, whose foreign policy priorities considerably changed within the context of the rearmament debate. Because the GDR was dependent on West German economic support, the East
German leadership tried to steer a delicate course between ostentative assertion of solidarity with the Soviet Union, while at the same time pursuing a course of improved relations with Bonn.

The first afternoon section then turned from “established politics” to the “anti-establishment” policies of the peace movement in East and West. Moderated by Ursula Lehmkuhl, the first panel explored the transnational nature of peace movements. Martin Klimke demonstrated the close nexus between activists on both sides of the Atlantic (highlighted by the biographies of Petra Kelly and Randall Forsberg) as well as the pan-European interactions. He stressed mutual interests, transatlantic personal and institutional networks as well as similarities in the cultural coping mechanisms of a perceived nuclear Armageddon (which was often communicated through popular culture and movies such as “The Day After” (1983) or Nena’s international hit single “99 Red Balloons” (1983/84)). Helge Heidemeyer drew a balance sheet of the mixed results of East German efforts to influence the West German peace movement. As Heidemeyer concluded, propagandistic efforts of the GDR could only be successful where they fell on fertile ground that had already been prepared by concerns within Western societies. Finally, Detlef Pollack looked at the GDR peace groups “between church and state.” While they did not conform to a Western definition of new social movements, they voiced common grievances in East German society. East German activists could in part draw on West German models and felt legitimized by the peace movements of the West.

The social consequences were the focus of the last panel of the second day, which was chaired by Ronald Granieri. Philipp Gassert placed the debate about nuclear armament within the context of the contemporary discourse on the “crisis of democracy.” As Gassert argued, the impact of the nuclear debate stretched well beyond the immediate political results. It was a vehicle for discussing much more profound issues in Western societies. Anja Hanisch explained the East German peace movement out of its social and political context, while Wilfried Mausbach sketched the structures of the US peace movement, its political strategy, and asked what its impact on Reagan’s “Janus face”–like policies was. As Mausbach concluded, Reagan was in sync with the peace movement because he abhorred nuclear weapons, too, although he certainly was a protagonist of a strong defense and an ardent anti-Communist, too. The panel thus showed that simple oppositions of an establishment prone
to nuclear armament and an anti-establishment bent on pursuing “peace” on any price, does not do justice to a highly complicated historical record.

The final panel looked at debates in various European countries. Georges-Henri Soutou explained the paradoxical French policies, with France being in favor of a continued German integration into NATO, while at the same time not being too much concerned about Soviet intermediate nuclear forces. Soutou also showed that the famous friendship between Schmidt and Giscard was marred by rivalries between the two leaders (with Giscard claiming to be the real father of the Double-Track Decision). Coreline Boot then read a paper by Beatrice de Graaf which dealt with the Netherlands as the one country where the stationing of Western nuclear weapons was never completed. Yet, despite these frequent bouts of “Hollan-ditis,” the Dutch never gave up their strong Atlanticist orientation. Leopoldo Nuti’s paper (read by Hermann Wentker) explained the Italian decision to offer its soil for the stationing of nuclear missiles as the result of a complicated process of interlocking domestic and foreign concerns. The final paper by Beatrice Heuser and Kristan Stoddard offered an “alternative master narrative.” According to Heuser, the threat perceptions of East and West were never compatible and a catastrophic misunderstanding could have been very likely because the West had a completely different understanding of nuclear warfare than the East. Heuser’s paper closed with the harrowing sounds of the title music of the movie “When the Wind Blows” (1986).

The concluding discussion was chaired by Hans-Peter Schwarz and focused on the connection between diplomacy and society and the overall impact and importance of the Double-Track Decision. Helga Haftendorn stressed again the role of Chancellor Schmidt and the crucial steps that had been taken by Carter even before Reagan came along. Helmut Altrichter highlighted the Soviet perception of a West in crisis during the 1970s and discussed the Soviet leadership crisis during the 1980s. Eckart Conze argued that the simple question whether the NATO Double-Track Decision had been a success or not gave short shrift to the larger social and cultural context in which the fears of nuclear Armageddon developed. Otherwise the power of the peace movement could not be explained. Jost Dülffer reminded the audience of what “an absurd age” the global Cold War had been, with whole disciplines devoted to making sense of
a highly complicated gamble. Dülffer also asked how we can account for the enormous cost of the nuclear arms race. Jeffrey Herf underscored the asymmetric nature of the interaction between East and West over the nuclear armament issue. While the Soviet Union did not have to worry about a domestic public, it could try to exploit the open societies of the West to its own advantage. To him, the Double-Track Decision was the most decisive step toward ending the Cold War.

The Berlin conference was memorable for the lively and stimulating exchanges between participants and the audience, which in part was made up of contemporary eyewitnesses. As the first meeting devoted itself to the historicization of the NATO Double-Track Decision, it helped to jumpstart a network of interdisciplinary and crossnational historiographical exchange about the issues concerned, which can be further explored in a webpage that the German Historical Institute has recently set up (www.nuclearcrisis.org).

Philipp Gassert (University of Augsburg)
15TH TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR: GERMAN HISTORY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Seminar at the GHI Washington and Georgetown University, April 29-May 2, 2009. Co-sponsored by the GHI and the BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI). Faculty Mentors: Jürgen Kocka (Free University, Berlin), Helmut Smith (Vanderbilt University), Corinna Treitel (Washington University, St. Louis). Participants: Uta Andrea Balbier (GHI), Tobias Becker (Free University, Berlin), Anthony Cantor (University of Toronto), David Brandon Dennis (Ohio State University), Norman Domeier (European University Institute), Steven Chase Gummer (Georgetown University), Jason D. Hansen (University of Illinois), Jasper Heinzen (Darwin College, University of Cambridge), Angelika Hoelger (Johns Hopkins University), Theo Jung (University of Bielefeld), Daniel J. Koecher (University of Chicago), Kerstin von der Krone (University of Erfurt), Yair Mintzker (Stanford University), Alexandra Ortmann (University of Göttingen), Daniel Reupke (University of the Saarland), Adam Rosenbaum (Emory University), Corinna Unger (GHI), Stefan Wünsch (Humboldt University, Berlin).

The 15th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar brought together sixteen doctoral students from North America and Europe who are writing their dissertations on topics in nineteenth-century German history. All the students submitted papers drawing on their dissertation projects, which were precirculated ahead of time so that the seminar could be fully devoted to comments and discussion among the doctoral students and faculty mentors. The participants asked hard questions of one another, but did so in a spirit of constructive criticism and collegiality, which made the seminar an enjoyable and rewarding experience.

The first panel was devoted to two papers that examined the spatial dimension of nineteenth-century German history and nation-building. In his paper on the “The Defortification of the German City, 1689-1866,” Yair Mintzker examined defortification as a significant moment in the history of German cities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Defortification, he argued, signaled a fundamental transformation of the urban environment on three interrelated levels: the city’s ability to defend itself militarily, public security within the city, and the way burghers and foreigners imagined and
defined the city. Moving from the unmaking of boundaries in urban topography to the making of boundaries in national cartography, Jason Hansen’s paper “Mapping Germans: Statistics and Cartography as Languages of a Personalized Nation” examined the use of maps and statistical tables in the second half of the nineteenth century. According to Hansen, statistics and cartography served as vehicles for creating images of the nation as a cultural body, thus counteracting economic and political forces that shaped national identity around the state. In particular, Hansen argued that in the last third of the nineteenth century the notion of the Sprachgrenze (language frontier) was transformed. Whereas it had previously been understood as something over which humans exerted little control, it now came to be conceived as a battleground among nationalities that could be aggressively pushed forward through assimilation or resettlement. The ensuing discussion debated the merits of the “spatial turn” and explored levels of analysis above and below the nation: the local causes of and responses to the demolition of city walls and the transnational dimension of cartography and statistics.

The second panel brought together two papers on different aspects of early and mid-nineteenth-century intellectual and cultural history. Theo Jung’s paper “Signs of Decadence: Semantic Studies on the Emergence of Cultural Criticism in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries” applied the methods of discourse analysis to examine the wave of cultural reflections (Kulturkritik) produced by the French Revolution and its aftermath. According to Jung, the concept of Zeitgeist played a central role in these reflections and quickly took on political significance. Though this spiritualizing interpretation of history was heavily criticized, by the end of the 1820s it was well established. Changing focus from discourse to institutions, Anthony Cantor’s paper “Our Conservatories? Local, Regional, and National Conceptions of German Music Education, 1843-1933” explored the role that German conservatories played in creating or strengthening local, regional, and national identities. The conservatories, Cantor argued, were focal points for prestige and power and served as laboratories for the internalization of claims of loyalty and identity. The discussion of Jung’s paper probed the differences between discourse analysis and Begriffsgeschichte, and the relationship of both to historical context and social history. The discussion of Cantor’s project concentrated on how national identity or gender issues manifested themselves in the world of
music and whether it made sense to widen the focus beyond nation and gender.

The world of theater and popular entertainment was the subject of the third panel. In her paper “Pleasures in an Age of Policing: Taverns, Leisure, and Entertainment in Berlin, 1830-1869,” Angelika Hoelger analyzed the role of taverns as sites of leisure and entertainment for Berlin’s lower classes as well as the policing of such establishments. In nineteenth-century Berlin, Hoelger concluded, both leisure and policing were intrinsically tied to class affiliation and to discourses on the so-called dangerous classes. Chronologically picking up almost exactly where Hoelger left off, Tobias Becker’s paper “Inszenierte Moderne: Populäres Theater in Berlin und London, 1880-1930” focused on the connections between popular theater and department stores in Berlin and London around 1900. Already around the turn of the century, he contended, popular entertainment was commercialized and closely intertwined with the economy, so that the advent of mass consumption applied not only to material goods but also to entertainment. The discussion that followed revolved around how to combine cultural and social history, the role of class in popular culture and its policing, and how to assess the effectiveness of policing.

Moving from entertainment to religion, the fourth panel featured papers on Jewish and Protestant history. Kerstin von der Krone’s paper “Wissenschaft in Öffentlichkeit: Modernisierungsdiskurse in der Publizistik der Wissenschaft des Judentums” examined the origins of the Wissenschaft des Judentums as a major intellectual movement of German Judaism in the first half of the nineteenth century through the lens of its scholarly periodicals. Focusing on how Jewish scholars adapted the tools of the press to create a public scholarly discourse, von der Krone explored the debates about what the central subject of a Wissenschaft des Judentums ought to be as well as the failed attempts to establish the field at a German university and the eventual founding of a Jewish Theological Seminary in Breslau in 1854. In the panel’s second paper, “The Wilhelmine Conversion Story: Time, Space, Community and the New Evangelical Subjectivity, 1885-1905,” Daniel Koehler analyzed the conversion stories that circulated among awakened Protestant communities in the Kaiserreich, primarily those from the generation born 1860-1880, who came of age around the turn of the century. With their treatment of motifs like style, speed, and temporality,
these conversion stories projected a newly awakened subject that was at ease with the world of fin-de-siècle urban life. This analysis, Koehler argued, not only helps to explain the success of revivalism in the Empire, but illustrates the dependence of that project upon the distinct modernity of the Wilhelmine period. The ensuing discussion included questions about Catholicism as an absent but perhaps fruitful reference point for both papers, definitions of Öffentlichkeit, and the extent to which Koehler’s conversion stories were part of a broader phenomenon of contemporaries searching for meaning in a period of rapid change.

The fifth panel explored the connections between nineteenth-century cultural and economic history from two different perspectives. Daniel Reupke’s paper “Die Grenzen des Kredits” applied the methods of historical network analysis to examine the mechanics of lending in three rural towns located in the Saar-Lor-Lux (Saarland, Lorraine, Luxembourg) border region. Using notarized debt certificates to construct a database spanning the whole of the nineteenth century, Reupke’s project seeks to reconstruct the networks within which all lending took place in an age before bank loans became available. Among other things, his preliminary findings suggest that these networks and their lending activities regularly crossed the state boundaries between the Saarland, France, and Luxembourg. Adam T. Rosenbaum’s paper “The Rise of Tourism and the Re-Mapping of Bavaria: Bad Reichenhall and the Struggle for Life, 1900–1920” examined early twentieth-century tourism in Bad Reichenhall, focusing on how the Upper Bavarian spa town was marketed via nature, modernity, and cosmopolitanism. Rosenbaum also showed how the First World War cut the city’s tourism industry off from its international clientele, as the spas were converted into sick bays for German soldiers. To some extent, the discussions of the two papers mirrored one another. Just as participants wondered how Reupke’s economic history might be supplemented by social and cultural history (by exploring the sociocultural aspects of his networks), they discussed how Rosenbaum’s cultural history might integrate social and economic history (by examining the socio-economic aspects of tourism).

The sixth panel brought together two papers on the imaginary boundaries (both internal and external) of Germanness in the Kaiserreich. In his paper “Ex-Servicemen’s Associations and Prussian State-Building in the Province of Hanover, 1866–1914,” Jasper Heinzen presented
a case study of the incorporation of new areas into German territorial states. In the case of Hanover’s incorporation into Prussia, he argued, a careful balance between top-down indoctrination and creative appropriation of military patriotism by ex-servicemen changed Hanoverian self-perception, thus transforming Prusso-Hanoverian kinship from an “imagined” to a “lived community.” David Brandon Dennis’s paper “Deserteurs, Syphilitic Sailors, and Prodigal Sons: Transnational Masculinities and the Foreign Port City” examined how Wilhelmine authorities interpreted merchant mariners’ experiences abroad via three transnational masculinities—that of the deserteur, syphilitic sailor, and prodigal son. These masculine counternotypes, Dennis argued, were structured around transgressions involving the crossing of national boundaries and served to uphold the goals of Weltpolitik even as they constructed a gendered line between nation and “overseas.” The panel prompted a vigorous debate on identity and gender as categories of historical analysis, and on the merits and problems of continuing to focus on national identity in writing nineteenth-century German history.

The seventh panel was dedicated to sex and crime. Alexandra Ortmann’s paper “Die Multiperspektivität juristischer Texte um 1900: Mehr als nur Quellenkritik” showed that judges had considerably more discretion in interpreting Imperial Germany’s code of criminal procedure (Reichsstrafprozessordnung) of 1879 than has often been assumed. After examining how differing interpretations of criminal procedure were related to contemporary debates on juridical methods and on substantive (as opposed to procedural) criminal law reform, Ortmann concluded that the interpretive leeway regarding procedure made it possible for some judges to conduct criminal trials in ways that came close to the old “inquisitorial” model rather than the reformed “adversarial” one. Stefan Wünsch’s paper “Heinrich Dreuw und die moderne Prostituiertenkontrolle” provided an analysis of a medical text by the physician Dr. Dreuw, who conducted medical examinations of prostitutes for the Berlin police. Wünsch focused on how the text produced gender difference. After relating Dreuw’s treatise to other texts as part of a larger discursive network, Wünsch concluded that it revealed more about the author’s fragile masculinity than about prostitution. The ensuing discussion centered on questions of context: for instance, whether differences over criminal procedure can be related to party-political positions, and, more generally, the question to what extent a textual analysis like Wünsch’s needs to be embedded in a historical context.
Different aspects of the political history of the Kaiserreich were the subject of the eighth and final panel. In his paper “Im ‘Reich der Gottesfürcht und frommen Sitte’: Der Eulenburg-Skandal als moralischer Skandal,” Norman Domeier examined reactions to the Eulenburg affair, which involved allegations of homosexual conduct among members of Kaiser Wilhelm’s entourage. When the foreign press reacted to the scandal by demolishing German pretensions to moral superiority, this foreign criticism failed to create a united patriotic response among Germans. Instead, the Eulenburg scandal polarized Wilhelmine society into two hostile camps. This polarizing effect, Domeier argued, marked the Eulenburg affair as a “moral scandal,” as opposed to a mere “political scandal,” which unites a society. In his paper, “Oriental Sympathies, Occidental Rebellions: German Turcophilism and the Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1875-1914,” Steven Chase Gummer investigated German public discourse and news reporting on the Great Eastern Crisis, especially the reception of religious violence between Christians and Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, arguing that the contours of the German debate were influenced by the ideology of the Kulturkampf.

The discussion of the papers included questions about the distinction between “public opinion” and “published opinion,” the extent to which parts of the Kaiserreich’s press functioned as a medium of state propaganda, comparisons between the Eulenburg and Dreyfus affairs, and the effect of the Eulenburg scandal on attitudes toward homo- and heterosexuality.

Vigorous debate in a collegial atmosphere made this seminar an extraordinary intellectual experience. The concluding discussion reflected on the predominance of cultural history—in the broad sense of the word—at the seminar, in both the North American and European dissertation projects. While some noted that the search for meaning had certainly not replaced the search for explanations (and, in that sense, a narrower conception of cultural history had not prevailed), others expressed concern that, even so, the cultural-history slant of most projects neglected social history and the role of class in particular. Others disagreed, arguing that most of the dissertation projects were supplementing their cultural-history focus with social history. Everyone agreed that virtually all of the presenters responded positively to suggestions to strengthen social-history aspects of their projects. Other critical observations called attention to the absence of master narratives in the projects as well as the discussions, and also expressed concern that most of the cultural
history being written lacked political relevance. In response, one of the conveners noted that while the political relevance of social-historical work focusing on social inequalities was more salient, the fact that topics such as the history of music education, popular entertainment, tourism, merchant sailors, criminal trials, prostitution, and a sex scandal were now regarded as legitimate topics of historical research was also of political significance.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
JUNIOR SCHOLARS CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF GERMAN-JEWISH HISTORY

Conference at the GHI, May 21-22, 2009. Co-organized by the Wissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft des Leo Baeck Instituts in Deutschland, the Institute of European Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and the German Historical Institute, Washington, D.C. Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Michael Brenner (University of Munich), John Efron (University of California, Berkeley), Marion Kaplan (New York University), Michael Meyer (Leo Baeck Institute, Cincinnati). Participants: Amos Bitzan (University of California, Berkeley), Philipp Graf (Leipzig), Laura Jockusch (Ben Gurion University, Be’er Sheva), Alexander (Ari) Joskowicz (Vanderbilt University), Emily Levine (Yale University), Miriam Rürup (University of Göttingen), Daniel Schwartz (George Washington University), Kate Sorrels (University of Pittsburgh), Mirjam Triendi-Zadoff (University of Munich), Rebekka Voß (Harvard University / University of Düsseldorf).

The conference brought together a transatlantic group of young scholars and senior faculty members in the field of German-Jewish history from North America, Israel, and Germany. Its goal was to assess the state of the field and to discuss possible future directions through presentations of the attendees’ recent projects and historiographical discussions. After introductions by Hartmut Berghoff and Michael Brenner, the conference began with reflections by Marion Kaplan and John Efron about the changes and continuities they have witnessed in the study of German-Jewish history over the past three decades.

Kaplan spoke about the ways in which Alltagsgeschichte, the history of daily life, has transformed the study of German-Jewish history. Kaplan suggested that Alltagsgeschichte encouraged the inclusion of previously marginalized historical actors, such as women, and also shifted the focus away from legal and political milestones, which had once loomed large in histories of German-Jewish emancipation, toward their much more gradual effects on ordinary people. Kaplan also spoke about her latest work on German-Jewish refugees to the Dominican Republic as a transnational history of daily life. Subsequent presenters took up both the notion of transnational history and an approach rooted in the study of daily life.

In his address, Efron commented on the increasing diversity of the pool of scholars writing about the history of German Jewry.
While German-Jewish émigrés dominated the field in the decades immediately following the Second World War, today, the history of German Jewry attracts Jewish and non-Jewish scholars with no familial connections to German Jews. The Junior Scholars Conference, which included participants from the current centers of German-Jewish history, reflected this trend. At the same time, the conference provided an opportunity for this younger generation of scholars to hear from Michael Meyer, a founding figure in the field. In his talk, Meyer conveyed the perspective of that earlier generation of scholars, composed mainly of German-Jewish refugees from the Nazis, like himself. In his autobiographical reflections, Meyer outlined some of the challenges that historians of German Jewry faced in his day, when there were few institutions and frameworks in the academy that supported this field.

In their presentations and in the discussions surrounding them, the junior scholars at the conference ranged chronologically from the early modern period to the postwar years, and methodologically across several disciplines. The first day featured four clusters: “Medieval and Early Modern Influences on Modern German Jewry,” “Intellectual and Cultural History,” “Jewish Responses to Anti-Semitism and Anti-Clericalism,” and “German and East European Jews.”

The first session began with Rebekka Voß’s talk on sixteenth-century Jewish apocalyptic thought. Sketching a world radically different from that of twentieth-century Jewish life, Voß focused on Jewish-Christian polemics about the Messianic Age. Her use of Yiddish sources in addition to Latin and Hebrew literature sparked a discussion about distinctions between “popular” and “high” culture. Voß presented her project as a contribution both to early modern German-Jewish history, still understudied, and an attempt to better understand the religious atmosphere of sixteenth-century Germany. Daniel Schwartz’s presentation then connected the early modern period to nineteenth-century German-Jewish intellectual and cultural history. His talk discussed the “rehabilitation” of Spinoza as a Jewish figure by German-Jewish writers beginning in the early 1800s. He observed that the reception of Spinoza among German Jews was bound up with the reception of the eighteenth-century thinker Moses Mendelssohn. Both of them emerged as icons of German-Jewish modernity, and Schwartz conceived of his work as a genealogy of modern Jewish identity.
In the second session, Emily Levine and Miriam Rürup presented their respective attempts to find “new contexts” for German-Jewish intellectual and cultural history. Levine used her work on Aby Warburg and Ernst Cassirer in the city of Hamburg as an entry to intellectual histories situated around particular urban spaces as well as family and friendship networks. Levine’s presentation also addressed the question of the “Jewishness” or “Germanness” of her subjects. Such questions of identity also animated Rürup’s talk about Jewish student fraternities and her preview of a future project on voluntary statelessness. Both speakers reflected on the contours of the field, asking about the boundaries separating Jewish, German, European, and other possible histories.

The transnational thread continued in the third session with presentations by Ari Joskowicz and Katherine Sorrels. Joskowicz used his work about interactions among French and German Jews involved in anti-clerical causes to argue for a reconceptualization of transnational history. He suggested that the historical actors in such histories do not need to have transnational identities. The modifier “transnational” should rather be understood as describing interactions among subjects and, more importantly, the historian’s approach to the past (comparative, spanning multiple national contexts). Joskowicz also used this opportunity to dispute characterizations of Jews as “subaltern” or “post-colonial” subjects. Sorrels’s presentation sought to highlight the transnational, European identities of Jewish writers in Central Europe from the late nineteenth century to the Cold War period.

The fourth session attempted to expand the (perceived) boundaries of German-Jewish historiography by tackling the question of relations among German and East European Jews. Amos Bitzan took the case of a Galician-Jewish officer who served in the Habsburg army during the First World War as a paradigmatic example in his talk. The officer represented East European Jews who could pass as “German Jews” but who still retained East European-Jewish allegiances. Bitzan asked how such personalities might be integrated into the more familiar narrative of German Jews encountering an East European Jewish other. Phillip Graf also sought to unbalance the particularly “German” narrative of German-Jewish history in his presentation. His talk centered around the 1933 “Bernheim” petition, in which the Paris-based Comité des Délégations Juives filed a complaint about the treatment of German Jews in Upper
Silesia by the Nazi government with the League of Nations. Graf pushed for an understanding of the German-Jewish condition as transnational and diasporic. He suggested that the case of the Jews of Upper Silesia, a peripheral community on Germany’s frontier, and the (at least temporarily) successful intervention on their behalf by outside players might lead us to correct our reading of the Jews of Germany as homogeneously German.

The presentations concluded with talks by Mirjam Triendl-Zadoff and Laura Jockusch. Triendl-Zadoff presented a rich family history that explored the German-Jewish identity of the socialist Werner Scholem, interweaving the stories of his wife Emmy Wiechelt, a worker and SPD activist, and of his more famous brother, Gershom (Gerhard), who emigrated to Palestine and became a pioneering scholar of Jewish mysticism. The linked lives of the Scholems and Werner and Emmy’s daughters, Triendl-Zadoff concluded, convey a very different German-Jewish experience than the familiar biography of Gershom Scholem does when read alone.

Laura Jockusch’s presentation switched gears to the post-World War II period. She outlined how the “surviving remnant” of Jewish Holocaust survivors, many of them living in displaced person camps in Germany immediately after the war, imagined post-Holocaust justice, participated on the margins of the Allies’ war crimes tribunals, and sought justice in alternative Jewish proceedings. Jockusch acknowledged that, in her account of postwar “German-Jewish history,” the modifier “German” ought to be understood primarily as a geographic designation. Like Graf, she asked how her work might fit into the field of German-Jewish history.

The conference closed with an open roundtable discussion among the participants. In summarizing the changes in the field, Meyer referred to a list of four things that the conference did not include: histories of particular German-Jewish communities, accounts of central communal institutions, narratives about particularly prominent German-Jewish personalities, and frameworks such as acculturation or assimilation. The absences seem to testify to the expansion of the field and of junior scholars’ immersion in the questions and methodologies driving research across the humanities and the social sciences.

Amos Bitzan (University of California, Berkeley)
A WORLD OF POPULATIONS: TWENTIETH-CENTURY DEMOGRAPHIC DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Workshop at the GHI, May 29-30, 2009. Conveners: Corinna R. Unger (GHI Washington) and Heinrich Hartmann (Free University of Berlin/University of Cologne). Made possible with support of the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung. Participants: Per Axelsson (Umeå University), Uta Andrea Balbier (GHI Washington), Annika Berg (Uppsala University), Sandrine Bertaux (Marmara University, Istanbul), Matthew Connelly (Columbia University), Patricia Deuser (University of Leipzig), Josef Ehmer (University of Vienna), Marc Frey (Jacobs University, Bremen), Larry Frohman (SUNY Stony Brook), Young-sun Hong (SUNY Stony Brook), Ian Innerhofer (University of Vienna), Eric Limbach (Michigan State University), Raul Necochea (McGill University, Montreal), Jesse Olszynko-Gryn (McGill University, Montreal), Thomas Robertson (Worcester Polytechnic Institute), Eric Ross (George Washington University), Paul Schor (University of Paris, Diderot), Thomas Schulte-Umberg (University of Münster), Patrick Sharma (UCLA), Eva-Maria Silies (University of Hamburg), Oscar Edoror Ubhenin (Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma), Susan Watkins (UCLA), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington), Peter Xenos (University of Hawaii, Manoa).

The conveners inaugurated this workshop with the observation that the history of demography has been revitalized by recent scholarship, especially Matthew Connelly’s exciting book Fatal Misconception (2008). Scholars on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly engaged with the historical roles of demographers and the legacies of colonialism. Although the politicization of population is well documented, the aim of this workshop was not to demonize the experts or unmask a hegemonic conspiracy. Rather, the task at hand was to confront the messy realities of population policies and programs in action “from international conference rooms to remote villages.”

The first panel, “Discourses and Perspectives,” began with Thomas Schulte-Umberg’s paper on the case of Hermann Muckermann (1877–1962), a Catholic priest, scientist, and influential proponent of eugenics in Germany. Schulte-Umberg discussed Muckermann’s curious relationship to hereditary biology, eugenic sterilization, and German Catholicism after the papal encyclical “Casti connubii,” and presented Muckermann as an example of Catholics’ attempts
to come to terms with modernity. Ian Innerhofer discussed the concept of “agricultural overpopulation” in Southeastern Europe in the 1930s. Innerhofer argued that, in the context of the quasi-colonial German-led modernization of Balkan agriculture, demographic experts made themselves indispensable by reducing all issues to population. “Agricultural overpopulation” thereby “misnamed” a variety of grievances and inequities. Eric Limbach discussed public policy debates in 1950s West Germany on the migration of refugees from the “underpopulated” East to the “overcrowded” West. He focused on the influential roles of Eugene Kulischer (1891-1956) and Gunther Beijer (1904-1983) on postwar migration studies.

Joseph Ehmer provided helpful comments on the “peculiarities” of German historiography on demography, wherein a sophisticated discourse about demography grew out of an interest in the politics of population under National Socialism. Newer research is increasingly international in scope, as the panel reflected. Ehmer suggested that an explicitly biographical approach might be usefully applied to individual experts. The discussion turned to the applicability of Ludwik Fleck’s concept of a Denkkollektiv (thought collective) to the international network of demographers and the transfer of their ideas across national borders. The complementary approaches to individuals and their social networks remained a leitmotif throughout the workshop.

The panel continued with Sandrine Bertaux’s paper on Alfred Sauvy (1898-1990) and the unexpected origins of the “Third World” concept. Sauvy coined the iconic term in 1952, but it rapidly escaped his control. Bertaux argued that in contrast to its Cold War reception, the origins of the concept of the “Third World” were closely linked to French fascism. Population, poverty, and the fraught relationship between Algeria and the rest of France were all bound up in Sauvy’s conception of the “Third World.” Patricia Deuser discussed the colonial roots of the concept of “Sexual Reproductive Health and Rights” (SRHR) in German development programs. She explored the genealogy of ideas about women’s health from liberal colonial reforms in the wake of the Herero massacres to crypto-Malthusianism after the Cairo consensus (1994) and Peruvian sterilization programs (1999). Using Michel Foucault’s concept of “biopolitics,” Deuser argued that the liberal reform agenda tied human rights to the logic of economic optimization. Peter Xenos’s paper on the longue durée of demographic change in Southeast Asia provided a critical view from within historical demography and area studies.
Xenos described the changing realities and representations of Southeast Asian social structure from the myth of emptiness to feedback mechanisms. He argued that, aside from a short, sharp fertility transition, migration was the key regulatory force driving population dynamics in Southeast Asia. Commenting on this panel, Marc Frey identified the unifying theme of long-term continuity. The ensuing discussion dealt with some of the methodological issues raised by the alleged continuities of such overarching concepts as colonialism, fascism, and even the very idea of “Southeast Asia.”

The second panel, “Methods and Institutions,” covered the fraught category of race in the context of census-taking in Peru and Sweden. Focusing on the Peruvian demographer and politician Alberto Arca Parró (1901-1976), Raul Necochea described how “demographic optimism” was built into Peru’s national census of 1940. Necochea applied Benedict Anderson’s concept of the “imagined community” to the political project of forging a sense of national unity out of the technical category of mestizo. To this day, Peruvian politicians bank on their “racial impurity” as a matter of “self-presentation.” Per Axelsson discussed the curiously “abandoned construction” of ethnic categories in Swedish population statistics. He described the strange case of the “Sami category,” which dates back to the Tabellverket (national population statistics) of the early nineteenth century but was dropped after the Second World War in the name of “equality.” The upshot is that systematic information about Sami health and welfare is no longer being generated, a situation the UN has recently criticized. Based on his own research on the U.S. census, Paul Schor’s comments focused on the interplay between statistical categories for “minorities” and state building. The discussion turned to the “Big Question of Race,” social constructivism versus positivism vis-à-vis counting people, and the slippery term “indigenous.”

The workshop reconvened the next day to continue with the second half of the panel, beginning with Oscar Ubhenin’s paper on “demographic experiments” in post-independence Nigeria. Enumerating and categorizing Nigerians has been a politically contentious task ever since the first national census of 1963. Although race and ethnicity were dropped from the most recent national census, counting people in Nigeria remains as politicized as ever, as evinced by the fact that Lagos conducted its own parallel census in 2006. Patrick Sharma discussed the lifecycle of population control at Robert
McNamara’s World Bank. Sharma was struck by the failure of a population program to take root at the bank, despite McNamara’s evident demographic zeal. Although McNamara wielded considerable political clout, he was effectively resisted by the bank. Sharma’s study highlighted the need for more institutional histories. Heinrich Hartmann’s comments were informed by his own research on demography’s prominence in the modern welfare-state apparatus. He observed that most of the conference papers where not explicitly postcolonial and reiterated the importance of dealing with demographic expertise at both the individual and institutional level.

The third panel, “Demography in Practice,” began with Annika Berg’s paper on a Swedish family-planning project in Travancore-Cochin in the 1950s, focusing on the work of a prominent husband-and-wife team, Axel and Signe Höjer. She traced Swedish state interference in the intimate lives of individuals at home and abroad through technologies of birth control from the rhythm method to mass sterilization. She warned, however, of diagnosing continuities too readily: “The history behind the sterilization campaigns is complex” and cannot be reduced to “the West” imposing technology on “the rest.” Thomas Robertson discussed population programs in Nepal in the 1960s and 1970s. His project, which involves interview-based fieldwork, situates population programs at the village level in the broader environmental history of Nepal. Robertson, who wants to get at population practices on the ground, has so far come away with the preliminary impression that population control was a “mixed bag”; programs brought in services, but they also led to coercion and unintended consequences. Eva-Maria Silies presented her paper on the birth control pill and “overpopulation” in 1960s West Germany. She described how organizations such as “Pro Família” appropriated the birth control pill (Antibabypille) differently in Western Europe and in the “Third World.” In West Germany, medical experts debated the contested social function of the pill at home and its utility for population control overseas.

Eric Ross and Corinna Unger jointly commented on this panel. Ross formulated a broad critique of the workshop based on what he diagnosed as a theoretical gap in the population literature that, in his opinion, has widened since the appearance of Mahmood Mamdani’s classic case study, The Myth of Population Control (1972). In particular, Ross expressed concern that in-depth studies focusing on “technical” aspects like the transfer of knowledge and individual
actors obscure the “big picture.” He argued that India should be situated in the context of the perennial resurgence of Malthusianism whenever capitalism is in crisis, and that population policies in India were, along with the Green Revolution, primarily aimed at “liquidating the peasantry.” Corinna Unger offered a contrasting evaluation informed by different schools of historiography. Reexamining the “big picture,” Unger observed that the newly prominent global perspective could help us reevaluate the role of the Cold War and move beyond the conflict’s rhetoric in studying population politics. As scholars have been paying more attention to activities in such “peripheral” places as Sweden and Nepal, they have been finding out that experts, like their projects, are a “mixed bag,” and that it is difficult to measure the intended and unintended consequences of their ideas and actions “in the field.” In the lively debate that followed, Matthew Connelly observed that, when it comes to digging around in the so-called population archive, no single theory is sufficient.

The workshop closed with some final comments by Matthew Connelly, Susan Watkins, and Josef Ehmer. Connelly confessed that when he first started working on population, he found it to be rather “depressing.” However, in light of recent scholarship, population is rapidly turning into an “exciting” field with lots of potential. In his estimation, the raison d’être of the workshop was that “we think this history matters,” and one of the participants’ main objectives should be to go beyond population-planning success stories and recover the “less-than-usable past.” In turn, Watkins observed that the stories about Nepal and Nigeria are very similar to the experiences of other developing countries between the 1960s and 1980s. She suggested that scholars familiarize themselves with the “standard choreography” of population planning and then try to find out what is distinctive about individual cases. Watkins was struck by the “hubris” of the idea that sex in the “Third World” could be planned “from a tall building in the center of New York.” She emphatically agreed with Connelly that there is “enormous potential” for scholars to historicize key individuals, institutions, and social networks. Watkins left the participants with the message that there are striking parallels between the choreographies of the population and the AIDS movement, which will soon be history. Last but not least, Ehmer’s assessment of the workshop was that it had taken a big step towards painting a more differentiated picture of population. He identified a master narrative with a discriminatory
agenda on the one hand, and discriminating practices and technologies on the other. These two different layers involve different sets of actors, spaces, elites, and targets. In terms of moving beyond the elites, Ehmer suggested that scholars pay more attention to the schoolteachers and journalists who popularized population in textbooks and newspapers. Returning to the peculiarities of German historiography, he pointed out that recent studies on National Socialist population pedagogy are a good place to start. Finally, Ehmer called attention to the analytical potential of “business cycles” in the population discourse. Did demographers lead or follow the ebb and flow of population in the public sphere? Ehmer surely spoke for all participants when he highlighted the value of having people from diverse parts of the world participate in this workshop. It was truly a global workshop in more than one way.

Jesse Olszynko-Gryn (McGill University)
GLOBAL CHALLENGE AND REGIONAL RESPONSE: EARLY-TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORTHEAST CHINA’S ENCOUNTERS WITH THE WORLD

Conference at Heilongjiang University, Harbin, China, June 17–20, 2009. Conveners: Dan Ben-Canaan (Heilongjiang University, Harbin), Frank Grüner (University of Heidelberg), Ines Prodöhl (GHI). Participants: Tomoko Akami (National University, Canberra), Olga Bakich (University of Toronto), Chen Ziguang (Harbin), Mark Gamsa (Tel Aviv University), Madeleine Herren (University of Heidelberg), Susanne Hohler (University of Heidelberg), Rotem Kowner (University of Haifa), Alena Kozlova (Memorial, Moscow), Thomas Lahusen (University of Toronto), Li Shuhua (Journal of Far East Economic Trade, Harbin), Heinz-Dietrich Löwe (University of Heidelberg), Rudolph Ng (University of Heidelberg), Yoshiya Makita (Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo / Boston University), Karl Schlögel (University of Frankfurt/Oder), Shu Zhan (Minorities and Religious Affairs Office at the Heilongjiang People’s Congress), Norman Smith (University of Guelph, Ontario), Christian Stoertz (University of Heidelberg), Su Ling (Southern Weekly, Guangzhou), Mariko Tamanai (University of California, Los Angeles), Sören Urbansky (University of Frankfurt/Oder), Victor Zatsepine (University of Hong Kong), Yin Tiechao (Heilongjiang University, Harbin), Yuan Xin (University of Heidelberg).

Northeast China, known to the Western world as Manchuria, became the focus of global attention in the early twentieth century, when Japanese and Russian imperialism struggled for hegemony over a region that had become increasingly important as a crossroads for trade between Asia, Europe, and North America. Manchuria itself was rapidly transformed by the construction of major railways, massive migration, and the often strife-ridden exploitation of its rich mineral and agricultural resources by Russia, Japan, the United States, and other countries. The conference focused on Manchuria as an example of “glocalization” – a phenomenon in which global and local interests converge. The organizers aimed to encourage methodological approaches that do not rely on ethnic, cultural, or national narratives but combine theories of transculturality with empirical research. The conference, in combination with a summer school, brought together scholars and students from various countries and disciplines to achieve a more complete picture of the dynamic and complex interactions that shaped the history of Manchuria.
Olga Bakich delivered the opening lecture on “Changing Identities: Harbin Censuses.” Looking at Harbin’s censuses and population estimates, she analyzed how the nationality and citizenship of Harbin’s multi-national residents were identified during the four major periods of Harbin’s history as a multicultural place: (1) the period before the Russian Revolution, (2) the years 1918-1931, which were marked by a significant influx of Russian émigrés as well as China’s assertions of sovereignty, (3) the Manchukuo period, and (4) the postwar decades. Bakich revealed how demographics were affected by geographical factors and political considerations.

The first panel was devoted to “Imperialism and National Aspirations in Northeast China.” In his talk on “The Russo-Japanese War and Northeast China: Global and Local Perspectives,” Rotem Kowner examined the different strategic goals of Russia and Japan on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War and the war’s perceived outcome by looking at short-term and long-term geopolitical achievements. In the next paper, Christian Störtz focused on the “Global Impacts” of the Russo-Japanese War, the first war against an Asian country that was lost by a European power. Störtz identified a multitude of processes at the regional, national, supranational, and global political levels, such as (anti-)colonialism and the emergence of national movements in the colonies. Rudolph Ng’s presentation “Yuandongbao: A Chinese or Russian Newspaper?” looked at the impact of ownership on Harbin’s first modern Chinese newspaper. Although the Russian-owned Chinese Eastern Railway financed the paper, the editorial staff remained entirely Chinese and was free to publish sinophile and anti-Russian news articles. Hence, the newspaper was not just a Russian propaganda instrument in Manchuria. Victor Zatsepine’s paper “Surveying Manchuria: Imperial Russia’s Topographers at Work” investigated the process of collecting knowledge about the conditions of the region. Although geographic expeditions to Manchuria were wide-ranging, maps of Manchuria remained inaccurate for decades due to a lack of knowledge of Chinese and local languages, as well as other obstacles. The ensuing discussion focused on the question of the impact of the global on the local. How did Russian topographical and mental maps influence the local population? To what extent did the Russian-owned Yuandongbao affect the minds of Chinese in Harbin?

The second panel dealt with different aspects of economy and trade. In his talk “When the Ruble Rolled: Currency and Money Exchange
Business as Part of Daily Life in Northeast China,” Frank Grüner examined the effects of multiple currencies at the regional and local levels and how various social and national population groups handled these circumstances. In his presentation “Is there a border? Smugglers and their Protonational and Transcultural Identities,” Sören Urbansky suggested a new approach to smuggling along the Sino-Russian border, which is of interest to historians not only in economic terms. He argued that smugglers’ careers can teach us a great deal about transcultural identities and interethnic contacts in border regions. Ines Prodöhl’s presentation “A Miracle Bean: How Soy Conquered the West, 1905–1945” analyzed the history of soy cultivation. She described the emergence of the United States as the main producer of this valuable commodity, overtaking China’s Northeast in the 1940s. She examined the increasing demand for soybeans and its effects on both Northeast China and the U.S. The subsequent discussion treated characteristics of transcultural identities and the ordinariness of chaos. Identities of people living in protonational societies are difficult to define retrospectively. Certain types of chaos—such as the existence of multiple currencies—can also be interpreted as a means of stabilizing a fragmented society.

The third panel looked into different “Aspects of Modernity in Manchukuo.” Examining media and propaganda policy, Tomoko Akami analyzed Japan’s attempt to secure its dominance in Manchukuo by using soft power. Focusing on the Manchukuo National News Agency, created in 1932, she demonstrated that Japan’s colonial strategy in Manchukuo was experimental and new. Nor- man Smith’s presentation “Shifting Narratives of Alcohol Use in Manchukuo” emphasized the importance of considering the “glocal” in terms of alcohol and its connotations. He investigated the shifting narratives in Manchukuo’s alcohol advertising, from describing alcohol as an essential product of modern life in the 1930s to branding alcohol as a dangerous substance in the war-torn early 1940s. Comparisons of Japan’s Manchukuo “puppet state” with German and Italian strategies of occupation were highlighted in the discussion.

The fourth panel, “Political Entanglements and Cultural Transgression,” dealt with different methods of exploring transcultural encounters in Manchuria. In his paper “Reading Time in Space: Mapping Cultural Junctions,” Karl Schlögel showed how the method of “spacing history” could be used for an in-depth analysis of a place
like Harbin. According to Schlögel, bringing the spatial dimension back into historiography means analyzing the city’s urban texture and reproducing the cultural topography of the city. Mark Gamsa discussed mixed marriages in Russian-Chinese Manchuria. The usual pattern was Chinese men marrying Russian women. These marriages often had an economic element, with Russian women seeking “economic” protection. Both men and women faced pressure and discrimination from their own communities for “crossing the line.” Yoshiya Makita analyzed cultural representations of Manchuria by physicians and nurses of the Japanese Red Cross Society in the first decades of the twentieth century by underscoring local intersections of global expansions of imperialism with (Western-style) medicalization. In her talk on language contacts, Yuan Xin examined Chinese pidgin Russian—a mixed, simplified language that was used as an interlanguage between the Chinese and Russian communities. In the discussion, participants primarily reflected on space as an analytical tool in historiography, which cannot be reduced to a “spatial turn.” They also discussed various outside cultural influences that initiated significant changes in the mental and material landscape of the city and region.

“Heritage and the Governing of History” was the topic of the fifth panel. The architect Chen Ziguang discussed the conservation or reconstruction of historical buildings and ways to integrate them into the architecture of modern Harbin using the example of Sofia Cathedral. He stressed that the protection of old buildings strengthens the identity of the city. In his presentation “Cultural Construction of Harbin and Manchuria in the Early 20th century: An Academic Reflection,” Shu Zhan, a member of the Office for Minorities and Religious Affairs at the Heilongjiang People’s Congress, gave an outline of the history of Harbin. Su Ling, a journalist at the Chinese Southern Weekly, gave an account of her investigations at the Heilongjiang Academy of Social Sciences, where the pursuit of prestige and income sometimes seems to take precedence over academic concerns among the resident scholars. Though attempts were made to intimidate her and others, Su Ling succeeded in publishing her article. Based on her personal experiences, Su Ling tried to present ways foreign scholars could conduct research in China. Due to Chen Ziguang and Shu Zhan’s early departure, the discussion centered on techniques for conducting research and investigative journalism in China like networking and cooperating with universities and Chinese scholars.
Panel six addressed “Global Memories and Shared Identities.” In her presentation “Sensibility Required: Exploring New Approaches to the History of Northeast China,” Mariko Tamanoi suggested a new concept of sensibility for scholars dealing with history and memory. Using the case of Japanese war crimes in Manchuria, she showed how descending from “national” to “local” levels and connecting different local networks to one another could help scholars overcome hostility and avoid a dubious “international apology boom.” Dan Ben-Canaan’s presentation “Problems of Memory and Nostalgia in Historical Reality: Imagined Communities—Imagined History” dealt with methodological problems that emerge when scholars work with memories and specifically with oral history records. Alena Kozlova’s paper on “Oral Testimony of Former Harbin’s Residents, 1932-1955” presented a project by the “Memorial” society of Moscow and Yekaterinburg, which conducted interviews with 29 former residents of Harbin who had resettled in the Soviet Union. She touched on topics like reasons for returning, repression, and exclusion from the Soviet state and society, as well as the effects their Harbin stay had on their identity and self-perception. Madeleine Herren’s presentation “Globalization of Death: Foreign Cemeteries in a Transnational Perspective” discussed growing global entanglements as expressed in the foundation of foreign cemeteries, using civil and military cemeteries abroad as examples. She argued that foreign cemeteries shape the way people remember the past of their former communities in a global context. The ensuing discussion revolved around memory and narrative. How should we speak and write about memory, especially memories of suffering?

The seventh and final panel examined the role of civil society in Harbin, in particular the role of Russian fascists and the Jewish community. In his presentation, Heinz-Dietrich Löwe showed that the ideology and Weltanschauung of the Russian fascists was not deeply influenced by Hitler and Mussolini. Rather, the Russian fascists were mainly influenced by the legacy of the Russian radical right of the late Tsarist empire. Susanne Hohler used the anti-German boycott organized by the Jews in Harbin in 1933 as an example to demonstrate how reactions to global events can be shaped by local particularities. Compared to the boycott movement in other communities, Harbin was a special case due to the presence of two fairly strong and self-confident antagonistic groups: revisionist Zionists and Russian fascists. Li Shuhua analyzed the relation between Jewish publications in the Soviet Union and those published by
the Jewish Community in Harbin. After 1922, when Soviet attitudes towards Jewish publications worsened and censorship intensified, the importance of the publishing work by the Jewish Community of Harbin increased. The discussion focused mainly on the ideology of the Russian fascists and their influence on daily life and society in the multiethnic city.

The conference’s presentations and discussions testified to the complexity of the history of Northeastern China, with the entanglements of different nationalities, cultures, and influences, and brought to light the problems that arise in dealing with this history. Different concepts of history, memory, and identity recurred throughout the conference and, linking approaches and topics across a wide range. Between 1898 and 1949 Manchuria was home to several populations that participated in transcultural processes that made it possible for national, ethnic, or religiously defined boundaries to be crossed. After the exodus of emigrants from Harbin, however, these boundaries were reconstructed to conform to the new national identities. Some questions raised during the conference still require further reflection and discussion. What role do historians play in the reconstruction of memory and identity? How are conflicts of influence connected to the construction of memory and identity? How and to what degree did Manchuria have an influence on the West?

Susanne Hohler (University of Heidelberg) and Sören Urbansky (University of Heidelberg)
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GERMAN EXPLOITATION IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES DURING WORLD WAR II

Workshop at the GHI, June 18–20, 2009. Convener: Jonas Scherner (GHI). Participants: Kim Christian Priemel (University of Frankfurt/Oder), Jaromir Balcar (University of Bremen), Vera Asenova (Central European University), Eugene White (Rutgers University), Kim Oosterlinck (Open University, Brussels), Angelo Riva (European Business School, Paris), Marcel Boldorf (Humboldt University, Berlin), Martin Laak (Erasmus University, Rotterdam), Fabian Lemmes (University of Saarbrücken), Giulio Mellinato (University of Milano-Bicocca), Jari Eloranta (Appalachian State University), Ilkka Nummela (University of Jyväskylä), Eric Golson (London School of Economics), Harald Espeli (Norwegian School of Management, Oslo), Carsten Burhop (MPI for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn), Johann Custodis (London School of Economics).

The first panel addressed the short- and long-term consequences of German domination using the examples of the Reich Protectorate, the Ukraine, and Bulgaria. Kim Christian Priemel examined Germany’s economic plans for exploiting the Ukraine and their realization. He was able to demonstrate that, in the final analysis, ideological restrictions stood in the way of efficiently exploiting the Ukraine and that the long-term economic effects of occupation were exclusively negative there. In a presentation on Czechoslovakia, Jaromir Balcar was able to show that German companies’ extensive investments in the Reich Protectorate during the occupation period simplified socialization after the war. A further legacy from the period of German domination that was beneficial for transitioning into the socialist bloc was the structural shift in industry towards heavy industry, the products of which were in high demand in the emerging East Bloc but could hardly compete in Western markets. Vera Asenova came to similar conclusions in her study of changes in Bulgaria’s foreign trade and payment transactions with Germany. These changes were accompanied by a tremendous increase in the power of Bulgaria’s central bank to the detriment of the private sector. Bulgaria’s increasing orientation toward the needs of Germany in foreign trade made its transition to the COMECON system easier.

The second panel discussed the most important occupied territory—France—in terms of population, economic productivity, and the extent to which Germany drew upon its financial resources for waging
war. Eugene White presented the main conclusions of an article he wrote with Kim Oosterlinck and Filippo Occhino. This article examined the long-term losses in GDP France suffered as a result of its forced payments to Germany during the war. Using a neo-classical growth model, the authors compared these losses for two cases: for the actual development, and for the counterfactual case supposing that Germany had won the war and the Vichy government had continued to pursue its traditional financial policy. Both cases led to significant reductions in consumer spending, although this reduction was not as severe in the first case because access to international capital markets under favorable conditions could be obtained. The central issue of Kim Oosterlinck and Angelo Riva’s presentation was the influence of Germany’s occupation on the development of the stock markets in France. One influence they were able to prove was that after the war it took several decades for regional markets to be joined with that in Paris, which was by far the most important market. Such consolidation would have made the markets more efficient. Finally, Marcel Boldorf examined the cooperation between German and French companies that Germany instigated in its efforts to reallocate tasks. After the war, French and German companies often revisited such cooperative endeavors. Another positive long-term consequence of the German occupation was that some French companies were able to profit from the transfer of technology that took place during the war.

The third panel also dealt with Western Europe. Martin Laak demonstrated that the economic consequences of the German occupation, which were negative in many respects but certainly not in all, could only be successfully overcome, for the most part, when normal foreign trade resumed at the end of the 1940s with (West) Germany, which had traditionally been the most important trading partner. Fabian Lemmes presented a comparative analysis of the economic and social impact of the Todt Organization in occupied Italy and France. In both countries, it lessened unemployment and was, therefore, welcomed by local authorities. Coercion played a greater role in recruiting workers than in recruiting domestic construction companies, for which carrying out Todt construction projects was an economically attractive prospect. Giulio Mellinato then presented a long-term historical study of the northeastern Italian region Venezia Giulia that placed its Nazi occupation in a larger historical context. Although the Nazi regime’s plans were never carried out, they were based on older traditions from the Habsburg Empire, which assigned
The last panel focused on Germany as the instigator of the Second World War. First, Carsten Burhop contrasted Germany’s aims in the First World War to the Allied demands in the Versailles Treaty. His presentation illuminated the historical backdrop that German government officials used in internal discussions to justify the heavy financial demands on the occupied territories. It also brought up the question of the degree to which Germany’s aims in the First World War can be considered precursors to the Lebensraum policy pursued in the Second World War. Based on new discoveries in the archives, Burhop concluded that this argument is not valid. Jonas Scherner then demonstrated that official German import statistics during World War II only reported about half of the actual amounts. This could be attributed to the fact that goods imported for the Wehrmacht—especially inputs for armament production—went largely unreported. If one considers this in determining German industry’s productivity in World War II, then it becomes clear that, contrary to popular belief, productivity only increased moderately during this period. Finally, Johann Custodis compared the treatment of prisoners of war in the Second World War. In part using mortality...
rates, he sought to determine the role that the principle of revenge played. Moreover, he established that putting prisoners of war to work compensated partially in some countries for economic losses brought on by the German occupation.

The concluding discussion summarized the new insights gained from the conference and elaborated on future research directions. One interesting finding is that German domination apparently made the transition to Soviet command economies in Eastern European countries after the Second World War easier, even though German domination was, of course, not a necessary precondition for this transition. Another general conclusion is that, viewed from a macroeconomic perspective, the countries studied displayed great differences in their economic development that cannot be explained merely by the “racial” preferences of the Nazi regime. Thus, other factors must have played a role, such as the availability of raw materials or, perhaps, the presence of a workforce that was underutilized immediately prior to the occupation. Furthermore, the conference revealed that coercion on the part of the occupying power manifested itself in different ways. It played a greater role in work relations than in company decision-making processes. Many companies in occupied countries viewed cooperation with the Nazi regime as profitable. Moreover, one must take a differentiated view of the relationships between Germany and countries under German hegemony. Many of these countries had room to maneuver during certain phases of the war and were able to use it to pursue their own interests. Moreover, after the war, some companies in Europe profited from the wartime transfer of know-how from Germany, and some networks between Germany and the formerly occupied countries were reactivated. Nonetheless, we need more research in this area to determine whether this was significant in the economic integration of Western Europe or whether it played a negligible role. We also need to pursue more research on the institutional measures that Germans implemented in occupied countries and evaluate whether such measures, if they were continued after the war, had a positive economic effect or inhibited development.

Jonas Scherner (GHI)

Translated by Patricia Casey Sutcliffe.
ARCHIVAL SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY, 2009


The GHI’s seventeenth archival summer seminar in Germany took place from June 21 to July 3, 2009. This year’s group visited research institutions and met with archivists and scholars in Speyer, Düsseldorf, Koblenz, Cologne, and Weimar. The aim of the seminar was to introduce doctoral students in German history to the wide range of research institutions in Germany and to support them in preparing their prospective dissertation research in German archives and libraries. In the first part of the seminar, participants learned to read documents in old German handwriting. The second part consisted of visits to local, state, and federal archives and libraries to familiarize the participants with the German archival system and the basics of Archivkunde. The group also met with two scholars to discuss research methods and practices and to receive advice on the practical issues of archival work.

As in former years, the seminar started off with a one-week course in paleography led by Walter Rummel, who heads the Landesarchiv Speyer. Rummel is not only a well-respected scholar but also a talented and experienced teacher. In accordance with the participants’ research topics, he taught the group to read documents covering the seventeenth to twentieth centuries. In addition to an introduction
to the evolution of German handwriting and the technical aspects of paleography, the course also included the basics of Quellenkunde as well as a tour through the Landesarchiv. In the afternoons, the students had the chance to explore Speyer, with its famous Romanic Dom and the Judenhof, both dating from the eleventh century.

One of the afternoons was dedicated to a meeting with Heinrich Hartmann (Free University, Berlin / University of Cologne) to talk about practical aspects of archival research. An expert on French and German history whose dissertation compared German and French companies’ management techniques between 1890 and 1914, Hartmann is now working on a study on recruiting techniques and military statistics in Europe, with a special emphasis on the anthropological aspects of “measuring” individuals and populations. Hartmann offered advice on how to prepare archival visits, make the best use of time in archives, and optimize note-taking. He encouraged participants to make use of databases to organize one’s findings efficiently.

Following the paleography course, the group spent a day at the Landesarchiv NRW, Abteilung Rheinland, in Düsseldorf. Archivists Uwe Zuber, Kathrin Pilger, and Jens Niederhut explained the archive’s organization, gave an overview of its holdings, and offered advice on a number of research questions from the participants. Of special value were two practical exercises in working with archival files. The Landesarchiv NRW is famous for its extraordinarily large holding of Gestapo files from Düsseldorf, some of which the archivists used in order to give the students a feeling for the kinds of information archival material can offer or lack.

At the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, President Hartmut Weber welcomed the participants. During the morning session, archivist Jörg Filthaut introduced them to Archivkunde. The introduction to the “secret language” of symbols and colors used to communicate between different departments, subdivisions, and staff members will prove valuable to the students when working with government documents. In the afternoon, the group was given a tour of the archive and learned about the Bundesarchiv’s digital photo archive, which offers access to a continuously growing number of the archive’s total of 11 million photographs, posters, and aerial photographs. The digital archive cooperates with Wikipedia and can be accessed through www.bild.bundesarchiv.de.
On the seminar’s last day in the Rhineland, Joachim Oepen welcomed the group at the Historisches Archiv des Erzbistums Köln. He explained the Provenienzprinzip, which is especially important with regard to historical developments that led to administrative changes on the regional and state levels. For example, in the early nineteenth century, secularization resulted in the break-up of Church archives’ holdings. These were then transferred to state and local archives, creating a complicated network of diverse archives. Something similar happened in the postwar era, when new Länder and Bistümer were created. Following this theoretical lesson, the students did a hands-on exercise. They worked with Findbücher to find files that might be of interest with regard to a specific research question, in this case the confiscation of a particular Church property by the National Socialists.

The third and last station of the seminar was Weimar. Here the group visited the Gedenkstätte Buchenwald, where Zsuzánna Berger-Nagy led participants on a tour of the grounds. After the tour, archivist Sabine Stein presented the archival holdings of the Gedenkstätte. Since the SS destroyed most of its documents at the end of the war, sources are scattered and incomplete, but the researchers at Buchenwald cooperate with many national and international institutions to assemble as much information about Buchenwald and its many Außenlager as possible. The scope of scholarly interest is not limited to the camp, however. The seminar met with Jens Schley and Sabine Schweitzer, who are currently preparing an international traveling exhibition on forced labor during National Socialism (www.ausstellung-zwangsarbeit.org). They talked about their methodological challenges and conceptual considerations and offered insight into how archival sources can be brought to life.

The last day of the seminar was devoted to the Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek (HAAB) in Weimar. Roland Bärwinkel led the group through the rococo reading room and library, which had been destroyed by a fire in 2004, but were restored and reopened two years ago. With its exquisite historic building and a highly aesthetic modern addition across the street, the HAAB offers outstanding working conditions. The tour was followed by a meeting with the HAAB’s director, Michael Knoche, who took the time to talk about the library’s work, especially with regard to salvaging and replacing those books damaged or lost in the fire, and to answer participants’ questions. Hans Zimmermann presented the journal Simplicissimus,
which has been digitalized and made available for online research by the library (www.simplicissimus.info). In the last session, Annett Carius-Kiehne discussed the issue of *NS-Raubgut*—books stolen from libraries and individuals during the Nazi period—and the efforts to find and return those books to their rightful owners.

In the afternoon, the seminar group met with Tim Geiger, a historian working at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Berlin on the *Edition der Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik*. Geiger shared his own research experiences with the seminar’s participants. Using his Ph.D. dissertation—a study of the conflict between Atlanticists and Gaullists within the CDU/CSU in the 1960s—as an example, he offered advice on how to identify relevant material and approach archives. He encouraged the participants to thoroughly study the existing primary and secondary literature before entering the archive in order to avoid duplicating others’ work. He also answered questions on writing techniques and methods to manage the psychological burdens that can accompany the final stages of writing a dissertation.

We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to all the individuals and organizations that contributed to the 2009 Archival Summer Seminar in Germany. An announcement of the program for the 2010 seminar can be found on our web site at http://www.ghi-dc.org/seminars.

Corinna R. Unger (GHI)
The conference provided a fresh look at Public History in Germany and the United States by exploring current fields of research, recent developments, and debates in both theoretical discourses and practical endeavors. It brought together an international group of scholars and practitioners from the United States and Germany.

The conference opened with a session on contested memories, history, and the public. Kathleen Franz gave “a report from the trenches,” in which she commented on training the next generation of Public Historians. Reflecting on the training recommendations of the National Council of Public History, she pointed out the strengths and shortcomings of current Public History curricula. She also discussed the value of on-site practical training for Public History graduate students, recommending the development of more integrated programs across the United States. Leora Auslander’s remarks focused on state-sponsored memorialization of domestic shame in Germany and the United States. Looking at the Jewish Museum in Berlin and the National Museum for African American History and Culture (NMAAHC) that the Smithsonian Institution is planning to open in Washington DC in 2015, she outlined the
museums’ missions, their (prospective) exhibits, and historical narratives. Devoting most of her attention to the Jewish Museum in Berlin, since it is already open and accessible to the public, she investigated what is being commemorated and who the museum is addressing as an audience. Pointing to the museum’s attempt to tell the long and complex history of Jewish Germans, she described the museum’s methods for dealing with the Holocaust and the issue of national shame as effective. It remains to be seen, she pointed out, how the NMAAHC will deal with similar issues.

In his keynote address, NMAAHC founding director Lonnie Bunch talked about his vision for the creation of a national museum devoted to the history and culture of African Americans and the broader challenges of interpreting race in American museums. Situating the museum in the lieu de mémoire that the National Mall in Washington DC constitutes, Bunch elaborated on the plan to tell the story of one minority culture in ways that are meaningful to both its members and a broader American public. Hoping to attract millions of visitors of different backgrounds – like the other Smithsonian museums – he reflected on the particular challenges of portraying the history of slavery and of presenting the issues of victimization and perpetration it entails. Bunch also elaborated on the more immediate challenges of constructing an attractive museum building and assembling a collection.

The second session, on history in museums and exhibitions, opened with a paper by Erik Christiansen, who explored the Cold War origins of the Smithsonian’s Museum of History and Technology (now the Museum of American History) and the history exhibits displayed at the Smithsonian between the end of World War II and the mid-1960s. Constructing and displaying a distinctly national history for American citizens to see and comprehend as their own unique and superior heritage, the museum and its history exhibits played a significant role in influencing contemporary political and economic thought. Its authoritative location, between the Washington Monument, the White House, and the U.S. Capitol, made it difficult to doubt the museum’s content or interpretation, unless one was also willing to doubt the legitimacy of the government that surrounded and supported it. Jacob Eder explored West German efforts to promote a positive interpretation of German history in the United States during the 1980s – one that would be respectful of, yet not overburdened by, the legacies of the Holocaust. The
history of the Federal Republic was to be presented as a “success story,” characterized by a stable democracy, reliability as a military partner in the Western Alliance, a strong commitment to Israel, and restitution payments for the victims of National Socialism. Eder demonstrated how this interpretation of German Zeitgeschichte, championed by Helmut Kohl, collided with the growing impact of Holocaust memory on American historical consciousness, a phenomenon often referred to as the “Americanization of the Holocaust.” Warren Rosenblum discussed recent exhibits dealing with the history of justice and legal repression, focusing on exhibits such as “Im Namen des deutschen Volkes – Justiz und Nationalsozialismus,” (Ministry of Justice, 1989) and “Justiz im Nationalsozialismus – Über Verbrechen im Namen des Deutschen Volkes” (Ministry of Justice in Lower Saxony, 1999) in Germany and “The Story of We, the People” at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia. Rosenblum analyzed how and why these exhibits stirred up public discussions about the historic failures of the court system, particularly in regard to racial justice, and the fragility of legal norms during times of national crisis. The session concluded with Katja Roeckner’s remarks on industrial museums, institutions that present the history of industries and industrialization on industrial heritage sites such as former factories. Roeckner argued that these museums afford excellent opportunities to study how institutions of public history deal with historical change: As museums they conserve images of the past, while at the same time becoming agents of change in an environment of changing economic, social, and cultural parameters.

The conference’s third session focused on the connections between landscapes and memory. David Glassberg discussed his involvement in two projects of historic preservation and cultural-resources management conducted for the United States National Park Service. According to Glassberg, both projects, Pinelands National Reserve and Cape Cod National Seashore, initially failed to adequately take local residents’, government officials’, and tourists’ widely different perceptions of the environment and its future use into account. He showed how Public-History methods were employed to consider the different memories attached to the landscape in future planning efforts. Elizabeth Lambert explored the contested memory of Weimarer Klassik and Gedenkstätte Buchenwald. Contending that Weimar’s legacy reveals a great deal about the construction of postwar German national identity, she explored the polarity between
elements of the Weimar-Buchenwald complex resulting from the fact that the National Socialist and East German states designated Weimar as a central site of ritual connected to the different ways that each imagined and appropriated the city’s past. She thus explored the challenges in separating culture from terror in order to elucidate the ways in which the landscapes, sites, and narratives of Weimar and Buchenwald have been marshaled to reinforce the dominant narrative of national identity. Janet Ward’s paper investigated the interrelationship between two highly charged sites of urban trauma in the United States and Germany – the ongoing reconstructive transformations at the World Trade Center site in Manhattan and the postwar ruin and post-reunification rebuilding of Dresden’s Frauenkirche, an emblem of the Allies’ terror bombing of German cities during World War II. Comparing the two sites, she pointed out two key representational strategies of the memorialization of civilian sacrifice: rubble aesthetics, on the one hand, and redemptive reconstruction, on the other. She demonstrated how the commemoration of 9/11 at Ground Zero is, in part, a dialogic response to the rubble thematics and reconstructive practices that have served affected urban centers since World War II.

The fourth session dealt with the history of lost causes. John Berndt Olson analyzed German post-unification debates about places of memory in Eastern Germany including the Buchenwald memorial, the German Historical Museum, the monuments to Ernst Thälmann and to Marx and Engels in Berlin, and the planned “Memorial for Freedom and Unity” designed to commemorate the 1989 revolution and the 1990 (re)unification of Germany. Olson argued that these debates about the monuments, museums, and commemoration traditions of the GDR provide a unique point of departure for examining the role of history within the larger political and social debates surrounding the unification of Germany. He posited that new monuments will continue to be controversial as popular memories of the GDR are contested in the public sphere, although we might also see a ratcheting down of the debates generated by these sites of memory. David Zonderman’s paper focused on the teaching of public history in the American South, which he described as a pedagogical project that challenges instructors and students to engage with the many myths surrounding the South. He argued that public historians must be trained to understand the roots of regional mythologies and their current expression in popular memory. Only then, he underlined, can they successfully guide their audiences
through the process of unpacking and understanding these myths in ways that respect regional identity, without letting that identity prevent serious engagement with historical facts and scholarly interpretations.

Session five pursued the connections between politics and public history. Joseph Harahan outlined the historical origins, development, and growth of Public History in the U.S. government. He maintained that governmental Public History mirrors the diverse interests of the institutions and bureaucracies carrying out the functions of a large democratic government. He also pointed out that the creation of this bureaucratic state came at a time (the 1940s) when dissemination of public information, victory in the global war, Cold War nationalism, and domestic imperatives led to the acceptance of employing historians to document, interpret, and publish histories of the federal government’s events and programs. Arnita Jones reflected on U.S. Public History as policy history. She argued that in stark contrast to developments in the historical profession at large, where scholars have paid less attention to studying the institutions of government and political history, policy history has accelerated over the last several years, as exemplified by the work of the Kennedy Assassination Board, the 9/11 Commission, and the currently much discussed federal history critical of the American effort to rebuild Iraq. Martin Sabrow inquired into history politics in post-reunification Germany by looking at the issue of GDR Aufarbeitung and his own involvement in the debate about it. He detailed the work of the Sabrow Commission, a panel of scholars and public history practitioners appointed by the German Bundestag, and its recommendations for ways to deal with and explore the GDR past, which were widely read and discussed in the German public.

The conference’s sixth and final session concerned itself with the marketing of history. Dietmar Pieper sketched the short history of Spiegel Geschichte, the history magazine series published by the German news magazine Der Spiegel. He detailed topics, approaches, and target audiences. Hanno Hochmuth’s paper focused on the tourism industry in Berlin. He suggested that the city’s booming tourism is largely based on Public History, demonstrating that the majority of Berlin’s most visited museums exhibit contemporary history. Moreover, Hochmuth showed that a significant heritage industry has developed in Berlin. Supported by the local government of the post-Fordist city, both public and private players compete for
the visitors’ attention. Hence, he concluded, they supply the tourists with what they seek most: Histotainment and authenticity.

The conference was characterized by lively discussion and exchange. It closed with a tour of the German Historical Museum led by the museum’s director, Hans Ottomeyer.

Anke Ortlepp (GHI)
ENDOWMENT OF A GERALD D. FELDMAN LECTURE

As was announced in the last issue, the Friends of the GHI have begun a fund-raising campaign to establish an endowment for an annual lecture named in honor of Gerald D. Feldman to commemorate his contributions to the study of modern German history and to the work of the German Historical Institute. The campaign is off to a promising start with significant contributions. We would like to thank all colleagues who have already contributed to the fund. All contributions will be acknowledged in a future issue of the Bulletin. If you have not yet contributed, please consider doing so.

From 1963 until his death in 2007 Gerald Feldman taught at the University of California, Berkeley, where he directed the Center for German and European Studies and mentored an extraordinary number of future German historians. His own work was prolific and important. His major works stretch from his pioneering Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 (1966) to his prize-winning later works The Great Disorder (1993) on the German inflation of the 1920s, and Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933-1945 (2001). From the founding of the Friends of the GHI in 1991, he was one of its most devoted supporters and served as chairman of the Board of Directors at the time of his death in October 2007.

The Friends of the GHI recognize that these are tough times financially but urges members of the scholarly community to contribute. Donations are tax-deductible under U.S. tax law. Checks should be made out to the Friends of the German Historical Institute (for: Donation Feldman Lecture) and sent to the Friends of the GHI, 1607 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington DC 20009-2562. Those who are taxed in Germany can make a bank transfer to: Deutsches Historisches Institut Washington, Verwendungszweck: Spende Friends GHI Washington Feldman Lecture, Konto-Nr.: 0233 363 600, Dresdner Bank AG, Bankleitzahl: 370 800 40. Contributors will receive a statement for the tax authorities.

TENTH GERD BUCERIUS LECTURE

On 12 March 2009, the German Historical Institute’s Tenth Gerd Bucerius Lecture was delivered by Kurt Biedenkopf, Chairman of the
Board of the Hertie School of Governance and former Minister President of Saxony (1990-2002), who spoke on the topic “Germany in Europe: Twenty Years After Unification.” Biedenkopf was introduced by Hartmut Berghoff, Director of the GHI, and Tatiana Matthiesen as the representative of the ZEIT Foundation, which sponsors the Bucerius Lecture Series.

In the first part of his lecture, Professor Biedenkopf argued that German reunification was in many ways a “missed opportunity” to reform the whole of Germany, which was already facing a number of serious problems in 1990. Chief among these problems were: first, the demographic challenge of an aging society, which will necessitate a major reform of the social insurance and pension system; second, the transition from a production-based to a primarily science-based economy, which demands important educational reforms; and third, the ecological challenge of how to protect a threatened natural environment. The postponement of efforts to solve these problems, he noted, has only made them harder to solve.

Biedenkopf also argued that, somewhat paradoxically, German reunification was not experienced as the reunification of a nation because, due to the Nazis’ abuse of the concept of the nation, Germans still had a very ambivalent attitude to national identity. In the years since unification, this ambivalence has receded somewhat as Germans, especially the younger generation, have developed a more normal type of national identity, which is, however, firmly rooted in European integration. Reunification, Biedenkopf concluded, was a “success story” because the East German population successfully adapted to West German ways of doing things, participated in the transformation of their society and economy, and came to recognize their own contribution to this process.

In the second part of his lecture, Biedenkopf commented on the role of Germany in Europe and the world, with special emphasis on the current international economic crisis. In his analysis of the crisis, Biedenkopf stressed that, since the true causes of the financial crisis are not yet fully understood, it is extremely difficult to decide on the proper remedies—very much like having to prescribe “therapy without a diagnosis.” Given this uncertainty regarding both causes and remedies, Biedenkopf insisted that it was all for the good if different countries tried different policies. While there is an international consensus on the need for more financial regulation, there is substantial
disagreement—especially between the United States and Europe—on the wisdom of government stimulus legislation along the lines just enacted by the U.S. The very real danger that the stimulus approach presents, Biedenkopf argued, is the risk of a bubble of state deficits that could eventually endanger the government’s role as lender of last resort.

In conclusion, Biedenkopf reminded the audience that beyond the current economic crisis Germany and Europe still face the pressing long-term issues whose solution has been put off too long: how to maintain growth and prosperity in an aging society; how to foster the transition to a science-driven economy with an aging population; and, finally, how to manage the distribution of limited natural resources in a world whose population is still growing at a rapid pace.

NEW GHI PUBLICATIONS


   Suzanne L. Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship* (2009)

2. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)

   Anke Ortlepp and Christoph Ribbat, eds., *Mit den Dingen leben: Zur Geschichte der Alltagsgegenstände* (2009)


   Thomas Adam, Simone Lässig, and Gabriele Lingelbach, eds., *Stifter, Spender und Mäzene: USA und Deutschland im historischen Vergleich* (2009)


3. Other Publications Supported by the GHI


LIBRARY REPORT

The GHI Library is happy to announce its subscription to three new databases. Historical Abstracts is an annotated historical bibliography, providing coverage of the history of the world, excluding North America, from 1450 to the present. JSTOR provides full-text access to more than a thousand leading academic journals across the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, as well as select monographs and other materials valuable for academic work. Academic Search Premier by EBSCO provides full-text access to more than 4,500 journals. PDF back files to 1975 or further are available for well over one hundred journals. For further information, please visit the “Electronic Research Tools” link on the library’s web site, which helps users navigate the library’s databases and other resources for research.

Recent noteworthy acquisitions include: Constitutions of the World From the Late 18th Century to the Middle of the 19th Century, edited by Horst Dippel, with 7 of 12 prospective volumes published containing constitutional documents dating from 1776 to 1849 from all over the world; Control Commission for Germany: British Element, 11 volumes, an inventory of the records now held at the Public Record Office in Kew of the Control Commission for Germany, British Element, which originated in Germany; The Nazi Holocaust: Historical Articles on the Destruction of European Jews, 9 volumes, edited by Michael R. Marrus, which gives an overview of historical accounts of the Holocaust, with special emphasis on recent contributions; the microfiche collection Privatbanken in der NS-Zeit which shows how foreign-exchange control regulations as well as banking and financial activities were used as
instruments of persecution. Newly acquired dictionaries include the *Biographical Dictionary of American Business Leaders* in 4 volumes and the *Dictionary of Business Biography* in 5 volumes. The GHI Library received 170 books from Dr. Ernest F. Fisher, author of several books on U.S. military history. We are very grateful for this generous contribution to our collection.

The GHI would like to express its gratitude to the following people and institutions who donated books to the GHI library: Hartmut Berghoff, Brandeis University, Deutsches Historisches Institut in Paris, Deutsches Historisches Institut in Rom, Timothy A. Duskin, Embassy of the Principality of Lichtenstein, Ernest F. Fisher, Historische Kommission der VW AG, David Lazar, Gerry Livingston, Bob Meier, Alexander Missal, The Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Palgrave, Amy Schmidt, Martin L. Skubinna, Gerald Steinacher, Franz Steiner Verlag, Corinna R. Unger.

**RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS**

**Fellowship in Economic and Social History**

**Christina Lubinski,** Fernuniversität Hagen, “Corporate Governance: Veränderungen deutscher und US-amerikanischer Groß-Familienunternehmen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg”

**Doctoral Fellowships in Business History**


**Doctoral Fellowships in the History of African Americans and Germans/Germany**

**S. Marina Jones,** University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “‘Outsiders Within’: Afro-Germans in West Germany—Discourses and Experiences, 1949-1989”

Horner Fellowships

Laura Feil, Universität Mainz, “Vor die Sonnenhöhe von Pennsylvanien: German Printing and Cross-Cultural Practices in the Greater Mid-Atlantic Region”

Christopher Geissler, Jesus College, Cambridge University, “Distinctly German Mission: Slavery and Abolitionism in German Writing, 1848-1918”

Richard Schaefer, SUNY Plattsburgh, “Catholic and Modern: German Scholars and the European Catholic Imagination, 1815-1865”

Postdoctoral Fellowships


Kai Marcel Sicks, Universität Gießen, “Die Eroberung des Nordpols. Arktisexpeditionen als transnationale Medienereignisse, 1869-1909”

Claudia Siebrecht, Trinity College Dublin, “Colonial Concentration Camp Systems: Origins and Historical Trajectory”

Doctoral Fellowships

Maria Dörnemann, Universität Tübingen, “Diagnose ‘Überbevölkerung’: Die Bevölkerungspolitik internationaler Organisationen am Beispiel von Kenia, 1974-1984”

Elisabeth Engel, Universität zu Köln, “Fighting the Color Line—Fighting Colonialism? AfroamerikanerInnen als AkteurInnen der (De) kolonisierung Afrikas”
Brendan Matz, Yale University, “Agricultural Animal Breeding and the Study of Heredity in Germany and the United States, 1860-1929”


GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the role of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For further information and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

GHI Internships

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.

GHI-SPONSORED EVENTS, SPRING 2009

Reports on the following events can be accessed online at www.ghi-dc.org/eventhistory. The list does not include conferences (on
which we report in the “Conference Reports” section) or the Spring and Fall Lecture Series (listed separately).

January 3  
Languages: Sine Qua Non for Globalizing Historiography  
GHI-sponsored panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, New York

January 4  
Problematizing Transatlantic History: German-American Perspectives  
GHI-sponsored panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, New York

January 5  
Facing the Challenge of a New Religious History: Post-1945 American Religion as a Site of Historical Inquiry in Germany  
GHI-sponsored panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, New York

January 13  
Civil Rights and America's Role in World War II  
Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Harvard Sitkoff (University of New Hampshire)

January 20  
Immer eine Nasenlänge voraus? Amerika und Deutschland im Wettlauf um die Moderne  
Symposium in Kaiserslautern  
Convener: Werner Kremp (Atlantische Akademie)

January 22  
Special Screening of *The Reader*  
Screening at the AFI Theater in Silver Spring, MD

March 13  
Rosa Lee: A Mother and Her Family in Urban America  
Lecture at the GHI  
Speaker: Leon Dash (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
March 18  Networking the International System  
Luncheon at the GHI  
Speakers: Cornelia Knab, Maya Okuda, Christiane Sibille (University of Heidelberg)

March 28  To Police and Protect: The Surveillance of Homosexuality in Imperial Berlin  
Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar at the GHI  
Speaker: Robert Beachy (Goucher College)  
Convener: Peter Jelavich (Johns Hopkins University)

April 15  Songs from Weimar Berlin  
An Evening of Cabaret at the GHI  
Performance at the GHI, in cooperation with the In Series theater company

April 22  Sexuality, Race, and Politics: Historical Perspectives on Antebellum  
Panel Discussion at Woolly Mammoth Theatre  
Speakers: Martin Klimke (GHI), Anke Ortlepp (GHI), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

May 4  Alexander von Humboldt – A Man for the 21st Century  
Roundtable at the GHI  
Speakers: Ottmar Ette (University of Potsdam), Andreas Daum (University at Buffalo), Kirsten Belgum (University of Texas at Austin)  
Moderator: Frank Holl (Munich)

May 6  Mourning, Celebrating, Revisiting: Alexander von Humboldt in the United States, 1859-2009  
GHI-sponsored Lecture at the Library of Congress  
Speaker: Andreas Daum (University at Buffalo)

June 10  Haus des Rundfunks – Berlin’s Broadcast House: An Audio Evening with Alex van Oss  
Co-sponsored event at the Goethe-Institut Washington
GI RESEARCH SEMINAR, SPRING 2009

January 14 Ines Prodöhl (GHI Washington)
Globalisierung und Global History: Sojabohnen und die globalen Verflechtungen der Mandschurei in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts

January 21 Felix Roemer (Universität Mainz)
"Information Requested..." The Culture of US Military Intelligence during World War II

January 28 Bettina Hessler (Northwestern University)
Constructing a Global Community in Early America: Moravians in an Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World

Hartmut Berghoff (GHI Washington)
Consumer Demand and Nazi Economic Policy: Conceptual Problems and Preliminary Findings

February 11 Carola Dietze (GHI Washington)
Terror in the 19th Century: Political Assassinations and Public Discourse in Europe and the United States, 1878-1901

February 25 Jan Logemann (GHI Washington)
State, Society & Space: Transatlantic Differences in Shaping Postwar Mass Consumption in West Germany and the United States

March 11 Corinna Unger (GHI Washington)
West German and American Modernization Policies in India, 1945-1980

March 18 Jan Behrends (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin)
Metropolen der Moderne: Moskau, Berlin und Chicago um 1900

April 22 Simon Wendt (Universität Heidelberg)
Gender, Memory, and Nation: A History of the Daughters of the American Revolution
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<td>Martin Klimke (GHI Washington)</td>
<td>Accidental Armageddons: Die Nuklearkrise und der Zweite Kalte Krieg</td>
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<td>June 10</td>
<td>Friederike Baer (Temple University)</td>
<td>Tour of Duty: Gender, Class, and Cultural Contact in the American Revolution</td>
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GHI LECTURE SERIES, FALL 2009

“DDR—Was Bleibt?” East German Legacies in German History

With the fall of the Berlin Wall twenty years ago and the subsequent union of both Germanys, the German Democratic Republic ceased to exist as a state. Culturally, however, the GDR remains a presence in contemporary Germany. There has been a steady flow of books and movies about Eastern German memory and identity amid discussion of Easterners’ Ostalgie. Historians debate the place of the GDR in the larger sweep of German history. Even in political and social debates, the GDR continues to have an impact on united Germany through the presence of the Left Party, which has its roots in part in East Germany’s ruling communist party. The question, then, as Germany celebrates the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, is not “Why did the GDR fail?” but rather: Was bleibt? What remains?

September 17
East German Socialist Modernity and Consumer Culture before and after the Wall
Katherine Pence (Baruch College, City University of New York)

October 5
Popular Culture, Memory, and German Unification: Heiner Carow’s The Mistake
Barton Byg (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)

October 15
Afterlives: On the Resonance of Vanished German States (Prussia, Weimar, The Third Reich, The GDR)
Charles S. Maier (Harvard University)

November 5
On Shoelaces, Fishing Manuals, and the Fear of Misspeaking
Katrin Askan (Berlin)

December 3
“Was it really meant to be this way?”
Unification and the Remaking of German Party Politics
Daniel Hough (University of Sussex)
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS, FALL 2009 / SPRING 2010

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org.

September 10-11  Kaleidoscopic Knowledge: On Jewish and Other Encyclopedias in Modernity
Workshop at the Simon Dubnow Institute, Leipzig
Conveners: Arndt Engelhardt (Simon Dubnow Institute) and Ines Prodöhl (GHI Washington)

September 16  Why Write a Book? From Lived Experience to the Written Word in Early Modern Europe
Lecture at the Grolier Club, New York
Speaker: Pamela H. Smith (Columbia University)

September 23  Yes, We Can! Political Rhetoric in U.S. and German Elections
Panel Discussion at the Goethe Institute Washington

September 24-26  Falling Behind or Catching Up? The East German Economy in the 20th Century
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI) and Uta Balbier (GHI)

October 2  German Unification Symposium 2009
At the GHI
Speaker: Dr. Frank Elbe

October 1-3  African-American Civil Rights and Germany in the 20th Century
Conference at Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY
Jointly organized by the GHI and Vassar College
Conveners: Maria Höhn (Vassar College) and Martin Klimke (GHI)

October 1-3  Germans’ Things: Material Culture and Daily Life in East and West, 1949-2009
Conference at the Wende Museum and the University of California at Los Angeles
Conveners: Uta Balbier (GHI), Philipp Gassert (University of Augsburg), Justinian Jampol (Wende Museum), Robert G. Moeller (UC Irvine)

October 8-11  Medieval History Seminar
Conference at the GHI London
Conveners: Carola Dietze (GHI), Jochen Schenk (GHI London)
October 15-17 The Decline of the West? The Fate of the Atlantic Community after the Cold War Conference at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia Conveners: Philipp Gassert (University of Augsburg), Ronald Granieri (Penn), Eric Jarosinski (Penn), and Frank Trommler (Penn)

October 22-25 Beyond the Racial State Conference at Indiana University, Bloomington Conveners: Devin Pendas (Boston College), Mark Roseman (Indiana University), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

October 30-31 Understanding Markets: Information, Institutions, and History Conference at the Hagley Museum and Library (Wilmington, DE) Co-sponsored by the GHI and the Hagley Museum Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Roger Horowitz (Hagley), Philip Scranton (Hagley), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

November 12 Twenty-Third Annual Lecture of the GHI Speaker: Donna Harsch (Carnegie Mellon University)

December 10 Award of the Helmut Schmidt Prize Award Presentation and Lecture at the GHI

2010

January 7-10 Immigrant Entrepreneurship in 19th- and 20th-Century America GHI-sponsored Panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association

February 5-6 Cultures of Credit: Consumer Lending and Borrowing in Modern Economies Conference at the GHI Convener: Jan Logemann (GHI)

February 12-14 Lives Beyond Borders: Toward a Social History of Cosmopolitans and Globalization, 1880-1960 Conference at the University of Heidelberg Conveners: Madeleine Herren (University of Heidelberg) and Ines Prodohl (GHI)

March 18-20 Anonymous Consumption: Rationalization, Mechanization, and Digitalization in the Twentieth Century
Conference at the GHI Conveners: Angelika Epple (University of Bielefeld), Gary Cross (Penn State University), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

May 12-15

16th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: Twentieth-Century German History
Seminar at the University of Jena
Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Norbert Frei (University of Jena), Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)

June

Archival Summer Seminar in Germany 2010
Convener: Ines Prodöhl (GHI)