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The current issue of the *Bulletin* reflects the rich diversity of historical topics addressed in the German Historical Institute’s research, conferences, and lectures. The history of science, legal history, contemporary history, gender history, the history of sexuality, and the history of religion are all represented in this issue’s articles. In last fall’s Annual Lecture, Margit Szöllősi-Janze addressed the relationship between science and politics by examining the political attitudes, actions, and practices of Albert Einstein, Fritz Haber, and Max Planck during the Weimar Republic. Looking well beyond the realm of political rhetoric, her article investigates the crucial question of to what extent these scientists promoted democratic practices in scientific organizations such as the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Society and the German Research Foundation. Cathryn Carson’s comment takes Szöllősi-Janze’s presentation as a starting point to raise important questions regarding the social and political influence of scientists and the definition of democracy.

The theme of democracy was also prominent in last fall’s Bucerius and Hertie Lectures, both of which are published in this issue. The 2008 Gerd Bucerius Lecture was delivered by Jutta Limbach, former chief judge of the German Federal Constitutional Court, who examined a topic of recent legal and constitutional history, namely the relationship between two fundamental rights that are in tension with one another in every modern democracy: human dignity and the freedom of the press. While Limbach outlined the development of a kind of democratic jurisprudence by the West German constitutional court over several decades, our Hertie Lecturer spoke about the much more rapid triumph of democracy in East Germany. Marianne Birthler, the Commissioner for the Records of the Ministry for State Security of the Former GDR, provided a perfect combination of eyewitness testimony and critical analysis of the crucial events of October 1989 that led to what she called “the peaceful revolution” of 1989. She closes with trenchant reflections on the ways in which these events are remembered almost twenty years later. We are grateful to the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius and to the Hertie Stiftung for sponsoring these lectures.

Two other articles present the work of two junior scholars whose innovative work has been recognized and supported by the German
Historical Institute. In the article “Gender, Sexuality, and Belonging,” Marti Lybeck, the winner of the 2008 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize (awarded annually by the Friends of the GHI), provides an overview of her pioneering dissertation research on female homosexuality in Germany from 1890 to 1933. In the GHI Research section, GHI Research Fellow Uta Andrea Balbier’s “Billy Graham’s Crusades in the 1950s” presents her thought-provoking research on the rise of American neo-evangelicalism in the context of civil religion, media, and consumerism.

Regular readers will notice that this issue of the Bulletin sports a new cover and layout. This change is part of a larger project to redesign the Institute’s publications, communications, and internet presence, all in an effort to communicate better with you—our colleagues, readers, and interlocutors. We hope you like the new design.

Hartmut Berghoff, Director
For a long time, the Weimar Republic has been judged by its end. Recently, new attempts have been made to reveal long forgotten elements of democratic thinking and to find out if there were more people from different social backgrounds and political contexts than originally thought who were, as historian Friedrich Meinecke put it, *Vernunftrepublikaner*—“republicans by reason” who originally were not supporters of parliamentary democracy but sided with the Republic after the revolution of 1918/19. This line of investigation goes on to ask whether there were perhaps many such republicans who remained isolated and unnoticed due to the political and social fragmentation of Weimar society.¹

Against this general background, I wish to take a closer look at three of the most famous scientists of the time—Albert Einstein, Max Planck, and Fritz Haber—and explore their democratic practices: the three protagonists’ perceptions of democracy, their commitment to political parties, and their other activities that could be deemed contributions towards the stabilization of the Weimar Republic. One should underline that, like most of their German contemporaries, these three scientists did not possess clear-cut concepts of democracy, be it social, parliamentary, presidential, or direct democracy. How could they? That is why I will also look at daily democratic practices in a broader sense, investigating whether these scientists applied or pushed for core democratic values such as pluralism, representation, and participation in everyday practice, that is, in academic committees, governing bodies, and institutions. Finally, I will address the limits of democratic practice that all three scientists manifested.

I. Politics and Science

Let me begin by reflecting more generally on the relationship between politics and science. The topic becomes even more complex when contemplating the meaning of political turning points for the development of science. I base my reflections on a definition of that relationship developed by Mitchell Ash first for the National Socialist

takeover of power, and later for other political caesurae in recent German history. In order to make scientists visible as autonomous actors, Ash suggested treating science and politics as complementary, interacting sets of resources. He applied a broad definition of the term “resources,” which, in his view, can be financial, but also cognitive, institutional, or rhetorical, in the form of equipment, staffing, or increasing prestige. Understanding politics and science as interacting sets of resources means that they can mobilize each other. For example, scientists can mobilize resources for their own benefit from the political domain, and politicians, on the other hand, can legitimize their goals with reference to the sciences. So both politicians and scientists should be viewed as closely related, interacting actors.

This perspective means two things. First, sets of resources in science and research are politically multivalent, meaning that alliances can be formed with very different types of government. Second, in principle, political breaks imply major or minor restructurings of resource constellations. A change in the political system means that the research system becomes detached from the former political context and merges into the current context.

Ash’s concept draws particular attention to three levels of analysis during the Weimar period: changes in the human resource constellation, institutional changes, and finally, the ideological realignment. Institutionally, there were many changes during and after the revolution. To mention just a few, prewar trends, such as the continued outsourcing of research from the universities to industry and non-university research institutes, accelerated after 1918. As a result of benefactors’ capital being destroyed by inflation, new funding agencies such as the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) came into being. However, these institutional changes were not linked to changes in political thinking, staffing, or shifts in the distribution of power. There were no dismissals and almost no newcomers in this field. During the restructuring of resources between politics and science after 1918, the negotiations were conducted by the same people as in the past, the protagonists were the same, and the same people were given the top positions in the newly established funding networks. As the money for science and research was distributed indirectly via private or semi-private organizations like the German Research Foundation, it became very relevant that they were run by the same people

who had been in charge before 1914. They used the terms “autonomy” and “academic freedom” as a method of shielding themselves systematically from democratic transparency.³

The final result was the same old distribution of corporate power and the same forms of organization. From an actively involved scientist’s point of view, there was no great need to adapt to the new political system. This continuity of the top men in charge also meant that the leading figures did not need to use any particularly democratic rhetoric in order to act efficiently in the new resource network. Another reason this was not necessary was that science and research enjoyed a remarkably unchallenged special status. Instead of representing only one factor among many contributing to the power of the German Reich, as had been the case before 1914, the sciences were perceived as the sole substitute for lost power in Weimar Germany. The natural sciences, especially, experienced a considerable increase in prestige, both within and outside the university system, on the political left and right alike.

II. Three Scientists and Their Politics

Of course, Einstein, Haber, and Planck were in no way “typical.” On the contrary, all three were exceptional—they were Nobel Prize winners. But they share some major similarities beyond that. All three received their awards shortly after the First World War: Planck and Haber were awarded Nobel Prizes for the year 1918, Einstein for the year 1921. The Nobel Prize not only strengthened their reputation, but also affected how they themselves handled the “symbolic capital” that the Nobel Prize conveyed. There are further common denominators. All three came from the physical sciences: Planck and Einstein from theoretical physics and Haber from physical chemistry. All three lived and worked in Berlin and were closely connected scientifically and also through friendship and mutual esteem. All three held important positions in the most distinguished academic institutions of their time: in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society (Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft), the German Research Foundation, and the Berlin Academy of Sciences (Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin). In short, they were powerful figures in a network that was once described by Mitchell Ash as “academic internal affairs.” Finally, unlike other well-known scientists of the time, they were all considered supporters of the Weimar Republic.

Despite so many similarities, there are also significant differences. First of all, their ages: Planck, born in 1858, was the oldest. If one wanted to put him into a generational category, he would belong in the so-called Wilhelmine generation that included the Kaiser himself. Haber was ten years younger. Born in 1868, he grew up in the so-called Gründerzeit, the flourishing founding years of the German Reich, as did Einstein, who, however, was younger still. Einstein was born in 1879 and around the same age as the Republic’s later foreign minister Gustav Stresemann. At the beginning of the Weimar Republic, then, Planck was 60 years old, Haber was 50, and Einstein was 40—all three were of mature age. Everything indicates that the older generation—those born between 1860 and 1885—could more easily accept the Republic than the younger one.

Within the small group of scientists who were relatively sympathetic to the Republic, the three Nobel Prize winners covered a fairly wide political spectrum from left to right. Einstein was the exceptional case. Whereas Planck and Haber had signed the ominous “Call to the Cultured World” in 1914 (Aufruf an die Kulturwelt), thus totally dedicating themselves to the German war effort, Einstein was an avowed pacifist. He advocated international dialogue and was continually under police observation. In the Weimar period, he committed himself openly to the Republic with the words: “My political ideal is the democratic one.” In his view, any autocratic system attracted the morally inferior and therefore had to degenerate. He despised anything having to do with the military top establishment and the Obrigkeitsstaat, the authoritarian state, as “the worst product of the herd instinct,” and, he continued: “If someone enjoys marching to music in a military line up, then he was given his brain by mistake—the spinal fluid would have been more than enough already.”

Planck was at the other end of the political scale. For him, adherence to the German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP) was the maximum political concession he was prepared to make to the new system. His


5 On Planck, see Dieter Hoffmann, “Das Verhältnis der Akademie zu Republik und Diktatur: Max Planck als Sekretär,” in Die Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin 1914-1945.
basic political conviction was national-conservative, but he always endeavored to act correctly toward the Republic. In his manuscripts, there are only few explicitly political statements. His comments were always quiet and reserved, and he cultivated the image of being a withdrawn scholar. He did, however, clearly understand the importance of institutions, boards, and committees for the functioning of the academic system and held a large number of official posts. In other words, one should not underestimate Planck’s sense of political power. Perhaps Planck is the natural scientist who could best be described as the prototype of the Vernunftrepublikaner, a republican by reason who, in line with Friedrich Meinecke’s definition, basically remained a monarchist at heart. Certainly the question of loyalty to State and Crown occupied him constantly. Even in 1934, after the National Socialist takeover, Planck still associated the November of 1918 with “the most disgraceful peace treaty, the even more shameful constitutional revolution and economic bankruptcy.”

Despite his formal allegiance to the Republic, Planck was noticeably tolerant of aggressive nationalistic and revanchist tones in academic commissions. The ideal of pure science without politics that he otherwise strongly defended suddenly did not seem to count here. Like many of his colleagues, Planck distanced himself from the Weimar Republic and withdrew into the republic of science free from politics. He was guided by the values of the Wilhelmine state: duty, order, loyalty, neutrality of state officials, and a self-portrait of the scientist as a nonpolitical upholder of culture above the abyss of daily politics. Planck bore the introduction of universal suffrage only with great reluctance. Even in 1943, in the middle of the most horrible war of destruction and annihilation, he still felt universal suffrage had been a “huge mistake.” He rejected the majority principle, comparing politics to science, and stated that, after all, non-experts should not decide on the validity of Einstein’s and Newton’s theories.

Planck’s elitist rejection of the masses was shared by Einstein, whose commitment to democracy contrasted with his differentiation between the common riff raff and the intellectual elite. In fact, there is a certain ambivalence in Einstein’s political thinking. An evaluation of his works and correspondence shows that his perception of his political role was closely connected to his self-conception as a natural scientist, which he elevated to a universal concept. In Einstein’s view, the true value of a person was determined by how far one had progressed towards “liberation from oneself,” that is, overcoming one’s instincts and
egoism. In his view, a democratic society consisted of two groups. On the one hand, a small group of selfless individuals with the moral duty of leadership—conflicts of interest no longer exist, nor is it necessary to negotiate political compromise. On the other hand, the “raw masses,” that is, a large number of impulsive and manipulable figures in urgent need of leadership, among them also people whom he called “worthless” and “detrimental.” With this elitist contrast between “raw masses” and a small number of high-ranking intellectuals in leading political roles, Einstein was basically no different from the Bildungsbürger, the educated middle-class citizens, of his time, except that they supported and legitimized the authoritarian state, whereas Einstein attacked it. To have to bow to a majority decision that went against his universal values was unacceptable to him, a view which clearly resembled Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s volonté générale.

The ambiguities in Einstein’s perception of democracy were of practical significance. On numerous occasions, he approved of a strong parliament and accepted parties as bodies of political decision-making. However, he also criticized the political parties for representing particular interests and adamantly refused to become a party member himself. Einstein joined a large number of associations with humanitarian, pacifist, and international ambitions, but only if their nonpartisan orientation was undisputed. Only once did he relinquish his abstinence from party politics—that was for the Reichstag elections in July 1932, when, after much hesitation, he signed a proposal for a joint list of Social-Democratic and Communist candidates in order to counteract the fascist danger.

If Planck’s and Einstein’s stances were ambiguous, what about Fritz Haber?¹⁰ Because of his leading role in German gas warfare in World War I, Haber was long considered a fervent nationalist who was
entirely fixated on the Kaiser. The German defeat did in fact make Haber ill, but he had seen it coming since the beginning of 1918 and still continued to work up to the final moment—the strongest proof of his sense of duty, which he fulfilled, however, more for the sake of the nation than for the Kaiser. Through his involvement in gas warfare, Haber had close connections with high-ranking officers, and through them, to right-wing political circles. But he always clearly rejected their political plans and coups attempts, and openly signaled his backing of Walter Rathenau, whom he personally disliked.

Haber was convinced—and in this he was similar to Planck—that Germany should return to international politics as a great power. Nevertheless, Haber differed remarkably from Planck, just as he differed from his friend Einstein. Politically, Haber belonged to the camp of the German Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei, DDP), that is, the left-wing liberals. He was presumably a party member and thus belonged to a party of the Weimar coalition. His political friends stretched from the right wing of the Social Democrats to the left wing of the German People’s Party. Entering into party politics cannot have been entirely new to him, as we see from the Reichstag election campaign of 1928, when the German Democratic Party leaders offered him the second seat in the Berlin electoral district. Haber felt deeply honored but declined the offer due to his very poor health. He did not feel he would be able to hold the sixty-two planned election speeches and then ten speeches in the Reichstag each year. However, he donated a considerable amount of money to the party and was shocked when the election results revealed the erosion of the politically moderate parties in the middle of the political spectrum.

Unlike Planck, who presented himself as an introverted, withdrawn scholar, Haber held a large number of lectures in which he covered topics at the intersection of politics, economics, and science. In these lectures, he always refrained from remarks about current political matters, but he was not afraid to make general political statements; he subsequently published his lectures in two collections.11 He supported the Republic unconditionally and used his prestige as a Nobel Prize winner to work for its stabilization. He did so at two levels: backing Gustav Stresemann’s foreign policy, and pushing for democratic practice within the committees of various research organizations. Haber not only supported Stresemann’s general course and strongly favored good relations with France, but also committed himself actively to foreign cultural

policy. In agreement with the Foreign Office, he consultated closely with the French mathematician and long-serving Minister of War Paul Painlevé. The explicit goal of these contacts was to achieve a Franco-German rapprochement by bringing across the German viewpoint on behalf of the Foreign Office and, in return, informing political and military circles in Germany of French intentions.

III. International Engagement

Einstein, Planck, and Haber all played active roles in the reintegration of German science into the international academic community. From this perspective, it is worth taking a closer look at the travel activities of all three. Between 1920 and 1925, Einstein traveled abroad unusually often and for unusually long periods, in total for one and a half years: first to the Netherlands and Denmark, then to Prague, Vienna, the United States, and Great Britain; in 1922 for the first time to France, in 1925 to South America. The numerous reports and extensive information compiled by the German diplomatic missions prove the German Foreign Office’s great interest in Einstein’s activities abroad. In 1920, he was already considered a “first-class cultural factor” and ideal for promoting German interests since he had a clean political record and was ranked as a German but by no means a notorious chauvinist. For Einstein himself, the main aim of his journeys was to strengthen his reputation and promote his theories. But he understood the symbolic capital of the Nobel Prize and was ready to serve the Republic as a “big name and lure” (“als Renommierbonze und Lockvogel”). In short, he agreed to travel on behalf of Germany in order to break the boycotts against German academia. But Einstein had an additional, hidden motive for traveling. His trips abroad were also a type of emigration allowing him to avoid his opponents in Germany and to become increasingly involved in Zionism.¹²

Max Planck was quite a different case. Instead of traveling abroad, he campaigned intensively for the revival of international scientific networks in his role at the Berlin Academy, which traditionally was one of the main agents of international academic cooperation. For Planck, maintaining scientific contacts in neutral countries was of utmost importance. With this in mind, he deliberately focused the Academy’s elections of corresponding members on Scandinavian and Dutch scientists. In addition, he pursued a kind of personal “Rapallo policy” with the young Soviet Union.¹³ He visited Moscow and Leningrad and established close contacts with the Russian

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Academy of Science. Needless to say, Planck had no sympathy for Soviet communism. Contacts with Soviet scientists simply served as a political opportunity to counterbalance the boycott policy of the former allied powers. In strong contrast to Haber, Planck intended to overcome the Western boycott by establishing scientific relations with the East—not with France and Western Europe. Planck was thus absolutely capable of abandoning his self-proclaimed nonpolitical concept of science and conducting hard politics via academic networking. The final result, however, was ambiguous: To be sure, his patriotism and dutiful loyalty to the state, as well as his emphasis on the autonomy and international nature of the sciences, made Planck “a loyal servant of the Republic.” But this very attitude also led Planck to a policy of cautious waiting and adaptation during the Third Reich and even to limited cooperation with the Nazi rulers.

Haber’s commitment to reintegrating German science into the international community was extraordinary. Through his services to the Republic’s foreign policy, he was far more involved in the cause than Einstein or Planck. He was one of the few leading scientists who had no anti-republican resentments, so that Stresemann’s Foreign Office had no difficulty in using his services. At the same time, his well-known commitment during the war protected him from accusations that he lacked patriotism. Haber traveled much less than Einstein, but in 1924 his trips to London, the United States, and Japan received a great deal of attention and had a considerable impact on scientific and industrial networking. Most of all, Haber worked to have Germany admitted into the International Research Council and the corresponding international unions. These commitments placed Haber in a precarious situation: facing the boycotters abroad and the counter-boycotters in his own country. In his own words, he had the explicit task of “keeping any potential hotheads in Germany calm for as long as possible.” The hotheads he was alluding to were mostly found in the scientific academies. He therefore reproached the cartel of German academies for “fatally tending to act on the
power of illusions rather than common sense and facts.” With varying degrees of success, Haber negotiated for months with the hardliners on both sides. He was most annoyed with the “ruthless Germanic circles in the Munich Academy,” and, by 1927, felt used by the Foreign Office “like a training team’s football.” In 1929/1930, he finally achieved a breakthrough when Germany joined the International Union for Pure and Applied Chemistry and other unions shortly thereafter.14

IV. Democratic Practices

The biggest differences between Haber, Planck, and Einstein emerge when we examine their everyday democratic practices.15 Haber personally led the battle against authoritarian structures in science, to be more specific, in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the German Research Foundation. In both cases, he wanted to expand representation and participation and break down authoritarian constellations and power structures. Neither Einstein nor Planck did anything similar. Einstein hated administrative work. He even left his work as the director of his Kaiser Wilhelm Institute to his deputy, Max von Laue, and shied away from official posts and committees. Planck, on the other hand, consciously used posts and committees to reestablish conservative positions.

Haber was without doubt one of the most powerful institute directors within the Kaiser Wilhelm Society. He was the only scientist who had a detailed overview of the needs of the other institutes and the course of the society as a whole. Within the Kaiser Wilhelm Society’s key steering committees, the scientists were at a major disadvantage vis-à-vis the industrialists and the representatives of the state and the society’s chief administration (Generalverwaltung) that served on those committees. Haber himself greatly disapproved of the domination of big industry and high finance in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society’s decision-making bodies. He criticized the structural inflexibility of what he called the “bearers of tradition” (Traditionsträger) at the top and deeply distrusted the chief administration. Instead, he sought to secure the participation of scientists in the decision-making. This put him in clear opposition to Adolf von Harnack, President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, who quite explicitly feared “a loss of power through the formation of a kind of faculty by [his] directors.” Harnack’s reference to a “faculty” commands our attention. German universities were by no means a stronghold of democracy but operated by means of authoritarianism

14 Szöllösi-Janze, Fritz Haber, 583-591.

15 For this entire section, see quotations and details in Szöllösi-Janze, Fritz Haber, 616-642.
and a strict hierarchy. A faculty, on the other hand, is based on the principle of radical equality and consensual deliberation and decision-making. Especially during the Republic’s last years of crisis, the practice of institutionalized equality and participation in the academic system sent out a political signal.

Haber worked toward the formation of a lobby to represent the interests of the scientists employed at the institutes. His plans called for the corporate representation of directors and academic members in a so-called Scientific Board (Wissenschaftlicher Rat) that would be newly set up. He spent two years preparing his initiative and gathering supporters on his side before he approached Harnack in 1928 with a request—as he said—to replace the old “patriarchal attitude” in the Kaiser Wilhelm Society with new structures of democratic participation. Harnack’s attempt simply to shelve the proposal failed, and the growing pressure was further increased by politics. The Scientific Board was in fact set up that same year as a body for democratic joint responsibility of the scientists within the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and as a counterweight to the president’s authoritarian rule and the gradually expanding power of the chief administration. However, Haber made no friends among the Kaiser Wilhelm Society’s executives. They very soon systematically thwarted any opportunities he might have had to become president.

In the German Research Foundation, established in 1920 thanks mainly to Haber, the conflicts ran even deeper.¹⁶ There, Haber had insisted from the start on the establishment of democratic principles and ensured that the Foundation’s grant selection panels were elected by scientists and scholars. In 1927, as second deputy of the president, Haber continued his campaign against authoritarian

¹⁶ See also Ulrich Marsch, Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft: Gründung und frühe Geschichte (Frankfurt, 1994); Notker Hammerstein, Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich: Wissenschaftspolitik in der Republik und Diktatur 1920-1945 (Munich, 1999), esp. 76-82.
structures by criticizing the foundation’s Annual Report, which only the president had seen before it was published. Among a whole list of criticisms, Haber emphasized the fact that the report contained no financial figures and, in particular, no accounting for the use of public funds. Unlike Haber, Research Foundation President Friedrich Schmidt-Ott interpreted the principle of academic autonomy in a decidedly anti-democratic sense. He systematically undermined democratic state control and refused to allow public scrutiny of grant allocation proceedings.

A short time later, in 1928/29, in the Foundation’s so-called existential crisis, Haber once again sided with those who wanted to phase out fossilized authoritarianism. This episode began with an article in the left-wing journal Die Weltbühne that criticized the foundation as a “den of evil clique mentality.” The article coincided with the political scandal surrounding the National Socialist mathematician Theodor Vahlen, to whom Schmidt-Ott had demonstratively granted a foundation fellowship after Vahlen’s removal from office for political reasons. This action and the resulting Weltbühne article triggered a political avalanche that first reached the foundation’s numerous, but hitherto non-active, governing bodies, then the Prussian Ministry of Education, and finally the Reichstag. In the public realm, Haber was by no means the main campaigner, but he was all the more active and influential behind the scenes. His main objective, which was eventually accepted and put into practice, was to reform the foundation by strengthening its representative bodies and, specifically, to transform the Steering Committee (Hauptausschuss) into a powerful body that would make the decisions on the distribution of funds. Haber worked hard on the implementation of the reform measures and finally triumphed over Schmidt-Ott’s fierce resistance. An amendment to the statutes curbed the president’s power and decisively strengthened the rights of the Steering Committee (Hauptausschuss). Scholars and scientists in the universities, however, made very little use of their newly established rights, and the elections for the granting bodies confirmed the old “traditionalists” whom Haber distrusted. Haber’s bold initiative resulted in deadlock, and Brüning’s presidential regime soon neutralized the political pressure to democratize the German Research Foundation.

This brings us to the last part of my essay on the intrinsic limitations of democratic practices in science and beyond. In the cases of Planck and Einstein, these limitations have already become clear, and Haber’s endeavor to revive or implement practices of participation
in research institutions and foundations were not appreciated by his fellow scientists—he remained isolated. Then, in 1930, in view of the escalating economic and political crises, Haber saw the necessity of deliberating fundamentally on the future of the Republic. In July 1930, the German Democratic Party joined forces with some smaller right-wing parties and merged into the so-called German State Party (*Deutsche Staatspartei*) in order to counteract the erosion of left-wing liberalism. Among a who’s who of German liberalism, the new party’s founding document also included Haber’s name. In view of extremist threats from left and right, the founding document redefined the role of political parties, claiming that parties as bodies representing only particular interests were not capable of creating the required “national solidarity.” Like millions of other Germans, Haber was convinced that things could not continue as they were and sought the strength to master the crisis not in party democracy, but in an authoritarian system of government.

The boundaries of Haber’s concept become clear in a detailed letter of May 1931 that he addressed to the Reich Minister of Finance, Hermann Dietrich, who was also a cofounder of the German State Party. Haber was well aware of the breach with his previous views when he suggested that the government itself should now move towards dictatorship. As had been the case with Einstein and Planck, now the “raw masses” constituted the turning point in Haber’s political thinking. Haber considered the masses a “new race” that pushed the old parties aside and demanded a new form of political leadership. This new race, he argued, was searching for a German version of what had already been realized in various ways in Russia and Italy. It no longer believed in grandfatherly liberalism or the slow pace of trade unionist Social Democracy. Haber saw the only feasible solution in the so-called German socialism that he viewed as having been pioneered during the First World War: “detach state power and authority from the parliamentary system and the power over the economy from private enterprise and declare dictatorship and planned economy as central claims of one’s own manifesto.” As was the case with other details in his proposal, it was explicitly the First World War which served Haber as an example. Haber attributed huge destructive power to the selfishness of particular groups such as business leaders, lobbies, and parties and felt that it was now high time to eliminate them all.

Haber’s fixation on the experiences of the First World War brings the blind spots of his political thinking into focus. In the end, his…

17 Such as Theodor Eschenburg, Theodor Heuss, Gertrud Bäumer, and Erich Koch-Weser.
thinking remained elitist, just like Planck’s and Einstein’s. Haber also overlooked decisive factors such as the obscure maneuvering of the army and the political intrigues of big industry and the conservatives—all of which were, of course, mostly unknown to contemporaries. Moreover, he lacked intuition for the meaning of politically mobilized masses—in fact, for political power in itself. Haber recognized political danger, but his intellectual encounter with National Socialism remained vague. Above all, he misjudged the political ambition of his State Party colleague Hermann Dietrich, who, Haber hoped, would pass on his ideas to eager and determined politicians so that—as he said—a leading personality would take the initiative. But who was that supposed to be? Haber’s political concept lacked a recipient who could implement it and was rooted in an overestimation of the state and its constitutive power. This shows, perhaps surprisingly, that Haber ultimately personified the dilemma of German liberalism.

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COMMENT ON MARGIT SzÖLLÖSI-JANZE’S
"THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES"

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Professor Szöllösi-Janze’s lecture is a marvelous one to respond to. Her address lets us reflect on how a cohort of German academics (scientists, in this case) struggled in a critical moment with their relation to a democratic system of governance. Their cohort was lacking, of course, either the personal historical experience or the ideological commitment that would give them the confidence that the democratic process was viable from the start: confidence that democracy was adequate to the structural demands placed on it; that it deserved the trust that has to come in advance of accomplishments; that it might indeed waver, even go astray, but eventually would right its course. The problem they faced is a compelling one. In its own ways, at least on the last of these counts, it speaks to present experience. Even in long-established democracies, historical experience of the form’s viability must be repeatedly renewed if the confidence of spokesmen and stakeholders is not to decay. The problem may be posed especially sharply for democratic systems in which academic elites, if these are to serve as pillars of the political order, face the reality of chasms of political opinion separating them from large sections of the voting public.

The commitment of academic elites to democracy is a problem that we must investigate in the specificity of a concrete historical context. In this case, the context is the fledgling Weimar Republic. And for the context chosen here, the strategy selected by Professor Szöllösi-Janze is to examine leading figures on the German scientific scene. This approach has a particular cogency. For much recent research in the history of science in this period, and inescapably in the Third Reich, has highlighted how German scientific statesmen steered the scientific community into collaboration with an expressly anti-democratic regime.1 Rather than assuming some natural affinity between science and democracy, as was part of conventional wisdom in other parts of the world, in Germany the presumption has been that natural scientists in Weimar were at best indifferent to the democratic system. An indifferent democrat, however, is no democrat at all.

Professor Szöllösi-Janze approaches her task through three individuals. For historians of the scientific enterprise in the Weimar

1 An introduction may be found in Margit Szöllösi-Janze, ed., Science in the Third Reich (Oxford, 2001).
Republic, Planck, Einstein, and Haber have long served as something akin to stick figures: Planck, the apolitical moderate; Einstein, the good democrat; Haber, the servant of power. Each has stood in for a version of scientists’ political involvement that has been constructed—it seems in historiographical retrospect—more with simplifying abstractions than with on-the-ground empirical detail. In her lecture, Professor Szöllösi-Janze has given us spot-on portraits of their considerably more complicated sensibilities; and the complications she highlights have more than merely biographical benefit. With the kind of research that Szöllösi-Janze has drawn on—and that she has herself done so exemplarily with Haber—we are starting to get beyond the stereotypes. Instead, we have far more challenging figures to deal with, figures who in their irreducible individuality break down simple analytical schemata. As unrepresentative as they may still have been, these individuals reveal a richer set of real historical options.

One reason Szöllösi-Janze’s figures deliver this insight is that all were elite actors with unusual opportunities for influence. When an Einstein, a Planck, or a Haber traveled abroad as a representative of German science, when he made a move in the chess game of “academic internal affairs,” however he intervened, his choices might in fact make a difference (or so we assume). For each man was situated in webs of expectation and power that lent consequence to his actions. And political actions matter here—as much as, or more than, political beliefs or political talk. As Einstein said in a different context: If you want to understand scientists, don’t listen to their words; fix your attention on their deeds. Einstein, of course, was talking about scientific practice, which, unlike politics, is presumably nondiscursive. His point is well taken, all the same.

Professor Szöllösi-Janze illustrates how these three figures leveraged cultural-political expectations and positions of institutional power. And the episodes she highlights are particularly useful because they point up disjunctions between doing and saying, actions and talk. Planck’s case is especially well illuminated by this choice. For a long time, Planck’s avoidance of overt political speechifying let us misrecognize him as more politically moderate than he in fact was. But the strategy of looking to actions is also a good one for Einstein and Haber, both of whom have more complicated palettes of actions than their public statements might lead us to believe. As historians of the scientific community begin to give less priority to
language, however abstractly quotable, and more to the realities of situated action, we are gaining a far more differentiated understanding of the political options chosen by scientists in Weimar.

There are many questions that Szöllösi-Janze’s examples raise. I shall pose three of them here. As anchored as these questions all are in these cases of scientists, they are hardly specific to science. Rather, they help illuminate more general questions about the relations of elite academic actors to Weimar democracy at large.

First, what understanding of democracy are we taking as our reference point and measuring our actors in relation to? “Democracy” is a protean thing; at least, it was back in the day. Let me list a few possible meanings, all of which may very well have preoccupied our actors at the same time. Democracy as an abstract political recipe—meaning, perhaps, universal suffrage plus respect for civil rights plus rule of law? Democracy defined structurally, as in the example of a democratic parliamentary system with its particular relation between the head of government and the parties represented in parliament? Democracy as Weimar’s specific instantiation thereof, marked by its strong party structure and intense polarization of the public sphere? Democracy even as some kind of democratic sensibility, embodied, for instance, in actions like not writing off the electorate as an unthinking irrational mass?

My observation is this: When we talk about scientists’ (or others’) democratic practices, it is crucial to pick out the reference point. Joining a political party, or making public displays of political opinion, or accepting the legitimacy of majority opinion or the outcome of parliamentary maneuvering whatever it may be—these actions at issue in Szöllösi-Janze’s account may be essentially democratic in certain understandings of democracy. In other understandings, they may be utterly marginal. Since our three figures split on some of these counts, we can get some analytical help in characterizing their differences by breaking the “democracy” notion apart. And where they end up agreeing—for at the end of the day, all three do look instinctively elitist—we get a possibly clearer sense of where their cohort’s troubles with Weimar democracy may lie.

Second, Szöllösi-Janze’s cases are dissected using the language of stabilization—the stabilization of Weimar democracy, of course. Stabilization is an extraordinarily powerful metaphor (one borrowed, to some extent, from the natural sciences, we may note). It
is powerful in part because it so distinctively captures the concerns of the actors of the day. At the same time, at least as those actors used it, stabilization directs our gaze in a particular direction. It asks us to focus on the overall course and behavior of the system. As for the system’s internal processes, stabilization directs our attention to them only insofar as they keep the system at hand from going off course or breaking apart. Weimar democracy could be stabilized by means that had no particular democratic valence. Further, it is worth making some distinctions. There are actions that might stabilize Weimar democracy in its practical realization—for instance, wooing understanding for its actions on the international scene, or campaigning for support for its policies at home. These are arguably quite different from behavior that itself models democratic process. Such might include respect for expression of divergent political opinions, or (with some allowance for skepticism in the case of Haber, who seems to have been most invested in the separation of powers) transparency and accountability in the organizations of science. For someone like Planck, stabilizing Weimar democracy amounted just to stabilizing the current form of the German state. It had no relation to democratic process at all. The question is whether the stabilization of Weimar democracy, in the sense of keeping it from external debacles or internal breakdown, had any hope of succeeding in the absence of a procedural commitment, on the part of elites or others, to democratic norms.

This brings me to my final question, one that Professor Szöllösi-Janze quite reasonably did not pose but that is provocative to try to work out of her material. Planck, Einstein, and Haber may have believed they were helping secure the Weimar Republic. Did their actions, or those of others like them, in fact contribute to that goal? Did their legitimation efforts in cultural foreign policy really make a difference? Their public statements on behalf of the forces that held the Weimar center together? Their sporadic modeling of democratic process, even? Certainly, they may have talked about securing the Republic. They may have even intended it, acted on it. But did it matter?

Talk of just how much they mattered, of course, has been well noted by historians. It is cogent and quotable, as Planck and others spoke of science as the last means of German self-assertion on the international scene. But outside the community of academics with their self-important rhetoric, outside friends in the Prussian

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Cultural Ministry and the Foreign Office and some of the parties—outside these groups, already committed to staging the scientists’ importance—did their engagements really contribute to any effective defense of the system? I frame the question in part out of skepticism about our actors’ self-understandings as powerful elites, in part as a historical exercise about the Weimar Republic. How can we work out in what way academics made a difference, if they did? As interesting as it may be, that is a larger challenge than the history of science, at least, in the Weimar Republic has yet taken up. It highlights the relation of self-perceived elites, scientific or otherwise, to the course of democracy at large.

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I would like to begin this essay on my dissertation research with some reflections on the questions that motivated and shaped it. At its most basic level, my question was: How does social and political change happen? The central topic I investigated, women’s emancipation, is one of the profound long-term changes in modern history. We know a lot about the events and organizations that were important to this transformation, and quite a bit about how abstract processes—such as modernization, capitalist economic development, and political liberalization—affected it. But in the end, people have to agree to live their lives differently and to make new choices. Economic structures, state actions, and advocacy organizations were, of course, crucial shaping factors in the emergence of New Women in the late nineteenth century, but they only give us context. They do not really explain how women became new.

My focus point in trying to penetrate emancipation is sexuality. One of the key terms in my analysis of women’s changing sense of themselves is desire. Desire is clearly one of the things we think about when we think of sex, but desire—desire for something different—is also central to any project of emancipation. Desire also describes what I was about in pursuing this research. I wanted to get below the surface of feminist organizations and the spectacular images associated with New Women and into what was happening in the consciousness and psyche of individuals that prompted them to create new self-definitions and new ways of imagining how their stories fit into the larger social and political stories of their time. I wanted to understand the processes and influential factors that gave shape to their choices and sympathies. I wanted a much more troubled view of how people struggle with re-making and re-defining themselves as they live out the relationships and activities of everyday life. I wanted to know how sexuality—pleasure, love, and desire—intersected with emancipation. I wanted to figure out how national identity and political commitments might be affected by changes in gender and sexuality on the very intimate level that encompasses feelings and dreams. And I wanted to connect all of
this to the pressures and fractures of German history in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In satisfying my intellectual and historical desires, I was transgressing one of the crucial rules that most of my historical subjects lived by. Most women I investigated could not simply claim emancipation as what they wanted. Articulating desires for things like freedom, ambition, power, a more enjoyable life—even in the name of justice—was taboo. They needed elaborate self-denying justifications to support their claims. As they negotiated this paradox, middle-class women produced texts in which their forbidden desires confronted the ideals they assimilated from their education and culture. Much of my dissertation was built on reading these texts carefully to get beyond the assumption that women naturally fought for liberation because they wanted to free their “real selves” from the oppression enforced on them by sexist social norms.

Narrowing the focus even further to homosexuality was uniquely possible in the German context. The German homosexual movement had long roots among men in the second half of the nineteenth century and was then the most organized and publicly visible in the world.1 When women occupied their own specific corner of the developing homosexual public sphere in the late 1920s and early 1930s, they left a historical record that gave me an intriguing entry point for my inquiry. Women active in the German homosexual movement wrote articles, stories, autobiographical fragments, poetry, and letters to and for newspapers published for their community.2 But telling the story of that one new public group, as important as it is, did not fully resolve my questions. By taking female homosexuality as a category—and a new one in public awareness—I could move out into discussions and representations of the intersection of gender and sexuality in many other contexts.

Wherever female homosexuality became an issue, it generated anxiety, conflict, and struggle, and therefore source material documenting changes in conceptions and experiences of gender and sexuality. Following the history of the concept allowed me to set up comparisons and trajectories of change over time. I could productively bring in historical subjects who struggled with these issues even though they did not think of themselves as homosexual.3 When medical experts defined the category of female homosexuality at the end of the nineteenth century, they more frequently used the

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3 Similar approaches to the intersection of gender and sexuality for groups of women in this period are exemplified in Martha Vicinus, Independent Women: Work and Community for Single Women, 1850-1920 (Chicago, 1985) (on Great Britain); and Margit Göttert, Macht und Eros: Frauenbeziehungen und weibliche Kultur um 1900: Eine neue Perspektive auf Helene Lange und Gertrud Bäumer (Königstein/Taunus, 2000) (on the German women’s movement).
term “invert.” Concepts of inversion prioritized gender over sexuality. Same-sex desire was understood as being caused by abnormal gender character—a masculine woman desired women because of her essential masculinity. Medical experts and other intellectuals who used the new categories in thinking about social relations in the late nineteenth century invariably conflated what they diagnosed as female masculinity with feminist claims on masculine spheres.4 In consequence of these uncertain and overlapping boundaries between sexual desire, gender performance, and aspirations for emancipation, discourse and contention over sexual categories always intimately involved gender and same-sex relations as well. These four elements—sexual desire, gender performance, feminist aspirations, and same-sex love—were exactly the facets of emancipation that I wanted to examine. They formed a conceptual quartet that shaped the analysis of texts and group dynamics.

As I discovered clusters of sources that fit these parameters, I found that I had four case studies of groups of women clearly wrestling with emancipation from traditional female roles and expectations. Two of them coalesced in the decades before the turn of the century and two during the Weimar Republic. This chronology is unsurprising since the New Woman was a figure much commented upon in both periods. In both periods sexuality as a theme proliferated as a point of experimentation and commentary in the sciences, the arts, and among avant-gardes.5 My micro-historical methodology involved careful reconstruction of the social context within which each group lived, of some of the texture of its everyday life, and of the conflicts as well as the attractions and affections among the individuals within it.

I.

The first case study was formed out of the stories of a small but growing stream of German women from well-off families who migrated temporarily to Switzerland in order to take university degrees beginning in the 1870s. German universities did not grant degrees to women before the first decade of the twentieth century, although many women did study with individual professors. Access to higher education was one of the earliest and strongest issues fought for by the feminist movement in that period. Living independently in Switzerland and taking on the identity of a student were regarded as scandalous in the press and among the


5 Two works I have found particularly helpful for my contexts are Peter Jelavich, Munich and Theatrical Modernism: Politics, Playwriting, and Performance, 1890-1914 (Cambridge, MA, 1985), and Richard W. McCormick, Gender and Sexuality in Weimar Modernity: Film, Literature, and the “New Objectivity” (New York, 2001).
bourgeois social circles from which the students came. The image of the student, stereotyped as masculine and asexual, became the object of public censure and ridicule. Like most pioneers, women university students also had to contend with the resistance of many of their male colleagues.  

The intensity of their student days induced many to write memoirs or novelizations of their experiences. In one case, collected letters and diary entries from the period were published as a memorial. Most were financially dependent on relatives and had to manage precarious family support carefully. But in their memories, at least, the exhilaration of new mental and physical freedom and intellectual stimulation outweighed the obstacles and barriers, and the intensity of sharing these experiences heightened their relationships with one another. A number of the women who were students in this pioneer period, including Anita Augspurg, Käthe Schirmacher, Franziska Tiburtius, and Joanna Elberskirchen, also appear in histories of female homosexuality because they lived in female couple relationships throughout their lives in addition to being active and outspoken feminists. Careful reading and analysis of these narratives reversed many of my assumptions about the role of the university circle of friends as a site where homosexual identity might have begun to take shape. 

First of all, women sought out university study because they already had feminist aspirations, close relationships with other women, and a strong drive to be active in public life. Although their friendships were intense and lifelong, in the university setting they did not form romantic couples. The fragile position from which they sought to claim autonomy and intellectual authority meant that any kind of absorbing love relationship was threatening to those goals. Instead they formed flexible networks that gave priority to comradeship and support, but that also involved occasional flirtations or fantasies. Gender performance was also strategic. Appropriating masculine signs was a strategy of signaling unwillingness to enter into traditional relations with men—relations which they could not separate from the norms of subordination and reproductive roles. But when more could be gained from conforming to conventional femininity, they adapted their personal styles. The radical aspect of their feminism lay in imagining and acting out genderless subject positions and non-sexualized sociability as a model basis for a new kind of social relations.

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6 A very thorough analysis of the contradictions faced by women students is found in Patricia Mazón, Gender and the Modern Research University: The Admission of Women to German Higher Education, 1865-1914 (Stanford, 2003).

7 The main titles are Ella Mensch, Auf Vorposten: Roman aus meiner Züricher Studentenzzeit (Leipzig, 1903); Ricarda Huch, Frühling in der Schweiz: Jugenderinnerungen (Zurich, 1938); Käthe Schirmacher, Züricher Studentinnen (Leipzig, 1896); Käthe Schirmacher, Die L. bercht: Novelle (Zurich, 1891); Franziska Tiburtius, Erinnerungen einer Achtzigjährigen (Berlin, 1929); and Marie Baum, Ricarda Huch, Ludwig Curtius, and Anton Erkelenz, eds., Frieda Düdensing: Ein Buch der Erinnerung (Berlin, 1926).

II.

Slightly later, in the mid-1890s, a heterogeneous group of feminists and emancipated women came into contact with each other within the overlapping circles of Bohemians and intellectuals that characterized Munich in that era. For this network, there are relatively few direct sources. Instead I use a set of fictional texts that appear to draw on the personal styles as well as the issues of emancipation that were evoked by the authors’ observations of New Women. The central figure in my analysis is Sophia Goudstikker, photographer and feminist activist. Goudstikker moved to Munich together with her then-partner Anita Augspurg as a deliberate act of self-emancipation. Goudstikker became notorious in Munich for her freewheeling appropriation of the trappings of masculinity as a provocative challenge to gender norms. While Goudstikker appears to combine all the markers that mean lesbian—masculine affect, female partners, feminism—it is clear in reading the representations of her that contemporaries diagnosed her as asexual or misguided rather than as a type with a label such as “invert” or “homosexual.”

Goudstikker’s performance of masculinity as captured in these representations took place within a milieu that was intensively engaged in rethinking sexuality. This opened a space where all kinds of alternatives were in play. I read Goudstikker’s masculinity as a critical mimicry. One of its features was enactment of a “lady’s man” role in interacting with other women. This exaggerated flattery and solicitude was a critique of men’s conventional approaches to women, but it also embedded a claim to sexual autonomy. The texts she seems to have inspired wrestled with how heterosexual reproduction, the family, and


erotic love could incorporate women’s independence. The chapter also pays attention to the difficulties women in this period encountered in thinking of themselves as autonomous sexual subjects, much less in thinking of the erotic as a factor that could define personal identity. Goudstikker’s masculinity marks out a transitional stage of asserting female sexuality. Other nontraditional women asserted themselves sexually in other ways; together these experiments in sexual subjectivity were a crucial precursor to the emergence of homosexual identity in the following decade.

A 1901 novel about female students was titled *Are These Women?* The Goudstikker-like character in one of the novels says, “If only there were such a thing as a normal woman!” These symptoms make clear the destabilization of Victorian ideals of womanhood at the end of the century. The common thread that runs through both of the pre-twentieth-century case studies is a complete reconsideration of received gender roles going on in multiple locations. For women, considering new self-definitions meant confrontation with expert (male) voices authoritatively claiming to know what a woman was. New roles and aspirations for women could not be harmonized with the existing concepts of sexual desire and love. One of the most intense and intimate issues for feminists, as well as for medical experts, artists, and intellectuals, was defining how sex, reproduction, and love could function if the femininity that anchored them was no longer operative.

Before 1900, neither women in all-women’s social groups nor the public generally yet recognized female homosexuality as a category. After the turn of the century, a number of texts appeared that described or made reference to the stereotyped female homosexual in explicit terms. In the German context, debates over reform of the law that criminalized homosexual contact between men and the character of Countess Geschwitz in Frank Wedekind’s Lulu plays were two important controversies that brought discussion of homosexuality into broader public awareness. Magnus Hirschfeld and other sexologists published books and pamphlets meant to inform the public about alternative sexual orientations. Große Glocke, a Berlin weekly, built on the scandals about male homosexuality among German elites by exposing the existence of neighborhoods, clubs, and bars where homosexual women gathered.
III.

The first of the Weimar case studies is focused on one segment of these urban subcultures of women that were beginning to coalesce around the turn of the century. It is not until the publication of periodicals for this audience that a source base capable of supporting an analysis parallel to the other case studies becomes available. The historical subjects in this case study did define themselves as homosexual. Their numbers in Berlin and other major cities were sufficient to support a public institutional infrastructure of clubs, bars, events, and periodicals. The extensiveness of their activities can be misleading; their public profile was made possible by alliance with a much more active and well-organized male homosexual mass movement. The clubs and periodicals for women were subordinate to groups led by men. Nevertheless, they allowed the women who assumed leadership positions to establish public personae as local intellectuals who attempted to guide and shape the consciousness of their members. Leaders drew on the rhetoric of respectability and German cultural values in their attempts to discipline a public that was all too easily tempted to become part of the transgressive, erotic milieu of Berlin nightlife.

Although these groups were reputed to be primarily social, their leaders constantly reminded members that they aspired to be accepted as German citizens contributing to the national mission and should behave accordingly. Despite the fact that women had gained suffrage and nominal citizenship in 1919, dignity, social standing, and responsible citizenship still took on a male form. Although it contradicted the inversion ideas of the nineteenth century, both male and female homosexuals claimed essential masculinity. The gender politics of the organizations reveal much about gender as a factor in Germany more broadly. What Germany seemed to need in late Weimar was more masculinity.

Both male and female leaders reinforced respectability as a kind of middle-class, responsible masculinity that homosexuals could use

to make their claims for inclusion in the nation, while denouncing those who hurt the reputation of homosexuals by acting out their desires. But conservative policing of behavior was not limited to the speeches and political appeals, which may have had limited resonance with ordinary members. Attention to the short stories and the novellas published in the periodicals reveals the representations of love, sex, community, and values with which readers identified more closely.

Most of the narratives were shaped according to the elements of the popular love story genre. The lonely protagonist is rescued by finding her true love. In many stories, the plot develops from another standard device: the dilemma of the protagonist’s choice between two potential lovers—one identified with desire and erotic satisfaction (and the spaces of erotic exchange that proliferated in Weimar Berlin), the other with spiritual love and the stable couple (and the establishment of a respectable home). This melodramatic choice externalized the conflicts between love and desire that continued to trouble women’s self-conceptions, even in sexually frank Weimar and even among women who identified themselves with a sexual preference. Needless to say, the heroine inevitably chose the partner with whom she could share her denial of sexual desire. But the respectable couple, or the female subject who aspired to be in one, needed compensation for the erotic temptations that it renounced. An ideology of “holy love,” spoken of using excessively religious language and imagery, eroticized the act of renunciation itself. The idiom of sacrifice and spirit mobilized in this ideology meshed seamlessly with romantic nationalism and German idealism. Two factors reveal that the hegemonic values of respectability may not have been quite as secure as they seemed. First, the very obsessive quality of drawing the boundaries between acceptable and rejected kinds of same-sex behavior indicates that the more transgressive pursuit of pleasure and desire remained an ever-present irritation. Secondly, although the stories find narrative closure in rewarding love and sacrifice, on the way to getting there, they communicate the excitement of erotic exchange and passion.

IV.

Another kind of sacrifice and duty connected to the nation motivated a second set of Weimar women. Women who worked as social workers, teachers, nurses, and policewomen were able to enter the

16 I analyze these overlapping groups as emergent alternative public spheres using the concept as described historically in Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Boston, 1989); and Michael Warner, “Publics and Counterpublics,” Public Culture 14 (2002): 49-90.
civil service under the terms of Weimar citizenship. They defined their professional ambitions as particularly gendered service to the nation. Most of them worked in female-dominated spheres that were nevertheless responsible to higher male bureaucrats. My engagement with women in the workplace comes through accusations of homosexuality that emerged in workplace conflicts and entered the historical record through disciplinary cases. The core of each case was conflict within workgroups that had fractured into enemy camps caught in a cycle of sabotage, harassment, and revenge. In their depositions, the working women describe their relationships with one another, as well as the pressures women faced in moving into unaccustomed roles and in adapting to the expectations of competitive and politicized workplaces. Family members and friends outside the workplace were also invited to assess their sisters’ or friends’ personality and relationships. Medical experts were consulted to diagnose the psychological and sexual character of the women accused. The sources thus provide a snapshot of knowledge and ideas about homosexuality in the medical profession and in the broader general population.

Through close reading of the circulation of rumor and accusation from the archival evidence, it is possible to reconstruct the strategic use of sexual language in circuits of power. Through innuendo and scandal, interpretation and investigation, repressed knowledge became a site for “spirals of power and pleasure” that, not incidentally, also generated considerable shame and psychic pain. In each case, juridical authority succeeded in removing the woman blamed for the irritating habit of making same-sex desire visible. But to situate this outcome as the story of (gendered) power would be to miss the power of talk about sex and the participation in these circuits of power by women who were supposed to be officially “pure.” In each case, the accused woman generated an escalating series of grievance statements demanding that the state recognize her injured innocence. In hyperbolic language, they created a mirror exposing the gaps between the civil service’s legitimating rhetoric of service and the competitive reality of the workplace.

Although their grievances decried the politicization of the bureaucracy as corrupt, the accused women also felt it necessary to align themselves with a party that could protect them and defend their honor. The Lyzeum teacher Anna Philipps exemplifies the reaction of a civil servant who smarted under the shame of disgrace and

17 In addition to the Philipps case manuscript cited in note 19, this chapter examines two archival cases. The Atteln case involved a nurse working in Frankfurt. Institut für Stadtgeschichte Frankfurt, Personalakten S2.667. The Erkens case involved the entire city government and was widely reported on in the German press. Erkens was head of the Female Police in Hamburg. Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Disziplinärkammer, D8/32, Bd. 1/17; Polizeibehörde, No. 314, 338; Polizei Personalakten, No. 316.1, 316.2. The case was also the subject of Ursula Nienhaus, Nicht für eine Führungsposition geeignet: Josefine Erkens und die Anfänge weiblicher Polizei in Deutschland, 1923-1933 (Münster, 1999).

18 The analysis of discourse as power and of the relations within the groups as an instance of capillary power draws on Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, 1990), 92-102, quote on 45.
took her case eventually to the National Socialists. In the early years following World War I, she had seen the film “Anders als die Anderen” and read some of Magnus Hirschfeld’s work. The knowledge of homosexuality she acquired caused her to question whether she might be homosexual herself. At this stage, she occupied the new space of republican openness with adventurous curiosity and openness to its possibilities. When she began to discuss the issue with her coworkers, they clearly recognized the danger of giving a sexual and perverse definition to their relationships and distanced themselves from her. As the case escalated, she took her demands for rehabilitation up the chain from the local school authorities to the Prussian minister responsible for education. By the time she had her own case file with commentary printed in 1931, she implicated the entire Weimar system: “The longer the fight for the rehabilitation of my professional honor lasts, the clearer the position of the government in this question becomes. Teachers who are prostitutes and homosexuals can do what they like—they are protected. Respectable teachers are allowed to be slandered by these people … That is the new Germany!”

As the case became public, she rewrote her narrative to turn herself into a figure of righteous opposition to official corruption. The desires she had acknowledged earlier were extruded onto a fantasized conspiracy of dark power ranged against her. Philipps was just one of a steady stream of women appearing in my research who combined exploration of the sexual aspects of emancipation with nationalist and authoritarian ideologies. This seeming contradiction is often left unexplored as an embarrassing coincidence for histories of either sexuality or politics. Striving for emancipation among both generations of women meant envisioning how they might use new opportunities to contribute to national unity, strength, and progress. When their aspirations were thwarted—by lack of space for women, by the compromises required in a political environment, by the unwillingness of “others” to accept their vision of national unity, by internal group conflict, or by their own miscalculation—the vision of the strong nation remained as the site where the kind of meaningful emancipation they sought could best be realized. By the end of Weimar, the existing state had lost its potential to fulfill their hopes, even though it had considerably expanded their life chances. The congruence in promises of renewal shared by feminism and nationalism provides one way of understanding the combination that seems so contradictory.

19 Anna Philipps, *Um Ehre und Recht: Mein Kampf gegen das Provinzial-Schulkollegium Hannover und das Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung*, unpublished manuscript (Neuminster, 1931), 12.
What was at stake in these everyday lives was finding a way to reconcile the temptations of emancipation and modernity with committed visions of the self as a contributing member of the nation. Examining marginal groups where sexuality became a hot-button issue provides a way of placing pleasure and desire within this framework. In the increasingly sexualized atmosphere of Weimar popular culture, these tensions became acute factors in self-fashioning and identity construction. Although the two groups of Weimar women that I have studied claimed very different gender identities, both sought the center from their marginal positions. For them, emancipation and modernization were strongly shaped by their adoption of the ideals of the *Bildungsbürger* culture in which they had been educated.\(^{20}\) Even though many of them likely did not come from the *Bildungsbürgertum*, they had absorbed its emphasis on self-cultivation, ethical responsibility, spiritual orientation, and a belief in reconciliation for the good of the whole. Even among homosexuals, sacrifice and denial of desire were crucial to a vision of themselves as elites who could contribute to German culture. The emancipated subject that women of all groups strove to become was infused with these qualities. Active participation in the nation and the public sphere required constant assertion of desirelessness or a uniquely masculine ability to control one’s desires and channel them responsibly. In either case, part of defining the self as competent for national citizenship entailed insistence on reinforcing boundaries against those “other” women who simply gave themselves up to unruly and selfish desire.

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In focusing on the effects of the rapid course of German modernization on women who occupied marginal positions within German society generally, my findings move historical questions onto new terrain in three different scholarly domains. For gender history, as we have seen, women’s emancipation did not simply mean the liberation of the individual from constraint, and it did not necessarily mean criticism of the ruling ideology. Scholarship that locates emancipation either with feminist activists or with transgressive flappers and vamps tends to take oppositional stances as a given. My focus on individuals and small social groups recovers the dynamic interaction between feminist ideas and emancipatory desires, on the one hand, and life circumstances that required justification and stabilizing references to received images and ideals, on the other. Despite the

vast differences between the Wilhelmine and Weimar eras, there are clear continuities between the generations. The gender emancipation that many women at the end of the nineteenth century sought through education was diffused more widely, in the Weimar years, to the middle levels of the population through greater access to girls’ higher schools where teachers saw their mission as inculcating the values and ideals of the Bildungsbürgertum. Female masculinity was a feminist strategy in both eras, but its meanings were quite different. For the early new women, appropriating a masculine affect was a strategy forcing observers to rethink femininity and heterosexuality. In the twenties, it functioned as an ambiguous sign of homosexuality, but it also took on additional political weight as homosexual women aligned their masculinity with models of the political subject and with discourses that bemoaned Weimar’s masculine deficit.

In chapters that frame the case studies, the dissertation traces the history of public confrontations with the concept of female homosexuality in the Reichstag, among censorship authorities, in the arts, and in scandal journalism. In combination with the case studies, this research supports a history of the emergence of female homosexuality as a concept and as an identity in Germany. A close focus on micro-historical contexts makes clear that ideas about sexuality and sexual identity were in flux in both periods. In the late nineteenth century, women in a position to do so experimented with relationships, attractions, personae, and the possibilities for desire without linking such experiments to fixed categories. In the Twenties, they acted as if the category was stable, but their debates and struggles show that no single subcultural pattern ruled the intersection of gender and desire. They published and discussed the work of medical experts as well as the many cultural theorists of homosexuality who had emerged from the men’s homosexual movement. Writers did not abjectly or passively accept definitions of homosexuality as pathology. Instead they selectively appropriated theory for their own purposes of identity building. Some were sure the couple consisted of a masculine woman and a feminine partner. Others celebrated attraction based on similarity and shared struggles. Most combined the two as it suited their purposes. The close connections between emancipation as women and sexual emancipation meant that female homosexuality in this period was something quite different from male homosexuality, although the movement placed the two groups in unequal proximity.
The focus on the interaction of sexuality with political subjectivity and some of the concerns of conservative nationalism exemplified by Anna Philipps suggests that there is more to the politics of sexuality than state regulation and the programs of movements for emancipation. In our thinking about Weimar and its demise, we might therefore give more emphasis to the internal conflicts generated for ordinary people in their confrontation with particular aspects of change. Even those who had undeniably progressive and modern goals could combine these with references to the past and with the vilification and exclusion of others who represented the troublesome aspects of their own temptations and desires. The eventual resort to the Nazi Party, even by women active in the homosexual movement, may be symptomatic of the acceptance of fascism by Germans more generally.

Using a micro-historical method of examining the processes of modernization in small groups brings the everyday struggles of women’s changing lives into focus. Attention to all of the conflict, shame, jealousy, and resentment as well as the aspirations, ideals, and triumphs that shape personal change makes clear how these ultimately accumulate as social and political change. In the context of messy lives, change is unexpectedly promiscuous in its alliance with past and future, progress and reaction, liberation and repression, inclusion and exclusion.

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I. Introduction

I would like to thank the Institute for inviting me to speak to you on this special day—eighteen years after the reunification of Germany and nineteen years after the events of the fall of 1989. The year 1989, which transformed not only Germany but all of Europe, will have its twentieth anniversary in 2009, and a host of historians, filmmakers, writers, museum directors, event planners, politicians, and countless societies and organizations have been preparing to commemorate this anniversary for quite some time. For this reason, I would like to focus my remarks on the revolution in East Germany in the fall of 1989. I make these remarks primarily from the perspective of a participant and eyewitness, and only to a lesser degree in the capacity of my current position as Federal Commissioner of the Stasi Files.

I grew up in East Germany, but I was never really a “child of East Germany.” For this I have primarily my mother to thank, a freedom-loving woman who was never swayed by Communism and who suffered from the existence of the Berlin Wall as long as it stood. We lived in East Berlin, while our relatives and friends of my parents lived for the most part in the western part of the city. Families and friends were torn apart by the construction of the Wall, and most of them had no contact for many years. The horizon of those living in the GDR became very narrow. Many tried to arrange their lives as best they could under the circumstances and did not seem to suffer from the pervasive loss of freedom. Many others, including my family, experienced the Wall and the loss of freedom as a permanent open wound.

Our connections to the West consisted of letters and Western media broadcasts. In contrast to other regions in East Germany, East Berliners were able to listen to western radio and watch West Berlin TV broadcasts unhindered. In my house, this was common practice. The “Westsender,” or western stations, were our media environment. In this way, our “class enemy” became a welcome evening
guest for millions of families, providing us with news and opinions and opening a window to the rest of the world. The Socialist Unity Party (SED), the ruling party in East Germany, raged against this practice and tried to impede and forbid tuning into the western stations, but neither their bans, their jamming transmitters, nor their propaganda could prevent citizens from “leaving” the GDR each evening via their favorite programs or from getting a taste of freedom in the process. Every Sunday, just before noon, my mother would turn up the radio and call to us: “Listen, kids, it’s the Freedom Bell!” And with the chimes of the Freedom Bell reverberating in the background, we listened to a solemn voice reciting a text that never failed to give me goosebumps:

I believe in the sacredness and dignity of the individual. I believe that all men derive the right to freedom equally from God. I pledge to resist aggression and tyranny wherever they appear on earth. I am proud to enlist in the Crusade for Freedom. I am proud to help make the Freedom Bell possible, to be a signer of this Declaration of Freedom, to have my name included as a permanent part of the Freedom Shrine in Berlin, and to join with the millions of men and women throughout the world who hold the cause of freedom sacred.

That was the bell we heard ringing in the Town Hall of West Berlin in the district of Schöneberg, and I would like to give you a brief history of this bell. Berliners had received the Freedom Bell as a gift from a group of American citizens, initiated and sponsored by the “National Committee for a Free Europe,” established in New York in 1949. The idea behind this initiative was inspired by General Lucius Clay, the “father of the Berlin Airlift.” The bell itself was cast in England and then transported to the U.S. for a tour of America. On September 6, 1950, it arrived in New York, where it was transferred to a special vehicle and began a twenty-six state tour. This so-called Crusade for Freedom traveled to Philadelphia, Washington, Atlanta, New Orleans, Houston, Phoenix, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and then back to New York, where the bell was loaded onto a ship bound for Bremen. Seventeen million Americans in twenty-six different cities from New York to Los Angeles donated money for the bell, and in the process signed the “Oath of Freedom.” The text of this oath is derived in part from the American Declaration
of Independence, and the bell itself was modeled on the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia.

On October 24, 1950, United Nations Day, the inaugural ceremony for the bell took place in Berlin and was attended by more than 400,000 Berliners. The list of signatures under the Oath of Freedom is preserved today in the tower of the Town Hall in Schöneberg, Berlin.

In contrast to its predecessor in Philadelphia, the Freedom Bell in Berlin carries an inscription: “That this world under God shall have a new birth of freedom.” The people residing behind the Iron Curtain had to wait almost four decades for this rebirth of freedom. The Berlin Freedom Bell endured throughout this period and, for all those with ears to hear, became a symbol of hope.

At some time in September 1950, on its tour through America, the bell must have stopped here in Washington, D.C. It is clear to me that at that time, with the end of the war only five years past, there must have been many American families still grieving for sons and daughters lost fighting against National Socialist Germany. Perhaps within your own family or among your circle of friends there is someone who saw the Freedom Bell and signed the Oath of Freedom back then. If that is the case, I would like to ask you to convey to them the heartfelt thanks of a woman from Berlin, who was not quite three years old at the time.

More than half a lifetime later, in 1996, I traveled to the United States for the first time, landing right here in Washington, D.C. The first American with whom I spoke during this trip was the taxi driver who brought me from the airport into the city. And the first thing he began to ask me about, when he heard where I was from, was the fall of the Berlin Wall. Again and again, he and his family had watched on TV the images of the Wall coming down. He said he would never forget it. And then he asked me, “Were you happy when the Wall fell?” “Yes, I really was,” I answered rather abruptly. Of course there was much more to say, and I wanted to, but at the time my English was simply too limited.

“How was it for you when the Wall fell?” “Were you happy?” On the list of questions that are now put to Germans around the world, in particular of East Germans, these two questions are always at the top. I recall the Brandenburg Gate, people strolling and running alongside the Wall, laughing and crying as they hugged each other,
climbing up onto the Wall and calling out blissfully, “Incredible!” And this was truly an incredibly moving moment, so moving that even today most people can remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when the news of the fall of the Wall reached them. For one long night, the Germans were the happiest people on earth, and the rest of the world shared our joy.

It is no wonder the fall of the Wall became a symbol of the self-liberation of East Germans. The fall of the Berlin Wall—how could it have been otherwise?—brought the citizens of the GDR the freedom they had longed for. But it did not happen quite this way. It was not the fall of the Wall that brought freedom. The Wall fell after the East German people had already struggled for, and earned, their freedom. Allow me to tell you something about all of this, about the history of this revolution, and about the three days in October that changed our world.

II. Prehistory

The Wall, built on the SED’s orders and cynically named the “anti-fascist protective wall,” did not just prevent people in the GDR from traveling to the other, larger part of their country. It made 17 million people prisoners. Along with this monstrous attack upon freedom, the ruling party claimed the right to control people’s opinions, behavior, and decisions. That was all the more dangerous for East Germans’ souls in that younger people, after twelve years of Nazism and war, had never tasted freedom. Some people still had a memory of it, and they experienced bitter disappointment in their hope for freedom and democracy. People were twice robbed of their freedom and deprived of it for more than half a century. It is difficult to assess the long-term social and cultural consequences of this theft. Millions of people left the GDR. And what became of those who remained? Countless numbers of them managed somehow to be beneficiaries of the system or low-level fellow travelers. Others searched for niches and spheres of comparative freedom. An astonishingly large number of people were successful in refusing to allow themselves to be morally corrupted, despite the state’s efforts to intimidate or threaten them.

Communist rule in the GDR always encountered resistance and opposition, however. Many citizens were punished with heavy prison sentences, with the loss of their jobs, and with other forms of discrimination. A not insubstantial number paid with their lives, especially
during the early years of the GDR. In the late 1980s, more and more oppositional groups began to form, and they were more daring and more in the public eye than those active in the 1960s and 1970s. The first step towards resistance for many was often the attempt to assert themselves intellectually and in terms of their own ideals. Those who distanced themselves from the pervasive system of lies and attempted to “live in truth,” as Vaclav Havel expressed it, had to reckon with persecution and prejudice. Those who had learned to appreciate how much more fulfilling a life of honesty and dignity was than a life of lies and fear accepted that risk. In this respect, the men and women in the civil rights movement in East Germany did not feel like victims. Their life was, to be sure, awkward and uncomfortable, but, at the same time, it was certainly freer and richer than the lives of those who kept them under surveillance, who harassed and tormented them.

The opposition groups in the GDR were closely allied with the Protestant Church. The reason for this was the fact that the churches were the only public institutions that were not subject to state control. This made them attractive to individuals and groups seeking a place where they could communicate openly and discuss topics that were otherwise taboo in the state-controlled public forums. While the ruling Socialist Unity Party and its underlings did everything in their power to stifle any independent social movements, the forerunners of a free, pluralistic, and combative society began to develop within the religious communities. And this attracted people who had hitherto been distant from the church. In this manner, a great many church groups developed into political workshops, simply because they made it possible to discuss social topics in a way that would have been unthinkable outside the protected space of the church. These topics included ecology, child-rearing, justice on a global scale, disarmament, minority rights, and the dream of a free and democratic society. An active and creative civil society did not exist in the GDR. The only public spaces that were not under state control were the churches. They were host to groups and events on issues that were taboo in the GDR on political grounds.

Encouraged by developments in neighboring countries and by the shift in the direction of Soviet politics, the opposition in East Germany increasingly went on the offensive and sought publicity. In a country where, for decades, the formation of any unauthorized group was punishable, where the media were subject to total censorship, and where even the children knew precisely what they could
talk about at home but never in school—in such a country this new
development was like a mummy opening its eyes, and, in amaze-
ment, beginning to move its limbs—not elegant, but sensational.
More and more illegal publications were printed and distributed,
and the various opposition groups increasingly started to form
networks, to get organized throughout East Germany, and to seek
contact with the public outside the protective walls of the church.
Arrests of opposition leaders triggered public vigils and protests.
The public in both East and West Germany learned about these
actions mainly from the broadcasts of West German television and
radio stations, who had had officially accredited correspondents in
the GDR since the 1970s. The state hesitated to use force openly to
put down these protests because it did not want to jeopardize its
hard-earned international recognition.

Consider a few examples of the increasingly open, increasingly bold
protests. When, in 1988, several high school students in Berlin
were expelled from school for publishing their political views, a
wave of solidarity rose up and swept across the country. At public
events throughout the GDR, the school system was subjected to
massive criticism, and an alternative evening school for adolescents
was established. And when the church newspaper—the only legal
medium which, at least occasionally, and then with the necessary
restraint, was able to publish critical reports and commentaries
—was banned, hundreds of citizens demonstrated in the streets.
They had advanced only about 300 meters before the police and
other security forces broke up the demonstration and arrested
many participants. Footage of the demonstration was, however,
broadcast on the evening news for everyone to see. That had not
happened before in the GDR: men and women taking to the streets
to demonstrate against actions of the state government.

One of the most effective campaigns of public protest at this time was
the proof of state election fraud on May 7, 1989. It was not the point
of this campaign to prove the deceptive and undemocratic character of
state elections in East Germany—this was already all too obvious: The
act of voting was not voluntary, there were no competing candidates
or parties, and there were no boxes to check on the ballot. Under the
supervision of vigilant official observers, voters were instead expected
to fold their ballots and deposit them in the ballot box; anyone who
made use of the voting booths, erected pro forma in a corner, was im-
mediately suspect. Official election results regularly yielded approval
ratings of more than 99 percent for the so-called candidates. On election night, May 7, representatives of the citizens’ movement observed the vote tallies at hundreds of polling places in dozens of towns and cities and were able to prove that the announced results of the election did not correspond to the actual vote tally. Even the SED rank-and-file were appalled.

In the early summer of 1989, the peaceful student protesters in Beijing drew a great deal of our attention and sympathy. We secretly printed and distributed stickers and bookmarks with the Chinese characters for democracy, pasting them on doors and walls. We were horrified by the Tiananmen Square massacre of students by the Chinese military on June 4. At the entrance of the Samaritan Church in Berlin, we erected an altar of mourning, which was decorated week after week with white flowers, a symbol of mourning in China. A group of church members paid tribute to the victims of violence in Beijing by beating drums in different parts of the city until police chased them away. They became an example to others, and similar actions that drew public attention took place in other cities. Of course, the SED leadership showed solidarity with the mass murderers. There was talk in the GDR of the “chinesische Lösung”—the “Chinese solution”—and we thought the SED leadership was capable of a similar reaction if confronted with mass demonstrations. The situation intensified from month to month. While state authorities reacted with increasing nervousness, the opposition groups became more and more daring and self-confident, despite the fact that their strategies and ultimate goals were anything but clear or unified. It was not their shared vision of the future that united them. Indeed, it was not what they were for, but rather what they were against, that brought them together. They were simply fed up with the German Democratic Republic. German unity itself was not yet a motivating force for them.

In September 1989, the “New Forum” party was founded, offering many thousands of citizens the means to express their discontent and impatience and to demand drastic reforms. The Social Democratic Party, founded on October 7, spelled out its platform more clearly: It demanded a top-to-bottom democratization of the GDR, strict separation of powers, parliamentary democracy, and party pluralism. At the same time, it professed explicit allegiance to the concept of “dual German states as a consequence of their guilt-ridden past.” With its “call for intervention in our own affairs” on September 12, the citizen movement “Democracy Now” voiced similarly far-reaching demands,
while also anticipating German unity. Although the opposition was growing steadily stronger, many people were of the opinion that there was no hope of change in the GDR. More and more people were leaving the country. Many risked great danger in fleeing. Others tried to leave legally. That often entailed years of harassment and uncertainty, as well as trouble for relatives who remained. Nevertheless, tens of thousands decided to pursue this route.

III. Three Days in October

On October 4, 1989, representatives of all the important opposition groups met in an apartment in Berlin and agreed upon a “Unified Declaration,” at the center of which stood the demand for free elections with secret ballots to be monitored by the United Nations. The GDR’s systemic conflicts and contradictions were coming to a head at this time: The massive exodus of refugees underscored the political bankruptcy of the GDR leadership, and citizens were openly demonstrating their disaffection. Nonetheless, the ruling party and the state did everything in their power to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the GDR just as they had in previous years, as if nothing had changed. It was simply eerie. On October 6, while thousands of youngsters, members of the Free German Youth organization, marched in a torchlight procession on the eve of the anniversary and cheered on the leaders of the ruling Socialist Unity Party, two thousand people gathered in the Church of the Redeemer (Erlöserkirche) in Berlin for an event entitled “Workshop on the Future: What’s next, GDR?” (Zukunftswerkstatt: Wie nun weiter, DDR?) The Unified Declaration of October 4 was approved to huge applause. The demand for free elections, signaling the end of Socialist Unity Party rule, was now on the table and impossible to ignore.
The Monday demonstrations in Leipzig became larger with each passing week, beginning with prayers in the large city center churches and spreading to the Ring, the major street surrounding the city center. In many other cities, thousands of people came together, primarily in churches, the only places available for such gatherings. Most of those who met there were not Christians. They came to meet kindred spirits, to have access to information, and to share their hopes and fears. They talked, shared information, sang, and prayed. “Dona nobis pacem” was among the most popular songs, a canon in which people—Christian or not—took one another’s hands and sang together. Perhaps one reason there was no violence on the part of the demonstrators was that people who join hands and stand shoulder to shoulder while singing “dona nobis pacem” can’t pick up and throw paving stones. They held candles. That was not only peaceful; it was clever. To beat people with stones in their hands is easier than if they are holding candles.

On October 7, the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR, the state’s plan for Berlin was a day of festivity. But the day ended more dramatically and differently than planned. At Alexanderplatz, a small group of protesters grew into a large crowd. Police and security forces reacted with brutal force. Hundreds were arrested. At this time, I was at the Gethsemane Church in Prenzlauer Berg almost around the clock. The large church, a beautiful Gothic revival edifice from the Wilhelmine period with space for at least 2000 people, was open day and night. A sea of candles burned in front of the main entrance. The church had become the political center of the city for protesting Berliners. Around the church there were a few trees and bushes, separated from the street by a fence. Faced with TV crews from all over the world, police and security forces did not dare to set foot on the church grounds. In the church and around it, young opposition activists held vigils for the political prisoners. The altar area was a barracks of sleeping bags and crates as a group on hunger strike held vigil and prayed there.

In an adjoining room of the church was the so-called contact telephone—a type of information pool for opposition groups and other interested parties. A group of opposition members had installed it a few months before in order to be able to coordinate the activities of the various groups around the country. At a time when there were no other means of fast communication and only a few telephones, such an information hub was invaluable. Of course,
we knew the phone was bugged; we were used to that. We had long since learned to live with informers in our midst. And we had almost nothing to hide any more—our protest was public and on the offensive. The contact telephone number was quite widely known, and that would prove to be very important in the first days of October.

Every evening, thousands of people gathered in the church. Initially, the protest was against the wave of arrests in Leipzig, but, in the meantime, it had come to encompass more. The evening of October 7 began as had the previous evenings—until the crowd made its way from Alexanderplatz to the Gethsemane Church. Suddenly, we were surrounded by armored police vehicles and water canons. The first telephone reports of arrests and detentions of demonstrators reached us. How many were there? Where were they being taken? We asked how many and who had been arrested and kept records of what we were told. That was the beginning of the comprehensive documentation with which we were later able to prove how forcefully and with what planning the police and Stasi had acted.

The next two days were filled with uncertainty: Would the weakened state again use force and attempt to discipline the increasingly bold and self-assured people? In Beijing shortly before, Egon Krenz had reaffirmed his support for the Chinese leadership’s terrible response to the events at Tiananmen Square and indicated that all means at the state’s disposal would be used if necessary. I cannot recall that I was afraid; there was probably too much excitement for that. But we knew the dangers. For example, we had provided each other with written powers of attorney so that, in the event that some of us were arrested, our friends would have the right to care for our children during our detention.
October 9, 1989, was a Monday and thus a day of peace prayers and demonstrations in Leipzig. But this Monday was different. Party leadership and security forces were more nervous than ever. Again and again during the day, we received alarming news: schools and preschools in Leipzig were closed, and hospitals were stocking up their blood banks. But more people than ever met that evening in the streets of Leipzig. They held prayer vigils in the churches and then they went, some arm in arm or holding hands, into the street. The SED leadership was initially intent on confrontation. Seventy thousand demonstrators faced eight thousand members of the People’s Police, the National People’s Army, and the Ministry for State Security, supported by five thousand so-called social forces from the party and state apparatus.

Simultaneously, thousands of people had gathered in the Gethsemane Church in Berlin, awaiting information and offering each other moral support. The church was still surrounded by police and Stasi, and again there were arrests. We waited nervously for news from Leipzig, since this day would decide whether the Socialist Unity Party was actually prepared to move against the people with armed force. Finally, the liberating news arrived: The citizens of Leipzig were in the streets and demonstrating unchallenged. Not one shot had been fired. Much later, it was learned that it was the local Leipzig authorities that had decided not to use force against the demonstrators. Egon Krenz, who went on to claim that he had prevented the politburo from using force, only endorsed that decision later. In Berlin, our relief was boundless. The forces surrounding the Gethsemane Church had also vanished like ghosts, and a sea of lights awaited us in front of the church as people from the surrounding buildings lit candles. Someone climbed the church tower and rang the bells. It was hard to believe: those in power were in retreat. Nothing was
yet decided, but for the first time, we tasted freedom. I hope I have been able to clarify why October 9, for many people, still symbolizes the democratic revolution in the GDR.

IV. 2009 – The Year of Commemoration

2009 will be a year of commemoration in Germany. In the spring, the Federal Republic of Germany will be 60 years old, and in the fall, we will celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the events I have been able to recount for you in only fragmentary form and only from personal memory. It is probably clear that it will take a long time before today’s Germans feel they have a common history. Whether East Germans will accept the sixtieth anniversary of the country’s founding as their holiday still remains to be seen. October 9, on the other hand, will probably be celebrated only in Leipzig, Berlin, and other Eastern German cities. We are still far from the day when West Germans will think of October 9 with grateful remembrance as the first German revolution with a “happy ending.”

The German situation has parallels in other parts of Eastern Europe. Most new members of the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe were, like the GDR, previously in the East Bloc. They will continue to bear the consequences of forty years of economic and cultural decline under Communist dictatorship for a long time to come, and no one can know when the wounds caused by tyranny, deportations, and political persecution will be healed. But the suffering of the peoples of the Baltic, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia is still foreign to the countries of Western Europe. The Velvet Revolution of the Czechs, the Singing Revolution of the Estonians, the Peaceful Revolution in the GDR—these are not yet understood to be an integral part of European history.

For us, the 1989 revolution was a significant, liberating event in the context of world history; for others, it meant only the collapse of the GDR or a “turning point” (Wende)—a concept Egon Krenz, the last party General Secretary and State Chairman of the GDR, put forward in October 1989. What our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will read one day in their history books about the fall of 1989 has not yet been decided. Since almost all the protagonists and antagonists, winners and losers, contemporary witnesses and non-participating observers are still alive today, they argue vehemently, sometimes bitterly, about these historic events. Of course, this debate is not only about what actually happened: The excellent
state of the documentation allows no uncertainty, and the salvaged documents of the GDR’s secret police, the Stasi, also bear witness to these events. The subtext of the debates has far more to do with the battle about the role of specific groups and individuals, with unacknowledged errors and vanities. It has to do with the painful loss of vanished world views, with disappointed hopes, with slights and gratifications, and with legends and historical lies. And, of course, it’s also about individuals using—and possibly exploiting—20-year-old events for themselves or their party.

For example, there is the question of whether these events even deserve to be called a “revolution.” Some historians vehemently deny it, questioning in particular the role of the opposition. They argue that the Communist rulers were not chased out by a protesting people but that the GDR “imploded,” that the party and government would have capitulated when they were economically finished, when they could no longer count on the military protection of the Soviet occupation forces, and when—despite the Wall and barbed wire—more and more people left the country. Why, they ask, should we pay our respects to the men and women of the citizens’ movement? Such historians claim that the significance of the small opposition groups is grossly overestimated. Moreover, they state, the demonstrators and protesters were more concerned with the prized West German mark than with freedom, and the sole freedom they sought was the freedom to have this coveted Western currency to purchase video recorders and other goods they had long had to do without. An early proponent of this view was Otto Schily, a prominent Green and then Social Democratic politician who later served in the federal cabinet. When on the evening of March 18, 1990—the day of the first free and democratic election in the GDR—Schily was asked by a journalist why citizens of the GDR, in the first free election, voted for the party that promised the fastest way to unification, he scornfully thrust a banana at the camera instead of answering. Bananas had been notoriously scarce in the GDR.

It is true that opposition groups in the GDR were weak and, until 1989, had had no decisive influence on the populace. In part, this was the case because millions of people had left the GDR, including many whose strength and radicalism would have served the citizens’ movement well. It was also significant that a large number of elites who hadn’t gone to the West were corrupt and did not consider joining the citizens’ initiatives in opposing the Socialist Unity Party.
Thus, it is all the more amazing that the couple of thousand people from the opposition groups and their supporters essentially shaped events. The list of their achievements is extensive: They gave form and voice to the mass protests, openly questioned party legitimacy, demanded new elections, organized a show of solidarity with the Rumanians oppressed by Ceausescu and with the Chinese students. They maintained contact with supporters in the West, with western media, and with the opposition groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia. They also documented state tyranny, formulated public values such as democracy, self-determination, and human rights, organized prayer vigils and protests against arrests, founded new and legitimate political parties, and occupied offices of the secret police. Finally, they saved the files of the Ministry of State Security from destruction, making sure that the archives were opened, and carried through a largely successful change of elites as well.

V. Eighteen Years of German Unity

On October 9, 1989, there was probably no one who considered it possible that Germany would be united just a year later, on October 3, 1990. Children born when people were demonstrating in the streets are grown-ups now; they take the free, democratic, united Germany for granted. My generation—in the East and in the West—was the first to grow up and be socialized in postwar Germany; we accepted the division of Germany as a fact of life. That had to do not least with the National Socialist past. For many, the division of Germany was not only a result of the war but a consequence of Germany’s monstrous crimes. To desire reunification made one suspect of not wanting to accept German guilt. A newly won German identity that permits one to like one’s own country, to experience joy and even to sing along when the national anthem is played at the end of a competition, is a rather new experience for many in my generation. How could such a feeling of community have arisen as long as both parts of Germany belonged to opposing power blocks and, above all, as long as a quarter of the German population was encircled by a wall and living in a dictatorship?

For many former GDR citizens, the once longed-for West remains a stranger. They enjoy its advantages but are unable to come to terms with the uncertainties and risks of an open society. Being accustomed to a life controlled by the state “fathers” makes freedom seem fearful. Decades of life in the GDR have clipped the wings of
many, have made them careful and mistrusting. The shadows of dictatorship are long. But the East Germans are not alone in their difficulties with freedom. There is at most only a gradual difference between East and West Germans in this regard. The history of Germans and freedom is not exactly a passionate love story. Heinrich Heine described it as follows:

The Englishman loves freedom like his lawful wife. He possesses her and even if he doesn’t treat her with any special tenderness, at least he knows how to defend her in an emergency. The Frenchman loves freedom like his chosen bride. He throws himself at her feet with the most exaggerated declarations of love. He pleads on her behalf as a matter of life and death. He commits on her account thousands of reckless deeds. The German loves freedom like his grandmother.

So that my remarks do not end with this rather sober view of Germans’ passions, I would like to remind you, once again, of the Freedom Bell in the Berlin City Hall. It stands for a great deal that Germans, especially the people of Berlin, owe to the United States. Americans could not have given us a better gift. I would venture to say that if General Lucius D. Clay were to visit us in Berlin today, he would not be entirely dissatisfied. What more can one ask for?

_Translated from the German by Richard W. Pettit and Kathryn Buck_

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HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

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I. Human Dignity—The Supreme Value

The commitment to the inviolability of human dignity, with which the German Basic Law commences, was intended as a counter-concept to totalitarianism. In accordance with Kant’s maxim, man was supposed to exist as an end in himself, and not be reduced to an existence as the means to another’s end. The principle of human dignity forbids making human beings mere objects of the state. The totalitarian state with its hierarchical structure of leader and followers, as well as the ideology of the dictatorship of the proletariat, are the historical references against which the Basic Law posited its focus on human beings.

What human dignity means cannot be defined one-sidedly according to any philosophical, religious or ideological teaching. The guarantee of human dignity is not the simple essence of Christian tenets of faith. In view of the inhumanity that had been demonstrated and experienced between 1933 and 1945, the creators of the Basic Law did not feel compelled to explain the principle of dignity. For them, the commitment to human dignity was a response to the inhuman Nazi regime, which had presumed to distinguish between life worthy of life and life unworthy of life. What the authors of the Basic Law agreed on was that encroachments on human dignity—such as deportations, annihilation through forced labor, and genocide—were never to repeat themselves.

The German Federal Constitutional Court considers human dignity the supreme legal value. In the first decade of the Federal Republic of Germany’s existence, two court cases involving bans on political parties had caused the court to deal with the relation between the individual and the state. In 1952, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the Socialist Reich Party unconstitutional and dissolved it. Many members of the National Socialist Party formed part of the executive of this neo-Nazi party. The ban on the Communist Party of Germany followed in 1956. In the Communist Party judgment, the court established that man was endowed with the ability to organize his life under his own responsibility. For the sake of his dignity, he
must therefore be enabled to freely develop his personality. If “the authorities endeavored to provide for the well-being of ‘subjects,’” the court held, “even if this was done in the best possible way,” this was not justified. Instead, the state had to make it possible for the citizen to participate in decisions about the body politic. Spiritual freedom was therefore “of decisive importance” for a free democracy. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the freedom of the spirit was a functional element of this order because it prevented democracy from ossifying and showed the range of possible solutions to factual problems.1

II. The Public Function of the Freedom of the Press

In many subsequent decisions, the Federal Constitutional Court has emphasized time and again that the fundamental rights related to communication, such as the freedom of opinion and the freedom of the press, which can be derived from human dignity, are constituent elements of a free democracy. For the citizens’ ability to judge and to decide is the elixir of life of this form of state organization.2 The Federal Constitutional Court vividly described the public task of the press in its Der Spiegel decision from 1966. I cite:

A free press not steered by public authority and not subject to censorship is a fundamental element of the liberal state; in particular, a free, regularly published political press is indispensable to modern democracy. If the citizen is to make political decisions, then he must not only be comprehensively informed but also be able to know and then balance the opinions that others have formed. The press stimulates this ongoing discussion; it procures information, comments on it, and thus functions as an orienting force in public debate. Public opinion articulates itself within the press; arguments become clarified by statement and counter-statement, gain distinct contours, and thus make it easier for the citizen to come to a decision. In a representative democracy, the press is located as a constant intermediary and control organ between the people and their elected representatives in parliament and government. It critically summarizes the opinions and demands that incessantly crop up in society and its groups, gives them a forum for discussion, and delivers them to the politically active organs of the state, which in this manner are constantly able to measure their decisions, even in individual issues of day-

1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (hereafter: BverfGE) 5, 85 (pp. 204-205).

2 Kathrin Thomaschki has aptly pointed this out in “Medien,” in Bürger, Recht, Staat: Handbuch des öffentlichen Lebens in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 161ff., 165.
to-day politics, against the standard of the views actually held among the people.\(^3\)

**III. The Most Important Civil Right**

Freedom of the press is a mainstay of the democratic constitutional state. This is a lesson that can be learned from the attempts to start democracies that have been made in Germany and in other countries. The yearning for freedom of thought and for freedom of the press has been at the center of every struggle for a written constitution, that is, at the center of every struggle for a document that guarantees the citizens’ sphere of freedom and establishes the limits of state authority. It is not a coincidence that it was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that freedom of the press was demanded for the first time. For the school of thought that took up the cause of respect for human rights called itself “Enlightenment.” Such Enlightenment required the large-scale dissemination of information, which is one of the noblest tasks of an independent press. The bourgeoisie therefore regarded freedom of the press as, politically, the most important basic right, a right which could guarantee all other civil rights, such as freedom of opinion, freedom of faith, and freedom of conscience.

It is therefore not surprising that in the countries in which the idea of democracy gained acceptance, the principle of the freedom of the press was also recognized: first of all, in England, where Parliament in 1695 decided not to renew the statutes requiring press censorship; then, almost a century later, in France, with the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” of 1789. The United States granted the freedom of speech and of the press in the famous First Amendment. In Germany, it was not possible to break the power of the state rulers until much later. The authors and journalists Heinrich Heine and Ludwig Börne, for instance, were forced to live in French exile. They cunningly cheated the customs officers to be able to publish their reports in Germany. In 1848, the constitution drawn up by the National Assembly in Frankfurt finally guaranteed the freedom of opinion and of the press (Article 143). This constitution, however, never really became effective since the revolution of 1848 failed for a variety of reasons. The monarchist powers recovered their strength and took the initiative in constitutional questions. The German princes and the King of Prussia had realized only too well that civil liberties were a challenge to their authoritarian rule.

In 1851, they repealed the catalogue of fundamental rights that had been put into effect by the National Assembly in 1848. The subsequent democratic and all-German constitutions that were drafted in the twentieth century, that is, the Weimar Constitution (1919) and the Basic Law (1949), followed the model of the Frankfurt Constitution by incorporating the citizens’ civil liberties. In the Basic Law, these liberties, above all the freedom of the press, are set out as fundamental rights that are enforceable before the courts.

IV. Enemies of the Freedom of the Press

Journalists live dangerously. They have a difficult relation to power, yet the difficulties vary according to the political system they live in. In a dictatorship, journalists as a professional group are threatened by prison and violence. In authoritarian states, they frequently fall victim to diverse oppressive measures. They are often deprived of their livelihood. And even in democracies, political pressure to exercise self-censorship thrives in times of crisis, for instance, after terrorist attacks. Just think of the public barrage of criticism aimed at those who, after September 11, 2001, took the liberty of asking to what extent the Western world itself produces its own enemies. Even in a free democracy, the quest for the truth requires courageous journalists—especially if they investigate political or economic structures of power and reveal irregularities and abuses. In such situations, the ability to tolerate criticism often turns out to be a rare virtue among the politically and economically powerful.

The German Federal Constitutional Court made it clear from the outset that criticism of government policy and of the members of the government, of parliament, and of members of parliament is admissible even if it is harsh, unobjective, and ignorant. For political debate traditionally brings in the “big guns”: it exaggerates, generalizes, and simplifies. The famous saying “If you cannot stand the heat, get out of the kitchen” especially applies to politics. Nevertheless, politicians do not have to tolerate everything; for the freedom of the press also has its limits. Among them the Basic Law explicitly mentions the protection of young persons and of personal honor. Tongue-lashings of politicians must not be disparaging or degenerate into diatribes. It is, however, difficult to draw the line here. One particularly salient issue is that German politicians react sensitively to criticism that associates them with the Nazis. Let me give you an example from the Federal Constitutional Court’s case law.

4 BVerfGE 5, 85 (pp. 318 and 388-389).
Take the case of a journalist who described the late Bavarian prime minister Franz Josef Strauss as a “coerced democrat” in a magazine article. The journalist included Strauss among people “who allowed themselves to be converted to democracy only under coercion or for opportunistic reasons, and who use this form of state at best formally,” adding that Strauss was “the personification of this type.” Continuing, the journalist opined that not all representatives of the German federal order were genuine democrats, convinced of the system’s advantages. He used the term “coerced democrat” in this context and related it to the Bavarian Prime Minister. He further argued:

... that a strong yearning existed in the Federal Republic for a “strongman,” and that Strauss ... had become the local figure of this yearning and its chief symbol. A comparison between Strauss and Hitler, however, was as absurd as the assertion that Strauss wanted to transform the democratic republic into a dictatorship.

Strauss sued claiming that this assertion violated his right of personality and his human dignity. While the Superior Court agreed with him that the journalist’s value judgment constituted an improper and insulting criticism and, therefore, was not protected by the constitution, the German Federal Constitutional Court raised doubts about the insulting effect of this text. The high court argued that the offending statement of the journalist must not be understood as a characterization of the former Prime Minister Strauss as “the federal-German offshoot of the Nazi Führer cult.” Rather it could be understood to signify that “portions of the Federal Republic’s population [were] the subject of the yearning for the strongman, so to speak, the federal-German offshoot of the Nazi-Führer cult,” and that Strauss was merely the object of their yearning. The statement, then, did not unequivocally assert that Strauss strove toward this goal. If understood in this way, then the belittling effect of the statement was cast in doubt, not to mention the fact that the journalist expressly rejected a comparison with Hitler. The Federal Constitutional Court therefore referred the proceedings back to the Superior Court for this court to analyze the disputed sentences again in light of the freedom of the press, to take other variants of interpretation into consideration, and to rethink its assessment.5 The outcome of the case suggested that the ability to tolerate criticism must be the supreme virtue of a politician. Politicians had to bear criticism and

value judgments even if they were tasteless or unobjective because “wrong and stupid criticism must be tolerated so that good and valid criticism may remain possible and may venture out.”

V. The Protection of Privacy

As regards the violation of their honor, politicians and celebrities of the entertainment industry, in particular, must be able to take a lot of punishment. What about the protection of their privacy, however? Today, the curiosity of the media has no limits. Their hunger for stories of sex and scandal is insatiable. Not only the yellow press and certain private television stations are interested in the sex life and the love life of actors, athletes, politicians, and other celebrities. Public television stations and the quality press, too, are prone to pandering to people’s base instincts from time to time. It’s just that they are more skillful in citing public interest as a cover, for instance, by suggesting that a person’s conduct in romantic and sexual matters reflected their general trustworthiness. Just think of Zippergate and President Clinton’s affairs. The media obviously believed that they had to cater to sensation-seeking and voyeuristic readers in this fashion, even though nationwide opinion polls later showed that most Americans did not want to be informed about the Lewinsky affair in such detail, that they soon grew tired of the matter, and that their positive assessment of Clinton’s presidency was hardly affected by it.

Do even sex and crime stories benefit from the freedom of the press? Are tabloids and television programs that show little respect for people’s intimate sphere and that systematically violate the boundaries of good taste also protected by the freedom of the press? The answer is, in principle, yes. The opinion that only the publication of political and cultural news and other objective reporting fall under the protection of the freedom of the press, which occasionally used to be advanced, did not gain acceptance under German law. For the concept of “press,” the content of the publications is irrelevant, and with good reason. If one made the protection of the freedom of the press dependent on the content of the statement in question, one would already set out on the slippery slope of censorship. And which criteria would one choose for orientation? Can viable criteria be clearly defined at all? The Federal Constitutional Court has made it clear that the concept of the “press” is to be interpreted broadly and according to formal criteria. The Court held that this concept cannot be made dependent on an evaluation of

6 Richard Schmidt aptly pointed this out in his remarks on the problematic relation of the judiciary to public criticism, which are worth reading even today. See Schmidt, Einwände (1969), 7ff., 9 and 109.


8 BVerfGE 34, 269 (p. 283).
the individual publication because this would contradict the neutrality of the basic rights protection as far as content is concerned. Therefore, the concept of the “press” is not restricted to “quality” press. The protection of the freedom of the press applies, in principle, also to the entertainment and sensationalist press. But if the right to privacy is in conflict with the freedom of the press, courts weighing the conflicting constitutional principles may take into account whether the publication in question accommodates a serious public interest in information or only panders to superficial entertainment interests. Princess Soraya, for instance, has been granted a claim for damages against a yellow press magazine that had printed a completely fictitious interview about her private life.

Does this mean that politicians and other prominent persons have to put up with all kinds of photographic reporting about them as well? If they move in public, photographic journalism about them is, in principle, allowed. However, the domestic sphere and “recognizable seclusion” are taboo for cameras even if the person concerned is a public figure. Public figures are persons who are normally in the focus of the public interest in information even if they do not attract attention through specific acts. Not only politicians, but also celebrities such as Boris Becker, Claudia Schiffer, or Caroline of Monaco/von Hannover are public figures. Princess Caroline and her husband, Prince Ernst August von Hannover, who behaves somewhat rudely in public at times, enjoy the unbroken curiosity of the German yellow press. The princess has repeatedly fought this press coverage with lawsuits and constitutional complaints. The German courts have made different decisions about the extent to which the princess can demand protection of her private sphere.

The European Court of Human Rights plays a crucial role here. The European Court of Human Rights takes the view that figures of contemporary society “par excellence” also enjoy a right to the respect of their private life, a right that is enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court has held that the press has the function of a public watchdog. To the extent that the press acts within the context of this task—disseminating information and ideas—it is allowed to publish photos as well. Such photos, however, have to be appropriate to contributing to a debate of “general interest.” This was not the case with pictures that showed Princess Caroline in scenes from her daily life—at a market or on winter vacation.9

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The German Federal Constitutional Court has taken a somewhat different position by recognizing not only the “general interest” cited by the European Court but an interest in being entertained. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, photos of prominent persons may be taken and published even if they do not show them in their official functions but in private and everyday contexts. However, the individual must, in principle, have the opportunity to move in recognizably secluded places without being disturbed by “paparazzi.” The German Court notes that even press articles that serve to entertain the readers convey images of reality and provide topics for conversation. The personalizing presentation in the press not only creates public attention. For some parts of the population, prominent persons can also provide orientation for their own concepts of life and can fulfill the function of role models or examples of lifestyles from which they want to detach themselves. In its latest judgment on these problems, the Federal Constitutional Court established the following:

It would be one-sided to assume that the public’s interest in entertainment is always focused exclusively on satisfaction of a desire for distraction and relaxation, on fleeing from reality. Entertainment can also convey images of reality and propose subjects for debate that spark a process of discussion relating to philosophies of life, values and habits of behavior, and thus fulfills an important social function. For this reason, entertainment in the press is not insignificant, let alone without value, when measured against the protective aim of freedom of the press.

We may also note that the conduct of celebrities who demand the protection of their privacy is not free of contradictions. On the one hand, they call for a ban on unauthorized photographic reporting; on the other hand, they capitalize on their private life by marketing it for money in exclusive press reports. What seems to rule here is the profit motive and not much decency. But we do not ask whether a person deserves the protection of human dignity because human dignity cannot be forfeited.

VI. Civil Liberties in Times of Terror

Let me conclude with some reflections on the fight against terrorism, which has led many countries to repeal fundamental freedoms. The murder of thousands of people, deliberately staged on Sep-
September 11, 2001, in broad daylight, made the danger of terrorist attacks omnipresent. The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London have shown that the danger of fanatical terror is everywhere. Seven years after September 11, 2001, the tension between freedom and security is still of great relevance. It is one of the great tasks for politicians and judges today to find the right balance between security and public interests, on the one hand, and the need to safeguard human rights and basic freedoms, on the other.

A law that was recently adopted by the German Bundestag permits the retention of communication data. The law obliges all telecommunications companies to store the connection data from telephone, email and internet traffic for six months. This law, which implements a European Union directive, irritates not only computer freaks. It is criticized, above all, by journalists—with rare unanimity. They fear that their professional confidentiality could be broken and that the protection of their sources could be abolished. In the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, public scandals have not been uncovered by public prosecutors, but by journalists who rely on informants relaying information in confidence. In the future, informants could be intimidated by the new laws, which would prevent them from revealing their knowledge to the press. It is obvious what this would mean for the control of state authority by the so-called fourth power, the press.

The Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly restricted encroachments on the freedom of the press and the secrecy of telecommunications. In these decisions, the Court has also pointed out the side effects of security measures, arguing as follows: If citizens expect state agencies to listen in on their communications, the naturalness of the use of modern communication technologies is endangered. Furthermore, the quality of communication in a society is impaired if the spread of investigative measures leads to risks of misuse. Thus, the legal protections created to protect the individual are also of benefit to the confidence of the general public.\(^{13}\) When security authorities encroach on these legal protections, they impair the common good because self-determination is a basic condition for the functioning of a free and democratic polity.\(^{14}\) A democratic political culture cannot exist without citizens’ participation and their willingness to speak their minds. This requires courage. If state security authorities measure inhabitants according to biometric criteria, draw up data profiles of them and record their activities,
such courage is lost. Wherever a climate of surveillance prevails, free political debate cannot take place. With such strategies, a body politic does harm to itself. It loses its credibility as a modern constitutional state.

Never again we will speak of the date of September 11 without sorrow and outrage. This is true for all of us who saw the terror attacks of this day in the year 2001. More than three thousand people had to die because fanatical terrorists attempted to spread fear and terror throughout the free world. The targets of the attacks were the ideals of the free world: democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and basic freedoms. The death of thousands of people was only a means to an end. The terrorists were and are unfamiliar with the human principle that each human being counts. We have already realized that we cannot win the fight against terror only by military means or by restricting human rights. The protection of human dignity and human rights must not be sacrificed in the fight against terror because this would undermine the foundations of the modern constitutional state.

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Today, the evangelist Billy Graham is known as “the nation’s pastor” or as “Pastor in Chief,” as evidenced by a *TIME* cover from the summer of 2007. Graham, a fundamentalist Southern Baptist from North Carolina, organized his first crusade—a religious revival meeting—during the fall of 1949 in Los Angeles. Every evening, several thousand people participated in this event. In 1952, he held his first crusade in Washington DC, entering the heart of the nation and the epicenter of political power. Other crusades followed that took Graham’s message all around the country and later around the whole globe.

Graham was not the first evangelist who traveled the country preaching hope and salvation. Evangelical preachers like Jonathan Edwards, Dwight L. Moody or Billy Sunday had influenced the religious landscape of the United States in every century. However, Billy Graham gave a whole new dimension to this sort of religious awakening. Between 1949 and 1954, he preached to 12 million people. In the summer of 1957, he held a 16-week crusade at Madison Square Garden in New York, selling out the Garden’s 20,000 seats nearly every night. In the same year, television companies started broadcasting the crusades live on Saturday evenings, making Graham the first televangelist.

My research project on Billy Graham, the 1950s revival meetings, and the rise of a new neo-evangelical form of religiousness analyzes the culture of the crusades as well as their cultural and social surroundings to explain Graham’s success. My first focus is on the mentality of U.S. society in that decade. At a crossroads between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, the nation was searching for a new identity as an imagined national community. The relationship between the civil religion of the national community and religious communities was being redefined, and evangelical Christians were developing a new understanding of themselves as Christian citizens. Graham’s message provided guidelines for this process.
My second focus is on the rise of the media, which opened new channels for advertising and communicating the religious message. Graham’s movement did not just invest in billboards and handouts; it also produced movies and organized press conferences. Thus, the history of advertising and media is closely intertwined with the religious history of this era. However, the use of media did not just change the way the Gospel was spread; it also produced new religious forms, communities, and experiences such as the religious conversion of television viewers (alone) in their living rooms.

My third focus concerns the connection between Graham’s religious mission and the rapid take-off of U.S. consumer society in the 1950s. Graham invented the language and symbols that were necessary to integrate neo-evangelicalism into the culture of consumption and that shaped it into a “white, middle-class religiousness.” In doing so, he helped evangelicals resolve the tensions between their Christian identity and their changing capitalist surroundings. This placed Graham in the tradition of the Second Great Awakening of the nineteenth century, when evangelicalism had adapted to the changing economic patterns of an industrial and capitalist society for the first time.  

In the context of these three social transformations—the changing national identity, the rise of the media, and the rise of consumer society—, a new form of neo-evangelical religiousness took shape that changed and modernized Protestant fundamentalism,7 fusing traditional aspects of evangelical and fundamentalist Christianity. From the evangelical tradition of American Protestantism in the time of the Great Awakenings, neo-evangelicalism took its strong focus on spirituality, revival meetings, and the belief that each individual has a personal calling. From the fundamentalist tradition of the 1920s, it took its concentration on a literal reading of the bible, its belief in the Second Coming of Christ, and its emphasis on Victorian family ideals. But neo-evangelicalism discarded one important aspect of its fundamentalist roots: It no longer relegated religious conviction to the private sphere but let it cross over into the public realm.8 Billy Graham’s so-called crusades provided the stage for practicing this new form of religion and further shaping the new belief system.

The crusades produced a new kind of religious culture. To analyze this culture, my project focuses less on neo-evangelical institutions

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8 On religion in the public sphere, see José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago, 1994).
and structures than on the symbols, discourses, and religious practices of the movement. Thus the project is part of a new religious history in Germany and the U.S. that rewrites religious history from the bottom up. Inspired by cultural history, this perspective challenges Protestant and civil religious metanarratives. It was during the crusades that the relationship between fundamentalist Protestant religion and society was reshaped. Analyzing this process will give us new insights into the relationship between modernity and secularization.

I. Religiousness as a National Task

As early as 1949, Graham presented his new style of revival culture during his crusade in Los Angeles. From the outset, his preaching combined biblical quotations with current news headlines. Thus Graham featured political statements more prominently in his sermons than his predecessors, Dwight L. Moody and Billy Sunday, ever had. He based his political message on two central themes: the perilous nature of nuclear war and the “ever-present” communist threat. He combined this with a call to civil religion, helping to restore the identity of the U.S. as a Christian nation. In Graham’s preaching, traditional fundamentalist fears and goals mixed with modern social needs.

Graham’s religious mission had two principal goals. On the one hand, it worked against communism, and on the other, it answered people’s yearning to clearly identify the United States as a Christian nation. These aims become clear from these words in a sermon from Graham’s crusade in Los Angeles:

Western culture and its fruits had its foundation in the bible, the word of God, and in the revivals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Communism, on the other hand, has decided against God, against Christ, against the bible, and against all religion.

Warning his followers that communists were infiltrating the U.S., Graham trained them to be responsible Christians and watchful citizens. Graham defined communism as a religion in and of itself, describing it as a Godless religion, a religion of the devil. With such statements, he declared it impossible for people to be
both Christians and communists at the same time. Graham not only elevated anticommmunism to the status of a mainstay in U.S. civil religion, but also used it to shape his own religious flock. His crusade members, the new evangelicals, became “we” and the communists became the “other” always secretly lurking in society. In this way, he embraced the fundamentalist tradition of designating (and clarifying for those in the general public) the anti-Christ and warned that the “fifth column” had already arrived in Los Angeles. With the devil present, it was the Christian citizen’s duty, Graham claimed, to fight him every day.

In his fight against communism, Graham continually blurred the boundaries between religious, national, political, and spiritual identities, thus shaping a new evangelical community conceived of and staged on the national level. At the same time, anticommunism became the shield under which other religious front lines started to disappear, such as the traditionally strong anti-Catholicism in the fundamentalist milieu. However, the new religious community was still primarily white and middle-class.

Graham not only defined this community in his sermons, but also staged it and trained its members during the crusades. The setting of the New York crusade in the summer of 1957 makes this obvious. The 16-week revival meeting was the most expansive and elaborate event in the history of American evangelicalism. Nearly two million people attended the meetings held at Madison Square Garden, which was arranged as a spiritual realm. It also served as a space of national celebration, decorated in the American colors with flags flying and politicians like Vice President Richard Nixon in attendance. Graham’s sermons fit the surroundings perfectly, blending American patriotism with evangelical spirituality. In his last sermon, for example, he exhorted the audience to
tell the whole world tonight that we Americans believe in God. Let us tell the world tonight that our trust is not in our pile of atomic and hydrogen bombs but in Almighty God. On this Labor Day weekend, here at the Crossroad of America, let us tell the world that we are united and ready to march under the banner of Almighty God, taking as our slogan that which is stamped on our coins: “In God we trust.”

With these words, he shaped a religious and a national community. He also gave form to the image of the American evangelical brethren as a national community at war.

Graham’s intertwining of a religious and national responsibility becomes ever more evident when one examines the climactic spiritual moment of his dramatic revival meetings: Graham’s invitation to his audience members to personally come to the stage and accept Christ. People would get up from their seats and approach the stage to meet a counselor to pray with. Counselors would then assist people individually in reaffirming their decision to personally change their lives and take the leap towards conversion.

Interesting and perhaps ironic was Graham’s occasional comparison between the conversion process and communism. He told those taking the momentous step that the decision he was asking them to make was not at all an easy one. However, he continued, “the appeal of communism today is partially because it is a hard thing.” In this way, he rhetorically linked the appeal of communism to the offer he was making to the audience, transforming the act of accepting Christ into a choice for the ideals of the free world over communism. Even at the most personal and spiritual moment of his religious mission, Graham continued to blur the boundaries between the political and religious realms.

II. Spreading the Gospel

The arrival of television in U.S. households in the 1950s certainly helped the new national neo-evangelical community to take shape. Religion in the U.S. has always been sold via the media, from the first religious printed booklets and early religious radio broadcasts to modern televangelist programs, and every use of the media has had an impact on the way religion has been spread and experienced. In a volume of essays on the media and religion, Steward Hoover


15 On religion and media in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see David Paul Nord, Faith in Reading: Religious Publishing and the Birth of Mass Media in America (Oxford, 2004); on religion in the age of mass media, see Heather Hendershot, Shaking the World for Jesus: Media and Conservative Evangelical Culture (Chicago and London, 2004).
and Lynn Clark have sought to explore the “layered interconnections between religious symbols, interests, and meanings and the modern media sphere within which much of contemporary culture is made and known.” My project, likewise, analyzes neo-evangelical religiousness to determine which of its aspects are produced in the interplay of religious revival meetings and the media.

The media spread Graham’s message from the first crusade, enabling Graham to influence religious communities on a more widespread basis than during the other Awakenings. Media mogul William Randolph Hearst was responsible for thrusting Graham into the headlines of the *Chicago Tribune* and the *New York Times*, while publisher Henry Luce placed Graham on the cover of *Time* and *Life*. Although both publishers portrayed Graham as a media star and his crusades as popular entertainment, Graham’s fight against communism and his quest for a spiritual renewal of the American nation were central themes in every article about him. The press did not just repeat Graham’s message but influenced it, emphasizing some topics over others and setting the tone of public debate. Graham developed a distinct language for communicating with the media, and the interplay between Graham and the media shaped a new public religious discourse.

Television also influenced Graham’s image. The cameras loved Graham’s good looks, his voice, and his gestures, and he knew how to play with them. As one observer noted, “Variety, the Bible of show business, said that Billy Graham ‘spells out Scripture and verse à la Judy Garland ballads.’” Moreover, Graham did not hesitate to communicate with the press: He held press conferences before and during the crusade in New York City, and all three major networks (CBS, NBC, and ABC) covered him and his crusade. From the third week of the New York Crusade on, the ABC-TV Network covered the crusade on Saturday evenings for an entire hour from coast to coast. The television ratings for the event were so high that ABC rebroadcast parts of it on seventeen evenings.

From that point on, Graham staged his crusades not only for his nightly audience in attendance, but for the audience at home in American living rooms as well. As a result, the rise of television as a medium created a new form of religious experience. Although large media surveys were not conducted back then, we know about the reactions of home viewers from hundreds of letters Graham


received. Many eager followers had found their way to God right in front of their televisions. These letters, therefore, reveal a new evangelical phenomenon arising from the use of media. The spiritual and transcendent experience of conversion no longer required the gathering of the community; it could happen in complete solitude. Still, there was an interaction between Graham and his television community. Graham would talk to viewers, and they would get down on their knees in their living rooms and write about their experiences afterwards. These letters give insight into the practice of media religiousness in the decade when it was created. They help us to understand how the use of television changed evangelical processes of conversion and community formation and altered or even replaced traditional forms of religious life.

III. Selling Hope, Consuming Salvation

The 1950s were not just the age that witnessed the television takeoff. They also constituted the decade when consumer culture, with its unique advertising and marketing structures, exploded. From the First Awakening, selling religion—the spread of bibles, sermons, and the staging of revival events—has been a business and an integral part of the development of religion following the ecumenical dogma: the better you perform, the better you advertise, the better you sell. In the 1950s, however, this selling process took on a new dimension. Competition in the religious market had always been fierce, as Laurence Moore has shown in his excellent study Selling God: Religion in the Marketplace of Culture. Moore points out that such competition has transformed religion as a cultural system. Therefore, it is never enough to analyze only the forms of merchandizing and the use of media as part of the religious selling process. Rather, we should ask how the competition for a share of the religious as well as the cultural market shapes and transforms religiousness.19

The consumer orientation of the crusades significantly affected the form that neo-evangelical religiosity took. At the same time, the crusades themselves provided a venue for reproducing but also redefining and stabilizing the “American Way of Life.”20 Graham did not just preach to a religious flock; he also communicated with white middle-class citizens. He staged himself as a new type of preacher and acted like a middle-class salesman to help them resolve the tension between their consumption behavior and the Christian ide-
als of modesty and charity. His campaign also turned him into an advertising icon, and the media portrayed him as a pop star. In all of these ways, Graham targeted the American middle class.

Graham, who had been a salesman for a short time after finishing high school, can clearly be situated within the realm of marketable religion. A benchmark quotation in this regard was first published in *Time* in 1954: “I am selling ... the greatest product in the world; why shouldn’t it be promoted as well as soap?” 21 The media picked up on this picture, viewing Graham more as a salesman than an evangelist, as in this journalist’s description of Graham during his New York Crusade in 1957: “Well-tailored in a gray summer suit, white shirt und gray and purple tie, the blond, wavy-haired Billy spoke with the punch, poise and magnetism of a super salesman, rather than the fire of an old-time evangelist.” 22 Graham made use of the everyday vernacular of a salesman, powerfully integrating metaphors of consumption into his religious language. Asked once how he imagined heaven, Graham answered: “We are going to sit around the fireplace and have parties and the angels will wait on us and we’ll drive down the golden streets in a yellow Cadillac convertible.” 23 Asked on another occasion, how he imagined the “Rapture”—the Second Coming of Christ—he declared that when the Rapture occurred, all the gravestones would pop up like popcorn on a stove. 24 By creating such pictures, Graham adapted the language of the consuming middle class to his religious purpose. In doing so, Graham spoke directly to the quotidian needs and dreams of consumers, validating and legitimizing their lifestyle and fulfilling their desire to “find their place” in American society.

Another technique Graham used to establish a rapport with his followers was to portray himself not only as a religious figure, but as a middle class icon as well. The media coverage of Billy Graham was infused with reflections on his lifestyle, fashion, and consumption, and described his leisure activities in detail. Graham talked about playing golf and watching baseball. Everyone in the U.S. knew which

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22 Quoted in Mitchell, *God in the Garden*, 55.
24 Ibid., 125.
department store he favored for his suits. His good looks, shoes, ties, and fashion style became an integral part of every newspaper article on religion. The media particularly emphasized Graham’s star-like quality. One observer remarked that he looked “as if he belonged in the star’s dressing room of a musical comedy rather than in a pulpit.”

Graham was the 1950s salesman of religion. He was successful because he knew how to communicate with middle class consumers, and they could identify with him. Accordingly, he tailored his religious message to best communicate with his target audience. Smoothing out the once exclusive fundamentalist rhetoric and the fiery style established by preachers like Jonathan Edwards and Billy Sunday, who had preached hell and damnation, Graham sold hope and salvation. He did not ask for social responsibility, but rather reinforced the American way of life. His social critique focused on porn and alcohol, but he never challenged the social injustices of American society in the 1950s. Moreover, he linked his religious message to the ever-present civil religion: He did not blame America as a nation for its sins; rather he returned to the traditional view of America as the chosen nation. Graham knew that the more agreeable his product was, the better it would sell. Even the staging of his revivals reflects his orientation toward the white middle class’s need for conformity. Screaming out loud in the middle of the service was deemed inappropriate, and Graham emphasized traditional elements of American evangelicalism like choirs and sermons instead of flashy rituals like the Speaking in tongues practiced by the Pentecostals. Graham sold a religiosity produced specifically for the white middle class, in sharp contrast to his pretension to include different classes and ethnic groups in his campaigns.

IV. Conclusion

Billy Graham’s crusades were products of the unique cultural atmosphere of the 1950s, which they reflected and reproduced. Graham integrated his religious message into the civil religious context of national self-assurance and into the developing media and consumer culture. In this process, he shaped a unique neo-evangelical religiousness that shows religion adapting to modernity, thus challenging our common understanding of secularization. Graham’s religious campaigns influenced the relationship between religion and society. They changed American Christians’ self-concept from an

25 Quoted in ibid., 25.
26 McLoughlin, Billy Graham: Revivalist in a Secular Age, 91.
27 Mitchell, God in the Garden, 50.
apolitical to a political one, in which they as citizens and consumers defined a new role for religion in public discourse. The nation’s pastor helped to establish a new media-based, national religious community. At the same time, he transformed the civil religious frame of the Christian nation into an evangelical one. Although Billy Graham built upon the tradition of the Great Awakenings in American religious history, he found a new way to embed evangelicalism into its political, economic, and cultural environment, thus securing it a unique place in modern society. Graham’s success story demonstrates that American religion derives its strength from embracing rather than resisting modernity.

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PROTO-EUGENIC THINKING BEFORE GALTON

Workshop at the GHI, September 25-27, 2008. Partially funded by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. Conveners: Christoph Irmscher (Indiana University, Bloomington) and Maren Lorenz (University of Hamburg/GHI). Participants: Graham Baker (University of Oxford), Jessica Berman (University of Maryland, Baltimore County), Bernhard Dietz (GHI London/Roehampton University), Sara Eigen Figal (Vanderbilt University), Sander Gilhoff (Indiana University, Bloomington), Brad Hume (University of Dayton), Sabine Kalff (University of Bielefeld), Sean M. Quinlan (University of Idaho), Kyla Schuller (University of California, San Diego), Frank Stahnisch (McGill University, Montreal), Pavela Vesela (Charles University, Prague), John C. Waller (Michigan State University), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI).

In the preface to the revised edition of his history of eugenics, *In the Name of Eugenics*, Daniel Kevles suggests that the heyday of eugenics is over. Where there was eugenics, there is genetics. And there is no chance, he says, that “the revolution in human molecular genetics will be turned to eugenic ends.” Kevles’s preface was written in 1995. Since then, the new challenges posed by prenatal diagnostics, the human genome project, and cloning have put paid to his prediction. They have also changed the parameters of the academic debate about eugenics, extending not only its traditional geographical scope but also its conventional temporal framework. Pace the common notion of eugenics as a phenomenon of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scholars have now realized that concepts of “human breeding” or of the “perfection of the human race” were being developed throughout Western Europe long before Francis Galton, designated the “founder of the faith” in Kevles’s book, published his *Hereditary Genius* in 1869.

When we convened the workshop, our hope was that we could nudge the study of human breeding from its traditional Anglocentric emphasis in the direction of a more unabashedly multinational (and less temporally limited) model. To that end, we also wanted to leave as much time for conversations as possible: all the papers were pre-circulated, and participants were asked to give only brief summaries of their main arguments.

The first panel addressed “The Genealogy of Eugenic Thought.” Sabine Kalff examined the proposals for human improvement in two early modern Italian utopian texts, Tommaso Campanella’s *La Città del Sole* (1600-1603) and Francesco Patrizi’s *Città Felice* (1553). Foucault repeatedly used the metaphor of the shepherd taking care of his flock as a paradigm for the ruler’s spiritual hold over the souls of his state, but Kalff insisted on the literal importance of
this popular model for early modern writers. Both Campanella and Patrizi relied on the contemporary practices of animal husbandry to make suggestions for human improvement. But while in Campanella’s ideal state the moment of conception itself had to be regulated—to the extent that intercourse after dinner had to be avoided because the “spirits” were still busy digesting—Patrizi, in a kind of pre-Lamarckian mode, expressed his belief that the mother’s temperament (as well as her mental state during pregnancy, physical exercise, and environment) had an influence on the embryo’s development, too.

John Waller’s paper gave an overview of a larger, historically oriented study he is currently writing, in which he traces elements of eugenic thoughts throughout Western history, as reflected, for example, in the medieval concern for lineage. Galton, stated Waller, was only “recapitulating an elitist attitude that had already pervaded European social thought for millennia.” Of course, as was pointed out after Waller’s paper, the vast archive such a comprehensive topic demands makes generalizations virtually impossible. Nevertheless, the undeniable heuristic force of Waller’s argument generated an animated exchange of views. Waller’s “long view” of eugenics served to highlight what, arguably, was so disarmingly innovative about the nineteenth-century interest in racial purity: the ability and willingness of the state to interfere actively (through legislation and prosecution) in the reproductive decisions of its citizens.

Sander Gliboff concluded the panel by offering a more uplifting view of nineteenth-century thinking about racial multiplicity—a legacy he claimed had been suppressed or distorted by twentieth-century historians. Framing his paper as a defense of the great late nineteenth-century evolutionary biologist and philosopher, Ernst Haeckel, Gliboff set out to rehabilitate nineteenth-century morphology. Concentrating on the work of three leading morphologists, Johann Friedrich Meckel, the Younger, Heinrich Georg Bronn, and Haeckel himself, Gliboff explained that for them improvement or Vervollkommnung did not mean a single, vertical path towards perfection of the species but Mannigfaltigkeit, i.e., many lines of differentiation and complex interdependencies among the disparate routes of development. Clearly, the eugenics movement did not initially adopt the same pluralistic conceptions of progress and improvement; neither did it value differentiation, diversity, and interdependence. Questions about Gliboff’s paper centered on Haeckel’s difficult concept of race that, to some participants, did retain traces of hierarchical order, as seemed evident in Haeckel’s graphs. But Gliboff argued that the placement of certain races on Haeckel’s evolutionary tree did not imply value and seemed to shift in subsequent revisions.
The second panel ("Debating the Hybrid") focused on the bête noir (no pun intended) of all those eager proponents of racial purity, the hybrid. At the heart of Sara Figal Eigen’s paper was a conundrum. Drawing on multiple eighteenth-century sources, among them the travel writer Jean Chardin, Figal delved into the genealogy of the label “Caucasian,” that monolithic-seeming racial category that would come to be used as a yardstick by which self-appointed racial theorists determined the inferiority of other races. But, as Figal claimed, the original European was not European at all but the racially ambiguous Circassian woman. Figal’s paper elicited a lively debate, chock-full of suggestions as to how this paradox might be “tamed.”

Figal’s comments on the “hybrid” origin of modern racial classifications provided a useful transition to Christoph Irmscher’s contribution on the role of the “half-breed” in the science of Louis Agassiz, once the world’s most famous scientist. Using Agassiz’s correspondence with the physician and abolitionist Samuel Gridley Howe and the papers of the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, Irmscher attempted to show that the mixed-race black was the void at the center of American antebellum racial discourse, inaccessible to both a polygenist racist like Agassiz and a freedom-fighting abolitionist like Howe. On behalf of the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, Howe later traveled to Canada, where he found ailing mulattoes and their feeble offspring, further proof to him that, “in the struggle for life,” some must and will fall by the wayside. Unlike Agassiz, the anthropologist Henry Lewis Morgan did not reject amalgamation per se, as Brad Hume pointed out in the paper that concluded the panel. Morgan remained committed to the idea of the controlled interbreeding of Native and Euro-Americans, because he was convinced that such unions would improve both the mental and the physical make-up of the whites. However, while Morgan denied the “hereditary legitimacy” of slavery, he also definitively excluded blacks from the racial enhancement he envisioned.

The first day of the conference ended with a panel devoted to “Intercultural Perspectives on Proto-Eugenics.” Extending our time frame, Frank Stanisch talked about the personal and academic connections between European psychiatrists working at the end of the nineteenth century (notably Alfred Ploetz, an early friend of writer Gerhart Hauptmann, who shared his eugenicist beliefs) and American doctors, and he proposed that we view psychiatry’s struggle for independence in the broader context of theories about the degeneration of the brain that spanned the continents. Graham Baker likewise was interested in transatlantic connections, comparing the influence of proto-eugenic thinking on Christian charities in England and the United States, specifically the New York City Mission Society and the London City Mission. Mining the
copious written archives left by both organizations, Baker revealed how easily orthodox Christian theology and eugenics coexisted. However, the missionaries’ hope that spiritual devotion could engender physical strength on a national level—a Lamarckian conviction they shared with other prominent eugenicists of the nineteenth century—remained curiously at odds with their belief in the “corrupt nature of man.” Pavla Vesela then revisited the connections between utopia and eugenic ideologies discussed at the beginning of the workshop, pointing out that the Russian utopian novels left the topic of sexual relations, so eagerly monitored and restricted by all those proto-eugenicists writing utopian texts in the West, pretty much untouched—that is, until Stalin came along.

The workshop reconvened the next day to ponder the connections between proto-eugenics and nation-building. Maren Lorenz, in a wide-ranging survey of sources from both sides of the Atlantic, emphasized the need for more comparative studies on nineteenth-century proto-eugenic theory and practice. The German model—notably Johann Peter Frank’s multivolume *Medizinische Polizey* (1779-1819)—provided her with a framework within which to address similar debates in early nineteenth-century America, where contributors to medical and phrenological journals seemed to be concerned early on with the degeneracy of the white race and called for marriage laws, which were sporadically implemented in the latter half of the nineteenth-century (e.g., the laws against consanguineal or first-cousin marriage in Ohio and Kansas). Lorenz noted the surprising absence of a sustained discourse on race and racial mixing in the more specialized medical journals; writers in the antebellum area seemed more concerned with first-cousin marriages, idiocy, and the “purity” of whites, arguing (as Samuel Gridley Howe did in 1848) that “nature, outraged in the persons of the parents, exacts her penalty from the parents to the children.” The provocative question that ended Lorenz’s talk—why, despite universal agreement about the need to perfect the white race, there wasn’t more widespread eugenic legislation in nineteenth-century America—led to a lively debate, during which participants commented mostly on the differences between the professionalization of science in the European and the American (postcolonial) context.

In his contribution to the panel, Sean Quinlan dealt with books and pamphlets published in post-revolutionary France that were meant to counteract the perceived decadence of the French population and mixed human breeding projects, sex advice, patriotism, and family values. The basic idea behind these publications was that by being devoted spouses (which meant taking their duties in the bedroom seriously) and loving parents, readers could still think of themselves as engaged citizens. Critiquing Foucault’s concept
of biopower (the technologies used by the state to control the bodies of its citizens), Quinlan pointed out that we know little about how people in fact understood these books and used them in their daily lives. The ensuing conversation focused on Quinlan’s concept of authorship and returned to questions of genre and authorship that had come up earlier during the workshop, especially in connection with utopian writing. How does the form of a source influence its content? What role does authorship play in the history of writing on eugenics?

Bernhard Dietz shifted the discussion of nationhood and eugenics to mid-nineteenth-century Britain, probing the connections between ideologies of national degeneracy (often related to studies of human poverty) and human improvability, a source of Galton’s thought that demands more attention than it has hitherto received. In the discussion, participants reflected on the perverse attraction of poverty as a subject in Victorian writing—an interdisciplinary connection that was also of importance to the workshop’s final paper, Kyla Schuller’s observations on the Orphan Train Riders, which centered on the ambivalent figure of Charles Loring Brace, a cousin of Harriet Beecher Stowe and Catherine and Henry Ward Beecher. Brace developed his plan to remove urban children from the noxious influences of their neighborhoods and families under the sway of the Transcendentalists as well as evolutionary theory (he had encountered Darwin through Asa Gray). Schuller explained how Darwin’s theory of the gemmule (pre-genetic latent forces inherited from one’s ancestors) and a fuzzy kind of Lamarckism joined forces in Brace’s worldview with a syrupy sentimentalism derived from popular fiction (such as Susan Warner’s novel *The Wide Wide World*, about an orphaned city girl embracing Christianity when sent to work in the country). Brace focused on girls because boys, in his view, inherited, to an unusually high degree, “the human tendencies to evil.”

In the workshop’s final panel, participants identified the topics we had not covered: we had not consistently paid attention to the importance of the human-animal relationship, we had barely focused on scientific writing, and the relevance of legal discourse had remained unexplored. While we acknowledged that more work needed to be done on proto-eugenics, the workshop participants agreed that our conversations had yielded one important result: paying attention to the history and practice of eugenic thinking before Galton makes evident that hereditarianism is not useful as a model for understanding eugenics. We also agreed that future scholarly treatments would have to find a way of incorporating the voices of the victims of eugenic planning.
At the end of my report, I would therefore like to invoke the spirit of Asa Ten-ney from New Hampshire, an old man often described as severely mentally impaired. He was the first close friend and teacher of Laura Bridgman, the deaf and blind girl later rescued (or so Howe thought) by the nineteenth-century physician, Samuel Gridley Howe. Rejecting Howe’s attempts to “civilize” Bridgman, with whom Tenney had roamed the New Hampshire countryside, Tenney associated himself with the Indians, people who had already been purged from this part of New England. Here is what Tenney, liberated from the tyranny of spelling, wrote to Howe on 17 September 1839:

The indain [sic] chief that I have seen in this village, when the younger in-dian spoke of talking by signs, said the chief held the opinnon [sic] there was one language that was universal, and he could talk that language. Laura was improving in that verry [sic] language as well as knitting work before leaveing [sic] home.

As Tenney observed, in the only letter he has left us, the only improvement Laura needed—learning a simple language of signs—was the one she had already embarked on herself. He feared that in Howe’s fancy institute she would miss him dreadfully (as she did). Others might think of him and her as deficient. Old Asa Tenney, the man rumored to have been born with a crack in his skull, knew better.

Christoph Irmscher (Indiana University Bloomington)
NATURE’S ACCOUNTABILITY: AGGREGATION AND GOVERNMENTALITY IN THE HISTORY OF SUSTAINABILITY

Conference at the GHI, October 9-11, 2008. Conveners: Sabine Höhler (GHI Washington / Deutsches Museum Munich), Rafael Ziegler (University of Greifswald/Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin). Participants: Dean Bavington (Nipissing University), Brett Bennett (University of Texas, Austin), Paul Erickson (Wesleyan University), Karen Hébert (Yale University), Richard Hölzé (University of Göttingen), Nayna Jhaveri (Colgate University), Jens Lachmund (University of Maastricht), Eva Lövbrand (Lund University), Timothy W. Luke (Virginia Tech), Emily Pawley (Chemical Heritage Foundation), Tejasvi Purusharth (NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad), Sajay Samuel (Pennsylvania State University), Jonas Scherner (GHI), Sidharth Sihag (NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Mart Stewart (Western Washington University), Johannes Stripple (Lund University), Jeremy Vetter (Dickinson College), Cornel Zwierlein (University of Bochum).

“Sustainability” has become a global norm, endorsed by actors on all levels of governance and discussed across the natural and social sciences. Closely tied to the normative dimension of the concept have been ways of mapping and measuring, monitoring and managing nature, from sustainable forestry to the Brundtland Report’s program of sustainable development. The conference on “Nature’s Accountability” examined the ways nature has been taken into account—for the sake of maximizing sustained yields in fisheries or agriculture, or for dematerializing national economies based on material flow analysis—and how these accounting techniques relate and respond to economic and political accountability. The conference asked how nature has been quantified and statistically aggregated according to accounting ideals that associate natural objects with the objects of market economies, to be allocated and exchanged as stocks and shares, as profitable commodities, or as social liabilities. The conference also addressed the normative values, ethical reflections, and governmental regimes flowing from and instituting the accounts of nature. Inherent in the concept of sustainability are questions of environmental justice that seek accountability for the use and abuse of nature. Focusing on “nature’s accountability” thus proved to be a fruitful way to discuss the history of sustainability up to the present where the norm has become both seemingly inevitable and impossible to achieve.

German “visionaries” appeared throughout the conference: Carlowitz’s work on scientific forestry, wherein he coined the German concept of Nachhaltigkeit (sustainability) in the early 1700s; Liebig’s agricultural chemistry around 1850; Heinke’s population ecology in the 1920s; and Schellnhuber’s metaphor of
planetary machinery in recent earth system science. While the role of these German scholars makes it seem appropriate that this event was held at the German Historical Institute, the complexity and reach of the theme clearly demanded a global scope. The GHI therefore offered a platform for an international and interdisciplinary group of scholars working at the intersection of the history of science, economics, environmental history, and philosophy to address the emergence of an objectifying environmental knowledge that accounts for various “kinds” of unruly nature. From “trees turned into thalers,” arable land, and harvestable cod to profitable elephant tusks, valuable nutrients, and costly carbon molecules, the group explored the ways in which nature has been “straightened” into natural capital. The debate, lively and focused from the beginning, made this two-day event a satisfying intellectual experience for all participants.

The first conference day was devoted to the “resourcification” of nature, that is, to ways of taking and maintaining stock, starting with techniques of mapping forest territory and of classifying and cultivating trees for optimized growth. Richard Hölzl explored how Holznot (wood shortage) legitimized a rigid management system of state foresters in the Bavarian Spessart forest around 1800 to secure sustained yields. The normalized trees were fed into customized machines for efficient timber processing. The implementation of a state blueprint for steady revenue cut off villagers’ traditional access to forest goods. Brett Bennett demonstrated how resistance to a new state-like gaze played out in another case of conversion of forests from “commons” to a “commonwealth” based on state-regulated property. In South Asian forestry, state foresters contested the utilitarian spirit of British timber merchants. Colonial forestry became the site of conflict between state conservationists and laissez-faire businessmen, who both claimed to follow natural laws.

In the nineteenth century, farmlands and rangelands were subjected to new forms of legibility. Emily Pawley presented the quantitative dream of agricultural “improvement” in the U.S. farming “according to the books” aimed at counterbalancing the hidden deficit that national husbandry was suspected of operating on. An array of measuring devices, analytical tables, and catechisms were meant to discipline farmers into keeping precise accounts of painstakingly converted expenses and returns. Around 1850, agricultural chemistry introduced the new currency of atoms and the “nutrient” as a universal conversion value. Jeremy Vetter studied the emerging field science of “agrostology,” the scientific study of grasses. At the turn of the twentieth century, the U.S. Department of Agriculture dispatched professional survey teams and field stations to the Great Plains to develop efficient and profitable ways of grassland ranching and agriculture in one of North America’s most arid regions. While
the taxonomic systems of the agrostologists relied to a great extent on local lay networks, the capitalist political economy of grassland productivity called for rationalized and standardized expert knowledge to control the vernacular. Vetter analyzed this agrostological work as a process of “factification” that—in analogy to commodification—would allow grass knowledge to enter global knowledge economies—an analytical tool that proved useful for the discussion of further case studies.

In the domain of legitimate scientific discourse, nature emerged as a “laboratory.” The modeling of populations was seen as a form of experimenting on reality, as Dean Bavington outlined using the example of cod fishery in Newfoundland. In the early twentieth century the qualitative understanding of cod shifted to a statistical paradigm. Populations were defined as self-regulating systems that could be modeled and predicted in their size and yield. Within this framework of population ecology, “surplus” fishing meant skimming off the interest of the capital stock. Swimming inventories were allocated to national economic zones to regulate quotas of “total allowable catch” that pragmatically overrode local fishing experiences. The 1990s saw a tragedy not of the commons but of an ocean fishery industrially managed into extinction. In what could be described as an innovative twist of the analysis developed by James Scott in the 1990s, Paul Erickson investigated how not just states, but also capitalist markets make human–nature relations visible (while at the same time obscuring others). As examples he chose ecologist Charles Elton’s use of data from the Hudson Bay Company and the use of market data in the contested protection of “the African elephant” under the International Trade in Endangered Species Convention.

The interventionist approaches of taking nature into account seem to bring about the uncertainties they set out to overcome. Yet, repeated failures of modeling and predicting the future did not prevent a growth in managerial ambitions. Since the late twentieth century, Earth System Science takes the “entire” earth into account as a system providing the stocks and services for the planetary household. Eva Lövbrand and Johannes Stripple offered a critical reading of this (meta-)science using a governmentality approach to analyze the origin and unfolding of the Earth System as the episteme of the “Anthropocene” understanding of nature as a “planetary machine.” Likewise taking a governmentality approach, Timothy Luke described the planetary accountancy as world watching and ultimately “terraforming” performed by a rising “expertarchy.” Both papers stressed the encompassing aspirations of scientific managerial approaches inherent in ways of accounting for nature in aggregate. Even the “humble” notion of “stewardship,” they argued, relies on nature being transformed into a controllable ecological system. As the
entire planet has been reshaped according to neoliberal economic principles, “sustainable yield” has turned into “life support” at the outer limits of the ecological “carrying capacity.”

How scientific expertise played into evaluating natural units in balanced accounts and how expert cultures centered on pricing natural resources to promote sustainable economies formed a common focus of the second day of the conference. Karen Hébert investigated recent predicaments in sustaining the Alaskan salmon fishery by marketing nature as a commodity. Where “poundage” had long been the primary indicator of sustainable cash flow, “quality” emerged as a new signifier of commodity aesthetics. Quality covered the imagery of original, regional, and natural red salmon – not produced and canned for mass consumption, but “babied” and “gently handled” wild salmon for upscale market segments. Also focusing on consumption, Nayna Jhaveri surveyed the history of material flow accounts in the U.S., that is, of a method for determining the “total material requirements” of national economies. The statistical aggregation of material throughput uncovers collective consumption patterns at the cost of reducing various economic flows under the single unit of weight. However, in spite of various research projects and reports, the U.S. never included material flows in an adjusted system of national accounts (as some European countries have done). And it departed from the goals of ecological economists insofar as material flows analysis was considered in terms of (national) environmental security. Sajay Samuel pursued the general problems of bringing units of nature into balance with monetary units in order to permit nature to be added, balanced, and exchanged in accordance with universal currency systems. Units of mass, volume, and time appear to provide, he argued, a de-historicized, abstract metrics for comparing and commuting items that were not alike or even similar. “Commensurating and arithmetizing machines” process nature in a form ready-made for the merchant’s double-entry bookkeeping and for standardized market instruments.

Confronted with such managerial approaches, Samuel urged a reconsideration of the Aristotelian notion of politics as a domain concerning the question and struggle for the good life. Questioning who counts, how, and for whom, allows an investigation into shifting power relations, contingencies of political participation, access to resources, and the transparency of information. Sidharth Sihag and Tejasvi Purusharth described the efforts of local residents to be included in the cost-benefit analyses of large dam-building projects in India. Social movements forced environmental impact assessments on corrupt governments, expecting that an objective method would allow for the compensation of local people’s displacement and thus maintain an overall social and economic balance. Environmental justice strategies that employ
market mechanisms to seek accountability for nature degradation often allow for trade-offs. Mart Stewart explored current carbon-trading regimes in which climate change is reduced to the denominator of carbon to allocate emission shares in equal units. A ton of carbon turns from a liability into an asset that sets up a market for emission credits and debits. Trading the “right to pollute” has also resulted in practices of substituting monetary terms for tainted nature. The wealthy industrialized nations utilize the weaker developing nations by investing in local green projects as a way of paying off their carbon debts. Whether there is hope for equity and efficiency, or whether we are witnessing large-scale “carbon colonialism” was a question raised by Stewart. Jens Lachmund studied another form of nature “displacement” through the example of “compensatory regimes” in urban nature regulation. Nature has become an object of political accountability and litigation as urban landscapes deteriorate and are being repaired in the city of Berlin. Lachmund highlighted the work of maintaining and legitimating the relations of equivalence between natures destroyed and replaced elsewhere. Not only social values and conventions have to be negotiated but also scientific expertise, economic rationalities, and legal provisions.

Projects of development transform not only natural but also social worlds. Returning to the Enlightenment period, Cornel Zwierlein explored the idea of the pursuit of happiness as a principle in the German and British economies. Nature entered the calculations of social welfare and security as an Unglück (an accident or hazard), a liability to be handled with foresight in pursuit of the general Glück. Accountants perceived the insuring of property against accidents of fire as an increase of credit in the overall balance of happiness—a principle of collective precaution in analogy to the principles of emerging sustainability thought. While Zwierlein moved from the discussion of general norms to a description of insurance practices, Rafael Ziegler scrutinized how such practices offered evidence and legitimizing metaphors for general systems of thought. His example was Kant’s work on universal history from a cosmopolitan perspective. Noting the evidence and metaphors from cameral science in Kant’s theory of development—the crooked wood and straight timber—leads to an extension of the Kantian theory of development to include the public use of reason for the promotion of the “hidden” plan of nature, Ziegler argued.

These two papers were not only a movement back to the century of Carlowitz, but also each in their way an illustration of the multiple sense of “nature’s accountability” as referring to the ways in which nature is taken into account, to the norms and evaluations these ways of accounting yield, and to the norms and values that are invested in these accounts. In a final session, these dynam-
ics were discussed in terms of the crosscutting themes and questions that remained: the valuation, trade-off, and contestation of nature, factification, the tensions between commodification and singularization, and the control and prediction of natural temporal cycles and hazards. The Foucault-inspired governmentality approach simultaneously united and divided the studies – it united them in a demand for further descriptions of the political accountability of taking nature into account; it divided them in terms of the questions regarding the place of the various accounting approaches in the (global) political economy, and the many open normative questions of “sustainability” and “development” raised thereby. “Nature’s accountability” raises the challenge to further disaggregate the settings, locate the actors, and identify the subject positions and the contesting views involved in projects of taking nature into account, from conservationists and stewards to technocrats, merchants, and scientific observers.

Sabine Höhler (Deutsches Museum Munich)
Rafael Ziegler (University of Greifswald)
The field of decolonization studies has undergone significant changes in recent years. As new approaches have proliferated and research interests have expanded, it has become one of the most vibrant fields of historical inquiry—always in flux, yet constantly yielding new perspectives and surprising insights. The conference added its own distinctive note to the large body of scholarship. By bringing together historians working on such different issues as political imagination, modernization, identity, intelligence gathering, and education, it not only mapped the diversity of current approaches, but also offered an alternative framework for understanding a process that was marked by paramount complexity. As Jost Dülffer and Marc Frey pointed out in their introduction, decolonization involved more than a transfer of political power. Rather, it was a “multilayered process” of social, economic, and cultural transformation that took place on a wide geographic scale, unfolded with varying speeds, and peaked around 1960. Key for the transition from colonial to postcolonial times was the formation and transformation of elites, conceptualized as social groups who command certain resources (political support, economic power, symbolic resources, such as communication or knowledge). Noting that these groups had not yet found the attention they deserved, the
organizers proposed to examine their trajectories on three distinct levels—by looking at indigenous elites, metropolitan elites, and the international context which often brought third-party interventions.

The conference first addressed the question of indigenous elites in Asia and the Middle East. Taking Ronald Robinson’s “theory of collaboration” as a point of departure, Paul Kratoska identified four major allies of the colonial powers in Southeast Asia—royalty and aristocracies, trading minorities, ethnic minorities, and the civil service—and showed how World War II opened up opportunities for new nationalist elites. Esther Möller explained how French schools in Lebanon became ambivalent spaces of nationalist activity, yet remained traditional institutions of exclusive elite education. This was well illustrated by the fact that almost all Lebanese presidents were educated there. Judith Brown focused on the “international superstar” (Andreas Eckert) of decolonization, British-educated Jawaharlal Nehru. Brown outlined Nehru’s personal and institutional “dilemmas of a colonial inheritance,” which severely limited his influence and eventually led to a life-long struggle with divergent local Indian groups at great personal cost. Three important findings followed from the general discussion, two of them further highlighting Nehru’s special role by putting it in comparative perspective. In contrast to the Lebanese elite that strove to conserve social structures, Nehru appeared as a fierce advocate of social and economic change. And while neighboring Pakistan soon hit the road to military dictatorship, conference participants largely agreed that it was Nehru’s passionate belief in parliamentarianism that saved Indian democracy from a similar fate. The discussion also settled the question of whether the concept of “elites” would primarily be a horizontal or a vertical concept, with most participants agreeing that it necessarily has to include both axes.

The second panel turned to metropolitan elites. In comparing the experiences, problems, and shifting identities encountered by the returning “middle-class aristocracies” of former European colonials, Elizabeth Buettner shed light on the long and complicated adjustments of European nations to the postcolonial era. Marc Frey examined the motivations and modes of behavior of Dutch political, business, and functional elites during and after the decolonization process. He concluded that the Dutch “police action” was as much a result of “consensus democracy” as of social pillarization. The question of continuity loomed large when Frey pointed out that functional elites such as colonial administrators often returned to the former colonies in new clothing—for example, as development experts. Next, Daniel Mollenhauer described how French core beliefs in “grandeur” and the civilizing mission translated into contradictory ad-hoc measures against the decolonization drive, comprising repression, economic development projects, democratization, and federalization.
The first day of fruitful discussions ended with Frederick Cooper's spirited keynote speech on the political imagination of elites in French West Africa from 1945 to 1960. Taking aim at Benedict Anderson’s dichotomy between empire and nation-state, Cooper underscored that the territorial nation-state was far from being the only grand design for postcolonial times. Nor was nationalism necessarily formed in opposition to empire. Instead, visions of an African-French community built on federal institutions and “intercitizenship” remained important political alternatives, as African leaders strove to reconcile African particularities with social and economic security.

Hugues Tertrais and Christoph Marx examined French and South African elites. Tertrais disentangled the conflicting interests of French political, economic, and military officials in Indochina. Initially caught between colonial nostalgia and cost-calculations, French leaders nevertheless ultimately decided to withdraw from Indochina, Tertrais showed. Christoph Marx, on the other hand, illustrated how the Verwoerdian homeland policy became a rallying point for Apartheid’s Broederbund and new collaborative elites in the Transkei and Lesotho—among them Chief Kaiser Matanzima and Chief Leabua Jonathan—who entered a political partnership with the Apartheid regime built on campaign funds and organizational support provided by the Broederbund.

Military elites were covered by Manjeet S. Pardesi, who compared India and Pakistan. Pardesi concluded that the dominant role of the military in Pakistan was born of early structural deficiencies—in particular, the absence of a viable political center and loose party structures. Martin Thomas introduced elites of a special kind: colonial intelligence providers. Although formally not part of the higher colonial service class, intelligence providers nevertheless occupied a crucial place in the colonial state, as they furnished information about indigenous societies, managed the flow of knowledge, controlled political participation, and cracked down on uprisings, albeit with diminishing success in the 1950s. One of the biggest colonial wars, that of Algeria, took center stage in Stephan Malinowski’s paper on “military-civilian elite units and the search for ‘modern men.’” Characterizing the Algerian War as a “war of modernization,” Malinowski argued that Western attempts to transform and dominate Algerian society in order to control the direction of the modernization process created a “Frankenstein’s nightmare,” a paradoxical ensemble of development initiatives coupled with massive colonial violence that closely reflected intra-European developments of the 1950s. Among other things, the ensuing discussion revolved around the ideology of consumption, another potential area of research.
Michael Bollig and Ousseynou Faye highlighted two different kinds of elite activism in changing African environments. Bollig reviewed the strategies of northwestern Namibian chiefs employed in the long process of decolonization. In place since the 1920s, the chiefs masterfully managed to defend their powerful position in the 1960s by embracing the South African homeland policy, while they later preserved their authority vis-à-vis the Namibian government by referring to the international norm of decentralization. In addition, Ousseynou Faye examined how Senegalese teachers became active within and beyond the realm of education by launching symbolic steps of resistance against the signs of colonial domination, expanding literary production, and forming powerful academic unions. Generally, it was agreed in the discussion that the concept of local governance could be useful in understanding decolonization at local and grass-roots levels. Also, some participants raised the question of whether decolonization in fact consolidated a Western European male-dominated gender order. While the discussion did not settle those issues, it identified further important avenues for future research.

The following panel centered on Sekou Touré and Julius Nyerere. Mairi MacDonald described Touré’s harsh uses of power against competing Guinean elites, which ranged from the elimination of traditional chiefdoms in 1957 and the attacks on intellectuals in 1961 to the “fifth column” purges against alleged Portuguese invaders in 1971. Likewise, Andreas Eckert demonstrated the value of biographical approaches by tracing the political career of Julius Nyerere. Eckert found striking continuities: A “product of the colonial state,” Nyerere engaged in a continuous effort to combine elements of European modernity with African traditions, most famously on display when Nyerere’s project of African socialism turned into a paternalistic and coercive civilizing mission with grave social consequences.

Other important players were economic elites. In this section, Thomas Lindblad’s paper dealt with emerging business elites in newly independent Indonesia. While older scholarship painted a grim picture of the Indonesian economy, Lindblad stressed the new élan of the business world after independence, which elevated indigenous and Chinese businesses to leadership status. For Liverpool shipping companies, though, the decolonization of markets had largely negative effects. In this context, Nicholas J. White illustrated how the rise of new competitors, flag discriminations, and cargo reservations coming along with new nation-states confronted Liverpool companies with rapidly changing business conditions and ultimately led to their decline. Last, Daniel Maul discussed the International Labour Organization (ILO) and its impact on new elites. Those influences were manifold, Maul pointed out: At the same time actor and forum, the ILO functioned as much as a place of representation
for new elites as it was a starting point for domestic careers or a transmitter of Western expert knowledge.

The concepts of “knowledge” and “education” also got prominent play in the following section, which explored the juncture of decolonization and the Cold War. First, Urban Vahsen gave a survey of the broadening contact zones between the European Economic Community (EEC) and its African associates. Greeted with much skepticism at the beginning, Vahsen argued, the EEC eventually succeeded in turning initial African resentment against partnership into acceptance by sending experts or pamphlets and organizing information tours or symposia. At the same time, the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations entered the Cold War educational competition with powerful force. As Corinna Unger showed, these well-funded elite institutions with close ties to the U.S. government soon became forerunners of Western development aid and African elite formation. In an effort to create pro-Western societies, all three foundations invested heavily in African education by funding entire schools, universities, and teacher education projects before they abandoned the top-down approach of elite-focused knowledge transfers and turned to bottom-up concepts on a wider social scale in the 1970s. Andreas Hilger’s paper described the Soviet educational offensive toward India—a prime example of systemic Soviet limitations. Marked by high ambitions and ringing rhetoric, the offensive in fact never got off the ground: By 1956, Soviet officials counted “three to four” Indian students enrolled in Soviet universities.

The conference concluded with a roundtable discussion led by Jost Dülffer and Dietmar Rothermund. Dülffer noted that the “symbolic imagery” of decolonization had been neglected as the Cold War and modernization theory had been. Yet he also found that the concept of elites as social groups had proven useful, since it captured the dynamics of social ascent and descent well. With regard to the trajectories of decolonization, Dülffer argued that there may be no clear answer, since elites followed different patterns of behavior as they occupied different strategic positions after independence. Indeed, one might add, it was precisely the comparative perspective taken by contributors that made the differing trajectories of elite formation and transformation visible—an important accomplishment in itself. Besides, the conference marked out several possible routes future researchers may take. Clearly, decolonization’s symbolic dimension and its intersections with the Cold War may be areas worthy of further study. The same holds true for life stories, consumption, changing concepts of home, governance, gender issues, modernity, knowledge transfers, and education, to name a few. The “multilayered process” of decolonization leaves historians plenty of challenges to grapple with.

Sönke Kunkel (Jacobs University, Bremen)
SYMPOSIUM IN MEMORIAM OF GERALD D. FELDMAN

Conference at the Deutsche Bank AG and Dresdner Bank AG, Berlin, October 23-24, 2008. Co-sponsored by the GHI Washington, Allianz AG, C.H. Beck, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Evonik, European Association for Business and Financial History, Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte, Alfred und Cläre Pott-Stiftung, and the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft. Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Michael Jurk (Dresdner Bank AG), Martin L. Müller (Deutsche Bank AG), Andrea H. Schneider (Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte), Dieter Ziegler (Universität Bochum). Speakers: Johannes Bähr (Universität Frankfurt/Main), Volker Berghahn (Columbia University), Christoph Buchheim (Universität Mannheim), Philip Cottrell (University of Leicester), Barbara Eggenkämper (Archiv der Allianz AG), Peter Eigner (Universität Wien), Jeffrey Fear (University of Redlands), Martin H. Geyer (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich), Manfred Grieger (Historische Kommunikation, Volkswagen AG), Herbert Hansmeyer (Allianz AG), Peter Hayes (Northwestern University), Peter Hertner (Universität Halle-Wittenberg), Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich (Freie Universität Berlin), Heidrun Homburg (Universität Freiburg), Tessen von Heydebreck (Deutsche Bank), Harold James (Princeton University), Jürgen Kocka (WZB Berlin), Urte Kocka, Werner Plumpe (Universität Frankfurt/Main), Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman, Manfred Rasch (ThyssenKrupp Konzernarchiv), Gerhard A. Ritter (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich), Reinhard Rürup (Technische Universität Berlin), Edith Sheffer (University of California, Berkeley), Fritz Weber (Universität Wien), Harald Wixforth (Universität Bochum), Dieter Ziegler (Universität Bochum).

On October 31, 2007, Gerald D. Feldman died at the age of 70. Feldman was “one of the most respected and influential historians of his generation” (H-German), and his books on the social, political, and economic history of the Weimar Republic and National Socialism were both masterpieces of scholarship and standard reading for anyone wishing to understand what occurred in Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. Feldman served as president of the Friends of the German Historical Institute Washington and was a member of its academic advisory board. Grateful for his intellectual and organizational work, the GHI Washington was one of the initiators of an academic symposium to commemorate and discuss Feldman’s life and legacy. With the co-sponsorship of leading German companies and the organizational support of the Gesellschaft für Unternehmensgeschichte, this symposium turned into a major event within the German historical profession, which was attended by over four hundred people.

The symposium began on the evening of October 23 in the Atrium of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin with an academic appraisal and private memories.
After a performance of Richard Wagner’s “Siegfried-Idyll,” Jürgen Kocka traced Feldman’s academic career, which included twelve books, fifteen edited books, and more than 130 articles. Based on intensive archival studies, Feldman’s work was engaged yet balanced, readable yet of exhaustive length and depth. Feldman acted as an important organizer of historical research and received many prestigious fellowships and prizes, while never losing his close contact with colleagues, archivists, and doctoral students. Highly personable, he established academic and personal networks in Berkeley, Berlin, Munich, and Vienna. Kocka’s overview of Feldman’s achievements was followed by three more private recollections. Barbara Eggenkämpfer spoke about Feldman’s work as historian, mentor, and friend during the project on the history of the Allianz AG that began in 1997. Urte Kocka gave insights into the Kockas’ friendship with “Gerry and Norma” – praising their humor as well as their love of good food and long operas. Most touching was the contribution of Edith Sheffer, Feldman’s last doctoral student at Berkeley, for whom Feldman was the first reader of her writing and an inspiring teacher. Sheffer said that she continued to use his jokes in her seminars and was “still writing for him.”

The following day featured four panels that analyzed Feldman’s major research topics and presented new research. The first panel was devoted to the war economy during the First World War, the topic of Feldman’s dissertation and first book, *Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918* (1966). Chaired by Volker Berghahn, three lectures analyzed the role of banks and heavy industry in the German war effort. Werner Plume shared insights from his current research project on Bayer’s CEO Carl Duisberg. Harald Wixford examined the foundation and financing of the growing network of German war societies, a corporatist form of public-private partnership. Manfred Rasch’s presentation covered a neglected field of business history – the history of aristocratic entrepreneurs—arguing that the growing disorder of the war was reflected in the difficult balance between economic rationality and the struggle for an increasingly authoritarian monarchy.

The second panel focused on the history of the German inflation, which Feldman had analyzed in his groundbreaking monograph *Iron and Steel in the German Inflation, 1916-1923* (1977) and in his magnum opus *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914-1923* (1993). Carl-Ludwig Holtfreterich (panel chair) and Gerhard A. Ritter discussed the contribution of these books and the work of the inflation project financed by the Volkswagen foundation since 1977. While both scholars concentrated on the German experience, Fritz Weber and Philip Cottrell emphasized the overall European context. Weber examined the expansion of Bavarian banks
into Austria as a result of prewar investments, the loss of former territory, and the dubious activities of some Austrian bankers. Although it took place in a highly politicized context, the German expansion was cautious and based on economic rationality. Cottrell’s presentation investigated the “rocky path” to Austrian reconstruction in 1920/21. After the relative failure of the reconstruction plan of the League of Nations and the cooperation of central banks, the reconstruction became a matter of business – with disastrous consequences in the autumn of 1921. Martin H. Geyer set a different tone, analyzing the war and inflation period with the tools of cultural history. Material want and injustice, he argued, are crucial in understanding this era because they built the basis for an economy of justice, in which right stood against order and justice against law. Therefore, terms like dictatorship and democracy must be used in a more cautious and differentiated way by historians.

During the 1990s, banking history became the center of Feldman’s research. The third panel, chaired by Christoph Buchheim, therefore examined the history of banking during the interwar period. Peter Hertner’s lecture concentrated on Feldman’s micro-sociological approach and highlighted his methodological pluralism and concentration on actors and mentalities, arguing that Feldman practiced a new political history, a trend that is once again becoming fashionable at present. Jeffrey Fear gave an interesting account of varieties of capitalism by comparing German and American banking regulation policies. Despite similar debates and arguments, the political consequences were quite different. Although both German and American small banks started out with comparable market shares of 20-25% in the late nineteenth century, German governments strengthened the smaller banks to support middle-sized companies, whereas in the United States smaller banks lost their position already before the First World War because of the different structure of the banking business and their failure to lobby for their own interests politically. Peter Eigner widened this comparative perspective in a lecture on the Austrian banking sector and the dominant role of Rudolf Sieghart, the CEO of the Österreichische Bodencreditanstalt. Sieghart established a personal network of subtle corruption that infiltrated both the political and the economic sphere. Eigner argued against the demonization of leading bankers and explained Sieghart’s strategy as typical for this branch, which failed to adapt to the changing economic and political conditions. At the end of the panel, Harold James highlighted the essentials of the 1931 banking crisis. In contrast to the current financial crisis, politicians then were unwilling to support the banks, initially the Danat-Bank, as the risks were considered too high. Paradoxically, however, the ensuing crisis resulted in a state-dominated banking sector already before the Nazi seizure of power.
The fourth panel dealt with business history during National Socialism – a topic that had attracted Gerald Feldman since the early 1990s. Reinhard Rürup provided an overview of the research projects on the history of the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Society. Rürup argued that scientists saw the Nazi regime primarily as an opportunity for intensified research and therefore cooperated with the regime and supported its racial policy and war preparations. The emerging question of individual and corporate freedom of action was picked up in Johannes Bähr’s comparison of two leading entrepreneurs. While Paul Reusch, the conservative CEO of the Gutehoffnungshütte, kept a relative distance from the Nazi regime until he lost his position in 1942, Friedrich Flick embodied the systematic cooperation with National Socialism. Thus the scope of individual choices remained broader than often suggested. The cooperation between the state and companies was closely analyzed in Manfred Grieger’s lecture on the construction of two new dams in the Harz region. Grieger gave detailed archival insights into the problems of acquiring a labor force and building materials from 1938 onwards, which resulted in the systematic exploitation of forced laborers. Heidrun Homburg added two French case studies from the electrical industry, which again stressed the heterogeneity of German occupation policies.

The symposium closed with concluding remarks by co-organizers Dieter Ziegler and Hartmut Berghoff, who will be preparing a book with papers from the symposium, which will be published by C.H. Beck in 2009. In addition to this symposium, the Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland (DGIA) has established a new Gerald D. Feldman travel grant to support German-American archival work. The Friends of the German Historical Institute Washington are working to establish an annual Gerald D. Feldman Lecture. Following the program, Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman expressed her gratitude for this event and ended with touching words, including Mascha Kaleko’s poem “Memento”: “Before my own death is me do not fear for. Only before the death of those, which are me close. How am I to live, if they are no longer there?”

Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
TERRORISM AND MODERNITY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON NINETEENTH-CENTURY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

International conference at Tulane University, New Orleans, October 23-26, 2008. Co-sponsored by the GHI in Washington, London and Paris as well as the Department of History at Tulane University, Murphy Institute of Political Economy at Tulane University, and Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland. Conveners: Carola Dietze (GHI Washington), Claudia Verhoeven (George Mason University), Mareike König (GHI Paris), and Benedikt Stuchtey (GHI London). Participants: Patrick Bahners (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), Melanie A. Bailey (Centenary College of Louisiana), David Blackbourn (Harvard University), Oleg Budnitskii (Academy of Science, Moscow), Gavin Cameron (University of Calgary), Alexander Demandt (Friedrich Meinecke Institute, Berlin), Barbara B. Diefendorf (Boston University), Johannes Dillinger (Oxford Brookes University), Roni Dorot (European University Institute), Mark Driscoll (University of North Carolina), Dan Edelstein (Stanford University), Christopher Ely (Florida Atlantic University), Beverly Gage (Yale University), James L. Gelvin (University of California, Los Angeles), Joshua D. Goldstein (University of Calgary), Adrian Guelke (Queens University of Belfast), Richard Bach Jensen (Louisiana Scholars’ College), Jeffrey Kaplan (University of Wisconsin Oshkosh), Isaac Land (Indiana State University), Ann Larabee (Michigan State University), Friedrich Lenger (University of Giessen), Martin A. Miller (Duke University), Paul Miller (McDaniel College), Daniel Monterescu (Central European University), Gotelind Müller-Saini (Heidelberg University), Neeti Nair (University of Virginia), Timothy H. Parsons (Washington University), Lynn Patyk (University of Florida), Samuel C. Ramer (Tulane University), David Rapoport (University of California, Los Angeles), Klaus Ries (University of Jena), Frithjof Benjamin Schenk (University of Munich), Ulrich Sieg (University of Marburg), Michal Targowski (Nicolas Copernicus University), Peter Waldman (University of Augsburg), Niall Whelehan (European University Institute), George Williamson (University of Alabama), Andrew Zimmerman (George Washington University). Additional participants: Elizaveta Budnitskaya, Jeffry M. Diefendorf (University of New Hampshire), Marline Otte (Tulane University), Peter G. Stillman (Vassar College).

This conference brought together leading scholars from Canada, Europe, the United States, the Middle East, and Asia to explore the links between terrorism and modernity as they articulate different forms of political violence on the global and local scales. Posing a critical alternative to Eurocentric historiography as well as to the contemporary reification of the phenomenon of terrorism, the participants employed sophisticated theoretical perspectives that drew on a wealth of empirical evidence. Revitalizing key conceptual and methodological debates, the conference illuminated the problem of terrorism’s historicity and provided a historically grounded definition of the subject.
Framing the foundational question of terrorism’s “modernity,” the introductory comments launched a lively debate. Carola Dietze and Claudia Verhoeven started with a series of open questions and guiding problems that set the terms for the following discussion. Both terrorism and modernity, they argued, present us with profound problems of definition and periodization regarding their respective historical itineraries in different locations and their linkage to state apparatuses, collective consciousness, and constructions of past, present, and future. In his keynote address entitled “Terrorism—A Timeless Topic,” Alexander Demandt surveyed more than two millennia of political violence to support the argument that terrorism has always been a part of contentious politics. From Spartan random killings through the zealot rebels in Judea, the Assassins, the Saint Bartolomeo massacres, the French Revolution, and the Red Brigades, terror has been deployed as both a “bottom up” and a “top down” strategy of mobilization, intimidation, and political bargaining. Terrorism thus enacts a “diabolical” dialectic cycle: When violent means are effective, they become legitimized as a rational means to an end, and when they bear no immediate fruits, they call for perpetual escalation until the goal is achieved. This bleak conclusion construes terrorist violence as an integral, “timeless” part of political history. The second keynote speech put forth the opposing view, namely, that rebel terrorism is a specifically “modern” phenomenon. To support this thesis, David Rapoport’s exposé “The Distinctive Features of Modern Terrorism” followed the unfolding of acts of terror since the 1880s and dissected different modalities of political violence. The subsequent emergence of four historical waves (Anarchist, Anti-Colonial, New Left, Religious) attest to the unique characteristics of terrorism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which are markedly distinct from previous forms of violence and therefore call for a critical interrogation of modern technology and culture.

Panel I, “Premodern Comparisons,” was dedicated to terrorism’s prehistory and its nineteenth-century interpretations. Johannes Dillinger, in his talk “Forerunners of Terrorism and Nineteenth-Century Historians” analyzed how nineteenth-century historians conceived the history of political crimes. Addressing the role of the emerging state in shaping European patterns of violence, Dillinger described how the fight of law enforcement agencies against political criminals contributed to state building and the creation of new security apparatuses. In the historiography of the nineteenth century, he concluded, the political criminals of the premodern era were considered to be lacking any political agenda. Therefore, they were not regarded as terrorists, although treason came close to the phenomenon of terrorism. In his talk “The World Church of Terror: The Papacy after Lord Acton,” Patrick Bahners drew on Acton’s work (1867) about the Lucca law, which permitted
the liquidation of former citizens who converted to Protestantism. Treating the papal supremacy theory as interchangeable with the theory justifying the assassination of heretics, Acton conceived the Church’s tradition as a web of lies which exercised a modern concept of sovereignty. Bahnens argued that by isolating events from their context, Acton’s account of the Catholic Church led him to develop a moral absolutism that did not differentiate between past actions and present judgments. Thus engaged in an intellectual war on terror, liberal universalism may breed its own fanaticism. Concluding the first panel, Dan Edelstein’s paper on “Law and Terror: Toward a Theory of Totalitarian Justice” argued that the Terror of the French Revolution was rooted in the Enlightenment tradition of natural rights. He further exposed the dual system of justice as an essential feature linking Jacobin Terror laws to the subsequent totalitarian justice of the Nazi and Soviet regimes. This duality was predicated on the existence of traditional criminal courts alongside new “extraordinary” courts that expanded their authority so as to eventually consume normative justice.

Panel II, “Intellectual History,” unpacked some of the conceptual questions raised in the opening session. In their paper “What is so Terrible about the Terror? Hegel, the French Revolution, and Contemporary Terrorism as Reenactment of Modernity,” Joshua Goldstein and Gavin Cameron turned to philosophy to reposition the logic of terrorism. Hegel’s analysis of the Jacobin Terror reveals a twofold logic of terrorism that constitutes a uniquely modern process of simultaneous identity construction and destruction. This dynamic of violence exposes contemporary terrorism as a logical articulation of modern identity. Klaus Ries’s paper on “Fichte’s Philosophy of the Act” described how Fichte’s thought, influenced by the French Revolution, constituted a theoretical basis of “Modern Terrorism.” He developed the figure of the “Modern Intellectual” who preached a political radicalism referring to the French Revolution and ultimately constituted an important foundation of the terrorist “act of conviction” and the formation of political parties in Germany. Lynn Patyk concluded the session with a paper on “Modern Terrorism and the Sensitive Heart,” which highlighted the emotional public discourse of “covert sympathy” for the victims of state oppression in the nineteenth century. One of the predominant types was the sensitive terrorist, a “wounded soul” whose violence was motivated by identification with the victims of state cruelty.

Panel III, “Wars and the Technology of the Bomb,” interrogated the transformations in styles of warfare brought about by new methods of terrorism in the nineteenth century. Andrew Zimmerman’s paper “Barricade Warfare and the Origins of Revolutionary and Military Modernity” identified the increase in barricade warfare during the 1848-49 revolutions across Europe
as a new battlefield for regular and revolutionary militants. Using the *Communist Manifesto* as a reference point, he showed how the prevailing view of historical optimism made way for a new form of military realism after 1848. Marx and Engels closely followed the American Civil War, during which the strategies of revolutionary and conventional war merged further, continuing a transatlantic dynamic that lasted into the era of decolonization.

Ann Larabee’s paper “The History and Subversive Rhetoric of Bomb-Making Manuals in the United States” examined how radical groups gained expertise through the circulation of bomb-making instructions. Analyzing bomb-making as a form of cultural and technical production, Larabee showed how bomb-making had many of the same functions recently ascribed to cultural forms like protest songs, murals, poetry, and documentary movies. Bombs, she concluded, are meaning-generating machines which often draw on “legitimate” sources. In the same vein, Niall Whelehan’s presentation dealt with Fenian violence in the late nineteenth century and the way its changing definitions of uprising and new repertoires of violence—new technologies, assassinations, and bombs—borrowed elements from several jurisdictions. According to Whelehan, processes of modernization enabled exchanges between Irish nationalists from inside and outside Ireland, thereby challenging routines of violence, which led to their self-perception as crossing existing political boundaries.

Panel IV, “Big Developments,” explored the transformations in material infrastructure and social organization that served as conditions for the rise of modern terrorism. In his paper “Urban Space and Populist Terror in Russia, 1878–1881,” Christopher Ely proposed to read the emergence of radical groups, e.g., the “Will of the People,” as a product of the changing environmental realities in Russia, especially urbanization. While Russian populists idealized the countryside, their ideas and organizations remained firmly embedded in the cityscape of urban Russia. By the late 1870s, they understood that effective manipulation of urban space offered them a remarkable source of power and influence. In “Attacking the Empire’s Achilles’ Heels: Railroads and Terrorism in Tsarist Russia,” Benjamin Frithjof Schenk identified modern transportation systems as vehicles of mobility and mobilization. While railroads served mainly to increase state control, they also became an effective device in the hands of political forces dedicated to destabilizing state control. From the 1860s, terrorist assaults on railway tracks aimed to end the lives of the tsar and high officials, the expropriation of state and private treasuries, and the obstruction of military transports within the country. Mareike König’s paper “Terrorism, Migration and the Fear of an International Complot” used the example of Germans in Paris from 1871 to 1895 to examine the impact of migration in constructing a transnational landscape of fear. Even though French
President Carnot was assassinated by the Italian anarchist Sante Caserio in Lyon in 1894 and Empress Elisabeth of Austria was killed by the Italian Luigi Luccheni in Geneva in 1898, König concluded that migration cannot be used as an analytical category to explain the emergence of terrorism and called the “international conspiracy” thesis into question. The session concluded with Richard Jensen’s analysis of anarchist terrorism, often cited at the turn of the century as the greatest single threat to civilization. Between 1880 and 1914, Jensen showed, the efforts to combat anarchist terrorism took place globally. The anarchist threat proved a powerful stimulus to police centralization, professionalization, and technical modernization in Italy, Germany, France, Switzerland, and Spain. Eventually it was the combination of economic, social, and political factors, along with an effort to downplay the importance of anarchist terrorism, that best explains the decline of this form of violence in certain countries. Careful police intelligence work and international police cooperation, together with more professional protection for monarchs and heads of state, could aid in reducing anarchist terrorism, but heavy-handed repression only worsened it.

Panel V. “Colonial and Anti-Colonial Assassinations,” began with Michal Targowski’s paper “Against Colonialism or Social Iniquities? Polish Terrorists in the Long Nineteenth Century,” which presented Polish terrorism as a reaction to two main forces: capitalism and the tsarist autocracy. Nationalist accounts were deliberately disguised by socialist programs so as to attract and mobilize youth. The rise of Polish terrorism, he concluded, was tightly connected to Russian terrorism, which was motivated by a radical socialism directed against the tsar’s capitalist and autocratic pressure. Moving the debate to the African colonial context, Timothy Parsons described the October 1905 assassination of Koitalel Arap Samoei, leader of central Kenya’s Nandi, by Captain Meinertzhagen, a military representative of the East African Protectorate (EAP). Parsons investigated the debate surrounding the question “Who is the terrorist?” by examining two colonizer and colonized cultures that resorted to extreme political violence. Since the British framed their African imperial project as a “civilizing mission,” the question of colonial modernity came to the fore, leading Parsons to challenge the Eurocentric conception of “modernity” in the colonial context. In “Gandhian ‘Satyagraha’ as Terrorism: The Limits to Non-Violence in Late Colonial India,” Neeti Nair analyzed Gandhi’s repudiation of Bhagat Singh—a popular “terrorist” who fought against colonialism and was consequently condemned to death. She argued that Gandhi’s refusal to support political actors who threatened his position as the nation’s most prominent advocate actually amplified Singh’s legacy and popularity.
Panel VI, “Comparisons,” set forth two case studies that shed new light on European terrorism. In her paper “China and the ‘Anarchist Wave of Assassinations,’” Gotelind Müller-Saini revisited the emergence of the so-called anarchist terrorism in China (termed “assassination-ism” at the time). Critically engaging Rapoport’s wave concept in the East Asian context, Müller-Saini argued that this wave of violence should not be called “anarchist,” because what circulated around the globe was more of a strategy. In China, for example, the strategy of assassinations was taken up by Chinese nationalists. Further elaborating the comparative framework, Peter Waldmann addressed the “lack” of terrorism in Argentina in the late nineteenth century. Terrorism should be regarded not only as a form of “irregular violence” committed by non-state actors but also as a form of symbolic violence or “violence as communication” (aka propaganda of the deed), committed by small groups who seek to represent and mobilize the masses. Contrasting the upsurge of urban guerrilla movements in the Cono sur in the 1960s and 1970s with the lack of terrorist groups eighty years before, Waldmann argued that the conditions for waging urban guerilla wars in the twentieth century help us to understand why the situation in the late nineteenth century was not yet “ripe” for the birth of a terrorist movement in Argentina.

Panel VII, “Nineteenth-Century Interpretations and Reactions,” addressed different narratives and responses to terrorism. In “Narrating the Origins of Political Violence,” George Williamson analyzed German reports on “revolutionary machinations” in the 1820s. Following the 1819 assassination of conservative publicist and playwright August von Kotzebue, a secret “report” sought to explain the origins of “revolutionary machinations” in Germany by relying on a “history of ideas” approach to German nationalism, which located these origins in the writings of Fichte, Arndt, Jahn, and Schleiermacher and then traced the influence of these ideas among German nationalist and liberal associations. The report also contained a psychological profile that characterized the assassins as mentally unstable, while the movement as a whole was referred to as a “sickness of mind.” As the term “terrorism” had not yet acquired a clearly negative connotation, state discourse relied on other strategies to condemn the violence it saw as inherent in the liberal and nationalist movements, thus undermining the emerging image of the assassin as a righteous tyrannicide and presenting him as a fanatic who killed for the sake of revolution. The “Increasing Importance of Values” was addressed by Ulrich Sieg, who studied the reactions in German philosophy after the assassination attempts against Wilhelm I. Sieg traced the genealogy of a theory of values to Hermann Lotze. After the assassination attempts in 1878, Bismarck launched an attack against intellectuals and leftist liberals who were blamed for “paving the way for socialism” by “systematically undermining all pillars of the monarchical
state.” In “Terrorism and the American Left, 1877-1920,” Beverly Gage traced the evolution of American left-wing terrorism from the Molly Maguires and Haymarket episodes of the late nineteenth century through the Wall Street explosion of 1920, arguing that ideological and tactical disputes over the use of violence, especially terrorism, formed a key point of factionalization within the American left. At the same time, dramatic acts of terrorism such as the 1910 dynamiting of the Los Angeles Times often united progressives, anarchists, socialists, syndicalists, and non-revolutionary labor unions around common causes such as free speech, due process, immigration policy, and labor reform. The session concluded with Melanie Bailey’s paper “Civilization or Barbarism? Violence and Terror in the French Revolutionary Tradition.” Analyzing the work of Domenico Sarmiento, who was forced into exile in Chile by the political situation in his native Argentina, Bailey reflected on the limits of modernity’s civilizing mission in Latin American political culture. Whereas mid-nineteenth-century Britain or France embodied civilization for Sarmiento, the violent politics of Argentina suggested that it belonged less to civilization than to barbarism. The decentralization of the struggle for independence and the prolonged weakness of the central government in Argentina had inured people to violence as a feature of the political culture. Sarmiento decried the harmful results and urged his people to opt for law over disorder, which he cast as a choice between civilization and barbarism. Other nineteenth-century writers and politicians, both in Latin America and in Europe, also attributed civility to those individuals or peoples who declined to engage in political violence. Representatives of a broader trend, mid-nineteenth-century thinkers such as Sarmiento and Blanc rejected political violence not only as ineffective but also as uncivilized and inhumane.

Panel VIII, “Legacies,” explored novel approaches to historical and contemporary terrorism. Mark Driscoll’s paper “Tokyo, 1923: Terror, Spectacle and the Origins of Modern Japan” analyzed the links between the 1923 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake, the emergence of Japan’s military police (kempeitai), and the institutionalization of a “state of exception” targeting Koreans and other “internal enemies.” The martial law instituted after the 1923 earthquake, the first in modern Japanese history, granted unprecedented legal powers to the military police. Targeting proletarian and syndicalist thought as the main threat to “public security,” the military police planned to assassinate several of Japan’s leftists during the earthquake crisis. The ensuing trial was the first mass spectacle that legitimized terrorism as a violent means to protect the Japanese emperor and national body. Driscoll concluded that the entirety of Japan’s modern history could be read through the kempeitai, and its “state terrorism.” Paul Miller’s paper “Compromising Memory: The Site of the Sarajevo Assassination” examined a potent symbol of Serb nationalism, the footprints
marking the spot where Gavrilo Princip stood when he shot Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Addressing the shifting memorial landscape at the murder site, Miller argued that the memorialization process rarely broke free from outside influences. For many Westerners, the Sarajevo assassination confirmed stereotypes of Balkan barbarism, allowing them to divert blame for the war from their own leaders. Indeed, numerous Western “terrorism experts” today still use this assassination to illustrate the consequences of a single terrorist act on global events. The session concluded with James Gelvin’s paper “Nationalism, Anarchism, Reform: Understanding Political Islam from the Inside Out.” Gelvin provocatively proposed to view Al-Qaeda actions as a form of Islamo-anarchist violence. Rather than interpreting contemporary Islamist globalized radicalism as a mere “pathology” or an embodiment of Oriental backwardness, Gelvin recast the history of the state in the Middle East as a forced colonial imposition rooted in nineteenth-century reformism, nationalism, and anarchism. Diametrically opposed to “ameliorist” movements and analytically distinct from “Islamo-nationalists,” Al-Qaeda exemplifies a global project of Islamo-anarchist liberation that puts the bond of religion over the bond of nationalism and ethno-territorialism.

The conference came to a close with Friedrich Lenger’s comments, which reframed the problem of modern terrorism and called for coining more precise analytical terms and employing diverse methodologies. Lenger suggested a narrow definition of terrorism as the violence of non-state actors targeting a strong state structure. Terrorism, this implied, emerges when partisan warfare (including its urban manifestations, e.g., barricade fighting) is impossible. He also emphasized that terrorism is symbolic—rather than primarily instrumental—violence that is directed at the public and the media. Finally, he argued for a restricted chronological framework, reaffirming terrorism’s traditional date of birth in the 1870s and 1880s, and stressing the importance of “high modernity” for the historical emergence of this new form of political violence. Therefore, he regarded terrorism as a European phenomenon, which has been made global by the exchange of people, goods, and ideas. The participants unanimously acknowledged the success of the conference in promoting individual and collective research agendas which articulate the long durée of terrorism as well as its localized engagements with nationalism, socialism, and anarchism.

Roni Dorot (EUI)
Daniel Monterescu (CEU)
A WHOLE NEW GAME: EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE HISTORY OF SPORTS

Conference at the GHI, October 30-November 1, 2008. Conveners: Uta Andrea Balbier (GHI Washington) and Stefan Wiederkehr (GHI Warsaw). Participants: Sandra Budy (Helmut Schmidt University), Brian D. Bunk (University of Massachusetts), Robert Edelman (University of California, San Diego), Christiane Eisenberg (Humboldt University, Berlin), Gerald Gems (North Central College), Allen Guttmann (Amherst College), Melanie Henne (University of Erfurt), Erik Jensen (Miami University), Nikolaus Katzer (Helmut Schmidt University), Barbara Keys (University of Melbourne), Alexandra Köhring (Helmut Schmidt University), Britta Lenz (University of Bonn), Jürgen Martschukat (University of Erfurt), Anke Ortlepp (GHI Washington), Gertrud Pfister (University of Copenhagen), Steven W. Pope (West Virginia University), Kay Schiller (University of Durham), John Soares (University of Notre Dame), Markus Stauff (University of Amsterdam), Christian Tagsold (University of Düsseldorf), Corinna Unger (GHI Washington), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington), Jean Williams (De Montfort University), Chris Young (University of Cambridge), Manfred Zeller (Helmut Schmidt University).

“Sports for all,” as governments across the developed world increasingly put it after the Second World War, is not a maxim that has mapped easily onto the historical profession. Largely ignored by diplomatic and political historians, it remained for a long time strangely undertreated in social history and remarkably unaffected by the cultural and linguistic turns. That is not to say there has been no historical study of sport, only that it takes place within an oddly textured and uneven field. Sports history exists, much of it good, most of it ignored by “mainstream” practitioners. In doing so, they miss out on a great deal. As a leisure activity enjoyed by millions of active participants and spectators in almost every society in the world, sport requires no justification as a valid and necessary object of historical study. It is a global language that creates, interacts with, and transports values, norms, and social concepts. Sport informs and is informed by race, gender, hierarchies, the public sphere, media, and communication: it impinges on and is impinged upon by ritual, health, sexuality, aesthetics, consumption, lifestyle, space, urbanity, and architecture. Finally, in its encounter with political, social and cultural structures at local, national, and international levels, sport forms new identities, fosters emergent ones, and preserves even the outmoded in an age of unprecedented global development.

At any rate, there is now a palpable sense that sports history is moving into a new phase. “Maverick” historians are peeling off from their day jobs to look
at sport in closer detail and are turning to those who have already spent long careers laboring in the field. It is precisely this moment that this conference, organized jointly by the German Historical Institutes in Warsaw and Washington, sought to capture and promote. While its title “A Whole New Game” might have been conceived with some spin, it is certainly true—to stay within the sporting metaphor—that new balls were called for and hit with skill and accuracy. Sport, as conveners Uta Balbier and Stefan Wiederkehr noted from the outset, “is now finally seen as what it is: a field that different subdisciplines within the field of history can make use of; and a field that reflects social reality as much as it constructs and produces cultural reality.” The time was ripe for considering what the agenda for a newly invigorated sports history should look like, and colleagues from the U.S., Europe, and Australia with a productive mix of experience and professional persuasion were invited as presenters and commentators.

In her opening lecture, Christiane Eisenberg considered the limits of sport as a social system by teasing out the present tension between the leveling off of participation and spectatorship, on the one hand, and the inexhaustibility of media reproduction, on the other. Her richly illustrated examination of the changing ways in which the press has generated images of sporting heroes across time produced a number of important findings: Although sport’s rise coincided with that of the media and photography, concrete images were initially less important than the words of journalists and actors themselves. Even after the advent of advanced photographic techniques in the 1930s, the mental image of the everyman hero retained its validity until television entered the majority of German households in the 1960s. Moreover, the flood of images produced from the 1970s onwards provided the public standards against which to judge contemporary heroes and find them lacking. Sport, as this first paper showed, is located in social networks but can function both inside and outside their technical parameters. It also developed with less help from the media than is often assumed, but is now very much under its emotional influence.

The first panel picked up on these themes by focusing on competition, media, and fans. Barbara Keys called for a re-examination of Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the Olympic Games, from the perspective of diplomatic and international history. The Games and other international sports competitions helped propel new conceptions of human relationships at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and deserve to claim center stage in the history of the creation of a new global consciousness based on universalism and empathy. As such, the rise of sports needs to be seen in the context of intellectual history and, vitally, the history of emotions. Emotions
and their construction formed the focus of Markus Stauff’s thoughts in a paper which showed how, in media sports, the face functions as a blurred boundary between the specifics of sports and all other, non-sporting human activity. Sports, as seen through and produced by the media, are marked by, and live off, this tension in an ongoing process of articulation that both restricts and opens them to other discourses and practices such as politics. Manfred Zeller switched attention from the media to fans in order to emphasize the relation between global events and local culture (glocalization). In his study of international championships and the development of stadium culture in the Soviet Union between 1960 and 1985, he showed how a fanatic subculture, based on the Western, mainly British, model, developed in the 1970s and spread across the country by the mid 1980s, but retained important local meanings and points of interaction with the specifics of late Soviet culture. The Soviet case presents an important caveat in the history of sports: For although sport has become what it is today in large part due to the media’s increased influence over the last thirty years, following soccer on television was a distinctly second-rate activity for the serious soccer fan.

The second panel continued to examine the intricate impact of international forms of competition on local, national, and transnational identities. Steven W. Pope’s paper echoed Barbara Key’s call for greater understanding of the diplomatic networks in which early sporting competition arose by outlining the genesis of the Davis Cup in terms of early twentieth-century American imperialism. The competition, which became dominated in the late 1920s by the French and after 1945 by the Australians, is an example of the way in which Americans indigenized a cultural sporting import (British tennis), created a nationalistic, international sporting competition, and effectively exported it back to Britain within the wider context of a burgeoning, imperial rivalry on the world stage between two sporting and political rivals. In addressing the case of Poland, Britta Lenz focused on a country whose sporting identity depended greatly on the international structures and competitions created by foreigners. Research on Polish soccer, conducted mainly by national sports historians, has concentrated on administration and statistics, with cultural aspects being largely neglected. Soccer, however, received a substantial boost on the foundation of the independent state after the First World War. International associations and their competitions (FIFA and the IOC) provided essential forums in and through which the new state could present itself abroad and configure the contours of its character at home. Sandra Budy explored a similar theme by examining the first All-Union Spartakiade in Moscow in 1928 as a media spectacle and analyzing press articles and photographs that sought to project images of the socialist body and way of life. The International Red Worker Sport event
was used to promote the advantages of socialist culture over its bourgeois counterpart (the Amsterdam Olympics were taking place at the same time), and to foster identification with the regime through some world-class performances and the participation of athletes and performers from across the Soviet republics.

The third panel focused specifically on ethnicity in the international sports arena. Brian D. Bunk discussed how boxing defined Spanish-speaking racial identities during the interwar period, when the sport became an obsession in the Atlantic world. As foreign fighters traveled to America to seek fame and fortune, they became cultural heroes in their countries of origin. In the same period, racial and ethnic identities were intensely debated, with boxing proving perhaps the most racialized sport of all. A differentiated study of images of the Argentine fighter, Luis Firpo (who fought Jack Dempsey in 1923), showed how sport helped construct popular notions of Spanish-speaking identity across the Atlantic. Immigrant communities formed the focus of Melanie Henne’s paper, which took the Chicagoland Sports Congress of 1931 (attended by several thousand athletes participating in gymnastics exhibitions, mass drills, and various ball games) as a starting point to examine the Sokol movement and its shaping of body concepts and identity. In the United States, the 1920s were characterized by institutionalized politics enforcing a complete cultural assimilation and Americanization of immigrants, and the American Sokol duly obliged by stating that its purpose was “to make better American citizens and not Czech patriots.” However, such promotion of good American citizenship—not least by supplying fit bodies to defend their new home country—did not sacrifice former national ties: The movement, its physical spaces, and activities transformed and remodeled its members’ relation to their ancestors’ culture as well.

The fourth panel turned to the codification of gender norms in international sports in Germany and the United States. Erik Jensen used reactions to the women’s 800 meter race at the 1928 Olympics—introduced as part of the first women’s track and field competition in the history of the event, won in a dramatic and exhausting finish by German star Lina Radke-Batschauer, and promptly banned by the IOC for a further thirty-two years—to explore the highly contested nature of the female athlete in Weimar Germany and the figure of the New Woman more generally. Through a series of debates about how women’s new physical and social roles could be reconciled with their capacity to bear children, Weimar Germany progressed towards an enlightened but still limited position on female participation. Jean Williams asked whether women’s sports could be seen primarily as a catalyst for change as part of a feminist agenda or as a continuing arena of restraint of
trade for female athletes. An overview of the development of women’s soccer in Germany and the U.S. demonstrated that “soccer” and “women’s soccer” are culturally rather than biologically constructed examples of difference and that “equal but different” policies are potent instances of institutional sex discrimination. Gerald Gems focused on masculinity, arguing contrary to Elias and the linear progression of civilized manhood, that its American sporting manifestation departed from the British ideal of the gentleman-amateur and regressed into an aggressive, even violent, form. A sweeping analysis, from the late nineteenth century to the present day, from Babe Ruth to Michael Jordan, showed how men of the working and middle classes underscored the physicality of their athletic performance to differentiate between the genders, a sporting habitus which has promoted and established itself via the media internationally as a particularly American form.

The final panel featured three papers that looked at modernist sports architecture and landscape design at different stages of the Cold War. Alexandra Koehring examined the dynamics of Moscow’s Luzhniki stadiums, which were constructed (1954-1956) during the Krushchev reforms as a representative object to launch a rejuvenated and modernized socialism. While participation in international sports involved new consumption patterns that partly undermined socialist ideals, the stadiums created a site where the representation of socialist sporting bodies projected imagined international space, satisfied the demands of an enlarged national media public, and fashioned Moscow as a sports metropolis. Kay Schiller and Christopher Young examined Munich’s Olympic Stadium, which was conceived in the following decade to showcase the Federal Republic as a peace-loving democracy at the 1972 Games, as a site that both transcended and benefited from its 1936 Berlin predecessor. On the one hand, the work of designer Otl Aicher and garden architect Guenther Grzimek reflected a discourse of individual freedom and participation that characterized the changes in values of West German society in the 1960s: affirmative of technology, industrial and urban society, relaxation and positive human interaction. On the other hand, its perfectly planned and executed Gesamtkunstwerk simultaneously drew on the problematic legacy of Berlin. Staying in the same period, Christian Tagsold’s study of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics (with comparative glances at Munich and the Rome Games of 1960) showed Japanese event organizers in a similar double bind: wishing to construct and project their modernity onto international audiences, they presented the emperor, who had presided over the ultranational disaster of the country’s first modernity, as a peaceful head of state. Via subtle spatial links to previous eras and traditions, the Games sought not simply to deny or forget the past, but rather to find the right way to recapture the unfulfilled promises of prewar modernity.
The richness and diversity of the papers demonstrated that sports history has much to offer general history on many fronts. At the same time, the interconnections between the presentations showed how fruitful it is for sports historians to harness their efforts to the common cause of the subdiscipline. The tension between the need for sports history to speak to and participate in wider debates in history, on the one hand, and the necessity of treating the specificities of sports within more narrowly defined parameters, on the other hand, became the subject of lively discussion in the final round table. Ultimately unresolved (and indeed irresolvable), such conversations underline the vitality of the field: The passionately argued desire both to do sports justice and integrate its many facets into the story of modern society bodes well for its future in the discipline. In the field of history, sport is no longer a game.

Christopher Young (University of Cambridge)
DECODING MODERN CONSUMER SOCIETIES:
PRELIMINARY RESULTS, ONGOING RESEARCH,
AND FUTURE AGENDAS

Workshop at the GHI, November 6-8, 2008. Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI) and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI). Participants: Uta A. Balbier (GHI), Gary Cross (Pennsylvania State University), Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (European University Institute, Florence), Matthew Hilton (University of Birmingham), Daniel Horowitz (Smith College), Pamela W. Laird (University of Colorado, Denver), Jan Logemann (Pennsylvania State University), Anke Ortlepp (GHI), Nico Stehr (Zeppelin Universität, Friedrichshafen), Susan Strasser (University of Delaware), Frank Uekötter (Forschungsinstitut des Deutschen Museums, Munich), Alan Warde (University of Manchester), Jonathan Wiesen (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale), James P. Woodard (Montclair State University).

During the past two decades, the history of consumption has metamorphosed from a niche topic to one of the most stimulating and vital areas of historical research, which will be a primary focus of research at the German Historical Institute Washington in the coming years. This international workshop was dedicated to reflecting on past achievements and current agendas of research in consumption studies, identifying topics for future research, and establishing active networks across the historical community and across the various disciplines that share a common interest in consumption. In their introduction the two conveners, Hartmut Berghoff and Uwe Spiekermann, attributed the enduring vitality of the field to a variety of factors. First, consumption is an essential human activity that affects nearly every sphere. Second, research on consumption is not dependent on one particular methodology, but requires multiple approaches and will therefore survive changing scholarly fashions. Third, the history of consumption is a multidisciplinary and integrative field. Fourth, consumption remains a powerful and contested force in contemporary history. Knowledge of consumption policies and consumer practices will be a strategic point in handling existing problems in the economic, political, and social spheres.

The first part of the workshop assessed the current state of consumption history. It began with two overviews of European and American core studies and research efforts, which were then supplemented and differentiated by evaluations of subfields and other disciplines, namely global and business history, sociology, and environmental history. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt’s paper “Research on the History of Consumption in Europe” began with the point that one cannot speak of “European” consumption history because historians
are still writing national histories, although a transnational perspective on consumer goods has opened up new perspectives. Haupt compared the heterogeneous historiographical traditions and approaches in Britain, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Despite the fashionable label “consumer culture,” cultural studies on consumption are still missing. This field will be the most challenging one in the future. Quite different was the picture that Gary Cross drew in his lecture on “Research on the History of Consumption in the United States.” The United States is not only the ideal of a consumer market with its promises of happiness, wealth, and identity and its ambivalence of fraud, vice, and death, but it has also developed a variety of forms of research. The cultural turn has yielded a loss of formerly dominant economic approaches. Consumption studies have explored race, class, and gender, using advertisements as a crucial source. Additionally, the flourishing historiography on marketing and retailing has tackled leisure activities and spatial aspects, and the consumer is more and more understood as a political actor. Nevertheless, Cross criticized a lack of comparison to other societies, the often overestimated relevance of “Americanization,” and the diminishing role of economic history. In addition, he noted that scholars need a deeper understanding of the function and symbolism of goods, including the human senses.

James P. Woodard’s paper “North Atlantic Models of Consumption and the Global South” broadened the perspective of the workshop by providing insights into Brazilian and Argentinean consumer culture. Woodard favored a transnational and global research perspective that integrates the global south – the so-called developing countries. There historians have found rather similar structures, attitudes, and practices. Consumer studies are still shaped by a kind of Cold War perspective, which marginalizes other parts of the world, even though cities such as Buenos Aires were not only prosperous but in some respects more advanced than many comparable European cities. In addition, actors often have transnational backgrounds. Radio shows and department stores are good examples for a hybrid consumer culture, far from plain cultural colonialism. Alan Warde’s contribution “The Emergence of European Consumer Culture in Sociological Perspective” set a different tone. Warde analyzed the diverse sources of the sociological rediscovery of consumption in the 1980s. Based on the decline of neo-Marxism, an intensified critique of neoliberalism, and the growing importance of the individualization thesis, the consumer and his goods became increasingly important for sociologists, who were primarily interested in consumption and social practices. From the late 1990s on, the ecological consequences of consumption practices has attracted more interest, and research on issues of morality and ethics has been intensified. Warde saw many analytic achievements but only a very limited potential for behavioral change.
Pamela W. Laird critically assessed “the role of the corporation” in her paper on “Business History and the History of Consumption.” Corporations interact with consumers and the state, and these externalities were crucial for research. Consumer goods production, research and development (R&D), packaging, marketing, and communications companies are the most important institutions in analyzing these interactions. Laird recommended that business history take a broader analytical perspective, including not only topics such as security and confidence, risk, education, and different cultures, but also consumers’ beliefs and practices. Similar to Laird, Frank Uekötter’s presentation “Affluence and Sustainability: Environmental History and the History of Consumption” argued for a new relationship of his subdiscipline to consumption. Environmental history, he argued, should not only accentuate problems and the ugly flipside of consumption because it could potentially add at least five narratives to complicate our understanding of consumer societies: the efficiency of resource use; the history of consumer protests; an evolutionary perspective on changing species; the ambiguities of tourism; and the history and ideal of the green consumer.

The workshop’s second part presented current projects in order to assess the variety and richness of contemporary research activities. The topics included religion and tourism, herbs and foods, as well as Nazi approaches to consumer policy. All speakers gave some insights into new book projects. Uta A. Balbier started with “God’s Own Consumers: Promises and Consumption of Religion in the U.S.” Her question was how religion, which in the U.S. is a matter of choice, was shaped and changed by an intense commercialization and utilization. Balbier emphasized that the success of U.S. religion resulted from its accommodation to modernity, above all an adaptation to changed social and cultural surroundings. The “super salesman” Billy Graham, who propagated the mentality of Cold War America, was the most successful representative of this new evangelism. He used new media with virtuosity and combined entertainment and faith for the rising consumer culture of the middle classes. Medical herbs are another consumer good located at the intersection of public and private, household and commercial sphere. Susan Strasser’s lecture “Commercializing American Everyday Medicine” examined the long-term changes of this “alternative” medical sector. Herbs represented local knowledge and home gardening, which became commodified during the nineteenth century, although many doctors rejected them as quackery. This medicalization was different from that of other pharmaceuticals, as not only the renewal of the 1960s showed. Medical herbs still symbolize a modern combination of science, nature, and expertise, which complicates our understanding of modernization and professionalization.
Anke Ortlepp’s contribution “Air Travel and the History of Tourism” used this new form of traveling as a tool for understanding the history of the twentieth century. From a cultural history perspective, air travel represented a new way of living. Ortlepp exemplified this thesis in four steps. First, she analyzed gender and family roles with the help of advertisements; then she examined race relations in a “free” consumer society with its cash nexus. Third, Ortlepp explored airports as spaces of consumption and ended, fourth, with the in-flight experience. Uwe Spiekermann’s presentation “Towards Science-Based Nutrition: Science and Food Consumption in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Germany” critically reflected on the often lacking knowledge perspective in consumption studies. In his view, consumer societies were always knowledge societies – and therefore the interaction of knowledge and consumption is crucial for any understanding of consumption and commodification. Spiekermann used the changing attitudes towards fruits and vegetables as examples to emphasize how problematic the use of terms such as “household,” “consumer,” “state,” “economy,” and “science” are, because different actors and institutions often shared the same forms of knowledge.

On the second day, the presentation of current research projects continued with Hartmut Berghoff’s paper “The Nazi Response to the Western Model of Consumption.” Based on Darwinist pessimism and an ideology of ongoing racial struggle, National Socialism tried to establish wealth and the highest possible standard of living for the superior race – and misery for the beaten rest. The U.S. model of consumption was always a point of reference, but the Nazi regime gave priority to subsistence consumption and a combination of sacrifices and wealth. Berghoff argued that the Nazi model of consumption was typical of a Janus-faced dictatorship that was based on enticement and deprivation. Increased consumption in some sectors—automobiles and radios, for instance—was combined with suppressed and virtual consumption in other ones. Jonathan Wiesen’s paper “Marketing and Consumer Research in Nazi Germany” investigated the role and function of new knowledge producers in the changing German consumer market. Actors such as the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung or the Institute for Economic Research, worked at the interface of state and society. They supported the regime’s imperial and racial aims, but had their specific visions of a National Socialist consumer society. Apart from such different backgrounds, they worked in a manner that was very similar to that of Western market research institutes.

The function of the workshop’s third part, “Towards a Future Agenda,” was to develop general outlines for future research. Nico Stehr’s manuscript “Morally Coded Markets” was read in his absence by Scott Harrison (GHI). Stehr argued that the trend toward morally coded markets is long-term, self-intensifying,
and amplifying, but not necessarily linear. Morality and moralization are open and underdetermined notions, which are given meaning by consumers in different markets at different speeds and at different times. Stehr’s optimistic vision of modern consumer societies pointed out that more and more markets at home and abroad are gradually being transformed, reflecting growing prosperity and a rapid rise in knowledge. As a consequence, future research must focus more on questions of knowledge, values, and consumer politics. Daniel Horowitz’s presentation “Pleasure and Symbolic Exchange: Understanding Consumer Cultures, 1951–1980” backed a transnational perspective as a necessary broadening of current perspectives. In contrast to many economic historians, he argued that intellectual history can make important contributions to our understanding of the modern consumer because it discusses different kinds of models and visions.

Matthew Hilton was interested in “Consumer Activism: Rights or Duties?” Acknowledging quite different approaches in intellectual history, he argued for a three-phase chronology of modern consumer politics: While the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were characterized by the duties of consumers to respect the interests of others, consumer rights have become more important since the 1930s. Backed by an emerging international consumer society and new consumer-oriented politics, consumers became the partners of producers and retailers. Since the 1970s, questions of social and ecological justice have emerged and revealed the ambivalence of consumers’ choices. Morally coded, these choices are also becoming duties. Hilton ended with remarks about the global inequalities and the deficits of commercialization. Consumption will remain a political problem – and research should be conducted in this direction. Jan Logemann’s presentation “Consumption and Space: Economic and Ecological Consequences of Consumerism” investigated the different spatial developments of U.S. and West German retailing and consumption patterns. The U.S. model of a suburban consumer society was based on the car and the mall, while German urban consumer society was characterized by parallel developments of pedestrian malls and large stores in the outer districts of the cities and by both public transport and the car. According to Logemann, this led to very different public places and forms of communication. As a consequence, simple models of “Americanization” must be carefully scrutinized.

The workshop was characterized by lively and often controversial discussion. The final discussion confirmed that there is a need for more comparative, global, and multidisciplinary research. Consumption studies should help to close the gaps between cultural and economic history as well as between theory and practice. The conveners plan to publish a volume of essays based on the workshop.

Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
GLOBAL MIGRATION SYSTEMS OF DOMESTIC AND CARE WORKERS

Conference at the University of Toronto, November 12-14, 2008. Conveners: Dirk Hoerder (Arizona State University), Wenona Giles (University of Toronto), Anke Ortlepp (GHI), Valerie Preston (York University). Participants: Sedef Arat-Koc (Ryerson University), Shelly Chan (University of California, Santa Cruz), Grace Chang (University of California, Santa Barbara), Cynthia Cranford (University of Toronto, Mississauga), Silvia D’Addario (York University), Marianne Friese (University of Gießen), Luann Good Gingrich (York University), Felicitas Hillman (University of Bremen), Abhar Rukh Gingrich (York University), Franca Iacovetta (University of Toronto), Ray Jureidini (University of Cairo), Mareike König (GHI Paris), Pei-Chia Lan (Taiwan University), Helma Lutz (University of Frankfurt), Ewa Palenga-Möllenbeck (University of Frankfurt), Mary Romero (Arizona State University), Daiva Stasiulis (Carleton University), Barbara Thiessen (JDI Munich), Leah Vosko (York University), Madeleine Wong (St. Lawrence University).

The conference provided a fresh look at the history and development of domestic and care work from a global perspective. Focusing on the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it brought together an international group of scholars from North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Sedef Arat-Koc opened the conference with her keynote lecture “The Politics of Neoliberalism—Migration and Social Reproduction: Crisis and Possibilities?” in which she reflected on the achievements of and challenges for the movements that are active on behalf of domestic and care workers in Canada. Broad in perspective, it set the agenda for the following conference days. The conference was dedicated to the memory of Christiane Harzig.

The first panel focused on historical views of the migration of domestic workers in the era of decolonization. Mareike König discussed the migration of German domestic servants to Paris in the second half of the nineteenth century. Due to the image of Paris as a city of culture and modernity, thousands of young women migrated to the French capital in order to find work and personal freedom. Whereas the sources on the German parishes in Paris often present these women as victims, letters of domestics show that they actively used the networks created by social organizations but also created networks themselves. Dirk Hoerder presented his and Christiane Harzig’s thoughts on the agency of European women who migrated to domestic work in Canada and the United States between the 1880s and 1950s. He dealt with the role of domestic service as a protected labor market for women’s post-migration insertion and argued that domestic service provided a stepping stone for the migrants’ aspirations since otherness appeared as a resource.
in an ethnically determined labor market. Comparing European to Caribbean migration, he showed that initial recruitment was an intermediate phase towards the postcolonial mobility of *femina migrans*. Women established their own long-distance migration routes and, even in service positions, developed independent life projects. Shelly Chen broadened the term “domestic labor” as work performed within the home by providing a traveling history of three groups of Chinese women in the period 1900-1966: maids who worked in European colonies, revolutionaries who went to Tokyo, and rural women whose husbands migrated overseas.

The volume, social profile, and direction of migration into domestic care work were the focus of the second panel. Felicitas Hillmann investigated the relationship of feminization to migration and domestic care work. Analyzing international data, she argued that there is a quantitative dimension to the feminization of migration. The invisibility of domestic work, the informal work setting, and the restricted entry of female migrants into the labor markets of the countries of arrival all enhance the necessity of domestic work for female migrants. She also outlined the social profile of female migration in Germany and pointed to the importance of domestic care work for the channeling of female migrants into the German labor market. Valerie Preston and Silvia D’Addario compared the participation in domestic work and caregiving for immigrant Filipinas in Toronto, Canada, focusing on the ways in which levels of unpaid work influence paid work, particularly in occupations related to care work. Using information from the census and from transcripts of interviews, both examined how paid and unpaid domestic work intersected for this group of women. Pei-Chia Lan examined the ethnically stratified labor market in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore and revealed the reasons why fewer Filipina migrants (the Westernized other) and Indonesian migrants (the traditional other) were recruited. Recruitment agencies function as a major doorkeeper in the maid trade and thus play an active role in the production of stratified others and professional servants. They not only construct and disseminate nationality-based stereotypes but also seek workers of “desired” characteristics through the organized practices of recruitment and training. Through “proper” management in dress, hairstyle, and character, migrant women are presented as de-feminized and naturally suitable servants under the gaze of prospective employers. This rite of passage aims to “moralize” and “civilize” the savage in the creation of “modern” servants for the service of foreign households.

The third panel dealt with emerging perspectives on migration and care work. Barbara Thiessen focused on the impact of social change in modern societies on private care arrangements. She argued that improvements in gender
equality rest on a new division of labor between women in a growing market for migrant domestic and care workers. She pointed to the transformation of Eastern Europe and to increasing inequality worldwide as the background for a growing number of female migrants. She also discussed the situation in Germany concerning domestic and care work and addressed gendered issues of domestic and care activities. In her paper on the development of care and household services as a profession in Germany, Marianne Friese pointed out that the feminization of work has not rendered the professional structure of Western industrial societies—the so called one-and-a-half-person-career—obsolete. Rather, it has created new types of social restructuring. These changes, she pointed out, are not based on a redistribution of work between the genders, but are founded on a new international division of labor among women of different generations, different ethnic groups, and different social backgrounds. Madeleine Wong examined the issue of transnational motherhood in the Ghanaian diaspora by exploring how Ghanaian women who have migrated to Canada and the United Kingdom care for children left at home with their fathers and other relatives. Using information from in-depth semi-structured interviews, she explored the frequency and nature of mothers’ contacts with their children and showed that Ghanaian women are similar to other transnational female migrants who maintain their roles as mothers by appointing surrogates who act in their places. However, in the Ghanaian case, the importance of female lineage increases the reliance on relatives from their mothers’ families in unexpected ways.

The panel on policy issues, labor rights, and protection opened with a paper by Cynthia Cranford, who presented a comparative analysis of personal assistance services (PAS) in the private and public sectors of Los Angeles. She showed that in the public sector innovative legislation allowed for employment flexibility and job security by deeming the recipient the employer for hiring/firing and creating a new organization as the employer for collective bargaining. Legislation combined with creative union organizing, she argued, has provided public workers with employment security, while a lack of regulation and unionization has resulted in insecurity for private workers. Her findings validate scholars’ calls for a re-regulation of employment relationships to protect vulnerable workers, but underscore the additional importance of new forms of unionism. Grace Chang introduced a framework for viewing trafficking as coerced migration or labor exploitation in any labor sector, including manufacturing, agriculture, service work, domestic work, and sex work. She pointed to reports showing that domestic work is the industry in which women are most commonly trafficked. Many unrecognized trafficking victims, particularly in care work, she argued, would be better served by a broader definition of trafficking that looks beyond the sex industry and focuses on exploited
workers in all labor sectors. Luann Good Gingrich explored the relationship between gender, the law, and transnational livelihoods by considering how national legal and regulatory enactments operate gendered processes of social exclusion and inclusion across sovereign borders. Extending previous and ongoing research on social exclusion and Mennonite migrant women from Mexico, she investigated the peculiar and contrived legal place of women from Mexico entering Canada as low-skilled temporary workers.

The fifth panel examined displacement, human rights, and care work. Ray Jureidini explored the history of domestic service in Lebanon. He showed that non-Arab migrant domestic workers have emerged mainly since the end of the country’s civil war (1990). But after years of arrests, detention, and deportation of female migrant domestic workers who left their employers (for unpaid salaries, verbal, physical, and sexual abuse), there are still few signs of the de-criminalization of these workers in Lebanon. There are no labor laws to protect migrant domestic workers in Lebanon or the Middle East generally. Following the invasion of Lebanon by Israeli military forces in July and August 2006, human rights awareness campaigns have sought to bring about a change in the attitude towards migrant domestic workers, but apparently with little effect. Abhar Rukh Husain contributed a perspective on Bangladesh. Focusing on migration and involuntary servitude, his paper highlighted the complex factors that underscore the persistent flows of women as migrant domestic workers from Bangladesh. These women migrate to the Middle East as domestic workers, but many also experience involuntary servitude, including fraudulent recruitment offers and debt bondage imposed by Bangladeshi recruitment agents.

The last panel aimed at a re-evaluation of reproductive labor. Helma Lutz and Ewa Palenga-Möllenbeck discussed their analytical concept for the exploration of the forms and dynamics of transnational labor and care arrangements in domestic work migration. They argued, first, that on the institutional level there is an interaction of three national regimes (migration, gender, and welfare/care), all of which must be considered in order to understand the specific dynamics of transnational care migration. Second, they explained how intersectionality analysis allows us to link the institutional level to the level of organizations and individuals in order to explore how these regimes function as a source of assets, or a cause of marginalization, or both. Third, by adopting the “dual” transnational perspective of both sending and receiving societies, they showed how transnational social spaces function as the frame of reference for migrants’ actions. A cross-national comparative study of two cases of East-West migration from the Ukraine to Poland and from Poland to Germany was used to provide examples. Mary Romero explored the hidden
costs of paid care work by looking at child care, arguing that individual solutions to the problem of child care result in hidden costs of paid reproductive labor that are transferred to the families of private household workers and nannies. She showed that the substitute mothering that is currently purchased by hiring domestics and nannies transfers the more physical and taxing part of child care to the workers, while employers upgrade their own status to mother-managers. Reproducing the contemporary middle-class family with all its privileges requires vulnerable workers who are stigmatized in the labor force by their citizenship and (racialized) economic status in order to retain a globalized unequal distribution of reproductive labor. Child care policies and programs that are not inclusive of all mothers, regardless of class, race, or citizenship, Romero concluded, maintain a system of privileges that relies on subordination. In her paper, Daiva Stasiulis asked “what if caregiving were deemed ‘natural’ to men?” and explored the implications of reversing the gendered assumptions underlying caregiving for the global migration of female care workers. Taking inspiration from the witty essay by Gloria Steinem, “If Men Could Menstruate,” she explored the implications of an ideological regendering of care work for the revaluation of reproductive labor. She also examined the analytical, political, and policy implications of “bringing men back” into analyses of household and caregiving work for the global chain of care and the global migration of care workers.

Anke Ortlepp (GHI)
SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM OF THE FRIENDS OF THE GHI AND AWARD OF THE FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE

Symposium at the GHI, November 14, 2008. Conveners: David Blackbourn (President, Friends of the GHI) and Hartmut Berghoff (GHI). Participants: Marti Lybeck (University of Wisconsin Lacrosse).

The Friends of the German Historical Institute convened in Washington on November 14, 2008, for their seventeenth annual symposium, chaired by David Blackbourn. At this year’s meeting, the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize—for the best dissertation in German history completed at a North American university—was awarded to Marti Lybeck for her dissertation “Gender, Sexuality, and Belonging: Female Homosexuality in Germany, 1890-1933.” Lybeck earned her doctorate at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in 2007, where her dissertation was supervised by Kathleen Canning and Geoff Eley. Fritz Stern attended the award ceremony and gave a comment. The Stern Prize Selection Committee was composed of Mary Jo Maynes (University of Minnesota), George S. Williamson (University of Alabama), and Jonathan Zatlin (Boston University).

David Blackbourn read out the committee’s award citation: “Marti Lybeck has written an original and provocative study of female homosexuality at two points of German history—the late Kaiserreich and the Weimar Era. The dissertation pursues three analytic lines laid out in a theoretically ambitious introduction: the history of the construction of the self; the history of homosexuality and its parts (for example, ‘female masculinity’); and change over time in how homosexuality was articulated as an identity and discussed in contemporary sources. Lybeck uses a series of case studies to develop her arguments. One case, for example, involves an analysis of Wedekind’s dramatic explorations of sexuality and of the police and public responses to them. Another focuses on locally notorious incidents of Weimar-era women civil servants and professionals who brought scandalous charges of homosexuality in women-centered workplaces. The diversity of the cases requires Lybeck to use a broad array of sources: personal narratives such as autobiographies and letters, fiction and drama, police records from several cities, newspapers, and local court and administrative case materials. Throughout the thesis, Lybeck is careful to historicize and deconstruct the terms she uses. Her refusal to look at the evidence of the past through the lens of sexual identities developed in the late twentieth century is persistent and admirable. Her deeply historical sensitivity to social categories yields fascinating insights into the history of homosexuality, gender, and selfhood in modern Germany.”
Following the award, Marti Lybeck presented an overview of her dissertation. Her work, she explained, analyzes the role of sexuality and gender identification in the processes of emancipation in four micro-histories. Two of the case studies, the first generation of women students at Swiss universities and avant-garde feminists in Munich, unfold in the intellectual ferment of the turn of the twentieth century. The other two, women organized into homosexual organizations and women civil servants, were new figures in the pressurized milieu of Weimar Germany. In both periods, Lybeck argued, gender was central to broader debates and anxieties about social order and national strength. Using highly personal sources, including diaries, narratives, and letters, her analysis aims at recovering the process of self-fashioning. The Weimar case studies also employ archival records of disciplinary cases in which female civil servants were accused of homosexuality and the debates and editorials of periodicals published by the homosexual movement. Detailed analysis is designed to crack apart the sexually charged figures of the New Woman and the homosexual to reveal the complexities and conflicts that such images contain. The case studies are situated within the context of public discussions of female homosexuality through theater reception, legal reform, censorship, and scandal journalism. Although as writers Lybeck’s historical subjects belonged to the intellectual elite among their groups, most of them were ordinary women without cultural or political significance. Studying them, Lybeck concluded, extends our knowledge of how such women received the elite discourses of their periods and how they perceived their position in relation to the state, the nation, society, and culture. An article offering a more detailed overview of Lybeck’s dissertation is featured in this issue of the Bulletin.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
ENGINEERING SOCIETY: THE SCIENTIZATION OF THE SOCIAL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 1880-1990

International Conference at the University of Sheffield, November 20-22, 2008. Jointly organized by the GHI London, GHI Washington, and the Department of History, University of Sheffield. Supported by the German History Society. Conveners: Kerstin Brückweh (GHI London), Dirk Schumann (University of Göttingen), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI Washington), Benjamin Ziemann (University of Sheffield). Participants: Peter Becker (University of Linz), Felix Keller (University of Zürich), Anja Kruke (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn), Martin Lengwiler (University of Basel), Elizabeth Lunbeck (Vanderbilt University), Sabine Maasen (University of Basel), Julia Moses (University of Oxford), Katharine Norris (American University, Washington, DC), Harry Oosterhuis (University of Maastricht), Ted Porter (University of California, Los Angeles), Lutz Raphael (University of Trier), Stefan Schwarzkopf (Queen Mary, University of London), Mathew Thompson (University of Warwick), Emil Walter-Busch (University of St. Gallen).

This international conference, hosted by the University of Sheffield, was dedicated to the analysis of the application of social sciences to social problems. The Douglas Knoop Centre at the University’s Humanities Research Institute provided the appropriate meeting space for a wide-ranging program consisting of three panels on Social and Penal Policy; Diagnosis and Therapy; and Organizations, Polling and Marketing. The academic host, Benjamin Ziemann, and his team contributed greatly to the conference’s congenial and fruitful atmosphere. The interdisciplinary contributions centered on the manifold ways in which applied social sciences (above all legal and statistical knowledge, neurosciences, psychology, polling, market research, and organizational research) have classified social phenomena, described abnormal situations, defined social “problems,” provided blueprints for possible solutions, and called for therapeutic intervention in the lives of individuals. Thus, the “scientization of the social” aimed at shedding light on both the scientific self-descriptions and the structures of modern Western societies since the late nineteenth century.

Lutz Raphael’s public keynote lecture “Experts, Ideas and Institutions: Main Trends in Embedding the Human Sciences in Western Societies since the 1880s” argued in favor of a methodological pluralism in examining the scientization of societies over space and time. The different discourse cycles that characterized this process should not only be described, but also examined in terms of their effects and consequences. Raphael advocated research that does not restrict itself to examining expert knowledge, but also takes into
account the role of clients, sponsors, and resistance. Further, he stressed the need to develop a cogent periodization of the scientization of the social that would pay attention to different discourse levels and antagonistic positions in the “fields” of knowledge.

The first panel was devoted to the interface of knowledge and society in the field of social and penal policy. Peter Becker’s paper “New Members of the Research Family? Neurosciences and Their Presence in Criminological Debates” critically examined the recent rise of neuro-chemical explanations of violence in criminological debates. Becker considered the appeal of the neurosciences to lie in their promise, first, to establish a “causal link” between violent behavior and specific pathologies of the brain, and second, to redress undesirable behavior by individualized interventions into neuro-chemical processes in the offender’s brain. Becker went on to analyze how neuroscientists were able to translate their scientific authority for the purpose of political and public debates, arguing that newspapers played a key role in integrating the neurosciences into public discourse.

Julia Moses’s paper “Compensation and Legal and Scientific Expertise about Workplace Accidents, 1880–1920” analyzed the emergence of workplace accident insurance legislation in Germany, Britain, and Italy. The social sciences, namely statistical ways of thinking about workplace accidents, she argued, were a crucial catalyst in the evolution of this new framework. Statistics suggested that industrial accidents were the product of “workplace risk” rather than individual actions for which workers or employers could be held personally responsible. Moses emphasized that once the respective compensation laws in each country had been adopted, expertise from medicine and the natural sciences became especially important for defining the scope of these laws. After the First World War, specific governmental structures and “compensation cultures” gained importance at the expense of transnational expertise networks.

Martin Lengwiler’s paper “From Standards to Co-ordination: Universalism, International Organisations and the Limited Convergence of Welfare States in the Twentieth Century” emphasized the importance of transnational exchange on social insurance. Lengwiler’s main interest lay in exploring the extent to which universalistic expert knowledge was able to define social policy models in Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland. Therefore, he closely examined the Internal Labor Office (ILO, 1919–1970) and the International Congress of Actuaries (1895–1951). Lengwiler argued that such international expert bodies were very successful in defining international technical standards of national welfare systems, but were unable to bring about convergence in insurance
legislation and regulation due to national institutional obstacles and national antagonisms.

Ted Porter’s contribution “How Society Became Statistical” investigated the engineering of society with particular attention to statistical knowledge. As the form of social investigation that was most conscious of its methods, statistics contributed considerably to the “hardening” of the sciences during the late nineteenth century in a transnational context. The example of economic ideas and econometrics in the twentieth century also illustrated how statistical investigation gave a new specificity and “concreteness” to the notion of “the economy” across national and ideological differences. For the measurement of gross domestic product, for example, statistical efforts were closely allied with economic management and involved government along with university economics. Most importantly, from this perspective, the free market and the state were not simply in opposition, but have been refashioned, each by the other, by the distinct representations of statistical measurement and cost-benefit analysis.

Richard Wetzell’s comment noted that both the rise of social insurance (Moses) and the penal reform movement associated with biological explanations of crime (Becker) were characterized by a shift from individual responsibility to risk and “dangerousness.” This shift, he argued, was undoubtedly due to the impact of the social and human sciences on social policy, but was also connected to transformations in the image of man—from viewing people as rational and autonomous individuals to viewing them as products of biological and social forces. Wetzell also addressed the theme of experts transgressing their disciplinary boundaries in order to make pronouncements on social and political issues—such as neuroscientists offering solutions to the crime problem. Raising the question of why society accepted the interventions of experts beyond their field of expertise, Wetzell suggested that experts might have offered a welcome opportunity to replace genuinely political debate with supposedly apolitical “expert opinion.”

The second panel explored the relationship between individual and society by focusing on diagnosis and therapy. Elizabeth Lunbeck’s paper “Narcissism as Social Critique” investigated how narcissism became a category used by American social critics by the mid-1970s. As a peculiar convergence of two distinct discursive topoi—of public intellectuals and of psychoanalysts and psychiatrists—narcissism and the narcissist became leading actors in the then popular dramas of cultural critics. Yet Lunbeck pointed to the inherent paradox that the category first coalesced as a clinical phenomenon not in the abundance of the late-twentieth-century America, but in the deprived
circumstances of World War I Vienna and Budapest. Here, Lunbeck identified a conflation of the two opposed analytical traditions—respectively organized around privation and gratification—into one that celebrated release and abundance.

Mathew Thomson critically assessed “Psychology and the Engineering of Society in Twentieth-Century Britain” and questioned the idea that psychology provided an authority and set of tools for the shaping of society. He argued that such “psycho-eugenic” forms of social engineering must be regarded in the light of a history of both ambition and practical achievements. The effects of opinion surveys as a tool of social psychology in the context of war propaganda, for example, have to be evaluated against the backdrop of historical opportunities, disciplinary struggles, and the promise of a popularization of professional psychological knowledge. Likewise, with regard to psychology as an applied social science, its relative underdevelopment and scarce therapeutic resources made the relative success in education via mental testing an exception.

Harry Oosterhuis’s paper “Mental Health and Civic Virtue: Psychiatry, Self-development, and Citizenship in the Netherlands (1870-2005)” examined the link between democratization and the psychologization of citizenship, illustrated by the development of mental health care in the Netherlands. On the basis of four different ideals of self-development, Oosterhuis argued that psychiatrists, psycho-hygienists, and other mental health workers were clearly involved in the liberal-democratic project of promoting not only productive, responsible, and adaptive citizens, but also autonomous, self-confident, and emancipated individuals as members of a democratic society. This account is particularly valid for the pillarized Dutch social system, which witnessed a major shift from the ideal of adaptation to existing values and norms (character) to that of individual self-development (personality) after the Second World War.

Katharine Norris explored “Scientific Child Psychology and Healthy Child Development in the French Third Republic, 1870-1940” as an emblematic moment for the co-construction of the nascent social sciences and modern social policies. Retracing debates among psychiatrists, criminologists, philosophers, and educators revealed competing scientific stances towards the working of the child’s mind as the key to devising effective curricula, cultivating loyal citizens, and ensuring healthy families. Thus, according to Norris, the interrelated discussions of lying, suggestibility, and the origins of child psychology not only illustrated the establishment of child psychology as a discipline, but also became a touchstone for public debates about the republic’s future.
In her comment on the second panel, Sabine Maasen, a sociologist of science, mentioned several important theoretical issues from a Foucauldian perspective. From this point of view, she missed both the “technological” aspect of how scientific knowledge is translated and made effective (e.g., through therapeutic action) and, consequently, the question of how a “neo-social” subject is formed as simultaneously being responsible for oneself and the society.

The third panel examined the evolution of applied social sciences in the field of business organizations, polling, and marketing and was opened by Anja Kruke’s “Polls in Politics: Restructuring the Body Politic in West Germany, 1940s to 1980s.” Kruke explored the development of polling as the epitome of democratic science in West Germany. For the 1960s, she identified a situation of mutual benefit to political parties and pollsters in their attempt to investigate the chances of political approval from non-voters or floating voters. Following the idea of a transparent market, the electorate was placed under scrutiny. Also, looping cycles between polling categories and self-descriptions led both to contingent interpretations of the electorate’s rationalities and to a self-perception of the people as a population and a normal feature of the public sphere.

Kerstin Brückweh was interested in “How to Streamline a Diverse Society: Market Research and Social Classification in Britain.” Acknowledging the multiple meanings of “social class,” Brückweh focused on the usage of “class” as a statistical categorization put forward by and widely used in applied social sciences. A brief genealogy of official social classifications revealed that the ways of classifying people in Britain were based on measurements of employment and remained unchanged over decades despite significant changes in society. It was not until the census of 2001 that the old model of 1911 and the “socio-economic groups” of the 1950s were merged into one new official system. That market researchers have continued to draw on these inflexible official classifications for their own “social grades” is a puzzling historical fact that Brückweh explained by reference to cost-efficiency and practicality, adherence to accepted British self-descriptions as well as the relative proximity of early market researchers to governmental social scientists.

Emil Walter-Busch’s paper “Business Organisations, Foundations, and the State as Promoters of Applied Social Sciences in the USA and Switzerland, 1900-1950” concentrated on the often forgotten history of specific sub-disciplines of the applied social sciences, i.e., industrial psychology, industrial relations research, and market and public opinion research. He highlighted the puzzling fact that these fields had a remarkable career in the U.S., whereas only industrial psychology gained ground in Switzerland. Busch found the
reason for this in a suspicious stance towards academia and intellectualism in Switzerland, which prevented the establishment of private foundations that were so important in the U.S. for the promotion of the social sciences in general (e.g., the commitment of J. D. Rockefeller Jr. from the 1920s to the 1960s).

Stefan Schwarzkopf’s paper “The ‘Consumer Jury’: Historical Origins, Theoretical Implications, and Social Consequences of a Marketing Myth” investigated the emergence, since the 1930s, of market research innovations that coincided with the popularization of the Austrian School of Economics and thus helped to forge the imagination of the marketplace as a “democracy of goods” or a “consumer democracy.” The “consumer-citizen equation” proved to be a powerful myth for legitimizing mass consumption and the “free” market in Western democracies. Schwarzkopf argued that the scientization of market-research tools through consumer interviews, panel surveys, and product testing panels helped to project the marketplace as the new agora and to install the consumer as the new sovereign. Here, the “consumer jury” symbolically aligned the act of voting with the act of consumer choice.

Felix Keller’s comments on the third panel highlighted the often forgotten role of machines in the processes of scientization and their interaction with symbolic languages (of the social sciences), that is, the importance of algorithms for multivariate analysis. He characterized the applied side of the social sciences as one that has shaken off epistemological reflections, adding that they seem to be constitutive of university-based research, but negligible to market research or web-based “quick polling.”

The concluding discussion, introduced by Dirk Schumann, reflected upon several conceptual omissions that would need to be taken up or clarified for further research. First, the question of what an expert is remained unclear. Is the expert a public figure with access to mass media, an authoritative figure whose social position is constituted by a transgression of disciplinary boundaries, or a practitioner in certain fields of knowledge (e.g., nurses and social workers)? Second, it was noted that the categories of gender and race were absent from most contributions. This omission meant that the issue of the dominance of male experts and the importance of the colonial ‘Other’ for the constitution of distinctly Western legal-political concepts (e.g., citizenship) as well as scientific and social ideas were neglected. A third prominent omission was the history of emotions, that is, the issue of how particular emotional regimes interacted with processes of scientization (for instance, parents’ anxieties for their children and home-based security in the U.S.). Finally, there was unanimity that it is futile to draw a distinction between pure and applied
(social) sciences because a “science effect” is most tangible through a mixture of scientific and popular knowledge. Nevertheless, a conceptual distinction between the history of “scientization” and that of “popularization/vulgarization” was considered heuristically useful. The organizers plan to publish a volume of essays based on the conference.

Jochen F. Mayer (University of Edinburgh)
As we approach the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new generation of GDR scholarship is emerging on both sides of the Atlantic. In the 1990s, historians of the GDR revived totalitarianism theory to explain the emergence, persistence, and subsequent fall of the East German state. Increasingly, the GDR came to be understood as the “second German dictatorship,” comparable to Nazi Germany in the goals, means, and practice of power. Such studies often seemed driven by an ideological commitment to delineating the boundaries between the “democratic” FRG and the East German “Unrechtsstaat”. But the integration of social history and Alltagsgeschichte began to break down this top-down narrative of repression and dissent. The rhetoric of dictatorship shifted as social historians considered the ways in which the regime attempted to build consensus for its rule. By the late 1990s, historians had begun to delineate the “limits of dictatorship,” including the difficulties East German authorities had in overcoming the continuities
of the past, as well as the problems posed by postwar political, social, and economic upheaval. Building on the tradition of the history of everyday life, scholars at the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung (ZZF) in Potsdam, in particular, began to investigate the “social practice of authority,” revealing the complicated ways in which the regime and its citizens exercised power. More recently, there has been an explosion of GDR scholarship that is informed by post-reunification debates about the coercive power of the dictatorship but is strongly influenced by the cultural turn. This new work has expanded the field of investigation to previously under-appreciated areas of research, not in order to negate the history of repression that preoccupied older studies, but in pursuit of understanding the history of power in new, more nuanced ways.

In the interests of exploring this new work, the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor hosted a lively and, at times, impassioned conference on the problems and perspectives of “Writing East German History” during the first weekend of December 2008. Over three days, thirty-one participants discussed pre-circulated position papers on topics as varied as sports, elections, art exhibitions, sexualities, infidelities both sexual and political, land use, food, medicine, television, death, hip-hop, and post-reunification museum practices. This report will explore a few of the broader themes that emerged in the submitted papers and subsequent discussions. More information on the conference can be found on the web at http://web.me.com/calytberg/WEGH/WEGH.html.

The purpose of the conference was to open lines of communication within a diverse and transnational community of scholars whose work seems to encapsulate the new approach to the GDR outlined above. Some of the participants are well-established scholars in the field, while others recently published first books, and still others are only at the start of their careers. In particular, the (largely North American) conference organizers convened the conference to assess the impact of the cultural turn on GDR studies. Central questions included the following: To what extent do cultural analyses help us understand the GDR? Are there a variety of (national) “schools” of GDR studies after the cultural turn? The conference began on a provocative note, with participants staking out distinctive and often defensive positions in their papers. It was clear that the contributors expected a certain amount of resistance to their ideas (and, paradoxically, even to the study of the GDR). Yet the papers taken as a whole represented not a cacophony of discordant voices, but a vibrant picture of the GDR. After two days of discussion, contributors overcame their initial sense of isolation to recognize a common ground.

Keynote speaker Sandrine Kott set the tone, questioning the existence of a “French” school of thought on the GDR, while recognizing that there were
differences in French-language historiography of the GDR, which remain largely unknown in North America and Germany. She described French work as “pre-cultural,” claiming that French scholars are more indebted to the legacy of social history (and the work of Michel Foucault, Arlette Farge, Roger Chartier, and Daniel La Roche). Culture, she argued, is integral to the social and, if one takes social history seriously, then meaning and subjectivity matter without taking the cultural turn into account. French work on the GDR also is less likely to construct communism as a “radical other,” informed as it is by the French experience of a strong, native communist movement. And, of course, the stakes of French work on the GDR are different from those in Germany, where study of the GDR is still beholden to “normative West German perspectives.”

Discussion persistently returned to these themes in the following two days as participants hashed out the meanings of the terms “culture,” “the cultural turn,” and the relationship of culture and cultural analyses to other, more traditional approaches. Contributors held remarkably different ideas about these concepts. While art historians hewed to a narrow model of “culture,” (referring primarily to “the arts”), others asserted a much broader, more anthropological model (culture as a whole way of life). Some questioned the analytical power of the cultural turn, which, as commentator Scott Spector pointed out, “doesn’t have the program or infrastructure of other methodologies ... or even a body of privileged theory.” The consensus reached was that historical work after the cultural turn does not ignore the methods and sources of political, social, or military history, but combines these with the study of culture, broadly defined, in a new way, while recognizing the socially and culturally constructed nature of things. That so much of this kind of work currently is being done in the field of GDR studies is perhaps because it enables us to understand better the lifeworld of the GDR, a society that lacked a vibrant social and cultural life that was independent of the state. It was also suggested that students of the GDR are more attracted to the notion of the socially and culturally constructed nature of things because the GDR is West Germany’s Cold War “other.”

Discussion often returned to the question of the “exceptional” nature of the GDR. As suggested above, in the 1990s historical understanding of the GDR focused on the study of the totalitarian state that relied on an apparatus of terror to maintain power, a characterization that drew a significant line in the sand between the GDR and the Federal Republic and has tended toward the creation of a new German _Sonderweg_. Having considered several other aspects of East German state and society, many of the participants challenged the ostensible exceptionalism of the GDR. Commentator Kathleen Canning,
among others, reminded the participants to avoid “excising the GDR from (important) continuities,” both spatial and temporal, exhorting the field to continue to push further into comparative studies—both to compare (Cold War) East and West, and to locate the GDR in the longer history of modernity. De-Germanizing the GDR—thinking about it in comparison with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Scandinavia, or even North America—points to the relative “normality” of the GDR. Temporal continuities also erode any perception of the exceptional nature of the GDR. Canning noted that even the language of the “failed experiment” that has been used widely to describe the GDR has its precedent in debates about the Weimar Republic. For some time, scholars have sought continuities between the Third Reich and the GDR, but they have done so largely with respect to the political regimes. Emerging studies show that the persistence of rituals, ideas, and values of the bourgeois past in what ostensibly was a new social order was just as important.

In that vein, several contributors asserted the need to approach the GDR as an attempt to create an “alternative socialist modernity” and as but one example of multiple, contested, “entangling modernities” (Lewis Siegelbaum). This was a state project, to be sure, but citizens participated as well with their own, sometimes competing, visions of “socialism.” The discipline and subordination of this modernity required its fair share of bargaining and bribing and, like liberal-democratic societies, relied on the unifying power of social rituals. Further, participants noted that there is a certain amount of pleasure to be derived from the disciplinary regime, which allowed, for example, for social differentiation, if not by the liberal-democratic standards of material wealth. Scott Spector reminded us that we should not be afraid to approach the GDR as an ideological project and to use a wider array of theoretical perspectives to interpret that project, going beyond Foucault to incorporate the thought of Althusser, Zizek, or Gramsci. Contributors also sought to break down the duality of the language of state/society, often simply correlated to bad/good. We often assume, for example, that “the state” degraded the environment, while “the people” sought environmental protections or that “the state” drove the persecution of homosexuals, when in some cases it was the petty bourgeois values of “the people.”

If there are particular schools of thought on the writing of East German history, they appear to be defined primarily by the conventions of the scholarly context. As indicated above, the stakes of studying the GDR are entirely different for Germans writing in Germany than they are for other Europeans or North Americans who are essentially “writing other peoples’ history.” In particular, participants discussed the “politics of the citation,” noting that in certain national or historiographical contexts there are authors that cannot not
be cited. The “din” of such citations is matched by the silences created by the absence of particular sources (targets of the thoughtless or willful destruction by those making decisions about preservation), or by what we as scholars think we cannot say. Albrecht Wiesner noted that the words “niche society” would never be heard at the ZZF. The existence of “schools” of thought also seems to be the outgrowth of the structural difficulties of “knowledge production and circulation,” shaped by such obstacles as language barriers, employment practices, and access to historical writing due to the limits of funding for research, archives, and libraries.

One of the legacies of the cultural turn is, of course, that it is hard to say that we can show the GDR as it “really was.” At best, perhaps, we can define a continuum of experiences, expectations, values, and world views shaped in part by a strong set of cross-border imaginaries. This explanatory uncertainty is further obscured by the current state of that spectral society—a defunct state that lives on to shape post-reunified Germany. But as many of the participants reminded us, culture is not essential; instead, it is always in a state of becoming. Perhaps the strength of GDR studies is that we can recognize L.P. Hartley’s dictum that “the past is another country” precisely because the East German state no longer exists and the legacy of its social order is contested. Moreover, although the struggles of the 1990s have abated somewhat, the GDR continues to be not just an object of study, but a vessel into which historians pour their own agendas. At the least, we can be keenly aware of these agendas.

Heather L. Gumbert (Virginia Tech)
DIRECTOR’S INAUGURATION

Hartmut Berghoff delivered his inaugural lecture as director of the German Historical Institute Washington on November 14, 2008. How merchants and manufacturers tried to cope with the risks and uncertainties of doing business in the rapidly expanding, increasingly impersonal markets of the nineteenth century was the focus of his lecture, “Civilizing Capitalism? The Beginnings of Credit Rating in the United States and Germany,” which will be published in the next issue of the Bulletin. Capitalism, Berghoff emphasized, depends on trust: No business ships goods, no bank makes a loan, nor does any professional render a service unless there is a reasonable certainty of receiving payment. As it became increasingly difficult for businesspeople to assess the trustworthiness of potential customers or trading partners in the age of industrialization, they turned to credit rating companies. These firms met the challenge of fast-growing, anonymous markets by “transforming uncertainty into risk” and “producing trust as a commodity.” Berghoff’s lecture was preceded by a series of welcoming comments. On hand to wish Berghoff success in his tenure at the GHI were Ambassador Klaus Scharioth; Wolfgang Schieder, chair of the Foundation German Humanities Institutes Abroad (DGIA); Friedrich Lenger, chair of the GHI’s Academic Advisory Board; David G. Blackbourn, president of the Friends of the GHI; Philipp Gassert, deputy director of the GHI; and Anke Ortlepp, former acting deputy director of the GHI.

ENDOWMENT OF A GERALD D. FELDMAN LECTURE

The Friends of the German Historical Institute Washington are seeking to establish an endowment that will support an annual lecture named in honor of Gerald D. Feldman. These lectures will be a fitting commemoration of an historian who contributed greatly to the study and understanding of modern German history. Gerald Feldman began teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1963. He was an inspiring undergraduate teacher and mentored an extraordinary number of future German historians. His own work was prolific and important. His major works stretch from his pioneering Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918 (1966) to his prize-winning later works The Great Disorder (1993) on the German inflation of the early 1920s, and Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933-1945 (2001). He brought his energy and commitment to the cause of German history on both sides of the Atlantic. He directed Berkeley’s Center for German and European Studies, served on the editorial board of the journal Contemporary European History for more than fifteen years, and gave his time to
many other boards and committees. From the founding of the Friends of the GHI in 199, he was one of its most devoted supporters and was serving as chairman of the Board of Directors at the time of his death in October 2007.

The Gerald D. Feldman Lecture will commemorate these and many other achievements. The director of the GHI, Hartmut Berghoff, joins the Friends of the GHI in strongly supporting the initiative. The Board of the Friends of the GHI recognizes that these are tough times financially but urges members of the scholarly community to contribute what they can. Donations are tax-deductible under U.S. tax law. Checks should be made out to the Friends of the German Historical Institute (for: Donation Feldman Lecture) and sent to the Friends of the GHI, 1607 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington DC 20009-2562. Those who are taxed in Germany can make a bank transfer to: Deutsches Historisches Institut Washington, Verwendungszweck: Spende Friends GHI Washington Feldman Lecture, Kontonr.: 0233 363 600, Dresdner Bank AG, Bankleitzahl: 370 800 40. In either case, contributors will automatically receive a statement for the tax authorities.

FRANZ STEINER PRIZE 2008

Every other year, the German Historical Institute Washington and the Franz Steiner Verlag in Stuttgart, which publishes the Institute’s book series Transatlantische Historische Studien (THS), award the Franz Steiner Prize for an outstanding piece of research in transatlantic history. The 2008 recipient was Ulrike Weckel, who teaches German and European History at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. She was honored for her path-breaking work Shameful Images: German Responses to Allied Documentaries on Nazi Concentration Camps. The prize was presented by Thomas Schaber, head of the Franz Steiner Verlag, and Philipp Gassert, deputy director of the GHI. The ceremony took place in Stuttgart on October 23, 2008, during the German-American Day celebrations, which were organized by the James Byrnes Institute in Stuttgart and the Association of German-American Clubs.

Ulrike Weckel’s work represents an important piece of scholarship in four respects: First, it is the first complete examination of the “atrocity films” that were produced in the context of British and American reeducation efforts to confront German concentration camp guards, officials, and the general population with crimes perpetrated against humanity during World War II. Second, it is methodologically innovative in that it combines a traditional social-historical approach with film and literary studies. Third, Shameful Images looks not only at the production of these atrocity films, but also investigates audience responses. For this purpose, Dr. Weckel analyzed new source material, such as the evaluations of
questionnaires handed to the audiences, for the first time. Finally, by embedding the film screenings in the context of shame and shaming, instead of controversies over collective guilt, Ulrike Weckel’s work opens a new perspective on the history of collective and individual “coping” with Nazism after 1945.

**FRITZ STERN DISSERTATION PRIZE 2008**

The 2008 Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize—for the best dissertation in German history completed at a North American university—was awarded by the Friends of the GHI to Marti Lybeck, who earned her doctorate at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in 2007, for her dissertation “Gender, Sexuality, and Belonging: Female Homosexuality in Germany, 1890-1933.” Lybeck provides an overview of her dissertation research in a feature article in this issue of the Bulletin. The dissertation was supervised by Kathleen Canning and Geoff Eley. The Stern Prize Selection Committee was composed of Mary Jo Maynes (University of Minnesota), George S. Williamson (University of Alabama), and Jonathan Zatlin (Boston University). The award ceremony took place at the 17th Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI on November 14, 2008, an event described in this issue’s Conference Report section.

**EXHIBITION “AFRICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS AND GERMANY”**

This photo exhibition, which was on view at the GHI from November 19, 2008 to March 15, 2009, showed how Germany emerged as a critical point of reference in African American demands for an end to segregation and for equal rights. From as early as 1933, African American civil rights activists used white America’s condemnation of Nazi racism to expose and indict the abuses of Jim Crow racism at home and to argue that “separate” can never be “equal.” America’s entry into the war allowed these activists to step up their rhetoric significantly. The defeat of Nazi Germany and the participation of African American GIs in the military occupation only strengthened their determination. Drawing on the experience of soldiers stationed in Germany, these activists claimed that it was in post-Nazi Germany that black GIs found the equality and democracy denied them in their own country. Once the civil rights movement gained momentum in the late 1950s, black GIs deployed overseas became crucial actors in the struggle. By 1960, sit-ins to integrate lunch counters were taking place not only in Greensboro, NC, but also in establishments on and around U.S. military bases in Germany. Because military deployments to Germany usually lasted two to three years, African American GIs were able to
establish contacts and often friendships within neighboring German communities. Beginning in the early 1960s, black GIs started to collaborate with German student activists in places like Frankfurt and Berlin to support demands for civil rights in the United States. After Martin Luther King Jr.’s visit to Berlin in 1964, the rise of the Black Power movement, and Angela Davis’s solidarity campaigns in both East and West Germany in the early 1970s, African American GIs only intensified their collaboration with German student activists to fight racism both in the U.S. military and in German communities. By illustrating the untold story of African American GIs and the transnational implications of the African American civil rights movement, this exhibition sought to advance a more nuanced and sophisticated sense of how America’s struggle for democracy reverberated across the globe. It presented the first results of a joint research initiative of the German Historical Institute, Vassar College, and the Heidelberg Center for American Studies at the University of Heidelberg. Its goal is to produce a digital archive on “African American Civil Rights and Germany” that includes documents, images, and oral histories. Please visit its website at: http://www.aacvr-germany.org.

NEW PUBLICATIONS


2. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)


Holger Löttel, Um Ehre und Anerkennung: Englandbilder im amerikanischen Süden und die Außenpolitik der Konföderation (2009)

3. Other Publications Supported by the GHI


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Vom Bochur zum bürgerlichen Mann: Kulturelle Ambivalenz, Männlichkeit und Moderne

Stephan Geier, Universität Nürnberg

Die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie und die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des deutsch-amerikanischen Verhältnisses, 1954-1977

Birte Timm, Freie Universität Berlin


November 26

Lars Heide, Copenhagen Business School

Data Processing in the Third Reich: Punched cards in the registration of people in Germany and Albert Speer’s success of German war production

December 3

Nathan Stolzfus, Florida State University

Memory Politics: Conflicts in National Representations of a WW II Battle and its Aftermath

December 10

Jonas Scherner, Universität Mannheim/ GHI Washington

Die Ausbeutung des besetzten Europas im Zweiten Weltkrieg und ihre volkswirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen

GHI-SPONSORED PANELS AND PRESENTATIONS, FALL 2008

Reports on the following events can be found on the GHI web site at www.ghi-dc.org/eventhistory.

October 1

“Nature Incorporated”: Business History and Environmental Change

GHI-sponsored panel at the 47. Deutscher Historikertag

October 1

Travel for Everyone? Tourism in the USA and Germany in the Twentieth Century

GHI-sponsored panel at the 47. Deutscher Historikertag

October 4

Making History in Kohl’s Republic: The Politics of the Past in the 1980s and 1990s

GHI-sponsored panel at the 32nd Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, St. Paul (MI)

October 8

What is a European Classic of Contemporary History?

Luncheon at the GHI

October 30

Konkurrenz und Konvergenz: Die USA und Deutschland im Wettlauf um die Moderne

Symposium at the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte Hamburg

November 19

Martin Luther King Jr. and Germany in the 1960s

Panel discussion at the GHI
Staff Changes

Nicole Kruz, Assistant to the Director, joined the Institute in December 2008. Prior to coming to the GHI, she studied Germanic languages and literature and Medieval and Early Modern Studies (MEMS) at the University of Michigan Ann Arbor, where she earned her Bachelor’s degree in April 2007.

Jessica Csoma joined the Institute as a Project Associate in October 2008, where she is working on the project “Immigrant Entrepreneurship: The German-American Business Biography, 1770 to the Present.” She received her Master’s degree in English, history, and economics from the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster in 2002. Subsequently, she was a teaching assistant at the European Viadrina University Frankfurt/Oder, giving seminars and courses in international management and conducting research on a broad range of topics in international business. From 2004 to 2008, she worked as project manager and curatorial assistant at the Josef and Anni Albers Foundation, a non-profit art institution in Bethany, Connecticut. There she organized exhibitions, managed the Foundation’s digitization project, performed archival research, and contributed as author and editor to several exhibition publications. Jessica Csoma’s research interests include nineteenth- and twentieth-century European economic history, the history of globalization, and German art history of the early twentieth century.

Philipp Gassert, who joined the GHI as Deputy Director and Acting Co-Director in January 2008, left the GHI in April 2009 to take up the Professorship in Transatlantic History at the University of Augsburg in Germany.

Jan Logemann joined the Institute in January 2009 as a Visiting Research Fellow in the History of Consumption. He studied modern German and U.S. history at Pennsylvania State University and at Humboldt University in Berlin as well as at the Free University’s John-F.-Kennedy Institute. His research focuses on transatlantic comparisons and the development of mass consumer societies in the twentieth century. He is especially interested in the relationship between private and public consumption and in the spatial configuration of modern consumer societies. He is currently revising his dissertation, “Shaping Affluent Societies: Divergent Paths to a Mass Consumer Society in West Germany and the United States during the Postwar Boom Era,” for publication. His article, “Different Paths to Mass Consumption: Consumer Credit in the United States and West Germany during the 1950s and ‘60s,” appeared in the Journal of Social History in the summer of 2008. His next research project will look at the relationship between retailers, consumers, and urban communities in the twentieth century.

Ines Prodöhl joined the Institute as a Research Fellow in October 2008. She studied history at the universities of Leipzig and Zurich. She was a research fellow
in Zurich, where she started a research project on national ambitions in a global context by examining general encyclopedias from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. In 2005, she became a wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin at Heidelberg University, at the chair of Professor Madeleine Herren. In 2008, she received her Ph.D. in Modern History for a thesis on the “Politics of Knowledge” focusing on encyclopedias in the “Third Reich,” Switzerland, and the GDR. Her research and teaching has centered on historical questions that embed the nation-state into a global context. Her current research project analyzes the global entanglements of economic interests in Manchuria, focusing on the export of soy beans to the West and, in particular, to the U.S. in the first half of the twentieth century.

Morgan Schupbach, Research and Project Associate, arrived at the Institute in August of 2008. She studied Political Science and German at the University of California at Davis and received her Master’s degree in German and European Studies from Georgetown University in the spring of 2008. Her research interests include Cold War German history, East German social and cultural history, and post-Cold War developments in Germany and Eastern Europe. She will be leaving the GHI in July 2009 to pursue a Ph.D. in German history.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship

Nicole Kvale, University of Wisconsin Madison, “Emigrant Trains: Migratory Transportation Networks through Germany and the United States, 1847-1914”

Fellowship in the History of Consumption

Jan Logemann, Pennsylvania State University, “Aunt Emma and King Customer: Small Retailers between Community and Consumer Interests in the Twentieth Century”

Postdoctoral Fellowships

Uffa Jensen, Universität Göttingen, “Das Selbst (auf) der Couch. Transnationale Kulturgeschichte der Psychoanalyse 1900-1933”


Adam Seipp, Texas A&M University, “In a Foreign Land: Refugees, Germans, and Americans, 1945-60”
Doctoral Fellowships

Frank Beyersdorf, Universität Mannheim, “Democratizing International Affairs through Publicity? The Information Policy of the League of Nations, 1919-1946”

Enrico Böhm, Universität Marburg, “Gipfel der Kooperation? Die Entstehung der G7 als Instrument internationaler Sicherheitspolitik”

Deborah Brown, University of California Los Angeles, “Science and Politics of Category Creation and their Relation to Religious-Racial Identity in Germany, 1900-1933”

Julio Decker, Leeds University, “The Immigration Restriction League and the Political Regulation of Immigration, 1894-1924”

Jacob Eder, University of Pennsylvania, “Sanitizing the Nazi Past? West German Politics of the Past and the Americanization of the Holocaust”


Stephan Isernhagen, Universität Bielefeld, “Fiedeln, während Rom brennt? Krieg und Protest – Susan Sontag interveniert in Hanoi und Sarajewo”

Nina Mackert, Universität Erfurt, “Die Figur der ‘Juvenile Delinquency’ in den USA der 1940er bis 1960er Jahre”

Bodo Mrozek, Technische Universität Berlin, “Jugendstile und Popkultur nach 1945 aus transnationaler Perspektive”


Maren Tribukait, Universität Bielefeld, “Bilder von Verbrechen in deutschen und amerikanischen Massenmedien, 1890-1960”

GHI FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS, 2009-2010

GHI Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the role of Germany and
the USA in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States. The GHI also offers a number of other doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with more specific profiles. For information about all our fellowships and current application deadlines, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/fellowships.

**GHI Internships**

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible in the sense that the GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. There is a rolling review of applications but applicants interested in coming to Washington in 2010 are encouraged to submit their application by July 2009. For further information, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org/internships.
GHI LECTURE SERIES, SPRING 2009

FINANCIAL CRISES: HOW THEY CHANGED HISTORY

March 26  The Effects of Overexpansion: The Panic of 1873 and the World Economy
Richard E. Sylla (New York University)

April 23  The Great Depression: Can It Recur?
Harold James (Princeton University)

April 30  The Great American Real Estate Bubble of the 1920's
Eugene N. White (Rutgers University)

James J. Boughton (International Monetary Fund)

June 4  The Current Global Financial Crisis: Origins, Consequences, and Remedies
Adam S. Posen (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

All lectures are held at the German Historical Institute from 6 to 8 pm.
GHI CALENDAR OF EVENTS FOR 2009

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org.

January 3 Languages: Sine Qua Non for Globalizing Historiography
GHI-sponsored panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association (AHA), New York

January 4 Problematizing Transatlantic History: German-American Perspectives
GHI-sponsored panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association (AHA), New York

January 5 Facing the Challenge of a New Religious History: Post-1945 American Religion as a Site of Historical Inquiry in Germany
GHI-sponsored panel at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association (AHA), New York

January 22 Special Screening of The Reader
Screening at the AFI Theater in Silver Spring, MD

January 20 Immer eine Nasenlänge voraus? Amerika und Deutschland im Wettlauf um die Moderne
Symposium in Kaiserslautern
Convener: Werner Kremp (Atlantische Akademie, Kaiserslautern)

January 13 Civil Rights and America’s Role in World War II
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Harvard Sitkoff (University of New Hampshire)

March 4–6 1968 in the US, Japan and Germany
Conference at the Japanese-German Center, Berlin
Conveners: Martin Klimke (GHI/HCA Heidelberg), Yoshie Mitobe (Meiji University, Tokyo), Joachim Scharloth (University of Zurich) and Laura Wong (Harvard University)

March 12 Tenth Gerd Bucerius Lecture
Lecture in Washington
Speaker: Kurt Biedenkopf

March 13 Rosa Lee: A Mother and Her Family in Urban America
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Leon Dash (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

March 13–14 Representing Poverty: American and European Perspectives
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Anke Ortlepp (GHI) and Christoph Ribbat (University of Paderborn)
March 18
Networking the International System
Workshop and Luncheon at the GHI
Convener: Ines Prodöhl (GHI)

March 19-21
Black Diaspora and Germany Across the Centuries
Conference at the GHI
Convener: Martin Klimke (GHI), Anne Kuhlmann-Smirnov (University of Bremen), and Mischa Honeck (HCA Heidelberg)

March 20
“Kasseler Neger—Kasseler Mohren?” Silenced Narratives of the African Diaspora in Germany
Lecture at the GHI
Speaker: Maria I. Diedrich (University of Münster)

March 26-28
Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive
Conference at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin
Sponsored by the GHI and the Institute for Contemporary History (IfZ) Munich-Berlin
Convener: Philipp Gassert (GHI), Tim Geiger (IfZ), Hermann Wentker (IfZ)

April 29-May 2
15th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History in the Nineteenth Century
Seminar at the GHI and Georgetown University
Convener: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)

May 4
Commemoration of the 150th Anniversary of Alexander von Humboldt’s Death
Roundtable at the GHI
Moderator: Frank Holl

May 29-30
A World of Populations
Conference at the GHI
Convener: Heinrich Hartmann (Freie Universität Berlin) and Corinna R. Unger (GHI)

June 18-20
The Short- and Long-Term Economic Effects of German Exploitation in Occupied Countries during World War II
Workshop at the GHI
Convener: Jonas Scherner (GHI)

June 22-July 3
Archival Summer Seminar in Germany

June 25-27
“Public History” in Germany and the United States: Fields, Developments and Debates in Praxis and Theory
Conference at the Freie Universität Berlin
Convener: Andreas Etges and Paul Nolte (FU Berlin) and Anke Ortlepp (GHI)
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<tr>
<td>September 24-26</td>
<td>Falling Behind or Catching Up? The East German Economy in the 20th Century</td>
<td>Conference at the GHI</td>
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<td>Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff and Uta Balbier (GHI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1-3</td>
<td>African American Civil Rights and Germany in the 20th Century</td>
<td>Jointly organized by the GHI and Vassar College (Poughkeepsie, NY)</td>
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<td>Conveners: Maria Höhn (Vassar College) and Martin Klimke (GHI)</td>
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<td>October 8-11</td>
<td>Medieval History Seminar</td>
<td>Conference at the GHI London</td>
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<td>Conveners: Carola Dietze (GHI), Jochen Schenk (GHIL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 15-17</td>
<td>The Decline of the West? The Fate of the Atlantic Community after the Cold War</td>
<td>Conference at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia</td>
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<td>Conveners: Philipp Gassert (GHI), Ronald Granieri (Penn), Eric Jarosinski (Penn), and Frank Trommler (Penn)</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 22-25</td>
<td>Beyond the Racial State</td>
<td>Conference at Indiana University, Bloomington</td>
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<td>Conveners: Devin Pendas (Boston College), Mark Roseman (Indiana University), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 30-31</td>
<td>Understanding Markets: Information, Institutions and History</td>
<td>Conference at the Hagley Museum and Library (Wilmington, DE)</td>
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<td>Sponsored by the Hagley Museum and Library and the GHI</td>
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<td>November 12</td>
<td>23rd Annual Lecture of the GHI</td>
<td>Speaker: Hans-Ulrich Wehler</td>
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<td>November 13</td>
<td>Symposium of the Friends of the GHI and Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize</td>
<td>Event at the GHI</td>
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German Historical Institute Washington DC
Fellows and Staff

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff
  Modern German social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption
Dr. Uwe Spiekermann, Deputy Director
  Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge
Sabine Flx, Administrative Director

Dr. Uta Balbier, Research Fellow
  American and German history since 1945; history of religion; history of sports; transnational history

Dr. Carola Dietze, Research Fellow
  19th-century German and American history; history of the media and social radicalism; history of emigration and remigration; intellectual history; historiography

Dr. Anke Ortlepp, Research Fellow
  19th- and 20th-century American social and cultural history; history of women and gender; ethnic history; history of space

Dr. Ines Prodöhl, Research Fellow
  Global history, cultural and economic history, civil society

Dr. Corinna R. Unger, Research Fellow
  Postcolonialism, development, and modernization; American and German history since 1945; Cold War and anticommunism; history of philanthropy; history of exile; history of science

Dr. Richard F. Wetzell, Research Fellow and Editor
  Modern German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Martin Klimke, Fellow in North American History
Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Jan Logemann, Fellow in the History of Consumption
PD Dr. Jonas Scherner, Fellow in Social and Economic History

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