Bulletin of the German Historical Institute

Features:

Booker T. Washington, Tuskegee Institute, and the German Empire
Andrew Zimmerman

New Left Violence as a Global Phenomenon
Jeremy Varon

Terrorism in Germany: The Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon
Stefan Aust and Bruce Hoffman
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CONTENTS

List of Contributors 5
Preface 7

FEATURES

Booker T. Washington, Tuskegee Institute, and the German
Empire: Race and Cotton in the Black Atlantic 9
Andrew Zimmerman

Refusing to be “Good Germans”: New Left Violence as a
Global Phenomenon 21
Jeremy Varon

Terrorism in Germany: The Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon 45
Stefan Aust

Putting German Terrorism in Perspective: An American Response 59
Bruce Hoffman

GHI RESEARCH

Proto-Eugenic Thought and Breeding Utopias in the United States
before 1870 67
Maren Lorenz

The African American Civil Rights Struggle and Germany,
1945–1989 91
Martin Klimke

CONFERENCE REPORTS

Connecting Atlantic, Indian Ocean, China Seas, and Pacific
Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s 107
Gisela Mettele

Transregional and Transnational Families 111
David Sabea
Managing the Unknown: Natural Reserves in Historical Perspective 121
Frank Uekötter

Modernization as a Global Project: American, Soviet, and European Approaches 129
David C. Engermann and Corinna R. Unger

1968–Forty Years Later 135
Martin Klimke

Perspectives on National Socialism, Global War, and the Holocaust: A Symposium in Honor of Gerhard L. Weinberg 137
Philipp Gassert

Flammable Cities: Fire, Urban Environment, and Culture in History 140
Greg Bankoff, Uwe Lübken, Jordan Sand

Public Eating, Public Drinking: Places of Consumption from Early Modern to Postmodern Times 151
Maren Möhring and Marc Forster

Early Modern German History, 1500–1790: Fourteenth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar 158
Richard F. Wetzell

Gender and the Long Postwar: Reconsiderations of the United States and the Two Germanys, 1945–1989 163
Michael Grutchfield, Reid Gustafson, Melissa Kravetz, Christina Larocco, Amy Rutenberg

Why Do Terrorists Stop? 171
Carola Dietze

Civilizing Nature: National Parks in Transnational Historical Perspective 178
Anna-Katharina Wöbse

Archival Summer Seminar in Germany, 2008 185
Corinna R. Unger

GHI Research Seminar, Spring 2008 189

ANNOUNCEMENTS: FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships 193
Fellowship in Social and Economic History 194
Postdoc-Stipendium für Nordamerikanische Geschichte 194
GHI Internships 195
NEWS

New Publications 197
Library Report 200
Recipients of GHI Fellowships, 2008–2009 200
Staff Changes 202

EVENTS

Lecture Series, Fall 2008 205
Events Sponsored by the GHI, Fall 2008–2009 206
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

STEFAN AUST was editor-in-chief of the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel from 1994 to 2008. His book Der Baader Meinhof Komplex (Hamburg, 1985; third, enlarged edition, 2008) has long been the standard work on the history of the terrorist group. A revised American edition is forthcoming from Oxford University Press later this year. Aust’s book also served as the basis for the German film Baader Meinhof Komplex that was released in September 2008.

BRUCE HOFFMAN is a professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He is the author of Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 2006), which was published in Germany as Terrorismus: Der Unerklärte Krieg (S. Fischer, 2006). Professor Hoffman was a Fellow and C. V. Starr Distinguished Visitor at the American Academy of Berlin in the fall of 2006.


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ANDREW ZIMMERMAN is Associate Professor of History at the George Washington University. His book Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago, 2001) treats German anthropology in the context of overseas imperialism and mass culture. He is currently completing a manuscript, “New South to Global South,” on the work of Tuskegee Institute in Togo as a pivotal moment in a transnational history of free labor, race, and social science in Germany, West Africa, and the United States.
This issue of the Bulletin reflects two themes that have been prominent in the Institute’s recent work. Andrew Zimmerman’s feature article on the Tuskegee Institute and Germany’s colonial empire, a wonderful example of transnational history, is based on a lecture he delivered in the GHI’s Spring 2008 lecture series “African-Americans and Germans: Historical Encounters.” This series is part of a sustained thematic program of GHI events, research projects, and publications dedicated to the historical relationship between African Americans and Germany. This program includes the research project “The African-American Civil Rights Struggle and Germany, 1945–1989,” which Martin Klimke, GHI Visiting Fellow in North American History, presents in this issue’s GHI Research section. This Bulletin’s second theme is the history of terrorism. To mark the thirtieth anniversary of the “German Autumn” of 1977—the Red Army Faction’s (RAF) abduction of Hanns Martin Schleyer, the hijacking of the Lufthansa jet Landshut, and the suicides of the RAF leaders in Stammheim Prison—the GHI organized a lecture series on “Terror, State and Society in West Germany” last fall. Jeremy Varon’s lucid comparative analysis of the German RAF and the American Weathermen is based on his lecture in that series. Pursuing the subject of terrorism further this spring, the GHI hosted an international conference on the topic “Why Do Terrorists Stop?” This issue features that conference’s remarkable keynote lecture on the “Baader Meinhof Phenomenon” by Stefan Aust, former editor-in-chief of Der Spiegel and author of the standard work Der Baader Meinhof Komplex, along with Bruce Hoffman’s incisive comparative comment “Putting German Terrorism in Perspective: An American Response.”

In April of this year I began my tenure as GHI Director, taking the helm of a vibrant institute. A new director, however, is not only charged with continuing successful programs but also with taking the Institute in new directions. In this spirit, economic history will be playing a greater role at the GHI than before. The economy is a crucial factor in all historical processes, and it seems time to refocus attention on this often neglected or even forgotten dimension of history. I am particularly interested in the historical study of consumption, and the GHI will develop a research program in the history of consumption, an exciting field that brings together economic and cultural history.

One of first priorities of the past few months has been the redesign and relaunch of the GHI web site in order to better inform the Institute’s friends and partners about our activities. The new web site makes it easy
to check for upcoming events, calls for papers, fellowships or new publications. It will also make conference reports available more quickly than this *Bulletin* can. If you have not yet visited the redesigned web site, please visit us at: [www.ghi-dc.org](http://www.ghi-dc.org). In closing, I want to thank the GHI’s fellows and staff for their friendly welcome and their active support in the past few months. It is the Institute’s individual members who make the GHI the wonderful institution that it is.

*Hartmut Berghoff, Director*
In January 1901, four African American men from Tuskegee Institute in Alabama arrived in the German Colony of Togo in West Africa.¹ Their expedition was financed by a German business organization that worked closely with the government on agriculture in the German overseas empire, the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee*. The agricultural attaché at the German embassy in Washington DC had approached Booker T. Washington the previous summer to organize this expedition, which was to transform cotton growing in Togo so that it would supply the world market with raw materials for European industry rather than supply local spinners and weavers.

Leading the expedition was James Nathan Calloway, a faculty member in the Tuskegee agriculture department. He had graduated from Fisk University in 1890 and, like all Fisk graduates, had learned to speak German. John Winfrey Robinson, who had graduated from Tuskegee in 1897, accompanied Calloway. After graduation, Robinson had taught school in Alabama for a year before returning to Tuskegee to do graduate work in agriculture, likely with Calloway and George Washington Carver, the famous head of the agriculture department at Tuskegee. Robinson would soon become the leader of the expedition. Also on the expedition were Allen Lynn Burks, a recent graduate in agriculture from Tuskegee, and Shepherd Lincoln Harris, who had come to Tuskegee from Union, Georgia, in 1886 to study mechanics, but had never graduated.

Observers around the world hailed the expedition as an important success, and other colonial powers soon imitated the colonial cotton efforts in German Togo. The Tuskegee men bred a variety of cotton that grew in Togo and produced a fiber equivalent to that of the American Upland cotton necessary for industrial textile manufacture. As European
mills mechanized cotton spinning and weaving, their machines became increasingly intolerant to variations in cotton fiber, giving the United States a near monopoly on a fiber that had grown in many parts of the world since antiquity. The Tuskegee expedition members were the first in Africa to succeed in producing significant quantities of cotton equivalent to American Upland. Soon British, French, and other colonial powers followed the German example, in some cases with instructors from Tuskegee.

Thanks to the cascading effects of the Tuskegee expedition, cotton is grown as a cash crop in much of West Africa. Colonial cotton programs, though carried out in the name, and sometimes even in the sincere belief, of economic progress for Africa, have been a political and economic disaster for Africans because of the coercion they involved, the economic opportunities Africans had to forgo to grow cotton, and, today, the terms of trade that force West African growers to compete with lavishly subsidized US and European growers.²

The important place of the German empire in the colonial transformation of West Africa stands at odds with the marginal place given to German colonialism, with the exception of the genocidal war against the Herero in Namibia, in historical memory today. It is true that the German overseas empire was relatively small and relatively brief, but other colonial powers regarded it as an exemplary colonial power, bringing its well-known preeminence in the social and natural sciences to bear on what would today be termed development. Frederick Lugard, for example, one of the pioneers of the British Empire in East Africa, and later perhaps the greatest political theorist of colonialism, wrote in 1893 that the German administration in East Africa “. . . set us an example in the thorough and practical way in which they set about to develop their territories,” although, he allowed, “as regards tact with the natives, the advantage, perhaps, lies with us.”³ Togo was the Musterkolonie, the model colony, of Germany.

The Treaty of Versailles after the First World War transferred the African territories of Germany to the League of Nations, with Britain, France, and South Africa ruling the territories on the League’s behalf. The basis of this transfer was not the venerable right of conquest, but rather the view that German colonial policy was brutal and inhumane. German colonial policy was indeed brutal and inhumane, as all colonial policy necessarily is. What German opponents of the Treaty of Versailles came to call the “colonial guilt lie” obscured not only the brutality of all colonialism, but also the extent to which other colonial powers employed German colonial policy as a model for their own.

The Tuskegee expedition to Togo was probably the single most admired German colonial effort. Yet the Tuskegee expedition was, obvi-
ously, at least as much an American effort as a German effort. The Tuskegee expedition to Togo reveals how theories and practices of the control of formally free labor in Germany, the United States South, and colonial Africa shaped each other. It shows how the New South—the South of segregation and sharecropping that emerged to replace the Old South of slavery and secession—became, via Tuskegee Institute, a model for colonial rule in Africa. It also suggests how colonial rule in Africa, in turn, shaped Tuskegee Institute, perhaps the most important institution of the New South.

I. Booker T. Washington and the Origins of Tuskegee Institute

Booker T. Washington was born into slavery in Virginia in 1856. He attended Hampton Institute, a Virginia normal school, a school for training teachers, established for African Americans by Freedmen’s Bureau Officer Samuel Chapman Armstrong in 1868. Armstrong had grown up in Hawaii, and he sought to apply to freedpeople the pedagogy his missionary father had employed for Hawaiians. Samuel Armstrong described both blacks and Hawaiians as members of “weak tropical races” who should be trained for hard manual labor. 4 Booker T. Washington graduated from Hampton in 1875 and, in 1881, established a similar normal school for African Americans in Tuskegee, Alabama.5

Tuskegee Institute, like Hampton, trained African American primary school teachers who would employ what they called “industrial education” in their own classrooms. Industrial education did not mean vocational training for particular trades, but rather imparting an aptitude and enthusiasm for physical labor, as well as personal virtues like cleanliness, sobriety, and thrift that many supposed African Americans to lack. Proponents of industrial education contrasted it to a literary or academic curriculum that they regarded as impractical for the majority of African Americans and that gave blacks too elevated a sense of their role in society. Many who supported industrial education opposed political agitation against disenfranchisement, segregation, and other forms of racist injustice in the United States. Most historians today agree with W.E.B. Du Bois’s assessment, in his 1903 Souls of Black Folk, that industrial education did not merely respond to the measures by which blacks were kept economically and politically subordinate, but rather “helped their speedier accomplishment.”6

Booker T. Washington became nationally and internationally recognized as a black leader and a prominent representative of the New South in 1895, as a result of an address he delivered to the Cotton States and International Exposition in Atlanta. This speech has become known as the
“Atlanta Compromise” because it suggested to many listeners that Washington accepted segregation and disenfranchisement. Many heard this message in the famous simile that has since come to stand for the entire speech: “In all things that are purely social, we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress.” While Washington characterized this interpretation of his speech as a “wrong idea of my position,” this wrong idea appealed to white elites in the United States and elsewhere who supported Washington’s position as a black leader.

In the years immediately following his sudden rise to fame, Washington seems to have taken advantage of his new authority to begin moving Tuskegee Institute beyond the colonial education offered at Hampton. The new Tuskegee that he might have created would have set about transforming, rather than facilitating, the subordinate political and economic status of blacks in the New South. Immediately after his speech, Washington began a seven-year effort to recruit W.E.B. Du Bois to Tuskegee. The split between W.E.B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington, which has become a canonical feature of narratives of American intellectual history, in fact emerged only in the twentieth century as a result of new political engagements of each thinker. Washington hoped that Du Bois would found a center at Tuskegee to conduct sociological research aimed at improving the conditions of African Americans in the South. In 1896, Washington hired George Washington Carver, a star agricultural researcher, who carried out agricultural research to transform black agriculture in the South, hoping to break the forced cotton monocropping that contributed to the poverty and dependence of black sharecroppers. Washington was no covert radical, to be sure, but before 1900 there was at least an ambivalence in Tuskegee that pointed to an alternate path for the institution. This ambivalence would be clarified when Tuskegee began working with the German empire, returning industrial education to its colonial origins.

II. Germany and the American South

The German officials who invited Booker T. Washington to send Tuskegee personnel to Togo thought to do so because many German academic, business, and political elites had a longstanding interest in the American South. German interest in the American South came in part from its interest in American cotton. The German cotton textile industry was the second largest in Europe, after the British industry, and Germany consumed about a fifth of the total US crop each year. Like their European counterparts, German textile manufacturers needed American cotton for mechanized spinning and weaving. India, the second largest supplier of
cotton to the world market, produced a cotton whose staple was too short to be used in textile machinery unless mixed with American cotton. The cotton famine that accompanied the American Civil War, when the Union blockade and wartime disruptions sharply reduced the supply of American cotton to Europe, made clear the international economic importance of the cotton of the American South and also the danger the American monopoly presented.

European and American observers shared the view that black labor was necessary for successful cotton growing and that African Americans, therefore, were in part responsible for the global preeminence of American cotton. Explanations for the connection between blacks and cotton ranged from assertions that blacks were "natural" cotton growers to more accurate observations that the brutal racism of the United States South, both during and after slavery, made it especially feasible to force black people to do the backbreaking and poorly paid labor of cotton growing. In fact, the sharecroppers that produced most of the world's cotton supply after the Civil War were not all black, and by 1910 the number of white tenant farmers in the cotton states approached, and by 1930 exceeded, the number of black tenant farmers in the region. However, the incorrect assumption that all cotton sharecroppers were black made it possible for many Americans to ignore the plight of all sharecroppers and also informed European plans for colonial cotton.

Many Germans had an especially strong interest in the American South because parts of Germany, like the American South, had undergone a transition from bound to free labor in the nineteenth century. In 1810, the Kingdom of Prussia freed all serfs, agricultural laborers bound to large estates in hereditary servitude. As in the American South after emancipation, many of these freedpeople remained subject to the authority of their former masters, for whom they continued to work as agricultural tenants. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, these German freedpeople began migrating en masse to greater freedom, both inside Germany and overseas, especially to the United States. Economic and political elites worried about labor shortages on agricultural estates and about the transformation of supposedly conservative peasants into radical workers. While African Americans would begin a similar migration during the First World War, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the American South presented a model of constrained agricultural labor that Germany seemed to be losing to migration.

German economists founded the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Social Policy Association) to discuss how to control free labor to prevent emancipation from leading to economic dislocation and political challenges to the status quo. The Verein was led by Gustav Schmoller, a professor of economics known for his rejection of abstract classical political economy in favor of
empirical, historical methods. Schmoller had been interested in the possibilities for controlling free labor in the American South since 1866, and free labor in the American South remained important in discussions about Germany in the Verein für Sozialpolitik. Georg Friedrich Knapp, a professor of statistics, focused his attention on the liberation of the serfs and often lamented that the social science of the eighteenth century had condemned serfdom without developing “a replacement” for it. Knapp studied plantation agriculture in the New World, both before and after emancipation, to study how political and economic elites controlled free agricultural labor. Schmoller elaborated the political implications of Knapp’s historical research, noting that a kind of re-peasantization of the working class could prevent the spread of social democracy after the decline of “patriarchal relations” and calling for mass settlement of workers on small farms in the Prussian East.

The Verein für Sozialpolitik had a major influence on German policy. Under Bismarck, the Prussian state began a policy of “internal colonization” to settle Germans on small farms in the Prussian East. For Bismarck and others in charge of the policy, internal colonization had more to do with changing the ethnic balance of eastern Prussia, which had a large Polish population. The Verein, though interested primarily in settling small farmers as a way to prevent the political instability of a mobile working class, applauded and advised the Prussian Settlement Commission that oversaw internal colonization. Members of the Verein, initially, were not particularly interested in the ethnic aspect of internal colonization.

When Max Weber joined the Verein für Sozialpolitik in 1890, at the age of twenty-six, he brought the ethnic concerns of the Prussian Settlement Commission into the Verein für Sozialpolitik. Weber had just finished military service in one of the areas of Prussian internal colonization and had come to despise Poles as a “race” both culturally and biologically distinct from Germans. Weber became a prominent member of the Verein with studies of the by then decades-old problem of free agricultural labor in Germany. His innovation, applauded by his colleagues, was to add concerns about racial conflict and degeneration to older concerns about class conflict and social degeneration. While members of the Verein had learned to connect race, racism, and free labor in their observations of the American South, Weber taught them to make similar racial observations about free labor inside Germany.

When W.E.B. Du Bois came to Germany in 1892 at the age of twenty-four to begin a Ph.D. with Gustav Schmoller, members of the Verein für Sozialpolitik were understandably enthusiastic about enlisting him as an African American expert for the organization. Schmoller had Du Bois write a thesis on agricultural smallholding in the American South, a topic
of great interest to the Verein, and Max Weber later had Du Bois write an article for the journal of the Verein on the “Negro Question in the United States.” Du Bois, and later Booker T. Washington, taught Weber and other members of the Verein much about race and free labor in the United States. Although Du Bois had political and ethical views totally at odds with the authoritarian and often racist views of Weber and his colleagues, he nonetheless remained an important colleague of his German teachers. Even before the Tuskegee expedition to Togo, the New South was an important reference for German social thought and social policy.

III. Tuskegee in Togo

The members of the Tuskegee expedition to Togo believed that their purpose was to improve the conditions of Africans who were economically and culturally inferior to African Americans but racially identical. They assumed, like many black nationalists at the time, as well as nearly all European colonial authorities, that slavery, for all its inexcusable horrors, had raised African Americans above Africans by teaching them to value labor and to accept Christianity. African Americans had a duty to bring these valuable lessons to Africa. This ethnocentric assumption about African inferiority made it possible for some African Americans with genuinely emancipatory aspirations to participate in what Europeans regarded as a colonial “civilizing mission” in Africa.

When the members of the Tuskegee expedition landed in Togo, they did not encounter the primitive people they likely expected, but rather African societies in the midst of major political and economic crises brought about by the onset of colonialism. The area that became Togo, a no-man’s land between the slaving kingdoms of Asante and Dahomey, had been a major source of captives in the Atlantic slave trade. With abolition, the area was able to establish diverse economies that included selling its abundant palm oil to European merchants on relatively equal and autonomous terms.

With the onset of colonial rule 1884, Germans began efforts to transform the inhabitants of southern Togo into an economically and politically dependent population. The Ewe, the main ethnic group in southern Togo, organized production in extended households. Several women shared a single husband and each lived in a separate household with separate children, fields, and property, connected to each other through market exchange. Togolese practiced mixed cultivation, and African yams were the major food crop. The oil of the palms ubiquitous in southern Togo had many local uses and could also be sold to European firms for cash. Cotton was grown only for local spinning and weaving. Transforming these households into monogamous patriarchal family farms
growing cotton for the world market, as the Tuskegee expedition was to do, would entail a decline in wealth, personal autonomy, and political independence for the region. This, indeed, was one of the aims of the German state in promoting cotton in Togo.\textsuperscript{18}

The Tuskegee expedition followed the German military conquest of Togo.\textsuperscript{19} Calloway and the others first set up an experimental cotton farm at Tove, a group of villages along a north-south road that had long resisted German rule. The area had produced pottery in demand throughout Togo, which had allowed it to remain independent of European trade networks. In 1895, the Germans laid waste to the area, burning villages, destroying farms, killing many, and destroying the local pottery industry. When the Tuskegee expedition members arrived in the area six years later, they likely did not know of this recent history, although the abandoned huts they at first occupied might have raised suspicions. At Tove, John Robinson produced a variety of cotton that approximated American Upland and grew successfully in Togo. The Tuskegee farm produced seeds that the government distributed to growers throughout the colony. Calloway and the other expedition members soon returned home, leaving John Robinson to continue the cotton project.

In 1904, Robinson set up a cotton school at Notsé, an area south of Atakpame that had, like Tove, recently been conquered by the German government. The cotton school gave three years of training in cotton growing to male students from all over the colony. The German government compelled thirty to forty students to enroll each year; only two students ever attended of their own free will. The government forced graduates of the school, deemed unlikely to continue cotton farming on their own, to settle in their home districts as model cotton farmers under the supervision of local officials. John Robinson himself came up with this idea, which, he explained, treated each graduate as “what we call a ‘cropper’ i.e. one who makes a farm under the direction of another.”\textsuperscript{20} The German government applied a scheme modeled, if only in its coercive nature, on the sharecropping system of the New South. The New South and Tuskegee had been recruited as participants in a colonial political economic struggle in Africa.

In 1909, Robinson left Notsé to found a second cotton school in the North of Togo, a region over which the German government had only recently established some police control. He drowned crossing a river near Notsé, ending the direct involvement of Tuskegee in German Togo. Both Tove and Notsé remained in operation under French occupation and continue as agricultural research stations in independent Togo. The expedition was widely admired and imitated by English and French colonial authorities, who began introducing commercial cotton cultivation in their own West African territories and elsewhere. The Gold Coast press,
run by Africans literate in English, did not specifically mention the Tuskegee expedition, but was often harshly critical of German colonial policy in neighboring Togo, pointing to brutality, lack of educational opportunities, and forced labor.

IV. Transnational Tuskegee

Booker T. Washington had become known in his 1895 Atlanta speech for urging African Americans to “cast down your buckets where you are,” to remain, primarily as agricultural laborers, in the South rather than seeking opportunities elsewhere. Thanks, in part, to the international attention he received for this speech, Washington began promoting Tuskegee as a colonial institution, suitable for black labor anywhere in the world, beginning with the expedition to German Togo. The German colonial government continued to model colonial policy on the American South and to regard Booker T. Washington as an authority on black labor and cotton. Bernhard Dernburg, Germany’s best known Colonial Secretary, visited Tuskegee and Booker T. Washington during his time in office. The colonial interests of Tuskegee represented a departure from the more emancipatory institute that might have emerged from the combined efforts of Carver and Du Bois.

With his increasing entanglements in colonial Africa, Washington began to transform Tuskegee itself to bring it in line with the image of an industrial school for blacks that had made him famous the world over, one that more thoroughly rejected academic education in favor of industrial training. Roscoe Conkling Bruce, head of the academic department at Tuskegee since 1902, led this transformation. After Tuskegee personnel began their work in Togo, Washington pressured George Washington Carver to devote more research to cotton. Carver soon became known not only for his work on peanuts and other crops that might give black farmers food independence, but also, internationally, for his work on cotton growing and colonial agriculture. In 1904, Washington joined the American branch of E.D. Morel’s Congo Reform Association. Morel, a journalist and activist tireless in exposing the atrocities of Belgian rule in the Congo, considered the small farming that Tuskegee promoted in German Togo as a colonial alternative to the Belgian abuses. Indeed, Morel even proposed transferring the Congo to Germany to correct these abuses. In 1912, Washington organized an “International Conference on the Negro” at Tuskegee, which brought together missionaries and educators from Europe, the United States, and Africa, to study “the methods employed in helping the Negro people of the United States, with a view of deciding to what extent Tuskegee and Hampton methods may be applied to conditions in these countries, as well as to conditions in Af-
rica.” The influence of Tuskegee and Hampton would continue in Africa after Washington’s death in 1915 and the end of German colonial rule.23

* * *

Studying the Tuskegee expedition to Togo in the three regional contexts from which it emerged, the southern United States, eastern Germany, and West Africa, reveals large transnational effects of a relatively small historical event. The Germans and Americans involved in the expedition presupposed significant similarities among the three regions it brought together. They assumed similarities between free labor in Germany and the United States; they assumed similarities between Africans and African Americans; and they assumed similarities between African cotton and American cotton. The results of this globalization of the New South were anything but homogenization, however. Rather, the expedition helped create the network of economic disparities that characterizes the global economy to this day. Colonial states undermined West African economic and political autonomy, exploiting the region as a source of raw materials and, with changing global commodities prices, later abandoning the region to the poverty that forced cotton farming had created. Forced cotton farming became a central element of the colonial economies of West Africa because Germany appropriated the American New South as a colonial model. This globalized New South continued well beyond the First World War, when the Treaty of Versailles erased the public memory of the German origins of this American type of colonization. Tuskegee adapted its self-presentation and even its curriculum from a focus on the New South to a focus on a global South. Washington traded the potential of challenging the status quo of the New South for the international influence he obtained by working with European imperialism. Colonial rule in Africa, the racist order of the New South, and internal colonization in eastern Prussia were interlinked counterrevolutions against the emancipation of bonded labor in the nineteenth century. The pivotal role of Tuskegee Institute in connecting these counterrevolutions suggests the dependence of political and economic elites on those whom they oppress and exploit, and thus points to the emancipatory potential inherent in even the most dismal global moments.

Notes

1 The brief space of this essay, which summarizes parts of a book manuscript, allows me only to cite the most directly relevant secondary literature. See also Andrew Zimmerman, “A German Alabama in Africa: The Tuskegee Expedition to German Togo and the Transnational Origins of West African Cotton Growers,” American Historical Review 110 (2005): 1362–1398. The classic account of the expedition is Louis Harlan, “Booker T. Washington and the White Man’s Burden,” American Historical Review 71 (1966): 441–467. See, more


13 See, for example, Georg Friedrck Knapp, *Die Landarbeiter in Knechtschaft und Freiheit: Vier Vorträge* (Leipzig, 1891).


18 The best contemporary accounts of Ewe political economy from the German colonial period are Jakob Spieth, Die Ewe-Stämme: Material zur Kunde des Ewe-Volkes in Deutsch-Togo (Berlin, 1906) and Diedrich Westermann, Die Glidyi-Ewe in Togo: Züge aus ihrem Gesellschaftsleben (Berlin, 1935).

19 My account of the expedition is based on archival sources in the Togo National Archives, of which microfilm copies are available in the Bundesarchiv, Berlin (BArch), R150, and the archives of the Kolonialabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes and the Reichskolonialamt, BArch, R1001.


Refusing to be “Good Germans”: New Left Violence as a Global Phenomenon

Lecture at the GHI, October 25, 2007

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I am honored by the task of addressing the history of the Red Army Faction (RAF) on the occasion of the forty-year mark of the terrible “German Autumn” of 1977. My presentation concerns a vitally important, but often minimized, aspect of the RAF phenomenon: the international scope of left-wing radicalism and, more particularly, the concomitant existence of self-described “revolutionary armed struggle” groups like the RAF in various societies around the world. This global context, I will argue, has powerful implications for how we might understand the RAF, both in historical and in normative terms. Before I address that context, however, I would like to sketch the place the RAF has in specifically German history and memory. The sketch will help to highlight the potential liabilities of an unduly national, and thereby parochial, view of the RAF, and the benefits of an international perspective.

The conflict between the RAF and the West German state was indeed a major episode in postwar German history. The RAF was a tiny organization, whose initial “hard core” had as few as twenty members, most of whom were imprisoned by 1972. Several times over, the group regenerated itself, but in the periods of its highest activity, in the mid 1970s and 1980s, as few as several dozen members were directly active in operations. So, too, the scales of its violence were small. By late 1978, the end of the RAF’s first phase, twenty-eight people had been killed by left-wing violence—a number dwarfed by annual deaths from auto accidents.

And yet, the RAF had an impact vastly disproportionate to its scale of violence. This is true of all terrorisms, which use fear to compensate for military disadvantage and the media to amplify the psychological effects of their violence. (Only in recent years have terrorists such as Al Qaeda sought to engineer acts of mass, indiscriminate violence; historically, violent groups on the left, who of course reject the label of “terrorism” and claim populist aspirations, have for the most part carefully selected human targets and worked to limit the numbers of dead and wounded.) This disproportion was, however, especially severe in the German case. Evidence of the imbalance abounds.

In broadly discursive terms, the RAF’s members were in the 1970s the object of relentless, even obsessive, media attention; the main figures of
Baader, Meinhof, Ensslin, Meins, and Mahler became not only household names, but, within an evidently dramatic narrative structure, characters in a protracted, tragic saga that for years consumed the German public. In an institutional register, the RAF was the cause of a massive mobilization of security forces and the expansion of the national security apparatus, as well as the cause of special—and highly controversial—anti-terrorism laws restricting such things as political speech and the rights of legal defense. Within the ideological realm, the RAF inspired fierce debates within the left over strategy, tactics, and values. For countless others in German society, the group was a touchstone for conflicting feelings and attitudes toward the postwar state.

Perhaps most importantly, the group was regarded by leading figures in public life as a powerfully destabilizing force that conceivably threatened the very existence of the Federal Republic. That anxiety took many forms. Among the most dramatic was Willy Brandt’s warning in 1977 to the RAF’s putative “sympathizers”: “To those directly aiding terrorism, I say again: Stop every form of assistance—before it’s too late. Otherwise our country becomes a living hell, where father mistrusts son, where neighbor suspects neighbor, the state spies on its citizens, and... deadly violence rule[s] the streets. Help us avert this nightmare... if you refuse, the nightmare could become a reality.” 3 Here the “existential threat” was not the violence itself, but the mistrust and even hysteria it might breed, breaking down the democratic solidarity presumably holding society together. Equally remarkable was Bundespräsident Walter Scheel’s declaration at the funeral of Hanns Martin Schleyer that the weeks of his kidnapping have “clearly been the worst in the history of the Federal Republic.” The RAF, in Scheel’s stern words, practiced “naked barbarism” and was “the enemy of every civilization.” It negated by its very presence the core values on which the postwar Republic was based and therefore had to be eliminated. 4 The RAF, in sum, was simultaneously the cause of a security crisis, a political crisis, a constitutional crisis, and a crisis of confidence for the new nation.

The RAF was also, in its own day, a key point of engagement of the German arts and intellectual life. The leading lights of postwar culture—from the Nobel laureate Heinrich Böll, to the painter Gerhard Richter, to the pioneers of the New German Cinema, to scholars like Jürgen Habermas and Oscar Negt—all delivered major treatments, either of the group or the climate in which it operated. Academic and other researchers, finally, dissected the origins, operations, and evolution of the RAF, refining in the process the tools used by social science to understand political violence.

Important in its own time, the RAF persists in German culture and memory. Though it no longer has “sympathizers” or imitators, it does
have something like political fans: largely young people, for whom the
romantic rebels in the film *The Edukators* (*Die fetten Jahre sind vorbei*) may
be seen as archetypes, who viscerally identify with the totalizing critique
of democratic capitalism of 1960s- and 1970s-era militants and at least
yearn to express their disgust in emphatic ways. Chock full of fascinating
themes and storylines, the RAF’s history has by now inspired thriving
genres of fiction, film, theatre, and the visual arts, which are themselves
objects of sophisticated analyses, university instruction, and journalistic
comment.

The RAF also endures as a source of controversy, in which old de-
bates and even wounds have been repeatedly pried open (though not
necessarily advanced) by such “events” as the 2004 exhibit “Zur Vorstel-
lung des Terrors” at the Kunstwerk museum, the possible parole of RAF
prisoners, new forensic insight into RAF crimes and revelations about the
extent of the RAF’s dealings with the East German Stasi, or, simply, the
anniversaries of 1968 and 1977 and the ubiquitous reflections on the
meaning and impact of the era’s radicalism they ritually summon. By
now there are whole eras of the RAF’s cultural reception and legacy, as
well as analyses of their evolution. This current anniversary season has
featured an almost uncanny quantity of commemorative events, media,
and publications, adding to the voluminous empirical research of recent
years into nearly all conceivable aspects of the RAF’s history. Implicit or
explicit in so much of this material is consideration of whether and to
what extent the social movements associated with 1968 should be judged
in light of the violence of the mid-1970s, as well as how both 1968 and
1977, figuratively speaking, should be understood with respect to the
Nazi period and the postwar founding (1933 and 1945 or 1948, respec-
tively). RAF has, in short, a conspicuous promiscuity, conjoining various
epochs in the German past as Germans ponder their collective identity
and historical experience.

In this sketch, I have underscored the importance of RAF within
German history and to German culture. In powerful respects, the RAF
conflict is a German story whose dynamic was conditioned by the speci-
cicity of both the German past and postwar German consciousness. In-
deed, the story has most often, and most famously, been told this way.
Common to so many treatments is a view of the RAF conflict as a con-
sequence of both the Weimar and Nazi pasts. The narratives vary in their
particulars and their politics, ranging from resurgent descriptions of the
RAF as “Hitler’s Children,” defined by ideological zealotry and a con-
tempt for democracy, to, at a far less common extreme, portrayals as
truth-tellers about the constitutive rottenness of postwar society, as well as
the victims of an overbearing state. Less partisan analyses present the
RAF saga as, in essence, a sharply German psychodrama, in which youth-
ful attitudes toward everything from the Vietnam War to the postwar state, the Palestinian conflict, and virtually all forms of adult and institutional authority were driven by anger, shame, and resentment stemming from Germany’s past. The RAF’s violence, aimed at a postwar state they and others on the left errantly deemed “fascist,” was therefore a case of displacement and misrecognition based in tortured, post-fascist psychology.

I favor a dialogic model stressing the volatility of competing perceptions. In this model, the Federal Republic’s defenders were concerned that their fledging democracy could be done in by an extremism similar to that which had wrecked Weimar. This led the state and some opinion makers to overreact to the RAF, arguably breeding more violence through harsh security measures and their vilifying rhetoric. The left, for its part, feared that authoritarian tendencies had persisted in the postwar state, and interpreted its actions—especially the policing of the New Left and then the RAF—as signs of a resurgent fascism. Germany’s special past, in short, led to an exaggerated, mutual enmity and extreme self-righteousness on both sides that served to intensify the conflict. By extension, the RAF phenomenon, at least in part, was a secondary trauma stemming from the poorly processed, primary trauma of the fascist past.

Understanding the role of the fascist past is valuable, if not indispensable, to understanding the RAF conflict, especially its intensity and longevity. But attention to this aspect can also be limiting and even distorting, especially with respect to the RAF’s origins and early impetus. Far from unique, the RAF was one of many groups in the advanced industrial world, emerging from the student movement or “New Left” of the 1960s, that sought to create a revolution by means of what they termed “armed struggle.” In all cases I know, such groups were aggressively anti-capitalist, opposed to American military and economic power, and inspired by anti-imperialist movements in the Third World. Emulating urban guerrillas in Latin America and insurgencies in Asia, they targeted the police and the military, as well as the sites and symbols of state and corporate power. And they saw themselves as part of a militant vanguard contributing to a global socialist revolution. The RAF, by one valid description, was an instance or manifestation of a global phenomenon driven by a global logic.

The RAF’s fellow travelers were many. First and foremost were Italy’s Red Brigades—the biggest and most active of such groups, whose members and numbers of attacks were in the thousands, and which came the closest to actually challenging their state’s grip on power. The RAF was also joined by the Japanese Red Army Faction, a small but very violent group, notorious for grisly attacks on its own members. Germany, Italy, and Japan are all, of course, former fascist powers, suggesting that
the emergence of violent groups from the student movement in those societies is attributable to the absence of longstanding democratic traditions and to legacies of authoritarian rule. Observing this, some researchers have sought to derive a hard sociological rule with respect to violence in the 1960s, holding that where democracy was strongest and most deeply rooted, violence was least prevalent. If the RAF, by the terms of this analysis, is not a narrowly German story, it is at least a post-fascist story.

The post-fascist analysis has some value, but it, too, proves reductive. England, a longstanding democracy, did have a small armed struggle movement led by the Angry Brigades, which committed bombings from the underground. In France, students and workers almost succeeded in creating a revolution in 1968. Though intense street battles were part of the tumultuous May, the conflict failed to take on a strongly militarized cast. Nonetheless, post-1968 Maoist groupings practiced a militant labor violence, and a small “armed struggle” contingent, led by the short-lived group Action Directe, did eventually emerge. And then there was the violence of American radicals, which recent research (including my own) has done much to document and interpret. The Black Panther Party initially practiced “armed self-defense,” but soon moved toward more intense combat couched in a rhetoric of revolutionary insurgency. The Weather Underground, forming in 1969 (as “Weatherman”), was only the most notorious group from the student and youth movement to practice violence. The numbers of violent acts during this tumultuous period are staggering. Between January 1969 and April 1970 alone, researchers counted as many as 2,800 political bombings and arsons (attempted or successful)—figures which dwarf those for peak years in Germany. A great volume of the violence may have been motivated, at bottom, by anger at the Vietnam War and the desire to stop it. But even more or less spontaneous strikes against the war machine were typically accompanied by a rhetoric of revolution, oozing everywhere from New Left and Black Power circles circa 1969. Fascinating both in its own right and in comparison to Germany, the US case is so important because it shows that longstanding democratic traditions provide no immunity against violent forms of civil conflict and a broader fascination among swaths of the public with revolution by means of war.

The groups mentioned above comprise just one species of violence in the 1960s and 1970s from non-state actors. Armed struggle groups, some with decades-long histories, also existed in the context of nationalist causes in Northern Ireland, Palestine, Quebec, and the Basque; to oppose authoritarian governments in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Iran; and, most influentially and consequentially, as part of campaigns against colonial or neo-colonial regimes in Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia,
and Africa. It is commonly asserted that we live today in an “Age of Terror.” To be sure, the violence of Islamic and other extremists is especially virulent and deadly. But in terms of the quantity and reach of non-state violence (though not the body count), the 1970s is most certainly a historic high-water mark, in which something like a cosmopolitan, international, and transnational culture of armed struggle existed. (A precious scene from Stephen Spielberg’s Munich, in which a shadowy figure awkwardly promises the same safe house in Greece to Palestinian, Basque, German, and other fighters, offers an image of this culture.) It was by no means a coordinated movement, consisting instead of a diversity of specific causes, tactics, and agendas. But between groups, there were ideological and operational continuities, occasional political and tactical alliances, and, to varying degrees, a subjective sense of being involved in the same broad struggle.

This brings me to my first, preliminary point about basic frameworks for seeing the RAF. The RAF has certainly been characterized as an instance of “terrorism.” As defined by governments, legal structures, and security experts, “terrorism” is an ahistoric designation that refers to a violent modus operandi (i.e., the use or threat of force to achieve a political end, by a standard phrasing), irrespective of any particular context. The RAF would appear to meet this clinical definition, and may well be worthy of the highly pejorative connotations of the term in common discourse. (It did murder, maim, and terrorize on behalf of a cause one might question or condemn.) Whatever one’s view, the RAF conceived its violence as “revolutionary armed struggle”—a historically specific form of political practice ascendant in the postwar period on a global scale and which had a particular etiology, texture, and set of meanings. Its deep roots certainly lie in the Russian Narodnik, anarchist, and communist movements of the late nineteenth century. In its twentieth-century guise, armed struggle developed overwhelmingly in the context of anti-colonial campaigns, from Cuba, to Algeria, to Vietnam. Groups within these larger movements generated both the military form (urban guerrilla, foco, etc.) and—drawing from indigenous resources, from Marxism, and from a liberal, universalistic rhetoric of independence and self-determination—the political language of emancipation that captivated rebels in other societies, including Germany. From the standpoint of the long durée, colonialism, or, more precisely, its protracted undoing, is the predicate or condition of possibility for the emergence of the RAF. Put otherwise, the violence of the RAF, the Weathermen, the Red Brigades, and the like depended on a kind of grand ideological support—the imagination of a comprehensive emancipation through revolution—that was central to the zeitgeist of the 1960s and which reflected profound, global socio-political
transformations. Any analysis that ignores or minimizes this constitutive context misdescribes what it seeks to illuminate.

Our recent times provide roundabout confirmation of the salience of the global context to the New Left violence of the 1960s and 1970s. In the wake of 9–11 and with another American war breeding the hostility of the global left, there have been understandable concerns that a “homegrown terrorism” like the Weatherman and RAF of yore may again develop in Western societies. It has not. The reason is likely not a deficit of anger or, as in many societies, much stricter surveillance and tougher laws. Rather, contemporary rebels simply do not have access to the kind of emancipatory vision and conception of global struggle that drove 1960s militants. (The characters in The Edukators give some indication of this; the strident critique of capitalism and proclamations of socialism’s certain victory are replaced by their laconic complaint of the super rich: “You have too much money.”) And, with even Third World versions of Marxism all but eclipsed, such a vision is extremely remote. Thankfully, violent jihad has had almost no cross-cultural appeal and, whatever Bin Laden’s occasional condemnation of the West’s cultural imperialism and soulless consumerism, has not captivated the global left. And though militancy has made a comeback in the Western anti-globalization (or “global justice”) movement, it does not remotely resemble the kinds of clandestine action seriously pursed in the 1960s and 1970s. The kind of leftwing violence of past decades—whether termed “armed struggle” or “terrorism”—may truly be history.

I would now like to narrow my focus to a comparison of the two groups I know best, the RAF and America’s Weather Underground, the leading violent group from the US New Left and the closest thing to an American counterpart to the RAF. In short form, Weatherman emerged as a faction in Students for a Democratic Society in 1969. After bloody street battles with police, the group went underground in early 1970. In March, a cell in New York City, set to attack a military dance that would likely have resulted in deaths, mishandled its bombs, causing an explosion that killed three Weathermen. The group then rethought its path, attacking thereafter property only and avoiding human injury. As the Vietnam War wound down, and the radicalism of the 1960s waned, the group lost a sense of purpose, voluntarily disbanding in 1976–7 after having committed a little more than two dozen bombings. (There were, it should be noted, many other, lesser known or anonymous bombing collectives, active mostly between 1969 and 1971).

The RAF formed in 1970, and for its first two years did little else but elude capture, rob banks, and engage in occasional, and sometimes deadly, shootouts with police. With its “May Offensive” of 1972 it escalated its violence to attacks on US military bases and German law en-
forcement and the judiciary, resulting in a number of deaths. When its leaders were captured, the worst violence—committed to force their release—and greatest drama began. The first phase of the RAF’s history ended with the German Autumn, by which point its vaunted anti-imperialist struggle had plainly devolved, in the words of one critic, into a “private war” with the state, obsessively trained on the prisoners’ fate and the alleged misdeeds of the security apparatus. The two groups had, in sum, remarkably similar origins, but soon pursued very different paths, separated above all by their very different attitudes toward taking human life.

My goal is not to detail the histories of the groups, which are surely well known. Rather, I would like to present and elucidate four interrelated dimensions to their violence. These I term the political, apocalyptic, existential, and ethical. Sometimes mutually reinforcing, but sometimes also in conflict, these categories provide a conceptual framework for understanding the cause, course, and character of the groups’ “armed struggles.” More specifically, they enable one to see how closely matched their core motivations and basic worldview were, at least in their early phases. These similarities, I shall argue, reflected broader continuities between the West German and American student movements (as well as those in other places). The roots of the RAF, by extension, were far from uniquely German, reinforcing the salience of the international context and consideration of the place of Germany in the postwar world. By the same token, appreciating the groups’ similarities also makes their differences stand in relief.

There is a second grand purpose to my comparison. As I indicated above, substantial debate surrounds the relationship of the RAF to the social movements of the West German 1960s—whether its violence extended or repudiated the New Left’s core values, sensibilities, and attitudes. Similar questions hover over the Weathermen and the American New Left. My analysis suggests that both groups, while clearly minorities within the left, represent the intensification of tendencies within the dissident student and youth cultures in their respective societies; it makes little sense to rigidly segment their “armed struggles” from the New Left cultures from which they emerged. Violence, in short, was a possibility implied or even dictated by forms of radical thought and practice developed from the mid-1960s on. This does not mean, however, that violence somehow represented the essence of the student, youth, and antiwar movements in America, Germany, and elsewhere. These were internally diverse movements, with multiple tendencies, logics, possibilities, and trajectories, and whose majorities rejected, whether in word or deed, “guerrilla” violence. To judge the movements by their most extreme
manifestations is historically irresponsible, if not politically and morally reckless.

This injunction brings me to my final broad point, which may well arouse some controversy. My contention is that there were genuinely progressive aspects to each “ingredient”—the political, apocalyptic, existential, and ethical—in the radical cultures from which the violence of the Weathermen and the RAF was born. Each also had latent or inherent dangers, which both groups (though to dramatically different degrees) came to realize or embody, as they crossed lines both articulated and invisible. I therefore try to chart a course between either cheap valorization or reductive and needlessly vituperative condemnation as I approach what is surely the most challenging question posed by the violence of 1960s-era militants: how to judge it in political and moral terms. From my extensive research—and especially knowing well the political biographies of many Weathermen, which typically include years of conscientious dissent prior to joining the group and careers of valuable service to various communities after leaving—I have always felt that the most constructive approach to New Left militancy is to see the admixture of good and bad in it and to try to understand from it both how movements can become degraded, and how their pathologies may be reversed.

The Political

The members of the Weather Underground and the RAF, as well as other activists in their New Left milieu, saw their lives and actions in deeply political terms. The groups’ raison d’être, by extension, was fundamentally political, defined by their goal of creating revolutions by means of “armed struggle.” How they became radicalized to that degree is the story of the 1960s itself.

In most societies that boasted a New Left—dissident groups of students and youth who sought to move beyond the language and politics of traditional communism—there was a shift over the course of the decade from “protest to resistance to revolution.” This was certainly true in the American and West German cases, where what started as essentially reform movements, intent on better fulfilling their societies’ democratic promise, moved in the space of a few short years to the belief that their societies had to be built anew.

In the American setting, young people were first politicized and then radicalized, above all, around the issues of race and the Vietnam War. In the mid-1960s, a new generation of African American activists emerged on the national scene, expressing a strident politics of Black Power. Partly, they sought to overcome the perceived limitations of the southern, largely non-violent civil rights movement, in favor of a more comprehen-
sive political and psychological empowerment, achieved by more confrontational means. Partly, Black Power proffered an anti-imperialist politics derived from anti-colonial struggles in Africa and Latin America challenging global structures of white supremacy. White activists, such as those who formed Weatherman, learned about America from the Black Power movement and about politics from Black Power militants. In some New Left circles, the notion developed that whites had the obligation to identify politically with the most militant segments of the most oppressed population—urban blacks—who increasingly saw themselves as members of an internal colony in need of what amounted to “national liberation.”

The Vietnam War had been the subject of significant student and youth protest since 1965. Despite its growing numbers and militancy, the movement, however, hardly slowed the war, which ground on with tragic intensity and a military draft that chewed up young lives. In response, many activists escalated their protest, hoping to impede the war through direct, and often illegal, interference with its prosecution. In ideological terms, some concluded that the war was not an isolated foreign policy mistake, but instead a structural necessity of American capitalism, which oppressed racial minorities at home just as it brutalized people of color in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. The fundamental insight propelling the New Left’s radicalism was a synthetic one: that racism, economic exploitation, and militarism were constitutive parts of the same broad system. As greater numbers of young leftists became rapidly acquainted with Marxism, the critique of “imperialism” came to dominate in radical circles. The often vicious police response to antiwar protest and, certainly, to black radicalism only seemed to confirm the venal quality of “the system” they opposed. For many, this core analysis, the heart-rending destruction in Vietnam, the harrowing experience of police violence, and the apparent promise of resistance to US power worldwide all pointed to the conclusion that only something as bold as revolution would right the many wrongs of America and relieve the world of the suffering it caused.

The reasons for the radicalization of West German youth are, prima facie, less obvious. The Federal Republic did not have America’s racial problems or gross inequality; it was not prosecuting the Vietnam War; and the example of East German communism hardly made a revolutionary socialist alternative seem compelling. And yet, German dissidents came to identify with the plight of the Vietnamese, as well as other victims of American military power. Here Germany’s relationship with the United States loomed large. The United States had been the Federal Republic’s great protector and moral benefactor—affiliating with America meant entrance into liberal, democratic modernity. For many
young Germans especially, seeing the United States bully a peasant nation struggling for self-determination not only exposed the hypocrisy of American power, but dramatically reduced Germany’s moral standing in their eyes. For them to critique US power was simultaneously to indict the political establishment of their own society, if not also question its basic worth. No doubt, a self-serving psychology played a role in West German hatred for the Vietnam war: condemnation of the war, which some activists castigated as “genocide” and thus a repetition of the Nazis’ crimes, diminished the far greater sting of Germany’s sinful past by relativizing German crimes. But the opposition of the West German New Left to the war—a conflict almost universally condemned by students and youth worldwide—hardly depended on any covert, psychological motive.

Furthermore, Marxist analyses were not nearly so taboo in Germany as in the United States; the jump from a critique of the war to a systemic condemnation of “imperialism” was far easier to make than for American radicals. Consequently, the West German New Left fairly quickly adopted a position of support for the Vietnamese “liberation movement,” not just the demand of an American withdrawal from Vietnam. Affiliating with an international revolutionary culture, moreover, permitted German leftists, in plainly attractive ways, to transcend their “Germanness” and craft a trans- or supra-national political identity. So many of the signal events of the German movement—from the demonstration against the African strongman Moise Tschombe, to the “flyer action” protesting the Vietnam War and the “pudding attack” prank against Vice President Humphrey, to, of course, the protest of the Shah of Iran ending with the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg—were directed at “foreign” injustices and Germany’s alleged complicity in them, and not at any conventionally domestic issue.

A portion of the New Left in the United States and West Germany was, in short, progressively gravitating toward the goal of something as fantastic, inspiring, and implausible as revolution. They initially had, however, little sense of how, as a practical matter, to bring revolution about. The New Left in both societies remained, after all, relatively small and isolated movements that hardly commanded the allegiance of the “masses.” Their societies, moreover, seemed to preclude in their very structures any hope of a revolutionary insurrection, given their affluence and the integration of the working class into the benefits of the consumer economy.

The New Left, in short, faced a crisis of narrative in which the “traditional” revolutionary script, which counseled the patient building of a mass communist movement rooted in economic grievances, seemed inadequate to the political circumstances and demands of the time. The
“solution” to this crisis was to construct a new revolutionary narrative, whose frame of reference was now global. A German activist described the essentials of this new narrative:

Imperialism, not the proletariat, constitutes the totality of the world . . . How can revolutionary forces assert themselves? The answer was: the subject of the world-wide revolutionary process is the oppressed, rendering the world’s principal contradiction between imperialism and the Third World. In the metropoles enlightened persons—and that meant above all the intelligentsia—must unite with the suffering masses of the Third World and themselves employ illegal, direct action against the state apparatus to weaken the imperialist powers.17

In this model, Third World liberation movements were the new revolutionary vanguard; the realization of global revolution, however, required militant resistance in the centers of imperialist power.

“Armed struggle” in both the United States and West Germany was a radicalization of this paradigm. The Weathermen’s founding manifesto declared that “the main struggle going on in the world today is between US imperialism and the national liberation struggles against it,” and instructed that the task of revolutionaries worldwide was “to solve this principal contradiction” on the side of “the oppressed.”18 The statement also called for the building of cadres of radical youth, akin to China’s “Red Guards,” who would wreak havoc throughout America. The Weathermen, in addition, were enamored with the model that the French intellectual Régis Debray, in a widely read text, insisted worked in Cuba.19 In that model, the daring acts of a militant minority could incite others to mass insurrection; indeed, the Weathermen saw themselves as that vanguard whose self-sacrifice, soon enough in the form of clandestine struggle, would light the spark to turn pervasive discontent into a revolutionary conflagration. The group’s signature call, which sought to translate foreign battles onto American soil, was to “Bring the War Home.” However implausibly, Weatherman originally promoted “armed struggle” as a means of doing what other political approaches could not, and explicitly dubbed it “a strategy to win.”20

The RAF’s founding ideology was a close echo of Weatherman’s. Quoting Mao Tse-Tung’s assertion that US imperialism was really a “paper tiger,” Meinhof argued that “there is absolutely no reason to rule out or exclude any region or country from the anti-imperialist struggle.”21 Freely admitting that “The Urban Guerilla Concept comes from Latin America,” she contended further that “[t]he situation there is the same as here—a revolutionary intervention coming from relatively weak revolu-
tionary forces.” Her grand conclusion, and the premise of the RAF, was that “the organization of armed resistance groups in West Germany”—contrary to the arguments of the more established, communist left—was “correct, possible, and justified.”

Even at the time, this notion of the viability of violent revolution seemed farfetched and even reckless to many on the left; in hindsight, it may appear wholly ludicrous. But in certain circles at least, it represented a compelling narrative predicated on an analysis of the nature of global conflict, the strength of revolutionary forces worldwide, the internal weaknesses of capitalism, and the inadequacy—to both the political and moral exigencies of the day—of traditional models of social change. This narrative, moreover, was available to activists worldwide and took root, at least as an articulated option, most everywhere students and youth wanted radical change. In this light, the specificities of the German or American (or Italian or Japanese) contexts recede, and the power of an international discourse—circulating by virtue of the very structures of global commerce and communication that capitalism had developed—asserts itself.

Revolutionary anti-imperialism also offered First World radicals a potentially seductive vision of themselves and the world. Sometimes American and German radicals suggested that their actions would merely facilitate a process of global revolution that was already inexorably happening, and led by someone else: the Algerians, Vietnamese, Cubans, and so forth. At other times, they argued that because they were at the nerve centers of global power—in the “belly of the beast,” as the metaphor ran—the liberation of everyone else depended on their efforts to weaken the “empire” from within. Rudi Dutschke, less prone to bluster than the RAF’s ideologues, nonetheless warned at the famous “International Vietnam Congress” in 1968 that a US victory in Vietnam could usher in a “new period of authoritarian world domination from Washington to Vladivostok,” and then implored, “Comrades, we don’t have much time. How this period of history ends depends primarily on our will.”

The revolutionary narrative, in short, gave New Leftists an important role in a nearly mythic process of global liberation. Whatever the reputation of the Weathermen and the RAF as desperados, demons, and romantic nihilists like Bonnie and Clyde, they actually participated in the powerful Utopian impulses of their times (even if their lives also had an aura of doom) that sought to defy the accepted limits of the possible, as well as a politics of solidarity, in which First World activists demonstrated concern for the plight of the Third World oppressed and felt some political responsibility for their fate.

Moreover, one could argue (and indeed I have argued) that the violence of the Weathermen and other militants, irrespective of their gran-
diose goal of advancing “revolution,” contributed to a domestic climate of chaos that imposed a political limit on the length and intensity of the Vietnam War. (Some former members themselves confess, in retrospect, skepticism about their violence as a mean of revolution, but defend it, in both tactical and moral terms, as a response to the Vietnam War.) The RAF can less easily claim any kind of mediated impact on the war. Nonetheless, some of its violence, such as the killings in 1972 of US military personnel on bases in Germany, obeyed a political calculus connected to the war. The RAF’s charge was that American soldiers would nowhere in the world be safe, so long as the Vietnam conflict—with its horrific wasting of Vietnamese life—continued.

Further, both groups pursued a systemic analysis that sought to address fundamental imbalances of global wealth and power in a way that would move beyond the staid politics and apologia for totalitarianism of much traditional communism. And it represented an attempt to intervene boldly in what seemed a critical juncture in world history, in which “freedom” for untold millions was a new possibility.

But it also held great hazards, principally the tendency to conflate or altogether collapse contexts in the assumption that the struggle for global justice can and should be fought everywhere by the same means. The failure to make qualitative distinctions could be striking. Erich Fried, an otherwise insightful poet in Germany, offered the verse: “Saigon is Berlin/The Americans here/Are the Americans there.” The image is of two societies occupied by a foreign, American army propping up pseudo-democracies in the name of anti-communism. It is a short leap to imagine West German rebels as the equivalent of the Viet Cong—a vainglorious identity the RAF would soon assume. The affective dimensions of an overwrought sense of solidarity could be disturbing as well. When merely contemplating street combat with police, a Weatherman declared, “we began to feel the Vietnamese in ourselves.” Among the many criticisms of this kind of presumptuous “affinity,” that of Jürgen Habermas, uttered before the Weathermen and the RAF even formed, was among the most cogent: “Moral outrage at the barbarity of the Americans’ action in Vietnam is understandable. But emotional identification with the role of the Viet Cong or the Vietnamese guerrillas has no political basis.”

The decisive proof of the absence of such a “political basis” was the unequivocal failure of the Weatherman’s and the RAF’s “armed struggles” to lead or catalyze anything like an actual, popular revolutionary insurrection in their societies. Lacking this kind of popular support, their armed struggles lacked both a social mandate and, by extension, the political legitimacy that violence had elsewhere in the world, where rebel insurgents led large populations against patently oppressive regimes.
The Apocalyptic

The Weatherman’s and the RAF’s image of armed struggle, as a means of revolution especially, was not only horribly mismatched to the conditions in their societies, but also conspicuously vague. Neither group specified how exactly it was to seize power nor, certainly, what its societies would look like after a projected revolution. The groups were, in large measure, proponents of a messianic Marxism, long on prophetic indignation and trafficking in what Ulrike Meinhof’s foster mother called a “contourless vision of the Coming Time.” Their politics, put otherwise, had an apocalyptic dimension comprising the following premises: that the existing society is corrupt; that its corruption is so great that it cannot be reformed and must therefore be destroyed; and that its destruction creates the possibility for emergence of something radically new, different, and better. Whether or not explicitly stated, this broad view underwrote the ethos of would-be guerrilla warriors and those who cheered them on. A famous slogan of the German New Left instructed, “Destroy that which destroys you.” A radical newspaper reporting on Weatherman bombings proclaimed: “Our humble task is to organize the apocalypse!” Another, celebrating the burning of a California bank, insisted “Out of the bankruptcy of AmeriKKKa will come a new country and a new people.” The rhetoric of Weatherman and the RAF itself pulsed with fierce condemnations of capitalism and proclamations of the power, promise, and certain victory of the guerrilla movement.

However ominous such language, belief in the generative power of destruction is a quality of so many utopian movements, and so many revolutions—especially those that aspire to conquer tyranny. A certain degree of audacity, grandiosity, and even zealotry has likely been present in, if not essential to, all ambitious moral crusades, whether abolitionism, labor radicalism, or various campaigns of national liberation—all of which accomplished valuable things. Indeed, an eschatological outlook is deeply embedded in the modern secular political imagination, especially in the West, and its adoption by New Left radicals is neither exotic nor pathological.

Such an outlook, however, also has pronounced dangers. With respect to Weatherman and the RAF, it encouraged them to take their violence out of the realm of political calculation and into what sociologist Mark Jurgensmeyer calls “cosmic war”—an epic struggle of good versus evil, transcending political particulars, and settled in some larger scale of time. This permitted both groups to rationalize failures and defeats and press on despite their tiny numbers; losses in the here and now would be redeemed by eventual victory in some unspecified future. And since that endpoint could not be known, struggle became an end in itself—divorced
from the achievement of any specific political or strategic goal—as well as
a means to transcend death. Holger Meins’s words, deep into his mortal
hunger strike, are here resonant: “The only thing that matters now is the
struggle—now, today, tomorrow, whether we eat or not . . . Everyone
dies anyhow, what matters is how . . . Fighting the pigs as a human being
for the liberation of man. Fighting to the last. Loving life, disdaining
Death.”

More troubling still, a framework of cosmic war allows one more
easily to judge—and even to sacrifice—others by the terms of some grand
liberation narrative or script that separates the world into the saved and
dammed. A Weatherman conceded that in the group’s most intransigent
phase, its attitude was “We’re ready to fight and die . . . and either you’re
on our side or you’re on the side of the pigs.” Weatherwoman Susan
Stern confessed to reaching the point of feeling that “everybody” who
fails to support the revolutionary struggle “has to die”; a comrade in the
group argued that if fascism were necessary to keep white Americans in
line after the revolution, “then we’ll have fascism.” One New Left critic
of the Weathermen aptly decried such conclusions as evidence of the
“horror of inhuman logic”—a logic that combined a callous hyper-
rationality with a morbidly transgressive imagination to sanction nearly
limitless murder.

Weatherman’s excesses were mostly rhetorical. Following the 1970
explosion, the group steadfastly rejected being killers and mostly avoided
dehumanizing language and militant bluster. They demobilized, in other
words, “cosmic war,” settling with their occasional bombings of property
for more modest, symbolic gains in something far short of a guerrilla war.
In fact, during most of its existence, the Weatherman’s violence amounted
to relatively minor property damage, often exacted in response to egregious
cases of state violence, such as the massacre of inmates at Attica
prison in 1971 and the notorious “Christmas bombings” of North Viet-
nam in 1972.

Not so the RAF, which escalated its violence as the 1970s wore on,
callously denouncing its victims or disregarding the worth of their lives
altogether (as in the case of the drivers of and security detail for its
political “targets”) by not even addressing their murders. Meins’s words,
which decry the enemy in absolute terms, are again resonant: “Either a
pig or a man/Either survival at any price or struggle unto death/Either
problem or solution/There is nothing in between . . . It’s simple. Fighting
the pigs as a human being for the liberation of man.”

In sum, both groups, reacting to conditions of oppression and suffer-
ing, fell prey to the grim faith that violence could be its own cure—that
a fallen world could be redeemed by blood. In 1969, a radical professor at
Berkeley intoned, “We have to remake ourselves, but not in the humane
ways we might wish. We have to learn to discipline ourselves, to hate, to
destroy, and to kill. This society will be liberated, but at the cost of much
blood.” In this sense, there was a sacrificial quality to their conception
of “struggle.” Certainly products of their own times and societies, they
also exemplified the tendency, observable in so many historical instances,
of cultures of resistance to devolve into cults of violence that lose touch
with the ethical principles originally and ostensibly animating them, and
which sanctify both violence and its perpetrator. An American leftist,
aghast at the Weatherman’s most grisly rhetoric in its most militant
phase, captured the essence of this slippage with his lament, “Under-
standing that killing is necessary is one thing. Reveling in it is another.”
Here he captures a critical distinction between viewing violence as a
political and moral exigency—such cases may exist—and exalting vio-
lence as something ennobling. Viewed in the latter way, it is unbound by
limits.

To be sure, conditions specific to Germany drove the RAF over a
moral abyss the Weathermen only peered into; but the broad, shared sin
was a militarism which had spread in the 1960s beyond governments to
countless groups, fighting for causes good and ill in ways cruel, craven,
and constrained.

Existential and Ethical

The violence of New Left radicals in the United States and West Germany
had, finally, existential and ethical roots, which were themselves tightly
woven together. An elemental critique of the global New Left was that
postwar consumer society was at its core inauthentic, encouraging self-
satisfied complacency and estranging individuals both from one another
and from their own moral potential. The antidote to this perceived inau-
thenticity was ethical and political commitment, defined centrally by ac-
tion. As one Weatherman eloquently put it:

You had a responsibility to link your conduct to your consciousness.
If you believed something, the proof of that belief was to act on it, not to
espouse it with the right treatises. We were militants. We were militants
before we were thinkers. Militancy is a stance in the world that says that
I’m going to put my body somehow in the way of the normal functioning
of things. The statement is my body standing in the way which opens up
a public space where lots of people have to think and act differently.
Militancy was the standard by which we measured our aliveness.

This attitude was at the heart of so much of the activism of the era,
from sit-ins, to freedom rides and marches, draft resistance and draft
board raids, building takeovers, blockades of war materiel, and stand-offs
with aggressive police. Countless thousands of people—many of them
young and in the context of so many causes and in so many societies—put their comfort, safety, and even lives on the line for the sake of a higher good, be it peace, equality, or freedom. “The sixties,” as defined by their world-changing social movements, are indeed unthinkable without militancy and self-sacrifice.

Yet as the decade ground on, and the New Left grew more radical, its militancy hardened. In some circles, the critique of “inauthenticity” morphed into a critique of the poverty of discourse, of language as such, as a means of social change. Activists in the United States, Germany, and elsewhere rejected first lawful and then peaceful protest altogether as ineffective. At an extreme, some held that violence was the only proper response to a system constituted by violence and a way of speaking its “language.” In addition, some radicals eventually deemed violence the highest form of militancy—the true measure of one’s commitment and capacity for solidarity.

The declared purpose of both the Weathermen and the RAF was to distinguish themselves on the left by at last putting revolutionary words into action. The Weathermen boasted of being “a movement that fights, not just talks about fighting.” Toward this end, its collectives instituted for a time harrowing rituals to drum up its members’ courage and overcome all kinds of ingrained ideological and emotional barriers to violence. Implicitly drawing on Fanonian and Sartrean images of violence as a form of inner liberation, a Weatherman at one point declared, in a remarkably severe utterance, that “carrying out acts of armed resistance against the state is the highest form of human being.” The RAF proclaimed in an early statement, “We will not talk about armed propaganda, we will do it.” It later declared that a real revolutionary is “anyone who starts to fight.” And it, too, exalted the man (or woman) of action—quintessentially Andreas Baader—as the embodiment not just of the revolutionary ideal, but true vitality. This too could be the fate of idealistic youth in the 1960s—the rapid matriculation through an ultimately cynical education that spins Aristotelian and Weberian premises into a dire formula: that the essence of life is politics, the essence of politics is power, and the essence of power is violence; therefore, to embrace conflict and to engage in violence is to experience politics—and life—in its most essential or vital form.

New Left radicals also justified their provocative acts within a broadly ethical mandate. In simplest form, that mandate held that one had a moral obligation to aggressively resist evil, irrespective of its political consequences. What mattered was the demonstration of non-compliance with a destructive social machinery; the extent of the risk and self-sacrifice, by extension, was the measure of the righteousness of the act. Just before Weatherman’s “Days of Rage,” in which a few hundred
members threw themselves into combat with heavily armed police, Weatherleader Bernardine Dohrn declared: “We aren’t going to be good Germans in a fascist state.” A radical journalist, deeply critical of the Weatherman on political grounds, wrote approvingly of this ethical logic: “That’s it on the line, and forget the rest. Right on Bernardine.”

A Weatherman-like collective combined existential and ethical themes in a communiqué to accompany a 1969 bombing: “What we want is salvation from a meaningless annihilation. To not be cremated for coca-cola and plastic flags . . . on the moon . . . In a time when all action seems meaningless at least we won’t be good Germans.”

Clearly, the notion of the “good German” was a trans-cultural one, invoked by radicals worldwide as shorthand to justify resistance in moral and highly individual terms, playing to the witness of history and, perhaps, God. For Germans in the 1960s, the idea obviously had a special resonance. So much has been said and written about how the German past functioned for postwar radicals as an impetus to militancy. A single, poignant quote from the RAF’s Horst Mahler will carry here much of that analysis: “The essential, highly personalized problem was this: How did your parents behave [during the Nazi period]? The question also had implications for us—namely, that whenever events occur that even in a distant way recall the twelve years [of Nazi rule], we must actively resist them.”

German dissidents, in short, felt a special obligation of resistance, implied in their frequent invocation of the Nazi past—by the RAF, but also by many others—to condemn everything from the Vietnam War and West Germany’s tacit support for it, to “Zionism” (in their frequently mangled understanding), the tabloid press, the police and broader security apparatus, the criminal justice system, and, of course, penal institutions like Stammheim. The great irony is that this heightened sense of the obligation to resist injustice drove the exaggeration of that injustice, leading in turn to increasingly militant and morally dubious acts of “protest.” This militancy increased state repression, only sharpening denunciations of, and attacks against, the state, ratcheting up once more the state’s response. The German conflict thus had the quality of a vicious circle, instigated, in part, by the desire of young West Germans not to be “good Germans.” But that core desire was not confined to Germany, and drove militancy in other places.

A sense of personal moral responsibility to advance justice and an existential ethic demanding action can propel social movements. It may share in the pathos of the Lutheran creed, “Here I stand, I can do other,” updated by Camus for postwar times in his influential text The Rebel. Taken to extremes, they also have marked dangers, exemplified by the Weathermen and the RAF: the privileging of action over thought; the denigration and crippling of critical thinking; the quest for individual
purity; making a willingness to engage in violence the measure both of one’s individual liberation and moral worth; and—notwithstanding the optimism of the heroic guerrilla narrative—the succumbing to a tragic view of self and world. Most importantly, there can be a short distance between the veneration of self-sacrifice and the sacrifice of others, dying for a cause and killing for a cause.

Furthermore, the moral and existential justification of militancy can work against its political logic by bracketing the question of consequences: if all that matters is the ardor of the act, it becomes irrelevant whether it materially advances one’s broad political cause or—by increasing repression, alienating allies, and even compromising one’s values—actually works against its ostensible goals. Finally, the very existence of structurally distinct and often competing logics—one political/strategic, which judges the means by the ends, and another ethical/existential, which stresses the valor of the deed—can horribly confuse one’s purpose and degrade one’s cause.

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I have presented here the Weathermen and the RAF as different iterations of a conception of “struggle” rooted both in global structures and a discourse on revolution widely flourishing in the late 1960s. The national contexts of course mattered, especially in giving the German conflict its intensity and, from the mid-1970s on, its terribly involuted quality. So, too, particular binational relationships, such as that of the Federal Republic and the United States, mattered greatly. The analytical challenge, in this and other cases of global protest movements, is to integrate an understanding of the international, regional, and national contexts. Excessive attention to national dramas, be they political, psychological, or cultural, threaten to distort one’s understanding of individual movements by submerging the very spires of global connection that animated them.

I have also argued that there were broadly positive qualities to the militant cultures from which the Weatherman and the RAF emerged and that those qualities turned blatantly negative when taken to reckless extremes. Acknowledging this mix greatly aids, I think, in understanding a phenomenon almost as enigmatic as the existence, in the first place, of these “armed struggle” groups: the pronounced fascination with them even decades later (especially the German preoccupation with the RAF). Such fascination, I would hazard, is for at least some the projection backward of contemporary political frustrations and an expression of their wish to find in the past both insight and inspiration. Accepting the legitimacy of, rather than decrying, this glance backward and the impulses behind it better qualifies one to argue how much caution can be read from
the tales of the Weathermen and the RAF, and how little inspiring—and indeed tragic—it is when movements waste their talent and promise.

Notes

1 This is an expanded and partially modified version of the lecture I gave at the GHI in October 2007. I would like to extend thanks to the German Historical Institute, both for inviting me to give this lecture and for supporting me in the research that forms the basis for it. In 1997, when I was writing a dissertation on left-wing violence, I had the pleasure of participating in the GHI’s Third Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History. For two days, sixteen graduate students—half of us North American and half German (including some from the former East)—sat in this sumptuous setting, discussing each others’ work with an uncommon intimacy. I delighted in the pomp and ceremony. But more than that, I was so impressed by the respect we were shown as scholars, no matter our young age. It was clear to me then, and remains clear today, that the GHI is deeply committed to scholarship, seeding our projects with resources and gracing our profession with a dignity it is too rarely shown, especially in this society.

2 Walter Althammer, Gegen den Terror (Stuttgart, 1978), 57.


4 Walter Scheel speech in Zum Gedanken an die Opfer des Terrorismus (Bonn, 1978), 12, 9.

5 A superb new edited volume, with international contributors, examines in detail the RAF’s varied legacy: Gerrit-Jan Berense and Ingo Cornils, eds., Baader-Meinhof Returns: History and Cultural Memory of German Left-Wing Terrorism (Amsterdam, 2008). Separate essays explore treatments of the RAF in film, on the stage, in novels, and in other media.

6 In a recent, controversial work, Götz Aly revives somewhat the notion, originally asserted by Jillian Becker, that Germany’s 68ers were the progeny of fascism, sharing in its hideous mentalities and conduct. Götz Aly, Unser Kampf. 1968—ein irritierter Blick zurück (Frankfurt, 2008).

7 This is the broad approach of Gerd Koenen in Das Rote Jahrzent 1967–1977: Unsere kleine deutsche Kultur-revolution (Cologne, 2001), who explains and largely denounces the German left by means of historically conditioned generational psychology. In a more recent work, Peter Schneider provides a less severe and more judicious critique of the psychic mechanisms within the West German New Left. Peter Schneider, Rebellion und Wahn: Mein ’68 (Cologne, 2008).

8 I deal with the issue of the German past at length in my Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies.

9 This is the conclusion of Donatella della Porta in a cross-country comparison in her Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (New York, 1995).


11 Scanlan’s I, no. 8, January 1971.

12 There are exceptions, such as the infamous “shoe bomber” and Muslim convert Richard Reed. Currently, two German converts to Islam are facing serious charges for alleged terrorist plots in Germany. Souad Mekhennet, “Germany Charges 3 Jailed in ’07 in Bomb Plot,” The New York Times, September 3, 2008, A9.


14 I therefore disagree, though with some qualification, with Gerd Koenen’s judgment that “one will find a quite different mindset and mode of action” between the Weathermen and the RAF, buttressed by his ill-chosen example, “One of the Weatherman women, Jane Alpert, told Daniel Cohn-Bendit in the late 1980s: ‘I have never meant to do harm to our
This is exactly what a young German leftist never could or would have said.” Gerd Koenen, “Armed Innocence, or ‘Hitler’s Children’ Revisited” in Berendse and Cornils, Baader-Meinhof Returns, 27–28. To be sure, the German radicals displayed over time a fierce edge or intensity that American radicals generally either lacked or shed, and the groups’ histories were in important respects dramatically different. Further, some American milti-\[\ldots\]
tants saw themselves as the true patriots, whose militant support for the Viet Cong and their goal of Vietnamese self-determination was an affirmation of America’s own revolutionary heritage. But, as I argue here, the basic paradigm of armed struggle was initially the same. And, whatever Alpert—who was not in fact a Weatherwoman, but part of a different group—said years later about her feelings all along, some American radicals expressed a fervent wish to obliterate the American political, social, and economic structure as it was known. Further, the Weathermen and others were roundly denounced as traitorous, terrorist, America-haters.

15 This is the evolution presented by Kirkpatrick Sale in his classic SDS (New York, 1972). To varying degrees, it describes as well the core narrative of the New Left in countries other than the United States. My use of the label “New Left” in the American context refers to the white student and youth movement, epitomized by SDS, and not the Black Power movement and other forms of African American activism. This conforms to commonly accepted definitions of the New Left, though some scholars use the term more inclusively.

16 The international origins of the American Black Power movement have been the subject of much recent research, notably Kevin Gaines, American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill, 2007) and Peniel Joseph, Waiting to the Midnight Hour (New York, 2006).

17 Jürgen Horlemann, quoted in Gerd Langguth, Die Protestbewegung in der BRD, 1968–1976 (Cologne, 1976), 208. This was Horlemann’s characterization of the influential position developed by Rudi Dutschke in the mid- to late 1960s.


21 The quotes are from the widely anthologized das Konzept Stadtguerilla. Written by Ulrike Meinhof in 1971, some time after the RAF’s formation, it is hardly a definitive statement of the RAF’s ideology, whose often contradictory elements are expressed in a host of communiqués and treatises by diverse authors. It nonetheless conveys many of the RAF’s core premises and beliefs. I am drawing from a translation by Anthony Murphy available at www.germanguerrilla.com/red-army-faction/71_04.html.


31 Interview with David Gilbert, Columbia Oral History Project, 346.


35 “der letzte brief von holger meins (am 31.10.1074),” *texte: der RAF*, 14.

36 *Leviathan*, November 1969, 22.


38 Author interview with Bill Ayers.


45 Camus, it should be noted, in the *Rebel* and elsewhere insisted that moderation and the recognition of moral limits were integral to the very notion of rebellion.
TERRORISM IN GERMANY: 
THE BAADER-MEINHOF PHENOMENON

Lecture delivered at the GHI, June 5, 2008

Stefan Aust
Editor-in-Chief, Der Spiegel, 1994–2008

Recently on Route 73 in Germany, between Stade und Cuxhaven, my phone rang. On the other end of the line was Thilo Thielke, SPIEGEL correspondent in Africa. He was calling on his satellite phone from Darfur. For two weeks he had been traveling with rebels in the back of a pick-up truck, between machine guns and Kalashnikovs. He took something to read along for the long evenings: *Moby Dick*. He asked me: “How was that again with the code names? Who was Captain Ahab?” “Andreas Baader, of course,” I said and quoted Gudrun Ensslin from a letter to Ulrike Meinhof: “Ahab makes a great impression on his first appearance in *Moby Dick* . . . And if either by birth or by circumstance something pathological was at work deep in his nature, this did not detract from his dramatic character. For tragic greatness always derives from a morbid break with health, you can be sure of that.”

“And the others?” the man from Africa asked, “Who was Starbuck?” At that time, that was not a coffee company—also named after *Moby Dick*—but the code name of Holger Meins. Starbuck was the chief mate on the whaling ship *Pequod*, whose role Melville described in this way: “Starbuck’s body and Starbuck’s coerced will were Ahab’s, so long as Ahab kept his magnet at Starbuck’s brain; still he knew that for all this the chief mate, in his soul, abhorred his captain’s quest.” This did nothing to change the fact that, after a dramatic arrest—naked down to his underwear—he later died in a hunger strike, while Andreas Baader lasted longer by eating secretly.

Jan-Carl Raspe had gotten the name “Zimmermann” (carpenter) from Gudrun Ensslin. Again, Melville’s description of this role: “He was like one of those unreasoning but still highly useful, *multum in parvo*, Sheffield contrivances, assuming the exterior—though a little swelled—of a common pocket knife; but containing not only blades of various sizes but also screwdrivers, cork-screws, tweezers, awls, pens, rulers, nail-filers, countersinksers. So, if his superiors wanted to use the carpenter for a screwdriver, all they had to do was to open that part of him, and the screw was fast . . .” Jan-Carl Raspe turned out to be the tinkerer who had developed the highly efficient communications system from cell to cell in Stammheim prison, which must have been used, among other things, to arrange the prisoners’ collective suicide.
A couple more code names from *Moby Dick* and the RAF passed back and forth over the telephone wire from the northern German Lowland to the Sudanese rebel zone. Queequeg, for example, Melville’s noble savage, the “idolator at heart, he ... lived among these Christians, wore their clothes, and tried to talk their gibberish.” His real name was Gerhard Müller, who later became the chief witness for the prosecution against the RAF. And then, of course, came the question: What did the RAF have to do with *Moby Dick*? The answer derives not only from the fact that this novel about the pursuit of the white whale, the Leviathan, was part of the standard reading of all the RAF prisoners. The group apparently found the romantic apotheosis of their struggle in this novel: the idea of revolution as the hunt for the white whale as a fight against the state, which they called “the machine.” As the epigraph to *Moby Dick* reads: “For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin, CIVITAS), which is but an artificial man.” Melville quoted this from the beginning of Hobbes’s *Leviathan*.

Isolated from the world like the crew of a ship of the dead, the RAF leaders led an almost mystical life in the high-security ward of Stammheim prison. It was thus no coincidence that Gudrun Ensslin and her comrades discovered Melville’s classic novel in the loneliness of their cells. The story of Captain Ahab’s fanatical hunt for the white whale bears all the traits of a revolutionary anticapitalist parable. The murderous struggle of Baader and his crew against the Leviathan state bore the characteristics of a metaphysical final struggle much like the one that monomaniacal Captain Ahab was leading in his war against the whale. “I’d strike the sun if it insulted me,” Ahab says about himself in Melville’s novel, musing: “How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall? To me, the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me. Sometimes I think there’s naught beyond.” A crew on a boat, in the middle of a hostile sea—this must be how Gudrun Ensslin saw the RAF when she borrowed code names from the crew of the *Pequod* in order to rally the troops outside, beyond the prison walls, and to inspire them to commit ever more horrifying crimes against the common enemy.

It was one of those moments that make you feel you are edging closer to the truth when, more than twenty years ago, among the 60-running-meters of investigative files collected in my home I came across the secret message in which Gudrun Ensslin bestowed code names from *Moby Dick* on her fellow prisoners. Only then did I read this novel in the original and begin to sense the degree to which the prisoners had romantically imbued their struggle against reality. They transformed themselves into icons, and they became icons, with all the consequences that entailed,
with all the severity and brutality against alleged opponents, innocent bystanders, against their comrades and, in the end, against themselves.

There was another book in the canon of the prisoners in Stammheim and elsewhere. It was Bertolt Brecht’s *Die Maßnahme*, known in English as *The Decision or The Measures Taken*. I came across it, too, in sifting through writings they circulated in prison. Ulrike Meinhof had quoted from the play:

> It is a terrible thing to kill.  
> But not only others would we kill, but ourselves too if need be  
> Since only force can alter this  
> Murderous world, as  
> Every living creature knows.¹

This motto determined the actions of the RAF—and of almost all terrorists in this world, be they politically or religiously motivated. They share the suicidal element, the murder of the self alongside the murder of others. Terrorists see themselves as martyrs; through their example, their experiment on living objects, they want to go down in history, or at least go to paradise with its seventeen virgins. Thus, the Attas and the Baaders certainly have much in common—yet each also belongs to a particular time and is embedded in a revolutionary mainstream, whether socialist or Islamist in nature. Both of these martyrs came close to achieving their goal of using their own death to attain immortality. We wouldn’t be here talking about this today if Andreas Baader had not shot himself with a pistol smuggled into the high-security wing of Stuttgart-Stammheim prison thirty years ago, in the fall of 1977. If Gudrun Ensslin had not hanged herself in her cell. And without the senseless struggle of “six against six million,” as Heinrich Böll put it, I would not have written my *Baader-Meinhof Komplex*.²

There’s no question about it: the history of the RAF is part of the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was the greatest challenge of German postwar society, and, concerning its effects on domestic policy, it is no doubt comparable to the meaning of 9/11 for the United States. And, of course, both instances of terrorism have something to do with circumstances in their respective countries. This is even easier to see in the case of the RAF than with the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. Briefly, the latter surely had to do with the role of the United States in the Middle East, with the unresolved Palestinian crisis, with the power of oil, with widespread re-islamification, that is, with a global situation of conflict—a statement that is certainly not meant as an excuse for the murderous pilots. But every kind of terrorism is always embedded in a larger conflict. Only out of such a conflict does terrorism draw its power and win support for its murderous clandestine groups. So
when we look at the history of the RAF, it relates to German history—both before and after World War II. The RAF is like an auxiliary craft floating along in the stream of time, a gunboat, if you will. This does not diminish the responsibility of those involved, but explains it, perhaps.

I surmise that I was invited to this conference because I wrote a book in which I reconstructed the history of Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Carl Raspe, and Ulrike Meinhof as precisely as possible. I was only able to do this because my own biography ran parallel at times, so that, from my own experiences and professional observations as a journalist, I could follow many of the events as they occurred. That’s why I would like to portray the different episodes from my own subjective point of view.

I was still going to school in the small northern German town of Stade when I met Klaus Rainer Röhl, the editor of the leftist magazine konkret. At the time, I worked with his little brother for the school newspaper. Röhl was married to Ulrike Meinhof, then editor-in-chief and later columnist for konkret. I met her, too, and watched her contributions to the critical TV program “Panorama.” When I finished high school, Röhl asked me if I wanted to sign on at konkret. And I did. It was the beginning of the student movement, and, working at konkret, I was in the thick of events. In addition to Ulrike Meinhof, I met Rudi Dutschke—the most prominent spokesperson of the student movement who advocated a less radical approach—as well as Jan-Carl Raspe and Horst Mahler, and Mahler’s friend Otto Schily, who would later defend many of them in court. I witnessed the demonstrations against the Vietnam War and for Ho Chi Minh. I witnessed how eggs were thrown at the Amerikahaus, and how eggs became paint bombs and then cobblestones. konkret published texts by Peter Weiss, a German poet I had studied intensively for my Abitur (high-school graduation exam). In these texts, Weiss called for the creation of “two, three, many Vietnams.” I was a participating observer of the events that transformed boring daily life in West Germany into an adventure. On the front wall of the main lecture hall of the Technical University of Berlin, Che Guevara’s dictum appeared in giant letters, “It is the duty of the revolutionary to make revolution!” It was only a matter of time before slogans calling for the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, capitalism, and so on followed.

When Kommune I (the first politically-motivated commune in Germany founded in January 1967) called for the torching of department stores in a satirical flyer, it was only logical that sooner or later someone would toss a Molotov cocktail in the outerwear department. At that time Ulrike Meinhof praised the progressive moment of the illegal deed. From there, it was only a small step into the abyss. Meinhof and her circle directed their protest against the American war in Vietnam, which generated images of previously unimaginable horror—all in the name of the
Free World. The cast of characters at the time included the lawyer Horst Mahler, who at first had socialist and later national-socialist leanings. In an interview in 2007 he said, “We were all very moral, so that didn’t leave us cold. I still remember that, during a television report on Vietnam with horrifying images, Ulrike Meinhof jumped up, sobbing, and said that she would not put up with it, that this was debasing, and said: we have to do something; we cannot just sit back in our easy chairs.”

The war in Vietnam. The mightiest war machine in the world battling a guerilla army. Bombs, napalm, stripping the jungle. These were the images that went round the world, fixed themselves painfully in your mind and demanded a response. Vietnam became the touchstone for the morality of the free West, and for many at that time, the original sin. Suddenly, there were once again “just wars” for some. Ulrike Meinhof remarked on this in a televised discussion: “We are acting for those who are trying to free themselves from terror and violence. And if no means other than war remains for them, then we are for their war. And we are against those who escalate their terror up to the use of nuclear weapons, something currently being discussed in regard to Vietnam.”

Outrage turned into protest, protest into resistance, and resistance into violence. From the very beginning, parallels were drawn to the Third Reich. For example, Ulrike Meinhof said, “In the moment when you become serious about solidarity with the Vietnamese, when you become intent on weakening the American position everywhere in the world, so that the Vietnamese people derive some benefit, then I know, then I really don’t see the difference between the terrorism of the police that we have already experienced in Berlin and are threatened with now and the stormtrooper terror of the Thirties.” In the perception of the rebelling students and their advocates, the state became a police state. And the provocateurs of Kommune I were only too happy to tease out the enemy in the police. It was a culture of political “happening” that attracted many. And it began to become a game with violence.

The wall at the headquarters of the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studen- tenbund (SDS) on Kurfürstendamm in Berlin featured the slogan: “It’s burning, it’s burning, a department store is burning. . . .” Rudi Dutschke sat on a table in front of it being interviewed for television on the subject of violence. In his husky and sonorous voice, he lectured, “In the metropolises, we are required—those of us who are allowed to develop a little bit of consciousness—we must proceed against this system—which necessarily pushes us all toward catastrophe—against this system with all our power.” And as if it were the most casual thing in the world, he added, “We should not dispense with our own means of violence from the outset because that would amount to granting free reign to the organized violence of the system.”
Their “own means of violence” was not long in coming. Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin set fire to two Frankfurt department stores. When they were arrested for this, Gudrun Ensslin’s father, a Protestant minister, said, “It astonished me that Gudrun, who has always thought in a very rational, intelligent way, has experienced what is almost a condition of euphoric self-realization, a really holy self-realization . . . To me, that is more of a shock than the fire of the arson itself—seeing a human being make her way to self-realization through such acts.” Life-threatening arson as “really holy self-realization”!

Then Baader was liberated from prison. Shots were fired, Ulrike Meinhof jumped out the window of the Institute for Social Questions in Berlin and went underground with the others. With the assistance of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s representative in Berlin—even then the Palestinian conflict was a red thread in the continuity of terror—the fugitives escaped via East Berlin to Beirut. The East German secret police, the Stasi, followed all of this, of course, but did nothing to put a stop to these would-be terrorists’ game. Later, lucrative connections evolved between Stasi and RAF members, but at the time, no one really saw this coming. From Lebanon, the Baader group traveled by car to Jordan, where they attended an El Fatah training camp. They were allowed to complete a fast, intensive military training course designed for urban guerilla fighters. The leader of the camp was the director of secret service for El Fatah, Abu Hassan Salameh, known as “The Red Prince.” He was a close associate of Yasser Arafat, the future Nobel Peace Prize laureate who supported all terrorism in the Middle East. A few years later, the Red Prince was a dead prince. The Israelis drew him into a trap and murdered him. I mention this just to briefly shed light on the decades-old murderous association of German and Palestinian freedom fighters.

I received an almost immediate eyewitness account of life in the training camp. A friend who had worked with me at konkret and who had first introduced Ulrike Meinhof to Baader, Ensslin, and Co. had gone with them to Jordan. The Berlin police knew that he had lived with Ulrike Meinhof and suspected him of being a gunman in Baader’s liberation, even though he had not taken part. As a result, he topped the list of wanted criminals. Rightfully afraid that he could wind up behind bars despite his innocence, he did the most foolish thing he could have done—he accompanied the Baader group to the guerilla training camp. There he crawled through the desert sands alongside Baader, Mahler, and Meinhof, but soon began to quarrel with his old drinking buddy Baader. Baader and Mahler were behaving like Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, and this travel companion found it all a bit ridiculous. But Baader and his future Red Army cohorts had no sense of humor. They made plans to kill their terror-resistant companion and disguise it as a shooting accident.
The Red Prince prevented this; the Berliner left the camp, returned to Germany, and got in touch with me. Therefore, at a time when many still sympathized with the supposedly revolutionary Robin Hood group around Baader, I had a pretty clear and unromantic view of the whole thing. It could only end in murder, prison, suicide, and increasing security measures by the West German state.

After several weeks, the group returned to Germany, but not before they arranged the ultimate childcare project with the Palestinians for Ulrike Meinhof’s seven-year-old twin daughters. These two were to be installed in an El Fatah children’s camp and trained as young guerillas. We thought this somehow unsuitable for little girls from a Hamburg suburb, whose father, Klaus Rainer Röhl, was trying to find them through Interpol. We found out where the children were being held, established contact with their care providers, said the code word, and I flew to Sicily to meet them as the purported envoy of the group. The operation was a success; when the real envoy of Baader and his women showed up to dispatch the girls to the Jordanian camp, they were no longer there. They then tried to shoot us in Hamburg, but, as you can see from my appearance today, this failed.

My interest in the RAF, as Baader and his faithful followers soon called themselves, did not wane, however. After all, I already had an advantage in terms of information. Now, at that time, the public television networks tended to see the topics on which one worked as an indication of one’s political proclivities. So if you dealt with the RAF, you were soon seen as a sympathizer; if you reported on DKP (Communist Party) members being barred from public employment, you were suspected of communist leanings; if you investigated the safety of nuclear power plants, you were regarded as a disguised eco-freak. Soon, I was all of these put together, as my palette of topics was large. But the subject of terrorism captivated me, especially since I had come to know more about it than the police allowed. Whenever something happened, I had to—and was allowed to—report on it for TV. Thus, I became familiar with the bizarre world of secret services, their informants, the traps they ensnared even themselves in; I saw prisons and courtrooms from the inside, read meter upon meter of police and judicial records, and acquired a more than passing knowledge of the law.

The RAF’s active underground campaign began. It primarily consisted in robbing banks to fill the coffers for the revolution. Even the largely impractical Ulrike Meinhof was deployed in these efforts, once even leaving the loot behind. The second front in the revolutionary campaign was the question of logistics: where could they sleep without being betrayed? They formed a circle of supporters without concerning themselves much with the voluntary or forced nature of people’s cooperation,
or that those who harbored them might themselves wind up being pursued by the police. And, of course, the illegal campaign required the acquisition and falsification of identification papers and the theft of automobiles. In stealing many cars, the RAF actually invented something, although they never registered it at the German patent office—the so-called corkscrew that enabled one to remove cars’ ignition locks in the blink of an eye.

This rather prosaic practice of revolutionary struggle received powerful theoretical nourishment in a variety of writings penned primarily by Ulrike Meinhof. The anti-imperial struggle drew its theoretical foundations above all from the ideas of the fading student movement. In a sense, it was the mainstream oppositional leftist thought of the time. But the consequences were different, more radical. They did not want to merely talk about revolution and call for it in other parts of the world, but wanted to make it happen here and now. The only thing that could make this plan fail was the reality of the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1960s. There was no revolutionary proletariat, it was hard to see the government as a fascist police state, there were no concentration camps or torture, there was the rule of law. But they would provoke the state into showing its true fascist face, normally so well hidden and disguised. That would move the masses to revolt. That was the theory, anyway, admittedly a bit simplified.

The logistics phase of building up the RAF lasted a couple of months. Then they were ready to take up the battle with their own homemade bombs. On May 11, 1972, three pipe bombs demolished the entrance gate and officers’ clubhouse of the Fifth US Army Corps at IG-Farbenhaus. The outcome: thirteen wounded and one dead. The letter claiming responsibility was signed “Kommando Petra Schelm.” Schelm had been a young hairstylist and fell in with the RAF through a friend. She had been killed in a police raid, becoming the first casualty on the RAF’s side. Her death had briefly roused public solidarity with the underground fighters. On May 19, 1972, a bomb exploded in the Springer House in Hamburg. Seventeen people were wounded, two of them seriously. On May 24, bombs planted in cars detonated fifteen seconds apart in front of the US Army’s European headquarters in Heidelberg. Three American soldiers were killed; five were wounded. The revolutionary game had turned deadly serious. Previous sympathizers noticed this, too. The RAF group zigzagging across Germany found it increasingly difficult to find accommodation. In the end, they were all betrayed.

The photos of the shootout and arrest of Andreas Baader and Holger Meins in Frankfurt went round the world. Above all, the image of Holger Meins, gaunt and naked down to his underwear, came to be the emblem of persecuted guilt. At last, the state presented itself to the RAF the way
they wanted it to—as a police state. One after the other, all the significant members of the group were captured by the police. Ulrike Meinhof was ratted out by her host in Hanover. Gudrun Ensslin dropped a pistol from her handbag in a Hamburg boutique, which caused the saleswoman to call the police. Then they were all in prison. Calculated from Baader’s liberation, the underground fight had lasted just over two years. Only during their incarceration did the RAF attain the importance that it had failed to achieve through its actions. It became a subject for its own sake. It acquired a capital, called Stammheim, and its own high-security wing in Stammheim prison. It was the second birth of the RAF, assisted by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, the court, politics, and the West German public.

The perpetrators shifted into the role of victims. In guilt-hungry post-war German society, this granted them a strength that was not expected, and they exploited it without reservation. Gudrun Ensslin’s father, the Protestant minister, had already transfigured his daughter’s motives in this direction during the arson trial: “They must have wanted to tell us—Look, this is where we are, where you have brought us. It is the position you have put us in.” Finally, they had come into their martyr role. Masterfully, they played it on the keyboard of those persecuted and tormented by the Unjust State. It was a piece that the machinery of the state accompanied just as willingly and foolishly.

In the end, the RAF had only one remaining purpose: the liberation of its incarcerated founders. To achieve this, the RAF mounted an attack on the German embassy in Stockholm, in which embassy employees were virtually executed and which ended in catastrophe when the explosives they had brought went off prematurely. Then the RAF tried to abduct a banker who was shot when he resisted. The Federal Prosecutor General was murdered in broad daylight. These actions were part of the operation known by the group as “the Big Raushole,” or the “Big Rescue”, and they culminated in the abduction of Hanns Martin Schleyer, head of the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (BDA) and the Federation of German Industries (BDI). All of his bodyguards and his driver were brutally shot. When the state failed to give in, a Palestinian squad hijacked the Lufthansa jet Landshut on the way from Palma de Mallorca to Frankfurt. In Mogadishu, the German counterterrorism unit, GSG 9, was able to liberate eighty passengers and crew members. After that, the RAF founders imprisoned in Stammheim, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe, committed suicide.

For many supporters and sympathizers both in and outside of Germany, this raised them completely to the status of martyrs. As I quoted before:
It is a terrible thing to kill.
But not only others would we kill, but ourselves too if need be
Since only force can alter this
Murderous world, as
Every living creature knows.

In the Dornhalden Cemetery of Stuttgart, the funeral of Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe was attended by supporters, who perceived them primarily as victims. They regarded their suicides as murders, regardless of whether or not the prisoners had killed themselves in their cells. The real victims of the RAF—the bodies torn apart in the bombings, the policemen who were shot, the executed Federal Prosecutor General and his security detail, and the abducted and executed leader of industry—were acknowledged with a shrug of the shoulders, sometimes even with “hidden joy.”

The founders of the RAF, Baader, Meinhof, and Ensslin, were transformed into icons. Indistinct drawings representing photos of their bodies became highly valued works of art that made it all the way to the Museum of Modern Art in New York. The quasi-religious character of their mad crusade had made them immortal in the worldview of many a German leftist. It had lasted from June 2, 1967, to October 18, 1977—ten years that shook the republic. “I want to have done something,” Gudrun Ensslin said after torching two Frankfurt department stores, and her father, the Protestant theologian, had spoken of “a really holy self-realization.” Her mother, too, Ilse Ensslin, had said admiringly, “I feel that by her act, she did something liberating, even for our family.” Ilse Ensslin herself claimed to have been suddenly “freed of a constraint and fear that—rightly or wrongly—dominated my life” after visiting her daughter in prison. The overly strict conscience that had been nurtured in the Ensslin pastoral household clearly thrust its way violently out. Thus Gudrun’s struggle against the “Schweinesystem” had had religious features from the beginning.

She and her comrades had never seen themselves as terrorists but rather as freedom fighters resisting an inhumane “system,” legitimated by an almost religious right to resist tyranny in any form. For the most part, they simply blinded themselves to the bloody, inhumane reality of their own actions. Only in Ulrike Meinhof’s allusions to Bertolt Brecht’s revolutionary drama The Decision could one occasionally catch a glimpse of her awareness of the monstrousness of her behavior: “And what baseness would you not commit could you rid the world of all baseness?” she quoted Brecht, and added: “Sure, it’s a disgusting thought.”

Even during their lifetime, the founders of the RAF in Stammheim had become screens onto which anything could be projected. Their image

54 GHI Bulletin No. 43 (Fall 2008)
as the greatest enemies of the state found its counterpart in their trans-
figuration into icons by the second generation of RAF members. Freeing
their founders had become the second generation’s whole purpose in life.
To murder or, if necessary, die for them had become the categorical
imperative of revolutionary self-realization. When the prisoners on the
seventh floor of the Stuttgart-Stammheim prison had freed themselves
from the high-security wing by suicide, the RAF lost its aim.

Years later, several RAF members gathered together in a therapy
group to work through their common terrorist past. One of the perpe-
trators in Stockholm, Karl-Heinz Dellwo, came to the following realiza-
tion:

Strangely, their deaths reconciled me to them later. The feelings
that flared up when I got the news contained rage—because they
had vanished and left us to deal with the mess they had made.
Today I tell myself: They adhered to political criteria or returned
to them. Disproportionality is barbarism. For years everything
had revolved around freeing the prisoners. Some of us had died
for that; others went to prison or faced other consequences. We
were responsible for several victims; in the end, the whole mo-
tility of the RAF reached a tipping point—the liberation of the
prisoners always took center stage. With their deaths, they were
also simply setting a limit. The message was: Don’t do anything
for us anymore. End it or find a new purpose for yourselves!
Their staging of their death had a lot in it: it was a last kick
against the power from which they saw themselves fully freed.
The reemergence of the old moral—’we are the projectile!’ But
also acceptance of responsibility, maybe even something like
penance and the recognition that means and ends were out of
proportion.

Like many in their generation, they had stepped up to battle the old and
the supposed new fascism. They had sought to change this killing world
with violence, had made themselves into lords over life and death and
had become guilty like many from their fathers’ generation. Some in the
RAF recognized this. Others still don’t see it today. Up to the German
Autumn of 1977, twenty-eight people had lost their lives in attacks or
firefights. Seventeen members of this urban guerilla troop had died. Two
completely uninvolved bystanders had inadvertently been shot by the
police. Forty-seven dead. That is the sum of seven years of underground
warfare in the Federal Republic of Germany—seven years that changed
the Republic. The state had armed itself with new laws, in its policing,
and in the consciousness of the broad population. The country had be-
come less liberal. But even the upgraded police apparatus was unable to stop the war of the next RAF generation.

The bloody end of the “German Autumn” of 1977 was not the end of terrorism in Germany. The new RAF had learned new lessons. It no longer left any traces. It murdered by ambush. When some in the group no longer wanted to participate, they secretly took refuge in the GDR. Everyone who opted out received three thousand marks from RAF coffers as start-up capital for their new lives in East Germany. There was enough money. Just from the 1977 abduction of the Austrian industrialist Walter Palmer, the “Bewegung 2. Juni” (or Movement of the Second of June) in 1977 had taken in 4.5 million marks in various currencies, which this group later brought with them to the RAF. The Stasi not only gave retiring RAF members a secure place to escape to but also maintained contact with the RAF squads in the West and offered these still active troops a refuge for rest and relaxation from the underground war. Once, Stasi officials even spent weeks with seven second-generation RAF members, including Christian Klar, at troop training facilities, organizing shooting practices and giving them lessons in explosives technology and how to handle Soviet-model rocket-propelled grenade launchers. While the RAF-retirees grew accustomed to life under real-existing socialism, the RAF published a strategy paper for the first time since Ulrike Meinhof’s 1972 text “Concept Urban Guerilla.” The 1982 paper was called “Guerilla, Resistance, and Anti-Imperialist Front.” In it, the RAF admitted, “We committed errors in 1977 and the offensive became our most serious defeat.” They criticized the hijacking of the Lufthansa jet Landshut by Palestinian allies, but declared that the RAF emerged “stronger than before” from the German Autumn of 1977. The point now was “to develop a new strategy of attack in the imperialist centers.”

What that meant was clear soon enough—murder, plain and simple. In February 1985, a bomb attack on Ernst Zimmermann, the head of MTU, Germany’s leading aircraft engine manufacturer, resulted in his death. In August 1985, the American soldier Edward Pimental was murdered to obtain his entry pass to the US base in Frankfurt. The bomb attack then carried out there cost two people their lives. In July 1986, a bomb attack on Siemens manager Kurt Beckurts killed him and his driver Groppler. In October 1986, Gerold von Braunmühl, an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was murdered. In November 1989, the head of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen, was killed by a bomb; his driver was injured. In April 1991, Detlev Karsten Rohwedder, the director of the Treuhand (the agency that privatized East German enterprises) was murdered. His wife was injured. In all probability, the RAF was responsible for this, although no conclusive evidence for this has been found.
In June of 1993, the Verfassungsschutz, Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution, managed to plant a spy in the new RAF leadership. At that time, Birgit Hogefeld and Wolfgang Grams jointly led the organization. There was a plan for the GSG-9 to arrest the two of them in Bad Kleinen, but things went wrong. One GSG-9 officer was killed, Wolfgang Grams shot himself, and Birgit Hogefeld was arrested. Although the RAF could not really do much without Grams and Hogefeld, it still took the RAF another five years to more or less officially call an end to the madness. On April 20, 1998, the news agency Reuters in Cologne received an eight-page fax from Chemnitz, in which the RAF announced, “The urban guerrilla in the form of the RAF is now history. . . . The end of this project shows that we were not able to succeed on this path.” No remorse for the victims of the “urban guerilla,” no self-criticism, no guilt. Just the laconic statement that the armed struggle had been wrong because it had no prospect of success. After listing the names of all the RAF members who died in the struggle, the statement concluded with a quotation: “The revolution says: I was, I am, I will be again.” Rosa Luxemburg had written this in January 1919, one day before she was murdered. The murderous and suicidal rage that had begun on May 14, 1970, with Andreas Baader’s liberation was over after twenty-eight years.

Notes

PUTTING GERMAN TERRORISM IN PERSPECTIVE: AN AMERICAN RESPONSE

Comment on Stefan Aust’s Lecture, delivered at the GHI, June 5, 2008

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The Red Army Faction (RAF) is often considered a relic of the Cold War. Yet there are a number of intriguing parallels between the RAF and Al-Qaeda that place the RAF in a key position in the history of terrorism. My comment will elaborate on this comparative perspective. There are, of course, profound differences between the RAF and Al-Qaeda. The RAF was primarily a domestic phenomenon, whereas Al-Qaeda, at least in its pretensions, operates on an international scale. The RAF was a secular terrorist organization: the God that it worshipped was a particularly idiosyncratic interpretation of Marxism, or perhaps Stalinism. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, is a mélange of many different things: in addition to being strongly ideological, it also has a strong base both in theology and Islamic jurisprudence. The RAF was also remarkably small. After all, there were no more than roughly three dozen actual trigger pullers and bomb throwers, who were able to terrorize the West German state and society for almost thirty years. It is sobering to think what a challenge this handful of people presented to the West German state, whose security services were rather more adept than many of the security, intelligence and police forces that terrorists are arrayed against throughout the world today. And finally, the RAF killed about thirty people, whereas Al-Qaeda has the blood of thousands on its hands, the vast majority of which are Muslims. Despite these differences, it is not entirely far-fetched to compare RAF and Al-Qaeda—and perhaps even draw some lessons—because the RAF was such an archetypal modern terrorist group.

First and foremost, as Aust’s metaphor for the RAF’s behavior—Captain Ahab’s search for the white whale—and the RAF’s own use of Moby Dick’s characters as their code names make clear, terrorists ineluctably live in the future. They are constantly grasping for that distant but imperceptibly close point in time when they will triumph over their enemies and attain the ultimate realization of their destiny. This certainly was a theme in the RAF, and Al-Qaeda, too—not least in the seven years after 9/11—similarly lives in this future: hoping to revitalize and reorganize itself, not just to carry on the struggle, but to succeed and triumph in a cause that they believe is divinely ordained.
Second, while these groups live in the future that they are chasing after, they have only a very vague conception of what exactly that future might entail. In the case of the Red Army Faction, when they attempted to conceptualize a concrete vision of their future, their efforts rarely produced anything more lucid than verbose disquisitions espousing an idiosyncratic interpretation of Marxist doctrine. Let me give you an example. In the collection of RAF statements that was published by the group in 1977 (and subsequently banned), Gudrun Ensslin wrote: “We have applied the Marxist analysis and method to the contemporary scene. Not transferred it, but actually applied it.” Yet no further elucidation of the desired result was offered, except for the expression of the belief that Marxism would be rendered obsolete when the movement triumphed and the “capitalist system had been abolished.”

Many would argue that Al-Qaeda’s conception of the future it plans for is just as vague and no less ill-formed.

Thirdly, like all terrorists, both the RAF and Al-Qaeda see themselves as reluctant warriors cast on the defensive, forced to take up arms against an aggressive predatory enemy. In the RAF’s conceptualization, this enemy was the state, which they saw as bent on killing or destroying all protest. This explains the galvanizing effect that the death of Benno Ohnesorg during the Shah’s 1967 visit to Berlin had on the radicals who eventually formed the “Second of June Movement” and the Red Army Faction. If the government was going to use violence against them, they had no choice but to use violence in return. Indeed, Gudrun Ensslin had written of this transformation, remarking: “This fascist state intends to kill all of us. We must organize resistance. Violence can only be answered with violence. This is the generation of Auschwitz [referring to the West German government and society], you cannot argue with them.”

Similarly, Al-Qaeda’s justification and legitimization of its violence is that the West—championed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations—is waging a predatory aggressive war on Muslims worldwide so that Muslims have no choice but to resist with violence.

Indeed, this is the fourth parallel: like the Red Army Faction, Al-Qaeda came to the conclusion that there is no option but violence. This is why bin Laden, Zawahiri, and others constantly issue threats, warnings, and entreaties to their enemies, giving them the opportunity—at least propagandistically—to repent and to mend their ways. This is done cynically, since no one expects any government to adjust its foreign policy to suit Al-Qaeda’s dictates; but it allows the Al-Qaeda leadership to say to their supporters: “See, we’ve warned them, we gave them a chance to change, but you see, they won’t change. The only logic they understand is the logic of violence. Therefore jihad and the sword is the only option.”

The same logic was expressed by Ulrike Meinhof when she wrote how
the most radical elements of the student protests became “deeply disappointed by the actions of the student movement and of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and their inability to achieve change. There was no other choice, and it therefore became a necessity for the Red Army Faction to declare the idea of armed struggle.”

Fifth, both Al-Qaeda and the RAF share a firm belief in the didactic power of violence to rally the masses, the main constituency in their self-appointed quest. For the RAF, this hinged on the unprecedented economic prosperity of the 1960s, which allowed a luxury of introspection and self-criticism that in most radical circles generated revulsion against the socio-economic inequities endemic in the modern industrialized capitalist state. “All they can think about,” Ulrike Meinhof once dismissively remarked of her fellow Germans, “is some hairspray, a vacation in Spain, and a tiled bedroom.” With violence, Meinhof and her comrades would galvanize the masses to action. Bin Laden has made a similar point in his effort to rally Muslims against the United States, the capitalist-imperialist international order, and the process of globalization that he decries: “The capitalist system,” he has written, “seeks to turn the entire world into a fiefdom of the major corporations under the label of ‘globalization’” championed by the Americans. The similarities are striking.

Sixth, in the case of Al-Qaeda and the RAF, the key lieutenants all came from middle-class or upper-middle-class backgrounds. In a column titled “Red Terror, Green Terror” that Bret Stephens wrote in the Wall Street Journal in September 2007, he remarked that neither the RAF nor Al-Qaeda were the “wretched of the earth”—to use Frantz Fanon’s famous term—but the educated and disgruntled children of the bourgeoisie. From that background, they were attracted to a lifestyle of action, taking control of their destinies, and enjoying, in the case of the RAF, the status of the “urban terrorist” and, in Al-Qaeda’s case, the status accorded to the “martyr.” “You must understand,” Astrid Proll, a member of the RAF’s first generation, once said, “that then, the most fantastic thing in the world was not to be a rock star, but to be a revolutionary.” In the same way in which Che Guevara was depicted on countless posters, with his beret and the revolutionary red star, today we see “martyrs” who have carried out suicide attacks lionized, celebrated, and emblazoned on posters, flags, key chains, and the like. It would be a mistake to dismiss Proll as an apolitical narcissist or a weird drop-out from society. Like her colleagues, she was animated by a profound sense of social injustice coupled with intense enmity towards what she and the rest of the RAF perceived as worldwide American militarism and domination. “To my mind, it was not simply an international question,” Hans Joachim
Klein recalled in a 1978 interview, “but also an internal problem. The B-52s stopped over Wiesbaden on their way from Vietnam.”

This leads to the seventh point in my comparison: the strident anti-Americanism that has been a sign of both the RAF’s and Al-Qaeda’s ideology. “Anti-imperialism,” Christof Wackernagel once said, “meant first of all the protest against the Vietnam War, but also against the American predominance over most countries of the Third World.” Or as Ulrike Meinhof told a German court in 1976: “The strategic concept as developed by the RAF was directed against the U.S. American military presence in the Federal Republic. The concept was developed by us all through a collective discussion process.”

Anti-imperialism, Christof Wackernagel once said, meant first of all the protest against the Vietnam War, but also against the American predominance over most countries of the Third World.” Or as Ulrike Meinhof told a German court in 1976: “The strategic concept as developed by the RAF was directed against the U.S. American military presence in the Federal Republic. The concept was developed by us all through a collective discussion process.”

Al-Qaeda’s views on American militarism and anti-Americanism are well-known.

Eighth, the RAF was among the first terrorist organizations to forge alliances between terrorist groups in different countries and to put together mixed commandos of operatives from different countries. After the end of the Vietnam War, the RAF and other German terrorist groups, such as the “Second of June Movement,” needed a new cause. Their choice reflected the international orientation of West German radical politics. Common cause was now to be made with the Palestinians. In his book How it all Began—or as it was titled in the United States, Terror or Love—Michael “Bommi” Baumann of the “Second of June Movement” described the logic behind this decision. “Since Vietnam is finished,” he said, “people should get involved in Palestine. It is actually much closer to us, which is apparent today with the oil business and has more to do with us here in the European cities than does Vietnam. Thus Palestine is to become the new framework to carry on the struggle here.” As a result, members of the RAF and of the “Second of June Movement” went to Palestinian camps in Jordan and elsewhere where they received training. As Stefan Aust pointed out, relations were not all that good. Nevertheless, the paramilitary training that Andreas Baader and his group received in Jordan was crucial for the establishment and future operations of the RAF. It also marked a milestone in the history of terrorism since it was probably the first time that one terrorist group had trained another. Thereafter, the relationship between the German and Palestinian terrorist groups flourished. Combined teams of German and Palestinian terrorists were involved in the 1975 seizure of the OPEC ministers’ conference in Vienna, the 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe, Uganda, and the hijacking of a Lufthansa flight to Somalia in 1977. German terrorists also reportedly provided critical logistical assistance to the Palestinian Black September terrorists responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympics attack. Although the closest ties were formed between the Germans and the PLFP, Arafat’s comparatively more moderate Al-Fatah organization also played a particularly important role in supplying the RAF with
weapons. According to the leading German-Israeli counterterrorism ana-
lyst, David Schiller, the RAF could not have survived without the assis-
tance provided by the Palestinian terrorists. The profound influence ex-
ercised by the Palestinians over the Germans was never clearer than in
1985, when the RAF joined forces with the French left-wing organization,
Direct Action, in the hopes of creating a PLO-like umbrella, an anti-
imperialist front of Western European guerillas that would include Italy’s
Red Brigades and the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells group. Like-
wise, Al-Qaeda’s name means “the base”—the foundation from which
the worldwide Islamist revolution can be waged in alliance with a num-
ber of like-minded organizations.

Ninth, the RAF provided us with the world’s first modern suicide
terrorists. The RAF certainly differed from the variant of suicide terrorism
that we see today: they used suicide terrorism not as a physical weapon,
but as a potent psychological one—after all, terrorism is a form of psy-
chological warfare. Witness the spectral image of Holger Meins starving
himself to death in prison and the dramatic impact of the deaths of
Baader, Ensslin and Jan-Carl Raspe in Stammheim prison.

Tenth, the RAF remains prominent because of the pioneering role of
women. To this day, it is hard to escape the image of Petra Schelm, a
former hair dresser, when she was stopped by a police roadblock with her
boyfriend. Told to “get out of the car, put down your weapons, put up
your hands, the boyfriend obediently followed the instructions of the
police, while Petra jumped out of the car guns blazing and was shot.10
This is what supposedly led to Germany’s GSG-9, one of the first elite
counterterrorist forces, being told to “shoot the women first” whenever
they encountered RAF terrorists. This is the title of a book Eileen Mc-
Donald wrote nearly twenty years ago about women in terrorism.11 Like-
wise, female suicide terrorists—perhaps not in Al-Qaeda’s case, but cer-
tainly with Al-Qaeda in Iraq—have generated enormous interest in the
field of terrorism studies today.

Eleventh, the RAF and Al-Qaeda are both known for the detailed
reconnaissance and planning of terrorist operations. In the annals of ter-
rorism, perhaps with the exception of 9/11, no terrorist operation was as
meticulously planned—and effective in its use of deception—as the 1989
assassination of the German banker Alfred Herrhausen. This is a lesson
we see countless times in Al-Qaeda: The five years that Al-Qaeda spent
planning the attack on the U.S. embassy in Nairobi in 1998, the three
years spent planning the 9/11 attacks, the two years that went into the
attack on the USS Cole, and so on.

Twelfth, the Red Army Faction is a classic example of the genera-
tional effects of terrorist organizations. Despite the successes of the West
German counterterrorist machinery, despite dwindling public support
and increasing isolation, especially in the 1990s, the RAF was consistently able to marshal its resources and carry on with its struggle. How could they have done this? The key mechanism of the most effective terrorist groups is that they are learning organizations. Through a constant learning effort to better understand the methods deployed against them by the government, these organizations develop improved countermeasures. The RAF went through three generations in slightly less than thirty years. In August 2008, Al-Qaeda celebrated its twentieth anniversary. Like the RAF, Al-Qaeda is a learning organization that, despite diminishing public support in the Muslim world, has been able to learn lessons from the mistakes of previous generations. The RAF was especially effective in this regard. A senior German counterterrorism official who was interviewed in 1991 marveled at how members of the RAF’s third generation “routinely study every court case against them to discover weak spots.” Having learned about the techniques used against them by authorities through testimony presented against them by law enforcement personnel in open court, the Red Army Faction was consistently able to undertake the requisite countermeasures to avoid detection. For example, learning that the German police could usually obtain fingerprints from the underside of toilet seats or the inside of refrigerators, surviving RAF members of the third generation began to apply a special ointment to their fingers that prevented fingerprints after drying, thus thwarting identification and incrimination.12

Finally, when the Red Army Faction eventually collapsed it was not only because the citadel at which they worshipped, the Soviet Union, had crumbled, but also because they lost the sanctuary that they had enjoyed in East Germany. Similarly, Al-Qaeda’s fortunes have revived at present precisely because it has been able to regain its sanctuary—no longer controlling an entire country, like Afghanistan, but a sanctuary nonetheless in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and adjacent states.

In conclusion, let me make a final observation about the importance of the RAF experience. Looking at the countermeasures that were used by the West German state, one can see precursors of many of the standard approaches to countering terrorism today, at least in the United States. Stefan Aust has written about the so-called “B/M,” which in American parlance we would call a “fusion center,” that was created by the German authorities to bring together federal and state police forces to coordinate and cooperate in gathering information about the RAF. Creating “fusion centers” is still one of the key weapons used in the war on terrorism, along with data mining to collect and process information to identify patterns of terrorist activity, another technique used by the German state in the fight against the RAF.
Notes


7 Quoted in Jean Marcel Bougereau, “Memoirs of an International Terrorist: Conversations with Hans Joachim Klein,” in The German Guerrilla: Terror, Reaction, and Resistance (Sanday, Orkney, no date), 12. See also the similar statements on pp. 9,14,15.


11 MacDonald, Shoot the Women First, xiv.

Human breeding utopias seem to have become socially acceptable again. The intellectual steps, from promoting to creating “elites” and from promoting to creating “healthy” babies, have already been taken. During the past fifteen years, the new challenges posed by prenatal diagnoses, the human genome project, and the debates around cloning have resulted in a veritable flood of publications on eugenics after a period of waning academic interest in this branch of the history of ideas. Investigations of the intersections between formulations of moral and legal norms and scientific standardization are now enjoying renewed attention among historians of science. By contrast, the response of general historians has been marked by caution and restraint (except for a few publications on institutional and gender history). If the subject of eugenics has been addressed at all, it has been mainly in the context of forced sterilization and euthanasia during the era of National Socialism.

In the Anglo-Saxon world, by contrast, the historical horizon was extended early on by dating the beginning of modern eugenics to around 1880, when society underwent a “scientific turn,” that is, a turn toward the description of the social and the historical using methods derived from the natural sciences. The instances in which this extension was pushed back to even earlier historical periods were rare and exerted little influence. This restraint also results from a very narrow definition of eugenics, which postulates certain scientific or surgical techniques for palpable intervention into individual bodies, thus restricting the sense of the term to so-called “negative” eugenics, describing measures such as sterilization or euthanasia, while “positive” eugenics generally is understood as the effort to increase the production and survival of healthy offspring by indirect means, such as marriage restrictions. This normative distinction, though, seems to be of little analytical help.

Understanding eugenics primarily as a theoretical framework or set of social goals—and only secondarily as concrete efforts to widen the state’s sphere of influence into actual reproduction—broadens the per-
spective and helps to anchor twentieth-century eugenic policies in their historical background. At the same time, the Enlightenment is still widely considered as the foundation of secular ethics and the “sanctification” of human life (the abolition of torture and the death penalty, as well as the “invention” of human and civil rights) without taking into account the ambiguity of the widespread intellectual ideal of perfecting societies and their people.6

Outside the disciplinary realm of the history of science, the hermeneutical power and social authority of the avant-garde natural sciences post-1750 are largely underestimated. This is particularly true for the perception of the role of politically, socially, and philosophically engaged physicians.7 Since the middle of the seventeenth century, newly emerging scientific journals published lively discussions among physiologists, natural philosophers, and “anthropologists” who argued over competing theories of procreation (monogenists vs. polygenists) and heredity, especially the hereditary transmission of disabilities and diseases,8 and the origins of so-called “freaks of nature” and “degenerate” peoples and races.9 Competing explanations were now based “empirically,” i.e., on case studies collected all over Europe, and no longer on tracts by classical authorities. Such scientific exchange laid the basis for establishing norms of normalization and pathologization and provided ammunition for heated debates about the hereditary transmission of physical as well as moral dispositions.

Since the mid-seventeenth century, many utopists proposed science as the prime mover of societal progress.10 Such beliefs were particularly strong in Central Europe, especially in the German lands, because it took them more than one hundred years to recover from the extreme population losses of the Thirty Years’ War. France, Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia had also suffered continuously due to a constant state of war since the sixteenth century. Comparatively early discussions in France about the qualitative improvement of the “nation” (health, beauty, intelligence) supplemented widespread European discussions about its quantitative (procreation) improvement.11 Such conversations began decades before the French Revolution and led to the development of measures to rationally control biological reproduction.12

In German-speaking states, similar concepts of meliorism (i.e., human improvement as a metaphysical goal given by nature that had to be deliberately fostered) appeared not only in the work of Johann Peter Frank (1779), the “founder” of social medicine who was active and well known throughout Europe, but also in many of his fellow reformers’ works about “medical police.”13 Long before the “invention” of eugenics as a modern science (c. 1880), concepts of “human breeding” and of the “perfection of the human race” started circulating throughout Western
Europe. Yet these concepts have attracted little attention so far, just as little attention has been paid to the sustained influence of Lavater’s physiognomics (in its elaborated form of phrenology and craniology) on European and North American proto-eugenic thinking. Whereas in several German-speaking states, a few U.S. states, and France and its colonies medical theories about the definition of the human and its hierarchical classification (to mark “freaks of nature” and “inferior races”) resulted in legislative measures, British discussions about marital hygiene and population politics were not reflected in laws or administrative precepts prior to the turn of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the success story of eugenics in the sciences and in the larger public began in England and the United States around 1880. Unlike the scientific legitimization of racial discrimination, which has been a subject of intense study in the United States since the 1960s, and the latest research in “disability studies,” the path that led to early and extreme forms of eugenic legislation and practices still remains in the academic dark. The fact that a statistical avantgardist like William Farr thanked God for epidemics because they regularly eliminated the “degenerate,” and demanded lifelong incarceration of all “insane” people and “criminals” in order to prevent them from procreating, has so far been widely ignored.

The underlying notions of physical and mental perfection—or their reverse: “degeneration” due to hereditary pathologies—in pre-twentieth-century learned discourses are often dismissed today as pre- or unscientific fashions. Yet such dismissals emanate from an anachronistic concept of science, and overlook the fact that these theories were vigorously promoted during the age of degeneration hysteria in order to advance the “breeding” of social elites and healthy citizens.

Since the mid-1840s the brothers Lorenzo and Orson Fowler used their influential American Phrenological Journal as well their marriage guidebooks to spread the mantra of racial improvement: “Progression is a law of man’s very being [. . .].” Consequently, their only goal was: “Perfecting our Race!” Vague as to whom this would apply the Fowlers never addressed the question of race in relation to phrenology. Their personal convictions can nevertheless be deduced from the fact that they published excerpts from articles and reviews of books dealing with the supposed superiority of the “Caucasian race.”

Although phrenology was generally rejected by mainstream British academia early on, a particular variety of phrenology enjoyed public success among the white middle class, especially in the United States between the 1830s and 1860s. Widely read men of letters like Walt Whitman and Edgar Alan Poe were influenced by those ideas. Also around 1860, several of the uniquely American Christian-utopian communities experimented with ideas of selective breeding. Best known and
most influential in its practices was the Oneida Community, but similar ideas also dominated the Mormons. During the 1850s, the infamous “freak shows” and “baby shows” organized by Phineas Taylor Barnum were an early form of popularizing such standards of a white, middle-class (classical Greek) body aesthetics among the working classes. This tradition was revived in the 1920s by several state governments and even implemented in their childcare programs. Another form also marketed by P.T. Barnum was the public display of black slaves as the “man monkey” and “missing link” between apes and (white) humans, a result of the emerging discourse on evolution during the early 1860s.

The aim of my research project is to compare the evolution of early breeding utopias in Germany and the United States against the background of the better researched medical, demographic, and economic discourses in France and Great Britain. The meta-question is not whether “Nazi eugenics were created in the US,” as biologist Garland E. Allen entitled his review of Edwin Black’s book War Against the Weak some years ago. Instead, my study deliberately focuses on the early period, beginning with the publication around 1750 of the first and central French works by Antoine Le Camus (Médecine de l’esprit), Charles-Augustin Vandermonde (Essai sur la manière de perfectionner l’espèce humaine), and Benoit-Auguste Morel (Traité des dégénérescences) and ending around 1870, when Francis Galton triggered an avalanche, not so much by coining the term “eugenics” (which happened only in 1883), but through the surprisingly positive reception of his Hereditary Genius.

The purpose of my GHI-NEH-Visiting Fellowship at the GHI was to systematically search for relevant primary source material from American publications of the aforementioned period dealing with the medicalization of demography and human reproduction. Preliminary research had shown that numerous articles in medical, surgical, and scientific journals addressed the subject of improving the “quality” of “human stock,” triggered at the latest by Robert Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), the first chapter of which praised the “perfectibility of man and of society.” Whereas Malthus had prioritized “checking” population growth due to looming food shortages in the near future, medical men discussed physical and mental degeneration as a result of hereditary weakness of large portions of their populations, leading to the “general enfeeblement” of the respective nation.

But Malthus was not the first to tackle such issues from a scientific rather than philosophical point of view; indeed, his book was a reaction to prior theses of other English and French philosophers and mathematicians such as William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet. As mentioned before, especially in France, there was a lively debate about disas-
tuous population growth and the future development of society decades before the French Revolution.34 Despite significant demographic interest by political economists, physicians were the most ambitious profession with regard to developing practical means of tackling social problems related to demographic issues. This interest among physicians was connected to the emergence of the “medical police” in France and Germany. Physical and hygienic problems resulting from wars, mass migration, and industrialization developed from squalor, chronic diseases, and epidemics. The situation grew more and more acute in many countries throughout Europe from the 1780s on and throughout the nineteenth century, eventually reaching the United States. Feelings ran high among Europe’s intellectuals, especially physicians, about whether there was a quantitative or qualitative lack in the population.

Nevertheless, the involvement of the physicians should not be misconstrued as mere philanthropy. Instead, it must also be understood as a strategic means to improve the medical profession’s uncertain status in society.35 When physicians in different countries addressed the question of enhancing the physical quality of soldiers (mainly in size and strength), this patriotic subject exemplifies their effort to prove their services as an essential profession to their governments. The idea of enhancing military or economic power by deliberately breeding a “race” of soldiers or, similarly, of farmers, already discussed by enlightened European physicians in the eighteenth century, came to American physicians’ minds only during and after the Civil War.36

Apart from personal or professional motivations, several broader questions might be raised: Were the American medical doctors who served on advisory public health commissions prior to the Civil War already participating in the relevant European scientific discourses? Or is Charles E. Rosenberg correct that, prior to the 1860s, American medical discourse was limited to moral and educational prevention, i.e. the notion that better hygiene and nourishment would reverse physical and mental degeneration within one generation?37 One subsequent question, then, is: How did scientists approach the prevention and “cure” of physical and moral “degeneration,” and at what point did they turn to proto-eugenic measures in order to (re-)establish public health and national strength? What was their position in the contemporaneous debate about birth control that evolved around 1830 in both Britain and the United States?

In order not to overrate the role of the medical profession in the discourse, it is also necessary to incorporate related discursive platforms, such as agricultural periodicals and animal breeders’ publications, which regularly reported on “selective breeding” in domesticated animals, as well as religious journals. For the same reason—that is, to assess the physician’s range of influence in the non-medical and non-professional
public sphere—the study also examines the impact of the academic discussions. To what extent did popular magazines engage in similar discussions about the self-perceived task of “improving the American race”? Last but not least, to what degree did pamphlets and popular books like marriage manuals and domestic advisors echo, or even trigger, such debates? What was the ideological and scientific background of their authors?

This study was able to draw upon a wide range of potential source material. This included a vast number of periodicals, of both major and minor prominence and from all fields, collected in the databases “American Periodicals Series Online” (APS) and “Early American Newspapers,” both accessible by full-text search in the Library of Congress, beginning in 1740 and 1690 respectively. In addition, the National Library of Medicine (NLM) in Bethesda has made available a vast collection of medical journals, tracts, books, and pamphlets. Although most of the material has yet to be analyzed in detail, preliminary findings indicate several general trends regarding the topics addressed by scientists involved in the issue of “improving” the human and/or “American race.” The major topics dealing with proto-eugenic questions are briefly introduced below.

General Observations

Before the 1830s, intellectuals in the United States, including writers, theologians, physicians, lawyers, and politicians, seem not to have taken much notice of the French and German discourses about active breeding control. After the 1830s, articles in American medical journals dealing with “laws of inheritance” in general, or with case studies of inherited diseases like blindness, deafness, “supernumerary fingers and toes,” or “madness” and “idiocy,” were rare, and mostly translated from British and French journals. I found this rather surprising because influential American physicians like Charles Caldwell, Samuel Gridley Howe or John C. Warren did publish reviews of British and French works such as James Cowles Prichard’s Researches into the Physical History of Mankind (1813), William Lawrence’s Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man (1819), George Combe’s Constitution of Men (1828), and Alexander Walker’s Laws Regulating the Resemblance of Progeny to Parents (1833). All of the reviewed authors advocated a concept of human nature that distinguished hierarchically not only between ethnicities but also between more or less useful classes of “human stock.” Reviews of many other related German, French, and British anthropological and medical books were published in important periodicals like The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, The Ohio Medical and Surgical Journal, and The North American Medical and Surgical Journal, but also in Timothy Flint’s Western
Most of these reviews and commentaries were published anonymously, presumably because they often contained blunt statements about highly sensitive moral and political issues. Statements in anthropological texts such as, “If men, in the affair of marriage, were as much under management as some animals are in the exercise of their generative functions, an absolute ruler might accomplish, in his dominions, almost any idea of the human form,” surely had their effect on the American audience. In addition, the popularity of the theory of the hereditary transmission of acquired characters and its later endemic use as a major argument for eugenic measures derived from the early dissemination of opinions such as the following: “The hereditary transmission of physical and moral qualities, so well understood and familiarly acted on in the domestic animals, is equally true of man. A superior breed of human beings could only be produced by selections and exclusions similar to those so successfully employed in rearing our more valuable animals.” Readers commented on reviews dealing with such topics, and even local journals like the Raleigh Register or the North-Carolina Gazette published their first articles about “frequent intermarriages [. . . ] among the members of a particular class, as nobility or royalty,” reflecting about ensuing “deterioration of mental and physical energies” around 1830, and complaining about such degenerative tendencies in the marriage policy of southern plantation holders. Thus they transferred a common discourse about the British or other European nobility dating back to the War of Independence to their own communities.

It was not only the leading American physicians who became fervent partisans of phrenology and demographic surveillance empirically supported by the new science of statistics. Many of their lesser-known colleagues also began collecting material on diverse issues, publishing their findings in the growing number of medical and surgical journals. Despite the early reflections on demography and the “quality” of the nation’s “stock,” the majority of morally concerned physicians viewed initial efforts to deal with birth control publicly, especially among the lower classes, with criticism, mainly from a religious standpoint.

Unlike the social, medical, and demographic discourses in continental Europe and Britain, up to the 1830s the North American debate remained confined to moral, social, and hygienic improvement. Earlier authors preferred to write under a pseudonym, even when merely summarizing arguments made by others concerning physical degeneration as a result of unhealthy lifestyles and bad habits, such as consuming coffee and meat. Some of these anonymous authors criticized slavery as “a prolific source of indolence and dissipation” only leading to “moral and
physical degeneracy.” Not until the 1850s was public opinion about demographic doom deliberately fueled by blunt pamphlets camouflaged as reviews, e.g. in the New York Times. In such articles, “race and nation” appeared marked by physical “degradation,” became more and more “physically contemptible,” “doomed to decline.”

Physicians observe, from lustrum to lustrum [i.e. every five years], a gradual increase and exacerbation of diseases which spring from unhealthy and disproportionate stress from the brain and nervous system, and correspondent neglect of the health of the other framework of the body—of the muscular or respiratory or digestive systems. Apoplexy, they say, and paralysis, and the fatal darkness of insanity, are yearly more frequent, and most frequent among the most active and laborious classes of our populations. Our blood, even, [ . . . ] is absolutely corrupt.

Marriage and Phrenology

In the 1830s, European developments in phrenology began to attract increasing attention in the United States. In 1830, The American Lancet reprinted a series of lectures by Johann Gaspar Spurzheim, the famous phrenologist, originally published in the London Lancet. As early as 1833, the Ladies’ Magazine and Literary Gazette published an anonymous article about one of Spurzheim’s American lectures, focusing on the “laws of hereditary descent.” The summary of its argument was:

The disposition to various disorders, as to gout, scrofula, dropsy, hydrocephalus, consumption, deafness, epilepsy, apoplexy, idiotism, insanity, etc., is frequently the inheritance of birth. Children born of healthy parents and belonging to a strong stock, always bring into the world a system formed by nature to resist the causes of disease, while children of delicate, sickly parents, are overpowered by the least unfavorable circumstance.

Messages of this kind might have planted the seed for later developments. In 1838, the aforementioned Lorenzo and Orson Fowler, America’s most engaged proponents of Spurzheim’s phrenology, founded the American Phrenological Journal, and soon also a very influential publishing house. In 1839, Horace Greeley, a prominent editor, social reformer, and molder of public opinion, who had already published George Combe’s lectures on phrenology in their entirety in his weekly The New Yorker in 1833, printed a similar series of lectures given by Combe after his tour through the United States in 1838–1839. From the 1840s onwards, one can observe a sharp increase in more explicit contributions from a physi-
ological standpoint on the issue of preventing further “degeneracy” and “improving” the nation. In 1840, George Combe published a treatise called Moral Philosophy and the Duties of Man Considered in His Individual, Social, & Domestic Capacities, in which he focused on the role of heredity and the danger emanating from marrying close relatives or those possibly carrying physical or mental diseases. He called for a law that would require anybody intending to marry to take a course in anatomy and physiology so that they would be optimally prepared for marital choice.50 This text became gospel for the Fowlers and their few but vociferous epigones.

Still, before the 1850s, the so-called “phrenological Fowlers” seem to have been virtually the only intellectuals who spread the message of careful procreation, not only through public lectures, but also through numerous advertisements in related journals. The real boom in medical self-help literature did not start until after 1850. This included dozens of tracts dealing either with birth control or the opposite, i.e., optimizing procreation.51 The Fowlers surely began it all, starting in the early 1840s with various similarly titled marriage manuals such as Matrimony; Or, Phrenology and Physiology Applied to the Selection of Congenial Companions For Life, Including Directions to the Married for Living Together Affectionately and Happily, which went through sixty-one revised editions between 1841 and 1851 alone, and grew from fifty to about a hundred and fifty pages. Another one was called Love and Parentage, Applied to the Improvement of Offspring, Including Important Directions and Suggestions to Lovers and the Married Concerning the Strongest Ties and the Most Momentous Relations of Life, which was reprinted forty times before 1855.52 All of their marriage manuals used section headings such as “Perfecting our Race!” or “Who should not marry?” Even in the 1870s and 1880s, the Fowlers continued to publish new marriage guides specifically promoting “scientific selection” of spouses.53 In the meantime, most of their books had grown to be thick volumes consisting of up to seven hundred pages featuring charts and phrenological portraits.54 Nevertheless, they were sold at prices between one to three dollars, and thus were affordable for the masses.

In 1843, Orson Fowler tried to ignite a more scientific debate, originally triggered by Combe, by publishing his book on The Laws of Hereditary Descent (second edition, 1848), which he simultaneously published as a lecture series in his Journal. From the very beginning, these texts not only dealt with appropriate lifestyle, diet, and the correct nursing of infants, as other domestic or sexual guidebooks did; in addition, they focused directly on “the Improvement of the Race; including Causes of its Degeneracy,” as the title frankly stated.55 In 1846/47, the Fowler brothers published another series of eleven extensive articles in their Journal focusing on “Progression—a Law of Nature” and “Its Application to Hu-
man Improvement, Individual and Collective.” Part Six was dedicated to the “Increase of Population” and aimed to trigger an international debate, “. . . throughout all ages and nations, for perfecting mankind physically, intellectually, and morally.”

Orson Fowler, as a former theologian, referred repeatedly in all his writings to religious norms, which he equated with the laws of nature. Over and over again, he dedicated special articles in the early years of the Phrenological Journal to the relation between phrenology and religion. In the tradition of the moral physiology of enlightened medicine, he held every individual responsible for his own health, but due to the newly discovered laws of heredity now also for the fate of future generations. The universal applicability of phrenology, similar to the ancient system of humoralism, made it easy to be consistent with norms of the Old Testament, as well as to meet conditions of modern overpopulated metropolises like New York: “Mankind should know that sickness and death in the prime of life, are only the penalties of violated physical laws, and therefore **morally wrong**.”

Fowler dedicated an extra issue of Volume V (1843) of the Phrenological Journal to discussing the specific influence of each parent’s sex on the offspring, explaining how the embryo inherited the “mental condition” of the mother, describing the responsibility of parents for “marks, deformities, and monstrosities” in their infants, and claiming that older parents produced smarter children.

Such convictions were still not outdated in the United States in the 1860s. Physician and self-declared sexual advisor James Ashton warned against too frequent intercourse as causing “feeble children” due to men’s “thin and watery semen,” and carefully categorized and grouped matching and non-matching couples according to their temperaments. Moreover, New York businessman Asa J. Soule tried to sell his contraceptive pills by insisting, “There are many, also, who *ought* not to become parents” because they “transmit hereditary diseases” or produce only “puny, sickly thing[s].”

The Fowlers complained about the lack of marriage laws that would prohibit the procreation between persons with certain defects:

If this [voluntary restraint from defective procreation] were the case, each generation would be an improvement on preceding ones. At present, however, the majority of society, from all appearances, live only for selfish purposes, regardless of the consequences to posterity; and thus, the improvement of the race is much retarded, man is degraded, and God dishonored.

Careful “matrimonial selection” was every citizen’s moral duty, but even the middle class and the wealthy cared more about family names and the financial background of a candidate than about the health of future gen-
erations. Consequently, the Fowlers proposed the establishment of a “Matrimonial Intelligence Office [ . . . ] to promote introductions and facilitate a right matrimonial choice. Not one based on dollars, but on all matrimonial qualifications.” Selection should of course follow phrenological guidelines:

And the Fowlers owe it to the public and their own position to lead or second some such movement. And they yet will. The progressive spirit of the age will not long allow so pressing a human need to go unsupplied. All required to secure patronage is to propound a judicious plan. And its patrons could afford to pay well to be thus enabled to select a better matrimonial partner than they otherwise could.61

Although the Fowlers and their phrenology business flourished among artists, lawyers, and politicians for more than two decades, it is remarkable how weak the immediate responses were to their constant appeal to “selective human breeding.” In vain, they repeatedly called for the establishment of the above-mentioned federal marriage agencies, which would also provide obligatory physical checks before issuing marriage permits.

The only other early fervent adherent of such convictions was Hester Pendleton, herself an ardent phrenologist and president of the short-lived New York Free Medical School for Women.62 In addition to books about child care and nursing, Pendleton also published three popular marriage guidebooks. It even seems that Orson Fowler copied her ideas. For Pendleton’s first book, which she “dedicated to the intelligent mother” and released anonymously in 1843 and 1844 through Winchester Publishers in New York, already dealt “phrenologically” with the risks of procreation. Facts and Arguments on the Transmission of Intellectual and Moral Qualities from Parents to Offspring consisted of about two hundred pages that must have been closely studied by the Fowlers. Although in 1841 Orson Fowler made only a lukewarm recommendation that some excerpts had been pre-printed in the Mother’s Magazine,63 he clearly recognized Pendleton’s promising synthesis of public education on marriage issues, the propagation of “his” new science, and, last but not least, business. After revising the content slightly, Pendleton reissued the book as The Parents’ Guide for the Transmission of Desired Qualities to Offspring; Or, Human Development through Pre-Natal Influences and Inherited Tendencies (1848). This time it came out under Pendleton’s own name, but much more importantly, it was now printed and marketed in the Fowlers’ publishing house. It sold very well, and went through several editions well into the 1870s. Encouraged by this success, Pendleton published another marriage manual with a third publishing house (Carleton) in
1863. *Husband and Wife, Or, The Science of Human Development through Inherited Tendencies* was neither published anonymously nor under her name, but under the revealing pen name of “the Author of *The Parent’s Guide.*” This book saw only one edition, perhaps due to protest by the Fowlers because the content was exactly the same as that of Pendleton’s other book, on their backlist. Again, the whole issue centered on the “laws of inheritance.” Pendleton stated frankly, practically quoting William Lawrence in her first chapter:

> It cannot be denied that if the same amount of knowledge and care which has been taken to improve the domestic animals, had been bestowed upon the human species, during the last century, there would not have been so great a number of moral patients for the prisons, or for the lunatic asylums, as there are at present. That the human species are as susceptible of improvement as domestic animals, who can deny? Then is it not strange that man, possessing so much information on this subject, and acknowledging the laws, which govern such matters, should lose sight of those laws in perpetuating his own species? Yet, how extremely shortsighted is that individual who, in forming matrimonial connection, overlooks the important consideration of the quality of the physical and mental constitution which his children will be likely to inherit?64

**Hereditary Predispositions**

Insanity, often called idiocy, had always been a central element of all concepts dealing with the brain or hereditary transmission, like those of Lavater, Gall, Spurzheim, Combe, and Spencer. From the mid-nineteenth century on, the topic of idiocy attracted scientists’ attention all over Europe, especially in France and Germany.65 In the United States, the debate was given a stronger foundation in 1848, when Samuel Gridley Howe, soon to become the director of the “Massachusetts School for Idiotic Children,” published a “Report upon Idiocy” for the Senate of Massachusetts. Its hundred pages were not based merely on vivid descriptions of cases and wild speculation, but also for the first time on multiple detailed statistics drawn from systematic research, demonstrated in forty-six pages of tables and questionnaires. Howe, head physician of the Commission, tried also to “shed some light” on the origins of insanity to “deduce general laws,” by comparing his results with earlier French findings. He made his stance on the topic quite clear from the beginning, when he stated, “Nature, outraged in the persons of the parents, exacts her penalty from the parents to the children.”66 In subsequent years, the
report was not only reviewed enthusiastically in almost every American and European medical and anthropological journal, but was also endlessly quoted and used as evidence for the necessity and legitimacy of anti-marriage laws, especially in the United States. The Commission’s findings not only changed traditional treatments of “madmen” fundamentally. They also triggered an international wave of efforts to discover the relationship between “laws of inheritance” and the prevention of madness.

Howe, often celebrated as an abolitionist and reformer of mental asylums, spoke openly only in foreign journals:

It may be assumed as certain, that in all cases where children are born deformed, or blind, or deaf, or idiotic, or so imperfectly and feebly organized that they cannot come to maturity under ordinary circumstances, or have the seeds of early decay, or have original impetuosity of passions that amount to moral insanity—in all such cases the fault lies with the progenitors.

At the same time, Howe was convinced that deteriorated “parental stock” could be improved if all “violation of natural law” was strictly checked “for two or three generations.” Thus, all physical and mental defects would be “totally removed from any family, however predisposed to insanity, or idiocy, [and] all possibility of its recurrence” would be inhibited. This also accounted for one of the most common origins of begetting “feeble” or “idiotic” children, i.e., the misuse of “distilled and fermented liquors.” Physicians were now also discussing the teratogenic effect of caffeine, which led to “debility of constitution in both sexes [ . . . ] enfeebling both parents and children.”

Until well into the 1860s, the deterioration of the American “stock” seems to have been viewed as reversible if dealt with appropriately, quickly, and, above all, strictly. But the tone became increasingly dramatic and apocalyptic. Those who were especially interested in the moral instruction of adults and/or the education of “imbecile and idiotic children” began to emphasize a connection between poverty, criminality, and the production of “imbecile offspring.” Official commissions, like that of Massachusetts, stated: “We regard idiocy as a diseased excrescence of society; as an outward sign of an inward malady.” They therefore demanded that society “seek for the sources of the evil” in order “to lessen such evils in coming generations.” The Commission’s report, and similar complaints published after 1850, are littered with derogatory remarks about those who recklessly spread “physical deterioration and mental and moral darkness” all over the country. This change in language from compassion to contempt and disgust may have facilitated the slow but
palpable turn from assistance to elimination between the 1850s and the 1870s.

Phrenologists and alienists of other scientific backgrounds shared the notion of physiognomic signs that enabled the trained professional to distinguish those with a problematic disposition from those without one. Beginning in the 1860s, more and more physicians in metropolises like London, Paris, Chicago, and New York described an increase in cases of insanity and imbecility, especially among the poor. Well into the 1870s, an astonishing number of anonymous articles complained in dramatic language about that specific variety of “degeneration” and vividly described the ill-favored physiognomy of those incriminated. Sub-discourses dealt with the controversial question of an above-average rate of insanity among Jews, the blind and “deaf-mute,” and other invalids. A parallel discourse concerning the deaf, the “dumb,” and especially the “deaf-mutes,” widely considered incapable of reasoned thinking, was carried on in legal journals, and dealt solely with their legal rights. The majority of those texts focused on questions about their mental capacities: whether they could testify in courts, sign contracts of any kind, bequeath, inherit, or vote. Surprisingly, the question of their right to marry was hardly touched upon. In fact, hundreds of couples of “deaf-mutes,” having graduated from US schools “for the deaf and dumb,” had married as a matter of course during the 1820s to the 1850s, the ceremonies mostly done in sign language. In most cases, both parties had been “deaf-mute,” and obviously nobody had cared about it.

Still, leading figures of American psychiatry like Pliny Earle, Edward Jarvis, or Abner Otis Kellogg, after returning from tours of European institutions, focused on the treatment of idiocy and insanity (often treated as the same thing, with the terms used synonymously). Like the famous French alienist Jean E. D. Esquirol, these Americans viewed insanity as “a disease of civilization.” Yet they perceived insanity in most cases as an acquired defect that could be mitigated or even prevented by proper education and lifestyle. Only a few physicians seem to have been interested in its prevention from a trans-generational perspective. Many of these focused more on idiocy as a brain defect, which they tried to distinguish from insanity as either a mental or a brain defect. Even fewer dared to mention a physiological relationship between poverty and insanity, or that certain immigrants seemed to be more prone to such diseases than others.

Not until the 1850s did more elaborate works appear, such as New York physician John Ellis’s *The Avoidable Causes of Disease, Insanity, and Deformity*. Unlike many other physicians and clergy, who concentrated on neglected child care and a debauched lifestyle, he wrote at length about the danger of inherited mental defects. His book closed with an elaborate
chapter about “Marriage and its Violations,” which he later also published separately. Around the same time, several of his colleagues proposed castration for the first time as a way not only to cure insanity, but also to prevent its further transmission. Finally, in 1884, the same John Ellis wrote *Deterioration of the Puritan Stock and its Causes*, a religious pamphlet complaining about deteriorating birth rates among whites, their sinful habits, and the fatal effects of the women’s movement on female health. He called the descendants of the first white immigrants “natives” and mourned their imminent extinction. His example shows how the same person could develop increasingly extreme positions over two to three decades, participating in an elite medical but religiously fueled discourse, that was already becoming part of a much more aggressive, Galtonian movement.

**Interrmarriage: Hybrid Vigor vs. Breeding-In-and-In, and the Issue of Miscegenation**

Although phrenology played a major role in relation to intelligence during these decades—thousands of Americans from all classes had their heads and those of their offspring measured by the Fowlers and their epigones—the proto-eugenic aspect of phrenology was not taken up by a broader audience. The only parallel discourse to be found in other medical and scientific journals from the 1850s on were complaints about “interrmarriage” among close relatives. The growing debate about the question of the intermarrying of relatives, mainly first cousins, resulted in an attempt to ground the highly sensitive issue on a statistical base. This promised to lead to a more objective evaluation about hereditary mechanisms. The issue of “interrmarriage” definitely dominates the range of topics dealing with the improvement of the nation’s “stock” over the time period investigated. Every author openly demanded a law that would forbid this practice once and for all. Their main argument was the apparently disproportionate number of “deaf”, “dumb” and “blind” children resulting from such matches.

After Alexander Walker’s above-mentioned bestseller *Interrmarriage* (1838) and Julius Steinau’s *Pathological and Philosophical Essay on Hereditary Diseases* (1843), which also focused on intermarriage, the subject exploded around 1850. Reputable physicians like Samuel Merrifield Bemiss, the editor of the *New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal*, and Nathan Allen, member of the State Board of Health in Massachusetts, sedulously preached the dire consequences of this all too widespread practice. They drew directly on agricultural arguments for or against “breeding in” or “out,” also referring to those in favor of “breeding in-and-in.” This meant breeding from a male and female from the same parentage in order to
strengthen wanted qualities, here of wealthy and influential family networks. Physicians interested in heredity obviously followed agricultural journals like the monthly Farmer’s Register, which published “Rules for Breeding” as early as 1840. These directly compared human to animal breeding, quoting authorities like Franz Joseph Gall and Alexander Walker and promoting phrenological criteria for selection.82

By 1854 it was possible to call for a master race under one’s own name in the Vermont Farmer’s Herald: “A superior breed of human beings could only be produced by selections and exclusions similar to those so successfully employed in rearing our more valuable animals.” Unfortunately this urgent necessity was permanently and deliberately “overlooked” by “the rulers,” the author complained.83 Experienced breeders knew that selective breeding always had been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the most successful British sheep and cattle breeders spoke in favor of “breeding-in-and-in,” while on the other hand, experience since ancient times taught that this bore the risk of hereditary defects after three or four generations at the latest. Race was openly debated by physicians as well as by self-proclaimed population experts. For many, the “white” race was superior to all other colors, especially the “negro race” and the “Indians.” Among the whites, the “Anglo-Saxon” stood above all, and for many the “Dutch-Irish” represented the lowest type. The Germans were placed somewhere in between. Such reflections contained the first romantic notions of racial purity, professionally labeled “purebreds,” and the concomitant fear of uncontrolled immigration.

Nevertheless, such notions did not yet make racial purity appeal to all their contemporaries.84 Some physicians drew the opposite conclusion, arguing that only deliberate racial intermarriage, representing the most extreme form of “breeding out,” namely out of the “racial stock,” would improve every nation. In their opinion, “hybrids” generally seemed to be stronger and healthier, as well as morally superior to those bred within the same stock: “When the people of these United States become a mixture of English, Scotch, Irish, Germans, and French, will they exhibit a strength of body and intelligence of mind, a true inborn energy and moral power, which do not equally signalize either of the nations from whom they sprang?” Many gave an affirmative answer to this question, which was raised by a theologian on one of the many public occasions when such topics were debated amongst intellectuals of different professions.85 “Hybrid vigor” in plants and many animals had been widely recognized since antiquity.86

Others became fervent crusaders against marriage between whites and blacks—among them Josiah C. Nott, a physician from Mobile, Alabama, who relied on skull studies made by Samuel George Morton. This camp frantically published dozens of texts about the physical and mental
inferiority of the “mulatto,” based on the theory that human races stemmed from different origins (polygenesis) and thus did not match.87 (The coining of the term “miscegenation” in 1863, meaning interracial marriage, goes back to an anonymous pro-intermarriage pamphlet that promoted the opposite position. Shortly after its first publication in New York City it was debunked as a political hoax defaming abolitionists).88 Not until the mid-1860s did suggestions “to improve the breeds of men” become as blunt as the Fowler brothers and Hester Pendleton had been twenty years earlier:

To know how to generate rightly is as much the duty of a man [. . . ] as to know how to be regenerate. Men and women are as much to blame for begetting sickly, ugly, malformed children—children of ill disposition and perverse in bad temper—as they would be were they to train them badly after birth. And the reason why they are responsible is, because they can avoid all such results if they will. . . . The whole subject of breeding children must come up for discussion as fully and freely as it has already done in regard to animals.89

Writers began mentioning blood more frequently now, though it still was only loosely connected to the transmission of inherited traits. Generally, it was the mother that “should be of better blood” than the father, due to her greater role in the physical development of the offspring during pregnancy and nursing.90 Blood as a powerful symbol had not yet made its way into medical rhetoric, although it had been used in popular texts, e.g., the New York Times.91

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These preliminary observations neglect the decisive political and economical changes and challenges of the turbulent decades between 1840 and 1870. The texts need to be analyzed in more detail and also situated in their broader historical context in order to answer the major question resulting from the observation of competing or even contradictory theories: Why did the faction supporting racial purity, medical marriage control, sterilization, and imprisonment prevail for nearly the next hundred years, while those favoring free marital choice, the melting pot ideal, social and health reforms, and trust in nature’s healing capacities (stillbirths, miscarriages, and sterility) failed? Perfection of human physicality as a divine purpose was beyond doubt for both parties. This normative starting point, too, deserves closer observation.
Notes


6 As an early exception, see Hilts, “Enlightenment.”


8 Ibid.

9 Although the term “race” was already used in its ethnic sense, i.e. distinguishing groups of people by skin color or anatomical differences, it also was still widely used across language borders well up into the mid-nineteenth century as a general term for labeling any group like a nation, or even a regional population. For example, the British founder of medical statistics William Farr used the term for social classes. Due to environmental differences, such as working habits, nourishment, and exposure to pollution, wealth and poverty entailed physical differences. See John M. Eyler, Victorian Social Medicine: The Ideas and Methods of Willam Farr (Baltimore, 1979), 155–156. For Germany, see Sara Eigen, “Policing the ‘Menschen=Racen,’” in The German Invention of Race, ed. Sara Eigen, Mark Larimore (Albany, 2006), 185–201.

10 Since early modern times, philosophers and theologians who developed elaborate and detailed schemes of future societies have been called “Utopists.”


13 Frank’s multi-volume Medizinische Polizei (Medical Police) was translated into Italian and Dutch and was republished over several decades. For an overview, see Caren Möller, Medizinpolizei: Die Theorie des staatlichen Gesundheitswesens im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am Main, 2005).


15 This will be the focus of the other half of a larger comparative research project.


20 See Eyler, Victorian Social Medicine, 156, 158.

21 Pick, Faces, reconstructs how general fears were transformed into a biological argument that proliferated in learned and popular milieus.

22 Quoted from Orson Squire Fowler, Love and Parentage, Applied to the Improvement of Offspring, Including Important Directions and Suggestions to Lovers and the Married Concerning the Strongest Ties and the Most Momentous Relations of Life, 40th ed. (New York, 1855), 108.

Allen, Physical Degeneracy


27 See the documents under “The Lost Museum” of the American Historical Society Project (The Graduate Centre, City University of New York/Centre for History and New Media, George Mason University): http://www.lostmuseum.cuny.edu/archives/babyshow.htm.


31 Medicalization is understood here as the expansion of medical authority into other domains of life by treating all physical and behavioral conditions as medical issues.

32 Pp. 5–12. See also Brian Dolan, ed., Malthus, Medicine, & Morality: Malthusianism after 1798 (Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA, 2000).

33 “If the premises are just, the argument is conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind.” Malthus, Principle, Chap. 1, 23.


35 This decisive strategic factor for medical commitment seems never to have been scrutinized until recently. Sebastian Berger, Ärztliche Denkstile, Standespolitik und gesellschaftliche Utopien in der ‘Medizinischen Polizey’ der Spätäufklärung (master’s thesis, Univ. of Hamburg, 2008).


38 Alexander Walker, Intermarriage; or, The Mode in Which and the Causes Why, Beauty, Health and Intellect, Result From Certain Unions, and Deformity, Disease and Insanity From Others (London, 1838/New York, 1839), was the first genuine American publication of that kind,
with editions in 1840, 1841, and 1853. It also saw several editions in the British market before 1866.

39 Quote from William Lawrence, Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man, Delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons (London, 1819), 454.

40 Lawrence, Lectures, 459.

41 See e.g. RR: Thursday, May 20, 1830, Iss. 1, 400; NCG: Thursday, May 27, 1830, Iss., 677. See also John Neal, “From the Portland Yankee: General View of Society in England,” Salem Gazette 6, no. 21 (1828): 1.

42 Robert Dale Owen, son of the utopian socialist Robert Owen, Moral Physiology (1830) and Charles Knowlton, Fruits of Philosophy (1832) recommended several methods of contraception, among them coitus interruptus, vaginal sponges, the condom, and post-coital vaginal rinses with spermicidal solutions. James W. Reed, From Private Vice to Public Virtue: The Birth Control Movement and American Society since 1830 (New York, 1978), chap. 2.

43 “A Friend to Mankind,” The Philosophical Monitor: Being an Investigation of the Causes which Diminish the Moral and Physical Perfection of Human Society in which many Hereditary Popular Customs Generally Supposed Innocent are shewn to be Productive of Indigence, Disease and Premature Termination of Life (Published in the United States for the Benefits of the Public, 1818), quote 28–29.

44 From one of the most fervent early and extraordinarily long harangues, “The Health Question,” New York Daily Times (November 27, 1855): 2, dealing with Catherine Beechers, “Letters to the People on Health and Happiness.” The NYT is plastered with similar tirades over the next twenty years.


48 In the 1840s and 1850s multiple prominent Americans flooded to New York to have the Fowlers analyze their heads. See Davis, Phrenology; Madeleine B. Stern, Heads and Headlines: The Phrenological Fowlers (Norman, Okla., 1971).


52 In 1859, they bound three similar volumes in one, Matrimony or Love Selection, Courtship, and Married Life; Love and Parentage, and Children and Home as Expounded by Physiology and Phrenology, and called it The Family in Three Volumes. For the 1869 edition, they added a 280-page (!) supplement: Offspring, and their Hereditary Endowment.

53 O.S. Fowler, Amativeness: Embracing the Evils and Remedies of Excessive and Perverted Sexuality, Including Warning and Advice to the Married and Single (New York, 1889).

54 O.S. Fowler, Creative and Sexual Science, or, Manhood, Womanhood, and Their Mutual Interrelations: Love, its Laws, Power, etc., Selection, or Mutual Adaptation, Courtship, Married Life, and Perfect Children, Their Generation, Endowment, Paternity, Maternity, Bearing, Nursing and Rearing, Together With Puberty, Boyhood, Girlhood, etc., Sexual Impairments Restored, Male Vigor and Female Health and Beauty Perpetuated and Augmented, etc., as Taught by Phrenology and Physiology.


57 Fowler, *Matrimony* (1841), 40 [original emphasis].

58 James Ashton, Book of Nature: Containing Information for Young People Who Think of Getting Married. On the Philosophy of Procreation and Sexual Intercourse; Showing How to Prevent Conception and to Avoid Child Bearing; Also Rules for Management During Labor and Child-Birth (New York, 1865), 22, 49–50.

59 J. Soule, *Science of Reproduction and Reproductive Control: The Necessity of Some Abstaining from Having Children—The Duty of all to Limit their Families according to their Circumstances Demonstrated* (New York, 1856), 5 [original emphasis].


62 Not much is known about her besides her writings. She does not appear in any of the American biographical encyclopedias. About her presidency, see *Women Journal, Boston, Chicago and St. Louis*, May 3, 1873, 138. The School existed only between 1871 and 1877.

63 Miscellany, *American Phrenological Journal* 3 (1841): 574.—At least four parts were published in *The Mother’s Magazine* 9 (1841).


66 Samuel Gridley Howe, *Report Made to the Legislature of Massachusetts, Upon Idiocy, Senate Document, No. 31* (Boston, 1848), 8.


68 See George Robinson, *On the Prevention and Treatment of Mental Disorders* (London, 1859); and multiple articles by the “founder” of American forensic psychiatry, Isaac Ray, in the 1860s in various journals, especially the *Journal of Insanity*.


71 A typical example of this theory is R.D. Mussey, “Effects of Alcoholic Liquors in Health and Disease,” *Transactions of the American Medical Association* 8 (1855): 571, 586, here 582–583, referring to Howe and also quoting an early Swedish study.


74 Harvey P. Peet, jurist and president of the “New York Institution for the Deaf and Dumb” did in fact devote several pages to the marriage question, but only from the standpoint of title of inheritance, underlining that, except from medieval Papal decrees and singular court decisions, no older legal tradition ever generally forbade the “deaf or dumb” to marry, but that often they had to pass an examination. Only recently, countries like France, Prussia, and Switzerland had passed such laws, even applying to literate “deaf-mutes” whose mental capacities were beyond doubt. See 99, 112, and 126–127, “On the Legal Rights and Responsibilities of the Deaf and Dumb,” *American Journal of Insanity* 13 (1856): 79–171.

75 An exception was the short, anonymous account “Marriage of the Deaf and Dumb,” *American Journal of the Medical Sciences* 5 (1843): 231, reporting about a Swiss court decision prohibiting the marriage of a young woman due to possible hereditary defects, hinting at the suitability of such a law.


77 Nevertheless, ever since the writings of Michel Foucault, the assumption of humanitarian reforms in the nineteenth century have been debunked as popular myths. See Philip M. Ferguson, *Abandoned to Their Fate: Social Policy and Practice Toward Severely Retarded People in America*, 1820–1920 (Philadelphia, 1994).


79 A volume of four hundred pages: (New York, 1860, 2d edition, 1870), subtitle: *A Book for the People as Well as for the Profession*. In 1858, he had already published a similar article of thirty-two pages that he previously had published under the signature of E. in the *Detroit Tribune*.

80 There are several articles in the 1860s in the *Chicago Medical Examiner*, the *Medical Times and Gazette*, and especially in the *Medical and Surgical Reporter*, dealing with male and female cases. See also Frederick M. Hodges, “The Antimasturbation Crusade in Antebellum American Medicine,” *The Journal of Sexual Medicine* 2 (2005): 722–731.

81 At the same time, Ellis was an ardent follower of the Swedish scientist and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg and his “New Church,” flourishing in the USA at that time, as he repeatedly states in his writings. This seems somewhat absurd given the fact that Swedenborg himself had found Africans more enlightened than Europeans and many American Church members were active in the abolitionist movement.


84 See e.g. Jackson, *Beget Beautiful Children*, 2.


87 See Bruce R. Dain, *A Hideous Monster of the Mind: American Race Theory in the Early Republic* (Cambridge, Mass, 2002). A collection of primary texts from different countries has been


89 Jackson, Beget Beautiful Children, 2 [original emphasis].

90 “She shapes the embryo, the fetus, the babe, the child”: James Caleb Jackson, How to Beget and Rear Beautiful Children (Dansville, N.Y., 1868), 2 and 3 [original emphasis]. Jackson was the inventor (1863) of the granola breakfast cereal. Like the much younger John Harvey Kellogg, he was one of those many religiously inspired health reformers that sooner or later crossed the line between individual and collective physical improvement, and actively engaged in the “betterment of the race.”

91 See the quote in note 45.
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE AND GERMANY, 1945–1989

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Remembering his tour of duty in West Germany as a young officer in the US Army, the later general and Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked in his memoirs that for black soldiers, “but especially those out of the South, Germany was a breath of freedom. [They could] go where they wanted, eat where they wanted, and date whom they wanted, just like other people.”¹ Similar to Powell, African American writer William Gardner Smith described the feelings of the protagonist in his novel The Last of the Conquerors, set in Germany at the end of the 1940s: “I like this goddamn country, you know that? . . . It is the first place I was ever treated like a goddamn man.”²

The permanent stationing of the US Army in Europe after the Second World War brought about 3 million African American GIs to the Federal Republic during the Cold War. Shortly after the fall of National Socialism, Germans were directly confronted with the presence of African Americans in the country, be it as soldiers, customers, tenants, husbands, or sons-in-law. In recent years, historians like Maria Höhn, Petra Goedde, and Heide Fehrenbach have begun to analyze and interpret the relationship between these two groups and the impact it had on the Cold War, transatlantic relations, and racial discourses and discrimination in Germany.³ This project will extend these groundbreaking studies by exploring the mutual relationship between the African American civil rights movement and German attitudes toward race and ethnicity, focusing in particular on how Germany was perceived by African Americans during the Cold War. Many African American intellectuals and artists, such as Ira Aldridge, W.E.B. DuBois, Duke Ellington, and Paul Robeson, visited Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their impressions of the country, combined with those of African American soldiers stationed in postwar occupied Germany, reflect not only their personal contacts with individuals and political networks (including international religious organizations and trade unions) but also more theoretical analyses of German history, including the Nazi era, which civil-rights activists invoked as a point of comparison when denouncing racial injustice in the US. The significance these interactions had in the further development of the civil rights struggle in the US will be one of the prime subjects of analysis.
In addition to exploring how African American perceptions of Germany influenced the development of the American civil rights movement, this project will look at how the reception and recontextualization of that movement’s ideology, iconography, and cultural practices transformed German political culture and traditional concepts of democracy, civil society, and the public sphere. By analyzing the ways in which Germans constructed and negotiated ethnic identities and ideas of blackness from 1945 to 1989, I hope to illuminate both the African American struggle for civil rights and the history of the black power movement in East and West Germany.

Retracing the historical encounter between African Americans and Germans during the Cold War is a critical step in reevaluating the socio-cultural and political relationship between these two groups. Governments on both sides frequently monitored and, in some cases, intervened in these interactions, which is another important aspect of the African American-German relationship that will be addressed in this study. The primary goals of the project are thus to understand how concepts of race, integration, and political empowerment were mutually appropriated by Germans and African Americans in the postwar period, and to outline the social and political evolution of those concepts after the pivotal years of the 1960s.

To accomplish these goals, I will follow the trend of recent works to situate issues of racial identity and the African American experience in the twentieth century in a larger international context. The growth of Black Diaspora Studies, the emergence of transnational history, and the research focus of such scholarly networks as CARR (Collegium for African American Research), ASWAD (Association of the Study of the Worldwide African Diaspora) and BEST (Black European Studies) have done much to reverse the often limited, national perspectives of historiography. In the past decade, these groups have been trying to expand African American Diaspora Studies beyond the narrowly bounded geography of the US and the Caribbean, and the existing focus on US slavery and its aftermath. It is a convergence of all these trends that has induced several scholars in the US and Germany to turn their attention to the African American experience in Germany and its impact on developments in the US.

To achieve these goals, this project has entered into an international research cooperation between Vassar College, the Heidelberg Center for American Studies, and the German Historical Institute. Together with Professor Maria Höhn (Vassar), we will create a digital archive on the role of African American GIs in carrying the civil rights movement to Germany and back to the US. Sources from the African American press, government documents, and military records, as well as flyers, pamphlets, and selected articles from the alternative media are currently be-
ing made available online for future scholars and students. This way, it will not only be possible to widely disseminate the project results among German and American academics, but also to establish this neglected chapter of African American diaspora and transatlantic relations as a vital subject of further inquiry, scholarship, and teaching.

“A Breath of Freedom”: Images of Germany in the Civil Rights Movement

The Second World War was probably the most important factor for a transformation in US race relations in the twentieth century. The experience of African American soldiers in their fight against fascism brought a new boost and particular dynamic to the African American civil rights movement. The American dilemma, defined by Gunnar Myrdal in 1944 as the contradiction between democratic ideology and racist reality, emerged not only as a domestic problem now but also as a weakness in the global competition for hearts and minds in the postwar period vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Already before the war, the black press had juxtaposed National Socialist discrimination of religious and ethnic minorities with the fight against racism at home. Among African Americans, the US entry into the war in December 1941 did not provoke any particular enthusiasm. Rather, it reminded them of the failed hopes and broken promises of equal rights after the previous war. As the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People) declared, “Memories of all Negroes except those of the very young are bitter-green regarding the last World War. We were taken up to a mountain-top and promised that if we gave without stint of our lives and resources we would enjoy after the war democracy in full measure. Instead, some of our soldiers were lynched for wearing the uniform they had worn in France fighting to preserve democracy.”

African American activists and leaders therefore tried to prevent a similar outcome in this conflict by calling for the simultaneous fight against injustice at home and abroad, hoping for a double victory on both fronts (“Double V-campaign”). The influential black press helped spread this message early on. In a remarkable editorial entitled “Now is the Time,” The Crisis, the official publication of the NAACP, wrote in January 1942:

If this is truly a death struggle between the brutalities and indecencies of dictatorships, and the dignity and decency of democracies, we cannot wink; we dare not keep silent. It must be that we declare the life blood of our fighters and the sweat of our workers to be a sacrifice for a new world which not only shall not contain a Hitler, but no Hitlerism. And to thirteen millions of
American Negroes that means a fight for a world in which lynching, brutality, terror, humiliation and degradation through segregation and discrimination, shall have no place—either here or there. So we must speak, even as we fight and die. We must say that the fight against Hitlerism begins in Washington, D.C., the capital of our nation, where black Americans have a status only slightly above that of Jews of Berlin. We must say that if forced labor is wrong in Czechoslovakia, peonage farms are wrong in Georgia. If the ghettos in Poland are evil, so are the ghettos in America.8

Cartoon from *The Crisis*, February 1935
(Source: NAACP)
While stressing the “bargaining power of battlefield bravery in the struggle for advancement,” the paper proclaimed that the practical necessities of the war effort would accelerate racial integration and equal employment opportunities in the armed services and industry. In addition, the experience of African Americans in the military was guaranteed to strengthen their self-confidence: “The important lesson that given training and opportunity [they] can do anything white people can do, and sometimes better, will not be lost upon the colored brethren. It will bring about a profound change in their psychology which will make them more unwilling than ever to accept a status of second class citizenship.”

The reality of legally sanctioned inequality and discrimination was, however, hard to change. Already in January 1941, the trade union leader A. Philip Randolph had threatened a mass march on Washington, DC to protest segregation in the defense industry, which led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to pass an executive order that prohibited discrimination in the defense industry “because of race, creed, color, or national origin.”

Even though the war did not bring any further legal improvements for the situation of African Americans, it strengthened their determination to change their practical disenfranchisement in US society. As a result, the membership of the NAACP, for example, rose from 50,000 to 400,000 between 1940 and 1946. This increasing politicization in the African American community went along with a concerted push for the desegregation of the military. As The Crisis wrote in June 1945, “In the closing weeks of the war in Germany, he [the Negro soldier] was finally given a chance to fight side by side with his white fellow Americans in the same units. . . . It is to be hoped that the performance of our soldiers in Europe will move the War department to abolish the color line in the Army. There is no sense in a nation preaching democracy and spending billions of dollars and a million casualties (to date) to achieve it, and then separating its fighting men on the basis of color.”

Moved by the growing pressure “to put our own house in order” before trying to spread democracy in Europe and elsewhere, President Harry S. Truman finally initiated the desegregation of the military in 1948. Other bills, however, aimed at banning desegregation in all public institutions, failed due to the veto power of the South in Congress. Nonetheless, the Second World War and the beginning Cold War had successfully internationalized the question of civil rights. African American activists had employed a more global outlook to race since the First World War, when black GIs encountered colonial troops in France, and kept a close watch on developments in Africa and India. Walter White, the head of the NAACP, consequently announced at the annual meeting in January 1946 that the organization would continue to stress the international dimension of the race question now, since the situation in the US was
“part and parcel of the problems of other colored peoples in the West Indies, South America, Africa, the Pacific and Asia.”¹⁴ But the domestic pressures of the Cold War soon led the NAACP to pursue a much tamer political agenda and drop international human rights in favor of gradual progress with civil rights at home.¹⁵ Despite this political strategy, the German-American encounter continued to expand the geographical boundaries of the civil rights movement and let African Americans on a large scale experience a different legal and social status on foreign soil.

Although the US Army that occupied Germany after the war remained strictly segregated, there was no open legal discrimination comparable to Jim Crow in place in the country. The experience of black GIs in the immediate postwar period was one of liberation from the legal and social constraints that confined them in American society. Black GIs, which made up about 10 percent of the troops (about 30,000 after the troop build-up in the 1950s), were in fact received very warmly by Germans together with their fellow (white) soldiers. Friendly relations, especially with the female population, also ensued relatively quickly. According to unofficial estimates, sexual relationships between Germans and Americans during the occupation resulted in about 94,000 children. In the immediate postwar period, about 3 percent of these children were the product of African American and German parents.¹⁶

The Federal Republic was by no means free from racism and prejudices, but the generally cordial public attitude of Germans and the frequency of these interracial sexual relations stood in stark contrast to the freedoms African Americans enjoyed in the US.¹⁷ As a result, many African Americans raised the question of why it was possible to seemingly transcend the color line in a post-fascist country but not in their home country, where traditional forms of institutionalized racism continued to blossom. Returning veterans, as well as detailed coverage in the black press or novels such as William Gardner Smith’s *The Last of the Conquerors* transported this sentiment back to the US. As a letter to the editor to *Ebony* from 1947 explained,

Your pictures and articles on . . . “GIs in Germany” were great, because . . . they gave undeniable proof that the Negro is a human being, a creature who loves and is loved. . . . As a free people we Negroes want the right to live wherever we choose and can pay the rent; to associate with, court or marry whomever we choose. . . . If a Negro boy and a white girl find things in common and desire to associate with each other, we as believers in democratic freedom should support their democratic right to do so.¹⁸
The experience of African American GIs in Germany thus began to provide additional leverage in the domestic struggle against Jim Crow or, as some labeled it, “Hitlerism at home.”

The comparison between the race laws of Nazi Germany and segregation in the US did not only exist in the discourse of African American activists and soldiers, but was also part of the legal battle for civil rights in American courts. In the first landmark case against US miscegenation laws, Perez v. Sharp (1948) before the Supreme Court of California, the petitioner’s brief even used a reference from Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf to defend the legal status quo. As a reaction, one of the judge’s concurring opinions in favor of the plaintiff expressed great distress: “To bring into this issue the correctness of the writings of a madman, a rabble-

“Jim Crow in Germany.” Cartoon from a Pamphlet by the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military and Training, 1949 (Source: Wisconsin Historical Society)
rouser, a mass-murderer, would be to clothe his utterances with an undeserved aura of respectability and authoritativeness. Let us not forget that this was the man who plunged the world into a war in which, for the third time, America fought, bled, and died for the truth of the proposition that all men are created equal.” In its decision to strike down these laws in California, the court paved the way for other laws allowing interracial marriage, which the US Supreme Court finally adopted in its 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia.

By that point, Germany had become a fixed reference point in the domestic discourse on African American civil rights. African American activists from the NAACP to the Black Panthers used the example of National Socialism as a comparative frame to illustrate the true nature of US race relations. In doing so, they stressed the rift between the American creed of equality and the factual system of apartheid that existed in the country. The experience of a different social treatment and legal status in postwar Germany also hardened the resolution of returning veterans and the African American community to advance their cause at home through active participation in civil rights marches and demonstrations. Likewise, the communist system of East Germany was only all too eager to exploit the issue of civil rights for its own propaganda during the Cold War and gladly embraced desertions of African American soldiers beyond the Iron Curtain. The impact their time in Germany had on African Americans and their decision to join and shape the civil rights movements thus remains a largely untold story to which this project seeks to give voice.

“A Guide into the Future”: African American Civil Rights in West Germany

Due to the spectacular iconography of its actions and its moral implications set in the propaganda battles of the Cold War, the African American civil rights movement transcended national borders and was formative for various groups of people outside the US. In addition, it forced the American political system to react to its claims so that these domestic struggles would not unduly overshadow America’s international image. Considering the extraordinarily close relationship between Germany and the US during the Cold War, it is no surprise that the African American struggle also seized the attention of many Germans and, in its visions and strategies, exercised a strong influence on German intellectuals, politicians, and the public at large, both East and West. Issues of (non-)violence, democratic participation, and civil rights were debated by church representatives, activists, government officials, and legal scholars alike. African American icons such as James Baldwin and Harry Be-
lafonte, Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, Elridge Cleaver, or Angela Davis, influenced popular culture as well as subculture. Grassroots activists, writers, and the women’s movement dedicated themselves to analyzing the situation of African Americans in the US, thereby trying to draw conclusions for their own situation. Moreover, German academics became more and more interested in what was to emerge as African American Studies.

This transatlantic reception was facilitated by the multitude of government-sponsored exchange programs that brought West German students, trade unionists, and economic and political leaders to the US in the 1950s. Many West Germans thus acquired firsthand experience of the racial divisions in the country of their transatlantic partner and could relate to the civil rights struggle on a personal basis. The music of the civil rights movements and folk icons like Joan Baez additionally transported this sentiment across the Atlantic. Even West German diplomats kept close tabs on the racial situation in the US and reported closely on the civil rights movement, race riots, or legal changes.

The West German mainstream press also followed the different stages of the African American liberation struggle in great detail. Particularly in the left-leaning media, the coverage of the civil rights movement was extensive. The leaders themselves, such as Martin Luther King Jr., were given a voice in the periodicals, and German activists and intellectuals discussed if their techniques and strategies had any relevance for West Germany. From the very beginning, the American civil rights movement was therefore also visible to German activists. Already in September of 1963, about a hundred West German students from various political organizations demonstrated for the equality of African Americans in the US and handed over a petition signed by four hundred fifty people addressed to John F. Kennedy to the US General Consul Ford in Frankfurt, protesting discrimination against blacks.

Günter Amendt, a member of the German Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), observed as early as February 1965 that the involvement of the young students in voter registration drives in the American South during Freedom Summer had been a decisive moment for the free speech movement at Berkeley. In September 1967, the riots in the ghettos of Detroit of July 1967 prompted the German SDS to officially declare its solidarity with “black power” at its twenty-second national convention. The German SDS argued that after the failed attempts by the early civil rights movement to counter the structural racism in US society, the black power movement had become a viable next step and alternative way. In the eyes of German activists, “Black Nationalism” had become part of an international class struggle designed to achieve victory against
American imperialism and capitalism in cooperation with the liberation movements of the Third World. Similar to their American counterparts, the German SDS saw its own task in supporting the black power movement through collective revolutionary actions or active solidarity.
In 1968, this solidarity mounted due to the assassination of Martin Luther King in April and the increasing militancy of the black power movement in the United States. A “Berliner Komitee für Black Power,” for example, openly tried to collect money for the armament of black people. German activists also reached out to black soldiers in Germany by engaging in GI-organizing efforts or translating works related to black power, increasingly viewing the black nationalist movement as an adaptable model to transform their own society. The emergence and popularity of the Black Panther Party (BPP), as well as direct contact to its leadership by the former German SDS president Karl-Dietrich Wolff, only intensified this sentiment. With the foundation of the Black Panther Solidarity Committee in West Germany in November 1969, formerly abstract solidarity declarations translated themselves into demonstrations and workshops on their behalf, the installation of the “Red Panthers,” an apprentice reading group in Frankfurt led by Wolff, as well as visits of leading Black Panthers such as Kathleen Cleaver to the Federal Republic. Due to the international presence of the BPP with Elridge Cleaver in Algiers, the German committee was even tied into a much larger network, including solidarity groups from all over Europe. Other focal points and indicators of Black Panther solidarity include the “Ramstein 2”-affair, the GI underground newspaper *The Voice of the Lumpen*, and the Angela Davis campaign.

These contacts and identifications were also formative for the rise of armed struggle in the Federal Republic in the early 1970s. In imitation of the Black Panthers, members of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF, Red Army Faction) and Bewegung 2. Juni (Movement June 2) adopted similar clothing (leather jackets, etc.) and, most importantly, the carrying of weapons as a sign of increasing militarization and a growing determination to resort to violence. Even the founding manifesto of the RAF “Die Rote Armee aufbauen!” in *Agit* 883 was published with a black panther next to the iconic Russian Kalashnikov. According to RAF member Margrit Schiller, the Black Panthers even played a vital role in the discussion among RAF leaders during the drafting of the first longer theoretical piece, “The Concept of Urban Guerilla” (*Das Konzept Stadtguerilla*). Schiller remarks that Gudrun Ensslin had been actively involved in the desertion campaign for GIs in the 1960s, during which she had extensively studied the history of the black movement with the help of Black Panther soldiers. Therefore, there are numerous references to the Black Panthers in the theoretical writings of the RAF, especially concerning their relationship to the masses and the transition to illegality, as well as the use of violence.

The reception of the Black Panther movement in West Germany also entered a strange symbiosis when it merged with Frantz Fanon’s theories.
of liberation from colonial oppression and the burden of the National Socialist past in the minds of the Red Army Faction (RAF). Drawing on Fanon’s model of colonial conflicts, the RAF saw the black power movement as an “internal colony” of the US, which could only liberate itself from oppression through the use of violence. Since the Federal Republic was tied to the US through the transatlantic alliance (as an external colony), it became complicit in any forms of American imperialism at home and abroad, while the RAF perceived US policy through the lens of Germany’s past, semiotically linking it to the crimes of National Socialism. Breaking away from this complicity thus became crucial for West German activists. Coming to terms with the West German past with the help of the “other” as a substratum of one’s own oppression grew into a symbol of a belated resistance, and was the background against which the solidarity with the black power movement played out. Through this discourse, the history of the Federal Republic after 1945 was continuously being re-written and terrorist actions legitimized.

Accordingly, for parts of the student movement and groups such as the RAF, the various stages of the African American civil rights struggle played the role of a mediator to come to terms with their own country’s past and future. Although unique in its intensity and violence, this particular way of recontextualizing and using the African American civil
rights movement for domestic purposes was certainly not limited to the student movement, but also permeated other segments of society. German church groups in particular were very much influenced by the integrationist vision of the African American struggle after some of their ministers and priests had taken part in civil rights demonstrations within the US.

This project therefore wants to extend its analysis of the impact of the African American civil rights and black power movement on Germany to all segments of society, and to evaluate the way in which discourses on race, national identity, and history were shaped by it. It also wants to break new territory in offering a perspective that includes both East and West Germany, by taking into account the close association of figures such as Angela Davis with the East German SED, her appearance at the “10. Weltfestspiele der Jugend und Studenten” in East Berlin in 1973, and the various support campaigns for her and African Americans being organized in the GDR.

Solidarity with African Americans was often to a vast degree part of a process of German self-definition, whether it be culturally or politically motivated. How these appropriation processes unfolded in both German states on various social levels, what the long-term consequences were in terms of concepts of race, democratic participation, and integration, and which repercussions it yielded on the nature and dynamics of transatlantic relations, will be the second major subject of this project.

* * *

Analyzing both the role of Germany in the African American experience during the Cold War and the impact the civil rights movement had on political discourses and views of race and ethnicity in East and West Germany will thus not only open up a previously unexplored chapter of postwar history, but will also help situate these transatlantic encounters in a more global context. In doing so, it will contribute to a more complex perspective of the role of the United States in the world of the twentieth century.

Notes

3 Georg Schmundt-Thomas, “America’s Germany: National Self and Cultural Other after World War II” (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1992); Maria Höhn, “GIs, Veronikas, and Lucky Strikes: German Reactions to the American Military Presence in Rhineland-Palatinate during the 1950s” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1995); Johannes Klein-schmidt, *Do not fraternize: die schwierigen Anfänge deutsch-amerikanischer Freundschaft,*


5 Preliminary results can be viewed at http://projects.vassar.edu/africanamericansoldiers. I am most grateful to Maria Höhn for her constant support and generous help with this project. She and her research team at the History Department at Vassar College have been invaluable and instrumental in unearthing previously unknown primary sources, images, and historical actors.


7 Quoted in “Fight for Liberties Here While Fighting Dictators Abroad, NAACP Urges,” in The Crisis, January 1942, 36.


9 Editorial Note to Benjamin Quarles, “Will a Long War Aid the Negro?,” The Crisis, September 1943, 268.

10 George Schuyler, “Will a Long War Aid the Negro?,” The Crisis, November 1943, 344.


13 President Harry Truman, Address Before the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, June 29, 1947, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry
S. Truman, 1947 (Washington, 1963), 312. For the role of white liberals in pushing the civil rights agenda, see Peter J. Kellogg, Civil Rights Consciousness in the 1940s.

14 Walter White, Annual Meeting of the NAACP, January 7, 1946, quoted in The Crisis, February 1946, 52.


16 Numbers quoted from Maria Höhn, We will Never Go back to the Old Way Again.

17 For a more detailed assessment see Maria Höhn, Ein Atemzug der Freiheit. For a micro-study of how Germans nonetheless discriminated against African Americans in various ways, see Maria Hoehn, GIs and Freiuleins, passim.

18 Letter to the editor, Ebony 2, no. 5 (March, 1947). Quoted in Maria Höhn, Ein Atemzug der Freiheit.


21 In the case of a black GI named Karl Lucas, East German papers quoted the deserter as saying that “while there was racial discrimination in the United States, ‘all men are created equal’ in the Soviet Union.” In: Reed Report Defection,” New York Times, December 9, 1952, 9.


28 This was to some extent also a result of individuals who had witnessed this process first hand in the US. One of them was Gerhardt Amendt, who spent the summer of 1967 in the
United States and lived in Harlem for two months. For his experience, see Gerhard Amendt, “Das Elend der amerikanischen Neger,” Frankfurter Rundschau, January 27, 1968. He later also published the following popular collection: idem, ed., Black Power: Dokumente und Analysen (Frankfurt, 1970).


CONFERENCE REPORTS

CONNECTING ATLANTIC, INDIAN OCEAN, CHINA SEAS, AND PACIFIC MIGRATIONS FROM THE 1830S TO THE 1930S

Conference at the GHI, December 6–8, 2007. Conveners: Donna Gabaccia (Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota), Dirk Hoerder (Arizona State University), Marcel van der Linden (International Institute of Social History), Gisela Mettele (University of Leicester). Participants: Sven Beckert (Harvard University), Mary Blewett (University of Massachusetts, Lowell), Sugata Bose (Harvard University), Ulrike Freitag (Center for Modern Oriental Studies), Wang Gungwu (National University of Singapore), Pamila Gupta (University of the Witwatersrand), Matt Guterl (Indiana University), Silke Hensel (University of Münster), Madeline Hsu (University of Texas, Austin), Amarjit Kaur (University of New England), Akram Khatr (North Carolina State University), Erika Lee (University of Minnesota), Haiming Liu (California State Polytechnic University), Michael Mann (Fernuniversität Hagen), David Cook Martin (Grinnell College), Sucheta Mazumdar (Duke University), Adam McKeown (Columbia University), Lara Putnam (University of Pittsburgh), Christine Skwiot (Georgia State University), Elizabeth Sinn (University of Hong Kong), Hamashita Takashi (Kyoto University), Carl Trocki (Queensland University of Technology), Henry Yu (University of British Columbia).

Historians have only recently begun to study world oceans and their role in connecting formerly isolated societies. For a long time, oceans have instead been regarded as empty spaces between continents and barriers to communication. In addition, the approach to migration has undergone several changes in the last decades. Recent discussions have moved away from the traditional historical emphasis that isolates continents and nation-states and toward a broader concept of social spaces created by human relationships rather than geography. This conference aimed to bring together the new interest in maritime history and the history of migration in order to examine oceanic “worlds” as systems or networks of migration.

The conference rested on the assumption that transoceanic communication and exchange were major motors of transformation in the process of globalization. This meant broadening the perspective beyond the
Atlantic and looking at migrations in different oceanic world regions and at the relationships between these migration systems. The conference brought together scholars from all parts of the world, thus offering a truly global-history approach that was not merely postulated or done from the Atlantic core.

Though the century from the 1830s to the 1930s, when the Great Depression and World War II in Asia and Europe put a halt to much migration, seems to be an adequate periodization for several seas and migration systems, the participants agreed that global historians must be careful not to impose periodizations that make sense for some regions but not for others. As Adam McKeown pointed out in his keynote lecture, historians instead have to look closely at how each flow was shaped by its own specific history, regulatory environment, economic opportunities, and power relations, even when processes and cycles of migration grew increasingly integrated across the globe.

Questions of state regulation and the mechanisms of control that influenced the movements of people were recurrent themes of the conference. Mary Blewett focused on the shifts, from the 1860s to the 1920s, in markets, capital investment, acquisition of raw materials, and sites of production in the transatlantic worsted trade, and the preceding and ensuing labor migration. Showing how the United States McKinley Tariffs of the 1890s provided stiflingly effective protection for the huge American domestic market, she argued that the state is a powerful actor in structuring migration systems.

Other talks that examined how exclusionary laws regulated flows pointed to the underlying racial discourses. Erika Lee explored the similarities, simultaneities, and transnationality of anti-Chinese sentiments, campaigns, and policies in various locales in the Americas and across the Pacific Ocean. In her talk, she asked how stereotypes about the Chinese circulated across borders and oceans, prompting a global discussion over race and labor. Lee explored the impact of the racialization of Chinese coolies in Cuba, Peru, and the Greater Caribbean on racial discourses in the United States, as well as how not only stereotypes but also the exclusionary laws they inspired traveled from country to country. The passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in the US in 1882 had a domino effect, not only in Australia and New Zealand, but also in Canada, where the anti-Chinese campaign drew much of its rhetoric and organizational strategies from the United States, and where the 1923 Exclusion Act closely mirrored Chinese exclusion laws in the United States. The global debates over Chinese immigration, Lee argued, had far-reaching consequences for other migrant groups as well, since they were invoked to support restrictions directed at other groups, notably a variety of Asians, Jews, and non-Jews from Eastern Europe, and to oppose mass migration.
of any kind. Xenophobic organizations in England attempting to fight the “alien invasion” explicitly appealed to the 1882 American legislation against the Chinese. The discussion emphasized that Chinese exclusion laws were part of larger racial discourses about whiteness. Speakers arguing in this vein included Akram Khater. He examined the multilayered identities of Syrian migrants to South Africa and the United States and their struggle with ethnic classifications. In characterizing race in terms of religion, Khater argued, Syrian Christians successfully forced the legal system to adjust its definition and consider them white Caucasians.

The complexities of outside labeling, self-identification, and political allegiances that shaped the migrant experience were also taken up by Lara Putnam. She explored how Caribbean Jews went from being routinely categorized as oriental to being routinely categorized as white, and presented the Caribbean migratory system as a key site within global debates over migration and the color line alike in the early twentieth century. Those debates, Putnam noted, reflected expectations about sex as much as expectations about race. In her examination of how debates over race mixture circulated within the complex cultural sphere of the circum-Caribbean migration system through newspapers, letters, pamphlets, and people, Putnam stressed that migrants were not only the objects but also the subjects of these discussions. She argued that knowledge about sex and race was manufactured not only by journalists, scientists, and politicians, but also by country doctors, angry tenants, and lovesick teens.

Elisabeth Sinn developed the concept of the “in-between space” as a possible paradigm in the study of migration situations, especially as an alternative to focusing solely on sending and receiving countries. She presented Hong Kong as an “in-between” place on several levels as a transit and intermediary place for things—money, letters, information, investments, etc.—and an “in-between home” for departing and returning migrants. Overseas migration, she argued, relied on dense and multidirectional networks of people and institutions linking overseas Chinese with their home villages and paving the way for the migrants. Charitable societies in Hong Kong supported people in transit, banks and exchange houses administered funds and remittances, and native-place associations ensured that the remains of deceased persons were transferred home. The migration trajectory, Sinn pointed out, was seldom a beeline from point A to point B; in reality, there were many detours and delays, diversions and dead ends. What lay in between often shaped the migration experience in profound ways and featured poignantly in the migrant’s mental landscape.

The significance of “in-between” spaces for shaping and transforming migrants’ identity was accentuated in several talks. In a certain way, discussants argued, the ocean itself was an “in-between” space. Migrants
spent an extended period of time on the ocean in the restricted space of a ship. They had to be organized somehow, and they perceived themselves in new identities and new gender roles. Participants agreed that the influence of the *rite de passage* of sea travel and the conditions onboard ship on the migration experience needs further investigation.

How the ocean was imagined in different cultures was another point of discussion. As Pamila Gupta pointed out, the sea has played a vibrant role in the life and minds of coastal people around the rim of the Indian Ocean. In the Caribbean, too, a profound relationship existed between the sea and the people, as Putnam demonstrated in her talk. Whereas in those maritime cultures the sea was seen as a source of livelihood and of food, a route of commerce and communication, a source of danger and of opportunity, Carl Trocki argued that the concept of the ocean in the imagination of the Chinese was much more negative. The opportunities oceans could provide were downplayed in the Chinese context, which had to do with the negative view of movement in Confucianism in general, but also with political imperial strategies. Whereas migration over-land was seen as part of the expansion of the Chinese empire, going overseas was not viewed as acceptable, and until the end of the nineteenth century, was even criminalized. Neither ideology nor legislation stopped people from moving, Trocki noted, but both have to be taken into account in how we think of movement.

Rarely have scholars of different regions of the world cooperated as closely as they did during this conference. Even though, as one participant noted, it is not possible to talk about the whole world at once, the conference provided a good example of how historians can work in their provinces of knowledge with a global consciousness. Future research will demand far more exchange between historians from different cultural macro-regions of the globe. The conflict between being a specialist in a necessarily limited field and thinking about the big picture, the conference concluded, can only be resolved through a collaborative effort.

*Gisela Mettele (University of Leicester)*
TRANSREGIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES: EUROPEAN KINSHIP IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Workshop at the GHI, January 25–27, 2008. Conveners: Christopher Johnson (Wayne State University), Gisela Mettele (GHI/University of Leicester), David Warren Sabean (UCLA), Simon Teuscher (University of Zurich), Francesca Trivellato (Yale University). Participants: Christina Antenhofer (University of Innsbruck), Vivian Berghahn (CUNY Graduate Center), Mary Chamberlain (Oxford Brookes University), Michaela Hohkamp (Free University, Berlin), Uwe Israel (Deutsches Studienzentrum in Venedig), Stéphanie Latte Abdallah (IREMAM/CNRS), Jose Moya (Barnard College), Christine Philliou (Columbia University), Gabriel Piterburg (UCLA), Ruxhsana Qamber (Quaid-i-Azam University), Jonathan Spangler (University of Gloucestershire), Dorothee Wierling (Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte, Hamburg).

This workshop was a follow-up conference to a series of six sessions at the European Social Science History Conference, held in Amsterdam in 2006, devoted to the dynamics of families and kinship groups dispersed over wide and not-so-wide geographical areas that continued to maintain intense interactions with one another. Most of the papers dealt with the experiences of Europe or Europeans, but there were also papers providing comparative perspectives to shed new light on political, social, and cultural processes of modernization. Interactive dispersed families are by no means a phenomenon to first emerge in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and many of the findings of the panelists contradict the dominant narratives of modernization. And “transnational families,” paradoxically, are to be found long before the nation-state was in place. The workshop was designed to bring together a selection from the Amsterdam conference, adding a few papers to open up new questions, in order to put together a volume for publication. The discussion centered around three issues: authority, hierarchy and power; succession and inheritance, the circulation of property, and inter- and intra-generational forms of mediation; and patterned, structured, and systemic aspects of kinship.

Current discussions of ethnic, trade, and commercial diasporas, “circulation” (Markovits), international or global networks, and transnational communities make constant reference to the importance of families and kinship groups for understanding the dynamics of dispersion. Few of the studies, however, examined the nature of these families in any detail. Although there were significant beginnings for long-term comparative analysis, certain crucial issues have not readily been taken into consideration. For example, much can be learned for the study of cross-national...
families, as Christopher Johnson has shown, from the study of an early nineteenth-century Breton family. Most observers would consider the history of the families Johnson is dealing with as circumscribed by the national context of France. Yet France had a long way to go to integrate the nation, and the Breton elites of Johnson’s study showed a remarkable talent for solidifying their position in a home territory while sending out feelers to Paris and other parts of France, creating regular patterns of exchange, reciprocity, and networking through commercial, professional, political, social, and marital ties. During most of the nineteenth century, mobile German families, even when they confined themselves within the German linguistic area, were networking across states with quite different political and social structures. Whether this kind of transregional family cohesion within dispersion can be usefully compared with the global networks of Gujaratis (Markovits) or Yemeni (Bang) expansion along the East African coast, to offer a few well-known examples, remains to be seen. But they do suggest fundamental questions about the role of kinship in pooling capital, constructing political networks, and developing connections between geographically close and geographically remote areas. From the outset, a perspective of microanalysis seems to offer the best methodological approach to deepening our understanding of trading success, the development of political cultures that both transcend and strengthen the nation-state, and the processes of cultural transfer.

Gabi Piterberg’s paper, “Ottoman Political Households and Networks of Elites: Does Kinship Matter?” dealt with an essential issue that has exercised the study of court societies in Europe, namely the building of networks of elites that cooperate with the ruling house. In Piterberg’s account, military-patronage states between 1100 and 1800 were characterized by the attempt to rule through one set of generational elites who were not allowed to strike down roots in the societies they ruled. At the center of the Egyptian mamluk household were two kinds of relationships: between master and slaves and among the generations of slaves themselves. With time, slaves were manumitted and expected to take ruling positions themselves, while maintaining loyalty to the house they came from. There are certain similarities with early modern European social relations, whereby patron/client relations could connect two generations without kinship playing a direct role. European courts functioned in some ways similarly to the mamluk households in that their purpose was to build “friends” through personal contact, together with ties of service, loyalty, and patronage. What, of course, gave continuity to the European court were lineage constructs, together with the succession to title and the inheritance of property. And property itself needs to be seen as a bundle of rights and privileges that could involve overlapping use rights and a kaleidoscopic shifting around of holdings.
Christina Antenhofer’s paper, “From Local ‘Signori’ to European High Nobility: The Gonzaga Family Networks in the Fifteenth Century,” studied the systematic coordination of a noble family and examined in detail networks constructed through women and younger sons. She traced the rise of the Gonzagas from their rural origins to their attaining a Duchy, from their competitive familial politics to the establishment of primogeniture. She made a clear distinction between inheritance and succession, showing how the devolution of different kinds of goods and honors played a role in familial coordination and conflict. Over time, new forms of authority developed in the kinship group, with increasingly patterned forms of coordination through the main line. Her paper analyzed where solidarity was to be found and where interests diverged. Once they attained the position of margraves, their political alliances crisscrossed Europe.

Uwe Israel’s paper, “German-Italian Families in Venice at the End of the Middle Ages,” dealt with a massive migration of Germans to Italy. He looked at ways in which the Germans became acculturated and developed alliances through marriage and professions. Especially in the first generation, the German migrants kept lively contacts with their places of origins. Especially interesting were the printers, with something on the order of 150 workshops. Interesting also was the Sicilian immigrant group that found ready contacts with the Germans. Israel analyzed marriages and godparentage, as well as the development of networks based on friendship. Migrants themselves constantly played a role in attracting new migrants and in providing links along which migration took place. By drawing on sources relating to social history, such as baptismal registers, tax declarations, and wills, different types of German-Italian immigrant families can be distinguished in late medieval Venice.

Simon Teuscher’s paper, “Medieval Nobility in Transregional Perspective,” examined “people in between.” He argued that the current understanding of patrician families as sedentary and strongly attached to cities needs to be modified: Rootedness also needed mobility. In fact, when one examines genealogies and goes beyond the straight line of succession to the major estate, one finds a great deal of mobility. Each child in a family had a legitimate claim to the family property, but the bulk of assets could not be divided. Sending young men away prevented conflict, but the practice also made for diversification. The migrant sons could run branches of the family business, serve at princely courts, and act as conduits for information. Families that developed a culture of migration were successful over many generations in establishing strategic patterns of diversification.

Michaela Hohkamp’s paper, “Kinship Dynamics among Ruling Families at the Dawn of the Modern Era,” developed the theme of “Haus-
denken” among royal families. She argued that state institutions should not be given precedence over the political and social functions of kinship. She analyzed the rise of primogeniture in the German dynasties and examined the roles of women as essential to maintaining political networks among different families. She especially emphasized the role of aunts in the development of multi-relational kinship networks. A key thing was the central role of women for kin. She traced shifts over the early modern period in the kinds of female kin that played central roles: the aunt, the Schwesterfrau, the sister-in-law.

Ruxhsana Qamber’s paper, “Family Matters: Post-1492 Transatlantic Muslim Migrants,” looked at patterns of Morisco networks between Spain and Mexico. She examined two family narratives that can be found in Inquisition records. Women of the families were placed as servants in well-to-do households and played a central role in developing and maintaining networks. Marriages themselves often mixed Christian and Morisco spouses with rather syncretic religious practices. Not just people circulated between Mexico and Spain: Documents did as well. Testimony given in Mexico might have important implications for family members living in Spain. Families developed strategies to protect each other in a transnational political/communication system with transnational families.

Francesca Trivellato’s paper, “Diaspora, Marriage, and Dowry: Transregional Sephardic Families and Business Organization in the Mediterranean (Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries),” offered a strong call for a comparative look at the family. Her point was that, although many studies point to the importance of kinship in trading diasporas, they seldom are specific enough to catch the particular ecologies of particular situations. The reference to kinship is too vague. What is needed is a comparative perspective that looks at “internal articulation” and marriage practices. Each of the early modern trading groups (and modern ones) utilized kinship in different ways and had different norms. Marriage could be used to integrate groups into a local or regional society: They could call upon or exclude women, or they could integrate people across quite extended space. Trivellato’s case in point was the Sephardic community in Livorno, where particular families created close kin relations with families in Venice, the Ottoman Empire, and European ports. Marriage was the instrument for creating networks and for building capital. Here the instrument of choice was strict endogamy, with parallel cousin marriage and uncle/niece marriages, a strategy used by the Rothschilds in the nineteenth century. The important point was that such marriages were used to “pursue, create, and expand opportunities.” It is often said that endogamous marriages are a strategy for keeping property
within the family, but clearly the endogamous practices in nineteenth-century Europe have to be understood in the context of grasping new opportunities. In her context, marriage alliances went together with permanent business partnerships and were part of a system of raising capital and associating partners. This created a close and interconnected community, with a contractual open-endedness that was a flexible strategic tool in long-distance trade. Trivellato also pointed to a peculiarity in the dowry/dower system that protected significant amounts of wealth for women. Her work suggests a close look at women—something that is not often done in diasporic studies. She pointed out that the material interests of these Jewish women were subordinated to the “larger patriarchal and patrimonial logic” of the extended families.

Jonathan Spangler’s paper, “Multi-National Aristocratic Kinship Networks on the Borderlands of France and the Empire from 1500–1815,” presented a series of sovereign princely families from small territories, who provided high court figures, generals and field marshals, governors and prime ministers, and diplomats for France, Spain, Savoy, Sweden, and the Empire. The key point was that siblings could be in the service of rival dynasties, and the same person could move from French to Imperial service (even to Ottoman service). These were families of very high status, whose loyalties were first to their own families, which, although rooted in some small principality or principalities, were crucial for the information networks and courtly personnel that made Europe work as a system. The strategy of the families was to place individuals in service to different states/dynasties and often to maintain branches devoted to different confessions. A family could lose in one area and gain in another. The key thing to note is that they were pan-European, and Spangler went so far as to say that in the early modern period they replaced the medieval church in this function. In his paper, he stressed the importance of the patronage networks that these families themselves built up, which could be a major resource in itself. Kings coveted the loyalty of this or that family precisely because they could integrate recently conquered territories with their patronage networks.

Gisela Mettele’s paper, “The Moravians as an International Fellowship of Brothers and Sisters,” examined an international group that “chose” kinship. She was interested in the imaginary order of belonging to a family and the development of networks of mutual aid and solidarity. She examined the circulation of information about family events from many different places around the globe, and with that, the development of a collective memory. The Moravians observed common rituals, family remembrance days, and funerals, sending details back and forth from Eastern Europe to North America. Information was communicated down
the generations as well. Finally, she looked at circles of marriage that connected different places.

Christopher Johnson’s paper, “Into the World: Breton Bourgeois Families Make their Way in the Nation, 1750–1890,” brought the idea of “transregional” families to bear on the issues of “transnationalism.” He examined the functions of kinship in developing the networks under consideration. It is important to understand the material interests that mediated family connections: business, urban cultural practices, and intellectual circles. Key to the development of familial networks at the beginning of the nineteenth century was the practice of cousin marriage. Marriage could disperse people across the nation.

Christine Philliou’s paper, “Phanariot Family Networks before the Greek Revolution of 1821 and their Post-Revolutionary Reconfiguration,” dealt with Greek elite families based in Istanbul, called Phanariots. They originated in merchant and money-lending occupations and ended up taking part in a wide range of services for the Ottoman state. Some of the issues Philliou addressed are the nature and structure of the family networks before the Greek Revolution of 1821 and the reconfiguration of the networks under the pressure of the novel nation-state. Before the revolution, these families might best be described as trans-imperial, for they worked relations between the Ottomans, Austria, and Russia. By education and linguistic ability, they made themselves indispensable to the functioning of the Ottoman Empire, as interpreters, diplomats, tax-farmers, provincial administrators, and such. But they were also part of a much larger group of scribes, secretaries, physicians, and servants. By the eighteenth century, these families had developed large networks that spanned Anatolia, the Black Sea, and the Balkans. Sparked by the Greek revolt, the government in Istanbul prompted and carried out a series of massacres, breaking up the coherence of the old Phanariot elites. When it was all over, the Ottomans replaced the old elites with new families, the point being that whole families were appointed. Once again, the family could be organized around an office, which as in Europe was considered as a property, thus giving coherence and continuity to a family and serving as the basis for alliances and patronage. Philliou described the pre-1821 situation as a series of “overlapping networks.” After 1821, many of the older families reconfigured themselves: Philliou spoke of diversification. Apparently, some parts of a kin network joined the national project, while other members ended up in states either close to or far from Greece, as what one can now call “transnational families.”

David Warren Sabean’s paper, “Nineteenth-Century German Families in Transnational Perspective,” concentrated on the development of the idea of lineage, with an example taken from the Siemens family.
During the nineteenth century, property-holding families of all stations and classes developed systems of marriage that linked the same families across generations. There were many forms of systematic and unsystematic repeated exchanges, and when one delves into the biographies of particular families, in many cases, particular marriages may seem arbitrary. Certainly there were no rules that created the expectation or the necessity of marrying kin. Exactly how the new forms developed or why people sought out members from within their kin groups for spouses is open to considerable investigation, but the phenomenon can be observed in many corners of Europe throughout the long nineteenth century. An older understanding of repeated marriages ascribed it to localism or provincialism, with the proverbial inbred village as the symptom of a pathological obsession with property, immobility, or fear of change. Other examples of inbred ethnic or religious groups or ruling houses often stirred the imaginations of political pundits, social commentators, or biologists. But we are now able to see that from the middle of the eighteenth century until the aftermath of World War I, a familial dynamic developed that sets this period off from the periods both before and after. Some observers have organized the analysis of the forms that characterize the long nineteenth century around the figure of “cousin” marriage. Certainly cousins as central for the pool of marriageable suitors emerged in all classes during this period, but the phenomenon of marital reciprocity goes well beyond the specific marriage between the children or grandchildren of siblings. What characterizes all of the kinds of marriages is a search for people from the same milieu, similar class background, and for familiarity. With this consideration in mind, it is possible to broaden the perspective on reciprocity and to think of the marriage strategies of the period as oriented toward developing broad, extensive, and well-integrated groups of kin, linked together through horizontally constructed networks. Until now, most studies of kinship have been carried out in local, regional, or national frameworks. But many of the same considerations from more restricted studies might fruitfully be examined by looking at the social dynamics of those families that spread themselves across different nations. This paper explored various kinds of familial reciprocities among German families that dispersed themselves across different nations or that allied themselves with families in different cultures and regions.

Mary Chamberlain’s Paper, “The Culture of Caribbean Migration to Britain in the 1950s,” dealt with the culture of migration, with migrants who have been on the move for several generations and who conceive of their families as distributed across national boundaries through narratives of continuous movement. The family itself, while represented
through genealogies and descent lines, lacks clear boundaries and is both extensive and inclusive. A good deal of work goes into learning about far-flung cousins and long-deceased ancestors. The migratory culture is centered on celebrating the family, understood as a complicated network of kinship, for which one ought to display loyalty and obligation. Despite the overarching understanding of migration as not disruptive or disorderly but simply interwoven into the warp of collective memory, there are still different ways that men and women represent their lives on the move. Migration does seem to have been more disruptive for women: Chamberlain describes their stories as containing a “searing experience.” Men are more apt to see their lives as ones of adventure. Memories are organized more around people than place, although in another place Chamberlain emphasizes the Caribbean (Barbados) as “home,” an emotional touchstone, the place to which people wish to or actually return.

Vivian Berghahn’s paper, “German Business Elites in New York: Corporate Governance, Capitalist Ideology, and Cultural Belonging,” took off from the proliferation of large-scale multinational corporations within the global economy. From geographical relocations to satellite offices and international mergers, firms constantly shift and renegotiate their organizational strategies and practices, and must coordinate their ambitions across a spectrum of business professionals. As a result of these shifts, an elite at the management level from a wide range of cultural and social backgrounds comes together, either under the same parent multinational corporation or as part of cooperative business organizations. Questions of governance arise as to how these culturally diverse professionals interact, not only within the global corporate structure but also in the localities in which they find themselves. How are the cultural beliefs and family values of these transnational elites transforming or transformed by their interactions, both within the firm and by means of the experiences of relocation that they and their families confront? Can we identify how these forces impact upon and shape the business systems in which these professionals operate and the markets that support them? In the realm of the global economy, what influences do these cultural and historical differences have, not only on their personal coping mechanisms, but also on the management practices and business strategies of these multinational corporations?

Jose Moya’s paper, “Spanish and Italian Worker Migration to Latin America,” began with a historical analysis of human migration and argued that the phenomenon of transnational families has existed for at most five centuries. His point was to set off various forms of migration and various patterns of early modern “transnational” families against nineteenth-century patterns. He examined the unprecedented forms of
migration that characterized the past two centuries. He then looked at patterns of family structure in rural and urban Italy for clues to the kinds of migration patterns found in Latin America. Here he was interested in implicit codes, naturalized habits and expectations, and manners: in short, the kinds of cultural capital that families developed that shaped the forms of migration across the Atlantic.

Dorothee Wierling’s paper, “Transnational Familial Links Between Hamburg Coffee Merchants and Latin American Producers in the Twentieth Century,” looked at small producers, agents, brokers, importers, roasters, and retailers, concentrating on those at the center of international trade. She examined patterns of male succession in coffee firms and patterns of circulation of relatives. Looking at the experience of particular individuals in detail, she showed how travel linked together German families dispersed across coffee-growing countries. Linkages between Hamburg and coffee-producing countries had to be based on intimate knowledge of individuals and on trust. She also looked at patterns of marriage exchange. Especially interesting are the linkages between coffee and banking. She stressed the “national inside the international families.” She also argued that kinship had to be understood as only one institution among many for building trust and reliability. Finally, for the twentieth century, rupture is at the center of international family histories.

Stéphanie Latte Abdallah’s paper, “Familial Networks in Palestinian Refugee Camps,” dealt with families that are part of a forced migration, Palestinians living in refugee camps in Jordan. One of the chief issues in the analysis of families is to pay attention to the different points of view, interests, and knowledge of different family members. There is no reason to treat the family as totally coordinated and integrated. Similarly, paying close attention to issues of gender allows for a much richer understanding of the way families adapt to new conditions. Women frequently create networks among themselves, establish contacts through neighborhoods, local markets, and kin, and build networks of communication (visiting, correspondence, and now, telephone and email). In some situations, they are the ones who most easily adapt to new conditions, while in others, they may be unable to find their way in new situations of strange customs, languages, and institutions. In the Palestinian context, Latte Abdalla pointed to the traditional role that women play in keeping the family together. Apparently, they are also the gate keepers who are responsible for maintaining the hierarchical edifice of (elite) family networks. In the Palestinian case, in the Jordanian camps, women also are objects invested with fundamental values that give coherence to national ideology. Issues of honor, dress codes, and morality are the media for buttressing the specificity of Palestinian national identity. At the heart of
Latte Abdalla’s analysis lies a political movement of opposition organized by women—sometimes radical women—to challenge some of the foundational connections between nation and “traditional” understandings of women’s honor. This is a direct challenge to certain forms of patriarchy, and calls into question the entire edifice of protection and subordination. Her paper stressed that the family not only can be a uniting element, but also an institution that generates diverging strategies—here male and female ones.

David Warren Sabean (UCLA)
MANAGING THE UNKNOWN:
NATURAL RESERVES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Conference at the GHI, February 21–23, 2008. Conveners: Uwe Lübken (GHI), Frank Uekötter (Deutsches Museum, Munich). Participants: Cornelia Altenburg (Bielefeld University), Ranjan Chakrabarti (Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India), Alena Drieschova (International Water Management Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka), Mark R. Finlay (Armstrong Atlantic State University), Deborah Fitzgerald (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Hugh S. Gorman (Michigan Technological University), Rüdiger Graf (Ruhr University, Bochum), Susan Herrington (University of British Columbia), Sabine Höhler (GHI), Kuang-chi Hung (Harvard University), Carmit Lubanov (Tel Aviv University), John R. McNeill (Georgetown University), Joachim Radkau (Bielefeld University), Stefanie Rixecker (Lincoln University, New Zealand), David Schorr (Tel Aviv University), Ole Sparenberg (University of Göttingen).

What fear I then, rather what know to fear [?] 
Eve, upon picking the apple (John Milton, Paradise Lost)

Conventional wisdom has it that mankind’s knowledge doubles every ten years. Or was it every five years? The self-proclaimed knowledge society of the twenty-first century has a hard time accepting ignorance as anything but a temporary phenomenon, bound to disappear after a thorough search on the Internet or some more research. Environmentalists in particular have long conveyed a sense that the key problem is usually defunct policies rather than deficient knowledge. And don’t they have a point? We know that global temperatures are rising, that the Amazon rainforest is shrinking, and that whales are on the brink of extinction, and still the problems remain unsolved. In fact, some researchers have even felt so certain about mankind’s knowledge of natural processes that they put a price tag on Earth’s performance: We now know that the ecosystems of the world provide benefits for humanity worth $33 trillion per year, courtesy of a Nature article of 1997 (Robert Costanza, et al., “The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital," Nature 387 [May 15, 1997]: 253–260). Given this overabundance of information, the conference theme certainly came across as somewhat counterintuitive: Does it really make sense to ponder upon questions about the unknown?

As it turned out, the question struck a note with researchers in many different contexts, resulting in a conference that was rich both in its range of topics and its geographic scope. The conference looked at forests and botanical gardens, oil and nuclear power, seeds and nature reserves, seas
that hold fish and a sea that does not. The papers crisscrossed the world from Canada to New Zealand, with major stops in the American West, Germany, Israel and the Middle East, India, Bangladesh, Japan, and the seas in between. To everyone’s surprise, the conference did not fall apart in discussions over the individual papers, as ignorance emerged as the recurring theme of the conference. Time and again, the unknown turned out to be far more than an ephemeral phenomenon: Discussions devoid of more than informed guesses were obviously no exceptional event, and probably even the rule historically. If anything, the conference brought a stark reminder of how little we know about the state of the natural world—and that we are bound, indeed forced to make decisions nonetheless.

Ignorance usually becomes the most obvious when contemporary scenarios for the future later turn out to be false. Energy prophecies of the 1970s provide a case in point: In the wake of the 1973 oil price shock, notions of an impending energy shortage ran rampant within the expert community. But rather than criticizing these statements as “false prophecies,” as a convenient right-wing cliché has it, Rüdiger Graf used them as the starting point for an exploration into the historical knowledge base of oil-hungry societies. It turns out that even though the importance of petroleum was plain, information about the extent of the reserves was weak. To some extent, that was due to the vagaries of petroleum exploration, which geologists and petroleum engineers could only reduce through decades of research, but never eliminate entirely. However, the prevailing ignorance was also due to a conflict over professional jurisdictions. Geologists and petroleum engineers were competing with energy economists and political scientists, and with demand rising sharply and unexpectedly during the postwar years, these latter groups gradually won the upper hand. As a result, prevailing scenarios were largely disconnected from the material reality of the oil reserves, instead stressing the trend in energy consumption as the decisive factor. It became plain only in hindsight that all professions could offer half-truths at best.

Surprisingly, Graf’s paper was one of the few where professions played a major role. Could it be that professions shy away from fields with a large degree of uncertainty because their claims to privileged knowledge are particularly hard to sustain in these contexts? Even forestry, perhaps the oldest environmental profession, came out as surprisingly weak and disoriented at the conference. In her discussion of forestry in British Columbia, Susan Herrington showed that ideas about seemingly endless and inexhaustible woods were far more important for forest policy than anything resembling professional management. In order to develop the inventories that any proper management would presuppose, foresters resorted to makeshift practices like aerial inspections, a highly
subjective method that had a hard time counteracting the power of the forest industry, which dominated the economy of the province. David Schorr showed that Palestine forestry was to a great extent guided by a colonial discourse that saw afforestation as the key to environmental improvement. It seemed that an increase in well-kept woodlands would improve the soil, increase the water supply, and repair the climate, a promise all the more remarkable since it had little to do with local conditions, and everything to do with overarching visions within the British imperial forest community. Deborah Fitzgerald drew a line to American notions of the rain following the plow, another trope that, upon close inspection, essentially encapsulated an enormous extent of ignorance.

With that, the tensions between global discourses and specific local conditions emerged as one of the major themes of the conference. If anything, the meeting showed that the global history of the environment is to a large extent that of international notions and concepts traveling around the world as a kind of intellectual correlate to economic globalization. As Kuang-chi Hung showed, the opening of Japan paralleled the integration of Japanese scientists into an international network of botanical gardens. The tension between the global and the local was also crucial in Ranjan Chakrabarti’s discussion of the Sundarbans, a mangrove swamp on the border between India and Bangladesh. The present tiger reserve, created with significant input from the international environmental community, is deeply resented within the local population. Even in international politics, usually a rather conservative field, Alena Drieschova could identify a common trend in international water treaties toward more open-ended management strategies in recent decades that allow a more flexible response to unexpected events. In many cases, new treaties drew on previous experiences and even copied entire passages, a fact that prompted John McNeill to propose a daring analogy: “Like at US universities, we do not know whether learning goes on, but we do know that plagiarism is going on.”

With the shortcomings of global debates in specific contexts so apparent, it proved to be productive to have a paper that looked at the opposite, namely local, indigenous knowledge. Stefanie Rixecker provided an overview of customary fisheries management by the Maori in New Zealand and its conflict with the concepts of the settlers who ultimately prevailed. The first surprise was that Maori fishing was neither a small-scale endeavor nor one isolated from the settler community: Maori dominated commercial fishing until the 1870s, supplied settlers with their products, and had even exported fish commercially to Sydney, Australia, earlier in the century. But behind the flourishing business stood a traditional ecological knowledge that differed sharply from Western concepts: It favored a holistic approach and stressed quality and health of the fish.
over sheer numbers. For the Maori, lack of knowledge was not really a problem but rather one of the many paradoxes of life. At the same time, Rixecker dispelled notions of an indigenous population living in harmony with nature; in fact, the existence of a single Maori culture was to a large part the result of pressure from the colonists. Unlike so many stories of traditional ecological knowledge, Rixecker ended on an optimistic note, as the Maori have recently received a major share of the fishing rights from the government, allowing them to bring their knowledge to bear in practice. However, it should not go unmentioned that all this happened in the wake of a serious decline in fish stocks, and in one of the few countries in the world where population pressure is still relatively weak.

During the discussion, Sabine Höhler argued for a concept of reserves as socially constructed in a strong way. No paper underscored this point more clearly than Hugh Gorman’s discussion of the nitrogen cycle. In sketching how the use of manure, guano, sewage farms, and mineral fertilizer changed the flow of nitrogen through the biosphere, Gorman showed how naïve a simple essentialization of resources and reserves really is. While the basic function of fixed nitrogen, namely fertilizing plants, remained unchanged, the origins of nitrogen changed dramatically, and so did the effects and repercussions. In the end, the paper provided a stark reminder of the arbitrariness (and the anthropocentrism) that definitions of reserves inevitably imply. However, Gorman probably overstretched his argument when he brought photochemical smog into his story of the nitrogen cycle, as historians seem to be somewhat averse to thinking in anonymous cycles and material flows, and probably rightly so. As Fitzgerald remarked, Gorman’s story was strangely devoid of human actors.

As befits a lively conference, Rumsfeldian puns of “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” flew around the conference table, though always in an ironic vein. After all, it was hard to argue for the political innocence of the unknown after Carmit Lubanov’s presentation on the sinking water table of the Dead Sea, where any decision is inevitably caught up in the quagmires of Middle East policy. And yet Fitzgerald noted in her concluding remarks that the state rarely emerged as a strong actor in the papers, and she had a point. Even in forestry, the state was struggling to assert itself as a guardian of long-term sustainability, and that was not just due to the fact that western Canada and Palestine were no classic forestry regions. As Joachim Radkau pointed out, it was perfectly illusionary to devise rigid rules for forest use for centuries into the future, as the German forester Georg Ludwig Hartig did in the early nineteenth century: Local conditions were far too variable for this kind of doctrinism, and so was the uncertain development of the timber market.
Thus, even the famous German forestry tradition comprised a good deal of bluff about the unknown.

Even when the state was enforcing a policy of autarky, usually in the context of a war economy, its role was surprisingly ambiguous. Ole Sparenberg’s discussion of the boom of marine resource use in Nazi Germany provided a case in point. In the end, the boom fell far short of the original intentions, failing to close the much-touted German “fat gap” (Fettlücke) and meeting with enormous skepticism among consumers. And that was not the only point for doubts: for Nazi politicians, expanding into fishing and whaling was just a temporary solution until expansion towards the east would provide Germany with more room for agricultural production, making it almost certain that investments in fisheries would not pay off—not to mention the fact that British naval supremacy made the fishing industry useless in times of war. And this was not even the weirdest autarky story that the conference had to offer. Mark Finlay’s paper provided a fascinating account of the discussion over a rubber reserve in the American West, where shifts between booms and busts were so dramatic that any thought of rational government planning quickly became obsolete. Sparenberg noted that, in the end, the government’s decision was right in claiming that there was no need for a rubber reserve, but that was only the wisdom of hindsight. As Höhler emphasized, the government had a perfectly rational plan at any given moment, except that it was subject to drastic change time and again. Uwe Lübken referred to a possible link between the rubber reserve cycle in the American West and US military contingency planning.

In the end, the plant in question, guayule, emerged as perhaps the best-understood plant in technical and scientific terms that was never put to commercial use. So does knowledge—or ignorance for that matter—really make a difference? It was hard to sustain Baconian notions of “knowledge is power” at this conference, as many participants suggested that it is time for an amendment: knowledge may be power, but ignorance may be even greater power. In his concluding remarks, Frank Uekötter made a case for the liberating power of deficient knowledge. It is easier to exploit Canada’s forests if one believes that they are indeed endless. It is easier to invest in modern whaling—a complex and expensive seaborne industry—if one forgets that whaling has historically shown dramatic fluctuations and repeated collapses of whaling fleets. And it is easier to go into industrialized farming if one does not ponder questions about what it means for the soils, the topic of some improvised remarks that Uekötter made to fill the slot of a participant who had cancelled on short notice. Clearly, the absence of knowledge allows measures and behaviors that more informed agents would shy away from—
though this kind of ignorance rarely seems to play out in favor of the environment.

Both Radkau and McNeill tried to tackle the concept of the unknown in their concluding remarks, though in somewhat different fashion. Radkau proposed a taxonomy that makes a distinction between three types of ignorance: uncertainty of knowledge due to the complexity of the world; uncertainty about the future; and uncertainty about the risks of technology. In contrast, McNeill called for deeper reflections on the types of knowledge, pointing toward the partisan interests involved: Certain parties may cultivate ignorance because it plays out in their favor. In some respects, McNeill’s remarks echoed Robert Proctor’s concept of agnotology, the scientific production of uncertainty and ignorance for special interests, with the tobacco industry’s handling of health concerns being Proctor’s prime example (Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger, eds., *Agnotology*, Stanford, 2008). It seems that agnotology may be an important part of the story—after all, the interests at stake in discussions over oil reserves were obvious—but it is probably not the full story. Many papers nourished the impression that knowledge and ignorance are not so much absolutes as two extremes, with a large and rather murky field opening in between. The curious thing is that ignorance did not simply go away over time as people were struggling against it; in fact, the unknown seemed to increase as people were making decisions. It may be time to reflect more deeply about the cognitive status of the known and the unknown.

One thing that became clear is that ignorance does not necessarily mean a lack of information. Rather, processing information emerged as the crucial point. Canadian foresters had plenty of aerial observations of forests, but transforming them into a management strategy was quite a different matter; in the end, a small but highly visible tract of forest land along the coastal road became the key engine of change. Likewise, in estimating the remaining oil reserves, the key issue was piecing together a coherent vision from an overabundance of facts spread over three professions, with few people being in a position to judge which information was trustworthy and which was not. And all this happened in the modern era under serious time constraints. As Finlay pointed out, one of the great drawbacks of guayule was that the plant needs four to five years to reach its maximum rubber yield, obviously an almost prohibitive factor for the impatient agriculturalists of the twentieth century.

Some discussion arose over the geographic framing of the case studies. For example, Sparenberg pointed out that the German autarky rhetoric frequently referred to the seas as a colony waiting to be exploited, but the more experienced Norwegian whalers probably saw that differently. Others suggested the concept of the frontier, though the stabilization of
knowledge and business that the frontier concept somehow implies seemed to materialize only very slowly in the cases under discussion. Going through the individual papers, it is clear that the conference was somewhat tilted toward peripheral regions, but that was sometimes a matter of perspective. Lubanov vigorously denied that the Dead Sea was a peripheral area, noting its importance for recreation and biblical references. Cornelia Altenburg discussed how a West German parliamentary commission dealt with uncertainty over future energy use in the late 1970s. Uekötter stressed that modern, presumably “science-based” agriculture is to a great extent based on a constrained concept of the soil that is basically seen simply as temporary storage for nutrients. Clearly, the struggle with the unknown also took place in late twentieth-century Europe.

In their call for papers, the conveners had raised the question of whether unknown, “hidden” reserves serve as “buffer areas” that provide a kind of insurance for unexpected events. With that, they followed Radkau’s path, who had argued in his global environmental history that the existence of these hidden reserves may be a key factor for sustainability (Radkau, *Nature and Power*, Cambridge/New York, 2008). However, this encouragement did not generate many responses by the presenters: Only Chakrabarti referred to the concept in his discussion of the Sundarbans, arguing that the area also served as a refuge for people and a food reserve in times of crisis. Was it only coincidental that Chakrabarti’s paper was also the most sweeping in scope, covering an entire region with multiple uses over several centuries? Perhaps the concept of the buffer area is simply too broad for individual case studies, making it advisable to rephrase the discussion as a metahistorical one that summarizes trends in different fields. Or maybe the concept has a basic flaw in that it stresses a collective interest in sustainability that usually takes second place to the specific interests of individual parties. There seems to be a certain tension, to say the least, between Radkau’s thesis and classic actor-centered narratives.

If the unknown is such a powerful and enduring part of environmental debates, the question of dealing with this kind of uncertainty in the future inevitably hung over the conference. Two papers specifically dealt with this topic. Altenburg described how a specific German parliamentary commission, established in the context of a bitter dispute over nuclear energy, identified a common ground for discussion by thinking in four scenarios, two with nuclear power and two without. Lubanov outlined a similar conceptual approach for the Dead Sea, where multiple technological options are possible to stop the dramatic fall of the water table, with different costs and risks. But can the scenario method, which inevitably carries the air of an academic enterprise, survive in the harsh
world of politics, where power and money often trump clever concepts? During the discussion of Altenburg’s paper, it was pointed out that the commission’s success was also due to personal friendships that ran across the front lines of the debate—an old-boys’ network that opened opportunities for an open dialogue. But fraternities of this kind usually develop within national contexts, a dire prospect for discussions over the Dead Sea, which touch on the interests of Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians alike.

So were we less ignorant about the unknown after two days of intensive discussions? It seems that the conference merely opened the door toward a new field of research, as the participants clearly raised more questions than they answered. The unknown remains a frontier of historical research both in empirical and in methodological terms. It seems that, in spite of all reflections, the epistemology of ignorance remains largely unresolved, but some progress has probably been made. We now know that it makes sense to discuss topics as diverse as fisheries, soils, and forests with the same set of questions in mind. We also know that managing the unknown is a truly global issue: It is a challenge in frontier societies as well as in advanced, industrialized countries. Even more, it is a challenge that will not go away automatically as soon as the much touted “knowledge society” evolves into full swing, as the problem is clearly more than one of simple lack of information. Ignorance is not only a scientific problem, but also a cultural one, as Rixecker reminded us when, in concluding her paper, she invoked a popular phrase of the Maori:

He aha te mea nui? What is the most important thing?
He tangata. It is people.
He tangata. It is people.
He tangata. It is people.

Frank Uekötter (Deutsches Museum, Munich)
MODERNIZATION AS A GLOBAL PROJECT: AMERICAN, SOVIET, AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES

Conference at the GHI, March 28–29, 2008. Conveners: Corinna R. Unger (GHI) and David C. Engerman (Brandeis University). Participants: Ragna Boden (University of Bochum), Jeffrey J. Byrne (London School of Economics and Political Science), Nick Cullather (Indiana University), David E. Hamilton (University of Kentucky), Joseph M. Hodge (West Virginia University), Young-sun Hong (SUNY Stony Brook), Constantin Katsakioris (École des hautes études en sciences sociales), Sara Lorenzini (University of Trento), Lorenz M. Luthi (McGill University), Daniel R. Maul (University of Gießen), Jason Pribilsky (Whitman College), Joy Rohde (American Academy of Arts and Sciences), Bernd Schaefer (Woodrow Wilson International Center), Perrin Selcer (University of Pennsylvania), Bradley R. Simpson (University of Maryland), Daniel Speich (ETH Zürich), Massimiliano Trentin (University of Florence), Odd Arne Westad (London School of Economics and Political Science), James P. Woodard (Montclair State University).

Historians’ studies of efforts to modernize the so-called Third World have accelerated in the last decade and show little signs of diminishing. Most of the early scholarship on modernization theory was American-centered, focused more on ideas than on practices, and examined only the 1950s and 1960s. The latest scholarship on modernization, some of which was discussed at a recent GHI workshop, has built on these studies but has expanded dramatically in terms of chronology, approach, and perspective. As the American and European scholars gathered to discuss “Modernization as a Global Project” agreed, new work on modernization is far broader. It is more global (looking from the perspective of the Soviet bloc and from the Third World countries that were the objects of modernization); it looks at periods both before and after the heyday of modernization in the two decades after the end of the Second World War; and it includes intensive local studies as well as expansive interpretative approaches, very often in the same work. As a result, scholars are now able to gain a better understanding of events and concepts that shaped the course of Third World and global history in the context of decolonization and the Cold War.

Several key issues emerged over the course of the workshop, one of which was the question of historical continuities and ruptures: When were the major points of inflection of theories and practices of modernization, and what accounted for them? Many British colonial officers, for instance, continued their careers in the postcolonial era as development
experts and advisors for postcolonial governments and international organizations, as Joseph Hodge demonstrated in his paper. Hence, conceptual continuities about development, modernization, and race tended to be strong, and experiences from the prewar era influenced postwar programs to a large degree. As a consequence, 1945 presented less of a caesura than often imagined, the discussants agreed.

Similarly, many participants stressed the need to situate the Cold War rather than assuming that modernization was inherently a Cold War project. In many cases, the turn toward American or Soviet sponsors was driven by domestic circumstances, both political and economic. Daniel Speich’s paper on the domestic politics of modernization in Kenya was one example of the ways in which modernization was a global project that existed both within and outside of Cold War geopolitics. Strategic issues, as important as they were to the superpowers and their allies, often had a smaller impact on modernization approaches and practices in the newly independent countries than local circumstances, interests, traditions, and personal preferences. Many Third World countries were attracted to the example of Soviet modernization, but the reality of Soviet development aid—low-quality goods, insistence on a single model of central planning that took no account of local conditions, overly rigid models—proved disillusioning and encouraged cooperation with countries that could offer more practical and more prestigious aid. Such was the Indonesian experience of Soviet aid, as Ragna Boden’s paper illustrated. Hence, material advantages competed with, and occasionally outweighed, ideological preferences.

The rise of multinational discourses of expert (especially social scientific) knowledge also worked alongside or against Cold War geopolitics. Key categories and measures, from Gross National Product to measures of food supply and population, contained embedded notions of progress, generally shared across ideological lines, and shaped both Western and Soviet modernization programs. Some of the most influential knowledge was economic in nature, and contained within it a disposition toward economic planning, one of the main features of modernization politics in the 1950s and 1960s globally. Indeed, one of the principal contributions of the workshop was to open up the question of Soviet-bloc strategies in the Third World in competition with the range of Western visions, as Sara Lorenzini did in her comparison of East and West German approaches in the Third World. Beneath the cover of Cold War ideology, Western economic planning strategies shared a great deal with certain Soviet strategies—even though, as Lorenz Lüthi emphasized, there were multiple Soviet models in play, each drawn from a different period of Soviet history.
The interest in planning, even on the American side, should not be such a surprise: Many of the proponents of postcolonial modernization were New Dealers committed to a mixed economy with a significant guiding role for government agencies. David Hamilton’s paper, for instance, traced the career of American agricultural economist Mordecai Ezekiel from the US Department of Agriculture to the Food and Agriculture Organization. In the postwar era, Ezekiel and his fellow New Dealers continued to embrace its privileging of social scientific expertise, long-term planning, and state intervention to solve economic problems and create welfare states. The specters of fascism and global war had strengthened their belief that economic security was essential to achieving long-lasting peace within a stable international order. Technocracy in the optimistic sense seemed to hold the opportunity to overcome political and ideological strife and to improve the standard of living (another quantitative measure of the postwar era) of billions of people across the globe. At the same time, technocratic planning would also provide expanded government control over peoples and regions that were difficult to monitor by traditional political means. Even during colonial times, political control over the subjected societies had remained incomplete; in many cases, decolonization made such control even harder. Unsurprisingly, the military played an important role in helping to realize large-scale modernization projects. Apart from strategic considerations, the massive transfer of military equipment and knowledge from the First and Second Worlds to the Third World was regarded as one of the most effective ways of enabling traditional societies to establish the structures necessary for building a modern state that would be able to withstand external pressures and solve domestic problems. As Brad Simpson’s paper on US aid to Indonesia and Bernd Schaefer’s on East German aid to North Vietnam demonstrated, military aid could serve not just geopolitical ends, but also promote a version of state-building defined by pervasive control.

One of the new nations’ most pressing domestic problems was the rural situation, long ignored by scholars of modernization. Historians have too often focused on industrial aspirations of modernization programs—dams, steel mills, and factories—without adequate attention to the massive transformations of agriculture and rural life that were an equal part of modernization programs. In the view of the postcolonial administrations and the modernizers from abroad, however, agricultural reforms were of utmost importance to making the Third World countries economically independent, politically stable, and generally modern. Corinna Unger’s paper compared West German aid programs for Indian agriculture and industry, showing how vastly different approaches to modernization could be, even within a single bilateral relationship.Usu-
ally, rural reform aimed at increasing the agricultural production to create a surplus and provide the basis for domestic economic growth. This implied abolishing the traditional, supposedly inefficient methods of agriculture and introducing modern techniques and structures. Model programs were initiated to convince the rural population of the advantages of modern agriculture and modern ways of living; Jason Pribilsky, for instance, described Cornell University’s program in Peru, which put Cornell in charge of its own hacienda and combined persuasion with coercion. Land reforms, resettlement, educational campaigns, and technological measures (irrigation, the use of artificial fertilizers and new seed varieties, extension, etc.) were supposed to solve the “rural problem,” which seemed to prevent the decolonized nations from advancing toward prosperity. Yet whether based on socialist or capitalist ideas, most reform projects sooner or later came to be regarded as failures for a number of reasons: The local populations resisted the programs, which ran counter to tried practices; the new techniques, typically imported from another part of the world or even from a theoretical construct, did not account for local conditions and preferences; production often remained too low or increased only in selected areas; or the effects—for instance, the Green Revolution—posed ecological and economic threats to the rural population.

Closely linked to the problem of low production levels and a low standard of living was the phenomenon of “overpopulation,” which Western observers came to regard as a danger to global security in the 1950s and 1960s. In some cases, racist Western notions about the value of Third World denizens encouraged such thinking. But even within the Third World, rural populations were designated as “surplus,” subjecting them to measures as diverse as resettlement and so-called population control. As in many other cases of structural and sociological modernization, from India and Indonesia to Peru, the line between voluntary and coercive implementation was very fine. Coercive measures in the field of public health, birth control, resettlement, or compulsory labor services to build infrastructure and lessen unemployment were legitimized in the name of modernization. Their sometimes brutal effects on the individuals involved and on the environment were presented as unavoidable sacrifices in the interest of the larger goal of overcoming “backwardness.” Many of the postcolonial regimes considered human rights a luxury that only established modern societies could afford.

These efforts were not solely imposed by the developed world upon helpless Third World nations. Many Third World governments themselves promoted coercive measures in the battles against “backwardness.” Daniel Maul showed that even organizations like the International Labor Organization (ILO), which made human rights a central element in promoting its integrated modernization concept and in fighting racism,
had only limited influence on these modernization practices. In sum, the effort to modernize the Third World by democratic means often clashed with coercive measures employed by authoritarian regimes that used the rhetoric of modernization to bridge national divides and generate political legitimacy.

This sense of modernization gone awry leads to another point that emerged as a prominent theme at the workshop: When would a modernization program be judged a success or a failure? Nick Cullather and Arne Westad questioned whether final judgments were ever rendered on modernization programs. The language of experimentation made it hard to determine when and under what circumstances a project might end. These “experiments” usually ended for external reasons—policy changes, funding cutoffs, or external pressures—rather than as a final measure of success or failure. Most historians follow modernization programs’ impresarios in deeming the projects failures, yet the failures rarely discouraged modernization efforts, at least until the very late 1960s. There were always groups and individuals that benefited from a given project by gaining access to resources or political control. David Engerman underscored the fact that the notion, widely held in the West, that the Third World was a laboratory for experiments on social and economic modernization also encouraged the deferral of an ultimate reckoning about a given project. A failure could continue almost indefinitely. The notion of a laboratory for social change, often found in the development discourse, seemed to suggest a controlled experiment. But this language worked against the claims by most experts that development was a complex and multifaceted set of changes—not the sort typically amenable to an experiment, especially one with only a handful of cases. As a result, most modernization programs privileged one variable—market production, standard of living or agricultural productivity—that would have unintended and often dangerous consequences on the so-called experimental subjects.

Modernization theorists and practitioners had an especially hard time reckoning with the role of religion. Western and Soviet programs alike considered religious belief an artifact of the “backwardness” that they hoped to overcome. This attitude was prevalent in programs in Islamic countries; Islam, as some participants noted, could be a vehicle as well as an obstacle for modernization programs. Especially in the Middle East and North Africa, Islam had a crucial political role that modernization programs typically ignored or misunderstood. Indeed, a cluster of papers on the Islamic world—including Jeffrey James Byrne’s on Algeria and Massimiliano Trentin’s on Syria—demonstrated the ways in which Western and Soviet encounters with Islam were fraught with misunderstanding well before the rise of militant Islam.
Conference participants generally agreed that future scholarship needed to take better account of the impacts of modernization politics on the Third World societies, on everyday life, on family structures, gender roles, and so on. How did individuals experience the introduction of infrastructure, technology, and industry into their daily lives? In what ways did economic modernization influence consumption patterns and consumer identities (as James Woodard discussed for Brazil)? How did different generations react to the social effects of modernization—the contestation of traditional gender roles (as Young-sun Hong and Constantin Katsakioris discussed in a range of Soviet-bloc cultural and medical programs for the Third World), the propagation of urban lifestyles, semantic and linguistic changes? To answer those questions, the particularities of places of modernization, the physical sites where modernization was contested, and its material conditions will have to be considered more systematically. Similarly, it will be important to investigate the reactions of the modernizers at the sites of modernization. How did they react to the frustrations that often accompanied their projects? Did they learn from their experiences, and did they adapt their approaches and expectations?

At this point, it seems evident that the similarities between Eastern and Western models of modernization were much greater than their differences. In the end, the socialist version of Third World modernization failed when the USSR, its most influential proponent, crumbled. However, it seems advisable to analyze socialist models of modernization in the Third World in their own right instead of tying them too closely to Soviet politics, much as scholars are starting to do for Western models. This would do justice to the inherent dynamic of decolonization, to the decolonized countries' individual historical development, and to their initiative and agency in promoting indigenous, hybrid concepts of modernization. As a consequence of this reassessment of the Cold War’s importance in the context of global modernization, historians will have to come up with a new periodization and a new geographic perspective that, instead of starting out from Moscow, Washington, London, and Paris, starts out from the alleged periphery, which turned out to be surprisingly central in the second half of the twentieth century.

David C. Engerman (Brandeis University) and Corinna R. Unger (GHI)
1968—FORTY YEARS LATER

Workshop held at Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York, April 12, 2008. Co-organized by the GHI and Vassar College (American Cultures, History Department, International Studies, and Dean of the Faculty). Conveners: Maria Höhn (Vassar College) and Martin Klimke (GHI). Participants: Michael Hanagan (Vassar College), Eric Lindbloom (Poughkeepsie, NY), Joe Nevis (Vassar College), Michele Mason (Vancouver, Canada), Jeff Schutts (Douglas College, British Columbia), David Schalk (Vassar College).

This workshop initiated the GHI’s cooperation with Vassar College in an international research project on “African American GIs and the Civil Rights Movement Abroad.” It sought to trace postwar social and anti-war movements on both sides of the Atlantic, their historiography and political legacies. The workshop was open to the public and drew a large audience both from the local community, Vassar students and faculty, as well as alumni and parents.

The first panel entitled “The Sixties in America and Europe” opened up the panorama of protest movements and dissent from a transatlantic perspective. In his talk on “The Other Alliance: Transnational Protest and Activist Networks during the 1960s,” Martin Klimke described the geopolitical infrastructure of the Cold War and the various factors that led to the emergence of a New Left in Europe and the United States. Klimke particularly examined the ideological and cultural convergences of the 1960/70s protest movements and countercultures, which allowed activists to reach across national boundaries and join forces in what they perceived as a common struggle against imperialism.

Maria Höhn subsequently discussed the relationship between “German Students, the Vietnam Campaign and Black Panther GIs” in greater detail, situating them in a larger framework of American occupation of West Germany after the Second World War and internal revolt in the U.S. army at the end of the 1960s. Höhn not only stressed the fact that the dissatisfaction of black GIs posed a significant problem for the internal moral and strength of the U.S. military and its mission in Vietnam. She also highlighted the efforts of German New Left activists to organize American soldiers and establish a Europe-wide “underground railroad” to help them desert from their bases in the Federal Republic to countries such as France and Scandinavia.

The third panelist, David Schalk, extended this perspective to the situation in France in the late 1960s in his talk on “Paris, Algeria and Vietnam: The French May of 1968.” Schalk analyzed the attitude of
French students to the war in Vietnam during the turbulent events of the French May based on the country’s experience with the Algerian War in the late 1950s. He suggested that France’s long colonial involvement both in Algeria and Vietnam was one of the reasons for the strong intellectual opposition against the U.S. engagement in South East Asia. In comparing the situation in France with the anti-war movement in the United States, Schalk also drew on his experience as a former anti-war activist who counseled more than 300 GIs who contemplated becoming conscientious objectors during the war in Vietnam.

To provide a comparison to current events, the first panel was followed by a screening of the documentary “Breaking Ranks” (2006), which examined the current phenomenon of U.S. soldiers seeking refuge in Canada as part of their resistance to the war effort in Iraq. The movie followed the experience of four American military deserters, their lawyers and families, as they tried to exercise their consciences while facing profound emotional, ethical, and legal consequences. After the screening, Michelle Mason, the movie’s director and film-maker of the award-winning documentary “The Friendship Village” (2001), explained the individual circumstances of these testimonies and the political complications generated by the decisions of these deserters for U.S.-Canadian relations today.

The second panel, “War and Peace—Then and Now,” brought together academics and anti-war activists from the 1960s to the present to discuss similarities and differences between the Vietnam War and the current war in Iraq. Jeff Schutts, himself a former veteran who became a conscientious objector in the late 1980s, gave an overview of current GI organizing efforts. Mike Hanagan recalled his experience as an anti-war activist in the 1960s, particularly his collaboration with GIs in producing underground newspapers. Eric Lindbloom elaborated on his candidacy as the 1966 Independent Peace Party candidate in the 28th Congressional District of New York. What united their presentations was their insistence that despite the different nature of the two wars, there remained a continuity in terms of the disastrous impact on both America’s image abroad and the lives of returning veterans.

The workshop was not only remarkable for the large audience it drew but also for the intensity of the discussions. Different generations of academics, activists, and students engaged in a vivid and stimulating debate on issues of war and peace that seemed to move a great many people. The event was thus a successful start for the cooperation between the GHI and Vassar College, as well as the greater community of New York.

Martin Klimke (GHI)
The historiography of National Socialism and the Holocaust would be unthinkable without the contributions of the generation of American scholars who started their careers just after World War II. Gerhard L. Weinberg, who turned eighty on January 1, 2008, is one of the most distinguished and prolific members of a group of historians who devoted their lives and careers to trying to understand Germany’s embrace of totalitarianism under the Nazis. Many, including Weinberg, were born in Germany and had first-hand experience of Nazi rule in practice. It was therefore fitting that, together with students and colleagues of Weinberg, the GHI convened a symposium dedicated to Weinberg’s achievements as a scholar and teacher. The symposium explored the depth and impact of Weinberg’s numerous contributions to the historical profession, both in the United States, where he was influential in re-establishing German history as a field of study, and in Germany, where he was a frequent participant in high-profile scholarly debates.

The symposium began with a panel chaired by Philipp Gassert that was dedicated to Weinberg’s early work with captured German records. Astrid M. Eckert’s contribution highlighted Weinberg’s role in the cataloging and microfilming of the captured documents, which were temporarily housed in the torpedo factory in Alexandria, Virginia. Weinberg and his colleagues helped guarantee scholarly and international access to valuable historical sources much earlier than would otherwise have been possible. This established an important transnational foundation for post-war scholarship. Detlef Junker highlighted one of Weinberg’s most important discoveries in the captured records: Hitler’s so-called Second Book. This source became central to historiographical debates over Hitler’s foreign policy aims, including the heavily debated question of
whether Nazi Germany aimed at world domination. Dietrich Orlow argued that access to documents was essential for the success of postwar German historiography, guarding against nationalist and apologist perspectives by making evidence against such arguments readily available.

The second panel, chaired by Doris Bergen, was devoted to Weinberg’s contribution to scholarship about Nazi foreign policy and World War II. Taking Weinberg’s seminal work *The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany* as his starting point, Norman Goda argued that Hitler had pursued truly global aims and that Hitler’s intentions and ideology mattered. Moreover, Goda noted that even though Weinberg was writing in a highly charged ideological moment, his arguments were not anchored in any specific ideology. Jürgen Förster considered the impact of Gerhard Weinberg’s scholarship in Germany, focusing on Weinberg’s response to Andreas Hillgruber and Hans-Günther Seraphim in the first volume of the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*. There Weinberg argued against Hillgruber and Seraphim’s thesis of a German preventive war with the Soviet Union. Indeed, Förster noted that Hillgruber eventually came around to Weinberg’s point of view, incorporating Hitler’s racist world view and focus on *Lebensraum* into his own interpretation. The panel was concluded by Alfred Mierzejewski, who discussed Weinberg’s *Visions of Victory* in order to highlight the war aims and postwar intentions of eight World War II leaders.

Daniel Rogers continued the focus on Weinberg’s role in historical debates in the third panel, devoted to Holocaust studies and chaired by Christopher Browning. Rogers underscored Weinberg’s role as an important public intellectual in the United States. In particular, Rogers cited Weinberg’s vigilance in rejecting shoddy uses of history in contemporary political debates, most famously, perhaps, Weinberg’s 2002 *Washington Post* critique of the use of the “Munich analogy” in the run-up to the Iraq War. Michaela Hoenicke Moore looked at the long history of policy debates on Germany and World War II, ranging from their origins in the 1930s to their present meaning for American foreign policy. Moore reminded her listeners that moral outrage against Nazi Germany was not always front and center in the public’s understanding. Finally, Richard Breitman returned to the theme of the first panel by highlighting the importance of sources and Weinberg’s role in the declassification process, most recently in securing the release of millions of classified documents from the CIA and other American intelligence agencies.

The symposium was followed by an evening of tributes and reminiscences from former students and representatives of the many institutions with which Weinberg was associated during his long and distinguished career. These included the GHI Washington, represented by its director, Hartmut Berghoff; the German Studies Association (of which
Weinberg is a past president), represented by Henry Friedlander; the Conference Group for Central European History, represented by Isabell Hull; the Friends of the German Historical Institute, represented by Geoffrey Giles; the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, represented by Gretchen Skidmore; the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, represented by Michael Brenner; and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, represented by Konrad Jarausch. German ambassador Klaus Scharioth honored Weinberg with a speech that culminated with the statement “Your former country is proud of you.” The evening concluded with a speech by Gerhard Weinberg himself, who reflected on his “Sixty Years of Adventures in German History.”

Philipp Gassert (GHI)
FLAMMABLE CITIES:
FIRE, URBAN ENVIRONMENT, AND CULTURE IN HISTORY

Conference at the GHI, May 15–17, 2008. Conveners: Greg Bankoff (University of Hull), Uwe Lübken (GHI), Jordan Sand (Georgetown University). Participants: Shane Ewen (Leeds Metropolitan University), Cathy Frierson (University of New Hampshire), Jason Gilliland (University of Western Ontario), Amy S. Greenberg (Pennsylvania State University), Andrea Davies Henderson (Stanford University), Sabine Höhler (GHI), Daniel Kerr (James Madison University), Susan Donahue Kuretsky (Vassar College), Nancy H. Kwak (Brooklyn Polytechnic University), Maren Lorenz (GHI), Samuel J. Martland (Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology), Kristen McCleary (James Madison University), John R. McNeill (Georgetown University), Mark C. Molesky (Seton Hall University), Ayodeji Olukoju (University of Lagos), Hrvoje Petric (University of Zagreb), Dirk Schubert (HafenCity Universität Hamburg), Sofia T. Shwayri (University of Oxford), Jérôme Tadié (Institut de recherche pour le développement), Sara E. Wermiel (MIT).

Pre-industrial cities around the world burned frequently. Yet many prospered, and some grew to populations of over a million inhabitants. Although new building and extinguishing technologies and the rise of fire insurance fundamentally altered the relationship between cities and fire beginning in the seventeenth century, many cities around the world remained largely wood-built into the twentieth century. Some still are.

On May 15–17, 2008, an international group of scholars met at the GHI to examine the history of uncontrolled fire in large urban settlements. No work to date has taken a global approach to this issue. Research on fire in pre-industrial and industrial cities has tended to be limited to treatment in the context of individual urban histories (either of particular great fires or of the growth of firefighting technology) or general treatment of overall trends. The English-language historiography on urban fire history overwhelmingly has treated only Europe and the United States. The conference departed from these narrow methodological and geographical limits in order to illuminate a host of new issues related to cities and the environment by permitting comparison of differing urban morphologies, types of building material, social systems, cultural attitudes, and methods for coping with disaster. Since the study of cities is inherently a multidisciplinary enterprise, the gathering included scholars in fields ranging from art history to geography, in addition to social, cultural, and environmental historians.
Fire poses a problem of particular subtlety and interest for the field of environmental history because it occupies a zone between human and natural causation. As recent studies (such as: Greg Bankoff, Georg Frerks, and Dorothea Hilhorst, *Mapping Vulnerability* [London, 2004]) have emphasized, “natural disasters” must be understood as encounters between episodic natural events and humans who build settlements exposed to natural hazards. The study of fire allows us to carry this insight yet further into the social realm, since fire is both a natural hazard and a resource whose controlled use is indispensable to human habitation.

The social issues surrounding fire include building codes, arson and punishment, the military use of fire, organization of citizens into voluntary and professional firefighting associations, and aid, charity, and compensation after fires. More broadly, in socioeconomic terms, the history of fire in cities is inseparable from questions about the growth of capitalism and private rights in property. Johan Goudsblom (*Fire and Civilization* [London, 1992]) notes that “stonification” and “brickification” in northern European cities developed in the seventeenth century in parallel with increased prosperity and commercial competition. Yet it remains questionable whether the flourishing commercial economies of early modern East Asia and the growth of capitalism in colonial and postcolonial contexts were accompanied by analogous patterns of change in the management of fire’s threat to material property. Further, the relationship between capitalist urban growth and permanent building materials in all places is a complex one, since a permanent state of flux and rapid obsolescence are inherent to the workings of capitalism. The modern real estate concept of the building cycle is predicated on fluctuation in property markets, not on cycles of natural growth and decay. Participants were thus charged with the task of considering the effects of urban fires—including not only their costs but also their benefits—in relation to the broad history of political and economic structures.

The cultural issues relating to urban fire include not only different ways of building cities and coping with their destruction, but the symbolic systems within which fire is understood. Destruction by fire can be treated as divine retribution, as a natural rebalancing of earthly forces, or as the fault of particular individuals or groups. Each set of cultural beliefs about fire predicates its own forms of response. Even in the largely secular modern context of twentieth-century San Francisco and New York, responses to urban disaster have been heavily shaped by cultural context, as Kevin Rozario has shown recently in his analysis of American “narratives of resilience” (see Rozario’s chapter in: Lawrence Vale and Thomas J. Campanella, eds., *The Resilient City* [Oxford, 2005]).

The conference was the first step in a scholarly attempt to develop the first large-scale comparison of the historical dynamics between urban
habitation, urban form, urban governance, and fire in different parts of the world. From this global comparison, it should be possible to map broad regional patterns and determine in a nuanced way for the first time what roles climate, economy, government, and culture have played in fire regimes across Europe and Asia and beyond.

Three papers dealt with fire in the Luso-Hispanic world. Mark Molesky reminded us that the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, often heralded as the “first modern disaster,” was actually a complex emergency. It was not simply a seismic event of great magnitude followed by a tsunami, but was also a devastating fire that raged for perhaps a week and consumed a large part of the old city. Using eyewitness accounts, Molesky was able to reconstruct the course of this conflagration from the controversies over its inception to the limited abilities of the city’s firefighting services to extinguish or even control the blaze, to estimates of the extent of the damages wrought. He concluded that it was the fire more than anything else that proved to be so destructive of property, and that perhaps as many as ten thousand people may have perished in the flames, a truly staggering figure both for the period and for the type of hazard. In fact, it was the sheer scale of this destruction that provided Enlightenment officials with a unique opportunity to reconstruct and “improve” the center of Lisbon in a form that it largely retains to this day.

Moving forward in time to the following century and in place to the southern cone of South America, two papers discussed fire in Chile and Argentina during the nineteenth century. The authors, however, examined their subject from very different vantage points, illustrating the myriad ways in which fire affects our lives and the diverse insights into history and culture that it provides. To Samuel Martland, the history of fire in Valparaíso was about enterprise and innovation. The city pioneered new firefighting and fire prevention measures in Chile: establishing volunteer firefighting companies from among the social elite; readily adopting private insurance as a means of limiting loss; and elaborating building codes and safety regulations to prevent future conflagrations. In this, the municipal authorities were evidently successful, as the city experienced no major blaze between the great downtown fire of 1858 and the earthquake of 1906. Paraphrasing a newspaper article of the period, Martland shows how fire had been transformed from a catastrophe to “a matter of business.”

Kristen McCleary had a very different take on fire. She was not so much interested in documenting the physicality of fires or how they are fought as in the discourse that surrounds them. Apparently, fear of fire and concern with fire safety in public theaters became an almost obsessive focus of city administrators in late nineteenth-century Buenos Aires. There was a certain irony to this mania in that the city, whether by luck
or design, was able to avoid the terrible fires that burnt down other major theaters with such loss of life in Paris, Vienna, and Chicago. Public theaters, along with churches and department stores, were the foremost “covered spaces” of the time where large crowds regularly congregated, and so posed exceptional fire risks. According to Mc Cleary, this fixation with fire safety had its roots in the local elite’s attempts to both “outperform” their counterparts in Europe and North America and to impose a measure of “discipline” upon the disorderly migrant population who were entering the country in such large numbers at the turn of the twentieth century. For her, fire constitutes a useful and fruitful lens through which to view the modernization of the city.

Bridging the divide between the Luso-Hispanic world and that of Southeast Asia, Greg Bankoff examined fire in the nineteenth-century Philippines. He viewed the European city outside of Europe as having had a dual nature, a European core at its center about which formed a much larger indigenous periphery. Manila, therefore, was really two cities within a city, representing not only the socio-economic and ethnic realities of colonial life, but also a particular cultural adaptation to the twin hazards of earthquake and fire that, over time, had come to dominate notions of urban planning. However, as Manila’s population steadily rose during the course of the century and as the boundaries between these two cities blurred, Bankoff showed how developments in fire management and firefighting not only helped control conflagrations, but also increasingly became a domain of colonial and even class contestation. Manila, as Bankoff demonstrated, was a city born out of fire, what he called a pyromorphology that represents a fascinating interplay between culture, architecture, and a combination of hazards over time.

Two other papers at the conference also studied fire in Southeast Asia, but in more contemporary times. It is the political nature of fire that came through so strongly with these authors. Nancy Haekyung Kwak showed how the government of Singapore used the Bukit Ho Swee fire of 1961, a conflagration that reduced some sixty acres of overcrowded slums to ashes in a matter of hours, to initiate a program of slum clearance, social engineering, and, ultimately, nation building. The fire provided the leaders of the People’s Action Party with an unprecedented opportunity to establish themselves in the public’s mind as a party that cared about people and used the full machinery of government to do something to better their lot. Re-housing those affected by the blaze paved the way for the massive HDB public/private housing programs that so characterize Singapore today. As such, Kwak presented the Bukit Ho Swee fire as the “crucible” from which the modern city-state and the continuing popularity of its ruling party emerged. When considering fires, she further
admonished us to distinguish between creative destruction and simple devastation.

The other paper on Southeast Asia continued with this political vein but across the Strait of Malacca in Indonesia. Jérôme Tadié examined the relationship between fire and governance in Jakarta since the 1970s. Fire, he argued, is a complex phenomenon that transforms the urban environment in different ways according to the political, economic, and social forces at play. It can equally be an issue of poverty and survival as one about international development and globalization. Focusing on fires in certain slums of Jakarta, Tadié revealed the web of interests and actors involved in the provision of aid and succor to those directly affected by it and in the subsequent reconstruction of an area. In particular, political parties in reformasi Indonesia use fire, both arson and the distribution of relief, as a means of extending patronage and expanding their power base. Fire in contemporary Jakarta is thus not just a hazard, but also a prism through which modernity, power, and the daily constraints of living are refracted, revealing how the metropolis functions over time.

In early modern Europe, prevention of large blazes engendered more municipal regulation than almost any other problem of urban habitation. Hrvoje Petrić presented detailed portraits of fire incidents in four key cities of the Croato-Slavonian Kingdom, on the frontier of the Habsburg Empire. All of these cities were characterized by high densities and construction in flammable materials. Fires occurred for a variety of reasons, most commonly human error. Records show that their social and economic impact was often devastating. Regular firefighting forces did not appear until the creation of voluntary societies in the nineteenth century. Municipal authorities sought with some success to limit fire damage by requiring citizens to equip themselves and be ready to fight fires. The most important development came, however, following the fire that destroyed the military stronghold of Varaždin in 1776. After this fire, all reconstruction within the city walls was required to be in brick. Varaždin re-emerged as a nascent bourgeois city, since the aristocrats who had made it their capital prior to 1776 decamped to Zagreb. Thus in this instance, the transition to fireproof construction accompanied a sharp break in the social composition and political role of the city.

A key development in the modernization of firefighting in Europe occurred in seventeenth-century Amsterdam: the invention of the fire engine and fire hose. Art historian Susan Kuretsky revealed the importance of the cultural context for this technological innovation by examining the ways in which fire and firefighting were represented in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Dutch art. Kuretsky focused in particular on the work of Jan van der Heyden (1637–1712), who patented the “snakepump,” one of the first fire engines with a flexible hose that could
be drawn into buildings to focus a stream of water directly on the seat of the fire indoors. This was especially suited to early modern European cities such as Amsterdam, with a high density of multi-story flammable buildings, where a single spark could trigger a citywide disaster. Illustrations in van der Heyden’s 1690 *Fire Hose Book*, a foundational document that popularized his invention throughout Europe, lavish great attention on the details of buildings, emphasizing the value of the property that could be saved by effective fire extinguishing. Although van der Heyden never painted a city on fire, the precise empiricism of his paintings of buildings in Amsterdam evokes the importance of pristine intactness in his aesthetic vision, a sensibility that related to his efforts to develop improved technology for the preservation of buildings and material property from the ravages of fire.

Like Amsterdam, pre-modern Hamburg was highly vulnerable to large-scale conflagration, as Dirk Schubert explained in his paper on the city’s 1842 fire. Igniting for unknown reasons in the Deichstrasse, the fire quickly spread to other parts of the town. Fueled by mostly timber-framed houses and aided by the weather conditions, as well as an inadequate firefighting organization, the catastrophe destroyed two thousand buildings with more than four thousand housing units. About twenty thousand citizens lost their homes and had to relocate to tent villages on the town’s periphery. Despite the widespread destruction, or rather because of it, many merchants and other influential citizens saw the fire as a welcome tool for transforming Hamburg from a pre-modern fortress city into a modern metropolis.

Montreal witnessed similar “creative destruction” after four large fires between 1850 and 1852 had destroyed almost one-fifth of the city’s housing stock. Here, too, fire proved to be a “powerful agent of urban morphological change,” as Jason Gilliland pointed out. Fires could reconcile the inertia of the built environment with the constant push to remodel the physical urban space according to the needs of a growing city in a capitalist economy. The pace of changes in Montreal’s urban fabric after the catastrophe, however, was not the same in all affected areas and at all times. Analyzing three different areas of the city, Gilliland was able to show that Montreal’s productive core was rebuilt much more quickly than peripheral quarters. Also, redevelopment was more intense in boom periods than during phases of economic distress and was more likely to involve morphological changes such as increased building height or improvements in infrastructure. Since fire could be such a useful tool, it is hardly surprising that many urban fires were intentionally set.

This is exactly what happened in postwar Cleveland, as Daniel Kerr elaborated in his paper. During the riots of the 1960s, African Americans
resorted to fire to protest police brutality and drive white businesses out of predominantly black neighborhoods to gain more economic control over these areas. But the strategy of abandoning and willingly destroying urban housing units, employed by (overwhelmingly white) landlords in the 1970s, proved to be much more devastating in the end than the riots. Fires turned out to be especially useful in transforming urban space for profitable future use. Kerr showed that in Cleveland, the city government itself eventually embraced fire as an instrument of urban renewal, abandoning inner-city residents and encouraging demolition contractors and property owners to burn buildings. The lasting effects of this strategy were devastating. The city lost a huge part of its housing stock, and gentrified “Renaissance Villages” supplanted former black working-class neighborhoods. In a more general sense, Kerr’s paper showed that not only large conflagrations could alter the urban landscape but also the combined effect of thousands of single events over almost two decades.

Amy S. Greenberg addressed approaches to fire risk by comparing late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century firefighting strategies in Mexico to those in the United States and Canada. Taking the fire histories of Mexico City, Mérida, and Monterey as case studies, Greenberg noted striking differences rather than similarities in the developments north and south of the Rio Grande. While urban modernization was a key element in President Porfirio Díaz’s vision of progress, firefighting was not a central part of it, to say the least. Only Mexico City witnessed the creation of a professional firefighting force during the Porfiriato. All other cities still had to rely on volunteer firefighters. One reason for this neglect certainly was the fact that most houses were built of stone and adobe; thus, fires in Mexico were rather rare and less destructive than in Canada and the United States. Greenberg, however, stated that differences in building materials could not sufficiently explain the history of Mérida and Monterey, two cities devastated by fire. Rather, the absence of strong and effective municipal government, the lack of local water sources, and city dwellers’ “fatalistic attitude” regarding disasters were responsible for Mexico’s different trajectory. Furthermore, fire insurance companies, crucial to the promotion of the professionalization of firefighting, as well as the funding of volunteer companies in the United States and Canada, did not arrive until much later in Mexico.

In the United States, however, as Sara Wermiel pointed out in her paper, the relationship between fire insurance companies and the management of urban fire risk was not one of straightforward risk reduction. She stated that insurance companies even discouraged fireproof construction, since fires were essential to their business. This was especially true for the stock fire insurance companies. Since their agents were unable to inspect every insured property, the hazard-rating systems they devel-
oped modeled the real risk only in a very rough manner and had only a few classes. As a result, everybody paid more or less the same premium, which rewarded hazardous buildings and penalized safe structures. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, a combination of factors pressured stock fire insurance companies to change their policies: the public grew increasingly discontent with their indiscriminate rates; new and hostile legislation was enacted; and, most importantly, mutual fire insurance companies appeared on the scene. The Factory Mutuals, in particular, offered an alternative to the rigorous systems of its competitors. By focusing on first-class risks, inspecting properties on a regular basis, and sponsoring research on the flammability of certain building materials, they were able to offer lower rates and, thus, force the stock companies to alter their rate-setting practices.

In her paper on the social impact of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire, Andrea Davies Henderson showed that catastrophes are anything but a social equalizer, even if homes of the rich and poor, the native-born and immigrant, were affected by the blaze. Crucial firefighting decisions as well as relief policies followed pre-disaster patterns of stratification by ethnicity, race, and class. Firefighters, for example, deliberately saved homes of the wealthy, while Chinatown was left to burn; servants in the Western Addition watched the houses of affluent families, allowing them to leave the city; and Chinatown was supposed to be relocated after the disaster—a plan that Chinatown residents successfully countered by immediate non-permit rebuilding. Thus, the fires, as Henderson emphasized, acted as “an accelerant to social differences” in turn-of-the-century San Francisco.

Ayodeji Olukoju’s paper on Lagos highlighted the political contexts and meanings of fire in a contemporary mega-city with a burgeoning population living in fragile and combustible shantytowns. Olukoju considered three types of fire outbreak: fires that began in shantytown dwellings; fires in markets; and fires in high-rise strategic buildings. Frequent shantytown fires result partly from infrastructural problems, such as the government’s failure to provide adequate electricity, which causes residents to use hazardous petrol-burning generators. Marketplace fires occur because combustible materials are often stored on site and because many workers also live in the markets. There are also cases of arson used as a strategy in turf battles. Arson is widely suspected in the case of fires in high-rise public buildings, where suspicious fires often occurred under the military government of the 1980s and 1990s whenever an office was being investigated for corruption. This use of fires to destroy accounts of financial transactions contrasts ironically with the shantytown fires, which often destroy stores of cash, since unlike elite officials, shantytown residents are compelled to keep their assets in tangible form at home.
One of the issues raised by framing the history of fire specifically in the urban context is how one defines the city. In her presentation on the history of urban fires in late imperial Russia, Kathy Frierson proposed the use of fireproof construction itself as a defining feature of Russian imperial urbanism. From the time of Ivan III (the late fifteenth century), a pattern emerged of building stone fortresses with administrative functions and churches within the walls and wood buildings without. When Peter the Great built St. Petersburg, masons were forbidden to work anywhere else. From this time forward, the earlier pattern of a masonry citadel with a wooden residential quarter was effectively writ large onto the landscape of the empire as a whole, with the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg built increasingly in fireproof materials and well guarded against conflagration while the rest of Russia constituted the flammable town. Frierson’s analysis of data from cities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries shows that even though wood construction remained common, even in Moscow, and fires were frequent, fireproofing and effective firefighting prevented their spread. This was in marked contrast to the rampant fire destruction in the villages that continued to trouble authorities through these same years, as Frierson has detailed in her book on rural fire, *All Russia Is Burning*.

In contrast to Peter the Great, the Tokugawa shoguns, who governed Japan between 1600 and 1868, ruled a capital city where large conflagrations were endemic. Jordan Sand’s presentation argued that uncontrolled fire was in fact an integral part of Edo’s social structure and the Tokugawa system of governance. Examining official responses to arson, Sand finds that although the letter of the law was extraordinarily harsh, in actual practice there was considerable leniency. Courts placed greater emphasis on the moral character of the defendant than on the damage caused by the crime. This is in keeping with a system in which the government invested little in either the protection of private property or in architectural grandeur and permanence. Relatedly, the economic system in Edo revolved around circulation of portable goods, since frequent fire militated against accumulation of fixed property in buildings or durables. Firefighters took a controlled burn approach, clearing a path for the conflagration to burn unimpeded downwind until it reached water or open fields.

The influential essays of E.L. Jones and Lionel Frost have focused on investment in fireproof construction as a measure of the development of a “modern fire regime.” Amy Greenberg’s study of fire brigades in the United States revealed the large role of institutional development overlooked in Jones and Frost’s schema. Shane Ewen’s examination of the growth of municipal brigades in Britain added further facets to the picture of modern fire regimes. Edinburgh played a critical role in this
development. Ewen showed that the municipalization of firefighting was tied to the rise of technocracy generally. This was related to a range of other concerns besides fire, including in particular public health, which provided the incentive for introducing pressurized water. At the same time, rather than describing this transformation as a gradual and steady social process, Ewen demonstrated the importance of the catastrophic event and the charismatic individual—in this instance the “Great Fire” of 1824 in Edinburgh and James Braidwood, the city’s “captain of engines” at the time, whose heroics and success established his disciplined and technologically sophisticated approach to firefighting as the model throughout Britain.

If firefighters were a new kind of hero in the growth of modern technocratic urbanism, in the context of late-twentieth-century urban warfare, they could represent precisely the forces of order and spatial hegemony that militias sought to undermine. This was the case in Beirut in the mid-1970s, according to the presentation of Sofia Shwayri. Firefighters were targeted by both sides in the battle to control the suqs (narrow, covered shopping streets) of central Beirut. The labyrinthine form of the urban fabric in these districts made firefighting difficult. It also made it difficult for the warring parties to control large continuous territories, so arson and explosives were used to homogenize the space. By the late 1980s, central Beirut was a no-man’s land. Shwayri described the resurrection of the suqs that followed, this time on a pattern seen in cities around the world, as a shopping mall for the global rich bearing the architectural trappings of local tradition. Ironically, it was in this context that Beirut for the first time instituted a building code with specific reference to fire safety.

The three-day event concluded with an open session to discuss common motifs, issues, and questions that might receive further consideration in the introduction to a volume of essays. One idea discussed was the possibility of looking more deeply into the global transmission of certain firefighting technologies, institutional models, and urban ideals. A number of instances of cities looking to other cities for models emerged that connected the papers to one another. Another possibility was to add nuance to the important arguments of Jones and Frost by mapping out in greater detail the patterns of fire risk management developed by authorities and populations in different urban environments and social contexts. This would help to overcome the old West-and-the-rest historical perspective that assumed a single Euro-American model of progressive mastery of nature, on one hand, and the rest of the world left to suffer the effects of unmastered nature, on the other. Many of the papers implicitly or explicitly challenged such a model by offering historical reasons for a variety of strategies for managing fire other than absolute suppression or
fatalism. Finally, although environmental and economic studies like those of Jones and Frost treat urban fires as universally measurable phenomena whose significance is unaffected by context, the contrasts between findings in different cities revealed that fires can have profoundly different meanings depending on context. Reading these papers together permits one to see not only the many ways in which urban fire has been survived and managed throughout history, but also the many ways in which it has also been positively useful.

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and Jordan Sand (Georgetown University)*
PUBLIC EATING, PUBLIC DRINKING: PLACES OF CONSUMPTION FROM EARLY MODERN TO POSTMODERN TIMES

Conference at the GHI, May 22–23, 2008. Conveners: Marc Forster (Connecticut College), Maren Möhring (University of Zurich/University of Cologne). Participants: Lars Amenda (Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte, Hamburg), Elizabeth Buettner (University of York), Simone Derix (University of Duisburg-Essen), Angelika Epple (University of Freiburg), Donna Gabaccia (University of Minnesota), Andrew P. Haley (University of Southern Mississippi), Beat Kümin (University of Warwick), Anke Ortlepp (GHI), Jeffrey M. Pilcher (University of Minnesota), Peter Scholliers (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), Gerd Schwerhoff (Technical University, Dresden), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI), Ulrike Thoms (Institut für Geschichte der Medizin, Charité Berlin), Ann Tlusty (Bucknell University), Corinna Unger (GHI).

Drinking and dining out has long been neglected by sociological as well as historical research, but has been studied more thoroughly since the 1990s. During the last two decades, a quite extensive literature, not only on the history of food, but also on eating out, has evolved. What is still widely missing in this field of research is a long-term perspective, as well as international and interregional comparisons. The workshop “Public Eating, Public Drinking” brought together American and European scholars of early modern and modern history to discuss the phenomenon of drinking and eating out from the sixteenth to the twenty-first century.

The workshop focused on the spatial dimensions of places of consumption, with the participants’ papers ranging from discussions of early modern inns to the French-style restaurant of the nineteenth century to today’s ethnic restaurants. Taking the material, the social, and the imaginary aspects of these places into consideration, the papers demonstrated the value of a comparative approach in historical as well as regional terms. This perspective allows for comparisons of issues of furnishing and interior design, as well as an understanding of the images and discourses surrounding these places and their social functions. The various places of consumption, with their distinct histories, legal regulations, and economic constraints, functioned not only as providers of food and drink, but also as important meeting places and sites of social interaction. All of them included and excluded specific individuals and social groups, often along the lines of race, class, and gender. Therefore, processes of social closure were a recurring theme of the workshop.
The first panel, on early modern public houses in Germany, stressed the different social functions of village and city taverns. Marc Forster pointed out that in rural regions, members of all social classes and women as well as men frequented the taverns, whereas Ann Tlusty demonstrated that urban public houses were predominantly male preserves and populated, above all, by the middle classes. Both papers emphasized the importance of drinking together as a social ritual that could have severe consequences. Accepting someone else’s tab implied reciprocation and meant that an agreement of some kind had been reached. Central in Forster’s and Tlusty’s papers was the question of the drinkers’ honor and reputation. For women, drinking in village taverns did not necessarily imply that their sexual honor was called into question, at least not when they were accompanied by a male relative. Male honor, although sometimes including sexual trespassing as in cases of adultery, was mostly defined as a man’s reliability, above all in economic terms. Not being allowed to visit public houses, as was the case with the poorest members of society, or being excluded from taverns as the result of repeated misbehavior, meant serious stigmatization and implied exclusion from important social and economic transactions for which the public houses were essential sites.

The taverns’ significant position in early modern society was also addressed by Beat Kümin, who concentrated on the visual evidence of these places of consumption. By differentiating the pictorial material on taverns and inns into generic representations with the purpose of identification, orientation, and promotion, and symbolic representations, comprising moral and political as well as religious symbolism, Kümin revealed the complexity of visual evidence and also highlighted the importance of public houses as spatial orientation markers, as when they appeared on road atlases and maps. At a time with very limited street signs, these places structured the geography of early modern towns and villages and helped the traveler to find particular locations.

In his comment on the papers presented in the first session, Gerd Schwerhoff pointed out that not only rural or urban contexts shaped the public houses and their functions, but that regional differences, especially between Catholic and Protestant areas, were of utmost importance, too. Furthermore, he drew attention to the fact that the early modern public houses have almost exclusively been analyzed in respect to drinking, whereas food has hardly been addressed. In the discussion, it became apparent that this was partly the effect of the early modern source material that focuses more on (the regulation of) drinking than on eating; some substances, like beer, however, were considered both drink and, in a lower alcohol version, also as food.
Although drinking still forms an important aspect of eating out in modern times, all the following panels of the workshop on modern places of consumption focused mainly on food and eating, with the second section discussing the modern institution of the restaurant, arguably developed in Paris at the end of the eighteenth century. Peter Scholliers demonstrated how the model of the French (especially the Parisian) restaurant was adopted in Belgium in the nineteenth century. Labor migration of chefs, waiters, and waitresses, as well as kitchen personnel, was an important component of this culinary transfer. In his analysis of restaurant names and their allusions, Scholliers convincingly integrated the economic aspects of French cuisine’s diffusion in Europe by pointing to the strategic choice of a particular restaurant name as an attempt at self-branding, as a way of finding or defining a new niche in the market.

Andrew Haley took a different approach to the history of restaurant dining by addressing the importance of children (and the family) as consumers. Children, who used to eat in separate rooms during the nineteenth century, were increasingly included in the dining experience and became a target group of their own in the course of the twentieth century. With their inclusion into the restaurant, children transformed these places and contributed to further differentiations among various types of restaurants, the ethnic restaurant being among the first places that became family restaurants. Furthermore, by analyzing children’s cookbooks, Haley pointed to the link between restaurant dining and dining at home, between public and private eating (and cooking), and the significance of this link for a history of consumption.

In his comment, Uwe Spiekermann took a passionate stand for not neglecting the economic dimension of consumerism and sparked a discussion on the relation of cultural and economic history. Both approaches were seen as indispensable to any analysis of places of consumption, and the participants stressed the mutual interdependencies of economy and culture, as apparent, for instance, in Schollier’s discussion of the gastronomic niches in Belgium. Economic studies, however, that do not take into account the cultural embeddedness of the phenomenon analyzed seemed to most participants of limited use for a history of (places of) consumption.

Dining at a nineteenth-century restaurant in Belgium meant spending quite some time enjoying the many courses of a French-style dinner, whereas other modern places of consumption, like the canteen and the Automatenrestaurant, offered a less expensive alternative to restaurant dining, and can be considered as prototypes for today’s time-saving fast-food restaurants. The workshop’s third panel, on rationalized eating places that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thus pointed to the fact that space and time are closely linked, for every
place of consumption not only has its own spatial, but also its own temporal order, and suggests a specific rhythm to having a drink or a meal.

The history of the canteen, with its preset eating hours, is, as Ute Thoms demonstrated, closely linked to the disciplining of the worker and his or her body, the hygienic movement, as well as the nutrition sciences. Scientifically informed “rational” mass feeding, based on the concept of the body machine, with its measurable needs for caloric intake, did not, however, mean that all employees of a firm or a plant received the same amount and kind of food in a common lunchroom. The workers’ canteen was a completely different, much more basic place than the white-collar workers’ lunchroom, which in its rich decoration and furnishing resembled the contemporary restaurant. The aspect of standardization that became more and more important in the history of the canteen, leading to the introduction of the Gastro-Norm, a system of containers in fixed measures, in West Germany in 1964, is also a key feature of the so-called Automatenrestaurant discussed by Angelika Epplle. She traces the invention of this type of self-service restaurant back to the 1891 Bar automatique that sold soda from automatic fountains at Montmartre and to the automatic buffet presented at the Berlin trade exhibition in 1896 in particular. This automatic buffet combined several vending machines behind a single counter and enabled the customer to see his or her dish before choosing and buying it. The dimension of immediate (visual) consumption as well as the potentially anonymous form of eating (alone) makes the Automatenrestaurant a modern place par excellence. It promised and, to a certain degree, in fact offered a public eating space for all social classes and men and women alike. At the same time, the unequal labor relations on which the working of this place was based were hidden from the eye of the customers.

The preparation, presentation, and delivery of food, which were defined in new ways by canteens and Automatenrestaurants, were of prime interest to another area of rationalized eating in the twentieth century. Dining in the air, the topic of Anke Ortlepp’s paper, depended heavily on inventions in the field of food technology. Only with the introduction of aluminum cans in the late 1950s did carbonated drinks, which in glass bottles had been at risk of exploding with the drop of atmospheric pressure, become available on board. Other food items like sponge cake collapsed at high altitudes. United was the first airline that established its own in-flight kitchen in 1936 to experiment with the changing qualities of foods served in the air. While until the late 1960s the foodservice on board had clearly imitated the French restaurant, this model was only kept in first and business class afterwards. Social differentiation today means that customers in economy class are served less and less food, if they get anything to eat at all.
In her comment, Simone Derix stressed the common features of the three rationalized eating places under discussion and contextualized their emergence with the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and mass society. Derix suggested further considerations of the connections and inherent contradictions of the self-service imperative in the case of the Automatenrestaurant and the idea of social welfare accompanying the history of the canteen. The different ways of addressing the individual and/or the community at these two places of consumption might offer new insights into the history of modern techniques of the self and of regulating “the other.”

One of the recurrent themes of the workshop was the impact of culinary transfers, such as French cuisine in Belgium or on United Airlines flights, or the so-called ethnic cuisine in the United States and Europe, the topic of the last panel of the workshop. Lars Amenda gave an overview of the history of Chinese restaurants in London, Hamburg, and Rotterdam throughout the twentieth century, locating the boom of Chinese cuisine in the period from the 1950s to the 1970s. As with the other “foreign” cuisines discussed in this panel—Italian and Mexican cuisine in the United States (Donna R. Gabaccia and Jeffrey M. Pilcher), Italian cuisine in Germany (Maren Möhring), and Indian cuisine in the United Kingdom (Elizabeth Buettner)—Amenda stressed that the first Chinese restaurants mainly catered to compatriots at the beginning, then were visited also by native citizens of the host countries, often students and bohemians, and became mainstream only in the second half of the twentieth century. With the change of customers, the interior of the restaurants underwent significant transformations, meeting the expectations of the guests by using silken embroidered curtains and draperies, as well as miniature landscape settings. According to Amenda, the success of Chinese restaurants relied on the “exotic otherness” ascribed to Chinese people in particular.

Gabaccia and Pilcher took a comparative approach to ethnic cuisines in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. First, they analyzed the practices of selling and consuming Mexican and Italian foods in their countries of origin, and then pointed out the transformations they underwent after their arrival in the US. Italian pasta and pizza, consumed as street foods in Naples, quickly moved inside and became restaurant foods in Chicago and New York, whereas Mexican tamales stayed outside as snack foods in Los Angeles as well as in San Antonio. Factors influencing these particular outcomes were certainly the differences between immigrant and colonized minorities, resulting in different perceptions of Mexicans and Italians, but also structural constraints and historical contingency were of importance: Italians who came to North American cities found well-established structures of (immigrant)
marketing and consumers familiar with tourism to Italy, both supporting the popularization of Italian cuisine.

Likewise the success of Italian cuisine in postwar Germany was at least partly the result of Italy’s popularity as a holiday destination. In her paper, Möhring discussed two places of consumption, the Italian ice-cream parlor and the hybrid *Pizzeria-Ristorante*. Sharing several characteristics, such as a predominantly Italian staff and the use of Italian products, the *gelateria* and the *Pizzeria-Ristorante* differ not only in respect to the foods they offer, but also in that they represent two distinct types of entrepreneurship and migration projects: temporary migration of trained ice-cream makers from the north of Italy versus southern Italian “guest-workers,” who often decided to become self-employed in the catering business only after their arrival in Germany. In recent years, the latter became increasingly disapproved of, not only by many ice-cream makers, but also by groups of Italian restaurateurs, most of them professionally trained, who tried to distinguish their eating places from the *Pizzeria-Ristorante*, which was (and is) disparaged as inauthentic. The notions and the politics of authenticity as well as the question of who can claim a position of authority to define the legitimacy of a particular form of cuisine were also at stake in Buettner’s presentation, which gave a concise account of the evolution of the “curry house stereotype” in postwar Britain, focusing on the material as well as the discursive dimension of this form of eatery. Those “Indian” restaurants (in fact mainly run by Bangladeshis) that were also patronized by whites had developed a specific repertoire of “Indian” signifiers by the 1980s, including flock wallpaper, that soon declined into cliché. The increasingly down-market image of the curry house offering cheap food until late at night, mostly prepared by autodidacts, has been countered by a growing number of largely London-based restaurateurs who recruit professional chefs from India and claim to offer (more) authentic food to “discerning” customers. The negotiations about the meanings and the status of ethnic foods are, as Buettner’s paper convincingly demonstrated, always involved in the contemporary social and cultural struggles within multicultural societies, with ethnic food functioning as a vehicle for masking, as well as articulating, racism(s).

In her comment, Corinna Unger pointed to the role of the state for processes of transnationalization in the field of consumption, asking for a broader perspective on consumerism that also integrates socialist countries and their systems of food provisioning and dining cultures. Including non-American and non-European places of consumption more fully is certainly necessary to get a more nuanced picture of the phenomenon of drinking and eating out, and would also contribute to a deeper understanding of the global interrelatedness of the various places of consump-
Foods and cuisines on the move—and, as all the papers suggested, they are almost always on the move—strongly affect the places where they are consumed; in a way, they transfer these locations and point to the various connections of every place of consumption with other places, synchronically and diachronically.

A selection of papers presented at the workshop will be published as a special issue of the interdisciplinary journal *Food & History*.

*Maren Möhring (University of Zurich) and Marc Forster (Connecticut College)*
EARLY MODERN GERMAN HISTORY, 1500–1790: FOURTEENTH TRANSATLANTIC DOCTORAL SEMINAR IN GERMAN HISTORY

Seminar at the Free University Berlin, May 28–31, 2008. Jointly organized by the GHI, the BMW Center for German and European Studies of Georgetown University, and the Free University Berlin. Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Claudia Ulbrich (Free University Berlin), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Faculty mentors: Ronald G. Asch (University of Freiburg), Susan C. Karant-Nunn (University of Arizona), Anthony J. LaVopa (North Carolina State University), Ulinka C. Rublack (Cambridge University). Participants: Kristina Bake (University of Halle), Annette Cremer (University of Giessen), Christina Gerstemayer (University of Trier), André Griemert (University of Marburg), Simon Grote (University of California, Berkeley), Phillip Nelson Haberkern (University of Virginia), Tilman Haug (University of Bern), Erik Heinrichs (Harvard University), David Horowitz (Columbia University), Karen Lynn Hung (New York University), Britta Kägler (University of Munich), Vera A. Keller (Princeton University), Sebastian Kühn (Free University Berlin), Stefanie Walther (University of Bremen), Jennifer Welsh (Duke University), Colin F. Wilder (University of Chicago).

This year’s Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in German History was hosted by the Free University Berlin and dedicated to early modern history. The Harnack-Haus and its Gästehaus in Berlin-Dahlem provided great meeting space and pleasant accommodations, which undoubtedly contributed to the seminar’s congenial atmosphere, as did our academic host, Professor Claudia Ulbrich. As usual, the seminar brought together sixteen doctoral students—eight from Europe and eight from North America—to discuss their dissertation projects with one another and with four faculty mentors from both sides of the Atlantic. This year’s seminar was remarkable for the strong presence of intellectual history, the history of science, and legal history, which together accounted for half the papers.

The first panel was devoted to the history of religion in the sixteenth century, focusing on the instrumentalization of religious symbols. Jennifer L. Welsh examined “Sanctity and Social Change in the Cult of St. Anne, 1450–1750.” She argued that previous historical analyses of the rise in St. Anne’s popularity in the late Middle Ages focused on her cult as an expression of late medieval popular piety, thus neglecting or ignoring the continued importance of the cult of St. Anne during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Her paper explored one aspect of St. Anne’s cult,
the “Heilige Sippenschaft” and its role as a useful model for pre-Reformation laity. Phillip Haberkern’s paper, “The Presence of the Past: Historia, Memoria, and the Making of St. Jan Hus,” dealt with the commemoration of the Bohemian priest Jan Hus during the 1530s. Executed by the Council of Constance in 1415, Hus became a central figure in the polemical exchange between Lutheran and Catholic authors over the legitimacy of a church council as an arbiter in the German religious schism. Haberkern’s paper focused on the composition of polemical plays by authors on both sides of the confessional divide, and how they represented disparate readings of the moral lessons contained in the death of Jan Hus.

The second panel was devoted to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century art history. Karen Hung’s paper, “More than Meets the Eye: Uncovering the Surfaces of Hans Thoman’s Carved Sculptures, 1500–1525,” studied the early modern phenomenon of monochromy (Holzsichtigkeit) in the carved limewood sculptures of the Swabian sculptor Hans Thoman (ca. 1500–25). Hung argued that closer examination of Thoman’s polychrome and monochrome sculptures reveals that their present appearance is not necessarily a reflection of their appearance in the fifteenth century, but rather of changing tastes and aesthetic inclinations over the centuries. Kristina Bake’s paper, “Spiegel einer christlichen und friedsamen Haußhaltung: Ehevorstellungen und Geschlechterrollen in deutschsprachigen illustrierten Flugblättern des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts,” examined the social disciplining effect that broadsheets about marriage had on both men and women. The abundance and wide dissemination of such broadsheets, she suggested, should be read as indicators of increased attempts of the authorities to regulate marriage, as well as popular reactions to this social pressure. Especially satirical broadsheets reveal the normative pressures of a society being transformed by the process of confessionalization.

The third panel explored the role of networks in seventeenth-century political culture. Tilman Haug’s paper, “Amis et Serviteurs du Roi: Netzwerke Ludwigs XIV. im Heiligen Römischen Reich, 1648–1678,” studied the network of relations between the French crown and the representatives of particular Reichsfürsten that played a central role for French policy within the Holy Roman Empire in the decades after 1648. In maintaining these relations, the French crown used patronage and interconnections in ways that were similar to the networks that stabilized the absolute monarchy internally. Instead of relying solely on the ethnically charged norms of patronage, these relations were founded on “calculating trust” based on self-interest on the part of the cooperating partners in the Reich. While such entanglements with the French were tolerated for several decades, they became criminalized in the course of
the Reich’s involvement in the Dutch wars in the 1670s. Britta Kägler’s paper, “Politische Handlungsspielräume und kultureller Einfluss der adeligen Frauen am Münchner Hof, 1651/52–1756,” examined the role of networks between the Munich and Turin courts. Her analysis of the correspondence between Munich’s Kurfürstin Henriette Adelaide and her Turin relatives traced the gradual cooling of relations as the lack of direct interaction made it difficult to resolve misunderstandings, thus supporting the thesis of the letter as a distancing medium.

The fourth panel was devoted to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century intellectual history and the history of science. Both papers used biographical approaches. Vera Keller’s paper, “Cornelis Drebbel: Fame and the Making of Modernity,” examined the career and reception of the engraver, inventor, alchemist, and natural philosopher Cornelis Drebbel (1572–1633). Almost forgotten today, Drebbel enjoyed immense fame throughout the German lands during his lifetime and long thereafter. While recent historiography has characterized Drebbel as a skilled mechanical practitioner, Keller focused on Drebbel’s claim to the status of natural philosopher. His widespread fame, she argued, demonstrates that an early respect for “maker’s knowledge” is more accurately situated in Central Europe than in Bacon’s England. Erik Heinrichs’s paper, “Caspar Kegler: Proprietary Medicine, Alchemy, and the Popular Press in Early Modern Germany,” investigated the significance of the Leipzig physician Caspar Kegler, a largely unknown figure of German medical history. Kegler’s life and work, he argued, reveal how the printing press, economic innovation, and socio-cultural exchange transformed academic medicine from an elite discipline of ancient texts and cures to one more open to the public, new medicines, and manual experimentation.

The fifth panel explored seventeenth- and eighteenth-century German-Jewish history through the lens of legal history. Andre Griemert’s paper, “Arm der Kayserlichen Gewalt: Jüdische Prozesse vor dem Reichshofrat unter Ferdinand III. (1637–1657) und Franz I. Stephan (1745–1765),” investigated court cases involving Jews at the Imperial Aulic Council in Vienna, which, alongside the Reichskammergericht in Wetzlar, was the highest imperial court of the Holy Roman Empire. Presenting the results of a quantitative analysis of all such court cases in the periods 1637–1657 and 1745–1765, Griemert demonstrated the quantitative importance of litigation between Jews and the authorities and a connection between these court cases and imperial politics. David Horowitz’s paper, “Fractures and Fissures in Jewish Communal Autonomy in Eighteenth-Century Hamburg,” used the tools of legal history to examine Jewish-Gentile relations at the local level. Horowitz argued that the system of Jewish legal autonomy in Hamburg became contested in the eighteenth century as Jews were granted the status of permanent
residents of the city. Through a close reading of two cases from the 1730s, he showed how this new status allowed individual Jews to bring their grievances to the attention of Hamburg’s Senate, which was forced to intervene with the Jewish authorities.

The sixth panel examined gender relations in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century nobility. Stefanie Walther’s paper, “Vom ‘Venus-Kriege’: Die (Un-)Ordnung der fürstlichen Ehe anhand eines Fallbeispiels aus den sächsis-ernestinischen Herzogshäusern,” investigated marital conflicts in the high nobility, in particular the deviance from secular and religious norms involved in extramarital affairs. Walther demonstrated that these marital conflicts were always more than emotional disputes, and had strong political ramifications. In her paper “Mon Plaisir: Monarchische Machtdarstellung im Miniaturformat,” Annette Cremer argued that the “Puppenstadt” (doll city) of Princess Auguste Dorothea of Thuringen must not be understood as a faithful representation of its time, but as a conscious presentation of Auguste Dorothea’s claim to political power, and thus played a crucial role in her fight for her due as a widow.

The seventh panel was devoted to eighteenth-century intellectual history. In his paper “Beleidigung und verletzte Ehre: Über Rituale der Unhöflichkeit von frühneuzeitlichen Gelehrten,” Sebastian Kühn investigated the function that rituals of impoliteness had in scholarly communication. Courtesy and impoliteness, Kühn showed, were complementary parts of a system of communication, in which impoliteness served specific functions, such as advancing communication, staking claims, and defending interests. Hence impoliteness was a sign of epistemic pluralization. Simon Grote discussed “Moral Education and the Origins of Modern Aesthetics in Eighteenth-Century Scotland and Germany.” The use of the word *aisthesis* by Halle Pietists in early eighteenth-century debates over biblical hermeneutics and moral education, Grote argued, strongly suggests that Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten shared important elements of his Pietist teachers’ view of moral education and saw an ethical purpose in the “aesthetic” philosophy whose development he called for when he coined the term *aesthetica* in 1735.

The eighth and final panel dealt with different aspects of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legal history. Colin Wilder’s paper, “Real Property Rights and Legal Indeterminacy in Hesse, 1648–1806,” set out the fundamental categories for his work on property rights in German history. Contrary to Thibaut (1801) and other authors, Wilder argued that a fief (*Lehn*) was something over which a landlord claimed a right of escheat (*Heimfall*); possession (*Besitz*), by contrast, was the set of rules governing peaceful enjoyment and transfer. In her paper “Gauner- und Räuberbanden am Beispiel des Kurfürstentums Sachsens im 18. Jahrhun-
Christina Gerstenmayer analyzed the social history, criminal trials, and public perception of electoral Saxony’s robber bands. Her study revealed the prominence of kinship bonds within the robber bands, which greatly affected their behavior in court.

The concluding discussion reflected on the prominence of intellectual history, the history of science, art history, legal history, and gender history at this seminar. Even though the selection of papers at the transatlantic doctoral seminar is never fully representative of the landscape of current research, the strong representation of intellectual history among the American projects and of work on the princely courts among the German ones was seen to reflect current research trends. The seminar also reflected changes in the nature of interdisciplinary historical work, namely the historical profession’s turn to anthropology, literary studies, and visual studies. The use of visual sources, in particular, was discussed at several panels. The papers dealing with art-historical topics seemed to indicate a rapprochement between art history and intellectual-cultural history, with art history becoming more interested in historical context and intellectual history taking more interest in visual sources and art. Notable by their absence were economic and military history, as well as work on confessionalization. Recurring questions that came up across different panels included: What counts as political and what counts as private at an early modern court? How does one define the premodern vs. modern divide? What are the turning points? How useful is the distinction? Another prominent theme was that of communication networks (at court, between courts, among academics, among robbers, etc). Finally, there was vigorous discussion of the dangers of presentism and the historian’s proper attitude toward the past. Whereas some argued that historians ought to keep careful hermeneutic distance, others suggested that while historians ought to be transparent about their viewpoints, they should interpret and judge the past.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
Historians have long understood that wars can serve as a catalyst for change. In his recent book *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*, Tony Judt argues that “World War II created the conditions for a new Europe.” The possibilities for change during this period were especially apparent in terms of gender relations. In Europe, the immediate aftermath of the war brought with it the need to confront massive death and destruction, continuing privations, dislocations, and, for women, the risk of rape. But at the same time, peace offered the prospect of new opportunities. Both communism and liberal democracy held out the promise of equality for women and well-being for them and their families. Yet the demands of rebuilding nations and restoring social order took immediate precedence.
The tensions between the political and economic needs of nations, the promises of new social orders, women’s ongoing struggle for recognition, autonomy, and equality, and men’s efforts to recast masculinity in the wake of unprecedented violence constituted the major themes of this conference.

Tony Judt’s study implies that conditions for creating “the new” were greater in Europe than in the United States. Was this in fact the case? From the perspective of gender, the war opened up possibilities for women and men on both sides of the Atlantic. But the extent to which those possibilities were realized varied considerably across societies. An international group of forty-five scholars explored this question. Comparing gender developments in the United States and the two Germanys during “the long postwar,” they examined the variations and asked how gender developments intersected and were affected by the trajectories of market-democratic and communist regimes as well as the impact of idiosyncratic cultural continuities. By extending the investigation to 1989, the conference was able to trace both continuities and change over a long expanse of gender relations, sorting out the impact of the war itself from other factors that came into play during the period.

The first panel, “Gendering the Aftermath of War,” addressed the immediate consequences of the Second World War and their long-term effects. Atina Grossmann examined sexual relations, from rape to consensual sex, between German women and occupying allied armies’ male soldiers. Grossmann argued that men used sexuality to enact personal and political domination of German women. At the same time, she asserted that today, too many scholars emphasize the debilitating horror surrounding these events, thus effacing women’s agency in the historical record. While not seeking to deny the criminal aspects of these acts, she emphasized that women developed often a “rational” (sachlich) strategy to cope with theses experiences, which they already had learned in Weimar Germany’s discourse on sexuality. Christina Morina discussed how male and a handful of female architects and urban planners in 1940s and 1950s Frankfurt an der Oder and Dresden gendered their building designs. Morina made the case that, by adopting modern, functionalist designs, these professionals developed masculine blueprints for the usage of urban space. Ulrike Weckel illustrated how US and UK occupation forces, particularly military newsreel film crews, gendered Nazi violence. She posited that these crews filmed female perpetrators of atrocities (mostly KZ guards) in a way that detached femininity from genocide. Interviews with film crew members revealed that these men had difficulty accepting the idea that women, too, committed atrocities. Such actions transgressed the crews’ traditional assumption about the gender order. Amy Rutenberg looked at American conscientious objectors from
the Korean to the Vietnam War periods and argued that, over time, draft avoiders increasingly saw their resistance to the US federal government as a masculine act. She demonstrated how multiple masculinities developed during this period, with the result that warrior men no longer held a monopoly on masculinity. In her comments, Karen Hagemann suggested that the conference’s comparison of the two Germanys and the United States needed to take into account not only the specific economic, social, political, and cultural circumstances and their rapid change, but also the differences that existed between individual and collective, communicative, and cultural memory. She emphasized that gender is a productive analytical tool because gender relations, in particular in the families, were one of the most important fields in which the two Germanys and the United States dealt with the aftermath. Families were supposed to heal the wounds left by war. Gender relations, marriage, and the family thus became private arenas for coping with the aftermath of war.

The second panel, entitled “Role Reversals: Work and Consumption Regendered,” dealt with economic, social, and cultural effects of World War II. Susanne Hilger asked whether German pharmaceutical companies served as bellwethers when it came to changing gender norms. She examined how the leading Schering Company introduced the birth control pill in West Germany in the 1960s. Hilger asserted that the company reflected the general conservatism of German society by targeting married women with children and not marketing to single women. Laura Puaca, examining women scientists from the 1950s, noted that these women framed their work as a form of Cold War service and did not perceive this role to be in tension with their domestic responsibilities. Joe Perry examined a coterie of German public opinion research experts during the 1950s and 1960s, showing that to a high degree, these experts gendered consumption as masculine by using masculine language and targeting men with supposedly masculine products such as auto tires and gasoline. Jessica Weiss studied letters written by female homemakers to women’s magazines during the 1950s and 1960s. These women objected to Betty Friedan’s critique of the American homemaker in her book *The Feminine Mystique*. They saw homemaking as a craft, not a burden, and fused it with femininity as well as ideals of self-sacrifice, non-consumerism, and even anti-communism. Moreover, Weiss used these women’s stories to argue that the domestic impulse was not merely a response to feminism, but rather also an undercurrent with a longer history in postwar society. Commentator Kathy Peiss noted that, to a certain degree, all four panelists dealt with the question of postwar conservatism. She recommended that the panelists pursue this angle of analysis further by, for instance, examining whether groups such as homemakers, scientists, and
marketing experts gendered emotion as feminine and rationality as masculine.

The third panel, “New Sexualities,” explored questions related to the sexual rhetoric in the public sphere, sexual consumerism, and the criminalization of homosexuality. Joanne Meyerowitz addressed sexuality in the public sphere of the postwar United States by looking at cultural evidence of sexual liberalism. She questioned the dominant interpretation of sexual “containment” offered by Elaine Tyler May, and argued against the dominance of sexual conservatism by showing, for example, how erotic literature flourished, and how Hollywood revised its production code to allow films that depicted abortion, prostitution, and interracial relations. She preferred the concept of a “long sexual revolution,” linking the events of the 1950s to the broadening of sexual mores that had developed in the 1920s and those that would take hold in the 1960s and 1970s. Likewise, Elizabeth Heineman posited that West German sexuality must be tied to its Wilhelmine past, suggesting German uniqueness in this area. Focusing on the consumption of sexual wares to explore sexuality in private, and on legislation regarding sexual consumption to examine sexuality in public, she challenged Dagmar Herzog’s influential thesis about the link between Nazism and postwar sexuality to argue that postwar West German behavior was not so much a reaction against Nazi permissiveness as it was an extension or completion of the long sexual revolution that was part of modernization. The question of whether a “new sexuality” existed in the postwar period was also up for debate in the papers by Jennifer V. Evans and Robert G. Moeller. Both analyzed how the postwar period failed to usher in dramatic changes for gay men. Evans argued that despite the decriminalization of homosexuality and the lauding of 1920s sexual progressivism, there was still much sexual alienation in key East German institutions. By looking at the experience of homosexual men, she showed how same-sex desire became associated with political opposition, demonstrating the limits of a total sexual revolution in the postwar East. Similarly, Moeller, by looking at how West German experts viewed homosexuality, claimed that homosexual men faced just as much persecution in the postwar period as they did during the war. He asked why laws that the Nazis enforced persisted in the Federal Republic, suggesting a continuous tension between homosexuality and liberalism, especially in public. Uta Poiger stressed in her comment that the papers offer new insights into the links between sexuality, consumption, and social change. She also highlighted the difference between the two Germanys in the postwar period.

The fourth panel, “The Fluidity of Ethnicity and Race,” discussed the contradictions and paradoxes of old and new constructions of collective and individual identities in the aftermath of World War II. Angela Tudico
looked at the transnational migration process through her paper on war brides who attempted to immigrate to the United States after the war. Tudico argued that America’s prewar racial distinctions persisted in the postwar period, challenging the notion that World War II was a watershed moment in US race relations. She showed that Greek and Italian war brides faced greater scrutiny than those from northern European nations, including Germany, even as they benefited from new war bride legislation. In fact, these Southern European women were often grouped with North African women, suggesting non-white status. Japanese women continued to be treated as a separate category. Malia McAndrew also explored the intersections of race and gender in her discussion of the United States’ cooptation of beauty norms in transforming its former enemy into an ally during the occupation of Japan. The US, according to McAndrew, understood that women were essential to this transition. Thus, influencing Japanese beauty culture, which was considered women’s realm, became part of the American military’s occupying mission. In its attempts to democratize and Americanize women in Japan, the US used cultural milieus like fashion magazines in an attempt to inject ideas of individualism and western ideals of beauty into the minds of Japanese women. Monika Mattes looked specifically at how and why female guest workers were recruited to work in West Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. She argued that the inclusion of women in the guest worker programs aimed for a highly gendered labor market policy. Women were selectively recruited from abroad only to reinforce gender hierarchies in the West German labor market. Therefore, as Steve Estes pointed out in his comment, looking specifically at female workers can shed new light on the dynamics of labor migration, but also extends the traditional economic view of the market to one that included a social space.

The papers presented in the fifth panel, “Politics, Protest, and Civil Society,” sought to challenge conventional chronological narratives that present developments in the 1960s as a radical departure from the earlier postwar period. Indeed, the question of whether or not the 1960s represented continuity or discontinuity came up repeatedly throughout the conference. Benita Roth’s paper took an explicitly sociological view in examining the development of multiple feminisms in terms of resource mobilization and their creation through networks based on collective activist identity. She found that different feminisms arose among black, Chicana, and white middle-class activist networks due to differences in the resources available to these groups and the necessity for non-white feminists to address issues of inequality beyond those concerned solely with gender. Here she found continuity between the foundational work of the 1950s and the “second-wave feminism.” Till van Rahden argued that the recognition that family life and democracy were intimately re-
lated was not a product of the 1960s, but rather arose in the immediate postwar period. As scholars like Robert Moeller have shown, the family was seen as a “way station” between Nazism and democracy—a training ground for political participation—and as such it was necessary that it become more egalitarian. Dorothee Wierling examined a different aspect of the relationship between personal history and political involvement. Using oral history interviews of women in established management positions in East Germany that she had collected in 1987, Wierling found that, although women in the GDR may have had better opportunities for professional advancement than their West German counterparts, most were still restricted to cultural and social occupations. She found that women in this society often demanded more from their lives than state policy delivered, and that on subtle levels they resisted the narrow version of success that the government attempted to project. The groundwork for these women’s professional success in the 1960s had been laid in the 1930s, again indicating the importance—common to all three of these papers—of interrogating received chronologies. The comment by Myra Marx Ferree emphasized the relationship between the three nations’ different socialist traditions and the development of feminism. In West Germany, where socialism was an important influence, it was necessary for feminists to “break away” from traditional privileging of the class struggle in order to prioritize gender issues. In the US, she argued, this was not a factor, and for East German women, feminist objectives were dictated by the state, making their task one of fulfilling goals established from above.

Panel six, “Gender, States, and Families,” explored the ways in which social policy under both communism and capitalism was fundamentally gendered. At the heart of each paper was the contention that the seemingly “private”—family and gender relations—and the seemingly “public”—government policy—were intimately connected. While Donna Harsch’s and Alice Weinreb’s papers limned the gendered implications of postwar social welfare policy in the two Germanys—the former locating East Germany within a longer history of Stalinism and the latter taking an explicitly comparative look at the two Germanys—Jennifer Mittelstadt focused on the United States and its military welfare state. Harsch analyzed the relation of women, work, and the family in the postwar gendering of the GDR’s welfare dictatorship. She argued that by the 1970s, the social welfare policy of the GDR could tentatively be called maternalist, a term that brought with it implications of a focus on mothers and children and not just on production. By overlooking such developments, Harsch contended, historians have unwittingly perpetuated the neglect of gender and family implicit in Stalinism’s nineteenth-century intellectual heritage. Weinreb explored the gendered ideologies and perceptions of
women’s roles as workers or mothers inherent in the decision to provide, in the case of East Germany, or not to continue, in the case of West Germany, lunches for school children. In the west, school lunches were seen as markers of poverty; thus, ending school lunches was an indicator of recovered prosperity and collective identity. In the east, by contrast, school lunches were seen as a marker of “socialist modernity,” a feature that allowed women-as-workers to achieve “full socialist development.” In both east and west, however, state rhetoric—if not state policy—dictated that providing nutrition was the mother’s role. In her comment, Sonya Michel picked up on Harsch’s use of the provocative term maternalism, encouraging attention to the specific historical implications of this term. Mittelstadt’s work, she noted, serves as a corrective to another blind spot in historical writing on the welfare state: the failure to identify the social services provided by the military, particularly after the shift to an all-volunteer army in 1973, as a fundamental part of the welfare state. Rather than rewards for service, as under the G.I. Bill, social benefits became enticements for enlistment. Moreover, this development of the military welfare state was fundamentally gendered, attempting to fix the army’s image in the wake of Vietnam and prop up the male breadwinner in the face of threats from feminism, the gay rights movement, and economic insecurity. Women, by contrast, received attention from the developing military welfare state largely as wives, not as soldiers. Also significant is the fact that the military welfare state was developing just as the civilian welfare state was being eroded by conservative politicians. While conservatives viewed the latter, along with other aspects of “big government,” as destroying family values, they saw the army as an honorable institution protecting the family. As Michel aptly put it in her comment, these developments raise the intriguing question of whether militarism is actually better for the welfare state than communism.

In the final roundtable, Richard Bessel, Steve Estes, Laura McEnaney, Uta Poiger, and Marjan Schwegman brought together the themes of the conference and provided questions for further thought. For them, the conference title, “Gender and the Long Postwar,” contained two of the most important concepts linking all of the papers. The first was the idea of the postwar, and how it should be both periodized and characterized. The half-century that followed the close of the Second World War is known for its dynamism, and the range of topics presented at the conference reflected a diversity of regional, national, and transnational developments and experiences. Commentators questioned when the postwar period ended, the existence of turning points, and even if it has yet ended. Periodization could not be discussed without also raising questions of causality and continuity vs. change. The first interrogates the extent to which the events of the postwar can be linked to World War II
itself. Or, as McEnaney put it, is there a difference between the postwar and the Cold War? From the papers presented, it seems possible that at certain times and places, especially in the United States, individuals acted and reacted to Cold War policy rather than to conditions stemming directly from World War II. It was also evident from the panels, however, that at times a longer view, one that bridges the periods before and after World War II, is necessary to fully understand the historical trends of the second half of the twentieth century. Several of the participants noted that the postwar period was also a post-Holocaust era.

The second major theme was, of course, that of gender in all of its guises. Papers explored historical subjects’ representations of femininity, masculinity, and sexuality, and their willingness to accept or propose alternatives to existing gender norms. Scholars linked gender to all facets of postwar—demobilization experiences, migration, reconstruction, myth-and memory-making, altered work and family patterns, sexuality, and consumerism, as well as violence and combat—demonstrating persuasively that a gender perspective must be part of any comprehensive account of the period.

Michael Grutchfield (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Reid Gustafson, Melissa Kravetz, Christina Larocco, and Amy Rutenberg (University of Maryland, College Park)
WHY DO TERRORISTS STOP?

Over the past forty years, several terrorist groups have emerged, changed policies, and, in many cases, disappeared. Some were primarily suppressed by good police and intelligence work, others simply dissolved, and still others persist, but have renounced violence or have ceased to be active. Under what circumstances do terrorists and their organizations bring terror campaigns to an end? What combination of factors—domestic, international, or internal to the organization—brings this about? The conference “Why Do Terrorists Stop?” brought together specialists on different terrorist groups (left-wing American and European groups, as well as Palestinian, Basque, and Islamic groups), students of domestic terrorists, those who track international terrorism, writers on counterterrorism policy, and those who analyze the terrorists themselves. These specialists looked at the data from failed, disbanded, stymied, suppressed, and suspended terrorist campaigns from the 1960s through 2006 to analyze the histories of these terrorist groups and to look for causes of defeat and decline in search of lessons that would be useful in fighting or undermining currently active terrorists and terrorist organizations.

The original idea for this conference came from Leena Malkki and Beatrice de Graaf, whose research poses the question, “Why do terrorists stop?” After meeting and discussing the idea with De Graaf, Timothy Naftali submitted a proposal for a two-year project that supported the conference participants in conducting research on different terrorist groups with funding from the Smith Richardson Foundation. At this conference—funded by the GHI and organized by Carola Dietze and Christof Mauch, with the assistance of Alia Ayub—the researchers met to share and compare their results.

After words of welcome from the director of the GHI, Hartmut Berghoff, as well as from Christof Mauch and Timothy Naftali, the conference...
opened with a keynote lecture (published in this Bulletin) by Stefan Aust, the former editor of the German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* and author of *Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex*. Aust discussed the Red Army Faction and its history based on his intimate knowledge of the sources and his personal acquaintance with some of its members. In his comment (also published in this issue), Bruce Hoffman underscored how rewarding the study of the Red Army Faction is even today, because it is such an archetypal terrorist group. He then went on to systematically note the similarities between the German left-wing terrorism of the 1970s and current Islamic terrorist groups, especially Al Qaida. In this way, he proposed fundamental general characteristics of modern terrorist groups.

The first conference panel dealt with revolutionary terrorism. Beatrice de Graaf opened the panel with a presentation on the Italian Red Brigades. In her paper, de Graaf discussed positive and negative lessons from counterterrorist experiences in Italy. On the negative side, she demonstrated that neither the arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of leaders nor the implementation of preventive counterterrorism laws and police measures had the intended results. Instead, even more violent leaders followed, and the arrested leaders came to be seen as martyrs, invoking public sympathy. This, in turn, created a new pool of recruits. Trials and severe sentences failed to frighten off future terrorists. Rather, the left-leaning public perceived these measures as a form of political repression directed against the left as a whole, and the new preventive laws thus contributed to the polarization of society, while the use of *agent provocateurs* discredited the law enforcement agencies. Turning to the positive lessons to be learned from the Italian example, de Graaf pointed to the importance of striving to alienate terrorists from their rearguard with the help of sound intelligence work and recruitment of informers. She also underlined the value of finding strategies to win legitimization and support for counterterrorist measures in society. Furthermore, she stressed the need for intelligence agencies and law enforcement institutions, as well as international agencies, to cooperate with one another.

Leena Malkki reported on her research on the Rode Jeugd group in the Netherlands. The Rode Jeugd was a group of young workers that came into being around the same time as the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Weathermen in the United States. However, it never developed into a full-fledged urban guerilla group. Malkki explained this as a consequence, on the one hand, of the increasingly efficient counterterrorist measures of the Dutch authorities, and, on the other hand, of the organization’s failure to alter its internal structure when it changed from protest to resistance. Internal conflicts, doubts about the chances of success for a revolutionary struggle in the Netherlands, heightened by the
developments in Germany, and a new political home in other movements motivated many individual members to leave. Moreover, the liberal political climate in the Netherlands played a crucial role. The Rode Jeugd was never demonized, and the Dutch authorities soon learned to avoid unnecessary provocations. Thus, members’ paths back into society were never closed. The fact that no one was killed, either by the Rode Jeugd, nor by the law enforcement authorities, prevented the conflict from escalating beyond the point of no return.

Assaf Moghadam spoke on the three generations of the Red Army Faction and its dissolution. His paper was based on published interviews and autobiographical accounts by RAF members in the available literature. The first generation declined, Moghadam argued, mainly because of the massive counterterrorism efforts conducted by German law enforcement agencies (especially the Bundeskriminalamt), which resulted in a series of arrests and a number of deaths in shootouts with the police. The three people who left the group—Beate Sturm, Ulrich Scholze, and Peter Homann—quit because of internal disagreements and conflicts or because they were tired of life in the underground. Similar to the first generation’s decline, some members of the second generation were arrested as a result of German investigations. However, ten members of the RAF, a substantial number, voluntarily opted to turn away from terrorism. Ideological reasons, tactical disagreements, moral considerations, rising doubts about the sense and future of armed struggle in Germany, interpersonal conflicts, and/or the strain of life in the underground prompted them to leave. This willingness to step out was made possible by the fact that they were offered a refuge in East Germany. Eight of them received a safe haven in East Germany, on the condition that they completely renounce terrorism. Of the third generation, only a few members have been apprehended and sentenced, while two were killed. The rest are still unknown. In 1998, members of this third generation declared that the “project RAF” had now ended. Moghadam attributes the dissolution of the group mainly to internal splits, the Kinkel Initiative (i.e., the decision of Germany’s Minister of Justice in 1992 to release RAF prisoners from jail before they had served their entire sentences), and the collapse of communist regimes, which forced most left-wing revolutionaries to soberly acknowledge that the struggle against imperialism had suffered a tremendous setback.

In the second panel, on Palestinian terrorist groups, Nasra Hassan presented findings from interviews she conducted over the previous years with members of the Black September Organization. According to her interviewees, the Palestinian organization Fatah created the Black September Organization for strategic reasons. It then dissolved its terrorist branch when its aim had been achieved. Moreover, there was consid-
erable pressure from the USSR and other nations in the Warsaw Pact to end the use of terrorist methods. Therefore, a change of political strategies from violence to diplomacy seemed necessary. To dissolve the Black September Organization, Fatah used a “domestication strategy”: Fatah members met the members of the Black September Organization in small groups, “married them off,” thus reintegrating them into society, while at the same time binding them to Fatah.

Yoram Schweitzer presented his research on the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) organization and its various factions. Until the rise of Al Qaida and the attacks of September 11, this group was regarded by many as the prime example of international terrorism. In spite of its successes, the PFLP chose to curtail its international operations—just like the Black September Organization—on the basis of political considerations. When the PFLP, as a member of the PLO, concluded that its international terrorism had exhausted most of its advantages and that it might do more harm than good for the Palestinian cause, it decided to abandon this strategy. However, in the case of the PFLP, this dissolution was not completely successful. Several factions emerged over time that continued to focus on international terrorism as their sole modus operandi. A secession followed, resulting first in the PFLP—External Operations (PFLP-EO) or “Haddad Faction,” and later in the “May 15,” or Abu-Ibrahim, Faction, and the PFLP—Special Command, or Salim Abu-Salem Faction. These factions relied exclusively on international terrorism. Their professionalism and specialization rendered them highly successful in the short term. However, their organizational structure led to certain weak points that contributed to these groups’ decline. They needed the support of states, which made them vulnerable to political change; their leaders were central to their organization, and they had limited cadres of high-quality operatives, so they were susceptible to “focused targeting”; they were highly hierarchical, which contributed to rivalries, internal conflicts, and succession disputes; and they operated in the international arena, thus becoming the target of multinational counterterrorism efforts. Taking these weak points into account, Schweitzer argued, might help in devising counterterrorism strategies.

The third panel investigated ethno-nationalist terrorism. Rogelio Alonso presented a paper on the Basque ETA, one of Western Europe’s most enduring terrorist organizations, in which he argued that the question is not so much why individual members stopped, but why ETA has not followed the same path as other disbanded terrorist groups that appeared at the same time in the European context. In 1982, the transition to democracy did lead a faction of ETA (the ETA político-militar, or ETA-pm) to renounce violence. The Spanish government, in return, re-
warded ETA members who chose this path with social reinsertion measures that enabled them to start a new life: From the early 1980s to 1995, a total of 370 individuals benefited from these practices. However, another ETA faction, the ETA-military, or ETA-m, decided to continue. Alonso listed three factors that help explain this decision. First, a terrorist campaign was waged against suspected members and supporters of ETA by the Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación, an illegal group of police officials that hired assassins and killed twenty-seven individuals, justifying the continuation of the armed struggle in the eyes of many ETA members. Second, ETA adhered to a fundamentalist nationalist ideology that prevented it from accepting any solution other than the full satisfaction of its most extreme demands. Third, a strong subculture of violence persisted. Nevertheless, ETA suffered a setback in 2000, when a “Pact for Freedom and Against Terrorism” was signed by the two main parties in Spain. The strong consensus in support of the pact enabled the state to apply pressure on ETA simultaneously from political, legal, social, and judicial angles, with very effective results. This combined action seriously damaged ETA’s ability to operate, weakened its infrastructure, and reduced its popular support, as well as the group’s capacity to mobilize supporters and activists. But in 2004, it found considerable relief in a policy shift adopted by the Spanish government. Government representatives negotiated a truce with ETA in exchange for political concessions, thus conveying the message that the threat of violence can pay off. Moreover, these negotiations gave ETA, whose members never intended to abandon terrorism anyway, the opportunity to rearm and restructure. Negotiations, therefore, must also be recognized as a factor in the continuation of violence.

Next, Beatrice de Graaf presented her research on the Free South Moluccan Youth. In 1970, the Free South Moluccan Youth seized the residence of the Indonesian ambassador in Wassenaar near The Hague. With this action, this terrorist group aimed to draw the attention of the public and government to the plight of their people, who had lived in the Netherlands for twenty-five years and had been neglected throughout that period. Moreover, they strove to gain a nation independent from Indonesia for their people back home, a Republic of the South Moluccas: They wanted to force the Dutch government to put this issue on the UN agenda. When they realized that they would not be able to achieve these goals, they staged three more terrorist acts, among them the hijacking of a regional train from Assen to Zwolle, resulting in some fatalities. The Dutch government reacted with the so-called Dutch approach, which it contrasted with a so-called German approach to combating left-wing terrorism. That is, it tried to resolve such crises by means of negotiation, while at the same time addressing the social and economic grievances of
the Moluccan minority and undertaking deradicalization measures. Thus, the Dutch government brought in respected representatives from the Moluccan community to show their willingness to engage in dialogue; it established commissions on several issues; and it offered free “orientation trips” to the Moluccan homeland in Indonesia, where the majority of the population did not favor independence from Indonesia. In addition, the government employed judicial measures against Moluccan terrorists that survived the actions, and used Dutch special forces in the case of the hijacked train. Most of the radical Moluccans viewed the commissions, the dialogue between Moluccan leaders and Dutch ministers, several welfare initiatives and positive discrimination, the orientation trips, and the enhanced media attention as considerable political successes, and did not deem new violent adventures necessary. After 1978, no more actions followed. In this case, thus, negotiation had exactly the opposite effect as with ETA and the IRA, as the next paper showed.

In this panel’s last paper, Jonathan Stevenson presented his research on the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Stevenson argued that the United Kingdom’s experience with the IRA demonstrates that a democratic state can effectively make terrorists stop by bestowing the fruits of democracy on the popular base of terrorist support. On April 10, 1998, the Belfast Agreement was signed. It provided for a power-sharing government in Northern Ireland and sub-sovereign cross-border agencies jointly run by the Northern Ireland assembly and the Irish parliament. The cornerstone of this agreement was the Irish Republic’s repeal of its constitutional claim on Northern Irish territory. In exchange, the Irish Republic gained an institutionalized sub-sovereign role in the Northern Irish government on the newly created North-South Ministerial Council. This agreement would not have been possible without having a so-called constructive ambiguity on disarmament built into it. That is, the agreement did not strictly require IRA decommissioning, but merely established it as an aim of the peace process. It is true that this ambiguity caused a lot of trouble, but absolute clarity, according to Stevenson, would probably have produced a political stalemate. He does not consider the Belfast Agreement a promising substantive model for resolving other conflicts: “The jury is still out whether it has resolved Northern Ireland’s.” Nonetheless, three general lessons can be learned from this example: first, that inclusive conflict-resolution processes condition combatants to behave non-violently; second, that the internationalization of peace processes tends to dull old enmities; and third, that ambiguity may ultimately doom peace agreements, but may nonetheless be vital to perpetuating peace processes.

The fourth panel, on Islamic terrorism, consisted of Magnus Ranstorp’s paper on the complex mechanisms of Hezbollah’s use of terrorism
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s as part and parcel of the Lebanese civil war, as well as Iranian and Syrian foreign policy calculations. Ranstorp argued that Hezbollah’s own official account of history was a mistake by the group, as it provided unusual avenues to undermine the movement. He underscored the sophistication of what he called Hezbollah jujitsu politics as it enveloped itself into the fabric of Lebanese political, social, and military life. With this success, terrorism was reserved for special occasions, and was used primarily in retribution, as well as to connect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the close nexus between Hezbollah and Iranian intelligence meant that the group, under the cover of plausible deniability, had a global terrorism reach, especially if a US-Iranian conflict were to materialize in the future.

The conference closed with a roundtable featuring Martha Crenshaw, Daniel Byman, and Bruce Hoffman as commentators on the conference as a whole. Martha Crenshaw stressed the differences between the tactical halt to a campaign, the decline or erosion of an organization, and ending terrorism. Daniel Byman pointed to the importance of the three levels of analysis introduced by Donatella della Porta, used by De Graaf in her papers: the external conditions (the macro-level), such as political opportunity structures; organized group dynamics (the meso-level); and individual perceptions and motivations (the micro-level). The question “Why Do Terrorists Stop?” has to be applied on all three levels: on the individual level, in terms of biographical choices; on the group level, in terms of coherence, conflicts, and strategies; and on the societal level, in terms of support structures and public opinion. Bruce Hoffman turned the leading question of the conference around by underlining that if we want to understand why terrorists stop, we also have to ask why and how they continue, as ETA did, for example. He stressed the fact that groups have a learning curve, and that it is necessary to understand how they learn and how they make sense of their mistakes or of phases of decline. He named the RAF as an example of a group that was defeated organizationally but not ideologically. All commentators stressed the importance of extending comparative research chronologically—by taking the anarchist and nationalist movements of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century into account—as well as geographically, to North and South America, Africa, and Asia.

Carola Dietze (GHI)
CIVILIZING NATURE:
NATIONAL PARKS IN TRANSNATIONAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Conference at the GHI, June 12–14, 2008. Conveners: Bernhard Gissibl (University of Mannheim), Sabine Höhler (GHI), Patrick Kupper (ETH Zurich). Participants: Etienne Benson (MIT), Marcus A. Burtner (University of Arizona), Indra Candanedo (University of Essex), Jane Carruthers (University of South Africa), Matthew Chrulew (Monash University), Carolin Firouzeh Roeder (University of Kent), Caroline Ford (UCLA), Melissa Harper (University of Queensland), Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells (Cambridge University), Michael Lewis (Salisbury University), Brad Martin (Northwestern University), Christof Mauch (University of Munich), John McNeill (Georgetown University), Judith Meyer (Missouri State University), Max Pfeffer (Cornell University), John Schelhas (Tuskegee University), Henny van der Windt (University of Groningen), Emily Wakild (Wake Forest University), Richard White (University of Sydney), Anna-Katharina Wöbse (University of Bielefeld).

The national park is the most successful idea yet conceived for nature protection. Nearly every nation on the planet has a park as part of its national identity, along with a flag, an anthem, and an Olympic team. Yellowstone National Park in the United States is the granddaddy of them all. This icon was created in 1872 as a tourist destination and natural attraction, and was placed under strict protection. The global implementation of the Yellowstone model during the twentieth century lends itself perfectly to transnational historical study. The GHI conference “Civilizing Nature: National Parks in Transnational Historical Perspective” aimed to explore the global spread of the concept of the national park, from its original Western principles to its local adaptations under varying historical, political, social, and economic conditions. In five interdisciplinary and internationally oriented panels, fifteen presenters introduced current research on the issue of the national park as an international phenomenon. The appropriately ambiguous title of the conference—“Civilizing Nature”—hints at the shifting ambiguity of the national park. The word “park” connotes a tamed, tolerated wilderness. At the same time, the program title hints at national parks’ role as yardsticks for assessing the degree of civilization and progress of modern nations.

The first panel, “What’s in a Park? Unpacking Yellowstone, Repacking Yellowstone,” examined the original model of the national park. Cul-
tural geographer Judith Meyer used examples from the history of Yellowstone Park to illustrate the influences of contemporary social needs and attitudes on the protection policies there. Swimming in the world-famous geysers? Long allowed, then forbidden. Intentional feeding of the bears in order to give visitors intimate contact with “wild” creatures and to increase the draw of the park? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Cell phone towers? Long forbidden in order to preserve a last vestige of wilderness feel, now camouflaged with green paint. Nature itself did not adhere to the boundaries of the preserve as established by the politicians. Meyer also made it clear that there is no static model of Yellowstone; indeed, protection policies remain dynamic today. The presentation by Melissa Harper and Richard White showed that in the nineteenth century, the national park model had already caught on in New Zealand, Canada, and Australia. These settler communities drew on Yellowstone as a model for using nature, rather than cultural legacies, to create national identity. The national parks near the city of Sydney reflected the Australian emphasis on recreation and the experience of nature through hiking. In this case, Yellowstone’s contribution was limited to providing the name “national park.” It did not provide a comprehensive protection strategy, since the first Australian parks much more closely resembled the city parks of London.

The second part of the conference was devoted to the international spread of the national park idea. At the beginning of the twentieth century, nature protection had established itself as part of the Western civilizing mission. Especially the overseas colonies, with their supposedly “empty” territories, seemed favorable for the establishment of spaces dedicated to nature protection, which would hardly have been possible in densely populated Europe. Nature protection became part of the colonial process of appropriation, as well as an accepted strategy of legitimization. France attempted to position itself at the forefront of the international movement for the protection of nature. Caroline Ford examined France’s nature protection policy in its Algerian colony. Her presentation made clear the extent to which an identity-forming narrative found concrete territorial expression: The French motherland made special efforts to protect forested areas in Algeria, linking itself to the classical tales of the supposed exploitation and destruction of the endangered granaries of Rome by Arab Muslims. Imperial forest protection in national parks thus came to stand for sustainable land use in the tradition of Roman civilization. Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells traced the British influences on nature protection policies in Malaysia using the example of King George V National Park, founded in 1939. After independence in 1957, the park was rededicated as the Taman Negara National Park. Though
created in the context of empire under the leadership of small networks of nature protection advocates interested in the hunt, the national park as a public and common space played a democratizing role for Malaysian society over the long term. Thus a colonial icon became both object and motor of a developing civil society. In contrast to the usual expulsion from national parks, an indigenous people could survive here. Essentially classified as flora and fauna, they would otherwise have fallen victim to civilizing projects and cultural assimilation.

Ecologist Henny van der Windt analyzed the creation of Dutch national parks between the two poles of native and colonial nature. According to his interpretation, Dutch protection strategies differed from the North American ones: the projects were privately initiated, without national impetus, and transcended the dogma of untouched wilderness. The specifically Dutch interpretation concentrated on the interaction between man and nature. The question of whether the creation of large-scale preserves based on the American model promoted by individual scientists and colonial officials truly had no national meaning was a point of some debate in the discussion. In the Netherlands themselves, a push for park designations occurred only with the international institutionalization of the national park discourse in the 1960s. Anna-Katharina Wöbbe examined the meaning of international organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations for the internationalization of protection parameters. In spite of an astonishing diversity of concepts for protection, the League of Nations during the 1920s promoted the national park as an ideal with global applicability for the development of a common world heritage—a concept that UNESCO was able to implement with the cooperation of a small network of white, Western male scientists and lobbyists. This approach was revived with the creation of the World Heritage Convention in 1972, which emphasized the policy of separate spheres of culture and nature. Today, this separation is viewed increasingly critically, as evidenced by the new emphasis on the integration of cultural landscapes in the United Nations program.

In his presentation “Local Adaptations: Parks From Below,” environmental historian Brad Martin portrayed the lasting conflicts of American and Canadian planners with the indigenous peoples in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions in the wake of the wave of expulsions from national parklands in the 1960s and 1970s. While ecological issues were taken into consideration, cultural concerns were not. The native Inuit population resisted the establishment of borders and restrictions, and gained increasing influence over the shaping and use of the territory. Thus the original model of the national park, which would have excluded human inhabitants, was jettisoned, and was opened up to participatory forms of na-
tional park management. John Schelhas and Max Pfeffer’s presentation addressed the conflict between native peoples and park institutions. The two anthropologists showed that the success of the policy of the reservation—globally recognized and promoted—resulted in the forced establishment of national parks that had to be tolerated and respected by locals, although from their perspective they were not necessarily sensible nor desirable. In a research project that surveyed the inhabitants of the national parks in Costa Rica (which followed a strict policy of protection) and Honduras (where a policy of integration was pursued), it became clear that the acceptance of a national park depended on the degree to which the overriding concern of nature protection was balanced with local necessities of life.

The panel “Nations and Natures: Parks and Political Regimes” discussed the implications of political power relations for views of nature protection. Emily Wakild provided an exciting new take on the typical interpretation of Mexican environmental history as a narrative of exploitation and overuse. Mexico’s revolutionary phase not only saw the development of new economic plans that took their toll on natural resources; it also saw the creation of many new national parks in the second half of the 1930s. Wakild showed how interest groups attempted to combine revolutionary identity formation, recreation, economics, and scientific forestry in the preserves. She also noted the broad international spectrum of influences Mexico drew upon, as it integrated ideas from the United States, Europe, and Japan. Carolin Firouzeh Roeder used the example of the Slovenian Triglav Berge to depict how three picturesque peaks were continually reinterpreted and repossessed by the nation across various political systems. The alpine region, today a Slovenian national park, served both as a “mental habitat” for the new national identity and as proof of Slovenia’s location within Europe as opposed to the Balkans. Indra Candanedo used the example of the trans-border national park La Amistad to show how the different political systems in Costa Rica and Panama had an immediate impact on the management of a joint natural region. The project, which began in the early 1970s, was massively influenced by the nature protection paradigms of the United States, which sought to exert economic and political influence during the Cold War, while the Panamanian military government used the national park to secure its control over land and resources.

The last four presentations at the conference were devoted to the scientific and cultural construction of national parks in a panel called “Creating the Pristine: The Science and Technology of National Parks.” Marcus A. Burtner addressed the visual representation and the intercontinental transmission of nature in the photographs of the American botanist Homer le Roy. His pictures of panoramic landscapes of South Africa
taken in the 1920s served as a visual archive for the reconstruction of rare cactus forests done in the 1930s in Arizona. In the wake of the transfer of nature as something to be protected to the American Southwest, the view of the observer also became Americanized, shifting from the idealized photographic image to something seen through the windshield of the new automobiles belonging to the middle class. Etienne Benson examined another form of technological control and construction of wilderness. He studied the tracking of large carnivores in national parks—grizzlies in the USA and tigers in Nepal—through the use of remote-sensing technologies developed during the Cold War. Thanks to a small network of wildlife biologists, this technology came from the United States to Nepal, and with the technology came particular ideas about nature. The remote-sensing technology was often hailed by wildlife biologists because it enabled them to study the territorial requirements of the animals and thereby helped extend the political boundaries of the park. Other interest groups, however, found the visual intrusiveness of the technology unacceptable—the early transmitters were visible from a great distance, resembling huge necklaces. They also objected to the fact that the animals would be subject to total control through radar, and that they faced possible destruction if they “misbehaved.” Benson’s presentation also illuminated the transition of the national park from a tourist’s ideal of a wilderness with clear boundaries to an ecosystem whose boundaries were determined by the functional relationships of their component parts.

Michael Lewis argued that the biosphere preserves of the 1970s stemmed from an international initiative, and that they followed a new epistemology of nature protection that selected representative units of the global ecosystem on a scientific basis. In his examination of the creation of the Indian tiger protection plan implemented in many national parks, Lewis analyzed the interplay of national interests and international impulses. The Indian policy of nature protection attempted to cast the tiger as a national icon. While the Indian authorities cooperated fully with international institutions such as the WWF, they simultaneously attempted to resist an “Americanization” policy. This resistance led to the fact that the Man and the Biosphere Program of UNESCO was not particularly effective in India because it was viewed by the Indian nature protection bureaucracy as a concept imposed from the outside. In the final presentation, Matthew Chrulew presented the controversial plans for a “Pleistocene Park” in northern Siberia. A 160-square-kilometer park is being set up, where an open grassland will be created by reintroducing large herbivores such as elk, wild horses, reindeer, and bison, once widespread there. As the crowning achievement of the ecological reconstruction, plans call for using genetic technology to resurrect the mammoths.
Thus high technology will be used to simulate a pre-human condition. This spectacular example condenses a number of historical debates: Which nature should be preserved, in what condition should it be preserved, with what degree of human assistance, and for which political and social purposes?

After the presentation of these detailed case studies, the advantages of a transnational perspective for the historiography of nature protection and national parks were assessed by a roundtable composed of: Jane Carruthers, who has made a significant contribution to the historiography of national parks with her studies of the South African preserves; Christof Mauch, a recognized expert on transatlantic environmental history; and John McNeill, a representative of a new global history of the environment. Carruthers compared the spread of the idea of the national park with the game of “Telephone”: An idea whispered around a table is altered by every speaker and listener to the point that the original idea is hardly recognizable in the end. The spatial, institutional, and political diversity encapsulated in the label “national park” reveals how easily it lent itself to different uses according to different needs. As Carruthers put it, “‘National Park’ is a mantra used for political and other purposes, more often looking outward not inward for validation.” She concluded that Yellowstone Park, which for virtually all the case studies played the role of historical yardstick, itself is a myth—more an imaginary realm than an actually existing place. Mauch, too, emphasized that the expression “national park” is more of a metaphor than a static quantity. After all of the success stories are examined, analyzing failed projects can reveal fractures in the transnational transmission of the idea of the national park. A meta-narrative of the national park is still lacking. Both Mauch and McNeill were interested in the thoroughly religious subtext of the material. The creation of nature preserves should be understood as the expression of a secular religion that attempted to define new borders between the sacred and the profane. At the same time, the spatial as well as the temporal contingencies of a delineation of nature should be considered, which sought to fix both geographical and chronological borders. McNeill addressed the proximity of nature protection to concepts of environmental security as the protection of natural resources, which would bring national parks into the context of military interests and national security. Carruthers advocated a more precise use of terms such as “national,” “wilderness,” “conservation,” and “Western.” Commentators also formulated a decentralization of historical perspective: It seems to be possible to understand how Western concepts were brought into the world and spread. But what about their echo? What comes back from the East, South, and North?
It is impossible to overlook the potential contributions of a transnational historical assessment of the national park to a global environmental history. As the Washington conference demonstrated, the diversity of interpretations and implementations of the concept of the national park can help to understand—and challenge—paradigms of nature protection that still prevail today. After all, while these “separate sphere” paradigms have preserved smaller spaces, they have not guaranteed a sustainable relationship between humans and nature.

Anna-Katharina Wöbse (University of Bielefeld)
ARCHIVAL SUMMER SEMINAR IN GERMANY, 2008

The GHI’s sixteenth archival summer seminar in Germany took place from June 16 to June 27. This year’s group visited research institutions and met with archivists and scholars in Speyer, Koblenz, Cologne, and Weimar. The aim of the seminar was to introduce the Ph.D. students in German history to the wide range of research institutions in Germany and to support them in preparing their prospective dissertation research in German archives and libraries. In the first part of the seminar, the participants learned to read documents in old German handwriting. The second part of the seminar consisted of visits to local, state, and federal archives and libraries to get to know the German archival system and learn the basics of Archivkunde. The group also met with two scholars to discuss research methods and practices and to receive advice on the practical issues of archival work.

As in former years, the seminar started off with a one-week course in paleography led by Walter Rummel, who heads the Landesarchiv Speyer. In accordance with the participants’ research topics, the documents he taught the group to read covered the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. In addition to an introduction to the evolution of German handwriting and the technical aspects of paleography, the course also covered the basics of Quellenkunde.

Following the paleography course, the group spent a day at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz. During the morning session, archivist Jörg Filthaut introduced the participants to Archivkunde and explained the characteristics of the Umlaufverfahren, a practice employed by administrations to reduce the institutions’ workload and to optimize bureaucratic efficiency. The explanation of the “secret language” of symbols and colors used to communicate between different departments, subdivisions, and staff members will certainly prove valuable to the students when working with government documents.

In the afternoon, the seminar group met with Tim Geiger, a historian working at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Berlin on the Edition der Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik, who shared his own research experiences with the seminar’s participants. Using his Ph.D. dissertation—a study of the conflict between Atlanticists and Gaullists within the CDU/CSU in the 1960s—as an example, he offered helpful advice on how to identify relevant material and approach archives, and how to organize and structure precious time at the archives.

The next station of the seminar was Cologne, where a large number of archives are situated. The first one the group visited was the Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, where Eberhard Illner and his colleagues offered a full day of sessions. One of the highlights was a tour through the
archive’s vast holdings. The participants were shown original documents from the middle ages to the postwar era. They also deepened their knowledge in Archiv- and Quellenkunde and learned about finding aids, historical dictionaries, and paleographical aids.

The second day in Cologne started with a visit to the Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, one of the central economic archives in Germany. It holds the papers of private companies, as well as German chambers of industry and commerce. Ulrich Soénius and Christian Hillen explained the archive’s organization, gave an overview of its holdings, talked about the specifics of private archives, and offered helpful advice on a number of research questions from the participants.

In the afternoon, the group was given the chance to see the originals of Otto Sander’s seminal photographic work Menschen des 20. Jahrhunderts at the Photographische Sammlung/SK Stiftung Kultur. Rajka Knipper presented a selection of Sander’s pictures of German society from the 1920s and 1930s and his documentation of the city of Cologne before its destruction during the war. This provided an excellent glimpse of the multifaceted character of photographs as historical sources. It was complemented by Barbara Hofmann-Johnson’s tour through the center’s current exhibition on Man Ray and Sigmar Polke, which, apart from its aesthetic value, offered insight into museological and art historical aspects of photography.

On the seminar’s last day in Cologne, Joachim Oepen welcomed the group to the Archiv des Erzbistums Köln. He explained the principle of provenance, which is especially important with regard to historical developments that led to administrative changes on the regional and state levels. For example, in the early nineteenth century, secularization resulted in the breakup of church archives’ holdings, which were transferred to state and local archives, creating a complicated network of diverse archives. Something similar happened in the postwar era, when new Länder and Bistümer were created. Following the theoretical part, the students did a hands-on exercise in working with finding aids.

The third and last stop of the seminar was Weimar. Here the group went to the Gedenkstätte Buchenwald, where it was given an excellent tour of the grounds by Martin Eckstein. After the tour, Wolfgang Röll led the students through the Gedenkstätte’s museological collection, which includes archeological findings, items donated by former inmates or their families, and post-1945 memorabilia. Finally, archivist Sabine Stein presented the archival holdings of the Gedenkstätte. Since the SS destroyed most of its documents at the end of the war, sources are scattered and incomplete, but the researchers at Buchenwald work hard to reconstruct the camp’s and the Gedenkstätte’s histories. In this sense, Buchenwald
allows unique insights into the legacies of National Socialism, the Holocaust, the GDR, and reunification.

The last day of the seminar was devoted to the Herzogin Anna Amalia Bibliothek in Weimar. Roland Bärwinkel led the group through the extraordinary rococo reading room and library that had been destroyed by a fire in 2004; they were rebuilt in record time and could be reopened last year. Some participants’ hopes to be able to return to Weimar to do research at the HAAB further intensified after they saw the wonderful new, additional library building. Following the tour and a meeting with the library’s director, Michael Knoche, Johannes Mangei and his team talked about the library’s efforts to regain those books lost in the fire. Hans Zimmermann presented the journal Simplicissimus, which has been digitized and made available for online research by the library (http://www.simplicissimus.info/).

Finally, historian Dorothee Brantz (TU Berlin) spent an afternoon with the group talking about the challenges of working with autobiographical sources and the practical aspects of research. She also recommended ways to organize and use archival material after returning from the archives. Making the transition from doing archival research to writing the dissertation can be a challenge. To avoid getting lost in the masses of notes archival visits usually result in, using a system to keep track of all records and writing short summaries of one’s findings often prove helpful.

We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to all the individuals and organizations that contributed to the 2008 Archival Summer Seminar in Germany. An announcement of the program for the 2009 seminar can be found on our web site www.ghi-dc.org.

Corinna R. Unger (GHI)

Participants and Their Topics

Waitman Beorn (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill), Murderous Choices: The Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in the East

Julia Brookins (University of Chicago), German Texas in the American Empire, 1845–1898

Thomas Burnett (University of California, Berkeley), Extinction in German Natural History, 1790–1830

Martina Cucchiara (Notre Dame University), “Bitter Times”: Catholic Sisters in Germany from 1933 to 1948

Martin Gutmann (Syracuse University), Protecting the Racial Body: West Germany’s Response to the Red Army Faction

JAMES PASTERNAK (University of Minnesota), The Power of Metaphor and the Dissonant Voices of Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century German Medievalism

GABRIELE VON ROEDERN (University of Iowa), Questionable Pasts: Nazis, Celebrities, and Consumer Society in Post-War West Germany and Austria

JEREMY WEYERMAN (University of Michigan), Different States, Different People? East and West German Understandings of Personality and Individualism

SHIRLEY YE (Harvard University), Hanseatic and Chinese Merchant Networks in China’s Ports and Hinterlands, 1829–1940
The GHI Research Seminar is a forum in which the members of the Institute, fellowship recipients, and other visiting scholars present their research to the Research Fellows of the Institute. They are organized by the Deputy Director. The GHI awards doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships for the duration of one to six months. These fellowships are designed for doctoral candidates and postdoctoral scholars whose research deals with one of the following fields: German history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the United States in international relations, and American history. For the application process, see the “Announcements” section of this Bulletin.

February 21  CONSTANZE KUTSCHKER, Universität Jena
Schuldkonfrontation als Kollektiverfahrung? Zum Umgang der Allierten mit den Deutschen 1944/45

SVEN-PAUL GETTYS, Ruhr Universität Bochum
Säkularisierung als Konzept des Wandels in der Semantik kirchlicher Selbstbeschreibung: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung am Beispiel Deutschlands, Schwedens und den USA 1945–1990

INGO KÖHLER, Universität Göttingen
Gesellschaftswandel und “Management of Change”: Die deutsche Automobilindustrie in der Krise der 1970er Jahre

SVEA KOISCHWITZ, Universität zu Köln
Der Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft im Spannungsfeld zwischen Studentenbewegung und Hochschulreform 1968–1976

March 20  MELANIE HENNE, Universität Erfurt
Doing Sports and Whiteness: Zur Selbstdarstellung von ImmigrantInnen in Chicago, 1921–1945

S. MARINA JONES, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
“Outsiders Within”: Afro-Germans in West Germany—Discourses, Perceptions, and Experiences

April 3  MONIKA DOMANN, Universität Zürich
Autoren und Apparate: Kopierpraktiken und Kopierrechte im Zeitalter der Vervielfältigung

MICHAEL BRENNER, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München
Deutsch-Jüdische Historiographie nach 1945
April 10  
H. Glenn Penny, University of Iowa  
*The German Love Affair with the American Indian*

Christianne Berth, Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte, Hamburg  
*Hamburg und die außereuropäischen Kaffee-Welten: Das Beispiel Zentralamerika*

May 7  
Ruben Mark Hackler, Humboldt Universität, Berlin  
*Das moderate Selbst: Zur Arbeit an der wissenschaftlichen Person in der deutschen Gerichtsmedizin zwischen 1790 und 1850*

Michael C. Kimmage, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.  
*The Conservative Turn: Lionel Trilling, Whittaker Chambers, and the Lessons of Anti-Stalinism*

May 21  
Thorsten Schulz, Universität zu Köln  
*Die sicherheitspolitische Dimension der internationalen Umweltpolitik in Europa: Das Beispiel Deutschland, Großbritannien, USA 1965 bis 1975*

Christoph Rosol, Humboldt Universität Berlin  
*Angewandte Voraussicht: Zur frühen Geschichte der numerischen Klimamodellierung in den USA*

May 28  
Rita Chin, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor  
*The Nazi Legacy and the Problem of Difference in Postwar West Germany*

Nicholas Schlosser, University of Maryland  
*‘The Road to Hell is Paved with RIAS Broadcasts’: The East German Campaign Against RIAS Berlin*

June 4  
Christine Hartig, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum  
*Deutsch-Jüdische Familien unter nationalsozialistischer Verfolgung: Familienbeziehungen und Generationsverhältnisse im Wandel*

Stefan Scholl, Universität Bielefeld  
*Grenzziehungen des Politischen im transatlantischen Diskurs der Ökonomen, 1880er–1980er Jahre*

June 11  
Carlos Meissner, University of York  
*A Resilient Elite: German Costa Ricans and the Second World War*

Derek R. Mallett, Texas A&M University  
*Hitler’s Generals in America: US Policy toward High-Ranking Prisoners of War*
June 18

JAN PHILIPP ALTENBURG, Universität Giessen
Die Aneigung des Stadtraumes: Großstadtleben in Philadelphia und Frankfurt in den 1920er Jahren

ESTHER KRUG, Universität Augsburg
ANNOUNCEMENTS: FELLOWSHIPS AND INTERNSHIPS

DOCTORAL AND POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the role of Germany and the United States in international relations. These fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States.

The GHI will not provide funding for preliminary research, manuscript composition, or the revision of manuscripts. It will give clear priority to those postdoc projects that are designed for the “second book.” As of January 1, 2009, the monthly stipend is €1,600 for doctoral students and €2,800 for postdoctoral scholars from European institutions; students and scholars based at North American institutions will receive a stipend of $1,800 or $3,000 respectively. In addition, fellowship recipients based in Germany will receive reimbursement for their roundtrip airfare to the US. All fellowship recipients are required to present the results of their research at the GHI during their grant period.

The next deadline for applications is May 20, 2009. Applications should include a cover letter, curriculum vitae, a copy of the most recent diploma, project description (3,000 words), research schedule for the fellowship period, and at least one letter of reference. While applicants may write in either English or German, we recommend that they use the language in which they are most proficient. They will be notified about the outcome within approximately two months after the deadline. Please send applications electronically in PDF or Word format via email to fellowships@ghi-dc.org or mail copies to:

German Historical Institute
Doctoral/Postdoctoral Fellowships
1607 New Hampshire Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20009-2562
U.S.A.
FELLOWSHIP IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY

The German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, is now accepting applications for a six-month fellowship in American or European Economic and Social History, with the possibility of extending it to one year (depending on the availability of funding). Preference is given to applicants on the postdoctoral level. The Fellow is expected to be in residence at the GHI and participate in GHI activities and events, including planning an economic/social history workshop. The Fellow will have the opportunity to make use of the resources in the Washington, DC area, including the Library of Congress and the National Archives, while pursuing his or her own research agenda. The starting date of the fellowship is September 2009.

To apply, please send a cover letter, a CV, the names and contact information of three references, a five-page research project proposal, a one-page proposal for an economic/social history workshop, and two writing samples, such as an article or a book chapter, no later than April 15, 2009. Submission of documents by email is strongly preferred. Please send an email with your application to Christa Brown (c.brown@ghi-dc.org).

For more information, please contact:

PD Dr. Philipp Gassert
German Historical Institute
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009

POSTDOC-STIPENDIUM FÜR NORDAMERIKANISCHE GESCHICHTE

GHI INTERNSHIPS

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American graduates and graduate students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist with individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible: The GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. German students are strongly advised to familiarize themselves with the American visa requirements beforehand. The process of obtaining a visa has become complicated and expensive. Information is available at the web site of the American Embassy in Berlin at www.usembassy.de. The GHI cooperates with an organization authorized by the State Department to issue the relevant papers to obtain a visa. Applicants accepted into the internship program will receive further information on the procedure in their acceptance letters. Applications should contain a cover letter, a CV, a letter of recommendation, and transcripts (proof of BA degree) or, for Germans, copies of a Zwischenprüfungs- or Abschlusszeugnis. Applications are accepted in either English or German. For further information, please contact Dr. Uta Andrea Balbier (balbier@ghi-dc.org).
NEWS

NEW PUBLICATIONS


Manfred Berg and Bernd Schaefer, eds., Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past (2008)

2. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)

Daniel Gossel, Medien und Politik in Deutschland und den USA: Kontrolle, Konflikt und Kooperation vom 18. bis zum frühen 20. Jahrhundert (2008)

3. Studies in German History (Berghahn Books)


4. Publications by GHI Research Fellows (Selected)

(a) Books


(b) Journal Articles


(c) Chapters in Edited Collections


The Institute is most grateful to have received more than 400 books from the estate of Christiane Harzig. Professor Harzig was a member of the history departments at the Technical University Berlin and Arizona State University in Tucson. Her book collection includes books on German emigration to the United States, immigrants in Germany, gender history, labor history, and Canadian history. Her collection also included the Zeitschrift für Kanada-Studien, volumes 1982–2006, and the journal Migration, volumes 1987–1997. This gift has helped to fill a number of gaps in our collection and greatly enriches our holdings of German Americana.

As part of our program to expand our holdings in economic history, we added more than 200 titles on business history, history of advertising, and consumer relations to our collection. We are subscribing to two new magazines: Business History published by Routledge and Enterprise and Society by Oxford University Press. We will try to obtain older issues of both journals.

Also worth mentioning as additions to the library are: Nachschlagewerk des Reichsgerichts, Gesetzgebung des Deutschen Reiches (four volumes, detailing law from the Kaiserzeit to the Third Reich), the first two volumes of Deutsches Verfassungsrecht 1806–1918, the series Exil-Studien/Exile Studies (more than 12 volumes), and the complete works of Bakunin as well as August Bebel’s Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften.

We would like to express our gratitude to the following people and institutions who donated books to the GHI library: Hartmut Berghoff, Bundesarchiv, Timothy A. Duskin, Linda Hunt, Georg-Eckert-Institut, German Historical Institute London, Ulrike Kirchberger, James Malten, Minerva Institute for German History Tel Aviv University, Luzie Nahr, Cecil S. Richardson, Max Schaible, Martin L. Skubinna, Ruth Stober.

**Recipients of GHI Fellowships, 2008–2009**

**Thyssen-Heideking Fellowship**

LORA WILDENTHAL, Rice University, “The Politics of Human Rights Activism in West Germany”

**Fellowship in Economic and Social History**

JONAS SCHERNER, Universität Mannheim, “Die Ausbeutung des besetzten Europas im Zweiten Weltkrieg und ihre volkswirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen”
Postdoctoral Fellowships

FRIEDERIKE BAER, Temple University, “Tour of Duty: Gender, Class, and Cultural Contact in the American Revolution”


SIMON WENDT, Universität Heidelberg, “Gender, Memory and Nation: A History of the Daughters of the American Revolution”

Doctoral Fellowships


KRISTIANE GERHARDT, Universität Göttingen, “Vom Bochor zum bürgerlichen Mann—Kulturelle Ambivalenz, Männlichkeit und Moderne”

GEORG VON GRAEVENITZ, European University Institute, Florence, “Internationalismus in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Die Auswirkung internationaler Kooperation auf dem Agrarsektor in Deutschland und Frankreich (1919–1939)”

BETTINA HESSLER, Northwestern University, “Constructing a Global Community in Early America. Moravians in an Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World”


GREGORY KUPSKY, Ohio State University, “German Americans and National Socialism, 1933–1945”


STAFF CHANGES

UWE LÜBKEN, Environmental History Fellow since May 2004 and Research Fellow since September 2006, left the GHI in August 2008. During his time at the GHI, he (co-)organized five conferences, several conference panels, a lecture series, and an exhibition. From 2006 to 2008, he was also co-editor of the Transatlantische Historische Studien. Uwe Lübken is now wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Amerika-Institut in Munich.

JONAS SCHERNER joined the Institute as Research Fellow in European Economic and Social History, a position he will hold from September 2008 to August 2009. He studied economics and history at the University of Mannheim and the University of Parma (Italy). He received his doctoral degree in economic history in 1998 and his Habilitation degree in economic and social history in 2006, both from the University of Mannheim. In the academic year 2005/2006 he was a postdoctoral visiting fellow at the Economic Growth Center, Yale University. From 1995 until 2008 he worked as teaching assistant, assistant professor, and substitute professor at the University of Mannheim. His dissertation analyzed the factors fostering and constraining industrialization in the Kingdom of Poland and in Spain during the nineteenth century in a comparative way. In his Habilitation project he examined investment decisions of industrial companies in the autarky and armament branches of Nazi Germany. Since 2006 his research has focussed on two projects: the exploitation of occupied Europe during Nazi rule and the causes of productivity growth of German armament producers during World War II (jointly with Jochen Streb, University of Hohenheim, and sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, the German Research Foundation). Further research interests include German historical statistics in the interwar period and German and Italian industrialization.

UWE SPIEKERMANN, Deputy Director, joined the Institute in April 2008. He studied modern history, political and communication sciences at the University of Münster. He received his doctorate in modern history from the University of Münster in 1996 and finished his Habilitation thesis at the University of Göttingen in March 2008. Uwe Spiekermann was a Research Collaborator of the German Research Foundation in Münster, a Research Fellow at the Department of Geography at the University of Exeter, a International Visiting Fellow at Birkbeck College, University of London, and a Fellow of the German Research Foundation. He worked as a lecturer of Home Economics at the Educational College Heidelberg and is
still Lecturer of Nutritional Sciences at the University of Vienna. After several years serving as a Managing Director of the Dr. Rainer Wild-Foundation, Heidelberg, he worked as Assistant Professor of Economic and Social History at the University of Göttingen. In 2006 he was Visiting Professor of Economic and Social History at the Jacobs University Bremen. His research work focuses on the economic and social history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany, the history of consumption, in particular the history of retailing and nutrition, and the history of science and knowledge. His major publications include: *Künstliche Kost: Die Genese der modernen Ernährung in der Wissens- und Konsumgesellschaft Deutschland 1880–2000* (forthcoming 2009); *Biermarkt und Bierkonsum im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, co-edited with Karl-Peter Ellerbrock and Heinrich Tappe (Dortmund: Ardey, forthcoming 2009); *Ernährung in Grenzsituationen*, co-edited with Gesa A. Schönberger (Berlin: Springer, 2002); *Die Zukunft der Ernährungswissenschaft*, co-edited with Gesa A. Schönberger (Berlin: Springer, 2000); *Basis der Konsumgesellschaft: Geschichte des modernen Kleinhandels in Deutschland 1850–1914* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999); *Warenhaussteuer in Deutschland: Mittelstandslehre, Kapitalismus und Rechtsstaat im späten Kaiserreich* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1994).
EVENTS

FALL LECTURE SERIES 2008

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

September 18  Enticement and Deprivation: Consumption under Hitler
Hartmut Berghoff (GHI)

October 16    Corporate Freedom of Action in Nazi Germany
Peter Hayes (Northwestern University)

November 6    Commercial Advertising in Nazi Germany
Pamela Swett (McMaster University)

November 20   The Economic Development of Germany in the ‘Third Reich’: A Comparison with the post-World War II Period
Christoph Buchheim (University of Mannheim)

December 4    Between Science and Politics: Economics and National Socialism
Jan-Otmar Hesse (University of Göttingen)

All lectures are held from 6–8 pm at the German Historical Institute.
EVENTS SPONSORED BY THE GHI, FALL 2008–2009

2008

September 11
*Human Dignity and Freedom of the Press*
Ninth Gerd Bucerius Lecture at the Willard Intercontinental Hotel, Washington, DC
Speaker: Jutta Limbach (Former Chief Judge, German Supreme Court)

September 25–27
*Human Breeding for the Improvement of the Nations: Proto-Eugenic Thinking before Galton*
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Maren Lorenz (GHI), Christoph Irmscher (Indiana University, Bloomington)

October 3
*The Peaceful Revolution of 1989*
German Unification Symposium at the GHI
Speaker: Marianne Birthler (Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR)

October 8
*What is a European Classic of Contemporary History?*
Luncheon at the GHI with Nicolas Berg (University of Leipzig) and Jan-Holger Kirsch (Center for Contemporary History, Potsdam)

October 9–11
*Nature’s Accountability: Aggregation and Governmentality in the History of Sustainability*
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Sabine Höhler (GHI), Rafael Ziegler (Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin, Germany)

October 23–24
*Symposium in Memoriam of Prof. Gerald D. Feldman*
Berlin

October 23–26
*Terrorism and Modernity: Global Perspectives on Political Violence in the Nineteenth Century*
Conference at Tulane University in New Orleans, LA
Conveners: Carola Dietze (GHI), Mareike König (GHI Paris), Benedikt Stuchtey (GHI London), Claudia Verhoeven (George Mason University/EUI Florenz)

October 30
*Konkurrenz und Konvergenz: Die USA und Deutschland im Wettlauf um die Moderne*
Symposium at the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte Hamburg
Convener: Christoph Strupp (FZH Hamburg)

October 30–November 1
*A Whole New Game: Expanding the Boundaries of the History of Sports*
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Stefan Wiederkehr (GHI Warsaw), Uta Balbier (GHI)
November 7–8  Decoding Modern Consumer Societies: Preliminary Results, Ongoing Research, and Future Agendas Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI), Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)

November 12–15  Global Migration Systems of Domestic and Care Workers Conference at York University, Toronto
Conveners: Anke Ortlepp (GHI), Valerie Preston (York University), Wenona Giles (York University), Franca Iacovetta (University of Toronto)

November 13  The Natural Sciences and Democratic Practices—22nd Annual Lecture of the GHI
Speaker: Margit Szöllösi-Janze (University of Cologne)

November 14  Symposium of the Friends of the GHI and Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize
Event at the GHI

November 19  Martin Luther King Jr. and Germany in the 1960s
Panel Discussion at the GHI

November 20–22  Engineering Society: The “Scientification of the Social” in Comparative Perspective, 1880–1990 Conference at the University of Sheffield
Conveners: Kerstin Brückweh (GHI London), Dirk Schumann (Jacobs University Bremen), Richard F. Wetzel (GHI), and Benjamin Ziemann (University of Sheffield)

2009

January 20  Immer eine Nasenlänge voraus? Amerika und Deutschland im Wettlauf um die Moderne
Symposium in Kaiserslautern
Convener: Werner Kremp (Atlantische Akademie)

March 4–6  1968 in the US, Japan, and Germany
Conference at the Japanese-German Center, Berlin
Conveners: Martin Klimek (GHI/HCA Heidelberg), Yoshie Mitobe (Meiji University, Tokyo), Joachim Scharloth (University of Zurich) and Laura Wong (Harvard University)

March 12  Tenth Gerd Bucerius Lecture
Speaker: Kurt Biedenkopf

March 13–14  Representing Poverty: American and European Perspectives
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Anke Ortlepp (GHI) and Christoph Ribbat (University of Paderborn)
March 19–21
*Black Diaspora and Germany Across the Centuries*
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Martin Klimke (GHI), Anne Kuhlmann-Smirnov (History Department, University of Bremen), and Mischa Honeck (Heidelberg Center for American Studies, University of Heidelberg)

April 29–May 2
*15th Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar: German History in the Nineteenth Century*
Seminar at the GHI and Georgetown University
Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University) and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)

May 29–30
*A World of Populations*
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Heinrich Hartmann (Freie Universität Berlin) and Corinna R. Unger (GHI)

June 22–July 3
*Archival Summer Seminar in Germany*

September 24–26
*Falling Behind or Catching Up? The East German Economy in the 20th Century*
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI) and Uta Balbier (GHI)

October 8–10
*African American Civil Rights and Germany in the 20th Century*
Workshop at Vassar College (Poughkeepsie, NY)
Conveners: Martin Klimke (GHI) and Maria Höhn (Vassar College)

October 22–25
*Beyond the Racial State*
Conference at Indiana University, Bloomington
Conveners: Devin Pendas (Boston College), Mark Roseman (Indiana University), and Richard F. Wetzel (GHI)

October 30–31
*Understanding Markets: Information, Institutions and History*
Conference at the Hagley Museum and Library (Wilmington, DE)
Conveners: Hartmut Berghoff (GHI) and Uwe Spiekermann (GHI)
German Historical Institute
Fellows and Staff
(September 2008)

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff
Modern German social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption
PD Dr. Philipp Gassert, Deputy Director
19th- and 20th-century international and transatlantic history; modern German and American history
Dr. Uwe Spiekermann, Deputy Director
Modern German economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge

Sabine Fix, Administrative Director

Dr. Uta Balbier, Research Fellow
American and German history since 1945; history of religion; history of sports; transnational history
Dr. Carola Dietze, Research Fellow
19th-century German and American history; history of the media and social radicalism; history of emigration and remigration; intellectual history; historiography
Bryan Hart, Research Associate
Insa Kummer, Project Associate
David B. Lazar, Senior Editor
Dr. Kelly McCullough, Project Manager
Expressionist painting, architecture, and dance; the garden city movement; architecture and politics
Dr. Anke Ortlepp, Research Fellow
19th- and 20th-century American social and cultural history; history of women and gender; ethnic history; history of space
Dr. Patricia Sutcliffe, Editor
Mary Tonkinson, Editor
Dr. Corinna R. Unger, Research Fellow
Postcolonialism, development, and modernization; American and German history since 1945; Cold War and anticommunism; history of philanthropy; history of exile; history of science
Dr. Richard F. Wetzel, Research Fellow and Editor
Modern German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Martin Klimke, Visiting Research Fellow in North American History
Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
PD Dr. Jonas Schernert, Visiting Research Fellow in Social and Economic History

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