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On November 18, 1987, Heinrich August Winkler and Bernard Bailyn delivered the first of the GHI’s Annual Lectures. The GHI had opened its doors only months earlier, and the Annual Lecture was its first major event. As founding director Hartmut Lehmann explained in the inaugural issue of the Bulletin that fall, a fundamental objective of the GHI would be to foster “a continuing dialogue between scholars across the borders of nations.” The Annual Lecture has indeed become established as an important forum of German-American scholarly dialogue in the years since Winkler and Bailyn shared the podium, and it was with justifiable pride that the GHI used the 2007 Annual Lecture as occasion to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of its founding. By pleasant coincidence, the main speaker, James J. Sheehan of Stanford University, had earlier joined with Lehmann in organizing the first conference held at the GHI, “German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States, 1933–1970” (1988). Lehmann was on hand for the 2007 Annual Lecture and graciously agreed to be interviewed on the early years of the GHI. The interview appears in this issue of the Bulletin along with the texts of Sheehan’s Annual Lecture and the comment by Cornelia Rauh-Kühne.

Thematic diversity has been a hallmark of the GHI’s research program from the outset. German-American relations are a core topic, but the GHI has also supported work on subjects ranging from Jewish-gentile relations in medieval Germany to the impact of the automobile on the ways Europeans and Americans experience landscape. Within the scope of the GHI’s broad scholarly mandate, each director has given special attention to a particular field of research. During Lehmann’s tenure as director (1987–93), the GHI undertook a number of projects on the history of migration. The Cold War stood at the center of the GHI’s work during the directorship of Detlef Junker (1994–99). Under Christof Mauch’s direction (1999–2007), the GHI became a major sponsor of research in international and comparative environmental history. Shortly after this issue of the Bulletin goes to press, Hartmut Berghoff will arrive in Washington to take up the directorship of the GHI. Berghoff, a specialist in economic and social history, will set out his research agenda in a forthcoming issue of the Bulletin.

The dialogue the GHI has sought to foster crosses not only borders but also generations. From “German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States, 1933–1970” on, GHI conferences have always included both junior and senior scholars as participants. If the Annual Lecture pays
tribute to distinguished members of the historical profession, the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize ceremony, traditionally held the day after the Annual Lecture, provides a platform for the young historians who will be shaping the field of German history in the U.S. in the years ahead. This issue of the Bulletin features project descriptions by the 2007 Stern Prize recipients, Monica Black and Winson Chu. The Stern Prize, we should note, is awarded not by the GHI, but by the Friends of the German Historical Institute, who have become a vital part of the institute’s work.

Another fall event at the GHI is the annual symposium on German unification. The speakers at the symposia over the years have been not historians but rather Zeitzeugen, men and women who played a part in the events of 1989–90 and the subsequent public debate on the ongoing process of unification. It was a great honor last fall to welcome Bärbel Bohley to Washington. Bohley’s civic engagement long preceded the East German revolution of 1989. From the late 1970 on, she found herself ever more frequently in trouble with East German authorities on account of her participation in the independent peace movement. She went on to play a leading part in establishing Neues Forum, the group at the forefront of the civil liberties movement in 1989, and co-authored its founding manifesto, Die Zeit is reif (The Time is Ripe). After unification, Bohley was an outspoken proponent of granting onetime citizens of the German Democratic Republic access to their Stasi files. True to character, she spoke her mind freely on unification and its aftermath in her address at the GHI, which appears in English translation in this issue of the Bulletin. We would like to thank the Hertie Foundation for its generous sponsorship of the October 3 symposia.

Events like the Annual Lecture, the unification symposia, and the GHI’s scholarly conferences are planned long in advance and involve considerably more work than one might expect. This work has carried on much as normal during the year-long period between Christof Mauch’s departure from the GHI and Hartmut Berghoff’s arrival. We are grateful to them both for the help and guidance they have offered. We also owe a great debt of gratitude to all of our colleagues at the GHI. The full calendar of upcoming events and steady flow of new publications attest to their commitment and professionalism.

Philipp Gassert and Anke Ortlepp
Deputy Directors
Any historian rash enough to put the word “future” in his title owes his audience an explanation—if not an apology. As Dieter Langewiesche has recently warned us, historians’ credentials become invalid as soon as we leave the past. “Historians,” he writes, “are competent only for retrospection. As experts they are fundamentally incapable of predicting—nicht prognosefähig.”¹ I shall try to keep Langewiesche’s prudent admonition in mind; this essay makes no predictions. But while I do not intend to predict what the future of the sovereign state will be, I will attempt to suggest how we should think about it. In this somewhat more modest project, history is a helpful companion and sometimes an indispensable guide.

The great French historian Marc Bloch once wrote that the “solidarity of the ages is so effective that the lines of connection work both ways. Misunderstanding of the present is the inevitable consequence of ignorance of the past. But a man may wear himself out just as fruitlessly in seeking to understand the past, if he is totally ignorant of the present.”² I think that what Bloch called “the solidarity of the ages” may reach in the other direction as well, connecting not only the contemporary world with its past, but also past, present, and future. However imperfect and tentative the result, we must struggle to imagine what lies ahead, and we must do so in the light of what we know about both past and present.

A great deal has been written about the future of the state—and here it is time to emphasize that my subject is the European state, although my remarks may have wider applications. Some observers have declared that
the European state’s days are numbered, indeed that it may have already passed from the historical landscape. For example, Carl Schmitt, that deeply disagreeable but sometimes insightful theorist, wrote that “the epoch of the state [Staatlichkeit] is now coming to an end . . . The state as the model of political unity, as the bearer of that most astonishing of all monopolies, the monopoly of political decision, this brilliant example of European organization and western rationalism, has been displaced.” More recently, the historian John Pocock remarked that “Europe, the cradle of the state, may be about to discover what it is like to do without it.” Others insist on the state’s durability. The influential political sociologist Michael Mann, for instance, maintains that “the nation-state is not in general decline anywhere.” Adding, “where countries lack an effective nation-state, they would dearly love to have one.” The lack of consensus about the state’s future is nicely captured in a collection of essays published a few years ago that was entitled Abschied vom Staat, Rückkehr zum Staat—“leaving the state, returning to the state.”

This title also points toward a central difficulty in thinking about states: It is contained in the simple definite article the (I often think that the most problematic words in any statement are usually the shortest and simplest, words like the, in, or and.) There is, as I shall argue at length, no such thing as the state, a historically necessary phenomenon that we can abandon or recover. States are not objects, destinations, agents; they are persistently changing ways of thinking and acting, idioms and practices, ideologies and institutions. To think about states’ past, present, or future, we must resist the urge to turn them into things, with a set character and normative existence. “The obvious escape from reification,” Philip Abrams once wrote, “is historical. The only plausible alternative I can see to taking the state for granted is to understand it as historically constructed.”

In this essay, I will examine three visions of the European state’s future: first, that individual states will become part of a federal “United States of Europe”; second, that states will be dissolved into a post-sovereign (sometimes called—although not by me—a postmodern) new order; and third, that states will continue to pursue their self-interest and security, much as they have in the past. I will deploy materials from German history to test each of these versions of the state’s future. The German historical experience strikes me as particularly appropriate, because from Hegel through Max Weber to Carl Schmitt and beyond, Germany has been both setting and model for some of the most powerful and influential thinking about the modern state’s past, present, and future. For more than two centuries, there has been something exemplary about the German state and, as I will try to suggest, this remains the case.
Part One: A United States of Europe?

Will Europe evolve from a federation of states like the European Union into a federal state like the United States, that is, a state in which the sovereign power of each member will be subordinated to a central authority, a super-state that would, for example, have the capacity to formulate and implement a common foreign and security policy?

The possibility that Europe might—and in the minds of some, should—become more than a collection of states was present from the beginning of the process of European integration. In 1957, the signers of the Treaty of Rome declared that they were determined “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” International organizations—the United Nations, for example—create connections among states, while individual states create connections among people. The European community, therefore, tried to be both at once. It was run by a council, composed of heads of governments, but it also had a parliament—which was at first indirectly, then directly elected—that was supposed to reach across state boundaries to represent the peoples of Europe.

For its advocates, the most important expression of European political unity would be a common foreign and security policy that could be created and implemented by European institutions. Beginning with the Hague Summit of December 1969, members of the European Community have continually called for greater cooperation in foreign affairs, which—in the words of the Davignon Report issued in 1970—would “show the world that Europe has a political vocation.” From then on, proclamations of the aspiration and intention to construct a common foreign and security policy have been a recurrent theme in the life of the European Community (and now European Union). They can be found in the Single Europe Act, the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, the ill-fated constitutional project of 2005, and current efforts to implement a new reform treaty. Considering the gap between these proclamations and Europeans’ actual ability to cooperate on the international scene, this long campaign has been—to borrow Dr. Johnson’s famous description of second marriages—a triumph of hope over experience.

The drive for political unity rests on the assumption that the creation of a European superstate is somehow the natural, logical outcome of economic integration. Many have argued that by failing to follow the path to statehood, Europe is incomplete, unfinished, its true destiny unfulfilled. As a French strategic expert wrote in 2000, it is “less and less logical for an economic, commercial, and technological power . . . to remain a minor power on the strategic plane. It amounts to a historical incongruity.” Words like “logical” and “historical incongruity” alert us to the fact
that we are, once again, in the presence of assumptions about the normative character of the state and the teleology of its evolution.

The historical experience that is often cited to support the idea that Europe must necessarily evolve into a federal state is the nineteenth-century German Customs Union, or Zollverein, conventionally regarded as the foundation on which a unified German nation-state was built. On the surface at least, there are some striking parallels between the Zollverein and the European Union. Both were created by states; both began as essentially economic organizations designed to facilitate trade, although in both cases some of the organization’s advocates also had political aspirations. But does the transformation of the German Customs Union into a united German nation-state support the notion that Europe’s evolution toward statehood is both necessary and inevitable? I don’t think so. Let’s look more closely at the evolution of the Zollverein: In the first place, most of the governments in the Customs Union opposed national unification, as did—so far as we can tell—a majority of their populations. Political unification did not grow naturally or logically out of economic cooperation: It was imposed by a single powerful state—Prussia—by force, first in the civil war of 1866, then in the war against France four years later.7

Far from showing that economic cooperation must bring political unity, the example of German unification reminds us that in the process of state-making, war has almost always played a critically important role. (This was, of course, equally true of the American case, the other historical example often cited as a model for European federalism.) In Charles Tilly’s one-sentence summary of the history of state formation: “Wars make states, and vice versa.” War, Tilly writes, “wove the European network of national states, and preparation for war created the internal structures of states within it.”8 Without the impetus of international competition and often the deployment of both foreign and domestic violence, few sovereign states would have come into existence—and, one might add, a number of them (including the United States) needed additional wars to remain together. The European Union, on the other hand, was created not by and for war, but by and for peace—that is, by the creation of a security environment that made economic and eventually other forms of cooperation possible. In this environment, the primary impetus to state-making was missing. It is often assumed that because Europeans have created a peaceful society of states, they will eventually form a unified state. I think it is much more accurate to say that precisely because Europeans have figured out how to live in peace with one another, they do not need—and most likely will not create—a European superstate. What historically has been the primary impetus to state-building is missing. Peace made the postwar European state, and vice versa.
It would be a mistake to underestimate the political implications of European integration, but it is fundamentally misleading to view these implications from the perspective of nineteenth-century state-building. The persistent inclination to do so is one reason why so many people have had trouble understanding what the European Union actually is—much as historians in the nineteenth century had trouble understanding the Holy Roman Empire. When measured against a normative image of the state, both the EU and the Empire appear odd, incomplete, unsuccessful. In fact, they are simply different—in origin, character, and purpose—from the way we usually understand states.9

Part Two: Beyond Sovereignty?
Like the federalists, the second vision of the European state’s future that I want to consider also imagines a decline in the importance of existing states, but in a much more radical way. While the federalists imagine a transfer of sovereign power from the member states to some kind of European super-state, the advocates of a new post-sovereign order imagine that the sovereign state will eventually dissolve, or at least play a decreasingly important part in international life.

The scholars who apply these ideas to the study of European integration are conventionally called functionalists or neo-functionalists. They argue that the process of economic interaction among individuals and enterprises creates an increasingly dense set of connections across sovereign boundaries, which necessarily encourage political cooperation and institutional coordination. The roots of these theories reach into the eighteenth century; they were given influential formulations by thinkers like Richard Cobden and Herbert Spencer in the nineteenth century and by Norman Angell and David Mitrany in the twentieth.10 These ideas were very much on the minds of some of the founding fathers of European integration, especially Jean Monnet. Functionalist ideas were clearly reflected in the famous Schuman Declaration of May 1950, which set the process of European integration into motion by calling for joint control of Europe’s coal and steel production: “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”11 At least in retrospect, this seems to be exactly what happened: first cooperation on coal and steel production, then an extension of commercial agreements in the Treaty of Rome, then an expansion of the community, as well as a deepening of its institutional basis. Europe, therefore, can be seen as the most vivid example of what the Princeton political scientist Anne-Marie Slaughter calls a shift in the meaning of sovereignty, from an emphasis on “autonomy from outside interference to the capacity to participate in transgovernmental networks of all types.”12
If Europe is the best example of a post-sovereign international order, then the German Federal Republic would seem to be the best example of a post-sovereign state. From its founding in 1949, the sovereignty of the Federal Republic was qualified in several important ways. The second section of Article 24 of the Republic’s Basic Law reads as follows: “To maintain the peace, the Bund can join a system of mutual collective security; it will thereby accept limitations on its sovereignty which introduce and insure a peaceful and stable order in Europe and between the nations of the world.” Until 1955, the occupying powers retained a substantial amount of control over west German affairs. And even after achieving formal sovereignty in 1955, the Federal Republic’s autonomy was limited, both by self-imposed restraints (on the manufacturing of certain kinds of weapons, for example) and by restraints imposed by its allies, who retained the right to station troops on German soil. Because these limitations became such an accepted part of the German political landscape, it was easy to lose sight of how radically they broke with the sovereign state’s traditional insistence on independence and autonomy.\(^{13}\)

The genius of West German foreign policy was to make a virtue of these necessities, which, among other things, meant eagerly participating in European institutions.\(^{14}\) From Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl, German leaders played a key role in the process of European integration, becoming thereby the model for what one scholar has called an “open state,” that is, a state that was economically, legally, and territorially open to external forces and influences. At the same time, economic and commercial policies (which were, of course, the central elements in functionalist theory) dominated the Federal Republic’s foreign and domestic politics: Germany became a “trading state,” skillfully using its economic power to define a place for itself within the new Europe.\(^{15}\) Significantly, this political strategy did not change in September 1990, when the occupying powers formally abandoned the rights they had retained since the end of the Second World War, thereby granting a united Germany “full sovereignty over its domestic and foreign affairs.” By then, most Germans agreed with President von Weizsäcker’s response to these events: “Today,” he said on October 3, 1990, “sovereignty means participating in the international community.”\(^{16}\) This definition of sovereignty was, you will have noticed, much the same as the one given in Anne-Marie Slaughter’s *New World Order*.

While the history of the Federal Republic is, in many ways, the best example of a post-sovereign state, it also suggests some of the limitations of this vision of Europe’s future. In the first place, it is important to notice that Germany is “open” to some external forces and not to others. A great many of the state’s most significant functions—internal security, education, taxation, welfare, to name just a few—remain largely free of external
influence. Last year’s government paper on the future of German security policy, for instance, underscored the importance of international cooperation, but also insisted that only German institutions could decide whether to deploy German troops.17

It is clear that neither the German public nor its leaders are prepared to abandon all claims on national sovereignty. This issue was raised, but by no means resolved in the Constitutional Court’s famous decision in the Brunner case of 1993. Rejecting a complaint by Manfred Brunner, a former official in the European Commission, that the Maastricht treaty violated the Basic Law, the court opened the way for the Federal Republic to join the European Union but at the same time set certain limits on the fusion of German and European institutions. Essentially, the court insisted that the Bundestag must keep the right to decide what power could be transferred to the Union. The Union’s members were to remain what the court called “masters of the Treaties,” retaining sovereign authority, including the right to withdraw from the Union.18

In its 1993 decision, the Constitutional Court emphasized the European Union’s frequently lamented “democratic deficit,” which continues to have profound implications for the political future of states. The institutional weakness of the European parliament both reflects and reinforces the lack of an authentic European political culture—that is to say, the absence of a European public, a European Demos. This means that the only effective instruments of democratic decision-making and sources of democratic legitimacy remain within the states. There is, I think, very little sign that this will change in the foreseeable future. And this will remain the single greatest impediment to the creation of a European foreign or security policy.19

What I have called the functionalist vision of the European experience provides some useful insights into the process of integration. In many ways, Robert Schuman’s “concrete achievements” did gradually build a “de facto solidarity” among European states, often in ways their leaders did not fully understand or intend. But functionalism’s explanatory and descriptive powers are limited. Like the federalist vision with which I began, there is a teleological thrust in functionalism—although obviously it posits a very different, indeed diametrically opposed telos. But both suppose there is some necessary logic at work: for the federalists, a logic of state formation; for the functionalists, of state dissolution. Neither, I think, stands up to rigorous historical examination.

Part Three: The Persistence of the Sovereign State?

If neither the federalist nor the functionalist scenario seems likely, are we left with a third alternative, that European states will persist? I think the
answer to this question must be a qualified yes, although this answer raises important questions about just what kind of states will persist.

Despite the apparent success of European integration, there have always been those who vigorously opposed both the creation of a European super-state and the dissolution of state sovereignty through some gradual process of functional cooperation. Charles de Gaulle famously insisted that a stateless Europe was neither possible nor desirable: “It is only the states,” he declared in 1962, “that are valid, legitimate, and capable of achievement. I have already said, and I repeat, that at the present time there cannot be any other Europe than a Europe of states.”

For him, Europe would have to remain a community of separate states with the capacity to define and defend their essential interests. No European power—and certainly not France—could ever surrender this capacity to its neighbors. The Euroskeptics have never found another leader as eloquent or as obdurate as de Gaulle, but they remain a formidable presence, formidable enough to defeat the European constitution in 2005 and, in my opinion, to threaten the success of the new reform treaty officially signed in Lisbon in December 2007.

The Euroskeptics can take comfort from those scholars who emphasize the persistent importance of state policies and national interest in the integration process. Alan Milward, a British economic historian, makes the strongest case for this position in a book appropriately entitled *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*. Milward begins—in his words—“from the realist position that the modern nation-state is still the arbiter of its own destiny.” Behind the rhetoric of European values and cooperation, he detects the powerful pull of national interests. The bargaining that produced the key agreements in Europe’s formation was driven by careful calculations about national advantage and produced stronger, more prosperous and effective nation-states. Statesmen may have justified their policies by evoking European values and goals, but their motivation came from a commitment to the interests of their states, not to some vague dream of European unity.

Andrew Moravcsik’s *The Choice for Europe*—again, the title points us toward the thesis—develops Milward’s analysis in a slightly different direction. Here is how Moravcsik summarizes his argument:

My central claim is that the broad lines of European integration since 1955 reflect three factors: patterns of commercial advantage, the relative bargaining power of important governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments. Most fundamental of these was commercial interest. European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests—
primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions—that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global economy.22

The German case provides some powerful evidence for both Milward and Moravcsik. Adenauer’s European credentials are authentic enough, but it is also clear that he saw participation in multinational institutions as the best, perhaps the only, way to recover German independence after the disaster of Nazism. As is so often the case, in the intense debates over Adenauer’s foreign policy, international and domestic politics were inseparable. Germany also plays a large role in The Choice for Europe, where Moravcsik is able to trace in compelling detail the complex interaction of political calculations, economic interest groups, and diplomatic maneuver.

My doubts about Milward’s and Moravcsik’s analyses do not come from their emphasis on the motivations of European statesmen. Of course, these statesmen acted according to what they thought were national interests and made what they believed were rational choices—how could it be otherwise? It does seem to me, however, that interests and rationality are not fixed categories, but are shaped by the domestic and international environment. What changed after 1945, therefore, was not policymakers’ commitment to their state’s self-interest or the fact that their motives were rational: What changed were the values, perceptions, and assumptions that gave these interests new meaning and expanded the range of rational choice.

The most important of these changes takes us back to the historical environment in which the postwar European state was created. This environment was the product of the Cold War division that created a new kind of security community in Europe. War among the European powers became increasingly unthinkable since the two superpowers enforced two internationally guaranteed security structures that may have threatened one another, but stabilized and secured the members of each. Then, and only then, was it possible for European statesmen to make the kind of concessions necessary for the integration process to begin and eventually to flourish. It is often said that European integration—the creation of new kinds of European states—brought peace to Europe. I think the reverse is closer to the truth: Because of the international architecture imposed by the superpowers, the process of integration in Western Europe became possible. Then, and only then, could it seem to be in the national interest to share resources, open boundaries, accept external limitations on budgetary powers, become part of a transnational legal system—in short, to qualify the state’s sovereign autonomy in ways that
would have been unthinkable to an earlier generation of European leaders. To repeat the point made earlier: peace made the new European state, and then and only then did these states abandon war as an instrument of policy.\textsuperscript{23}

Earlier in my remarks I quoted Charles Tilly’s comment that in the process of state formation, war “wove the European network of national states, and preparation for war created the internal structures of states within it.” After 1945, it was the gradual disappearance of war that wove a new kind of international network in Europe, and it was the growing irrelevance of military preparedness that created new kinds of internal structures of European states. Milward is right: the unification of Europe did rescue and in many ways strengthen the national state, but in the process these national states were transformed, often in ways that policymakers had neither anticipated nor intended. The result is a Europe in which states are still ready and willing to pursue their interests, but do so enmeshed in a set of international rules and institutions that would be extraordinarily difficult to break.

**Conclusion**

Let me conclude with some general observations about the past, present, and future of European states. I have tried to show that the German case should make us skeptical about two prominent versions of the state’s future: that it will become part of a federal Europe or that it will be dissolved into a post-sovereign order. As we have seen, both visions presuppose a normative view of the state and a teleological view of its development. From this perspective, states must either ebb or flow, disappear or persist, grow stronger or weaker.

The European state is not going away, sovereignty will not disappear, the era of what Carl Schmitt called *Staatlichkeit* has not come to an end. After all, can we really say that the Federal Republic is somehow weaker than its predecessors, less secure, less willing and able to provide order and services for its citizens, less willing to raise revenue and impose regulations? Has the meaning of security, the nature of order and the kind of services to be provided, the purpose and scope of revenue and regulation changed? Of course they have.\textsuperscript{24}

In fact, the key element in the history of states is their persistent capacity for change. This capacity for change—and the rich variety of institutions that changing circumstances have produced—is surely a prominent feature of German states’ long history: from their mixed and qualified sovereignty within the Holy Roman Empire (suggested by some as a useful model for understanding the European Union), to the German Confederation’s federative structure, the federal structure of the Kaiser-
reich and republic, the Nazis’ racial dictatorship, the two German states between 1949 and 1990, each enmeshed in a set of supranational systems, and finally the contemporary Federal Republic, with its secure sovereign status but deep connections with a European set of institutions.

The habits of mind and action, the idioms and institutions that make up states will continue to evolve as they interact with the world around them, shaping and being shaped by internal demands and external conditions. There is no end to this process, no telos to give it shape and determine its trajectory. The history of states is open-ended, driven by a complex blend of continuities and innovations, contingencies and necessities, dangers and opportunities. That is the lesson that the German past teaches us as we struggle to think about the next chapter in the long, complex, and often troubled life of European states.

Notes

1 I want to dedicate this essay to the memory of Gerald D. Feldman, a treasured friend for more than forty years and a tireless supporter of the German Historical Institute.


8 For more on this, see James Sheehan, German History, 1770–1866 (Oxford, 1989), Chapter 14.


10 According to Jan Zielanka, “the union is on its way to becoming a kind of neo-medieval empire with a polycentric system of government, multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, striking cultural and economic heterogeneity, fuzzy borders, and divided sovereignty.” Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford, 2006), v.

11 For an introduction to this body of thought, see Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London, 1973). The classic contemporary analysis is Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 1964).

12 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, 2004), 34.
13 Ludolf Herbst, “Wie souverän ist die Bundesrepublik?” in Sieben Fragen an die Bundesrepublik, ed. W. Benz (Munich, 1989), 72–90.

14 This is the theme of Helga Haftendorn’s excellent synthesis of West German foreign policy: Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy since 1945 (Lanham, Md., 2006).


20 Quoted in David Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future (Princeton, 2002), 140, n. 2.


23 For an expanded version of this argument, see Sheehan, Where Have all the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston, 2008), Part III.

24 A forceful statement of this view can be found in the essays edited by Jonah Levy, The State after Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Liberalization (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).
COMMENT ON JAMES SHEEHAN’S LECTURE

Comment delivered at the Twenty-First Annual Lecture of the GHI, November 15, 2007

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I have to confess that the reference to the future in Professor Sheehan’s title initially worried me. It is, after all, a part of the intellectual equipment I acquired at the University of Tübingen working with Dieter Langewiesche, whom Professor Sheehan quoted at the beginning of his lecture, to be skeptical about the utility of our discipline in making predictions about the future.

My skepticism about the predictability of structural political change has been reinforced by my experience as an eyewitness to the political upheaval of 1989 in Eastern Europe, which came as a total surprise to scholars and everyone else. We all know that before 1989, not a single reputable historian considered the unification of the two German states possible, despite the readily evident signs of political decay in the Eastern bloc. I will only mention in passing that scholars in related, policy-oriented disciplines like political science did not do much better.¹

I was thus very relieved when I heard Professor Sheehan’s explanation and realized that he clearly rejects the idea that historians should be expected to offer predictions about the future. As a preeminent authority on the history of nineteenth-century Germany, he has explained to us the changes in conceptions of the state and in ideas about the state’s duties in the course of the modern era. On account of those changes, a normative perspective that takes the state-building processes of the nineteenth century, which were nation-state-building processes, as its point of orientation—a perspective that is common in many contemporary discussions of Europe—is inappropriate. The European Union is something new on the historical stage, a new model of political organization. This new supra-national institution came into existence in the context of the Cold War, as Professor Sheehan clearly showed, but not as the result of warfare, which had played a constitutive role in the state-building processes of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.² Because war often served as the midwife at the births of nation states, history has little useful advice to offer about Europe’s transformation of the state in the future.

The vision of a “United States of Europe” must be realized by some entirely different means than those used in nation-building in the past or otherwise the core element in the idea of Europe—the promise of peace—
will be rendered null. I therefore agree with James Sheehan that this vision does not seem very likely in light of historical experience.

I also share his doubts about the second vision of the future, the vision of the gradual transformation of the old nation-states into post-sovereign states. The recent past provides little evidence to support that vision. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the state’s social welfare services and its claim to regulatory authority have not diminished in the half century since the signing of the Rome treaties. The welfare state and redistributive policies have expanded since then, and will probably become more important in the future as the result of demographic change—and not only in Germany.³ Think, for example, of education and health care or of consumer protection: The sovereign state is not in retreat—it’s on the advance. Of course, it is true that the EU now sets the framework for national guidelines in many areas. That is most clearly evident in economic and trade policy, but even in education, the EU’s authority is increasing. The increase in the EU’s importance has not, however, been accompanied by a retreat on the part of the sovereign states. For that reason, Sheehan’s vision number three is much more plausible, namely, “that states will continue to pursue that self-interest . . . much as they have in the past.”

The political philosopher Hermann Lübbe recently called attention to the fact that even in the area of policy on Europe, the prevailing currents of public opinion remained tied up with views on national matters, which are shaped by national political parties and which gain currency in national political systems. Consequently, even the preconditions for a European identity are lacking.⁴ That does not worry many pro-European intellectuals, such as Ralf Dahrendorf, who consider that appropriate, given the EU’s limited range of responsibilities and its supranational structure.⁵ Others complain about the lack of a European identity, mainly teachers and politicians, but also some scholars. Their expectations are directed above all toward schools and the historical profession, which they suggest should create and propagate a European memory. The putative lessons of the nineteenth century are supposed to serve anew in this way as a guide for the European future.

When the plans for a European constitution collapsed in December 2003, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published an article with the programmatic title “Europäismus”—“Europeanism.”⁶ The author was the political scientist Jerzy Macków, who teaches international relations at the University of Regensburg. Macków called upon pro-European elites to do to their nations—he literally used the German word “antun”—“what the nationalists in the nineteenth century did in regard to their peoples.” Namely, through nationalism, they spread appealing depictions of their countries’ histories and cultures at the same time that they
fostered the desire for political sovereignty. The task for Europeanism, as Macków sees it, is to counter the nationalisms that still exist in Europe. He stresses, of course, that this “counter-ideology” is to be carefully controlled so that the mistakes of nationalism are not repeated. The nationalisms of the nineteenth century were movements deliberately organized by intellectual elites. Today, Macków argues, we are to take a lesson from them in order to put an end to national identities by establishing a European identity. The main point seems to be that the Europeans should learn to understand European history. Macków is not alone in making this argument: Many supporters of Europe share this view. It is we historians who are expected to help Europe find a European memory. I cannot hide my skepticism about such suggestions. It would be one thing if we were supposed to create a Europe like the one envisioned by the Swiss writer Walter Muschg, namely “a community of memory and experience, with the defining trait that the memories be those that fundamentally divided us before they united us, and that the experiences are of seemingly irresolvable differences.” Histories of Europe along these lines have already been written: Mark Mazower’s *The Dark Continent* is one example.

No one can seriously expect historians to emulate the professional national apologists of the nineteenth century today in the name of Europe. Back then, historians played an active role in the state-building processes of the sovereign states, and it was an extremely problematic role because it contributed to the construction of ideologies. They presented long lines of continuity in the history of their peoples and their countries so that it appeared their development was moving with teleological necessity toward the establishment of an independent state.

As a historian or politically interested citizen, one might be firmly persuaded by the idea of Europe and welcome this historically unprecedented experiment in supranational conflict containment with great anticipation. We historians cannot, however, revert to the nationalist naïveté of our professional forebears. No one would believe us!

The recommendation from so many supporters of Europe that we take the supposedly successful nationalists of the nineteenth century as models to imitate in creating an identity for citizens of Europe strikes me as very unrealistic and, indeed, even paradoxical. The founding fathers of the European Union wanted it to accomplish one thing above all: to hinder nationalism from causing yet another disaster in Europe. They recognized that the supposedly controllable and admirable elite nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century had quickly turned into the ideology of integration that led to nation-building by war. To quote Dieter Langewiesche once again: “War was the creator not only of nation-states but also of national identity.” Let me add that wars against internal as
well as external enemies could serve that purpose. Langewiesche comprehensively refutes the arguments put forward by various historians that it is possible to separate the popular mobilization and process of integration achieved by nationalism from the darker aspects of aggressive nationalism. “Nationalism,” Langewiesche observes, “unleashes both participation and aggression.” The idea that it lies within the power of today’s champions of Europeanism to control what comes of that concept—that they decide whether Europe rests on a peaceful vision of community or on aggressive collective self-satisfaction—that idea rests on a naive belief that history repeats itself. That idea trivializes the destructive capacity that nationalism displayed over the past two centuries as an almost omnipotent secular “system of belief.” And last but not least, that idea is an example of ahistorical thinking. It is by no means clear whether forms of political organization in the twenty-first century can and must be legitimatized in the same way they were in the early and peak phases of nationalism. At that time, according to Ernest Gellner’s anthropological explanation, it was a question of adapting society to the conditions of modernity. Since then, modernity has taken on a different character as a result of the processes of social differentiation and individualization, and it is now undergoing a global transformation. Which forms of political organization and which mechanisms of social-psychological integration will accompany that transformation is open to debate. For example, Hermann Lübbe, who has been cited here several times already, contends that identity as it is now understood, identity defined by shared origins, will no longer be a key element in defining membership in the social and political communities of the future. It’s too early to tell—especially for me as a historian—whether that prediction will turn out to be right. Only one thing seems to be certain: Professor Sheehan’s observation about the transformation of state institutions also holds true for their legitimatization to the citizenry: Looking back to previous centuries can help us avoid misinterpreting the process of European unification. It is not a guide for coping with the future.

Notes


12 Lübke, “Politische Organisation.”
“UNDER OPEN SKIES”:
REFLECTIONS ON GERMAN UNIFICATION

Hertie Lecture delivered at the German Unification Symposium, October 3, 2007

Bärbel Bohley*

Today is October third, and Germany is celebrating the anniversary of its political reunification for the seventeenth time. I have been asked to speak today in honor of this momentous date. Many others have spoken in honor of this day, such as Jens Reich and Joachim Gauck, both of whom were active with me in the civic movement during the autumn of 1989. Jens Reich and I were both among the thirty founding members of the New Forum,¹ whose slogan “the time is ripe” became a decisive factor in the mass awakening that took place in the autumn of 1989. In a short time, more than 200,000 people signed up for this cause, and the New Forum became the largest mass movement in the GDR at that time.

Jens Reich and Joachim Gauck both discussed the basic issues, and I do not want to repeat them. We probably all judge the past years differently, as we have spent them in different places. Today I have been given the opportunity to voice some criticism. Celebration alone will not bring us further.

Perhaps I am only a ghost of the past for you, or, in today’s parlance, a witness to history. I’ve asked myself why I’ve been invited here today: I do not belong to a political party, I do not hold a political office, and I haven’t been active in German politics for years. For me, working at the grassroots level was always the most important; this is where I work today and where the bulk of my political experience continues to be. Today I would like to talk about this experience, both old and new. At the grassroots level, people are more hesitant, and perhaps because of this, they have a more realistic view of things than the elites do from their penthouses and corner offices.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the invitation to speak here today, as I have enjoyed my time in America. Here, for me, freedom has a more tangible feeling than in Germany since reunification.

I was born in Berlin in 1945 and grew up there. Life in a ruined and divided city dominated my upbringing: I saw the worker’s uprising on June 17, 1953, as an eight-year-old, and the building of the Wall in 1961 as a seventeen-year-old. I grew up in East Berlin, studied there, worked there, and lived there. When the Wall fell, I was forty-four years old. I have had more than enough time and opportunity to know what it’s like living in an authoritarian and repressive system.
The most important time of my life, however, will forever be the autumn of 1989. Almost two decades have passed since then. In two years, there will be many commemorations and celebrations. This calls for a look back. The political movements of the autumn of 1989 in East Germany have already been written about countless times and studied from numerous perspectives. Most interpretations fall in between two poles: Either they narrate the history from the vantage point of the political opposition in the GDR, because they view this as the beginning, or they narrate history from the perspective of the political order that was established at the end of that “amazing year.”

For me, it is a history that began on the streets under open skies, and that is its particular charm. I will never forget the enthusiasm that had taken hold, not only of the East Germans: The whole world seemed to be carried away by it. Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, West Germans, Americans, even Japanese, to name only a few, were all excited that the world had finally been shaken up. The unbelievable had happened: The blocks broke open, the Iron Curtain fell by the wayside, and people fell into each other’s arms.

The great caesura of 1989 has entirely changed the whole world order since then, and there is no end in sight to these changes. If we set aside for a moment the decades-long prehistory, then the actual political breakthrough to self-determination from below began in Germany, or, more precisely, in the former GDR. The upheavals in Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, etc. ensued in quick succession, historically speaking. In Eastern Europe, these political movements and large demonstrations were limited to the capitals and a few other main cities. Not so in East Germany. In the autumn of 1989, from September to December, a constant, country-wide, almost simultaneous awakening took place in Germany, in which two million people actively participated—people in all of the large cities, in all of the mid-sized cities, in many small cities, and even in small villages. It was the largest democratic movement in German history so far, whose extent could perhaps be compared with the revolution of 1848, but this time the strength of organization and the degree of political morale reached even further than in 1848.

The autumn of 1989 in the GDR is essentially a history of the masses harnessing their long-suppressed democratic potential in reaction to state-ordered stagnation. For me, the decisive moment was not the collapse of the dried-up carcass that was the East German dictatorship in the autumn of 1989, but rather the virtual awakening of the masses that effected this collapse. The citizens’ central forms of action were: organizing independently of the regime; determining their own goals; mutually agreed non-violence; forming a pragmatic consensus; and basic social solidarity. The dynamic spread of the citizens’ search for a new type of...
government is not recognized frequently enough. The events of that autumn happened “under open skies”—they played out on the street, the only place they could. During these six months, the demonstrating masses were able to achieve their political priorities. In contrast, “high politics” were forced to follow the masses, first and foremost on the terrain that the civic movement had already carved out. Only afterward could they go back to their traditional domain.

In this sense, the “autumn of 1989” lasted from the beginning of September 1989 until March 18, 1990—although by November of 1989 the cry, “We are the people” (Wir sind das Volk) was joined with the cry, “We are one people” (Wir sind ein Volk). The open border, the economic gap, the disintegrated power structures in the GDR, and people’s actual experiences with socialism nurtured many people’s desire for a quick German unification. Starting in January 1990, the growth of an independently organized East German society was stunted by the implementation of the West German political parties in the newly forming political landscape of East Germany. The new political movements were still forming when they were appropriated by the West German political parties. Throughout 1990, the democratic and social goals had to be increasingly reformulated to conform to the standards of the political language in the former Federal Republic. By losing their own language and, consequently, their own ways of changing society, East Germans also lost democratic self-confidence and their right to self-determination. These conditions, which we are still facing today, came about at the very beginning of the 1990s.

The main consequence of the way unification was conducted was that the rebuilding of East German society was not the work of the East Germans themselves. The parliamentary rules of the game, the political parties, the laws, the political, economic, and academic elites, and the major mass media—that is, virtually all of the elite institutions in society—were, by 1992 or 1993 at the latest, controlled by former West Germans or West German institutions.

Try to imagine, or even more importantly, try to understand, this: After decades of living in a dictatorship, the reluctant, cowering, hopeless, or hopeful, masses finally rise up together, conquer themselves and win back their own country, only to have their televisions, radios, and major newspapers no longer speak their language or recount their experiences twelve or twenty-four months later. Two million people demonstrate on the streets; they occupy government facilities such as ministry buildings, city halls, barracks, and Stasi offices. They open and search the archives. Factory bosses are deposed and new ones are appointed. The municipal—as well as the national—order is starting to be restructured through the so-called “Round Tables.” And yet, three years later, not a
single factory, apartment, or agency exists where a former East German’s status is recognized. Two out of seventeen million—in terms of the population of the United States, that would be a good thirty million politically active, demonstrating citizens. Can you understand how deep people’s confusion and disillusionment was in the former East German (and for that matter, the West German) society?

After the elections on March 18, 1990, events took on a special dynamic, one that normal citizens could hardly follow. On May 18, 1990, the treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR was concluded. As we now know, it was essentially agreed upon by the elites of West Germany and the representatives of the former East German elites. In the treaty, the basic principles for the unification of the two states were established and the economic, currency, and social union were all agreed upon. On July 1, 1990, the Deutschmark became the official currency in the GDR, noticeably intensifying the economic problems in the East. The first factories were closed and the first wave of people lost their jobs. The events and headlines spiraled. Treaties, negotiations, and then more treaties followed.

Although many people had yearned for the day of reunification, many now realized that this day also spelled the end of the “fall of 1989” and its promise of social self-determination. A new, very demanding period began for people in East Germany. Most of all, people had to adjust to the new circumstances; whoever could not, or did not want to, was left out. Often people reacted by becoming disenchanted with politics and democracy, distancing themselves from society. For years, complaining and criticizing were the favorite activities in both East and West Germany, even if for different reasons.

Certainly, the flourishing landscapes promised by Chancellor Helmut Kohl do exist in the new federal states. Again and again, it is a pleasure to see the once-ailing cities. The GDR wanted to solve the problem of the decaying historical centers (for example, in Görlitz, Halberstadt, Leipzig, Halle, and many others) with a wrecking ball. Today they shine with new splendor. However, renovated inner cities, new streets, modern telephone lines, and sleek trains do not amount to a self-determined way of life.

I recently revisited a village in Mecklenburg that I had visited many years ago. Previously, the life of the residents was dominated by the collective farm. Everyone worked on it. There were pig-breeding facilities, unending fields of rapeseed, a small Konsum grocery store, a village pub, shabby houses, and no street lights. Everyone had chickens and their own, privately owned pig behind their houses. Today there are street lights and new sidewalks, and everyone has renovated their houses and built garages for their shiny new cars. However, there is no longer a
Konsum or a village pub. The collective farm is also long gone. The land has been bought by a Dutch farming company, which uses gigantic machines and a handful of people to produce just as much, if not more, than the collective farm once did. Almost everyone is unemployed and is a Hartz-IV recipient, the lowest tier of the German welfare system. Most people have spent the years since reunification in all sorts of job-creation programs. This often meant that they had a well-paid job, but such work seemed pointless because it had little to do with people’s individual qualifications. Unwittingly, the psychology of work in the GDR was kept alive: in the GDR, too, one received money for a job that, to many, seemed pointless. One was kept busy, but one only rarely actually identified with one’s work.

The job-creation schemes of today sometimes seem just as absurd as the prescribed jobs in the GDR. In a forest near the village in Mecklenburg, a nature trail for students was created. Almost every tree and shrub was outfitted with a sign indicating what type of tree it is: oak, beech, birch, and so on. Something like this might make sense near Berlin, but in this area, the youth is long gone, having long since moved west, where the jobs are. And the old farmers already know all the trees.

Since reunification, the residents of this village have not gone hungry; indeed, they have been able to renovate their houses and buy fancy cars. But haven’t they actually just fallen by the wayside? One gets this impression, at any rate, when observing how they ride around on their little lawn mowers frantically looking for a single blade of grass to cut. In truth, they are looking for a meaningful task, but they cannot find one. It’s not worth it anymore to keep a few chickens around: Eggs cost less at the Aldi supermarket in the neighboring small town than food for the chickens would. That’s the reason there are no longer chickens in this village.

I’ve told you this story to show that, after almost two decades, many people still have not arrived in reunified Germany. In the fall of 1989 these people, too, dreamed of self-determination and shaping their own future. Such feelings have gone stale. Was that all there is to it? Is there anything left in store for us? The right-wing NPD achieved one of its best election results in this region.

No one wants to turn back the clock, but no one seems able to cope with the present. Many people once again feel as if everything is out of their hands. They are looking for a foothold, for security, but it is no better than it used to be. Moreover, people have the feeling that they have even less influence than they did before. In the whole Eastern bloc, loafing on the job, for example, was one of the most beloved forms of rebellion, a way to express one’s dissatisfaction with the whole system, especially the conditions of the work environment. While loudly proclaiming a truth could still shake the entire system in the Eastern bloc—I remind
you of Vaclav Havel’s “attempt to live in truth”—now such statements just get drowned out in the cacophony of special interests.

The West Germans are also unsure, and they too have fears about the future. The transformation of the welfare state is in full swing. What will happen if I become unemployed or sick, when I get old, or if my child does not find an apprenticeship or student scholarship? These questions affect everyday life. This is something new because for decades both German states provided a social safety net, albeit to different degrees. It is frightening to think that since the healthcare reform, which went into effect this year, 50,000 healthcare workers had to be downsized, meaning that there are now 700 million fewer Euros in the healthcare system than before. When the “bottom line” and quarterly figures become all-important, the social climate becomes rather icy. Since German reunification, the extreme right-wing National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) has increased its local and regional foothold, especially in East Germany.

On the path that Germany has embarked on since reunification, East Germans are disadvantaged by their late entry into “West German” life. The key differences between East and West Germans do not lie in economic factors and personal savings, but in the different mentalities, psychologies, and personal experiences. To integrate East Germans into West Germany, more than one generation will be necessary. German unity could have been achieved—probably more quickly and with less money—by leaving more creative space for developing economic, social, agrarian, environmental, health, and education policies. Now the new federal states are an albatross around the necks of the former West German states. More and more people are leaving eastern Germany, and the resulting depopulation exacerbates many of the problems there, like the maintenance of infrastructure, which becomes prohibitively expensive.

Of course, there are also many people that have profited in the past few years: Some have made a lot of money. They believe that they “have arrived.” But money affects social relationships. Old friendships suffer as a result. While some people are buying their fifth new car and going to the Bahamas for vacation, penniless Hartz-IV welfare recipients have to deal with a massive bureaucratic system to receive their social entitlements. This probably is not that interesting for you, since America learned long ago to live with problems like these. People here are more flexible when it comes to overcoming these problems. However, from afar it looks like they are becoming more and more difficult to overcome. In this respect, one can only applaud the Germans for having “arrived” in the world at large. Unfortunately, the Germans themselves often do not fully appreciate this; otherwise they would follow and assess the
current transformations of the welfare state and the rule of law in a much more constructive and critical manner.

People who were persecuted or discriminated against in the GDR wanted justice after reunification. They were now living in a country characterized by the rule of law. But this did not mean that they got justice. Justice and the rule of law are two very different things. This became especially clear when members of the old GDR Nomenklatura and unofficial Stasi collaborators became government ministers, or political party leaders. The half-hearted treatment of GDR injustices and the many court decisions connected to the GDR are, however, a separate topic. I mention them only because they contributed to the negative post-unification atmosphere and created mistrust toward the rule of law. More and more people feel alienated from the German justice system. Common sense, new technologies (the Internet, for example), and people’s experiences increasingly contradict German court decisions, just as was the case in the GDR.

As an ex-GDR citizen, I am perhaps particularly vigilant when I see my freedom of speech being restricted. Manfred Stolpe has contributed to this considerably. In the GDR, he was Konsistorialpräsident of the Protestant Church and worked for the Stasi as an “unofficial collaborator”; in reunified Germany, he was a minister in the SPD government. In 2005, Mr. Stolpe won a case stipulating that “ambiguous statements”—and what statements aren’t in some way ambiguous?—could be legally prohibited, if a possible meaning was disagreeable to the person to whom the statement referred. This means that anyone who disapproves of a publicly expressed opinion about him or herself can block it. Luckily, this is unthinkable here in America! This new legal precedent has been applied to a wide range of cases. It can distort the way history is written. This is particularly disastrous because people in eastern Germany have just learned how to speak out and question things; now they will have to learn all over again how to say what is “right.” This is self-censorship before a public discourse can even begin. Internet archives have to be checked for statements that might be legally questionable in order to avoid paying high legal costs. This applies to university archives, newspaper archives, and many others. History is being rewritten on the Internet. Today, a whole new branch of the economy has been created: writing legal warning letters. The court costs are dangerously high and can threaten people’s livelihood. Whoever cannot pay has to serve a jail sentence. Once again, people are sitting in jail just for expressing their opinion.

* * *

The title of my lecture today, “Unter freiem Himmel” [Under Open Skies], does not just refer to the “open skies” of the fall of 1989, but also
to the sky in New York, which has always seemed especially clear, vast, and active to me. The first time I flew to New York, I felt very insecure. What awaited me there? Would it actually be the heartless, selfish, exploitative society where every man fends for himself, as America was depicted in the GDR? Many West Germans—not just leftists—saw America the same way, even though they had never been there themselves. The East Germans could not go, but many West Germans did not want to. The first time I flew to New York, in 1992, the wondrous sky filtered through the canyoned streets down to me. It was November. In Germany, I had received many death threats after the Wall fell, and it would be impossible to argue that they had not affected me. I even decided to buy a life insurance policy. In New York, though, I wasn’t afraid. I met the most wonderful people in the oddest situations. Thousands of new impressions and questions: What is the value of freedom without a social safety net? How does democracy function without thousands of laws and bureaucratic rules? How does such a diverse society function, one where the people have hardly anything more in common than a flag and McDonalds? I was fascinated by these questions. Most of all, though, I was impressed by the way people of different nationalities and religions could live together. To be sure, there are more than enough problems here, but I have always been impressed that people managed to live peacefully with each other despite everything, and there seem to be self-imposed ways to adjust to problems in critical moments. Whether one can count on this in the future is another question entirely.

Since 1996 I have lived and worked in the Balkans. I worked in Bosnia in the office of the High Representative until 1999. This official represents the international community and the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina—the people of Bosnia do not elect the “High Representative.” He holds wide-ranging authoritarian powers allowing him to dismiss democratically elected ministers, judges, and mayors; issue laws; and create new civil offices and agencies. Unfortunately, these powers were not used often enough to remove irresponsible politicians. The office is in charge of implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement. I worked in the department dealing with humanitarian issues. Later, I organized various projects in Bosnia and Croatia, most recently a project providing cisterns for a village near Mostar.

Life in a war-torn and hate-filled country is hard, and it changes the way you see the world. I was a dedicated pacifist prior to coming to Bosnia, but quickly realized that only the presence of foreign soldiers maintains the peace. Many locals still say today that when all of the soldiers leave, they will go, too. It is clear to me now that the world never should have stood by watching the war for those first four years. We are paying the price for that now. No country in the Balkans is as tattered and
ungovernable as Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war ended twelve years ago, and there should finally be light at the end of the tunnel. Politicians and diplomats claim to see it, but the common people are still in the dark.

As long as the past determines the present and the future, no actual development will occur in Bosnia. War criminals still move freely about; just look at Karadzic and Mladic. But I am mainly thinking of the old hatreds that still plague many people here. Many people have been traumatized by the war and their experiences. The old political and social system continues to dominate. People have still not learned to function in the new political system; they have only learned to conform. This is why they are unable to meet the present challenges and exert constructive pressure on their politicians.

Outside of the family, there is no basic social solidarity. There is no will to come together independently of the government and the established political order; there is hardly any local non-governmental aid; there are no effective alternatives to the daily chaos of the state; there is no courage to make the real issues known; and society seems to lack even a basic identity as a whole. Just as it was in the GDR, the only place politics can be discussed is at the kitchen table, where people lament the duplicitous and corrupt politicians, the bad policies, the lousy present, and the lack of prospects.

What can be done? Who can partner with the international community in such war-torn countries? How can the international community have an influence on politicians who have completely different intentions, intentions that do not necessarily even include the well-being of their constituents? Or do we have to wait for a stronger civil society to be built, one that can solve its own problems? When will that happen? Are people even capable of building one without support? It is particularly important to find answers to these questions when we stop to think about the many war zones that are also waiting for help. Afghanistan and Iraq are obviously only two of many.

Vast amounts of money and huge amounts of humanitarian aid flow into the Balkans, especially to Bosnia. This aid often does not reach its destination, but rather disappears into black markets. There are only three and a half million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina; nevertheless, the international community still has not succeeded in providing them with a good prospect for their future or in solving their problems. Bosnia still lacks a unified police force and a constitution, yet these institutions are the conditions for Bosnia’s “return to Europe.” Ethnic and religious conflicts allow the politicians to manipulate people and determine day-to-day politics. Unemployment averages 50 percent; a third of the young people want to leave the country because they do not see a future for themselves in such a demoralized place. Agriculture is unorganized.
Very few workers are socially insured. Most people work illegally or clandestinely, are self-sufficient, and live from hand to mouth. Altogether these conditions provide a good breeding ground for terrorism. Many of the mujahedeen, who fought on the side of the Bosnian Muslims in the war, still live in the country. Four hundred of them have been classified as potentially violent. In the meantime, they have started families and have Bosnian passports; they are not going anywhere. For years, local politicians and the international community avoided the issue, since they did not want to create additional problems. Progress in Bosnia has become dependent on the will of donor countries to keep providing aid money.

My experience after German reunification and in Bosnia tells me that democracy fails when we export our notions of democracy and the rule of law without sufficiently taking into account other countries' histories, traditions and mentalities. We need to put ourselves under the magnifying glass and be ready to change ourselves, too. “This is supposed to be democracy?” I have often heard this question voiced in eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary, and in Bosnia. Sometimes it sounds sarcastic, sometimes mournful, but always as if these people have nothing to do with this democracy. It was just exported or donated to them. And the one who is exporting it—the West—believes that it is thus ensuring its own safety and protecting itself from harmful changes. But this is naïve: the more people and cultures are affected by change, the more we need alternative concepts of democratization.

People need time to find themselves and their own way; otherwise, they feel as though they lack the freedom and the ability to determine their own lives. The solution is definitely not to take away the responsibility and initiative of the very people who are expected to take their destiny into their own hands. Western values and ideas cannot simply be implemented, as has happened in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and frankly in the whole Eastern bloc after 1989. The result can only be half-hearted and imperfect. Societies must be built from the bottom up. To do this, we need to develop new concepts, which will actually involve the local population, helping them form an environment in which democracy can grow. The sky is the limit.

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It seems especially fitting in this city to end by commemorating my friend and colleague Gerd Wagner. He worked here in Washington at the Germany Embassy. In 1997, he went to Bosnia as one of the two deputies of then-High Representative Carlos Westendorp. Wagner lost his life in a helicopter crash in September of that year. Five of the twelve that died in...
that accident were Americans. This was not just a tragedy for his family and our office, but for Bosnia as well. Gerd loved and defended Western ideals. He also loved and knew the people of the former Yugoslavia. He spoke fluent Serbo-Croatian. Hardly anyone could connect with everyday people as quickly as he. He listened to them, he was trusted. At the same time, he was open to non-bureaucratic and quick solutions. I am convinced that Bosnia would be a different place today had he been able to work there longer. The world needs people who take their time and plan ahead and consider the consequences that their decisions have for the future.

Notes

* www.baerbelbohley.de

1 www.baerbelbohley.de/neuesforum/aufruf.htm

2 Round tables were established in 1989 as new informal committees during the peaceful revolution in the GDR to work through the national emergency and to identify legislative and executive tasks. They did this even though they lacked a legitimate mandate, as they were not democratically elected.

3 The collective farm (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft, or LPG) refers to the partially forced merger between farmers and other means of production such as other occupations related to communal agrarian production in the GDR.

4 Konsumladen was GDR slang for a grocery store in the consumer collective (Konsumgenossenschaft), the biggest chain in the GDR.
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE GHI:
AN INTERVIEW WITH THE INSTITUTE’S FOUNDING DIRECTOR, HARTMUT LEHMANN

To mark the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the German Historical Institute, we interviewed Hartmut Lehmann, the first director of the GHI (from 1987 to 1993). We asked him to reflect on the GHI’s early years. The interview was conducted (in English) by Carola Dietze and Richard F. Wetzell during Professor Lehmann’s visit to Washington on November 17, 2007.

Prior Experiences in the US

Before coming to Washington as the founding director of the GHI in the summer of 1987, I had spent about four and a half years in the United States. I first came here as a high-school exchange student in 1952/53, spending a year on a dairy farm in upstate New York and graduating from high school in 1953. The next stay was in 1968, when I taught at UCLA for the summer quarter. Right after that, in 1968/69, I had a research fellowship at the University of Chicago. In 1973/74 I was a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton. In 1984, I returned to Princeton as a fellow at the Princeton Theological Seminary and the history department. Finally, I spent a year as a visiting professor at Harvard Divinity School 1986/87. Having been back and forth between Germany and America a number of times, I saw the Institute as a unique chance to make a contribution toward a better exchange, toward better understanding of historians of both sides. Through my stays, I had gotten to know a number of people, so that when I started in Washington, I had friends on whose advice I could rely. This was extremely helpful for me and I don’t think I could have done the work here the way I did without the help of these American friends. I had also been to conferences at the German Historical Institutes in Rome and London, so I knew these two Institutes best.

Founding of the Institute

For me, the Vorgeschichte of the Institute began when one day in 1985 Rudolf Vierhaus called us in Kiel and said: “Can I come and visit?” So he came and over coffee he said; “The plans to establish an Institute in Washington are now entering a concrete phase. I think this would be something for the Lehmanns. Would you consider becoming the director?” So I was among those who were invited by the Gründungskommis-sion, which included Erich Angermann, Karl-Dietrich Bracher, Klaus

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Hildebrand, Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, Wolfgang Mommsen, Thomas
Nipperdey, Gerhard A. Ritter, and Michael Stürmer, among others. The
main decisions had already been made. The concept had been spelled out
by the Gründungskommission; and it had been decided that the Institute
would be in Washington, rather than New York or Chicago. So in 1985,
I traveled to Bonn and presented my ideas for a profile of a German
Historical Institute in the United States. In my opinion, it was important
to begin with creating an effective infrastructure: spring and fall lecture
series, an annual lecture, an English-language book series, a bulletin,
occasional papers, and so on. I also suggested that the Institute should
cover a broad spectrum of topics of interest to both sides. In other words,
go beyond German-American relations only covering diplomatic and po-
litical affairs. The Institute should address cultural history, religious his-
tory, the history of historiography, economic history, social history, and
it should reach back to the Middle Ages. A broad range of topics should
be covered. I also recommended that the Institute should not have a
Forschungsschwerpunkt (research focus) from the start, but rather establish
an open field, and that the decision about a Forschungsschwerpunkt should
be suspended for four or five years.

There were two candidates. The commission couldn’t decide. So they
offered two names to the Ministry. Several months later I received a letter
inviting me to become the first director. This is what I know first-hand
about the Vorgeschichte. In fact, the Gründungsgeschichte goes back to the
1970s. When the GHI London was officially opened in the early 1970s,
German historians present at the opening asked: Where do we go next?
Vierhaus told me later that this was when the idea of a GHI in Wash-
ington was mentioned for the first time. Following up on this, Erich Anger-
mann convened a number of German-American conferences in the 1980s
in Cologne, to find out if there was a common basis for establishing an
Institute.

The GHI and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum

When I came to Washington and began talking to some journalists and
people at the Embassy and others, I was confronted with the rumor—and,
I stress, rumor—that there was a connection between the official opening
of the Holocaust Memorial Museum and the German Historical Institute;
even in the way that some people said: “Oh, you are the guy who is pro-
viding the German answer to the opening of the Holocaust Memorial
Museum,” which deeply shocked me because I saw my role as a com-
pletely different one. I must note that such a connection was neither
mentioned nor hinted at in any of my conversations with Minister
Riesenhuber of the Forschungsministerium or at the German Embassy
with Ambassador Ruhfus. So I was shocked by the rumor, but I had to react. And I reacted in several ways: For example, I was present when the cornerstone for the Holocaust Museum was laid in the fall of 1987, shortly before the official opening of the GHI that November. It was a big ceremony with Ronald Reagan; of course, I was a little figure sitting somewhere in the back, but it was important for me to be present. More importantly, I came into contact with the team that was laying the groundwork for the scholarly work of the Holocaust Memorial Museum. They had a team of scholars and we decided that we would organize an event together on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Kristallnacht in November 1988. This was one of the first events of the GHI, a cooperative enterprise with the Holocaust Memorial Museum, and we agreed that Hans Mommsen should speak. It was a joint invitation and a joint event sponsored by both institutions. We also agreed that we would remain in contact and that we would cooperate in the future. Of course, they were just beginning, and we were just beginning, so the concrete cooperation was suspended. But we didn’t forget it, and when the Holocaust Memorial Museum was officially opened in 1993 I was present at the ceremony and shortly afterwards there was an official visit of all the members of the GHI to the Holocaust Memorial Museum, including a private tour of the museum and research facilities. It was clear then that we would want to cooperate in the future.

Establishing the GHI and Its Academic Programs

In my view, the Institute had several different tasks or functions. First, to be a forum for the exchange of ideas between American and German historians—through conferences, lectures, workshops, through a number of different instruments. Second, to serve as a kind of Basisstation for German scholars abroad, especially for young German scholars who are in the United States for the first time: to provide them with the necessary knowledge and with the contacts that they need to be successful. Third, to provide information to American scholars who want to do archival research in Germany, so that they can do productive research from the first day in Germany. And, fourth, each individual research fellow should be able to pursue a research project and bring it to completion within three to five years.

The initial challenge when I arrived in Washington was overwhelming because we began with zero: there was nothing. So everything had to be arranged: furniture, stationery, office machines. In the GHI budget for 1987, the Ministry had listed one typewriter, so one of my first battles with the Ministry for Research and Technology (Bundesministrium für
Forschung und Technologie) was to convince them that we needed computers. Initially, we rented rooms, while we looked all over Washington to find a suitable building, until we finally found this beautiful building on New Hampshire Avenue. At the same time, of course, we also had to start an academic program. I strongly believed that we should not delay this. You cannot build the infrastructure and then begin with an academic program years later. So we started a spring lecture series already in 1988, after half a year, and held our first conference in the fall of 1988. It was important to me that this first conference address a topic that related to the past of German-American relations in our profession—the refugee historians. I’m still grateful to James Sheehan that he agreed to co-organize this first conference with me. We were also very grateful that several of the refugee historians themselves, who had emigrated to the United States after receiving doctorates in history in Germany before 1933, attended this conference. In that sense, it was not only a conference, but also an emotional event for all sides involved. I think this conference helped to place the Institute in the right environment and opened many doors for us. I asked Catherine Epstein to join the Institute to research a bibliography—published as A Past Renewed in 1993—that documented the work of the refugee historians and where their papers were located.

We then systematically planned conferences on a broad spectrum of topics ranging from medieval times and the Reformation to contemporary history. It was also very important that only half of the conferences took place in Washington, while the other half took place at American universities all over the country—in Denver, Philadelphia, Kalamazoo, and Atlanta, for instance. There are hundreds of universities and colleges, of course, and you cannot be everywhere, but we managed to hold conferences at about a dozen universities in the first two years, which I thought was important. And we organized all conferences with American partners: developing the idea together, designing the program together, organizing the actual conference together, and publishing the proceedings together. We also shared the financing, not always fifty/fifty, but all of the conferences received American financial contributions. So there was cooperation on all levels. For me, it was part of the mission that we had to improve the exchange of ideas; and you can only improve this exchange if you discuss concrete ideas with concrete people. This is also why we had a commentary after the annual lecture: this, too, was an attempt to have a German-American discussion. So if we had a German speaker, there was an American commentator, and vice-versa.

Then, of course, the library had to be started. In the library, it was our mission to help Americans who wanted to do research in Germany. We built a collection of archival guides very early on, so that if Americans asked where they could find what, we could look up in-house which
archives had which kind of holdings. Also very early on, we found out that it was an obstacle for young Americans studying German history, especially early modern history, that they couldn’t read the handwriting. So we started the archival summer seminar, a tour of German archives in connection with courses in paleography, learning the old German script. Already in the first year, these archival seminars attracted some of the best students from the best American universities. The task was to find concrete ways of how to fulfill our mission: archival tours, archival guides, and so on. There were two Washington institutions that were particularly important for us: the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) and the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University, which had just been founded. In order to establish regular, long-term relations with both institutions, I was able to obtain a special grant from a German foundation. This allowed us to start the Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar in cooperation with Georgetown and a series of postdoctoral fellowships in cooperation with the AICGS.

With Erich Angermann as the head of the Institute’s Academic Advisory Council, it was clear that the Institute would play an important role for the Amerikanisten in Germany. And we had Amerikanisten in the GHI team from the beginning. But, at the same time, the mission of the Institute was much broader. When it came to conferences and workshops, we had to make sure that the Amerikanisten would occupy no more than a third of the program. Regarding scholarships we also established a certain quota. The German Amerikanisten understood this very well. The one group that was a bit more insistent in this regard were the German-Americans in the United States. I made it clear that the Institute had an interest in German-Americans as a part of a multinational scene in the United States, but that we had a much broader mission.

The GHI’s Relationship with the Ministry of Research and Technology

It was my strong belief that the GHI should not only systematically cover different fields of history, but also address earlier periods. For this I found support in the Academic Advisory Council but not from the Ministry. The academic program was approved by the Advisory Council, and as long as they supported me, things were alright. But, from the beginning, there was some criticism by some officials in the Ministry who wanted the Institute to focus on contemporary history. I responded that we had to work in areas in which American and German historians had common interests and that one of these areas certainly was medieval history. So we organized a medieval history seminar and I’m very glad that this interest has been continued in recent years. The Ministry also never supported
that the Institute organized conferences on historiography, cultural history or religious history. But I insisted that these are fields in which American colleagues were very interested. Another area of disagreement with people from the Ministry concerned what they called “the dark sides” of German history, the National-Socialist past. I argued that topics relating to the Nazi period were a key testing ground for cooperation and that, if we did not convene conferences on such topics, we would have failed in our mission. The sentence that I heard in the Ministry, especially after unification, was: “Ist das noch nötig?” Why look back to the dark sides of the German past? “Yes,” I said, “das ist noch nötig.” And I insisted that the Institute continue addressing the Nazi past. In this regard I had complete support from the German ambassador and the embassy, by the way. Ambassador Ruhfus understood that historians have a different agenda from political foundations. After all, there were a number of German political foundations in Washington—as well as the cultural branch of the Embassy—so they did not need another political foundation.

There was one big crisis in 1989. Early that year, the Ministry indicated that there were extra funds available for the celebration of forty years of the Federal Republic of Germany: up to 200,000 Marks for a big conference. I said: I don’t need that much, I can have a great conference for half that sum. Shortly after that I received a call from Charles Maier at the Center for European Studies at Harvard, whom I knew from my time in Harvard. Maier said “We’ve been thinking about organizing an event on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Federal Republic. Could we do this together?” I gladly accepted, delighted that the German Historical Institute—just two years old—would be cooperating with world-famous Harvard University. So I flew up to Boston, and we agreed on a program, and I sent the program to Bonn asking for the promised funding. And I received a veto from Bonn on the grounds that our proposed program was too critical of the Federal Republic; they did not want certain speakers on the program. I responded that the program was mutually agreed on with Harvard and that we did not want to have a Jubelfeier. The point was to have a critical assessment of the Federal Republic. The Ministry said that under these circumstances we would not get the funding. I then talked to the head of the Academic Advisory Council, which held an emergency meeting, at which Ministry and the Advisory Council clashed. I gratefully remember the support that I got from Karl-Dietrich Bracher, Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, Wolfgang Mommsen, Thomas Nipperdey, and Rudolf Vierhaus. I didn’t have to do much talking myself. The only thing I said was: If you don’t give us the money, Harvard has enough money to put on the conference, and we will proceed with the conference with or without German funding. In the end, the
Ministry gave in and said they would support the conference financially. But this was a serious crisis because the autonomy of the academic program was at stake. I was determined to give up my post and return to Germany if I did not prevail. (I had a contract with the University of Kiel that I could return to my position with six months’ notice.)

Criticism from the Ministry continued to a certain degree. Prior to the opening of the Holocaust Museum in 1993, Werner Weidenfeld, the German government’s special coordinator for German-American relations, visited Washington and asked the German cultural organizations to organize programs to accompany the Museum’s opening. I agreed and organized a spring lecture series for 1993 that presented recent American research on the Third Reich. But when I visited the Ministry in Bonn, I was sharply criticized for doing that and I heard that sentence once again: “Ist das noch nötig?” By that time I had already been offered the position of director at the Max-Planck Institut für Geschichte in Göttingen. While the Academic Council recommended an extension of my contract until retirement age, the accumulation of conflicts over the years had been such that the Ministry seemed to be glad to be rid of me. At least, that was my impression. So I went to Göttingen in the fall of 1993.

The Friends of the GHI

I realized very early on that American historians were underrepresented in the GHI’s two decision-making and advisory bodies: the Foundation Council (Stiftungsrat) and the Academic Advisory Council (Beirat). The Stiftungsrat consisted of representatives of the Ministry of Research and Technology (chair), the Foreign Ministry, the Max-Planck Society, and two German members of the Beirat. The Beirat consisted of eight historians: six Germans and two Americans. So the American input into the organizational structure was minimal. First, I tried to fill the ninth Beirat seat with an American; this was declined. That’s when I had the idea of creating an informal body of “friends of the institute,” in which American organizations and colleagues would be represented and would have an informal voice in the Institute. I discussed this idea with Mack Walker and Konrad Jarausch, and they were very helpful and explained whom to approach. That’s how the Friends of the German Historical Institute were founded, with representatives from the Conference Group for Central European History, the American Historical Association, the German Studies Association, and the Society of German-American Studies. There was the additional idea that if we received donations, those could go to the Friends of the GHI, and the Friends could then finance certain things. But the most important goal was to have a group of American historians
who would be close to the Institute. And the Friends have, in fact, become a vital and productive part of the Institute’s affairs.

Unachieved Goals and Hopes for the Future of the Institute

There were several things that I would have liked to achieve, but was not able to. The first was to create a position for a development officer to do fundraising. I did not want to give up a research fellow position, but asked the Ministry for an additional position. I said: Authorize the position for five years, and if within five years this position does not finance itself, plus bring in extra money, we will drop it. Once we were in this building, the Institute had a highly visible profile, creating the chance for a development officer to operate very successfully. But the Ministry declined this request. The second thing that I would have liked to have achieved was to start a GHI dependency, a regional branch office, somewhere in the West. The United States is so large that you cannot get everything done from Washington. It’s as if you had an Institute for European History located in Lisbon—with no representation in Paris, Rome, Berlin or Moscow. It’s very difficult to have an operation that does justice to the colleagues out there in the West, Northwest, and Canada. A third objective that I was unable to achieve was the establishment of an English-language book series with translations of recent German research on specific topics, for example, recent German research on Weimar, on the post-1945 period, and so on. There are many American historians of European history who do not read German. If you do not present the results of German research to them in English, they will not take note of it. I found a publisher, but I could not find the necessary money for translations from German into English.

My main hope for the future of the GHI is that it will continue to foster dialogue and cooperation with our American colleagues. This involves contacting American colleagues at academic meetings such as the annual meetings of the AHA and the GSA, and developing concrete cooperative projects with them. In particular, I hope that the GHI will succeed in drawing the new middle generation of American historians of Germany—the scholars who are now in their forties—as well as the younger generation of junior scholars into cooperation with the Institute.

In closing, I want to say that I could not have done the work here without the trust of American colleagues. And I want to thank all of them for placing their trust not only in the German Historical Institute, but also in me as a person. I was very fortunate to have deputy directors who were extremely helpful. I owe special thanks to Christof Mauch for carrying on some of the ideas and expanding some of the projects that I had
envisioned in the beginning and was not able to carry out. He brought the activities of the Institute to a new level. In closing, I want to send my best wishes for a successful directorship to Hartmut Berghoff, the incoming director of the GHI. And, last but not least, I want to thank my wife, who gave up certain professional plans at home and came to Washington for an extended period of time and supported me from beginning to end in a very generous and helpful manner.

*Interview transcribed by GHI intern Anne Kurr and edited by Richard Wetzel.*
"I Am No Anti-Semite, but I Am Also No Jew": German Liberalism and the "Jewish Question" in the Third Reich

Eric Kurlander
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Thyssen-Heideking Fellow, 2007–08

I.

In the introduction to his seminal volume on Jewish life in the Third Reich, Peter Pulzer stresses the degree to which Jews and Germans alike viewed Nazi anti-Semitism as part of “a cyclical phenomenon that flared during crises but would normally lie fairly dormant . . . [T]he principal reason why German Jews underestimated the significance of Hitler’s coming to power was . . . their familiarity with prejudice and discrimination.”1 In short, 1933 was hardly a decisive caesura, before which “liberal” attitudes toward German Jewry predominated and after which a new paradigm of racial exclusion prevailed. Instead, German liberals, like Germans in general, had always maintained a close but fraught relationship with German Jewry.2 This was a product of the liberals’ equally ambivalent relationship to the völkisch-nationalist creed that called into question the prominent role of Jews in German society after 1870.

Most liberals hoped to resolve this “Jewish Question”—namely, what to do with Germany’s increasingly visible and influential Jewish minority—through assimilation. But this seemingly “universalist” perspective did not preclude underlying anti-Semitic assumptions similar to those on the radical right.3 Since the role of anti-Semitism defines current debates on the origins of the Holocaust, the attitude of a party with such close and contradictory ties to German Jewry provides a unique perspective on the evolution of the “Final Solution” to the “Jewish Question.”

For many years, the so-called functionalist explanation has dominated historiography on the “Final Solution.” Functionalists, of course, reject the traditional (“intentionalist”) notion that Hitler and the Nazi leadership, motivated by fanatical anti-Semitism, planned the Holocaust from the moment they took power. For functionalists, Hitler’s anti-
Semitism, not to mention the highly variegated anti-Jewish sentiments of the German people, was a necessary but not sufficient cause of the cumulative radicalization that led to the "Final Solution." This view has been challenged in recent years by a modified version of the "intentionalist" argument that incorporates elements of a functionalist approach but refuses to discard the central role of anti-Jewish ideology. While much of this work reinforces the view that the Nazi leadership played a decisive role in pushing forward measures against the Jews, some proponents of this new "intentionalism" insist on the active complicity, indeed enthusiasm, of "ordinary" Germans in eliminating Jews from German society.

Hence the question: Did German liberals embrace the anti-Semitic assumptions of their Nazi colleagues? What were their reactions to the initial wave of anti-Jewish legislation, the Nuremberg Laws, "Crystal Night," or the Final Solution? Were liberal attitudes toward official anti-Semitism characterized by a pattern of growing indifference and eventual acquiescence, as the new "intentionalism" argues? This article will address such questions through brief case studies of three prominent Weimar Democrats: the German Democratic Party (DDP) co-founder and later Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht; the DDP Chairman Hermann Dietrich; and the Jewish Mayor of Berlin, Fritz Elsas. But first a word about liberalism and anti-Semitism before 1933.

II.

From the moment in 1879 when the liberal historian Heinrich von Treitschke declared, "The Jews are our misfortune," German liberalism has possessed a Janus-faced relationship to the "Jewish Question." Indeed, Treitschke's infamous statement would later bedeck the arena at Hitler's annual Nuremberg rallies. We should nonetheless remember that Treitschke concluded his original polemic by urging the Jews to assimilate into, not leave, the German Reich. Even Theodor Mommsen, Treitschke's main adversary in this so-called "Berlin Anti-Semitic Controversy," claimed to agree with Treitschke in principle. That is, while German liberals always combated state-sponsored racial or religious discrimination, many tended to encourage Jewish assimilation in return.

In discussing liberalism and the "Jewish Question," it is consequently important to distinguish between "anti-anti-Semitism" and "philosemitism." "Anti-anti-Semitism" connotes a typically liberal resistance to discrimination against individuals on a racial or religious basis. Outright "philosemitism" endorses what we might anachronistically call a "multicultural" paradigm, fostering the existence of German Jewry as a distinct cultural and religious entity. Right-wing insinuations to the con-
trary, very few liberals, even Jewish liberals, embraced “philosemitism.” Among “anti-anti-Semites,” one might differentiate further between völkisch liberals, who publicly defended the Jews’ equal right to participate in society but privately denigrated their “alien” national character, and universalist liberals, who saw little point in preserving religious or racial particularism of any kind. Despite these subtle ideological differences, all liberal “anti-anti-Semites” wished the “Jewish Question” would soon be resolved so they might stop spending time and energy defending their party against accusations of “philosemitism.”

Yet erroneous allegations of “philosemitism” only multiplied after the First World War, as right-wing parties tried to exploit the fact that Jews tended overwhelmingly to support the left liberal Democrats. The DDP faced a dilemma. On the one hand, Jews provided a significant reservoir of financial support, political talent, and intellectual dynamism. On the other hand, in many constituencies, a reputation for “philosemitism” meant political suicide. Hence the DDP party secretary Otto Fischbeck openly dissuaded Jewish liberals, including Weimar’s brilliant foreign minister Walther Rathenau, from running. And in 1930, the Democrats merged with the racist paramilitary organization known as the Young German Order, which had its own Aryan clause opposing Jewish membership. Though the Young Germans eventually agreed to delete this clause, many cosmopolitan and Jewish liberals withdrew from the new German State Party in protest.

The merger did not turn liberals into Nazis. Jewish Democrats like Fritz Elsas and Erich Koch-Weser, the party’s first chairman, continued to play a leading role. But even Democrats who resisted National Socialism proved notably ambivalent regarding Nazi anti-Semitism. After the State Party organized an assembly in defense of the Republic, the Democrat Marcel Mitschke wrote party co-chairman Hermann Dietrich to complain about the Berliner Tageblatt’s coverage of the event. The BTB devoted only “twenty-six lines” to the assembly, “including a wholly misleading title and entirely petty complaints . . . that really don’t interest anyone” except that “1 percent Jewish minority that is supposedly ‘oppressed’ in Germany!!!” It was obvious, Mitschke added, that “the State Party could thank these repugnant ‘Weltblatt’-methods for its going to the dogs; that is not only my conviction, but that of many who still stand by democracy!”

Another left-liberal conceded various Nazi transgressions, but implored his party to recognize Nazi achievements in diminishing “the destructive role of the Jewish tabloids.” Equally revealing is the explanation of a long-time Democrat for leaving the DStP in 1933: “If I soon leave the party it is not because I’m changing with the wind . . . but because I really do not want to be alone in one party with the pariah [verscheuchten] Jews. Politically I am no anti-Semite, but I’m also no
Such statements hardly clinch the case for an “eliminationist anti-Semitism.” But to borrow from Chinua Achebe in his criticism of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, while Democrats “saw and condemned” the Third Reich’s grossest anti-Jewish transgressions, “they seemed strangely unaware of the racism on which it sharpened its iron tooth.”

III.

Ever since Hjalmar Schacht was acquitted at the Nuremberg trials, historians have debated the “Old Wizard’s” assertion that he always tried “to prevent the worst excesses of Hitler’s policies,” anti-Semitism in particular. Initially at least, most scholars agreed with the verdict at Nuremberg, arguing that the “business world was . . . a so-called refuge in which . . . the Jews were able to continue comparatively unmolested until the second half of the thirties, almost until Schacht stepped down as Minister of Economics.” More recently, historians have begun to revise this assumption, claiming that Schacht was never as sympathetic toward Jews as he claimed. Though a founding member of the Democrat Party, for example, Schacht left the DDP in 1926 and joined the conservative opposition in 1931. Only two years later, he took over as Hitler’s Reichsbank president, and in August 1934, he was named finance minister. The historian Albert Fischer even blames Schacht, in restoring the German economy and facilitating the expropriation of Jewish property, for Hitler’s long-term popularity and, to some extent, the Holocaust.

This revisionist approach ignores essential aspects of historical context, however. Before Auschwitz, moderate anti-Semitism was acceptable even among “anti-antisemitic” liberals. Thus Schacht saw no contradiction in befriending and mentoring Jewish colleagues like Gustav Stolper while simultaneously propagating anti-Semitic stereotypes. Schacht’s position on the “Jewish Question” prior to 1933 is perhaps best exemplified in a letter he wrote to a colleague regarding the decision of the Socialist Reich President Ebert not to invite a representative of the Jewish religious community to speak at a celebration in honor of the new Weimar Republic. The Jewish community’s repeated insistence on “equal” representation with Protestants and Catholics, Schacht explained, was one of the reasons for the rise in anti-Semitism after the First World War. “No one denied the Jews human or political equality,” Schacht concluded, “but their religious values were certainly not worth fifty or a hundred times those of other beliefs.” This letter indicates the struggle of many Democrats between a liberal view that Jews deserved equal rights as individuals and a lack of patience, verging on anti-Semitism, with the influence ostensibly demanded by Jews as a collective ethnoreligious entity.
There are superficial continuities between Schacht’s (liberal) insistence on Jewish equality as individuals and not an ethnoreligious community, and Nazi policies toward the Jews in the first months of the Third Reich. Early on, Schacht countenanced a reduction of Jewish influence in finance and the professions, including a moderate level of Aryanization. More controversially, he endorsed the 1935 Nuremberg Laws. Although he disagreed with stripping the Jews of their citizenship, Schacht reasoned pragmatically that the laws might finally resolve the eternally nettlesome “Jewish Question.”

Nevertheless, when these expectations proved illusory, Schacht increased his public exertions to prevent anti-Semitic excesses and private efforts to assist individual Jews. He began to complain more frequently about the economic consequences of anti-Semitic prejudice and condemned the use of violence by SA stormtroopers against Jewish shopkeepers. For a leading Reich official to work against Nazi Jewish policy, particularly after Nuremberg, was no easy task. Nor did Schacht’s opposition to anti-Semitic terror assist Goering in “Aryanizing” Jewish businesses or Heydrich in fomenting emigration.

Some historians nonetheless argue that Schacht advocated Aryanization, citing examples where he did not utilize his power to protect Jewish banking interests. But what was the point of resisting the expropriation of Jewish property in the wake of the Nuremberg Laws? The Jews were stripped of their citizenship rights and Germany was in the midst of the Great Depression. Why expend political capital protecting the financial interests of individuals who were no longer citizens and who possessed, on average, considerably more assets than the average German? This would have been politically self-defeating and utterly futile to boot. Conversely, even Schacht’s most prominent critics note that Schacht did nothing to accelerate the process, and may in fact have prevented some of its worst excesses.

Of course it is critical to distinguish between purely pragmatic policies designed to serve the German economy and genuinely magnanimous efforts to curb Nazi policies. But while much of what Schacht pursued before 1935 fits into the former category, it is hard to maintain that Schacht maintained a utilitarian course thereafter. He castigated Julius Streicher and the SA for their arbitrary and violent anti-Semitism, most famously in a speech at Königsberg, which received multiple warnings from Nazi officials. Schacht’s open disputes with Hitler over tempering anti-Jewish measures were not always pragmatic, either. Goering’s resulting appointment as plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan in September 1936 signaled the decline of Schacht’s power and influence. Still, he persisted in questioning Nazi policies, not only toward the economy but also the Jews, while actively purging Nazis from his Economics Ministry.
and employing former Democrats whenever possible. Even the Jewish businessman Hans Robinsohn, always contemptuous of Schacht during their time as party colleagues, acknowledged that it was far easier for Jewish businesses to avoid Aryanization under Schacht than Funk or Goering.\(^{31}\)

For all these reasons, it is difficult to accept Albert Fischer’s contention that “there was no discord between Schacht and Hitler.”\(^{32}\) When the Führer relieved Schacht of his duties as president of the Reichsbank in January 1939, Hitler justified his decision in a curt letter: “You simply do not conform to the general National Socialist framework,” and “you have refused to allow your civil servants to be evaluated by the party.”\(^{33}\) As Robinsohn noted, there was a palpable “strengthening of the political opposition” in the wake of Schacht’s dismissal.\(^{34}\) Suspected for obvious reasons of complicity in the 20 July conspiracy, Schacht spent the last ten months of the Third Reich in different concentration camps—ten months more than most of his Democratic colleagues.\(^{35}\) Whether Schacht could have done more than he did is a matter of speculation. But there is no doubt he preserved an uncommon degree of liberal moderation and compassion in an otherwise virulently anti-Semitic Reich.

IV.

As we have seen in the case of Hjalmar Schacht, the experience of Jewish persecution could turn even the most ambivalent “anti-antisemites” into active opponents of National Socialism. Like Schacht, the State Party chairman Hermann Dietrich was hardly known for his “philosemitic” views during the Weimar Republic. Indeed, he had endorsed the DDP’s merger with the völkisch Young Germans and voted for the Enabling Law along with his State Party colleagues. Yet Dietrich would become one of the most active “anti-antisemites” in the Third Reich, doing more than most to insulate Jewish colleagues from the “Final Solution.”\(^{36}\) Throughout the 1930s, we find letters from Jewish colleagues, sometimes once or twice removed, requesting financial assistance, employment, or legal advice.\(^{37}\) Rarely did he disappoint. Already in 1933, as the major Jewish-owned publishing firms were forced to release scores of Jewish Democrats, Dietrich was there to aid them in transitioning into other jobs.\(^{38}\) And in 1934, always on the lookout for Jewish employment opportunities, Dietrich instructed a colleague to investigate a rumor that “a paper will appear in the Mosse Verlag that is supposedly produced by non-Aryan people.”\(^{39}\) In 1936, a former Ullstein employee, Alexander Weinstein, contacted Dietrich about helping him to obtain a visa. Encouraged by the fact that Weinstein spent three years training to be a mechanic, Dietrich promised to mine contacts to find him a job abroad.\(^{40}\)
Dietrich represented Jews frequently in cases of Aryanization and emigration. Neither was terribly remunerative. According to the Aryanization laws, any money made by representing Jews was taxed an *additional* 40 percent over the usual income tax. Yet Dietrich devoted considerable time assisting Jewish acquaintances in selling their businesses and financing emigration. Even after the war began, Dietrich managed to help at least a dozen Jewish men and women emigrate to Great Britain, America, or Palestine. Dietrich’s motives weren’t purely magnanimous. When a former DDP colleague Ernst Mayer wrote Heuss looking for employment, Dietrich helped Mayer purchase a soon-to-be Aryanized real estate business. Mayer probably paid a more generous price than that offered by the Nazi government. But he still obtained an exceptional deal, and Dietrich subsequently used Mayer as his real estate agent. Dietrich was also cautious. He does not appear to have defended Jewish firms against Aryanization, for example, something that garnered his Democratic colleague Waldemar Koch three weeks of Gestapo interrogation. We should nonetheless remember that most gentile lawyers refused to defend Jews, or at the very least exploited their vulnerable circumstances. By contrast, Dietrich treated his Jewish clients with the utmost respect, sometimes offering counsel without requiring payment.

On a more personal level, Dietrich continued to employ his Jewish secretary, Ms. Käthe Zolki. When the Reich Legal Association first inquired as to why Dietrich still retained a non-Aryan secretary in 1937, Dietrich argued that he employed her to finish up a particular case, and then only at his home office in Berlin-Steglitz. It is obvious, however, that he was using her services for a great many duties. After Dietrich moved permanently to his home office in July 1940, ostensibly for health reasons, Ms. Zolki took over all formal secretarial duties. Indeed, he retained her services even after dismissing his equally loyal “Aryan” secretary Charlotte Bein. Dietrich likewise permitted Zolki to handle both delicate financial correspondence and most intimate personal matters. One might assume this opened his practice to Gestapo intervention and compromised friends and colleagues. Yet dozens of Dietrich’s colleagues wrote Zolki back personally, wishing her happy holidays, thanking her for gifts sent on Dietrich’s behalf and encouraging her “to remain brave,” no doubt referring to the difficulty of being Jewish in wartime Nazi Germany. Dietrich himself kept in close touch with erstwhile Jewish colleagues long after it was fashionable.

Dietrich worked equally hard to help sponsor Jewish emigration. As the last chairman of the Defense League Against Anti-Semitism, Georg Gothein had more experience than any Democrat in dealing with Jewish persecution. But Gothein still turned to Dietrich to intervene in the case of the Hamburg Democrat Felix Waldstein. Dietrich reacted cautiously. In
the seven weeks since Kristallnacht, he had contacted the American con-

sulate repeatedly on behalf of Jewish colleagues, but the conversation invari-

ably “ended in a very depressing fashion.” Despite the serious

situation, Dietrich complained, the Americans were hardly more favor-

able to Jewish émigrés than the Third Reich. Nevertheless, only a few

weeks after Gothein’s missive to Dietrich, Waldstein managed to emi-

grate to London.52

Of course Dietrich could only do so much. He was neither a leading

Nazi official, extraordinarily wealthy, nor exceptionally well connected.

But that is precisely why his example is so illuminating. Dietrich’s co-

chairman of the German State Party, Reinhold Maier, also a lawyer with

a small practice, found himself in similar political and financial circum-

stances. The only real difference is that Maier had a Jewish wife instead

of a Jewish secretary. Yet even after his wife and children emigrated to

England in 1936, Maier was unable to muster the least resistance to Na-

tional Socialism. Afraid that the Gestapo might take away his law prac-

tice, Maier finally divorced his émigré wife in 1943.53 Dietrich, in contrast,

managed to find employment for Jewish colleagues, help others sell their

businesses, and facilitate emigration wherever possible, all the while pro-

tecting his Jewish secretary and refusing to participate in the Reich Legal

Association in any appreciable way. While modest in its impact,

Dietrich’s long-term ideological non-conformity indicates the substantial

degree to which liberal “anti-anti-Semites” might assist Jewish colleagues

without compromising their own safety or livelihood.

V.

A legal scholar by training, Fritz Elsas entered politics during the First

World War as a Progressive (FVP) member of the Stuttgart city council.54

As a DDP Landtag representative and deputy mayor of Berlin, Elsas rose

to become one of the most influential Democrats in the latter years of the

Weimar Republic. Like many of his colleagues in the Robinsohn-

Strassmann resistance group, Elsas was a left-wing, social liberal. But

unlike Robinsohn, he joined the völkisch-inflected German State Party and

supported a temporary “dictatorship of the center” as the most practical

alternative to a dictatorship of the extreme right or left. He likewise

co-founded the journal The State is You alongside Thomas Mann and Ernst

Jäckh, Vernunftrepublikaner whose anti-Nazi antipathies were leavened by

an ample dose of romantic, anti-democratic nationalism.55

Elsas himself never accepted the Nazi “equation of National Social-

ism with Germanness.” Nor did he cite his own “Jewishness” as crucial

in shaping his resistance to the regime. To be sure, one reason for his

ability to see himself as German and not a Jew was his exceptional status.
As a converted Protestant married to an “Aryan,” he was insulated from persecution through a so-called “privileged mixed-marriage” [privilegierte Mischehe]. Elsas ostensibly enjoyed the “protection” of leading Reich liberals like Hjalmar Schacht and Werner Stephan as well. Despite these “advantages,” he might have nonetheless retreated into inner emigration. But Elsas rejected the path of least resistance, joining the incipient Robinson-Strassmann group in 1934 and devoting himself to overthrowing Hitler. Surviving a pending Holocaust was the least of his worries.  

Among all liberal democrats—and certainly Jewish liberals—Elsas may have taken the greatest risks and had the greatest impact. Until 1937, Elsas’s main professional activity was advising Jews how to negotiate the complex currency controls, Aryanization laws, and other legal restrictions that stood in the way of emigration. In July 1937, the Gestapo appeared at his door and proceeded to rifle through his cabinets, finding nothing incriminating, but nevertheless sending Elsas to the Moabit prison for a month of interrogation.  

Elsas subsequently lost his secretary and much of his clientele, and in the wake of Crystal Night he was evicted from his apartment. Though shaken by these events, he also seemed stirred to more active resistance [Widerstand]. For the duration of his life, he lived with his wife in a modest apartment in Berlin-Dahlem, studying history, working on his Romance languages, and plotting the coming of a post-Nazi Germany.  

Elsas subsequently developed intimate ties to high-ranking members of the 20 July Circle. After the war broke out, Elsas intensified his contacts, in particular to Carl Goerdeler. As an associate of Goerdeler, Elsas managed to meet the ardent Nazi general Walter von Reichenau, who apparently intimated Hitler’s plans for an invasion of the Low Countries. Through contacts in Copenhagen and Stockholm, Elsas forwarded this information on to Holland. Elsa’s worked closely with the shadow chancellor Goerdeler on plans for a post-Nazi government and was ultimately designated to take over the Reich Chancellery. Interestingly, however,—and indicative of Elsas’s “German national” point of view—it was Goerdeler who insisted on a clear statement of principles against the “Final Solution,” promising to restore equal rights for German Jews and to support a Jewish state in Palestine for any Jews who wished to leave. Given the profound trust that must have developed between the two men, it is hardly surprising that Goerdeler sought refuge with Elsas in the days after the failed assassination attempt. But due to Goerdeler’s lack of discretion, both were arrested. Unlike Goerdeler, Stauffenberg, and Moltke, Elsas was not immediately executed. He was tortured and, after refusing to betray any accomplices, transferred to Sachsenhausen concentration camp. At some point in mid-January 1945, he was murdered by the Gestapo.
Elsas’s participation in the 20 July plot is compelling for three reasons. First and foremost, Elsas was apparently not arrested in 1937 and 1944 (or murdered in 1945) because he was Jewish, but rather due to his direct complicity in the 20 July plot. Equally astounding is the fact that Elsas, a left-wing Jewish liberal who composed the bulk of the plotters’ proclamation to the German people and who occupied a leading position in Goerdeler’s shadow government, would survive the initial wave of executions that took the lives of so many “Aryan” generals and politicians. While his marriage to a gentile no doubt protected Elsas prior to his involvement in the resistance, it cannot have played a major role thereafter. Finally, Elsas’s close relationship with Goerdeler, Beck, and other notable conservatives suggests the simplicity of any assertions about the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism—much less its “eliminationist” variant—in German society. Many of Germany’s leading generals, aristocrats, and businessmen clearly trusted Elsas with their lives, not to mention Germany’s future. He is a unique example of the potential for active Jewish resistance, the skepticism of German elites toward Nazi anti-Semitism, and perhaps even the lingering Rechtsstaatlichkeit of the German justice system.

VI.

During the course of their voluminous correspondence, Karl Jaspers and Hannah Arendt eventually turned to the question of German resistance against National Socialism. Arendt wrote Jaspers that his assessment was quite good, except that “you have completely forgotten about the Jews.” The liberal philosopher responded matter-of-factly. Since the Jews were no longer citizens according to the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, it didn’t make sense to include them in a discussion of “German” resistance. The fact that Jaspers was a putative “philosemitic” whose own wife was Jewish makes his insensitive response all the more remarkable. Yet, as another liberal “philosemitic,” Theodor Tantzen, put it after the war, “The murder of the Jews was for [members of the resistance] not the central problem. They viewed this crime together with other crimes.” Even Heuss, who made an immense effort as Federal President to raise awareness of the Holocaust, barely discussed the “Jewish Question” between 1933 and 1945.

One cannot write off this seeming disinterest in the “Jewish Question” to liberal anti-Semitism. To be sure, some völkisch-inclined Democrats tacitly acquiesced to the 1933 laws restricting the Jews’ supposedly disproportionate influence in the civil service, education, and the professions. But as Nazi persecution worsened, most Democrats did what they could to assist Jewish friends or colleagues who had been deprived of
their equal rights as individuals. The case of Fritz Elsas does little to dispel the general impression of initial indifference toward “Jewish questions,” followed by growing political, legal, and ideological rejection of Jewish persecution as individuals. Elsas was equally susceptible to the patriotic fervor of his Democratic colleagues and possessed few special insights as to Hitler’s “true” intentions. As a liberal nationalist and converted Protestant, Elsas simply refused to see his marginalization as peculiarly “Jewish.” That he might persevere as well as he did, organizing discussion circles, helping colleagues escape, and even plotting the downfall of the regime, nonetheless indicates extraordinary Jewish agency in the midst of the Holocaust.

At the same time we must remember that liberals faced enormous challenges in helping Jewish colleagues. Although collective action appears to have checked some Nazi measures—none more famously than the 1943 Rosenstrasse protests—in no aspect of the Third Reich was individual dissent more difficult than the “Jewish Question.” As war ensued and the “Final Solution” developed its murderous logic, helping Jews became an increasingly perilous business. Reinhold Maier divorced his Jewish wife out of fear of the Gestapo. And when asked to hide a Jewish child for a few days, the humanitarian Anna von Gierke, herself part Jewish, confessed that “for the first time in her life, she was compelled to refuse someone in need of help.”

These dangers did not dissuade Democrats from resisting anti-Semitism on a case-by-case basis. But rarely did they contemplate challenging Nazi anti-Semitism at a conceptual level. Even after 1933, liberals continued to view the right-wing (as well as Zionist) obsession with the collective fate of German Jewry as antithetical to individual equality before the law. Virtually all liberals, from Treitschke to Elsas, shared a general conviction that the “Jewish Question” would resolve itself through assimilation, not greater ethnoreligious differentiation. This reticence to privilege collective Jewish suffering over the problems facing all Germans in the war can hardly be equated with “eliminationist anti-Semitism.” To paraphrase the Democrat Mayer-Pantenius from the beginning of this article, however, the liberals were no anti-Semites, but they were also no Jews.

Lacking the benefit of hindsight, preoccupied with survival, and distracted by larger questions of domestic and foreign policy, German Democrats reacted similarly to their colleagues in France, Great Britain, and the United States. On an individual basis, they expended substantial time, money, and energy helping Jewish colleagues. But they consistently failed to provide an alternative answer to Hitler’s “Jewish Question.” By the time these otherwise well-meaning German Democrats acknowledged the centrality of eliminationist anti-Semitism in Nazi ide-
ology, Jewish life in Central and Eastern Europe was virtually extinguished.

Notes


9 Fischer, The Socialist Response to Anti-Semitism, 6–36; van Rahden, Juden und andere Breslauer.


12 Ibid. Also see letter from Dr. Levy to Nathan, 8.12.20, in NL Nathan, BAB: N 2207, #18.


16 Mitschke to Schütt, 2.11.33, in NL Dietrich, BAK N 1004, #150.

17 Schnell to Dingeldey, 5.15.33, in NL Dingeldey, BAK: N 1002, #63.

18 B. Mayer-Pantenius to Dietrich, 6.16.33, in NL Dietrich, BAK N 1004, #150.


23 Fischer, “The Minister of Economics and the Expulsion of the Jews from the German Economy,” in Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, 215; Fischer, Schacht, 104–125; Stolper to Schacht, 7.02.33, in NL Stolper, BAK: N 1186, #29.

24 Schacht to Kardorff 1.27.60; Kardorff to Schacht, 2.09.60, in NL K. v. Kardorff, BAK: N 1039, #65.


28 Fischer, “Expulsion,” in Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, 221–222.


32 Fischer, “The Minister of Economics and the Expulsion of the Jews from the German Economy,” in Probing the Depths of German Antisemitism, 225.


35 Schacht, Abrechnung, 12–17.


37 Schiftan to Dietrich, 7.26.39; Birk to Dietrich, 7.06.33, 2.14.34, in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #143; Steiner to Dietrich, 11.29.34, in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #155.

38 Dietrich to Nuschke, 1.12.34, in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #152.


40 Dietrich to Berlin Treasury Department, 3.30.42, Treasury to Dietrich [April 1942], in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #365.

41 See folders in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #370, 384–386, 406.

42 Ernst Mayer to Heuss, 11.02.35; Heuss to Dietrich, 11.04.35; Mayer to Dietrich, 1.12.36, 3.17.36, 5.28.36; Dietrich to Mundhenke, 1.13.36; Dietrich to Mayer, 1.04.36, 5.11.36, 5.15.36, 5.22.36, 11.09.36. NL 1004, BAK: Dietrich, #150.

43 Koch to Dietrich, 9.01.33, in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #149.


46 Dietrich to Sander family, 11.22.37, 3.08.37, 3.15.37, 3.18.37, 12.13.38; Kaufmann to Dietrich, 11.19.38; also see folders marked 411–421 Anwaltsakten betr. Wilhelm Lieberg u. Co. GMBH, NL Dietrich, N 1004, #155, #’s 411–421; Dietrich to Berg, 3.02.36, NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #143.

47 Dietrich to Zolki, 6.10.37, in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #364.

48 Dietrich to RVDA, 7.01.40; Dietrich to Bein, 6.01.40, in N 1004, #364, #143.

50 Troeltch to Zolki, 7.30.41; Rita Troeltch to Zolki, 9.07.41; Zolki to Troeltch, 9.11.41, 9.17.41, in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #172.

51 Dietrich to Heinemann, 6.28.38, in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #146; Becker to Dietrich, 12.03.35, 6.06.37, 1.09.38; Dietrich to Becker, 6.08.37, in NL Dietrich, N 1004, #143.

52 Gothein to Dietrich, 11.27.38; Dietrich to Gothein, 11.28.38, in NL Dietrich, BAK: N 1004, #145; also see Waldstein Family Holocaust claims proceedings, http://www.crtii.org/_awards/_apdfs/Waldstein_Felix_and_Gertrud.pdf.


61 Sassin, Liberale, 78; Schmid, ed., Demokrat, 7–8.


63 Martina Neumann, Theodor Tantzen: Ein widerspenstiger Liberaler gegen den Nationalsozialismus (Hanover, 1998), 176.

64 Neumann, Tantzen, 356.


68 Marie Baum, Rückblick auf meinem Leben (Heidelberg, 1950), 291–292; Bankier, Public Opinion, 140–152.

69 Bryan Rigg, Hitler’s Jewish Soldiers (Lawrence, 2002).


71 Baum, Rückblick, 309–310; Lauterer, Parlamentarierinnen in Deutschland 1918/19–1949 (Königstein, 2002), 226.

72 Kardorff to Weizmann, 5.03.55, 7.22.55, 9.10.48, 5.07.56, in NL Kardorff, BAK: N 1039, #60, 67; Koch-Weser, Hitler and Beyond (New York, 1945), 105–106.


74 Baum, Rückblick, 297.
“Spaceship Earth”: Envisioning Human Habitats in the Environmental Age

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A Conservationist Mission

The opening sequence of a science-fiction film released in 1972 begins with close-up views of an Edenic garden of plants—plentiful, precious, pure, and peaceful. It soon becomes clear, however, that the richness on display is as unique as the biblical paradise. As the camera draws back, we see that this botanical abundance is quite limited, contained within a large glass dome. Pulling back still further, the camera discloses that the encapsulated environment is actually situated in deep space; the dome is part of the Valley Forge, a huge American Airlines space freighter.

Accompanied by majestic music, the first sequence of the movie culminates in the revelation of the awe-inspiring extent and importance of this US mission. A solemn voice reads out a declaration written at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in which the last surviving forests on Earth are dedicated to a conservationist journey through outer space that, as the story begins, has been in progress for eight years. Astronaut and botanist Freeman Lowell, one of four spacemen aboard, tends the precious cargo that will one day be returned safely to its earthly home. Freeman is a true disciple of the environmental movement of the 1960s and early 1970s. He still remembers when vegetables had taste, smell, and color, when the air was fresh and the skies were blue (a time evoked by the film’s soundtrack of Joan Baez performing folk music). Through Freeman we learn that, despite the warnings of environmental activists, the earth of the future has become a bleak and monotonous place with a uniform temperature of seventy-five degrees. The planet is so densely populated that it has grown into one massive, completely defoliated city; trees and plants are no longer essential for (human) life, as nutrients are now manufactured in a laboratory.

The Spaceship, a Modern Container of Life

The startling contrast between the richness of life and the fragility of its artificial environment, as well as the consequences of changed attitudes toward nature, are the issues on which the 1972 movie Silent Running
focuses. The film was produced amid heated debates on resource scarcity, environmental pollution, and overpopulation. It reflects the popular images of impending ecological catastrophe and the questionable survival of humankind. It is certainly no coincidence that the film is set entirely on a spaceship, which had become a major symbol of both the fears and the hopes associated with Earth’s transformation into an endangered planet. “Whole Earth” or “Full Earth” was first pictured and repeatedly represented through photographs taken on the Apollo missions during the 1960s. At this time, the “Blue Planet” became an icon of Earth’s singularity, one that would endure throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The dynamic green and blue colors in this image of Earth are attributed to three billion years of converting sunlight into processes of life. James Lovelock would later state that it was “this kind of evidence from space research that led me to postulate the Gaia hypothesis,” which views Earth as a single, organic whole. It is not without irony that it was this distant vision of the earth that focused attention on life’s fundamental conditions, believed to be unique within the universe.

The figure of the spaceship merged notions about the fragility of life with the triumphs of science and technology. Inside this discursive frame, it took only a small step to imagine the newly discovered “Planet Earth” as a spaceship. The predicaments of the late twentieth century seemed to find a perfect expression in the phrase “Spaceship Earth.” In 1965, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson, used the metaphor in an appeal to the international community, referring to the earth as a little spaceship on which humankind traveled together as passengers, dependent on its threatened supplies of air and soil. In 1966, the English economist and political scientist Barbara Ward chose the term to advocate a new “balance” of power between the continents, of wealth between North and South, and of understanding and tolerance in a world of economic interdependence and potential nuclear destruction.

The true engineers of “Spaceship Earth,” however, used the term not as a metaphor of vulnerability and community, but to describe an innovative technological model of a natural environment yet to come. The architect and designer Richard Buckminster Fuller published his Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth in 1969, summoning the engineering elite to take control of an environment in bad repair. The economist Kenneth E. Boulding, in his programmatic lecture “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth,” delivered in 1966, chose the spaceship to prefigure the “closed earth of the future.” He advocated replacing the wasteful “cowboy economy” of the past with a frugal “spaceman economy,” a cyclical ecological system capable of continuous reproduction of material form.

My research explores the cultural horizons that were opened—and closed—by the image of Spaceship Earth in the so-called “Environmental
Age, the decade ranging from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. I begin by examining the meaning of the ship in Western culture. I see the figure of the ship as linked to narratives of fragility and transience on the one hand and exploration and expansion on the other; these themes continue in narratives of the spaceship. Imagining Earth as a spaceship made it possible to combine concerns about the planet with visions of global control in order to address the question of mankind’s “survival.” At a time when the earth seemed like a paradise in jeopardy, the spaceship, like the ark, held out the hope of preserving life in all its diversity. I will then discuss “Spaceship Earth” as a mythical structure that illuminates the double strategies involved in representing the planet as a spacecraft:

A singular site in the universe, Spaceship Earth also signified the growing scientific fascination with natural-technological environments on earth—and beyond. I contend that this mythically resonant metaphor marked Earth as a temporary environment and introduced the idea of human survival elsewhere, a survival that would be based on rational scientific management.

As a historian of science and technology, I am interested in how the economy of obsolescence and utility operates in the discourse of the earth’s finite “carrying capacity.” I look at the sciences of ecology and human ecology, or population biology, and ask how the earth turned into a complex and self-contained circulatory system and the earthly biosphere into a “life-support system.” I explore how the metaphors of ship and lifeboat were used to express the problem of global “overpopulation.”

From a cultural history perspective, I am interested in the frontier mythology that is contained and repeated in the ship and spaceship metaphors and narratives. The frontier mythology suggests that the heart and fate of a growing nation is to be found at its limits, that a people is defined by the territory it must conquer and cultivate. The history of the American frontier can be understood as a narrative of national origin that was crafted to explain why the people of the United States were destined to colonize a newly discovered continent. I am interested in how the concept of “manifest destiny,” of a fate that fulfills an ordained purpose, is mirrored in the figures of the spaceship and of “Spaceship Earth.”

The space freighter Valley Forge in Silent Running is named after the battlegrounds near Philadelphia, where General George Washington endured the hard winter of 1777 with the army of the newly formed United States of America, and where he waged a heroic struggle against the elements and the sinking morale of his soldiers. Valley Forge still ranks as a foundational element in the national historical consciousness of Americans. It signifies a place where immeasurable suffering and sacrifice will finally be transformed into hope and renewal.12

The Ship, a “Swimming Endosphere”

From the early modern voyages of discovery to the Apollo missions, the ship has served as a reservoir of collective memory and imagination. Symbolizing spatial expansion and exploration of the unknown, as well as fragility, transition, and transience, the image of the ship has been at the heart of Western culture’s most powerful narratives. Michel Foucault considered the ship to be the “heterotopia par excellence.” “Heterotopia” is his term for an exceptional site that exists within the world and, at the
same time, lies far remote from or beyond it. Heterotopias, according to Foucault, are in relation with all other places and spaces and yet in opposition to them. The ship he describes as a “floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea.”

Roland Barthes likewise saw the ship as a symbol of seclusion and refuge from life’s raging storms. Barthes refers to the fictional narratives of Jules Verne, in which the ship replicates and preserves the world on a small scale. In a very confined space, it keeps at the traveler’s disposal the utmost number of valued objects, a singular universe floating amid the violent tempests of time. Barthes describes Verne’s ships as vehicles of the encyclopedic project of the nineteenth century, designed to encompass and conserve en miniature all elements of a finite but rapidly proliferating world.

Appropriating space by compiling, registering, and neatly arranging the elements within it is a strategy not limited to the modern era of scientific collecting, archiving, and interpreting of the world. The procedure recalls the primal ship representing the inventory of the world, the biblical ark. This vessel from the Old Testament (Genesis 1:6–9), furnished with specimens of life on earth, differs in a significant way from Verne’s crammed but comfortable floating interiors: Noah’s ark is the paradigmatic heterotopia, a storm-tossed place of survival and salvation in the face of catastrophe. In the second volume of his work titled Sphären, Peter Sloterdijk analyzes the ark as the perfect example of an “ontology of enclosed space.”

Ark, from the Latin arca, is the word for “case” or “compartment.” To Sloterdijk, the ark denotes an artificial interior space, a “swimming endosphere,” that under certain conditions provides the only possible environment for its inhabitants.

Like Sloterdijk’s “swimming endosphere,” the spaceship constitutes an insular habitat for a small group of living beings facing a hostile outside world. In the twentieth century, when the “World Frontier” closed and the formerly distant “lost horizon” of the seas and the unknown continents became familiar territory, it was outer space that seemed to hold new possibilities for exploration and expansion. “What was once the furthest outpost on the old frontier of the West will be the furthest outpost on the new frontier of science and space,” US President Kennedy declared in 1962 on the occasion of his famous “moon speech” at Rice Stadium, which committed the nation to its ambitious space program.

“The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development.” Frederick Jackson Turner proposed his “frontier thesis” in the year 1893, asserting that the center of American history was actually to be found at its edges. Turner’s frontier was neither a spatial location nor a
geographical zone, but a historical process. “His most compelling argument about the frontier,” according to historian of the American West William Cronon, “was that it repeated itself.” To quote his colleague Patricia Nelson Limerick, “the West is wherever the American mind puts it.” The “frontier” is a timeless place, an imaginary site. It is renewed wherever the narrative of a chosen people, driven from their homeland to settle a new continent, in a New World, constitutes its collective identity. The spaceship—scientifically and technologically propelled and sustained—promised the opportunities and the rewards of a utopian society flourishing in a re-created Eden.

The National Cathedral in Washington, DC, is a monument almost as impressive as Westminster Abbey, but much younger. This majestic structure, the world’s sixth-largest cathedral, was built in Gothic style in the twentieth century and finished only in 1990. The “National House of Prayer,” which actually belongs to the Episcopal Church, identifies itself as embracing all religions. Even the cultural belief in science and technology finds a place in its congregation. Notable among the many beautifully colored windows is the “Space Window.” It stands in deep contrast to more traditional stained-glass artworks in churches. A single image stretches across the three-part arched window. Colored spheres represent planets floating in the deep blue of space. Thin white lines circling the spheres represent the orbits of a spaceship. Dedicated in 1974 on the five-year anniversary of the Apollo 11 moon landing, the window contains colors that are said to be based on photographs taken during the mission. In its center is a two-and-a-half-inch chip of basalt rock brought back from the moon by the Apollo 11 astronauts. One of the ceiling vaults nearby is ornamented with a sculpted lunar surface marked with astronauts’ footprints. And it should be noted that among the many grotesque and fanciful gargoyles on the cathedral façade appears the figure of Darth Vader from George Lucas’s science-fiction saga Star Wars. Because of his evil character, Darth Vader was placed on the north face of the dark northern tower.

The state-sanctioned intersection of religion, science, and science fiction within the National Cathedral is striking. Since we must presume that no element of this cathedral is ironic in character, but that every detail was chosen with care and gravity, we must also accept that human space flight is here being advanced as a literal expression of religious belief. At the lower edge of the space window is written in capital letters: “IS NOT GOD IN THE HEIGHT OF HEAVEN?” Space flight, both that already mastered (science) and that only imagined (fiction), participates in a larger discourse of divine authority into which humans inscribe themselves by means of their civilizing accomplishments and, not least, by their scientific and technical achievements.
Washington National Cathedral’s “Space Window.”
Courtesy of Washington National Cathedral.
Myth as Reconciliation of Antagonisms

The spaceship did not serve simply as a metaphor to express perceptions of environmental problems in a contemporary way; rather, it informed and organized the rhetoric of the Environmental Age. “Spaceship Earth” opened up a discursive horizon, against which certain formulations of and solutions to environmental dilemmas became dominant points of reference and the core of a modern mythology. I regard myth not as a fiction opposing a reality, but as a narrative that meaningfully describes collective human experience. This culturally shared narrative is performed and sustained through stories, traditions, rituals, images, and objects, and is consolidated in institutional settings.24 The power of mythical narrative lies in its synthesis of traditional elements and time-specific variants of a story. In ever-changing versions, the myth’s core elements are combined and intertwined with particular situations. “Spaceship Earth” took the ancient motif of the ship as the “greatest reserve of the imagination”25 and united it with the modern image of human technological supremacy in space. Moreover, the power of myth derives from its ability to reconcile conflicting arguments: “Spaceship Earth” simultaneously represented “crisis” and “progress,” the era’s two prevailing attitudes toward environmental issues. The oppositional reference to the “cowboy” ideology makes a good example: The spaceship works as an alternative to reckless expansionism on the one hand and as an extension of it on the other.

The mythological perspective explains how both optimistic space-age “cargoists”26 and “survivalists”27 of the so-called “counterculture”28 could argue radically different positions on and in the same terms. This perspective can contribute to an environmental historiography that avoids the fallacy of simply taking one side in the ongoing debate between supporters of sufficiency and advocates of efficiency. Neither can it be my goal to resolve these debates. My research addresses the more fundamental question of how the ideas that environmental resources should be managed scientifically, and that limitation can be overcome by new,technologically controlled living spaces, achieved wide acceptance.

Metabolism under Control: “Life Support”

When Kenneth Boulding in 1966 suggested thinking and acting in terms of the “closed earth,” he argued for a cyclical economic and ecological system, capable of continuous material reproduction and sustained entirely by solar energy. The “spaceman economy” was envisioned as a rational management of circular material flows in order to secure “stock maintenance.”29 His programmatic vision of an efficient technologically
maintained ecosystem was shared across disciplinary boundaries and by much of the general public. As “Spaceship Earth” was fused with “System Earth,” the planet became a habitat based on cybernetic principles. The global environment was conceptualized as functioning by means of technology-driven control systems, similar to the control systems integrated into space capsules. Ecosystems sciences regarded the environment as an economy of efficiently cooperating parts, composed and operated like a machine. Life in System Earth was increasingly reduced to its essential conditions and functions, similar to those in a space capsule: life support became the term proper.30

Buckminster Fuller stretched the spaceship metaphor provocatively, arguing, “We are all astronauts.”31 “We have not been seeing our Spaceship Earth as an integrally-designed machine which to be persistently successful must be comprehended and serviced in total.”32 But because “no instruction book came with it,”33 humankind was confronted with the challenge of learning on its own how to operate “Spaceship Earth and its complex life-supporting and regenerating systems.”34

Carrying Capacity: “Lifeboat Ethics”

These statements do not indicate who exactly would be the global captain steering the ship through space; it is obvious, however, that the idea of “Spaceship Earth” was successfully transforming the planet into one gigantic life-support system.35 At first glance, this discursive shift may seem small, yet it demonstrates how this powerful metaphor reorganized the traditional inclusive image of the “good ship Earth”36 on the verge of sinking. Speaking about Earth in terms of a planetary complex of “life-support and maintenance systems” did not include all of life; “Spaceship Earth” would sustain instead the optimum combination of collaborating organisms.

This applied also to population policies that proliferated during the 1960s, when ideas of “overpopulation” and “population control” moved to the vanguard of state politics. While in the 1950s the term population was used in policy statements essentially as an equivalent to concrete social collectivity, during the 1960s, demographic assessments and statistical population forecasts entered developmental discourse.37 “Few issues in the world have undergone such a rapid shift in public attitudes and government policies over the last decade as the problems of population growth and fertility control,” George H. W. Bush, then US Representative to the United Nations, proclaimed in 1973.38 Development programs began to include population as a field for international technical aid, especially in the so-called underdeveloped nations. The 1972 UN conference on the “Human Environment” in Stockholm popularized the
“One Boat” concept, the thought that all of humanity shared a common fate within absolute limits.\textsuperscript{39} The year 1974 was declared “World Population Year.”

Global population growth curves plotted empirical population figures and extrapolated back into ancient times and up to the year 2000. These curves marked the contemporary situation as unique in history, not because the absolute number of people in the world had reached roughly three billion, but because of the “exponential nature” of growth. Within less than a century, world population had doubled, and it was increasing at a rate that indicated another doubling within just one generation. Population growth threatened to surpass the ongoing economic expansion of the postwar period: “DNA was greater than GNP,” as David Brower, managing director of the Sierra Club, put it.\textsuperscript{40} The underlying Malthusian arithmetic had been translated into the “laws of population growth” by biologist Raymond Pearl in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{41} According to his law of “natural” growth, the size of any population over time, be it animal, plant, or human, could be described by a symmetrical S-shaped curve, sometimes known as the “logistic curve.” The constraining factor in the growth pattern, biologists explained, consisted in the restriction of most populations to a limited area. Framed by such boundaries, population development was thought to grow exponentially up to a point of inflection, when environmental feedback would cut in and, subsequently, progressive deceleration and regression would occur. The asymptote of the logistic growth curve of world population became known as the earth’s ultimate ecological “carrying capacity.” In line with models of ecological balance, “carrying capacity” equaled the maximum number of lives that could be sustained within the finite limits of the planet.\textsuperscript{42}

In 1972, a study titled \textit{The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind} proposed different future scenarios based on the logistic growth model.\textsuperscript{43} The study employed four basic types of “survivorship curves” to describe the “behavior modes of the population-capital system” over time. According to this report, a population growing in a limited environment could approach its “ultimate carrying capacity” in several possible ways: It could “adjust smoothly to an equilibrium below the environmental limit by means of a gradual decrease in growth rate”; it could “overshoot the limit and then die back again in either a smooth or an oscillatory way”; or it could “overshoot the limit and in the process decrease the ultimate carrying capacity by consuming some necessary nonrenewable resource.”\textsuperscript{44}

Natural and life scientists tried to answer the question “How Many People Can the World Support?” by numerical means.\textsuperscript{45} Human ecologists like Paul Ehrlich brought this question to a point by asking, “What is the \textit{optimum number} of human beings that the earth can support?” All
of these scientists framed the world’s population problem as a matter of efficiently allocating “human elements” within a limited cargo area or storage space. In these calculations, colonial history, global power relations, and disparities of wealth were rarely taken into account. Biologist Garrett Hardin, professor of human ecology at the University of California at Santa Barbara, demanded in 1968 a “fundamental extension in morality,” in the Old Testament formula Thou shalt not exceed the carrying capacity became Hardin’s quasi-biblical commandment of ecological correctness in the 1970s. He took on a godlike authority when demanding that society should close the commons in breeding and oppose the present policy of laissez-faire in reproduction.

Hardin’s claim articulates the notion that the ultimate carrying capacity of “Spaceship Earth” involved not only a zero-sum economy, but also, to refer to a term Lorraine Daston introduced to science studies, a “moral economy” for deciding who was to live and who was to die on a global scale. Hardin altered the image of the earth as “One Boat” or a “sinking ship” to a “lifeboat,” stressing not unity and cooperation, but limited capacity. He based his “Lifeboat Ethics” on the claim that assur-
ing survival in a lifeboat depended on the efficient allocation of provi-
sions and the disposal of dead weight. In his “Case Against Helping the
Poor,” Hardin argued against the “fundamental error of the ethics of
sharing” in international aid programs, urging wealthy nations to close
their doors to acts of charity like immigration and food aid. In his opin-
ion, the optimum world population would have to be reached via a
Darwinian process of selection that reflected a nation’s “fitness.”53 He
defined fitness according to the classical liberal logic of achieved economic
prosperity. Socially and historically developed problems he regarded as
biological in origin and individual in character.

“The demoralizing effect of charity on the recipient has long been
known,” Hardin claimed.54 An international food bank, he argued, would
be simply “a disguised one-way transfer device for moving wealth from
rich countries to poor.” Without conscious population control, a nation’s
population would endlessly repeat the cycle of overpopulation followed
by a drop back to “the ‘normal’ level—the ‘carrying capacity’ of the
environment—or even below.” If such countries were able to draw on
world food-bank resources in times of emergency, the normal cycle
would be replaced by the “population escalator”: The input from a world
food bank would act as “the pawl of a ratchet,” pushing the population
upward.55 The “ratchet effect” would end only with the total collapse of
the entire system.

Building a “Glass Ark”: Biosphere 2

From today’s point of view, these schemes for deciding who would re-
main on the planetary ship and who would have to be rejected as “sur-
plus”56 may seem at best irrelevant and at worst aberrant. When consid-
ered as part of a theory of earth’s maximum “carrying capacity,”
however, they are plausible and rational—and this is what makes them so
disturbing. We need to sharpen our focus on conceptualizations of envi-
ronment that prefer scientific, technological, and bio-economical aims over
social and cultural principles. Lifeboat and spaceship economies not only
created new metaphors for understanding the fragility of the planet, but
also inspired a rigid classification and selection of life and nature in order
to establish a rational scientific basis for determining what would be
useful and what was redundant, what was to be conserved and what
discarded.

Sloterdijk points to the selectivity that characterizes all ark narratives,
in which the choice of the few is declared a holy necessity and salvation
is found only by those who have acquired one of the few boarding passes
to the exclusive vehicle.57 The selective mechanisms employed on “Space-
ship Earth” become visible in the Biosphere 2 project that was realized in
Biosphere 2, Aerial View. Courtesy of Global Ecotechnics (http://www.biospheres.com)

the Arizona desert during the 1980s. The “Second Biosphere” was based on the idea that the most powerful way to understand biospheres was to build and operate them. Biosphere 2 was designed as an “experiment” to study Earth’s biosphere in an artificial system on the small scale of about three acres. It created a new type of ecological laboratory, in which an ecosystem’s functions and interactions could be studied and in which the impact of humans and their technologies on the overall biospheric system could be researched. Biosphere 2 was also the attempt to develop a robust ecological system capable of longer duration and supporting greater diversity than common “life support systems” in space. Anticipating that in the long run, Earth life would have to expand to other planets, the experimenters hoped to develop “a prototype for a space colony.” The architect of the project summarized its aims with the provocative question, “Why not build a spaceship like the one we’ve been traveling on—along with all its inhabitants?”

While Hardin’s “lifeboat” continued to be fraught with terrestrial problems and solutions, “Spaceship Earth” projected the planet as a temporary environment, opening up the prospect of leaving the planet altogether. “Men in a spaceship are not locked in one place, but become perpetual travelers,” William Kuhns remarked in 1971. Sloterdijk reminds us that the ark mythology includes the radical idea of completely removing the “endosphere” from nature. The Biosphere 2 project rep-
resents just such an artificial construct of a nature materially isolated from
the outside environment, to allow the study of closed ecological systems
and the development of a self-contained and ultimately self-sustaining
“living” system.62

“Biosphere 1,” as the project managers started to call the Earth’s
biosphere, was recreated under a single roof. The architecture was in-
spired by Buckminster Fuller’s geodesics, and the modular structure of
space frames was designed by Peter Pearce, one of Fuller’s collaborators.
In 1991, seven defined ecosystems—tropical rain forest, ocean and savan-
nah, marsh and desert, as well as an intensive agricultural area and a
small “city” including eight human “Biospherians”—were sealed inside
the dome.63 The five wilderness biomes were to cooperate in the effort to
“sustain” the human habitat at the top of the food chain. Ecological
connections were translated into biological, physical, and chemical cause-
and-effect relations. An elaborate infrastructure of electrical, mechanical,
chemical, thermal, and hydraulic transmissions formed the basis of a new
hybrid version of “nature,” a thin organic skin stretched across the sur-
face of huge machinery. A circuit of cables, ventilators, pumps, and tur-
bines was responsible for circulating, flushing, cleaning, and cooling the
air and the water, for moving wind and waves, and for regulating the
climate—air pressure, temperature, humidity, and precipitation. An in-
ticate network of more than two thousand sensors, the “nerve system” of
the plant, would assure continuous monitoring and automatic regulation
of designated parameters and thus control the stability and safety of this
biospheric life-support system.64 The “Glass Ark,”65 as it was called, em-
phasized not completeness but systemic integrity, following an economy
of modular combination and substitution of single components. To select
the 3,800 species to be taken on board, not natural affluence but systemic
“diversity”66 was modeled, based on biological agents selected according
to criteria of efficiency, practicality, and replaceability.67 And, indeed,
neither acid rain nor “overpopulation” nor “pollution” posed a problem
within this artificial environment. Rather, a drastic decline in pollinating
insects and losses of other species had to be taken into account, and the
slow decline of oxygen called for an oxygen injection one and a half years
into the experiment.68 Like so many myths, the story of the Second Bio-
sphere met its fate in hubris: the endosphere turned out to be an exosphere,
where the only environment in which it was possible to survive was
outside.

The end of “Biosphere 2” came about even faster than the end of its
science-fiction double Valley Forge in the movie Silent Running. In both
cases, political resolutions ended the projects ahead of their scheduled
time. Shortly after the unsealing of the glass dome at the end of the initial
two-year closure, the owners of Biosphere 2 decided to use the facility for
research purposes only. In the movie, decisions made at the base station on Earth led to termination of the conservationist mission in space. Following a short battle and a long solitude, Freeman Lowell as the sole human survivor blows up his spaceship. He arranges for a last bubble of life to survive floating in space. Significantly, this ark is devoid of humans: the dispatched biospheric idyll of plants and animals is cared for devotedly by a small robot.

Ecology and Space Flight

By turning the conventional biosphere “preserve” into a material reserve for newly created environments, both technonatures—Biosphere 2 and the Valley Forge—carry to extremes the image of nature in a “state of exception,” realizing in environmental terms a concept developed by Giorgio Agamben to describe a different state of emergency rule.69 This nature comes attached to exclusive claims of reservation and rights of access that determine who in a “state of emergency” will be able to command, to dispose of, to optimize, and to alter it. Following Michael Jäger and Gudrun Kohn-Waechter, “someone may soon contend that ecology boils down to space flight.”70

Whether the twentieth century’s unprecedented integration of ecology, geopolitics, and technoscience is ultimately directed toward “leaving the earth,” as they presume, may be arguable. The association of environmental degradation and the flight into space, however, has become common. Taking up this motif, the popular American cartoonist Gary Larson published a cartoon in 1980, in which animals, two of each kind, select a NASA spaceship as their salvaging ark.71 While the animals clearly sense impending catastrophe, the humans appear to be clueless. Their elaborate technoscientific apparatus of monitoring and control has failed; Homo sapiens does not have the imminent ecocide on screen. Larson inverts the power relations in the biblical story of the ark, reversing the Christian teleology of the species selected for survival being the one made in God’s image. Similarly, he gives an ironic modern twist to the story by having the animals choose as their lifeboat a spaceship, the epitome of human technologies designed to achieve world control!

Pictures of the spaceship as an ark, as well as suspicions concerning an ecologically motivated abandonment of the earth, show how visions of “Spaceship Earth” can generate strategies neither intended nor sought by ecologists or ecologically minded economists. Spaceflight and the view of Earth from space do not necessarily lead to environmentally correct conduct. Just as often, spaceflight seems to be viewed as an exit strategy—a means for escaping an environment we have worn out. In the summer of 2006, the British physicist Stephen Hawking revitalized the discussion
about colonizing space with a question he posed in the Yahoo! Internet forum: “How can the human race survive the next hundred years?” Addressing the future of mankind as it faces viruses, terror, and war, along with resource exploitation and global climate change, Hawking answered his own question by saying that the survival of humankind could in the long run be secured only by humans swarming out into space and colonizing other planets. He suggested that by manipulating their genetic material, humans could be bio-engineered to make them capable of tolerating environmental conditions on other planets. A new species adapted to life elsewhere in the galaxy—Homo spaciens—could be created.
Hawking’s question calls new attention to a much older theme: the alleged power of humanity to choose a technologically enhanced nature over a once-pure but now polluted environment by constructing a more sustainable Earth than the one that is now literally at man’s disposal. What is at stake in these debates is not so much the moral issues of a “natural” versus an “artificial” environment and whether humans should abandon their home planet or stay and act responsibly; rather, it is vital that we think more critically about the consequences of humans’ renewed confidence in their ability not only to pose these questions, but also to resolve them.

Notes


5 Barbara Ward and René Dubos, Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet (New York, 1972), xvii–xviii.


These considerations point to much larger and more complicated questions that this project cannot explore in detail. They involve the problem of whether and to what extent the imagery, the mythology, and the cultural concept of spaceflight in the twentieth century derives from, reflects, or embodies the Judeo-Christian religious tradition that shaped Western culture and is characterized by a teleological understanding of development and expansion, which for the earth and for humankind promises either salvation or doom.


Sloterdijk, Sphären, “schwimmende Endosphäre”; “schwimmende Innenwelt” (translations are mine).

Fairfield Osborn, The Limits of the Earth (Boston, 1953), 78.


Patricia Nelson Limerick, “Making the Most of Words: Verbal Activity and Western America,” in Cronon et al., Under an Open Sky, 167–184, 171.


On myth as cultural narrative, see Sabine Höhler, Luftfahrtforschung und Luftfahrtnmythos: Wissenschaftliche Ballonfahrt in Deutschland, 1880–1910 (Frankfurt, 2001), 36–57.
Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” 27.


The movement of “Survivalism” was based on the contention that the earth is fitted with a limited stock of resources and prescribed drastic and multidimensional action to prevent global disaster; John S. Dryzek, *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses* (Oxford, 1997).


Fuller, *Operating Manual*, 54. Biologist Paul Ehrlich and political scientist Richard Harriman organized their 1971 book *How to be a Survivor: A Plan to Save Spaceship Earth* around the metaphor of Spaceship Earth, with chapter titles such as “The Size of the Crew” and “The Control Systems,” along with one chapter describing the new “Spacemen” culture that would have to develop; Paul R. Ehrlich and Richard L. Harriman, *How to be a Survivor: A Plan to Save Spaceship Earth* (New York, 1971).

Wolfgang Sachs discusses the concept of sovereign technological control in “Astronautenblick—Über die Versuchung zur Weltsteuerung in der Ökologie,” in *Jahrbuch Ökologie* 1999 (Munich, 1998), 199–206. See esp. 204–205 on the “metaphor of the governor (from the Greek kybernetae)” and Plato’s “ship of the state” as a basis for calling out the “rule of the competent” (204; translations mine). Sachs warns of “ecocracy” (205; translations are mine). Anker makes a similar argument in “Buckminster Fuller as Captain of Spaceship Earth.”

“It is obvious that we cannot exist unaffected by the fate of our fellows on the other end of the good ship Earth. If their end of the ship sinks, we shall at the very least have to put up with the spectacle of their drowning and listen to their screams.” Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York, 1969), 132 [4th edition; orig. 1968].


Rafael M. Salas, *International Population Assistance: The First Decade. A Look at the Concepts and Politics Which have Guided the UNFPA in its First Ten Years* (New York, 1979), 125.


44 Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth*, 91–92.


47 Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” 23.


55 Hardin, “Living on a Lifeboat,” 564 (emphasis in the original).


Architect Phil Hawes as quoted by Allen, *Biosphere 2*, 16.


These artificial constructions of nature have been called “Second Nature”; Slotserdijk, *Globen*, 255; Dorion Sagan, *Biospheres: Metamorphosis of Planet Earth [Reproducing Planet Earth]* (New York, 1990), 195.


“Perhaps a direct path leads from the ‘planetary’ experience of Sputnik via Sänger’s Malthusianism and Boulding’s ‘Spaceship Earth’ to the ‘ecological’ problem of overpopulation brought up by the Club of Rome, and from there to the Greens on the one hand, and via Global 2000 [1977] back to the American President on the other, who meanwhile was named not Kennedy but Reagan and who sent NASA to its ‘second stage.’ Going one step further, someone might soon contend that ecology boils down to space flight.” Michael Jäger and Gudrun Kohn-Waechter, “Materialien zur ökologischen Katastrophe: Das Verlassen der Erde,” *Kommune* 1 (1993): 33–38, 35 (translation is mine).

The cartoon panel *The Far Side* by Gary Larson ran from January 1, 1980 until January 1, 1995. During these 15 years the panel appeared in more than 1,900 daily and Sunday newspapers worldwide and was translated into 17 languages. It is still syndicated in 45 newspapers in 17 countries. The cartoon panel was also published in 23 *Far Side* books, including 16 collections, five anthologies and two retrospectives. *The Far Side®* and the Larson signature are registered trademarks of FarWorks, Inc.

Stephen Hawking, “How can the human race survive the next hundred years? In a world that is in chaos politically, socially and environmentally, how can the human race sustain another 100 years?” Yahoo! Answers, http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20060704195516AAnrdOD (accessed November 30, 2007).

In summer 1945, Berliner Willy Hennig later recalled, he received a request from the wife of a colleague. She had just received the news that her husband, a soldier who had fought in the battle for Berlin in April, had been killed near the Gotzkowsky Bridge in Moabit. People who lived nearby, who saw him bleed to death, had buried him there. The widow asked Hennig and four other colleagues and friends for a favor. “We organized a big handcart,” Hennig wrote, “and left before 5 am from Baumschulenweg, down the Sonnenallee.” The widow had procured a simple coffin. “Before Neukölln a Soviet guard stopped us. We were able to explain to him that we wanted to pick up our fallen friend who was buried in the north of Berlin. He let us pass. It was a long way to Gotzkowsky Bridge and soon it was very warm. The widow had arranged everything for the burial with the pastor at the cemetery in Baumschulenweg, so that when we got back with our dead friend the funeral could take place.” This, Hennig said, was a “final duty of honor” to his friend.1

When I first began the research for my dissertation on customs and perceptions of death in Berlin, 1933 to 1961, I ran across a lot of stories like this one concerning the months just after the fall of Berlin. In fact, what originally caught my attention when I began the project were numerous references to Umbettungen in some of the files of the post-1945 municipal government, or Magistrat, which I located in the Berlin Landesarchiv.2 I had no idea what the word meant and had to ask one of the gentlemen sharing a work table with me in the reading room, “Excuse me, please, but what does ‘Umbettung’ mean?” It was soon explained to me that the word meant “reburial,” but this hardly clarified anything. It would take me some time to understand that in 1945, tens of thousands of people—civilian Berliners, Soviet and German soldiers, members of the Volkssturm, and others—had ended up hastily buried in temporary graves all over the city to prevent the spread of disease. Within weeks, even in the heat of summer and the desperate material conditions of the ruined city,
Berliners were already beginning to remove their dead from these temporary graves and to reburry them in “proper” cemeteries.

It took me quite a while longer to begin to historicize and then to interpret what that experience meant to contemporaries and to try and grasp why, in a moment of crisis and dislocation, many had apparently seen the reburial of their dead, of all things, as an essential task. A discourse had existed in Germany since at least the First World War holding that the meticulous care Germans showed their dead was one of the key virtues elevating Germany to the status of Kulturvolk, one that marked the German nation as a bearer of Kultur, rather than mere Zivilisation. During the Third Reich in Berlin, arguments emerged in favor of “purifying” the German cult of the dead from “foreign” elements by reforming the design of cemeteries, promoting one or another form of burial, resurrecting the putative burial practices of Germanic ancestors, and, perhaps most pointedly, by banning Jews from “German” cemeteries. Under Nazism, in other words, the practices and customs of death often became a means of emphasizing supposedly “timeless” and fundamental distinctions between Germans and Jews. But particularly over the last months of Nazi rule in the Reich’s capital, the burial of the dead became an even more decisive instrument for conflating and symbolically marking out racial, cultural, and moral distinctions. As the air war escalated over the winter of 1943–1944, and space for burial began to run out and coffins became harder and harder to come by, Hitler proscribed the burial of Volksgenossen in mass graves and city authorities distributed coffins exclusively to members of the racial community.

Despite such measures, by the end of the war, a chaotic situation had developed in Berlin resulting in what I have characterized as a “burial crisis,” one that was simultaneously material, emotional, and psychological. By the time the Red Army arrived in Berlin in April, the routine provision of burial services in the city had all but collapsed. Thousands of Berliners had to bury their dead where they could, often in parks and gardens. Great pains were taken and large sums expended to acquire coffins. In most cases, however, the dead were simply wrapped in sheets or tablecloths, and their homemade graves adorned with helmets, tree branches, bits of stone, or crosses made from available materials. Dotting the postwar landscape from one end of the city to the other, these crosses became a potent symbol of German defeat, whose presence was simultaneously so arresting and yet so ubiquitous that there is hardly a memoir of the period that fails to mention them.

This was only one part of the context in which postwar reburials took place, however. Immediately after the fall of the Third Reich, stories
began to circulate in the communist press implicating the Nazis in the wartime desecration of the dead. Almost from the beginning of its existence, the German Communist Party (KPD) newspaper *Deutsche Volkszeitung* was filled with tales of Nazis tossing the naked bodies of Berlin’s dead into open pits before throwing grave registers to the four winds in a diabolical gesture aimed, it was said, at erasing the identities of the dead. Other reports described the bodies of soldiers left to rot in the open across the plains of eastern Europe. Such stories were clearly intended to vilify the Nazi regime in a very particular, and, to many Berliners, personal way. The western-sector press soon took up similar themes, again emphasizing the obliteration of the individual identities of the dead while simultaneously blurring the differences between “foreign workers,” those killed in the air war, those implicated in the plot to assassinate Hitler in July 1944, and German and Soviet soldiers. All were equally “victims” of “Hitler” and “the war,” press reports implied; all had been equally dishonored in death.

Whether or not “Nazis” were directly responsible for deliberate attempts to erase the identities of the dead in Berlin in the last weeks of the war and to desecrate their bodies, as the communist and western press alleged, the point is that these stories were emerging at nearly the same moment that detailed revelations of the Holocaust were becoming part of public discourse. Radio broadcasts and films like *Die Todesmühlen* (The Death Mills) were introducing German audiences to the notorious images we now so indelibly associate with the genocide. Many contemporary sources—memoirs, letters, and newspaper editorials—are pervaded by fears of depersonalized death and improper (meaning mass) burial. And it was in that same moment that some Berliners reported that reburials were taking place. One Berlin woman apprised authorities in August 1945 that a grave she had often noticed near her apartment in Flensburger Straße, which had always been lovingly tended and decorated with forget-me-nots, had suddenly disappeared. It is true that such reburials were not always the work of family or friends: *Leichenkommandos* (corpse details), in the local parlance, were organized by the Red Army early on to begin the process of removing graves from unfavorable locations and relocating remains to cemeteries. Yet sources also reveal instances in which contemporaries, like Willy Hennig, recalled being asked by family members or friends to help them rebury a loved one. For at least some Berliners, I argue, rescuing the dead from the shame of oblivion and improper burial was both a gesture of fellow feeling and, in some sense, an attempt to save them from the terrors of mass, anonymous death—a horror to which Germans had only recently subjected Jews and other “racial outsiders,” but could not sanction for themselves.
In this and other ways, the practices of burial would continue to figure into the reconstruction of Berlin—understood as a moral project—long after 1945. In both east and west, restoring “piety” to the city’s burial regime became a way of distancing postwar Germany from its Nazi past and of reconstructing civic life on new terms. In East Berlin, for example, a renewed emphasis was placed on socializing burial. The burial practices of Jews, at least as understood by East German functionaries, were not infrequently held up as a new, egalitarian, cultural ideal. Yet memories of the war often limited endeavors to reform burial in curious ways. Officials in both East and West Berlin pointed to an apparent decline in cremation after the war, which some linked to the “memory of the mass burnings in the concentration camps.” It has often been lamented that most postwar Germans saw themselves as victims and failed to take responsibility for the atrocities committed under National Socialist rule. Yet thinking about both the issue of reburials and the vague fears some Berliners apparently associated with cremation after 1945 suggests how discourses and representations of guilt and victimization concerning the recent past commingled in a particular urban, social context and became the lens through which postwar Berliners interpreted their own experiences of the war and Nazism. That some contemporaries may have adopted the position of the victims of the Holocaust so literally after 1945 that they feared their own dead befalling the fate of the millions who perished in Auschwitz demands our attention, especially as it took place well after the fall of Nazism. For at least some Berliners, the crimes associated with the defunct Nazi regime were not so much past as real and present dangers—of which their dead were potential victims.

In West Berlin, neither the state nor the municipality made the concerted attempts to reform the practices of death that were made in the East. Yet the emergence of new ideological, social, and cultural values made themselves felt in the practices of death all the same. An increasingly liberal political outlook gradually led to the rejection of authoritarian cultural norms that had long endured in Germany regarding such matters as cemetery design and the style of headstones—norms that continued to be upheld in the East. West Berliners ultimately abandoned these in favor of more individualistic mortuary iconography, rituals of burial, and views of mourning. Yet emerging cultural differences between East and West where death was concerned were muted throughout the 1950s by continuities in cultural traditions, shared memories of the past and of the war dead, and by the mobility that still prevailed for Berliners on both sides of the border. Until August 1961, the city’s inhabitants continued largely to bury and visit their dead as they liked, regardless of where in the city they resided. It was only with the building
of the Berlin Wall that such activity was decisively curtailed and that truly different cultures of death began to develop in East and West.

Interpreting social practice in the way I have tried to describe here is admittedly not without its perils for historians. Berliners in 1945 did not describe why they reburied loved ones, for example: They treated it as a natural and self-evident matter of respect, a “last duty of honor,” as Willy Hennig put it. Yet the insights of anthropologists of death are tremendously useful in comprehending such ritual activity. Peter Metcalf and Richard Huntington once described the moral authority of rites of death: Funerals, modes of burial and the like, they argued, “are subtly governed by notions of propriety, notions that ordinary people are not in the habit of formulating in words yet that they regularly put into action in moments of crisis.” What my study of death in Berlin seeks to demonstrate is that the meanings Berliners assigned to death and the practices of burial were continually subject to disruption and reconstruction. Over a period of thirty years, though Berliners’ ways of dealing with their dead remained fundamentally similar, the city’s inhabitants nevertheless perpetually reinvented the moral standards they linked to the procedures of burial and to the exacting choreography of funerary ritual as material, ideological, economic, political, and other circumstances shifted. In doing so, they consistently rearticulated the metaphors, assumptions, conventions, principles, habits, and “fundamental tools of thought” by which they lived in radically different historical contexts. Yet despite their constitutive relationship to social existence, these tools, conventions, habits, and assumptions concerning the practices of burial nevertheless went almost entirely unexamined.

It is curious that although cultural history has become perhaps the dominant mode in which history is now written, most of the groundbreaking texts in the history of mentalities in the German-speaking world deal with the late medieval and early modern periods. Yet more attention to classic subjects in the history of mentalities by historians of modern Germany can, I believe, yield new and significant insights. Certainly, in order to understand the truly astonishing feats of collective invention and reinvention in which Germans engaged over the period 1933 to 1961, we have to search out topics of investigation that get at the symbols and meanings that quietly, unobtrusively, and unremarkably structured and restructured existence even as they in turn were restructured by experience. Topics like death necessarily involve exploring a tremendously varied corpus of texts, some profound, others quotidian. Yet despite their diverse origins and purposes, the sources I consulted for my study almost universally conveyed the sense of moral concern that so often underpins social relationships with the dead. This made them especially revealing of cultural values and how they shifted in three Berlins.
Notes

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2 The record group containing many of these files is LAB C Rep 110, Magistrat von Berlin, Abteilung Bauwesen.

3 George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York, 1990), 85.


6 See, for example, Willi Bredel, “Der Totengräber,” Deutsche Volkszeitung, June 24, 1945.


8 Anonyma, Eine Frau in Berlin, 244, entry for 27 May 1945, discusses the radio broadcasts; Dagmar Barnouw, Germany 1945: Views of War and Violence (Bloomington, Ind., 1996) and Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, 1997), describe how the German public was presented with images from Nazi camps beginning in 1945.


11 Bundesarchiv-Berlin (BA) DO 1/8703, An das Ministerium des Innern des Landes Sachsen, betr.: kostenlose Totenbestattung, October 24, 1950.


The Geography of Germanness: Recentering German History in Interwar Poland

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German minorities in Eastern Europe were among the many nationality issues created by the peace settlements following the First World War. Both Weimar and Nazi claims to take care of German compatriots abroad made the treatment of these minorities a point of international tension. In the 1938 Munich Agreement, the European powers allowed Germany to incorporate the Sudeten German regions in Czechoslovakia. In the following year, Germany’s invasion of Poland was backed by claims of Polish repression of the German minority there. Yet who were the Germans in Poland? Germanness, after all, was a slippery concept, and it was contested not just by authorities and scholars in Poland and Germany, but also by German minority leaders themselves. Behind the façade of völkisch unity lurked serious divisions that worked to crosscut the political cohesion of the Germans in Poland. This essay examines how the German minority in interwar Poland can provide new perspectives on nationalism and nationalist historiography. First, it questions the narrative of national transformation within the German minority in Poland by focusing on regional particularities in the minority; second, this perspective from the national periphery offers a reexamination of interwar Reich policies and German nationalism; and third, it shows how the use of Polish sources and different approaches can lead to new findings.

Interwar Poland was composed of a complicated agglomeration of territories from the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the Russian Empire. According to the official Polish census for 1921, there were 1,059,154 Germans in Poland, or 3.9 percent of the total population. At least initially, most of Poland’s German minority did live in those territories that had once belonged to the German Empire, that is in the western Polish regions of Poznania, Pomerelia (including much of West Prussia and often referred to as the “Polish Corridor”), and Upper Silesia. Many, if not most, studies on the Germans in interwar Poland have concentrated on these areas. But there were also several hundred thousand Germans who lived in the formerly Russian and Austrian territories, and by 1939, these Germans made up the majority of Germans in Poland.

Rather than examining the development of regional identities, post-war West German and Polish historians have tended to focus on the
narrative of “national becoming” within the German minority in Poland. According to this view, the diverse Germans in Poland from the three Polish partitions were slowly but surely becoming a unified minority group in the interwar period, what many called a Volksgruppe. The narrative of a Volksgruppe-in-becoming fulfilled the normative view of many historians who believed in an inherent unity of all Germans: minority leaders needed only to put aside or overcome their regional differences in order to work together against Polish oppression.6 Although there had been steady and significant progress toward becoming a Volksgruppe in this view, the process was interrupted (but not necessarily ended) by the onset of the Second World War. This interpretation also allowed postwar German historians to lambaste the interwar Polish state for its supposedly clumsy and repressive nationality policies; indeed, the mass migration of Germans from Poland to Germany seemed to foreshadow the mass expulsions of Germans from Poland’s new western territories following the Second World War.7 Yet the “silver lining” in the otherwise dark period of Polish rule was that it accelerated the minority’s national transformation. Polish repression was seen as the midwife of growing German nationalism in Poland, and as such it served as the scapegoat for the minority’s Nazification.

Polish historiography after the Second World War also played on this Volksgruppe narrative, if for different reasons. Polish historians could point to the apparent homogenization of the minority as proof indeed that the Germans in Poland had become Nazis.8 In this view, the German minority did not just lack a sense of loyalty to Poland, but Polish historians could blame local Germans for acting as a “Fifth Column” that carried out diversionary attacks during Hitler’s invasion in September 1939.9 Hence, the Polish state had been justified ex post facto in its suspicions of the minority and the (reasonable) countermeasures it had taken. It was important in postwar Polish eyes that no Germans could be trusted, for on the one hand, the purported crimes of the German minority in helping the German attackers and occupiers not only legitimated Poland’s annexation of eastern German territories (which Poles referred to as the “recovered lands”) following the Second World War, but the crimes that local Germans committed during the occupation also justified the expulsion of Germans from all territories that had come under Polish control.10 Thus, both postwar Polish and German historiographies, which usually agreed on little else, converged on the idea of the Germans in Poland having largely become a unitary Volksgruppe by 1939. This view is still present in much of the recent scholarly and less politicized literature.11

The Volksgruppe narrative can be explained in part because the previous history of the Germans in Poland has focused on the role of the
metropoles, and this perspective from the top down often underplays differences within the minority.\textsuperscript{12} Recentering the story of German nationalism in Poland from the metropoles to the periphery allows a different picture. No doubt, it is impossible to understand the politics of the German minority in Poland without examining the role of the German and Polish states in shaping the overall setting for German activists to operate. As Rogers Brubaker has argued in his study of nationalism involving the Germans in interwar Poland, one must take minority actors more seriously, for they form a “single, interdependent relational nexus” with the Polish “nationalizing” host state and the German “external national homeland” state.\textsuperscript{13} It is thus important to treat minority actors as central, independent subjects who were not simply subordinate to Polish repression or Reich manipulation. Centralized policies, whether from Berlin or Warsaw, often produced conflict rather than cohesion within the minority. Moreover, the confusion of jurisdictions and competencies within the Reich tended to give “client” minority leaders considerable influence over their “patrons,” thereby allowing German activists in Poland to formulate and to pursue their own agendas.

At the same time, the diversity of voices within the German minority must be given more attention as well. Due to their stronger ties with the Reich, the views of German minority leaders in western Poland dominated and were often taken to stand for the position of the German minority as a whole. Going beyond the “center” of the minority in Prussian Poland and focusing on Germans living in other regions, however, would show that German minority leaders could not agree on what their short- and long-term goals were. Forced from three disparate empires into one “successor” state, regional German leaders discovered and created differences between themselves, and they continually navigated politically between national cohesion and regional particularisms. The salience of regional cleavages was one of the reasons that German activists in Poland failed to form a unified political organization, despite their own pronouncements for political unity and the intermittent encouragement of certain Reich German offices. Unity, after all, had to be balanced with issues of power. At the same time, strong nationalization processes within the minority resulted from this often-vigorous intraethnic competition. There is thus a need to consider multiple imaginations of German-ness within the minority—and without.

The second point of this essay is to argue that a study of regional cleavages within the minority allows for a reexamination of nationalisms and nationalist policies in the Reich. Such an approach enables a better understanding of why certain views on the German minority prevailed. Minority politics, while not subject to Reich whims, closely interplayed with the policies of the German state, and these had inadvertently deep-
ened regional cleavages among ethnic Germans in Poland. Especially important in this process was the widespread desire in Germany to regain the territories it had lost to Poland after the First World War and to support the ethnic Germans who lived there. Although the German state provided aid to the Polish Germans, it did not care equally. Even within the borders of Poland, Reich officials differentiated Germans according to their value to Germany’s geopolitical goals. As will be discussed below, these views were also related to perceptions of hierarchical Germanness within the minority. Moreover, this differentiation in care for ethnic Germans was glaringly apparent. During the Weimar Republic, substantial subsidies flowed to the Germans in Poland. Yet these funds were not appropriated equally among the regions. Germans who used to be Reich citizens, i.e. those in the formerly Prussian territories, received considerably more aid than Germans in formerly Austrian or Russian Poland. One loan program supported by Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in the mid-1920s allocated 21.5 million marks to be distributed to the Germans in Poland. Yet over 95 percent of the funds were to go to the Germans in western Poland, although they made up somewhat more than half of the minority.14 Not surprisingly, the coincidence of revisionist claims with regional cleavages fostered jealousies and animosity between the “di-aspora” Germans of the former Russian and Austrian territories and the “borderland” Germans in areas ceded by the German Reich.15

Looking at the motivation, intent, and effect of such differentiated Reich policies can provide a reexamination of nationalism at the metropoles. For example, historians have noted the rapid rise of völkisch nationalism during and after the First World War, what has been referred to as the “völkisch turn.”16 Indeed, the considerable sums for “Germandom policy” (Deutschtumspolitik) might appear concurrent with a greater völkisch interest in Germans outside of Germany’s borders. It is important, however, not to over-ethnicize this financial support for minorities abroad. Even those offices devoted to retaining German culture and influence abroad, such as the Deutsche Stiftung (which was affiliated with the Foreign Ministry), were not committed to an egalitarian brotherhood of Germans regardless of their state of residence. Rather, Reich officials acted out of a mix of concerns that were informed by a geography of Germanness. There was a greater sense of obligation for former Reich citizens stranded in Poland, who enjoyed a kind of “residual citizenship” and had special claims on the German state. Prewar membership in clubs, pensions, and unions had created ties and mutual obligations that continued in the interwar period across the new borders. While it was important that these former citizens were somehow “German,” Weimar’s official revisionist policies had little to do with the currents of völkisch thought that saw the minorities as important in themselves for their
intrinsic racial qualities. Nor was aid to the Germans in western Poland merely an instrument of territorial revisionism, but it was based in large part on the state’s residual obligations to former citizens. Hence, the Weimar Republic’s lopsided support for the Germans in western Poland reveal the political and social resilience of the borders of 1914. Such etatist and civic bases of Germanness persisted long after the First World War ended and competed with other ideologies, including völkisch thought. A hierarchy of Germanness became discernible, with some Germans being somehow more “German” and more deserving of aid from the Reich.

By recentering our attention on those peripheralized within the German minority in Poland, it is possible to see the complicated contingency of national belonging and self-understanding. The aforementioned “residual citizenship” did not just affect policies at the German Foreign Ministry and Prussian Interior Ministry, but it also existed in the minds of those former German citizens who were now in Poland. Differentiated Reich policies both reflected and fostered imaginations of a variegated Germanness within the minority. By stressing their legal, political, and social connections to Germany, the former Staatsvolk in western Poland could resist coming to terms with their new status as Auslandsdeutsche. In turn, this “residual citizenship” of the western Polish Germans complicated their cooperation with those Germans elsewhere who never had a connection with the German state and who were more or less resigned to remaining in Poland. While German minority leaders could not control the purse strings of funds coming from the Reich, they did contribute to shaping the hierarchy of Germanness in Poland. By tarring other German groups with the brush of cultural contamination, regional German activists in Poland could influence the overall political direction of the minority.

An important example involved the city of Łódź in formerly Russian Poland. Once a great textile manufacturing center, the city also counted some sixty thousand Germans, which represented the largest concentration of Germans in Poland. The Germans in Łódź were hence the greatest potential challenge to the dominance of the formerly Prussian Germans in western Poland. German activists in Łódź, who largely saw themselves destined for a life outside Germany, appeared especially threatening because they adopted a reconciliatory attitude toward the Polish state. Western Polish German leaders found out early on that working with their purported cousins in Łódź could be more of a liability than a benefit. Such political differences within the minority were difficult to reconcile, and they were often attributed to other, more nefarious causes. Reich officials and German activists commonly portrayed the Łódź Germans as somehow too Polish, too Jewish, and too un-German. This stereotype could be summed up as the “Łodzer Mensch,” a preexisting
stereotype of Łódź’s entrepreneurs as being cosmopolitan and preoccupied with business matters. The ascription of anti-Polish and anti-Semitic qualities upon the broader section of Łódź’s Germans helped to give order to vague and shifting notions of Germanness. At the same time, German activists in Poland internalized and exploited the myth of the “Lodzer Mensch” to support the concept of hierarchical Germanness, with Germans living further east portrayed as somehow less German and less reliable in national matters.19 While the former Reich Germans took the dominant position in the minority, the “Lodzer Mensch” stereotype confirmed the subordinate role (and inherent danger) of the central and eastern Polish Germans.

Yet during the 1930s, the tenuousness of this constructed Germanness became clear as the confluence of demographic, political, and ideological changes began to undermine the established hierarchy. German scholars began to see the Germans in the eastern regions of Poland more favorably, in part due to their higher birth rates and their purported steadfastness in the face of Polish repression. Their alleged toughness stood in stark contrast to the apparently weak-willed Poznanian and Pomerelbian Germans who had left in droves for Germany in the 1920s. Yet this higher appraisal was also due to the vigorous leadership of German activists in central and formerly Austrian Poland. The ability of previously peripheralized leaders to mobilize the rhetoric of National Socialism undermined the position of the Germans in western Poland. At the same time, the increasing calls within the minority for political unification only exacerbated intraethnic and regional tensions. The National Socialist tenets of an egalitarian German community, the new Volksgemeinschaft, helped to induce unrealistically high expectations of national solidarity and empowered those Germans who had long been seen as somehow less German, especially in central and eastern Poland. In practice, it unleashed a power struggle that fractured the minority even further.

By the late 1930s, German minority organizations had solidified largely along regional lines. The formerly Prussian regions were represented by the Deutsche Vereinigung in Poznania and Pomerelia and the Volksbund in East Upper Silesia.20 The Deutscher Volksverband arose in what had been the Russian-controlled Congress Kingdom of Poland, and the Jungdeutsche Partei based itself in formerly Austrian Silesia. Importantly, the Jungdeutsche Partei had largely failed in its attempt to expand to other Polish regions. Far from overcoming old political borders and growing together into a homogeneous Volksgruppe, German activists became increasingly conscious of their regional distinctions and interests. At the same time, one should not see the hardening of regional lines as a lack of nationalism, for the interplay of regionality and nationality was not a zero-sum game, as recent scholarship has shown.21 German minor-
ity leaders on the periphery consistently deployed notions of Germanness and community for particular ends.

The third point of this essay is that new questions based on sources in Poland have made it possible to come to this interpretation of German minority history in Poland. The persistence of the Volksgruppe narrative is in part due to the nature of the sources available. Reich officials were often not only geographically far away when reporting on the minority, but were also loaded with Reich German baggage in their viewpoints and priorities. Even Reich officials serving in Poland had limited access to what Germans were doing, and they were often deceived and subjected to various interests. It was difficult for consular officials to filter through competing loyalties and claims. Minority-generated sources also give a skewed view. Tensions seldom came to light in the official correspondence of minority leaders, or they were couched in terms that did not question the essential unity of the Volk. Minority leaders who lived under the threat of house searches often kept few records (and much of what was written was destroyed during the war). Moreover, German activists often felt compelled to display national solidarity, which was as much a show for themselves as for the funding agencies in the Reich.

While also sown with their own inconsistencies and political agendas, Polish administrative and police reports provide greater detail regarding the political life of the Germans in Poland. Polish police informants were able to infiltrate German organizations with ease, in part because German parties were often lax in their membership criteria, and in part because the Polish police were able to take advantage of the deep divides within the minority. Polish informants listened intently to the considerable grumbling of minority activists, who often disparaged the Germans from other territories quite freely at their meetings.22

Polish reports show that instead of collaborating to build a Volksgemeinschaft, as minority-generated materials tend to suggest, the regional leaders were actively working against one another to protect the interests of their regional fiefdoms.23 One Polish administrative report reveals that during a political rally in Łódź, a German activist noted that Germans in formerly Russian Poland did not enjoy a good reputation in the Reich and in the other Polish territories.24 At the same time, such statements show how alleged regional resentments and self-perceptions could be formulated and deployed to mobilize the German groups in Poland. In short, Polish sources enable a retelling of the Volksgruppe narrative by providing a dense archival base for new research questions. The wealth of information left by local Polish administration and police offers the historian the ability to counter-read the proclamations made by German minority leaders and to assess how Germans acted beyond their nationalist pronouncements.
To conclude, recentering the narrative of the German minority in Poland undermines the teleology of German national development in interwar Poland. It also enables a reassessment of nationalism and policymaking at the metropoles. Germanness was hierarchical but also malleable, and Germanness was constructed not just at the center, but at the peripheries of Germandom as well. Because the Germans in western Poland always had one foot out of the minority door, their political goals were very different from those of the Germans in formerly Austrian and Russian territories, which fostered considerable tension between German minority leaders. Although no unified political organization was formed, the intense intraethnic conflict along regionalized lines also culminated in minority radicalization, which had dire consequences for their Polish and Jewish neighbors in the Second World War.25

Notes

1 This essay is based on the author’s dissertation: Winson W. Chu, “German Political Organizations and Regional Particularisms in Interwar Poland (1918–1939)” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2006).

2 Richard Blanke, Orphans of Versailles: The Germans in Western Poland, 1918–1939 (Lexington, 1993), 32. This figure did not yet include the some 330,000 Germans who would be added to Poland after the division of Upper Silesia in 1922. Blanke, Orphans of Versailles, 30–31.


4 The territories that had belonged to the Russian Empire included Volhynia and the Congress Kingdom of Poland, whose main city was Łódź. The formerly Habsburg territories included Austrian Silesia (centered on the towns of Bielsko/Bielitz and Cieszyn/Teschen) and western Galicia, centered on Lwów/Lemberg.

5 Blanke, Orphans of Versailles, 3.

6 One of the most notable proponents of the thesis that the German minority had transformed into a Volksgruppe was Richard Breyer, who grew up in central Poland and later became director of the Herder-Institut in Marburg. See Richard Breyer, Das Deutsche Reich und Polen 1932–1937: Außenpolitik und Volksgruppenfragen (Würzburg, 1955), especially 49–51, 227–236, 255–256. The Volksgruppe-in-becoming narrative continued to have a strong resonance long after the Second World War among German expellees from interwar Poland. Germans from Poznania and central Poland (which had been part of the former Reichsgau “Wartheland” during the war) were joined in one expellee organization, the Landsmannschaft Weichsel-Warthe. LWW-affiliated scholarship has perpetuated old tropes of interwar minority unity by focusing on similarities rather than on differences. Because the LWW did not make any territorial claims, Jutta Faehndrich has ranked it as moderate within the expellee political landscape. See Jutta Faehndrich, “Erinnerungskultur und Umgang mit Vertreibung in Heimatbüchern deutschsprachiger Vertriebener,” Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung 52, no. 2 (2003): 191–229.


10 See especially: Cygański, Mniejszość niemiecka w Polsce centralnej, 147–150.


14 Norbert Friedrich Krekeler, Revisionsanspruch und geheime Ostpolitik der Weimarer Republik: Die Subventionierung der deutschen Minderheit in Polen (Stuttgart, 1973), 93.


17 Tensions between German regions were apparent already at the first Congress of the Germans in Poland in 1921. See German Passport Agency in Łódź (Drubba) to German Foreign Ministry, 14 September 1921, Auswärtiges Amt-Politisches Archiv, Abt. IV Po, Politik 25 Polen, vol. 7 (R82187), 38–44.


19 A reference by a Łódź German activist to being perceived as “auch-Deutsche” can be found in Jungdeutsche Partei für Polen, “Rede von Pg. Dr. Günzel, Łódź,” Reden und Berichte vom Parteitag 1934 (Bielsko, 1934), 23–30, here 30, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, R57-Neu, 1093 (Nr. 21).

20 East Upper Silesia, which had been allocated to Poland in 1922, enjoyed international minority protection for fifteen years. Prussia had acquired Silesia in a war against Austria,
so unlike Poznania and Pomerelia, East Upper Silesia had not been part of the Prussian partition of Poland. During the interwar period, the Volksbund was the largest German organization in East Upper Silesia, and it jealously protected its particular interests vis-à-vis the other regional German organizations.


22 A report by Polish authorities in Łódź revealed that Germans in Poznania and Pomerelia often expressed their contempt toward German Upper Silesians by derisively calling them “Galician Germans.” Social-Political Department of the Voivodeship of Łódź, monthly report, no. 12 for 1 to 31 December 1935, dated 9 January 1936, Archiwum Państwowe Łódź, Urząd Wojewódzki Łódzki, sign. 2507 L (microfilm no. L-12757).

23 Nationalities Department of the Polish Interior Ministry, *Sprawozdanie życia mniejszości narodowych za II kwartał 1936 r.* (Warsaw, 1936), Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych File 2348, Mikrofilm Nr. B 18553, 70.


CONFERENCE REPORTS

LOCAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF CHRISTIANITY: RELIGIOUS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS, 1680–1830

Conference at the GHI London, July 12–14, 2007. Co-organized by the GHI London and the GHI Washington. Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHI London), Alexander Pyrges (University of Trier), Gisela Mettele (GHI Washington). Participants: Elena Y. Apkarimova (University of Ekaterinburg), Luke Clossey (Simon Fraser University), Linda Frey (Montana State University), Marsha Frey (Kansas State University), Markus Friedrich (University of Frankfurt am Main), Richard Gawthrop (Franklin College), Jeremy Gregory (University of Manchester), Sunne Juterczenka (Max Planck Institute for History, Göttingen), Sergei Kizima (Academy of Public Administration, Minsk), Hartmut Lehmann (University of Göttingen), Robert D. Linder (Kansas State University), Rebekka von Mallinckrodt (Free University of Berlin), Benjamin Marschke (Humboldt State University), James van Horn Melton (Emory University), Regina Pörter (Swansea University), Astrid von Schlachta (University of Innsbruck), Alexander Schunka (University of Stuttgart).

This conference was a first step toward investigating the “long eighteenth century” as an era of religious communication networks that crossed denominational borders. The organization of the conference was based on the idea that communication networks represent one of the social forms on the basis of which old forms of Christian religiosity changed and new forms developed during the “long eighteenth century.” In addition, the production and distribution of the new religious semantics that developed around the mid-eighteenth century took place in networks of interaction as well as long-distance communication. The conference further assumed that comparable structures of communicative interweaving existed or developed in all of the European and North American Christian world. In order not to further perpetuate the traditional boundaries of research between church and secular history, conference themes encompassed the entire spectrum of Christian beliefs and denominations. This enabled interconnections at the local and communal level to be examined, along with cross-territorial movements, intercontinental religious missions, and international migration.

Alexander Pyrges led off the conference with a paper on “Circulating Knowledge and Connecting Instruments: Letters to Networks in the Prot-
estant Atlantic World, 1730–1770.” It focused on a case study of the network of the Ebenezer community that emerged in the early 1730s and comprised a number of Protestant institutions and numerous laypeople and clergymen in Britain and continental Europe. This community strove to help exiles from Salzburg settle in Georgia. Pyrges argues that the degree of involvement and the frequency and volume of interaction made the network not only a place of contact, exchange, and cooperation, but also a space of cultural production. By examining practices of forwarding and enclosing, as well as systems of intertextual references, he showed in some detail how letters cast interpersonal ties into the form of a network and how they secured the extensive circulation of knowledge inside the network. He ended his talk by noting that actual Salzburgers and migrants only constituted a very small minority within this network. They were not participants, but were rather the chief topic of the communication.

Robert D. Linder’s paper, “The Evangelical Triangle: The Connections of the Pietist Renewal, the Wesleyan Revival, and the First Great Awakening,” went beyond studying individual awakenings in isolation and investigated the connections and influences among the leaders of various evangelical groups during the era of the first awakening. Whereas earlier studies have focused on the transatlantic relationships between the North American Awakening and the English Wesleyan Movement, Linder advocated enlarging the scope of investigation to include the continental Pietist movements. His paper thus produced new insights into evangelical interrelationships and influences through literature, conversation, and example. Linder further suggested that the Moravians provided the nexus for these liaisons between evangelical leaders of the various awakenings in different parts of the Atlantic community.

In her paper “The Gemeinnachrichten as Medium of the International Communication of the Moravians in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” Gisela Mettele explored the question of how the Moravian Brethren, scattered across the globe in settlements and missionary outposts, succeeded in maintaining a communal identity at a time in which international communications were so irregular and uncertain. The sense of communal identity, according to Mettele, was maintained not only by close institutionalized links between the worldwide settlements and the group’s leadership in Herrnhut, Saxony, but also by shared rituals and festivities, commonly read magazines, or other devotional literature and the circulation of reports about various settlements’ activities. The global social arena of the Moravians thus consisted primarily of an “imaginary order.” Ultimately, it was not the actual connection that was decisive, but the feeling of unity. Mettele concluded that in the nineteenth century, shifting identities and the development of rival loyalties ultimately un-
dermined the determination of the Moravian settlements to maintain their identity as members of a global community.

Hartmut Lehmann delivered the keynote lecture. His talk, “Pietism Research at a Crossroad,” pleaded for a reevaluation of the revival movements of the nineteenth century and a chronological extension of the term pietism to apply to the religious awakening movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including contemporary evangelicalism. Theology remains at the core of the study of Pietism, according to Lehmann. Nevertheless, secular historians, too, must better incorporate themes of pietism research and integrate the longing for salvation into the larger discussion about the role of religion in the process of secularization. Lehmann declared the investigation of the role of communication and networks to be central to reconceptualizing the study of pietism.

The second day started with a paper by Astrid von Schlachta, “Confessional-Political Networks and Dissenting Subjects: Toleration and Expulsion,” in which she pointed to theories about confessionalization. To support her thesis that confessionalization in the Reich was not finished by 1648, she examined smaller dissenting groups that were still excluded from regulations of the “Reichsrecht” in the second half of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century. She especially focused on persecuted Anabaptist groups in Switzerland and their communications that evolved along “lines of relation” built up in the wake of the persecutions of the late seventeenth century. She convincingly argued that the communication that emerged between confessional dissenters, government officials, and different scholars generated a field of communication that transported ideas apart from the “big thinkers.” Instead, merchants discussed side by side with scholars and farmers, generating an opinion-forming discourse on toleration and freedom of conscience on various political and social levels.

Giving a fresh perspective on the large amount of scholarship on the relationship between Pietism and the Prussian state, Benjamin Marschke’s paper, “Lutheran Jesuits: Halle Pietist Communication Networks at the Court of Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia,” discussed some especially explicit but not, as he pointed out, atypical examples of Pietists reaching out to the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm I. Though Pietists often conducted their affairs in meetings that produced no written records, Marschke was able to track down the informal channels through which Pietists regularly reached Friedrich Wilhelm. Networks, as Marschke pointed out, were paramount because of the many pitfalls and intricacies involved in maneuvering at court. Uninitiated outsiders could not be successful without the aid of knowledgeable insiders. The paper also discussed the reasons for the decline of Pietism’s influence at Friedrich Wilhelm’s court. The death of August Hermann Francke itself,
as is often assumed, was not the decisive event that triggered the king’s change of heart. According to Marschke, it was instead the subsequent failure to enforce solidarity and suppress conflicts within the Pietist movement that resulted in their exposure as “Lutheran Jesuits.”

Alexander Schunka’s paper, “The Anglo-Prussian Communication Network: Toward an Ecclesiastical Union in the Early Eighteenth Century,” investigated the Prussian-Protestant connections from a different angle, and explored Friedrich Wilhelm’s interest in English culture that derived from the influences of a certain ecclesiastical connection between Prussia and England. In his paper, Schunka analyzed the way these ecclesiastical links were set up in order to promote an ecclesiastical union between the Protestant denominations on the continent with the help of the Church of England. Distinguishing between people, infrastructure, and the quality and quantity of different ways of communication, Schunka stated that a very influential line of communication went through the charitable societies in London, notably the Society for the Promoting Christian Knowledge (SPCK) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG). Even though the attempt at church unification eventually failed, Schunka argued that it significantly added to a new awareness of English religion and culture in Prussia.

Luke Clossey’s paper, “Jesus and the Jesuits: Notes on the Structure and Content of the Early Modern Global Catholic Network,” presented an ongoing research project that seeks to describe how Jesus has been understood, by believers and nonbelievers alike, in cultural history. Instead of considering a single, regional instance of Jesus entering a new culture, it pursues a holistic analysis to present a global view of migration of the idea of Jesus throughout the world. According to Clossey, this global historical strategy points directly to the Early Modern period, which witnesses the development of global empires, global trading networks, and global missionary enterprises, each contributing to a moment of early globalization that spread ideas of Jesus worldwide. In his fascinating presentation, Clossey emphasized the special strength of the project that examines global history in a collaborative effort of a team of researchers coming from different cultural and scholarly backgrounds.

Jeremy Gregory’s paper, “Transatlantic Anglican Networks, c. 1680–c. 1770: Transplanting, Translating, and Transforming the Church of England,” looked at the ways in which differing religious, political, social, and geographical circumstances could mean that members of a network living in one context had a totally different experience from those in other milieus. In his talk, Gregory contended that a religious network by its very nature must have some shared set of assumptions, but in his case study of transatlantic Anglicanism, he argued that mutations and the sea changes made the experience of Anglicanism in New England very dif-
ferent from that at home. Still massively dependent on English Anglican print culture, the dependency on personnel from Britain and Ireland decreased over time, and the extent of lay initiative was far greater than in Old England. In large measure, Gregory concludes, this would be a defining difference between the Episcopal and the Anglican churches during the next centuries.

Rebekka von Mallinckrodt’s contribution, “Between Neighborhood and Community of All Christians: Research on Religious Brotherhoods as Research on Social Networks,” offered a comparative presentation of how group cohesion was created and religious knowledge disseminated in these pre-modern associations. She asked what effects the religious profile and membership structure had on the ratio of socio-political motives on the one hand and religious/spiritual motives on the other. With membership numbers ranging from twenty members to five thousand and catchment areas ranging from the immediate neighborhood to all of Catholic Europe, sweeping statements about network building in Catholic brotherhoods are not possible, Mallinckrodt pointed out. Fraternities were the medium for anyone to express belonging to a group, with as much as 90 percent of the adult male residents of Cologne belonging to a fraternity. Mallinckrodt therefore concluded that brotherhoods were in social terms far more open than the societies, clubs, and salons of the Enlightenment, which are generally associated with the development of a political public sphere.

James van Horn Melton assessed the relationship between the Salzburg emigrants and the Pietist movement prior to their expulsion. His rich paper focused on the extent to which Salzburg Protestants were in fact exposed to Pietist writing on the eve of expulsion. Seasonal migration, Melton pointed out, brought them into contact with co-religionists outside the territory, either personally or, more importantly, through books. Melton’s talk provided a revealing window into the clandestine print culture that encapsulated the experience of persecuted Protestants in Salzburg and throughout the alpine regions of the Habsburg monarchy. Especially the absence of radical separatism, Melton argues, made the Salzburg brethren a cause célèbre. To Pietist publicists, Salzburg Protestants were the living embodiment of Luther’s priesthood of all believers. Despite the absence of clergy, they had kept their faith alive for almost two centuries with seemingly little more than the printed word to sustain them. The Salzburgers were thus Pietists avant la lettre.

Sunne Juterczenka’s paper explored the networking activities of a geographically highly mobile denomination, as well as the ways in which these activities are reflected in spatial imagination and representation. In her talk, she presented different modes in which seventeenth-century Quaker missionaries expressed the spatial quality of their missionary
field. Missionary work, Juterczenka contended, depended first and fore-
most on communication, and one important goal of Quaker networking
activities on the continent was to establish communication channels in
order to deliver the missionary message. Informal networks became es-
pecially crucial in stabilizing the new continental branch of Quakerism.
Juterczenka ended her talk with an overview of the imagery that Quakers
employed when referring to the countries and places that they intended
to visit or actually visited, thus demonstrating how missionary methods
and success were reflected in spatial representations.

Markus Friedrich summed up the discussions of the conference by
raising some fundamental questions that led to a general discussion on
networks: Can networks be conceptualized without at least having a
certain range of content in mind? How do content and structure of net-
works interact? For instance, did the scientific aspect of the Jesuit network
follow the same rules that organized the purely administrative correspon-
dence? Another point of general interest was the question of how to find
the appropriate criteria to evaluate the efficiency (or inefficiency) of a
network. How did people in the early modern period deal with infra-
structural impasses, and how did this affect their understanding of com-
munication and social organization? Intensity and extensity of networks
differed, as did the aims behind them. Networks are not all the same;

hence our methodologies must be diverse as well. Understanding net-
works requires investigations on several scales, since networks have dif-
ferent functions on the local, regional, and global levels. Finally, Friedrich
raised the question of the specific religious aspect of the networking
discussed in the conference. Are the networks under discussion here
comparable to trading companies and artisan fraternities? Is there a reli-
gious dimension to the networking? Is there an “angelic” dimension of
communication in a religious context? If there was, when and how did it
get lost on the way to modernity?

Gisela Mettele (GHI)
READING HAMBURG: ANGLO-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Conference at the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg (FZH), September 6–8, 2007. Co-organized by the GHI and the FZH. Conveners: Axel Schildt (FZH), Christoph Strupp (DGIA-Research Fellow, FZH), Dorothee Wierling (FZH).

Participants: Katherine B. Aaslestad (West Virginia University), Lars Amenda (FZH), Frank Bajohr (FZH), Julia Bruggemann (DePauw University), Charles Closmann (University of North Florida), Elisabeth von Ducker (Museum der Arbeit, Hamburg), Geoffrey Giles (University of Florida), Frank Hatje (University of Hamburg), Rainer Hering (Landesarchiv Schleswig-Holstein, Schleswig), Jennifer Jenkins (University of Toronto), Carolyn H. Kay (Trent University), Eckart Krause (University of Hamburg), Ann C. Le Bar (Eastern Washington University), Emily Levine (Stanford University), Mary Lindemann (University of Miami), Jürgen Martschukat (University of Erfurt), Anthony McElligott (University of Limerick), Julia Sneeringer (Queens College, New York), Robert P. Stephens (Virginia Polytechnic Institute), Maiken Umbach (University of Manchester), Andrew Wackerfuss (Georgetown University), Klaus Weinhauer (University of Bielefeld / University of Lüneburg), Clayton Whisnant (Wofford College), Frank Zelko (University of Vermont), Tamara Zwick (University of South Florida).

Few German cities have received as much attention from Anglo-American historians as Hamburg. The Directory of History Dissertations of the American Historical Association alone lists eighteen entries for Hamburg, considerably more than for Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne, or Leipzig. Hamburg, as one of the biggest cities in Germany, a commercial hub, and a city with a long-standing tradition as a center of culture and the media, certainly has a lot to offer to historians. The strong international interest in Hamburg was reason enough for the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg, in collaboration with the GHI, to organize a conference on the history of Hamburg as reflected in Anglo-American research of the last two decades. It was the main purpose of the conference to draw the balance of existing projects, many of which have already led to publications, but also to stimulate future research, to expand the existing network of international “Hamburg historians,” and to create new links to German colleagues. The conference took place onsite and opened with a tour of Hamburg’s historic Town Hall and an official reception of the participants by the Hamburg Senate, represented by State Secretary Roland Salchow of the Department of Science and Research.
Even though no topics or methodological approaches had been excluded deliberately, many of the presentations at the conference focused on cultural history—in line with international trends in current historical research in general. This was particularly true for the first day that featured papers on a variety of aspects of the city’s civic culture from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century. The first two sections dealt with different aspects of Bürgerkultur in the decades around 1800. Mary Lindemann focused on true crime narratives in eighteenth-century Hamburg. By using the crimes of Maria Wächter, who was accused of matricide, Charlotte Guyard, who committed perjury, and Daniel Nachtigal, who was a blackmailer, she shed light on the changing relationship between real-life crimes and their complex literary afterlife, which was in turn a result of broader changes in the economic and cultural situation of Hamburg.

Ann C. Le Bar refuted the long-standing myth of Hamburg citizens being disinterested in music by focusing on the process of music-making and its function in domestic life instead of the activities of great composers. While it is true that a vibrant tradition of church music and opera had come to an end in the early eighteenth century, particularly in the middle classes, music lived on behind closed doors. Rich collections of vocal music with sacred and secular songs side by side appeared in print throughout the entire eighteenth century and underlined the importance of amateur domestic singing as a social event and an integral part of Hamburg’s civic culture.

Katherine Aaslestad presented her research on the Hanseatic ideal of republicanism and the changes it underwent between 1780 and 1815. In the late eighteenth century, a flourishing popular press had helped codify a common vocabulary of republican identity with strong self-congratulatory notions and introduced it to a constantly growing audience. Under the influence of the Enlightenment in Northern Germany, the political upheavals of the French Revolution, and the political, economic, and military crises of the Napoleonic era, Hamburg’s collective identity went through a period of transformation. Patriotism became distinctly militaristic, and the traditional civic virtue of serving the common good waned in favor of a laissez-faire attitude.

Tamara Zwick focused on aspects of kinship and gender in the Hamburg middle classes of the early nineteenth century. She demonstrated the important social function of the open tables and salons that were organized by women of influential families from the mercantile elite such as Johanna Sieveking. They were open to the public, and it was even possible to be a member by correspondence. In the meetings of these open tables and salons, the public and the private sphere interconnected in various ways.
The discussion of civic culture and the role of Hamburg’s citizen elite continued with presentations on art and architecture in the decades around 1900. Jennifer Jenkins focused on the cultural consequences of the major economic and political transformations the city underwent during the Kaiserreich. She identified a form of “public culture” that was characterized by its modernist attitude, unique social depth, and an expansion of public life in the form of new associations and institutions. It was personified by Alfred Lichtwark, the first director of the Hamburg Kunst- halle and proponent of an aesthetic education for broader social strata.

However, Lichtwark’s “pioneering spirit” and his strong support for French and German impressionistic art met with resistance in the city, as Carolyn Kay showed in her paper. Even though generous donations from members of the local elite enabled him to build a first-class art collection for the Kunsthalle, the realistic, distinctly “unheroic” portrait of Mayor Carl Petersen he had commissioned from Max Liebermann led to a major scandal in 1892. The conflict illustrated different artistic tastes and attitudes within the Hamburg bourgeoisie, and it also shed light on the general discrepancies between contemporary perceptions of modern art and current interpretations.

In her presentation on Hamburg’s “built environment” around the turn of the century, Maiken Umbach highlighted the tension between the strong particularistic tendencies of the “Free and Hanseatic City” of Hamburg and the growing importance of its national role in the Kaiserreich. This tension was not only visible in the style of major new buildings that were finished between the 1880s and the 1900s: It also influenced Hamburg’s stance toward German colonialism, which in its strong orientation toward certain commercial aspects—primarily banking interests and ship-building—was distinctly different from that of other German regions.

The sections on elite culture were rounded out with a presentation by Emily Levine on the art historian Erwin Panofsky’s tenure at the new University of Hamburg. Panofsky went to Hamburg as a Privatdozent in 1921, became a full professor in 1926, and was driven into exile in 1933. In the 1920s, with financial support from the Warburg family, Hamburg became the birthplace of modern art history and the iconological method. Panofsky stood at the center of the academically highly respected “Hamburg School,” but under difficult economic and political circumstances, the role of a professor and of the university as a whole changed. Levine used Panofsky’s satire “Socrates in Hamburg,” a short play performed at a “Winterfestival” and published in 1931, to reflect upon the complex relationship between urban setting, economic and intellectual life, and the multilayered role of civic patronage in Hamburg.
All presentations on Hamburg’s history from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century emphasized the particularly civic character of its culture and the close relationship between culture and the bourgeois elite. However, from 1914 on, the political and economic crises seriously undermined the position of the bourgeoisie in Germany in general. It was therefore probably no coincidence that in the part of the conference that focused on contemporary history, the perspective widened to include additional social groups and different topics.

Anthony McElligott looked back on his research on the workers’ movement and the rise of Nazism in Altona. By focusing less on organized workers and political parties and more on local networks, and by broadening the time frame to include the prehistory of the revolution of 1918 and the first years of the Nazi regime after 1933, he was able to open new paths beyond traditional German narratives of Weimar Arbeitergeschichte. In his presentation, he also shed light on the complex interaction of national politics with politics and policies on the local level.

Neighborhood relations and local politics also played an important part in Andrew Wackerfuss’s research on the mental universe of the “stormtrooper family” of the SA in Hamburg. In his interpretation, the paramilitary organization of the NSDAP attracted new members in the city less because of its right-wing ideology than due to personal reasons. Existing personal networks facilitated the joining of the SA. The SA detachments had deep roots in the neighborhoods. Membership shaped the political attitude, religious beliefs, and even the sexual identity of young men. World War I and the crises of the early 1920s had put a strain on traditional forms of the family. In the SA, comrades could become Ersatz families, and SA dormitories literally replaced home for many young men without a family of their own. However, for those with wives and children, the SA “family” rivaled their real family for time and attention, and the communal living arrangements were in conflict with the self-image of SA men as “respectable citizens.”

Despite the homosexual overtones of the movement and the Männerbund atmosphere at the SA Wackerfuss described in his paper, the NSDAP, of course, was strictly opposed to homosexuality, and after 1933, their exclusionary policies also targeted gay men. However, neither the definition of what constituted a homosexual nor the legal consequences of being accused of homosexual acts were consistent. Geoffrey Giles used the cases of the economist Karl August Fischer, the historian Otto Westphal, and the military historian and Wehrwissenschaftler Alfred Schüz—all three strong supporters of the Nazification of the University of Hamburg and, in the mid-1930s, all three accused of homosexual behavior—to shed light on the considerable variations in the legal proceedings and the university’s reaction to the cases.
After 1945, the tightened Section 175 of the German Penal Code remained in effect for another twenty-five years. However, Clayton Whisnant, in his paper on the Hamburg gay scene after World War II, painted a complex picture of tolerance and repression. He identified two tensions that run counter to established political and social narratives of a linear development from persecution to liberation and the decriminalization of homosexuality in 1969, and from the conformist 1950s to the rebellious 1960s. Based on interviews with contemporaries and Hamburg court cases, he described the late 1940s and early 1950s as a period that many gay men experienced as being relatively tolerant, in which a lively gay publishing industry existed in the city, and in which even other police departments considered Hamburg’s policies to be rather lenient. From the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, the pressure on the gay scene increased. Heightened police and Jugendschutz activities created an atmosphere of renewed repression, even though at the same time those voices that would ultimately contribute to the reform of Section 175 started to gain ground.

One of the key attractions for tourists in Hamburg still today is the famous “Reeperbahn,” the nightlife district in St. Pauli, home to a variety of bars, brothels, and porn-shops, but also cabaret and music clubs. The city had to deal with the issue of prostitution as early as the nineteenth century, when brothels existed in many neighborhoods. Julia Brugemann described how the authorities introduced a system of strict regulation that made women available to men but kept them under close supervision to protect public order and the health of the customers. From the 1870s to World War I, the shortcomings and contradictions of the official policy led to intense public debates in which Christian groups, leaders of the Social Democratic Party, and feminist women’s organizations played key roles.

While prostitution always had had economic benefits, only in the 1950s did Hamburg begin to actually embrace the rougher sides of its image and actively market the Reeperbahn, as Julia Sneeringer showed in her paper on the “assembly line of joys.” After the war, tourism played an important role for the West German economic recovery, and it helped reestablish Germany’s image as being open and tolerant. The red light district, the bars, and the flourishing music scene in St. Pauli made Hamburg the place to go for adult entertainment, and contemporary tourism guides and official brochures openly advertised it as such. Sneeringer pointed out that Hamburg became a forerunner of changes in postwar West Germany that ranged from leisure to new attitudes about sexuality to youth culture in general.

An unwanted side effect of the new leisure culture was the use of drugs in Hamburg in the 1960s and 1970s, which Robert Stephens treated.
in his paper from a transnational perspective. He used case files of drug users to show how goods, people, and institutions in this underground economy were interwoven on local, national, and global levels. He further shed light on the tension between the public and political perception of drug use as a social or a police problem.

The conference closed with a panel on environmental history. Charles Closmann followed the debates and policy initiatives around Hamburg’s water supply system from the late nineteenth century to the 1980s. He showed how originally rather narrow debates on making safe and good-tasting drinking water available expanded into broader discussions of the environmental consequences of water use after World War II. The devastating cholera epidemic of 1892 in Hamburg led to reforms that were to ensure that contaminated water from the Elbe no longer entered the city’s water supply system. Concepts and measures that were developed until 1945 continued to influence the city’s water policy until the mid-1970s, even though the growth of Hamburg and the expansion of its industry and harbor economy after the war posed new challenges to its water management.

Finally, Frank Zelko presented a paper on Hamburg as a center of environmental activism in the 1970s and early 1980s. The unmitigated expansion of the Hamburg harbor after 1945 and the industrial areas around it had serious consequences for the environment, in particular the water quality of the Elbe. Since the local authorities proved ineffective in ameliorating the problem of water pollution, a grassroots movement of environmental activists from diverse social and educational backgrounds sprang up. It gained national prominence and achieved successes with the help of spectacular public actions. It became the nucleus of the German branch of Greenpeace, still headquartered in Hamburg.

The presentations at the conference and the lively discussions in the panels made it clear that the history of Hamburg has been an attractive subject of study for Anglo-American historians for a variety of reasons. Individual case-studies did not necessarily aim to portray historical developments in Hamburg as unique. Focusing on the “Free and Hanseatic City,” as Hamburg is officially called—an independent political entity for centuries, and today one of the sixteen states of the Federal Republic—enabled new perspectives on broader historical trends and offered a route of escape from the dominance of Prussia in international German historiography. As was to be expected in light of general trends in historical research, methodologically, many papers focused on culture and “counter-culture,” forms of cultural representation, and historical discourse. The studies on Hamburg’s literature, music, art, architecture, and education reflected the distinctively civic and mercantile character of the city’s social and political elite, however.
Other features of the city—for example, Hamburg’s “international” character as a port city and point of transit for people and goods from all over the world—have generated less interest abroad in recent years. While the conference did not identify a particularly “foreign” image of the history of Hamburg, several participants pointed out that their “alien” view may have been beneficial in practical ways. It fostered a “fresh look” uninhibited by existing local master narratives and self-perceptions. With politically and socially sensitive topics, it was often easier to stay clear of local conflicts and to get access to a variety of sources.

Bringing together seventeen British and North American experts on the history of Hamburg for an assessment of their projects proved to be a stimulating intellectual experience. The publication of a conference volume is not intended, but three of the presentations on Hamburg’s contemporary history have appeared in the FZH-Bulletin “Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg 2007,” published in April 2008.

Christoph Strupp (FZH)
UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTS: NATURAL HAZARDS, RISK, AND INSURANCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In recent years, the history of natural hazards and natural catastrophes has become a flourishing area of research. To date, most studies have focused on questions of perception, interpretation, coping strategies, and institutional change triggered by such events. Thus far, however, extreme natural events and the disasters they bring about have usually been treated as singular events, analytically isolated from long-term perspectives. By looking at problems of risk and uncertainty, this conference laid special emphasis upon natural hazards as a perennial threat, and on ongoing processes of encountering, defining, and adapting to risk. A critical innovation in this respect has been the development of insurance schemes. By converting natural processes into statistical formulae, risk could be calculated and, at least theoretically, distributed over space and time.

Risk and uncertainty are both categories that can help us to understand how disasters and hazards have been perceived, classified, and managed over time. Uncertainty about environmental stability has compelled societies to develop strategies tailored to specific risks. Historically, national governments, social institutions, and local municipalities have sought ways to minimize the impact of future disasters. They have, for example, sponsored flood-control projects, introduced building codes for disaster-prone areas, developed emergency financial reserves, and devoted considerable funding and energy to programs designed to create
public trust and confidence in the face of potential disaster. Such programs have radically altered popular attitudes toward natural disasters. In fact, dam projects in hurricane-prone regions (such as New Orleans) and insurance programs (especially in the West) have shaped the development of many urban and rural areas. Above and beyond that, scientific and cultural discourses and the role that “natural” disasters played in them—whether seen as “freak events” or rationalized into (seemingly) predictable data—have defined and redefined social constructions of “uncertain,” “risky,” and “uncontrolled,” as well as “stable,” “livable,” or even “understandable” environments.

This conference took a comparative look at different “cultures of risk” across the globe. Most participants focused on the modern period, when the destructive potential of natural forces has reached new heights due to the steadily increasing entangling of the environment in the infrastructure of human activity.

In the first paper of the conference, Greg Bankoff highlighted the importance of social capital in coping with disaster. Looking at poor rural communities in the disaster-stricken Philippines over the past three centuries, Bankoff discovered a plethora of community organizations and networks that have functioned as a kind of social insurance in times of emergency. Although most often not explicitly founded to deal with the consequences of disaster, organizations such as rotating credit associations, cooperative societies or religious fraternities (cofradias) offered aid to members affected by floods, droughts, earthquakes, or other natural catastrophes. The frequent and intense exposure of many Filipinos to such hazards, Bankoff argued, has promoted community welfare and encouraged different forms of mutual assistance and reciprocal labor. Thus, it is not surprising that the most hazard-prone areas in the Philippines also had the largest number of mutual-aid associations.

A different “risk society” was described by Joanna Dyl in her paper on the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire. Dyl showed how nineteenth-century transformations of the urban environment promoted patterns of vulnerability that led directly to the loss of many lives and to the widespread destruction that followed the quake. Filling in coastal areas and waterways to create new land and constructing a high percentage of buildings out of wood, she pointed out, established the conditions for disaster. At the same time, Dyl emphasized the importance of contingency and warned of the dangers inherent in framing the histories of natural hazards and catastrophes as teleological narratives. How differently might the city of San Francisco have evolved, she asked, if the northern segment of the San Andreas Fault had remained inactive until earthquakes in other parts of California had prompted precautionary measures?
Two presenters addressed the important role of institutions in the history of disaster and risk management. Anne-Marie Granet-Abisset described the evolution of the “Pôle Grenoblois sur les Risques Naturels” (PGRN), a large research center in the French Alps devoted to the study of natural hazards. Founded in 1988 in a city that frequently experiences extreme natural events, the PGRN cooperates closely with local politicians, and has increasingly integrated social-science perspectives as well as cultural analyses into its activities. Marian Moser Jones, in her study of race and class disparities in nineteenth-century disaster relief, compared the relief efforts of the American Red Cross after the Johnstown flood in 1889 and after the Sea Islands Hurricane in South Carolina four years later. In Johnstown, Pennsylvania, over twenty million tons of water rushed down the Conemaugh Valley and into the city on May 31, after a vast earthen dam collapsed, causing the deaths of more than two thousand people. The Red Cross provided $39,000 in cash donations and $211,000 in supplies; it built temporary lodgings for more than a hundred families; and, among many other things, it furnished survivors with food, clothing, and shelter. In stark contrast to the aftermath of the Johnstown flood, the Sea Islands hurricane of 1893 received only scant coverage in national newspapers, which resulted in much smaller donations from the public, only $30,000. Of the more than six hundred people who died and approximately thirty thousand who were driven from their homes, the great majority were African Americans. The Red Cross reacted more slowly than it had four years before, and in many instances displayed paternalistic behavior toward the victims of this disaster. Still, it was the only relief organization to offer assistance in the devastated area, and it filled a vacuum created by the lack of governmental relief efforts.

Science, like institutions, had a major impact on the way societies dealt with environmental hazards and risks. Focusing on the discipline of seismology around 1900, Andrea Westermann illuminated the process by which tectonic activity was converted into a continuous seismic record by a global network of observers collecting, comparing, and interpreting data. For those immediately affected, however, earthquakes trigger a fundamental experience of uncertainty, as Alexander von Humboldt noted in this well-known passage: “When . . . we suddenly feel the ground move beneath us, a mysterious and natural force, with which we are previously unacquainted, is revealed to us as an active disturbance of stability. A moment destroys the illusion of a whole life. Our deceptive faith in the repose of nature vanishes.” Seismologists at the turn of the century took a totally different view of these events. By emphasizing the normal character of earthquakes, these experts dissociated them from their uncertain and catastrophic aspects. At the same time, instrument-
based seismology also served to turn hazards into risk, at least in particularly vulnerable regions such as California.

Even more challenging than predicting earthquakes is predicting the weather, as Jamie Pietruska demonstrated in her paper on the US Weather Bureau’s struggle with long-range weather prophets in the early twentieth century. Originally, the Weather Bureau shied away from long-term predictions since, in its reinvention of weather forecasting as a modern scientific practice, it deemed such undertakings a hallmark of meteorological amateurism, if not outright quackery. In addition, due to their alleged inaccuracy, the Bureau regarded long-range forecasts, especially those of extreme events such as storms, floods, or droughts, as a threat to agriculture, industry, and commerce. Long-range weather forecasters, on the other hand, constantly challenged the Weather Bureau—not only with their predictions but also with their methods. They employed planetary meteorology and periodicity as well as lunar phases. Furthermore, looking at the behavior and special conditions of animals was a central part of vernacular forecasting traditions. Cries of yellow-billed cuckoos, the coloring of caterpillars in late fall, or the shadow of the famous groundhog all served the weather prophets in making predictions. With the issuance of its own weekly forecast in 1908, however, the Weather Bureau accepted uncertainty as a key element of long-range weather forecasting.

Environmental risk can also be the unintended result of human intervention into nature, as Sam Temple explained in his paper on the Landes de Gascogne. Originally a moorland supporting a sparse, agropastoral society, the region was transformed into an engineered landscape by an intense program of pine forestation. The maritime pine not only yielded large profits, but also became an agent of change and modernization in an area that had formerly been regarded as a backward and unhealthy wasteland. The monocultural region was plagued, however, by recurrent and disastrous fires, and by the middle of the twentieth century, almost half of the forest had been destroyed, and with it the hopes for a better future.

Just as representations of the Landes as a wasteland served to justify state intervention and the massive forestation program, floods and droughts along the St. Francis River in Quebec during the first half of the twentieth century were used to legitimize river regulation, mostly for industrial purposes. Until then, as Stéphane Castonguay has shown, inhabitants of local towns and villages displayed a remarkable culture of risk. During times of flood, personal belongings were moved to the upper stories, merchants temporarily emptied their basements, and canoes were used to visit neighbors. Floods were a part of the identity of this riparian society, and local hydrological knowledge, while not foolproof, was rela-
tively reliable in predicting the next rise. With the construction of several
dams and flood walls to regulate the river flow and to protect commu-
nities from inundations, people ceased to be accustomed to floods. The
river was not only materially transformed, but also discursively recon-
structed as floods were no longer regarded as a normal part of the hy-
drological cycle and were viewed instead as catastrophic events. Vulner-
ability was literally built into the landscape.

Dams and the artificial landscapes they create can be seen as the
epitome of “uncertain environments.” The earthen or concrete walls de-
signed to dam a river signify the power inherent in natural processes as
well as their destructive potential. In her paper on the “Visible and Con-
cealed Spaces of the Aswan High Dam,” Elizabeth Bishop showed how
the level of risk to which laborers were exposed during construction of
the dam, especially the six tunnels that run through it, corresponded to
their gender as well as their citizenship status in postcolonial Egypt.

Dorothee Brantz described a different kind of modern vulnerability
in her paper on the unintended consequences of epizootics, i.e. the non-
human equivalent of epidemics. She looked at the risks and hazards
posed by livestock diseases in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France
and Germany, focusing on the history of Rinderpest (cattle plague), which
killed more than 200 million cattle in eighteenth-century Europe. Brantz
identified several human activities that contributed to the spread of the
disease, such as war, the transportation of cattle by rail, and the central-
ization of slaughter. She also highlighted different strategies of contain-
ment. Indemnities, for example, were paid to farmers in order to prevent
them from selling infected cattle or their hides and to accelerate the
rebuilding of healthy herds. Other strategies included disinfection, quar-
antine or cordon sanitaire, and vaccination as forms of biological insurance.
The most common method of containing the disease was, however, the
large-scale culling of both infected and healthy animals and the destruc-
tion of their cadavers. Despite all these measures, contagious livestock
diseases remained a hazard beyond human control. Brantz concluded
that the struggle against epizootics exemplifies the integration of risk into
modern society.

With the rapid growth of trade, industrialization, urbanization, and
globalization, modern societies were compelled to address the increas-
ingly complex financial implications of environmental hazards and di-
sasters. In France, a new understanding of risk evolved during the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. The old system of royal favors and
public charity in times of emergency that had favored the poorest parts of
the population was gradually supplanted by a scheme of compensation
based not on need but on actual losses sustained, as René Favier clearly
showed in his presentation.
The final five papers of the conference discussed insurance as an innovative device for distributing the risks of natural hazards over time and space. Guido Poliwoda outlined his research on financial mitigation of severe floods and winter storms over the twentieth century, focusing especially on Switzerland, Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia. While the Swiss succeeded in establishing a mandatory, government-subsidized insurance scheme that covered all types of hazards, most German attempts to create insurance against natural hazards failed. Victims of floods and storms must still rely on the state or private charity for relief and compensation. Frank Oberholzner traced the history of crop insurance in Germany, where insurance against agricultural catastrophes was uncommon before the nineteenth century. Lack of capital, religious constraints, and a dearth of precise data inhibited the development of crop insurance in the early modern era, but as Enlightenment ideas and attitudes gained ground, the perception of natural hazards changed. No longer regarded as divine retribution, thunderstorms, floods, and crop-destroying hailstorms were recognized as natural processes that were susceptible to human intervention. Furthermore, rapid population growth in Germany led to higher prices for agricultural land and products, making protective measures more desirable. Despite some early failures, crop insurance turned out to be a success. The value of insured crops rose from 215 million marks in 1844 to 3.5 billion marks in 1913. Crop insurance remains the most important protection farmers have against the vagaries of the weather.

In a co-authored paper, Eleanora Rohland and Franz Mauelshagen introduced a model to explain the transformation of risk between policyholders and insurers. Rohland and Mauelshagen distinguished between what they called “first-order,” “second-order,” and “third-order” risks of policyholders, insurers, and reinsurers. In the theoretical part of their paper, they argued that the term vulnerability, which has emerged as a key concept in the field of disaster studies, should also be applied to the insurance markets and industries, as these enterprises are in many ways equally vulnerable (in an economic and institutional sense) to disaster and natural hazards. In a case study that looked at fire insurance and reinsurance of Swedish cities, where the most common building material was wood, Eleanora Rohland discussed the material and cultural construction of fire hazards in Sweden. While urban fires were not as frequent as one might assume, the devastating fire that burned down large parts of Sundsvall and the simultaneous occurrence of a fire in the city of Umeå led to the renegotiation of insurance terms and, ultimately, to the redefinition of fire risk in Sweden in 1888. Furthermore, insurers and reinsurers exerted their influence by lobbying for the reconstruction of Sundsvall in stone rather than wood. In a second case study that looked
at the “unpredictability of hail” and the role of reinsurers in Switzerland, Franz Mauelshagen elaborated upon the important environmental, economic, and financial consequences of hail storms. His paper focused on how the Swiss Reinsurance Company adopted hail insurance largely as a concession to the fire insurance industry. Mauelshagen not only discussed expectations from peasants in different parts of Switzerland and the problems of establishing state versus private hail insurance; in reviewing the complicated negotiations between insurers and reinsurers, he also explored the critical role played by political and economic calculations as well as specific economic losses (following natural disasters) in reinsurers’ decision both to sign contracts with insurers and to terminate such agreements.

Finally, Pete Kakel presented a comparative study of the impact on the global insurance and reinsurance industries of two major catastrophic events: the San Francisco earthquake and fire in 1906 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Kakel observed that both of these events challenged existing perceptions of risk, generated new scientific research, and accelerated the development of enhanced insurance and risk-finance techniques. According to Kakel, these two disasters have served as catalysts for major changes in the global (re)insurance industry.

In the closing discussion, the two conveners, Uwe Lübken and Christof Mauch, offered some reflections on the cultural, social, and historical construction of risk. The massive human interventions into the environment that have accompanied the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and commercialization have also created new patterns of risk and vulnerability. With natural processes allegedly under control, an attitude of denial and of obliviousness toward natural hazards has become increasingly widespread over the course of the twentieth century. This is also an outcome of the important role that science has played and still plays in predicting extreme natural events, and thereby in redefining risk. Furthermore, the role of federal governments in sharing risks and in compensating for losses has steadily increased. Risk, hazards, and disasters, as well as our collective responses to these phenomena, have shaped our social institutions and determined our belief systems, and they will continue to do so as long as we inhabit a world of uncertain environments.

*Uwe Lübken (GHI) and Christof Mauch (University of Munich)*
PLEASURE, POWER, AND EVERYDAY LIFE UNDER NATIONAL SOCIALISM

Workshop held at the GHI Paris, September 13–14, 2007. Co-organized by the GHI Paris, the Institut d’histoire du temps présent (Paris), GHI Washington and GHI London, with support from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. Conveners: Fabrice d’Almeida (Institut d’histoire du temps présent), Corey Ross (University of Birmingham), Pamela Swett (McMaster University), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI). Participants: Elizabeth Harvey (University of Nottingham), Dagmar Herzog (CUNY Graduate Center), Jean-Luc Leleu (University of Caen), Chris Lorenz (University of Amsterdam), Patrick Major (University of Warwick), Stefan Martens (GHI Paris), Patrick Merziger (Free University, Berlin), Daniel Mühlenfeld (University of Jena), David Pan (University of California, Irvine), Werner Paravicini (GHI Paris), Martin Sabrow (Zentrum für Zeitgeschichte Forschung, Potsdam), Jonathan Wiesen (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale).

Is it odd that the Germans also enjoyed themselves during the Nazi period and the Second World War? Insofar as the dark sides of National Socialism have rightly stood in the foreground of research, this notion may seem somewhat disconcerting. Naturally, most contemporaries never even asked the question, since entertainment, fun, and pleasure were integral parts of everyday life in Germany as elsewhere. Social historical research has become more conscious of this over recent years, as evidenced in a plethora of studies on topics such as sport, film, radio, leisure time, tourism, sexuality, and smoking in the Third Reich. The focus of the conference “Pleasure, Power, and Everyday Life under National Socialism” was not so much the phenomenon of pleasure per se but rather the many interconnections between the aim of securing and stabilizing the Nazi regime, on the one hand, and the popular desire for entertainment and diversion on the other. The conference was therefore not intended only for historians, but instead sought to pursue an interdisciplinary approach of interest also to German Studies scholars as well as scholars of media and communications.

After a word of welcome from Stefan Martens, Corey Ross opened the conference on behalf of the organizers with an introduction that emphasized the importance of entertainment and pleasure as a source of social placation and stability in the twentieth century. Although the Nazis could not possibly exploit every cultural event and free-time activity for their own ends, entertainment and diversion were an extremely useful part of the wider strategy to maximize popular satisfaction with—and
thus also acceptance of—the regime. In this sense, large-scale sporting events, *Kraft durch Freude*-sponsored tourism, or popular feature films often promised greater political advantage than repressive measures or deliberate attempts at indoctrination.

The extent to which a desire for pleasure became a matter of concern for the National Socialist leadership was the subject of the first section of the conference. Daniel Mühlendfeld explored the ambiguous relationship between pleasure and a sense of duty. Using NSDAP members and functionaries as examples, he demonstrated how the early adherents to the movement in particular developed a diffuse and potentially pleasurable understanding of duty to the Fatherland. Yet even this feeling of responsibility and importance did not stop many party functionaries and *Blockleiter* from soon perceiving their activities as tiresome chores. As a result, beer-drenched evenings of reverie often served as compensation. Pleasure was not in itself a meaningful category in the self-understanding of the Nazi leadership, who idealized the Spartan figure of the “political soldier” instead. Stories of drunken excesses and the like thus undermined the image they sought to convey. Mühlendfeld singled out two self-reinforcing tendencies at work. While the boozed-up sociability was necessary to maintain enthusiasm for rendering service to the party, it simultaneously damaged the image of Nazi functionaries. News of such drunken antics greatly detracted from the popular reputation of the party, not least due to its constant claims to moral superiority over its opponents. In turn, this loss of prestige further undermined the attractiveness of working for the party.

In his commentary on the first section, Chris Lorenz first turned to the basic arguments of Thymian Bussemer’s paper on “Propaganda und Unterhaltung im Nationalsozialismus.” Bussemer, who unfortunately could not attend, showed how the propaganda specialists centered around Goebbels continually tried to deploy the culture of popular entertainment as an object of political persuasion. For instance, following the tactics of the Trojan horse, apparently “unpolitical” feature films were intended at the very least to minimize dissatisfaction and divert attention away from the problems of everyday life, and at best to encourage a positive identification with the political system. Bussemer confirmed the widely held thesis that there were no “unpolitical” films under National Socialism, but at the most films without manifest political content. The thesis of an active and selective audience was a matter of universal consensus in the broader discussion.

The second section, on the “Aesthetics of Pleasure,” investigated the realms of literature and photography. David Pan’s contribution on Nazi theater explained that despite the competition between Göring and Goebbels for pre-eminence in the Berlin theater scene, both men prioritized the
entertainment value of the theater over propagandistic intentions. Using Goethe’s *Faust* as an example, Pan endeavored to trace how the controlled production of theatrical “pleasure” was realized in practice. He argued that certain central themes of the play, in particular the “escapist” episode of the *Walpurgisnacht* in relation to the values conveyed by the Gretchen tragedy, fit effortlessly into the National Socialist worldview. Contrary to the widely held opinion that the Faust text was ideologically distorted for these productions, Pan emphasized rather the overarching effort to remain as faithful to the original text as possible. His argument, which led to lively debate, was that the willingness of the Nazis to use Goethe’s original text was a logical consequence of the aesthetic structure of *Faust* itself. Although Goethe opposes Nazi ideology in fundamental respects—as defender of an individualistic view of humankind at odds with the idea of self-sacrifice for the good of the collective—in the case of *Werther*, the audience reaction showed that it did not understand Goethe’s parody of sacrifice. In *Faust*, Gretchen embodies the ideal of self-sacrifice. The contemporary reception of *Faust* in this sense reflects the enthusiasm of the Nazis for the idea of a restless striving for “something higher.”

In the next paper, Elizabeth Harvey presented three female photographers who worked as travel reporters during the Nazi period. Special attention was devoted to the photographic essays of Liselotte Purper during the first half of the war. As Harvey argued, the mandatory membership in the *Reichsverband der deutschen Presse* helped make the illustrated reports of these women into a useful tool for underscoring the alleged normality and tolerance of the Third Reich in the lands it occupied. These reports were a symbol of the broader contradictions of Nazi cultural policy, in this case satisfying the curiosity and Wanderlust of readers while at the same time emphasizing their own cultural particularity. The thematic selection of the images and the way in which they were assembled led Harvey to the conclusion that these photographers were not merely purveyors of popular visual pleasure, but must also be seen as propagandists of the Third Reich.

The third section, on “Pleasure and Entertainment,” dealt with various forms of popular amusement in the Third Reich. In the first paper, Patrick Merziger explored the concept of “German Humor” in literature and other media of the period. Contrary to the conventional view that laughing was “lethal” under the totalitarian regime, he stressed the absolutely central role played by comical forms and genres in the popular media. Satire, for example, functioned—in stark contrast to the subversive criticism along the lines of Kurt Tucholsky—as a means of discrediting the opponents of state propaganda. Such genuinely popular comedy, whether initiated or supported by the state, is what Merziger means
by “German Humor,” which he sees as having been hitherto undervalued by researchers. Alongside radio, film, and television, he emphasized the popularity of “light” literature as a medium of communication. Here, too, “German Humor” was characterized above all by depictions of minor deviations from the norm that were not so serious as to exclude the individual completely from the collective. Whether Merziger’s description of the idealized “authentic German who leads his life with humor”, in contrast to the “earnest (Jewish) foreigner”, suffices as a definition for the concept of “German Humor” as a special form of German literature was questioned in the discussion by Martin Sabrow. Sabrow also suggested that the concept of “caricature” was more appropriate than “satire” when discussing state-sponsored publications.

Corey Ross then spoke about media-based entertainments during the war, focusing especially on their contradictory roles as a means of mobilization and distraction. He described how audiences streamed in record numbers into the cinema after the outbreak of the war to gain a vicarious experience of the fighting—up-to-date newsreel reports and (macabre) diversion in one, a potent amalgam of political mobilization and aesthetic appeal. Ross took the extraordinarily popular film Wunschkonzert (1940) as an example to illustrate how a romantic/dramatic plot was interwoven with contemporary events in order to suggest a convergence of individual and collective fate during the war. In this sense, the ideology of Volksgemeinschaft, though prioritizing collective over individual interests, could itself seek support through the promise of individual fulfillment. Popular music of the period similarly propounded a sometimes overbearing sense of optimism that, especially after the summer of 1941, sought to distract attention from the rising tide of suffering and doubts about the final victory. The importance of radio and film as a means of entertainment and escapism—rather than the mobilization function of the first half of the war—only increased with the closure of theaters and concert halls in the summer of 1944. Whereas Goebbels interpreted the continually high demand for film in early 1945 as evidence that the nation stood behind the leadership through thick and thin, other reports more accurately suggested that the seemingly hedonistic exploitation of every available source of pleasure reflected the attitude of living merely day-to-day. Thus the “infotainment” formula of the successful early war years was, for both producers and consumers, increasingly displaced by escapism.

Capping off the third section, Patrick Major considered what he views as the “love-hate” relationship between Hollywood and Nazi Germany. On one level, Nazi themes presented Hollywood with rich material for developing a combination of spy and gangster films with film noir, while on another level Hollywood itself made a strong distinction be-
tween “bad” members of the political and military elite and the “good” average German (a distinction that was kept after the war as well so as not to scare off the lucrative German market). In its Hollywood depiction, Nazi Germany was both a negative stereotype of “jackbooted nightmare” and a positive cliché of a pre-modern society, all of which reflected the views and escapist expectations of the Anglo-American audiences. It is thus worth emphasizing that wartime “escapism” and entertainment were primary goals of Hollywood as well as of Babelsberg, and that Hollywood producers were generally reluctant to jeopardize the entertainment value of their films in the interest of conveying certain political messages. The Office of War Information, which was present throughout Hollywood, was therefore only moderately successful. Major nonetheless emphasized that the US film industry, above all in its relation to Nazi Germany, was by no means “apolitical.” It was more a matter of producers wanting to decide for themselves how to combine entertainment with political messages rather than bowing to government guidelines.

In his commentary on this section, Richard Wetzell focused attention on the ideological intentions of National Socialist-controlled entertainment and their degree of success. Clearly, humor that was recognizably an attempt at political disciplining would exert little if any popular attraction. Yet an interesting question is whether there were nonetheless certain indirect disciplining effects at work. Could one, for instance, interpret the officially invoked and—to all appearances—genuinely popular wish for a “jolly community” as a form of indirect support for the regime and its policies?

In the fourth section, on the theme of “Sex under National Socialism,” Dagmar Herzog began by reminding the audience that the sexual politics of the Third Reich do not fit readily into any available conceptual framework. However, she highlighted the potential usefulness of Herbert Marcuse’s “repressive desublimation” theory, and she lauded Marcuse’s early recognition that the Nazi obsession with race would inevitably require a reorganization of sexual practices. Herzog went on to list four ways in which sexuality was important to the regime, pointedly rejecting the previous consensus that the sexual politics of the Third Reich were unambiguously repressive. She argued that trends toward sexual liberation, in combination with the undoubtedly repressive treatment of certain practices, contributed to the attractiveness of National Socialism. In the ensuing discussion, participants debated whether the concept of “liberalization” can fruitfully be applied to Nazi Germany, not least its sexual and reproductive policies.

Pamela Swett’s paper connected to this theme by exploring the relationship between the state, industry, and the sex lives of consumers through the example of a popular male impotence remedy (Titus-Perlen)
invented by the famous Jewish sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld. The coming of the Third Reich forced Hirschfeld to flee from Germany, and the company quickly reworked its ad campaigns to fit the new market. If the happiness of the married couple served as the central marketing strategy during the Weimar Republic, after the Nazi takeover, the focus shifted more and more to the pleasure of the man alone, whose sexual fulfillment was central to an overall sense of youthful vigor and spiritual contentment. At first glance, downplaying the language of sexual success for the married couple can be seen as a result of the era’s sexual conservatism. However, Swett argued instead that the ads reflect the Nazi period’s glorification of the male body and its emphasis on the necessity of sex beyond the bounds of marriage and procreation.

The sex lives of SS soldiers in occupied Western Europe was the subject of the paper by Jean-Luc Leleu. According to Leleu, the SS leadership asserted its authority to control the sex lives of its soldiers on two grounds: first, as a means of limiting sexually transmitted diseases and raising the “Aryan” birth rate, and second, as a system of rewards and penalties designed to guarantee the unconditional obedience of the troops. The suggestion put forward in the discussion that extensive or rapacious sexual activity on the part of soldiers may in some way have helped overcome the inhibition to kill was flatly rejected by Leleu on the basis of the evidence at his disposal. In his view, a far more convincing and important cause for unbridled violence was the excessive consumption of alcohol, which indeed was deliberately encouraged.

“Private Pleasure versus Public Utility” was the theme of the final section, which Jonathan Wiesen opened with an analysis of the rich material of the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK). The GfK was established in 1935 by leading representatives of industry who, like their counterparts elsewhere, wanted to gain better insight into consumer behavior. The reports of the GfK experts on customer wishes thus showed little evidence of tailoring their findings to ideological concerns. Rather, the dominant image of the consumer that emerged was one who simply sought the fulfillment of individual desires with little regard for political matters or priorities. For instance, in spite of the massive anti-smoking campaigns of the Nazis, cigarette sales peaked around the end of the 1930s. Perhaps precisely because of the domestic and international political tensions, many Germans increasingly reached for their cigarettes as a means of relaxation and diversion. Overall, the GfK reports vividly demonstrate the limits of ideological control over popular desires. The analyses of consumer researchers reveal instead the tensions between power and pleasure in the Third Reich, between Nazi ideas and reality. The continuing evolution of consumer behavior and expectations could not be halted in the Third Reich any more than elsewhere, and thus
closely paralleled contemporary developments in other advanced industrial societies.

In the second paper of this section Fabrice d’Almeida investigated the role of luxury goods in the Third Reich and the various meanings they possessed for their users. He argued that luxuries were considered legitimate in National Socialist ideology only as long as they benefited the Aryan race. An important means by which leading Nazis defined themselves as the elites of the new regime was indeed by publicly exhibiting their luxuries. Yet the luxuries enjoyed by the upper crust of Nazi Germany were not always seen in a positive light. Hitler had already condemned the inappropriate display of wealth in Mein Kampf, viewing it as a primary cause of social conflict. Insofar as Nazi elites demanded or at least expected to possess luxury goods, this meant that other groups, above all Jews, would inevitably be excluded from having them. After 1933, one’s Aryan racial credentials played an increasingly important role in determining one’s access to high-quality and expensive products. After the outbreak of the war, more and more Germans profited from the systematic plundering of the occupied territories.

In his commentary on the final section, Stefan Martens emphasized how much the image of National Socialism had changed in recent research. The old black-and-white stereotypes are increasingly being displaced by studies of everyday life and cultural practices that, like Wiesen’s investigation of consumer behavior, paint a much more nuanced and colorful picture, in which the seeming “normality” of life under the Nazis finds its place. The key for future research was, in his view, to outline what characteristics were specific to Nazi Germany. In response to d’Almeida’s paper, he also suggested an important distinction between private luxury, which most Germans disapproved of, and state-sponsored pomp, which was broadly accepted. Thus, whereas the corruption of Nazi officials was vigorously criticized and indeed punished, Göring’s ostentatiously luxurious lifestyle was largely accepted—and cynically presented—as a part of his various official roles.

Finally, in his summary of the conference as a whole, Martin Sabrow began by posing the question of what the various contributions said about the current state of research on National Socialism. In the course of two days, it had become clear that many of the questions we are now asking revolve around everyday life and reflect the currency of cultural history approaches, thus moving beyond the old paradigm of the demonic NS state. Looking back, one might single out the appearance of Hans-Ulrich Thamer’s book Verführung und Gewalt (1986) as the beginning of a gradual move away from the “special path” thesis of the 1970s and 1980s. We have become more and more adept at spotting societal trends that are largely independent of, or at least by no means reducible
to, certain political systems. Everyday “normality” has moved more and more into focus. The conference further demonstrated the advantages of adopting everyday-life approaches that allow us to view German society under the Nazis as more than just a “special case,” and thus help us more easily integrate it into transnational patterns and developments. The case of “pleasure” as an analytical category highlights the ambiguities and overlaps involved: In the relationship between pleasure and power, it served first and foremost the cause of entertainment and diversion, yet could also be harnessed by the regime as a means of mobilization. Sabrow therefore called for a more precise set of concepts in order to unravel the many complexities involved. “Pleasure” (Vergnügen) does not commonly appear in the sources of the period and is difficult to define with sufficient clarity. As a result, one runs the danger of unwittingly transposing present-day horizons of thought on to the period of National Socialism.

Stefan Becker, Stephanie De Felice, Philipp Hertzog (GHI Paris)
Translated and edited by Corey Ross and Pamela Swett
A Humanitarian as Broad as the World: Abraham Lincoln’s Legacy in International Context

Conference at the GHI, October 4–6, 2007. Endorsed by the Abraham Lincoln Bicentennial Commission. Conveners: Gabor Boritt (Gettysburg College), Uwe Lübken (GHI), Jörg Nagler (University of Jena). Participants: Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh (Indiana University), Akwasi B. Assensoh (Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi), Bettina Hofmann (University of Wuppertal), Prafulla Kar (Centre for Contemporary Theory, Baroda), Michael C. Kimmage (Catholic University), Tanis Lovercheck-Saunders (Valley City State University), Thomas D. Matijasic (Big Sandy Community and Technical College), Patricia Moral (Buenos Aires), William Pederson (Louisiana State University), Jacques Portes (University of Paris VIII Saint Denis), Leslie Rowland (University of Maryland), Matthew Specter (George Mason University), Amrit Tandon (Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi), Hans L. Trefousse (Brooklyn College), Hasan Al Zayed (East West University, Dhaka).

Abraham Lincoln is a world-renowned figure whose political legacy continues to exert a powerful influence to this day. Protesters against injustice have echoed his famous definition of democracy—“government of the people, by the people, for the people”—around the world: in Hungary in 1956, Tehran in 1979, and Tiananmen Square in 1989. Despite his tremendous stature, little research has been done on international perceptions of Lincoln. This conference therefore focused on the global reception of Lincoln as a politician, thinker, and moral exemplar.

In his opening remarks, Jörg Nagler emphasized that the discussion would concentrate not on Lincoln as a historical figure, but rather on individual and collective perceptions of him. Because such perceptions are deeply rooted in the history and culture of the respective community, they can tell us a lot about those who generated them. The specific interrelations between image, object, and interest of the perceiving subject, be it an individual or a group, thus become of primary interest. At the same time, the image of Abraham Lincoln is inseparable from the political and historical culture that produced it, as Nagler pointed out. In other words, when analyzing international perceptions of Lincoln, we are simultaneously analyzing and interpreting US history and culture. Nagler then suggested some topics that participants might address: How, why,
and in what historical contexts have Lincoln’s notions of political equality inspired reformist and revolutionary leaders in disparate societies worldwide? What significance should we attach to the fact that his international reputation began to grow sharply after 1945—that is, just as former European colonies were asserting their independence? Did Lincoln’s legacy influence or even hasten the decolonization process? How have the image and iconography of Lincoln been used to advance human rights in Africa, South and Central America, and elsewhere? Has this self-made man and martyred president been perceived as a representative of a single nation or system of government or as a champion of universal human rights?

Yvette Alex-Assensoh outlined the ambiguous character of Lincoln’s attitude toward African Americans. Although the “Great Emancipator” argued that all men were created equal, Lincoln also held that there could never be equality between black and white people. Before he issued the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln had enforced the fugitive slave laws and even advocated colonization and deportation schemes. His image, as Alex-Assensoh showed, has changed significantly over the decades and is still under debate. One important and largely overlooked influence on Lincoln’s view of African Americans was his legal experience, in particular his reverence for the law, his firm belief that the most important court to which he appealed as president was the court of opinion, and his conviction that compromise was preferable to litigation. She concluded that despite these contradictions, Lincoln’s example has served as a beacon for countries around the world in coping with ethnic and racial conflicts or internal strife.

Hans Trefousse discussed Lincoln’s stance toward German-American immigrants and his keen interest in mobilizing this ethnic group for the Republican Party. Lincoln enjoyed a close relationship with the German-American ethnic leadership, including some of the exiled leaders of the failed revolution of 1848/49, the so-called Forty-Eighters. During the presidential campaign of 1860, Lincoln secretly purchased a German-American newspaper in Illinois in the hope of influencing German-American public opinion in his home state. During the Civil War, the more radical German-Americans became critical of Lincoln’s military policies, disappointed by his failure to emancipate the slaves as soon as Fort Sumter fell to the Confederate troops. Trefousse then explored how Lincoln supported the recruiting of German-American troops, and how, by commissioning German-Americans as high-ranking officers in the Union Army, he was able to attract the “German vote” to the Republican Party. Trefousse concluded by briefly describing the reaction in Germany to Lincoln’s assassination, an event that evoked strong expressions of grief for the slain president, who was perceived as a symbol of freedom.
Bettina Hofmann traced Lincoln’s status as an icon of the German labor movement back to Karl Marx. In a letter written in 1864 to congratulate Lincoln on his reelection on behalf of the International Working Men’s Association, Marx called this American president “the single-minded Son of the Working Class” and expressed his belief that the outcome of the war would initiate a new social order. For Marx, the Civil War was basically a clash between two incompatible economic systems, driven by either wage labor or slave labor. Thus, he interpreted American slavery mostly in European terms of class struggle. The publication of Marx’s letter by Wilhelm Liebknecht in the Sozialdemokrat laid the foundation for widespread admiration of Lincoln, not only among the intellectuals of the party elite, but also among the rank and file of the German labor movement. While acknowledging that the image of Lincoln may have served other functions in different corners of the world, Hofmann concluded that within the German socialist community, he was revered as a leader who advanced the cause of the workingman and thus improved the lot of mankind.

By contrast, as Jacques Portes explained, in France, Lincoln was and still is an obscure figure, overshadowed by both grand events and more popular American presidents like George Washington, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and, most of all, John F. Kennedy. Focusing on representations of Lincoln in French magazines and daily papers, Portes demonstrated how, in French public opinion, the American president appeared indecisive at the beginning of the Civil War. Only with the Emancipation Proclamation could French Republicans applaud him, but they were still unable to grasp the profound significance of the event. French conservatives, on the other hand, were appalled by Lincoln’s radical act. Portes concluded that a public more accustomed to tyrants than to democratic statesmen was unable to recognize the depth of Lincoln’s character or the breadth of his political vision.

In a paper titled “Lincoln Transfigured: Gandhi and the Politics of Compassion,” Prafulla Kar showed how Lincoln’s experiment with ethical politics at a critical juncture of American history became a benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of similar attempts by reformers in other countries. He also addressed the methodological question of how to map a legacy. This is especially important when dealing with Lincoln’s influence on Gandhi, since the latter barely mentions Lincoln in his writings. Drawing on F. R. Leavis’s concept of “The Great Tradition,” Walter Benjamin’s work on translation, and Harold Bloom’s notion of an “anxiety of influence,” Kar asserted a conceptual relationship between Gandhi and Lincoln that transcended the historicity of their struggles and the local conditions that determined their actions. Kar pointed out that both
Lincoln and Gandhi believed in the cultivation of restraint, both cherished the value of rational debate, and both were pragmatists in politics, although a strong sense of religiosity and faith in a “higher law” are apparent in Lincoln’s as well as Gandhi’s biography. In the end, each died in pursuit of his ideals.

Unlike Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru—the architect of modern India and one of the most prominent representatives of the new spirit of Asia in the postwar world—made frequent references to Lincoln in his writings and speeches. As Amrit Tandon noted in his contribution, Nehru even owned a bronze cast of Lincoln’s right hand that had been presented to him by Arthur E. Morgan in 1949. Lincoln was a natural role model and influence for Nehru, since both statesmen were confronted with secessionist movements that threatened the very survival of their respective union.

Hasan Al Zayed described Lincoln’s image as a champion of human rights and democratic values not only in India, but throughout Asia. Asian leaders often quoted him to improve their own credibility, whereas people across the continent invoked Lincoln’s speeches on democracy and justice to protest the lack of freedom in their own countries. Asian perceptions of Lincoln are, however, complexly intertwined with attitudes toward the West, international politics, the flow of capital, and the processes of knowledge production, as Al Zayed explained. Thus it was possible for the Tamils in Southern India to regard Lincoln as “one of the Mahatmas of the world” and for Gandhi and Nehru to pursue Lincolnian ideals even as Lincoln’s achievements also found admirers among autocrats and dictators. Politicians of communist China, for example, repeatedly invoked Lincoln’s legacy to ward off accusations of human-rights violations in Tibet and to justify Peking’s policy toward Taiwan. In the same vein, admiration for Lincoln shown by Indonesian president Sukarno and Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf is restricted to personal veneration while they ignore the implications of Lincoln’s political philosophy. Those Asian leaders who claim Lincoln as their inspiration, Al Zayed concluded, have often quoted his speeches in order to shore up their own political agendas while pursuing policies that contradict his ideals. Lincoln’s influence on leadership was also the topic of Akwasi B. Assensoh’s paper. Focusing on Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah, one of Africa’s best-known leaders and a leading proponent of both Pan-Africanism and the Non-Aligned movement of the 1960s, Assensoh examined Lincolnian elements of forgiveness, reconciliation, and healing in African politics in the twentieth century.

In his paper “Lincoln, Democracy, and the Founders of Czechoslovakia,” Thomas Matijasic explained how during World War I, Czech leader Thomas Masaryk drew inspiration from Lincoln and how he used
his knowledge of Lincoln’s legacy to tie the cause of Czech independence to the larger American vision of making the world safe for democracy. Tanis Lovercheck-Saunders presented a comparative analysis of the “Great Emancipator” Abraham Lincoln and the “Tsar Liberator” Alexander II. Both leaders sought to ease the suffering of millions, and both were in the end assassinated for their efforts. Alexander II, although he freed twenty million serfs, has rarely received the credit he deserves for this accomplishment. The tsar himself claimed that, in giving them land as well as personal liberty, he had done more for the Russian serfs than Lincoln had done for the slaves, since the American president had not provided them with the material means of subsistence. Russians, however, were particularly impressed by Lincoln’s humility—in both positive and negative senses. While Imperial Russian diplomats regarded it as a weakness, Soviet-era historians like A. V. Efimov or Robert Fedorovich Ivanov saw it as an asset. The latter, in his 1976 book American History and the Black Question, offers a remarkably balanced and critical account of the Civil War and especially of Lincoln’s failures and achievements. Tolstoy, too, was impressed by Lincoln, whom he referred to as “Christ in miniature.” The Russian writer held that Lincoln, though neither a great general nor a skillful statesman, derived tremendous power from his moral authority and his unique character. To him, Lincoln was “a humanitarian as broad as the world.”

Two papers dealt with Abraham Lincoln’s influence in Latin America. Patricia Moral traced Lincoln’s influence on education in Argentina by analyzing three different schools named for him, and William D. Pederson claimed that no region of the world outside the United States has been more influenced by Lincoln’s political legacy than Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. This is especially surprising when one recalls that Mexico lost half its territory to the United States during the Mexican American War (1846–1848). Lincoln, however, is remembered by many Mexicans as an opponent of that conflict. Pederson called attention in particular to how Lincoln has been memorialized in, for example, a thirteen-foot statue by sculptor Angel Tarrac in the Mexican border town of Juarez; stamps issued by the Federal Government of Honduras; and public spaces named for Lincoln, such as a sugar refinery in Cuba or avenues in El Salvador and the Dominican Republic.

Perhaps Lincoln’s legacy throughout the world can best be described as heterogeneous. Paradoxically, he became a model for those who wanted to preserve the unity of a state as well as for those who sought to throw off the yoke of empire. His humble origins made him appealing to the working class, but also raised doubts about his ability to lead a nation in crisis. Portraits, busts, and photographs of Lincoln have decorated the
offices of numerous politicians, many of them democrats and liberators, such as Willy Brandt, José Marti, or Thomas Masaryk. Others, like Fulgencio Batista or Fidel Castro, were of a more dictatorial nature. In most cases, however, the invocation of Lincoln’s legacy has provided inspiration for freedom movements, reformers, and all those who seek to preserve human rights.

_Uwe Lübken (GHI)_
The fifth meeting of the Medieval History Seminar took place in Washington DC on October 11–14, 2007. It was the first tri-national seminar of its kind, organized jointly by the GHI Washington and the GHI London. Following an opening lecture by Dame Janet L. Nelson on periodization in medieval history and the need to question the notion of a divide around 1200, eight German, five American, and three British doctoral candidates and recent Ph.D.’s discussed their papers together with faculty mentors Michael Borgolte, Frank Rexroth, Patrick J. Geary, Dame Janet Nelson, Barbara H. Rosenwein, and Miri Rubin. Just as in the preceding seminars, proposals from all areas of medieval studies were considered. The presented projects covered a broad range of thematic perspectives, methodological approaches, and periods of medieval history. Since the participants’ papers had been distributed beforehand, the eight panels could be fully devoted to discussion. Each panel featured two papers, introduced not by the authors themselves, but by two of their fellow students acting as commentators. The papers provided fascinating insights into current research in medieval history in Germany, Britain, and North America, and the discussion benefited greatly from the enthusiasm and expertise of all involved.

The opening panel started with a presentation of Matthias Heiduk’s dissertation “Offene Geheimnisse—Hermetische Texte und verborgenes Wissen in der mittelalterlichen Rezeption von Augustinus bis Albertus Magnus.” Heiduk argued that the widespread reception of “Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum” points to the fact that Christian medieval writers adopted Hermes Trismegistus as an authority without difficulty. Taking his observations as a starting point, the panel discussed the use and spread of alchemical literature in the Middle Ages in general, that is, in a period where the importance of alchemical knowledge and practice is not as obvious as it was from the Renaissance onward. Niklas Konzen’s dissertation focuses on the feud between Hans von Rechberg and Swabian imperial cities (Reichsstädte) in order to research the development of territorial peace (Landfriedensrecht) in a society that lacked a state monopoly.
on the legitimate use of force. Taking his considerations as a starting point, the panel discussed the opportunities and limits of modern sociological thought on statehood and the monopoly of violence for an analysis of political violence in the Middle Ages.

The second panel began with a discussion of Dana Polanichka’s dissertation, which situates Carolingian church consecration in its physical and societal contexts. Examining liturgical texts, she revealed the centrality of ideas of sacred space to church dedications. She questioned how the lay audience participated in, understood, and was affected by church dedications, arguing that even though the laypeople were neither present nor active participants during most of the liturgy, they nevertheless fulfilled important roles in ecclesiastical social and religious transformations. After that, Eric Knibbs presented his textual analysis of pallium donations purportedly issued by the popes Gregory IV (in 832) and Nicholas I (in 864) for the missionary Anskar, archbishop of Hamburg-Bremen. Whereas scholars have long debated the authenticity of these texts, Knibbs maintained that they are later forgeries, drafted by Anskar’s successors in the tenth or eleventh century, to replace originals that had been lost or were somehow inconvenient.

In the third panel, Sita Steckel presented her work on the 1148 heresy trial of French theologian Gilbert von Poitiers and its context from the perspective of the history of science. Comparing the practical use of theological thought in debates on heresy in France and the Staufer Empire in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Steckel finds new ways to deal with the rise of scientific thought in the High Middle Ages. Erin Heidkamp’s dissertation deals with the charters of Altenberg Abbey—a Cistercian monastery located in the Lower Rhine region—to construct a regional history of the abbey for the period 1400–1539. Its charters reveal that over the course of this period, the number of leases of Altenberg’s long-held urban dwellings in Cologne declined, while the number of rural farm and farmland leases increased or remained steady. Using this observation as a starting point, Heidkamp explores various themes as factors that influenced Altenberg’s fiscal management during this time, including Cistercian reform, the decline of viticulture, and the increasing demand for fisheries.

In the fourth panel, Shirin Fozi presented her work on Quedlingburg. Although textual sources claim that Henry I, patriarch of the Ottonian dynasty, was buried in Saint Servatius, no material evidence of the king’s body has been found. Fozi discussed the implications of the king’s absent body in light of other funerary monuments made for Saint Servatius in the tenth through twelfth centuries. Hendrik Mäkler’s dissertation concerns the introduction of gold coins in the reign of Ludwig the Bavarian (1314–1347). This introduction gave Ludwig the opportunity to present
his rule in particularly representative imprints. These utilized the double eagle coat of arms for the first time in conflict with the papacy. Moreover, Mäkler argued that this use of coins clearly reflects the fact that development in northern Europe had begun to catch up with development in the south.

In the fifth panel, Courtney Kneupper considered a fourteenth-century prophecy preached by the leader of a little-known heretical group: the crypto-flagellants of Thuringia. She offered a detailed examination of the prophecy and, more generally, of the eschatological beliefs of the crypto-flagellants, exploring the context from which the heretics drew their unique vision. Finally, she reflected upon the role of this eschatological vision in inspiring the heretics’ beliefs and actions. Erik Spindler presented a detailed case study of a judicial incident in 1406 involving a Hanseatic captain in Flanders and a study of apprenticeship in London that was drawn largely from court records. He argued that “marginality” describes social relations—specifically weak and imbalanced ones. Mobility is integral to urban society and to the people and circumstances discussed herein.

In the sixth panel, Hannah Wheeler examined how tavern violence was enacted, understood, and represented in late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century Paris and Picardy. She argued that violence in the taverns of Picardy self-consciously developed a semiotics of excess that responded to the perceived disequilibrium of a rapidly developing commercialism. Tavern violence in Paris, on the other hand, nihilistically commented on the futility of life by eliminating meaning from its gestures. She shows the tavern to be a place of violent commentary on day-to-day life. Hiram Kümpfer studies the ways in which old German law in the period from 1250 to 1600 dealt with sexuality. His paper focused on the connection between sexuality and violence and the construction of masculinity.

In the seventh panel, Erik Niblaeus’s study on the cathedral of Lund was discussed. A survey of the earliest manuscripts preserved from the cathedral of Lund, founded in 1060 and seat of the archbishop of Denmark in the Middle Ages, reveals a number of connections with German centers, often in the southwest, indicating that the cathedral from early on actively interacted with other young foundations at the forefront of continental European Christianity. After that, the panel discussed two chapters from Juliane Schiel’s dissertation, comparing the view of two Dominican monks on the Mongolian invasion and the fall of Constantinople. Analyzing the letters of Philippus and Julian between the contradictory contexts of semantics and social practice reveals that the fraternal order was a transcultural hybrid whose members were adaptable border crossers, not only when dealing with the cultural Other, but also within their.
own culture: They constantly transgressed status boundaries, for example.

In the eighth panel, Katharina Behrens presented her work on medieval shame. Taking the ubiquity of shame in English source texts of the Late Middle Ages as her point of departure, Behrens examines the contemporary modes of thought and their expression in social practices and institutions. Using chronicles of the peasant revolts of 1381 as an example, she demonstrates how talk of shame and dishonor were used to underscore class differences. Silke Schwandt examines *virtus* as a central term of political ethics. She focuses on the development of concepts of *virtus* in medieval society and the limits of legitimate power that become visible in the different uses of the term, contending that developments in the use of the term mirror developments in the social and political reality of society.

The final discussion focused on differences and similarities between medieval study and scholarship in Germany, Britain, and the United States. Moreover, the present status of the discipline in the different university systems was compared. Finally, participants discussed the possibility and limits of, as well as the need for, medieval history to produce studies that contribute to current political debates.

The sixth Medieval History Seminar for German, British, and American doctoral students and recent Ph.D. recipients will take place at the German Historical Institute in London in October 2009. If you are interested in participating, please visit the web site of the GHI Washington for further information.

Carola Dietze (GHI)

Participants and Their Topics

KATHARINA BEHRENS (University of Göttingen), *Scham, Schande, Schamhaftigkeit: Zum sozialen Gebrauch der Rede von der Scham im ricardischen England*

SHIRIN FOZI (Harvard University), *The King’s Missing Body and Ottonian Funerary Representation*

ERIN HEIDKAMP (University of Connecticut), *Cistercian “Localism”: A Regional History of Altenberg Abbey, 1400–1550*

MATTHIAS HEIDUK (University of Freiburg), *Offene Geheimnisse—Hermetische Texte und verborgenes Wissen in der mittelalterlichen Rezeption von Augustinus bis Albertus Magnus*

COURTNEY KNEUPPER (Northwestern University), “You Have Kept the Good Wine Until Now”: The Crypto-Flagellants of Thuringia and their Narrative of the Last Days
ERIC KNIBBS (Yale University), *The Pallium Grants of Gregory IV and Nicholas I for Anskar*

NIKLAS KONZEN (University of Tübingen), *Straßenraub oder exekutiertes Recht? Gesetz und Gewalt in Hans von Rechbergs Fehde gegen den Schwäbischen Städtetum, 1451–57*

HIRAM KÜMPER (University of Bochum), *Sexualität, Mann-Sein und Recht im spätmittelalterlichen Deutschland, ca. 1250–1600*

HENDRIK MÄKLER (University of Kiel), *Visualisierung und Verdichtung des Reiches: Das Reichsmünzwesen in der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern*

ERIK NIBLAEUS (King’s College, London), *German Influence on the Cathedral of Lund in its First Century of Existence (1060–1164)*

DANA POLANICHKA (University of California, Los Angeles), *Transforming Space, (Per)forming Community: Church Consecration in Carolingian Europe*

JULIANE SCHIEL (Humboldt University, Berlin), “*Die Mongolen kommen!*” Zwei dominikanische Deutungsversuche aus dem Jahr 1237 im Vergleich

SILKE SCHWANDT (University of Bielefeld), *Et omni virtute praestantior: Zur Sprache der politischen Ethik in Fürstenspiegeln von der Spätantike bis ins Hochmittelalter*

ERIK SPINDLER (Oxford University), *Mobility and Marginality in Late Medieval Bruges and London*

SITA STECKEL (University of Münster), *Gefährliches Wissen: Gilbert von Poitiers und scholastische Theologie im Blick deutscher Gelehrter des 12. Jahrhunderts*

HANNAH WHEELER (Oxford University), “*Oés comme il fierent grans caus!*” *Tavern Violence in Thirteenth- and Early Fourteenth-Century Paris and Picardy*
PRACTICES AND POWER IN THE EVERYDAY LIFE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF ALF LÜDTKE

Symposium at the University of Michigan, November 9–10, 2007. Conveners: Kathleen Canning (University of Michigan), Geoff Eley (University of Michigan). Sponsored by the GHI, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and the following institutions at the University of Michigan: the Eisenberg Institute for Historical Studies, the Departments of History and Germanic Literatures and Languages, the Center for European Studies and the Center for Russian and East European Studies, the Frankel Center for Judaic Studies, the International Institute, Rackham Graduate School, the College of Literature, Science and the Arts, and the Office of the Vice-President for Research.

Participants: Manuela Achilles (University of Virginia), Anne Berg (University of Michigan), Andrew Bergerson (University of Missouri), David Willliam Cohen (University of Michigan), David Crew (University of Texas), Carola Dietze (GHI), Peter Fritzsche (University of Illinois), Maureen Healy (Oregon State University), Heiki Lempa (Moravian College), Harry Liebersohn (University of Illinois), Peter Loewenberg (UCLA), Alf Lüdtke (University of Erfurt), Marti Lybeck (Texas A&M University, Corpus Christi), Jan Palmowski (Kings College, London), Katherine Pence (Baruch College), Roberta Pergher (University of Michigan), Helmut Puff (University of Michigan), Annemarie Sammartino (Oberlin College), Gerald Sider (CUNY Graduate Center), Scott Spector (University of Michigan), Paul Steege (Villanova University), Ulrike Weckel (European University Florence/University of Michigan), Alice Weinreb (University of Michigan), Dorothee Wierling (Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte, Hamburg).

This symposium was organized to coincide with Alf Lüdtke’s visiting professorship at the University of Michigan during October and November 2007 and in advance of his retirement in 2008. It aimed to take stock of his extraordinary contributions to the field of modern German history, to the practices of historical anthropology, and to the still-flourishing study of the history of everyday life, both in and beyond the field of modern German history. The symposium explored the methodological and conceptual issues that have made everyday life history so influential among historians and scholars across fields and disciplines. Participants included faculty and Ph.D. candidates from Michigan and from several other institutions in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The panels were organized around the keywords and concepts that featured most prominently in Alf Lüdtke’s scholarship: Eigensinn,
everyday life, Herrschaft, physical violence, states of exception, and visualizing history.

The symposium not only honored Alf Lüdtke, who participated in conversations at every panel, but it also stimulated significant methodological discussion about the history of everyday life, the ability to situate it in conventional and unconventional source materials, and the kinds of historical writing it has inspired. In addition, the symposium sought to sustain and reaffirm the rich scholarly exchange between American universities (in this case the University of Michigan and the University of Chicago) and the former Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte in Göttingen and the University of Erfurt. Alf Lüdtke’s visiting professorships at both institutions in the 1990s and his generous hosting of graduate students and faculty from both institutions at Göttingen and Erfurt are exemplary of this exchange.

The opening panel of the conference featured Kathleen Canning, David Crew, David William Cohen, and Geoff Eley, whose contributions both reflected on their long-term intellectual collaborations with Alf Lüdtke and aimed to introduce younger generations of scholars, including many graduate students and scholars from other fields, to his most influential contributions to everyday life history, historical anthropology, and visual history. Canning reflected on the concept of Eigensinn, which has remained a sharpening stone for subsequent generations of historians who continue to contemplate the issues of agency and subjectivity that remained unsettled in the wake of the “linguistic turn.” Cohen, historian and anthropologist of Africa, explored Lüdtke’s placement of itineraries of experience at the center of the project of historical anthropology. Eley’s contribution emphasized Alf Lüdtke’s place in the politics of knowledge in German history, tracing the genealogies of Alltagsgeschichte in the theory of needs and also noting its significance in laying the groundwork for a history of emotions. David Crew took stock of Alf Lüdtke’s important contributions to visual history, particularly his study of photography in the history of the twentieth century as presented in the co-edited volume, Die DDR im Bild: Zum Gebrauch der Photographie im anderen deutschen Staat (2004) and the expansion of the term Eigensinn to encompass visual Eigensinn.

tions of Power” analyzed the links between local everydayness and broader global or transnational contexts that underpin her study of coffee consumption in twentieth-century Germany. Gerald Sider’s paper, “Anthropology, History, and the Problem of Everyday Life,” examined the place of power, violence, and everyday life in his study of the economies of race and labor in Maxton, North Carolina. As commentator on this panel, Alf Lüdtkke suggested that we expand the term “field” to include “archive,” and posed questions that probed the relationship between the routinized and the spectacular in everyday life.

Friday afternoon’s closing panel, on “Eigensinn, Selfhood and Subjectivity,” included papers by Andrew Bergerson, Marti Lybeck, and Jan Palmowski. Bergerson’s co-authored analysis of “The German Sisyphus” posited an alternative understanding of Eigensinn as a notion of modern selfhood that crucially involves self-deception and ironic enactment, especially in the context of remembering the Nazi past. Marti Lybeck’s paper, “Sex Talk: Power and Honor among Women Civil Servants in Weimar Germany,” explored the realm of informal communication, particularly sexual gossip, as it shaped honor, exertion of power, and subjectivities in the gendered workplace. Jan Palmowski’s paper on “Power and Community in the GDR: Eigen-Sinn and Private Transcript,” took the example of citizens’ agency vis-à-vis the state in the Mecklenburg town of Dabel in order to probe the private transcripts fashioned in the course of individual and local actions and the ways in which they constituted power. Eve Rosenhaft’s comment compared and contrasted the different notions of Eigensinn at play in the three papers, noting the shared interest of the panelists in the terms of selfhood and subjectivity and the consensus that Eigensinn, refigured in terms of performance, does not always encompass subversion.

The topic of Saturday morning’s panel, “Violence, Temporality, and Transformations of the Everyday,” was taken up by Manuela Achilles, Peter Loewenberg, and Scott Spector. Achilles’s paper, “Power, Violence, and the State in Weimar Germany,” probed the explosive emotions unleashed by nationalist murders, both on the part of pro-republican citizens and on that of the state in response to the “masses.” Loewenberg’s paper, “9–10 November in Modern German History: Anniversary Reversal and Undoing,” not only addressed the significance of this anniversary in German history, but also the agency that underpinned the events of November 9, 1938, Reichskristallnacht, in particular. Spector’s contribution, “Against ‘Assimilation.’ Lived German Jewishness 1867–1938,” offered insightful methodological reflection on the categories of identity and subjectivity among German Jews amidst the politics of assimilation, with specific reference to case studies of Gershom Scholem and Jakob Wassermann. Although Michael Geyer was unable to attend the confer-
ence due to illness, his paper, “Die eigensinnigen Toten,” which examined the revival of a funeral culture and funerary rituals surrounding Americans killed in the Iraq war, was included in the discussion. David Crew’s comment on this panel noted the papers’ shared interest in the politics of emotion, interiority, and subjectivity and their embeddedness in violence (or threats of violence).

On Saturday afternoon, the participants turned their attention to an analysis of the “Everyday under States of Exception.” Ph.D.-candidate Anne Berg’s paper, “Nazi Hegemony, Film, and Everyday Life in Hamburg,” probed the usefulness of everyday life history to her ongoing study of cinema in Hamburg during the Second World War, in which the relationship between the everyday and the exceptional were central. In his paper, “Weimar as Text: Franz Goell’s Autobiographies,” Peter Fritzsche offered compelling insights into the fragmented and fractured self of “graphomaniac” Franz Goell, whose everyday life was recorded in three genres of autobiographical texts: the diary, household account books, and a memoir. Heikki Lempa’s analysis of “Dietetics as Political Autonomy” noted the importance of dietetics in shaping notions of Lebensordnung among the German educated middle classes from 1790–1890, but also suggested that dietetics fostered its own eigensinnig understandings of bodily autonomy. The state of exception analyzed in Roberta Pergher’s paper was that of Italian fascism and the Eigensinn of settlers who sought to extend Italian rule to its borderlands and colonies, and in so doing sidestepped, ignored, or circumvented many of the state’s rules and expectations. Ulrike Weckel compared and contrasted the different sites of Eigensinn reflected in this panel, ranging from the middle-class body to the cinema in wartime to settler cultures in fascist Italy and the diaries of a meticulous observer of both politics and the self in Weimar Germany.

The last set of presentations on Saturday afternoon explored “Power, Policing, and the Everyday” in realms “beyond the state.” Annemarie Sammartino’s paper, “Taking Marzahn Seriously: Reflections on Community in the Plattenbau,” pursued the possibilities for and obstacles to everyday experiences of community among residents of Marzahn’s Plattenbauen in the former GDR. Ph.D.-candidate Alice Weinreb’s paper, “The Powers of Hunger: The Role of the ‘Hunger Years’ in Negotiating Past and Future in Germany, 1945–49,” explicated the conflicted meanings of hunger in the years of reconstruction and analyzed how the framework of collective hunger informed notions of community, nation, and the everyday into the 1950s. In a paper entitled “Looking for Russian Murderers in Berlin,” Paul Steege presented the results of “an ordinary criminal case” from December 1941, analyzing the testimony of German witnesses for their perceptions of foreign laborers and Russian POWs as a means to
probe the differences between *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*, between ordinary and extraordinary violence amidst war. Dorothee Wierling approached the question of Russians in Germany from a different angle in her paper, “Germans from Russia—Russians in Germany.” She assessed their “double existence” of both belonging and being “other,” and compared the experiences of different generations of Russian immigrants on the basis of oral interviews. Andrew Bergerson’s comments took stock of the individual and collective claims to victimhood, whether of postwar hunger, impersonal housing projects, conscripted foreign workers, or ethnic German immigrants from Russia, noting also the importance of space, distance, and movement/migrations in the papers for this panel.

The closing session of the conference offered an opportunity for the participants to reflect on the recurrent themes of our discussion, including the possibilities and limits of *Alltagsgeschichte*: If everyday perspectives shape many different histories now, how subversive or creative is it today? How has everyday life history reinforced or helped to dissolve the boundaries between and among social, cultural and political history? In the face of an increasingly transnational field, can *Alltagsgeschichte* be conceived as a transnational inquiry despite its close attention to specific empirical settings? How do the fragmented and fractured stories of everyday life change the kinds of narratives historians compose? Do they provide mere details or compel a rewriting of our narratives? What is the relationship between key concepts of *Alltagsgeschichte* and the history of emotions or the notions of subjectivity and agency? We hope to have the chance to pursue these questions and others at a follow-up conference, which would take place in Europe in 2008, with an eye to the publication of a volume of essays.

The symposium also prompted the creation of an inventive and attractive website (http://eihs-online.net/luedtke), which provided an overview of Alf Lüdtke’s intellectual biography and served as a gateway to the conference papers and other information for participants. Thanks to the design skills of Ph.D.-candidate Peter Lawless, the website also now serves as an archive for the symposium, which will be particularly useful in the event of a follow-up conference and/or the compilation of a volume of essays on the basis of these conference papers.

On a sad note, the symposium was marked by the death of Daphne Berdahl, anthropologist of Germany from the University of Minnesota and close colleague and friend of Alf and Helga Lüdtke and many other symposium participants. Daphne had been part of the symposium since its inception and corresponded with us about it until weeks before her death of cancer on October 5, 2007.

*Kathleen Canning (University of Michigan)*
TERRORISM IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA: NEW RESEARCH AND SOURCES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

Workshop at Tulane University, November 14, 2007. Co-organized by the GHI and the Murphy Institute of Political Economy at Tulane University. Conveners: Anke Hilbrenner (University of Bonn), Frithjof Benjamin Schenk (University of Munich), Carola Dietze (GHI). Participants: Sally Boniece (Frostburg State University), Oleg Budnickij (Institute for Russian History, Moscow), Anna Geifman (Harvard University), Samuel C. Ramer (Tulane University), Claudia Verhoeven (George Mason University/EUI Florence).

This workshop brought scholars to Tulane University to share information concerning current trends in the study of pre-revolutionary Russian terrorism, archival holdings of particular importance to students of such terrorism, and ideas about the most fruitful directions in which study of such pre-revolutionary Russian terrorism might proceed.

The workshop opened with Oleg Budnickij’s paper on the archival and published sources on the history of Russian terrorism. Budnickij pointed out that the most important documentary sources for the “first wave” of Russian terrorism in the 1870s and 1880s are accessible in published form. But there is a significant body of materials for the “second wave” of such terrorism (the first decade of the twentieth century) that must still be sought in archives. Budnickij provided a detailed review of the Moscow archival holdings that he has found most useful, together with sage advice on locating terror-related materials, whose archival descriptions rarely include the term “terror.” Anke Hilbrenner concluded this opening session with an overview of the materials on the Russian terrorist movement contained in the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. Her paper, which placed particular emphasis on holdings indispensable when writing the history of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, included a brief but fascinating history of how these materials had been assembled and preserved during the first half of the twentieth century.

The second morning session turned to recent research on pre-revolutionary Russian terrorism. Drawing upon the work she has done on Dmitry Karakozov’s failed attempt to assassinate Alexander II in 1866, Claudia Verhoeven illustrated some of the ways in which she had chosen to focus upon a “material history” of terrorism. Her exploration of popular and commercial responses to Karakozov’s assassination attempt...
suggested how such responses to terror can be an important lens through which to examine popular attitudes and beliefs.

In her paper “Maria Spiridonova: The Terrorist, Terrorized,” Sally Boniece drew attention to the pitfalls inherent in the very use of the word “terror,” so frequently called upon to describe political movements that differ in significant ways. The subject of her study, the Socialist Revolutionary Maria Spiridonova, provides an example of the varied contexts of “terror.” Spiridonova was active in the pre-revolutionary terrorist movement, murdering police inspector G. N. Luzhenovsky in 1906. During the Russian Revolution of 1917, as a leader of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, she engaged in the plot to assassinate Count Mirbach, the German ambassador to Soviet Russia, as a protest against the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Eventually, like many other political opponents of the Bolsheviks, she herself became a victim of state terror.

Afternoon sessions offered further examples of current research. Drawing upon her published studies of terror in Russia, Anna Geifman emphasized the enormous scope that Russian terror assumed during the first decade of the twentieth century. She cites a figure of 17,000 victims of terror in the course of the decade. Tsarist statistics on victims do not distinguish between killed and wounded, but regardless of the distribution, this figure suggests a degree of political violence that is stunning by any measure (and insufficiently appreciated in most studies of Russian revolutionary politics). In its techniques and its goal of political intimidation, Geifman argued, this Russian terrorist movement constitutes the birthplace of modern terrorism worldwide.

In a second paper, Carola Dietze presented the broad outlines of her book project on political assassination and public discourse in Europe and the United States. Dietze’s work places central emphasis upon the relationship between modern terrorist movements and the media through which they hope to communicate their message. The emergence of a mass public and popular press in the late nineteenth century provided terrorists with the possibility of influencing public opinion in a fashion previously unprecedented.

Papers in the workshop’s concluding session explored the importance that terrorists attached to the places they chose for attacks. Anke Hilbrenner’s paper focused on terrorism as a “language of the streets.” She pointed out that much of the literature on Russian terrorism emphasizes the huge boulevards of the capitals. What remains to be explored, she argued, are the narrow streets of towns on Russia’s periphery, where there was also significant terrorist activity. (Her own paper focused on the importance of political terror in the south of Russia). Frithjof Benjamin Schenk’s paper on railroads and terrorism focused on the various attractions that railroads presented to terrorists, whether as sites for attack or
means of communication. The railroad, he argued, was obviously a vital tool in the tsarist regime’s efforts to knit the empire together and promote economic development. But it was also an arena in which terrorists chose to confront the tsarist regime, and for which the regime had to devise some means of defense.

At the workshop’s conclusion, participants reflected upon the most promising directions in which the study of pre-revolutionary Russian terrorism might develop. The relationship between terror and “modernity” struck all participants as a particularly fruitful avenue of inquiry. Many of the developments of the late nineteenth century—the railroad, the telegraph, increased literacy, and a burgeoning popular press—greatly enhanced terrorists’ capacity to communicate their message to a broader public and to conduct a political war with the tsarist regime. Popular consciousness of a growing disparity between Russian institutions and practices, on the one hand, and the emergence of a modernity more attuned to the rights and dignity of individual citizens, on the other, created an environment in which terrorists could count upon a certain degree of popular (if passive) sympathy.

While participants were wary of exaggerating the similarities between pre-revolutionary Russian terrorism and the events of our own day, there was nevertheless a sense within the workshop that the very dilemmas of our own time might also serve scholars well, making them sensitive to aspects of terrorism that earlier scholars have either overlooked or dismissed as marginal. Conversely, participants shared a modest sense that the study of terrorism in pre-revolutionary Russia might yield useful insights into the broader roots of terrorism as well as the ways in which it might be effectively combated, including ways of opposing terrorism that have been proven ineffective.

Samuel C. Ramer (Tulane University)
Sixteenth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI and Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize

Symposium at the GHI, November 16, 2007. Conveners: David Blackbourn (Vice-Chairman, Friends of the GHI) and Anke Ortlepp (GHI). Participants: Monica Black (Furman University), Winson Chu (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee), Sabine Höhler (GHI).

The Friends of the German Historical Institute convened in Washington on November 16, 2007, for their sixteenth annual symposium, chaired by David Blackbourn. The morning session featured the awarding of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize, which has been awarded for eight years for the two best dissertations in German history at a North American university. The morning began with a moment of silence in memory of Gerald D. Feldman, the chairman of the Friends of the GHI, who passed away late last year. This year’s prizes were awarded to Monica Black, who earned her doctorate at the University of Virginia under the supervision of Alon Confino, for her dissertation “The Meaning of Death and the Making of Three Berlins: A History, 1933–1961,” and to Winson Chu, who earned his doctorate at the University of California at Berkeley under the supervision of John Connelly, for his dissertation “German Political Organizations and Regional Particularisms in Interwar Poland (1918–1939).” Fritz Stern attended the award ceremony and gave a comment. The Prize Committee was composed of Norman J. W. Goda (Ohio University), Astrid M. Eckert (Emory University), and George S. Williamson (University of Alabama). Articles by the two prize winners that offer overviews of their dissertations can be found in the “Stern Prize” section of this Bulletin.

The committee’s citation for Monica Black read: “In a sophisticated cultural history Monica Black has written herself into the historiography of death and burial. She has wrested the topic from graveyard enthusiasts and placed it squarely into twentieth-century German history. Black shows that ways of remembering the dead in Berlin under the Nazis and then under divided communist and democratic rule defined how Berliners viewed themselves as Germans and how, by negative example, they defined others less civilized than they, from slave laborers to those on the other side of the Cold War divide. Black’s sources are broad and include every conceivable archive in Berlin down to Kreisarchive and Bezirksamter as well as obscure pamphlets and journals. By reconceiving death and the representation of the dead, Dr. Black shows how Berliners displayed changing values across three political systems.”
The committee’s citation for Winson Chu read: “Winson Chu has written a new and innovative political history of the German minority in Poland. His theoretical argument is that the very conception of a national minority is misleading, still carrying the mark of interwar völkisch thought. By studying German communities from Poznan to the Ukraine, Chu shows that the minority had its own internal hierarchy, that it was riddled with infighting, and that it held differing agendas concerning Germanness on the one hand and reactions to the Polish state on the other. National cohesion within the minority was problematic from the start, and contrary to common belief, Germans in Poland never became a more unified minority during the interwar years. Instead they grew more regionally distinct. Through the use of fifteen archives in Germany and Poland and through broad rethinking of key concepts from ‘nation’ to ‘region,’ Chu has written a history that reveals the limits of national solidarity as well as these terms themselves.”

In the afternoon, Sabine Höhler, Visiting Research Fellow in Environmental History, delivered a lecture titled “‘Spaceship Earth’: Envisioning Human Habitats in the Environmental Age,” which is printed in this issue of the Bulletin.

Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)
FELLOWS SEMINARS, FALL 2007

The GHI’s Fellows Seminars are a forum in which fellowship recipients and other visiting scholars present their research to the Research Fellows of the institute and interested scholars from local academic institutions. They are organized by the Deputy Director. The GHI awards doctoral and postdoctoral fellowships for the duration of one to six months. These fellowships are designed for doctoral candidates and postdoctoral scholars whose research deals with one of the following fields: German history, the history of German-American relations, the role of Germany and the United States in international relations, and American history. For the application process, see the “Announcements” section of this Bulletin.

September 20  Nora Kreuzenbeck, Universität Erfurt  
“Die Stellung der Haitianischen Revolution im Diskurs des amerikanischen Südens, 1791–1865”

Doreen Eschinger, Humboldt Universität  
“Jüdische Heimat nach dem Holocaust in Ungarn”

October 25  Katharina Hering, George Mason University  
“Family Histories of Producers; Producing Family Histories: The History of Pennsylvania German Genealogical Research between 1891 and Today”

Enrico Heitzer, ZZF Potsdam  
“Terror für die Freiheit? Die Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit 1948 bis 1959”

David Motadel, Cambridge University  
“Muslime in Deutschland 1918–1945”

November 29  John Trygve Has-Ellison, University of Texas, Dallas  
“Janus-faced Modernism: Nobles and the Fine Arts in Jahrhundertwende Germany 1890–1914”

Martin Lütke, Universität Gießen  
“Cars, Color-Line, and Crossing-Over: Motown, Race, and the Body during the 1960s”
DOCTORAL AND POSTDOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as postdoctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the role of Germany and the United States in international relations. The fellowships are also available to German doctoral students and postdoctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the field of American history. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon source materials located in the United States.

The GHI will not provide funding for preliminary research, manuscript composition, or manuscript revision. It will give clear priority to postdoctoral projects designed for the “second book.” The monthly stipend is approximately €1,600 for doctoral students and €2,800 for postdoctoral scholars. In addition, fellowship recipients based in Germany will receive reimbursement for their roundtrip airfare to the US. All fellowship recipients are required to present the results of their research at the GHI during their grant period.

The next deadlines for applications are May 20 and October 15, 2008. Applications (two copies) should include cover letter, curriculum vitae, transcripts of academic degrees, project description (3,000 words), research schedule for the fellowship period, and at least one letter of reference. While applicants may write in either English or German, we recommend that they use the language in which they are most proficient. They will be notified about the outcome within approximately two months after the deadline. Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute
Doctoral/Postdoctoral Fellowships
1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20009–2562
POSTDOC-STIPENDIUM FÜR NORDAMERIKANISCHE GESCHICHTE


GHI INTERNSHIPS

The GHI Internship Program gives German and American graduates and graduate students of history, political science, and library studies an opportunity to gain experience at a scholarly research institute. Interns assist with individual research projects, work for the library, take part in the preparation and hosting of conferences, and help with our publications. They receive a small stipend. The program is very flexible: The GHI tries to accommodate the interns’ interests, abilities, and goals. A two-month minimum stay is required; a three-month stay is preferred. German students are strongly advised to familiarize themselves with the American visa requirements beforehand. The process of obtaining a visa has become complicated and expensive. Information is available at the web site of the American Embassy in Berlin at www.usembassy.de. The GHI cooperates with an organization authorized by the State Department to issue the relevant papers to obtain a visa. Applicants accepted into the internship program will receive further information on the procedure in their acceptance letters. Applications should contain a cover letter, a CV, a letter of recommendation, and transcripts (proof of BA degree) or, for Germans, copies of Zwischenprüfungs- or Abschlusszeugnis. You may apply either in English or German. For further information please contact Dr. Uta Andrea Balbier (balbier@ghi-dc.org).
NEWS

NEW PUBLICATIONS

1. GHI Reference Guides

2. Bulletin Supplements

3. Transatlantische Historische Studien (Franz Steiner Verlag)
Johannes Dillinger, *Die politische Repräsentation der Landbevölkerung in Neuengland und Europa in der Frühen Neuzeit* (THS, vol. 34; Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008)

4. Other Publications Supported by the GHI

LIBRARY REPORT

We are happy to announce the acquisition of the series *Handbuch der historischen Buchbestände in Deutschland, Handbuch der historischen Buchbestände in Österreich* and *Handbük deutscher historischer Buchbestände in Europa* on CD-Rom. The Handbücher are directories of collections of material printed or published between 1450 and 1900. It comprises publications from the German-speaking countries as well as German-language
publications printed in other European countries. It includes books, periodicals, newspapers, music, maps, and ephemera. Furthermore, we were able to acquire sixteen films (on DVD) produced by the East German film studio DEFA. This collection comprises East German classics like The Gleiwitz Case, Jacob the Liar, and Naked among Wolves. Other important additions to our collection are the works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (in thirty-six volumes) and the two encyclopedias Europe 1789 to 1914 and Europe since 1914, edited by John Merriman and Jay Winter.

We would like to express our gratitude to the following people and institutions that donated books to the GHI library: David Binder, Cambridge University Press, Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg, Claudia Haupt, Peter Horwarth, Dirk Hoerder, Goethe-Institut Chicago, Thomas F. Johnson, Joachim Kaiser, David Lazar, Corinna Unger, Peer Volkmann, Volkswagen AG Historische Kommunikation.

RECIPIENTS OF GHI FELLOWSHIPS

Doctoral Fellowships


MELANIE HENNE, Universität Erfurt, “Doing sports and ‘Whiteness’: Zur Selbstwahrnehmung von ImmigrantInnen in Chicago, 1921–1945”


ESTHER KRUG, Universität Augsburg, “Die Operational History (German) Section and ihre Nachfolger: Die deutsch-amerikanischen Militärkontakte im Spannungsfeld von Kriegserinnerung, Geschichtspolitik und strategischer Planung im Kalten Krieg 1945–1961”
Derek R. Mallett, Texas A&M University, “Hitler’s Generals in America: US Policy toward High-Ranking Prisoners of War”

Carlos A. Meissner, University of York, UK, “A Resilient Elite: German Costa Ricans and the Second World War”

Christoph Rosol, Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, “Angewandte Voraussicht: Zur frühen Geschichte der numerischen Klimamodellierung in den USA”

Stefan Scholl, Universität Bielefeld, “Grenzziehungen des Politischen im transatlantischen Diskurs der Ökonomen (1880–1980er Jahre)”

Andrea Wiegeshoff, Philipps-Universität Marburg, “Die Internationalisierung internationaler Eliten: Gruppenbiographische Studien zum diplomatischen Korps der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945/49–1969”

Recipients of GHI Internships

The GHI was again fortunate to have a number of excellent interns who made valuable contributions to our work. The interns conducted research in libraries and archives, helped prepare and run conferences, assisted editors, librarians, and administrators, and cheerfully performed all other tasks that came their way. For their excellent work we would like to thank Oliver Mallick (University of Rostock) and Ruben Marc Hackler (Humboldt University Berlin).

Staff Changes

Philipp Gassert, Deputy Director, joined the Institute in January 2008. He studied history, economics, and public law at the universities of Heidelberg, Angers (France) and the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. He received his Ph.D. in Modern History from the University of Heidelberg in 1996 and his Habilitation from Heidelberg in 2004. Philipp Gassert was a GHI Research Fellow from 1994 to 1999 and afterwards served as Assistant and Associate Professor of History at the University of Heidelberg, a position from which he is currently on leave. He is one of the founders of the Heidelberg Center for American Studies (HCA) and served as its first Managing Director. In 2005/06, he was Visiting Professor of American Cultural History at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich, and from 2006 until December 2007 he was DAAD Visiting Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania. His research interests include
EVENTS

LECTURE SERIES, SPRING 2008

AFRICAN AMERICANS AND GERMANS: HISTORICAL ENCOUNTERS

March 13  Of Border States and Leeches: Ottilie Assing and the Douglasses
Maria Diedrich (Universität Münster)

April 17  Black Germans, Photography, and the “Evidence” of History
Tina Campt (Duke University)

April 24  Booker T. Washington, Tuskegee Institute, and the German Empire: Race and Cotton in the Black Atlantic
Andrew Zimmerman (George Washington University)

May 8    “I Prefer Panthers to Pigs”: German Students, Black Panther GIs, and the 1970/71 Racial Crisis in the 7th Army
Maria Höhn (Vassar College)

May 22   Hitler’s Black Victims: Black Resistance and Oppression under Nazism
Clarence Lusane (American University)

All lectures are held at the German Historical Institute from 6 to 8 pm.
**Events Sponsored by the GHI in 2008**

For a regularly updated calendar of events, please check our web site at www.ghi-dc.org.

**January 25–27**  
*Transregional and Transnational Families*  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Gisela Mettele (GHI), David Sabean (UCLA), Christopher Johnson (Wayne State University), Francesca Trivellato (Yale University), Simon Teuscher (Universität Zürich)

**January 29**  
*Max Mohr: One Story, Two Tellings*  
Event at the Goethe Institute, Washington, DC

**January 30**  
*Celebrating 325 Years: German Migration to the United States*  
Event at the Union League—Lincoln Hall, Philadelphia

**February 21–23**  
*Managing the Unknown: Natural Resources and Reserves in History*  
Workshop at the GHI  
Conveners: Uwe Lübken (GHI), Frank Uekötter (Deutsches Museum München)

**March 28–29**  
*Modernization as a Global Project: American, Soviet, and European Approaches*  
Workshop at the GHI  
Conveners: Corinna Unger (GHI), David Engerman (Brandeis University)

**April 12**  
*Socialist Memories: Shaping Memory Culture and Historical Consciousness in the GDR*  
Mid-Atlantic German History Seminar, at the GHI  
Speaker: Jon Berndt Olsen (George Mason University)  
Convener: Peter Jelavich (Johns Hopkins University)

**May 2**  
*Perspectives on National Socialism and Global War: A Symposium in Honor of Gerhard L. Weinberg*  
Symposium at the GHI  
Conveners: Doris Bergen (University of Toronto), Philipp Gassert (GHI), Alan Steinweis (University of Nebraska)
May 14  
*One, Two, Three, Many 1968s?—Lessons and Legacies of the 1960s*  
Panel Discussion  
Panelists: Tom Hayden, Patty Lee Parmalee, Norman Birnbaum (Georgetown University)

May 15–17  
*Fire and Flammable Cities: Urban Environment and Culture in History*  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Uwe Lübken (GHI), Greg Bankoff (University of Hull), Jordan Sand (Georgetown University)

May 23–24  
*Public Eating, Public Drinking: Places of Consumption from Early Modern to Postmodern Times*  
Conference at the GHI  
Convener: Maren Möhring (GHI) and Marc Forster (Connecticut College)

May 28–31  
*Early Modern German History, 1500–1790*  
Fourteenth Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar, at the Free University, Berlin  
Conveners: Roger Chickering (Georgetown University), Claudia Ulbrich (FU Berlin), and Richard F. Wetzell (GHI)

May 30–31  
*Gender and the Long Postwar: Reconsiderations of the United States and the Two Germanys, 1945–1989*  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Karen Hagemann (University of North Carolina), Sonya Michel (University of Maryland), Corinna Unger (GHI)

June 5–7  
*Why Terrorists Stop: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Global Comparison*  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Alia Ayub (Hoover Institution, Stanford), Carola Dietze (GHI), Christof Mauch (University of Munich), Timothy J. Naftali (Hoover Institution, Stanford)

June 12–14  
*Civilizing Nature: National Parks in Transnational Historical Perspective*  
Conference at the GHI  
Conveners: Bernhard Gissibl (University of Mann-
heim, Germany), Sabine Höhler (GHI), Patrick Kupper (ETH Zürich, Switzerland)

June 16–27  Archival Summer Seminar in Germany
Convener: Corinna Unger (GHI)

September 11  Ninth Gerd Bucerius Lecture
Speaker: Jutta Limbach (President, Goethe Institut)

Fall 2008  Global Migration Systems of Domestic and Care Workers Conference
Conveners: Anke Ortlepp (GHI), Valerie Preston (York University), Wenona Giles (York University), Franca Iacovetta (University of Toronto)

September 25–27  Human Breeding for the Improvement of the Nations: Proto-Eugenic Thinking before Galton
Workshop at the GHI
Conveners: Maren Lorenz (GHI), Christoph Irmscher (Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana)

October 3  German Unification Symposium
Speaker: Marianne Birthler

October 9–11  Nature’s Accountability: Aggregation and Governmen
tality in the History of Sustainability
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Sabine Höhler (GHI), Rafael Ziegler (Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin, Germany)

October 23–26  Terrorism and Modernity: Global Perspectives on Po
ditical Violence in the Nineteenth Century
Conference at Tulane University, New Orleans, LA
Convener: Carola Dietze (GHI), Benedikt Stuchtey (GHI London), Claudia Verhoeven (George Mason University/EUI Florenz)

October 30—Nov. 1  A Whole New Game: Expanding the Boundaries of the History of Sports
Conference at the GHI
Conveners: Uta Balbier (GHI), Stefan Wiederkehr (GHI Warsaw)

November 13  Twenty-Second Annual Lecture of the GHI
Speaker: Margit Szöllösi-Janze (University of Cologne)
November 14  Seventeenth Annual Symposium of the Friends of the GHI and Award of the Fritz Stern Dissertation Prize

Conference at the University of Sheffield
Conveners: Kerstin Brückweh (GHI London), Dirk Schumann (Jacobs University Bremen), Richard F. Wetzell (GHI), Benjamin Ziemann (University of Sheffield)
GHI PUBLICATIONS

PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
PUBLISHED IN COLLABORATION WITH CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS


GHI STUDIES IN GERMAN HISTORY
PUBLISHED IN COLLABORATION WITH BERGAHN BOOKS


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GHI STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY
PUBLISHED IN COLLABORATION WITH ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS


TRANSATLANTISCHE HISTORISCHE STUDIEN
PUBLISHED IN COLLABORATION WITH FRANZ STEINER VERLAG, STUTTGART


BULLETIN OF THE GHI

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BULLETIN SUPPLEMENTS


3 (2006) From Heimat to Umwelt: New Perspectives on German Environmental History. Edited by Frank Zelko.


REFERENCE GUIDES

Please note: Nos. 1–7, 11, and 15 are out of print.


**ANNUAL LECTURE SERIES**

Series discontinued and out of print, but available online on the GHI web site. In 1997 the Annual Lecture was published as part of the *Occasional Papers* series. Since 1998 it is featured in the *Bulletin*.


**OCCASIONAL PAPERS**

Series discontinued and out of print, but available online on the GHI web site.


**CONFERENCE PAPERS ON THE WEB (at www.ghi-dc.org)**


No. 4 Remembering Hermann-Josef Rupieper. Symposium at the GHI, January 28, 2005.


**ADDITIONAL PUBLICATIONS SUPPORTED BY THE GHI**


Matthias Judt and Burghard Ciesla, eds., *Technology Transfer Out of Germany After 1945*. Amsterdam, 1996.


Detlef Junker, ed., with Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach, and David B. Morris,  


Peter Krüger and Paul W. Schröder, eds., in cooperation with Katja Wüstenbeck-er, “_The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848_”: _Episode or Model in Modern History?_ Münster/Hamburg/London, 2003


Alexander Nützenadel and Christoph Strupp, eds., _Taxation, State, and Civil Society in Germany and the United States from the 18th to the 20th Century._ Baden-Baden, 2007.
German Historical Institute
Fellows and Staff
(April 2008)

For further information, please consult our web site: www.ghi-dc.org

Prof. Dr. Hartmut Berghoff, Director
Modern social and economic history; history of consumerism and consumption
PD Dr. Philipp Gassert, Deputy Director
19th- and 20th-century international and transatlantic history; contemporary German and American history
Dr. Uwe Spiekermann, Deputy Director
Modern economic history; history of consumption; history of science and knowledge

Sabine Fix, Administrative Director

Dr. Uta Balbier, Research Fellow
American and German history since 1945; history of religion; history of sports; transnational history
Dr. Carola Dietze, Research Fellow
19th-century German and American history; history of the media and social radicalism; history of emigration and remigration; intellectual history; historiography
Bryan Hart, Research Associate
Kerstin Jager, Project Associate
Insa Kummer, Project Associate
David B. Lazar, Senior Editor
Dr. Uwe Lübken, Research Fellow
Environmental history; economic history; international relations
Dr. Kelly McWilliams, Project Manager
Expressionist painting, architecture, and dance; the garden city movement; architecture and politics
Dr. Anke Ortlepp, Research Fellow
19th- and 20th-century American social and cultural history; history of women and gender; ethnic history; history of space
Dr. Patricia Sutcliffe, Editor
Mary Tonkinson, Editor
Dr. Corinna R. Unter, Research Fellow
German and American history since 1945; history of anticommunism and the Cold War; history of science; intellectual and cultural history; historiography
Dr. Richard F. Wetsch, Research Fellow and Editor
Modern German history; intellectual and cultural history; legal history; history of science and medicine; history of sexuality

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Dr. Thomas L. Hughes, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Martin Klimke, Visiting Research Fellow
Dr. Robert Gerald Livingston, Senior Visiting Research Fellow
PD Dr. Maren Lorenz, Visiting Research Fellow

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